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advantage needed to tip the balance one way or the other. Waterpower potential is limited in many areas by inadequate rainfall and, where feasible, requires large capital outlays. Atomic reaction and other revolutionary sources of power are still largely experimental. Superficially, at least, these facts seem to point to sizable future markets overseas for U.S. coal if present trends toward higher productivity and lower prices continue.

Some specific trends abroad can be cited to support this view. Japan's coal production has been fairly stable in recent years despite phenomenal growth in her general economy. In the 5 years between 1956 and 1961, for instance, pig iron production nearly tripled and thermal-generated electric power considerably more than tripled. During the same interval, Japan was able to increase water-generated power by only 15 percent; in Europe, West Germany increased steel production 40 percent between 1956 and 1961; France, 30 percent; Italy, 50 percent; Sweden, 50 percent; Belgium, a little over 10 percent; and Great Britain, a little less. For the same 5-year period, increases in production of electric power were about 40 percent in West Germany, France, and Italy; 50 percent in Great Britain and Sweden; and 30 percent in Belgium. In South America, steel production rose 50 percent in Argentina and 20 percent in Chile, while increases in electric power production in the principal countries ranged from 30 percent in Brazil and Chile to 50 percent in coal-rich Colombia and over 100 percent in oil-rich Venezuela.

The statistics quoted above are not exact. The purpose is to create a general impression of growth rates, in various parts of the world, in the two industries that consumed the most coal. In contrast, coal output actually declined between 1956 and 1961 in Western Europe, and recorded only moderate gains in South America and Japan. There is, of course, no way of knowing how economic forces may shift. But the present trends—lower costs in the United States, rising demands and limitations on output overseas—seem to point to a period of rising export opportunities for the United States.

The U.S. Position in World Affairs

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

HON. JAMES E. VAN ZANDT

OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, August 27, 1962

Mr. VAN ZANDT. Mr. Speaker, on Monday I had the privilege of addressing the 17th annual convention of the National Society of Public Accountants at the Sheraton Hotel in Philadelphia, Pa. At the request of the society, the subject of my address was "The U.S. Position in World Affairs." Under leave to extend my remarks I am including the text of that address:

THE U.S. POSITION IN WORLD AFFAIRS

(Address by Representative JAMES E. VAN ZANDT, Member of Congress, 20th District of Pennsylvania, before the 17th National Convention of the Public Accountants, Sheraton Hotel, Philadelphia, Pa., Monday, Aug. 20, 1962, 7:30 p.m.)

The subject I have been asked to speak to you about tonight is "The U.S. Position in World Affairs."

Every American is aware of our country's great variety of activities in a thousand spots around the globe.

The newspapers, radio, and television keep us informed daily of American activities in Laos, South Vietnam, Geneva, the United Nations—revolutions in Latin America, riots in Palestine, or propaganda from Moscow.

Yes we are deeply interested in what is going on around the world—because we are deeply involved.

This involvement is partly by choice and partly by circumstance.

The circumstances of World War II left only two great powers—the United States and the Soviet Union.

Japan and Germany were defeated and occupied.

Other European powers were drained and exhausted by the long bitter years of war.

As the United States brought its boys home, the hard realities of this new two-power world soon became evident.

Unless the United States exercised strength—either militarily or economically—as in the case of the Marshall plan the Soviet Union would capture by force and subversion every free country whose affairs it could entangle.

The United States chose to take up vigorously the task that historic circumstance had thrust upon us.

We became leader of the free world in the struggle to maintain independence against the threat of Soviet Russian imperialism.

Of all the roles which our country plays in the world today—this one is the most worthy.

I could speak to you today about our position as a firm and loyal supporter of the United Nations.

I could speak to you about our position of builder of the underdeveloped areas—about our foreign aid program—and our Alliance for Progress.

I could speak to you about our evolving position as a partner in trade with the new Europe—a Europe saved from Communist chaos by its own determination and hard work—aided by the resources the American taxpayer provided by our Marshall plan.

I could speak of these and many other positions of the United States in world affairs today.

But I want to talk about one aspect of our position of leadership of the free world, the very core of strength of our leadership position—our military strength.

We know from bitter experience that Communism will not hesitate to use the force of arms in pursuit of its imperial ambitions.

We also know that freemen, armed with a knowledge of Soviet tactics as well as with the machines of war, will not lose their freedom easily.

Since the core of free world strength is the military power of the U.S. Armed Forces, and since Khrushchev has been making so many claims lately about the size and strength of the Soviet strategic forces, I would like to take this opportunity to point out the relative balance of military power between the United States and the Soviet Union.

There are two reasons for my selection of this specific subject to speak about on this occasion.

First, I have firsthand knowledge of it and, second, during the month of July Mr. Khrushchev and other Russians did some boasting that needs a straight answer.

My knowledge of the subject comes from my Navy experience in the two World Wars, and the Korean conflict.

Also from the fact that I am currently a member of the House Committee on Armed Services and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

I think during the course of my remarks that I will be able to show up Mr. Khrushchev's boasts for what they are.

I think I shall also be able to clear up some possible question in your minds about such things as the missile gap.

It is important in this age of the possibility of nuclear catastrophe—for every citizen to be aware of the realities of the military situation.

This is another reason I thought it important to clear up any confusion created by last month's Soviet exaggerations.

I believe it is useful to share our thinking with our staunch allies—such as our friends from Canada who are here with us at this gathering.

They share equally in the dangers of defending our freedoms.

For that reason, they ought to share equally in our evaluation of the actual military balance of power today.

Let me begin by comparing the strategic striking forces of the United States and the Soviet Union.

At present we have about 85 operational ICBM's to a reported Soviet 50-75.

In addition the United States has 128 Polaris missiles on 8 operational submarines.

We have over 600 B-52's, almost 100 B-58's, and about 1,000 B-47's with round trip refueling capabilities.

Against this the Russians have only 150 intercontinental bombers and about 400 to 800 one-way-only medium bombers.

This is all that the Russians have that poses a direct threat to the United States and Canada.

We have, however, in addition to all these missiles and bombers about 100 MRBM's in Europe.

We also have about 300 carrier-based and 1,000 land-based tactical aircraft designed and stationed so that they could carry nuclear weapons into Russia.

Thus, considering only the United States and the Soviet Union, we have an enormously overwhelming advantage in strategic nuclear striking power.

To partially offset this advantage the Soviets have their huge well-equipped land army and about 400 MRBM's stationed in Eastern Europe with which to threaten our NATO allies.

The advantage in missiles and bombers is decidedly on the side of the United States and is growing rapidly.

Furthermore, we and our NATO allies are building up our conventional forces in Europe—so that we can conduct a successful local defense without using destructive nuclear weapons to do it.

Therefore, without ignoring the dangers of the fantastically destructive weapons of today, there is no need for us to be more afraid of the Russians than they are of us.

We can be confident that our vigorous defense program is keeping us ahead of the Reds.

But what about the missile gap? Did it ever exist?

Yes it did exist on paper but fortunately it never materialized in fact.

The missile gap was a prediction, let us remember, based on intelligence estimates.

These estimates showed that the Russians were building a fleet of ICBM's.

The estimates were arrived at based on the amount of steel alloy and the number of specialists and so forth required to build one of these missiles.

In addition, the estimates were based on the total amount of steel alloy and the number of specialists that the Russians had.

Then also the experts calculated how many missiles the Russians were capable of building over the next few years.

Compared to the number of missiles that the United States had planned to build over those same years, the Russians could have had in the early 1960's a lead of as much as 3 to 2.

This was the so-called missile gap.

The main reason it never materialized was that Russia never built anywhere near the number of missiles that were estimated.

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Her failure to do so was due perhaps to agricultural or other internal problems which kept her defense spending down.

At any rate, we speeded up our program, and when the new intelligence information came in that the Russians had not built all their missiles—the so-called missile gap disappeared.

In fact, the United States assumed a small but growing lead in the missile field.

The same thing had happened in the early 1950's with the bomber gap and it was resolved in the same fashion.

It was worthwhile to take these alleged gaps seriously.

You can imagine the dangerous situation which could have arisen, if we had not taken them seriously, and the Russians had built to their limit.

At the present time it is reported we have a safe lead in both these categories.

That fact is a satisfying feeling for all Americans.

Now there are two specific Russian rumors that I would like to try to counter.

On July 17, Premier Khrushchev in an interview with some American editors repeated his earlier claims that Russia had an anti-ICBM missile.

He boasted that the Soviet missile could "hit a fly in space."

Our Department of Defense and other space scientists are positive, however, that the first successful intercept of an ICBM by an antimissile missile took place 3 days later.

It was on July 20, over Kwajalein Island in the Pacific, a U.S. Army Nike-Zeus missile intercepted an Atlas ICBM.

So here is an anti-missile-missile gap that Mr. Khrushchev is trying to create in the minds of the world.

The facts do not back him up.

Another Russian boast that took place last month was in connection with the Soviet Navy day celebration held in Leningrad on July 29.

There, Russian Admiral Baikov said that the Soviet Navy now had Polaris-type submarines that could go under the pole just like the U.S. version.

Later, in the military newspaper Red Star, the Soviet Polaris-type striking force was called the "shock force" of the Red navy.

Now this may well be, but if the Russians have Polaris-type submarines that can go under the pole, they must not be able to make it up the Neva River to Leningrad.

They did not show up with all the other Red navy vessels at the navy day celebration.

And only a few weeks before the Red Star called the Polaris-type submarine fleet the "shock force" of the Red navy, reports came out that the Soviet Union had just conducted its first successful underwater missile launch.

No wonder none of these subs showed up at Leningrad.

If these submarines advanced from the experimental stage to a "shock force" stage in the matter of a few weeks, those subs must have been cruising under the pole or somewhere with no time to celebrate navy day.

What all these exaggerations show, I think, is a desperate attempt by the Soviets to keep up the false image of Russian military supremacy.

This exaggerated supremacy claimed the attention of a worried world under the influence of such things as the "bomber gap" and the missile gap.

Now that time has shown each of these gaps to be nonexistent, the world realizes that the United States is still way ahead of the Russians militarily.

For one thing, the Soviet economy cannot stand the defense expenditures needed to surpass the U.S. effort.

And for the world to know this most certainly upsets the Soviet leaders.

In the face of all this Soviet bluffing and the lack of facts in the false gap stories America faces a problem at home.

Some of our fellow citizens claim that the United States is behind in everything.

They say we have become a second-rate power.

They are alarmists and prophets of defeatism.

They talk about Russia's expanding economy—and now they throw in Germany, France, and Japan.

What they do not say or do not know is that the Russian expansion is based on the period between 1948 and 1953, when the Soviet was recovering from the effects of the German invasion.

It was a recovery from a nearly mortal blow, and not normal, healthy economic expansion.

Much the same may be said for most European countries.

We know that Russia has not expanded agricultural production.

We know she is short of automobiles and such durables as refrigerators, washing machines, and many other items.

The United States has never failed to meet production goals in either war or peace from either its farms or factories.

These achievements should be the pride and glory of every single American.

One of the great unsolved military problems facing this country is that of organizing and equipping the NATO shield forces.

We must be able to fight and to win a local resistance war without destroying the homeland of the ally, which we are defending.

This means in simple terms that if we use tactical nuclear weapons to stop a possible Russian thrust into Europe, they would use them, too, and soon there would be nothing left to defend.

That is why our policy is now directed toward increasing the strength of the conventionally armed defense forces there.

If the Communists tried to invade Western Europe and we had the number of regular divisions there that we are now building up to, a stout defense could be made without the use of highly destructive nuclear weapons.

Our policy is now directed toward keeping these weapons always on hand—always ready to use if our regular defense forces cannot hold—while at the same time increasing their capability to do so.

If the Regular Forces cannot hold—and we must use nuclear weapons to do it—the dimension of the war will be radically altered, for the initiation of the use of nuclear weapons is more than just an increase in firepower.

It is a firm and solemn demonstration to the enemy that the object which we are defending is of extremely high value to us. And his persistence in trying to gain it has raised the risks to him to a high and dangerous level.

The problem today, however, is that the conventional forces in NATO are still in the process of building up to a high enough level.

What we want is a choice of whether or not to use nuclear weapons, not a necessity to do so.

This position of choice between alternatives is a position of strength.

But the problem of tactical nuclear weapons in NATO is more complex than this.

Basic decisions will have to be made within the next year or two about the strategy under which NATO forces will use these weapons.

And based on this strategy, additional problems will have to be solved.

Our allies are demanding a greater share in the decisions about when, where, how, or if to use nuclear weapons.

After all, if we use them, they will explode in our backyard.

Therefore, they are also asking more command positions in the military branch of NATO, which will have control of these nuclear weapons.

The military problems of NATO are further complicated by the political problems which always arise when two or more independent nations work together.

I would like to leave with you now a few thoughts about perhaps the greatest and most challenging problem which will have to be overcome if we are to realize our goal of a free and peaceful society of independent nations.

That problem is the mastery of outer space. The advance in this field in the last 5 years stagger the imagination.

For example, the successful orbiting and landing last week of the Russian cosmonauts reveal the great advances made by the Soviet Union in probing outer space.

Frankly the Russian accomplishments reveal military danger which could arise if an alien power could take and maintain control of outer space—while denying its use to the West by antisatellite missiles or other means.

Seriously ladies and gentlemen—we have a lot of work to do in the development of our space program. If we are to forge ahead or even keep abreast of the Soviets.

This is the crux of the vexing problem we face.

If the West wins this space race or at least matches Russia, we will be successful in keeping the Soviet Union from threatening the free world from an invulnerable space haven.

I am certain you will agree that in such an event—we will have taken a long step toward the kind of international society we want.

Our basic problem centers on how to win this cold war without having a thermonuclear war if possible.

For as the greatest of all Chinese military philosophers, Sun Tzu said almost 2,500 years ago 500 B.C., "To fight and conquer is not supreme excellence—supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting."

While we are ready today to fight a thermonuclear war we have no wish to do so unless forced to it by the Russians.

The United States with its overwhelming strategic superiority would put an end to Soviet Russia, but she in turn would kill many millions of our people and perhaps destroy Western Europe completely.

Such an ending to the cold war would obviously satisfy no one.

Western strategy is to remain militarily strong enough so that the U.S.S.R. will not try an armed takeover in the free parts of the world.

In addition, by economic cooperation and increased world trade, we hope to make the Atlantic alliance a strong and thriving center of well-being and freedom.

Having accomplished this objective, the Soviet alliance system would break down as the captive nations of Eastern Europe are irresistibly attracted to the Western example of free and happy prosperity.

Finally the road to this ideal solution will be neither short nor easy.

There are many problems to be met and overcome and the twists and turns in the road will be many.

Yet with the confidence that the facts of the present military balance give us, and the knowledge that history is on the side of freedom, with God's help, our cause shall prevail.

If it does not prevail, let us make certain it is not due from lack of effort on the part of any one of us.