93D CONGRESS
2d Session

SENATE

REPORT
No. 93-884

AUTHORIZING APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1975 FOR MILITARY PROCUREMENT, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, AND ACTIVE DUTY, SELECTED RESERVE AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL STRENGTHS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

REPORT

TOGETHER WITH

INDIVIDUAL VIEWS

[To accompany S. 3000]

ON

AUTHORIZING APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1975 FOR MILITARY PROCUREMENT, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, AND ACTIVE DUTY, SELECTED RESERVE AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL STRENGTHS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

MAY 29, 1974.—Ordered to be printed

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1974

31-683

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

JOHN C. STENNIS, Mississippi, *Chairman*

STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri
HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington
SAM J. ERVIN, JR., North Carolina
HOWARD W. CANNON, Nevada
THOMAS J. McINTYRE, New Hampshire
HARRY F. BYRD, JR., Virginia
HAROLD E. HUGHES, Iowa
SAM NUNN, Georgia

STROM THURMOND, South Carolina
JOHN TOWER, Texas
PETER H. DOMINICK, Colorado
BARRY GOLDWATER, Arizona
WILLIAM L. SCOTT, Virginia
ROBERT TAFT, JR., Ohio

T. EDWARD BRASWELL, JR., *Chief Counsel and Staff Director*
JOHN T. TICER, *Chief Clerk*

Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B00380R000700030012-3

CONTENTS

Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B00380R000700030012-3

Calendar No. 858

93D CONGRESS
2d Session

SENATE

REPORT
No. 93-884

AUTHORIZING APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1975 FOR MILITARY PROCUREMENT, AND RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, AUTHORIZING ACTIVE DUTY, SELECTED RESERVE AND CIVILIAN MANPOWER STRENGTHS AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

MAY 29, 1974.—Ordered to be printed

Mr. STENNIS, from the Committee on Armed Services, submitted the following

REPORT

[To accompany S. 3000]

The Committee on Armed Services, to which was referred the bill (S. 3000) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1975 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes, and other weapons, and research, development, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength for each active duty component and of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces, authorization of civilian end strengths for the Department of Defense, and for other purposes, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon with an amendment and recommends that the bill as amended do pass.

COMMITTEE AMENDMENTS

(1) On page 2, line 9, strike out "$339,500,000" and insert in lieu thereof "$320,300,000."

(2) On page 2, line 10, strike out "$2,960,600,000" and insert in lieu therof "$2,862,700,000".

(3) On page 2, line 11, strike out "$3,496,600,000" and insert in lieu thereof the following:

> , $3,286,300,000, of which (1) $192,700,000 shall be available only for the procurement of the A–10 or the A–7D aircraft, based on the winner of a "fly-off" competition between such aircraft, as determined by the Secretary of Defense and certified to the Congress by the Secretary, such funds to be available within thirty days after certification to Congress provided no objection is interposed by any of the four au-

thorizing or appropriation committees having jurisdiction over such procurement, and (2) $549,800,000 shall be available only for procurement in connection with the Airborne Warning and Control System, and shall be available for that purpose only if and after the Secretary of Defense determines and certifies such determination to the Congress that such system is cost effective and meets the mission needs and requirements of the Department of Defense, except that the foregoing certification requirement shall not apply with respect to the procurement of long lead time items for such system.

(4) On page 3, line 5, strike out "$459,200,000" and insert in lieu thereof "$436,500,000".

(5) On page 3, line 6, strike out "$620,600,000" and insert in lieu thereof "$634,500,000".

(6) On page 3, line 7, strike out "$76,000,000" and insert in lieu thereof "$74,100,000".

(7) On page 3, line 8, strike out "$1,610,800,000" and insert in lieu thereof "$1,572,400,000".

(8) On page 3, line 10, strike out "$3,562,600,000" and insert in lieu thereof "$2,881,000,000".

(9) On page 3, lines 13 and 14, strike out "$331,900,000" and insert in lieu thereof "$293,300,000".

(10) On page 3, line 14, strike out "$80,100,000" and insert in lieu thereof "$74,200,000".

(11) On page 3, line 19, strike out "$53,400,000" and insert in lieu thereof "$46,000,000".

(12) On page 3, line 20, strike out "$25,600,000" and insert in lieu thereof "$25,500,000".

(13) On page 3, line 21, strike out "$1,985,976,000" and insert in lieu thereof "$1,875,243,000".

(14) On page 4, lines 8 and 9, strike out "$3,264,503,000" and insert in lieu thereof "$3,151,042,000".

(15) On page 4, line 10, strike out "$3,518,860,000" and insert in lieu thereof the following:

$3,389,470,000, of which $81,405,000 shall be available only for research, development, testing, and evaluation in connection with the A–10 aircraft, and shall be available for that purpose only if such aircraft wins the "fly-off" competition against the A–7D aircraft.

(16) On page 4, line 16, strike out "$555,700,000" and insert in lieu thereof "$536,657,000".

(17) On page 4, line 24, strike out "785,000" and insert in lieu thereof "768,300".

(18) On page 4, line 25, strike out "740,380" and insert in lieu thereof "527,000".

(19) On page 5, line 1, strike out "196,398" and insert in lieu thereof "192,800".

(20) On page 5, line 2, strike out "330,345" and insert in lieu thereof "615,000".

(21) On page 5, after line 2, add the following:

SEC. 302. (a) It is the sense of the Congress that the United States military forces in Europe have an excessive number of headquarters and noncombat military personnel relative to the number of combat personnel located in Europe. Therefore, the noncombat component of the total authorized Army strength in Europe shall be reduced by an amount not less than 20 per centum of the noncombat component strength authorized as of June 30, 1974. Such reduction shall be completed not later than June 30, 1976, and not less than 50 per centum of such reduction shall be completed on or before June 30, 1975. The Secretary of Defense may take action to increase the combat component strength of the Army in Europe by restructuring the various combat and support elements of these forces and by obtaining from other North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries as much logistical support as possible for United States forces in Europe. Except in the event of imminent hostilities in Europe, the amount of such increase in United States Army combat strength shall not exceed the number of noncombat military personnel that are reduced by this section. For purposes of this section, the combat component of the Army in Europe includes only the infantry, cavalry, artillery, armored, air defense, and missile combat units of battalion or smaller size. The Secretary of Defense shall report semiannually to the Congress on all actions taken to improve the combat proportion of United States forces in Europe. The first report shall be submitted not later than January 31, 1975.

(b) The Secretary of Defense shall undertake a specific assessment of the costs and loss of nonnuclear combat effectiveness of the military forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries caused by the failure of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization members, including the United States, to standardize weapons systems, ammunition, fuel, and other military impediments for land, air, and naval forces. The Secretary of Defense shall also develop a list of standardization actions that would improve the overall North Atlantic Treaty Organization nonnuclear defense capability or that would save resources for the alliance as a whole. He shall evaluate the relative priority and effect of each such action. The Secretary shall cause these assessments and evaluations to be brought before the appropriate North Atlantic Treaty Organization bodies in order that the specific actions and recommendations can become an integral part of the overall North Atlantic Treaty Organization review of force goals and development of force plans. The Secretary of Defense shall report semiannually to the Congress on the specific assessments made under the above provisions as well as the results achieved with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies. The first such report shall be submitted to Congress not later than January 31, 1975.

(c) The total number of United States tactical nuclear warheads located in Europe on the date of enactment of this Act shall not be increased except in the event of imminent hos-

tilities in Europe. The Secretary of Defense shall study the overall concept for use of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe; how the use of such weapons relates to deterrence and to a strong conventional defense; reductions in the number and type of nuclear warheads which are not essential for the defense structure for Western Europe; and the steps that can be taken to develop a rational and coordinated nuclear posture by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Alliance that is consistent with proper emphasis on conventional defense forces. The Secretary of Defense shall report to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives on the results of the above study on or before April 1, 1975. In addition, beginning on September 1, 1974, the Secretary of Defense shall report semiannually to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives on the number, type, and purpose of United States tactical nuclear warheads located in Europe.

SEC. 303. It is declared to be the policy of Congress that any increase in the ratio of aircrew to aircraft for the strategic airlift mission of the Air Force above the present ratio of 2.00 active duty crewmembers and 1.25 Reserve Force crewmembers per aircraft should be achieved through the components of the Selected Reserve and not by increasing the active duty force level of the Air Force. To carry out such policy the Secretary of Defense is directed to formulate a plan to increase the strategic airlift crew ratio per aircraft to the required levels by utilizing jointly the resources of the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve. Such plan shall specifically include: (1) restructuring the missions of Air National Guard units so as to retain an effective strategic airlift capability within the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve; (2) the utilization of Air National Guard units now in existence so as to avoid the loss of existing skills in those units; (3) alternatives, including, but not limited to, transfer, rotation, "hybridization," and "association," for making available to the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve strategic airlift aircraft in numbers sufficient to support an effective capability; (4) a test of the "hybrid concept" for Air National Guard units in the strategic airlift role using C–5 or C–141 aircraft at not less than two existing Air National Guard facilities. The Secretary shall submit his plan to the Congress not later than ninety days after the date of enactment of this Act, and before the implementation thereof, together with an evaluation of such plan, the proposed schedule for its implementation, and such recommendations for legislative action relating to the subject matter of this section as he may deem appropriate.

(22) On page 9, line 10, strike out "379,848" and insert in lieu thereof "390,000".

(23) On page 9, line 11, strike out "215,842" and insert in lieu thereof "220,000".

(24) On page 9, line 12, strike out "107,526" and insert in lieu thereof "110,000".

(25) On page 9, line 15, strike out "89,128" and insert in lieu thereof "93,412".

(26) On page 10, line 15, strike out "358,717" and insert in lieu thereof "335,400".

(27) On page 10, line 18, strike out "323,529" and insert in lieu thereof "313,200".

(28) On page 10, line 19, strike out "269,709" and insert in lieu thereof "261,300".

(29) On page 10, line 22, strike out "75,372" and insert in lieu thereof "72,800".

(30) On page 11, line 10, beginning with the word "program" strike out all down through the word "when" in line 17, and insert in lieu thereof the following: "program. Whenever".

(31) On page 12, beginning with line 1, strike out all down through line 11 on page 12 and insert in lieu thereof the following:

> SEC. 502. It is the sense of Congress that the Department of Defense shall use the least costly form of manpower that is consistent with military requirements and other needs of the Department of Defense. Therefore, in developing the annual manpower authorization requests to the Congress and in carrying out manpower policies, the Secretary of Defense shall, in particular, consider the advantages of the conversion of jobs performed by military personnel to civilian employees and vice versa. A full justification of conversions from one form of manpower to another, included in the authorization requests, shall be contained in the annual manpower requirements report to the Congress required by section 138(c)(3) of title 10, United States Code.

(32) On page 13, line 3, immediately after "Sec. 601." insert "(a)".

(33) On page 13, line 7, after "Army," insert "97,368".

(34) On page 13, line 8, after "Navy," insert "71,279".

(35) On page 13, line 9, after "Marine Corps," insert "26,262".

(36) On page 13, line 10, after "Air Force," insert "52,900".

(37) On page 13, line 12, after "States," insert "12,111".

(38) On page 13, line 13, after "Army Reserve," insert "6,673".

(39) On page 13, line 14, after "Naval Reserve," insert "2,536".

(40) On page 13, line 15, after "Reserve," insert "3,403".

(41) On page 13, line 17, after "States," insert "2,359".

(42) On page 13, line 18, after "Air Force Reserve," insert "1,126".

(43) On page 13, after line 18, add the following:

> (b) The average military training student loads for the Army, the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Air Force and the Reserve components prescribed in subsection (a) of this section for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1975, shall be ad-

justed consistent with the manpower strengths provided in title III, title IV, and title V of this Act. Such adjustment shall be apportioned among the Army, the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Air Force and the Reserve Components in such manner as the Secretary of Defense shall prescribe.

(44) On page 14, beginning with line 6, strike out all down through line 19 and insert in lieu thereof the following:

SEC. 701. (a) Paragraph (1) of section 401(a) of Public Law 89–367, approved March 15, 1966 (80 Stat. 37), as amended, is amended to read as follows:

"(1) There is authorized to be appropriated as a single appropriation to the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1975, the sum of $900,000,000, including $212,300,000 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, tracked combat vehicles, and other weapons, to support South Vietnamese military forces. Such appropriation shall be administered and accounted for as one fund and may be obligated only by the issuance of orders by the Secretary of Defense for such support. Funds appropriated pursuant to this section shall be deemed obligated at the time the Secretary of Defense issues orders authorizing support of any kind to South Vietnamese military forces. No support herein authorized may be made available in any manner unless pursuant to a specific order issued by the Secretary."

(b) That portion of paragraph (2) of such section 401 (a) which precedes clause (A) is amended to read as follows:

"(2) No defense article may be furnished to the South Vietnamese forces with funds authorized for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States under this or any other Act unless the Government of the Republic of South Vietnam shall have agreed that—".

(c) Section 401 of such Public Law 89–367 is amended by striking out subsections (b), (c), and (d) and inserting in lieu thereof the following:

"(b) No funds authorized by this or any other Act to or for use by the Department of Defense may be obligated in the fiscal year ending June 30, 1975, for support of South Vietnamese military forces in any amount in excess of the amount of $900,000,000.

"(c) Any obligation incurred against funds authorized under this section shall, in the case of nonexcess materials and supplies furnished from the inventory of the Department of Defense, be equal to the replacement cost thereof at the time such obligation is incurred, and in the case of excess materials and supplies, be equal to the actual value thereof at the time such obligation is incurred.

"(d) No funds authorized by this section may be used in any way to support Vietnamese or other forces in actions designed to provide military support and assistance to the Government of Cambodia or Laos.

"(e) Within 30 days after the end of each quarter of the fiscal year, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives a written report regarding actual obligations incurred against funds appropriated pursuant to this section. Such report shall indicate the different purposes for which such obligations were incurred and the amounts thereof, together with such other information as the Secretary determines appropriate."

SEC. 702. Subsection (b) of section 7307 of title 10, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:

no naval vessel in excess of 2,000 tons or less than 20 years of age may be sold, leased, granted, loaned, bartered, transferred, or otherwise disposed of unless the disposition thereof has been approved by law enacted after such date of enactment.

"(2) After the date of enactment of this paragraph, any naval vessel not subject to the provisions of paragraph (1) may be sold, leased, granted, loaned, bartered, transferred, or otherwise disposed of in accordance with applicable provisions of law only after the Secretary of the Navy, or his designee, has notified the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives in writing of the proposed disposition and 30 days of continuous session of Congress have expired following the date on which notice was transmitted to such committees. For purposes of this paragraph, the continuity of a session of Congress is broken only by an adjournment of the Congress sine die, and the days on which either House is not in session because of an adjournment of more than 3 days to a day certain are excluded in the computation of such 30-day period."

PURPOSE OF THE BILL

This bill would:

(1) Authorize appropriations during fiscal year 1975 for (a) major procurement and (b) research, development, test, and evaluation by the Department of Defense;

(2) Continue for fiscal year 1975 the authority for military assistance financing for South Vietnam in the form of a newly required separate appropriation account;

(3) Authorize the personnel end strength for each military active duty component of the Armed Forces for fiscal year 1975;

(4) Authorize the annual average military training student load for each of the active and reserve components of the Armed Forces for fiscal year 1975;

(5) Authorize the personnel strengths for fiscal year 1975 for the Selected Reserve of each of the Reserve components of the Armed Forces;

(6) Authorize civilian end strengths for fiscal year 1975 for the Department of Defense;

(7) Impose certain limitations with regard to specific procurement actions and manpower strengths, provide certain additional legislative authority, and for other purposes.

PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS

Percentage Funds Reduction Overall--5.5% From Request

The committee recommends authorization of appropriations in the amount of $21,859,712,000, a net reduction of $1,270,427,000 from the request of $23,130,139,000. This is a 5.5 percent reduction from the request as follows:

[Dollar amounts in millions]

	Request	Senate committee recommendation	Difference	Percent reduction of request
Procurement	$13,805. l	$12,907. 3	$897. 8	6. 5
R.D.T. & E	9,325.)	8,952. 4	372. 6	4. 0
Total	23,130. l	21,859. 7	−1,270. 4	−5. 5

Note: Senate committee recommendation includes $212,000,000 for Military Assistance Service Funded items (sec. 701).

House Action on Funds Authorization

For information, the committee recommendation of $21.9 billion is $783.2 million below the authorization recommended by the House Armed Services Committee. The recommended changes proposed by the House Armed Services Committee have been identified in the charts in this report for information only.

Percentage Manpower Reductions Overall—2% Active Duty Military and 4% Civilian From Request

The committee recommends authorization of an active duty military end strength of 2,103,100, a net reduction of 49,000, or abour 2%, from the request of 2,152,100. The committee recommends authorization of a civilian end strength of 982,700, a net reduction of 44,600, or about 4%, from the request of 1,027,300.

House Action on Manpower Authorization—Active Duty and Civilian

For information, the committee recommendation of 2,103,100 active duty end strength is 46,200 below the authorization recommended by the House Armed Services Committee. The committee recommendation of 982,700 civilian end strength is 29,600 below the authorization recommended by the House Armed Services Committee.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FISCAL YEAR 1975 AUTHORIZATION BILL—SUMMARY BY MAJOR WEAPON CATEGORY

ARMY, NAVY, AIR FORCE AND DEFENSE AGENCIES

[Amount in thousands of dollars]

	Fiscal year 1973 program	Fiscal year 1974 program (appropriated)	Fiscal year 1975 request	House authorized	Senate	
					Change from request	Recommended
Aircraft:						
Army	114,400	138,400	339,500	335,000	−19,200	320,300
Navy and Marine Corps	2,974,100	2,722,700	2,960,600	2,964,100	−97,900	2,862,700
Air Force	2,639,800	2,720,400	3,496,600	3,391,400	−210,300	3,286,300
Subtotal	5,728,300	5,581,500	6,796,700	6,690,500	−327,400	6,469,300
Missiles:						
Army	699,500	525,100	459,200	439,400	−22,700	436,500
Navy	698,500	574,800	620,600	620,600	+13,900	634,500
Marine Corps	22,000	32,300	76,000	76,000	−1,900	74,100
Air Force	1,686,400	1,393,300	1,610,800	1,610,800	−38,400	1,572,400
Subtotal	3,106,400	2,525,500	2,766,600	2,746,800	−49,100	2,717,500
Naval vessels: Navy	2,962,400	3,468,100	3,562,600	3,539,100	−681,600	2,881,000
Tracked combat vehicles:						
Army	198,900	179,600	331,900	321,200	−38,600	293,300
Marine Corps	49,700	46,200	80,100	74,200	−5,900	74,200
Subtotal	248,600	225,800	412,000	395,400	−44,500	367,500
Torpedoes: Navy	196,400	198,000	187,700	187,700	----------	187,700
Other weapons:						
Army	43,900	44,700	53,400	55,700	−7,400	46,000
Navy	37,900	27,900	25,600	25,600	−100	25,500
Marine Corps	1,300	700	500	500	----------	500
Subtotal	83,100	73,300	79,500	81,800	−7,500	72,000
Total procurement	**12,325,200**	**12,072,200**	**13,805,100**	**13,641,300**	**−1,110,100**	**12,695,000**
Research, development, test and evaluation:						
Army [1]	1,884,550	1,912,100	1,985,976	1,878,397	−110,733	1,875,243
Navy (including Marine Corps) [2]	2,545,004	2,654,405	3,264,503	3,153,006	−113,461	3,151,042
Air Force	3,120,040	3,042,000	3,518,860	3,459,760	−129,390	3,389,470
Defense agencies	446,311	457,900	528,700	485,500	−19,043	509,657
Test and evaluation, Defense	27,000	24,600	27,000	25,000	----------	27,000
Total, R.D.T. & E. [3] [4]	**8,022,905**	**8,091,005**	**9,325,039**	**9,001,663**	**−372,627**	**8,952,412**
Grand total procurement and R.D.T. & E. [3] [2]	**20,348,105**	**20,163,205**	**23,130,139**	**22,642,963**	**−1,482,727**	**21,647,412**

[1] Includes $3,300,000 in fiscal year 1974 current program which is proposed for transfer from procurement.
[2] Includes $23,800,000 in fiscal year 1974 current program which is proposed for transfer from procurement.
[3] Includes special foreign currency program for Navy under R.D.T. & E. appropriation.
[4] Excludes FY 1974 Supplemental Authorization.

NOTE: Does not include $212,300,000 in Title VII for procurement authorization for South Vietnam.

MAJOR CHANGES BY SENATE COMMITTEE

This report discusses in detail all of the various changes recommended by the committee on all aspects of the bill. The following is a list of the more significant changes being recommended by the committee.

Major Funding Changes

Procurement

Deletion of Military Assistance Service Funded Program From Title I—Procurement

Funds in the amount of $287.3 million have been deleted from various accounts in Title I—Procurement. The MASF program authority and amount are contained in Section 701 of this bill.

Reduction of funds for Army AH–1Q attack helicopter

Reduction of 15 helicopters and $12.5 million from request of 21 helicopters for $27.5 million, and $4.5 million reduction for AH–1 modifications.

Deletion of procurement funds for Marine Corps A–4M aircraft

Denial of $58.1 million requested for 24 A–4M aircraft and initial spares.

Addition of procurement funds for Air Force F–111F aircraft

Inclusion of $220.5 million for continued production of 12 F–111F aircraft plus long lead funds for a subsequent buy.

Denial of Civil Reserve Airlift Fleet modifications

Denial of $155 million proposed for modification of civilian aircraft for cargo capability.

Reduction of funds for C–141 stretch modification

Reduction of $19 million (from $50 million to $31 million) for C–141 stretch modification program.

Reduction of funds for Air Force Maverick missile

Reduction of $30.3 million (from $88.0 million to $57.7 million) for procurement of Maverick missiles.

Denial of one nuclear attack submarine

Denial of $167.5 million for construction of one SSN–688 class nuclear type submarine.

Denial of funds for Sea Control Ship

Denial of $142.9 million for full funding of the first Sea Control Ship.

Reduction of funds for Patrol Frigate

Reduction of four of the seven Patrol Frigates for a reduction of $250.5 million.

Denial of funds for Destroyer Tender

Denial of request of $116.7 million for one Destroyer Tender.

Denial of funds for Army armored scout vehicle

Denial of $25.3 million request for procurement funds to initiate production of the armored scout vehicle.

Research and Development

Reduction in R&D funds for Air Force B–1 development

Reduction of $44 million from $499 million requested denied a fourth prototype and limited the program to three prototype aircraft to support flight testing and technical progress before further Congressional action.

Net increase of funds for Navy Trident program

Increase of $24.8 million for construction of Trident submarines because this amount was denied, without prejudice, in the Senate version of the fiscal year 1974 supplemental. Decrease of $15 million in Trident missile R&D which is excess to fiscal year 1975 requirements.

Reduction of R&D funds for Army Heavy Lift Helicopter

Reduction of $21.2 million from $57.7 million requested reflects denial of a secondary prototype and related maintainability and reliability as being premature, because this program is approved only for advanced development to prove out the technology.

Reduction in Army Site Defense program

Reduction of $50 million from request for $160 million to reorient program from prototype demonstration to technology.

Denial of R&D funds for Army Pershing II missile

Deletion of $11.2 million requested because separate radar area correlation development and flight test in airplane should first be completed and overall study of tactical nuclear needs in Europe required.

Reduction of R&D funds for Navy Surface Effect Ship

Reduction of $12.2 million from $58.0 million requested due to late start of 2000 ton contract design.

Deletion of R&D funds for Improved Ballistic Missile Submarine

Deletion of $16 million requested because initiation of SSBN–X is premature.

Reduction of R&D funds for Air Force Advanced Tanker/Cargo Aircraft

Reduction of $15.5 million of $20 million requested because of late start of program and need for results of competitive studies.

Major Manpower Changes—From Request

Reduction of Army Active Duty Military Strength

Reduction of 16,700 from the Army requested FY 1975 end strength of 785,000, all to be taken from non-combat units. Included are reductions in overseas headquarters and non-combat units, training command overhead and staffs, base operating support manning, medical support personnel and a denial of increases for non-combat units in Army general purpose forces.

Reduction of Navy Active Duty Military Strength

Reduction of 13,400 from the Navy requested FY 1975 end strength of 540,000, all to be taken from non-combat units. Included are reductions in training staffs and overhead, base operating support, medical support personnel and overseas headquarters and non-combat units.

Reduction of Marine Corps Active Duty Military Strength

Reduction of 3,600 from the Marine Corps requested FY 1975 end strength of 196,400. Included are reductions in training staffs and overhead, overseas headquarters armed combat units, and a denial of the full increase in divisional manning levels.

Reduction of Air Force Active Duty Military Strength

Reduction of 15,300 from the Air Force requested FY 1975 end strength of 630,300. Included are reductions in strategic airlift manning levels, staffs and overhead in training commands, overseas headquarters and non-combat units, and medical support personnel.

Reduction of Army Civilian Strength

A reduction of 23,300 from the Army requested FY 1975 end strength of 358,700. Included is a denial of increases in base operating support and medical support personnel as well as reductions of civilians in headquarters and training command staffs and overhead.

Reduction of Navy-Marine Corps Civilian Strength

Reduction of 10,300 from the Navy-Marine Corps requested FY 1975 end strength of 323,500. Included are reductions in headquarters civilians, training command staffs and overhead, base operating support and medical support.

Reduction of Air Force Civilian Strength

Reduction of 8,400 from the Air Force requested FY 1975 end strength of 269,700. Included are reductions of civilians associated with airlift increases, base operating support headquarters staffs, training commands staffs and overhead, and medical support.

Reduction of Defense Agencies Civilian Strengths

Reduction of 2,600 from the requested FY 1975 end strength of 75,400 for Defense Agencies. Included is a denial of increases in Defense Agencies strength and reductions in civilian headquarters personnel.

Language Changes

Conditions on the Use of Funds for the Procurement of the A–10 or A–7D Aircraft

The committee added language providing $192,700,000 would be available to the Air Force for either the procurement of the A–10 or the A–7D aircraft, based on the winner of a fly-off competition between the two aircraft, to be determined by the Secretary of Defense and certified to the Congress, and subject to certain other conditions fully discussed elsewhere in the report.

Condition on the Use of Research and Development Funds for the A–10 Aircraft

The committee added language providing that the R&D funds available for the research and development effort for the A–10 aircraft would be available only for that purpose if the aircraft won the fly-off competition against the A–7D.

Condition on the Procurement Funds for the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS)

The committee added language providing that the $549,800,000 would be available for the procurement of the AWACS system only if the Secretary of Defense determines and certifies to the Congress that this system is cost effective and meets the mission needs and requirements of the Department of Defense for this program. An exception for this certification is provided with regard to the procurement of long lead items.

Requirement for the Consideration of the Use of Air Force Reserve and National Guard for Increased Strategic Airlift Capability

The committee added language required in connection with the increased crew ratio for strategic airlift crews that the Secretary of Defense formulate plans for using the Reserves of the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve, and that he report to the Congress on several alternatives for achieving this objective.

Deletion of Language Permitting Civilian Substitution of Military Personnel in Excess of the Authorized Civilian Personnel Ceilings

The committee deleted language in the bill which would have permitted the civilian substitution of military personnel in excess of the authorized civilian personnel ceilings.

Additional Language Providing for Appropriate Study of Both Military and Civilian Job Conversions

The committee added language providing that the Secretary of Defense, in submitting his annual manpower requirements to the Congress, will consider the conversion of both military jobs to civilian, and vice versa, with a full justification of each form of conversion being contained in the annual report.

New Requirement for a Separate Appropriation Account for Assistance to Southeast Asia.

The committee deleted the proposed language which, as in the past years, would have authorized funds out of the regular military accounts for military assistance to South Vietnam.

The committee added language authorizing money in a single and separate appropriation for the support of South Vietnamese forces for FY 1975. Further language was authorized placing a ceiling on the total funds which might be used for this purpose, as well as certain other limitations.

Mandatory Reduction of Non-Combatant Personnel in Europe With Permissive Authority for Adding the Same Number in Combatant Categories

The committee adopted an amendment providing that the number of non-combatant personnel Army strength in Europe would, as a matter of law, be reduced by not less than 20 percent by June 30, 1976. Further, language was added providing that the Secretary of Defense, on a permissive basis, could increase the combatant strength of the Army in Europe by the same number.

Standardization of Weapons in NATO

The committee added language which requires the Secretary of Defense to undertake actions which will improve the standardization of non-nuclear weapons among the entire NATO alliance.

Freeze on the Number of U.S. Tactical and Nuclear Warheads in Europe

The committee added language providing that the total number of United States tactical nuclear warheads located in Europe on the date of enactment of this bill will not be increased except in the event of imminent hostilities in Europe. Further, language was included which requires a study of the overall concept of the use of such weapons, together with certain other actions to be taken.

Language on the Transfer of Naval Vessels

The committee added language which requires the approval in law of any transfer of naval vessels in excess of 2,000 tons, or less than 20 years of age. Further language was added which requires the notification of the committees of Congress with respect to any naval vessel not subject to the foregoing requirement.

OBSERVATIONS RELATIVE TO BILL

Basic Considerations

Congress, in its annual consideration of the military procurement authorization bill, must always legislate for an uncertain future. Long lead-times for sophisticated weapon systems require that programs must be authorized now if weapons are to be available when they may be needed as many as ten years hence.

This year consideration of the military procurement bill has been further shadowed by other uncertainties which exist here in the United States as well as in the field of international affairs. These uncertainties make it increasingly difficult to make judgments as to what weapons will cost and to make decisions as to whether and when they will be needed.

In these deliberations, the question of whether a costly weapon will be needed is not answered simply by whether the weapon will ever be used against an enemy. In a variety of possible conventional confrontations, as in the strategic power balance, the goal is a force strong enough to deter aggressive acts by any enemy.

The inflationary trend, which is the central feature of today's economy will, if it continues, materially inflate defense costs, for weapons and for manpower. In the relatively unsophisticated production of Navy ships, for example, the Navy experienced a seven percent cost escalation this year. Manpower costs have escalated eight percent in that period. Inflation has, of course, contributed to both these increases.

The Armed Services Committee's decision-making as to what is needed for defense cannot be driven solely by these economic factors. On the other hand, the committee cannot and should not ignore them in its force planning for the future.

In the international arena, relations have been improved with the Soviet Union and with the Peoples Republic of China. High hopes are entertained for negotiations which seek to reduce the risk of an East-West confrontation in several areas—Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and Mutual Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) to name only two.

The committee is, of course, mindful of these negotiations which could, if successful, affect our force makeup in future years. Clearly, however, the first responsibility of Congress now, in this period of uncertainty, is to authorize weapons and force levels sufficient to deter a broad range of military threats which could develop in future years.

At a time when the Soviet Union is expanding both its strategic and conventional power and reach, Congress must discharge their responsibility wisely. Whatever the future uncertainties, the military procurement decisions this year, as in the past, must reflect present realities and current power trends.

These decisions, if made wisely, can contribute to progress in international understanding. Credible deterrence need not impair detente. Indeed, if mutually accepted and understood, it may help to foster a climate in which a true detente can thrive.

What the Bill Covers

The Military Procurement Authorization Bill, enacted yearly since 1960, originated as a Procurement Bill. At first it was confined to authorizations for procurement of major weapons systems. In the intervening years, however, the bill has been amended no less than nine times, and its scope has been greatly broadened.

This bill, for Fiscal 1975, includes seven titles covering procurement, research and development, active duty manpower, reserve forces, civilian manpower, military training student loads, and general provisions. The title on civilian strength for the services and defense agencies appears this year for the first time.

The committee notes that, as the scope of the Bill has broadened over the years, the responsibilities of the committee have greatly increased and the congressional stewardship over the government's largest Department has been exercised with ever increasing care.

Weapons, Manpower and Money

The committee must again stress, as it has in the past three years, its concern that the escalating cost of weapon systems and manpower is keeping the defense budget at a consistently high level, a high level which buys fewer weapons and less manpower with each passing year. This year the concern is expressed with a real sense of urgency, as the United States is in the grip of the worst inflation since World War II.

Inflation is not the only cause of a requested defense budget which is $7.5 billion higher than the fiscal year 1974 request and nearly $100 billion when the fiscal year 1974 supplemental request is included. Far too much of the increased cost is directly attributable to poor program management.

The committee has drawn attention to this problem before and is glad to note that the Department of Defense has begun to move toward more efficient program management with marked improvement now visible in some areas. But, at today's prices, it is more important than ever that improvement continue because every dollar wasted by inefficiency is one dollar less spent in a real sense for national defense.

Today's prices also require better use of every soldier, sailor, airman, Marine, and civilian. With manpower estimated to cost $52.5 billion in fiscal year 1975, we must learn to think in terms of cost effectiveness of people as well as of weapon systems.

The Senate Armed Services Committee, in dealing with defense authorization each year, does not operate in a vacuum. Defense programs, along with other programs in the Federal budget, are paid for by American tax dollars. Every procurement item, every R&D item, and the salaries of all military and civilian personnel of the Department of Defense must be paid for by American tax dollars; and, as is well known, the demands for use of American tax dollars is growing greater daily.

Interest to be paid on the national debt mounts hourly, with the national debt itself $469 billion. The budget of this country has only

been balanced 4 times in the last 20 years. The staggering national debt is an obligation of the U.S. Government, as is $137 billion in military retired pay, $164 billion in Social Security and railroad retirement, and $68 billion in Civil Service retired pay, all of which are accrued obligations that must be paid somewhere down the line.

There is, of course, a whole spectrum of opinion on national spending priorities. This committee believes that a strong national defense is the first priority because it provides the nation with an underpinning of security that makes progress on other priorities possible.

In this situation, however, money for defense or any other area must be spent as prudently as possible. The committee believes defense spending should be based on the perceived requirement, although differences of opinion in perception always exist. And the committee recognizes that requirements and assessments of requirements can change overnight.

In the 14 months since the last American troops came home from Vietnam, there has been talk of world peace and, indeed, movement toward detente between East and West. But, the suddenness with which the Middle East war broke upon the world in October of 1973 serves as a dramatic reminder that the status quo is often the least likely shape of the future.

MONITORING THE PROGRESS OF MAJOR WEAPON SYSTEMS ACQUISITION

The committee has continued to monitor the progress of the acquisition of selected major weapon systems through a quarterly reporting system established by the committee in 1969. The committee, as of the last report period, received 46 reports on major systems with projected funding requirements of $128.1 billion. The committee has requested some improvements in the format and detailed information in the report and recognizes that there are possible additional changes that can be made. The committee emphasizes, however, that the quarterly reports in this system are for the committees purposes of monitoring the progress of the weapon system acquisition and as such are not expected to contain all the information that would be needed to manage the program. The committee has no desire to get into the business of managing the Department of Defense programs, but the committee does have the responsibility for congressional oversight of these programs. As further information is needed, the committee will request this data, after reviewing the quarterly reports, from the program office concerned.

The committee has been concerned with the reporting of inflation on major weapon systems and the impact of projected inflation rates on the program costs. The committee is of the opinion that a realistic inflation projection should be considered in estimating weapon system cost. At the same time inflation reporting should not become a means of circumventing an analysis of management performance. For instance, the committee understands that actual and projected inflation as applied to the basic program that was initially presented to the committee is beyond the direct control of the Defense Department. Hence, such inflation should be recognized as an independent cost

variable. The committee, however, does not expect that added program costs caused by program slippages and delays or subsequent quantity changes, for example, should be obscured through inflation reporting. It is the management of the program itself that caused the program revision and, therefore, should be charged with any increased cost. In other words, if the program were to continue on the basic course presented to the committee, the inflation inherent in program revisions would not be incurred. This approach is considered by the committee as a part of the program analysis and should not be lumped as an inflation issue. The committee staff has been talking with the Defense Department as to how this inflation should be presented, however, at this time there has been no format presented by the Defense Department that has been agreed to by the committee.

The committee is also concerned with the manner of presentation of some of the major weapon programs such as the Trident and the B–1 and has requested the Department of Defense to make improvements in these reports. It is through this reporting means that the committee is keeping close track of the progress of these major weapon systems and monitoring cost data during its deliberations on the authorization request.

Weapon Acquisition

The committee has, in recent years commented on the acquisition of major weapon systems. The committee has reported its concern for the high cost of major weapon systems, for excessive concurrency in the procurement of weapon systems, for procurement practices of the Department of Defense, for contracting processes for major weapon systems, for the testing of major weapon systems, and for other areas of the complicated process of weapon system acquisition.

The committee has taken some action with regard to these areas of concern through reducing budget requests where the concurrency was considered too great, insisting on contractual actions in selected cases before authorizing funds, requiring more operational testing before full procurement of major systems as well as continued review and comment on procurement practices of the Department of Defense.

The committee is encouraged by the Defense Department's action to reduce the high cost of major weapon systems through the design to cost concept in weapon procurement as well as the high-low of weapon mix, particularly in the aircraft area.

The committee is further encouraged by the action of the Army in some cases, in reviewing and reconsidering programs where the design to cost was reaching the maximum consideration. The committee remains concerned, however, with implementing these new concepts throughout the services. A major trial area is in the new lightweight fighter programs intended to complement the expensive F–14 and F–15 aircraft programs. The committee will follow carefully the progress that the Defense Department can achieve.

In addition to its regard for the high cost of major weapon systems, the committee is also concerned with the high cost of supporting these systems. The committee has continually been advised that one of the reasons for the higher cost for weapon systems is the improvements made in the quality and reliability of the components. The committee notes, however, that the Defense Department has requested

supplemental funding to build more adequate stocks of spare parts and components necessary to reverse the downward trend in aircraft operational readiness. The committee also notes Navy testimony for FY 1975 used the exact wording testified in support of the FY 1974 budget to assert that spares and repair parts availability is deficient at the present time. The committee has found for example, that based on actual usage reliability of selected components of some aircraft is significantly less than expected by either the Navy or the contractor resulting in increased requirements and cost of spare parts support. The committee requests the Department of Defense to conduct an effective and forceful review of these high support costs and provide the committee with some reasonable explanation as to why the reliability and support costs of major components is not in all cases as projected and planned.

ASPECTS OF BILL OF SPECIAL INTEREST

Strategic Initiatives—Research and Development

Defense Department Proposal

Both in his testimony before the committee and his posture statement, Secretary Schlesinger presented a thoughtful, comprehensive analysis of U.S. strategic policy. One of Secretary Schlesinger's major themes was the importance of strategic flexibility. While pointing out the importance of the assured destruction mission, Secretary Schlesinger highlighted its limitations, stressing, in particular, that the President must have a full range of strategic options to cover a variety of contingencies. The Secretary argued strongly that the United States must not limit its strategic objectives to the threat to destroy millions of innocent civilians as the sole—or even the principal—response to potential Soviet actions.

To provide for a necessary range of options, Secretary Schlesinger announced a new emphasis in targeting policy. As outlined to the committee, this emphasis in targeting doctrine does not represent a major departure from past U.S. policy. Indeed it is consistent with the committee's longstanding conviction that the United States must have the capability to destroy a variety of selected targets, military and civilian, if and when necessary.

In addition, several new R&D programs have been proposed in an effort to develop a broader range of strategic options. The following programs have been proposed:

Navy:

- Submarine Launched Cruise Missile
- Terminally Guided Maneuvering Reentry Vehicle

Air Force:

- Air Launched Cruise Missile
- Mobile Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
- Improved Yield for Minuteman
- Improved Accuracy for Minuteman
- Increased Number of Minuteman Reentry Vehicles

According to Secretary Schlesinger, these specific R&D programs in large measure represent hedges against the potential growth and development of Soviet strategic forces as well as the outcome of SALT II.

Finally, Secretary Schlesinger reported to the committee on the relentless momentum of Soviet strategic weapons development. As Secretary Schlesinger declared in his posture statement, "In summary, the new Soviet ICBM program represents a truly massive effort—four new missiles, new bus-type dispensing systems, new MIRVed payloads, new guidance, new-type silos, new launch techniques, and probably new warheads." The breadth and depth of the new Soviet missile development is both surprising and disturbing.

Committee Action

In assessing the strategic initiatives proposed by the Defense Department, the committee shares a fundamental commitment to the principles of deterrence and to the maintenance of a U.S.–U.S.S.R. strategic balance based upon parity. Although making some minor dollar reductions, the committee felt that the new strategic initiatives were necessary to maintain and implement these principles and should be supported.

By its action the committee seeks to insure that the necessary resources are available to the United States in order to maintain its technological margin in the face of Soviet strategic advancements. Under the provisions of the interim agreement on strategic weapons, Soviet strategic missile forces are numerically superior to our own. Moreover, they deploy three times the missile throw weight of the comparable U.S. forces. A vigorous program of research and development on the part of the United States is essential to our effort to maintain the stability of the strategic balance.

The committee believes that the strategic programs recommended to be authorized for fiscal year 1975 are a particularly appropriate means of maintaining the technological margin of our strategic missile forces in a period of rapid Soviet technological development. The programs are not primarily designed to make numerical additions to our existing strategic forces. On the contrary, the major thrust of these research and development programs is to upgrade our existing forces so as to enable them to be used with greater discrimination and with less unintended damage over a broader range of selected options.

Finally, the committee wishes to reaffirm, as it has in the past, its hope for a successful and stabilizing follow-on agreement at the SALT negotiations.

The nature and extent of the deployments that these strategic initiatives will enable us to make will inevitably reflect the outcome of present and future negotiations at SALT as well as the evolution of Soviet strategic forces. It is worth pointing out that the new strategic programs now underway in the Soviet Union, which have given rise to great concern within the committee, have all come to light since the conclusion of the ABM treaty and the Interim Agreement on Offensive Weapons. In authorizing these programs, the committee intends to demonstrate, with unmistakable force and clarity, its resolve never to allow the Soviets to obtain strategic superiority. These new R&D programs create the most compelling incentive for Soviet restraint in the technological exploitation of its numerically superior strategic forces and for a genuine effort to conclude a stabilizing SALT II agreement.

The Improved Accuracy-Yield Issue

The primary focus in the deliberations on strategic initiatives was on the issue of whether it was in the best interests of the United States to improve the accuracy and yield of U.S. missiles. The $77 million request was as follows: Improved Guidance to increase the accuracy of the Minuteman force, Maneuvering Reentry Vehicle (MaRV) with terminal guidance for increased accuracy of the Trident missile, and Mark 12A to increase the yield of the Minuteman force.

The committee voted to support the proposed accuracy-yield program for a variety of reasons. There were, however, as discussed below, four principal points upon which a broad consensus was achieved.

First, the committee has long been concerned to sustain the technological excellence of our strategic forces and, wherever possible, to improve the efficiency of those forces. Improving the accuracy of our strategic forces enables us to broaden the range of options available to the President and to minimize the collateral damage associated with a retaliatory strike in the event that deterrence fails. Moreover, improved accuracy enhances the value of our existing strategic forces by permitting one strategic launch vehicle to accomplish a strategic mission that might, with less accurate weapons, require several such weapons.

Given the growth and development of Soviet strategic forces, a deterrent posture based principally on the threat to retaliate against Soviet civilians, knowing that such a strike would almost certainty lead to the destruction of millions of American civilians, is less and less credible. Development of the technology required for a range of more discriminating—and more credible—responses is, in the judgment of the committee, simple prudence.

Second, a purposeful failure to improve the accuracy and yield of our strategic warheads would be a gratuitous self-constraint. Since the growth of Soviet strategic forces, expecially that reported to the committee by Secretary Schlesinger, appears to be accelerating such a unilateral constraint on our part would give the Soviets the strategic initiative.

Third, several members emphasized that the development of these yield and accuracy improvements would not be a commitment to deployment. At a relatively modest cost, these developments provide an important hedge against future as well as developing Soviet programs in addition to preserving flexibility.

Fourth, the committee was extremely sensitive to the importance of negotiating from a position of strength in the complex SALT deliberations. In reviewing SALT I it was noted that favorable Congressional action on the ABM program enabled us to do precisely that. The Secretary of Defense will advise the committee of any developments affecting Soviet strategic capabilities, including the conclusion of further agreements at SALT, that may bear on the committee's assessment of the strategic initiatives authorized in this bill.

The committee would also like to stress that these improvements are not intended to provide the United States with a first-strike capability. The committee agrees with Secretary Schlesinger that a principal feature of United States policy should be, "The avoidance of any combination of forces that could be taken as an effort to acquire the ability to execute a first-strike disarming attack against the USSR."

Conclusion

In summary, the committee considers that maintaining technological superiority in strategic weapons, even more so than in other areas of weaponry, is critical to the future deterrent posture of the United States. The line of demarcation between research and development and production is clearly defined. The Soviets have thus far made it clear that research and development is in no way constrained by the agreements reached at SALT I. In fact, their own rate of development nearly underlines this point. Thus, the committee recommends supporting the strategic initiatives proposed by the Defense Department.

NAVY FIGHTER AIRCRAFT PROGRAMS

AUTHORIZATION REQUEST AND COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS

The Navy requested F–14 funding of $11.8 million for R&D and $709.3 million for procurement of 50 F–14A aircraft. The Navy also requested $34.0 million in R&D to start a VFX lightweight fighter development program.

Committee Recommendation

The committee recommends approval of both programs, but a reduction of $22.0 million in the F–14 procurement authorization. This reduction is made possible because of the sale of F–14s to Iran, which has reduced the fiscal year 1975 cost to the Navy by that amount.

Background

A year ago the committee reviewed the F–14 program in great detail because of the fixed price contract problems between the contractor, Grumman, and the Navy. Last year the committee approved in principle the production plan proposed by Deputy Defense Secretary Clements, which was to procure 50 F–14As per year in fiscal years 1974 through 1977. This plan would result in a production program of 334 F–14As for the Navy and Marine Corps, and outfit 12 Navy squadrons and 4 Marine Corps squadrons with the plane.

Also proposed last year was an R&D effort to build prototypes of a stripped-down F–14 and a carrier-suitable F–15 to be the candidate fighters for the follow-on to the 334 F–14As. The committee rejected this prototyping proposal due to its high cost and questionable worth. The committee did recommend that the Navy examine the potential of a new and smaller fighter to be the successor to the F–14.

During the past 9 months, the Navy convened a special Fighter Study group to examine the potential of a "lightweight fighter" type airplane as well as other alternatives to the F–14A. This group, aided by design experts in the Navy and by aircraft industry studies, defined a "VFX" lightweight fighter with excellent combat potential. This airplane would weigh about 30,000 pounds at takeoff, have about 30,000 pounds of engine thrust using any of 3 current engine candidates, and would be armed with Sparrow and Sidewinder missiles and a gun. The Navy Fighter Study recommended soliciting the aircraft industry for detailed design evaluations of such a fighter as the next step in its development cycle, to be followed by requests for development proposals if these design evaluations confirmed the potential combat capabilities of the VFX. A major point made by the study group was that this VFX should be optimized as a fighter plane but would have an excellent ground attack capability as well. Potentially, it could replace both F–4s and A–7s on Navy attack carriers in the 1980s.

The VFX was endorsed by the Navy's Air Systems Command and by the Marine Corps, but the CNO and Navy Secretary proposed to

the Secretary of Defense an alternate plan to buy 240 F–14Xs, a slightly cheaper F–14 without the Phoenix missile, in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Deputy Secretary Clements rejected this plan and endorsed a start on a VFAX (as the VFX became known in order to emphasize its attack potential). Secretary Clements also pointed out that between 100 and 200 additional F–14s should be planned for between 1978 and 1981, when a VFX first would be ready for production, in order to maintain the Navy and Marine fighter inventory levels.

Committee Recommendation on Future Navy Fighter

The committee believes that the Navy was entirely responsive to committee direction of a year ago in forming the Navy Fighter Study. The committee also is impressed with the excellent quality of that study and with the potential which appears inherent in the VFX, defined by that group, to be a less expensive but highly capable air superiority fighter for the 1980s for the Navy and Marines. The committee strongly recommends that the Navy proceed immediately with the next step in this program and solicit the aircraft industry for analyses of the VFX design, *as defined by the Navy Fighter Study.*

The committee does not find it necessary at this time to accept or reject a plan for F–14A procurement in FY 1978 or beyond. The F–14 program will be reviewed each year based on the then current situation. The committee does believe that the VFX program should be started now so that an F–14 complement or replacement will be available at the soonest possible time.

AIR FORCE CLOSE AIR SUPPORT AIRCRAFT: A–10 AND A–7D

Authorization Request

The Air Force A–10 request was for $93.9 million for R&D to support a 10 airplane development program and a total of $173.8 million for procurement of 26 A–10 aircraft, plus initial spares. No funds were requested for A–7D procurement.

Committee Recommendation (Procurement and R&D)

The committee recommends authorization of $81.4 million in R&D for the A–10, a reduction of $12.5 million and 4 R&D funded airplanes, and recommends that these funds be available only if the A–10 wins the current "flyoff" between the A–10 and A–7D. A year ago the committee rejected a 10 airplane R&D program, and nothing has happened since to change that position.

With respect to procurement funds, the committee recommends an increase of $18.7 million and 4 airplanes to the A–10 procurement authorization by transferring 4 requested airplanes from the R&D account to the procurement account (the dollar difference results because production airplanes are fully funded and R&D airplanes are incrementally funded), and recommends that $192.7 million be available only for procurement of 30 A–10s or for procurement of A–7Ds, based on the winner of the flyoff between these airplanes.

31–683—74——3

Background on A–7D/A–10 Flyoff

The recommendation for a flyoff between the A–7D and A–10 first was made by the committee's Special Subcommittee on Close Air Support in 1972, and was endorsed by this committee in that year. The reason for the recommendation was the slow speed of the A–10 (originally the A–X), which raised questions as to its survivability in the face of modern air defenses composed of SAM missiles and radar-directed guns.

When the Air Force ignored the recommendation and proceeded into engineering development on the A–10, followed by a production funding request a year ago, this committee was instrumental in rejecting the production request and insisting that the flyoff be carried out. The flights in the A–7D/A–10 flyoff took place between April 15 and May 8, 1974, and the report on the flyoff is scheduled to be completed by June 15. As far as the committee is concerned, this flyoff has the purpose of determining which aircraft is better for the close air support mission. The airplane that wins the flyoff is the one that should be procured.

Committee Position on Close Air Support Requirements

The committee believes that close air support of ground troops in combat is a primary mission for the Air Force and one which deserves a high priority in terms of force levels and also procurement resources. The Army deserves the best possible close air support that the Air Force can provide.

The committee is concerned by one aspect of the Air Force's force structure planning. Presently the Air Force has 3 wings of A–7Ds for the close air support role, but the Air Force plans to reduce this down to 2 wings in the next several years by phasing out A–7Ds to the Air National Guard. The plan then is to build up to 4 wings of close air support airplanes when the A–10 is introduced in quantity into the force. The committee does not envision any interim reduction in requirements to provide close air support to the Army and urges that the active force retain at least 3 wings of aircraft for this particular mission area.

F–15

Committee Recommendation

The committee recommends authorization of the full Air Force request for the F–15 fighter, $182.6 million in R&D and $756.9 million for procurement of 72 F–15 aircraft.

Discussion of F–15 Program

The development and testing of the F–15 has been proceeding with excellent results to date. The major problems with engine durability testing have been resolved, and the production configuration of the engine has passed its 150-hour qualification tests. Air Force pilots continue to report that the F–15 promises to be an outstanding air superiority fighter.

The production plan for the F–15 was revised by the Secretary of Defense late in 1973. Originally the Air Force planned to increase the F–15 production rate in a series of steps and have the FY 1975 airplanes built at a rate of 12 per month, requiring an FY 1975 total

procurement of 144 F–15s. The production line then would have remained stable at 12 per month until the programmed quantity of 729 airplanes was procured in FY 1979. The revised plan now calls for a slower build-up in the monthly rate and an attendant stretch-out of the production program by 18 months.

The revised production schedule also was predicated on obtaining a sale of F–15s to Iran in FY 1975. Deliveries of F–15s to Iran would stabilize the F–15 production line at 9 per month from the FY 1975 through the FY 1977 procurement program. If this sale is not consummated, however, the F–15 production rate will be decreased for a two-year period.

The committee believes it would be unwise and financially unsound to make such a cutback in F–15 production if the Iranian sale does not materialize. The committee recommends that the Air Force program should be stabilized at the higher 9 per month rate in that case, which could be accomplished by delivering the 72 aircraft in FY 1975 over an 8-month period and then programming 108 F–15s in FY 1976.

AWACS

Authorization Request

The request for the AWACS program was for $219.7 million in R&D to continue development on AWACS, and $549.8 million for procurement of the first 12 AWACS production airplanes.

Committee Recommendation

The committee recommends that the AWACS request be approved but that the procurement funds be restricted to be available only for the AWACS program, subject to a prior certification from the Secretary of Defense on the capability of the AWACS to perform its mission as described more completely in the following paragraphs.

Program Description and Status

AWACS is an acronym for Airborne Warning And Control System. The AWACS consists of an advanced radar system mounted in a Boeing 707 airplane. The distinguishing feature (and major improvement over previous systems) is its ability to track low flying airplanes that normally would be hidden by the ground "clutter" on the radar scope. AWACS typically will have a 17 man crew, 4 flight crew and 13 system operators, although the Air Force plans to expand the number of operators in the future to take advantage of the full potential of the system.

AWACS has been in R&D since 1970. Two competing radar subsystems were tested in 1972, and the Westinghouse radar was selected. This winning prototype of the production radar has continued flight testing and in 1974 is being tested for operability with all of the other subsystems of the AWACS to ensure that the total system will function as an integrated unit. This testing, called the Systems Integration Demonstration (SID), must confirm the operation of the AWACS before the Defense Department gives a full go-ahead on the production contract for the first 12 airplanes. This go-ahead is scheduled for December 1974 after completion of the SID test program.

GAO Report on AWACS

The GAO was requested by Senator Eagleton in the Fall of 1973 to review the AWACS program and make a report on it, including a review of Air Force cost-effectiveness studies of the system. The GAO report, issued in March 1973, raised several allegations regarding the program, including excessive concurrency between R&D and production, the overall operational viability and utility of AWACS in a dense tactical war environment such as would be likely in NATO, the vulnerability of an AWACS to enemy fighters, and also whether the AWACS could be jammed easily by enemy ECM systems.

The Tactical Air Power Subcommittee called the GAO to testify on their report at the same time the Air Force presented their AWACS program review on the FY 1975 budget request. At that hearing the GAO witnesses agreed that they believed the AWACS airplane would add an important and necessary capability for the Air Force and stated that their primary concern was with concurrency between R&D and production in light of the complexity of the tactical mission. The hearing also revealed that the GAO team reviewing the program had not even visited the Air Force AWACS program management office before issuing their report. The Air Force disagreed with the GAO's contention that the radar was highly vulnerable to ECM and stated it was designed to be a most difficult radar system to jam.

Combat Pilots' Testimony on Warning and Control

The Tactical Air Power Subcommittee held a separate hearing with Air Force and Navy pilots who had shot down MIGs over North Vietnam and who had extensive combat experience operating in enemy air space. These pilots were unanimous in their praise of the radar warning and control that was available from Navy cruisers stationed in the Tonkin Gulf, but they also pointed out that they could and did end up inland where effective coverage, particularly at lower altitudes, was not available to them. All were convinced of the operational benefits accruing from friendly radar warning and control when flying combat missions penetrating an enemy's GCI radar network. The committee felt this was impressive testimony on the need for the capability provided by the AWACS lookdown radar system.

Additional Committee Recommendations

The committee believes that the AWACS will provide a major enhancement to our military operations, particularly in tactical warfare situations where surveillance and flight operation into enemy airspace is required. The committee recognizes that if the GAO's allegations are correct and that the AWACS easily could be jammed by an enemy, then much of its operational utility would be lost. Therefore, it is recommended that the Secretary of Defense appoint a group of disinterested radar and ECM technical experts (ones with no parochial service interest in the outcome of their review) to examine this issue and report to him on the potential vulnerability of the system to jamming, with an assessment of the GAO and Air Force claims on the subject. The committee also insists on a certification from the Secretary of Defense that the AWACS will be cost-effective and will meet the mission needs and requirements of the Department of Defense particularly

when operating in a NATO tactical environment. This certification is to be provided *before* the AWACS production contract is signed. It appears to the committee that the DSARC review of the AWACS program which has been scheduled for this December as a normal Departmental review prior to releasing the AWACS for production should provide an adequate review to enable the Secretary to decide whether or not he can provide this certification to the Congress. The committee has recommended that the AWACS production funds be restricted in the law to be available only for that program following the Secretary's review, with the exception that continuing long lead funds may be provided before the Secretary makes his certification.

SPARROW MISSILE

The AIM–7F Sparrow missile has suffered technical problems and development delays which have had the effect of delaying volume production for a number of years. The FY 1975 program represents the start of high volume production of Sparrow–7F missiles.

The evidence presented to the committee indicates that the –7F version will represent a significantly improved Sparrow missile over the –7E2 version which it will replace. As a result of utilizing solid state components, the –7F has proven to be at least 6 or 7 times more reliable than its predecessor and it still is improving. Its test firings in dogfight situations have been excellent. Its capability against high-speed, high-altitude aircraft is significantly better than the –7E2. Its capability to shoot down toward low-flying targets also is a major improvement. While the –7F Sparrow has failed some of the highly demanding test requirements at the extremes of its design capability, the committee is impressed with its marked advantages over the –7E2 and believes that it should be ready for production in FY 1975.

AIRCRAFT SIMULATORS/TRAINERS

Committee Recommendation

The committee recommends approval of the Department of Defense request for $165.2 million, which, by service is, Army $11.0 million, Navy $51.6 million, and Air Force $102.6 million.

Discussion

The committee continues to support the efforts of the DoD to increase the number of simulators and trainers, which not only reduce the requirement for energy but also improve the quality of training and the readiness of those trained. Last year the committee requested that the Secretary of Defense provide an assessment of the applicability of simulators to all aircraft types in the Defense inventory. Selected portions of that assessment are printed below:

> The group initially considered applicability of simulation to aircraft in the DoD inventory. Their approach was to determine which aircraft were the most expensive to operate, or involved, in total, the largest number of people and priority was given to those systems having the highest combination of inventory and fuel consumption. This was done

for two reasons: first, because fuel burned per hour can indicate relative cost of operation and, secondly, because it appeared that fuel availability could be drastically limited as was experienced by recent oil embargoes against the U.S.

The mission profile of multi-engine aircraft such as the B–52, KC–135, C–5, C–141, P–3, S–3, is readily applicable to state-of-the-art simulation techniques. These aircraft represent higher acquisition/investment and operating/fuel consuming costs.

Simulation of full mission profiles is considerably more difficult for tactical fighter/bombers as the F–4. Current state-of-the-art visual devices can provide take-off, landing and flight familiarization portions of the training syllabus. Electronic warfare training can now be accomplished without any actual flying. The more difficult missions to simulate are air-to-air and air-to-ground combat operations but, with high fidelity-wide angle visual systems becoming more sophisticated, it may soon be possible to simulate all aspects of these missions with a high degree of realism.

While one of the basic questions surrounding the simulation issue is the degree to which a simulator can effectively substitute for actual flying time, state-of-the-art simulation technology is capable of much more training than our currently deficient simulator inventory allows. American Airlines recently made a bold move toward simulation which resulted in amortization of a $50 million investment in simulators in six months through savings in their training programs. American Airlines pilots currently receive 90% of their transition training in FAA certified simulators. Accident rates, which were highest in training programs, dropped significantly. Pilot transition from one aircraft to another now requires only about two hours of actual flying.

NASA conducted 100% of its Apollo training in a simulator. It was in the simulator that NASA technicians tested theories which enabled the pilots of the crippled Apollo 13 to return safely to earth after serious malfunctions.

The experience of American Airlines and of NASA indicate that the potential for reducing training costs in DoD through the use of simulation is significant.

Based on these indicators, the study group determined that added emphasis should be given to simulation. The first step was to update the current simulator inventory. Because simulator production lead times average 30 months, a simulator ordered today will not be fully operational on line for three years.

The Simulator Study Group, under the guidance of OASD (M&RA), will continue to develop and explore simulator potential and will monitor the progress of the services in achieving DoD objectives.

The committee is pleased to note that the Simulator Study Group will continue with its efforts and that OASD (M&RA) will provide guidance.

With reference to the FY 1975 programs the committee notes it reluctantly approved Navy's request for an Air Combat Maneuvering (ACM) trainer. This is a device that will enable two pilots, plus the backseat crew members, to engage in simulated air-to-air combat against each other. It will have the capability to provide a two-on-one situation as well as generate the flying characteristics of enemy aircraft. Navy plans to solicit proposals from industry in FY 1975 for procurement of one ACM.

The committee fully and strongly supports the requirement for devices of this type but is concerned that Navy may be proceeding to procurement without benefit of adequate research and development and without a full examination of alternative ways to simulate the air-to-air combat environment. For example, Air Force for the past three years, has had underway an advanced research and development program to build a similar device called the Simulated Air-to-Air Combat (SAAC) trainer. One of the program objectives of SAAC is to demonstrate the feasibility of realistically simulating in a ground based simulator the air-to-air combat environment.

Since the Air Force trainer operates under a different concept than the Navy plans to use, the committee directs Navy to conduct a detailed examination of the SAAC trainer prior to procurement. The committee believes Navy can benefit from the research and development that has been done in this area and is hopeful any replowing of old ground can be precluded.

The committee also notes the ACM and SAAC are first of a kind devices and believes that once they are perfected there will be a substantial inventory requirement for both Navy and Air Force. The committee believes it is possible for Navy and Air Force to develop a common air-to-air combat trainer to the point where almost everything, with the exception of different aircraft cockpit requirements, is identical. While this particular request has been approved, the committee in the future expects Navy and Air Force to resolve any conceptual differences to the point where joint procurement will be possible. Future requests will be considered on that basis.

The committee also wishes to point out the difficulty encountered in bringing together all of the FY 1975 requests related to simulators and training devices. Since the committee intends to monitor this area very closely in the future, it requests the Secretary of Defense to identify a common format within the existing Congressional Data Books for each of the services to present their fiscal year requests for simulators, training devices, and related activities. In particular, the committee expects all aircraft procurement data sheets to contain a full accounting and breakout of those funds associated with simulators, training devices and related activities, Further, the committee directs that those particular funds not be used for any other purpose unless specifically approved by the committee. Past abuses in this area have not gone unnoticed.

The committee believes that the use of simulators and improved training devices can make a very meaningful contribution to Defense readiness and future savings and benefits will be very significant. It expects forceful management of this program by OASD (M & RA) and requests a written report in conjunction with submission of the FY 1976 budget which summarizes the Department's progress and future plans with simulators and trainers.

ARMY SHORT RANGE AIR DEFENSE MISSILES

Committee Recommendation

The committee recommends approval of Army requests for $26.3 million for modifications of the existing Chaparral missiles and $35.1 million for R&D on an all-weather radar-guided follow-on to the present Chaparral. The committee recommends a reduction of $5.8 million in R&D which was requested to start development on a target acquisition aid for the Chaparral missile system.

Background

The present Army Short Range Air Defense missile (SHORAD) for the field forces is the Chaparral, a version of the Sidewinder heat-seeking air-to-air missile. This missile does not have any capability against aircraft flying in or above clouds. The Army plans for near-term improvements to its SHORAD capability by modifying the Chaparral guidance unit to give it a head-on firing potential in clear weather against approaching airplanes (the present missile operates essentially only in a tail-chase mode). Over the longer term, the Army plans to increase the capability of its SHORAD air defense force to be able to fire at aircraft doing radar blind bombing through clouds or in other bad weather conditions. This requires a radar-guided SHORAD missile system.

Last year the committee deleted R&D funds requested by the Army to begin "Americanization" of one of three already developed foreign all-weather SHORAD missiles. The potential candidates were the British Rapier, French Crotale, and German Roland. The reasons for the committee's rejection were that the Army had not validated a requirement for an all-weather capability and also because of indications that the Defense Department intended to buy a foreign system solely to demonstrate cooperation in R&D with NATO countries.

All-Weather Shorad System

The Army has done additional analyses since last year of the need for an all-weather capability. One study concluded that there would be a potential future threat from enemy tactical blind-bombing airplanes against high-value rear area targets such as depots, bases, and storage areas. Another study, in progress at the time of this report, is evaluating the potential future all-weather threat against forward division-area troops, ones in or near the battle area. This study could find requirements for additional radar-guided Shorad batteries.

The committee has concluded that the Army has presented a valid case for its need for a future all-weather-capable Shorad system. The committee does not believe, however, that it is necessary to buy a foreign-developed system solely to demonstrate cooperation with NATO countries. If this capability can be fulfilled by a less costly and equally effective system designed in the United States, and within the time frame required, then that system should be the one procured. As one example, there is the possibility of adapting the present Chaparral missile with a radar guidance unit.

The committee believes that the Army's criterion for selecting a Shorad contractor should be to choose the weapon system which can meet the basic military requirements at the least cost to the American taxpayer. The committee was assured in testimony from the Army and DDR&E that the competition for this all-weather system would be open to all prospective bidders, without a pre-determination to select a foreign system. The committee will monitor this program to ensure that such is the case.

Chaparral Improvement Program

The Army's near-term improvements for Chaparral include modifications to the guidance to give a head-on clear weather firing capability, as mentioned earlier. This modification has essentially completed development and is ready for production funding in FY 1975.

The Army also proposed to start into engineering development this year on a target acquisition and identification system for the Chaparral. Development would take several years and the total cost of R&D and procurement would be in excess of $100 million. The committee believes that this is an excessive price to pay for an improvement to a weapon which may be phased out shortly after the improvement is introduced into the Army's inventory. The committee recommends deferral of this development until the future plans for the Chaparral system are determined more precisely, based on the all-weather Shorad program schedule.

B–1 AIRCRAFT

Authorization Request

The Air Force request includes $499 million to continue engineering development of the B–1 Advanced Strategic Bomber and to begin construction of a fourth aircraft.

Committee Recommendation

The committee recommends a reduction of $44 million, which will leave $455 million for continuation of the present three prototype aircraft development program. The principal effect of this reduction is to deny the start of a fourth prototype aircraft and preclude new work not needed for the three prototype aircraft program. In making this reduction, the committee wishes to emphasize that it is not satisfied with the continued increases in cost and delays in schedule which have occurred during this year, and is hopeful that with the management changes made both by the prime contractor and by the Air Force, the program will be stabilized. The following table provides the details of the committee recommendations for funds, compared with the request, and also shows the fiscal year 1974 program:

[In thousands of dollars]

	Fiscal year 1974	Fiscal year 1975		
		Request	Recommend	Change
B–1 Program elements:				
Airframe	309,600	250,000	250,000	0
Engine	77,500	84,800	84,800	0
Offensive avionics	38,300	23,300	23,300	0
Defensive avionics	900	15,000	15,000	0
Defensive integration	0	22,000	22,000	0
Other Government costs	22,200	28,900	59,900	+31,000
Program development tasks	0	23,000	0	−23,000
New initiatives	0	13,000	0	−13,000
4th aircraft	0	39,000	0	−39,000
Total	448,500	499,000	455,000	−44,000

Background

The need for a follow-on advanced strategic bomber, to replace the B–52G and H force, has been fully supported by the committee since the program entered engineering development in June 1970.

Last year, the Air Force requested $473.5 million for fiscal year 1974, and testified initially that the B–1 bomber program was in good shape, and that both time and cost schedules were being met satisfactorily. Approximately three months later, in July 1973, the Secretary of the Air Force advised the committee that serious technical difficulties were being experienced and that it would be necessary to revise the cost and schedule projections for the program. In testimony before the committee, the Secretary of the Air Force was unwilling to assure the committee that the revised program would be adequate and that further increases in cost or program slippage would not occur. The committee was very apprehensive that unforeseen technical problems could arise that would cause further delays and increases in cost. The committee was also concerned that the management of the program needed significant improvement if the committee was to consider the B–1 to be a viable program.

The committee expressed its dissatisfaction with the management of the program, by both the Air Force and the contractor, and recommended a $100 million reduction in the amount requested. This reduction was supported by the Senate in its deliberations on the fiscal year 1974 budget, but $75 million was restored in conference and ultimately was appropriated.

Committee Considerations

During fiscal year 1974, the Air Force appointed a special committee of experts to review the technical and management aspects of the program. In addition, both the Air Force and the contractor took steps to revamp the management of the program. Consistent with recommendations of this special committee, the Air Force has further revised the program which now reflects increases in total cost and a further delay in schedule. The B–1 program plan presented by the Air Force for fiscal year 1975 provides for continuation of the program as presented last year, plus an initial request for a fourth development aircraft,

acceleration of some development effort that had been previously planned to be conducted subsequent to the production decision, and some production type engineering design effort.

Testimony this year by both the Air Force and the contractor has established that the present program funding and schedule plan are considered very tight, and that they would be more comfortable with this development program if more funds were available. The management reserve included in the request for fiscal year 1975 is considered to be grossly inadequate to meet anticipated technical problems and schedule delays. The Air Force budget request provides only $10.0 million for this purpose, which compares with a subcommittee estimate of $40.0 million that more closely approximates the prime contractor's current estimates.

First flight of the No. 1 aircraft is estimated to be delayed from September to November 1974 and flight testing will continue during the remainder of fiscal year 1975. The committee received testimony that none of the new program effort proposed during this year would provide any additional test data that would assist the committee in making a production decision for fiscal year 1976.

It is apparent that all of the additional new effort planned for fiscal year 1975 is intended to fill the gap between development and planned production of the B–1. It is also apparent that funds that could be needed during fiscal year 1975 for the basic three aircraft development program are being planned to initiate new development effort during that year.

Conclusion

The reduction of $44 million recommended by the committee should in no way be construed as simply a reduction in funds to express the committee's disappointment with the program. In fact, the committee has seen some progress in program management, and is encouraged that the aircraft is approaching its first flight. The committee is of the opinion, however, that this effort should not be jeopardized by the diversion of funds needed for the three airplane program to work that is not mandatory or beneficial to these aircraft, but relates to the production decision on the B–1 program.

The committee therefore specifically disapproves the $23 million requested for Program Development Tasks, $13 million for New Initiatives, and $39 million for the fourth aircraft. These reductions are compensated, in part, by an increase in the general program of $31 million, which added to the $10 million requested makes a total of $41 million available to cover normal development problems anticipated during the fiscal year.

The committee also directs that only the development program as presented in July 1973 be continued. If any funds are not required in fiscal year 1975 for this purpose, such funds would be available either to apply to the fiscal year 1976 B–1 program, or, if appropriate, requested for reprogramming within the B–1 program, after satisfactory flight testing is demonstrated, to initiate deferred development effort during fiscal year 1975. Such a reprogramming will require the specific prior approval of this committee.

These recommendations are consistent with the testimony of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Research and Development,

who stated on March 26, 1974, that "We will know whether or not we made any major errors in that design after a year of flight testing. Then we will have to stand back and see whether or not we have done a good design job."

The committee is convinced that the B–1 development program must conform to the fly-before-buy concept, using the three development prototypes, and must remain in close proximity to currently forecast schedules and cost. However, the committee wishes to note it is less concerned with the B–1 making a specified flight date than it is with the flight test data that can be presented to the committee next year. The committee believes a successfully progressing and on-going flight program could have a significant impact on the fiscal year 1976 program considerations and recommendations.

In conclusion, the Secretary of Defense is encouraged to direct that a comprehensive cost effectiveness study be conducted with the option of including participation by the General Accounting Office and independent technical, financial, and management experts. This should include consideration of all other alternatives to the B–1 in preparation for such an eventuality if it should become necessary. The results of such a study would be useful in the consideration of the fiscal year 1976 request.

TRIDENT

Committee Recommendation

The committee recommends authorization of $1,943,605,000 to continue development and construction of the Trident Submarine Launched Strategic Weapon System. This is a net increase of $9.8 million over the amount requested. The committee recommendation reflects a reduction of $15.0 million representing funds determined or excess to fiscal year 1975 missile research and development requirements, and an increase of $24.8 million representing the amount requested in the fiscal year 1974 supplemental for submarine construction, which the Senate had denied without prejudice. The details of the amounts requested and committee recommendations, together with prior year funding are as follows:

[In thousands of dollars]

	Prior years	Fiscal year 1975		
		Request	Recommend	Change
Research and development:				
Trident I (C–4) missile	958,717	648,767	633,767	−15,000
Trident II (D–5) missile				
Submarine	330,696	107,238	107,238	
Total, research and development	1,289,413	756,005	741,005	−15,000
Procurement:				
Ship construction (SCN)	938,800	1,166,800	1,191,600	+24,800
Weapons procurement (WPN)	5,000	11,000	11,000	
Total, procurement	943,800	1,177,800	1,202,600	+24,800
Total, program	2,233,213	1,933,805	1,943,605	+9,800

Description of Program

Trident was conceived to make the submarine based strategic missile force relatively invulnerable to the broad spectrum of potential

future threats. It is designed both to improve the capability of the existing Polaris/Poseidon fleet and to replace them. With the Minuteman and Titan land based ICBM force, and the B–52 strategic bomber force, Trident, together with Polaris/Poseidon, constitutes the Triad of strategic deterrence.

Trident consists of two major subsystems: primary strategic missile system, and the submarine system. Both will utilize the latest advances in technology and be designed to increase employment flexibility, significantly reduce vulnerability of submarine, enhance survivability of payload delivered, and greatly expand the dimension of the U.S. counterstrike force.

The Trident submarine, which is planned to become operational in 1979, will be nuclear powered, capable of carrying 24 missiles, and substantially larger and more capable than the Polaris/Poseidon submarines, Initially it will carry the Trident I (C–4) missile but is designed to accommodate a larger diameter, and longer range Trident II (D–5) missile if and when developed.

The C–4 missile, which is planned to become operational in 1979, is being developed with a range of about 4,000 miles, with payload and accuracy equivalent to the Poseidon missile. It will be capable of being backfitted on the 31 existing Poseidon submarines, thus substantially increasing the weapon system capability. It will be equipped with an improved ballistic reentry vehicle and will be compatible with an advanced reentry vehicle.

The D–5 missile, for which development is not proposed to begin in fiscal year 1975, will be larger than the C–4 missile and use the growth space available in the Trident submarine tube.

Background

The oldest of the present fleet of 41 Polaris/Poseidon submarines became operational in 1959, so that they will begin to reach 20 years of age in 1979 when the first Trident submarines are planned to become operational. The oldest Polaris submarines are even now showing the effects of age. From the nature of their continuous operations, with two different crews rotating to keep the submarines on station, wear and tear exceeds that of most other ships. While it may be probable that these submarines will provide safe and economic operation for 25 years or more, and Navy maintenance efforts are geared to provide as long a life as possible, such life in a vital strategic systems role cannot be guaranteed.

Implications of SALT

The five-year interim strategic arms agreement reached with the Soviets in May 1972 limits the number of submarine ballistic missile launchers to 710 and the number of ballistic missile submarines to 44. The significance of this restriction is that the Trident submarine may replace the Polaris/Poseidon submarine, each of which has 16 launchers, on a one for one basis, except that this would limit the number of launchers on each Trident submarine to 16. Since the Navy plans to build Trident with 24 launchers each, the total number which would be allowed under the interim agreement would be 29. This is 12 less than the 41 submarines now in the fleet.

The committee raised this question because of the concern that more submarines with fewer than 24 launchers each, although less cost

effective, would provide a more survivable and therefore more credible deterrent force. The committee recognizes that this situation may change as a result of SALT II negotiations or upon the expiration of the interim agreement. The Navy has testified that the 10 Trident program approved by the Secretary of Defense provides for 24 launchers each, but that determination of the number of launchers may be considered independently for each submarine and that the Trident submarine design will accommodate quantities down to 16 launchers on a modular basis without otherwise disturbing construction of the submarine.

Program Reorientation

The need for the Trident submarine as an ultimate replacement for Polaris/Poseidon has not been and is not now at issue. The controversy of last year, and again this year has centered on the question of when and at what rate it is required to be deployed.

Last year the Research and Development Subcommittee, in an effort to explore a range of alternative schedules and provide the committee with several options to the continued accelerated program, requested the Department of Defense to provide alternative cost estimates and schedules. These were reviewed and explored in formal hearings held by the subcommittee. This resulted in the recommendation by the subcommittee that the C–4 missile be developed as proposed in order to permit backfit into the Poseidon submarine, but that the Trident submarine Initial Operational Capability (IOC) be delayed by approximately two years to 1980. This would have reduced the fiscal year 1974 request by $885.4 million.

The committee rejected this recommendation by an 8 to 7 vote, and supported the full request for $1.527 billion to continue with the accelerated program as strongly justified by the Department of Defense. Subsequently, the House Appropriations Committee cut the submarine construction rate and funds to slow the program. This was sustained in the final appropriation action by the Congress.

The Secretary of Defense has restructured the program, consistent with the actions of the Congress, but has gone even further. He has adopted the recommendations made by the Research and Development Subcommittee last year to slow the pace of submarine construction from three to two per year, and approved the backfit of Poseidon submarines with the C–4 missile beginning in fiscal year 1979, now planned for 10 submarines. Previously, this was approved only as an option for initiation in the early 1980s.

Use of Funds Recommended for Fiscal Year 1975

The $1.944 billion will provide for the following effort:

1. $633.8 million to continue engineering development of the C–4 missile including the ballistic reentry vehicle and advanced development of the Evader Maneuvering Reentry Vehicle (MARV). (RDT&E)

2. $107.2 million for continued development of the lead (prototype) submarine including initiation of Land Based Evaluation Facility certification for the command and control system, system level integration test of command and control system software, and both contractor and Navy test and evaluation of the integrated radio room full scale prototype. (RDT&E)

3. $1.192 billion for full funding for the first two follow submarines initiated in fiscal year 1974, and for procurement of long lead components for the fourth through seventh follow submarines for which authorization will be requested in later years. (SCN)

4. $11.0 million to continue initial engineering planning services necessary prior to architectural and engineering design in support of a missile assembly production plant at the Trident Support Site, and for coaxial cabling for the Trident missile test complex. (WPN)

Conclusion

The committee recognizes the vital importance of the submarine launched ballistic missile system, the most survivable of our Triad of strategic deterrence. However, the committee is concerned at the projected total cost of $13.3 billion for a fleet of 10, as presently approved by the Department of Defense. This equates to $1.33 billion each, and, as stated last year, is the most expensive weapon system ever built by the United States.

The committee is satisfied with the slower rate of submarine construction but has some reservation about the ability to construct even at the reduced rate of two per year.

The committee has recommended denial of $16.0 million requested to initiate an Improved SSBN, called the SSBN–X, because it is considered as premature. This is explained elsewhere in the report. The committee recognizes the merit of a lower cost, smaller submarine than Trident, to provide a hi-low mix with Trident, as the Poseidon force is phased out.

The committee intends to continue to closely follow the development and construction of this weapon system to ascertain its progress against planned schedules and to insure that its costs are consistent with estimates.

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

Mission

The mission of ballistic missile defense is one for which the Army has been assigned primary responsibility within the Department of Defense. The success with which this responsibility has been fulfilled can be traced over the years through the evolutionary development of Safeguard.

Committee Recommendation

The Army has requested a total of $312.2 million to conduct research and development for ballistic missile defense. The details of that amount, compared with fiscal year 1974, and showing committee recommendations for reduction, are as follows:

[In thousands of dollars]

	Fiscal year 1974	Fiscal year 1975		
		Request	Recommend	Change
Ballistic missile defense:				
Safeguard	181,820	60,794	60,794	0
Site defense	110,133	160,000	110,000	−50,000
Advanced ballistic missile defense (ABMDA)	61,830	91,410	91,410	0
Total	353,783	312,204	262,204	−50,000

The committee recommends approval of the $60.8 million requested for Safeguard, which will complete the development program, and of the $91.4 million requested to continue Advanced Ballistic Missile Defense (ABMDA) technology. However, the committee recommends a change in the Site Defense program from a prototype demonstration to an advanced development program and a reduction of $50.0 million from the $160.0 million requested. The remaining $110.0 million will be adequate to continue Site Defense as an option to develop and produce if the permanent ABM treaty is abrogated.

Background

The Site Defense system consists primarily of a state-of-the-art phased array radar, a third generation commercial data processor and related software, and a modified Safeguard Sprint interceptor missile, called Sprint II.

The program has been limited to a prototype demonstration to provide an option to defend the Minuteman force against a higher threat than Safeguard can accommodate. Site Defense could not be deployed under the provisions of the ABM treaty except at the National Command Authority (NCA) site. It therefore constitutes simply a hedge in the event that the treaty is violated by the Soviets, or if the United States deems it necessary to abrogate the treaty in the interest of its strategic deterrent posture.

Last year the committee recommended a reduction of $70.0 million from the $170.0 million requested for fiscal year 1974 to slow the pace of development. Congressional actions on the authorization and appropriation bills added $10.0 million, and $110.0 million finally was authorized and appropriated.

In its report on the fiscal year 1974 bill, the committee stated, "It is less important, therefore, to complete the prototype demonstration program by a specific date than it is to proceed at a minimum but constructive dollar level to avoid the expenditure of substantial dollar amounts if the decision should be made later to terminate this program."

Committee Considerations

The committee reiterates its position of last year, as quoted in the previous paragraph, with one significant modification. The Department of Defense is directed to reorient the program from a prototype demonstration, which is pointed toward a specific date (February 1978) and would require the expenditure of some $600.0 million more to complete, to a simple advanced development program.

The advantage of this approach is to keep the option open by maintaining a contractor team which could be expanded to move out in an orderly and accelerated pace, if it became necessary. This will minimize the annual cost but continue essential work on the long lead major subsystems (Sprint II missile and radar) as well as the computer software and systems engineering. This redirection of the program permits a reduction of $50.0 million from the fiscal year 1975 request.

The alternatives would be either to terminate the program which would essentially dissolve any capability to deploy a system capable of defending the Minuteman force against the threat anticipated in the

1980s, or to support it at the $160.0 million level requested and spend some $600.0 million over the next four years just to demonstrate a system that could not be deployed. It is estimated to cost more than $1.8 billion for total development.

The committee considers that the expanded investment in the array of other strategic systems to enhance the survivability of our deterrent complements a substantial Site Defense technology program which now is estimated to cost, in addition to $1.8 billion to develop, some $3.2 billion to deploy at just one site. This estimate has increased by one billion dollars over what was estimated last year.

Conclusion

In summary, as stated in its report on last year's bill, the committee reaffirms its conviction that major emphasis in research and development for support of the strategic mission should be placed on strategic offensive capability. The committee recommendations for fiscal year 1975 conform to this objective.

CRUISE MISSILE PROGRAMS

Committee Recommendation

The committee recommendations, compared with the amounts requested for the Air Force Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) and the Navy Submarine Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM) are as follows:

[In thousands of dollars]

	Fiscal year 1974	Fiscal year 1975		
		Request	Recommend	Change
Air launched cruise missile	11,000	80,000	64,000	−16,000
Submarine launched cruise missile	2,590	44,971	37,971	−7,000

The reductions of $16 million and $7 million respectively for the ALCM and SLCM programs represent amounts determined to be excess to fiscal year 1975 requirements because of the anticipated lateness of planned contractual actions. The reductions should not be interpreted as a criticism of these programs because the committee is in complete accord with the way that they have been reoriented by the Department of Defense.

Description of Programs

ALCM—A long range, air-launched, subsonic, turbofan powered missile to be compatible with and carried on the B–52G and H strategic bombers, the FB–111, and the B–1.

SLCM—A submarine launched (torpedo tube) subsonic, cruise missile, with strategic and tactical variants, and also suitable for possible deployment from air, surface and land based platforms.

Background

The committee denied all of the funds requested in fiscal year 1974 for the predecessor Air Force Subsonic Cruise Armed Decoy (SCAD) and Navy Strategic Cruise Missile (SCM) programs because of the concern that the Department of Defense had not yet come to grips with

the broader issue of what technology to direct the two military departments to pursue to provide the advanced technology and subsystem building blocks from which to evolve weapon systems essential to future strategic offensive capability. The committee also determined that basic technology, up to subsystem and component development, could be conducted.

This guidance was amplified and conveyed to the Deputy Secretary of Defense by letter dated August 6, 1973, which is reproduced on page 30 of the committee report on the fiscal year 1974 military procurement bill. The letter concluded by permitting necessary technology to be continued, using other available funds, and permitting the Department, when it has formulated the requirement for a specific system, to present the plan to the Congress.

In conference, $11 million of the $22 million denied for the SCAD and $2.5 million of the $15.2 million denied for SCM were restored and ultimately authorized and appropriated.

Committee Considerations

The Department of Defense has complied with the direction of the Congress and has completely restructured the two cruise missile programs. The Deputy Secretary of Defense decision of December 19, 1973, directed that:

1. Two separate cruise missile programs would be pursued with a common technology base, but different in application and launch platform.
2. The Air Force will develop the ALCM and the Navy will develop the SLCM.
3. The ALCM will make maximum use of the terminated SCAD engineering development program for air vehicle design, and small turbofan engine development which, with related high energy fuels, will be suitable for the SLCM.
4. The Navy will develop the required SLCM guidance system whose technology also would apply to the ALCM.
5. Both Air Force and Navy project offices will establish direct communication channels to minimize information delay and maximize use of development resources.

Conclusion

The committee is satisfied with the program as redirected by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, consistent with the guidance of the Congress, and recommends approval of both programs as proposed for fiscal year 1975, but at the reduced dollar amounts recommended by the committee.

FISCAL YEAR 1975 ARMY AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT REQUEST

[Amount in millions of dollars]

	Fiscal year 1973 program		Appropriated in 1973 for fiscal year 1974		Fiscal year 1974 current program (excludes fiscal year 1974 supplemental)		Fiscal year 1975 request		House				Senate			
									Change from request		Authorized		Change from request		Recommended	
	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount
U–X utility transport	20	12.0														
AH–1Q helicopter, attack							21	27.5			21	27.5	–15	–12.5	6	15.0
CH–47C helicopter, cargo							19	41.4			19	41.4			19	41.4
UH–1H helicopter, utility							128	43.6			128	43.6			128	43.6
Modification of aircraft		58.8		109.0		117.9		165.0		–4.5		160.5		–6.7		158.3
Aircraft spares and repair parts		6.7		23.3		13.2		21.9				21.9				21.9
Support equipment and facilities		36.9		28.5		33.7		40.1				40.1				40.1
Items less than $500,000				4.0												
General reduction				–5.0												
Subtotal	20	114.4		159.8		164.8	168	339.5		–4.5	168	335.0	–15	–19.2	153	320.3
Prior year financing				–21.4		–26.4										
Authorization or appropriation	20	114.4		138.4		138.4	168	339.5		–4.5	168	335.0	–15	–19.2	153	320.3

Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B00380R000700030012-3

TITLE I—PROCUREMENT

ARMY AIRCRAFT

	Millions
Army request	339.5
Senate committee recommended reduction	−19.2
Senate committee recommendation	320.3
House authorization	335.0

Authorization Request

The Army request for fiscal year 1975 includes $112.5 million for 168 helicopters. The remaining $227.0 million includes $165.0 million for modification of aircraft, $21.9 million for spares and repair parts, and $40.1 million for other support equipment and miscellaneous charges related primarily to maintenance of the existing inventory of helicopters and airplanes.

Summary of House Action

The House reduced the Cobra/TOW procurement amount by $4.5 million, transferring that amount to R.D.T. & E. for the Cobra/TOW. House action is shown for information only since the House bill was not referred in time for committee consideration.

Committee Recommendation for Changes

The committee recommends authorization of $320.3 million, a reduction of $19.2 million from the request, as follows:

AH–1Q Cobra/TOW, −$17.0 million reduction

The Army requested $27.5 million for procurement of 21 new AH–1Q attack helicopters, in addition to a request for $64.4 million to modify 189 existing AH–1G Cobra helicopters with the TOW missile system. The committee approved the full request for TOW modifications funds, but recommended deferral of authorization for 15 of the 21 new AH–1Q helicopters and $12.5 million because these aircraft will not be delivered until 1977, and funding for these 15 aircraft is not required until fiscal year 1976. An additional $4.5 million to be used for an engine power improvement program was transferred to R.D.T. & E. at the Army's request. The net reduction recommended is $17.0 million.

Aircraft Modifications, −$2.2 million reduction

The $2.2 million was requested for a product improvement of a parachute. The Army cancelled the project as a result of making other safety improvements to their parachutes and informed the committee the funds no longer were required.

Description of Army Aircraft Recommended for Approval

AH–1Q Attack Helicopter

The AH–1Q (Cobra/TOW) attack helicopter is the Army's primary helicopter gunship, used in Southeast Asia combat. It is modified to be armed with the TOW antitank missile. The AH–1Q will provide an interim antiarmor capability pending introduction of the Advanced Attack Helicopter in the 1980 time period.

CH-47C Cargo Helicopter

The CH–47C cargo helicopter is a twin rotor, twin engine medium lift helicopter capable of lifting 8 tons of payload. It is used for battlefield transportation of personnel, weapons, and cargo in combat assault and logistic support roles.

UH–1H Utility Helicopter

The UH–1H Huey helicopter is a single rotor, single engine helicopter capable of transporting 11 passengers or 6 litter patients. It is the Army's primary utility aircraft used to provide battlefield mobility of troops and supplies, evacuation of casualties, and command and control.

FISCAL YEAR 1975 NAVY AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT REQUEST

[Amount in millions of dollars]

	Fiscal year 1973 program		Appropriated in 1973 for fiscal year 1974		Fiscal year 1974 current program (excludes fiscal year 1974 supplemental)		Fiscal year 1975 request		House				Senate			
									Change from request		Authorized		Change from request		Recommended	
	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount
A–4M Light Attack Skyhawk			20	53.6	20	53.6	24	57.3			24	57.3	—24	—57.3		
A–4M advance procurement, current year		2.0		2.2		2.2		2.2				2.2				2.2
A–6E all weather attack intruder	21	147.6	13	116.2	13	116.2	12	127.5			12	127.5			12	127.5
A–6E advance procurement, current year	7	1.7 100.8	6	1.9 101.6	6	1.9 101.6	6	1.8 121.7			6	1.8 121.7			6	1.8 121.7
EA–6B electronic warfare Prowler								1.0				1.0				1.0
EA–6B advance procurement, current year		1.4														
A–7E medium attack Corsair II	48	155.7	30	130.1	30	126.4	34	138.2			34	138.2		—7.5	34	130.7
A–7E advance procurement, current year		8.7		.8		.8		3.8				3.8				3.8
AV–8A V/STOL Harrier	30	99.6	12	39.8	12	39.8										
AV–8A advance procurement, current year		8.1														
F–14A fighter Tomcat	48	407.8	50	584.9	50	584.9	50	639.3			50	639.3		—22.0	50	617.3
F–14A advance procurement, current year		75.7		55.0		55.0		70.0				70.0				70.0
VH–3D helicopter	11	34.0														
UH–1N helicopter, utility	24	17.3	24	21.0	24	19.0	20	14.9			20	14.9			20	14.9
UH–1N advance procurement, current year		1.4		1.1		1.1		1.6				1.6				1.6
AH–1J helicopter, attack	20	30.8	20	21.6	15	20.8	20	24.9			20	24.9	—6	—5.4	14	19.5

AH–1J advance procurement, current year		1.0		.7		1.2		3.9				3.9			3.9
P–3C ASW aircraft Orion	12	106.5	12	126.2	12	126.2	12	138.4			12	138.4		12	138.4
P–3C advance procurement, current year		12.7		8.9		8.9		11.6				11.6			11.6
S–3A ASW aircraft carrier based	35	472.3	45	401.4	45	402.6	45	429.4			45	429.4		45	429.4
S–3A advance procurement, current year		61.2		54.0		54.0		56.0				56.0			56.0
E–2C early warning aircraft	8	120.4	9	134.4	9	134.4	6	107.1			6	107.1		6	107.1
E–2C advance procurement, current year		18.2				1.9									
C–9B cargo Skytrain II	3	16.9					7	41.6			7	41.6		7	41.6
CT–39 light cargo transport	5	8.4					6	10.5			6	10.5		6	10.5
T–2C trainer aircraft	24	31.3	24	29.0	24	32.1									
F–5E trainer aircraft															
TAV–8A V/STOL trainer aircraft			8	44.3	8	44.3									
TAV–8A advance procurement, current year		1.9													
T–34C trainer aircraft									+18	+7.0	18	7.0			
EC–130 special mission TACAMO	1	12.1	1	10.2	1	10.2									
EC–130 advance procurement, current year		1.3													
KC–130 R tanker			4	25.0	4	26.0	6	39.1			6	39.1		6	39.1
Modification of aircraft		314.4		295.4		285.8		338.5		−3.5		335.0	−4.9		333.6
Aircraft spares and repair parts		468.4		408.8		418.8		374.2				374.2			374.2
Aircraft component improvement		61.9		30.1		33.4		36.4				36.4	−.8		35.6
Aircraft industrial facilities		27.8		26.7		25.4		23.2				23.2			23.2
Other production charges		30.4		22.4		24.3		19.5				19.5			19.5
Common ground equipment		113.4		84.5		88.1		126.0				126.0			126.0
War consumables		.9		2.7		.7		1.0				1.0			1.0
General reduction				−5.0											
Subtotal	297	2,974.1	278	2,829.5	273	2,841.6	248	2,960.6	+18	+3.5	266	2,964.1	−30	−97.9	218	2,862.7
Prior year financing				−106.8		−118.9									
Authorization or appropriation	297	2,974.1	278	2,722.7	273	2,722.7	248	2,960.6	+18	+3.5	266	2,964.1	−30	−97.9	218	2,862.7

Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B00380R000700030012-3

NAVY AND MARINE CORPS AIRCRAFT

	Millions
Navy request	$2,960.6
Senate committee recommended reduction	−97.9
Senate committee recommendation	2,862.7
House authorization	2,964.1

Authorization Request

The Navy request for aircraft procurement is for $2,960.6 million. This request includes funds for the procurement of 248 new aircraft of 13 different types, together with their supporting components and spare parts, the cost of modifying and modernizing aircraft already in inventory, and related items such as aircraft support equipment, industrial facilities, and training equipment. In addition, the bill provides for the procurement of long lead items required for aircraft that will be included in next year's program.

Summary of House Action

The House committee added $3.5 million, authorizing a total of $7.0 million to procure 18 new T–34C aircraft, and approved the remainder of the request.

House action is shown for information only, since the House bill was not referred in time for committee consideration.

Committee Recommendation for Changes

The committee recommends authorization of $2,862.7 million, a reduction of $97.9 million from the request as follows:

A–4M Skyhawk, −$58.1 million reduction

The request is for $57.3 million to buy 24 A–4Ms and $0.8 million for initial spares for those aircraft. The Marines have 24 A–4Ms authorized in the fiscal year 1974 supplemental which will be delivered in calendar 1976, at the same time as the 24 requested in fiscal year 1975. Those already approved A–4Ms, plus others for foreign sales, will result in a high production rate in 1976, which will be followed by a shut-down of the line in 1977 under present Navy planning. The committee recommends deferral of funding for these 24 A–4Ms to fiscal year 1976, for delivery in calendar 1977.

This will have the benefits of keeping the A–4M production line open another year, will result in a more even and orderly monthly production rate, and will allow finalization of the Marine Corps' future light attack program before the A–4M line is closed.

The committee emphasizes that it strongly supports this deferred procurement being placed in the fiscal year 1976 budget request.

F–14A Tomcat, −$22.0 million reduction

The request is for $709.3 million to buy 50 F–14A fighters for the Navy and Marine Corps. The sale of 30 F–14s to Iran has reduced the cost of the fiscal year 1975 Navy aircraft by $22.0 million, and

the budget request was reduced accordingly. The F–14 program is discussed in more detail in the section of the report "Aspects of the Bill of Special Interest."

A–7E Corsair II, −$7.5 million reduction

The request is for 34 aircraft at a cost of $138.2 million. The fiscal year 1974 procurement request was for 42 A–7Es, and contracts for long lead time components for those 42 aircraft already had been entered into when the appropriations committees reduced the 1974 program to 30 aircraft. Rather than stop work on items already started, they were continued as long lead for the fiscal year 1975 program. This allowed a $7.5 million savings towards this current year's request.

AH–1J Sea Cobra, −$5.4 million reduction

The request is for 20 aircraft and $24.9 million. An improved version of the Sea Cobra will be bought with an uprated engine and power transmission. The production schedule of the improved configuration has slipped, and 6 of the requested aircraft will not be delivered until calendar 1977. These 6 Sea Cobras do not require funding until fiscal year 1976, and the committee recommends deferring the 6 aircraft and $5.4 million to next year's request.

OV–10 Night Gunship Modification, −$4.9 million reduction

The funds were requested to start a modification program to add night vision sensors and uprated engines to Marine Corps OV–10 forward air control airplanes. The total program for 24 airplanes would cost $47 million, nearly $2 million apiece, in order to provide a night observation gunship capability. The committee believes the Marines should evaluate carefully the possibility of utilizing existing Air Force AC–130 night gunships being phased out of their inventory before going ahead with this program.

Description of Navy and Marine Corps Aircraft Recommended for Approval

A–6E (Intruder)

The A-6E is a subsonic, twin-jet, two-place attack aircraft with night and all-weather, low altitude attack capabilities. The "E" model has new solid state avionics but otherwise is similar to the combat-proven A-6A. The request of $129.3 million dollars to procure 12 aircraft continues a modest inventory modernization and provides for a minimum production capability.

EA–6B (Prowler)

The EA-6B is a tactical jamming (ECM) variant of the A-6 attack airplane. It carries a crew of 4, a pilot and 3 equipment operators. An improved configuration with more modern jamming controls will be bought starting with this year's program. The FY 1975 request is for 6 aircraft and $122.7 million.

A–7E (Corsair II)

The A-7E is a single-place subsonic, light attack aircraft capable of carrying all types of conventional ordnance while performing close air support and interdiction missions. The A-7E has proven to be both

reliable, maintainable, and highly survivable in combat deployments in Southeast Asia. It is essentially a twin to the Air Force A–7D. The request of 34 aircraft and $142.0 million continues the modernization of the light attack force by replacing older and less capable A-7A/B's and A-4's.

F–14A (Tomcat)

The F–14A is a high performance variable sweep wing carrier-based airborne weapon system capable of performing air-to-air combat and air-to-surface attack missions. The F–14 employs any combination of Phoenix, Sparrow and Sidewinder missiles as well as an internal 20mm cannon.

UH–1N (Iroquois)

The UH–1N is a twin engine version of the "Huey" helicopter series. The primary missions of this versatile Navy and Marine helicopter are command and control, troop transport, medical evacuation and command liaison. The request of $16.5 million to procure 20 aircraft provides for the continuation of the modernization of the Marine Corps assault helicopter force.

AH–1J (Sea Cobra)

The AH–1J is a helicopter gunship utilized by the Marine Corps to provide close-in ground fire suppression during aerial and ground escort operations and landing zone preparation.

P–3C (Orion)

The P–3C is a land-based, long-range, four engine turbo-prop patrol aircraft. Its primary mission is anti-submarine warfare with a secondary mission capability of aerial mining, maritime surveillance and coastal shipping destruction. The request of $150.0 million dollars to procure 12 aircraft allows the twelfth squadron to transition to the P–3C's.

S–3A (Viking)

The S–3A is a twin engine, turbofan, carrier-based anti-submarine aircraft capable of carrying conventional and nuclear airborne ASW weapons. It is replacing the S–2 Tracker presently being used aboard anti-submarine carriers. The request of $485.4 million to procure 45 aircraft will provide assets to transition the seventh through ninth squadrons into the S–3A.

E–2C (Hawkeye)

The E–2C is an all-weather, turbo-prop, carrier-based radar warning aircraft which provides early warning of approaching enemy units and vectors interceptors into attack positions. In addition to this function, the E–2C also provides strike and traffic control, area radar surveillance, search and rescue assistance and communications relay. The request for 6 aircraft and $107.1 million continues the replacement program of the aging and obsolescent E–2B aircraft.

C–9B (Skytrain II)

The C–9B is an off-the-shelf, twin fan-jet commercial passenger aircraft configured to carry either all cargo, all personnel, or a mixture of both. These aircraft will be utilized to supplement Military Airlift

Command and commercial resources to meet Navy/Marine airlift requirements. The request for 7 aircraft and $41.6 million continues modernization of the active transport fleet.

CT–39 (Sabreliner)

The CT–39 is a small commercial jet transport aircraft capable of transporting eight to ten passengers or a small cargo load.

The CT–39 is used for the purpose of providing rapid response airlift for high priority, time critical cargo and personnel. The request for 6 aircraft and $10.5 million enables the continuation of an orderly Navy/Marine Corps fleet support modernization program.

KC–130R (Hercules)

The KC–130R is a version of the current production C–130 aircraft modified as an aerial tanker. These aircraft provide aerial refueling for Marine Corps fighter and attack aircraft during tactical operations and for both Navy and Marine Corps aircraft transiting the Atlantic and Pacific. The request for $39.1 million provides funding to procure advanced attrition aircraft to maintain force levels until the mid-1980's.

FISCAL YEAR 1975 AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT REQUEST

[Amount in millions of dollars]

	Fiscal year 1973 program		Appropriated in 1973 for fiscal year 1974		Fiscal year 1974 current program (excludes fiscal year 1974 supplemental)		Fiscal year 1975 request		House				Senate			
									Change from request		Authorized		Change from request		Recommended	
	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount
A-7D tactical attack Corsair	24	84.7	24	70.1	24	70.1			+24	+100.1	24	100.1				
A-10/A-7D close support attack aircraft																
A-10 advance procurement, current year							26	140.3			26	140.3	+4	+18.9	30	159.2
A-37B light attack aircraft	60	32.0					29	28.9			29	28.9				28.9
E-3A AWACS							12	15.5			29	15.5	−29	−15.5		
E-3A advance procurement, current year								494.4	−6	−247.2	6	247.2			12	494.4
F-111F tactical fighter	12	151.4	12	151.6	12	151.6		21.0	+12	−10.5	12	10.5	+12	+205.5	12	21.0
F-111F advance procurement, current year		30.0								+205.5		205.5		−15.0		205.5
F-4E tactical fighter	48	168.1	24	98.6	24	98.6										15.0
F-5A freedom fighter			116	69.3	116	69.3										

F–5B freedom fighter	7	10.6																						
F–5E international fighter	57	90.4	71	112.0	71	112.0	28	85.4			28	85.4	–28	–85.4										
F–5F international fighter							72	756.9			72	756.9			72	756.9								
F/TF–15A tactical fighter	30	421.6	62	736.0	62	736.0	72	756.9																
C–5A unfunded deficiencies		107.6		37.2		37.2																		
C–130H tactical transport	20	90.0	36	180.6	36	180.6	4	35.3			4	35.3	–4	–20.3										
VC–9C transport	3	19.0																						
T–41D basic trainer			1		1																			
T–43A navigational trainer	8	45.1																						
E–4A airborne command post	2	69.0	1	32.3	1	32.3																		
CH–47C helicopter, cargo			24	51.5	24	48.2	8	18.9			8	18.9	–8	–18.9										
UH–1H helicopter, utility	180	50.1	180	56.5	180	56.5	77	25.0			77	25.0	–77	–25.0										
HH–57C helicopter	6	20.8																						
CX–X utility aircraft	14	8.4																						
Modification of aircraft		471.4		483.9		479.1		766.4		–157.9		608.5		–162.1										
Aircraft spares and repair parts		521.0		535.7		515.7		781.5		+4.8		786.3		–80.7										
Common ground equipment		50.2		76.5		76.5		120.2				120.2		–9.9										
Component improvement		39.9		.7		.7		13.4				13.4		–3.5										
Industrial facilities		24.3		23.9		23.9		31.8				31.8		–2.3										
War consumables		14.0		.9				35.0				35.0		–2.3										
Other production charges		75.9		103.4		106.0		126.7				126.7		–23.8										
Classified projects		44.3		29.5		29.5																		
MASF reduction				–25.7																				
Subtotal	471	2,639.8	551	2,831.4	551	2,831.4	256	3,496.6	+30	–105.2	286	3,391.4	–130	–210.3	126	3,286.3								
Prior year financing				–111.0		–111.0																		
Authorization of appropriation	471	2,639.8	551	2,720.4	551	2,720.4	256	3,496.6	+30	–105.2	286	3,391.4	–130	–210.3	126	3,286.3								

AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT

	Millions
Air Force request	$3,496.6
Senate committee recommended reduction	−210.3
Senate committee recommendation	3,286.3
House authorization	3,391.4

Authorization Request

The Air Force request for procurement of aircraft is for $3,496.6 million. This provides for the procurement of 256 aircraft at a cost of $1,621.6 million, plus $766.4 million for the modification and modernization of in-service aircraft, $781.5 million for the procurement of aircraft spares and repair parts, common ground equipment, and overhaul programs, and $327.1 million for aircraft support equipment and facilities.

Of the 256 aircraft requested, 110 are for the Air Force inventory, including 72 F–15, 26 A–10, and 12 E–3A (AWACS) combat aircraft. The other 146 aircraft include 29 A–37B, 28 F–5F, 4 C–130, 8 CH–47, and 77 HU–1H in the MASF account to replace losses and maintain the capabilities of the Vietnam Air Force (VNAF).

Summary of House Action

The House reduced the request for the E–3A AWACS from 12 aircraft and $549.8 million to 6 aircraft and $292.1 million, deleted $50 million to begin a fuselage-stretch modification of the C–141, reduced the request for $132.9 million down to $25.0 million to modify civilian wide-bodied jets in the CRAF fleet, added $205.5 million to procure 12 F–111 aircraft, and added $104.9 million to procure 24 A–7D aircraft. The net change was a reduction of $105.2 million.

Committee Recommendation for Changes

The committee recommends authorization of $3,286.3 million for procurement of Air Force aircraft. This is a net reduction of $210.3 million to the request, composed of the following changes:

MASF Aircraft, −$245.0 million reduction

The 146 aircraft and $245.0 million requested for the MASF program in the Air Force aircraft procurement request were deleted from this account and considered under Title VII to the bill.

F–111, +$220.5 million addition

Although not requested in fiscal year 1975, $205.5 million was added for procurement of 12 F–111F tactical aircraft and $15.0 million was provided for long lead funds specifically for fiscal year 1976 procurement of F–111s. The committee strongly urges that the F–111 production line be kept open until a replacement aircraft enters development and further recommends modernization of the F–111 inventory with continued annual procurement of this latest version of the aircraft.

A–10, +$18.9 million addition

The committee recommends transferring funding for 4 A–10 aircraft from the R.D.T. & E. account to the procurement account, which requires the addition of $18.9 million to fully fund production of these airplanes. The A–10 program is discussed in detail in the section of the report "Aspects of the Bill of Special Interest".

Electronic Countermeasures Pods, −$22.6 million reduction

The committee recommends a reduction of $22.6 million from the Air Force request for $56.6 million for ECM pods. The $22.6 million is for procurement of the ALQ–119 pod, of which the Air Force already has a large inventory. An improved pod, the ALQ–131 will begin production in fiscal year 1975 and the committee approved that procurement.

Civil Reserve Airlift Fleet (CRAF) modification, −$155.0 million reduction

The committee recommends a reduction of $155.0 million from the request of funds to modify civilian aircraft for cargo capability. The committee is of the opinion that the Air Force or the Defense Department should study the complete airlift requirement including allied airlift capability and the proposed new tanker-cargo-missile carrier aircraft to ascertain any new airlift requirement as well as the most economical and cost-effective means of meeting any new requirement. In the committee's opinion the Air Force had not satisfactorily resolved many issues of this civilian aircraft modification program to demonstrate among other things its requirement, feasibility, availability and cost-effectiveness. These issues should be adequately resolved before again presenting this program anticipated to cost over $1 billion.

C–141 Stretch Modification, −$19.0 million reduction

The committee recommends a reduction of $19.0 million from the FY 1975 budget request of $50 million for the C–141 stretch program. The committee sees some merit in this program although it is of the opinion that this modification should move slowly to allow full testing and also to provide time to include this airlift plan in the overall airlift study that the committee believes should be made.

Therefore, the committee has provided funding for the engineering development and the modification and test of one prototype. This should not be construed as authorization to proceed with a procurement of production tooling or kits or other requirements that would relate to a go ahead on this program beyond the one prototype. The committee wants to look at this program again next year before further authorization is considered.

Aircraft Spares and Support Items, −$8.1 million reduction

The committee recommends the reduction of this spares funding request, since it is directly related to the request for increased strategic airlift manning that the committee has recommended reduction from active forces. Since the committee's reduction directs the Secretary of Defense to develop a plan within 90 days to increase required airlift manning through reserves and national guard forces, the committee will also reevaluate the spares requirement for possible repro-

gramming consideration when such plan is formulated and the implementation schedule is established.

Description of Air Force Aircraft Recommended for Approval

F/TF-15A (Eagle)

The F–15A is an air superiority fighter aircraft characterized by a high thrust-to-weight ratio and low wing loading for maximum maneuverability. It is designed to be superior to all present and currently projected Soviet fighter aircraft through the 1980 time period. The Air Force request is for 72 aircraft at a cost of $756.9 million.

A–10

The A–10 attack aircraft is a twin jet engine, single pilot airplane designed for the close air support role. The A–10 program is discussed in more detail in the section of the report "Aspects of the Bill of Special Interest."

F–111F

The F–111F is a variable sweep wing, twin jet, supersonic tactical aircraft used for long range interdiction, with a night and bad weather attack capability. It is the latest version of the F–111, with an uprated engine and improved digital fire control system.

E–3A (AWACS)

The AWACS is a modified Boeing 707 aircraft equipped with a radar system and communications and command and control equipment. The Air Force request is for 12 aircraft plus advanced procurement at a total cost of $549.8 million. The AWACS is discussed in more detail in the section of the report "Aspects of the Bill of Special Interest."

F–5F (International Fighter)

The F–5F is a two-seat version of the F–5E and is a twin engine fighter/trainer which retains the essential combat capabilities of the F–5E. The 28 aircraft requested at $85.4 million for the VNAF will be used for training and as attrition replacements for the F–5E. These aircraft are recommended for procurement under Title VII of the bill, the MASF account.

FISCAL YEAR 1975 ARMY MISSILE PROCUREMENT REQUEST

[Amount in millions of dollars]

	Fiscal year 1973 program		Appropriated in 1973 for fiscal year 1974		Fiscal year 1974 current program (excludes fiscal year 1974 supplemental)		Fiscal year 1975 request		House				Senate			
									Change from request		Authorized		Change from request		Recommended	
	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount
Safeguard		285.4		159.3		159.3										
Dragon antitank missile	3,950	48.3	7,000	60.6	7,000	60.6	15,200	106.3		—19.8	15,200	86.5		—19.8	15,200	86.5
Hawk missile	732	106.0	720	104.8	720	101.3	520	80.3			520	80.3			520	80.3
Honest John Missile	6	.6	5	.5		.5										
Lance missile	360	93.0	360	73.0	360	80.0	194	64.4			194	64.4			194	64.4
Pershing missile	20	29.2	26	49.3	26	49.3		7.9				7.9				7.9
TOW antitank missile	12,000	42.5	12,000	57.9	12,000	55.3	24,000	107.1			24,000	107.1		—2.5	24,000	104.6
Modification of missiles		28.4		10.4		11.9		45.7				45.7				45.7
Safeguard spares and repair parts		14.6						3.0				3.0				3.0
Other spares and repair parts		27.9		17.0		18.1		18.4				18.4		—.4		18.0
AN/TSQ-73		1.9		10.5		10.5		5.7				5.7				5.7
Air defense		3.2		4.7		4.7		11.7				11.7				11.7
Production base support		7.0		1.9		4.4		5.5				5.5				5.5
Other support		11.5		1.2		1.2		3.2				3.2				3.2
Subtotal		699.5		557.1		557.1		459.2		—19.8		439.4		—22.7		436.5
Prior year financing				—32.0		—32.0										
Authorization or appropriation		699.5		525.1		525.1		459.2		—19.8		439.4		—22.7		436.5

Army Missiles

	Millions
Army request	$459.2
Senate committee recommended reduction	−22.7
Senate committee recommendation	436.5
House authorization	439.4

Authorization Request

The FY 1975 request for authorization of appropriations for the procurement of Army missiles includes the funding for missiles, modifications, spare parts and related support equipment. The major items in this request are the TOW, Dragon, Hawk and Lance missiles.

Summary of House Action

The House approved a total of $439.4 million for Army missiles. This action reflects a $19.8 million reduction in the budget request for Dragon missile program.

Committee Recommendations for Change

The committee recommends authorization of $436.5 million for Army missiles. This recommendation represents a reduction of $22.7 million below the request, as follows:

Dragon Missile, −$19.8 reduction

The committee recommends deletion of $19.8 million with no change in quantities based on refinements of Army cost estimates.

MASF Items, −$2.9 million reduction

MASF items are to be deleted from the Service accounts. These items are discussed elsewhere in the report.

Comments

The committee is concerned about the numbers of anti-tank type weapons being planned for total inventory procurement in the Army as well as the other services. Testimony in support of the FY 1975 budget request disclosed that significant quantities of anti-tank capable weapons such as missiles, bombs, mines, and other capabilities are already either in procurement or planned for procurement for U.S. forces. Additional anti-tank capabilities are also in the development process. Further anti-tank capabilities are also available to our allies. The committee questions the possibilities of purchasing an excess inventory capability in the anti-tank weaponry.

The committee therefore requests the Department of Defense to conduct such studies as may be required to enable the Defense Department to present to the committee adequate justification that the combined anti-tank capabilities and weapons of all of the services planned for procurement are needed to meet the threat that is anticipated and are the most economical and cost effective.

Description of Army Missiles Recommended for Approval

Dragon Missile

The Dragon is a medium weight, man portable, antitank missile to be used by the Army infantry. It is a wire guided weapon that is launched recoillessly.

TOW Missile

The TOW is a tube-launched, optically tracked, heavy antitank missile system which provides the infantry battalion with long range antitank capability.

Improved Hawk Missile

The Improved Hawk provides all-weather capability for defense against low and medium altitude supersonic aircraft.

Lance Missile

The Lance missile system provides surface-to-surface nuclear fire support for intermediate range targets. The Lance system has only been approved in the nuclear configuration and the committee does not favor any conventional configuration of this missile system until it can be demonstrated as the most cost-effective alternative for an increased conventional capability if such an increase is required.

Pershing Missile

The Pershing missile system provides surface-to-surface nuclear firing capability for U.S. Forces in Europe at longer ranges than the Lance missile system.

Fiscal Year 1975 Navy Missile Procurement Request

[Amount in millions of dollars]

	Fiscal year 1973 program		Appropriated in 1973 for fiscal year 1974		Fiscal year 1974 current program (excludes fiscal year 1974 supplemental)		Fiscal year 1975 request		House				Senate			
									Change from request		Authorized		Change from request		Recommended	
	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount
Ballistic missiles:																
Polaris		10.9		2.0		2.1		1.0				1.0				1.0
UGM-73A (C-3) Poseidon	95	268.8	72	159.8	72	185.5		48.0				48.0				48.0
UGM-73A advance procurement, current year		18.4		43.9												
Trident				5.0		5.0		12.6				12.6				12.6
Modification of ballistic missiles		12.0		43.0		52.4		15.5				15.5				15.5
Spares and repair parts		3.8		3.0		2.0		1.0				1.0				1.0
First destination transportation		2.5		2.1		2.1		1.8				1.8				1.8
Missile industrial facilities		.6		.7		.7		.8				.8				.8
Astronautics		2.8		3.6		3.6		4.0				4.0				4.0
Other missiles:																
Sparrow III	100	28.3	100	25.9	100	25.8	300	54.9			300	54.9			300	54.9
Sidewinder ICIR	470	11.7	850	14.8	850	14.6	800	15.5			800	15.5			800	15.5
Phoenix	180	89.3	240	92.5	240	92.5	340	94.7			340	94.7		−1.5	340	93.2
Bulldog													+1,000	+23.1	1,000	23.1
Shrike	1,672	26.8	760	10.6	760	11.0	900	25.4			900	25.4			900	25.4
Condor	20	17.9	60	22.7	30	22.7	35	19.0			35	19.0			35	19.0
Standard Arm	316	39.6		.5		.8		.5				.5				.5
Harpoon							150	78.2			150	78.2	−50	−7.7	100	70.5
Standard MR	340	33.8	244	29.1	244	30.3	200	29.1			200	29.1			200	29.1
Standard ER	100	12.7	68	9.7	68	9.5		3.2				3.2				3.2
Standard SSM			26	4.3	26	4.3	62	8.1			62	8.1			62	8.1
Standard Active SSM							74	32.1			74	32.1			74	32.1
Other missile support		16.2		12.5		12.5		10.7				10.7				10.7
Aerial targets		36.5		28.9		33.8		41.3				41.3				41.3
Modification of missiles		13.8		6.4		6.8		17.8				17.8				17.8
Spares and repair parts		10.4		12.3		15.2		21.2				21.2				21.2
First destination transportation		.7		.6		.6		1.0				1.0				1.0
Missile industrial facilities		9.9		9.3		9.3		12.3				12.3				12.3
Fleet satellite communication		31.1		36.6		36.6		68.0				68.0				68.0
Classified projects								2.9				2.9				2.9
Subtotal		698.5		579.8		579.7		620.6				620.6		+13.9		634.5
Prior year financing				−5.0		−8.5										
Authorization or appropriation		698.5		574.8		571.2		620.6				620.6		+13.9		634.5

Navy Missiles

	Millions
Navy request	$620.6
Senate committee recommended addition	+13.9
Senate committee recommendation	634.5
House authorization	620.6

Authorization Request

The authorization request of $620.6 million for Navy missiles includes procurement of fleet strategic ballistic missiles, tactical missiles launched from aircraft, surface ships, and submarines, fleet satellite and astronautics programs, aerial targets, and missile modifications, spares, and other related changes.

Summary of House Action

The House committee approved the full request. House action is shown for information only since the House bill was not referred in time for committee consideration.

Committee Recommendation for Changes

The committee recommends authorization of $634.5 million, a net addition of $13.9 million composed of the following changes:

Bulldog, +$23.1 million addition

No funds were requested in fiscal year 1975 for procuremnt of Bulldog missiles. The committee recommends the addition of $23.1 million to buy 1000 Bulldog missiles for the Marines.

Last year the committee reviewed the laser guided missile programs of the 3 services. The committee reported that the Bulldog close air support missile had completed R&D and was ready for procurement, but DDR&E had rejected the Navy's request for production funding in favor of waiting for development of a laser-guided version of the Air Force Maverick. The committee added funds to buy Bulldogs and recommended the already-developed Bulldog laser seeker be used on the Maverick. The funds were authorized but not appropriated in fiscal year 1974. The appropriations committees recommended another Defense Department review of these programs.

This year the committee found the situation essentially unchanged. The Navy again requested approval for production of Bulldog missiles, but it was rejected again by DDR&E in favor of a laser Maverick, a missile which had not even begun engineering development by the time the committee acted on this bill. The Bulldog has completed R&D and all of its required operational testing, with outstanding results, and now is ready for production with a total of $16.8 million invested in R&D on the project. Rather than see that development wasted, the committee strongly recommends approval of procurement of 1000 Bulldog missiles for the Marines as an interim inventory of laser close air support missiles, pending availability of a laser Maverick at some time in the future.

Harpoon, −$7.7 million reduction

A year ago long lead funds were requested to start production of the first 200 Harpoon missiles in fiscal year 1975, and this committee reduced those funds to the amount required to start 100 missiles in the first production run. The committee's reason was the Harpoon production rate was planned to build up too rapidly early in the program before the missiles had completed operational testing.

This year's budget request was for 150 Harpoon missiles and $78.2 million. The committee reiterates its belief that 100 missiles is the optimum quantity for this initial procurement, and recommends a reduction of 50 missiles and $7.7 million from the request.

Phoenix, −$1.5 million reduction

The Navy request was for authorization for 340 Phoenix missiles and $94.7 million. The sale of Phoenix missiles to Iran, along with 30 F–14A aircraft, has reduced the cost of the Phoenix missiles to be bought by the Navy in fiscal year 1975 by $1.5 million. The committee recommends the request be reduced by that amount.

Description of Navy Missiles Recommended for Approval

Poseidon

The Poseidon is a two stage solid propellant submarine launched ballistic missile with improved accuracy and a larger payload than the Polaris, and with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles. It replaces the Polaris Missile System on 31 of 41 SSBNs. The FY 1975 request of $48.0 million continues the procurement of Poseidon production support efforts.

Sparrow

The Sparrow AIM–7F is a new solid state version of the Sparrow radar guided missile, and will be used in a number of air-to-air and ship-to-air weapon systems.

The request for FY 1975 is $54.9 million to procure 300 missiles. The Sparrow is discussed in greater detail in the section of the report "Aspects of the Bill of Special Interest".

Sidewinder

The Sidewinder is a heat seeking, short range air-to-air dogfight missile carried on Navy and Marine Corps fighter and attack aircraft. AIM–9H is the latest version in production and has solid state components for greatly improved reliability.

The request for FY 1975 is $15.5 million to procure 800 missiles.

Phoenix

The Phoenix missile is a large, all weather, long range air-to-air missile with semi-active mid-course and active terminal guidance and multiple target capability. Six Phoenix missiles, each weighing 985 lbs. can be carried aboard the F–14.

Shrike

The Shrike is an anti-radar, air-to-surface missile, launched toward its target guiding on the radar antenna signals. It can be launched from the A–4, A–6 and A–7 aircraft. The FY 1975 request is $25.4 million to procure 900 missiles in the –6 version.

Condor

Condor is a long range air-to-surface cruise missile. It uses a television-type terminal guidance plus mid-course programed navigation and data link control. The request for FY 1975 is $19.0 million to procure 35 missiles.

Harpoon

The Harpoon is an air, surface and submarine launched anti-ship missile. It uses an active radar seeker for terminal homing, and is propelled by a turbo-jet engine augmented by a solid booster for ship launch. It is compatible with the Tartar, Terrier, and ASROC ship launchers, as well as aircraft launchers. Harpoon presently is planned for use aboard the P–3 and S–3 aircraft, the DE, DDG/DEG, DLG/DLGN, PF, CG/CGN, PG and attack submarines.

Standard

The Standard missile airframe is used in both surface-to-air and surface-to-surface applications from Navy ships. The SAM version is bought in a medium range version, using the basic missile, and in an extended range version when a booster rocket is added. It also is used in two surface-to-surface anti-ship versions, one with an anti-radar homing guidance unit and the other with an active radar seeker. The FY 1975 request includes funds for procurement of the medium range SAM version and the two surface-to-surface models.

Fiscal Year 1975 Air Force Missile Procurement Request

[Amount in millions of dollars]

	Fiscal year 1973 program		Appropriated in 1973 for fiscal year 1974		Fiscal year 1974 current program (excludes fiscal year 1974 supplemental)		Fiscal year 1975 request		House				Senate			
									Change from request		Authorized		Change from request		Recommended	
	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount
LGM-30G Minuteman	120	396.4	115	355.4	115	368.7	61	312.0			61	312.0			61	312.0
Minuteman III, Advance procurement, current year				13.3												
Shrike	300	11.3	200	8.8	200	8.8	300	11.1			300	11.1			300	11.1
Maverick	3,000	66.1	3,500	59.1	3,500	59.1	6,000	88.0			6,000	88.0		−30.3	6,000	57.7
SRAM	480	195.2	454	131.1	454	131.1										
Sparrow	50	9.8	75	20.0	75	20.0	300	43.3			300	43.3			300	43.3
Sidewinder		5.1														
Standard Arm	300	39.0														
Minuteman force modernization		269.2		253.2		253.2		298.9				298.9				298.9
Target drones		2.6		7.8		7.8		10.3				10.3				10.3
Modifications		36.4		40.9		43.0		49.0				49.0		−8.1		40.9
Spares and repair parts		41.9		39.1		36.4		75.1				75.1				75.1
Other support		613.4		494.6		495.2		723.1				723.1				723.1
Tactical drones																
Subtotal		1,686.4		1,423.3		1,423.3		1,610.8				1,610.8		−38.4		1,572.4
Prior year financing available				−30.0		−30.0										
Authorization or appropriation		1,686.4		1,393.3		1,393.3		1,610.8				1,610.8		−38.4		1,572.4

Air Force Missiles

	Millions
Air Force request	$1,610.8
Senate committee recommended reduction	−38.4
Senate committee recommendation	1,572.4
House authorization	1,610.8

Authorization Request

The Air Force request for Missile Procurement is $1,610.8 million. These funds provide for the continued procurement of strategic and tactical missiles, modifications of in-service missiles, spares and repair parts, and other support equipment and facilities. This last category includes industrial facilities, satellites for operational space systems, classified drones and special programs.

House Action

The House committee approved the full request.

House action is shown for information only, since the House bill was not referred in time for committee consideration.

Committee Recommendation for Changes

The committee recommends authorization of $1,572.4 million, a reduction of $38.4 million from the request. This reduction is composed of the following changes:

Maverick, −$30.3 million reduction

The request was for $88.4 million which would provide for procurement of 6000 Maverick missiles for $58.1 million, plus advanced funding of $30.3 million towards a fiscal year 1976 buy of 5000 additional Maverick missiles. The two fiscal year procurements are scheduled to be delivered over a 19 month period, and would bring the total quantity of Mavericks ordered to 22,000 (some of which are allocated to foreign sales). The committee believes the Air Force will end up with an excessive stockpile of the basic Maverick missile under the proposed production plan, and recommends the fiscal year 1975 quantity of 6000 missiles be built at a slower rate and stretched over a longer delivery period. The Air Force should plan for Maverick production to phase into the laser-guided Maverick program without closing the production line and without building up an excessive inventory of the basic TV-guided version. The committee recommends that the request for advanced funding for 5000 additional Mavericks be denied.

Sidewinder Modifications, −$8.1 million reduction

The request was for $14.5 million to modify 2000 existing AIM–9B Sidewinder missiles to the AIM–9J configuration. The "J" has increased maneuverability which improves the effectiveness of the missile in close-in dogfight combat. The Air Force determined after

the budget was submitted that only 590 "B" Sidewinders were available in the present inventory for this modification. The committee reduced the request accordingly.

Description of Air Force Missiles Recommended for Approval

Minuteman

The Minuteman III missile is a solid propellant land-based ICBM capable of carrying three independently targetable warheads. The FY 1975 request provides for the procurement of missiles for operational testing requirements, long lead hardware to protect the option for deployment of Minuteman III missiles, and hardware/site activation for continued modification of Minuteman launch and launch control facilities.

Shrike

The Shrike is an airplane launched anti-radiation missile designed to destroy enemy ground radars by homing on the source of the radiation. It is carried on the F–105 and F–4 Wild Weasel aircraft. The requested procurement is for the latest two versions of the Shrike missile, which have expanded threat radar coverage over the earlier Shrikes.

Maverick

The Maverick is an air-to-ground missile equipped with automatic television homing guidance for use against fixed or moving hard targets such as tanks and field fortifications. It is carried on the F–4D/E, A–7D, and A–10 airplanes.

Sparrow

The AIM–7F Sparrow is a modernized solid state version of the Sparrow radar guided air-to-air missile with an all weather capability against high performance aircraft. It will be used on the F–4E and F–15 aircraft. The FY 1975 request provides for the first quantity of full production missiles to support inventory requirements. The Sparrow is discussed further in the section of the report Aspects of the Bill of Special Interest.

FISCAL YEAR 1975 MARINE CORPS MISSILE PROCUREMENT REQUEST

[Amount in millions of dollars]

	Fiscal year 1973 program		Appropriated in 1973 for fiscal year 1974		Fiscal year 1974 current program (excludes fiscal year 1974 supplemental)		Fiscal year 1975 request		House				Senate			
									Change from request		Authorized		Change from request		Recommended	
	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount
Improved Hawk	215	21.0	230	30.1	230	30.1	230	20.6			230	20.6			230	20.6
Dragon							1,378	19.8			1,378	19.8			1,378	19.8
TOW							6,319	30.8			6,319	30.8		−1.9	6,319	28.9
Modification kits		.1				.1		2.4		.6		2.4				2.4
Interim support equipment						1.5		.6				.6				.6
First destination transportation		.5		.1				.1				.1				.1
Spares and repair parts		.2		.4		.7		1.6				1.6				1.6
Items less than $500,000		.2		1.7		.2		.1				.1				.1
Subtotal		22.0		32.3		32.6		76.0				76.0		−1.9		74.1
Prior year financing available																
Authorization or appropriation		22.0		32.3		32.6		76.0				76.0		−1.9		74.1

MARINE CORPS MISSILES

	Millions
Marine request	$76.0
Senate committee recommended reduction	1.9
Senate committee recommendation	74.1
House authorization	76.0

Authorization Request

The Marine Corps request for authorization for procurement of missiles included the Dragon, TOW, and Improved Hawk missile programs as well as support and modification items.

House Action

The House approved the authorization as requested.

Committee Recommendation for Changes

The committee recommends that $1.9 million of the budget request be deleted. This results from a recomputation of funding requirements for the number of missiles requested in the TOW program.

Description of Marine Corps Missiles Recommended for Approval

Dragon Missile

The Dragon missile is a man portable lightweight antitank weapon planned for use by the Marine Corps at the infantry battalion level.

Improved Hawk Missile

The Improved Hawk is a surface-to-air missile system for defense against supersonic aircraft.

TOW Missile

The Tow missile is the same anti-tank missile system used by the Army and described under the Army programs.

Fiscal Year 1975 Navy Shipbuilding and Conversion Procurement Request

[Amount in millions of dollars]

	Fiscal year 1973 program		Appropriated in 1973 for fiscal year 1974		Fiscal year 1974 current program (excludes fiscal year 1974 supplemental)		Fiscal year 1975 request		House				Senate			
									Change from request		Authorized		Change from request		Recommended	
	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount
Trident (nuclear)			1	780.8	1	780.8	2	1,065.0			2	1,065.0		+24.8	2	1,089.8
Less advance procurement				−194.0		−194.0		−138.0				−138.0				−138.0
Net			1	586.8	1	586.8	2	927.0			2	927.0			2	951.8
Advance procurement, current year		311.0		41.0		41.0		239.8				239.8				239.8
CVN aircraft carrier (nuclear)			1	956.0	1	956.0										
Less advance procurement				−299.0		−299.0										
Net			1	657.0	1	657.0										
CVAN advance procurement, current year		299.0														
SSN submarine (nuclear)	6	1,050.0	5	908.2	5	908.2	3	580.5			3	580.5	−1	−193.5	2	387.0
Less advance procurement		−136.0		−125.0		−125.0		−78.0				−78.0		+26.0		−52.0
Net	6	914.0	5	783.2	5	783.2	3	502.5			3	502.5	−1	−167.5	2	335.0
Advance procurement, current year		125.0		130.0		130.0										
DLGN guided missile frigate (nuclear)							1	268.0			1	268.0			1	268.0
Less advance procurement								−115.7				−115.7				−115.7
Net							1	152.3			1	152.3			1	152.3
Advance procurement, current year				79.0		79.0		92.0				92.0				92.0
DD–963 destroyer			7	634.5	7	634.5	7	655.4			7	655.4			7	655.4
Less advance procurement				−247.0		−247.0		−198.3				−198.3				−198.3
Net			7	387.5	7	387.5	7	457.1			7	457.1			7	457.1
Advance procurement, current year		247.0		198.3		198.3										
SCS sea control ship							1	172.2			1	172.2	−1	−172.2		
Less advance procurement								−29.3				−29.3		+29.3		
Net							1	142.9			1	142.9	−1	−142.9		
Advance procurement, current year				29.3		29.3										
PHM patrol hydrofoil missile							4	96.2			4	96.2			4	96.2
Less advance procurement								−3.9				−3.9				−3.9
Net							4	92.3			4	92.3			4	92.3
Advance procurement, current year				3.9		3.9										

FISCAL YEAR 1975 NAVY SHIPBUILDING AND CONVERSION PROCUREMENT REQUEST—Continued

[Amount in millions of dollars]

	Fiscal year 1973 program		Appropriated in 1973 for fiscal year 1974		Fiscal year 1974 current program (excludes fiscal year 1974 supplemental)		Fiscal year 1975 request		House				Senate			
									Change from request		Authorized		Change from request		Recommended	
	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount
PF patrol frigate	1	202.2					7	436.5			7	436.5	−4	−250.5	3	186.0
PG patrol gunboat							2	14.3	−2	−14.3			−2	−14.3		
AD destroyer tender	1	103.6					1	116.7			1	116.7	−1	−116.7		
AS submarine tender	1	100.3														
Less advance procurement		−15.0														
Net	1	85.3														
AO Fleet O'ler							1	81.4			1	81.4			1	81.4
T–ATF fleet ocean tug							1	10.8			1	10.8			1	10.8
Service craft		2.0						31.2		−9.2		22.0		−9.2		22.0
Pollution abatement craft				10.4		10.4		10.4				10.4				10.4
Subtotal new construction	9	2,289.1	14	2,906.4	14	2,906.4	30	3,307.2	−2	−23.5	28	3,283.7	−9	−676.3	21	2,630.9
CONVERSION																
SSBN fleet ballistic missile submarine (nuclear)	6	432.6	2	155.0	2	150.0	3	187.5			3	187.5			3	187.5
Less advance procurement		−163.7		−52.6		−52.6		−82.9				−82.9				−82.9
Net	6	268.9	2	102.4	2	97.4	3	104.6			3	104.6			3	104.6
Advance procurement, current year		108.2		13.8		13.8										

AS submarine tender (SSBN)	1	26.1						1	29.2			1	29.2			1	23.2			
Less advance procurement		−8.9							−10.9				−10.9				−10.9			
Net	1	17.2						1	18.3			1	18.3			1	18.3			
Advance procurement, current year		2.1		8.8		8.8														
DLGN guided missile frigate (nuclear)			1	113.0	1	113.0														
Less advance procurement				−30.0		−30.0														
Net			1	83.0	1	83.0														
Advance procurement, current year		30.0																		
DLG (AAW) guided missile frigate	1	61.2	2	88.9	2	88.9														
Less advance procurement		−16.9		−30.8		−33.8														
Net	1	44.3	2	58.1	2	55.1														
Advance procurement, current year		19.1																		
Subtotal, conversions	8	489.8	5	266.1	5	258.1	4	122.9			4	122.9			4	122.9				
OTHER																				
Outfitting material																				
FBM ships		5.5		3.7		3.7		3.0				3.0				3.0				
All other		24.4		30.5		30.4		27.2				27.2		−5.3		21.9				
Post delivery																				
FBM ships		5.8		3.2		3.2		3.4				3.4				3.4				
All other		35.2		17.3		16.4		27.0				27.0				27.0				
Cost growth		72.0		138.8		143.3														
Escalation on prior year programs				102.1		106.6		71.9				71.9				71.9				
Completion of prior year programs		40.6																		
Subtotal, other		183.5		295.6		303.6		132.5				132.5		−5.3		127.2				
Total program		2,962.4		3,468.1		3,468.1		3,562.6		−23.5	28	3,539.1		−631.6	26	2,881.0				
Prior year financing available																				
Authorization or appropriation		2,962.4		3,468.1		3,468.1		3,562.6		−23.5	28	3,539.1		−631.6	26	2,881.0				

Navy Shipbuilding and Conversion Program

	Millions
Navy request	$3,562.6
Senate committee recommended reduction	−681.6
Senate committee recommendation	2,881.0
House authorization	3,539.1

Authorization Request

The request for $3,562.6 million would continue the level of procurement effort for shipbuilding and conversion evident over the past two years. The amount requested includes $3,265.6 million for the construction of 30 new ships, $122.9 million for the conversion and modernization of 4 existing ships, and $174.1 million for other shipbuilding and conversion costs.

This year's request compares with the fiscal year 1974 request of $3,901.8 million, of which $3,468.1 million was appropriated.

Summary of House Action

The House approved a Navy shipbuilding and conversion program in the amount of $3,539.1 million, a reduction of $23.5 million for Military Assistance Funded Programs.

Committee Discussion

The Navy shipbuilding and conversion request of $3,562.6 million for fiscal year 1975 is the third largest request since World War II. The committee recommends a reduction of $681.6 million, and authorization of a fiscal year 1975 program in the amount of $2,881.0 million. The various ships and programs in the request are discussed in Title I of this report.

The committee fully supports the requirement for a modern and capable naval force. For the past few years, however, there has been concern over problems in management, as evidenced by continued delays, increasing costs, and the continued high level of claims on shipbuilding programs. The committee notes that some progress appears to have been made, but continued emphasis on proper management is still required.

Over the past year, there have been important changes related to ship construction. These include steel shortages, shortages of skilled ship construction workers, increased material lead times, a sharp increase in economic escalation, and the largest peacetime backlog of ships awaiting construction.

The committee has had to consider all factors in arriving at the recommendation for fiscal year 1975. The practical aspects, such as whether a ship could be constructed in a reasonable time frame, and the speed that a program should proceed when there were still questions on availability of required weapons and equipment, have resulted in recommendations for reductions, even though the committee may generally support the concept or program. There are too many examples already of premature program approval leading to subsequent serious production problems.

Committee Recommendation for Changes

Authorization in the amount of $2,881.0 million is recommended for fiscal year 1975. This is a reduction of $681.6 million from the request.

Trident Ballistic Missile Submarine, +$24.8 million addition

Advance procurement funding of $24.8 million was included in the fiscal year 1974 supplemental request. The Senate denied authorization of the $24.8 million as a supplemental item necessitating adding authorization in the bill in order to fully fund two Trident submarines.

Nuclear Attack Submarine, −$167.5 million reduction

The committee recommends denial of one of the three nuclear attack submarines requested. Testimony revealed that 27 nuclear attack submarines have been authorized and funded that have not yet been delivered and a substantial portion of those submarines are not yet under construction. In view of this and the substantial delivery delays being reported, funding of only two nuclear attack submarines is recommended.

Sea Control Ship, −$142.9 million reduction

The committee recommends denial of full funding of the lead ship of this proposed new concept for convoy protection. For fiscal year 1974 the committee recommended denial of $29.3 million in long lead funds until such time as the concept had been completely validated and the "optimum aircraft" had been fully defined to include total costs and schedule availability and justified to Congress. Subsequent Congressional action resulted in authorization and funding of the $29.3 million. However, the Navy was precluded from spending these funds until a complete review of the Sea Control Ship concept has been completed and written approval to release the funds has been granted by the appropriations committees. To date, that review has not been completed.

The objections raised by the committee in considering the fiscal year 1974 request still have not been satisfied. Despite the contention last year that the concept had been fully validated, it is noted that the ship has been lengthened by 30′ in order to carry additional aircraft, and additional testing of the concept is still underway. An orderly review of this entire program will be undertaken in connection with the fiscal year 1976 authorization request.

Patrol Frigate (PF), −$250.5 million reduction

The committee recommends denial of 4 of the 7 ships requested for fiscal year 1975. The committee notes that the MK–92 gun fire control system is still in development and will require extensive testing to assure that all requirements are achieved. The committee directs that the contract for the 3 ships recommended for approval not be awarded until such time as the MK–92 system has successfully completed the required test and evaluation. Upon completion of the test and evaluation, the committee is to be advised of the results including all deficiencies for review prior to contract award for the fiscal year 1975 program.

Destroyer Tender, −$116.7 million reduction

The committee recommends denial of the request of $116.7 million for one destroyer tender. Three tenders approved by Congress in

31–683—74——6

fiscal year 1972 and 1972 are not yet under contract, and until such time as these ships are under contract and the costs and schedules are known, authorization of additional tenders will not be considered.

Military Assistance Service Funded Items, —$24.9 million reduction

The committee has deleted $24.9 million for items in support of the South Vietnamese navy from the Navy shipbuilding account. These items are discussed further under the separate section for Military Assistance Service Funded Programs.

Outfitting Material, —$3.9 Million Reduction

The $3.9 million recommended for denial has been identified by the Navy as not required in fiscal year 1975 because of delays in deliveries.

Description of Navy Shipbuilding and Conversion Programs Recommended for Approval

2 Trident Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBN)

These ships are the first two follow ships of the new long range undersea launched missile system submarine program. They have been designed for improved quietness of operation, and their longer range missiles give them a greater ocean area in which to operate. Both of these attributes enhance the survivability and effectiveness of this first line element of our deterrent forces.

2 Nuclear Attack Submarines (SSN)

These are additional follow-on submarines of the high-speed Los Angeles (SSN–688) class. They are a key element of the Navy's sea control forces, capable of covert offensive operations in ocean areas under enemy air and surface control.

7 Destroyers (DD)

The Spruance (DD–963) class destroyers provide conventionally powered, high speed, long endurance, antisubmarine escort capability combined with other general purpose destroyer missions and tasks such as naval gunfire support of operations ashore. The ship's primary mission will be to supplement the guided missile fleet air defense frigates as elements of the Navy's fast carrier task forces.

1 Nuclear Powered Guided Missile Frigate (DLGN)

This ship represents a continuation of the Virginia (DLGN–38) class fleet air defense guided missile frigates. The nuclear powered frigate is the most capable of our surface combatants. The endurance and firepower of these ships make them particularly suited for the protection of nuclear powered aircraft carriers.

Also approved was $92.0 million for procurement of long lead material for the fifth DLGN–38 class nuclear frigate which is expected to be fully funded in fiscal year 1976.

3 Patrol Frigates (PF)

This ship is the primary replacement for the many World War II destroyers and destroyer escorts which have been retired. It is a capable, economical open ocean surface combatant with antisub-

marine, anti-air, anti-missile and anti-surface ship weapon systems, designed to operate in the role of protection of naval and merchant shipping in the lower threat areas.

4 Patrol Hydrofoils (Missile) (PHM)

The anti-shipping-missile equipped patrol hydrofoil will operate in coastal, island and narrow sea areas against much larger hostile surface shipping. Armed with 8 Harpoon missiles (and a 76mm gun), the ship will free the larger patrol frigates and destroyer escorts for open ocean missions.

With respect to the MK-92 fire control system, the committee desires to review the testing, including all deficiencies prior to any contract award for the fiscal year 1975 PHM program.

1 Fleet Oiler (AO)

This is the lead ship of a new class of underway replenishment oilers, required to support fleet operations at sea.

1 Fleet Ocean Tug (T-ATF)

Designed to be manned by Military Sealift Command civil service mariners, the T-ATF will provide open ocean towing and limited salvage capability. This is the lead ship of a new, smaller class.

Service, Pollution Abatement and Small Craft

Approval is recommended for four non-self propelled fuel oil barges (YON), one medium repair drydock (ARDM), and 26 ships' waste offloading barges (SWOB).

Conversion and Modernization

The fiscal year 1975 program includes four ships, the last of the conversions currently planned under this appropriation:

(1) Three fleet ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) to accommodate the Poseidon missile system;

(2) One submarine tender (AS) to provide the capability to support fleet ballistic missile submarines.

Long-Lead Time Costs

Advance procurement costs are included for the Trident submarine and nuclear frigate programs.

Other Costs

The authorization also includes the following "other" costs:

(1) Outfitting Material—For government furnished repair parts and consumable supplies required to fill initial ship allowances for ships delivering during the fiscal year.

(2) Post Delivery—To correct deficiencies defined during acceptance and shakedown trials.

(3) Escalation—To fund differences between contract escalation projections and actually experienced costs, in fiscal year 1974 and prior programs.

Fiscal Year 1975 Army Tracked Combat Vehicle Procurement Request

[Amount in millions of dollars]

	Fiscal year 1973 program		Appropriated in 1973 for fiscal year 1974		Fiscal year 1974 current program (excludes fiscal year 1974 supplemental)		Fiscal year 1975 request		House				Senate			
									Change from request		Authorized		Change from request		Recommended	
	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount
M578 recovery vehicle			90	14.4	90	14.4	180	27.9			180	27.9	−2	−.3	178	27.6
M60A1 tank, 105 mm gun	166	50.8	360	111.2	360	111.2	510	180.8			510	180.8			510	180.8
Less advance procurement		−1.9		−6.9		−6.9		−12.0				−12.0				−12.0
Net		48.9		104.3		104.3		168.8				168.8				168.8
Advance procurement, current year		6.9		13.3		13.3		3.8				3.8				3.8
M30A1 turret trainer (M60A1)							34	6.0			34	6.0		−1.5	34	4.5
ARSV armored scout vehicle							35	25.3	−35	−25.3			−35	−25.3		
M125A1 carrier, 81 mm mortar							13	.8			13	.8	−13	−.8		
M113A1 carrier, armored, personnel							194	9.4	+302	+14.6	496	24.0	−194	−9.4		
M110 howitzer, SP, 8-inch																
M88A1 recovery vehicle							77	33.6			77	33.6			77	33.6
Modification of tracked combat vehicles		135.4		39.4		40.0		36.8				36.8				36.8
Support equipment and facilities																
Items less than $500,000		.6		1.0		.7		1.6				1.6		−.5		1.1
Spares and repair parts		3.1		3.3		5.6		11.6				11.6		−.8		10.8
First destination transportation		2.0		3.7		3.7		3.1				3.1				3.1
Production base support		2.0		5.2		6.8		3.2				3.2				3.2
Subtotal		198.9		184.6		188.8		331.9		−10.7		321.2		−38.6		293.3
Prior year financing				−5.0		−5.0										
Authorization or appropriation		198.9		179.6		183.8		331.9		−10.7		321.2		−38.6		293.3

Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B00380R000700030012-3

ARMY TRACKED COMBAT VEHICLES

	Millions
Army request	$331.9
Senate committe recommended reduction	−38.6
Senate committee recommendation	293.3
House authorization	321.2

Authorization Request

The FY 1975 request for authorization for the procurement of Army tracked combat vehicles includes tanks, tank trainers, tracked recovery vehicles, and other support items.

Summary of House Action

The House approved a total of $321.2 million for Army tracked combat vehicles. This amount reflects a reduction in the Armored Reconnaissance Scout vehicle that was agreed to by the Army.

Committee Recommendation for Changes

The committee recommends authorization of appropriation of $293.3 million. The committee recommends a reduction of $25.3 million from the Armored Reconnaissance Scout vehicle program and a reduction of $1.5 million from the tank turret trainer program. The committee also recommends a reduction of $11.8 million from MASF requests as explained elsewhere in this report.

Armored Reconnaissance Scout Vehicle, −$25.3 million reduction

The committee recognizes the Army's position on this program and considers the $25.3 million reduction appropriate since the program is under complete review. The committee commends the Army for its sound management practices in requiring a complete program review when significant questions arise in the program requirements and success. This type of action has signified the Army's leadership in the implementation of reasonable weapon systems procurement practices. The committee is encouraged by this action and expects to see this in all of the service's weapons programs where required.

M60A1 Tank Turret Trainer, −$1.5 million reduction

The committee recommends the reduction of $1.5 million in the Army's tank trainer program. This reduction agreed to by the Army is again an example of the Army's leadership in efforts to reduce costs in the weapon procurement area.

MASF Programs, −$11.8 million reduction

The $11.8 million requested under Army tracked combat vehicles for military assistance to South Vietnam has been deleted from this account and is considered under Title VIII of this bill.

Description of Army Tracked Vehicles Recommended for Approval

M60A1 Tank

The M60A1 tank is the currently standard medium tank powered by a diesel engine and mounting a 105 millimeter gun as its primary armament.

The committee is concerned with the M60A1 tank program and the possibility of production problems, future cost increases and delivery problems. The sole source environment places the Army in a difficult position in attempting to quickly and economically improve its tank inventory. The committee expects the Army to keep it advised throughout this next year as to any probable or possible production or cost problems with this program.

M578 Recovery Vehicle

The M578 recovery vehicle is a tracked recovery wrecker capable of recovering vehicles up to 30 tons in weight.

M88A1 Recovery Vehicle

The M88A1 medium recovery vehicle is fully tracked and provides the recovery capability for the medium tank operations in the Army.

M60A1 Tank Trainer

The turret trainer is a complete functional tank turret intended for instructional purposes for armored personnel.

Fiscal Year 1975 Marine Corps Tracked Combat Vehicle Procurement Request

[Amount in millions of dollars]

	Fiscal year 1973 program		Appropriated in 1973 for fiscal year 1974		Fiscal year 1974 current program (excludes fiscal year 1974 supplemental)		Fiscal year 1975 request		House				Senate			
									Change from request		Authorized		Change from request		Recommended	
	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount
Tube F/M 109		0.8		0.7		0.8										
LVTP-7	188	27.4														
LVTC-7	38	6.1														
LVTR-7	27	5.1														
LVT design contract services		4.3		2.5		2.5										
M110E2 modification kit 8-inch howitzer								1.0				1.0				1.0
Special training devices								1.2				1.2				1.2
M60A1 tank, 105 mm gun			120	34.6	120	39.1	154	55.4			154	55.4			154	55.4
Less advance procurement				−1.7		−1.7		−3.4				−3.4				−3.4
Net			120	32.9		37.4		52.0				52.0				52.0
Advance procurement, current year		1.7		5.7		3.4		5.9		−5.9				−5.9		
M88A1 recovery vehicle							40	16.4			40	16.4			40	16.4
Spares and repair parts		1.6		2.8		.9		1.4				1.4				1.4
Modification kits						.2		.6				.6				.6
Items less than $500,000				1.4		.4		.1				.1				.1
Interim support equipment		1.9				.1		1.2				1.2				1.2
First destination transportation		.8		.2		.1		.3				.3				.3
Subtotal		49.7		46.2		45.8		80.1		−5.9		74.2		−5.9		74.2
Authorization or appropriation		49.7		46.2		45.8		80.1		−5.9		74.2		−5.9		74.2

MARINE CORPS TRACKED VEHICLES

	Millions
Marine Corps Request	$80.1
Senate committee recommended reduction	5.9
Senate committee recommendation	74.2
House committee recommendation	

Authorization Request

The FY 1975 request is for authorization of appropriation for the procurement of tanks, recovery vehicles and other spare parts and support equipment.

Committee Recommendation for Change

The committee recommends authorization of appropriation of $74.2 million. The committee agrees with the $5.9 million reduction in M60A1 tank advanced procurement funding deleted by the House action.

Description of Marine Corps Tracked Vehicles Recommended for Approval

M60A1 Tank

The M60A1 tank is basically the same tank used by the Army and is in the second year of procurement by the Marine Corps to modernize their tank force.

M88A1 Recovery Vehicle

The M88A1 recovery vehicle is also the same recovery vehicle being purchased by the Army and is planned by the Marine Corps as the recovery vehicle for their M60 tank modernization.

FISCAL YEAR 1975 NAVY TORPEDO REQUEST

[Amount in millions of dollars]

	Fiscal year 1973 program		Appropriated in 1973 for fiscal year 1974		Fiscal year 1974 current program (excludes fiscal year 1974 supplemental)		Fiscal year 1975 request		House				Senate			
									Change from request		Authorized		Change from request		Recommended	
	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount
Torpedo MK-48	500	153.6	500	154.0	500	154.0	450	141.2			450	141.2			450	141.2
CAPTOR advance procurement								5.9				5.9				5.9
Mobile target MK-30	7	8.8		8.1	4	11.6	3	9.8			3	9.8			3	9.8
Mini mobile target							500	.6			500	.6			500	.6
Modification		6.0		6.2		9.0		6.9				6.9				6.9
Torpedo support equipment		8.3		7.8		8.4		7.0				7.0				7.0
Spares and repair parts		19.7		21.9		17.7		16.3				16.3				16.3
Subtotal		196.4		198.0		200.7		187.7				187.7				187.7
Authorization or appropriation		196.4		198.0		200.7		187.7				187.7				187.7

NAVY TORPEDOES

	Millions
Navy request	$187. 7
Senate committee recommended reduction	
Senate committee recommendation	187. 7
House authorization	
Authorization request	187. 7

The Navy request for procurement authorization for the torpedo account includes the MK–48 torpedo, advance procurement for the Captor program, and other spares and support equipment.

Summary of House Action

The House approved the Navy request of $187.7 million.

Committee Recommendation

The committee also recommends authorization of $187.7 million.

The committee notes that Captor, an encapsulated torpedo, is now scheduled to enter full production in FY 1976. The request in FY 1975 is for $5.9 million in advance procurement and the committee's approval of those funds is not to be viewed as a commitment to full production. This program will be closely monitored by the Congress as final testing is completed.

The Navy has failed to make a strong case justifying the Captor when viewed against the costs involved. Questions as to the systems' reliability, effectiveness and application raise issues which must be resolved before full production is approved.

FISCAL YEAR 1975 ARMY OTHER WEAPONS PROCUREMENT REQUEST

[Amount in millions of dollars]

	Fiscal year 1973 program		Appropriated in 1973 for fiscal year 1974		Fiscal year 1974 current program (excludes fiscal year 1974 supplemental)		Fiscal year 1975 request		House				Senate			
									Change from request		Authorized		Change from request		Recommended	
	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount
Vulcan air defense system										+2.3		2.3				
XM198 towed howitzer advance procurement								1.3				1.3				1.3
Launcher, grenade for M16 rifle	33,396	2.5														
M202A1 launcher, incendiary rocket			2,500	1.5	2,500	1.5	3,049	2.6			3,049	2.6	−1,046	−.9	2,003	1.7
M60 machine gun, 7.62 mm			3,600	2.7	3,600	2.7	6,000	5.0			6,000	5.0	−4,763	−4.0	1,237	1.0
M219 machine gun, 7.62 mm			1,572	7.2	1,572	7.2										
M85 machine gun, .50 cal							1,682	10.7			1,682	10.7			1,682	10.7
AN/GVS–3 laser range finder	1,020	6.4														
M161A1 rifle, 5.56 mm	37,533	4.8	22,600	3.1	22,600	3.1	9,114	1.3			9,114	1.3	−9,114	−1.3		
XM10 Vulcan target selector	60	3.8														
Modifications		4.2		3.6		3.6		6.9				6.9				6.9
Support equipment and facilities																
Items less than $500,000		.8		1.5		1.5		2.4				2.4		−.2		2.2
Spares and repair parts		8.6		4.1		4.1		8.7				8.7		−1.0		7.7
First destination transportation		.4		.8		.8		.6				.6				.6
Production base support		12.4		20.2		16.0		13.9				13.9				13.9
Subtotal		43.9		44.7		40.5		53.4		+2.3		55.7		−7.4		46.0
Authorization or appropriation		43.9		44.7		40.5		53.4		+2.3		55.7		−7.4		46.0

ARMY OTHER WEAPONS

	Millions
Army request	$53.4
Senate committee recommended reduction	−7.4
Senate committee recommendation	46.0
House authorization	55.7

Authorization Request

The FY 1975 request is for authorization for procurement of machine guns, rifles, rocket launchers and support items. This request also included some items that were intended to be placed in storage as War Reserve for Allies.

Summary of House Action

The House approved $55.7 million, an increase of $2.3 million over the request. This increase was to be applied to the Vulcan gun system and was requested by the Army as diverted funds from the ARSV program reduction.

Committee Recommendation for Changes

The committee recommends authorization of $46.0 million for Army other weapons. As it did last year, the committee is again recommending reduction of the items included for War Reserve for Allies. The committee does not agree that these items should be procured for storage for allies in a title that is intended for the procurement of items for U.S. forces. The committee also recommends a reduction of $2.7 million of MASF items as discussed elsewhere in this report.

M60 Machine Gun, −$4.0 million reduction

The committee recommends, as it did last year, that the M60 machine guns included in the budget request for purposes of storage reserve for allies be deleted from the request. $0.1 million of the reduction is for MASF machineguns.

M202A1 Rocket Launchers, −$0.9 million reduction

The committee also recommends that the M202A1 rocket launchers that are requested for procurement against future allied requirements be deleted from the budget request. $0.1 million of the reduction is for MASF launchers.

MASF items, −$2.5 million

An additional $2.5 million for items for the MASF program has been deleted from this account. The Military Assistance Service Funded Program is discussed elsewhere.

Description of Army Other Weapons Recommended for Approval

M85 Machine Gun

The M85 machine gun is a .50 caliber machine gun used with the Army M60 tank.

Fiscal Year 1975 Navy and Marine Corps Other Weapons Procurement Request

[Amount in millions of dollars]

	Fiscal year 1973 program		Appropriated in 1973 for fiscal year 1974		Fiscal year 1974 current program (includes fiscal year 1974 supplemental)		Fiscal year 1975 request		House				Senate			
									Change from request		Authorized		Change from request		Recommended	
	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount	Quantity	Amount
Navy other weapons:																
MK 29 machine gun, 20 mm							10	1.7			10	1.7			10	1.7
MK 75 gun mount, 76 mm							2	1.5			2	1.5			2	1.5
Weapons under $500,000		0.3						.3				.3		—.1		.2
Modification of guns and mounts		26.3		21.7		21.7		17.5				17.5				17.5
Gun support equipment		6.4		2.6		2.7		2.0				2.0				2.0
Spares and repair parts		4.9		3.6		4.4		2.6				2.6				2.6
Subtotal		37.9		27.9		28.8		25.6				25.6		—.1		25.5
Appropriation or authorization		37.9		27.9		28.8		25.6				25.6		—.1		25.5
Marine Corps other weapons:																
Grenade, LAU 40 mm M203					8,000	.7										
Special training devices		.5				.2		.3				.3				.3
Spares and repair parts		.3				.3										
First destination transportation		.1				.2										
Items less than $500,000		.4		.7		.4		.2				.2				.2
Subtotal		1.3		.7		1.8		.5				.5				.5
Authorization or appropriation		1.3		.7		1.8		.5				.5				.5

NAVY OTHER WEAPONS

	Millions
Navy request	$25. 6
Senate Committee recommended reduction	0. 1
Senate Committee recommendation	25. 5
House authorization	25. 6

Authorization Request

The Navy request for authorization of procurement of other weapons includes MK–29 machine guns, gun mounts as well as other modification and support requirements.

Summary of House Action

The House approved the Navy request for $25.6 million.

Committee Recommendation

The committee recommends authorization of $25.5 million. The reduction of $0.1 million is for MASF items which are discussed elsewhere in the report.

MARINE CORPS OTHER WEAPONS

	Millions
Marine Corps request	$0. 5
Senate Committee recommended reduction	—
Senate Committee recommendation	0. 5
House authorization	0. 5

Summary of House Action

The House approved the Marine Corps request for $0.5 million.

Committee Recommendation

The committee recommends authorization of $0.5 million.

TITLE II—RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

SEC. 201—RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION AUTHORIZATIONS

The tabulations below show a comparison of the amounts authorized and appropriated for research, development, test, and evaluation for fiscal year 1974 with the amounts requested in the President's budget for fiscal year 1975, as adjusted by the actions of the House (H.R. 14592), and as recommended by the committee.

RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION—COMPARATIVE SUMMARY OF ACTIONS ON AUTHORIZATION REQUEST

[In thousands of dollars]

Department	Fiscal year 1974		Fiscal year 1975		
	Authorized	Appropriated	Request	As reported by the committee	House bill [1]
Army	1,935,933	1,951,330	1,985,976	1,875,243	1,878,397
Navy (including Marine Corps)	[2] 2,656,200	[2] 2,716,716	[3] 3,264,503	[3] 3,151,042	[3] 3,153,006
Air Force	2,958,200	3,071,466	3,518,860	3,389,470	3,459,760
Defense agencies	484,800	462,916	528,700	509,657	485,500
Test and evaluation, Defense	24,600	24,600	27,000	27,000	25,000
Total, R.D.T. & E. authorization	[2] 8,059,733	[2 4] 8,227,028	[3] 9,325,039	[3] 8,952,412	[3] 9,001,663

[1] House action is as reported by the committee and is shown for information only.
[2] Includes $2,600,000 for Navy special foreign currency program in fiscal year 1974.
[3] Includes $2,570,000 for Navy special foreign currency program in fiscal year 1975.
[4] Includes $108,908,000 for pay raise supplemental for fiscal year 1974 as passed by the Senate.

SUMMARY OF ADJUSTMENTS TO FISCAL YEAR 1975 R.D.T. & E. AUTHORIZATION REQUEST RECOMMENDED BY SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

[In thousands of dollars]

Department	1975 request	Senate Armed Services Committee		House bill [1]
		Change	Recommended	
Army	1,985,976	−110,733	1,875,243	1,878,397
Navy (including Marine Corps)	[2] 3,264,503	−113,461	[2] 3,151,042	[2] 3,153,006
Air Force	3,518,860	−129,390	3,389,470	3,459,760
Defense Agencies	528,700	−19,043	509,657	485,500
Test and evaluation, Defense	27,000	----------	27,000	25,000
Total, R.D.T. & E. authorization	[2] 9,325,039	−872,627	[2] 8,952,412	[2] 9,001,663

[1] House action is as reported by the committee and is shown for information only.
[2] Includes $2,570,000 for Navy special foreign currency program in fiscal year 1975.

Authorization requested

The Department of Defense requested authorization in the amount of $9,325,039,000, which includes $2,570,000 for the Navy Special Foreign Currency Program.

House action

The House Armed Services Committee reduced the authorization request by $323,376,000, resulting in an authorization of $9,001,663,000. These reductions were made in specific programs, as subsequently identified except for Defense agencies.

Summary of committee recommendations

The committee recommends authorization of $8,952,412,000. This represents a reduction of $372,627,000 or 3.9 percent from the amount requested, and is $49,251,000 below the amount recommended for authorization by the House committee. This recommendation reflects numerous decreases which are offset in part by one increase as discussed elsewhere in the report.

General discussion of committee reductions

The fiscal year 1975 authorization request for $9,325,039,000 is $767.1 million more than the amount originally requested for fiscal year 1974, and it is the largest amount ever requested for the Research, Development, Test and Evaluation appropriation. It also is $1.130 billion more than the amount authorized and $1.234 billion more than the amount appropriated for fiscal year 1974.

It is important to recognize that the total amount requested will not in fact provide a real increase in research and development effort over the amount available in fiscal year 1974. In fact, most of the increase is needed to stay abreast of the high rate of inflation and to provide for items which were included under other appropriations in prior years but, which in accordance with Congressional direction, have been transferred to the RDT&E account in fiscal year 1975. As presented in the statement made before the committee by the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, the specific increase over the appropriations originally enacted for fiscal year 1974 consists of:

$515 million for inflation;
$225 million for items transferred from other accounts; and
$494 million increase in real effort.

Allowing for the transfers and escalation factors, the fiscal year 1975 request provides for an increase of $494 million, which is 6.1 percent, in real effort.

The effect of the committee recommendation to reduce the request by $372.6 million would be to provide a real increase of $121.4 million, or 1.5 percent. However, if the addition of the pay supplemental of $108.9 million for fiscal year 1974 is taken into account there is no significant increase and the real program totals for the two fiscal years are essentially the same.

The technical challenge which the Department of Defense faces, therefore, is clear. To maintain a vigorous and viable research and development program, adequate to insure that our future weaponry will meet any threat to our national security, will require much greater efforts in improving research and development management at all levels within the Department of Defense as well as in industry.

The new Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Dr. Malcolm R. Currie, heads a team of new Assistant Secretaries for Research and Development for the Army, Navy and Air Force. In their respective appearances before the committee, each has stated his

dedication to this objective. Their concerted resolve promises to mold the Defense research and development program into a new image of down-to-earth practicability and efficiency, to a degree not previously achieved. The committee is encouraged by their statements.

Several major examples of improved research and development management were set by this new team, with the support and approval of the Deputy Secretary and Secretary of Defense, in reaffirming the fly-before-buy policy in systems acquisition. One involved the Navy Surface Effect Ship program, where the Navy was directed to conduct another year of advanced development and risk reduction before embarking on the 2,000 ton prototype program. Another involved the Army SAM–D air defense system. In this case, the Army was directed to reorient the program from an ongoing engineering development to proof-of-principle for an advanced, self contained, missile tracking concept and an austere engineering development program.

Actions such as these will insure that substantial dollar commitments in the future will not be made until the services have demonstrated by actual hardware test that the weapon system works and is cost effective in comparison with other competing systems.

The Department of Defense has displayed a new awareness of the facts of life concerning the prohibitive costs of new weapon systems which literally and progressively have been pricing Defense out of business. This is demonstrated by the proposal in the budget to initiate development of low cost fighters for the Navy and Air Force, which, coupled with the expensive F–14 and F–15 air superiority fighters, promises to provide an affordable hi-lo mix of combat aircraft adequate to our military needs.

In both cases these proposals were somewhat late in coming and therefore will make it more difficult to achieve an optimum mix of these weapon systems, with the F–14 and F–15 aircraft if and when they are developed and produced.

The committee held separate hearings covering the overall Department of Defense programs in Electronic Warfare, Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPVs), Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW), and High Energy Lasers. The purpose was to obtain a complete understanding of these highly complex and technical programs, to determine the adequacy and merit of the programs proposed for fiscal year 1975, and to publicize these technologies as being very important to our future military capability.

Electronic warfare embraces every aspect of military operations and poses a major challenge to our industry. The ability of our offensive equipment to reach and destroy enemy targets depends in large measure on the effectiveness of our electronic warfare capability. In the same manner, defensive electronic warfare equipment may well determine the ability of our forces to survive an enemy attack.

Remotely Piloted Vehicles already have proven their value, and promise to be a relatively inexpensive way to perform important military missions which today must be conducted with manned aircraft.

Antisubmarine warfare is the name of the game in maintaining our control of the ocean lines of communication and insuring the survivability of our fleet.

High Energy Lasers promise a revolutionary change in future weapon systems which may alter the very concepts and tactics of warfare.

The committee strongly supports the pursuit of these technologies at a rate commensurate with technical progress. However, this should not be interpreted as an unqualified prior commitment to these programs. There is more reason to exercise judicious restraint than there is to expand programs without valid justification. The Department of Defense is encouraged to review these efforts more closely and to propose a program for fiscal year 1976 which will be consistent with the committee's views.

The subject of strategic initiatives as proposed and expounded by the Secretary of Defense will be addressed elsewhere in the report. However, in the broader view of the research and development and procurement programs, there is always the problem that such programs, once they are begun, tend to acquire a momentum and cloak of permanency which is very difficult to undo. The Department must be conscious of this risk and be prepared, if international tensions ease and if SALT II is successful, to turn off those programs which prove to be unnecessary.

The committee is concerned that the technology base funding requested for fiscal year 1975, adjusted for inflation, is lower than in fiscal year 1974. The Director of Defense Research and Engineering stated that this area, consisting of Research and Exploratory Development, is being held essentially level because a substantial increase would be premature until he strengthens the framework in which such an increase would be used. The various planned approaches to this goal, which would improve technology management and coordination within the Department, reduce unnecessary duplication and overlap, and attain a better balance between in-house and contract research in the face of limited resources, have merit and should be tried. But this could have been done without a real reduction in technology effort during fiscal year 1975 which may disrupt on-going important work, cause the loss of highly qualified scientists and engineers, or otherwise delay the start of promising new research.

However, the committee defers to the judgment of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering and will be interested in hearing of the results of these efforts when he appears next year in support of the fiscal year 1976 request.

The following statement from the Committee report on the fiscal year 1974 authorization bill is quoted to inform and to guide the new team of Research and Development managers. It is timely and bears repeating.

"'The committee urges the Department of Defense to exercise more foresight and better judgment in the decisions made regarding what research and development programs to propose each year. This should insure more favorable consideration by the Congress. Future authorization requests for R.D.T.&E. must emphasize those technologies and weapon systems which are critical to our future survival. The Department of Defense would not be fulfilling this responsibility if it settled for anything less. Adverse Congressional reaction must not be interpreted as a vote against the need for research and develop-

ment. It should instead be recognized as a challenge to do a more effective job of convincing the Congress of the validity and urgency of the requirements. Failures such as the Cheyenne helicopter and the Main Battle Tank, parochialism, as evidenced by the "four tactical air forces," and other inefficiences and wasteful duplication discourage Congressional support. The Department must strive to do a better overall job of managing the research and development program."

ADJUSTMENTS TO FISCAL YEAR 1975 RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORIZATION REQUEST RECOMMENDED BY SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

[In thousands of dollars]

Program element	Fiscal year 1975 request	Senate Armed Services Committee		[1] House bill
		Change from request	Recommendation	
R.D.T. & E., ARMY				
Military sciences	111,520		111,520	111,520
Aircraft and related equipment:				
Aerial Scout	6,000	−5,360	640	6,000
Heavy lift helicopter	57,725	−21,200	36,525	57,725
Utility tactical transport aircraft system (UTTAS)	54,060		54,060	49,060
Cobra TOW		+4,500	4,500	4,500
Other programs approved	152,211		152,211	152,211
Total, aircraft	269,996	−22,060	247,936	269,496
Missiles and related equipment:				
Stinger	33,730	−1,500	32,230	33,730
Chaparral/Vulcan	7,229	−5,800	1,429	7,229
Site defense	160,000	−50,000	110,000	150,000
Pershing II	11,200	−11,200		11,200
Advanced forward area air defense system	44,668		44,668	15,000
Advanced ballistic missile defense	91,410		91,410	65,000
Cannon launched guided projectile	12,556		12,556	6,300
Surface-to-air missile development (SAM-D)	111,215		111,215	100,000
Kwajalein Missile Range	84,554		84,554	80,000
Other programs approved	149,856		149,856	149,856
Total, missiles	706,418	−68,500	637,918	618,315
Military astronautics and related equipment	15,832		15,832	15,832
Ordnance, combat vehicles and related equipment:				
Bushmaster	7,030	−2,900	4,130	4,100
Armored reconnaissance scout vehicle	8,062	−3,900	4,162	4,300
XM-1 tank	68,790	−3,500	65,290	65,000
Weapons and ammunition	7,306		7,306	5,706
Lethal chemical munitions (P.E. 64610A)	4,894	−1,900	2,994	3,000
Mechanized infantry combat vehicle (XM723) MICV	9,011		9,011	10,711
Other programs approved	158,778		158,778	158,778
Total, ordnance	263,871	−12,200	251,671	251,595
Other equipment:				
Triservice tactical communications program	37,273		37,273	35,000
Clothing, equipment, and packaging technology	2,220		2,220	3,720
Food technology	5,986		5,986	6,486
Surveillance, target acquisition, and night systems (STANO)	15,398		15,398	13,000
Classified program	20,529		20,529	16,500
Other programs approved	481,087		481,087	481,087
Total, other equipment	562,493		562,493	555,793
Programwide management and support	55,846		55,846	55,846
Reimbursements from foreign military sales		−7,973	−7,973	
Total, Army R.D.T. & E. authorization	1,985,976	−110,733	1,875,243	1,878,397

See footnotes at end of table.

ADJUSTMENTS TO FISCAL YEAR 1975 RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORIZATION REQUEST RECOMMENDED BY SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE—Continued

[In thousands of dollars]

Program element	Fiscal year 1975 request	Senate Armed Services Committee: Change from request	Senate Armed Services Committee: Recommendation	House bill
R.D.T. & E., NAVY				
Military sciences	[2] 140,832		[2] 140,832	[2] 140,832
Aircraft and related equipment:				
Tactical air reconnaissance	5,300	−5,300		5,300
Classified program	5,700	−5,700		5,700
VCX (carrier on board delivery program)	4,961	−4,461	500	4,961
VFX fighter prototype	34,000		34,000	
Other programs approved	299,361		299,361	299,361
Total, aircraft	349,322	−15,461	333,861	315,322
Missiles and related equipment:				
Surface launched weaponry (U1770)	13,142	−4,000	9,142	13,142
Sanguine	13,205	−1,800	11,405	13,205
Surface missile guidance (advanced)	3,000	−2,000	1,000	3,000
Trident missile system	648,767	−15,000	633,767	648,767
Fleet ballistic missile system	46,669		46,669	37,000
Sidewinder (AIM 9L)	522		522	5,522
Air-launched air-to-air missile (Agile)	19,987		19,987	
Aegis	67,012		67,012	50,000
Close-in weapon system (Phalanx)	32,100		32,100	12,100
Surface missile guidance	32,222		32,222	25,022
Submarine launched cruise missile	44,971	−7,000	37,971	42,471
Other programs approved	230,978		230,978	230,978
Total, missiles	1,152,575	−29,800	1,122,775	1,081,207
Military astronautics and related equipment	38,716		38,716	38,716
Ships, small craft, and related equipment:				
Advanced ship development	19,042	−3,400	15,642	16,042
Radar surveillance equipment (engineering)	10,940	−3,000	7,940	10,940
Surface effect ships	57,981	−12,200	45,781	57,981
Improved SSBN	16,000	−16,000		16,000
Classified program	7,319	−4,000	3,319	7,319
Other programs approved	616,223		616,223	616,223
Total, ships	727,505	−38,600	688,905	724,505
Ordnance, combat vehicles, and related equipment	92,335		92,335	92,335
Other equipment:				
Classified program	24,096	−1,900	22,196	24,096
Other programs approved	455,196		455,196	455,196
Total, other equipment	479,292	−1,900	477,392	479,292
Programwide management and support:				
USS Hip Pocket	3,129		3,129	
Other programs approved	280,797		280,797	280,797
Total, programwide management and support	283,926		283,926	280,797
Reimbursements from foreign military sales		−27,700	−27,700	
Total, Navy R.D.T. & E. authorization	[2] 3,264,503	−113,461	[2] 3,151,042	[2] 3,153,006

See footnotes at end of table.

ADJUSTMENTS TO FISCAL YEAR 1975 RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORIZATION REQUEST RECOMMENDED BY SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE—Continued

[In thousands of dollars]

Program element	Fiscal year 1975 request	Senate Armed Services Committee: Change from request	Senate Armed Services Committee: Recommendation	House bill
R.D.T. & E., AIR FORCE				
Military sciences	131,400		131,400	131,400
Aircraft and related equipment:				
A–10 aircraft	93,905	−12,500	81,405	93,905
F–4 avionics	13,600	−1,000	12,600	13,600
Aircraft equipment development	4,994	−1,000	3,994	4,994
Electronically Agile radar	8,000	−4,000	4,000	8,000
Gas turbine technology	14,789	−1,800	12,989	14,789
Advanced tanker/cargo aircraft	20,000	−15,500	4,500	20,000
B–1	499,000	−44,000	455,000	499,000
Air combat fighter	36,000		36,000	31,000
Other programs approved	519,712		519,712	519,712
Total, aircraft	1,210,000	−79,800	1,130,200	1,205,000
Missiles and related equipment:				
Advanced ballistic reentry system	119,943	+11,900	131,843	104,943
Advanced air-to-air weapons technology	3,100	−3,100		
Air launched cruise missile	80,000	−16,000	64,000	75,000
Minuteman	142,900	−19,000	123,900	142,900
Other programs approved	73,057		73,057	73,057
Total, missiles	419,000	−26,200	392,800	395,900
Military astronautics and related equipment:				
SLBM radar warning systems	8,000		8,000	
NAVSTAR global positioning system	25,400		25,400	22,900
Other programs approved	439,300		439,300	439,300
Total, military astronautics	472,700		472,700	462,200
Ordnance, combat vehicles, and related equipment:				
Conventional weapons	24,900		24,900	20,000
Improved aircraft gun system	9,690	−7,490	2,200	2,190
Other programs approved	122,110		122,110	122,110
Total, ordnance	156,700	−7,490	149,210	144,300
Other equipment:				
Drone/RPV systems development (Project 2107)	18,000	−11,000	7,000	18,000
Improved tactical bombing	11,828	−3,500	8,328	11,828
F–4/F–105 protective systems	5,400	−1,400	4,000	5,400
Joint tactical communications	15,700	−3,000	12,700	15,700
Minimum essential emergency communications network	7,500	−2,000	5,500	7,500
Advanced command and control capabilities	1,500	+5,000	6,500	1,500
Conus over-the-horizon (OTH) radar system	12,300		12,300	10,300
Improved capability for operational test and evaluation	11,900		11,900	8,800
Precision emitter location strike system	25,100		25,100	22,100
Other programs approved	568,972		568,972	568,972
Total, other equipment	678,200	−15,900	662,300	670,100
Programwide management and support	450,860		450,860	450,860
Total, Air Force R.D.T. & E. authorization	3,518,860	−129,390	3,389,470	3,459,760

See footnotes at end of table.

ADJUSTMENTS TO FISCAL YEAR 1975 RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORIZATION REQUEST RECOMMENDED BY SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE—Continued

[In thousands of dollars]

Program element	Fiscal year 1975 request	Senate Armed Services Committee		House bill [1]
		Change from request	Recommendation	
R.D.T. & E., DEFENSE AGENCIES				
DARPA program:				
Military sciences	41,100		41,100	38,300
Missiles and related equipment: Strategic technology	75,000	−2,300	72,700	69,000
Total, missiles	75,000	−2,300	72,700	69,000
Other equipment:				
Management systems technology	2,743	−2,743		2,743
Undistributed reduction				−8,000
Other programs approved	94,057		94,057	94,057
Total, other equipment	96,800	−2,743	94,057	88,800
Programwide management and support	3,900		3,900	3,900
Total, DARPA	216,800	−5,043	211,757	200,000
DCA program:				
Other equipment:				
WWMCCS-JTSA	4,550	−1,000	3,550	4,550
Defense communications system	13,605	−3,500	10,105	13,605
Undistributed reduction				−5,000
Other programs approved	12,845		12,845	12,845
Total, DCA	31,000	−4,500	26,500	26,000
DMA program:				
Other equipment:				
Mapping, charting and geodesy development	5,651	−1,000	4,651	5,651
Undistributed reduction				−2,000
Other programs approved	8,849		8,849	8,849
Total, DMA	14,500	−1,000	13,500	12,500
DSA program:				
Programwide management and support:				
Defense documentation center	11,778	−500	11,278	11,778
Undistributed reduction				−500
Other programs approved	2,722		2,722	2,722
Total, DSA	14,500	−500	14,000	14,000
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)		−1,000		−1,300
Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA)		−2,000		−3,000
National Security Agency (NSA)		−5,000		−10,800
Total, DIA/DNA/NSA	233,100	−8,000	225,100	218,000
Total, technical support to OSD/JCS	18,800		18,800	15,000
Total, defense agencies R.D.T. & E. authorization	528,700	−19,043	509,657	485,500
Total, Director of Test and Evaluation	27,000		27,000	25,000
Total, Department of Defense R.D. & T. E. authorization	[2] 9,325,039	−372,627	[2] 8,952,412	[2] 9,001,663

[1] House action is as reported by the committee and is shown for information only.
[2] Includes $2,570,000 for Navy special foreign currency program in fiscal year 1975.

MAJOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

The programs listed below, with adjustments recommended by the committee but discussed elsewhere in the report, include the major weapon systems for which the largest amounts are requested for research and development as well as those which the committee considered to be of special significance.

MAJOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

[In millions of dollars]

Program	Fiscal year 1975 request	Senate Armed Services Committee		House bill [1]
		Change	Recommended	
Army:				
Heavy lift helicopter	57.7	−21.2	36.5	57.7
Advanced attack helicopter	60.8		60.8	60.8
Utility tactical transport helicopter	54.1		54.1	49.1
Aerial Scout	6.0	−5.4	.6	6.0
Cobra TOW		+4.5	4.5	4.5
Safeguard	60.8		60.8	60.8
Site Defense	160.0	−50.0	110.0	150.0
SAM–D	111.2		111.2	100.0
Tank systems (XM–1)	68.8	−3.5	65.3	65.0
Pershing II missile	11.2	−11.2		11.2
Navy:				
VFX fighter prototype	34.0		34.0	
VCX carrier on board delivery	5.0	−4.5	.5	5.0
F–14A	11.8		11.8	11.8
CH–53E helicopter	46.7		46.7	46.7
Submarine launched cruise missile	45.0	−7.0	38.0	42.5
Fleet ballistic missile	46.7		46.7	37.0
Sanguine	13.2	−1.8	11.4	13.2
Trident missile	648.8	−15.0	633.8	648.8
Trident submarine	107.2		107.2	107.2
Aegis	67.0		67.0	50.0
Close in weapon (Phalanx)	32.1		32.1	12.1
Surface effect ship	58.0	−12.2	45.8	58.0
Improved SSBN	16.0	−16.0		16.0
NATO PHM	15.7		15.7	15.7
Air Force:				
A–10	93.9	−12.5	81.4	93.9
B–1	499.0	−44.0	455.0	499.0
EF–111A	36.7		36.7	36.7
Advanced tanker/cargo aircraft	20.0	−15.5	4.5	20.0
Air combat fighter	36.0		36.0	31.0
F–15	182.6		182.6	182.6
Advanced medium STOL transport	55.8		55.8	55.8
Advanced airborne command post	67.7		67.7	67.7
AWACS	219.7		219.7	219.7
Minuteman	142.9	−19.0	123.9	142.9
Advanced ICBM technology	37.3		37.3	37.3
Air launched cruise missile	80.0	−16.0	64.0	75.0
Advanced ballistic reentry system	119.9	+11.9	131.8	104.9

[1] House action is as reported by the committee and is shown for information only.

COMMITTEE ACTION ON SELECTED SUBJECTS IN THE RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION AUTHORIZATION REQUEST

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT FISCAL YEAR 1975 PROGRAMS WITH EXCESS FUNDS

The committee recommends reductions totaling $91.6 million in the programs listed below. Analysis of available data and testimony by Defense witnesses indicates that these funds are excess to fiscal year 1975 requirements because of program slippage, unrealistic schedule, or denial of the fiscal year 1974 readiness supplemental.

[In thousands of dollars]

Program	Requested	Change	Recommended
Army:			
Bushmaster	7,030	−2,900	4,130
Armored reconnaissance Scout vehicle	8,062	−3,900	4,162
XM–1 tank	68,790	−3,500	65,290
Total, Army	83,882	−10,300	73,582
Navy:			
Submarine launched cruise missile	44,971	−7,000	37,971
Advanced ship development	19,042	−3,400	15,642
Radar surveillance equipment (engineering)	10,940	−3,000	7,940
Sanguine	13,205	−1,800	11,405
Surface missile guidance	3,000	−2,000	1,000
Trident missile system	648,767	−15,000	633,767
Other programs	31,415	−5,900	25,515
Total, Navy	771,340	−38,100	733,240
Air Force:			
F–4 avionics	13,600	−1,000	12,600
Aircraft equipment development	4,994	−1,000	3,994
Improved tactical bombing	11,828	−3,500	8,328
F–4/F–105 Protective Systems	5,400	−1,400	4,000
Electronically Agile Radar	8,000	−4,000	4,000
Air Launched Cruise Missile	80,000	−16,000	64,000
Total, Air Force	123,822	−26,900	96,922
Defense agencies:			
Strategic technology (ARPA)	75,000	−2,300	72,700
Defense communications system (DCA)	13,605	−3,500	10,105
WWMCCS–JTSA (DCA)	4,550	−1,000	3,550
Mapping, charting, and geodesy development (DMA)	5,651	−1,000	4,651
Defense Documentation Center (DSA)	11,778	−500	11,278
Other programs	167,038	−8,000	159,038
Total, defense agencies	277,622	−16,300	261,322

Reimbursements From Foreign Military Sales

Committee recommendation

The committee recommends reductions of $7.973 million and $27.7 million respectively from the Army and Navy requests for new obligational authority (NOA). These amounts will be provided as repayments from the proceeds of sales of military equipment to foreign governments.

Background

The committee has been provided with the following facts. The Foreign Military Sales Act and Department of Defense regulations (including DOD Directive 2140.2 dated January 23, 1974) require

that foreign governments reimburse the Department (DOD) for administrative services (usually 2 percent) and non recurring research and development (R.D.T.&E.) costs applicable to items sold (usually 4 percent). However, in the case of the Federal Republic of Germany the Military Procurement Agreement of 1956 has been interpreted to prohibit Defense from including administrative surcharges in any sales case. As a result, Operations and Maintenance appropriations in the Army and the Air Force are paying the cost which, according to DOD regulations, should be paid by the foreign customer. However, the Navy has used recoupments from R.D.T.&E. surcharges to make up for the lack of sufficient resources collected from the administrative surcharges. The committee understands that DOD has solicited State Department aid in having the 1956 agreement with Germany rescinded. In addition, DOD has directed the Navy to realign their budget submissions to include sufficient funds in their operating budget to support manpower and other administrative costs necessary to administer the foreign military sales (FMS) program with offsets for anticipated reimbursements from administrative surcharge collections. The committee endorses these procedures and anticipates that these actions will provide sufficient resources from FMS administrative surcharges, thereby eliminating the requirement for the Navy to use Navy R&D reimbursements for this purpose.

Committee considerations

The reimbursements represented by the reductions recommended by the committee, were not reflected in the fiscal year 1975 budget as submitted, but will be available for transfer to the R.D.T. & E. accounts of the Army and Navy during fiscal year 1975 from orders received from foreign governments for military equipment produced in the United States. They represent non-recurring costs associated with research and development for these equipments, which were initially paid by the Army and Navy in the development of the equipment. This is in accordance with the sales agreements with the foreign countries. The Department of Defense agrees that these amounts will be available to support fiscal year 1975 program requirements.

AIR-TO-AIR DOGFIGHT MISSILES

Committee Recommendations

The committee recommends approval of Navy requests for $0.5 million to continue development of the AIM–9L, an improved version of the Sidewinder missile, and approval of $20.0 million to continue advanced development of the Agile dogfight missile. The committee recommends denial of an Air Force request for $3.1 million to start prototype development of the CLAW missile.

Committee Considerations

Sidewinder Missiles

The current close-in dogfight missiles used by the Air Force and Navy are variations of the Sidewinder series which started with the common AIM–9B version back in the early 1960s. The Air Force has chosen to modify its –9B Sidewinders for improvements in maneuver-

ability, resulting in the -9E and -9J configurations. The Navy has developed and built a series of product improved Sidewinders, the -9D, -9G, and -9H versions, featuring an improved seeker, larger rocket motor, and in the -9H, solid state electronics. The -9D and -9G demonstrated excellent combat results in Southeast Asia and in the recent Mideast war when used by the Israelis.

The Navy and Air Force have joined again to develop a common Sidewinder, the -9L as the latest product improvement version. The -9L will have solid state electronics, a more lethal warhead, and a guidance seeker with a head-on firing capability. The -9L has been experiencing a long series of development problems which have stretched out the R&D program and delayed a start on production of the missile. The committee believes the services should be given some additional time to fix these -9L problems, but also recommends that the Air Force as well as the Navy should carefully consider procurement of the -9H as an alternative if the problems with the -9L are not resolved this year.

Agile

The Agile is being developed as a successor to the Sidewinder. It is in the advanced development stage, with only prototypes of the future missile's components being tested so far. The Agile is being designed with highly sophisticated capabilities, including a thrust vectoring rocket motor and exotic target seeker to give the ultimate in off-boresight launch and maneuverability.

These capabilities promise to be very expensive. The Navy has spent $74 million in R&D already and has not yet fired the first complete prototype missile. The total development cost is estimated as $223 million, and the procurement cost as $50,000 apiece when built in high volume production. By contrast, present Sidewinders cost on the order of $20,000 each.

While recommending approval of the fiscal year 1975 funding request, the committee believes the Agile design should be reviewed carefully this year to see if all of the capabilities and sophistication currently being designed in the missile are essential, cost-effective, and truly required in operational use.

CLAW

The Air Force has studied the potential concept of a CLAW missile, which would be a small weapon only one-third the size of the present Sidewinder, but using similar seeker technology. Funds were requested in fiscal year 1975 to start an advanced development prototype phase, with two contractors to build 30 test missiles each. The cost of this phase would total $18 million.

The CLAW would have a much smaller warhead than the Sidewinder. The missile would have to achieve essentially a direct hit to kill an airplane. The Air Force recently abandoned the Falcon missile, another hit-to-kill weapon, because it was not effective. The committee believes the CLAW missile would have the same deficiencies and recommends that the CLAW project be terminated.

ARMY PROGRAMS

HEAVY LIFT HELICOPTER

Committee recommendation

The committee recommends a reduction of $21.2 million from the $57.7 million requested, reflecting denial of the proposal for a second prototype helicopter, including reliability and maintainability improvement of components.

Background

The Army Heavy Lift Helicopter (HLH) program was approved on September 17, 1970, based on the possibility of also meeting Navy and Marine Corps requirements. However, in May 1971 Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard determined that the Army HLH was not acceptable for Navy/Marine Corps operations primarily because of incompatibility for shipboard basing. In November 1971 the Deputy Secretary authorized the Navy to initiate a separate prototype program to meet its own needs. This is the CH–53E which is a three engine version of the CH–53D, and which flew successfully on March 1, 1974.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense, while approving the current CH–53E program on April 25, 1973, directed the Army and Navy to develop details, including costs, to provide a Navy/Marine Corps version of the HLH. This is not understood because the Navy and Marine Corps have testified that the CH–53E, which is cheaper, shipboard compatible, and has flown successfully, is adequate to meet all of their requirements. The Department of Defense therefore should give serious consideration to discontinuing the designation of the larger HLH as a joint Army/Navy/Marine Corps program.

The HLH, which is designed to lift at least six tons more than the CH–53E (22.5 tons vs. 16 tons), is in the early stage of dynamic component testing on a ground test rig and is not scheduled to fly for about another year and a half.

The Army expanded the HLH program in January 1973 from only an Advanced Technology Component (ATC) phase to minimize technical risks and costs associated with possible later full scale development, to include building and test flying one austere HLH prototype with first flight in August 1975. The committee was advised that following completion of prototype flight tests and demonstration of technological feasibility, the Army and the Department of Defense then will decide whether to propose the start of engineering development.

Committee consideration

The Army request includes $21.2 million to do reliability and maintainability improvement work, and to start a second development prototype which is estimated to cost a total of $38.5 million. The justification is that this would provide a hedge against a loss of the first prototype, and would facilitate transitioning into engineering development. It also would permit the contractor to maintain his skilled engineering manpower who otherwise would be significantly reduced when the single prototype phase is completed.

The committee disapproves a second prototype and the companion reliability and maintainability work for the following reasons:

1. The operational requirement for the HLH has not been approved. It is only approved as an advanced development program to prove out the technology.

2. There is no urgency since no operational requirement has been approved. Therefore the program should be pursued at a pace which is dictated solely by technical progress. This step by step approach will minimize cost until the technology is demonstrated through prototype flight testing. The Department of Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council will not even consider if the HLH should go into engineering development for two more years, in April 1976. It is noted that the program has encountered technical problems and schedule delays recently.

3. If the first prototype succeeds in proving out the ATC program, additional development prototypes would be appropriate coincident with a decision to begin engineering development, and reliability and maintainability improvements would be appropriate during that phase.

4. If the first prototype is lost, the reason for the loss may be sufficient cause to terminate the program. If the decision is made to continue with the program, a second prototype could be built in this possible eventuality. Since there is no critical need date, the delay would make little difference. It is debatable whether costs would increase because any increase would be compensated by the lessons learned up to that time which can be incorporated in a second prototype.

5. Even if technically proven, the HLH may not be a cost effective program. Although $146.2 million has been spent through fiscal year 1974, it will take an additional $554 million to finance the $700 million estimated for the complete development program. Present estimates of a $10 million production unit cost, in escalated dollars, and a possible requirement of 100 for inventory would add $1.0 billion for procurement. This equates to $17 million program unit cost for a helicopter whose operational need has not yet been approved. By contrast, the Navy and Marine Corps have a requirement for only 74 CH–53E helicopters at a production unit cost of $6.1 million. This amounts to a total procurement cost of $453.7 million and, including research and development, $553.9 million.

In summary, prudence and economy would clearly point toward holding the program in fiscal year 1975 to demonstration of ATC components and fabrication of the single prototype. The General Accounting Office sums up the situation similarly in their staff study dated March 1974. On page 9 they state:

> The purpose of the ATC program is to minimize costs and technical risks associated with the full-scale development of an HLH by developing selected critical HLH components. The Army is currently building one austere HLH prototype and is requesting funds for a second, more fully equipped, prototype. Since the critical components have not yet been fully tested by the ATC program, the prototype procurement may be premature.

AERIAL SCOUT

Committee recommendation

The committee recommends a reduction of $5.36 million from the $6 million requested, leaving $640,000.

Background

The Army has a requirement for a more modern Aerial Scout helicopter which will be compatible with the increased speed and performance capability of the Advanced Attack Helicopter (AAH) and Utility Tactical Transport Helicopter (UTTAS).

Last year, the committee and the Congress denied the $1.0 million requested for fiscal year 1974 because initial contract award was planned to be made at the beginning of fiscal year 1975 so the fiscal year 1974 funds were not needed.

The Army has established a task force to examine three possible approaches to this program, as follows:

1. A modified version of an existing Army helicopter.
2. A military adaptation of a current U.S. or foreign airframe.
3. A completely new development.

Committee consideration

The fiscal year 1975 effort through the middle of the fourth quarter will be primarily in-house, and the remaining $640,000 is being left in for this purpose. This will permit the issuance of RFPs to industry by October 1974, as planned.

Since the planned contract date is mid-May 1975, just 45 days before the beginning of fiscal year 1976, the short delay until fiscal year 1976 funds become available should have no impact on the program. Moreover, this would also provide the Congress with specific information that it does not now have, and which is essential to a determination of Congressional support. By next February, when the fiscal year 1976 budget is being reviewed by the Congress, the committee will know the result of the Department of Defense actions which will have decided on approval or disapproval, and also, if approved, which one of the three alternative approaches had been selected. This will be a much more meaningful basis for consideration. The potential candidates for the three alternatives available to the Army include the following:

French SA 341 Gazelle.
French Augusta 109.
British Lynx.
German BO–105.
Bell DH 222.
Army OH–58.
Army AH–1G.

The committee encourages the Army and the Department of Defense to give major consideration to the most cost effective of the three approaches, when the selection of one is made, and considers that a completely new development is recognized as being the most costly and will take the longest period of time to obtain.

PERSHING II

Committee recommendation

The committee recommends approval of the $12.0 million requested for the Radar Area Correlation project, but denial of the $11.2 million requested to initiate development of the Pershing II missile in which it would be incorporated.

Background

The program, as proposed by the Army, is in two parts: Completion of development of the Radar Area Correlation technology effort carried on during fiscal year 1974 and initiation of Pershing II development to do further design effort towards incorporating this technology. If successful, this would significantly increase the accuracy and reduce the collateral damage that could be caused by the present Pershing I missile.

The Army completed the procurement of the Pershing I missile in fiscal year 1974. This missile is a tactical nuclear weapon for use primarily in the NATO environment. The Federal Republic of Germany also has purchased the Pershing I weapon.

Committee Considerations

The committee recommendation reflects the concern that Pershing II should not be initiated until the Radar Area Correlation equipment has completed development and testing at high velocities in supersonic aircraft. Moreover, additional development effort in the tactical nuclear weapons field should be paced by actual military requirements. In this regard, the committee is concerned about Department of Defense future plans for NATO deployment of tactical nuclear weapons.

The committee also acknowledges the excellent report of Senator Sam Nunn, dated April 2, 1974, regarding the NATO theatre, and the concern expressed about the uncertainties relating to the plans for employment of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.

The Department of Defense has indicated that the cost and operational effectiveness analysis for Pershing II is not the most current or most useful to be considered by the committee. An updated cost analysis of this program should be made to consider all available tactical weapons that could be employed.

The committee also is concerned that the Department of Defense has not explored the possibility of joint development with Germany or other NATO countries who would benefit from this program. If feasible, this would reduce the amount of research and development funds to be contributed by the United States.

SAM–D AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM

Committee Recommendation

The committee recommends approval of the full amount of $111.2 million requested to support the reoriented SAM–D program.

Description

SAM–D is an advanced surface-to-air missile weapon system which is planned to replace both the Nike Hercules and the Improved Hawk missiles in the 1980s. It is being developed with the ability to simul-

taneously detect, track, and engage a number of high performance airborne targets in severe electronic and tactical countermeasure environments. It will be complemented by low altitude, forward area air defense weapons and will be integrated with the Air Force in the overall air defense of the theatre of operations.

Background

Last year the committee recommended and the Congress provided the entire $194.2 million requested. At that time the committee stated that in recommending approval, this did not constitute a commitment to production, but merely the next step in an orderly development program.

During the floor debate on the authorization bill last year, an amendment to delete all of the funds requested for SAM–D was defeated. It was again introduced during consideration of the appropriations bill, but was withdrawn in view of an agreement within the Senate Appropriations Committee to include report language in the fiscal year 1974 appropriations bill directing that the Department of Defense conduct a cost effectiveness study to be completed by March 31, 1974.

Program Reorientation

The Deputy Secretary of Defense on January 10, 1974, directed the Army to reorient the SAM–D program from a full scale engineering development program to an advanced development program with certain austere engineering development tasks to continue. Specific provisions of the directive which govern the fiscal year 1975 program include the following:

1. Demonstrate that the Track-Via-Missile (TVM) guidance works by conducting 16 missile flight tests during fiscal year 1975.

2. Eliminate all efforts not in direct support of this specific TVM test program or which are not critical to the continuation of the austere SAM–D engineering development program.

The directive also states "It is empasized that this decision to continue with the SAM–D program does not represent a decision to complete the development program. Rather, it indicates the intent to continue through the 'proof-of-principle' TVM flight tests and at that time to hold a Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) meeting for addressing the termination or continuation of the program as appropriate in view of the demonstrated technical and cost performance. The work to be completed through fiscal year 1975 prior to the DSARC is effort normally addressed in the advanced development phase of a program which focuses on elements which are time critical and involve some technical risks. It seems desirable to conduct SAM–D as an advanced development program until this plan has been completed."

Committee Considerations

The Army has complied fully with the Deputy Secretary's decision, and has deleted substantial engineering development work from their fiscal year 1975 program that reduced their initial requirement by $54.7 million, from $165.9 million to $111.2 million, the amount finally included in the budget. This is a 33 percent reduction in funds.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Programs and Analysis has completed a 90 day cost effectiveness study, as requested in the Senate

Appropriations Committee report, with participation by the General Accounting Office. His report, while recognizing the difficulty of analyzing future air defense requirements due to the uncertainties of the threat, technology and cost, clearly supports continued SAM–D technology. It states:

"In short, if the SAM–D technology works, we can demonstrate its cost effectiveness in a family of high to medium altitude (HIMAD) air defense systems—if, as presently predicted, a substantial enemy air threat continues to materialize. We believe this clearly supports the need to continue research and development in the HIMADs area along the general lines of SAM–D. By the same token, specific deployment decisions as to quantities or final configurations are still premature."

It is clear that the General Accounting Office agrees that SAM–D technology should not be terminated, but should be continued in order to prove or disprove its value. The committee concurs with the General Accounting Office, and recommends support of the revised SAM–D program.

The committee is aware that the TVM guidance tests will not be completed by the end of fiscal year 1975, as directed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Therefore, the committee will consider the extent to which technical progress, including a number of TVM test firings, has been demonstrated, when the fiscal year 1976 authorization request is being reviewed next year.

The Federal Republic of Germany recently announced that the SAM–D is the best candidate for the Nike Hercules replacement in the 1980s and supports its use for that purpose. If SAM–D, as presently configured or in a less costly version, ultimately proves to be successful, and this is yet to be demonstrated, the interests of Germany and other NATO countries would reduce acquisition costs and therefore cost effectiveness of the system.

Conclusion

In summary, there is general agreement between the Department of Defense and the General Accounting Office that SAM–D technology should continue to be proven out during fiscal year 1975. The major advancements proposed over existing air defense systems are substantial. The Deputy Secretary of Defense is to be complimented on making the difficult decision in reorienting the program and, in effect, moving it back into advanced development. The committee will continue to closely monitor this program and will not favorably consider resumption of full scale engineering development until all questions concerning evaluation of the projected threat, demonstration of technical feasibility, and cost effectiveness have been resolved. The Secretary of Defense is requested to provide the data necessary to satisfy these requirements in support of the fiscal year 1976 request.

NAVY PROGRAMS

IMPROVED STRATEGIC NUCLEAR BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINE

Committee recommendation

The committee recommends denial of the $16.0 million requested to initiate the Improved Strategic Nuclear Ballistic Missile Submarine weapon system as premature, but fully supports the concept of a lower cost submarine launched ballistic missile system than the Trident.

Background

The Secretary of Defense decision of January 1974 approved a 10 Trident weapon system program at a rate of two per year following the lead submarine, provided for accelerated backfit of 10 Poseidon submarines starting in fiscal year 1979 and completing in fiscal year 1982, and approved the start of feasibility and conceptual design work on an Improved SSBN called SSBN–X.

The SSBN–X, which would be a smaller ship than Trident and carry 16 Trident I or C–4 missiles, could be a cheaper replacement for Poseidon submarines on a one-for-one basis. It could be slightly larger than Poseidon but would be unable to accommodate the larger and longer range Trident II or D–5 missile.

The SSBN–X could be available beginning in calendar year 1984, and would provide a hi-lo mix with the 10 Trident weapon systems, being more flexible and more economical. The Navy considers the SSBN–X to be a desirable option.

Committee consideration

The committee considers that the concept of the SSBN–X has merit, but the need for initiation in fiscal year 1975 is questioned, particularly because of the early stage of the Trident program. In fact, as of the time of this report, the lead submarine contract had not yet been awarded.

It is debatable whether the Poseidon submarines will last longer than the design life of 20 years. Still, the Navy has testified that they may last as long as 25 years, although this cannot be proven because the oldest of the Polaris submarines is 14 years old. The upper estimate of useful service life approaches 30 years.

Under the existing interim SALT agreement the 10 Trident submarines will replace the oldest 10 Polaris submarines which were deployed from 1960 through 1963. This will leave 31 Poseidon submarines in operation, 10 of which were deployed in 1964 with the remainder during 1965 through 1967.

The plan to deploy the SSBN–X starting in 1984, therefore, would coincide with the assumed need to start replacing the oldest Poseidon submarines when they become 20 years old. This is considered to be extremely conservative and unjustifiable. A delay of one or two years in starting the SSBN–X would still provide ample time to develop them and put them into operation at least several years before obsolescence dictated the orderly replacement of Poseidon. Moreover,

there are other important advantages to deferring the start of the SSBN–X. Since it would incorporate much of the Trident submarine technology, more important technology lessons could be learned from another year or two of Trident submarine development. The results of SALT II, which cannot be prejudged, also could have a major impact on the size and composition of the future SLBM fleet and could influence any plan for the SSBN–X.

The committee also considers that the United States retains the option, if the need arises, to continue to build Trident submarines beyond the initial 10 now planned.

SURFACE EFFECT SHIPS

Committee recommendations

The committee recommends a reduction of $12.2 million from the $58.0 million requested for fiscal year 1975 because these funds will not be required to contract for the 2,000 ton prototype contract design and long lead procurement until fiscal year 1976. The details of the program, together with committee recommendations, are as follows:

[In thousands of dollars]

	Fiscal year 1974	Fiscal year 1975—		
		Request	Recommend	Change
Technology and advanced development	9,900	9,500	9,500	0
1,000 ton test program	16,500	12,000	12,000	0
2,000 ton program	32,900	34,800	22,600	−12,200
Preliminary design	(1,300)	0	0	0
Subsystem development	(18,600)	(20,000)	(20,000)	0
Ship system development	(13,000)	(2,600)	(2,600)	0
Contract design	0	(6,800)	0	(−6,800)
Long lead procurement	0	(5,400)	0	(−5,400)
Detail design and construction	0	0	0	0
Program management	1,600	1,681	1,681	0
Total	60,900	57,981	45,781	−12,200

Background

The committee has been correct in restraining the Navy, for the past three years, from prematurely initiating the 2000 ton prototype follow-on to the 100 ton test craft. The Navy has acknowledged this and agrees that this has enhanced the continued support of the program.

The General Accounting Office (GAO), by letter dated November 21, 1973, to the Department of Defense provided the results of a complete review of the program and stated that there were too many unknowns to justify proceeding with the 2000 ton program. A letter was written by the committee to the Secretary of Defense on November 28, 1973, expressing concern about the GAO findings and asking that they be seriously considered by the Department.

The Department of Defense finally recognized the validity of the GAO and committee statements and the Deputy Secretary of Defense, on January 23, 1974, directed the Navy to undertake a risk reduction program instead of awarding detailed design contracts as proposed by the Navy. This decision had the effect of delaying these contracts by about a year, to May 1975, at which time Defense would review the

technical progress made. If satisfied, award of the detailed design contracts could occur at the earliest in June 1975, the last month of fiscal year 1975. During fiscal year 1975, two of the four competing contractors will be awarded preliminary design contracts to continue to update their design proposals including what is incorporated from the risk reduction technology efforts.

Committee Considerations

The committee considers that there are enough uncertainties in the critical technologies involved in the risk reduction program that the major decision to start detailed design in the last month of fiscal year 1975 is not likely to occur as forecast, and that this event will take place at the beginning of fiscal year 1976 at the earliest. Moreover, this will provide the Congress an opportunity in March and April 1975 to consider the results of an additional 12 months of progress in risk reduction, in deciding whether detailed contract design should begin. The risk reduction items include seals, waterjet flush inlets, ride control, propulsion system and environmental effects.

The committee reiterates its position of previous years that the Navy should plan to build only one 2000 ton ship initially, because it is still the Navy plan to build two. The Secretary of Defense has not taken a position on this as yet. However, competitive detailed contract design may be supported to obtain maximum benefit from two different designs and the advantages of a cost competition. Following this, only one contractor should be selected in fiscal year 1976 to build the ship now estimated to cost between $125 and $150 million.

The committee recognizes the possibility that the Navy may achieve the planned schedule in time to obtain Secretary of Defense approval to initiate detailed contract design of the 2000 ton ship at the beginning of fiscal year 1976. Therefore, if enactment of fiscal year 1976 appropriations is late, the committee would be amenable to the initiation of this program at that time, using fiscal year 1976 funds, provided that the committee is satisfied with the progress made.

VCX (CARRIER ON BOARD DELIVERY AIRCRAFT)

Committee Recommendation

The committee recommends a reduction of $4.5 million from the $5.0 million requested, leaving $500,000.

Background

The Navy has a requirement for a more modern carrier on board delivery aircraft than the present C–2A and C–1A aircraft. The C–2A is out of production and the C–1A is obsolete. Neither of these has the capability to perform as required by the Navy.

A replacement aircraft is required to meet the Navy's need for rapid response delivery of cargo/personnel/medical evacuation to and from carriers at sea.

The Navy has stated that the $1 million of fiscal year 1974 funds will support study contracts with Grumman and Lockheed during the May through July 1974 period. These companies make the C–2A and S–3 which are candidates to be adapted to satisfy the VCX program requirement. The result of these studies will be considered together

with any unsolicited proposals from other airplane companies, and the Navy will revise the Development Concept Paper (DCP) No. 131 leading to the submission of a coordinated DCP for Defense review in August 1974. This will coincide with Defense deliberations on the fiscal year 1976 budget, and should be resolved in December of 1974.

Committee Considerations

The committee considers that the uncertainties about which approach the Navy will recommend, among the various possible aircraft, including the S–3 and C–2A derivatives, as well as proposals by other companies, should be resolved and the decision made known to the Congress before proceeding with the program. This will be reflected in the fiscal year 1976 request which will include the funds needed to initiate the development contract. The $500,000 remaining in the fiscal year 1975 program will support Navy in-house efforts during the remainder of that year, and enable the Navy to move out on the fiscal year 1976 program in an orderly manner.

This approach also enables the committee to exercise its oversight responsibility in judging the merits of the actions proposed by the Navy in the review of the fiscal year 1976 budget.

NAVY RECONNAISSANCE

Committee Recommendations

The committee recommends denial of Navy requests totalling $11.0 million for R&D on two reconnaissance programs. These are $5.3 million to start development on a reconnaissance sensor pod and $5.7 million to start development on an electronic intelligence collection system.

Reconnaissance Pod Program

The Navy is proposing to phase out its RA–5C carrier based supersonic reconnaissance airplanes by the end of the 1970s and instead perform this mission by carrying pods containing the cameras and other sensors under the wings of tactical attack bombers and fighters. The Navy bought its last RA–5C airplanes in the late 1960 time period, so aircraft age is not a problem. The Navy states that the sensors in the RA–5C are obsolete and that the airplanes are large and difficult to operate on carrier decks.

The Navy is not clear yet on how its reconnaissance missions will be performed, that is, with specially trained squadrons "dedicated" to the mission or with fighter and attack squadron pilots doing reconnaissance as an occasional mission. Also the capability of the A–7E attack plane for reconnaissance is an issue which needs operational test validation. The committee recommends deferral of this program until it is better defined.

Electronic Intelligence

The Navy's carrier-based electronic intelligence gathering mission has been performed by EA–3B airplanes, with specially trained crews and aircraft configured particularly for this function. These airplanes are to be phased out soon. The Navy request is for funds to start development of a modern system, called TASES, but the Navy

has proposed to install this system in the S–3A antisubmarine warfare airplane. This decision apparently was made because current budgetary constraints made it difficult to fund 20 new airplanes to fulfill this mission requirement.

The Navy's concept for operating the 20 S–3As which also would have TASES equipment installed would be to have alternate crews take turns flying the airplanes, one trained for ASW and one trained for intelligence missions. The committee does not believe that this operational concept is practical and recommends that the TASES project be deferred until the Navy can program new aircraft as well as new equipments to perform this mission.

NAVY CRUISE MISSILE DEFENSE

Committee Recommendation

The committee recommends authorization of $5.5 million in R&D, a reduction of $4.0 million from the request, for a program to validate the size requirements for an anti-cruise missile defense weapon.

Background

Last year the Navy proposed development of a dual-mode Redeye missile as a close-in weapon to destroy enemy cruise missiles targeted against ships. The committee rejected all funding for this project because the Redeye missile is too small and would require a direct hit to kill its target.

The Navy now concurs that the Redeye is too small. It requested $9.5 million in fiscal year 1975 to determine whether a 5 inch diameter missile (Sidewinder size) or an 8 inch diameter missile (Sparrow size) was the smallest that could effectively accomplish this function and then to start on system development. The basic difference between these two candidates is in their warheads with their different kill potentials.

Basis for Committee Action

The committee concurs that the Navy is proposing the logical first step for a new program. The committee recommends approval of $5.5 million this year, the amount the Navy identified as needed to evaluate and confirm whether a 5 inch missile effectively can kill an incoming cruise missile. Once the determination of minimum size has been made, the Navy then can propose a new development program in fiscal year 1976 if one is warranted by the results of the tests.

PROJECT SANGUINE

Committee Recommendation

The committee recommends a reduction of $1.8 million from the $13.2 million requested with the full understanding that this does not represent a commitment to or approval of full scale development. The amount reduced represents funds determined to be excess to fiscal year 1975 program requirements. The committee recommends continued support of Sanguine, both to insure the future survivability of communications with our strategic submarine deterrent force, as well as the submarine itself, and to enhance the doctrine of flexible response.

Background

Sanguine is an extremely low frequency communications system which, despite enemy nuclear attack or jamming, is intended to provide assured command and control of U.S. strategic forces, particularly ballistic missile submarines deployed worldwide. The committee recognizes the importance of maintaining reliable and highly effective communications with our vital strategic forces.

This program, despite its significant potential value, has been very controversial in recent years primarily because of widespread concern as to its feasibility as well as its environmental implications. Opposition has been expressed by members of both houses of the Congress, by universities and scientific institutions, by state and local governments, and by individual scientists and engineers concerning the various aspects of this program including the potential site for its location.

This committee consistently has acted in a monitorship role, and has taken such measures as holding public as well as closed hearings, cooperated at the staff level as well as with individual senators to insure that Congressional oversight was being adequately exercised. Those who have expressed their opposition to this program have indicated their satisfaction with these various actions of the committee.

The Navy is continuing to cooperate by providing unclassified scientific and technical data as it becomes available and updating the Environmental Impact Statement on file with the Council on Environmental Quality.

Committee Considerations

During fiscal year 1974, the Wisconsin Test Facility is being operated and this will be continued in future years. The Concept Validation Phase, involving studies by three competing contractors, has been conducted and was completed in April 1974. These studies will be evaluated and used during fiscal year 1975 as a basis for initiating the Design Validation Phase which will develop, test and evaluate critical hardware components and other system aspects to demonstrate Sanguine feasibility and its compatibility with the environment. The Design Validation Phase precedes but does not include full scale development and follow-on construction. Environmental compatibility studies will be continued.

There are two decision points prior to commencing full scale development, but not construction, of the Sanguine system. The first is a Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) meeting to be held in April 1975. This will be a general review of the progress in design validation and a status report on the 20 month site study which will give particular emphasis to land already owned by the Federal Government. Upon completion of the site survey studies in July 1976, a DSARC is planned for the purpose of reviewing the results of the site study and approval or rejection of the recommendation for a final system site. If the DSARC approves the final system design, previously denoted as full scale development, funds will then be requested from the Congress for full scale development. Initial funding for this phase would be requested for fiscal year 1977. No funds are provided in fiscal year 1975 either for full scale development or construction of the Sanguine system.

The committee will continue to closely follow the progress of this program, including, in particular, both technical feasibility and environmental aspects of the system. In this regard, the committee considers Sanguine to be a program of special interest and enjoins the Department of the Navy to keep the committee apprised of all significant problems or developments as they occur.

V/STOL PROGRAMS

The Navy requests for R&D on its three V/STOL programs in FY 1975 totalled $24.9 million: $19.3 million for the Thrust Augmented Wing development, $3.9 million for the Advanced Harrier and $1.7 million for Lift-Plus-Lift Cruise studies. The committee recommends approval of all three requests.

Last year the committee pointed out that the Thrust Augumented Wing is a high-risk, technology-advancement effort and that the committee believed that it might not produce a useful operational vehicle. Information provided in connection with the FY 1975 program further enforces this opinion, and the committee is sure that there is no near term potential for an operational fighter using this technology. While the committee has approved funding for this fiscal year, which will allow the Navy to complete production of the two prototype test airplanes, it is recommended that the Navy turn this project over to NASA for flight testing and continued developmental effort starting in FY 1976.

AIR FORCE PROGRAMS

ADVANCED TANKER/CARGO AIRCRAFT

Committee Recommendation

The committee recommends a reduction of $15.5 million from the $20.0 million requested to initiate the Advanced Tanker/Cargo Aircraft program.

Background

The fiscal year 1975 budget submitted by the Air Force to the Secretary of Defense on October 1, 1973, did not include this requirement. Although the Air Force had in recent years considered the need for an advanced tanker to replace the KC–135, it was the Israeli October War and the employment of the C–5A transport to the Middle East which highlighted the requirement for additional cargo and bulk POL delivery capability. The Secretary of Defense therefore added $20.0 million to the Air Force budget specifically to initiate this program as an advanced tanker/cargo/cruise missile aircraft. In the final stages of the budget process, the cruise missile application was deleted, presumably because this could be interpreted as supporting an alternative standoff cruise missile carrier as a possible alternative for the B–1.

The concept is to initiate development of such an airplane as a derivative of the commercially available DC–10, L1011, and 747. The airplane would be able to serve as a tanker by using the lower fuselage to carry fuel. In a cargo mode, the upper section of the fuselage would accommodate cargo. Depending upon the operational requirement the airplane then would be available to serve either or both purposes, but not simultaneously.

The Air Force estimates that it would cost $225.1 million to develop this aircraft with a first flight date in the third quarter of fiscal year 1978, and a production decision in the first quarter of fiscal year 1979. The development program would result in the procurement of two test aircraft.

Committee Considerations

The $20.0 million requested is predicated upon a program go-ahead in December of 1974, with the award in January 1975, of contracts for approximately $1.5 million each to the three airplane manufacturers. This $4.5 million would be used to support concept development, trade-off studies, and preliminary design over a three month period ending in March 1975. An additional $13.5 million is planned to be applied to either two or all three of these contracts to support work during the last quarter of fiscal year 1975 involving configuration definition, mock-up design and construction, and planning documentation. The balance of $2.0 million, making up the total of $20.0 million, is planned to be used during the second half of fiscal year 1975 for separate development of a multipoint refueling capability or store which would be useful on this airplane as well as on the present KC–135 fleet.

The $4.5 million recommended by the committee would be used for the concept development, trade-off studies and preliminary design effort which would be completed in March, 1975. The committee considers that the results of that work would provide a basis for Congressional consideration at the time of the next phase of the program which could commence at the beginning of fiscal year 1976. At that time, the committee also will be reviewing the fiscal year 1976 budget, and will have the benefit of the formal proposal to the Congress by the Department of Defense for the next phase of the program.

The alternative, if the full $20.0 million was provided in fiscal year 1975, would in effect be authorizing the Air Force to proceed with a program which has not yet been clearly defined and which is not a meaningful basis for consideration at this time.

The committee recognizes that the budget request includes a number of other major programs involving improving airlift. These include $50 million for the stretch C–141, $155 million to begin modification of the wide bodied jets of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF), $15 million to begin a wing modification program on the C–5A, and additional amounts for spares and the cost of increasing crew ratios. The eventual total cost of these efforts will exceed $2 billion. The committee is concerned that the Department of Defense has asked for about everything in airlift and has not come down on the hard question of just what is required. Therefore the request for fiscal year 1976 should be supported by a detailed and comprehensive analysis of airlift requirements which will include consideration of all aircraft whether in inventory, being procured, or under development. Also to be included are the airlift assets of our NATO allies.

INTERIM MULTI-MISSION REMOTELY PILOTED VEHICLE

Committee Recommendation

The committee deleted the entire $11.0 million requested by the Air Force to begin R&D on an "interim" multi-mission RPV program.

Basis for Committee Action

Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPVs) are target drones adapted with special payloads to perform operational missions. Successful functions already demonstrated include high altitude reconnaissance and surveillance and low altitude photography. RPVs also are being adapted for roles such as chaff dispensing and electronic jamming.

The Air Force is pursuing an aggressive R&D program on RPVs. Included in this year's budget are requests for advanced development of new airframes, a multiple drone control program, and an avionics update program, all of which the committee supports.

The request for an interim multi-mission RPV is to start development of a drone with alternate capabilities for photo reconnaissance, electronic jamming, or tactical strike missions. This last capability would be obtained by launching weapons from the drone against enemy targets. The total cost of this multi-mission project is very high, $25 million in R&D and $57 million to buy 50 drones. The average cost is $1.6 million apiece.

The committee believes that the existing drone/RPV fleet has adequate capabilities for reconnaissance and electronic jamming. Before an expensive program is started for strike-capable RPVs, the Air Force should validate the cost-effectiveness and operational utility of such vehicles with careful studies and extensive operational testing.

DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY

MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY PROJECT

Committee Recommendation

The committee recommends denial of the request for $2.7 million to initiate this program in fiscal year 1975.

Committee Considerations

The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency is responsible for computer science and advanced computer technology for the entire Department of Defense. This project, which is estimated to cost $15.7 million to complete development, "seeks to increase the effectiveness and lower the cost of management and administrative functions within the Department of Defense by developing a complete computer-based management support system embodying powerful information-handling capabilities derived from advanced computer science research."

The most positive way to increase the effectiveness and lower the cost of management and administrative functions of the Department of Defense would be to reduce people in headquarters and staff organizations. This could be done by placing more emphasis within the Department on existing computer applications rather than pursuing new computer science for such relatively mundane purposes as improved management and efficiency.

Another possibility would be to establish a Blue Ribbon Defense Panel type of organization to take an up-to-date hard look at the organization and management of the Department. The General Accounting Office also could be asked to make such a study since they have conducted similar studies in the past. The Department is encouraged to explore these alternatives.

In conclusion, there should be many other ways of improving Defense management efficiency without spending $15.7 million. The requirement is not considered to be justified.

FEDERAL CONTRACT RESEARCH CENTERS

Committee Recommendation

The committee recommends approval of a ceiling of $265,860,000 for all appropriations of the Department of Defense for support to be provided by the Federal Contract Research Centers (FCRCs) during fiscal year 1975. This amount is $1,685,000 less than the $267,545,000 requested and provides only for an estimated five percent cost of living increase over the fiscal year 1974 Congressional ceiling of $253,200,000, consistent with previous year Congressional actions.

Committee Considerations

The committee is satisfied that the Department of Defense is continuing to maintain effective control over the size and activities of the FCRCs. Although the committee stated in last year's report that the possibility of discontinuing annual dollar ceilings on the FCRC program would be considered in conjunction with review of the fiscal year 1975 request, such consideration will be deferred until next year. This will provide the new Director of Defense Research and Engineering a full year of experience upon which to base his recommendations. As in the past, to provide the necessary latitude in the administration of the ceiling, the Secretary of Defense may exercise complete flexibility to adjust among the FCRCs within the total ceiling subject to normal reprogramming procedures but not otherwise subject to prior Congressional approval. A breakdown of the total ceiling of $265,860,000 appears in the following table:

[In thousands of dollars]

	Fiscal year	
	1974 ceiling	1975 recommended ceiling
Army:		
R.D.T. & E. appropriation:		
Aerospace Corp	3,314	2,348
Applied Physics Laboratory, Johns Hopkins University	80	960
Lincoln Laboratory	9,500	10,022
Mitre Corp	1,149	450
Total, R.D.T. & E	14,043	13,780
Other appropriations	1,275	1,445
Total, Army	15,318	15,225
Navy:		
R.D.T. & E. appropriation:		
Aerospace Corp	2,725	1,740
Applied Physics Laboratory, Johns Hopkins University	31,391	32,478
Applied Research Laboratory, Penn State University	5,970	6,730
Center for Naval Analysis	8,700	9,304
Lincoln Laboratory	1,450	2,180
Mitre Corp	451	950
Total, R.D.T. & E	50,687	53,382
Other appropriations	13,911	15,610
Total, Navy	64,598	68,992

[In thousands of dollars]

	Fiscal year	
	1974 ceiling	1975 recommended ceiling
Air Force:		
R.D.T. & E. appropriation:		
Aerospace Corp	41,665	46,468
Analytical Services, Inc	2,078	2,097
Applied Physics Laboratory, Johns Hopkins University	800	1,020
Lincoln Laboratory	27,660	26,574
Mitre Corp	29,027	23,316
Rand Corp	8,700	8,700
Total, R.D.T. & E	109,930	108,175
Other appropriations	28,127	35,638
Total, Air Force	138,057	143,813
Defense agencies:		
R.D.T. & E. appropriation:		
Aerospace Corp	1,410	1,565
Analytical Services, Inc	80	125
Applied Physics Laboratory, Johns Hopkins University	1,390	1,500
Institute for Defense Analysis	8,309	8,435
Lincoln Laboratory	8,450	10,635
Mitre Corp	4,123	4,490
Rand Corp	6,497	7,290
Total, R.D.T. & E	30,259	34,040
Other appropriations	4,665	5,475
Total, Defense agencies	34,924	39,515
Summary:		
R.D.T. & E. appropriation	204,919	209,377
Other appropriations	47,978	58,168
Undistributed ceiling	303	0
Total	253,200	267,545
Reduction recommended by committee		−1,685
Total recommended ceiling		265,860

Chemical and Biological Warfare

Committee Recommendation

The committee recommends approval of the chemical and biological warfare (CBW) research and development program proposed for fiscal year 1975 with the single exception of a reduction of $1.9 million in the Army Lethal Chemical Munitions engineering development program for which $4.9 million was requested.

Program Proposed for Fiscal Year 1975

The chemical and biological warfare program proposed for fiscal year 1975 amounts to $133.6 million for research and development and procurement. This is $30.4 million higher than the $103.2 million for fiscal year 1974, with the increase being almost entirely for procurement. Only $2.1 million of the increase relates to research and development, which increases from $52.3 million to $54.4 million.

The committee has reduced the research and development request from $54.4 million to $52.5 million, which is essentially the fiscal year 1974 level. The procurement appropriations, which account for the remaining increase of $28.3 million, are not included under the fiscal year 1975 military procurement authorization bill, and will be considered separately as part of the appropriations actions of the Congress.

Summary of Committee Position

The committee is satisfied that the Department of Defense is complying with the provisions of Section 409, Public Law 91–121 and Section 506, Public Law 91–441, which established certain restrictions concerning development, procurement, handling, transportation, storage and disposal of chemical and biological delivery systems and agents. The subject of the study on the use of herbicides and the effects of defoliation in South Vietnam is discussed next in the report.

The Director of Defense Research and Engineering, when he testified before the committee, was asked to bring the committee up to date on the Department's compliance with the aforementioned provisions of law relating to chemical and biological warfare (CBW), and to indicate if any problems had been encountered in implementing these provisions which would indicate a need for a change in language. He responded that the aforementioned provisions parallel closely those contained in Public Law 91–190, the National Environmental Policy Act, which are more rigorous, and that no problems were being encountered which would indicate a change in legislative language.

The committee considers that the requirement for chemical warfare munitions should be reviewed in the broad context of current and projected NATO and other world-wide commitments, consistent with our national policy. This also should include the implications of United States posture during the current disarmament negotiations. Based upon such a review, a determination should be made concerning projected inventory requirements and validation of the need for and cost effectiveness of producing binary munitions to meet such requirements. If an international agreement can be reached which would prohibit lethal chemical munitions, it would be unnecessary to proceed with the program as now planned.

The action of the committee in denying the requested increase for lethal chemical munitions development is consistent with these considerations.

Review of Current National Policy

The Department of Defense presented a review of current national policy relating to CBW, including the following statement of overall mission objectives:

Present U.S. policy on chemical warfare and biological research is based on Presidential decisions of 25 November 1969 and 14 February 1970. The President on 25 November 1969 stated that the U.S. renounced the use of lethal biological agents and weapons, and all other methods of biological warfare and announced that the U.S. would confine its biological research to defensive measures such as immunization and safety measures. The President also reaffirmed the U.S. policy of no first use of lethal chemical weapons and extended this no first use policy to cover the use of incapacitating chemical agents. On 14 February 1970, the policy on biological agents and weapons was extended to include toxins.

The biological research program is a defensive effort oriented primarily toward medical research for the development of vaccines, prophylactic and therapeutic measures, and safety and protective measures. There is an R. & D. program for the development of a biological detection and warning system to alert U.S. forces when

they have been attacked by biological agents so that proper protective measures may be taken.

The objective of the chemical warfare program is to deter the use of chemical weapons by other Nations and to provide a retaliatory capability if deterrence fails. This includes a defensive program aimed at providing the equipment and procedures necessary to warn of, withstand, and recover from the effects of a chemical attack against U.S. forces. Even though the U.S. has signed both the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the Biological Convention of 1972, neither of these has been ratified by the Senate.

Study on Use of Herbicides in South Vietnam

Background

Section 506(c), Public Law 91–441, directed the Secretary of Defense to make arrangements with the National Academy of Sciences for the conduct of a study on the effect of using herbicides and the ecological and physiological effects of defoliants in South Vietnam, and to report the results to the Congress.

Interim reports of the study have been made to the committee, and their contents, as well as a complete chronology of events, have been reported to the Senate (Congressional Records of October 6, 1971, Pages S15995–S16001, and March 3, 1972, Pages S3246–S3254).

The Department of Defense by letter dated February 24, 1973, transmitted Part A, the summary and conclusions of the final report prepared by the National Academy of Sciences Committee on the Effects of Herbicides in Vietnam, as required by Section 506(c). Included also were Department of Defense comments on the report, as well as copies of letters addressed to the various appropriate agencies of government to provide an orderly transition of the recommended follow-on studies noted in the report. Copies of these documents and report summaries were placed in the Congressional Record on February 28, 1974 (pages S2425 through S2442).

Completion of Study

The Department of Defense by letter dated April 30, 1974, transmitted Part B, Supplementary Report, which is the final section of the National Academy of Sciences report. This supplementary report consists of 19 volumes, each addressing a specific area of investigation by the Committee on the Effects of Herbicides in Vietnam. The report does not change the findings and conclusions presented in the initial Part A report, but represents the detailed analyses which form the background data and rationale to support the conclusions. Copies of these reports can be obtained either at the National Academy of Sciences or at the National Technical Information Service of the Department of Commerce.

The letter also stated that responses from each of the other federal agencies contacted had been received and that a joint meeting is planned to be convened with the National Academy of Sciences to develop an implementation plan to address the Academy recommendations early in May. The results of this meeting are not yet available.

The committee considers that the Department of Defense has satisfied the requirements of Section 506(c), Public Law 91–441, and

commends the Department for continuing with this matter in a cooperative manner with other federal agencies to insure that any follow-on efforts are pursued in an orderly manner. The Department advises that it will continue to be available for such purposes.

Independent Research and Development

Summary of Committee Position

The committee recommends that no changes be made at this time in Section 203, Public Law 91-441, which established restrictive language and procedures to control the amount of funds reimbursable to contractors for independent research and development and bid and proposal costs, and which included restrictive language relating to relevancy to Defense programs.

Background

Section 203 established permanent language involving the expenditure of funds appropriated to the Department of Defense for the purpose of Independent Research and Development (I.R. & D.), or Bid and Proposal (B. & P.). For the purpose of this report these activities will be referred to as I.R. & D.

Major provisions of this section require that (a) the Secretary of Defense negotiate advance agreements each year with major defense contractors as to the dollar ceiling on funds which are to be reimbursed by Defense for these purposes, (b) these advance agreements be based on company submitted plans which are subject to technical evaluation by Defense, (c) dollar penalties are imposed by Defense when such advance agreements cannot be reached, (d) the work for which payment is made has, in the opinion of the Secretary of Defense, a potential relationship to a military function or operation, and (e) the Secretary of Defense submit an annual report to the Congress on or before March 15 of each year advising of the results of implementation of this section.

In accordance with paragraph (e) of Section 203, the Secretary of Defense has submitted the annual report to the Congress as required. The Chairman of the Research and Development Subcommittee made a comprehensive report to the Senate on May 28, 1974. The report included a series of letters involving the Senate, the Department of Defense and the General Accounting Office as well as complete details of the DOD report for calendar year 1973 transmitted on March 14, 1974.

Highlights of Department of Defense Report for 1973

The data reported by the Department of Defense for calendar year 1973 is summarized below.

1. The amount of payments to contractors for IR&D, as reported a year ago was $738 million for 1972. The Department of Defense estimated at that time that the amount for 1973 would be within a few percentage points of the amount reported for 1972.

2. The revised amount for 1972 is $735 million which is essentially the same as the $738 million estimated for 1972 last year. In gross terms, the estimate for 1973, covering the same 83 contractors, amounts to $819 million. This is an apparent increase of $84 million

of which only $6.8 million or less than one percent is the actual increase. The balance of $77.2 million is not an increase in payments made by the government. Rather, it consists of an increase of $22.2 million in the amounts paid by foreign governments as part of their purchase of military equipment from the United States, and $55 million more of contractor engineering overhead costs now identified as IR&D but which during 1972 were not so identified, although paid for by the government in the cost of items procured.

On an adjusted basis, comparative amounts would be $721.2 million for 1972 and $728 million for 1973. In real terms, therefore, if inflation is considered, the amount for 1973 actually would be lower than in 1972.

Estimate for Calendar Year 1974

The Department of Defense has stated that, aside from the effects of inflation, the estimate for calendar 1974 should approximate the amount reported for 1973.

Committee Considerations

During the debate on the fiscal year 1974 Military Procurement bill, an amendment was introduced to reduce the amount of funds authorized for IR&D by 50 percent. The amendment was withdrawn with the understanding that the General Accounting Office would conduct a program evaluation and an extensive study of IR&D including a number of alternative approaches to the present procedures, and report to the Congress by April 1, 1974, together with appropriate recommendations.

The General Accounting Office has advised that more time is needed to perform the study and that they will report to the Congress in time for consideration of the fiscal year 1976 authorization bill. The committee looks forward to completion of the study at the earliest possible time. Copies of all of the correspondence bearing on this matter, and a copy of the interim GAO report were placed in the Congressional Record by the Chairman of the Research and Development Subcommittee on May 28, 1974.

The committee was advised that the Cost Accounting Standards Board is studying proposed standards for IR&D on a government wide basis. If completed in time, the results of this study should be considered by GAO in conjunction with its own study.

Conclusion

The committee will continue to follow this matter closely, and will report findings and make recommendations for legislative change, as appropriate, in conjunction with the report on the fiscal year 1976 authorization bill.

R & D Program Structure

Background

The Committee is concerned with the changes that have occurred in recent years involving the transfer of major efforts from other appropriations, primarily procurement, to the RDT&E appropriations. This has resulted largely from actions directed by other Committees of the Congress. Although justified to some extent, these transfers have.

reached such large proportions that they have created a distortion in the relationship between total R&D and the overall defense program.

Historically, the R&D program has represented about 10% of the total annual defense program. The continuing trend of transferring amounts into the R&D program tends to create a situation where the R&D program will suffer because it is exceeding this historical ratio. Aside from this, the composition of the R&D program has changed as has the definition of what constitutes R&D. This is aggravated by the difficulty in making a clear distinction between R&D and production of a major weapon system, just to mention one example. The impact of these actions are dramatically illustrated by the fact that in the fiscal year 1975 authorization request, totaling $9.3 billion for R&D, $225 million represents the amount identified with items transferred from other accounts.

Committee Recommendation

The Committee recommends that the Department of Defense conduct a comprehensive study of this matter and determine what actions might be taken, such as redefinition of appropriations or establishment of new appropriations to stabilize the R&D program in a manner consistent with all other DOD appropriations. The Committee staff will be available to participate in these considerations in arriving at a basis for submission of the FY 1976 budget request.

The FY 1976 budget submission will include, as part of the narrative justification of estimates, a section covering transfers between accounts. This will identify and explain transfers proposed for the budget year, as well as comparative transfers for the current and preceding years. This requirement was discontinued a number of years ago, but now is considered necessary because of the many changes that have occurred in recent years.

Cooperative Research and Development With European Allies

Background

In recent years, the former Director of Defense Research and Engineering has consistently emphasized the fact that there was a substantial amount of unnecessary overlap and duplication, estimated last year as $1 billion, between research and development conducted by the United States and by our European Allies. The authorization request which he has supported in testimony each year has proposed cooperative programs, worked out in detail on a country-to-country basis. Two such programs are the NATO Patrol Hydrofoil Missile ship (PHM) and the all weather Low Altitude Forward Area Air Defense System now called Short Range Air Defense System.

Committee Considerations

The committee supports the concept of cooperative programs with our allies provided that it produces military equipment required for our military forces more economically than if undertaken alone by the United States, and within the time required. If an item has been successfully developed or is approaching completion of successful development by our allies, it makes no sense to "reinvent the wheel" and take the time and spend the money to duplicate what has been done because it was not done in the United States.

The NATO PHM is nearing completion of development and involves the cooperation of the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, and the United States.

Low Altitude Forward Area Air Defense System (or Short Range Air Defense System) is still in a competitive phase and involves three candidate systems developed by different combinations of our European allies. Requests for Proposal are planned to be issued which also will permit U.S. companies to propose other possible systems.

Cooperative developments such as these also involve licensing agreements between U.S. and foreign companies which provide for the development and/or production of whole systems or components by both companies. This recognizes the "facts-of-life" concerning the balance of payments and provides work for our own labor force and profit to our industries. In fact, when we adopt equipment already developed by an ally, and manufacture it in the United States, the benefit to our labor and industry occurs that much earlier.

Continued Department of Defense support was expressed by Dr. Malcolm Currie, the new Director of Defense Research and Engineering, when he testified on March 4, 1974. At that time he was asked if there is any legislative or other action that the Congress could take to foster greater cooperation with our allies in research and development. His answer was as follows:

"We are continuing to study ways by which legislative changes may improve R&D cooperation. In the meantime, until DoD can make specific recommendations, I think it very important that Congress continue to support in a highly visible manner the DoD efforts in this area. Those who have attempted to oppose our cooperative R&D efforts, for parochial reasons, have continually raised the specter of congressional opposition to these international thrusts in an effort to discourage the vital participation of our industries and military services. After all, our cooperative efforts are in large measure in response to the initiative of this committee and the Congress to insure more efficient use of collective NATO resources, and greater allied share of the R&D burden. Statements and positions such as contained in Mr. Fine's report, and approval of our budget requests relating to acquisition of foreign systems, such as Short Range Air Defense System, will help immeasurably in our efforts to get the support of our vital institutions to adopt this new way of thinking in our R&D process."

Conclusion

In furtherance of the committee's interest in cooperative research and development, a staff member visited our major European allies and met with government and industry leaders to convey a message of cooperation and to report on what additional measures could be taken to broaden these relationships. The report was inserted in the Congressional Record on February 5, 1974, by the Chairman of the Research and Development Subcommittee (pages S1224–S1227).

The Department of Defense final comments on the staff report were transmitted by letter dated April 18, 1974, and inserted in the Congressional Record on May 30, 1974. That letter was highly complimentary of the committee efforts and recommended that a follow-up trip be made by the Chairman of the Research and Development Subcommittee.

31-683—74——9

The committee is in full accord with these actions and will continue to encourage and support such cooperative programs with our allies.

SUMMARY BY BUDGET ACTIVITY

The Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation authorization request is presented in eight budget activities as summarized below. A description of each budget activity, together with the amounts requested and changes recommended by the committee, with appropriate comments follows:

FISCAL YEAR 1975 R.D.T. & E. REQUEST—CONSOLIDATION BY BUDGET ACTIVITY

[In thousands of dollars]

	Request	Committee recommendation		[1] House bill
		Change	Amount	
1. Military sciences	[2] 443,652		[2] 443,652	[2] 437,052
2. Aircraft and related equipment	1,829,318	−117,321	1,711,997	1,789,818
3. Missiles and related equipment	2,352,993	−126,800	2,226,193	2,164,422
4. Military astronautics and related equipment	527,248		527,248	516,748
5. Ships, small craft, and related equipment	727,505	−38,600	688,905	724,505
6. Ordnance, combat vehicles, and related equipment	512,906	−19,690	493,216	488,230
7. Other equipment	2,095,385	−29,043	2,066,342	2,050,485
8. Programwide management and support	836,032	−5,500	830,532	830,403
Reimbursements from foreign military sales		−35,673	−35,673	
Total R.D.T & E	[2] 9,325,039	−372,627	[2] 8,952,412	[2] 9,001,663

[1] House action is as reported by the committee and is shown for information only.
[2] Includes $2,570,000 for Navy special foreign currency program in fiscal year 1975.

1. MILITARY SCIENCES

[In thousands of dollars]

Department	Request	Committee recommendation		[1] House bill
		Change	Amount	
Army	111,520		111,520	111,520
Navy (including Marine Corps)	[2] 140,832		[2] 140,832	[2] 140,832
Air Force	131,400		131,400	131,400
Defense agencies	59,900		59,900	53,300
Total, military sciences	[2] 443,652		[2] 443,652	[2] 437,052

[1] House action is as reported by the committee and is shown for information only.
[2] Includes $2,570,000 for Navy special foreign currency program in fiscal year 1975.

This budget activity consists primarily of research and exploratory development of potential military application. The objective of research is to increase the store of fundamental scientific knowledge adaptable to the solution of widely varied future requirements. The objective of exploratory development is to apply new knowledge to the solution of known or anticipated military requirements. The major program under this activity, Defense Research Sciences, provides for basic research in physics, chemistry, mathematical sciences, electronics, materials, mechanics, energy conversion, oceanography, terrestrial and atmospheric sciences, astronomy and astrophysics, biological and medical sciences, and behavioral and social sciences. This activity supports work conducted in in-house laboratories, as well as in other federal activities, universities, not-for-profit institutions, and industry.

The committee recommends approval of the full amounts requested, which are essentially the same as provided for fiscal year 1974, and even slightly lower when adjusted to reflect inflation.

2. AIRCRAFT AND RELATED EQUIPMENT

[In thousands of dollars]

Department	Request	Committee recommendation		House bill[1]
		Change	Amount	
Army	269,996	−22,060	247,936	269,496
Navy (including Marine Corps)	349,322	−15,461	333,861	315,322
Air Force	1,210,000	−79,800	1,130,200	1,205,000
Total, aircraft and related equipment	1,829,318	−117,321	1,711,997	1,789,818

[1] House action is as reported by the committee and is shown for information only.

This activity supports research, development, test, and evaluation related to aircraft weapon systems, subsystems, and components, including exploratory development in a wide variety of supporting technologies.

The Army program provides substantially for the development of helicopters and includes continuation of the Utility Tactical Transport Aircraft System (UTTAS), the Advanced Attack Helicopter, component development and fabrication of the Heavy Lift Helicopter prototype, the Experimental Rotary Wing Research Aircraft and Tilt Research Aircraft, and the Aerial Scout. The committee recommends a net reduction of $22.1 million, consisting of reductions of $5.4 million for the Aerial Scout and $21.2 million for the HLH. These are partially offset by an increase of $4.5 million for the Cobra–TOW, which merely represents a transfer of research and development work from the Army procurement account to the Army R.D.T.&E. account without change. The reductions in the Aerial Scout and the HLH are explained elsewhere in the report.

The major Navy programs include the final stages of development of the F–14, the CH–53E heavy lift helicopter, and V/STOL aircraft prototypes including the Thrust Augmented Wing. New programs proposed for initiation include the VCX Carrier on Board Delivery aircraft, the HSX antisubmarine warfare system, and the VFX, a low cost prototype fighter. The committee recommends a reduction of $15.5 million, consisting of $5.3 million for the Tactical Air Reconnaissance program, $5.7 million for a classified program, and $4.5 million for the VCX Carrier on Board Delivery aircraft. All of these reductions are explained elsewhere in this report.

The Air Force program provides primarily for continued development of the B–1 Advanced Strategic Bomber, the final development effort on the F–15 All Weather Air Superiority Fighter, the EF–111A Electronic Warfare Support Aircraft, completion of the F–5E/F International Fighter, Advanced Medium STOL Transport prototype, and the A–10 Close Air Support Aircraft. Also included is the initiation of development of an Advanced Tanker/Cargo Aircraft and engineering development of a new, low cost Air Combat Fighter. The committee recommends a reduction of $79.8 million, comprised of $12.5 million for the A–10 Close Air Support Aircraft, $15.5 million for the

Advanced Tanker/Cargo Aircraft, $44.0 million for the B–1 Advanced Strategic Bomber, $4.0 million for the Electronically Agile Radar, $1.0 million for aircraft equipment development, $1.0 million for F–4 avionics, and $1.8 million for Gas Turbine Technology, which reduces this level of effort program to the same level as fiscal year 1974 and allows for a 5 percent cost of living increase. All other reductions are explained elsewhere in the report.

3. MISSILES AND RELATED EQUIPMENT

[In thousands of dollars]

Department	Request	Committee recomendation		[1] House bill
		Change	Amount	
Army	706,418	−68,500	637,918	618,315
Navy (including Marine Corps)	1,152,575	−29,800	1,122,775	1,081,207
Air Force	419,000	−26,200	392,800	395,900
Defense agencies	75,000	−2,300	72,700	69,000
Total, missiles and related equipment	2,352,993	−126,800	2,226,193	2,164,422

[1] House action is as reported by the committee and is shown for information only.

This activity provides for contract and in-house costs of research, development, test and evaluation of ballistic and other missile systems of all types including surface-to-air, air-to-surface, air-to-air, and surface-to-surface. This activity also is a major source of financial support for operation of certain test and evaluation facilities such as the Air Force Western Test Range, the Navy White Sands Missile Range, the Naval Weapons Center at China Lake, and the research and development programs at the Army's Redstone Arsenal and the Kwajalein Missile Range.

The Army program provides for final development costs for the Safeguard Antiballistic Missile System, Site Defense of Minuteman, and Antiballistic Missile Technology. In tactical missiles, development will continue on the reoriented SAM-D Air Defense Missile System, Forward Area Air Defense Systems, Stinger Man Portable Anti-Aircraft Missile System, Cannon Launched Guided Projectile, improvements to the Pershing Missile, and the Hellfire Helicopter Borne Air-to-Ground Missile. The committee recommends a reduction of $68.5 million, consisting of $50 million for Site Defense of Minuteman, $11.2 million for the Pershing II missile, $5.8 million for the Chaparral/Vulcan, and $1.5 million for the Stinger Man Portable Antiaircraft Missile System. These reductions are explained elsewhere in the report.

The Navy program provides primarily for continued development of the Trident Missile System, as well as a Submarine Launched Strategic Cruise Missile, the Aegis Fleet Defense Missile, the Phalanx Close In Weapon System, the Harpoon Antiship Missile, the Agile Air-to-Air Missile, and the late stages of development of the Condor, Sparrow, and Improved Sidewinder Air-to-Air Missiles. The committee recommends a reduction of $29.8 million, consisting of $15.0 million for the Trident C–4 Missile System, $7.0 million for the Submarine Launched Cruise Missile, $4.0 million for Surface Launched Weaponry, $2.0 million for Advanced Surface Missile Guidance, and $1.8 million for the Sanguine Communications System. These reductions are explained elsewhere in the report.

The Air Force program includes effort on improved guidance, higher yield and increased number of reentry vehicles for the Minuteman System, Advanced Ballistic Reentry System developments, including improved guidance for the Navy Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile System, and expanded Advanced ICBM Technology Program, which includes new emphasis on mobility concepts. Increased emphasis is placed on engineering development of the Air Launched Cruise Missile. The committee recommends a net reduction of $26.2 million, consisting of decreases of $16.0 million for the Air Launched Cruise Missile and $3.1 million for Advanced Air-to-Air Weapons Technology. Also included is a reduction of $19.0 million in the Minuteman Program, which is compensated in part by an increase in the Advanced Ballistic Reentry System (ABRES) program of $11.9 million. This provides for a transfer of a classified program from Minuteman to ABRES. The difference of $7.1 million represents the cost of two Minuteman missiles which were determined not to be required. All other reductions are explained elsewhere in the report.

The Defense Agencies program supports strategic technology under the cognizance of the Advanced Research Projects Agency. The committee recommends a reduction of $2.3 million, which is explained elsewhere in the report.

4. MILITARY ASTRONAUTICS AND RELATED EQUIPMENT

[In thousands of dollars]

Department	Request	Committee recommendation		
		Change	Amount	[1] House bill
Army	15,832	----------	15,832	15,832
Navy (including Marine Corps)	38,716	----------	38,716	38,716
Air Force	472,700	----------	472,700	462,200
Total, military astronautics and related equipment	527,248	----------	527,248	516,748

[1] House action is as reported by the committee and is shown for information only.

This budget activity provides for research, development, test and evaluation of military space systems and equipment including spaceborne, ship-based and ground-based equipment. The objective is to improve space technology for military applications and to investigate and develop specific military applications of space vehicles.

The Army program provides for continued development of ground terminals and subsystems for the Defense Communications Satellite and the NAVSTAR Global Positioning System.

The Navy program provides for continued development of Navy capabilities in satellite communications and the NAVSTAR Global Positioning System.

The Air Force program includes participation in the NAVSTAR Global Positioning System, development of an Interim Upper Stage for the NASA Space Shuttle, and a variety of programs directed toward the improvement of space technology for military purposes and the development of space vehicles for specific military missions. Initiation is proposed for a Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile Radar Warning System and continued support provided by the Aerospace Corporation.

The committee recommends approval of the full amounts requested for this budget activity which in the aggregate are significantlybelow the level of fiscal year 1974 and primarily relate to the Air Force.

5. SHIPS, SMALL CRAFT, AND RELATED EQUIPMENT

[In thousands of dollars]

Department	Request	Committee recommendation		House bill [1]
		Change	Amount	
Navy (including Marine Corps)	727,505	−38,600	688,905	724,505

[1] House action is as reported by the committee and is shown for information only.

This activity provides for research and development effort on radars and sonars, nuclear propulsion, the design of new ships, electronic warfare equipment, and communication and navigation systems. Major effort includes the continued development of new types of surface craft and ships, such as the Surface Effect Ship, which travel on a cushion of air at very high speeds, and have the potential for revolutionizing naval warfare. Also included are the joint development with Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany of the NATO PHM missile carrying patrol hydrofoil ship, the air cushion vehicle Amphibious Assault Craft, and the submarine for the Trident Strategic Ballistic Missile system which ultimately will replace the Polaris/Poseidon fleet. Programs recommended for continuation in fiscal year 1975 also include advanced development and engineering development of reactor propulsion plants, surface antisubmarine warfare, surface electronic warfare, and surface tactical command and control systems. Included also is initiation of an Improved SSBN, which is a new, small strategic ballistic missile submarine called the SSBN–X. This could provide a lower cost replacement for the aging Poseidon submarine in addition to the approved 10 submarine Trident program. A significant portion of the effort at the Naval Ships Research and Development Center is funded under this activity.

The committee recommends a reduction of $38.6 million which consists of $16.0 million for the Improved SSBN, which is a Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile system smaller than Trident, $12.2 million for the Surface Effect Ship, $4.0 million for a classified program, $3.4 million for Advanced Ship Development, and $3.0 million for Radar Surveillance Equipment. All of these reductions are explained elsewhere in the report.

6. ORDNANCE, COMBAT VEHICLES, AND RELATED EQUIPMENT

[In thousands of dollars]

Department	Request	Committee recommendation		House bill [1]
		Change	Amount	
Army	263,871	−12,200	251,671	251,595
Navy (including Marine Corps)	92,335		92,335	92,335
Air Force	156,700	−7,490	149,210	144,300
Total, ordnance, combat vehicles, and related equipment	512,906	−19,690	493,216	488,230

[1] House action is as reported by the committee and is shown for information only.

This activity provides for the research, development, test, and evaluation of improved artillery, guns, rocket launchers, mortars, small arms, mines, grenades, torpedoes, nuclear and chemical munitions, combat and combat support vehicles both wheeled and tracked. Also included is the principal support for research and development activities at several Army arsenals and the Naval Ordnance Laboratory at White Oak, Maryland.

The Army program provides for continued development of the Main Battle Tank prototype (XM–1), the Mechanized Infantry Combat Vehicle (XM–723), Armored Reconnaissance Scout Vehicle (XM–800), Towed 105 mm Howitzer (XM–204), Towed 155 mm Howitzer (XM–198), and Bushmaster rapid fire weapon system. Effort is being increased on improved mine systems and on prototype laser weapons. The committee recommends a reduction of $12.2 million, consisting of $3.9 million for the Armored Reconnaissance Scout Vehicle, $3.5 million for the XM–1 Tank prototype, $2.9 million for the Bushmaster weapon, and $1.9 million for Binary Munitions engineering development. These reductions are explained elsewhere in the report.

The Navy program provides for the late stages of development of the Captor antisubmarine mine and the Mark 48 torpedo. Increased emphasis is included on other mine developments, surface launched munitions, gun systems, and Marine Corps weaponry.

The Air Force program provides increased emphasis on laser weapon applications, improved aircraft gun systems for the A–10 Close Air Support Aircraft and for air superiority aircraft, and the Close Air Support Weapon System. The committee recommends a reduction of $7.5 million for the GAU–7 Improved Aircraft Gun System as explained elsewhere in the report.

7. OTHER EQUIPMENT

[In thousands of dollars]

Department	Request	Committee recommendation		House bill [1]
		Change	Amount	
Army	562,493		562,493	555,793
Navy (including Marine Corps)	479,292	−1,900	477,392	479,292
Air Force	678,200	−15,900	662,300	670,100
Defense agencies	375,400	−11,243	364,157	345,300
Total, other equipment	2,095,385	−29,043	2,066,342	2,050,485

[1] House action is as reported by the committee and is shown for information only.

This activity provides for research, development, test, and evaluation of equipment which is not separately provided under the other budget activities. Examples of the types of programs included are communications and electronics, communications security, signal support of intelligence operations, electronic warfare, surveillance and target acquisition, automatic data processing systems, chemical and biological defense, nuclear power systems, mapping and geodesy, night vision, command and control systems, training devices, combat feeding, clothing and equipment, medical equipment, ocean engineering, undersea surveillance, and Navy laboratory independent exploratory development.

The Army program includes such major developments as the Tri-Service Tactical Communications Program (TRI-TAC), the Tactical Fire Direction System (TACFIRE), the Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Night Observation System, electronic warfare systems, chemical and biological agent detection and protective equipment, counterbattery and countermortar radars, remotely piloted vehicles and drones, food and clothing technology, and other programs in support of improved logistics, facilities design and training. Also included is support of the various Army test facilities supporting Army research and development programs.

The Navy program includes the major portion of the Exploratory Development program, as well as Advanced and Engineering Development programs in undersea surveillance, high energy lasers, intelligence equipment, tactical command and control, antisubmarine warfare equipment, logistics and medical developments, aerospace ocean surveillance, manpower and training developments, electronic warfare, and related Marine Corps programs. The committee recommends a reduction of $1.9 million in a classified program because funds are in excess of program requirements during fiscal year 1975.

The Air Force program includes development of the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), the Advanced Airborne Command Post for command and control of the Armed Forces during periods of emergency, TRI-TAC, and numerous other development programs involving communications, electronic countermeasures, reconnaissance, surveillance, and air traffic control approach and landing. It also includes support of the Electromagnetic Compatibility Analysis Center, Lincoln Laboratory, and Mitre Corporation support. The committee recommends a net reduction of $15.9 million comprised of decreases totaling $24.9 million compensated in part by an increase of $5.0 million for the Advanced Command and Control Capabilities program. The decreases include $11.0 million for Drone/RPV Systems development, $3.5 million for Improved Tactical Bombing, and $1.4 million for F-4/F-105 Protective Systems. The increase of $5.0 million is provided by reductions of $3.0 million in Joint Tactical Communications and $2.0 million in the Minimum Essential Emergency Communications Network, and is needed to support an urgent requirement as requested by Deputy Secretary of Defense letter dated May 1, 1974. All other reductions are explained elsewhere in the report.

The Defense Agencies program primarily covers Advanced Research Projects Agency work in nuclear monitoring research and tactical technology, Defense Communications Agency (DCA) in DOD-wide communications systems, Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) in mapping, charting, and geodesy, and Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) in nuclear weapons effects development and test. The committee recommends a reduction of $11.2 million consisting of $3.5 million for Defense Communications System and $1.0 million for World-Wide Military Command and Control System, both under the Defense Communications Agency, $1.0 million for the Defense Mapping Agency Mapping, Charting and Geodesy program, $1.0 million for a classified program under the Defense Intelligence Agency, $2.0 million for a classified program under the Defense Nuclear

Agency, and $2.7 million for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency Management Systems Technology program. All of these reductions are explained elsewhere in the report.

8. PROGRAMWIDE MANAGEMENT AND SUPPORT

[In thousands of dollars]

Department	Request	Committee recommendation		House bill[1]
		Change	Amount	
Army	55,846		55,846	55,846
Navy (including Marine Corps)	283,926		283,926	280,797
Air Force	450,860		450,860	450,860
Defense agencies	45,400	−5,500	39,900	42,900
Total, management and support	836,032	−5,500	830,532	830,403

[1] House action is as reported by the committee and is shown for information only.

For the Army and the Navy, this activity provides for those costs of operation, management, and maintenance of research, development, and test facilities which are not distributed directly to the other budget activities. For the Air Force it provides for certain costs of central administration such as the Air Force Systems Command Headquarters and divisions, as well as several large research, development, test and evaluation centers. This activity also provides for expanded joint service effort in the initial operational test and evaluation of new systems. This program provides for pay of civilian personnel, travel expenses, supplies and equipment, and other general and administrative research, development, test, and evaluation expenses.

The committee recommends a reduction of $5.5 million, comprised of $500,000 for the Defense Supply Agency Defense Documentation Center, and $5.0 million for a classified program under the National Security Agency for which these funds were determined to be in excess of fiscal year 1975 requirements.

TITLE III—ACTIVE DUTY MANPOWER AUTHORIZATION

Background.—Under 10 U.S.C. Sec. 138, the Congress is required to authorize the active duty military personnel end fiscal year strength for each of the military services. The committee held hearings in open session on March 21, 22, 26; and April 11, 1974, and heard testimony from Defense Department manpower experts on the active duty military personnel strengths requested by the Department of Defense for Fiscal Year 1975. Based on this testimony, the information provided in the annual Manpower Requirements Report for FY 1975 submitted by the Department of Defense and other information provided to the committee, the staff has conducted a comprehensive review and analysis of military personnel requirements.

Committee recommendations

Reduction of 49,000 in active military manpower strengths—a 2% Reduction

For the reasons below, the committee recommends reductions totalling 49,000, or about 2%, from the Defense active duty military manpower request. The Defense request for active duty military strength as of June 30, 1975 totalled 2,152,100 and the committee recommendations would reduce that to 2,103,100 by the end of FY 1975. The committee recommendations on the active duty strength for each Military Service is shown below:

ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTH

[End fiscal year 1975 strength in thousands]

	DOD request	Committee recommended	Reduction from request	Percent
Army	785.0	768.3	−16.7	−2
Navy	540.4	527.0	−13.4	−2
Marine Corps	196.4	192.8	−3.6	−2
Air Force	630.3	615.0	−15.3	−2
Total	2,152.1	2,103.1	−49.0	−2

Discussion

The committee reductions of 49,000 would bring active duty military strength in FY 1975 about 3% below the planned end FY 1974 strength of 2,174,000. However, current DoD estimates indicate that all of the Services combined will fall short of their planned end FY 1974 strength by 17–20,000, or 1%, because of recruiting shortfalls.

Savings in future years resulting from manpower reductions

Based on present pay costs, the committee reduction of 49,000 in active duty strength, once fully implemented and made effective, would save about $600 million annually in future years. When combined with the 44,600 civilian manpower reduction in Title V of this bill, annual savings in future years would amount to about $1.2 billion on the same basis.

The committee added amendatory language proposed by Senator Nunn in the following four areas:

Reduction of 20% in Army non-combat troop strength in Europe

In addition to the recommendations on the active duty end strength authorizations, the committee recommends not less than a twenty percent reduction of Army non-combat strength located in Europe must be completed not later than June 30, 1976. Not less than fifty percent of the reduction must be completed on or before June 30, 1975. The Secretary of Defense may on a permissive basis increase the combat strength of the Army in Europe by a number not to exceed the number of support troops reduced by this provision. The limitation on increasing combat strength in Europe does not apply if hostilities are imminent in Europe. For purposes of this provision, the combat component strength is defined as the strength of infantry, cavalry, armored, artillery, air defense and missile units of battalion size or smaller. The Secretary of Defense should report to the Congress on these reductions semiannually beginning January 31, 1975.

Limitation on the number of United States tactical nuclear warheads in Europe

The committee further recommends that the number of United States tactical nuclear warheads located in Europe on the date of enactment not be increased except in the event of imminent hostilities. In addition, the Secretary of Defense should study the overall concept for use of nuclear weapons in Europe; how the use of these weapons relates to deterrence and a strong conventional defense, reductions in the number and type of nuclear warheads not essential for Western European defense; and steps that would develop a national, coordinated nuclear posture of the NATO Alliance that is consistent with proper emphasis on conventional defense forces. The amendment requires the Secretary of Defense to report to the Armed Services Committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives on this study on or before April 1, 1975. In addition, the Secretary of Defense should report semiannually, beginning September 1, 1974, to the committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives on the number, type and purpose of U.S. tactical nuclear warheads located in Europe.

Requirement to develop standardization plans and present them to NATO

The committee also recommends that the Secretary of Defense should assess the costs and the loss of non-nuclear combat effectiveness of NATO military forces as a whole that is caused by failure of the NATO Allies, including the United States, to standardize weapons systems, ammunition, fuel and other military impedimenta for land, air and naval forces. The Secretary should further develop a list of standardization actions that would improve the overall NATO non-nuclear defense capability or save resources for the Alliance as a whole and should evaluate the priority and effect of each action. The Secretary of Defense should cause these assessments to be brought before the appropriate NATO bodies so that the specific actions and recommendations can become an integral part of the overall NATO review of force goals and development of force plans. The Secretary of Defense should report semi-annually to the Congress, beginning on January 31, 1975, on these assessments and the results achieved with the NATO Allies on actions to reduce NATO costs and improve conventional defense effectiveness through standardization.

Requirement to achieve any increase in strategic airlift manning through the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve rather than active duty Air Force

As part of its overall manpower reductions, the committee reduced the active duty manpower request for the Air Force by 8300 and the civilian manpower request for the Air Force by 1800 as a result of its decision that any increases in strategic airlift manning (C–5A and C–141 aircraft) should be achieved through the reserve components.

The Secretary of Defense is directed to develop a plan within 90 days to accomplish any increase in the strategic airlift crew ratio per aircraft to required levels by using the resources of the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve. This plan must include a) restructuring of the missions of the Air National Guard to retain an effective strategic airlift capability in the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve; b) using existing Air National Guard units to avoid losing existing skilled personnel in those units; c) alternative means of making aircraft available to but not necessarily under the control of the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve, including "hybridization", "association", rotation and transfer of aircraft; and d) a test of the "hybrid" concept at not less than two existing Air National Guard facilities.

Military Manpower Requirements

In making its review of overall military manpower the committee reviewed each of the major functional categories which require personnel. The following table shows how the Defense military manpower request is distributed among these categories.

DOD MILITARY MANPOWER REQUEST (ACTIVE DUTY END STRENGTHS, FISCAL YEAR 1975)

[In thousands]

	(Fiscal year 1973 (actual)	(Fiscal year 1974 (Plan)	(Fiscal year 1975 (request)
Strategic forces	124	123	115
General purpose forces	909	901	929
Land forces	512	513	537
Tactical air forces	165	169	169
Naval forces	190	178	176
Mobility forces	43	41	47
Auxiliary functions	162	156	139
Intelligence and security	63	56	48
Communications	47	49	40
Research and development	35	33	34
Support to other nations	4	5	5
Geophysical activities	14	13	13
Support functions	1,057	994	969
Base operating support	286	250	254
Training	394	402	379
Command/headquarters	99	93	90
Logistics	21	21	20
Personnel support	142	124	123
Medical support	101	90	88
Reserve component support	14	15	14
Total DOD	2,252	2,174	2,152
Army	801	782	785
Navy	564	551	540
Marine Corps	196	196	196
Air Force	691	645	630

Manpower and Force Structure

Last year the committee expressed its concern about the trend to fewer combat units but relatively more manpower. The sharp phasedown of force units and force levels below FY 1964 levels has not been matched by a corresponding phasedown of manpower and support levels. Although the FY 75 ratio of manpower to force units is still below that of FY 64, the FY 75 budget request included some increased force levels and a small decrease—22,000 or 1%—in manpower levels.

There is still much more to be done to produce more combat power out of available resources, but the committee is encouraged by the efforts that are being made. In particular the committee noted the increase between FY 74 and FY 75 of 13 Army combat battalions and 12 Navy ships which were manned with personnel saved from other activities.

It should be emphasized that the transfer of resources from support to combat uses alone is not a sufficient justification for authorization. It must also be demonstrated that the increase in combat resources is required and that the proposed method of using the increase is efficient. If these latter two criteria are not met, support reductions should be used to help keep down the overall defense budget.

The table below shows the forces upon which the military manpower levels are based. The committee fully expects its recommended reductions will not be taken from combat units but the reductions will be made in headquarters and support activities.

SUMMARY OF SELECTED ACTIVE MILITARY FORCES

	Actual, June 30, 1964	Actual, June 30, 1973	Estimated June 30, 1974	Estimated June 30, 1975
Strategic forces:				
Intercontinental ballistic missiles:				
Minuteman	600	1,000	1,000	1,000
Titan II	108	54	54	54
Polaris-Poseidon missiles	336	656	656	656
Strategic bomber squadrons	78	30	28	27
Manned fighter interceptor squadrons	40	7	7	6
Army air defense firing batteries	107	21	21	0
General-purpose forces:				
Land forces:				
Army divisions	16⅔	13	13	13⅓
Marine Corps divisions	3	3	3	3
Tactical air forces:				
Air Force wings	21	22	22	22
Navy attack wings	15	14	14	14
Marine Corps wings	3	3	3	3
Naval forces:				
Attack and antisubmarine carriers	24	16	14	15
Nuclear attack submarines	19	60	61	67
Other warships	368	242	186	191
Amphibious assault ships	133	66	65	65
Airlift and sealift forces:				
Strategic airlift squadrons:				
C-5A	0	4	4	4
C-141	0	13	13	13
Troopships, cargo ships, and tankers	101	53	32	32

Reducing Headquarters and Non-Essential Support

The major emphasis of the committee review and recommendation on manpower is to reduce headquarters and unneeded overhead and support. A substantial part of the committee reductions come from simply denying requested increases in these overhead areas. The Defense Department has mentioned plans and hopes to convert "fat into swords" and produce more combat effectiveness. But the budget request for FY 1975 particularly in view of requested increases in civilian and military personnel in headquarters and support areas, still shows considerable room for progress toward this end.

The committee sees that it is difficult for the Defense Department to cut back its own overhead. That tends to be a difficult task for private industry and other parts of the government as well. However, we are in a period that demands more than ever a lean and combat effective military establishment. Headquarters staffs, non-combat units and manning levels that are inefficient or that are not absolutely essential must be reduced to improve the combat effectiveness and reduce the cost of the military departments. The committee is determined to help the Defense Department accomplish that objective. This year's committee recommendations are aimed at moving toward that objective.

Overseas Troop Levels

For many years, the United States has maintained a substantial part of its military strength overseas. From 1952 to 1972, over 600,000 U.S. military personnel were stationed abroad. Since the late 1960's, there has been a steady decline of U.S. troops located overseas as is shown in the attached table.

U.S. MILITARY STRENGTH OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES

[End strengths in thousands]

	June 30, 1964	June 30, 1965	June 30, 1966	June 30, 1967	June 30, 1968	June 30, 1969	June 30, 1970	June 30, 1971	June 30, 1972	June 30, 1973	Dec. 31, 1973
Total outside the United States	*755*	*778*	*1,013*	*1,247*	*1,241*	*1,195*	*1,071*	*842*	*628*	*585*	*523*
U.S. territories and possessions [1]	36	34	37	39	41	41	37	38	33	43	31
Foreign countries	719	774	977	1,208	1,200	1,155	1,034	804	595	542	492
Total foreign afloat (included in foreign countries figure).	(129)	(142)	(132)	(156)	(117)	(94)	(120)	(83)	(87)	(73)	(55)
SELECTED AREAS:											
Southeast Asia	*21*	*103*	*322*	*529*	*622*	*622*	*472*	*287*	*133*	*53*	*36*
South Vietnam	17	60	268	449	534	539	415	239	47	(*)	(*)
Thailand	4	10	25	39	48	48	41	32	47	42	36
Afloat	NA	33	30	41	40	35	17	16	40	11	
Western Pacific	*222*	*194*	*212*	*215*	*238*	*220*	*211*	*166*	*142*	*146*	*136*
Japan	43	33	39	38	40	40	38	32	22	19	32
Philippines	15	16	26	28	28	27	24	19	17	16	16
Ryukyus Islands	46	35	39	42	39	43	43	47	43	38	23
South Korea	63	62	52	56	67	61	54	43	41	42	38
Taiwan	4	4	8	8	9	9	9	9	8	9	6
Afloat	52	45	47	43	54	40	43	16	11	22	21
Western Europe and related areas	*403*	*401*	*360*	*364*	*319*	*296*	*304*	*314*	*298*	*319*	*300*
Belgium				2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
France	34	32	28	2							
Germany	263	262	237	257	225	206	214	223	210	229	214
Iceland	3	2	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Italy	11	11	10	10	10	11	10	9	10	10	12
Greece	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	5	4
Greenland	4	3	2	1	1						
Libya	4	3	3	3	3	3					
Morocco	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1
Netherlands		1			2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Portugal (including Azores)	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1
Spain	11	9	9	10	9	10	8	9	9	9	10
Turkey	11	10	10	11	10	10	7	7	7	7	7
United Kingdom	26	20	20	25	24	23	21	21	22	21	21
Afloat	28	39	30	32	23	19	28	29	26	28	23
Other	2	1	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	1	(*)
Other Areas	*110*	*84*	*124*	*142*	*62*	*58*	*84*	*76*	*53*	*67*	*51*
Bermuda	3	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2
Canada	11	10	6	5	4	4	3	2	2	2	2
Cuba	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	3	3	3	3
Ethiopia	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1		1
Guam	8	7	9	12	15	12	11	9	11	16	9
Midway	2	1	1	1	1	1	1				
Panama Canal Zone	11	11	12	13	12	12	11	11	11	10	11
Puerto Rico	10	10	11	9	9	10	9	6	7	7	5
Afloat	49	25	51	40	*	*	34	28	11	18	13
Other	11	12	27	55	13	10	8	15	8	9	[2] 6

[1] Excludes afloat.
[2] Includes 1,006 Navy personnel in British Indian Ocean territory.
*Indicates service presence insufficient for round-off to 1,000.

Note.—Total may not add due to rounding.
( )Non-add figures.

31-683 O - 74

The DoD manpower request for fiscal year 1975 included the following overseas troops levels:

REQUESTED OVERSEAS MILITARY MANPOWER [1]

[In thousands]

	End fiscal year—	
	1974	1975
Total military manpower	2,174	2,152
Total United States, territories and possessions, Southeast Asia [2]	1,694	1,674
Europe and related areas	319	319
Western Pacific	153	153
Other Foreign Countries/areas	9	9
Navy/Marine Corps forces deployed afloat included in above	(64)	(64)
Total Foreign Countries/areas, less Southeast Asia	481	481

[1] All geographic areas include Navy and Marine Corps units afloat in those areas.
[2] Southeast Asia strengths have been included here due to security classification.

Overseas Headquarters

The committee was particularly interested this year in headquarters overseas, largely because the fiscal year 1974 committee report had recommended a 30% reduction in certain headquarters, mostly overseas, by June 30, 1974. The reductions, which were recommended in conjunction with an overall manpower reduction, were not made mandatory, allowing the commanding officers in the headquarters flexibility in apportioning the reductions. But, the report cautioned, "this flexibility should not be construed as a means of avoiding the achievement of significant personnel reductions."

The DOD manpower request included a 7% reduction as of June 30, 1974, compared to the 30% this committee recommended. And the reduction planned to be completed by DOD as of June 30, 1975, totals 11%, still far less than 30%.

The committee did not recommend a 30% reduction frivolously or without study. Our judgment on the subject has not changed. Headquarters staffs and organizations, including these overseas, can and should be reduced.

The following table details the strength reductions as of June 30, 1974, and June 30, 1975, in the headquarters specified in the FY 74 Committee report. It should be noted that the staffs of some headquarters have increased rather than decreased.

COMPARISON OF THE FISCAL YEAR 1974 COMMITTEE REPORT AND DOD ACTION ON SPECIFIC HEADQUARTERS

Headquarters	Last year's Committee report		DOD fiscal year 1975 budget request			
	Strengths	Suggested Reduction	June 30, 1974	Change	June 30, 1975	Change
EUROPE						
SHAPE	4,827		4,766	−61	4,555	−272
EUCOM	885		838	−47	837	−48
USAREUR	1,195		1,009	−186	1,009	−186
V Corps	328		289	−39	289	−39
VII Corps	355		320	−35	320	−35
USAFE	1,565		1,538	−27	1,276	−289
7th AR	43		42	−1	38	−5
NAVBER	190		196	+6	196	+6
PACIFIC						
CINCPAC	1,082		1,063	−19	1,031	−51
PACAF	1,260		1,188	−72	1,091	−169
PACFLEET	471		482	+11	478	+7
ARPAC	924		837	−87	837	−87
FMFPAC	784		751	−33	743	−41
UNKOR	312		341	+29	341	+29
8th AR	846		879	+33	803	−43
I Corps	92		131	+39	131	+39
UNITED STATES						
REDCOM	395		396	+1	396	+1
NORAD	806		804	−2	802	−2
ADC	1,434		1,008	−426	967	−467
WSEG	88		79	−9	79	−9
Total	18,194	−5,500	16,957	−1,237	16,219	−1,975
Cumulative percent reduction		−30		−7		−11

11,000 Reduction of Overseas Headquarters and Non-Combat Units

For fiscal year 1975, the committee stresses that it believes headquarters reductions should continue as recommended last year, certainly at a higher rate than is reflected in the planned 11% figure. Overseas headquarters particularly should be reduced.

Headquarters are only part of the operating "overhead" of military units. The committee believes that some support or non-combat units can be cut from the overall force without impairing its fighting capability.

U.S. forces in general, but especially U.S. forces overseas, are known to be heavy in support, or as having a low teeth-to-tail ratio. This committee does not deny the necessity of support and administrative personnel, but we do stress our interest in an improved combat/support ratio that would mean the defense dollar was buying more combat than support.

Accordingly, the committee suggests an 11,000 man reduction in overseas headquarters and non-combat units.

One theme of this report is buying the most and best defense possible with every dollar spent. Reducing headquarters and non-combat units, especially overseas, will contribute significantly to this goal.

Two examples of areas where the committee feels reductions could be accomplished are Europe and Korea.

Europe

The European headquarters mentioned in last year's report have only been reduced 4%, with a 9% reduction planned by June 30, 1975. The committee believes that further reductions in European headquarters would be reasonable.

The committee believes that a part of the 11,000 man reduction could occur in headquarters and non-combat units in Europe. Using combat battalions the combat-to-support ratio in U.S. Army forces is currently 41/59, obviously heavy in support. A small reduction from the support tail would not subtract from the fighting capability of the force and, hopefully, would serve as the first step in restructuring Army forces in Europe to produce more combat capability.

It should be stressed that the Army is mentioned here only as an example because it has the largest share of troops in Europe. The reduction should be apportioned by the Secretary of Defense among the manpower levels of all four Services in Europe.

The 319,000 American military personnel authorized in Europe do not represent a magic number. This committee believes it is time to assess the fighting capability of the force, and strengthen it wherever possible without adding forces. It is in the spirit of constructive criticism that a recommendation is made to reduce the U.S. support forces in Europe. This should not be construed as a waning of support for NATO, the beginning of major reductions in Europe, or lack of support for the MBFR talks.

Korea

The fiscal year 1974 report of this committee suggested a 50 percent reduction in the three U.S. headquarters in Korea. The committee is surprised that, as of June 30, 1974, 100 people will have been added to these headquarters, representing an 8 percent increase.

The committee looked at the overall U.S. force structure in Korea and determined that the overstaffing in headquarters is part of a larger problem. Using the Army again as an example, U.S. Army forces in Korea have a combat/support ratio of 37/63. Of the 63 percent representing noncombat units, about one-quarter are headquarters and administrative units.

Last year Secretary Richardson said that further U.S. withdrawal from Korea should be phased with the completion of the $1.5 billion Korean modernization program begun in 1971. As of this year—fiscal year 1974—that program is reported to be 58 percent complete. The requested Army strength for Korea in fiscal year 1975 has not been reduced.

Secretary Schlesinger this year said that there have been no major improvements in North Korean force size or improvement. In the manpower hearings, DOD stated that South Korean ground forces are now adequate for defense against North Korea.

Based on the South Korean's credible defense capability in ground forces, the 58 percent completion of the Modernization Program, and the fact that the U.S. Army forces in South Korea are even heavier in support than other U.S. Army forces, a reduction in U.S. forces in Korea is reasonable and unprecipitous. As a reasonable first step, a 15 percent reduction in headquarters and noncombat units in South Korea is suggested. Such a reduction would be aimed at improving the efficiency of U.S. forces remaining in Korea and would in no way diminish their effectiveness.

31-683—74——10

NATO Amendments

The committee remains convinced that the United States' commitment to NATO is vital to U.S. security and interests. But it believes that at this time of a changing strategic balance, rising costs, changing technology and reduced tensions it is more important than ever that a hard look be taken at the NATO Alliance and at the U.S. participation in the Alliance. It is of real interest and concern to the Committee that action be taken to realize the following objectives:—that the size, structure, and deployment of U.S. NATO forces be as efficient and economical as possible consistent with adequate conventional defense;—that maximum emphasis be placed on conventional defense and deterrence to minimize the risk of nuclear confrontation; and—that the fullest cooperation be obtained from the Allies to maximize use of resources and to equalize burden sharing.

Three amendments requiring positive steps toward the above objectives were offered by Senator Nunn and adopted unanimously by the committee.

The three NATO amendments form a package designed to enhance the non-nuclear potential of NATO forces in Europe and start toward putting the U.S. NATO posture on more of a long term basis. Each is directed at a critical problem of the Alliance with a certainty that the problems are solvable and are worth solving because NATO is basically a strong and, in the opinion of the committee, vital alliance.

Reports to Congress are required on the three subjects so Congress can be kept informed of progress or lack of progress.

A. Improving the Tooth-to-Tail Ratio in Europe

This amendment reflects the committee consensus that U.S. NATO forces are too heavy in headquarters and non-combat units relative to combat personnel. It mandates a 20% reduction in the number of U.S. Army support troops in Europe, amounting to some 23,000 troops and phasing the reduction over a two-year period. Because the committee feels that U.S. forces in Europe can and should be restructured to increase combat capability, the amendment allows the combat strength of the Army in Europe to be increased by the number of non-combat positions cut. Any such increase must be made in units of battalion size or smaller, assuring that these increments will be in real fighting strength.

The amendment affects only the Army since it is the largest component in Europe, but it is expected that the other Services will take action in line with the intent of this amendment.

The committee feels it would be unwise to make a large unilateral reduction in U.S. forces in Europe at this time for several reasons:

(1) The MBFR talks would be damaged. Since they appear to be making progress, it makes sense to wait at least until the end of this year to see if an agreement takes shape.

(2) In adopting the Jackson-Nunn Amendment last year Congress made an implied undertaking to maintain our conventional support in NATO if our allies would assume their fair share of the burden. Negotiations are still underway and we are told the outlook is optimistic. Going back on this arrangement now would be irresponsible.

(3) Reducing our conventional forces would seriously lower the nuclear threshold. When we had assured strategic nuclear superiority, our tactical nuclear force was an effective deterrent to a conventional Soviet attack. With strategic parity and expanded Soviet tactical nuclear capabilities this is no longer true. Neither side can afford the risks of initiating a nuclear conflict. Our tactical weapons are necessary to deter a Soviet tactical nuclear attack, but only a strong conventional capability can deter a conventional attack.

B. Developing a Tactical Nuclear Policy in Europe

This amendment prohibits any increase in the number of U.S. tactical warheads in Europe except in the event of imminent hostilities and directs the Secretary of Defense to study our tactical nuclear policy and posture to ensure that it is coordinated within the Alliance and is fully consistent with a strong conventional defense. The study must also consider the numbers and types of weapons that could be reduced.

The present U.S. posture on tactical nuclear weapons in Europe does not appear to reflect current and comprehensive policy determinations; it seems to be more of an accumulation of kinds and numbers of weapons over a long period of time. The number, dispersal and variety of tactical weapons and the high alert status we maintain is probably a destabilizing factor lowering the nuclear threshold. The committee believes that NATO needs a convincing nuclear deterrent but that we cannot afford the unnecessary risk of too many nuclear weapons in Europe or too great a readiness to use them.

The amendment assures that a comprehensive review of the situation will be completed and that Congress will get, by way of semi-annual reports, the facts and rationale of U.S. policy on tactical nuclear warheads in Europe.

C. NATO Standardization Amendment

This amendment is directed at improving commonality and standardization in weapons, equipment and support systems in NATO. It directs the Secretary of Defense (a) to assess the consequences in cost and loss of combat effectiveness of failures to standardize, (b) to make specific proposals for common action and (c) to work within NATO to make standardization in research, development, procurement and support an integral part of the NATO planning process. He must report progress to Congress every six months beginning January 31, 1975.

The failure to standardize has multiplied NATO costs and undercut combat effectiveness. The former Head of the NATO Military Committee has estimated that 50% of the $20 billion spent annually by NATO countries for research and development is on duplication.

The NATO navies have 100 different ships of destroyer or larger classes, 36 different types of radars for fire control, and 40 different types of guns of 30 mm or larger caliber. NATO forces at sea cannot replenish expended weapons unless each nation's own logistics replenishes its own forces. Fuel for NATO tactical aircraft has been standardized but there is not yet standard equipment for transferring the fuel into the fighters. And many airfields, NATO and national, can only resupply and reload aircraft from that country, meaning that if a

plane landed after expending its munitions, it may not be able to take off again. Guns are not of uniform caliber; command and control systems differ. In short, each ally must have its own logistics tail and inventory of spare parts.

With greater commonality, NATO could strengthen its defense while reducing its defense expenditures. It is the Committee's judgment that standardization offers a great potential for improving NATO's defense capabilities.

Reduction of Training Staffs and Overhead

The Defense Department request for manpower included some 528,000 military and civilian personnel for the formal, individual training establishment. This does not include the manpower used in combat or other functional units where training is also conducted. The request included the following manpower in each Service.

FISCAL YEAR 1975 DOD TRAINING MANPOWER REQUEST

[Military and civilian in thousands]

	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force	Total
Students	113	79	25	56	273
Staffs and overhead	73	53	14	37	177
Base support	49	2		27	78
Total	235	134	39	120	528

Overall, there is a very high proportion of staffs, overhead and support personnel compared to the student load in the Department of Defense. For example, using only staff and overhead personnel in the above table, the ratio of students per staff in each Service is shown below:

Students per staff:

Army	1.6 to 1
Navy	1.5 to 1
Marine Corps	1.8 to 1
Air Force	1.6 to 1
Total DOD	1.6 to 1

If training base support personnel were included in the above ratios, it would reduce the overall Defense Department ratio to almost one instructor or staff man for every student. That is much more than other school systems in the country. For comparison, student to staff ratios for several kinds of non-Defense schools are shown below:

Students per staff:

Public high schools	18.9 to 1
Public post high school vocational schools	From 4.6 to 2 to 70.4 to 1
Private post high school vocational schools	From 28.6 to 6 to 123.7 to 1
Colleges	15.0 to 1
Local school system	15.0 to 1

The committee is aware of the fact that military training differs substantially from the training and education in the civilian sector. It is also aware of the accounting differences that make exact comparisons difficult. However, the difference in staffing is so wide, the committee believes that much more can be done to tighten down on staffs and overhead for training. As a minimum, the committee feels

that the following avenues should be vigorously pursued to achieve reductions in training manpower and expects a report on actions taken in each area prior to the FY 1976 manpower request.

Reduction of the levels of staffing in training activities.

Consolidation of schools and courses to eliminate duplication within each service and between Defense components.

Use of educational technology to substitute equipment for training personnel.

Use of improved systems for on-the-job training instead of formal individual training.

Reduction in the scope of career development education as opposed to job related skill development.

The committee believes that by the end of FY 1975, the Department of Defense should reduce military and civilian training manpower by about 7% from the requested levels.

Base Support Personnel

The Department of Defense manpower request included some 576,000 military and civilian personnel for base operating support. This support includes the many varied functions involved in operating bases for active duty and reserve military and civilian personnel and their dependents. It includes such things as operating commissaries, laundries and theatres, providing base transportation, supply and food service, building and road maintenance and construction, providing utilities, fire and police services and running the base headquarters and administrative activities.

Since FY 1973, the Department of Defense has announced 463 base closures or realignment actions that have eliminated 69,400 military and civilian jobs. However, these reductions are not reflected in the DoD manpower request for base support personnel. In some areas, the DoD request included substantial increases above current levels of base support personnel as shown in the table below.

BASE OPERATING SUPPORT REDUCTION

[Military and civilian manpower in thousands]

	June 30, 1973, actual	Dec. 31, 1973, actual	June 30, 1974, plan	June 30, 1975, request
Army	183	163	178	183
Navy	103	101	101	105
Marine Corps	34	31	31	31
Air Force	267	260	253	250
Defense agencies	7	7	7	7
Total DOD:				
Military	286	262	250	255
Civilian	308	300	320	321
Total	594	562	570	576

The Defense Department said that the Military Departments had been authorized to increase the direct *combat* strength of the armed forces by using the manpower freed by base consolidation actions. However, the DoD manpower request included increases in base support. The Committee felt that these increases should not be authorized since the base realignment actions had already been ac-

complished. This resulted in a reduction of some 28,000 military and civilian personnel from the DoD request, or about 5% of the total base support manpower requested.

Medical Support Personnel

The DoD manpower request included some 129,000 military and civilian personnel for medical support. These are personnel for "fixed site" medical facilities such as hospitals and include all the various kinds of people from doctors to administrative clerks who operate these facilities. This category does not include the medical personnel and units that directly support Army and Marine divisions, Navy ships or Air Force direct support clinics and dispensaries. Although the overall number of military personnel has declined and the Defense Department reported a decrease in medical workload (i.e. patients), the DoD request included an overall increase in the number of medical support personnel and in the ratio of medical support personnel to military manpower.

The committee felt that the number and proportion of medical support personnel in the military services should not be increased. The committee has no intention of decreasing medical care, but there are compelling reasons to hold up increases in medical support personnel at this time.

First, a major study of Health Personnel is underway with participation of Defense, HEW and the Office of Management and Budget. This study, which is to be completed in late 1974, will examine the requirements for medical personnel and is seeking to find ways of making Defense health care delivery more efficient. The reduction would hold medical support at current levels until the study is completed.

Second, medical personnel are difficult to recruit and retain in an all-volunteer situation. The reduction would deny increases in medical support until the recruiting situation is clearer and there is more experience with the medical bonus.

Third, defense medical costs have been increasing rapidly. "Fixed site" medical support costs totaled $1.6 Billion in FY 1970 compared with $2.8 Billion in FY 1975. These medical costs on a per man basis have risen from $470 per man in FY 1970 to $1280 per man in FY 1975—up 2.7 times.

The committee reduction totalling 4000, or about 3% of the requested military and civilian manpower, would hold medical support personnel at current proportions.

Army General Purpose Force Manpower

The military manpower request for FY 1975 included 450,000 personnel for general purpose forces (or an increase of some 17,000). These forces include the Army's combat battalions and other divisional units, but also include a good many non-combat support units. A summary of the manpower for these various units, together with requested increases and decreases is shown below.

ARMY, GENERAL PURPOSE FORCE MANPOWER, FISCAL YEARS

[Military manpower in thousands]

	1974 manpower	1975 budget request manpower	Change
General purpose forces	433	450	+17
Divisions	195	196	+1
Separate combat brigades, battalions, etc	47	56	+9
Air defense units	22	22	
Missile units	10	9	−1
Engineer units	22	23	+1
Aviation units	11	11	
Electronic warfare/communication	19	18	−1
Special ammo control	5	5	
Intelligence support		6	+6
Combat support units	8	8	
Field army support	76	78	+2
Theatre support	16	16	

The committee applauds the Army's effort to increase the number of combat battalions by reducing support activities. The Army has made some real progress in this regard. As can be seen above, about 10,000 of the increase requested in general purpose force manpower is for 13 combat battalions, both within and separate from divisions. However, the table also shows an increase of some 9000 personnel for various non-combat units. The Committee questions whether all of this latter increase is needed. Reducing support in one accounting category and increasing it in another does not achieve the result of restructuring Army forces to produce more combat power.

Marine Corps Manpower Reductions

In addition to the military manpower reductions in other functional areas, the Committee noted a requested increase of 14,000, or 20%, for Marine Corps manpower for land forces above current levels as shown below:

Marine Corps Land Force Manpower (military manpower in thousands) (excluding tactical air and support):

June 30, 1973	75
Dec. 31, 1973	71
June 30, 1974 (plan)	77
June 30, 1975 (request)	85

This increase is explained by several factors. First, current land force strength is below planned strength, largely because of recruiting shortfalls. Second, the Marines want to increase the manning of some support units within their divisions. Third, the Marines plan to increase the strength of each rifle company. The overall effect of these changes would be to bring Marine land force manning levels up to about 93% of their revised plan for a peacetime structure.

The committee commends the Marine Corps' usual practice of emphasizing combat power. However, the Marine Corps is about 7000 below their total strength objectives and is expected to fall as much as 12,000 short of their end FY 1974 strength target of 196,000. Just to stay even with their end FY 1974 strength, Marines will have to recruit some 7000 more men in FY 1975 than they recruited in FY 1974. The committee is concerned that by increasing their planned strength objective for land forces in 1975, the Marines may be driven

to accepting lower quality personnel with an attendant loss of effectiveness and increase in discipline and other personnel problems. The committee strongly believes the Marine Corps should not sacrifice quality for quantity and should concentrate on maintaining their long-standing tradition of a ready, top quality, small, fighting force. The small reduction in Marine Corps requested strength would still allow the Marine Corps to substantially increase its combat strength above the current actual level, but would hold down the amount of the increase until it is clear the Marine Corps can achieve this higher strength level with top quality personnel.

Air Force Strategic Airlift Manpower

The committee adopted an amendment proposed by Senator Nunn to improve the back-up crew strength for emergency use of the strategic airlift. The amendment requires that such increases be made with Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve personnel, thus providing for the Guard and Reserve a meaningful role with an important and vital mission.

For FY 1975, the Department of Defense requested 8300 active duty personnel and civilians to provide increased strategic airlift capability in the event of an emergency. As there is no peacetime operational requirement for the crews, the Committee considered it logical to utilize the resources of the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve to fulfill the requirement. Such an action could save as much as $100 million per year or more in defense expenditures.

Specifically, the amendment:

(*a*) Reduces the *active* Air Force end strength request by 8300 positions, the operational and support positions included for the crew increase.

(*b*) Reduces the civilian end strength of the Air Force by 1800 positions, the number of new civilian slots associated with the increase.

(*c*) Expresses the sense of Congress that any increase in the ratio of air crew to aircraft for the Air Force strategic airlift mission above the present ratio of 2.00 active duty crew members and 1.25 Reserve force crew members per aircraft should be achieved through the components of the Selected Reserve.

(*d*) Directs the Secretary of Defense to develop a plan for meeting increased manpower requirements for strategic airlift jointly from the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard, and to submit the plan to the Congress together with his comments and recommendations within 90 days from enactment. The amendment requires the plan to include: (1) proposals for restructuring Air National Guard missions and using existing units in order to avoid loss of present skills; (2) plans for making adequate aircraft available to the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard for this mission whether by transfer, rotation, "hybridization", "association" or otherwise; (3) plans for instituting the hybridization program on a test basis at two or more Air National Guard facilities. The amendment directs the Secretary of Defense to delay implementation until after this plan has been submitted to Congress.

"Hybridization" and "association" are two concepts of assigning reserve component units to active forces for use in strategic airlift using aircraft which remain under control of MAC (Military Airlift

Command). This allows reserve crews to train and participate in the world-wide air-lift system. Associate units are colocated with MAC units, training in peacetime with MAC aircraft, and manned to augment MAC upon mobilization. Hybrid units are attached to, but not colocated with, MAC units. As separate reserve units, the hybrid units would operate at their own bases in peacetime, but with aircraft on loan from MAC on a rotating schedule. Like associate units, on the other hand, they are manned to merge with and augment MAC upon mobilization.

Rising costs of military personnel and the constraints of the All Volunteer Army demand that we utilize the lower cost but high skill personnel of the Reserve and National Guard as fully as possible under the Total Force Policy. DOD's request to establish a wartime surge crew capability through increases in the active force flies straight in the face of this policy. This amendment indicates the Committee's interest in bringing the components of the Selected Reserve into the Total Force in a meaningful way. If practical problems exist which limit these possibilities, the amendment would require that they be addressed directly.

All-Volunteer Force

There is neither sufficient experience nor adequate evidence upon which to base final judgments about the success or failure of the volunteer concept. Overall, testimony by Department of Defense officials is a basis for encouragement. On the other hand, the statistical indicators remain mixed—recruiting shortfalls experienced over the past year in the Army and Marine Corps are of concern to the committee. Serious questions remain as to whether or not these services can attract sufficient numbers of "quality" recruits in the future.

The measures of quality remain ambiguous. The committee has previously expressed concern over the lack of adequate yardsticks for measuring quality and on several occasions encouraged the Department of Defense to develop better predictors of job performance. To date, there is little evidence that such yardsticks have been developed.

Also of concern to the committee are the potential implications of the decline that will occur in the source of supply of military volunteers as a result of declining birth rates. After the male population (ages 17–22) levels off over the next several years, it will start to decline in the early 1980s, bottoming out in 1987 at about 12 percent below 1974 levels, before turning upward again in the 1990s. Although future military manpower needs are uncertain, this decrease in the supply of available manpower can be expected to have a significant impact on the magnitude of the recruiting task. Early attention should be directed toward this problem area. The Secretary of Defense is requested to provide a report to the committee on or before December 1, 1974, which provides estimates of the need for and availability of volunteers for each Service for the next 10 to 15 years. The report should also estimate the feasibility and highlight the anticipated problems of continuing the volunteer system through that period.

Many questions have been raised over the past year concerning the representativeness of the all-volunteer force. Evidence provided to date—though sketchy—suggests that the volunteer forces are dispro-

portionately represented geographically, economically, and racially. While the implications of such imbalances remain unclear, it is important that adequate data be collected by the Department of Defense. Accordingly, the Department of Defense is requested to provide to this committee by December 1, 1974 for fiscal 1974, and annually thereafter, the distribution of recruits by service, whether urban or rural by state, by racial background, and by annual family earnings broken down in appropriate categories. It is recognized that family earning data may not be available now. Sample survey results should be used until such data can be collected on a routine basis.

Concern for Manpower Management

This bill authorizes the total military personnel strengths for each Service based on the requirements to do the many various jobs within the Defense Department. It does not specify the individuals who are assigned to the various jobs. How well the jobs get done depends on the quality of the individuals and how well they are managed. The committee in its review noted two problems in this regard. First, according to Defense Department and GAO estimates, the authorized strengths for FY 1974 will probably not be achieved in the Army, Navy and Marine Corps. This is the result of recruiting shortfalls in the volunteer environment and, in part, inaccuracies in the personnel accounting system. The overall shortfall is expected to be 20,000 to 30,000 men (about 1%).

This strength shortfall is compounded by malassignment of personnel by the personnel assignment system. The net result of both problems is that combat units tend to be undermanned, while support units tend to be overmanned. For example, in December 1973, while total military strengths was still about 27,000 above the end FY 74 target, the general purpose forces were undermanned by 30,000 and support was overmanned by 57,000 compared to the end FY 74 target strengths. The committee expects the Department of Defense and the Military Services to adopt policies and procedures that will properly account for personnel strengths and assign personnel to the various functions that have been authorized. Priority should be given to the combat units by the assignment procedures.

Improvements in the Annual Manpower Requirements Report

The statutory manpower requirements report continues to be a key part of the justification for the Defense request for military and civilian manpower requirements. Therefore, it is essential that the format and categories used in that report be consistent from year to year and the definitions of each category be improved. This year's report included some new major categories which added little to the overall prospective and some changes in categories which tended to confuse the presentation. Such non-essential changes simply weaken the overall justification.

The unit annex provided with this year's report at committee request was useful in strengthening the report and should be continued in the future. The committee requests that manpower numbers be rounded to the nearest tenths of thousands (eg: 396.4 thousand) in future manpower reports and unit annexes.

The committee believes a major effort is needed to improve the definition of the various manpower planning categories of the manpower report. This effort should have the following objectives: 1) to improve the connection between the planning categories and actual units in the field, 2) to improve the definition of support and identify support units, 3) to develop broad standards that relate the amount of support with the forces support, 4) to make the categories used by each Service consistent, 5) to relate locations (eg: overseas troops) to the various planning categories. However, the committee requests the Defense Department not to make any changes in the manpower report until such proposed changes have been fully reviewed by the committee staff and the committee has been provided a complete crosswalk from the current categories to the proposed new definitions.

TITLE IV—RESERVE FORCES

Summary of request

In the Fiscal Year 1975 budget the Department of Defense requested authorization for an average strength total of 892,066 personnel to make up the seven Selected Reserve forces of the Reserve Components. This proposed force structure is 96,293 less than requested in FY 1973 when the force was manned at higher levels because of draft-induced accessions.

The budget request, broken out by Reserve Components, was as follows:

Army National Guard	379, 848
Army Reserve	215, 842
Naval Reserve	107, 526
Marine Corps Reserve	36, 703
Air National Guard	89, 128
Air Force Reserve	51, 319
Coast Guard Reserve	11, 700

Sectional analysis

Section 401.—Establishes the annual average strength at which the Reserve Forces are to be programmed for the fiscal year.

Section 402.—Provides for proportionate reduction of any Reserve component by the total authorized strength of units of that component which are on active duty (other than for training) at any time during the fiscal year. This proportionate reduction is applicable also to the total number of individual members, not in units, serving on active duty without their consent during the fiscal year. When units and/or individuals are released from active duty, proportionate increases are permitted.

Committee Increases Requests

The committee recommends approval of the manning levels requested in the budget for the Marine Corps, Air Force and Coast Guard Reserve and increases in the other four Reserve Components. The discussion below sets forth the reasons for the higher figures approved by the committee.

Personnel Turbulence

This year the committee was faced with unusual circumstances impacting on Selected Reserve strength levels which hopefully will not recur.

The following factors interplayed in the committee's efforts to determine the exact size of Reserve strengths required for fiscal year 1975.

1. The average strengths requested in the budget were determined in the Fall of 1973 when personnel levels were unstable and generally declining as a result of expiration of the induction authority.

Thus, the request was tied to "recruiting ability" rather than actual requirements. In Fiscal Year 1973 and prior, Reserve strength was at higher levels because of draft induced enlistments.

2. Testimony during committee hearings resulted in requests by the individual Reserve and Guard Chiefs for higher manning levels than those in the budget. These requests were based on favorable results from recruiting drives conducted after the budget figures were fixed. Such additions were in conflict with Defense Department estimates and required appropriation increases approaching $100 million.

3. The Defense Department announced plans to reduce the Army Reserve Component force structure by 48,000 spaces but could not identify for the committee the types of units to be phased out or the distribution of the cut between the Army Guard and Army Reserve.

Overall Committee Position

In general, the committee in certain components favored higher levels than those requested in the budget and acted accordingly. These increases were allowed because the committee feels the Reserve Components can recruit to higher levels than those requested in the budget and there is a justifiable requirement for higher manning levels.

The committee took special exception to the Defense Department proposal to reduce the personnel of five units of the Air Guard in fiscal year 1975. Thus, the number of personnel in the 5 Air Guard units to be eliminated was restored. The committee directs that these trained personnel be utilized in the Air Guard program through the most economical and meaningful plan possible.

Also, the committee will once again ask the Defense Department for a detailed justification and identification of the Army Guard and Army Reserve units to be eliminated as a result of the 48,000 force structure reduction directed by the Secretary of Defense. This report will be considered during Conference with the House members when the manning levels of the two Houses are resolved for final submission to the Congress.

Current State of the Reserve

During hearings on the FY 1975 requests the committee gave special attention to the current state of the Reserve Components as regards personnel, equipment and readiness.

Personnel

While the committee was encouraged regarding the recent upsurge in manning levels, emphasis was placed on quality of personnel as opposed to numbers. With the increasing sophistication of weapon systems it is felt that the best quality individual available should be aggressively sought by the recruiting offices. All Reserve Chiefs expressed continued concern that over three-fourths of the new accessions were still coming from prior service personnel. While these individuals are already trained and represented cost savings in that regard, this particular source of reserve manning will eventually decline as active force levels stabilize. If the Reserve Components are to be properly manned in the future more new accessions will be necessary. The committee feels special study should be given to this problem. Shorter enlistments and shorter initial training periods are two approaches the committee feels have not yet been adequately tested.

While additional incentives to attract and hold personnel may eventually be required, the committee desires that low cost administrative procedures should be fully exploited before more expensive approaches are considered.

The committee was impressed with the results of the Army Guard and Army Reserve recruiting campaigns during Fiscal Year 1974. Based on these reports the average strength requests of both components were increased.

The Air Guard request was increased for reasons already explained.

The Navy Reserve request was also increased, as was the case last year. The committee continues to express concern relative to the Naval Reserve strength reductions. These reductions in the past two years take the Naval Reserve well below requirements and are obviously based on budgetary considerations irregardless of mission requirements.

Equipment

Despite significant advances in equipping the Reserve Forces the committee feels the Department of Defense is lacking in an aggressive program in this area.

The Army Guard Chief testified, "All of our major organizations are limited by resource constraints to authorized equipage levels of 3 on a scale of 1 to 4, with 1 being complete equipment fill." Thus, regardless of the quality of training or manning strengths, necessary readiness levels cannot be reached.

The Naval Reserve is still hampered by having to use the old C–118 aircraft for transportation. Replacement of these aircraft should be given highest priority.

Another example of constraints on the Naval Reserve is the order to transfer in FY 1975 10,000 personnel from Pay Group A (48 drills) to Pay Group B (24 drills). A similar transfer in FY 1974 of 2,000 personnel resulted in over 60% of the enlisted men withdrawing from the program. The Naval Reserve Chief testified if this order was not withdrawn the program could not meet the manning levels requested in the budget.

The committee also took note of the fact that all air elements of the Reserve Components were severely hampered by the total shutdown of flying during the energy crisis. Reduced levels now in effect limit the ability of these units to attain acceptable readiness levels and also increase the risk of accidents.

Actions by the Congress in recent years such as adding aircraft to the budget designated for the Air Guard are steps which the Defense Department should be taking on its own initiative in order that a more efficient equippage will take place.

Availability of Reserve Components

In the event of a national emergency the President has the authority to call to active duty up to 1 million members of the Reserve Components.

With the expiration of the induction authority the Reserve and Guard have now become the first line source of manpower in the event of any mobilization requirement. International events may require limited call-ups but commitment to combat of any military person-

nel are subject to the new controls embodied in the War Powers legislation enacted by the Congress in 1973.

The committee which has promoted fullest possible support for Reserve and Guard forces thus expects these forces to be available for call-up at any time. This availability of Reserve Components greatly strengthens our national defense posture and enables us to provide a reasonably large force at an economical cost.

Transfer of Missions

The committee also has included language in the bill and in the report relative to utilization of Reserve Component resources in meeting the required expansion of the strategic airlift mission.

This provision is included in Section 302 of the bill and is explained fully in Title III of the Report.

Future of Guard and Reserve

Events in recent years have placed additional responsibilities on Guard and Reserve forces. With rising manpower costs the Guard and Reserve offer to the nation an economical way of maintaining necessary levels of preparedness at minimum costs.

With these views in mind, the committee awaits the findings of the major study directed last year by the present Secretary of Defense and a special Air Guard, Air Reserve study directed by this committee.

It is recognized that some realignment of all components may be prudent. However, in this context the committee favors utilization of on-board manpower to the fullest extent possible. These trained resources should be shifted to any new requirements which may be identified. The Secretary of Defense has indicated this would be his policy and the committee fully supports this position.

Cost of Reserve Components

Although the provisions of this bill are not concerned directly with cost, the committee believes it desirable to show an overview of the anticipated costs for the Reserve components during fiscal year 1975. These costs, by budget element, representing an increase of $324.1 million over fiscal year 1974, are shown in the following chart:

FISCAL YEAR 1975 RESERVE COMPONENTS PRESIDENT'S BUDGET

[Dollar amounts in millions]

	Personnel [1]	O. & M.	Construction	Subtotal	Procurement [2]	Total
Army National Guard	$621.7	$608.4	$59.0	$1,289.1	$361.3	$1,650.4
Army Reserve	490.6	279.7	43.7	814.0	([3])	814.0
Naval Reserve	209.7	238.4	20.8	468.9	8.3	477.2
Marine Corps Reserve	73.0	11.4	([4])	84.4	43.7	128.1
Air National Guard	198.6	596.1	30.0	824.7	47.0	871.7
Air Force Reserve	148.5	278.2	16.0	442.7	17.5	460.2
Total	1,742.1	2,012.2	169.5	3,923.8	477.8	4,401.6
Active personnel support for Reserve components						317.4
Grand total						4,719.0

[1] Does not include active personnel support for Reserve components.
[2] Distribution of procured equipment is accomplished by separate schedule and extends over several years.
[3] Included in Army National Guard procurement.
[4] Included in Naval Reserve construction.

Committee Approved Strengths

The average strengths as recommended by the Army, Navy, Air Force, Department of Transportation and Department of Defense for Fiscal Year 1975 are shown on the chart below. Also shown are the manning levels approved in Fiscal Years 1973, 1974 and those recommended by the Senate Committee for 1975.

RESERVE PERSONNEL AUTHORIZATION CHART

	Congress authorized in fiscal year 1973	Congress authorized in fiscal year 1974	Requested in budget, fiscal year 1975	Senate action
Army Guard	402,333	379,144	379,848	390,000
Army Reserve	261,300	232,591	215,842	220,000
Naval Reserve	129,000	119,231	107,526	110,000
Marine Reserve	45,016	39,735	36,703	36,703
Air National Guard	87,614	92,291	89,128	93,412
Air Force Reserve	51,296	49,773	51,319	51,319
Total, DOD	976,559	912,765	880,366	901,434
Coast Guard Reserve	11,800	11,300	11,700	11,700

TITLE V—CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

Background.—Under 10 U.S.C. Sec. 138, the Congress is required for the first time this year to authorize the civilian personnel end fiscal year strength for each of the components of the Defense Department. The Committee held hearings in open session on March 21, 22, 26; and April 11, 1974 and heard testimony from Defense Department manpower experts on the civilian personnel strengths requested by the Department of Defense for Fiscal Year 1975. Based on this testimony, the information provided in the annual Manpower Requirements Report for FY 1975 submitted by the Department of Defense and other information provided to the Committee, the staff has conducted a comprehensive review and analysis of civilian personnel requirements.

Committee Recommendations

Reduction of 44,600 in civilian manpower strengths—a 4% reduction

For the reasons discussed below, the committee recommends reductions totaling 44,600, about 4%, from the Defense Department request for civilian strength at the end of FY 1975. The Defense Department request included an increase of about 29,000 above the actual on-board strength of 998,000 as of June 30, 1973 and totalled 1,027,300. The Committee recommendations would reduce the requested strength to 982,700 by the end of FY 1975. The Committee recommendations on the civilian strength for each Defense component is shown below:

CIVILIAN EMPLOYEE STRENGTH

[End fiscal year 1975 strength in thousands]

	DOD request	Committee recommended	Reduction from request	Percent
Army	358.7	335.4	−23.3	−6
Navy-Marine Corps	323.5	313.2	−10.3	−3
Air Force	269.7	261.3	−8.4	−4
Defense agencies	75.4	72.8	−2.6	−3
Total	1,027.3	982.7	−44.6	−4

Requirement to use the least costly type of manpower

The committee adopted amendatory language proposed by Senator Taft that the Defense Department use the least costly form of manpower that is consistent with military requirements and other needs of the Department. This language requires DoD to consider the advantages of converting jobs performed by military personnel to civilian employees and vice versa.

31-683—74——11

Other Committee Amendments

The committee also recommends two other amendments deleting sections of the bill that would have had the effect of negating the Congressional strength authorizations for civilian personnel. One section deleted by these amendments would allow the Secretary of Defense or the Service Secretaries to increase civilian strengths without regard to the numbers of civilian personnel authorized by this title when "direct substitution of civilians for military personnel (which) will result in economy without adverse effect upon national defense." The other section that would be deleted would allow the Secretary of Defense to exceed the authorized civilian strength by 1% at his discretion. Both these provisions were determined to be so broad as to negate the effect of the Congressional authorization of civilian strengths.

Definition of Civilian Personnel

Before discussing the committee recommendations further, it should be pointed out that the end-strength figures represent only *direct-hire* employees, both permanent and temporary, including full-time, part-time and intermittent employees paid from appropriated funds, who are employed to perform military functions administered by the Department of Defense. The following categories of civilian employees are excluded from the strengths recommended.

(1) Employees performing civilian functions administered by the Department of Defense, the largest of which is the Corps of Engineers Civil Works activities. For fiscal year 1975, the estimated end strength is approximately 29,000.

(2) Indirect-hire employees who are hired by the host nation in support of U.S. Forces stationed abroad. The estimated to be approximately 103,000. Foreign nationals who are employed directly by the U.S. Government are classified as direct-hire and included in our recommended end strength for civilians. Slightly over 43,000 foreign nationals are included in this category.

(3) Employees in special employment programs for students and disadvantaged youths, such as the Stay-in-School Campaign and the Temporary Summer Aid Program. The approximate strength in this program at the end of fiscal year 1973 was 22,000 but during the summer, the number of these temporary student hirings usually rises to a peak of about 40,000 employees.

(4) Employees of the National Security Agency who are excluded because employment statistics are classified information.

It should be noted also that the approximately 8,000 schoolteachers in the Department of Defense Overseas School System are not included because they serve on a nine-month basis and are not on the Department of Defense payroll on June 30th, the teaching period having ended before that time.

In addition, employees paid from non-appropriated funds are not included.

No Layoffs Needed to Accomplish Civilian Strength Reductions

The full committee reduction should be accomplished by not filling new job vacancies and by normal attrition, rather than any layoffs. The Committee reduction of 44,600—or 4%—from the requested

civilian end strength is largely a denial of increases of civilians in the Defense Department request. The Committee has repeatedly warned the Defense Department not to hire to fill these new vacancies until the Congress had an opportunity to review the Defense request. The Defense request would have increased civilian strength by some 33,000—from the 994,000 actually employed on January 1, 1974 to 1,027,000 by June 30, 1975. As a result, about three quarters of the reduction is a reduction of new job vacancies and thus would not affect civilians already employed by the Department of Defense. The balance of the Committee reduction can be accomplished by reduced hiring and normal attrition. The Defense Department reported that about 215,000 new civilians would have to be hired just to keep the number of civilians in FY 1975 about equal to the number in FY 1974. A reduction of less than 10% of the new hires would more than accomplish that part of the Committee reduction that would reduce strength below actual on-board levels. The Committee expects the Secretary of Defense to carefully manage this small, phased reduction of civilian strength in a way that precludes large personnel layoffs and turbulence.

Reduction of Civilians in Headquarters

In addition to the civilian manpower included in the earlier discussions and title III of the military civilian personnel reduction in base operations, training, medical and airlift, the Committee included a reduction of some 9200 civilians from the requested levels for headquarters and administrative activities. For the past several years the Committee has recommended reductions in headquarters. While there has been some reduction of military personnel in headquarters staffs, the FY 1975 Defense request actually included an *increased* number of civilians for these staffs. The requested civilian strength for command/headquarters was 74,000, compared with 73,000 at the end of FY 73. The Committee noted that the number of executive level and supergrade civilians in the DoD request totalled 1611, up 13% from the 1422 on-board as of the end of FY 73. The Defense request includes over 360 more top level civilians than general and flag officers. These trends toward increasing numbers of civilians in headquarters staffs must be reversed. However, this should not be done in a way that weakens civilian control of the Defense Department. The Secretary of Defense should insure that proper and effective means are available for career development of a small, highly professional civilian staff that can serve the civilian managers of DoD. This is particularly important at the present time, when substantial numbers of experienced civilians are leaving Defense employment under the new, earlier retirement provisions and for other reasons. As with military personnel, the emphasis in managing civilian personnel should be as quality rather than quantity.

Civilian Manpower Requirements

In making its review of overall civilian manpower requirements the committee reviewed each of the major functional categories which require civilian personnel. These are the same planning categories used for military personnel and part of the discussion of these categories under the active duty military section of this report included a discussion of civilians. The following table shows how the Defense civilian manpower request is distributed among these categories.

DOD CIVILIAN MANPOWER REQEST (END STRENGTHS, FISCAL YEAR 1975)

[In thousands]

	Fiscal year—					
	1973 (actual)		1974 (plan)		1975 (request)	
Strategic forces		16		16		11
General purpose forces		77		78		82
Land forces		39		40		43
Tactical air forces		13		14		15
Naval forces		(1)		(1)		1
Mobility forces		25		24		24
Auxiliary functions		128		127		124
Intelligence and security		10		10		10
Communications		16		17		15
Research and development		87		88		87
Support to other nations		5		2		2
Geophysical activities		10		10		10
Support functions		879		912		912
Base operating support		307		319		320
Training		39		45		47
Command/headquarters		73		76		74
Logistics		389		389		385
Personnel support		10		11		11
Medical support		41		46		47
Reserve component support		20		26		26
	Indirect hire	D rect hire	Indirect hire	Direct hire	Indirect hire	Direct hire
Total DOD	1,100	998	1,133	1,029	1,130	1,027
Army	405	333	430	356	431	359
Navy	315	305	318	308	315	306
Marine Corps	19	16	21	18	21	18
Air Force	288	270	288	270	287	270
Defense Agencies	73	73	77	76	76	75

[1] Includes indirect hire.
[2] Direct hire.

TITLE VI—MILITARY TRAINING STUDENT LOADS

Committee recommendations

For reasons discussed below, the committee recommends approval of the student loads as requested. The Secretary of Defense is required to adjust these training loads so that they are consistent with the changes made in active duty, reserve and civilian personnel strengths authorized in other titles of this bill.

Background

The Congress, commencing with fiscal year 1974, is required to authorize average military training student loads. Training "loads" represent the average number of military personnel that would be found attending formal military training courses on any given day during the year. Included are the following types of training:

(1) *Recruit training* includes all basic initial enlisted training for all services for both active and reserve components. In all services, it represents an introduction of the new enlisted man or woman into military life.

(2) *Officer Acquisition training* includes training programs through which officers are procured, such as the Service Military Academies, the Reserve Officers Training Corps, Officer Candidate Schools and Enlisted Commissioning programs.

(3) *Specialized training* provides both officer and enlisted personnel with the skills and knowledge necessary to perform specific jobs or to operate or maintain specific pieces of equipment.

(4) *Flight training* provides the basic undergraduate flying skills for pilots, navigators and Naval Flight Officers. This category does not include the major formal advanced combat training programs which are beyond the scope of this authorization since they are conducted by and for operational units. However, some flight-related skills, such as the Air Force navigator/bombadier and electronic warfare are included.

(5) *Professional training* includes military education, graduate education, degree completion education and professional development courses not leading to a degree. This training is accomplished at both military and civilian institutions and includes: Senior Service Schools, Staff Colleges, advanced degree programs, Department of Defense schools such as the Defense Systems Management School and enlisted leadership training.

The Committee notes with approval the improvements made in developing the second annual Military Training Report. There is still concern that some training is excluded from this report (e.g.: advanced fllight training and training of civilians in military schools).

In fiscal 1975, the Department of Defense requested the following training loads:

AVERAGE MILITARY TRAINING STUDENT LOADS, FISCAL YEAR 1975 BY COMPONENT AND MAJOR TRAINING CATEGORY

DOD component	Recruit	Officer acquisition	Specialized skill	Flight	Professional	Total
Active:						
Army	30,800	5,117	54,575	863	6,283	97,638
Navy	16,287	6,828	40,674	1,761	5,729	71,279
Marine Corps	13,339	503	9,347	1,036	2,037	26,262
Air Force	9,706	5,915	27,515	3,459	6,305	52,900
Subtotal loads	70,132	18,363	132,111	7,119	20,354	248,079
Reserve:						
Army National Guard	4,875	----------	7,025	101	110	12,111
Army Reserve	2,625	132	3,623	60	233	6,673
Naval Reserve	678	150	1,702	----------	6	2,536
Marine Corps Reserve	1,824	288	1,239	----------	52	3,403
Air National Guard	685	3	1,264	245	162	2,359
Air Force Reserve	402	33	473	156	62	1,126
Subtotal loads	11,089	606	15,326	562	625	28,208
DOD total loads	81,221	18,969	147,437	7,681	20,979	276,287

Discussion

The committee approval of the authorization of training loads as requested is not intended to indicate agreements with the proposed training program. As discussed in the section on active duty manpower authorizations, the committee feels that there is much room for efficiency in the training establishment. However, the committee is leaving to the discretion of the Secretary of Defense the specific adjustments to be made in its training loads as a result of the changes made in the active duty, reserves and civilian strength authorization.

TITLE VII—GENERAL PROVISIONS

SEC. 701—FUNDING AUTHORITY FOR SUPPORT OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY FORCES

Committee Recommendation—Funding Authority

Section 701 authorizes for appropriation $900 million for support of South Vietnamese military forces during fiscal year 1974 of which $212,300,000 is authorized for those items which require authorization before appropriation—procurement of aircraft, missiles, tracked-combat vehicles, and other weapons. Also $900 million is a ceiling limitation on obligations.

Other new provisions of the bill include (1) the establishment of a separate appropriation and separate account for support to South Vietnamese military forces, (2) a definite system for how and when obligations are incurred, (3) explicit restrictions on the valuation of support provided to South Vietnamese military forces, (4) a broader and more realistic reporting requirement. In addition, a new provision contains a restriction similar to prior years prohibiting military support for the Governments of Cambodia and Laos. Finally, the bill preserves with only slight modification a provision in existing law requiring agreement by the Government of South Vietnam to certain terms of usage for defense articles furnished to South Vietnamese military forces.

Two reporting requirements established in fiscal year 1966 dealing with construction projects and contract auditing have been eliminated.

Background

During FY 1966, the committee first authorized Military Assistance Service Funded (MASF)—a merger of funding for support to allied forces in South Vietnam. Due to the high level of combat activity at that time, it was inefficient and inappropriate to attempt to maintain separate financial and logistic systems for support furnished to U.S. forces and to other forces receiving U.S. military assistance. The effect of this merged funding was to provide military assistance through the regular DoD appropriations.

In light of combat conditions, the Supplemental Military Authorization Report, 1966 stated:

"The Committee is aware that a requirement to maintain exact accounts at the field level during the course of combat operations would defeat the major purpose of this section, but it is expected that the quarterly reports on the estimated value of support furnished by country will be based on the most accurate data, including statistical data that may be made available without impeding supply and distribution in the combat areas."

Thus the committee endorsed the use of statistical data and estimates in accounting and reporting U.S. support to South Vietnam and other free-world forces.

In subsequent years the Department of Defense accounting of MASF obligations has been inaccurate in part because of this difficulty of determining which supplies and equipment were for use of U.S. forces and which were for use of South Vietnamese and other free-world forces. In addition, there was no clearly articulated system for determining when an obligation arose. Obligations were not tied to deliveries or consumption. Informal ground rules governed the treatment of replenishing U.S. inventories with items which had been provided to support South Vietnamese forces. Since there was no separate account for military support to South Vietnam and other free-world forces, overall audit reconciliation was impossible.

In FY 1970, Congress first imposed a ceiling on support to South Vietnamese and other free-world forces. This ceiling, combined with lower levels of U.S. troops and reduced combat activity in South Vietnam, should have prompted more accurate DoD accounting of MASF support. Unfortunately, the imprecision and statistical estimating in the accounting system remained.

The full extent of past MASF accounting discrepancies is not known at this time. In fairness to the Defense Department it should be pointed out that Congress never revised the crude accounting and reporting requirements levied in FY 1966 even though by 1972 combat conditions and the makeup of combat forces had changed significantly. Hence the law never required accurate and timely accounting of military support to South Vietnam. Nevertheless, DoD can be justly criticized for failure to maintain a more realistic accounting of MASF.

Explanation of New Provisions

MASF authority in prior years allowed the Defense Department to use obligational authority in Service line-item accounts from both present and prior year authorizations to fund support to South Vietnam and other free-world forces.

MASF was an annual authority and expired at the end of each fiscal year. Since the committee did not include any MASF authority for fiscal year 1975, all unused MASF authority automatically expires at the end of fiscal year 1974. Hence the Defense Department has no authority to use any unobligated balances in Service funds for support of South Vietnamese military forces. Indeed, the Defense Department has no authority to obligate any funds for support of South Vietnamese military forces without specific authorization from Congress.

The fiscal year 1975 language would authorize funds in support of South Vietnamese military forces which can be appropriated, administered, and accounted for only as a single fund line item. The rationale for the merged funding out of regular service appropriations no longer exists. Accounting procedures designed to accommodate supply operations to several allies during heavy combat conditions are now inappropriate.

Authorizing a single appropriation for military support rather than preserving the service-funded approach does not do violence to any prerogatives of the Appropriations Committees. The intent is simply to eliminate the confusion and inaccuracies that have accompanied MASF accounting in previous years. A single appropriation and account would provide greater visibility to Congress and would be

subject to the same auditing and review procedures as any other appropriations account. It would, for example, permit audits by the General Accounting Office (GAO).

In addition, a single appropriation and account would facilitate the transfer for fiscal year 1976 of military support from the regular military appropriations to the Military Assistance Program.

A new procedure for incurring obligations is established in the fiscal year 1975 language whereby funds may be obligated only upon issuance of orders by the Secretary of Defense for any military support to South Vietnamese forces. While the issuance of such orders will remain the responsibility of the Secretary of Defense, in practice Chairman Stennis has asked that a "highly competent individual of top reputation" be assigned to take full charge of the South Vietnam military assistance program. This individual should supervise all aspects of the program both in the United States and in South Vietnam.

All funds authorized for support of South Vietnamese military forces shall be deemed obligated at the time the Secretary of Defense issues orders for such support. In addition, no support of any kind may be made available to South Vietnamese military forces in any manner unless a specific order is issued by the Secretary. This would apply to making support available through gift, loan, lease or any form of transfer. Under this procedure the treatment of "payback" or the replenishment of U.S. inventories should be separate from the treatment of obligations incurred in support of South Vietnamese military forces.

Another new subsection provides that $900 million will be the ceiling limitation for all support to South Vietnamese military forces by this or any other Act. This subsection is merely for emphasis since the Defense Department has no authority to support South Vietnamese military forces other than with the $900 million authorized by Section 701. Although the Defense Department has, for example, an estimated $30.4 million in unused authority for military construction in Southeast Asia, this authority has been available in the past only by annual MASF authorization and only under past MASF ceilings. Under the new single account system any unused construction authority applied during fiscal year 1975 for support of South Vietnamese military forces must be under the authority of Section 701 and be counted under the ceiling limitation.

A further provision sets out restrictions on the valuation of U.S. inventory items obligated for support to South Vietnamese military forces. For regular inventory materials and supplies, the Department of Defense must obligate at replacement cost, that is, the actual cost for acquiring an item of similar condition and model type. Excess materials and supplies must be obligated at actual value.

A final provision modifies the reporting requirement for obligations under this section. Unlike past practice, statistical estimates of obligations are not permitted. The Defense Department must report actual obligations in exact amounts and the purposes for which such funds were obligated.

Fiscal Year 1975 Request

The President's fiscal year 1975 budget requested $1.6 billion in obligational authority and included specific budget justification

for new funds for programs totaling $1.45 billion. Of the $1.45 billion, $287.3 million was for weapon systems and programs requiring authorization.

The $287.3 million was spread by account as follows:

	Millions
Army missiles	$2.9
Army tracked combat vehicles	11.8
Army other weapons	2.7
Navy shipbuilding and conversion	24.9
Navy other weapons	0.1
Air Force aircraft	245.0
Total	287.4

Committee Action on MASF Authorization Items

The committee recommends approval of $212,300,000 for weapons and other items requiring authorization. This is a reduction of $74,978,000. The various programs which are recommended for reduction are as follows:

	Thousands
A-37B aircraft	−$15,700
Patrol gunboats	−15,700
Miscellaneous boats and craft	−9,200
M-113 armored personnel carrier	−9,400
M-60 machine gun	−100
M-125A1 mortar carrier	−800
M-202A1 rocket launcher	−100
C-130 cargo aircraft	−22,000
TOW missile launcher	−2,000
Total authorization items	−75,000

Justification for the above items provided to the committee did not substantiate an urgent need for authorization as part of the fiscal year 1975 program.

The committee was advised by the Defense Department of a problem in obligating of all of the funds provided for Air Force aircraft procurement for FY 1974, reimbursing the MAP account in the amount of $69.3 million and, at the same time, remaining within the overall MASF ceiling of $1.126 billion. As a solution, the Department proposed to defer full funding of the 71 F-5E airplanes authorized in FY 1974 over to FY 1975. The committee has advised the Secretary to fully fund the F-5E program in fiscal year 1974 and to defer reimbursement of the MAP program for F-5As until the FY 1975 MASF funds are available, if MAP reimbursement still is desired.

Explanation of Committee Reduction in Authorized Amount of $900 Million

The committee recommends an authorization ceiling of $900 million for fiscal year 1975 in lieu of the request of $1.6 billion. This compares with a ceiling of $1.009 billion and new obligational authority of $813 million for South Vietnam in fiscal year 1975. The remaining amounts in the fiscal year 1974 program were for Laos. The recommended $900 million represents a balance between rapid increases in the cost of replacement equipment and petroleum products and

cost reductions made possible by such factors as the lower level of violence, decreased attrition, and the planned phase-out of substantial numbers of U.S. contractor personnel.

The committee recognizes the importance of continuing to support South Vietnamese armed forces by replacing the armaments, munitions, and war material consumed in the continuing, though lessened, military engagements. Since combat casualties have dropped by 75 percent in the past year, however, it is reasonable to expect that reductions can be made in the previous levels of military assistance.

The committee does not believe that projected attrition and assumptions of increased usage rates of air and ground munitions are justified. The recommended authority should be sufficient to sustain operations at only slightly below the actual levels of the past year. In addition, many items of equipment appear to be in excess of what may be reasonably expected to be required.

Rather than authorizing funds for the sake of flexibility, the committee believes that the MASF program should be governed by fiscal stringency. Should a serious change occur in the military situation, of course, the committee would give prompt consideration to a request to change the law in order to meet these unforeseen needs.

Accounting and Administration

After the committee acted on the bill, the Chairman, Senator Stennis, made the following statement on tightening up administrative procedures for military aid to South Vietnam:

> In recent weeks the Senate Committee on Armed Services has devoted much time to the program of military aid for South Vietnam. That program was originally designed to finance a shooting war in which U.S. troops, South Vietnamese, and others were engaged.
>
> The after-the-fact accounting procedures which may have been necessary for full-scale fighting with allies are wholly inappropriate for providing aid to a single nation—South Vietnam. I think this program must be tightened up and put on a sound basis, and I am asking the Defense Department and the White House to do that.
>
> In the pending Military Procurement Authorization Bill, the Senate Armed Services Committee has provided a new accounting format for military aid to South Vietnam. In place of the merged accounting arrangement known as Military Assistance Service Funded, MASF, our Committee has set up for this assistance a separate appropriations account which, in contrast to the present arrangement, would be subject to the same auditing and review procedures as any other appropriations account. Among other things, it would be subject to audit by the General Accounting Office. Obligations would require approval by the Secretary and would be charged immediately against the ceiling set by Congress.
>
> To administer this new program, I think a highly competent individual of top reputation should be assigned to take full charge and supervise operations here and in South Vietnam.

I understand that the program will be the general responsibility of the Secretary of Defense and the Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs, but I want a top-man assigned full-time to this job.

I favor a reasonable amount of military aid for South Vietnam in the wake of our withdrawal. I am sure, however, that the Program must be put on a new basis which reflects the present situation.

SEC. 702—REQUIRING STATUTORY APPROVAL OF SHIP TRANSFERS

Section 702 provides language that amends existing legislation to require that naval vessels in excess of 2,000 tons or less than 20 years of age be subject to statutory approval prior to disposal in any manner. The section also provides that disposal of other ships not covered by this section be subject to notification of the Committees on Armed Services for 30 days prior to proposed disposition. This language was added to the bill to insure that Congress is made aware of and approves the disposal of our naval vessels that Congress has authorized.

DEPARTMENTAL RECOMMENDATION

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
Washington, D.C., February 4, 1974.

Hon. GERALD R. FORD,
President of the Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: There is forwarded herewith legislation "To authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1975 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes, and other weapons, and research, development, test and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength for each active duty component and of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces and of civilian personnel of the Department of Defense, and to authorize the military training student loads and for other purposes." This proposal is a part of the Department of Defense legislative program for the 93d Congress, and the Office of Management and Budget has advised that enactment of the proposal would be in accord with the program of the President. This proposal is also being sent to the Speaker of the House.

This proposal would provide authorization for appropriations as needed for procurement in each of the categories of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes, and for other weapons for each of the military departments in an amount equal to the new obligational authority included in the President's budget for fiscal year 1975. In addition, the proposal would provide fund authorization in amounts equal to the new obligational authority included in the President's budget for fiscal year 1975 in total for each of the research, development, test and evaluation appropriations for the military departments and the defense agencies.

Title III of the proposal prescribes the end strengths for active duty personnel of each component of the Armed Forces as required by section 138(c)(1) of title 10, United States Code, in the number provided for by new obligational authority in appropriations requested for these components in the President's budget for fiscal year 1975.

Title IV of the proposal provides for average strengths of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces as required by section 138(b) of title 10, United States Code, in the number provided for by the new obligational authority in appropriations requested for these components in the President's budget for fiscal year 1975.

Title V of the proposal is responsive in the new requirements contained in section 138(c) of title 10, United States Code, which requires that beginning with fiscal year 1975, the civilian personnel end strengths for each component of the Department of Defense be authorized. Title V provides for end strengths for civilian personnel of the Department of Defense in the number provided for by the new obliga-

tional authority in appropriations requested for the Department of Defense in the President's budget for fiscal year 1975.

Language authorizing average training student loads is contained in Title VI as required by section 138(d) of title 10, United States Code; however, this proposal does not include, at this time, the actual student load figures which this Department will request for fiscal year 1975. The requirement for authorization for average training student loads was only recently enacted and fiscal year 1974 was the first year in which such authorization was provided. Data is now being analyzed and developed in order to determine the fiscal year 1975 requirements. As soon as this data is available, but not later than March 1, 1974, when the related report is required to be submitted to the Congress, the necessary figures will be submitted to the Congress for inclusion in Title VI of this proposal.

This proposal would also include for fiscal year 1975 language authorizing appropriations of the Department of Defense to be made available for the support of Vietnamese military forces. The proposed language is substantially identical to similar provisions in prior year's acts in its application to support for Vietnamese forces, except that for clarity in light of recent congressional actions regarding public safety programs, the language has been modified to make it expressly applicable to Vietnamese military forces rather than Vietnamese forces. To reflect the reversion of support for Laos to the Military Assistance Program in fiscal year 1975, references to Laos have been deleted as have been other obsolete references which no longer reflect the current situation.

The reporting requirements of subsection (b) of section 401 of Public Law 89–367, as amended, are considered permanent and would be equally applicable to this provision.

Sincerely,

JAMES R. SCHLESINGER.

Enclosure.

A BILL To authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1975 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes, and other weapons, and research, development, test and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength for each active duty component and of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces and of civilian personnel of the Department of Defense, and to authorize the military training student loads and for other purposes

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

TITLE I—PROCUREMENT

SEC. 101. Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated during the fiscal year 1975 for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes, and other weapons as authorized by law, in amounts as follows:

AIRCRAFT

For aircraft: for the Army, $339,500,000; for the Navy and the Marine Corps, $2,960,600,000; for the Air Force, $3,496,600,000.

MISSILES

For missiles: for the Army, $459,200,000; for the Navy, $620,600,000; for the Marine Corps, $76,000,000; for the Air Force, $1,610,800,000.

NAVAL VESSELS

For naval vessels: for the Navy, $3,562,600,000.

TRACKED COMBAT VEHICLES

For tracked combat vehicles: for the Army, $331,900,000; for the Marine Corps, $80,100,000.

TORPEDOES

For torpedoes and related support equipment: for the Navy, $187,700,000.

OTHER WEAPONS

For other weapons: for the Army, $53,400,000; for the Navy, $25,600,000; for the Marine Corps, $500,000.

TITLE II—RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST AND EVALUATION

SEC. 201. Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated during the fiscal year 1975 for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States for research, development, test and evaluation, as authorized by law, in amounts as follows:

For the Army, $1,985,976,000.

For the Navy (including the Marine Corps), $3,264,503,000;

For the Air Force, $3,518,860,000; and

For the Defense Agencies, $555,700,000, of which $27,000,000 is authorized for the activities of the Director of Test and Evaluation, Defense.

TITLE III—ACTIVE FORCES

SEC. 301. For the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1974, and ending June 30, 1975, each component of the Armed Forces is authorized an end strength for active duty personnel as follows:

(1) The Army, 785,000;
(2) The Navy, 540,380;
(3) The Marine Corps, 196,398;
(4) The Air Force, 630,345.

TITLE IV—RESERVE FORCES

SEC. 401. For the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1974, and ending June 30, 1975, the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces will be programmed to attain an average strength of not less than the following:

(1) The Army National Guard of the United States, 379,848;
(2) The Army Reserve, 215,842;
(3) The Naval Reserve, 107,526;
(4) The Marine Corps Reserve, 36,703;

(5) The Air National Guard of the United States, 89,128;
(6) The Air Force Reserve, 51,319;
(7) The Coast Guard Reserve, 11,700.

SEC. 402. The average strength prescribed by section 401 of this title for the Selected Reserve of any Reserve component shall be proportionately reduced by (1) the total authorized strength of units organized to serve as units of the Selected Reserve of such component which are on active duty (other than for training) at any time during the fiscal year, and (2) the total number of individual members not in units organized to serve as units of the Selected Reserve of such component who are on active duty (other than for training or for unsatisfactory participation in training) without their consent at any time during the fiscal year. Whenever such units or such individual members are released from active duty during any fiscal year, the average strength for such fiscal year for the Selected Reserve of such Reserve component shall be proportionately increased by the total authorized strength of such units and by the total number of such individual members.

TITLE V—CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

SEC. 501(a). For the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1974 and ending June 30, 1975, the Department of Defense is authorized an end strength for civilian personnel as follows:

(1) The Department of the Army, 358,717;
(2) The Department of the Navy, including the Marine Corps, 323,529;
(3) The Department of the Air Force, 269,709;
(4) Activities and agencies of the Department of Defense (other than the military departments), 75,372.

(b) In computing the authorized end strength for civilian personnel there shall be included all direct-hire civilian personnel employed to perform military functions administered by the Department of Defense (other than those performed by the National Security Agency) whether in permanent or temporary positions and whether employed on a full time, part time, or intermittent basis, but excluding special employment categories for students and disadvantaged youth such as the Stay-in-School Campaign, the Temporary Summer Aid Program and the Federal Junior Fellowship Program and personnel participating in the Worker-Trainee Opportunity Program: *Provided*, That whenever the secretary of the military department concerned or the Secretary of Defense determines that the direct substitution of civilian personnel for military personnel will result in economy without adverse effect upon national defense, such substitution may be accomplished without regard to the numbers of civilian personnel authorized by this section: *Provided further*, That when a function, power, or duty or activity is transferred or assigned to a department or agency of the Department of Defense from a department or agency outside of the Department of Defense or from a department or agency within the Department of Defense, the civilian personnel end strength authorized for such departments or agencies of the Department of Defense affected shall be adjusted to reflect any increases or decreases in civilian personnel required as a result of such transfer or assignment.

SEC. 502. When the Secretary of Defense determines that such action is necessary in the national interest, he may authorize the employment of civilian personnel in excess of the number authorized by section 501: *Provided*, That the number of additional personnel authorized to be employed pursuant to the authority of this section shall not exceed one per centum of the total number of civilian personnel authorized for the Department of Defense by section 501: *Provided further*, That the Secretary of Defense shall promptly notify the Congress of any authorization to increase civilian personnel strength pursuant to this authority.

TITLE VI—MILITARY TRAINING STUDENT LOADS

SEC. 601. For the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1974 and ending June 30, 1975, each component of the Armed Forces is authorized an average military training student load as follows:

(1) The Army, _____;
(2) The Navy, _____;
(3) The Marine Corps, _____;
(4) The Air Force, _____;
(5) The Army National Guard of the United States, _____;
(6) The Army Reserve, _____;
(7) The Naval Reserve, _____;
(8) The Marine Corps Reserve, _____;
(9) The Air National Guard of the United States, _____;
(10) The Air Force Reserve, _____;

TITLE VII—GENERAL PROVISIONS

SEC. 701. Subsection (a)(1) of section 401 of Public Law 89-367, approved March 15, 1966 (80 Stat. 37), as amended, is hereby amended to read as follows:

"(a)(1) Not to exceed $1,600,000,000 of the funds authorized for appropriation for the use of Armed Forces of the United States under this or any other Act are authorized to be made available for their stated purposes to support Vietnamese military forces on such terms and conditions as the Secretary of Defense may determine: *Provided*, That nothing contained in this section shall be construed as authorizing the use of any such funds to support Vietnamese military forces in activities designed to provide military support and assistance to the Government of Cambodia or Laos."

This Act may be cited as the "Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act, 1975".

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,
Washington, D.C., February 28, 1974.

HON. JOHN C. STENNIS
Chairman Committee on Armed Services,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Reference is made to Secretary Schlesinger's letter of February 4, 1974, which forwarded legislation "To author-

ize appropriations during the fiscal year 1975 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes, and other weapons, and research, development, test and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength for each active duty component and the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces and of civilian personnel of the Department of Defense, and to authorize the military training student loads and for other purposes."

As indicated in that letter, the proposed legislation did not include the average military training student loads in section 601 which this Department requests for fiscal year 1975. Attached is a copy of section 601 as introduced in S. 3000, 93d Congress, with the average military training student load figures inserted.

These proposed training loads will be explained and justified in the Military Manpower Training Report which is required to be submitted to the Congress by section 138(d) of title 10, United States Code. Pending transmittal of the report, we note that the proposed training loads for fiscal year 1975 exclude enrollees in college Reserve Officers' Training Corps and Armed Forces Health Professions Scholarship programs. These enrollees are not in active military status while undergoing training (except for brief periods of annual active duty prescribed for reservist participants of the Armed Forces Health Professions Scholarship program) and therefore authorization required by section 138(d) is not, in our opinion, applicable to such enrollees. We call this matter to your attention since this Department's request for authorization for fiscal year 1974, the first year such authorization was required, inadvertently included authorization for such enrollees and this request was reflected in the authorization provided by the Congress.

The number of such enrollees excluded is as follows:

Sponsoring service	College ROTC program	Armed Forces health professions scholarship authorized
Army	33,564	1,850
Navy	8,100	1,575
Air Force	19,260	1,575
DOD total	60,924	5,000

Sincerely,

L. NIEDERLEHNER, *Acting General Counsel.*

Enclosure.

COMMITTEE ACTION

In compliance with the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 as amended by the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, there is set forth below the Committee vote to report this bill, S. 3000 as amended.

In favor: Senators Stennis, Symington, Jackson, Ervin, Cannon, McIntyre, Byrd of Va., Hughes, Nunn, Thurmond, Tower, Dominick, Goldwater, Scott of Va., and Taft.

Opposed: None.

Vote: 15 in favor; none opposed. Motion adopted.

The other roll call votes on amendments to the bill which were taken up during the course of the mark-up have been made public and are available at the committee.

FISCAL DATA

With respect to 5-year cost projections, under Public Law 91–510, the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, certain Senate rules and procedures were revised. Shown below is the legislative language.

SEC. 252(a)(1) The report accompanying each bill or joint resolution of a public character reported by any committee of the Senate (except the Committee on Appropriations) shall contain—

(A) an estimate, made by such committee, of the costs which would be insured in carrying out such bill or joint resolution in the fiscal year in which it is reported and in each of the five fiscal years following such fiscal year (or for the authorized duration of any program authorized by such bill or joint resolution if less than five years), except that, in the case of measures affecting the revenues, such reports shall require only an estimate of the gain or loss in revenues for a one-year period; and

(B) a comparison of the estimate of costs described in subparagraph (A) made by such committee with any estimate of costs made by any Federal agency; or

(C) in lieu of such estimate or comparison, or both, a statement of the reasons why compliance by the committee with the requirements of subparagraph (A) or (B), or both, is impracticable.

(2) It shall not be in order in the Senate to consider any such bill or joint resolution if such bill or joint resolution was reported in the Senate after the effective date of this subsection and the report of that committee of the Senate which reported such bill or joint resolution does not comply with the provision of paragraph (1) of this subsection.,

Below is the letter received in compliance with the legislation. This bill is an annual authorization and does not, within its own terms, generate costs beyond fiscal year 1975 even though the funds authorized to be obligated by this act may not be expended for several years in the future. The fiscal year authorizations herein provided are reviewed annually by the committee and the Congress.

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
Washington, D.C., May 8, 1974.

Hon. JOHN C. STENNIS,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
U.S. Senate.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: In accordance with Section 252(b) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 (PL 91–510), indicated below

is an estimate of how the $23,130.1 million authorization requested in FY 1975 will be expended over FY 1975–1980 period:

Fiscal year:	*Millions*
1975	$7, 400. 0
1976	8, 600. 0
1977	3, 800. 0
1978	1, 600. 0
1979	1, 000. 0
1980	730. 1

The extreme uncertainty of future year Defense programs precludes any precise estimates, but I can also provide the general estimate that to support the forces contained in the Annual Defense Report on the FY 1975 Budget, authorizations for procurement and RDT&E in the range of $23–$25 billion (in FY 1975 dollars) would be required for each of the next five years.

Sincerely,

BILL CLEMENTS.

CONGRESSIONAL ACTION ON PROCUREMENT AND R.D.T. & E. AUTHORIZATION REQUESTS

Fiscal year	Authorization request	Senate authorization	House authorization	Conference	Appropriated
1964	$15, 358, 691, 000	$14, 951, 491, 000	$15, 856, 391, 000	$15, 314, 291, 000	$14, 364, 690, 000
1965	17, 185, 300, 000	17, 040, 140, 000	16, 914, 800, 000	16, 967, 620, 000	16, 722, 391, 000
1966	19, 363, 050, 000	15, 283, 800, 000	15, 303, 400, 000	[1] 19, 468, 250, 000	[1] 19, 320, 550, 000
1967	20, 769, 659, 000	17, 170, 059, 000	17, 858, 059, 000	[1] 21, 404, 459, 000	[1] 21, 057, 559, 000
1968	21, 066, 432, 000	20, 765, 332, 000	21, 481, 032, 000	21, 168, 032, 000	20, 149, 432, 000
1969	22, 385, 052, 000	21, 341, 738, 000	21, 636, 964, 000	21, 625, 750, 000	18, 491, 041, 000
1970	21, 963, 660, 000	19, 988, 886, 000	21, 347, 860, 000	20, 710, 502, 000	[2] 19, 311, 520, 000
1971	20, 317, 430, 000	[3] 19, 242, 889, 000	20, 237, 489, 000	[3] 19, 929, 089, 000	[3] 18, 997, 376, 000
1972	[4 5 7] 22, 359, 129, 000	[6] 21, 016, 417, 000	[5] 21, 252, 682, 000	[6] 21, 316, 870, 000	20, 461, 802, 000
1973	[8] 23, 272, 971, 000	20, 521, 671, 000	21, 318, 788, 250	[9] 21, 588, 747, 000	19, 567, 838, 000
1974 [10 11]	21, 959, 100, 000	20, 947, 653, 000	20, 445, 255, 000	21, 299, 520, 000	20, 163, 205, 000

[1] Includes supplemental.
[2] Of this amount, $350,000,000 to be derived by transfer from stock funds.
[3] Includes $334,000,000 for Safeguard construction and family housing.
[4] Reflects budget amendment submitted subsequent to House Action (+$111,000,000).
[5] Includes $183,600,000 for Safeguard construction and family housing.
[6] Includes $109,570,000 for Safeguard and construction family housing.
[7] Includes $59,762,000 additional requested for civilian pay increases pursuant to Public Law 91-656.
[8] Includes $3,000,000 for special foreign currency program for Navy under R.D.T. & E. appropriation; includes fiscal year 1973 budget amendments of $54,000,000 for civilian personnel pay raise, $254,800,000 for various programs, and June 27, 1972, amendments of $770,000,000 for Southeast Asia and SALT related items.
[9] Includes $644,900,000 additional authorization in section 801 of Public Law 92-570.
[10] Includes $2,600,000 for special foreign currency program for Navy under R.D.T. & E. appropriation.
[11] Does not include the Feb. 4, 1974, supplemental authorization request for procurement and R.D.T. & E. in the amount of $1,224,589,000.

Notes:
During fiscal years 1964 and 1965 tracked combat vehicles were not subject to authorization action.
During fiscal years 1964, 1965, and 1966 the emergency fund under R. & D. was not subject to authorization action.
Authorization for other weapons was not required prior to fiscal year 1971.
Authorization for torpedoes and related support equipment not required prior to fiscal year 1972.

Relationship of Authorization to Department of Defense Appropriations

HISTORY OF SECTION 138, TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE

(Superseding "Section 412")

The jurisdiction of the committee so far as specific authorizations are concerned was increased significantly in 1959 by the enactment of section 412(b) of Public Law 86–149 which required congressional authorization of appropriations for the procurement of aircraft, missiles, and naval vessels. That law was amended and expanded as follows:

In 1962 (Public Law 87–436) to require similar authorization of appropriations for research, development, test, or evaluation associated with aircraft, missiles, and naval vessels;

In 1963 (Public Law 88–174) to require authorization of appropriations for all research, development, test, or evaluation carried on by the Department of Defense;

In 1965 (Public Law 89–37) to require authorization of appropriations for the procurement of tracked combat vehicles.

In 1967 (Public Law 90–168) to require annual authorization of the personnel strengths of each of the Selected Reserves of the Reserve components as a prior condition for the appropriation of funds for the pay and allowances for the Reserve components.

In 1969 (Public Law 91–121) to require authorization of appropriations for the procurement of other weapons to or for the use of any armed force of the United States. (Essentially, heavy, medium, and light artillery, antiaircraft artillery, rifles, machineguns, mortars, small arms weapons, and any crew-fired piece using fixed ammunition); and

In 1970 (Public Law 91–441) to require authorization of appropriations to or for the use of the Navy for the procurement of torpedoes and related support equipment; and to require authorization of the average annual active duty personnel strength for each component of the Armed Forces as a condition precedent to the appropriation of funds for this purpose; and

In 1972 (Public Law 92–436) to require annual authorization for the average military training student loads for each component of the Armed Forces, and modified the provisions relating to authorization for active duty personnel strength.

In 1973 (Public Law 93–155), to require authorization for end strength civilian employment for each component of the Defense Department in each fiscal year.

Also, in 1973 these enactments were codified by section 803(a) of Public Law 93–155 and codified into title 10, United States Code, as section 138. The law today, therefore, reads as follows:

§ 138. Secretary of Defense: Annual authorization of appropriations for armed forces

(a) No funds may be appropriated for any fiscal year to or for the use of any armed force or obligated or expended for—

(1) procurement of aircraft, missiles, or naval vessels;

(2) any research, development, test, or evaluation, or procurement or production related thereto;

(3) procurement of tracked combat vehicles;

(4) procurement of other weapons; or

(5) procurement of naval torpedoes and related support equipment;

unless funds therefor have been specifically authorized by law.

(b) Congress shall authorize the personnel strength of the Selected Reserve of each reserve component of the armed forces. No funds may be appropriated for any fiscal year for the pay and allowances of members of any reserve component of the armed forces unless the personnel strength of the Selected Reserve of that reserve component for that fiscal year has been authorized by law.

(c) (1) Congress shall authorize the end strength as of the end of each fiscal year for active-duty personnel for each component of the armed forces. No funds may be appropriated for any fiscal year to or for the use of the active-duty personnel of any component of the armed forces unless the end strength for active-duty personnel of that component for that fiscal year has been authorized by law.

(2) Congress shall authorize the end strength as of the end of each fiscal year for civilian personnel for each component of the Department of Defense. No funds may be appropriated for any fiscal year to or for the use of the civilian personnel of any component of the Department of Defense unless the end strength for civilian personnel of that component for that fiscal year has been authorized by law.

(3) The Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a written report, not later than February 15 of each fiscal year, recommending the annual active duty end strength level for each component of the armed forces for the next fiscal year and the annual civilian personnel end strength level for each component of the Department of Defense for the next fiscal year, and shall include in that report justification for the strength levels recommended and as explanation of the relationship between the personnel strength levels recommended for that fiscal year and the national security policies of the United States in effect at the time. The justification and explanation shall specify in detail for all military forces, including each land force division, carrier and other major combatant vessel, air wing, and other comparable unit, the—

(A) unit mission and capability:

(B) strategy which the unit supports; and

(C) area of deployment and illustrative areas of potential deployment, including a description of any United States commitment to defend such areas.

It shall also include a detailed discussion of (i) the manpower required for support and overhead functions within the armed forces and the Department of Defense, (ii) the relationship of the manpower required for support and overhead functions to the primary combat missions and support policies, and (iii) the manpower required to be stationed or assigned to duty in foreign countries and aboard vessels located outside the territorial limits of the United States, its territories, and possessions.

(d)(1) Congress shall authorize the average military training student loads for each component of the armed forces. Such authorization is

not required for unit or crew training student loads, but is required for student loads for the following individual training categories—

(A) recruit and specialized training;

(B) flight training;

(C) professional training in military and civilian institutions; and

(D) officer acquisition training.

No funds may be appropriated for any fiscal year for training military personnel in the training categories described in clauses (A)–(D) of any component of the armed forces unless the average student load of that component for that fiscal year has been authorized by law.

(2) The Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a written report, not later than March 1 of each fiscal year, recommending the average student load for each category of training for each component of the armed forces for the next three fiscal years, and shall include in that report justification for, and explanation of, the average student loads recommended.

CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW

In compliance with paragraph 4 of rule XXIX of the Standing Rules of the Senate, changes in existing law proposed to be made by the bill are shown as follows: Existing law to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in italic, and existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman.

TITLE VII—GENERAL PROVISIONS

SECTION 401 OF PUBLIC LAW 89-367 (80 STAT. 37), AS AMENDED

SEC. 401. (a) [(1) Not to exceed $1,126,000,000 of the funds authorized for appropriation for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States under this or any other Act are authorized to be made available for their stated purposes to support: (A) Vietnamese and other free world forces in support of Vietnamese forces, (B) local forces in Laos; and for related costs, during the fiscal year 1974 on such terms and conditions as the Secretary of Defense may determine. None of the funds appropriated to or for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States may be used for the purpose of paying any overseas allowance, per diem allowance, or any other addition to the regular base pay of any person serving with the free world forces in South Vietnam if the amount of such payment would be greater than the amount of special pay authorized to be paid, for an equivalent period of service, to members of the Armed Forces of the United States (under section 310 of title 37, United States Code) serving in Vietnam or in any other hostile fire area, except for continuation of payments of such additions to regular base pay provided in agreements executed prior to July 1, 1970. Nothing in clause (A) of the first sentence of this paragraph shall be construed as authorizing the use of any such funds to support Vietnamese or other free world forces in actions designed to provide military support and assistance to the Government of Cambodia or Laos: *Provided*, that nothing contained in this section shall be construed to prohibit support of actions required to insure the safe and orderly withdrawal or disengagement of United States forces from Southeast Asia, or to aid in the release of Americans held as prisoners of war.

[(2) No defense article may be furnished to the South Vietnamese forces, other free world forces in Vietnam, or to local forces in Laos or Thailand with funds authorized for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States under this or any other Act unless the government of the forces to which the defense article is to be furnished shall have agreed that—]

(1) There is authorized to be appropriated as a single appropriation to the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1975, the sum of $900,000,000, including $212,300,000 for procurement

31-683—74——13

of aircraft, missiles, tracked combat vehicles, and other weapons, to support South Vietnamese military forces, Such appropriation shall be administered and accounted for as one fund and may be obligated only by the issuance of orders by the Secretary of Defense for such support. Funds appropriated pursuant to this section shall be deemed obligated at the time the Secretary of Defense issues orders authorizing support of any kind to South Vietnamese military forces. No support herein authorized may be made available in any manner unless pursuant to a specific order issued by the Secretary.

(2) No defense article may be furnished to the South Vietnamese forces with funds authorized for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States under this or any other Act unless the Government of the Republic of South Vietnam shall have agreed that—

"(A) it will not, without the consent of the President—

"(i) permit any use of such article by anyone not an officer, employee, or agent of that government,

"(ii) transfer, or permit any officer, employee, or agent of that government to transfer such article by gift, sale, or otherwise, or

"(iii) use or permit the use of such article for purposes other than those for which furnished;

"(B) it will maintain the security of such article, and will provide substantially the same degree of security protection afforded to such article by the United States Government;

"(C) it will, as the President may require, permit continuous observation and review by, and furnish necessary information to, representatives of the United States Government with regard to the use of such article; and

"(D) unless the President consents to other disposition, it will return to the United States Government for such use or disposition as the President considers in the best interests of the United States, any such article which is no longer needed for the purposes for which it was furnished.

The President shall promptly submit a report to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate on the implementation of each agreement entered into in compliance with this paragraph. The President may not give his consent under clause (A) or (D) of this paragraph with respect to any defense article until the expiration of fifteen days after written notice has been given to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate regarding the proposed action of the President with respect to such article. As used in this paragraph the term 'defense article' shall have the same meaning prescribed for such term in section 644(d) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. In order to allow a reasonable period of time for the Department of Defense to comply with the requirements of this paragraph, the provisions of such paragraph shall become effective sixty days after the date of enactment of this paragraph.

[(b) Within 30 days after the end of each quarter, the Secretary of Defense shall render to the Committees on Armed Services and Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives a report with respect to the estimated value by country of support furnished from appropriations authorized to be made under this subsection.

[(c) The Secretary of Defense shall furnish to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives a description of all construction projects, including cost estimates and periodic reports, made available to the Secretary of Defense simultaneously with the receipt of such information from the persons responsible for the construction of such projects in support of Vietnamese and other free world forces in Vietnam. Whenever such construction projects, involving $1,000,000 or more, are performed by private contractors, the Secretary of Defense or his representative in Vietnam shall report to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives the name or names of such private contractors, the amounts involved in each contract, a copy of the report in support of each progress payment, and a complete report prior to final payment.

[(d) The Secretary of Defense shall also furnish to the Armed Services Committees of the Senate and House of Representatives complete information regarding the alternative methods of adequately auditing contracts which he and the Comptroller General have agreed upon prior to the execution of any contract which would waive the provisions of section 2313(b) of title 10, United States Code.]

(b) No funds authorized by this or any other Act to or for use by the Department of Defense may be obligated in the fiscal year ending June 30, 1975, for support of South Vietnamese military forces in any amount in excess of the amount of $900,000,000.

(c) Any obligation incurred against funds authorized under this section shall, in the case of nonexcess materials and supplies furnished from the inventory of the Department of Defense, be equal to the replacement cost thereof at the time such obligation is incurred, and in the case of excess materials and supplies, be equal to the actual value thereof at the time such obligation is incurred.

(d) No funds authorized by this section may be used in any way to support Vietnamese or other forces in actions designed to provide military support and assistance to the Government of Cambodia or Laos.

(e) Within 30 days after the end of each quarter of the fiscal year, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives a written report regarding actual obligations incurred against funds appropriated pursuant to this section. Such report shall indicate the different purposes for which such obligations were incurred and the amounts thereof, together with such other information as the Secretary determines appropriate.

UNITED STATES CODE, TITLE 10—ARMED FORCES

Subtitle C—Navy and Marine Corps

* * * * * * *

PART IV—GENERAL ADMINISTRATION

* * * * * * *

Chapter 633—NAVY VESSELS

* * * * * * *

§ 7307. Restriction on disposal

(a) Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, no battleship, aircraft carrier, cruiser, destroyer, or submarine of the Navy may be

sold, transferred, or otherwise disposed of, unless the Chief of Naval Operations certifies that it is not essential to the defense of the United States.

[(b) Without authority from Congress granted after March 10, 1951, no battleship, aircraft carrier, cruiser, destroyer, or submarine that has not been stricken from the Naval Vessel Register under section 7304 of this title, nor any interest of the United States in such a vessel, may be sold, transferred, or otherwise disposed of under any law.]

(b) (1) After the date of enactment of this paragraph, no naval vessel in excess of 2,000 tons or less than 20 years of age may be sold, leased, granted, loaned, bartered, transferred, or otherwise disposed of unless the disposition thereof has been approved by law enacted after such date of enactment.

(2) After the date of enactment of this paragraph, any naval vessel not subject to the provisions of paragraph (1) may be sold, leased, granted, loaned, bartered, transferred, or otherwise disposed of in accordance with applicable provisions of law only after the Secretary of the Navy, or his designee, has notified the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives in writing of the proposed disposition and 30 days of continuous session of Congress have expired following the date on which notice was transmitted to such committes. For purposes of this paragraph, the continuity of a session of Congress is broken only by an adjournment of the Congress sine die, and the days on which either House is not in session because of an adjournment of more than 3 days to a day certain are excluded in the computation of such 30-day period.

INDIVIDUAL VIEWS OF SENATOR HUGHES

In the months since the Senate acted on last year's military procurement bill, we have witnessed a war in the Middle East, an accelerated program of Soviet weapons testing, and, thus far, a failure to conclude a second strategic arms limitation agreement. These developments should make clear that we still live in a world of uncertainty and potential violence. Consequently, we need the capacity to deter any potential enemy.

Over the years the United States has developed a terrifying arsenal of nuclear weapons and delivery systems plus conventional forces which give us the ability to respond to a full array of military contingencies. We have also maintained a vigorous research and development effort to preserve and extend our technological superiority in weaponry.

For fiscal year 1974 the Congress appropriated nearly $74 billion for the Department of Defense, including vast sums for new nuclear submarines, a new strategic bomber, and continued improvements in our existing bombers and missiles. A year ago, the United States had the capability to deliver 6,784 strategic nuclear warheads against potential enemy targets, more than three times the capability of the Soviet Union. Since that time, the United States has added 1,156 warheads to its arsenal while the Soviet Union has added about 400.

Clearly, we have and shall continue to have for the foreseeable future sufficient military forces to withstand even a massive surprise attack against our country and then retaliate with devastating effect. For example, defense analysts drawing on unclassified sources calculate that either 85 Poseidon missiles (less than six boat loads) or 110 Minuteman III missiles could kill 37 million people in the Soviet Union (15 percent of the population) and destroy 59 percent of that nation's industrial capacity. By the deadly logic of deterrence, no nation would risk such assured destruction by starting a nuclear war.

Despite this "balance of terror" and the continued improvements in our forces, the Defense Department has requested a 15 percent increase in the military budget, while virtually all other departments of government are asking less in constant dollars because of inflation and some even less in dollar amounts than last year. The Secretary of Defense has also admitted that his budget was padded at the last moment with several billions of dollars to fight our current recession, although most economists agree that more jobs would be created by directing spending into more socially useful programs such as education, housing, and health.

We are confronted, in short, with a defense budget which is excessive in terms of our military needs and which undermines programs to deal with our domestic needs. It is a tragic distortion of our national priorities, for example, to spend as much to maintain our own military presence in Southeast Asia as we will spend on all federal drug abuse pre-

vention programs, or to pour far more money into the costly and unnecessary B–1 bomber than we will spend for research on either cancer or heart disease.

Yet those are the budgetary facts of life. The Pentagon gets billions to develop new ways to kill, and other agencies have to beg for funds to heal.

We have been so obsessed by the threat of external attack that we have ignored or neglected the clear signs of our internal stagnation and decay. Families which are struggling to pay skyrocketing bills for food, clothing, housing, and education are nevertheless taxed hundreds of dollars each year to prepare for hypothetical contingencies in dozens of countries around the globe.

Our military planners are simply doing their jobs by offering programs and weapons to deal with every conceivable situation. It is up to the Congress and the President to draw the line and set the priorities.

Too often, I believe, we have focused narrowly on this year's effort compared to last year's, or this system compared with the older, less sophisticated one which it is intended to replace. We have rarely, if ever, addressed the broad assumptions on which our force levels are based or the trade-offs between programs, such as surface-to-air missiles and fighter-interceptors, which contribute to the same mission.

In addition to questions of cost, management, and comparative capability, we must ask whether a given program or policy will make war more or less likely and whether it will inhibit or facilitate arms control agreements.

On that basis, we would probably reject such destabilizing programs as warhead yield and accuracy improvements, the submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM), new tactical nuclear weapons, continued proliferation of multiple-warhead missiles, and overseas base expansion into such areas as the Indian Ocean.

In the long run, we want to build a stable deterrent force which will keep the nuclear powers from ever resorting to war to resolve political disputes.

To do this, we have to shed many assumptions and practices of the past—such as our belief in large standing armies ready to act as world policeman and our preference for nuclear superiority when other nations can easily achieve parity.

We need to redefine America's military role in the world so that we will not jump blindly or recklessly into conflicts but will be ready and able to act effectively when a national consensus, reached through our Constitutional processes, demands it.

And, fundamentally, we must train and build a military force that is fully responsive and subordinate to civilian control.

STRATEGIC PROGRAMS

Despite the arms limitation agreements of 1972, the Defense Department wants to press ahead with many new strategic programs, including several which could not be deployed under the terms of those agreements. And though some of these are justified as "bargaining chips" for SALT, our previous experience has been that these chips are never cashed in, but rather remain as IOU's for our taxpayers for years into the future.

This year the Secretary of Defense is requesting over half a billion dollars for a collection of strategic initiatives—over and above the continuing costly programs to improve or replace our existing triad of bombers, ICBM's and submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM's). While several of these new programs may contribute to a more stable, more survivable nuclear balance, the overall impact of these initiatives is to fire the starting gun on a new round in the arms race.

In truth, many of these programs turn our "defense" budget into an "offense" budget.

Yield and Accuracy Improvements: The most dangerous and destabilizing part of this bill is the $77 million for three programs to increase the yield and accuracy of our missiles. Thirty-two million dollars is proposed to increase the accuracy of our Minuteman III missiles; $25 million will go for a higher yield Mark 12A warhead; and $20 million will support an effort to develop a Maneuvering Reentry Vehicle (Marv) with terminal guidance which would give our missiles pinpoint accuracy.

These programs represent a sudden reversal of the policy of the Congress and the Defense Department against developing weapons which might be construed as having a hard-target or first-strike potential, a policy propounded by every recent Secretary of Defense, including Mr. Schlesinger, and reiterated by the Congress in the resolution approving the interim agreement on offensive weapons.

Now Mr. Schlesinger sidesteps his earlier statement by arguing that no nation could ever achieve a first-strike capability so long as nuclear submarines remain invulnerable. This position ignores the many previous arguments that we could not tolerate a Soviet capability to destroy at one blow any component of our strategic forces, in particular our ICBM's. Since the USSR, lacking intercontinental bombers, relies on ICBM's for the bulk of its strategic force, any potential U.S. hard target capability would be considered dangerous and destabilizing. Whatever marginal gains we would make in the efficiency and kill probability of our forces would more than likely be upset by new Soviet offensive systems.

In fact, we do not need these hard target programs in order to have a flexible response to the full range of hypothetical nuclear exchanges. Secretary Schlesinger has admitted, "We can devise selective, flexible strikes with our existing array of weaponry." The new programs merely increase the efficiency and probable effectiveness of our existing weapons.

Already our land-based missiles have an accuracy of less than a quarter of a mile, which is certainly sufficient to destroy above-ground structures and, to some degree, even hardened missiles. Further improvements, by reducing the uncertainty about the effects of an attack, increase the likelihood of war.

A nation threatened by a high probability of a one-shot obliteration of its ICBM's would prudently adopt a hair-trigger launch-on-warning strategy in order to use its missiles before they were destroyed in their silos. Ambiguous evidence from early warning systems could thus prompt a kill-or-be-killed decision. And once one nation has successfully demonstrated a hard-target system, no other nation could

verify or be sure that that capability had not been extended to enough of the force to provide a disarming first-strike potential.

Furthermore, assumptions about greater flexibility undermine the now clear firebreak between conventional and nuclear war. For if national leaders think that they can get away with limited, selective strikes, they may be more willing to try them. In fact, even such limited counter-force strikes would have substantial collateral, civilian damage. A hard-target Soviet strike against our Minuteman force alone, for example, would kill between five and ten million Americans.

The cost of these improvements, if fully implemented, would probably run to several billions of dollars. Such huge expenditures would leave us poorer in resources, less secure because of a less stable military balance, and only slightly more capable of selective nuclear attacks.

These programs are not needed now, especially since we have not yet succeeded in putting limits on existing strategic forces. Official intelligence estimates conclude that the USSR could not have the capability for a disarming strike against our Minuteman force before several years into the future. And this would require a Soviet willingness to spend the equivalent of $30 billion to replace the current SS–11 force with SS–19's and $12–$15 billion to replace the SS–9 with the SS–18. There is still time, in other words, to halt this dangerous trend before either side goes too far, and even time for the United States to respond prudently if such efforts fail.

SLCM: Another unnecessary program is the Navy's plan to develop a strategic cruise missile which could be launched from our submarine torpedo tubes. The SLCM would be a costly but less capable addition to our existing Triad.

The air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) would at least provide the option for a stand-off bomber/missile system, but the SLCM, which could not be recalled once launched and which would be even slower than a bomber in reaching its assigned target, would add little to our strategic posture. Moreover, use of such missiles would expose to enemy attack the subs from which they were launched, thus reducing their current invulnerability.

Worst of all, it would be difficult or impossible to set verifiable limits on such cruise missiles once they are developed. We should stop this program now.

B–1 Bomber: This program is in even worse trouble now than last year. The total program cost has jumped from $13.6 billion to $15.0 billion, and the per plane cost from $56.0 million to $61.5 million in the past six months. Major milestones have slipped further and further into the future. And performance characteristics continue to fall below the design specifications.

The Secretary of Defense seems to have begun to hedge his own options by initiating programs which could provide alternatives to the B–1, in particular the ALCM and a new ICBM which may be air-launched or ground-mobile. Unfortunately, he is still unwilling to cut his losses by terminating the B–1 program.

The General Accounting Office has reviewed the B–1 and existing alternatives, not including the standoff option, and has concluded that "The deterrence mission can be accomplished, in varying degrees,

by any one of the systems analyzed." GAO also found that "Total production costs for the projected B–1 fleet will significantly exceed the production costs of other options." The B–1 would, however, provide the most advanced operational capabilities if it did meet performance goals.

The prudent course would be to give much more serious study to a force mix of existing alternatives and the new programs related to the standoff option. While a major study is currently under way in the Pentagon, the Congress should insist on consultation about the assumptions on which that study is based and should then carefully review the results.

The Armed Services Committee action in denying funds for a fourth prototype aircraft is a sensible, though token, step. We should be willing to admit our mistake in continuing this program and concentrate our resources in other, more promising areas.

OVERSEAS DEPLOYMENTS

There are still too many Americans in uniform overseas. Except for some reductions in Southeast Asia, particularly Thailand, the U.S. military presence abroad remains the same. We have not yet begun to put the Guam Doctrine into practice.

While we can debate the precise figures and timing for troop reductions, the basic point is that we must move in that direction in the years ahead. The days of global interventionism are over, poisoned by the tragic experience of Vietnam and undermined by the growing military power of other nations. For the long run, we must rely on the fighting ability of our allies, supplemented by U.S. forces only when a major nuclear power intervenes and threatens our vital interests.

We should retain, not a far flung military establishment ready for major war, but rather an emergency rescue force which can act in those situations where our Constitutional processes determine it is necessary. Outside of Europe, we do not need to be fully ready for major conventional wars.

Europe is a special case, both because of our long standing alliance and because of the nuclear environment there. Even so, we should consider the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks not as an exercise in propaganda and delay, but rather as an important opportunity to establish a new, stable, and less costly military balance.

I am pleased with the Committee action in adopting proposals by Senator Sam Nunn, for I believe that these are important steps toward strengthening our NATO forces and reducing the nuclear threshhold.

In the Middle East, we have demonstrated our concern for maintaining a military balance among the conflicting nations, and we have facilitated genuine progress toward a lasting settlement. We should remain ready to provide diplomatic and material support, short of the direct involvement of U.S. forces in combat.

Although important questions will be raised in the discussion of the military construction bill as it relates to the proposed base expansion at Diego Garcia, our Government should act now to agree to limitations on great power involvement in the Indian Ocean. We should not jump headlong into a new arms race in that area, which is peripheral to our vital interests.

MILITARY AID TO SOUTH VIETNAM

The Committee reached a significant consensus to limit U.S. military aid to South Vietnam to $900 million in fiscal year 1975. This action should be a signal to the Saigon government that it no longer has a blank check to draw on our Treasury.

At a time when the North Vietnamese Government has received drastically reduced military assistance from its allies, I do not believe that the United States should increase its own aid to Saigon. Much of the justification of funds for South Vietnam is based on inflated and unreasonable assumptions about the level of continuing conflict in that area, and I hope that the Appropriations Committee will examine these requests on the basis of later evidence in order to make further sensible reductions in this request.

Our aid should be structured so as to encourage the transition from a military to a political struggle. While both sides have obviously violated certain provisions of the Paris cease-fire agreements, we should not compound those violations by giving any more than the piece-for-piece replacement items permitted under those agreements. And we should do all within our power to require the Saigon government to abide fully by the political provisions agreed to at Paris.

There are many other items in this bill which are questionable or reducible, but I shall not make those arguments here.

Since I shall be leaving the Senate, I will not have another opportunity to wrestle with the defense budget. I am alarmed, however, at the complacency with which the Congress views this massive commitment of our resources.

We are moving toward ever larger military budgets, which will be justified in part by a continuing inflation which is fueled by spending on defense rather than on other programs. There is no reason, in my view, to allocate even a fixed share of our gross national product for military purposes. The six per cent which now seems to be the target figure is still significantly greater than what most of our allies deem necessary.

We are moving toward a force structure so weighted with complex and costly weapons systems that we are dangerously sacrificing quantity for only marginally better quality. Despite our vast expenditures, we wind up with fewer planes and ships and tanks.

We can reverse these trends and still protect our national security. We can defend ourselves and still improve the nation which our forces are intended to defend.

But fundamentally, we need to change our basic assumptions which have locked us into a military-technological-budgetary spiral. We have been prisoners of fear rather than hopeful workers for a truly peaceful world.

War can never build, only destroy. If we are to build a world of harmony, social progress, and peaceful change, we have to prevent war, especially that nuclear conflict which could devastate what we now know as civilization.

Some military expenses are necessary as a kind of insurance policy against irrationality and barbarity, but we must not neglect long-term investments to make life more bearable now.

After all, our capacity for violence must never be allowed to diminish our reverence for life.

Senator HAROLD HUGHES.

INDIVIDUAL VIEWS OF U.S. SENATOR THOMAS J. McINTYRE

Buried in the obscure details of this bill's R&D section are three programs which, if approved, would drastically and dangerously alter our national strategic policy. These programs would greatly increase the accurace of our Minuteman III, double their yield, and develop a terminally guided MARV (maneuverable reentry vehicle) which would give our SLBM's, as well as our Minutemen, nearly perfect accuracy. The net effect of these programs would be to give us the ability to destroy efficiently large numbers of Soviet missiles in their hardened silos.

I have opposed these counterforce programs in the Armed Services Committee and will continue to do so on the Floor of the Senate for the following reasons:

(1) *These counterforce programs will put a hair trigger on nuclear war.*

The stable nuclear peace that the world has enjoyed in recent years has been secured by the confidence each side has had in the survivability of its retaliatory force—even after an all out attack. This stability would be undermined by greater counterforce capabilities on either side.

Our threat to Soviet ICBM's might motivate them to strike first in a period of international tension. These programs would, therefore, produce an international wild-west filled with the fears and dangers of a nuclear "fast gun."

(2) *Whether the Soviet threat to our Minuteman, these counterforce programs would do nothing to meet that threat.*

Our real choice is not between strength and weakness but choosing a kind of strength that will meet the threat. And no matter how accurate or powerful our Minuteman may become these improvements would not make them one iota less vulnerable to any projected Soviet threat against them. In fact they would make them less secure since they might draw Soviet fire.

The effective counter to any projected threat to our Minutemen from Soviet MIRVed heavy missiles are programs that will insure the survivability of our own deterrent. This is our critical R&D task in strategic arms.

The Military R&D Subcommittee, which I chair, therefore recommended support of all DOD requests, even some questionable ones, which will insure the survivability of our strategic forces. R&D programs in this bill would give us a number of alternative ways to deny the Soviet any real counterforce advantage—by mobile deployment of our ICBM's in the air or on the ground; defending our ICBM's with a dedicated missile defense; or augmenting our strategic force through alternative systems such as the air launch cruise missile.

The continuation of the R&D arms race is unattractive no matter what route we choose. But R&D programs dedicated to survivability do meet the threat and they do not add to nuclear instability.

(3) *There is no military requirement for these counterforce programs.*

The R&D Subcommittee I chair held searching hearings into our strategic requirements.

DOD's witnesses assured us that we can now confidently destroy all Soviet civilian targets, all soft military targets, and a number of hard military targets. The only thing we cannot do is confidently destroy a large number of very hard military targets (hardened silos) efficiently. Such an increased counterforce capability is not necessary to our deterrent even as defined by the new flexible response doctrine.

(4) *These programs don't give us the kind of strength we need to succeed at SALT.*

These counterforce programs will give the Soviets a military reason to go ahead with their MIRV deployment and will, therefore, work against our key goal at SALT—a Soviet acceptance of a verifiable agreement to restrict deployment of their new MIRVed heavy missiles.

Moreover, since these programs will require the Soviets to further harden their silos, their earth moving and construction will complicate any independent verification by obscuring detection of MIRVed deployment or other modernization they might do at the same time.

Our imposing, dynamic Trident program plus our continued development of B–1, plus continued modernization and improvement of our Minutemen, plus our active retention of the option of MIRVing additional Minutemen, plus our R&D of Mobile ICBMs, plus our R&D of site defense, plus our continued MIRV conversion of our submarine fleet, plus R&D on sub and air launched cruise missiles, will insure that our military position at SALT II will be a powerful incentive for the Soviets to come to a serious and secure agreement.

But most important, concentrated support of those R&D programs which would enhance the survivability of our deterrent speaks with unmistakable clarity and force to the Soviets that we will never let them put a substantial part of our strategic force at risk. We, thereby, give them the most compelling motive to restrain their destabilizing MIRV technologies and come to a secure agreement at SALT. If they refuse, we will have technologically prepared ourselves to take whatever practical steps are necessary to assure the survivability of our deterrent.

(5) *These programs would reverse previously stated DOD policy and overwhelming recent Congressional opposition.*

In 1971 DOD opposed Senator Buckley's counterforce amendments saying, "It is the position of the United States *not* to develop a weapons system whose deployment could reasonably be construed by the Soviets as having a first strike capability. Such a deployment might provide an incentive for the Soviets to strike first."

DOD understood then that the question was not whether we could actually achieve first strike, but whether conservative Soviet analysts could reasonably construe greater accuracy as leading to a first strike capability. The counterforce proposals currently in dispute certainly could be so construed.

In 1971 the Senate, led by Senator Stennis, rejected a Buckley amendment for improved Minuteman accuracy by a vote of 66 to 17. In 1972 the Senate conferences insisted that a $20 million DOD request for Silo kill accuracy in the post-SALT supplemental be deleted in conference. In both cases there was a full appreciation

that such R&D programs would break new ground and set dangerous new policy.

The threat of a run-away arms race which has been raised during the last year by Soviet development of MIRV's and our frustrations at SALT II make it all the more necessary that we not develop increased counterforce capabilities which would only further fuel the R&D arms race.

In sum, the counterforce proposals are the most dangerously destabilizing requests to come before my Military R&D Subcommittee in its six years of existance. Most disputes about R&D are in essence about money or management, important considerations to be sure.

But the debate on these requests could literally mean life or death—of the human race.

And I therefore pray that the Senate will reject them and insist instead on proven policies of nuclear stability, assured survivability of our deterrent, real military strength designed to meet any projected Soviet threat, and bargaining strength that will help, not hamper our efforts to curb the arms race through SALT II.

THOMAS J. MCINTYRE.

O