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SYMINGTON

## A Shift Toward Sanity

There seems to be at least a temporary shift toward sanity on the Democratic side in Washington in connection with the Summit Conference. Khrushchev exploded, and the incident that preceded the explosion, and now that an is serene along the Potomac. But at least some of the top Democrats who had become like Old Faithful Geyser in periodic spoutings which Khrushchev must have enjoyed finally subsided to little more than irregular bubbling.

Of course, Adlai Stevenson, like Tennyson's babbling brook, keeps babbling on. But the Butlers, the Kennedys, and some of the others who certainly comforted Khrushchev with their attacks on President Eisenhower, are not so active. They strain at the leash but do not bark.

What started the quieting down was the action of Republicans on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee when Chairman Fulbright called for hearings on the U2 incident. Republicans on the Committee were expected to oppose vigorously. Instead they voted unanimously for the hearings. It was only then that the Stevenson-Butler-ADA band of Democrats realized that by their own irresponsible yowling, they were building up a situation where the coming presidential election could develop into a Nixon versus "Khrushchev Democratic Candidate," contest and that there was nothing the GOP would like better.

The Fulbright hearings have gone along rather well on the surface. They helped avoid what might have been a reckless—and ruinous—Senate debate. They have developed some points where there might have been some improvement of the handling of certain incidents revolving around the U2. Senator Fulbright has been quite calm outwardly. But he seems to be itching to—politically—over-play his contention that only the State Department should have made any statement about the U2 when news came of its tragedy—that neither lesser authority nor the President ever should have spoken.

Certainly Mr. Fulbright is wrong as to the President. He seems to be right as to the lesser authority. If he is—so what? Is that something on which to castigate a President, give support to contemptible charges of Khrushchev, and demand a change in national administration as several Democratic leaders have done? It's easy to look back and say "maybe" we should have done it some other way.

But—

In whom will Americans place their greatest trust where Khrushchev and survival itself is the foundation of the issues raised by the Democrats?

In the Adlai Stevensons?

In the Paul Butlers?

In the Jack Kennedys?

In the Symingtons?

Or in Dwight David Eisenhower?

The Fulbright Committee majority report—from its one-sided Democratic majority — may say much about "why didn't we do it this way?" when it is placed before the Senate. It should be an uncompromising and bristling denunciation of Khrushchev's blowing up of the Summit Conference and a general commendation of the President and the almost inconceivably effective espionage system which has been going on over the Soviet for four years under his approval.

But in the end the people will decide, and the Democrats must know they are playing with fire. That is why there has been some quiet on the Potomac of late—and some shifting among Democrats. For example:

Senator Symington of Missouri, the candidate darling of Harry S. Truman and a sharp critic of the President on the U2, suddenly told Washington reporters that if the Foreign Relations Committee tried to pick on the Central Intelligence Agency in its hearings, he would fight to the end for CIA. The CIA, he said, was a special agency and could operate only in complete secrecy without attack from within the government. It took Senator Symington a little while to realize all this but he finally did. And, of course, he is right. Oddly, he did not tell CIA until the Communists in the country began screaming for the scalp of Adlai Ful-

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