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# RUSSIAN MISSILE CALLED SUCCESS

Continued From Page 1, Col. 8

procedures, which he said would be "difficult."

Today, Dr. Schlesinger said that the Soviet success meant that it was imperative for the United States to prevent the Russians from gaining a clear advantage by combining their quantity lead with qualitative equality.

Information on the SS-18 and its successful test on a range ending on the Kamchatka Peninsula in northeastern Siberia apparently reached the Pentagon from intelligence sources yesterday.

Dr. Schlesinger, characterizing as "very adventuresome" a series of missile tests that started in May, listed four new-generation Soviet missiles that he said could lead the Soviet Union to "a clear advantage in counterforce capability" over the United States.

The four missiles are designated by United States defense authorities as the following:

¶The SS-16, a missile propelled by solid fuel, with a carrying capacity about that of the United States Minuteman—some 30 tons—and possibly intended as a mobile weapon.

¶The SS-17, also about Minuteman-size, but liquid-fueled and a possible successor to the standard SS-11.

¶The SS-18, largest of all, liquid-fueled and planned as the successor to the SS-9.

¶The SS-19, a hitherto undisclosed liquid-fueled missile in the Minuteman range. The Minuteman carries three warheads, each with an explosive content of about 200,000 tons of TNT.

## Sure of 2 Tests

Dr. Schlesinger said that the Defense Department was certain that the Soviet Union had tested its multiple-warhead capability on the SS-17 and SS-18 rocket vehicles, and added, that there was "flimsy evidence" of such testing on the other two.

The Pentagon, he said, had become persuaded that the Soviet Union intended to provide all its intercontinental missiles with multiple, separately-targetable warheads.

Judging from past experiences, he said, the new missiles could be ready for production and deployment by 1975. By the end of the decade, he said, the Soviet Union could have independently targetable

# Soviet Missile Test May Chart a New Course for the Arms Talks

By BERNARD GWETZMAN

The announcement by Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger yesterday that the Soviet Union had finally flight-tested an independently targeted multiple warhead came as no surprise, since Pentagon leaders had been saying for more than a year that it was only a question of time before the Russians caught up with the Americans in multiple-warhead technology.

## News Analysis

But the unanswered question—perhaps as much a mystery to the Kremlin as to the White House—is whether the Russians intend to use the development simply to catch up with the Americans or to surpass them in both numbers of warheads and their destructive power.

This would be conceivable if the Russians began to put these

warheads equal in numbers to those of the United States.

Noting that the Soviet Union had already achieved superiority over American missile-capability in "throw weight"—bigger missiles through bigger explosive charges—Dr. Schlesinger remarked: "I think the Soviets are seeking a strategic advantage."

## Not a Surprise, He Says

He said it was not astonishing that the Russians should eventually achieve and deploy multiple-warhead capability, "whether in several years or half a dozen years."

"One may have been surprised that they have all these missiles," he added. "It is the breadth of development, not the race, that is surprising."

Dr. Schlesinger said that the Soviet achievement had great significance for the current second round of talks on limitation of strategic arms between the Soviet Union and the United States "because our ability to monitor is rapidly, very rapidly deteriorating."

"Once they come through the flight test the ability to verify will be substantially undermined," he explained, adding that in the first round of talks "we repeatedly insisted on the ability to verify." The first strategic arms agreement of 1972 imposed an interim limitation on the quantities of nuclear missiles each side could build but permitted qualitative improvements.

Now, the Defense Secretary

warheads on their entire arsenal of land-based and submarine-launched missiles.

In a sense, the Soviet flight test has put the newly-developed, improved state of relations between Washington and Moscow to its first real test.

The two nations will have to decide in coming years whether to carry out their obligations, in various accords, not to seek nuclear superiority over the other or to let the Russian missile advances lead to another round in the arms race.

On June 21, President Nixon and Leonid I. Brezhnev, in the summit atmosphere of their second meeting, signed a seven-point document on the "basic principles" governing further negotiations on achieving a permanent treaty that would impose limits on each side's offensive nuclear weapons.

It was signed in the knowledge that the United States had

said, the Soviet Union is "closing the technological gaps through MIRV guidance and warheads."

"The United States is not in a position to tolerate Soviet superiority," he went on. "We must have some equality."

The Soviet position, as outlined recently by Russian officials here, is that the second round of arms talks would succeed only if the Soviet Union had a demonstrated MIRV capacity. The Soviet argument was, basically: "What you have we must get and where you are we must be," in world strategic terms.

Dr. Schlesinger countered this view with the argument that the Soviet Union was now moving toward attaining an advantage by "marrying" its quantitative superiority to qualitative equality. He added that phase two of the arms talks "must prevent imbalance," though he cautioned: "The Soviets are not particularly interested in limitations."

"The minimal point one can make is that the Soviets are unwilling not to demonstrate technology that the United States has demonstrated," he said. "Imagery is important."

Asked whether the Soviet missile success would lead him to press harder for Congressional acceptance of the Defense Department's accelerated Trident missile submarine program, Mr. Schlesinger replied: "No. I thought we were making a hard pitch. There is no intent on my part to make a harder pitch."

a technological lead over the Russians in multiple-warhead missiles, but that the Soviet Union had a numerical edge in numbers of missile launchers.

The two leaders agreed to accelerate negotiations so that an offensive-weapons treaty could be signed by the end of next year. In crucial language, they also agreed to be "guided by the recognition of each other's equal security interests and by the recognition that efforts to obtain unilateral advantage, directly or indirectly, would be inconsistent with the strengthening of peaceful relations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics."

In other words, both sides agreed to take steps that would lead to mutual trust rather than mutual suspicion, the cause for most of the previous arms races between the two nuclear powers.

## Parity in Sight

It was always clear from talking with Soviet officials that they regarded the MIRV as an important weapons system. A senior Soviet official once said that "we made the mistake of going for an ABM [anti-ballistic missile] while you went for MIRV."

"I wish it was the other way around," he added.

Now that the Russians seem on their way to developing and deploying multiple-warhead missiles, they will have achieved their objective of achieving technological parity with the United States. Will they agree to a formula at the talks on limitation of strategic arms, due to resume this fall in Geneva, which would insure that a rough equality could be achieved, and sufficiently verified, so that neither Moscow nor Washington felt at a disadvantage?

## Visits Are Ruled Out

There are many possible ways of achieving this, but the agreement reached in June rules out visits by officials of one country to the missile sites of the other to inspect what is going on. Rather, verification must be by "national technical means," a highly complex field involving "spy-in-the-sky" photo reconnaissance satellites and various radar systems.

Up to now, verification has been relatively easy because the first arms-control accord, signed in Moscow in May, 1972, put limits only on the number of launch vehicles. These launch vehicles—or rockets, to laymen—can be detected by

reconnaissance satellites either at their land-based sites or by spotting submarines.

But the MIRVs, placed on top of the launch vehicles, are virtually impossible to detect.

It is not possible to tell, by photography, for instance, whether a warhead has one, three or a dozen individual missiles.

It is possible to ascertain this by checking the flight-testing of the other side what kind of MIRVs it can launch. In other words, if the Russians on the flight test a six-head missile, that means that it is unlikely they will be able to put a 12-head cap on top of their launchers.

## An Accepted Disadvantage

Under the five-year interim accord on offensive weapons, the United States accepted a disadvantage in total numbers of launchers—10 to 2,358—because with the MIRV, the United States had a two-to-one edge in the number of warheads.

By simple arithmetic, the

Russians could surpass the United States both in numbers of warheads and in their total destructiveness by the end of the decade, if they chose.

They would have more destructive power—"throw weight," in the jargon—because they have gone in for mammoth land-based missiles rather than the smaller ones deployed by the United States.

In the past, officials such as Henry A. Kissinger, President Nixon's national security adviser, have predicted that the strategic arms negotiators would have a very difficult time reaching an accord on offensive weapons because of the problems in verifying limits on multiple-warhead missiles.

But Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Nixon have both said also that the United States and the Soviet Union were entering a new historic relationship. The relationship will be severely tested in coming months and years by MIRV.

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## Cambodians Back Home To Rubble and Despair

By MALCOLM W. BROWNE  
Special to The New York Times

KRANG PONG RO, Cambodia, Aug. 17—Cambodian refugees who spent months running from successive battles and air raids have begun returning to their home villages, discovering in most cases that everything they left was burned or destroyed.

This village, which once had 3,000 people living in about 300 houses, was burned to the ground. The first handful of women who walked up the muddy trail today burst into sobs on seeing the destruction. Many spent the day aimlessly sifting through broken roof tiles, melted bicycle frames and smashed pots.

Krang Pong Ro, which is a short distance from Route 3 and about a mile from the district capital, Kompong Kantuot, was engulfed in some of the heaviest fighting of recent months.

The enemy's June offensive cut off the Government garrison at Kompong Kantuot and then overran the town, sweeping along the road toward Phnom Penh, 15 miles to the northeast.

In the resulting rout soldiers and families poured up the road, in many cases with only what they could wear or carry. On June 19 Communist troops moved into Krang Pong Ro and began fortifying it as an anchor of their whole front.

### Intense U.S. Bombing

There followed a period of intensive American bombing of the region. Krang Pong Ro itself was not bombed, but the countryside in all directions is cratered. Route 3, a well-graded blacktop road, has been churned by bombs, shells and monsoon rain into a cratered, rutted, muddy track.

Government soldiers said the Communists had piled their dead in several of the houses, setting fire to them to cremate the bodies. The fire then spread through the deserted village.

A United States Air Force fighter-bomber was circling overhead this morning, apparently on a reconnaissance mission. Apart from its roar the town was still.

Cambodian houses are generally built on stilts to protect the occupants from water and rats. The houses of Krang Pong Ro, a prosperous and substantial place, had concrete stilts and staircases. Only a forest of stilts and stairs remains.

There is no suggestion of battle anywhere now, and soldiers and civilians here behave more like people returning to a town ravaged by a passing storm than one still in the midst of war.

"The Vietcong are all gone," a lieutenant said, using the official term for the Communist insurgents. "We killed them and drove them out, and they won't be back around here again."

The fortifications left by the Communists are reminders of their martial skills, however. Deep underground bunkers strong enough to survive even direct bomb and artillery hits are everywhere, and multitudes of foxholes attest to the willingness of the enemy soldiers to dig.


The pagoda, a large concrete building with many brightly painted plaster images of Buddha, is almost ruined. Whole stupas, on towers, outside the main structure have been overturned or smashed by heavy explosions apparently inside the buildings. There are no signs of aerial bombing.

Government officers explain that the "Vietcong" committed the sacrilege of using the pagoda as a command post, even cooking meals within it. Government troops are using the pagoda as their command post now, but without cooking inside.

A bulldozer arrived to clear rubble at about the time Mrs. Ou Heang arrived on foot. She had walked most of the way from a squatter settlement near the Phnom Penh airport where she had been staying for weeks.

Like most of the others she burst into tears on seeing the place where her family and two others had shared a large house, the stilts of which are all that survived. Through her sobs she said again and again, "Everything is gone!"

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## Pentagon Says 'Pop-Up' Missile Gives Soviet Heavier Warhead

By JOHN W. FINNEY

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 18 —

The Soviet Union, according to Defense Department officials, has developed a "pop-up" technique for launching missiles that could significantly increase the warhead payload of its intercontinental missile force.

The recently acquired intelligence information has been relayed to certain Administration supporters on the Senate Armed Services Committee and is expected to be a prominent factor in the forthcoming defense debate in the Senate.

One of the committee members who have been informed is Senator Henry M. Jackson, Democrat of Washington, who is expected by the Administration to take a leading role in defending the defense budget against further cuts.

In the silo-launching technique hitherto practiced by both the United States and the Soviet Union, the missile must be considerably smaller in diameter than the silo hole. This is to permit the exhaust of the hot rocket gases when the missile is ignited as it stands at the base of the silo hole.

In the "pop up" launching  
Continued on Page 11, Column 1

missile almost as large in diameter as the silo hole can be used. The missile is slowly pushed up the silo hole by hot gases, much like a piston being pushed up an engine cylinder. Then, as the missile reaches the surface, its rocket engines are ignited.

Senator Jackson, in an interview, made it clear that he intended to discuss the Soviet "pop-up" technique to underscore his contention that the credibility of this nation's nuclear deterrent was being undermined by Soviet missile developments.

In the past, such as in the antiballistic missile debates in 1969 and 1970, the Defense Department has supplied Senator Jackson with previously classified intelligence information in an attempt to sway a closely divided Senate.

This year, with the support of Senator Jackson, the Administration is seeking to defend its Trident missile submarine program against budget reductions, with the outcome apparently depending upon two or three votes going one way or the other.

Whether the Soviet "pop up" technique is a potentially destabilizing development in the present nuclear balance is a matter of debate between the Pentagon and its nongovernment critics.

But there is agreement that if the technique has been developed, as contended by Defense Department officials and Senator Jackson, it will permit the Soviet Union to increase substantially the "throw weight"—or the payload—of its missiles under the limitations of the 1972 Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement with the United States.

The key advantage of the "pop-up" technique is that it permits the Soviet Union to place a much larger missile in its existing missile silo holes.

Under last year's arms limitation agreement controlling offensive strategic weapons, neither side can "significantly increase" the size of its existing missile silos or build new ones. With the Soviet Union unwilling to agree to specific limitations on the size of missiles, this limitation on missile silos was agreed upon as a way of controlling the number of large intercontinental ballistic missiles, such as the SS-9, deployed by the Soviet Union.

But as seen from some defense officials and by Senator Jackson's aides who have been briefed by the Defense Department, the Russians may have found a way to get around this silo limitation with the "pop-up" technique.

Defense officials speculated that one possible Soviet use of the "pop-up" technique would be to place the SS-18 missile that it is developing into the existing 313 silo holes built for the SS-9 missile.

Under conventional launching techniques, the SS-18 appears to be too large to fit into the SS-9 holes but with the "pop-up" technique, defense officials suggested, it might be possible to adapt the SS-9 silos to accommodate the larger missile.

Another possibility raised by Senate sources is that the same technique would be used for deploying the SS-17 missile, which the Soviet Union is developing as a replacement for its "light" SS-11 intercontinental missile.

If so, this could raise a question—which defense officials refused to comment on—as to whether the Soviet Union is complying with the terms of the five-year agreement on offensive weapons, as interpreted by the United States.

# A SOVIET SUCCESS REPORTED IN TEST OF NEW MISSILES

Pentagon's Chief Tells of  
a Moscow Breakthrough  
in Multiple Warheads

## ARMS PARLEY AFFECTED

Schlesinger Speculates on  
'a Clear Advantage' Over  
the American Arsenal

By DAVID BINDER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 17 — Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger announced today that the Soviet Union has successfully flight-tested missiles with multiple warheads that can be directed to separate targets.

At a briefing for newsmen at the Pentagon, Dr. Schlesinger said that one of the intercontinental missiles, designated the SS-18, had carried at least six hydrogen warheads in the one-megaton range. One megaton is the equivalent of a million tons of TNT.

The United States began installing multiple warheads — known as "MIRVs," for "multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles" — in its Minuteman II missiles in April, 1970, and has since spread the network.

## Nixon-Brezhnev Pledge

On June 21 in Washington, President Nixon and Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Soviet Communist party leader, pledged that "qualitative" limitations on strategic weapons, including missiles with multiple warheads, would be their joint goal in a second strategic weapons agreement to be reached by the end of 1974. The first agreement on limitation of strategic arms, reached in 1971, dealt with quantitative limits.

A United States official said that the Soviet success had virtually erased American hopes for a two-way moratorium on future testing of such missiles in the framework of a new agreement on limitation of strategic arms. Earlier, the United States had planned to propose such a moratorium. Now, the official said, the stress would have to be on controlling MIRV deployment and verification

Continued on Page 4, Column 1

# 'Centaur Plan' to Oust Allende Called Hoax

By Laurence Stern  
Washington Post Staff Writer

U.S. intelligence sources have branded as a "hoax" the so-called Centaur plan to overthrow the Allende government in Chile.

They attribute the plan and its circulation through Latin America to an American parole violator named Richard Alexander Zander, who is said to have "peddled" it commercially in Mexico.

Centaur has created ripples of mystification since it was first mentioned in Mexico City on Monday by Hugo Vigorena, Chile's former ambassador to Mexico.

Vigorena, in an interview with the Mexican daily Excelsior, charged that the anti-Allende plan was conceived and executed by the Central Intelligence Agency. Although it was first put into motion two years ago, he said, the Chilean government did not discover it until six weeks before the coup that ousted Allende and led to his death.

Until now the CIA, White House and State Department have steadfastly denied any U.S. involvement in the Chilean coup.

U.S. intelligence sources said Wednesday that a plan such as the one described by Vigorena was being distributed in Latin America by the American named Zander.

"This guy was selling a cock-and-bull fabrication," said one Government official. "He is a fugitive from justice."

At a hearing yesterday of the House foreign affairs inter-american affairs subcommittee, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Jack B. Kubisch testified yesterday he understood the Centaur plan "was a spurious document."

Kubisch said he would prefer to discuss the plan with the subcommittee in executive session but he testified publicly that he understood there was an individual in Mexico who claimed he had a document showing that CIA was involved in the coup. Earlier this week State Department officials said the only information they had on the Centaur plan had come from U.S. intelligence sources, presumably the CIA.

The Federal Bureau of In-

vestigation confirmed Wednesday that a Richard Alexander Zander, 21, is wanted as a parole violator and that a warrant was issued for his arrest last Aug. 27.

The Zander on the FBI's wanted list was convicted in Portland, Ore., of the interstate transport of stolen goods on May 9, 1972, and given a 10 year sentence and \$10,000 fine. The sentence was reduced to three years last November 21 and Zander was released on probation. He was listed as "self employed."

Intelligence sources here claim to have no documentation on the Centaur plan but are nonetheless convinced that it is a bogus scheme with which the CIA has no connection.

It was understood that State Department officials were appraised of the "Hoax" aspects of the plan in the event that any news inquiries about it arose at the Department's Tuesday briefing.

State Department spokesmen were reportedly apprehensive about dealing publicly with the matter without corroborative documents or other evidence.

Zander has reportedly left Mexico and there is no current information on his whereabouts.

The Centaur affair is laden with potential embarrassment for the administration, in the view of some officials, unless it can be conclusively established as a hoax. "What's at stake here is credibility," said one government officer.

Last March the CIA acknowledged, in Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings, that it sought to promote economic distress in Chile during 1970 in an effort to prevent Allende's election. The testimony was given by William V. Broe, at the time the CIA's chief of clandestine services for Latin America.

It is for that reason the CIA is now vulnerable to public suspicions of intervention in the upheaval that ousted Allende from office last week and led to his death.

Officially the CIA has no comment on the Vigorena allegations.

THE WASHINGTON POST Saturday, Sept. 22, 1973

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## The Washington Merry-Go-Round

# No Direct U.S. Role Seen in Chile Coup

By Jack Anderson  
and Les Whitten

We have been deluged with inquiries from all over the world about possible U.S. involvement in the overthrow of President Salvador Allende in Chile. Because we exposed the KKK-CIA plot to block Allende from assuming power in 1970, newspapers in many countries have asked us whether the CIA was also behind the military coup which left Allende dead in the presidential palace last week.

We have checked carefully with the best sources available to us in the White House, State Department, Pentagon and CIA. Here's what we have found:

For the past few months, Washington has been bombarded with intelligence reports from Chile warning of "discontent and plotting in the military services." Only the day before the takeover, a Chilean military officer informed the U.S. embassy in Santiago that a coup was imminent.

The warning, however, wasn't treated as any more significant than dozens of similar reports that have been passed on to Washington recently. We could find no evidence that Washington knew in advance what the Chilean generals were planning.

The sudden arrival in Washington of Nathaniel Davis, the

American ambassador to Chile, on the weekend before the takeover has been cited as evidence that the United States must have had some inkling of the plot. On the contrary, we have learned that Davis chose that weekend for his visit because he expected it to be comparatively calm in Santiago.

He was summoned to Washington by Henry Kissinger, who, in anticipation of his confirmation as Secretary of State, wanted to assess a few top diplomats for possible Washington assignments. Because of the volatile situation in Chile, Kissinger specified that Davis should choose the most quiet time to come to Washington.

Davis, of course, knew about the stirrings within the Chilean armed forces. But he had emphasized in his secret cables that "events move slowly in Chile, or perhaps better said, Chileans have great ability to rush to the brink, embrace each other and back off."

When Davis met with Kissinger, according to our sources, they spent no more than five or 10 minutes reviewing the Chilean situation. Most of their discussion was devoted to internal State Department matters.

It is possible that the CIA may have been involved in some minor project against Allende. But the CIA is forbidden to intervene in any major foreign

operation without the specific approval of the hush-hush **Forty Committee**, which passes on undercover operations. Our sources, who have access to the secret deliberations of the **Forty Committee**, assure us that no project was approved to depose Allende.

The Pentagon, meanwhile, has been furnishing arms to the Chilean military establishment. After Allende came to power, the White House considered cutting off military aid to Chile. The decision was made to continue arms shipments because the Chilean generals were known to be anti-Allende.

For example, \$12.4 million worth of credits were granted to the Chilean armed forces last year for the purchase of U.S. military supplies and the training of Chilean officers. The Pentagon had no direct part, however, in the plot against Allende.

**Deadly Enemies**—The Watergate developments have taken an ironic twist which has left the two ringleaders, G. Gordon Liddy and E. Howard Hunt, deadly enemies.

Liddy is a fanatic who offered to submit to being gunned down in the streets, Mafia-style, for his failure at Watergate. When his startled superiors declined to arrange his execution, he went to prison, lips grimly sealed.

Hunt is a romantic who

played the spy role until the plot turned out not to have a storybook ending. He was one of the first to break and to throw himself upon the mercy of the prosecutors.

When he told the other Watergate conspirators that he had broken his secret oath, according to prison sources, Liddy hollered for a guard. "Keep me away from him," Liddy growled, referring to Hunt, "or I'll kill him!"

That was the last time Liddy and Hunt have spoken to one another.

Now Hunt appears to be the key government witness against the Cubans he recruited to do his dirty work. His flair for the dramatic gives him a charismatic sway over the Cubans. He had been their CIA superior during the Bay of Pigs fiasco, and he returned 10 years later to recruit them for the Daniel Ellsberg and Watergate capers.

With heroic words that could have come from one of his own spy novels, Hunt swore them to secrecy. After their arrest, he persuaded them to plead guilty rather than risk revealing what they knew in a court trial.

Hunt, meanwhile, collected most of the \$460,000 hush money that the White House crowd passed out to buy the silence of the Watergate defendants. Less than \$27,000 filtered down to the Cubans.

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The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST

Thursday, Nov. 1, 1973

H7

# Plot to Tie Hughes, Democrats Cited

By Jack Anderson

Not long after Bebe Rebozo took a \$100,000 cash gift intended for President Nixon from industrialist Howard Hughes, the President's friend joined in a White House plot to link Hughes to the Democrats.

This amazing double-cross is revealed in confidential White House memos, which we have uncovered in the course of investigating Rebozo's role as a money raiser for the President.

The memos show that in January, 1971, White House staff chief H. R. Haldeman sought to plant stories in the press tying the eccentric Hughes to Democratic National Chairman Larry O'Brien.

This was only a few months after Rebozo had received the last of two \$50,000 installments, paid in \$100 bills, from a Hughes aide. Yet Rebozo apparently had no hesitation to help expose the financial ties between the phantom billionaire and the Democrats.

Rebozo was careful to request, however, that he be kept informed "if any action be taken with regard to Hughes" because of "his own dealings with the Hughes people."

Both Haldeman and Dean, therefore, knew of Rebozo's dealings with Hughes, although the memos don't make clear whether they were aware the billionaire had slipped Rebozo \$100,000 for the President. Haldeman decided, never-

theless, to go ahead with the plot even if it meant "embarrassing" Hughes. Haldeman instructed Dean, however, to keep "Bebe out of it at all cost."

Haldeman asked White House counsel John Dean in a memo, dated Jan. 18, 1971, to begin "an inquiry into the relationship between Larry O'Brien and Howard Hughes."

Dean reported back his "preliminary findings" on Jan. 26, 1971. Among others, Dean spoke to Rebozo.

"I discussed the matter with Bebe Rebozo who indicated that his information regarding (a retainer paid by Hughes to O'Brien) had come from Robert Maheu, the recently released head of Hughes' Nevada operation," reported Dean.

"Bebe said that this information had come to his attention at a time when Maheu was professing considerable friendliness towards the administration, but that it was not documented information. Bebe indicated that he felt that Maheu had possibly retained O'Brien for his services without any direct knowledge by Hughes himself.

"Bebe is under the impression that Maheu had a good bit of freedom with Hughes' money when running the Nevada operation. Bebe further indicated that he felt he could acquire some documentation of this fact if given a little time and that he would proceed to

try to get any information he could.

"He also requested that if any action be taken with regard to Hughes that he be notified because of his familiarity with the delicacy of the relationships as a result of his own dealings with the Hughes people."

Dean also reported that Robert Bennett, son of Sen. Wallace Bennett (R-Utah) represented Hughes. "Bennett informs me," wrote Dean, "that there is no doubt about the fact that Larry O'Brien was retained by Howard Hughes and the contract is still in existence. . . . Bennett also indicated that he felt confident that if it was necessary to document the retainer with O'Brien that he could get the (documents)."

Two days after receiving Dean's report, Haldeman sent him confidential instructions.

"You should continue to keep in contact with Bob Bennett, as well as looking for other sources of information on this subject," Haldeman directed. "Once Bennett gets back to you with his final report, you and Chuck Colson should get together and come up with a way to leak the appropriate information.

"Frankly, I can't see any way to handle this without involving Hughes. The problem of 'embarrassing' him seems to be a matter of degree. However, we should keep Bob Bennett and

Bebe out of it at all costs. . . ."

As it happened, we were the recipients of the White House leak. We reported on Aug. 6, 1971, that "Hughes' lieutenants offered to subsidize Larry O'Brien so he could serve without pay as Democratic National Chairman during the 1968 campaign."

We quoted O'Brien, who acknowledged he had been "sounded out by Maheu in 1968" but insisted he "never drew a dime from the Hughes interests during the campaign." Several months later, we reported O'Brien was retained by Hughes.

We have spoken to O'Brien again for an updated comment. "If they'd wanted to know about my relationship to Hughes," he said, "They could have looked at the public record. . . . If they didn't want to look at the public record, they could have saved themselves the trouble by simply calling me on the telephone."

O'Brien said his fee was "a personal matter between me and my clients." But in a letter to Maheu, dated Aug. 21, 1968, O'Brien said his "annual fee would be \$100,000, payable in monthly installments."

Haldeman told us through his lawyer that he remembers the exchange of memos but doesn't remember the outcome. Dean and Rebozo refused to comment.

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## Collectors Excited by Insulators

On Sunday, between 10 a.m. and 6 p.m. in the community room of the Springfield Mall Shopping Center, a group of people from 12 states will meet to discuss their collecting hobby and hear speeches about it.

The object of their attention is the insulator: yes, the pieces of glass you used to throw rocks at on telephone poles as kids," according to James A. Barron of Springfield, Va., treasurer of the Eastern Insulator Club.

It turns out that there are about 2,300 different kinds of glass and porcelain insulators, and only one company still makes them. Therefore, to people who like insulators, they have become an item to be collected.

Barron says he has insulators worth \$200 each and saw a man pay \$300 for one. He knows of another man who values one insulator in his collection at \$1,800.

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## The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST

Monday, Oct. 8, 1973

C33

# CIA Teaches Terrorism to Friends

By Jack Anderson

Bomb and booby trap experts from the Central Intelligence Agency have been quietly training foreign police to make explosive devices at an isolated federal school in Texas. The tutelage is so dubious that the Pentagon has refused to have anything to do with it.

The cloak-and-dagger professors are on loan from the CIA to the Agency for International Development, which runs the school at the Border Patrol Academy in Los Fresnos.

The existence of the school was first depicted in the movie "State of Siege," where foreign police were shown being trained to use bombs and booby traps against political opponents. But because the film was propagandistic, few took seriously the reality of the "terror school."

Dubious but curious Sen. James Abourezk (D-S.D.) began a quiet investigation. His confidential findings raise disquieting questions about America's police aid to military juntas.

In one memo wrung from AID by Abourezk, Assistant Administrator Matthew Harvey concedes that the Defense Depart-

ment refused to teach the bomb course when it was set up in 1969. Therefore, "the Central Intelligence Agency agreed to provide guest lecturers for this portion of the training program."

At the secret school, he says, demonstrations are given of "the construction, use and counter-measures against homemade bombs and explosive devices used by criminal terrorists." The foreign police also get graphic lectures on booby traps, "incendiaries" and other lethal devices. To defuse and dispose of bombs, Harvey explained, a police officer first has to learn all about them.

The documents obtained by Abourezk show that most of the 165 policemen trained at the school come from military-backed regimes such as those in Brazil, Guatemala, Thailand, Uruguay, Panama and El Salvador. Only a thin blue line of cops are trained for the democracies.

AID officials explained to us that they have had fewer requests for the "Technical Investigations Course" from democracies. The bomb-building course, they add, is only part of

the curriculum at the Texas hideaway. The visiting police are also taught bomb squad organization, record keeping and a course called "Press Releases and Press Relations."

At the CIA, a spokesman said the decision to help with the anti-bomb courses was associated with terrorist attacks on American personnel and facilities in foreign land. The courses are now being reviewed.

**SILENT TREATMENT**—Last year, the four foolhardy Cubans on the Watergate squad were willing to follow their ring-leader, E. Howard Hunt, blindly. Now they hold him in silent contempt.

They had planned to plead not guilty and appeal to the jury for understanding. But at that time, the White House wanted to avoid a public trial. Hunt advised them to plead guilty, and overnight they changed their plan.

The Cubans sometimes quarreled among themselves, but all four swore by Hunt. They wept with him when his wife was killed in an airliner crash. They would have died for him.

Then the sordid Watergate story was spread across the

front pages. They found out that Hunt had collected tens of thousands of dollars in behalf of the Watergate defendants. But only a few paltry payments ever reached them. He used most of the money to pay his own legal expenses.

He is now prepared to testify against the Cubans, whom he recruited to break into Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office, in return for immunity for himself.

But perhaps the last straw was the deal he wangled from the Senate Watergate committee. In return for his cooperation, the committee arranged for him to be removed from jail into spacious, comfortable quarters at Ft. Holabird, Md. Our sources say he occupies his time playing checkers and chess.

The four Cubans, meanwhile, are still behind bars. They saw him as he was cashing a \$100 money order just before checking out of jail. As a gesture of contempt, Eugenio Martinez pulled his empty pockets inside out. Then they watched together in cold silence as the sheepish Hunt was led away.

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST Monday, Dec. 24, 1973

B7

# Nuclear Diplomacy Still Practiced

By Jack Anderson

The Christmas theme of peace on earth has been profaned, regrettably, by the men who control the nuclear switches.

They still engage in nuclear diplomacy, and the horror weapons are poised in their silos and submarines ready for the ultimate holocaust.

In less than a dozen years, there have been at least three nuclear confrontations. The latest occurred only last October, as Soviet attack submarines targeted on U.S. warships and both superpowers ordered their forces on alert.

The public has been given only the sketchiest details of the incidents that could have ended in nuclear devastation. Here are the stark facts, which men of goodwill would do well to ponder while the carolers sing of peace on earth:

During the 1962 missile crisis, as the world is aware, John Kennedy ordered our nuclear forces on red alert.

President Kennedy threw a naval blockade around Cuba, calling it a "quarantine," with orders to stop Soviet missile

shipments from entering Cuban waters. Nikita Khrushchev, then the cock of the Kremlin, responded with a blistering secret message.

Nevertheless, Kennedy called the Joint Chiefs into the Situation Room in the White House basement. He plunged a thumb tack into an Atlantic map and ordered the Joint Chiefs to intercept any Soviet ships that reached the point of the thumb tack.

Soviet ships, loaded with Cuba-bound missiles, arrived at the crucial spot. The President called the Joint Chiefs back into the Situation Room. Slowly, he withdrew the tack from the map, moved it back and pressed it into the map again. "Let's give them a little more time," he instructed. "But when they reach this point, you'll have to stop them."

As the missile-laden Soviet ships approached the second thumb tack, orders from Moscow turned them around.

Kennedy's handling of the Cuban confrontation made a deep impression on Richard Nixon. He spoke admiringly of the cold courage Kennedy had

demonstrated when he faced an imminent nuclear explosion.

In December, 1971, President Nixon had an opportunity to stage his own nuclear showdown in the Bay of Bengal.

While Pakistan and India fought over the dreary, humid, painfully impoverished piece of earth now called Bangladesh, the United States, the Soviet Union and China issued orders. Armies and navies with hydrogen-headed missiles responded.

It turned out to be a limited, two-week war. But it could have been otherwise. The secret intelligence reports reveal that the three superpowers were being sucked into the vortex of war.

The world was spared, but none of the big powers can take credit. The war was not ended by the menacing moves of the Russians, Americans and Chinese, but by the collapse of the Pakistani army in Bangladesh.

Again, at the height of the latest Arab-Israeli war in October, the United States and the Soviet Union moved their nuclear forces on the world chessboard.

Seven Soviet airborne divisions in full combat gear were

moved to embarkation points. The airlift of military supplies to Egypt and Syria was suddenly halted to make the planes available to haul the waiting troops.

A flotilla of warships, landing ships and back-up ships moved out of the Black Sea into the Mediterranean. The Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean quickly swelled to 90 vessels, one-third more than the U.S. Navy's Sixth Fleet. At least 20 Soviet attack submarines appeared on the tails of U.S. carriers and other key ships.

Then Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, in a blunt secret message declaring: "I will say it straight," called upon President Nixon to join him in sending troops to stop the alleged Israeli cease-fire violations. Otherwise, he threatened to send in Soviet troops unilaterally.

The President responded instead by ordering a worldwide military alert. The Soviet forces never left Russia. Tensions were relaxed. But once again, mankind had taken a step dangerously close to the nuclear brink.

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The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST

Monday, Dec. 10, 1973

B17

# How the CIA Snooped Inside Russia

By Jack Anderson

We have been accused of compromising an intelligence operation, perhaps even jeopardizing the life of an agent, inside the Soviet Union.

Let us set the record straight.

More than two years ago, we were tipped off that the Central Intelligence Agency had managed to eavesdrop on the private conversations of Kremlin leaders. Some of the transcripts, we were told, were quite titillating.

We checked out the story with a CIA source who had access to the transcripts. He confirmed that the CIA was intercepting the telephone traffic between the limousines of Soviet bigwigs.

Unfortunately, he said, they didn't hold strategy sessions in their limousines. The CIA picked up small talk, however, which provided an insight into the personalities of the likes of party chief Leonid Brezhnev, Premier Alexei Kosygin and President Nikolai Podgorny.

The transcripts revealed that the Soviet leaders gossip about one another and complain

about their ailments. Their favorite limousine stop was a private clinic where they could get steam baths, rubdowns and other physical therapy.

Brezhnev, who sometimes drinks too much vodka and suffers from hangovers, told Podgorny in a typical conversation that he was suffering from the woes and would stop off at the clinic for a massage. He mentioned a masseuse named Olga.

"Olga! Oh ho!" chortled the Soviet President, who apparently was familiar with Olga.

Our source said the transcripts showed that the Kremlin chiefs were aware the CIA was listening to them. Anything they already knew, he agreed, should be safe for the American people to be told.

Therefore, it should do no harm to write about the eavesdropping operation, said our source. He cautioned, however, that the monitored conversations didn't make clear whether the Soviet leaders had figured out how we did it.

We published a careful story on Sept. 16, 1971, about the eavesdropping. "For obvious security reasons," we wrote, "we

can't give a clue as to how it's done. But we can state categorically that for years the CIA has been able to listen to the kingpins of the Kremlin banter, bicker and backbite among themselves."

The following December, we quoted from secret White House minutes to show that President Nixon had lied to Congress and the public about the India-Pakistan conflict.

This brought the President's gumshoes down on our necks with a vengeance. No newsmen in Nixondom have ever received a more thorough going-over. The undercover work was done by the plumbers, the bizarre para-police unit whose operatives ran around in CIA wigs and committed foolish crimes.

The bewigged ones, among other things, began checking into our account of the Kremlin bugging. This aroused Richard Helms, then the CIA chief, who invited me to lunch on March 17, 1972.

He asked me not to mention the eavesdropping operation in my book, "The Anderson Papers." He acknowledged that

the Kremlin leaders knew their conversations had been monitored. But he pleaded with me to keep quiet and urged me particularly never to mention how the conversations were intercepted.

Accordingly, I omitted the references from my book and left it to others to reveal the secret monitoring method. Not until today, after the limousine-listening operation had been widely publicized elsewhere, have we mentioned how it was done.

Nevertheless, the White House has seized upon this affair to justify the President's claim of national security in the plumbers' case.

This is strictly a red herring, which President Nixon hopes will distract the Watergate bloodhounds. The truth is that (1) the monitored Kremlin chit-chat was never an important intelligence source; (2) our Sept. 16, 1971, story revealed nothing the Kremlin leaders didn't already know; and (3) the President's claim of national security simply won't wash.

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# \$1.5 Billion Secret in Sky

## U.S. Spy Unit Surfaces by Accident

By Laurence Stern  
Washington Post Staff Writer

In the arcane and heavily classified world of "overhead" reconnaissance and spy satellite intelligence, the existence of the National Reconnaissance Office has been one of the best kept trade top secrets.

The name of the organization, in fact, is top secret, and, according to intelligence officials, has appeared in public print only once before—by inadvertence.

Yet the NRO, which is funded primarily through Air Force appropriations, spends an estimated \$1.5 billion a year acquiring and managing the most sophisticated, elusive and expensive force of spies that has ever been recruited into the government's service.

Its customers include the Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency and the White House. Its operatives bear such names as SR-71, Samos, Agena, and "the Big Bird." Its activities are screened off from all but a relative handful of specialists in the national security bureaucracy who carry some of the highest and most specialized clearances issued by the government.

Curiously enough, the only reference to NRO that has been made in a public government document was last Oct. 12 in a report of the Special Senate Committee to Study Questions Related to Secret and Confidential Government Documents. The

drafters of the report unwittingly breached security by listing, along with CIA, DIA and NSA on the concluding page, the National Reconnaissance Office.

And, more obliquely, Sen. William Proxmire (D-Wis.) alluded to the NRO's mission in a recent statement challenging the appointment of Lockheed Aircraft Corp. reconnaissance satellite expert James W. Plummer as under secretary of the Air Force.

In questioning Plummer's nomination on conflict-of-interest grounds, Proxmire made a pointed observation:

"Normally, the under secretary of the Air Force has jurisdiction over certain intelligence matters and sits on a special committee that directs manned and unmanned overhead reconnaissance, including spy satellite programs. These critical projects have run into the billions of dollars—money that flows to defense contractors such as Lockheed."

Plummer has been with Lockheed since 1955. The California-based firm is the principal corporate contractor in the so-called "black" reconnaissance satellite programs carried out by NRO.

From the "skunk works," as specialists describe the facility, of Lockheed spy plane developer Kelley Johnson in Nevada also emerged the U-2 and SR-71. "The U-2 was perhaps the only government spy project to have a cost under-

run and to exceed the promised performance standards," said one expert on the program. Lockheed was also the prime contractor on the C-5A, which was plagued by \$2 billion in combined cost overruns.

In addition to the conflict-of-interest issue in Plummer's appointment, congressional investigators are looking into the possibilities of overruns in the supersecret reconnaissance satellite programs under NRO's jurisdiction.

"I've never heard of one of these programs that didn't have enormous cost overruns," said one Defense Department official who has worked first-hand with some of the spy satellite operations. The opportunities for breaking cost and performance commitments are greater in spy satellite programs, this official said, because of the atmosphere of secrecy and narrow channels of accountability in which they operate.

NRO's existence is shielded from senior congressional intelligence overseers. Former high-ranking staff members of the National Security Council, who were cleared for some of the most sensitive intelligence material to reach the President's desk, acknowledged in interviews that they had not been informed about it.

"This is a black program and you're not supposed to know it exists," said one Pentagon administrator. For the past several years its supervision has nominally been in the hands of the under secretary of the Air Force. Operations and procurement have been handled through the office of the Secretary of the Air Force, according to Defense Department sources.

Its intelligence products labeled ELINT (for electronic intelligence) and COMINT (for communications intelligence) are parceled out under special code names to the government "consumers"—such as CIA or NSA. The users may get the product of the secret reconnaissance, such as monitoring of Chinese nuclear tests, or radio transmissions in the Soviet Union, without being told of the collection techniques. This is known as "compartmentalizing" of intelligence data.

Since the inception of the U. S. reconnaissance satellite program in the mid-1950s to 1970 some \$10 to \$12 billion had been spent on the spy birds, according to an estimate by aviation and space writer Philip J. Klass in his book, "Secret Sentries in Space." Since then the outlay may have grown by about \$5 billion.

Overhead reconnaissance has proven of enormous value in providing more realistic assessments of such things as Soviet ballistic missile capability, both offensive and defensive. It helped, in fact, to defuse

public anxieties over the missile gap in the early 1960s. The first publicized use of the program was to support President Kennedy's contention that the Soviet Union was installing offensive missiles in Cuba.

But congressional investigators in the unpublicized inquiries are raising questions about relationships between corporate contractors and the super-secret programs being carried out under the aegis of NRO and other military intelligence agencies.

Proxmire's concern about the Plummer appointment is one example of this. Air Force Secretary John L. McLucas came to the government from the Air Force think tank MITRE. Assistant Air Force Secretary for procurement Frank Schrantz came from Boeing.

"There has been a tendency, stronger than ever in recent months, to put executives of contractor agencies in these key positions," said one veteran Defense Department official. "Not that there is anything personally wrong with these men. But all their attitudes have been shaped by their experience working for contractors."

The late Allen Ellender (D-La.), former chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, was one of the few members of Congress privy to some of government's best kept intelligence secrets, and thubarbs.

"If you knew how much money we spend and how much money we waste in this area," Ellender said in a 1971 interview, "it would knock you off your chair. It's criminal."

Whatever that amount might be, will probably never appear in the public domain.

# U.S. Tapped Top Russians' Car Phones

By Laurence Stern  
 Washington Post Staff Writer

The U.S. government systematically monitored the limousine radios of top Soviet officials in Moscow for several years ending in 1971, according to former intelligence sources familiar with the operation.

The project, code-named Gamma Gupy, was terminated in late 1971 after some details of its operation were disclosed by columnist Jack Anderson.

A former intelligence official who had access to the transcripts of the monitored conversations in Moscow described the system as one of the most valuable intelligence pipelines the United States had in the Soviet Union.

Among the Soviet officials who were tapped by the Gamma Gupy system were Soviet Party General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, President Nikolai Podgorny and Premier Alexei Kosygin.

The top-secret operation was conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency in collaboration with the National Security Agency—the government's chief gatherer of intelligence by electronic means.

A former intelligence official who monitored the Gamma Gupy interception traffic said that the conversations revealed few major strategic secrets but "gave us extremely valuable information on the personalities and health of top Soviet leaders. But we didn't find out about, say, the invasion of Czechoslo-

vakia. It was very gossipy—Brezhnev's health and maybe Podgorny's sex life."

The CIA had built a facility a few miles from its Langley, Va., headquarters, where incoming traffic from the super-secret Moscow tap was monitored, according to knowledgeable sources.

Anderson's column, which appeared on Sept. 16, 1971, did not specify the means by which the conversations of top Kremlin officials was transmitted to Washington.

Intelligence sources here said, the Soviet limousine telephone traffic was susceptible to interception because the phones were not sufficiently "scrambled"—a technique for making spoken words snoop-proof.

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The name of the telephone tap operation is reportedly an NSA code classification indicating the priority and secrecy of the mission.

Anderson said yesterday that after his column appeared he was invited to lunch with then CIA Director Richard M. Helms and asked by Helms not to divulge the means by which the interception was made. Helms also, requested, Anderson said, that the project not be referred to again.

The columnist said his original source on the Soviet tap told him the Russians had already realized their phone traffic was being monitored.

Otherwise, he insisted, he would not have written the column. Anderson said he agreed not to mention details of the system and specifically promised Helms not to allude to the operation in his book, The Anderson Papers.

A CIA spokesman said yesterday the CIA had no comment on any aspect of the matter.

There was only one other published reference to the Moscow taps—a passing allusion in The Wall Street Journal of May 8, 1973 to the fact that "the CIA was busy monitoring the radiotelephones in Mr. Brezhnev's limousine as he sped around Moscow and out to the country for week-ends."

A former intelligence official who had access to the Gamma Gupy traffic characterized the original 1971 leak as "completely gratuitous—it served no purpose and blew our best intelligence source in the Soviet Union."

There has been widespread conjecture that the White House Special Investigations Unit, known as the Plumbers, was investigating a news leak in the fall of 1971 that compromised an important intelligence source in the Soviet Union.

White House special counsel J. Fred Buzhardt has been seeking to discourage the indictment of John D. Ehrlichman, Charles W. Cason and Egil (Bud) Krogh, all former presidential aides, on grounds that the prosecution of their cases would jeopardize national security.

Ehrlichman, testifying last June in his California trial, said the responsibilities assigned the Plumbers included the Pentagon Papers, the SALT talk leak "and the third one which had to do with the disclosure of a CIA source in a foreign country and then the fourth one, which I am not at liberty to discuss."

The nature of the third and fourth news leaks has never been officially identified.

NEW YORK TIMES

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## 40 Newsmen Reported Serving As Secret C.I.A. Informants

The Washington Star-News

WASHINGTON, Nov. 30 — The Central Intelligence Agency has about three dozen American journalists working abroad on its payroll as undercover informants, some of them as full-time agents.

After William E. Colby, Director of Central Intelligence, ordered a review of the practice two months ago, agency officials found the names of some 40 full-time reporters, free-lance journalists and correspondents for trade publications in their files as regular undercover contacts who supplied information to agents in the field and who are regularly paid for their services.

Sources said that 25 of the group were free-lance magazine writers, part-time "stringers" for newspapers, news magazines and news services, and itinerant authors. Eight

others are writers for small, limited circulation specialty publications, the sources said, and no more than five are full-time staff correspondents with general circulation news organizations who function as undercover contacts for the agency and are paid on a contractual basis.

Sources refused to identify any of the reporters involved, but it is understood that none of the five agents with full-time news organizations are regular staff correspondents of major American daily newspapers with regular overseas bureaus.

The use of foreign correspondents by the C.I.A. has been suspected for years by reporters who have worked overseas. But the suspicion has never been verifiable until

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now. The facts were made known by an authoritative source.

The continuing extent of the practice and its wide scope, which is believed to have been scaled down since the cold war tensions of the 1950's, was apparently a surprise even to Mr. Colby, who last month ordered a significant cutback in the C.I.A. relationship with journalists connected with major news organizations.

### Some Being Phased Out

No longer to remain on the agency payroll is the one category of journalist-agents whose continued existence could most seriously compromise the integrity of the American press in general and possibly cripple its ability to function overseas. This small group, the full-time staff correspondents with general circulation news organizations, is to be phased out.

It is understood that three of these agents have maintained their C.I.A. contacts without the knowledge of the news organizations involved but that the agency sideline of two others is known to their civilian employers.

Mr. Colby has approved explicitly the continued maintenance of more than 30 other C.I.A. agents abroad who are not strictly newsmen but who rely on some kind of journalistic "cover" for their intelligence operations.

### 'Stringers' to Continue

Among those to be maintained is by far the largest category of journalist-agents: a group consisting of about 25 correspondents scattered across the globe who appear to the world as magazine writers, "stringers" for newspapers, news magazines and news services, and itinerant authors. (A "stringer" is a journalist, usually self-employed, who offers news items on a piece-work basis to news organizations but does not have regular staff assignment in the stringer's city.)

Agents in this category are not regularly identified with any single publication, and most of them are full-time independent who frankly use their own presence in a foreign country as a cover for their work.

States citizens.

Most are paid directly and regularly for services rendered, but a few of these semi-independent free-lance writers occasionally draw on C.I.A. funds to pay out-of-pocket expenses for trips in which the agency had an interest or for maintaining a useful contact.

A second group of overseas correspondents whom Mr. Colby intends to keep on the payroll consists of eight writers for small, limited-circulation specialty publications, such as certain types of trade journals or commercial newsletters. It is understood that most in this group operate as paid C.I.A. informants with the approval of their employers.

Mr. Colby also intends to keep up the quint, informal relationship the agency has built up over the years with many reporters working at home and abroad and editors who for their part maintain regular contact with the C.I.A. officials in the routine performance of their journalistic duties. No money changes hands under these relationships.

In such a relationship, the reporter is free to use the information he gained in a news story and occasionally the C.I.A. agent might make use of what he has learned from the reporter. Very likely, the agency official would report the gist of his conversations with the reporter to his superiors orally or in a written memo.

In this group, sources indicated, the C.I.A. includes a Star-News reporter, Jeremiah O'Leary, whose name apparently found its way into agency files as a result of contact of this professional type during an assignment overseas for the Star-News.

Star-News editors have discussed this matter with Mr. O'Leary and other sources and have found no evidence to suggest that either he or his newspaper has been compromised.

### No Times Involvement

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 30 — On Nov. 15, Mr. Colby, the C.I.A. director, assured The New York Times, in response to a question, that nobody connected with The Times was involved with the C.I.A.