

vive the conference, we would be at least pinpointing something that needs to be emphasized in this day and age, because one day we will have to go from war to peace, prayerfully and hopefully. The big question is, How do we do it?

Do we just sit back and say, "Well, we will just wait and see what the Government is going to do about it?"

With reference to the Rhode Island situation, we tried to go down and see the President for a long time and we could not do it. We were told the day before the order came out cutting our installations. Only the day before did we know it. I tried to find out from Mr. Kissinger, I tried to find out from Melvin Laird, I tried to find out from Admiral Zumwalt, I tried to find out from the President. None of them told us what was going to happen to Rhode Island. We never knew of it until the axe came down and chopped off our economic head. I say that is disgraceful. I repeat, we are not over the agony yet.

Mr. President, I am very amenable to this amendment for the reasons I have stated. I realize this is not the complete answer. I realize it may not survive the conference. But surely the Senate ought to express its sentiment.

It is not going to affect my State a great deal. It may affect one or two plants. Perhaps we can reconvert them without Federal help. But the time has come when we have to think about these things in advance, and not, after the fact, get up on the floor and propose to extend unemployment compensation, and have a silly retraining-for-jobs program, without knowing what jobs they are going to give these people after they are trained. This is something that has to be done in advance.

I would hope such a proposal would receive serious consideration. I can say this as one who has depended on the Pentagon and the Defense Department. I am one who has not always agreed with the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. McGovern) with reference to some of the cuts he wanted to make in defense. I have been on the side of the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. Stennis) and the Senator from South Carolina (Mr. Thurmond) more than I have been on the side of the Senator from South Dakota, but this proposal ought to be given serious consideration, and I am going to vote for it.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield myself 1 minute.

I appreciate very much the problem Rhode Island had at a time when I was not active. I read about it in the newspapers, and it had my interest, and I remember the vigor with which the Senator from Rhode Island and his colleague opposed it. They did everything anyone could do to try to alleviate that situation. But with all deference to my friends, I do not believe such an amendment on this bill is a solution to the problem. I think, legislative-wise, it would be better to take the route that all

think, a full development of all the facts to give the Congress a choice among alternatives, if it has alternatives before it.

I hope we can keep this bill a military authorization bill, as I explained before, and get it into law as soon as we can, and pave the way for appropriations. I know that if the authorization committees do not meet those time demands, our work is going to be brushed aside.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. STENNIS. I yield myself 1 additional minute.

And the appropriations will be made whether there is an authorization or not, and we will be helpless to do anything about it.

I think we do render a service—I am sure my colleagues agree—through these authorization bills.

So let us keep it what it is to begin with—an authorization bill for military hardware and manpower for the ensuing year.

Mr. President, I yield the floor. I will yield anytime any Senator wishes. Otherwise I am willing to yield back the time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi has 12 minutes remaining. The Senator from South Dakota has 5 minutes remaining.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, so far as we are concerned on this side, we are willing to yield back our time if the Senator from South Dakota is so willing.

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, under those circumstances, I am willing to yield back the remainder of my time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time having been yielded back, the question is on agreeing to the amendments numbered 1347 by the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. McGovern). The yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I announce that the Senator from California (Mr. CRANSTON), the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. FULBRIGHT), the Senator from Michigan (Mr. HART), the Senator from Indiana (Mr. HARTKE), the Senator from Maine (Mr. HATHAWAY), the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. HOPPLESTON), the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. INOUE), the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. KENNEDY), the Senator from Wyoming (Mr. MCGEE), the Senator from Utah (Mr. MOSS), the Senator from Alabama (Mr. SPARKMAN), and the Senator from California (Mr. TUNNEY) are necessarily absent.

I also announce that the Senator from Missouri (Mr. SYMINGTON) is absent because of illness.

Mr. GRIFFIN. I announce that the Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. BELLMON), the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. BROCK), the Senator from New York (Mr. JAVITS), the Senator from Oregon (Mr. PACKWOOD), and the Senator from Delaware (Mr. ROTZ) are necessarily absent.

The result was announced—yeas 27, nays 55, as follows:

YEAS—27		
Abourezk	Humphrey	Monrillo
Bayh	Jackson	Nease
Biden	Long	Perot
Canine	McGowan	Proxmire
Clark	McGuire	Rosen
Cranston	Metcalfe	Schmitt
Eastland		Stennis
Edwards		Tavel
Evans		Trotter
Feinstein		Wicker
Fullbright		Williams
Gale		
Graham		
Gravel		
Harlan		
Hart		
Hartke		
Hathaway		
Hoppleston		
Inoué		
Javits		
Kennedy		
McGee		
McGuire		
Metcalfe		
Monrillo		
Nease		
Perot		
Proxmire		
Rosen		
Schmitt		
Stennis		
Tavel		
Trotter		
Wicker		
Williams		

NAYS—55		
Alben	Dole	Metzenbaum
Allen	Domenici	Nease
Baker	Domicick	Perot
Bartlett	Eastland	Proxmire
Beall	Evans	Rosen
Bennett	Feinstein	Scott, Hugh
Bentsen	Fong	Scott, William L.
Bibb	Gale	Stennis
Buckley	Graham	Stevens
Burdick	Gravel	Stevenson
Byrd	Harlan	Taft
Harry F. Jr.	Hart	Talmadge
Byrd, Robert C.	Hartke	Thurmond
Cannon	Hathaway	Tower
Casse	Hoppleston	Weicker
Chiles	Inoué	Young
Cook	Javits	
Cotton	Kennedy	
Curtis	McGee	
	McGuire	
	Metcalfe	
	Monrillo	
	Nease	
	Perot	
	Proxmire	
	Rosen	
	Schmitt	
	Stennis	
	Stevens	
	Stevenson	
	Taft	
	Talmadge	
	Thurmond	
	Tower	
	Weicker	
	Young	

NOT VOTING—18		
Bellmon	Hathaway	Moss
Brock	Hoppleston	Packwood
Cranston	Inoué	Perot
Fulbright	Javits	Sparkman
Hart	Kennedy	Symington
Hartke	McGee	Tunney
	McGuire	
	Metcalfe	
	Monrillo	
	Nease	
	Perot	
	Proxmire	
	Rosen	
	Schmitt	
	Stennis	
	Stevens	
	Stevenson	
	Taft	
	Talmadge	
	Thurmond	
	Tower	
	Weicker	
	Young	

So Mr. McGovern's amendment (No. 1347) was rejected.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the amendment was rejected.

Mr. THURMOND. I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

AMENDMENT NO. 1369

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. ABOUREZK). Under the previous order, the Senate will now proceed to the consideration of the amendment (No. 1369) offered by the Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. PROXMIRE), which the clerk will state.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

At the appropriate place in the bill insert a new section as follows:

Sec. —. On or before March 1 each year the Director of Central Intelligence shall submit an unclassified written report to the Congress disclosing the total amount of funds requested in the budget, transmitted to the Congress pursuant to section 201 of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 (31 U.S.C. 11), for the national intelligence program for the next succeeding fiscal year.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time for debate on this amendment shall be limited to 3 hours, to be equally divided between and controlled by the mover of the amendment and the manager of the bill, with 30 minutes on any amendment in the second degree.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, before I yield to the distinguished Senator from Mississippi, which I shall do in a moment, I would like to call the attention of the Senate, while some Senators are still on the floor, to the fact that what this amendment does is provide a

part of what has been requested by Senator Scott and myself. I am sure that Senator McClellan when he wrote him last November, and what, in my judgment, Senator McClellan said then he would like to do if he can. I shall just read that letter, and then leave the matter in the hands of the Senator from Mississippi.

This is the letter dated November 13, 1973, signed by the majority and minority leaders:

As Co-chairmen of the Senate Select Committee on Secret and Confidential Documents, we wish to call your attention to one of the major recommendations which our Committee made with respect to the operations of the various intelligence agencies. Specifically, it was agreed that the Senate should be provided with the over-all sums requested for each agency. We believe that the release of this limited information will be useful to the Senate in maintaining the necessary support for our intelligence operations.

We do wish to reiterate that the Committee did not recommend the disclosure of any particular intelligence activity or any other such detailed matters, which continue to remain, and properly so, under your jurisdiction.

I have talked with the majority leader this morning, and he said it was his construction that that would mean the over-all figure would be made available publicly. The response of Senator McClellan dated November 20, was as follows:

DEAR SENATOR: I have your letter of November 13 and want you to know that I intend to comply, as fully as possible, with the recommendation of the Senate Select Committee on Secret and Confidential Documents to provide the Senate with the over-all sums requested for each of the various intelligence agencies.

Mr. President, the purpose of the amendment which I am offering now is to provide that the overall figure for the intelligence community as a whole, not broken down but the overall figure, would be made available, so that the taxpayers of this country would have some idea of how much, how many billions of dollars—and it is billions of dollars—are going for intelligence efforts by our Government.

Now, Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Mississippi—

Mr. STENNIS. On my time.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Yes, I yield to the Senator from Mississippi.

Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator. I take 2 minutes of my time first to emphasize to Senators present the overwhelming importance of this amendment and the far-reaching effect it would have if passed and enacted into law.

When we disclose—and I speak as one who, for years, has had to take care of a lot of keeping up with this problem—and it is no fun—if we disclose the amount of money spent on this effort, which includes the CIA, then we give to our adversaries all over the world, present and future, a true index as to what our activities are. There are deductions that can be made from our figures which could lead them along the path of information which would be priceless to them to know.

True, we are an open society and, so far, we have been

intelligently, program effectively, which has been worth to us billions and billions of dollars in savings. But, if we are going to abandon the idea of keeping these figures from being disclosed, then, in my humble opinion, we might as well abolish the agency. It would be like saying, in effect, that we do not want this secret intelligence after all, that we do not need it, and that we will abandon it.

We will pay an awful price for that.

I am familiar with the CIA budget. I can satisfy most any Senator in the cloakroom, talking to him some about this, but I will publicly say that it is a clean budget and they have justified many times over the expenditure of the money.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from Mississippi.

Mr. President, how much does the United States spend each year on the intelligence budget? Except for a small handful of Senators and Congressmen, nobody knows, at least in this country.

My amendment would end this ignorance and allow the Congress to reassert its fiscal control over the largest budget currently unavailable to public or congressional scrutiny.

The amendment requires that on or before March 1 each year the Director of Central Intelligence shall submit an unclassified written report to the Congress disclosing the total amount of funds requested in the budget for the national intelligence program for the next succeeding fiscal year.

It is as simple as that. Each year the Director of Central Intelligence adds up the combined budgets of the intelligence community and supplies that figure to Congress in an unclassified form.

No longer would we be operating in darkness. For the first time we would have hard budgetary facts. Granted, it would only be one figure each year, but that is enough to tell us the relative size of that budget.

At present, we do not know if the national intelligence program budget is \$1 billion or \$10 billion. We do not know if it went up 200 percent this year, or went down 10 percent. We simply do not know and the consequence of our ignorance is twofold.

First, the intelligence community escapes effective congressional control.

Second, Congress is systematically deceived as to the size of other civilian budgets.

How does that come about?

It comes about because the intelligence budgets, particularly the CIA, are hidden in other budgets that pass through the legislative process. There is intelligence money in this bill before us today.

I don't know how much. Only the Oversight Committee members know that. There are funds in other budgets. It is quite possible that even some of the chairmen of these subcommittees do not know that their budgets contain intelligence funds.

The authority for this sleight of hand resides in the Central Intelligence Act of

Section 6 states that the CIA is authorized to receive from other Government agencies any money approved by the Bureau of the Budget authorized under the National Security Act of 1947.

According to the Office of Management and Budget, the transfer of funds to CIA under section 6 of the CIA Act is accomplished by the issuance of Treasury documents routinely used for the transfer of funds from one Government agency to another. The amount and timing of these transfers are approved by OMB.

The funds approved for transfer to CIA by OMB are limited to amounts notified to OMB by the chairmen of the Senate and House Appropriations Committees. The specific appropriations accounts from which the funds will be transferred are also determined by this process. Obligations after the transfer are further controlled by OMB through the apportionment process.

In other words, only two men in the entire Congress of the United States control the process by which the CIA is funded.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that my correspondence with Roy L. Ash, Director of OMB be printed in the Record. There is an error in Mr. Ash's reply that should be noted. When the letter refers to section 5, it should read section 6.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 2.)

Mr. PROXMIRE. As chairman of the HUD, Space, Science, Veterans Appropriations Subcommittee, I became interested in whether or not there were intelligence funds in my \$21 billion budget. I checked with OMB and was told that except for possible Economy Act transactions, no funds have been transferred to the CIA from any of the agencies falling under the jurisdiction of the HUD, Space, Science, Veterans and Independent Agencies Subcommittee. I urge other subcommittee and committee chairmen to make the same inquiries.

THE SECURITY ISSUE

This sleight of hand aside, the major question each of us has to answer before voting on this amendment is "Will the public release of this aggregate budget in any way compromise our national security?" If it can be shown that it will not, then this amendment should be passed.

I intend to show that it will not compromise our security, in any way.

First, let us apply a little common sense to the problem of security. Would anyone charge that the Senate Armed Services Committee is endangering our national security by publishing the total amount of the Defense budget? Would anyone claim that the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have violated security when they testify before Congress in open session and when they peak across the country and use the total amount of the defense budget in public?

Of course not. That would be utterly ridiculous. The total amount of the budget is a public problem.

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...we go much further out than budget in great detail. We break it down by component and by function. We then talk about each individual weapon. When will it be ready? How much will it cost? What does it look like in a technical sense?

Of course, this detailed information is valuable to the U.S.S.R. But long ago, a decision was made that in our open society it was better to know the facts and ride hard on the Defense Department than to accept the intangible fear of enemy knowledge.

In fact, many American strategists have argued that the size of the U.S. military budget and the characteristics of our overwhelming nuclear force should be made public in order to reinforce the psychology of deterrence. The enemy will not be deterred unless he truly believes the United States has these weapons.

The same goes for the intelligence budget. It is a form of deterrence for the potential adversary to know that we will continue to spend sizeable funds for intelligence. They will be less inclined to spring some surprise.

Of course it should be quickly said that the only figure we would be releasing is the single number representing the combined intelligence budget. Not a breakdown. Just the overall figure.

Now just what would this tell our adversaries? They would not know if it all went to the CIA, or DIA. Whether the NSA spent most of the money, or the Air Force.

How about yearly fluctuations? Say for example, that the budget went up 10 percent in 1 year. What would they conclude? That manpower was more expensive? That the CIA was spending more for labs? That the DIA had bought a new computer division? That NSA was hiring more people? They would know nothing.

Listen to what former CIA Director James R. Schlesinger told Senator HARVEY P. BRNO, Jr., during his confirmation hearings for Secretary of Defense:

I think it (speaking of releasing selected intelligence budget data) might be an acceptable procedure, Senator, to indicate the total figure of the national intelligence programs. I would not personally advocate it, but it may be an acceptable procedure. . . . There is the feeling that it might be wise to give the gross figure. I have come to share that feeling at least in this time frame, but that does not say that is not a possibility.

Senator BRNO specifically asked:

There would be no security reasons why it should not be done?

Dr. Schlesinger replied:

For the gross figure, I think that the security concerns are minimal. The component figures, I would be more concerned about but for the gross national intelligence program figures I think we could live with that on a security basis, yes.

Remember that this was the Director of Central Intelligence testifying, the man who then was the CIA Director. He is now the Secretary of Defense. This is exactly what the amendment before the Senate provides.

When the same question was put to William E. Colby during his confirmation hearings to be Director of Central Intelligence, he replied:

Chairman, in the hands of the Congress to decide. . . . We are not going to run the kind of intelligence service that other countries run. We are going to run one in the American society, and the American constitutional structure, and I can see that there may be a requirement to expose to the American people a great deal more than might be convenient from the narrow intelligence point of view.

Mr. Colby's two points should be kept in mind. First, he left it up to Congress. Second, he said we have to run our intelligence agencies in a democratic environment. Both of these points argue for supporting this amendment.

After he was confirmed, Mr. Colby started having a change of heart. It is interesting to note how opinions change during and after confirmation hearings.

Now Mr. Colby argues against releasing even the aggregate total of the intelligence community budget.

During the confirmation, he said,

I would favor a greater degree of exposure of what we are doing (p. 13).

Now he says he does not think it would be a good idea.

Mr. Colby further explained why he opposes such a course of action. Quoting from a February 22, letter, Mr. Colby says:

I am still concerned that public disclosure of total intelligence figures on an annual basis would lead to pressures for further public explanation of the programs for which monies were appropriated.

That is the real reason for not releasing the budget. It will allow Congress to start doing its job. Questions will be asked. There will be pressure on the oversight committees to very closely review that budget and justify it thoroughly, so that they in turn could come back to Congress and say we are getting our money's worth.

There is something very healthy about responding to public pressure—even for the intelligence community.

The question must be asked of every person who says that the release of this total budget will endanger national security. How will it do so? Why did Secretary Schlesinger say it would not? Give some examples, hypothetical if desired of how such disclosure would work against us. How is the total intelligence budget figure different from the total military budget? Is it more important than a \$100 billion defense budget? Are the Armed Services Committees violating security by reviewing the Defense budget in public?

These questions need answering by those that support continued secrecy of the intelligence budget.

I hope answers are forthcoming.

Mr. President, this amendment is the most restrained attempt to introduce fiscal integrity to the intelligence community. It is written to take into consideration the possibility of security problems. It only calls for the release of the total figure.

It is time we found out just how large that budget is. It will not impinge on security considerations.

It is a long overdue step toward releasing the light of Congress into the money it appropriates. We have operated in the dark too long.

Mr. President, to the fact that the Senate Select Committee on Secret and Confidential Documents, the cochairmen of which were the majority leader and the minority leader, Senators Mansfield and Hugh Scott, made the recommendation which is embodied in the amendment I am presenting to the Senate today and on which we will vote a little later.

I hope that the Members of the Senate will recognize that this is a matter that has been studied by the select committee; that they did make this recommendation; that the present Secretary of Defense, who was formerly Director, and the present CIA Director, when his nomination was being confirmed—both at the time of the confirmation of their nominations—indicated that the damage, if any, would be minimal and that they saw strong arguments in favor of releasing the total figure. They could live with that, provided there was no breakdown of the components.

Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time, and I yield the floor.

EXHIBIT 1

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS,
Washington, D.C., April 3, 1974.

Hon. ROY M. ASH,
Director, Office of Management and Budget,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. ASH: Under the authority of the 1949 Central Intelligence Agency Act, the CIA is authorized to transfer funds to and receive funds from other Government agencies subject to the approval of your office. This authority is granted without regard to other provisions of law.

Would you please provide answers to the following questions dealing with this practice.

1. Is there any other authority for this transfer or receipt of funds other than in the 1949 CIA Act, Section 8? If so, where?
2. As Chairman of the HUD, Space, Science, Veterans and Independent Agencies Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, I request you to make known to me if any of the funds appropriated under my jurisdiction have been transferred to or expended by or on behalf of the CIA?
3. Will you please describe the process by which funds are transferred from one appropriation account to use by the CIA?
4. What members of Congress are made aware of this practice in terms of the actual flow of funds?
5. What restrictions are placed on this transfer or expenditure of funds?
6. Why cannot the CIA budget be funded in a single appropriations bill?

I would appreciate an early answer to these questions since hearings are currently in progress.

Sincerely,

WILLIAM PROXMIRE,
U.S. Senator.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT
AND BUDGET,

Washington, D.C., April 23, 1974.

Hon. WILLIAM PROXMIRE,
Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR PROXMIRE: This responds to your letter of April 3, 1974, in which you pose several questions regarding the funding of the Central Intelligence Agency.

As you know, extraordinary measures have been taken by both the Congress and the executive branch to protect the sensitive foreign intelligence operations in which the CIA is engaged. In addition to the budget, information relating to CIA's funding has been classified by the Director of Central Intelligence.

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gence in order to assure that information might not be made available to any foreign government. Nevertheless, the Office of Management and Budget exercises its responsibility to review CIA funding in the same detail that it reviews the budget requests of any other executive branch agency. The specific amounts of the agency's approved appropriation request and the identification of the appropriation estimates in the President's annual Budget, within which these amounts are included, are formally provided by the Director of OMB to the Chairmen of the Senate and House Appropriations Committees; similarly, the Director is informed by them of the determination of the CIA budget, and OMB approval of the transfer of funds to CIA is based upon this decision.

Within the limits of this arrangement made necessary by security requirements, I wish to respond fully to the questions raised in your letter.

1. The authority under which OMB approves the transfer of funds to CIA for its approved budget is Section 5 of the CIA Act of 1949 (50 USC 403f). To our knowledge, no other authority is now or ever has been used by OMB for this purpose. As in the case of other executive agencies, CIA receives other funds under provisions of the so-called Economy Act (31 USC 686), which permits the purchase of supplies or services by one agency from another when it is more economical to do so. The magnitude of these transactions is reported to the appropriate committees and to OMB, but no formal OMB approval is required.

2. Except for possible Economy Act transactions, no funds have been transferred to the CIA from any of the agencies falling under the jurisdiction of the HUD, Space, Science, Veterans and Independent Agencies Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee.

3. The transfer of funds to CIA under Section 5 of the CIA Act is accomplished by the issuance of Treasury documents routinely used for the transfer of funds from one government agency to another. The amount and timing of these transfers, pursuant to that Act, are approved by OMB.

4. Information concerning the transfer of these funds to CIA is available to members of the Senate and House Armed Services and Appropriations Subcommittees concerned with CIA matters.

5. Under established procedures, funds approved by OMB for transfer to CIA are limited to amounts notified to OMB by the Chairmen of the Senate and House Appropriations Committees. The specific appropriation accounts from which the funds will be transferred are also determined by this process. Obligations by CIA, subsequent to the transfer, are further controlled by OMB through the apportionment process.

6. The funding of CIA through a single publicly identifiable appropriation could result in the disclosure of information detrimental to the agency's sensitive foreign intelligence operations, as I understand the Director of Central Intelligence has indicated to members of the Congress on several occasions.

I trust that the above information is responsive to your needs.

Sincerely,

Roy L. Ash,
Director.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. On whose time?

Mr. THURMOND. The time to be equally divided between Mr. Ash and

objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

The clerk will call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Who yields time?

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield me 5 or 10 minutes?

Mr. STENNIS. I yield 10 minutes to the Senator.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, what I have to say will not take 10 minutes.

I must recognize the sincerity and the motive—I might say the noble motive—on the part of the sponsors of this amendment and what they are trying to accomplish. As a matter of fact, I do not think any matter has disturbed Members who are charged with this responsibility more than this matter, with respect to the ramifications and the complexities that are involved in this kind of situation.

I would pray for the day in this world when nations could live as neighbors, when people could live as brothers, when we would not have to have an atomic bomb or a missile or a nuclear submarine, that we could live in peace and tranquility, and that we would not even need a Central Intelligence Agency.

But the world is not made that way. The history within my lifetime has proved pretty much that unless a nation is on its guard, as we had to be in 1962 at the time of the Cuban crisis, it could lose its birthright.

Now, what are we talking about here? We are talking about the Central Intelligence Agency. I have been connected with the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy almost as long as I have been in the Senate. Day in and day out we sit behind closed doors in a room that has been debugged because of what is told, what is given to the committee, and what is listened to. Only the members of that committee are privy to what goes on, except, of course, that the courtesy is rendered on a need-to-know basis to Members of Congress if they make a request that they need to know. The same goes for the Central Intelligence Agency. I daresay if any Senator really wants to know how much we spend for intelligence, he could find out. But then they would have to reveal what they spend it for. They might not be able to publish the information, and why should they? What would it accomplish?

I do not know the men and women up in that Press Gallery. For all I know, there may be a newspaperman there from Moscow. We live in a free society, and what we say on the floor of the Senate goes all over the world. It is a public record. That is the way we live. We are an open society. If we tell the Russians what they have to know, will they tell us what they have? I will eat anyone's hat on the Capitol steps if that happens.

Do Senators know what Khrushchev said when he came here and met with Mr.

Intelligence Agency, for the first time? He said, "You know, your country and my country could save a lot of money if we could get together." Do Senators know what he meant by that? He meant by that that they are spying on us and we have to spy on them. That can be said publicly, because that is what this is all about. We have to know what they are doing, so we can know what we have to do in order to guarantee the security of our own country.

So we cannot come out here and tell the whole world, "We spent \$1 billion or \$2 billion for the Central Intelligence Agency." What does that mean to anyone else, except that perhaps some people think they are spending too much. And the minute the question is asked where they are spending it we are in serious trouble.

So what happens to your children and my children, Mr. President? What happens to you when you go home tonight? What happens tomorrow? What happens to the security of our country? Can we afford to tell them? Oh yes. I would like to tell the public everything it is possible to tell them. I believe in that. I have been in public life continually for 40 years. I believe in the right of the public to know. But I certainly would not come to the floor of the Senate and tell you, Mr. President, how to put together an atom bomb. I would not tell you that. I would not tell you how far our nuclear subs are able to travel. I would not tell you how we can detect an enemy sub; and I would not tell you how they might detect ours. I would not tell you that. Why would I not tell you that? I would not tell you that because the minute I told you that I would jeopardize the future of your children.

I do not relish the responsibility on this ad hoc committee. I happen to be on it. We sit there for hours and hours, day in and day out. It is not a pleasant job, but it is a job that was assigned to me and I have to do it. If anyone wants my job on that particular committee I will give it to him tomorrow. But it has been assigned to me and I have to do it.

I repeat again that I realize the motive behind this measure. I think a lot of people are a little disturbed over some things that CIA has done. That needs to be investigated, and that is our job, and we are doing it every day.

But as the Senator from Minnesota has said on this floor a hundred times: Please do not throw out the baby with the bath water. That is the point. In our attempt to catch that one mouse, are we going to burn down the barn? We cannot and must not burn down the barn. So we come out here and say, "This is the amount of money we are spending." Very well; after it has been said, then what? Someone else says, "You are spending too much." In order to prove that too much is not being spent, statements have to be made as to where it is being spent, what we are doing. The big question is, Can we afford to tell them what we are doing?

I have been in many committee meetings—the Joint Committee on Atomic

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before the Committee on Appropriations, and on the ad hoc committee to which I referred—where they show us the evidence they have. But they do not disclose how they spend money to provide this information. Once the Russians, or even the Chinese Communists find out our national security can be damaged. And it is just to satisfy a little bit of an emotional rebellion that is justified on the grounds that an agency has made some mistakes. Can we throw away the security of the country? That is what it means to me.

I have sat down with the Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. PROXNER), the Senator from California (Mr. CRANSTON), to find a solution, and I have sat down with Mr. Colby, who is a great American. He said, "Please do not do this. If you want to make my job easier, please do not do this." I cannot sit there after that admonition and exhortation and turn around and say, "Mr. Colby, I do not believe what you have to say." If I believed that for 1 minute, I would say, "You ought to give up your job."

I know the CIA got mixed up in Vietnam. Many got mixed up in Vietnam. I condemned it.

Do not forget, I was Governor of my State when the bomb fell on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945. A few days after that a second atomic bomb fell on Nagasaki. Frankly, I have not slept so well since then thinking about the horror that can be visited upon mankind if this thing ever lets go. I would hope that the CIA is not a provocative agency but a protective agency; that it is there to protect American security and the American people. The minute we disbelieve that we should do away with it entirely.

I repeat again that as long as we live in this kind of a world, where tomorrow we do not know where we will be, where the Russians now are trying to achieve parity with us; where we have been told categorically, without any question of doubt, that what they are doing is because they do not want to suffer the humiliation of Cuba again—that is what this is all about, and that is why they are coming along, hell bent for election, augmenting their military strength.

Look at the deal we made on SALT I. They can have over 60 missile firing nuclear subs; we have only a little more than 40 of this type of submarine. They have about 1,700 land-based missiles; we have slightly over 1,000.

When anyone stands up and says to me, "Oh, they are not going so fast," that person is not going to the briefings. One does not find that information on the floor of the Senate. He has to go to the secret briefings. There one sees the statistics, the facts. I can tell Senators that after they have done so they will be frightened as to what could happen to this world if one act of madness lets this thing go off.

And so I say to my distinguished colleague from Wisconsin, and all those who agree with him, I sympathize with his feeling. I realize the fact that the CIA has done some things wrong—perhaps too many things wrong—but let us correct it. Let us put the brakes on. Let us admonish the committee and the

Senate to do its job. But in the name of truth, in the name of protecting this Nation against an assault, in the name of protecting the American people and their future, let us rely on the special committees that do their job, and if any Member of the Senate really wants to find out what the total amount is, I think in private he should be told.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. PASTORE. I yield.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I rise to commend the Senator from Rhode Island and to associate myself fully with his comments. The Senator pointed out very properly that the Central Intelligence Agency has in the past engaged in activities that have been looked upon by certain Members of the Congress as undesirable; but I want to make it clear that every one of those activities had been ordered by a President. The Central Intelligence Agency does not just engage in activities for the love of work. I know that the Central Intelligence Agency, during the Kennedy years and the Johnson years, was engaged in activities in Laos—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from Rhode Island has expired.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I yield such time as the Senator may require.

Mr. PASTORE. Five more minutes.

Mr. HUMPHREY. There were Members of Congress who knew full well what we were doing, but at the time we thought we were doing the right thing. Hindsight is so marvelous, is it not? We see so much better after the fact.

Mr. President, the Central Intelligence Agency is possibly the most important agency in this Government. By and large, it is made up of people who are competent, able, and who have served this country well and faithfully. To be sure, there are times when it has engaged in activities, as we have said, that are looked upon with suspicion; but I think it would be folly for us to publicize all of its activities, to publicize the amounts it receives, particularly when there are ways and means within this body and within the other body of Congress to supervise it and to keep a check rein upon it.

The Soviet Union does not tell us what they spend in intelligence, or even in subversion, and they are not about ready to. The only way we have any chance of knowing what they are doing is through agencies like the Central Intelligence Agency—not alone, but that agency is, without a doubt, the prime instrument of this Government for the gathering of intelligence.

I was visiting earlier here with our distinguished friend and colleague from Washington—and I know this to be a fact, of course—and discussed the fact that there is only one person in the British Government who knows who the director of intelligence is and to whom that director reports—just one, and that is the Prime Minister. In most countries that is the case. In the Republic of France and in the Federal Republic of Germany it is the case.

Presently we are on a binge in this country about every aspect of government. Everything is suspect. Well, Mr. President, you have got to call a halt to something. You cannot just start to dismantle the structure because of the transgressions, or alleged transgressions, of a few.

I think that the Senator from Rhode Island stated it so succinctly and so effectively that all I can do is just add my amen to it; but I had the privilege of serving on the National Security Council, and I want to tell my colleagues that the Central Intelligence Agency was the most accurate and effective instrument of Government for that council. Its reports were most accurate, and had we followed the advice of the Central Intelligence Agency in many areas, we would have been better off, but at least it was there.

I know the Senator from Wisconsin is going to say he is not going to interfere with them, and that is true, but the figure will be out there, and right away there will be some of my political persuasion, who are labeled "liberals," who are going to say, "Well, look at how much money they are spending on spying. Look at how much money they are spending on gathering information which is unnecessary. Look at what they are going to do on counterforce activities or clandestine military activities."

If the Congress does not want it to engage in clandestine activities, all it has to do is legislate it—they will obey the law. But the trouble around here is that we like to put the blame on a lot of other people when we do not have the guts to legislate what we ought to be legislating.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I yield.

Mr. PASTORE. Talking about the amendment, it sounds so harmless to say, "All we want is the overall figure."

When we discussed this with Mr. Colby and asked him, "What is wrong with the overall figure?" he told us, "There is a lot wrong with it, because if you choose to cut the figure down at some time, privately and secretly, and I have to live with it, nobody knows what is done, but if you do it publicly, then the Russians and the Chinese Communist will know we are doing less, and that might let them become more audacious. They might think we are letting our guard down. It will have repercussions."

This came from the lips of an expert in the area, and it makes sense.

If I thought giving the overall figure would be the answer to our problems, I would go along with it, because, after all, it could be argued, "Well, we are not giving the details," but, as the expert said, if we give the overall figure, what does it mean? If anybody thinks we are spending too much, he will want to know where we are spending it. If we are spending too little, he will want to know what we are doing. These are not matters that we can discuss before the public for the public.

It does not make any difference to me personally. I am interested in my family. I am interested in my grandchildren. I do not want them to live in an unsafe coun-

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try. Other than that, I do not relish the job; I am not trying to do it for the American people. I am concerned and interested because that is the only way we can behave in a crazy world, and it is a crazy world.

Mr. HUMPHREY. And it is going to continue that way for some time, regrettably.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. PASTORE. I yield.

Mr. JACKSON. And what if the following year the CIA found it necessary to ask for more money? Then we would have the same problem. They would want to know what they are engaged in now that they were not engaged in in the past. We could not allow the publication of the figures without that sticking out like a sore thumb.

Mr. PASTORE. You cannot win.

Mr. JACKSON. You cannot win either way.

Mr. HUMPHREY. It is a no-win proposition.

Mr. JACKSON. I commend the Senator from Minnesota and the Senator from Rhode Island.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, as long as the Senator from Rhode Island and the Senator from Minnesota have the floor, I would like to ask them some questions.

Mr. PASTORE. I yield.

Mr. PROXMIRE. I ask the Senator if it is not true that the amendment does not require the revealing of information or any figure about the CIA, but simply the total national intelligence overall figure, including the CIA, the DIA, the Army and Navy Intelligence, all together. It is not an anti-CIA amendment. What this amendment would do is tell us whether we are spending \$1 billion, \$5 billion, \$10 billion. It would give us some notion of how important this is in terms of resources and would mean we could have some attention given to these agencies, attention we do not have now.

The fact is, as the Senator from Missouri (Mr. Symington) said, that in 1970 the CIA oversight committee of the Senate Armed Services Committee met twice. In 1971 there were no meetings. In 1972 it met once. When it does meet, what does it accomplish? It does not keep a record. No staff is present. Only Senators are present. We know that without a staff or a transcript, a hearing like that cannot be very useful.

When we have some knowledge of what this amount is, whether it is \$5 billion, \$7 billion, or \$10 billion, we have some interest or pressure on this. Not being on the oversight committee, one would be entitled to ask about it, so one would be inclined to be better informed. It seems to me we will function far better. That is all the amendment is intended to do.

Mr. PASTORE. When the Senator says there is no record kept, that is true, but there is an obvious reason for that. The staff is there. The Senators are there. We sit there for hours, listening, and we have a very minute scrutiny of the items that are presented.

Is the Senator telling me that if the entire figure is revealed, it would be

would not get up on the floor of the Senate? The figures are for this year as compared to last year? Knowing the Senator from Wisconsin, he would be the first in the Senate to do so.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Would that not be good? What would be wrong with that?

Mr. PASTORE. The Senator can reveal what he knows.

Mr. PROXMIRE. I do not have to reveal it. I can ask about it.

Mr. PASTORE. What am I supposed to do? I cannot tell the Senator; so the Senator goes out and says, "Senator Pastore would not tell me."

Mr. PROXMIRE. No. But the Senator from Rhode Island and other Senators know about it.

Mr. PASTORE. The Senator can find it out privately, but he does not want to find it out privately. He wants to tell the world about it.

Mr. PROXMIRE. I think the world ought to know the overall figures.

Mr. PASTORE. Does the Senator mean Russia should know?

Mr. PROXMIRE. Right.

Mr. PASTORE. My goodness, I quit.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Would the Senator say that it would have been in our national interest in World War II if Franklin Delano Roosevelt had published how much money was invested in the atomic bomb?

Mr. PROXMIRE. Of course not. My amendment would not require it.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I realize whenever we get into any element that is called secrecy, here it is suspect. We are dealing with national security, and one has got to trust somebody. We have a way at least of checking here a little bit, and that check is with the ad hoc committee. If that committee does not meet often enough, I suggest we submit an amendment requiring the committee to meet monthly or to meet quarterly for whatever time is necessary. That is what we need to do.

I happen to believe that we need a Joint Committee on National Security in Congress, that is going to have general supervision of the CIA, consisting of the top people of Congress, just as we have a National Security Council.

I proposed it repeatedly. I proposed a Joint Committee on National Security, in which the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives would have particular responsibility in the field of national security.

But my point is, and I think the Senator from Rhode Island is so right, the minute we publicize all these intelligence figures, the inevitable followthrough is a debate in this body as to what it is for, it will be in every journal and every tabloid. It will be all over. It will not serve the public interest.

If we could get the Soviet Union and the Chinese to walk to the altar with the rest of us, confess our sins, live a pure life, and pledge ourselves to peace and love, then I would let them know everything about what was going on. But, frankly, they will not do it.

I believe in détente. No Senator has worked harder for arms control; no

committees. But there is a point where we get in my judgment.

I know the Senator can make a brilliant argument and a moving, emotional argument, that we ought to have all these figures right out in the open, and if we can have assurance that is all we are going to do, that is all it would lead to. Even that would be a risk, but perhaps one that we could take.

But just as surely as we are in this body today debating whether or not we ought to have a release of the figure, next year it will be whether it is too big or too little, and then it will be what is in it. Then when we start to say what is in it, we are going to have to expose exactly what we have been doing in order to gain information; for example, years ago as to where the Soviet Union was building its nuclear subs and the kind of nuclear subs they were. I saw that material in 1965—how far they were along, what their scientific progress was. I do not think it would serve the public interest for all of that information to have been laid out. It would have destroyed our intelligence gathering completely.

I wonder how many Senators realize the unbelievable torture that a number of our Central Intelligence agents go through in order to get information that is vital to the Nation's national security.

It is because I feel this strongly that I make this statement, although it runs counter to much of my so-called ideological philosophy. One advantage I have had—and I am not going to be a partisan around the Senate when it comes to national security—is to sit on the other end of the line. I am here to tell the Senate, that if we start to tinker with the intelligence services of this country, we do it at our peril.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HUMPHREY. Yes, I yield.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Could not the same argument the Senator is making be made with much more force with respect to our Defense budget? We debate on the floor of the Senate, we have open public hearings, we publish a great deal about our missiles, about our submarines, about our most advanced and complex planes. This does give great information to the Soviet Union. I am not asking about anything of that nature with respect to intelligence. This would not even reveal how much we provide for the CIA.

All I am saying is that the taxpayer is entitled to know how much of the billions of dollars he contributes in taxes goes for intelligence operations overall. Then he can, through his Representatives, determine to some extent whether we spend any kind of effort and interest and concern with whether or not that money is wisely spent. That is all the amendment does.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I think I understand fully the Senator's honorable, legitimate purpose. I really am not opposed to that legitimate purpose. The problem is it is sort of like loose string on a ball of twine, so to speak, that starts to unravel. Now, indeed, we tell the whole world about practically everything we are doing. As Gunnar Myrdal, the great Swedish sociologist, once said about the United

If you really want to find out what is going on in America, you should just ask anybody and he will give you a full hour's dissertation.

MR. PROXMIRE. We have a pretty good system.

MR. HUMPHREY. Do not misunderstand me.

MR. PROXMIRE. It works well. It is open and free.

MR. HUMPHREY. I think this openness is our strength. I think a society has to have that openness. But I think there are some things in family life that are private, that do not aid a good family if one starts exposing it all.

I think there are some things, may I say, in public life called national security, particularly when it comes to intelligence gathering. It is a nasty business, and the Senator knows it and I know it, and, of course, it makes good headlines, it makes good stories; it makes good fiction; it makes good TV. But there is a point, I think, where we have to ask ourselves, "Do I dare go this far," and that is all the Senator from Minnesota is doing.

I really do not intend to get so involved in this debate, but I feel a very deep obligation about this. I think that I owe it to this body to at least tell what my experience has been, even though I had no direct responsibility. I only served as Vice President, but I happen to believe that this agency is so important that we ought to make sure within the confines of Congress that we know what it is doing, and set up the instruments and then we can trust.

We trust one another in this body on the basis of censorship of each other. One thing I plead for in the Senate is more trust rather than our running to get the headlines. More love, more affection in this body; that is what this country really needs today.

What I worry about is that somehow or other we feel we cannot trust each other here. I happen to think—and I use one Senator, the Senator from Rhode Island—who is as much interested in cutting the defense budget as the Senator from Minnesota. I want to see that budget reasonable, and I want to see it trimmed. By the way, the committee did cut it. It cut it so much that some of us who thought we were going to cut it feel that they bent us to it.

It is my judgment that we have got to trust somebody. I think what we are doing here is trusting somebody.

MR. MCLELLAN. I might say that at the same time we cut the defense budget, we also cut this budget more than we did the defense budget. I will just say that much for the record.

MR. HUMPHREY. There we are. I believe we have to have some place in this body where there are some of most delicate things involved where we can put our trust. When we find that trust has been violated, we can remove people from those positions.

I do not believe I have any more to add and be redundant. I have participated in this debate because I feel we have got to be very, very careful. I welcome the initiative of the Senator from

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MR. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I yield the Senator from Iowa such time as he may require.

MR. STENNIS. Before he does that, will the Senator yield to me to ask how much time we have remaining, those in opposition to the amendment?

MR. PROXMIRE. I yield.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. Those in opposition have 54 minutes remaining.

MR. STENNIS. Fifty-four minutes; what about the proponents?

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. The proponents of the amendment have 72 minutes remaining.

MR. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I yield the Senator from Iowa such time as he may require.

MR. HUGHES. I thank the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin.

Mr. President, the distinguished Senator from Minnesota has six guests waiting in the dining room. He has assured me he is not walking out on my dissertation here today. I assure him that he is free to go. I value his friendship and integrity beyond anything he could possibly know.

The debate I have listened to so far seems to carry an implication that this amendment is a threat to the internal workings of the CIA and the intelligence gathering community of America around the world, and thereby a threat to the security of the United States of America.

The amendment is very simple. Mr. President, it would list publicly the ceiling or the total amounts of money spent in the intelligence gathering community.

One of the greatest threats to any country, and particularly a country that has great military strength, is not from the outside or from its foreign enemies, it is from the inside, from secrecy and interior deterioration. The greatest threat of all is when we begin to lose control and not know what is happening, and when we begin to give large sums of money to mechanizations and machines that have no bureaucratic control over them.

The Senator says, trust. Yes, we trust and we love. But we know from reading history that governments have destroyed themselves when they no longer had knowledge of what was happening, and when the interior started breaking down.

I am not half as concerned, in today's world, about the future of America based on exterior threat as I am about what is happening inside this country and what can happen inside this country unless we are completely open, with every ounce of communications we can have with the people of this country. If thereby there is some little risk to the world, with the risks we are already living with, I say it is not too high a price to pay.

What is the role of the CIA? As far as I know, I know nothing. I am a member of the Armed Services Committee, and I know nothing. I could get such information, as the Senator from Minnesota has said, given to me privately. It would be given. But as far as I know, there is no Member of the Senate, no Member of Congress, and no member of the

the President of the United States, who knows precisely and exactly what the CIA is doing in every incident.

We do know they are involved, as the Senator from Minnesota has said, in a nasty business. They are involved in a nasty business in a lot of areas of the world, and that nasty business is supposedly directed at protecting the freedom of the people of this country and our friends in the free world. But no one has the certainty to know precisely what everyone is doing, or even where they are doing it from time to time.

But that is not what we are asking for today. Not at all. All of this debate that I have been listening to, though relevant to the overall intelligence community, which is certainly involved in the security and freedom of the people of the free world, not just in our country but that of the people of other countries, has no relationship to the risk involved in giving the people of this country a glimpse of light in telling them what the total cost is involved in the intelligence activities of this country throughout the world. We do not know that amount, but we do know it is in the billions of dollars.

I listened to the chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee say did not even want to know, because he was afraid he might talk in his sleep sometime and thereby disclose it to someone. He made that statement on the floor of the Senate.

Mr. President, we are asking just for a thread of light into what may be not only our greatest source of security, but has the potential to be our greatest threat, without the observation and light and without the security that we ourselves as publicly elected officials can place upon those who have the capacity together with the restraint—and if there is any evidence that we have applied, as elected officials, the responsibility of restraint I am unaware of it. I am not saying there are misdeeds or there are wrongs. I am saying none of us know whether we are right or wrong. If we know, I would like to know it is and how much he knows, even an individual Senator, if he is asked far enough ahead, to know what groundwork is being laid for the capacity to draw the threads of the armaments of this country into entanglements.

We have wrestled for years with the problem of the CIA. We do not know. We are uninformed. The oversight that is done apparently is not carried out either mechanically or intelligently. We have not had the capacity or responsibility to know even when we were given information whether it was right or wrong, or what was happening.

Mr. President, one of the great Senators of our time has been the distinguished Senator from Minnesota. He is, as he called himself, a liberal, who has said, "Let us show the public everything, let us give them all the information."

I respect his debate today in saying the public should not have this information, that it is a threat to our security. But, Mr. President, I leave this

ate: The greatest threat to the security of this Nation is the secrecy that we ourselves place on these things. It will be from the inside, not from the outside.

We talk about the numbers of missiles, we talk about the numbers of warheads, we talk about the numbers of submarines, we talk about the numbers of airplanes, and all of these things; but when each can destroy the Earth, then how much is enough?

The threat will come from losing control on the inside. If maintaining that control requires an ounce of risk, then I think we should be prepared to take that ounce of risk in at least letting us see publicly and the people see publicly whether we are spending \$3 billion, \$7 billion, or \$90 billion, and how we are concealing it and hiding it, and if we are protecting ourselves from the inside as well as from the outside.

I think that ounce of risk, if it exists, is worth taking, and I thank the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin for yielding.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HUGHES. I yield.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I respect this good man the Senator from Iowa, who is one of the great men of the Senate, a great spirit and a great inspiration to me, and I really regret that on occasions like this one has to disagree with a friend so dear and precious, but I want to say to the Senator that while this argument is moving and I think filled with much truth, we can control any possibility of secrecy or of coverup by establishing within the instruments of the Congress the necessary machinery for the supervision of the Central Intelligence Agency.

We have executive sessions in this Congress. We have them in the Foreign Relations Committee and we have them in the Armed Services Committee, and we do not permit those executive sessions to become public. Maybe that is a mistake. But I, over long years of service here, have felt that some of these sessions are necessary.

I feel there is a tendency to try to make too much secret and too much executive. This is why I have proposed that we have a joint committee on national security of the House of Representatives and the Senate. We have an ad hoc committee on this matter of the intelligence operations of our Government, and on that ad hoc committee serve some of the finest Members of this body. I know what good men they are. I am confident that they are as concerned about the security of this country inside and outside as any of us. I find them philosophically the kind of Senators who would be able to cross-examine anyone. And while I cannot help but agree with the Senator from Iowa that one of our great threats is from within, particularly from the moral erosion that is taking place in our society, not only now but over the years, I do not underestimate the threat from without.

Furthermore, good intelligence permits us to do a better job in terms of our national security expenditures and operations, not necessarily increasing them

but reducing them, and I believe I heard today from the chairman of the Committee on Appropriations that the expenditures for intelligence operations have been reduced.

I happen to believe that we have the power in Congress to set up whatever kind of method or supervisory system we need so that we do not let the executive branch run rampant. But, under our system, we put a great deal of trust and faith in the President. I know that this is a difficult time to discuss that, because of the events of recent months, but I do say to you, Mr. President, that we have a man in that high office, the President of the United States, who has the prime responsibility for these requirements of intelligence and national security and if we do not have the right man there, then it our fault, because we elected him.

We can establish all kinds of systems, elections, and campaign reform, and say that we do a better job, but I happen to believe that we should proceed with great caution when it comes to this business of, really, opening up and exposing, because I think of what would be the inevitable result of our intelligence operations.

Mr. President, I regret to have to say this, because I would like very much from my own political point of view to say to the contrary, but from the point of view of my conscience, I speak as did the Senator from Iowa. Is it not a wonderful thing in this body that two of us can believe so differently and can be as sincere in our point of view?

I greatly respect the Senator from Iowa, and if his point of view prevails, I think it will prevail in large measure, because of our great respect for him.

Mr. HUGHES. I thank the distinguished Senator from Minnesota. I am ready, willing, and I hope able to join him, and I hope the chairman of all of the committees, to find out what they are doing. This would be the appropriate moment, the time, and the day to find out. Let us make sure, instead of an ad hoc oversight or a minimum oversight, that there is some sort of bearing and adequate responsibility on that oversight and in carrying it out. Although we do not have enough time, I agree that an occasional session here is useful so that the youngest and the newest Members can get available information in relation to these activities so that they would know something about them.

Again, I say that this is no risk compared to the risk of darkness. A little bit of light at this moment might help us all in the years to follow.

Mr. PROXMIER. I want to commend the distinguished Senator from Iowa (Mr. HUGHES). He has hit the target exactly on this issue. The greatest danger we face is from within, I agree. We have seen what has happened to the intelligence community. But I want to tell the Senator from Iowa that I tried to get the most practical and limiting amendment that I could get. I discussed the amendment recommended by the majority and minority leaders, written to the chairman of the Appropriations Committee, and it was agreed, after a study by the

Senate Select Committee on Secret and Confidential Documents, that the Senate should be kept abreast with all of the information requested for intelligence. They believed that the release of this limited information would be useful to the Senate in maintaining the necessary support for intelligence operations. All I do is provide the overall figures. The committee consists of Senators Mansfield, Pastore, Hughes, Clark, Gravel, Javits, Hartfield, Gurner, and Cook. Their report recommended this procedure. That is all. It certainly does not go so far as breaking it down as to what the CIA and the DIA spend. The leaders concluded that if we get this overall information, we will be in a better position to discharge our duties and responsibilities to the people.

Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time and I yield the floor.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. McCLELLAN).

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HASKELL). The Senator from Arkansas is recognized for 3 minutes.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, I am reluctant to speak on this issue, because of the position I occupy as chairman of the Appropriations Subcommittee on Intelligence Operations. By reason of that position as chairman of that subcommittee, I have the duty of oversight over the CIA.

I am reluctant to speak on these matters because—I do not relish nor do I cherish nor do I take pride in the fact—that I may have access to information that I cannot share with my colleagues. I would wish it were practical. I wish it were a proper thing to do—to disclose every bit of information that I have been able to obtain from time to time respecting the activities of the CIA, what it does, its methods of procuring information, how it spends its money, and the results that it achieves. I would prefer to do that. The subcommittees who have this responsibility are ad hoc committees of the Appropriations Committee and the Armed Services Committee of both the Senate and House. We are instrumentalities of the Senate, of the Congress, and so created where we are serving as your agent, as your tool, to achieve the supervision that is possible and necessary. We are charged with the responsibility to see that this work is carried on, and to recommend the proper appropriations therefor.

If these subcommittees—and there are 23 members on them. Ten are from the Senate—five are from the Appropriations Committee and five are from the Armed Services Committee, who are privy to this information that is withheld for security reasons from the public. The committee members are:

INTELLIGENCE SUBCOMMITTEES

Senate Appropriations: McClellan, Stennis, Pastore, Young, and Hruska.

Senate Armed Services: Stennis, Symington, Jackson, Thurmond, and Dominick.

Mr. President, there are 12 members of the Armed Services Committee and the Appropriations Committee of the House of Representatives. The House Committee members are:

House Appropriations: Mahon, Whitten, Shivers, Mitchell, and Cedarberg.
 Defense Armed Services: Nedzi, Hubert, Price, Brown, Gray, Arenberg, and Ford.

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Mr. President, as I have pointed out, we are servants of this body and of the House. If it is desired that this matter be not handled this way, the Senate should recommend a change in the law and a joint supervisory committee be created. I will support it. I will welcome it. I do not care.

But, let us bear in mind that if we are to have a security intelligence agency, we cannot have it with national publicity on what it does, how it does it, and how much it spends here, or how much it spends there.

I was intrigued by the statement of the Senator from Wisconsin when he said, "Let us end this ignorance."

All right. How much is ignorance?

First, the total amount. You want to end that ignorance? That is when you intend to put the camel's nose under the tent. That is the beginning. That is the wedge. You say you do not want to know all the details on how the money is spent. But if you get the overall figures of \$1 billion or half a billion dollars or \$5 billion, or whatever, then how are you going to know, how can you evaluate, how can you judge or make an intelligent judgment on whether that is too much or too little, whether it is being expended wisely or unwisely, except when you can get the details?

How? You cannot know. And if you receive these figures and if you end this ignorance as to the total amount, next, you will want to end the ignorance as to the different agencies and how it is spent, and through whom it is spent. Next, you will want to end the ignorance on what it is spent for. Next, you want to end the ignorance of how that intelligence is procured. There is no end to it. We take a choice. If you vote this way, the Senate takes the responsibility. It is no embarrassment to me or to any other member of this committee. If this is the way the Senate wants to do it, that is its responsibility.

The national security of this country also is the Senate's responsibility. If this is the way the Senate wants to do it, very well. But let me say this: By ending the ignorance that the Senator speaks of, that can be pursued logically to the point that this will not be the end of it. It will go on from here.

"Ignorance" is a harsh word. We have to be ignorant of many things in Government. If Government is going to function in the area of national security, we cannot be informed at all times about everything that is going on. We often inform our enemies of too much—and they can take advantage of it.

If you are going to end all their alleged ignorance, you are going to end national security. Where do we stop? If you do not like the ad hoc committees, do what the distinguished Senator from Minnesota has suggested: Create another committee in which you will have confidence. Create another committee; name the people you will trust to oversee.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's 3 minutes have expired.

Mr. STENNIS. I yield the Senator 1 additional minute.

There has been a burden to me. I have had Senators in good conscience, in good faith—dedicated, loyal, patriotic Americans—come to me and seek this information. I would like to give it to them. But I am torn between the personal desire to make them acquainted with everything I know—everything I have seen and heard in these hearings—and the duty to help maintain and preserve our national security. A security that will be effective and can be useful and can serve to protect the welfare of our country. I have to make that choice.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCLELLAN. I will yield, but first I should like to make one other comment.

I think I can go this far. For the past 5 years, we have held extensive hearings on these requests for appropriations. It has been more than adequate supervision with respect to expenditures; I can say that. It has been on the conservative side, I may say to the Senator, without any reservation whatever.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's additional time has expired.

Mr. STENNIS. I yield the Senator 1 additional minute.

Mr. McCLELLAN. We cut the national defense budget. We cut this more percentage-wise.

The issue can simply be stated. Do we want to publicly disclose these figures? Or do we want some other change, some other committee to try to perform these functions? I am willing to abide by the decision of the Senate.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield on my time?

Mr. McCLELLAN. I yield.

Mr. PROXMIRE. I yield myself 2 minutes. Mr. President, to ask the distinguished Senator from Arkansas a question.

On November 15, the majority and minority leaders wrote the Senator from Arkansas, asking that he release all overall intelligence information of the kind called for in the amendment. The response of the distinguished Senator from Arkansas, on November 20, is as follows:

I have your letter of November 15 and want you to know that I intend to comply, as fully as possible, with the recommendation of the Senate Select Committee on Secret and Confidential Documents to provide the Senate with the over-all sums requested for each of the various intelligence agencies.

What was the intention of the Senator from Arkansas? Is his intention the same now, or has he changed his mind?

Mr. McCLELLAN. It was my intention and it would be my intention now, to release those figures if it would not jeopardize our national security. I do not want to withhold them. I would like to give the Senator everything I know. But this is not my responsibility. I am not the committee. I would have no right to come here and spread these matters on the floor of the Senate without the approval of the committee.

Mr. PROXMIRE. The Senator is absolutely right.

Mr. McCLELLAN. It would not be

right for me to do that. But I wish it were possible and consistent with the law to release these figures on the front pages of the press, on television and radio, so that everybody would know. I believe, however, that the Senator agrees with me that that would be a bad mistake. I think it is a mistake to start the public disclosing of these matters. If you do not like the setup, change the setup, but we must protect our national security.

Mr. PROXMIRE. I say to the Senator from Arkansas that I wholeheartedly agree that the Senator is absolutely right to come and ask for the Senate's decision on this.

As I understand the Senator's response, at one time he thought that he could release this if the Senate would approve; but he has had second thoughts on it, and now he feels that it might not serve the interests of the country to disclose this information at the present time.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. PROXMIRE. I yield.

Mr. McCLELLAN. We had Mr. Colby in and discussed this matter. I asked Mr. Colby to come down, and I asked the Senator from Wisconsin and the Senator from California to come in and interrogate him and visit with him about these things. I have done everything I possibly can to try to find an answer to this problem. But I do not know the answer. We either have to do it or not do it.

Mr. PROXMIRE. I thank the Senator.

Mr. President, I should like to make one other statement.

The Senator from Arkansas has argued, as do other Senators, that the release of this information, the overall total information, is going to be of some value to the Soviet Union, but of no value to us. That does not make any sense at all to me. It may or may not be of any value to the Soviet Union. Frankly, I think it will be of none. There is no way the Soviet Union can interpret whether our overall figure indicates what we are doing within our intelligence committee. Suppose we decrease the amount we are spending. That may mean that our satellites are more effective. That may mean we have found methods that are more efficient in gathering intelligence than relying on manpower. If we increase the amount we are spending, it may mean the reverse. It may not mean that we are making a greater intelligence effort.

What this does is to alert the Senate of the United States—it alerts Members of Congress—so that they, in turn, can get the information they should have if they feel that a disproportionate amount is being devoted to the intelligence community—as to whether they feel it is too much or too little.

As the letter from Senator HUGH SCOTT and Senator MANSFIELD pointed out, the purpose of this is to maintain the necessary support for our intelligence operations, not to tear them down. Not to diminish our effort, but so that we can reinforce it and do so wisely and intelligently.

One more point. With all the debate we have heard—and I challenge the dis-

timinished Senators who have yet to speak in opposition to the amendment. I have not heard one. I have not heard any hypothetical, or imaginary example of how any damage is going to be done to the United States of America. How is this information going to be used against us? I have heard nothing on that score. I have heard generalizations as to what might happen if we were to release information not called for by this amendment. That does not make any sense. Because we provide the overall total figure for intelligence does not mean we are going to tell anything about the CIA.

My point is that if this amendment is wrong, the burden of proof certainly is on those who would say it is wrong; because what we are doing is simply providing the taxpayer what they are entitled to know, information on where their money goes. If we are not going to disclose this, the burden of proof certainly should be on the side of those who say we should insist on secrecy and not provide disclosure.

So I say that proof has been lacking and I see no examples at all of any damage this could do.

Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, how much time remains in opposition to the amendment?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The opposition has 45 minutes remaining.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield myself 10 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi is recognized.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I have said in this Chamber before and I repeat now that it is not fun being on this committee that looks into the money that goes into intelligence. I say that after years of service on the Committee on Armed Services and the last 5 years as chairman of that committee.

This idea of not having had any surveillance and Congress having failed to go into it, those statements are just unfounded because they are made on facts that have been told to some Senators that are not correct.

I do not like to go into this matter but in the formative days men like former Senator Russell of Georgia, former Senator Ellender of Louisiana, and former Senator Smith of Maine were Members of this body, and they were some of the personalities involved. I have served with them, as has the Senator from North Dakota (Mr. Young), who is still serving. Also the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. McClellan) is here. He already has spoken.

It is a mistake to say that the Committee on Armed Services in the year 1970-71 held no meetings on this matter. Every item in the CIA budget in those years was gone over by members of the committee and the capable staff members, and checked in and checked out.

I remember that in January of 1973 we had a full briefing before the full committee by the CIA, and the budget committee on the CIA had meetings, and we have had meetings this year, in 1974, that went over the budget; and we had

briefings by the CIA direct to our full committee. Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B00380R000700030038-5
year this matter has been scrupulously gone into because of the special nature and because we had this extraordinary responsibility. I remember asking Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard when he was here 3 years ago to look into this matter from his viewpoint, and he did that.

Now, we are talking about a good many different groups that are connected with the intelligence effort. The Senator from Wisconsin asked for something specific.

To start with, the Soviets know almost everything about everything we are doing by merely going to the bookstore or to the newsstand. They get all of that laid out before them, almost everything; and we get nothing. We do not know anything much about what they are doing. That is what makes it necessary for us to have such a vast intelligence-gathering activity which is worldwide. We have to carry a great deal of the load, the majority of the load for the free world. I am talking about the money load. But we do not have anything to start with. The Soviets have everything, almost.

If they are given this new information then certain deductions could be made about how much of the budget is going for these different activities and the first things we know calculations are made and they come pretty close to being correct as to how much is spent by the military, how much is spent in the civilian area how much is spent on satellites, and how much is spent by the CIA itself and where. Following a series of deductions and inferences based on all the information they already have from us, from the newspapers, and from the newsstands, they will be able to make fairly good calculations.

Specifically I wish to point out one matter. Senators remember the incident of the U-2 having been shot down. Remember that landing that was made. We later had that gentleman before our committee. President Eisenhower was President then. He said:

I am to blame if any blame is to be attached.

That U-2 venture saved our Treasury billions and billions of dollars, in my judgment, and I am familiar with the facts. If we had not been carrying on an activity such as that we would have been totally in the dark with respect to what we knew about the extensive missile work, the sites that they had, and a great many other things that could be named. There is a specific illustration.

Some might say, "Go on and develop what is happening now." I cannot do that; I cannot go on. That is one of the things that can be brought out. I have talked to Senators in the cloakroom and largely have satisfied them with respect to the matters we have talked about, with respect to these programs, and this money, and how we hold back the actual dollar amounts for reasons I have already given, and other reasons that could be given. I know this has been a good debate and I have never seen a debate where I was so certain no single speaker was speaking for any agency.

This argument today is not prompted by the CIA. I have not mentioned this. I do not have one scintilla of line about them, or a telephone call, a meeting, or anything else. Those of us who have been in touch with the problem have a feeling about it. As the Senator from Arkansas said, we are not speaking for a committee, or a department, a director, an employee, or anything else. This is a problem concerning our national security that has jammed us right to the question of national survival. That is why we stand here year after year standing firm on this position. It may sound apologetic, but it is not apologetic. It goes as far as it can to explain to the membership and to the American people the problem we are up against, and how this problem is handled; and, as much as we can, the reason for handling it that way—at the same time showing the proper respect for every Member of this body and for the taxpayer who contributes as much as one thin dime to the cause involved.

Now, what about the CIA itself. The Senator from Wisconsin has offered a valuable amendment with respect to the basic CIA law, and it has been accepted. I commend him highly for the amendment. We had a bill I had introduced in my committee. We have not yet had a chance to have hearings on that bill. There are some of its provisions that I am delighted to see added as a part of this bill. They are relevant and will be helpful.

For many years I, along with other Senators, have gone over every single major item in the CIA budget.

On my responsibility to my colleagues, they in CIA keep a clean house. They have had a conservative operation dollar-wise and have accounted for the money in a splendid way. That has been true without exception. There has been no great spillage of money or great extravagances, and not one bit of scandal or odor of any kind.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's 10 minutes have expired.

Mr. STENNIS. I yield myself 2 more minutes.

In connection with the expenditure of that intelligence money. There are other agencies involved, as we all know. The military services have already been mentioned. The Defense Department itself has a certain intelligence agency attached to it.

So when I say these matters have been gone over, I mean all of it, but our Armed Services Committee is the so-called parent committee of this direct CIA money. I am not here to praise anyone, but I tell you, Mr. President, that moneywise for years and years the CIA has been conservatively operated and has had a firm hand and a clean house and a clean record with reference to the handling of the taxpayers' money.

I hope that in a moment of frustration—and I do not blame any Senator for being frustrated about this—this system is not overturned here on the floor of the Senate on an amendment which, if it becomes law and is carried out, would, as its practical effect, virtually destroy 80 to 90 percent of the effective-

ness of much of our most important work in the field of intelligence. The PRESIDENTING OFFICER. The Senator's minutes have expired.

Mr. STENNIS. I yield myself 1 minute more.

I oppose the amendment because it would give our adversary, now and in the future, the working tools, a blueprint, to a degree, of our activities that have already proved to be so valuable and are proving themselves more valuable, in a way, as each year comes and goes.

So I hope the Senate will not only defeat this amendment but, with all due deference to my friend, do so by a large vote. I will be glad to be relieved of my responsibilities in this field if the Senate wants to adopt a new system.

I yield to the Senator from South Carolina.

Mr. President, how many minutes do we have left?

The PRESIDENTING OFFICER. The Senator has 30 minutes left.

Mr. STENNIS. I yield 12 minutes to the Senator from South Carolina.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I rise in opposition to the amendment by the senior Senator from Wisconsin. The proposal has the lure of simplicity, but consequences that run deep, and against our Nation's fundamental interests. It contains the promise of informing the public while preserving the essential security of our foreign intelligence capabilities. In fact, I believe it would serve both interests poorly.

A constant in the needs of sovereign nations is to possess intelligence about the intentions and capabilities of adversaries. General Washington wrote one of his intelligence chiefs, Col. Elias Dayton:

The necessity of procuring good intelligence is apparent and need not be further urged—all that remains for me to add, is, that you keep the whole matter as secret as possible. For upon secrecy, success depends in most Enterprises of the kind, and for want of it, they are generally defeated, however well planned and promising a favorable issue.

That was the statement of our first Commander in Chief, the first President.

The tragic experience of Pearl Harbor taught us a number of painful lessons. In the 1947 National Security Act the Congress took a giant step toward assuring that executive action or inaction in the international field would be based upon the best information available. Insofar as it is possible for the Congress to direct the executive branch in the conduct of essentially an executive responsibility, the National Security Act of 1947 provided the authority needed for an effective foreign intelligence establishment.

The CIA Act of 1949 provided additional administrative authority for CIA and provided for its funding. The funding of CIA was particularly important from the point of view of Congress since it establishes the second of the two principal relationships between an executive branch agency and the Congress—legislation and appropriations.

I believe that our Nation is unique in the attention its legislature has given to specifying and circumscribing the activi-

ties of the agency designated to perform the process of working out legislation for CIA. It was necessary to somewhat change the procedures followed in the case of the more normal Federal agency. This was particularly true in connection with provisions concerning the authorization and appropriation of funds.

Public revelation in these areas would alert potential adversaries to programs, needs, and accomplishments. This knowledge could be used against our Nation's interest to offset the value of intelligence collected or to neutralize the sources and methods used.

The 1949 CIA Act permits the allocation of sums for the CIA to carry out its activities without publicly revealing the secret purpose to which such funds may be put.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that section 6 of that act be printed at this point in my remarks.

There being no objection, the section was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

Sec. 6. In the interests of the security of the foreign intelligence activities of the United States and in order further to implement the proviso of section 403(d) (3) of this title that the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure, the Agency shall be exempted from the provisions of section 654 of Title 5, and the provisions of any other law which require the publication or disclosure of the organization, functions, names, official titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel employed by the Agency: Provided, That in furtherance of this section, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget shall make no reports to the Congress in connection with the Agency under section 947(b) of Title 5.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, as a matter of fact, the arrangements worked out are completely responsive to the major elements of the Federal budgetary systems. Changes from the norm are designed to provide a reasonably controlled environment so as to protect and preserve the sources and methods which necessarily must be resorted to in collecting foreign intelligence.

As a matter of fact, I know that the budget of CIA is scrutinized with great care.

Similar procedures have been used over the years to fund other governmental activities of an extremely sensitive nature when the public interest would not be served through the use of more common explicit procedures. Examples of this include the Manhattan project for the development of the atomic bomb and the development of the U-2 airplane.

On May 10, 1950, following the loss of the U-2 over the Soviet Union, the chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, Clarence Cannon, explained that:

The plane was on an espionage mission authorized and supported by money provided under an appropriation recommended by the House Committee on Appropriations and passed by the Congress.

Although the Members of the House have not generally been informed on the subject, the mission was one of a series and part of an established program with which the subcommittee in charge of the appropriation was

familiar, and of which it had been fully apprised in previous sessions.

The appropriation and the activity had been approved and recommended by the Bureau of the Budget and, like all military expenditures and operations, was under the aegis of the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, for whom all members of the subcommittee have the highest regard and in whose military capacity they have the utmost confidence.

The question immediately arises as to the authority of the subcommittee to recommend an appropriation for such purposes, and especially the failure of the subcommittee to divulge to the House and the country the justifications warranting the expenditure and all details connected with the item at the time it was under consideration on the floor.

The answer of the subcommittee is—absolute and unavoidable military necessity, fundamental national defense.

This appropriation, and its purpose, is justified by honored and established precedent. This subcommittee, including the same personnel with the exception of two members who have since died, was the same committee which for something like 3 years provided in the annual appropriation bills a sum which finally totaled more than \$2 billion for the original atomic bomb. Session after session the money was provided, and the subcommittee visited Oak Ridge where the work was in progress without any Member of the House with the exception of the Speaker of the House being aware of this tremendous project or the expenditure of the money. According to the testimony of all military authorities that bomb ended the war and saved the lives of not less than half a million men who would have had to be sacrificed in the conquest of Japan. No one has ever said that the subcommittee was not justified in expending an amount that eventually aggregated more than the assessed valuation of some of the States of the Union for that purpose.

And now the most gratifying feature of the entire incident.

The world has always recognized the remarkable success of our form of government. It has been the wonder and admiration of mankind. But they have said that it was at a great disadvantage in a war with an authoritarian dictatorship.

We have here demonstrated conclusively that free men confronted by the most ruthless and criminal despotism can under the Constitution of the United States protect this Nation and preserve world civilization.

The CIA is held tightly accountable within the executive and legislative bodies. There may be disagreement as to whom the Members should be or more particularly what committee they should be from in the Congress, but I think such disagreements can only be resolved on the basis of giving priority to the special constitutional roles of the Congress—the appropriation of funds—the enactment of legislation—and the oversight of legislation already enacted. It is difficult to perceive how enlarging a somewhat small group into a somewhat large group would assure that these congressional responsibilities are being fulfilled. Clearly information on the activities of the CIA should not be displayed in a public arena. To do so would defeat our national interest.

Mr. President, I simply want to say that four committees of Congress now receive this information—the Armed Serv-

the Committee of the Senate, the Appropriations Committee of the Senate, the Armed Services Committee of the House, the Appropriations Committee of the House. So there is nothing hidden. It is disclosed. It just not disclosed to anybody. If any particular Senator wants this information, he can get it from these committees on a classified basis.

It should be classified. This information should not be made public. Those who passed a law of Congress in 1949, I think, were very far-sighted when they provided that such information would not be made public.

I do not know of any objection that has been made to the way these four committees have handled this information. So far as I know, the four committees in Congress have done a good job handling this information.

If we reveal this information to the public generally it will simply aid our enemies. We cannot get around that. There is no doubt about it. It will reveal the size of our activities that the CIA is engaged in. It will reveal not only the size but also the trends, because some year it may go up, some year it may go down. Then that will indicate to our enemies what we are doing. It will indicate whether we are increasing our intelligence activities; whether we are reducing our intelligence activities. Then the effort will be made to know where, in what country.

Another thing: In dealing with foreign nations this could be a sensitive matter. Our relations could be affected because if we make this information available then there is going to be the desire on the part of somebody to know how much of it is being spent in this country, how much is being spent in that country. This is a sensitive question that might bring about some ill will in our foreign relations.

No country in the world reveals this information to the public. Why should we do it in the United States? Why should we tell our enemies the size of our expenditures in collecting information which we need to preserve this form of government and protect the people of the United States.

This would be an opening wedge for intelligence details. Once the total amount is revealed there will be the strenuous effort to collect the details. There will be a strenuous effort to collect the sources of information, the methods of collecting information, who is engaged in this, and how they go about it.

Further, I know of no clamor from the public. If the Senator from Wisconsin knows of any clamor from the public to divulge figures here that will hurt our country and help the enemy, I do not know about it.

Mr. President, I may say, further, that it has been referred to here that Dr. Schlesinger does not seem to object to the amendment, and that Mr. Colby does not object to it. I believe the Senator from Wisconsin made some such statement. At any rate, during the course of the hearing on his nomination to be Secretary of Defense, Dr. Schlesinger did make the statement, but the Senator from Wisconsin did not give the entire

statement. I want to give some of the rest of it. Mr. President, the Senator's time has expired.

Mr. THURMOND. These are his words.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I am virtually out of time, but I yield 1 minute to the Senator from South Carolina.

Mr. THURMOND. Dr. Schlesinger stated:

I would lean against it. But I think that it could be done. The problem that you get into, you see, as you well know, Senator, is that it would be just a free floating figure, unsupported and unsupportable in public, with nobody except the members of the Oversight Committees or members of the Armed Services Committee and Appropriation Committees who would know the details. Those are circumstances which under certain conditions would elicit the strong tendency for a flat 10 percent, 20 percent, 30 percent, 100 percent, cut in intelligence activities because there is an identifiable target with no broad understanding of what the components are and it is that aspect that I think concerns me.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.

Mr. THURMOND. I may say in closing that we do have an open society.

Mr. STENNIS. I yield one-half minute to the Senator to conclude.

Mr. THURMOND. We do have an open society, but there are some things that have to be kept secret, and this is one of those things.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Arizona for 2 minutes.

Mr. GOLDWATER. I thank the Senator.

I want to express my deep concern about this amendment. I think it is extremely dangerous, and it should be defeated.

It is dangerous because it starts a precedent. It is a precedent that I do not know exists any place else in the world, and I do not know that it even exists in this country.

If this amendment is voted on favorably today, we can rest assured that within a year or two, the demand will be made to break the figures down so that we will know where every cent is going.

In military operations there is nothing that approaches intelligence. The estimate of the situation that is made by every man in any battle he has ever engaged in is headed by intelligence of the enemy forces. If the enemy knows what we know about their forces, then this intelligence becomes valueless.

Mr. President, I see no need for this amendment. Any Senator can attend briefings by the CIA if he is cleared for top secret. Any Senator can get the figures that we are talking about by asking for them. If we make them public I think we are asking for trouble.

We have had imposed on us an almost impossible task of espionage with respect to the Soviet Union, while they have a very easy time of it in the United States. I do not want to make that any easier.

I hope that one Senator will say "no" to this very ill-advised amendment.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from Nevada.

Mr. CANNON. I thank the chairman for yielding to me.

I am in complete accord with the statement just made by Senator Goldwater. I cannot think of anything more unwise or anything that could possibly be more harmful to our Government than to let this amendment be agreed to, providing for full and free information to people from whom we would like to keep that information.

I certainly am in favor of full disclosure on matters that ought to be of public interest and ought to be disclosed to the public. I have supported that concept continuously over the years. But I think that disclosure of the intelligence budget would, over the years, by virtue of the trends that were discovered, and which that would disclose, would certainly provide valuable assistance to our adversaries.

I think that if we were to provide that type of information, then we might just as well discontinue the type of activities that we are trying to continue to keep this country informed of for the benefit of the people who reside here.

I hope that the Senate will defeat this amendment overwhelmingly.

I thank the distinguished Senator for yielding.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield 4 minutes to the Senator from Washington.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I do not feel that this proposal really meets our national interest. It is true that a foreign intelligence service like the CIA must operate more openly in our society than any other similar service in any other democracy in the world. Let us look at the facts:

Last year the new Director of Central Intelligence, William Colby, appeared before the Senate Armed Services Committee and gave extensive testimony in public. I know of no other democratic society in which this would occur.

It has been mentioned here earlier, Mr. President, that the head of MI-6, which is British Intelligence, is known only to the Prime Minister of Great Britain. That is how close they keep that information.

The functions and responsibilities of the Central Intelligence Agency are fully prescribed in statute. I know of no other democratic society in which this has been done.

Finally, the appropriations for CIA are subject to a process which intimately involves four committees of the Congress who are aware of and approve the details of its programs.

The proposal before us is designed to contribute to a more informed public. But how can the public be really informed unless the details of CIA's programs are also spelled out? Yet, if we did so, I can guarantee that we will be providing what is necessary for our potential adversaries to neutralize the methods which we must use in order to obtain information about closed societies.

The paradox of the situation is reflected in the fact that recently some journalists were jailed in Sweden—certainly not a closed society—for merely mentioning that Sweden has an intelligence service.

In summary, our foreign intelligence service grew out of an Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B00380R000700030038-5 and all of its activities are closely scrutinized by a number of representative members of both the Senate and the House of Representatives. This is how we have resolved the balance between the needs of an open society and the needs for a secret foreign intelligence service. I certainly do not think that this is the time to unbalance the situation as I am confident enactment of the proposed amendment would do.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I thank the Senator. I am sorry I do not have more time, but I am glad to yield a minute to the Senator from Virginia.

Mr. WILLIAM L. SCOTT. Mr. President, I merely want to join with my colleagues on the Armed Services Committee in opposing this amendment. We are all proud of the open society of which we are a part, but there is a time when we must keep some of our intelligence secret, and I would urge my colleagues, in the interest of the country, to defeat this amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, how much time does the opposition have remaining? I might have misunderstood the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The opposition has 9 minutes. The proponents have 54.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from North Dakota.

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. President, I rise to oppose the amendment.

I see no objection to every Member of the Senate knowing exactly how much money is spent for intelligence, and Senators can get that information now if they want it. It cannot be made public though. But as one who has served for many years on this five-member Subcommittee on Intelligence Appropriations and Oversight I can see great danger in having to publicize the amount of money that can be spent for intelligence purposes.

Let me give a good example. During World War II, President Roosevelt spent some \$4.5 billion, as nearly as I am able to ascertain, to develop the atomic bomb. That was probably the best kept secret this country ever had. It was a good thing it was, because the Germans had the know-how, and if they had known we were developing an atomic bomb, they could probably have developed one before us. I understand only five or six Members of Congress knew of that development. Even Vice President Truman did not know it until he became President. If the bomb had not worked, President Roosevelt might have been subject to impeachment for spending so much money without being authorized to do so.

Also, during World War II, a German named Richard Sorge became a Russian Communist spy. He found out from Japan that they had no intention of attacking Russia, but were going to move south, and as a result, the Russians were able to remove their crack troops from the Far East and win the war in Germany.

Our problem with the secrecy of the critical situation. What was not generally known at that time was that a high ranking Russian G.P.U. intelligence agent named Oleg Penkovsky had turned against the Communists, and he was supplying information, quite accurate as it turned out, as to how far the Russians would go. If anyone wants to read something interesting on intelligence operations, The Penkovsky Papers is the most interesting book on the subject I have ever read.

I know there is great interest in the public knowing everything possible, but I think there are some things that should be kept secret for our own security.

Mr. STENNIS. That is a fine statement.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, since this is my amendment, I prefer that the opposition make whatever statements they want to make. I intend to speak only another minute or so, and then I shall yield back the remainder of my time, which is 54 minutes.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, if the Senator will conclude in 1 minute, I will yield back the rest of my time right now, and that will conclude the debate.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, with all deference to my colleagues, I think this amendment has been very badly misinterpreted. It would not give away any secrets or expose any of the secret workings of the CIA. All it would do is provide one overall figure, of what our intelligence operations in total cost.

There has been not one example during the debate of how this figure could do us any damage; not one. How it would help the Russians is beyond me. If they inquire as to what the figure means, obviously they get no answer. But Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, on the basis of this figure, could inquire if the total is increasing or decreasing, or determine whether they think it is too big or too small. I point out that it might very well be too small.

Finally, Mr. President, this proposal is not based on something that came from my mind, by any means. This is based on the recommendation of a bipartisan committee of Democrats and Republicans, headed by the majority leader and the minority leader, who recommended that the release of this limited information will be useful to the Senate in maintaining the necessary support of our intelligence operations.

I just cannot understand how Members of the Senate could be afraid of a little knowledge of a little information on the basis of which inquiry could privately be made, so we could see whether or not these enormous sums are being spent wisely. Now we do not know whether it is \$1 billion, \$5 billion, \$10 billion, or what it is. We do not know whether the amount is going up or down. It has been indicated by the chairman of the Appropriations Committee that the amount has been fairly stable, and perhaps has declined in the last year or so. This is very useful to know. It seems to me that we have a right to know how much is involved and a duty to

know. I am prepared to yield back the remainder of my time. If the opposition is prepared to yield back its time.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I am glad to yield back the remainder of my time.

Mr. PROXMIRE. I yield back the remainder of my time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HASKELL). All remaining time having been yielded back, the question is on agreeing to the amendment (No. 1359) of the Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. PROXMIRE).

On this question, the yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I announce that the Senator from California (Mr. CRANSTON), the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. FULBRIGHT), the Senator from Indiana (Mr. HARTKE), the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. HUMBLESTON), the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. INOUYE), the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. KENNEDY), the Senator from Utah (Mr. MOSS), the Senator from Alabama (Mr. SPARKMAN), and the Senator from California (Mr. TUNNEY) are necessarily absent.

I also announce that the Senator from Missouri (Mr. SYMINGTON) is absent because of illness.

Mr. GRIFFIN. I announce that the Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. BILLMON) and the Senator from Oregon (Mr. PACKWOOD) are necessarily absent.

The result was announced—yeas 33, nays 55, as follows:

[No. 224 Leg.]

YEAS—33

Abourezk	Hatfield	Muskie
Baker	Hathaway	Nelson
Bayh	Hughes	Pell
Case	Javits	Proxmire
Church	Magnuson	Randolph
Clark	Mansfield	Ribicoff
Cook	Mathias	Schweiker
Eagleton	McGovern	Steffers
Gravel	Metcalf	Stevenson
Hart	Mittelman	Welcker
Haskell	Mondale	Williams

NAYS—55

Alben	Dole	McClure
Allen	Domenici	McGee
Barlett	Dominick	McIntyre
Beall	Eastland	Montoya
Bennett	Ervin	Nunn
Bentsen	Fannin	Pastore
Bible	Fong	Pearson
Biden	Goldwater	Perry
Brook	Griffin	Roth
Brooks	Gurney	Scott, Hugh
Buckley	Hansen	Scott
Burdick	Heins	William L.
Byrd	Hollings	Stennis
Harry F. Jr.	Hruska	Stevens
Byrd, Robert C.	Humphrey	Taft
Cannon	Jackson	Talmadge
Chiles	Johnston	Thurmond
Cotton	Long	Tower
Curtis	McClellan	Young

NOT VOTING—12

Billmon	Huddleston	Packwood
Cranston	Inouye	Sparkman
Fulbright	Kennedy	Symington
Hartke	Moss	Tunney

So Mr. Proxmire's amendment (No. 1359) was rejected.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the amendment was rejected.

Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B00380R000700030038-5 to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was