physics, and electronics to enable them to live an adventurous, exciting, and wondrous life, with unlimited opportunity for high-paid income?

THE PENKOVSKY PAPERS

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, a famous American who has long been intimately associated with efforts to combat the encroachments of communism in the United States has said that today's headlines remind us there has been no basic change in Communist imperialism and that the danger which world communism presents to the free nations has not abated, but, if anything, has increased.

And he has rhetorically stated the question, "Why is our free society inherently superior to communism?" and answered by pointing out that, among other vital principles, in our American society freedom of speech, the press, and assembly are protected not only in constitutional guarantees but in practice and that media of mass communication are free to praise or criticize without fear of Government control or governmental retaliation. By contrast, under communism, freedom of speech, the press, and assembly are permitted only to the extent that they support official policy, and media of mass communication—such as newspapers, magazines, radio, and television—are strictly controlled by the government.

Late in 1965, an event occurred in Soviet Russia which is a classic example of this cardinal Communist tenet—that freedom of the press is permitted only to the extent that it supports that nation's official policy and the privilege of serving as a member of the press in the U.S.S.R. is strictly controlled by that government. Any so-called violation—failure to support or cater to the party line—brings swift retaliation.

On November 25, 1965, the Soviet Union ordered the closing of the Moscow Bureau of the Washington, D.C., Post and the expulsion of that newspaper's correspondent, Mr. Stephen S. Rosenfeld, because of the publication by the Washington Post of portions of the Penkovsky papers. It is noteworthy that a number of other newspapers have published or reported in detail on the contents of those papers.

Believing firmly in the right of freedom of speech for all mankind, the right of the press, radio, and television to freely and objectively report news and facts to those interested in learning the facts, and the right of responsible men to express their views and opinions openly and without fear of retaliation, I wish to express strong personal censure of the punitive action by the U.S.S.R. against the free American press.

I wish to point out that the Post, in publishing the Penkovsky papers excerpts, reported fairly critiques which questioned the authenticity of the papers, or portions thereof, so that the reading public might have access to available facts and expressions of views both in support of and in opposition to the contents of the papers. Indeed, as recently as this past Sunday, January 9, the Parade—magazine section—of the Washington Post carried statements which critically appraised the contents of these papers.

I shall not attempt to evaluate the contents of the Penkovsky papers; however, I do wish strongly to affirm the right of American newspapers to publish openly and in an unbiased manner material which throws light on the political structure of one of the world's great powers, believing that wisdom in conduct of our national affairs arises from knowledge of governments, whether free or totalitarian in nature.

I do not personally always agree with editorial policies of various newspapers, but as a citizen of a free nation, I am proud to affirm that right of disagreement and the right to express it openly. I shall continue to defend to the fullest extent in my power the right of the American press to report fairly, objectively, and openly that which is newsworthy.

I desire to encourage those who direct our media of communications to continue to provide such material as reveals the world behind the Iron Curtain to the citizenry of the United States so that judgments may be openly derived based on the widest range of fact and opinion which can be made available. I believe that the entire episode of the publication of portions of the Penkovsky papers by the Washington Post, and the retaliatory action by the Soviet Russian Government, deserves national review.

Therefore, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the collections which I have amassed of Washington Post articles, editorials thereon, and pertinent material from other sources such as the New York Times.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington Post, Oct. 31, 1965]

WHEN WEST HAD A MAN IN KREMLIN—A RED WAR HERO PREPARED UNITED STATES FOR ITS CONFRONTATION WITH MR. K. ON CUBAN MISSILES

(By Frank Gibney)

On April 12, 1961, at an unobstrusive meeting in Moscow, a high Russian official quietly handed a double-wrapped, double-sealed envelope to an English acquaintance. He asked that it be given to "interested parties" in the West.

Later that same month, the Russian said, he would himself be in London. He wanted to talk to people in the West "to tell them what conditions in the Soviet Union are really like." The time was short, he said, and it was a critical time.

With this action, Col. Oleg Penkovsky, Russian war hero, senior officer in Soviet military intelligence, graduate of the Staff College and the Missile Academy, friend and confidant of Soviet marshals and generals, began his secret career as a volunteer spy for the West.

A SCIENTIFIC COVER

Greville Wynne, the British businessman to whom Penkovsky entrusted his message, knew Penkovsky only in his capacity as an official of the Soviet State Committee for Coordination of Scientific Research, the huge subministry in charge of all Soviet business and technical exchanges with foreigners. He had then little idea of Penkovsky's true function and the importance of his action to the West.

Penkovsky's work as deputy chief of the committee's foreign department was merely a cover for his function as a general staff intelligence officer. And as a former aide and confidant of the chief marshal of Soviet tactical missile forces, Marshal Sergei Varentsov, Penkovsky was privy to the most intimate details of high Russian military and political planning.

For the next 16 months, Penkovsky conducted the most amazing singlehanded campaign of espionage in modern history. He rocked Nikita Khrushchev's policy to its foundations. For 1961 and 1962, the 2 years in which Penkovsky worked for British and American intelligence, marked the freezing point of the cold war.

In June, 1961, Khrushchev risked war with his decision to force an Allied retreat in Berlin. In August, he put up the Berlin Wall. In September, 1961, he resumed nuclear testing, breaking agreements with the United States. His missile buildup of 1962 was climaxed in the Cuban confrontation with the United States, when Krushchev almost threw the world into total war.

Throughout this time, Penkovsky furnished the West with high-priority information on Soviet missile strength, Soviet nuclear capabilities and the Soviet plans for a localized shooting war in Germany. Ultimately, he was a key factor in our ability to identify so swiftly the configurations of Soviet missile installations on Cuban soil. He also prepared American intelligence for Khrushchev's decision to use them.

THREE LONDON VISITS

Three times Penkovsky made his way to London and Paris, ironically using his confidential Soviet intelligence assignments as a cover for his real espionage work with American and British officers. Three times he went back to Moscow to get further information for the West. In October, 1962 he was finally detected and arrested by the Soviet secret police, the State Security.

How badly he hurt Moscow's plans for an aggressive breakthrough against the West in those two critical years can be gathered from the public aftermath of his arrest; one chief marshal of the Soviet Union demoted and disgraced; the chief of Soviet military intelligence, Gen. Ivan Serov (the "Hangman of Hungary" in 1956) demoted; some 300 Soviet intelligence officers recalled to Moscow from their foreign posts.

Penkovsky had exposed them all. Soviet military intelligence has not yet recovered from the blow.

The recapitulation of matters covered in Penkovsky's Soviet indictment suggests the extent of his intelligence achievement: "Top secret information; documents of great value; of an economic, political and military nature; Soviet space secrets; material on Soviet troops in the German Democratic Republic; new Soviet war material; command personnel of the antiaircraft defenses; (material on) atomic energy, rocket technology and the exploratoin of outer space."

The trial of Colonel Penkovsky and his British contact, Greville Wynne, began in Moscow May 7, 1963, and lasted 4 days. It was carefully organized by the Soviet authorities.

Penkovsky and Wynne had been under interrogation in Lublanka Prison for 6 months preceding it. Both prisoners admitted their "guilt." Penkovsky apparently did so in an effort to secure decent treatment for his family.

Wynne was sentenced to a long prison term but was released in 1964 in exchange for the Soviet spy Konon Molody, who had been arrested by the British under the name of Gordon Lonsdale. Penkovsky was sentenced

to death. Soviet authorities said he was shot May 16, 1963.

Until now, Penkovsky's remarkable feat was a secret, locked in the intelligence files of three countries. The Penkovsky Papers, excerpts of which begin here today, were smuggled out to the West 2 years ago and translated by Peter Deriabin, himself an escaped Soviet state security officer.

The papers have never before appeared anywhere. They will be published in book form by Doubleday November 19.

The Penkovsky papers comprise a strange, arresting document—partly a day by day account of Penkovsky's personal struggle against the Soviet regime; partly a running fever chart of Khrushchev's drive for aggression in Berlin and Cuba. They were written at great personal risk while Penkovsky was living his double life as a secret agent for the West.

He wrote them because he was not content merely with transmitting his intelligence reports. Colonel Penkovsky was a single-minded zealot who hated the Khrushchev regime because he feared that Khrushchev was leading the world into a nuclear war. He wanted ordinary people in the West, not just intelligence officers, to hear his story and his reasons for breaking with a lifetime of service to the Soviet regime.

In a real sense of the word, for the brief 16 months in which he worked, Oleg Penkovsky was our man in the Kremlin. Without his guidance and information, Washington could not have acted in either Berlin or Cuba with the sureness it did.

Only by reading Penkovsky can Americans finally understand the pressures and tensions that were driving the Soviet leadership to risk war in 1961 and 1962, 2 years when the cold war almost became hot.

[From the Washington Post, Oct. 31, 1965]

WHY THE SOVIET COLONEL CHANGED HIS COLORS—THE PENKOVSKY PAPERS

(By Oleg Penkovsky)

My name is Oleg Vladimirovich Penkovsky. I was born April 23, 1919, in the Caucasus, in the city of Ordzhonikidze (formerly Vladikavkaz), in the family of a salaried worker; Russian by nationality, by profession an officer of military intelligence with the rank of colonel.

I have received higher education. I have been a member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union since March 1940, I am married; as dependents I have my wife, one daughter and my mother.

I have never been on trial for criminal or political offense. I have been awarded 13 government decorations (5 orders and 8 medals). I am a resident of the city of Moscow and live on Marxim Gorky Embankment, House No. 36, Apartment 59.

I am beginning the notes that follow to explain my thoughts about the system in which I live and my revolt against this system. I am fully aware of what I am setting out to do. I ask that you believe in my sincerity, in my dedication to the real struggle for peace.

I must write hurriedly, hoping that I will some day have the time to elaborate or explain. I am unable to do this all at once—or to write all I know and feel—for the simple physical lack of time and space.

When I write at home, I disturb my family's sleep (our apartment is only two rooms and typing is very noisy). During working hours, I am always busy, running like a madman between the visiting (foreign) delegations and military intelligence headquarters and the offices of my committee.

My evenings are generally occupied; it is part of my job. When I visit my friends in the country, it is worse. Someone may always ask what I am doing. Here at home, at least I have a hiding place in my desk. My family could not find it even if they knew. And they know nothing.

It is a lonely struggle. As I sit here in Moscow in my apartment and write down my thoughts and observations, I can only hope that the persons in whose hands they eventually fall will find them of interest and use them for the truth they say.

WHITE RUSSIAN PARENTAGE

I was born in the thick of the civil war, during which my father was lost. Mother told me that my father saw me for the first and last time when I was only 4 months old.

My father was a lieutenant in the white army. I learned this only recently. My father fought against the Soviets. I still do not think they know the whole truth about him. If the state security forces had known all along that he was in the white army (although I was only a few months old at the time), every door would have been closed to me: for an officer's career, for membership in the party and especially for the intelligence service.

Yet I began my life as a believer in the Soviet system. I was brought up in a Soviet environment and from the very first, when I went at 18 to the Second Kiev Artillery School, I wanted to be a commander in the Soviet Army.

During the war, I commanded a battalion. By the end of the war, I was a lieutenant colonel. After one action, Marshal Konev recommended me for the Military Staff College.

In 1945, I began the 3-year course at the Frunze Military Academy and in 1948 I pinned on my chest the diamond-shaped insigna of a Frunze graduate. At the end of 1949, I was transferred to the Military Diplomatic Academy, the training school for the military intelligence service.

I learned how to conduct military espionage and completed a 3-year course in the English language, which I mastered, I believe, fairly well. In September 1958, after serving as assistant military attaché in Turkey, I was sent to the Dzerbhinsky Military Engineering Academy to attend a 9-month academic course for the study of missile weapons.

DEEDS BELIED WORDS

It was during the struggles of World War II that I first became convinced that it was not the Communist Party which moved and inspired us all to walk the fighting road from Stalingrad to Berlin. There was something else behind us: Russia.

Even more than the war itself, my eyes were opened by my work with the higher authorities and general officers of the Soviet Army. I happened to marry a general's daughter and quickly found myself in a society of the Soviet upper class. I was one of the privileged.

But I soon realized that their praise of the party and communism was only in words. In their private lives, they lie, deceive, scheme against each other, intrigue, inform, cut each other's throats. In pursuit of more money and advancement for themselves, they become informants for the state security on their friends and fellow workers. Their children despise everything Soviet, watch only foreign movie films and look down on ordinary people.

Our communism, which we have been building for 45 years, is a fraud. I myself am a part of this fraud. Some disease or infection is gnawing and eating at our country from within.

The ideals that so many of our fathers and brothers died for have turned out to be nothing more than a bluff and a deceit. I know the army and there are many of us in the officer corps who feel the same way. But they are afraid to unite for action. So we all work separately. Each man here is alone.

GOVERNMENT OF ADVENTURERS

I associate with highly placed, important people: ministers and marshals, general and senior officers, members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. I praise our leaders, but inside me I wish them death.

Khrushchev's is a government of adventurers covering themselves with the banner of the struggle for peace. But Khrushchev has not renounced war. He is quite prepared to begin a war if circumstances turn favorable to him. This he must not be permitted to do.

In the past, our general staff and our foreign representatives condemned the concept of surprise attack such as Hitler used. Now they have come around to the viewpoint that there is great advantage to the side which makes a sudden massive attack first.

From what I have learned and what I have heard, I know now that the leaders of our Soviet state are the willing provocateurs of an atomic war. At one time or another they may lose their heads entirely and start an atomic war. See what Khrushchev is doing over Berlin?

In Moscow, I have lived a nuclear nightmare. I know the extent of their preparations. I know the poison of the new military doctrine as outlined in the top-secret special collection—the plan to strike first at any cost.

I know the design of the new missiles and their warheads. I am decribing them to my friends in the West. Imagine the horror of a 50-megaton bomb with an explosive force almost twice what one expects. The people of Moscow congratulated themselves on this.

USING THE PEACELOVERS

The Soviet leaders know that the Western world, and especially the Americans, do not wish an atomic war. They try to use the Western desire for peace to their own advantage.

It is necessary somehow to drain the energy and to divert the great material and living strength of the Soviet Union to peaceful purposes—not to bring about a great world conflict. I think it is necessary to have meetings secretly conducted, not summit meeting. Those Khrushchev welcomes. He will use the decisions reached at summit meetings to increase his own prestige.

This you must understand. That is why I write these observations of mine to the people of the United States and Britain. I ask only that you believe the sincerity of my thoughts. Henceforth I am your soldier, pledged to carry out everything which is entrusted to me.

In presenting the above, I want to say that I have not begun work for my new cause with empty hands. I understand perfectly well that to correct words and thoughts, one must add concrete proof confirming these words. I have had and do have now a definite capability for doing this.

[From the Washington Post, Oct. 31, 1965]

A KREMLINOLOGIST TRIES TO STRIKE A BALANCE

(By Edward Crankshaw)

(The following is a condensation of the foreword to "The Penkovsky Papers" by the British journalist and expert on Soviet Russia.)

I imagine that the general reader will be most fascinated by Penkovsky's inside account of the workings of the Soviet intelligence system. He may very well be appalled and dismayed by their scope and sheer magnitude. But I think we should try to keep a sense of proportion here.

I am not for a moment suggesting that neither the British nor the American secret services are anything like so heavily staffed as the KGB and GRU. The Russians, not to put too fine a point on it, have always been nuts about espionage and counter-espionage and they have always been hair-raisingly reckless in the expenditure of manpower.

I am quite sure that the material the Russians receive from their agents is not worth anything like the expenditure of manpower, ingenuity and cash which they consider an appropriate price. I am not an expert in these matters, but there is one thing that stands out even to a layman; that is, that some of the most valuable intelligence coups ever achieved by the Russians have fallen into their laps, contributed by oddities like Nunn-May and Fuchs, acting from individual conviction.

Conversely, invaluable information presented to us by Penkovsky was obtained not as a result of the efficiency of our own secret services but as a free gift arising from the idiosyncratic behavior of an individual Russian.

Penkovsky was shocked by the size and magnitude and malevolence of the secret service of which he formed a part. He was also shocked by the behavior of Khrushchev and others. Here, I think, he can be very misleading.

He was brought up as a young Communist and developed into an eager careerist in the regular army, on the lookout for patronage, keen for promotion, cultivating the sort of gifts which enabled him quite naturally and easily to make an extremely useful marriage, one of the privileged new class and enjoying it. It is impossible to decide from his papers the precise point at which the whole thing went sour, and why.

That he took violently against the whole system, for the reasons he gives is entirely understandable; tens of thousands of intelligent Russians—hundreds of thousands, indeed—feel the same way. But this does not lead them to spy on their own country for the benefit of the West.

One thing is very clear—and this should be borne in mind constantly when considering Penkovsky's indictment of Khrushchev as a man actively preparing to launch a nuclear war—and that is that, like so many defectors from the West, this Soviet army colonel was in some measure unbalanced. (A man who will take it upon himself to betray his government because he is uniquely convinced that he is right and it is wrong is by definition unbalanced, although he may also be a martyr.) And almost certainly, this lack of balance made it impossible for him to distinguish between government intentions and government precautions. Or, like so many others, he confused loose, menacing talk with tight-lipped calculation; contingency planning with purposive strategy.

Having said all this, read Penkovsky also for the light he throws on the Soviet world, which is an illumination rarely vouchsafed foreigners.

[From the Washington Post, Nov. 1, 1965]

OUR MAN IN THE KREMLIN—SECRET POLICE, SPYING DOMINATE REGIME AND ALL AGENCIES ABROAD

(By Frank Gibney)

By mid-April 1961, Greville Wynne, the British businessman in whom Colonel Penkovsky confided, had taken Penkovsky's letter to British and American intelligence officers in London. In it, the Soviet General Staff officer described in detail his position in Moscow, together with his motives of volunteering to spy against the Soviet regime.

He promised to arrive in London later that month, in charge of a visiting Soviet delegation of technical and industrial experts. Many of these were in fact intelligence specialists from Penkovsky's own committee, the State Committee for Coordination of Scientific Research, which regulated all contacts and exchanges between foreign and Soviet scientists and businessmen.

Penkovsky's own record and position were quickly checked out in London and Washington—and if Western intelligence had dreamed up the perfect man to penetrate the Kremlin's secrets, it could hardly have done better.

He was then 43 years old. Made a full colonel in the Soviet Army at 31, he had graduated both from the Frunze Military Academy (the Soviet staff college) and the Military-Diplomatic Academy—cover name for the 3-year Soviet military intelligence school. He had served as assistant military attaché in Turkey in 1956, run an area desk in Soviet intelligence headquarters, and helped select and train intelligence officer candidates—one of the most sensitive jobs in the Soviet system.

The colonel was also a veteran artilleryman who had taken the special Soviet Army course in military missilery at the Dzherzshinsky artillery school. He was the former aide and still the confidant of Chief Marshal Varentsov, who commanded the Soviet tactical missile troops.

In almost every respect Penkovsky was wired into the Soviet hierarchy. His great uncle, Valentin Penkovsky was a lieutenant general; his wife was a general's daughter. Penkovsky was on the friendliest of terms with his boss, Gen. Ivan Serov, Khrushchev's secret police expert, who now commanded Military Intelligence. Through Serov and Marshal Varentsov, he had pipelines to the highest levels of the Soviet regime and almost unlimited access to secret files and documents.

Other Soviet officers had defected to the West, over the years, but never anyone this high up in the Kremlin's operating command structure. In his own biography, he gave one big reason for his anger at the Soviet regime. Only a year or two before the State Security had discovered that Penkovsky's father had been a White officer in 1919—thus putting a sudden black mark on his record (and probably blocking his promotion to general).

As a professional soldier and general staff officer, also, Penkovsky was increasingly appalled by the network of spies and informers he found throughout his own government—fully 8 years after de-Stalinization has supposedly thawed Soviet society.

In the following excerpt from "The Penkovsky Papers," he writes about the secret police dominance over the Soviet regime:

(By Oleg Penkovsky)

The Soviet Government goes in force for espionage on such a gigantic scale that an outsider has difficulty in fully comprehending it. Daily we expand our already swollen spy apparatus. That is what Khrushchev's "peaceful coexistence" and "struggle for peace" really mean. We are all spies.

Any Soviet citizen who has anything at all to do with the work of foreign countries or who is connected with foreigners in the course of his work, is perforce engaged in intelligence work. There is no institution in the U.S.S.R. that does not have in it an intelligence officer or agent.

Here are some of the Soviet ministers and committees through which we conduct intelligence: Intourist and the International Book Association (almost 100 percent state security); Ministry of Foreign Trade; Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church; The Academy of Sciences; Union of the Red Cross; State Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries. * * * The list is almost endless.

State security officers and agents are everywhere, literally everywhere. I saw fewer of them under Stalin than now. They control our whole army and military intelligence, too. These security police scoundrels even forced my aunt to be an informer. She worked for them the whole time she was a housekeeper in the Afghan and the Italian Embassies in Moscow.

My poor aunt often came to my mother, crying and complaining about the degrading and dishonest things she had to do. She eavesdropped, stole documents, cleaned out waste baskets, wrote reports on diplomats, helped with provocations against them. Many time she complained to me. But this was before I began working for military intelligence. I could give her no advice only sympathy.

Khrushchev himself directly supervises the work of the state security. In this matter he trusts no one else; he controls the State Security as First Secretary of the Communist Party. It is said that Shelepin, the state security boss, spends more time in Khrushchev's office than in his own headquarters on Dzerzhinsky Square. If it were not for the state security police and General Serov, Khrushchev could never have become the "supreme commander in chief."

SPIES ABROAD

The majority of the personnel in Soviet embassies abroad are military intelligence or state security employees. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Trade exist as such only in Moscow. Abroad everything is controlled by us. Three out of five Soviet embassy officers are either from state security or military intelligence. Thus, it can be stated wtihout error that 60 percent of Soviet embassy personnel are serving officers in intelligence. In Soviet consulates the figure is almost 100 percent.

In an embassy the state security spies on everyone, including us in military intelligence Security police watch absolutely everything that goes on: the purchases people make, how they live and whether it accords with their salary, where they go, which doctors they visit, how much drinking they do, their morals. Meanwhile we in military intelligence watch the security police in return. We want to establish which of our own men are connected with them or work as their informants.

A Soviet Ambassador is first of all an employee of the central committee of the party, only secondly of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Often he is himself part of the military intelligence or the state security police. A great many of the Soviet Ambassadors in foreign countries are intelligence officers.

Before my duty in the Embassy in Turkey, I thought that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the embassies were important organizations with authority. Now I know there is only the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the two intelligence organizations.

To process people traveling abroad, there is a special commission for trips abroad under the central committee. It consists entirely of state security officers. Any person, even a tourist, going overseas comes for a conference to the central committee.

When I was leaving, this scoundrel Daluda from the state security poked through my file for 2 hours. What was he looking for? He questioned me about all my relatives, living and dead, about my family life, whether I drink, quarrel with my wife, etc. He also asked me about international problems. This was done to me, an officer of the general staff and the military intelligence.

INDISCRIMINATE ESPIONAGE

We are engaged in espionage against every country in the world. And this includes our friends, the countries of the peoples' democracies. Who knows, some fine day they may become our enemies. Look what happened with China. Months before the break with China became clear, instructions came direct from the central committee to being intensive intelligence activity against China. Quietly, the Chinese section was transferred from the directorate dealing with peoples' democracies to that for neutral or enemy countries in the Far East.

Col. Pavel Demetriyevich Yerzin was formerly the state security resident in Turkey,

where I knew him. Later he was promoted to the rank of brigadier general and appointed pro rector of the Patrice Lumumba Friendship University in Moscow.

The entire faculty of this Lumumba Friendship University is made up of state security police—even the people in charge of dormitories. Only a few professors are there as "co-optees," i.e., people who have agreed to work with the state security. The basic task of the Friendship University is to prepare a fifth column for the African countries.

Many of the African students there have already been recruited. They are now working for the Soviet intelligence. They are studying Marxism and Leninism, preparing to become the future leaders of the African countries.

As a first step, after their return from Moscow, they are directed to organize strikes, demonstrations to overthrow governments, etc. At the university they live better than the average Soviet student. Almost everything is paid for.

SPIES IN WASHINGTON

The Soviet strategic intelligence service alone has special "residencies" (i.e. self-contained operative units) on the territory of the United States. One is in Washington, D.C.—"residency" personnel include individual Soviet Embassy secretaries, commercial representatives, and other employees.

There are two "residencies" in New York, one under the cover of the U.N. (The other, the "illegal residency," has direct independent contact with Moscow.)

The Washington "residency" has a great many Soviet operations officers and an insignificant number of agents; these are basically "oldtimers" who were recruited a long time ago.

The New York "residencies" are of greater strength. They have new agents from whose ranks they build up the "illegal residency." Among the agents are many foreigners who reside and work in the United States.

Intelligence officers of legal "residencies" (i.e. officers who have legally entered the United States with an official "cover" position) always use their cover, such as: Tass correspondent, Aeroflot representative, merchant marine, member of a trade mission.

Sometimes, in order to evade FBI surveillance, Soviet intelligence officers stay in the embassy overnight, sleeping on desks, then get up early in the morning to leave the embassy unnoticed. In this way, they manage sometimes to avoid surveillance.

After the Powers affair (the U–2 incident of May 1960) Khrushchev issued an order to all units of the intelligence service, especially those in the United States, to cease their active work temporarily—in order to take no chance of putting into enemy hands any evidence pointing to Soviet espionage against the United States and other countries. In November 1960, this order was rescinded. Intelligence activities began again in full swing. Recent directives have ordered establishment of social contacts with as many Americans as possible.

Ivan Yakovkavich Melekh is a Soviet intelligence officer with the military rank of lieutenant colonel. He knows English very well. At one time he was an instructor of English at the Military Diplomatic Academy, which trains officers for Military Intelligence. After special training, Melekh was sent under the cover of the United Nations secretariat in New York to carry out his intelligence missions. That was in 1955. On October 27, 1960, he was arrested by the Federal Bureau of Investigation on charges of espionage. In April 1961, the U.S. Government dropped its charges on condition that Melekh leave the United States before April 17. This should help us to judge the value of Soviet protests and declarations at the U.N.

FRIEND OF SEROV

The present Chief of Military Intelligence, Gen. Alexander I. Serov, is not the most brilliant of men. He knows how to interrogate people, imprison them, and shoot them. In sophisticated intelligence matters, he is not so skilled. Serov was a Beria man. Beria took a liking to him and pushed him to the top quickly.

Before coming to Military Intelligence, Serov was Chairman of the State Security. After his appointment to Military Intelligence, he remembered my name from my Turkish assignment and became personally interested in my work. Eventually a certain degree of friendship developed between us and I visited him several times at his apartment and his country house. My personal relationship with Serov placed me in the forefront of Military Intelligence officers.

Serov lives on Granovsky Street. Many ministers, members of the Central Committee, and marshals live there. Rudenko, the Chief Prosecutor of the U.S.S.R. lives on the same floor as Serov. When Serov was Chairman of the State Security, he arrested people and Rudenko signed the death sentence. One would drop into the other's place in the evening for a drink and they together would decide who should be put in jail and who should be shot. Very convenient.

[From the Washington Post, Nov. 2, 1965]

OUR MAN IN THE KREMLIN—KHRUSHCHEV'S POLICIES COULD HAVE MEANT WAR

(By Frank Gibney)

On April 20, 1961, at 11 p.m. a trimly dressed foreign gentleman, handsome, red haired, and of medium height, walked without notice through the lobby of the Mount Royal Hotel in London and made his way to an inconspicuous suite upstairs.

The door was quickly opened. Inside the room, Col. Oleg Penkovsky had his first face-to-face meeting with British and American intelligence officers, the "interested parties" in the West whom he had been trying to contact for almost a year.

For hours, Penkovsky talked. He had brought with him from Moscow two packets of handwritten notes and documents, materials taken from Soviet top-secret files. The range of his information was almost encyclopedic—the design of new missiles, names of Soviet undercover intelligence agents in Europe, troop deployments in East Germany.

As the intelligence officers talked with him, they began to grasp not only the breadth of his knowledge about Soviet plans, but the intensity of his conviction that Moscow's dangerous brinkmanship in 1961 could well lead to war.

A lonely idealist, Penkovsky wanted neither money nor immediate asylum. Of the intelligence officers in London he asked only that he be given either British or American citizenship and some employment commensurate with his experience, if circumstances ever compelled him to flee the Soviet Union.

On another floor of the Mount Royal Hotel, Penkovsky had housed members of the 45-man Soviet delegation he headed. The delegation had been sent to London ostensibly to discuss trade prospects, but actually to gather intelligence, of an industrial and military nature. It was a sign of the Communist regime's trust in Penkovsky that he was assigned to lead it.

Throughout this first 2-week visit to London, Penkovsky continued to hold night meetings with the British and American intelligence officers, whom he knew only by their code names, the British intelligence officers called "Grille" and "Miles" and the Amreicans, "Alexander" and "Oslav."

Since the U–2 surveillance flights had been abandoned in 1960, the West badly needed fresh information on Soviet work in missilery and new rocket technology. As a missile specialist himself, Penkovsky had a wealth of technical background on the state of Soviet missile readiness—and most importantly, plans for missile production and deployment. The configuration of missile sites, the type of troops used, warheads, performance details—all this information Penkovsky possessed, from his own experience and his close association as aide to Marshal Varentsov, the Soviet tactical missile commander. In that London hotel room Penkovsky began the vital flow of information which, barely a year later, enabled the West to understand the seriousness of Khrushchev's threat in Cuba, as well as recognize the exact nature of his missile weapons there.

In the following excerpt from the papers, Penkovsky outlines the real facts behind the Soviet missile effort. These notes represent only a tiny portion of the information Penkovsky revealed in this area. For 16 months he produced a stream of reliable intelligence, technical and strategic, on Khrushchev's missile buildup. His guidance lay behind the quick identification of the Cuba-based missiles in aerial photographs. Also, his reports of Khrushchev's lagging production on long-range missiles explained the reasoning behind the risky shipment of medium-range Soviet missiles to Cuba.

Millions breathed a sigh of relief over President Kennedy's facedown of Khrushchev's Cuban threat in October 1962. But until now only a small group of intelligence experts knew the great contribution made by Colonel Penkovsky to this U.S. victory.

(By Oleg Penkovsky)

Khrushchev is blabbing that we are ready, we have everything. That is so much idle talk. He talks about the Soviet Union's capability to send missiles to every corner of the world, but he has not done anything about it, because he knows that we are actually not ready.

Of course we can send our big missiles in different directions, as far as the United States or Cuba. But we are not yet capable of launching a planned missile attack to destroy definite targets long range. As Marshal Varentsov, who commands the ground missile forces, tells me: "We still have a long way to go before we actually achieve the things about which Khrushchev keeps talking and boasting."

Of course, there have been fine achievements in developing tactical and operational short-range missiles. But it is too early to speak of our strategic missiles as perfected. Many of the big ones are still on the drawing boards, in the prototype stage or undergoing tests. There are altogether not more than a few dozen of these—not the 'shower" of missiles with which Khrushchev has been threatening the West.

Only the smaller (IRBM) missiles are in production. The R–12 missile, now being mass produced, has a range of 2,500 kilometers (1,550 miles). Our "cruise" missile has been adopted for use by the submarine fleet as well as ground troops. But our big R–14 missile is only in the development stage. The range of the R–14 with a nuclear warhead is 4,500 kilometers (2,800 miles).

Often a new model missile is still only in the testing stage—in fact the tests may have proved unsuccessful. But there is Khrushchev, already screaming to the entire world about his "achievements" in new types of Soviet weapons.

COSMONAUTS DIE

All the money made available from the military reorganization is put into missile production, and sputnik required the combined efforts of all available Soviet scientists and technical personnel, with the entire technological capacity of the country at their disposal.

Marshal Varentsov warns in private conversations that we do not have enough qualified people in the missile and sputnik programs, that training is inadequate, the quality of production poor. Quantity is inadequate, also. Accidents and all sorts of troubles are daily occurrences. In this connection, there is much talk about shortcomings in the field of electronics.

There have been many cases during the test launchings of missiles when they have hit inhabited areas, railroad tracks, etc., instead of the designated targets, after deviating several hundred kilometers from their prescribed course.

Sometimes Khrushchev's pushing for premature achievement in missiles and sputniks has disastrous results.

Several sputniks were launched into the stratosphere and never heard from again. They took the lives of several specially trained cosmonauts.

The sudden death of Marshal Nedelin, former chief of our missile forces, was another case in point.

Khrushchev had been demanding that his specialists create a missile engine powered by nuclear energy. The laboratory work for such an engine had even been completed prior to the 43d Anniversary of the October Revolution in 1960, and the people involved wanted to give Khrushchev a "present" on this anniversary—a missile powered by nuclear energy.

Present during the tests on this new engine were Marshal Nedelin, many specialists on nuclear equipment, and representatives of several government committees. When the countdown was completed, the missile failed to leave the launching pad. After 15 to 20 minutes had passed, Nedelin came out of the shelter, followed by the others. Suddenly there was an explosion caused by the mixture of the nuclear substance and other components. Over 300 people were killed.

A few people miraculously survived, but all of them were in deep shock. Some of them died soon afterward. What was brought to Moscow were not Nedelin's and other victims' remains, but urns filled with dirt. Yet we all had read in the "truthful" official government statements printed in the newspaper Pravda and Izvestiya only that Nedelin died, "* * * in the line of duty—in an air accident," and we also read about how these bodies were cremated, as well as other details about the funeral.

MORE SPACE FAILURES

This is not the first time that a missile accident took place. There had been others before this, but the government keeps silent about them.

When Khrushchev announced at the beginning of 1960 that the Soviet Union possessed a completely new and terrifying type of ballistic missile, he actually had in mind the order he had issued to invent or prepare this new type of propellant based on nuclear energy. Some of the work in this direction proved quite successful, even after Nedelin's accident, but it is still far from what Khrushchev had in mind. There is a big lag in electronics.

There were more accidents during tests. In this respect my sympathies are with the Americans. If they have an accident, it is all in the papers; everyone knows about it. But in our country everything is kept secret.

For example: There were several unsuccessful launchings of sputniks with men killed prior to Gagarin's flight. Either the missile would explode on the launching pad, or it would go up and never return.

When Gagarin made his flight, it was said officially that there was not a single camera in his sputnik. This was a big lie. There was a whole system of cameras with different lenses for taking pictures and for intersection. The photographic equipment was turned on and off during the flight by the astronaut. But Khrushchev tells everybody that nothing was photographed. Photographic equipment has been installed on all sputniks, but this has been denied in order to prevent the Americans from launching espionage sputniks, or as we call them: "spies in the sky."

Right now we have a certain number of missiles with nuclear warheads capable of reaching the United States or South America; but these are single missiles, not in mass production, and they are far from perfect. Every possible measure is taken to improve the missiles and their production.

Money is saved everywhere and allocated to the building of kindergartens. That is the slang expression we use for missile production. Many different towns have been specially built for these scientists and the technical and engineering personnel. Scientists and engineers not only have been awarded decorations and medals, but some have been awarded the title of Hero of Socialist Labor three or four times.

They have received the Lenin Prize, and other prizes. The work of these people is not publicized and their pictures do not appear in the newspapers.

I have already heard some talk about a woman astronaut being readied for a flight into the stratosphere in a sputnik for propaganda purposes. All the higher commanders think that such a flight will have a strong propaganda effect. The launching is planned for the beginning of 1963.

The vigilance of the Western powers must not be weakened by the shortcomings mentioned above. If at the present time the Soviet ballistic missiles are still far from being perfect, in 2 or 3 years—perhaps even sooner—Khrushchev will have achieved his goal.

In 1961, a firm directive was issued to equip the satellite countries with missile weapons. This was by a special decision of the Central Committee CPSU. Marshal Varentsov made the following comment: "They say we must give our brother Slavs missile weapons. So we give them missiles now, and later they will stick a knife in our back."

In my opinion as a general staff officer, it will take a year or a year and a half for us to be able to equip all the Eastern European countries with missiles. In order to stop this armament of Khrushchev's and his attempts to launch an attack, the Western countries must triple both their efforts at unity and increase their armaments. Only then will Khrushchev realize that he is dealing with a strong adversary.

[From The Washington Post, Nov. 3, 1965]

OUR MAN IN THE KREMLIN—TRICKERY USED BY RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE AGAINST WEST REVEALED BY PENKOVSKY

(By Frank Gibney)

Col. Oleg Penkovsky, the brilliant Soviet general staff officer who volunteered to spy for the West, was almost the exact opposite of the drab, mousy professional spy, as celebrated in current "realistic" espionage novels. A sociable man who liked good food and good conversation, he had a ready wit and was prone to parlor card tricks.

When he arrived in London, in late April 1961, he was consciously setting out to play an incredibly dangerous game of espionage against his own regime. But he managed to enjoy his stay, at least ostensibly, as thoroughly as any tourist.

The colonel took long walks through the city, visited department stores, restaurants and theaters, generally in the company of Greville Wynne, his British businessman friend. The obvious freedom of the British people delighted him. He told Wynne, again and again, how different it was from the closed society of Moscow.

Personally, he was manifestly relieved for once to be out of the orbit of Soviet secret police surveillance. He even managed some discreet nightclubbing and a few dancing lessons. (Soviet intelligence circles in London, assumed that Penkovsky, a trusted officer, was attempting to "recruit" Wynne as a Soviet agent. So his association with Wynne was not under suspicion.)

Penkovsky also did some guide work of his own, which considerably helped his standing in Soviet military intelligence. Shortly before he left Moscow, General Seroy, the chief of military intelligence, had called him into his office and informed him that his wife and daughter were also flying to London for an unofficial tourist visit. He asked Penkovsky to look after them and give them any help they needed in getting around in a strange city.

Accordingly, the colonel helped Mrs. Serov and her attractive daughter Svetlana make their purchases (with money drawn from local Soviet intelligence funds). He even managed to take Svetlana on a tour of the better London night spots without arousing undue attention.

Beneath this facade of socializing, however, Penkovsky's new work continued in earnest. On the basis of the information he had submitted, the British and American intelligence officers were now convinced that his desire to work with them was genuine.

In their nocturnal meetings, they gave the Soviet colonel a complete short course in clandestine radio communications, as well as a small Minox camera for photographing documents. It was arranged to make contact with him through Wynne or another Western emissary, if he found it impossible to return to Western Europe in the near futue. If necessary, instructions would be transmitted to him by radio.

When he finally left London on May 6, Penkovsky carried with him presents for his highly placed Soviet friends, including General Serov, a full report of the trade and technical mission (which Moscow judged a great success) and a complete set of instructions and equipment for getting further espionage information out of his "new friends" in the West.

In the following excerpt from the papers, Penkovsky has some more to say about the real nature of his own Soviet delegation—and the stern ground rules still laid down to cover all Soviet contacts with foreigners.

(By Oleg Penkovsky)

The State Committee for Coordination of Scientific Research Work is like a ministry. Our chairman, Rudnev, enjoys all the privileges of a minister in the U.S.S.R. The committee is in charge of all scientific and technical exchanges with foreigners, both in the Soviet Union and abroad. In fact, it is a large espionage apparatus, which not only collects scientific and technical information, but tries to recruit Western technical specialists.

When I began my work in the committee, I was myself astounded by the number of intelligence officers working there. Eighty or ninety senior intelligence officers work in the foreign relations section alone. When one walks down the halls in our offices, one can see some of them saluting each other in the military manner. They have conspicuous difficulty getting away from military habits, even getting used to their civilian clothes.

The friendly contacts and "services" we provide visiting foreign delegations we might better call "friendly deceit." Often we military intelligence officers cannot understand ourselves why the foreigners believe us. Do they not understand that we show them in the U.S.S.R. only those things which are well known to everybody? If there is something new at a plant which foreigners are about to visit, we simply give orders to its director:

"Show them everything, but have shops 1 and 5 closed for repairs." That is all.

On my desk I have a list of pretexts and alternate proposals which we use to keep foreigners out of certain areas of the U.S.S.R.:

1. The plant is under repair.
2. A bridge is closed.
3. There is no airport and the railroad tracks have been damaged by recent frost; therefore, for the time being there are no trains.
4. The local hotel is not ready for guests.
5. All hotels are completely filled with tourists, etc.

Sometimes we take foreign delegates through museums and parks in Moscow until the members are so tired they themselves call off the trip to a factory, preferring to rest. Or, instead of taking the delegation by plane, we put them on a train. As a result, the delegation has enough time to see only one or two installations in which they are interested, instead of five or six. Their visas expire and they have to leave after having seen nothing but vodka and caviar.

RECRUITING TASKS

In Moscow our main task as intelligence officers inside the committee it to recruit agents among the foreigners visiting the U.S.S.R. Of course, this does not often happen. But we collect information by personal conversations, eavesdropping, examining baggage, literally stealing secrets from the visitors' pockets.

I have been assigned to British delegations visiting Moscow. My job is to establish friendly relations with these men, assess their intelligence possibilities, then write a report on each to our intelligence people in London. It will be up to them to collect enough compromising information on these men—family problems, amorous adventures, personal finances, etc.—to secure their recruitment.

We are also to obtain as much scientific and technical information as possible of value to our Soviet industry—everything from cheaper methods of getting fresh water from sea water to the manufacture of artificial fur. Thanks to visits to our country by foreign delegations, we obtain vast quantities of extremely valuable information.

By contrast, all members of Soviet delegations traveling abroad are carefully instructed how to answer questions that might be put to them. I can honestly say that there is nothing new that Western scientists and specialists could learn from the Soviet specialists—or Soviet exhibitions abroad. For example, the exhibits to be shown at our London exhibition in 1961 were first carefully checked by intelligence technicians to make sure there was nothing new which foreign scientists could see or steal. Some exhibits were purposely put together in a distorted way; the cone of the sputnik on display was not built that way, the spheres were of another type.

Trips of Soviet delegations to foreign countries require special preparation. The departure of any delegation requires a separate decree from the Communist Party Central Committee. And no delegation ever goes abroad without some form of state security involvement.

After a Soviet delegation has been formed, we select certain scientists, engineers or other suitable members and instruct them individually on the type of information we need. Take my own 45-man delegation to London. Five of its members were employees of the Communist Central Committee. Ten military intelligence officers left for London at the same time in the guise of delegation members or tourists. There were also three other military intelligence colonels in the delegation, besides myself.

As a rule, Soviet scientists and technicians in missile production work are not allowed to go abroad. But lately, because these scientists must learn something about missile work in the United States, a few have been given permission to travel—provided they have not participated in any missile production work for the last 2 years. Thus, if they defected to the West, their knowledge would not be so fresh.

TOURING INSTRUCTIONS

Our intelligence instructions to traveling Soviet delegates are very specific. How many forms and autobiographies must be filled out before a trip abroad is processed. All of them in four or five copies. I myself had to submit 18 photographs before a single trip. What are they going to do with them? Marinate them? My wife and I worked on them for 2 days, and still could not finish all the forms.

Instructions we give to Soviet travelers stipulate that when traveling by train, you should always be seated with your own sex. Do not drink, do not talk too much and report any incidents on the trip to the consul or Soviet Embassy representatives. Do not carry any confidential materials with you, do not leave your hotel room, do not make any notes, but if this is unavoidable, keep them on your person.

I remember early in 1961 we sent a delegation to the Federal Republic of Germany. An engineer from Leningrad went with this delegation. He was co-opted, i.e., forcibly recruited by military intelligence. He had a notebook for making notes on the information he gathered. He left the notebook in a raincoat, then it disappeared. A search was conducted. We found nothing. The engineer became so upset that when his comrades went out shopping, he hanged himself in his hotel room. He used the cord of an electric iron which he found attached to the light fixture in the ceiling. (The delegation had taken the electric iron with them to save money on pressing.)

The engineer's body was sent to Leningrad by plane. Later, at the enterprise where he worked, it was announced that he was not normal and suffered from constant headaches. That is how things are done in our country.

[From the Washington Post, Nov. 4, 1965]

OUR MAN IN THE KREMLIN—UNITED STATES GOT TRUE ACCOUNT OF U–2 PLANE INCIDENT

(By Frank Gibney)

Col. Oleg Penkovsky returned to Moscow on May 6, 1961, from his first visit to London and set about in earnest to gather more information for Western intelligence.

Some of this intelligence turned out to be the first accurate account of two troubling incidents on the Soviet-American policy frontiers—the downing of the U–2 reconnaissance plane in 1960 and the later Soviet attack on another American aircraft off the coast of Siberia.

When he returned to Moscow, he stored his new camera, film, radio receiver and frequency instructions in a secret drawer in the apartment which he and his family occupied on the Maxim Gorky Embankment. But he kept all knowledge of his new espionage role from them.

As far as Vera Penkovsky was concerned, her husband was busy at his normal confidential talks. Her own background as the daughter of a "political" general conditioned her against asking too many questions about his late hours or unexplained absences. The best Vera hoped for was another attaché's assignment abroad, like their 1956 post in Turkey, where she could practice her French and enjoy the better clothes and companionship of a foreign society.

Greville Wynne flew back into Moscow on May 27, to resume business negotiations with Penkovsky's committee on behalf of the British firms he represented. Penkovsky met him with a car at Sheremetevo Airport. On the way into the city, "Alex," as Wynne called him, handed the Englishman a packet of some 20 exposed films and other documents, including his own reports, for delivery to British and American intelligence.

The same evening Penkovsky visited Wynne in his room at the Metropol Hotel. Taking care to keep their conversation innocuous (the room of a foreign visitor like Wynne would probably be wired), Wynne gave Penkovsky a package containing 30 fresh rolls of film and further instructions from the Anglo-American intelligence team in London.

Far from suspecting anything strange in Penkovsky's meetings with Wynne, his superiors in Soviet military intelligence continued to think that he was "developing" a promising British contact. Penkovsky's work with the Soviet delegation in London was so highly regarded, in fact, that his pleased superiors arranged to send him there again in July, to attend the opening of a Soviet Industrial Exhibition. This time he was to travel alone, without any delegation. American and British intelligence could hardly have wished for such a nice arrangement.

One presumes that Western intelligence found intensely valuable not only Penkovsky's estimates of future Soviet plans, but his reconstruction of recent events in Soviet-American relations—most of which served only to underline his warnings about Khrushchev's new policy of aggression.

For Penkovsky the intelligence information he gave was only a means to an end. His real purpose was to alert the American and British people to the danger of Khrushchev's "adventurist" tactics.

(By Oleg Penkovsky)

The American U–2 Pilot Gary Powers was shot down on May 1, 1960. Prior to the Powers flight, other U–2 flights had been made over the Kiev and Kharkov, but Khrushchev kept his mouth shut, because at that time there were no missiles that could be effective at the altitudes where the U–2 aircraft were flying.

When Powers was shot down over Sverdlovsk, it was not a direct hit but rather the shock wave that did it. The aircraft simply fell apart from it. During his descent Powers lost consciousness several times. He was unconscious when they picked him up from the ground; therefore, he was helpless to do anything and did not put up any resistance. On May 1 when this incident happened, I was duty officer at GRU (military intelligence) headquarters. I was the first one to report it to the GRU officials.

At that moment, the KGB did not have an English interpreter. I was supposed to talk to him because I was the only one around who had some understanding of English—I had already reported the incident to some generals. If they had not found a KGB interpreter at the last minute, I would have been the first one to interview Powers.

Ultimately, they called up to say that I was not needed. It seems that the KGB (State Security) chief, this young fellow Shelepin, who used to run the Komsomol (he replaced Serov at the KGB), wanted to make the report to Khrushchev personally. So he got an interpreter and picked Powers up himself. But the military had knocked Powers down and Powers was considered to be a military prisoner. He should have been turned over to the General Staff. Nonetheless, the KGB seized him, took him to Dzerzhinskiy Square, and made their own report. He needed medical treatment, because he was still in shock.

NEW ROCKETS

Earlier, when a U–2 flight came over in the direction of Kiev-Kharkov, there had been nothing to shoot with. As soon as the new rockets appeared, Khrushchev gave the order to use them. So they fired at Powers

on May 1, 1960. Of course, we had anti-aircraft defenses before, but not in quantity, and they were not able to go into action so quickly.

Marshal Biryuzov, then commander-in-chief of missile forces, was reprimanded because he had not correcty estimated the probable direction of the U–2 flights—he misgaged the importance of the targets. His forces wanted to fire when the aircraft from Turkey flew over Kiev, but there was nothing to fire with and the aircraft escaped. Powers would have escaped if he had flown one or one and a half kilometers to the right of his flight path.

On May 5, after Powers was knocked down, Khrushchev ordered a suspension of (secret) agent operations to avoid the risk of being caught by a Western provocation or, possibly, of further material for Western counterpropaganda. There were many protests about dropping scheduled meetings and other contacts, but it had to be done.

The resident in Pakistan decided on his own to pick up material from a dead drop which was already loaded, in order to avoid possible compromise to the agent. For this he was severely reprimanded by his superior at the GRU even though he did the right thing. Thus, despite the damage it did to the agent network, Khrushchev ordered cessation of agent contacts during the period when he was going to capitalize on the Powers incident.

KHRUSHCHEV LIED

Khrushchev followed Powers' investigation and trial with great interest. He personally conducted the propaganda activity connected with the case. He was the first who began to shout about the direct hit, although actually there had been no such thing. Khrushchev wanted to brag about his missiles.

Khrushchev lied when he says that Powers was shot down by the first missile fired. Actually, 14 missiles were fired at his plane. The shock wave produced by the bursts caused his plane to disintegrate. The examination of Powers' plane produced no evidence of a direct hit; nor were there any missile fragments found on it. One of the 14 missiles fired at Powers' plane shot down a Soviet MIG–19 which went up to pursue Powers. Its pilot, a junior lieutenant, perished.

The U.S. aircraft RB–47 shot down on Khrushchev's order (in July, 1960) was not flying over Soviet territory; it was flying over neutral waters. Pinpointed by radar, it was shot down by Khrushchev's personal order. When the true facts were reported to Khrushchev, he said: "Well done, boys, keep them from even flying close."

Such is our way of observing international law. Yet Khrushchev was afraid to admit what had actually happened. Lies and deceit are all around us. There is no truth anywhere. I know for a fact that our military leaders had a note prepared with apologies for the incident, but Khrushchev said: "No, let them know that we are strong."

[From the Washington Post, Nov. 5, 1965]

OUR MAN IN THE KREMLIN—PENKOVSKY FED DATA TO KEEP BOSSES HAPPY

(By Frank Gibney)

Between July 15 and August 10, 1961, Col. Oleg Penkovsky played out the second round of his harrowing espionage game in London. He spent part of each day working with Soviet delegates to the trade exhibition, or running through plans for Soviet espionage work in Britain with other Russian intelligence officers in the soundproofed basement room used by the intelligence "president" (i.e., the officer in charge) of the Soviet Embassy at 48 Kensington Gardens.

At night, or during other off-hours, he would meet with the four American and British intelligence officers assigned to him in one of MI-6's safe houses for his real intelligence mission—explaining the documents he had obtained from the secret files in Moscow, exposing further Soviet intelligence missions in the West, elaborating on technical aspects of the Soviet missile program as well as information on Khrushchev's political and diplomatic strategy. Rarely in the history of espionage has any country's high command been so thoroughly penetrated as the Kremlin was during the critical 16 months when Colonel Penkovsky worked for the West.

Since Penkovsky had come to Britain again on a Soviet spying mission, it was necessary for the British and Americans to give him some intelligence material of apparent value to forward to his superiors in Moscow. This was provided. Penkovsky thus kept sending reports to Moscow of ostensibly new information on military as well as political objectives (e.g. "In traveling from London to Sheffield I observed for the second time in the southern outskirts of the city of Stamford a military airfield, on which British air force planes were based. I had the opportunity to study more carefully the indicated objectives"). Such reports kept Penkovsky's superiors in Moscow happy and unsuspecting.

AMAZING COOLNESS

With amazing coolness, the volunteer spy for the West also went on to advance his standing as a loyal Communist Party man with Moscow in other ways. One quiet morning he and Greville Wynne took a trip to see Karl Marx's grave in Highgate Cemetery and discovered it was in a bad state of neglect. Penkovsky wrote a letter of protest directly to the First Secretary of the Central Committee in Moscow. In the letter, Comrade Penkovsky told Comrade Khrushchev that, as a loyal Marxist he found such neglect an appalling reflection on communism and the Soviet Union.

Moscow took swift action. The London Embassy was ordered to set things right immediately and Penkovsky was commended for his socialist vigilance.

All the while new assignments for Penkovsky came from Washington. It was a tense summer in Europe. The continent still shook from Khrushchev's threats to sign a treaty with East Germany and force the Western allies out of Berlin. If anything, the Vienna meeting of Krushchev and President Kennedy had increased the political electricity. It was absolutely vital that the White House and Whitehall have every available piece of information on the extent of Khruschev's military preparations and his political planning. Above all, they needed to know how far Khruschev was prepared to go in pursuit of his German objective.

Some of Penkovsky's sessions with the Anglo-American team lasted as long as 10 hours at a stretch. Now that he had switched his allegiance, his dedication to the West was a single-minded as his youthful allegiance to communism. As a literal sign that he was now your colonel, he asked his contacts to provide him with both a British and an American colonel's uniform. They did so. Pleased as punch, he had his picture taken in both.

As the following excerpt from the Papers indicates, Penkovsky was amazed that both the Western peoples and their governments seemed disposed to accept Khrushchev's boasts at face value. This only made Khrushchev's brinkmanship or adventurism grow more dangerous. A firm Western stand was needed, particularly in the case of Berlin.

(By Oleg Penkovsky)

In my considered opinion, as an officer of the general staff, I do not believe Khrushchev is too anxious for a general war at the present time. But he is preparing earnestly. If the situation is ripe for war he will start it first in order to catch the probable enemy (the United States and Western States) unawares. He would of course like to reach the level of producing missiles by the tens of thousands, launch them like a rainstorm against the West, and, as he calls it, "bury capitalism." In this respect even our marshals and generals consider him to be a provocateur, the one who incites war.

The Western powers must do something to stop him. Today he will not start a war. Today the Soviet Union is not ready for war. Today he is playing with missiles, but this is playing with fire, and one of these days he will start a real slaughter.

Look what happened during the Hungarian events and Suez crisis in 1956. We in Moscow felt as if we were sitting on a powderkeg. Everyone in the general staff was against the "Khrushchev adventure." It was better to lose Hungary, as they said, than to lose everything.

THANKS TO KHRUSHCHEV

But what did the West do? Nothing. It was asleep. This gave Khrushchev confidence, and after Hungary he began to scream: "I was right." After the Hungarian incident he dismissed many generals who had spoken out against him. If the West had slapped Khrushchev down hard then, he would not be in power today and all of Eastern Europe could be free.

Kennedy must carry out a firm and consistent policy in regard to Khrushchev. There is nothing to fear. Khrushchev is not ready for war. He has to be slapped down again and again every time he gets ready to set off on one of his adventures.

Kennedy has just as much right to help the patriots of Cuba as we had when we helped the Hungarians.

This is not just my opinion. Everyone at the general staff said this. It was said in Marshal Varentosv's home, even on the streetcars in Moscow. If the West does not maintain a firm policy, then Khrushchev's position will become stronger, he will think even more about his might and right, and in this case he might strike.

The people are very unhappy with Khrushchev's militant speeches. One can hear this everywhere, listening to conversations. Now, at least, one can breathe a little easier than in Beria's time. So one can hear and say a few things.

On the other hand, the world can be thankful to Khrushchev for his militant words. They forced Kennedy, Macmillan, and De Gaulle to double or triple their military budgets and defense preparedness. If Stalin were alive he would have done all this quietly, but this fool Khrushchev's loudmouthed. He himself forces the Western powers to strengthen their defense weapons and military potential.

The generals on the general staff have no love for Khrushchev. They say that he is working to his own detriment. Why is this bald devil allowed to do as he pleases? He blabs too much about Soviet military successes in order to frighten the West, but the West is not stupid, they are also getting ready. What else can they do?

I believe Marshal Varentosv and Khrushchev's assistant Churayev; it was they who claimed that Khrushchev said, "I will drop a hail of missiles on them."

At the Soviet Embassy in London I saw a short comment on Mr. Kennedy's recent speech. The speech was called "the militant speech of the President of the United States." That is all we say officially. The Tass intercepts, however, contain the entire speech point by point: first, second, third. First, Kennedy's references to the increase in the budget, next, the increase in the strength of the Armed Forces, in connection with the new Army draft, then the new specific categories of naval flyers, etc. If necessary, the increases must be even greater.

But when we speak privately, it is a different story. At our Embassy, I heard many good comments on Kennedy's speech. It

was excellent. Everyone criticized Khrushchev, including the military intelligence and the security police "residents": "There is no reason to be surprised." They all said, "Kennedy's speech is the answer to Khrushchev's saber rattling."

WEST MUST PREPARE

The West must be ready. They must be prepared to retaliate with tank and antitank forces, in the event of trouble over Berlin. The troops must be trained as well as possible. The Soviet plan to create a conflict in Berlin is simply a bid to win without a fight, but to be ready for a fight if it comes. When the time for a showdown comes, it is planned to use tanks to close all the roads and thus cut off all routes to East Germany and to Berlin.

The first echelon will consist of East German troops, the second of Soviet troops. As a whole, the plan provides for combined operations by Soviet and East German troops. If the first echelon is defeated, the second echelon advances, and so on. Khrushchev hopes that before events have reached the phase of the second echelon, the West will start negotiations in which East Germany will also participate. This will result in recognition of East Germany.

The Soviet and German troops will participate jointly in this operation because the Germans cannot be trusted to act independently. In the first place, the East German Army is poorly equipped and insufficiently prepared because we are afraid to supply them with everything. The Germans have no love of us, and there is always a chance that in the future they may turn against us, as it happened with the Hungarians.

Volodya Khoroshilov came home on leave. He is chief of the artillery staff of the tank army in Dresden under General Kupin. He was called back to duty, however, 2 weeks ahead of time. Before his departure, we went to a restaurant for dinner and he spelled it out for me:

"As soon as the treaty with Germany is signed, an alert will be declared immediately, and the troops in East Germany will occupy all the control points and will take over their defense and support. Our troops will stand by on alert, but they will not occupy these routes immediately because this might be considered a provocation. We will simply say, 'Please, Americans, British, and French, go to Berlin, but you must request permission from East Germany.'

"If the Americans, British, and French do not want to confer with the East Germans and try to use force, the Germans will open fire. Of course, the Germans do not have enough strength, and then our tanks will move directly into Berlin."

I heard this from many officers, specifically from General Pozovny, and also from Fedorov and Marshall Varentsov. Varentsov, however, added, "We are taking a risk, a big risk."

IMPORTANCE OF TANKS

In 1961, when Khrushchev decided to resolve the Berlin question, a tank echelon was brought to combat readiness on the border in the U.S.S.R., as well as in Czechoslovaka and Poland. That is the truth.

The NATO countries should give particular attention to antitank weapons. Why? Because East Germany has two tank armies in full readiness; this is in addition to the tank armies which are part of the second echelon located on the territories of the U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, and Poland.

Khrushchev personally attached a great deal of importance to tank troops, especially in the fight for Berlin. So much importance is attached to tanks in connection with the Berlin crisis, that controversies have already broken out in the general staff regarding finances. They are afraid that too much money has been allotted for the tank troops and that there will not be enough for missiles, electronics, and other types of equipment.

Khrushchev has lately become confused on the Berlin matter, particularly because he has realized that the West is firm there. He would like to pursue a hard policy and rattle his saber, but our country suffers from a great many shortages and difficulties which must be eliminated before the West is to be frightened further.

[From the Washington Post, Nov. 7, 1965]

OUR MAN IN THE KREMLIN—IMMORALITY OF RUSSIAN ELITE DISGUSTED PENKOVSKY

(By Frank Gibney)

Late in the afternoon, one bright September day in 1961, a smiling Russian gentleman stopped to watch three English children playing by a sandbox along Tsvetnoy Boulevard in Moscow.

He handed them a small box of candy, which the children brought obediently to their mother, who was sitting nearby.

The Russian gentleman was Col. Oleg Penkovsky, the English mother Janet Anne Chisholm, wife of a British Embassy attaché.

Concealed in the innocent-looking candy box was a package of exposed film, which Penkovsky urgently wanted to put in the hands of British and American intelligence, in the course of his extraordinary voluntary spy mission for the West.

The bizarre meeting with the children was of course carefully planned. Penkovsky had met Mrs. Chisholm during his second trip to London and he had been drilled in this procedure by his Western intelligence contacts.

A few weeks before, the British businessman, Greville Wynne, Penkovsky's original contact with the West, had arrived again in Moscow to attend the French industrial fair.

In Wynne's room at the Metropol, Penkovsky had turned over the film and several packets of highly classified information from the Kremlin files, as well as a broken Minox camera—he had dropped it during one of his nocturnal photograpy sessions. Wynne had given him a replacement camera and the little box of candy lozenges to use in the contact with Mrs. Chisholm.

RISKY FOR FOREIGNERS

The meeting with Mrs. Chisholm was risky in a city where foreigners are as closely watched as they are in Moscow. Wynne, however, and Penkovsky continued to meet with impunity, because of Penkovsky's official dealings with him. When Penkovsky saw Wynne, he told him that he was about to take a trip to Paris himself with another Soviet trade delegation, for the purpose of attending the Soviet industrial fair there.

As Wynne later recalled, Penkovsky seemed cool, self-possessed and happy in their conversation at that time. He was cheered by the way his intelligence information was registering with London and Washington and buoyed up, against the hazards of his lonely espionage mission, by the thought that he was materially damaging the Moscow regime which he hated so bitterly.

In the following excerpts from the papers, he emphasized his disgust at the immorality of the Kremlin hierarchy.

(By Oleg Penkovsky)

It is interesting to observe our prominent Soviet personages. What a difference there is between them when they are on the speaker's platform and when they are in their family circles with a glass of vodka in their hands.

They become entirely different types. They are very much like the personalities which are portrayed by Gogol in "Deal Souls" and "The Inspector General."

In writing these notes, I have intentionally omitted the subject of moral degradation and drunkenness among the top military personnel—because there are already too many dirty stories on this subject. I know one thing for sure, though: all our generals have mistresses and some have two or more.

Family fights and divorces are a usual occurrence, and nobody tries to keep them secret.

IMMORAL BEHAVIOR

Every month at our party meetings in the GRU we examine three or four cases of so-called immoral behavior and lack of discipline among our officers.

The party committee and the chief political directorate of the GRU examine the cases involving generals and colonels, while those cases involving marshals are examined by the Central Committee CPSU. The Central Committee naturally discusses such matters behind closed doors, in order to conceal from the general public and the rank and file officers the dirt in which our high command personnel is involved.

Besides, marshals are not punished so severely as others. In most cases they are just given a warning.

The explanation for this given by the Central Committee is the same simple answer once given by Stalin:

"A marshal and his services are more valuable than a female sex organ."

Khrushchev has shown special favor to our Minister of Culture, the lady Furtseva. In the anti-party fight against Bulganin and the others in 1957 Furtseva helped him a great deal; she worked day and night dispatching planes, and some say that she herself made some of the flights campaigning for support for Khrushchev. She is power-mad, everybody in Moscow calls her "Catherine the Third."

Later Furtseva fell from favor. After the party congress in 1960, Furtseva was ousted from the Presidium of the Central Committee CPSU. As a result of this, her husband Firyubin was unable to go to the United States as the Soviet Ambassador.

OUSTER PLEASED ARMY

The entire Army was happy about the news of Furtseva's ouster from the Presidium.

At one of the Presidium meetings, she had proposed that the additional pay the Soviet army officers get for their respective ranks be discontinued. The answer to her was:

"What is the matter with you? You want to leave them without pants?"

What a fool. And yet there she was, occupying the post of Minister of Culture. How can such a person carry culture to the masses.

Take my friend Brig. Gen. Ivan Vladimirovich Kupin. He is Marshal Varentsov's protege and a distant relative of his; Varentsov's daughter Yelena is married to Kupin's nephew.

Kupin is the commander of artillery and missile troops of the Moscow Military District. Prior to this post, Kupin served in the German Democratic Republic as commander of artillery of the 1st Tank Army.

AMOROUS ESCAPADES

He was in a lot of trouble due to his amorous escapades. While in Germany, he lived with his cipher clerk Zaytseva. After Kupin's departure from Germany, she hanged herself because Kupin had left her pregnant. During the investigation, a photograph of Kupin had been found among her belongings.

Kupin confessed that he had lived with Zaytseva while concealing this fact from his wife; he admitted that he promised Zaytseva to marry her.

When he arrived in Moscow, General Krylov, commander of the Moscow Military District, refused to see him, but, because the decision concerning Kupin's assignment had already been approved by the Central Committee CPSU, the case was hushed up. Varentsov persuaded Krylov to forget the whole thing.

This is the way it goes in our country. As long as the Central Committee approves, as long as one has connections, one can get away with anything, even crimes; but if a similar incident happens to an ordinary officer without any connections, he is punished immediately—either his rank is reduced, or he is discharged from the army entirely.

Look at Krupchinskiy, head of the School for Nurses, and a friend of General Smolikov. They drink together and indulge in sexual orgies with girls attending the school. Krupchinskiy also provides girls for other generals of the general staff.

Khrushchev's son-in-law Adzhubei got himself so deeply involved with some actress that it almost led to divorce. He was given a warning by Khrushchev himself to be more careful in his adventures. Adzhubei is the chief editor of the newspaper Izvestia, and every day he writes articles about Communist morality.

Yet, look at his own behavior. All the other journalists hate him.

Even Satyukov, the editor of Pravda, has sunk down to second place after Izestia. Adzhubei received a Lenin prize for his so-called work about Khrushchev's trip to the United States. This work was compiled and written by the Central Committee. All Adzhubei did was put his signature to it as its editor.

In our own committee in Moscow, Yevgeniy Ilich Levin, secret police (KGB) worker and Gvishiani's deputy, is a drunkard and dissolute man. The stories he tells about the cheap dives he frequents are hardly consonant with what the party tells us about Socialist morality.

After his nightly drunken escapades and amorous adventures, Levin invariably sleeps until noon. Almost every morning Gvishiani looks for him:

"Where is my deputy?" Someone says: "He has not arrived yet. Probably he is at his other office (that is, KGB)." Gvishiani is afraid of Levin. He knows very well that Levin is at home sleeping off his rough night, but he will do nothing.

The relatives of the highly placed do very well in our Socialist society. Almost all of the marshals' sons have finished the Military Diplomatic Academy. All of them would like to be sent abroad to work, but the Government will not let them.

There is a special decree of the Central Committee CPSU forbidding the sons of marshals to go abroad. Many of them tried, but to no avail.

Marshal Sokolovskiy's son was given a 25-year prison term. He belonged to a large group of sons of marshals and ministers—some of our so-called golden youth—who had organized druken orgies at their country houses outside Moscow.

At one of these orgies, a girl who had just come to Moscow from Leningrad was raped by the gang. She happened to be the niece of some minister.

After she was raped, the girl was placed in a car and taken somewhere behind the Byelorussian Railroad Station, where they dumped her. Because the whole gang was drunk, the driver of the car was driving very poorly. A militiaman noticed this and blocked the car. One of the boys in the car grabbed a pistol and fired a blank shot. The car was stopped.

TWENTY-FIVE-YEAR TERM GIVEN

This happened under Stalin, and he said, "I respect Sokolovskiy very much, but there will be a trial just the same." And so a trial was held, and Sokolovskiy's son was given a 25-year prison term. He stayed in jail only 3 years, however, and then he "became ill," allegedly suffering from an ulcer or something of that sort. He was released.

Marshal Konev's son, Gelly Ivanovich Konev, is a woman-chaser and a drunkard. He also is a member of that same group of sons of marshals and other high officials. He is a motorcycle enthusiast, and he loves to play the horses.

I studied with Gelly at the Military Academy. During that time Gelly had an accident while riding his motorcycle. He hit a man who later died. Papa, however, took care of everything and Gelly was not jailed. He was graduated from the academy in 1953, and is now working in the Information Directorate of the GRU, on the American desk. He knows English well.

Gorkin, chairman of the supreme court, has a son-in-law named Lieutenant Commander Ivanov, a GRU military intelligence employee. (This is the same Ivanov who was connected with the Profumo scandal in England.) He and I studied together at the Military Diplomatic Academy. At present he is the Assistant Naval Attaché in Great Britain. His wife is one of Gorkin's daughters. Ivanov loves going to night clubs in London.

As one can well see, all the sons and relatives of our Soviet leaders and high-level personnel are well taken care of. I have told only about those who work in the GRU. But the same thing may be said about those who are in the Central Committee, the Council of Ministers, the KGB and various other ministries.

All roads are open for them. They are the first ones who get promoted to higher ranks and better jobs. Everything is done by pull, through friends and family connections.

The newspapers scream that a struggle must be waged against such practices. But what happens? They punish some factory director for giving a job to his niece, and he is criticized for it in the newspapers. But we must look higher and see what is going on at the top level. That is where all the big crimes are committed. It is they who set the example for the others to follow.

[From the Washington Post, Nov. 8, 1965]

OUR MAN IN THE KREMLIN—SPY'S CHOICE: HOME OR SAFETY

(By Frank Gibney)

Colonel Penkovsky arrived at LeBourget Airport, near Paris, on September 20, 1961. His British friend, Greville Wynne, met him at the airport.

Penkovsky obviously could not have informed Wynne of his exact arrival time without arousing suspicion among his superiors in Moscow. At the request of the British and American intelligence team, Wynne, still Penkovsky's safest contact, had flown to Paris and gone to the airport every day for 2 weeks, watching the arrivals on each flight from Moscow.

From the standpoint of Western intelligence, his vigil was well spent. The brilliant Soviet volunteer spy had brought a huge quantity of exposed film out with him—photographs of secret intelligence documents, technical processes, order of battle information on Soviet dispositions in Germany, and—most important of all—more top-secret details of the Kremlin's missile production and deployment.

As usual, Penskovsky checked in promptly with the Paris "resident" of the Soviet military intelligence and went over details of the Soviet intelligence assignment given him in Moscow as well as his cover job of looking after the Soviet exhibition in Paris.

Three days after his arrival, however, the colonel began the real business of his trip. Wynne drove him to one of the Seine River bridges, where he met the members of the British and American intelligence team who had worked with him in London.

Through the next month he continued his secret conferences with them at various safe apartments in the city. As before in London, Penkovsky gave them a vast store of military and political information, supplementing the documents he had photographed with his own informed analyses of current Soviet plans and military preparations.

He also laid the groundwork for an even more widespread network of communications with Western agents in Moscow which would allow him to continue his secret communications with Washington and London with a minimum of risk.

FRESH AIR

When he was not engaged with either set of intelligence officers, Penkovsky again turned tourist, with his British friend, Greville Wynne, acting as guide. The paintings at the Louvre and the night club extravaganzas at the Lido, Penkovsky viewed with apparently equal interest. Once again, he acted like a man who had suddenly been exposed to a draft of fresh air after long confinement in a closed place.

Without constant Soviet surveillance to worry about, occasionally he lost his normal caution. Once, when he and Wynne stumbled on an emigre Russian restaurant in Paris, Penkovsky could hardly be restrained from staying far into the night, singing and talking Russian with the proprietor—hardly the safe thing for a visiting Soviet intelligence officer to do, especially when he was actually working for the West.

Penkovsky liked London better, however. In Paris, also, he faced what he must have suspected was a final decision: to go back or remain in the West.

The American and British intelligence officers were perfectly willing to have Penkovsky remain then and there, to receive asylum and a job suitable to his talents in Europe or the United States.

The information he had already given on Khrushchev's missile and Berlin offensives was so important that they were concerned about his future personal security.

For days before his departure Oleg Penkovsky debated with himself as he walked the streets of Paris. He had pressing family considerations at home—a pregnant wife, a mother, a teenage daughter? Could he cut them from his life forever? And to leave the familiar world of Russia, much as he hated the Soviet regime, meant a cruel wrench. Yet everything in his immediate surroundings argued that he stay.

He almost did. The plane for Moscow was delayed by fog and the omen did not escape him. For hours he paced the floor of the waiting room at Orly Airport, virtually arguing out loud with himself, as Wynne patiently listened. He hesitated, literally at the customs barrier, but at the last minute he said goodby to Wynne and marched back into a world from which he had long since emigrated in spirit.

Penkovsky explained his decision later in the papers, when he wrote shortly after his return to Moscow: "I feel that for another year or two I must continue in the general staff of the U.S.S.R. in order to reveal all the villainous plans and plottings of our common enemy; i.e., I consider myself as a soldier of the West, so my place during these troubled times is on the frontline. I must remain on this frontline in order to be your eyes and ears, and my opportunities for this are great. God grant only that my modest efforts be useful in the fight for our high ideals for mankind."

The following excerpt from the Penkovsky papers suggests how powerful some of Penkovsky's immediate efforts were. He discusses the extent of the Soviet intelligence network operating out of the Paris embassy. It is now clear that Penkovsky exposed most

of the Soviet spy network in Western Europe to United States and British intelligence during the same month when he was a temporary member of Soviet Military Intelligence in Paris.

(By Oleg Penkovsky)

During my trips to England and France during 1961, I was given the mission, just as other military intelligence officers, of collecting information of a military and scientific nature.

As I was in charge of the delegation, I did not participate in "active operational work," as we call it. It established contacts, made acquaintances, collected literature which would be of interest to Soviet intelligence.

In France and England people talked to me freely, invited me to their homes, restaurants and offices. I was astonished by this because at intelligence staff school in Moscow I was taught entirely different things about the French and British "secret police."

After spending some time in those two countries I saw how natural and unaffected the people behaved, as though there were no such thing as the secret police. Even our military intelligence officer in London, Shapovalov, loves England—"Mother England," as he calls it.

While I was in London, I asked about the Cosmonaut Yuri Gargarin's visit to England. Gargarin does not speak English, but he had some excellent translators. Everyone assigned to him was selected from our "neighbors," the secret police. Shapovalov told me that it was uncomfortable to see so many state security police surrounding Gargarin.

While he was in London, he lived in House No. 13, on the second floor (Kensington Palace Gardens). People by the hundreds stood in the streets in order to see him, and one British girl waited 18 hours to catch a glimpse of him. When Gargarin was told about this, he said, "What a fool. It would have been better if she had shared my bed for a couple of hours." Here is the new historical personality for you.

BERLIN CRISIS?

During my second trip to London in July 1961, there were a few representatives of the Central Committee CPSU in my delegation. They had a lengthy conference with Ambassador Soldatov. Later I was told by our deputy resident, Pavlov and Shapovalov, that they had brought money and special instructions for the British Communist Party.

Khrushchev had personally ordered Soldatov to meet with certain leaders of the British Communist Party in the expectation of obtaining information on the Berlin situation and on the probable reaction of the British Government in case of a Berlin crisis.

Pavlov, Shapovalov and Milovidov also said that a directive had been received from the Central Committee and military intelligence to employ all agents and friendly contacts in England in order to collect information. The Ambassador had a conference with the intelligence residents and gave them instructions from the center.

Shortly after this all the officers in the embassy took off in various directions all over England to gather the needed information. The entire force of operational, strategic, and political intelligence services was mobilized for this.

I cannot understand at all why the Communists are permitted to operate so freely in England and France. Why are they not shown who is boss? Where are the counter-intelligence services of the Western countries? What are they doing?

COMMUNIST CONTACTS

Ananyev, our officer in Paris, told me that Soviet intelligence has very close working relations with Communists, especially those who work in the government, Army, and NATO. Ananyev and Prokhorov had both told me that it was very easy to carry on illegal operations in France, especially in Paris.

It is true that if we approach an ordinary Frenchman, and he learns that he is speaking with Russians, he will immediately run and report the contact to the police. But French Communists, generally speaking, readily agree to work for us, asking only directions on how and what to do. They act as spotters and obtain military information.

According to Prokhorov, we could not work so well in France without Communist help. He actually made the statement that we bought France easily, and for a cheap price. "We bought the harlot cheap"—those were the words he used.

Military intelligence has levied a requirement on all residencies, especially those in France, to obtain information on the new models of NATO weapons. They are to use all possible contacts, including all the representatives of the countries of the people's democracies, acquaintances and Communists.

There were many other requirements regarding the collection of information of various sorts, including approximately 20 to 25 items directly concerned with electronics, especially electronic technology as used by missile troops of the American and British Armies. We were also directed to obtain information about certain kinds of small American missiles launched from aircraft, which create various forms of interference in the air and disrupt radar scanning.

All operational intelligence officers were assigned the task of visiting chemical enterprises in France, America, and England in order to learn the process and ingredients of solid fuel for missiles.

Information was desired on heat-resisting steel; there seemed to be some reason to believe that the United States had done some very good work in this field. The GRU considers that the French have an excellent solid fuel for missiles and have made great progress in this direction.

I told the resident in Paris that I would be traveling through France and could select suitable sites for dead crops. The resident replied that they had all the dead drop sites needed. He told me not to waste my time on this.

The resident also said that it was very easy to arrange agent meetings in France, to transmit and receive materials, etc. He even indicated that dead drops were seldom used because it was simple to arrange direct meetings with agents. These are not set up very frequently, however, only when necessary.

At the embassies in Paris and London, Tass intercepts and prints all communications which do not find their way into the Soviet press. This is done for all the Ambassadors, Ministers, and Deputy Ministers. In military intelligence they are read by everyone down to and including the chief of a directorate. This is how they learn about everything that goes on in the world but does not get into their own press.

[From the Washington Post, Nov. 9, 1965]

OUR MAN IN THE KREMLIN—DEAD DROPS AND RED SURVEILLANCE

(By Frank Gibney)

Colonel Penkovsky's Paris visit was his last to the West. Although his superiors in military intelligence later made several proposals to send him on foreign assignments, it became clear that the state security police were watching him, for some reason. Penkovsky himself believed that the state security's surveillance arose from the belated discovery that his father had been a White officer in the revolution. He correctly believed that they did not suspect the real truth: that he had volunteered to do espionage for the West.

Back in Moscow, he cooly continued to deliver information to his American and British contacts. He used three standard intelligence methods: (1) carefully arranged "chance encounters"; (2) meetings at the homes of British or Americans he might normally be expected to visit; (3) the device of the "dead drop," the inconspicuous hiding place where a package can be left for a later pick up, without the need for either party to the transaction to meet face to face.

On October 21, just 2 weeks after his return from Paris, Penkovsky had his first meeting with one of his contacts. At 9 p.m. he was walking near the Balchug Hotel, smoking a cigarette and holding in his hand a package wrapped in white paper. A man walked up to him, wearing an overcoat, unbuttoned, and also smoking a cigarette. "Mr. Alex," he said in English. "I am from your two friends who send you a big, big welcome." The package changed hands. Another hoard of documents and observations on Soviet military preparations was on its way westward.

"Alex," for such was his code name, kept on collecting and transmitting information, without skimping on his normal daily rounds. More than ever, he maintained contacts with his friends in the Army. He exuded confidence.

In December Penkovsky resumed meetings with his Western contacts, but the risks involved grew ever more apparent. On January 5, after he had passed some more film to Mrs. Janet Anne Chisholm, wife of a British Embassy attaché, in an elaborately casual encounter, he noticed a small car, violating traffic regulations, had swung around to observe them.

Later that month the same car appeared again at one of his meetings, a small brown sedan with the license plate SHA 61-45, driven by a man in a black overcoat. Penkovsky wrote a letter to a prearranged address in London, advising that no further meetings with Mrs. Chisholm be attempted.

From that time on, Penkovsky relied on the two remaining methods of communication. He either handed over material in the houses of Westerners, to which he was invited in the course of his duties, or relied on the relative anonymity of dead-drops which were, of course, the safest way to communicate. But they had their own peculiar suspenses and horrors. In effect, an agent working through dead-drops finds himself playing a grown-up game of blindman's buff.

Through the spring of 1962 Penkovsky's existence was bounded by a collection of these inconspicuous hiding places. Drop No. 1 was located in the doorway of No. 5-6 Pushkin Street, behind a radiator painted dark green. Messages to be sent were placed in a matchbox wrapped in light blue paper, bound with cellophane tape and wire, and hung on a certain hook behind the radiator.

When Penkovsky had something to leave there, he was to make a black mark on Post No. 35 on the Kutuzov Prospect. He would then put the materials in the drop, and make two telephone calls to numbers G 3-26-87 and G 3-26-94, each with a set number of rings. And so it went. Such are the complexities of a working intelligence operation.

Through it all, Penkovsky continued to jot down his observations and his own warning to the West. The following excerpt discusses one of the most chilling aspects of Soviet war preparation: unrestricted chemical warfare.

(By Oleg Penkovsky)

It is not enough for Krushchev to prepare for atomic and hydrogen warfare. He is also preparing for chemical warfare. A special 7th Directorate in the general staff is involved in working out methods of chemical and bacteriological warfare.

The Chief Chemical Directorate of the Ministry of Defense is also concerned with the problems of chemical and bacteriological warfare. We also have the Voroshilov Military Academy of Chemical Defense, several

military-chemical schools and scientific research institutes and laboratories in the field of chemistry and bacteriology. They are all working on these military projects.

Near Moscow there is a special proving ground for chemical defense. I know a new gas has been invented which is colorless, tasteless, and without odor. The gas is avowed to be very effective and highly toxic. The secret of the gas is not known to me. It has been named "American." Why this name was chosen, I can only guess.

Many places in the country have experimental centers for testing various chemical and bacteriological devices. One such base is in Kaluga. The commanding officer of this base is Nikolay Varentsov, the brother of Marshal Varentsov.

Near the city of Kalinin, on a small island in the Volga, there is a special bacteriological storage place. Here they keep large containers with bacilli of plagues and other contagious diseases. The entire island is surrounded by barbed wire and is very securely guarded. But my readers in the West must not be under any illusions. This is not the only place where there are such containers.

ARTILLERY EQUIPPED

Soviet artillery units all are regularly equipped with chemical warfare shells. They are at the gunsights, and our artillery is routinely trained in their use. And let there be no doubt: If hostilities should erupt, the Soviet Army would use chemical weapons against its opponents. The political decision has already been made and our strategic military planners have developed a doctrine which permits the commander in the field to decide whether to use chemical weapons, and when and where.

I recently read an article entitled "Principles of the Employment of Chemical Missiles" of the top secret military publication "Information Collection of Missile Units and Artillery." It is being distributed this month, August 1961. (This publication is intended to explain the latest in tactical and operational doctrine to the highest ranking officers, i.e., major general and above.)

The article wastes no time and minces no words. It opens with the statement that under modern conditions highly toxic chemical agents are one of the most powerful means of destroying the enemy.

There is no mention made of waiting until the enemy uses chemical weapons; there is no reference to the need for a high-level political decision for the use of such weapons.

From the start to finish the article makes it clear that this decision has been made, that chemical shells and missiles may be considered just ordinary weapons available to the military commander, to be used routinely by him when the situation calls for it. The article specifically states, "The commander of the army (front) makes the decision to use chemical weapons."

The authors add that one of the most important uses for chemical missiles will be the destruction of the enemy's nuclear strike capability. Specific mention is made of the Little John, Honest John, Lacrosse, Corporal, Redstone, and Sergeant units, the width and depth of their dispersed formations under tactical conditions, and their vulnerabilities to the chemical attack. Also American cruise missile and atomic artillery units. The article contains the usual precautions about the necessity to prevent damage to friendly troops, and discussed the operational situations in which chemical weapons could be used to greatest advantage. This is how it concludes:

"The purpose of this article is to present the main fundamental principles of using chemical missiles: Those principles should not, under any circumstances, be considered as firmly established, because they can be defined with greater precision as practical experience is accumulated."

Soviet officers generally consider Americans to be extremely lax in matters of training and discipline for defense against chemical attack. I have heard that American soldiers even boast of throwing away their gas masks and other protective equipment, claiming they have lost them. I can hardly believe this, but even if it is only partly true, it is a training deficiency which must be corrected immediately. Such crucial flaws in an enemy's defensive armor are not overlooked by Soviet planners.

[From the Washington Post, Nov. 10, 1965]

OUR MAN IN THE KREMLIN—PENKOVSKY ON LAST ARRIVAL IN MOSCOW KNEW SOVIET NET WAS CLOSING ON HIM

(By Frank Gibney)

"I am under observation," Colonel Penkovsky said, when his British businessman contact, Greville Wynne, arrived in Moscow for what proved to be his last visit before Penkovsky's arrest. It was July 1962.

Penkovsky had continued to produce tremendous quantities of information for American and British intelligence, but by now he was considering means of making his escape.

He still could not be sure what the state security police suspected, but he realized that a net of surveillance was tightening around him.

A less bold or zealous man would have curtailed his activities. But Penkovsky knew the extent of Khrushchev's buildup in missiles, as well as his continued plans for military provocation over Berlin. He sacrificed caution in his effort to get his warning across to Washington and London.

Wynne brought Penkovsky letters from his contacts in the West, which improved his spirits. Western intelligence officers had forged a new passport for Penkovsky to use within the Soviet Union in case surveillance increased to the danger point. He had previously discussed the possibility of leaving Moscow for Leningrad and somehow making a rendezvous with a submarine in the Baltic. However farfetched the plan seemed, he was also thinking of some way to get his family out as well.

On the fourth of July 1962, Penkovsky attended a reception at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, where he apparently succeeded in turning over information on the Soviet missile buildup to U.S. officers. On July 5, he and Wynne had a last meeting, at dinner, at the Peiping Restaurant in Moscow. There they ran into the most obvious kind of surveillance by the state security.

Penkovsky wrote down this account of the event after it happened. "On approaching the Peiping I noticed surveillance of Wynne. I decided to go away without approaching him. Then I became afraid that he might have some return material for me before his departure from Moscow. I decided to enter the restaurant and to have dinner with Wynne in plain sight of everyone.

"Entering the vestibule I saw that Wynne was surrounded (and that surveillance was either a demonstrative or an inept one). Having seen that there were no free tables, I decided to leave, knowing that Wynne would follow me. I only wanted to find out if he had material for me and then to part with him until morning, having told him that I would see him off. I went 100 to 150 meters beyond into a large, through courtyard with a garden. Wynne followed me, and the two of us immediately saw the two detectives following us. Exchanging a few words, we separated.

"I was very indignant about this insolence, and on the following day, I reported officially to my superiors that State security workers had prevented me from dining with a foreigner whom we respect, have known for a long time, with whom we have relations of mutual trust, with whom I have been working for a long time, etc. I said that our guest felt uncomfortable when he saw that he was being tendered such attention.

"My superiors agreed with me that this was a disgrace, and Levin (the State security representative) was equally indignant about the surveillance. Levin said that the committee and I as its representative, granted the necessary courtesies to Wynne and that we (State security) do not have any claims on him."

Pankovsky's cool-headed bluff bought him time—almost 3 months' worth. He continued to photograph secret documents in the general staff library, relying on his good connections in Soviet military circles to hold off further action by the State security police.

Later, the Moscow press strenuously attempted to play down Penkovsky's influence and associations with Soviet generals and marshals.

Izvestia, for example, called him "a rank and file official whose contacts and acquaintances did not go beyond a limited circle of restaurant habitues, drunkards, and philanderers."

How true this characterization was may be gaged from the papers themselves, a record of which the regime was, of course, ignorant. In the following excerpt, Penkovsky describes one of the many intimate gatherings at which he hobnobbed with the Kremlin hierarchy: Marshal Varenstov's birthday party in September 1961.

(By Oleg Penkovsky)

Marshal Varentsov's birthday party was held at his country home. Many guests were invited, including the minister of defense, Marshal Malinovsky. My whole family, including even my mother, was invited long in advance. Yekaterina Karpovna, Varentsov's wife, asked me to be master of ceremonies (temadan).

On the evening of September 16, 1961, the guests began to arrive: Marshal Malinovsky with his wife; Chruayev, Khrushchev's right-hand man in the Central Committee Bureau for the Russian Republic (R.S.F.S.R.); Lieutenant Ryabchikov; Major General Semenov, and many others.

All the military were in civilian clothes with the exception of Malinovsky, who came wearing his uniform. Some of those invited could not come because they were busy, many of them out of town on business trips. The most important guests, of course, were Malinovsky and Churayev. Both arrived in Chaikas (the largest Soviet luxury car).

Malinovsky presented Varentsov with a large (3-liter) bottle of champagne, Churayev gave him a large wooden carved eagle, someone even gave Sergey Sergeyevich a black dog. The best and the most original presents were those from me and my family.

They were the things I had bought in London. Varentsov openly admitted it by declaring loudly: "My boy has really outdone himself this time." And my presents went from one guest to another. Everyone asked where and how I managed to get such beautiful things. Mrs. Varentsov and my wife quietly explained to the guests about my latest trip to London. The answer was always the same: "Oh, well, that of course explains it."

MOTHER'S QUESTION

At some point, while the party was in full swing, my mother approached Malinovsky and out of a clear sky asked him: "Forgive me, an old woman, Comrade Minister, my dear Rodion Yakovlevich, tell me please will there be a war? This question worries all of us so much."

[From the Washington Post, Nov. 11, 1965]

OUR MAN IN THE KREMLIN—HOW PENKOVSKY WAS SEIZED—AIDED IN FLIGHT OF ENGLISH ASSOCIATE

(By Frank Gibney)

Early in the morning of July 6, 1962, Colonel Penkovsky drove to Sheremetevo airport and met Greville Wynne in the passenger waiting room.

Using his Party card to overawe customs and security personnel, Penkovsky changed Wynne's tickets, rushed him through the departure formalities, and saw him aboard the first westbound plane, an S.A.S. flight headed for Copenhagen.

Coming on the heels of their surveillance at the Peking Restaurant the night before, the hasty departure must inevitably have deepened the suspicions of the State Security Police. But Penkovsky knew that Wynne was in some danger.

Heedless of his own risk, he wanted at all costs to assure Wynne's safety.

Over the next three months the colonel succeeded in getting several packets of information out to his Western contacts, mostly through the use of "dead drops" and prearranged messages.

On September 5, he brought some film to an American Embassy reception, but he could find no safe opportunity to transfer it.

The next day he tried to establish contact with one of his British sources. That effort, too, proved fruitless. The net had tightened.

On October 22, according to official Soviet record, Col. Oleg Penkovsky was arrested by representatives of the State Security, in Moscow, and taken to Lubianka Prison. On November 2, Greville Wynne was kidnaped in Budapest, where he had gone to make preliminary arrangements for a mobile trade exhibition in Eastern Europe. He was flown to Moscow in an aircraft commanded by a State Security general and thrown into Lubianka for interrogation.

The "interrogation" of Penkovsky and Wynne was to last fully six months.

What finally betrayed Penkovsky? It was certainly not the result of a long cat-and-mouse game played by an all-seeing State Security. Penkovsky's high rank and access to the Kremlin's secrets made him far too dangerous an enemy for the Soviet high command to temporize with, in an effort to learn more about his contacts, sources, etc.

The minute his spying was discovered, it would have to be stopped. So the discovery must have been made just before his arrest.

The State Security's original discovery that Penkovsky's father was a White Russian officer—a damaging item in any Soviet file—undoubtedly started an investigation. In the course of the investigation, the State Security Police noticed Penkovsky's frequent meetings with foreigners.

Even though Penkovsky's position in Intelligence permitted such associations, there must have been a great many dangerous foreign contact reports in his security file.

The expensive gifts he brought back from the West, for high army and party officials, also aroused some suspicion. Wynne still believes that Penkovsky was first suspected of blackmarketeering—not an unusual crime among Soviet officials.

There was another important factor. Through the spring and summer of 1962, as tension with the West was built up by Khrushchev, the state security had been ordered to tighten its surveillance on all foreigners—and Russians who associated with them.

Ironically, the same "collision course for war" which Penkovsky warned about was responsible for the intensified surveillance that brought on his arrest.

At some point the state security searched Penkovsky's apartment. Once the searchers found the secret drawer with Penkovsky's espionage apparatus—cameras, radio and instructions for Western contacts—the colonel's doom was sealed.

Could Penkovsky have saved himself before that time? Probably yes. In July, for instance, after Wynne's return to London, Penkovsky could have sent a message to London announcing that he was breaking off communication, temporarily cut his Western contacts and, above all, destroyed the incriminating materials in his desk drawer.

He did not do this precisely because he thought it necessary, to the very last, to continue his warnings about Khrushchev's political adventurism and its danger to the world.

In the following excerpt from the papers, one of the last he wrote, he discusses the Soviet nuclear menace—and Khrushchev's disregard of any test ban in 1961 and 1962.

(We must remember that Khrushchev agreed to a test ban in 1963, only after the United States faced him down in Cuba.)

(By Oleg Penkovsky)

Many of our nuclear explosions (tests) have been conducted in the central part of the U.S.S.R., mostly in Kazakhstan. Some of the smaller tests were not noticed at all and were not recorded by the Western states.

The large nuclear explosions are reported by Tass and the Soviet press, but nothing is ever said about the smaller ones. At the general staff we sometimes know of tests being conducted on a certain type of nuclear weapon, and we wait to see what Tass will say about this. If Tass keeps silent, then we keep silent, too.

Tests of various new types of nuclear weapons are conducted daily. Nuclear test explosions take place more often than reported by Tass or the Soviet press. All this talk about the Soviet Union advocating the prohibition of nuclear tests is nothing but lies.

Khrushchev will fire anyone who mentions complete suspension of nuclear tests. He is not ready for it.

He will sign an agreement prohibiting nuclear tests only after he becomes convinced that the U.S.S.R. is ahead of the United States in the use of nuclear energy for military purposes. The negotiations could last another 10 years without any results.

There is a shortage of atomic raw materials needed for the atom bombs and missiles with nuclear warheads. Almost all the ore containing uranium comes to the Soviet Union from Czechoslovakia.

Recently some uranium ore deposits have been found in China, but they are very insignificant. Soviet monazite sands and ore deposits are not particularly rich either in elements necessary for atomic energy.

In views of this shortage of atomic raw materials, it is small wonder that our government is so interested in establishing Soviet control in the Congo. The largest uranium ore deposits are in the Congo.

When Lumumba was temporarily in power in the Congo, the Soviets sent 23 planeloads of officers (including generals) there via Egypt and Sudan. The aircraft were of the IL–14 and IL–18 types; heavier types could not land on the Sudanese airfield, and other countries would not give permission for the Soviet aircraft to land for refueling.

A good friend of mine, Maj. Aleksey Guryev, was the first one to fly to the Congo with the Soviet generals. The primary task of this mission was to establish Soviet control over the uranium ore in the Congo.

On September 8, 1961, there was a regular experimental atomic explosion of a 16-megaton bomb. This was the first test explosion of a bomb of such force in the Soviet Union. An R–12 missile was used in this test. The missile was launched from the base at Kapustin Yar. Varentsov was present when the missile was launched.

Later, when a 50-megaton bomb was tested, to everybody's surprise the explosion's actual force equaled that of 80 megatons. Such great force was not expected.

It was believed that some unforeseen chemical changes in the charge must have taken place after it was prepared. It is now thought that such a bomb with a calculated force of 100 megatons may actually produce an explosion equaling that of 150 or 160 megatons.

Why did Khrushchev unexpectedly begin to conduct new nuclear tests?

(The Soviets resumed nuclear testing on September 1, 1961. They continued the practice until the nuclear test-ban treaty of 1963)

All nuclear tests have had and some still have two phases. The first phase deals with the explosive force in TNT equivalents.

In these tests the bombs were dropped from aircraft or from special masts. The second phase tests nuclear payloads lifted by missiles.

The present tests are almost exclusively on the second phase type. Almost all of them are conducted with missiles.

Why is Khrushchev pushing these nuclear tests? Why is he unwilling to sign the agreement forbidding nuclear weapons tests? Because most of our missiles have not even passed the necessary tests, let alone of missile production, as regards quality and there have been many instances of missiles and satellites exploding in the air or disappearing completely.

But Khrushchev persistently does everything possible to improve missile weapons. He wants to seize the initiative and to show the West that he is ahead in the field of missile production, as regards quality as well as quantity.

Khrushchev and our scientists are still quite far from being able to prove such a superiority; but they are working hard to improve all types of missile weapons.

General Kupin says there are insufficient defense facilities in case of war, particularly as regards defense against radioactive substances.

Although we tell our people working in defense plants that everything is under control and that there is no danger of contamination, they are still afraid.

Many become ill, after working for 6 months or a year. Even our nuclear-powered icebreaker *Lenin* is a floating deathtrap because of its badly designed valves which allow radioactive leakage.

(EDITOR'S NOTE.—On August 25, 1962, Colonel Penkovsky added the following personal note to the Papers. It was one of the few entries with a date affixed. It was the last thing ever received from him.)

I have already grown used to the fact that I note periodically some degree of surveillance and control over my movements. The "neighbors" continue to study me. There is some reason for this KGB activity. I confuse and lose myself in guesses and suppositions. I am very far from exaggerating the dangers. Still, I am an optimist and I try to evaluate the situation objectively.

I am not disappointed in my life or my work. The most important thing is that I remain full of strength and desire to continue this work. To tell the truth about the Soviet system—it is the goal of my life. And if I succeed in contributing my little bricks to this great cause, there can be no greater satisfaction.

[From the Washington Post, Nov. 12, 1965]

OUR MAN IN THE KREMLIN—PENKOVSKY FATE NEVER IN DOUBT

(By Frank Gibney)

"On May 7, 1963, in Moscow in the Court of Session Hall of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R., there began an open trial in the criminal case of the agent of the British and American intelligence services and citizens of the U.S.S.R. O. V. Penkovsky and the subject of Britain and spy go-between, Gre-

ville Wynne." (Information release, Military Collegium of the Soviet Supreme Court.)

The trial of Colonel Penkovsky and Greville Wynne lasted all of 4 days, and one of these days was occupied by a closed session. The verdict was never in doubt. Penkovsky was sentenced to death, Wynne to 16 years' imprisonment.

Both defendants confessed their guilt, as agreed on during the long months of brutal state security interrogation. Wynne displayed some obvious reservations, however, and he left little doubt about the extent of his coaching and coercion.

Penkovsky had agreed to the humiliation of a Soviet "show" trial for only one reason: to safeguard the lives of his family.

As Wynne later said, it was clear that he had made a bargain with his state security interrogators. If he played the game, as they ordered it, his wife and children would be spared the imprisonment they might ordinarily have expected, as close relatives of an enemy of the state.

He was probably safe in assuming the bargain would be kept. The Stalinist terror has left such a bad taste in the mouth of all Russians that reprisals against a political prisoner's family are generally unpopular. Penkovsky's wife and children never suspected the dangerous crusade to which he had committed himself. He naturally wanted to spare them the worst of its consequences.

WYNNE FREED IN EXCHANGE

Wynne was released in 1964, in exchange for the Soviet spy Konon Melody, who under the name of Gordon Lonsdale had been passing information to Moscow from London. Although "Lonsdale's" espionage against the British can hardly be compared to the magnitude of Penkovsky's disclosures to the West, he was a professional Soviet intelligence officer and they wanted him back in Moscow.

The very fact that a trial had to be held must have been embarrassing to the Kremlin. But Penkovsky had to have a public trial. Eight British and U.S. diplomats in Moscow had been declared persona non grata for their connections with him. A foreign national, Wynne was directly implicated.

But Penkovsky himself was too big a fish to dismiss with the minimal notice reserved for most such offenses. The wave of transfers and demotions in the Soviet intelligence service and the army, following Penkovsky's arrest, was too large to avoid explaining. (Some 300 intelligence officers alone were hastily recalled to Moscow.

Finally Penkovsky's associates in the army were too highly placed to avoid the most public sort of warning.

TRIAL PLANNED 6 MONTHS

For 6 months the prosecution had worked out the details of those 4 days in court. Wynne was interrogated steadily, since the day—November 3, 1962, when he was flown to Moscow after his abduction in Budapest by Soviet and Hungarian security men.

Inside the Lubianka Prison, the State Security arranged a meeting with both Penovsky and Wynne. There Penkovsky begged ynne to cooperate in a public trial. Wynne reed to cooperate within limits. After 6 lpless months in a solitary cell of the ubianka, there was little option left to him. e feared also, that without a public trial, nothing would be known of his fate.

In the pretrial interrogations Penkovsky, who had a rough time of it, made no attempt to disguise his motives and actions. He told his interrogators that he had acted not primarily to help the West, but in the best interests of his own people, the Russians. This was hardly a defense which a Soviet court would permit him to repeat in public. (It is of interest that the final statements of both defendants were made in a closed court session.)

The two defense attorneys assigned to Wynne and Penkovsky went through the motions of talking to their "clients," but only after the interrogators had finished. (Wynne's attorney, who spent most of his time in court agreeing with the prosecution, later presented him with a capitalist-sized bill.)

DEFENDANTS REHEARSED

When the trial was finally staged, both defendants had been rehearsed thoroughly, even to the point of visiting the courtroom in advance. The military court, presided over by Lt. Gen. V. V. Borisoglebskiy, called four witnesses, two of them acquaintances of Penkovsky's, and produced nine experts to certify the equipment found in Penkovsky's apartment, the security nature of the information which he gave, and other things.

In the orderly process of question and answer the whole story of Penkovsky's espionage against the Soviet Union was repeated, from the first meeting with Wynne in Moscow and the confrontation with the British and American intelligence officers in London.

Lt. Gen. A. G. Gornyy, the chief military prosecutor, summarized it at the outset: "* * * the accused Penkovsky is an opportunist, a careerist and a morally decayed person who took the road of treason and betrayal of his country and was employed by imperialist intelligence services.

"By the end of 1960 he attempted to get in touch with the American intelligence service, further exploiting the undeserved trust placed in him and his position as deputy head of the Foreign Department of the State Committee for the Coordination of Scientific Research Work—having, through the nature of his work, the opportunity to meet foreigners visiting the Soviet Union as members of the various scientific and cultural delegations."

NO DOUBT OF GUILT

There was no doubt that Penkovsky had engaged in the most serious sort of espionage. The catalog of material confiscated in his apartment as read off at the Soviet trial would in itself offer ample grounds for an espionage conviction.

"During the search at Penkovsky's apartment, in addition to the already mentioned records with the telephone numbers of the foreign intelligence officers, six message postcards with instructions for them, the report and the exposed rolls of film, the following articles were discovered in a secret hiding place installed in his desk, and were attached to the file as tangible evidence: a forged passport, six cipher pads, three Minox cameras and a description of them, two sheets of specially treated paper for writing secret text, a memorandum with an indication of the frequencies on which Penkovsky received instructional radio transmission from the foreign intelligence services, the draft of a report from Penkovsky to the intelligence headquarters, the article which Penkovsky had received from the foreign intelligence services and which he intended to publish in the Soviet Union, 15 unexposed rolls of film for the Minox camera, and various instruction manuals provided by the foreign intelligence services—the Soniya (Sony) radio receiver which he had received from the foreign intelligence services and which he used to receive enciphered radio messages from the intelligence headquarters, and the typewriter on which Penkovsky typed his reports."

There was no doubt, either, whom Penkovsky had been dealing with. Witness the prosecutor's angry tirade:

"A leading role in this belongs to the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States—the support of the most adventurist circles in the United States. Like a giant octopus it extends its tentacles into all corners of the earth, supports a tremendous number of spies and secret informants, continually organizes plots and murders, provocations and diversions. Modern techniques are put to the service of espionage: from the miniature Minox cameras which you see before you up to space satellites, spies in the sky."

IMPORTANT FACTS HIDDEN

But what the Soviet prosecutors could not do was admit the two most important facts in the whole case: (1) Penkovsky's real identity as a colonel in Military Intelligence and the real extent of his contacts with the Soviet hierarchy; and (2) Penkovsky's real motive in betraying the Soviet regime.

In the Soviet record, he could be a drunkard, a philanderer, greedy, and a girl chaser—all these motives the prosecution clumsily attempted to adduce. But the Communist system is too brittle and insubstantial to admit that such a highly placed official could revolt against it because he thought the system was bad and wrong.

As a result the trial showed up as a farce. (Even witnesses from military intelligence had to be disguised as officers from the educational branch of the Ministry of Defense.) The Soviet prosecutors left only an agonizing question mark, when they tried to show how such a brilliant and promising officer had gone wrong.

Time and time again Penkovsky's past credentials were certified: a war hero, a brilliant officer (and even more brilliant if one included his real record in intelligence), and a responsible Soviet official.

Then suddenly came the fall in 1960. Despite all the prosecutor's attempts to trace the beginning of careerism, it was, as they depicted it, a fall as abrupt as original sin and about as rationally explainable. An extraordinary gap yawned between the able, hardworking, trusted Soviet official and the cringing specimen of "moral depravity" which General Gornyy presented, in a summation titled "Penkovsky's path from careerism and moral degradation to treachery."

"Penkovsky is dead," the prosecutor told Izvestia and the world, a few days after the trial ended. "The sentence was carried out on May 16, in the second half of the day. When it was announced to him that the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. had denied his petition for mercy and he was to be executed, there was not a trace of the poseur's manner which he had maintained in court. He met death like a despicable coward."

So ended the career of the most extraordinary volunteer spy of this century.

The free world is forever in his debt.

(By Greville Wynne)

(The following description of Oleg Penkovsky was written after Wynne returned from Soviet captivity. Wynne was the last westerner to see Penkovsky alive.)

Oleg Penkovsky was a most extraordinary man. It was an unforgettable experience to accompany him, particularly during his first visits to London and Paris, and to see the tremendous impact of our free society on a decent, and by Soviet standards, sophisticated man, but a man who had been sheltered all his life inside the prison of the Soviet system.

It was the people in the West who impressed him most. He was amazed, for example, to find that the assistants in department stores were clean, neat in dress and well groomed, that nearly all the young ladies there were attractive, smiling and anxious to please.

I had often visited the gloomy GUM department store in Moscow and the drab shops in Gorky street with their drab, surly attendants. So I had some idea of the mental contrast he must have been making.

He was interested in religion. He had indeed been baptized himself by his pious mother. In London one day we were passing the Brompton Oratory. He asked me whether it was a church and whether he could go in to look around.

He was fascinated. "This is good," he said. "Perhaps the religious doctrine is not entirely correct, but at least it gives us a principle to guide our life. At home in the Soviet Union we have nothing. There are no principles—only what the Party tells us."

Wherever we went he was accepted as my friend. This first amazed him, but also pleased him immensely. Such a terrific contrast from the Soviet system where it is still highly dangerous for citizens to mix socially with Westerners.

He was bitter about the Soviet regime. He would weep, quite literally, when he talked about its misdeeds and the sufferings or unhappiness of his friends in the Soviet Union.

At the very end of his Paris trip he worried about going back. He knew he could stay. I shall never forget that day when I picked up Oleg in the early morning for a drive to the airport in thick fog. Then we waited for over 4 hours for the plane to take off. He almost stayed. His face was tense with his decision. Finally he made up his mind, turned to me and said, "Oh Greville, I must go back. I have more work to do."

KNEW HE WAS WATCHED

It was then July 1962, and he knew that the State Security was watching him. He was a lonely man in those last months in Moscow. What a burden he carried.

The more I knew him, the more I realized that Penkovsky was an extraordinarily high-minded man. He did what he did because it was the one way he, as an individual, could strike back at a system that had debased his country. I never saw him waiver from this basic decision from the moment we first met.

He had thought things through many months before I first made contact with him. He was willing to put up with the basic deceptions of spying and the tremendous strain of this lonely life, because he believed in a cause. He believed simply that a free society should emerge in the Soviet Union, and that it could only come by toppling the only government he knew. He was a heroic figure.

I shall never forget him.

[From the Washington Post, Nov. 14, 1965]

OUR MAN IN THE KREMLIN—SPY LECTURE BROUGHT OUT—PENKOVSKY SMUGGLED TRAINING DATA TO WARN AMERICA

(By Frank Gibney)

(A Soviet Spy's Guidebook to the United States: a top-secret lecture, given to Soviet intelligence officers in Moscow at the Military-Diplomatic Academy, by Lt. Col. I. E. Prikhodko, officially titled: "Characteristics of Agent Communications and of Agent Handling in the U.S.A.").

In the vast amount of intelligence material which Col. Oleg Penkovsky smuggled out of Moscow—Soviet prosecutors at his trial in 1963 themselves admitted he had passed on 5,000 separate photographed items—Penkovsky apparently thought this one item, in particular, should receive the widest distribution.

This training lecture was given in 1961 to acquaint Soviet intelligence officers with some of the problems and opportunities of espionage in the United States.

SERVED IN THE UNITED STATES

Its author, Lt. Col. I. E. Prikhodko, had himself served as an intelligence officer in New York, from 1952 to 1955, under "cover" of a post with the Soviet Mission to the United Nations.

Penkovsky first read it in the course of a briefing session in Moscow while preparing for a mission to the United States, which was later canceled. He sent it along, with the papers, as "a warning to the American people" of the extent to which Soviet espionage has expanded, in fact, formalized, its widespread undercover activities in the United States.

Although the language of the Prikhodko lecture in professorial, its content is hair raising. It is literally a professional working manual for Soviet intelligence officers in the United States, complete with instructions on how to recruit American agents to do their spying work—a most sinister variety of how-to-do-it book.

As his first step, Colonel Prikhodko tries to give his pupils—most of them Soviet intelligence officers of major's or lieutenant colonel's rank—an objective introduction to the strange ways and customs of Americans, regarded in his Soviet classroom as virtually citizens of another world.

COMMUNIST CONTACT

Although Col. Prikhodko was trying to be objective, his guidebook is a weird article with observed reality constantly being confused with the necessity to interpret everything in a Communist context. While the colonel finds the Americans, on the one hand, energetic, enterprising, and open people, resourceful, courageous and industrious, they are at the same time demoralized by bourgeois society and constantly diverted by "monopolists" into spending their time in silly amusements instead of "meditative and deliberative activity."

They have a natural love of freedom and independence, but they are always swayed by money and indifferent to anything not connected with business.

If this clinical Soviet appraisal of Americans is unintentionally funny, it is also frightening. For the Soviet intelligence officers who study lectures like this are the very men the Kremlin relies on to make estimates of American responses to Soviet actions.

THE LECTURE

Agent communications and agent handling involve first and last working with people, as a rule from the bourgeois world. For this work to be successful, it is necessary that Soviet officers know these people well, their characteristics and their personality traits, and the political and economic circumstances which condition their behavior.

In the recruitment of agents, preference should be given to Americans because they are highly trusted both in the United States and in the countries of Europe. It is much easier for an American agent to deliver mail for the "Center" "i.e., intelligence headquarters in Moscow" from the United States to one of the West European countries (a neutral country or an ally of the United States) and mail to our residencies in the United States.

An intelligence officer, however, who does not know the characteristics of the American way of life or who neglects those aspects cannot be trusted to handle and control American agents working for us.

TRAITS STUDIED

The way of life, customs, temper, demeanor, and personality traits of Americans have specific significance. Most Americans are energetic, enterprising, and open people, with a great sense of humor.

They can be described as having business acumen and as being resourceful, courageous, and industrious.

The over-all situation and the absolute power of money in the United States arouses just one desire in many people—to make more money.

In describing a person, Americans often use the expression, "He knows how to make money," which means that such a person has a lot of money.

The other side of the question, specifically where the money comes from or how it is "made," is not, as a rule, of interest to anybody.

It can be said that Americans encourage any method of getting rich.

American bourgeois propaganda tries in every way to convince the population that anyone can make money if he is sufficiently resourceful.

Such a one-sided upbringing engenders in some of the people an indifference to everything unconnected with business, profits, and gain. The American love of money can be exploited by paying an agent for his work in order to increase his personal interest in working for us.

Payments must be prompt and equitable. This disciplines the agent and improves the Soviet officer's authority.

To encourage an agent, monthly payments are increased or bonuses, awards, or valuable gifts are given.

Thus, for example, agent B, who was on a monthly salary, reduced his production appreciably. His attendance at meetings and visits to dead drops were irregular. Despite rebukes by the intelligence officer, the agent's work did not improve.

The intelligence officer decided that he would have to use material inducement. With the Center's permission he began to pay the agent only for those months during which the agent actually worked and performed his operational activities.

Soon B realized that further backsliding would result only in the loss of all his extra income. He began to perform his tasks more efficiently.

An American's circle of interests is often rather small. Many Americans do not read books. Their main interest lies in advertisements, sports news, and cartoons; on the front pages they only glance at the large sensational headlines.

Generally speaking, bourgeois society demoralizes people.

Every American family tries to save money for a rainy day; therefore a certain amount is set aside from each pay check.

Wall Street does everything possible to keep Americans from devoting their free time to meditation and deliberation. Movies, cheap concerts, boxing, parks, horse races, baseball, football, restaurants—all these are used to divert the masses from the realities around them.

In general, an American's wants consist of having his own automobile, a comfortable apartment, and a good time. Most Americans, both men and women, smoke.

CONCERNED OVER CLOTHES

Americans are very concerned about clothes and outward appearances. They try always to have a clean suit, well pressed with a good crease in the trousers, a clean shirt, and shoes well polished. They send their suits regularly to the cleaner and their shirts to the laundry, both of which are everywhere in the United States. It is customary to change white shirts and socks daily.

It should be noted, therefore, than an intelligence officer who has an outward slovenly appearance will not command respect from an American agent.

In American clothing, light colors predominate. Americans like loose-fitting shoes, as a rule one or two sizes larger than necessary.

In his free time, when not at work, and especially during the summer, the American wears sports clothes: light trousers, short-sleeved shirts, no necktie. Sunglasses are in common use.

Outside the office an American's behavior is free and relaxed. Many Americans like to keep their hands in their pockets and chew gum.

Americans listen to the weather forecast and, if bad weather is predicted, they take an umbrella and raincoat; Americans do not wear rubbers. Both men and women use umbrellas. Thus, before going to a meeting, an intelligence officer should listen to the weather forecast and, if necessary, take an umbrella or a raincoat.

TIME SPENT IN BARS

Americans like to spend their time in bars. Many bars have no tables. Customers sit on high round stools next to the bar. As a rule, bars do not provide snacks or hot dishes. One can order only drinks: whisky, gin, beer, etc.

In order not to attract undue attention, the intelligence officer must know how to order sufficiently well. It is not enough, for example, to ask, "Give me a glass of beer." It is also necessary to name the brand of beer, "Schlitz," "Rheingold," etc. For the customers' amusement, most proprietors install a television set in a corner above the bar. Customers often sit over a single glass of beer for several hours watching television programs.

American drugstores, especially in large cities, have almost become department stores. Therefore they are never without customers. Drugstores can be used to hold short meetings with agents, as well as for other agent activities, e.g., signaling, clandestine phone calls.

Even American movie theaters are distinctive. Most movie theaters in large cities are open from 12 noon to 1 a.m. Moviegoers enter as soon as they get their tickets, and they may take any unoccupied seat. Films are shown continuously. Americans are not content with only a single feature. Therefore, movie theater proprietors show two films, one after the other, which last 3 to 4 hours.

Intelligence officers can make extensive use of movie theaters when organizing agent communications by spending a certain amount of time in them before a meeting. The fact is that there are few people in most movie theaters, especially on weekdays during working hours.

GOLF COURSE MEETINGS

Golf is the most popular sport among the well to do in the United States. Agent meetings can be held at golf courses as easily as in other athletic clubs. During the week there are very few people at the golf courses. On weekdays the intelligence officer and his agent can arrive at the golf course (preferably at different times, 20 to 30 minutes apart), each can begin to play alone, and at a previously designated time can meet at, let us say, the 16th hole or at some other hole (there is a total of 18 holes).

Saturdays and Sundays are less suitable days for holding agent meetings at golf courses because on these days many players gather, tournaments are held, and single play is not permitted. Golf courses are found on the edges of wooded areas or parks in broken terrain where there are many hidden areas. These hidden areas are the best places for holding meetings. In some cases, meetings can be held in clubhouse restaurants.

To hold successful meetings at a golf course, one should learn the conditions there ahead of time. A basic requirement is to know the game and how to play it. Therefore students should learn this game while still here in Moscow at the academy.

Golf club membership is rather expensive, however. Also, not all clubs are equally accessible to our intelligence officers. It is even difficult for local residents, to say nothing of foreigners, to get into some golf clubs, if they do not have a certain position in society.

With club memberships so difficult to obtain it is advisable to use public golf courses.

The technical knowledge of the average American is rather high. In his everyday life he makes wide use of machines, equipment, and instruments. Therefore the training of an American agent in operational technology is all the easier.

Yet it should be emphasized that the national characteristics of American agents are such that they are often careless in their operations. Americans make poor conspirators. They therefore need extremely careful briefing.

When necessary, the intelligence officer must brief the agent on how to smuggle material out of an installation, how to return it undetected, and how to reproduce the material at home or at work. It is very important that our American agents know how to develop proper and plausible cover stories for their extra income and for their periodic absences.

The Soviet intelligence officer can skillfully put to use such American traits as efficiency, resourcefulness, boldness, and perseverance. These will help an American agent to carry out operational tasks and to exploit his operational capabilities fully.

Americans, to a larger degree than representatives of many other peoples, have a natural love of freedom and independence, and do not like discipline. The officer must respect this characteristic and not resort to open pressure on the agent.

Realizing that the majority of Americans are open, straightforward, and happy people with a great sense of humor, the intelligence officer can prepare for and conduct a conversation with an agent that is not dull but lively and witty.

When preparing for a meeting he must try to anticipate the agent's questions, prepare good answers to them, and at the meeting to answer the agent in such a manner that the agent will feel that the intelligence officer is being frank with him.

Americans, like other people, are patriots. They are proud of their country's achievements; they honor their national heroes, and value their cultural monuments.

Therefore the intelligence officer must be careful not to indiscriminately criticize things American, but must remember that an unfortunate statement, for example, about some popular U.S. President (George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, Thomas Jefferson) might offend the agent. A negative result might also come from an officer's underrating American culture.

[From the Washington Post, Nov. 15, 1965]

OUR MAN IN THE KREMLIN—HOW RUSSIAN AGENTS COMMUNICATE WITH SPIES IN THE UNITED STATES

(By Frank Gibney)

One of the most significant documents which Col. Oleg Penkovsky managed to smuggle out of Moscow to the West was the top-secret lecture given by Lt. Col. I. E. Prikhodko to a select audience of Soviet intelligence officers in Moscow, in 1961.

Titled "Characteristics of Agent Communications and Agent Handling in the United States," the lecture is nothing less than a detailed instruction manual for the use of Soviet spies and their American agents, in spying on U.S. secrets.

Probably never in the history of espionage has a document like this ever been surfaced to public view.

In yesterday's excerpt from the Prikhodko lecture, the Soviet "American expert," who had once done spying work in New York under cover of his nominal work as a Soviet U.N. delegation member, gave his Moscow listeners an outline of American national characteristics, with special reference to the virtues and defects of Americans in espionage work.

The following excerpt goes into the details of how Soviet intelligence spies in the United States, the signals Soviet officers use, the places they like to meet their agents, the methods they use to avoid surveillance and detection by the FBI.

THE LECTURE

Under modern conditions, when the U.S.A., as the principal imperialist power, is preparing to unleash a surprise war with the mass employment of nuclear/missile weapons, the basic task of our strategic agent intelligence is to give early warning of U.S. preparations for an armed attack against the U.S.S.R. and other socialist countries.

In view of the probable nature of a future war, an important task is the systematic collection of the most complete data on the following questions:

1. The locations of U.S. missile bases, depots for nuclear weapons, plants producing atomic weapons and missiles of various designations, scientific research institutes, and laboratories developing and perfecting weapons of mass destruction.

2. Information as to the nature and results of scientific research work in the field of creating new models of nuclear and missile weapons and improving existing ones.

3. The status of antiaircraft defense, including the entire radar detection and warning system.

4. The plans of U.S. military commanders on the use of nuclear/missile weapons.

5. U.S. military preparations in the various theaters of operations.

If the imperialists unleash a war, the United States will be the target of a crushing retaliatory strike causing damage to all the most important political and economic centers of that country. The most important tack of intelligence is the prompt reporting of objectives in the United States against which we plan to carry out the first strikes.

Soviet intelligence, therefore, should adopt timely measures to guarantee the security of its intelligence net. To achieve this it is necessary to disperse our operating "residences" and to move some valuable single agents some distance outside the limits of large cities. As for agent nets engaged in collecting intelligence on atomic and missile bases, they should preferably consist of individual sources equipped with radio having direct communications with the "Center" in Moscow.

MEETING VULNERABLE

A meeting between intelligence officer and agent is one of the most vulnerable means of communications. Therefore, in organizing meetings, our intelligence officers must anticipate everything in order to guarantee security.

In the United States where the counterintelligence effort of the Federal Bureau of Investigation is highly developed, planning and preparation for a meeting are of the greatest importance. In planning a meeting one should give the greatest consideration to the characteristics of the American people and of the country, which we have already mentioned, the working and family situation of the agent, his capabilities, etc.

Meetings should be varied as to time of day, days of the week, and dates of the month. For example, meetings should not be held on the fifth day of each month, on Wednesday of every week, or consistently at 8 p.m., because such consistency in the activities of an intelligence officer makes the work of American counterintelligence easier.

Under present working conditions in the United States, one should start for a meeting not later than 2 to 3 hours before the scheduled time, and establish a good "cover" story for the meeting.

For example: An intelligence officer in the United States had a Sunday meeting scheduled for the latter part of the day. After breakfast he took his family for a walk in

the park. He usually took such a walk every Sunday. On the way, he invited a friend.

The two families chose some benches in the park and talked and glanced through newspapers and magazines which they had bought at a stand while the children played nearby. They all visited the zoo together, and they also looked at some monuments.

While passing a movie theater, they looked at the advertising display and decided to see the new film. They all went inside. The intelligence officer, who had a meeting scheduled with an agent, quickly departed through a side door and left for the meeting site along a previously selected route. The meeting was successful. Toward evening the intelligence officer and his family returned home after a restful Sunday.

RENDEZVOUS AT NIGHT

Most meetings are held in the evening, however. As a rule, the agent does not work in the evening and does not have to ask permission of his boss to leave. In addition, evenings provide the greatest security. It is not recommended, however, to hold meetings in a park, because, unlike Europeans, Americans visit parks only during the day.

At the approach of darkness nobody uses the parks. At that time of the day only criminal elements and persons who are mentally ill can be found in the parks. In the press one can find special warnings concerning the danger in going to parks in the evening. It is not unusual for the newspapers to publish detailed accounts of rapes and murders which were committed in the parks during the night.

In choosing a meeting place, it is necessary of course to consider the character of the country as a whole and, above all, the characteristics of the area. As a whole, conditions in the cities of New York and Washington, for example, are favorable for the organization of agent communications.

The existence of a subway in New York helps in locating different places in the city. It should be borne in mind, however, that the subway system there is quite complicated and it should be studied carefully before planning to use it for operational purposes.

In New York it is easy to establish a cover story for going downtown either during the day or at night, because New York has many public places. Skillful use of transportation facilities makes it possible to make a good check for the detection of surveillance. Finally, an intelligence officer who speaks with an accent in New York is quite acceptable since a large segment of the city's population speaks with an accent.

On the other hand the organization and utilization of agent communications in Washington are full of difficulties because of the city's small size, its limited number of public places, no subways, and an inadequate public transportation system, especially in the suburbs.

NEW YORK PROBLEMS

Differences exist not only among the sections and cities of the United States, but also among different sections of cities, often within the very same borough or area.

For example, let us take Manhattan, which is the business area of New York. Negro Harlem is unsuitable for the organization of agent communications in Manhattan. It is located north of Central Park, and the Chinese quarter, located downtown, is also difficult for agents. Extreme squalor distinguishes the Chinese quarter. A properly dressed person will stand out sharply there.

As for Negro Harlem, white people cross it only by automobile. A white person is unsafe there, because the Negroes regard every white person who comes there as a curiosity seeker who came to view them much as people go to the zoo to view the animals in cages.

We do not recommend that meetings be held in the area between 42d and 34th Streets. This is the busiest part of midtown and therefore has the widest coverage by the police and by counterintelligence.

Likewise, it is unadvisable to hold meetings in the vicinity of the U.N. Building (along the shore of the East River, between 42d and 48th Streets), near buildings of the permanent representations of various countries to the U.N. and, above all, the delegations to the U.N. of representations of Socialist countries (the representation of the U.S.S.R. to the United Nations is located at 680 Park Avenue), nor in the vicinity of large banks, jewelry stores, etc.

WASHINGTON DETAILS

In Washington, meetings should not be held in the central part of the city, where congressional buildings, the White House, departmental buildings, and other governmental offices, large banks, stores, and restaurants are located. Neither should they be held on the main streets of the city or in areas where foreign embassies and, especially, the embassies of the U.S.S.R. and other countries of the Socialist camp are located. Meetings should also not be held in areas near military objectives or in the Negro district.

Generally, an operation can be compromised through the improper selection of a meeting site. For example, an intelligence officer, who did not know the city well, once selected a meeting place with an agent on a street corner in the evening. A large bank stood on this corner.

The intelligence officer arrive for the meeting exactly at the appointed time. The agent was late. The intelligence officer was there for less than 2 minutes when a policeman approached, asked him what he was doing there, and requested him to move along. The intelligence officer had to leave quickly. In addition, two plainclothesmen followed him until he entered a subway station. The meeting was not held.

New York and Washington have numerous restaurants, many of them representing different nationalities. Each restaurant has its own distinctive characteristics. One may specialize in steaks (the most expensive steaks are sirloin and T-bone steak) another is seafood; some restaurants have orchestras, others have not. Before selecting a certain restaurant as a meeting site, one should learn everything about the restaurant; the system of service, the type of customers, whether it has a bad reputation with the police, etc.

It is the practice in all restaurants to tip the waitress 10 percent of the amount shown on the check.

Depending on the nature of the agent operation, the officer and agent may sit at the same table and hold the meeting during dinner. Or they may sit at separate tables, keeping only visual contact, for the purpose of exchanging prearranged signals.

AVOID THE PRESS

American stores periodically hold sales of their merchandise at lowered prices. At the beginning of the sale a large number of people usually gather at the store. In their efforts to advertise the sale, the proprietors invite newspaper photographers to the opening of the sale. To avoid being caught by the photographer's lens, our intelligence officers and members of their families should not visit the store during the beginning of the sale.

In New York there are no ticket collectors on the subway. The ticket office does not sell tickets but only metal tokens which cost 15 cents. In passing through the revolving gate at the entrance, the passenger inserts the token in a special slot.

An intelligence officer should always have several tokens with him, especially on the day of a meeting, so as not to waste any time in buying them at the subway entrance.

It is hard to imagine how agent communications would be conducted in New York without using the subway, which, despite its complexity, facilitates one's orientation in the city. It also affords a convenient place to check on the existence or absence of surveillance. In some cases, inadequate knowledge of the subway system has forced officers to cancel meetings with their agents.

Buses also operate without conductors. The driver allows the entrance and departure of passengers, makes change, and hands out transfers (at the request of the passenger). He gives change for bills but only up to $5. Thus the intelligence officer must always be certain that he has small change or $1 bills.

A taxi can be stopped anywhere; this is done merely by waving the hand or by loudly shouting, "Taxi" when an empty one passes.

The driver writes in his log the place a fare entered the taxi, the place he got out, and the time. Therefore, an intelligence officer must never take a taxi directly to the meeting place.

There are many companies in the United States which rent cars. Use of rented cars in the organization of agent communications is recommended, because this has a number of advantages. For instance, an intelligence officer can drive to the city in his own car, check for surveillance, and then leave it in a suitable area or in a parking lot. He can then complete his job in a rented car. This makes the work of the American counterintelligence service more difficult.

USE OF DEAD DROPS

Dead drops (i.e., hiding places where material can be left for prearranged pickups) are extensively used for communication within agent nets, or with individual agents.

Stationary dead drops are selected or specially prepared in parks and squares, in trees, in the ground, in fences, in benches, in monuments, in public buildings, and beyond populated places such as forests, fields, seashores, riverbanks, etc.

In selecting and preparing a "dead drop" in a park, one must bear in mind that a number of American parks (for example, Central Park in New York) have many squirrels which can destroy the "dead drop" (especially in hollow trees) and carry off our material.

The United States has up to 2,000 daily newspapers with a circulation of about 57 million and more than 7,000 magazines. Both newspapers and magazines are considerable space to advertisements and all kinds of announcements. Newspaper companies receive sizable profits from advertisements and announcements and therefore accept them very readily.

Advertisements published in American newspapers differ greatly in content and in length. The most common ones deal with the sale and rental of living quarters, the sale of personal effects, employment opportunities, announcements of weddings, divorces, births, and deaths, the loss of valuables and pets, etc. Below are several samples of advertisements which could be used in intelligence work. (Following samples appear in English.)

"POSITION WANTED

"Housework: Mature Colombian maid speaking a little English will give considerable care to children or invalid lady; do efficient general housework, $25–$30 per week. Exeter 4–0482, 7–10 p.m

"DOMESTIC EMPLOYMENT

"Chauffeur, white—wanted. Age 35, married. 12 years experience. Intelligent, alert, neat. Fordham 4–7457 before noon."

"PUBLIC NOTICES AND COMMERCIAL NOTICES

"My wife, Jane Smith Doe, has left my bed and board. I am no longer responsible for

her debts. John Doe, 17 Leslie Lane, Dobbs Ferry, N.Y."

One can see from these examples that many advertisements can be adapted quite easily to the transmittal of information. Among the code words which can be used are: the names or description of a lost article; a description of the circumstances; the place and time it was lost; the size of the reward for returning the valuable or pet; etc.

Illegal residences have a greater opportunity to make use of the press in arranging agent communications. Residences under cover may use the press on a lesser scale, primarily to transmit information or signals from agent to intelligence officer. On the whole, the United States presents favorable conditions for the use of the press for intelligence work.

A sum of money is paid to place an advertisement or some kind of announcement in the press. The text of these advertisements will contain a prearranged coded secret message.

A thorough study of the specific features of the country enables one to select the most natural signals. For example one of our intelligence officers called an agent for an introductory meeting by sending the newspaper Washington Daily News to his apartment. The intelligence officer went to the city, made a careful check, and then called the newspaper office from a public telephone and asked them to start delivery on the next day to the address he gave them (the agent's address). A week after delivery started, the agent appeared at the prearranged meeting place.

Radio communications provide the most rapid means for transmitting orders and instruction from the center.

Because of our distance from the United States, should the need arise, we can set up radio relay stations which can be located on ships, submarines, and aircraft. We also must not exclude the possibility that in the not too distant future we can install a radio station on an earth satellite.

In certain special situations, we might consider the possibility of getting a courier to the American mainland by submarine. It must be remembered, however, that the United States shore defenses are stronger than those of other countries of the American continent. Therefore one should not always attempt to land an agent directly in the United States. At times it is possible to send mail to a third country (for example, Mexico) and then deliver it overland to the United States. Mail sent in this manner can be placed in the center's dead drops.

[From the Washington Post, Nov. 12, 1965]

WEST'S SPIES ACTIVE, WYNNE HINTS

(By Flora Lewis)

NEW YORK, November 11.—The Englishman who was freed from a Moscow jail in exchange for Soviet Spy Gordon Lonsdale today indicated that there are top Western spies now functioning in the Soviet Union.

Greville Wynne, who served as contact for Western intelligence with Soviet State Security Col. Oleg Penkovsky, appeared at a press conference here to help launch the "Penkovsky Papers." The book, now being serialized in the Washington Post, is said to be Penkovsky's memoirs smuggled to the West before the writer was convicted of spying and executed in Russia.

Wynne was arrested in Hungary 10 days after Penkovsky was arrested in Moscow. The Englishman was taken to Russia immediately, tried, sentenced to 8 years in prison but sent home after 18 months in return for Lonsdale.

He spoke with ardent admiration for Penkovsky, whose main aim in providing valuable information to the West was "to prevent a war," Wynne said.

"There are other people like him," he said, "But, of course, you don't hear about them until they get caught."

Penkovsky "was in the holy of holies and he blew it sky high," Wynne said, describing his late friend's importance. "They (the Russians) haven't recovered yet and they won't for a long time." Wynne said he did not believe that Russians were aware of his own real role in the espionage link despite his prison interrogation and learned the story only when he came back and made public disclosures. He is writing his own book about the affair.

Lonsdale, now back in Russia has also published a book about his activities in the West. Wynne said this extraordinary change in Soviet policy against discussing Moscow's intelligence activities was almost certainly provoked by word that the "Penkovsky Papers" would be published.

Lonsdale's book naturally puts Soviet espionage in a good light while the "Penkovsky Papers" does exactly the opposite.

[From the New York Times, Nov. 12, 1965]

PENKOVSKY'S FELLOW SPY HAILS HIS SERVICE TO WEST

(By Max Frankel)

Oleg V. Penkovsky's service to the capitalist world—considerable while he lived and still unfinished in death—reached a pecuniary culmination here yesterday.

The mysterious forces of espionage and the obvious forces of commerce joined to promote a book that purports to be the secret journal of Colonel Penkovsky, the West's best-placed Moscow spy in memory. Thus they produced yet another extrarordinary chapter in an extraordinary but slippery tale.

With an expression of regret that the executed colonel was unfortunately "not with us," the publishers of the book, Doubleday & Co., presented the nextbest pitchman, Greville Wynne, just 19 months out of a Soviet jail for his contact work with Penkovsky in 1961 and 1962.

Mr. Wynne, whose dark hair and curled mustache make him look a little like the actor Terry-Thomas in repose, showed a certain flair for dramatic narrative but, so as not to spoil his own, as yet unwritten book, held back most of his own story of 7 years of business journeys in Communist Europe.

PENKOVSKY'S FEAT PRAISED

He was happy, however, to have flown the Atlantic to help drum up business for the Penkovsky papers, to be published Friday, because, he said, he wished to call attention to a courageous man, to his warning that the West must show strength to the Soviet Union and to the importance of their joint venture in espionage.

"If it hadn't been for Penkovsky, you would have had more than a blackout in this fine city," Mr. Wynne remarked. "Penkovsky saved a war, in my opinion."

The evidence for this judgment could not be drawn from Mr. Wynne or Frank Gibney, the papers' editor, except for vague suggestions that Penkovsky passed along very important information during a time of crisis in Germany and Cuba. The judgment greatly exceeds even the most generous appreciation of Penkovsky ever heard in Washington.

At a news conference in the Doubleday offices, Mr. Wynne also hinted that he had gone to Moscow with the express purpose of appraising Penkovsky after the colonel had twice tried to make contact with Western intelligence. Soviet efforts to recruit Mr. Wynne for espionage and Western efforts to make their contacts appear like a backmarket conspiracy, at worst, also figured somehow in the story, Mr. Wynne suggested, but he kept plugging his own book whenever the interview threatened to become interesting.

Neither Mr. Wynne nor Mr. Gibney said enough to dispel the widespread doubts about the origin of the Penkovsky journal. It is said to have been smuggled out of Moscow just before the colonel's arrest October 22, 1962. Mr. Wynne said that, in more than 50 meetings with Penkovsky, the colonel never mentioned the secret diary by which he allegedly wanted one day to reveal and justify his treason to the world.

The book, called "The Penkovsky Papers," says nothing more about how it came to be published. "Penkovskiy" is a more literal rendering a final double vowel in Russion under a transliteration system preferred by the U.S. Government, including the Central Intelligence Agency.

Without necessarily questioning that Penkovsky was the author of most of the book's anti-Soviet information, speculation and gossip, many Soviet specialists in Washington doubt that he actually duplicated many of his reports to the West in a secret diary. Some officials believe that British and American intelligence services created the memoir from the record of their three interrogations of Penkovsky in London and Paris during his 16-month career as a spy.

The CIA is known to have checked the book for security, and, according to Mr. Gibney, "took out a few things, I assume," Mr. Gibney said he had obtained the papers already translated from Peter Deriabin, a defector from Soviet intelligence, whose present job and whereabouts are secret.

Mr. Gibney would not describe the original manuscript except to say that it consisted of several hundred pages, mostly typewritten, plus pictures of Penkovsky and photocopies of personal documents, including his Communist Party membership card, which appear in the book.

[From the Washington Post, Nov. 14, 1965]

SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY PROTESTS PUBLICATION OF PENKOVSKY PAPERS

The Soviet Foreign Ministry yesterday called in Stephen S. Rosenfeld, Moscow correspondent of the Washington Post, and protested this newspaper's publication of the Penkovsky Papers.

F. M. Simonov, deputy head of the Ministry's press department, read the following statement to Rosenfeld:

"The Washington Post began on October 31 the publication of so-called Penkovsky Papers. The claimed author is allegedly Penkovsky, who was condemned for espionage and high treason in 1963 for American and British intelligence services.

"The papers are a falsified story, a mixture of anti-Soviet inventions and slander which are put into the mouth of a demasked spy, provocatory claims whose purpose is to denigrate the Soviet Union, poison the international atmosphere, and make difficult a search for ways to improve relations between states.

"Publication of the Penkovsky Papers cannot be understood otherwise than as an intentional act in the spirit of the worst traditions of the cold war, which cannot but inflict damage on Soviet-American relations.

"The press department of the Foreign Ministry is authorized to invite the attention of the editorial board of the Washington Post to the provocative character of this publication. It is clear that responsibility for this is shared by anybody who has anything to do with the publication of the Penkovsky Papers.

"We expect that measures will be taken so that no articles and materials of such kind will be published in the Washington Post in the future."

In answer to a question, Simonov added:

"We shall pay attention not only to the continued publication (of the Penkovsky Papers) but to comments and articles in connection with it. We do not want to foretell events, but if publication continues we reserve the right for ourselves to take necessary measures."

The Washington Post on October 31 commenced publication of a syndicated version of "The Penkovsky Papers" distributed by Publishers Syndicate (The New York Herald Tribune-Chicago Sun Times). The final installment will appear as scheduled on Monday, November 15.

The excerpts from the papers have created much controversy among Soviet experts. The papers have been credited by Edward Crankshaw, writer on Soviet affairs for the London Observer, as being the authentic narrative and comment of one of the West's major intelligence sources. They are criticized for defects in translation and attacked as part forgery by Victor Zorza of the Manchester Guardian.

The first article of Zorza's critique of the papers will be printed in the Washington Post on Monday, as previously scheduled, and the second article on Tuesday.

[From the Washington Post, Nov. 14, 1965]

THE PENKOVSKY PAPERS

On Monday, the Washington Post will print, as scheduled, the concluding installment of syndicated excerpts from the book the "Penkovsky Papers." They have aroused a great deal of discussion among American and British experts on Soviet affairs with competent opinion divided as to the form in which the papers were released and as to the extent to which they were wholly in the words of Penkovsky. No one has challenged the essential point that Penkovsky was for a time a spectacularly successful intelligence source of the West.

It would not be conceivable that responsible newspapers in this country would suppress notice of a book of this significance in history or of such consequence in foreign affairs. The Washington Post, as one of the newspapers which have published excerpts from the papers, has unsuccessfully solicited criticism and comment on them from the Soviet Embassy and will publish Monday a critique by Victor Zorza of the Manchester Guardian, who doubts that the papers originated in the form in which they are presented in the book and who suspects the intrusion of material not originating with Penkovsky. No doubt this will long remain an interesting subject of conjecture and speculation, and the Washington Post will try to present opposing views as they appear.

The readers of this newspaper should know that the Washington Post's Moscow correspondent was summoned to the Soviet Foreign Ministry at 5 o'clock on Saturday afternoon and told that "we expect that measures will be taken so that no articles and materials of such kind will be published in the Washington Post in the future." He was further told that "if publication continues we reserve the right for ourselves to take necessary measures."

What those measures are we cannot know. They will not cause the Washington Post to alter its intent regarding this series of articles or any subsequent publication. We refuse to accept the inadmissible suggestion that this newspaper must not print material which the Soviet Government may find inacceptable.

It will fulfill its responsibilities as it sees them, whatever "necessary measures" of intimidation and censorship Moscow undertakes to prevent it. Newspapers in the United States, the Soviet Government should know by this time, are not to be told by governments, either foreign or domestic, what they must print or must not print.

[From the Washington Post, Nov. 14, 1965]

CRANKSHAW ON PENKOVSKY

In his foreword to "The Penkovsky Papers" which you published with the first installment on October 21, Edward Crankshaw makes one peculiar assertion, namely that Col. Oleg Penkovsky was "in some measure unbalanced." He supports this contention with another sweeping assertion that "a man who will take it upon himself to betray his Government because he is uniquely convinced that he is right and it is wrong is by definition unbalanced."

Having thus laid a foundation for his argument, Mr. Crankshaw implies that Penkovsky's indictment of Khrushchev as a man actively preparing to launch a nuclear war is false because the presumably mentally disordered colonel of the Soviet military intelligence could not possibly "distinguish between government intentions and government precautions" and that he almost certainly "confused loose, menacing talk with tight-lipped calculation; contingency planning with purposive strategy."

The so far published summaries by Frank Gibney and excerpts from the book fail to give the faintest evidence that Oleg Penkovsky was in any way mentally unbalanced. Mr. Crankshaw's contention that anyone who betrays his Government because he is convinced that his Government is wrong "is by definition unbalanced" is ridiculous on the face of it. Whatever the British Kremlinologist might think of Benedict Arnold, the participants in the July 20, 1944, anti-Hitler plot, the Rosenbergs, Alger Hiss, Burgess and MacLean, Igor Gouzenko and the host of others, these men were not mentally sick either in the legal or clinical sense.

Another point is that Mr. Crankshaw—who does not for a moment question the authenticity of "The Penkovsky Papers"—presumes to know actual intentions of the Kremlin leadership better than a Soviet officer who directly and on a high level participated in the development of his Government's strategic moves.

In fact, the reason for Mr. Crankshaw's warning not to trust Penkovsky is transparent to those familiar with the tenor of his many writings: Penkovsky's revelations run contrary to that line of thought which Mr. Crankshaw represents and which stubbornly insists that the Soviet Government under Khrushchev genuinely wished to become friendly with the West.

With all due respect for Mr. Crankshaw's concern in preserving his reputation as a Soviet expert, one cannot escape the conclusion that the technique he chose to employ to that end—that of discrediting Penkovsky's testimony by implying that the man was essentially insane—serves no good purpose. It does not mean that "The Penkovsky Papers" should be accepted uncritically. But it does mean that any serious critical analysis of them must be based on a much more solid foundation than that laid by Edward Crankshaw.

K. L. LONDON,
V. PETROV,
Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies, the George Washington University.
WASHINGTON.

[From the Washington Post, Nov. 15, 1965]

A COMMUNICATION FROM PRESS DEPARTMENT OF THE SOVIET EMBASSY

Recently the Washington Post and some other American newspapers have started publishing the so-called Penkovsky Papers. The authorship of these papers is attributed to the person of Penkovskiy—the man who in May of 1963 was convicted in the U.S.S.R. of treason and espionage on behalf of the United States and British intelligence services.

In fact, the so-called Penkovsky Papers is nothing but a crude forgery cooked up 2 years after Penkovskiy's conviction by those whom the exposed spy served.

The authors of the papers stuffed them with stereotyped anti-Soviet insinuations. Using Penkovsky's name, they ascribe to the Soviet Union such concepts as, for instance, the concept of preventive war, which in reality is hatched by certain quarters in the West. The authors of the papers apparently assume that any sort of slander might be put into the traitor's mouth and that they could easily get away with that.

The provocative cooking entitled "The Penkovsky Papers" no doubt deserves serious analysis. This is not the first case of publishing slanderous stuff about the U.S.S.R. and it has the only purpose—to smear the Soviet Union, to poison international atmosphere, to hinder the search for ways of improving relations between nations.

The publication of the "Penkovsky Papers" is to be regarded as nothing but a premeditated act in the worst traditions of the cold war. Such actions cannot but damage the interests of the development of friendly relations between the American and the Soviet peoples. And if those who are directly or indirectly associated with the publication of the papers pretend that they do not understand it, they only reveal the insincerity of their statements about their desire to improve relations between the U.S.S.R. and the United States.

[From the Washington Post, Nov. 15, 1965]

ON SEVERAL FRONTS—PENKOVSKY DISPUTE CONTINUES TO BOIL

The Washington Post today concludes publication of the "Penkovsky Papers" around which has swirled much controversy as to their source and authenticity.

The Soviet Union on Saturday protested the publication. In addition, a letter to the editor of the Washington Post from the Soviet Embassy, printed today on page A21, calls the papers "a crude forgery cooked up 2 years after Penkovsky's conviction by those whom the exposed spy served."

The Washington Post also is printing, on page A22, the first of two articles by Victor Zorza, Soviet affairs expert of the Manchester Guardian, analyzing the papers. He writes that "the book itself contains the evidence showing certain parts of it to be a forgery even though other sections of the book are evidently made up of intelligence information provided by Penkovsky long before his arrest."

Last month Zorza had written Vladimir E. Semichastny, chairman of the Soviet State Security Committee, asking for evidence to support the charge that the papers were forgeries. On Saturday an official from the Soviet Embassy in London asked to meet Zorza and declared that the book is "a fabrication from beginning to end."

Zorza said the official gave only one piece of evidence—an inconsistency of dates. At one point Penkovsky had said that recruitment of Communist Party members in the West for work with Soviet intelligence had resumed in 1956–57. At another point it said this occurred in 1960.

Officials at the Central Intelligence Agency, whose agents dealt with and interrogated Penkovsky before his arrest, say that they read the papers only to determine whether their publication would compromise intelligence sources. They refuse to pass judgment for the press on authenticity.

[From the New York Times, Nov. 15, 1965]

PENKOVSKY PAPERS STIR SOVIET PROTEST

WASHINGTON, November 14.—The Soviet Embassy, through its press department,

issued a statement tonight attacking the Penkovsky papers.

The statement was handed to several news bureaus here. It was in the form of a communication to the editor of the Washington Post, which the Embassy noted, along with other U.S. newspapers had been publishing the so-called Penkovsky papers.

The statement said that authorship of the papers was attributed to "the person of Penkovsky—the man who in May of 1963 was convicted in the U.S.S.R. of treason and espionage on behalf of the United States and British intelligence services." Col. Oleg V. Penkovsky was arrested in October 1962 and was executed after conviction.

The Soviet Embassy statement also said:

"In fact, the so-called Penkovsky papers is nothing but a crude forgery cooked up, 2 years after Penkovsky's conviction, by those whom the exposed spy had served. * * *

"This is not the first case of publishing slanderous stuff about the U.S.S.R. and it has the only purpose—to smear the Soviet Union, to poison the international atmosphere, to hinder the search for ways of improving relations between nations.

"The publication of the Penkovsky papers is to be regarded as nothing but a premeditated act in the worst traditions of the cold war. Such actions cannot but damage the interests of the development of friendly relations between the American and the Soviet peoples."

[From the Washington Post, Nov. 15, 1965]

SOVIET EXPERT THINKS PENKOVSKY PAPERS ARE A FORGERY

(By Victor Zorza)

LONDON.—"Their authenticity," say the introduction to the "Penkovsky Papers," the memoirs of the Anglo-American spy in Russia, "is beyond question." It is not.

Indeed, the book itself contains the evidence showing certain parts of it to be a forgery, even though other sections of the book are evidently made up of intelligence information provided by Penkovsky before his arrest.

But the book does not, in fact, claim to be made up of Penkovsky's intelligence reports to the West. On the contrary, it is said to be quite distinct from them, and to consist of notes, sketches and comments accumulated by him during his spying career in 1961–62 and smuggled out of the Soviet Union only in the autumn of 1962, at the time of his arrest. It is said that Penkovsky hoped that they might eventually be published to clarify his motives and to clear his name beyond question. It is curious that a work with so noble a purpose should include so much purely military and political intelligence.

THE LOWDOWN

Much of the book seems calculated to show the Soviet system in the worst possible light, but this would be consistent with Penkovsky's attempt to justify his defection. It is even possible to stretch this interpretation to explain the "lowdown"—and it really is low—on the sexual mores, the drunkenness and cupidity of some of the people he knew in the higher ranks of the political, military and intelligence quarters. "I have absolutely no intention of defaming the marshals and generals," he says, after giving some particularly choice details.

He adds that he had "intentionally omitted the subject of moral degradation and drunkenness"—which he had not. "I know one thing for sure, though: all our generals have mistresses, and some have two or more." All? For sure?

It is conceivable that Western intelligence organizations might have been interested in the peccadilloes of members of the Soviet General Staff, just as Soviet intelligence would be interested in their Western opposite numbers, and that Penkovsky thought it right to supply this information. But he would hardly write it all down for posterity.

INTELLIGENCE FEAT

The introduction says that the extent and ingenuity of Penkovsky's work add up perhaps to the most extraordinary intelligence feat of this century. If there is no Soviet spy now working at an even higher level in the West, then this claim may well be valid. Much of the intelligence information reproduced in the book is obviously genuine.

Western government experts revealed their knowledge of it some time ago in the course of discussion about Soviet affairs. Penkovsky's information about the ignominious failure of Khrushchev's "secret weapon," which blew up on the launching pad, enabled the Western leaders to treat Soviet threats and boasts with composure. Penkovsky's information about Khrushchev's plans during the German crisis of 1961 enabled the West to make the dispositions which warded off the Soviet threat to Berlin.

Penkovsky sent reports on the bickering over the building up of the Soviet missile force, favored by Khrushchev, and the maintenance of adequate conventional forces, favored by the marshals.

DISPUTE IN KREMLIN

This gave Western intelligence analysts the clues that helped them to study between the lines of the Soviet press the most important political dispute that raged in the Soviet leadership in recent years—on the allocation of resources between civilian and military needs, within the military field itself.

This contributed greatly to the Western governments' understanding of the factors that caused the fall of Khrushchev, even though this occurred some 2 years after Penkovsky's arrest.

For some months before the Cuban missile crisis, Penkovsky and his Western masters knew that he was being watched by Soviet counter-intelligence. He could therefore neither acquire nor send any intelligence on what was to prove the most fateful confrontation between East and West, and suggestions that he was asked to report on Soviet operations in Cuba just before the crisis would appear to be without foundation. Yet paradoxically, his contribution was probably decisive.

He had sent out, earlier, details of the deployment pattern of Soviet missiles. This enabled U.S. air reconnaissance experts to identify the missile sites at an early stage of construction. The early warning made it possible for President Kennedy to make in secret the preparations that played so major a part in his later management of the crisis, and in compelling Khrushchev to withdraw.

LACK OF TIME

The most important part of the information he sent out consisted of some 5,000 photographs of documents, sketches, etc., taken with a miniature camera. Yet we are asked to believe that this highly professional and valuable spy added to the great risks he was already running by keeping a detailed account of his activities and views, virtually every page of which contained enough secret information to send him straight to the firing squad.

In the foreword we are told that "throughout the period during which Penkovsky was turning over infomation to the West, he sat up night after night composing a journal." Yet in a passage that has the ring of truth Penkovsky himself makes it clear that this is just what he could not do. He has to write hurriedly, he says, "for the simple lack of time and space."

When he writes at night in his two-room flat he disturbs his family's sleep: typing is very noisy. During the day he is always busy, "running like a madman," in a typically Russian phrase, between the offices of his two employers, the Committee for the Coordination of Scientific Research, and the Military Intelligence Headquarters. His evenings are generally occupied, nor can he write while visiting his friends in the country. "Someone may always ask what I am doing." At home, at least, "I have a hiding place in my desk." On his own showing, he is hardly likely to have produced in these circumstances the manuscript of what is now a sizable book.

AUTOBIOGRAPHY QUESTIONED

The description of his domestic circumstances comes from Penkovsky's autobiographical outline, of a kind that any intelligence service would require from a prospective spy, so that it could check his credentials before employing him.

Penkovsky passed a paper of this kind to an American Embassy official in Moscow, together with an offer of his service, but this was not taken up because it was thought that he had been put up to it by Soviet counter-intelligence. Only 6 months later, when he made another approach to the British, was his offer accepted.

But even the autobiography is not wholly genuine. The description of Penkovsky's own war service is woven into a three-page potted history of the war in Russia. A man of Penkovsky's intelligence would not have thought it necessary to waste his time on supplying this kind of "background."

A Western compiler of the Penkovsky papers, on the other hand, might have thought it useful to provide the wide readership of the book with a historical sketch that would have made Penkovsky's war career more meaningful.

KHRUSHCHEV IN UKRAINE

However, it is not safe to sketch in the background without being familiar with the details of which it is composed. Penkovsky spent the last 2 years before the war in a military school and then in an artillery unit in the Ukraine, to which he was posted as a political officer.

On one occasion the unit was visited by a number of Soviet military leaders, whom Penkovsky recognized, but there was one person "whom I had never seen before." He was told later that this was a certain N. S. Khrushchev. Yet for the past 2 years Khrushchev had been the first secretary of the Ukrainian Party, carrying out a ruthless and bloody purge, feared and hated by all—the virtual master of the Ukraine, the "Little Stalin," with his picture frequently displayed in public places and in the newspapers which would have been obligatory reading for an aspiring political officer.

No doubt the account of the incident was inserted into the papers to make them appear more authentic, but the result, as happens so often when enthusiasm outruns good judgment, is the opposite of what was intended.

There is much tedious repetition which is hardly accounted for by the explanation that the papers are arranged with little attempt at order and none at literary style. That this is so is painfully obvious, but it still does not explain why the book should contain several accounts of Khrushchev's intended strategy for the Berlin confrontation, all more or less the same, and two of them separated by only one page—a curious waste of time and space by one so short of both.

Nor can these be the written reports sent out by Penkovsky at the time, re-edited, and put together in a book. He was clearly much too intelligent and efficient a spy to waste his efforts on writing down laboriously, in minute detail, and repetitively, the views, impressions and facts which would have sufficed in much shorter outline.

Yet sometimes the book arouses the reader's curiosity, only to frustrate it with lack of detail. The introduction makes for Pen-

kovsky the claim that among the "thousands of pieces of information" swept up by him was "the exact planned dimensions of the Berlin wall."

RESPONSE TO WALL

If true this is very important, for it may cause trouble between Washington and London on the one hand, and Berlin on the other—something that the compilers of the book can hardly have intended.

It has always been assumed that the slow and fumbling nature of the Western response to the wall was due in large measure to the lack of any warning. Even so, the West German Government has not wholly forgiven its allies for the indecision they displayed at that time.

But had Penkovsky told them? In the text, he is made to say that "I learned about the Berlin wall 4 days before the Soviet Government actually closed it off." Yet the account of his travels given in the book, and the record of his trial, makes it clear that "4 days before" that date Penkovsky was still in London, on one of those extended duty trips on which he took time off from shepherding Soviet delegations—the official reasons for his visits to the West—to spend long hours with the special Anglo-American team of four intelligence officers who used every available minute to milk him of any information he might have.

UNLIKELY ANSWERS

In the extremely unlikely event that he had learned about the Berlin wall while still in London, would he have gone back to Moscow and reported later to his masters that he had known about the wall 4 days in advance? Why would he do that—to show them after the event how well-informed he was?

Or, it the book is a genuine collection of notes he kept in Moscow, would he simply have made a bald statement of fact like that, almost conversationally, and then gone on with his discussion of Khrushchev's tactics on Berlin? Neither explanation seems credible, and no other offers itself. The only logical answer is that the words attributed to Penkovsky were written by someone else—unless this was a remark he made in one of his subsequent conversations with a member of the Anglo-American team, who took it down, filed it, and it was then seen and used by the compiler of the papers.

Indeed, the style of the memoirs is often discursive, verbose, almost conversational—the very opposite of what one would expect from a man writing in Penkovsky's difficult circumstances. At one point, when discussing Soviet military maneuvers, he is made to ask, "What is the point of these exercises"—and then proceeds to give a detailed reply.

Would he really write like that, whether in an intelligence report or in his memoirs? Or was it perhaps, a question put to Penkovsky by one of his interrogators, and then, inadvertently, allowed to remain in the edited transcript of the conversation that might have formed the basis of this passage in the book?

The conversational origin of a number of passages is betrayed in similar ways, thus giving the lie to the claim that the book is made up of Penkovsky's written notes. This, however, does not mean that the book as a whole may be regarded as a genuine edited transcript of Penkovsky's conversations with Western intelligence officers. There are many other passages, and sometimes whole sections, which betray the alien hand—or tongue.

[From the Washington Post, Nov. 16, 1965]

SOVIET EXPERT DOUBTS VALIDITY OF CONTROVERSIAL PAPERS—USAGE IN PENKOVSKY SAID TO PROVE FORGERY

(By Victor Zorza)

LONDON.—So far as can be established, the Russian manuscript of Penkovsky's memoirs just does not exist.

When news of the imminent publication of the Penkovsky Papers was reported in the world press, the American publishers of the book were inundated with requests for permission to serialize the story in newspapers and to publish it in foreign languages.

Among these requests was one from a small Russian emigre publishing house in West Germany. All it could offer was $250. This was accepted without any haggling, since all the proceeds from the book are to go to the Penkovsky Foundation, formed in the United States for this purpose.

That the American publishers had accepted the book for publication in good faith is shown by their willingness to procure the Russian text for the emigre publishing house. But after several weeks and repeated requests to the Penkovsky Foundation, the Russian text has not been made available, and it looks as if it never will be.

On Monday, the Russian emigre publisher made a telephone call from Frankfurt to Doubleday, the New York publishers, to get the final answer which had been promised for the beginning of this week. He was told by R. E. Banker, for Doubleday, that they were still unable to provide a Russian text. However, they were prepared to let the Russian publisher go ahead—if he was prepared to retranslate the Penkovsky text from English back into Russian. As for the Russian "original," Banker said, they had twice asked the State Department about it, but were still not able to provide it.

STRANGE PHRASES

The English text is peppered with words and phrases that no man with Penkovsky's Soviet background would use. He is made to refer repeatedly to Soviet Russians or to Soviets in describing his countrymen. These terms would sound as strange in Russian as United States Americans or British Englishman would sound in ordinary English usage.

These are not mistakes in translation, but they arise from ignorance of Soviet terminology. The stock Soviet phrase for the kind of political deviation for which Marshal Zhukov, the Defense Minister, was purged in 1957, is "Bonapartist tendencies." Yet Penkovsky is made to report Khrushchev as saying that Marshal Zhukov was displaying Napoleonic characteristics. No translator would depart so far from the original. But if the remark was inserted in English by someone writing sometime after he had read an account of the Zhukov affair, a faulty memory for phrases might have easily led him to use the associated but, incorrect, term.

Penkovsky is made to illustrate the change in Sino-Soviet relations by remarking that the phrase "great China" has now been replaced in official terminology by unadorned "China." However, the official usage was never "great China"—it was "the great Chinese people."

Penkovsky is made to refer to a high party official as an "R.S.F.S.R. Communist Party leader"—a phrase that would never be used by a Soviet official, who would know that the R.S.F.S.R.—the initials of the Russian Republic—has no Communist Party distinct from the Soviet Party. One of the chapters begins with a reference by Penkovsky to his recent trip to "Europe"—although a Russian returning to Moscow would speak of a visit to the "West." But the reference to a trip to "Europe" would have come naturally to an American compiler of the papers.

Among Penkovsky's many unlikely digressions, his excursion into the history of the party appears particularly improbable—and factually wrong. He provides a long list of party leaders over the years who, as successive editions of the party history went to press, were purged and described variously as enemies of the people, traitors, and imperialist hirelings. This is an exercise beloved by anti-Communist propagandists, and figures in many of their tracts. But a true professional would never make the mistake of listing Marshal Zhukov as "Khrushchev's enemy"—a phrase that would never be used in an official Soviet textbook. Penkovsky would certainly have known it to be wrong.

MEANINGLESS TITLES

In listing the official functions of high Soviet officers, he often describes them as "deputies of the Supreme Soviet"—a meaningless dignity on which the good spy that he was would not waste his breath. However, a Western compiler might well have taken these and other details from any good reference book, just to fill out the picture for the inexpert reader.

Penkovsky is made to show his indignation at Khrushchev's recklessness in 1961 in testing a 50-megaton bomb which he describes as having a yield of 80 and, elsewhere, of 100 megatons—although the accurate measurements taken by Western experts have put it at under 60 megatons. Similarly, he reports that several Soviet launches of manned sputniks took the lives of their crews. In fact, all Russian launchings have been monitored by Western radio and radar tracking devices which would have revealed beyond any doubt, through the nature of the communications passing between the satellite and the base, the presence of a human being aboard. Western experts have repeatedly dismissed this particular rumor.

CONFUSION OVER EVENTS

The report attributed to Penkovsky that Marshal Chuikov, the commander in chief of the ground forces, was dismissed from this post in 1961 and appointed chief of civil defense is wrong. It is true that he got the civil defense job at that time, but he continued as the commander of the ground forces—and the Soviet military press referred to him repeatedly as such.

It was only in 1964 that he lost this post, nearly 2 years after Penkovsky's arrest. It would appear that someone compiling the "papers" more recently has confused the two events and dates, making Penkovsky report something that occurred after he was executed in 1963. Similar confusion is evident in Penkovsky's references to the removal by Khrushchev in 1957 of the antiparty group of Molotov, Malenkov, and Bulganin—although Bulganin remained Prime Minister until 1958, without at first being charged with membership in the group.

Virtually the whole section on the Soviet military doctrine appears to have been written by a Western pen. It is here that the references to "Soviets" and "Soviet Russians" are most obtrusive. Penkovsky is made to explain that he had sent out the full text of the "special collection" on military doctrine to the West—and at the same time to go on for pages on end, giving long quotations from it.

Would Penkovsky really have bothered to write out long passages from a publication which he had photographed and dispatched to his Western masters? This whole section, and a number of others in the book, is accompanied by repeated warnings from Penkovsky about the Soviet determination to acquire a first-strike posture, and to launch a surprise nuclear attack on the West.

The chapter on strategy is made the main vehicle for the message, and the long quotations from the "Special Collection" are designed to give it an air of authority. But the impression is false, for General Gastilovich, on whose contribution the compiler relies to drive the first strike lesson home, was strongly contradicted by equally authoritative contributors to the "Special Collection." But the Penkovsky Papers give no hint of this.

UNDOUBTED FORGERY

General Kurochkin, a respected Soviet strategist, went so far as to describe some of

the more extreme views as anti-Marxist. This is the chapter that can be described without any hesitation as forged. The compiler of the book adds insult to injury by making Penkovsky say that "I am sorry that I cannot copy here the entire 'Special Collection' "—or is it, perhaps, a private joke inserted for the entertainment of the compiler's colleagues? The use—or misuse—of the "Special Collection" in this way is a great pity. Its publication in full would have added greatly to the understanding of Soviet strategy among students in the West. But there is now reason to fear that the account given in the papers will prevent the full publication which would inevitably show up the imbalance of the Penkovsky book.

It may be that some of the errors pinpointed in this article are not necessarily evidence of forgery, but the cumulative weight of the evidence is too great to support any other interpretation.

WORK OF CIA

The book could have been compiled only by the Central Intelligence Agency. No other organization in the West, apart from British Intelligence, and certainly no individual, could have had access to the information of which the book is made up. British Intelligence officers did at one time entertain the idea of building Penkovsky up posthumously as something of a hero, but permission to proceed was withheld.

The CIA has been repeatedly stung and provoked by the attempts of the Disinformation Department of the Soviet intelligence organization to discredit its activities throughout the world. The "Penkovsky Papers" are the CIA's answer. But in psychological warfare of this kind the intelligence agencies of the democratic countries suffer from the grave disadvantage that in attempting to damage the adversary they must also deceive their own public. It is the function of a free press to uncover such deception. Some of my best friends are in the CIA, but if they want their psychological warfare efforts to remain undiscovered, they must do better than this.

[From the Washington Post, Nov. 17, 1965]

GIBNEY DEFENDS PENKOVSKY PAPERS

On two separate occasions the Soviet Government has attacked the authorship and the authenticity of "The Penkovsky Papers." Both the Soviet Foreign Ministry and the press department of the Soviet Embassy in Washington have commented predictably.

Such terms as "anti-Soviet invention and slander," "provocative character," and "crude forgery" are commonplace in most efforts of the Soviet regime to discredit anyone who disagrees with it. It is typical of this approach that the Washington Post and other newspapers running the papers were threatened by unspecified forms of Soviet retaliation, if publication continued.

Actually, there is no better evidence of the papers' honesty, accuracy and authenticity than this loud, almost unprecedented protest from Moscow. As I said in the introduction to the papers, the continuing power of state security apparatus over Soviet citizens is the greatest problem in the way of any real rapprochement between the West and the Russians.

Penkovsky felt this strongly himself, as the papers reveal. The sharp protest of the Moscow leadership suggests that his arrow struck home.

A further charge of "forgery"—or partial forgery, if I interpret his article correctly—was made by Victor Zorza, of the Manchester Guardian. His comment relies on conjectures about what Penkovsky would or should have done. It abounds in phrases like "would hardly write," "it is curious that," "it is conceivable that," or "he is hardly likely to have produced."

This is understandable. I am sure that if Mr. Zorza had been in Colonel Penkovsky's shoes, he would have behaved differently; and if a panel of Western Soviet experts had written the papers for Penkovsky, they would have undoubtedly written them differently. The fact is that Colonel Penkovsky was very much his own man. He was a zealot and an individualist who lived with risk and whose desire to have his views known drove him to take even more risks.

Mr. Zorza does have one point of factual criticism, which he interpreted incorrectly, however. He asserts that the acocunt of Colonel Penkovsky's movements which I gave in my introduction to the papers and "the record of his trial" show that he was in London on August 9, 1961, the day he found out about the proposed erection of the Berlin wall. Mr. Zorza understandably questions why Penkovsky did not warn his Western contacts then about the building of the wall, since he had free access to them in London. From this he somehow concludes that "The Penkovsky Papers" are not genuine.

I owe him and other readers an apology for this confusion. In the process of editing, I incorrectly gave the date for Penkovsky's arrival in Moscow at that time as August 10, 1961. Actually, it was August 8—and I have since asked the publisher to correct this error in subsequent editions.

If Mr. Zorza rereads the October 1963 transcript of Penkovsky's Soviet trial—one of the principal sources of this book—he will discover that the correct date was August 8. Hence, Penkovsky was in Moscow at the time he found out about the Berlin wall—and unable to communicate immediately with the West.

Mr. Zorza points out that Penkovsky's writings were often discursive, verbose, almost conversational. I am sure any expert on Russian-English translation would have his own pet way of rendering them into English—just as Mr. Deriabin, the translator, and I have ours. But this discursiveness hardly detracts from their authenticity.

On the contrary, I deliberately held all editing down to an absolute minimum. Neither Mr. Deriabin nor I felt we had the right to add any literary or factual embellishments to the words of a brave man, who wanted to get his own language out to the world.

FRANK GIBNEY.

NEW YORK CITY.

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Nov. 18, 1965]

HIS GREATEST SERVICE—PENKOVSKY UNMASKED THREE SOVIET SPIES IN WEST

(By Don Cook)

PARIS, November 17.—Whatever the value of the spy papers of Col. Oleg Penkovsky, or even their validity, which is being questioned by some experts on Soviet affairs, his greatest service to the West was the unmasking of key Russian agents in Paris, London, and Stockholm.

The three most important espionage cases in the West in the last 5 years were all broken by counterintelligence services on the basis of information passed to Britain and the United States by Penkovsky. The cases involved:

Georges Paques, a senior French civil servant who spied for the Russians in the Ministry of National Defense and later in NATO headquarters in Paris. He was caught and sentenced to life imprisonment in July of 1964.

Col. Stig Wennerstrom of the Swedish Army, who spied for the Russians in the Swedish Defense Ministry and also while serving as Swedish military attaché in Washington. He was caught and sentenced to life imprisonment in July 1963, at about the same time that Penkovsky went on trial in Moscow with his British contact, Greville Wynne.

William J. C. Vassall, a senior clerk in the British Admiralty, who had been recruited by the Russians through homosexual blackmail during a tour of duty in Moscow. He was apprehended and sentenced to 18 years in prison in September 1962.

Penkovsky did not finger these Russian agents directly. But he did pass to the British and American intelligence services information that enabled them to trap the three spies.

A Penkovsky speciality was sending the identify numbers on Western documents that were reaching the Russians. The identity numbers were sufficient to start the counterintelligence search for the spies in the West who were passing the documents to Soviet intelligence.

In the case of the British Admiralty documents and the Swedish Defense Ministry documents, the work of isolating Vassall and Wennerstrom went fairly rapidly. But the apprehension of Georges Paques was more complicated and took more time.

Partly this was because many hundreds of documents had to be sifted and checked. Partly it was because the French counterintelligence services, which are highly effective, do not as a rule respond very swiftly to information provided from American or British sources.

In the end, the break in the Paques case came as a result of the assiduous espionage the Frenchman had done. Paques served from 1958 to 1962 in the private office of French Defense Minister Pierre Messmer. He later became chief press officer at NATO with a "cosmic top secret" clearance, NATO's highest security classification.

Among the document identity numbers Penkovsky sent to the West was one with a very unusual and limited classification. It was a French NATO standing group document—in other words, a French position paper prepared for the NATO military standing group in Washington. When the French checked on the document, they discovered that it was the draft of a French position that eventually was altered and renumbered before it was actually submitted to the standing group.

The document, therefore, had received very limited circulation. It had been prepared in Washington by the French element on the standing group and sent to Paris for clearance at the Ministry of Defense. Only six persons signed for it at the Ministry when it was discussed, altered and sent back to Washington. One of these was Georges Paques.

Had Paques limited his activities to general Ministry of Defense documents or NATO documents, with much wider circulation, it might have taken months to narrow the search. But in the brief period of approximately 36 hours in which that particular French standing group document was in Paris for clearance, he took it home, photographed it and returned it to its proper place next day.

When the French identified the document on the basis of the number transmitted from Moscow to the British and Americans by Penkovsky, they immediately put a 24-hour tail on each of the six who had signed for it—including the Minister of Defense. In about 10 days, Paques was seen in contact with a member of the Soviet Embassy staff in Paris whom the French knew to be a KGB agent.

His arrest followed swiftly, and he confessed promptly. At his trial, he testified in words reminiscent of some of the Penkovsky papers that he spied for Russia because he felt that it would help preserve peace if the Russians were fully informed of NATO plans.

[From the Washington Post, Nov. 19, 1965]

PENKOVSKY PAPERS DEFENDED

As the translator of "The Penkovsky Papers," I would like to make some com-

ments on Victor Zorza's review. I do not want to get involved in polemics with Mr. Zorza, whose previous work I have admired. I know, better than anyone, that the papers are genuine, but I also know that there is no way to prove this to the satisfaction of those determined to degrade Penkovsky's legacy as the Soviets sought to degrade Penkovsky.

I find it surprising that Mr. Zorza has made up his mind that "the Russian manuscript of the Penkovsky memoirs just does not exist" simply because I do not wish to release it in its original form. The published format is as true to Penkovsky's notes as it could be, even though Mr. Gibney and I inevitably had to translate, select, and edit them for publication. I will not, however, reveal how the papers came to me.

Let me cite details from Mr. Zorza's critique. He says that "the English text is prepared with words and phrases no man with Penkovsky's Soviet background would use," i.e. he cites the terms "Soviet Russians" or "Soviets" in describing his countrymen. Mr. Zorza's quotes are in English, thus they are my translations. But Penkovsky clearly distinguished between the Russian people and the Soviet regime. In the papers, Penkovsky used a variety of terms: "Soviet citizens," "the Soviet people," "Russians," etc. In translating I used the term "Soviet Russian" or "Soviet" for purposes of simplicity and consistency.

Penkovsky referred to Marshal Zhukov's removal because of his "Napoleonic characteristics." Mr. Zorza thinks that this should read "Bonapartist tendencies" and concludes that "no translator would depart so far from the original." The exact Russian term used by Penkovsky was "Khrushchev ego ubral za napoleonovskiye zamashki." Colonel Penkovsky evidently knew Bonaparte's first name and preferred to use the term "napoleonovskiye zamashki."

Mr. Zorza also finds fault with the expression "Great China." Obviously, Penkovsky was not writing an editorial for Pravda. "Velikiy Kitay" was what he wrote and that's how I translated it.

In Mr. Zorza's opinion no Soviet official would refer to a high party official as an RSFSR Communist Party leader. Colonel Penkovsky was well aware that there is no separate Communist Party of the RSFSR. The Russian original of the line on page 207 is, however, "tak nazyvayemyy partiynyy vozhd RSFSR."

With regard to Penkovsky's statement that several Soviet cosmonauts had lost their lives, I can only repeat that I merely translated what Penkovsky wrote—that some of them lost their lives.

About Marshal Chuykov: Mr. Zorsa is correct in saying that Penkovsky was in error when he wrote that Chuykov was relieved of his duties when he took over the civilian defense command. However, I have simply translated what he wrote.

With regard to the antiparty group: again I simply translated what Penkovsky wrote. It is the Kremlinologist who is concerned with precision in the matter of dates of ousters; for Penkovsky, as for most Soviet citizens, it was apparently of little importance that Bulganin managed to hang on until 1958.

Mr. Zorza shows a lack of knowledge of the everyday Soviet language when he claims that a "Russian returning to Moscow would speak of a visit to the West, not to Europe." Penkovsky wrote "Yevropa" which means "Europe." Soviet intelligence officers do not normally talk of their travels to European countries as to "the West"; they refer to "Yevropa" or the country which they visited.

As far as the 50–80–100 megaton bomb is concerned, Penkovsky was apparently not in a position to measure the bomb's yield as accurately as Western experts or Mr. Zorza. If Western experts wrote "The Penkovsky Papers," as Mr. Zorza seems to believe, why did they not use the correct figures?

PETER DERIABIN.

New York City.

[From the Washington Post, Nov. 21, 1965]

PENKOVSKY'S SPY-CATCHING ROLE DENIED

Reports that Col. Oleg Penkovsky supplied materials that led to the detection and arrest of the Swedish master spy, Col. Stig Wennerstrom, are flatly denied by sources close to the case.

Wennerstrom reportedly first came under suspicion in 1959—2 years before Penkovsky started assisting the West.

The Swedish officer had served as air attaché in Moscow and Washington before returning to the Defense Ministry and Foreign Ministry in Stockholm.

Arrested in June 1963, he was sentenced last year to life imprisonment. He could be released after 10 years and it is understood that he, too, is writing his memoirs.

PENKOVSKY PROTEST

In another development, the State Department disclosed yesterday that it has received a protest from the Soviet Union about publication of papers atributed to Penkovsky. He became a spy for the West in 1961 and was later caught and executed.

The Penkovsky papers were serialized in newspapers, including the Washington Post and are now out in book form.

A State Department spokesman said that Soviet Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin expressed concern last Monday in a talk with Russian affairs expert Llewellyn E. Thompson.

Later, the spokesman said, Thompson replied that the Government "had no responsibility in the matter."

CIA CONCOCTION

In the first report on the Penkovsky papers in the Russian press, the Communist Party newspaper Pravda referred to them yesterday as "another anti-Soviet concoction of the American Central Intelligence Agency and apparently of its British associates."

While not further explaining what was in the papers, Pravda said that "this fabrication does not deserve analysis."

A Moscow dispatch from the Washington Post's Stephen Rosenfeld said the bulk of the article was devoted to unflattering reflections on the character of Greville Wynne, the British businessman convicted with Penkovsky and later exchanged for Gordon Lonsdale, a Soviet spy caught in England.

Last week, a news story from Paris linked the work of Penkovsky with the uncovering of three Westerners spying for the Soviet Union. These were listed as:

Wennerstrom; George Paques, a senior French civil servant who worked in NATO, and William J. C. Vassall, a British Admiralty clerk. Other sources have denied that information furnished by Penkovsky led to the apprehension of any of the three.

[From the New York Times, Nov. 20, 1965]

PENKOVSKY BOOK SCORED BY SOVIET—ANTI-RUSSIAN PAPERS CALLED CONCOCTION OF CIA

Moscow, November 20.—Soviet authorities, apparently embarrassed by the publication in the West of "The Penkovsky Papers," are strongly denouncing the controversial book as a forgery of the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States.

The papers, published this month in London and New York, are a compilation of anti-Soviet information, speculation, and gossip purported to have been supplied to Western intelligence agencies by Oleg V. Penkovsky, who was executed by the Russians in 1963 as a spy for the West.

Pravda, the Communist Party newspaper, described the volume today as the "latest anti-Soviet concoction of the CIA and evidently its British associates."

In an article by V. Golubov, the newspaper said the book "does not deserve analysis," and added: "It has been compiled so crudely that self-respecting British newspapers at very first glance could not but expose its authors."

Pravda went on to quote from British press comment that cast doubt on the authenticity of the alleged memoir.

DERIABIN CITED

Soviet sources have suggested privately that the book, even if based in part on intelligence supplied by Penkovsky to the West, was embroidered with information already in the hands of Western agencies.

It was noted that a Soviet defector, Peter S. Deriabin, was identified as the translator of material from the Russian-language original that allegedly was used in the volume.

Mr. Deriabin, a former official in the Okhrana, the secret service responsible for guarding Soviet leaders, has refused to make the Russian manuscript public and has declined to say how it came into his possession.

In testimony before the House Committee on Un-American Activities, made public in March 1959, Mr. Deriabin gave a detailed view of what he described as the high living of Soviet leaders. A large amount of material on the private lives of the Kremlin leaders is also contained in "The Penkovsky Papers."

According to reports from Washington, the CIA said its representatives had read the book to guard against "security violations," but the Agency disclaimed responsibility for publication and refused to vouch for the papers' accuracy.

WYNNE IS DENOUNCED

The Soviet denunciations of "The Penkovsky Papers" have also been directed against Greville M. Wynne, a British businessman who was Penkovsky's codefendant at a partly public trial in Moscow 2 years ago. Wynne allegedly was Penkovsky's principal Western contact.

Wynne was sentenced to 8 years in jail but was released in April 1964 in exchange for Gordon A. Lonsdale, who had been convicted as a Soviet spy in Britain. Pravda alluded to the exchange today by saying Wynne had been freed under certain circumstances.

Lonsdale's purported memoirs, titled "Spy," were published last month in London.

Pravda assailed Wynne for promoting "The Penkovsky Papers" by holding widely publicized news conferences in London and New York.

[From the New York Times, Nov. 21, 1965]

FOREIGN AFFAIRS: HOW JAMES BOND GOT STARTED

(By C. L. Sulzberger)

PARIS.—"Any fiction spy story you have ever read pales in comparison with Oleg Penkovsky's dramatic account of his extraordinary personal adventure," says the advertisement of an American best seller. Simultaneously, English readers are offered memoirs called "Spy" by a Soviet agent known in London as Gordon Lonsdale until his arrest for espionage and really named Konon Trofimovitch Molody. Molody-Lonsdale was subsequently exchanged for Greville Wynne, a British associate of Penkovsky imprisoned in the U.S.S.R. Wynne has not yet published a book.

A CIA PRODUCT?

Victor Zorza, the (Manchester) Guardian's Kremlinologist, believes "The Penkovsky Papers" are not wholly genuine. He contends no Russian text has been produced and the English version is peppered with words and phrases no man with Penkovsky's Soviet background would use. Zorza adduces errors in dates and facts, asserting much of Pen-

kovsky's memoir must have been written "by a Western pen." He concludes: "The book could have been compiled only by the Central Intelligence Agency."

The genesis of Penkovsky's papers seems valid but whether part of the work is fake cannot be judged. Whatever its origin, the work provides juicy reading and embarrasses Moscow just as Lonsdale's possibly spurious work embarrasses Washington. Penkovsky was undoubtedly an efficient Western agent in the Soviet hierarchy where his boss was Kosygin's son-in-law. After Penkovsky's arrest in 1962, almost 300 Soviet intelligence officers were recalled as intelligence networks were overhauled.

SPIES, FORGERIES, AND FAKES

The period since World War II has been gaudy with spies, forgeries, and fakes. Indeed some spies have been widely publicized—like Col. Rudolf Abel, traded for U–2 Pilot Gary Powers; Lonsdale; Ivan Egorov, a Soviet official in the U.N.; Giuseppe Martelli, an Italian who spied for Moscow in hollow-heeled shoes; Burgess, Maclean, and Philby, who skipped to Russia when their cover wore thin.

Yet intelligence services don't limit themselves to ferreting out secrets; they calumniate each other whenever possible. Moscow's KGB has its disinformation section with a subsidiary branch in East Germany that disseminates false papers. Some of these have included crude documents bearing U.S. Cabinet or CIA signatures.

Four years ago the CIA claimed it had uncovered 32 such forgeries in 4 years. British counterintelligence is equally alert. Some documents are sold and others merely given to naive newspapers.

The befuddled public derives particular entertainment from the cold war's fake literary productions. Among these Prof. Paul W. Blackstock of the University of South Carolina lists: the purported diary of Maxim Litvinov, late Soviet Foreign Minister; the strategic thesis of Marshal Bulganin; memoirs of General Vlassov, who organized an army of Russian prisoners for Hitler and was later hanged; and two volumes of fascinating recollections by a nonexistent nephew of Stalin, Budu Svanidze.

Excellent works in this category—including those of Litvinov and "Svanidze"—were apparently manufactured in Paris by the literary artel of a refugee Soviet diplomat named Grigori Bessedovsky. In 1929 Bessedovsky, then counselor at the Russian Embassy in Paris, sought political asylum.

WRITTEN FOR IDIOTS

According to Blackstock, Bessedovsky, a gentleman of talent and imagination, once wrote a fellow emigré from Poland: "Sir, I write books for idiots. Do you imagine that anyone in the West would read what you call my apocryphal works if, in quoting Kaganovich, Zhukov, Mikoyan or Bulganin, I tried to be faithful to the manner, sense and form of their speeches?

"But when I portray Stalin or Molotov in pajamas, when I tell the dirtiest possible stories about them—never mind whether they are true or invented—rest assured that not only all intellectuals will read me, but also the most important capitalist statesman, on his way to a peace conference, will pick up my book before going to sleep in his pullman. Allah has given money to the stupid in order that the intelligent can live easily."

Facts, fiction, half-truths and distortions are mixed together in the strange game played by competing intelligence services and ambitious entrepreneurs. When an American military attaché in Moscow lost his diary, Russian security officials published it with falsified inserts such as: "War. As soon as possible. Now.

SOME EXPERTS FOOLED

Among amateur factories, Bessedovsky's ranks high. He fooled some of the most pretentious Kremlinologists. Even General Bedell Smith, former U.S. Ambassador to Moscow and CIA boss, was persuaded to write an "introductory note" for the highly suspect Litvinov "memoirs."

Penkovsky and Molody may be genuine authors but, at any rate, the late Ian Fleming had many unannounced anonymous cold war competitors. Like Fleming's works, they are pleasant bedside reading.

[From the Washington Post, Nov. 23, 1965]

AROUND THE WORLD: WIFE OF PENKOVSKY IS REPORTED TO DOUBT HE AUTHORED PAPERS

MOSCOW.—The wife of Col. Oleg Penkovsky was reported yesterday as saying she did not believe her husband, executed in 1963 for spying for the West, could have authored "The Penkovsky Papers." The papers, serialized by the Washington Post, have been denounced by Soviet news media as CIA forgeries.

Mrs. Vera Penkovsky told Viktor Louis, a Soviet citizen who works for a London daily newspaper, that her husband was lazy about writing, never kept a diary, and typed laboriously with one finger. Mrs. Penkovsky still lives in the apartment she shared with her husband and works as a French-language translator. Her 65-year-old mother-in-law and her two daughters live with her.

[From the Washington Post, Nov. 26, 1965]

ANTI-SOVIET CAMPAIGN CHARGED—RUSSIA EXPELS POST CORRESPONDENT OVER "PENKOVSKY PAPERS" SERIES

(By Chalmers M. Roberts)

The Soviet Union yesterday ordered the closing of the Moscow bureau of the Washington Post and the expulsion of this newspaper's correspondent, Stephen S. Rosenfeld, because of the publication of "The Penkovsky Papers."

Rosenfeld, 33, was given 7 days to leave with his wife, Barbara, and their two children, David, 16 months old, and Rebecca, born in Moscow 3 months ago. He opened the Washington Post's bureau there on November 12, 1964.

Rosenfeld was called to the Foreign Ministry's press department at noon and was read a statement charging that the Washington Post had engaged in "an anti-Soviet campaign" around "The Penkovsky Papers" and that it had refused to halt their publication after a warning on November 13.

Oleg Penkovsky was a Soviet colonel executed by his government for serving as a spy for the West. The papers, serialized to newspapers from a just published book, purport to be his diary smuggled out of the Soviet Union. There has been considerable controversy as to the paper's authenticity but the value of Penkovsky's work for the West was acknowledged at his trial.

An editorial in the Washington Post today states that Rosenfeld's expulsion is a deplorable exercise of arbitrary power and an attempt by the Soviet Government "to impose on the press of other countries, by treating the correspondents from these countries as virtual hostages, a control and dictation to which no reputable newspaper can submit."

The editorial also terms "a remarkable hallucination" the charge that the newspaper had launched a "campaign" against the Soviet Union, adding that it "will not be plunged" into any "campaign of denigration" because of the expulsion.

Rosenfeld is the third American correspondent to be expelled from Russia this year. American officials view the action as part of the hardening Soviet attitude toward the United States over the war in Vietnam, an attitude not unrelated to the bitter Chinese Communist charges that Moscow has not acted firmly enough on the Communist side in that conflict.

It also was felt here that one chapter of "The Penkovsky Papers," commenting unfavorably on personal habits of high Soviet officials and officers, was particularly offensive to Moscow, which has always been highly sensitive about such criticism.

The most recent correspondent expelled this year was Sam Jaffe, of the American Broadcasting Co., who was ordered out in September because of a report by ABC's Washington diplomatic correspondent on possible changes in the Kremlin. Adam Clymer of the Baltimore Sun was expelled last February after being accused of striking a Soviet policeman during a demonstration by Asian students in Moscow outside the U.S. Embassy protesting American policy in Vietnam.

A Newsweek correspondent was expelled in 1962, a National Broadcasting Co. reporter was ordered out in 1963 and Time magazine's Moscow bureau was closed in 1964. Newsweek and NBC have since been allowed to reopen their bureaus.

Here is the chronology of the current case:

The Washington Post began publication of the Penkovsky Papers on October 31. The last of 14 installments ran on November 15. On November 2 it was reported to this newspaper that Soviet Embassy officials were saying the papers were a forgery. A Washington Post representative called on Embassy Counselor Alexander I. Zinchuk, by appointment, the following day to ask any proof of the accusation. Zinchuk was told that the Washington Post would publish any such proof. His reply was that he would look into it and he asked and was told how long the series would run.

On November 5, at the Embassy's national day party, a representative of the newspaper was told by another Soviet official that he expected "a strong reaction" to the publication very shortly. He was told that the Washington Post would publish the reaction.

The reaction did not come until November 13. On that day Rosenfeld was called to the Foreign Ministry's press department in Moscow. F. M. Simonov, a department deputy, read him a statement describing the "Penkovsky Papers" as a falsified story, a mixture of anti-Soviet inventions and slander and stating that their publication "cannot be considered otherwise than as an intentional act in the spirit of the worst traditions of the cold war."

Simonov said the press department was "authorized to invite the attention of the editorial board of the Washington Post to the provocative character of this publication," adding that "we expect that measures will be taken so that no articles and materials of such a kind will be published in the Washington Post in the future."

Simonov added to this threat by saying that "if publication continues we reserve the right for ourselves to take necessary measures." The text of the complaint was published in the Washington Post the next day.

The same day it commented editorially that it would complete publication of the papers, adding that "we refuse to accept the inadmissible suggestion that this newspaper must not print material which the Soviet Government may find unacceptable."

On November 15 the newspaper published a communication from the Embassy's press department condemning the papers as a forgery and a scar on the Soviet Union. It also published, as previously scheduled, the first of two articles by Victor Zorza, Soviet specialist of the Manchester Guardian, analyzing the papers. He questioned their authenticity and suggested they had been written in part by the Central Intelligence Agency.

On November 18, Rosenfeld was told by a Soviet friend in Moscow that a decision had been taken to expel him. He also was told that the Central Committee of the Communist Party had given the Foreign Ministry permission to threaten Rosenfeld with expulsion unless the Washington Post ceased publication of the papers.

UNDER PARTY PRESSURE

After the newspaper ran the two concluding articles, the Central Committee was reported to have asked the Foreign Ministry why it had not expelled Rosenfeld. The informant said that the Ministry would have liked to forget the affair but that it was under Communist Party pressure and so agreed to the expulsion.

It was reported here in Washington to the Post that the Embassy had recommended expulsion. Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin formally protested publication of the papers to the State Department, and in London the Soviet Ambassador called at the Foreign Office to complain about publication of the Penkovsky Papers in Britain. The London Observer serialized the papers as did more than 30 papers in the United States and elsewhere.

Then yesterday Rosenfeld was again called to the Soviet Foreign Ministry's press department to be read the following statement by deputy chief Pyatisnev:

"On November 13 you were asked to the press department and the attention of the editorial board of the Washington Post was invited to the provocative character of the publication of the anti-Soviet entitled the so-called Penkovsky Papers.

"In our statement we pointed out that these so-called papers were a coarse fraud, a mixture of provocative invention and anti-Soviet slander. Publication of these notes in the Washington Post cannot be considered other than as premeditated action in the worst traditions of the cold war, which cannot but harm Soviet-American relations.

DEMAND REJECTED

"In a statement the press department expressed the hope that measures would be taken so that no such articles and materials of this kind would appear in this newspaper in the future. Despite that * * * the Washington Post continued to publish the notes and other material which popularized this fraud.

"Considering such a position of the editorial board of your newspaper, which continued an anti-Soviet campaign around the so-called Penkovsky Papers, the press department is authorized to state that your future stay in the Soviet Union as correspondent of the Washington Post is undesirable and it is proposed that you leave the territory of the Soviet Union."

Pyatisnev, after reading the prepared statement, told Rosenfeld that "we would like to add that this measure is not directed against you personally but was made necessary by actions of the editorial board of your newspaper."

Rosenfeld asked how much time he had to leave. Pyatisnev inquired as to how much time he would need. When Rosenfeld suggested 2 or 3 weeks, Pyatisnev replied that he could have 5 to 7 days. They agreed on 7.

Tass, the Soviet news agency, then made public the action. It included the statement that the papers "are an obvious forgery, fabricated by the U.S. intelligence service which the exposed spy had served."

[From the Washington Post, Nov. 26, 1965]

PENKOVSKY REGRETS

The decision of the Government of the Soviet Union to close the Moscow Bureau of the Washington Post and to expel this newspaper's correspondent in reprisal for the publication of the Penkovsky Papers is a deplorable exercise of arbitrary power.

It is to be regretted on many counts. Chiefly it is to be regretted because it indicates tha the short-lived relaxation following the death of Stalin has indeed proved to be a reversible process. Instead of loosening the rigorous and inhibiting control of its own writers, the Soviet Government now attempts to impose upon the press of other countries, by treating correspondents from these countires as virtual hostages, a control and dictation to which no reputable newspaper can submit.

This decision also is to be regretted because it will diminish the access of the readers of the Washington Post and of other newspapers in which Stephen Rosenfeld's objective accounts have appeared, of his lucid reporting. (It is to be noted that the Soviet Government has specifically declared Mr. Rosenfeld in no way to blame for this act of reprisal against the Washington Post.)

The Soviet action also is to be regretted because this drastic course seems to be premised upon the erroneous notion that the Washington Post has launched a campaign against the Soviet Union. That is a remarkable hallucination, but probably one that is inevitable in rulers who have grown so accustomed to utter immunity to internal criticism that any reproach appears to them to take on the aspects of deliberate persecution.

The Washington Post published excerpts from the Penkovsky Papers, which were distributed to it as a conventional syndicated newspaper feature, just as did more than 30 other newspapers. The publishing company (Doubleday) that produced the book is a responsible firm. The editor of the papers (Frank Gibney) is a man of sound reputation. We have no reason to believe, and no one has produced evidence to show, that the published matter did not represent the views and opinions of Penkovsky.

In conformity with the best prevailing American newspaper practice, the Washington Post also published attacks on the views of Penkovsky and on the authenticity of the papers, including the criticisms by the Soviet Embassy in Washington. It proposes to deal in the same way with interesting and significant material about the Soviet Union that may come to hand in the future, but it is not in the midst of any campaign of denigration aimed at the Soviet Union and will not be plunged into one by this misguided effort at press coercion by Soviet officials.

The Soviet Government's action, also, is to be regretted, because it is bound to result in future interruptions and obstructions to a flow of information between the two countries that already is frighteningly disproportionate to their need to know more of each other. American newspapers inclined to establish correspondents in the Soviet Union will be made hesitant by the knowledge that the Communist government there not only asserts the right to obstruct, censor, and punish the correspondent for acts of his own, but also reserves the right to take reprisal against him for publications in which he is not at all involved.

There also will be a strong impulse in many governmental quarters in the United States to imitate the reactionary notions of press freedom that possessed the Soviet Government. We hope that this impulse will be resisted, because not a single Soviet correspondent would remain in America if the United States embraced this theory of reprisal in order to punish Soviet publications for the ceaseless flow of libel and slander about this country that is daily fare in the Soviet press.

Many as are the regrets over this incident, the Washington Post, for all the inconveniences and unhappy consequences, cannot regret its refusal to bow to the demands of the Soviet Government that it suspend publication of the installments of the Penkovsky papers still unpublished when Soviet officials first threatened reprisal. No free and responsible newspaper in this country could submit to such imperious dictation by any government.

The repressive policies of the Soviet Union are not going to alter the principles of the free press in this country; but we hope that, in time, the survival of the Government of the United States, despite the continuous and unrelenting criticisms by the press, may persuade the Soviet Union to abandon its paranoiac and lunatic apprehension that every unfriendly printed word is an assault upon the foundation of the regime. Perhaps, on that happy day, the Washington Post will be able again to establish a bureau in Moscow. Until then it will cheerfully rely upon the excellent services that previously provided it with coverage of the Soviet Union.

[From the New York Times, Nov. 26, 1965]

MOSCOW EXPELS A U.S. REPORTER—RETALIATES FOR WASHINGTON POST'S PENKOVSKY SERIES

Moscow, November 25.—The Soviet Union today ordered the explusion of the Washington Post's Moscow correspondent in retaliation for the newspaper's refusal to cease publication of the purported memoirs of Oleg V. Penkovsky, a convicted Soviet spy.

The Foreign Ministry accused the editorial board of the Post of conducting an anti-Soviet campaign in publishing the Penkovsky Papers, a "premeditated action in the worst traditions of the cold war which cannot but harm Soviet-American relations."

Stephen Rosenfeld, correspondent here since the Washington Post opened its bureau a year ago, was summoned to the Foreign Ministry to receive the expulsion order. He was given 7 days to leave the country.

The U.S. Embassy expressed regret at the Soviet move. A spokesman said no official protest was planned since such representations were not considered likely to reverse the decision.

THIRD EXPULSION THIS YEAR

Mr. Rosenfeld is the third American correspondent to be expelled this year. The representative of the Baltimore Sun, Adam Clymer, was ordered to leave in February. He was charged with having struck a policeman during an anti-American student demonstration.

In September, Sam Jaffe, the American Broadcasting Co.'s correspondent, was expelled because of a news report originating in the network's Washington bureau that a shakeup in the Kremlin leadership was imminent.

As in Mr. Jaffe's case, the Foreign Ministry made it clear that the action against Mr. Rosenfeld was not directed against the correspondent personally for anything he had reported under a Moscow dateline.

It was rather a punitive action—apparently the most direct one open to the Soviet Government—aimed at the newspaper.

"The Penkovskiy Papers," published as a book in London and New York this month, are random notes critical of the leadership of former Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev. They allegedly disclose details of the operations of Soviet intelligence organizations.

The publishers described the material as the informal comments of Mr. Penkovsky, smuggled out of the Soviet Union shortly before he was convicted as a spy for the West and shot in 1963. The name is spelled in the book with a literal rendering of the Russian final vowel.

[From the Washington Post, Dec. 3, 1965]

PENKOVSKY REACTION

I share your regrets over the obtuseness of the Soviet authorities in matters pertaining to freedom of the press. Obviously, you are under no obligation to show a correct point

of view and are even perfectly at liberty to print anything that fills the empty spaces between chuck roast ads. However, it is regrettable that the expulsion of your able and amiable Moscow correspondent should have resulted from the publication of so unworthy material as "The Penkovsky Papers."

At best, the papers are worthless as a source of insight into Soviet intentions; at worst, they tend to arouse the suspicions of the Soviet authorities that the timing of the publication was "not accidental."

The issue is not really the authenticity of the papers (although I personally consider them, on the internal evidence of the text, a rather substandard forgery or a doctored version of oral remarks by Penkovsky recorded on tape by his London contacts).

The business of spies is to forward factual information and leave analysis to others. As Edward Crankshaw so ably pointed out in the remarks which you used as a scanty figleaf for the papers, Penkovsky confused capabilities with intentions, a cardinal sin in intelligence analysis. The papers also confuse contingency reasoning with evidence of planning. It is interesting and important to know that there exists somewhere in Moscow a staff paper arguing the merits of surprise attack or preventive war or bacteriological warfare. Such contingency papers are produced by the dozens in Washington and elsewhere and they are the legitimate province of strategic military thinking. But it is the business of political analysts to assign to them the exact weight they deserve.

The publication of the papers comes at a time when the Soviet Union is in an extremely delicate position with respect to the outside world, pressured by the Chinese as virtually a lackey of Wall Street and at the same time charged with responsibility for real or imaginary disturbances in places far removed from Moscow's influence. It takes little to generate in the minds of the Soviet leaders the notion that someone was trying deliberately to complicate still further the otherwise delicate relations between the U.S.S.R. and the United States.

It would, of course, be of help if the Soviet leaders or their advisers knew more about the free-wheeling habits of the American publishing industry. At the very least, the customary delay between the acceptance of a manuscript and its actual appearance in print should seriously impair the "curious timing" theory. On the other hand, once the editors of the Washington Post have digested their indignation, they might take some time to ponder this friendly suggestion: The publication of drivel, while admittedly a matter of right—is not the best way of discharging the precious responsibilities of a free press.

SAMUEL L. SHARP,
Professor of International Relations, American University.

WASHINGTON.

[From the Washington Post, Dec. 4, 1965]

EXPELLED NEWSMAN BACK IN THE UNITED STATES

NEW YORK, December 3.—Stephen S. Rosenfeld, expelled Moscow correspondent of the Washington Post, said on his arrival today at Kennedy Airport that the Russians apparently regard foreign correspondents as "hostages" for the performances of the organization they represent.

If a newspaper or a network does something the Russians don't like "the correspondent is the hostage and out he goes," Rosenfeld said, adding:

"It's a silly idea and they (the Russians) don't seem to learn. They don't have a free press themselves and by using foreign correspondents as hostages they attempt to control the foreign press, but of course they can't."

Rosenfeld was given 7 days to leave Russia after he was asked to have his newspaper halt the publication of the last 2 installments of a series of 14 from "The Penkovsky Papers," reputedly the notes of Col. Oleg Penkovsky, a Soviet intelligence officer executed for spying for the West.

[From the Washington Post, Dec. 26, 1965]

PENKOVSKY'S ROLE: A BRITISH REVIEW

(The Times literary supplement)

Not so long ago "banned in Boston" used to be one of the most valuable puffs a book could earn. "Protested against in Downing Street" is less promising in one respect, but Messrs. Collins (British publishers of the Penkovsky papers) must be profoundly grateful for the publicity which the Soviet Government has given to a book which, by reason of a rather scrappy composition and alien subject, might otherwise not have received the attention it richly deserves.

But for the opportune diplomatic intervention many people might have remained under the impression, which was pretty general at the time of the trial in May 1963, that Penkovsky was a mere accessory to the case against the British businessman, Greville Wynne, framed to justify the latter's kidnaping in Hungary. This book reveals the real seriousness of the affair. The trial and conviction of Penkovsky was to the Soviet Establishment as damaging a blow as was the Hiss case to America. The repercussions were of seismic intensity.

It is precisely because Penkovsky was so highly placed that these papers are of such interest * * *. From a material point of view Penkovsky was thoroughly well off and to all appearances an efficient and convinced member of the ruling class when he voluntarily got in touch with British Intelligence and during a short run of 16 months handed over to them more than 5,000 items of information of political, military and economic matters (the figures come from the indictment at this trial) * * *. What were his motives?

At the trial he was made out to be a dissolute playboy. The usual antisemitic overtones were also brought in. The importance of his position was minimized, though scarcely consistently with the details of the indictment, and this is still the official line. From the Communist point of view it is difficult to see why this should be found necessary: after all, nothing in the history of treachery can equal the record of the Russian ruling class since the revolution, if the official version is to be believed.

Why should it be surprising that a colonel should be in touch for 16 months with British Intelligence when the faithful are still required to believe that Beria, a marshal of the Soviet Union, was a paid employee of the same service for 36 years, from 1917 to 1953? Perhaps it is the difference between truth and official truth that calls for concealment on the Government's part; and his realization of the same difference clearly inspired Penkovsky to make sure the reason for his action were recorded.

His first motive was revulsion against the organization of Soviet society. The disillusioned aristocrat is a well-known phenomenon in all regimes based on privilege. Penkovsky thought it shocking that while he was being entertained by his friend Marshal Varentsov at a table collapsing with food, "salmon, fish in aspic, sprats, cheese, 10 different kinds of sausage, over 50 bottles of vodka and cognac, champagne, cakes, pastry, ice cream and so on," people in Voronezh were queueing for horsemeat. He was scandalized by the behavior of some of his fellow aristocrats, their dissolute private lives, their immunity from the law.

His second motive was fear of nuclear war. He evidently hated and distrusted Khrushchev—there may have been something personal in this—and seriously believed that he was an adventurer. After the removal of Zhukov, for whom many Russian officers had a high respect, it appeared to Penkovsky that Khrushchev was surrounded only by military yes-men. He reproduces extracts from theoretical military studies which show a dangerous indifference to the possibility of world destruction.

It may well be, as Mr. Edward Crankshaw says in a sympathetic and entertaining foreword, that Penkovsky confused contingency planning with purposeful strategy, but he was close to the source of danger, and he believed it real.

The book is made up partly of documents attributed to Penkovsky himself and partly of a connecting narrative. American editing and adaptation have been responsible for attracting some attacks on the authenticity of the former, unjustified except possibly in matters of detail; certain verbal infelicities may be attributable to the same cause. Some have also found it inconceivable that Penkovsky could have committed so much to paper; but it is clear from the evidence of the book and of the trial that he was madly reckless, and his record of success shows him skilled at directing material in bulk to the correct address. As a whole, what is presented here has the stamp of genuineness.

[From Parade Magazine section, the Washington Post, Jan. 9, 1966]

Question. In "The Penkovsky Papers," allegedly the diary of a Russian agent who defected, there is a statement to the effect that Yekaterina Furtseva, the Soviet Minister of Culture, was Khrushchev's mistress. Is there any truth to that statement? Is there any truth to the book? Penkovsky must have been a stupid secret agent to keep a diary.—Allen James, New York, N.Y.

Answer. Penkovsky probably never kept a diary. Intelligence agents suggest that the book consists of transcribed reports from tape recordings he made for British Intelligence and the CIA. Khrushchev and Furtseva were close friends, but she was never his mistress.

THE UNPRECEDENTED SUPPORT FOR A WAR AGAINST WANT

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, at the opening of this session of Congress I am gratified to report to the Senate the remarkably widespread support expressed during the congressional recess for revision and expansion of our food-for-peace effort into an international food program that will close the world food gap. Many thoughtful people see such a program, as I do, as an opportunity to reduce hunger in the world while opening up new production and income benefits to the American farmer and our economy as a whole.

Before I report further concerning the reaction which has been pouring into my office concerning this proposal for the last few months, I should like to digress for a moment to congratulate President Johnson on what I regard as a superb state of the Union message. It was a message of peace and progress for our country.

I was especially pleased with the President's call for a "maximum attack," as he called it, on hunger and disease and ignorance in the world.

The President's vigorous espousal of a "worldwide attack" on human hunger and misery has my strong support. I believe that is the kind of war that most