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U-2 Incident Imperils Entire Overseas Base System; Soviet Reaction So Far Just a Prelude

Pakistani President's Doubts About U.S. Nuclear Policy Regarded as a Straw in Wind That Indicates Trouble With Small Allies.

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THE ENTIRE UNITED STATES OVERSEAS BASE SYSTEM is in grave danger since the admission by the United States that the U-2 flights were government policy, approved at the highest levels. The threats made by the Soviet Union against Pakistan, Norway, Turkey and Japan are only the first steps in a campaign that will increase in violence.

In the days between May 1, when the U-2 plane came down, and May 3, when the Soviets announced it, one can reconstruct the continuous discussions in the Kremlin to decide what line to take. (Unfortunately, no such thoughtful meetings were in progress in the top Administration levels in the United States.)

If the flight was made public, if it was admitted that an American airplane had penetrated 1300 miles inside the Soviet Union without being shot down, it would appear to the outside world and to the Russian and satellite populations that Soviet defenses were helpless against American aircraft.

But if the flight, and the capture of the plane and pilot were made public, it would give the Russians a propaganda weapon of high credibility in its campaign against American overseas bases. It would also provide a lever to raise doubts about American good faith in all international conferences.

THE DECISION to make the flight public was taken. The lever was used to break up the Paris summit conference, casting the blame upon the United States, and then to break up the Geneva conference on disarmament. The conference considering a bar on atomic testing may be next.

The long-range campaign against United States overseas bases has not yet started. The U-2 incident was made use of in Japan and Okinawa to exacerbate sentiment already in existence against American bases. The Japanese and Okinawans are fearful of American aircraft.

and Nike-Hercules missiles capable of firing nuclear warheads, are employed in Okinawa.

With massive Communist help in money, leadership and organization, sentiment in Japan was not difficult to organize against the ratification of the mutual security treaty with Japan and against the visit of President Eisenhower, a protest.

In Okinawa, the people do not realize the difference between a Nike-Hercules air defense missile and atomic weapons. In one Hercules firing, some burning rubber fragments of the solid propellant that fell to earth were described as fallout in Okinawa newspapers. It was not hard to organize Okinawan sentiment against the President, United States bases and Government in view of the fear of nuclear war and the sentiment for reversion to Japan.

WARNINGS WERE GIVEN to Pakistan, Turkey and Norway by the Soviets after the U-2 incident. Pakistan and Norway disclaimed knowledge and responsibility of any kind. Turkey took the threats in stride. We are ready to march with 10 minutes warning, the Turks declared.

But in December 1957, Pakistan had assured the Soviet Union that it had no intention of granting bases to the United States. This was during a massive campaign of propaganda and threats directed against all nations allied with the United States that lasted for about one year in 1957 and 1958.

Today Pakistan is faced with the fact that the U-2 took off from a base constructed by the United States (but not occupied).

in Pakistan. What are the Pakistanis going to reply now to Soviet complaints and threats?

A straw in the wind that bodes ill for the United States is a statement by President Ayub Khan June 25, in which he declared that Pakistanis were "beginning to doubt" that the governmental machinery of the United States was attuned to the nuclear age. It appears to be "careless, sluggish and a clumsy juggernaut," Ayub asserted. "In my mind that is the greatest danger to the free world."

The next step could be a withdrawal, in part or entirely, from the SEATO security alliance with the United States.

NORWAY ASSURED the Soviet Union Nov. 15, 1957, that it would refuse to give bases to Norwegian, said unless it were attacked and threatened. But the U-2 airplane was scheduled to land on a Norwegian air base built by the United States.

Norway had been threatened with nuclear retaliation in 1957, in case of war, NATO bases were in Norway. The threat was massive. Former Premier Nikita Khrushchev stated that radius of destruction of nuclear weapons was hundreds of kilometers (meaning the radius of the radioactive fallout) and asked what would be left of Norway.

Other small nations received the same kind of threats. It was informed that air hydrogen bombs could wipe out all of Britain. A week ago, the British Labor party adopted a policy statement that nuclear rocket bases (but not bomber bases) in Britain be denied to the United States.

Japan, Norway and Pakistan have received second warnings. April 9, the Soviet radio demanded that the United States base in Libya be abandoned.

What has taken place thus far is only a clearing of the decks. The real campaign against United States overseas bases is yet to start. It will far exceed the almost successful one of two years ago.

What if the Soviet campaign is successful in certain areas? In the Far East, Korea cannot be defended without bases in Japan. The defense of Korea is also the defense of Japan. Japan can not now, and probably never can, defend itself with its own resources.

THE BASES ON OKINAWA are endangered by the same sentiment that exists in Japan and, in addition, there is the desire to get rid of the United States bases.

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East for two-thirds of a marine division in readiness (the marine air wing is in Japan) and Air Force tactical wings.

The defense of Formosa can not be assured without holding Okinawa. The Philippines are safe for the present, but the naval and air bases there cannot be enlarged to take over what may be forced out of Japan and Okinawa.

For Strategic Air Command purposes, overseas bases can be dispensed with, but with difficulty. They now are used only for alert forces that stay two or three weeks. In time of war they would be valuable as refueling and recovery bases after a mission.

But for troop movements by air in limited warfare situations, the overseas bases intended originally for the Strategic Air Command are invaluable, actually indispensable. This is because an airborne movement over great distances is carried the major part of the way by long range strategic transports and then is unloaded and reloaded on slower aircraft from which paratroopers can jump or that can land on short runways.

PENTAGON PLANNERS fear that if the prospective Soviet campaign against American bases is even only partially successful, the whole forward strategy of the United States for the defense of the free world will be endangered.

There is little question that the Soviet chess players, planning their movements on a global scale from May 1 to May 1, a period in which the United States authorities were not able to think up a reasonable cover story for the downed U-2—made a difficult decision to admit that a United States airplane had penetrated 1300 miles into the Soviet Union to gain a weapon to be used against United States allies and bases everywhere.