

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

AMENDMENT NO. 1378

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will now proceed to the consideration of amendment No. 1378, by the distinguished Senator from Minnesota (Mr. HUMPHREY), which the clerk will report.

The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to read the amendment.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered; and, without objection, the amendment will be printed in the RECORD.

The amendment is as follows:

On page 17, between lines 20 and 21, insert a new section as follows:

Sec. 703. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no funds appropriated pursuant to this or any other Act may be used for the purpose of carrying out research, testing, and/or evaluation of poisonous gases, radioactive materials, poisonous chemicals, biological, or chemical warfare agents upon dogs.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Time for debate on this amendment shall be limited to 30 minutes, to be equally divided between and controlled by the mover of the amendment and the manager of the bill.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I yield myself such time as I may need.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will be in order. Senators will take their seats or retire to the cloakroom for their conversations. The Senator will not proceed until the Senate is in order.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I discussed this amendment yesterday. I want to be sure that the Department of Defense and its related departments or agencies do not engage in the use of dogs for carrying out research, testing, and evaluation of poisonous gases, radioactive materials, poisonous chemicals, biological or chemical warfare agents. That is the whole purpose of this amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate is not in order. The Senator from Minnesota is entitled to be heard. The Chair asks the indulgence of Senators.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, because I want to make sure that this amendment is specific and is directed toward the Department of Defense, as it relates to the use of dogs in the testing of poisonous gases, radioactive materials, poisonous chemicals, and biological or germ warfare agents. I want to change my amendment very simply, by making sure that it applies directly to this act. Therefore, on line 2 I would say:

No funds appropriated pursuant to this Act may be used for the purpose of carrying out research, testing . . .

I so modify the amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair advises the Senator that inasmuch as the yeas and nays have been ordered, unanimous consent is required.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I ask unanimous consent.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

The modified amendment is as follows:

On page 17, between lines 20 and 21, insert a new section as follows:

Sec. 703. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no funds appropriated pursuant to this Act may be used for the purpose of carrying out research, testing, and/or evaluation of poisonous gases, radioactive materials, poisonous chemicals, biological, or chemical warfare agents upon dogs.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, the purpose of that is for clarity. We are not trying in this proposal to move in on the National Science Foundation, in its normal research work, or the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.

I wonder what the arguments are against this particular proposal. The arguments are, of course, that if the Humphrey amendment, known as the beagle amendment, passes, it will restrict research, and it will complicate the problems of the Department of Defense on ascertaining how much, for example, an individual or man can take in a submarine; how much bad air; how much polluted air.

Mr. President, I say all of that is not relevant because if the Department of Defense wants to make tests as to the effect of poisonous gases, radioactive materials, poisonous chemicals, biological, or germ warfare agents, there are plenty of other animals they could use such as rates and mice.

I do not believe any Member of this body wants to see the Department of Defense advertise, as it has recently, for 450 beagle puppies for the purpose of testing poisonous gases, radioactive materials, poisonous chemicals, biological or germ warfare agents.

I, for one, am trying to save the Department of Defense from a little more bad publicity. I hope they were mistaken in that original advertisement. This amendment really is the result of conversations I have had with the distinguished Senator from Washington (Mr. MAGNUSON), who long has been interested in this kind of legislation. The Senator from Washington was not on the floor yesterday when I proposed this amendment, so I ask unanimous consent that his name be added as a principal sponsor of the amendment, along with the Senator from Kansas (Mr. DOLE), and the Senator from West Virginia (Mr. RANDOLPH).

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. HUMPHREY. These Senators all have given serious consideration to this proposal.

Mr. President, the amendment before us addresses the question of the cruel testing by the Department of Defense of poisonous gases, germ warfare agents, nerve gas, biological warfare agents, poisonous chemicals, and radioactive materials on dogs.

As I pointed out to my colleagues late yesterday afternoon upon introduction of this amendment, the military branches have been insensitive to the hue and cry in this country against their continued use of dogs in test gas programs. The DOD has used dogs extensively and currently is using dogs in the evaluation of the toxicity and disabling nature of poisonous gas. The DOD needs some direction in its use of dogs in an experi-

mentation program. My amendment gives it that direction. It prohibits the use of dogs in all such deadly and cruel experimentation.

Mr. President, I find the poison gas experiments by the DOD on dogs—on man's best friend—reprehensible.

It is one thing to do legitimate medical research on rats and rabbits, but it is quite another thing to use dogs, to use beagle puppies, in the testing of poisonous nerve gas and radioactive material and other deadly agents of warfare.

I want to remind my colleagues in the Senate of the moving words of Senator George G. Vest, who served in the Senate in the late 1800's to 1903:

The one absolutely unselfish friend that man can have in this selfish world, the one that never deserts him, the one that never proves ungrateful or treacherous, is his dog . . . He will kiss the hand that has no food to offer. . . . When all other friends desert, he remains.

I introduce this amendment not only to protect our dogs, which are so close to our hearts, but also with earnest concern for the provisions of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 which prohibits the use of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases, in war, and the use of bacteriological methods of warfare.

I am the author of Senate Resolution 48 which calls for the Senate to support a broad interpretation of the Geneva protocol. In so doing my resolution recommends that the United States be willing, on the basis of reciprocity, to refrain from the use in war of all toxic chemical weapons whether directed against man, animals, or plants.

The amendment which we are considering today is in the context of my concern that we prohibit the development and use of all chemical and biological weapons whether directed against man or man's best friend.

The DOD currently is testing poisonous gases on beagles and it will continue to do so unless we prohibit such a heartless practice.

Senators have been calling the Department of Defense, editors have been writing editorials, doctors have been protesting, but the Department of Defense just goes willy-nilly on its way with its deadly research on dogs.

As I indicated earlier, the U.S. Army's Edgewood Arsenal in Maryland currently is advertising for 450 beagle puppies to be used to test poisonous chemicals and gases. We must stop the appalling suffering which the dogs must experience in these DOD experiments.

If my colleagues were able to read the scientific description of some of these experiments from the American Hygiene Journal, which appeared in the RECORD yesterday, I am sure they will want to stop these devastatingly cruel experiments by supporting my amendment. I urge its adoption.

Mr. President, before anything further is said about it, there is not one bit of necessary research that would be inhibited by this amendment. Not one bit of research has to be done on dogs in connection with poisonous gases, radioactive materials, poisonous chemicals,

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In summary, our foreign intelligence service arises out of an act of Congress and all of its activities are closely scrutinized by a number of representative members of both the Senate and the House of Representatives. This is how we have resolved the balance between the needs of an open society and the needs for a secret foreign intelligence service. I certainly do not think that this is the time to unbalance the situation as I am confident enactment of the proposed amendment would do.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I thank the Senator. I am sorry I do not have more time, but I am glad to yield a minute to the Senator from Virginia.

Mr. WILLIAM L. SCOTT. Mr. President, I merely want to join with my colleagues on the Armed Services Committee in opposing this amendment. We are all proud of the open society of which we are a part, but there is a time when we must keep some of our intelligence secret, and I would urge my colleagues, in the interest of the country, to defeat this amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, how much time does the opposition have remaining? I might have misunderstood the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The opposition has 9 minutes. The proponents have 54.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from North Dakota.

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. President, I rise to oppose the amendment.

I see no objection to every Member of the Senate knowing exactly how much money is spent for intelligence, and Senators can get that information now if they want it. It cannot be made public though. But as one who has served for many years on this five-member Subcommittee on Intelligence Appropriations and Oversight I can see great danger in having to publicize the amount of money that can be spent for intelligence purposes.

Let me give a good example. During World War II, President Roosevelt spent some \$4.5 billion, as nearly as I am able to ascertain, to develop the atomic bomb. That was probably the best kept secret this country ever had. It was a good thing it was, because the Germans had the know-how, and if they had known we were developing an atomic bomb, they could probably have developed one before us. I understand only five or six Members of Congress knew of that development. Even Vice President Truman did not know it until he became President. If the bomb had not worked, President Roosevelt might have been subject to impeachment for spending so much money without being authorized to do so.

Also, during World War II, a German named Richard Sorge became a Russian Communist spy. He found out from Japan that they had no intention of attacking Russia, but were going to move south, and as a result, the Russians were able to remove their crack troops from the Far East and win the war against Germany.

Our problem with the removing of the Russian missiles from Cuba posed a real critical situation. What was not generally known at that time was that a high ranking Russian G.R.U. intelligence agent named Oleg Penkovsky had turned against the Communists, and he was supplying information, quite accurate as it turned out, as to how far the Russians would go. If anyone wants to read something interesting on intelligence operations. The Penkovsky Papers is the most interesting book on the subject I have ever read.

I know there is great interest in the public knowing everything possible, but I think there are some things that should be kept secret for our own security.

Mr. STENNIS. That is a fine statement.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, since this is my amendment, I prefer that the opposition make whatever statements they want to make. I intend to speak only another minute or so, and then I shall yield back the remainder of my time, which is 54 minutes.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, if the Senator will conclude in 1 minute, I will yield back the rest of my time right now, and that will conclude the debate.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, with all deference to my colleagues, I think this amendment has been very badly misinterpreted. It would not give away any secrets or expose any of the secret workings of the CIA. All it would do is provide one overall figure, of what our intelligence operations in total cost.

There has been not one example during the debate of how this figure could do us any damage; not one. How it would help the Russians is beyond me. If they inquire as to what the figure means, obviously they get no answer. But Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, on the basis of this figure, could inquire if the total is increasing or decreasing, or determine whether they think it is too big or too small. I point out that it might very well be too small.

Finally, Mr. President, this proposal is not based on something that came from my mind, by any means. This is based on the recommendation of a bipartisan committee of Democrats and Republicans, headed by the majority leader and the minority leader, who recommended that the release of this limited information will be useful to the Senate in maintaining the necessary support of our intelligence operations.

I just cannot understand how Members of the Senate could be afraid of a little knowledge of a little information on the basis of which inquiry could privately be made, so we could see whether or not these enormous sums are being spent wisely. Now we do not know whether it is \$1 billion, \$5 billion, \$10 billion, or what it is. We do not know whether the amount is going up or down. It has been indicated by the chairman of the Appropriations Committee that the amount has been fairly stable, and perhaps has declined in the last year or so. This is very useful to know. It seems to me that we have a right to know how much is involved and a duty to know, and a duty to act on the information.

Mr. President, I am prepared to yield back the remainder of my time, if the opposition is prepared to yield back its time.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I am glad to yield back the remainder of my time.

Mr. PROXMIRE. I yield back the remainder of my time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. (Mr. HASKELL). All remaining time having been yielded back, the question is on agreeing to the amendment (No. 1369) of the Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. PROXMIRE).

On this question, the yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I announce that the Senator from California (Mr. CRANSTON), the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. FULBRIGHT), the Senator from Indiana (Mr. HARTKE), the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. HUDDLESTON), the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. INOUE), the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. KENNEDY), the Senator from Utah (Mr. MOSS), the Senator from Alabama (Mr. SPARKMAN), and the Senator from California (Mr. TUNNEY) are necessarily absent.

I also announce that the Senator from Missouri (Mr. SYMINGTON) is absent because of illness.

Mr. GRIFFIN. I announce that the Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. BELLMON) and the Senator from Oregon (Mr. PACKWOOD) are necessarily absent.

The result was announced—yeas 33, nays 55, as follows:

[No. 224 Leg.]

YEAS—33

Abourezk	Hatfield	Muskie
Baker	Hathaway	Nelson
Bayh	Hughes	Pell
Case	Javits	Proxmire
Church	Magnuson	Randolph
Clark	Mansfield	Ribicoff
Cook	Mathias	Schweiker
Eagleton	McGovern	Stafford
Gravel	Metcalf	Stevenson
Hart	Metzenbaum	Weicker
Haskell	Mondale	Williams

NAYS—55

Aiken	Dole	McClure
Allen	Domenici	McGee
Bartlett	Dominick	McIntyre
Beall	Eastland	Montoya
Bennett	Ervin	Nunn
Bentsen	Fannin	Pastore
Bible	Fong	Pearson
Biden	Goldwater	Percy
Brock	Griffin	Roth
Brooke	Gurney	Scott, Hugh
Buckley	Hansen	Scott,
Burdick	Helms	William L.
Byrd	Hollings	Stennis
Harry F., Jr.	Hruska	Stevens
Byrd, Robert C.	Humphrey	Taft
Cannon	Jackson	Talmadge
Chiles	Johnston	Thurmond
Cotton	Long	Tower
Curtis	McClellan	Young

NOT VOTING—12

Bellmon	Huddleston	Packwood
Cranston	Inouye	Sparkman
Fulbright	Kennedy	Symington
Hartke	Moss	Tunney

So Mr. PROXMIRE's amendment (No. 1369) was rejected.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the amendment was rejected.

Mr. McINTYRE. I move to lay that motion on the table.

ices Committee of the Senate, the Appropriations Committee of the Senate, the Armed Services Committee of the House, the Appropriations Committee of the House. So there is nothing hidden. It is disclosed. It just not disclosed to anybody. If any particular Senator wants this information, he can get it from these committees on a classified basis.

It should be classified. This information should not be made public. Those who passed a law of Congress in 1949, I think, were very far-sighted when they provided that such information would not be made public.

I do not know of any objection that has been made to the way these four committees have handled this information. So far as I know, the four committees in Congress have done a good job handling this information.

If we reveal this information to the public generally it will simply aid our enemies. We cannot get around that. There is no doubt about it. It will reveal the size of our activities that the CIA is engaged in. It will reveal not only the size but also the trends, because some year it may go up, some year it may go down. Then that will indicate to our enemies what we are doing. It will indicate whether we are increasing our intelligence activities; whether we are reducing our intelligence activities. Then the effort will be made to know where, in what country.

Another thing: In dealing with foreign nations this could be a sensitive matter. Our relations could be affected because if we make this information available then there is going to be the desire on the part of somebody to know how much of it is being spent in this country, how much is being spent in that country. This is a sensitive question that might bring about some ill will in our foreign relations.

No country in the world reveals this information to the public. Why should we do it in the United States? Why should we tell our enemies the size of our expenditures in collecting information which we need to preserve this form of government and protect the people of the United States.

This would be an opening wedge for intelligence details. Once the total amount is revealed there will be the strenuous effort to collect the details. There will be a strenuous effort to collect the sources of information, the methods of collecting information, who is engaged in this, and how they go about it.

Further, I know of no clamor from the public. If the Senator from Wisconsin knows of any clamor from the public to divulge figures here that will hurt our country and help the enemy, I do not know about it.

Mr. President, I may say, further, that it has been referred to here that Dr. Schlesinger does not seem to object to the amendment, and that Mr. Colby does not object to it. I believe the Senator from Wisconsin made some such statement. At any rate, during the course of the hearing on his nomination to be Secretary of Defense, Dr. Schlesinger did make the statement, but the Senator from Wisconsin did not give the entire

statement. I want to give some of the rest of it.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.

Mr. THURMOND. These are his words.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I am virtually out of time, but I yield 1 minute to the Senator from South Carolina.

Mr. THURMOND. Dr. Schlesinger stated:

I would lean against it. But I think that it could be done. The problem that you get into, you see, as you well know, Senator, is that it would be just a free floating figure, unsupported and unsupportable in public, with nobody except the members of the Oversight Committees or members of the Armed Services Committee and Appropriation Committees who would know the details. Those are circumstances which under certain conditions would elicit the strong tendency for a flat 10 percent, 20 percent, 50 percent, 100 percent, cut in intelligence activities because there is an identifiable target with no broad understanding of what the components are and it is that aspect that I think concerns me.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.

Mr. THURMOND. I may say in closing that we do have an open society.

Mr. STENNIS. I yield one-half minute to the Senator to conclude.

Mr. THURMOND. We do have an open society, but there are some things that have to be kept secret, and this is one of those things.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Arizona for 2 minutes.

Mr. GOLDWATER. I thank the Senator.

I want to express my deep concern about this amendment. I think it is extremely dangerous, and it should be defeated.

It is dangerous because it starts a precedent. It is a precedent that I do not know exists any place else in the world, and I do not know that it even exists in this country.

If this amendment is voted on favorably today, we can rest assured that within a year or two, the demand will be made to break the figures down so that we will know where every cent is going.

In military operations there is nothing that approaches intelligence. The estimate of the situation that is made by every man in any battle he has ever engaged in is headed by intelligence of the enemy forces. If the enemy knows what we know about their forces, then this intelligence becomes valueless.

Mr. President, I see no need for this amendment. Any Senator can attend briefings by the CIA if he is cleared for top secret. Any Senator can get the figures that we are talking about by asking for them. If we make them public I think we are asking for trouble.

We have had imposed on us an almost impossible task of espionage with respect to the Soviet Union, while they have a very easy time of it in the United States. I do not want to make that any easier.

I hope that the Senate will say "no" to this very ill-advised amendment.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from Nevada.

Mr. CANNON. I thank the chairman for yielding to me.

I must say that I am in complete accord with the statement just made by Senator GOLDWATER. I cannot think of anything more unwise or anything that could possibly be more harmful to our Government than to let this amendment be agreed to, providing for full and free information to people from whom we would like to keep that information.

I certainly am in favor of full disclosure on matters that ought to be of public interest and ought to be disclosed to the public. I have supported that concept continuously over the years. But I think that disclosure of the intelligence budget would, over the years, by virtue of the trends that were discovered, and which that would disclose, would certainly provide valuable assistance to our adversaries.

I think that if we were to provide that type of information, then we might just as well discontinue the type of activities that we are trying to continue to keep this country informed of for the benefit of the people who reside here.

I hope that the Senate will defeat this amendment overwhelmingly.

I thank the distinguished Senator for yielding.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield 4 minutes to the Senator from Washington.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I do not feel that this proposal really meets our national interest. It is true that a foreign intelligence service like the CIA must operate more openly in our society than any other similar service in any other democracy in the world. Let us look at the facts:

Last year the new Director of Central Intelligence, William Colby, appeared before the Senate Armed Services Committee and gave extensive testimony in public. I know of no other democratic society in which this would occur.

It has been mentioned here earlier, Mr. President, that the head of MI-6, which is British Intelligence, is known only to the Prime Minister of Great Britain. That is how close they keep that information.

The functions and responsibilities of the Central Intelligence Agency are fully prescribed in statute. I know of no other democratic society in which this has been done.

Finally, the appropriations for CIA are subject to a process which intimately involves four committees of the Congress who are aware of and approve the details of its programs.

The proposal before us is designed to contribute to a more informed public. But how can the public be really informed unless the details of CIA's programs are also spelled out? Yet, if we did so, I can guarantee that we will be providing what is necessary for our potential adversaries to neutralize the methods which we must use in order to obtain information about closed societies.

The paradox of the situation is reflected in the fact that recently some journalists were jailed in Sweden—certainly not a closed society—for merely mentioning that Sweden has an intelligence service.

ness of much of our most important work in the field of intelligence.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's 2 minutes have expired.

Mr. STENNIS. I yield myself 1 minute more.

I oppose the amendment, because it would give our adversary, now and in the future, the working tools, a blueprint, to a degree, of our activities that have already proved to be so valuable and are proving themselves more valuable, in a way, as each year comes and goes.

So I hope the Senate will not only defeat this amendment but, with all due deference to my friend, do so by a large vote. I will be glad to be relieved of my responsibilities in this field if the Senate wants to adopt a new system.

I yield to the Senator from South Carolina.

Mr. President, how many minutes do we have left?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 30 minutes left.

Mr. STENNIS. I yield 12 minutes to the Senator from South Carolina.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I rise in opposition to the amendment by the senior Senator from Wisconsin. The proposal has the lure of simplicity, but consequences that run deep, and against our Nation's fundamental interests. It contains the promise of informing the public while preserving the essential security of our foreign intelligence capabilities. In fact, I believe it would serve both interests poorly.

A constant in the needs of sovereign nations is to possess intelligence about the intentions and capabilities of adversaries. General Washington wrote one of his intelligence chiefs, Col. Elias Dayton:

The necessity of procuring good intelligence is apparent and need not be further urged—all that remains for me to add, is that you keep the whole matter as secret as possible. For upon Secrecy, Success depends in most Enterprises of the kind, and for want of it, they are generally defeated, however well planned and promising a favorable issue.

That was the statement of our first Commander in Chief, the first President.

The tragic experience of Pearl Harbor taught us a number of painful lessons. In the 1947 National Security Act the Congress took a giant step toward assuring that executive action or inaction in the international field would be based upon the best information available. Insofar as it is possible for the Congress to direct the executive branch in the conduct of essentially an executive responsibility, the National Security Act of 1947 provided the authority needed for an effective foreign intelligence establishment.

The CIA Act of 1949 provided additional administrative authority for CIA and provided for its funding. The funding of CIA was particularly important from the point of view of Congress since it establishes the second of the two principal relationships between an executive branch agency and the Congress—legislation and appropriations.

I believe that our Nation is unique in the attention its legislature has given to specifying and circumscribing the activi-

ties of the agency designated to perform its foreign intelligence mission. In the process of working out legislation for CIA, it was necessary to somewhat change the procedures followed in the case of the more normal Federal agency. This was particularly true in connection with provisions concerning the authorization and appropriation of funds.

Public revelation in these areas would alert potential adversaries to programs, needs, and accomplishments. This knowledge could be used against our Nation's interest to offset the value of intelligence collected or to neutralize the sources and methods used.

The 1949 CIA Act permits the allocation of sums for the CIA to carry out its activities without publicly revealing the secret purpose to which such funds may be put.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that section 6 of that act be printed at this point in my remarks.

There being no objection, the section was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

Sec. 6. In the interests of the security of the foreign intelligence activities of the United States and in order further to implement the proviso of section 403(d)(3) of this title that the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure, the Agency shall be exempted from the provisions of section 654 of Title 5, and the provisions of any other law which require the publication or disclosure of the organization, functions, names, official titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel employed by the Agency: Provided, That in furtherance of this section, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget shall make no reports to the Congress in connection with the Agency under section 947(b) of Title 5.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, as a matter of fact, the arrangements worked out are completely responsive to the major elements of the Federal budgetary systems. Changes from the norm are designed to provide a reasonably controlled environment so as to protect and preserve the sources and methods which necessarily must be resorted to in collecting foreign intelligence.

As a matter of fact, I know that the budget of CIA is scrutinized with great care.

Similar procedures have been used over the years to fund other governmental activities of an extremely sensitive nature when the public interest would not be served through the use of more common explicit procedures. Examples of this include the Manhattan project for the development of the atomic bomb and the development of the U-2 airplane.

On May 10, 1960, following the loss of the U-2 over the Soviet Union, the chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, Clarence Cannon, explained that:

The plane was on an espionage mission authorized and supported by money provided under an appropriation recommended by the House Committee on Appropriations and passed by the Congress.

Although the Members of the House have not generally been informed on the subject, the mission was one of a series and part of an established program with which the subcommittee in charge of the appropriation was

familiar, and of which it had been fully apprised during this and previous sessions.

The appropriation and the activity had been approved and recommended by the Bureau of the Budget and, like all military expenditures and operations, was under the aegis of the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, for whom all members of the subcommittee have the highest regard and in whose military capacity they have the utmost confidence.

The question immediately arises as to the authority of the subcommittee to recommend an appropriation for such purposes, and especially the failure of the subcommittee to divulge to the House and the country the justifications warranting the expenditure and all details connected with the item at the time it was under consideration on the floor.

The answer of the subcommittee is—absolute and unavoidable military necessity, fundamental national defense.

This appropriation, and its purpose, is justified by honored and established precedent. This subcommittee, including the same personnel with the exception of two members who have since died, was the same committee which for something like 3 years provided in the annual appropriation bills a sum which finally totaled more than \$2 billion for the original atomic bomb. Session after session the money was provided, and the subcommittee visited Oak Ridge where the work was in progress without any Member of the House with the exception of the Speaker of the House being aware of this tremendous project or the expenditure of the money. According to the testimony of all military authorities that bomb ended the war and saved the lives of not less than half a million men who would have had to be sacrificed in the conquest of Japan. No one has ever said that the subcommittee was not justified in expending an amount that eventually aggregated more than the assessed valuation of some of the States of the Union for that purpose.

And now the most gratifying feature of the entire incident.

The world has always recognized the remarkable success of our form of government. It has been the wonder and admiration of mankind. But they have said that it was at a great disadvantage in a war with an authoritarian dictatorship.

We have here demonstrated conclusively that free men confronted by the most ruthless and criminal despotism can under the Constitution of the United States protect this Nation and preserve world civilization.

The CIA is held tightly accountable within the executive and legislative bodies. There may be disagreement as to whom the Members should be or more particularly what committee they should be from in the Congress, but I think such disagreements can only be resolved on the basis of giving priority to the special constitutional roles of the Congress—the appropriation of funds—the enactment of legislation—and the oversight of legislation already enacted. It is difficult to perceive how enlarging a somewhat small group into a somewhat large group would assure that these congressional responsibilities are being fulfilled. Clearly information on the activities of the CIA should not be displayed in a public arena. To do so would defeat our national interest.

Mr. President, I simply want to say that four committees of Congress now receive this information—the Armed Serv-

tinguished Senators who have yet to speak in opposition to the amendment—I have not heard one, single, solitary, real, hypothetical, or imaginary example of how any damage is going to be done to the United States of America. How is this information going to be used against us? I have heard nothing on that score. I have heard generalizations as to what might happen if we were to release information not called for by this amendment. That does not make any sense. Because we provide the overall total figure for intelligence does not mean we are going to tell anything about the CIA.

My point is that if this amendment is wrong, the burden of proof certainly is on those who would say it is wrong; because what we are doing is simply providing the taxpayer what they are entitled to know, information on where their money goes. If we are not going to disclose this, the burden of proof certainly should be on the side of those who say we should insist on secrecy and not provide disclosure.

So I say that proof has been lacking and I see no examples at all of any damage this could do.

Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, how much time remains in opposition to the amendment?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The opposition has 45 minutes remaining.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield myself 10 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi is recognized.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I have said in this Chamber before and I repeat now that it is not fun being on this committee that looks into the money that goes into intelligence. I say that after years of service on the Committee on Armed Services and the last 5 years as chairman of that committee.

This idea of not having had any surveillance and Congress having failed to go into it, those statements are just unfounded because they are made on facts that have been told to some Senators that are not correct.

I do not like to go into this matter but in the formative days men like former Senator Russell of Georgia, former Senator Ellender of Louisiana, and former Senator Smith of Maine were Members of this body, and they were some of the personalities involved. I have served with them, as has the Senator from North Dakota (Mr. Young), who is still serving. Also the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. McCLELLAN) is here. He already has spoken.

It is a mistake to say that the Committee on Armed Services in the year 1970-71 held no meetings on this matter. Every item in the CIA budget in those years was gone over by members of the committee and the capable staff members, and checked in and checked out.

I remember that in January of 1973 we had a full briefing before the full committee by the CIA, and the budget committee on the CIA had meetings, and we have had meetings this year, in 1974, that went over the budget; and we had

briefings by the CIA direct to our full committee.

But going back over the years, every year this matter has been scrupulously gone into because of the special nature and because we had this extraordinary responsibility. I remember asking Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard when he was here 3 years ago to look into this matter from his viewpoint, and he did that.

Now, we are talking about a good many different groups that are connected with the intelligence effort. The Senator from Wisconsin asked for something specific.

To start with, the Soviets know almost everything about everything we are doing by merely going to the bookstore or to the newsstand. They get all of that laid out before them, almost everything; and we get nothing. We do not know anything much about what they are doing. That is what makes it necessary for us to have such a vast intelligence-gathering activity which is worldwide. We have to carry a great deal of the load, the majority of the load for the free world. I am talking about the money load. But we do not have anything to start with. The Soviets have everything, almost.

If they are given this new information then certain deductions could be made about how much of the budget is going for these different activities and the first things we know calculations are made and they come pretty close to being correct as to how much is spent by the military, how much is spent in the civilian area how much is spent on satellites, and how much is spent by the CIA itself and where. Following a series of deductions and inferences based on all the information they already have from us, from the newspapers, and from the newsstands, they will be able to make fairly good calculations.

Specifically I wish to point out one matter. Senators remember the incident of the U-2 having been shot down. Remember that landing that was made. We later had that gentleman before our committee. President Eisenhower was President then. He said:

I am to blame if any blame is to be attached.

That U-2 venture saved our Treasury billions and billions of dollars, in my judgment, and I am familiar with the facts. If we had not been carrying on an activity such as that we would have been totally in the dark with respect to what we knew about the extensive missile work, the silos that they had, and a great many other things that could be named. There is a specific illustration.

Some might say, "Go on and develop what is happening now." I cannot do that; I cannot go on. That is one of the things that can be brought out. I have talked to Senators in the cloakroom and largely have satisfied them with respect to the matters we have talked about, with respect to these programs, and this money, and how we hold back the actual dollar amounts for reasons I have already given, and other reasons that could be given. I know this has been a good debate and I have never seen a debate where I was so certain no single speaker was speaking for any agency.

This argument today is not prompted by the CIA. I have not mentioned this matter to the CIA. I do not have one scintilla of line about them, or a telephone call, a meeting, or anything else. Those of us who have been in touch with the problem have a feeling about it. As the Senator from Arkansas said, we are not speaking for a committee, or a department, a director, an employee, or anything else. This is a problem concerning our national security that has jammed us right to the question of national survival. That is why we stand here year after year standing firm on this position. It may sound apologetic, but it is not apologetic. It goes as far as it can to explain to the membership and to the American people the problem we are up against, and how this problem is handled; and, as much as we can, the reason for handling it that way—at the same time showing the proper respect for every Member of this body and for the taxpayer who contributes as much as one thin dime to the cause involved.

Now, what about the CIA itself. The Senator from Wisconsin has offered a valuable amendment with respect to the basic CIA law, and it has been accepted. I commend him highly for the amendment. We had a bill I had introduced in my committee. We have not yet had a chance to have hearings on that bill. There are some of its provisions that I am delighted to see added as a part of this bill. They are relevant and will be helpful.

For many years I, along with other Senators, have gone over every single major item in the CIA budget.

On my responsibility to my colleagues, they in CIA keep a clean house. They have had a conservative operation dollar-wise and have accounted for the money in a splendid way. That has been true without exception. There has been no great spillage of money or great extravagances, and not one bit of scandal or odor of any kind.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's 10 minutes have expired.

Mr. STENNIS. I yield myself 2 more minutes.

In connection with the expenditure of that intelligence money. There are other agencies involved, as we all know. The military services have already been mentioned. The Defense Department itself has a certain intelligence agency attached to it.

So when I say these matters have been gone over, I mean all of it, but our Armed Services Committee is the so-called parent committee of this direct CIA money. I am not here to praise anyone, but I tell you, Mr. President, that moneywise for years and years the CIA has been conservatively operated and has had a firm hand and a clean house and a clean record with reference to the handling of the taxpayers' money.

I hope that in a moment of frustration—and I do not blame any Senator for being frustrated about this—this system is not overturned here on the floor of the Senate on an amendment which, if it becomes law and is carried out, would, as its practical effect, virtually destroy 80 to 90 percent of the effective-

House Appropriations: Mahon, Whitten, Sikes, Minshall, and Cederberg.
House Armed Services: Nedzi, Hébert, Price, Fisher, Bray, Arends, and Bob Wilson.

Mr. President, as I have pointed out, we are servants of this body and of the House. If it is desired that this matter be not handled this way, the Senate should recommend a change in the law and a joint supervisory committee be created. I will support it. I will welcome it. I do not care.

But, let us bear in mind that if we are to have a security intelligence agency, we cannot have it with national publicity on what it does, how it does it, and how much it spends here, or how much it spends there.

I was intrigued by the statement of the Senator from Wisconsin when he said, "Let us end this ignorance."

All right. How much is ignorance?

First, the total amount. You want to end that ignorance? That is when you intend to put the camel's nose under the tent. That is the beginning. That is the wedge. You say you do not want to know all the details on how the money is spent. But if you get the overall figures of \$1 billion or half a billion dollars or \$5 billion, or whatever, then how are you going to know, how can you evaluate, how can you judge or make an intelligent judgment on whether that is too much or too little, whether it is being expended wisely or unwisely, except when you can get the details?

How? You cannot know. And if you receive these figures and if you end this ignorance as to the total amount, next, you will want to end the ignorance as to the different agencies and how it is spent, and through whom it is spent. Next, you will want to end the ignorance on what it is spent for. Next, you want to end the ignorance of how that intelligence is procured. There is no end to it. We take a choice. If you vote this way, the Senate takes the responsibility. It is no embarrassment to me or to any other member of this committee. If this is the way the Senate wants to do it, that is its responsibility.

The national security of this country also is the Senate's responsibility. If this is the way the Senate wants to do it, very well. But let me say this: By ending the ignorance that the Senator speaks of, that can be pursued logically to the point that this will not be the end of it. It will go on from here.

"Ignorance" is a harsh word. We have to be ignorant of many things in Government. If Government is going to function in the area of national security, we cannot be informed at all times about everything that is going on. We often inform our enemies of too much—and they can take advantage of it.

If you are going to end all their alleged ignorance, you are going to end national security. Where do we stop? If you do not like the ad hoc committees, do what the distinguished Senator from Minnesota has suggested: Create another committee in which you will have confidence. Create another committee; name the people you will trust to oversee.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's 8 minutes have expired.

Mr. STENNIS. I yield the Senator 1 additional minute.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, this has been a burden to me. I have had Senators in good conscience, in good faith—dedicated, loyal, patriotic Americans—come to me and seek this information. I would like to give it to them. But I am torn between the personal desire to make them acquainted with everything I know—everything I have seen and heard in these hearings—and the duty to help maintain and preserve our national security. A security that will be effective and can be useful and can serve to protect the welfare of our country. I have to make that choice.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCLELLAN. I will yield, but first I should like to make one other comment.

I think I can go this far. For the past 5 years, we have held extensive hearings on these requests for appropriations. It has been more than adequate supervision with respect to expenditures; I can say that. It has been on the conservative side, I may say to the Senator, without any reservation whatever.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's additional time has expired.

Mr. STENNIS. I yield the Senator 1 additional minute.

Mr. McCLELLAN. We cut the national defense budget. We cut this more percentage-wise.

The issue can simply be stated. Do we want to publicly disclose these figures? Or do we want some other change, some other committee to try to perform these functions? I am willing to abide by the decision of the Senate.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield on my time?

Mr. McCLELLAN. I yield.

Mr. PROXMIRE. I yield myself 2 minutes, Mr. President, to ask the distinguished Senator from Arkansas a question.

On November 15, the majority and minority leaders wrote the Senator from Arkansas, asking that he release all overall intelligence information of the kind called for in the amendment. The response of the distinguished Senator from Arkansas, on November 20, is as follows:

I have your letter of November 15 and want you to know that I intend to comply, as fully as possible, with the recommendation of the Senate Select Committee on Secret and Confidential Documents to provide the Senate with the over-all sums requested for each of the various intelligence agencies.

What was the intention of the Senator from Arkansas? Is his intention the same now, or has he changed his mind?

Mr. McCLELLAN. It was my intention and it would be my intention now, to release those figures if it would not jeopardize our national security. I do not want to withhold them. I would like to give the Senator everything I know. But this is not my responsibility. I am not the committee. I would have no right to come here and spread these matters on the floor of the Senate without the approval of the committee.

Mr. PROXMIRE. The Senator is absolutely right.

Mr. McCLELLAN. It would not be

right for me to do that. But I wish it were possible and consistent with the best interests of our country to disclose these figures on the front pages of the press, on television and radio, so that everybody would know. I believe, however, that the Senator agrees with me that that would be a bad mistake. I think it is a mistake to start the public disclosing of these matters. If you do not like the setup, change the setup, but we must protect our national security.

Mr. PROXMIRE. I say to the Senator from Arkansas that I wholeheartedly agree that the Senator is absolutely right to come and ask for the Senate's decision on this.

As I understand the Senator's response, at one time he thought that he could release this if the Senate would approve; but he has had second thoughts on it, and now he feels that it might not serve the interests of the country to disclose this information at the present time.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. PROXMIRE. I yield.

Mr. McCLELLAN. We had Mr. Colby in and discussed this matter. I asked Mr. Colby to come down, and I asked the Senator from Wisconsin and the Senator from California to come in and interrogate him and visit with him about these things. I have done everything I possibly can to try to find an answer to this problem. But I do not know the answer. We either have to do it or not do it.

Mr. PROXMIRE. I thank the Senator. Mr. President, I should like to make one other statement.

The Senator from Arkansas has argued, as do other Senators, that the release of this information, the overall total information, is going to be of some value to the Soviet Union, but of no value to us. That does not make any sense at all to me. It may or may not be of any value to the Soviet Union. Frankly, I think it will be of none. There is no way the Soviet Union can interpret whether our overall figure indicates what we are doing within our intelligence committee. Suppose we decrease the amount we are spending. That may mean that our satellites are more effective. That may mean we have found methods that are more efficient in gathering intelligence than relying on manpower. If we increase the amount we are spending, it may mean the reverse. It may not mean that we are making a greater intelligence effort.

What this does is to alert the Senate of the United States—it alerts Members of Congress—so that they, in turn, can get the information they should have if they feel that a disproportionate amount is being devoted to the intelligence community—as to whether they feel it is too much or too little.

As the letter from Senator HUGH SCOTT and Senator MANSFIELD pointed out, the purpose of this is to maintain the necessary support for our intelligence operations, not to tear them down. Not to diminish our effort, but so that we can reinforce it and do so wisely and intelligently.

One more point. With all the debate we have heard—and I challenge the dis-

ate: The greatest threat to the security of this Nation is the secrecy that we ourselves place on these events. It will be from the inside, not from the outside.

We talk about the numbers of missiles, we talk about the numbers of warheads, we talk about the numbers of submarines, we talk about the numbers of airplanes, and all of these things; but when each can destroy the Earth, then how much is enough?

The threat will come from losing control on the inside. If maintaining that control requires an ounce of risk, then I think we should be prepared to take that ounce of risk in at least letting us see publicly and the people see publicly whether we are spending \$3 billion, \$7 billion, or \$90 billion, and how we are concealing it and hiding it, and if we are protecting ourselves from the inside as well as from the outside.

I think that ounce of risk, if it exists, is worth taking, and I thank the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin for yielding.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HUGHES. I yield.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I respect this good man the Senator from Iowa, who is one of the great men of the Senate, a great spirit and a great inspiration to me, and I really regret that on occasions like this one has to disagree with a friend so dear and precious, but I want to say to the Senator that while this argument is moving and I think filled with much truth, we can control any possibility of secrecy or of coverup by establishing within the instruments of the Congress the necessary machinery for the supervision of the Central Intelligence Agency.

We have executive sessions in this Congress. We have them in the Foreign Relations Committee and we have them in the Armed Services Committee, and we do not permit those executive sessions to become public. Maybe that is a mistake. But I, over long years of service here, have felt that some of these sessions are necessary.

I feel there is a tendency to try to make too much secret and too much executive. This is why I have proposed that we have a joint committee on national security of the House of Representatives and the Senate. We have an ad hoc committee on this matter of the intelligence operations of our Government, and on that ad hoc committee serve some of the finest Members of this body. I know what good men they are. I am confident that they are as concerned about the security of this country inside and outside as any of us. I find them philosophically the kind of Senators who would be able to cross-examine anyone. And while I cannot help but agree with the Senator from Iowa that one of our great threats is from within, particularly from the moral erosion that is taking place in our society, not only now but over the years, I do not underestimate the threat from without.

Furthermore, good intelligence permits us to do a better job in terms of our national security expenditures and operations, not necessarily increasing them

but reducing them, and I believe I heard today from the chairman of the Committee on Appropriations that the funds for intelligence operations have been reduced.

I happen to believe that we have the power in Congress to set up whatever kind of method or supervisory system we need so that we do not let the executive branch run rampant. But, under our system, we put a great deal of trust and faith in the President. I know that this is a difficult time to discuss that, because of the events of recent months, but I do say to you, Mr. President, that we have a man in that high office, the President of the United States, who has the prime responsibility for these requirements of intelligence and national security and if we do not have the right man there, then it our fault, because we elected him.

We can establish all kinds of systems, elections, and campaign reform, and say that we do a better job, but I happen to believe that we should proceed with great caution when it comes to this business of, really, opening up and exposing, because I think of what would be the inevitable result of our intelligence operations.

Mr. President, I regret to have to say this, because I would like very much from my own political point of view to say to the contrary, but from the point of view of my conscience, I speak as did the Senator from Iowa. Is it not a wonderful thing in this body that two of us can believe so differently and can be as sincere in our point of view?

I greatly respect the Senator from Iowa, and if his point of view prevails, I think it will prevail in large measure, because of our great respect for him.

Mr. HUGHES. I thank the distinguished Senator from Minnesota. I am ready, willing, and I hope able to join him, and I hope the chairman of all of the committees, to find out what they are doing. This would be the appropriate moment, the time, and the day to find out. Let us make sure, instead of an ad hoc oversight or a minimum oversight, that there is some sort of bearing and adequate responsibility on that oversight and in carrying it out. Although we do not have enough time, I agree that an occasional session here is useful so that the youngest and the newest Members can get available information in relation to these activities so that they would know something about them.

Again, I say that this is no risk compared to the risk of darkness. A little bit of light at this moment might help us all in the years to follow.

Mr. PROXMIRE. I want to commend the distinguished Senator from Iowa (Mr. HUGHES). He has hit the target exactly on this issue. The greatest danger we face is from within, I agree. We have seen what has happened to the intelligence community. But I want to tell the Senator from Iowa that I tried to get the most practical and limiting amendment that I could get. I discussed the amendment recommended by the majority and minority leaders, written to the chairman of the Appropriations Committee, and it was agreed, after a study by the

Senate Select Committee on Secret and Confidential Documents, that the Senate should be provided with all of the information requested for intelligence. They believed that the release of this limited information would be useful to the Senate in maintaining the necessary support for intelligence operations. All I do is provide the overall figures. The committee consists of Senators MANSFIELD, PASTORE, HUGHES, CLARK, GRAVEL, JAVITS, HATFIELD, GURNEY, and COOK. Their report recommended this procedure. That is all. It certainly does not go so far as breaking it down as to what the CIA and the DIA spend. The leaders concluded that if we get this overall information, we will be in a better position to discharge our duties and responsibilities to the people.

Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time and I yield the floor.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield 8 minutes to the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. McCLELLAN).

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HASKELL). The Senator from Arkansas is recognized for 8 minutes.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, I am reluctant to speak on this issue, because of the position I occupy as chairman of the Appropriations Subcommittee on Intelligence Operations. By reason of that position as chairman of that subcommittee, I have the duty of oversight over the CIA.

I am reluctant to speak on these matters because—I do not relish nor do I cherish nor do I take pride in the fact—that I may have access to information that I cannot share with my colleagues. I would wish it were practical. I wish it were a proper thing to do—to disclose every bit of information that I have been able to obtain from time to time respecting the activities of the CIA, what it does, its methods of procuring information, how it spends its money, and the results that it achieves. I would prefer to do that. The subcommittees who have this responsibility are ad hoc committees of the Appropriations Committee and the Armed Services Committee of both the Senate and House. We are instrumentalities of the Senate, of the Congress, and so created where we are serving as your agent, as your tool, to achieve the supervision that is possible and necessary. We are charged with the responsibility to see that this work is carried on, and to recommend the proper appropriations therefor.

If these subcommittees—and there are 22 members on them. Ten are from the Senate—five are from the Appropriations Committee and five are from the Armed Services Committee, who are privy to this information that is withheld for security reasons from the public. The committee members are:

INTELLIGENCE SUBCOMMITTEES

Senate Appropriations: McClellan, Stennis, Pastore, Young, and Hruska.

Senate Armed Services: Stennis, Symington, Jackson, Thurmond, and Dominick.

Mr. President, there are 12 members of the Armed Services Committee and the Appropriations Committee of the House of Representatives. The House Committee members are:

June 4, 1974

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

If you really want to find out what is wrong in America, you don't have to do research; just ask anybody and he will give you a full hour's dissertation.

Mr. PROXMIRE. We have a pretty good system.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Do not misunderstand me.

Mr. PROXMIRE. It works well. It is open and free.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I think this openness is our strength. I think a society has to have that openness. But I think there are some things in family life that are private, that do not aid a good family if one starts exposing it all.

I think there are some things, may I say, in public life called national security, particularly when it comes to intelligence gathering. It is a nasty business, and the Senator knows it and I know it, and, of course, it makes good headlines, it makes good stories; it makes good fiction; it makes good TV. But there is a point, I think, where we have to ask ourselves, "Do I dare go this far," and that is all the Senator from Minnesota is doing.

I really do not intend to get so involved in this debate, but I feel a very deep obligation about this. I think that I owe it to this body to at least tell what my experience has been, even though I had no direct responsibility. I only served as Vice President, but I happen to believe that this agency is so important that we ought to make sure within the confines of Congress that we know what it is doing, and set up the instruments and men we can trust.

We trust one another in this body on the basis of censorship of each other. One thing I plead for in the Senate is more trust rather than our running to get the headlines. More love, more affection in this body; that is what this country really needs today.

What I worry about is that somehow or other we feel we cannot trust each other here. I happen to think—and I use one Senator, the Senator from Rhode Island—who is as much interested in cutting the defense budget as the Senator from Minnesota. I want to see that budget reasonable, and I want to see it trimmed. By the way, the committee did cut it. It cut it so much that some of us who thought we were going to cut it feel that they beat us to it.

It is my judgment that we have got to trust somebody. I think what we are doing here is trusting somebody.

Mr. McCLELLAN. I might say that at the same time we cut the defense budget, we also cut this budget more than we did the defense budget. I will just say that much for the record.

Mr. HUMPHREY. There we are. I believe we have to have some place in this body where there are some of most delicate things involved where we can put our trust. When we find that trust has been violated, we can remove people from those positions.

I do not believe I have any more to add and be redundant. I have participated in this debate because I feel we have got to be very, very careful. I welcome the initiative of the Senator from

Wisconsin, because it gives us a chance to really explore what we are doing.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I yield the Senator from Iowa such time as he may require.

Mr. STENNIS. Before he does that, will the Senator yield to me to ask how much time we have remaining, those in opposition to the amendment?

Mr. PROXMIRE. I yield.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Those in opposition have 54 minutes remaining.

Mr. STENNIS. Fifty-four minutes; what about the proponents?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The proponents of the amendment have 72 minutes remaining.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I yield the Senator from Iowa such time as he may require.

Mr. HUGHES. I thank the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin.

Mr. President, the distinguished Senator from Minnesota has six guests waiting in the dining room. He has assured me he is not walking out on my dissertation here today. I assure him that he is free to go. I value his friendship and integrity beyond anything he could possibly know.

The debate I have listened to so far seems to carry an implication that this amendment is a threat to the internal workings of the CIA and the intelligence gathering community of America around the world, and thereby a threat to the security of the United States of America.

The amendment is very simple, Mr. President. It would list publicly the ceiling or the total amounts of money spent in the intelligence gathering community.

One of the greatest threats to any country, and particularly a country that has great military strength, is not from the outside or from its foreign enemies, it is from the inside, from secrecy and interior deterioration. The greatest threat of all is when we begin to lose control and not know what is happening, and when we begin to give large sums of money to mechanizations and machines that have no bureaucratic control over them.

The Senator says, trust. Yes, we trust and we love. But we know from reading history that governments have destroyed themselves when they no longer had knowledge of what was happening, and when the interior started breaking down.

I am not half as concerned, in today's world, about the future of America based on exterior threat as I am about what is happening inside this country and what can happen inside this country unless we are completely open, with every ounce of communications we can have with the people of this country. If thereby there is some little risk to the world, with the risks we are already living with, I say it is not too high a price to pay.

What is the role of the CIA? As far as I know, I know nothing. I am a member of the Armed Services Committee, and I know nothing. I could get such information, as the Senator from Minnesota has said, given to me privately. It would be given. But as far as I know, there is no Member of the Senate, no Member of Congress, and no member of the ad-

ministration, including the President of the United States, who knows precisely and exactly what the CIA is doing in every incident.

We do know they are involved, as the Senator from Minnesota has said, in a nasty business. They are involved in a nasty business in a lot of areas of the world, and that nasty business is supposedly directed at protecting the freedom of the people of this country and our friends in the free world. But no one has the certainty to know precisely what everyone is doing, or even where they are doing it from time to time.

But that is not what we are asking for today. Not at all. All of this debate that I have been listening to, though relevant to the overall intelligence community, which is certainly involved in the security and freedom of the people of the free world, not just in our country but that of the people of other countries, has no relationship to the risk involved in giving the people of this country a glimpse of light in telling them what the total cost is involved in the intelligence activities of this country throughout the world. We do not know that amount, but we do know it is in the billions of dollars.

I listened to the chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee say did not even want to know, because he was afraid he might talk in his sleep sometime and thereby disclose it to someone. He made that statement on the floor of the Senate.

Mr. President, we are asking just for a thread of light into what may be not only our greatest source of security, but has the potential to be our greatest threat, without the observation and light and without the security that we ourselves as publicly elected officials can place upon those who have the capacity together with the restraint—and if there is any evidence that we have applied, as elected officials, the responsibility of restraint I am unaware of it. I am not saying there are misdeeds or there are wrongs. I am saying none of us know whether we are right or wrong. If we know, I would like to know it is and how much he knows, even an individual Senator, if he is asked far enough ahead, to know what groundwork is being laid for the capacity to draw the threads of the armaments of this country into entanglements.

We have wrestled for years with the problem of the CIA. We do not know. We are uninformed. The oversight that is done apparently is not carried out either mechanically or intelligently. We have not had the capacity or responsibility to know even when we were given information whether it was right or wrong, or what was happening.

Mr. President, one of the great Senators of our time has been the distinguished Senator from Minnesota. He is, as he called himself, a liberal, who has said, "Let us show the public everything, let us give them all the information."

I respect his debate today in saying the public should not have this information, that it is a threat to our security. But, Mr. President, I leave this thought with the Members of the Sen-

try. Other than that, I do not relish the job; I am not trying to keep this away from the American people. I am concerned and interested because that is the only way we can behave in a crazy world, and it is a crazy world.

Mr. HUMPHREY. And it is going to continue that way for some time, regretably.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. PASTORE. I yield.

Mr. JACKSON. And what if the following year the CIA found it necessary to ask for more money? Then we would have the same problem. They would want to know what they are engaged in now that they were not engaged in in the past. We could not allow the publication of the figures without that sticking out like a sore thumb.

Mr. PASTORE. You cannot win.

Mr. JACKSON. You cannot win either way.

Mr. HUMPHREY. It is a no-win proposition.

Mr. JACKSON. I commend the Senator from Minnesota and the Senator from Rhode Island.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, as long as the Senator from Rhode Island and the Senator from Minnesota have the floor, I would like to ask them some questions.

Mr. PASTORE. I yield.

Mr. PROXMIRE. I ask the Senator if it is not true that the amendment does not require the revealing of information or any figure about the CIA, but simply the total national intelligence overall figure, including the CIA, the DIA, the Army and Navy Intelligence, all together. It is not an anti-CIA amendment. What this amendment would do is tell us whether we are spending \$1 billion, \$5 billion, \$10 billion. It would give us some notion of how important this is in terms of resources and would mean we could have some attention given to these agencies, attention we do not have now.

The fact is, as the Senator from Missouri (Mr. SYMINGTON) said, that in 1970 the CIA oversight committee of the Senate Armed Services Committee met twice. In 1971 there were no meetings. In 1972 it met once. When it does meet, what does it accomplish? It does not keep a record. No staff is present. Only Senators are present. We know that without a staff or a transcript, a hearing like that cannot be very useful.

When we have some knowledge of what this amount is, whether it is \$6 billion, \$7 billion, or \$10 billion, we have some interest or pressure on this. Not being on the oversight committee, one would be entitled to ask about it, so one would be inclined to be better informed. It seems to me we will function far better. That is all the amendment is intended to do.

Mr. PASTORE. When the Senator says there is no record kept, that is true, but there is an obvious reason for that. The staff is there. The Senators are there. We sit there for hours, listening, and we have a very minute scrutiny of the items that are presented.

Is the Senator telling me that if the entire figure is revealed, at some time he

would not get up on the floor of the Senate and ask how much higher or lower the figures are for this year as compared to last year? Knowing the Senator from Wisconsin, he would be the first in the Senate to do so.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Would that not be good? What would be wrong with that?

Mr. PASTORE. The Senator can reveal what he knows.

Mr. PROXMIRE. I do not have to reveal it. I can ask about it.

Mr. PASTORE. What am I supposed to do? I cannot tell the Senator; so the Senator goes out and says, "Senator PASTORE would not tell me."

Mr. PROXMIRE. No. But the Senator from Rhode Island and other Senators know about it.

Mr. PASTORE. The Senator can find it out privately, but he does not want to find it out privately. He wants to tell the world about it.

Mr. PROXMIRE. I think the world ought to know the overall figures.

Mr. PASTORE. Does the Senator mean Russia should know?

Mr. PROXMIRE. Right.

Mr. PASTORE. My goodness, I quit.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Would the Senator say that it would have been in our national interest in World War II if Franklin Delano Roosevelt had published how much money was invested in the atomic bomb?

Mr. PROXMIRE. Of course not. My amendment would not require it.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I realize whenever we get into any element that is called secrecy here it is suspect. We are dealing with national security, and one has got to trust somebody. We have a way at least of checking here a little bit, and that check is with the ad hoc committee. If that committee does not meet often enough, I suggest we submit an amendment requiring the committee to meet monthly or to meet quarterly for whatever time is necessary. That is what we need to do.

I happen to believe that we need a Joint Committee on National Security in Congress, that is going to have general supervision of the CIA, consisting of the top people of Congress, just as we have a National Security Council.

I proposed it repeatedly. I proposed a Joint Committee on National Security, in which the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives would have particular responsibility in the field of national security.

But my point is, and I think the Senator from Rhode Island is so right, the minute we publicize all these intelligence figures, the inevitable followthrough is a debate in this body as to what it is for, it will be in every journal and every tabloid. It will be all over. It will not serve the public interest.

If we could get the Soviet Union and the Chinese to walk to the altar with the rest of us, confess our sins, live a pure life, and pledge ourselves to peace and love, then I would let them know everything about what was going on. But, frankly, they will not do it.

I believe in détente. No Senator has worked harder for arms control; no Senator has worked for more open com-

mittees. But there is a point where we have to stop, at least in my judgment.

I know the Senator can make a brilliant argument and a moving, emotional argument, that we ought to have all these figures right out in the open, and if we can have assurance that is all we are going to do, that is all it would lead to. Even that would be a risk, but perhaps one that we could take.

But just as surely as we are in this body today debating whether or not we ought to have a release of the figure, next year it will be whether it is too big or too little, and then it will be what is in it. Then when we start to say what is in it, we are going to have to expose exactly what we have been doing in order to gain information; for example, years ago as to where the Soviet Union was building its nuclear subs and the kind of nuclear subs they were. I saw that material in 1965—how far they were along, what their scientific progress was. I do not think it would serve the public interest for all of that information to have been laid out. It would have destroyed our intelligence gathering completely.

I wonder how many Senators realize the unbelievable torture that a number of our Central Intelligence agents go through in order to get information that is vital to the Nation's national security.

It is because I feel this strongly that I make this statement, although it runs counter to much of my so-called ideological philosophy. One advantage I have had—and I am not going to be a partisan around the Senate when it comes to national security—is to sit on the other end of the line. I am here to tell the Senate, that if we start to tinker with the intelligence services of this country, we do it at our peril.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HUMPHREY. Yes, I yield.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Could not the same argument the Senator is making be made with much more force with respect to our Defense budget? We debate on the floor of the Senate, we have open public hearings, we publish a great deal about our missiles, about our submarines, about our most advanced and complex planes. This does give great information to the Soviet Union. I am not asking about anything of that nature with respect to intelligence. This would not even reveal how much we provide for the CIA.

All I am saying is that the taxpayer is entitled to know how much of the billions of dollars he contributes in taxes goes for intelligence operations overall. Then he can, through his Representatives, determine to some extent whether we spend any kind of effort and interest and concern with whether or not that money is wisely spent. That is all the amendment does.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I think I understand fully the Senator's honorable, legitimate purpose. I really am not opposed to that legitimate purpose. The problem is it is sort of like loose string on a ball of twine, so to speak, that starts to unravel. Now, indeed, we tell the whole world about practically everything we are doing. As Gunnar Myrdal, the great Swedish sociologist, once said about the United States:

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Energy, the Committee on Appropriations, and on the ad hoc committee to which I referred—where they show us the evidence they have. But they do not disclose how they spend money to provide this information. Once the Russians, or even the Chinese Communists find out our national security can be damaged. And it is just to satisfy a little bit of an emotional rebellion that is justified on the grounds that an agency has made some mistakes. Can we throw away the security of the country? That is what it means to me.

I have sat down with the Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. PROXMIER), the Senator from California (Mr. CRANSTON), to find a solution, and I have sat down with Mr. Colby, who is a great American. He said, "Please do not do this. If you want to make my job easier, please do not do this." I cannot sit there after that admonition and exhortation and turn around and say, "Mr. Colby, I do not believe what you have to say." If I believed that for 1 minute, I would say, "You ought to give up your job."

I know the CIA got mixed up in Vietnam. Many got mixed up in Vietnam. I condemned it.

Do not forget, I was Governor of my State when the bomb fell on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945. A few days after that a second atomic bomb fell on Nagasaki. Frankly, I have not slept so well since then thinking about the horror that can be visited upon mankind if this thing ever lets go. I would hope that the CIA is not a provocative agency but a protective agency; that it is there to protect American security and the American people. The minute we disbelieve that we should do away with it entirely.

I repeat again that as long as we live in this kind of a world, where tomorrow we do not know where we will be, where the Russians now are trying to achieve parity with us; where we have been told categorically, without any question of doubt, that what they are doing is because they do not want to suffer the humiliation of Cuba again—that is what this is all about, and that is why they are coming along, hell bent for election, augmenting their military strength.

Look at the deal we made on SALT I. They can have over 60 missile firing nuclear subs; we have only a little more than 40 of this type of submarine. They have about 1,700 land-based missiles; we have slightly over 1,000.

When anyone stands up and says to me, "Oh, they are not going so fast," that person is not going to the briefings. One does not find that information on the floor of the Senate. He has to go to the secret briefings. There one sees the statistics, the facts. I can tell Senators that after they have done so they will be frightened as to what could happen to this world if one act of madness lets this thing go off.

And so I say to my distinguished colleague from Wisconsin, and all those who agree with him, I sympathize with his feeling. I realize the fact that the CIA has done some things wrong—perhaps too many things wrong—but let us correct it. Let us put the brakes on. Let us admonish the committee that is in

charge to do its job. But in the name of truth, in the name of protecting this Nation against an assault, in the name of protecting the American people and their future, let us rely on the special committees that do their job, and if any Member of the Senate really wants to find out what the total amount is, I think in private he should be told.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. PASTORE. I yield.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I rise to commend the Senator from Rhode Island and to associate myself fully with his comments. The Senator pointed out very properly that the Central Intelligence Agency has in the past engaged in activities that have been looked upon by certain Members of the Congress as undesirable; but I want to make it clear that every one of those activities had been ordered by a President. The Central Intelligence Agency does not just engage in activities for the love of work. I know that the Central Intelligence Agency, during the Kennedy years and the Johnson years, was engaged in activities in Laos—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from Rhode Island has expired.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I yield such time as the Senator may require.

Mr. PASTORE. Five more minutes.

Mr. HUMPHREY. There were Members of Congress who knew full well what we were doing, but at the time we thought we were doing the right thing. Hindsight is so marvelous, is it not? We see so much better after the fact.

Mr. President, the Central Intelligence Agency is possibly the most important agency in this Government. By and large, it is made up of people who are competent, able, and who have served this country well and faithfully. To be sure, there are times when it has engaged in activities, as we have said, that are looked upon with suspicion; but I think it would be folly for us to publicize all of its activities, to publicize the amounts it receives, particularly when there are ways and means within this body and within the other body of Congress to supervise it and to keep a check rein upon it.

The Soviet Union does not tell us what they spend in intelligence, or even in subversion, and they are not about ready to. The only way we have any chance of knowing what they are doing is through agencies like the Central Intelligence Agency—not alone, but that agency is, without a doubt, the prime instrument of this Government for the gathering of intelligence.

I was visiting earlier here with our distinguished friend and colleague from Washington—and I know this to be a fact, of course—and discussed the fact that there is only one person in the British Government who knows who the director of intelligence is and to whom that director reports—just one, and that is the Prime Minister. In most countries that is the case. In the Republic of France and in the Federal Republic of Germany it is the case.

Presently we are on a binge in this country about every aspect of government. Everything is suspect. Well, Mr. President, you have got to call a halt to something. You cannot just start to dismantle the structure because of the transgressions, or alleged transgressions, of a few.

I think that the Senator from Rhode Island stated it so succinctly and so effectively that all I can do is just add my amen to it; but I had the privilege of serving on the National Security Council, and I want to tell my colleagues that the Central Intelligence Agency was the most accurate and effective instrument of Government for that council. Its reports were most accurate, and had we followed the advice of the Central Intelligence Agency in many areas, we would have been better off, but at least it was there.

I know the Senator from Wisconsin is going to say he is not going to interfere with them, and that is true, but the figure will be out there, and right away there will be some of my political persuasion, who are labeled "liberals," who are going to say, "Well, look at how much money they are spending on spying. Look at how much money they are spending on gathering information which is unnecessary. Look at what they are going to do on counterforce activities or clandestine military activities."

If the Congress does not want it to engage in clandestine activities, all it has to do is legislate it—they will obey the law. But the trouble around here is that we like to put the blame on a lot of other people when we do not have the guts to legislate what we ought to be legislating.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I yield.

Mr. PASTORE. Talking about the amendment, it sounds so harmless to say, "All we want is the overall figure."

When we discussed this with Mr. Colby and asked him, "What is wrong with the overall figure?" he told us, "There is a lot wrong with it, because if you choose to cut the figure down at some time, privately and secretly, and I have to live with it, nobody knows what is done, but if you do it publicly, then the Russians and the Chinese Communist will know we are doing less, and that might let them become more audacious. They might think we are letting our guard down. It will have repercussions."

This came from the lips of an expert in the area, and it makes sense.

If I thought giving the overall figure would be the answer to our problems, I would go along with it, because, after all, it could be argued, "Well, we are not giving the details," but, as the expert said, if we give the overall figure, what does it mean? If anybody thinks we are spending too much, he will want to know where we are spending it. If we are spending too little, he will want to know what we are doing. These are not matters that we can discuss before the public for the public.

It does not make any difference to me personally. I am interested in my family. I am interested in my grandchildren. I want them to live in a safe country. I do not want them to live in an unsafe coun-

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gence in order to assure that this sensitive information might not be made available to any foreign government. Nevertheless, the Office of Management and Budget exercises its responsibility to review CIA funding in the same detail that it reviews the budget requests of any other executive branch agency. The specific amounts of the agency's approved appropriation request and the identification of the appropriation estimates in the President's annual Budget, within which these amounts are included, are formally provided by the Director of OMB to the Chairmen of the Senate and House Appropriations Committees; similarly, the Director is informed by them of the determination of the CIA budget, and OMB approval of the transfer of funds to CIA is based upon this decision.

Within the limits of this arrangement made necessary by security requirements, I wish to respond fully to the questions raised in your letter.

1. The authority under which OMB approves the transfer of funds to CIA for its approved budget is Section 5 of the CIA Act of 1949 (50 USC 403f). To our knowledge, no other authority is now or ever has been used by OMB for this purpose. As in the case of other executive agencies, CIA receives other funds under provisions of the so-called Economy Act (31 USC 686), which permits the purchase of supplies or services by one agency from another when it is more economical to do so. The magnitude of these transactions is reported to the appropriate committees and to OMB, but no formal OMB approval is required.

2. Except for possible Economy Act transactions, no funds have been transferred to the CIA from any of the agencies falling under the jurisdiction of the HUD, Space, Science, Veterans and Independent Agencies Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee.

3. The transfer of funds to CIA under Section 5 of the CIA Act is accomplished by the issuance of Treasury documents routinely used for the transfer of funds from one government agency to another. The amount and timing of these transfers, pursuant to that Act, are approved by OMB.

4. Information concerning the transfer of these funds to CIA is available to members of the Senate and House Armed Services and Appropriations Subcommittees concerned with CIA matters.

5. Under established procedures, funds approved by OMB for transfer to CIA are limited to amounts notified to OMB by the Chairmen of the Senate and House Appropriations Committees. The specific appropriation accounts from which the funds will be transferred are also determined by this process. Obligations by CIA, subsequent to the transfer, are further controlled by OMB through the apportionment process.

6. The funding of CIA through a single publicly identifiable appropriation could result in the disclosure of information detrimental to the agency's sensitive foreign intelligence operations, as I understand the Director of Central Intelligence has indicated to members of the Congress on several occasions.

I trust that the above information is responsive to your needs.

Sincerely,

ROY L. ASH,
 Director.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. On whose time?

Mr. THURMOND. The time to be equally divided between both sides.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

The clerk will call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Who yields time?

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield me 5 or 10 minutes?

Mr. STENNIS. I yield 10 minutes to the Senator.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, what I have to say will not take 10 minutes.

I must recognize the sincerity and the motive—I might say the noble motive—on the part of the sponsors of this amendment and what they are trying to accomplish. As a matter of fact, I do not think any matter has disturbed Members who are charged with this responsibility more than this matter, with respect to the ramifications and the complexities that are involved in this kind of situation.

I would pray for the day in this world when nations could live as neighbors, when people could live as brothers, when we would not have to have an atomic bomb or a missile or a nuclear submarine, that we could live in peace and tranquility, and that we would not even need a Central Intelligence Agency.

But the world is not made that way. The history within my lifetime has proved pretty much that unless a nation is on its guard, as we had to be in 1962 at the time of the Cuban crisis, it could lose its birthright.

Now, what are we talking about here? We are talking about the Central Intelligence Agency. I have been connected with the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy almost as long as I have been in the Senate. Day in and day out we sit behind closed doors in a room that has been debugged because of what is told, what is given to the committee, and what is listened to. Only the members of that committee are privy to what goes on, except, of course, that the courtesy is rendered on a need-to-know basis to Members of Congress if they make a request that they need to know. The same goes for the Central Intelligence Agency. I daresay if any Senator really wants to know how much we spend for intelligence, he could find out. But then they would have to reveal what they spend it for. They might not be able to publish the information, and why should they? What would it accomplish?

I do not know the men and women up in that Press Gallery. For all I know, there may be a newspaperman there from Moscow. We live in a free society, and what we say on the floor of the Senate goes all over the world. It is a public record. That is the way we live. We are an open society. If we tell the Russians what they have to know, will they tell us what they have? I will eat anyone's hat on the Capitol steps if that happens.

Do Senators know what Khrushchev said when he came here and met with Mr.

Dulles, of the Central Intelligence Agency, for the first time? He said, "You know, your country and my country could save a lot of money if we could get together." Do Senators know what he meant by that? He meant by that that they are spying on us and we have to spy on them. That can be said publicly, because that is what this is all about. We have to know what they are doing, so we can know what we have to do in order to guarantee the security of our own country.

So we cannot come out here and tell the whole world, "We spent \$1 billion or \$2 billion for the Central Intelligence Agency." What does that mean to anyone else, except that perhaps some people think they are spending too much. And the minute the question is asked where they are spending it we are in serious trouble.

So what happens to your children and my children, Mr. President? What happens to you when you go home tonight? What happens tomorrow? What happens to the security of our country? Can we afford to tell them? Oh yes, I would like to tell the public everything it is possible to tell them. I believe in that. I have been in public life continually for 40 years. I believe in the right of the public to know. But I certainly would not come to the floor of the Senate and tell you, Mr. President, how to put together an atom bomb. I would not tell you that. I would not tell you how far our nuclear subs are able to travel; I would not tell you how we can detect an enemy sub; and I would not tell you how they might detect ours. I would not tell you that. Why would I not tell you that? I would not tell you that because the minute I told you that I would jeopardize the future of your children.

I do not relish the responsibility on this ad hoc committee. I happen to be on it. We sit there for hours and hours, day in and day out. It is not a pleasant job, but it is a job that was assigned to me and I have to do it. If anyone wants my job on that particular committee I will give it to him tomorrow. But it has been assigned to me and I have to do it.

I repeat again that I realize the motive behind this measure. I think a lot of people are a little disturbed over some things that CIA has done. That needs to be investigated, and that is our job, and we are doing it every day.

But as the Senator from Minnesota has said on this floor a hundred times: Please do not throw out the baby with the bath water. That is the point. In our attempt to catch that one mouse, are we going to burn down the barn? We cannot and must not burn down the barn. So we come out here and say, "This is the amount of money we are spending." Very well; after it has been said, then what? Someone else says, "You are spending too much." In order to prove that too much is not being spent, statements have to be made as to where it is being spent, what we are doing. The big question is, Can we afford to tell them what we are doing?

I have been in many committee meetings—the Joint Committee on Atomic

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But we go much further than that. We lay out that budget in great detail. We break it down by component and by function. We then talk about each individual weapon. When will it be ready? How much will it cost? What does it look like in a technical sense?

Of course, this detailed information is valuable to the U.S.S.R. But long ago, a decision was made that in our open society it was better to know the facts and ride herd on the Defense Department than to accept the intangible fear of enemy knowledge.

In fact, many American strategists have argued that the size of the U.S. military budget and the characteristics of our overwhelming nuclear force should be made public in order to reinforce the psychology of deterrence. The enemy will not be deterred unless he truly believes the United States has these weapons.

The same goes for the intelligence budget. It is a form of deterrence for the potential adversary to know that we will continue to spend sizeable funds for intelligence. They will be less inclined to spring some surprise.

Of course it should be quickly said that the only figure we would be releasing is the single number representing the combined intelligence budget. Not a breakdown. Just the overall figure.

Now just what would this tell our adversaries? They would not know if it all went to the CIA, or DIA. Whether the NSA spent most of the money, or the Air Force.

How about yearly fluctuations? Say for example, that the budget went up 10 percent in 1 year. What what they conclude? That manpower was more expensive? That the CIA was spending more for Laos? That the DIA had bought a new computer division? That NSA was hiring more people? They would know nothing.

Listen to what former CIA Director James R. Schlesinger told Senator HARRY E. BYRD, JR., during his confirmation hearings for Secretary of Defense:

I think it (speaking of releasing selected intelligence budget data) might be an acceptable procedure, Senator, to indicate the total figure of the national intelligence programs. I would not personally advocate it, but it may be an acceptable procedure . . . There is the feeling that it might be wise to give the gross figure. I have come to share that feeling at least in this time frame, but that does not say that is not a possibility.

Senator BYRD specifically asked:

There would be no security reasons why it should not be done?

Dr. Schlesinger replied:

For the gross figure, I think that the security concerns are minimal. The component figures, I would be more concerned about but for the gross national intelligence program figures I think we could live with that on a security basis, yes.

Remember that this was the Director of Central Intelligence testifying, the man who then was the CIA Director. He is now the Secretary of Defense. This is exactly what the amendment before the Senate provides.

When the same question was put to William E. Colby during his confirmation hearings to be Director of Central Intelligence, he replied:

I would propose to leave that question, Mr. Chairman, in the hands of the Congress; to decide . . . We are not going to run the kind of intelligence service that other countries run. We are going to run one in the American society, and the American constitutional structure, and I can see that there may be a requirement to expose to the American people a great deal more than might be convenient from the narrow intelligence point of view.

Mr. Colby's two points should be kept in mind. First, he left it up to Congress. Second, he said we have to run our intelligence agencies in a democratic environment. Both of these points argue for supporting this amendment.

After he was confirmed, Mr. Colby started having a change of heart. It is interesting to note how opinions change during and after confirmation hearings.

Now Mr. Colby argues against releasing even the aggregate total of the intelligence community budget.

During the confirmation, he said,

I would favor a greater degree of exposure of what we are doing (p. 18).

Now he says he does not think it would be a good idea.

Mr. Colby further explained why he opposes such a course of action. Quoting from a February 22, letter, Mr. Colby says:

I am still concerned that public disclosure of total intelligence figures on an annual basis would lead to pressures for further public explanation of the programs for which monies were appropriated.

That is the real reason for not releasing the budget. It will allow Congress to start doing its job. Questions will be asked. There will be pressure on the oversight committees to very closely review that budget and justify it thoroughly, so that they in turn could come back to Congress and say we are getting our money's worth.

There is something very healthy about responding to public pressure—even for the intelligence community.

The question must be asked of every person who says that the release of this total budget will endanger national security. How will it do so? Why did Secretary Schlesinger say it would not? Give some examples, hypothetical if desired of how such disclosure would work against us. How is the total intelligence budget figure different from the total military budget? Is it more important than a \$100 billion defense budget? Are the Armed Services Committees violating security by reviewing the Defense budget in public?

These questions need answering by those that support continued secrecy of the intelligence budget.

I hope answers are forthcoming.

Mr. President, this amendment is the most restrained attempt to introduce fiscal integrity to the intelligence community. It is written to take into consideration the possibility of security problems. It only calls for the release of the total figure.

It is time we found out just how large that budget is. It will not impinge on security considerations.

It is a long overdue step toward reasserting the right of Congress to inquire into the money it appropriates. We have operated in the dark too long.

I invite attention, Mr. President, to the fact that the Senate Select Committee on Secret and Confidential Documents, the cochairmen of which were the majority leader and the minority leader, Senators MANSFIELD and HUGH SCOTT, made the recommendation which is embodied in the amendment I am presenting to the Senate today and on which we will vote a little later.

I hope that the Members of the Senate will recognize that this is a matter that has been studied by the select committee; that they did make this recommendation; that the present Secretary of Defense, who was formerly Director, and the present CIA Director, when his nomination was being confirmed—both at the time of the confirmation of their nominations—indicated that the damage, if any, would be minimal and that they saw strong arguments in favor of releasing the total figure. They could live with that, provided there was no breakdown of the components.

Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time, and I yield the floor.

EXHIBIT 1

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS,
Washington, D.C., April 8, 1974

HON. ROY M. ASH,
Director, Office of Management and Budget,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. ASH: Under the authority of the 1949 Central Intelligence Agency Act, the CIA is authorized to transfer funds to and receive funds from other Government agencies subject to the approval of your office. This authority is granted without regard to other provisions of law.

Would you please provide answers to the following questions dealing with this practice.

1. Is there any other authority for this transfer or receipt of funds other than in the 1949 CIA Act, Section 6? If so, where?
2. As Chairman of the HUD, Space, Science, Veterans and Independent Agencies Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, I request you to make known to me if any of the funds appropriated under my jurisdiction have been transferred to or expended by or on behalf of the CIA?
3. Will you please describe the process by which funds are transferred from one appropriation account to use by the CIA?
4. What members of Congress are made aware of this practice in terms of the actual flow of funds?
5. What restrictions are placed on this transfer or expenditure of funds?
6. Why cannot the CIA budget be funded in a single appropriations bill?

I would appreciate an early answer to these questions since hearings are currently in progress.

Sincerely,

WILLIAM PROXMIRE,
U.S. Senator.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET,

Washington, D.C., April 29, 1974

HON. WILLIAM PROXMIRE,
Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR PROXMIRE: This responds to your letter of April 8, 1974, in which you pose several questions regarding the funding of the Central Intelligence Agency.

As you know, extraordinary measures have been taken by both the Congress and the executive branch to protect the sensitive foreign intelligence operations in which the CIA engages. With respect to the budget, information relating to CIA's funding has been classified by the Director of Central Intelli-

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House conferees, even if it did not survive the conference, we would be at least pinpointing something that needs to be emphasized in this day and age, because one day we will have to convert from war to peace, prayerfully and hopefully. The big question is, How do we do it?

Do we just sit back and say, "Well, we will just wait and see what the Government is going to do about it"?

With reference to the Rhode Island situation, we tried to go down and see the President for a long time and we could not do it. We were told the day before the order came out cutting our installations. Only the day before did we know it. I tried to find out from Mr. Kissinger. I tried to find out from Melvin Laird. I tried to find out from Admiral Zumwalt. I tried to find out from the President. None of them told us what was going to happen to Rhode Island. We never knew of it until the axe came down and chopped off our economic head. I say that is disgraceful. I repeat, we are not over the agony yet.

Mr. President, I am very amenable to this amendment for the reasons I have stated. I realize this is not the complete answer. I realize it may not survive the conference. But surely the Senate ought to express its sentiment.

It is not going to affect my State a great deal. It may affect one or two plants. Perhaps we can reconvert them without Federal help. But the time has come when we have to think about these things in advance, and not, after the fact, get up on the floor and propose to extend unemployment compensation, and have a silly retraining-for-jobs program, without knowing what jobs they are going to give these people after they are trained. This is something that has to be done in advance.

I would hope such a proposal would receive serious consideration. I can say this as one who has depended on the Pentagon and the Defense Department. I am one who has not always agreed with the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. McGovern) with reference to some of the cuts he wanted to make in defense. I have been on the side of the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. Stennis) and the Senator from South Carolina (Mr. Thurmond) more than I have been on the side of the Senator from South Dakota, but this proposal ought to be given serious consideration, and I am going to vote for it.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield myself 1 minute.

I appreciate very much the problem Rhode Island had at a time when I was not active. I read about it in the newspapers, and it had my interest, and I remember the vigor with which the Senator from Rhode Island and his colleague opposed it. They did everything anyone could do to try to alleviate that situation. But with all deference to my friends, I do not believe such an amendment on this bill is a solution to the problem. I think, legislative-wise, it would be better to take the route that all

far-reaching legislation should take. I think, a full development of all the facts to give the Congress a choice among alternatives, if it has alternatives before it, is the best way to do it.

I hope we can keep this bill a military authorization bill, as I explained before, and get it into law as soon as we can, and pave the way for appropriations. I know that if the authorization committees do not meet those time demands, our work is going to be brushed aside.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. STENNIS. I yield myself 1 additional minute.

And the appropriations will be made whether there is an authorization or not, and we will be helpless to do anything about it.

I think we do render a service—I am sure my colleagues agree—through these authorization bills.

So let us keep it what it is to begin with—an authorization bill for military hardware and manpower for the ensuing year.

Mr. President, I yield the floor. I will yield anytime any Senator wishes. Otherwise I am willing to yield back the time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi has 12 minutes remaining. The Senator from South Dakota has 5 minutes remaining.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, so far as we are concerned on this side, we are willing to yield back our time if the Senator from South Dakota is so willing.

Mr. MCGOVERN. Mr. President, under those circumstances, I am willing to yield back the remainder of my time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time having been yielded back, the question is on agreeing to the amendments numbered 1347 by the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. McGovern). The yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I announce that the Senator from California (Mr. CRANSTON), the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. FULBRIGHT), the Senator from Michigan (Mr. HART), the Senator from Indiana (Mr. HARTKE), the Senator from Maine (Mr. HATHAWAY), the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. HUDDLESTON), the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. INOUE), the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. KENNEDY), the Senator from Wyoming (Mr. MCGEE), the Senator from Utah (Mr. MOSS), the Senator from Alabama (Mr. SPARKMAN), and the Senator from California (Mr. TUNNEY) are necessarily absent.

I also announce that the Senator from Missouri (Mr. SYMINGTON) is absent because of illness.

Mr. GRIFFIN. I announce that the Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. BELLMON), the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. BROCK), the Senator from New York (Mr. JAVITS), the Senator from Oregon (Mr. PACKWOOD), and the Senator from Delaware (Mr. ROTH) are necessarily absent.

The result was announced—yeas 27, nays 55, as follows:

[No. 223 Leg.]

YEAS—27

Abourezk	Humphrey	Mondale
Bayh	Jackson	Montoya
Biden	Long	Muskie
Brooke	Magnuson	Nelson
Church	Mansfield	Pastore
Clark	Mathias	Pell
Gravel	McGovern	Ribicoff
Hatfield	McIntyre	Schweiker
Hughes	Metcalf	Williams

NAYS—55

Aiken	Dole	Metzenbaum
Allen	Domenici	Nunn
Baker	Dominick	Pearson
Bartlett	Eagleton	Percy
Beall	Eastland	Proxmire
Bennett	Ervin	Randolph
Bentsen	Fannin	Scott, Hugh
Bible	Fong	Scott,
Buckley	Goldwater	William L.
Burdick	Griffin	Stafford
Byrd,	Gurney	Stennis
Harry F., Jr.	Hansen	Stevens
Byrd, Robert C.	Haskell	Stevenson
Cannon	Helms	Taft
Case	Hollings	Talmadge
Chiles	Hruska	Thurmond
Cook	Johnston	Tower
Cotton	McClellan	Weicker
Curtis	McClure	Young

NOT VOTING—18

Bellmon	Hathaway	Moss
Brock	Huddleston	Packwood
Cranston	Inouye	Roth
Fulbright	Javits	Sparkman
Hart	Kennedy	Symington
Hartke	McGee	Tunney

So Mr. MCGOVERN's amendment (No. 1347) was rejected.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the amendment was rejected.

Mr. THURMOND. I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

AMENDMENT NO. 1369

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. ABOUREZK). Under the previous order, the Senate will now proceed to the consideration of the amendment (No. 1369) offered by the Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. PROXMIRE), which the clerk will state.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

At the appropriate place in the bill insert a new section as follows:

Sec. —. On or before March 1 each year the Director of Central Intelligence shall submit an unclassified written report to the Congress disclosing the total amount of funds requested in the budget, transmitted to the Congress pursuant to section 201 of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 (31 U.S.C. 11), for the national intelligence program for the next succeeding fiscal year.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time for debate on this amendment shall be limited to 3 hours, to be equally divided between and controlled by the mover of the amendment and the manager of the bill, with 30 minutes on any amendment in the second degree.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, before I yield to the distinguished Senator from Mississippi, which I shall do in a moment, I would like to call the attention of the Senate, while some Senators are still on the floor, to the fact that what this amendment does is provide a

part of what has been requested by Senators SCOTT and MANSFIELD of Senator McCLELLAN when they wrote him last November, and what, in my judgment, Senator McCLELLAN said then he would like to do if he can. I shall just read that letter, and then leave the matter in the hands of the Senator from Mississippi.

This is the letter dated November 15, 1973, signed by the majority and minority leaders:

As Co-chairmen of the Senate Select Committee on Secret and Confidential Documents, we wish to call your attention to one of the major recommendations which our Committee made with respect to the operations of the various intelligence agencies. Specifically, it was agreed that the Senate should be provided with the over-all sums requested for each agency. We believe that the release of this limited information will be useful to the Senate in maintaining the necessary support for our intelligence operations.

We do wish to reiterate that the Committee did not recommend the disclosure of any particular intelligence activity or any other such detailed matters, which continue to remain, and properly so, under your jurisdiction.

I have talked with the majority leader this morning, and he said it was his construction that that would mean the overall figure would be made available publicly. The response of Senator McCLELLAN dated November 20, was as follows:

DEAR SENATOR: I have your letter of November 15 and want you to know that I intend to comply, as fully as possible, with the recommendation of the Senate Select Committee on Secret and Confidential Documents to provide the Senate with the over-all sums requested for each of the various intelligence agencies.

Mr. President, the purpose of the amendment which I am offering now is to provide that the overall figure for the intelligence community as a whole, not broken down but the overall figure, would be made available, so that the taxpayers of this country would have some idea of how much, how many billions of dollars—and it is billions of dollars—are going for intelligence efforts by our Government.

Now, Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Mississippi—

Mr. STENNIS. On my time.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Yes, I yield to the Senator from Mississippi.

Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator. I take 2 minutes of my time first to emphasize to Senators present the overwhelming importance of this amendment and the far-reaching effect it would have if passed and enacted into law.

When we disclose—and I speak as one who, for years, has had to take care of a lot of keeping up with this problem—and it is no fun—if we disclose the amount of money spent on this effort, which includes the CIA, then we give to our adversaries all over the world, present and future, a true index as to what our activities are. There are deductions that can be made from our figures which could lead them along the path of information which would be priceless to them to know.

True, we are an open society and, so far, we have been able to carry on an

intelligence program effectively which has been worth to us billions and billions and billions of dollars in savings. But, if we are going to abandon the idea of keeping these figures from being disclosed, then, in my humble opinion, we might as well abolish the agency. It would be like saying, in effect, that we do not want this secret intelligence after all, that we do not need it, and that we will abandon it.

We will pay an awful price for that. I am familiar with the CIA budget. I can satisfy most any Senator in the cloakroom, talking to him some about this, but I will publicly say that it is a clean budget and they have justified many times over the expenditure of the money.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from Mississippi.

Mr. President, how much does the United States spend each year on the intelligence budget? Except for a small handful of Senators and Congressmen, nobody knows, at least in this country.

My amendment would end this ignorance and allow the Congress to reassert its fiscal control over the largest budget currently unavailable to public or congressional scrutiny.

The amendment requires that on or before March 1 each year the Director of Central Intelligence shall submit an unclassified written report to the Congress disclosing the total amount of funds requested in the budget for the national intelligence program for the next succeeding fiscal year.

It is as simple as that. Each year the Director of Central Intelligence adds up the combined budgets of the intelligence community and supplies that figure to Congress in an unclassified form.

No longer would we be operating in darkness. For the first time we would have hard budgetary facts. Granted, it would only be one figure each year, but that is enough to tell us the relative size of that budget.

At present, we do not know if the national intelligence program budget is \$1 billion or \$10 billion. We do not know if it went up 200 percent this year, or went down 10 percent. We simply do not know and the consequence of our ignorance is twofold.

First, the intelligence community escapes effective congressional control.

Second, Congress is systematically deceived as to the size of other civilian budgets.

How does that come about?

It comes about because the intelligence budgets, particularly the CIA, are hidden in other budgets that pass through the legislative process. There is intelligence money in this bill before us today.

I don't know how much. Only the Oversight Committee members know that. There are funds in other budgets. It is quite possible that even some of the chairmen of these subcommittees do not know that their budgets contain intelligence funds.

The authority for this sleight of hand resides in the Central Intelligence Act of 1949, section 6 (50 USC 403f).

Section 6 states that the CIA is authorized to transfer to and receive from other Government agencies any money approved by the Bureau of the Budget authorized under the National Security Act of 1947.

According to the Office of Management and Budget, the transfer of funds to CIA under section 6 of the CIA Act is accomplished by the issuance of Treasury documents routinely used for the transfer of funds from one Government agency to another. The amount and timing of these transfers are approved by OMB.

The funds approved for transfer to CIA by OMB are limited to amounts notified to OMB by the chairmen of the Senate and House Appropriations Committees. The specific appropriations accounts from which the funds will be transferred are also determined by this process. Obligations after the transfer are further controlled by OMB through the apportionment process.

In other words, only two men in the entire Congress of the United States control the process by which the CIA is funded.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that my correspondence with Roy L. Ash, Director of OMB be printed in the Record. There is an error in Mr. Ash's reply that should be noted. Where the letter refers to section 5, it should read section 6.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 2.)

Mr. PROXMIRE. As chairman of the HUD, Space, Science, Veterans Appropriations Subcommittee, I became interested in whether or not there were intelligence funds in my \$21 billion budget. I checked with OMB and was told that except for possible Economy Act transactions, no funds have been transferred to the CIA from any of the agencies falling under the jurisdiction of the HUD, Space, Science, Veterans and Independent Agencies Subcommittee. I urge other subcommittee and committee chairmen to make the same inquiries.

THE SECURITY ISSUE

This sleight of hand aside, the major question each of us has to answer before voting on this amendment is "Will the public release of this aggregate budget in any way compromise our national security?" If it can be shown that it will not, then this amendment should be passed.

I intend to show that it will not compromise our security, in any way.

First, let us apply a little common sense to the problem of security. Would anyone charge that the Senate Armed Services Committee is endangering our national security by publishing the total amount of the Defense budget? Would anyone claim that the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have violated security when they testify before Congress in open session and when they peak across the country and use the total amount of the defense budget in public?

Of course not. That would be utterly ridiculous. The total amount of the budget is not a security problem.

file HR 14592

passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

A similar House bill (H.R. 13685) was laid on the table.

CALL OF THE HOUSE

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Speaker, I make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The SPEAKER. Evidently a quorum is not present.

Without objection, a call of the House was ordered.

There was no objection.

The call was taken by electronic device, and the following Members failed to respond:

[Roll No. 229]

- | | | |
|------------------|----------------|------------------|
| Anderson, Calif. | Ford, | Moorhead, Calif. |
| Andrews, N.C. | William D. | Moorhead, Pa. |
| Ashbrook | Fountain | Morgan |
| Badillo | Gaydos | Moss |
| Bafalis | Gettys | Murphy, Ill. |
| Barrett | Giaino | Murphy, N.Y. |
| Bell | Gibbons | Nedzi |
| Biaggi | Goldwater | Nelsen |
| Blester | Goodling | Nix |
| Blainik | Grasso | Parris |
| Boland | Gray | Peyster |
| Bolling | Green, Oreg. | Pedell |
| Brademas | Green, Pa. | Pritchard |
| Brasco | Griffiths | Quie |
| Broomfield | Gunter | Rangel |
| Brotzman | Hanna | Reid |
| Buchanan | Hansen, Idaho | Rinaldo |
| Burke, Calif. | Harrington | Roncalio, Wyo. |
| Burke, Fla. | Hays | Rooney, N.Y. |
| Butler | Heckler, Mass. | Rooney, Pa. |
| Byron | Heinz | Roy |
| Carey, N.Y. | Helstoski | Ruppe |
| Carmey, Ohio | Hogan | Satterfield |
| Chisholm | Hollifield | Scherle |
| Clancy | Huber | Schneebell |
| Clark | Hudnut | Schroeder |
| Clausen, | Hunt | Sebelius |
| Don H. | Ichord | Shibley |
| Clawson, Del | Jarman | Shoup |
| Clay | Johnson, Pa. | Shuster |
| Conyers | Jones, Okla. | Skubltz |
| Corman | Kluczynski | Smith, Iowa |
| Cotter | Kyros | Staggers |
| Culver | Landgrebe | Stanton |
| Daniels, | Landrum | J. William |
| Dominick V. | Lehman | Steed |
| Dantelson | Litton | Steele |
| Davis, Ga. | Long, La. | Steiger, Wis. |
| Davis, S.C. | Long, Md. | Stubblefield |
| Delaney | Luken | Teague |
| Dennis | McCloskey | Udall |
| Dont | McCormack | Vander Jagt |
| Diggs | McKinney | Veysey |
| Dingell | McSpadden | Vigorito |
| Donohue | Macdonald | Waldie |
| Dorn | Madigan | Ware |
| Dulski | Mann | Widnall |
| Eckhardt | Maraziti | Williams |
| Eilberg | Matsunaga | Wyatt |
| Eshleman | Mayne | Wylder |
| Findley | Milford | Wyman |
| Fish | Mink | Yatron |
| Fisher | Mitchell, Md. | Young, Ga. |
| Flood | Mollohan | Young, S.C. |
| Flowers | | |

The SPEAKER. On this rollcall 274 Members have recorded their presence by electronic device, a quorum.

By unanimous consent, further proceedings under the call were dispensed with.

USDA DELAYS FLEMING KEY ANIMAL IMPORT CENTER PLANNING

(Mr. MELCHER asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, and to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. MELCHER. Mr. Speaker, although directed by action of the 92d Congress to build an import quarantine center to import European breeds of cattle and other

livestock at Fleming Key off the coast of Florida, the Department of Agriculture has failed to start the plans and design of the facilities.

Congress appropriated \$300,000 for design and planning in fiscal year 1973. The Department advises me:

The design criteria have been completed. Architectural-engineering firms have been evaluated and ranked in order of preference by a review board.

But—the Department then equivocates by saying that they do not intend to expand the \$300,000 appropriation for design and planning until construction funds are available.

For the current fiscal year appropriations the conference committee of the Agriculture Appropriations Committee asked that the request for funds for the Fleming Key Animal Import Center be made in the routine way through the President's budget rather than asking for the funds outside the normal budgetary process. That was not done. Now the Department position is that this quarantine center should be financed through private sources.

Whether it is private or Government funds that pay the bill for this needed facility I would strongly urge the Department to get right on the job of design and planning the installation, which usually takes a year, so that when the funds are available construction can start. Further delay only stalls what is an obvious need for the U.S. livestock industry. Also the stall defies the will of Congress in directing that the \$300,000 appropriated be used for the purpose of planning and it's obvious that the Department has wasted a year or more in defiance of the directive of Congress.

(Mr. WOLFF asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.)

(Mr. WOLFF addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.)

(Mr. VANIK asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.)

(Mr. VANIK addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.)

MILITARY PROCUREMENT AUTHORIZATION, 1975

Mr. MADDEN. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, I call up House Resolution 1112 and ask for its immediate consideration.

The Clerk read the resolution as follows:

H. RES. 1112

Resolved, That upon the adoption of this resolution it shall be in order to move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 14592) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1975 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat

vehicles, torpedoes, and other weapons, and research, development, test and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength for each active duty component and of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces and of civilian personnel of the Department of Defense, and to authorize the military training student loads and for other purposes. After general debate, which shall be confined to the bill and shall continue not to exceed four hours, to be equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on Armed Services, the bill shall be read for amendment under the five-minute rule by titles instead of by sections. At the conclusion of the consideration of the bill for amendment, the Committee shall rise and report the bill to the House with such amendments as may have been adopted, and the previous question shall be considered as ordered on the bill, and amendments thereto to final passage without intervening motion except one motion to recommit.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Indiana (Mr. MADDEN) is recognized for 1 hour.

(Mr. MADDEN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. MADDEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 minutes to the gentleman from Nebraska (Mr. MARTIN) pending which I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, last week the House Rules Committee held hearings on the 1975 military authorization legislation and reported out an open rule with 4 hours of general debate—House Resolution 1112

Chairman HEBERT and other members of the Armed Services Committee testified at length regarding the important features of this legislation, after months of extended hearings of recorded testimony from the heads of the various armed services, Members of Congress, et cetera.

This legislation reported by the Armed Services Committee provides for appropriation authorization of \$22,642,963,000. The total authorization includes \$13,641,000 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes, and other weapons. The sum of \$9,001,663,000 is authorized for research, development, testing, and evaluation.

After the hearings were completed, the Armed Services Committee reduced the total amount of this authorization by \$487 million. The total amount of the authorization is \$1.2 billion above the 1974 authorization.

The total authorization also includes \$1,400,000,000 for the military assistance service funded program, providing for military assistance to South Vietnam.

The Armed Services Committee reduced the requested airborns warning and control system authorization from \$515.4 million to \$257.7 million. This reduction included authorizing 6 instead of 12 aircraft.

The committee denied the request of \$50 million for the stretched version of the C-141 aircraft.

The request of \$132.9 million for the civilian reserve air fleet program was reduced to \$25 million.

The procurement authorization request for \$14.3 million for two patrol

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is not a party to the subcontract. The executive communication points out that the proposed amendments would afford protection to those subcontractors, especially when they are small businessmen who might otherwise suffer from unnecessary financial losses when performing as subcontractors and material suppliers on Government contracts. The General Services Administration also stated that it does not believe that the bill would result in any increased cost to the Government. The only possible cost would be an indirect one based on the possibility that private surety companies would increase their bond premiums to reflect the added exposure to the payment of interest and attorneys' fees in the event a subcontractor enforced his right by suit. It can be assumed that the prime contractor's bid would reflect the increased premiums, if any.

The amendments are consistent with the policy of protecting subcontractors as embodied in the Miller Act. It is recommended that the bill be considered favorably.

(Mr. MOORHEAD of California, asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. MOORHEAD of California. Mr. Speaker, when Congress first passed the Miller Act in 1935, its primary objective was to safeguard the rights of subcontractors and suppliers in connection with Federal construction contracts. Normally, a mechanic's lien serves as an adequate security for payment for work done by subcontractors or suppliers in the construction industry. However, since a mechanic's lien does not attach to Federal property, some other mechanism was needed to protect them. Consequently, Congress provided a vehicle in Federal law so that subcontractors or suppliers could recover overdue payments from prime contractors on Government-financed projects.

The Miller Act requires the prime contractor to provide a payment bond, where the value of the contract exceeds \$2,000. The payment bond is required as a security for the protection of those supplying labor and/or materials in the performance of such public contracts. Then, if a subcontractor or supplier is not paid within 90 days after full performance, he is given a right to bring an action in the U.S. district court against either the prime or the surety on the payment bond. The suit must be brought where the contract was performed, within 1 year after the labor was performed or the materials supplied. In enacting this law, the Congress embraced a public policy of protecting subcontractors working on Government construction contracts.

But, while the intent of the original Miller Act is clear, as a practical matter the remedy provided has all too often been illusory. Frequently, the cost of litigation is prohibitively high, when compared with the amount which may be recovered. So, in many instances, there exists a basic economic disincentive for bringing such suits. Also, either through a lack of legal advice or pressure from the prime contractor, a subcontractor often enters into an arrangement where-

by he waives his rights under the Miller Act, in return for getting the job.

The amendments to the Miller Act, contained in the legislation (H.R. 11691) we consider today, seek to make that statute the genuine remedy it was intended to be. First, it authorizes the payment of attorney's fees and interest—6 percent per annum—to a successful plaintiff. Since the existing provisions of the Miller Act do not specifically authorize attorney's fees and interest, a Federal court applies the law of the State where the contract was performed. This has resulted in an unfortunate and unjust lack of uniformity with respect to the recovery of attorney's fees and interest.

So, for example, a subcontractor suing under the Miller Act in California or Kansas would recover both interest and legal fees while one suing in Mississippi or South Carolina would not. This is true irrespective of how comparatively meritorious their cases may be. Under Alaska law the allowance of attorney's fees to the prevailing party is left to the discretion of the trial court and, in Miller Act suits, the district court has gone both ways. *United States v. F. D. Rich Co.*, 434 F.2d 355 (9-10); *United States v. Peter Kiewit Sons, Inc.*, 235 F. Supp. 500 (1964); and *Macri v. United States*, 353 F.2d 804 (1965).

Similar confusion clouds Miller Act suits in Texas, where the recovery of attorney's fees in some instances seemingly depends upon whether you sue the prime contractor or the surety. *Boyd Callan, Inc. v. United States*, 328 F.2d 505 (1964); *Transamerica Insurance Co. v. Red Top Metal, Inc.*, 384 F.2d 752 (1967).

H.R. 11691 would also render unenforceable any provision in a contract between the prime contractor, where the subcontractor purports to waive his rights under the Miller Act, including arbitration clauses. This provision aims at protecting the unknowing subcontractor or the one who falls victim to the inequality of bargaining power.

Mr. Speaker, this bill is fully supported by the General Services Administration, the Federal agency that deals most closely with these matters. It is legislation that protects a subcontractor on a Federal contract from being the victim of economic inequality or coercion. It is a proposal that seeks to make the remedies available under a Federal statute uniform throughout the several States.

This measure is fully consistent with the original intent of the Miller Act. In fact, it is an attempt to insure that its original intent is realized. I strongly urge my colleagues to support the adoption of this needed remedial measure.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, was read the third time, and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

RENAMING CIVILIAN CONSERVATION CORPS CENTER IN FRANKLIN, N.C., IN HONOR OF FORMER PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON

The Clerk called the bill (H.R. 13685) to rename the first Civilian Conservation Corps Center located near Franklin,

N.C., and the Cross Timbers National Grasslands in Texas in honor of former President Lyndon B. Johnson.

There being no objection, the Clerk read the bill, as follows:

H.R. 13685

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the first Civilian Conservation Corps Center, known as the Arrowood Civilian Conservation Corps Center, located near Franklin, North Carolina, is redesignated as the Lyndon B. Johnson Civilian Conservation Corps Center, and the Cross Timbers National Grasslands, located in Wise and Montague Counties, Texas, is redesignated as the Lyndon B. Johnson National Grassland."

SEC. 2. Any law, regulation, document, map, or record of the United States in which reference is made to the Arrowood Civilian Conservation Corps Center or to the Cross Timbers National Grasslands shall be held and considered to be a reference to the Lyndon B. Johnson Civilian Conservation Corps Center and the Lyndon B. Johnson National Grasslands, respectively.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, was read the third time, and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

Mr. POAGE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Agriculture be discharged from further consideration of the Senate bill (S. 2835) to rename the first Civilian Conservation Corps Center located near Franklin, N.C., and the Cross Timbers National Grasslands in Texas in honor of former President Lyndon B. Johnson, a bill identical to H.R. 13685 just passed by the House, and I ask for its immediate consideration.

The Clerk read the title of the Senate bill.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Texas?

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, this is an identical bill; I mean, a verbatim bill?

Mr. POAGE. Yes, it is.

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my reservation of objection.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Texas?

There was no objection.

The Clerk read the Senate bill as follows:

S. 2835

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the first Civilian Conservation Corps Center, known as the Arrowood Civilian Conservation Corps Center, located near Franklin, North Carolina, is redesignated as the Lyndon B. Johnson Civilian Conservation Corps Center, and the Cross Timbers National Grasslands, located in Wise and Montague Counties, Texas, is redesignated as the Lyndon B. Johnson National Grasslands.

SEC. 2. Any law, regulation, document, map, or record of the United States in which reference is made to the Arrowood Civilian Conservation Corps Center or to the Cross Timbers National Grasslands shall be held and considered to be a reference to the Lyndon B. Johnson Civilian Conservation Corps Center and the Lyndon B. Johnson National Grasslands, respectively.

The Senate bill was ordered to be read a third time, was read the third time, and

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Mr. J. William Stanton with Mr. Ruppe.
 Mr. Reed with Mr. Scherle.
 Mr. Danielson with Mr. Shoup.
 Mr. Roy with Mr. Skubitz.
 Mr. Smith of Iowa with Mr. Schneebell.
 Mr. Staggers with Mrs. Griffiths.
 Mr. Steiger of Wisconsin with Mr. Sebelius.
 Mr. Steele with Mr. Williams.
 Mr. Davis of South Carolina with Mr. Shuster.
 Mr. Udall with Mr. Vigorito.
 Mr. Waldie with Mr. Young of South Carolina.
 Mr. Wyatt with Mr. Ware.
 Mr. Wydler with Mr. Wyman.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded. A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 14592) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1975 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes, and other weapons, and research, development, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength for each active duty component and of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces and of civilian personnel of the Department of Defense, and to authorize the military training student loads and for other purposes.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. HÉBERT).

The motion was agreed to.

IN THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 14592) with Mr. ROSTENKOWSKI in the chair.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

By unanimous consent, the first reading of the bill was dispensed with.

The CHAIRMAN. Under the rule, the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. HÉBERT) will be recognized for 2 hours, and the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. BRAY) will be recognized for 2 hours.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. HÉBERT).

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Any Member of the House who has anything to say on this very complex subject will be allowed the time he desires today.

I hope that consideration will be given during the amendment period and that it will not be abused by some individuals. We ran into a difficult situation last year, as the Members will recall. I refused to ask that debate be cut off, but other Members insisted that it be cut and did make the motion.

Mr. Chairman, let me first inform Members that it is our intention to complete general debate today and that on completion of general debate the committee will rise. We can then begin reading for amendments when the committee meets tomorrow.

It has been my custom since becoming chairman of the Armed Services Committee to assure the House at the begin-

ning of the annual consideration of this important bill that I would make no move to cut off debate. As I said, I renew that promise again today.

WHAT THE BILL DOES

H.R. 14592 authorizes appropriations for all major military procurement and for research, development, test, and evaluation; authorizes the active duty and Reserve strengths of the Armed Forces; and authorizes the military training student load.

This year for the first time the bill authorizes the annual civilian personnel strength for the Department of Defense.

The action on the civilian personnel strength was accomplished with the splendid cooperation of the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service; and I wish to express my deepest appreciation to the gentleman from New York (Mr. DULSKI) and the members of his committee. The Manpower Subcommittee of the Post Office and Civil Service Committee met jointly with our own Manpower Subcommittee during the consideration of this title of the bill, and the separate statement by the Post Office and Civil Service Subcommittee will be found in our report beginning on page 79. This is, I believe, a unique example of outstanding cooperation between two committees on a matter that affects the prerogatives of more than one committee.

It is necessary for this authorization to pass before appropriations can be voted for the military departments.

Therefore, the legislation is absolutely necessary for continued operation of our military establishment.

DOLLAR TOTALS

Let me briefly list the significant dollar totals in the bill:

Authorization requested: \$23,130,139,000.

Recommended by the committee: \$22,642,963,000.

Reduction from Defense Department request: \$487,176,000.

The net reduction does not tell the whole story, however. The committee actually made reductions totaling more than \$800 million and made additions totaling over \$300 million.

PERSONNEL IMPACT

In addition to the dollar impact of decisions on procurement and R.D.T. & E., the committee action on personnel will have a significant impact on budgetary requirements. Personnel costs now take 55 percent of our Defense budget.

Our committee has made a slight reduction of 2,810 in the active duty strength of the Armed Forces and has increased the Selected Reserve strengths by approximately 54,000. But it has reduced the Defense Department's civilian personnel strength request by 15,000. While not reflected in the dollar totals of the bill, the net effect of the committee's personnel revisions, when implemented, will be a reduction of approximately \$121 million from the administration's Defense budget request.

NUCLEAR POLICY

In addition to the money authorizations and strength levels, the committee has made important policy decisions in two other areas:

The committee has added to the bill a new title, title VIII, which would establish as the policy of the United States the requirement that construction of future major combat ships for the U.S. Navy be nuclear powered. I particularly recommend that Members read the section of our report beginning on page 6 on the "Nuclear Navy." It was the Congress which dragged the Navy and the Department of Defense into the nuclear age and, sadly the Congress is still required to take the lead in this vital area.

The committee continued the military assistance service funded—MASF—program authority to aid South Vietnam. But we provided a limitation of \$1.4 billion for fiscal year 1975, a reduction of \$200 million below the amount requested by the Department. The committee also rewrote the language of this section of the bill, section 701, to require the establishment of a single fund. This will improve the administration and accounting of the funds used for this purpose and make the use of such funds more responsive to congressional intent.

The committee language provides that unobligated balances previously authorized for the program are repealed as of June 30, 1974.

COMMITTEE PROCEDURE

The bill I bring before the committee today is the product of 67 days of hearings in the Committee on Armed Services. In addition to 14 days of hearings by the full committee, there were:

Twenty days of hearings by subcommittee No. 1, chaired by Mr. PRICE of Illinois, with Mr. GUBSER as ranking minority member. Subcommittee No. 1 considered title II, the research and development portion of the bill.

Twenty-one days of hearings by subcommittee No. 2, chaired by Mr. FISHER, with Mr. DICKINSON as ranking minority member. Subcommittee No. 2 considered titles III, IV, V, and VI, the personnel sections of the bill.

Twelve days of hearings by subcommittee No. 3, chaired by Mr. BENNETT, with Mr. BOB WILSON as ranking minority member. Subcommittee No. 3 considered the naval ship construction portion of title I of the bill and also the new title VIII on nuclear ship construction policy. Title VIII results from legislation developed separately by Mr. BENNETT and Mr. WILSON.

Following my remarks, I am going to yield to Mr. PRICE to explain the R. & D. authorizations, Mr. FISHER to explain the manpower decisions, and Mr. BENNETT to discuss ship construction programs.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to express my appreciation, not only to the chairmen and ranking minority members of the subcommittees, but also to all members of the committee for their work on this bill. The bill involves literally thousands of separate items. The hearings fill four volumes. It would be simply impossible to complete the committee's required work without the splendid cooperation and diligent attendance that we have had by members of the committee.

MAJOR ADDITIONS

The committee's report is available to all Members of the House. It is 132 pages,

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gunboats to be furnished the South Vietnamese Navy was denied.

The Defense Department's request for \$9.2 million for 45 naval craft to be furnished to the South Vietnamese Navy was denied also.

The \$106.3 million request for procurement of the Dragon missile for the Army was reduced to \$86.5 million, in which the Army Department concurred.

The request for \$25.3 million for 35 armored reconnaissance scout vehicles was denied.

Further changes were made which resulted in a reduction of \$8.4 million in Army procurement authorizations, which met with the concurrence of the Army.

Mr. Speaker, I fully realize that some of these items in this military procurement bill are controversial. The open rule will permit the Members to have an opportunity to offer amendments, and I urge the adoption of this rule in order that we may discuss and debate H.R. 14592 this 1975 armed services authorization bill.

Mr. MARTIN of Nebraska. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

(Mr. MARTIN of Nebraska asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. MARTIN of Nebraska. Mr. Speaker, as the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. MADDEN) has explained, House Resolution 1112 provides for an open rule and 4 hours of debate on the bill H.R. 14592, the military procurement authorization for fiscal year 1975. As I say, this is an open rule which provides that the bill shall be read for amendment under the 5-minute rule by titles instead of by sections. There are no waivers of points of order. It is a completely open rule. I know of no objection to the rule itself, and I urge, Mr. Speaker, the adoption of the rule.

Mr. MADDEN. Mr. Speaker, I have no requests for time.

Mr. Speaker, I move the previous question on the resolution.

The previous question was ordered.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the resolution.

The question was taken.

Mr. SNYDER. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground that a quorum is not present and make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The SPEAKER. Evidently a quorum is not present.

The Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—yeas 298, nays 0, not voting 135, as follows:

[Roll No. 230]

YEAS—298

Abdnor	Beard	Brown, Calif.
Abzug	Bennett	Brown, Mich.
Adams	Bergland	Brown, Ohio
Addabbo	Beyll	Broyhill, N.C.
Anderson, Ill.	Björster	Broyhill, Va.
Andrews,	Bingham	Burgener
N. Dak.	Blackburn	Burke, Calif.
Annunzio	Boggs	Burke, Mass.
Archer	Boland	Burleson, Tex.
Arnds	Bowen	Burlison, Mo.
Armstrong	Bray	Burton
Ashley	Breaux	Byron
Aspin	Breckinridge	Camp
Baker	Brinkley	Carney, Ohio
Bauman	Brooks	Casey, Tex.

Cederberg	Jones, Ala.	Riegle	Ellberg	Kyros	Roy
Chamberlain	Jones, N.C.	Roberts	Eshleman	Landrum	Rappe
Chappell	Jones, Tenn.	Robinson, Va.	Findley	Lehman	Scherle
Cleveland	Jordan	Robison, N.Y.	Fisher	Litton	Schneebeil
Cochran	Karth	Rodino	Flood	Long, La.	Schroeder
Cohen	Kastenmeier	Roe	Flowers	McCloskey	Sebelius
Collier	Kazen	Rogers	Ford	McCormack	Shipey
Collins, Ill.	Kemp	Roncallo, N.Y.	Fountain	McKinney	Shoup
Collins, Tex.	Ketchum	Rose	Fraser	McSpadden	Shuster
Conable	King	Rosenthal	Frelinghuysen	Madigan	Skubitz
Conte	Koych	Rostenkowski	Gaydos	Mann	Smith, Iowa
Conyers	Kuykendall	Roush	Gialmo	Maraziti	Staggers
Coughlin	Lagomarsino	Rousselot	Goldwater	Matsunaga	Stanton,
Crane	Landgrebe	Roybal	Goodling	Milford	J. William
Cronin	Latta	Runnels	Grasso	Mink	Steed
Daniel, Dan	Leggett	Ruth	Gray	Moorhead, Pa.	Steele
Daniel, Robert	Leahy	Ryan	Green, Pa.	Morgan	Stelger, Wis.
W. Jr.	Long, Md.	St Germain	Griffiths	Moss	Stubblefield
Davis, Wis.	Lott	Sandman	Gunter	Murphy, Ill.	Teague
de la Garza	Lujan	Sarasin	Hanna	Murphy, N.Y.	Udall
Dellenback	Luken	Sarbanes	Hansen, Idaho	Nix	Vigorito
Dellums	McClory	Satterfield	Harrington	Parris	Waldie
Denholm	McCollister	Seiberling	Hays	Peysner	Ware
Derwinski	McDade	Shriver	Heckler, Mass.	Podell	Williams
Devine	McEwen	Sikes	Heinz	Pritchard	Wyatt
Dickinson	McFall	Sisk	Helstoski	Quie	Wydler
Dingell	McKay	Slack	Huber	Rangel	Wyman
Downing	Macdonald	Smith, N.Y.	Hudnut	Reid	Yatron
Drinan	Madden	Snyder	Jarman	Rinaldo	Young, Ga.
Duncan	Mahon	Spence	Johnson, Pa.	Roncallo, Wyo.	Young, S.C.
du Pont	Mallary	Stanton,	Jones, Okla.	Rooney, N.Y.	
Edwards, Ala.	Martin, Nebr.	James V.	Kluczynski	Rooney, Pa.	
Edwards, Calif.	Martin, N.C.	Stark			
Erlenborn	Mathias, Calif.	Steelman			
Esch	Mathis, Ga.	Stelger, Ariz.			
Evans, Colo.	Mayne	Stevens			
Evins, Tenn.	Mazzoli	Stokes			
Fasell	Meeds	Stratton			
Fish	Melcher	Stuckey			
Flynt	Metcalf	Studds			
Foley	Mezvisky	Sullivan			
Forsythe	Michels	Symington			
Frenzel	Miller	Symms			
Frey	Mills	Talcott			
Froehlich	Minish	Taylor, Mo.			
Fulton	Minshall, Ohio	Taylor, N.C.			
Fuqua	Mitchell, Md.	Thompson, N.J.			
Gettys	Mitchell, N.Y.	Thompson, Wis.			
Gibbons	Mizell	Thone			
Gilman	Moakley	Thornton			
Ginn	Mollohan	Tiernan			
Gonzalez	Montgomery	Towell, Nev.			
Green, Oreg.	Moorhead,	Traxler			
Gross	Calif.	Treen			
Grover	Mosher	Ullman			
Gubser	Murtha	Van Deerlin			
Gude	Myers	Vander Jagt			
Guyer	Natcher	Vander Veen			
Haley	Nedzi	Vank			
Hamilton	Nelsen	Veysey			
Hammer-	Nichols	Waggonner			
schmidt	Obey	Walsh			
Hanley	O'Brien	Wampler			
Hanrahan	O'Hara	Whalen			
Hansen, Wash.	O'Neill	White			
Harsha	Owens	Whitehurst			
Hastings	Pasman	Whitten			
Hawkins	Patman	Widnall			
Hébert	Patten	Wiggins			
Hechler, W. Va.	Pepper	Wilson, Bob			
Henderson	Perkins	Wilson,			
Hicks	Pettis	Charles H.,			
Hillis	Pickle	Calif.			
Hinshaw	Pike	Wilson,			
Hogan	Poage	Charles, Tex.			
Hollifield	Powell, Ohio	Winn			
Holt	Preyer	Wolf			
Holtzman	Price, Ill.	Wright			
Horton	Price, Tex.	Wylie			
Hosmer	Quillen	Yates			
Howard	Rallsback	Young, Alaska			
Hungate	Randall	Young, Fla.			
Hunt	Barick	Young, Ill.			
Hutchinson	Bees	Young, Tex.			
Ichord	Regula	Zablocki			
Johnson, Calif.	Reuss	Zion			
Johnson, Colo.	Rhodes	Zwach			

NAYS—0

NOT VOTING—135

Alexander	Brotzman	Cotter
Anderson,	Buchanan	Culver
Calif.	Burke, Fla.	Daniels
Andrews, N.C.	Butler	Dominick V.
Ashbrook	Carey, N.Y.	Danielson
Badillo	Carter	Davis, Ga.
Bafalis	Chisholm	Davis, S.C.
Barrett	Clancy	Delaney
Bell	Clark	Dennis
Biaggi	Clausen,	Dent
Blatnik	Don H.	Diggs
Bolling	Clawson, Del	Donohue
Brademas	Clay	Dorn
Brasco	Conlan	Dulski
Broomfield	Corman	Eckhardt

So the resolution was agreed to.

The Clerk announced the following pairs:

Mr. Dominick V. Daniels with Mr. Kyros.
 Mr. Rooney of New York with Mr. Milford.
 Mr. Teague with Mrs. Mink.
 Mr. Steed with Mr. Davis of Georgia.
 Mr. Brasco with Mr. Hanna.
 Mr. Corman with Mr. Butler.
 Mr. Helstoski with Mr. Findley.
 Mr. Biaggi with Mr. Carter.
 Mr. Rooney of Pennsylvania with Mr. Dennis.
 Mr. Delaney with Mr. Ashbrook.
 Mr. Ellberg with Mr. Conlan.
 Mr. Donohue with Mr. Clancy.
 Mr. Shipley with Mr. Bafalis.
 Mr. Stubblefield with Mr. Eshleman.
 Mr. Yatron with Mr. Don H. Clausen.
 Mr. Young of Georgia with Mrs. Schroeder.
 Mr. Moorhead of Pennsylvania with Mr. Bell.
 Mr. Murphy of New York with Mr. Del Clawson.
 Mrs. Chisholm with Mr. Culver.
 Mr. Morgan with Mr. Broomfield.
 Mr. Gunter with Mr. Badillo.
 Mr. Diggs with Mr. Eckhardt.
 Mr. Harrington with Mr. Clay.
 Mr. Rangel with Mr. Fraser.
 Mr. Barrett with Mr. Frelinghuysen.
 Mr. Green of Pennsylvania with Mr. Brotzman.
 Mrs. Grasso with Mr. Goldwater.
 Mr. Podell with Mr. Heinz.
 Mr. Nix with Mr. Blatnik.
 Mr. Murphy of Illinois with Mr. Huber.
 Mr. Flood with Mr. Buchanan.
 Mr. Ford with Mr. Hudnut.
 Mr. Gaydos with Mr. Burke of Florida.
 Mr. Gialmo with Mr. Goodling.
 Mr. Hays with Mrs. Heckler of Massachusetts.
 Mr. Kluczynski with Mr. Hansen of Idaho.
 Mr. Dent with Mr. Jarman.
 Mr. Flowers with Mr. Johnson of Pennsylvania.
 Mr. Carey of New York with Mr. Fisher.
 Mr. Alexander with Mr. Landrum.
 Mr. Fountain with Mr. Madigan.
 Mr. Jones of Oklahoma with Mr. Litton.
 Mr. Dulski with Mr. Parris.
 Mr. Lehman with Mr. Maraziti.
 Mr. Anderson of California with Mr. Andrews of North Carolina.
 Mr. Long of Louisiana with Mr. Peysner.
 Mr. Mann with Mr. Moss.
 Mr. Cotter with Mr. Quie.
 Mr. Matsunaga with Mr. McCloskey.
 Mr. Brademas with Mr. Rinaldo.
 Mr. Clark with Mr. McKinney.
 Mr. Dorn with Mr. Roncallo of New York.
 Mr. Gray with Mr. McSpadden.

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and it explains the actions taken by the committee. Let me just highlight some of the major changes.

A-7

The committee added \$104.9 million for the procurement of 24 A-7D aircraft and specified in the bill that these A-7's shall be for the use of the Air National Guard.

F-111

The committee added \$205.5 million for the procurement of 12 F-111 aircraft.

In providing funds for the F-111, the committee continues the procurement of one of the outstanding aircraft in the world, the only tactical aircraft in our inventory capable of performing a strategic nuclear mission. This action keeps open the only active aircraft production line in the free world capable of producing a strategic bomber. I want to emphasize, however, that the committee considers even the bomber version of the F-111 as an interim aircraft until the B-1 comes along. We do not consider the bomber version of the F-111 a long-term replacement for the B-52. In title II of the bill the committee has provided the development money for the B-1, which we must have the option to produce to assure the continuation of the manned element of our strategic triad.

MAJOR REDUCTIONS

The R. & D. request was reduced \$323.3 million. The reductions affect a great variety of programs. They are explained in the report and will be discussed more fully by Mr. PRICE in the course of this debate.

The committee denied \$50 million requested for the stretched version of the C-141. The committee determined that authorization should not be provided until prototypes have been developed and engineering and flight-testing completed.

The procurement request for modification of the Civil Air Reserve Fleet (CRAF) was reduced from \$132.9 million to \$25 million, a reduction of \$107.9 million. Because of the failure to provide funding in the fiscal year 1974 supplemental appropriation bill, the committee believes the authorization should be limited to \$25 million for fiscal year 1975. This will provide for basic engineering, design, and tooling. The committee does not oppose the concept of the program.

The request for the E-3A (AWACS) was reduced by \$257.7 million, a 50-percent reduction. The committee believes this program should be slowed down until completion of the complex system integration testing.

The committee turned down the request for \$14.3 million for patrol gunboats and \$9.2 million for 45 naval craft, all of which would have been furnished to the South Vietnamese Navy. The committee believes these vessels for South Vietnam should be provided through the military assistance program.

COMMITTEE OVERSIGHT

In some cases the committee has imposed requirements to make sure that authorizations are prudently used. In providing \$436.5 million for the patrol

frigate program, the committee has provided in the bill that the contract for construction of these ships shall not be entered into until the Secretary of the Navy has notified the committee that the fire control system for the ship has been satisfactorily tested.

In providing funds for the procurement of the A-10 close-support aircraft for the Air Force, the committee has made clear in its report that the authorization is available subject to a favorable decision in the flyoff competition between the A-10 and the A-7.

SPECIAL CONCERNS

In addition to its actions on the specific weapons program requests of the military departments, the committee has, in its report, expressed special concern in a number of areas.

Beginning on page 37 of the report, the committee expresses its concern for the management of R. & D. programs in the Department of Defense. The discussion will be useful to Members of the House, and I caution those in the R. & D. business in the military departments to read it also. The mounting cost of defense is going to require improved procedures in managing weapons programs. And it is going to require our committee to look more closely at expensive programs.

We have not fully absorbed, as yet, the lessons of the October war in the Middle East for our Armed Forces.

But that war has made us aware of the awesome capacity of the Soviets to produce and supply conventional arms to countries with which it seeks influence. On page 8 of the report the committee expresses its particular concern with the limitations on the capacity in our own country to produce tanks and with the considerable numerical advantage the Soviets have in tank inventories. At present, there is only one producer in the United States; and the rate of production is 360 a year. The Soviets have provided more than that number to one Arab country in a matter of weeks.

Last year the House, via the Peyser amendment, directed our committee to make a study of our commitments in Europe. The report resulting from that study, which our committee approved by a vote of 32 to 5, was transmitted to the House on April 8. On page 5 of the report the committee discusses the essential points of that study which Members of the House should keep in mind in considering any proposals to change our NATO deployment. Briefly, we are in the middle of a process that was begun as a result of U.S. urging. Negotiations began in Vienna last October which will affect not only the level of troops in Europe, but the whole spectrum of détente. The Jackson-Nunn amendment requiring the NATO allies to offset our balance-of-payments deficit due to troops in Europe was enacted as part of last year's bill, and efforts are underway to meet the requirements of that amendment. The prospects for success look very good.

To reduce forces in Europe now would undercut the mutual and balanced force reductions negotiations, would throw away the beneficial economic ef-

fect of Jackson-Nunn, and would make the United States look capricious and irresponsible on the world's stage.

CONCLUSION

Since the authorization bill was brought to the floor last year, the free world has had a frightening lesson in the necessity for military preparedness.

I hope the lesson was not lost on Members of the House. The October war in the Middle East gave renewed evidence not only of the willingness of the Soviets to sponsor aggressive action, but of their capacity to supply arms at an incredible rate.

All of the evidence available to us also indicates that the Soviets continue to develop strategic missile capability at an undiminished pace and continue the feverish expansion of their worldwide naval forces. We all want peace. But surely the last 55 sad years of history, if it has taught us anything, teaches us that we do not get peace by reducing the capabilities for defense. In our world it is absolutely necessary to keep our Armed Forces in a high state of readiness. That means keeping them supplied with adequate weapons systems of today. But it also means keeping the technological vigor to make sure our forces will be ready for any eventuality in the decade ahead. The bill I present to you today is necessary to carry out Congress part of that awesome responsibility.

Mr. GONZALEZ. Mr. Chairman, will the distinguished gentleman yield?

Mr. HEBERT. I am happy to yield to the distinguished gentleman from Texas (Mr. GONZALEZ).

(Mr. GONZALEZ asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GONZALEZ. Mr. Chairman, first I am sure that I express the sentiments of most if not all Members of the House in wishing to compliment the distinguished gentleman from Louisiana for the monumental task that the gentleman handles for us. I rise only to compliment the gentleman and his committee, and to ask the gentleman a question in connection with a matter that I believe is of great importance to the country, and especially in view of those who believe that you have provided too much in this authorization bill.

The question that I have is: In view of the recommended strength and the projected strength of the Army of less than 800,000 men, and also reductions in some of the other services, does the gentleman believe that this is adequate, and have we not reached the danger point?

Mr. HEBERT. We have reached a point of necessity in an area where we must recognize that we need the maximum of muscle. We have 800,000 provided for in the Army, and I might say that they are having some difficulty in recruiting in some areas. But I am sure the gentleman has noticed that we have increased the reserve forces by some 58,000 men.

Mr. GONZALEZ. Yes.

Mr. HEBERT. And as we move down the lane further in the future, we have to realize that the area of personnel now demands 55 percent of the budget.

So if we make a strong regular cadre out of the active military, and have a strong reserve force that can be called up quickly, and functions properly, then we can save a great amount of money, and still have the capability and the ability to rally these forces.

I believe that the committee has taken that into consideration, and is following in line with what not only the Army has recommended, but also the Air Force and Navy.

Mr. GONZALEZ. Mr. Chairman, may I say that that makes sense, and I thank the gentleman for his reply. I trust that the gentleman through his leadership will help us avoid at this point in our national history the same sad and tragic errors that we have made twice before, when we stripped ourselves of our defense capabilities only to find ourselves in an emergency, and then having to do everything we could so as to procure the equipment that was needed.

In other words, if the gentleman will recall, after World War I and after World War II and after Korea, we did disengage, and we did reduce, but history has shown that we reduced a little bit too fast, and too foolishly.

I hope we do not do the same thing this time. I am very hopeful that under the gentlemen's leadership it will not happen this time.

Mr. HÉBERT. I will say to the gentleman from Texas it is certainly refreshing and reassuring for me to hear his remarks. I only wish that the spirit of those remarks and their logic and their full impact would spread more widely, not only in the Congress here, and in the House in which we serve, but throughout the country.

The situation has not changed at all. The Russians know only one language—only one language and no other. That language is strength. We must maintain our strength. We cannot go to the table to negotiate unless we have the backup strength.

This bill gives us the opportunity of holding that strength, although I personally would like to go even beyond the bill in some areas. Consider that our Navy has dropped in the number of ships by hundreds the ships in our Navy are, on the average, far older than the ships in the Russian navy. This is a horrible situation in which we find ourselves, and it is very annoying—which is about the only word I can use—to hear people strongly cry out for a reduction in our forces when we are doing the best we can to maintain this Nation. Some cry out that too much money is being spent on defense but 55 percent is spent on manpower. Take away the 55 percent and we have comparatively little with which to buy new weapons.

I think the gentleman from Texas has expressed a sentiment which I only hope will be more widespread in this House and in this country.

Mr. GONZALEZ. I thank the chairman.

Mr. KAZEN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HÉBERT. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. KAZEN. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for the work he has done on this bill and for his attitude as far as our national defense is concerned. I, for one, think that we should not lower our guard. I fully agree with what the gentleman has said.

If we are to maintain our relationship in this world, we must remain strong, and I would hate to see anything cut from this bill that would weaken us in the face of possible adversaries in the future, because we cannot just turn the switch on at that time for that which we need and have everything that we need immediately. We have got to provide for it.

Let me ask the gentleman one question. What has happened to our flight training program under this bill here? Are we cutting off any of the flight training?

Mr. HÉBERT. No; we are not cutting off any of the flight training, we are also expanding the capability of the Reserve Air Forces by providing additional A-7D's which must go to the National Guard.

We also had to be very sensitive about another area. There are some individuals and some very fine people who believe in national defense as much as the gentleman from Texas and I do. There is a movement to sort of combine the training of the National Guard and the Air Reserve which, would destroy the Guard. We have to be very alert to that. We have to understand these things. They are well-meaning, well-intentioned people.

We hear voices raised on the floor against the bill, in offering amendments, but the same voices seem to cry out against every military item. I recognize that the voices are often the same; the forces are often the same, and the arguments are always the same. I have not seen a new one come over the horizon yet.

Mr. KAZEN. I thank the gentleman from Louisiana, and I intend to stand by him.

Ms. ABZUG. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HÉBERT. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Ms. ABZUG. Do you recognize the face, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. HÉBERT. I certainly recognize the voice.

Ms. ABZUG. I would suggest, Mr. Chairman, that obviously some of the voices that were raised did create some change in policies and attitudes with respect to the war in Vietnam and in Cambodia. Would the gentleman not agree?

Mr. HÉBERT. The gentlewoman did what?

Ms. ABZUG. Not I. People have changed their minds. Voices do change and faces do change.

What I would like to know is what is the purpose of the research and development proposals for the new maneuverable reentry vehicles popularly known, I believe, as MARV.

Mr. HÉBERT. Does the gentlewoman mean MIRV's?

Ms. ABZUG. No, MARV.

Mr. HÉBERT. In the area of research and development? I would be very happy to answer the gentlewoman's question, but as I have indicated I am going to leave that part of the program in the hands of the expert on our committee, the gentleman from Illinois (MELVIN PRICE), and I suggest to the gentlewoman when he rises that she address any question on research and development to him. The gentlewoman must keep in mind that the Armed Services Committee has a job to do and he does it well. The man in this area of responsibility is the gentleman from Illinois (MELVIN PRICE) and he will talk to the gentlewoman on this subject.

Mr. PRICE of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HÉBERT. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. PRICE of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, naturally this is an advancement of art in the weapons system. I think unless we do continue to advance and always have a secondary weapon we will be out of commission. The Soviet Union is pressing us pretty far in the area of the reentry vehicles. I think this indicates an advancement in the art.

Ms. ABZUG. If the gentleman will yield further, it was my understanding that kind of advancement in the art—and correct me if I am wrong—would seem to indicate a new strategy with respect to our program and policy. I understood always it was a deterrent policy, and development of these other kinds of weapons actually represent a new strategy of a first strike capability rather than a deterrent strategy.

I would suggest we ought to keep ourselves strong in order to keep the peace, as the chairman of the committee indicated before, and that kind of strategy would seem to indicate we would be incorrect in increasing our strength and therefore also the probability of war and not of peace. When we first started manufacturing, after we did the research and development on the MIRV, the Soviet Union did not have these weapons. But once we started producing MIRV's, the Soviet Union started to develop MIRV's. We still have an enormous advantage over the Soviets in the development of these weapons—an advance of 5 years or so. But if we are to start a new program of weapons with increased counterforce capabilities, we will only be encouraging the Soviet Union to keep up with us, thereby accelerating the nuclear arms race. There is no reason in the world for increasing our counterforce capabilities except to achieve a first-strike capability. And if that is our goal and we are, in fact, reversing our policy of nuclear deterrence, should we adopt such a radical departure in policy in an authorization bill, without giving the Members of Congress an opportunity to focus on this and to discuss it more fully? Will the gentleman explain that?

Mr. HÉBERT. I will explain it. This is an authorization, not an appropriation.

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It is a proper place for Congress to make policy. That goes not to research and development, but to the logic of the situation. Are we going to stand by and just twiddle our thumbs and let the Russians advance? We know they are making a great deal of progress in research and development, at a greater rate than we have ever made in our history; we know they are not hampered nor contained by the restrictions and by the attacks which restrain us and by the money values which restrict us.

We never thought the Russians had the MIRV, except those of us who make this our business, and the individuals who are on the side of the gentlewoman often told us the Russians did not have the MIRV and would not have them. Immediately after the SALT agreement, we found the Russians did have the MIRV. We know the Russians are advancing so fast we have to make the most of our progress and prevent them trying to do anything to us. This is policy; and it is something the House decides and properly so, and something which is in the full area of the authorization Committee on Armed Services and we accept that responsibility and we will do everything we can to help the House carry out its grave duties to national defense.

We will leave no stone unturned. We will not falter. We will not hesitate to keep America the first Nation in the world.

Ms. ABZUG. But is it not true that our policy has been one of utilizing nuclear power as a deterrent, and not as an offensive or first-strike weapon?

Mr. HÉBERT. I can say that is true and that is the reason we have not had a nuclear war, because nuclear power is a deterrent. The Russians have nuclear weapons and we have them. If they throw first or we throw first, either nation will be destroyed.

Mr. PRICE of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HÉBERT. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. PRICE of Illinois. That is exactly true. The weapon the gentlewoman from New York referred to is a deterrent weapon, not a first-strike weapon. It is being developed to meet the capability that we now know the Soviets have.

Ms. ABZUG. I think the gentleman is in error. Even Secretary Schlesinger has concluded—and stated in his testimony—that we now have greater operational counterforce capability than the Soviets have. And the Secretary has indicated that this and other items in the research and development budget are really intended to be used to increase further the accuracy and yield of these weapons in order to enable us to target on Soviet missile silos and other hardened military installments and not merely on cities and soft military targets. These new weapons are aimed at enabling us to destroy the Soviet retaliatory force. Is this not why the authorization for these new missiles is requested?

Mr. Chairman, my chief objection to this military procurement bill is that it moves the country away from peace and toward war. It increases not just our ex-

penditures for war, but also the likelihood that war will occur.

The new direction of the Department of Defense can only be viewed by the rest of the world as conversion to a Department of Offense. The preparations contemplated in the Pentagon budget are difficult to interpret as defensive.

At the outset, the Pentagon proposes to spend an alltime high of some \$94 billion, of which today's \$22 billion is only a small part. After other wars, the military budget has been drastically reduced; this time, with the Asian war supposedly ended, we are asked to increase the expenditures by some \$8 billion, or 9.4 percent. Why? When even the Secretary of Defense concedes that this is "the first budget in a decade or more that does not include support of U.S. forces in combat." It is also a budget that would gobble up 44 percent of all Federal spending.

The Secretary and Chairman MAHON have quite frankly justified the inclusion of \$5 to \$6 billion simply to stimulate our sinking economy. Yet a Department of Labor study in 1972 shows that in reality, more jobs could be derived from transferring military funds to education, health, and other social service programs at the State and local level. Further, these jobs would become available not just to highly skilled persons but to the low-income, low-skilled workers who are hardest hit by unemployment. Military jobs on the contrary usually demand high technical skills.

We must remember, too, that the end product of jobs produced by the military is pure waste. The planes and tanks and bombs and missiles produced by the thousands of workers are far beyond our legitimate defense needs. Either they are used in war—which has now become unthinkable—or they soon become obsolete and are scrapped. In either case, what a waste of resources, both human and inanimate, particularly when these resources could be invested, instead, in fulfilling so many socially desirable needs.

The very concept of investing more of our national resources, rather than less, into military machinery at this time is indefensible. It cannot be justified on any grounds—military, economic, or social. There is, moreover, more than a touch of irony in the present Pentagon request, coming, as it does, from the administration that promised us prosperity with peace.

Even so conservative an institution as the First National City Bank of New York warns that increased military spending—

Could be an inflationary stimulus to an economy that has already started on the road to recovery . . . historically, it has seldom proved good economics to give an economy a fiscal shot in the arm by upping defense outlays.

But there are even more serious implications to this budget. The very manufacture and storage of nuclear and nerve weaponry—which it contemplates—endangers us all. If the general public were aware of the dangers we all live with daily, there would be a hue and cry that would drown out even the Pentagon lobby. The leakage of radiation and

deadly gases into our and air water, and the danger of massive accidents or malicious theft of materials, will accelerate as we continue to manufacture and test new and more lethal weapons. We talk about those programs as if we were discussing the construction of a new building: Is this or that weapon functional, does it fill a need? What need? We should rise up and declare an end to this dangerous waste.

We also are asked, in this bill, to increase the risk of confrontation. Negotiation is viewed as another form of combat. We are told we must develop even more lethal weapons as "bargaining chips." We must make the American presence ever more visible. I thought we had renounced the role of world policeman—but here we are asked to authorize a "stabilizing military presence" in the Indian Ocean, which has traditionally been a zone of peaceful commerce among nations.

We are asked to approve new land forces with new equipment; to expend our airlift capability; to continue supporting a dictatorship that allows oil interests a toe-hold in Asia. We are asked to approve more accurate nuclear warheads so that we can pinpoint our destructiveness not only on cities and missile silos but also upon a long list of other important assets.

There is reflected in this budget a completely new nuclear targeting strategy by providing funds for research and development of new missiles for fixed deployment and for terminally guided MARV's in order to give this country a first-strike capability. We are, in effect, reversing our long-standing policy of nuclear deterrence. This is a radical and dangerous move and one which will, I fear, provide a strong impetus to the nuclear arms race. The implications of this change in policy are earth-shattering. Yet we are asked to approve this about-face in foreign policy through a military authorization bill with many hidden items and without any real opportunity for the Members of Congress to discuss—or even to focus on—this issue. I, for one, am completely opposed to this new policy. Therefore, I plan to introduce an amendment which would delete all funds for research and development of counterforce weapons.

Another new philosophy reflected in the bill before us is the requirement in title VIII that all new major combatant vessels be nuclear powered—the provision for a nuclear Navy. The committee's proposal to retire prematurely our existing naval surface ships and to build all future major vessels with nuclear propulsion can only be characterized as a make-work welfare program for private shipyards.

Nuclear propulsion does, I concede, pay off in substantial added capability for our submarine fleet, but will add nothing to our surface fleet—nothing except substantial costs. By greatly increasing the costs of destroyers, frigates, and other fighting ships we will, in effect, reduce our naval capability as we can afford to build fewer of these surface vessels. I view this new policy as economically wasteful and self-defeating.

H 4018

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I cannot emphasize too strongly that, despite all our rhetoric about arms limitations agreements, we are accelerating the nuclear arms race. This is a confrontation budget. How can we be pretending to be seriously negotiating for peace or for new SALT agreements when we are pouring more and more funds into more and newer weapons? Secretary Schlesinger claims that the development of new weaponry—and particularly new counterforce programs—are essential to a strong bargaining position at the SALT talks. But we are now years ahead of the Soviet Union in nuclear weaponry.

Make no mistake: the new counterforce strategy is a belligerent stance. We are asked—in title VIII of the bill—“to modernize the strike forces of the U.S. Navy by the construction of nuclear powered major combatant vessels * * *.” Whom do we expect to strike? to combat? In such phrases is reflected the entire mentality of the new counterforce strategy.

According to a group of former Defense officials headed by former Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul C. Warnke.

We are today the strongest military power in history . . . the U.S. has been about five years ahead of the Soviets in the development of MIRV's, multiple warheads which can be aimed at separate targets, and will continue to lead them in the number of missile warheads well into the 1980's no matter what the Russians do. Nevertheless, we are moving on to the next generations of nuclear warheads without waiting to see whether this dangerous and expensive race can be halted.

. . . Our true national security is neither measured nor insured by tanks, planes, missiles, warships and armed men but by the fundamental strength, unity and confidence of our people in our institutions; our economy and our society. We do not protect but endanger that real security by excessive military spending.

I agree.

(Ms. ABZUG asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)

Mr. HÉBERT. I will answer that. Every effort we make in this field, any research and development, any construction, any production, is aimed at one objective and that is to keep America No. 1. As far as the Committee on Armed Services is concerned, it will do everything it can to keep this Nation first and to assure the Soviets do not achieve an unacceptable technological advantage over us.

Mr. Chairman, I have yielded long enough.

Mr. EVINS of Tennessee. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HÉBERT. I yield to the gentleman from Tennessee.

Mr. EVINS of Tennessee. I wonder if the very able chairman can tell me what the possibility is for the Navy Fighting Fleet to be nuclear powered, in view of the great requirement in the consumption of oil by the Navy; what is the possibility of our Navy having complete nuclear power?

Mr. HÉBERT. If this bill is passed and signed by the President, there is not just the possibility, but it is there. Keep in mind, it has been the Congress, and

particularly the House Committee on Armed Services that has compelled the nuclearization of the Navy, from the Polaris on.

Now again we find evidence of slippage whereby nuclear power is being shoved aside. Under the new title VIII we have in the bill, every major Navy combat vessel in the future must have nuclear power. Major combat vessel means, according to the bill, all submarines, all ships that run with a carrier navy, including the carrier and all of its escorts, and all of strike forces where independent, high-speed operations will be of military significance.

We certainly cannot have a Cadillac running down the street with all its guns, followed by horses carrying bows and arrows. The Navy will follow along with nuclear construction.

Mr. EVINS of Tennessee. I thank the gentleman and I think his policy should be followed by the Congress.

Mr. JOHNSON of Colorado. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HÉBERT. I yield to the gentleman from Colorado.

Mr. JOHNSON of Colorado. During the Korean conflict, I flew jets in the Marine Corps. I flew an old type of plane that was not very compatible with the time. It did not have the safety devices that it should have. I have always been resentful of the fact that several of my friends were killed because these planes did not have the proper equipment that planes of that time should have had.

I felt that the Congress was derelict in its duties.

I have a question on the F-111. When the Air Force itself does not want the F-111, it is very hard for me to understand why Congress insists that it should have it. I do not know whether the safety provisions of this aircraft have been perfected; but for several years it was not safe to fly it. This is the second year the committee has insisted that the production lines be kept open, when the Air Force says it did not want it.

I would like to have that explained from the report.

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Chairman, the language describes it. The fact the Air Force did not ask for it was because they were constrained by the budgetary limitations and they had to put priorities on what they could get.

Now, as far as the F-111 is concerned, any flyer that has flown the F-111 will tell anyone that it is one of the greatest planes we ever had. It is a plane that has been developed out of the very odious beginnings of the TFX. The FB-111 version is only an interim manned bomber. That is why we have to keep the lines open. For years I fought Secretary McNamara to put a new manned bomber in the air.

He insisted that he did not want any. As a result, there has not been a B-52 constructed in over 15 years. We cannot have this happen; that the B-52 should wear out before the B-1 comes along. Then, we would have nothing.

All the F-111 does is keep that spread open until the B-1 becomes a part of the inventory. It cannot come into the in-

ventory until 1981. There are three prototypes in the B-1 now. We will give them another prototype B-1 this year and give them a fifth prototype before a decision on production will be made. I hope it will be made.

Referring back again to the gentleman's observation about the Marines and the lack of safety, this is what we are trying to correct. We realize these shortcomings. This is why we are trying to put into the hands of our forces the proper instruments of war and the most advanced airplanes.

Mr. JOHNSON of Colorado. Mr. Chairman, if the chairman will yield further, the committee report says:

The committee was advised that current plans contemplate that a substantial number of the earlier F-111s be converted to electronic warfare configuration.

I was wondering why we need to do that.

Mr. HÉBERT. Keep in mind that we cannot go in and take an airplane off the shelf. We do not keep them in stock like shoes or things like that. It takes us a minimum of 5 years from the drawing board to the air. We are going to have a fight again on the B-1 on the floor before this bill is over. I hope its opponents do not prevail. There are so many things we have seen prevail. The antimilitaristic spirit is so up; the antidefense spirit is so up, that I am not amazed at anything that happens in this body.

I am trying to warn this body and tell this body exactly what we need.

Mr. McCLODY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. McCLODY. Mr. Chairman, I have in my district, as the gentleman knows, the Naval Training Center at Great Lakes. I am particularly interested in authorization for the Navy.

It has been my view that funds for the Trident submarine can really, in the long run, provide economies for the country. In other words, it can in the long run enable us to eliminate some of our overseas military bases and return a number of our men from overseas.

Would the gentleman confirm that concept?

Mr. HÉBERT. Yes, and there is another area in which an attack will be made on this floor before this bill is passed, to cut down Trident. Another attack will be made in the Senate on the same subject. That is why I tried to point out again that all these attacks will be made by the same individuals who attack everything.

Mr. McCLODY. The Trident, then, will not only enhance our military strength, but at the same time, in the long run provide economies in our defense posture which can provide savings in the future?

Mr. HÉBERT. There is the advantage. It is the advanced submarine weapon. But keep in mind, as regards the troops overseas, that the Trident is a strategic weapon. It is needed independent of the need for forward deployed conventional forces.

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Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, will the distinguished chairman of the committee yield?

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, responding to the gentleman from Colorado (Mr. JOHNSON) who raised the question with regard to the F-111, I would like to say that I was the member of the committee who offered the amendment to add the F-111 to the bill.

I would like to simply say that I concur with what the chairman has said about this airplane. There is no question about the fact that the Air Force wanted it, but the restraints that exist in the Pentagon made it impossible for the Air Force to come out and include it in their request.

We have three basic reasons for it, as the chairman has indicated. First of all, it is one of the very few planes, I think—as far as the Air Force is concerned, the only aircraft—this country has developed in the last 15 to 20 years, which can perform a strategic mission, while the Russians have developed some three or four. All the bugs have been worked out and the F-111 is flying spectacularly. It would be shameful to turn off the production line.

The several electronic aircraft that are now being developed have been taken out of the basic four wings of the F-111 for the Air Force because it is such a terrific plane and performs well in the electronic role. The Air Force schedule itself included no planes to replace those taken out for electronic purposes.

And by continuing the production line for another year we provide both planes, so they will fill out the men required for four wings of F-111's.

Mr. Chairman, the second point, as the chairman has already indicated very eloquently, is that this is the only kind of aircraft that can qualify as an interim manned bomber. The B-1 has been delayed for years. The cost is estimated very conservatively; and if for some reason the B-1 should not be approved by Congress as a bomber, the FB-111 can perform almost all of the jobs that the B-1 can do. Therefore, we ought to keep it going, at least until we make a decision about the B-1.

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HÉBERT. I yield to the gentleman from Alabama.

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I would just like to add one factor that was not mentioned by the distinguished gentleman from New York on the other side, to put the shoe on the other foot. Those of us who have some skepticism, some doubts as to whether or not we will buy the B-1 when that time comes, if we, in fact, allow the line to be closed down on the FB-111, then we will have no option; and it does not make any difference what the B-1 costs. If it is \$100 million per copy, we will have absolutely no option, because if this one is closed down, we can never again crank it up to get it back on the job. So this allows us an option when we come to decide

whether or not to buy the B-1 and then does not put us in a position where we have absolutely no choice at all.

Mr. WHITEHURST. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HÉBERT. I will be happy to yield to the gentleman from Virginia.

Mr. WHITEHURST. Mr. Chairman, I just want to make a comment on the F-111. If anyone in this body or in this country thinks the airplane is deficient in what it will do, it is significant to me that 2 years ago when SALT I negotiations were going on, this is the one airplane in our inventory that the Russians wanted to include in the SALT agreement, so we know what they think of it.

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman has indicated in the discussion, in the colloquy and exchange of thoughts, again how important it is to have the essential weaponry to go to the table and talk about reduction in arms. This we must have. Indeed, this is one of the reasons we cannot reduce our troops in Europe at this time. We want to reduce the troops; of course, we do, but we cannot tell the Russians that we are going to reduce them and have the Russians say, "So you are going to reduce the troops. What can we talk about?"

Mr. Chairman, this is one of the things I tried to point out the other day. These things were fought in this body and fought bitterly; and if we had to survive on one of those counts, we would not have had any SALT talks at all.

I repeat and reemphasize again that the only language the Russians know and understand is strength. That is the only thing they know, strength, and we must have that strength and that muscle if we want to survive.

Mr. BRAY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

(Mr. BRAY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BRAY. Mr. Chairman, the bill that the committee brings to the floor of the House today is necessary to provide the weapons systems, the research and development and the personnel strengths of the Armed Forces. The Committee on Armed Services has worked its will on this legislation, making reductions of more than \$800 million and additions of more than \$300 million and making substantial changes in the Reserve and civilian personnel strengths requested by the military departments.

The chairman of the committee has explained the highlights of the bill. And the leaders of our subcommittees will explain in more detail some of the specific actions on research and development, manpower levels, and ship construction.

Rather than repeating the details of the bill that will be covered by others, I would like to depart from tradition and use my time to discuss some of the major aspects of world conditions which make such legislation necessary. One thing that I am deeply concerned about is the basis on which Members determine their vote on this bill and particularly on some amendments which will be offered.

We Americans are people who like to feel that we control our destiny. It is,

therefore, not surprising that some Members, with the best of motives, make their judgment on the Defense budget on the basis of things we can control.

References are made to domestic needs and to the desire to give domestic programs priority. One of our "Dear Colleague" letters tells us that we should treat military authorizations "in the same manner as other Government programs." Attempts are made to set the level of authorization according to some amounts that were spent in the past plus an allowance for inflation.

But the simple fact is that our defense needs, and therefore our authorization requirements, are driven by factors that we cannot control.

It is nice to say that Defense spending should be treated "in the same manner" as other Government programs. But it is essentially a meaningless statement. The fact that you could, in a given year, reduce spending on the Commerce Department because of developments in the business community does not mean that you can reduce spending on Defense in a similar period. Defense spending is governed by needs relating to the world situation and the actions of potential adversaries and simply cannot be based on happenings on the domestic scene.

One of the letters that has been sent to Members of Congress in connection with this bill says that defense expenditures can be held down because of the improvement in international relations. It is a great mystery to me how anyone can look at events of the past year and conclude that international developments have been so favorable as to allow us to reduce our commitments to national defense. There has been, in the past year:

The October war in the Middle East where the Soviets showed how much respect they have for détente;

The Soviet testing of MIRV missiles; The political instability of Western European governments.

Among the major democracies of Western Europe, there is virtually no government left that has been in office more than 6 months. This demands, more than ever, steadfastness on the part of the United States.

SOVIET DEVELOPMENTS

The Soviets have been engaged in an unprecedented drive to achieve clear superiority in strategic weapons.

SALT I was based upon a balancing of technological advantages of the United States and the quantitative advantages possessed by the Soviet Union. SALT I limited the number of missiles in an attempt to stop the pace of Soviet deployments. In so doing, SALT I institutionalized the numerical advantage of the Soviets. We were able to accept this numerical advantage because we had a clear technological advantage through having the MIRV capability and greater accuracy.

SALT I, however, while it limited the number of missiles on each side, did not place any limit on research and development. The Soviets thus have had the option to try to catch up with us technologically, though we are prevented from matching them numerically.

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If the Soviets truly look upon SALT I as a stabilizing development and if they truly wish to lessen world tension and slow down the arms race, they should curtail their strategic developments.

The opposite, however, has been true. Soviet development of strategic systems has been going forward at a frightening rate. Four new ICBM designs of varying sizes and characteristics are currently being flight-tested by the Soviets. Of the four, three have now been tested with MIRV's. These new systems incorporate improved guidance and reentry techniques.

One of the characteristics of the Soviet missile flight tests last summer was that they made use of onboard computers for the first time. This means that they will be able to achieve greater accuracy in their MIRV'd warheads.

The Soviets thus are successfully developing the capabilities which will allow them to match the technological advantages of the United States. If they marry these technological capabilities with the considerable advantage in the number and throw weight of their missiles, a serious strategic imbalance will occur.

Unless we are prepared to offset these gains, the Soviets could, by the decade of the 1980's be in a position to have an overwhelming strategic advantage, an advantage which could upset the nature of the world we live in. It is important to remember the psychological effect of such an advantage. Just by having such power, they could greatly increase their influence in the world.

What SALT II negotiations are all about, really, is to prevent the marrying of these newly acquired Soviet techniques to the existing Soviet nuclear advantage. But if the Soviets do not see that we are prepared to continue developments to offset their technological advancements, there will be no incentive to them to negotiate at SALT II. It is, therefore, simply absolutely necessary that we continue a vigorous research and development program and continue to maintain the ability to improve our weapons systems so that we do not lose ground to the Soviets.

SLBM'S AND MOBILE MISSILES

The Soviets have also continued the rapid modernization of their submarine-launched ballistic missile force. The SS-N-8 missile aboard the Delta-class submarine has a range of 4,200 nautical miles. The SS-N-6 missile deployed aboard the Yankee-class submarine has been improved, and a version of the missile with a multiple-reentry vehicle appears to be ready for deployment.

One of the four new missiles being developed by the Soviets, the SS-X-16, which has a range of over 5,000 nautical miles, is being developed in such a manner as to indicate the Soviets are considering deploying it as a land-based mobile ICBM. The United States in the SALT agreements stated unilaterally that deployment of a land-mobile ICBM would be inconsistent with strategic arms limitation objectives. But the U.S.S.R. did not agree on any objectives concerning mobile ICBM's. And the treaty does not prohibit development and testing of a

mobile system. The SS-X-16 could be deployed in 1975.

THE CHANGING BALANCE

Ten years ago the United States had an advantage in delivery vehicles—ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers and bombers—of over 2,000. The U.S.S.R. has now totally eliminated our lead and has surpassed us in delivery vehicles.

Ten years ago the United States had five times the available megatonnage as the U.S.S.R. The Soviets have long since taken a substantial lead.

The only remaining quantitative lead of the United States is in strategic offensive warheads and bombers. The United States is expected to maintain this lead through the decade of the 1970's; but as the U.S.S.R. develops its new family of ICBM's, with their larger throw weight and MIRV's, it will give the Soviets the potential to overcome the last remaining quantitative missile lead of the United States.

NO NEW U.S. SYSTEMS

Members of the House should be reminded that the bill before you provides for no new major weapons systems. The strategic systems developments that are carried forward by this bill—the Trident and the B-1—are systems that have been in development for several years. In the case of the B-1 it has been many years. We are not building new strategic missiles, or increasing the number of our missiles, or digging new silos. We are simply continuing a comparatively modest R. & D. effort on the systems to make sure of their continued capabilities in the years ahead.

One of our problems is that we spend more time studying and talking about weapons systems than building them. The Soviets do not talk about weapons development much—they just build weapons.

We have been debating about a new manned bomber for over 10 years. And the B-1 will still not be ready for several years. The Soviets, meanwhile, have built a new bomber, the Backfire, which is expected to be deployed this year. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff told our committee that when deployed with refueling tankers, the Backfire "constitutes a potential threat to the continental United States."

The B-1 is expected to be superior to the Backfire. But the B-1 is still in development. The Backfire is ready for deployment.

CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS

Surely it is axiomatic that in a time of nuclear parity conventional capability increases in importance.

Since there is no way that we could match the Soviets or other potential adversaries in manpower, it is important, if our forces are going to be a deterrent to conventional conflict, that we have weapons of the quantity and quality necessary to deter aggressive action.

But do not get the impression that this bill allows us to develop conventional weapons at anywhere near the pace of the Soviets.

Last fall I was privileged to be the ranking minority member on a subcom-

mittee that toured the battlefields of the Middle East. Probably never before in history has a congressional subcommittee visited a battlefield so soon after the conflict. The litter of war was still visible in the Sinai. Egypt was still in a state of readiness that included blackouts at night in Cairo.

On one stretch of desert we saw more destroyed tanks within a half-mile than the United States can produce in a year. The Arab nations lost thousands of tanks in that war. But in a few months after the cease fire, the Russians had resupplied the Arabs to the extent of virtually all of their losses.

The numbers and speed with which the Soviets poured missiles, tanks and other weapons into the Middle East was a development unmatched in history.

We know we can produce as good or better weapons than the Soviets. But we cannot produce them in the quantities the Soviets turn out. We have only one producer of tanks in the United States. We have only one producer of tank turrets.

We must, therefore, keep our forces supplied with modern weapons. We must keep the quality of our weapons on a par with those of the Soviets.

So do not be lulled by statistics about economic considerations. Whether you like it or not, it is what happens in the rest of the world—that happens in Russia—that dictates how much defense you must provide for the United States.

The bill before you today is designed to provide the defense our country needs. It does no more. I urge all Members to support it.

Mr. HEBERT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. PRICE).

(Mr. PRICE of Illinois asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. PRICE of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, the fiscal year 1975 authorization request for \$9,325,039,000 is the largest amount, in actual dollars, ever requested by the Department of Defense for research, development, test, and evaluation. Some people—without probing any further—would contend that this spending level is excessive for Defense research. There are many demands being placed upon our economy and this level of Defense spending is of grave concern.

However, there is even a greater concern that must be addressed, that of delineating the kind of R. & D. program that is essential for our national defense.

Mr. Chairman, having served as a member of the Armed Services Committee since its organization in 1947, and as chairman of the Research and Development Subcommittee for over 10 years, I can realize and appreciate the importance of research and development to our military strength and national security.

Unpleasant as a memory can be, many of us here today can remember those tragic days in the history of mankind on August 6 and August 9, 1945, when the awesome power of technology and its relationship to military strength was demonstrated. Since then, technological advances have taken even greater

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strides. Developments such as the high-energy laser, among others, will make tomorrow's national security even more dependent upon technology.

I am not a believer in legislating or spending through fear. However, we must face up to the current world situation and gear out policymaking accordingly. The Governments of Italy, Britain, France, Canada, and West Germany have all been subjected to varying degrees of turbulence.

The status of our naval fleet has fallen very nearly to the cross-over point—that point where the technology balance is changed to our disadvantage. The Middle East conflict, the limited progress of SALT II and other factors lead me to believe that while a \$9 billion research budget may be very high—it is a relative bargain—a cheap price to pay—for freedom.

Mr. Chairman, this belief does not preclude the vigilance required by our committee to insure the authorization of an effective R.D.T. & E. program at the lowest possible cost. As the architects of our research program, the Department of Defense has done a credible job. They are not, and can not, be expected to be perfect. They have the same internal management weaknesses that are characteristic of any body of this size. For this, among other reasons, the Research and Development Subcommittee examined over 3,000 individual programs and projects in the fiscal year 1975 authorization request.

The programs were discussed at varying lengths with Defense witnesses during the 30 hearings that were held by the subcommittee. During the hearings the committee assessed the requirement or need for each weapon system development program, program progress, the Department of Defense course of action and the possibility of using lower cost alternatives.

The arguments concerning the continued use of the B-52 or developing a stretched version of the FB-111 in lieu of the costly B-1 were again thoroughly assessed. The committee considered the results of studies conducted by the General Accounting Office and others, and used these and other input in the overall decisionmaking process. The committee concluded that new Soviet advances and developments preclude the use of less expensive, less capable alternatives in lieu of the B-1, Trident, and several major strategic tactical systems presently being developed.

The result of the extensive hearings was a 3.5-percent reduction in the request—a reduction of \$323,376,000 from the \$9,325,039,000 request. The amount approved for authorization by the Armed Services Committee for R.D.T. & E. is \$9,001,663,000.

I wish to emphasize, Mr. Chairman, that the reduction was the result, and not the prescribed goal. A meaningful R.D.T. & E. program necessary to insure our national defense was the committee's objective.

During the committee's markup of this bill, several amendments were offered which would have a significant, long-term impact upon the ability of this Na-

tion to underwrite its strategy of deterrence. The authors of these amendments have indicated that they would offer the same amendments on the House floor.

One of the amendments offered would be to delete the entire amount included in the bill for the development of the B-1 bomber. The rationale for this amendment as described in the committee report certainly has substance: The B-1 program has experienced cost overruns, schedule slippage, and some performance degradation. What we must ask ourselves, however, is—does this Nation need a manned strategic bomber?

Today—right now—the Soviets have a manned strategic bomber with performance characteristics that are not widely apart from those of our planned B-1. Yes, there are two other legs of the triad, but are we content to be second best on the third?

Beyond the thought of a nuclear confrontation, have we forgotten the effectiveness of the bomber during the Southeast Asia conflict?

As a nation we are committed to a policy of non-first aggression; however, inevitably and unavoidably, in the absence of clairvoyance, this nation must be prepared to fight almost every kind of war that could be thrust upon us. Unpalatable as it may be, Mr. Chairman, we are compelled to keep up with the Joneses—as long as our potential enemies have a strategic bomber, so must we.

In the committee report, my distinguished and dedicated colleague from New York has called the B-1 a "sick program"—and that it has been. But will the financial euthanasia that puts it out of its misery make us, as a nation, any healthier? I think not.

We must admonish the Air Force and take the necessary action to insure against subsequent ineffective management. Killing the B-1 may be an answer to the problem, but it certainly is not the solution.

I urge the Members of the House to think hard and long before adopting any proposed amendment. The question that must be resolved in every instance is—will the proposed amendment, if adopted, compromise in any way our ability to deter. This is not a rhetorical question, but is the gut issue which underlies every amendment.

I also urge the Members to exercise caution in arriving at decisions that are based solely on cost or program slippage.

In my many years with the Research and Development Subcommittee, I have come to realize that research and development never has and never will be perfect. Failure is inherent in the process. It is part of the learning process that leads to success. I would like to paraphrase a distinguished member of the Armed Services Committee in the other body, who described the research and development request as the "most difficult part to understand and examine."

We authorize the expenditure of millions—and in some cases—billions of dollars with the expectation that the technology will culminate in an operational, deployable, effective system. Then, only in a time of crisis do we tend to appreciate it.

Mr. Chairman, and Members of the House, I urge you to consider:

Whether deletion of funds for binary chemical munitions will help or hinder the arms control and disarmament negotiation talks; can one bargain in the absence of bargaining chips?

Whether deferral or stretchout of the Trident program will be the final step that permits the Soviets to change the balance of our technology to our disadvantage;

Whether in light of the current state of world affairs, coupled with the strength of the Warsaw Pact nations and the weaknesses of our NATO allies, we can call to a halt our air defense programs, such as SAM-D;

Whether in light of the limited progress of SALT II, we can reduce the present lead we now hold in ballistic missile defense; and

Whether this Nation is content with a 20-year-old bomber for the 1980 time frame.

Mr. Chairman, I do not wish to dwell on how hard our committee worked on the Defense request. We are expected to work hard. The point I wish to make is that many hours of pondering, assessment, and discussion went into the decisionmaking process.

I stated earlier that the Department of Defense was not perfect. Neither is the Congress. We, too, are capable of capricious and irresponsible action. With this awareness, we strive to avoid such action and I urge the Members to share this awareness here today.

I ask you further to recall the words of President Kennedy in his inaugural address. He said:

We dare not tempt them with weakness. For only when our arms are beyond doubt can we be certain beyond doubt that they will never be deployed.

Mr. Chairman, I ask the Members of the House to support the R.D.T. & E. portion of this bill as reported by the Committee on Armed Services.

Mr. HÉBERT. I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. FISHER).

Mr. FISHER. Mr. Chairman, I want to address myself generally to titles III, IV, V, and VI of the bill. This is the portion relating to manpower and training. It was my pleasure to chair the subcommittee which considered these sections of the bill. We spent 6 weeks in intensive hearings on this subject alone. For 1 week of the hearings we had the pleasure of holding joint hearings with the Manpower Subcommittee of the Post Office and Civil Service Committee when we reviewed the Department of Defense request for civilian personnel. Various members of the subcommittee will tell our actions on the four titles of the bill; however, I want to present just a brief overview.

At the outset let me tell you what our overall recommendations are: For the active forces, we are recommending the numbers which were requested except for the Air Force where we recommend reducing the strength by 2,810 and ending up with a total active force end strength of 2,149,313. This is a reduction from that authorized for fiscal year 1974 of 40,589.

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For the Reserve forces, we made numerous changes from the request and authorized an average Selected Reserve strength of 946,019. This is 22,026 more than authorized for fiscal year 1974. For civilian manpower, we reduced the total requested by 15,000, the reduction to be allocated by the Secretary of Defense. In the training load title, we changed it in two instances to reflect the change we made in the Reserve strengths.

Thus, we end up with a total military force consisting of active forces and Selected Reserve forces of approximately 15,737 less than were authorized for fiscal year 1974. In the civilian personnel area, we are recommending authorization for approximately 1,012,000 as contrasted that budgeted for in the fiscal year 1974 budget and supplemental of 1,029,000. The total reduction then is in the nature of 32,753 in these three categories.

For the active duty forces this represents an end strength of 2,149,313. This is 40,589 fewer personnel than were authorized for fiscal year 1974. To put these figures in perspective the recommended end strength is 538,000 lower than the strength at the end of fiscal year 1964, a pre-Vietnam year; 1,399,000 lower than fiscal year 1968, the peak of the Vietnam war; and 84,000 lower than the fiscal year 1974 strength requested in the President's budget submitted to the Congress in January 1973.

It is my understanding that later on this afternoon when the bill is open for amendments there will be an amendment to reduce the size of our Active Forces by approximately 200,000. Frankly, I can find no connection between these arbitrary reductions and any alternative strategy for the protection of this Nation. I do know, however, that any reductions would seriously jeopardize our national security. It is clear that a strength reduction of this magnitude would require reductions in combat units. As a preliminary estimate, actions of the following order would have to be taken:

For the Army you would have to reduce the number of active divisions programmed for fiscal year 1975 by 2 1/2 divisions.

For the Navy we would have to reduce the number of active combatant ships by the equivalent of two carrier task groups.

For the Marine Corps we would have to inactivate five infantry battalions and supporting arms.

For the Air Force this would require elimination of additional strategic defensive squadrons and many tactical fighter and airlift units.

We are already short of both airlift and tactical units to meet many of the war contingency plans as determined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I am firmly convinced that the services have responded to the will of the Congress and are making substantial progress in reducing the fat and increasing the muscle. Headquarters are being reduced and eliminated and personnel are being transferred to combat units.

We will have at the end of fiscal year 1975, 105 fewer general officers than we had in 1969—or 63 fewer than we had in fiscal year 1964. We plan to have 13.8

percent fewer colonels and Navy captains; 23.5 percent fewer lieutenant colonels and commanders; 24.7 percent fewer majors and lieutenant commanders, and 32.1 percent fewer captains or Navy lieutenants at the end of fiscal year 1975 than we had at the end of fiscal year 1969.

By the end of fiscal year 1975 the officer force will have been reduced by almost one-third, or about 124,000 officers, from the Vietnam peak. The changes between fiscal year 1973 and 1975 positions show their efforts to control the officer content. One out of every four military spaces eliminated during fiscal years 1974 and 1975 will be an officer space. In fiscal year 1975, almost half of the eliminated spaces will be officer spaces. The effect is shown in the trend of the number of enlisted personnel per officer, which rises from 6 in fiscal year 1973 to 6.3 in fiscal year 1975.

They are moving in the right direction. For instance, within the framework of the 785,000 manpower authorized for the Army, they are working for a 16 division force by 1980. This compares with the 13 division force at the end of this fiscal year and the planned goal of 14 divisions by the end of fiscal year 1975.

For the Navy, the end strength is the lowest in 29 years and I will add that this reduction occurs over a time frame in which the total number of ships has increased by four, including one aircraft carrier.

The strength we are recommending for the Marine Corps is 384 more people than were authorized for fiscal year 1974. This represents a requirement for increased guards at our overseas embassies.

We recommend an authorization for the Air Force of a total of 627,121. This is 2,810 personnel less than were originally requested. It represents a decrease of 17,885 less than were authorized for fiscal year 1974. In our opinion, this additional decrease is warranted because testimony presented during our hearings indicate certain roles in the strategic airlift mission could be withdrawn from the Active Forces and given to the Air Force Reserve, with the resultant decrease in active personnel and an annual overall cost savings of approximately \$31 million.

In the area of our Reserve forces, I am extremely concerned about what is happening in the Pentagon at the present time. For example, the Secretary of Defense ordered a structure cut of 48,000 in the Army Reserve and National Guard while simultaneously ordering a study of roles and missions of the Reserve forces in the total force concept. It is our opinion that this structure cut at this time is like putting the cart before the horse. The roles and missions study should be completed and a Reserve force built to supplement the wartime requirements of the Active Forces—rather than taking arbitrary cuts before the study is completed.

We are extremely concerned too that equipment diversions to our Allies have left a severe shortage in the Reserves of tanks, tactical and airlift aircraft. If we are to be a prime supplier of equipment to our allies, we must arrange for direct

procurement of this equipment to our Reserves so the implementation of the total force policy can become a reality.

We rejected the request for a lessened Reserve Force at the time our active Forces are being reduced and added approximately 54,000 to the Reserve Forces. It must be pointed out, however, that the Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs in a second appearance before our committee adjusted the figures upward by approximately 40,000, claiming the Department of Defense had grossly underestimated recruiting capability in the Reserves.

Frankly, we do not want one more person in the Reserve structure than is required for mission accomplishment, but we strongly urge a Selected Reserve Force of sufficient strength to meet the requirements imposed upon them by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The cuts proposed will not allow this.

In my opinion, with friendly Allied governments falling from public favor, this is no time for us to weaken our defense structure.

Insofar as civilian personnel is concerned, it was a real pleasure working with my good friend and colleague, Dave Henderson, who is chairman of the Manpower Subcommittee of the Post Office and Civil Service Committee, and the members and staff of that subcommittee. As I said earlier, we reduced the DOD request for civilian personnel by 15,000 from that which was requested. By this action alone, we are effecting a cost savings of approximately \$185,000,000. We are firmly convinced that these reductions will not affect readiness or curtail the ongoing civilianization program. A more detailed statement will be presented later.

The training loads in this bill have been increased slightly to provide for nonprior accessions in the Marine Corps Reserves and the Army Reserves where we added to the requested strengths.

Frankly, both in the areas of civilian personnel and training loads, I personally am not convinced that they could not be better controlled by budgetary processes rather than establishing ceilings. However, by establishing such strengths through legislation we are able to have the legislative vehicle on which to annually review the total DOD request for manpower and training requirements.

Mr. Chairman, this completes my general overview of titles III, IV, V, and VI of this bill.

I urge the support of every Member of this House.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Texas has expired.

Mr. HEBERT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 additional minutes to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FISHER. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, I certainly want to commend the gentleman for the excellent manner in which he has carried on the review of manpower personnel levels, both during the current session and previous sessions of Congress.

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I think you did a very, very good job for the Air National Guard and for the reserve forces all over the United States. I think the actions of your subcommittee are going to result in economies in military manpower costs, and on behalf of those of us in the West, I thank the gentleman very much for his service.

Of course, obviously the gentleman will be retiring at the end of this term, and we want to thank him for the good work that he has done on the House Armed Services Committee. I think it has inured to the benefit of our defense posture.

Mr. FISHER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman very much. He favored us with his presence a time or two and contributed to our hearings. We appreciated that. He was very knowledgeable and very helpful.

Mr. GRAY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. DICKINSON).

(Mr. DICKINSON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased to be able to rise in support of H.R. 14592, the bill under discussion.

As the ranking member of our Subcommittee on Manpower, I want to echo the statements made by the distinguished chairman of the subcommittee, the Honorable O. C. FISHER, of Texas, who preceded me here in the well.

At this point I would also like to pay tribute to his excellent leadership during the years he headed this subcommittee. I am sure all of the Members know that this will be the last time he will bring the manpower portion of the yearly Defense Department authorization request to the floor, as he is retiring at the end of this Congress. The gentleman has been a real stalwart for the defense of this Nation; one whom we can lean on; one whom we can depend on. And I know that as he retires he retires with the thanks of all of us who are interested in a strong America.

I do not want to repeat what he has said about the bill or what others will say; therefore, I am going to confine my remarks to certain ancillary suggestions which directly relate to manpower in the armed services and anticipated amendments.

First, let me say we will commence holding hearings on the bill to admit women to the academies on May 29. I call this to your attention because that is the time to raise this issue, not during the discussion of this particular bill. This is a matter that is of vital interest to many of you but it is also a complex issue and one which should be thoroughly explored. I am hopeful that the House will not take precipitous action on the bill in this area when we vote tomorrow.

The second area relates to the numbers of colonels and lieutenant colonels or their Navy equivalents in the armed services. We have a bill proposed by the Department of Defense which would permit selective elimination from the armed services of certain colonels and lieutenant colonels who have been passed over for promotion but have a right under the current tenure laws to remain in the

service for 28 to 30 years. Plans are being made to hold hearings on this subject prior to the completion of this Congress. This bill is H.R. 1113 which would amend title 10, United States Code, to authorize the selective continuation of certain regular commissioned officers on the Active list of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force upon the recommendation of a selection board and for other purposes.

Third, in order to eliminate certain junior regular officers in the services, we also plan to hold hearings on H.R. 11745 which would amend title 10, United States Code, to provide the commissioned officer of the Army in regular grades below major may be involuntarily discharged to coincide with a reduction in force. This would help the Department of Defense to eliminate one officer for every enlisted man during fiscal year 1975. I think we would have accomplished these actions prior to bringing this bill to the floor had time permitted but, frankly, the nearly 3 months of hearings held on this particular bill by both the full committee and subcommittees meeting simultaneously have precluded our acting on these bills prior to now.

The reason I mention our future plans is to alert you of the actions we are about to take, and I hope you will give us the consideration of letting full scale hearings be held on this matter rather than taking quick action on the floor tomorrow when the bill is open for amendments.

Mr. Chairman, in my opinion, the services are moving in the direction in which the Congress desires them to move, and with your cooperation by permitting hearings on these vital subjects, we may be able during the remainder of this session to bring you the bills after they have been given careful consideration by the House Armed Services Committee. Today, however, I urge you to support the thoughtful committee action that has been taken by the Armed Services Committee.

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Mississippi (Mr. MONTGOMERY).

(Mr. MONTGOMERY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman, I thank the chairman of the committee for giving me this opportunity to talk to the Members briefly about one section of the bill.

I rise in support of H.R. 14592, and I wish to point out that I will limit my remarks to title IV, which deals with the reserve forces.

I would also like to commend my chairman of the subcommittee, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. FISHER), for the time and the patience that he has shown the members of the subcommittee in working on this section. I think we have come up with a very, very strong section, as far as the Reserve Forces are concerned. We spent 21 full days in the subcommittee working on title IV. This is the longest time our subcommittee has ever spent working on the manpower section of the bill. Most of the time or at least a good deal of the time was put into

the portions relating to the National Guard and the Reserve Forces.

I might say, Mr. Chairman, we have come up with a very, very strong section, as far as the National Guard and the Reserves is concerned. For the first time in my memory since I have been on this committee, we have raised the overall strengths of the Reserve Forces of this country not reduced them as recommended by the Defense Department.

Really this is a good "buy" for the taxpayers of this country. It was certainly proved in Israel that the Reserve Forces are a good buy. We can put a man with a rifle in the National Guard, and that man will cost us one-eighth, as far as cost to the taxpayer is concerned, of what it would cost to have a regular infantryman carrying a rifle in the Regular Forces. He might not be as good at first as the Regular, but time and equipment will bring him up to the standards of the Regulars.

So the Reserve and National Guard are good buys. As we move into a period of high expenses it will pay to rely more and more on these Reserve forces. We have done this and have increased the strengths despite what the Department of Defense wanted us to do. Thanks to our subcommittee chairman, Mr. FISHER, we have added new aircraft which will go to the Reserve and the Air National Guard. This aircraft consists of A-7's. This is the first time in a long, long time in a procurement bill that a reserve force has been given a new type of aircraft. We believe it is a step in the right direction.

If we want to get efficiency out of the Guard and the Reserves, we will have to give them good equipment, and, as I said, this is a step forward. The Army Guard and the Reserve need new tanks and modern tanks so that they can also update Army training as we improve the Air Guard and the Air Reserve.

As far as the Air Guard were concerned, we were requested by the Department of Defense to cut 14 Air Guard squadrons out of the T.O. and E. of the Air Guard. We found out that these units were efficient and could be put on active duty in 24 hours. They had better skilled mechanics than some of the regular Air Force had—4,500 trained Guardsmen would have to find other units to train with, so we locked them in with it so the regulars could not do away with these 14 air squadrons. Therefore there will now be 91 squadrons in the bill. This is a good move, our subcommittee thought.

Mr. LEGGETT. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MONTGOMERY. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. LEGGETT. I would like to say at this point the gentleman in the well has been a real sparkplug on the committee in achieving the goal he just described of the new revitalized A-7 mission for the Air Guard and, of course, maintaining at least 91 units around the country. This is a real economy, and it also saves the existing capability.

I wonder if there has been any indication on the part of the Air Force that they will carry through and if the recom-

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mendations of the committee are approved on the House floor and in conference, will the Air Force carry through and cooperate and give this new mission to the Air Guard?

Mr. MONTGOMERY. I certainly hope so. It is in the law. It is in the report and in the debate today. If they obey the law and have any respect for the Congress of the United States and the laws of the land, they will have to carry out this mandate.

Also the Air Reserve squadrons will be moved onto certain Air Force bases and participate with the regulars in flying the 141 transport plane. It will share the plane with the regular Air Force. This is another step forward in getting the Reserves into the total concept picture.

Mr. LEGGETT. The committee also recommended that the Guard give additional 130 capability. Is that correct?

Mr. MONTGOMERY. That is correct. My time is running out, but I would like to include the following remarks which emphasize my very strong support of the Reserve components.

I am extremely delighted with the actions taken by the Armed Services Committee in connection with the Reserves this year. On the other hand, I am totally dismayed by actions currently on-going in the Pentagon which would result in reducing the Reserve structure and lessening the effectiveness of our Reserve forces. This, to me, is appalling.

Let me illustrate the inconsistency within the Department of Defense in the area of the Reserve program. Earlier this year the Secretary of Defense proposed an arbitrary strength cut of 48,000 structure spaces in the Army National Guard and Army Reserve, with no clear conception of what units, or types of units, were to be eliminated. Simultaneously, with ordering this structure cut, he ordered a study of the roles and missions which should be assigned to the Guard and Reserve within the total force concept. Others have spoken to you about this apparent inconsistency, so I will not dwell on it.

But a second inconsistency exists. For the Active Forces, manpower requests are based on requirements. In the Reserves, however, the requests were built upon projections of recruiting capability—and, as admitted by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, these projections now prove to be completely erroneous. So, he revised the figures upward by some 30,000. In most instances we accepted his revised figures, and I will discuss our deviations from those figures in a moment. It appears to us, however, that manpower requests for both Active and Reserve Forces should be based on the same premise—and by that I mean requirements to fulfill mission responsibilities.

Still, an equally important inconsistency exists in Pentagon statements and Pentagon action on the Reserves and that is in the area of equipping the Guard and Reserve Forces. If the Reserve Forces are to become an important segment of our total force policy, they must be provided equipment equal to

that of the Active Forces or the concept of the total force policy is a mere deception.

I refer specifically to two areas of equipment—tanks and planes particularly. While the information on the adequacy of tanks in our Reserve Force is a classified matter, I can assure you that less than one-fourth of our tanks are in a usable condition. We must find ways to correct that condition. The airplanes assigned to our Reserve and National Guard Forces are becoming so obsolete that the Secretary of Defense is looking into the possibility of phasing out some flying units merely because of the obsolescence of the equipment. As you know, we have included in this bill 24 A7-D for direct entry into the Air National Guard. This should be an indication of congressional intention that actions must be undertaken to make the Guard and Reserve Forces a realistic portion of our defense forces.

In the Army Reserve we had testimony that the structure strength for the Army Reserves is presently established at 276,000. Using the 93 percent manning figure, a figure which has been used over the past several years, this would result in a desired strength of 260,000. On-going studies within the Army indicate that revised missions which will be assigned will increase the structure by 25,000 spaces. While we did not want to authorize a figure that would be unattainable, we did feel that we should maintain the Army Reserve strength at a 225,000 level, and to use that figure to build up to a required strength of 260,000 as required.

In the Naval Reserve, where the request was made for 108,000, we increased the strength to 117,000. We did so because the reductions requested were made solely for budgetary purposes and not because of lessened military missions.

We rejected the idea, too, that we should do away with all of the civil affairs units in category A status: that is, 48 drills per year and a 2-week summer training program. The Secretary of Defense would have transferred the 7,000 persons in civil affairs units to category D status which would provide only 2 weeks of summer training. We agree with the Secretary of Defense that 53 civil affairs units are probably excessive to our present-day requirements. But to eliminate all such units would, in our opinion, be wrong because many people believe that, if we ever have another war, it will be a short one, and there will not be time to assemble and train people to run the governments which we would have to run in case of victory. We recommend retention of at least half of the units and half of the personnel in category A status.

Another concern that I have with the present-day policy of the Secretary of Defense is to transfer certain aviators in the Naval Reserve from category A to category B status, thus reducing the number of drills from 48 to 24 yearly. When we have done this in the past, experience has shown us that we lose approximately half of these highly skilled personnel which are so expensive to train.

Now, let me come to the hardest part of our decision insofar as it pertains to

the Reserves this year. I refer specifically to the Air National Guard of the United States. The Secretary of Defense made a decision to phase out 15 of the 92 flying units in the Air National Guard in fiscal year 1974, 1975, and 1976. These Guard units had as their principal mission the air defense of the United States. The Secretary of Defense reasons that the United States cannot afford to maintain significant air defense forces to defend against strategic bombers when the thrust is dominated by large numbers of strategic missiles. During extensive testimony we could find no evidence that the Russian bomber threat had been reduced. And thus, it was not a change in the threat; it was just a change in the decision as to how to respond to the threat. We were given assurances that, by the deactivation of these flying units, the United States would not have the ability to insure that foreign bombers could fly over U.S. airspace unimpeded.

We are recommending a provision in this bill which puts a floor on the number of flying units in the Air National Guard at 91. Currently, there are 92 such units, 2 of which are collocated at Van Nuys, Calif., which will be consolidated before June 30 of this year. This will cause no reduction in the number of aircraft but will eliminate a headquarters.

We agree with the Under Secretary of the Air Force when he stated:

We are concerned over the loss of the affected Air Guard Units. We are concerned over the abrupt loss of 11,726 highly-skilled, well-trained Guardsmen which will affect the morale in other units and have a severe impact on recruiting potential.

A significant delay in Reserve Force modernization has been created by a slowdown in F-15 and A-10 procurement for the active force. This slowdown causes the retention of F-4 and A-7 aircraft in the active force longer than previously programmed, thereby slowing down the transfer of these assets to the Reserve Forces causing retention of F-100 aircraft. Requirements to provide C-130 and A-37 aircraft to the Republic of South Vietnam have also contributed to the slowdown of re-equipping Reserve Force units.

The Air Force has substantial shortage of tactical units including Reserve units to satisfy requirements established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to meet wartime requirements, for example, fighter attack and airlift. In finalizing the fiscal year 1975 Program and Budget we were unable to find the necessary funds to meet all of the foregoing as well as other priority force requirements.

The Air Force can retain the 14 Air National Guard units and provide interim equipment for them largely by redistribution of aircraft from other Air National Guard units not deactivating. In other words, spread what we have a little thinner. We have not budgeted the military personnel, operations and maintenance and other funds required for the retention of these units.

The best solution to the equipable needs of these units can be found in a combination of additional A-7 and C-130 procurement and an acceleration in the procurement of the F-15 and A-10 so that F-4 and A-7 aircraft can be released earlier from the active force.

Frankly, the Reserve Forces are our Nation's best defense bargain in terms of cost. This does not mean we want to transfer all missions to the Reserves. But where they have adequate capability

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to perform at a cheaper cost than the Active Forces, then serious consideration must be given to letting the Reserve Forces perform the mission.

We are not attempting to design the roles and missions of the Active or the Reserve Forces. Obviously that is the job of the Department of Defense but what we are trying to do is at least preserve the status quo until they have made that determination. And, we are attempting to try and find the most effective means of protecting our Nation at the cheapest possible cost.

Mr. Chairman and Members, a completed study on the roles and missions of the Reserve and National Guard will be ready in August of this year. And, I think it would be self-destructive at this time to provide only that which was originally requested in the bill. I would call your attention to the fact that the bill we authorized last year was for 66,000 less reservists than was authorized in fiscal year 1973. And the bill that is before you today still represents 20,000 less than were authorized for fiscal year 1973. With a reduction in both our Active and Reserve Forces during this time frame, I feel we have reached the bare minimum to insure the defense of the United States.

I urge your support of this bill.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. May I have 1 additional minute?

Mr. HÉBERT. I am sorry. The time has been allocated.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. I thought I could get more than 5 minutes to talk about a very important subject in the bill.

Mr. HÉBERT. I am sorry, but the gentleman from California used up your time.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 15 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. BENNETT).

(Mr. BENNETT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BENNETT. If the gentleman from Mississippi had some line of thought he wanted to complete at this point, I will be glad to yield to him.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. I appreciate the gentleman yielding to me.

I wanted to point out something which is very important in the report, namely, that there has been a letter circulated by the Secretary of Defense ordering the Army Guard and the Army Reserve to give a report back to the Secretary of Defense on a structural cut of 48,000 personnel in the Army Guard and in the Army Reserve.

In effect, the Secretary of Defense would be getting around the strength levels that we set up, and would be reducing the National Guard units in small towns, and the Army Reserve units in small towns across the country.

In our report—if the gentleman from Florida will permit me to conclude, and I appreciate the gentleman giving me this additional time—in the report it instructs the Secretary of Defense—and this is not in the bill, but it is in the re-

port—that before he makes any structural cuts in the Army National Guard, or Reserve, that he would come back to the House Committee on Armed Services and would tell us what he was going to do, and then we could take a look at it and decide whether we would accept it or not. We are not telling him what units we need to have a strong National Guard and a strong Reserve, but we are saying that if he wants to make a cut, then he should come back to the House and tell us.

Again I appreciate the gentleman yielding me this time.

(Mr. BENNETT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 14592.

The Seapower Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee has held extensive hearings in connection with the Navy shipbuilding and conversion program, both last year and this year. We are gravely concerned about the state of our Navy.

A decision was made some years ago to use the operating funds saved by the retirement of over-aged ships to buy new ships. Since 1970 our fleet has been reduced by 47 percent down to a mere 508 ships. This means that the United States has fewer total ships of all kinds in its fleet than the Soviet has major combatant ships. The Soviets, on the other hand, have continued building a new, modern, surface and submarine fleet. Their momentum has not slackened. The result is that this year has been described to our committee, by both the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations, as the year of our greatest jeopardy and peril.

This is the year in which we will begin to build the numbers of ships claimed by the Navy to be needed to provide a top notch fleet. The situation is so drastic that the Chief of Naval Operations, in a recent press interview, publicly said for the first time that—

The United States has lost to the Soviet Union its ability to control the world's sea lanes.

It was primarily for this reason that our committee has recommended almost the entire shipbuilding program requested this year by the President. The Armed Services Committee, over 12 years ago, was in the fore telling the Navy and the country that we urgently needed to build new ships because the large number of ships constructed during World War II—and still relied upon—presented us with a monumental tragedy through block obsolescence. We need new ships and we need them now desperately.

The only ships which we removed from the administration's budget were 2 patrol gunboats and 45 craft which are planned for transfer to South Vietnam. We believed that the proper way to provide for these ships was through the military assistance program—not through the Navy's shipbuilding and conversion program. Even with this cut, the Navy's shipbuilding program is about \$3.5 billion this year.

This must be considered along with the

testimony we have received in earlier years, from both Admiral Moorer—as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs—and Admiral Zumwalt—as Chief of Navy Operations, that the Navy really needs an annual \$4 to \$5 billion shipbuilding budget for several years in succession in order to build up over the block obsolescence hump.

There is one main addition to this year's authorization bill which I wish to emphasize: The new provisions in this bill for a Nuclear Navy.

The Armed Services Committee added to this bill a new title, title VIII, which would require that all new frontline combatant ships be nuclear powered. It defines those ships as all submarines—both missile and attack submarines—and all the major combatant ships in an attack carrier task group—which includes the carrier and its escorts and any other ships running with the group—and, last, all ships with independent missions dependent on unlimited high-speed endurance for military value.

You will notice that there is no arbitrary weight limit set forth in this definition like there used to be in Navy statements. This is because there are some ships which may be larger than the limit which should not be included for they do not have the main strike characteristic. Nuclear propulsion is not needed for them. I am referring to the sea control ships and the amphibious attack ships. They are not part of the naval strike force, but are there to keep the sea lanes open.

On the other hand, there may be ships which might be less in weight than an arbitrary limit which should be included for nuclear propulsion, such as the new guided missile destroyer which is presently being discussed and which will carry the main naval armament for the future, the Aegis missile system. It will be the main surface escort for the carriers. It must be nuclear in order to keep up with the nuclear task group.

You might ask why this new title VIII is necessary at this time—after all, Congress last year fully funded the *Carl Vinson*, CVN-70, the third of the Nimitz class aircraft carriers. This year we are recommending the funding of two nuclear-powered Trident ballistic missile submarines, three nuclear-powered attack submarines of the SSN 688 class, and one nuclear frigate, the DLGN 41—and we are providing long leadtime funds for DLGN 42. In this year's program, the nuclear powered program is doing very well.

However, we found that the Department of Defense has ordered the Navy to study a carrier costing \$550 million for the fiscal year 1978 budget; we also find no more nuclear frigates in the years planned ahead; we hear authoritative talk about studies for a diesel-powered submarine class; and we have heard definitely about the guided missile destroyer plans—most of which will be conventionally powered.

The Armed Services Committee cannot believe that the Department of Defense is still trying to turn the clock back and to avoid nuclear power. It took the Congress to include the reactors for

the first nuclear-powered submarines in the Atomic Energy Commission budget—to start the nuclear navy. The *Nautilus* and the *Sea Wolf* would have been diesel unless the Congress acted. Even after that, it took continuous congressional pressure to keep the attack submarine program going. At one point the systems analysts in the Department of Defense said that they wanted to stop the attack submarine fleet at 69—but the Armed Services Committee was able to override that decision and had the new fast submarine programs—the SSN 688's—started.

The Congress had to exert pressure to get the new quiet submarine built when the systems analysts tried to stop it. It took congressional decision to start the ballistic missile submarine fleet—and that was a crash program in which the first ships were actual attack submarines under construction on the days which were cut in half, lengthened and had the missile silos installed.

After the *Enterprise* was commissioned, the Department of Defense had the following two carriers conventionally powered, over strong congressional objection. One of these, the *John F. Kennedy*, had to sail at reduced speed during the 1968 Middle East crisis to go from the east coast to the Eastern Mediterranean and had to have planned refuelings along the way. If the *Kennedy* had been nuclear powered it would have saved up to 2 days in the crisis. Further congressional insistence made the *Nimitz* class nuclear.

Then we come to the carrier escorts. The Congress changed a conventionally power frigate to nuclear power in the fiscal year 1976 program to create the *Truxtun*. With this, the Navy had two destroyers and one cruiser with which to escort the *Enterprise*. The Navy has said that there should be at least four nuclear powered escorts to run with each nuclear powered carrier. The cruiser was best used on independent missions so there were really only two escorts.

The Congress then put a nuclear powered escort into the fiscal year 1966 budget. When there was a refusal to build this, the Congress mandated its construction in fiscal year 1967. The frigates became the DLGN 36—the *California*. The next year Congress mandated the construction of DLGN 37, the *South Carolina*. It took further congressional mandate to get the DLGN 38 class started and this year we are only fully funding the DLGN 41 with more long lead time money for the DLGN 42. We are going to have four nuclear powered carriers by the time the *Vinson* is commissioned. We need at least 16 nuclear powered escorts for these carriers. We must continue to have them constructed to get the kind of fast independent strike force we need in our Navy.

There is no need to repeat here the superiority that exists for nuclear powered naval ships. They have unlimited steaming endurance—they do not need to be tied to a black oil logistics train—they can run around bad weather without regard to fuel consumption—they need not come off the line in any mission to get refueled—they have no corrosive stack

gases which attack the ship or its planes. Indeed, the nuclear forces are so superior that no mission of any of our over 100 nuclear ships has ever had to be aborted because of the failure of its nuclear propulsion plant.

Because of the repeated failure of the Department of Defense to read the lessons of nuclear operations, we have found it necessary to mandate that all first line strike combatant ships of the Navy shall be nuclear powered.

Mr. RANDALL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BENNETT. I yield to the gentleman from Missouri.

Mr. RANDALL. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I want to commend the gentleman for the excellent analysis he has made this morning. Also we are indebted to him for his good work as the chairman of the Sea Power Subcommittee. As the ranking member of the Sea Power subcommittee, I have noted at times we have had to disregard some of the advice of the Navy—particularly when they declined to recommend nuclear powered ships.

I am sure that our conclusion to go nuclear was the best one for this country. The gentleman made a very excellent statement providing the reasoning for use of nuclear power. There was one other reason not mentioned for going nuclear. It is energy problems meaning a shortage of petroleum products. There is a huge great consumption of petroleum products by the Navy. This is an additional reason to use nuclear power in our Navy.

Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BENNETT. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, I commend the gentleman from Florida for the job he has done in overseeing and pioneering in the Seapower Subcommittee. I think his recommendations have been very salutary throughout the years. While I do not agree with each and every thing done in the current bill I think overall my objections are rather minor.

I would like to ask this question. We keep observing that our numbers of ships in our Navy are continuously dwindling, and they have gone from 980 ships down to 500-some-odd ships. So we talk about the numbers and we want to build up the numbers of ships. On the other hand the committee has wisely come out with this program to go to nuclear power wherever we can. I think it is pretty well conceded that when we talk about going to nuclear power today we understand it is going to be a \$400 million investment in each ship. How can we rationalize in your mind how we can build up the number of ships in our Navy and simultaneously spend as much as the committee amendment and the subcommittee amendment contemplates in this new nuclear Navy?

Mr. BENNETT. I had some difficulty with that originally but Admiral Zumwalt helped with his high and low concept. He convinced me, against my original critical interrogation, that it would

be wise to build some of these lower cost ships; which, although not very cheap, are much lower in cost than others because they have principally to do with keeping the sea lanes open rather than with a strike capacity in a Navy combatant function. Of course they have nothing to do with strategic operations.

Mr. LEGGETT. I would like to ask another question. I remember former Chairman Mendel Rivers asked the Navy for a 10-year projection as to where we were going with the Navy from 1966, say, to 1976—and certainly we are not there. We have kind of missed our target rather substantially. I wonder if the committee has a 10-year projection currently for the Navy or if they are contemplating getting something like that from the Navy?

Mr. BENNETT. We had a recommendation last year for a \$5 billion-a-year program in shipbuilding for the Navy, and obviously we are not living up to that because this bill this year is for only \$3.5 billion. The Navy thinks it must have a \$5 billion-a-year program and we have revised it down to \$3.5 billion because of fiscal constraints.

Mr. BRAY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. BOB WILSON).

(Mr. BOB WILSON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BOB WILSON. Mr. Chairman, I join my colleagues in commending the chairman of the Sea Power Subcommittee, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. BENNETT) who has just spoken on the subject of sea power. It is my privilege to be the ranking minority member of that Sea Power Subcommittee. I think under the leadership of the gentleman from Florida (Mr. BENNETT) we have studied the situation as to the Navy's strength and the comparative strength of our Navy vis-a-vis Russia sufficiently to start taking some action.

This bill does contain some significant action, in my opinion for rebuilding our Navy. There is no question it is the Congress that has been responsible for modernizing the Navy with nuclear power. Twenty years ago we insisted that the *Nautilus* submarine be built. We insisted on the *Polaris* submarine and we are relying today on the *Polaris* as our most important, in my opinion, strategic defensive system. Yet we find ourselves needing to continue to build and to rebuild in order to maintain the traditional freedom of the seas which has kept this country alive over its history.

The gentleman from Florida took our subcommittee down to Norfolk, Va., earlier this year. We studied every type of ship that was in port.

We made a trip up to New London, Conn. and saw the mock-up of the *Trident*. Incidentally, my colleague, the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. ROBERT W. DANIEL, JR.) will be speaking about the give a concept of just what a weapons system this is from a size standpoint alone. Imagine a submarine 42 feet in diameter. That is about as far as from here to the back wall and half again, one and a half times the length of a football

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field. That is the size of the Trident submarine, which carries 20 powerful missiles. When it is built it will be the most important strategic defensive system ever designed by man. I think it is a vital thing that it be included in this bill.

Most importantly, the title VIII that the gentleman referred to added to this bill and setting a nuclear policy for this Navy, is the most important step taken by this committee in 20 years, because we have had the planners in the Pentagon insisting over and over again, as they have in the past 20 years, that know better than anyone else whether we should have nuclear-powered ships. We have overridden their plans and have built over 100 nuclear-powered submarines. We have very successful nuclear-powered surface ships to the envy of the world.

It seems to me it is time that Congress gave a message to the planners in the Pentagon that for major combatant ships, there is no other way to go than nuclear power.

It is true, the first cost because it includes 10 years of fuel is more than buying a nonnuclear powered vessel; but with the rapidly escalating cost of black oil, there is no doubt that it is an economical thing for us to build nuclear powered combatant vessels, the larger ones, and to use them for the most important duties, which are strike duties, in wartime. It would be absolute folly for us to allow the planners to go ahead, as they are now doing, talking about a nonnuclear powered aircraft carrier or nonnuclear powered submarine, despite the fact that the Vietnam war has proved that nuclear power far exceeds in efficiency the black oil powered vessels that are common to navies around the world.

So I would hope this Congress would not even question the inclusion of title VIII in this bill. We will probably have trouble selling it to the Senate, because the Senate has some other ideas.

I think in this case the House position should prevail and we should plan to work our problems out in conference to maintain an all nuclear Navy.

It seems to me this is an excellent bill from the Navy point of view. I commend the subcommittee for the great work they did. They worked long and hard on the bill. They are ready to go with new programs for shipbuilding potential. We find that the shipyards are filled and we must have hearings on shipyard capacity.

Mr. KING. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BOB WILSON. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

(Mr. KING asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. KING. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 14592. I want to compliment the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee for the excellent bill which he has brought to the House floor. The bill before you is a result of the most extensive study by the Committee on Armed Services, extending over 3 months. I also want to congratulate the distinguished chairman of

the Research and Development Subcommittee, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. PRICE), and the distinguished chairman of the Manpower Subcommittee, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. FISHER), and the distinguished chairman of the Seapower Subcommittee, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. BENNETT).

Every member of the committee worked hard on this bill, and we believe it should receive the support of every Member who seeks to keep America strong.

I want to talk for a few minutes about the E-3A aircraft, the airborne warning and command system. The Armed Services Committee deleted 6 aircraft of the requested 12, not because the committee does not see the need for the system, because it is needed, but rather they objected to the degree of concurrent development and production which the Air Force contracted for. In other words, the committee felt the R. & D. program should be further along and the complex system integration testing should be completed before going to a 12-aircraft buy.

The AWACS would make a number of unique contributions to deterrence, and would provide an important capability in the event of high intensity conflict—such as in NATO Europe—and in more limited contingencies in other parts of the world.

Of major importance to the effective functioning of general purpose forces—and therefore of major importance to the credibility of our deterrent—is the assured survivability of our command and control systems. The AWACS will sustain deterrence by denying to a potential aggressor confidence of being able to delay, disrupt, or otherwise negate a timely, controlled, and effective response by United States and allied forces through attack on those less survivable elements of our surveillance, warning, and control systems which are located at fixed, ground-based sites. This ability of AWACS to deny an enemy the option to attack a command and control "Achilles' heel" is fundamental to deterrence and is important at all times, particularly during periods of heightened tensions when deterrence is subject to its most severe test.

The AWACS would also contribute to deterrence by providing deep-look surveillance into enemy territory. In addition to providing important information on the location and movement of enemy air and surface forces, AWACS surveillance would deter attacks that depend on surprise for success. Warning of an attack may well prevent the aggressor from achieving his objective. Thus, AWACS would provide an element in crisis management that does not exist today. Moreover, the contribution of AWACS to the quality and timeliness of surveillance may, in itself, be sufficient justification for deployment of AWACS.

An imminent theater conflict would feature a mobilization period, including dispersal of aircraft to forward operating locations and movement of ground units and their organic air vehicles, on both sides. The AWACS would provide invaluable information to the NCA and

to military commanders on enemy movements and intentions during a mobilization period. Such data would be used to determine the approximate number of enemy aircraft available at forward locations, the most lucrative airfields for attack by friendly forces, likely avenues of attack by the enemy, and the most urgent ground targets for initial close air support operations. This capability to support operational planning is not currently available and could well be the dominant influence in subsequent resolution of the conflict.

Should deterrence fail and conflict occur, the improved capabilities of the AWACS would better enable the combined, joint, and component commanders to select and allocate, in an informed deliberate manner, the appropriate forces to counter hostile strategies in massing and thrusts by hostile forces. These improved capabilities would insure maximum practical effectiveness in the application of our forces.

The AWACS also provides, for the first time in the history of tactical air warfare, the capability to observe and to direct simultaneously the forces engaged in the range of tactical air missions—air superiority, theater air defense, and search and rescue. This capability provides an entirely new dimension in both resource allocation and assessment of mission effectiveness.

AWACS, by eliminating the low level detection deficiency, would perform the surveillance and interceptor control functions of the theater air defense system more effectively. Fighters employed under radar control are more effective in the air-to-air battle, and overall air-to-air effectiveness has become critically important to overcome the numerical advantage enjoyed by Warsaw Pact forces.

The ability of the AWACS to extend radar coverage beyond that possible with ground-based radar would also provide significant benefits during interdiction and reconnaissance operations in a NATO/Warsaw Pact conflict. For example, strike or reconnaissance aircraft would receive adequate warning of potential attackers to take appropriate defensive maneuvers. Additionally, friendly escort fighters could be vectored to intercept the enemy's attacking aircraft.

The flexibility programmed for the AWACS will offer unique and valuable capabilities in more limited contingencies in other parts of the world where facilities for the control of tactical air operations are marginal or non-existent. The clean need for such facilities was demonstrated in the Vietnam conflict, particularly during the period when U.S. forces were attacking targets in North Vietnam.

For example, after August 1967, the Mig-21 aircraft effectively employed new, radar controlled, low altitude intercept tactics to achieve surprise and position advantage on U.S. strike flights. Without adequate radar warning and control, an increased number of our strike aircraft were forced to jettison their bomb loads to counter an attack, and the previous U.S. exchange ratio of 4 kills to 1 over the Mig-21 decreased to

1.2 to 1. This lack of adequate warning and control also forced the United States to increase the size of the force defending against air attacks with a resultant decrease in the number of tactical aircraft available to perform the interdiction mission.

Moreover, recent combat experience has shown that combat aircraft under centralized surveillance from command and control centers were able to achieve much higher rates of success in air battles, with much lower losses than those sustained by aircraft without that kind of assistance.

AWACS could also serve as a command and control center; managing the immediate air battle; coordinating area air traffic; and relaying combat reports or other messages. AWACS would not necessarily perform all these missions simultaneously and continuously. Many would be taken over by other facilities as soon as ground-based equipment could assume these tasks. But AWACS' capability to perform in each of these roles would insure that the most important control tasks could be accomplished without interruption.

With regard to friendly ground force elements, current communications systems do not permit senior commanders to maintain a constant update on the location and status of their maneuver units in a fluid combat situation. However, efficient management of these forces is based in part on such information. Moreover, the efficient application of tactical airpower in support of these forces also relies on precise knowledge of their location and status. AWACS has demonstrated a potential to display returns from radar beacons or IFF—identification, friend or foe—transponders which have been deployed with ground force elements, and to provide in real time, the location and status of friendly ground forces, airfields, and other resources.

AWACS has also demonstrated a capability to detect and track surface ships and to provide real time information to aid senior commanders in making timely decisions concerning force deployment and employment. Through use of IFF, AWACS can monitor the location and status of friendly ships. Non-IFF targets would easily be identified as unknown or hostile. This information could be made available to senior commanders,

thereby enhancing the capability to vector friendly naval and air forces for reconnaissance, and for attack enemy vessels.

In short, the inherent mobility and flexibility of the AWACS would offer the capability to perform a number of important functions in any future contingency, and, thereby, could greatly enhance the overall effectiveness of U.S. forces in future conflicts—not only in air battles but also in combined arms battles. This increase in effectiveness would help to offset expected future growth in the capabilities of enemy general purpose forces. Moreover, AWACS could function in support of friendly indigenous forces. This could enable friendly nations to make greater contributions to their own defense by increasing the effectiveness of their aid and surface forces.

Mr. HEBERT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. LEGGETT).

(Mr. LEGGETT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, I intend to offer amendments tomorrow in a number of subject areas. First, perhaps, I should point out that a large part of this bill, as in previous years, I concur with. A large number of the cuts that were made by the committee I likewise concur with, particularly the reductions that were recommended by the committee on the AWACS system on the order of \$250 million. I think that was well thought out. I think that program can well afford to be slowed down and we should know where we are going with it. Obviously, it is a tactical program, as the committee report wisely points out, that particular aspect of AWACS should be better thought out.

The C-141 stretch out program and the CRAF program likewise have been either abated or slowed down. It is a little difficult to figure out exactly where we are in these programs, since they were also included in the authorization supplemental and the supplemental appropriation bills. We do not have the results of either of those conferences to date, but hopefully we can take considerable testimony on both of these two subject matters.

On the CRAF program modification we are talking about making a nose

loader out of the Boeing 747's and the Lockheed 1011's and the DC-10's; ripping out all of the interiors and putting in a new hinge in the front section, giving them a tank ramp.

Obviously, spending \$7 million per vehicle and perhaps \$800 million or \$1 billion on these programs requires considerable thought and should not come up in a supplemental. It requires more testimony than we have before our committee, so I think we were wise in slowing that program down.

The other program that I will talk about in the couple of minutes I have remaining is the MASF program, the military assistance service funded program for Vietnam. I do intend, with a number of my colleagues from a number of committees, to offer an amendment tomorrow to reduce that program from the \$1.6 billion recommended by the Pentagon, the \$1.4 billion recommended by the House committee, down to a \$900 million level. The \$900 million level, I think, is reasonable. It does not pull the rug out from under the allies that we have in Southeast Asia. It is \$900 million for military assistance and will be combined with about \$900 million of economic assistance and will provide a total program of about \$1.8 billion for the 1975 fiscal year, which compares to about \$1.8 billion for the current fiscal year.

So, we are not escalating that program at all. It allows for a one-half billion dollar reduction in the Vietnam program for the 1975 fiscal year. We will have some reasons in addition to those I have outlined.

Mr. Chairman, I also intend to offer an amendment with regard to the Trident submarine system. I have already complimented my colleague from Florida, Mr. BENNETT, on the method by which the Sea Power Subcommittee has made its recommendations. However, the last time we had appropriations approved by conference on the Trident program, we agreed to a one ship program for fiscal year 1975, and we should keep with that schedule.

Mr. Chairman, today we begin consideration of the military procurement authorization bill for fiscal 1975. As the action on the fiscal 1974 supplemental bill indicates, not all committees, dealing with the defense budget view it in the same light:

COMPARATIVE ACTION ON FISCAL YEAR 1974 DEFENSE SUPPLEMENTAL AND APPROPRIATIONS BILLS

	Defense request	House A.S.	Senate A.S.	House appropriations	Senate appropriations	Defense request	House A.S.	Senate A.S.	House appropriations	Senate appropriations	
I. Procurement:											
Army ACFT.....	22.0	22.0	15.0	16.0	16.0						
Army, Marine ACFT.....	219.2	219.2	101.1	153.7	113.0						
AF ACFT.....	445.0	445.0	154.8	294.0	244.4						
Army missiles.....	84.4	76.6	66.3	76.6	76.6						
Army missiles.....	28.6	28.6	17.0	0	0						
Marine Corps missiles.....	22.3	22.3	22.3	22.3	22.3						
Air Force missiles.....	39.0	39.0	22.9	59.0	27.0						
NAVY SCN.....	24.8	24.8	0	0	24.8						
Army TCV.....	113.6	113.6	50.9	63.1	50.6						
						Army other.....					
						8.2	8.2	8.2	8.0	8.0	
						Total.....	1,007.1	999.3	458.5	658.1	532.7
						H. R. & D.:					
						108.9	108.9	108.9	54.4	108.7	
						R. & D.....	108.6	0	0	0	
						29.0	29.0	0	29.0	0	
						0	0	0	0	0	
						III. MILCON.....					
						IV. MASF.....					
						1,253.6	1,138.75	212.8	741.7	681.6	

* \$155,000,000 to be transferred from \$2,200,000,000 for Israel.
 * MASF request required no appropriation.

* Approved bookkeeping switch freeing \$266,000,000.

May 20, 1974

If the country had unlimited money, no agency would need to be limited in spending. Since we don't have the money, we have therefore restricted poverty, education, health, housing and manpower training funds. Defense expenditures should be no exception.

The following chart shows the escalation of the U.S. national debt over the past 7 years, the annual service charge on the debt that must be paid, administrative income and the percentage of administrative income allocated to this item:

[Dollar amounts in billions]

Year	National debt	Service charge	U.S. administrative income	Percentage service charge
1969	\$367	\$15.8	\$143	11.0
1970	382	18.3	143	12.7
1971	410	19.6	134	14.6
1972	437	20.6	149	13.8
1973	468	22.8	161	14.1
1974	486	27.8	185	15.0
1975	508	29.1	202	14.4

Obviously, our escalating debt, escalating service charge, and escalating service charge as a percentage of income dictates and demands moderation.

Since we spend 95 percent of all military funds spent in this hemisphere, and 60 percent of all military funds expended in the world, we need constantly to review our posture in this regard.

The short chart that follows, prepared by committee counsel, shows the action of our House Armed Services Committee in various subject areas of the pending bill:

H.R. 12564
[In thousands of dollars]

	Requested by DOD	Recommended by committee
Procurement:		
Aircraft:		
Army	339,500	335,000
Navy and Marine Corps	2,960,600	2,964,100
Air Force	3,496,600	3,391,400
Missiles:		
Army	459,200	439,400
Navy	620,600	620,600
Marine Corps	76,000	76,000
Air Force	1,610,800	1,610,800
Naval vessels: Navy	3,562,600	3,539,100
Tracked combat vehicles:		
Army	331,900	321,200
Marine Corps	80,100	74,200
Torpedoes: Navy	187,700	187,700
Other weapons:		
Army	53,400	55,700
Navy	25,600	25,600
Marine Corps	500	500
Total procurement	13,805,100	13,641,300
Research, development, test and evaluation:		
Army	1,985,976	1,878,397
Navy	3,264,503	3,153,006
Air Force	3,518,860	3,459,760
Defense agencies	555,700	510,500
Total R.D.T. & E.	9,325,039	9,001,663
Grand total	23,130,129	22,642,963
SUMMARY		
Net change in procurement (title I)		-163,800
Net change in R.D.T. & E. (title II)		-323,376
Total reduction		-487,176

¹ Includes foreign currency programs \$2,570,000.

Lest we believe that every cent in the defense budget is vital to national security, we should consider this testimony given by the Secretary of Defense to the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee on February 17, 1974, in response to allegations that the budget contained \$5 billion worth of padding:

It was recognized late in calendar year 1974 that there may be an easing of the economy and some growth in unemployment and that as a consequence of that, the total figure for the budget outlays would be relaxed. . . . If there had not been this perception of an easing economic environment I believe our outlays might have been a billion dollars or a billion and a half dollars less in 1975.

In short, the Secretary had admitted to a billion or a billion and a half WPA dollars intermixed with the national security budget.

We had further evidence of Pentagon padding in the fiscal year 1974 supplemental request, which included \$108.6 million for research and development. The committee decided the request was not sufficiently urgent to warrant supplemental action, and suggested the Defense Department make a strong appeal for these funds in the fiscal year 1975 regular budget if it so desired. Now we find not one word about these programs in the 1975 request; the previously vital programs are no longer vital. To me it seems the DOD sometimes means what it says and sometimes does not.

TITLE I. PROCUREMENT
A. TRIDENT SUBMARINE

The submarine-launched ballistic missile system is probably as important as the rest of the military establishment combined. It is secure from detection and is expected to remain so in the foreseeable future. Of all our weapons systems, it makes the greatest contribution to national security, and at the same time is not provocative. By increasing the range of the missile, the Trident I and Trident II systems will provide a prudent hedge against the possibility of unforeseen breakthroughs in Soviet anti-submarine technique.

In short, I favor the Trident concept. However, the very high rate at which the Navy plans to build the 10 ships is, in my view, unwise.

It is not sufficient for a system to be sound in concept; it must be reliable in operation. The Polaris submarine-launched missile system, which had the benefit of a thorough and careful R. and D. program, was perhaps the most reliable missile system ever built. The Poseidon, which was not developed as carefully, has been somewhat less reliable but still creditable. It would be disastrous if this trend were to continue and we were to find our underwater security dependent upon an aquatic C-5A.

The surest way to induce unreliability, as well as cost overruns, is to rush the program. The worst aspect of a rushed program is what is called "concurrency": placing the system full into production while a substantial amount of R.D.T. & E. remains to be done.

The arguments for accelerated development are not persuasive.

First. There is no need to rush Trident into the water to meet a Soviet threat to Polaris-Poseidon ships, since the threat does not exist. On the contrary, at this point we cannot even speculate on the nature of the threat which might develop. Thus, the sooner we construct the ships the more we increase the possibility that they may be inappropriate to the threat they may eventually face. I believe the House Appropriations Committee was entirely correct in its rejection of the Trident acceleration in the fiscal year 1974 supplemental. Its report stated:

The Committee recommends that the \$24,-800,000 requested to accelerate Trident submarine construction from one per year, as recommended by the Congress in fiscal year 1974, to two per year not be appropriated.

It is the considered judgment of the Committee that with new Navy initiatives, such as the strategic cruise submarine-launched missile, the available options to backfit the Trident I missile into our 10 Polaris, and 31 Poseidon submarines, and the proposed NARWHAL submarine as a low cost option to the Trident submarine, an acceleration of the Trident submarine construction effort cannot be justified. The Committee is also mindful of the backlog of new construction and conversion of ships and submarines at the two large nuclear-capable shipyards which are involved in the Trident submarine program, and the problems they and many shipyards are having in obtaining skilled labor.

All of these factors seem to mandate a prudent and cautious, but deliberate course in the construction of Trident submarines. There must be a reasonable limit or plateau that should be achieved in spending merely for the sake of "bargaining chips." The Trident submarine construction rate of one per year as directed by Congress appears to be a sufficient demonstration that this country has the national resolve to modernize and maintain our sea-based missile deterrent and a current status technologically, without risking an escalation or renewal of the arms race.

Second. While submarines do wear out, there is no indication that a 1-per-year Trident program will leave Polaris boats in operation longer than would be justified by safety considerations. On the other hand, it is undeniable that the sooner we launch the Tridents the sooner they will wear out and the sooner we will need the next generation SSBN. Moreover, if we buy Tridents in rapid succession they will wear out in rapid succession, thus forcing us into excessive concurrency on the next generation and more block obsolescence.

It is claimed that faster procurement is cheaper. This is only true if the acceleration does not produce difficulties. In my views, it is probable that problems, and therefore increased costs, will arise from the accelerated schedule proposed by the Navy.

Therefore, I will propose an amendment to reduce the procurement schedule to one ship per year from the Navy's proposed two.

I propose to reduce the \$1,166.8 million two-ship program to \$700 million, which would consist of last year's \$627.8

million one-step program plus a reasonable inflation allowance.

I do not propose to reduce research and development. Neither do I propose to reduce procurement of the Trident I missile, which can and should be retrofitted into the existing Poseidon submarines.

In additional views appended to the fiscal year 1974 report, I described the landing heavy assault—LHA—program as “one of the worst disasters in the history of American military procurement.” While this rhetoric may have been somewhat overdramatic, subsequent events have not impugned the accuracy of the assertion. At the time of last year’s report, these five ships were 2 years behind schedule. Today they are 2½ years behind; the cost is sitting on the contract ceiling and we can expect, before we have the ships in hand, to find the contractor rewarded for his delays by payments well above the ceiling.

The same contractor in the same shipyard—Litton Industries in Pascagoula, Miss.—is building another series of ships: the 30 large antisubmarine destroyers of the DD-963 class. This program is clearly headed for similar or worse problems.

The new “assembly-line” method used in this shipyard has received much publicity, but it is not the source of the problem.

The difficulty stems from the inability of the contractor to attract sufficient quantity and quality of labor to the site of the shipyard. Total labor force on the DD-963 program is presently 23 percent below program. The problem is increasing rather than decreasing, with 10.6 percent attrition but only 9.9 percent accession between September 1972, and September 1973. The shipyard today is 4,000 men short and is unable to accelerate employment.

The quality of the work force, according to the General Accounting Office, is as substandard as the quantity. The journeymen/apprentice ratio has been about 1.4-1, where 2-1 is considered desirable. While this ratio has remained relatively stable, the quality of the apprentice force has declined markedly, with the percentage having less than 1 year’s experience soaring from 18 percent in October 1972, to 41 percent in August 1973. The contractor sees no prospects for improvement.

These are the results:

First. Scheduling: The first two ships, DD-963 and DD-964, have been launched on schedule. However, this has been a mere public relations gesture, accomplished by launching them in an incomplete state. Ship 963 was launched 50 percent complete, in contrast to the original plan calling for 75 to 85 percent completion at launch.

Whereas the original plan calls for 9½ months in which to complete 20 percent of the work after launch, the contractor will now have to perform 50 percent of the work in the same time period to achieve on-time delivery. This would require working at 2½ times the originally expected pace. If we generously assume work at the planned pace, we must project a 24-month scheduled slippage. If

we more realistically assume work at two-thirds of the planned pace, we find ourselves facing a 3-year slippage. And this is only the first of the 30 ships.

Second. Cost: Program unit cost has so far kept reasonably consistent with the general inflation. However—

Delays inevitably require the contract to be performed in an inflated economy, which increases the cost to the contractor.

Litton is now asking for an additional \$7 million per ship.

With only 2 of the 30 ships in the water, the Navy has already told us it expects the cost to go to ceiling—130 percent of target price.

A number of expensive subsystems—totaling perhaps 20 percent of the cost of the ship—are to be installed after delivery. Thus, they are not included in the systems acquisition costs. Instead, they are funded by the other procurement, Navy—OPN—and operations and maintenance—O. & M.—budgets, which receive relatively light scrutiny and are therefore prime breeding grounds for what is known in the trade as “contract nourishment.”

Third. Performance: We are not yet capable of judging the performance of the system. However, our experience has been that late delivery and cost overruns do not usually go hand in hand with satisfactory performance.

I believe it to be a real mistake to authorize the last of the 30 ships, thus effectively giving up the Armed Services Committee’s control over this program. A similar mistake was made on the LHA program, in which we finished authorizing the last of the five ships last year, yet the Navy has still to see its first LHA.

I do not propose to reduce or cancel the program. At this point, I merely emphasize that the reasons for the difficulty—difficult location and inadequate management—were entirely subject to the control of the contractor at the time he made his bid. It is he, and not the taxpayers, who should bear the burden of his inability to live up to the contract.

According to the recent report to the Congress by the General Accounting Office, the Navy and its contracting officer have made sincere and vigorous efforts to adhere to the terms of the contract. I commend them for it. It would be my intention to see that the full 30 ships will be delivered with satisfactory performance at not one cent above the contract ceiling, and we wish to make the contractor aware that, from all indications, the 94th Congress will be more receptive to this position than has any Congress in the recent past.

TITLE II. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT A. SITE DEFENSE ABM

The pros and cons of antiballistic missile systems have been discussed at length in previous reports. Very briefly, I regard the Safeguard as ludicrously inadequate from its basic concept onward, and I regard it as now self-evident that the \$8 billion this system has and will siphon out of the taxpayers’ pocket is so much money down the drain. In contrast, site defense appears to be intelligently designed and technically capable of increasing the survivability of our fixed

base Minuteman ICBM’s against a reasonable vigorous threat.

However, site defense operates under two handicaps:

The Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty—SALT—sets a limit of 100 interceptors whereas many hundreds would be required before Site Defense could add significantly to our deterrent.

Site defense is incompatible with the administration’s headlong rush for maximum ICBM accuracy. As I point out under “Dangerous Nuclear Programs” later in these additional views, if we fund the development of high accuracy, there will be no way to negotiate the Soviets out of also deploying high accuracy warheads. They will thus be able to use very small yields as silo-killers which means they will be able to use large numbers of warheads on each ICBM at low cost. Thus, they will be able to exhaust site defense far more cheaply than we could expand it. It is important to note that the same unlikely and tragic circumstances that would permit deployment of site defense abrogation of SALT I—would almost certainly be accompanied by the failure of SALT II and the consequent technological developments that would neutralize any ABM.

Therefore, we shall move to amend the site defense authorization, reducing the \$160 million prototype demonstration program to a \$110 million technology program.

B. SAM-D

Secretary of Defense Schlesinger has wisely pointed out that, since the United States has no technological choice but to remain vulnerable to Soviet missiles, there is no sense spending money to defend against bombers.

Thus, the only function of the SAM-D anti-aircraft system will be to defend our allies. This \$6 billion program makes a very expensive charity item in these days of precarious economic security.

Therefore, it would be desirable for the Secretary of Defense to seek commitments from our allies to pay in cash a minimum of one-half the total program cost of the system, and to include the result of his efforts in his annual report for fiscal year 1976. If these commitments are not in hand at the time of the report, it is my view that the program should be abandoned.

C. DANGEROUS NUCLEAR PROGRAMS

It is natural to assume that any technological development which offers increased military capability at relatively modest cost is a good thing. Unfortunately, this is not always true. The present bill contains four nuclear weapons programs which, while increasing our nominal military effectiveness, give us no useful ability we would not have already. Moreover, they would decrease national security by increasing the probability of nuclear war.

First. Three of the programs in question are strategic: \$25 million for engineering development to increase the yield of Minuteman warheads; \$32 million for maneuvering re-entry vehicles—MaRV—to improve the accuracy of Minuteman; and \$20 million for advanced research on terminal guidance of warheads.

The purpose of all three programs is to

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increase our ability to destroy hard targets. These programs are sometimes presented as offering a more humane way of fighting nuclear war, allowing us to attack military and industrial targets rather than cities.

This characterization is not entirely accurate. A steel mill is an impressive and imposing structure if you plan to strike it with your fist, but in nuclear terms it is a very soft target; we can easily destroy it with the accuracy-yield combination found in our present Minuteman warheads. The same is true of all Soviet factories, refineries, troop concentrations, tank parks, et cetera. The only hard targets of any significance are missile silos.

If we wish to destroy a small number of Soviet silos as a show of force, we can do so with our present warheads; higher accuracy and yield are not needed.

If we wish to develop the capability to destroy all Soviet silos, we have to use terminal guidance. The problem is that such a capability would force the Soviets to adopt a launch-on-warning policy, emptying their silos on radar warning of a U.S. attack rather than riding out the attack. This would neutralize our capability—even highly accurate warheads cannot destroy a missile that isn't there—and it would greatly increase the probability of accidental war. Even if the Soviets for some reason did not launch on warning, our hard-target capability would still be suicidal in that it would bring retaliation from the Soviet missile submarine fleet.

Thus, there are no benefits and considerable losses in this program. The Senate Research and Development Subcommittee recognized this in killing these programs, pointing out that our goal should be to enhance the survivability of our deterrent, not to chase the ill-defined mirage of counterforce capability.

Several years ago, Congress unwisely approved the development of MIRV. Since MIRV deployment cannot be verified without on-site inspection, once we had tested MIRV the Soviets had no choice but to assume we had deployed it, and we lost the opportunity to negotiate a MIRV ban. Now the Soviets have their own MIRV, there is no way to negotiate them out of deploying it, and there is great—although in my view unwarranted—concern about its significance. The United States could have avoided the entire issue by going slow on testing and fast on negotiations; it does no one credit that we did the opposite.

The proposed warhead-improvement programs present a similar but more serious problem; there is a danger that we will deal with it in a similarly unfortunate manner. I note with regret that the full Senate Armed Services Committee has overruled its Research and Development Subcommittee and approved funds for these programs. The rationale given by the chairman of the Senate committee was that we need the warhead improvement programs as bargaining chips for SALT II.

Mr. Speaker, these items are categorically incapable of being used as bargaining chips. Once we approve the money, the system can no longer be bargained

away. Just as MIRV deployment cannot be verified, so deployment of high-accuracy warheads cannot be verified. Worse, testing of high-accuracy warheads cannot be verified. If we do not prohibit the development of high accuracy, the Soviets will have to assume we have achieved the ability to destroy all their silos. They will then either abandon their fixed-base ICBM's or place them on launch-on-warning status. Given their present truculent mood, it seems more likely that they will choose the latter course; we will thus have increased the probability of nuclear war and gained nothing by doing so.

The Pentagon has proposed that we deploy smaller, cleaner tactical nuclear weapons for use in Europe. The rationale is that our present large, dirty weapons would cause so much collateral damage to the surrounding friendly countryside that we would be afraid to use them, whereas the smaller weapons would cause less collateral damage, and we could therefore resort to them more easily.

This argument rests on two assumptions:

The Soviets, having only old-fashioned large dirty nuclear weapons, will refrain from using them in retaliation because they share our concern for collateral damage to the soil of our allies and their enemies.

Even if the Soviet also develop small nukes, if we cross the nuclear firebreak first, the Soviets will not feel compelled to respond by attacking us with weapons slightly larger, whereupon we will counter-respond with weapons still larger, and we will very shortly find ourselves in an all-out nuclear war.

The evidence for either of these propositions is distinguished by its total nonexistence. It would be the height of folly to take any steps that would make crossing the nuclear firebreak easier. Among all the military failures and foreign policy failures of the past twenty years, our one shining success has been the avoidance of nuclear war. To deliberately set out to violate this record is to take unconscionable risks with the national security.

Title VII of this bill, which deals with military aid to Vietnam, does three things, two of which have my wholehearted support. The committee's recommendation of a \$1.4 billion ceiling on military aid to Vietnam, however, serves the best interests of neither the United States nor the Vietnamese people, and I and others shall propose an amendment to reduce that figure to \$900 million. The bill as recommended by the committee:

Tightens up the language by which we require the Department of Defense to report its expenditures of the MASF program. Henceforth, DOD will be required to report actual obligations instead of estimated obligations, giving us for the first time real figures to work with in evaluating our military aid to Vietnam.

It repeals the authorization for any unobligated balances remaining in the MASF account at the end of this fiscal year. This will end the guessing game we have had to play each year as to how

much money is left in the MASF account.

It authorizes a ceiling on this year's MASF program of \$1.4 billion. This is \$100 million, or 8 percent more than the committee recommended for South Vietnam and Laos last year; almost \$400 million, or 39 percent more than the \$1,009.5 million that the Congress finally approved for Vietnam last year; \$570.5 million, or 31 percent more than the \$829.5 million in new money we made available for military aid to Vietnam last year; and \$656.5 million, or 88 percent more than the Defense Department had available in controllable expenditures last year. As was explained in the letter I and several of my colleagues sent to your offices today, of the \$1,009.5 million available for Vietnam military assistance last year, \$266 million had to be used to replenish U.S. stocks for ammunition provided to the ARVN in prior years. When this amount was subtracted from the available funds, only \$743.5 million was available for obligation for military aid to Vietnam in fiscal year 1974.

As these facts clearly show, there is absolutely no way that the \$1.4 billion ceiling can be viewed as anything but a substantial escalation of our military aid to Vietnam; yet, the facts of that conflict are that there has been no escalation of the war. The casualty figures provided to my office show, if anything, a slight decrease in military activity this year.

CASUALTY FIGURES

These figures show another interesting trend; VC/NVA casualties continue to bear about the same relationship to ARVN casualties as they have in the past with the VC/NVA losing 3 to 4 men for every ARVN soldier killed. You do not have to be a military genius to conclude from this that the ARVN is still mounting a substantial number of offensive operations. If there was ever any doubt about this, it was dispelled by the testimony of Maj. Gen. William B. Caldwell III. In his testimony before the committee, General Caldwell told us, in language which is repeated virtually verbatim in the committee report, that—

Territorial and population control have changed little over the last year—*what change has been made has been in favor of the Government forces;* (italic added).

Since the only land changing hands is coming under Saigon's control, it is impossible to believe that the ARVN has not been on the offensive. U.S. military aid is intended to help Vietnam defend itself, not to continue the war as though nothing had happened. Expert testimony shows that the ARVN has been able to mount offensives with the amount of aid they have; therefore, it is obvious that no increase is required for purely defensive purposes.

It should be understood that this is not all the military assistance that the Saigon government can count on from the United States this year. The President's foreign aid request contains \$183 million in funds for the commodity import program. The dollars generated by this program in the past have been used by Saigon for uniforms and construction

programs; in other words, to supplement their defense budget. If that \$183 million is added to the \$1.4 billion recommended by the committee, it will boost our Vietnam military assistance program to \$1.583 billion, or very nearly the \$1.6 billion requested by the Pentagon. Thus, this bill represents an even larger escalation than appears on its face.

It has been argued that we must provide aid at this level because "the Russians and Chinese are supplying Hanoi." True enough, Hanoi's aid does come from the major Communist countries; but how extensive is that aid? Hoang Duc Nha, Minister for Information and Open Arms for South Vietnam, wrote in the May 1 edition of the Vietnam Bulletin that—

Hanoi has now begun to realize that . . . neither Russia nor China will be willing to help it on a large scale.

Such figures as we possess on aid to Hanoi are classified, but if CVN officials are willing to describe that aid as being not on a large scale, it certainly cannot be very much.

Inevitably, we must ask ourselves exactly what our aid accomplishes. I have cited several times the report we received last year that the amount of gunfire in Vietnam on both sides was directly attributable to the amount of ammunition we supplied to the ARVN. That report was buttressed by acknowledgment by our embassy in Saigon of a need to "restrain" ARVN ammunition consumption, especially artillery ammunition. Yesterday, confirmation of the relationship between the level of our aid and the level of violence in Vietnam was received from yet another source. In a front-page story in the Washington Post, Phillip McCombs tells of discovering the "strange accommodation" between the VC and the ARVN; if the ARVN does not shoot too much, the VC do not attack. The logical extension of this accommodation is that if we were not giving the ARVN ammunition in excess of their self-defense needs, far fewer VC attacks would be provoked. With a lowered level of activity on the battlefield thus obtained, perhaps a higher level of activity at the conference table might ensue.

In the final analysis, it is not our military aid to Vietnam that will make the difference of their ability to or not to survive. Our former colleague, Melvin Laird, recently said:

The South Vietnamese can handle them. They have enough pilots. It is their foot soldiers who are important. If there is no will, it's their own tough luck. We have done everything that we told them we were going to do. That's what Vietnamization is all about. The fighting will continue for 20 years.

Mr. Laird and I have had our differences in the past, but that makes our agreement on this point all the more significant. Dollars do not buy victory—only the Vietnamese will can do that. If we continue as we have, dumping \$2.5 to \$3 billion into Vietnam every year, we can look forward to doing so at least for the next 20 years. Is this a fitting memorial to the Americans who were sent to die in Southeast Asia? I think that if those men

could come back to talk to us, they would tell us that we have far better things to do with our money than that. The administration has told us that we do not have \$250 million this year for programs to serve our own veterans; others will propose to reduce our military aid to Vietnam by twice that amount, and I hope that the House will agree with us that we have other, more pressing needs for that money.

Our amendment does not signal an abrogation of our responsibilities to the Vietnamese; rather, it is an acknowledgment of our responsibilities to the American taxpayers. The \$900 million ceiling I propose will not leave Vietnam high and dry. It makes available more money than either the \$743.5 million in controllable money we allowed last year or the \$829.5 million in new money we appropriated for military aid to Vietnam in fiscal year 1974. A \$900 million ceiling was unanimously agreed to by the Senate Armed Services Committee just last week; and no one would suggest that such men as Senator THURMOND or Senator TOWER would countenance an abrogation of our responsibility to Vietnam. They and I agree that \$1.4 billion is simply too much money for this program.

Our fiscal year 1975, Southeast Asia costs are \$584 million greater than our total MAP budget. In other words, military aid to Vietnam will cost us 46 percent more than military aid to the rest of the world combined. If our amendment is adopted, Vietnam costs will still be \$84 million more than the rest of our military assistance budget; but we will at least have brought these expenditures into some kind of reasonable relationship with the rest of the budget.

Mr. Chairman, it is a reasonable program that we seek. The United States is at peace; its citizens should not be called on to pay indefinitely for someone else's war. If we intend to participate in a meaningful peace, we must serve notice that the U.S. Treasury is not a bottomless grab bag for another 20 years of carnage in Vietnam. This reasonable reduction will represent a continuation of the policy of fiscal disengagement from Vietnam that the Congress initiated last year. It is a policy Americans will thank us for pursuing, because they know better than anyone what a drain Vietnam has been on financial resources already ravaged by the worst inflation we have experienced in over two decades. In the name of the American taxpayer, I urge the House to consider our amendment favorably when we propose it tomorrow.

Mr. BRAY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. ROBERT W. DANIEL, JR.)

(Mr. ROBERT W. DANIEL, JR. asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. ROBERT W. DANIEL, JR. Mr. Chairman, the Polaris/Poseidon strategic ballistic missile systems have gained recognition as a major cornerstone of the U.S. triad of forces to deter nuclear war largely on the basis of the survivability and reliability of the submarine platforms. The Trident system, now under development, will further exploit the

survivability and reliability inherent in the application of submarine technology.

As this country has indeed come to recognize in recent months, all wheels grind to a halt without suitable energy sources. This was very true of our early submarines, dependent on gasoline or diesel engines and chemical batteries. However, with the application of nuclear fission-generated power to submarine propulsion, the submarine became virtually unlimited in its operations.

The marriage of the ballistic missile to the nuclear submarines in our first Polaris systems is a success story that has long been told. It is a fact that our Polaris/Poseidon fleet has been a most valuable member of our deterrent forces almost 15 years. During that period five different classes of submarines and four different missile systems have evolved. Over 1,000 deterrent patrols have been successfully completed with the crews having spent almost 2 million hours underway in the 41 submarines of this force.

In developing Trident the Navy is following this same normal evolutionary process but with widespread application of new technology that has become available in the years since the Polaris/Poseidon systems were designed and built.

The major objectives of this report are to provide a strategic submarine-based ballistic missile weapon system that will: Be highly survivable in a sophisticated ASW environment; be a cost effective replacement for Polaris/Poseidon systems; carry a missile capable of delivering full payload to a much greater range than the Polaris/Poseidon systems.

In achieving the Trident objectives the Navy is, for the first time, developing a new submarine platform and a new strategic weapon system at the same time. In addition, with the longer range missile available, the Trident system will be based and operate out of a base in the United States. The location for that base has been selected at the naval torpedo station, Keyport, Bangor Annex on the Hood Canal across Puget Sound from Seattle, Wash. Construction on phase 1 of the base is planned to start late this fall.

Development of submarine components has been ongoing since 1971. The single most important development is perhaps the nuclear propulsion plant designed to allow Trident to operate more quietly than any prior class of submarine. The reactor is a new design first developed and tried out on an attack submarine, the *Narwhal*. Under normal Trident patrol conditions this reactor has virtually no moving parts. The propulsion plant used on Trident makes maximum use of machinery and hydraulic quieting techniques developed, tested, and proven on the *Narwhal* and the Navy's very latest attack submarines. The design is such that the systems will be capable of continuing deterrent patrol operations between regular shipyard overhauls for about 10 years.

Command and control of the Trident system is a second major area of improvement. Here the Navy is making maximum use of the significant progress

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made in the last few years in computer technology and computer driven displays. By bringing information from multiple sources to a single control station, they have been able to reduce the number of so-called "watch stations" and thus crew manning. This has a significant input in reducing the continuing operational costs of this so important system.

The Trident strategic weapon system is designed to handle a new family of missiles capable of much greater ranges than today's Poseidons. The missile under current development is intentionally designed to be compatible with backfit into the 31 SSBN's being converted for Poseidon. Although the missiles externally look very much alike, internally Trident is all new. It is the Navy's first three-stage submarine launched ballistic missile and utilizes much new propulsion technology developed in very recent years. All the experience gleaned from Polaris/Poseidon programs is being utilized to make Trident ever more reliable. The Trident system will also provide the room for future growth which was so prudently provided in Polaris and Poseidon, but which is now used up.

There are, of course, many other areas where Trident is taking advantage of new technology, such as the automatic and built-in test equipment utilized to increase overall system reliability by decreasing system downtime. Even when the system is in port, it is intended that a rotatable pool of replacement components and equipments be utilized rather than try to repair equipments on board.

Trident system acquisition is expensive, but today, what is not, however, when built and operating, the system will keep missiles at sea in an "alert" status for about one-third the cost of acquiring and operating a system similar to our earlier systems. All agree, even those who oppose Trident, that the system will be highly survivable against all projected threats that we can foresee. As a new element of the U.S. Strategic Forces, Trident provides some measure of maintaining nuclear parity with the Soviet Union and continues the criteria of a credible deterrence of nuclear war. As such, it provides additional safeguards to our Nation as we continue to work for an equitable armament limitations agreement. Under such circumstances, Trident must be considered a bargain.

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. DAN DANIEL).

(Mr. DAN DANIEL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. DAN DANIEL. Mr. Chairman, we consider our military procurement bill today in a climate of turmoil among the Western nations which is unprecedented. To borrow the words of Charles Dickens, written in an earlier period of unrest, if these are not the worst of times, they are certainly not the best.

West Germany has not recovered from the shock of Chancellor Brandt's resignation and the events which led to it. France barely saved her constitutional form of government from a Communist-Socialist takeover in the national election

yesterday. Britain's new Government, having come into office in a period of the most serious economic and political upheaval in two decades, appears at times to be hostage to manipulators, at least one of whom is a self-proclaimed Marxist. In Italy, where political stability has been virtually unknown since World War II, the Christian Democratic Party is in grave trouble, and serious cracks in the European Economic Community are beginning to widen. Belgium's Premier has recently put together a coalition government, after 3 months of effort, and in the Netherlands, a coalition was 6 months being assembled. Our neighbor to the north, Canada, faces new elections in July, and half a world away, in Australia, another cliffhanger election has been held, with the voters split down the middle. In Israel, nearly 4 months after that nation's elections, a new Cabinet still has not been assembled.

The entire portion of Scandinavia outside the Russian sphere is in turmoil. In Denmark, the minority Liberal Government escaped defeat last week by a hair. Norway's Premier, elected 8 months ago, functions with an uneasy coalition. Sweden's legislature is tied equally between opposing parties. It would come as no surprise if any of the three nations soon faced new elections.

Even Iceland is feeling the pangs of political upheaval, and its Parliament has been dissolved, with new elections set for June.

Portugal, under the rule of a military dictatorship, has in its cabinet two Communists, and the people of that land may very well find that a devil has been swapped for a witch.

There is a drought of decision leadership in the Western World today.

On the other hand, there is no disruption in Russia. There is no change. The dictatorship holds firm, and holds firm as well to its goals. There is no change in that respect, either.

None of the Western nations has, of course, been immune to governmental upheaval, although some have historically been more stable than others. But there has never been a period when the political fabric of the Western World was so torn at the seams, when nations were so buffeted about by political dissent and at times by political opportunism.

Just now, trauma in government may be the least of the world's worries. Having seen the successes achieved by those who control Arab oil, other nations enjoying monopoly or near-monopoly status in certain other basic commodities have begun talking in terms of embargo, of doubled and quadrupled prices, with little or no thought given the rest of the world—developed, developing, or undeveloped.

Inflation—bad as it is here at home—is considerably worse in the rest of the world. And balance-of-payments deficits loom large on the horizons of Japan, West Germany, and other nations which have not known them in the past few years.

At the moment, there is no really stable currency, and people in ever-growing

numbers are exchanging currency for tangible resources—for things—where it is possible.

Just this weekend, we learned that India—with all her other problems—has become the sixth nation to join the nuclear club.

And what else has happened, worldwide, as far as our Nation is concerned? Plenty.

Russia has recently acknowledged what many of us knew, but have not been able to say: At the time of the October war in the Mideast, she had available and ready to go into that troubled area some seven divisions, while we could have fielded only slightly more than one.

At that time, if I may add an aside, a great cry went up that the Department of Defense had manufactured a crisis, that the worldwide alert had been called solely for domestic political reasons; that no real danger existed.

Russia has told us in no uncertain terms that the danger was very real.

As he leaves his current assignment, the Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt, has acknowledged the conviction that we have lost our ability to control the world's sea lanes. He said:

The Soviet Union's capability to deny us the sea lanes—is greater than our capability to keep the sea lanes open.

While it is being argued that we must not establish a presence in the Indian Ocean, lest we provoke a buildup of Russian opposition seapower, the Russians have moved ahead full tilt to establish their own presence, and this will be expanded when the Suez Canal is opened. Right now, our naval forces are outnumbered by Russia's in that part of the seas, and you can depend on this—it will grow even larger.

All this is bad enough—but the situation gets worse.

Peace in the Mideast remains elusive. While we are all prayerful for success, reasonable men must agree that the outcome of current negotiations will be based in large measure on goodwill of all parties—a trait which has been absent from that area for many, many years.

The conference on mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe proceeds. Proceeds? That is a miserable choice of wording. Right now, it stagmates.

And why should this not be so? Why in the name of all that is good and holy should the Soviet Union withdraw 1 man—1 tank—1 airplane from Eastern Europe? By simply waiting, enough Members of Congress will apparently succumb to pressure from the antimilitary, and our adversaries will accomplish their goals; it will cost them absolutely nothing. All they must do is stall—and wait.

Those who espouse unilateral withdrawal adopt the following logic. One: MBFR talks are stalled. Two: they are stalled because the Soviet Union has no interest in expediting them, since the longer they wait—and I am quoting here

The more intolerable will be our irrational commitment in domestic terms, and the more damaging to European unity will be unilateral cuts when they come.

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Three: Since the Eastern nations, and Russia, have done nothing, we may as well accede to their wishes.

This is like saying: One. We live on the brink of a precipice. Two. Some day we may stumble over it, or the edge might erode away. Three. We therefore may as well throw ourselves over, since we are likely to go by accident, anyway.

Last year, the Jackson-Nunn amendment to mandate burden-sharing was appended to the military procurement bill. Its provisions have been substantially met. This was not an unreasonable requirement on our part, and the fact that it has been met indicates that our NATO partners recognize the reasonableness of it, also. It belabors the obvious to say that no one—and no nation—is going to pay for what can be had free. It is equally obvious that people are not going to pay for that which has no value. The requirement—and the meeting of it—represent a mutual acknowledgement of the necessity for our presence in Europe.

In the past 25 years, we have spent untold sums on military endeavors, to aid friendly nations in the maintenance of stability—and the Russians have helped those who shared their beliefs. In the same quarter-century, we have invested additional unnumbered dollars in economic assistance to friendly nations—as have the Russians. But there has been, in addition to these similarities, one difference. We have helped nations whose beliefs, whose ideologies, differed vastly from our own—India is a prime example—and we have occupied no nation to enforce our will.

By loans, grants, gifts, by provisions of grains and the material for self-sufficiency, by the construction of industries, of hospitals, of roads, we have done more than the world has ever seen before to help those who could or would not help themselves.

The people of the United States—unwillingly, through individual and group willingly, through individual and group endeavors—have assumed an obligation to the rest of the world. And no one held a gun to our heads. No one extracted our money at bayonet-point. We have done it largely out of our own free will.

Some of us have acted altruistically; others from a sense of practicality, in the belief that a peaceful and stable world would help to insure an equally peaceful and stable environment for ourselves and our children. I do not believe it is the will of the American people to write off this investment in the future.

Has it cost us? You can bet your life it has. But before you bet other people's lives, consider this: In a time when government, and the Congress in particular, are at a very low point in public esteem—garbagemen are more highly regarded—the military in our land lead the list of most-admired. In essence, the people of America believe the military is meeting its commitment, at a time when they believe the politician is shirking his.

And consider this as well—two-thirds of the people of America have faith in their country—have faith that things, bad as they are, are not intolerable, and

that they will be better. Should we not share this feeling?

We cannot ignore the effect of our actions here in this Hall on other nations of the world—our potential enemies, as well as our friends. The leaders in both categories can read—and they can read English as it is written in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

I do not believe it is the intent of this body or of the American people to send them a message of surrender. We have invested too much—too much of our blood, of the best of two generations of men. We have invested our money—that money which might well have been invested in other things. I concede. We cannot walk away now. We cannot say, "It was not worth it. We will throw away our friends, our lives, our children's future."

The pessimists say that we are watching the decline of the West, that capitalism and its attendant freedoms are gasping their last. I do not believe this. And the evidence is that the American people do not believe it, either.

The urge is strong at times like this to quote from an earlier period, to reassure ourselves, perhaps, that no matter how bad things are, they have been worse—or at least as bad—before. Yet nothing quite fits. The times are indeed unique. Still and all, there is a quotation, a statement which applies to our times. It is 33 years old, and it was said, not by a politician, not by a man of the military. It was said by an author—an intellectual, some same. It was said by Somerset Maugham:

If a nation values anything more than freedom, and the irony of it is, if it is comfort or money that it values more, it will lose that, too.

I cannot add to this.

Mr. Chairman, last week a member of the board of a Methodist Church in the Fifth District of Virginia, forwarded me a two page "justification" for reduction in military spending. This material was compiled by Coalition on National Priorities and Military Policy.

The Department of Defense, through a Deputy Assistant Secretary who was formerly an Armed Services Committee staff member, was asked to respond. The material is admittedly lengthy, but it is exceptionally pertinent to the bill we discuss today. I, therefore, include the statement and responses for printing in the RECORD so that we may all give it full consideration as we debate the military procurement bill:

REDUCE DEFENSE SPENDING—CONTACT YOUR CONGRESSMAN NOW

This year military spending increased significantly even though the U.S. has concluded direct participation in the Vietnam War and entered into a "peacetime economy". With the Defense Department requesting \$92.9 billion for FY75 and \$6.2 billion as a supplemental for FY74 (total of \$99.1 billion)—"the largest ever requested in one year except for 1942"—it is imperative that the defense budget be substantially reduced.

When communicating with your Congressman please urge him to support the following forthcoming legislative actions to reduce military spending:

1. A major worldwide overseas troop cut of at least 100,000.

2. Elimination or development slowdown of unnecessary weapons such as the SAM-D Air Defense System, B-1 Bomber, Trident Submarine, AWACS, Binary Cases and Tactical Mini-Nukes.

3. Support of a ceiling amendment which will limit further increases in defense spending. An amendment will be offered by Congressman Les Aspin (D-Wis) to hold spending to last year's levels; this would mean a reduction of approximately \$1.1 billion in the FY75 defense budget.

If these legislative actions are to succeed, your Congressman must hear from you immediately. The Military Authorization Bill which authorizes programs for funding will be on the floor of the House by mid May.

Constituent pressure is the most effective way to encourage congressional opposition to increased defense spending.

If you want your Representative and Senator to vote against FY 1975 military spending write, call or see them now.

STATEMENT

In FY 1974 approximately 68% of the 2-100,000 active duty personnel are serving as commissioned, warrant officers and non-commissioned officer/specialists (E-4 through E-9). There is an average of 2 officers or non-commissioned officer/specialists on active duty to command, supervise or assist each private.

DOD POSITION

To classify all officers and non-commissioned officers as executive or supervisory is an erroneous assumption. Many officers and senior enlistment personnel are specialists and technicians whose grades are more reflective of their technical skills, training, education and experience than it is a reflection of their supervisory responsibilities. To illustrate the magnitude of this, the Army officer corps at the end of FY 1974 will contain 92,500 commissioned officers. Of this number, approximately 28,000 (30%) will be a technically oriented officer of the Chemical Corps, Engineer Corps, Finance Corps, Judge Advocate General, Chaplains Corps, Medical Corps, Dental Corps, Veterinary Corps, Medical Service Corps, Nurse Corps and Medical Specialist Corps. Many of the personnel in the combat oriented groups are also performing technical duties. This group contains officers working in communications and electronics; transportation; ordnance (including nuclear devices); police, intelligence and logistical support.

On the enlisted side there are nine different pay grades. Technically, the top five of these grades (E-5 through E-9) are "sergeants", varying in title from "buck sergeant" to sergeant major. Many are NCO's, but many others are skilled technicians and specialists who operate and maintain complex equipment but do not supervise. The bottom four grades include recruits, privates, privates first class and corporals or corporal-equivalents. Although the corporals are technically NCO's, the majority of them are first-term personnel experienced only to a journeyman level of skill. A more meaningful comparison would be to combine the strengths of the bottom four grades, since together these constitute the group of first-term enlisted men, and compare that with the top five grades which constitute the second-termers and careerists. On this basis, there are 1.5 times as many in the bottom enlisted group as in the top. If officers are included, the officer NCO level would be 48% of the total force vice the 68% cited.

STATEMENT 2

In FY 1974 only 17% of the 2,100,000 active duty military personnel are assigned to combat skills jobs that fire on an enemy. In FY 1975, the Department of Defense estimates that there will be no improvement and this percentage will remain at 17%.

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DOD POSITION

This 17% of military personnel only considers those personnel assigned to such activities as the infantry and armor, artillery and aircraft crews. No recognition is given to the total number of personnel assigned to within those manpower categories which constitute our combat forces, i.e., the Strategic and General Purpose Forces categories. Since these are our fighting forces, it is certainly more meaningful to examine how many military personnel are assigned to these categories and what actions have been taken to increase that number.

At the end of FY 1973, there were 46% of our military personnel assigned within the Strategic and General Purpose Forces categories. In 1975, this will increase to 49%. That is, of the 2,152,000 personnel requested for FY 1975, 1,044,000 will be assigned to these combat categories. Certainly, not all these personnel will be in skills which require direct confrontation with an enemy. It is a principle of the Department of Defense to take full advantage of technology to obtain equal or increased combat effectiveness rather than use the gross application of the American Combat Soldier. This technology dramatically increases combat capability of our forces, but the complex weapons systems obviously have increased the requirements for supply, maintenance and transportation personnel. For example, an Air Force fighter squadron has 27 aircrew personnel, but there "combat skill" personnel certainly cannot function within that specialty without the support of approximately 262 maintenance and 151 munitions support personnel. In this light, the mix of resources required to constitute and support our combat forces structure is designed to provide the required capability at minimum cost. No "support" or "overhead" resources are applied which are not essential, directly or indirectly, to the accomplishment of the combat mission.

STATEMENT

In FY 1975 the Army and Marine Corps are requesting a total authorized end-strength of 981 (thousand) active duty personnel at a total cost of approximately \$10 billion. Yet only 260,000 of those personnel will be assigned to the 16 1/2 divisions the Army and Marine Corps will field to fight in defense of the US National security.

DOD POSITION

The allegation is correct. It was planned that way deliberately in order to obtain maximum combat power from limited resources.

This common allegation ignores the fact that modern land warfare is a complex, highly mechanized business, which demands a complex and highly mechanized Army and Marine Corps. It is simply no longer true—and has not been true since the turn of the century—that "divisions" contain all of the combat power, or that the vast bulk of an army should consist of private soldiers carrying rifles. If DoD were to design its forces to satisfy these kinds of critics, we would have more divisions, a high proportion of private soldiers with rifles, few supporting troops—and we would not be able to win a battle. The facts are that:

1. About one-third of combat power is not included in divisions.
2. Support is needed to operate and maintain the vehicles and weapons (tanks, helicopters, jet fighters) used by the Army and Marine Corps.
3. Weapons are useless unless they can be brought to bear on an enemy in a coordinated fashion, and this takes intelligence, command, control, and communications.

The following combat forces are not included in divisions:

Three Marine Air Wings (30,000 men) with fighters, bombers, and helicopters.

Four active Army separate brigades (20,000 men) with organic infantry, tank, and artillery battalions.

Three Armored Cavalry Regiments (9,000 men).

Forty-seven separate Aviation Units (10,000 men).

Marine Force Troop Tank, Artillery, Amphibious Battalions (5,000 men).

Seventy-five separate Artillery Battalions (45,000 men).

Special Forces and Ranger Units (6,000 men).

Fifteen Surface-to-Surface Missile Units (10,000 men).

Seventy-four Air Defense Units (12,000 men)

Thus an additional 147,000 soldiers and Marines are in combat units. The total for both Services is about 407,000 personnel in combat units.

Proper support of these combat units is essential to success in battle. Guns without ammunition are useless. Tanks without fuel are useless. Soldiers without food are useless. There is no point in providing combat units which cannot be sustained in combat at their design levels of combat power. The support forces of the Army and Marine Corps are designed primarily to provide the sinews of war: ammunition, POL, food, personnel replacements, maintenance, and new parts and equipment to replace combat losses. Other support, such as pay, mail, medical service, and police service, are provided to assure proper administration of the forces. Support which does not contribute in one way or the other to combat effectiveness is not provided.

Similarly, an effective command and control system is an essential ingredient of success in battle. It would not make sense to line up thousands of rifemen and order them just to "fire in the direction of the enemy". The object of the exercise is to bring fires to bear on the enemy. This involves finding the enemy, determining his relative position, providing aiming and firing instructions to the weapons, and pointing the weapons in the right direction with the proper firing attitude. The process is incredibly complex. This is true because the stand-off distances from our forces to those of the enemy have increased from 300 yards for rifles to 300 miles for missiles and aircraft. Our desire is to minimize our losses by hitting the enemy before he has the opportunity to close with our units. We want to fire at him from a distance. This is the cheapest way to fight. But it does involve having people for intelligence (to find the enemy), communications (to transmit the information), and control at various levels (headquarters). War is a confusing business; errors persist. The side that prevails is often the one that makes the fewest errors. We invest a lot of men in our intelligence, command, control, and communications systems in order to minimize error and make best use of our weapons.

Modern land forces are designed to provide maximum combat power. Critics who use simplistic ratios to discredit this design make about as much sense as those who would complain that there is something wrong with a football team because only four of the eleven players are in the backfield.

STATEMENT

Within each of the 15,000 to 17,000 men divisions only 28% of the manpower will be assigned to the combat battalions that do the actual fighting. Each division contains approximately 11,000 officers and noncommissioned officer/specialists—and about 5,000 privates.

DOD POSITION

This allegation is incorrect. A "type" division of about 16,000 men includes about 50% in the combat maneuver battalions, and an overall total of 72% in combat modules. The remainder of the typical division includes 16% combat support and only 12% combat

service support. The division is a balanced combined arms organization designed to apply effective combat power on the enemy. The combination of infantry, armor, artillery, and aviation, in which each arm complements and reinforces the others, allows a synergism which produces a maximum of combat power.

The approximate composition of the "average" or "type" division is as shown below:

	Men	Percent
Combat:		
10-11 Combat maneuver battalions: (infantry or tank).....	8,000	50
4 field artillery battalions.....	2,400	15
1 cavalry squadron.....	800	5
1 aviation battalion (less general support company).....	320	2
Total combat.....	11,520	72
Combat support:		
1 combat engineer battalion.....	1,000	6
1 signal battalion.....	500	3
1 military police company.....	200	1+
1 general support aviation company.....	220	1+
Headquarters (division, division artillery, and 3 brigades).....	600	4
Total combat support.....	2,520	16
Combat service support:		
1 maintenance battalion.....	600	4
1 medical battalion.....	320	2
1 supply and transportation battalion.....	600	4
1 personnel services company.....	240	1+
1 support command headquarters and band.....	200	1+
Total combat service support.....	1,960	12
Total division.....	16,000	100

The allegation with respect to grade structure is also incorrect. The basic journeyman grade for an infantry rifleman is Specialist 4th Class (E-4). The lower grades, entitled recruits, privates, and privates first class, are apprentice grades. Recruit and private grades are actually used in the initial training period for a new soldier or are the result of disciplinary or other administrative reduction action. The typical good and well-trained soldier in today's army is a Specialist E-4.

When a "type" division is broken out into officers, NCOs, and workers, both specialist ratings and privates, the approximate mix is:

Officers (including warrant officers) : -	1,200
Noncommissioned Officers:.....	4,800
Specialists and Privates:.....	10,000
Total:	16,000

Statement: The 2.1 million FY 1974 military force will contain more 4- and 3-star generals and admirals and colonels and Navy captains than were required on active duty in 1945 to command 12.1 million military personnel. Approximately 80% of all U.S. general and field grade officers serve in non-combatant assignments.

DoD Position: The Department of Defense shares the concern of those who want the grade distribution of officers to be at the minimum necessary to meet the needs of Defense. However, comparisons made to World War II structures can be misleading because the situation in World War II differed in many respects from the situation today.

First, in 1945 forces were fully mobilized. The quantum buildup from a total officer force of only 31,000 in 1940 to an officer force of 1.2 million in 1945 resulted in an officer corps consisting largely of very young men in uniform for the duration of the war. The grade structure produced under such circumstances is not a valid basis of comparison for the current peacetime force three decades later.

Second, the organization for Defense has changed. In 1945 there was neither a Depart-

ment of Defense nor a separate Air Force. The Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 created new unified commands and Defense Agencies and strengthened the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Both NATO and SEATO were established after 1945. All of these developments have increased the requirements for senior officers.

Third, Defense management is functionally more complex today than in 1945. The procurement and distribution of material and equipment is more technically demanding and requires a much higher degree of economic control. Command and control systems are more sophisticated. The management of human resources, too, is far more complex and challenging. These developments significantly increase the requirements for senior officers. It should be noted that the proportion of top management positions has grown elsewhere in government and the private sector for many of these reasons.

The Department is unable to readily verify the statement concerning the proportion of flag and field grade officers in non-combatant assignments because such summary information is not maintained nor required for effective management. It would be expected that the majority of senior officers would not be in direct contact with enemy forces.

Statement: In FY 1974 there were 42,000 U.S. military personnel (including 20 generals and admirals) and an undisclosed number of nuclear weapons stored in South Korea to "assist" the 600,000 man armed forces of the Republic of South Korea to defend themselves from the unlikely possibility of attack by the 360,000 man North Korean forces. Last year this force cost the U.S. taxpayers over \$600 million in direct costs—no change is proposed in this deployment in the FY 1975 Defense budget.

DOD Comment: The annual operating costs of maintaining U.S. forces in the Republic of Korea (ROK) currently are estimated at \$525 million in FY 1973 and \$560 million in FY 1974. Maintaining U.S. troops in Korea at this time costs less than supporting the same troops in the U.S. if factors such as the cost of providing in the U.S. modern housing and other support facilities and higher costs for food, civilian support, and other operations are considered.

Secretary Schlesinger in his Annual Report described the function of U.S. forces in Korea as follows:

"At the moment, the principal role of our forces in Korea is to provide a hedge against the uncertainties and deficiencies in South Korea's defense posture, and to provide an inducement to caution on the part of North Korea against the precipitation of new hostilities."

In addition, the presence of our forces serves as a manifestation of our support of the Republic of Korea in its effort to resolve the Korean problem. Our support encourages the South to take constructive initiatives with greater self-confidence such as the opening of contacts with the North (which resulted in the July 4, 1972 Joint Communiqué), the June 23, 1973 proclamation of a policy of free and open competition with the North, and the proposal of a non-aggression agreement by President Park on January 18, 1974.

It is policy to neither confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons at any particular location.

Statement: There is no article of the NATO Treaty that requires the commitment of any level of U.S. military forces in Europe. Yet in FY 1974 there are 320,000 U.S. military personnel stationed in Western Europe at a cost to the taxpayer of \$7.7 billion.

DOD Comment: It is true that there is no article of the NATO Treaty which, per se, re-

quires U.S. military personnel to be stationed in Europe. U.S. forces in Europe are an integral part of the NATO military posture designed to implement NATO strategy and operational plans as approved by the Supreme Allied Commander after consultation and agreement with National Authorities concerned.

Statement: There is no article in the SEATO Treaty that requires the commitment of any U.S. forces in the Western Pacific and Southeast Asia. Yet in FY 1974 there are 188,000 U.S. military personnel stationed or afloat in those world areas at a cost to the taxpayer of nearly \$3 billion.

DOD Comment: Listed below is the disposition of U.S. military personnel in the Pacific area as of 31 December 1973. (Areas where military personnel number under 1,000 are not shown.)

Japan (including Ryukyus).....	55,000
Philippines	16,900
South Korea.....	38,500
Thailand	36,000
Taiwan	6,000
Afloat	21,000

These troops are present in the area for a variety of reasons: because the U.S. is a Pacific power, to implement our forward defense strategy, and to support various treaty commitments.

Secretary Schlesinger in his Annual Report summed up the reasons for our continued presence in Asia. After noting that our military presence in Asia had been considerably reduced he pointed out:

"Nevertheless, we consider the possibility of conflict in Asia in deciding upon the characteristics and forward deployment of United States forces, because the continuing instabilities in Asia could involve the United States, and because having the visible capability to act can help to avoid, through deterrence, the necessity for action. A further large-scale or rapid reduction of United States forces in the Western Pacific would have unsettling effects in the region. Therefore, we continue to deploy one Army division to South Korea; a Marine Amphibious Force in Japan, including Okinawa, three tactical fighter wings at various bases in the Pacific, tactical fighter squadrons in Thailand, and B-52 aircraft on Guam and in Thailand; and naval deployments, including three carrier task forces, in the Western Pacific and, on occasion, in the Indian Ocean."

In speaking of our future posture Secretary Schlesinger emphasized:

"As we look forward, we see the most useful role for United States forces in the Pacific as providing a strong measure of visible support for our Allies, a credible deterrent to those who might risk new hostilities, and a general umbrella under which our Allies can pursue negotiations and internal development in an environment that encourages cooperation and discourages hostilities. Therefore, our present plans call for maintaining our forward deployments in the Pacific."

(It is planned that approximately 10,000 troops will be withdrawn from Thailand by the end of this year. Our deployments are under constant review and will be adjusted downward when the situation in Southeast Asia permits.)

Statement: On February 5, 1974, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger said, "It is a well-worn truism that our forces exist to support our foreign policy." Yet at a time when current U.S. foreign policy is supposedly directed toward detente with the Soviet Union and reapproachment with China, the United States is maintaining almost the same troop levels in Europe and Asia as during the depth of U.S. 1950-1960 Cold War foreign policy.

DOD Comment: It is false to assert that we maintain as many troops overseas as in the 1950's and 1960's. On the contrary, we

are now at the lowest point in our overseas troop deployments since before the Korean War.

The attached table shows U.S. strength overseas by year since 1955, i.e., since we had passed our 1952 Korean War peak. (Prior to 1955, different regional aggregations were used for strength data; these aggregations are not comparable to those in use since 1955, hence regional time-series cannot be constructed in such a way as to extend back beyond that year.) The table shows, first, that at the end of 1973, both our total strength overseas and our strength in Asia and the Western Pacific was at an all-time low for that period, while our strength in Western Europe and Related Areas was within 4,000 of the low registered in 1968, and substantially below the levels reached in the mid-1950's.

ASSIGNED U.S. TROOP STRENGTH OVERSEAS (ASHOR: AND AFLDAT)¹

Year (as of June 30)	[In thousands]		
	Total	Asia and W. Pacific	W. Europe and related areas
1955.....	867	320	412
1956.....	813	284	407
1957.....	799	262	461
1958.....	734	214	401
1959.....	699	185	375
1960.....	698	179	362
1961.....	703	197	371
1962.....	770	214	456
1963.....	762	224	424
1964.....	719	242	403
1965.....	744	297	401
1966.....	977	594	380
1967.....	1,208	744	364
1968.....	1,200	860	319
1969.....	1,155	842	296
1970.....	1,034	683	308
1971.....	804	453	311
1972.....	595	275	298
1973.....	542	199	319
Dec. 31, 1973.....	438	172	300

¹ Source: OASD/comptroller.
² Does not include troops afloat, for which 6th Fleet breakout is unavailable prior to 1955.

Statement: In FY 1974 the Defense Department operates over 200 training installations and has about two training personnel assigned for each trainee.

DOD Position: The statement does not agree with the facts. First, DOD does not "operate over 200 training installations." Of the 491 principal bases (that is, those which house a battalion-sized unit or its equivalent in manpower) which the four Services will operate in FY 1975, only 68 have the primary mission of training. Some training activities, such as technical schools, are tenants on other bases which have other primary missions, but these bases are not training installations.

The statement that DOD "has about two training personnel assigned for each trainee" is also incorrect. The average number of trainees in individual training during FY 1975 will be about 276,000. The total number of instructors and support personnel for this training will be about 266,000 (162,000 military, 93,000 civilians). It should be noted that this figure is not just instructors, as might be inferred from the statement. It included the full array of support personnel, such as the mechanics who service the aircraft used for flight training and the engineers who maintain the roads and operate the utilities on training installations. Nevertheless, using the full figure for training support manpower, the ratio of training personnel to trainees is only about nine-tenths to one, not two to one.

Statement: In FY 1974 and FY 1975, the Armed Forces programmed 2.1 million costly, permanent change of station moves among a yearly total force of 3.1 million military members.

DOD Position: In planning for proposed

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Permanent Change of Station (PCS) movements, each of the Military Services recognizes the delicate balance between the needs of the Service in mission accomplishments, objectives of Service attractiveness and limited monetary resources. At the same time, every effort is being made to provide more stability in the lives of service members by assuring less frequent PCS moves.

Unfortunately, it is not possible to gauge the PCS problem by dividing the number of programmed moves by the total military force figure. The two are related, of course, but are not necessarily inter-dependent. Certain categories of PCS moves cannot be controlled. For example, accession of personnel (which includes moves attendant to entry into service) accounts for over 1/4 of the total number of PCS moves. Similarly, separation of personnel (approximately the same percentage as accession) cannot be reduced. The other types of PCS, however, are controllable to an extent. These include training (for schooling purposes), operational (generally resulting from unit or activity activations or inactivations, relocation of units or reduction in size of activities), rotational (reassignment of an individual to a new billet—the category which usually comes to mind when discussing PCS movements) and Organized units (movements of entire units with all assigned personnel).

The following table summarizes the distribution of types of moves in the FY 74 PCS program for each Service.

PCS MOVES BY TYPE OF MOVE FOR FISCAL YEAR 1974
[In percent]

	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force
Accession.....	25	27	42	13
Training.....	3	10	1	19
Operational.....	9	18	9	10
Rotational.....	36	15	26	40
Separation.....	27	28	22	16
Organized unit..	(1)	2		2
Total.....	100	100	100	100

¹ Less than 0.5 percent.

In recognition of the problems involved, not only from a fiscal standpoint, but with a realization that morale of military personnel and their dependents is adversely affected by too-frequent PCS moves, the Services have been actively pursuing methods to reduce PCS moves since 1970.

As a result, in the Navy alone, which has an additional factor that does not apply to the other Services, the rotation of personnel between the fleet and shore billets, the number of PCS moves were reduced almost 50% from FY 70 to FY 73. Costs were reduced approximately 16% which represented a savings of \$26.8 million. The difference in percentages between moves and costs can be attributed to the inflationary impacts on cost factors.

The other Services have reduced PCS moves and attendant costs by a continuous examination of all policies which influence PCS moves. Wherever practicable, all factors being taken into consideration, unnecessary PCS moves have been eliminated.

Attached are illustrations of the PCS moves made by each Service from FY 72 to FY 74.

[PCS moves in thousands]

	Fiscal year—		
	1972	1973	1974
ARMY			
Total PCS moves ¹	1,486.7	1,018.6	849.4
PCS moves not related to transient requirement:			
Accession.....	187.1	252.8	184.4

	Fiscal year—		
	1972	1973	1974
NAVY			
Organized unit.....	16.8	14.1	3.0
Separation.....	533.4	254.5	228.5
Total.....	737.3	521.4	415.9
PCS moves related to transient requirement:			
Accession.....	27.0	25.4	23.9
Training.....	21.7	23.3	22.3
Operational.....	89.9	79.7	73.9
Rotational.....	610.8	368.8	313.4
Total.....	749.4	497.2	433.5
NAVY			
Total PCS moves ²	435.6	437.3	419.3
PCS moves not related to transient requirement:			
Organized unit.....	.8	3.0	9.3
Separation.....	151.9	150.0	117.3
Total.....	152.7	153.0	126.6
PCS moves related to transient requirement: ³			
Accession.....	121.7	140.6	111.3
Training.....	37.8	39.8	44.0
Operational.....	71.8	62.8	74.7
Rotational.....	51.6	41.1	62.6
Total.....	282.9	284.3	292.6
Ship/shore "no cost" rotations.....	32.4	29.5	33.9
Total.....	315.3	313.8	326.5
MARINE CORPS			
Total PCS moves.....	288.3	272.6	264.4
PCS moves not related to transient requirement:			
Accession.....	49.8	47.8	47.1
Separation.....	74.0	62.0	58.5
Total.....	123.8	109.8	105.6
PCS moves related to transient requirement:			
Accession.....	59.1	62.9	63.4
Training.....	3.9	2.7	2.7
Operational.....	22.4	24.6	23.6
Rotational.....	79.1	72.6	69.1
Total.....	164.5	162.8	158.8
AIR FORCE			
Total PCS moves ⁴	731.4	773.4	736.4
PCS moves not related to transient requirement:			
Accession.....	107.9	118.3	94.1
Organized unit.....	4.0	9.2	12.5
Separation.....	135.3	149.6	118.6
Total.....	247.2	277.1	225.2
PCS moves related to transient requirement:			
Training.....	170.0	175.6	142.8
Operational.....	61.9	61.5	72.9
Rotational.....	252.3	259.2	295.5
Total.....	484.2	496.3	511.2

¹ Excludes Military Academy cadet accession and separation moves.

² Excludes Naval Academy midshipman accession and separation moves.

³ The substantial decrease in transient requirements from fiscal year 1972 to fiscal year 1973 is the result of Navy managerial action to reduce the time personnel spend awaiting assignment or transfer.

⁴ Excludes Air Force Academy cadet accession and separation moves.

Statement: "In FY 1975 U.S. military personnel will be serving as military advisors in 43 foreign countries."

DOD Comment: The DOD personnel referred to will be assigned to Military Assistance Advisory Groups, Military Missions and Military Groups in foreign countries, commonly referred to as MAAG's which are key elements in the system through which military assistance and Foreign Military Sales requirements are identified and the resulting grant aid programs and sales arrangements are developed and implemented in a manner ensuring their maximum contribution to U.S. security objectives. These organizations are

not only responsible for efficient planning, administration and management of Military Assistance Program (MAP) and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programs, but also perform other functions of equal importance to U.S. interests by:

Providing knowledgeable Department of Defense representation in country to advise and assist the host country prior to and during major sales and delivery transactions involving a wide variety of complex military equipment produced by U.S. manufacturers.

Advising and assisting the host country in the development of military self-reliance and a realistic force level which meets the country's security needs, is within its capability to maintain, and is also consistent with U.S. collective security interests.

Establishing and maintaining rapport with the military of the host country to provide channels of communication, dialogue and influence which are valuable to the U.S. Government for diplomatic and commercial, as well as military, reasons.

Monitoring the movement and delivery of MAP end items and continuous observation and review of their use by recipient countries to ensure proper utilization and disposal—a residual function which continues after termination of grant aid programs.

The Department of Defense is dedicated to the principle that the basic purposes and missions of the MAAG's are consistent with the national interest in maintaining a minimum military presence in selected foreign countries. Thus, the need for MAAG's, their size and the skills of personnel assigned are kept under constant review within the Department of Defense. As the situation in a particular foreign country changes, all of these elements of the MAAG's structure are adjusted so that the objectives of minimum presence and maximum efficiency are kept in balance.

These security assistance organizations, by type and location, are shown on the attached sheet.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE ORGANIZATIONS
COUNTRY: MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUPS—19

Bellux, Denmark, China (Taiwan), Dominican Republic, Ethiopia, France, Germany, Greece, Iran, Italy, Korea, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Thailand, Turkey.

MILITARY MISSIONS—10

Cambodia, Military Equipment Delivery Team; Indonesia, Defense Liaison Group; India, Office of Defense Representative; Japan, Mutual Defense Assistance Office; Liberia, U.S. Military Mission; Morocco, U.S. Liaison Office; Pakistan, Office of Defense Representative; Saudi Arabia, U.S. Military Training Mission; Tunisia, U.S. Military Liaison Office; Zaire, U.S. Military Mission.

MILITARY GROUPS (14)

Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Uruguay, Venezuela.

Mr. BRAY. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. WHITEHURST). (Mr. WHITEHURST asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. WHITEHURST. Mr. Chairman, in these times of inflation, increased technical complexity, and rising cost of weapon systems, the Navy's patrol frigate program stands out as an excellent example of a program to meet an urgent military requirement in the most economical manner.

It is widely appreciated that the

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United States is growing more and more dependent on the use of sea lanes of communication for the necessary conduct of world trade, for the import of needed raw materials, and to sustain our friends overseas in both peace and war.

At the same time the Soviet Navy is expanding rapidly in the numbers of modern combatant ships and in its ability to deploy these ships in the critical ocean areas of the world. In contrast, the U.S. Navy has diminished markedly in size for over the last 10 years. The World War II ships, destroyers in particular, that were the mainstay of our Navy for so many years have reached the end of their useful life. To replace them with large, multipurpose, "able to fight anywhere" destroyers in the numbers required to adequately cover the thousands upon thousands of miles of vital sealanes in time of war would be prohibitively expensive.

The Navy has taken cognizance of the fact that, when combined with the newer escort ships that we now have or will have during the next 10 to 25 years, relatively small, less expensive ships could be designed and constructed to adequately defend our sealanes in all but the most hostile of the world's potential war zones where our carrier task forces and other highly sophisticated ships are designed to fight. And most importantly, the Patrol Frigate can be constructed in the numbers that we require at an affordable price.

The Navy has devoted almost 3 years of concentrated study, analysis, and design effort to determine exactly the right combination of weapons and sensors to provide the required force effectiveness at a minimum cost. Taking advantage of modern computers they evaluated over 300 combinations of hull, propulsion, weapons, and sensors before deciding on the patrol frigate as the most effective in meeting our needs. It is an austere ship design to provide maximum required capability at least cost. It is a ship which will fill a major portion of the void brought about by the retirement of our World War II destroyers.

It should be noted, also, that the Navy has been equally diligent in developing a shipbuilding program designed to prevent gross cost overruns. The ship is "designed to cost" and the "design to cost" principles will be adhered to in its planned production.

In summary, the patrol frigate is a well conceived program, carefully tailored to provide capabilities vital to the protection of the sea lanes of the world essential to the United States in peace and in war. It is a "no nonsense" ship, designed to provide maximum effectiveness at least cost. It is a ship we can build in the numbers that we need. It is a ship we cannot afford not to build.

Mr. BRAY, Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Colorado (Mr. ARMSTRONG).

Mr. ARMSTRONG. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I rise to congratulate the chairman of the Seapower Subcommittee and the ranking member for their leadership in bringing before the committee and be-

fore the House the important new provision in this legislation relating to the nuclear Navy.

It seems to me all too often Congress is preoccupied with day-to-day crises and all too seldom looks ahead to plan wisely for the future.

In presenting this proposal the gentleman from Florida and the gentleman from California have done so in a most responsible manner. I think historians will look back on the action they have recommended as an important turning point in the naval history of the United States.

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 6 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. PIKE).

(Mr. PIKE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. PIKE. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 14592, but I do not want to give the impression that I rise in support of everything contained within H.R. 14592.

I think we have done some very useful things in this bill. I am particularly impressed with the work of the Subcommittee on Manpower. Any time we can increase the proportion of enlisted men to officers, that is real progress toward a more effective fighting military. Any time we can decrease the proportion of generals and admirals to combat troops, that, too, is real progress.

I would like to say at this time I think among the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that General Abrams in particular is committed to the goal of making a fighting Army rather than a parade Army. I think he is doing everything he can in this regard and should be commended and encouraged.

Tomorrow I will offer an amendment to cut out the B-1 program. I will not go into that in detail at the present time. The minority views on this subject are on page 97 of the committee report. I was encouraged to hear the chairman of the Research and Development Subcommittee, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. PRICE) did concede in his own remarks today that it is in fact a sick program.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to address myself briefly today to the larger problem of getting facts out of the Pentagon.

I have not brought my lunch here today in this package, but I have brought an altimeter. This particular altimeter costs \$1,000, and that is not a bad buy for an altimeter, except that this particular altimeter does not work. It not only does not work, but it cannot be repaired.

It has on it a red tag which says, "Warning, for Ground Use Only. Not To Be Installed on Aircraft."

I would submit that an altimeter which cannot be installed on an aircraft is not much of a bargain. Not only did it cost \$1,000, but there are thousands of them sitting on the shelves at an Air Force facility, and they just cannot be installed on aircraft, because they do not work.

The Air Force investigated this procurement. What did they find? They found that the manufacturer was sneaking into the factory at night during the testing process and adjusting the altim-

eters while they were being tested. Did they cancel the contract? Oh, no, they did not cancel the contract. The Government inspector found that in the testing facility there was a tube running off from the vacuum and pressure testing mechanism, right into the wall of the facility, so that no matter whether the altimeter really worked or not, it would indicate that the altimeter worked.

So, did they cancel the procurement? No, they did not cancel the procurement.

There was just unadulterated fraud in this procurement of these altimeters, and finally the Air Force, because they did not work, canceled it for nondelivery. But they continue to buy other altimeters from the same corporation.

Now, can we get these investigation reports? No. We cannot, because, for instance, I have tried to get the OSI report. They have let me look at it, but I could not keep it. I pointed out to them the Freedom of Information Act which we passed, and the Freedom of Information Act says that when an investigation is completed we can get the facts.

Well, what do they say? Although the investigations say on the face of them that they are completed, the case is closed, they say, "We have not completed the investigation."

I say, "Why have you not completed the investigation?" They say, "We have not completed the investigation because you, Congressman PIKE, asked a question about it."

If I had not asked for the information, in other words, I could have it. But, in view of the fact that I have asked for the information, they are still investigating it, and, accordingly, we cannot get it.

Now, this is true throughout this whole procurement business.

The B-1 program increased in cost by \$300 million a month every month in the last year—increased. And we cannot get the up-to-date selected acquisition reports not only on the B-1 program, but on any program. We have not gotten a selected acquisition report in the subcommittee dated more recently than last December 31. We do not know what the B-1 costs today. They know over in the Pentagon. They are not telling us the truth. They know that they are accelerating the price at an estimated inflation rate of only 3.3 percent a year.

This is fantasy, and we ought to at least insist on the truth from the Pentagon.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. WHITEHURST, Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. RANDALL).

(Mr. RANDALL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. RANDALL. Mr. Chairman, tomorrow this committee will be faced with some amendments that will be every bit as important as those we faced at this time last year. Last year we had what we called the Peyser amendment. It was added to an amendment which made an attempt to reduce our commitments to NATO. The Peyser amendment called for a study of our forces in Europe, and with

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the mandate that the Committee on Armed Services make a report effective April 1 on its study. But there have been some important intervening events. I wish there were more Members on the floor who were not members of the Committee on Armed Services who could listen to this brief discussion.

Following the Peysner amendment came the Jackson-Nunn amendment. That said that in the period ending in 18 months—12 months from last November and an additional 6 months, which would expire next May—that if there is a deficit in our balance of payments because of deployment of air troops and our allies do not make up that deficit, then there should be a withdrawal of forces by the percentage which fell short of full offset by air allies. Thus Jackson-Nunn is one difference this year. As one who was privileged to serve as chairman of the ad hoc committee, that we have a very excellent chance of meeting Jackson-Nunn on time. There is no indication that we will fail.

There has been another event which has already been alluded to. That is the MBFR. The subcommittee visited Vienna, and we found there something that we had never seen before. There was complete unity among our allies in agreeing on what forces we should reduce and, on the contrary there was no footdragging and no delays at all by the Russians.

The committee reports to you here today that there is a good chance that that conference can succeed. We are not certain of the reasons for it. Maybe it is because the Russians are anxious to have our credits and our technology. Maybe they think more of the concept of detente than we realize, but they have indicated a willingness to move forward.

How does this apply to the debate and the amendments which will be offered tomorrow? There will be two amendments offered tomorrow, and maybe more. One will be simply to the effect that there are going to be 200,000 troops brought home from overseas. We do not know yet whether they are to be brought home or discharged. The other one would be a little bit different. It will say about 100,000 troops phased out, apparently brought home.

Of course, at the appropriate time the Armed Services Committee will attempt to show there will really be no saving. There might be some saving for those who are brought home if they were discharged. But for those who are brought home and try to find a place to house them, there will be no saving. In fact, it will cost more to keep them in this country than if they remain in the NATO area in the Federal Republic of Germany.

But let me get back on the track in the limited time I have remaining and say to the Members that the real seriousness of this whole thing is that if we approve any amendment to call home our troops then our Nation can very well become a spectacle in the eyes of the world for acting capriciously. We will allow ourselves to be held up to the justified criticism of all the world. In effect we will have said yes, we passed the Jackson-

Nunn amendment. Our allies are meeting Jackson-Nunn but we are bringing our troops home anyhow. The Federal Republic of Germany made the best offset agreement that has ever been made in all of the years there has been an agreement. At the moment just about everything is going our way.

In spite of their problems this year, the oil crisis, and all of the other problems, our allies have, nevertheless, come up with the best offset agreement of any year. So if we do a turnaround here tomorrow and happen to adopt one of these amendments for withdrawal, or any variation of them, then we are saying to our allies and to the world in effect: We did not mean what we said by Jackson-Nunn, and we do not mean anything we are saying or doing in Vienna at MBFR.

We have Secretary Resor, former Secretary of the Army, heading the negotiations over at Vienna. He came over here to make a report 2 or 3 weeks ago. We had a chance to visit with him. There was no diminution in his optimism.

It is unexpected and unanticipated the cooperation we are getting from the Warsaw Pact at this time in Vienna. Sure, we have a long, tedious time ahead at MBFR. It is going to be a lot of work yet, but the prize or the objective is the important thing, and that is to get a reduction—a balanced reduction of forces without diminishing our security.

For the first time we appear to have a breakthrough. Think how foolhardy, how almost stupid it would be if we approve any of these amendments tomorrow. It simply would mean we will have pulled the rug out from under our people. We might as well say to them: "Just pack your bags and come on home."

So I suggest to the Members they should think long and hard before they support either of these amendments which will be offered tomorrow.

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 6 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. DELLUMS).

(Mr. DELLUMS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, obviously this is one of the most important bills considered by Congress. The size of the military bureaucracy and the amount of money needed to supply it with hardware far exceeds the wildest dream of any nondefense agency administrator. Only the military budget is significant enough itself to set limits to what the whole Government can do or hope to do. In fact, the size of the military budget is the central issue determining domestic reform.

As Secretary Schlesinger has clearly told us, this first completely post-Indochina budget shows what to expect for the indefinite future unless some basic assumptions are changed.

It is the first indication of what can be expected from a supposedly peacetime Government. Unfortunately, the answer is: "Not much." Whatever else "peace" means for this administration, it does not mean any commitment to creativity

in any other field besides military hardware or to any renewed dedication to working out real problems.

At home, we see this in the fact that while every other Government agency and program is scraped to the bone, especially the human needs programs, and forced to show "efficiency dividends" at the expense of significant accomplishment only the military maintains its rate of growth without any substantial savings, in fact with a growth rate that outstrips the overall rate of inflation.

We must realize this: In an era of tightened resources and hard choices, we must choose either tax reform and defense cuts on the one hand, or a helpless Government facing multiplying social problems on the other. If the Defense budget is untouchable, the rest of the Government must wither away.

Abroad, we see this when we notice that détente does not mean an end, first, to our worldwide military presence; second, to our ability to fight any way at any time; third, to our dedication to keeping dictators in power though any means necessary; and fourth, to the same perception of political and strategic realities that dominated foreign policy thinking 20 years ago.

So we are forced to ask ourselves, "Is détente any different from the cold war? Does it make any difference at all? What is the use of it then?"

OVERSEA TROOP LEVELS

Manpower costs comprise 55 percent of the military budget. This figure does not include the increasingly heavy burden of veterans' benefits, which the administration never includes in its military spending figures, but which this year will be \$13.6 billion. We will undoubtedly save some money if we end some of the unneeded and costly weapons systems such as the atomic aircraft carrier, the B-1 bomber, the Trident submarine or the destabilizing land-based missiles—but we will never touch the bulk of the huge military budget until we revise our assumptions about the use of manpower. It is here that the Pentagon's refusal to come up with any real "efficiency dividend" is most flagrant.

For these reasons, I shall offer an amendment that will substantially cut end-strength, and mandate that the cuts be taken overseas. Exact location of the overseas cuts will be left to the Pentagon.

We now have 492,000 troops scattered all over the world. My amendment will cut 198,100 from this total. This decrease could easily be accommodated without any reduction in real commitment, because of the inefficient structure of the overseas troops as reflected in crowded headquarters, wasteful support-to-combat ratios, and disruptive rotation policies.

These are the key questions we want to ask:

Is it possible to have a real peacetime budget? Can the Government get its job done without raising taxes?

Do we need to maintain a worldwide military manpower presence?

Can we really end the arms race by the method proposed by the Pentagon, that is, new technological leaps in weaponry?

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Finally, does this budget really serve the interests and the security of the American people?

The answer to the final question is "no." In simple terms, this bill continues the disastrous trend of blind faith militarism and adventurism which has dominated policymaking in this Nation and which, over the past decade, has destroyed and distorted the American economy, shattered the political and social framework upon which our democracy was created, and killed and maimed hundreds of thousands of persons. There is a massive difference between what funds should be required to provide for the common defense of our Nation, and the money required by this bill. For this reason, I am strongly opposed to the bill in its present form.

MILITARY AID TO SAIGON

This Nation is a signatory to the Paris agreements and yet we are in serious violation of that true. Our client, General Thieu, has made a mockery of the Paris agreements; there is probably not an article that Thieu has not flagrantly violated.

Nevertheless, American taxpayers are virtually the sole financial support for Thieu. Estimates indicate that our tax dollars account for 85 percent of Thieu's national budget, and I would like to call attention once again to the figures noted by our colleague from New York (Mr. Price) in the floor debate on the supplemental aid to Vietnam, when he pointed out that the South Vietnamese defense budget dropped from \$1.3 billion in 1971 to only \$474 million budgeted for this year.

American dollars allow Thieu to continue a war that took approximately 60 thousand lives last year; American dollars pay for a police state in which thousands of Vietnamese are held political prisoner without benefit of trial; American dollars pay for the security of a petty dictator who refuses to allow distribution of the Paris agreements in his areas, who holds illegal elections, forbids neutralism, and employs systematic torture.

It is a sham to say there is peace in Vietnam, and a lie to claim there is "honor" in American policy toward that

tragic nation. What honor for us can there be when Thieu's biggest friend also happens to be the American Ambassador? I do not think this is the forum to deal with all of Ambassador Martin's follies, but I would like to bring attention to the fact that Martin himself has admitted that he is permitting outright American violation of the Paris agreement. Despite legislative mandate and terms of the Paris agreement, in a memorandum printed in the April 4, 1974, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD on page E2117, Ambassador Martin notes that—

A certain number of people in the Defense Attaché Office were retained, engaged solely on logistics assistance to the military forces of South Vietnam.

To me, that appears to be a flagrant violation of both congressional intent and the Paris agreement.

Finally, let me indicate what I see occurring if huge flows of American military assistance continue to Thieu—as the general and the administration desire. As long as America picks up the tab for his military operations and for his repeated violations of the Paris agreements, Thieu will continue the war. I do not think the Provisional Revolutionary Government will allow that to happen for any prolonged period—and up to now, the PRG has concentrated on achieving a political settlement based upon the Paris agreements and has undertaken only limited military operations. But I do not think it realistic for us to assume that the PRG and its allies would remain so passive, if it becomes apparent that Thieu will never agree to any of the political components of the Paris accords and that America will continuously fund Thieu's aggression. Whenever that point is reached, I think that massive fighting will break out again, and we will be back to the situation of a decade ago.

Given that chance, it is conceivable that, based upon the implicit commitment Secretary Kissinger has made, large-scale American forces could be reintroduced in Vietnam.

Have we not learned from the past decade in Vietnam? How long is this tragedy to continue? As long as Congress allows Thieu to mock the Paris

agreements by his repeated offensives, by his refusing basic human rights guaranteed by the agreements, and by gestapo tactics which pervert the legal system in Vietnam, it is we who must take the responsibility for war in Vietnam.

I do not oppose the concept of humanitarian assistance to the people of Vietnam. But this bill provides nothing of that sort. Instead, the American taxpayer once again assumes the burden of Thieu's military budget. As long as we do so—and no matter what level ceiling we may impose—there will be continuing war in Vietnam.

If instead, our Nation is to abide by the Paris agreements—something we have not done up to now—Congress must insist that Thieu live up to the terms set in Paris. I intend to offer an amendment on the floor proposing that all military aid be suspended until we are assured that Thieu is in accord with the Paris agreements and I urge my colleagues to support that motion.

This is a serious issue, but not one apparently critical enough though for the Armed Services Committee to devote major analysis and attention. Proper legislative oversight of Executive activities is, of course, the very key to our system of government—particularly now in an era of gross Executive misuse of power. It is thus with considerable dismay that I found that the committee report's language justifying military aid to Saigon contains outright plagiarism of unsubstantiated and thoroughly inaccurate Executive testimony.

I have discovered that the committee's justification is not only misleading, loaded with inaccuracies, and in many cases totally untrue, but it is, in fact, copied almost word-for-word from testimony given by a Pentagon spokesman to the committee on March 26, 1974. The following comparison of testimony given by Maj. Gen. William B. Caldwell, Director, Security Assistance Plans and Policy Formulation, to the committee on pages 893-895 of its hearings with the language of the committee report shows that the committee has simply copied the prepared statement of General Caldwell and then presented it as a summary of committee findings:

A COMPARISON BETWEEN HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE REPORT ON FISCAL YEAR 1975 MASF PROPOSAL AND TESTIMONY BY PENTAGON SPOKESMAN

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE REPORT ON MILITARY PROCUREMENT AUTHORIZATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1975 MASF FOR SOUTH VIETNAM, MAY 10, 1974, PAGES 85-90

TESTIMONY BY MAJ. GEN. WILLIAM CALDWELL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DIRECTOR, SECURITY ASSISTANCE PLANS POLICY, MARCH 26, 1974, PAGES 893-895

COMMENTS

The objectives of our military assistance to South Vietnam are limited, but absolutely essential. [The Government of the United States wishes] to help the Government of South Vietnam to maintain an effective military deterrent in the face of the considerable threat posed by the North Vietnamese forces within the Republic of Vietnam. Attainment of this limited objective is the key to the maintenance of stable balanced conditions necessary to ensure peace in Indochina and Southeast Asia. However, attainment of this objective has a vital and strategic importance far beyond Indochina. Involved are the fundamental goals of our nation's foreign policy.

General CALDWELL, Mr. Chairman, and distinguished members of this committee:

The objectives of our military assistance to South Vietnam are limited but absolutely essential. We seek to help the GVN to maintain an effective military deterrent in the face of the considerable threat posed by the North Vietnamese forces within the Republic of Vietnam. Attainment of this limited objective is key to the maintenance of stable, balanced conditions necessary to insure peace in Indochina and Southeast Asia. However, attainment of this objective has a vital and strategic importance far beyond Indochina. Involved are the fundamental goals of our foreign policy.

Paragraphs 1-2—The available evidence does not indicate that our military assistance is helping to "ensure peace". There were well over 1,000,000 war victims in South Vietnam alone last year—perhaps more than in the rest of the world combined for 1973. (50,152 military dead and over 100,000 military wounded, according to GVN official statistics; 15,000 civilian dead, 70,000 civilian wounded, and 818,000 refugees, according to the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Refugees.)

Not only does our military assistance fuel this continuing war, but it shows no hope of stabilizing. Thus last year \$1.009 billion in MASF funds was allocated to the GVN; in FY 75, however, the Administration request was set at \$1.6 billion, an increase of 42%.

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A COMPARISON BETWEEN HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE REPORT ON FISCAL YEAR 1975 MASF PROPOSAL AND TESTIMONY BY PENTAGON SPOKESMAN—Continued

Events in Vietnam over the past year have taught us that a lasting peace is possible only if there is a stable balance of power between the opposing sides. It is the view of the Committee on Armed Services that a military equilibrium in that area of the world will deter new offensives and gradually induce a (general) shift in priorities (by the contending forces) away from war.

Events in Vietnam over the past year have taught us that a lasting peace is possible only if there is a stable balance of power between the opposing sides. A military equilibrium will, we believe, deter new offensives and gradually induce a shift in priorities away from war.

Nor does it offer any hope of deterring possible offensives by the other side, which was neither deterred from a 1968 offensive by 550,000 U.S. ground troops or a 1972 offensive by a massive U.S. bombing campaign.

Clearly, the only way of achieving our objective of "lasting peace" is implementation of the Paris Agreement; there are numerous indications, however, that the GVN still refuses to recognize the PRG (See the *N.Y. Times*, Feb. 10, 1973; *The Economist*, Feb. 16, 1974) and test its offer to engage in political settlement.

Under these circumstances, the Administration's present MASF program offers little hope of encouraging peace and seems only to be leading to more war.

"The post agreement period in Vietnam has recorded substantial progress toward this goal. (Although) some fighting has continued, on the basis of testimony received by the Committee, it is the conviction of the Committee that the cease fire has indeed served to significantly dampen combat activity. Thus, the hopes of the Executive Branch, which are shared by the members of the Committee on Armed Services, for a stable peace in South Vietnam, are largely dependent upon the continued ability of the South Vietnamese to defend themselves.

The cease fire already has witnessed the following:

"A rough but tenuous balance of forces thus far prevails in Vietnam;

Territorial and population control have changed little over the past year (what change has been made has been in favor of the Government forces);

In the area of military operations, Hanoi's land grab offensive on the eve of the Paris agreement set a pattern of NVA attacks and Government reactions which still characterizes the cease-fire. Major Communist initiatives in the past year have included:

Another land grab attack prior to the June communique;

The capture of strategic posts (e.g., Le Minh border Camp) in the western highlands last fall;

An offensive in Quang Duc province which seized a district capital;

The shelling of Bien Hoa airbase;

The destruction of a major civilian fuel depot near Saigon;

Continuing attacks against all forms of transportation and;

Terrorism against civilians.

The post-agreement period in Vietnam has recorded substantial progress toward this goal. While fighting has continued, we believe that the cease-fire has served to dampen combat activity. Our hopes for a more stable peace are dependent on the continued ability of the South Vietnamese to defend themselves.

The cease-fire already has witnessed the following:

A rough but tenuous balance of forces thus far prevails in Vietnam;

Territorial and population control have changed little over the past year—what change has been made has been in favor of the Government forces;

In the area of military operations, Hanoi's land grab offensive on the eve of the Paris agreement set a pattern of NVA attacks and government reactions which still characterizes the cease-fire. Major Communist initiatives in the past year have included: another land grab attack prior to the June communique; the capture of strategic posts, for example, Le Minh Border Camp in the western Highlands last fall; an offensive in Quang Duc Province which seized a district capital; the shelling of Bien Hoa Airbase; the destruction of a major civilian fuel depot near Saigon; continuing attacks against all forms of transportation; and terrorism against civilians.

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A new North Vietnamese full-scale offensive, however, is not inevitable. Hanoi is keeping its option open but, is encountering serious problems both at home and in the south. These problems, together with a strong GVN deterrent and the international context of détente give us hope that an offensive can be avoided. A shift in Hanoi's priorities would then make possible a serious accommodation within the spirit of the Vietnam agreement.

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Paragraph 3—All evidence indicates that it is not our arming the GVN that has served to "dampen combat activity", but rather a Communist decision in 1973 that it is in their interests to try for a political solution to the conflict and emphasize reconstruction. (See U.S. Embassy analysis of Document No. 113, Vietnam—Documents and Research Notes; *N.Y. Times*, January 23, 1973; "Hanoi Puts Rebuilding Ahead of Victory"; *Baltimore Sun*, April 16, 1974.)

Paragraph 4—This shocking admission that "what change has been made has been in favor of Government forces" indicates that the GVN may well be using our military assistance to take land from the other side. This has been also suggested by numerous newspaper reports, for example one which reported that "In the past month, military officials say, almost 20 square miles of formerly Communist-held territory have been seized by South Vietnamese troops driving westward from Highway 1. . . ." (*Wash. Post*, September 30, 1973.)

This fact indicates that while the communist attacks listed did occur, the GVN is not entirely blameless.

Indeed, the consensus of opinion indicates that at the very least both sides have engaged in violations of the military ceasefire, thus making it difficult to attribute primary blame to either side for a specific military incident.

Senate Foreign Relations Committee investigators, for example, have reported that Saigon forces "have encroached on territory considered predominately under Communist control, and in MR III they have been even more aggressive in military operations. ("Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam," April 1923, p. 35)

And, until the GVN at least tests the other side's offer to compete for power politically by recognizing the PRG and allowing democratic liberties guaranteed by Article 11 of the Paris Agreement, the GVN may have to take the political responsibility for the military breakdown.

Paragraph 5—As long as the PRG is outlawed from the political arena, another offensive is unlikely in the short-term but inevitable in the long-term. The notion that the Communists are encountering more problems now than five years ago when facing 550,000 American ground troops or 1½ years ago when facing hundreds of U.S. bombing raids daily does not make sense. "International détente" did not stop an offensive in 1972, nor is likely to preclude a future one. There is every reason to believe that build up the GVN's army can only increase its capacity to provoke attacks, while doing nothing to prevent defeat. The GVN is offering the other side no choice at this point but surrender, and the experience of the past 25 years indicates that this simply will not happen.

H 4042

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

May 20, 1974

A COMPARISON BETWEEN HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE REPORT ON FISCAL YEAR 1975 MASF PROPOSAL AND TESTIMONY BY PENTAGON SPOKESMAN—Continued

While the North Vietnamese have increased the conventional capability of the main forces, the cost has been great, and the Government of Vietnam has thus far managed to turn back all their challenges in the past year.

Combat deaths, while substantial on both sides, have declined to the lowest level since 1965 and are down 75% compared with the rate in 1972. Some 500,000 refugees have been resettled. Virtually all pre-cease-fire civilian detainees and POW's—at least on the GVN side—have been released.

The balance of power which underlies the chances for peace is under heavy pressure from North Vietnam. Hanoi is conducting a massive military buildup in the south and repeatedly violates the cease-fire. These activities threaten the equilibrium and consequently the whole framework of the peace we so laboriously negotiated in Paris, for example: In total violation of the Paris Agreement, since the cease-fire, Hanoi has infiltrated over 70,000 replacement troops, some 400 tanks, 150 long-range heavy artillery pieces, 1,000 AAA guns and 150,000-200,000 tons of ammunition and supplies. Since the cease-fire, North Vietnamese capabilities have increased 20% in combat manpower, 200% in tanks, 75% in heavy artillery and 75% in AAA. Some of this additional equipment includes new items such as SAM-2 missiles with 16 to 20 launchers of which most, if not all, were introduced into the south after the cease-fire. The Communists are also working on 12 airfields in the south and are completing a massive new logistics system of all-weather three lane roads and pol pipelines.

The record of GVN's and North Vietnam's cease-fire implementation simply does not support the argument that our assistance will only facilitate new "violations" by the GVN and thus undermine the cease-fire. Throughout the cease-fire period, Saigon has exercised restraint compared with the Communists' excesses. It has observed the agreement to the extent of any prudent state faced with North Vietnam's current policy and activities in the South. Despite Hanoi's record of violations, the GVN has limited itself to justifiable acts of self-defense. With few exceptions, Saigon has limited its military operations to responding to communist land grab

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For example: In total violation of the Paris agreement, since the cease-fire, Hanoi has infiltrated over 70,000 replacement troops, some 400-plus tanks, 150-plus long-range heavy artillery pieces, 1,000 AAA guns, and 150,000-200,000 tons of ammunition and supplies. Since the cease-fire, North Vietnamese capabilities have increased 20 percent in combat manpower, 200 percent in combat manpower, 200 percent in tanks, 75 percent in heavy artillery, and 75 percent in AAA. Some of this additional equipment includes new items such as SAM-2 missiles with 16 or 20 launchers of which most, if not all, were introduced into the South after the cease-fire. The Communists are also working on 12 airfields in the South and are completing a massive new logistics system of all-weather, two lane roads and POL pipelines.

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Paragraph 6—Since the "enemy offensives" long predicted by U.S. and GVN officials have simply not materialized since the cease-fire, it is fundamentally inaccurate to claim that the GVN has "turned back all their challenges."

Paragraph 7—The Pentagon neglects to note that the 818,000 new refugees reported by the U.S. Senate Refugee Subcommittee are more than in any year of the war except 1966 (906,000) and 1972 (1,320,000). The Refugee Subcommittee also notes that many of those "resettled" have actually been simply shifted to economically unviable land so the GVN can claim new territory, in violation of Article 11 of the Paris Agreement which permits "freedom of movement". The Senate Appropriations Committee reported on December 19, 1973, that "reliable and objective sources suggest that there are between 40,000 and 60,000 political prisoners being held." Since the ceasefire, however, the GVN has only released, by its own official count, 5,081 "civilian detainees" to the other side, leaving tens of thousands still in jail. The U.S. Embassy in Saigon, moreover, has admitted not visiting the prisons since the ceasefire. (Cong. Record, April 29, 1974, S6421.) Thus American officials do not have sufficient evidence to make the sweeping generalization that the GVN has released all pre-ceasefire civilian detainees.

Paragraph 8—The evidence suggests that there has been no shift in the military balance of power in South Vietnam since the Paris Agreement in favor of Hanoi. Although there is no way of knowing the real figure of replacement troops, the 70,000 figure is more than offset by the 40-50,000 troops reported to have left South Vietnam to return North during this period. (Los Angeles Times, February 13, 1974), and the 50,000 or more "NVN/PRG" reported killed.

Moreover, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Staff reported the CIA estimate to be 142,000 North Vietnamese troops in South Vietnam as of April 15, 1973. (See "Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam: April 1973", p. 36.) Since then there has been virtually no change. Official U.S. sources put the figure at 138,000 in December, 1973. U.S. News and World Report, December 17, 1973; Chicago Daily News, December 19, 1973.) More recently the estimate was put at between 140,000 and 150,000 (N.Y. Times, May 6, 1974).

Moreover, USSAG headquarters reported that nearly all 400 tanks referred to actually came into South Vietnam before the cease-fire deadline. (See "Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam," pp. 36-37.) The argument can also be made that the relatively small number since South since then may well fit the "one for one" provision of the Agreement, as may also be true for the artillery pieces. [As for AAA and SAMs, the buildup since the ceasefire could well be a response to the heavy bombing of PRG zones which has been going on since the beginning of the ceasefire. Such defensive measures, in any event, hardly "threaten the equilibrium" as much as the refusal of the GVN to compete for power politically with its adversaries.]

Paragraph 9—The record shows precisely the contrary. An American official has been quoted as saying that "after we cut down the ammo supply, we found that the South Vietnamese were still outshooting the enemy by 20 to 1, but the overall total was that much lower." (Washington Post, June 4, 1973). Virtually every western newsman to have visited PRG zones since the ceasefire has reported random shelling of villages by ARVN forces (See, for example, New York Times, Feb. 18 and 19, 1974; CBS News, Nov. 14, and 16, 1973). Returning staff aides from a GVN-sponsored trip in April, 1974, have reported that American officials say the GVN is wast-

May 20, 1974

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

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A COMPARISON BETWEEN HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE REPORT ON FISCAL YEAR 1975 MASF PROPOSAL AND TESTIMONY BY PENTAGON SPOKESMAN—Continued

activities and to consolidating where its forces were present at the time of the cease-fire.

to Communist land grabs activities and to consolidating where its forces were present at the time of the cease-fire.

ing considerable ammunition and could get by on far less of what they are now consuming. U.S. Ambassador Graham Martin recently reported in a cable that it was only after "U.S. imposed constraints" that the use of American-supplied ammunition dropped at a rate of 20 to 50 percent.

The most striking indication of lavish ARVN use of ammunition is the fact that despite the Congressional refusal of \$474 million in a supplemental ammunition request, the Pentagon recently reported that the ARVN has survived and is not in the "dire straits" that Assistant Secretary Clements predicted it would be if the supplemental ammunition request was refused.

The foregoing suggests that far from exciting GVN violation of the cease-fire, our military assistance is tailored to enable Saigon to defend itself against Communist pressure while deterring a major offensive. South Vietnam's need for substantial U.S. assistance, both military and economic, is not open-ended. The next 18-24 months is an especially critical period which will determine whether Saigon becomes economically viable and whether a North Vietnamese attack can be deterred.

Provided the requisite amount of U.S. assistance is forthcoming in the near term, the executive branch foresees a significant economic revival in the South and the chance that Hanoi will shift its energies to more peaceful pursuits. Hopefully, these developments will reduce the need in subsequent years for heavy American assistance.

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Provided the requisite amount of U.S. assistance is forthcoming in the near term, we foresee a significant economic revival in the South and the chance that Hanoi will shift its energies to more peaceful pursuits. Hopefully, these developments will reduce the need in subsequent years for heavy American assistance.

Paragraphs 10-11—All available evidence directly contradicts the notion that there is the slightest possibility that Saigon can become either economically or militarily viable in the next 18-24 months.

An official World Bank Study Mission recently reported that "... net aid required in 1980 will still be on the order of \$770 million a year. . . . it seems probable that Vietnam is at least a medium 'long haul' case as far as foreign aid is concerned. . . . as a purely arithmetical exercise . . . by 1990 the external resources gap would close by about \$300 million to about \$450 million." (Current Economic Position and Prospects of the Republic of Vietnam, January 28, 1974, p. 34.)

As long as the GVN continues to refuse to allow refugees to return to their villages, even if in PRG zones—thus maintaining unproductive islands of millions of people, as long as it does not reduce its 1.1 million man army, 120,000 man police force, and 350,000 civil servants, moreover, there is little reason to believe that the GVN can become economically viable.

In 1973, for example, the GVN exported only \$56 million, while importing \$795 million. There is no foreseeable way this huge balance of payments deficit can be altered until there is peace.

Indeed, the reverse is likely to be true, as the cost of maintaining the GVN's war machine rises for the U.S. taxpayer due to inflation. Thus, although ARVN casualties were down from 39,587 in 1972 to 11,093 in 1973, the costs of maintaining the ARVN for the U.S. taxpayer did not decrease at all. According to official AID statistics supplied Congresswoman Bella Abzug on February 20, 1974, U.S. Military aid in CY 1972 was \$2.382 billion and in CY 1973 was \$2.270 billion.

Secretary Kissinger himself as much as acknowledged that our commitment to the GVN is open-ended, when he stated in a March 25 letter to Senator Kennedy that "we believe it is important that we continue our support as long as it is needed."

Paragraphs 12-14—If Committee members actually do read the hearings for the FY 74 supplemental and FY 75 authorization, they will discover that the DOD not only provides no evidence for any of its major assertions, but even admits this on page 900: "The determination of a ceasefire violation is exceedingly difficult. . . . As a result, we do not have truly independent sources for information of this kind." Indeed, this fact makes the numerous newspaper reports of GVN ceasefire violations by western correspondents all the more credible.

The question of whether the Administration is violating the "one for one" clause is not at all answered by the insertion from page 51 of the hearings, which in fact states that *no one*, not even the ICCS, is aware of what the Administration has channeled into South Vietnam.

Given the fact that the Administration has admitted replacing the F5A with the F5E, an entirely different aircraft, the weight of the evidence would seem to indicate that the Administration is not honoring the "one

The Departmental budget for military assistance to South Vietnam in fiscal year 1975 contemplates a program involving \$1.45 billion. Departmental representatives have assured the Committee on Armed Services that the proposed program in no way violates the cease fire agreement.

The printed Committee hearings on both the Department's fiscal year 1974 Supplemental Request and for the Department's fiscal year 1975 Authorization Request contain extensive data on the administration of the MASF program. The Committee urges that these hearings be read by all Members of Congress since such a reading will eliminate much of the confusion and misinformation which often occurs during debate on the justification for the continuation of this military assistance program to South Vietnam. For example, one of the more pertinent questions which is continually raised concerning the military assistance program to South Vietnam is the possible alleged conflict with Article VII of the Cease Fire Agreement, which provides for a one-for-one replace-

It is an honor and privilege to appear before you today in support of the request for a \$1.6 billion overall authorization and related program of \$1.45 billion in fiscal year 1975 for the military forces of South Vietnam. The proposed program in no way violates the cease-fire agreement.

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ment of weapons of the same characteristics and properties. The answer to this question appears on page 51 of HASC Document 93-40, and because of its pertinency, is set out below in its entirety:

Question. Is the International Control Commission in Vietnam supervising the delivery of weapons and ammunition for either side under article 7 of the cease-fire agreement which provides for a one-for-one replacement of weapons of the same characteristics and properties?

Answer. Article 7 of the ICCS Protocol specifies that the International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS) and the Two Party Joint Military Commission jointly inspect the entry into South Vietnam of replacements of war materiel permitted under Article 7 of the Paris Agreement. The Viet Cong has refused to permit the TPJMC to carry out this function, and the ICCS has taken the position that inspections by it alone would not be official. The United States and the RVN have kept records of replacement shipments to South Vietnam and have stated their readiness to provide a full accounting to the ICCS and to the TPJMC whenever those bodies begin to carry out their duties with respect to inspection and replacement materials for the two sides. Hanoi on the other hand has introduced illegally into South Vietnam vast quantities of armaments. No offer to allow ICCS inspection of this material has ever been made.

for one" portion of the Agreement. The committee report, moreover, also fails to note that the Administration is now proposing an even more blatant violation of the Paris Agreement for FY 75: introduction of 28 new F5Fs.

Most importantly, however, is the failure of the Pentagon to provide a rationale for its provision of \$521.6 million in FY 74 and \$574 million in FY 75 for Operations and Maintenance, and \$42.4 million in FY 74 and \$24 million in FY 75 for personnel.

It seems clear that neither of these categories fit the provision of Article VII of the Paris Agreement permitting only "one for one" replacement, and Article IV by which the U.S. agreed not to "continue its military involvement or intervene in the internal affairs of South Vietnam."

Most shockingly, the Committee also fails to note that the DOD's own definition of what is allowed under Article VII also precludes Operation and Maintenance and Personnel. "The Executive branch would be limited to furnishing only armaments, munitions, and war materials. . . . Those words (were) defined by the DOD for the purpose of complying with the peace agreement," DOD lawyer Forman has testified. (Senate Armed Services Committee, FY 74 Authorization hearings, Part 8, p. 5906).

Given such massive violations of the Agreement, the Administration would be better advised to observe Article VII rather than making empty offers to allow inspection of records, particularly when responsibility for the failure of the Two-Party JMC may lie as much with the GVN as its opponent.

That the committee would just copy word for word Executive testimony and present it as the recommendations of Congress is shocking enough, in and of itself. It also represents a surprising degree of slovenliness and shoddiness. And it raises the question of the very need for a staff. Why should taxpayers fund hearings, hire a staff, pay for the printing of public reports if the committee is going to merely mindlessly and slavishly reproduce Executive testimony?

The real issues raised by the report, however, go far deeper.

Is our only function to rubber-stamp Executive actions? Are we to avoid taking public witnesses more seriously, doing some of our own investigative work, integrating testimony by executive officials with that of other observers in an attempt to come up with the truth? What do we need the Congress for, if it is simply to endorse Executive pronouncements, no matter how untrue or tendentious.

The fact that the committee would plagiarize Executive testimony, falsely presenting it as independent conclusions based on an impartial and thorough analysis of the subject goes to the very heart of our democratic system. It represents an unconstitutional erosion of congressional powers, and is symbolic of our headlong progress toward an executive dictatorship in this country.

For, at the heart of the matter, there is not only plagiarism, but more importantly, indifference to the truth and to

our responsibility. The Caldwell testimony is replete with factual errors, and is indeed little more than blatant propaganda misrepresented as serious analysis.

I believe that there are few more critical matters facing our Nation than exposing the kind of congressional indifference to responsibility represented by this report. I further believe that the House has an obligation to reject entirely both the suggestion of giving \$1.4 billion to the Thieu regime this year and the half-baked rationale presented for it.

Despite what the Pentagon and its friends in Saigon would want us to hear and to read, there is quite another side of the situation in Vietnam. Because the committee has not allowed us a full range of material before we vote on this critical issue, I would now like to insert in the Record important testimony given to the committee and other materials available to it which present a broad perspective on the existing situation.

The materials follow:

TOWARD PERPETUAL WAR OR A POSSIBLE PEACE

(Testimony of Guy Gran)

The Military Assistance Service Funded (MASF) program is the principal overt and legislated channel through which the United States sends military aid to the Republic of South Vietnam (RVN) and to the Royal Lao government. For FY 74 this program now has a ceiling of \$1.126 billion of which \$1.022.1 billion for the RVN. In the supplemental bill under consideration the Nixon Administration wishes to raise the MASF

ceiling by \$474 million, using pipeline funds, to restore precisely the amount cut by Congress from the original request.

It would be well at the onset to consider that the MASF monies are only a part of the direct and indirect military aid to the government in Saigon. Additional military support results from all of the plasters generated by \$295 million of commodities under the Food for Peace program and some if not most of the plasters from the c.\$200m. Commodity Import Program. Additional aid is being channeled through excess defense articles, plaster purchases, and military service money. There is no reason to believe that three decades of covert CIA activities in Indochina, squandering both their own and DOD resources, with and without legal authority or Congressional knowledge, has come to a halt in FY 74. Finally, the RVN benefits from the American military presence elsewhere in Southeast Asia. An early FY 74 estimate of such costs was \$1.1 billion. A recent UPI report contained a DOD estimate that the sum of DOD activities in Southeast Asia would cost \$3.4 billion this fiscal year.²

The investment of another \$474 million requires judgments about political, military and legal realities in Indochina. It also necessitates judgments about the integrity of information concerning such issues released by the Executive branch. I shall argue that the basic political and military arguments advanced on behalf of this level of aid are not supported by empirical evidence. A major portion of the MASF program is not in keeping with the legal provisions of the Paris Agreement. The relevant information released by the Executive is deliberately distorted and incomplete. In sum, our policies

Footnotes at end of article.