93D CONGRESS } HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES { REPORT
2d Session } { No. 93-1035

AUTHORIZING APPROPRIATIONS, FISCAL YEAR 1975, FOR MILITARY PROCUREMENT; RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT; STRENGTHS FOR ACTIVE-DUTY MILITARY COMPONENTS, CIVILIAN PERSONNEL OF THE DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT AND RESERVE COMPONENTS; MILITARY TRAINING STUDENT LOADS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

MAY 10, 1974.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed

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MR. HÉBERT, from the Committee on Armed Services, submitted the following

REPORT

together with

ADDITIONAL AND DISSENTING VIEWS

[To accompany H.R. 14592]

The Committee on Armed Services, to whom was referred the bill (H.R. 14592) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1975 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes, and other weapons, and research, development, test and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength for each active duty component and of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces and of civilian personnel of the Department of Defense, and to authorize the military training student loads and for other purposes, having considered the same, report favorably thereon without amendment and recommend that the bill do pass.

PURPOSE

This bill would:

(1) Authorize appropriations during fiscal year 1975 for (a) major procurement, and (b) research, development, test and evaluation by the Department of Defense;

(2) Authorize the personnel strength for each of the active duty components of the Armed Forces for fiscal year 1975;

(3) Authorize the personnel strength for the Selected Reserve of each of the Reserve components of the Armed Forces for fiscal year 1975;

(4) Authorize the civilian personnel strength for the Department of Defense for fiscal year 1975;

(5) Authorize annual average military training student loads for each of the active and Reserve components of the Armed Forces for fiscal year 1975;

(6) Continue the authority for military assistance for South Vietnam within the funding of the Department of Defense, subject to a dollar limitation, with provisions for segregating such authorized appropriations in a single fund; and

(7) Establish United States policy with respect to use of nuclear power in major combatant vessels of the U.S. Navy.

The bill provides specific authorizations for appropriations totaling $22,642,963,000. This includes $13,641,300,000 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes and other weapons; and $9,001,663,000 for research, development, test and evaluation.

H.R. 14592—A CLEAN BILL

H.R. 14592 is a clean bill superseding H.R. 12564 on which hearings were held.

CONTENTS

SUMMARY OF MAJOR COMMITTEE REVISIONS IN DEFENSE DEPARTMENT REQUEST

The committee made numerous changes in the dollar authorizations and other authorities requested by the Department of Defense. The revisions are discussed in detail throughout this report. Following is a summary of the major changes made by the committee:

Funding Authorizations

AWACS. The procurement authorization requested for the E–3A Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), $515.4 million, is reduced to $257.7 million. The request was to provide for purchase of 12 aircraft. The authorization allotted would allow purchase of up to 6 aircraft.

C–141 stretchout. The procurement authorization request of $50 million for the stretched version of the C–141 aircraft is denied.

CRAF program. The procurement authorization request for $132.9 million for the Civilian Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) program is reduced to $25 million.

Patrol gunboats. The procurement authorization request for $14.3 million for 2 patrol gunboats to be furnished to the South Vietnamese Navy is denied.

Naval craft. A request for $9.2 million for 45 naval craft to be furnished to the South Vietnamese Navy is denied.

Dragon. The procurement authorization request of $106.3 million for procurement of the Dragon missile for the Army is reduced to $86.5 million with the concurrence of the Army.

ARSV and armored personnel carrier. The procurement authorization request of $25.3 million for 35 Armored Reconnaissance Scout Vehicles (ARSV) is denied; and the procurement authorization request of $9.4 million for the M–113A1 armored personnel carrier is increased to $24 million, an increase of $14.6 million, and an additional authorization of $2.3 million is provided for procurement of additional modification kits for the Vulcan 20mm air-defense gun system. These changes, resulting in a net reduction of $8.4 million in Army procurement authorizations, are made with the concurrence of the Army.

Research, development, test and evaluation. The authorization request of $9,325,039,000 for RDT&E is reduced to $9,001,663,000, a reduction of $323,376,000.

Strength Authorizations

Air Force active-duty strength. The active-duty personnel strength request for the Department of the Air Force of 630,345 is reduced to 627,535, a reduction of 2,810.

Army National Guard. The Selected Reserve strength of the Army National Guard is increased from the number requested, 379,848, to 408,000 an increase of 28,152.

Air National Guard. The Selected Reserve strength of the Army National Guard is increased from the number requested, 89,128, to 95,000, an increase of 5,872.

Army Reserve. The Selected Reserve strength of the Army Reserve is increased from the number requested, 215,842, to 225,000, an increase of 9,158.

Naval Reserve. The Selected Reserve strength of the Naval Reserve is increased from the number requested, 107,526, to 117,000, an increase of 9,474.

Marine Corps Reserve. The Selected Reserve strength of the Marine Corps Reserve is increased from the number requested, 36,703, to 38,000, an increase of 1,297.

Civilian personnel strength. The authorized strength for civilian personnel for the Department of Defense is reduced from 1,027,327, the total requested, to 1,012,327, a reduction of 15,000. The reductions are to be allocated among the services by the Department of Defense.

Language Changes

Southeast Asia funding. The authority provided in the general provisions for the continuation of the limitation on military assistance to South Vietnam under the Military Assistance Service Funded program (MASF), subject to dollar limitation, has been extensively revised to require the administration of such authorization as a separate fund and to require improved accounting and auditing procedures.

The authorization for expenditure requested under the program by the Department of Defense of $1,600,000,000 is reduced to $1,400,000,000, a reduction of $200 million.

Nuclear Navy. A new title is added to the bill to establish as the policy of the United States the requirement that future construction of naval combatant vessels for the Navy shall be nuclear powered.

Cost Totals

The total dollar authorization recommended by the committee in this bill, $22,642,963,000, is $487,176,000 below the amount requested by the Department of Defense.

The following table compares the amounts authorized for fiscal year 1974 and the amounts requested by the Department of Defense for fiscal year 1975 and the amounts recommended by the committee in H.R. 14592:

COMPARISON OF AUTHORIZATIONS REQUESTED BY DOD FOR FISCAL YEAR 1975 WITH CONGRESSIONAL ACTION IN FISCAL YEAR 1974 AND COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1975

[In thousands of dollars]

	Requested fiscal year 1974	Authorized fiscal year 1974	Appropriated fiscal year 1974	Requested fiscal year 1975	Committee recommends
Procurement:					
Aircraft:					
Army	181,000	181,000	138,400	339,500	[8]335,000
Navy and Marine Corps	2,958,300	2,958,300	2,722,200	2,960,600	2,964,100
Air Force	2,912,800	2,739,100	2,720,400	3,496,600	3,391,400
Total, aircraft	6,052,100	5,878,400	5,581,000	6,796,700	6,690,500
Missiles:					
Army	599,900	574,200	525,100	459,200	439,400
Navy	680,200	680,200	579,700	620,600	620,600
Marine Corps	32,300	32,300	[4] 32,600	76,000	76,000
Air Force	1,573,200	1,573,200	1,393,300	1,610,800	1,610,800
Total, missiles	2,885,600	2,859,900	2,530,700	2,766,600	2,746,800
Naval vessels	3,901,800	3,788,200	3,468,100	3,562,600	3,539,100
Tracked combat vehicles:					
Army	201,700	193,300	188,800	331,900	321,200
Marine Corps	46,200	46,200	45,200	80,100	74,200
Total, tracked combat vehicles	247,900	239,500	234,000	412,000	395,400
Torpedoes: Navy	219,900	219,900	200,768	187,700	187,700
Other weapons:					
Army	51,300	44,700	40,500	53,400	55,700
Navy	41,900	41,900	28,751	25,600	25,600
Marine Corps	700	700	700	500	500
Total, other weapons	93,900	87,300	69,951	79,500	81,800
Total, procurement	13,401,200	13,073,200	12,084,519	13,805,100	13,641,300
Research, development, test and evaluation:					
Army	2,108,700	2,031,686	1,912,100	1,985,976	1,878,397
Navy	[1] 2,711,700	[1] 2,675,300	[1] 2,654,405	[2] 3,264,503	[2] 3,153,006
Air Force	3,212,500	3,110,811	[5] 3,042,000	3,518,860	3,459,760
Defense agencies	[3] 525,500	[3] 504,000	[3] 482,500	[6] 555,700	[7] 510,500
Total, R.D.T. & E	8,557,900	8,321,797	8,091,005	9,325,039	9,001,663
Total, procurement and R.D.T. & E	21,959,100	21,394,997	20,175,524	23,130,139	22,642,963

[1] Includes $2,600,000 for special foreign currency program for Navy under R.D.T. & E. authorization.
[2] Includes $2,570,000 for foreign currency program.
[3] Includes $24,600,000 for the activities of the Director of Test and Evaluation, Defense.
[4] Appropriated amount includes $300,000 in minor reprograming for spare parts and miscellaneous items.
[5] Appropriated amount includes $7,200,000 authorized in the procurement account.
[6] Includes $27,000,000 for the activities of the Director of Test and Evaluation, Defense.
[7] Includes $25,000,000 for the activities of the Director of Test and Evaluation, Defense.
[8] Reduction results from $4.5 million transfer to R.D.T. & E. authorization from procurement authorization of Cobra/Tow helicopter.

RELATIONSHIP OF AUTHORIZATION TO TOTAL APPROPRIATION

The $22,642,963,000 authorized for appropriation in the present bill is only a part of the $90,974,292,000 in budget authority requested by the President for the Department of Defense in fiscal year 1975.

The appropriations categories covered by authorization in the present bill are those for major procurement and research, development, test and evaluation. Authorizations of specific dollar amounts for personnel are not carried in the present legislation. However, the legislation authorizes the strength levels for the active-duty military components, for civilian personnel of the Department of Defense and for the Selected Reserve of each of the Reserve components; and these authorizations, therefore, govern the appropriation requirements for major personnel and operation and maintenance expenditures.

Military construction is authorized in separate legislation.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FISCAL YEAR 1975 AUTHORIZATION BILL
SUMMARY BY MAJOR WEAPON CATEGORY

[In thousands of dollars]

Weapon category	Total amount of request for fiscal year 1975 programs	Committee	
		Net change from request	Recommended
Aircraft	6,796,700	−106,200	6,690,500
Missiles	2,766,600	−19,800	2,746,800
Naval vessels	3,562,600	−23,500	3,539,100
Tracked combat vehicles	412,000	−16,600	395,400
Torpedoes	187,700	None	187,700
Other weapons	79,500	+2,300	81,800
Procurement Total	13,805,100	−163,800	13,641,300
R.D.T. & E	[1] 9,325,039	−323,376	[2] 9,001,663
Grand Total	23,130,139	−487,176	22,642,963

[1] Includes $2,570,000 for foreign currency programs, and $27,000,000 for the activities of the Director of Test and Evaluation, Defense.
[2] Includes $2,570,000 for foreign currency programs, and $25,000,000 for the activities of the Director of Test and Evaluation, Defense.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FISCAL YEAR 1975 AUTHORIZATION BILL—SUMMARY, BY DEPARTMENT

[In thousands of dollars]

	Army	Navy and Marine Corps	Air Force	Defense agencies	Grand totals
Authorization requested:					
Procurement	1,184,000	7,513,700	5,107,400	([1])	13,805,100
R.D.T. & E	1,985,976	[2] 3,264,503	3,518,860	[3] 555,700	9,325,039
Total requested	3,169,976	10,778,203	8,626,260	555,700	23,130,139
Committee recommends:					
Procurement	1,151,300	7,487,800	5,002,200	([1])	13,641,300
R.D.T. & E	1,878,397	[2] 3,153,036	3,459,960	[4] 510,500	9,001,663
Total recommended	3,029,697	10,640,836	8,461,960	510,500	22,642,963
Net changes:					
Procurement	−32,700	−25,900	−105,200	([1])	−163,800
R.D.T. & E	−107,579	−111,467	−59,100	−45,200	−323,376
Total changes	−140,279	−137,367	−164,300	−45,200	−487,176

[1] Not available.
[2] Includes $2,570,000 for foreign currency program.
[3] Includes $27,000,000 for the activities of the Director of Test and Evaluation, Defense.
[4] Includes $25,000,000 for the activities of the Director of Test and Evaluation, Defense.

NATURE OF COMMITTEE PROCEDURES

The Committee on Armed Services conducted extensive hearings on all phases of the present bill, commencing hearings on February 7 and voting to report the bill on May 7.

In addition to 14 hearing days by the full committee, which included a general review of military posture and detailed consideration of aircraft and missile procurement, other sections of the bill were reviewed in detail by subcommittees as follows:

Subcommittee No. 1 conducted 20 days of hearings on Title II, research, development, test and evaluation authorizations.

Subcommittee No. 2 conducted 21 days of hearings on Titles III, IV, V and VI of the bill, the authorizations for personnel strengths of the active-duty military force, the Reserve force, civilian personnel of the Department of Defense and military student training loads.

Subcommittee No. 3 conducted 12 days of hearings on that part of Title I relating to authorization for naval ship construction.

The committee and subcommittee hearings on the bill fill four volumes.

COMMITTEE OBSERVATIONS

U. S. military commitments to Europe

The committee reminds the House that on April 8 the committee, pursuant to section 301(c) of Public Law 93–155, transmitted a report on U.S. military commitments to Europe. The report was approved by the committee by a vote of 32–5.

Section 301(c) of Public Law 93–155 was the section added to last year's procurement authorization bill on the House floor by the Peyser amendment which required a study on "the advisability of maintaining our present military commitment to Europe in view of the current economic and military situation in Europe."

The committee would remind the House that in acting on H.R. 14592 it should keep in mind this principal point raised in the earlier report: The question for the House is substantially different this year than last year because major actions have been taken to delineate the policy with regard to deployment of forces in Europe. The two major actions in this regard were the adoption of the Jackson-Nunn amendment to Public Law 93–155 and the commencement of MBFR negotiations in Vienna, which included the submission of a unified position by the NATO allies.

(1) In adopting the Jackson-Nunn amendment, the Congress set as policy that the allies have 18 months to offset the balance-of-payments deficit of the United States as a result of its deployment of forces in Europe. If such offset is not accomplished, then beginning 6 months thereafter the United States will begin to reduce its forces by a percentage equal to the percentage by which the balance of payments is not offset.

In adopting Jackson-Nunn as the law of the land, the Congress has made a commitment to the NATO allies that they will have an opportunity to meet the balance-of-payments requirement before we reduce our forces.

To withdraw such forces at this time prior to a determination of whether or not the allies can meet the requirements of Jackson-Nunn would be a capricious act by the United States.

Information available to the committee gained in the study conducted pursuant to the Peyser amendment and updated in recent hearings with the Assistant Secretary of State on the German Offset Agreement provide encouraging indications that through a combination of the German Offset Agreement and other purchases by other NATO allies, the European partners would be able to meet the requirements of Jackson-Nunn. It must be emphasized, however, that a precise determination of the balance-of-payments deficit, which by law must be made by the Department of Commerce, cannot be made until the close of fiscal year 1974, and, therefore, determination of whether the requirements of Jackson-Nunn can be completely met by the allies cannot be determined until sometime thereafter.

(2) At the time of last year's House consideration of the annual authorization legislation, the MBFR negotiations were still a hope. They are now a reality. Negotiations commenced in Vienna in October 1973. The NATO allies have submitted a substantive proposal for mutual reduction of forces, the first phase of which calls for reductions to be made entirely from forces of the United States and the Soviet Union. It should not be lost on Members of the House that this allied proposal, therefore, carries an agreement by the European partners of NATO for a reduction of U.S. forces, in context of MBFR, without any reduction of their own forces. In joining with its allies in submission of substantive proposals at the Vienna talks, where the Warsaw Pact has also submitted substantive proposals, the United States has made a commitment to give such negotiations a reasonable time to work. A unilateral withdrawal of U.S. forces at this stage would be an abrogation of our commitment and would undercut the negotiations in Vienna and in the process would undercut our allies and the position they have taken at considerable U.S. urging. As was said in the report submitted to the House on April 8, "MBFR is the litmus test of detente, and the impact of undercutting negotiations would extend beyond European security."

Your committee believes that the U.S. has a great responsibility not to undermine the MBFR talks. The committee, therefore, urges Members of the House to remember these twin policy commitments the U.S. has made in considering any effort to change our European deployments at this time. As the committee's earlier report stated, unilateral reductions at this time "would be a capricious action and would not be worthy of the United States."

Nuclear Navy

Ever since the Congress found it necessary to fund the reactor for the NAUTILUS, the world's first nuclear submarine, with Atomic Energy funds, the Congress has had to drag the Navy and the Department of Defense into the nuclear era.

It was at congressional insistence that the Polaris fleet of ballistic missile submarines was created. Congressional action changed a conventionally powered frigate into a nuclear-powered frigate in 1961 to construct the TRUXTUN. Every nuclear frigate since then—DLGN's 38 through 42—has been constructed only after the Congress mandated their construction.

Notwithstanding the great success of the nuclear-powered carrier ENTERPRISE, the then Secretary of Defense returned to conventional power for the follow-on JOHN F. KENNEDY and AMERICAN over the strong objections of the Congress. The latest carriers, the NIMITZ, EISENHOWER and VINSON, are all nuclear powered.

The use of nuclear power on submarines and other naval ships thus resulted from the initiative of the Congress and their introduction would have been long delayed if the Congress had not taken the initiative. It is perhaps true that in no other area has the Congress provided such clear leadership in weapons decisionmaking as in the introduction of nuclear power to naval forces.

It can be equally said that in no other area has the initiative of Congress proven to be profoundly correct. Given the present problems of our Navy, even with the nuclear capability that it does have and facing as it does the awesome increase in naval capability of the Soviet Union—the details of which have been enunciated to the House by this committee on numerous occasions in the past—one shudders to think of what the state of our naval forces would be today without the actions initiated by the Congress on nuclear submarines and surface ships.

The advantages of nuclear power for naval craft that have been expounded by the Congress in the past have proven to be true beyond a shadow of a doubt in any military sense. The operational advantage of nuclear power is undisputed. The only arguments of any possible substance against the use of nuclear power for some time have been on economic grounds. Your committee has long held that those economic arguments were unreliable and were not sufficient to outweigh the operational advantages of nuclear power. But the question is now moot. The oil crisis resulting from the October War in the Middle East and the resulting dramatic increase in the cost of oil have made meaningless scraps of paper out of all those vast and impressive compilations of comparative cost statistics produced so laboriously in the Pentagon.

Notwithstanding this overwhelming weight of evidence, the committee was appalled to learn that renewed consideration was being given within the Departmnt of Defense to a conventionally powered carrier for the Navy in future budget programs as well as diesel powered submarines and conventional power for a new class of destroyers.

The advantages of a nuclear fleet compared to ships tied to a black oil train are so strong as to be incontrovertible and have been delineated for the House on a number of occasions in the past by this committee.

It is unnecessary to take time for a detailed discussion here. Nuclear power has proved itself over the past 20 years. Since the first nuclear ships were commissioned in September 1954 and with over 100 nuclear submarines and 6 nuclear surface ships in commission, no nuclear-powered vessel has ever had to abort a mission in all of that time because of failure in a nuclear propulsion system.

The Committee on Armed Services, in view of the above considerations, believes that it is time for the Congress to take the leadership once more in setting naval policy and to put an end to the continuous struggling within the Department of Defense on nuclear propulsion

systems. Your committee recommends, therefore, the addition of a new title to the bill, Title VIII, to establish as the policy of the United States that the strike forces of the U.S. Navy will be modernized by the construction of nuclear-powered major combatant vessels and to assure an adequate industrial base for such policy. Essentially, this title would require that all new first-line combatant vessels will be nuclear powered.

Title VIII defines major combatant vessels as all submarines, both missile and attack; all ships that run with an aircraft carrier task force including the carrier and all of its escorts; and all strike forces which operate independently where high-speed operations will be of significant military value.

Title VIII requires the Secretary of Defense to submit written plans for the nuclear Navy to the Congress with the annual submission of the budget and requires further that no nonnuclear-powered first-line strike ships may be requested from Congress unless and until the President advises the Congress that construction of nuclear-powered vessels would not be in the national interest. Such a report from the President would have to include for the consideration by Congress an alternate program of nuclear-powered ships with appropriate design, cost and schedule information.

Tank procurement

The committee would like to express its concern as to the limitations on the capabilities of the Armed Forces and the military procurement industry to produce conventional weapons systems at the rate necessary to meet fully our long-range requirements.

The committee is particularly concerned about the level of procurement of tanks for the Army and Marine Corps. A great deal of money has been spent in past years on the R&D of follow-on tanks, in some cases on programs which have been terrible failures. At the same time we have in our inventory a tank which is the equal of any operating in the world today but have failed to produce this tank in numbers anywhere approaching the tank production of the Soviet Union. The October War in the Middle East provided frightening evidence of the willingness and the ability of the Soviets to supply tanks to their allies at an incredible rate. The U.S. policy decision to supply tanks to Israel diminished our own tank inventory. Even so, the Israelis have not received tanks in the quantity they desire.

The committee would like to repeat here a statement made in the report of the special subcommittee of this committee which visited the Middle East following the October War:

> What the Soviets gave the Arabs was not sophistication, but proliferation. It was the vast number of weapons provided the Arabs rather than any exceptional technical capability that took a toll.
>
> It is important to ask ourselves what the lesson is for our military. In a confrontation of equal tactical, technical and fighting ability, at what point does a great advantage in quantity overcome an advantage in quality?

> We have continued to develop technically superior conventional weapons (although these developments have sometimes met with great resistance) but we have not supplied U.S. forces with conventional weapons in quantities matching Soviet forces. If the decision is made to resupply the Israeli forces at anywhere near the number they request and those supplies are taken out of inventory, the U.S. forces could end up with shortages in some areas of conventional weapons. Perhaps the United States has concentrated so heavily in developing weapons for the future that not enough effort has been given to producing already adequate systems.

The committee reminds the House that in Central Europe the Warsaw Pact has an advantage over NATO in tanks of approximately 2½ to 1. Elsewhere in this report the committee has also expressed its concern about the substantial deficit in tank inventories for the Reserve forces.

At present there is only one producer of tanks in the United States for the U.S. Army and Marine Corps, and the present rate of production is 30 tanks a month, or 360 a year.

In addition, there is only one remaining willing supplier of the traversing turret.

The FY 1975 procurement authorization for the M60A1 tank is based not on the true requirements of the Army, but on the estimated rate of production that the assembly line can deliver. Efforts are underway to increase the production rate, but the time required to provide a substantial increase is of great concern to the committee. And even when the production rate is increased according to the present plans of the Army, the replenishment capabilities would still be inferior to those of the Soviets.

The committee believes, therefore, that both the Army and the Department of Defense have to give a great deal of thought to the production needs for the tanks currently in our inventory and for other conventional weapons systems whose needs might prove critical on tomorrow's battlefield. As part of this reexamination, the committee believes that consideration should be given to developing additional sources for the production of tanks and possibly other systems.

TITLE I—PROCUREMENT

Discussion of Major Weapons Procurement Programs

T–34

The Navy request for $3.5 million to modify two T–34B aircraft to the T–34C configuration was discussed at length by the committee. The committee was advised that the cost of new T–34C aircraft was within two percent of the cost to modify older T–34 aircraft.

According to information received by the committee, the service request for $3.5 million to modify two T–34B aircraft was brought on by the conference report in the authorization bill for fiscal year 1974 directing a review of total defense pilot requirements and training

rates together with assets available to meet pilot training requirements prior to submitting a request for additional training aircraft. It is obvious that this hiatus in training aircraft procurement was an outgrowth of the T–2C/T–38 training aircraft issue that resulted in termination of T–2C procurement in fiscal year 1974.

Both the T–2C and the T–38 are costly jet training aircraft and the committee felt that the language in the conference report was intended to apply to these expensive jet training aircraft. The T–34C is a small, propeller-powered training aircraft, not in any way competitive with jet training aircraft such as the T–2C or T–38. In addition, the committee was advised that the O&M cost per hour for the T–34C is $90, while the O&M cost per hour of the T–2C and the T–38 is $413. Therefore, the committee felt the prohibition of further procurement of jet training aircraft applied to the costly jet trainers discussed at the conference and not to inexpensive small propeller aircraft.

The proposed modification of the T–34B to T–34C configuration is extensive. New components include the engine, propeller, wing, landing gear, avionics and oxygen system which are available from in-production sources. Due to the extensiveness of the T–34B to T–34C configuration, disassembly and handling costs cause the price of a T–34C acquired by modification to be within two percent of the cost of a new production T–34C. Further, procurement of only two aircraft in fiscal year 1975 would result in a costly break in the T–34C production line while awaiting fiscal year 1976 contract implementation. Therefore, the service request for $3.5 million to modify two T–34B aircraft to T–34C configuration would be a more expensive method to acquire T–34C aircraft than is new procurement.

The T–34C aircraft will replace the T–34B and the T–28 trainer aircraft. Both the T–34B and the T–28 are over 18 years old. An investment in a Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) for both aircraft will be required if operated beyond fiscal year 1977. This costly SLEP for these two aircraft, which will extend service life for only five years, can be avoided by initiating T–34C procurement in fiscal year 1975 and continuing production into fiscal year 1977.

The House Armed Services Committee believes it is much more cost effective to procure new aircraft and, therefore, recommend procurement of 18 T–34C trainer aircraft at a cost of $7.0 million.

F–14A

For the first time in several years, the F–14 aircraft procurement request was not the center of controversy in the committee. The committee was advised that production deliveries are on schedule and the program is presently within cost.

Information furnished the committee indicated that in 1973 the F–14 air superiority fighter, by virtue of its superlative flight characteristics and successfully demonstrated capability as a weapon system, established new standards for fighter effectiveness, versatility and aircrew safety. Of major significance in 1973 was the conclusive evidence that the Variable Geometry Wing (VGW) of the F–14 added new and most noteworthy dimensions in the realm of fighter aviation safety and effectiveness. This feature provides optimum lift configuration throughout the flight envelope.

Further, the F–14 weapon control system and PHOENIX missile in 1973 demonstrated capabilities unprecedented in the annals of aviation:

Longest range fighter detection of fighter-size targets to date;
Longest range fighter launched air-to-air missile firings to date;
First fighter to demonstrate automatic detection and tracking of multiple targets;
First fighter to demonstrate multiple, near-simultaneous firing of missiles against multiple airborne targets.

These events, coupled with an outstanding PHOENIX firing score (90 percent) from the F–14, fulfilled the far-reaching performance requirements defined by the Navy during the conceptual stage of the F–14.

Therefore, the committee recommends the procurement of 50 F–14As, in the amount of $639.3 million, together with advance procurement, in the amount of $70 million, and initial spares, in the amount of $35.2 million.

A–10

The Air Force request, in the procurement account, for the A–10 aircraft was $173.8 million. $140.3 million is for the procurement of 26 aircraft; $28.9 million is for advance procurement; and $4.6 million is for initial spares.

At the conclusion of the "flyoff" between the A–9 and A–10 prototypes, a contract was awarded by the Air Force to Fairchild-Republic, manufacturer of the A–10, for the full scale development and manufacture of ten development and test aircraft. In addition, the contract includes an option to produce 48 production aircraft. That contract was awarded in March 1973.

The Air Force reported to the committee that since the contract was awarded, there have been some very significant program milestones. The Air Force has added 150 flight evaluation hours to the prior 328 hours that were accomplished during the prototype phase; they have completed the prototype testing of the drag reduction on the wing slat; the GAU–8 gun has not only been fired on a ground mockup, but is now being successfully fired in flight with no adverse effects on the aircraft or the pilot. Additionally, the TF34–100 engine has experienced 675 problem-free hours of operation.

During the hearings, the Air Force advised the committee that the "flyoff", requested by the Senate Armed Services Committee, was in progress between the A–10 and the A–7; and that a report of the results of that "flyoff" would be before the Congress by the 15th of June.

After receiving the Air Force budget request, the committee was informed that "the AF plans to initiate procurement of the first 26 production aircraft and 4 additional RDT&E aircraft with a 1 July 1974 release of funds under the Continuing Resolution Authority". The committee was concerned about the authority for such action. Under questioning by the Chairman, the Air Force witness explained it definitely "is the intent of the Air Force, after successful completion of the flyoff, to ask the Congress, through letters to the chairmen of the four committees involved, for permission to apply long-lead money, $30 million, as early as possible to exercise our option."

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The committee unanimously agreed to recommend approval of the A–10 request in the Air Force budget, subject to a favorable decision for the A–10 in the flyoff competition with the A–7. Therefore, the money authorized in the bill will be available for the A–10 only if that aircraft wins the fly-off competition for the close support role.

E–3A (AWACS)

The authorization requested by the Air Force in their fiscal year 1975 budget for the E–3A (AWACS) was $769.5 million, of which $494.4 million was requested for procurement; $21.0 million was requested for advance procurement; and $34.4 million for initial spares. The R.D.T. & E. portion of the AWACS is $219.7 million. The number of aircraft requested in the fiscal year 1974 program was 12.

The General Accounting Office began a study in the fall of 1973 to evaluate the latest rationale for AWACS and to assess the Air Force's plans for using this "elevated platform" for surveillance, command, communications and control. According to the GAO report, "the Secretary of Defense transferred AWACS from the Strategic Forces to the General Purpose/Tactical." This transfer was in line with other steps reducing the strategic air defense mission, apparently on the assumption by DOD that an enemy attack on the United States is likely to come via missile rather than bombers. Further, according to the GAO, this transfer in roles made AWACS' cost-effectiveness calculations and findings about the tactical role obsolete and therefore GAO says AWACS must now be reconfigured to satisfy a more demanding tactical mission.

Even though the Air Force does not agree, GAO says the tactical mission to which the AWACS is to be assigned is much more complex and requires additional highly sophisticated electronics and a self-defense system. According to the GAO, none of these will be available for operational flight testing prior to the decision to go ahead with the production schedude. Information furnished the committee indicated that this decision date is December 1974.

The Air Force states that ground testing results can be extrapolated with high confidence to airborne system results on the basis of their similarity to the ground/flight relationship of the Brassboard Program. Thus, by December 1974, the necessary testing for performance, capability and capacity for Block I will have been accomplished in sufficient depth so that all of the information necessary for sound decisionmaking will be available. Therefore, the Air Force states that in December 1974 the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council III (DSARC III) would review AWACS to decide whether full production for Block I (first production buy) should be approved. By that time, each subsystem will have been thoroughly tested. And, on the basis of test performance to date, the Air Force has full confidence that go-ahead will be given.

The Air Force further states that the true mission of the AWACS from the outset was both strategic and tactical, and that allegations to the contrary by the GAO are exaggerated regarding the change from strategic purposes to tactical purposes.

The committee is somewhat at a loss to understand the reasoning behind the Air Force contract for the development of the AWACS

system. Along with the original development contract, there were included certain production options, the first of which must be exercised in December 1974. However, the option agreed to by the Air Force requires that they must buy not less than 12 aircraft nor more than 50 aircraft per year. The Air Force agreed to this, in the face of a proposed program of a total of only 34 aircraft. Any proposals by the Air Force to buy less than 12 aircraft in any given year must be renegotiated.

At the present time, only one aircraft is flying. Three other aircraft have been authorized for test and evaluation, but as yet have not begun flight tests. The Air Force, under its present contract, is not required to make a production decision until the completion of DSARC III in December 1974, at which time sufficient test data should be available on which to base a production decision. However, they are asking the Congress to make that decision now without sufficient facts and test information.

The committee, because of the fact that there has been little or no demonstration of the capability of AWACS to properly manage the tactical air situation in a high-density combat environment, such as is expected to be encountered in Europe, is reluctant to authorize the 12 aircraft program as requested. Even in view of the necessity for renegotiation, the committee is wary of authorizing the full Air Force request until the R&D program is further along and the additional equipment required to be integrated for the tactical role has been sufficiently tested to prove its effectiveness.

Therefore, the committee recommends approval of only six AWACS aircraft, in amount of $257.7 million which includes advance procurement, in the amount of $10.5 million. Initial spares, in the amount of $34.4 million; and R&D funds, in the amount of $219.7 million were also authorized. The committee's objections are not so much to the need for the system but rather the degree of concurrent development and production which the Air Force has contracted for.

F–15

To date the F–15 flight test program has been an outstanding success. To date, fifteen F–15 aircraft, including two two-place models have accrued over 1770 hours in 1775 separate flights. Since first flight in July 1972, the F–15 has flown throughout the design flight envelope, and has exceeded the combat altitude and maximum mach number for which it was designed. These two points are well in excess of 60,000 ft. altitude and twice the speed of sound. Test pilots attest to its superior handling qualities and remarkable agility and acceleration. The pulse doppler radar system has already demonstrated search and track ranges in excess of the development specifications. It can distinguish targets from background clutter, and through computer processing of the radar information, permits the pilot to detect and track airborne targets regardless of their altitude. Successful weapons subsystems testing has been accomplished, including airborne firings of the M–61 20mm cannon, and the AIM–7F and AIM–9E air-to-air missiles.

The Pratt & Whitney F–100 engine has completed all endurance qualification testing and production configured engines are being flown in the test aircraft.

The airframe has completed the required four lifetimes of fatigue testing. Approximately 99 percent of all air vehicle equipment components requiring qualification have completed testing.

The following Demonstration Milestones have been accomplished during fiscal year 1974:

One (1) G Flight Envelope.
Fatigue Test—Four Lifetimes.
Air Force Summary Evaluation.
Air Force DT&E Aircraft and Equipment in Place.
Engine Military Qualification Test (MQT).

These accomplishments have provided the Air Force with a high degree of confidence that the F–15 design is sound and that the first production aircraft will be ready for the November 1974 introduction into the operational force.

Therefore, the committee recommends that the budget request for the procurement of 72 F–15s in the amount of $756.9 million be approved.

F–111

Last year members of this committee expressed concern over the absence of a procurement request by the Air Force of the F–111 type aircraft for fiscal year 1974. This same concern was voiced during the consideration of the fiscal year 1975 Authorization Bill. It is the opinion of the committee that, in view of the further delay of the B–1 program, the only logical and cost-effective solution is to maintain a warm base of production of an aircraft which will provide the closest possible performance capability that the B–1 was designed to achieve. This committee is fully aware that the F–111 is not a replacement for the B–52, as is the B–1; however, the F–111 production line is the only active line in the free world capable of producing a strategic bomber. Should a requirement arise for such production, the existing line could produce FB–111Fs, or the even more capable stretched version of this bomber, the FB–111G. Therefore, for this and the additional reasons listed below, the committee added 12 F–111 type aircraft to the fiscal year 1975 bill. The F–111 is a superb deep-penetration attack aircraft that has no counterpart in capability in our own inventory or in the inventory of any nation in the world. In its tactical role, there is no substitute for the F–111; and the committee believes failure to continue the production of these aircraft could result in an eventual degradation of our air defense capability if the number of F–111s falls below the desired level.

Further, the committee was advised that current plans contemplate that a substantial number of the earlier F–111s be converted to electronic warfare configuration, thereby removing these aircraft from the regular attack force for assignment and use if the need arose. Another reason, and a very important one, for continuing the production of the F–111 is the fact that this airplane is the only tactical aircraft in our inventory that is capable of performing a strategic nuclear mission.

Therefore, the committee recommends approval of the addition of $205.5 million for the procurement of 12 F–111 type aircraft.

C–141 Modification

Included in the Air Force request was $50 million for a modification to lengthen the C–141 and increase its strategic airlift capacity by 30 percent. The modification consists of lengthening the fuselage by 23′4″, installation of an air refueling capability, and drag reduction improvements. The Air Force states that this modification will improve the overall performance of the C–141 by increasing the rate of climb 300 feet per minute, increasing the service and cruise ceiling by 1,000 feet, increasing the cruise speed by 15 knots, or increasing the specific range by 6.5 percent at the existing cruise speeds.

In the fiscal year 1974 supplemental $40 million was requested for engineering, prototyping, production tooling and modification of the test article. However, even though this committee authorized the Air Force request for this purpose, the fiscal year 1974 Supplemental has not been finally acted on and it appears that final action will not take place in time to complete the work necessary so that the fiscal year 1975 funds could be spent during fiscal year 1975. Air Force testimony indicated that the funds requested in the fiscal year 1975 budget would not be obligated until the base line configuration of the reconfigured C–141 was established and performance was verified by flight testing. The committee believes that even if final Congressional action on the fiscal year 1974 Supplemental includes the requested $40 million for prototyping, time would not permit obligation of the $50 million requested in fiscal year 1975 for the modification program.

The committee, therefore, recommends approval of $6.4 million to initiate a modification to improve navigational equipment and permit the C–141 to fly transoceanic airways at optimum altitudes to conserve fuel; $3.5 million to incorporate visual capability in simulators, thus enhancing pilot ground training; and $2.4 million for various other modifications to the aircraft, but recommends denial of the $50 million for the lengthening of the C–141 until the prototypes have been developed and the engineering and flight testing completed.

Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF)

The Air Force requested $132.9 million for the modification of wide-bodied jets from the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF). The airlift capability of these wide-bodied jets would equate to approximately an equivalent capacity of 100 C–5 aircraft after completion of the modifications envisioned. The committee was advised that the agreement between the civilian airlines and the government to modify their wide-bodied jets would be consummated in a legal contractual instrument whereby the airlines would be able to use their modified aircraft as cargo carriers provided that a proportionate share of the funds for modification and cargo kits is reimbursed to the government. Other safeguards would be included in the contract to protect the government investment in these civilian aircraft.

The Air Force advised the committee that an informal survey with respect to probable CRAF operators shows an offered participation of 141 wide-bodied jets for modification. This total consists of 67 B–747s, 49 DC–10s, and 25 L–1011s.

The $18.5 million requested in the fiscal year 1974 Supplemental was planned to accomplish engineering, design, and tooling. This money was denied by the House Appropriations Committee because that committee felt that the fiscal year 1974 Department of Defense Appropriations Act (Public Law 93–238) did not appear to authorize the use of CRAF funds for this purpose. The Air Force, through the office of its General Counsel, has suggested that a specific statutory authority for the CRAF modifications would be desirable, and they are seeking new language in the fiscal year 1975 Appropriations Act.

This committee strongly supports the need for an adequate program such as is envisioned in this proposal. However, it is believed that the funds requested in the fiscal year 1975 budget cannot be obligated due to the failure to thus far complete action on the fiscal year 1974 Supplemental. Therefore, the committee recommends approval of only $25 million of the requested $132.9 million for this program so that the engineering, design, and tooling can be accomplished. The committee believes that the airlift capability of the CRAF can be dramatically increased when a program embodying these objectives gets underway.

A–7D

The committee was advised that the Air Force was not requesting A–7D procurement in the Fiscal Year 1975 budget due to higher priorities in force structure planning. Further, the committee was aware this decision was based on a Secretary of Defense decision to phase out 14 flight units in Fiscal Year 75 and Fiscal Year 76 of the Air National Guard (ANG). When that decision was announced, many Members of Congress expressed increasing concern over the loss of the active Air Guard units. Further concern was expressed over the abrupt loss of the 11,726 highly skilled and trained Guardsman manning these units, which could not help but have an adverse effect on morale in other units and a severe impact on recruiting potential. This committee reacted to these actions by putting a floor on the number of flying units in the ANG at 91. This, of course, precludes the deactivation of the 14 units announced for phaseout.

Further, notice was taken of the obsolescence of the equipment in the ANG. Testimony did reveal that some delay in the modernization program for the Air Guard was created by a slowdown in the F–15 and A–10 procurement for the active forces since the introduction of these aircraft into the inventory of the active forces would make A–7s available for the Reserve forces. However, the committee felt that additional modernization of the ANG, which was started last year, with the introduction of the A–7D into the ANG, should be continued; and that the ANG should have modern jet aircraft.

The A–7D aircraft was introduced into the ANG during fiscal year 1974 from active assets and from new production aircraft. Two ANG units (Kirtland AFB, New Mexico and Buckley AFB, Colorado) were converted to A–7s during fiscal year 1974 with Rickenbacker AGB, Ohio (formerly called Lockbourne) and McEntire AGB, South Carolina programed to convert during fiscal year 1975. Further ANG A–7 modernization is planned coincident with the conversion of active force units to F–15s and A–10s. The ANG A–7 aircrews will train to effectively employ the aircraft in a primary interdiction role with a secondary close air support mission.

Therefore, the committee voted to recommend 24 A–7Ds for the exclusive use of the ANG and the addition of $104.9 million to the Air Force aircraft authorization. The $104.9 million is broken down as follows: $77.8 million for 24 aircraft; $4.8 million for initial spares; $13.8 million for associated ground equipment; $2.2 million for technical data; and $6.3 million for a simulator.

Lance

The bill provides $64.4 million, the amount requested, for procurement of the Lance (MGM–52C missile). In addition, the bill provides $0.3 million for initial spares for a net total authorization of $64.7 million for the system. R&D has been completed on the basic system and no RDT&E funds are included for the system in the present bill.

The Lance is a surface-to-surface ballistic missile system composed of a guided missile, a self-propelled tracked transporter-loader, a launcher, and other miscellaneous equipment. Lance is deployed at the corps level for general nuclear fire support to corps and division forces.

The present authorization continues the level of procurement initiated two years ago to support the continued deployment of Lance battalions in replacement for the Honest John and the Sergeant missile battalions.

The authorization provided in the bill provides for a nuclear-only capability for the system.

The Armed Services Committee has in the past indicated its support for a nonnuclear as well as a nuclear warhead configuration for Lance. The committee continues to support this development. The Army has pursued an R&D program toward developing a nonnuclear capability for this missile.

The committee has not received the result of a cost-effectiveness study of a nonnuclear capability conducted with the cooperation of the Institute for Defense Analysis. The study was due prior to the consideration of this bill. The committee will expect that at the latest the results of this study will be available to it in time for consideration of the fiscal 1976 missile procurement program, so that funding for a nonnuclear capability can be included in next year's authorization bill if the study indicates that such configuration would be cost-effective. However, a reprograming request to provide funds during fiscal year 1975, if the study indicates such would be desirable, will be entertained by the committee.

The committee notes that the Army has supported a nonnuclear capability for Lance.

Commanders in Europe have also indicated to representatives of the committee their desire for a nonnuclear capability for Lance. The committee wishes to express to the Department of Defense its belief that this concept has been studied endlessly and that the time has come to stop using studies as a substitute for firm decisions.

Minuteman

The bill authorizes $615.3 million, the amount requested, for the Minuteman missile program. This includes $312 million for procurement, $4.4 million for initial spares, and $298.9 million for force modernization. Additionally, in Title II of the bill, there is $142.9 million

for RDT&E, for a total authorization for Minuteman in the legislation of $758.2 million.

The procurement program authorized for in the bill will provide for the procurement of 61 missiles. These 61 missiles include 21 which were slipped to the FY 1975 program when the 1974 buy was reduced by Congress. The missile procurement will complete the initial planned buy of Minuteman III missiles and, in addition, provide sufficient replacement missiles to allow replacement of missiles which will be used in the test program over approximately the next five years.

The FY 1975 program allows a maintaining of the Minuteman III production line at the minimum production rate of five missiles per month and protects an option to procure additional missiles in FY 1976 if required.

The force modernization authorization includes funds for the Upgrade Silo Program, which modifies the silos and launch control facilities to provide greater survival of the missiles against attack, the Command Data Buffer Program, which provides rapid remote retargeting capability for the Minuteman III, and basic force modernization to modify ground electronic systems and silos to be compatible with the Minuteman II and Minuteman III missiles.

The Minuteman III is a three stage solid propellant intercontinental ballistic missile capable of carrying three independently targeted vehicles.

Sparrow

The bill provides $54.9 million, the amount requested, for the procurement of the SPARROW (AIM–7F) missiles for the Navy, and $43.3 million, the amount requested, for the procurement of SPARROW (AIM–7F) missiles for the Air Force. In addition, the bill provides $1.1 million for initial spares and $6.0 million for RDT&E for a net total authorization of $62.0 million for the Navy; and $0.2 million for initial spares and $1.7 million for RDT&E for a net total authorization of $45.2 million for the Air Force. The Navy acts as procurement agent for all SPARROW procurement for itself and the Air Force.

The Committee is deeply concerned about the cost of this program and the projected high unit cost of the AIM–7F missile. The Navy is in the process of establishing a second source for the production of the SPARROW. A second source would be designed to achieve a more competitive cost structure and to increase the availability of the missile.

The Committee on Armed Services intends to continue to monitor this program closely and will expect to be informed promptly of any new developments in the program. Continued Committee support of this procurement will depend on future developments with respect to the cost of the missile.

The SPARROW (AIM–7F) missile is to be used in a number of air-to-air and ship-to-air weapon systems. The AIM–7F is planned to replace the SPARROW AIM–7E missile presently in the Air Force and Navy inventories.

TOW

The bill provides $107.1 million and $30.8 million, the amounts requested, for the procurement of TOW missiles for the Army and Marine Corps, respectively. In addition, the bill provides $0.5 million for initial spares for the Marine Corps; and $10.7 million for RDT&E for the Army; for a net total authorization of $117.8 million for the Army and $31.3 million for the Marine Corps.

The TOW missile system is a heavy anti-tank/assault weapon consisting of a launcher, a missile and various ground support equipment required for maintenance, test and training. TOW can be man packed, employed on the ground on a tripod or mounted on various vehicles. After firings, missile guidance is automatic and the missile will remain constrained to the gunner's line of sight to the target by commands sent through a wire.

The purpose of this weapon system is to replace the 106mm Recoiless Rifle and to provide heavy, long-range, antitank/assault fire capability against armored vehicles and fortified targets. The system will be considerably enhanced upon completion of a night sight presently undergoing RDT&E. Due to the high performance as an antitank weapon, the TOW missile is under a large procurement demand from other nations. This situation is of considerable concern to the committee. The committee wants the Army to be aware of its desire that delivery or sale of this weapon to other nations should not interfere with meeting U.S. requirements.

Dragon

The bill provides $86.5 million, a reduction of $19.8 million from the original request of $106.3 million by the Army, and $19.8 million, the amount requested by the Marine Corps, for the procurement of Dragon (XFGM–77A, XFTM–77A) missile system. In addition, the bill provides $2.4 million and $1.1 million for initial spares for the Army and Marine Corps, respectively, for a net authorization of $88.9 million for the Army and $20.9 million for the Marine Corps. RDT&E funds have not been asked for Fiscal Year 1975.

The reduction of the procurement request, from $106.3 million to $86.5 million, by the Army, is in agreement with their decision to procure an identical number of missiles with the $86.5 million authorized.

This is the first-year procurement request of the Dragon missile system by the Marine Corps. The Dragon procurement program is managed by the Army.

The Dragon is a lightweight man-portable, day and night, all-weather, antitank weapon system consisting of a modular missile launcher, a tracker, and related test and training equipment. The missile is launched and automatically guided to the target by the tracker which issues electronic commands to the missile by wire link. Its purpose is to provide antitank and assault fire against tanks and hard targets such as emplaced weapons or fortifications.

Harpoon

The bill provides $78.2 million, the amount requested, for procurement of the Harpoon (AGM–84A/RGM–84A) missile. In addition, the bill provides $3.5 million for initial spares and $67.4 million for RDT&E for a net total authorization of $149.1 million.

The FY 1975 procurement request is to provide a first-year production of these missiles. Approximately one-third of the number of missiles to be procured will be utilized for operational evaluation (OPEVAL), the remainder will be deployed as initial fleet assets.

The Harpoon is an air-surface/subsurface-launched, all-weather anti-ship missile, effective against enemy surface vessels. It is compatible with the presently-deployed Tartar, Terrier, and ASROC ship launchers, as well as aircraft launchers. The missile is presently planned for use aboard the P–3 and S–3 aircraft, surface vessels, and attack submarines.

Shrike

The bill provides $25.4 million, the amount requested, for the procurement of the SHRIKE (AGM–45–6) missile for the Navy, and $11.1 million, the amount requested, for the SHRIKE (AGM–45–9, and AGM–45–10) missiles for the Air Force. In addition, the bill provides $0.5 million for initial spares, for a net total authorization of $25.9 million for the Navy; and $0.2 million for initial spares, for a net total authorization of $11.3 million for the Air Force.

The Committee was concerned over the difference in procurement unit price of these missiles between the Navy and Air Force requests. The difference in costs was reconciled to the satisfaction of the Committee after a clarification of the increased costs of the Air Force's SHRIKE procurement request were determined to be associated with a substantial increase in capability of these models over those being requested by the Navy.

The SHRIKE is a rocket-propelled air-to-ground and surface-to-surface missile utilized to detect and destroy enemy radars. The primary mission is to suppress or destroy anti-aircraft systems.

The Navy request, for the older 45–6 SHRIKE series, was based on the fact that Navy aircraft cannot use the later SHRIKE models, such as the Air Force is requesting, as it would require modification of the aircraft. The Navy has chosen to wait until the HARM missile becomes ready for deployment. The HARM missile will blanket a threat area considerably larger than the present SHRIKE used by the Navy.

The SHRIKE series 45–9 and 45–10, requested by the Air Force, will blanket, in combination, almost the whole threat spectrum that the HARM missile will be capable of covering when deployed.

Phoenix

The bill provides $94.7 million, the amount requested, for procurement of the Phoenix (AIM–54A) missile. In addition, the bill provides $4.8 million for initial spares, for a net total authorization of $99.5 million. The RDT&E has been completed, and no additional funds are requested.

The fiscal year 1975 procurement authorization for the Phoenix missile will support both Navy and Marine Corps requirements and continue an orderly inventory buildup to support the operational deployment of the F–14 TOMCAT aircraft.

The Phoenix missile is a supersonic, all-weather, long-range, air-to-air missile designed to destroy enemy aircraft and missiles at great distances, in any weather and in heavy jamming environment. Six

Phoenix missiles may be carried at one time by the F–14 aircraft. Near simultaneous launching of all missiles against six different targets is possible.

Trident

The bill provides $1,922.8 million for the Trident program out of a total budget requirement for the year of $2,177.5 million. The difference is in appropriation categories not subject to authorization. The shipbuilding and conversion, Navy portion of Title I contains $1,166.8 million, with the balance of $756.0 million in RDT&E. The funds in the procurement account will provide for the full construction of two more Trident submarines, Nos. 2 and 3.

The Trident submarine is the replacement for the Polaris-Poseidon fleet. The 41 ships in our fleet ballistic missile fleet were commissioned between December 1959 and April 1967. This means that by 1979 they will begin to be 20 years old. These submarines have had two crews—Blue and Gold—which take them out on patrols in turn. No other class of vessels in our fleet are subjected to such continuous service. These submarines were built on a crash program from the existing attack submarine plans. The U.S. Navy has had no new design fleet ballistic missile submarine since 1963. In the meanwhile the Soviets have commissioned at least three classes of new missile submarines. Indeed, the Soviets now have more nuclear powered submarines—missile and attack—than the United States.

With the longer range Trident I missile, the Trident submarine will be able to operate in a greatly expanded ocean area—thus greatly increasing the difficulty of locating it. In addition, the Trident will be much quieter than the Polaris/Poseidon. It will also be faster and have greatly increased capability to survive because of the newer types of sensors it will employ and the newer technologies of shipboard processing equipment.

Last year, after considerable debate in Congress, the Department of Defense decided the rate of production should be two Trident submarines a year and so requested. In cutting back from the earlier plans of 3 Tridents a year to 2, the overall cost of the program has increased by $550 million.

If this were cut back to one Trident a year, the cost would increase another $500 million according to Adm. Hyman Rickover.

Procurement costs of system components would increase due to loss of production effectiveness as production rates were necessarily cut back. Shipyard costs would increase through less efficient use of capabilities unique to building and testing the Trident system. Standardization of parts, components, and systems would become increasingly difficult resulting in possible increases in life cycle costs.

The Soviet Union has a force of over 30 Yankee submarines which are, with their 16-missile launch tubes, comparable to our 31 Poseidon submarines. The Soviets are currently deploying even larger ballistic missile carrying submarines which carry a new missile with a range comparable to the Trident I missile. It is highly probable that they will build at least 20 of these so-called Delta submarines.

The Polaris/Poseidon force continues to be an effective deterrent, but one that is aging. By 1985 almost all will be 20 or more years old. The Trident program, as presented to Congress this year, requests a building rate of two per year, reducing our dependence in future years on the older Polaris submarines. The proposed program would result in 10 Trident submarines at sea by the end of 1982. Building Trident at this rate moves toward achieving equivalency with the Soviet ballistic missile Delta submarine program. It is an orderly procurement of Trident submarines, at a rate which allows us the option of timely replacement of our current aging strategic missile submarines and of maintaining a highly survivable submarine-based strategic missile capability throughout this century. To do any less could eventually jeopardize our national security.

Nuclear frigates

The bill provides $256.0 million for the guided missile nuclear powered frigate (DLGN) program. Of this sum, $152.3 million is for the completion of DLGN 41, for which the Congress provided long lead time funds last year, and $92.0 million in additional long lead time items for DLGN 42, for which the Congress also provided long lead time funds last year. The Department of Defense will require full funding of the balance of the moneys needed for the construction of DLGN 42 next year.

Until and unless an alternate level of construction is set by the Congress in connection with the needs for the nuclear Navy, the committee will expect the Department of Defense to submit at least one new nuclear powered guided missile frigate for construction next year.

Patrol frigate

The bill provides $436.5 million, the amount requested, for 7 ships in the patrol frigate program. This program is designed to produce 50 ocean escort destroyers for such employment as merchant marine convoys. These ships are designed to play an anti-submarine role in areas of lesser risk. The patrol frigate is designed to be built for an average of under $50 million a ship in unescalated fiscal year 1973 dollars. The lead ship is presently under construction and will be completed in fiscal year 1977. There is no question that the Navy needs a considerable number of smaller ocean escort destroyers.

The hearings of the committee elicited concern over the Americanization of two foreign systems which are to go on board the ship.

The first is the Oto Melara gun, an Italian gun which is on the ships of many other navies. There appears to be no serious problem about going ahead with the Americanization of this gun and indications are the basic Oto gun can readily be installed on the patrol frigate without Americanization if there are difficulties.

The second is the Mark 92 gun fire control system. This is a Dutch design which is being Americanized by a U.S. company. The Dutch design is already in use in 14 other navies in 163 variations. The Americanization seems to be progressing on time—with only a slippage of two weeks in one small item. There is no immediate backup available. If the Mark 92 should not work out, there would be a one-time cost of about $20 million to put on another fire control system.

The committee believes the contracts for the 7 patrol frigates should not be let until after the successful completion of the initial operating test and evaluation of the Mark 92 system, which is consistent with Navy plans. Therefore, the committee added a proviso to the grant of authorization for this program, reading:

> "*Provided, however*, That, except for necessary long lead time items, no contract for the construction of these ships shall be entered into until after the Secretary of the Navy has notified the Chairmen of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees that the fire control system has been satisfactorily tested; . . ."

This language will assure the Navy does what testimony indicates it plans to do; namely, hold off on the construction contracts until after the successful completion of the testing, and at the same time give the Congress assurance that that testing is successful before the contracts are entered into.

Ships and craft for Vietnam

The authorization request included $14.3 million for 2 patrol gunboas to be furnished to the South Vietnamese Navy and $9.2 million for 45 craft also to be furnished to the Vietnam Navy.

The 2 patrol gunboats were to have been part of a buy of 8 patrol gunboats for the South Vietnam Navy with the other 6 to be provided through the Military Assistance Program. The committee believes that it is preferable to provide the entire lot through the Military Assistance Program rather than splitting off part for inclusion in this bill.

Therefore, the committee recommends that the $14.3 million for the 2 patrol gunboats and the $9.2 million for the 45 craft be eliminated from the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy program.

M60A1 Medium Tank

The bill provides $172.6 million, the amount requested by the Army, and $52.0 million, $5.9 million less than originally requested by the Marine Corps, for the procurement of M60A1 Medium Tanks. In addition, the bill provides $2.6 million for initial spares and $6.0 million for RDT&E for the Army; $0.6 million for initial spares for the Marine Corps. The net total authorization for the Army and Marine Corps programs is $181.2 million and $52.6 million, respectively.

The $5.9 million reduction to the Marine Corps authorization was made at that service's request and involves long lead monies no longer required in fiscal year 1975.

The fiscal year 1975 M60A1 procurement requests have been based on the maximum estimated rates of production that the assembly lines can deliver, particularly since there is only one remaining willing supplier—subcontractor of the traversing turret.

The M60A1 tank is a diesel powered, fully tracked, armored vehicle, with a four man crew. The primary armament is a 105mm gun mounted in a traversing turret. It has improved turret ballistic protection over the earlier M60 tank. Secondary armament consists of one .50 cal. machine gun coaxially mounted in the turret cupola and a 7.62mm machine gun coaxially mounted alongside the 105mm gun.

Armored Reconnaissance Scout Vehicle

The Committee denied the $25.3 million originally requested by the Army for the Armored Reconnaissance Scout Vehicle (ARSV).

The fiscal year 1975 budget request for the weapons and tracked combat vehicles appropriation, Army, included $25.3 million for the procurement of ARSVs to be manufactured as the low-rate initial production phase of the ARSV procurement. For the past several months, the Army has been reexamining the requirement for the ARSV. Serious reservations concerning the current ARSV program surfaced as a result of recent Mid-East War. Other areas of Army concern prompting program examination were the continuing desire to reduce the number and types of vehicles in combat units, the need to reevaluate the air and ground reconnaissance requirements and their interrelationships, and the need to get the optimum readiness from the limited procurement dollars available. Examples of unanswered questions concerning the reconnaissance vehicle requirement are:

(1) The requirement for a special purpose vehicle to perform scout missions,

(2) The ability of three-man scout crew to perform their mission on a 24-hour basis,

(3) Sensors and other devices necessary to accomplish the surveillance and acquisition mission of ground reconnaissance vehicles,

(4) Air defense weaponry required for the scout, and

(5) The most cost-effective vehicle to be employed in the scout role.

The committee concurs with the Army analysis, that the above questions and other issues surrounding the ARSV program cannot be resolved prior to the scheduled milestone decision point in September 1974. At that time, a Department of Defense decision would have permitted initiation of low-rate initial production of the ARSV's if authorization were included in the fiscal year 1975 procurement legislation. The study, now formulated by the Army, cannot be concluded until March 1975. The study effort will include examination of additional alternative vehicles, testing of alternative vehicles with variations of tactics and organization, examination of the role of the scout and current Army doctrine, and a Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis. The findings of the study will provide the basis for a decision on the future of the Armored Reconnaissance Scout Vehicle program.

In view of the time required to reexamine the basic requirement for a scout vehicle and reservations with the current ARSV configurations, the Army reoriented the current ARSV program on 14 March 1974 retaining only sufficient RDT&E funding in fiscal year 1975 to complete the current contracts which expire in September 1974 and to provide for minimum testing to support the study efforts.

Because of the redirection in the ARSV program, the $25.3 million procurement request in fiscal year 1975 is no longer required. However, the Army proposed that $14.6 million of the $25.3 million be authorized and appropriated to procure additional M113A1 Armored Personnel Carriers in fiscal year 1975. This will permit the Army to substitute the highly reliable M113A1 carrier for the current unreliable, gasoline-powered M114 Command and Reconnaissance Carrier

in those units with reconnaissance missions not destined to be equipped with the ARSV. The Army, after a comprehensive cost analysis, determined that as an alternative to product improving the M114 additional procurement of the more reliable M113A1 would be preferable. The committee concurs.

The Army further requested that $2.3 million of the funds deleted from the fiscal year 1975 budget request for procurement of the ARSV be added to the $4.4 million requested in fiscal year 1975 for modification of the Vulcan 20mm air defense gun systems. A total fiscal year 1975 program of $6.7 million will accelerate the modification of both the self-propelled and towed air defense guns permitting major improvements in systems reliability, availability and maintainability. The increased fiscal year 1975 program can be implemented within established funded delivery periods and will hasten high-priority modification of fielded weapons systems by providing kits to modify additional vehicles. The request for increased funding in fiscal year 1975 will reduce the funds required to complete the program in fiscal year 1976.

The Army's proposal was approved by the committee. A net reduction of $10.7 million resulted in the Army's fiscal year 1975 budget request for tracked combat vehicles and an increase of $2.3 million for other weapons, a net reduction of $8.4 million from the combined total of the original procurement request.

Armored Personnel Carrier

The bill provides $24.0 million, $14.6 million above the original request, for procurement of M113A1 Armored Personnel Carriers. No additional funding is requested for initial spares or RDT&E.

As indicated above, because of the redirection in the Armed Reconnaissance Scout Vehicle (ARSV) program, the $25.3 million procurement request by the Army in fiscal year 1975 was found to be no longer required. However, the Army proposed, and the committee agreed, that $14.6 million of the $25.3 million be authorized and appropriated to procure additional M113A1 Armored Personnel Carriers in fiscal year 1975.

The M113A1 Armored Personnel Carrier is a fully tracked, light-armored vehicle designed to provide personnel with mobility and protection against small armed fire shell fragmentation. Its primary mission is to transport mechanized infantry and combat engineer squads in forward battle areas.

REVIEW OF ADDITIONAL WEAPONS PROCUREMENT AUTHORIZED IN TITLE I

Following is a review of the other weapons items authorized in Title I of the bill. The dollar amounts provided by service and by functional category are found in the tables appearing earlier in this report.

AIRCRAFT

Army Aircraft

Helicopter, Attack, AH–1Q

The AH–1Q (COBRA/TOW) attack helicopter is a single engine, single rotor, two-place helicopter. It will be armed with the anti-

armor TOW missile and a chin turret containing a 40mm grenade launcher and a 7.62 mm high rate machine gun. The AH–1Q will provide an interim anti-armor capability pending introduction of the Advanced Attack Helicopter.

Helicopter, Cargo, CH–47C

The CH–47C cargo helicopter is a twin engine, twin rotor helicopter capable of lifting 8 tons of payload. It features a straight-in rear loading with an unobstructed 30 foot cargo compartment and is equipped with an external cargo hook. The CH–47C will be used for battlefield transportation of personnel, weapons, bulk liquids and cargo in combat assault and logistic support roles.

Helicopter, Utility, UH–1H

The UH–1H utility helicopter is a single engine, single rotor helicopter capable of transporting 11 passengers or 6 litter patients. It is the Army's primary aircraft used to provide battlefield mobility of troops and supplies, evacuation of casualties, and command and control.

NAVY AND MARINE CORPS AIRCRAFT

A–4 Skyhawk

The A–4M is a single seat high-performance carrier or land-based jet visual attack aircraft utilized by Marine forces for close-in ground support. The FY 1975 request of 24 aircraft continues the modernization of the Marine Corps light attack force by replacement of older A–4E/F's.

A–6E

The A–6 is the Navy and Marine Corps all-weather attack aircraft. The A–6E is an improved version of the combat-proven A–6A which has demonstrated its capabilities under the most demanding combat conditions. This long-range, versatile, twin-jet aircraft is capable of very accurate navigation and weapons delivery and its specialized electronics equipment permits it to attack targets day or night under all-weather conditions.

The authorization is for 12 aircraft and continues a modest inventory modernization program and provides for a continued production capability.

EA–6B Prowler

The EA–6B is the first aircraft ever built specifically for the tactical jamming mission. It is a derivative of the A–6A attack aircraft and carries a pilot and three electronic countermeasures operators.

The jammers are carried in modern computer controlled external pods which radiate electromangetic energy that will degrade enemy air defense systems, thereby enhancing mission success of strike aircraft and pilots. The authorization is to procure 6 aircraft to continue the procurement of a tactical EW capability for each of the aircraft carriers.

A–7E Corsair II

The A–7 is a single-seat, single-engine light jet attack aircraft providing significant improvement in range and load carrying ability

over the A–4 which it replaces. The combat proven A–7E is now successfully deployed in both the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets. It features advanced avionics and a fully integrated ditigal weapons system which affords quantum improvement in navigation/weapons delivery accuracy over the earlier A–7A/B series. The authorization provides for the procurement of 34 aircraft to continue the modernization of the light attack force by replacing attrited A–7A/B aircraft with new production A–7E's.

UH–1N Iroquois

The UH–1N is a versatile helicopter whose primary missions are command and control, troop transport, medical evacuation and carrier liaison. Other missions include movement of cargo and equipment in amphibious assault and subsequent operations ashore, local base rescue, light vertical replenishment, and search and rescue. The authorization for 20 aircraft continues the modernization of the USMC assault helicopter force.

AH–1J Sea Cobra

The AH–1J is a helicopter gunship used by the Marine Corps to provide enroute escort and protection of troop assault helicopters, landing zone preparation immediately prior to arrival of assault helicopters, landing zone fire suppression during the assault phase, and fire support during ground escort operations. The authorization is to procure 20 aircraft for continued modernization of the USMC attack helicopter force.

P–3C Orion

The P–3C is a long range, land-based, antisubmarine warfare aircraft. It is also capable of ship surveillance and mining day and night and in all kinds of weather. The P–3C, with a central digital computer, has the data handling capacity, flexibility and accuracy through digital data processing, to throughly integrate appropriate sensor, display, navigation, communication, and armament equipments. The authorization will procure 12 aircraft.

S–3A Viking

The S–3A is a carrier-based, anti-submarine search and attack aircraft containing the latest ASW sensors, integrated with a general purpose digital computer. It is designed to employ air-to-surface missiles, homing torpedoes and mines as well as conventional and nuclear depth charges. It replaces the S–2 aircraft and will introduce a carrier-based capability for searching large ocean areas and will provide anti-submarine protection for naval forces and other units independent of land bases. The authorization is for 45 aircraft to provide cumulative assets to transition seven squadrons to the S–3A through end of Calendar Year 1976.

E–2C Hawkeye

The E–2C is a carrier-based turbo-prop aircraft equipped with the necessary avionics to provide our forces at sea with a modern and vastly improved early warning, strike control and surveillance capability. The E–2C has the same basic airframe as the earlier model E2A/B but is equipped with a new avionics suit including new radar,

antenna and passive detection system. The authorization is to procure 6 aircraft to continue the modernization of the carrier-based early warning force.

C–9B Skytrain II

The C-9B is a commercially-available, land-based transport capable of carrying 90 passengers, cargo or a combination of both. These aircraft will be utilized by both the Navy and Marine Corps and will replace obsolete C–118's, C–121's and C–131's. The authorization is to procure 7 aircraft.

CT–39 Saberliner

The CT–39 is a commercial, light-weight, twin turbo-jet capable of carrying eight to ten passengers or equivalent weight in cargo. The CT–39 will be assigned to Navy and Marine Fleet tactical support squadrons in support of fleet and Marine Corps operations. The authorization is to procure 6 aircraft.

KC–130R Hercules

The KC–130 is the current production C–130 aircraft equipped as an aerial refueler and configured with a removable internal fuel tank for additional fuel capacity. In its tanker configuration it carries 13,195 gallons of fuel with a crew of seven. The authorization is to provide the necessary aircraft to modernize and sustain the aerial refueler capability of the Marine Corps until the mid-1980's.

AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT

A–37B

The A–37B is a low wing, dual control, jet attack aircraft. It is a counter-insurgency aircraft used for destruction of surface targets in support of ground forces. Armor plate is provided to enhance aircraft survivability. The 29 aircraft authorized will provide the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) replacements for attrition aircraft.

F–5F (International Fighter)

The F–5F is a two-seat version of the F–5E and is a twin engine fighter/trainer which retains the essential combat capabilities of the F–5E. The 28 aircraft authorized are for the VNAF and will complement the single-seat F–5E by providing the best available hardware for in-country training, thus assuring efficient use of the F–5E.

C–130H (Hercules)

This aircraft is a medium-size, tactical turboprop transport capable of providing immediate and responsive air movement and delivery of combat troops and supplies directly into objective areas through airlanding, extraction, airdrop, and other delivery techniques. The authorization is for four aircraft to replace Reserve Forces aircraft projected as replacements for VNAF losses, and for a simulator for the USAF C–130 force.

CH–47C (Chinook)

The CH–47 is a medium transport helicopter with twin T–55 engines and dual rotor. The integral rear ramp permits straight-in loading and unloading. It provides air mobility to military forces in the field by transporting personnel, weapons, bulk liquids and other cargo in both

combat assault and logistical support roles. The eight aircraft authorized are to permit replacement of projected VNAF losses.

UH–1H (Iroquois)

The UH–1H is a low silhouette, high-performance helicopter powered by a single T–53 gas turbine engine. It is a small troop transport capable of carrying eleven personnel. The 77 aircraft authorized are VNAF attrition replacement helicopters.

MISSILES

Army Missiles

Improved Hawk

HAWK provides low and medium altitude, all-weather air defense against air-supported targets in the field Army area. HAWK is a key element in the Army's mid-range air defense plan and reinforces the visual acquisition capability of other forward air defense systems, such as REDEYE and CHAPARRAL. HAWK also provides air defense for strategic strike force locations. Improved HAWK (MIM–23B) has the same general mission as Basic HAWK with greatly improved capabilities. It has greater accuracy and range, takes less time to react and can attack targets moving at higher speeds and greater altitudes.

Pershing

The PERSHING missile system is a completely ground-mobile, air-transportable, surface-to-surface, 2-stage, solid-propellant, inertially guided ballistic missile system. The primary mission of the PERSHING is to provide a nuclear firing capability.

Air Defense Command and Control System, AN/TSQ–73

The AN/TSQ–73 is a micro-miniaturized, largely automated air defense command and control system, mounted in a single shelter and operated by a three-man crew. The system is carried on a five-ton truck. The AN/TSQ–73 coordinates the air defense activities of multiple HAWK and NIKE HERCULES batteries against hostile aircraft and exchanges target information with other services.

Radar Test Set, AN/TPM–25

This radar test set is used to maintain the new generation identification friend or foe (IFF) tactical prime systems AN/TPX–46 and AN/TPX–50. The test equipment in the existing inventory severely curtails the degree of maintenance support available for checkout of the sophisticated circuits of the new family of interrogator equipment. This radar test set will provide the additional capabilities that are needed to support the new IFF interrogators used with the NIKE HERCULES, HAWK, and Air Defense Command and Control Systems.

Navy and Marine Corps Missiles

Poseidon Fleet Ballistic Missile System (UGM–73A)

The POSEIDON Fleet Ballistic Missile System is a two stage solid propellant missile with improved accuracy, larger payload than PO-

LARIS and with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles. The POSEIDON Missile System replaces the POLARIS Missile System on 31 of 41 SSBNs. The authorization of $48.0 million continues the procurement of POSEIDON production support necessary to maintain required schedules.

Sidewinder (AIM-9H/) Missile

The SIDEWINDER is an infra-red, short range air-to-air missile carried by Navy and Marine Corps fighter and attack aircraft for use against all enemy aircraft. The solid state AIM-9H is limited to rear hemisphere attacks; however, the incorporation of the lead bias function will move the impact forward to a more vulnerable point of the aircraft and improve lethality capability.

SHRIKE (AGM-45A) Missile

The SHRIKE is an all-weather, supersonic, anti-radar, air-to-surface and surface-to-surface guided missile. The SHRIKE is launched and boosted on a ballistic flight path toward its target guiding on the radiating antenna. It can be launched from the A-4, A-6, and A-7 aircraft.

Condor (AGM-53A) Missile

CONDOR is a medium range, cruise missile with a conventional warhead which utilizes electro-optical guidance. It carries a television camera which view the area ahead of the missile. The operator fires the missile and by the use of data link communications system controls the camera and missile remotely. He can thus search the area, locate the target, lock the missile tracker onto the selected target and update the missile aim point if desired to achieve a more effective impact location. Use of this system will allow attack aircraft to deliver a warhead without exposing the launch aircraft to the effective envelope of known or predicted enemy surface-to-air defense system.

Standard MR (RIM-66B) Missile

The STANDARD MR (RIM-66B) missile is a supersonic missile which incorporates advanced solid-state electronics and engineering concepts. This missile, with a dual-thrust solid-propellant rocket motor, is a medium range (MR), ship-launched, anti-aircraft, anti-missile, and anti-ship weapon for destroyers, ocean escorts, patrol craft and cruisers. It is a follow-on to the TARTAR IT missile. The RIM-66B version of the STANDARD MR missile is common with the RIM-67 STANDARD ER missile except for the propulsion systems. The RIM-66B is approved for service use and was first procured in fiscal year 1966.

Standard ER (RIM-67A) Missile

The STANDARD ER (RIM-67A) missile is a supersonic missile which incorporates advanced solid-state electronics and engineering concepts. This missile, with a booster and sustainer, is an extended range (ER), ship-launched, anti-aircraft weapon for frigates, cruisers and aircraft carriers. It is used for defense against high-performance aircraft, anti-ship missiles, and surface targets. This missile is a follow-on to the TERRIER missile, and provides improved over-all performance and reliability for the weapon system.

Standard SSM (ARM) (RGM–66D) Missile

The STANDARD SSM (ARM) (RGM–66D) missile provides the Navy with a rapidly deployable; low risk, surface-launched missile with wide-band passive homing capability against enemy shipboard radars located either within or over-the-horizon. The "rapidly deployable" and "low risk" attributes of the program are achieved by utilization of already developed hardware from the air-launched STANDARD ARM missile (AGM–78D–2) and the ship-launched STANDARD Missile type 1 (RIM–66B2). This missile can be fired from the PG Class ships using a box launcher and TARTAR ships using the modified launch platforms.

Standard Active (RGM–66F) Missile

The STANDARD ACTIVE (RGM–66F) Missile, derived by adding an ACTIVE guidance section to the basic STANDARD MISSILE (SM–1), provides an over-the-horizon surface-to-surface missile capability to the Fleet. This missile acquires and intercepts the target, thus eliminating the present need for continuous radar illumination of the target by the firing ship. The STANDARD ACTIVE Missile derives a tactical advantage because it can effectively engage hostile ships over-the-horizon while the launch ship maintains electronic-silence; and because of its inherent trajectory diversity, supersonic speed and steep dive angle to the target. The STANDARD ACTIVE missile will be deployed in 16 classes of ships in the FY 1975–FY 1976 time frame.

Aerial Targets

The target program is designed to provide realistic presentations of potential threats, and is used in developing, testing and evaluating Navy missiles. Targets are also used for training and for maintaining the skills of Navy personnel in the use of missiles and anti-aircraft guns.

The authorization is for the recoverable BQM–34S drone which simulates subsonic aircraft and is used in the Navy's air-to-air and surface-to-air missile testing and training programs. Another model, the recovarable BQM–34T, simulates high-performance, supersonic aircraft for air-to-air and surface-to-air missile evaluation and training requirements. The recoverable, subsonic MQM–74C, is primarily required for anti-aircraft gunnery exercises.

AIR FORCE MISSILES

Shrike

The Shrike is an anti-radiation missile designed to destroy enemy ground radars by homing on the source of the radiation. This weapon is carried on the F–105 and F–4 aircraft. The fiscal year 1975 quantity buy continues production of missiles to support War Readiness Materiel (WRM) requirements.

Maverick

The Maverick is an air-to-ground missile equipped with automatic television homing guidance for use by the F–4D/E, A–7D, and A–10 tactical aircraft against fixed or moving hard targets such as tanks and field fortifications.

Target Drones

Target Drones are airborne vehicles which are used to simulate subsonic and supersonic aircraft. They are used to develop air-to-air missile tactics, train aircrews and to test and evaluate aircraft and missile weapon systems. The authorization provides for procurement of the PQM–102 full scale maneuvering, after burning, non-manrated target drone and the BQM–34A subscale turbojet propelled "Firebee" target drone.

SHIP CONSTRUCTION AND CONVERSION: NAVY

The bill provides $3539.1 million in authorization of appropriation for naval ship construction and conversion.

The 28 ships authorized for construction and the 4 conversions under the Fiscal Year 1975 program in this bill are in addition to those already discussed.

3 Nuclear Attack Submarines (SSN)

These are additional follow-on submarines of the high-speed LOS ANGELES (SSN 688) Class. They are a key element of the Navy's sea control forces, capable of covert offensive operations in ocean areas under enemy air and surface control.

7 Destroyers (DD)

The SPRUANCE (DD 963) Class destroyers provide conventionally-powered, high-speed, long-endurance, antisubmarine escort capability combined with other general purpose destroyer missions and tasks such as naval gunfire support of operations ashore. The ship's primary mission will be to supplement the guided missile fleet air defense frigates as elements of the Navy's fast carrier task forces.

1 Sea Control Ship (SCS)

This is the lead ship of a class which will provide a sea-based air support capability where the presence of an aircraft carrier is neither practical nor required; namely, in the lower threat open ocean areas. The ship will carry a mix of helicopters and vertical/short take off and landing aircraft. Tests, directed by the Congress, to establish the viability of the Sea Control Ship concept, have been completed and the program is ready to proceed.

7 Patrol Frigates (PF)

This ship is the primary replacement for the many World War II destroyers and destroyer escorts which have been retired. It is a capable, economical open ocean surface combatant with antisubmarine, anti-air, anti-missile and anti-surface ship weapon systems, designed to operate in the role of protection of naval and merchant shipping in the lower threat areas.

4 Patrol Hydrofoils (Missile) (PHM)

The anti-shipping-missile equipped patrol hydrofoil will operate in coastal, island and narrow sea areas against much larger hostile surface shipping. Armed with 8 HARPOON missiles (and a 76mm gun), the ship will free the larger patrol frigates and destroyer escorts for open ocean missions.

1 Destroyer Tender (AD)

The destroyer tender represents a resumption of a replacement program for aging fleet assets. The capabilities of this new ship, and others in coming year programs, are required to support the gas turbine and nuclear powered destroyers and frigates which will soon begin coming into operation.

1 Fleet Oiler (AO)

This is the lead ship of a new class of underway replenishment oilers, required to support fleet operations at sea.

1 Fleet Ocean Tug (T–ATF)

Designed to be manned by Military Sealift Command civil service mariners, the T–ATF will provide open ocean towing and limited salvage capability. This is the lead ship of a new, smaller class.

Service, Pollution Abatement and Small Craft

The request is for four non-self propelled fuel oil barges (YON), one medium repair drydock (ARDM), and 26 ships' waste offloading barges (SWOB).

Conversion and Modernization

The Fiscal Year 1975 program includes four ships:

(1) Three fleet ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) to accommodate the POSEIDON missile system;

(2) One submarine tender (AS) to provide the capability to support fleet ballistic missile submarines.

TRACKED COMBAT VEHICLES, TORPEDOES AND OTHER WEAPONS

Recovery Vehicle, Light, FT, M578

This vehicle is a lightly armored, self-propelled, full-tracked, air transportable recovery vehicle which performs the battlefield recovery role for tracked vehicles up to 30 tons. The M578 has a three-man crew, a cruising range of 450 miles and mounts a .50 caliber machine gun as its only armament.

Trainer, Turret, for M60A1(PI) Tank, M30A1

The M30A1 is a fully functional tank turret mounted on a wheeled stand with portions of the turret walls and top cut out to permit student observation. The trainer is used for instructing armored personnel in operation, maintenance, crew duties, employment, and command skills. All training missions can be performed by the trainer except firing of live ammunition. The trainer allows eight students to simultaneously receive instruction from one instructor.

Carrier, 81mm Mortar, M125A1

The M125A1 is a light, armored tracked vehicle employed as a mobile firing base for the 81mm Mortar, M29A1. Employed by the mechanized infantry battalion, the M125A1 provides close-in indirect fire support. It is capable of fording and cross-country operations. The M125A1 Carrier is assigned 3 per mortar platoon, infantry battalion.

Recovery Vehicle, Medium, FT, M88A1

The Medium Recovery Vehicle is a full-tracked, armored, medium tank recovery vehicle with an "A" frame boom, two winches, and a spade dozer. Its mission is to perform hoisting, winching, towing, and bull-dozing operations in the recovery and rescue of medium tanks and renders limited repair support.

Launcher, Incendiary, Rocket, 66mm, M202A1

The Army requests $2.6 million for 3,049 M202A1 rocket launchers. This rocket launcher, which is an assembly of four symmetrically arranged 66mm tubes, replaces the old flame thrower which required mixing, transferring, and pressurization of the fuel as well as several pieces of ancillary support equipment. The M202A1 can be employed against point targets up to a range of 200 meters and has a maximum range of 700 meters against area targets such as vehicle convoys or advancing enemy troops.

Machine Gun, 7.62mm, M60

The Army requests $5.0 million for 6,000 M60 machine guns. The M60 machine gun is a general purpose flat trajectory 7.62mm weapon capable of providing sustained automatic fire at medium to long ranges. It can be fired from a built-in bipod, a tripod (M122), from the hip or from the shoulder in a standing, sitting, or prone position. The M60 is organic equipment to all type Army units to include combat, combat support, and combat service support units.

Machine Gun, Cal. 50, M85

The Army requests $10.7 million for 1,682 M85 machine guns. The M85 is a caliber .50 machine gun specifically designed to fit in the M219 cupola of the M60 family of tanks. The weapon is used against enemy lightly armored vehicles, aircraft, and for reconnaissance by fire on suspected enemy targets.

Rifle, 5.56mm, M16A1

The M16A1 is the Army's standard rifle. It is an air cooled, gas operated rifle which can be fired from the shoulder or hip, either full or semiautomatic. It has an effective range of 460 meters and a maximum range of 2,653 meters.

NAVY

Torpedo MK–48

The Torpedo MK–48 has been developed to replace all submarine launched torpedoes for both the anti-submarine and anti-ship role. The MK–48 Torpedo Mod 1 satisfies this requirement and was authorized for full scale production in July 1971.

The FY 1975 funding request is based on phased procurement to obtain torpedo needs in an orderly manner. The inventory objective is based on providing an initial shipfill plus additional quantities required to support combat usage rates.

Mobile Target MK–30

Fleet ASW training exercises and torpedo firings are severely restricted by the lack of "live" submarine services and safety restrictions. Continued procurement of this sophisticated Mobile ASW Target provides realistic training opportunities to exercise all ASW

torpedoes, all surface ship and submarine sonars, and airborne Magnetic Anomaly Detection (MAD) equipment. The Mobile Target MK–30 provides a direct and realistic substitute for "live" submarine services.

Miniature Mobile Target

The Miniature Mobile Target (MMT) is a small, non-sophisticated, expendable, hand launched acoustic device developed as an open ocean training device for sonar teams. It provides basic but cost effective training for Fleet ASW units. Its small size, low cost, ease in use, and simplicity make it an excellent device for basic open ocean Fleet ASW training.

The FY 1975 procurement is the initial production buy of the Miniature Mobile Target. These targets are required to meet Fleet open ocean training requirements.

CAPTOR Advance Procurement, Current Year

CAPTOR is a mine-like influenced-activated ASW Weapon system employing a modified MK–46 Torpedo as a payload, deliverable by aircraft, surface ships, and submarines and is designed to detect, classify, and attack advanced diesel and nuclear submarines.

Machine Gun MK–29

The MK–29 Machine Gun (20MM) will replace pre-World War II model machine guns now in use in riverine, patrol assault craft and auxiliary ships as primary ordnance, and as secondary ordnance in many other ship types such as LHA, CVAN–65, and Destroyer types.

MK–75 76MM Gun Mount

The MK–75 76MM Gun Mounts are to be installed aboard newly constructed PHM (Patrol Hydrofoil, Guided Missile) and PF (Patrol Frigate) ships. This line item provides for the procurement of MK–75 76MM Gun Mounts for use at Navy schools for training gun crews to man those mounts.

MARINE CORPS

M88A1 Tank Recovery Vehicle

The fiscal year 1975 procurement of 40 vehicles is the first year of a two-year program to replace the M51 Tank Recovery Vehicle. The M51 will have been a Marine Corps recovery vehicle since 1955.

Improved Hawk Missile

The Improved Hawk is an Army Surface to Air Missile System. The authorization represents the third year procurement of a four-year modernization program.

TITLE II—RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION

The following tabulation compares the amounts authorized and appropriated for research, development, test, and evaluation in fiscal year 1974 with the amounts requested and recommended by the Committee for fiscal year 1975.

[In thousands of dollars]

Department	Fiscal year— 1974 requested	1974 authorized	1974 appropriated	1975 requested	Committee recommends
Army	2,108,700	1,983,758	1,912,100	1,985,976	1,878,397
Navy (including Marine Corps)	2,711,700	2,670,749	2,654,405	[1] 3,264,503	[1] 3,153,006
Air Force	3,212,500	3,034,800	3,042,000	3,518,860	3,459,760
Defense agencies	525,000	505,578	482,500	[2] 555,700	[3] 510,500
Total, R.D.T. & E.	8,557,900	8,194,885	8,091,005	[1] 9,325,039	[1] 9,001,663

[1] Includes $2.57 million for Navy special foreign currency program.
[2] Includes $27 million for Director of Test and Evaluation, Defense.
[3] Includes $25 million for the Director of Test and Evaluation, Defense.

SUMMARY OF ADJUSTMENTS TO FISCAL YEAR 1975 R.D.T. & E. AUTHORIZATION REQUEST RECOMMENDED BY THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

[In thousands of dollars]

	Fiscal year 1975 request	Committee changes	Committee recommendations
Army	1,985,976	−107,579	1,878,397
Navy (including Marine Corps)	[1] 3,264,503	−111,497	[1] 3,153,006
Air Force	3,518,860	−59,100	3,459,760
Defense Agencies	[2] 555,700	−45,200	[3] 510,500
Total R.D.T. & E. authorization	[1] 9,325,039	−323,376	[1] 9,001,663

[1] Includes $2.57 million for Navy Special Foreign Currency Program.
[2] Includes $27 million for the Director of Test and Evaluation, Defense.
[3] Includes $25 million for the Director of Test and Evaluation, Defense.

Authorization Requested

The fiscal year (FY) 1975 Research, Development, Test and Evaluation request for authorization totalled $9,325,039,000.[1] The fiscal year 1974 funding level was $8,091,005,000, not including the RDT&E supplemental request of $217,000,000.[2] The Department of Defense has transferred to the fiscal year 1975 RDT&E account $225,000,000 for items that appeared in other accounts in fiscal year 1974 that were more closely allied to RDT&E. The transfer was generally in accord with Congressional direction. The Department of Defense used an inflation or escalation factor of approximately 6 percent in generating the fiscal year 1975 RDT&E request. Overall then, recognizing the transfer and escalation factors, the Department of Defense estimates that the fiscal year 1975 request represents an increase of about 4 percent in real effort.

According to the Director, Defense Research and Engineering, the RDT&E request in terms of buying power is commensurate with expenditures of the past ten-year period.

[1] Includes $2.57 million for Navy Special Foreign Currency Program.
[2] This Committee has authorized only the pay raise portion of the supplemental $108,908,000 of the total $217,000,000.



SUMMARY OF COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS

The Committee recommends an authorization of $9,001,663,000 for Research, Development, Test and Evaluation. This represents a reduction of $323,376,000, or 3.5% of the amount requested by the Department of Defense.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

The FY 1975 authorization request for $9,325,039,000 is the largest amount in actual dollars ever requested by the Department of Defense for RDT&E. The Committee was naturally concerned over the magnitude of such a request. The Committee's initial question, however, was not whether this was too much, but what kind of an RDT&E program is essential to ensure our national security. Only after answering this question can the cost consideration be addressed.

The Committee recognizes the importance of an effective RDT&E program. RDT&E has established the technology base that has given this country the edge in overall military posture. It is the foundation of our military strength. Unlike procurement, where production rates can be accelerated in a time of need, the RDT&E process cannot be compressed to suit the need. The translation of the technology base to operationally deployable products requires time.

This philosophy, however, doesn't preclude the vigilance required by this Committee to ensure the authorization of an effective RDT&E program at the lowest possible cost. For this reason, the Research and Development Subcommittee examined every item in the FY 1975 request. The recommended action was based upon the merits of the

individual programs rather than the attainment of a prescribed percentage reduction. The 3.5% reduction was the result, not the goal.

The Committee review of the request was comprehensive. During the long hearings, the Committee assessed the requirements or need for each weapon system development program, program progress, the Department of Defense planned course of action, and the possibility of using lower cost alternatives. The arguments concerning the continued use of the B–52, or developing a stretched version of the FB–111 in lieu of the costly B–1 was again thoroughly assessed. The Committee considered the results of studies conducted by the General Accounting Office and others, and used these and other input in the overall decisionmaking process.

The Committee concluded that new Soviet advances and developments preclude the use of less expensive but also less capable alternatives in lieu of the B–1, TRIDENT, and several major strategic and tactical systems presently being developed.

While the Committee was in concurrence with the Department of Defense on most major weapons developments, the Committee believes that the Department can do a better job of managing the RDT&E programs. The rationale for this belief emanates from the following considerations.

Duplication of Effort within the Services

The Committee noted the numerous developments of low power neodymium yag laser rangefinders/designators. The development of guided ordnance was another example. The Army and Navy are both developing guided projectiles. The guidance law and parameters are virtually identical; yet there are three developments, two by the Army, one by the Navy, for a program that could possibly use a common round for both applications. The Navy has already demonstrated the feasibility of doing so. There is an indication that each of the services still prefer to pursue separate programs, often at the price of using RDT&E dollars less effectively and less efficiently. A joint Army and Navy development effort would have resulted in a significant cost savings. The money saved in developing one semi-active laser seeker rather than three with the same performance characteristics could have been applied to the development of a much-needed dual-mode seeker.

The Department of Defense "Selecting Out" Process

The Committee believes that the Department should "select out" those programs which have shown insufficient progress for the investment, programs that are duplicative, or programs that are too costly for the capability they will provide. For example, the Director, Defense Research and Engineering indicated concern in this prepared statement over the cost and technical problems associated with the AIM–7F missile. The projected cost has increased since his statement; however, the Committee has not found evidence of any change in the program plan. While the Committee has not recommended a funding reduction for this program in the fiscal year 1975 request, the cost/capability factor of this missile will be closely monitored.

Inaccurate Cost Reporting

The Department of Defense cost estimates for our weapon system development programs are too often inaccurate. More frequently than

is desirable, the Committee had to ask repeated questions to ascertain actual system costs. The Department's escalation factors have not and do not represent the state of the economy.

Typical escalation factors have ranged from one to six percent in times when nearly eight percent was more representative. The Committee cannot comprehend the logic used by the Department to arrive at the rates shown in the following table:

System	Escalation rates—Fiscal year			
	1972	1973	1974	1975
B–1:				
R. & D	2.57	2.57	2.57	4.6
Procurement	1.94	3.4	3.3	3.3
AWACS:				
R. & D		4.25	4.25	4.25
Procurement		4.25	4.25	4.25
Minuteman:				
R. & D			3.5	3.5
Procurement			3.1	3.1

The Director, Defense Research and Engineering, stated that a six percent escalation factor was used in generating the FY 1975 RDT&E authorization request. This is not in consonance with the examples shown.

This inaccurate method of cost estimating conveys perpetual overruns to the Congress as well as the public. The Committee urges the Department to address this concern and provide more accurate means of estimating actual system costs prior to the submission of the fiscal year 1976 authorization request.

Responsiveness

The Committee found the Department to be non-responsive in following the Congressional guidance provided in the House-Senate Armed Services Committee Conference Report (No. 93–588) of last year. This report called for the conduct of studies to determine the specific requirement for the cruise missile. The results of these studies were to be submitted to the Congress as part of the FY 1975 request. Both the Navy and Air Force were advised of this requirement prior to hearings and reminded during the hearings of their obligation. To date the results of these studies have not been received by this Committee. This inaction by the Departments formed the basis for the reductions in both programs. The Committee requests that this data be provided within sixty days following the date of this report.

System Planning

During his appearance before the Committee, the Director, Defense Research and Engineering was asked why the Navy was not taking a more systems-oriented approach in their development efforts. It was pointed out to him that twenty year-old gunfire control systems were being installed on our newer ships, that available technology was not being tied together to enhance the Fleet's operational capability. His response was:

> "All I can say is that it's partly an institutional problem and partly because it's a very difficult problem and I have no simple answer except that I recognize, with you, the need for doing that, doing a better job."

The Committee expects visible signs of progress in solving this "institutional problem" during the coming year.

These Committee comments concerning the management aspects of the Department are intended to be constructive. The objective of this Committee has been, and will continue to be, to work in a cooperative spirit with the Department of Defense in an effort to ensure our nation's security.

The Committee believes that the amount recommended for FY 1975 will provide adequately for the development of those weapons systems which are needed to meet our future military requirements. It will also provide the level of technology needed to ensure the capability to develop future weapons systems to meet the threats posed by our potential adversaries. The Committee recommendations are identified in the tables that follow:

ADJUSTMENTS TO FISCAL YEAR 1975 RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORIZATION REQUEST RECOMMENDED BY HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

R.D.T. & E., ARMY

[In thousands of dollars]

Program element	Fiscal year 1975 request	Change	Recommended
Military sciences	111,520		111,520
Aircraft and related equipment:			
Utility tactical transport aircraft system (UTTAS)	54,060	—5,000	49,060
Cobra TOW		+4,500	4,500
Other programs approved	215,936		215,936
Total, aircraft	269,996	—500	269,496
Missiles and related equipment:			
Advanced forward area air defense system	44,668	—29,668	15,000
Advanced ballistic missile defense	91,410	—26,410	65,000
Site defense	160,000	—10,000	150,000
Cannon launched guided projectile	12,556	—6,256	6,300
Surface-to-Air missile development (SAM-D)	111,215	—11,215	100,000
Kwajalein Missile Range	84,554	—4,554	80,000
Other programs approved	202,015		202,015
Total, missiles	706,413	—88,103	618,315
Military astronautics and related equipment	15,832		15,832
Ordnance, combat vehicles and related equipment:			
Weapons and ammunition	7,306	—1,600	5,706
Tank systems (XM-1)	68,790	—3,790	65,000
Lethal chemical munitions (P.E. 64610A)	4,894	—1,894	3,000
Mechanized infantry combat vehicle (XM723) MICV	9,011	+1,700	10,711
Vehicle rapid-fire weapon systems—Bushmaster	7,030	—2,930	4,100
Armored reconnaissance scout vehicle (XM800)	8,062	—3,762	4,300
Other programs approved	158,778		158,778
Total, ordnance	263,871	—12,276	251,595
Other equipment:			
Triservice tactical communications program	37,273	—2,273	35,000
Clothing, equipment, and packaging technology	2,220	+1,500	3,720
Food technology	5,986	+500	6,486
Surveillance, target acquisition, and night systems (STANO)	15,398	—2,398	13,000
Classified program	20,529	—4,029	16,500
Other programs approved	481,087		481,087
Total, other equipment	562,493	—6,700	555,793
Programwide management and support	55,846		55,846
Total, Army R.D.T. & E. authorization	1,985,976	—107,579	1,878,397

ADJUSTMENTS TO FISCAL YEAR 1975 RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORIZATION REQUEST RECOMMENDED BY HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE—Continued

R.D.T. & E., AIR FORCE

[In thousands of dollars]

Program element	Fiscal year 1975 request	Change	Recommended
Military sciences	131,400		131,400
Aircraft and related equipment:			
Air combat fighter	36,000	—5,000	31,000
Other programs approved	1,174,000		1,174,000
Total, aircraft	1,210,000	—5,000	1,205,000
Missiles and related equipment:			
Advanced ballistic reentry system	119,943	—15,000	10,943
Advanced air-to-air weapons technology	3,100	—3,100	
Air-launched cruise missile	80,000	—5,000	75,000
Other programs approved	215,957		215,957
Total, missiles	419,000	—23,100	359,900
Military astronautics and related equipment:			
SLBM radar warning systems	8,000	—8,000	
Navstar global positioning system	25,400	—2,500	22,900
Other programs approved	439,300		439,300
Total, military astronautics	472,700	—10,500	462,200
Ordnance, combat vehicles, and related equipment:			
Conventional weapons	24,900	—4,900	20,000
Improved aircraft gun system	9,690	—7,500	2,190
Other programs approved	122,110		122,110
Total, ordnance	156,700	—12,400	144,300
Other equipment:			
Conus over-the-horizon (OTH) radar system	12,300	—2,000	10,300
Improved capability for operational test and evaluation	11,900	—3,100	8,800
Precision emitter location strike system	25,100	—3,000	22,100
Other programs approved	628,900		628,900
Total other equipment	678,200	—8,100	670,100
Programwide management and support	450,860		450,860
Total, Air Force R.D.T. & E. authorization	3,518,860	—59,100	3,459,760
R.D.T. & E., DEFENSE AGENCIES			
Military sciences:			
DARPA	41,100	—2,800	38,300
Technical support to OSD/OJCS	18,800	—3,800	15,000
Total, military sciences	59,900	—6,600	53,300
Missiles and related equipment: DARPA	75,000	—6,000	69,000
Other equipment:			
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)	96,800	—8,000	88,800
Defense Communications Agency (DCA)	31,000	—5,000	26,000
Defense Mapping Agency (DMA)	14,500	—2,000	12,500
Total, DIA/NSA/DNA	233,100		218,000
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)		—1,300	
Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA)		—3,000	
National Security Agency (NSA)		—10,800	
Total, other equipment	375,400	—30,100	345,300
Programwide management and support:			
Defense Supply Agency	14,500	—500	14,000
Director of test and evaluation, Defense	27,000	—2,000	25,000
Other programs approved	3,900		3,900
Total, programwide management and support	45,400	—2,500	42,900
Total, Department of Defense R.D.T. & E. authorization	[1] 9,325,039,000	[1] —323,376	[1] 9,001,663

[1] Includes $2,570,000 for Navy special foreign currency program.

ADJUSTMENTS TO FISCAL YEAR 1975 RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORIZATION REQUEST RECOMMENDED BY HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE—Continued

R.D.T. & E., NAVY

[In thousands of dollars]

Program element	Fiscal year 1975 request	Change	Recommended
Military sciences	140,832		140,832
Aircraft and related equipment:			
VFX fighter prototype	34,000	−34,000	
Other programs approved	315,322		315,322
Total, aircraft	349,322	−34,000	315,322
Missiles and related equipment:			
Fleet ballistic missile system	46,669	−9,669	37,000
Sidewinder (AIM 9L)	522	+5,000	5,522
Air-launched air-to-air missile (AGILE)	19,987	−19,987	
Cruise missile	44,971	−2,500	42,471
Aegis	67,012	−17,012	50,000
Close-in weapon system (Phalanx)	32,100	−20,000	12,100
Surface missile guidance	32,222	−7,200	25,022
Other programs approved	909,092		909,092
Total, missiles	1,152,575	−71,368	1,081,207
Military astronautics and related equipment	38,716		38,716
Ships, small craft, and related equipment:			
Ship development (advanced)	19,042	−3,000	16,042
Other programs approved	708,463		708,463
Total, ships, small craft, and related equipment	727,505	−3,000	724,505
Ordnance, combat vehicles, and related equipment	92,335		92,335
Other equipment	479,292		479,292
Programwide management and support:			
USS Hip Pocket	3,129	−3,129	
Other programs approved	280,797		280,797
Total, programwide management and support	283,926	−3,129	280,797
Total, Navy R.D.T. & E. authorization	3,264,503	−111,497	3,153,006

COMMITTEE ACTION ON SELECTED SUBJECTS IN THE R.D.T. & E. AUTHORIZATION REQUEST

R.D.T. & E. Fiscal Year 1975 Programs with Excess Funds

The Committee recommends reductions totaling $67.930 million in the programs listed below.

Analysis of available data and testing by Defense witnesses indicated that these funds are excess to Fiscal Year 1975 requirements because of incomplete data, similar efforts being accomplished in other programs, or disparity between the planned effort and the funding requested.

	Fiscal year 1975 request	Change	Recommended
Army:			
Kwajalein Missile Range	84,554	−4,554	80,000
Weapons and ammunition	7,306	−1,600	5,706
Tank systems (XM-1)	68,790	−3,790	65,000
Vehicle rapid fire weapon system—Bushmaster	7,030	−2,930	4,100
Armed reconnaissance Scout vehicle (XM800)	8,062	−3,762	4,300
Tri-service tactical communications program	37,273	−2,273	35,000
Surveillance, target acquisition, and night systems (STANO)	15,398	−2,398	13,000
Lethal chemical munitions	4,894	−1,894	3,000
Unspecified reductions		−4,029	
Navy:			
Cruise missile	44,971	−2,500	42,471
Surface missile guidance	32,222	−7,200	25,022
Ship development (advanced)	19,042	−3,000	16,042
Air Force:			
Navstar global positioning system	25,400	−2,500	22,900
Conventional weapons	24,900	−4,900	20,000
Improved aircraft gun system	9,690	−7,500	2,190
Improved capability for operational test and evaluation	11,900	−3,100	8,800
Precision emitter location strike system	25,100	−3,000	22,100
Air launched cruise missile	80,000	−5,000	75,000
Conus over-the-horizon (OTH) radar system	12,300	−2,000	10,300

COMMITTEE RATIONALE FOR OTHER REDUCTIONS

Advanced Forward Area Air Defense System

Committee Recommendation

The Committee recommends a reduction of $29.668 million from the Army's $44.668 million request.

Basis for Committee Action

The Army has defined the need for an all-weather system that could defend adequately against aircraft attacking in non-visual conditions. At the present time, there is not a viable threat that has an all-weather capability. The Committee, however, concurs with the need to establish such a capability against future potential threats.

The Director, Defense Research and Engineering has expressed interest in three foreign systems, the Roland, Rapier and Crotale. The salient feature of these systems is that their research and development phase has been completed. However, the Committee is concerned over the difficulties encountered in previous attempts to Americanize foreign systems. The Army's estimate for the cost and the time required to field any of these systems reinforces this concern. The Committee

believes that there is American technology available that can be improved to provide the performance required in less time and at less cost. The Chaparral with a RF seeker and a pulse doppler radar is one possible alternative. There are others as well.

The Committee believes that the Army should explore these alternatives for cost effectiveness and performance prior to system development on a large scale basis. The concerns expressed form the basis for the reduction in fiscal year 1975 funding.

Utility Tactical Transport Aircraft System (UTTAS)

Committee Recommendation

The Committee recommends a reduction of $5.0 million from the Army's $54.1 million request.

Basis for Committee Action

The Committee concern in this program is with the engine development. The present Army consideration is to use the GE T–700 engine to power both the UTTAS and the Advanced Attack Helicopter. The Army, however, is considering proposals for two backup engines. The Committee questions the need to spend additional money for a backup engine since the Army has reported good results on the baseline T–700 engine. The Committee also expressed concern over the fact that while the AAH and the UTTAS were to use the same engine, the AAH program has a sizable amount of money earmarked for engine development. The amount was in excess of what the Committee believed was required to design the inlet, support structure, gearbox and integration of the engine into the AAH.

The Committee believed that a $5.0 million reduction in the UTTAS program was commensurate with the fiscal year 1975 planned effort.

The Committee is also concerned over the massive number of helicopters in the inventory and the number of new developments and plans an indepth review of the overall Army and Navy helicopter program during the next year.

Clothing, Equipment, and Packaging Technology

Food Technolcgy

Committee Recommendation

The Committee recommends an increase of $1.500 million to the Army request of $2.220 million for the Clothing, Equipment and Packaging Technology program and $0.5 million to the Food Technology.

Basis for Committee Action

The Committee recommends that greater effort be expended on providing the individual soldier with better protection against hostile and hazardous environments in which he may be deployed in the future. The Committee believes the soldier can be provided better protection with improved: foods, detection and protective BW/CW equipment, body armor and protective head gear, packaging for supplies to be shipped and stored, flame resistant materials for tentage

and clothing, control and treatment of infectious diseases which are not of public health interest in the United States, combat surgery and treatment of severe burn injuries, means of waste disposal under field conditions; and that means should be found to provide greater protection against the hazards of microwaves, flame, toxic substances, and lasers.

CANNON-LAUNCHED GUIDED PROJECTILE

Commitee Recommendation

The Committee recommends a reduction of $6.256 million from the Army's request of $12.556 million.

Basis for Committee Action

The Committee concurred with the Army's need for the guided projectile. The Committee, however, is concerned over the number of developments in this area. The Army has two contractors for their parallel development effort. The Navy is developing a 5-inch guided projectile. The Navy initially developed the feasibility hardware for the Army. The Navy has also saboted their 5-inch round to the Army 155mm configuration and demonstrated the feasibility of using a common round for both applications.

The reduction is based on an excessive level of effort for this development. The Committee requests the Director, Defense Research and Engineering to define funds for procurement of an adequate number of saboted 5-inch rounds for a flyoff with the 155mm round during this fiscal year. The Committee believes that the possibility using a common round will more than offset this investment.

Advanced Ballistic Missile Defense System

SITE DEFENSE

Committee Recommendation

The Committee recommends a reduction of $26.4 million from the Army's request of $91.4 million for the Advanced Ballistic Missile Defense program and a reduction of $10 million from the Army's request of $160 million for Site Defense.

Basis for Committee Action

The committee believes that an effective program for ballistic missile defense consists of the admixture of research and system development. The committee's concern relates to how much of each is required to adequately defend our ballistic missile sites over both the near and far term.

In light of the SALT Agreement, the Army is emphasizing in their Advanced Ballistic Missile Program a vigorous R&D effort instead of the previous goal of operational site deployment. Further, the Army has a substantial effort for site defense—the system phase.

The committee believes that a lesser technology phase than the one proposed by the Army for fiscal year 1975 will ensure the present lead we have in ballistic missile defense. This lead, coupled with our credible deterrence, is the basis for this conclusion. The recommended level of

funding should be adequate to exploit the technology and make new advances in radars, optics, interceptors, as well as in phenomenology. The site defense reduction was based on an assessment of the planned effort for fiscal year 1975. The committee believes that the tasks delineated in the Army written material reflect continuations or completions of the tasks that were in the more crucial stages of development in fiscal year 1974. These were conducted at a significantly lower level of funding. The committee recognizes the higher costs that will be incurred during the later system integration phases.

Overall, the committee believes that a total fiscal year 1975 funding level of $215 million for these two programs reflects an adequate level of technology and system development for ballistic missile defense.

Surface-to-Air Missile Development (SAM–D)

Committee Recommendation

The Committee recommends a reduction of $11.2 million from the Army's request for $111.2 million.

Basis for Committee Action

The Army has redirected the SAM–D program to provide greater austerity and a minimum expenditure of funds prior to flight verification of the guidance concept. The deferral and deletion of many efforts during fiscal year 1975 coupled with a planned reduction in the number of missile firings form the basis for the recommended reduction.

Aegis

Committee Recommendation

The Committee recommends a reduction of $17.0 million from the Navy's request for $67.0 million to continue development of the AEGIS Missile System.

Basis for Committee Action

The AEGIS Surface-to-Air Missile Weapon Control System includes a phased array radar which will permit multiple target engageability. It is a complex state-of-the-art system that employs 12 digital computers. The current Standard missile and improved version of Standard both will be compatible with AEGIS. While the Committee believes that the AEGIS will enhance the operational capability of the Fleet, it is not convinced that the system is shipboard operable and maintainable by ships' forces. The experience with digital fire control systems of far less complexity than AEGIS indicates that this is a major consideration.

AEGIS is a 150-ton system that will not be retrofitted on present Navy ships. It is intended for installation aboard the new DG class ship which has not yet been approved by the Department of Defense. Without the DG, AEGIS has limited application. The only viable candidate platform would be the DLG(N). The Committee believes that no further developments of engineering development models or major design changes should be made to the system until completion of an acceptable level of at sea testing. The Navy is encouraged to emphasize this testing to verify the shipboard operational and maintenance aspects of the system by ships' forces.

Fighter Prototype

Committee Recommendation

The Committee recommends deletion of the entire $34.0 million requested by the Navy to initiate the development of a lightweight fighter aircraft.

Basis for Committee Action

The Navy was not able to present a solid argument in favor of developing another lightweight fighter aircraft. The need to employ an aircraft to augment the F–14 is questionable. Beyond the question of the need, the Navy could not adequately describe the reasons why either Air Force prototype, the YF–16 or YF–17, could not be made carrier compatible to satisfy the requirement.

The Committee, however, is willing to consider a request next year if the Navy can adequately demonstrate a requirement, supported by reasons why existing lightweight fighter aircraft would not be suitable.

Fleet Ballistic Missile Defense

Committee Recommendation

The Committee recommended a reduction of $9.669 million from the Navy's request for $46.669 million.

Basis for Committee Action

The Navy requested a $35.0 million increase for this program which is designed to better define the error budget for the Polaris-Poseidon systems. The program will define areas for improvement and not result in system improvements as such.

The Committee believes that the planned effort for fiscal year 1975 does not correlate with the excessive dollar increase and should be reduced to the stated level.

Sidewinder (AIM 9L)

(See Agile.)

AIR-LAUNCHED AIR-TO-AIR MISSILE SYSTEM (AGILE)

Committee Recommendation

The Committee recommends deletion of the entire $19.987 million request by the Navy to continue this advanced development program.

Committee Considerations

This program was intended to give the Navy a superior dogfight type missile. The program has been in being since 1968. Since this time, nearly $75 million has been spent and the Committee is not satisfied with the progress. The Committee believes that while Agile can be made to perform, the complexity of this thrust vector control missile will be costly. Most of the performance sought by Agile can be acquired more easily with an aerodynamic version. Improvements to sidewinder AIM–9L such as a larger gimbal angle, better seeker sensitivity and others can be made to give it adequate maneuverability and performance.

The Air Force has been unwilling to pursue the Agile concept. They have proposed to develop CLAW, a smaller, less costly, aerodynamic

dogfight missile. While the Committee did not concur with the Air Force request for the reason shown in a later section of this report, the Air Force had indicated that a relatively simple change could have been made to their aerodynamic version to provide the offbore-sight acquisition capability desired by the Navy.

The Committee recommends that the Agile program be terminated and that the Navy and Air Force pursue a single development for both applications. Of the $19.987 million deleted from the Agile request, the Committee has added $5 million to the Sidewinder program element to initiate this development.

Close-in Weapon System (Phalanx)

Committee Recommendation

The Committee recommends a reduction of $20 million from the $32.1 million request by the Navy for continued RDT&E of this engineering development program.

Basis for Committee Action

CIWS was designed as a fast reaction, last ditch defense against the anti-ship missile. An engineering prototype has been in test for over one year. The House Appropriations Committee was not convinced of the adequacy of the tests against a replica of the intended threat and recommended in House Report 93-662, dated November 26, 1973, the transfer of $23.2 million from the "Other Procurement, Navy" account to the RDT&E account.

The Navy indicated that the funds would be used to procure six additional operational suitable models. The ability of Phalanx to kill its intended target has not been demonstrated. The Committee believes that CIWS should be tested by Navy personnel against realistic dynamic target replicas this year. If successful, the Navy should submit a request for procurement; if not, it should be terminated.

U.S.S. Hip Pocket

Committee Recommendation

The Committee recommends deletion of the entire $3.129 million requested by the Navy for this effort.

Basis for Committee Action

In the U.S.S. Hip Pocket program, the Navy installs new technology hardware aboard ship for at-sea evaluation. The Committee believes that the Navy can use its Development Assist type tests for such evaluation and doesn't need dedicated funding for this purpose.

The Air Combat Fighter

Committee Recommendation

The Committee recommends a reduction of $5 million from the Air Force request of $36 million.

Basis for Committee Action

The Committee is concerned over the Air Force plan to commence the engineering development phase for either the YF-16 or YF-17

lightweight fighter prototype prior to the completion of operational evaluation. The committee believes that the operational evaluation should be completed prior to the indicated level of engineering development. The new funding level is intended to limit the Air Force to a safer level of concurrency in the advanced and engineering development phases.

SLBM Radar Warning System

Committee Recommendation

The committee recommends deletion of the entire $8.0 million Air Force request.

Basis for Committee Action

The planned program effort for FY 1975 included the design and system engineering for a phased array radar and software development. The Army has conducted studies for SLBM defense in their Ballistic Missile Program. The Army planned to continue the conduct of these studies as part of their FY 1975 effort. The committee could not concur with the Air Force requirement for a system of the complexity they described. The need to track the stated number of targets is questionable in light of the similar tactics that would be employed against a fewer number. The technology to perform the SLBM task is on the shelf if this is the type of system most suited to the task. The committee is not convinced that another SAFEGUARD or derivative thereof is the optimum solution.

Advanced Air-to-Air Technology

Committee Recommendation

The Committee recommends deletion of the entire $3.1 million from the Air Force request.

Basis for Committee Action

The Committee does not concur in the Air Force plan to develop a low-cost aerodynamic dogfight missile. The Committee doubts the ability of such a missile to perform the intended mission because of the small warhead and missile size. These factors led to the decision to terminate the multi-billion dollar FALCON program. The Committee recommends that the Navy and Air Force pursue a single development of an improved SIDEWINDER (AIM 9L) to satisfy their requirements. Five million dollars has been added to the Navy SIDEWINDER element to initiate this effort. (See Sidewinder, Agile discussion.)

Advanced Ballistic Reentry System

Committee Recommendation

The Committee recommends a reduction of $15 million from the Air Force request of $119.943 million.

Basis for Committee Action

The Committee did not concur in the requirement for a $30.0 million increase over last year's funding level. The Committee recognized the

added test and evaluation costs that have been added to this program; however, the study efforts and hardware developments planned for FY 1975 are more closely allied to the recommended funding level.

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)

Committee Recommendation

The committee recommends a reduction of $16.8 million from the DARPA request of $216.8 million.

Basis for Committee Action

The Committee was not satisfied with some of the DARPA fiscal year 1974 progress as described in the presented written material.

The fiscal year 1975 planned effort for Material Services, for example, is identical to the planned effort delineated in last year's authorization request. The committee questions the use of the $6.5 million that was authorized and appropriated for this program in fiscal year 1974.

The committee also believes that some of the DARPA programs are overly ambitious. The Automatic Programming task is a case in point. Attempts to use high level computer languages, as planned in this effort, have experienced repeated failure over the years. The committee has not deleted the funds for this program since the DARPA has previously demonstrated its ability to solve complex technological problems; however, should this effort continue, the DARPA will be expected to demonstrate significant progress for the accumulated expenditures during the coming year.

The DARPA reductions in each budget activity are to be taken on a priority basis. The DARPA is also cautioned against providing the committee with nebulous justification for subsequent authorization requests.

Technical Support to OSD/OJCS

Committee Recommendation

The Committee recommends a reduction of $3.8 million from the OSD/JCS of $18.8 million.

Basic for Committee Action

The Committee is concerned over the utility of the studies conducted by the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group (WSEG). The testimony presented indicated that the results and conclusions of WSEG studies have not had significant or positive impact on the RDT&E program. The Committee has reviewed several WSEG studies and found them to be of high quality; however, if they are conducted purely for academic purposes, they are of little value to the research and development program.

Last year the Senate Armed Services Committee requested the Department to consider elimination of the WSEG. That Committee believed that the WSEG functions could be assumed by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.

The House Armed Services Committee requests the Director, Defense Research and Engineering to reassess the WSEG function and organizational position with a view toward improving effectiveness and efficiency through consolidation.

Defense Agencies

The Committee recommends reductions in the amounts specified for the following Defense Agencies:

	Millions
Defense Communications Agency (DCA)	—$5.0
Defense Mapping Agency (DMA)	—2.0
Defense Supply Agency (DSA)	—.5
Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA)	—3.0
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)	—1.3
National Security Agency (NSA)	—10.8
Director, Test and Evaluation, Defense	—2.0

Basis for Committee Action

The Committee believes that while the proposed fiscal year 1975 RDT&E program for each activity lies within the framework of RDT&E, their efforts reflect more product improvement than RDT&E per se. There are relatively few new initiatives presented in the fiscal year 1975 programs. The majority of the programs are continuing efforts from fiscal year 1974.

For the above reasons, the Committee recommends retaining the fiscal year 1974 funding level plus a reasonable escalation factor. The reductions are to be taken on a program priority basis.

Special Considerations

Naval Gunfire

The committee recommends that the following restrictive language be included in the authorization act to prevent funds authorized for this purpose from being reprogrammed to other requirements.

> "of which $57,500,000 shall be available only for application to surface naval gunnery (excluding the Close-In Weapon System), including gun fire control systems, gun mounts, unguided and guided ordnance, and fuzing;"

The committee has been concerned over the status of the Surface Fleet Gun Systems. The majority of the gun systems in the present Fleet were developed 20 or more years ago. They are being installed on some of the Navy's newer platforms. The committee questions the ability of the naval gun to perform its intended mission. Gun programs have been deemphasized over recent years in favor of missile programs. The committee is not satisfied with the demonstrated progress in several gun programs for which funding has been requested. The Mark 68 Gunfire Control System improvement program is an example. Since the Chief of Naval Operations issued a directive in 1971 to improve the 5″/54 gun system, there has been relatively little progress shown. The program has been faced with funding and administrative problems that preclude the total system improvements required to enhance its performance. Efforts have been directed

toward improving the system's target tracking capability, but the improved system will still lack an adequate detection, designation system required to improve its reaction time. The improved system, until recently, was being designed around the antiquated Mark 47 Analog Computer. Within a three year period over $1 million was expended on this unfruitful effort. There are over 100 Mark 68 Gunfire Control Systems in the present Fleet. Many of these ships will remain in the Fleet over the foreseeable future. The committee believes that in light of the extensive population, the system's performance must be improved, or the system must be replaced.

The Surface Fleet contains many other World War II vintage gun systems. Unfortunately, there are relatively few World War II vintage targets left for them to encounter. Millions of dollars are spent each year to maintain these systems for which there is no return on the investment. The development of a lightweight modular fire control system is essential as a replacement for these systems and will certainly improve the Navy logistic support posture; yet, the Navy has deferred the effort after requesting funding for its initiation.

Newer technology programs, such as guided ordnance and the 8" Major Caliber Lightweight Gun can provide a significant increase in the effectiveness of naval gunnery. The newer missile systems are characterized by their high cost of expendables. Gun systems present much lower expendable costs. The Surface Fleet requires the combination of both missiles and guns, integrated as a combat system, to carry out its intended mission.

The committee believes that the lessons learned in Southeast Asia dictate the need for increased fire power. This belief, coupled with the fact that the Navy has been using the gun programs as a source of revenue for other requirements, is the basis for this restrictive language. The committee urges the Navy to take a more systems oriented approach in both the improvement and development programs.

Trident

While the Committee did not recommend a reduction in the funding for the Trident Missile, it is concerned with the Navy's management of the program. The Committee was not satisfied with the Navy testimony concerning the cost of the motors for the combined three stages for the C-4 Missile. The Director, Research and Engineering, now forecasts a 72% increase over the pre-award estimates. This sizable increase in less than a one-year period leads the Committee to suspect possible irregularities in the procurement process. For this reason the Committee has referred the matter to its Investigating Subcommittee. The Navy is directed to provide the entire procurement data package, including the original request for proposal, specifications, evaluation criteria, weighting factors, and all other related correspondence, documentation and information, to this Committee within 30 days following the date of this report.

Binary Chemical Munitions

The Committee received extensive testimony concerning RDT&E of the binary chemical weapons. A binary munition differs from a conventional munition in that it produces a nerve gas by combining two nontoxic elements only after the weapon is on its way to the

target. The Army contends that the pacing factor in the development of the system is the need for modernization of the chemical deterrent/retalitory stockpile. The binary system offers the advantages of improved safety during production, transportation and storage and relaxes the requirements for high cost toxic production facilities.

The adversaries of the binary chemical munitions program contend that continued RDT&E in this area is affecting the progress of the arms control and disarmament negotiations. A second argument is that binary munitions are not, in fact, a deterrent.

The Committee believes research establishing a credible deterrent chemical warfare capability should be continued until effective agreements are reached. This recommendation is based on new advances and developments made in this area by our potential adversaries.

Surface Effect Ships

The Committee questioned the Navy's original plan to proceed with the development of the 2,000-ton prototype in light of the lessons learned with the smaller craft. The Committee concurs with the Navy's decision to restructure the program with emphasis on component development and testing and the solution of engineering problems.

The Committee questioned the Navy's plan to proceed with the 2,000-ton prototype program in light of the lessons learned with the smaller craft. The Committee concurs with the Navy's decision to restructure the program with emphasis on component development and testing and the solution of engineering problems.

The Navy is requested to keep the Committee apprised of new developments, either positive or negative, during the coming year. The Navy is advised to inform the Committee of any plans relating to the procurement of the 2,000-ton prototype prior to the award of contract.

SUMMARY BY BUDGET ACTIVITY

The Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation authorization request is presented in eight budget activities as summarized below.

FISCAL YEAR 1975 R.D.T. & E. REQUEST—BY BUDGET ACTIVITY

[In thousands of dollars]

	Committee recommendation		
	Request	Change	Amount
1. Military sciences	[1] 443,652	−6,600	437,052
2. Aircraft and related equipment	1,829,318	−39,500	1,789,818
3. Missiles and related equipment	2,352,993	−188,571	2,164,422
4. Military astronautics and related equipment	527,248	−10,500	516,748
5. Ships, small craft, and related equipment	727,505	−3,000	724,505
6. Ordnance, combat vehicles, and related equipment	512,906	−24,676	488,230
7. Other equipment	2,095,385	−44,900	2,050,485
8. Programwide management and support	836,032	−5,629	830,403
Total R.D.T. & E.	9,325,039	−323,376	9,001,663

[1] Includes $2,570,000 for Navy Special foreign currency program.

The following discussion highlights the FY 1975 RDT&E program by budget activity.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE FISCAL YEAR 1975 R.D.T. & E. BUDGET ACTIVITIES

1. Military Sciences

This budget activity consists primarily of research and exploratory development directed toward increasing knowledge and understanding in those fields relating to long term national security needs. Exploratory development is directed toward the solution of specific military problems, short of major development projects. The major program under this activity, Defense Research Sciences, provides for basic research in mathematics, physics, chemistry, electronics, materials mechanics, energy conversion, atmospheric sciences, and other related disciplines so directed as to search out, assess and commence active exploitation of scientific opportunities that appear to offer solutions to Army, Navy, and Air Force technological needs. This budget activity supports work conducted in universities, non-profit institutions, and the in-house laboratories. The in-house laboratory independent research provides the principal means for laboratories to stimulate original work in science and technology related to the interest of each Service. Objectives are to initiate challenging research, capitalize on ideas germinating out of phase with budget cycles, enhance the competence of the in-house laboratories, and attract and retain talented and creative scientists. The output of this research oriented budget activity has produced tangible useable products. The Army developed new organic elastomers for longer wearing, higher temperature oil and grease seal applications. This new seal material is being evaluated for seals for the UH–1 and UTTAS Army helicopters. In the Navy's program, discovery was made of the first known example of a completely shear-repairable drag-reducing polymer for use in non-aqueous systems. This breakthrough shows promise of significantly reducing the power required for recirculating nonaqueous systems such as shipboard turbine lubricating and hydraulic oil systems.

2. Aircraft and Related Equipment

This budget activity supports RDT&E related to aircraft weapon systems, subsystems, and components including exploratory development in a wide variety of supporting technology.

The Army efforts are directed toward insuring an effective airmobile and organic airborne fire support capability on the mid-intensity battlefield.

Major aircraft systems developments and improvements include: development of a new Advanced Attack Helicopter (AAH), a Heavy Lift Helicopter (HLH), and the Utility Tactical Transport Aircraft System (UTTAS).

Supporting developments and application of new and improved techniques are conducted in the areas of: engines and propulsion components; firepower, avionics, survivability, maintainability and air drop/aerial delivery equipment.

For the Navy and Marine Corp, this Budget Activity finances research, development, test and evaluation related to airframes, engines, airborne detection and fire control equipment, aerial targets and

other associated equipments. Some of the more significant efforts in fiscal year 1975 will consist of development effort on several major aircraft types.

The major Navy programs include the F–14A high performance fighter which will be substantially completed in fiscal year 1975. The LAMPS III helicopter effort will continue this year with completion of fabrication of the prototype avionics system.

To explore the potential of V/STOL aircraft for Navy use, there are several advanced development programs underway. These include the Thrust Augmented Wing which the Navy believes holds the most potential for flight deck operations, and at a lower level of effort the Lift plus Lift Cruise concept utilizing dedicated engines to assist in the lift maneuver and a program of upgrading of the engines for the operational AV–8A HARRIER. In fiscal year 1975 the Navy expects to start engineering development of two CH–53E helicopter production prototypes for delivery in early fiscal year 1976. The Navy also planned to initiate efforts in 1975 for three new aircraft concepts, the VFX Advanced Fighter Prototype, intended to replace the F–4 and augment the F–14; the HSX VTOL aircraft, itnended to replace the SH–3 and CH–46 helicopter in the early mid-1980s; and the VCX advanced COD aircraft which is intended to replace the C–2. The Committee recommended deletion of all funds requested for the VFX Advanced Fighter Prototype.

The Air Force program includes the cost for the "International Fighter Aircraft" which will provide an air superiority capability for South Vietnam, Taiwan, South Korea and the other allies; the A–10 aircraft which will provide more accurate and timely fire support for ground troops than is being provided by current aircraft; the F–15 which is an all weather air superiority fighter capable of engaging and destroying any known aircraft; the B–1, a long-range strategic bomber to replace the present B–52 aircraft, which will include the latest technology to permit it to penetrate all known or contemplated defenses; Advanced Medium STOL Transport Prototype which will demonstrate applicable new technology for possible modernization of the tactical airlift force in the early eighties; and the Lightweight Fighter Prototype (Advanced and Engineering Development). The fiscal year 1975 request also provided funding for the Aerospace, Flight Dynamics, Biotechnology, Propulsion and Avionics Exploratory Development Laboratories.

3. Missiles and Related Equipment

Included in the Army activity is the SAFEGUARD ABM System, Site Defense, and the Ballistic Missile Defense Advanced Technology program. The purpose of this program is to provide qualitative improvement in ballistic missile defense technology and components to cope with the growing spectrum of threats. Also included in this budget activity are the funds needed to support the test and evaluation of weapons systems conducted at Kwajalein and White Sands Missile Ranges. These Army managed national ranges support test programs of all services including the Army's SAFEGUARD, Air Force's MINUTEMAN, the Navy's POLARIS at Kwajalein, and the Air

Force's SRAM and ATHENA, NASA programs, and several Navy tactical missiles at White Sands.

Other Army weapons programs for which significant development funding was requested include: the surface to air missile, SAM–D, which will replace the NIKE HERCULES and HAWK Air Defense Systems; development of a manportable air defense system, STINGER, to replace REDEYE: development of a short range highly mobile all weather air defense missile system (SHORAD) to fill the gap between STINGER and SAM–D; continued development of the terminal homing concept which is directed toward defeating tanks, armored personnel carriers, field fortifications, air defense sites and other point targets.

For the Navy and Marine Corps, the Fiscal Year 1975 request is in support of three major warfare areas—Strategic, Surface, and Air Warfare. The Strategic, contains the largest single Navy program in Fiscal Year 1975—the TRIDENT strategic weapon system. The TRIDENT missile development efforts includes conduct of full scale propulsion tests; continued design release and start of fabrication and assembly of C–4 X–1 missile. Work will also be underway in the other components of the system as well as construction of the explosive handling wharf for the TRIDENT Weapon facility and the TRIDENT training facility.

Another strategic weapon system, the Submarine Launched Cruise Missile, is intended to develop a strategic cruise missile designed for launch from submarine torpedo tubes. In Fiscal Year 1975 beginning with the airframe, the design, testing and demonstration of hardware items will be completed.

The related programs of FBM system, and the FBM command and control programs will also be pursued.

There are several surface warfare related programs in this budget activity—the AEGIS, HARPOON, PHALANX, and the STANDARD missiles. The AEGIS will undergo shipboard at sea evaluation during this year. The HARPOON anti-surface missile, will provide surface ships, submarines, and certain aircraft with a long-range stand-off, all-weather, anti-ship weapon system to counter the Soviet bloc surface navy threat. The Fiscal Year 1975 effort will concentrate on proof of the prototype missile and launch system designs. In addition to the HARPOON, there are other air-to-surface missiles. CONDOR is intended to provide a highly accurate, long-range standoff, air-to-surface missile for use against heavily defended, high value land or sea targets. This missile is now entering Operational Evaluation. The HARM High Speed Anti-Radiation Missile is intended as a follow on of the presently operational SHRIKE and STANDARD ARM Missiles.

The STANDARD MISSILE–2 (SM–2) with its command guidance feature during mid-course flight and a new receiver antenna will begin initial operational test and evaluation during the year. The PHALANX Close-In Weapon System is designed as a fast reaction, last-ditch defense against low-flying, high speed anti-ship missiles penetrating other Fleet defensive envelopes. This system will undergo additional testing during FY 1975.

The Navy request included development of several other air-launched missiles. In the air-to-air missile area there are three on going efforts: SIDEWINDER (AIM–9L), SPARROW (AIM–7F) and the AGILE.

Programs in Exploratory Development advanced technology and related missile developments are also carried out under this activity. The Committee recommended deletion of all funds for the AGILE program.

The Air Force program for fiscal year 1975 provides for the development and test of ballistic and other missiles and related equipment. Included are funds for MINUTEMAN, ABRES (Advanced Ballistic Re-entry System), the Air Launched Cruise Missile, and advanced air-to-air weapon technology. Design and development will continue on the MINUTEMAN Missile Performance Measurement System and in-flight hardness assessment and ground testing will continue. The ABRES provides for the development and test of new techniques in re-entry systems and penetration aids for all Department of Defense ballistic missiles.

The Committee recommended deletion of funds for advanced-air-to-air weapon technology program.

4. Military Astronautics and Related Equipment

The Army funds under this budget activity are for: development of new ground terminals for all Services and subsystems to increase the efficiency and reliability of the world-wide Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS); development of small terminals for tactical application in the field army, which are also compatible with DSCS; and for investigations of navigation by satellite.

The Navy's programs are directed towards the improvement of space technology for military purposes and the development of space vehicles for specific military applications.

The Navy is engaged in the implementation of a satellite communications program to provide essential command and control communications with ships, submarines and aircraft. The Program consists of (1) GAPFILLER leased satellite channels; (2) FLTSATCOM; (3) Super High Frequency (SHF) Shipboard Terminals; and (4) Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) Shore Terminals.

The two projects in the Weather Service program are directed toward the development of a shipboard readout terminal capable of receiving high resolution satellite data from the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program, an Air Force system. Readout equipment planned for ships will provide enroute weather pictures of enormously improved quality.

The program of Satellite Navigation consists of two efforts, NAVSTAR GPS and Expanded TRANSIT. NAVSTAR GPS is the Navy portion of a Joint Service Development Program to evaluate concepts and techniques of an Advanced Satellite Global Positioning System capable of providing very precise positioning information in three dimensions. The Navy effort is devoted to developing technology

satellites participating in joint service common user equipment development and testing and to develop and space-qualify atomic frequency standards. Expanded TRANSIT programs supports the on-going TRANSIT Improvement Program by incorporation of a ranging signal and developing modifications to submarine receivers to receive these signals for quick fixes.

The Space Technology program will develop, launch and demonstrate a satellite system capable of continuous, real-time assessment/prediction of space environment disturbance effects on ionospheric dependent operational systems such as HF communications, HF direction finding and over-the-horizon radar. Two solar radiation monitoring satellites will readout into a ground station from which on-line data processing will enable real-time transmission of space environment disturbance effects to R&D and operational users. The Committee recommended approval of the full amount of the request.

The Air Force program for fiscal year 1975 includes costs for the continuing development of space programs such as Defense Support, Satellite Communications Systems, Space Defense System, Space Surveillance Technology, and NAVSTAR Global Positioning System. The Air Force proposed a new effort, Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile Radar Warning System. The committee recommended deletion of all funds for this new program.

5. Ships, Small Craft, and Related Equipment

For the Navy, this budget activity provides for applied research, development, test and evaluation of ship structures and equipment, including propulsion, communications, navigation and surveillance systems directly affecting ship operations. It includes the design, prototype fabrication and performance evaluation of new types of ship radars and sonars, Electronic Warfare devices, conventional propulsion systems and nuclear propulsion systems.

There are several major ship development programs included in fiscal year 1975.

The TRIDENT Submarine system will develop and deploy a new submarine to enhance survivability and availability of sea-based deterrent systems and augment or replace existing strategic weapons systems. In fiscal year 1975 the Navy expects to complete submarine mockup, final hardware and software design of sonar system, ship control station studies, missile tube prototype, Land Based Evaluation Facility software, factory testing of Defensive Weapon System engineering development model.

Related to TRIDENT is the IMPROVED SSBN. The Navy plans in fiscal year 1975 to initiate development of the conceptual design for a smaller and less capable SSBN than TRIDENT, as a possible complement to the TRIDENT Submarine in providing for replacement of the bulk of our aging SSBNs as they are retired. Characteristics will draw on technology developed in TRIDENT R&D to maximum extent possible.

The Surface Effects Ships—(SES) development program is aimed at expanding the technology to ships of ocean-going size. Phase I of the program, fiscal year 67–73, focused upon the design, development,

construction, and tests of two 100-tons test craft embodying different approaches to the critical technological areas of propulsion, sidewalls and seals, lift systems, and systems for stability and control. The two 100-ton test craft were completed in fiscal year 1972 and have since been undergoing extensive testing. Tests to date have demonstrated the essential validity of the SES concept, and provided verification of the design data base needed for proceeding to larger size ships. The fiscal year 1975 effort will emphasize component development and testing.

The Amphibious Assault Landing Craft Project was established to develop an Amphibious Assault Landing Craft System which will provide an improved capability in ship to shore and over the beach delivery of personnel and equipment. The program has concentrated on the design and construction of two, differently configured, air cushion vehicles (ACV's). Funding from 1971 to 1975 was directed toward prototype construction to specific Navy/Marine operational requirements.

Under NATO, the United States offered to share its hydrofoil technology with other interested nations and took the initiative in planning a cooperative program to meet a common set of performance requirements. In November 1972, a Memorandum of Understanding, covering the Detailed Design and Lead Ship Construction stages of the NATO PHM (Patrol Hydrofoil, Guided Missile) Program, was signed by Italy, Germany, and the United States. In fiscal year 1975 lead ship construction will be completed.

The Advanced Ship Development project provides new ship design for the Navy's Shipbuilding Program in response to new military requirements. Additionally, it includes Advanced Ship Concept Development for ships not yet in the shipbuilding program and development of in-house ship design capabilities. This project was established to support the conceptual phase of new ship development.

New in RDT&E, Navy in FY 1975 is Ship Contract Design. This program was formerly funded under SCN and is part of the design process wherein preliminary design, engineering and planning are expanded to establish the production configuration. It provides the basis for award of a contract for detailed design and construction of one or more ships.

In addition to these programs there are programs which support the development of ships and ship related systems such as propulsion systems, shipboard Radar and Sonar, Navigation and Data processing systems, Surface EW and ASW programs and Exploratory Development and Advanced Technology development efforts.

6. Ordnance, Combat Vehicles, and Related Equipment

This budget activity provides for research and development of weapons and vehicles. The Army program includes field artillery weapons and ammunition, air to surface weapons except missiles, infantry small arms and ammunition, combat vehicles including their integral weapons and ammunition, and nuclear and non-nuclear munitions required for increased combat effectiveness. Additionally tactical vehicles both wheeled and tracked, and amphibious and ground effects

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vehicles for conducting warfare in all conditions of terrain, weather and climate are development under this budget activity.

The principal fiscal year 1975 programs in this budget activity are the XM–1 Tank, the Mechanized Infantry Combat Vehicles, the XM204 Towed 105mm Howitzer, the XM198 Towed 155mm Howitzer, High Energy Lasers, and Scatterable Mines. The XM1 will have better armor to reduce its vulnerability and a better track, suspension and powerplant will increase its cross-country mobility, speed and agility, thus providing the Army with a superior tank. The Mechanized Infantry Combat Vehicle, which will replace the M113 in selected units, will have increased effectiveness in cross-country mobility, ballistic protection, and improved stabilized weaponization. The range of the new howitzers is signficantly greater than that of the weapons they will replace.

High energy chemical lasers have the greatest energy per weight potential of any known laser but the technology is the least advanced; this program will address the technology of high energy chemical lasers. The chemical weapons system under development represent a modernization program which will insure compatibility of chemical munitions with the new family of artillery tubes and are intended to replace the non-binary chemical deterrent-retaliatory stockpile necessary to hte support of national policy. In the area of mines, the primary effort is developing delivery systems for a variety of mines.

Ordnance and related equipment:
NAVY (including Marine Corps) ---------- $92,335,000

For the Navy this Budget Activity consists of weapons systems not including aircraft, ships or missiles which provide the Navy and Marine Corps forces with their strike capability as well as a defensive capability.

In FY 1975, the Navy plans to complete TECH/OPEVAL for the ASW mine CAPTOR. CAPTOR is a mine which launches a MK–46 torpedo against submerged submarines while rejecting surface targets.

The MK–48 Torpedo entered the production stage in FY 72. Additional tasks requirements were identified during OPEVAL and Fleet introduction and remain to be accomplished. These efforts are supported in this Budget Activity in FY 1975.

In the Exploratory Development effort under Ordnance, efforts are directed toward the development of the technology of undersea weapons, including torpedoes, mines, warheads, fuzes, explosives, propellants, guidance, fire control—systems and components.

There are three projects under Gun Systems in FY 1975. However, the major effort is development of the Lightweight Intermediate Caliber Gun, an extremely light weight, automatic, high rate of fire gun system for fast patrol craft, hydrofoils, SES, and other light displacement ships.

There are also several Fire Control Systems or improvements to fire control systems pursued under this activity. The largest effort in FY 1975 is devoted to the 8″/55 caliber MK–71 Lightweight Gun developed for use aboard destroyer-size ships to perform the naval gunfire support and anti-ship missions. The Gun was designed, fabricated, assembled and tested as a 175mm/60 caliber gun. It was converted to

8″/55 caliber and successfully completed an Operational Evaluation ashore. In fiscal year 1975 the Navy will conduct at-sea technical and operational evaluations.

Marine Corps Ordnance efforts are devoted to such programs as LVTP–7 product improvement, a shoulder-Launched Multi-purpose Assault weapon, encapsulated flame rounds and Laser Homing Ordnance.

The Air Force program provides for the research, development and test of weapons and munitions. Included are funds to continue development of the 30mm gun for air-to-ground operations. Also included are programs to develop more effective conventional bombs, fuses, dispensers and weapon guidance systems. This activity also provides funding for the Air Force Weapons and Armament Exploratory Development Laboratories.

7. Other Equipment

This activity provides for research, development, and evaluation of equipment not separately provided for under other activities. The Army program covers cover a broad range of items including communication-electronics, battlefield cover and deception, chemical warfare defense equipment, biological defense equipment, combat support equipment such as night vision devices, counterbattery and countermortar radars, fuel cells, combat feeding, clothing items and training devices. Testing provides for the all important test activities of the Army R&D program. The TRI-TAC program will develop a new multichannel tactical communications system for the services.

Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Night Observation is an Army program to manage all development in this high priority area; the STANO programs consists of the development of night vision devices, special purpose detectors, radar and ground sensors. The night vision program is oriented toward improving night vision devices to enhance the soldier's effectiveness during darkness. Counterbattery and countermortar radars are being developed to provide timely and accurate location of hostile artillery and mortar positions.

The bulk of the Navy Exploratory Development Program is funded in this Budget Activity. The Navy has restructured Exploratory Development (Category 6.2) to be more compatible with the structures used by Army and Air Force. As a result, the FY 1975 budget request includes 19 program elements for Exploratory Development (as opposed to 7 in FY 1974) and Exploratory Development now appears in 5 separate Budget Activities with 13 in Budget Activity 7. Previously all elements were in Budget Activity 7. Exploratory Development is conducted in such areas as Undersea Target Surveillance and Surface and Aerospace Target Surveillance, Logistics Technology, Energy and Environmental Protection Technology, and Laboratory Independent Exploratory Development.

In addition to important Advanced and Engineering Development efforts in Undersea Surveillance and Aerospace Ocean Surveillance, the major portion of the Navy's Oceanographic R&D program and several Marine Corps programs are carried out under this Budget Activity.

The primary Air Force area funded in this activity is command and control. For fiscal year 1975 this includes the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) which will provide the Air Defense and Tactical Forces with the means for detecting and engaging enemy aircraft. The Advanced Airborne Command Post will provide the National Command Authority with a significantly increased capability over the present EC–135 aircraft to command and control the armed forces during periods of emergency. Many other development tasks in such areas as communications; electronic countermeasures; reconnaissance; surveillance; and traffic control approach and landing are included in this budget activity. This activity also provides funding for the Ground Electronics and Human Resources Exploratory Development Laboratories.

8. Programwide Management and Support

This Activity provides for those costs of operation, management and maintenance of Research, Development, Test and Evaluation facilities which are not distributed directly to other activities. There is a net increase in fiscal year 1975 over the amount budgeted for fiscal year 1974 in this Budget Activity. The primary reason for the change is the new Defense Department uniform funding policy for use at various designated Test and Evaluation activities. The new policy directs that all the cost of retaining and operating the T&E support activity which could not be directly attributed to the benefiting users would be consolidated in a single, separately identified budget line, or program element, aggregating groups of T&E support activities, and these indirect costs would be financed on an institutional basis. The new policy required a recomputation by all the Services of the total costs associated with the T&E operation, a redetermination of the distribution of these costs to both customers and institutional funding sources and a shifting of funds from various institutional support budget lines into program (customer) budget lines—both intra- and inter-service. The amount budgeted for Test and Evaluation Support contains funds formerly included in other appropriations of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force.

For the Army, this activity includes the general and administrative RDT&E expenses at major command headquarters (except Department of the Army Headquarters); operation and maintenance of selected general purpose RDT&E activities; minor construction (less than $50,000) and special purpose equipment benefiting more than one RDT&E project; cost associated with international cooperative research and develpoment with allied nations; effort for continued improvement of technical information activities required for the general support of the RDT&E program, and long-term training of Army RDT&E civilian employees.

Some Navy programs supported under this activity are AUTEC, the Marine Corps Development Center, NARL Pt. Barrow, Alaska, ASMD Test Range and the USS HIPPOCKET program.

The committee recommended deletion of all funds required for the USS HIPPOCKET program.

For the Air Force, this activity provides for pay of civilian personnel, travel expenses, supplies and equipment for such installations as

the Space and Missile Test Center, Vandenberg AFB, California; Flight Test Center, Edwards AFB, California; Armament Development Test Center, Eglin AFB, Florida; Aeronautical Systems Division, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio; Space and Missile Systems Organization, Inglewood, California; and HQ Air Force Systems Command, Andrews AFB, Maryland.

TITLE III—ACTIVE FORCES

The Department of Defense requested an authorized end strength for active duty personnel in each component of the Armed Services for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1974 and ending June 30, 1975, as follows:

(1) The Army, 785,000;
(2) The Navy, 540,380;
(3) The Marine Corps, 196,398;
(4) The Air Force, 630,345.

The committee recommends the following authorized end strengths for active duty personnel in each component of the Armed Services for fiscal year 1975 as follows:

(1) The Army, 785,000;
(2) The Navy, 540,380;
(3) The Marine Corps, 196,398;
(4) The Air Force, 627,535.

This represents an end strength of 2,149,313. This is 40,589 fewer personnel than were authorized for fiscal year 1974. It is 2,810 less than requested by the Department of Defense for fiscal 1975. To put these figures in perspective, the recommended end strength is:

—538,000 lower than the strength at the end of fiscal year 1964, the last pre-Vietnam year;
—1,399,000 lower than fiscal year 1968, the peak of the Vietnam War;
—84,000 lower than the fiscal year 1974 strength requested in the President's budget submitted to the Congress in January, 1973.

The end strength for fiscal year 1975 marks the arrival of the "base line force," the minimum force that the President and the Secretary of Defense consider necessary to carry out national security objectives.

Manpower end strength levels can only be meaningful when viewed in terms of our national security objectives established by the President and the Congress. Basically they are: to preserve the United States as a free and independent nation, to safeguard its fundamental institutions and values, and to contribute to the security of other nations with whom we have treaties or whose security impacts upon our own security.

The rationale for the committee action on the strengths recommended is summarized below.

Army Active Duty Strength

With Authorization and Appropriations Committee cuts, the end strength for the Army for fiscal year 1974 is established at 782,000. For fiscal year 1975 the Army has asked, and the committee has recommended, a 3,000 increase in manpower working toward a goal of 13⅓ divisions in fiscal year 1975 as contrasted with a 13-division force

in fiscal year 1974. Army Chief of Staff General Creighton Abrams stated that his goal was 14 divisions by the end of fiscal year 1975. It now seems apparent that this increase in combat forces is feasible and will be a reality, due largely to effective management of the Army structure by selective reductions in support activities.

Requirements as established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff state there is a need for 30 divisions in the Army to operate within a margin of safety. Today, we have 13 Active and 8 Reserves Divisions. This force level has been characterized as a prudent risk. By 1980 it is the Army's intention to have 16 divisions in the Active Force within the manning level of 785,000. This is not to indicate that all of the divisions will be structured in exactly the same manner; however, the planned increase of 9 maneuver battalions is evidence of an increase in our combat teeth and a shortening of the support tail.

Navy Active Duty Strength

The Navy's recommended end strength is 540,380, a reduction of approximately 10,700 from their fiscal year 1974 appropriated end strength. This reduction occurs over a time frame during which the total number of ships has increased by four, including one aircraft carrier. This reduction is primarily in the Central Support Forces and Individuals account. This number is the lowest in 29 years, and is the base point from which the Navy will expand to accept the approximately 38 new ships coming into the inventory over the next five years. It represents the Navy's estimate of the lowest acceptable manpower level. With this authorization, the number of structure positions for ship and squadron manning in fleet units will be 5 percent below that specified on unit documents.

The Marine Corps request, which the committee recommends for authorization, is 384 people more than end fiscal year 1974. This number is attributed to a request by the State Department to increase embassy guards by 438.

Air Force Active Duty Strength

In the Air Force, we see the greatest change from fiscal year 1974's end strength figures. The service has requested a level of 630,345 people, a reduction of 15,075 from this year's end strength. This is a self-imposed reduction of approximately 2½ percent in end strength. To place it in perspective, it also represents the seventh consecutive year in which this manpower figure has declined. Air Force Under Secretary Plummer testified that the bulk of these reductions result from headquarters cutbacks and reductions in certain additional areas, such as a 5 percent decrease in strategic forces and a 10 percent decrease in auxiliary forces.

The committee has recommended an authorized end strength of 627,535, a reduction of 2,810. This reduction is warranted because of testimony presented during our hearings that, in fact, certain roles in the strategic airlift mission could be withdrawn from the Active Forces and given to the Air Force Reserve, with the resultant decrease in active personnel and an overall annual cost savings of approximately $31 million. The committee was careful to determine whether this readjustment would cause any problem in the overall readiness of our airlift capabilities and was convinced no such problem would occur.

Overall then, the Total Active Force recommended for fiscal year 1974 is 40,589 less than the Congress authorized last year.

The All-Volunteer Force

Last year in its Report on the Authorization Bill, the Committee stated:

> There is considerable question as to whether the All-Volunteer Force can meet the military manpower requirements both qualitatively and quantitatively over the critical years ahead.

During the year that has passed since we issued that report, there is no reason to change the opinion.

Year-to-Date Recruiting Results by Service

During the first nine months of the fiscal year the four Military Services had achieved 93 percent of their cumulative recruiting objectives. The following table shows the year-to-date performance by Service:

RECRUITING RESULTS—ALL SOURCES, YEAR-TO-DATE, FISCAL YEAR 1974

[In thousands]

	Program objective July–March	Actual	Percent of objective
Army	159	142	89
Navy	66	65	98
Marine Corps	43	39	91
Air Force	57	57	100
Total, DOD	325	303	93

Enlistments by Source

The number of non-prior-service men enlisted was 27,050 or 95 percent of the Services' March objective; the number of non-prior-service women was 2,260 or 100 percent of the objective; and the number of prior-service personnel was 2,420 or about 117 percent of the objective. The following table shows the distribution of March enlistments by source:

RECRUITING RESULTS BY SOURCE

	March			February percent objective
	Program objective	Actual	Percent objective	
Nonprior service:				
Men	28,410	27,050	95	95
Women	2,260	2,260	100	91
Prior service	2,070	2,420	117	110
Total, DOD	32,740	31,730	97	95

Total Military Strength by Service

The total DoD military strength was about 1 percent below the strength level planned at the end of February, as shown in the follow-

ing table. The Navy shortfall reflects a continuing problem in strength accounting rather than a failure to meet recruiting objectives. A total of 8,800 enlisted losses resulted from a careful review of actual strength on hand. The Navy is striving to make up the difference before year-end through over-delivery against its recruiting goals:

STATUS OF MILITARY STRENGTH BY SERVICE

[In thousands]

	End of February				June 1974 current objective [1]
	Objective [1]	Actual	Shortfall	Percent	
Army	785	784	1	1	782
Navy	561	550	11	2	551
Marine Corps	192	192	0	0	196
Air Force	673	669	4	1	645
Total DOD	2,211	2,195	16	1	2,174

[1] February strength objectives reflect the lowered strength objectives for the end of the fiscal year which were announced in January and which resulted from congressional action on the fiscal year 1974 budget request. Program adjustments were made in late January.

Non-Prior-Service Enlistments, Men and Women, by Service

During March the Services achieved the following results against their non-prior-service objectives for men and women:

NONPRIOR SERVICE RECRUITING RESULTS

	March			February percent objective	Year to date percent objective
	Program objective	Actual	Percent objective		
MEN					
Army	14,000	12,190	87	87	86
Navy	5,300	5,250	99	100	97
Marine Corps	3,800	4,240	112	106	93
Air Force	5,310	5,370	101	101	100
Total DOD	28,410	27,050	95	95	92
WOMEN					
Army	1,200	1,210	101	84	104
Navy	440	430	98	97	107
Marine Corps	110	100	91	113	99
Air Force	510	510	100	100	99
Total DOD	2,260	2,250	100	91	103

Mental Groupings: High School Graduates

In March about 91% of all non-prior-service enlistees were in Mental Categories I through III, which are the average and above average mental groups; only 9% were in Mental Category IV, the below-average group. High School graduates amounted to 62% of enlistments; this is unchanged from February and is more favorable than seasonal trends.

The data for July-March is shown in the following table along with the March results:

HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES AND MENTAL GROUPINGS (NONPRIOR-SERVICE MEN AND WOMEN)

	High school graduates			Mental Groups, I, II, III[1]		
	March		Year to date (percent)	March		Year to date (percent)
	Number	Percent		Number	Percent	
Army	7,760	58	54	11,390	85	82
Navy	3,420	60	71	5,480	96	97
Marine Corps	1,520	35	48	4,010	92	92
Air Force	5,400	92	94	5,850	99	99
Total DOD	18,100	62	65	26,730	91	90

[1] Above average and average categories.

April Objectives

The Services' manpower programs for April called for the following enlistment objectives from all sources:

Army	15,600
Navy	4,580
Marine Corps	3,750
Air Force	5,380
Total DOD	29,310

In addition to these program objectives the Navy is seeking 810 extended active duty reserve enlistments; 1,670 additional regular force enlistments because of revised loss estimates, and the Marine Corps is seeking 980 additional enlistments to offset previous recruiting shortfalls.

Reserve Components

The total selected reserve strength increased in February for the fifth consecutive month with the two National Guard Components, and the Air Force Reserve showing net gains. Although non-prior-service enlistments for all reserve components are lower than the objectives for the year to date, the shortfalls have been partially offset by successes in recruiting prior-service enlisted personnel:

FISCAL YEAR 1974 SELECTED RESERVE STRENGTHS[1]

[In thousands]

	ARNG	USAR	USNR	USMCR	ANG	USAFR	DOD total
Authorized end strength	412.0	260.6	116.9	39.5	92.5	51.5	973.0
Actual:							
June 30, 1973	385.6	235.5	126.2	37.5	90.4	43.8	919.0
Sept. 30, 1973	384.9	231.5	119.1	35.3	90.5	43.3	904.6
Dec. 31 1973	392.5	227.2	119.1	33.1	92.5	46.2	910.6
Jan. 31, 1974	396.4	227.7	117.8	32.4	92.9	46.6	913.8
Feb. 28, 1974	403.1	226.9	114.9	32.2	93.1	47.6	917.8
Change from previous month	+6.7	−.8	−2.9	−.2	+.2	+1.0	+4.0
Net short/over authorized end strength	−8.9	−33.7	−2.0	−7.3	+.6	−3.9	−55.2
Percent short/over	−2.2	−12.9	−1.7	−18.5	+.7	−7.6	−5.7

[1] Unaudited preliminary reports from services.

The current shortfall in personnel strength is presently projected to be 10,000 for the Army, 6,000 for the Navy and 6,000 to 12,000 in the Marine Corps. One of the reasons for this shortfall was the requirement that 55 percent of the new accessions into each Service were required to be high school graduates. This posed no problem for the Air Force and the Navy where the percentage of high school graduates during the first half of Fiscal Year 1974 were 96 percent and 73 percent respectively. However, the Army was able to obtain only 54 percent and the Marine Corps 51 percent high school graduates during the same period.

This committee is interested in seeing the quality of the Services maintained and improved. But, we do not agree with those who urge this 55 percent of non-prior accessions must be of high school graduates in order to maintain quality. It means that the services have to turn away non-high school graduates who would make good soldiers and marines.

Another measurement of potential quality is by mental categories. In Service testings, people are placed in categories I through V. Category III represents the average with Category I being the highest mental grouping and Category V the lowest. Category V personnel are not permitted to join the Services. During the first half of Fiscal Year 1974 89 percent of all new entrants into the Service were in mental Categories III and above. This compares with 85 percent in these categories in 1964, a pre-Vietnam year. By Service, the Army has 81 percent in category III or above which is comparable to what they were achieving in 1964. The Navy is at 97 percent and the Marine Corps at 95 percent both of which are above the pre-Vietnam level. The Air Force has 99 percent in Category III or above which is also above the pre-Vietnam level.

Frankly, the committee believes the test for entry should be trainability rather than the completion of high school. And, the Services have developed the criteria to determine such trainability.

Committee Comment

Despite the shortfalls, it is still too early to predict with any degree of accuracy the results of the effort to achieve an All-Volunteer Force. The committee does view with some alarm, however, that the Army and the Marine Corps continue to fall below their accession goals, particularly in the area of non-prior accessions. These shortfalls are producing a lack of readiness in the respective Services. The condition will become worse in fiscal year 1975 as the last draftees leave the service by December, 1974.

Despite the difficulties in recruitment and the shortfalls, the committee recommends authorization of the numbers delivered to be the minimum required in order to permit the Services to accomplish their assigned missions. We reject the idea of ceilings based upon our projection of their recruiting capability. The Committee applauds the efforts of the Secretary of Defense in reducing headquarters staffing both within the Department of Defense and the various services and transferring the personnel to combat units so as to increase the readiness of forces.

TITLE IV—RESERVE FORCES

The committee recommends that for fiscal year 1975 the Selected Reserve of each Reserve Component of the Armed Forces be programed to attain an average strength of not less than the following:

(1) The Army National Guard of the United States, 408,000.
(2) The Army Reserve, 225,000.
(3) The Naval Reserve, 117,000.
(4) The Marine Corps Reserve, 38,000.
(5) The Air National Guard of the United States, 95,000.
(6) The Air Force Reserve, 51,319.
(7) The Coast Guard Reserve, 11,700.

Total, Selected Reserve Force. 946,019.

This represents 22,086 more than were authorized for fiscal year 1974 and 53,953 more than were originally requested by the Department of Defense for fiscal year 1975. However, during hearings on the Reserve Components, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs revised the DoD request upward by 41,734.

To put this matter in perspective, the starting point must be the authorization request for fiscal year 1974. Congress was requested to and did authorize the average strength for the Selected Reserve at a figure approximately 66,000 less than was authorized for fiscal year 1973. The committee, at that time, did not believe the strengths authorized were adequate for mission requirements but felt there was no need to mandate a floor for the Reserves which, we then believed, was impossible of accomplishment. The recruiting capability of the Guard and Reserves has been grossly underestimated and the total in the Selected Reserves is now 4,309 more than were authorized for fiscal year 1974. It appears there was initial difficulty in determining the appropriate level of strength to be authorized for the Reserve Components for three principal reasons:

1. The inability or reluctance of the Department of Defense to define the specific application of the force structure reductions proposed for the Army National Guard and Reserve;
2. The erroneous projections of attainable end fiscal year 1974 strengths and the resulting low average strengths requested for fiscal year 1975;
3. The dichotomy between the Secretary's stated Total Force Policy and the force structure actions which would eliminate Guard and Reserve units while maintaining more expensive active forces units.

Uncertainty in DoD Reserve Strength Estimates

As to the force reductions in the Army components, Defense analysts had proposed an arbitrary strength cut of 48,000 structure spaces in the Army National Guard and Army Reserve with no clear conception of what units or types of units were to be eliminated. This action was taken concurrently with the Defense Secretary's direction of a study to determine the proper distribution of active force, Guard and Reserve structure within the Total Force. The committee supports neither the arbitrary aspects of this procedure nor the strategy of withholding the details of the decision during the hearings. Furthermore, the committee is of the opinion that, since we have not yet received a statement of

specific units to be eliminated, we cannot respond favorably to the Secretary's Army Guard and Reserve proposal. To do so would rely solely on the personal credibility of the Defense analysts—credibility which is questionable in view of some of the proposed alternatives such as elimination of one division and further degradation of the already markedly limited antiaircraft capability.

As to strength projections, the Reserve Component budget strength requests were based to a large extent on erroneous estimates of what Reserve strengths would be at this time without improvement in recruiting effort and capability.

The Congress has repeatedly endorsed and supported the concept of genuine application and use of the National Guard and Reserve to product greater effectiveness and economy in the Total Force. This committee reaffirms its belief in this concept and applauds the Secretary of Defense on his statement that Total Force is no longer a concept but a firm policy. However, the committee finds disturbing evidence that implementation of the Total Force Policy is inconsistent with its stated objectives and that compliance with Congressional intent in the pasage of P.L. 90–168 has been less than complete.

The proposed elimination of some of the most highly qualified units of the Selected Reserve appears to have been a judgmental and tactical error. It is difficult to reconcile retention of units in the Active Force and the elimination of less expensive Air National Guard units with proved ability to accomplish the same mission with a policy which embodies maintaining capability at less cost through effective use of Guard and Reserve sources.

This year the original request was for a Selected Reserve Force of 892,927 or a reduction of 31,927 from that which was authorized last year. In a second apearance before the committee, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs said that DoD had underestimated the recruiting capability in the Reserve and that if he were building the budget today he "would request a higher level of strength, and that level would be much closer to the theoretical target." When asked for specific recommendations based on mission requirements for Reserve Components, the Secretary replied as follows:

> I would put in 408,000 for the Army National Guard; 217,000 for the Army Reserve; 108,000 for the Naval Reserve; 38,000 for the Marine Corps Reserve; 98,000 for the Air National Guard; and, 53,000 for the Air Force Reserves. That totals 922,000." (It should be noted this figure does not take into consideration the 11,700 request for the Coast Guard.)

When asked for the reasoning behind this new recommendation, the Secretary replied:

> The figure that I gave you are the theoretical manning level requirements of the force structure. In other words, in the case of the Army National Guard, for example, the total of TOE structure spaces is 426,000 spaces. We man the units in the Army National Guard in peacetime at an average level of 96 percent of TOE. Some units are manned at 100 percent and some at 90 percent. The manning level determination is made by the Army in connection with readiness requirements. The

96 percent average figure produces an authorized manning level of about 408,000. So we are not increasing the structure of the Reserve Components; only building up to the manpower levels that the structure calls for, consistent with readiness requirements.

The committee accepted the revised recommendations for the Reserve Forces except as they pertained to the Army Reserve, Naval Reserve and Air National Guard. However, in a third appearance before the committee, the Secretary again revised his previously revised strength figures for the Air Force Reserve to that originally requested. This change was made because of the failure in accounting procedure to show that the Air Force Reserve was nearly 5,000 below the strength authorized for fiscal year 1974. Thus, he believed the Air Force Reserve would be unable to recruit the necessary personnel to attain the 53,000 average strength that he had previously requested. The committee agreed to recommend a strength figure of 51,319 as originally requested by the Department of Defense.

Committee Additions: Army Reserve

Now to look at the areas where the committee recommends strength levels higher than the revised request:

In the Army Reserve Program where the committee increased the numbers beyond the revised request of the Secretary, Lieutenant General John J. Hennessy, Chief of the Army Reserve Components, testified that the structure strength for the Army Reserves has been established for the present time at approximately 276,000. Using the 93 percent manning figures, a figure which has been used over the past several years, this would result in a desired strength of 260,000. This contrasts to the committee recommendation of 225,000. There are ongoing studies both in the Army and DoD regarding the Reserve program. In DoD, the study embraces the roles and missions of the Reserves in the Total Force Policy. The study will be completed in August, 1974. Currently, an Army study indicates that revised missions to be assigned to the Army National Guard and Army Reserve will increase the structure by 25,000 spaces.

The Secretary of Defense has proposed that those in the Civil Affairs Units be transferred to a Category D status, thus entitling them to pay only for the two weeks of training when they attend summer camps. The committee agrees with the Secretary that a structure of 7,000 in 53 Civil Affairs Units is excessive but disagrees that all such members be transferred to a Category D status. We believe a more logical solution to the problem to be retention of approximately one half of these individuals in a Category A status and retention of approximately one half of the units. At the present time, many persons believe that if we have another war, it will be a short one and there won't be time to assemble and train personnel to accomplish the Civil Affairs' functions.

Thus, we recommend 225,000 as the minimum number required for the Army Reserves in fiscal year 1975. This contrasts to the figure of 232,951 authorized for fiscal year 1974 and to the current on-board strength of 226,623.

Naval Reserve

Insofar as the Naval Reserve is concerned, the committee is recommending an average strength of 117,000. This is in contrast to the 119,231 authorized for fiscal year 1974. The strength requested was 108,000. This request, as testified to by Admiral Cooper, Chief of Naval Reserve, is insufficient to meet mission requirements. The Chief of Naval Personnel told the subcommittee the Navy reduced the Naval Reserve by ". . . about 4,200 people . . . in order to make more funds available to purchase . . . equipment for the readiness centers." The additional 5,000 reduction was imposed by the Department of Defense. Admiral Bagley stated that the size of the Naval Reserves has now been structured in terms of augmentation for a Korea- or Vietnam-size contingency rather than on requirements for World War II-type mobilization which had been the case in the past. When questioned on requirements as to whether it was a safe assumption to build our Reserve Forces only to cope with a Korea or Vietnam conflict, rather than on a larger conflict in which we might possibly be involved, Admiral Cooper responded:

> I think that there has to be a compromise between the two, because we haven't got and we could not get the assets into the Naval Reserve as we currently exist to satisfy the requirements of either of the two.

Then he stated that he, as Chief of the Naval Reserve, was unable to tell the committee what the basis was for the 108,000 request but that he would like to see a strength figure ". . . somewhere in the vicinity of 117,000." The members of the committee were convinced that the 108,000 requested was too low to meet mission requirements and was based primarily on budgetary considerations. Therefore, the committee recommends a strength for the Naval Reserve in the numbers of 117,000—the approximate number now in the Naval Reserve.

Air National Guard

The Air National Guard program is much more difficult. The original request was based on a Secretary of Defense decision to phase out 14 flying units in fiscal year 1975 and fiscal year 1976 of the Air National Guard which had as its principal mission the Air Defense Mission in the United States.

The Secretary of Defense made this determination based on his belief that the United States cannot afford to maintain significant Air Defense Forces to defend against strategic bombers when the threat is dominated by large numbers of strategic missiles.

The committee did not concur in this judgment.

During hearings it became obvious the Air Force did not concur.

Air Force witnesses testified that in their opinion the Air Force does not believe there has been any substantial reduction in the Soviet long-range bomber capability. The witness stated:

> The Secretary of Defense now believes that we should postulate a scenario which would involve only intercept and control and warning of U.S. air space. That is to deny to any unwarranted intruder the possibility that he could fly over air space unimpeded. He does not postulate a scenario in which he could expect a bomber only attack.

But when asked whether, if Congress phased out the interceptor units as suggested by the Secretary, the U.S. would have the ability to insure that no foreign bomber could fly over air space unimpeded, the Air Force witness replied:

> No, sir, we do not.

A member of the committee asked:

> Then there is an inconsistency, isn't there, between what you are required to do and what you are able to do?

The Air Force witness replied:

> Yes sir. What we would look for is the retention of at least the F–101s as an interim measure.

Recognizing the threat is a continuing one, one of the members of the committee summarized the view of all when he stated:

> There has been no basic change in the threat, it's just a change in the decision.

The Under Secretary of the Air Force stated:

> We are concerned over the loss of the affected Air Guard Units. We are concerned over the abrupt loss of 11,726 highly-skilled, well-trained Guardsmen which will affect the morale in other units and have a severe impact on recruiting potential. . . .
>
> A significant delay in Reserve Force modernization has been created by a slowdown in F–15 and A–10 procurement for the active force. This slowdown causes the retention of F–4 and A–7 aircraft in the active force longer than previously programmed, thereby slowing down the transfer of these assets to the Reserve Forces causing retention of F–100 aircraft. Requirements to provide C–130 and A–37 aircraft to the Republic of South Vietnam have also contributed to the slowdown of reequipping Reserve Force units.
>
> The Air Force has substantial shortage of tactical units including Reserve units to satisfy requirements established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to meet wartime requirements, for example, fighter attack and airlift. In finalizing the FY 75 Program and Budget we were unable to find the necessary funds to meet all of the foregoing as well as other priority force requirements.
>
> The Air Force can retain the 14 Air National Guard units and provide interim equipment for them largely by redistribution of aircraft from other Air National Guard units not deactivating. In other words, spread what we have a little thinner. We have not budgeted the military personnel, operations and maintenance and other funds required for the retention of these units.
>
> The best solution to the equipable needs of these units can be found in a combination of additional A–7 and C–130 procurement and an acceleration in the procurement of the F–15 and A–10 so that F–4 and A–7 aircraft can be released earlier from the active force.

The committee reacted to this testimony by putting a floor on the number of flying units in the Air National Guard of the United States at 91. Presently, there are 92 such flying units and two units which are colocated at Van Nuys, California are being combined during the remainder of this fiscal year. This, of course, precludes the Secretary of Defense from deactivating the 5 units during fiscal year 1975 and an additional 9 units in fiscal year 1976. The committee takes the position that the threat has not diminished—but equally important, we cannot afford to lose the trained and capable manpower resources which would be caused by the phase-out of these flying units. It is beyond question that we need more tactical and airlift units in the Air Force inventory. To phase-out capable flying units because their planes are becoming obsolete is, in our opinion, a very shortsighted viewpoint. If we retain a need for flying capability within the Reserve Forces, then ways must be found to provide and preserve such a capability.

If on the other hand the Members of the House of Representatives believe the Secretarial decision is sound, then it is our view that new mission requirements should be assigned—and there is an on-going study within the Air Force concerning missions which could safely be assigned to the Air National Guard.

In mandating the retention of 91 flying units in the Air National Guard, the committee believes this action is consistent with the Department of Defense's objective of increasing dependents on the Reserve Components in implementing the All-Volunteer Force. The committee recognizes that action will require an additional 800 to 900 civilian technicians which were not included in the original budget request and this fact should be borne in mind when the Secretary of Defense allocates the 15,000 reduction in civilian end-strengths. We further recommend that the Appropriations Committee increase the Air Force's original budget request by approximately $15.3 million for Operation and Maintenance and Military Personnel of the Air National Guard and $1,097,000 for Active cost adjustments to support these units.

Equipment for the Reserve

The committee is becoming increasingly concerned over the obsolescence of equipment for the Reserve Forces, particularly in aircraft and tanks. In the aircraft area, as noted earlier in the report the Committee added to the request submitted by the Department of Defense 24A–7D aircraft for direct entry into the Air National Guard of the United States. We will expect that next year and in years to come that the Department of Defense, in implementing the Total Force concept will budget for modernization of equipment in the Reserve Forces.

The committee views, with great concern, the large deficit in the Army Guard and Army Reserve Force tank inventory. Equally alarming is the considerable time that will elapse before the shortages are eliminated, based upon current and future production of M–60 tanks and planning for the XM. It is the committee's understanding that there is a significant potential gain in early operational readiness possible through modification of existing stocks of older, combat capable M48A1 and M48A3 tanks to a M48A5 configuration. A similar conversion was used by the Israeli forces with great success against the Russian T–62 tank.

The conversion provides diesel engine power, fire power upgraded from a 90 to a 105MM gun, improved sighting equipment, modern interoperable communications and rework, and overhaul of the other tank components as necessary to place the whole unit in a first-class combat serviceable condition.

The committee believes that the Department of Defense should give careful consideration to the possibility of reprograming funds in the fiscal year 1975 budget to modernizing existing existing tank inventories in the Reserve Forces or, in the alternative, include a request in the fiscal year 1976 budget for the substantial procurement of new M–60 tanks for exclusive delivery to the Guard and Reserve Forces.

There are other areas of deficiency in equipment for the Reserve Forces which the committee calls to the attention of the Secretary of Defense—the KC–130 aircraft refuelers for the Fourth Marine Air Wing and replacement of the 30 C–118 propeller-driven transport aircraft by twelve more capable fan jet aircraft in the Naval Reserve.

Changes in Reserve Structure

The advent of completely volunteer input into the Reserve Components has made it difficult to attain the basic Selected Reserve strength manning levels authorized each year since enactment of P.L. 90–168. Reorganization and structure adjustments have become confused with recruiting and strength capability for a fiscal year, giving rise to the definite possibility that the Congress may inadvertently, unintentionally, or unknowingly authorize a single Selected Reserve strength number for each Component which in fact permits elimination of significant Reserve Component forces.

The comprehensive hearings and resultant enactment of P.L. 90–168 clearly established that significant changes in Reserve Component strength structure level will not be made without prior and specific approval of the Congress. Accordingly, beginning with FY 1976, the strength authorizations for each Reserve Component should include the three major elements of (1) full TOE, (2) manning level authorization, and (3) strength estimate for the year for apropriation purposes.

Each year the OSD request for strength authorization should specify all three of the pertinent numbers, and specifically address any significant structure or unit changes proposed for the fiscal year within the TOE level. It is the intent of the Committee that units proposed for inactivation be replaced with units needed but either not active or not manned to the maximum feasible extent. Where a net reduction in TOE strength level is proposed, there should also be provided the identification of all units required but not manned and the specific reasons why they are not proposed for substitution.

The provisions herein are intended to insure that the Congressional control gains by P.L. 90–168 are not unintentionally lost.

Action Required to Meet Congressional Intent

Several actions by the Department of Defense are indicated in order to attain compliance with the intent of Congress.

—The Secretary of each Service should assure that his Assistant Secretary for Manpower and Reserve Affairs monitors and supervises all aspects of Reserve force management including

but not limited to manpower requirements and force structure; personnel management and strength; plans, programs and budgets; equipment and logistics support; facilities and construction; training, readiness and mobilization; and management and administration. The Assistant Secretaries would participate actively in the policy-making role when Reserve forces matters are under consideration, including full participation in the Reserve Forces Policy Board and comparable Service committees. It is strongly urged that each Service Assistant Secretary have a civilian deputy assistant secretary charged exclusively with responsibility for Reserve forces matters, and it is noted that the Secretary of Defense has previously suggested such action.

—The Chiefs of Reserve Components should be so designated and should have in fact the authority to carry out all the responsibilities now authorized by law and by current Department of Defense Directives.

—The committee has noted on past occasions and in the testimony of several Defense witnesses who are directly involved in decisions affecting the Reserve forces a lack of attention to and interest in the Guard and Reserve. A change in this situation is of increasing importance as the Secretary of Defense stresses increased dependence on Guard and Reserve forces. More interest and more concentrated high level attention is particularly important at the DoD level to insure that the Secretary of Defense policy of reliance on Reserves leads to adequate equipping, manning and training.

—There should be a return to having representatives of each of the Guard and Reserve Components in the Reserve Affairs office at OSD level. This is strongly urged as a means of insuring adequate understanding of the variations among components as policy matters are considered within OSD. The Congress has provided in 10 U.S.C. 265, the means of accomplishing such representation and has further provided in this same section of law that such representatives shall be considered as additional members of the staff with which they are serving, thereby precluding any adverse impact on efforts to reduce headquarters manpower.

Response to this recommendation and others made in this section of the report will be evaluated by the committee as indicators of the intent of the Secretary of Defense to implement the policy of developing reliable Guard and Reserve forces.

The committee further directs that all of the Active Services undertake an immediate evaluation of all mission areas for the purpose of identifying, to this committee, mission, force and equipment tradeoffs between the Active and Reserve which will offset (1) ever increasing manpower, procurement and production costs; and (2) accelerate the modernization of the Guard and Reserve forces by concurrent assignment of new weapons and new production to the Active, Guard and Reserve forces.

Witnesses appearing before this committee have indicated serious concern about the impact on operational readiness of so-called "energy crisis" standdowns and reduced fuel allocations to the Reserve Component forces.

The committee is deeply concerned with the energy crisis as well as the readiness of all of our forces. We believe, however, that the Reserve Components may have been disproportionately penalized by actions arbitrarily imposed by those who do not understand and did not seek out all of the facts on reduced activity rates, flying safety and operational readiness of these forces.

The committee recommends that the Department of Defense undertake an immediate reevaluation of fuel requirements for the Reserve Components which will insure adequate fuel for flying safety and operational readiness of these forces. The committee further recommends that this amount of fuel be not less than 90 percent of the amounts programmed in the fiscal year 1974 budget, submitted to the Congress in January 1973, as readjusted for force changes which have occurred since that time. The Services are requested to identify the amounts required to meet this recommendation and notify the committee.

TITLE V—CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

This year, for the first time, the Committee on Armed Services is recommending authorization of civilian personnel for the Department of Defense. This is required by Public Law 93–155.

After extensive hearings, held jointly with the Manpower Subcommittee of the Post Office and Civil Service Committee and the Manpower Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee, a reduction of 15,000 is recommended in the total civilian personnel requested by the Department of Defense, the allocation to be made by the Secretary of Defense. The reduction was agreed to by both Manpower Subcommittees and was concurred in by the Armed Services Committee.

Before presenting the recommended civilian end-strength levels, it should be pointed out that the end-strength figures represent only *direct-hire* employees, both permanent and temporary, including full-time, part-time and intermittent employees paid from appropriated funds, who are employed to perform military functions administered by the Department of Defense. The following categories of civilian employees are excluded from the strengths recommended.

(1) Employees performing civilian functions administered by the Department of Defense, the largest of which is the Corps of Engineers Civil Works activities. For fiscal year 1975, the estimated end strength is approximately 29,000.

(2) Indirect-hire employees who are hired by the host nation in support of U.S. Forces stationed abroad. The estimated to be approximately 103,000. Foreign nationals who are employed directly by the U.S. Government are classified as direct-hire and included in our recommended end strength for civilians. Slightly over 43,000 foreign nationals are included in this category.

(3) Employees in special employment programs for students and disadvantaged youths, such as the Stay-in-School Campaign and the Temporary Summer Aid Program. The approximate strength in this program at the end of fiscal year 1973 was 22,000 but during the summer, the number of these temporary student hirings usually rises to a peak of about 40,000 employees.

(4) Employees of the National Security Agency who are excluded because employment statistics are classified information.

It should be noted also that the approximately 8,000 schoolteachers in the Department of Defense Overseas School System are not included because they serve on a nine-month basis and are not on the Department of Defense payroll on June 30th, the teaching period having ended before that time.

Thus, the strength figures which are presented do not include more than 180,000 civilian personnel who are on the Department of Defense payroll.

The Department of Defense presented its request for 1,027,000 personnel on the basis that it was a reduction from 1,029,000 budgeted for in fiscal year 1974. While this is correct, it does not tell the entire story. In the fiscal year 1974 supplemental 19,000 additional civilian employees were requested but this was not granted by the Congress. So, in essence, what the DoD was requesting was an increase of 17,000 civilian personnel rather than a decrease of 2,000. The on-board end strength of civilians, excluding the categories mentioned above, was slightly over 988,000 at the end of fiscal year 1973. The committee reduced the numbers requested by 15,000—thus permitting the continuation of the civilianization program and improvements for the readiness of the forces. The committee action takes into consideration the reductions of civilians in the reductions of the various headquarters both in the Department of Defense and the various Services.

Authorizations recommended

The figures recommended for authorization of civilian end strength are as follows:

(1) The Department of the Army, 358,717;

(2) The Department of the Navy, including the Marine Corps, 323,529;

(3) The Department of the Air Force, 269,709;

(4) The Activities and Agencies of the Department of Defense (other than military departments, 75,372.

These numbers are reduced by 15,000 with the allocations to be made by the Secretary of Defense.

Several changes were made in the language in this Title from that originally requested by the Department of Defense. First, the provision which permits the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of the military department concerned to determine "that direct substitution of civilian personnel for military personnel [which] will result in economy without adverse effect upon national defense, such substitution may be accomplished without regard to the numbers of civilian personnel authorized by this subsection:" was determined by the Armed Services Committee to be so broad as to negate the effect of the ceilings imposed by subsection (a) of the Title. Therefore, the language was deleted.

A language change suggested by the Manpower Subcommittee of the Post Office and Civil Service Committee which would permit a civilian end strength upward or downward whenever work which has been done by direct-hire personnel is shifted to an outside contractor or vice versa, was included by the Armed Services Committee.

The committee is not convinced that the establishment of civilian end strength is necessarily the best way to control civilian employment in the Department of Defense. In fact, we believe it can be better controlled through man-year budgeted figures. But it does provide to the Armed Services Committee a more complete picture of total manpower requirements for the Department of Defense, thus enabling the committee to do a better job in establishing strengths for the military services and the Department of Defense.

VIEWS OF MANPOWER SUBCOMMITTEE, POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE COMMITTEE

The Manpower Subcommittee of the Post Office and Civil Services Committee has asked for the opportunity to present its views on Title V, Civilian Personnel, of this bill. The Subcommittee report follows:

> The Subcommittee on Manpower and Civil Service of the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service had the unique experience this year of joining with the Armed Services Manpower Subcommittee to consider the Department of Defense request for Fiscal Year 1975 civilian manpower authorizations contained in Title V, H.R. 12564. It was unique not only from the standpoint of conducting joint hearings with the Armed Services Subcommittee but also from the anomalous position that the Manpower and Civil Service Subcommittee opposes the imposition of numerical limitations on civilian employment as a means of controlling costs within the Department of Defense. The Subcommittee strongly believes that numerical ceilings lead to false economies in the Defense budget, poor management of the civilian workforce and encourages the proliferation of contracting out for support services.
>
> The Subcommittee is very concerned with the burgeoning costs of manpower in the Department of Defense. Through the groundwork laid in the hearings this year, our continuing oversight and review of manpower management and trends in the Department of Defense and review of subsequent Defense manpower authorization requests, we believe that such costs can be effectively controlled. One of our purposes this year was to try to identify the costs of civilian manpower in the proposed fiscal year 1975 budget and to compare those costs to total military personnel costs and to the significant third element of Defense manpower resources, "contracting out" for support services. Civilian manpower costs are not easily identified in the existing Defense budget. We have identified as many as twelve different "accounts" in the budget that contain civilian manpower costs, making any kind of comparison to military manpower costs difficult at best. We estimate, however, that of the $85.8 billion Defense budget outlays projected for fiscal year 1975, 17.4 percent or $14.9 billion represents civilian personnel costs and 38 percent or $32.6 billion are for related military personnel costs. We be-

lieve that the comparisons of the "average cost" of a soldier to the "average cost" of a civilian presented this year do not accurately reflect the actual costs of these categories of personnel and are not meaningful at this point in considering authorizations requested for numbers of military and civilian manpower. We intend through the coming year to refine these cost comparison figures so that a more meaningful relationship can be established.

A significant element in the Defense budget is the cost of contracting for support services. The Department of Defense has very little accurate information on the manpower costs of "contracting out." The best information available from the Department is the Annual Inventory of Commercial or Industrial Activities and Contract Support Services (DOD Instruction 4100.33 of July 16, 1971). The Inventory for fiscal year 1973 shows that an estimated 97,062 man-years of effort were by contract at a cost of approximately $1.8 billion. However, the Inventory includes only those contracts that exceed $50,000 and does not cover all of the functions that are performed by support service type contracts. It is the intent of our Subcommittee to require that the Department of Defense develop more accurate and complete equivalent man-year costs of contracting for support services in the coming year. We believe that the Department of Defense should establish, for both budgetary and expenditure control purposes, the average cost for contractor employee; for the various categories of civilian in-house employee, white collar, blue collar and indirect hire; and for military personnel. With the control and reporting requirements contained in this year's authorization bill, future authorizations can be considered in relation to accurate and complete cost comparisons between the three major categories of manpower resources, i.e., military, civilian and contractor, and that future controls on the Defense manpower budget will be in terms of dollars spent for each category and not rely on arbitrary unmanageable numerical ceilings. These kinds of controls could be easily translated to budget authority and directly tied to the appropriations process thereby controlling the dollars in lieu of using unreliable "average" figures for manpower costs.

It is important to note that the ratio of civilian manpower to the military forces has remained relatively constant over the last ten year period. In December 1973 direct-hire civilians comprised 31.8 percent of Defense military manpower. Based on the requested fiscal year 1975 authorization this ratio would increase slightly to 32.9 percent. It is also important to note that in considering the ratio of civilian to military, the current civilian figures include 10,000 contract technician positions that were converted to direct-hire status, 39,000 National Guard technicians who were given Federal employee status in fiscal year 1969 and the substitution of 92,000 civilians for 114,000 military that was completed in fiscal year

1968. The Department of Defense is currently completing a second "civilianization" program that will substitute 39,000 civilians for 48,000 military by the end of fiscal year 1975.

We share with the Armed Services Committee the concern over the 185,000 employees that are excluded from the requested authorization, particularly the large number of indirect hire employees whose functions within the Department are substantially similar to those of direct-hire employees. We strongly believe that the reduction of 15,000 from the requested authorization should be absorbed within the Department by contemplated reductions in headquarters staffs, through normal attrition and the current vacancies that exist in the Department. It is the intent of both of our committees that the Department of Defense or the military departments will not contract out for support service activities or functions solely because of reduced manpower authorizations for fiscal year 1975.

The Subcommittee on Manpower and Civil Service was impressed with the thoroughness and comprehensive treatment given by the service representatives in their testimony for the joint hearings. The singular weakness in the testimony, however, related to the lack of data on manpower requirements and cost comparisons of performing support services through the use of military, in-house civilians and contractor personnel. There are some specific areas of civilian manpower management that will require further oversight activities and inquiries by our Subcommittee throughout the coming fiscal year.

TITLE VI—MILITARY TRAINING STUDENT LOADS

Title VI of this bill authorizes the military training student loads for fiscal year 1975. The term "training loads" can be defined as man-years in a training status and should not be confused with the numbers of military personnel who will actually undergo formal training during the course of the fiscal year, as most of the training programs are for periods of considerably less than a full year. Not included in this authorization is training performed in the field and in the fleet in order to attain and maintain technical and combat proficiency.

The authorized military training student loads for fiscal year 1975 are:

(1) The Army, 97,638.
(2) The Navy, 71,279.
(3) The Marine Corps, 26,262.
(4) The Air Force, 52,900.
(5) The Army National Guard of the United States, 12,111.
(6) The Army Reserve, 9,673.
(7) The Naval Reserve, 2,536.
(8) The Marine Corps Reserve, 3,903.
(9) The Air National Guard of the United States, 2,359.
(10) The Air Force Reserve, 1,126.

The above authorized training load is 3,400 man-years above that requested by the Department of Defense. This increase is in Army Reserve and Marine Corps Reserve and results from the increases in Reserve strength authorized by the Committee. This increase is primarily to compensate for the anticipated influx of untrained non-prior service personnel. However, the above authorization request, even with appropriate adjustments due to the deletion of ROTC and the Health Scholarship Program, represents an overall reduction of approximately 20,000 man-years from last year's authorized training load.

Justification for the President's budget request was submitted in the Military Manpower Training Report for fiscal year 1975 in accordance with the requirements set forth in Public Law 92-436 which states, in pertinent part:

> Beginning with the fiscal year ending June 30, 1973, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Congress a written report not later than March 1 of each fiscal year recommending the average student load for each category of training for each component of the Armed Forces for the next three fiscal years and shall include in such report justification for and explanation of the average student loads recommended.

Military training is categorized in the following manner:

(1) Recruit training includes all basic initial enlisted training for all services for both active and reserve components. In all services, it represents an introduction of the new enlisted man or woman into military life. In addition, in the Army and Marine Corps, recruits are taught common military skills, such as the fundamentals of individual weapons and combat skills.

(2) Specialized training provides both officer and enlisted personnel with the skills and knowledge necessary to perform specific jobs or to operate or maintain specific pieces of equipment.

(3) Officer Acquisition training includes training programs through which officers are procured, such as the Service Military Academies, Officer Candidate Schools and enlisted Commissioning programs. Although included in this category in last year's report, the Reserve Officers Training Corps and Health Professions Scholarship Program are not included in the training load data this year as the participants are not in active military status.

(4) Flight training provides the basic undergraduate flying skills for pilots, navigators, and Naval Flight Officer. This category does not include the major formal advanced combat training programs which are beyond the scope of this authorization since they are conducted by and for operational combat units. However, some flight-related skills, such as the Air Force navigator/bombardier, electronic warfare and survival course, are included.

(5) Professional training includes military education, graduate education, degree completion education and professional development courses not leading to a degree. This training is accomplished at both military and civilian institutions and includes: Senior Service Schools, Staff Colleges, advanced degree programs, Department of Defense schools such as the Defense Systems Management School and professional medical training.

The following table shows the authorized training loads for fiscal year 1975 for each Service component for each type of training:

AVERAGE MILITARY TRAINING STUDENT LOADS, FISCAL YEAR 1975 BY COMPONENT AND MAJOR TRAINING CATEGORY

	Recruit training	Officer acquisition training	Specialized skill training	Flight training	Professional development education	Total
Active forces:						
Army	30,800	5,117	54,575	863	6,283	97,638
Navy	16,287	6,828	40,674	1,761	5,729	71,279
Marine Corps	13,339	503	9,347	1,036	2,037	26,262
Air Force	9,706	5,915	27,515	3,459	6,305	52,900
Subtotal, loads	70,132	18,363	132,111	7,119	20,354	248,079
Reserve components:						
Army National Guard	4,875		7,025	101	110	12,111
Army Reserve	4,025	132	5,123	60	233	9,673
Naval Reserve	678	150	1,702		6	2,536
Marine Corps Reserve	2,124	288	1,439		52	3,903
Air National Guard	685	3	1,264	245	162	2,359
Air Force Reserve	402	33	473	156	62	1,126
Subtotal, loads	12,789	606	17,026	562	625	31,708
DOD, total loads	82,921	18,969	149,137	7,681	20,979	279,787

OFFICER ACQUISITION ENROLLEES NOT IN ACTIVE MILITARY STATUS FISCAL YEAR 1975 [1]

	College ROTC programs	Armed Forces professions scholarships authorized [2]
Army	33,564	1,850
Navy	8,100	1,575
Air Force	19,260	1,575
DOD, total enrollees	60,924	5,000

[1] Excluded from loads shown in the table above.
[2] The number of scholarships authorized is consistent with average annual enrollments shown in budget documents.

The Committee recognized, in reviewing the training area, the importance of education as an inducement to young men to enter or make a career of military service. The importance of this incentive must not be overlooked, even though presently the trend of incentives seems to be almost entirely monetary. Its significance is further illustrated by the fact that experience indicates that the use of educational incentives attracts young people of higher average intelligence, skills, and self-esteem than those attracted by higher pay.

USAFI

Last year's Congressionally-directed dismantling of the USAFI program for budgetary reasons is viewed by the Committee as a potentially unwise action for the above reasons. The effect of this action is exacerbated by information adduced in this year's hearings which indicates that the substitute programs necessary to provide these educational opportunities may prove more expensive than the USAFI program as it was functioning. The fact that DoD eventually concurred in this action leads to the conclusion that further cost effectiveness study is warranted by the Defense Department in this area.

Trainee Discharge Program

As it relates to the training establishment and the investment therein, the Committee was impressed by the implementation of the Army's Trainee Discharge program. It represents the effective utilization of a management tool to maximize scarce resources, yet in a manner not detrimental to individual volunteers not fully suited for military service. Aggressive implementation of this program in the other services is in order.

Professional Development Education

In the area of Professional Development Education, the authorization request, which was approved, was for an average military training student load of approximately 20,979 manyears. Last year, a 10% reduction in the requested program was recommended by the Committee and has been implemented. A further reduction of 20% occurred in the appropriation process. While no further reductions are considered to be warranted this year, the Committee would urge the Defense Department to adjust its criteria for selection into the fully funded graduate education program in order to give additional emphasis to the element of the individual selectee having partially completed the educational credits on his own prior to selection into the program. The Committee believes that such action will result in certain economies in allotted funds as well as insure the selection of properly motivated personnel.

Centralized Management Control

In its report on the fiscal year 1974 Authorization Bill (House Report 93-383), the Committee expressed concern with an apparent lack of management of Service training programs which seemed to result from insufficient management personnel in the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, (Education). At that time, the then Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs indicated that "better monitorship of training" from the Education office was necessary in ". . . such areas as reducing duplication of training resources between services and eliminating training in skills that are not being employed."

The Committee received assurances that upon completion of a study to define specific requirements, the Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Education) would be expanded to allow for an increase in its oversight capabilities.

The Committee is not impressed that a substantive upgrading of this office has occurred, but rather that the capability for centralized management control of the Services' training programs is still a problem. During the hearings, it was elicited that in fact the staffing of this office has decreased in the last year.

Further, the required Military Manpower Training Report is now prepared in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, in contrast to last year when it was prepared by those in the Education office who deal with the subject on a full-time basis.

While hesitant to sanction further superstructure positions in the Department of Defense, the Committee is concerned by the apparent lack of authority, centralized direction and coordination which exists

over the Services' disparate portions of this $6.5 billion training expenditure. This is an area which may benefit from the application of tight management techniques. The problem is apparently due to inadequate numbers in staffing of this office, and the significance of this deficiency is exacerbated in the Committee's view by the budgetary investment over which this office is tasked with exercising responsible direction.

TITLE VII—GENERAL PROVISIONS

Military Assistance Service Funded (MASF)

Section 701 of H.R. 14592 will provide authority for continuation of the Military Assistance Funded Program (MASF). This program will provide military assistance to South Vietnam for fiscal year 1975. The language of this section also establishes the obligational limitation on the amount of such military assistance which can be provided during fiscal year 1975.

The Department of Defense budget for fiscal year 1975 proposes an obligational limitation of $1.6 billion. However, the Committee on Armed Services, after careful consideration of the Department's request, decided to approve a new obligational limitation of $1.4 billion for fiscal year 1975, a reduction of $200 million, in the Department's request.

Committee changes

The Committee on Armed Services, in addition to reducing the Department's request by $200 million, also wrote new language in the bill which changes the manner in which MASF assistance will be administered. The new language incorporated in Section 701 requires the establishment of a single fund for this purpose to be administered by the Secretary of Defense, and further requires quarterly reports to the Congress on the obligations incurred from appropriations authorized for this program.

Finally, in establishing this single fund concept for the MASF program, the Committee language provides "that as of June 30, 1974, unobligated balances previously authorized for the above purpose are hereby repealed." Thus, the controversy which has developed over the question of remaining unobligated balances from prior fiscal years for the MASF program would be moot.

Program Justification

The objectives of our military assistance to South Vietnam are limited but absolutely essential. The Government of the United States wishes to help the Government of South Vietnam to maintain an effective military deterrent in the face of the considerable threat posed by the North Vietnamese forces within the Republic of Vietnam. Attainment of this limited objective is the key to the maintenance of stable, balanced conditions necessary to ensure peace in Indochina and Southeast Asia. However, attainment of this objective has a vital and strategic importance far beyond Indochina. Involved are the fundamental goals of our nation's foreign policy.

Events in Vietnam over the past year have taught us that a lasting peace is possible only if there is a stable balance of power between the

opposing sides. It is the view of the Committee on Armed Services that a military equilibrium in that area of the world will deter new offensives and gradually induce a general shift in priorities by the contending forces away from war.

The post agreement period in Vietnam has recorded substantial progress towards this goal. Although some fighting has continued, on the basis of testimony received by the Committee, it is the conviction of the Committee that the cease fire has indeed served to significantly dampen combat activity. Thus, the hopes of the Executive Branch, which are shared by the members of the Committee on Armed Services, for a stable peace in South Vietnam, are largely dependent upon the continued ability of the South Vietnamese to defend themselves.

The cease fire already has witnessed the following:

A rough but tenuous balance of forces thus far prevails in Vietnam;

Territorial and population control have changed little over the past year (what change has been made has been in favor of the Government forces);

In the area of military operations, Hanoi's land grab offensive on the eve of the Paris agreement set a pattern of NVA attacks and Government reactions which still characterizes the cease-fire. Major Communist initiatives in the past year have included:

Another land grab attack prior to the June communique;

The capture of strategic posts (e.g., Le Minh border Camp) in the western highlands last fall;

An offensive in Quang Duc province which seized a district capital;

The shelling of Bien Hoa airbase;

The destruction of a major civilian fuel depot near Saigon;

Continuing attacks against all forms of transportation and;

Terrorism against civilians.

A new North Vietnamese full-scale offensive, however, is not inevitable. Hanoi is keeping its option open but, is encountering serious problems both at home and in the south. These problems, together with a strong GVN deterrent and the international context of detente give us hope that an offensive can be avoided. A shift in Hanoi's priorities would then make possible a serious accommodation within the spirit of the Vietnam agreement.

While the North Vietnamese have increased the conventional capability of the main forces, the cost has been great, and the Government of Vietnam has thus far managed to turn back all their challenges in the past year.

Combat deaths, while substantial on both sides, have declined to the lowest level since 1965 and are down 75% compared with the rate in 1972. Some 500,000 refugees have been resettled. Virtually all pre-cease-fire civilian detainees and POW's—at least on the GVN side—have been released.

The balance of power which underlies the chances for peace is under heavy pressure from North Vietnam. Hanoi is conducting a massive military buildup in the south and repeatedly violates the cease-fire. These activities threaten the equilibrium and consequently the whole framework of the peace we so laboriously negotiated in Paris, for ex-

ample: In total violation of the Paris agreement, since the cease-fire, Hanoi has infiltrated over 70,000 replacement troops, some 400 tanks, 150 long-range heavy artillery pieces, 1,000 AAA guns and 150,000–200,000 tons of ammunition and supplies. Since the cease-fire, North Vietnamese capabilities have increased 20% in combat manpower, 200% in tanks, 75% in heavy artillery and 75% in AAA. Some of this additional equipment includes new items such as SAM–2 missiles with 16 to 20 launchers of which most, if not all, were introduced into the south after the cease-fire. The Communists are also working on 12 airfields in the south and are completing a massive new logistics system of all-weather three lane roads and pol pipelines.

The record of GVN's and North Vietnam's cease-fire implementation simply does not support the argument that our assistance will only facilitate new "violations" by the GVN and thus undermine the cease-fire. Throughout the cease-fire period, Saigon has exercised restraint compared with the Communists' excesses. It has observed the agreement to the extent of any prudent state faced with North Vietnam's current policy and activities in the South. Despite Hanoi's record of violations, the GVN has limited itself to justifiable acts of self-defense. With few exceptions, Saigon has limited its military operations to responding to communist land grab activities and to consolidating where its forces were present at the time of the cease-fire.

The foregoing suggests that far from exciting GVN violation of the cease-fire, our military assistance is tailored to enable Saigon to defend itself against Communist pressure while deterring a major offensive. South Vietnam's need for substantial U.S. assistance, both military and economic, is not open-ended. The next 18–24 months is an especially critical period which will determine whether Saigon becomes economically viable and whether a North Vietnamese attack can be deterred.

Provided the requisite amount of U.S. assistance is forthcoming in the near term, the executive branch foresees a significant economic revival in the South and the chance that Hanoi will shift its energies to more peaceful pursuits. Hopefully, these developments will reduce the need in subsequent years for heavy American assistance.

The Departmental budget for military assistance to South Vietnam in fiscal year 1975 contemplates a program involving $1.45 billion. Departmental representatives have assured the Committee on Armed Services that the proposed program in no way violates the cease fire agreement.

The printed Committee hearings on both the Department's fiscal year 1974 Supplemental Request and for the Department's fiscal year 1975 Authorization Request contain extensive data on the administration of the MASF program. The Committee urges that these hearings be read by all Members of Congress since such a reading will eliminate much of the confusion and misinformation which often occurs during debate on the justification for the continuation of this military assistance program to South Vietnam. For example, one of the more pertinent questions which is continually raised concerning the military assistance program to South Vietnam is the possible alleged conflict with Article VII of the Cease Fire Agreement, which provides for a one-for-one replacement of weapons of the same characteristics and properties. The answer to this question appears on page 51 of HASC

Document 93–40, and because of its pertinency, is set out below in its entirety:

Question. Is the International Control Commission in Vietnam supervising the delivery of weapons and ammunition for either side under article 7 of the cease-fire agreement which provides for a one-for-one replacement of weapons of the same characteristics and properties?

Answer. Article 7 of the ICCS Protocol specifies that the International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS) and the Two Party Joint Military Commission jointly inspect the entry into South Vietnam of replacements of war materiel permitted under Article 7 of the Paris Agreement. The Viet Cong has refused to permit the TPJMC to carry out this function, and the ICCS has taken the position that inspections by it alone would not be official. The United States and the RVN have kept records of replacement shipments to South Vietnam and have stated their readiness to provide a full accounting to the ICCS and to the TPJMC whenever those bodies begin to carry out their duties with respect to inspection and replacement materials for the two sides. Hanoi on the other hand has introduced illegally into South Vietnam vast quantities of armaments. No offer to allow ICCS inspection of this material has ever been made.

General Background

U.S. MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO VIETNAM, FISCAL YEARS 1966–73

[In millions of dollars]

Fiscal year	Economic assistance [1]	Military assistance [2]
1966	739.8	392.7
1967	661.5	1,155.4
1968	545.5	947.3
1969	400.6	1,632.3
1970	517.7	1,432.3
1971	488.1	1,526.9
1972	504.3	1,985.0
1973	[3] 542.4	2,270.5

[1] U.S. economic assistance to Vietnam (foreign assistance appropriation) source: Fiscal years 1966–72, report to the Ambassador from USAID mission director, Jan. 1, 1973. Fiscal year 1973 AID/Washington.
[2] Source: DOD report on support furnished to the Vietnamese and other free world forces in Vietnam.
[3] Estimated.

U.S. MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO VIETNAM, FISCAL YEARS 1974–75

[In millions of dollars]

Fiscal year	Economic assistance [1]	Military assistance
1974	[2] 550	1,126
1975	([3])	[4] 1.4

[1] U.S. economic assistance to Vietnam (foreign assistance appropriation) source: AID/Washington. Does not include fiscal year 1974 supplemental request.
[2] Estimated.
[3] Unavailable.
[4] As recommended by the Armed Services Committee.

ESTIMATED AMOUNTS INCLUDED THE MILITARY FUNCTIONS APPROPRIATIONS FOR SUPPORT OF FREE WORLD FORCES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA FISCAL YEAR 1975—PRESIDENT'S BUDGET

[In millions of dollars]

Appropriation	Fiscal year 1973				Fiscal year 1974			Fiscal year 1975—
	South Vietnam	Korea	Laos	Total	South Vietnam	Laos	Total	South Vietnam
Military personnel:								
Army	60.6	56.3	20.0	136.9	32.8	9.6	42.4	24.0
Navy		.1		.1				
Total	60.6	56.4	20.0	137.0	32.8	9.6	42.4	24.0
Operation and maintenance:								
Army	555.1	60.3	117.6	733.0	266.2	26.9	293.1	304.8
Navy	42.3	.4		42.7	20.2		20.2	19.2
Marine Corps	.2			.2				
Air Force	281.0	.5	59.4	340.9	170.3	38.0	208.3	250.4
Total	878.6	61.2	177.0	1,116.8	456.7	64.9	521.6	574.4
Procurement:								
Army:								
Missile	4.3			4.3	.4		.4	2.9
Weapons and TCV	5.9	.1	.1	6.1	3.5	.2	3.7	14.4
Ammunition	736.4		83.2	819.6	65.2		65.2	400.2
Other	26.0	.2	.2	26.4	2.6	.3	2.9	56.3
Navy:								
Weapons								.1
Ships								24.9
Other	3.0			3.0	1.8		1.8	11.1
Marine Corps	.2			.2				
Air Force:								
Aircraft	277.2		11.2	288.4	234.2	.8	235.0	245.0
Other	125.3		35.8	161.1	32.3	2.2	34.5	96.7
Total	1,178.3	.3	130.5	1,309.1	340.0	3.5	343.5	851.6
Summary:								
Army	1,388.3	116.9	221.1	1,726.3	370.7	37.0	407.7	802.6
Navy	45.3	.5		45.8	22.0		22.0	55.3
Marine Corps	.4			.4				
Air Force	683.5	.5	106.4	790.4	436.8	41.0	477.8	592.1
Total	2,117.5	117.9	327.5	2,562.9	829.5	78.0	907.5	1,450.0

MASF Request Requiring Specific Authorization in Accordance With Section 138 of Title 10, United States Code

In accordance with established practice, the procurement of aircraft, ships, missiles, tracked combat vehicles, and certain specific weapons systems, require annual authorization before appropriations can be made. Those items included in the MASF program which require this authorization are incorporated in Title I of this bill. A brief summary of the amounts requested for authorization contained in the Department's budget request for fiscal year 1975 are set out below:

MASF request for fiscal year 1975 amounts subject to authorization[1]

Appropriation	*Amount in thousands*
Missile Procurement, Army	$2,900
Procurement of Weapons and Tracked Combat Vehicles, Army[2]	14,460
Weapons Procurement, Navy[3]	100
Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy	24,900
Aircraft Procurement, Air Force	245,000
Total	287,360

[1] The $287,360 represents that portion of the total MASF request included in appropriations normally subject to the authorization process. The total MASF request for FY 1975 of $1,450,000 NOA and the $1,600,000 overall ceiling includes all appropriations.
[2] Tracked combat vehicles (11,810); and weapons and other combat vehicles (2,650).
[3] Weapons (100).

Committee Recommendation on MASF

The Committee on Armed Services strongly believes that a continuation of military assistance to the Government of South Vietnam is essential to the maintenance of the military equilibrium which now exists in South Vietnam and that a failure to continue this program, as recommended by the Committee, will seriously jeopardize the possibility of maintaining peace in Southeast Asia, and therefore would be contrary to our national interests.

The Committee therefore recommends that the Congress approve a program of military assistance for South Vietnam for fiscal year 1975 in the amount of $1.4 billion.

COMMITTEE POSITION

The Committee on Armed Services, a quorum being present, approved the bill by a vote of 36 to 3.

FISCAL DATA

Fiscal year 1975 cost

If the total amounts specifically authorized in this bill are appropriated, the cost of the bill would be $22,642,963,000.

Five-year cost projection

Pursuant to section 7, rule 13, of the House of Representatives, the committee attempted to ascertain the cost of H.R. 14592 in the present year and the five following fiscal years.

The following letter from the Department of Defense addresses itself to this requirement:

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
Washington, D.C., May 8, 1974.

Hon. F. EDWARD HÉBERT,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
House of Representatives.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: In accordance with Section 252(b) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 (PL 91–510), indicated below is an estimate of how the $23,130.1 million authorization requested in fiscal year 1975 will be expended over the fiscal year 1975–1980 period:

Fiscal year:	*In millions*
1975	$7,400.0
1976	8,600.0
1977	3,800.0
1978	1,600.0
1979	1,000.0
1980	730.1

The extreme uncertainty of future year Defense programs precludes any precise estimates, but I can also provide the general estimate that to support the forces contained in the Annual Defense Report on the FY 1975 Budget, authorizations for procurement and RDT&E in the range of $23–$25 billion (in FY 1975 dollars) would be required for each of the next five years.

Sincerely,

BILL CLEMENTS, *Deputy.*

The committee would point out that this is an annual authorization act and the authorizations herein provided are subject to annual review and revision by the committee and the Congress. Also, the committee would remind the House that limitations on the availability of appropriations for the categories of authorization herein provided are normally included in appropriation legislation.

DEPARTMENTAL DATA

The legislation was requested by the Department of Defense and is in accordance with the program of the President as is illustrated by the correspondence set out below:

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
Washington, D.C., February 4, 1974.

HON. CARL ALBERT,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: There is forwarded herewith legislation "To authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1975 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes, and other weapons, and research, development, test and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength for each active duty component and of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces and of civilian personnel of the Department of Defense, and to authorize the military training student loads and for other purposes." This proposal is a part of the Department of Defense legislative program for the 93d Congress, and the Office of Management and Budget has advised that enactment of the proposal would be in accord with the program of the President. This proposal is being sent to the President of the Senate.

This proposal would provide authorization for appropriations as needed for procurement in each of the categories of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes, and for other weapons for each of the military departments in an amount equal to the new obligational authority included in the President's budget for fiscal year 1975. In addition, the proposal would provide fund authorization in amounts equal to the new obligational authority included in the President's budget for fiscal year 1975 in total for each of the research, development, test and evaluation appropriations for the miltary departments and the defense agencies.

Title III of the proposal prescribes the end strengths for active duty personnel of each component of the Armed Forces as required by section 138(c)(1) of title 10, United States Code, in the number provided for by new obligational authority in appropriations requested for these components in the President's budget for fiscal year 1975.

Title IV of the proposal provides for average strengths of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces as required by section 138(b) of title 10, United States Code, in the number provided for by the new obligational authority in appropriations requested for these components in the President's budget for fiscal year 1975.

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Title V of the proposal is responsive in the new requirements contained in section 138(c) of title 10, United States Code, which requires that beginning with fiscal year 1975, the civilian personnel end strengths for each component of the Department of Defense be authorized. Title V provides for end strengths for civilian personnel of the Department of Defense in the number provided for by the new obligational authority in appropriations requested for the Department of Defense in the President's budget for fiscal year 1975.

Language authorizing average training student loads is contained in Title VI as required by section 138(d) of title 10, United States Code; however, this proposal does not include, at this time, the actual student load figures which this Department will request for fiscal year 1975. The requirement for authorization for average training student loads was only recently enacted and fiscal year 1974 was the first year in which such authorization was provided. Data is now being analyzed and developed in order to determine the fiscal year 1975 requirements. As soon as this data is available, but not later than March 1, 1974, when the related report is required to be submitted to the Congress, the necessary figures will be submitted to the Congress for inclusion in Title VI of this proposal.

This proposal would also include for fiscal year 1975 language authorizing appropriations of the Department of Defense to be made available for the support of Vietnamese military forces. The proposed language is substantially identical to similar provisions in prior year's acts in its application to support for Vietnamese forces, except that for clarity in light of recent congressional actions regarding public safety programs, the language has been modified to make it expressly applicable to Vietnamese military forces rather than Vietnamese forces. To reflect the reversion of support for Laos to the Military Assistance Program in fiscal year 1975, references to Laos have been deleted as have been other obsolete references which no longer reflect the current situation.

The reporting requirements of subsection (b) of section 401 of Public Law 89–367, as amended, are considered permanent and would be equally applicable to this provision.

Sincerely,

JAMES R. SCHLESINGER.

Enclosure.

A BILL To authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1975 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes, and other weapons, and research, development, test and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength for each active duty component and of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces and of civilian personnel of the Department of Defense, and to authorize the military training student loads and for other purposes."

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

TITLE I—PROCUREMENT

SEC. 101. Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated during the fiscal year 1975 for the use of the Armed Forces of the United

States for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes, and other weapons as authorized by law, in amounts as follows:

AIRCRAFT

For aircraft: for the Army, $339,500,000; for the Navy and the Marine Corps, $2,960,600,000; for the Air Force, $3,496,600,000.

MISSILES

For missiles: for the Army, $459,200,000; for the Navy, $620,-600,000; for the Marine Corps, $76,000,000; for the Air Force, $1,610,800,000.

NAVAL VESSELS

For naval vessels: for the Navy, $3,562,600,000.

TRACKED COMBAT VEHICLES

For tracked combat vehicles: for the Army, $331,900,000; for the Marine Corps, $80,100,000.

TORPEDOES

For torpedoes and related support equipment: for the Navy, $187,700,000.

OTHER WEAPONS

For other weapons: for the Army, $53,400,000; for the Navy, $25,600,000; for the Marine Corps, $500,000.

TITLE II—RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST AND EVALUATION

SEC. 201. Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated during the fiscal year 1975 for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States for research, development, test and evaluation, as authorized by law, in amounts as follows:

For the Army, $1,985,976,000;

For the Navy (including the Marine Corps), $3,264,503,000;

For the Air Force, $3,518,860,000; and

For the Defense Agencies, $555,700,000, of which $27,000,000 is authorized for the activities of the Director of Test and Evaluation, Defense.

TITLE III—ACTIVE FORCES

SEC. 301. For the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1974, and ending June 30, 1975, each component of the Armed Forces is authorized an end strength for active duty personnel as follows:

(1) The Army, 785,000;
(2) The Navy, 540,380;
(3) The Marine Corps, 196,398;
(4) The Air Force, 630,345.

TITLE IV—RESERVE FORCES

SEC. 401. For the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1974, and ending June 30, 1975, the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces will be programmed to attain an average strength of not less than the following:

(1) The Army National Guard of the United States, 379,848;
(2) The Army Reserve, 215,842;
(3) The Naval Reserve, 107,526;
(4) The Marine Corps Reserve, 36,703;
(5) The Air National Guard of the United States, 89,128;
(6) The Air Force Reserve, 51,319;
(7) The Coast Guard Reserve, 11,700.

SEC. 402. The average strength prescribed by section 401 of this title for the Selected Reserve of any Reserve component shall be proportionately reduced by (1) the total authorized strength of units organized to serve as units of the Selected Reserve of such component which are on active duty (other than for training) at any time during the fiscal year, and (2) the total number of individual members not in units organized to serve as units of the Selected Reserve of such component who are on active duty (other than for training or for unsatisfactory participation in training) without their consent at any time during the fiscal year. Whenever such units or such individual members are released from active duty during any fiscal year, the average strength for such fiscal year for the Selected Reserve of such Reserve component shall be proportionately increased by the total authorized strength of such units and by the total number of such individual members.

TITLE V—CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

SEC. 501(a). For the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1974 and ending June 30, 1975, the Department of Defense is authorized an end strength for civilian personnel as follows:

(1) The Department of the Army, 358,717;
(2) The Department of the Navy, including the Marine Corps, 323,529;
(3) The Department of the Air Force, 269,709;
(4) Activities and agencies of the Department of Defense (other than the military departments), 75,372.

(b). In computing the authorized end strength for civilian personnel there shall be included all direct-hire civilian personnel employed to perform military functions administered by the Department of Defense (other than those performed by the National Security Agency) whether in permanent or temporary positions and whether employed on a full time, part time, or intermittent basis, but excluding special employment categories for students and disadvantaged youth such as the Stay-in-School Campaign, the Temporary Summer Aid Program and the Federal Junior Fellowship Program and personnel participating in the Worker-Trainee Opportunity Program: *Provided*, That whenever the secretary of the military department concerned or the Secretary of Defense determines that the direct substitution of civilian personnel for military personnel will result in economy without adverse effect upon national defense, such substitution may be accomplished without regard to the numbers of civilian

personnel authorized by this section: *Provided further*, That when a function, power, or duty or activity is transferred or assigned to a department or agency of the Department of Defense from a department or agency outside of the Department of Defense or from a department or agency within the Department of Defense, the civilian personnel end strength authorized for such departments or agencies of the Department of Defense affected shall be adjusted to reflect any increases or decreases in civilian personnel required as a result of such transfer or assignment.

SEC. 502. When the Secretary of Defense determines that such action is necessary in the national interest, he may authorize the employment of civilian personnel in excess of the number authorized by section 501: *Provided*, That the number of additional personnel authorized to be employed pursuant to the authority of this section shall not exceed one per centum of the total number of civilian personnel authorized for the Department of Defense by section 501: *Provided further*, That the Secretary of Defense shall promptly notify the Congress of any authorization to increase civilian personnel strength pursuant to this authority.

TITLE VI—MILITARY TRAINING STUDENT LOADS

SEC. 601. For the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1974 and ending June 30, 1975, each component of the Armed Forces is authorized an average military training student load as follows:

(1) The Army, ----------;
(2) The Navy, ----------;
(3) The Marine Corps, ----------;
(4) The Air Force, ----------;
(5) The Army National Guard of the United States, ----------;
(6) The Army Reserve, ----------;
(7) The Naval Reserve, ----------;
(8) The Marine Corps Reserve, ----------;
(9) The Air National Guard of the United States, ----------;
(10) The Air Force Reserve, ----------;

TITLE VII—GENERAL PROVISIONS

SEC. 701. Subsection (a)(1) of section 401 of Public Law 89-367, approved March 15, 1966 (80 Stat. 37), as amended, is hereby amended to read as follows:

"(a)(1) Not to exceed $1,600,000,000 of the funds authorized for appropriation for the use of Armed Forces of the United States under this or any other Act are authorized to be made available for their stated purposes to support Vietnamese military forces on such terms and conditions as the Secretary of Defense may determine: *Provided*, That nothing contained in this section shall be construed as authorizing the use of any such funds to support Vietnamese military forces in activities designed to provide military support and assistance to the Government of Cambodia or Laos."

This Act may be cited as the "Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act, 1975".

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,
Washington, D.C., February 28, 1974.

Hon. F. EDWARD HÉBERT,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Reference is made to Secretary Schlesinger's letter of February 4, 1974, which forwarded legislation "To authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1975 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes, and other weapons, and research, development, test and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength for each active duty component and the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces and of civilian personnel of the Department of Defense, and to authorize the military training student loans and for other purposes."

As indicated in that letter, the proposed legislation did not include the average military training student loads in section 601 which this Department requests for fiscal year 1975. Attached is a copy of section 601 as introduced in H.R. 12564, 93d Congress, with the average military training student load figures inserted.

These proposed training loads will be explained and justified in the Military Manpower Training Report which is required to be submitted to the Congress by section 138(d) of title 10, United States Code. Pending transmittal of the report, we note that the proposed training loads for fiscal year 1975 exclude enrollees in college Reserve Officer's Training Corps and Armed Forces Health Professions Scholarship programs. These enrollees are not in active military status while undergoing training (except for brief periods of annual active duty prescribed for reservist participants of the Armed Forces Health Professions Scholarship program) and therefore authorization required by section 138(d) is not, in our opinion, applicable to such enrollees. We call this matter to your attention since this Department's request for authorization for fiscal year 1974, the first year such authorizations was required, inadvertently included authorization for such enrollees and this request was reflected in the authorization provided by the Congress.

The number of such enrollees excluded is as follows:

Sponsoring service	College ROTC program	Armed Forces Health Professions Scholarship authorized
Army	33,564	1,850
Navy	8,100	1,575
Air Force	19,260	1,575
DOD total	60,924	5,000

Sincerely,

L. NIEDERLEHNER,
Acting General Counsel.

Enclosure.

TITLE VI—MILITARY TRAINING STUDENT LOADS

SEC. 601. For the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1974, and ending June 30, 1975, each component of the Armed Forces is authorized an average military training student load as follows:

(1) The Army, 97,638;
(2) The Navy, 71,279;
(3) The Marine Corps, 26,262;
(4) The Air Force, 52,900;
(5) The Army National Guard of the United States, 12,111;
(6) The Army Reserve, 6,673;
(7) The Naval Reserve, 2,536;
(8) The Marine Corps Reserve, 3,403;
(9) The Air National Guard of the United States, 2,359;
(10) The Air Force Reserve, 1,126.

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF HON. OTIS G. PIKE (D., N.Y.)

THE B–1 BOMBER—A SICK PROGRAM

While we have become conditioned to massive problems and cost overruns on many defense contracts, the B–1 is in a class by itself. It is very difficult for any program to slip by more than one year during one year, but the B–1 has done it. It is very difficult for any program to increase in cost by $3.7 *billion* in one year, but the B–1 has done it. It is very difficult for the cost of one single plane, the only B–1 aircraft being authorized this year, to increase in cost by over 100 per cent in one year while decreasing in capability, but the B–1 has done it.

One year ago we were told that the production decision on the B–1 bomber would be made in July 1975, and the first squadron would be operational in December 1979. Today we are told that July 1975 has slipped 16 months to November 1976, and December 1979 has slipped 15 months to March 1981.

One year ago we were told that the research and development cost for the B–1 would be $2.709 billion, the procurement costs would be $8.567 billion, and the total program would cost $11.276 billion. Today we are told that the research and development cost for the B–1 will be $3.5 billion. The procurement costs will be $11.5 billion, and the total program will cost $15 billion, an increase in one year of $3.724 billion.

One year ago we were told that aircraft No. 4, which is authorized in this bill, would be the first production aircraft and would cost $70 million. Today we are told that aircraft No. 4 will be another research aircraft and will cost $150 million.

While the program has been slipping and the prices have been soaring, the performance has been sliding. Originally the B–1 was to be supersonic at both high altitude and low altitude. Today it is supersonic only at high altitude. Because of a growth in weight from 356,000 lbs., as approved, to 395,000 lbs., as now estimated, its takeoff distance has been increased by 1,000 feet, its range has been diminished in both its high altitude supersonic mission and its low altitude subsonic mission.

One year ago we were told that if only we would spend $473.5 million on the program in fiscal 1974, they would only need $1.102 billion this year and in the following years to complete the research and development.

We did cut $25 million from the program last year, but we did spend $448.5 million on the plane. Today the carrot on the end of the stick is further out of range than ever before. Today they tell us that despite the $448.5 million we spent on this program last year, even after the $499 million they are asking for this year they will still need $1.419 billion just to complete the research and development.

All of the figures which I have cited are the Air Force's own estimates and they are optimistic to the point of fantasy. For example, over three-fourths of the cost of the B-1 bomber will be in procurement rather than in research. The Pentagon and the Air Force to this day are estimating the rate of inflation for the procurement program at 3.3 per cent. Any rational estimate of the inflation factor would greatly increase the cost of the program, and it is obvious to anyone who has followed the program that the costs are being under-estimated just so the Congress will continue to buy it.

The money which we continue to pour into this unnecessary, ill-managed and very sick program is contributing not one iota to our national defense. Surely there are other deserving projects which need and can use the half billion dollars which is this year's bite. Until the Congress has the courage to stop wasting money on losers, we will be contributing to America's weakness and not to its strength.

Otis G Pike

SUPPLEMENTAL VIEWS OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT L. LEGGETT (D.-CALIF.) ON THE 1975 DEFENSE PROCUREMENT AUTHORIZATION ACT

Our House Armed Services Committee, working with a partially new and augmented staff, spent a full week in marking up the final legislative bill. To do complete justice to a twenty-three billion dollar piece of legislation would require a month of Committee debate—unfortunately, nobody has the time in the forty-ring Congressional circus.

The problem of an oversight committee is how to compete with the verve and professionalism of the Department of Defense when they assert a position. There is no agency of government better prepared in its testimony and presentation than Defense agencies; but considering the size of the Defense Budget and the fact that the $90-plus billion requested in 1975 amounts to 44 percent of all administrative income, there is need for restraint.

As is shown on the following chart, some committees exercise more restraint than others.

COMPARATIVE ACTION ON FISCAL YEAR 1974 DEFENSE SUPPLEMENTAL AND APPROPRIATIONS BILLS

	Defense request	House A.S.	Senate A.S.	House appropriations	Senate appropriations
I. Procurement:					
Army ACFT	22.0	22.0	15.0	16.0	16.0
Navy, Marine ACFT	219.2	219.2	101.1	153.7	113.0
AF ACFT	445.0	445.0	154.8	294.0	244.4
Army missiles	84.4	76.6	66.3	76.6	76.6
Navy missiles	28.6	28.6	17.0	0	0
Marine Corps missiles	22.3	22.3	22.3	22.3	22.3
Air Force missiles	39.0	39.0	22.9	39.0	27.0
NAVY SCN	24.8	24.8	0	0	24.8
Army TCV	113.6	113.6	50.9	63.1	50.6
Army other	8.2	8.2	8.2	8.0	8.0
Total	1,007.1	999.3	[1] 458.5	658.0	582.7
II. R. & D.:					
Raises	108.9	108.9	108.9	54.4	108.7
R. & D.	108.6	.975	0	0	0
III. MILCON	29.0	29.0	0	29.0	0
IV. MASF	[2] 0	0	[3] 0	0	[3] 0
Total	1,253.6	1,138.175	712.8	741.7	681.6

[1] $155,800,000 to be transferred from $2,200,000,000 for Israel.
[2] MASF request required no appropriation.
[3] Approved bookkeeping switch freeing $266,000,000.

If the country had unlimited money, no agency would need to be limited in spending. Since we don't have the money, we have therefore restricted poverty, education, health, housing and manpower training funds. *Defense expenditures should be no exception.*

The following chart shows the escalation of the U.S. national debt over the past 7 years, the annual service charge on the debt that must be paid, administrative income and the percentage of administrative income allocated to this item.

[Dollar amounts in billions]

Year	National debt	Service charge	U.S. administrative income	Percentage service charge
1969	$367	$15.8	$143	11.0
1970	382	18.3	143	12.7
1971	410	19.6	134	14.6
1972	437	20.6	149	13.8
1973	468	22.8	161	14.1
1974	486	27.8	185	15.0
1975	508	29.1	202	14.4

Obviously, our escalating debt, escalating service charge, and escalating service charge as a percentage of income dictates and demands moderation.

Since we spend 95 percent of all military funds spent in this hemisphere, and *60 percent of all military funds expended in the world*, we need constantly to review our posture in this regard.

The short chart that follows, prepared by committee counsel, shows the action of our House Armed Services Committee in various subject areas of the pending bill.

H.R. 12564

[In thousands of dollars]

	Requested by DOD	Recommended by committee
Procurement:		
Aircraft:		
Army	339,500	335,000
Navy and Marine Corps	2,960,600	2,964,100
Air Force	3,496,600	3,391,400
Missiles:		
Army	459,200	439,400
Navy	620,600	620,600
Marine Corps	76,000	76,000
Air Force	1,610,800	1,610,800
Naval vessels: Navy	3,562,600	3,539,100
Tracked combat vehicles:		
Army	331,900	321,200
Marine Corps	80,100	74,200
Torpedoes: Navy	187,700	187,700
Other weapons:		
Army	53,400	55,700
Navy	25,600	25,600
Marine Corps	500	500
Total procurement	13,805,100	13,641,300
Research, development, test, and evaluation:		
Army	1,985,976	1,878,397
Navy	13,264,503	13,153,006
Air Force	3,518,860	3,459,760
Defense agencies	555,700	510,500
Total R.D.T. & E	9,325,039	9,001,663
Grand total	23,130,129	22,642,963
SUMMARY		
Net change in procurement (title I)		—163,800
Net change in R.D.T. & E. (title II)		—323,376
Total reduction		—487,176

Lest we believe that every cent in the defense budget is vital to national security, we should consider this testimony given by the Secretary of Defense to the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee on February 17, 1974, in response to allegations that the budget contained $5 billion worth of padding:

> "It was recognized late in calendar year 1974 that *there may be an easing of the economy and some growth in unemployment* and that as a consequence of that, the total figure for the budget outlays would be relaxed. . . . *If there had not been this perception of an easing economic environment I believe our outlays might have been a billion dollars or a billion and a half dollars less in 1975.*"

In short, the Secretary had admitted to **a billion or a billion and a half WPA dollars intermixed with the national security budget.**

We had further evidence of Pentagon padding in the FY 74 Supplemental request, which included $108.6 million for research and development. The Committee decided the request was not sufficiently urgent to warrant supplemental action, and suggested the Defense Department make a strong appeal for these funds in the FY 75 regular budget if it so desired. Now we find not one word about these programs in the '75 request; the previously vital programs are no longer vital. To me it seems the DOD sometimes means what it says and sometimes does not.

TITLE I. PROCUREMENT

A. TRIDENT SUBMARINE

The submarine-launched ballistic missile system is probably as important as the rest of the military establishment combined. It is secure from detection and is expected to remain so in the foreseeable future. Of all our weapons systems, it makes the greatest contribution to national security, and at the same time is not provocative. By increasing the range of the missile, the Trident I and Trident II systems will provide a prudent hedge against the possibility of unforeseen breakthroughs in Soviet anti-submarine technique.

In short, I favor the Trident concept. However, the very high *rate* at which the Navy plans to build the ten ships is, in my view, unwise.

It is not sufficient for a system to be sound in concept; it must be reliable in operation. The Polaris submarine-launched missile system, which had the benefit of a thorough and careful R&D program, was perhaps the most reliable missile system ever built. The Poseidon, which was not developed as carefully, has been somewhat less reliable but still creditable. It would be disastrous if this trend were to continue and we were to find our underwater security dependent upon an aquatic C–5A.

The surest way to induce unreliability, as well as cost overruns, is to rush the program. The worst aspect of a rushed program is what is called "concurrency": placing the system full into production while a substantial amount of the RDT&E remains to be done.

The arguments for accelerated development are not persuasive.

1. There is no need to rush Trident into the water to meet a Soviet threat to Polaris-Poseidon ships, since *the threat does not exist.* On

the contrary, at this point we cannot even speculate on the nature of the threat which might develop. Thus, the sooner we construct the ships the more we increase the possibility that they may be inappropriate to the threat they may eventually face. I believe the House Appropriations Committee was entirely correct in its rejection of the Trident acceleration in the FY '74 Supplemental. Its report stated:

> "The Committee recommends that the $24,800,000 requested to accelerate Trident submarine construction from one per year, as recommended by the Congress in fiscal year 1974, to two per year not be appropriated.
>
> "It is the considered judgment of the Committee that with new Navy initiatives, such as the strategic cruise submarine-launched missile, the available options to backfit the Trident I missile into our 10 Polaris, and 31 Poseidon submarines, and the proposed NARWHAL submarine as a low cost option to the Trident submarine, *an acceleration of the Trident submarine construction effort cannot be justified.* The Committee is also mindful of the backlog of new construction and conversion of ships and submarines at the two large nuclear-capable shipyards which are involved in the Trident submarine program, and the problems they and many shipyards are having in obtaining skilled labor.
>
> "All of these factors seem to mandate a prudent and cautious, but deliberate course in the construction of Trident submarines. *There must be a reasonable limit or plateau that should be achieved in spending merely for the sake of 'bargaining chips'.* The Trident submarine construction rate of one per year as directed by Congress appears to be a sufficient demonstration that this country has the national resolve to modernize and maintain our sea-based missile deterrent in a current status technologically, without risking an escalation or renewal of the arms race."

2. While submarines do wear out, there is no indication that a 1-per-year Trident program will leave Polaris boats in operation longer than would be justified by safety considerations. On the other hand, it is undeniable that the sooner we launch the Tridents the sooner they will wear out and the sooner we will need the next generation SSBN. Moreover, if we buy Tridents in rapid succession they will wear out in rapid succession, thus forcing us into excessive concurrency on the next generation and more block obsolesance.

It is claimed that faster procurement is cheaper. *This is only true if the acceleration does not produce difficulties.* In my views, it is probable that problems, and therefore increased costs, will arise from the accelerated schedule proposed by the Navy.

Therefore, I will propose an amendment to reduce the procurement schedule to one ship per year from the Navy's proposed two.

I propose to reduce the $1,166.8 million two-ship program to $700.00 million, which would consist of last year's $627.8 million one-step program plus a reasonable inflation allowance.

I do not propose to reduce research and development. Neither do I propose to reduce procurement of the Trident I missile, which can and should be retrofitted into the existing Poseidon submarines.

B. DD–963

In additional views appended to the FY '74 report, I described the Landing Heavy Assault (LHA) program as "one of the worst disasters in the history of American military procurement". While this rhetoric may have been somewhat overdramatic, subsequent events have not impugned the accuracy of the assertion. **At the time of last year's report, these five ships were two years behind schedule. Today they are 2½ years behind;** the cost is sitting on the contract ceiling and we can expect, before we have the ships in hand, to find the contractor rewarded for his delays by payments well above the ceiling.

The same contractor in the same shipyard—Litton Industries in Pascagoula, Mississippi—is building another series of ships: the thirty large anti-submarine destroyers of the DD–963 class. This program is clearly headed for similar or worse problems.

The new "assembly-line" method used in this shipyard has received much publicity, but it is not the source of the problem.

The difficulty stems from the inability of the contractor to attract sufficient quantity and quality of labor to the site of the shipyard. Total labor force on the DD–963 program is presently 23% below program. The problem is increasing rather than decreasing, with 10.6% attrition but only 9.9% accession between September, 1972, and September, 1973. The shipyard today is 4000 men short and is unable to accelerate employment.

The quality of the work force, according to the General Accounting Office, is as substandard as the quantity. The journeyman/apprentice ratio has been about 1.4/1, where 2/1 is considered desirable. While this ratio has remained relatively stable, the quality of the apprentice force has declined markedly, with the percentage having less than one year's experience soaring from 18% in October, 1972, to 41% in August, 1973. *The contractor sees no prospects for improvement.*

These are the results:

1. *Scheduling.* The first two ships, DD–963 and DD–964, have been launched on schedule. However, this has been a mere public relations gesture, accomplished by launching them in an *incomplete* state. Ship 963 was launched 50% complete, in contrast to the original plan calling for 75–85% completion at launch.

Whereas the original plan called for 9½ months in which to complete 20% of the work after launch, the contractor will now have to perform 50% of the work in the same time period to achieve on-time delivery. This would require working at 2½ times the originally expected pace. If we generously assume work at the planned pace, we must project a 24-month schedule slippage. If we more realistically assume work at two-thirds the planned pace, we find ourselves facing a *three-year* slippage. And this is only the first of the 30 ships.

2. *Cost.* Program unit cost has so far kept reasonably consistent with the general inflation. However,

a. Delays inevitably require the contract to be performed in an inflated economy, which increases the cost to the contractor.

b. Litton is now asking for an additional $7 million per ship.

c. With only 2 of the 30 ships in the water, the Navy has already told us it expects the cost to go to ceiling (130% of target price).

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d. A number of expensive subsystems (totaling perhaps 20% of the cost of the ship) are to be installed after delivery. Thus, they are not included in the systems acquisition costs. Instead, they are funded by the Other Procurement, Navy (OPN) and Operations and Maintenance (O&M) budgets, which receive relatively light scrutiny and are therefore prime breeding grounds for what is known in the trade as **"contract nourishment".**

3. *Performance.* We are not yet capable of judging the performance of the system. However, our experience has been that late delivery and cost overruns do not usually go hand-in-hand with satisfactory performance.

I believe it to be a real mistake to authorize the last of the 30 ships, thus effectively giving up the Armed Services Committee's control over this program. A similar mistake was made on the LHA program, in which we finished authorizing the last of the 5 ships last year, yet the Navy has still to see its first L.H.A.

I do not propose to reduce or cancel the program. At this point, I merely emphasize that the reasons for the difficulty—difficult location and inadequate management—were entirely subject to the control of the contractor at the time he made his bid. It is he, and not the taxpayers, who should bear the burden of his inability to live up to the contract.

According to the recent report to the Congress by the General Accounting Office, the Navy and its contracting officer have made sincere and vigorous efforts to adhere to the terms of the contract. I commend them for it. It would be my intention to see that the full 30 ships will be delivered with satisfactory performance at **not one cent above the contract ceiling,** and we wish to make the contractor aware that, from all indications, *the 94th Congress will be more receptive to this position than has any Congress in the recent past.*

TITLE II. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

Title II of H.R. 14592 is entitled *Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation.* Last year the Congress funded $8,091,000,000. This year the Department of Defense escalated the request to $9,325,039,000; a 12½ percent increase. After two months of hearing our R.D.T. & E. Subcommittee, of which I am a member, reduced this request $323,376,000, or **3.4 percent.** There are a number of projects in this title that can stand a further reduction in this title. We made no substantial reduction in *SAM–D, AWACS, Site Defense* or *Trident.*

At the appropriate time, I will offer an amendment to effect a further percentage reduction in Research Programs. I believe, with a three-service multi-billion dollar Research Program and with an additional Office of Secretary of Defense umbrella program, that there is a multi-million dollar overlap that should be curtailed.

A. SITE DEFENSE ABM

The pros and cons of antiballistic missile systems have been discussed at length in previous reports. Very briefly, I regard the Safeguard as ludicrously inadequate from its basic concept onward, and I regard it as now self-evident that the $8 billion this system has and will siphon out of the taxpayers' pocket is so much money down the drain. In contrast, Site Defense appears to be intelligently designed

and technically capable of increasing the survivability of our fixed base Minuteman ICBMs against a reasonably vigorous threat.

However, Site Defense operates under two handicaps:

A. *The Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) sets a limit* of 100 interceptors, whereas many hundreds would be required before Site Defense could add significantly to our deterrent.

B. *Site Defense is incompatible with the Administration's headlong rush for maximum ICBM accuracy.* As I point out under "Dangerous Nuclear Programs" later in these additional views, if we fund the development of high accuracy, there will be no way to negotiate the Soviets out of also deploying high accuracy warheads. They will thus be able to use very small yields as silo-killers, which means they will be able to use large numbers of warheads on each ICBM at low cost. Thus, they will be able to exhaust Site Defense far more cheaply than we could expand it. It is important to note that the same unlikely and tragic circumstances that would permit deployment of Site Defense—abrogation of SALT I—would almost certainly be accompanied by the failure of SALT II and the consequent technological developments that would neutralize any ABM.

Therefore, we shall move to amend the Site Defense authorization, reducing the $160 million prototype demonstration program to a $110 million technology program.

B. SAM–1

Secretary of Defense Schlesinger has wisely pointed out that, since the United States has no technological choice but to remain vulnerable to Soviet missiles, there is no sense spending money to defend against bombers.

Thus, **the only function of the SAM–D anti-aircraft system will be to defend our allies.** This $6 billion program makes a very expensive charity item in these days of precarious economic security.

Therefore, it would be desirable for the Secretary of Defense to seek commitments from our allies to pay in cash a minimum of one-half the total program cost of the system, and to include the result of his efforts in his annual report for FY '76. If these commitments are not in hand at the time of the report, it is my view that the program should be abandoned.

C. DANGEROUS NUCLEAR PROGRAMS

It is natural to assume that any technological development which offers increased military capability at relatively modest cost is a good thing. Unfortunately, this is not always true. The present bill contains four nuclear weapons programs which, while increasing our nominal military effectiveness, give us no useful ability we would not have already. Moreover, **they would decrease national security by increasing the probability of nuclear war.**

1. Three of the programs in question are strategic:

(*a*) $25 million for engineering development to increase the yield of Minuteman warheads.

(*b*) $32 million for maneuvering re-entry vehicles (MaRV) to improve the accuracy of Minuteman.

(*c*) $20 million for advanced research on terminal guidance of warheads.

The purpose of all three programs is to increase our ability to destroy hard targets. These programs are sometimes presented as offering a more "humane" way of fighting nuclear war, allowing us to attack "military and industrial" targets rather than cities.

This characterization is not entirely accurate. A steel mill is an impressive and imposing structure if you plan to strike it with your fist, but in nuclear terms it is a very soft target; we can easily destroy it with the accuracy-yield combination found in our present Minuteman warheads. The same is true of all Soviet factories, refineries, troop concentrations, tank parks, etc. *The only hard targets of any significance are missile silos.*

If we wish to destroy a small number of Soviet silos as a show of force, we can do so with our present warheads; higher accuracy and yield are not needed.

If we wish to develop the capability to destroy all Soviet silos, we have to use terminal guidance. The problem is that such a capability would force the Soviets to adopt a "launch on warning" policy, emptying their silos on radar warning of a U.S. attack rather than riding out the attack. This would neutralize our capability—even highly accurate warheads cannot destroy a missile that isn't there—and it would greatly increase the probability of accidental war. Even if the Soviets for some reason did not launch on warning, **our hard-target capability would still be suicidal** in that it would bring retaliation from the Soviet missile submarine fleet.

Thus, there are no benefits and considerable losses in this program. The Senate Research and Development Subcommittee recognized this in killing these programs, pointing out that our goal should be to enhance the survivability of our deterrent, not to chase the ill-defined mirage of "counterforce capability".

Several years ago, Congress unwisely approved the development of MIRV. Since MIRV deployment cannot be verified without on-site inspection, once we had tested MIRV the Soviets had no choice but to assume we had deployed it, and **we lost the opportunity to negotiate a MIRV ban.** Now the Soviets have their own MIRV, there is no way to negotiate them out of deploying it, and there is great—although in my view unwarranted—concern about its significance. The U.S. could have avoided the entire issue by going slow on testing and fast on negotiations; it does no one credit that we did the opposite.

The proposed warhead-improvement programs present a similar but more serious problem. Just as MIRV deployment cannot be verified, so deployment of high-accuracy warheads cannot be verified. Worse, *testing* of high-accuracy warheads cannot be verified. If we do not prohibit the development of high accuracy, the Soviets will have to assume we have achieved the ability to destroy all their silos. They will then either abandon their fixed-base ICBMs or place them on launch-on-warning status. Given their present truculent mood, it seems more likely that they will choose the latter course; **we will thus have increased the probability of nuclear war and gained nothing by doing so.**

The Pentagon has proposed that we deploy smaller, cleaner tactical nuclear weapons for use in Europe. The rationale is that our present large, dirty weapons would cause so much collateral damage to the surrounding friendly countryside that we would be afraid to use

them, whereas the smaller weapons would cause less collateral damage, and we could therefore resort to them more easily.

This argument rests on two assumptions:

(*a*) The Soviets, having only old-fashioned large dirty nuclear weapons, will refrain from using them in retaliation because they share our concern for collateral damage to the soil of our allies and their enemies.

(*b*) Even if the Soviet also devleop small nukes, if we cross the nuclear firebreak first, the Soviets will not feel compelled to respond by attacking us with weapons slightly larger, whereupon we will counter-respond with weapons still larger, and we will very shortly find ourselves in an all-out nuclear war.

The evidence for either of these propositions is distinguished by its total nonexistence. It would be the height of folly to take any steps that would make crossing the nuclear firebreak easier. Among all the military failures and foreign policy failures of the past twenty years, our one shining success has been the avoidance of nuclear war. To deliberately set out to violate this record is to take unconscionable risks with the national security.

TITLE VII. ESCALATED VIETNAM SUPPORT PROGRAM

The Committee has approved a $1.4 billion ceiling on military aid to Vietnam. This constitutes an increase of $100 million above the Committee's recommendation of last year. It is almost *$400 million above the $1,009.5 million actually spent last year* in military assistance to the Thieu government.

It is an escalation of our involvement in Indochina. I do not believe this is a policy the American people wish to pursue.

This money does not include over $183 million generated by commodity import programs in the Foreign Aid budget which is used primarily for uniforms and military constructions projects. Thus, the Committee-approved $1.4 billion would in reality give the Thieu government $1,583 billion, which, for practical purposes, is identical to the $1.6 billion requested by the Defense Department for overt military aid.

Incredibly, the evidence presented by DOD showed no change in the level of activity in Vietnam that would justify a reversal of our withdrawal. In fact, the casualty figures which DOD provided my office indicate a slight drop in military activity.

COMBAT DEATHS

Year	United States	SVN	3d country	Enemy	Totals
1963	78	5,665	----------	20,575	26,318
1964	147	7,457	1	16,785	24,390
1965	1,369	11,243	31	35,436	48,079
1966	5,008	11,953	566	55,524	73,051
1967	9,377	12,716	1,105	88,104	111,302
1968	14,589	27,915	979	181,149	224,632
1969	9,414	21,833	866	156,954	189,067
1970	4,221	23,346	704	103,638	131,909
1971	1,381	22,738	526	98,094	122,739
1972	300	39,587	443	131,949	172,279
1973	202	11,093	4	38,858	50,157
1974[1]	----------	10,107	----------	38,514	48,621
Totals	46,086	205,653	5,225	965,580	1,222,544

[1] Projection based on KIA rates of 1st 4 months.

Coupled with this evidence of no change in activity is the report received last year that **the amount of gunfire on both sides in Vietnam is directly related to the amount of ammunition supplied to the ARVN.** Thus, if we are truly interested in bringing peace to Indochina, a reduction in our military aid would seem far more appropriate than an increase.

Since the most effective means the House has of making itself heard on matters of policy is budgetary action, it is imperative that Congressional ceilings on expenditures be observed *to the letter.*

Both the House and the Senate have made themselves very clear on the subject of spending ceilings for this program. The House has rejected an attempt to simply ignore the ceiling, and the Senate has rejected an attempt to spend $266 million miraculously discovered in a Pentagon closet. In addition, the Committee has strengthened the language of the requirement for reporting obligation of this money.

Taken together, I hope that these measures will prevent a recurrence of any action by the Department of Defense, however inadvertent, whose effect would be to obviate the intent of the Congress.

This year's MASF budget includes $86.8 million for petroleum supplies for the Vietnamese armed forces, almost twice last year's expenditure of $42.9 million. Military gasoline has a way of winding up on sale to the public in Vietnam; last year we reduced those supplies 20 percent in an effort to curb this black marketeering. By June of 1973, it became apparent that commercial gasoline sales had increased by almost exactly that amount. Since that time, energy resources have become much harder to come by; our own citizens and military establishment have had to do with much less. I believe it only fair to require the Vietnamese to do likewise.

In a recent interview in the *Washington Post*, former Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird commented on the war in Vietnam:

> *"The South Vietnamese can handle them. They have enough pilots. It's their foot soldiers who are important. If there is no will, it's their own tough luck. We have done everything that we told them we were going to do. That's what Vietnamization is all about. The fighting will continue for 20 years."* [1]

I concur with their judgment: without the Vietnamese "will", no amount of our money will make a difference. I do not believe that the American people want to spend 2.7 billion [2] a year for 20 years. Can we afford that in good conscience while telling our veterans that we cannot find $250 million per year to satisfy our "debt of honor" to them? I believe not.

It is time we served notice that the United States Treasury is not a bottomless grab bag for another 20 years of corruption and carnage in Vietnam. We do not propose to "cut and run" from Vietnam; a military assistance budget of $900 million is only *10 percent below the level we sent to Saigon last year; many of our own military programs have survived far greater cuts.* But if we mean to disengage from Vietnam, if we mean to participate in a peace instead of continuing war, we must continue the deescalation of military aid we began last year.

[1] Washington Post, May 5, *Potomac* Supplement, pp. 28–29.
[2] $1.4 billion in direct military aid, $500 million in incremental military costs; $800 million or more in other categories.

On this item, therefore, I propose to offer an amendment reducing this Vietnam Aid by $500 million. If the amendment carried, the Vietnam assistance account for 1975, as compared to 1974, would look like this:

FUNDS FOR U.S. PROGRAMS IN SOUTH VIETNAM FOR FISCAL YEARS 1974 AND 1975

[In thousands of dollars]

	Fiscal year—	
	1974 programed	1975 proposed
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE		
Military assistance service funded (MASF):		
Army:		
Operations and maintenance	355,900	
Procurement	80,400	
Military personnel	40,400	
Total	476,700	
Operations and maintenance	247,100	
Procurement	278,400	
Military personnel	0	
Air Force: Total	525,500	
Navy:		
Operations and maintenance	19,900	
Procurement	0	
Military personnel	0	
Total	19,900	
Total MASF	1,022,100	900,000
Defense attache's office	(1)	(1)
Excess defense articles	35,000	35,000
Local currency purchases	63,600	(1)
Department total [2]	1,120,700	935,000
DEPARTMENT OF STATE		
Direct expenses	5,086	5,086
Shared administrative expenses (Department of State portion)	2,611	2,585
Total	7,697	7,672
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (AID)		
Indochina postwar reconstruction assistance (IPR):		
Technical assistance	40,000	(1)
Humanitarian assistance	35,000	(1)
Commercial import program	190,000	(1)
Undistributed	35,000	(1)
Total	[3] 300,000	(1)
Narcotics control	205	(1)
Population control	750	(1)
Development loans	110,000	(1)
Total	410,955	602,540
Public Law 480 shipments: [4]		
Title I	309,027	182,550
Title II	500	553
Total	309,527	183,103
Total	720,482	785,743
U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY [5]		
U.S. Information Service, South Vietnam:		
Direct costs	1,887	2,059
Support costs	574	595
Total	2,461	2,654
Regional post equipment:		
Officer (administrative servicing)	48	49
Direct costs	41	39
Saigon correspondent staff (Voice of America): Direct costs	2,550	2,742
Total		

See footnotes at end of table.

FUNDS FOR U.S. PROGRAMS IN SOUTH VIETNAM FOR FISCAL YEARS 1974 AND 1975—Continued

[In thousands of dollars]

	Fiscal year—	
	1974 programed	1975 proposed
DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION (DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE)		
Salaries, benefits, foreign allowances	125	125
Shared administration expenses (payable to Department of State)	20	22
Operating expenses	19	20
Total	164	167
FEDERAL SUPPLY SERVICE (GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION)		
Salaries and related expenses	39	0
Travel (in country)	1	0
Total	40	0
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY		
Exchange stabilization fund—Assessment of South Vietnam's financial and economic development	100	109
Total	100	109
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE (IRS)		
Salaries and related expenses	31	[2][1]
Administrative expenses	14	[1]
Total	45	[1]
U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE		
Salaries and other personnel expenses	281	0
Shared administrative expenses (payable to Department of State)[3]	57	0
Total	338	0
U.S. Government total	1,852,116	1,731,433

[1] Not available.
[2] On Mar. 18, 1974, the Department of Defense submitted a request to have the fiscal year 1974 spending ceiling of $1,126,000,000 for South Vietnam and Laos raised to $1,600,000,000. No breakdown is available showing the portion of the $474,000,000 increase that would be spent in South Vietnam. The Department of Defense told us that the increase in spending would be financed by funds appropriated but unobligated in prior years.
[3] On Mar. 18, 1974, AID submitted a request for a $54,000,000 supplemental appropriation for fiscal year 1974 in South Vietnam.

The following members of the Committee concur with the foregoing supplementary views.

RONALD V. DELLUMS,
Member of Congress.
PATRICIA SCHROEDER,
Member of Congress.

DISSENTING VIEWS BY HON. LES ASPIN

The problem with this Authorization bill is that it is too high.

The last few years in the House we have moved toward limiting federal spending and toward treating all federal programs equally in holding down increases. Attesting to that is last year's vote establishing a budget ceiling of 267.1 billion dollars for all federal spending and last December's vote approving the Budget Control Act which will eventually mandate specific ceilings on the entire federal budget.

In this year's budget many federal programs *are* being held down. Listed below are some programs for which the jurisdiction has remained unchanged, and figures showing the differences between what was appropriated last year and what was requested for this year.

INCREASES IN SEVERAL FEDERAL PROGRAMS

[In millions of dollars]

	Fiscal year 1974 appropriations	Fiscal year 1975 request	Percent change
Consolidate grants for elementary/secondary education	2,674.4	2,875.5	+7.3
Drug abuse	760.0	745.1	−2.0
Health services	1,176.0	1,177.0	+.0008
Biomedical research	1,781.0	1,835.0	+3.0
LEAA	871.1	886.5	+1.8
Manpower programs	2,451.2	2,578.8	+5.2
Military procurement and R. & D.	20,162.2	23,130.1	+14.7

An exception to the overall trend is Military R&D and Procurement. The request for Military R&D and Procurement was 14.7 percent higher than last year's Appropriation. The House Armed Services Committee, in the bill reported here, made a miniscule cut of only 2.1 percent. So, not counting transfers, the bill before us increases spending for these defense programs by 12.6 percent over last year's Appropriation. Other federal programs are not being increased by such a large amount.

There is no reason why the House Armed Services Committee could not have reduced this bill by more. After all the Appropriations Committee does it every single year.

R. & D. AND PROCUREMENT

[In millions of dollars]

	House authorized	House appropriated	Difference
Fiscal year:			
1974	21,394	20,021	−1,373
1973	20,949	19,564	−1,358
1972	21,316	20,461	−855
1971	19,929	18,997	−932
1970	20,710	18,961	−1,749
1969	21,625	18,491	−3,134

The Appropriations Committee every year reports out a defense bill which is lower than the bill of the Armed Services Committee not by cutting out any major programs but by cutting out little amounts here and there. And those minor cuts seem to be acceptable. No one accuses the Appropriations Committee of cutting the "bone and the muscle" of our defense. No one gets up on the floor of the House to offer amendments to put back in what the Appropriations Committee took out.

The point is that if acceptable cuts can be found in the Appropriations bill, acceptable cuts can be found in the Authorization bill which is here before us. The need for reduced federal spending is widely accepted by the American people. The budgets for other programs have been held down or cut back—the Department of Defense should not be and need not be an exception.

DISSENTING VIEWS OF REPRESENTATIVE RONALD V. DELLUMS

Obviously this is one of the most important bills considered by Congress. The size of the military bureaucracy and the amount of money needed to supply its hardware dwarfs the wildest dream of any non-defense agency administrator. Only the military budget is significant enough itself to set limits to what the whole government can do or hope to do. In fact, the size of the military budget is the central issue determining domestic reform.

As Secy. Schlesinger has clearly told us, this first completely post-Indochina budget shows us what can be expected for the indefinite future—unless some basic assumptions are changed.

It is the first indication of what can be expected from a supposedly peacetime government. Unfortunately, the answer is: not much. Whatever else "peace" means for this Administration, it does not mean any commitment to creativity in any other field besides military hardware or to any renewed dedication to working out real problems.

At home, we see this in the fact that while every other government agency and program is scraped to the bone, especially the human needs programs, and forced to show "efficiency dividends" at the expense of significant accomplishment—*only the military* maintains its rate of growth without any substantial savings, in fact with a growth rate that outstrips the overall rate of inflation.

We must realize this: in an era of tightened resources and hard choices, we must choose either tax reform and defense cuts on the one hand, or a helpless government facing multiplying social problems on the other. If the defense budget is untouchable, the rest of the government must wither away.

Abroad, we see this when we notice that détente does *not* mean an end (1) to our world-wide military presence, (2) to our ability to fight any war at any time, (3) to our dedication to keeping dictators in power through any means necessary, or (4) to the same perception of political and strategic realities that dominated foreign policy thinking twenty years ago.

So we are forced to ask ourselves, "Is détente any different from the cold war? Does it make any difference at all? What's the use of it then?

I—Manpower Levels

Manpower costs comprise 55% of the military budget. This figure does not include the increasingly heavy burden of veterans benefits, which the Administration never includes in its military spending figures, but which this year will be $13.6 billion. We will undoubtedly save some money if we end some of the unneeded and costly weapons systems such as the atomic aircraft carrier, the B–1 bomber, the Trident or destabilizing land-based missiles—*but we will never touch the bulk of the huge military budget* until we revise our assumptions about the

use of manpower. It is here that the Pentagon's refusal to come up with any real "efficiency dividend" is most flagrant, as grade-creep, wasteful support-to-combat ratios and other abuses continue unchecked.

Yet why do we need all these men in the first place? This is the central question, and yet in the course of the normal appropriations process, it almost never gets asked. Last year I asked the Pentagon for the diplomatic and military reasoning for our 600,000 troops overseas. On the diplomatic side, I found that our level of troops abroad is in no case determined by treaty. On the military side, I found vague, worn-out formulas that hadn't changed for 10 years. I began to suspect that our half-million men are maintained all over the world at enormous expense *not* from any valid strategic reason, but *simply* because of bureaucratic inertia.

Events of the past few years show us that this neglect cannot continue. Our military presence is no longer a tool of foreign policy; instead, foreign policy is more and more determined by the needs of our military presence. My basic point here is that our troop commitments were *not* arrived at by constitutional processes of congressional control; in fact, they represent abdication of control—over not only to the executive, but to foreign countries as well.

First of all, there are *no* specific treaty obligations that force Congress to approve *any level* of troop commitment. Exact figures for each country are the result of *executive* agreements, and are not submitted to Congress for approval. Furthermore, such figures are the result of political foreign policy calculations—and are not based on military matters to which we may legitimately defer to military experts.

The last point is crucial. There is only one factor from which we are forced to rely on assurances of the Pentagon: whether a force level in a certain country is necessary or sufficient to repel the threat that is responsible for its presence overseas. Yet, in almost no case, is the Pentagon able to give us this assurance.

Either our forces are unnecessary or they are not sufficient. Let me give an example of each. The South Koreans have one of the most battle-hardened armies in the world. It has well over 600,000 people under arms, and many of these have had combat experience in Vietnam. The North Koreans have an army of less than a half million who have done nothing beyond border sniping since 1953. We assume the South Koreans will have the advantage of a defensive posture.

In other words, if any nation is relatively secure, it is South Korea. Yet we have a top heavy military establishment there of 40,000 troops which add a mere 7,000 fighting men in the combat division we station there to provide ground combat support to the South Korean forces—although we must pay for all 40,000 men, when we count support and command troops. If the Nixon Doctrine can be applied anywhere, it is in Korea. Given any sense of logic, there is no justification for the presence of these men, and we should bring them home.

An example of where troops are not sufficient is in Europe. Briefly stated, the fact is that *NATO is now—and long has been—vulnerable to a Soviet conventional attack.* If this basic military fact is not accepted by my colleagues, the debate on overseas troops will always remain out-of-focus.

The Pentagon has recently changed its line on NATO's conventional capability—surprisingly enough, when it became helpful as far as its budget requests were concerned. However, the following facts should be kept in mind when assessing these claims:

(1) Unless the European allies are willing to make real sacrifices to provide adequate defense, it will be impossible to structure a truly adequate combat-effectiveness conventional ground force of sufficient size to offset the superior Warsaw Pact ground forces. Yet the basic fact is that our NATO allies *have not been willing*, over the last 15–20 years, to make such sacrifices.

Why do we continue to second-guess the people directly concerned, the West European public? Surely their stake in the matter is far greater than even our own. They are not incapable of making sacrifices—they simply do not perceive any fundamental threat that is not taken care of by the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Our attempts to find ways to 'limit the damage' to the West European theater are not greatly appreciated by the Europeans themselves.

(2) The Randall Report indicates that the Warsaw Pact has superiority in numbers of men and armor. A recent RAND study on NATO military policy indicates the Pact forces are also superior in numbers of tactical aircraft, missiles, artillery and mortar tubes. In view of this evident superiority in practically all areas of conventional contest, how can it be said that the NATO conventional force "is not a tripwire"?

(3) The Department of Defense estimates that the FY 1974 balance of payments deficit relating to NATO deployments will be approximately $2.1 billion—an increase of $600 million over the reported FY 1973 deficit.

(4) Another political factor cited by those opposing troop reductions anywhere is the mutual force reduction talks now going on in Europe. We are told that *any* unilateral move *anywhere* will undercut our negotiators. Although most impartial observers agree that after almost a year of talk, all that has been accomplished is the clarification of how diametrically opposed are the positions of the two superpowers, we in Congress are given the line that great progress is being made, that significant troop cuts can be expected shortly.

What exactly can we rationally expect from this very complicated multilateral conference where most of the parties concerned are actively opposed to troop reductions? When considering this question we should remember that the Soviet Union has no interest in expediting the negotiations, since the longer they wait, the more intolerable will be our irrational commitment in domestic terms, and the more damaging to European unity will be unilateral cuts when they come.

It is the presence of the troops that will cause an acceleration of the "unraveling" process, not a cut based on perception of the realities. Furthermore, the Soviets are glad for an excuse to keep their occupation troops in eastern Europe under the guise of "defense".

In other words, the Mutual Force Reduction talks have not yet gotten off dead center. How long can we allow these negotiations to completely tie our hands in relation to military policy towards Europe?

(5) Recent testimony by General Davison (CINCUSAEUR) rated morale in the U.S. Seventh Army as no more than "good" and discipline—essential to effective combat readiness—as only "fair".

To sum up: if we wish to defend Europe with conventional capabilities—or rather, defend *ourselves in* Europe, a distinction the Europeans themselves understand very well—we must buckle down our belts, tell the U.S. public to accept greater economic burdens, re-institute the

draft, and get down to work. If—more rationally—we decide to accept the West European scale of priorities, then we will cut back on our presence there. *Either way you look at it, our present position is unsatisfactory.*

Europe is not fundamental to the overall overseas manpower question, however. We could easily cut back up to 200,000 troops without affecting Europe and I intend to offer a floor amendment of that nature. For all these reasons, manpower levels are the most logical place to cut the military budget without loss of defense capability.

II—Military Aid to Saigon

This nation is a signatory to the Paris Agreements and yet we are in serious violation of that true. Our client, General Thieu, has made a mockery of the Paris Agreements; there is probably not an article that Thieu has not flagrantly violated.

Nevertheless, American taxpayers are virtually the sole financial support for Thieu. Estimates indicate that *our* tax dollars account for 85% of Thieu's national budget, and I would like to call attention once again to the figures noted by our Colleague from New York, Mr. Pike, in the floor debate on the Supplemental Aid to Vietnam, when he pointed out that the South Vietnamese defense budget dropped from $1.3 billion in 1971 to only $474 million budgeted for this year.

American dollars allow Thieu to continue a war that took approximately 60 thousand lives last year; American dollars pay for a police state in which thousands of Vietnamese are held political prisoner without benefit of trial; American dollars pay for the security of a petty dictator who refuses to allow distribution of the Paris Agreements in his areas, who holds illegal elections, forbids neutralism, and employes systematic torture.

It is a sham to say there is peace in Vietnam, and a lie to claim there is "honor" in American policy towards that tragic nation. What honor for us can there be when Thieu's biggest friend also happens to be the American Ambassador? I do not think this is the forum to deal with all of Ambassador Martin's follies, but I would like to bring attention to the fact that Martin himself has admitted that he is permitting outright American violation of the Paris Agreement. Despite legislative mandate and terms of the Paris Agreement, in a memo printed in the April 4, 1974 Congressional Record on Page E2117, Ambassador Martin notes that "A certain number of people in the Defense Attache Office were retained, engaged solely on logistics assistance to the military forces of South Vietnam." To me, that appears to be a flagrant violation of both Congressional intent and the Paris Agreement.

Finally, let me indicate what I see occurring if huge flows of American military assistance continue to Thieu—as the General and the Administration desire. As long as America picks up the tab for his military operations and for his repeated violations of the Paris Agreement, Thieu will continue the war. I do not think the Provisional Revolutionary Government will allow that to happen for any prolonged period—and up to now, the P.R.G. has concentrated on achieving a political settlement based upon the Paris Agreements and has undertaken only limited military operations. But I do not think it realistic for us to assume that the P.R.G. and its allies would remain so passive, if it becomes apparent that Thieu will never agree to any

of the political components of the Paris Accords and that America will continuously fund Thieu's aggression. Whenever that point is reached, I think that massive fighting will break out again, and we will be back to the situation of a decade ago.

Given that chance, it is conceivable that, based upon the implicit commitment Secy. Kissinger has made, large-scale American forces could be re-introduced in Vietnam.

Have we not learned from the past decade in Vietnam? How long is this tragedy to continue? As long as Congress allows Thieu to mock the Paris Agreements by his repeated offensives, by his refusing basic human rights guaranteed by the Agreements, and by gestapo-tactics which pervert the legal system in Vietnam, it is we who must take the responsibility for war in Vietnam.

I do not oppose the concept of humanitarian assistance to the people of Vietnam. But this bill provides nothing of that sort. Instead, the American taxpayer once again assumes the burden of Thieu's military budget. As long as we do so—and no matter what level ceiling we may impose—there will be continuing war in Vietnam.

If instead, our nation is to abide by the Paris Agreements—something we have not done up to now—Congress must insist that Thieu live up to the terms set in Paris. I intend to offer an amendment on the floor proposing that all military aid be suspended until we are assured that Thieu is in accord with the Paris Agreements and I urge my colleagues to support that motion.

III—Summary

In simple terms, this bill continues the disastrous trend of blind faith militarism and adventurism which has dominated policy-making in this nation the past thirty years and which, over the past decade, has destroyed and distorted the American economy, shattered the political and social framework upon which our democracy was created, and killed and maimed hundreds of thousands of persons throughout the world. There is a massive difference between what funds should be required to provide for the common defense of our nation and the huge defense budget upon which this measure is predicated, and for that reason, I am strongly opposed to this bill.

Ronald V. Dellums,
Member of Congress.

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF HON. PATRICIA SCHROEDER

FISCAL YEAR 1975 DEFENSE PROCUREMENT AUTHORIZATION

Last year in additional views to the FY 1974 Military Procurement bill, I expressed the opinion that improvements were necessary in our defense budget review—a process that involves over 40% of our taxes and invokes fundamental questions of war or peace in a nuclear age. My opinion this year remains unchanged.

The Committee is still not enthusiastic about searching out differing opinions from within and without the military; we still shy from oversight review of the programs already authorized and side-step vigorous investigation of cost-overruns and waste; we still let questions of cost-effectiveness and superior design be buried under military goldplating and political temporizing; and we remain prone to skim over the frightening potential that some weapons policies, urged as necessary to preserve the peace, may instead be leading us in the opposite direction (as for example, the new strategic nuclear options waved ahead by this bill). In many cases this has been a default of will; more often a product of the system itself.

The mood thus grows among those convinced of budget errors or excesses that Congress can do nothing more than set more or less artificial ceilings for military spending, leaving it to the Defense Department to reconstruct its budget accordingly. The circumstances perhaps permit no alternative, but the tack nonetheless seems an abdication of fundamental congressional responsibility.

Systemic reform of the defense budget process is overdue, and until it comes no one should harbor the notion that Congress can function in this area as it was intended.

Patricia Schroeder

CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW

In compliance with clause 3 of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, there is herewith printed in parallel columns the text of provisions of existing law which would be repealed or amended by the various provisions of the bill as reported.

EXISTING LAW

THE BILL AS REPORTED

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

TITLE I—PROCUREMENT

SEC. 101. Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated during the fiscal year 1975 for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes, and other weapons as authorized by law, in amounts as follows:

Aircraft

For aircraft: for the Army, $335,000,000; for the Navy and the Marine Corps, $2,964,100,000; for the Air Force, $3,391,400,000, of which $104,900,000 shall be used only for the procurement of A–7D aircraft for the Air National Guard of the United States.

Missiles

For missiles: for the Army, $439,400,000; for the Navy, $620,600,000; for the Marine Corps, $76,000,000; for the Air Force, $1,610,800,000.

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Naval Vessels

For Naval vessels: for the Navy, $3,539,100,000, of which sum $1,166,800,000 shall be used only for the Trident program; $502,500,000 shall be used only for the SSN–688 nuclear attack submarine; $244,300,000 shall be used only for the DLGN nuclear powered guided missile frigate program; $457,100,000 shall be used only for the DD–963 program; $142,900,000 shall be used only for the sea control ship program; $92,300,000 shall be used only for the patrol hydrofoil missile program; $436,500,000 shall be used only for the patrol frigate program: *Provided, however*, That, except for necessary long lead time items, no contract for the construction of these ships shall be entered into until after the Secretary of the Navy has notified the Chairmen of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees that the fire control system has been satisfactorily tested; $81,400,000 shall be used only for the fleet oiler; $116,700,000 shall be used only for a destroyer tender; $10,800,000 shall be used only for a fleet ocean tug; $104,600,000 shall be used only for the Poseidon conversion of the fleet ballistic-missile submarines; $18,300,000 shall be used only for conversion of a submarine tender; $22,000,000 shall be used only for craft; $10,400,000 shall be used only for pollution abatement craft; $30,200,000 shall be used only for outfitting material; $30,400,000 shall be used only for post delivery; $71,900,000 shall be used only for escalation on prior year programs.

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Tracked Combat Vehicles

For tracked combat vehicles: for the Army, $321,200,000; for the Marine Corps, $74,200,000.

Torpedoes

For torpedoes and related support equipment: for the Navy, $187,700,000.

Other Weapons

For other weapons: for the Army, $55,700,000; for the Navy, $25,600,000; for the Marine Corps, $500,000.

TITLE III—RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION

SEC. 201. Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated during the fiscal year 1975 for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States for research, development, test, and evaluation, as authorized by law, in amounts as follows:

For the Army, $1,878,397,000;

For the Navy (including the Marine Corps), $3,153,006,000, of which $57,500,000 shall be available only for application to surface naval gunnery (excluding the Close-In Weapon System), including gun fire control systems, gun mounts, unguided and guided ordnance, and fuzing;

EXISTING LAW

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For the Air Force, $3,459,760,000; and

For the defense agencies, $510,500,000, of which $25,000,000 is authorized for the activities of the Director of Test and Evaluation Defense.

TITLE III—ACTIVE FORCES

SEC. 301. For the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1974, and ending June 30, 1975, each component of the Armed Forces is authorized an end strength for active duty personnel as follows:

(1) The Army, 785,000;
(2) The Navy, 540,380;
(3) The Marine Corps, 196,398;
(4) The Air Force, 627,535.

TITLE IV—RESERVE FORCES

SEC. 401. For the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1974, and ending June 30, 1975, the Selected Reserve of each reserve component of the Armed Forces will be programed to attain an average strength of not less than the following:

(1) The Army National Guard of the United States, 408,000;
(2) The Army Reserve, 225,00;
(3) The Naval Reserve, 117,000;
(4) The Marine Corps Reserve, 38,000;
(5) The Air National Guard of the United States, 95,000;

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(6) The Air Force Reserve, 51,319;
(7) The Coast Guard Reserve, 11,700.

SEC. 402. The average strength prescribed by section 401 of this title for the Air National Guard of the United States shall include a force of not less than 91 flying units.

SEC. 403. The average strength prescribed by section 401 of this title for the Selected Reserve of any reserve component shall be proportionately reduced by (1) the total authorized strength of units organized to serve as units of the Selected Reserve of such component which are on active duty (other than for training) at any time during the fiscal year, and (2) the total number of individual members not in units organized to serve as units of the Selected Reserve of such component who are on active duty (other than for training or for unsatisfactory participation in training) without their consent at any time during the fiscal year. Whenever such units or such individual members are released from active duty during any fiscal year, the average strength for such fiscal year for the Selected Reserve of such reserve component shall be proportionately increased by the total authorized strength of such units and by the total number of such individual members.

TITLE V—CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

SEC. 501. (a) For the fiscal year begining July 1, 1974, and ending June 30, 1975, the Department of Defense is authorized an end strength for civilian personnel as follows:

(1) The Department of the Army, 358,717;
(2) The Department of the Navy, including the Marine Corps, 323,529;

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(3) The Department of the Air Force, 269,709;

(4) Activities and agencies of the Department of Defense (other than the military departments), 75,372.

(b) The end strength for civilian personnel prescribed in subsection (a) of this section for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1975, shall be reduced by 15,000. Such reduction shall be apportioned among the Army, Navy, Air Force and activities and agencies of the Department of Defense. The Secretary of Defense shall report to Congress within sixty days after the date of enactment of this Act on the manner in which this reduction is to be apportioned among the military services and the activities and agencies of the Department of Defense. This report shall include the rationale for each reduction.

(c) In computing the authorized end strength for civilian personnel there shall be included all direct-hire civilian personnel employed to perform military functions administered by the Department of Defense (other than those performed by the National Security Agency) whether in permanent or temporary positions and whether employed on a full-time, part-time, or intermittent basis, but excluding special employment categories for students and disadvantaged youth such as the stay-in-school campaign, the temporary summer aid program and the Federal junior fellowship program, and personnel participating in the worker-trainee opportunity program: *Provided*, That when a function, power, or duty or activity is transferred or assigned to a department or agency of the De-

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partment of Defense from a department or agency outside of the Department of Defense or from a department or agency within the Department of Defense, the civilian personnel end strength authorized for such departments or agencies of the Department of Defense affected shall be adjusted to reflect any increases or decreases in civilian personnel required as a result of such transfer or assignment. Whenever the Secretary of the military department concerned or the Secretary of Defense determines that a function, power, or duty or activity will be performed by a support services contract which had been performed by direct-hire civilian personnel employed to perform a military function administered by the Department of Defense or determines that a function, power, or duty or activity that is being performed by a support services contract will be performed by a direct-hire civilian personnel employed to perform a military function administered by the Department of Defense, the civilian personnel end strength authorized for such department or agencies of the Department of Defense affected shall be adjusted to reflect any increases or decreases in civilian personnel required as a result of such determination. The Secretary of the military department concerned or the Secretary of Defense shall promptly notify the Congress of any adjustment in the authorized end strength for civilian personnel authorized pursuant to this subsection.

SEC. 502. When the Secretary of Defense determines that such action is necessary in the national interest, he may authorize the employment of civilian personnel in excess of the number authorized by section 501: *Provided*,

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That the number of additional personnel authorized to be employed pursuant to the authority of this section shall not exceed 1 per centum of the total number of civilian personnel authorized for the Department of Defense by section 501: *Provided further*, That the Secretary of Defense shall promptly notify the Congress of any authorization to increase civilian personnel strength pursuant to this authority.

TITLE VI—MILITARY TRAINING STUDENT LOADS

SEC. 601. For the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1974, and ending June 30, 1975, each component of the Armed Forces is authorized an average military training student load as follows:

(1) The Army, 97,638;
(2) The Navy, 71,279;
(3) The Marine Corps, 26,262;
(4) The Air Force, 52,900;
(5) The Army National Guard of the United States, 12,111;
(6) The Army Reserve, 9,673;
(7) The Naval Reserve, 2,536;
(8) The Marine Corps Reserve, 3,903;
(9) The Air National Guard of the United States, 2,359;
(10) The Air Force Reserve, 1,126.

TITLE VII—GENERAL PROVISIONS

SEC. 701. (a) There are authorized to be appropriated to the Department of Defense for fiscal year 1975, $1,400,000,000 to support Vietnamese military forces on such terms and conditions as the Secretary of Defense may determine, to be administered as one fund and to be obligated only upon issuance of orders by the Secretary of Defense: *Provided*, That as of June 30, 1974, unobligated balances previously authorized for the above purpose are hereby repealed: *And provided further*, That nothing contained in this section shall be construed as authorizing the use of any such funds to support Vietnamese military forces in activities designed to provide military support and assistance to the Government of Cambodia or Laos.

(b) Within thirty days after the end of each quarter the Secretary of Defense shall render to the Committees on Armed Services and Appropriations of the Senate and of the House of Representatives, a report with respect to the obligations incurred during that quarter from appropriations authorized by this section.

TITLE VIII—NUCLEAR NAVY

SEC. 801. It is the policy of the United States of America to modernize the strike forces of the United States Navy by the construction of nuclear powered major combatant vessels and to provide for an adequate industrial base for the research, development, design, construction, operation, and maintenance for such vessels. New construction major

EXISTING LAW

TITLE 31

MONEY AND FINANCE

CHAPTER 1.—THE NATIONAL BUDGET AND AUDIT SYSTEM

THE BUDGET

§ 11. President to transmit Budget to Congress; contents thereof; transmittal of supplemental summary to Congress; transmittal of estimated expenditure summaries

(a) The President shall transmit to Congress during

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combatant vessels for the strike forces of the United States Navy authorized subsequent to the date this Act becomes law shall be nuclear powered, except as provided hereafter.

SEC. 802. DEFINITION.—For the purposes of this title, the following definition shall apply:

Major combatant vessel(s) for the strike forces of the United States Navy shall mean—

(a) combatant submarines for strategic and/or tactical missions;

(b) combatant vessels intended to operate in combat in aircraft carrier task groups (that is, aircraft carriers and the combatants which accompany them);

(c) those combatant vessels designed for independent combat missions where essentially unlimited high speed endurance will be of significant military value.

SEC. 803. The Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress each calendar year, at the same time the President submits the budget to Congress under section 11 of title 31, United States Code, a written report regarding the application of nuclear propulsion to major combatant vessels for the strike forces of the United States Navy as defined in section 802 of this Act. The report shall identify contract placement dates for their construction. Further, the report shall identify the Department of Defense plans for construction of nuclear powered major combatant vessels for the succeeding five years and certify whether such plans are adequate to provide a modern striking force

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the first fifteen days of each regular session, the Budget, which shall set forth his Budget message, summary data and text, and supporting detail. The Budget shall set forth in such form and detail as the President may determine—

(1) functions and activities of the Government;

(2) at such times as may be practicable, information on program costs and accomplishments;

(3) any other desirable classifications of data;

(4) a reconciliation of the summary data on expenditures with proposed appropriations;

(5) estimated expenditures and proposed appropriations necessary in his judgment for the support of the Government for the ensuing fiscal year, except that estimated expenditures and proposed appropriations for such year for the legislative branch of the Government and the Supreme Court of the United States shall be transmitted to the President on or before October 15 of each year, and shall be included by him in the Budget without revision;

(6) estimated receipts of the Government during the ensuing fiscal year, under (1) laws existing at the time the Budget is transmitted and also (2) under the revenue proposals, if any, contained in the Budget;

(7) actual appropriations, expenditures, and receipts of the Government during the last completed fiscal year;

(8) estimated expenditures and receipts, and actual or proposed appropriations of the Government during the fiscal year in progress;

(9) balanced statements of (1) the condition of the Treasury at the end of the last completed fiscal year, (2) the estimated condition of the Treasury at the end of the fiscal year in progress, and (3) the estimated condition of the Treasury at the end of the ensuing fiscal year if for the United States Navy and to maintain the necessary industrial base for design and construction of such vessels.

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the financial proposals contained in the Budget are adopted;

(10) all essential facts regarding the bonded and other indebtedness of the Government;

(11) such other financial statements and data as in his opinion are necessary or desirable in order to make known in all practicable detail the financial conditions of the Government;

(12) with respect to each proposal in the Budget for new or additional legislation which would create or expand any function, activity, or authority, in addition to those functions, activities, and authorities then existing or as then being administered and operated, a tabulation showing—

(A) the amount proposed in the Budget of appropriation and for expenditure in the ensuing fiscal year on account of such proposal; and

(B) the estimated appropriation required on account of such proposal in each of the four fiscal years, immediately following that ensuing fiscal year, during which such proposal is to be in effect.

(b) The President shall transmit to the Congress, on or before June 1 of each year, beginning with 1972, a supplemental summary of the Budget for the ensuing fiscal year transmitted to the Congress by the President under subsection (a) of this section. Such supplemental summary—

THE BILL AS REPORTED

(1) shall reflect with respect to that ensuing fiscal year—

(A) all substantial alterations in or reappraisals of estimates of expenditures and receipts, and

(B) all substantial obligations imposed on that budget after its transmission to the Congress;

(2) shall contain current information with respect to those matters covered by subparagraph (8) and clause (2) and (3) of subparagraph (9) of subsection (a) of this section; and

(3) shall contain such additional information, in summary form, as the President considers necessary or advisable to provide the Congress with a complete and current summary of information with respect to that Budget and the then currently estimated functions, obligations, requirements, and financial condition of the Government for that ensuing fiscal year.

(c) The President shall transmit to the Congress, on or before June 1 of each year, beginning with 1972, in such form and detail as he may determine—

(1) summaries of estimated expenditures, for the first four fiscal years following the ensuing fiscal year for which the Budget was transmitted to the Congress by the President under subsection (a) of this section, which will be required under continuing programs which have a legal commitment for future years or are considered mandatory under existing law; and

(2) summaries of estimated expenditures, in fiscal years following such ensuing fiscal year, of balances carried over from such ensuing fiscal year.

EXISTING LAW

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SEC. 804. Neither the Department of Defense nor the Office of Management and Budget, nor any other executive department or agency, nor any employee thereof shall make any request for authorization or appropriation from Congress for construction of any non-nuclear powered major combatant vessels for the strike forces of the United States Navy unless and until the President of the United States has fully advised the Congress that construction of nuclear powered vessels for such purpose is not in the national interest. Such report of the President to the Congress shall include for consideration by Congress an alternate program of nuclear powered ships with appropriate design, cost, and schedule information.

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