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~~Pers. Symington, Stuart~~
Pers. Mohr, Charles
Pers. Spivak, Lawrence
Pers. Steele, John
Pers. Gosalski, Robert
Pers. Frankel, Max
Doc 4-01.3 Meet the Press
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article entitled "Saigon Takes Reins of CIA School," which had appeared the previous day on the front page of the New York Times, and asked that a member of one of the CIA subcommittees inform the Senate as to the purported facts in this article.

The Senator from Minnesota described the article as "confused." He is right. The article deals with the South Vietnamese Government's training school for their revolutionary development training program. Much of it is inaccurate in implication as well as in fact.

In passing, it is noted that the Senator misquotes the article when he lists the article's final paragraph. The words "not happy" are used instead of "not unhappy." We are sure this change in the meaning as expressed in the article was inadvertent, and only mention it in the case someone reads the purported quote of the last paragraph but not the last paragraph itself.

The training school in question is not in Saigon. It is in Vung Tau, in the delta. The school was established in 1964 by the Central Intelligence Agency in order to train Vietnamese from the rural areas to defend themselves and their fellow villagers against the political and terrorist incursions of the Vietcong.

The prime objective of this program was to reestablish contact between the villagers and the local authorities, to revive the confidence of the villagers in their local government, and to enlist the active participation of the latter in the war against the Vietcong.

Since its inception, the training at this school has been done by the Vietnamese. The direction and control of the teams, once they return home to begin work, is entirely in the hands of the local district and province chiefs of the South Vietnamese Government.

From its inception, the Central Intelligence Agency has provided the logistic and financial support to the effort. The CIA has also provided civilians who advise provincial officials of the South Vietnamese Government on political and civil problems. This is done in much the same way that American military personnel advise the same officials on military matters.

As soon as the school was set up and running successfully, the Central Intelligence Agency initiated negotiating to turn over the entire program, including the school, to the South Vietnamese Government. These negotiations were concluded in November 1965, and the South Vietnamese took control in early February 1966.

The South Vietnamese Government thereupon revamped its Rural Construction Ministry and appointed General Thang the Minister of Revolutionary Development. General Thang took over the entire CIA-sponsored cadre as the core of his new Ministry's effort. At that time the general issued a series of decrees which formalized his country's direction and control of the school and the entire program.

The South Vietnamese Government specifically requested that the Central Intelligence Agency continue its logistic and financial support, as well as its ad-

THE FACTS WITH RESPECT TO THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
AND THE NATIONAL TRAINING
CENTER IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, earlier this week the Senior Senator from Minnesota inserted in the Record an ar-

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visory role, during this transitional period. That is the way the relationship stands today.

As for the situation described in this article in the New York Times, what took place recently was an internal dispute among the Vietnamese staff at Vung Tau, touched off by Minister Thang's replacement of the commander he himself had appointed last February. As a result there was an element of the old staff which resented the changes that had taken place; and accordingly demonstrated against the new management. Seven instructors out of a total of some 400 were dismissed, including the director of training.

There is nothing secretive whatever about this training program or the affiliation with it of the Central Intelligence Agency. Both have been discussed at length, in the press and on radio and television.

Ambassador Lodge and the U.S. mission council, in concert with their appropriate counterparts in the South Vietnamese Government, are studying intensively the entire rural development cadre program, including the best methods of assistance.

At this point, let me emphasize that the CIA has done nothing, and is doing nothing, except what it has been formally asked to do by the appropriate officials of the United States Government and the South Vietnamese Government.

In other words, the Times article is more than "confused." Much of it was untrue. The implied charge that the CIA was hoodwinked into sponsoring an anti-South Vietnamese Government "third force" movement does not square with the facts.

Major Mai is an active duty officer in the Vietnamese Army. He did preach a dynamic message of intense nationalism, and his relations with his Vietnamese colleagues and superiors have not been free of friction. But the charge that as a "result" of his activities the South Vietnamese Government was forced to "take over" the Vung Tau school from the CIA is totally inaccurate.

In this connection, the author of this article, Mr. Charles Mohr, appears either to have changed his position, or to be confused himself.

In this article that he wrote on July 18, Mr. Mohr states:

The change-over of the training program (from the Central Intelligence Agency to the South Vietnamese) took place in mid June.

And—

As a result, Saigon government officials have taken control from the Central Intelligence Agency of the program for training the "Revolutionary Development Cadre"—armed experts in political propaganda.

But 2 months earlier, in an article he also wrote for the New York Times as of May 21, and directly contrary to this his article of July 18, Mr. Mohr gave the facts as they actually are when he said:

The cadre training school at Vungtau, a coastal town near Saigon, lasted for 13 weeks. The school is run by the Vietnamese but is known to be financed by an American agency and has a number of American advisors.

In other words, if Mr. Mohr felt the school was being run by the Vietnamese

in May, how can he now say that it was taken over by the Vietnamese from the CIA in June?

In a classified report made to the Senate upon my return to this country from the Far East earlier this year, I presented the details of a visit to Vung Tau with Major Mai—then captain—and others at the training school in question.

I ask unanimous consent that the declassified part of this Senate report on this school be inserted at this point in the Record.

There being no objection, the declassified part of the Senate report was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

VUNG TAU, Monday, January 3.—The first thing this morning was a briefing at the U.S. Embassy. Then we flew to Vung Tau. On the flight we were accompanied by Captain Lo Xuan Mai, Director of the Vung Tau Farm.

On arrival we were taken to the Farm, where political action teams are trained. On arrival, Captain Mai first briefed us.

They take in natives, bringing in people who other people with whom they have contact say they know and trust. They operate on the coast where such a large part of the people live. The PAT are represented in each province.

The class they had going down there at this time had 3,200 people. The next class is planned for 3,800 people. They train 40 man political action teams, equipped with three medals each. The class also included 160 girls who were being trained primarily as midwives. It was essentially a large "civil action" course. They tried to teach the students a strong spirit concerning what they were fighting for. Vietnam has been at war for 25 years.

Ever since the Japanese came, people had been influenced by Communist-Viet Cong propaganda. Most thought it was all right, customary to contribute to the Viet Cong. When many if not most come to Vung Tau Farm, they have a bad attitude; therefore, Captain Mai said they concentrated on orientations.

When they arrived, the students often used expressions like "American imperialists," along with "French colonialists." At Vung Tau these young ones were taught there are absolute enemies and relative enemies. China, for example, it was constantly stressed, is an absolute enemy.

The students were also taught that they had friends whose interests in South Vietnam were as dear as their own. Such were the United States, Korea, Australia, plus the other nations who were supporting the South Vietnamese.

Those North Vietnamese fighting for the Chinese Communists are absolute enemies, and those who are mistaken, and have joined the Viet Cong, are absolute enemies if they won't come back when they have the chance.

During phase I of the course, special stress is laid in creating confidence in the Vietnamese youth. The students are allowed, encouraged, to speak their minds fully about any problems there may be in the Vietnamese government, or anything else they may have on their minds. There is discussion of such problems as corruption, poverty, misery, and fatalism. They want them to talk about it, and they want to change it. They try to imbue them with a revolutionary spirit. Phase I is a three week intensive training period.

During phase II there is special emphasis on the importance of a strong will. They formerly made a fourteen kilometer march, everyday. Now that is reduced to eight kilometers a day. The student is asked if he is ready to accept hardship, and the life of a revolutionary. They have a cere-

mony incident to issuing the black suit. The student must wear it willingly. The black suit is the traditional peasant black, pajamas. An individual, once he is a member of a political action team, stays on the payroll indefinitely.

During phase III they teach the student to accept the challenge of war. They teach him that he cannot stay around and do nothing, that much of the country is overrun by the Viet Cong, and that they cannot relax and put the whole future and destiny of the Republic of Vietnam in the hands of friends. They must do something for themselves.

In phase IV the students are taught how to fight, and urged to fight. They are taught the use of various arms and explosives; but the main weapon is political action, propaganda, how to help peasants fix houses, promote literacy, and care for the sick. They learn to send medicines out to the sick, instead of asking the sick to come to the medicines. Captain Mai observed they didn't need much medicine; usually a friendly word and an aspirin was very good propaganda.

During the course the students are given complete freedom to speak. In the beginning they generally resolutely criticize or accuse Americans, but then they are shown that they have no substantial basis for their arguments. They come to realize that the United States does not take from them, rather gives assistance. They are taught that if the Viet Cong are not present in the land, and the South Vietnamese can produce more rice, automatically there will be more wealth for all.

In teaching the students at Vung Tau Farm, the instructors go back deep in Vietnamese history, because the ancestors pass the spirit from one generation to another. They remind the students of the story of the fairy and the dragon. In this Vietnamese story, the fairy represents spirit, and the dragon represents matter. Materialism is only 50% of life. So the students should not follow the Marxist way of 100% materialism, rather it should be a 50-50 proposition. They also use other legends, such as the one about the three-year-old boy who became a young man when the aggressor struck. They show why the people must unite if they are to defend themselves.

At the Vung Tau Farm School there are seven steps in conducting a complete lesson. First, there is individual study, in a five-man cell.

This is followed by a group lecture, at which the students take notes.

Third is a period when the students discuss the lesson among themselves, and elect a secretary to take notes.

The instructor then talks to the class, and corrects any mistakes, or mistaken ideas he feels they may have about the subject matter in question.

The fifth step is students themselves volunteer to address, and carry on the lesson with the class.

The sixth step is a summing up by the instructor of major points in the lesson.

The seventh step is the examination. Each of the first six are two hour periods. The examination lasts one hour, so there are thirteen hours per lesson.

Throughout the course the instructors use the technique of instilling strong faith. They keep repeating and emphasizing that South Vietnam will be victorious.

There are five men in each cell of students. Eight cells go to make up a team. They teach parliamentary procedure and form a mock village government.

One half of their studies are in the school buildings, one half in the jungle. They set up defenses around villages, and defend against mock Viet Cong attacks.

Before bed each night the student makes a pledge to be loyal to discipline himself,

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have no self interests, to help the sick, to help the poor and the aged, and to fight the communists. In the morning again they make the same pledge.

The students are taught that they can and will win with love and sincerity. From this has been derived a symbol which, in block letters, is the letter "T", super inscribed on the letter "H". These two letters, TH, form the first two letters of the three words in the Vietnamese meaning Victory, Love, Sincerity, Thank, Tauong, Thanh.

I asked Captain Mai to give me one of these "symbol" pins. It was interesting to watch the pride in his face as he pinned it on. They teach the student that this symbol, Victory, Love, Sincerity, blots out the hammer and sickle.

The students are trained in the use of weapons, the submachine gun, the Browning automatic rifle, the M-1 rifle, carbines and grenades.

The students are issued weapons when they get into the area where they plan to set up their permanent team.

The ages of the students are from 15 to 50. The total training course is ten weeks.

Captain Mai and his Deputy then took us on a tour of the school.

In one student class we heard the student instructor ask, "Why do you think the people of Vietnam do not agree with President DeGaulle?" A very young student rose and said, "First of all President DeGaulle is a neutral South Vietnam for his own self-interest." "He plans to later move in and colonize it, or at least regain his economic control."

The students are trained for eleven hours a day, six days a week. This does not include their physical training, before 8:00 in the morning, nor their study period from 11:00 to 11:00 at night.

When they graduate, they form "People's Action Teams", sometimes referred to as "People's Action Teams." The Vietnamese refer to these teams as Biet Chinh. It is a special political.

When M-1 joined the Army by going to Military Academy at Dalat in 1952. He had a year at Benning.

Captain Mai says that there are now many in the provinces. Sometimes they get killed, but the overall is improving. Then and then he gets a letter from the one who becomes disillusioned. He reads a letter from Saigon the other day in which one of his students said he had seen the beaten by the police. The individual was shocked, asked Captain Mai to help.

In Vietnam there are 44 provinces. Each has about seven districts. Beneath the districts are the villages.

We listened to some more classes. In one the students got in an argument. Captain Mai or Captain Phac said one had asserted, "Communism dominates the Afro-Asian block." Another student challenged him and said, "You should give names to justify your position." This from youths from the villages. We then went with Captain Mai on an automobile tour around the training farm. Captain Mai explained that only one course of one class could be taught at any one time, after the faculty rested for ten days, then started on a new class. The reason they didn't have several grades going on at one time was lack of instructors.

Captain Mai explained they had had a visit of the school with Montagnard students up in Pleiku. Captain Mai said 25% of the students go on leave after the 4th week. Those who stay are urged to go out and help the villagers.

We saw a camp of refugees by the Farm, and the students at Vung Tau helping them.

We said we were amazed at the depth of the political questions and political interests of the students. Captain Mai explained that the villagers for years had been harassed by

the Viet Cong, that this had forced them to think politically.

One of the various things done to defy the Viet Cong was to put the national colors on little T-shirts, then hand them out to five-year old children. In effect, they were defying the Viet Cong to take the shirt off of a five-year old child.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, last Sunday, on the well-known television program "Meet the Press," a great American, Adm. William F. Raborn, former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, accepted questions with respect to the structure and functioning of that Agency. The interrogation panel consisted of Mr. John Steele, of Time-Life magazines, Mr. Max Frankel, of the New York Times, Mr. Robert Goralski, of NBC News, and Mr. Lawrence E. Spivak, permanent panel member.

Because the questions and answers incident to this program in turn furnish the replies to many questions about the Agency that have been brought up in the past, I ask unanimous consent that a transcript of the program be inserted at this point in the Record.

There being no objection, the transcript was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

MEET THE PRESS

(Produced by Lawrence E. Spivak, Sunday, July 17, 1966; guest, Adm. William F. Raborn, former Director, C.I.A.; panel John Steele, Time-Life magazines; Max Frankel, the New York Times; Robert Goralski, NBC News; Lawrence E. Spivak, permanent panel member; moderator, Neil Boggs)

Mr. Boggs. This is Neil Boggs, inviting you to "Meet the Press."

Mr. Boggs. Our guest today on "Meet the Press," is Admiral William F. Raborn, recently retired Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Admiral Raborn is widely recognized as the developer of the Polaris missile system. He succeeded John McCone as head of the CIA in April, 1965. Now we will have the first question from Lawrence E. Spivak, permanent member of the "Meet the Press" panel.

Mr. Spivak. Admiral Raborn, the Senate is engaged in a controversy over the question of adding members of the Foreign Relations Committee to the committee that now oversees the CIA. Would you say that it makes much difference to the CIA what Senate committees oversee it?

Admiral Raborn. It has been the position of the agency, and it was my position too, Mr. Spivak, that the oversight activities of the Congress were distinctly the business of the Congress.

Mr. Spivak. May I have your opinion. You are out of the CIA at the present time. What is your personal opinion, does it make any difference?

Admiral Raborn. Well, I stated my opinion. My opinion is that this is a matter which the Congress itself would want to resolve and it is not a matter of conjecture by me.

Mr. Spivak. Do you mean to tell me, Admiral, now that you are a private citizen, you have no opinion on a matter of that importance that might be of great help to the American people if you did give an opinion?

Admiral Raborn. As a private citizen I would make my views known to the people who have to do with such matters, namely the Congress, and I think I must be appropriately reticent about commenting on the responsibilities of responsible people.

Mr. Spivak. Admiral, it was reported that

you refused to give members of the Foreign Relations Committee any information on sources and methods. Can you tell us why you refused?

Admiral Raborn. Yes. I am directed by the Congress, the Congressional Act that set up the Agency, Public Law 80-253 of 1947. It specifically charged the Director of Central Intelligence with safeguarding methods and sources of intelligence and it has been the practice of all previous Administrations since then and under the current Administration, that we would report fully on these activities to the Oversight Committees set up to oversee the activities of the intelligence agencies and bodies of the United States government.

Mr. Spivak. Admiral, as you know there has been a good deal of criticism and even hostility in recent years against the CIA. Would you say that any of the criticism has been justified?

Admiral Raborn. Oh, I am sure that none of us lead a blameless life. I think there has only been one Person I believe in the history of mankind who has lived a blameless life, but by and large I would say that the criticisms have been largely based on inaccuracies and are not justified at all.

Mr. Spivak. What is your explanation for the rising tide of criticism against the CIA in recent years?

Admiral Raborn. Well, I think that this is in the nature of the organization. It, of course, has to be secret and this fact that it has to be secret was recognized even by General Washington in an original letter that I have in which he stated that secrecy in intelligence matters was a primary essence of intelligence.

I think that the American people have not had the Central Intelligence Agency and other intelligence activities of the United States government properly explained to them and this is one reason why I gladly accepted your kind invitation to appear on this program because it is a wonderful organization, one that is extremely vital to the United States, the security of the United States, and one which they can not do without.

Mr. Spivak. Now may I give you an opportunity to make an explanation on one matter of great importance: Senator STEPHEN YOUNG of Ohio was recently reported as charging that the CIA has become an invisible government answerable only to itself. Now how would you answer that charge?

Admiral Raborn. I would say that this is a complete fallacy.

Mr. Spivak. What about his charge that the CIA was employing a small army in Vietnam?

Admiral Raborn. I would say also this is a complete fallacy.

Mr. Spivak. You are not hiding behind CIA secrecy when you make these general refutations, are you, Admiral?

Admiral Raborn. No, I am just answering them directly. Trying to.

Mr. Spivak. The CIA has been charged also with stirring up insurrections and sometimes running little wars. Would you say that that too is a false charge?

Admiral Raborn. I would say that the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, the clandestine activities, are relatively small by comparison to the major weight of their activities in other fields and that any activities of this sort is in conformance with the approval of the National Security Council and in furtherance of United States policy.

Mr. FRANKEL. Admiral, since so relatively small part of the Agency's work is, as you say, clandestine, since much of it is analytical, scientific, collecting well-known information, do you think that part of the trouble and misunderstanding of your critics is due

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to the fact that there is too much secrecy surrounding the Agency?

Admiral RABORN. This could be so, but I rather doubt it. As a matter of fact, I doubt it sincerely. The nature of our work is that we of course make these reports, as you say, to the Administration authorities and to the Congress, that we make it on a "need to know" basis, give it to the people who have a need for it.

Obviously it would be unwise to make this general knowledge because of the delicacy of the matters.

Mr. FRANKEL. For instance, the total budget you operate under, the total number of employees that you have. You have been in secret projects before, Polaris—the Pentagon has many secrets. Yet the overall activities, the extent of them are known. And I know that law forbids you now to talk about the budget and the number of employees, but is this really necessary, is so much mystery necessary?

Admiral RABORN. Yes indeed it is. If we know, for instance the exact—I am not saying we don't—the exact numbers that the KGB, we will say, employs, and their budget, it is quite possible for one intelligence service to determine the effectiveness of the other and their capabilities. If you know these salient factors. You can work it out, piece it together, little by little. So this is a very tightly-held secret.

Mr. FRANKEL. Let me ask you about another aspect of the secrecy: When we tried to determine from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and other universities who have done, I understand, very good work for the agency, they told us that you insist that they not tell us the size of the subsidy they get from the Agency, that often they can publish material, but they can't identify government money behind it. Why does that have to be so?

Admiral RABORN. Well, I think this is not necessarily restricted to the CIA. This is common practice in many classified projects from all departments of the government. It is just information that we don't want loosed to the hands of foreign intelligence services.

Mr. FRANKEL. In connection with that there has been another controversy recently. The United States Information Agency, for instance, is forbidden by law to propagandize within our country. Yet some people have suggested that you have allowed your men to write in American magazines, that you have supported books that are published in the United States, magazines that circulate in the United States, without ever telling the reader that they are getting government material, that they are getting official points of view.

Do you think that is right for the CIA when, say the USIA is not allowed to do it?

Admiral RABORN. Well, let's put it this way: The Agency is accused of many things and quite a bit of it is most inaccurate. Specifically, now, as to permitting the scholars who are a large part of the Central Intelligence Agency, they feel a need to publish objectively information on situations existent around the world. To the extent that they can be cleared from a security point of view, they add to the general understanding of the public, and this goes back to your problem of secrecy, now, a general understanding of the public of the actual facts in a matter under scrutiny, and it is a public service. Whether or not a writer should be identified as a member of a government agency I think that is a matter for the Department concerned to make up their minds upon. It has been the past policies of the Central Intelligence Agency not to trade on a name but to let the work stand on its own merit, which is the way scholars like to have their work considered.

Mr. FRANKEL. Don't you think it is important that we the readers know that when a scholar comes with material that this is

really material that has been cleared as officially acceptable at least by an agency of government?

Admiral RABORN. "Acceptable" connotes something that I can't buy. Let's say that they represent facts or objectives. If they are objective and factual that is the thing that should be brought out. The Central Intelligence Agency does not write articles in support of administration policies or anything of that kind, so I don't like to get that connotation in there.

I think it is an open question whether or not scholars in the future should identify themselves. As a matter of fact, I rather perhaps think they should. I like to think that the Central Intelligence Agency can be more widely accepted as a good, worthwhile member, church-going member of the family of departments that make up our fine government.

Mr. STEELE. Admiral RABORN, you told Mr. Spivak a minute or two ago that a lot of the criticism of CIA stemmed from inaccuracies. I want to ask you if perhaps there isn't a different kind of criticism that is stimulated, one perhaps stemming from our enemies on the other side of the so-called Iron Curtain. Are you conscious of any attempt to undermine the CIA, to question its validity from not-sympathetic sources?

Admiral RABORN. Yes, indeed, Mr. Steele. The Communist intelligence services are working night and day, twenty-four hours every day around the world, to undermine the effectiveness of the Central Intelligence Agency and of democratic processes and institutions around the world. We know that, for instance, there is a "Department-D" known as the "Department of Disinformation." And the KGB, Lt. General Yagyanast, I believe, is the head of it—this is no secret—who spends their time in trying to undercut truly democratic institutions and agencies.

Mr. STEELE. What does this Department D do about the CIA? What activities are you aware of?

Admiral RABORN. They float stories around the world and then the Communist press picks it up immediately and puts it on the air and prints it in the newspapers. Generally these stories are completely false and they have just enough truth in them to be twisted all out of shape.

Mr. STEELE. Has this activity of this Soviet department made things more difficult or is it really more of a joking matter around the world?

Admiral RABORN. I don't mean to just single out the KGB. All foreign intelligence services that are opposed to the democratic way of life and the true democracy such as the United States represents, engage in these activities and it is part and parcel of their work and they, of course, are out to discredit anything that tends to thwart their nefarious activities.

Mr. STEELE. Well, it has been said quite often by outsiders that the CIA really is locked in a deadly battle with this Department-D and the KGB. Do you feel that is going too far or is the competition such that it really does amount to a serious battle?

Admiral RABORN. I think that the Central Intelligence Agency is but a small part of the national effort to perpetuate truly democratic ideals and freedoms around the world. We do have a significant part to play but I think we shouldn't overdo it.

Mr. GORALSKI. Admiral, aren't you unwittingly helping the KGB by not denying some of the stories that they are circulating? Every time we call the CIA, we, as newsmen, we always get nothing but a "No comment."

Admiral RABORN. Well, sir, this is the policy, which is long established and it has generally been recognized over the years that you deny no stories, good or bad, you accept no praise and you try to ignore criticisms. Because they are largely uninformed,

in both cases, and you never know when to stop once you get into the practice.

There are those in the United States government that from time to time—such as the Secretary of State, such as the Congressional oversight committees, knowing the facts, get up and do, for the record, straighten things out. Unfortunately they don't get quite as much publicity in the news media around the world as some of the accusations do.

Mr. GORALSKI. In the light of this criticism of the CIA of late, are you having trouble recruiting Americans to work for the Agency?

Admiral RABORN. No. Let me say this. This is one of the real wholesome things that I can say. The fine, patriotic, really outstanding men and women who apply for lifetime employment with the Agency every year. The people of the Agency come from more than 600 universities. Seventy-seven percent of them have college degrees and about 20 percent have a Masters or a Doctorate.

Mr. GORALSKI. I wonder if I could ask you a question on Vietnam. One of our concerns is that we don't really have enough information on what Hanoi is thinking or for that matter Peking as well. Do you feel we know enough about their own attitudes right now or could we get a better insight?

Admiral RABORN. I would say, Mr. Goral-ski, no intelligence service is ever satisfied with the amount of information that they have and in a closed society where the efforts of a nation are closely controlled in the hands of ten to 12 hard-lined, close-mouthed men, it is quite difficult to get into the minds of those men. You have to read their actions in order to get their line.

Mr. SPIVAK. Admiral, one of the grave concerns in this country is that Communist China might enter the war in Vietnam if the U.S. furthers its escalation. Can you give us an opinion on that, your own opinion?

Admiral RABORN. I guess this would be a very difficult thing to do because the spectrum of things that could trigger off such an action is very wide and I perhaps should not try to conjecture on it. I do have my own personal views, but these are matters which I think are best left to the policy makers.

Mr. SPIVAK. Admiral, in a speech you made when you were head of the CIA, you said this, and I quote: "I can assure you that we deserve the confidence and support of the public."

Now can you tell us just why?

Admiral RABORN. Well, I certainly can. Going back to President Truman, President Eisenhower, President Kennedy and President Johnson, all have expressed their thoughts on the Central Intelligence Agency as an extremely essential part of the United States government. Now having been at the head of the Central Intelligence Agency and as Director of Central Intelligence, which includes responsibility for the coordination of the rest of the intelligence activities of the United States government, I can say proudly—and I am not a Johnny-Come-Lately around Washington—that the Agency deserves the unbounded admiration, the respect and support of the United States citizens everywhere and of the Free World everywhere. I have greatest admiration for them. The breadth and depth of competence, the integrity, the loyalty, the willingness to serve the government under adverse conditions sometimes and under criticism is something that I thought perhaps was the sole property of the military.

Mr. SPIVAK. Well, Admiral, we did pretty well in this country without a CIA, which was set up in 1947. What do you think would happen if the CIA were abolished?

Admiral RABORN. May I suggest, sir, that your statement is not correct. Before Pearl

Harbor there was no CIA. We had a Pearl Harbor. And I think if there is a motto of CIA, it is "There will never be another Pearl Harbor," and Pearl Harbor caused this country to go to a Central Intelligence Agency type of intelligence work.

Mr. SRIVAK. You think with a half hour warning time that we have the CIA is sufficiently informed on countries that have missiles so that there can not be a surprise attack against this country again?

Admiral RABORN. I would say you are far better off with it than without it.

Mr. FRANKEL. I would like to touch on the clandestine part of your activity—I think I am not going to get very far if I ask you to discuss it in detail, but CIA activities in this area over the years have raised some questions almost of a philosophical nature and I think from what little I know about the Agency it isn't always necessarily the Agency that has to answer, it is the President of the United States himself who does. But being a part of that machinery, what are your thoughts on just how far we Americans really ought to go in this world in terms of meddling in other people's business? In terms of throwing money into elections, into helping the people we like and resisting the people we don't like, some of which at least crudely stated might resemble some of the activities of our Communist opponents. But we of course think we are doing it for better purposes. But how far do you think we ought to go?

Admiral RABORN. Mr. Frankel, I think it is the thrust of the entire United States government, through its diplomacy and through its U.S. aid programs and the security apparatus to safeguard first the security of the United States and assist in the safeguarding of the Free World, and to promote our way of life, vis-a-vis the active efforts of the Communist movement to undermine the free institutions. I think we should go far enough to win, and this includes military action, and unfortunately sometimes it comes. You have to say, do we let them rule the world or are we going to stand up for what we know is a better way of life?

Mr. FRANKEL. It is usually that question: Is a Communist going to profit from this fellow winning an election or this government coming to power or this government falling? That should be the decisive point?

Admiral RABORN. I wouldn't like to get too specific, but I think the main thrust of the philosophy of the United States Government is what I was trying to speak to and the CIA is just a part of that.

Mr. STEELE. Admiral, it has been said that a very small percentage of your activity and energy is devoted to so-called clandestine or covert activity, is that correct?

Admiral RABORN. Only a very small fraction of the entire effort of the Central Intelligence Agency has to do with clandestine activities, Mr. Steele.

Mr. STEELE. Admiral, many people don't understand what a national intelligence estimate is. Can you tell us in a very few words what it is and how it is made?

Admiral RABORN. Yes, sir, I will try. The national intelligence estimate is the general views of the entire intelligence apparatus of the United States which includes of course, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Intelligence Department of the Department of State, the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the FBI, and the Atomic Energy Commission. They are formulated in weekly meetings in which these are put out in formal pamphlets and signed by the Director of Central Intelligence. Exceptions from what is printed in there are also freely entered so that the reader can have the benefit of both points of view on a particular point.

Mr. STEELE. Is it for the President of the United States?

Admiral RABORN. It is for the President

and for the members of the Administration who have need for them.

Mr. STEELE. And as such that is used in the making of foreign policy?

Admiral RABORN. As such they are part of the information that goes into whatever actions are taken.

Mr. GORALSKI. Can you tell us if any changes were implemented at CIA as a result of the Special Committee that was appointed by President Kennedy?

Admiral RABORN. Yes, I think so. It has been an extremely efficient and effective Committee, Mr. Goraliski. In my view it has been most helpful. They give us an objective point of view from really a distinguished panel.

Mr. GORALSKI. But there were obvious changes that did take place within the organization as a result?

Admiral RABORN. And continually so. We are trying to improve always.

Mr. GORALSKI. You couldn't tell us what some of those areas are?

Admiral RABORN. No, not without getting into security matters.

Mr. SRIVAK. Admiral, it was reported that you refused to tell the Foreign Relations Committee whether the CIA ever used the Fulbright Scholarship Program as a cover for your agents. Why did you hesitate to say you didn't, if you didn't?

Admiral RABORN. Well, this came at the end of a series of questions which had to do with sources and methods which, of course, were quite private, and I did answer it, although I understand it didn't get into the—this is one exception I made because of the distinguished Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Chairman Fulbright. I did answer it, but there were four or five other people talking at the same time, and I understand it didn't get into the record. I said categorically No.

Mr. BOGGS. Thank you, Admiral RABORN, for being with us today on "Meet the Press."