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The Boston Globe — Saturday, July 12, 1969

Businessman, Dummy Fund

Funds Boston SDS

RICHARD J. CONNOLLY
Staff Writer

Amidst the current construction boom, you'd expect to see the name of the company and a completion date on a sign in front of a rising building project somewhere in Greater Boston.

But the company doesn't own a sign, a hard hat, a long-handle shovel or even a wheel barrow.

It doesn't have a single employee, a telephone or an office. As impressive as the name sounds, Cambridge Iron and Steel Inc. has yet to produce, purchase, distribute, or erect its first ounce of iron or steel.

The name has absolutely nothing to do with its avowed purpose. It has no particular significance. One officer says the name "came out of a hat, just a brainstorm when we couldn't think of a name for ourselves."

You might say that Cambridge Iron and Steel is made of paper.

Its only physical asset appears to be a checking account with a balance of under \$35,000.

Incorporated under Massachusetts laws last Feb. 21, when it reported 3750 shares of Class B common stock with no par value, the firm has figured prominently in the widening ideological rift between two elements of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) in Cambridge.

Creation of the firm as a conduit for funds to support such activities as the SDS newspaper, The Old Mole, and the Boston Draft Resistance Group has angered the militant Progressive Labor (PL) faction of the SDS.

The group of SDS members associated with Cambridge Iron and Steel, which is financed by Ralph P. Hoagland 3d, a wealthy, 35-year-old Newton businessman, has been accused by the PL rivals of selling out to the bourgeoisie.

Cambridge Iron and Steel (CIS) is an example of how the shrewdest elements of the ruling class devise schemes to co-opt incipient revolutionary movements by channeling their energies

into harmless paths according to the PL faction.

The PL group argues that CIS is a conduit of funds to support "New Left" counter-institutions as a way of isolating radical political activity in the New England area.

A lengthy report on CIS, entitled, "An Exposure" and prepared by the PL group for distribution within SDS. "To support CIS is to collaborate with the enemy. Therefore, it is necessary to oppose CIS to attack the ruling class."

The SDS members associated with the firm reply in an open letter to the movement that CIS is dedicated to building a revolutionary socialist, anti-imperialist, adult movement in America.

They accused the PL critics of various errors and a lack of political and intellectual integrity.

"It is obvious from the language that is used (selling out, counter revolutionary) that PL cannot distinguish between others on the left with whom it may have political disagreements, and its class and political enemies," those involved in the new corporation state.

"A group which cannot make such elementary distinctions has little right to claim to have a revolutionary analysis," they add.

The name of Hoagland, the financial angel behind the controversial enterprise, doesn't appear in the corporate records. He describes himself as an investor in Cambridge Iron and Steel. The firm says he promised it \$100,000, \$25,000 of which has been received.

In its report on CIS, the PL faction characterizes Hoagland as a man of many political interests — "a sharp and highly influential political agent of the ruling class." He is said to have "brilliant business experience."

A graduate of Princeton and Harvard Business School, Hoagland is president of Consumer Value Stores Inc. and has headed a

New England subscription service. He and his wife, Frances, and two children live at 363 Waverley av., Newton.

Hoagland, who long has been sensitive to racial problems, is the founder and will soon retire as president of the unique Fund for Urban Negro Development (F.U.N.D.).

Established after the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, F.U.N.D. is a charitable organization of some 300 whites, including prominent government officials, educators and businessmen, who provide white talent and capital to help the black community of Boston.

The other key figure in CIS is Michael S. Ansara, 22-year-old SDS organizer who was graduated cum laude from Harvard in 1968 and led the campus demonstration in April. He and his wife, Amy, work on The Old Mole.

Mrs. Ansara, 22, is the daughter of Mr. and Mrs. Charles B. Merrill Jr., of 23 Commonwealth av., Back Bay. Her father is headmaster of the Commonwealth School and her grandfather, Charles F. Merrill, founded Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith Inc., the largest brokerage house in the country.

Cambridge Iron and Steel lists its address as 112 1/2 Gerry St., Cambridge, which is off I-93, and close to Harvard sq. It is a brown, four-family dwelling where Ansara and his wife live. Ansara is vice president and a director of the firm.

Other principals are Daniel I. Schechter, president; David Landau, treasurer, and Boston attorney John G. S. Flynn, clerk and director.

State license records list Schechter's address as c/o Morgan, 1039 Massachusetts av., Cambridge. Miles Morgan, a student who resides at that address, recently reported that Schechter does not reside there, but receives mail at the address.

Landau's address is listed as 102 Columbia st., which is a one-story brick shop used as headquarters by the Boston Draft Resistance Group. Landau is a draft

counselor for the resistance group.

Key figures in Cambridge Iron and Steel also include Nicholas M. Ellison, a member of The Old Mole staff and an MIT instructor who works with the Boston Draft Resistance Group. He is a leader of the right-wing of the SDS in New England and former national president of SDS.

Prominent among those in the PL faction is John Pennington of 235 Green st., Cambridge, who was elected national secretary by the PL-WSA (Worker-Student Alliance) during the recent SDS convention in Chicago. Pennington has distributed copies of "An Exposure" but has declined to discuss the controversy with a reporter.

Ansara was instrumental in creation of Cambridge Iron and Steel in main purpose corporation which can, among other things, import and export goods, operate restaurants, coffee houses, bookstores and newspapers. Ellison's role is that of an attorney. He was engaged to set up the corporation.

Hoagland's decision to invest \$35,000 initially and then an additional \$75,000 resulted from an acquaintance with Ansara which developed last summer.

Hoagland says he gave the money to the SDS group because it represented an opportunity "to do something constructive."

"I invested in it," Hoagland explains. "It's a corporation and if they make a million dollars I'll get part of it."

The PL faction, which believes that the money should have gone into the SDS treasury, rather than into a corporation, interviewed Hoagland and quoted him as saying that he met Ansara while he, Hoagland, was "walking on the bridge between the black community and the white community" and that his decision was rational.

Hoagland questions the accuracy of statements made by the PL group but says he

was quoted correctly when PL reported:

"Institutions have become so big that people can't make the decisions that affect their own lives. Students can't control their own newspapers. People living in black communities and white communities can't control them. It's the same problem all over. Ansara and Cambridge Iron and Steel can do in the white community what the United Front has done in the black -- set up the alternative institutions which people can control."

The PL paper alleges that the "first and most obvious string" that Hoagland attached to the money was that it should not go to SDS. Ansara, an SDS fund raiser, was "to set up a dummy corporation" and appoint a board of directors.

Cambridge Iron and Steel's purpose, according to PL, was to give the directors money to disburse within the movement and provide Hoagland with a tax advantage.

Three thousand dollars has been given by CIS to The Old Mole whose staff is represented by 11 of the 21 CIS directors, according to PL. Two thousand dollars has been given to Sgt Brown's Memorial Necktie, Inc., a coffeehouse at 49 Pleasant st., Cambridge.

A venture of the Boston Draft Resistance Group, Sgt Brown's Memorial Necktie has been in business since May 16. Landau is treasurer and director; Sara Anne Roper of 235 Pearl st., Somerville, a director of CIS, is secretary, and Glenn A. Hoffmann of 81 Columbia st., Cambridge, is clerk and director.

According to the PL faction, Ansara announced last August that he could get \$70,000 to build a "Movement Center" -- a building converted into a coffeehouse, bookstore, newspaper, and movement printing press, a meeting hall, theater, and offices.

Ansara has declined to discuss the PL report with a reporter except to state that the publication "has nothing to do with reality." He did, however, lend his name to

the CIS open letter replying to the PL's criticism.

"CIS gave money to the BDRG coffeehouse (Sgt. Brown's)," the PL report points out. "What's it for? ... Is it a way of building real fighting ties with working class kids? Is it a necessary step in winning college kids to fighting in workers' interests? No ... it means isolating working class and college kids from the people with whom they must unite to fight the ruling class, and thus building and consolidating their contempt for the people."

Ansara has the beginning of his "empire" with money from Hoagland and with the coffeehouse and the newspaper, according to the PL faction. And if Cambridge Iron and Steel succeeds, the radical group claims, the movement will cut itself off from "the struggles the people are waging."


Defending its criticism of Ansara, the PL group states:

"In any case, why should we not object to being led by someone who, while a regional SDS fundraiser (1) secretly negotiates half a year to get \$100,000 (2) then secretly forms a corporation, appointing the directors to disburse these funds while (3) the source is a political agent of the bourgeoisie who agree with the fund-raiser's politics and (4) when, to this day, no official SDS discussion has occurred about these matters?"

The PL faction says it's not a matter of sharing leadership but the direction of the movement -- "toward serving the people, or toward serving imperialism so that a few misleaders can get themselves a fist-full of loot."

Explaining its function, Cambridge Iron and Steel reports that decisions about distribution of funds are made by a majority of the members and that Hoagland, who has never been to a business meeting, has no influence.

It reviews the list of projects which it has supported, including various papers, a coffee house at Fort Lee, The Old Mole, The Guardian



OFFICE OF CAMBRIDGE IRON & STEEL
... 11 1/2 Gerry st. (Julian Brown Photo)

and Liberation News Service, military organizing, female liberation, work-study groups and power structure research and analysis.

The SDS members in Cambridge Iron and Steel accuse their PL critics of making two false bases -- that Hoagland's politics are the basis for a judgment of the corporation and that the firm supports "non-struggle counter-institutions."

Cambridge Iron and Steel, replying to a charge by PL that Hoagland's money is "dirty," like that of any capitalist, states that all of the movement's money is "dirty" and that CIS money is no more and no less dirty than the money PL uses from Georgia Land and Texas Oil.

Ansara and his associates explain that there were no strings attached to Hoagland's money and that he gave the money to a corporation for tax reasons, "but if we do not set up a business, he will lose even that," replying to a PL charge that Hoagland stipulated the

money was not to go to SDS. The Ansara faction says Hoagland placed no restrictions and, in fact, some money has gone to SDS in New York City.

"It is because CIS has a commitment to building an adult and working class movement (as well as a student movement) that the money was not turned over, as in jump case, to the student organization SDS," the group explained.

Cambridge Iron and Steel emphasizes that it considers black and white capitalism counter-revolutionary -- will not fund either and if Hoagland thought CIS would support counter-institutions in the white community "he bet on the wrong horse."

"Since we do not have Hoagland's politics, have no strings attached to the money, and find it no dirtier than any other, we find that there is no argument, on the basis of Hoagland's politics, that CIS should not have taken the money," Ansara and his colleagues argue.

Washington Star
87 311

RECORD OF '68 DISCUSSION

The CIA Has 'Cover' Problems, Too

By JAMES DOYLE
Star Staff Writer

Early in 1968 a group including former officials of the Central Intelligence Agency and the State Department settled down after dinner at the Harold Pratt House, on New York's Avenue, to discuss some of the CIA's problems.

A record of their conversation shows that the particular concern of the group that night was how to provide a deeper cover for Americans gathering information by using non-governmental organizations as fronts.

The participants were members and guests of the prestigious Council on Foreign Relations, men who seem to direct foreign policy from within and without the government on a permanent basis, and publishers of "Foreign Affairs," the quarterly bible of American diplomacy.

A record of the discussion at the council's headquarters on that evening, Jan. 8, 1968, has been circulated to some newspapers by a group of self-styled radical scholars based in Cambridge.

It portrays with some new details the structure and style of the American intelligence community. The document is timely in the wake of events last week in London, where 105 members of the Soviet community there, including employees from the Soviet embassy, trade delegation, tourist agency, Moscow Narodny Bank and Aeroflot Airlines were uncovered as espionage agents, and banned from the country without replacements.

It was a fear of just such an incident, apparently, that dominated the conversation at Pratt House that night.

The U.S. "employees" whose cover constantly is endangered, the participants felt, are those who work in the American Embassies, trade delegations, and other U.S. agencies in countries around the world.

Richard Bissell, a former deputy director of the CIA who left the agency after the Bay of Pigs debacle, led the discussion. According to the record made available to The Star, he told his council colleagues that CIA

agents "need to operate under deeper cover."

Bissell recounted ruefully the uproar over the CIA's exposed funding of the National Student Association's overseas activities and said, "The CIA interface with various private groups, including business and student groups, must be remedied."

He noted that the problems of American spies overseas "is frequently a problem of the State Department."

"It tends to be true that local allies find themselves dealing always with an American and an official American—since the cover is almost invariably as a U.S. government employee," Bissell is reported to have said.

"There are powerful reasons for this practice, and it will always be desirable to have some CIA personnel housed in the embassy compound, if only for local 'command post' and communications requirements.

"Nonetheless, it is possible and desirable, although difficult and time-consuming, to build overseas an apparatus of unofficial cover," Bissell is quoted as saying.

"This would require the use or creation of private organizations, many of the personnel of which would be non-U.S. nationals, with freer entry into the local society and less implication for the official U.S. posture."

Use Non-Americans

Bissell said that the United States needed to increase its use of non-Americans for espionage "with an effort at indoctrination and training; they should be encouraged to develop a second loyalty, more or less comparable to that of the American staff."

He added that as intelligence efforts shifted more toward Latin America, Asia and Africa, "the conduct of U.S. nationals is likely to be increasingly circumscribed. The primary change recommended would be to build up a system of unofficial cover. . . . The CIA might be able to make use of non-nationals as 'career agents', that is with a status midway between that for the classical agent used in a single compartmented operation

and that of a staff member involved through his career in many operations, and well informed of the agency's capabilities."

An unidentified former State Department official responded to Bissell that he agreed with the need to change covers, noting that "the initial agreement between the agency and State was intended to be 'temporary', but nothing endures like the ephemeral."

Another participant noted that very little attention was paid to revelations of the CIA's use of supposedly independent operations such as "Radio Free Europe," he added, "One might conclude that the public is not likely to be concerned by the penetration of overseas institutions, at least not nearly so much as by the penetration of U.S. institutions."

This participant was quoted as saying, "The public doesn't think it's right; they don't know where it ends; they take a look at their neighbors." Then he asked whether "this suggested expansion in use of private institutions should include those in the United States, or U.S. institutions operating overseas?"

In response, clear distinctions were reportedly made between operating in the United States and abroad, and the suggestion was made by Bissell, "One might want CIA to expand its use of private U.S. corporations, but for objectives outside the United States."

Fund Demands Rise

The record of the discussion did not link comment and author, but did give a general identification of the men present. There also was a diligent removal from the authorized reporter's transcript of all specific references of agents, incidents and the like, with one noticeable lapse.

In a discussion of the effect of revelations that the CIA was financing U.S. labor union activities abroad, it was noted that these disclosures had simply increased the demand for such funds from overseas labor groups.

"For example," the text says, 'British Guiana' labor unions

"were supported through CIA conduits, but now they ask for more assistance than before. So, our expectations to the contrary, there has been no damage."

These present and taking part in the discussion included men who have journeyed back and forth between government and corporate work, most of whom have remained near the center of the foreign policy establishment.


They included Bissell, now an executive with United Aircraft Corp. in Hartford, Conn.; former Treasury Secretary Douglas Dillon; former CIA director Allen Dulles; Robert Amory Jr., a former deputy director of the CIA; Meyer Bernstein, director of international affairs for the United Steelworkers of America; columnist Joseph Kraft; former White House aide Theodore Sorensen of Kennedy and Johnson days; and Philip Quigg, recently resigned as managing editor of Foreign Affairs.

Facsimile copies of the discussion summary have been circulated by "The Africa Research Group," a dozen young scholars in Cambridge who take a radical dissenting view of U.S. foreign policy.

Reached at his home, Bissell confirmed the authenticity of the document.

He noted that in the discussion that night in New York, he had begun by saying that agent espionage was the least valuable of three main CIA missions, behind reconnaissance and electronic intelligence, the two areas where most CIA money is spent.

DATE: 28 SEPTEMBER 1971



Seeks Shift to 'Unofficial Cover'

CIA Fears a Mass Exposure

By Chicago Sun-Times

WASHINGTON -- The Central Intelligence Agency has long feared the type of mass exposure that befell Soviet intelligence in Britain last week, a confidential report disclosed Monday.

The report shows that the CIA has been trying for several years to shift its espionage operations away from U. S. embassies and offices to "unofficial cover" -- private organizations and

businesses and "non-U. S. nationals."

It acknowledges that tough Russian security has forced the CIA to collect intelligence on the Soviet Union through "third-country" operations -- just as the Russians apparently were seeking intelligence on the United States through its spy apparatus in Britain.

THE REPORT, a copy of which has been obtained by The Chicago

Sun-Times, is based on a discussion among several former high-ranking intelligence officials conducted by the Council on Foreign Relations in New York on Jan. 8, 1968.

Richard M. Bissell, former deputy director of the CIA and moderator of the discussion, has confirmed the authenticity of the report, which is headed: "Confidential: Not for publication. Restricted to group members only. Not to be quoted or cited."

THE PARTICIPANTS included Allen Dulles, the late director of the CIA; Robert Amory Jr., a former deputy director of the CIA; Eugene Fubini, former assistant secretary of defense in the area of electronic intelligence; Thomas L. Hughes, former director of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and Theodore Sorensen, special assistant to President Kennedy.

Although the report does not identify the source of various opinions and comments, Bissell appears to have been the main contributor.

"If the agency is to be effective," the report declares at one point, "it will have to make use of private institutions on an expanding scale . . . CIA's interface with the rest of the world needs to be better protected."

THE REPORT calls for "deeper cover" and "increased attention to the use of 'cut-outs'" defined in a footnote as "projects backed by the CIA which cannot be traced back to the CIA."

The report concedes that there are "powerful reasons" for concealing CIA agents within U. S. embassies, principally to provide safe means of communication to Washington.

"Nonetheless," it goes on, "it is possible and desirable, although difficult and time-consuming, to build overseas an apparatus of unofficial cover. This would require the use or creation of private organizations, many of the personnel of which would be non-U. S. nationals, with freer entry into the local society and less implication for the official U. S. posture."

THE REPORT suggested links with U. S. corporations which could make their own lines of communication available to CIA agents.

All 105 of the Russian officials expelled by Britain last Friday were under "official cover," operating out of the Soviet embassy or trade mission. As such they were much more susceptible to British counterintelligence than "unofficial cover" agents such as those suggested in the Bissell report.

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SEP 28 1971

Spying: Political Fact Of Life

By **NEEDHAM DUEMAN**

Chief Washington Correspondent
of the Post-Dispatch

WASHINGTON, Sept. 28

BY COINCIDENCE, Great

Britain announced the expulsion of 105 Soviet citizens accused of spying just as some radical scholars in Cambridge, Mass., were circulating a report that threw some light on American spy practices.

The fact is that all major countries maintain elaborate espionage networks.

Some well informed Western observers have been puzzled by the British vehemence in denouncing what is known to be standard practice and has been thought to be more or less condoned by mutual understanding.

One possible explanation that has been put forward has been that the recent defection by a high official of the KGB, the Soviet secret police, provided an unusual opportunity. He gave the British a list of Soviet espionage agents in Britain.

Some observers conjecture also that the governments of Britain and the United States had been waiting for an opportunity to undercut growing Western support for a European security conference, which the Communist bloc countries have been urging for several years.

IT WAS NOTED that the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas Home, and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko had Soviet espionage tried in the way of preparations for a conference on European security.

Secretary of State William P. Rogers, speaking with reporters at the United Nations Saturday, went a step further. He said that Soviet espionage activities in Britain would be halted before the preparation of a security conference on European security could begin.

Douglas Home told Gromyko in two days that the British would refuse to supply information, to obtain embargoed commodities and to conduct sabotage operations.

The document circulated in Washington as a result of a panel discussion in January, 1971, by the late Dr. Richard J. ...

deputy director for plans in the Central Intelligence Agency, was an unusually frank account of U.S. covert intelligence operations in other countries.

THE PANEL discussion, one of a series conducted by the Council on Foreign Relations on intelligence and foreign policy, was attended by former officials including Secretary of the Treasury C. Douglas Dillon, former CIA Director Allen W. Dulles, and Robert Anson Jr., former CIA deputy

director for intelligence. ... including the various means of covert intelligence collection, Biswell put reconnaissance first in importance. Next came communications and electronic intelligence, primarily under control by the national security agency. Finally, considerably below the other two methods in importance, he put "classical espionage by agents."

He described the Communist bloc, and more specifically USSR KGB, as the "primary target for espionage activities" since the early 1950s.

"Circumstances have greatly limited the scale of operations that could be undertaken within the bloc, so much of the effort had been directed at bloc nations situated in neutral or friendly areas, and at third country operations that seek to use the nationals of other non-Communist countries as sources of information on the Soviet bloc," the summary quoted him as saying.

More recently, he continued, priorities for classical espionage have shifted toward targets in the underdeveloped world, but "the USSR remains a prime target" and "Communist China would today be given the same priority."

"The summary reported a general conclusion that espionage was not a primary source of intelligence against the Soviet bloc or other sophisticated societies, "although it has had occasional brilliant successes (like the Berlin tunnel and spy-rod of the high-level defections)."

"A basic reason is that espionage operates mainly through the recruitment of agents and it is extremely difficult to recruit high-level agents," the summary stated. "A low-level

agent, even assuming that he remained loyal and that there is some means of communicating with him, simply cannot tell you much of what you want to know. The secrets we cannot find out by reconnaissance or from open sources are in the minds of scientists and senior policymakers and are not accessible to an ordinary citizen of middle rank."

THE underdeveloped world, on the contrary, there are "greater opportunities for covert intelligence collection."

"Governments are much less highly organized; there is less security consciousness; and there is not so many actual or potential divisions of power among many individuals, organizations and individuals outside of the central governments," the summary said.

"The primary purpose of espionage in these areas is to provide Washington with timely knowledge of the internal power balance, a form of intelligence that is primarily of tactical significance."

In order to predict a coup d'etat, the summary said, U.S. intelligence must penetrate the military and other agencies and organizations in the country in question, reaching junior officers, non-commissioned officers, labor leaders and others, it was said.

BISWELL WAS quoted as saying that many such penetrations would "horrify students of covert operations" by their disregard of the standards and rules for recruiting agents.

"Many of the 'penetrations' don't take the form of 'hiring' but of establishing a close or friendly relationship (which may or may not be furthered by the provision of money from time to time)," the summary said.

He noted that there was a stereotype that all covert operations are illegal and hostile, but he said this was not usually the case. For example, the CIA once provided extensive private financing of a project also supported by a local ... Agency for International Development. The CIA also ...

Continued

without causing a
complete failure of the transac-
tion."

HE DESCRIBED the usual
purpose of covert intervention
abroad as "to operate on the in-
ternal power balance, often
with fairly short-term objec-
tives in view." As examples, he
cited weakening the local Com-
munist Party, or winning an
election.

Such an effort, he said,
"is not pragmatic for the
people and the instruments
that are available and the
methods that seem likely to
work."

LETTERS

Secrets from the CIA

Cambridge, Mass.

DEAR SIR: With the exposure of the papers from the Media, Pa. FBI office last spring, the investigation of Army surveillance activities, and finally the publication of the Pentagon Papers, the public has had an unparalleled opportunity to understand the similarity of the government's foreign and domestic covert action programs. The most sophisticated arm of the U.S. secret agency—the CIA—had, however, escaped public scrutiny until last month. Now major excerpts from a secret document which details the CIA's global strategies have been made public. The complete text of the document, "Intelligence and Foreign Policy," together with an introduction and other studies of the CIA's activities is available for \$1 (plus 25¢ for postage and handling) from the Africa Research Group, P.O. Box 213, Cambridge, Mass. 02138.

Africa Research Group

Letter to the Editors

I wish I could be as optimistic as Jonah Raskin on the question of the uses of the Pentagon Papers as a mass instructional tool. Despite all appearances, I fear that the documents, in their manner of excerptation and interpretation, may have the effect of actually reinforcing public respect for the system responsible for the war. Here are a few brief comments:

1. *The Pentagon Papers Do Not Offer an Explanation for American Aggression in Vietnam.* They may contain the ingredients for an honest history but their authors do not really probe into the concrete interests of America's mad bombers or the nature of the Pax Americana the Indochina intervention was intended to advance. The Study is overloaded with facts but weak on their interpretation. It presents the spectacle of tactical disagreements between policy advisors, but little direct evidence about the framework of their analysis. The Bundys and the Rostows remain technocrats even in their criminality: By limiting their stories on the documents to the so-called "decision-making process" the New York Times and the rest of the bourgeois press, which have now abandoned the story, narrowed the scope of any real inquiry. Their intent was never to demystify the American system. "We threw out literally hundreds of documents — some which would have put your hair on end — because they didn't show how the decisions were made," the Times' foreign editor has admitted. This approach led a Times editor to conclude the paper's series by pronouncing the Vietnam war a "Greek Tragedy." We learn more about the war to find we have understood very little.

2. *The Pentagon Papers Have Been Used as an Advertisement for the American System.* Overseas, the publication of the Study has been taken as evidence of the basic resilience of the American system. The press has patted itself on the back for its courage while its pundits speak glibly of the Supreme Court's anti-government decision as an indication that 1984 is not here yet, by

golly. For the most part, the Study portrays the inner councils of government as arenas which encouraged debate. Here is American pluralism at work: The CIA is to be congratulated for the accuracy of its estimates, while the Generals are condemned for their gung-ho bombs-away attitudes. When one is drawn into this type of analytical game, one is expected to support one side or the other rather than call for the overthrow of the game itself.

3. *The Pentagon Papers Don't Necessarily Bring Those War Crimes Trials Closer.* By portraying the war as a progression of errors, the Study may very well soften the culpability of individual decisionmakers and their collective effort. "The published record," notes former U.S. Ambassador to Saigon, Frederick Nolting, "tends to varnish over these crucial events to make them less offensive or damaging to those involved." As the newspaper columnists warn against "McCarthyism of the Left," the mass media actually adopts the position warned against by Daniel Ellsberg. They view the war as "a tragedy without villains, war crimes without criminals, lies without liars, a process of immaculate deception."

I am sure Brother Raskin shares all of these briefly-enumerated fears. If someone's looking for an account of the war which shows how documents can be used to write honest history, consult "The Secret History of Kennedy's Private War" by Ralph Stavins which appeared in the New York Review of Books in late July. All of this is to say that it remains for radical scholars and the left itself to reinterpret and popularize the meaning of the Pentagon Papers. Jonah Raskin has made one stab. We need more.

Daniel Schechter

MAR 23 1972

STAT

Corporations' secret foreign-policy role faces probe

By Thomas B. Ross
Sun-Times Bureau

WASHINGTON — The Senate Foreign Relations Committee agreed Wednesday to look into the secret role of international corporations in U.S. foreign policy.

But it deferred a decision on whether to order a full-scale staff investigation or to call witnesses from the International Telephone & Telegraph Corp. and other large companies.

After a closed-door meeting with Sec. of State William P. Rogers, Sen. J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.), the chairman, said the committee decided only to make a general "study" of the problem.

Several committee members obviously were reluctant to delve too deeply into the explosive issue, despite the revelation by columnist Jack Anderson of confidential ITT memos on its dealings in Chile.

Sen. Frank Church (D-Ida.), chairman of the Latin American subcommittee, urged a full investigation, including testimony from ITT officials.

A number of present and former government officials are understood to have volunteered to provide information on the extensive relationship between the Central Intelligence Agency and U.S. corporations with operations abroad.

If an investigation is launched it would be the second involving ITT at the Capitol. The Senate Judiciary Committee already is conducting an inquiry into Anderson's al-

legations that ITT pressured the administration into an out-of-court settlement of a major antitrust case last year.

Anderson's memos described extensive ITT dealings with the Latin American division of the CIA's Clandestine Services as part of an alleged plot to prevent the installation of leftist Salvador Allende as president of Chile.

The documents also include purported reports on the Chile maneuverings to ITT director John A. McCone, former head of the CIA.

The CIA's efforts to operate through U.S. corporations and other private organizations abroad was the subject of a confidential Council on Foreign Relations report revealed by The Sun-Times last September.

The report, based on a secret discussion among several former ranking CIA officials in 1968, declared: "If the agency is to be effective, it will have to make use of private in-

stitutions on an expanding scale. . . . CIA's interface with the rest of the world needs to be better protected. . . .

"It is possible and desirable, although difficult and time-consuming to build overseas an apparatus of unofficial cover. . . . If one deals through U.S. corporations with overseas activities, one can keep most of the (CIA's) bureaucratic staff at home and can deal through the corporate headquarters, perhaps using corporate channels for overseas communications (including classified communications)."

Fulbright described ITT's activities in Chile, as alleged by Anderson, as "very bad business" but "probably a normal course of conduct" for corporations with major investments in a foreign country.

Church said Anderson's charges were "very disturbing (and) suggest our policy may be mainly concerned with the protection of large American companies."

However, he praised the Nixon administration for showing "admirable restraint" in dealing with Allende.

STAT

Jonah's Firing Is Assessed

IN THE LATEST ISSUE of University Review, one Jonah Raskin has a sad little tale about how he was fired for "political" reasons by the State University of New York, Stony Brook. Indeed, he claims he has a conclusive case against the English department there because some friends of his bugged the meeting where his appointment was discussed! But this amusing display of respect for civil rights is beside the point. To realize why Raskin was fired all one has to do is read the description of his course. Stony Brook has its eccentricities, but in logistical terms it just can't provide a sandbox for a thousand kids to play in.

In Raskin's own words, "In the spring of 1971 I gave a course on Contemporary British and American literature which connected literature to life, the classroom to the world, books to politics, and which created a classroom community where all of us were both teachers and students. There were over 1,000 students enrolled." A thousand students is a lot of work—too much—for any faculty member who takes his pedagogical role seriously, but Raskin devised the answer: "The living classroom experience (which) threatened the structure of traditional, hierarchical education and the professors of mediocrity."

AS BEST one can figure it out from his description, this body of a thousand became a sort of permanent floating crap game on campus. Again to quote, "The class was an embodiment of Raskin's Revolutionary Manifesto on Education (Revolutionary Manifesto No. 1063, dated February 14, 1970)"—(Please reader, do not abandon ship: this is not a put-on and the best is yet to come, J.P.R.)

What are the five principles of "Raskin's Revolutionary Manifesto on Education" (Revolutionary Manifesto No. 1063, etc.)? First, American education is a fake. "Students should be cultural revolutionaries. Disrupt classes; don't sit still and behave." Etc. Second, "Call your professor by his or her first name. Try treating him or her like a human being and maybe he'll stop treating you like an animal." Etc. Third, "End small classes,

We are a people. We gather together at rock concerts, at smoke-ins, in the street for rallies . . ." Etc. "We must gather together as a people in the classroom and break the alienation and the isolation of the universities."

BY NOW, you will have noted, we have everybody on campus engaged in a kind of perpetual Woodstock ritual. However, there is the small point of academic credit. How do you manage to convert calling professors by their first names—a real radical act—that—into points on a transcript?

Raskin is ready. "Grades are repressive. Grades sustain the death culture . . . Abolish grades. No exams. Moratorium on term papers. Be creative. Resist the Death Culture in Education. Build the Life Culture . . . Liberate the Universities." In short, take the year off!

Not knowing Mr. Raskin, I am unable to determine whether he just got paid for his kindergarten exercise, or whether he got paid for it and believes it. However, either way his dismissal was hardly a "political act," unless, that is, one believes that the firing of a "flatworlder" by a department of astrophysics is an act of political repression. As I said initially, universities these days are expected to fulfill all sorts of odd roles, but building sandboxes for games like Raskin's really falls beyond the pale. By the way, just call me John—everybody else does.

King Features Syndicate

Potomac Fever

Nixon told Latin American diplomats that he feels the breeze of change blowing through the Americas. Are we polluting the air that far south?

Previously secret documents revealed that the Japanese bombing raid on Australia in 1942 was a mistake due to faulty intelligence. Ain't everything?

Today's Lie: A computer has been developed to take the place of long government hearings. Conflicting information is fed in, then out comes a card saying, "I don't remember." It's all over within 10 minutes.

NYT
28 May 72

Literature and Politics—Again

By RICHARD LOCKE

In last month's issue of Commentary magazine Norman Podhoretz roasted Philip Rahv for an article on Henry James in The New York Review of Books. I don't agree with Podhoretz's reading of the article—I don't feel Rahv's criticism of James was as heinously political as Podhoretz takes it to be—but I did like Podhoretz's reminder that literary excellence isn't determined by a writer's politics. However, a return to a 1950's New Critical formalism that insists on the absolute autonomy of a work of art would be as retrograde as a return to 1930's Communist party line. For politics and literature are separate but intertwining threads. In the hands of great critics—Edmund Wilson, F. R. Leavis, Lionel Trilling—the interpretation of the political and cultural forces at work in a text can illuminate it as much as formal analysis. But it takes a delicate touch to avoid pulling so hard on one thread that all one gets is a snarl.

Now all this may seem trite. Almost everyone knows today that the political opinions of Yeats, Eliot, Lawrence, Pound or Pablo Neruda are infinitely less complex and intelligent than their literary works—to quote Lawrence himself, don't trust the teller, trust the tale. Wasn't all this solved 40 years ago in the Mike Gold-Thornton Wilder-Edmund Wilson controversy? Apparently not. Podhoretz obviously feels the issue is still alive. And it's unfortunately true that there are those on both the left and right who slaver and howl whenever "relevance" is mentioned and those who still think crudely about these matters.

To wit: last week, Pantheon Books published the latest of their "anti-texts"—anthologies by scholars who intend to reform their special fields. "The Politics of Literature" (\$10) is a collection of "dissenting essays on the teaching of English" edited by Louis Kampf (recent president and Luddite Captain Swing of the M.L.A.) and Paul Lauter. Only two of its 13 essays seem to be examples of "radical" literary scholarship and criticism. In the other pieces the writers seldom get down to cases on the reforms they'd like to see in those literary institutions called English departments. For the most part the book is a disturbingly fuzzy collection of ruminations on the evils of bourgeois society and on the hard lot of graduate students and faculty members in a field still

The Last Word

dominated by professors who insist—with all the power of the job market at their command—that politics and literature have nothing to do with each other in any "fruitful way." The writers explicitly reject this mandarinism and insist that they should be able to connect their professional lives and political convictions in a direct, forthright manner—by giving the political significance of Spenser's "The Faerie Queep" or by studying 19th-century working-class poems or slave narratives, for example. Splendid. But some of them argue that the main function of literary study has been to inculcate class values, and nearly all of them tend to confuse the vocation of literary instruction with the vocation of political reform. Their thinking is alarmingly sloppy, and for anyone truly serious about politics or literature such confusion is bound to breed disaster.

Look for example at a recent work of Yippie literary criticism. Its author is Jonah Raskin, "unofficial minister of education for the Youth International Party" and an English teacher at S.U.N.Y. at Stony Brook. Raskin's book, "a revolutionary critique of British literature and society in the modern age," is called "The Mythology of Imperialism" (Random House, \$7.95). It purports to deal with Kipling, Conrad, Forster, Lawrence and Joyce Cary as apologists and infrequent critics of the late British Empire. This is an excellent idea for a book, but "The Mythology of Imperialism" is an impossibly contentious, assertive and confused rewrite of a doctoral dissertation—a mess of late sixties agit-prop and wretchedly incoherent and inaccurate academic generalizations. Raskin believes that unrevolutionary, un-Maoist politics make bad literature. The introduction, "Bombard the Critics," is a key to the book, a hysterical attack on Raskin's old culture heroes:

"The literary critics, our teachers, those assassins of culture, have put us up against the wall and held us captive. . . . They have thieved our books, our movies, our hair, our life styles, our words, our passions, our tribal rites."

They, the murderers with the pen, have kidnapped our poets, playwrights, novelists, essayists, and demanded ransom—a little piece of our hearts pledged to love the monster they have manufactured [the 'literary tradition']... Who are these gangsters, conspirators and terrorists of the literary page? We see their faces on their Wanted posters: T. S. Eliot, E. M. Forster, F. R. Leavis, Lionel Trilling. Nearly all of them are neatly attired men in three-piece suits. They remind us of corporation executives or investment bankers. There is nothing bohemian, or beat, or hippie or freaky about them. They are straights; uptight." And this is only the beginning. Things get much worse when Raskin foams and fumbles his way into writers like Conrad and Forster, who weren't exactly monomaniacal simpletons when it came to either revolution or Empire.

Now—again—I'm not saying that literature and politics ought to stay in neat little vacuum packs and never touch; they always do. And I'm not saying that the teaching of literature is in great shape, nor that teachers shouldn't have political beliefs and impulses, nor, if they do, should hide them under a bushel. And I'm not saying that the old New Critics or the pure historians of literary genres or the mythopoetic archetypists have the only key to truth.

But I emphatically agree with Quentin Anderson in "The Imperial Self" that we ought to realize that literature was written by men and for other men in particular historical and psychological situations that can and must be studied in conjunction with formalistic matters if we're ever to sharpen our understanding of literature, our past, ourselves. This kind of flexible "interdisciplinary" approach to literary study seems the only way to stop playing academic ostrich while outraged and frustrated teachers and students (and Kampf, Lauter and Raskin) are ranting on about the "irrelevance" of the literary tradition. Great literature is as relevant as you can make it. As Marshall Berman has written, the great books of the past are often far more radical—and the radical ideas and impulses of the moment far more traditional—than is often perceived. Such wildly different critics as Georg Lukács and Irving Howe (in "Politics and the Novel," for example) have shown how much light from the left can be brought to bear on literary works. Kampf, Lauter and Raskin—and those who make unqualified nostalgic appeals to the autonomy of art—are shooting it out in the dark. □

A CIA Paper

"...Although this entire series of discussions was "off the record", the subject of discussion for this particular meeting was especially sensitive and subject to the previously announced restrictions."

—C. Douglas Dillon

By The Africa Research Group

The Central Intelligence Agency is one of the few governmental agencies whose public image has actually improved as a result of the publication of the Pentagon Papers. Despite disclosures of "The Agency's" role in assassinations, sabotage, and coup d'etats consciously intended to subvert international law, America's secret agency has actually emerged in some quarters with the veneration due prophets, or at least with the respect due its suggested efficiency and accuracy.

Virtually every newspaper editor, not to mention Daniel Ellsberg himself, has heaped praise on the CIA for the accuracy of its estimates detailing the U.S. defeat in Vietnam. Time and again, the Agency's "level headed professionalism" has been contrasted with the escalation-overkill orientation of the Pentagon or the President's advisors. The editor of the Christian Science Monitor even called upon policy makers to consult the CIA more, calling it a "remarkably accurate source of information." But such backhanded praise for conspirators confuses public understanding of the important and closely integrated role which the CIA plays in advancing the Pax Americana on a global scale.

For many, the Pentagon Papers provided a first peek into the inner sanctum of foreign policy making. As the government's attempt to suppress the study illustrates, the people are not supposed to have access to the real plans of their government. On close inspection, what emerges is not an "invisible government" but an indivisible system in which each agency offers its own specialized input, and is delegated its own slice of responsibility. Coordinated inter-departmental agencies work out the division of imperial labor. There are disagreements and bureaucratic

rivalries, to be sure, but once the decisions are reached at the top they are carried out with the monolithic tone of state power.

The intelligence community now plays an expanded and critical role in creating and administering the real stuff of American foreign policy. CIA Director Richard Helms presides over a U.S. Intelligence Board which links the secret services of all government agencies, including the FBI. In the White House, Henry Kissinger presides over an expanded National Security Council structure which further centralizes covert foreign policy planning. It is here that the contingency plans are cooked up and the "options" so carefully worked out. It is in these closed chambers and strangelovian "situation rooms" that plans affecting the lives of millions are formulated for subsequent execution by a myriad of U.S. controlled agencies and agents.

Increasingly, these schemes rely on covert tactics whose full meaning is seldom perceived by the people affected — be they Americans or people of foreign countries. The old empires, with their colonial administrators and civilizing mission have given way to the more subtle craftsman of intervention. Their manipulations take place in the front rooms of neo-colonial institutions and the parlors of dependent third world elites. In this world of realpolitik, appearances are often purposely deceptive and political stances intentionally misleading. The U.S. aggression in Vietnam, lest anyone forget, began as a covert involvement largely engineered by the CIA. Similar covert interventions now underway elsewhere in the world may be fueling tomorrow's Vietnams.

It is for this reason that the Africa Research Group, an independent radical research collective, is now making public major excerpts from a document which offers an informed insider's view of the secret workings of the American intelligence apparatus abroad. Never intended for publication, it was made available to the Group which will publish the entire text in October, 1971.*

This document may contain few of the startling disclosures found in the Pentagon Papers, but it does offer some insights which put those papers in a broader context.

"Intelligence and Foreign Policy" is the text of the minutes of a "confidential discussion group" which met in 1967-1968 under the aegis of the powerful and influential Council on Foreign Relations in New York. Widely known as a key center of foreign policy formulation, the Council literally is where the elite meet. It is here that corporation presidents and top bankers confer with government officials, leading academicians and foreign dignitaries. Currently headed by Chase Manhattan's David Rockefeller, the Council publishes books, supports the work of Establishment scholars (Henry Kissinger is one of their prominent alumni), and enables the country's opinionmakers to brief each other on the state of their multinational interests. Even by Council standards, its sessions on Intelligence operations were extraordinary. Though compiled in 1968 this document from one of those meetings offers a still-relevant primer on the theory and practice of CIA manipulations.

Richard Bissell, the man who led the Council discussion that night, was well equipped to talk about the CIA. A one-time Yale professor and currently an executive of the United Aircraft Corporation, Bissell served as the CIA's Deputy Director until he "resigned" in the wake of the abortive 1961 invasion of Cuba. The blue-ribbon group to which he spoke included a number of intelligence experts including Robert Amory, Jr., another former Deputy Director, and the late CIA chief, Allen Dulles, long considered the grand old man of American espionage. Their presence was important enough an occasion for international banker Douglas Dillon to

*The complete text of the document will be available for \$1 in late October from Africa Research Group, P.O. Box 213, Cambridge, Mass. 02138.

officiate. The accompanying "Who's Who" of the participants offers some details about the well-regarded positions these "leaders" hold in the Established order. In this discussion digest — only one of a still secret series — these power brokers get down to the nitty gritty issues that confront their world. Contrast, if you will, the precision of their concerns with the popular images of intelligence work.

In the mass media, the CIA has been so over identified with the James Bond-Mission Impossible image (perhaps not undeliberately) that it is difficult to appreciate the full range of its daily mundane work and power. On the left the tendency to associate the CIA only with coups and intrigue also mystifies its role as an administrator of complex political and economic institutions. Coups and assassinations are certainly within the organization's purview, but so is the task of orchestrating the intelligence-diplomatic-corporate-military-foreign aid-penetration of undeveloped countries by the U.S. "Overturning a regime is the easy part of political engineering," writes Richard Cottam, a political scientist privy to CIA operations. "Creating a stable and ideologically compatible regime is infinitely more complex..." In Vietnam, that strategy of shoring up a "compatible regime" has been called "Vietnamization." Elsewhere in the world, it is known as Neo-Colonialism.

As a strategy, neo-colonialism is failing in Vietnam largely because of resistance by a well-organized peoples' army. Of all the government agencies, the CIA appears to have understood that best, and consequently is viewed as a sober counterbalance to the military solutions so ineffectively attempted by the Generals. Elsewhere in the world revolutionary movements are not as advanced or as experienced as the Vietnamese. It is the CIA's mission to keep them that way. This objective underlies Mr. Bissell's enumeration of the ways the U.S. attempts to understand and influence any given country's "internal power balance." His is a program for grooming agents and allies in a way that makes them interdependent and ultimately indistinguishable.

These strategies are designed by an apparatus with immense resources at its disposal. A top-secret budget — esti-

imated to range from \$600 million to several billion annually — permits the CIA to maintain a staff of at least 15,000 Americans along with several thousand non-American agents. At least half of its analysts and researchers have advanced degrees; a third hold doctorates. What the CIA does not know, it can find out through its links with universities, U.S. corporations, and other institutions.

The CIA monitors and indexes most major ongoing scientific and academic research with the aid of a specially designed data processing system. At least half of its daily "intelligence input" comes from open sources such as newspapers, periodicals, radio monitoring, specialized journals, etc. Another 35 per cent is collected through various electronic devices, ranging from bugs to satellites; and the remaining fifteen per cent from agents in the field. This vast and well financed research nexus has its tentacles in virtually every sector of a nation's life: its schools, its media, its unions, its social organizations, and its political institutions.

Why does the United States require such an apparatus? Mr. Bissell doesn't really deal with this question, nor for that matter do the house experts who drafted the Pentagon Papers. The technocrats who serve American power are never ones to raise fundamental questions about the interests served by their global strategies. Unhappily, the periodic clamor for "controlling" the CIA also usually avoids any of the more basic questions about the covert character of American intervention. The latest such reform effort underway is a bill introduced by Senator John Sherman Cooper which would force the CIA to share its analyses and projection with Congress. In offering their tentative approval, the editors of the liberal Washington Post admitted bluntly that the measure does not regard the CIA as an "ominous operational agency whose work must be checked". With enemies like this the CIA needs few friends.

The CIA clearly is an operational agency: it has established itself plainly on the beaches of Cuba, in the continuing heroin traffic of Indochina, and in its role in the murders of Che Guevara and Patrice Lumumba, just to mention

some of its better known achievements. Throughout the world, revolutionary movements know they must "check" CIA dirtywork if they are to win back their countries from elites now dependent on foreign interests. In this country, the repressive apparatus is not only swelling but increasingly equipping itself with the sophisticated gadgetry long associated with counterinsurgency and foreign spying. CIA Director Richard Helms has even been publically mentioned as a possible successor to the FBI's aging J. Edgar Hoover. Those corporate liberals now aboard the anti-FBI bandwagon would like nothing more than to see the FBI streamlined and professionalized along CIA lines. In other words the covert action strategies now in use abroad may very well get introduced — if they aren't already — in the domestic political arena.

It will be an uphill battle for U.S. citizens as well as the people of undeveloped countries to check the operations of the CIA. The first step is understanding the scope and purposes of its actions. This document, like the Pentagon Papers, adds to our understanding of how U.S. really conducts foreign policy. Its appearance, like the appearance of the Pentagon Papers, is certain to alarm the keepers of national insecurity. They will order the imperial barn-doors closed and double-locked. But for this testament, it's too late. Too late. The horses of instruction and insurgency are running wild. Wild horses! And with apologies to Mr. Jagger and Company, these wild horses are going to drag this system away.

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