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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

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urgency assistance in the United States. Title IV provides for emergency security assistance for Israel in the amount of \$200,000,000.

This is the appropriation bill for the authorization funded in the same amount for Israel which was presented in the previous bill.

Mr. Speaker, this is a very meritorious appropriation bill which is very much needed.

Mr. Speaker, I urge adoption of House Resolution 739 in order that we may discuss and debate H.R. 11771.

Mr. WYLIE. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PEPPER. I am glad to yield to the gentleman.

Mr. WYLIE. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

On line 4 of House Resolution 739 it says "and for other purposes, all points in order against said bill are hereby waived." Do I understand the gentleman to say the authorization bill has not been passed and that the reason for this is the use in House Resolution 739 waives the rule which prohibits an appropriation before the passage of authorizing legislation?

Mr. PEPPER. The reasons why the committee on Rules waived points of order against H.R. 11771 are because: first, it contains legislation on an appropriation bill; second, reappropriations of certain funds; and third, because S. 1443, which is the foreign assistance authorization conference report, has not yet been signed into law.

Mr. WYLIE. I would just make the reservation, why do we bother to adopt rules of procedure for the House if we continue to pass resolutions which waive the rules?

Mr. QUILLEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself as much time as I may consume. Mr. QUILLEN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. QUILLEN. Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 739 is the rule which provides for the consideration of H.R. 11771, the Foreign Assistance Appropriations bill. This rule waives all points of order because there are several items in the bill which had not been authorized at the time the Rules Committee held its hearings.

The Foreign Aid Authorization Conference report has not yet been signed into law. It provides the necessary authorization for most of the items contained in titles I and II and also for the Development Bank contained in title III of the appropriations bill.

The authorizing legislation for the United Nations Environment Fund, also contained in title I of the bill, has been agreed to in conference and the conference report has been agreed to by both Houses. The other major authorizing legislation outstanding at this time is for emergency Security Assistance for Israel and Disaster Relief Assistance which are contained in title IV of the bill.

Mr. Speaker, I have no objection to the bill in order that the House may begin debate on this legislation.

Mr. PEPPER. Mr. Speaker, I move the previous question on the resolution. The previous question was ordered.

The resolution was agreed to.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

EMERGENCY SECURITY ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1973

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 11088) to provide emergency security assistance authorizations for Israel and Cambodia.

The motion was agreed to.

IN THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill H.R. 11088 with Mr. MURPHY of New York in the chair.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

By unanimous consent, the first reading of the bill was dispensed with.

The CHAIRMAN. Under the rule, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. MORGAN) will be recognized for 30 minutes, and the gentleman from California, (Mr. MAILLIARD) will be recognized for 30 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. MORGAN).

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

(Mr. MORGAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, the House has before it today a major bill which I believe to be in the highest national interest.

The purpose of H.R. 11088, the Emergency Security Assistance Act of 1973, is to help maintain a military balance necessary for the achievement of peace in the Middle East.

The bill would do this through authorizing \$2,200 million in emergency security assistance appropriations to Israel in fiscal 1974.

As Members know, an appropriations bill containing this amount will be coming up shortly and there will be more debate on this same subject. So I will keep my remarks short.

PRESIDENTIAL REQUEST

First, I will recall for you the President's request for this emergency measure in a message to the Congress dated October 19, during the Middle East crisis.

The President asked for \$2,200 million in emergency security assistance for Israel and \$200 million for Cambodia in fiscal 1974.

The President said:

This request is necessary to permit the United States to follow a responsible course of action in two areas where stability is vital if we are to build a global structure of peace.

COMMITTEE ACTION

The Committee on Foreign Affairs, to whom the legislation requested by the President was referred, received briefings on the Middle East situation from the Secretary of State, the Honorable Henry A. Kissinger, on October 29 and again on November 28.

The committee received testimony in open session on November 30 from the Honorable Kenneth Rush, Deputy Secretary of State; the Honorable William P.

Clements, Jr., Deputy Secretary of Defense; and Adm. Thomas M. Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The committee heard further testimony and received classified material in executive session on December 3.

The committee then marked up the bill in open session and ordered it favorably reported, with amendments, on December 4.

The committee vote for the bill was 33 to 1.

COMMITTEE AMENDMENTS

The committee approved three amendments.

First, the committee deleted the proposed \$200 million for Cambodia.

This action was taken in view of the conference report on S. 1443, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973, which the House and Senate passed last week. S. 1443 provided authority under which the President could draw down up to \$200 million from U.S. defense stocks for emergency military assistance for Cambodia in fiscal 1974.

Because of this, it was unnecessary to include the amount for Cambodia in the bill before us today.

The committee also required that of the \$2,200,000,000 authorized for Israel, any amounts above \$1,500,000,000 can be obligated by the President only after he makes a determination that this is in the national interest.

The President must report any such determination to Congress at least 20 days before he commits the money, with a justification for what he is doing.

The second committee amendment directs the Secretary of Defense to conduct a study relating to the effectiveness of the military assistance program as it relates to the Middle East conflict.

Congress appropriates a lot of money for foreign military assistance programs around the world every year. This bill serves the same purpose, except that it is just for Israel.

So we ought to know what we get for our money—and this is a good chance to see what our foreign assistance weapons do compared with the weapons the Soviet Union is providing to the Arabs.

The third and final committee amendment authorizes the President to pay for the United States share of the costs of the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East.

The executive branch had requested a separate authorization for this, but the committee included it in this bill since the Middle East Peace Force is part of the overall Middle East peace effort supported by this bill.

This bill seeks to promote conditions for a peaceful settlement in the Middle East and to protect Israel's security. The U.N. Emergency Force also helps toward these objectives.

The U.S. payment for the United Nations Emergency Force would come out of the \$2,200 million. The U.S. share is estimated to be \$17.3 million over the first year—about 29 percent of the total peace force cost.

NECESSITY FOR THIS BILL

Mr. Chairman, I believe Members can easily understand why we must help Israel at this critical time when peace hangs in the balance in the Middle East.

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Serious discussions are underway which could lead to a durable settlement.

But to negotiate a peace, Israel must have security. And the Arab States and the Soviet Union must be served notice that the United States will support Israel's defense, so they will not try more war instead of negotiation.

To maintain the military balance and her security, Israel needs our help.

The Soviet Union has been delivering massive amounts of modern weapons to the Arabs. Obviously the question of payments has not stopped the Soviet flow.

Israel can get equal weapons only from us. And so far, she has paid in cash or credit for all her American arms.

But Israel has suffered large war losses. Her economy has been dealt a heavy blow.

Israel already has bought nearly \$1 billion worth of military equipment from us since October 6, the outbreak of the war.

These American shipments of replacement arms have restored Israel's relative military strength to about the same as it was October 6, the committee has been told. But Soviet deliveries to the Arabs are continuing.

The Defense Department estimates that Israel may need further arms totaling somewhat more than \$1 billion, in addition to those we have already sent. This is more than Israel can afford.

What H.R. 11088 would do—in effect—would be to authorize payment for the \$1 billion worth already sent and for those additional shipments which prove to be absolutely necessary for Israel's security.

The committee approved the President's request for flexibility in deciding how much of the \$2 billion should be in grants and how much in sales credits. He needs this leeway in the changing Middle East situation. There is precedent for such authority for the President in past aid programs.

In summary, Mr. Chairman, the Foreign Affairs Committee believes there would be great reward to the United States, to the nations of the Middle East, and to the world, if permanent peace comes to this area.

For more than a quarter of a century, the Middle East has been a potential source for world conflict.

We do not want to have Soviet dominance over this strategic area.

We have an abiding special friendship for Israel.

It is in our interest to assure Israel's security—and thus to help bring about conditions for an enduring Middle East settlement.

To this end, I urge passage of this bill.

Mr. MAILLIARD. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. MORGAN), the chairman of the committee has explained the bill and what we did to amend it in the committee and there is certainly no point in my being repetitious.

Mr. Chairman, I strongly support passage of the Emergency Security Assistance Act of 1973.

This legislation is needed, not only to provide urgently needed support for Israel, but to promote conditions for negotiations leading to a durable peace in the Middle East. In my opinion, a military balance between Israel and her adversaries is a prerequisite to successful peace negotiations.

The amount requested by the President and recommended by the committee is \$2.2 billion. However, the arms requests by Israel are being carefully reviewed, and the committee has placed restrictions on the use of assistance in excess of \$1.5 billion. Sums in excess of that amount may be used only if the President determines it to be important to our national interest and reports to Congress each such determination. While we hope the full amount will not be used, the committee believes it should be authorized in case it is needed.

Recognizing the importance of maintaining the cease-fire, this legislation as amended in committee would authorize the use of funds to pay the U.S. share of expenses of the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East. The U.N. Emergency Force is essential if we are to prevent the renewal of hostilities, so that the adversaries can move ahead with peace negotiations.

I might add that the United States has a rather large stake in the success of the negotiations.

I urge approval of this legislation.

(Mr. MAILLIARD asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. ZABLOCKI).

(Mr. ZABLOCKI asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this legislation. However, I do so with certain qualifying reservations.

The bill H.R. 11088 authorizes \$2.2 billion. Of this amount, \$1 billion of this measure providing for the defense of Israel is justified to the extent that it will replace lost equipment and maintain the military power balance in the area. I hasten to add, however, that it is with intention that the balance of power thus provided will hopefully make possible negotiations for peace—not further hostilities.

As for the remaining \$1.2 billion this legislation makes available on the conditional basis of possible future need, I do not find any similar justification. I believe it is in our country's national interest to support and assist in the defense of our allies. At no point, however, was it demonstrated in the hearings that there exists any long-range requirement to use more than \$1.5 billion of these funds for additional arms. My sincere hope, therefore, is that the entire \$2.2 billion will not be needed.

As author of the amendment in the Foreign Affairs Committee to establish a limitation of \$1.5 billion and give to the President limited discretionary power over any additional expenditure, my purpose was to give the President a neces-

sary diplomatic flexibility in this delicate situation.

Nevertheless, inherent in the extension of that discretionary authority to the President were certain specific implications and guidelines.

First, that he would exercise it with extreme discretion as a means of maintaining stability in the area—not in any way which would result in renewed hostilities.

Second, from a diplomatic standpoint, that this "blank check" discretionary authority would not be exercised or interpreted as an advance commitment from the United States for any future hostilities in the area—started accidentally or otherwise.

These two guidelines regarding the \$1.2 billion discretionary authority to the President are absolutely crucial. Overriding these, however, is another even more important consideration which motivated my authorship of this amendment.

I refer to the urgent social and economic needs of the entire Mideast area. These tragic conditions of poverty and ignorance have been too long overshadowed by repeated hostilities. Indeed, economic and social conditions have worsened as already scarce resources are spent on armaments.

It is for this reason that this amendment was associated to a recommendation for the formation of a Mideast Regional Development Bank. Briefly, the purpose is that at an appropriate time the executive branch will consider requesting Congress for authorization of a portion of the unused \$1.2 billion to stimulate the creation of such a bank. This view is expressed on p. 7 in the report accompanying H.R. 11088.

Mr. Chairman, I was greatly encouraged by Secretary of State Kissinger's positive reaction to the proposal when he appeared before the Foreign Affairs Committee on November 28.

The short and long-range benefits of such a bank seem obvious: governments would be energized; resources would be better utilized; and constructive human contacts would be made.

In would, in short, represent a positive, reasonable, and promising approach to promoting the social and economic development of the entire area, thereby creating a climate for true and lasting peace.

Mr. MAZZOLI. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ZABLOCKI. I yield to the gentleman from Kentucky.

Mr. MAZZOLI. The gentleman in the well is the chief sponsor and the prime mover of one of the great pieces of legislation this House has passed and that is the war powers bill. The gentleman initiated it and is probably more familiar with the philosophy of the War Powers Act than any man in this Congress.

I would ask the gentleman two questions. First, does it concern the gentleman that in this case we are asked to pick up the pieces, in effect, to ratify action already taken by the Chief Executive?

Second, I would ask the gentleman, is there any possibility that the Presi-

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ent could commit troops to the Middle East with or without the sanction of the war powers bill?

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

(At the request of Mr. MORGAN and by unanimous consent, Mr. ZABLOCKI was allowed to proceed for 1 additional minute.)

Mr. ZABLOCKI. At the outset I want to thank the gentleman for his counsel and support of the War Powers Act and for his kind remarks. Those are very serious questions. I would say to the first question that I believe that the authorization in the bill before us indeed is seeking to legitimize the unilateral action the President took to resupply military materials to Israel. However, it does not negate the war powers bill passed earlier. After all, we have stated in the war powers bill that whenever it is in our national security interest, the President could, indeed, react. In no way was he hamstringing in U.S. diplomatic actions, even using our military forces short of committing our Armed Forces to combat in order to promote diplomatic efforts.

Further, in no way does the war powers bill authorize the President to involve our troops in any part of the world, including the Middle East.

Mr. MAZZOLI. If the gentleman will yield further, does he believe that on October 6 that the situation in the Middle East was the kind of emergency that would have triggered the President's ability to deploy American troops under the war powers bill?

Mr. ZABLOCKI. He did not on October 3 deploy troops.

Mr. MAZZOLI. No. I say, does the gentleman believe that situation was one that could have provided the President the right to deploy American troops?

Mr. ZABLOCKI. No. It would not.

Mr. JOHNSON of Colorado. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ZABLOCKI. I yield to the gentleman from Colorado.

Mr. JOHNSON of Colorado. Does the gentleman find any inconsistency with what he said to what we find under chapter 2 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, under which we are granting this aid?

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has again expired.

(At the request of Mr. MORGAN and by unanimous consent, Mr. ZABLOCKI was allowed to proceed for 1 additional minute.)

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. JOHNSON of Colorado. Section 503(d) provides:

(d) assigning or detailing members of the Armed Forces of the United States and other personnel of the Department of Defense to perform duties of a noncombatant nature, including those related to training or advice.

In this case, to send them to Israel on a noncombatant status. So the President under this situation will be given authority to send troops to the area, is that true?

Mr. ZABLOCKI. The war powers bill provides that the President may not send troops to an area of combat or to areas

where hostilities appear to be imminent. Under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973 what the gentleman says is true. Under the general authority provision of chapter 2—military assistance—the President may send training forces and noncombatant forces to any friendly country when the President determines such assistance will strengthen the security of the United States and promote world peace.

Mr. JOHNSON of Colorado. The bill provides for sending the Armed Forces of the United States to perform duties of a noncombatant nature, including those related to training or advice. Obviously a man is not a combatant until he gets into a combat situation. I am afraid that our noncombatants may become combatants in the future. We have not learned anything from our mistakes in Vietnam and we are repeating them here.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Indeed, the gentleman must know that in the recent conflict when the United States had shipped replacements for military equipment and materiel to Israel, U.S. noncombatant forces were needed and involved in Israel for logistic purposes.

Mr. MAILLIARD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. GILMAN).

(Mr. GILMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, in considering this measure before us today, the Emergency Security Assistance Act of 1973, there are several thoughts that we should bear in mind. In our quest for peace in the Middle East, it is essential that we assure Israel's ability to bargain for peace from a posture of strength, just as we have always maintained a strong defensive posture for our own Nation in order to guarantee world peace. Anything less than a totally secure military force will severely restrict and hamper Israel's negotiating power in the forthcoming Geneva peace talks.

Mr. Chairman, I call to the attention of my colleagues that Israel's initial request for military equipment was some \$3.2 billion, and of that total our Nation's military experts have already pared down some \$1 billion of that request. Our Nation has already supplied approximately \$1 billion of equipment during the October 1973 hostilities. Our Nation's aid in providing military equipment was an important factor in Israel's ability to resist aggression from all sides.

Accordingly, in considering this measure today, let us bear in mind that the proposed assistance has already been whittled down by \$1 billion, that \$1 billion has already been supplied and that in providing the \$1.2 billion that is now being sought, we are helping Israel meet its essential military needs so that it can maintain a stable defense and so that it can negotiate in a spirit of independence.

It has been estimated that close to \$9 billion of military equipment was poured into the Arab States by the Soviet Union before and during the October 1973 Middle East conflict. Those estimates

serve to further emphasize the need for additional U.S. assistance, if any semblance of balance is to be maintained in the Middle East.

Of further significance, as we consider this authorization, is the fact that this is the first time that Israel has sought outright grant assistance for military equipment purchases from our Nation. Over the past 25 years, that proud nation has purchased military equipment through our military sales program. However, the exorbitant costs of this recent conflict, which cost was equal to Israel's entire annual gross national product, necessitates its seeking grant assistance at this time.

Since Israel's birth as a nation, over 25 years ago, the United States has remained a firm supporter of this independent democratic state. These are difficult times for our ally in the Middle East. This measure is critical to Israel's very existence.

Mr. Chairman, I am proud of our Nation's staunch support of this small bastion of freedom. Despite the attempts of some nations to use oil as a political weapon in influencing our foreign policy and in the interest of securing peace in the Middle East and in the interests of Israel's very survival, I urge my colleagues to support this Emergency Security Assistance Act, H.R. 11088.

Mr. MAILLIARD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. FINDLEY).

(Mr. FINDLEY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Chairman, to the best of my knowledge the Congress has not enacted a bill of any sort since 1958 which could reasonably be interpreted as setting congressional policy towards the Middle East. The 1958 Middle East resolution is still on the statute books, but the administration has stated publicly that it no longer considers this resolution operative.

The 1958 act was a balanced resolution. To the best of my knowledge, it did not mention any State in the Middle East but, instead, set forth a declaration to support the territorial integrity and the independence of any State in the Middle East that may be threatened.

This bill will be viewed as a major policy statement by the Congress on the Middle East.

Now, what does it say? I would like to ask any Member in the Chamber now to define what an outsider might draw from the language of this bill as representing congressional policy toward the Middle East.

It mentions only one State. It deals only with military solutions to the problem. There is no reference whatever to some very laudable and, I believe, reasonably balanced and structured declarations by the United Nations, declarations to which our Government has lent support.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FINDLEY. I am glad to yield to the gentleman from New Jersey.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Chair-

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man, the gentleman has suggested that there is no broad policy statement in this bill with respect to our position in the Middle East.

I would think it self-evident that our policy position is that we want to see peace in the Middle East, that we do not consider we have enemies there, and that we feel strongly that the best way to bring peace is to see that the State of Israel has enough strength to engage in negotiations with a reasonable degree of confidence, as the gentleman from New York has suggested.

I assume the gentleman is leading up to an argument that at this stage we should be attempting to establish policy by incorporating into the bill a reference to U.N. Security Council Resolution 242.

That language was offered in committee. I think that amendment would be a senseless exercise, if I may differ with the gentleman.

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Chairman, let me ask the gentleman a question.

Does the gentleman support the term of U.N. Resolution 242, a resolution which was advanced first under President Johnson and more recently supported by the Nixon administration?

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Is the gentleman asking me for my opinion?

Mr. FINDLEY. Yes, I am.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Of course, I do, and I would assume this country continues to support that position.

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Chairman, let me make a statement in reference to that.

The administration has clearly stated its support for Resolution 242. But the point I was trying to make is that the Congress until this day has not only restrained itself from any declaration of support for Resolution 242, but is now considering a totally one-sided piece of legislation, one that could be misinterpreted by other nations.

Mr. MAILLIARD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. BUCHANAN).

(Mr. BUCHANAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BUCHANAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise only to point up the fact that in addition to the assistance for Israel that is involved in this legislation, there are also provisions to handle the funding for the emergency force formed by the United Nations to help establish and maintain the peace in the Middle East.

It was my privilege to handle this matter in the United Nations as a part of our delegation there on the Committee on Administration and Budget. We were able to obtain a broad-based agreement to which many countries became parties, in which the Soviets will participate for the first time in the funding, and in which Arabs, Israelis, East and West, are all participating and paying for this force. All permanent Security Council members will be asked to pay for this purpose at a rate 15 percent above their regular assessment rate for next year. Our share is only \$16.8 million.

Hence, Mr. Chairman, this is a matter of a few million dollars. I think it is a great bargain when we consider the billions of dollars we would have had to

spend had the war continued. I am glad that the committee saw fit to report this item and urge its approval by the House.

Mr. MAILLIARD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN).

(Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of this legislation.

I would like simply to say that I think the legislative history should indicate that there is no justification for considering this legislation as one sided.

The fact that it gives aid to Israel, that it authorizes aid to Israel, should not be interpreted as a slap at the Arab States. It is purely a continuation of a consistent policy of trying to maintain a reasonable military balance in order to prevent a conflagration.

The fact that there have been several outbreaks of hostilities already shows we have no alternative, in my opinion, but to keep a reasonable degree of strength in the hands of Israel so that she can negotiate. It is not an indication that we do not think there should be meaningful negotiations. Of course, we feel there should be negotiations soon. Passage of this bill does not mean that there should not be substantial concessions by both sides. Of course, there must be territorial concessions by Israel with respect to the occupied lands which she has held since 1967.

In my opinion, Mr. Chairman, this country has made very plain what we feel should be done. We have supported this position in the United Nations, and I assume we should not read into passage of this bill, and giving military assistance, that in some way we are repudiating the position of our own country.

I am sorry that time has not permitted a better exposition of the position in the United States, but this bill does not attempt to enunciate an up-to-date policy position with respect to the whole Middle East. Nor do I think it fair to suggest that in some way it commits us on a different basis to the defense of Israel, or that we are not recognizing the interests of the Arab countries. Of course, we are sympathetic to them and, of course, we want to see a just settlement. There will not be a lasting settlement unless it is just, and in order for it to be just it must be just in the eyes of the participating countries.

Mr. MAILLIARD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. DENNIS).

(Mr. DENNIS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. DENNIS. Mr. Chairman, this is not only a very important measure, but it is one which is, of course, exceedingly close to the hearts of many people, including many of my colleagues. I fully recognize that fact.

I think for that reason, perhaps, it is all the more incumbent on those of us who have some reservations to mention them now before it is, perhaps, too late to do so. I say that very seriously, because, of course, what we are doing here,

whatever our motives, whether we think it should be done or not, is really committing an act of war. I say that because we are financing one of two belligerents and giving them the money to buy the guns and bullets to shoot the other. That is a very risky proposition.

A lot of my friends have told me that we have another Vietnam here, but we are not really talking about another Vietnam. This is a war which could be World War III. So I think it is a very serious thing that we approach. How do you justify this measure, if you do?

I say the amendment which Mr. FINDLEY, as I understand it, is going to offer, which says that we do this not only to maintain a military balance but also in support of resolution 242 of the United Nations which looks, in the end, to an evenhanded decision and a retreat to recognized and respected boundaries, is essential. It is the only thing, in my judgment, which could possibly justify our support of this measure.

You cannot support it on a financial basis, God knows. We cannot afford voting for it on any financial basis; not another \$2,200 million outside the budget. It does not help our military situation, because we are using up our own equipment. We do not have any treaty obligation. If we are going to take sides in this situation, it seems to me the very least we can do is to say, at the same time, that we recognize that there are a lot of rights and wrongs on both sides in this situation; that territory is being held which obviously sometime—at least some of it—has to be released; that there are people who have been homeless for a quarter of a century. Some of these things have to be adjusted and in maintaining a military balance in the Near East in the cause of peace, which is the justification for this bill, we are surely doing so not only to effectuate a military solution, which in the end can be no solution at all, but, in the long run, to effectuate a solution which will be permanent because it is based on justice.

I do not think I can support this bill, but if I could do so it would have to be only with the Findley amendment, as a matter of simple conscience.

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. LEHMAN).

(Mr. LEHMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of emergency security assistance for the State of Israel. This legislation carries out the clear intent of the recent House and Senate resolutions in support of Israel which have been cosponsored by 339 Congressmen and Senators from 48 States.

#### THE MIDEAST WAR AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

The recent Mideast war represents our first confrontation with Russian expansionism since the Cuban missile crisis.

There would have been no war in the Middle East with the intervention of Soviet arms. Russia has poured huge quantities of weapons into Egypt and Syria. Within the last year alone, it is estimated that weapons valued at more

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than \$3 billion have been delivered to the Arab States.

Russia is using the Middle East as an arena for testing its most sophisticated weapons and tactics, not unlike the Nazi's during the Spanish Civil War. Captured documents prove the Russians planned in detail the Arab attack.

The Soviet Union blocked a cease-fire when the Arab armies appeared to be winning. Then they negotiated with the United States for the imposition of a cease-fire on the Israelis when the tide of battle had turned in their favor.

Suppose the Soviet-backed Arabs had won? Russia would gain clear dominance over the Eastern Mediterranean and over the major source of oil for Western Europe and Japan. They would also open the Suez Canal and gain easy access to the Indian Ocean for the Soviet Navy.

Israel's defeat would have meant the subjugation of an independent state due to the application of Soviet power. The impact of such escalating Soviet power would be devastating to the free world.

Security is based not only on the might of the opposing forces but on the perception each nation has of the might of its adversaries and its friends.

We have an understanding of sorts now with the Russians based on our mutual perception of each other's strength. When the Russians feel that we are no longer equal in strength, the understanding between us may well disappear.

This emergency security legislation is a part of America's own defense to meet the thrusts and moves of the Soviets. Peaceful coexistence can be based only on Russian realization of America's will to defend its world interests.

#### ISRAEL PAYS BACK THE UNITED STATES

As we consider this legislation to provide military assistance to Israel, we should stop for a moment and consider the valuable military assistance which Israel has provided to the United States.

It is no secret that Israel has provided the United States with the latest Soviet military equipment captured from the Arabs.

Even before this latest fighting, the Israelis provided our Nation with valuable information about Soviet military technology. Only a few years ago, the Israelis captured an entire radar station which provided us with important information on how to locate, counteract and destroy Soviet radar and to protect our aircraft.

From this new Mideast war, the Israelis have provided the United States with a number of new Soviet weapons. The value to our own military defense of having these weapons in hand is incalculable.

Let us take the capture and transfer to the United States of the Soviet SAM-6 surface-to-air missile as an example:

During the months of July and August of 1968, when the United States was involved in some of its heaviest bombing over North Vietnam, the United States lost 30 planes in 27,000 sorties or a rate of 20 planes per 18,000 sorties. This figure is comparable to the loss rate of Israel during the six-day War of 1967. In both situations, ground fire

and SAM-2's and 3's were the most sophisticated weapons faced.

With the introduction of the SAM-6 in the latest Mideast War, Israel's losses went up to 120 aircraft in 18,000 sorties. Eighty of those losses were directly attributable to the SAM-6, while many of the others were brought down during evasive action taken because of the SAM-6.

If the United States had faced the SAM-6 over North Vietnam, at the same ratio we would have lost at least four times as many aircraft. At least four times as many American pilots would have been killed and captured. In addition, many more American planes would have been made vulnerable to ground fire.

Considering the effectiveness of the SAM-6 against American-made aircraft in the Middle East war, it is clearly necessary for our Defense Department to develop countermeasures against the SAM-6.

The standard method is to create a prototype of the SAM-6 and then to experiment with possible countermeasures against it. The cost of creating a prototype of the SAM-6 has been estimated by one well-informed source to be \$150 million and at best its capabilities would only be an approximation of those of an actual SAM-6.

The Israeli capture of the SAM-6 will prove, therefore, to be of enormous value to America's defense posture, both in the development of a SAM-6 prototype and more importantly in the prevention of future American plane losses.

Another sophisticated Russian anti-aircraft weapon captured by the Israelis is the SAM-7. The capture of the SAM-7 has, for the first time, revealed the makeup of the special radar filter which controls this weapon.

Also among the weapons captured by the Israelis were certain radar-operated anti-aircraft guns which play an important role in Soviet anti-aircraft strategy.

Now, because of Israeli assistance and cooperation, the United States can learn to take those steps necessary to successfully counter the effectiveness of all of these deadly weapons—weapons which were designed to shoot down American aircraft.

In addition to anti-aircraft weaponry, the United States now has in its possession the Russian T-62 tank. The T-62 is Russia's most sophisticated tank and it operates with a new 115 mm smooth bore gun.

The Russians certainly know the value of U.S. possession of these Soviet weapons. They know that over the years Israel has destroyed or captured many billions of dollars in war equipment which could someday have been used against the United States. Perhaps the Russians will someday decide that the military cost of their support for the Arabs is too high.

The first echelon of the Russian military machine is in Egypt. The first echelon of defense against Russian aggression is Israel. Because of the superior quality of Israel's military manpower, they have traditionally needed to match the Soviet-made Arab ground equipment

only on a one to three basis—one American-made Israeli tank is a match for three Russian-made Arab tanks. And one Israeli Phantom jet is equal to five Egyptian or Syrian Mig's. When it comes to countering the power of Soviet weaponry, this is the best such bargain the free world will ever have.

Israel pays the United States back for its military assistance in many concrete ways. One of the most important ways is the direct military assistance Israel give to the United States by both destroying and capturing Soviet military equipment.

#### NATIONAL PRIORITIES AND AID TO ISRAEL

I have spoken before about the need to reorder our national priorities, to reduce military spending and to improve the quality of life in America. My belief in the necessity of a reordering of priorities stems from a review of every facet of Federal spending.

I have weighed the level and type of military spending against the social needs of this country and I continue to find that imbalances remain.

In the past I have specified three areas of defense spending where our level of expenditures can no longer be justified in the face of our national needs: First, the stationing of large numbers of American troops abroad; second, the proposed acquisition of certain major new weapons systems which would add little to our overall defense, and; third, the size of the civilian bureaucracy supporting the military. I continue to believe that reductions can and must be made in each of these areas to bring about a more equitable allocations of our Nation's resources to meet our country's total needs and requirements.

My belief in reducing military spending in these three specific areas can in no way be taken as a blanket attack on our military and on the need for a strong national defense.

Our first priority is and should always be the interest and welfare of the United States. It just happens that, to use the worn out phrase, "at this point in time," it is vital to our national defense to block with aid to Israel the attempts by the Soviet Union to achieve total domination over the oil-rich and strategically located Middle East.

#### IN CONCLUSION

Much of Israel's military losses were incurred when Israel held its forces back from launching a preemptive first strike in order to maintain American support and good will.

Recent reports now indicate that the Soviet Union has completely replaced Arab equipment losses and that Israel is again facing a fully-equipped Arab force.

Pressures are mounting on Israel to pull back from captured territories without any firm evidence that the Arabs are yet willing to recognize Israel's right to exist. Without such evidence, Israel must have boundaries which help to protect it from future attack.

Only when the Arabs publicly agree to recognize the right of Israel to exist and to renounce future war, will Israel be

able to withdraw in safety from territories occupied in recent fighting.

Lastly, let us recognize that our involvement in support of Israel is fundamentally different from our involvement in Vietnam. Vietnam will survive regardless of the outcome of the fighting in Southeast Asia. If Israel loses a war, it would be the end of the Israeli nation.

Mr. Chairman, for the many reasons I have mentioned here today, it is vital that we approve this measure to provide emergency security assistance to the State of Israel. In light of our responsibility to ourselves, our Nation and all free men throughout the world, we can do no less.

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. HAMILTON).

(Mr. HAMILTON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 11088, the supplemental aid bill for Israel introduced at the administration's request. I support this bill because I believe it is important at this time for the United States to maintain Israel's deterrent strength and to replace equipment destroyed and damaged during the October Middle East war.

The United States must take seriously its support of Israel's integrity at a time when Israel is suffering from the shocks of the recent war and from the extreme and increasing isolation it faces in the world community.

I support this legislation, however, with several reservations about its precise purpose, magnitude and the impact it may be conveying about U.S. policy in the Middle East. With the strong support for this bill in the House, I am sure many of my colleagues will state the cogent reasons for passage of the bill. It may also be appropriate for me to state several reservations that several of us feel about it, even as we vote for it.

#### POOR JUSTIFICATION OF REQUEST

My major problem with this bill is the gap between a \$2.2 billion request and the administration's justification of that large figure.

Consider the following facts which the administration witnesses gave the House Foreign Affairs Committee in testimony:

First, the military balance which existed on October 5, before the war, has already been restored by our resupply effort, which cost about \$1 billion.

Second, the additional \$1.2 billion above the already committed \$1 billion was justified on political grounds for "imponderables."

Third, although the tonnage of our resupply effort to Israel and the tonnage of the Soviet resupply effort in Iraq, Syria and Egypt are roughly equal, the heavy equipment losses in the recent war, that is, planes and tanks, were roughly four to one in Israel's favor.

#### POLITICAL INTANGIBLES.

In my view the administration, for one reason or another, offered insufficient evidence to our committee for the need of \$1.2 billion over and above the \$1 billion to pay for the war's immediate effect on Israel's armed strength.

When justification for the additional \$1.2 billion could not be made on military grounds alone, testimony was given that having made a \$2.2 billion request, it would be detrimental politically to the United States to cut the figure. The administration seemed to be saying that a lesser appropriation, say \$1.7 billion, instead of \$2.2 billion, would indicate to Israel a lessening of our commitment to it or that such an appropriation might cause havoc if the United States had to request another special appropriation during peace talks which will hopefully start December 18, in Geneva.

I disagree that a reduction in an unjustified appropriation request will show wavering support of Israel. Neither do I think that just because the administration requested \$2.2 billion for arms for Israel at the height of the war, when the duration and intensity of the war could not be gaged, that the Congress, much later and with the fighting stopped and a peace conference beginning, should feel compelled to support the administration's request.

I likewise disagree that another appropriation for military equipment next year could adversely affect peace negotiations because if there is another special aid request, it will be because peace talks have failed and hostilities have resumed.

As the Near East and South Asia Subcommittee has noted before, our aid to Israel should not be fitful and erratic. Our aid should not be based on what Arabs might think of it, but rather on our assessment of Israel's needs.

The \$2.2 billion request is so large, so poorly justified, so militantly defended by some that it frankly makes it very difficult to vote for the request even if Members, like myself, want to support Israel and assure its deterrent strength. The administration and Israel's strongest supporters should try to appreciate that most Members of Congress are committed to and want to support the reasonable defense needs of Israel, but that performances like those surrounding this request may polarize positions and produce undesirable and undeserving opposition.

#### PERMISSION

A second reservation I have with this legislation is the pessimism it conveys. The \$2.2 billion request presumably represents a paring down of an initial Israeli shopping list of about \$3.2 billion. This list was prepared in mid-October at the height of the fighting.

Imponderables did then exist. How long would the fighting last? How much would the Soviet Union continue to resupply? How much further could the Egyptians advance? How extensive are Israel's losses?

In this context, a \$2.2 billion request had merit. It told the Soviets that we mean business if its resupply effort continues to be large. It told the Arabs we remain prepared to support Israel with arms if aggressed against. It told Israel, at a time of hardship and trial, of our commitment to its integrity.

But the request's pessimism, its military emphasis, its size were based on the assumption that hostilities might con-

tinue, indefinitely, that this was no 6-day war.

Our officials, indeed all Americans, now seek to view Middle East efforts more optimistically. The Congress should do the same. Secretary of State Kissinger and President Nixon talk of the best chance for peace in 25 years. Their cautious optimism that peace talks can start, that parties can disengage, that the United States and the Soviet Union, despite many differences, can agree on the broad outlines of reducing tensions in the Middle East—these factors are part of a different political environment than the \$2.2 billion request might suggest.

#### TOTAL IMPACT OF WHAT CONGRESS IS DOING

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I am quite worried about the total message Congress is signaling these days. It is true that the United States has probably already seen the full damage this bill will cause in our relations with the Arab world; namely, the Arab oil embargo imposed only a few days after the \$2.2 billion request was made, and, according to Arab spokesmen, triggered by it. But this action, coupled with other recent actions Congress is considering these days, raises questions about whether we are taking the steps we should to create a climate conducive to successful peace negotiations.

Nor do these actions show a clear understanding that we have definite interests on both sides of the Middle East conflict, that we want to play a useful and important mediating role in helping get negotiations between the parties on track and that we want to work with the Soviet Union in reducing arms and the levels of tensions throughout the region.

Only last Tuesday, we approved the conference report on S. 1443, Foreign Assistance Act of 1973 which contained an earmarking of \$300 million in foreign military credit sales for Israel, and a \$50 million security supporting assistance item, again earmarked for Israel.

This week we will approve a foreign assistance appropriation bill of close to \$5.3 billion, over \$2.55 billion of which is for Israel—including the special emergency appropriation bill of \$2.2 billion and the earmarked foreign assistance items—and roughly \$130 million is for the Arab world. And this week we will consider the trade bill, where efforts to deny MFN status and certain credits to countries which prohibit free emigration have the overwhelming support of this body. These efforts naturally have the strong support of all Israelis, and many others, as well, who want all Soviet Jews to have the right of free emigration.

#### IMPORTANCE OF PEACE

Mr. Chairman, the United States has the best opportunity for peace in the Middle East in many years. The recent history of the Middle East can be written in terms of missed opportunities for peace. We do not want to miss again. This Congress, I know, does not want to take any action which will exacerbate the situation. I sincerely hope the actions we are now taking will not send any wrong signals to any party in the Middle East or in the Soviet Union.

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Moving toward peace in the region will involve the implementation of U.N. Resolution 338, firming up the ceasefires, and later of U.N. Resolution 242, which sets out the only agreed upon broad outlines of a peace settlement. While the language of both resolutions is vague and ambiguous, their acceptance as documents by Israel and the Arab States remains clear and unequivocal. We could support their implementation. And an expression of such support now could serve as an important signal to the parties that we want peace. I am not convinced that other actions taken can be taken by this body give a similar signal.

We have heard a great deal recently about the deplorable Arab oil embargo of the United States; certainly, the quick removal of that boycott should be a prime diplomatic objective now. U.S. relations against Arab oil States, through economic or military means, will likely not work because practically no nation will support us. Our only sure way to restore our access to Persian Gulf oil will be to demonstrate our commitment to peace with evidence that we are moving toward a just and lasting settlement of a problem that has caused untold human misery for so long.

Mr. Chairman, helping bring peace to the Middle East is the only policy we can pursue now that will guarantee both Israel's integrity and our access to oil. The price for not moving forward is an angry equation of Israel or oil—a non-starter of incomparables. H.R. 11088, in the absence of a strong commitment to a just and lasting peace, serves only a small part of our Middle East policy. I hope we in the Congress realize that fact and put this legislation in its important broader context of what we should be doing, and I think are trying to do, in the Middle East.

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. DRINAN).

(Mr. DRINAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. DRINAN. Mr. Chairman, this bill has two objectives: It will allow Israel to negotiate from strength and stability and, second, it will be a signal to Russia and to the world that the United States will abide by its commitments to protect Israel from its enemies.

It is overwhelmingly significant that in the years 1946 to 1972, according to the AID, the United States gave \$55 billion for military assistance to all the nations of the earth, and not a single dollar of that went to Israel.

Because of the disastrous military losses on two fronts in the 3-week war, Israel has estimated its needs at some \$3 billion.

Since 1970 the Soviet Union has engaged in the Middle East in one of the largest military buildups in the entire history of Russia. This bill is designed to make Israel militarily invulnerable. This grant, Mr. Chairman, is intended to make the Day of Atonement war in 1973 the war that will end war forever in the Middle East.

I urge an "aye" vote.

Mr. MAILLIARD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. WHALEN).

(Mr. WHALEN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. WHALEN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I take this time to pose a question to the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. MORGAN).

As the gentleman knows, during the past several months the administration has impounded approximately \$12 to \$15 billion in funds which have been authorized and appropriated for various health, education, manpower training, housing and environmental programs. This was done ostensibly to combat inflation. Many of the Members of this body are concerned that if we increase total authorizations and appropriations by \$2.2 billion there will be further impounding of domestic programs by the administration to keep total spending levels the same as before enactment of those authorizations and appropriations.

I wonder if the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. MORGAN) has received any assurances from the Office of Management and Budget that passage of this legislation and the subsequent appropriations bill will not involve any further impounding of funds for domestic programs?

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WHALEN. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, I remember very well that the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. WHALEN) was disturbed about this during the hearings, and he asked the Deputy Secretary of State, Kenneth Rush, the very question, and Mr. Rush answered the gentleman. But I requested a further statement from the Office of Management and Budget, and it appears in the hearings on page 29:

The Office of Management and Budget has advised us that the entire \$2.4 billion requested in this legislation can be fitted into the President's fiscal year 1974 budget ceiling. OMB estimates that the net cost to the U.S. Government of this \$2.4 billion authorization in fiscal year 1974 will be approximately \$600 million.

OMB has advised us that this legislation will not—I want to emphasize—will not force the executive branch to reduce or impound any funds previously requested under other Federal programs.

Mr. WHALEN. I thank the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. MAILLIARD. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Colorado (Mr. JOHNSON).

(Mr. JOHNSON of Colorado asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. JOHNSON of Colorado. Mr. Chairman, trying to make an objective appraisal of the Middle East situation and our policies there is the most frus-

trating situation I have encountered since coming to Washington. Emotions run so high among Americans that communication on the subject is impossible for some. If it is that way with us, it is no wonder the Arabs and the Jews cannot communicate with one another. Before commenting on the bill that is pending, I must state that I recognize the right of Israel to be an independent nation and that the United States, through several administrations, commencing with Harry Truman and coming down to the present Nixon administration, have indicated their "commitment" to the State of Israel. It must also be pointed out that the extent of the so-called commitment has never been spelled out.

I do not object to the recognition of the fact that we have unique ties with Israel. I do object to the inflammatory rhetoric, the open-ended flexible policy which leaves to a President, either this one or one in the future, the sole determination of whether or not we shall go to war in Israel. If it is my belief that whatever U.S. policy should be made clear to the world. If troops ever are to be sent, in my opinion, they must only be sent pursuant to congressional approval. And if that is required in advance, then the treaty making process should be gone through. We must not allow ourselves to be brought into a shooting war through a step-by-step miscalculation which we seem so prone to do.

Now to an analysis of H.R. 11088. There is so much obfuscation on the part of the administration with respect to the situation in the Mideast that one finds it difficult to even comment. The positions which the administration takes are conflicting, inconsistent, and misleading. It is impossible to tell what our policy really is, and it is impossible to predict what our future course of action will be. This leaves us in exactly the kind of position of which I am the most afraid—that is, with unlimited authority in the executive branch to involve us, or not, at its discretion.

Let me give you just a few examples of the infuriating cloud of nonfacts with which we are supposed to deal and to make critical decisions with.

It is clear that the United States delivered approximately \$1 billion worth of material from our Defense Department inventories to Israel since October 6, 1973, the date the war started. This equipment was delivered under the Foreign Military Sales Act, which requires payment within 120 days after delivery. But it is also clear from the statements of William B. Clements, Deputy Secretary of Defense, that it is the judgment of the Defense Department that they cannot pay us in 120 days. That is the reason for the bill, H.R. 11088, which will leave to the President whether or not the funds authorized will be used to provide grants or credits. The weapons have been delivered, and more shall be delivered, pursuant to an act which requires that they be sales, but our evaluation of the Israeli economy is that they cannot afford to make the payments now. They may never be able to afford to make the payments,

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and therefore, Congress is being asked to provide authority to retroactively make the deliveries in the form of grants if necessary.

Now this is done because the Defense Department must be repaid for delivery so that it can replenish its inventory, which has been depleted. But it is going to cost more than the \$1 billion to replenish the inventory since we are replacing old equipment with new equipment. Mr. Clements refused to give an exact amount, but used the figure of \$250 million between what the equipment cost to Israel versus what it is going to cost us to put it back in our defense inventory.

Let me summarize to this point. Israel asked for a total of \$3 billion. The administration comes to the Congress for \$2.2 billion—\$1 billion of which has already been delivered, pursuant to an act which requires cash payment within 120 days, which the Defense Department acknowledges is a burden on the Israeli Government which it cannot in all probability meet. We do not know what the ultimate cost will be, and we do not know what the ultimate requirement will be.

We say we are doing this to maintain the balance of military power in the area, but the net assessments of the losses are not finished, and we do not know exactly how much we need to send in. We say we want to maintain a balance which will prevent the Soviet Union from moving into the area, but by adopting a policy of unlimited resupply of Israel, are we not driving the Arab States into the Soviet Bloc? As Mr. ZABLOCKI said at the hearings,

My concern is that the presentation today does not really give us the necessary substantive information with which we can intelligently consider the proposal and report the bill to the Floor of the House and defend the request.

Mr. Rush said at the hearings that we cannot allow the Soviet Union to take over the Middle East by our refusing to assist Israel to have a balance of military power with those countries supplied by the Soviet Union. But by continuing to supply Israel without limit, we force the other countries to turn to the Soviet Union and once again, our policy results in accomplishing exactly the opposite of what we say we want to do.

Israel's per capita debt is probably the highest in the world. Their economy is such that they cannot sustain a protracted war. Are we doing them any favors when we provide them with enough arms to continue to hold the ground obtained during the 1967 war, which was the direct cause of this latest war? At the time of the hearings, we did not know the capability of the Egyptian and Syrian armies after the Russian resupply. We specifically did not know whether it was equal to or beyond the capabilities of October 6, 1973 when the war commenced. But nevertheless, we are asked to give the President a blank check with which to do as he pleases. Why are we not given the information so that we can make the decision?

We know that for every ton of material delivered to Israel, it costs us 3½ tons of fuel. That means that if we have de-

livered approximately 100,000 tons of material to Israel, it has cost us 350,000 tons of fuel. How much fuel will be burned under the authority granted to the President by this act? We do not know.

Congressman FINDLEY stated at the hearings,

I would like to know how much energy approximately was required to manufacture what was supplied, how much will be required to manufacture and deliver the items that are contemplated in this authorization. This is a \$2 billion bill and there surely are some yardsticks that can be used to determine what the price tag is so that we will go into this with our eyes open and be able to answer questions on the Floor.

The information was furnished but it was classified so it is not available to the public.

The Office of Management and Budget has repeatedly said this year that any additional expenditure beyond the President's original budget request in January would result in busting the budget. In response to a question from Congressman WHALEN, we got this response.

OMB has also advised us that this legislation will not force the Executive Branch to reduce or impound any funds previously requested for other Federal programs.

Why not, when every other request is regarded as a budget buster?

In response to a question about the potential of whether or not our troops will be involved, the answer was deferred to executive session and so there is no assurance on the record that American troops will not be involved. We do know that American troops were placed on the alert during the latest crisis and this just 2 or 3 days after assurances that they would not be sent into the Mideast.

Mr. Chairman, once again I want to reiterate that the rhetoric being used to justify this is totally irresponsible and dangerous. Let us define our commitment to Israel in terms which the whole world will know and recognize. If it is the decision of the Congress to send in troops, let it be known in advance exactly what the conditions are that will result in American troops being sent in. If we are to give unlimited supplies of aid to Israel to help them in the fight against our friends, the Arabs, let us let that be known also. If there to be any strings attached to the aid we give to Israel, let that be known.

I do not believe any one person has a solution or an answer to this problem. Obviously, there are inequities on both sides. The Palestinians must be pacified, if possible. Jerusalem must be made an open city so that all can go and worship, and Israel must be recognized as a nation which has a right to have secure boundaries and which is not facing extermination. The Arab nations have come a long way in acknowledging the latter fact.

Mr. Chairman, we will make a grave mistake if we continue to alienate the Arabs and drive them into the Soviet bloc and continue to provide aid to Israel under terms which inevitably can lead us to a commitment of our forces. I am willing to abide by the collective wisdom of Congress if a true debate is held after serious consideration is given by the

Membership of the Congress. Even a cursory examination of the hearings show that the Foreign Affairs Committee did not give adequate attention to the legislation. There were limited number of witnesses and they all urged the administration position—the blank check options open, flexible negotiation, attitude which has cost us so dearly in the recent past in Southeast Asia.

Mr. Chairman, I am begging the Members of this Congress to act on their own rather than follow blindly the path of potential catastrophe.

Mr. MAILLIARD. Mr. Chairman, have no further requests for time. I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. STRATTON).

(Mr. STRATTON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, I take this time because I had the privilege a couple of weeks ago of being the chairman of a 22-member Special Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services that visited both the Israeli and the Egyptian sides of this war, and is now in the process of filing a report on our findings, both a classified one and a non-classified one.

We came back with the primary impression, I think, that there is a real opportunity for peace in the Middle East after talking with both Prime Minister Meir and President Sadat. We concurred with Secretary of State Kissinger that the opportunities for a genuine settlement in the Middle East are better today than they have been at any time in the past 20 years.

Some people had raised the question as to whether this legislation, if they support it, is going to upset that peace agreement. I do not think it is, for a very plain and simple reason. First of all, people have said this bill would be a war-supply bill. But let me point out, half of the \$2.2 billion has already been supplied to Israel. This measure is primarily designed just to pay for the weapons that were furnished to them at a very critical time in the fighting.

Secondly, as has already been said, this bill will make peace more possible simply because it is designed to reestablish a military balance between the competing forces in the Middle East.

The reason we have a détente today—whether the Members like it or not—with the Soviet Union is that we have previously reached a military and a nuclear kind of stalemate with them, and we have to maintain that stalemate if we are also going to maintain the détente. The same is true in the Middle East; and we have got to make sure that the supplies we send match the supplies that have already gone to the other side. When we achieve a real balance, those supplies will not need to be used; they will instead deter a new conflict, we hope.

Finally, we have to remember, as has also been said earlier during this debate, that to get a peace settlement, there is going to have to be some territorial adjustment on the part of Israel. There are

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ing to have to be territorial concessions. And surely if as a result of such settlement some of the "buffer zone" is going to be taken away from Israel, do not we have to be even more concerned that she has enough of the weapons needed to deter attack or defend herself such an attack should come?

I believe this bill will be a positive contribution to a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, and I believe it deserves to be adopted on that account.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. WOLFF).

(Mr. WOLFF asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. WOLFF. Mr. Chairman, I rise to reiterate my support for the \$2.2 billion emergency assistance to Israel. As a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, I have heard a wealth of testimony, particularly from our own State Department officials, which confirms my contention that this support for Israel is essential in terms of our own security as a nation. Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Rush told us that the \$2.2 billion is critically needed "to counterbalance the heavy flow of sophisticated Soviet weapons to the Arab world." Captured documents brought to our attention not only confirm the massive influx of Soviet assistance, but indicate that the Soviets actually mapped out the Arab offensive, copying the fire plans, the plans for crossing the canal and those for determining which fields would be mined. It is known that the Soviets began their lift to the Arabs the day before the war started—further indication of Russia's involvement in the Arab offensive. The Soviet Union has encouraged other Arab nations to support the Egyptian-Arab aggression and has served to aggravate hostilities in the Middle East since the 1950's. It is known that since early 1971, the Soviets have directed the Egyptian and Syrian armies and air force, have trained Arab pilots and officers and have provided the sophisticated technology and material necessary to advance Arab military strategy. It is estimated that the Soviet Union has 1,000 military and other technicians in Egypt and 2,000 so-called technicians in Syria. In short, quoting from the official Egyptian daily, Al-Ahram, "The Soviet Union has proved until the last moment that she is a loyal friend—to the Arab world"; the question we must ask ourselves today is what does this loyalty and commitment on the part of the Soviet Union mean, not so much in terms of the security of Israel, for the answer to that is obvious, but rather, in terms of our own national security.

Every move made by the Soviet Union in the Middle East corroborates the fact that the Soviets strongly desire to have a controlling influence in this strategically important area of the world. Russia wants control over the Suez Canal to allow Soviet naval might to be projected in the Indian Ocean. This would upset the balance in the subcontinent and place the Soviets in a posi-

tion to bully the subcontinent nations into agreement with Soviet policy. It would turn the Mediterranean Sea and the Persian Gulf into Russian lakes wherein U.S. influence and security would be seriously undermined. Admiral Moorer in a meeting with the Foreign Affairs Committee made this point. In the early 1950's, the U.N. Security Council passed a resolution declaring Israel's right to free passage in the Suez Canal. The resolution was ignored by Egypt with Soviet support. Similarly, Egypt ignored the understanding negotiated by Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld that Israel would have free access to the Straits of Tiran, as a condition upon Israel's withdrawal from Sharm El-Sheikh in 1957. In 1967, President Nassar, again with Soviet backing, proclaimed a blockade of the straits, one of the factors which led to the outbreak of hostilities in 1967. The recently passed U.N. Resolution 242 again affirms Israel's right to free passage through international waterways; and the resolution has been virtually ignored by the Soviet-Arab alliance.

Russia also seeks to use the Middle East as a steppingstone to achieve domination over Africa with its vast supply of critically needed natural resources. Most important, the Soviets would like to gain further control over Arab oil policy. If Russia's hand were on the oil spigot, according to Secretary Sisco, "such control would serve to restructure the carefully established balance of power in the world" and leave the United States and its European allies in a measurably disadvantaged strategic position. Such a situation could also lead, as a matter of course, to a breakdown of the Atlantic Alliance which, for the last three decades, has been the key to the security of the free world. We have already begun to see the beginnings of such a breakdown in the face of the Soviet-influenced Arab oil boycott.

If the Soviet Union were truly interested in détente with the United States, they would be exercising their influence to join, rather than impede, efforts to calm the situation in the Middle East. Instead, they have been fomenting instability and using the Arab States as a testing ground for their most advanced military weapons, providing to Egypt and Syria weaponry not available to their most trusted satellites of Poland and Czechoslovakia.

If the Soviets were interested in peace, they would be seeking to foster negotiations that would lead to a durable peace in the Middle East. Instead, we note their callous attitude toward UN resolution 242, the stated goal of which is the establishment of a just and lasting peace in which every state in the area can live in security. The resolution, which Israel has agreed to, as have all nations in the UN, calls upon Israel to relinquish certain territories but recognizes the importance of "secure and recognized boundaries" for Israel's survival. The Soviet Union has tried repeatedly to pressure Israel into relinquishing all territories, a demand which both the UN Security Council and the General Assembly have rejected as asking the impossible.

We might also note the double standard inherent in the Soviet demands upon Israel. They call upon Israel to relinquish all territories because the Soviets supposedly support the principle that the acquisition of territory by war is inadmissible. Yet, the Soviet Union, I must remind, holds a substantial amount of territory acquired in recent times by war from Poland, Finland, Rumania, Japan, and other states.

In 1967, the UN attempted to avert a conflict in the Middle East after Nassar, with Soviet support, moved substantial Egyptian forces into the Sinai, reoccupied the strategic and previously demilitarized Sharm El-Sheikh and blockaded the Straits of Tiran. The UN attempt failed because of the Soviet Union, which seemingly would rather embrace war than risk losing any of its growing influence in the Middle East. When war did break out on June 5, 1967, the Soviet Union again blocked attempts by the UN to permit a cease-fire on the first day of war. Instead, the Soviets tried repeatedly to get through a resolution proclaiming Israel as the aggressor in that war. Each time they failed.

If the Soviets were interested in expanding relations with the United States, if they were truly committed to the avowed détente, they would not now be encouraging the Arab oil producing states in hostile, improper acts of blackmail against the United States. If we succumb to Soviet pressure tactics in this instance, if we renege on or weaken our support for Israel, we ultimately place our own national security in serious jeopardy. We also leave ourselves vulnerable to hostile tactics that can be used by any other nation which has the ability to withhold from us essential materials, and the repeated use of illegal pressure tactics by the Soviet-Arab alliance.

Now that we have ascertained the extent and intensity of Soviet involvement in the Middle East, the question may arise as to whether the full \$2.2 billion is necessary to insure Israel's security and defense against the powerful Soviet-Arab bloc, and thus insure our own security against further Soviet expansion in and control over the Middle East. In September 1973, our State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research brought to our attention the extent, in dollar figures, of Soviet assistance to the Arab world. During an 8-year period, between 1964 and 1972, Egypt and Syria received in excess of \$6 billion from the Soviet-Communist alliance. From June 1967 to October 5, 1973, the Soviets supplied the Arabs with 3,900 tanks, including 1,000 tanks just 1 month prior to the outbreak of the current conflict. In the midst of the war, between October 16 and November 8, the Soviets supplied an additional 1,500 tanks. They have replaced all Egyptian and Syrian losses which includes over 1,000 tanks in this resupply count. By contrast, the U.S. has supplied Israel with 200 to 250 tanks. In addition, the major portion of the \$1 billion already sent to Israel was for so-called "expendable" items—ammunition that has already been exhausted. In fact, it has been said that during the heavy fighting, ammunition received by Israel

to the morning would be completely used up later that same evening.

The \$2.2 billion we are considering today is desperately needed, not only for replacing the expendable items like ammunition, but for essential heavy equipment like tanks which were extensively used. We have been told in the past that war in the Middle East could change the concept of modern day warfare, that ground weaponry like tanks would no longer be useful. Yet, strangely enough, ground weapons, tanks and the like, proved the deciding factor in the current conflict. As an example, back in 1970, the Soviets emplaced the most advanced type of missilery beside the Suez Canal—a fact which, by the way, it took our intelligence at that time a very long 10 days to recognize. As a result of the emplacement of these missiles, the Israeli Air Force was neutralized and crossing of the Canal by the Egyptians was rendered possible. The Israelis have successfully employed two methods for knocking out these missiles: one, by Kamikaze-type air attacks and two, the method which was found to be the most effective against ground to air missiles, attack by ground weapons; namely, tanks.

The State Department's intelligence report on the financial resources available to the Arab world ended on the note:

The figures in the magnitude of billions available to the Arabs indicate how slight in comparison are the millions of dollars . . . to aid in Israel's development.

Along with the administration, I again stress the importance of the \$2.2 billion as security and defense against the concerted build-up of power by the Soviet Union in this strategically vital area of the world, a build-up which I have attempted to outline above only in its smallest dimensions.

Our policy in the Middle East has wisely recognized the importance of Israel's security in relation to our own ultimate national security. The \$2.2 billion we are considering today is in keeping with that policy of maintaining the "balance" that has existed in the Middle East. I urge my colleagues to support the Emergency Security Assistance Act in the interests of the security of the United States.

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Nix).

(Mr. NIX asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. NIX. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of H.R. 11088.

Mr. NIX further addressed the Committee. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.]

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from New York (Mr. BRASCO) such time as he may consume.

(Mr. BRASCO asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BRASCO. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 11088. In recent weeks a school of thought has emerged in the United States which seeks to abrogate or water down America's commitment to Israel. They would have America act toward that little democracy as France

and Britain behaved toward Czechoslovakia in the late 1930's. If these elements in American life succeed, we will be doing the same kind of harm to ourselves now as those other two nations did to themselves 35 years ago.

Above and beyond moral obligations and longstanding policies, we have a strategic requirement demanding American resupply and rearming of Israel as swiftly and generously as possible.

H.R. 11088 presently before the House provides emergency security assistance authorizations for Israel. The amount sought is \$2.2 billion in either emergency military assistance or foreign military sales credits. I endorse this measure wholeheartedly and urgently, fervently hoping the overwhelming majority of Members of Congress will feel and act similarly.

From the first moments of her existence as a free nation, Israel has been under military assault, or has had that threat hovering over her entire span of national life. To the credit of her people, this has not led to a garrison state mentality. Instead, Israel's devotion to democratic principles and individual rights has thrived and grown despite an understandable temptation to erode such a commitment. How many nations, including those sworn to destroy her and their allies, can make such a claim?

For this very underlying reason, Israel has been in tune with American ideals, and has grown stronger because of our own commitment. Her people fight because of a desire to be free, rather than on behalf of a desire to conquer and subject others.

As a result, she poses a danger to totalitarian regimes and their client states everywhere. The "third world," torn by strife and evolving before our eyes, can see in Israel a choice between dictatorship and socialist-oriented democracy. The Arab States, unwilling to tolerate a free Israel in their midst, have found a willing patron in Russia, which has other goals in mind in that vital area of the world. Here is where America's geopolitical necessity comes into play. If we ignore or misinterpret Israel's role and goals, we will injure our own best interests by shortchanging the Israelis in a time of crisis.

The Communist rulers of Russia are inheritors of foreign policies of the Romanoff czars. Among goals they have in common down through history has been a desire to obtain warm water ports and to dominate narrow strategic gateways controlling so much of the world's commerce.

Control of such narrow straits and geopolitical linchpins brings with it military dominance as well. The Dardanelles, Suez Canal, Straits of Gibraltar, Bab-el-Mandeb, and the Straits of Tiran are perfect examples of such locations.

Much of the Middle East embroglio revolves around who shall control a short passage to Asia from the Mediterranean. Russia is now a first rate naval power, seeking to use her sea arm to extend her reach around the world. In order to be militarily effective, that growing fleet must be able to move to critical areas swiftly. This means either control of or

easy access to such strategic geographical linchpins of the world. Russia seeks to be able to move her Black Sea and Mediterranean fleets through the Suez Canal to the Indian Ocean in order to present an overwhelming military presence in and around the entire periphery of the Indian Ocean. This is why Brezhnev was recently in India, again salvaging the Indian economy with more Russian aid.

Soviet Russia's rulers envision, and perhaps correctly so, an eventual and inevitable confrontation with an increasingly powerful China. Already their long mutual land frontier bristles with armaments, front-line troops and the faint odor of physical clashes. Russia seeks to dominate the subcontinent, outflanking Communist China, a situation the Chinese rulers anticipate and view clearly. In this way, the Kremlin's masters believe they will seize China in a crushing military vice from which she cannot escape. This was one reason China welcomed our attempts at rapprochement.

Russia must obtain control of the Suez Canal, or at least have a complaisant and cooperative regime astraddle of the waterway. Egypt, indebted to Moscow for military aid against Israel, fills such a bill amply.

Simultaneously, Russia still sees eventual world domination. She reminds me of a paroled burglar, proclaiming her conversion and reform, strolling down a hotel corridor turning every door knob to see if any rooms are accessible. Whether her motives are complex, a present primary one is control over Middle East oil, to deny or control access to it to the West and to guarantee it for her own eventual use.

If the present Soviet diplomatic and military drive succeeds, we shall be shut out of that entire area of the world. Israel is rendered impotent in a geopolitical sense, there will be no effective counterweight to Russian influence. Once the Kremlin becomes master of Suez and Middle East oil, the world strategic balance tips decisively against the United States, setting the stage for dramatic Soviet adventurism which will only lead to further, and certainly more dangerous confrontations.

Appeasement of the Arabs and the Soviet patrons would be as useless as a sterile policy as was a similar attempt in another era.

Have we learned nothing? Has the siren song of "détente"—that pernicious word, so sapped our capacity to realize that it will allow us to guarantee our destruction? Do we really believe Russians have, like Paul on the road to Damascus, had a blinding vision and a accompanying change of heart? Nothing could be more of an exercise in self-delusion. The nations betraying Czechoslovakia to Hitler made themselves believe Germany would be satisfied with just that much and no more. We all call the drama played out in Prague under Alexander Dubcek. How then we delude ourselves today?

If further proof were required, examine the entrails of the recent Middle East war. Russia knew about the Arab surprise attack well ahead of time. Her resolute effort by sea was keyed to start arriving

two nights after the Arabs attacked. The very quality and quantity of material supplied should tell us something. Turning aside talk of détente and rapprochement with the West, the Soviet Union plunged all out into the latest Arab attempt to destroy Israel. She even indicated a desire to insert her own military forces into the struggle. Mention has even been made of nuclear weapons being brought from Russia to Egypt. Even if that is untrue, the recklessness of such a total policy is both breathtaking and appalling.

Western Europe, guarded by American military might and inexplicably incapable of learning from the past, has totally capitulated to the Arab boycott. To them, with the exception of the Dutch, all honor to them, oil is more important than principle, morality, compassion and elementary decency. Leading the pack are those two familiar betrayers of the Czechs, France and England. Daladier and Chamberlain would feel right at home with Pompidou and Heath.

These people possess a coterie of sympathizers in this country, echoing their cry that we must support a sellout of the Israelis because they have such a nasty habit of defending themselves against those sworn to destroy them. It is just not done in our crowd, Reggie, old boy.

They bleat on about refugees, ignoring Arab treatment of Jews in Arab lands and cynical exploitation of Palestinians by their brother Arabs. To them, the discredited, one-sided United Nations is the answer. Actually, it is the chosen instrument to deal Israel further blows.

International promises are as worthless as international organizations. Noble in concept they may be, but incapable of execution in time of crisis they also certainly are. Israel needs more tangible means of insuring her survival. And she must survive. Why?

Because she is a counterweight to Russian influence in the entire Middle East. Because she helps create a balance, along with Iran and other non-Communist regimes, to radical, pro-soviet Arab governments, whose instability is matched only by their propensity for violence. For example, let us reflect upon treatment of Jews in Arab countries, violent anti-Semitism of King Faisal and the incredibly brutal and barbarous butchery of Israel prisoners of war by the Syrians.

Israel is a beacon, an alternative, and refuge for Third World elements seeking a choice. She is a staunch friend of the United States, and a dependable one in an area of the world where stability is at a premium. She is an ace in the game for strategic domination of that crucially important part of the world; a deadly game we must maintain a viable presence in or lose out entirely.

For these as well as humanitarian reasons, we must act favorably regarding the \$2.2 billion. Can there be any doubt of the eventual fate of Israel's people if she ever really lost a war? How many of us would wish to share in the responsibility of the aftermath of such a situation. Does this not occur to Arab apologists here? Evidently not.

Israel must have the full \$2.2 billion in American weapons aid, and she must have it all soon. We have it in our power to grant that urgent request. We must act with dispatch.

In closing, let me return once again to Czechoslovakia and those who betrayed her sovereignty to Adolph Hitler. To this day, that group remains an abomination in the eyes and memories of decent people everywhere and the deed they perpetrated stands as a hallmark for deceit, ignobility, cowardice, and betrayal. It need not have been thus. They had a choice; so do we.

Mr. KASTENMEIER. Mr. Chairman, over the years, like other Americans, I have supported both the creation of the State of Israel and her aspirations for peace and recognition of her right to exist. Clearly, we must all be pleased that real progress is now being made to secure a permanent resolution to the Middle East conflict. However, I do not believe that the legislation currently before the House serves the interests of peace in the Middle East. Rather, in my view, the effect of this legislation is to provide more fuel to fan the flames of war.

The Emergency Security Assistance Act operates on the premise that the only way Israel can know security is by literally building a bristling fortress surrounded by the hostility of the Arab people. We have seen the Arab nations turn to the Soviet Union as the source of their own military security. The Middle East provides testimony to the fact that providing absolute military security for one nation in turn fosters absolute insecurity for its neighbors. The arms race perpetuated by the United States and Russia in the Middle East, including increasingly more sophisticated and devastating weaponry, can only result as the recent war has shown, in continued tensions and, ultimately, in more death and destruction.

Mr. Chairman, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger expressed a hope which I share when he said:

We hope that Israel, as well as the Arab countries, will recognize that one of the clear consequences of the recent events is that a purely military solution to the problems of the Middle East is impossible.

Yet, this legislation recognizes only military needs, and seems to contemplate only military solutions.

I have long felt that the United States ought not to encourage the perpetuation of war, with the accompanying death and destruction, by sending arms and other military assistance to foreign countries, whether it be to Israel, the Arab nations, or Southeast Asia, and my voting record has been consistent on this issue. I cannot, therefore, in good conscience, support this bill.

Mr. Chairman, I firmly believe that it is in the best interest of Israel, the Arab countries, and the United States, for us to devote our major energies to finding a permanent solution to the Middle East problem so that the people in that part of the world will finally be able to live in peace. The founding father of the State

of Israel, David Ben-Gurion, made the observation some time ago that—

Real peace with our Arab neighbors—mutual trust and friendship—that is the only true security.

This is the goal all concerned parties must strive for. This is the goal not served by this legislation.

Mr. Chairman, I would like at this point to include with my remarks an article by Arthur Waskow which appeared recently in the New York Times. Mr. Waskow has made a compelling argument for finally coming to terms in the Middle East, and I commend his comments to the attention of my colleagues:

[From the New York Times, Nov. 24, 1973]

A TIME FOR TERMS IN THE MIDEAST

(By Arthur Waskow)

WASHINGTON.—It is time for the Israeli Government and the American Jewish establishment to pay attention to some of us Jeremiahs.

Since 1967, a small band of American and Israeli Jews have been warning that the Meir Government was trundling down a road to disaster, endangering Israeli security by seeing that security in the narrowest military terms. We saw the Israelis' arrogance, born out of victory, and the Arabs' hysteria, born from defeat, reinforcing each other; no justice offered from either side, no security won on either side.

Sometimes, full of hope, we preached justice—arguing that Israel and the Palestinians owed each other the fraternal recognition of another oppressed nationality and the political recognition of a self-determining Palestine alongside Israel. Sometimes, full of foreboding, we have warned Arabs that Israel could strike at them still more harshly, and have warned Israel that incompetence, self-glorification and self-deception would not forever dominate the Arab governments; that world-wide popular and diplomatic support for Israel's military outlook were eroding; and that Israel's deepening internal social divisions could only be dealt with if a stable peace were achieved. In both modes, the call for justice and the warning of disaster, we said that Israeli arrogance—expressed in the holding and slow incorporation of Sinai and the West Bank—was wasting time that could be used to secure a stable peace; and that Arab hysteria was preventing evolution within Israel.

Slowly—much too slowly—the Arabs have grown out of their hysteria. (The danger now is that they will fall over into arrogance.) But the Israeli and American Jewish establishments have been even slower to change. When we preached justice, they dismissed us as soft-minded relics of the old "galut" mentality, self-hating Jews devoid of pride in the new Israeli power. And when we warned of the long-term security "problems" facing Israel, they dismissed us as harebrained analysts who did not understand the power of modern technology and organization to win round after round of war.

In truth, it was the Israeli Government that was harebrained. It thought of the Arabs as tortoises, and would not heed our reminders that the tortoise sometimes wins the race if the hare gets arrogant.

Now, like Jeremiah we can only mourn at how correct we were. Look at the situation now: Arab oil boycotts bearing down on a Western Europe, America, and Japan already frightened by the "energy crisis." American power distracted by an internal agony over national identity and purpose that began in the sixties and is simply continuing in Watergate, and will not end there. Hostility between Western and Russian immigrants and Oriental immigrants to Israel—hostility

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over housing and public services, and over communal dignity, that cannot be eased so long as 40 per cent of Israel's gross national product is spent on the military. The erosion of non-Jewish support for Israel as the remnant of the holocaust, amid growing doubts of the justice of a permanent occupation of the Palestinian west bank and Gaza and of the Egyptian Sinai. The beginnings of articulate criticism among young American Jews of blind financial and political support for an arthritic Israeli bureaucracy and policy—even as these same young American Jews create stronger and stronger ties to real live people and communities in Israel.

The Meir Government's policy has led Israel into this moment of danger. But it can become a time of opportunity, if Israel will see it as a moment for making the claims of justice and security coincide. At this moment Israel is still militarily superior, though not triumphant; still has strong support from American Jews and the U.S. Government; still faces moderate politics among the west bank Palestinians and weakness in Egypt; still has not descended into a domestic kulturkampf. From now on, delay will weaken Israel.

That is, delay will weaken Israel unless the Arab governments and particularly the Palestinian nationalist leadership continue to pose unjust demands. If they do, Israel will in desperation coil itself even tighter, bolder, committed to strike first at any danger and to rule the Middle East, regardless of the consequences to freedom and justice.

So this is the moment, maybe the last when both sides can offer decent terms. For example, the Palestinian leadership and the Arab states should recognize Israel within the 1967 pre-war boundaries as a fully legitimate state, and extend to it such normal rights as free access to the Suez Canal; Israel should offer to return to those boundaries on two conditions: the demilitarization under effective international inspection and control, of all the territories Israel occupied from 1967 till the 1973 war; and an Israeli-Palestinian condominium over the old city of Jerusalem. Israel and the Arab states should jointly sponsor and guarantee an independent, neutral, and demilitarized Palestine on the west bank and in Gaza. Israel and the Arab states should agree to accept no military aid or advisers from any of the great powers, and the powers should agree to give them none.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, we have today a question to decide that I approach with the greatest reluctance. A vote can be a cruel thing: You cannot vote "yes, but" or "no, however." There are only two lists of names, and one of them is "yea" and the other is "nay." There may be principles and counterprinciples, pressures and counterpressures, and whichever way you turn you may see more unfortunate consequences than fortunate ones, but the time still comes when you have to choose. I have chosen to vote against this legislation—a painful decision but I believe a necessary one.

I am faced with two principles that seem to some people to be in open contradiction. First, I came to Congress utterly committed to peace, and if I am not doing that, I should not be here. As an American and a human being, I want this country to stand for the possibilities of life and freedom, not power and death. I also want Israel to survive, to flourish, and to live in security and peace with its neighbors. This is not in contradiction to the first principle; it is a consequence of it. Israel's only future lays in peace.

The basic fact is, these two principles are in contradiction only if we make them so. Only if we consider that the only way to help Israel and the people within its borders is through more and more weapons, through reliance on force—only if we turn our back on a positive policy of economic assistance for the entire area that would remove the causes of war—only then do we set up an opposition between peace and Israel. Only if we take over the Nixon administration's automatic assumption that the only alternatives are war or abandonment does the willingness to vote for arms become the ultimate test of fidelity to Israel.

But these are not the only choices, and my vote today is a protest against reducing the issue to just those barren and nonproductive terms. I vote today to break the cycle, to move discussion up to a creative strategy that will help the Middle East, not just to a higher level of armed instability, but to a situation where the capacities of all the peoples in the Middle East can be used for something else besides this insane war.

There will be many, I fear, who will interpret this vote as indicating some lack of concern for Israel. This is unfortunate. Nothing is further from the truth. If this were the only act of my congressional career that had to do with Israel, perhaps such an interpretation might be justified. But I know that there are other ways to help Israel other than—ever-increasing grants of military aid—I have worked for them in the past and I will continue to work for them in the future. It is my profound conviction that I am working for them today, by rejecting an illusion that our only duty to Israel is just to send off a shipment of arms so that the Israelis and the Arabs can kill each other more efficiently.

I have studied the actual situation in the Middle East, and I have come to a conclusion that to claim that Israel's survival depends on these arms alone and this vote alone is not fact. There is the same balance of weaponry now as existed before the war. Even if the current level were not enough, I feel assured that the Defense Department and the President would find a way to get Israel more weapons—with or without congressional authorization.

If I was ever convinced that Israel's survival depended on an immediate shipment of arms, or upon a single vote, I would fight for it strongly. I do think that Israel's long-term survival does depend on vigorous economic assistance, coupled with a realistic diplomatic strategy that will lay the groundwork for lasting security and lasting peace.

Because of my belief in the importance of our responsibilities in this area, I intend to visit both Israel and the Arab countries next month, to learn as much as I can firsthand about the situation. I hope to come up with some suggestions that will substantiate my profound conviction that there exists creative solutions to the Middle East dilemma that can break the deadlock of security through mutual terror, instead of tightening it.

What is really needed in the Middle East now is significant economic assistance for the entire area, coupled with international guarantees for the preservation of Israel and a multinational commitment to end the suffering of the Palestinian refugees. This is the opportunity we now have to remove the causes of war.

The Nation and the Congress must reject the political manipulation of international crises that the Nixon administration too often substitutes for foreign policy.

This is a time for long-term realities, a time to step back from the pressures of the moment to consider the consequences of our acts, not just in terms of our own debate and rhetoric, but out in the real world of blood and suffering. When I consider those consequences with the greatest seriousness I have within me, I cannot regret this vote today.

Mr. TAYLOR of North Carolina. Mr. Chairman, I rise to express support for H.R. 11088. Prompt, equitable compromise of Israel/Arab differences is absolutely imperative if peace is to be achieved in the Middle East. This conflict, producing four wars in 25 years, has created a danger of nuclear war, separated America from her NATO allies and brought about a worldwide energy shortage. Even though Russia has resupplied Egypt and Syria with war materials destroyed in fighting last October, there now exists the best opportunity in 25 years for a negotiated peace.

This peace is in the highest U.S. interest. The oil crisis which followed the October war shows the disturbing effect that war there has on the rest of the world and the importance of the peace negotiations which soon begin.

Maintaining a military balance between Israel and her Arab neighbors is essential to providing a proper setting for successful peace negotiations. Neither party should be put into a position of negotiating from weakness. An imbalance of power will tempt the stronger party to rely on force, not reason, at the negotiating table. A settlement not based on fairness and reason will likely not be permanent.

Mr. BAUMAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 11088, an emergency authorization for assistance to Israel. While there is little doubt in my mind of the support in the minds of most of the Members that this authorization is justified, there are several implications of approving a sum so large which we must not ignore.

Throughout its history, Israel has had one principal ally—one nation that has come to her assistance whenever it was necessary. During the most recent Arab-Israeli war, the United States once again stood alone as the only nation willing to stand behind the state of Israel and help it right to exist. Few of us take exception to this policy, a policy which I believe to be sound, both morally and politically. Particularly in view of the continuing Russian intervention in the Middle East, this authorization, of some \$2.2 billion, is unusually large, but it is necessary. The vast amount of resupply which was carried out during the war was costly, indeed, and Israel, with the highest per capita debt of any nation in the world,

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ven before the war, simply cannot bear his cost alone.

But \$2.2 billion is a lot of money, even in a budget which this year totals more than \$265 billion. We are operating in the red, and this will push us quite a bit further into the red, a situation which we cannot afford to ignore. To fully discharge our responsibility to the American public which elected us, we should be looking for a way to finance this appropriation by cutting spending elsewhere. The habit of spending money without concern over where it will come from is what has gotten us into deep trouble before. It provided the motivation for the Budget Control Act which we passed last week. To spend this money without providing the revenue from which it must come or by curtailing other spending would be irresponsible.

We should note that the supply of Israeli armed forces with American tanks, planes, and other equipment was at the expense of our own stockpiles, and in some cases, at the expense of the inventories maintained by our active and reserve units. This equipment must be replaced if the United States is to maintain the necessary level of military preparedness.

Thus, I hope we hear no anguished cries when the Pentagon approaches us in the near future for money to replace equipment which was shipped to Israel last October. We should also keep in mind that the cost of new equipment will inevitably be higher than the equipment in hand which we sent overseas during the Arab-Israeli war, thus further increasing the amount which will be necessary to replace it.

In short, let us keep in mind that our generosity to our allies must come at a price. Our willingness to provide this aid must be matched with a willingness to pay for it.

Mr. PODELL. Mr. Chairman, there is a monument to the fallen in northern Galilee with the inscription:

In blood and fire Judah fell, in blood and fire Judah will arise.

In 1948 many of us felt we had seen fulfillment of that prophecy. A free and independent Jewish state rose from the ashes of war to take her place proudly among the nations of the world. Now, 25 years later while the pride of accomplishment is still strong, the struggle for independence goes on, the fire is still raging.

Every conflict ends with a cease-fire, never a permanent peace settlement; brief years of prosperity alternate with terrifying wars, and any moment a new hooting war may begin. As the fighting continues, the human needs of millions of Jews and Arabs are neglected. We can only pray that the negotiations soon to begin in Geneva will signal a new process of peace, compromise, and mutual respect.

Yet with bitter irony as Israel works for peace, she prepares for war. Years of distrust endanger the negotiations and if they fail the only option will be a strong defense. As in the days of Nehemiah the people of Israel must build up the land carrying swords in their hands

as they work. For the past 25 years those swords have been provided by the United States. As Americans, we have committed ourselves for both moral and strategic reasons to the aid of Israel.

Today we can either reaffirm that commitment or we can yield to Arab blackmail. The recent war proved beyond any doubt that Israel cannot fight solely on guts and will. Cash and extremely sophisticated weapons are necessary elements in any hope of victory. The costs to the Israeli forces exacted by the SA-6 ground-to-air missiles alone were so great as to jeopardize the entire war effort. These missiles have been poured into Egypt and Syria as a small part of the stream of military hardware.

This Russian challenge can only be countered by the United States. It was the massive airlift wisely authorized by President Nixon which assured Israel's security during the recent fighting. Without the knowledge that American supplies would be forthcoming, Israel could not have committed her forces so strongly in battle.

However, the airlift was only the first stage in the supply effort. The second stage must be to rebuild and strengthen a war torn army still facing a foe with limitless equipment. The decision on the amount of equipment which the United States provides for the rebuilding effort and the method of financing it properly rest with Congress. Today we will make that decision.

The bill before us, H.R. 11088, authorizes \$2.2 billion in emergency security assistance for Israel in some combination of aid and credits as the President determines to be proper. At a time when our own budget is so severely strained, the allocation of such massive grants to any country must be closely questioned. A careful consideration of this legislation, however, forces the conclusion that large military grants are unavoidable. Though in the past, Israel has always paid for American equipment, today the Israeli economy, quite simply, cannot afford it. On top of the billions upon billions of war related costs, the Israeli Government recently announced that full mobilization would remain in effect for at least three more months.

That means the economy must continue to manage with a critically depleted labor force. Crops will go unharvested, exports needed for foreign exchange will pile up on the docks, and the trucks and buses which form the heart of the transportation industry will remain commandeered for military purposes. Given these extreme pressures a new arrangement on military supplies between the United States and Israel is clearly dictated.

Essentially the issue of providing grants is the same as that raised by the Arab oil boycott. We will stand firm militarily but allow economic pressures to subvert our policy and Israel's safety? A protracted war of attrition, requiring full mobilization of Israeli reserves will tax Israel much more severely than it will the heavily populated, oil rich Arabs. Surely, the effect of the oil boycott has taught us how potent economic weapons

can be and we must treat them as seriously as we would military provocations.

In short, without these grants we will be crippling Israel's economy just as effectively as the Arab oil boycott is crippling our economy, and for Israel that would be total disaster.

Nor is there any where else Israel may turn for help. Her traditional friends around the world are deserting her as Arab pressure grows. Japan, Britain, West Germany, Ethiopia, and dozens of other countries have prostituted themselves for Arab oil. If the United States joins their ranks, Israel will be truly alone.

Mr. Chairman, all sides in the Middle East must make compromises if peace is to come but the incentive to compromise will disappear if one side is disarmed.

Mr. COTTER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of H.R. 11088, a bill which authorizes \$2.2 billion in emergency security assistance to Israel. As is well known by my colleagues in the House today, the brave Nation of Israel fought a war on two fronts that resulted in tremendous losses of Israeli fighting men and women. The war also took a horrible toll in airplanes and tanks which were so essential in stemming the tide of this unprovoked attack by Egypt and Syria.

As I mentioned in a statement on October 10, there could be no question who started this war. But this is not the time to enter into mutual recriminations and name calling. Rather, we must work to maintain a military and diplomatic atmosphere that will result in a lasting peace in this war-torn area of the world.

In large measure the hope for a lasting peace will depend not only on the good will of the negotiators, but also on Israel's ability to maintain a viable military posture. A weakened Israel, an Israel without adequate weapons, will encourage further warfare. Without a balance of conventional weapons, this arms instability could lead to renewed fighting with the possibility of a nuclear confrontation which could ultimately involve both the United States and the U.S.S.R.

This bill provides that the Defense Department conduct a thorough study of the effectiveness of the military assistance program as it relates to the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. The bill further authorizes payment of the U.S. share of United Nations Emergency Forces in the Middle East but, of course, does not provide that U.S. troops would be used in these United Nations Forces. Finally, the bill authorizes military aid and/or military sales credits for Israel.

Mr. Chairman, I support this bill because the massive Soviet resupply of Arab forces is contributing directly to the present and future instability in the Middle East. Since October 6, Israel has purchased over \$1 billion of U.S. arms to replace the war losses. But even this effort was overwhelmed by the massive Soviet resupply effort. Therefore, I think that this \$2.2 billion emergency assistance program, prudently administered, will contribute to stability in the Middle East.

I know that some people believe that we should abandon Israel in order to se-

cure Arab oil. I cannot agree. To give in to Arab oil blackmail will decrease our ability to prevent future types of blackmail, wholly apart from the question of abandonment of our moral and diplomatic commitment to Israel.

On the other hand, I believe that the horror of the October 6 war has increased the mutual respect between the Arab and Israeli armies. This mutual respect, I am hopeful, will be the basis for a lasting peace, but if Israel is abandoned, the forces of aggression in the Arab world will be strengthened, the forces of moderation crushed, and the flames of war will again be ignited.

I believe that our Nation which contributed directly to the founding of Israel in 1948 has a serious and binding moral obligation to contribute to Israel's ability to maintain itself as a free and vibrant Nation. I urge my colleagues to support this bill.

Mr. TALCOTT. Mr. Chairman, I am voting for this authorization bill to provide \$2.2 billion for Israel. I do so with reluctance. I am perfectly willing to help Israel defend its national security but I question the adequacy of the justification for this huge sum of money.

There has been insufficient proof of war losses. No one has seen an accurate "shopping list." Israel has not proved its need for this sum. Neither the State Department nor the committee has demanded justification.

It has been said that \$2.2 billion is necessary to replace Israeli war losses. No accounting of Israeli war losses has been made. The excuse that the "confusion of war" precludes obtaining accurate estimates of the losses is not sufficient excuse for the Congress when authorizing the expenditure of U.S. funds.

For one example, tank losses are said to be a larger portion of this demand. But "tank losses" have not even been defined, let alone proved or accounted for.

When is a tank lost? When it is totally destroyed by a direct missile hit? When it "throws" a track? When it runs out of fuel? When it sustains minor damage? When it can be returned to operation in 5 days or 30 days?

Many of the tanks claimed to have been lost are probably now back in operation.

The Israelis captured several hundred Arab tanks which could be refitted with Israeli arms. Is this "net gain" of tanks deducted from the Israeli shopping list?

I think we should know.

If there is a true, justifiable need for \$2.2 billion to save Israel from annihilation, of course, U.S. taxpayers would be willing to foot the bill, but we are entitled to better justification of such demands. We demand better justification from our own departments and agencies.

Also we should inquire about Israeli arms and munitions which they manufacture or refit and sell to other nations. Should we be furnishing arms and war materials to Israel while they are selling arms and war materials to other Nations?

Mr. BIAGGI. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the bill H.R. 11088,

providing emergency security assistance for Israel. This legislation is urgently needed if we are to succeed in achieving a viable and lasting peace in the war-torn Middle East.

In the last 25 years, since Israel's conception, the Middle East has been a flashpoint for potential world conflict. In the last 6 years alone, there have been two major outbreaks of war between the Arabs and Israelis which flared dangerously with bringing about a full-scale confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States.

Throughout these troubled years, the United States has attempted to carry out a policy with Israel designed to achieve the combined objective of maintaining a balance of military capabilities; as well as promoting overall stability in this area.

Yet, in recent years, the costs involved in carrying out this policy have increased dramatically. In the October 6 war alone, we have provided Israel with nearly \$1 billion worth of arms to compensate for a massive Soviet buildup of Arab nations. This resulted in restoring Israel's military strength to at least prewar levels, thus preventing her defeat.

However, despite the peace which precariously prevails today in the Middle East, the Soviet Union is continuing to rearm and resupply the Arab armies. It is in light of these continued reckless and dangerous actions on the part of the Soviet Union that the President was forced to ask for this \$2.2 billion package to assist Israel, which we are considering today.

The beleaguered, yet courageous, nation of Israel has been besieged with adversities throughout its entire history. And despite the efforts of many international leaders to bring peace to this area, it is now conceded that the only peace which can last here will be based on the maintaining of a military balance between Israel and her Arab enemies. This bill would help her accomplish this by allowing the Israelis to keep peace with the massive Arab reinforcements supplied by the Russians. It is only when the Arab nations realize that Israel will be equally equipped will there be a basis for peace here.

Mr. Chairman, let us serve notice not only on the Arab nations but on the Soviet Union as well, that the defense and safety of Israel will continue to be our foremost international concern. We cannot afford to delay another day in granting this assistance. The need is now, and we must respond to it. I urge the overwhelming passage of this bill by my colleagues today.

Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, I commend the chairman and my colleagues on the House Foreign Affairs Committee for developing a proposal for emergency military assistance to Israel which won practically unanimous bipartisan support within the committee.

The central purpose of H.R. 11088 as amended by the committee is to guarantee the security of Israel and thus maintain the balance of power in the Middle East. As administration representatives in the hearings and in private

discussions with committee members have pointed out, the Arab States, as well as the Israelis, must be made to realize that they have nothing to gain by continuing the fighting and everything to gain by negotiating. As Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Rush testified:

This legislation will provide firm evidence of American support against (Arab) aggression and of our willingness to help create a situation in which negotiations leading to a lasting peace can take place.

Historical forces have placed a heavy responsibility on the United States for creating a climate of peace in the Middle East. We have the difficult job of offsetting the massive Soviet assistance to the Arabs so that negotiations can proceed under favorable conditions. For the first time in 25 years the Arabs feel confident enough politically to go to the conference table. Israel's leaders have sought reconciliation through negotiations with their Arab neighbors ever since the creation of this tiny democracy, but the Arabs have consistently refused. In their weakened and disorganized condition, the Arabs apparently felt unable to negotiate directly with Israel. Their humiliation in the 1967 war was so great that the Arab leaders believed they must restore their prestige before they would talk. Now with huge arms shipments from the Communists, improved Arab unity and morale, and use of the weapon of oil blackmail, the Arab nations seem confident that they can force significant concessions from Israel at the negotiating table.

As for Israel, the events since the reprehensible Yom Kippur attack have come as a shock. For the first time there is doubt in the minds of her leaders that Israel can maintain her own security without outside help. Her financial condition has been drastically weakened by massive expenditures for arms and ongoing nonmilitary needs, while her sources of foreign currency, principally exports and tourism, to pay for needed imports have declined rapidly. Israel's citizens already bear the burden of the highest rate of taxation in the world and her foreign debt per capita is more burdensome than that of any other nation. A large portion of Israel's debt is to the United States, which up until now has provided her with arms only on a cash or credit basis. Prior to the outbreak of fighting on October 6, Israel owed the United States \$1.2 billion for credit sales and \$500 million for cash sales. Since that time Israel has received \$1 billion worth of military equipment transferred to her by the U.S. Defense Department on the basis that she would pay cash for it in 120 days, that is by February or March of 1974. Defense Deputy Secretary Clements testified before our committee that there is a real possibility that Israel would have to default on the \$1 billion if she does not receive U.S. financial aid. I personally doubt that Israel would do so—she has never yet defaulted on a loan—unlike nations we aided during World War I under our lend-lease program—but the burden of making such payments would be almost catastrophic. Moreover, H.R.

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11088 will assure that the Defense Department will be promptly reimbursed for the value of the materiel supplied Israel since October 6.

Israel can no longer assume that she can defeat the Arabs over and over again. And she realizes that, while the Arabs can afford many defeats, Israel cannot afford one. The Arabs not only have great superiority in numbers and in sophisticated equipment supplied by the Communists, but they have also shown improved fighting ability. Many Israeli leaders are beginning to accept the hard facts that Israel can no longer go it alone, and that, because of Arab oil blackmail, the United States has become Israel's only source of help. Her representatives go to the conference table in hopes of securing a negotiated settlement for a lasting peace, but they must be mindful of the extremists elements in their constituency who still hold on to the belief that the only solution to the conflict is a military one.

H.R. 11088 will give the Government of Israel a chance to seek a nonmilitary solution; without it, the extremist elements on both sides may prevail. If Congress wavers in its support for the kind of flexible aid approach the administration has recommended, it may provide aid and comfort to these extremist elements and jeopardize the climate for peace.

How much of the \$2.2 billion needs to be grants and can be credits in order to fulfill H.R. 11088's purpose cannot be determined at this point. Israel is in the process of a massive fund-raising effort while assessing her losses in the October war and her future military needs. Our Government also is in the process of completing an independent assessment of Israel's military needs.

Turning now to the legitimate concerns expressed by Members of Congress about this highly flexible proposal, the committee has sought to add safeguards and guidelines through amendments and the legislative record to insure that the money this bill authorizes will be used wisely with the maximum participation of Congress in the decisionmaking. The executive has been put on notice that it is to spend no more than necessary to achieve a Middle East power balance. To insure some measure of congressional responsibility in this regard, amounts of aid in excess of \$1.5 billion—the current cash liability of Israel—have to be reported to Congress together with their justification 20 days before the date of their obligation or expenditure. However, the committee has wisely recommended suspension of this 20-day reporting requirement in the event of a renewal of hostilities. In addition, to make sure that Congress is kept fully informed about the effectiveness of this emergency assistance in maintaining the balance of power in the Middle East, the Secretary of Defense is directed to conduct a study of the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict to assess the military strength of each party to the conflict including a comparison of U.S. weapons supplied to Israel with the Communist weapons delivered to the Arabs. The Secretary is to report his conclusions from

this study to Congress as soon as possible and no later than December 31, 1974.

In closing, I would like to reaffirm my belief in the possibility of a permanent peace in the Middle East through direct negotiations, hopefully beginning this month. If the United States helps to maintain the balance of power, and resists the temptation to seek to impose terms for a settlement on Israel, there can be realistic negotiations on the part of both parties. I recognize that this is not an easy course to follow, especially when we are faced with hard domestic choices forced upon us by Arab oil blackmail. If our Middle East policy is successful the rewards will be great morally, politically, and economically; if we waver and fail, we face grave long-term consequences, one of the most serious of which will be the establishment of economic blackmail as a successful political tool in the hands of nations controlling needed raw materials. The United States has a unique chance to prevent such a disastrous development.

I urge my colleagues in the House to join me in reasserting U.S. control over its own foreign policy, and our faith in the possibility of a peaceful settlement in the Middle East by voting for passage of H.R. 11088, as amended.

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 11088 which authorizes \$2.2 billion in emergency security assistance for Israel in fiscal 1974 and for the U.S. share in the cost of maintaining the U.N. emergency force in the Middle East. I think it is most important to point out in considering this legislation that maintaining a military balance in the Middle East during this difficult cease-fire and prenegotiation period is essential to getting those negotiations on the track and to promoting a lasting peace in that troubled part of the world. We have no interest in engaging in a runaway Middle East arms race with the Soviet Union which might tempt either side to reinitiate hostilities. I think the diplomatic record of the United States makes it quite clear that our primary objective is to bring the parties directly involved in the hostilities together for the purpose of achieving a permanent resolution of their longstanding differences.

As the recent outbreak of hostilities so clearly demonstrated, turbulence in the Middle East can cause an adverse ripple effect on countries around the world, and poses the ultimate threat of engulfing our entire globe in a nuclear tidal wave. As the committee report points out:

For more than a quarter of a century, the Middle East has been a potential tinderbox for world conflict. Even without direct superpower combat involvement, Middle East instability and wars have been costly to the people of that region, to the United States and to other countries.

In addition to our own interest in maintaining peace throughout the world, this country has a longstanding moral commitment to the sovereignty and survival of the democratic State of Israel. We have supported that concept since the birth of Israel and it has been our position that the recognition of Israel's

sovereignty by other nations in the area, coupled with a serious effort by the Arabs and Israelis to negotiate a settlement of their longstanding differences can lead to a permanent peace in the Middle East. Hopefully the most recent stalemate and ceasefire can finally bring about the realization of those goals.

The purpose of the bill before us today is not to rearm Israel for the purpose of renewing hostilities, but rather to provide military material to replace combat losses and thereby give Israel an equal footing with its adversaries as it approaches negotiations and to insure the type of military balance in the area which is necessary to insure that those negotiations go forward. Obviously, a military imbalance will only provide a disincentive to negotiations and a potential invitation to a renewal of fighting.

I think it is important to emphasize that in the past Israel has obtained U.S. arms by cash or credit, and not by grants. However, the most recent Arab-Israeli war has taken its heaviest toll on Israel's economy. Last year one-fourth of Israel's GNP was devoted to defense; her taxpayers are reported to be paying the highest rate in the world; her foreign debt was around \$4 billion; and at the time of the outbreak of hostilities she owed the United States approximately \$1.7 billion in past cash and credit purchases of military equipment.

The most recent war has obviously compounded Israel's economic plight with one-quarter of her work force mobilized for defense. This has greatly impaired her production and ability to earn foreign exchange. Without financial assistance she is likely to default on the \$1 billion due to the United States next February. For these reasons, this legislation is essential for it provides authority for grant military assistance for Israel as well as cash and credit sales.

Mr. Chairman, I think the committee is to be commended on underscoring our intention to promote Middle East peace and stability through this legislation incorporating a provision to insure that the Executive will spend no more than necessary to achieve a military balance. That provision, contained in section 2 of the bill, would require that the President give 20-day prior notification to the Congress if he finds it necessary to expend more than \$1.5 billion for military assistance and/or credit sales. The President's report must include the amount in excess of \$1.5 billion he intends to expend, and the terms and justification for the additional assistance.

I think the committee is also to be commended on the innovative feature in the committee report which proposes that the portion of the \$2.2 billion authorization not used for military assistance be used to stimulate the creation of a Middle East Regional Development Bank, to be funded by other countries as well, for the purpose of assisting in promoting the social and economic development of the entire area, thus fostering a climate for genuine peace and progress in the Middle East. While this is not authorized in this bill and would require a separate authorization, I think

It is a most meritorious proposal and one which should help induce the parties involved to reach a peaceful settlement. In addition, it is a multinational assistance approach which is in keeping with the new direction in foreign development assistance we are attempting to promote.

Mr. ANDERSON of California. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 11088, which would authorize \$2.2 billion in emergency security assistance for Israel.

On the holy day of Yom Kippur, the State of Israel was attacked on two fronts; the Syrians moved southwest over the Golan Heights and the Egyptians moved northeast across the Suez Canal into the Sinai Desert.

This offensive was countered by the Israeli Army at the cost of many lives, destroyed weapons, and a perilous situation in the already tense Middle East. And today, while peace hangs by a thread, the Arab nations are making demands upon both Israel and her allies who stood with her during this brutal conflict.

Israel is being asked to move back to the pre-1967 borders, and the United States is being asked to guarantee this move, or face a continued embargo on Arab oil.

Mr. Chairman, our commitment to the continuation of the State of Israel is being tested, and, perhaps, greater pressures will come.

But, stand beside Israel we must. The assistance needed to defend her borders is necessary for peace; for the moment that Israel is incapable of defending herself, surely the Arab threats to extinguish this solitary light of freedom will be fulfilled.

Israel is like a city under siege: Those within the walls can win many battles without bringing true peace and the attackers outside may lose many times without losing entirely. But the defenders—the Israelis—can lose but once. No matter how many wars are fought, no matter how many battles are won, the enemy will still be there waiting for that one victory which will spell disaster for those within the city.

Thus, it is our duty to provide Israel the strength for a stand-off, to equalize the forces, so that the people of Israel and the Arab nations may solve their problems together at the peace table.

The bill before us today would provide funds to help Israel defend herself, and I urge my colleagues to join with me in supporting this necessary measure.

Mr. DORN. Mr. Chairman, providing emergency military assistance to the small nation of Israel is in the interest of peace. This bill has my full support and I urge the House to approve it by an overwhelming margin.

Mr. Chairman, the bill now before us would help maintain the military balance necessary for peace in the Middle East by authorizing \$2.2 billion in emergency security assistance to Israel. Soviet Russia continues to pour military hardware into the Arab States. Since the Yom Kippur war Israel has paid for nearly \$1 billion in arms from the United States. Israel will need further arms to counter the Russian arms influx but

simply cannot pay the bill without U.S. help. If the military balance is disrupted there would be no incentive for the Russians and the Arabs to negotiate.

This bill will serve notice on Russia and the Arab States that the United States is determined to maintain a balance of power. This bill will serve notice to all nations that the only answer is a negotiated peace and not further war.

Mr. BADILLO. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this legislation to authorize \$2.2 billion in emergency military aid and foreign military sales credits to Israel for the current fiscal year and urge that it be promptly enacted.

By providing Egypt and Syria with highly sophisticated planes and other modern military equipment such as tanks and missiles, the Soviet Union clearly precipitated the Arab invasion of Israel. The only possible course open to maintain the military balance essential for the eventual achievement of peace in the Middle East and to insure Israel's territorial integrity is for the United States to furnish Israel the arms and equipment necessary to defend herself against any future attacks by her Arab neighbors. We must not only replace those items lost during the actual fighting with the Arab States but must also furnish Israel the necessary financial aid to maintain military strength for her defense.

Shortly after the outbreak of the Middle East fighting I was pleased to join in sponsoring a resolution calling upon the administration to honor existing commitments to supply aircraft to Israel. Israel's traditional air superiority was critical, in my judgment, to bring the fighting to an end. Further, I was an original cosponsor of House Resolution 613 which urged our Government to supply Israel with Phantom jet fighters and other military equipment in sufficient quantities to enable her to repel further attacks and to offset the military equipment and supplies furnished by the Soviet Union.

By supplying the Arabs with vast quantities of military hardware the U.S.S.R. has made a mockery of détente with the United States and has subverted any meaningful attempts to achieve some sort of accommodation. In light of this action the United States has a special duty to guarantee Israel's invulnerability to Arab attack. By convincing Russia and her Arab pawns that the United States is committed to Israel's security, I believe the way toward a substantive Middle East peace will be opened.

Mr. Chairman, I strongly believe that the measure before us this afternoon affords the Congress an opportunity to take affirmative action to fulfill our moral and legal commitments to Israel and to make clear our intention to continue our support for this lone bastion of democracy in the Middle East. I urge prompt and favorable action on it.

Mr. O'NEILL. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of this bill, H.R. 11088, which authorizes emergency security assistance for Israel.

This measure has been urgently requested by the President and is sup-

ported by the leadership on both sides of the aisle. For, we not only have assurances that the administration will not spend any more funds than are absolutely necessary, but we also have a provision in the bill requiring the President to report and justify his expenditure to the Congress.

The purpose of this bill is to promote the goal of American foreign policy in the Middle East—that is, to help achieve an enduring peace in an area of such dangerous volatile potentiality, that it could explode into worldwide consequences and repercussions.

It is because of this explosive potentiality that we need this bill.

We need this bill to support Israel, to assure her of the security she must have in order to negotiate a truly lasting settlement.

We need this bill to serve notice to the Arab States and to the Soviet Union, that the United States will provide Israel with the weapons she needs for her defense, indeed for her survival as a nation.

We need this bill, therefore, to encourage the Arab nations that their best interest lies in negotiating a durable peace—not in striking at Israel again.

Israel cannot afford to pay for the weapons she needs from us. Her economy already is heavily overburdened. Yet, she must have the military means to defend herself and assurance of further shipments from us to the extent that becomes necessary so she can proceed with the serious negotiations at hand.

Mr. Chairman, our only goal in the Middle East is a lasting peace with security for Israel under a negotiated settlement acceptable to all sides.

So, I urge all my colleagues to vote for this legislation which I am convinced will contribute dramatically to achieving this objective.

Mr. KOCH. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the legislation before us to provide Israel with \$2.2 billion in emergency security assistance. I will not restate all of the arguments that have been made in support of this legislation by the distinguished members of the Foreign Affairs Committee and its distinguished chairman, THOMAS E. MORGAN. That committee was almost unanimous in reporting this bill out to the House.

I recently visited Israel and was present in that country from November 18 to November 23. The Government officials with whom I spoke and our own U.S. Embassy officials provided me with background and insight into the military and economic problems facing that country. I met with the Director General of the Ministry of Finance, Avraham Agmon. He told me that the 19 days of the October war cost Israel approximately \$300 million a day, or a little less than \$6 billion. This was the cost of destroyed war material, mobilization of the army, and the immediate economic losses suffered by the country. The total working population of Israel is 1 million and when the army is fully mobilized it commands the efforts of 300,000 people.

On November 22 when I was in the country, 25 percent of the working force was still mobilized in the army which had to maintain a daily alert. During

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the recent hostilities, our Defense Department delivered approximately \$1 billion in arms to Israel. Because of the enormous forces arrayed against the Israelis, munitions delivered in the evening by our C-5A's were used by the Israeli soldiers on the battle line the following morning.

The expected deficit in the next year for the Israeli budget is \$2.7 billion. To deal with that problem and to raise new funds within Israel itself, Israeli citizens are now being required to purchase "compulsory bonds"; in addition, people are being urged to buy additional bonds on a voluntary basis. The Government also has cut its various subsidies heretofore used to keep prices for necessities within bounds and it has increased the cost to consumers of Government services. Taxes represent 60 percent of the total income in the country compared to 30 percent in the United States and Israel has doubled its taxes every 2 years.

As the committee report states:

This bill is designed to assure Israel the security she needs. It is designed to demonstrate unmistakably to Arab states and the Soviet Union that the U.S. will provide Israel with weapons essential for Israel's defense.

Director General Avraham Agmon provided me with the following details on his own financial situation to demonstrate how the Israelis are being required to bear as much of the cost of the country's defense as possible: Director General Agmon is one of the highest officials in the country and receives a salary of \$650 a month. Out of that he must pay taxes and buy his compulsory bond as well as his voluntary bond. These bonds are redeemable after 15 years at 3-percent interest. With these deductions, his salary is reduced to \$300. This amount is further subject to municipal taxes, school costs, and health insurance.

Mr. Chairman, as it has been stated by those who have spoken before me, as well as by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, it is in our national interest and a moral imperative that we provide Israel with this financial assistance. Israel is the only democratic state in the Mideast. If we do not insure its security and economic well-being, and were it to be defeated by the Arabs, that area will become a Soviet bastion which would not bode well for our national security or for the free world. It is a moral commitment because of the Judeo-Christian ethics which bind our people. The United States took the lead in creating the State of Israel and resurrecting an ancient people in its own land. We must assist them now when almost every other country has bartered or sold its principles and ideals in exchange for oil.

When I saw Mrs. Meir on my recent trip to Israel she said to me and I shall always remember her statement:

We shall never, never forget what your country did for us. Our children will be telling it to our great grandchildren.

The ties that bind our two countries together are insoluble. I urge the passage of this bill.

Mr. HARRINGTON. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 11088, legislation authorizing \$2.2 billion in emergency security assistance for the state of Israel.

as a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, from which this legislation originates, I have had ample opportunity to study the issues raised by this bill, and I am convinced of the need for its enactment.

The \$2.2 billion authorized by this bill is to be used to provide military assistance to the nation of Israel that is still recovering from a tragic and costly conflict. Much of this authorization will be used to provide, for the first time, grant military assistance to Israel. This bill sets a limit of \$1.5 billion on total assistance unless the President determines that the expenditure of the remaining \$700 million is required by the national interest.

This legislation marks another step in the evolution of American support for Israel. It should be remembered, as we consider this request for \$2.2 billion, that the great preponderance of military assistance to Israel in the past 25 years has been on a cash or credit basis. It was not until 1962 that the United States began to sell sophisticated weapons to the Israelis, and in fact, it was only in response to the massive Soviet arms resupply effort to the Arab States after the six-day war of 1967 that the United States initiated the kind of comprehensive military sales program that included Israeli purchase of F-4 Phantom fighters, the mainstay of the Israeli Air Force. Prior to the "Yom Kippur war," however, grant military assistance was not made available to Israel, while between 1946 and 1972 the United States, according to the Agency for International Development, expended a total of approximately \$55 billion in grant military assistance throughout the world.

Israel's economy is such that grant military assistance is now a necessity. Israel has the highest per capita foreign currency debt in the world. Israel has the highest tax rate in the world—and yet, Israeli citizens have recently been required to make a compulsory defense loan of between 7 and 12 percent of their income.

Israel's economy has been hurt by the war, and continues to be stifled by the impact of mobilization. It is estimated that the loss in gross national product between October and December of this year will be approximately \$476 million, with an additional estimated loss in GNP of \$952 million for 1974. The Department of Defense has documented that Israeli purchases of military equipment, as a result of the recent war, have already amounted to \$825 million, with at least another \$175 million in purchases expected. Yet Israel's need is estimated to be \$3.2 billion, and this need will be difficult if not impossible to meet without substantial grant assistance.

Many Americans, remembering the tragedy of our involvement in Vietnam, are anxious that American military forces not be directly involved in the Mideast conflict. The current energy crisis makes matters more difficult, as the Arab oil embargo has exacerbated an already difficult energy situation. And, there is a view that the United States should take a position that at least reflects an acknowledgement of legitimate goals and aspirations of the Arab States and the Palestinians.

I believe that passage of the emergency security assistance bill will further these goals. The most important objective of U.S. policy toward the Mideast, it seems to me, should be the conclusion of a durable peace that is just for all parties concerned, but which also provides for the continued security of Israel—a country for which the United States historically bears a great responsibility. The one lesson of the recent conflict is that the force of arms alone will not solve the many critical problems in the Mideast. But there is another important lesson as well—one demonstrated by the massive Soviet arms shipments to the Arab States since the cease-fire—and that is that no peace will be achieved if either side in the conflict has the perception that the other side is negotiating from a position of weakness. Therefore, I believe it necessary and appropriate that the United States continue adequate security assistance in support of Israel to the extent necessary to ensure the military sufficiency of Israeli forces. H.R. 11088 would accomplish this goal.

Seventeen million dollars in the bill will go to cover the costs of the United Nations troops now policing the delicate cease-fire. If for no other reason than to reduce the likelihood that hostilities will be renewed, this \$17 million is well spent. But, it seems to me, there is a more important principle at stake. The recent war reemphasizes the importance of the United Nations in any Middle East solution. I hope that U.S. policy will reflect an appreciation for the valuable role that the U.N. can play.

I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 11088. It is an urgently needed bill, and one that I genuinely believe will advance the prospects for peace in the Mideast.

Ms. HOLTZMAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of H.R. 11088 which provides \$2.2 billion in emergency security assistance for Israel. In taking this essential action we not only are seeking to guarantee the survival of a valiant friend and a vital democracy, but we are at the same time protecting the best interests of our own Nation. We are reaffirming our support for the territorial sovereignty of a threatened democracy and at the same time we are protecting our only reliable ally in the Middle East, a region dominated by forces hostile to American interests.

Since the sudden and deliberate attack on Yom Kippur, the holiest day of the Jewish year, Israel has faced a formidable military threat. No less than 10 nations, with combined armed forces that outnumber Israeli forces by nearly 3 to 1, have united against them. Supplied with the most advanced Russian weaponry, the Arab nations are clearly bent on achieving a military dominance in the Middle East. Some even advocate the destruction of the State of Israel. It is, therefore, imperative that we take prompt action to help Israel replenish her resources so that she can bargain from strength at the negotiations table, thereby retain defensible borders, and the city of Jerusalem.

For this reason I urge my colleagues in the House to guarantee the security of Israel by passage of the Emergency Se-

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security Assistance Act, which authorizes \$2.2 billion in direct grants and sales credits for military aid to the State of Israel. It is estimated that at least \$1 billion in military equipment will be needed immediately to counter the massive Soviet arms shipments to Arab countries that have continued unabated since the outbreak of fighting. Without prompt action that neutralizes past and future Soviet armament build-up in the Middle East, Israel will be a target for another Arab attack.

Israel suffered casualties in the brief Yom Kippur war that, in proportion to its population, were greater than American losses in 11 years of fighting in Vietnam. And in spite of their military success, the Israelis were forced to spend \$100 million per day during the hostilities. We must do everything in our power to make it plain to the Arab nations that they cannot continue to wage wars of attrition supplied by Soviet arms that will take the place of serious negotiations.

We must support the survival of Israel. I therefore urge passage of H.R. 11088.

Ms. ABZUG. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 11088 which provides emergency security assistance for Israel. The funds contained in this legislation are critical to the very survival of the State of Israel and the maintenance of her territorial integrity.

This is, as we know, a time of both peril and opportunity for Israel. Her negotiators are going into the peace talks, which are scheduled to open in Geneva on December 18, with a set of proposals that deserve wide support. They will call for a final renunciation of war by both sides, the establishment of diplomatic relations, and the introduction of normal commercial ties between all countries of the Middle East. Recently, an Israeli official was quoted in a New York Times interview as saying, "We want to demonstrate at the outset that this is a peace conference, not a withdrawal conference."

Certainly no unilateral withdrawals or other concessions can be expected until it is clear that the Arab nations are willing to accept the existence of Israel once and for all and to follow this up with apparent evidence of a desire to live peacefully side by side with Israel. The leaders of Israel have made clear that territorial concessions would be forthcoming within the context of such an agreement.

It is even more essential that Israel go into the peace talks able to bargain from a position of military strength. During a trip I made to Israel during the Thanksgiving recess with other Members of the House, we had an opportunity to talk with Prime Minister Golda Meir and other government and army officials, and we also toured the Suez front. Over and over, we were told that the rapid airlift of American weapons, ammunition, medical supplies, and equipment—an average daily lift of about 1,000 tons—had been absolutely crucial to Israel's military recovery and the advances that were made.

We were also told, and it is by now well-known, that the Arab armies were

equipped by the Soviet Union with very large numbers of the very best in each class of weapons. In some instances, the Syrians and Egyptians were equipped with advanced models of troop carriers, antitank missiles and tanks that are not yet even in general use in the Soviet Army, and the Soviet Union is continuing to supply the Arab nations with military equipment.

It should also be noted that the Israelis were not only confronting the most sophisticated Soviet planes and missiles, but also French Mirage planes, British Hunter jets and Centurion tanks, and even some tanks furnished by the United States.

In voting on this bill we should also remember that unlike other nations who have received our weapons Israel is a democracy with a united purpose whose people and country have been a haven for the dispossessed and the haunted from the days of the holocaust to the present.

As the one nation that has stood by Israel, we must today enact this bill to provide up to \$2.2 billion in emergency security assistance to Israel. We should do so for at least two reasons: to restore the enormous losses that Israel incurred in the Yom Kippur war and to notify the whole world that the American people will continue to stand by their commitment to Israel and its territorial integrity and to serve notice that we will not succumb to the Arab oil blackmail.

The public may not realize this, but between 1946 and 1972, according to the Agency for International Development, the United States provided to foreign nations grants and military assistance totalling approximately \$55 billion. Among the recipients were many dictatorships whose policies are anathema to our democratic principles. We even sent grants of military assistance and training totalling about \$324 million to nine Arab States, but not a single penny of this assistance was ever given by us to the tiny, democratic State of Israel.

Leaders of the Israeli Government estimate that it will cost almost \$3 billion to make up for the overwhelming destruction of military equipment, weapons, and planes that occurred on the two fronts. The compromise figure of \$2.2 billion in this bill will allow Israel to purchase the military equipment she needs for her defense, allow her to pay off those short-term debts whose payment cannot be avoided, and prevent her from sliding into hopeless bankruptcy.

In voting on this bill, we should also remember that unlike other nations which have received our weapons, the beleaguered Israeli people have never asked for American manpower. They have shown they are willing to make incredible sacrifices to preserve their tiny nation. The threat to their survival remains, compounded by the ominous Arab oil boycott.

Our action in favor of this bill today can signal to the world the readiness of the American people to continue to extend the hand of friendship and support to the courageous people of Israel. We all pray that a permanent peace settlement will be achieved in Geneva, a settlement

that is vital not only to all the nations of the Middle East but to the entire world. We must do all we can to make that peace possible and I therefore will vote for this measure.

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, I have no further request for time.

Mr. MAILLIARD. Mr. Chairman, I have no further request for time.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will read.

The Clerk read as follows:

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the "Emergency Security Assistance Act of 1973".*

(Mr. GROSS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

(By unanimous consent, Mr. Gross was allowed to proceed for 5 additional minutes.)

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, the legislation now before the House is the latest chapter in the continuing tragic inability of the administration and Congress to understand that the American people, already bearing the crushing load of more debt than all other nations combined, cannot continue to bankroll wars around the world and pose as this planet's policeman over and over and over again.

This legislation, authorizing the handing over of \$2.2 billion to Israel, represents a partial payment, and only a partial payment, for the one-sided and improvident intervention by President Nixon in the Arab-Israel war—an act of intervention that had no approval by the American people or Congress, either before or after the fact.

The unilateral, one-sided action of the President is not only costing our citizens more than \$2 billion, but his alienation of once friendly Arab nations and their subsequent oil embargo is costing American industry, business, and workers uncounted hundreds of millions of dollars and thousands of workers have lost their jobs.

The grave and unanswered question is why Nixon armed only Israel in this war. In years past, the President and his predecessors have provided military hardware to the Arab States. Arming both sides in the October conflict would have set no precedent, but it would have been a demonstration of evenhanded treatment and it is doubtful that vital oil supplies would have been cut off.

Appearing before the House Appropriations Committee on the administration's request for this huge handout to Israel, Deputy Secretary of Defense Clements stated:

United States policy in the Middle East, as the President has said, is neither pro-Arab nor pro-Israel, but pro-peace.

No one can actually believe, not even Clements, that providing \$2.2 billion in arms to Israel—all or much of it an outright gift—while refusing to sell jet fighters for cash to Saudi Arabia, is neither pro-Arab nor pro-Israel.

No one can actually believe that providing \$36.5 million for Jewish refugee relief compared with \$2 million for Arab refugee relief is neither pro-Arab nor pro-Israel.

If President Nixon is going to single-

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handedly embark on military adventures is it too much to expect him to practice a modicum of even-handedness?

Incidentally, where now are the doves whose wings were constantly fluttering a few months ago from the floor to the rafters of this Chamber and the one across the way? They seem to have undergone a strange metamorphosis since those days when they were beating their breasts in self-proclaimed righteous horror and outrage over this country's involvement in Southeast Asia.

I am not for 1 minute defending participation in that no-win war that started with a little intervention and went on for so long and at such a horrible cost. But it has not been necessary for me to shed any dove feathers as have these self-anointed, alleged peace-lovers who mounted the battlements in October exhorting all of us to support resolutions and otherwise rush headlong to participate in yet another war—heedless of the consequences and heedless of the lessons of the past.

Mr. Chairman, on October 17, when the Petroleum Emergency Act was before the House and the Middle East war was still in progress, I stood here in the well and said this:

I predict that our supplies of fuel from the Middle East whether they come through the refineries of Europe or direct from the Middle East, are going to be reduced and we are going to pay right through the nose for every gallon and every barrel of oil or the product thereof which comes to this country. Why? Because we cannot keep our big, long noses out of the affairs of other people around the world.

I do not know who is going to win the war in the Middle East, but I do know one thing for dead sure and certain—that I can name the loser. That will be the common, garden variety citizen and taxpayer of the United States of America.

Now, nearly 2 months later, let me add this: By his act of unilateral intervention in the Middle East war our internationalist President has handed the citizens of this country a costly Christmas present—a Christmas present for which they will be paying long after he leaves Pennsylvania Avenue to bask in the warmer climes of Florida or California.

Mr. Chairman, during the past year Congress has been yelping at the top of its collective lungs about recapturing its delegated powers and thus assert its role as a coequal branch of Government. That is what the fight over impoundment and the war powers legislation was all about.

Having marched up the Hill to attack Executive power, this bill greases the skids for a quick retreat. Read the second sentence of section 3 of this bill. It gives the President the unadulterated right to use \$2.2 billion for aid to Israel on whatever terms and conditions he wishes.

As if that were not enough, turn to section 4. In plain, unvarnished English it provides that if any of this money starts out as loans, the President can convert them to grants—gifts—before the end of next June.

Let us hear three big cheers right now from those who have professed so much

worry about the erosion of the powers of Congress.

Then there is a little window dressing inserted by the Foreign Affairs Committee that the President can hold back—impound—\$700 million until he alone determines it is in the national interest to use it. These are weasel words and do less than nothing to restrict this broad delegation of power and authority to the President.

In short, there never was a worse congressional abdication of control over the public purse than this.

Last but not least, how does this \$2.2 billion fit into the President's budget which he charges is constantly being exceeded by Congress? One witness read a reassuring statement from the Office of Management and Budget that "this legislation will not force the executive branch to reduce or impound any funds previously requested for other Federal programs."

How sweet it is to have those words. One can only wonder how much more loose change to the tune of \$2.2 billion is floating around that can be used to finance other programs without exceeding what the President proclaimed as his "tight" budget for the current fiscal year.

When Members receive hot letters from cold constituents they should tell them that Congress is simply restoring the balance of power in the Middle East. It should give them great comfort. What with the gasoline shortage, they may even welcome you home—permanently.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GROSS. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, I thought somebody ought to remind the gentleman that in the regular foreign aid bill—and may I say that I voted against it—there is \$81 million for six Arab nations, so I just thought the House ought to know, in view of the gentleman's speech, that we are on both sides in this war, arming both sides so they can keep the thing going.

Mr. GROSS. It has become fashionable for this country to practice duplicity. That is why I said the precedent was already created. Why did we not sell Saudi Arabia Phantom jets while we were giving them to Israel?

Mr. HAYS. We gave assistance to Saudi Arabia.

Mr. GROSS. We would still have Arabian oil to operate on.

Mr. HAYS. We will sell them if they want them, not give them to them, but that is what we did in the regular bill.

Mr. GROSS. But in this case we are giving Israel \$2,200,000,000, when they are already in hock to us. Israel is already in debt to the United States for a billion dollars.

Mr. WYLIE. Mr. Chairman, one of the most complex and vexing issues to confront the world today is the lingering dispute between the Arab nations and the State of Israel over which of these people shall claim the land of Palestine as their national home. It is a tragic dispute, for both the Palestinian Arabs and

the Jews of Israel are able to support their claims to Palestine with historical, legal, moral, and religious precedents which they each believe to be right. It is tragic because they are both right, and they are both wrong, and they both have suffered the ultimate frustration of resorting to armed force to secure their concept of justice.

I have not risen to praise or denounce either the Arabs or the Israelis, nor to offer a brief in defense of past actions, nor to act as advocate as though this were a court of law. I have risen to offer what I earnestly believe to be a reasonable encouragement to Arab and Israeli alike to resolve their differences and find an accommodation under which they both may survive. My proposal, if it may be called that, is not a formula for peace nor a detailed plan to resolve all the problems. It is, instead, a gesture of encouragement which I hope would send the Israelis and the Arabs to the peace talks scheduled to be held shortly in Geneva with a concise understanding that the United States does not support the use of war to settle differences between nations.

My proposal requires that I oppose the current bill before the House, the bill which would provide \$2.2 billion for the State of Israel. I am in opposition to providing military assistance, as my voting record will attest, because I do not believe the way to a peaceful resolution of conflict is through the continual rearming of nations at war. This was my purpose in supporting an amendment to the Export-Import Bank legislation during my first term which prohibited the making of a loan for the purchase of arms. This is why I have voted against the Foreign Military Assistance bills. It appears to me that the best hope for peace in the Middle East is the direct display of peaceful intentions, not the belligerent show of strength inherent in an arms race. For the United States to become directly involved in an arms race in the Middle East, and our providing more weapons to either or both sides at this time amounts to a direct involvement, is incongruous with the stated principles of this Nation that the world should live at peace.

I appreciate Israel's plight, surrounded as it is by hostile neighbors, and I appreciate the Israeli hunger for a future of peace and an end to war. I also appreciate the frustration and fears of the Arab peoples and their search for modernity and respectability among the family of nations. I also know that the sentiment in favor of this bill today in the House of Representatives probably mirrors the sentiment of my own constituents of the 15th District of Ohio. By opposing the bill, I do not denigrate that sentiment, but, I believe, support it.

The Israeli Minister of Defense, Mr. Moshe Dayan, was quoted as saying on December 9, 1973, that Israel has never been stronger than it is today. If that is true, and I have no reason to doubt the Minister of Defense of Israel, then why should the United States add to that feeling of strength by providing a gift of \$2 billion worth of weapons? With each in-

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cease of Israeli might, there is a corresponding decrease in the chances for a peaceful settlement, because both the Arabs and the Israelis know that if their efforts at Geneva should founder or stall, they can always return to the battlefield. More battles, more war in the Middle East, will cause more destruction, more interrupted lives, more maimed bodies, more deaths, more empty chairs in the family circle. Let the Israelis and the Arabs go to Geneva, to the peace conference arranged through the good offices of the United States, knowing that there will be no more weapons, no more arms races, to which they can turn when conflict clouds their deliberations. The United States should stop fueling the engines of war. The United States should continue what we have begun in Geneva, the peaceful settlement of conflict through discourse and compromise. Hope for peace is in Geneva, not along the cease-fire lines.

Israel has every right to exist, and I support that right. But I wonder how long Israel can exist if it is in a perpetual state of war. Can Israel afford endless war? Can it afford to send its young people and its treasure off to battle every 5 or 10 years? I would suggest that if the United States is the friend of Israel, then we should stop supplying the means for Israel's suicide. Knowing that they cannot rely upon the threat of an increasing military capacity, perhaps both the Arabs and the Israelis will talk more seriously and concentrate upon the search for peace in the Geneva negotiations. I simply cannot in good conscious vote to give any country \$2.2 billion to buy arms.

Mr. RARICK. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

(Mr. RARICK asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. RARICK. Mr. Chairman, I take this time to pose a question to my good friend, the distinguished chairman of the committee, Dr. MORGAN.

I would ask the gentleman if he or any members of the committee have at any time considered the possibility that this legislation poses a constitutional question regarding a violation of the doctrine of separation of church and state as expressed in the first amendment of the U.S. Constitution.

Mr. MORGAN. No. I do not think the committee ought to consider that. There was never any discussion in that area, to my knowledge.

Mr. RARICK. Mr. Chairman, I will remind the gentleman that the first amendment reads:

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, we are not giving this assistance to a religion; we are giving it to a foreign, friendly state.

Mr. RARICK. This is the problem that I feel is posed.

The status of Israel is a matter of interpretation, of course.

Mr. MORGAN. We are in no way giving this money or granting these arms to a religion. Israel is a state; it is a nation;

it is a member of the world community.

Mr. RARICK. Is the gentleman's interpretation that Israel is not a religious state?

Mr. MORGAN. Well, not any more than England or some other country is a religious state, no.

I would say again that Israel is a member of the world community. It is a state; it is a nation.

Mr. RARICK. Of course, the problem is that there have not yet been any lawsuits filed on this issue.

Coming to the interpretation of whether or not this is the establishment of a religion, I might remind the members of the committee that recently here in Washington, D.C., several Federal judges have ruled that taxpayers' funds could not be used to place a nativity scene on the ellipse in celebration of Christmas. Other judicial decisions concerning separation of church and state under the first amendment have forbidden prayer by children in public schools. Allowing this bill to pass without even considering the constitutional ramifications certainly creates a strange double standard as concerns the American people and relations between themselves as compared to their relations with foreigners concerning the establishment of religions.

Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman very much for his response.

Mr. RUNNELS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

(Mr. RUNNELS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. RUNNELS. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that I may be allowed to proceed for 5 additional minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New Mexico?

There was no objection.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New Mexico (Mr. RUNNELS) for 10 minutes.

Mr. RUNNELS. Mr. Chairman, there are two things in this bill that flashes lights and rings bells—blank checks and slush funds. I feel that a full discussion is absolutely necessary so the American taxpayers can read and judge for themselves the considerations and votes on this measure.

Part of what I have to say has been said thousands of times on this floor. This is one place where I believe conviction means something and I am impressed with the many Members who do not waiver on this score. My topics are loose funds; in the Government bin; abdication of power and; manipulation of funds. Almost everyone has used or read these words in a speech at one time or another. There are many quotations I think are appropriate. I will not take the time to cite commentators of the press or quotable quotes from taxpayers' letters. The CONGRESSIONAL RECORD will do.

First, as I read the committee report, page 7, there is to be an estimated outlay of only \$600 million in fiscal year 1974 which will come out of the \$2.2 billion. The rest will come in succeeding years it says. I ask, are we passing on something

that will become a form of carryover of an unobligated balance from a prior year? If \$600 million is all that is needed for expenditures in fiscal year 1974, then why are we talking about \$2.2 billion? Why are we not talking about \$600 million? Why do we not review the \$1.6 left during next year's appropriations effort when the figures are current?

I hope the Members will remember all of the howling and screaming a couple of weeks ago about carryovers and unobligated funds. A favorite description was "slush funds." If you have forgotten here is a couple of quotes.

On page H10412 of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD it says:

We can never have true congressional control over military spending as long as we allow the Department of Defense to maintain such huge sums of money which they can spend pretty much as they please. The power of the purse is the only real power Congress can exercise to control the military and I believe it is high time to reduce these funds to more equitable amounts.

On that same day it was stated on page H10413 that "we have given them carte blanche, one might say" and although the billion talked about was a large amount, we were told it was a "slush fund" or a kitty just for the asking.

Another page, H10422, says—

Will we next see more of the \$10 billion of unobligated funds in the bill put to work for America's reinvolved in Vietnam?

Well, if you are worried about a pipeline of money to Vietnam, you had better take a second look at this bill. Buried in the language is a potential \$2.2 billion blank check to not only the President but to DOD for the reimbursement of appropriations, accounts, and funds for the value of articles and services sent to Israel. I ask who in Congress has absolute assurance that this reimbursed money will not end up, as one Member put it, in a fancy new F-5E with a hot Vietnamese pilot blowing 671 gallons of gas to bomb yet another village? I do not want to shiver in the dark this winter and I would suggest that if these Members want to stick to their convictions they will not vote for this slush fund either.

Next, I have trouble understanding who has got what and where is it going? Just for starters, the \$600 million outlay seems like an awfully low amount and does not even sound reasonable. The testimony in the hearings expresses concern over the fact that Israel does not have the cash to cover an obligation to pay \$1 billion in the February-March time frame. There is also a matter of \$500 million worth covering cash sales prior to October 6, 1973. No one has said where the cash will come from other than from this bill. In fact it has been said that it will come from this bill. That totals \$1.5 billion which will be an outlay in fiscal year 1974 as I read it. And if I read the provisions of the bill correctly, the money will end up in DOD's pocket for the reimbursement of goods and services sold. Deputy Secretary of Defense Clements just as much as said so when he testified, and I will paraphrase, "If Israel defaults on the cash sales, the U.S. military departments may not be

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reimbursed." He is no doubt referring to the \$1.5 billion of cash sales made around October 1973.

I think either we have not yet obtained all of the facts we need to make a sensible decision or we are being sweet talked, hoodwinked, and gobble-de-gooked right out of our purse strings under the cover of aid to Israel.

At first we were told that we must provide a billion for arms already sold and shipped and for which Israel cannot pay. Then the President says we need another billion besides—but as I see it, this extra billion amounts to a giant contingency fund not supported by actual facts and figures, but rather, hazy estimates. The Deputy Secretary of Defense said we may be confronted with another bill for \$3 billion. The Deputy Secretary of State said that the Israelis have approached us and suggested they may need \$500 million a year—year after year—and we are studying the matter. Not much is being said of the outstanding debt on credit sales before October 6 in the amount of \$1.2 billion.

The \$2.2 billion looks piddley compared to these amounts thrown around. Setting a precedent with this bill, with this magnitude of potential cost overrun is not what I call appropriate—particularly with regard to the lack of congressional oversight of billions flowing every which way.

Although I am one who supports the theory that we should provide assistance to Israel, I cannot agree with the methods contained in this bill. I am not even bothering to propose an amendment because under the circumstances there is nowhere to begin—and it does not look like the bill is needed in the first place.

Whether this bill passes or not, laws already on the books provide ample authorization to give needed assistance to Israel provided the appropriations are available.

We have the Jackson amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1971 which authorizes unlimited assistance in this kind of situation. Under the amendment, which is in force till 1975, the assistance is authorized through credit sales and the President has the power to extend such credit in any shape, manner or form he chooses. Surely he can find a satisfactory credit arrangement that will ease Israel's acute economic burden. And I can see no objection to a simple conversion of the cash sales in question to a credit transaction.

There is one other matter I would like to take up. The committee has amended the bill directing the Secretary of Defense to study doctrine, tactics, assess arms effectiveness, compare U.S. arms with those of other major nations, consider program unit costs, and report to Congress.

I consider this amendment a direct affront to the committees and those Members in the House and the Senate concerned with the annual examination of the Defense Establishment. Nearly a month ago the Armed Services Committee started an examination of these very subjects. The committee did not ask the Secretary of Defense to do its work nor was there a law required to get the work

started. Twenty-one Members have already been to the Mideast to get a first hand observation and discussion of these matters and the investigation is continuing. To do less would amount to a shirking of committee responsibilities to the Congress and the taxpayer. I feel that the amendment in this bill is redundant and it seems nothing more than window-dressing hastily tacked on at the last minute.

SEC. 2. In addition to such amounts as may be otherwise authorized to be appropriated to the President for security assistance for the fiscal year 1974, there are hereby authorized to be appropriated to the President not to exceed \$2,220,000,000 for emergency military assistance or foreign military sales credits, or for both as the President may determine, for Israel, and not to exceed \$200,000,000 for emergency military assistance for Cambodia.

## COMMITTEE AMENDMENT

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will report the committee amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

On page 2, beginning in line 1, strike out "and not to exceed \$200,000,000 for emergency military assistance for Cambodia." and insert in lieu thereof the following: "of which sum amounts in excess of \$1,500,000,000 may be used pursuant to this section or section 4 of this Act only if the President (1) determines it to be important to our national interest that Israel receive assistance hereunder exceeding \$1,500,000,000, and (2) reports to Congress each such determination (if more than one) at least twenty days prior to date on which funds are obligated or expended under this Act in excess of such \$1,500,000,000 limitation. The twenty-day requirement contained in the preceding sentence shall not apply if hostilities are renewed in the Middle East. The President shall include in his report the amount of funds to be used pursuant to the determination, the terms of the additional assistance under section 2 or section 4, and the justification for the determination. All information contained in the justification shall be public information except to the extent that the President concludes that publication would be incompatible with the security interests of the United States."

The committee amendment was agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will read. The Clerk read as follows:

SEC. 3. Military assistance furnished out of funds appropriated under section 2 of this Act shall be furnished in accordance with all of the provisions applicable to military assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (75 Stat. 422; Public Law 87-195), as amended. Foreign military sales credits extended to Israel out of such funds shall be provided on such terms and conditions as the President may determine and without regard to the provisions of the Foreign Military Sales Act (82 Stat. 1320; Public Law 90-629), as amended.

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the remainder of the bill be considered as read, printed in the RECORD, and open to amendment at any point.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Pennsylvania?

There was no objection.

The Clerk read the remainder of the bill as follows:

SEC. 4. At any time prior to June 30, 1974, the President is hereby authorized, within the limits of funds appropriated under sec-

tion 2 of this Act for Israel, to release Israel from its contractual liability to pay for defense articles and defense services purchased or financed under the said Foreign Military Sale Act or under this Act during the period beginning October 6, 1973, and ending June 30, 1974, and such funds shall be used to reimburse current applicable appropriations, funds, and accounts of the Department of Defense for the value of such defense articles and defense services.

## COMMITTEE AMENDMENT

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will report the committee amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

On page 2, immediately after line 23, insert the following:

"SEC. 5. The Secretary of Defense shall conduct a study of the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict to ascertain the effectiveness of the foreign military assistance program as it relates to the Middle East conflict, including weapons that the United States is providing to Israel through foreign assistance programs, and to compare them to the effectiveness of the weapons which the Soviet Union is providing to the Arab states. In conducting such study and submitting such report, the Secretary shall take care not to disclose, directly or indirectly, intelligence sources or methods or confidential information received from any other nation. A report of the conclusions of such study shall be submitted to the Congress as soon as practical and in any case not later than December 31, 1974.

"SEC. 6. Of the funds appropriated pursuant to section 2, the President may use such sums as may be necessary from time to time for payment by the United States of its share of the expenses of the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East as apportioned by the United Nations in accordance with Article 17 of the United Nations Charter."

The committee amendment was agreed to.

## AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. GROSS

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. GROSS: Page 4, after line 10, add the following:

"Sec. 7. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, none of the funds authorized to be appropriated under section 2 of this Act shall be available for use as provided in this Act until the President determines and certifies to the Congress, in writing, that current energy supplies available for use to meet current energy needs of the United States have been restored to the level of such supplies so available on October 5, 1973."

## POINT OF ORDER

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, I reserve a point of order against the amendment.

Mr. GROSS. Why does not the gentleman go ahead and make it? I do not want to waste any energy. If the gentleman is going to make a point of order, let him make it.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman from Pennsylvania insist on his point of order?

Mr. MORGAN. I do, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order against the amendment in that it deals with a subject that is not germane to the bill. As a matter of fact, it deals with an energy crisis in an emergency situation.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman from Iowa wish to be heard on the point of order?

Mr. GROSS. No, Mr. Chairman, I do

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not wish to be heard on the point of order. I do not accede to it.

The CHAIRMAN (Mr. MURPHY of New York). The Chair sustains the point of order because the amendment would make the authority contained in the bill dependent on an unrelated contingency.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. FINDLEY

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. FINDLEY: On page 4, after line 10, add a new Section 7 to read as follows:

"Sec. 7. In addition to the maintenance of the balance of military power in the Middle East, the military assistance authorized herein for Israel is intended to support the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) and United Nations Security Council Resolution 338 (1973)."

(Mr. FINDLEY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Chairman, this bill I feel deserves careful examination for a number of reasons, but the great fundamental flaw is the absence of even a single word which shows recognition on the part of the Congress that Arab States, as well as Israel, have legitimate interests at stake.

My proposal for correcting the defect is a modest one: Include language which refers favorably to United Nations Resolution 242 of 1967, and the supportive U.N. resolution 338 of this year is a balanced thoughtful resolution still strongly supported by the United States and all other major powers. It calls upon Israel as well as the Arab States to accept certain principles as the basis for a peaceful settlement.

The amendment—printed in the committee report on page 13—would not reduce by one penny the financial and military assistance for Israel authorized by this act. It would not extend financial or military assistance in any form to any Arab State. But it would do something vitally important: It would place the prestige of the House of Representatives behind fairness and evenhandedness as the basis for our Middle East policy.

True, the bill as reported says nothing about policy. It is nevertheless thunderous as a policy document. It supports explicitly and implicitly only the military interests of Israel. It contemplates only a military solution to the problem.

Israel of course has interests which the United States should support, and for that reason I voted to report this bill. But so do other parties to the recent military conflict; namely, Egypt and Jordan, with which we have diplomatic relations, and Syria, with which we do not.

Testimony before the committee disclosed that, except for a few minor commando actions, all the fighting in October occurred on Arab land occupied by Israel since 1967. The chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Thomas Moorer, testified that he had no reason to believe the Arab States had military objectives in October extending beyond the recovery of these occupied lands. American intelligence reported that the

Egyptian battle plan called for stopping at the June 1967 borders and for not pressing the attack into Israel.

Two Presidents have recognized and supported the interests of Arab States, as well as Israel, by sponsoring and steadfastly supporting United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 in 1967 and Security Council Resolution 338 this year. Just 2 weeks ago Secretary of State Kissinger restated U.S. support for these two resolutions:

The United States has committed itself, in Security Council Resolution 338, to support the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 in all of its parts.

He went on to say:

We hope that Israel, as well as the Arab countries, will recognize that one of the clear consequences of recent events is that a purely military solution to the problems of the Middle East is impossible.

This bill, is silent on nonmilitary solutions and Arab interests. It is advanced as necessary to "maintain the balance of power" in the Middle East, but Arab States could understandably interpret it as a bill to help maintain only the occupation of Arab lands.

The House should amend the bill in order to avoid such a misinterpretation. It should explicitly endorse the wise initiative toward a peaceful settlement of the Middle East conflict which two Presidents have advanced. The amendment I offered in committee will provide badly needed balance to this bill.

My amendment, which I will offer in the House, states:

In addition to the maintenance of the balance of military power in the Middle East, the Military Assistance authorized herein for Israel is intended to support the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) and United Nations Security Council Resolution 338 (1973).

My amendment will provide needed balance. It will do no harm to the interests of Israel. Indeed, it should help the negotiating position of our diplomats and thus enhance the possibility that this massive provision of military assistance will actually become a powerful force for a just peace.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FINDLEY. I yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. The two United Nations Security Council resolutions which the gentleman mentions in his amendment have for years been the policy of the United States; is that not true?

Mr. FINDLEY. That is certainly true of the executive branch but unfortunately to this moment the Congress has never stated its own position in regard to U.N. Resolution 242.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. I join the gentleman from Illinois in his efforts to bring balance to the bill. It is my sincere hope the members of the committee will support the amendment.

Mr. FINDLEY. I thank the gentleman from Wisconsin very much.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Illinois has expired.

(On request of Mr. ICHORD, Mr. FINDLEY was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)

(Mr. ICHORD asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Chairman, I rise to commend the gentleman from Illinois for offering this amendment. As the gentleman from Wisconsin has stated, it will bring balance to the bill.

The war between the Arabs and the Israelis, is an enormously complex controversy. It is going to be extremely difficult to obtain a just and lasting peace. But it is to the interests of not only the United States, but the entire world, that peace be obtained in the Mideast, because the closing of the Suez Canal, for example, in my opinion stands as a monument to the stupidity of man; but if a peace is to be reached, it must be reached within the framework of resolution 242 of the United Nations.

I would hope that the chairman of the committee will accept the amendment of the gentleman from Illinois. I commend him for his offering it.

Mr. FINDLEY. I thank the gentleman very much.

(Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment. A few minutes ago the gentleman from Illinois and I had a brief discussion regarding the language which in his mind would make this bill more balanced. The thing that disturbs me is the fact that the gentleman seems to be trying to write legislative history to indicate, without the language he is now proposing, that in some way we were intentionally trying to slap the Arabs. He says the Arabs might interpret U.S. assistance to Israel as being provided only on the basis of a continuing occupation by Israel of the Arab lands.

I can see no justification for such a contention or belief on the part of anyone, including the gentleman from Illinois. He says that the fundamental flaw in the language of the bill as written is its failure to recognize that the Arabs have legitimate interests. How could he possibly justify a contention that we Members of Congress do not recognize that the Arabs have legitimate interests in the area? I would think a child must know the Arabs have legitimate interests.

The fact that we are providing assistance to Israel should not by any stretch of the imagination be considered as an indication that we do not think the Arabs have any rights.

What the gentleman seems to be saying is that the language of Resolution 242 will give a pro-Arab flavor to what we are doing.

As the gentleman indicated earlier, I do not think this should be interpreted as an anti-Arab move in any sense. Necessity compels us to restore the military balance in the Middle East.

I, myself, think it is entirely unfounded to suggest that we are going around bankrolling wars as the gentleman from Iowa has just claimed.

I think it is even more untenable to charge, as the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. HAYS) just did, that we are arming both sides to keep this thing going.

I do not snicker at our administration officials who say that our objective is peace. Our objective is peace. Our objective in this bill, though obviously providing assistance to only one side, is not to encourage war, but to develop conditions that will produce peace.

The fact that there is no reference to Resolution 242 in the bill should not be considered, unless we make it so, a repudiation of the principles of Resolution 242.

As the gentleman from Illinois himself suggested, the fact that Israel supported the U.N. Resolution 242 indicates that it can be read almost any way anyone wants to read it.

What does this resolution say? It says that we are interested in the establishment of a just and lasting peace. Of course, we are. It says that we are interested in fair and recognized boundaries, free from threats or acts of force.

Of course we are. But to some extent the wording and the language of Resolution 242 is out of date. What we should be concerned with is the practical situation in which the countries of the Middle East find themselves.

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to finish, and I do have 5 minutes. If I have the time, I shall be glad to yield.

If, in the course of negotiations, all the participants recognize the continued validity of Resolution 242, more power to them. All I am saying is, this amendment provides no balance; it does not provide a pro-Arab bias regarding what we are doing nor will it prevent us from being considered anti-Arab, because we are aiding Israel.

The gentleman says it does not reduce the amount we are giving Israel. That is the point; it is already well known in the Arab world that the President would like to provide aid and the expectation is that Congress will provide it. So I would suggest that we are not doing any good by incorporating this language, and it could complicate the situation.

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman very conveniently refrained from referring to a very important item in the United Nations Resolution 242 which states,

Withdrawal of Israeli Armed Forces from territory occupied in recent conflicts.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Chairman, I did not very conveniently fail to recognize that language; it was the lack of time. In fact, I specifically recognized that language in my previous remarks. Of course, there is recognition on the part of this country and Israel that there be an adjustment of territory.

Mr. DENNIS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

Mr. Chairman, the basic imbalance in this situation is a result of imbalance in the past. The gentleman from New Jersey is quite correct that the amendment offered by the gentleman from Illinois will not correct that imbalance. On the other hand, it is very difficult for me to see why anybody should object to this amendment.

It is very true that it does very little. As the gentleman from Illinois says, it does not hurt the Israelis or hurt anybody. Actually, all it is, is a sort of an expression of congressional intent.

But, I think in that fashion it is important because what it says, in effect, is that although we are trying to maintain that military balance in the Mid East, we are doing it as a step in maintaining peace and we are doing it in the recognition and with the intent that in the end we want a just and balanced peace, something beyond a mere maintaining of military balance.

If we vote against that amendment, it seems to me that in effect we are saying that all we are interested in is a military balance; that we are not concerned with going ahead and arriving at the type of peace which Resolution 242 envisages. I think that is what the gentleman from Illinois is trying to do, and I cannot see any possible harm in adopting the amendment, and much good may flow from it.

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DENNIS. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for his words and support. I would like to take this opportunity to respond to something the gentleman from New Jersey said. He indicated that my amendment was intended to give a pro-Arab flavor to the bill, or that the amendment has a pro-Arab flavor. Nothing could be further from the truth, and an examination of the amendment and United Nations Resolution 242 will show that.

Furthermore, the gentleman from New Jersey has stated his personal support for United Nations Resolution 242, so I am at a loss to understand why there should be any objection on his part or on the part of anyone else to including this very beneficial balanced language.

Mr. DENNIS. Mr. Chairman, neither the gentleman from Illinois nor the gentleman from Indiana wants to give a pro anybody flavor. We are interested in even handed justice.

Mr. PRICE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

(Mr. PRICE of Texas asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. PRICE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I rise to discuss the amendment offered by the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. FINDLEY).

I had not planned to take part in the discussion on this bill. However, I think it is time that some of us stand up and let it be known to the Members of this body what we learned on the trip that the Committee on Armed Services took to Israel and Egypt recently.

We met in Israel with General Dayan and received a briefing from him about the war. We met with their economic advisers. We met with Mrs. Meir for an hour and a half, and the war and economic situation was discussed very thoroughly and frankly.

We saw firsthand the captured Russian materials that were in Israeli hands.

We went to the front at the Suez Canal and viewed the territory that was held by the Israelis on the Egyptian side of the canal. And while in Egypt we traveled to and crossed the Suez Canal to the Egyptian front.

While in Israel we were told of the economic hardships that are now being brought upon the State of Israel and the losses that were sustained by their people in men and materials. We were told that approximately 60,000 immigrants are coming into that nation every year and is costing \$40,000 per family to relocate.

Mr. Chairman, I do not know what part of our assistance goes for the settlement of people of the Jewish race in Israel, but I am wondering if it is the position of the citizens of our country that our taxpayers should be called upon to provide assistance for the relocation of a race of people in peripatetic.

I want it clearly understood that I have no animosity toward the Jewish people of this country or the Nation of Israel or toward the Arabic people of this country of Egypt.

To continue conveying my observations on our trip to the Mideast, we then proceeded to Egypt, and we met with President Sadat for 1½ hours, and the very question was asked that the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. FINDLEY) brought out in his amendment.

He said, "Why are you Americans furnishing weaponry and not only taxing your people to give them this weaponry but to sell them this weaponry to kill Egyptian people when we have been your friends for years?"

And they also asked us at the same time, "Why are you loaning and giving \$2.2 billion to Israel, in order to kill Egyptian people?"

Honestly, it was difficult to reply to this question.

President Sadat said that the Sinai had belonged to the Egyptian people for 7,000 years, and they intended to take it back.

He said, "You are always worrying about the protection of the Israelis. What about the protection of the Egyptian people? We, too, would like to have some type of protection and guarantee."

Then the thought was brought out: Why not have a buffer zone as called for under U.N. section 242? However, the U.N. forces have not been able to enforce or guarantee any buffer zone for either side as long as the Russians continue their aggression in all parts of the world.

Mr. Chairman, in my opinion, the U.N., in the Middle East, with regard to this war, is a joke. We observed a U.N. man standing there with a gun, and he could not have turned back anybody or enforced anything. It is a tribunal that sits there, and it is a farce, in my estimation. Both sides, Egyptians, Syrians, and Israelis, can push them aside immediately if they want to move tomorrow, and the U.N. would not make one iota of difference.

Why do we not try to settle the problem with all countries involved? Both countries say, "Yes, we want peace," and then they say, "We want peace, but we want arms to carry out this peace."

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The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

(Mr. PRICE of Texas, by unanimous consent, was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)

Mr. PRICE of Texas. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania for a question.

Mr. MORGAN. I wonder whether any member of the Armed Services Committee that was over there asked President Sadat where he got the SAM-2, SAM-3, SAM-6, and SAM-7 missiles, and SCUD missiles, and Frog missiles, and Sagger antitank missiles, and T-62 tanks, and Mig-21 jet fighter planes and a lot of other military equipment and under what terms?

Mr. PRICE of Texas. They bought them from Russia and said they would be glad to buy the F-4's from us if we would sell them to them.

Mr. MORGAN. Does the gentleman think they bought them?

Mr. PRICE of Texas. All I know is what the gentleman told us. I am not tied to any position. I was a young man in 1947 and I was not in the Government at that time. I am not arguing for or against either side but trying to discuss it so that hopefully we can make a decision on the matter on the merits.

Mr. MORGAN. I am sure that in the Armed Services Committee, the gentleman was told about the amount of tonnage of military equipment the Soviets sent into Syria and Egypt before the October hostilities, and again after the hostilities began, as compared to what we have furnished to Israel. It was a much greater tonnage of arms than what we sent to Israel as replacement for war losses. I am sure the gentleman realizes that Israel has an economy that is at least twice as developed as the economy of Egypt, so it is difficult to imagine how Egypt could possibly have paid for those arms.

Mr. PRICE of Texas. According to the figures presented to me, the Russians shipped 15,000 tons over a period of days and we shipped 14,800 tons over a period of time.

Mr. MORGAN. I am talking about the whole period since the start of the war.

Mr. PRICE of Texas. I agree with the gentleman. President Sadat said that the \$2.2 billion of course, will be taken as an affront to the Egyptian people. Of course they are going to take it as an affront. I would do so and so would you. But I am saying that we are not going to help solve the Middle East problem if we keep pumping more money and pumping more equipment in there. We do realize that perhaps the overall problem is really between Russia and ourselves aside from the Israeli-Arabic war.

Mr. WOLFF. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PRICE of Texas. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. WOLFF. Can the gentleman tell me on what side the Arab nations were in World War II and on what side they were in World War I?

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

(Mr. DERWINSKI asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. DERWINSKI. Mr. Chairman, I hope to return this debate to the amendment before us. Basically I rise in opposition to the amendment. I think it is superfluous to the bill before us.

I have just discussed the matter with the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. FINDLEY) and I do not think this amendment does a disservice to the measure, but I do not believe it adds anything, either.

The important thing is that in the next week negotiations will take place in Geneva. The bill before us is a practical recognition of the fact that one of the ways in which we hope to keep the peace is to maintain a legitimate military balance there. That is the basic intention of this proposal before us.

Calling for compliance with Resolution 242 again, I say, does not perform a disservice, but there is hardly anyone in the United Nations who agrees on exactly what Resolution 242 means. I believe at this point, outside of being a momentous number in history—at least in the history of the United Nations—Resolution 242 will be rendered obsolete at the start of peace negotiations approximately a week from now in Geneva.

As I understand the issue before us, it is possible for the military balance to be maintained so that peace will be maintained during the course of what will be long, delicate, frustrating but eventually, we hope, successful peace negotiations.

I am not aware of anyone who wants a new outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East. I look upon this basic bill as an investment in peace in the Middle East. Since it does not add a needed feature, I would suggest we reject the amendment.

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DERWINSKI. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Chairman, I realize that the gentleman from Illinois regards this as a very modest and ineffective amendment, but I want to point out that others do not so view it.

For example, former U.N. Ambassador Charles Yost read the language of the amendment, and he said, "I strongly support it." He said, "I think it ought to be written into the bill."

People from the Arab States not only in this country, but elsewhere, view resolution 242 as a significant statement of U.N. policy. It does have importance and value in their eyes. And if for no other reason, the Congress ought to seize this opportunity to support this.

Mr. DERWINSKI. I still do not believe that proves that this particular amendment deserves support at the present time. I do not see the point in further cluttering up the bill.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DERWINSKI. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.

Mr. FASCELL. Will the gentleman agree that the timing of this particular amendment is of great significance? Here is a U.N. resolution which has been

on the statute books since the last war, renewed in October of 1973. This has been accepted as U.S. policy, enunciated by the President, and voted on by the United States in the U.N. Now the gentleman says let us have the Congress put its stamp of approval into the bill. I think that this is interjecting an entirely new element in this bill. We have come here to talk about authorizations for funds for helping Israel, and to inject a U.N. resolution dealing with a certain policy I think puts an entirely new light on the problem. Obviously it can only be interpreted to mean something in terms of pending negotiations and thus would be dangerous to adopt at this particular moment. The timing of the effort of the gentleman from Illinois is what gives this amendment on unfortunate interpretation. It can be read as a U.S. effort to pressure the pending negotiations differently from that already established. And the meaning of the U.N. resolutions can only be determined by the negotiations.

Does not the gentleman agree that putting this amendment in this bill at this time could give it a erroneous interpretation even though unintended?

Mr. DERWINSKI. I agree with the gentleman from Florida, and may I say frankly that humility requires me to admit that the gentleman from Florida has made the argument much better than I did myself.

I again suggest that we defeat this amendment.

Mr. SMITH of New York. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words, and I rise in strong support of the amendment.

(Mr. SMITH of New York asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SMITH of New York. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from Illinois in his supplemental views says that this would do something vitally important, and I agree with the gentleman. It would place the prestige of the House of Representatives behind fairness and evenhandedness as the basis for our Middle East policy.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. FINDLEY) a question, and that is has the committee talked to Secretary of State Dr. Kissinger in regard to similar language?

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield, shortly after this bill was introduced by the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. MORGAN) Henry Kissinger appeared before our Committee on Foreign Affairs here in the Capitol Office, and in response to a question I raised he said:

I have no objection to this bill being amended by including language which would state the support of the Congress for U.N. Resolution 242.

## POINT OF ORDER

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, a point of order. I believe the gentleman from Illinois is quoting a remark which may have been made, or may not have been made, in executive session.

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Chairman, if I have violated a rule of the House I certainly apologize. I will say that he certainly did

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not qualify by any secrecy known to me his views on this.

I was asking him for his position on an amendment to a bill which is very public in its character. I will add further that shortly before this I had one of these rare opportunities to be in the Oval Room, and the President told me of his own personal support for the terms of U.N. Resolution 242. So support of U.N. Resolution 242 is obviously something that the administration is not at least ashamed of, and I hope the gentleman will not press his point of order.

Mr. WOLFF. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SMITH of New York. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. WOLFF. I think the gentleman for yielding.

I should like to take the time to ask the gentleman, was not this amendment brought up in committee, and was it not defeated in committee?

Mr. FINDLEY. Yes, to my sorrow it was turned down by a very substantial vote. I regret that my lack of ability to argue its merits caused it to fail upon that occasion, but I have high hopes for today.

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SMITH of New York. I yield to the chairman, the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, I made by point. I withdraw my point of order.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SMITH of New York. I yield to the gentleman from New Jersey.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

The gentleman has suggested that in some way this language would show that Congress is interested in fairness and evenhandedness. Is there anything in the language of this bill that makes the gentleman think that we would not be interested in fairness and evenhandedness if this amendment were not included?

Mr. SMITH of New York. If I were a member of an Arab nation of the Middle East and read the bill, I would not think this body was too fair and evenhanded.

I would urge this committee to adopt the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the remainder of my time.

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

(Mr. ICHORD asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Chairman, I rise in behalf of the amendment of the gentleman from Illinois. Let me say that I cannot understand how the Committee can possibly oppose this amendment. Let me read what the amendment says:

Sec. 6. In addition to the maintenance of the balance of military power in the Middle East, the Military Assistance authorized herein for Israel is intended to support the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) and United Nations Security Council Resolution 338 (1973).

It is true, as the gentleman from New Jersey states, there are different inter-

pretations of United Nations Resolution 242, but both the Israelis and the Arabs have stated that they agree with the United Nations Resolution 242.

Let me state to the members of the Committee that I have the greatest respect and admiration for the Israel nation and for the courage of her soldiers. There is no doubt, as stated by the gentleman from Texas (Mr. PRICE) the war between the Arabs and the Israelis is one of quality against quantity—quality supplied in weapons by the United States of America, and quantity supplied to the Arab nations by the nation of Russia. The Israelis are using our weapons, I would state, even better, in my opinion, than we can use the weapons ourselves. The military strategy carried out by the Israelis in the recent war was daring, brave, and nothing short of brilliant.

I have the greatest respect and admiration for Israel and her soldiers and we do have a vital interest in the continuance of Israel as a nation. But, Mr. Chairman, the Israelis by the occupation of Sinai have done something for the Egyptians that no Egyptian leader has been able to do for 5,000 years: it has united the Egyptians. The Egyptians are united and they are ready and willing to die, if necessary, to regain the Sinai.

I ask the gentleman from New Jersey to answer this question. As the gentleman from Texas stated, we were repeatedly asked by President Sadat and other Egyptian leaders this question: What have we done as a nation to cause you to supply the Israelis guns and ammunitions to kill our innocent women and children and to occupy our land? They pointed out that they were not Communists by any stretch of the imagination; that their Moslem religion precluded their ever going communistic; that many of their leaders were educated in the United States; that they had the utmost respect for our Nation and all for which it stands. This was not the easiest question for us to answer. Oh, yes, we could answer the question obliquely by saying that we were not supplying the weapons to kill Egyptians; that we were supplying the weapons to maintain a balance of power and we could also state that the Israelis could say the same thing about Russian arms. To say the least, this is a difficult question to answer to their satisfaction. What have they done to us? As the gentleman from Illinois has stated, we should have balance in the bill. We should recognize that Egypt and other Arab nations who want to be our friends do have legitimate interests.

I state to the gentleman from New Jersey that, if we are going to obtain a peace in the Middle East, it will have to be within the framework of the United Nations Resolution 242.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ICHORD. I yield to the gentleman from New Jersey.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Missouri has expired.

(On request of Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN, and by unanimous consent, Mr. ICHORD was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. Chairman, I thought the gentleman was asking me a question. All the gentleman has made me think is that perhaps some members of the Foreign Affairs Committee should have accompanied the members of the Armed Services Committee if they were not able to answer that question that the Egyptians posed.

We are not anxious to give anybody arms, and Lord knows we are not anxious to pour a substantial amount of arms into the Middle East. We are doing it because the Soviet Union and others have been pouring arms into Egypt and Syria.

Of course, there must be something other than a military effort to resolve the difficulty. Of course, there must be a recognition of concessions on the part of both sides along the lines of Resolution 242.

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Chairman, I decline to yield further. We are not making any interpretations of the United Nations Resolution 242. Why is the gentleman objecting to the amendment? The Israelis have said they agree with 242 and the Arabs have said they agree with 242. Why should not the Congress of the United States agree with Resolution 242?

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. If the gentleman is asking me a question, I am not suggesting we should not. I am suggesting the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. FINDLEY) and the gentleman and others are making a mountain out of a molehill. Nobody is suggesting because we do not have language with respect to Resolution 242 in this bill that we are somehow repudiating it. I am saying, if we want to state the U.S. position, we can do it in some way other than by adopting the weasel wording of Resolution 242—and I mean no disrespect to the U.N. by this description—but it was passed in 1967. I do not think it adds much to the prestige of the House of Representatives one way or another to support this U.N. resolution. I would suggest we vote against the amendment.

Mr. ICHORD. I would put it the other way around. I would say, if the amendment does not amount to anything, why is the committee making a mountain out of a molehill?

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the Findley amendment. In doing so let me also observe that of course on the Armed Services trip to the Middle East we had a lot of democracy, since obviously not all the members of that subcommittee see eye to eye on this legislation. But as long as there has been some reference to the President of Egypt (and I have some qualms as to exactly how much of that conversation we ought to discuss here) I think it should be made clear, and I speak now as just one of the members of that delegation and not in an official capacity as its chairman, that it was perfectly obvious to all of us that President Sadat's primary concern is to get back to Arab territories.

He made it clear to all of us in the dis-

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discussion that that was his objective, and if that objective is achieved and peace is obtained in the Middle East, then he is not worried whether Israel gets \$2.2 billion or \$3.2 billion. His concern is to achieve peace; and although some members of our subcommittee have spoken on one side of this amendment this afternoon and other members have spoken on the other side, I feel strongly that both sides in the Middle East sincerely want peace and that there is a real opportunity to achieve peace. In my judgment this particular bill goes to the heart of achieving that peace because it will help to achieve the military balance on which any kind of effective peace must be founded.

Now with specific regard to the amendment offered by the gentleman from Illinois dealing with U.N. Resolution 242, the fact of the matter is, that this resolution, which of course we all support, actually says a great many things, as former Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg said and in an article in the Washington Post on Sunday. The fact is that Resolution 242, like most good political documents, including the ceasefire agreement in the Middle East negotiated by Mr. Kissinger, contained a substantial number of ambiguities. And so the fact of the matter is that putting a reference to it in this legislation does not commit us on either side.

Actually the achievement of peace in the Middle East will depend on what the Peace Conference which convenes on the 18th of December in Geneva decides what Resolution 242 means.

I believe we would be making a very serious mistake here on this floor, when we are being presented with a simple measure directed toward one single aspect of this overall problem, the military aspect, that we should try to get into the specific details of those peace negotiations, which we simply cannot do here on the floor of this House.

The place to determine what Resolution 242 really means is in the Peace Conference. We ought to leave that business up to the participants in the Peace Conference and not try to include it in this legislation.

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

I can assure the Members of this House that there is nothing in this bill that we are considering here today that is in any way anti-Arab. There is nothing here that is anti-Arab at all.

This is not a policy bill, as many speakers have pointed out, but a bill which involves existing U.S. policy.

I hope we do not get into the writing of policies here, as the gentleman from New York said. Negotiations are going to start on the 18th of this month and here we are being confronted with a policy matter, which could certainly harm those negotiations.

Mr. KETCHUM. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MORGAN. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. KETCHUM. Did we not just exact such a policy in the trade bill a few minutes ago?

Mr. MORGAN. The gentleman did not vote for the trade bill. I am not defend-

ing what happened then. I am defending this bill.

The amendment of the gentleman from Illinois in my opinion will add more controversy to the negotiations that are going to start on the 18th.

Mr. MAILLIARD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MORGAN. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. MAILLIARD. I do not think there is any harm in the substance of the amendment; but to try to go back to a policy established by the United Nations 6 years ago when we are in a whole new ball game is just unwise.

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, I urge defeat of the amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. FINDLEY).

The question was taken and the Chair announced that the yeas appeared to have it.

## RECORDED VOTE

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.

A recorded vote was ordered.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—ayes 82, yeas 334, not voting 16, as follows:

[Roll No. 646]

## AYES—82

Baker  
Bauman  
Bennett  
Bowen  
Burleson, Tex.  
Burkison, Mo.  
Butler  
Chisholm  
Cochran  
Collier  
Cronin  
Daniel, Robert  
W. Jr.  
Davis, Wis.  
De la Garza  
Dellenback  
Dennis  
du Pont  
Edwards, Ala.  
Evins, Tenn.  
Findley  
Ford  
William D.  
Gibbons  
Ginn  
Gross  
Hammer-  
schmidt  
Hanna

Hansen, Wash.  
Hastings  
Heinz  
Hicks  
Holt  
Hosmer  
Hutchinson  
Ichord  
Jarman  
Johnson, Colo.  
Jones, Okla.  
Jones, Tenn.  
Kastenmeier  
Kazen  
Ketchum  
Landrum  
Lott  
McClary  
McCloskey  
Mann  
Maraziti  
Martin, Nebr.  
Martin, N.C.  
Mayne  
Mazzoli  
Miller  
Mink  
Montgomery  
Mosher  
Nedzi

## NOES—334

Abzug  
Adams  
Addabbo  
Alexander  
Anderson,  
Calif.  
Anderson, Ill.  
Andrews, N.C.  
Andrews,  
N. Dak.  
Annunzio  
Archer  
Arends  
Armstrong  
Ashbrook  
Ashley  
Aspin  
Badiolo  
Bafalis  
Barrett  
Beard  
Bell  
Bergland  
Bevil  
Biaggi  
Biesler  
Bligham  
Blackburn  
Blatnik

Boggs  
Boland  
Bolling  
Brademas  
Brasco  
Bray  
Breaux  
Breckinridge  
Brinkley  
Brooks  
Broomfield  
Brotzman  
Brown, Calif.  
Brown, Mich.  
Brown, Ohio  
Broyhill, N.C.  
Broyhill, Va.  
Buchanan  
Burgener  
Burke, Fla.  
Burke, Mass.  
Burton  
Byron  
Camp  
Carey, N.Y.  
Carney, Ohio  
Carter  
Casey, Tex.  
Cederberg

Denholm  
Dent  
Derwinski  
Devine  
Dickinson  
Diggs  
Dingell  
Donohue  
Dorn  
Downing  
Drinan  
Dulski  
Duncan  
Eckhardt  
Edwards, Calif.  
Filberg  
Fisch  
Eshleman  
Evans, Colo.  
Fascell  
Fish  
Flood  
Flowers  
Foley  
Forsythe  
Fountain  
Fraser  
Frelinghuysen  
Frenzel  
Frey  
Froehlich  
Fulton  
Fuqua  
Gaydos  
Gettys  
Giammo  
Gilman  
Goldwater  
Gonzalez  
Goodling  
Grasso  
Gray  
Green, Oreg.  
Green, Pa.  
Griffiths  
Grover  
Gubser  
Gude  
Gunter  
Guyer  
Haley  
Hamilton  
Hanley  
Hanrahan  
Hansen, Idaho  
Harrington  
Harsha  
Harvey  
Hawkins  
Hays  
Hechler, W. Va.  
Heckler, Mass.  
Helstoski  
Henderson  
Hillis  
Hinshaw  
Hogan  
Hollifield  
Holtzman  
Horton  
Howard  
Huber  
Hudnut  
Hungate  
Johnson, Calif.  
Johnson, Pa.  
Jones, Ala.  
Jones, N.C.  
Jordan  
Karth  
Kanting  
Kemp  
King  
Kluczynski  
Koch

Kuykendall  
Kyros  
Landgrebe  
Latta  
Leggett  
Lehman  
Lent  
Littton  
Long, La.  
Long, Md.  
Lujan  
McCollister  
McCormack  
McDade  
McEwen  
McFall  
McKay  
McKinney  
McSpadden  
Macdonald  
Madden  
Madigan  
Mahon  
Mailiard  
Mallory  
Mathias, Calif.  
Mathis, Ga.  
Matsunaga  
Meeds  
Melcher  
Metcalfe  
Mezvinisky  
Michel  
Milford  
Minish  
Minshall, Ohio  
Mitchell, N.Y.  
Mizell  
Moakley  
Mollohan  
Moorhead,  
Calif.  
Moorhead, Pa.  
Morgan  
Moss  
Murphy, Ill.  
Murphy, N.Y.  
Myers  
Natcher  
Nelsen  
Nichols  
Nix  
Obey  
O'Brien  
O'Hara  
O'Neill  
Owens  
Passman  
Patman  
Patten  
Pepper  
Perkins  
Pettis  
Peyser  
Pickle  
Pike  
Podell  
Preyer  
Price, Ill.  
Quie  
Quillen  
Rallsback  
Randall  
Rangel  
Rees  
Regula  
Reid  
Reuss  
Rhodes  
Riegle  
Rinaldo  
Robinson, Va.  
Robison, N.Y.  
Rodino  
Roe

## NOT VOTING—16

Abdnor  
Burke, Calif.  
Erlenborn  
Fisher  
Hébert  
Hunt  
Mills, Ark.  
Mitchell, Md.  
Rooney, N.Y.  
Shoup  
Steed  
Stokes

Sullivan  
Veysey  
Walsh  
Wyatt

So the amendment was rejected.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

## AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. SIKES

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

December 11, 1973

## CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

Amendment offered by Mr. SIKES: On page 4, after line 10, add a new Section 7:

"It is the sense of Congress that every reasonable effort be made by the President to bring about meaningful negotiations between Israel and the Arab states directly concerned leading to a treaty of peace in the Middle East and to a resumption of diplomatic and trade relations between the United States and the Arab countries, and between Israel and the Arab countries."

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, I reserve a point of order on the amendment.

(Mr. SIKES asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that I may be permitted to speak for an additional 2 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Florida?

There was no objection.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Florida is recognized for 7 minutes.

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Chairman, I believe this amendment is very clear. I question that it requires detailed discussion. I am hopeful that the Committee will accept the amendment.

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SIKES. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, I have had some consultation with the gentleman from Florida, and if the point of order which has been reserved by the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. GROSS) to the amendment offered by the gentleman from Florida (Mr. SIKES) is overruled by the Chair, then I, as the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, would accept the amendment. I think it is a good amendment.

One of the principal objectives of the bill before us is to promote lasting peace in the Middle East—peace which can only come through negotiations between Israel and the Arab countries, and which will benefit all concerned.

The amendment of the gentleman from Florida (Mr. SIKES) seeks that same objective and for that reason I would support it.

Mr. MAILLIARD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SIKES. I yield to the gentleman from California (Mr. MAILLIARD), the ranking minority member on the committee.

Mr. MAILLIARD. Mr. Chairman, while I have not had opportunity for consultation with all of the minority committee members, as far as I am personally concerned I am agreeable to accepting the amendment.

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Chairman, I had been disposed to try to save this time, but now that a point of order has been reserved I feel constrained to discuss the amendment, even though it has been accepted by the committee on both sides of the aisle.

Mr. Chairman, the language of the amendment is carried in the report on the appropriations bill which will follow this bill. It was overwhelmingly adopted by the Appropriations Committee.

Let me make it clear that I support the legislation now before the House. I

realize that without positive help for Israel from the United States that nation would in a few years cease to exist. Arab power is growing, and other nations are backing away from Israel because of concern for Arab purchasing power, and the need for Arab oil.

Our Nation has strong ties with Israel which have caused us to look beyond the considerations that are influencing other nations. But we also have an additional reason for apprehension. We know how Russian influence has grown in the Middle East. We know that Russian naval ships are based in Yemen, Iraq, Egypt, and Somalia, and that Russian ships, in large numbers, are regularly visiting most ports of the area. We know that Russia is supplying advanced weapons to virtually every country that is anti-Israel. If Israel should cease to exist as a nation, it will be Russia that dominates the Middle East, and which exercises new and fearsome control over Europe and much of the free world elsewhere.

The reasons for my amendment should be very clear. It not only is important, it is essential that peace be restored to the area as quickly as possible—not an armed truce of the kind which has existed for a quarter of a century with constantly recurring wars—a lasting peace which is acceptable to both Israel and to the Arab States. I think it is a mistake to pass this bill without a hope for peace and an expressed desire that the President make every reasonable effort to obtain a lasting peace. Otherwise, this bill speaks only for the U.S. concern for arms for Israel.

Having achieved peace, it is equally important that the Congress show an interest in the resumption of normal diplomatic and trade relations with the Arab countries. Nearly all of those countries want our friendship. They do not want the doors closed to normal relations with the United States. How much better it would be if we show that beyond the immediate necessity of keeping Israel alive, we want both peace and normal relations with the Arab countries and, indeed, with and between all of the countries of the world, including peace and normal relations between Israel and the Arab States.

There are those who say that we cannot deal with some Arab nations. They use Libya as an example. Who can say that the present policies of Libya will continue or that another government in Libya will not in time be friendly to America?

Let us leave the door open. This amendment can help to show both sides that we want peace, that we want meaningful negotiations, that we want to live in harmony with all nations. It takes nothing away from the Israelis. It gives nothing to the Arabs. But it shows that we are not blind to the future.

Indeed, how important it would be if peace were to come quickly and Arab oil would flow again to the United States. This could prevent cold homes and stalled transportation and increasing unemployment before the end of winter.

The Arabs have said that oil will be available if peace returns.

The rank and file of the American people want peace in the Middle East and trade with the Arab nations. This amendment endorses that hope. I trust that it will be accepted, and I sincerely hope that the distinguished gentleman from Iowa will not insist on his point of order.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SIKES. I yield to the gentleman from Alabama.

Mr. BUCHANAN. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I should like to commend the distinguished gentleman on his amendment, and I wish to associate myself with his remarks.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman from Iowa insist on his point of order?

Mr. GROSS. I do, Mr. Chairman. This amendment is window dressing. It calls upon the President to resume diplomatic and trade relations between certain nations and clearly goes beyond the scope of this bill.

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Chairman, this amendment expresses the hope and asks the President to move to bring to the Middle East. It expresses the hope that we will be able to resume normal trade relations with all nations, and that other nations, the Arabs and the Israelis, will be able to resume diplomatic and normal trade relations. I feel that it does not impose additional requirements. I feel that it adds to and supplements the language of the bill, and that the point of order should not be sustained.

The CHAIRMAN (Mr. MURPHY of New York). The Chair has studied the amendment and will state that the amendment goes to the question of negotiations involving Arab and United States trade and diplomatic relations and is not within the purview of this legislation. The Chair sustains the point of order of the gentleman from Iowa. Are there further amendments? If not, under the rule, Committee rises.

Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker having resumed the chair, Mr. MURPHY of New York, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that Committee having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 11088) to provide emergency security assistance authorizations for Israel and Cambodia, pursuant to House Resolution 742, he reported the bill back to the House with sundry amendments adopted by the Committee of the Whole.

The SPEAKER. Under the rule, the previous question is ordered.

Is a separate vote demanded on any amendment? If not, the Chair will put them en gros.

The amendments were agreed to.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was read the third time.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the passage of the bill.

RECORDED VOTE

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.

H 11102

## CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

December 11, 1973

A recorded vote was ordered.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—ayes 364, noes 52, not voting 16, as follows:

(Roll No. 647)

AYES—364

Abzug	Diggs	Leggett
Adams	Dingell	Lehman
Adabbo	Donohue	Lent
Alexander	Dorn	Litton
Anderson	Downing	Long, La.
Calif.	Drinan	Long, Md.
Anderson, Ill.	Dulski	Lujan
Andrews, N.C.	Duncan	McClory
Andrews	du Pont	McCloskey
N. Dak.	Eckhardt	McCollister
Annunzio	Edwards, Ala.	McComack
Archer	Edwards, Calif.	McDade
Arvends	Ellberg	McEwen
Armstrong	Esch	McFall
Ashbrook	Fahleman	McKay
Ashley	Evans, Colo.	McKinney
Aspin	Evins, Tenn.	McSpadden
Badillo	Fasell	Macdonald
Bafalis	Findley	Mahten
Barrett	Fish	Madigan
Baumman	Flood	Mahon
Beard	Flowers	Mallard
Beil	Foley	Mallory
Bennett	Ford	Mann
Bergland	William D.	Maraziti
Beverly	Forsythe	Martin, N.C.
Binggi	Fountain	Mathias, Calif.
Blesler	Fraser	Mathis, Ga.
Bingham	Frelinghuysen	Matsunaga
Blackburn	Frenzel	Mayne
Blatnik	Frey	Meeds
Boggs	Freohlich	Metcalfe
Boland	Fulton	Mezvisky
Bolling	Fluqua	Michel
Brademas	Gaydos	Milford
Brasco	Gettys	Minish
Bray	Gialmo	Minshall, Ohio
Breckinridge	Gibbons	Mitchell, N.Y.
Brinkley	Gilman	Mizell
Brooks	Ginn	Moakley
Brownfield	Goldwater	Molloyhan
Brotzman	Gonzalez	Moorhead, Pa.
Brown, Calif.	Grasso	Morgan
Brown, Mich.	Gray	Mosher
Brown, Ohio	Green, Oreg.	Moos
Brown, N.C.	Green, Pa.	Murphy, Ill.
Broyhill, Va.	Griffiths	Murphy, N.Y.
Buchanan	Grover	Myers
Burgener	Gubser	Natcher
Burke, Fla.	Gude	Nedzi
Burke, Mass.	Gunter	Nelsen
Burton	Guyer	Nichols
Butler	Haley	Nix
Carey, N.Y.	Hamilton	Obeve
Carney, Ohio	Hanley	O'Brien
Carter	Hanna	O'Hara
Cassey, Tex.	Hanrahan	O'Neill
Cederberg	Hansen, Idaho	Owens
Chamberlain	Hansen, Wash.	Parris
Chappell	Harrington	Passman
Chisholm	Harvey	Patman
Clancy	Hastings	Patten
Clark	Hawkins	Pepper
Clausen	Hays	Perkins
Don H.	Heckler, Mass.	Pettis
Crawson, Del.	Heinz	Peyser
Clay	Helstoski	Pickle
Cleveland	Henderson	Pike
Cohen	Hillis	Poage
Collins, Ill.	Hinshaw	Podell
Collins, Tex.	Hogan	Preyer
Conable	Hollifield	Price, Ill.
Conlan	Holt	Price, Tex.
Corte	Holtzman	Pritchard
Corman	Horton	Quie
Cotter	Hosmer	Quillen
Coughlin	Howard	Railsback
Craie	Huber	Ransel
Cronin	Hudnut	Rees
Culver	Hutchinson	Regula
Daniel, Dan	Jarman	Reid
Daniel, Robert	Johnson, Calif.	Reuss
W. Jr.	Johnson, Pa.	Rhodes
Daniels	Jones, Ala.	Riegle
Dominick V.	Jones, N.C.	Rinaldo
Danielson	Jones, Okla.	Roberts
Davis, Ga.	Jones, Tenn.	Robinson, Va.
Davis, S.C.	Jordan	Robinson, N.Y.
Davis, Wis.	Karh	Rodino
De la Garza	Keating	Roe
Delaney	Kemp	Rogers
Denholm	King	Roncallo, Wyo.
Dent	Kluczynski	Roncallo, N.Y.
Derwinski	Koch	Rooney, Pa.
Devine	Kuykendall	Rose
Dickinson	Kyros	Rosenthal

Rostenkowski	Steed	Ware
Roush	Steele	Whalen
Roy	Steelman	White
Roybal	Steiger, Ariz.	Whitehurst
Ruppe	Steiger, Wis.	Whitten
Ruth	Stephens	Widnall
Ryan	Stratton	Wiggins
St Germain	Stubblefield	Williams
Sandman	Stuckey	Wilson, Bob
Sarasin	Studds	Wilson,
Sarbanes	Symington	Charles H.
Satterfield	Talcott	Calif.
Schneebell	Taylor, N.C.	Wilson,
Schroeder	Teague, Calif.	Charles, Tex.
Sebellus	Teague, Tex.	Winn
Seiberling	Thompson, N.J.	Wolff
Shriver	Thomson, Wis.	Wright
Sikes	Thone	Wyder
Sisk	Thornton	Wyman
Slack	Tierman	Yates
Smith, Iowa	Towell, Nev.	Yatron
Smith, N.Y.	Treen	Young, Alaska
Spence	Udall	Young, Fla.
Staggers	Ullman	Young, Ga.
Stanton	Van Deenlin	Young, Ill.
J. William	Vanik	Young, S.C.
Stanton	Vigorito	Young, Tex.
James V.	Waggonner	Zablocki
Stark	Waldie	Zion

NOES—52

Baker	Harsha	Montgomery
Bowen	Hechler, W. Va.	Moorhead,
Braux	Hicks	Calif.
Burleson, Tex.	Hungate	Powell, Ohio
Burlison, Mo.	Ichord	Randall
Byron	Johnson, Colo.	Rarick
Camp	Kastenmeier	Rousslet
Cochran	Kazen	Runnels
Collier	Ketchum	Scherle
Conyers	Landgrebe	Shipley
Dellenback	Landrum	Shuster
Dellums	Latta	Snyder
Dennis	Martin, Nebr.	Symms
Flynt	Mazzoli	Taylor, Mo.
Goodling	Melcher	Vander Jagt
Gross	Miller	Wampler
Hammer-	Mink	Wylie
schmidt	Mitchell, Md.	Zwach

NOT VOTING—16

Abdnor	Lott	Sullivan
Burke, Calif.	Mills, Ark.	Vessey
Erlenborn	Rooney, N.Y.	Walsh
Fisher	Shoup	Wyatt
Hébert	Skubitz	
Hunt	Stokes	

So the bill was passed.

The Clerk announced the following pairs:

Mr. Rooney of New York with Mrs. Burke of California.

Mr. Hébert with Mr. Fisher.

Mr. Mills of Arkansas with Mr. Stokes.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

## GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks, and include extraneous matter, on the bill just passed.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Pennsylvania?

There was no objection.

# PERMISSION FOR COMMITTEE ON POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE TO FILE CONFERENCE REPORT ON H.R. 3180, FRANKING PRIVILEGES

Mr. HENDERSON. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the managers may have until midnight tonight to file a conference report on the bill, H.R. 3180.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from North Carolina?

There was no objection.

CONFERENCE REPORT (H. REPT. No. 93-712)

The committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 3180) to amend title 39, United States Code, to clarify the proper use of the franking privilege by Members of Congress, and for other purposes, having met, after full and free conference, have agreed to recommend and do recommend to their respective Houses as follows:

That the Senate recede from its amendments numbered 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 15, 17, 18, 26, and 27.

That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendments of the Senate numbered 8, 10, 13, 14, 16, 19, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 30, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 38, 39, 40, 41, and 42, and agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 3: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 3 and agree to the same with an amendment as follows: Strike out the matter proposed to be inserted in the House engrossed bill by Senate amendment numbered 3 and, on page 2, line 15, of the House engrossed bill, strike out "by a Members of Congress".

And the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 9: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 9 and agree to the same with an amendment as follows:

In the matter proposed to be inserted in the House engrossed bill by Senate amendment numbered 9 strike out the word "a" and insert in lieu thereof the following: "such".

And the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 11: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 11 and agree to the same with an amendment as follows: In lieu of the matter proposed to be inserted in the House engrossed bill by Senate amendment numbered 11 insert the following subparagraph:

"(D) any mass mailing when the same is mailed at or delivered to any postal facility less than 28 days immediately before the date of any primary or general election (whether regular, special, or runoff) in which such Member or Member-elect is a candidate for public office. For the purpose of this clause (D), the term 'mass mailing' shall mean newsletters and similar mailings of more than 500 pieces in which the content of the matter mailed is substantially identical but shall not apply to mailings—

"(i) which are in direct response to inquiries or requests from the persons to whom the matter is mailed;

"(ii) to colleagues in Congress or to government officials (whether Federal, State, or local); or

"(iii) of news releases to the communications media.

The House Commission on Congressional Mailing Standards and the Select Committee on Standards and Conduct of the Senate shall prescribe for their respective Houses such rules and regulations and shall take such other action, as the Commission or Committee considers necessary and proper for the Members and Members-elect to conform to the provisions of this clause and applicable rules and regulations. Such rules and regulations shall include, but not be limited to, provisions prescribing the time within which such mailings shall be mailed at or delivered to any postal facility to attain compliance with this clause and the time when such mailings shall be deemed to have been so mailed or delivered and such compliance attained.

And the Senate agree to the same.

December 11, 1973

## CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

H 11103

## Amendment numbered 12:

That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 12 and agree to the same with an amendment as follows: In the matter proposed to be inserted in the House engrossed bill by Senate amendment numbered 12, strike out "February" and insert in lieu thereof the following: April

And the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 12: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 12 and agree to the same with an amendment as follows: In the matter proposed to be inserted in the House engrossed bill by Senate amendment numbered 12, strike out "February" and insert in lieu thereof the following: "April".

And the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 21: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 21 and agree to the same with an amendment as follows:

In the matter proposed to be inserted in the House engrossed bill by Senate amendment numbered 21 strike out the word "February" and insert in lieu thereof the following: "April".

And the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 28: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 28 and agree to the same with an amendment as follows:

Eliminate the matter proposed to be inserted by Senate amendment numbered 28 in the House engrossed bill, restore to its former place in the House engrossed bill the matter proposed to be eliminated from the House engrossed bill by Senate amendment numbered 28, and, immediately after the word "privilege" in such matter so restored, insert the following: "by any person listed under subsection (d) of this section as entitled to send mail as franked mail".

And the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 29: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 29 and agree to the same with an amendment as follows:

On page 7, line 3, of the Senate engrossed amendments, insert immediately after "privilege", the following: "by any person listed under subsection (a) of this section as entitled to send mail as franked mail".

And the Senate agree to the same.

## Amendment numbered 31:

That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 31 and agree to the same with an amendment as follows:

In lieu of the provisions of Senate amendment numbered 31, on page 15 of the House engrossed bill, strike out line 6 and all that follows down through the period in line 10 on page 16, and insert in lieu thereof the following:

"(a) The equivalent of—

"(1) postage on, and fees and charges in connection with, mail matter sent through the mails—

"(A) under the franking privilege (other than under section 3219 of this title), by the Vice President, Members of and Members-elect to Congress, the Secretary of the Senate, the Sergeant at Arms of the Senate, each of the elected officers of the House of Representatives (other than a Member of the House), and the Legislative Councils of the House of Representatives and the Senate; and

"(B) by the surviving spouse of a Member of Congress under section 3218 of this title; and

"(2) those portions of fees and charges to be paid for handling and delivery by the Postal Service of Mailgrams considered as franked mail under section 3219 of this title; shall be paid by a lump-sum appropriation to the legislative branch for that purpose and then paid to the Postal Service as postal

revenue. Except as to Mailgrams and except as provided by sections 733 and 907 of title 44, envelopes, wrappers, cards, or labels used to transmit franked mail shall bear, in the upper right-hand corner, the sender's signature, or a facsimile thereof, and the printed words 'Postage paid by Congress'.

"(b) Postage on, and fees and charges in connection with, mail matter sent through the mails under section 3214 of this title shall be paid each fiscal year, out of any appropriation made for that purpose, to the Postal Service as postal revenue in an amount equivalent to the postage, fees, and charges which would otherwise be payable on, or in connection with, such mail matter.

"(c) Payment under subsection (a) or (b) of this section shall be deemed payment for all matter mailed under the frank and for all fees and charges due the Postal Service in connection therewith.

And the Senate agree to the same.

## Amendment numbered 37:

That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 37 and agree to the same with an amendment as follows:

In lieu of the matter proposed to be inserted in the House engrossed bill by Senate amendment numbered 37, insert the following:

Sec. 12. (a) Chapter 32 of title 39, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section:

"§ 3219. Mailgrams

"Any Mailgram sent by the Vice President, a Member of or Member-elect to Congress, the Secretary of the Senate, the Sergeant at Arms of the Senate, an elected officer of the House of Representatives (other than a Member of the House), or the Legislative Counsel of the House of Representatives or the Senate, and then delivered by the Postal Service, shall be considered as franked mail, subject to section 3216(a) (2) of this title, if such Mailgram contains matter of the kind authorized to be sent by that official as franked mail under section 3210 of this title."

(b) The table of sections of such chapter 32 is amended by adding at the end thereof the following:

"3219. Mailgrams."

And the Senate agree to the same.

T. J. DULSKI,  
DAVID N. HENDERSON,  
MORRIS UDALL,  
CHARLES H. WILSON,  
EDWARD J. DERWINSKI,  
ALBERT JOHNSON,

Managers on the Part of the House.

GALE W. MCGEE,  
JENNINGS RANDOLPH,  
H. L. FONG,  
TED STEVENS,

Managers on the Part of the Senate.

## JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE COMMITTEE OF CONFERENCE

The managers on the part of the House and Senate at the conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 3180) to amend title 39, United States Code, to clarify the proper use of the franking privilege by Members of Congress, and for other purposes, submit the following joint statement to the House and the Senate in explanation of the effect of the action agreed upon by the managers and recommended in the accompanying conference report:

## TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS RELATING TO SENATE AMENDMENT NUMBERED 3

Amendments Numbered 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 15, and 17: These technical amendments, which make certain purely minor and technical changes in language, punctuation, and paragraph and subsection and subparagraph designations, are eliminated as inappropriate because of the action taken by the confer-

ence committee on Senate amendment numbered 3. The Senate recedes.

## MAIL MATTER FRANKABLE BY MEMBERS AND MEMBERS-ELECT OF CONGRESS

## Amendment numbered 3:

## House Bill

Section 3210(a) (3) of title 39, United States Code, as set forth in subsection (a) of the first section of the House bill listed specific categories of mail matter, included in all of those categories of mail matter, mailable by a Member of Congress or a Member-elect to Congress under the franking privilege.

## Senate Amendment

Senate amendment numbered 3 inserted on page 4, after line 2, of the House engrossed bill, language in a new paragraph (4) intended to emphasize that certain categories of mail matter frankable by a Member of Congress are also frankable by a Member-elect.

## Conference Agreement

The conference agreement reflects the effect and intent of both Senate amendment numbered 3 and the applicable provisions of the House engrossed bill with an amendment which clarifies the application of the sending of mail matter by Member of, and Members-elect to, Congress under the franking privilege.

## HOLIDAY GREETINGS

## Amendments numbered 8 and 9:

## House Bill

The House bill, in the form in which it passed the House, contained no specific provisions prohibiting a Member of or Member-elect to the Congress from sending a card expressing holiday greetings. However, the provisions of section 3210(a) (4) of the House passed bill contained a general prohibition against any public official using the frank for mail which, in its nature, is purely personal to the sender and is unrelated to the official business, activities, or duties of the official.

## Senate Amendments

Senate amendment numbered 9 amended the provisions of the House bill to provide a specific prohibition against a Member of or Member-elect to the Congress using the frank to mail a card expressing holiday greetings.

Senate amendment numbered 8 is a technical amendment to conform the provisions of the House bill to the changes made by Senate amendment numbered 9.

## Conference Agreement

The House recedes from its disagreement to the technical amendment made by Senate amendment numbered 8 and recedes from its disagreement to Senate amendment numbered 9 and agrees with a further amendment which is purely technical to include the clarifying word "such" before the words "Member or Member-elect".

## MASS MAILINGS

## Amendments numbered 10, 11, and 35.

## House Bill

The House bill did not restrict mass mailings. It did, however, direct the House Commission on Congressional Mailing Standards to study and evaluate problems relating to mass mailings and postal patron mailings. The House bill also directed the Commission not to recommend that mailings, whether mass or individual mailings, be prohibited more than 30 days before an election.

## Senate Amendment

Senate amendments numbered 10 and 11 added a new clause (D) to section 3210(a) (5) to prohibit mass mailings mailed less than 31 days before a primary or general election (whether regular, special, or runoff) when the Member or Member-elect is a candidate for public office. "Mass mailing" includes newsletters and similar mailings of

more than 500 pieces when the content is identical but exempting mailings in direct response to direct inquiries or requests. Senate amendment numbered 35 repealed the provisions of the House bill on studying and evaluating mass mailings and postal patron mailings as no longer necessary because of the specific prohibition against mass mailings before elections and the prohibition in Senate amendment 18 against postal patron mailings.

#### Conference Agreement

The conference agreement provides that mass mailings shall not be delivered to the postal facility less than 28 days before a primary or general election in which the Member of Congress is a candidate for public office. The term "mass mailing" is defined to include newsletters and other similar mailings of more than 500 pieces when the content is substantially the same, except for mailings—

(1) in direct response to inquiries or requests;

(2) to colleagues in Congress or to Federal, State, or local officials; and

(3) of news releases to the communications media.

The House Commission on Congressional Mailing Standards and the Senate Select Committee on Standards and Conduct are to promulgate rules and regulations necessary to carry out clause (D), including rules and regulations to determine when mailings are considered to be mailed at or delivered to a postal facility.

#### EXPIRATION OF FRANKING PRIVILEGE

Amendments numbered 12, 21, 22, 23, 24, 30, 32, 33, 34, 39, 40, 41, and 42:

#### House Bill

Section 3210(b) of title 39 in the House bill authorized the use of the frank by the various officials until the 30th day of June following the expiration of their respective terms of office.

#### Senate Amendments

Senate amendment numbered 12 limits the authority for such officials to use the frank until the first day of February.

Senate amendment numbered 21 adds a new section 2 to the bill amending section 3211 of title 39, United States Code, relating to the sending of public documents under the frank and makes two changes. First, the amendment deletes from the provisions of existing law reference to the Clerk of the House of Representatives and the Sergeant at Arms of the House of Representatives and inserts in lieu thereof "each of the elected officials of the House of Representatives (other than a Member of the House)". Secondly, the amendment changes the provisions of existing law which permits the use of the frank for sending public documents until the 30th day of June following the expiration of their respective terms of office to the first day of February.

All of the other Senate amendments referred to above are technical amendments to conform the provisions of the bill to the changes made by Senate amendments numbered 12 and 21.

#### Conference Agreement

The conference agreement provides for the use of the frank until the first day of April following the expiration of the terms of offices of such officials. The conference agreement also adopts the changes contained in the Senate amendment numbered 21 relating to the mailing of public documents.

The House recedes from its disagreement on all of the technical conforming amendments.

#### LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL OF THE SENATE

Amendments numbered 13, 14, 16, and 38:

#### House Bill

Section 3210(b) of title 39 in the House bill, relating to the basic authority for the

use of the frank, did not extend the privilege to the Legislative Counsel of the Senate. The last sentence of section 1303(d) of the Revenue Act of 1918 (2 U.S.C. 277) authorizes the Legislative Counsel of the Senate to use penalty mail.

#### Senate Amendments

The Senate amendments numbered 13, 14, and 16 made the necessary amendments under section 3210(b) to extend the privilege of the frank to the Legislative Counsel of the Senate. Senate amendment numbered 38 repealed the last sentence of such section 1303(d).

#### Conference Agreement

The conference substitute adopts the language of the Senate amendments on this subject.

#### POSTAL PATRON MAIL

Senate amendment numbered 18:

#### House Bill

Section 3210(d) of title 39 in the House bill authorized Members of the House to send mail with a simplified form of address for delivery within the area constituting the congressional district from which he was elected. The simplified form of address does not require a specified addressee or address to be placed on the mail matter.

#### Senate Amendment

The Senate amendment numbered 18 struck out the provision of such section 3210(d).

#### Conference Agreement

The Senate recedes from the amendment.

#### FRANKING COST AS POLITICAL CONTRIBUTION

Senate amendments numbered 19 and 20:

#### House Bill

The House bill contained no provision relating to the cost of franked mail as a political contribution.

#### Senate Amendments

Senate amendment numbered 20 added a new subsection (f) to section 3210 to prohibit the cost of preparing or printing frankable matter from being considered as a contribution to or an expenditure by the Vice President or a Member of Congress for the purpose of determining any limitation on expenditures or contributions with respect to any such official imposed by any Federal, State, or local law or regulation in connection with any campaign of such official for election to any Federal office.

Senate amendment numbered 19 is a technical amendment to conform the provision of the bill with the change made by Senate amendment numbered 20.

#### Conference Agreement

The House recedes from its disagreement to Senate amendments numbered 19 and 20.

#### ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ON FRANKING PRIVILEGE COMPLAINTS

Senate amendments numbered 25, 26, 27, 28, and 29:

#### House Bill

The House-passed bill established a House Commission on Congressional Mailing Standards to provide guidance, assistance, advice, and counsel through advisory opinions or consultations in connection with franking mailings upon the request of any Member of the House or Member-elect, Resident Commissioner, or Resident Commissioner-elect, Delegate, or Delegate-elect, surviving spouses of any of the foregoing or other House official entitled to use of the frank.

Provisions were also included for complaints to be filed with the Commission that a violation of any of the franking requirements is about to occur or has occurred with the requirement that the Commission conduct an investigation of the complaint and make written findings of fact. Such findings of fact are binding and conclusive for all judicial and administrative processes. A

provision was included that any judicial review of such decision if ordered on any ground shall be limited to matters of law. The Commission if it finds that a "serious and willful" violation has occurred or is about to occur may refer its decision to the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct of the House of Representatives for appropriate action.

#### Senate Amendments

Senate amendment numbered 25 added the words "by any person" to clarify who could file the complaint of a violation. Senate amendment numbered 27 struck out the words "serious and willful" in connection with the provision relating to the type of violation which the Commission would refer to the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct.

Senate amendments numbered 26 and 28 struck out the provision of the House bill that made the findings of fact by the Commission final and binding on the courts.

Senate amendment numbered 29 added a new section 6 to the bill to provide that the Senate Select Committee on Standards and Conduct would provide guidance, assistance, advice, and counsel to Members and Members-elect of the Senate. This amendment provided that the appropriate courts would not have jurisdiction to entertain any civil action relating to a violation of the franking laws or an abuse of the franking privilege until a complaint has been filed with the Select Committee and the Committee has rendered a decision thereon.

#### Conference Agreement

The House receded from its disagreement to amendment numbered 25 so that the words "by any person" is included to clarify the application of the complaints that may be filed with the House Commission on Congressional Mailing Standards.

The Senate receded from its amendment numbered 27 so that the words "serious and willful" are retained in the House provision relating to the type of violation that would be referred to the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct of the House of Representatives.

The Senate receded from amendment numbered 26 relating to the finality of the findings of fact by the House Commission.

The House receded from its disagreement to amendment numbered 28 with a further amendment that clarifies the application of the provisions of section 5 to violation of the franking privilege by officials of the House only.

The House receded from its disagreement to amendment numbered 29 which added section 6 to the bill and agreed to the amendment with a further amendment which makes it clear that the provisions of such section 6 relate only to the mailings under the frank by Members of the Senate.

#### MAILGRAMS

Amendments numbered 31 and 37.

#### House Bill

The House bill, in the form in which it passed the House, contained no provisions permitting the sending of Mailgrams as franked mail.

#### Senate Amendments

Senate amendment numbered 37 permits the frank to be used for the sending of Mailgrams and other items transmitted by electronic means.

Senate amendment numbered 31 provides for payment for the handling and delivery of Mailgrams as franked mail.

#### Conference Agreement

The House recedes from its disagreement to Senate amendment numbered 37 and agrees with a further amendment which deletes the authority to send items transmitted by electronic means under the frank except Mailgrams.

The House recedes from its disagreement to Senate amendment numbered 31 with further technical amendments to reflect the agreement of the conferees on Senate amendment numbered 37.

**FRANKED MAIL BY SERVING SPOUSES OF MEMBERS**

Amendment numbered 36:

**House Bill**

The House bill in the form in which it passed the House contained no provisions modifying the privilege granted to the surviving spouse of a Member to send franked mail relating to the death of such Member under section 3218 of title 39, United States Code.

**Senate Amendment**

Senate amendment numbered 36 amended section 3218 of title 39, United States Code, by restricting the type of mail which the surviving spouse of a Member may send under the frank to "nonpolitical" mail relating to the death of such Member.

**Conference Agreement**

The conference agreement adopts the Senate amendment.

T. J. DULSKI,  
DAVID N. HENDERSON,  
MORRIS UDALL,  
CHARLES H. WILSON,  
EDWARD J. DERWINSKI,  
ALBERT JOHNSON,

*Managers on the part of the House.*

GALE W. MCGEE,  
JENNINGS RANDOLPH,  
H. L. FONG,  
TED STEVENS,

*Managers on the part of the Senate.*

**FOREIGN ASSISTANCE AND RELATED PROGRAMS APPROPRIATION ACT, 1974**

Mr. PASSMAN. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 11771) making appropriations for Foreign Assistance and related programs for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1974, and for other purposes; and pending that motion, Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that general debate be limited not to exceed 1½ hours, one-half of the time to be controlled by the gentleman from Kansas (Mr. SHRIVER) and one-half of the time to be controlled by myself.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. PASSMAN)?

There was no objection.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. PASSMAN).

The motion was agreed to.

**IN THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE**

Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill H.R. 11771, with Mr. PRICE of Illinois in the chair.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

By unanimous consent, the first reading of the bill was dispensed with.

The CHAIRMAN. Under the unanimous-consent agreement, the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. PASSMAN) will be recognized for 45 minutes, and the gentleman from Kansas (Mr. SHRIVER) will be recognized for 45 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. PASSMAN).

Mr. PASSMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, the foreign aid bill before you, supported by facts covering title I only, is the best balanced bill presented to the Congress since the inception of the foreign aid program. Incidentally, practically all of the publicity on foreign aid is built around title I.

The budget request for title I, fiscal 1974, was \$2,501,682,000. The bill before you calls for \$2,044,932,000 for title I, or a reduction below the budget of \$456,750,000.

Now, dealing with the total bill that is before the committee covering titles I, II, III, and IV, the reduction below the budget request for all titles of the bill is \$1,032,655,000. The bill calls for \$269,789,000 below the amount appropriated last year for titles I, II, and III. Incidentally, it is \$84 million below the authorization that the House passed in the conference report last week. So, all in all, we have brought you a bill that should be acceptable even to the critics of foreign aid.

I would like to call the committee's attention to the fact that the large increase in the total foreign aid bill covering titles I, II, III, and IV is brought about by the emergency request for \$2.2 billion for Israel, plus, of course, the continued alarming increase in multilateral organizations.

Let me assure the committee that the bill is not purposely weighted in favor of any particular nation. To those who would venture far enough to call this bill weighted in favor of Israel, may I urge that you check the facts as they are. First, the calm thinkers realize that if there is a strong Israel, it simply means protection for 150 million Arabs, because if the one nation in the Middle East friendly to the United States should go down the drain, then, in all probability, in due time the entire Arab world would fall under the domination of the Soviet Union, the wishes of the Arabs, notwithstanding. Such designs are on the trestle board, and we might as well face up to it.

Of course, if the Arab world should come under the domination of Russia, so would 70 percent of the known oil reserves of the world, and it would give the Soviet Union free access to all ports in the Mediterranean, plus the Suez Canal.

In addition to the words that I have committed to the record, let us have a look at the figure which you may find somewhat surprising. For instance, in the budget request there is \$200 million plus for the Arab States, including, of course, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, Yemen, Sudan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and Tunisia, to name only a few. In addition to that portion of the bilateral request, these nations draw very heavily upon the multilateral organizations of which the United States is by far the largest contributor—in fact, several times as much as any runner-up contributor.

With respect to those who may feel that they should criticize the military assistance to Israel, may I point out that our country has never provided military

material to Israel on a grant aid basis. In fact, there has been only a limited amount of grant economic aid. Those who have negotiated sales agreements with Israel have usually driven hard bargains.

As I reported this bill today, I can say to you that Israel is not delinquent on as much as one dollar of her indebtedness to the United States. Her accounts are completely up-to-date. In recent years, she has repaid 213 million dollars for her indebtedness.

It may also surprise you to know that the Israelis are so proud of their country and so determined to maintain it that they are willing for 80 percent of their total budget to go to the military establishment.

Now, may I cover a few of the pertinent points in the bill before you:

Mr. Chairman, we have a new format to deal with this year. In prior years in considering this bill we have had worldwide, technical assistance, Alliance for Progress, and technical assistance, programs relating to population growth and development loans. None of these titles are any longer in the bill. Rather, the authorizing committee has substituted new titles such as: food and nutrition, development assistance; population planning and health, development assistance; education and human resources development, development assistance; selected development problems, development assistance; and selected countries and organizations, development assistance. These things are extremely complicated.

The AID people assure us though that they can administer the programs according to the new captions and titles. Of the \$580 million we are recommending in the bill for these development assistance programs, \$280 million will be for loans, the same as the old development loan funds, and \$300 million will be for various types of grants.

Mr. Chairman, I would now like to run through the bill very briefly, and bring out, if I may, some of the key points and things in which I know the Members will be interested. This bill is cut \$1,032,655,000 below the budget request. That is one of the largest cuts made in the history of foreign aid, and a lot of credit goes to the great Committee on Foreign Affairs, because they certainly did their homework well this year. They trimmed this bill very substantially and did not leave too much fat for this committee to take out.

Mr. Chairman, if we may actually look to what this bill protects, let us go back if we may about 25 years ago, to the outbreak of the Korean war. President Truman, and later of course President Eisenhower, and I believe President Kennedy, and subsequently President Johnson felt that Korea must be maintained as a sovereign nation. All of our great generals and great admirals, all of our Secretaries of State during the period made the same claim, that we must protect South Korea, and protect them because they are friends of our Nation. Now that we have done this, they have a very strong economy, and they are just as

good friends of America as any nation you will find on the face of the Earth. But they must maintain a very strong military, and without some military assistance from this country it is perfectly obvious that it is just a question of time until South Korea would fall.

Some of the members do not like to refer to it as an investment, but I do not know of any better way to refer to it than an investment. We actually invested \$56.9 billion in all of the categories of financial assistance, including the Defense Department, for South Korea. In addition to that, we invested 54,246 precious American lives in that conflict, and added to that were 105,785 casualties. To me that is a tremendous investment made by the American people and, for my money, it is an investment that must be protected.

Let us have a look at another investment that we made, and this goes back to the days of President Eisenhower, later President Kennedy, President Johnson, and President Nixon. All of these Presidents, all of our great leaders, our Secretaries of State over the period of years went all out and said we must have a sovereign South Vietnam.

This may surprise you. We have invested \$141 billion of our resources in South Vietnam, and added to that, of course, are 56,388 lives and 308,817 casualties. Without economic aid, and, of course, the replacement for those military items in the defense appropriation, South Vietnam would go down the drain. So, we must provide assistance to South Vietnam, otherwise, of course, that country cannot survive.

So, as I say, that investment must be protected.

Knowing, as I believe, that the Members want their subcommittee in the future as they have in the past, not to withhold any information from them, we have a very voluminous report. We put it on the line. We have named every nation on the face of the Earth that we have given assistance to since the inception of the foreign aid program, and we have given aid to 128 nations of the world and 7 territories.

If we add the amount of money we have spent for the interest on money we have borrowed to give away, we can see on page 9 the total cost is \$253,171,100,000. We are not trying to hide anything from the Members. We want to put it out where they can see it. The main reason for putting the table in our report is so the Members may return to their constituents after reading the report and tell them what any nation on the face of the Earth has received. Most people think it is a good investment. I am only reporting the facts as we find them.

In an effort to be completely fair with the Members and not to mislead them, we have put all types of foreign aid and assistance in one place. We have included the Export-Import Bank, which is one of the finest organizations we have in our Federal Government. It has paid back to the U.S. Treasury over \$800 million in dividends. It has been a very handsome profit.

If the Members will study the reports, they will find that there have been bil-

lions of dollars paid into the U.S. Treasury due to the profits made by the corporations on the sale of their exports, in addition to the fact that it provides employment for thousands of our fellow Americans in producing the goods that we export.

To give the Members a general idea how this committee over the years, along with other committees, has taken some of the fat out of the foreign aid program, the Members will find on page 11 the amount of money that we have been able to take out of the budget request by year for the past 19 years.

Hurrying along, if I may, Mr. Chairman, let us look at population planning and health, development assistance. Under the legislation that we have drafted and the limitation we placed in this bill, there will only be \$100 million for family planning. So far as abortion is concerned, it is covered in the authorization bill. But population planning and health is a program, as far as I know, which has a lot of support, so we funded it.

If I may discuss briefly American schools and hospitals abroad, I think that this is one of the finest parts of the foreign aid bill and we have provided \$19 million for this item. Among the institutions that will be financed will be the University of the Americas at Puebla, Mexico. That is purely and wholly an American institution. It is owned by Americans, and students from 42 States attend this university. So we are financing that university.

The American University of Beirut. That is totally an American institution. Many of our leaders in the Far East were educated at the American University at Beirut, and it has been said by expert witnesses before our committee that without the AUB in Beirut, Lebanon would have also broken off diplomatic relations with our country when some of the others did. So it has been a tremendous investment.

Then, of course, we have the Weizmann Institute in Israel. That is an institution that is attended by scholars from throughout the world. So far as I know, there is no criticism of the Weizmann Institute. Project Hope, of course, is covered in this bill. That is something that we have been supporting for many, many years. It is funded in this bill.

Of course, the appropriation last year was \$25,500,000. This year it is only \$19 million, a reduction of \$6½ million. That will leave very little money in this bill for what is usually referred to as purely small schools. Very few schools can or will be funded out of this bill.

We have what has been referred to previously as the President's Contingency Fund. We have made no reduction in this fund, inasmuch as we have cut substantially from the other sections. We have included \$20 million in the bill so in case of emergency the President would have sufficient funds in that particular item to take care of emergencies.

The Members will find on page 33 that we have the International Narcotics Control program for \$42,500,000. We have met with great success with this

program. For instance, in Turkey they have almost eradicated the growing of the poppy, and they are cooperating beautifully. We find that to be true in other parts of the world, so the committee decided we should make no reduction in the International Narcotics Control item.

On page 35 it can be seen we have put in a special grant for the African Sahel Famine and Disaster Relief Assistance. This is set out at \$25 million in a single item.

Mr. Chairman, in military assistance the budget request was \$685 million, but the bill before us provides \$500 million, which is \$53.4 million below the amount that was appropriated last year.

The Indochina postwar reconstruction, Mr. Chairman, is a must. The budget request was \$632 million, which is shown on page 40 of the report, but the Members will find the committee recommended only \$500 million. That is a reduction below the amount authorized. Concerning aid to Israel, and the \$2.2 billion, it is clear what the thinking of the House is on this matter. I can assure the Members that this money will not be spent unless it is necessary, because a certain amount of it will be held until such time as the President makes a determination and notifies the Congress.

On the international organizations our committee is deprived of the right to examine those who administer this program. They say this is in violation of our international agreements, so those who administer the program cannot come before our committee and justify the funds. We have to hear people in the State Department or in the Treasury who try to justify these funds.

I might try, Mr. Chairman, to give the Members an idea how the United Nations Development program works. I think the Members are entitled to have these facts. I have always thought the United Nations was supposed to be a peacekeeping organization but rapidly they are moving toward becoming another rather large spigot of foreign aid. If the Members will look at the UNDP item, they will find we have recommended a reduction. We feel it is adequate.

This agency has financed 53 projects in Cuba, amounting to almost \$10 million. In addition to that we find that they are working on some plan to invest millions of dollars in Kuwait. We find the U.N. financed seven projects in Kuwait, one of the richest countries of the world.

In Japan, another of the world's wealthy countries, we find that the UNDP has a project for some \$737,000.

We can go on and on about how this organization is operating. We think the time is coming when we are going to have to insist that we have the right to examine those who administer the programs. I am not going to be knocked off my feet by any claims that we put up this much and that fellows puts up that much. Look at how much money we put up and how much of it is going to nations such as Cuba to which I just referred.

I think I should cover one other item and show the Members how the inter-

Mid East

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# Israeli Errors on Eve of War Emerging

By TERENCE SMITH  
Special to The New York Times

JERUSALEM, Dec. 9—In the book-lined library of the former Justice Ministry in downtown Jerusalem, a five-man judicial commission has been taking top-secret testimony for the last two weeks from Cabinet ministers, intelligence specialists and Government officials.

Known formally as the Commission of Inquiry into the War, the select panel is seeking an answer to the major question being asked in Israel today: What went wrong that left Israel so unprepared for the combined Arab attack of Oct. 6?

The question still haunts most Israelis more than two months later. Israelis from all levels, especially the families of the 2,412 soldiers killed dur-

ing the war, are demanding an answer.

The full report of the commission is not expected for several months, but a preliminary picture of the Government's deliberations during the crucial days before the war has already emerged.

It illustrates how and why Israel's normally efficient intelligence apparatus erred in its assessments, how certain key indicators were misread, because of a widespread assumption that the Arabs would not attack, and finally, how few ministers actually participated in the final assessments on the eve of the war.

The commission's report is likely to have major political ramifications. One Government official predicted that it would be "political dynamite" that

could bring about the resignation of Defense Minister Moshe Dayan and other ministers if pointedly critical of their performance.

The controversy has been fueled by a number of statements by ministers absolving themselves and indirectly implicating others.

There has been a wrangle, for example, over whether Deputy Yigal Allon was kept properly informed of the Arab build-ups from Sept. 30 to Oct. 2, when he was Acting Premier while Premier Golda Meir was in Europe.

Mr. Allon has denied that he received the daily intelligence reports normally prepared for the Premier. Associates have suggested that the blame lay

with Mr. Dayan, in his capacity as Defense Minister.

The controversy has yet to be resolved, but it has already produced a response from the Mossad, the Israeli External intelligence agency, denying that it had or was required to provide such information to Mr. Allon. It was the only public statement by the Mossad Israelis could recall.

The judicial commission, which was appointed by the Government in response to demands from all parties, is the more important of two official inquiries. The second is a military commission examining the performance of the armed forces before and during the war. The military study may well result in resignations of some commanders and army organizational changes but it will not have the same political impact.

The judicial commission is headed by the President of the Supreme Court, Justice Shimon Agranat. It includes two former Chiefs of Staff, Yigal Yadin, the Hebrew University archeologist, and Lieut. Gen. Chaim Laskov, now the army Complaints Commissioner, or ombudsman. The others are Dr. Itzhak Neibenzahl, the State Controller, and Justice Moshe Landau of the Supreme Court, have high reputations for integrity and independence.

The commission's first witness was Maj. Gen. Eliahu Zeira, the army chief of intelligence, who testified for seven hours on the first day and returned for additional questioning. Foreign Minister Abba Eban, who was in the United States at the time of the war, was scheduled to testify today.

## Day-by-Day Sequence

Pieced together from interviews with Government officials and subsequently confirmed news reports, the day-by-day sequence went as

**Tuesday, Oct. 2—**The Egyptian Press agency announces a high state of readiness along the Suez Canal, after similar reports from Syria. In Israel, a senior military source calls in the military correspondents of several Israeli papers and asks them to tone down their reports of the battlefield situation, to avoid raising tension. Premier Meir is in Vienna, arguing with Chancellor Bruno Kreisky over the continued transit of Soviet Jews through Austria.

**Wednesday, Oct. 3—**Upon Mrs. Meir's return, her so-called kitchen Cabinet meets in Jerusalem. Participants include the influential minister without portfolio, Israel Galili; the Chief of Staff, Lieut. Gen. David Elazar; Mr. Dayan, Mr. Allon and a colonel from army intelligence. The build-ups on both the Egyptian and Syrian fronts are discussed, but are viewed as similar to other build-ups in January, May and September that proved to be false alarms. (In May, General Elazar mobilized part of Israel's reserves to meet the threat. The order cost some \$10-million and was criticized as wasteful by some ministers.)

The assessment that the prospect of war is remote is apparently influenced by the assumption that the Soviet Union is discouraging any Arab military activity to protect its new relation with the United States.

Israeli intelligence reportedly has full details of Egypt's attack strategy, but there is skepticism that Egypt would launch an attack until she acquired aircraft capable of deep strikes into Israel.

**Thursday, Oct. 4—**Mrs. Meir

reports on her European trip to the Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee of Parliament, but makes no mention of the Arab troop concentrations still building on both fronts.

That afternoon, in an election campaign appearance at a kibbutz, Mrs. Meir attacks the right-wing opposition party, Gahal, for its persistent forecasts of an Arab attack. "Not one bit of the black prophecies of Gahal have come true," she tells her audience. "Why don't the Gahal people have the courage to admit it?"

Meanwhile, the military command is alerted by an intelligence report that the families

and dependents of Soviet advisers in both Egypt and Syria are being airlifted out. This, according to military sources, lit a "red light" at Israeli headquarters since there had been no such evacuation during the previous buildups. At a special staff meeting late that night, a decision is made to declare an alert the next morning for the relatively small regular army. No mobilization of the much larger reserves is recommended.

**Friday, Oct. 5—**In the morning, a senior military officer telephones the military correspondents of the Israeli papers, asking if they close early that day because of the Yom Kippur holiday, which begins that evening. The army spokesman then issues a statement: "Israeli forces are following with attention events on the Egyptian side of the Suez Canal and all steps have been taken to prevent the possibility of a surprise on the part of the Egyptians." The statement receives little attention since no papers were to be published the next day.

At the same time, Mr. Dayan meets with General Eleazar, General Zeira and other officers in his Tel Aviv office. Learning of the arrival of large Soviet transports in both Cairo and Damascus, presumably carrying heavy weapons, they alert the regular forces. Holiday leaves are canceled and as a precaution, the reserve mobili-

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United Press International  
Israeli soldiers captured  
in the Sinai during the  
first days of the war.

zation machinery is alerted as well. Despite all this the official intelligence estimate is still that there is "little likelihood" of war.

The defense officials then move next door to the old stucco building that houses Mr. Meir's Tel Aviv office. Mrs. Meir invites in Mr. Galili and they both listen to the intelligence assessment. The other ministers who live in Tel Aviv are called and arrive about 11 A.M. Missing is Mr. Allon, who has already gone to his kibbutz for the weekend, and Pinhas Sapir, the powerful Finance Minister, who later complains that Mrs. Meir's office made only half-hearted efforts to reach him. ("With a little effort they could have found me," he said "When has it ever happened that they didn't find me when they needed me?")

Both fronts are thoroughly reviewed and General Elazar repeats his doubts that war will break out. He stresses the previous build-ups and says that American intelligence also considers war unlikely. As the meeting breaks up, Mrs. Meir announces that she will not go to visit her daughter, Sarah, at her Negev kibbutz, as she had planned. She recommends that the other ministers remain in the Tel Aviv area. But at the same time, the Premier tells friends that she is relieved by the generally encouraging reports and that war seems unlikely after all.

An hour later, Mr. Sapir meets Michael Arnon, the Cabinet secretary, in a restaurant and learns that he has missed the meeting.

Later he said: "Mike told me it was a matter for the general staff and that it was not serious.")

**Saturday, Oct. 6**—At 4 A.M., General Elazar telephones Mrs. Meir in her suburban Tel Aviv apartment. Irrefutable intelligence has come in during the night indicating that war is inevitable. It is expected to begin on both fronts at 6 P.M. that day. Mrs. Meir and Mr. Dayan confer on the phone. They agree that the key ministers must be summoned to a special meeting at 8 A.M.

Shortly after 6 A.M. General Elazar proposes to Mr. Dayan that the air force launch a pre-emptive strike against both Egypt and Syria. Mr. Dayan thinks it unwise, but agrees to suggest it to Mrs. Meir.

#### Drives Back in Car

The kitchen cabinet convenes in Mrs. Meir's office. Mr. Galili is there, but not Mr. Allon nor Mr. Sapir. The Deputy Premier, contacted by Mr. Arnon at his kibbutz, in Galilee asks if the situation is urgent, in which case he will take a helicopter. Mr. Arnon, who apparently had not been filled in on the intelligence received during the night, says no. Mr. Allon sets off by car for Tel Aviv, two hours away.

Mr. Sapir is attending Yom Kippur services in his synagogue just outside Tel Aviv. He sees young reservists, including the cantor, being called out of the service to active duty. He rushes to call Mr. Arnon and learns that the Cabinet is discussing imminent war.

In her office, Mrs. Meir rejects General Elazar's proposed pre-emptive strike. Recalling the political damage Israel suffered by striking first in 1967, she reportedly says: "This time it has to be crystal clear who

began, so we won't have to go around the world convincing people our cause is just."

Mrs. Meir also reveals that during the night she has sent a message to Foreign Minister Eban in New York urging him to confer immediately with Secretary of State Kissinger to get the American appraisal. The message apparently does *not* arrive in New York until late in the evening, by which time both men are committed to pre-vious engagements.

#### War Footing Ordered

After a new review of the military intelligence, the decision is made to declare a full mobilization of the reserves and place the country on a war footing. It is 10 A.M., six hours after clear evidence had been received that war was imminent, four hours before the fighting is actually to begin.

Shortly after 10, Mrs. Meir summons the American Ambassador, Kenneth B. Keating, to her office. She reveals Israel's intelligence appraisals and asks the United States to inform Egypt, Jordan and Syria that Israel will not strike first.

The messages are transmitted, but it is too late. The Arab decision is final.

At noon a full Cabinet session is convened. For several of the ministers, including Labor Minister Yosef Almogi, and Justice Minister Yakov Shimshon Shapiro, it is the first official word of the crisis. Since all the major decisions have been made, there is little for them to do except endorse the mobilization order and prepare for war. In protest Mr. Shapiro later resigns, charging Mr. Dayan with "criminal negligence." At 2 P.M., the fighting begins.

# Soviet Mideast Tactics Puzzling

By George Sherman  
Star-News Staff Writer

Many key elements of Soviet tactics in the recent Middle East war are still a mystery to the American intelligence community.

According to insiders, the two main missing pieces to the puzzle are:

- What did Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin tell Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger during several long meetings in the days between Sept. 30 and Oct. 6 — the day the war broke out.

- Why did the Russians suddenly ship nuclear warheads to Egypt at the height of the war and then leave them sitting in Alexandria harbor — only to withdraw them several days after the cease-fire finally took hold Oct. 25.

These two unanswered questions, according to analysts, reflect uncertainty in the Washington intelligence community about how Moscow handled the 18-day war. Soviet tactics contained elements both of caution and adventurism. But top sources acknowledge that vital pieces of information which would provide a coherent view are still missing.

**PART OF THE REASON** say these sources, is that Kissinger has so centralized the intelligence process that he alone is the only official in the Nixon administration who knows all the intelligence available. Only Kissinger and the President, the sources say, know what Dobrynin told Kissinger about possible Arab intentions before the war, and that information was not given to intelligence analysts.

Suspicion exists, said the sources, that the Soviet ambassador broadly hinted to Kissinger that an attack was in the offing. Three times during the week before Oct. 6 Kissinger — by his own admission — asked for special assessment of American and Israeli intelligence that the Egyptian and Syrian military buildup was not preliminary to an all-out war.

"There was the unanimous view that hostilities were unlikely to the point of there being no chance of its (an attack) happening," said Kissinger at a press conference Oct. 12 of the outcome of these assessments.

**IN RETROSPECT**, say sources, it is clear that the Russians had advance warning of the Oct. 6 attack and were dubious about its success.

On Oct. 3 Soviet dependents were airlifted out of both Egypt and Syria, scarcely a sign, say analysts, of Soviet confidence in an Arab victory. Even earlier, during the last week in September, the Soviets began a seafit of military supplies to Egypt and Syria which began arriving almost precisely with the outbreak of war.

If the Russians knew of the attack and were skeptical, reasoned a top intelligence source, the immediate

aim of Soviet diplomacy would have been to prevent it from upsetting the balance of power in the Middle East and Soviet-American détente. For that reason, it is thought Dobrynin may have presented formulations to Kissinger that week before the war which, with the other intelligence available, could have alerted Washington to the imminence of the war.

Within four days after the war, say these insiders, Soviet policy veered to a far less cautious path. The Egyptians had reached the Israeli Bar-Lev line on the east bank of the Suez Canal, the Syrian tanks were moving up the Golan Heights. On Oct. 10, the Russians began their round-the-clock airlift of vital ammunition and equipment — believing, analysts conclude, that Arab success would give the Arabs and their Soviet allies the whip hand in the peace negotiations to follow.

**BY THAT TIME**, say these sources, the Russians had dispatched by sea to Egypt the Scud surface-to-surface missile long desired by President Anwar Sadat. For over a year he had been asking for this offensive weapon, which has a range of 180 miles and is able to hit Israeli cities, to balance the Israeli Phantom jet fighter-bombers and the still highly secret Israeli Jerico ground-to-ground missile.

According to the best information available here, the Scuds arrived without nuclear warheads. According to U.S. intelligence they were in place with conventional warheads in barns outside Alexandria in northern Egypt within a week to 10 days after the Oct. 6 attack. On Oct. 16 Sadat, in a speech to his national assembly, warned Israel he had the Egyptian "Zafir" missile, but the unanimous consensus in Washington is that he was really speaking about the Soviet Scud.

The real argument is believed to have come over putting nuclear warheads on these missiles. At the day American intelligence is not sure what happened. The number of Soviet ships carrying nuclear arms rapidly built up in the eastern Mediterranean, an apparent maneuver to make ships carrying nuclear warheads from the Black Sea to Egypt less conspicuous.

**BUT ON** or about Oct. 20 American sensors on the narrow Bosphorus picked up atomic radiation from at least one ship which, by its "configuration," might not be on its way to join the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean.

By Oct. 25 that ship was spotted in Alexandria, as were Soviet crews likely to be needed to keep control of the Scuds with nuclear warheads. But no evidence exists that any warheads were unloaded. Several days later the ship with the nuclear material aboard departed and returned to the Black Sea.

By that time the crisis was over. According to top

sources, the intelligence about the nuclear warheads did not play a part in the general military alert the Nixon administration ordered the night of Oct. 24-25, in response to Soviet threats to airlift troops to Egypt.

Informed analysts believe that the Soviet defense establishment under Gen. Alexei A. Grechko had prevailed upon the Kremlin to send the warheads as a "contingency need," after the basic political decision had been made to send the Scuds. It is also believed that Sadat was making the same argument to Moscow.

**BUT SOVIET** party leader Leonid Brezhnev, ac-

cording to this reasoning, saw the danger of escalation and the risk of the warheads falling into Egyptian hands, and withheld them once the cease-fire took hold Oct. 25.

In the final stages of the war, then, according to this assessment, Soviet caution once again took charge. Ever since Soviet Premier Alexei N. Kosygin spent three days in Cairo Oct. 17-19, Moscow saw the pressing need for a cease-fire to prevent Egyptian defeat by Israeli forces now being resupplied by the United States and still on the west bank of the canal. A day after Kosygin returned to Moscow Kissinger was in-

vited to come to the Soviet capital and the Soviet-American agreement on a cease-fire was reached Oct. 21.

When Israel continued its encirclement of the city of Suez and the Egyptian 3rd Army in the following three days, say analysts, Brezhnev felt he had been had by Kissinger and Israeli Premier Golda Meir. He had to act.

Moscow was no longer thinking of a whip hand in the peace negotiations, the sources say, but simply of preserving the Soviet stake in the Arab world. The threat of unilateral Soviet intervention was the lever used.

Victor Zorzo

# The 'Money Weapon'

The new Arab decision to use the "money weapon" against the West is being dismissed by Western bankers in as cavalier a manner as some experts once dismissed the oil weapon, but the Kremlin has high expectations from it.

The economic ministers of the Arab League member-states met in Cairo earlier this month and agreed to begin the "gradual" withdrawal of Arab funds from Western banks. Financial experts concede that if the Arabs withdrew the \$10 billion they now keep in Western banks, or any major part of it, this could play havoc with the intricate economic and financial mechanism of the Western world.

But, they contend, the Arabs would do no such thing, because they could not find a better home for their money—which is much like the earlier argument than the Arabs could not stop selling oil to the West, because they could not drink it. Moscow, on the other hand, is telling the Arabs that they certainly ought to use the money weapon—and give the money to the Russians.

The Arabs, say the Western bankers, would not be as simple-minded as to do that. But the Kremlin, which knows that it cannot dupe the canny Arab finance ministers, has devised a roundabout way to achieve its purpose.

A typical Moscow broadcast, just before the Arab League meeting, complimented the Arabs on their "effective" use of the oil weapon, but reminded them that their potential was "not confined to oil alone." The withdrawal of funds, it said, could have "a great effect" on the Western countries which are "arming Israel in its "aggressive" policy.

After the Arab League meeting, Moscow welcomed the decision to begin the gradual withdrawal but evidently felt that this did not go far enough. An inflammatory broadcast promptly sought to arouse Arab suspicions with talk of an international Zionist conspiracy. In terms reminiscent of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, it linked the "oil monopolies" with Jewish-controlled banks, and the Rothschilds with the Rockefellers and the Gettys.

It mattered little that the Rockefellers and the Gettys were not Jews, Moscow explained, since they were beholden to the Jews. They profited from the industries which supplied arms "to the Israeli aggressors at low cost." Had it not been for Arab oil, which was "the life blood of modern industry," hundreds of major factories in the West "would have ground to a halt." That was just before they had indeed ground to a halt in Britain.

What Moscow now seems to be concerned about is that the Arabs might weaken in their resolve to use the oil weapon, and it is therefore urging them to supplement it with the money weapon. The West's major industrial corporations, it says, are "subservient to the Zionist banking capital which dominates, according to economists, 80 per cent of the financial system of the West." And yet the Arabs put their

money in these banks which "use Arab capital to develop the war industry and to give direct economic and financial aid to Israel."

When the money theme of recent broadcasts is examined against the background of what the Russians have been saying to the Arabs over the years, it adds a further strand to the pattern which has begun to emerge lately. Now the "reactionary Arab oil kings" who insist on keeping their money in Western banks are seen to be "secretly" in league with Western imperialists and Jewish capitalists, and, indeed, with Israel itself. The aim of this international conspiracy is to preserve Israel's power and to protect the kings against the "Arab revolutionary movement," in which the Communists would one day play a leading part.

Moscow's recent pat on the back for King Faisal of Saudi Arabia is certain to be followed, sooner or later, with a blow under the belt. The Kremlin expects that when the "reactionaries" are overthrown, the Arabs would establish the political and economic links with the Soviet Union which would not only give it a share in the Mideast's oil, as has been suggested, but would also

**"If the Arabs withdraw the \$10 billion they keep in Western banks, it could play havoc with the economic mechanism of the Western world."**

help to redirect the flow of Arab oil money to Moscow.

This is the long-term plan, which depends to some extent on continuing tension to produce the sparks that would ignite the flammable revolutionary material lying around the Mideast. In the short term, as another Moscow commentary on the Arab League decision made clear, the Arabs must withdraw the money from the West because "tomorrow" another devaluation could again cost them hundreds of millions of dollars. At the same time Moscow warned them that if they used it to buy shares in Western industry, as some Arab leaders propose, their dependence on the West would only increase.

The way out of the dilemma, according to Moscow, lies in using the Arab money withdrawn from the West to buy, from a certain country that remains coyly unnamed, the equipment, machinery, and whole factories which it would supply—unlike you know who—"on the basis of equal and mutual economic cooperation and cordial and honest assistance." That way, it said, the Arabs would be "assured" that their money would not be used to finance Israeli aggression, "which is what is happening now."

Of course, as Moscow has often told the Arabs, its own interest is entirely unselfish. It certainly wants them to use the money weapon, but for their own good only—or so it says.

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Mid East.

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# Soviets Say U.S. Got Mideast War Alert

By Murrey Marder

Washington Post Staff Writer

The Soviet Union contends that it tried in vain to alert the United States to the danger of an outbreak of warfare in the Middle East in the months before the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli conflict on Oct. 6, according to a diplomatic source.

Warnings that Arab-Israeli tension was "explosive" and that pressure was mounting in Egypt to recoup territory captured by Israel in the 1967 war were passed to the Nixon administration as late as September, a Soviet diplomatic source said yesterday.

Soviet Communist Party leader Leonid I. Brezhnev, it was said, told President Nixon earlier at their summit conference in June that hostilities might break out "at any time."

Subsequent warnings of urgent need for diplomatic movement toward a peace settlement to head off a conflict were said to have been passed by the Russians to Henry A. Kissinger, now Secretary of State.

There is no claim that the Soviet Union specifically warned the United States that war was imminent in early October. The Soviet version, instead, is that the Soviet Union repeatedly tried to caution the United States that a conflict was inevitable if no progress was made to prevent it.

The American reaction is reported, from the Soviet side, to have been two-fold: disbelief that the Egyptians would launch an attack on Israel, and American confidence that if the Egyptians were foolish enough to do so, the Egyptians would "get a bloody nose."

On the Soviet side it is said that this reaction illustrated a fundamental difference of assessment by the Soviet Union and by the Nixon administration of the danger in the situation. The Soviet Union, the arms supplier of Egypt, withdrew dependents of its military advisers from Egypt just before the war broke out.

There was no immediate official comment from either the White House or the State Department yesterday on the Soviet contention. Earlier, President Nixon expressed hope for a lasting settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict in

conference which opens in Geneva on Friday with the United States and the Soviet Union as co-chairman. Secretary Kissinger, who will represent the United States, has been in frequent consultation with the Soviet Union on organizing the conference, for which he has taken the lead.

The claim that the Soviet Union tried to alert the United States to the danger of Arab-Israeli war was made in response to questions raised by newsmen here about a speech by Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.) in New York last Monday. Jackson repeated a charge made earlier by himself and others, that the Soviet Union defaulted on an agreement it signed with President Nixon on June 22 for the prevention of nuclear war, by failing to consult over the threat of war in the Middle East. The Soviet Union maintains that there was no default and that it repeatedly tried to warn of danger.