

14 September 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Proposed CIA Position on a DCID 15/1

REFERENCES : (A) Letter to Acting Director of Central Intelligence
from the Special Assistant for Intelligence,
Department of State, 28 August 1953
(B) Department of State Draft of a Proposed DCID 15/1,
17 August 1953 (Tab A)

A. Problem.

To present and explain a proposed CIA position in regard to a DCID 15/1 and to provide a draft Directive representing this position.

B. Facts Bearing on the Problem.

1. NSCID 1 states that the Director of Central Intelligence shall perform for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies such services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally. By implication in NSCID 3, the production of economic intelligence on the Soviet Bloc is of common concern to the intelligence agencies. Research in depth on the Soviet economy in its entirety can, in view of ORR, be more efficiently accomplished centrally, and therefore logically falls to CIA (Tab B).

2. NSCID 3 states that any intelligence agency may call upon other appropriate agencies for intelligence which does not fall within its own field of dominant interest and that such requests shall be made upon the agencies in accordance with their production capabilities and dominant interest. There is no implication in that Directive that the Department of State or the Military Services have dominant interest in the economic intelligence field. Furthermore, the Department of State, as an example, cannot undertake the depth of research required to meet the needs of other intelligence agencies in those fields which are allocated to the Department of State in its draft proposal (Tab A).

3. NSCID 3 further states that the Director of Central Intelligence will seek to minimize the necessity for any agency to develop intelligence in fields outside its dominant interests. It is understood that the research organizations of CIA were, in part, established to assist the Director of Central Intelligence in providing intelligence production in areas not of dominant interest to individual intelligence agencies.

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4. With reference to DCID 3/4, the assignment of production responsibility in the field of economic intelligence is not comparable with the problem of allocating such responsibility in the field of scientific and technical intelligence. DCID 3/4 divides responsibility in the scientific and technical field between the Department of Defense and the CIA, allocating those subjects that are clearly of direct military importance to Defense and assigning the subject of fundamental research on the basic sciences and medicine to CIA. The various subjects requiring research in the field of economic intelligence are so interrelated (as noted in Tab B) that any artificial separation of research responsibility would reduce the efficiency and effectiveness of the total research effort.

5. As a result of the recognition over two years ago of the paucity of economic intelligence research on the Soviet Bloc, ORR, as a matter of common concern, shifted its research effort from world-wide coverage to a concentration on the Soviet Bloc, and greatly strengthened this effort. As of January 1953, [redacted] doing full time research on the Soviet Bloc; the Department of State had 29, including those working on NIS; the Department of the Army had 31; the Department of the Navy had 15; and the Department of the Air Force had 219 (see chart, Tab B). It is understood that the relative proportions have not changed significantly since that time.

C. Discussion.

1. At the present time, CIA has in its Office of Research and Reports the broadest research program on the Soviet Bloc and the largest number of personnel engaged in such research within the intelligence community. The only other sizable organization conducting such research is in the Department of the Air Force. However, this Air Force effort is primarily concerned with target intelligence, and the emphasis is on the production of specialized studies in support of war plans. The Air Force has been drawing increasingly upon the resources of CIA as this Agency has developed competence in the field of Soviet Bloc economic research.

2. The Department of State proposal for a DCID 15/1 (Tab A) is unrealistic in the light of the Department's present and foreseeable research capabilities. On the other hand, the ORR proposal for a DCID 15/1 (Tab C) reflects the existing capabilities to produce economic intelligence on the Soviet Bloc and the lack of any dominant interest in the field by either the Department of State or the Military Services. In essence, the ORR proposal states that CIA will produce, as a matter of common concern, the bulk of the economic intelligence on the Soviet Bloc and that other agencies may supplement this for their departmental needs as necessary.

3. The ORR proposal is couched in such terms as not to specify the numbers of people which other agencies require in the discharge of their departmental responsibilities for Soviet Bloc economic intelligence, nor does it attempt to allocate in rigid fashion the specific areas in which other agencies may do such research.

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D. Conclusions.

That neither the Department of State nor the Military Services have dominant interest or primary responsibilities for the production of economic intelligence on the Soviet Bloc; that this intelligence production is a matter of common concern and can be most efficiently accomplished centrally in CIA, because it requires research in depth and an integrated approach to the entire economic structure; that the Department of State proposal does not abide by the intent of NSCID 3 to minimize the necessity for any agency to develop intelligence production capabilities in fields outside its dominant interest; and, that other agencies should supplement the economic intelligence production on the Soviet Bloc produced by CIA in order to meet their departmental needs.

E. Action Recommended.

That, if a DCID 15/1 is to be considered at this time, the DCI accept the draft proposal contained in Tab C as the position of this Agency.

ROBERT AMORY, Jr.
Deputy Director/Intelligence

OAD/RR/OEGuthereux
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