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CIA AND THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

The Origins of CIA

The concept of central intelligence to support US national security policies emerged during World War II. In 1940, when the fortunes of Britain and France were at their lowest ebb, President Roosevelt sent Colonel William Donovan, a prominent New York attorney and a Congressional Medal of Honor winner, to assess the situation in Europe. He reported that Britain would hold on. He also urged that the United States organize immediately for global war, including the formation of a "service of strategic information" which would combine intelligence collection and production with action arms for propaganda and subversion.

Coordinator of Information

Donovan's efforts bore fruit in the formation of the Office of Coordinator of Information (COI) by Presidential Order on 11 July 1941 with Donovan as Coordinator. The functions prescribed for the COI were quite similar to those eventually enacted for CIA:

- a. Collect and analyze all information and data, which may bear upon national security;
- b. To correlate such information and data, and to make such information and data available to the President and to such departments and agencies as the President may determine, and;
- c. To carry out, when requested by the President, such supplementary activities as may facilitate the securing of information important for national security not now available to the Government.

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Under this simple but broad mandate, Donovan began building a foreign intelligence service for the United States government.

Office of Strategic Services

Following the declaration of war against the Axis powers, it was clear that there needed to be a closer link between the capabilities of COI and the Armed Forces. On 13 June 1942, the President, as Commander-in-Chief, issued a military order redesignating the COI as the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and placing it under the jurisdiction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The foreign information activities of COI were transferred to a newly-created Office of War Information, - a predecessor of the present United States Information Agency.

OSS was charged to:

- a. Collect and analyze such strategic information as may be required by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- b. Plan and operate such special services as may be directed by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff.

OSS was forced to face a number of problems which had not faced COI. COI had received secret, secure support in the form of funding, contracting, and other services from the Executive Office. OSS needed and was granted certain specific authorities on its own.

The President extended to OSS the privilege to enter into contracts ". . . . without regard to the provisions of law relating to the marking, performance, amendment, or modification of contracts" a privilege granted earlier to the War Department, the Navy Department, and the Maritime Commission under the first War Powers Act of 1941.

From its inception, OSS operated under two unusual rules relating to the expenditure of government monies. One permitted latitude concerning the purpose for which funds could be spent. The other protected OSS against

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the unauthorized disclosure of the purpose and details of certain expenditures. The Director of OSS enjoyed the confidence of Congress in the exercise of this grant of broad authority. This confidence in Donovan was sustained in subsequent appropriation acts as the war ended in which funds were specifically allocated for OSS.

Shortly after the creation of OSS, top officials in various elements of the US intelligence effort began to look ahead to the shape of a foreign intelligence service in peacetime. In October 1944, Donovan forwarded his views to President Roosevelt in a document entitled "The Basis for a Permanent United States Foreign Intelligence Service."

Donovan proposed a central service which would:

- a. collect, analyze, and deliver intelligence on the policy or strategic level;
- b. have its own means of communication and control over its secret operations;
- c. not have any police function.

Under Donovan's plan there would be an individual rather than a collective responsibility for national intelligence. Finally, the director of the proposed organization would be responsible directly to the President.

The President returned the proposal to Donovan with the comment that he had been advised that it was possible to devise a better and cheaper intelligence system.

The President asked Donovan to continue working on a post-war intelligence system. Nearly two years of studies and discussion followed, during which the bulk of OSS was dismantled as part of general post-war demobilization. In a holding action, the espionage, counter-espionage, and support sections of OSS were transferred to the Department of the

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Army and became the Strategic Services Unit. Although there was general agreement on the need for a central intelligence service, there was little agreement on what it should be. There were conflicts particularly over whether the new service should report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of State, or the President. There was no agreement on whether the responsibility for national intelligence should be individual or collective.

By late 1945, a growing body of opinion was arguing the necessity of a central intelligence agency. The Congressional investigation of Pearl Harbor revealed that there was sufficient information available in diverse parts of the government to provide advance warning of the 7 December 1941 attack. However, no central agency or individual had the responsibility to correlate, analyze, and report such intelligence to the President.

Central Intelligence Group

The studies and debates culminated in the issuance of a Presidential Order on 22 January 1946 establishing a National Intelligence Authority (NIA) and a Central Intelligence Group (CIG). The NIA was made up of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy and the Military Chief of Staff to the President. The order directed the NIA to plan, develop, and coordinate all Federal foreign intelligence activities. The President ordered the formation of a Central Intelligence Group to be made up of persons and facilities assigned from the Departments of State, Army, and Navy. The President designated a Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) to direct the CIG, to be responsible to the NIA, and to sit as a non-voting member of the NIA.

The order fixed the DCI with clear responsibility for national intelligence and established an Intelligence Advisory Board as the focal point of the intelligence community for all functions related to national security.

The CIG and the intelligence community inherited certain assets from the OSS-SSU. There were the war-time records; some means for procuring both overt and secret information; basic counter-espionage files; a substantial body of knowledge about research and analysis of basic intelligence information; skilled personnel; and working agreements with key foreign intelligence services.

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A number of functions were transferred to CIG from wartime agencies and from departments anticipating budget reductions in peacetime. The nucleus of the CIG was the Strategic Services Unit which was transferred from the Department of Army. It became the Office of Special Operations charged with espionage and counterespionage.

With the expiration of the President's war powers, it was apparent that Congressional authorization for the CIG was required. A comprehensive legislative proposal was prepared covering the general guidelines of the CIG Executive Order and requesting administrative authorities to support an autonomous agency. For example, CIG lacked the authority to hire personnel directly and had no independent budget.

As it happened, enabling legislation for CIA was caught up in the drafting of the National Security Act of 1947 which aimed primarily at unification of the military services. Provisions relating to CIA's functional responsibilities and its structural position within the Executive Department were included in the draft legislation submitted to Congress by President Truman on 26 February 1947. During almost five months of deliberation, Congress studied the CIA proposals in great depth. During a debate on the bill in the House of Representatives, Congressman Carter Manasco (Democrat, Alabama), a member of the committee which had marked up the bill, said: "This section on central intelligence was given more study by our sub-committee and the full committee than any other section of the bill."

Congress enacted the National Security Act of 1947 on 25 July 1947. It was signed into law by President Truman the following day.

Central Intelligence Agency

Section 102 of the National Security Act established the positions of the Director of Central Intelligence and the Central Intelligence Agency. The concept of central intelligence was given formal functions and a precise relationship within the executive branch. CIA was given a definitive charter which not only specified the new agency's functions but also made it clear that CIA would not trespass on the prerogatives of other departments and agencies, including their need for departmental as opposed to national intelligence.

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Out of respect for international law, the act does not use the word, "espionage," but the intent of Congress was clear, - the United States would indeed engage in the peacetime collection of intelligence by clandestine methods. Moreover, the term, "intelligence," was not given a precise statutory definition, but was understood to encompass not only the collection and production of national intelligence but also other activities which the President deemed to be in support of US national security.

Therefore, the Act provides that the CIA - in practice, the DCI - will advise the National Security Council (NSC) on all foreign intelligence activities of the US government; make recommendations to the NSC for the coordination of such activities; correlate, evaluate, and disseminate foreign intelligence; perform services of common concern for the intelligence community; and undertake other functions and duties affecting the national security as the NSC may from time to time direct.

This final clause was designed to permit CIA to conduct foreign activities which the President and the NSC might find appropriate to assign to a "secret service." These activities have always been subordinated to the primary task, the production of national intelligence. Moreover, they have always been under the direct supervision of the executive branch.

The legislative history surrounding the establishment of the DCI and CIA bespeaks overwhelming support for institutionalizing a national foreign intelligence effort to serve the needs of the President and his senior policy advisers. The Act also recognized the autonomous needs of the intelligence community members for their own departmental, as opposed to national, intelligence.

The CIA Act of 1949

On 20 June 1949, Congress enacted the CIA Act of 1949 providing legislative authority for the administration of the Agency. The provisions of the Act were based on the experiences of OSS and its conduct of intelligence operations in the broadest sense of the word.

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Major provisions of the Act included:

- a. authorization for CIA to exercise authorities in sections of the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947;
- b. authority to transfer monies between CIA and other government agencies with the approval of the Bureau of the Budget, but without regard to limitations of appropriations from which transferred;
- c. authority to expend sums necessary to carry out CIA's function, notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary;
- d. for objects of a confidential, extraordinary, or emergency nature, expenditures could be accounted for solely on the certificate of the Director, which certificate is deemed to be a sufficient voucher for the amount certified.

The language on certification was taken directly from appropriations acts for the latter years of OSS and was deemed essential to protect the secrecy of intelligence operations.

The Act of 1949 completed the creation of CIA and established its roots in a composite of legislative action and executive orders.

The Intelligence Community

The Early Years

The National Security Act of 1947, which established the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency, recognized the need:

- a. to integrate national security policies
- b. to coordinate foreign intelligence activities in support of national security policies

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The Act recognized the existence of and the need for separate intelligence organizations in various departments and agencies. The Act also established the Central Intelligence Agency to:

- a. produce national intelligence
- b. perform services of common concern
- c. coordinate the intelligence community

Since the creation of a national security policy machinery, it has been possible to identify broad policy guidelines within which the intelligence community could:

- a. levy intelligence requirements
- b. conduct collection operations
- c. produce national intelligence estimates
- d. allocate material resources

The division of responsibilities among the elements of the intelligence community are set forth in a series of National Security Council Intelligence Directives (NSCID's). These are supplemented by a Director of Central Intelligence Directives (DCID's) series.

Although the Act of 1947 stipulates CIA as the coordinating agency, in practice this responsibility has rested with the Director of Central Intelligence in his capacity as the President's principal foreign intelligence adviser. The evolution of the intelligence community from an advisory to managerial entity has depended very largely on directives from the President to the DCI and on the propensities of the DCI to devote attention to his supervisory responsibilities.

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For some years, the supervisory body of the intelligence community - first the Intelligence Advisory Committee and later the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) - concerned itself almost exclusively with setting national intelligence requirements and producing national intelligence estimates. The DCI and the Board had little authority to direct collection efforts and almost no say in the deployment of material resources by the various departments and agencies.

During General Walter Bedell Smith's tenure as DCI (October 1950 - February 1953), the Korean War was the primary concern, and there was a prevailing sentiment that a general war with the Communist Bloc was not unlikely. Under these circumstances, the overriding requirement for the intelligence community was to develop information on the capabilities and intentions of our adversaries, with special emphasis on early warning of an enemy attack. This concern was reflected in the priority national intelligence objectives list, in the national intelligence estimates produced, and in the allocation of resources to military intelligence needs.

Also, under DCI Smith, the other members of the intelligence community were made fully aware of the DCI's primary position and his special relationship to the President and the NSC. Smith rejected any suggestion that he was simply the chairman of a board of directors and that the community was thus ruled by a consensus. This affirmation of the DCI's role came at a time when there was strong opposition not only to the assignment of broad responsibilities to CIA as a new agency, but also to the establishment of the DCI with power to direct the affairs of the intelligence community.

In the 1950s, the concern over a conventional general war tended to diminish only to be replaced by a more urgent worry about long-range striking forces carrying nuclear warheads. At the same time, the atmosphere of mutual deterrence lent itself to an expansion of cold-war tactics, including subversion and wars of national liberation. DCI Allen W. Dulles was urged on several occasions by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

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to play a more active role in coordinating the activities of the intelligence community, but Mr. Dulles' interests lay in other directions. He was deeply involved in the development and use of the U-2 and in the direction of cold-war activities, a responsibility assigned to CIA by the National Security Council.

The Impact of Reconnaissance Collection Operations

The advent of the U-2 and the following reconnaissance satellite systems forced the intelligence community to focus its attention on four major problems:

- a. requirements
- b. collection operations
- c. exploitation of the intelligence product
- d. allocation of resources

First, requirements reflect the needs of the intelligence analysts and are correspondingly broad or narrow. An integral part of the U-2 program was the Ad Hoc Requirements Committee which tried to reconcile the different requirements of the various consumers. The Air Force was primarily interested in targetting data; the Army and the Navy had their special interest. The Department of State and CIA were interested in broader strategic questions, including the state of the Soviet economy to support a crash military problem.

Second, the U-2 had operational limitations, and weather was a critical issue. An urgent intelligence requirement could go unsatisfied if the aircraft lacked the range or if there was cloud cover. After the U-2, there was a constant debate over the priority to be assigned to wide-ranging search satellites or narrowly-focussed spotting satellites. Both were needed.

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Third, beginning in 1960, the influx of photography threatened to overwhelm those who would exploit it. The dramatic nature of the new photography tended to overshadow other products, such as the carefully-written analysis or the report from a walking mortal. The intelligence community was almost mesmerized by pictures. The importance of other sources was not overlooked entirely, and the acquisition of Col. Olag Penkovsky as a source pointed up the need for someone on the scene who could see through cloud cover, a roof, and even into other men's minds.

Fourth, the reconnaissance satellites and the aircraft to replace the U-2 were very expensive, and the demands of the analysts called for even higher-resolution photography. The cost of collecting signals intelligence continued to soar. The intelligence community had to husband its resources, and to allocate its resources with two objectives in view:

- a. to ensure that no critical gaps existed in intelligence coverage
- b. to eliminate unnecessary duplication.

Two steps were taken in the latter days of President Eisenhower's administration. First was the creation of the Defense Intelligence Agency as a means of integrating the military intelligence effort which had been divided among the separate military services. DIA became the Department of Defense member of USIB, with representatives of the Army, Navy, and Air Force holding the right to comment on matters within their competence. Other board members are the intelligence chiefs from State, AEC, FBI, NSA and CIA. Recently, the Treasury representative has become a Board member. Second was the establishment of the National Photographic Interpretation Center under the direct supervision of the DCI, to provide a central facility for handling the flood of photography in a way which would satisfy the demands of all consumers.

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Meanwhile, the United States Intelligence Board continued as the focal point of the intelligence community and operated as an advisory board supported by an elaborate sub-committee structure trying to coordinate the national foreign intelligence effort. The USIB continued to devote its attention almost entirely to the ultimate product, the national intelligence estimates and to formulating lists of requirements.

The Role of the DCI Re-defined

Following the Bay of Pigs operation in April 1961, there was an open season on the DCI and CIA. Washington was awash with schemes to separate the operational and analytical elements of the Agency; to abolish it as such and to distribute its functions among other governmental agencies; to separate the DCI from CIA. The PFIAB persisted in its view that the DCI should serve primarily as the President's principal foreign intelligence adviser and that he control the activities of the intelligence community through USIB. Secondarily, he should oversee the activities of CIA but not its day-to-day operations. This managerial concept also reflected the view that intelligence collection and production were more important than covert cold-war activities.

Incoming DCI John A. McCone received a letter from President John F. Kennedy on 16 January 1962 which directed the DCI to coordinate and provide effective guidance to the total foreign intelligence effort and to maintain a continuing review, with the heads of the Departments and Agencies concerned, of the programs and activities of all US agencies engaged in foreign intelligence activities with a view to assuring efficiency and effectiveness and to avoiding undesirable duplication.

DCI McCone was the first Director to face up to the problems of managing the intelligence community, and he took the first modest steps. One of the first was an effort to identify the magnitude of the intelligence community, its personnel strength, its material resources, and the nature of its activities. Depending on which criteria were used, the intelligence

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community approached [] with an annual budget of about [] The majority of the money and people were engaged in the collection and processing of signals intelligence; another heavy budget item involved reconnaissance operations.

Given the size of the intelligence community, the DCI's first problem was how to satisfy the President's directive to provide coordination and effective guidance. Beyond the directive to review programs and activities with the heads of Agencies and Departments, the DCI had no authority to probe into budgets and programs outside CIA. Mr. McCone elected to concentrate his attention on those activities which were in direct support of the DCI's responsibility for the production of national intelligence. He identified the Board of National Estimates, the National Reconnaissance Organization, the National Security Agency, the National Photographic Interpretation Center, and the Air Force Technical Application Center as national intelligence assets. He conferred with the Bureau of the Budget, who looked to him for an over-view of the community budget as well as CIA's activities and programs. The DCI met with Secretary of Defense McNamara, and they agreed that an effort should be made to streamline NSA to be more responsive to national intelligence requirements.

In order to carry out his role as leader of the intelligence community, Mr. McCone named a Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence Programs Evaluation. This official, standing above any responsibilities in CIA, had a small staff responsible for reviewing all national intelligence activities to see if they were, indeed, responsive to priority national intelligence objectives and if the resources were adequate. At the same time, Mr. McCone imposed a management role on USIB by tightening requirements and insisting that collection efforts concentrate on priority tasks.

The National Reconnaissance Program, reconnaissance overflights of denied territories by manned and unmanned vehicles, proved to be a severe test of the DCI's efforts to establish his authority in the intelligence community. Because of the vast amount of support required from the US Air Force for CIA's U-2 project, the effort was regarded as a joint one.

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Informal understandings were made official in a written agreement establishing the National Reconnaissance Office with the Under Secretary of the Air Force as Director. With the development of reconnaissance satellites, divergence between the Air Force and CIA increased. The Air Force seemed determined to emphasize research and development on a high-resolution spotting satellite, to deny CIA a role in research and development, to fly missions without reference to USIB, and to stall on releasing funds for CIA programs.

DCI McCone insisted that the NRP had to be responsive to national intelligence needs. To that end, he developed a managerial role for USIB in validating requirements levied by the USIB Committee on Over-head Reconnaissance, in fixing launch schedules to fit the production of national intelligence estimates, and in making recommendations for new satellites to satisfy the needs of the analysts. He wanted both CIA and the Air Force to go forward with research and development, arguing that the Agency had always shown greater initiative and imagination in the development of the U-2, the A-12, and the first working satellite. To repose full authority with either CIA or the Air Force would, according to DCI McCone, leave the NRP short of fulfilling its national intelligence mission.

Mr. McCone carried his views to the highest levels of the government, disagreeing with a PFIAB recommendation that the President turn the management of the NRP over to the Department of Defense. It was decided to manage the NRP by means of an Executive Committee, made up of the DCI, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Director, NRO. This arrangement had the effect of leaving the NRP as a national intelligence asset responsive to the guidance of the DCI and USIB.

Intelligence, Policy, and Management

During the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 and during the period of growing US involvement in Southeast Asia, the intelligence community was asked more and more to produce estimates on probable enemy reactions to US courses of action. There was a closer link between specific policy moves and the intelligence community's estimative processes. This had

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the effect of strengthening the direct connection between policy and intelligence so that the intelligence community could be more responsive to the needs of the policymakers. The objectivity and integrity of national intelligence estimates were in no way threatened; the more ready access to US policy guidelines gave the estimates a more immediate relevance.

The refinement of priority national intelligence objectives by USIB did not lead to a reallocation of resources by collecting agencies to meet national intelligence requirements. The DCI's authority stopped short of being able to tell other departments and agencies how to deploy their people and material resources. For example, NSA faced the dilemma of whether to respond first to the needs expressed by the DCI from whom it received exhortations or to the needs of the military services from whom it received money and people.

During 1970-71, the need for more effective management and coordination of all aspects of intelligence community activities was under careful examination by James R. Schlesinger, then Assistant Director, OMB. The results of this examination were reflected in the President's November 1971 memorandum concerning "Organization and Management of the US Foreign Intelligence Community." Citing the urgent need for an improved intelligence product and for greater efficiency in the use of resources allocated to intelligence, the President charged the DCI with four major intelligence community responsibilities:

- a. Planning and reviewing all intelligence activities including tactical intelligence and the allocation of all intelligence resources. This would include the submission of a consolidated intelligence program budget.
- b. Producing national intelligence required by the President and other national consumers.
- c. Chairing and staffing all intelligence community advisory boards or committees.

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d. Reconciling intelligence requirements and priorities with budgetary constraints.

The President directed only limited formal changes. He did, however, ask that work be directed toward the attainment of three goals:

a. A more efficient use of resources in the collection of intelligence information.

b. A more effective assignment of functions within the community.

c. Improvement in the quality and scope of the substantive product.

Certain necessary conditions to help the DCI attain the President's goals were set forth in the Presidential memorandum:

a. The DCI must delegate authority to his Deputy - as far as possible without legislation - for the plans, programs, and day-to-day operations of CIA, and he must assume overall leadership of the community.

b. A more effective review of intelligence product quality and policy must be provided to the DCI, especially by high-level consumers of national intelligence.

c. The DCI must play a major role in the resolution of important issues within the intelligence community.

d. The DCI should be supported by major committees of the community with clearly defined advisory functions involving intelligence production and requirements on the one hand and intelligence budget and the allocation of resources on the other.

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e. Intelligence collection programs, financed and managed primarily by DOD, must come under more effective management and coordination with other intelligence programs.

f. NSC and DCI intelligence directives must be rewritten to reflect these changes and others as they occur.

The intelligence community now includes three principal advisory elements:

a. The National Security Council Intelligence Committee which provides the DCI with substantive intelligence guidance and evaluation of the intelligence product.

b. The Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee which advises the DCI on the preparation of budgets and the allocation of resources.

c. The United States Intelligence Board which advises and assists the DCI in: (1) establishing priority national intelligence objectives; (2) setting requirements in priority order for meeting the objectives; (3) the production and dissemination of national intelligence; (4) the protection of intelligence sources and methods; and (5) the release of intelligence to foreign governments.

The DCI's personal staff to discharge his augmented responsibilities is headed by a Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community. Intelligence Community Staff membership is broadly representative of the community, both military and civilian. The Staff includes:

a. A Product Review Group which maintains a dialogue with high-level intelligence product consumers concerning their needs and their evaluation of the Community's responsiveness to those needs.

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b. A Community Comptroller Group which conducts program reviews and produces a National Foreign Intelligence Program Budget; various planning and development studies; and provides financial analysis and data support to the DCI, the Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee, and other community elements.

c. A Program Evaluations Group which provides cross-program analyses of major issues.

Even as the intelligence community has undergone an evolution since its inception, so has the management of the community. Further changes seem likely as more experience is gained. At this time, the intelligence community has priority responsibilities for foreseeing possible technological breakthroughs in foreign weaponry, for monitoring strategic arms limitations treaties and related agreements, and for divining the intentions of foreign government leaders, especially the Communists. The community has also been assigned heavier responsibilities in the area of economic intelligence and new assignments in international narcotics and terrorism.

The intelligence community has never been monolithic and never will be. A piece of intelligence information can be interpreted quite differently by a CIA case officer, a Department of State analyst, or by an expert in international energy questions. These differing emphases are necessary and desirable. Some duplication in analysis, collection, and production is valuable if duplication means the elimination of serious deficiencies in our knowledge.

The intelligence community is well-named. It is a body with much in common, but certain areas are private and privileged. The individual and community needs tend to compete as well as cooperate, and a certain tension obtains. It is the DCI's job to control that tension and see that it results in overall benefit to US national security. Without the community, the US Government would revert to the practices which President Truman sought to eliminate: reliance on a disparate series of intelligence judgments from entities with particular policy axes to grind. National intelligence attuned

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to national security needs is responsive and helpful; intelligence slanted to support policy can be unresponsive and even dangerous.

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<p>Jack: <i>This looks good but maybe it should be split into 2 papers of about p. 9.</i></p> <p>Here 'tis. It has been reviewed by [redacted] for DCI/IC. I invited Steininger to look at it, but he never did. The first part came out of Larry Houston, who says he'll look at the whole thing only if you want him to.</p> <p>NRP makes it SECRET. Without NRP, however, it ain't got much flesh and blood. Let me know what more I can, please.</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><i>Walt</i></p>			
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