

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, Prime Minister Ky talks big. He acts small. His is not a legitimate government. It was based on the military seizure of power.

Premier Nguyen Cao Ky cannot be depended upon to so run his country that peaceful preparations for the elections can be held. Another interim head of government should be found, and found quickly.

We are involved in a miserable civil war in South Vietnam. If we continue in combat there, we will help depopulate South Vietnam. We shall be adding to the millions of refugees whose homes have been destroyed. President Johnson no doubt considered that everything he has done has been done to help Vietnam. Now, he must know what we are doing over there will really result not in helping but in destroying Vietnam.

Vietnam was never of any strategic importance to the defense of the United States. Certainly it is not now of any economic or strategic importance to the defense of our country.

Throughout Asia the unfortunate facts are that we Americans are now regarded as a neocolonial power. In other words, the French who sought to retain and reestablish their huge Indochinese colonial empire and who were fought by the forces of the National Liberation Front, have been succeeded by us.

In 1953 and 1954 it was unfortunate but it is a fact, that under President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles the United States provided massive military aid to the French and in addition to providing war planes, munitions, trucks, machineguns, tanks, and bombs, we contemplated making an actual military intervention. At that time reason finally prevailed and the French colonial forces of 200,000 withdrew. This, directly after their so-called offensive base at Dienbienphu which Gen. Henri Navarre had established and garrisoned was overrun and surrendered May 8, 1954.

Following that, through the operations of our CIA we established the first puppet government in Saigon and President Diem was brought from the United States to Saigon as President by our CIA. He called off the elections stipulated in the Geneva accords. President Eisenhower, in his reminiscences, stated that had the elections been held as provided in the Geneva agreement which we approved Ho Chi Minh would have received 80 percent of the vote of the Vietnamese living to the north and south of the demarcation line.

Now we are in the unfortunate situation of aggressor and neocolonial oppressor. Here is the time and opportunity for our President to announce a pause in bombing and propose a ceasefire to be followed, we would hope by an armistice agreed to by delegates representing the National Liberation Front or Vietcong, and delegates of the Hanoi government and our own delegates and those of the Saigon regime.

Mr. President, the hour is late. The opportunity for a suspension of bombing of North Vietnam and putting an end to waging an American ground and air war in Vietnam is here. That highly respected columnist, James Reston, referred to the situation in his column

published in the New York Times of May 18, 1966 under the caption, "The Evaded Moral Question in Vietnam." The statements made by James Reston are irrefutable. I ask unanimous consent, Mr. President, that this column be printed at this point in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD as part of my remarks.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York Times, May 18, 1966]

WASHINGTON: THE EVADED MORAL QUESTION IN VIETNAM

(By James Reston)

WASHINGTON, May 17.—President Johnson has been confronted for some time with a moral question in Vietnam, but he keeps evading it. The question is this: What justifies more and more killing in Vietnam when the President's own conditions for an effective war effort—a government that can govern and fight in Saigon—are not met?

By his own definition, this struggle cannot succeed without a regime that commands the respect of the South Vietnamese people and a Vietnamese army that can pacify the country. Yet though the fighting qualities of the South Vietnamese are now being demonstrated more and more against one another, the President's orders are sending more and more Americans into the battle to replace the Vietnamese who are fighting among themselves.

THE TWO OPTIONS

Ever since the start of this latest political crisis in Saigon, the President has had before him two courses of action. The first was to make clear to all the contending South Vietnamese leaders that the United States was going to limit its reinforcements, its military and economic aid, its casualties, and its military operations to the minimum until they had composed their differences.

The objective of this course was to try to produce unity, and failing that, to provide time for a basic reappraisal of the American commitment.

The second course was to appeal to everybody to get together and meanwhile to keep the war going as best we could with the American forces. President Johnson chose the second course. He is appealing and fighting, though he has even less reason to believe in the formation of a stable government now than he had at the beginning of the crisis.

WHAT JUSTIFICATION?

Justifying this historically, and particularly, justifying it personally to families of the casualties in the coming monsoon offensive will not be easy. If there were a reasonable expectation of political stability, the thing might be done, but lacking that, it is hard to see why the President rejected the course of a defensive pause.

The latest review of the war here with Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge did not deal primarily with fundamental policy, but with operations. It did not focus on where we now stand or where we mean to go from here, but on what to do about the inflation and the shipping in Saigon, and the tactical problems in Danang and Hue, and how to pump a little more sawdust into the ruling generals in the capital.

There is little reason to believe that President Johnson's latest "appeal" to the Buddhist leader, Thich Tri Quang, will have any more effect than the other innumerable appeals that have been made to that militant monk by other Americans in the last few weeks.

He is clearly not thinking much about putting aside "the lesser issues in order to get on with the great national tasks." He is summoning his followers to new demonstrations against the military junta in Saigon and the generals in the Government are moving troops of the Seventh Infantry Division out of the operations against the Com-

munists to deal with the expected rioting in the capital.

Plenty of appeals have been made by President Johnson, among others, to General Ky, to "compose his differences" with the Buddhists and get on with the formation of a civilian government, but his answer to that was first to increase his military power by kicking out his rival general in the First Corps area, and lately sending his marines to Danang and bringing the country to the verge of civil war.

It may be that, in the face of all this petty and provocative folly, President Johnson is playing a waiting game and being more clever than anybody here can see. What he will do if his latest appeal to Tri Quang is ignored and followed by more chaos in the streets remains to be seen.

WHAT COMMITMENTS?

At one point, however, if the present trend continues, there will have to be a new definition of all the commitments that have been given. Our commitment to Saigon originally rested on Saigon's commitment to fight and govern, neither of which it is now doing effectively. The President's commitments in this war involve not only a handful of generals who seized power, but involve the Vietnamese people and the American people as well.

Our commitment was to a "legitimate government" and what we now have in Saigon is neither "legitimate" nor a "government." Our commitment was to help them win the war not to replace them on the battlefield. Our arms were provided to fight the aggressors and not to start a civil war. Our promise was to help South Vietnam, not to destroy it.