

In 1949, after much legal haggling, Los Alamos became a county, and its citizens became legal residents of New Mexico with voting privileges in local, State and national elections. In 1957, the gates came down, and anybody who wanted to could come and go in the town.

Today, except for its rugged mountain setting, the community of bright green lawns and brilliant gardens looks just about like any suburban town. Its more than 13,000 residents enjoy an outstanding school system, a fast-growing shopping facility and plenty of recreation. The housing has never caught up with the demand and often seems to be losing ground, but the big hope for improvement lies in two burgeoning subdivisions, where land and homes are being bought and built by private individuals for the first time in the history of the Federal project.

But, if Los Alamos is still not quite a "normal" community, it soon will be. Last fall, President Kennedy signed a bill making possible the shift of commercial and residential property of the Hill from Federal to private ownership. Although the long process of platting, planning and appraisal has begun, actual sales are not expected to begin before mid-1964. Meanwhile the AEC is planning more than \$8 million worth of construction and maintenance to put municipal facilities in good, shapable shape, and the busy members of the Los Alamos County Commission are tackling the monumental job of preparing the community for self-government.

Many changes have taken place on Pajarito Plateau during the past two decades. Changes which have affected not only the community itself, but changes which have altered mankind's whole outlook on the world in which he lives. But, one thing will not change: the Laboratory's adventurous spirit and the unmatched natural beauty of the setting which provides much of the inspiration for that spirit.

With an impressive record of accomplishments behind it, and its hometown becoming what the AEC hoped in 1947 would be "a community satisfactory to scientists," the Laboratory can look to a promising future.

Many technological and scientific advances are predictable—achievement of flyable nuclear rockets and investigation of more sophisticated types of nuclear rocket propulsion; practical systems for obtaining power from controlled fusion; fast breeding fission reactors; explorations in the field of molecular biology. Quite unpredictable, however, are scientific and technological breakthroughs. There were plenty of these during the Laboratory's first 20 years—there are certain to be many more in the future.

THE ROLE OF OUR INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES DURING THE CUBAN MILITARY BUILDUP: WHAT ARE THE REAL FACTS, AND WHAT CAN WE PROPERLY CONCLUDE?

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from New York [Mr. STRATTON] is recognized for 45 minutes.

[Mr. STRATTON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.]

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Speaker, as a member of the Armed Services Committee and as a former intelligence officer in the Navy I have been gravely concerned since last January with the sweeping and serious charges that have been made against our established Government intelligence agencies in connection with their performance in the Cuban crisis. For this reason I have awaited with great interest the release of the

report of the Special Preparedness Subcommittee of the other body, summarizing its findings in its recent investigation into this whole matter.

Mr. Speaker, now that this report has been released I feel constrained to say that I find myself baffled, mystified, and disappointed by it. Last January and February we found ourselves with a violent, almost hysterical attack being made upon both the integrity and the competence of our Nation's intelligence agencies. Either they cannot find out the real facts about Cuba, we were being told, or else they are deliberately covering up. This attack became so severe and so potentially damaging that on February 6 to quiet it, the Secretary of Defense went on nationwide television for 2 hours with material that only a few hours earlier had been classified as secret or top secret—a truly unprecedented undertaking, which, incidentally, was only partially successful.

It was against this background, Mr. Speaker, that the subcommittee moved to try to find the real answer to these grave and very disturbing questions. Were the intelligence people right—or were they not? The Congress ought to know, and the people ought to know, too.

This was the task to which the distinguished subcommittee set itself.

Now the verdict is in, Mr. Speaker, and I must say I am flabbergasted to see it. All charges have been factually disproved, but somehow the defendant has still not been acquitted. Instead he remains under suspicion, if he is not indeed actually found guilty at least on some counts.

I realize that the legislative process involves compromise, but surely when it comes to a question as gravely serious as the one that originally led to the subcommittee's inquiry, do not we deserve a more specific answer than that, if the facts at all warrant such an answer?

Yet here is a jury verdict with something for everybody, a strange amalgam of both fact and fancy which comes out clearly and positively exactly nowhere.

Surely if the facts point one way, Mr. Speaker, then we have a right, do we not, to expect that the conclusions will follow them in the same direction? Surely when the integrity and the competence of our top intelligence services have been so viciously attacked, the American people have a right to expect a more specific and forthright answer from this great subcommittee.

Let us look at this report. As I see it, every single one of the grave charges made against our intelligence services last February—both on and off the floors of Congress—have been specifically and conclusively disproved by the subcommittee's report.

Let me just run down some of their findings, mostly in their own words:

The subcommittee has uncovered no evidence to substantiate charges and speculation about a photography gap having existed from September 5 to October 14. The evidence before the subcommittee leads to the conclusion that such charges are unfounded.

The news reports of an alleged conflict between the CIA and SAC with reference to the operation of U-2 high-altitude reconnaissance flights prior to October 14 were also closely inquired into and found to be without merit.

To a man the intelligence chiefs stated that it is their opinion that all strategic missiles and bombers have been removed from Cuba.

The intelligence community estimated that approximately 5,000 Soviet personnel were withdrawn from Cuba following the October confrontation. A net of 4,000 to 5,000 additional have been withdrawn since the first of the year, our intelligence people say.

That, Mr. Speaker, is a direct quote, as are the others, from the subcommittee's own report, and that adds up to a total estimated withdrawal of from 9,000 to 10,000 Soviet personnel. The report does not mention a single word about any evidence to support the charge, made in some quarters, that a comparable number of Soviet personnel—whether called troops or technicians—have newly arrived in Cuba.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. STRATTON. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. MORSE. How many Soviet troops, according to the estimates of our intelligence sources, now remain in Cuba?

Mr. STRATTON. If the gentleman will permit me to develop my point of view as I have prepared it, I think that we can then discuss that subject a little later.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will yield further, will the gentleman agree that the presence of Soviet troops rather than the number of Soviet troops is the critical factor?

Mr. STRATTON. Well, I would say to my good friend from Massachusetts that I certainly agree with him that the presence of Soviet troops is a matter of concern, but what I am directing myself to, however, is a specific item with respect to the quality of our intelligence and with respect to certain suggestions that have been made in certain quarters that certain individuals have a different kind of intelligence from that available to our top intelligence agencies. Such a suggestion was made, for example, to the effect that as many troops or technicians, or whatever you want to call them, had moved back into Cuba in recent months as had been withdrawn earlier, and I am simply calling to the attention of the House the fact that the report of the subcommittee says that a total of 9,000 to 10,000 troops were withdrawn from Cuba since October.

And that there is not a shred of evidence in the report—I am not quoting—but there is nothing in the report to suggest that any number of troops or technicians or Soviet personnel ever went back into Cuba.

Mr. MORSE. If the gentleman will yield further, would the gentleman agree that there are still thousands of Soviet troops on the island of Cuba today?

Mr. STRATTON. Yes; and the reports substantiate that.

Mr. MORSE. Would the gentleman restate his quotation with reference to the "photography gap"?

Mr. STRATTON. Well, I do not mind debating with the gentleman, and I am always happy to talk with him, but my time is somewhat limited.

Mr. MORSE. I just missed the dates.