

# NEWS, VIEWS and ISSUES

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# Governmental Affairs

WASHINGTON POST  
18 December 1972

## The State Department Denies Pre-Election Deception Over Aid to Uganda

Jim Hoagland's article on Nov. 19 charged that the Department of State deliberately deceived the American public regarding U.S. policy in Uganda as part of the American Presidential campaign.

This charge is as totally unfounded and unfair as it is serious.

It is so serious in our system of government that we regret you did not have sufficient concern for the facts as to check the allegation with us before printing the article. I was dismayed when, after the department denied the charge publicly the following day, your newspaper ran an article which, while it accurately described the policy we have consistently followed, made no effort to reflect that denial. That, in my view, is unfair journalism.

The events in Uganda have presented this government with several difficult problems.

Individual Americans and institutions in this country have been active in Uganda for many years, as educators, missionaries, and technicians. When Uganda achieved its independence, these activities were supplemented by official technical assistance, including both Peace Corps and AID activities. These programs were undertaken to further East African economic cooperation, to help in the development of Makerere University, one of Africa's oldest and finest, and to assist the people of Uganda. Whatever the political circumstances may be, one does not lightly suspend or terminate such help.

On Sept. 11, Gen. Amin sent his telegram to Secretary General Kurt Waldheim of the United Nations with its references to Hitler and the Jewish people. This naturally and understand-

ably provoked a strong moral reaction in this country, as in the Department of State. If followed other actions in Uganda such as the abrupt expulsion of the Asians, the arrest and disappearance of some of the lay intellectuals, harassment of Americans, and verbal attacks against the United States which had already attracted notice and awakened concern in this country.

At the same time Uganda was experiencing not only serious internal problems but also the attempted invasion by political exiles in Tanzania. Tension was high in the country and the safety of U.S. citizens in Uganda, numbering over 1,000, were judged to be in some jeopardy. Their safety was and always is the U.S. government's first preoccupation. We were certain that any abrupt or seemingly hostile action on our part would increase this threat.

On Sept. 14 the department's spokesman, Charles Bray, was asked for our reaction to Gen. Amin's telegram and, subsequently during his briefing, for U.S. intentions with respect to aid programs to Uganda. He replied that in the circumstances—the expulsion of the Asians, the harassment of Americans, and Gen. Amin's telegram to Mr. Waldheim—we did not contemplate signing a new loan agreement at this time. He noted that technical assistance would continue.

Mr. Bray had asked the Assistant Secretary for African Affairs just before his noon briefing that day if we were going to sign the loan which was then under negotiation and had been told that we certainly could not sign it under the existing circumstances, i.e., harassment of Americans, expulsion of Asians, the telegram to Mr. Waldheim.

In retrospect, and as this thought was conveyed at the noon briefing, it was interpreted by reporters present

to mean that we were holding up the signing solely to signal our political displeasure with Gen. Amin's telegram. We were holding up the signing solely to signal our political displeasure with Gen. Amin's telegram. We were shocked by the telegram. The facts, which had perhaps not been made sufficiently clear to Mr. Bray but which he subsequently noted in his briefing on Sept. 19, however, were that the loan was not yet ready for signing and that we had made no final decision regarding its disposition. Mindful of the delicate circumstances in Uganda and of the possible impact there of the interpretation being given the noon briefing, we authorized Ambassador Melady to inform Gen. Amin of the circumstances surrounding the loan, which I have just described.

Recognizing that these events had left some uncertainty regarding our position on these various matters, the Assistant Secretary for African Affairs took the occasion of a call on him by the Ugandan Minister of Finance on Sept. 28 to inform him that the circumstances surrounding events in Uganda, including the harassment and arrest of our citizens (since ended) and the expressed attitudes of Ugandan leaders on matters of deep concern to Americans would not permit us to go forward with the signature of the loan at that time. This remains our position. There will be no change in our position, moreover, without appropriate consultation with the Congress and a full evaluation of the state of our relations with Uganda and of Ugandan attitudes toward us and our citizens.

Those are the facts of the matter. They do not support a charge of deception. Your correspondent erred in making it.

ROBERT J. McCLOSKEY,  
Deputy Assistant Secretary  
for Press Relations  
U. S. Department of State.

Washington

WASHINGTON POST  
4 JANUARY 1973

## Departures Continue at White House

By Carroll Kilpatrick  
and Lou Cannon

Washington Post Staff Writers

The exodus of high ranking Nixon administration officials continued yesterday, led by Gerard C. Smith, who headed the American delegation at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks with the Russians over the last four years, and Phillip V. Sanchez, director of the Office of Economic Opportunity.

The resignation of Smith was confirmed by the Reuter news agency, who spoke with Mrs. Smith in Washington. She said her husband is returning to private life. He is a former New York lawyer who began government serv-

ice with the Atomic Energy Commission in 1950.

Sanchez' resignation, it was learned, soon will be accepted.

One of two second-line appointees is in line to succeed Sanchez.

Administration sources identified them as Nicholas Craw, director of recruitment at Action, and Howard Phillips, the program review director of OEO.

Craw was in charge of manpower and training at Volunteers in Service to America (VISTA) when that volunteer program was part of OEO, and was formerly director of operations for Project Hope, the hospital ship. Phillips was an unsuccessful Republican candidate for Congress from Massachusetts in 1970.

Mr. Nixon's chief science adviser and the government's chief labor mediator also are resigning to return to private life, it was announced yesterday.

J. Curtis Counts, 57, director of the Federal Mediation and

Conciliation Service, was offered the post of under secretary of labor, but turned it down to return to private life. He is an old friend of the President.

Edward E. David, 47, science adviser to the President and director of the Office of Science and Technology since 1970, also is leaving the government, the White House said.

The Defense Department confirmed reports that two top civilians—John S. Foster Jr., director of defense research and engineering, and Daniel Z. Henkin, assistant secretary for public affairs, are leaving.

And on Capitol Hill, sources told United Press International that three top Agriculture Department officials would be named shortly: Clayton E. Yeutter and William Erwin to be assistant secretaries, and John A. Knebel to be general counsel.

Yeutter, a Nebraskan,

headed the farm division of the President's re-election campaign last year. Erwin is now deputy under secretary of agriculture for rural development. Knebel is general counsel of the Small Business Administration.

David denied reports that he is leaving because of unhappiness over the role his office has been able to play in the scientific field.

"I'm not leaving with any sense of disappointment at all," he said.

Federal expenditures on civilian research and development now exceed expenditures on military research and development, he said. That was the charge the President gave him when he appointed him 28 months ago, David said.

David is to become executive vice president and director of Gould, Inc., a Chicago manufacturer of electrical, electronic and automotive parts. Counts has played a leading

role in settling some major strikes since he has headed the Mediation and Conciliation Service.

Counts declined to say what he expected to do in the future.

In other announcements, the President:

- Accepted the resignation of Tom Lilley as a director of

the Export-Import Bank, effective at the end of 1972.

- Accepted the resignation of Charles A. Meyer as assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs. From 1939 until he became assistant secretary in 1969, Meyer was with Sears, Roebuck & Co.

- Accepted the resignation of Kenneth Franzheim II as

ambassador to New Zealand, Western Samoa, Fiji and Tonga.

- Accepted the resignation of John R. Stevenson as legal adviser to the State Department. He is a former New York attorney and plans to return to private practice.

- Announced that Jonathan C. Rose, a member of the

White House staff since 1969, will become general counsel for the Council on International Economic Policy, headed by Peter M. Flanigan.

- Announced that Gordon C. Strachan, a White House staff member since 1970, would join the staff of the U.S. Information Agency.

HINDUSTAN TIMES  
5 December 1972

## Nixon's Desire For Secrecy

Krishan Bhatia writes from Washington

RECENTLY, following a reference to the subject by Mr Z. A. Bhutto, when diplomats and newsmen tried to assess U.S. thinking on the issue of resumption of arms aid to Pakistan, they were unable to make what could be described even as a moderately accurate appraisal. Their bafflement was typical of the difficulties they have encountered here in recent years and which should persist for another four years.

Not merely on the subject of supply of arms to Pakistan but on other, often less controversial, issues one finds the Nixon Administration excessively, almost pathologically, secretive. Mr Johnson was known to hold his cards pretty close to his chest but, by comparison to his successor, his Administration could claim to have had the openness of a market place.

When he chose his Cabinet four years ago, Mr Nixon introduced its members at a specially televised function and presented them as a group of remarkable, "extra-dimension" personalities who would be entrusted with considerable autonomous power. In a matter of weeks, however, most of them became faceless persons and remembering the names of the "Nixon Dozen," as they were called, became a favourite party game in Washington.

### Presidential Rebuffs

Most of them counted for little in the decision making processes that Mr Nixon established. One of them, the Interior Secretary, was so distressed over having no role to play that he wrote a letter of protest to his boss and was promptly dismissed. Another, the Housing Secretary, got his audience with Mr Nixon in the fourth year of his appointment and only when he had a politically sensitive report to make and threatened to go to the Press with it if he were not ushered into the Presidential presence. Yet another, who at the time of his appointment was considered as a leader with a future, resigned his cabinet post and joined the White House staff, in the

hope of saving that future, but in reality only to slide further into oblivion.

Real power has rested in the hands of individuals, not even half a dozen in number, in the White House and most of them have shared Mr Nixon's overwhelming, compelling desire for secrecy. Barring Dr Henry Kissinger who at least did not object to a certain measure of social limelight, these Presidential advisers have assiduously courted anonymity and have remained—by choice, of course—as "faceless" as the cabinet members. They almost never speak to the Press or the diplomats or even attend social functions.

### Other Influences

Two of Mr Nixon's senior advisers, whose personal influence and power equals that of Dr Kissinger, are Mr H. R. Haldeman and Mr John Ehrlichman. After four years of their powerful existence in the U.S. capital, they could probably walk through a crowd of diplomats and journalists without being recognised. Mr Haldeman has appeared on television only once. (Or may be it was Mr Ehrlichman!) The name of another important Nixon aide came to light recently when the Press was investigating alleged political espionage by the Republicans and it was discovered that he had been on the White House staff for over three years without his name appearing even on the private White House telephone directory.

Because the number of persons involved in decision-making is so small and because they tend to prefer dark corners, the dissemination of information is in the nature of a miserable trickle. When a decision is finally reached, it has to be made public, but how that particular resolve was made and what considerations weighed with the Administration is seldom known. Prior inking of any important decision, particularly if it is sensitive and controversial, is, in the circumstances, virtually impossible. If and when Mr Nixon decides to resume supply of arms to Pakistan, the public—and the Secretary of State,

Mr William Rogers—will learn of it more or less simultaneously. How and why that decision is taken will probably remain a secret between the President and Dr Kissinger.

This secrecy apart, what makes assessment of the Administration's approach to any issue exceedingly difficult is the fact that it lacks any firm "moral moorings". In the case of every government, here or elsewhere, there is always a sizable gap between its public professions and real actions. In defence of national or party or even certain personal interests, a government would sometimes deviate markedly from the principles by which it claims to stand. Yet, usually there is a limit beyond which it will not go. After studying its actions and declarations for a few months, observers are usually able to prescribe the outer limits to which a government will go in pursuit of selfish objectives. But the Nixon administration has foxed even seasoned students of government and diplomacy. What it would do in a particular situation would be a hazardous guess to make.

### Devious Manner

How far it may go for how little was demonstrated last month when President Amin of Uganda publicly praised Hitler for what he did to the Jews. Mr Nixon was by then entirely assured of a landslide victory in the elections. Yet he was not averse to taking away a few more votes from Senator McGovern by exploiting what the Ugandan dictator had said. In Washington, therefore, the official spokesman promptly announced that U.S. economic aid to Uganda was being held back as a mark of displeasure over the Amin utterance. But even as Jewish hearts were being mellowed, the U.S. ambassador in Uganda was directed to privately assure President Amin that aid was on its way and that the official spokesman had spoken out of turn. He was also urged to keep this assurance private but he declined to oblige. His disclosure made Nixon watch-

ers wonder why the Administration should act in this devious manner when the Jewish votes it could bring the President were not really needed and when U.S. interests in Uganda were far from vital.

Again, last year, Mr Nixon personally assured Mrs Gandhi that a solution of the conflict between the two wings of Pakistan was within sight and that the U.S. had been permitted to meet Sheikh Mujib in jail when, in reality, all that had happened was that President Yahya Khan had grudgingly permitted a U.S. embassy representative to meet Sheikh Mujib's lawyer. Even a committed Republican like Mr Kenneth Keating was disturbed by the obvious lack of truth in the official claim and sent a coded message of protest from Delhi.

### Buoyant Spirit

Apparently, the Administration plays this game as readily with its own people as with foreigners. Last month, Dr Kissinger publicly announced that peace in Vietnam "is at hand". For the first time in four years he allowed his voice to be recorded for television and radio broadcasts. The announcement roused tremendous optimism. Wives of American war prisoners who had previously sharply criticised and often even booed Mr Nixon were so cheered by the disclosure that at their annual meeting in Washington they gave Mr Nixon a standing, tearful ovation. The spectacle of their buoyant spirit carried tens of thousand of other Americans, too, behind Mr Nixon. The importance of the peace news pushed allegations of corruption against the Republicans off the front pages just when the public was beginning to get agitated about the matter. After the election, however, the White House stated that Dr Kissinger had "overstated" the situation and that peace was farther than everyone had been led to believe.

Watching the Nixon Administration for another four years promises to be a fascinating but frustrating experience.

BALTIMORE SUN  
21 December 1972

## Nixon is spreading Foreign Service brains around

By GILBERT A. LEWTHWAITE  
Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington — Frank C. Carlucci's new appointment to the No. 2 slot in the Department of Health, Education and Welfare makes him the "star performer" in a program to spread the State Department's brainpower around the government.

Mr. Carlucci, who is moving from the Office of Management and Budget, belongs to the nation's elite corps of 3,279 Foreign Service officers, of whom 1,385 are based in Washington.

### Agnew, Kissinger aides

Today, 120 of these work outside the State Department in other government agencies.

Their assignments stretch from the White House to the National Bicentennial Commission, from the Justice Department to the Council on Environmental Quality, from the Interior Department to the Conference on the Industrial World Ahead.

Vice President Agnew has one Foreign Service officer in his office. Henry A. Kissinger has three on his personal staff. And half the foreign affairs professionals on the National Security Council are Foreign Service officers.

Explaining the outside demand for Foreign Service officers, Robert T. (Ted) Curran, the State Department's deputy director of personnel for management, said:

"I believe there is quite a market for the type of background the FSO's present to the federal administration. They are carefully selected. It is a very competitive service. People in it tend to do well. I think they are a desirable commodity."

### State Department prospect

He added, "Frank Carlucci is our star performer."

According to one of his close colleagues, Mr. Carlucci was in line for a top State Department appointment before being named under secretary of health, education and welfare.

He still makes no secret of

his desire to return to the State Department eventually.

Whether the trend toward temporarily assigning middle-rank and senior officers to other departments continues — there are 20 more Foreign Service officers with outside jobs this year than in 1970 — will depend on President Nixon's reorganization plans and departmental budgets.

State Department officials deny that the program is used to discipline any officers or to dump "dead wood." And they claim that outside experience is an added qualification for promotion.

### Career boost questioned

Stanley Carpenter, on loan for the last year as deputy assistant secretary of interior for territorial affairs, questioned whether departmental assignment helped a Foreign Service career.

But he added, "I frankly feel more FSO's should be sent to other departments. My own feeling is that the future of the Foreign Service really lies in doing this sort of thing."

"It is the Foreign Service of the United States, not necessarily of the State Department."

Another Foreign Service officer, currently on outside assignment, said of his temporary transfer, "Emotions are never clean and simple. There were some regrets [about moving], but certainly not in the same way I would have had them 10 years ago."

"There has been some reluctance in the department to take outside assignment, but there is not as much now as there was. Morale is so bad. The State Department is a rather triste place at the moment. Some are rather pleased to leave the building."

The low morale has various causes, but two of them are easily identified as Dr. Kissinger's overriding influence on major foreign policy and constant efforts to reduce expenditure — and thus jobs — overseas.

WASHINGTON STAR  
21 December 1972

## Paper Gives Court Watergate Tapes

By BARRY KALB  
Star-News Staff Writer

The Los Angeles Times today gave U.S. District Court here tape recordings of an interview in the Watergate bugging case after the subject of the interview agreed.

The newspaper's action frees its Washington bureau chief, John F. Lawrence, of a contempt citation issued by the judge in the Watergate case after Lawrence refused to turn over its recording of the interview.

Until today's surprise move, it had appeared that the case, considered a test of the court's contempt powers and the newspaper's 1st Amendment rights, would go to the Supreme Court.

Surrender of the tape recordings was approved by Alfred C. Baldwin III, who says he participated in the bugging last summer of Democratic National headquarters, and followed almost exactly the course suggested yesterday by Judge Harold Leventhal of the U.S. Court of Appeals.

Lawrence was held in contempt of court and ordered to jail by Chief U.S. District Court Judge John J. Sirica on Tuesday after the Times bureau chief refused to obey an order directing him to turn the tapes over to the defense.

The Court of Appeals yesterday refused to delay jailing of Lawrence beyond a brief period allowed the Times to take an appeal to the Supreme Court. The Times bureau chief spent over two hours in a courthouse lockup on Tuesday after refusing Sirica's order. He was freed after an appeal was taken to the appellate court.

The contempt finding against Lawrence now is expected to be dismissed.

As a pre-trial conference in the Watergate case began this morning, Asst. U.S. Atty. Earl J. Silbert announced that following yesterday's Court of Appeals hearing, he had, as Leventhal had suggested, called Baldwin in Connecticut to see if the interview's subject would voluntarily agree to disclosure of the tapes' contents.

The prosecutor told Sirica that Baldwin, through his lawyers, had agreed to release of the tapes. They were handed over later to one of the judge's

law clerks.

The Times had refused to turn over the tapes on the grounds that Baldwin granted the interview after being assured that only parts of the interview authorized by him would be published, with the rest kept confidential.

The only condition set by Baldwin, in agreeing to release of the tapes, Silbert said, was that voices on the tapes other than his own be erased and not made public.

In a telegram sent to Jack Nelson and Ronald J. Ostrow, the two Times reporters who conducted the interview, Baldwin's attorneys, John V. Cassidanto and Robert C. Mirto, said yesterday:

"On Mr. Baldwin's behalf we are requesting that you withdraw your opposition to the subpoena and that you agree to the submission of the tapes . . . we appreciate the fact that both of you, as reporters for the Los Angeles Times, have steadfastly honored your agreement of confidentiality."

The defense in the Watergate case wants the tapes in order to study Baldwin's full statement and possibly attack his credibility when Baldwin takes the stand for the prosecution.

Baldwin said in the interview that he took part in the bugging of Democratic National Committee headquarters as an employee of the Nixon re-election committee. He implicated some of the seven defendants in the case, who include James McCord Jr., former chief security officer of the Nixon re-election unit, E. Howard Hunt Jr., a former White House consultant, and G. Gordon Liddy, former re-election committee treasurer.

Sirica said after today's development that he would accept the tapes and keep them locked in a courthouse safe until the trial.

"I'm very happy to see that this matter's been settled to the satisfaction of all parties," the judge said. He added that he was "very sorry" that he had had to order Lawrence locked up.

Sirica said that "at the proper time" he will rule that Lawrence has purged himself of contempt.

Nelson told reporters that he felt the outcome had been proper under the circumstances, but he said that the

larger question of whether a reporter can be forced to turn over confidential notes or tapes has still not been answered.

"I don't think we particular-

ly won our point, but I don't think under the circumstances we could have done anything but turn the tapes over," Nelson said.

NEW YORK TIMES  
4 January 1973

## Defense Sees Constitutional Test As Ellsberg-Russo Trial Starts

By MARTIN ARNOLD  
Special to The New York Times

LOS ANGELES, Jan. 3 —In the modern, almost antiseptic Federal Building downtown here, thousands of miles from Vietnam, the final act of the Pentagon papers case began to unfold today with the start of jury selection in the trial of Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony J. Russo Jr. They are accused of espionage.

The incidents leading to the revelations of secret documents can sometimes be as intriguing as documents themselves, and the trial is expected to be filled with thriller-story tales of documents clandestinely copied and distributed, of people hiding away and of F.B.I. stake-outs in the dead of night.

But more important than these mystery story ingredients are the legal issues involved, and their implications. Many lawyers see the trial of Dr. Ellsberg and Mr. Russo as a major test of the First Amendment to the Constitution, of the Government's authority over information and of the public's access to that information.

Nonetheless, the Government has refused to concede that such broad constitutional issues are involved in this trial. For even though the decision to prosecute Dr. Ellsberg and Mr. Russo was made at the highest levels of the Justice Department, the Government is contending that the issues are very narrow indeed—that, in fact, two men have committed precise crimes for which they are being tried and that no basic constitutional precedents are involved in the courtroom proceedings.

The Pentagon papers, a top study of America's involvement in Indochina through four Presidential Administrations, were first made public on June 13, 1971, in The New York Times.

Since then, the papers have become embroiled in the public debate over the Vietnam war, and have precipitated other debates over the obligation of the Government to keep its constituency honestly informed.

Indeed, the publication of the papers has led to reviews within the Nixon Administration and Congress of the nation's

security classification procedures.

And although it is not directly part of the Ellsberg-Russo trial, in the background is the fact that when the papers were made public, a newspaper of general circulation, The Times, for the first time in the country's history, was restrained by prior court order from publishing articles.

### Ruling by High Court

This restraint was lifted by the Supreme Court, in a 6-to-3 finding, but that ruling left important questions unresolved, questions that could in part be cleared up as a result of this trial.

The Times case drew separate opinions from all nine justices, leaving freedom of the press rights under the First Amendment somewhat blurred.

The Court did say that the Government had not met the "heavy burden" of proving enough damage to the national defense as balanced against a crack in the First Amendment to allow prior restraints.

However, the Court gave the Government the right to prosecute The Times after the articles were published. And this right left the issue of "national defense" obscure.

The drama and constitutional questions that are part of the Pentagon papers case focus on two men, Dr. Ellsberg and Mr. Russo.

Dr. Ellsberg, 41 years old, a former research associate at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, is charged with 12 counts of espionage, theft and conspiracy in the Pentagon papers case. If convicted on all counts he could receive 115 years in prison.

Mr. Russo, 36, an aeronautical engineer and economist, is charged with three counts of espionage, theft and conspiracy and could receive 35 years in prison.

There are also two alleged co-conspirators — Miss Lynda Sinay, a Los Angeles advertising woman, and Vu Van Thai, a former South Vietnamese Ambassador to the United States. Neither was indicted.

### Focus of Indictments

The indictments focus mainly on how Dr. Ellsberg copied the Pentagon papers while he was employed at the Rand Corporation in nearby Santa Monica, but they do not go into the question of how the papers

were finally made public. (The corporation does considerable work for the Defense Department and had two copies.)

The 15 counts in the indictments cover the period between March 1, 1969, and Sept. 30, 1970—nine months to more than two years before the papers were first made public by The Times.

They say that Dr. Ellsberg, during that period, first took many of the heavy Pentagon papers volumes out of the Rand Corporation offices in Washington and transported them to Los Angeles. The first cross-country trip, with 10 volumes of the 47-volume study, is said to have been made on March 4, 1969, and a second with eight more volumes on Aug. 29, 1969.

### Details of Allegations

The allegations are that Dr. Ellsberg, who by the nature of his position was authorized to have access to the papers, took the volumes, and other related material he had obtained from the Rand Corporation in Santa Monica, to Miss Sinay's advertising office at 8101 Melrose Avenue here and, along with Miss Sinay and Mr. Russo, copied them on Oct. 4, 1969.

Neither Miss Sinay nor Mr. Russo nor later Mr. Thai was authorized to have or see the papers.

Mr. Thai, who came to oppose the war in Vietnam, was alleged to have entered into a conspiracy with Dr. Ellsberg in the spring of 1969 to reveal to the public the classified papers, and the Government contends that it has found his fingerprints on several of the pages of the Pentagon papers.

The first count charges that in violation of Title 18, section 371, of the United States Code Annotated, Dr. Ellsberg and Mr. Russo conspired against the Federal Government to: "Obtain and caused to be obtained classified Government documents relating to the national defense . . . The documents would be communicated, delivered and transmitted to defendants and others, none of whom would be authorized to receive them."

That is the conspiracy charge.

The next six counts involve specific acts of stealing, concealing and receiving stolen Government property—including nine volumes of the Pentagon papers, a 1968 memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff about Vietnam and a case study of the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina.

The nine volumes mentioned in these counts were among the 18 that Dr. Ellsberg allegedly transported across the country, and why only these nine are mentioned in these counts will presumably be made clear by

the Government during the trial.

The six counts allege violation of Title 18, section 641, of the Code, which involves the embezzlement and theft of Government property.

The final eight counts involve unauthorized possession and reception of the Pentagon papers in violation of three subdivisions of Title 18, section 793, of the Code, which pertains to espionage and censorship, most particularly the gathering, transmitting or losing of defense information.

The subdivisions have to do with receiving and obtaining information about the national defense, whether they are documents or blueprints, photographs or sketches, and copying and distributing them to unauthorized persons.

### Maze of Issues

If the charges in the indictments sound cut and dried, the maze of legal and constitutional issues underneath is not, and because of that the Ellsberg-Russo case could become one of the most extraordinary trials in an era of spectacular courtroom encounters.

The Government alleges, for instance, the Dr. Ellsberg had illegal possession of documents "relating to the national defense." This means that the Government must prove that the documents are, in fact, related to the "national defense," not merely classified top secret.

In the case of the Government against The Times, the issue of "national defense" was resolved only insofar as it was related to the freedom of the press issue. The Court said The Times could print the papers because they did not imperil the national defense enough to justify the unprecedented step of prior restraint.

But the Court did not define "national defense," and it did say that perhaps, in a different action, the Government could prove that making the material public did imperil the national defense enough to make possible criminal convictions at a later date, after the papers were published.

So the Ellsberg-Russo trial could involve expert testimony from high officials of this and previous Administrations on just that point—what imperils the national defense.

Furthermore, the espionage statute requires that the defendants must have knowingly acted "against the best interests of the United States" and any argument over the nation's "best interests" would afford the defense an opportunity to discuss foreign policy, lawyers point out.

Dr. Ellsberg, for example, is prepared to argue that releasing the Pentagon papers was the best thing he could have

done for the nation.

His argument here is that he performed a public service by providing the nation with information that it should have about the conduct of the war in Vietnam and of American foreign policy.

All of this, of course, tends to obscure the very real constitutional issues, particularly the crucial First Amendment implications of the case.

Many constitutional lawyers believe, for instance, that conviction of Dr. Ellsberg and Mr. Russo would set legal precedents that could give the Government a greater degree of control over information than has ever before existed.

There are several reasons for this conclusion. The first is that the Ellsberg-Russo trial is, in essence, the Government's first attempt at imprisoning a person who "leaked" information to the public. That is, Dr. Ellsberg has admitted being the source of the Pentagon papers that appeared in the news media.

And while it is not the stated purpose of prosecuting Dr. Ellsberg, many constitutional authorities believe that successful use of the espionage laws against persons who have made information available to the public could have a deadly effect on others who might have information they believe should be made public. Such a development could give the Government unprecedented authority to conceal embarrassing facts.

In a separate case involving the Pentagon papers, a Federal grand jury in Boston investigated how The New York Times and other media obtained the papers. That grand jury was discharged shortly after Thanksgiving, without having handed down any indictments.

A spokesman for the United States Attorney's office in Boston said no final decision would be made on whether a new grand jury should be impaneled until after the Ellsberg-Russo trial. The office had said that the Boston jury was dismissed to avoid any conflict with the prosecution of criminal charges against Dr. Ellsberg.

How to keep Government secrets has always been a profound dilemma for the nation, since the First Amendment says: "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press. . . ."

Consequently, Congress has made several unsuccessful attempts to pass official secrets acts that would make it a crime to disclose or publish any information classified as secret.

However, with very few exceptions, these attempts have never succeeded for two reasons: many Congressmen believed finally that such laws would have questionable validity under the First Amendment, and they feared that such laws would allow Presidential Administrations to hide their mistakes simply by stamping them "classified."

The exception to this has been the Espionage Act, which outlaws the release of secret codes, disclosure by a Government employe of information to a foreign agent and the release of atomic information. None of this is alleged against Dr. Ellsberg and Mr. Russo.

But the Espionage Act also contains a broad, catch-all prohibition against disclosure of "any information relating to national defense" by a person who "has reason to believe [it] could be used to the injury of the United States or the advantage of any foreign nation."

Dr. Ellsberg and Mr. Russo are the first persons who did not pass on information to foreign agents who are charged under that provision of the act.

There are two more charges against the defendants that have never been made by the Government in any previous case, and both also raise profound constitutional issues.

The first is that Dr. Ellsberg and Mr. Russo conspired to "defraud the United States" by "impairing, obstructing, and defeating its governmental function of controlling dissemination of classified Government studies, reports, memorandums and communications."

If upheld, this could allow the Government to invoke general federal anticonspiracy statutes against, for example, Government officials and newsmen who work together to make public information marked "classified" — even though Congress has never made it a crime to make such material public.

Secondly, and perhaps even more far-reaching in the view of some constitutional authorities, the charging of Dr. Ellsberg and Mr. Russo under the general Federal statutes involving theft.

Dr. Ellsberg, for example, apparently never intended to keep a Government copy of the Pentagon papers. Rather, he made a copy and returned the original.

Thus, in this context, the Government's charge appears to imply that it owned the information contained in the papers, and that Dr. Ellsberg stole and criminally converted that information for his own use when he copied it. This raises the point that if the Government can own and control information rather than the paper it is printed on, the Government could suppress any embarrassing reports or studies without regard to the national defense.

In this, as in other points of the indictments, the Government has refused to speculate about broader constitutional issues and precedents that may be set by this trial. Instead, it has stuck to the much narrower view that two particular men have committed particular crimes and that whatever happens to them in the end will set no future precedents for Government prosecutions.

It is also the contention of the Government not only

that Dr. Ellsberg stole the Pentagon papers to make copies of them, but also that while he had them he deprived the Government—defrauded it, in fact—of their use.

Furthermore, the Government contends that while there may be no official secrets act, it is indeed the lawful function of Government to classify certain documents as "top secret."

The defense does not concede that Dr. Ellsberg stole the documents. It argues that he had Government clearance to see the papers, which he had helped to write, and that removing them from the Rand Corporation, copying them and then returning them did not constitute theft.

The defense argues further that since Congress did not pass an official secrets act, the Government is in effect asking the judge and jury to make law concerning classified documents, something that Congress has steadfastly refused to do.

Indeed, there is no statute that gives the Executive Branch of Government the right to establish its system of classifying information with such labels as "top secret."

The classification system rests, instead, on executive orders, not Congressional action. Violators of the system have not suffered criminal prosecution, only administrative jobs.

So if the two men are convicted, and the conviction is sustained through the Supreme Court, it could mean that making public classified information would have been declared a crime, even though no statute makes it a crime.

It could also mean that the Government would not be required to show that the act of passing information was intended to do injury or to help a foreign power, as the espionage laws now require.

Prof Melville B. Nimmer of the University of California at Los Angeles Law School, a leading authority on the First Amendment, has said: "The Government will have an official secrets act which covers not only official secrets but any and all information the Government has."

There is, of course, another side to this question. In 1789, for instance, Congress enacted a statute authorizing the heads of executive departments to prescribe "regulations" for the governing of the department, including "the custody, use and papers and property obtaining preservation of the records, to it."

Whether that will pertain to the Pentagon papers case will be determined finally by the judge's charge to the jury and the jury's decision.

The defense contends that the 1789 statute merely pertains to the internal operations of an executive branch department, not to broader issues such as security.

Under the statute the regulations, including executive orders, have the force of law,

many legal authorities believe.

Furthermore, the Freedom of Information Act of 1966 provides exemptions for nine board categories of information, including the exemption for "matters that are . . . specifically required by the executive to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy." And it will be argued that in providing exemptions, the right of the executive to impose secrecy is explicit.

In the end, this question might turn on what the jury perceives to be the meaning of the words "national defense."

One of the main defense contentions will be that the information contained in the Pentagon papers—as distinct from the physical papers themselves—was long in the public domain; that all the information in the papers had been the subject of newspaper and magazine articles, of books and of speeches by officials in various Administrations.

Dr. Ellsberg is not contending that the documents themselves, which include numerous secret Government memorandums, had been made public, but that the general sweep of the information they contain was already known and that the documents merely served to support that knowledge.

And the defense will argue that if this is so, and since the Government does not have a copyright on information, how can Dr. Ellsberg and Mr. Russo be tried for releasing information that was already public?

It is, a practicing Los Angeles lawyer who is not connected with the trial said recently, "the most interesting case I've ever heard of—there are so many great constitutional issues, so many obscure points of law.

"The defense has two really tough jobs, to defend the case in court and build a good record for appeals, because so much is going to depend on the judge's charge to the jury at the end of the trial," he said.

WASHINGTON POST  
22 December 1972

# Schlesinger to Get Helms' Post at CIA

By Carroll Kilpatrick  
Washington Post Staff Writer

KEY BISCAIYNE, Fla., Dec. 21—President Nixon today confirmed reports that he will nominate James R. Schlesinger, chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, to be the next director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Richard M. Helms, who has been director since 1966 and an official of the agency since 1947, will be nominated ambassador to Iran.

The President worked at his residence here today and conferred with aides, including national security adviser Henry A. Kissinger, by telephone, White House press secretary Ronald L. Ziegler said.

In Washington, it was learned that Mr. Nixon is expected to nominate Under Secretary Joseph N. Irwin, the No. 2 man at the State Department, as ambassador to France.

It was understood that nomination of the 59-year-old Irwin will be made this week. He would replace Arthur K. Watson, former IBM executive who has resigned.

The White House already has announced that Irwin—previously described as slated for “a high-level ambassadorial post”—will be succeeded at State by Kenneth Rush, who now is deputy defense secretary.

Early Friday the President and Kissinger will meet here with Gen. Alexander M. Haig

Jr., deputy national security adviser and designated to be vice chief of staff of the Army, who will report on his brief trip this week to South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand.

Ziegler refused to comment on reports from Saigon that the President had in effect delivered an ultimatum to both Saigon and Hanoi.

The reports said that the President warned Hanoi it could expect continued and intensified bombing if it refused to accept a negotiated settlement and told Saigon to stop making peace proposals that make it more difficult to reach a settlement.

Significantly, Ziegler did not deny the reports. Rather, he branded them a “rumor” and said he would not comment on rumors.

When a reporter asked if it was the word “ultimatum” that bothered him, he again declined to comment. If the reports had been entirely without foundation he almost certainly would have said so.

Haig left Bangkok today. Kissinger flew here with the President on Wednesday and is scheduled to leave sometime this weekend to spend Christmas with his children.

Reporters have repeatedly asked Ziegler this week why the President has not delivered a report to the nation on the breakdown of the peace negotiations. The report Kis-

singer gave last Saturday is all the administration has to say about the failure at Paris, Ziegler said.

There have been no public hints, predictions or speculations from White House officials on what may happen in the future. However, Ziegler has repeated almost daily that the United States is prepared to resume the talks at any time. The United States believes a settlement can be reached if Hanoi adopts a constructive attitude, he has said.

The administration is pursuing “every avenue” to reach an accord, Ziegler said.

In other announcements, Ziegler said that the President had accepted the resignation of David M. Abshire as assistant secretary of state for congressional relations. He resigned to return to Georgetown University as director of its Center for International Studies, Ziegler said.

Ziegler said no decision had been made as to whether acting FBI Director L. Patrick Gray III would be nominated to be director. He also said no decision had been made on a replacement for Schlesinger at the Atomic Energy Commission.

Ziegler vigorously denied published reports that Helms was leaving under pressure and that the White House was dissatisfied with some of Helms' work.

Helms informed the Presi-

dent Nov. 20 that CIA required all senior officials to retire at age 60 and that he believed no exception should be made for him, Ziegler said. Helms will be 60 on March 30.

Mr. Nixon is “totally satisfied” with Helms' work, Ziegler said.

The President requested Helms to stay in the government and offered him the ambassadorship to Iran, Ziegler said. Joseph S. Farland, who has been ambassador to Iran since May, will be reassigned to “another important post,” Ziegler said.

Helms is a native of St. Davids, Pa., and a graduate of Williams College. After a brief time in newspapers, he entered the Navy shortly after Pearl Harbor and served with the wartime predecessor of CIA, the Office of Strategic Services. President Johnson promoted him from CIA's deputy directorship to director in 1966.

Schlesinger, who will be 44 in February, is regarded as one of the more able administrators in the government. He is a native of New York City and was graduated from Harvard in 1950 summa cum laude. He also received his master's and doctorate degrees from Harvard.

He taught for eight years at the University of Virginia and then joined the Rand Corp. as director of strategic studies.

Schlesinger is a Republican and no relation of Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., who served in the White House during the Kennedy Administration.

NEW YORK TIMES  
22 December 72

## A.E.C. Chief to Replace Helms as C.I.A. Director

Schlesinger, 43, Chosen  
—Intelligence Official  
to Be Envoy to Iran

By JACK ROSENTHAL  
Special to The New York Times

KEY BISCAIYNE, Fla., Dec. 21—President Nixon said today that he would nominate James R. Schlesinger, who is chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, to be Director of Central In-

telligence.

He said also that he would nominate the current director, Richard Helms, to be Ambassador to Iran.

Mr. Helms' departure from the C.I.A. was described as a retirement, consistent with his feeling that he, like other C.I.A. officials, should retire at age 60. He will be 60 in March. There had been rumors that Mr. Helms was being forced out of his job.

The White House took pains

to affirm the President's appreciation for Mr. Helms' 30 years of public service and for the fact that it will continue. At the same time, the departure from the C.I.A. is touched with symbolic overtones.

In the opinion of knowledgeable officials, it means the end of an era of professional intelligence operatives and the beginning of an era of systems management. Mr. Helms, who once interviewed Hitler, as a reporter, epitomizes a generation that developed its expertise during World War II and subsequently helped to create the C.I.A. When appointed in June, 1966, he was the first careerist to become D.C.I.—Director of Central Intelligence.

Mr. Schlesinger, by contrast, is a 43-year-old economist and political scientist schooled in strategic studies, systems analysis, and defense spending. The author of a detailed report on the intelligence community for Mr. Nixon last year, he is expected to take over at the C.I.A. as soon as he is confirmed by the Senate.

Both the Helms and Schlesinger appointments had been forecast.

No successor was named to the A.E.C. chairmanship, which Mr. Schlesinger has held since August, 1971. Before that he had been with the Office of Management and Budget, concentrating on national security and international affairs.

Cost Issue Noted

That experience, coupled with the Administration's apparent interest in the cost and redundancy of intelligence programs, led a close student of C.I.A. to suggest today that what Mr. Nixon now wanted was "more cloak for the buck."

Details about "the agency," as the C.I.A. is known in the Government, are classified. But it is thought to have a budget of more than \$750-million a year and more than 10,000 employees. Most are involved in intelligence—technical assessment, analysis and estimates.

A "plans division" conducts clandestine operations, such as the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1961. Mr. Helms once directed this division, but not at the time of the Cuban invasion.

His new assignment is to a country whose leader was strongly assisted, according to wide belief, by a clandestine C.I.A. operation in 1953. The agency was reputed to have had a role in the overthrow of Mohammed Mossadegh, then premier, permitting the Shah of Iran to reassert his control.

If confirmed by the Senate, Mr. Helms will succeed Joseph S. Farland, who has been Ambassador to Iran since May. The White House said today that he would return to Washington and be reassigned to another post.

According to a private source, the outgoing Deputy Secretary of State, John N. Irwin, is Mr. Nixon's choice to become Ambassador to France. The position has been vacant

since the departure in early November of Arthur K. Watson, who is Mr. Irwin's brother-in-law.

In the first news briefing of the President's week-long Christmas trip here, Ronald L. Ziegler, the White House press secretary, also dealt with the following appointments topics:

¶Mr. Nixon has accepted "with very special regret" the resignation of David M. Abshire as Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations. Mr. Abshire will become chairman of the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies on Jan. 9.

¶Speculation about the directorship of the Federal Bureau of Investigation should be discounted for the time being Mr. Ziegler said. One newspaper

has reported that Acting Director L. Patrick Gray will be formally nominated, another has said he would not be, and a third has been in between, Mr. Ziegler said. The fact is, he continued, that no decision has been made.

Another vacancy arose in Washington today with the resignation of John P. Olsson after 20 months as deputy under secretary of transportation to return to private business.

Mr. Helma's new position comes after 30 years in intelligence work. After graduation from Williams College, he became a United Press correspondent in Germany from 1935 to 1937. Until 1942, when he was commissioned as a Navy officer, he was in newspaper advertising.

WASHINGTON STAR  
21 December 1972

## JAMES SCHLESINGER

# A New Look for the CIA

Late in 1971 James R. Schlesinger, his wife, Rachel, and two of their children made headlines by roaming around a barren, uninhabited island—Amchitka, in the Aleutian chain off Alaska's coast. They were not there to pursue Schlesinger's hobby: bird-watching. Their mission was to prove to skeptics that it was safe to inhabit an area where the U.S. government had just exploded the largest underground nuclear blast, known as "Project Cannikin."

A determined man who acts out his convictions, the 43-year-old native of New York City now moves into another controversial area, but one that produces few headlines: intelligence network.

Chosen by President Nixon today to succeed Richard M. Helms as director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Schlesinger will be giving up the post of chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.

In taking the intelligence position, Schlesinger will have an opportunity to act out some of his own conclusions about the way that job should be run.

His first job in the Nixon administration — assistant director of the Budget Bureau (later during his tenure renamed the Office of Management and Budget)—led to primary responsibility for reorganization of the intelligence apparatus of the federal government.

Accomplished in 1971 the changes streamlined budget-

ing procedures and, more importantly concentrated the process of coordinating and assessing intelligence data in the hands of presidential adviser Henry A. Kissinger and his aides in the White House.

The reorganization gave the director of Central Intelligence full budgeting responsibility for all of the intelligence services—enhanced a authority which Schlesinger himself presumably now inherits.

### Created Post

Perhaps by coincidence, a former colleague of Schlesinger's at the Rand Corp. "think tank" in California—Andrew M. Marshall—is the member of Kissinger's National Security Council staff most concerned with coordinating intelligence matters.

Marshall's post, as head of the "Net Assessment Group," within the NSC staff, was created by Schlesinger's reorganization plan.

Schlesinger had joined the Nixon administration in February 1969, primarily as a budget-watcher. His main assignment was to oversee the Pentagon's budgeting procedures, during a period when military spending was easing off the massive levels of the Vietnam war's peak years. He is reputed to have shown the Pentagon in one year how to trim \$5 billion out of its budget.

Although much of his professional and governmental life seems to have involved national security in one way or an-

other, he also has a reputation for being sensitive about environmental issues.

### Ecology Stand Tested

His friends recall that, among his other activities within the government, he persuaded the administration to reverse itself and to allow the Taos Indians to keep their sacred Blue Lake lands in New Mexico.

The chairmanship of AEC tested his devotion to ecology. Although environmental organizations strongly criticized his full support for the Amchitka atomic blast, they have praised his stand on the so-called Calvert Cliffs case.

Pressed by the atomic energy industry to appeal a federal court decision ordering the AEC to act much more aggressively to protect the environment, Schlesinger refused, choosing to obey the court.

The chairman also has taken the position that it is not appropriate for the AEC to promote atomic energy, or to estimate how much nuclear power the nation will need. Instead, it has been his policy to have the agency develop energy options that the public may decide to use as it wishes.

Trained as an economist, Schlesinger was graduated summa cum laude from Harvard in 1950. After a year's travel in Europe on a fellowship, he returned to Harvard to take a doctorate in econom-

ics.

### Taught at Virginia

After, that, he taught economics at the University of Virginia, and began concentrating on the budgetary side of national security and defense policy. He wrote a book titled "The Political Economy of National Security."

In part as a result of the book's favorable notice among experts in the national security field, Schlesinger was offered the job at Rand in Santa Monica which carried out much of the defense establishment's computer-based analysis of defense systems.

While at Rand, Schlesinger headed a study of nuclear arms proliferation, and worked on a study of the role of "systems analysis" in political decision-making. That work brought him to the attention of the Nixon administration's new budget staff in the early days after the President's inauguration.

During their time in Washington, the Schlesingers have avoided much of the city's social life. Schlesinger is said to dislike cocktail parties.

He is a Republican and a Lutheran. Mrs. Schlesinger, the former Rachel Mellinger, is a graduate of Radcliffe. They have eight children—four daughters and four sons.



NEW YORK TIMES  
22 December 72

## A Discreet Nominee

James Rodney Schlesinger

By LINDA CHARLTON  
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 21— James Rodney Schlesinger, whose expected nomination as the new head of the Central Intelligence Agency was announced by the White House today, received considerable public attention as the Atomic Energy Commission chairman who took his wife and two of his children along to witness the controversial detonation of a hydrogen bomb in the Aleutian Islands.

But that incident, in November, 1971, about four months after he became chairman of the commission, was one of the less startling actions of his tenure.

Faced with trying to reconcile the opposing interests of conservationists and advocates of nuclear energy, Mr. Schlesinger began by indicating that he was no longer going to take the traditional A.E.C. position of championing the rights of nuclear energy above all others, including those of citizens.

This he did by deciding, on taking office, not to appeal a Federal court decision requiring the commission to be responsive to questions on the location of nuclear power plants and their effects on the environment.

### Public Interest Stressed

Not long after this, he told representatives of the nuclear industry that the commission "exists to serve the public interest," not that of the industry.

During his 17 months as chairman of the commission, he has also undertaken a drastic reorganization of its structure—cutting back on high-level staff and creating a new "assistant general manager for environmental and safety affairs."

While the 43-year-old Mr. Schlesinger has made no secret of his advocacy of nuclear energy as a power source, he says that the skeptics have a right to be heard.

In a magazine interview, he urged "getting away from the attitude, to wit, that atoms are beautiful."

"Historically, this attitude is understandable," he said. "But, in fact, atoms may or may not be useful, depending on the circumstances."

He urged the commission

to broaden its concern to take in the entire energy area.

Before heading the commission, Mr. Schlesinger was assistant director of the Office of Management and Budget. He joined the Nixon Administration in 1969 after working for the Rand Corporation as director of strategic studies. During his years at Rand, he was a consultant on atomic energy to the Budget Bureau and directed a nuclear-proliferation study commissioned by the Federal Government.

### Born in New York

Mr. Schlesinger was born in New York on Feb. 15, 1929. He graduated summa cum laude and was elected to Phi Beta Kappa.

He also won a prize of \$2,400 that underwrote a year's travel in western Europe and parts of Africa and Asia. "I learned that the world was a very complicated place," he said, "and that the narrow discipline of economics gave a narrow insight into the social life of man."

He returned to Harvard for his master's and doctorate degrees and in 1954 married Rachel Mellinger, who was then at Radcliffe. They have four sons and four daughters and live in Alexandria, Va.

They moved on to the University of Virginia, where Mr. Schlesinger taught economics for six years except for a six-month leave of absence to teach at the Naval War College in Newport, R. I. He wrote a book, "The Political Economy of National Security" and it was this that attracted the attention of, and a job offer from the Rand Corporation.

Mr. Schlesinger is described as an unpretentious, plain-living man who wears off-the-bargain-rack suits, drives a retirement-age car, enjoys bird-watching and reading Lutheran Theology and writes his own policy speeches.

For all his articulateness, the normally frank Mr. Schlesinger has demonstrated recently that he can keep his mouth shut. Speculation that he would be named to the intelligence agency has been swirling through Washington since the beginning of the month, but he has been as discreet as any C.I.A. operative of fact or fiction.

WASHINGTON STAR  
21 December 1972

## State Aides in Dark In Choice of Helms

By OSWALD JOHNSTON  
Star-News Staff Writer

The White House apparently bypassed normal channels when it informed the Iranian government that Richard M. Helms, outgoing director of the Central Intelligence Agency, would be the next U.S. ambassador in Tehran.

Iranian specialists at the State Department have indicated their office was totally uninformed as recently as yesterday about Helms' nomination. Yet it is understood the Iranian government was informed of the choice through less bureaucratic channels as long as three weeks ago.

Bypassing the bureaucracy in obtaining compliance from a foreign ministry to an ambassadorial appointment from outside the career foreign service is not that rare an occurrence. But Foreign Service veterans are noticing some unusual aspects to the Helms' nomination.

First is the generally recognized fact that the CIA has acquired a largely mythical but highly potent reputation in much of the underdeveloped Third World as an agent of "U.S. imperialism" and an instigator of political intrigue.

Second is the historical fact that the origins of this reputation lie in the CIA's spectacularly successful 1953 coup d'etat in Iran which, under the direction of Kermit Roosevelt, unseated the anti-Western premier, Mohammed Mossadegh, and reinstalled the present shah, Reza Pahlevi, as ruler.

WASHINGTON POST  
23 November 1972

### Soviets Accuse CIA Of 'Heroin Policy'

MOSCOW, Nov. 22 (UPI)—The Soviet newspaper Literary Gazette accused the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) today of providing heroin to dissident groups in Europe.

The CIA "policy of heroin" has been under way for five

Third is the circumstance that Helms, from 1952 to 1962, was deputy director of plans at the CIA—the division responsible for planning and carrying out clandestine operations like the Iranian coup. Helms headed the division from 1962 to 1966, when he became CIA director.

Foreign Service sources indicated a belief that these facts and circumstance could explain the otherwise baffling delay in the public announcement by the White House of its weeks old decision to send Helms to Tehran.

Given the widespread impact of the shah's CIA-backed coup on Iran's immediate neighbors in the Middle East, the Soviet Union and the Indian peninsula, Helms' nomination can scarcely have been received with equanimity even at nearly 20 years' distance.

Despite a carefully nurtured public image of peace, progress and prosperity, Iran in recent years has had to deal with an ugly and persistent problem of internal security.

Dissident groups drawn in part from the Kurdish, Arab and tribal minorities in the country and encouraged by a hostile radical government in neighboring Iraq have kept Savak, the Iranian secret police, busy.

Within the past two years members of the shah's family have been the target of at least one kidnap attempt, and the U.S. embassy has been the target of sabotage and assassination plots.

years in Italy, West Germany and France, the newspaper said. "In almost every big town, in universities and clubs for young people, the CIA installs its opium agents (very often they're pretty girls) among the potential young dissidents. Eventually some of the dissidents become addicts," the paper said, and "at this stage the CIA starts its ideological infiltration of their minds."

NEWSWEEK

1 January 1973

## THE CIA'S NEW SUPER SPOOK

The change had been rumored for nearly a month, making it perhaps the worst-kept secret in the history of the nation's super-secret Central Intelligence Agency. But this hardly lessened the impact of President Nixon's announcement last week that he intends to replace veteran CIA director Richard Helms with a relative newcomer to intelligence, James R. Schlesinger, the tweedy economist who now serves as chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. For Helms, 59, it means a late start on a new career: Mr. Nixon will nominate him to be ambassador to Iran. For "the agency," it means the end of an era, the passing of control from an old crew of World War II cloak-and-dagger professionals to a new breed of cost-conscious systems managers who promise more spook for the buck.

Schlesinger, 43, may never have broken an enemy code or parachuted behind the lines, but he has precisely the qualifications President Nixon was looking for in his top intelligence agent. A bird-watching, pipe-smoking perfectionist with three degrees from Harvard, he directed strategic studies at the Rand Corporation before signing on at the White House Office of Management and Budget in 1969. At

OMB, Schlesinger rode herd on military and international affairs—including the nation's various intelligence budgets. Named to head the AEC in 1971, he showed his colors as an administrator by increasing efficiency and tuning up the commission's concern with public safety and environmental protection. Confronted with a public controversy over the hazards of the Amchitka H bomb test in November 1971, Schlesinger took his wife and two of his eight children to witness the blast on an isolated Aleutian island.

As the new director of Central Intelligence, Schlesinger will control not only the shadowy CIA operations but the entire \$6 billion U.S. military-civilian intelligence complex—an arrangement he himself had proposed more than a year ago in a special report commissioned by the President. The goal was typically Nixonian: greater efficiency in place of what the President felt were too many overlapping "collection efforts" in the field and too many conflicting analyses presented to the White House. Whether too much management may actually handicap the nation's intelligence operation—limiting the number of viewpoints on ticklish foreign situations—remains to be seen, but Schlesinger is going in with a powerful mandate to trim back and tighten up.

"Devoted": Helms was given the same mandate last year. But the courtly OSS veteran, one of the foun-

ders of the CIA in 1947, remained more involved with traditional intelligence processing than with budget cutting. That sense of priorities, plus the fact that he was a Democratic appointee with a host of Democratic friends, made his departure almost inevitable. The White House put the least political face on it, explaining that Helms was reaching the CIA's standard retirement age (60) in March and praising him for "extremely able and devoted service." More than that, the President encouraged Helms to remain in government service with the assignment to Iran.

Transforming a master spy into a diplomat is a matter of some delicacy, of course, particularly since Helms was head of the CIA's "dirty tricks" division back in 1953 when it played a key role in overthrowing former Iranian Premier Mohammed Mossadegh. But the appointment was cleared personally with the Shah of Iran, who indicated that his country would be flattered to have such a VIP; and diplomatic experts surmised that the U.S.S.R. was sophisticated enough to realize that having Helms so near one of its borders constituted no real escalation of U.S. espionage efforts. Helms himself has little fear of James Bondian reprisals, kidnaping or liquidation. "I certainly don't intend to live the rest of my life in hiding," he tells friends, "just because I used to work for the CIA."

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR  
2 January 1973

## A shadow over CIA . . .

We are uneasy about the change of leadership at the Central Intelligence Agency in Washington, not because we have doubts about the integrity of the new man, but because we have doubts about the propriety of the reasons for pushing out the old.

Had there been a vacancy at CIA we would have said that James Schlesinger's qualifications for the job were impressive.

What disturbs us is that a vacancy was created when there were excellent reasons for not having one.

Richard Helms is 59 years of age. He has been in the American intelligence business since 1942. He has been director of the CIA since 1966. He is in excellent physical health. He is the first professional CIA intelligence officer to reach the directorship. His appointment was a plus for morale at the agency. It was reassuring that a professional intelligence man had been given the job. It was evidence that politics would be kept out of intelligence gathering and evaluation. Continuation of his service as director would have been further reassurance that politics would not get mixed up with intelligence because Mr. Helms is totally nonpolitical.

He was so nonpolitical that on more than one occasion he presented to the White House intelligence evaluations which cut straight across the political line of the Nixon administration at the moment. When Pentagon and White House were calling for a stepped-up ABM program on the ground of high estimates of Russian intentions, Mr. Helms simply put in the CIA estimates which were modest, and confirmed by later events.

We do not know that he was pushed out of CIA (to be shipped to Iran as Ambassador) because he offended politicians at White House and Pentagon. We do know that his intelligence estimates were untarnished by political apple-polishing.

There are two jobs in Washington which must at all times be above suspicion of political interference. CIA is one and the FBI is the other. Partisanship in either job would be most dangerous.

WASHINGTON POST  
26 December 1972

## The Change at CIA

There are such strict limits to what is knowable about the Central Intelligence Agency and its workings that any discussion of Mr. Helms' departure from the directorship and Mr. Schlesinger's appointment to replace him must necessarily rest on a comparatively small store of information. Even so, one or two things are plain. And chief among these is the fact, evident from what is known about the two men themselves, that one highly qualified and eminently capable official is being replaced by another.

Richard Helms has spent most of his professional life in intelligence work, and he has acquired a reputation among those qualified to judge, as a man of great honesty and tough-mindedness. The term "tough-minded" in this connection can only summon forth imaginary zither music for some people and visions of grown men running around endlessly shoving each other under trains. But Mr. Helms—unflappable, personally disinterested, and beyond the reach of political or ideological pressures where his judgment is concerned—earned his reputation for tough-mindedness in an intellectual sense. As Agency Director, he has been far less a public figure or celebrity than some of his predecessors—Allen Dulles, for example, or John McCone—evidently preferring to maintain a certain becoming obscurity. He has worked very effectively with some of his overseers on the Hill. And, if the leaked (not by CIA) material, such as the Pentagon Papers, that has been appearing in the press is any guide, he and his Agency have also served their executive branch leaders with some distinction. One gets the impression that from the presumed efficacy

of bombing the North Vietnamese to the presumed necessity of responding to every wild surmise of what the Russians were up to in nuclear weapons development, Mr. Helms has offered a practical, dispassionate and rigorously honest—if not always popular—view.

That the Congress will be pushing for some greater degree of responsiveness from the CIA in the coming session seems pretty certain. And there also is at least a chance that internal bureaucratic difficulties at the Agency will require some managerial rearrangements. In a way, solely because he comes to CIA from outside (not from up the ranks), James Schlesinger may be specially suited to take on both. But he has other qualifications. At the Rand Corporation in California, Mr. Schlesinger did analytic work that gave him more than a passing familiarity with the intelligence estimating business. At the Budget Bureau—as it was then known—in the early days of the Nixon administration he proved himself a very astute, not to say downright cold-eyed, scrutinizer of military budget requests. His brief term at the AEC was notable in several respects. Mr. Schlesinger bucked the pressure of the atomic energy establishment to insist that the AEC take note of and respond to the claims of its ecological critics. And he attempted to push the agency back from its political role toward the more disinterested service role it was meant in the first place to fulfill. He, like Mr. Helms, is demonstrably a man of talent, dedication and impressive intellect. We should have been content to see them stay on in their present jobs. But if Mr. Helms is to leave the Central Intelligence Agency, we think Mr. Schlesinger is a first class choice to replace him.

WASHINGTON STAR  
26 December 1972

**CHARLES BARTLETT**

## Tehran a Logical Post for Helms

It was probably not a merry Christmas for the Americanologists in the Kremlin who were kept at their desks by their masters' demand to know why President Nixon is sending his intelligence chief, Richard Helms, to be ambassador to Iran.

Intelligence is the nerve center of the Soviet system and the White House move will inevitably put the comrades into a spin. Their conjectures on Helms' reassignment are certain to be laced with conspiratorial intrigues and suspicions that Nixon has dark plans for deeper meddling near the under-belly of the Soviet Union.

The Muscovites would intelligently brush aside most of White House press secretary Ron Ziegler's explanation that Helms had asked to retire as CIA director because he was near his agency's retirement age of 60. Helms is a man who keeps fit with daily stints on an indoor track

at the CIA and he is lean, healthy and young-minded enough to qualify easily for an exemption to stay at his job.

The Soviet experts also would be correct in brushing aside published speculation that Helms fell out of favor or disappointed the President with the quality of his performance as the government's chief intelligence officer. He has not always told the administration what it wanted to hear but his record of discretion—in the men he sent abroad, in his intelligence assessments and in his dealings with Congress—is widely judged to have been remarkably solid.

Possibly his greatest feat has been to hold the confidence and credibility of Congress through a period in which the executive branch was faced with deep mistrust on foreign policy. It also was a time when the CIA's chief defenders on the Hill, domi-

neering men like Sen. Richard Russell, D-Ga., and Rep. Mendel Rivers, D-S.C., were passing from the scene.

Actually the agency gained respect in a period when it easily might have fallen victim to the popular mood because Helms held tautly to his professional role. Once he persuaded skeptics that he was not a man who would play partisan games, he was able to head off those senators who were bent on shrinking the CIA's cloak so they could have a better look at what was going on.

Ironically, the events which led to Helms' replacement were launched many months ago by James Schlesinger, the Rand analyst who has agreed, reportedly with great reluctance, to take Helms' job. As the Budget Bureau specialist on defense, Schlesinger was asked to study how the government's intelligence needs could be accomplished more economically.

This is not a small problem

for a pinched government. Intelligence costs run about \$3.5 billion a year and the upward pressures on that spending level grow more intense as inflation bites into the dollar. Schlesinger's study concluded that the director of central intelligence would have to reach out beyond his agency to perform budget surgery in the overlapping areas of Pentagon intelligence.

Helms was handed this task with an unreassuring fanfare at the White House. He declined to move his office into the Budget Bureau and held as closely as he could to his old activities as an intelligence officer. This was rational prudence because an abrupt move to chop the Pentagon's intelligence budget would stir many enemies and perhaps shatter the working alliance he had forged on the Hill. Some believe he decided to postpone any strong moves until the elections were over.

But the President, pinched by fiscal pressures, came to an impatient conclusion that the job will have to be done by a non-career man who will play the bull in the china shop more cheerfully. He turned

to Schlesinger who is tough, savvy and disposed to seek his future outside of government, perhaps as a university head. He is taking a role that promises to be as bruising as any in government.

Very well, the Russians will say, but why Iran? The fact is there are few significant

nations to which an ex-CIA director, even with Helms' charm, could go as ambassador without stirring mass protests. Iran is one and the Shah, reportedly delighted to draw an envoy who is close to the President, will be certain to insure that Helms is well received.

WASHINGTON POST  
29 December 1972

*Chalmers M. Roberts*

## Helms, the Shah and the CIA

THERE IS A CERTAIN irony in the fact that Richard Helms will go to Iran as the American ambassador 20 years after the agency he now heads organized and directed the overthrow of the regime then in power in Teheran. The tale is worth recounting if only because of the changes in two decades which have affected the Central Intelligence Agency as well as American foreign policy.

Helms first went to work at the CIA in 1947 and he came up to his present post as director through what is generally called the "department of dirty tricks." However, there is nothing on the public record to show that he personally had a hand in the overthrow of the Communist backed and/or oriented regime of Premier Mohammed Mossadegh in 1953, an action that returned the Shah to his throne. One can only guess at the wry smile that must have come to the Shah's face when he first heard that President Nixon was proposing to send the CIA's top man to be the American envoy.

The Iranian affair, and a similar CIA action in Guatemala the following year, are looked upon by old hands at the agency as high points of a sort in the Cold War years. David Wise and Thomas B. Ross have told the Iranian story in their book, "The Invisible Government," and the CIA boss at the time, Allen Dulles, conceded in public after he left the government that the United States had had a hand in what occurred.

IRAN IS NEXT DOOR to the Soviet Union. In 1951 Mossadegh, who confused Westerners with his habits of weeping in public and running government business from his bed, nationalized the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. and seized the Abadan refinery. The West boycotted Iranian oil and the country was thrown into crisis. Mossadegh "connived," as Wise and Ross put it, with Tudeh, Iran's Communist party, to bolster his hand. The British and Americans decided he had to go and picked Gen. Fazollah Zahedi to replace him. The man who stage-managed the job on the spot was Kermit "Kim" Roosevelt (who also had a hand in some fancy goings-on in Egypt), grandson of T.R. and seventh cousin of F.D.R., and now a Washingtonian in private business.

Roosevelt managed to get to Teheran and set up underground headquarters. A chief aide was Brig. Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, who, as head of the New

Jersey state police, had become famous during the Lindbergh baby kidnaping case. Schwarzkopf had reorganized the Shah's police force and he and Roosevelt joined in the 1953 operation. The Shah dismissed Mossadegh and named Zahedi as Premier but Mossadegh arrested the officer who brought the bad news. The Teheran streets filled with rioters and a scared Shah fled first to Baghdad and then to Rome. Dulles flew to Rome to confer with him. Roosevelt ordered the Shah's backers into the streets, the leftists were arrested by the army and the Shah returned in triumph. Mossadegh went to jail. In time a new international oil consortium took over Anglo-Iranian which operates to this day, though the Shah has squeezed more and more revenue from the Westerners.

In his 1963 book, "The Craft of Intelligence," published after he left CIA, Dulles wrote that, when in both Iran and Guatemala it "became clear" that a Communist state was in the making, "support from outside was given to loyal anti-Communist elements." In a 1965 NBC television documentary on "The Science of Spying" Dulles said: "The government of Mossadegh, if you recall history, was overthrown by the action of the Shah. Now, that we encouraged the Shah to take that action I will not deny." Miles Copland, an ex-CIA operative in the Middle East, wrote in his book, "The Game of Nations," that the Iranian derring-do was called "Operation Ajax." He credited Roosevelt with "almost single-handedly" calling the "pro-Shah forces on to the streets of Teheran" and supervising "their riots so as to oust" Mossadegh.

TODAY THE IRAN to which Helms will go after he leaves the CIA is a stable, well armed and well oil-financed regime under the Shah's command which has mended its fences with Moscow without hurting its close relationship with Washington. The Shah has taken full advantage of the changes in East-West relations from the Cold War to today's milder climate.

While Iran and Guatemala were the high points of covert CIA Cold War activity, there were plenty of other successful enterprises that fell short of changing government regimes. Today the CIA, humiliated by the 1961 Bay of Pigs fiasco it planned and ran, has withdrawn from such large scale affairs as Iran, save for its continuing major role in the no longer "secret

war in Laos." The climate of today would not permit the United States to repeat the Iranian operation, or so one assumes with the reservation that President Nixon (who was Vice President at the time of Iran) loves surprises.

The climate of 1953, however, was very different and must be taken into account in any judgment. Moscow then was fishing in a great many troubled waters and among them was Iran. It was probably true, as Allen Dulles said on that 1965 TV show, that "at no time has the CIA engaged in any political activity or any intelligence that was not approved at the highest level." It was all part of a deadly "game of nations." Richard Bissell, who ran the U-2 program and the Bay of Pigs, was asked on that TV show about the morality of CIA activities. "I think," he replied, that "the morality of . . . shall we call it for short, cold war . . . is so infinitely easier than the morality of almost any kind of hot war that I never encountered this as a serious problem."

PERHAPS the philosophy of the Cold War years and the CIA role were best put by Dulles in a letter that he wrote me in 1961. Excerpts from his then forthcoming book had appeared in Harper's and I had suggested to him: some further revelations he might include in the book. He wrote about additions he was making: "This includes more on Iran and Guatemala and the problems of policy in action when there begins to be evidence that a country is slipping and Communist take-over is threatened. We can't wait for an engraved invitation to come and give aid."

There is a story, too, that Winston Churchill was so pleased by the operation in Iran that he proffered the George Cross to Kim Roosevelt. But the CIA wouldn't let him accept the decoration. So Churchill commented to Roosevelt: "I would be proud to have served under you" in such an operation. That remark, Roosevelt is said to have replied, was better than the decoration.

Helms doubtless would be the last to say so out loud but I can imagine his reflecting that, if it hadn't been for what Dulles, Kim Roosevelt and the others did in 1953, he would not have the chance to present his credentials to a Shah still on the peacock throne in 1973.

WASHINGTON POST  
16 December 1972

*Tom Braden*

## Removing Helms From the CIA Had to Be a 'Personal' Decision

THIS CITY'S BEST wisecracker proposed last summer to Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin that he make himself available as a replacement for Sen. Thomas Eagleton on the Democratic ticket. "Mr. Dobrynin," he said in mock seriousness, "you would not be fooled by briefings from the Defense Department about the strength of U.S. weapons. You would know."

I would not argue—even in the same vein—that Richard Helms, whom Mr. Nixon recently deposed as director of the Central Intelligence Agency, knows more about Soviet weapons than leaders in the Kremlin. But it is a demonstrable fact that he knows more about them than the Defense Department does. Helms was right, a couple of years ago, when the question of whether or not to build an ABM system was being argued in the Senate—and Melvin Laird, and his research chief, John Foster, were wrong.

Laird told the President that the Soviets were going for a first-strike capability with the development of the huge SS-9s. He predicted they would build them at the rate of 50 or 60 a year. By 1974, he suggested, the Soviet Union, possessed of 500 SS-9s, would be ready to call the tune.

IT WAS A FRIGHTENING prediction but it happened—perhaps by coincidence—to come at the time when President Nixon was trying to convince the U.S. Senate to embark upon

an ABM system. Laird's predictions fitted neatly with the arguments Mr. Nixon's men were making on Capitol Hill. No doubt, the President was pleased to have them.

In this context, the word from Helms cannot have been pleasing. Helms said the Soviet Union was not going for a first strike; it would not build SS-9s at the rate of 50 or 60 per year; it would not reach the level of 500.

As it turned out, Helms was right and Laird and Foster were wrong. The Soviet Union built 34 more SS-9s and then stopped at 318; the balance of terror preserves the peace; nothing suggests that it can be disrupted by 1974.

I HAVE SINCE thought that Helms displayed courage in sticking to his view in the face of formidable opposition and his superior's obvious predilection for it. So I was disturbed when I learned Helms was to be dismissed as

*"... he knows more about Soviet weapons than the Defense Department does."*

chief of CIA and more disturbed when I consider the possible reasons for his dismissal.

Perhaps an admission for the record should be entered at this point: I served for some years as an associate

of Helms' in the agency. I learned to respect his quiet pragmatism, to admire his ability and his human decency and to stand in absolute awe of his uncanny ability to avoid having anything to do with those programs of the era which in retrospect should clearly have been handled by the army, the navy or Ringling Brothers Circus.

Nevertheless, I find myself hoping that Mr. Nixon doesn't like Helms at all. For it is easier to live with this thought than with the suspicion that Mr. Nixon doesn't like the intelligence which Helms has been giving him. Consider, for example, the following:

- That thousands of North Vietnamese agents hold jobs in the South Vietnamese government.
- That the Cambodian invasion will not halt infiltration.
- That the enemy headquarters or COSVN is not where the Department of Defense thinks it is.
- That the South Vietnamese army will not perform well in Laos.
- That the bombing will not cause North Vietnam to sue for peace.
- That mining Haiphong Harbor will not cut off supplies.

These cannot have been welcome views at the White House. But the important thing is that they were accurate views. So I hope the decision to dismiss Helms was not ideological: The CIA is one of the places in government which ought not to be asked to come up with something better.

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DAILY WORLD, New York (Communist)  
7 DEC 1972

## Reaching down

This is the top of Nixon's centralization of control. It extends not only to economic matters and foreign affairs but to other areas as well, including the FBI and CIA. Nixon already has his own man in the post of Director of the FBI, Patrick Gray, and will be able to place his own man in the CIA because of the resignation of Richard M. Helms as director (Washington Star-News, Dec. 4).

But, in addition, Nixon is overseeing the appointment of second level officials in governmental departments. His operative for this work is Frederic Malek, who heads a special office in the White House established for this purpose. In the past the Department Secretary and/or heads were able to arrange their own teams, but now Malek has the job of passing on suggestions, finding persons and approving or not approving persons for open posts.

These are the so-called drafters of policy, innovators, the nuts and bolts men who make the machinery turn. Eugene V. Risher, in United Press

International's Washington Window (Dec. 6), said these people have in the past meant "frustration and anguish to Richard Nixon... He has thought long and hard about how he can make them more responsive to his wishes" (my emphasis — C.K.)

He concluded: "The suspicion persists that the President does not want any more new concepts. He already knows what he wants to do with his next four years in office and is trying to find the people to carry out his wishes."

That is a fair summing up, with the exception that it leaves out the all-important element of U.S. imperialism and its wishes and plans. Nixon is carrying out his wishes and at the same time the wishes and plans of U.S. imperialism.

There is no imaginative change in that. It is more of the same — but, as was noted, with a shifted orientation and greater concentration of state power on behalf of U.S. imperialism's aims.

THE BOSTON GLOBE  
7 Dec 1972

## Impending CIA bloodletting?

It would be easier to evaluate the partially "confirmed" rumor that Richard M. Helms is about to bow to pressure to resign as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency if one were able to get some kind of fix on the CIA itself. The virtually impenetrable secrecy that surrounds every phase of CIA activities, however, reduces one to an evaluation of such extraneous but relevant facts as are available, and there is no excess of comfort in any of these.

It is disconcerting to learn, for example, that the background of Mr. Helms's dissatisfaction (or president Nixon's dissatisfaction with him) includes disputes with both Henry Kissinger, Mr. Nixon's foreign policy adviser, and Melvin Laird, the retiring Secretary of Defense.

Mr. Laird's quarrel with Mr. Helms reportedly stems from their disagreement in 1969 when Mr. Laird insisted that the Soviets were maneuvering to attain a "first-strike capability" against the US and Mr. Helms insisted that Moscow had in no way shifted from its traditional emphasis on defense. That we are all still here may not prove conclusively that Mr. Laird was wrong and Mr. Helms was right, but we ARE still here.

His dispute with Mr. Kissinger, or vice versa, was predictable a year ago when Mr. Nixon set up an intelligence committee within the National Security Council and made Mr. Kissinger its head. Whether Mr. Nixon is perhaps giving Mr. Kissinger too much authority and is spreading him too thin would be a subjective judgment incapable, for now at least, of objective proof.

But the reputed Kissinger objection that Mr. Helms "was not supporting the Administration" in committee councils raises an interesting question. The CIA director's chief function, one would think, is not to

support the Administration or Dr. Kissinger either when the facts as he knows them dictate otherwise. His job is to let the facts fall where they may.

Mr. Nixon spoke highly of Mr. Helms just a year ago when he announced that Mr. Helms would assume "enhanced leadership" in planning, reviewing, coordinating and evaluating all intelligence programs and activities. By most estimates, he had earned the accolade.

For one thing, he had both the wisdom and the courage to oppose the CIA's disastrous attempt to invade Cuba at the Bay of Pigs in 1961, opposing not only the then CIA hierarchy but also the admirals and generals in the Pentagon. President Kennedy thereafter was as leery of Pentagon counsel as Mr. Helms had been. "If it wasn't for the Bay of Pigs, I might have sent Marines into Laos in 1961, as a lot of people around here wanted me to do."

Mr. Helms showed his perspicacity also in 1967 when Air Force intelligence insisted that bombing would bring North Vietnam to its knees, and Mr. Helms said that it would unite the North Vietnamese and firm up their resolve to fight to the death if necessary. Lyndon Johnson could have saved his Presidency and the war could have been ended long ago if the White House had listened to the facts of the situation rather than the politics of it.

One does not lightly endorse a secret police agency even when, as in the case of the CIA under Mr. Helms, "we do not target on American citizens." But so long as super-spies are one of the facts of international life, one rests somewhat more comfortably when the top spy, so far as one is able to judge, is competent and conscientious and sticks to the hard facts without bending to political winds.

CHICAGO, ILL.  
NEWS  
DEC 9 1972

### 'Will Nixon rule CIA with firmer hand?'

That small item the other day about Richard Helms being relieved of his job as head of the Central Intelligence Agency whets the appetite for more information.

The agency is placed now under the State Department's wing by President Richard Nixon. Does that mean that there will be stricter surveillance of CIA activities? Does it mean that some authority will have the power to tell the CIA where to head in when it tries to bring on national disasters with its spying and assassinating as heretofore? Or what does it mean?

The account of activities of both friend and foe in Vietnam by Frances Fitzgerald makes it rather plain why French and American warring in that tragic land has been such a complete failure. Westerners, both French and American, have made assumptions about those people that were unrealistic and they were too myopic to know it. For us who watch, it would have saved this country billions in money, millions of lives, and that blackened image we now have the world over if the CIA as well as the Defense Department were made completely responsible to the people to begin with. This silencing treatment we received about "the necessity for not letting the enemy know what you were doing in offense or defense" was the gimmick used to betray and defraud us, the citizens and taxpayers.

I still think the CIA should be investigated by Congress. Legal matters aside, there are aspects of CIA action that get reported occasionally which are amoral, immoral, and socially disastrous and these should be stopped.

R. G. LeVAN  
East Chicago, Ind.

## THE VILLAGE VOICE

7 Dec 1972

# Debriefing the press: 'Exclusive to the CIA'

by William Worthy

In April 1961, a few days after the unsuccessful Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, Allen Dulles, at that time the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, met in off-the-record session with the American Society of Newspaper Editors at their annual convention.

Given the Cuba intelligence, by then obviously faulty, that had entered into Washington's rosy advance calculations, he inevitably was pressed to tell: "Just what are the sources of the CIA's information about other countries?"

One source, Dulles replied, was U. S. foreign correspondents who are "debriefed" by the CIA on their return home. The usual practice is to hole up in a hotel room for several days of intense interrogation.

Much of the debriefing, I've learned over the years, is agreed to freely and willingly by individual newsmen untroubled by the world's image of them as spies. In

at least one case, as admitted to me by the Latin-American specialist on one of our mass-circulation weekly newsmagazines, the debriefing took place very reluctantly after his initial refusal to cooperate was vetoed by his superiors. But depending on the particular foreign crises or obsessions at the moment, some of the eager sessions with the CIA debriefers bring handsome remuneration. Anyone recently returned from the erupted Philippines can probably name his price.

Despite its great power and its general unaccountability, the CIA dreads exposes. Perhaps because of a "prickly rebel" family reputation stretching over three generations, the CIA has never approached me about any of the 48 countries I have visited, including four (China, Hungary, Cuba, and North Vietnam) that had been placed off-limits by the State Department. But the secret agency showed intense interest in my travels to those "verboden" lands. In fact in those dark days, Eric Sevareid once told me that Allen Dulles, the intelligence

gatherer, differed with brother Foster Dulles, the Calvinist diplomat about the wisdom of the self-defeating travel bans.

Years later, I learned that the U. S. "vice-consul" in Budapest who twice came to my hotel to demand (unsuccessfully) my passport as I transited Hungary en route home from China in 1957 was, in fact, a CIA agent operating under a Foreign Service cover. During a subsequent lecture tour, I met socially in Kansas City a man who had served his Army tour of duty in mufti, on detached service in North Africa and elsewhere with the National Security Agency. Out of curiosity I asked him what would be the "premium" price for a newsmen's debriefing on out-of-bounds China. He thought for a moment and then replied: "Oh, about \$10,000." Out of the CIA's petty cash drawer.

My first awareness of the CIA's special use of minority-group newsmen abroad came at the time of the 1955 Afro-Asian summit conference at Bandung, Indonesia. Through Washington sources (including Marquis Childs of the St. Louis Post Dispatch), Cliff Mackay, then editor of the Baltimore Afro-American, discovered—and told me—that the government was planning to send at least one black correspondent to "cover" the historic gathering.

The "conduit" for the expense money and "fee" was the director

of a "moderate" New York-based national organization, supported by many big corporations, that has long worked against employment discrimination. The CIA cash was passed to the organization's director by a highly placed Eisenhower administration official overseeing Latin-American affairs who later became governor of a populous Middle Atlantic state, and whose brothers and family foundation have long been heavy contributors to the job opportunity organization.

Because of the serious implications for a press supposedly free of governmental ties, I relayed this information to the American Civil Liberties Union. I also told Theodore Brown, one of A. Philip Randolph's union associates in the AFL-CIO Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters. Ted's response has always stuck in my

memory: "I'm one step ahead of you, Bill. President Sukarno, and the Indonesian government know all about this, and they are particularly incensed at having a man of color sent to spy in their country."

Cold-war readiness to "cooperate" with spy agencies, whether motivated by quick and easy money (I've often wondered if under-the-counter CIA payments have to be reported on income tax returns!) or spurred by a misconceived patriotism, had its precedent in World War I and in the revolutionary-counterrevolutionary aftermath. In the summer of 1920 Walter Lippmann, his wife, and Charles Merz published in the New Republic an exhaustive survey of how the New York Times had reported the first two years of the Russian revolution. They found that on 91 occasions—an average of twice a week—Times dispatches out of Riga, Latvia, buttressed by editorials, had "informed" readers that the revolution had either collapsed or was about to collapse, while at the same time constituting a "mortal menace" to non-Communist Europe. Lippmann and his associates attributed the misleading coverage to a number of factors. Especially cited in the survey were the transcending win-the-war and anti-Bolshevik passions of Times personnel, as well as "undue intimacy" with Western intelligence agencies.

After 1959, when Fidel Castro came to power after having ousted the corrupt pro-American Batista regime, Miami became a modern-day Riga: a wild rumor factory from where Castro's "death" and imminent overthrow were repeatedly reported for several years. Both in that city of expatriates and also in Havana, "undue intimacy" with the CIA caused most North American reporters covering the Cuban revolution to echo and to parrot official U. S. optimism about the Bay of Pigs invasion.

In the summer of 1961, on my fourth visit to that revolutionary island, a Ministry of Telecommunications official told me of a not untypical incident shortly before the invasion. Through mercenaries and through thoroughly discredited Batistianos, the CIA was masterminding extensive sabotage inside Cuba—a policy doomed to failure not only because anti-Castro endeavors lacked a popular base, but also because kindergartens, department stores during shopping hours, and similar public places were among the targets being bombed. In no country does one mobilize mass support by killing

children in their classrooms and women where they shop.

On one such occasion a bomb went off at 9.08 p. m. Five minutes earlier, at 9.03 p. m., an ambitious U. S. wire-service correspondent filed an "urgent press" dispatch from the Western Union teleprinter in his bureau office, reporting the explosion that, awkwardly for him, came five minutes after the CIA's scheduled time. When that correspondent and most of his U. S. colleagues were locked up for a week or two during the CIA-directed Bay of Pigs invasion and were then expelled, many U. S. editorial writers were predictably indignant.

Except perhaps in Washington itself and in the United Nations delegates' lounge, the CIA's department on journalism is probably busier abroad than with newsmen at home. In 1961, during a televised interview, Walter Lippmann referred casually to the CIA's bribing of foreign newsmen (editors as well as the working press), especially at the time of critical elections. All over the world governments and political leaders, in power and in opposition, can usually name their journalistic compatriots who are known to be or strongly suspected of being on the CIA's bountiful payroll. I believe it was Leon Trotsky who once observed that anyone who engages in intelligence work is always uncovered sooner or later.

Even neutralist countries learned to become distrustful of U. S. newsmen. In early 1967, Prince Norodom Sihanouk expelled a black reporter after just 24 hours. In an official statement the Ministry of Information alleged that he "is known to be not only a journalist but also an agent of the CIA." In a number of Afro-Asian countries, entry visas for U. S. correspondents, particularly if on a first visit, can be approved only by the prime minister or other high official.

As recently as a generation ago, it would have been unthinkable for most U. S. editors, publishers, newscasters, and reporters to acquiesce in intelligence debriefings, not to mention less "passive" operations. What Ed Murrow denounced as the cold-war concept of press and university as instruments of foreign policy had not yet spread over the land. In the years before the Second World War, if any government agent had dared to solicit the cooperation of a William Allen

White at the Emporia Gazette or a Robert Maynard Hutchins at the University of Chicago, the rebuff would have been as explosive as the retort to the CIA five or six years ago by the president of the New Mexico School of Mines. Describing himself as a "fundamentalist" on fidelity to intellectual freedom and on adherence to professional codes, he told me of his having been asked by the CIA to alert the agency whenever any of his faculty members were about to travel abroad "so that we can ask them to keep their eyes open." "You people ought to be put in jail," he spat at the agent. "You have no right to involve academics and innocent people in your dirty business." To his disappointment, however, not everyone on his teaching staff saw it his way. At the next faculty meeting,

when he related the conversation, some of the professors missed the underlying principle by asking: "Well, what's wrong with the CIA's proposition?"

At Harvard, during our 1956-7 Nieman Fellowship year, New York Times correspondent Tony Lewis and I were told by an anthropologist that during her years at the State Department at the height of the cold war, she had been horrified to find herself reading CIA transcripts of the debriefing of academics upon their return home from foreign "scholarly" trips. She had complained to the Social Science Research Council, but at that time was unable to get that prestigious body to denounce the practice.

But now the times—and the all-important intellectual climate—

have changed, thanks in large part to a new image of the government after its eye-opening crimes and disasters in Indochina and elsewhere. Today, to at least some degree, a goodly number of the most respectable spokesmen for establishment journalism are fighting the government's insistence on turning newsmen into extensions of the police and prosecution apparatus.

Under the sobering impact of dismaying troubles ahead, the older tradition of this country is re-asserting itself. Far fewer of us are still living in the fool's paradise of the Eisenhower-Kennedy years. In the mass media and on the campuses the "fundamentalists" may never become a majority. They don't have to. They are again "raising a standard to which all honorable men may repair."

THE NEW YORK TIMES, SATURDAY, DECEMBER 30, 1972

## Marchetti v. United States

By Kenneth McCormick

The ray of hope of reassertion and protection of our rights of free speech and press—which many had when the Supreme Court ruled against restraining publication of the Pentagon Papers—has faded.

While many civil libertarians have pointed out the dangers of sanctioning even temporary prior restraints, as was done by some of the Justices in the Pentagon Papers opinions, a subsequent case, in which the Supreme Court has just denied review, raises the specter of Government censorship to a far greater degree—*Marchetti v. United States*.

In April 1972, the Government instituted legal proceedings against Victor L. Marchetti, a former C.I.A. agent, by obtaining a temporary restraining order from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The temporary order, which later became a preliminary and permanent injunction, requires Marchetti to submit to the C.I.A., thirty days in advance of release, all writings, even fictional, which relate or purport to relate to intelligence, intelligence activities, or intelligence sources and methods. The C.I.A. may forbid disclosure of any information which it has classified and which has not been placed in the public domain by prior disclosure. The basis of this broad injunction was a secrecy agreement signed by Marchetti in 1955 when he began working for the C.I.A. The decision of the District Court

was affirmed, with slight modification, by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. It is that opinion which now stands by reason of the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari.

Although the Circuit Court of Appeals' opinion does allude to the importance of the First Amendment, it allows the C.I.A. full discretion to prevent the publication of any material which is "classified" and not in the public domain. The ruling means that once material has been stamped "classified," no court may look behind that stamp to determine whether or not it is reasonable—let alone necessary.

In effect, it purports to allow the executive branch unfettered discretion in determining what information can be withheld from the public. It imposes no requirement that some need for secrecy exists.

While a traditional view of the First Amendment would impose a firm mandate against any prior restraint by the Government, it cannot be denied that some judicial inroads have been made on this doctrine. A recent example is, of course, the Pentagon Papers case where there was a temporary period of restraint to enable the judiciary, at various levels including the Supreme Court, to determine whether or not dissemination of the publications would be harmful to the nation. In the *Marchetti* case, however, the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals allows prior restraint by the executive branch without meaningful judicial review.

Moreover, by holding that the courts may not look behind the government

label of "classified," the Fourth Circuit would abrogate the important role of the judiciary to protect the First Amendment rights of the people. To allow the executive branch such unilateral determination not only undermines the very purpose of the First Amendment but it serves to weaken the whole concept of responsible government so vital in a democracy.

While it is difficult to attribute any concrete reason to the denial of review by the Supreme Court, one can hope that the determining factor was that no attempt to restrain publication of specific material had been made.

In its brief to the Supreme Court, the Government argued that the issue of prior restraint as posed by the *Marchetti* situation was now only "academic." It emphasized that Marchetti had not yet submitted any proposed publication to the C.I.A. and that the C.I.A. had not denied approval for publication of any material. To that extent, the *Marchetti* case can be distinguished factually from the government's action to restrain publication of the Pentagon Papers.

Should Marchetti proceed with his writing and should the C.I.A. order the deletion of certain materials prior to publication, the Supreme Court justices could still determine that judicial review of the appropriateness of such deletions is required.

Kenneth McCormick is senior consulting editor of *Daedalus*.



WASHINGTON POST  
31 December 1972

# Bad Writing, Bad Taste, Startling Disclosures

CIA

*The Myth and the Madness*

By Patrick J. McGarvey

Saturday Review, 240 pp. \$6.95

By THOMAS B. ROSS

NOTHING WOULD better serve the American people in their current stage of cynicism, paranoia and fear of repression than an honest book from inside the CIA. There have been a number of competent books by outsiders and a number of cover stories by insiders, notably Allen Dulles's *The Craft of Intelligence* and Lyman Kirkpatrick's *The Real CIA*. But no one yet has successfully shed the cloak as he turned in his dagger, Victor Marchetti, who rose to the top suite of the CIA only to quit in disillusionment, is trying to publish a book about his experiences. But the lower courts have upheld the agency's demand that it be suppressed and there is no guarantee that the Supreme Court, which ruled so narrowly in the case of *The New York Times* and *The Washington*

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Post, will extend the First Amendment to an ex-CIA operative.

Into the breach comes Patrick J. McGarvey, a former intelligence officer of 14 years' service in the military, the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency. The fact that he has gotten into print might suggest that the CIA feels it has nothing to fear from him. And certain deletions in the advance-proofs indicate a degree of censorship or at least self-censorship. (Hold the page to the light and you can read through the inked crossovers—a familiar process recalling the Pentagon's decision to publish a

censored version of the Pentagon Papers after the full text was in print. Foreign agents come see what we really think is sensitive.)

But McGarvey's book, though flawed—almost fatally so—by bad writing, bad taste and bad logic, contains several startling disclosures, allegations and horror stories: how the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended a retaliatory air strike against the Israeli naval base that launched the attack on the U.S. intelligence ship *Liberty* in the 1967 Middle East war; how CIA agents obtained a sample of King Farouk's urine from the men's room of a gambling casino in Monte Carlo; how an investigation of the Pueblo fiasco turned up the fact that the Air Force had been flying a routine reconnaissance mission over Albania for 12 years, without purpose and without authorization; how a leper colony in North Vietnam was bombed on the advice of the CIA that it was an army headquarters; and how CIA psychologists rewarded Vietcong defectors by subjecting them to ghoulish experiments in which they were exposed to rapid changes in color, light and temperature.

McGarvey also lodges serious allegations against a number of important individuals and institutions. He contends that Richard M. Helms made his way to the top of the CIA by systematically destroying his competitors: Ray Cline, former deputy director for intelligence and now head of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research; Admiral Rufus Taylor, Helms's former deputy; and Admiral William (Red) Rayborn, his predecessor. "I thought for a time when I was director of the CIA," McGarvey quotes Rayborn as telling him, "that I might be assassinated by my deputy."

McGarvey also accuses Helms of blunting the investigative spirit of the major newspapers and magazines by taking their correspondents to lunch and keeping them happy with periodic leaks about other matters and other agencies.

He alleges further that Congress has given the CIA a veto over which senators and representatives are to be seated on the subcommittees that are supposed to serve as watchdogs on the agency's activities.

Against the obvious implication of many of his citations, McGarvey's thesis is that the crucial problem with the CIA is mismanagement, not an excess of power and secrecy or a lack of accountability.

"CIA is not a ten-foot ogre," he writes. "It is merely a human institution badly in need of change. CIA is not the invisible government. Rather, it is a tired old whore that no one has the heart to take off the street."

Too much intelligence is collected, McGarvey argues, and too little is properly analyzed. There is less danger in the CIA's excursions into sabotage and subversion, he contends, than in the insatiable electronic search that put the U-2, the *Liberty* and the *Pueblo* in extremis.

His recommendations for change are rather forlorn. He concedes that Congress has abdicated its responsibility, the so-called oversight committees sitting mute through Helms's annual "lantern slide show," wilfully ignorant of how much is being spent on intelligence and where, never informed before or after the fact about covert operations. Yet McGarvey's cure is the weary old recommendation: write your congressman—the one, perhaps, who is telling Helms he'd rather not know what's going on lest he have to assume responsibility.

I fear we must await a more compelling book before the establishment is moved to reform itself. The Supreme Court willing, Marchetti may provide it for us. It does not seem too much to ask that he be able to use his CIA experience to inform the people, when the three ex-CIA agents of the Watergate bust-in (or were they, too, just on loan for the campaign?) can apply their agency-imparted expertise to subvert the political process of a supposedly free nation.

WASHINGTON STAR

27 DEC 1972

# Is Camp Peary Cloak for CIA?

WILLIAMSBURGER, Va. (AP) — Is Camp Peary, a hush-hush Department of Defense installation in York County, Va., actually a training camp for the Central Intelligence Agency?

The Virginia Gazette, a weekly newspaper published not far from the camp says it is, basing its claim principally on an interview with an ex-CIA agent turned novelist.

Two reporters for the Gazette contend in an article for the weekly that the CIA uses Peary to train teams of assassins, guerrillas, foreign mercenaries and special warfare agents, and to test exotic new weapons.

They wrote that they were not permitted to enter the camp property and received crisp "no comments" when they posed questions to officials there.

## Maggio the Source

Nearly all their information apparently came from former CIA man Joe Maggio, who wrote a novel — "Company Man" — which mentioned a "Camp Perry" at which he said tactical nuclear weapons were tested.

The Gazette reported that Maggio said from his home in Coral Gables, Fla., that the "Camp Perry" in his novel in

actuality was Virginia's Camp Peary, taken over by the Department of Defense 21 years ago.

The newspaper said it was told by Maggio that he was at Camp Peary for three months in 1956, enrolled in a "special intelligence tradecraft course" given CIA recruits.

It said Maggio said in the interview that the "training methods and techniques covered by the CIA" at Camp Peary included "assassination training, demolition training, parachute training, courses in wiretapping and intelligence-gathering, and experiments with special weapons for use in the field, including what Maggio labeled as 'mini-nuclear bombs.'"

## 'Disneyland of War'

The Gazette quoted Maggio as saying, "I'm sure if you had a blue ribbon committee

go in there, they'd find a whole new world — a Disneyland of war."

The Gazette quoted him as saying "the information contained on Camp Peary in the novel is factual."

Among other weapons the Gazette quoted Maggio as saying are being tested at Camp Peary were a laser beam weapon used to cause bodily deterioration within 24 hours, experimental formulas of drugs such as LSD, and a variety of chemical warfare materials.

"Some day, somewhere," the Gazette said it was told by Maggio in a taped telephone interview, "that base is going to have a catastrophe — some Dr. Strangelove explosion that really is going to rock that area."

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2 DEC 1972

## Court's ruling could restrain secrecy stories

By Luther Huston

Reporters who write "inside" stories about the operations of government intelligence agencies could find themselves in trouble because of a Federal Court of Appeals ruling in the case of Victor L. Marchetti.

Marchetti signed a secrecy oath, which is required of all CIA employees, when he went to work for the agency 14 years ago. He resigned in 1969 and wanted to write a book about the CIA and arranged with a publisher to publish it. His years with CIA gave him access to many of the agency's secrets.

When the CIA learned of his plans for a book, it sought an injunction against publication, claiming the secrecy provision of his contract applied. Opposing issuance of a restraining order, Marchetti claimed an injunction would infringe his First Amendment rights.

Judge Albert V. Bryan, in U.S. District Court, Alexandria, Va., rejected the First Amendment argument, held that it was a question of contract law, and issued

a permanent injunction. Marchetti took the case to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.

## Appeal to Haynesworth

In an opinion written by Chief Judge Clement F. Haynesworth, the appellate court affirmed Bryan's decision, holding that the CIA's contract with Marchetti, including the secrecy provision, was legal and constitutional. The appeals court, however, modified the injunction to make it reach only to classified information, inapplicable to information that is unclassified or that has been officially disclosed.

Haynesworth wrote that, although the upon information that is not classified and has been officially made public, the court First Amendment precluded restraint in the case before it, was "concerned with secret information touching upon the national defense and the conduct of foreign affairs, acquired by Marchetti in a position of trust and confidence," and the First Amendment argument did not apply.

Although the Marchetti case involved only a book, the ruling could conceivably be invoked by the government in any subsequent case involving publication of stories purporting to relate secret activities of a government agency. The Supreme Court, conceivably, might be asked to reconcile its ruling in the Pentagon Papers case that prior restraint on publication was unconstitutional with the lower court judgments in the Marchetti case.

FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS NEWSLETTER  
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## THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY: TIME FOR REVIEW?

The intelligence community, and its budget, pose many problems of traditional concern to the Federation of American Scientists: governmental reform, morality, proper use of high technology, and defense expenditures. In the last quarter century, intelligence agencies have proliferated. The United States has established an agency which goes beyond intelligence collection and, periodically, interferes in the internal affairs of other nations. Technology suited to the invasion of national and personal privacy has been developed apace. And the \$4 to \$6 billion being spent for intelligence might well be termed the largest "unreviewed" part of the defense budget.

Twenty-five years after the passage of the National Security Act of 1947, it seems a good time to consider the problems posed by these developments.

Of least concern in terms of its budget but of over-riding significance in its international political impact, is the Directorate of Plans of CIA, within which clandestine political operations are mounted. This is the issue discussed in this newsletter. More and more, informed observers question whether clandestine political operations ought to be continued on a "business-as-usual" basis. In the absence of an investigation, a secret bureaucracy—which started in the Office of Strategic Services during a hot war and which grew in the CIA during a cold war—may simply continue to practice a questionable trade.

Clandestine "dirty tricks" have their costs not only abroad but at home, where they are encouraged only too easily. And is not interference in the affairs of other nations wrong?

Two decades ago, as the cold war gained momentum, one of America's greatest political scientists, Harold D. Lasswell, wrote a comprehensive and prophetic book, "National Security and Individual Freedom." He warned of the "insidious menace" that a continuing crisis might "undermine and eventually destroy free institutions." We would see, he predicted: pressure for defense expenditures, expansion and centralization of Government, withholding of information, general suspicion, an undermining of press and public opinion, a weakening of political parties, a decline of the Congress, and of the courts.

Today, with the Cold War waning, it seems in order to reexamine our institutions, goals and standards. Which responses to the emergency of yesterday can we justify today? □

The National Security Act of 1947 created the Central Intelligence Agency and gave it overall responsibility for coordinating the intelligence activities of the several relevant government departments and agencies interested in such matters. Today, a quarter century later, CIA is reported to have a budget of about \$700-million to \$1-billion and a staff of perhaps 18,000 people, or about 8,000 more than the Department of State! (This advantage in size gives CIA an edge in interdepartmental meetings for which, for example, others may be too rushed to fully prepare or not be able to assign a suitable person.)

The National Security Act authorized CIA to:

"perform for the benefit of the existing intelligence

agencies such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more effectively accomplished centrally; "perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct." (Italics added)

These clauses clearly authorize clandestine intelligence collection but they are also used to justify clandestine political operations. However, overthrowing governments, secret wars, assassination, and fixing elections are certainly not done "for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies" nor are they duties "related to intelligence." Someday a court may rule that political activities are not authorized.

In any case, at the urging of Allen Dulles, the National Security Council issued a secret directive (NSC 10/2) in 1948, authorizing such special operations of all kinds—provided they were secret and small enough to be plausibly deniable by the Government.

Even this authority has been exceeded since several impossible-to-deny operations have been undertaken: the U-2 flight, the Bay of Pigs invasion, the Iranian Coup, the Laotian War, and so on.

The National Security Act gave the CIA no "police subpoena, law enforcement powers, or internal security functions..." But another secret Executive Branch document evidently did give the CIA authority to engage in domestic operations related to its job. It was under this authority that such organizations as foundations, educational organizations, and private voluntary groups were involved with the CIA at the time of the National Student Association revelations (1966).

The "white" part of CIA is, in a sense, a cover for the "black" side. CIA supporters and officials invariably emphasize the intelligence, rather than the manipulation function of CIA, ignoring the latter or using phrases that gloss over it quietly. The public can easily accept the desirability of *knowing* as much as possible. But its instincts oppose doing abroad what it would not tolerate at home. And it rightly fears that injustices committed abroad may begin to be tolerated at home: how many elections can be fixed abroad before we begin to try it here? The last election showed such a degeneration of traditional American standards.

The present Director of Central Intelligence, Richard Helms, is working hard and effectively at presenting an image of CIA that will not offend. In a recent speech, he said:

"The same objectivity which makes us useful to our government and our country leaves us uncomfortably aware of our ambiguous place in it. . . . We propose to adapt intelligence to American society, not vice versa."

Even construed narrowly, this is no easy job, and adapting clandestine political operations to American ideals may well be quite impossible.

At the time of the Bay of Pigs, President Kennedy gave serious consideration to breaking CIA into two pieces: one piece would conduct operations and the other would just collect intelligence. The dangers were only too evident

to Kennedy of letting operations be conducted by those who were accumulating the information. Allen Dulles insisted on a united operation, arguing that separation would be inefficient and disruptive. But there are many arguments on both sides and the issue deserves continuing consideration.

In particular, there is something to be said for deciding now not to let Mr. Helms be succeeded by another Deputy Director for Plans (i.e. clandestine operations). This would otherwise tend to institutionalize the notion that CIA itself is run by the organizers of clandestine activities rather than by those who do technical intelligence. Indeed, there is much to be said for a tradition of bringing in outsiders to manage CIA.

The unprecedented secrecy concerning CIA's budget also deserves re-examination. It is being argued, in a citizen suit, that it is unconstitutional to hide the appropriations of CIA in the budgets of other departments because the Constitution provides, in Article I, Section 9, Clause 7, that:

No money shall be drawn from the Treasury *but* in consequence of appropriations made by law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time. (italics added).

Not only the CIA expenditures but the distorted budget reports of other agencies would seem to violate this provision. The petitioners call for a functional breakdown, showing general categories of uses of CIA funds and a breakdown by nation showing where funds have been spent.

Certainly, there is little justification for hiding the total figure of CIA expenditures from the public and the Congress. This figure reveals less to any potential enemy than the size of the Defense Department budget—which would freely reveal. Releasing at least this overall figure would make unnecessary the hiding of the CIA budget in other agency budgets. This would stop an authorization and appropriation procedure which systematically and perennially misleads Congress and the public.

#### Problems Posed by Clandestine Political Operations Abroad

CIA's four divisions concern themselves with Support, Science and Technology, Intelligence, and Plans. Press reports suggest that the personnel in these divisions number, respectively, 6,000, 4,000, 2,000 and 6,000.

The Intelligence Division examines open and secret data and prepares economic, social, and political reports on situations.

It is in the Plans Division that clandestine operations are undertaken. Former Deputy Directors for Plans have been: Allen Dulles, Frank Wisner, Richard Bissel and, after 1962, Richard Helms—now the Director of the CIA itself.

#### Does the CIA Pressure Presidents?

The most dramatic clandestine operations obviously have the approval of the President. But as any bureaucrat knows, it can be hard for the President to say "no" to employees with dramatic ideas that are deeply felt.

The U-2 and Bay of Pigs operations—both under the guidance of Richard Bissel—revert this phenomenon. In both cases, the President (first Eisenhower, then Kennedy) went along with the plan reluctantly. In both cases, the operation was not the best idea that was available.

In the case of the U-2, President Eisenhower recalled saying: "If one of these planes is shot down, this thing is going to be on my head. I'm going to catch hell. The world will be in a mess." He often asked the CIA: What happens if you're caught? They would say "It hasn't happened yet."

But it was obvious that it would happen eventually. Indeed, two years after the 1960 crash, it was an agreed military estimate that Russian rockets could hit U-2s at 68,000 feet. And it was known that these U-2s could flare out. At what point would CIA itself have had the self-control to stop the flights?

#### Are the Repercussions Worth It?

We learned a great deal from the U-2 flights, though it was of much less direct significance to our security and tranquility than is commonly believed. The last U-2 flights still had not found any Soviet missiles other than test vehicles. But the information was too secret to be used even though it was known to the Russians. At home, missile gap was still a popular fear based on pencil and paper calculations of "capabilities" rather than "intentions of direct knowledge." Eventually, the flights destroyed a

#### SPIRIT OF OSS LIVES ON

"The CIA," writes OSS veteran Francis Miller, "inherited from Donovan his lopsided and mischievous preoccupation with action and the Bay of Pigs was one of the results of that legacy." CIA men, like their OSS predecessors, have been imaginative, free-wheeling, aggressive, and often more politically knowledgeable than their State Department colleagues. And, like the men of Donovan's organization, CIA "spooks" abroad still resist headquarters "interference in their activities."

— R. Harris Smith, *OSS The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency*, University of California Press, 1972, pg. 362.

hopeful summit conference in 1960 and thus perpetuated dangerous tensions. Yet this was CIA's greatest clandestine success!

In the case of the Bay of Pigs operation, the disaster was complete. CIA supporters of the plan became its advocates and pressed it upon President Kennedy. According to some reports, they even led him to believe that the Eisenhower Administration had given the plan a go-ahead from which disengagement would be embarrassing. Once the invasion started, they pressed for more American involvement. The plan itself was, in retrospect, ludicrously ill-conceived. Despite the proximity of Cuba, intelligence about the likelihood of the necessary uprising was far too optimistic.

This failure had repercussions as well. It left the President feeling insecure and afraid that the Soviets thought him weak for not following through. It left the Soviets fearing an invasion of Cuba in due course. The stage was set for the missile crisis. Some believe that U.S. involvement in Vietnam was also encouraged by Kennedy's fear of being seen as too weak.

Clandestine political operations obviously have far-reaching political consequences no one can predict.

#### Is the Burden of Secrecy Too Great?

The CIA recently brought suit against Victor Marchetti, a former employee, for not submitting to them for clearance a work of fiction about spying operations. It is evident that the CIA feared disclosures about clandestine operations or methods. The result was a "prior restraint"

order without precedent in which Marshetti is precluded from publishing anything about CIA, fiction or not, without letting CIA clear it. Thus a dangerous precedent against the traditional freedom of American press and publishing is now in the courts as a direct result of Government efforts to act abroad in ways which cannot be discussed at home. This is a clear example of the statement written by James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (May 13, 1798), "Perhaps it is a universal truth that the loss of liberty at home is to be charged to provisions against danger, real or pretended, from abroad."

#### Must We Manipulate the Underdeveloped World?

For the clandestine (Plans) side of CIA, a large institutionalized budget now sees little future in the developed world. In the developed free world, the stability of Governments now makes political operations unnecessary. In the Communist developed world, these political operations are largely impossible. Indeed, even intelligence collection by traditional techniques seems to have been relatively unsuccessful.

The penetration of CIA by the Soviet spy, Philby, is said to have left CIA with a total net negative balance of effectiveness for the years up to 1951. It completely destroyed the CIA's first "Bay of Pigs"—that effort to overthrow the Albanian Government in 1949 which cost the lives of 300 men.

The only really important clandestine Soviet source of information known publicly was Pankofsky. The public literature really shows only one other triumph in penetrating Soviet secrecy with spies: the obtaining of a copy of the secret speech by Khrushchev denouncing Stalin. But this speech was being widely circulated to end and Eastern European sources. Allen Dulles, on television, called this "one of the main coups of the time I was [at CIA]."

Compared to the Soviet Union, the underdeveloped world looks easy to penetrate and manipulate. The Governments are relatively unstable and the societies provide more scope for agents and their maneuvers. While the underdeveloped world lends itself better to clandestine operations, these operations are much harder to justify.

We are not at war—usually, not even at cold war—with the countries in the underdeveloped world. And they rarely if ever pose a direct threat to us, whether or not they trade or otherwise consort with Communists. Today, fewer and fewer Americans see the entire world as a struggle between the forces of dark and light—a struggle in which we must influence every corner of the globe.

In tacit agreement with this, CIA Director Helms recently said:

"America's intelligence assets (sic), however, do not exist solely because of the Soviet and Chinese threat, or against the contingency of a new global conflict. The United States, as a world power, either, is involved or may with little warning find itself involved in a wide range and variety of problems which require a broad and detailed base of foreign intelligence for the policy makers."

Thus, where the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) of World War II was justified by a hot war, and the CIA by a cold war, the present justification for intelligence activities in the underdeveloped world springs ever more only from America's role as a "great power."

Moreover, the word "assets" above is significant. If information were all that were at issue, a strong case could be made for getting needed information when you need it, through open sources, embassies and reconnaissance. But

if clandestine political manipulation is at issue, then one requires long-standing penetration of institutions of all kinds and a great deal of otherwise unimportant information necessary to plan and hide local maneuvers.

#### Political Control of Agents in the Field

Because political operations are so sensitive and, potentially so explosive, it is imperative that the agents be under strict control. But is this really possible? To each foreign movement of one kind or another—no matter how distasteful—CIA will assign various operatives, if only to get information. In the process, these operatives must ingratiate themselves with the movement. And since they are operating in a context in which subtle signals are the rule, it is inevitable that they will often signal the movement that the United States likes it, or might support it.

Indeed, the agents themselves may think they are correctly interpreting U.S. policy—or what they think it should be—in delicate maneuvers which they control.

What, for example, did it mean when CIA agents told Cambodian plotters that they would do "everything possible" to help if a coup were mounted. (See Philadelphia Inquirer, April 6, 1972, "CIA Role Bared in Sihanouk Ouster.")

No one who has ever tried to control a bureaucracy will be insensitive to the problems to which these situations give rise. These problems would be dramatically diminished, however, if CIA were restricted to information gathering and were known to be. The movements would then cease to look to CIA for policy signals.

#### Alternative Controls on CIA

What alternative positions might be considered toward CIA involvement abroad? There are these alternative possibilities:

1. *Prohibit CIA operations and agents from the underdeveloped world:* This would have the advantage of pro-

#### AGENTS LIKE FREEDOM OF ACTION

Writing after the war of his negotiations for the surrender of the German forces in North Italy, Dulles cautiously suggested: "An intelligence officer in the field is supposed to keep his home office informed of what he is doing. That is quite true, but with some reservations, as he may overdo it. If, for example, he tells too much or asks too often for instructions, he is likely to get some he doesn't relish, and what is worse, he may well find headquarters trying to take over the whole conduct of the operation. Only a man on the spot can really pass judgment on the details as contrasted with the policy decisions, which, of course, belong to the boss at headquarters." Dulles added, "It has always amazed me how desk personnel thousands of miles away seem to acquire wisdom and special knowledge about local field conditions which they assume goes deeper than that available to the man on the spot." Almost without exception, Dulles and other OSS operators feared the burden of a high-level decision that might cramp their freedom of action.

—R. Harris Smith, *OSS The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency*, University of California Press, 1972; pg. 9.

tecting America's reputation—and that of its citizens doing business there—from the constant miasma of suspicion of CIA involvement in the internal affairs of other countries. Open sources would continue to supply the U.S. with 80% of its intelligence. Further intelligence in the underdeveloped world could be collected by State Department

officials through embassies. This policy would enforce the now-questionable supremacy of the State Department in dealing with the Nations involved.

Arguments against this policy include these: the area is too important to U.S. interests to permit such withdrawal and the credibility of the withdrawal would be hard to establish, at least in the short run.

2. *Permit covert activities in the underdeveloped world only for information, not manipulation:* This policy would prevent the fixing of elections, the purchase of legislators, private wars, the overthrow of governments, and it would go a long way toward protecting the U.S. reputation for non-interference in the affairs of other countries. One might, for example, adopt the rule suggested by Harry Howe Ransom that secret political operations could be used only as an alternative to overt military action in a situation that presented a direct threat to U.S. security.

Of course, the mere existence of a covert capability for espionage would leave the U.S. with a capability for manipulation; the same agents that are secretly providing information could secretly try to influence events. But there is still a large gap between buying "assets" for one purpose and for the other.

Also, *large scale operations* would not be conducted under this rule. According to some reports, the Committee, chaired by General Maxwell Taylor, that reviewed the Bay of Pigs episode, recommended to President Kennedy (who apparently agreed) that the CIA be limited to operations requiring military equipment no larger or more complex than side arms—weapons which could be carried by individuals.

3. *Require that relevant representatives of Congress be consulted before any clandestine operations, beyond those required for intelligence collection, are undertaken:* It is an unresolved dispute, between the Executive and Legislative Branches, whether and when the Executive Branch may undertake operations affecting U.S. foreign policy without consulting Congress. If a clandestine political operation is important enough to take the always high risks of exposure, it should be important enough to consult Congress. These consultations can produce a new perspective on the problem—which can be all important. The

Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was one of the few who predicted accurately the political consequences of the Bay of Pigs operation.

4. *Require that the ambassador be advised of covert operations in the nation to which he is accredited. Monitor compliance with Congressional oversight:* Under the Kennedy Administration, after the Bay of Pigs, a letter went to all embassies affirming the authority of the Ambassador over the representatives of C.I.A. But this authority is variously interpreted and might be periodically clarified and strengthened. One method of policing the order would involve occasional visits by Congressmen or Congressional staff who would quiz the Ambassador to be sure that he knew at least as much as did they about local covert activities. Another control would require that Assistant Secretaries of State knew about the covert activities in their region. In all these cases, political oversight and political perspective would be injected into operations that would otherwise be largely controlled by an intelligence point of view.

#### Improper Use of Force

One morally and politically important imperative seems clear: *Adopt and announce a firm rule against murder or torture.* There are repeated and persistent reports that this rule does not exist. There was the murder by a green beret,

There is the Phoenix program involving widespread assassination of "Vietcong agents"—many, of which, it is reported, were simply the victims of internal Vietnamese rivalries. Some years ago, the New York Times quoted one of the best informed men in Washington as having asserted that "when we catch one of them [an enemy agent], it becomes necessary "to get everything out of them and we do it with no holds barred."

There is also this disturbing quotation from Victor Marchetti, formerly executive assistant to the Deputy Director of CIA:

"The director would come back from the White House and shake his head and say 'The President is very, very upset about \_\_\_\_\_. We agreed that the only solution was \_\_\_\_\_. But of course that's impossible, we can't be responsible for a thing like that.'

"The second man would say the same thing to the third man, and on down through the station chief in some country until somebody went out and \_\_\_\_\_ and nobody was responsible." (Parade Magazine, "Quitting the CIA," by Henry Allen.)

#### Problems of Clandestine Domestic Operations

After the 1966 revelations that the Central Intelligence Agency had been financing the National Student Association, a variety of front organizations and conduits were unravelled which totaled about 250. The CIA gave its money directly to foundations which, in turn, passed the secret funds along to specific CIA-approved groups, organizations and study projects. These, in turn, often supported individuals. The organizations included National Education Association, African-American Institute, American Newspaper Guild, International Development Foundation, and many others.

The way in which these organizations were controlled was subtle and sophisticated in a fashion apparently characteristic of many clandestine CIA operations. Thus, while distinguished participants in the Congress for Cultural Freedom and editors of its magazine, *Encounter*, evidently believed that the organizations were doing only what came naturally, the CIA official who set the entire covert program in motion, Thomas W. Braden, saw it this way:

"We had placed one agent in a Europe-based organization of intellectuals called the Congress for Cultural Freedom. Another Agent became an editor of *Encounter*. The agents could not only propose anti-Communist programs to the official leaders of the organizations but they could also suggest ways and means to solve the inevitable budgetary problems. Why not see if the needed money could be obtained from "American foundations"? (Saturday Evening Post 5 / 20 / 1967 *Speaking Out*, page 2)

President Johnson appointed a panel headed by then Undersecretary of State Nicholas deB. Katzenbach to review this aspect of CIA operations. The other panel members were HEW Secretary John Gardner (a former OSS employee) and CIA Director Helms. The panel was to study the relationship between CIA and those "educational and private voluntary organizations" which operate abroad and to recommend means to help assure that such organizations could "play their proper and vital role." The Panel recommendations were as follows:

1. It should be the policy of the United States Government that no Federal agency shall provide any covert financial assistance or support, direct or indirect, to any of the nation's educational or private voluntary organizations.

### CIA BECOMING A BURDEN?

While the institutional forms of political control appear effective and sufficient, it is really the will of the political officials who must exert control that is important and that has most often been lacking.

Even when the control is tight and effective, a more important question may concern the extent to which CIA information and policy judgments affect political decisions in foreign affairs.

Whether or not political control is being exercised, the more serious question is whether the very existence of an efficient CIA causes the U.S. Government to rely too much on clandestine and illicit activities, back-alley tactics, subversion and what is known in official jargon as "dirty tricks."

Finally regardless of the facts, the CIA's reputation in the world is so horrendous and its role in events so exaggerated that it is becoming a burden on American foreign policy rather than the secret weapon it was intended to be.

—The New York Times, April 25, 1966.

2. The Government should promptly develop and establish a public-private mechanism to provide public funds openly for overseas activities by organizations which are adjudged deserving, in the national interest, of public support.

On March 29, 1967, President Johnson said he accepted point 1 and directed all Government agencies to implement it fully. He said he would give "serious consideration" to point 2 but apparently never implemented it.

When these operations were first proposed by Braden, Allen Dulles had commented favorably on them, noting: "There is no doubt in my mind that we are losing the cold war." Twenty years later, though we are no longer in any risk of "losing the cold war," some would like to continue despite the regulations.

At least one influential former CIA official's thinking was simply to move to deeper cover. And sympathy for this approach probably goes very deeply into the so-called "Establishment." For example, when the National Student Association scandal broke, those who ran the liberal, now defunct, Look Magazine, were so incensed at general expressions of outrage that they wrote their first editorial in thirty years (!) defending the students. In such an atmosphere one must expect liberal (much less conservative) foundations and banks to cooperate whole-heartedly with the CIA whatever the cover.

In any case, what could such deeper cover be? In the first place, commercial establishments or profit-making organizations are exempt from the ban. Hence, with or without the acquiescence of the officials of the company, CIA agents might be placed in strategic positions. It is possible also that organizations which seemed to be voluntary were actually incorporated in such a way as to be profit-making. Other possibilities include enriching individuals by throwing business their way and having these individuals support suitable philanthropic enterprises.

To the extent that these arrangements, such as voluntary organizations, they pose the same problems which created the distress in 1966. In short, the policy approved by President Johnson was sensible when it proscribed "direct or indirect" support. Moreover, in the coming generation, we can expect a continuation of the existing trend toward whistle-blowing. The CIA's reputation and its ability to keep secrets can be expected to decline. Even the most "indirect" support may eventually become known.

All of these deep cover arrangements are made much easier by the intelligence community's so-called "alumni association." These are persons who are known to the community through past service and who are willing to turn a quiet hand or give a confidential favor. Sometimes, much more is involved. Examples from the past include these. A high official of CIA's predecessor—the Office of Strategic Services (OSS)—becomes head of the CIA-financed National Committee for a Free Europe. Another becomes an official of the CIA-funded American Friends of the Middle East. A Deputy Director of State Department Intelligence becomes President of Operations and Policy Research, Inc., a CIA conduit which financed "studies" of Latin American electoral processes. (This official is simultaneously well placed to arrange studies of elections as the Director of the American Political Science Association).

Thus, a large and growing domestic network of persons trained in dissembling, distortion, and human manipulation, may be growing in our country. And the use of these kinds of skills may also be growing more acceptable. During the Republican campaign for President, a memorandum went out to Republican college organizers which urged them to arrange a mock election and gave what seemed to be pointed hints about how to manipulate the election.

This kind of thing produces a suspicion and paranoia that divides Americans from one another. It makes them ask questions about their associates, colleagues, secretaries and acquaintances—questions that are destructive of the casual and trusting atmosphere traditional in America. (Already, unbelievable numbers of persons seem to assume that their phones are tapped and their mail read.)

As the public sense of cold war dissipates, the American distaste for secret organizations can be expected to grow. The occasional disclosure of any "dirty trick" or political manipulation sponsored by CIA will certainly deepen this sense of unease. In the end, as now, many of the best and most sophisticated college graduates will not be willing to work for the CIA. And professional consultants will be discouraged as well. The result can change the character of the Agency in such a way as to further threaten American values.

One method, in the American tradition, for keeping CIA honest would be a public-interest organization of alumni of the intelligence community (and those who are serviced by intelligence in the Government). This public interest group would, as do so many others, offer its testimony to Congress on matters of interest to it—in this case, intelligence. The testimony might be given in public or in executive session, as appropriate. And constructive suggestions and criticisms could be made.

Such an organization would have a credibility and authority that no other group can have and a general knowledge of the relevant intelligence problems facing the nation and public. It goes without saying that no one in this organization, or communicating with it, would violate laws, or oaths, associated with classified information. The Federation of American Scientists' strategic weapons committee is an example of the feasibility and legitimacy, by which a group of persons, well grounded in strategic arms problems can, without violating any rules concerning such information, make informed and useful policy pronouncements. Many persons consulted in the preparation of this newsletter endorsed this suggestion.

### CIA CHANGING PERSONALITY?

There are still sensitive, progressive men in the CIA, but they are becoming scarcer by the moment. The Agency's career trainees no longer come from the Phi Beta ranks of Harvard, Yale, or Berkeley. The Agency is widely regarded on college campuses as the principal symbol of all that is wrong with our nation. "For the world as a whole," wrote Arnold Toynbee recently, "the CIA has now become the bogey that communism has been for America. Wherever there is trouble, violence, suffering, tragedy, the rest of us are now quick to suspect the CIA has a hand in it." Millions of college students and young professionals, the future "power elite" of the United States, would accept that judgment.

— R. Harris Smith, *OSS The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency*, University of California Press, 1972, pg. 382.

In any case, as the distaste for CIA grows, CIA has a moral obligation to stay out of the lives of those who do not wish to be tarnished by association with it. In one country, it is reported; CIA put funds into the bank deposits of a political party without its knowledge. But what if this were discovered! Obviously, CIA could lightly risk the reputations of persons it wanted to use, or manipulate, by trying to help them secretly.

### TWO SOURCES OF POSSIBLE WASTE

#### Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA):

The Army, Navy and Air Force intelligence agencies provided such parochial and biased intelligence estimates in the late fifties that they were removed in 1961 from the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) and replaced by a new supervisory organization: the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). DIA's job was to coordinate all of the Defense Department's intelligence resources and analyses. Allen Dulles had feared that CIA and DIA might become rivals and competitors; apparently, this has become the case.

By 1964, DIA had merged the intelligence publications of the armed services into publications of its own; launched a "Daily Digest" that competed with the CIA's "Central Intelligence Bulletin;" supplanted J-2, the intelligence staff of the Joint Chiefs; replaced the services in providing "order of battle" information and had basically reduced the services to the role of collecting raw intelligence.

A number of informed observers have nevertheless suggested that DIA serves no useful purpose and that its functions could well be taken over by CIA. Others, with Pentagon experience, have noted that there is no way to prevent the military services from having intelligence branches and—that being the case—DIA is necessary to sit on them and coordinate their conclusions. In any case, in contrast to CIA's reputation for competent normally disinterested analysis, DIA and the intelligence services pose real questions of redundancy, waste, service bias, and inefficiency.

Both of the Appropriations Committees of Congress are convinced that there is such waste in Defense Department Intelligence. In 1971, the House Committee reported:

The committee feels that the intelligence operation of the Department of Defense has grown beyond the actual needs of the Department and is now receiving an inordinate share of the fiscal resources of the Department. Redundancy is the watchword in many intelligence operations. The same information is sought and obtained by various means and by various organizations. Coordination is less effective than it should be. Far more material is collected than is essential. Material is col-

lected which cannot be evaluated in a reasonable length of time and is therefore wasted. New intelligence means have become available and have been incorporated into the program without offsetting reductions in old procedures.

In July, 1970, the Panel Chairman of the Blue Ribbon

MR. SYMINGTON. As a longtime member of the Committee on Foreign Relations, as an ad hoc member of the Appropriations Committee and the ranking member of Armed Services, I respectfully plead with my colleagues to allow me to receive in executive session enough intelligence information to in turn form an intelligent judgment on matters which so vitally affect our security; and so I can vote in committee and on the floor of the Senate on the basis of the facts. There have been several cases where we have not been able to do that in the past. In my opinion, this lack of disseminated information has cost the country a great deal of treasure and a number of American lives.

— from *Congressional Record-Senate*  
November 23, 1971, S-19529

Report on Defense Department problems Gilbert Fitzhugh, told a press conference: "I believe that the Pentagon suffers from too much intelligence. They can't use what they get because there is so much collected. It would almost be better that they didn't have it because it's difficult to find out what's important." He went on to suggest diffusion of responsibility, too much detail work, and too little looking ahead in the five-to-fifteen year range.

#### National Security Agency (NSA):

In 1952, a Presidential directive set up the National Security Agency as a separate agency inside the Defense Department. NSA's basic duties are to break codes of other Nations, to maintain the security of U.S. codes, and to perform intelligence functions with regard to electronic and radar emissions, etc. In 1956, it had 9,000 employees. Today, it is thought to have 15,000 and a budget well over a billion.

In August 1972, an apparently well-informed former employee of NSA wrote a long memoir for Ramparts Magazine. The article summarized the author's claims by saying:

... NSA knows the call signs of every Soviet airplane; the numbers on the side of each plane; the name of the pilot in command; the precise longitude and latitude of every nuclear submarine; the whereabouts of nearly every Soviet VIP; the location of every Soviet missile base; every army division, battalion and company—its weaponry, commander and deployment. Routinely the NSA monitors all Soviet military, diplomatic and commercial radio traffic, including Soviet Air Defense, Tactical Air, and KGB forces. (It was the NSA that found Che Guevara in Bolivia through radio communications intercept and analysis.) NSA cryptologic experts seek to break every Soviet code and do so with remarkable success. Soviet scrambler and computer-generated signals being nearly as vulnerable as ordinary voice and manual Morse radio transmissions. Interception of Soviet radar signals enables the NSA to gauge quite precisely the effectiveness of Soviet Air Defense units. Methods have been devised to "fingerprint" every human voice used in radio transmissions and distinguish them from the voice of every other operator. The Agency's Electronic Intelligence Teams (ELINT) are capable of intercepting any electronic signal transmitted anywhere in the world and, from an analysis of the intercepted signal, identify the transmitter and physically reconstruct it. Finally, after having shown the size and sensitivity of the Agency's big ears, it is almost superfluous to point out that NSA monitors and records



every trans-Atlantic telephone call."

A July 16, New York Times report noted that "extensive independent checking in Washington with sources in and out of Government who were familiar with intelligence matters has resulted in the corroboration of many of [the article's] revelations." Experts had denied, however, the plausibility of the assertion that the sophisticated codes of the Soviet Union had been broken. □

### CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

In each House of Congress, the Armed Services and the Appropriations Committees have a subcommittee that is supposed, in principle, to oversee CIA. In the House of Representatives, even the names of the Appropriations subcommittee members are secret. In the Senate, the five senior members of the Appropriations Committee form a

#### WHAT DRIVES INTELLIGENCE?

We are going to have to take a harder look at intelligence requirements, because they drive the intelligence process. In so doing they create demands for resources. There is a tendency for requirements—once stated—to acquire immortality.

One requirements question we will ask ourselves is whether we should maintain a world-wide data base, collected in advance, as insurance against the contingency that we may need some of this data in a particular situation. Much of this information can be acquired on very short notice by reconnaissance means. As for the remainder, we are going to have to accept the risk of not having complete information on some parts of the world. We haven't enough resources to cover everything, and the high priority missions have first call on what we do have.

—Hon. Robert F. Fraehke, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, June 9, 1971 before Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, House of Representatives.

subcommittee on Intelligence Operations.

The subcommittee of Armed Services on CIA has not met for at least two years—although Senator Symington, a member of the subcommittee, has sought to secure such a meeting. In 1971, Senator Stennis and Senator Ellender—then the Chairmen of the full Armed Services and Appropriations Committees (as well as of their CIA subcommittees) said they knew nothing about the CIA-financed war in Laos—surely CIA's biggest operation! (Congressional Record, November 23, 1971, pg. S19521/S19530.)

NEW YORK TIMES  
19 December 72

## Downgrading the U.N.

The above title appeared over an editorial on this page last week, commenting on President Nixon's removal of George Bush as United States Ambassador to the United Nations in order to make him Chairman of the Republican National Committee. We repeat it with sorrow, as a headline comment on Mr. Nixon's nomination of John A. Scali to replace Mr. Bush at Turtle Bay.

Mr. Scali was known as a shrewd, aggressive foreign affairs reporter for The Associated Press and the American Broadcasting Company. As an unofficial liaison between State Department and Soviet Embassy in Washington, he played a useful role in the defusing of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. But his only official diplomatic experience has come as a White House con-

sultant for twenty months, during which he made arrangements for the television coverage of Mr. Nixon's spectacular trip to China and accompanied the President to the Soviet Union.

There is little in Mr. Scali's experience to suggest he is qualified to fill a position once held with distinction by Adlai E. Stevenson, Arthur J. Goldberg and Warren R. Austin. Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson were all guilty of overbuilding and overselling the U.N. ambassadorship as a Cabinet-level job virtually on a par with that of Secretary of State. Stripped of the hyperbole, however, it remains by a wide margin the most important of United States ambassadorial posts.

Whatever Mr. Nixon's intent, the naming of Mr. Scali compounds the downgrading of the United Nations that began with word that Mr. Bush would leave the ambassadorship to come to the aid of the Grand Old Party.

The Congressmen are understandably reluctant even to know about intelligence operations. Without publicity, and public support, there is a limit to their influence over the events about which they hear. And if they cannot appeal to their constituency, the knowledge of secrets only makes them vulnerable to the smear that they leaked a secret or mishandled their responsibilities.

Approximately 150 resolutions have been offered in the Congress to control the CIA and/or other intelligence functions. The most common resolution has called for a Joint Committee on Intelligence, and there is much to be said for it. Such a renewal of Congressional authority to review such matters might strengthen Congressional oversight.

Two more recent efforts, both sponsored by Senator Stuart Symington, have tried different tactics. One resolution called for a Select Committee on the Coordination of U.S. Government activities abroad; such a committee would have authority over CIA and DOD foreign activities in particular. Another approach called for limiting the U.S. intelligence expenditures of all kinds to \$4 billion.

Senator Clifford Case (Rep., N.J.) has sought to control the CIA by offering resolutions that simply apply to "any agency of the U.S. Government." These resolutions embody existing restraints on DOD which CIA was circumventing; e.g., he sought to prevent expenditure of funds for training Cambodian military forces. In short, Senator Case is emphasizing the fact that CIA is a statutorily designed agency, which Congress empowered, and which Congress can control.

Congress has not only given the Executive Branch a blank check to do intelligence but it has not even insisted on seeing the results. The National Security Act of 1947 requires CIA to "correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the government . . ." (italics added). As far as the legislative branch of "government" is concerned, this has not been done. On July 17, 1972, the Foreign Relations Committee reported out an amendment (S. 2224) to the National Security Act explicitly requiring the CIA to "inform fully and currently, by means of regular and special reports" the Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services of both Houses and to make special reports in response to their requests. The Committee proposal, sponsored by Senator John Sherman Cooper, put special emphasis upon the existing precedent whereby the Joint Atomic Energy Committee gets special reports from DOD on atomic energy intelligence information. □

NEW YORK TIMES  
18 December 72

## Watch on the Media

By Herbert Mitgang

More than five years after the Freedom of Information Act became Federal law, it is still difficult for journalists, historians and researchers to obtain information freely. The idea behind the law was to take the rubber stamp marked "Confidential" out of the hands of bureaucrats and open up public records, opinions and policies of Federal agencies to public scrutiny. It hasn't worked that way.

When President Johnson signed the bill, he declared that it struck a proper balance between Government confidentiality and the people's right to know. In actual practice, it has taken court actions to gain access to Government records. An effort is finally being made to declassify the tons of documents by the Interagency Classification Review Committee, under the chairmanship of former Ambassador John Eisenhower. This historical survey will take years.

But more than mere documents are involved. There is a matter of the negative tone in Washington.

The White House and its large communications staff have lengthened the distance between executive branch, Congress and the public. Of course, every Administration has instinctively applied cosmetics to its public face, but this is the first one operating for a full term under the mandate of the Freedom of Information Act. The result is that official information — especially if it appears to brush the Administration's robes unfavorably — is not communicated but excommunicated.

The other day Senator Symington of Missouri, a former Air Force Secretary who has been questioning the wisdom of the President's B-52 foreign policy in Southeast Asia, said: "I would hope that during this session of Congress everything possible is done to eliminate unnecessary secrecy especially as in most cases this practice has nothing to do with the security of the United States and, in fact, actually operates against that security."

This point was underscored before the House Subcommittee on Freedom of Information by Rear Adm. Gene R. La Rocque, a former Mediterranean fleet commander who since retiring has headed the independent Center for Defense Information. Admiral La Rocque said that Pentagon classification was designed to keep facts from civilians in the State and Defense Departments and that some Congressmen were considered "had security risks" because they shared information with the public.

Reputable historians trying to unearth facts often encounter Catch-22 conditions. The Authors League of America and its members have resisted those bureaucrats offering "cooperation" on condition that manuscripts be checked and approved before book publication. The Department of Hous-

ing and Urban Development has denied requests for information about slum housing appraisals. The Department of Agriculture turned down the consumer-oriented Center for the Study of Responsive Law in Washington when it asked for research materials about pesticide safety.

The unprecedented attempt by the Administration to block publication of the Pentagon Papers, a historical study of the Vietnam war, took place despite the Freedom of Information Act, not to mention the First Amendment. And the Justice Department is still diverting its "war on crime" energies to the hot pursuit of scholars who had the temerity to share their knowledge of the real war with the public. Such Government activities not only defy the intent of the Freedom of Information Act; they serve as warnings to journalists, professors, librarians and others whose fortunes fall within the line of vision — budgetary, perhaps punitive — of the Federal Government.

The executive branch's battery of media watchmen are busiest with broadcasting because of its franchises and large audiences. At least one White House aide, eyes glued to the news programs on the commercial networks, grades reporters as for or against the President. In one case that sent a chill through network newsrooms, a correspondent received a personal communication from a highly placed Administration official questioning his patriotism after he had reported from North Vietnam. Good news (meaning good for the Administration) gets a call or a letter of praise.

The major pressure on the commercial and public stations originates from the White House Office of Telecommunications Policy, whose director has made it clear that controversial subjects in the great documentary tradition should be avoided. The same viewpoint has been echoed by the President's new head of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, which finances major programs on educational stations. This Government corporation is now engaged in a battle to downgrade the Public Broadcasting Service, its creative and interconnecting arm responsible for serious news shows.

Long before there was a Freedom of Information Act, Henry David Thoreau was jailed for speaking out and defying the Government's role in the Mexican war, last century's Vietnam. "A very few men serve the State with their consciences," he wrote, "and they are commonly treated as enemies by it." Grand juries, subpoenas and even Government jailers will be unable to overpower today's men of conscience.

Herbert Mitgang is a member of the editorial board of *The Times*.

NEW YORK TIMES  
17 December 72

## Richardson Called Liberal by Soviets

Reuter

MOSCOW, Dec. 15 — The Soviet foreign affairs magazine *New Time* today welcomed the appointment of Elliott Richardson as U.S. defense secretary, describing him as a man of "moderate liberal trend".

The description contrasted with the standard Soviet propaganda reference to his predecessor, Melvin Laird, as being among the "hawks" of Washington.

But the magazine warned that the Pentagon, traditionally a chief target of Soviet propaganda, had not turned into a "house of doves" overnight. "Its multi-billion dollar budget is not likely to be reduced," the weekly's New York correspondent reported.

However, Western observers here saw today's relatively friendly presentation of Richardson to the Soviet reader as symptomatic of the new climate between the superpowers following President Nixon's Moscow summit last May.

*New Times* said Laird's departure "confirms the failure of Washington's policy [of negotiating] from a position of strength." It shows the obvious fact that the enforced change of military course in the new conditions requires new leaders.

It said neither Richardson, nor the new secretary of Health Education and Welfare, Caspar Weinberger, nor the new director of the Office of Management and Budget, Roy Ash, could be called hawks.

"This circumstance is especially remarkable concerning Richardson, who is to head the gigantic military machine of the Defense Ministry," *New Times* said.

But it cautioned that Richardson would have a counterbalance in his deputy, "the Texas multimillionaire and oil magnate William Clements," whom it called a "frank conservative."

THE NEW REPUBLIC  
DECEMBER 16, 1972

## An Interview with Oriana Fallaci

# KISSINGER

*In his White House office, November 4, Henry Kissinger talked with the distinguished Italian journalist, Oriana Fallaci, and his remarkable taped conversation with her, reprinted in full here, first appeared in the magazine L'Europeo. "Why I agreed to it," Mr. Kissinger later commented, "I'll never know."*

The Editors

*Fallaci: I wonder what your feelings are, these last few days, Dr. Kissinger. I wonder if you too are disappointed, like us, like most of the world. Are you disappointed, Dr. Kissinger?*

*Kissinger: Disappointed? Why? What has happened, within the last few days, to disappoint me?*

*Q: Something unpleasant, Dr. Kissinger: although you said that peace was "within reach," and although you confirmed that an agreement with the North Vietnamese had been drawn up, peace has not come. The war goes on as before, and worse than before.*

*A: There will be peace. We're determined to obtain it and we shall have it. It will come within a few weeks or even less, i.e. immediately following the resumption of negotiations with the North Vietnamese for the final agreement. This is what I said ten days ago and I repeat it. Yes, we'll have peace within a reasonable period if Hanoi accepts another meeting before signing the agreement, a meeting to define the details, and if they accept it in the same spirit and with the same attitude adopted in October. Those "ifs" are the only uncertainty of the last few days. An uncertainty, however, that I refuse even to consider; you are giving in to panic, and one shouldn't panic in cases like this. Nor succumb to impatience. The fact is that . . . Well, we've been conducting these negotiations for months, and you newspaper people wouldn't take them seriously. You kept on saying they wouldn't end in anything concrete. Then, suddenly, you proclaimed that peace was already around the corner, and now, finally, you say the negotiations have failed. That way you take our temperature every day, four times a day. But you take it from Hanoi's point of view. And . . . please take note, I understand Hanoi's point of view. The North Vietnamese wanted us to sign on October 31: a proposition that was reasonable and unreasonable at*

*the same time and . . . No, I don't want to engage in polemics on this subject.*

*Q: But had you actually engaged to sign on October 31?*

*A: I say and repeat that they were the ones who insisted on this date and that, to avoid an abstract debate about dates that seemed in fact merely theoretical at the time, we replied that we'd make every effort to conclude the negotiations within October 31. But it was always clear, to us at least, that we wouldn't be able to sign an agreement until the last details had been discussed. We couldn't be expected to respect a date merely because, in good faith, we had promised to exert every effort to do so. So where does that put us? At the point where those details still need to be discussed and a further meeting is indispensable. They say it isn't indispensable, that it isn't even necessary. I maintain it is indispensable and that it will take place. It will take place as soon as the North Vietnamese summon me to Paris. But this is only November 4, today is November 4, and I can quite understand the North Vietnamese not wishing to resume negotiations just a few days after the date on which they had asked us to sign. I can understand this adjournment on their part. But it isn't conceivable, to me at least, that they should refuse to agree to a further meeting. Especially now, when we have already covered ninety percent of the road and are near our destination. No, I'm not disappointed. I should be, certainly, were Hanoi to break the agreement, were Hanoi to refuse to discuss any alterations. But, no, I can't believe it. I can't even suspect that we've come so far only to fail on a matter of prestige, of procedures, of dates, of nuances.*

*Q: And yet, it looks as if they've really stiffened, Dr. Kissinger. They've reverted to a harsh vocabulary, they've proffered serious, almost insulting charges against you . . .*

*A: Oh, that doesn't mean a thing. It's happened before and we've never paid any attention. I'd say that serious charges, even insults, are part of a normal picture. Essentially, nothing has changed. Since Tuesday October 31, since, that is, we've calmed down here, you keep on asking me whether the patient is ill. But I can discover no illness. And I really believe things will fall out more or less as I claim. Peace, I repeat, will come within a matter of weeks after talks are resumed;*

not within a matter of months. Within a matter of weeks.

*Q: But when will talks be resumed? That's the point.*

*A: Whenever Le Duc Tho wants to meet me. I'm here, waiting. But without any anxiety, believe me. For God's sake! Before, two or three weeks used to elapse between each meeting! I don't see why we should get the wind up now if we have to wait a few days. The only reason for the nervous tension that has seized you all is that people are wondering: "Will talks really be resumed?" When you were cynical and didn't believe anything would happen, you didn't notice time passing. You were over-pessimistic at the beginning, and over-optimistic after my press conference, and now you're over-pessimistic again. You refuse to realize that everything is proceeding as I always thought it would from the moment I declared that peace was at hand. I calculated it would take a couple of weeks then, if I'm not mistaken. But even if it were to take more . . . Enough, I don't want to talk of Vietnam any more. I can't afford to at the present time. Every word I utter makes the headlines. At the end of November, perhaps . . . Look, why don't we meet again at the end of November?*

*Q: Because it's more interesting now, Dr. Kissinger. Because Thieu, for instance, defied you to talk. Please read this cutting from The New York Times. It carries Thieu's words: "Why don't you ask Kissinger what issues we differ on, what points I refuse to accept?"*

*A: Let me see it . . . Oh! No, I shan't answer him. I shan't respond to his invitation.*

*Q: He's already given his own answer, Dr. Kissinger. He's already told the world that the disagreement stems from the fact that, according to the terms accepted by you, the North Vietnamese troops will remain in South Vietnam. Dr. Kissinger, do you believe you'll ever be able to win over Thieu? Do you think the United States will be compelled to sign a separate treaty with Hanoi?*

*A: Don't ask me that. I have to stick to what I said in public ten days ago. I cannot, I must not consider a hypothesis that I don't believe will materialize, a hypothesis that must not materialize. All I can tell you is that we are determined to make peace, and that we will make it within as short a delay as possible, after my next meeting with Le Duc Tho. Thieu may say what he likes. It's his business.*

*Q: Dr. Kissinger, if I put a pistol to your head and enjoined you to choose between a dinner with Thieu and a dinner with Le Duc Tho . . . which would you choose?*

*A: That's a question I can't answer.*

*Q: What if I were to answer it saying I like to think you*

*would prefer to dine with Le Duc Tho?*

*A: I can't, I can't . . . I don't want to answer that question.*

*Q: Can you answer this question then: did you like Le Duc Tho?*

*A: Yes. I found in him a man deeply dedicated to his cause, very serious, very strong, and always courteous, well-bred. Sometimes, too, very hard, difficult to come to terms with, in fact. But this is something I've always respected in him. Yes, I feel great respect for Le Duc Tho. Of course, we met on strictly professional terms, but I believe, I believe I could feel a certain softening in the background. It's a fact, for instance, that at times we even managed to crack a joke together. We said that one day I might go to lecture on international relations at Hanoi University and that he would come to Harvard to lecture on Marxism-Leninism. Well, I should say our rapport was good.*

*Q: Would you say the same of Thieu?*

*A: I had a good rapport with Thieu too, at first.*

*Q: Exactly, at first. The South Vietnamese said this time you didn't greet each other like the best of friends.*

*A: What did they say?*

*Q: Yes. Would you deny it, Dr. Kissinger?*

*A: Well of course we had and still have our own points of view, and not necessarily the same points of view. Let's say Thieu and I greeted each other like allies.*

*Q: Dr. Kissinger, it is now obvious that Thieu is a harder nut to crack than formerly thought. As regards Thieu, do you feel you've achieved as much as you could or do you still hope to do something more? In one word: are you optimistic as regards the Thieu problem?*

*A: Yes, I do feel optimistic! I've still got something to do! Lots to do! I have by no means finished, we have by no means finished! And I don't feel powerless. I don't feel discouraged. Not at all. I feel prepared, confident. Optimistic. Even if I can't speak of Thieu, even if I can't tell you what we're doing at this point in the negotiations, that doesn't mean that I'm about to lose confidence in my ability to tie everything up within the delay I've mentioned. That's why it's useless for Thieu to ask you journalists to make me list the points we disagree about. It's so useless that his plea doesn't even irritate me. Besides, I'm not one of those people that allow themselves to be swayed by their emotions. Emotions are of no use. Least of all are they of any use in helping one to attain peace.*

*Q: But the dying, those that may die, are in a hurry, Dr. Kissinger. There was a dreadful picture in this morning's*

*papers: a picture of a very young Vietcong who died two days after October 31. There was also a horrifying news item: about the twenty-two Americans shot down in their helicopter by a Vietcong grenade three days after October 31. And while you condemn haste, the American Department of Defense is sending fresh arms and munitions to Thieu. Hanoi is doing the same.*

A: That was unavoidable. It always happens before a cease-fire. Don't you remember the maneuvers in the Middle East at the time of the cease-fire? They lasted for two years, to say the least. You know, the fact that we're sending Saigon arms and that Hanoi is sending arms to the North Vietnamese quartered in South Vietnam means nothing. Nothing. Nothing. And don't make me talk of Vietnam any more, please.

Q: *Won't you even talk of the fact that, according to some, the agreement you and Nixon have accepted is, to all practical purposes, an act of surrender to Hanoi?*

A: That's absurd! It's absurd to say that President Nixon, a President who, towards the Soviet Union and Communist China, and on the eve of his own election has taken up a stance of assistance and defense as regards South Vietnam against what he considered a North Vietnamese invasion . . . it's absurd to think that such a President could surrender to Hanoi. And why should he surrender now? What we have done is not a surrender. What we have done is give South Vietnam an opportunity to survive under conditions that are, today, political rather than military. It is now up to the South Vietnamese to win the political contest awaiting them, as we have always maintained. If you compare the agreement we have accepted with our proposals of May 8 last, you will see that it's almost the same thing. There are no great differences between what we proposed last May and what the draft of the accepted agreement contains. We haven't added new clauses, we haven't made new concessions. I totally and absolutely reject the opinion of a "surrender." But that's really enough about Vietnam now. Let's talk of Machiavelli, Cicero, anything except Vietnam.

Q: *Let's talk of war, Dr. Kissinger. You're not a pacifist, are you?*

A: No, I really don't think I am. Even if I respect genuine pacifists, I don't agree with any pacifist and especially with half-and-half pacifists: you know, those that are pacifists one way and anything but the other. The only pacifists I agree to talk to are those that bear the consequences of non-violence right to the end: but even to them I talk willingly merely to tell them that they will be crushed by the will of those that are strong and that their pacifism can lead to nothing but horrible suffering. War is not an abstraction: it's something depending on prevailing conditions. The war against

Hitler, for instance, was a necessary one. By that I don't mean that war is necessary as such, that nations have to wage war to preserve their virility. What I mean is that there are certain principles for which nations must be ready to fight.

Q: *And what can you tell me about the war in Vietnam, Dr. Kissinger? You have never been against it, have you?*

A: How could I be? Even before I occupied the position I occupy today . . . No, I have never been against the war in Vietnam.

Q: *But don't you think [Arthur] Schlesinger is right when he says that all the war in Vietnam has managed to prove is that half a million Americans, with all their technology, were unable to defeat poorly armed men dressed in black pajamas?*

A: That's a different problem. If it is a problem whether the war in Vietnam was necessary, a just war, rather than . . . Opinions of that kind depend on the position one takes up when the country is already caught up in the war and all there remains is to devise a method to extricate it. After all, my, our part has been to reduce increasingly America's involvement in the war, and then terminate the war. Eventually, history will judge who achieved most: whether those who merely criticized or we who tried to reduce the war and then ended it. Yes, judgment belongs to posterity. When a country is involved in a war, it's not enough to say: we must put a stop to it. One must end it wisely. And that's very different from stating that we were right to start the war.

Q: *But, Dr. Kissinger, don't you think it was a useless war?*

A: I may agree. But don't forget the reason why we started that war was to prevent the North gobbling up the South, to enable the South to hold on to its territory. Of course, by that I don't mean that we had no other aim; it was something more as well. But today I am not in a position to judge whether the war in Vietnam was a just one or not, whether it was useful or useless for us to become involved in it. But are we still talking of Vietnam?

Q: *Yes, and, still concerning Vietnam, do you think you might say that these negotiations have been and are the most important undertaking in your career, or even in your life?*

A: The most difficult undertaking. Often, too, the most painful. But maybe it isn't right to describe them as the most difficult undertaking: it is more accurate to say that they have been the most painful undertaking. Because they involved me emotionally. You see, ~~approaching~~ ~~China~~ was a difficult task from an intellectual point of view, but not emotionally difficult. Peace in Vietnam, on the other hand, has been an emotion-

ally difficult task. As for describing those negotiations as the most important thing I've ever done . . . No, what I wanted to achieve wasn't merely peace in Vietnam: it was three things. This agreement, the *rapprochement* with China and a new relationship with the Soviet Union. I have always attached great importance to the problem of a new relationship with the Soviet Union. No less, I might say, than to the *rapprochement* with China and the end of the war in Vietnam.

Q: *And you've done it. You succeeded with China, you succeeded with Russia, you almost succeeded with peace in Vietnam. So, at this point, Dr. Kissinger, I'll ask you the same question I asked the astronauts when they were flying to the Moon: "What next? What will you do after the Moon, what more can you do than your astronaut's job?"*

A: Oh! And what did the astronauts answer?

Q: *The question bewildered them, and they answered: "We'll see . . . I don't know."*

A: Neither do I. I really don't know what I'll do afterwards. However, unlike the astronauts, I'm not bewildered. I've always found so many things to do in life and I'm certain that when I leave this job . . . Of course, I'll need some time to recuperate, a decompression period; one can't be in the position I now occupy, then leave it and begin something else at once. However, once decompressed, I'm certain of finding a worthwhile job. I don't want to think about it now. It could influence my . . . my work. We are living in such a revolutionary period that to plan one's life, nowadays, is to revert to a Victorian middle-class mentality.

Q: *Would you go back to teaching at Harvard?*

A: I might. But it's very, very unlikely. There are more interesting things. And if, after all the experience I've acquired, I'm unable to keep on leading an interesting life, it will be my own fault entirely. Besides, I've by no means decided to give up this job yet. You know, I enjoy it very much.

Q: *Naturally. Power is always seductive. Dr. Kissinger, to what extent does power fascinate you? Try to be sincere.*

A: I will be. You see, when one wields power, and when one has it for a long time, one ends up thinking one has a right to it. I'm sure that when I leave this job I shall feel the lack of power. However, power as an instrument in its own right has no fascination for me. I don't wake up every morning exclaiming by God, isn't it extraordinary that I am able to dispose of a plane, that a car with a driver waits at my door? Who would have thought it possible? No, I'm not interested in such reflections. And if I do happen to entertain them, they certainly never become a determining factor. What interests me is what one can achieve with

power. Splendid things, believe me . . . However, it is not the craving for power that has spurred me on to take this job. If you examine my political past, you will discover that President Nixon couldn't have been included in my plans. I've been against him in three elections.

Q: *I know. You even once declared that Nixon "wasn't suited to be President." Does this fact ever make you feel embarrassment in Nixon's presence, Dr. Kissinger?*

A: I don't remember the exact words I may have used against Nixon. I presume that is more or less what I must have said, since the phrase is constantly quoted between inverted commas. However, if I did say it, it's a proof that Nixon was not included in my plans for a rise to power. As for feeling embarrassment in his presence . . . No, I didn't know him, that's all. My attitude towards him was the conventional highbrow one, that's all. I was wrong. President Nixon has shown great strength, great skill. In summoning me to his side, too. I had never met him when he offered me this job. I was astonished. After all, he was acquainted with the unfriendly and unsympathetic attitude I had always assumed towards him. Yes indeed, he showed great courage in turning to me.

Q: *He made a good deal, Dr. Kissinger. Except for the charge people proffer against you today, that you are Nixon's mental nurse.*

A: It is an utterly senseless charge. We mustn't forget that, before he ever met me, President Nixon had been very active in matters of foreign policy. It had always been his consuming interest. Even before he was elected it was obvious that foreign policy mattered greatly to him. He has very clear ideas on the subject. He is a strong character. Besides, a weakling would never have been twice nominated presidential candidate, would never have survived in politics for so long. You can think what you like of President Nixon, but one thing is certain: you don't become President of the United States twice running because you're another man's tool. Such interpretations are romantic and unjust.

Q: *You're very fond of him, Dr. Kissinger, aren't you?*

A: I have great respect for him.

Q: *Dr. Kissinger, people say you don't care about Nixon. "They say all you care about is the job you are doing. They say you'd have done it under any president."*

A: I on the other hand, am not at all so sure I could have done what I've done with him with another president. Such a special relationship, I mean the relationship between the President and me, always depends on the style of both men. In other words, I don't know many leaders, and I've met several, who would have

the courage to send their aide to Peking without telling anyone. I don't know many leaders who would entrust to their aide the task of negotiating with the North Vietnamese, informing only a tiny group of people of the initiative. Really, some things depend on the type of president. What I've done was achieved because he made it possible for me to do it.

*Q: And yet, you have been an adviser to other presidents too, presidents who were Nixon's opponents, in fact. I mean Kennedy, Johnson.*

*A: My position towards all presidents has always been the same: I let them decide whether they wanted my opinion or not. When they asked for it, I gave it to them, telling them all, indiscriminately, what I thought. I was never concerned with what party they belonged to. I answered Kennedy's, Johnson's and Nixon's questions with the same independence. I gave them the same advice. There was some difficulty in Kennedy's case, true. In fact, people usually state that I disagreed with him. Well, yes, it was my fault, in substance. I was much too immature at the time. Moreover, I was only a part-time adviser; one can't hope to influence a president's day-to-day politics if one only meets him twice a week while there are others who see him every day. I mean that in Kennedy's and Johnson's time I was never in a comparable position to the one I now enjoy with Nixon.*

*Q: Not Machiavellian by any chance, Dr. Kissinger?*

*A: No, not at all. Why?*

*Q: Oh, only that, listening to you, one sometimes wonders not how much you have influenced the President of the United States, but to what extent you have been influenced by Machiavelli.*

*A: To none whatever. There is really very little of Machiavelli's one can accept or use in the contemporary world. The one thing I find interesting in Machiavelli is his estimate of the Prince's will. Interesting, but not such as to influence me. If you want to know who has influenced me most, I'll answer with two philosophers' names: Spinoza and Kant. Which makes it all the more peculiar that you choose to associate me with Machiavelli. Most people associate me with Metternich. And that is childish. My only connection with Metternich is a book I wrote: it was to be the first volume in a lengthy study of the construction and disintegration of international order in the nineteenth century. The series was to cover the whole period up to the first world war, that's all. There can be nothing in common between me and Metternich. He was chancellor and foreign minister at a time when it took three weeks to travel from Central Europe to the ends of the continent. He was chancellor and foreign minister at a time when wars were conducted by professional soldiers and diplomacy was in the hands of the aristoc-*

*racy. How can one compare such conditions with the ones prevailing in today's world, a world where there is no homogeneous group of leaders, no homogeneous internal situation and no homogeneous cultural background?*

*Q: But, Dr. Kissinger, how do you explain your incredible superstar status, how do you explain the fact that you have become almost more famous and popular than a president? Have you any theories?*

*A: Yes, but I won't tell you what they are. Because they don't coincide with the common theory. Intelligence, for instance. Intelligence is not all that important in the exercise of power, and is often, in point of fact, useless. Just as a leader doesn't need intelligence, a man in my job doesn't need too much of it either. My theory is quite different, but, I repeat, I won't tell you what it is. Why should I, while I'm still in the middle of my job? Instead, you tell me yours. I'm sure you too have some theory on the reasons for my popularity.*

*Q: I'm not sure, Dr. Kissinger. I'm looking for a theory in this interview. But I haven't found one yet. I expect the root of all lies in success. What I mean is, like a chess player you've made two or three clever moves. China, first of all. People admire a chess player who makes away with his opponent's king.*

*A: Yes, China was an important element in the mechanics of my success. And yet, that isn't the main point. The main point . . . Well, why not? I'll tell you. What do I care after all? The main point stems from the fact that I've always acted alone. Americans admire that enormously. Americans admire the cowboy leading the caravan alone astride his horse, the cowboy entering a village or city alone on his horse. Without even a pistol, maybe, because he doesn't go in for shooting. He acts, that's all: aiming at the right spot at the right time. A Wild West tale, if you like.*

*Q: I see. You see yourself as a kind of Henry Fonda, unarmed and ready to fight with his bare fists for honest ideals. Solitary, brave.*

*A: Not necessarily brave. This cowboy doesn't need courage. It's enough that he be alone, that he show others how he enters the village alone and does everything on his own. This romantic, surprising character suits me, because being alone has always been part of my style, or of my technique if you prefer. Independence too. Yes, that's very important to me and in me. And, finally, conviction. I am always convinced of the necessity of whatever I'm doing. And people feel that, believe in it. And I attach great importance to being believed: when one persuades or conquers someone, one mustn't deceive them. Nor can one do everything by calculation alone. Some believe I carefully plan whatever consequences on the public one of my initiatives or efforts may have. They believe that is a con-*

stant preoccupation of mine. On the contrary, the consequences of my actions, I mean public opinion's verdict, have never worried me. I'm not asking for popularity, I'm not seeking it. In fact, if you really want to know, I care nothing for popularity. I'm not at all afraid of losing my public support, I can afford to say what I think. I am referring to what is genuine in me. If I let myself be perturbed by public reaction, if I acted merely on the basis of a calculated technique, I should achieve nothing. Take actors, for instance, the really good ones don't rely on mere technique. They also follow their feelings when they play a part. Like me, they are genuine. I don't mean to say that all this will last forever. In fact, it may evaporate as quickly as it came. But for the time being it's there.

*Q: Are you trying to tell me, Dr. Kissinger, that you're a spontaneous person? Heavens: if I'm not to think of Machiavelli, the first type my mind associates you with is a mathematician, someone who is almost spasmodically cold and controlled. I may be mistaken, but I believe you're a very cold man, Dr. Kissinger.*

*A:* In tactics, not in strategy. In fact, I believe in human relations more than in ideas. I make use of ideas, but I need human relations, as I've shown in my work. After all, didn't what has happened to me happen by chance? For God's sake, I was a totally unknown professor, wasn't I? How could I possibly tell myself: "Now I'm going to fix things so as to become an international celebrity"? It would have been pure folly. I wanted to be where the action is, true, but I never paid a price to get there. I never made any concessions. I have always been guided by spontaneous decisions. One might retort: then it happened because it had to happen. That's what people always say when things have happened. One never hears it said of things that haven't happened; nobody has ever written the history of things that haven't happened. In a sense, however, I am a fatalist. I believe in fate. True, I believe one must fight to attain a goal. But I also believe there are limits to the fight a man may engage in to reach his goal.

*Q: Another thing, Dr. Kissinger: how do you reconcile the tremendous responsibilities you have shouldered with the frivolous reputation you enjoy? How can you succeed in being taken seriously by Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai and Le Duc Tho on one hand and be judged a carefree Don Juan or even playboy on the other? Doesn't it embarrass you?*

*A:* Not at all. Why should it embarrass me when I go off to negotiate with Le Duc Tho? When I'm talking to Le Duc Tho, I know how to behave with Le Duc Tho, and when I'm with a girl, I know how to behave with a girl. Besides, Le Duc Tho isn't agreeing to negotiate with me because I'm an example of all the moral virtues. He agrees to negotiate with me because he wants certain things from me as I do from him. As a matter of

fact, in case of Le Duc Tho, as with Mao Tse-tung, and Chou En-lai, I believe my playboy reputation has been and still is useful, because it has helped and helps to reassure people, to show them I'm not a museum piece. In any case, my frivolous reputation amuses me.

*Q: And to think I believed it undeserved, a put-on act rather than the truth.*

*A:* Well, it's partly overdone, of course. But it's partly, let's admit it, true. What counts is not how true it is or how much time I devote to women. What counts is to what extent women are part of my life, a central pre-occupation. Well, they aren't that at all. To me women are no more than a pastime, a hobby. Nobody devotes too much time to a hobby. Moreover, my engagement book is there to show I only devote a limited portion of my time to them. What's more, I often prefer to visit my two children. I still see them often, although less frequently than before. As a rule I spend Christmas, other holidays and several weeks in summer with them, and I go to Boston once a month to see them. You probably know I've been divorced for several years. No, being divorced doesn't bother me. The fact that I don't live with my children doesn't give me any guilt complexes. Since my marriage was through, and not owing to any fault on either side, there was no reason not to divorce. Besides, I'm much closer to my children now than when I was their mother's husband. I'm also much happier in their company now.

*Q: Are you against marriage, Dr. Kissinger?*

*A:* No. The problem of marriage for or against is a dilemma that can be solved as a question of principle. I might marry again . . . oh, yes, I might. However, you know, for a serious person like me, after all, it is very difficult to co-exist with someone else and to survive such co-existence. The relationship between a woman and a man of my type is unavoidably very complex. One must be cautious. Oh, how hard it is for me to explain these things. I'm not a person that usually confides in journalists.

*Q: So I gather, Dr. Kissinger. I've never interviewed anyone that evaded close questions and definitions like you, anyone that defended themselves as strenuously as you from attempts to penetrate their personality. Are you shy, by any chance, Dr. Kissinger?*

*A:* Yes, I am rather. On the other hand, however, I believe I'm fairly well balanced. You see, there are those that describe me as a mysterious, tormented character, and others who see me as a merry guy always smiling, always laughing. Both these images are untrue. I'm neither the one nor the other. I'm . . . No, I won't tell you what I am. I'll never tell anyone.

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## A Shrewdness of Kissingers: I

By C. L. Sulzberger

PARIS—Numerous words are applied to groups of differing species including a school of fish, an ostentation of peacocks, a pride of lions, a swarm of bees and a shrewdness of apes. In considering the contemporary Kissinger Phenomenon—which exists in other countries besides the United States—I have decided that perhaps the most apt word applicable to this particular species is shrewdness; not because they are in any way apish but they have to be unusually astute.

Henry Kissinger, who gives his name to this form of super-counsellor, is not the first in American history. Before him there came such Presidential advisers as Colonel House (for Wilson), Harry Hopkins (for Roosevelt), Mac Bundy (for Kennedy) and Walt Rostow (for Johnson). In the autumn of 1948, when it seemed certain Dewey would be elected U.S. President, I asked his principal foreign affairs expert, John Foster Dulles, whether he would be Secretary of State.

"I haven't yet decided," said Dulles with beguiling absence of modesty. He wasn't certain whether he wanted the job. He might prefer a position, like House or Hopkins who had "much more fun." Dulles complained the secretary was too tied up with political maneuvers. In the event, Truman defeated Dewey and Dulles had to wait four years for Eisenhower's victory. He solved his problem by becoming Secretary of State and serving as his own Kissinger.

Henry Kissinger has proven to be the outstanding Kissinger in American experience and also the outstanding

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## A Shrewdness of Kissingers: II

By C. L. Sulzberger

PARIS—Not even the Kissingers of this world are entirely sure just who are full members of their club. Thus I have been told at various times by one or another of this select establishment that Frau Katharina Focke, charming expert on Western Europe, is really Chancellor Brandt's Kissinger or that Robert Temple Armstrong, principal private secretary to the Prime Minister, is really Mr. Heath's Kissinger. In neither case is this correct.

Dr. Focke, now a Cabinet member but who recently adorned the Chancellor's office, is the daughter of a famous German journalist and advised on European matters. Mr. Armstrong, a charming old Etonian who works at the Prime Minister's right hand and is an expert on finance, is not the nearest British equivalent to Henry Kissinger. The original of the species considers Egon Bahr and Sir Burke Trend as his German and British peers.

Confusion arises because it is im-

possible to have a genuine Kissinger in a parliamentary system of government. Mr. Brandt explained to me he must always deal the Foreign Ministry into diplomatic games because the Minister, Walter Scheel, also heads the Liberal (F.D.P.) party, whose minority coalition participation keeps Brandt Chancellor.

Therefore, Mr. Brandt says he can only use Mr. Bahr as a special agent on an *ad hoc* basis and not as a full-fledged Kissinger. That would risk splitting the coalition. Even with this limitation, there is irritation in the Foreign Ministry because of Bahr's role and a feeling that at times the ministry is insufficiently informed.

Mr. Brandt also emulates President Nixon's system of personal lieutenants apart from Bahr. Horst Ehmke, Minister without Portfolio, has been a trouble-shooter doing something like the White House jobs of Messrs. Halde- man and Ehrlichman. Herbert Wehner, Social Democratic floor leader in the Bundestag, serves as an idea man for

international "Kissinger." But, in varying degrees and with differing operational methods, other Kissingers are active abroad.

A.M. Aleksandrov, assistant to the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist party, is Brezhnev's Kissinger. Aleksandrov, a quiet, cautious man who speaks good English and adequate French, is attached to the Russian boss's office and handles important policy matters. He travels with Brezhnev and plays a key role in many negotiations.

Gen. Aharon Yariv, former chief of Israeli intelligence, is now said to be Golda Meir's Kissinger. He is a slender, fit, cool officer, unemotional and objective. Egon Bahr, a short, square, 50-year-old German civil servant with long thin nose, mouse-colored hair and brown eyes, is the equivalent of Willy Brandt's Kissinger. A former journalist, he is renowned for his discretion. Some people call him "the fox in the chancery."

Brandt told me: "There is one big difference between our type of government and yours. I have a Cabinet in a different sense than Nixon. While I make decisions on the general lines of foreign policy, my Foreign Minister (Scheel, who also heads the Liberal party in Brandt's coalition) is still responsible for policy vis-à-vis Parliament.

"Bahr gets only *ad hoc* tasks. And there is stronger coordination between his work and the Foreign Ministry than is the practice in the U.S.A. Kissinger deals with all your foreign policy. Bahr is more my ambassador at large. First he worked on negotiations with Mos-

cow. Then on Berlin and relations with the G.D.R. (East Germany). So it is really different. But I suppose Bahr might be called the nearest thing I have to a Kissinger."

The English Kissinger—or the nearest equivalent—is Sir Burke St. John Trend, Secretary to the Cabinet. Trend is a tall, pale, white-haired man with glasses. He graduated from Oxford where he studied the classics and, after entering the Civil Service, worked for the Education Ministry, then the Treasury. His particular role will be discussed in more detail later.

French President Pompidou likewise has his Kissinger, a short, thin, subtle and highly intelligent man of 51 named Michel Jobert. Under the Fifth Republic established by de Gaulle, the President has great executive power. Therefore the Secretary-General of the Elysée Palace (presidential residence) has enormous influence although he is rarely well known to the public.

When Etienne Burin de Roziers (now French Ambassador to the Common Market) was de Gaulle's Secretary-General, he was perhaps the second most important man in France although few people were aware of this. The same might now be said of Jobert.

Although, apart from stenographers, he has only two full-time staff members and all told there are only fifteen, including experts on monetary matters, internal affairs and foreign policy, his scope is in some ways even larger than Henry Kissinger's. This and similar comparisons will be discussed in subsequent column.

the Chancellor.

A somewhat comparable situation exists in England. Sir Burke Trend is the closest thing to a Kissinger. When Henry Kissinger himself goes to London and wants to talk with an alter-ego he consults Sir Burke. Under the British governing system Mr. Kissinger knows that whatever he confides to Mr. Trend goes to the Prime Minister himself, not just the Foreign Secretary.

However, no genuine Kissinger would be tolerated by the English Cabinet, which would resign if there were one, or by Parliament, which would raise hell. On two occasions when a Prime Minister tried to use the Kissinger formula—during the 1938 appeasement of Hitler and during the 1956 Suez collaboration with France and Israel—there were explosions of wrath after the news eventually leaked.

As Cabinet secretary, Mr. Trend is in charge of assembling the views of all ministers concerned with any problem and, if possible, with compiling options for Prime Ministerial decisions.

But Trend is a nonparty civil servant. He was just as loyal to Harold Wilson as he is to Edward Heath. When Mr. Nixon and Mr. Heath have a personal summit, Messrs. Trend and Kissinger first work out the approximate agenda.

In France, where the position of President is nearer to that of Mr. Nixon than the position of Prime Minister in England or Chancellor in Germany, Michel Jobert has an easier time and less inhibited authority than his equivalents in London and Bonn.

Mr. Jobert is immensely intelligent and hard working. He often looks tired, rarely emerges in Paris society, is frequently called to the Elysée even on Sundays. He takes an annual one-month holiday but returns to Paris every week. Although he has one weak arm, he plays a determined game of tennis, likes to paddle a kayak and is a passionate gardener.

Mr. Jobert is in charge of everything that passes the President's desk; foreign policy only occupies about a third of his time. His job is to coordinate and to get the proper experts working on any problem that arises.

When U.S. Ambassador Watson (recently resigned) arranged Mr. Nixon's Azores meeting with Mr. Pompidou, the entire matter was handled between the White House and the Elysée, with Watson and Jobert discussing the details. Neither the State Department nor the Quai d'Orsay knew about it until the program had been settled.

Nobody in France's executive branch has any complexes about not dealing with the Foreign Ministry. President Pompidou, like General de Gaulle, considers diplomacy and defense "reserved domains" which the Elysée runs. Maurice Schumann, head of the Quai d'Orsay, has no more ultimate authority than William Rogers, Lord of Foggy Bottom. Each is hoist by his own Kissinger.

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## A Shrewdness Of Kissingers: III

By C. L. Sulzberger

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

PARIS—Henry, the proto-Kissinger, came to his job with an analytical brain, a brilliant reputation as a Harvard professor and considerable political experience. He worked for a while with President Kennedy but quit because he disagreed over General de Gaulle. Then he became Nelson Rockefeller's foreign policy expert. Rockefeller recommended him to President Nixon.

Mr. Kissinger arrived at the White House at an appropriate moment. Washington, which had experimented with Presidential agents before, was even more ready for the formula because the bureaucracy had become so swollen. Mr. Kissinger soon realized that one of his functions would be to drive this bureaucracy, above all the State Department, against its inclinations.

He saw that all around the world foreign policy was in the process of moving from foreign ministries to the office of the chief of government. What was occurring in the United States was part of a global process.

Mr. Kissinger originally regarded his primary function as that of eliciting options from various Government experts and presenting these for Mr. Nixon's choice. The job grew as these options dealt with increasingly important matters and Mr. Kissinger became a roving negotiator.

The growth of his influence inevitably produced friction with the State Department. He had no desire to quarrel with Secretary Rogers, an old friend of Mr. Nixon, whereas Mr. Kissinger was a German-Jewish immigrant with a foreign accent who had previously been linked to Mr. Nixon's rivals.

But conflict was inescapable. Cabinet Secretaries tend to be spokesmen for their own bureaucracies rather than Presidential spokesmen to their bureaucracies. Nor did the State Department like Mr. Kissinger dominating policy questions.

Mr. Kissinger contended he didn't formulate policy but only forced the President to come up with alternatives on a day-to-day basis as problems arose. Mr. Nixon had his own coherent philosophy on foreign affairs and didn't intend to be anyone's rubber stamp.

The White House developed a new kind of blueprint for long-term policy. This was featured in 1972 by the Presidential trip to Peking, which was regarded by Mr. Nixon as a bifurcation in the road, and to Moscow, which was regarded as a historical landmark. The Chinese option was held as essential to America's Soviet policy.

This conception heavily influenced the U.S. attitude during the India-Pakistan war. China supported Pakistan and felt that if the United States reacted against Soviet-backed India (as it did ineffectually), Peking could expect American reaction should China be attacked.

Washington also reckoned Moscow would get wrong ideas if it felt the U.S. was too weak to react at all for its ally, Pakistan. So the nuclear carrier Enterprise was sent to the Bay of Bengal as a token warning that India shouldn't attack West Pakistan. It was also believed this would discourage Egyptian President Sadat from carrying out his promise to start another round of Palestine war.

These calculations were part of a global concept of American policy. They did not seek Indian enmity nor did they reckon on sudden Chinese fidelity. Washington continued to regard Japan as its permanent ally in the Pacific and saw China continuing as an opponent.

These decisions, when taken together, may be regarded as a kind of climax in the Presidential method of policymaking and cannot yet be assessed. Notwithstanding, in many ways the Kissinger approach has proven its value—ultimately depending on whether it can wind down the Vietnam war.

It was the judgment of the Kissinger office—more than a year before the event—that Moscow would pull its immense military establishment out of Egypt. It was the Kissinger office that cooled a potential crisis with Moscow about a submarine base in Cienfuegos, Cuba. It now seeks to jar policymakers into reckoning what may happen to Yugoslavia when President Tito dies.

Mr. Kissinger has become an international figure. The Assembly of Western European Union recently discussed "the very particular manner in which United States foreign policy is conducted by Dr. Henry Kissinger," adding: "On more than one occasion there has been evidence that Dr. Kissinger's own conduct of foreign affairs has been independent of the State Department, which may not always have been kept informed."

The point is there is nothing unconstitutional about it. That is simply the way Mr. Nixon, who is charged with making policy, wants to work. Executive diplomacy is practiced increasingly in other countries. The grumbling heard in Foggy Bottom is by no means unfamiliar in other twentieth-century capitals.

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Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

## Factor in Cabinet-Making: A Possible Kissinger-Connally Clash

PRESIDENT NIXON has confided to political intimates that one reason he did not press John B. Connally to become Secretary of State was his concern that Connally could never work harmoniously with Dr. Henry Kissinger, Mr. Nixon's top foreign policy aide.

As Mr. Nixon views it, a clash of powerful personalities, both skilled in the underworld wars of competing bureaucracies, would inevitably break out if Connally took over the State Department while Kissinger remained in charge of the National Security Council machinery.

Mr. Nixon gave the matter much thought last fall, when William P. Rogers, a victim of repeated humiliations as Secretary of State, was prepared to resign beginning Mr. Nixon's second term. Rogers then changed his mind about leaving, partly because of last fall's flurry of press criticism. White House aides now believe Rogers will stay no longer than one more year.

Kissinger is also believed to be planning his departure around the end of 1973, although developments abroad could change that tentative timetable. He has informed colleagues at Harvard, which gave him an unprecedented four-year leave of absence with full protection of tenure, that he does not plan to return.

Thus, the grand entrance on the diplomatic scene of the former Democratic governor of Texas may occur early in 1974 as the possible springboard for a switch in party registration and a run for the Republican presidential nomination. This is precisely the Connally scenario expected by some Nixon-wise White House aides.

A footnote: Kissinger's grand strategy of a peaceful world in which the U.S. controls the balance of world power contradicts Connally's chauvin-

istic goal of a world dominated by the U.S., from trade to monetary relationships to military power.

The irony of the reform drive against the congressional seniority system is that its only possible victim is one of the reformers' favorite committee chairmen: Rep. Wright Patman, the 79-year-old populist from Texas.

After much agitation, the reformers now seem likely to subject every committee chairman to formal endorsement by the House Democratic caucus. The only chairman who might fail that test is Patman, whose age, erratic behavior and autocratic methods as chairman of the Banking Committee will generate opposition votes in the caucus.

However, that's not at all what the outside reformers have in mind. They are not so much interested in purging erratic, autocratic, old committee chairmen as in dumping conservative chairmen. Thus, the recent broadside by Common Cause against the seniority system does not include Patman in its rogues' gallery of high-handed committee chairmen. The reason: Officious though he is, Patman's year-around vendetta against the banking industry fits the Common Cause line.

Conservative Rep. W. R. (Bob) Poage of Texas is no winner of House popularity contests and will receive some "no" votes for retention as agriculture committee chairman. Some doves will vote to remove Rep. F. Edward Hebert of Louisiana, personally popular but hawkish, as armed services committee chairman. A few southerners might oppose Rep. Charles Diggs of Michigan, a black man, to become the new chairman of the District of Columbia committee.

But only the vote on Patman will be

close, and even he probably will survive.

A footnote: the post of House majority whip (No. 3 in the Democratic hierarchy), now appointive by the speaker, would become elective by the caucus where it not for the aggressive campaign for whip being waged by liberal Rep. Phillip Burton of California.

Even old-line establishment Democrats believe that since the whip's job has become a stepping-stone to speaker, it should be made elective. But they don't want Burton on the leadership escalator and would feel in comparably safer with Speaker Carl Albert's presumed appointment, California Rep. John McFall. They would relent, however, if they were certain that the caucus would elect a less passionate liberal than Burton — say Rep. Morris Udall of Arizona.

The otherwise unfathomable selection of Texas politician Anne Armstrong, co-chairman of the Republican National Committee, to become a Cabinet-level counselor to President Nixon was a hurried move to head off criticism from women.

A coalition of women's groups was about to blast Mr. Nixon for failing to include any women in the second-term Cabinet, when the White House hurriedly turned to a stunned Mrs. Armstrong. Though Mrs. Armstrong is an effective party politician, nobody claims she has the background for a job originally designed for the estimable Dr. Arthur Burns, now chairman of the Federal reserve Board.

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WASHINGTON POST  
1 JANUARY 1973

### Kissinger, Rogers Shun Bids to Hill

By Jane Denison  
United Press International

Despite clamors in Congress to find out what is going on in Vietnam and the Paris peace talks, Secretary of State William P. Rogers and presidential adviser Henry A. Kissinger have refused to testify on Capitol Hill this week.

Their refusals, it was learned yesterday, were given to the chairmen of the Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs committees shortly after the White House Saturday announced a halt to the heavy bombing of the Hanoi-Haiphong area and the impending resumption of peace negotiations with North Vietnam Jan. 8.

"In view of the imminent renewal of the negotiations, the secretary does not consider it would be appropriate to meet with the committees next week and believes it would be more useful to the committees

to defer the meeting for a short while," State Department spokesman Charles W. Bray said yesterday.

"The secretary does wish to keep the Congress as fully informed as possible and after Congress reconvenes he will be in touch."

The committees had invited Rogers and Kissinger at the height of the 12-day bombing blitz to appear on Tuesday, the day before the 93d Congress convenes.

Though there was no official White House announcement, informed administration sources said that Kissinger

also had declined to appear before the committees. He has regularly declined invitations to testify before Congress, citing "executive privilege."

Sen. J. W. Fulbright (D-Ark), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said he was disappointed but not surprised.

"I'm very sorry that they didn't feel free to meet with the committee and talk about the present situation," he said in an interview. "But that's not unusual. They (the administration) haven't been disposed to consult with the Congress for some time."

**GENERAL**WASHINGTON STAR  
10 December 1972**Is Plowshare****Worth the Price?**By JAMES J. WADSWORTH  
and JO POMERANCE

The SALT arms control agreement is a step in the direction of a more secure world. But the arms race is not over.

Indeed, while President Nixon has characterized the SALT agreements as signifying a "new era of mutually agreed restraint," he at the same time ordered full speed ahead on new strategic weapons systems. It becomes all the more important, therefore, that the United States and the Soviet Union press forward on negotiations on a comprehensive test ban—the measure which, above all, would signify that the superpowers are serious about halting the arms race.

ONE OF THE arguments used by opponents of a comprehensive test ban agreement among the nuclear powers is that it would eliminate the testing of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes.

This opposition is based on the scientifically valid point that these tests could not be permitted since they might be used for weapons development to circumvent a test ban agreement. It is contended that a total test ban would, therefore, force the termination of the highly touted U.S. Plowshare Program.

But the fact is that the once promised boon to man of peaceful nuclear explosions may be a dangerous and perhaps worthless activity.

There have been two types of industrial applications of peaceful nuclear explosions.

One is for large-scale excavation projects, such as forming new harbors, the construction of canals and the creation of passes through mountain ranges for railroad and highway routes.

The second is designed to fracture large volumes of rock underground for the purpose of recovering natural resources, particularly natural gas and oil from shale deposits.

Other underground applications are for the creation of underground storage facilities for fuels and waste disposal and the possible stimulation of geothermal heat sources for electric power production.

After several years of experience it is doubtful that any of these applications has proved to be practical.

The United States has halted development of devices for excavation. There have been no tests since 1970. In that same year a government commission concluded that a peaceful explosion for creating a new canal across the Isthmus of Panama was neither technically feasible nor politically acceptable. The tests conducted through 1970 showed that while radioactive emissions from these tests had been reduced, fallout was still a

problem.

Fallout presents not only environmental and safety hazards but a political risk as well. The Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963 prohibits any nuclear blast that causes radioactive debris to drift beyond the territorial limits of the nation conducting the explosion. This is apparently a condition that cannot be guaranteed with the excavation type of peaceful explosion. Other excavation projects once considered and now cancelled include a harbor excavation at Cape Keraudren, Australia, and plans to blast a railroad pass through mountainous terrain in the U.S.

The Plowshare device for the recovery of oil, gas and other natural resources has also been unproductive. The list of projects proposed and later cancelled is long. These include Project Sloop—a plan to recover copper ore; Projects Bronco and Utah—both designed for oil shale recovery, and Projects Wagon Wheel and WASP—for natural gas stimulation.

Of all these plans and programs promoted over the years only a gas stimulation program in the Rocky Mountains is now funded by the Atomic Energy Commission.

There are three problems associated with the concept of natural gas recovery by nuclear explosion—economic, technical and environmental. The program can be economically viable only if the price of natural gas increases considerably over the present market. To reduce the radiation received by consumers, the gas from the nuclear-stimulated well must be diluted with gas from other sources at least tenfold before being shipped, a requirement that many experts consider impractical.

The full program for gas recovery calls for the detonation of 4,000 nuclear devices of 1000 kilotons each in 1,000 wells over a 20-year period. The regions where the explosions are to take place—Colorado, Utah, New Mexico, Wyoming and Arizona—contain areas of high natural rock stress. It has not been established that these nuclear blasts won't cause earthquakes.

PEACEFUL EXPLOSIONS can also cause the proliferation of nuclear weapons capability. Several near-nuclear powers, such as India, Israel, Japan and even less technically sophisticated nations such as Brazil, are understandably interested in whatever benefits may be produced by the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

But any nation could conceivably test nuclear weapons under the guise of peaceful-uses programs requiring nuclear explosions. And who can be sure that any nation might not attempt to develop nuclear weapons to meet a real or imagined threat to its security or to increase its international prestige

and power.

The evidence is persuasive that the Plowshare programs may be more trouble than they are worth. The excavation program has been halted without achieving technically suitable devices for application. Nor have ways been found to overcome the safety, political and international problems.

On balance, the entire program is simply not promising enough to impede the completion of a total nuclear test ban. No provision for continued Plowshare device development should be contained in a test ban agreement since the chances of weapons application are too high and the potential benefits of these devices as peaceful explosions are low.

UNTIL THE BENEFITS of peaceful nuclear explosion are conclusively established, the nuclear powers should declare a moratorium on these explosions as part of a comprehensive ban on all tests. A careful evaluation could be conducted by an international authority, perhaps the International Atomic

Agency, to determine under what conditions peaceful explosions could be conducted in the future, if at all.

Now that the American people have given President Nixon the "four more years" he wanted, he should move forward to negotiate a ban on all nuclear tests.

The name of the Plowshare program was, of course, inspired by a Biblical passage from Isaiah, "They shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruning hooks; nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more." The true spirit of that ancient admonition can best be realized by not allowing our modern-day Plowshare to stand in the way of the pursuit of peace.

*Mr. Wadsworth was the chief U.S. negotiator at the Geneva disarmament conferences in the late 1950s and early 60s. Mrs. Pomerance is a consultant to the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on arms control and international organization.*

NEW YORK TIMES, TUESDAY, DECEMBER 26, 1972

## Press Curbs Stir Fleet Street

### Search at Magazine Poses New Issue on Freedoms

By ALVIN SHUSTER  
Special to The New York Times

LONDON, Dec. 25—Some four weeks ago, at 10:30 in the morning, two Scotland Yard men walked into the offices of the obscure Railway Gazette, a monthly publication with a circulation of 12,000. After producing a search warrant, they proceeded to spend nearly three hours opening filing cabinets and desks for clues concerning a leak of a Government document on proposed changes in the country's railway network.

The incident is stirring a national controversy and raising new questions about the relationship between the Government and the press. Members of Parliament and the press described the search as a sinister blow to the freedom of the press. And Richard Hope, the Gazette's editor, charged last week that his telephone had been bugged by the police.

The dispute, which has involved Prime Minister Heath in parliamentary exchanges, is the latest in a series focusing on Fleet Street, Britain's publishing district. The Sunday Times of London, which printed the rail report, was recently stopped by a court from publishing a definitive article on the deforming drug, thalidomide, on ground it might influence negotiations for settlement of a suit for damages by the drug's victims.

#### Stringent Legal Restraints

British editors, of course, recognize that they operate under much more stringent

legal restraints than their colleagues in the United States. There is no written constitution, for example, containing provisions for freedom of the press.

Accordingly, newsmen here often look with envy at the freedom enjoyed by American reporters, despite recent court decisions against the press in the United States. Libel laws, the rules of contempt, the claims of parliamentary privilege and the laws covering secrets are all much tougher in Britain.

The case of William T. Farr, the Los Angeles journalist now in jail for refusing to reveal his sources, dramatically illustrates the differences. During the Charles Manson murder trial in 1970, Mr. Farr wrote in an article that one of the Manson "family" had confessed to a plan to kill Richard Burton, Elizabeth Taylor and Frank Sinatra. Mr. Farr then refused to reveal who had told him.

In Britain, Mr. Farr or his editor would probably have been arrested within an hour after that article appeared on the streets, not necessarily to be questioned on his sources, but on the grounds that his report was prejudicial to the defendants and hence was in contempt of court. Reporters here may report only what is said at a trial, and may not go beyond it.

#### No Protection for Newsmen

If Mr. Farr had been called before a court here to reveal his sources, there would have been no doubt about the outcome. He would either talk or go to jail. There is no legal precedent to protect a newsmen who asserts that his information was given in confidence.

The press here has learned from bitter experience the limits on its scope. Twenty

years ago, for example, Sylvester Bolam, editor of The Daily Mirror, went to jail for three months for articles on a pending murder trial. Nine years ago, two reporters, Reg Foster and Brendan Mulholland, went to prison for refusing to reveal their news sources to an official inquiry into a spy ring.

The dispute over the Gazette raid, which Mr. Heath defended in the House of Commons, also underscores the restraints on newsmen. So few Government documents get out without a minister's approval that the circulation of one stirs a huge inquiry.

"There are so many classified documents floating around in Washington that nobody pays any attention any more, unless it is really big," said one editor here. "One document floats around here—an innocuous one at that—and they call in Scotland Yard, produce search warrants and touch off a major controversy."

#### Eyes on the United States

Against this background of their own problems, British editors are viewing with extreme interest the events in the United States after the Supreme Court decision holding that the First Amendment did not exempt journalists from the obligation to testify before grand juries whether or not they were protecting their sources.

"We regret what we see going on there," said Anthony Howard, a former Washington correspondent and now the editor of The New Statesman. "I've always felt it was far easier to be a reporter in Washington than in London."

"Small things illustrated it all for me," he went on. "Take that State Department book with all the home phone numbers of every official. Try and

call a Foreign Office man outside the press office at night or on the weekend. You'll never get his number.

"Another example is the budget. You actually get briefed on the thing before it's announced. A Chancellor of the Exchequer whispers an innocent word about the budget before he speaks in the House and he's out of a job."

Other newsmen who have worked both sides of the Atlantic agree. Here, for example, a reporter usually has trouble getting into any Government building, from the Ministry of

### Newsmen Have Far More Restrictions Than in U.S.

Defense to the Department of Environment, without a specific appointment with an official.

"British officials remain especially secretive, and particularly sensitive to the idea that anything that they say or do might be discussed by the public that they are supposed to serve," said Joe Rogaly of The Financial Times. "Anyone who has lived and worked in America knows the difference: it is like night and day."

The reluctance of British officials to speak frankly to the press is backed by strong legal powers, particularly the 60-year-old Official Secrets Act, which guards the Government from overzealous newsmen. Unlike laws in the United States, the act makes no distinction between security information and other Government documents.

In the course of the inquiry into the rail report, for example, Harold Evans, the editor of The Sunday Times, was also visited by policemen who suggested that he might face prosecution under the Secrets Law. Calling the inquiry a "sinister farce," The Sunday

Times said it was intolerable that the raids should follow publication of a document that has "no relevance whatever to national security."

#### Secrecy Even About Trees

As it now stands, the Secrets Law makes it a crime to publish anything at all from official documents of any department, unless its release has been authorized. Charles Wintour, the editor of The Evening Standard, who has long campaigned for changes in the law, has often noted that even the number of trees blown down in a park during a gale

would be an official secret. Even gardeners working for the Government must sign a pledge under the act.

There is no doubt among editors on Fleet Street, for example, that they would have been promptly jailed if they had published anything resembling the Pentagon papers.

The Government is now considering changes in the Secrets Law to permit a larger flow of information, but editors remain doubtful that any new legislation would make life easier for them.

The severe libel laws are also a constant source of restraint

on newsmen here, who again cite the relative freedom of American newsmen to say just about what they wish about public officials.

It is much easier to collect under British law, and public figures and others often win large damages.

Such laws have had a particularly inhibiting effect on the press in investigative reporting, for example, on corruption involving officials. A newspaper would rarely accuse an official of wrongdoing unless the police decided to move against the offender.

Another crucial distinction

between the two countries, often cited by editors here, is that reporters generally have far less status than they do in the United States. The result is an inbred mistrust of the press on the part of many senior officials.

If a government minister is known to be friendly with reporters, he is somehow regarded as rather odd. Journalists in general, as one editor put it, "are not the types ministers feel they would normally have down for the weekend."

THE GUARDIAN, Manchester  
22 December 1972

DAVID FAIRHALL and HELLA PICK on Europe's latest East/West talks

## SALT on the disarmers' tail

THE paradox about Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions—a piece of diplomatic jargon as irritating as SALT is appealing—is that although nearly everyone in NATO wants to talk about them, the prospect of the talks actually succeeding makes a lot of people distinctly nervous.

This nervousness is concentrated, as one would expect, among the military men rather than the politicians. And it is based on the simple arithmetical fact that if you have two numbers, one bigger than the other by a certain ratio, reducing each of them by the same absolute amount increases the ratio.

It happens that all the obvious numerical indicators by which one might compare the military strength of NATO with that of the Warsaw Pact in Northern and Central Europe—manpower, divisions, tanks, or aircraft—show a heavy advantage for the Eastern Block. And the same is true to a lesser extent even if one compares the NATO forces with the Soviet Union on its own. For example, the Institute of Strategic Studies' count of main battle tanks on these fronts shows that NATO has 6,000 and the Warsaw Pact 16,000 (of which 10,000 are Russian).

Such crude comparisons, of course, may give only the vaguest idea of the true military balance in a particular area. But unfortunately that is not the point. The SALT negotiations have demonstrated over the past two and a half years how difficult it is to escape, in this sort of bargaining, from simply counting the number of roughly comparable objects on each side. Qualitative differences were allowed for in SALT to some extent; for example when the Americans agreed to allow the Russians a higher number of missile launchers because many of their own were fitted with multiple, independently controlled warheads, but

some American congressmen still objected to the discrepancy.

If one does use straight arithmetical comparisons "balanced" has to mean "proportional," which immediately gives the Warsaw Pact negotiators something to complain about, however unreasonably. And that is just a start. If one talks in terms of proportional withdrawals of, say, American and Russian troops from Central Europe, one is not pulling back a few hundred miles to their bases in the Soviet Union while the others were airlifted 3,000 miles across the North Atlantic.

NATO commanders are already worried by the comparative weakness of their conventional forces and what they regard as complacency among some members of the alliance. As soon as they start trying to think what MBFR might actually mean, they get even more worried. They fear that the end result might be a lopsided disarmament which left NATO simultaneously less able to defend herself and less convinced of the need to do so.

Yet they have to admit that if such negotiations could eventually prompt some measure of real disarmament, as opposed to merely shuffling the military pieces around, or even just help to build mutual confidence in each other's peaceful intentions, they should be worth trying. Even such a small thing as an agreement to tell the other side about major troop movements in advance would be useful.

THE Finns can breathe a sigh of relief and, for a month, relax their internal security arrangements. The preparatory talks for a conference on European Security and cooperation have been recessed, and many of the visiting diplomatic firemen, who came to help their Ambassadors, are leaving for home.

They leave without any firm decision on the proposed

34-motion European Security Conference. The NATO countries only agreed to come to Helsinki after years of pressure from the Communist block and even if the conference is convened this summer they are determined to get a carefully worded agenda that will not prevent them from bringing up questions of freer flow of people and information.

The preparatory talks have made little headway beyond establishing reasonably good relations. Rumania sought to assert its independence of the Warsaw Pact, and to ensure that neither these consultations, nor the security conference itself, would be conducted on a block to block basis. The NATO countries and the Warsaw block say they accept this premise. Perhaps the most interesting phenomenon of this initial phase has been the degree to which the nine members of the enlarged EEC have managed to cooperate.

In the past few days the conference representatives began to work at the organisational aspect of the main conference. This subject will be resumed, along with detailed examination of the agenda in mid-January. So far, there is agreement that the conference should be held in three stages, opening with a Foreign Ministers' meeting, then breaking up into working commissions, and concluding with another high-level meeting. But they have not yet decided how many commissions there should be.

Quite a few gaps will have to be bridged before agreement can be reached on an agenda for the security conference. The Russians want to put all the emphasis on a declaration of principles guiding relations between European States in the hope that this will establish the status quo in Europe. And they would like to back this with the establishment of a permanent body. The Western countries see no way of getting out of the declaration of principles, but intend to use other conference

agenda items to work towards breaking down existing barriers.

They want to talk about expanding East-West trade and other exchanges. They oppose the idea of a permanent organisation on the grounds that this could lead to unwarranted interference in internal affairs. On the other hand, they want "confidence building" measures, such as mutual advance notice of troop movements.

Russia, as well as most NATO countries, are agreed that questions of military security should best be discussed at the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction negotiations which will be conducted in parallel. Rumania, as well as some of the smaller Western countries, would prefer the security conference to negotiate on military questions. But they will not get their way. Switzerland, assuming its traditional rôle of neutral and mediator, is suggesting the security conference should set up a mechanism for settling disputes between European States. There is a great deal more to discuss when the Helsinki talks resume on January 15.

WASHINGTON POST  
31 December 1972

#### Charges by IPI

ZURICH—The International Press Institute in its annual review accused the U.S. government of trying to "chip away" at press freedom through the threat and use of court action. It said: "The intention . . . is to make the journalist timid in research for the facts and the public nervous when confronted by a reporter asking for them. . . ."

NEW REPUBLIC  
16 December 1972

# Is There a Way to Eradicate the Opium Poppy? The Heroin Supply Problem

by Peter J. Ognibene

There's no business like the illicit drug business. Peasants harvest by hand the poppy fields of Asia to collect the raw opium which they sell for \$12 to \$32 a kilogram, depending on its quality. A simple chemical process converts 10 kilograms of opium into a kilogram of heroin which can bring retail sales on the streets of New York of a quarter of a million dollars. With illicit opium production estimated to be in excess of a million kilograms a year, the heroin trade has a \$25 billion a year *potential*, roughly the annual sales of General Motors and more than the gross national product of Switzerland. Most illicit opium is thought not to enter the international market.

Heroin traffic has been supported by legitimate American businesses which supply the products used to distribute the drug. Two years ago the House Select Committee on Crime documented one corporation's sales of small (1½ inches square) "glassine" envelopes to a stationery store in Harlem. They are sometimes used by stamp collectors but more often used as heroin bags. Of the company's 1969 production of 152 million of these envelopes, 140 million were sold to New York City businesses. The Harlem stationery store probably did not sell the 52 million it bought to philatelists.

Quinine hydrochloride and mannite are two of the materials used to "cut" or dilute pure heroin. A typical formula might be three ounces of mannite and two tablespoons of quinine to an ounce of heroin. Quinine of course has a legitimate use as an anti-malarial drug, and mannite has been used as a children's laxative. Crime committee investigators found quinine and mannite readily purchasable (at high prices) in several New York drugstores. One Harlem pharmacy has sold 40,000 ounces of quinine, buying it for \$3 an ounce and selling it for up to \$35, while also moving an incredible four tons of mannite at \$5 a pound. Malaria and constipation have little to do with these sales.

Stopping the sale of glassine envelopes might have a temporarily disruptive effect on the heroin trade, but other means of packaging, such as gelatin capsules, can take their place. Quinine and mannite could be replaced by other diluents such as lactose and dextrose. To present an obstacle to drug trafficking one must eliminate the source of supply.

The war against the supply of heroin has so far been more a series of skirmishes than an all-out offensive, but it has had its successes. The Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control reported in Septem-

ber that worldwide seizures of heroin and morphine base had increased from 7.3 tons in 1970 to 21.6 tons in 1971; 1972 seizures were said to be running at twice those of last year. Turkey limited cultivation of the opium poppy to four provinces this year and will ban it altogether next year. Paraguay extradited to the United States a man alleged to have headed an operation which smuggled three to six tons of heroin into the US, but the cabinet committee did not report that his ring had been put out of business. Thailand staged a well-publicized but allegedly phony burning of thousands of pounds of opium.

Progress will probably continue to be measured by such episodes, but incremental steps can be counteracted. Higher prices for raw opium could turn substantial amounts now retained for local consumption into international traffic. The governments of Burma, Thailand and Laos have no control over the so-called "Golden Triangle" where most of the world's illicit opium is now grown. Similar situations obtain in Afghanistan and Pakistan which produce about 12 percent of the world supply of illicit opium. The cabinet committee estimates it costs about \$4000 to set up a "laboratory" which can process 100 kilograms of heroin a week. Even if we succeed in getting those nations, such as Paraguay, which are used as trans-shipment points to stop their heroin traffic, laboratories could be quickly set up in the remote Asian areas where opium is grown, and new channels of distribution—"direct from factory to you"—could be established. By the time we catch on to the changed pattern, a new one might have replaced it. It happened before when we thought the key to controlling heroin was the Turkey-Marseilles-New York route: the so-called French connection. Now most of the illicit opium is grown in the Golden Triangle. If the committee's estimate for heroin seizures in 1972 is correct, officials will have succeeded in capturing four percent of the world's illicit opium crop.

In spite of the magnitude of the heroin supply problem, the step-up in heroin seizures has apparently had some effect. The price of heroin on the street has gone up while the purity has gone down; undercover agents have reported difficulty in purchasing the drug. Nelson Gross, the State Department's senior adviser on international narcotics matters, believes that a "shortage of drugs will then tend to drive addicts into treatment; as well as prevent them from addicting others

who might be tempted to experiment with the drug." There seems to be some truth in Gross' statement: the number of heroin users in treatment has increased appreciably in the past year. But there is a darker view. The addict who has been feeding his \$40 or \$50 a day habit by crime may increase his criminal activities to cover the higher costs of getting heroin. Some might turn to barbiturates or other drugs. More might seek a drug rehabilitation program, such as methadone maintenance, only to stave off the pain of withdrawal until street heroin becomes available at cheaper prices.

Dick Gregory used to say: "If a twelve-year-old kid in Chicago can find a dope pusher, why can't the cops?" Now he talks about nine-year-olds on heroin. Sometimes police arrest heroin pushers only to find their hard work frustrated by other elements of the criminal justice system. Take the matter of bail. In the southern (judicial) district of New York during the 1960s, there were 121 bail forfeitures, and 77 of them were by persons facing narcotics charges. These 77 forfeited bails totaled \$836,200. Even a drastic increase in bail for persons arrested as narcotics couriers has had little effect. A US attorney told the House Select Committee on Crime that bails for South American couriers had gone higher than \$100,000 but that "every South American that's been arrested in the past three years [1967-70] . . . who has posted cash bail, and I can't think of anyone who has done anything but post cash bail, every single one of them is a fugitive."

The law enforcement problem cannot be laid entirely on the doorstep of the courts however. The Knapp Commission hearings in New York found that some police officers there were being paid off by drug traffickers, an odious alliance that has led to a complete breakdown in law enforcement in some communities. One resident told the House committee about police pay-offs in his South Bronx neighborhood:

You see a squad car come up. You know where the building is so you see a squad car come up. One of them will get out of the car and go in the basement, go in the hallway, or go in the back of the store and they will stand there talking for a while and then come back and get in the car and this is a regular routine all the way down. . . . You understand, like there is three shifts. Every shift must get his pay, no one shift for the whole term, the

whole 24 hours. There is three shift changes . . .

A woman from the same community described what happens when heroin activity is reported to the police:

We have seen people buy and sell the dope. We have seen them bring the dope in. We call the police department. They ask your name, phone number, and what apartment you are in. . . . In the meantime if you go around police headquarters you will find my name there about 50,000 times. I called and they ask your name. First I wouldn't tell them. They tell the addicts somehow. They come to your house and do things to you. They push your door in, and they beat your children up or they give your children a needle.

In April the Justice Department established a "heroin hotline": a toll-free number (800-368-5363) which citizens can call from anywhere in the United States to report suspected narcotics traffic without revealing their own identity. Although 33,000 phone calls were received in its first three-and-a-half months of operation, only 5200 were considered "serious calls." These calls, in turn, led to the arrest of 14 persons and the seizure of four-and-a-half kilograms of marijuana, 3300 doses of LSD but only two grams of heroin. The Justice Department has awarded a Madison Avenue firm a \$124,000 contract to publicize the hotline.

"Once the opium poppy is cut and the opium gum is diverted to the illicit market and processed into heroin," concludes one General Accounting Office study, "it is a formidable task to prevent the heroin from entering the United States." The Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs and the Customs Bureau have made modest increases in their worldwide strength, and diplomatic efforts are being made to induce other governments to cooperate in eradicating illicit opium cultivation. These efforts, unfortunately, have so far been unsuccessful because the governments of Burma, Thailand and Laos, for example, cannot control the Golden Triangle where remnants of Chiang Kai-shek's defeated army rule the opium trade like "warlords" (to use one government official's characterization).

If the US is to face up to the magnitude of the heroin supply problem, it will have to realize the limits of the conventional methods it is now using and consider some unconventional ones. If American reconnaissance satellites can pinpoint the location of Russian missiles, might they not also be able to locate opium fields? If the governments responsible for opium-growing areas cannot control them, the United States might be able to assist these nations with its technology and resources. We used defoliants and other chemical agents to destroy trees in Vietnam; perhaps that same technology might be used to destroy the opium poppy. The heroin supply is too vast to be controlled by ordinary means.



# FOUR EAST

THE ECONOMIST DECEMBER 23, 1972

## The peace that wasn't

The Russians, as well as Henry Kissinger and the North Vietnamese, had better look at the consequences of more war in Vietnam

There is no reason that a liberal should accept why the two Vietnams ought to be reunited until it has been shown that a majority of the people in both of them, or at least of those in the south, wish it to be so. Until that happens, a liberal would add, South Vietnam should have a government of its own based on some sort of reasonably accurate measurement of the preferences of the South Vietnamese. Most people in the west would accept those principles, as principles; after all, it is what they say about that other divided nation, Germany, and they would be outraged if one half of Germany sent its army into the other half in order to insist on putting its own preferred sort of government into power there. The difference in Vietnam is the reluctance of so many people to apply these principles as the necessary test of the terms on which the war is ended. It was imprecision in applying this test that led Mr Kissinger to say on October 26th that "peace is at hand," when it turns out that it was not. The same imprecision is now making many bone-weary people say that he should nevertheless embrace in December the consequences of what he let his eye slide over too easily in October:

By sending his bombers back north of the 20th parallel this week, and losing quite a lot of them, President Nixon has reverted to the argument of force to end the war. He is using the means at his disposal, as the North Vietnamese used the means at their disposal when they sent their army over the 17th parallel in the spring. They employed the firepower carried by their army; he is using the firepower of his air force. The pictures from An Loc and Quang Tri show that there is not much difference between them in what they do to the places where the artillery shells or the bombs fall. But there is a fundamental difference, and it should be recognised, between the purposes for which Mr Nixon and the North Vietnamese politburo are using the different sorts of power available to them. Mr Nixon is using the argument of force to try to get the North Vietnamese to agree that the next government of South Vietnam should be chosen by a more or less violence-free election. The North Vietnamese are using their sort of force to try to insist that that government should itself be the product of the further violence which they and their friends in the south would bring to bear after a nominal ceasefire. These are the two very different meanings that lay concealed beneath the skin of the agreement that seemed so close in October.

Mr Kissinger, and those who hoped he was right, had their eyes fixed on the passage in clause 4 of the agreement which said that "the internal matters" of South Vietnam were to be settled between "the two South Vietnamese parties." By saying that, North Vietnam seemed to be renouncing its own claim to decide what should happen in the south; and if the North Vietnamese kept out of it all there was little doubt that the non-communists would win a large majority in the election. President Thieu has long been offering to hold after the ceasefire. It is true, of course, that clause 1 of the agree-

ment paid due respect to the unity of Vietnam. But it was hoped that that was the equivalent of the letter the west Germans have sent to the east Germans about German unity, a formal but at the moment non-operative reminder of their right to bring the subject up again later on. If North Vietnam carried out its promise (clause 7) to withdraw its troops from Laos and Cambodia, and if its men in South Vietnam had a real team of truce supervisors watching over them, it seemed that the North Vietnamese army could be more or less neutralised. And from 1965 onwards the removal of the North Vietnamese intervention has been the main argument used to justify the American intervention.

That was the pattern Henry Kissinger thought he saw in the agreement, but Le Duc Tho plainly saw a different one. It has been known for some time—from Cosvn-6, the document the communist headquarters issued in mid-September—that the Vietcong has been telling its men to organise undercover squads for a campaign of "tyrant elimination, abduction and assassination" after the ceasefire. Mr Thieu's army and police force could probably cope with that if North Vietnam's 14 regular divisions really did stay out of the war. But the sort of international inspection system the North Vietnamese turn out to have been calling for makes it highly unlikely that they ever intended to stay out of it. They apparently proposed a total of 250 men for the whole of Indochina, only half of whom would actually be allowed to travel around the countryside, and even those few would have had to rely for transport on the people they wanted to inspect.

### Two states in one nation

It would be a bad joke, if the old control commission set up in 1954 had not stopped people laughing about supervisors who supervise nothing. Such a handful of inspectors could not possibly know what General Giap's men were doing in South Vietnam, let alone check that they had got out of Laos and Cambodia. This is not the proposal of men who, in the Guardian's bland phrase on Wednesday, "know that they . . . cannot win." It seems only too likely that North Vietnam's leaders wanted nobody watching their army while it pursued its own definition of victory in the south after the last Americans had left. The question of the supervisory force is not in itself the one last decision that Mr Kissinger says the North Vietnamese still have to take. That decision is to leave the politics of the south to the southerners, within the procedures already agreed to in October; but the powers of the supervisors are a decisively important test of whether North Vietnam is really ready for that.

What Mr Nixon is still trying to get is the Vietnamese version of what Herr Brandt has settled for in Germany: the acceptance by North Vietnam's leaders that there are "two states within one nation." The North Vietnamese went part of the way to accepting that in October, when they dropped the idea that the United States should remove Mr Thieu from power, and put a coalition government in his place, before they would agree to a ceasefire.

But they will still be evading the central issue so long as they refuse to accept any real limitations on what their army can do after a ceasefire. Perhaps they are trying to take advantage of the difficult moment Mr Nixon has created for himself just before Christmas, by allowing the expectations of peace to outrun reality and the wives and mothers to think that the American prisoners were as good as home. Perhaps they believe that the new Senate, with two more Democrats in it, will cut off funds for the war. But they know that, if that does not happen, Mr Nixon is pretty well free from political constraints at home until 1974 or 1975, when he will want to start making his preparations for America's bicentenary; and although he is not going to make it his policy to bomb them back into the stone age—that brutal phrase used years ago by one foolish American general, and so often put into other Americans' mouths since then—he can cause a great deal of damage to North Vietnam. They have their calculations to make.

#### The Brezhnev calculation

So do the Russians. What happens now will be a measure of whether there really is a new relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States. It is Russian-supplied missiles, and Russian training in using them, that shot down six B-52s by Thursday; since the B-52s seemed almost invulnerable until recently, it is even possible that the equipment which brought them down was sent into North Vietnam during the two-month halt of bombing north of the 20th parallel. It is almost certainly Russian oil pumped in over the Chinese border that keeps North Vietnam's war machine in action.

There is assumed to be a tacit understanding between Mr Nixon and Mr Brezhnev. If the United States provides the help that Russia needs to overcome the inefficiency of its economy, and underwrites the political division of Europe, the assumption is that the Soviet Union will help, among other things, to end the Vietnam war in a way compatible with Mr Nixon's definition of peace with honour. It is hard to imagine Mr Nixon quietly proceeding with his part of that understanding if the Russians continue to help the North Vietnamese to make the other part impossible: if the centrepiece of Mr Nixon's second term has to be a choice between continued war in Vietnam and the acceptance of defeat. That is not how Mr Nixon wanted his next four years to be. The Vietnam war stretches out its consequences into many parts of the world. That is why it has been so long and terrible a war, and why it is so difficult to end; and why Mr Brezhnev, on reflection, may not choose to use it as a rug to whip from under Mr Nixon's feet.

NEW YORK TIMES  
4 January 1973

## Congress Demands Peace

Whatever its impact on the negotiating position of the other side, it is now clear that President Nixon's 12-day aerial blitz against North Vietnam has had a backlash at home that cannot but affect the American bargaining stance. When Henry Kissinger returns to the Paris talks, he will have, in addition to Presidents Nixon and Thieu, an aroused Congress looking over his shoulder.

Republican Senator Saxbe's prediction last week that "all hell is going to break loose" unless the President changes course in Indochina appears to be sustained by the angry mood in which Congress has convened. The Democratic majority in both houses has gone on record demanding an immediate end to American involvement in the Vietnam conflict. Leaders in both houses have warned that unless a settlement is speedily negotiated—by Inauguration Day on Jan. 20, according to Senator Fulbright—Congress will move to cut off further funds for the war effort.

Even members of his own party are faltering in their support of the President's policy. Senator Percy of Illinois could not muster more than a 16-to-10 vote among Republican Senators in support of Mr. Nixon's efforts "to end the tragic conflict in Indochina now through a negotiated settlement." Senator Saxbe, whose defection was early and notable, spoke for many in both parties when he cited the indignation of "the average upright American who's had enough."

It is beyond dispute that, as Administration spokesmen have taken pains to point out, this ugly division does not offer the most favorable basis for American participation in the coming negotiations. The fault, however, does not lie with the critics whose patience has been tried beyond endurance through four long years. It rests rather with a President who has sacrificed his most precious bargaining asset—the confidence and support of a free people—by arrogantly disregarding the Congress and ordering military actions that have horrified the civilized world.

Mr. Nixon can regain the unity and self-respect this nation desperately needs by abandoning the dangerous illusion that negotiation through terror is the same as negotiating from strength and by sending Mr. Kissinger to Paris with instructions to seek an accord that will guarantee the speedy safe return of American troops and prisoners from Vietnam. This fundamental objective has the support of all Americans. It appears to be within reach today, just as it was apparently within reach last October when Mr. Kissinger proclaimed that peace was "at hand."

NEW YORK TIMES  
3 January 1973

# A Last Quibbling Scene

By C. L. Sulzberger

PARIS—When President Nixon received French Foreign Minister Maurice Schumann last September he said he wanted to end the Indochina war before his reinauguration (which he already expected) in order to wipe clean the diplomatic slate for major negotiations with Western Europe and Japan.

There now seems to be some chance that this desire may be realized. Contacts between American and North Vietnamese delegations have resumed at what is called a "technical" level and the Kissinger-Le Duc Tho talks begin again Monday.

If there is any logic to the situation—which may at times be doubted—new pressures favor an end to the fighting, at least for U.S. involvement. Whether there will be a total halt to the purely Indochinese and purely political civil war (involving three countries) is less probable.

Washington is certainly eager to get out of the conflict. Now that the Saigon Government has been given an impressive arsenal of ground weapons and tactical aircraft, the White House clearly assumes the South Vietnamese should be able to look after themselves for a considerable time to come.

Moreover, merciless bombing of the North during the December aerial offensive that followed interruption of Paris negotiations has undoubtedly curbed the possibility of any serious resumption of the Hanoi offensive so frequently bruited as a possibility.

Indications are that both Moscow and Peking have been active in trying to encourage a settlement although it is not easy for either capital to indicate anything other than full endorsement of the North Vietnamese and Vietcong. France, which has little power in the area involved but more experience than anyone else, has added its own diplomatic wisdom.

From the American viewpoint, Mr. Nixon is eager to start a new foreign chapter which will prove far more important when regarded by future historians, focusing on the primordial areas of Europe and Japan that can tilt the power balance in this multipolar world.

He also knows an angry Congress is about to assemble on his doorstep, a Congress in which both houses are dominated by his opponents. These legislators have been incited by hostile official opinion abroad where a "religion" of unconditional peace has been widely expressed, most shrilly in Sweden.

And, although polls indicate Amer-

## FOREIGN AFFAIRS

ican public opinion is so far less exercised, the influence of important and adverse newspaper criticism, when taken up and echoed by Congress, may well change this situation if a settlement isn't swiftly arranged. All objective factors therefore indicate a speedy formula is likely to be agreed upon in Paris and even truculent and suspicious Saigon seems aware that this is inescapable.

The three-way Indochina conflict more or less began during World War II after Japan occupied what was then a French colony. Vichy French, Gaullist French, Japanese, Chinese and small groups of Vietnamese were all involved before Tokyo surrendered in August, 1945. That same month the Vietcong's predecessor, Vietminh occupied administrative buildings and proclaimed a republic.

The French struck back and a series of negotiations occurred at Dalat, Vietnam, and at Fontainebleau in 1946 but, after the struggle renewed that December, massive bloodshed set in. It hasn't ceased yet. The Indochina conflict has tarnished every participant.

In January, 1950, napalm was used as a weapon for the first time in history—by the French. When (after the 1954 defeat at Dienbienphu and the Geneva Accords) France withdrew, there was a surcease of only seven years before the United States, at first tentatively, moved in. The Americans used more napalm plus, for the first time, six-engined jet bombers, laser bombs and new types of delayed-action mines.

Hanoi's generals, with Soviet aid, built up the greatest antiaircraft artillery ever seen and developed remarkable improvements in the tactics of revolutionary warfare. And what both North and South Vietnamese did to each other by way of torture, throat-cutting and deliberate terror, beggars description.

Now, just as a quarter of a million French troops departed in 1954-5, the last of more than half a million American troops are clearly on their way out, leaving the Vietnamese to each other's mercy, which is not renowned for tenderness.

Whether, months or years hence, there will be a renewed war for that unification which has been denied to Ireland, Palestine, Germany, India and Korea, no one can predict. But this week the last quibbling scene of a sordid Southeast Asian tragedy began.

DAILY TELEGRAPH, London  
19 December 1972

## VIETNAM PEACE SETBACK

WRITING YESTERDAY in a leader which, like the rest of *The Daily Telegraph* and for reasons beyond our control, was seen only by our Northern readers, we emphasised that the final Vietnam peace agreement must close all loopholes against abuse. Evidently this is what President Nixon is determined to do, rather than to bow to the storm against him with which his domestic adversaries are seeking revenge for their election failure. By making one of their main complaints the fact that the 500 American prisoners will not now be home for Christmas, and by accusing Dr KISSINGER of bad faith rather than the devious and secretive Communists, they are once again playing Hanoi's game. Hanoi tried to double-cross Mr Nixon into signing just before the elections. They are now doing the same with regard to the Christmas deadline. It is sad that the prisoners will not be home. But it would be infinitely worse if, after the Americans and South Vietnamese have sacrificed so much, the Communists should be allowed to gain at the conference what they failed to gain in battle.

Mr NIXON is once again being true to his pledge not to allow this to happen. While still leaving all doors open for negotiations, he has resumed the bombing deep into the North which he stopped two months ago to improve the atmosphere. In the South the intensity of the fighting continues to grow, as does the weight of American bombing on North Vietnamese reinforcements and supplies, which are now flowing on a great scale. Dr KISSINGER was right to accuse Hanoi of planning to launch a major offensive under cover of a cease-fire.

Mr NIXON's enemies are blaming President THIEU for the deadlock. But the differences between Mr NIXON and Mr THIEU should not be exaggerated. Mr THIEU's toughness in resisting American pressure has vastly enhanced his already considerable stature as a national leader, and also that Southern patriotism which, throughout, has been one of America's main objectives.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, DECEMBER 29, 1972

# Hanoi Pressing Its Charge That U.S. Snagged Talks

WASHINGTON POST  
3 JANUARY 1973

## Hanoi Says POWs Ask End of War

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN  
Special to The New York Times  
WASHINGTON, Dec. 28 — North Vietnam has undertaken an effort to convince Americans and others that the Vietnam negotiations broke down in Paris not because of its recalcitrance, as charged by Washington, but because the United States made new demands that reopened the entire scope of the negotiations.

According to Hanoi's account, Henry A. Kissinger sought major changes in at least five areas of the draft agreement reached in October, and this produced counterdemands by North Vietnam and the acknowledged impasse. Hanoi has also asserted that Mr. Kissinger, the chief American negotiator and President Nixon's adviser on national security, said at the Paris talks on Nov. 24 and 25 that the President would launch heavy bombing raids over North Vietnam if the United States proposals were not accepted.

### Several Channels Used

North Vietnam's rationale for the collapse of the negotiations, and the stepped-up American bombing, is being made known through several channels. Xuan Thuy, the chief Hanoi delegate to the regular, semipublic Paris talks, provided a public explanation when he appeared last Sunday on the American Broadcasting Company program "Issues and Answers."

Additional amplification has been given to Tom Hayden, a leading antiwar activist, and David Livingston, a New York labor leader who opposes the war, by Hanoi officials in Paris in recent days. The Americans have relayed these views to The New York Times in separate interviews.

Hanoi's arguments occasionally parallel the official American explanation given by Mr. Kissinger at a news conference on Dec. 16, but they are more often at odds with his remarks.

The North Vietnamese sources said that Mr. Kissinger made the following substantive proposals, which, they said, would have changed the agreement drastically if they had been accepted.

### NORTH VIETNAM TROOPS

The Hanoi officials said that Mr. Kissinger, claiming to be speaking for Saigon, indirectly raised the issue of withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops from South Vietnam. For instance, Mr. Thuy said, "Kissinger insisted that there should be some phrase, some sentence in the agreement, implying the total withdrawal of North Viet-

namese forces." North Vietnam has always refused to acknowledge the 145,000 troops it is said to have in South Vietnam, and Mr. Kissinger said on Dec. 16 that although Saigon might want a total withdrawal, that was not the American position. The United States, Mr. Kissinger said, wanted language, however, that would "make clear that the two parts of Vietnam would live in peace with each other."

### VIETCONG RECOGNITION

Hanoi claimed that the original draft accord called for formal recognition of the Provisional Revolutionary Government, or Vietcong, as one of the two political forces in South Vietnam after a settlement.

But the Hanoi officials said that Mr. Kissinger wanted to eliminate any mention of the Provisional Revolutionary Government. They said that he was trying to get language in which only the Saigon Government would be recognized as a legitimate force in South Vietnam. This issue has not been discussed by the United States in public, and Hanoi did not provide specific examples.

### NATIONAL COUNCIL ROLE

The original draft accord called for the establishment of a Council for National Reconciliation and Concord, with representatives from Saigon, the Vietcong and neutralists participating.

The Hanoi officials said that because of Saigon's concern, Mr. Kissinger wanted to reduce the importance of this council. They said that the original agreement provided that the council would be organized on a national and a local level, but that Mr. Kissinger, in the latest talks, wanted to eliminate the lower levels of the council.

Mr. Thuy said that the original accord had set up the council as a body to oversee "the implementation of the signed agreements, of the cease-fire, of preserving the peace, and of deciding the modalities and procedures for the general elections and to organize the elections." He said that in the latest talks, Mr. Kissinger wanted the council only to organize the general elections.

Mr. Kissinger, in discussing the council, said that the United States wanted to make sure that the group could not be interpreted as a disguised coalition government, to which Saigon objects.

### SUPERVISORY FORCE

Mr. Kissinger said at his news

conference that Hanoi's proposal for an international supervisory force was inadequate to maintain the cease-fire since it would allow only 250 inspectors instead of the 5,000 sought by the United States. The North Vietnamese sources said that the American plan would impinge on the right of Vietnamese to conduct their own affairs. Hanoi insisted that it would live up to the cease-fire provisions and rejected American claims that it was preparing to violate the cease-fire.

Mr. Hayden said that the North Vietnamese had asserted that the military provisions of the 1954 Indochina agreement had been carried out without violation even though the international supervisory force had been limited to 350 men. American officials have asserted that in October, Hanoi agreed to the 5,000-man force. Hanoi, however, has not acknowledged this.

### PRISONERS

The original accord called for the release of American prisoners of war within 60 days, parallel with the withdrawal of American forces from South Vietnam. It called for the release of political prisoners in South Vietnam within 90 days, Hanoi said. Mr. Thuy said that at the latest talks Mr. Kissinger had made the release of political prisoners — mostly Vietcong — contingent upon the withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces.

American officials have indicated in recent days that Hanoi, in retaliation, made a new proposal linking the release of American prisoners to the release of political prisoners.

### Tell of Bombing Threat

The Hanoi sources insisted that Mr. Kissinger had threatened them with renewed and heavier bombing similar to what is now going on if the American proposals were not accepted. That is why, Mr. Thuy said, children were evacuated from Hanoi on Dec. 3, before the breakdown in the talks.

TOKYO, Jan. 2 (AP) — North Vietnam said today that 30 American prisoners of war, including 20 crewmen from B-52 bombers downed recently, have issued a joint statement urging the U.S. Congress to try to help end the Vietnam war.

The official Vietnam News Agency broadcast the text of the statement and the names of the 30 POWs. Hanoi had reported the capture of all them previously.

The statement recalled the remark made in late October by Henry Kissinger, President Nixon's adviser for national security, that "peace is at hand" in Vietnam.

"But," the statement continued, "now the war is more fierce than ever before, and American lives are in grave jeopardy from the round-the-clock attacks. This contradiction compels us to add our voices to the public opinion in our country. Whether we have been detained for a few days or several years, it is important that you hear us.

"We strongly appeal to the members of Congress to exercise all your legal and moral power to bring about peace."

Included among the 30 POWs, were Lt. (j.g.) Joseph E. Kernan, of Washington, D.C., and Capt. Marion A. Marshall, of Hyattsville, Md.

WASHINGTON POST  
4 JANUARY 1973

*Joseph Kraft*

## Mr. Nixon's Decision

### 'Compromised' Dr. Kissinger...

IS HE the little Dutch boy, finger in the dike stemming the tide of disaster? Or is he just a good German lending a cover of respectability to whatever monstrous policy President Nixon is pleased to pursue?

Those questions now have to be raised explicitly about Henry Kissinger. For since the 12 days of murder-bombing against North Vietnam, the answer is not clear.

It used to be. For most of the past four years, Dr. Kissinger has been an undoubted force for good.

A supreme example is the accord with Russia in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks or SALT. President Nixon entered office hostile to an agreement limiting defensive missiles, or ABMs, which had been projected by the Johnson administration.

As late as January 1970, Mr. Nixon was moving toward full development of an American ABM—a step that would have precluded any limit on either offensive or defensive missiles. But Dr. Kissinger organized within the administration a process of analysis which showed that an effective ABM could not be built. By the same means he demonstrated that it would be possible to monitor any secret Soviet moves to develop a full-scale ABM system.

The upshot was not that Dr. Kissinger changed the President's mind. What he did was build a track along which the President was able to move toward what eventually became the Moscow agreements on arms limitation.

Apart from such activities, Dr. Kissinger acted as a bridge to foreign leaders not easy for President Nixon to approach. In that respect, the classic example is Premier Chou en-Lai of China.

From his first encounter with Chou, Dr. Kissinger sensed — as not many Americans could sense—how much abstract principle mattered to the Chinese Communists. On that basis he was able to cut a deal whereby this country acknowledged a set of principles that pointed to an eventual reversion of Formosa to China.

On Vietnam, Dr. Kissinger has been at all times the chief proponent inside the administration for a political settlement — "The Don Quixote," as he once put it, "of negotiations." At the end, when a negotiated settlement seemed possible after years of effort, Dr. Kissinger not surprisingly became euphoric. He overestimated, and overstated in public, the easiness of bringing President Nguyen Van Thieu of South Vietnam to support the agreement worked out with Hanoi.

Even so the agreement he worked out was the best one possible. It secured the return of American prisoners and gave the Saigon Government a very good shot at survival. By establishing a reconstruction program, it

gave Hanoi a powerful incentive to abide by the ceasefire.

Moreover, Dr. Kissinger was not the only one who believed that peace was "at hand." The President thought so too, and said as much publicly on a pre-electoral swing through Kentucky.

Subsequently President Thieu and Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker reached the President with the argument that Hanoi was going to break the ceasefire as soon as the Americans withdrew from Vietnam. When American efforts to tighten the agreement yielded only counterclaims from Hanoi, Mr. Nixon broke off the talks. He launched the 12 days of murder-bombing to give Hanoi a foretaste of what would happen if in fact the Communists did break the ceasefire.

THE GUARDIAN, MANCHESTER  
20 December 1972

## Vietnam: the war must be ended

The strategy now adopted by President Nixon in Vietnam is horrifying. Heavy bombing has been resumed against targets throughout North Vietnam, including some in and around Hanoi and Haiphong. At the same time naval guns are bombarding the coast of Vietnam including targets along its entire length, according to the US Navy's statement yesterday. What good will all this do? Nothing is likely to be achieved that can remotely justify the death and destruction now being wrought by American guns and bombs. That the Vietcong and North Vietnamese have resumed their offensive operations in parts of the South is deplorable, too, but

the political reasoning behind it is more intelligible and the devastation less frightful than that caused by massive air and sea bombardments. For the wretched people of North and South the war is being resumed in all its misery and terror.

Does President Nixon really believe that he can bludgeon the North Vietnamese back to the conference table? Rather the reverse will happen. They are likely to break off diplomatic contact and dig in for months more of siege. They are tired of the war, of course, and by now they must know that they themselves cannot win. The Tet offensive failed in 1968 and the spring offensive this year also failed. This year neither Hue nor any other major town or city in the South was captured, although the

Dr. Kissinger may have opposed the murder-bombing. But he certainly did not put everything he had into the fight against what is probably the worst step taken by the United States in the memory of most Americans. On the contrary, several members of the Kissinger staff felt free to advocate the bombing and to knock the original agreement worked out by Dr. Kissinger.

Furthermore, Dr. Kissinger did not organize a canvass of the rest of the government. As it turns out, there was significant opposition to the bombing inside the Defense Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Central Intelligence Agency and the State Department.

Despite all this, Dr. Kissinger remains perhaps the only instrument for effective foreign policy available to President Nixon. But he has been compromised and everybody in town knows it. Unless he gets a new mandate from the President — the kind of mandate he can only get by being made Secretary of State—he should probably resign in the next year.

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Communists gained ground. Although they believe that time is on their side they have repeatedly failed to achieve a decisive victory. Everyone ought to recognise that this is a war that cannot be won, except at an intolerable cost.

The proper course for President Nixon when Dr. Kissinger's negotiations had to be broken off—if they had to be, which remains unclear—was to resume only limited military activity. In truth, unduly heavy bombing had already been launched in the past few weeks, after the Presidential election but before the negotiations were ended. That was wrong, and the strategy now is worse. It is the action of a man blinded by fury or incapable of seeing the consequences of what he is doing. Does Mr. Nixon want to go down in history as one of the most murderous and bloodthirsty of American Presidents? Has he any concept of how he will end the war? For end it he must. To unleash the bombing again with full ferocity is a grave error even from his own viewpoint. Far from strengthening the American bargaining position, it will convince many people inside and outside the United States that unconditional withdrawal is now the only course. The President ought to be left in no doubt that his action is wholly abhorrent.

NEW YORK TIMES  
27 December 72

# Power Without Pity

By James Reston

WASHINGTON, Dec. 26—President Nixon has sent the bombers over North Vietnam again, but it is hard to see how this air war can go on for long at the present rate.

In the first place, there are not that many legitimate military targets in North Vietnam and the cost to the United States of the present offensive is also rising steeply. North Vietnam claims to have shot down eight B-52's and one F-4 fighter-bomber since the Christmas recess, and the U.S. command acknowledges the loss of eighteen aircraft and seventy flyers since heavy raids began on Dec. 18.

Second, the President no longer has the excuse that this heaviest bombardment of the war is essential to stop an enemy offensive. The White House spokesman, Ronald Ziegler, linked the air raids to the threat of another Communist drive but no evidence of this was ever produced and the plain fact is that nobody believed him. He has since given up this part of his charade.

Third, the President has mounted this aerial war while the Congress was in Christmas recess and has never offered a single word of explanation as to why it was necessary or what it was intended to achieve.

The result is that he has left the impression that he is bombing, not as a necessary instrument of war but as a brutal weapon of negotiation, and that he feels free to turn the bombing on or off as he pleases.

For the last two years, the Senate of the United States has tried to get some control of the President's power to fight the war as he likes, and always it has failed because a majority simply would not withhold funds from

## WASHINGTON

a Commander in Chief in the middle of a battle; but the situation is different now.

He is not in the middle of a battle but in the middle of a negotiation and is insisting on using the same weapons of war to compel the enemy to accept terms that have never even been made clear to the American people.

Also, the excuse given by Dr. Henry Kissinger is that the war is going on because the Communists changed the truce terms, though the impression he left with French officials and others in Paris was that Saigon caused the

impasse by insisting on sovereignty over all of South Vietnam, including territory the United States was willing to leave in the hands of the North Vietnamese.

Ever since October of 1970, the U.S. has said it was prepared to arrange a cease-fire in place, without demanding that the North Vietnamese withdraw their troops from the South. The military and political aspects of the truce were to be separated: there would be a military cease-fire, the return of U.S. prisoners, and later on negotiation between the Vietnamese themselves about the political future of Vietnam.

But now the U.S. is deeply involved in the political future of the country and is complaining that the North Vietnamese want to "intervene" in the affairs of South Vietnam. What did Mr. Nixon and Dr. Kissinger think the North Vietnamese would be doing with troops in South Vietnam when they agreed to leave them there in the first place?

This tangle over who ruined the peace at hand, however, is not the immediate question. Nobody had signed anything, and everybody probably had second thoughts when it came to the point of decision. The interesting thing is how the President reacted to all this, using power without pity, without consultation and without any personal explanation.

If this is how Mr. Nixon interprets the mandate of his election, we had better know it now, for even in the long and shameful record of the Vietnam war we have never seen such power used with so little provocation. This is war by tantrum, and it is worse than the Cambodian and Laotian invasions, for Mr. Nixon had at least a strategic purpose in those offensives, and back then he explained what he thought he was doing.

Now, Mr. Ziegler merely says "we are not going to allow the peace talks to be used as a cover for another offensive." If there's not an offensive, he merely suggests there might be one. If you're going to bomb North Vietnam, of course you have to blame North Vietnam for wrecking the talks; and if you're asked about South Vietnam's part in the wreck, you can't discuss "questions of substance."

Maybe none of this is surprising. The war has corrupted everything else, and is now corrupting the American democratic process, not for the first time. The trouble is that this sort of thing is bound to produce an ugly confrontation with the Congress when the members come back early in the new year if there is not a lull in the bombing and a return to the negotiating table by that time.

Violence of this intensity for such ambiguous reasons cannot help but produce trouble on the Hill, if not a constitutional crisis, and even more violence in the streets. This was not what Mr. Nixon had planned for the beginning of his second term, but he has treated the Congress and the people with contempt and even made a mockery of the Christmas spirit in the process.

NEW YORK TIMES  
22 December 72

# Terror From the Skies

Asked whether civilian centers would not inevitably be hit during the resumed massive air assault on North Vietnam, a Pentagon spokesman replied: "No. We don't strike civilian targets." He then amended his comment to say: "We do not target civilian targets."

The difference is crucial.

The big B-52 bombers that are being used for the first time over the heavily populated Hanoi-Haiphong area are not precision weapons. Normally they operate in flights of three that lay down a pattern of bombs—20 tons to a plane—which scatter over an area more than half a mile wide and more than a mile and a half long.

Even if the "targets" were strictly military, a great deal more than military would inevitably be caught up in such sweeping devastation, especially in a blitz that in the first two days alone is estimated to have dropped 20,000 tons of explosives—the equivalent of the Hiroshima bomb. Imagine what would happen to New York or any other American city if a comparable enemy force were unleashed to attack such targets on the Pentagon's authorized list as rail yards, ship yards, command and control facilities, warehouse and transshipment areas, communications facilities, vehicle-repair facilities, power plants, railway bridges, railroad rolling stock, truck parks, air bases, air-defense radars and gun and missile sights.

It requires no horror stories from Hanoi radio to deduce that the destruction and human suffering must be very extensive indeed. And to what end?

Officials in Washington and Saigon have suggested that the raids are intended to disrupt a Communist offensive. But military men in Saigon say they have seen no indication that the North Vietnamese are preparing for such a strike.

Administration spokesmen have also reported that this brutal assault is intended to convey to North Vietnamese leaders President Nixon's displeasure over Hanoi's intransigence at the Paris peace talks. Only last week, however, a responsible American official in Paris indicated that the impasse centered on President Thieu's insistence, backed by President Nixon, that any agreement specifically recognize Saigon's authority over all of South Vietnam. This amounts to a demand that the Communists acknowledge a defeat they have not suffered on the battlefield.

No matter who is to blame for the breakdown in talks, this massive, indiscriminate use of the United States overwhelming aerial might to try to impose an American solution to Vietnam's political problems is terrorism on an unprecedented scale, a retreat from diplomacy which this nation would be the first and loudest to condemn if it were practiced by any other major power. In the name of conscience and country, Americans must now speak out for sanity in Washington and peace in Indochina.

WASHINGTON POST  
19 December 1972

Marquis Childs

## Congress Moving to Seize the Initiative for Peace

ALREADY taking shape following the disastrous failure of the cease fire negotiation is a determination in Congress to seize the initiative for peace. This comes out of a growing conviction that the White House now has no way out of the tangled web that Henry A. Kissinger so painfully delineated.

The gloss of optimism he put on the sorry record of failed intentions and the haunting, humiliating memory of "peace is at hand" rates as hardly more than cosmetics. To think that Hanoi will now negotiate on Washington's terms is the same kind of wishful dream stuff of a decade of tragedy and frustration dressed up in ignorant predictions of light at the end of the tunnel and victory just around the corner.

Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield has been steadfast in supporting past attempts to use the power of the purse to shut down the war. Three times the Senate voted to cut off funds for Vietnam after a date certain and three times the House rejected the Senate resolution.

THIS has the highest priority for Mansfield today and he is determined in the new Congress to try once again to compel the administration to end the war and bring the remaining American troops home. As past efforts have shown that is easier said than done. But the shock and total disillusion over what had been heralded in late October as imminent success gives it a new urgency.

Those considering this course suggest that privately it might even be welcome to President Nixon. If Congress took the initiative out of his hands he could say to President Nguyen Van Thieu in Saigon and to the small right wing fringe here at home that he had no option but to move out. The consequences would fall on Congress and not on the chief executive.

This is on the assumption that Thieu's stubborn fear for his own future is the root cause of the failure. Despite Kissinger's kind words about compassion and understanding it is evident that Thieu worked his own form of blackmail to undermine the negotiation. Part of that blackmail has been the vilification of Kissinger over the Saigon radio in Hitlerite terms.

IF AND WHEN Congress gets down to still one more attempt to bring an end of the shooting the charge will inevitably arise that this is certain to prolong the conflict. Every effort to get a negotiated peace during the past two years has drawn this same charge. It was raised against Sen. George McGovern in the campaign when he promised to end the war, bring home the troops and the American prisoners immediately after his inauguration, incidentally even his principal foreign policy advisers who are convinced that "peace is at hand" was part of a planned deception on the eve of the election feel that it made no essential

difference in the outcome. They consider it to have been a kind of insurance against the use of the war issue by the Democrats and an extra push toward a landslide.

In light of what has now happened this is singularly unimportant. What matters is that the war goes on with the massive bombing of the north adding thousands to the toll of dead and injured. These, of course, are "natives" and apparently in the American conscience count for nothing. By one calculation four tons of bombs fell every minute night and day during the latest round of Kissinger-Le Duc Tho talks.

This will not bring an end to the war. It will not compel Hanoi to return to the bargaining table. That has been amply proved in the past. The North Vietnamese have the will and the capacity to conduct an underground war for an indefinite time terrible though the cost may be.

Hanoi has just signed a new military-economic agreement with the Soviet Union. This will mean something in the ability to continue the war. If the United States goes to even further lengths to shut off Halphong Harbor and bomb the land entries, the hopeful Nixon overture to Moscow will be in jeopardy. That is a measure of what Thieu's demand for victory, and it is no less than that, can cost.

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NEW YORK TIMES  
29 December 72

## 'We Must Tell the President'

WASHINGTON—Can we scientists meet in Washington and ignore the fact that our national Administration is launching from this city the most massive air attacks in history? It is launching those attacks against concentrated centers of civilian population, while blandly announcing lists of military targets that under these circumstances insult the intelligence of every thinking person. North Vietnam hardly contains military targets; and a B-52 bombing pattern one and one-half miles long by one-half mile broad, dropped from an altitude of 30,000 feet, cannot pick out targets. Yet such bombings are now crisscrossing some of the most densely populated cities in the world, in an unprecedented orgy of killing and destruction that horrifies people everywhere—as Guernica, Coventry and Dresden once horrified them. And all in our name.

As scientists we bear a special responsibility. Explain as we will—that science is not technology; that most of us do not make proximity fuses, B-52 bomb sights and all the sophisticated super-weaponry of electronic battlefields—we have also too often claimed that our science is the ultimate source of all such advance technology. Indeed

in World War II, which we could regard with some justice as a war of defense, we were ready to help design the prototypes of much of the technological arsenal being used now against one of the smallest and poorest of nations—a nation that offers so little in the way of military targets. This arsenal is now destroying nature itself in Indochina, the land, the trees, the stock animals, depriving a poor people of their homes, fields, means of livelihood and very lives.

Can we meet to talk of nature as our Government is destroying nature? As though that were not going on, directed from this very place?

Just a year ago, as we met in Philadelphia—the city of brotherly love—our President ordered the resumption of mass bombing of North Vietnam, which had been halted in 1968. Beginning the Sunday morning after Christmas, Dec. 26, and continuing until Dec. 31—as we met—1,000 bombing sorties were flown over North Vietnam. We know now that bombing has continued ever since; and now as we meet again in another Christmas season, it is being enormously intensified.

Is our science to serve life, or death? This planet that is in our care

—this environment that concerns us so seriously—can we talk of ways to foster and preserve it here while wantonly destroying it there?

We must speak out, as Americans, as scientists, against this outrageous misuse of the fruits of science for death and destruction.

We must tell the President where we stand. Let us insist on an immediate end to the bombing. Let us insist that the cease-fire we were told he was virtually ready to sign last Oct. 26 be signed now.

This statement was prepared for the American Association for the Advancement of Science, and signed by these members: Dr. George Wald, Nobel Laureate, Harvard University; Dr. Salvador Luria, Nobel Laureate, M.I.T.; Dr. Albert Szent-Gyorgyi, Nobel Laureate, Marine Biology Laboratory, Wood's Hole; Dr. Everett Mendelsohn, vice president A.A.A.S.; Dr. John Edsall, Professor of Biochemistry, Harvard; Dr. E. W. Pfeiffer, Professor of Zoology, University of Montana; Dr. Arthur Galston, Professor of Biology, Yale University; Dr. Arthur Westing, Director of the Herbicide Assessment Commission, A.A.A.S.; Dr. Richard Lewontin, Professor of Biology, University of Chicago.

WASHINGTON POST  
31 December 1972

## The Story of Vietnam: An Instant Editorial

"I fully expect [only] six more months of hard fighting." *General Navarre, French Commander-in-Chief, Jan. 2, 1954.*

"With a little more training the Vietnamese Army will be the equal of any other army . . ." *Secretary of the Army Wilbur Brucker, Dec. 18, 1955.*

"The American aid program in Vietnam has proved an enormous success—one of the major victories of American policy." *Gen. J. W. O'Daniel, Official Military Aide to Vietnam, Jan. 8, 1961.*

"Every quantitative measurement shows we're winning the war . . . U.S. aid to Vietnam has reached a peak and will start to level off." *Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, 1962.*

"The South Vietnamese should achieve victory in three years . . . I am confident the Vietnamese are going to win the war. [The Vietcong] face inevitable defeat." *Adm. Harry D. Felt, U.S. Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Forces, Jan. 12, 1963.*

"The corner has definitely been turned toward victory in South Vietnam." *Arthur Sylvester, Assistant Secretary of Defense, March 8, 1963.*

"The South Vietnamese themselves are fighting their own battle, fighting well." *Secretary of State Dean Rusk, April, 1963.*

"South Vietnam is on its way to victory." *Frederick E. Nolting, U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam, June 12, 1963.*

"I feel we shall achieve victory in 1964." *Tram Van Dong, South Vietnamese general, Oct. 1, 1963.*

"Secretary McNamara and General [Maxwell] Taylor reported their judgment that the major part of the U.S. military task can be completed by the end of 1965." *White House statement, Oct. 2, 1963.*

"Victory . . . is just months away, and the reduction of American advisers can begin any time now. I can safely say the end of the war is in sight." *Gen. Paul Harkins, Commander of the Military Assistance Command in Saigon, Oct. 31, 1963.*

"I personally believe this is a war the Vietnamese must fight. I don't believe we can take on that combat task for them." *Secretary McNamara, Feb. 3, 1964.*

"The United States still hopes to withdraw its troops from South Vietnam by the end of 1965." *Secretary McNamara, Feb. 19, 1964.*

"The Vietnamese . . . themselves can handle this problem primarily with their own effort." *Secretary Rusk, Feb. 24, 1964.*

"We are not about to send American boys 9,000 or 10,000 miles from home to do what Asian boys ought to be doing for themselves." *President Lyndon Johnson, Oct. 21, 1964.*

"We have stopped losing the war." *Secretary McNamara, October 1965.*

"I expect . . . the war to achieve very sensational results in 1967." *Henry Cabot Lodge, U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam, Jan. 9, 1967.*

"We have succeeded in attaining our objectives." *Gen. William Westmoreland, U.S. field commander in Vietnam, July 13, 1967.*

"We have reached an important point when the end

begins to come into view . . . the enemy's hopes are bankrupt." *Gen. Westmoreland, Nov. 21, 1967.*

"We have never been in a better relative position." *Gen. Westmoreland, April 10, 1968.*

"[The enemy's] situation is deteriorating rather rapidly." *Gen. Andrew Goodpaster, White House aide, January 1969.*

"We have certainly turned the corner in the war." *Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, July 23, 1969.*

"I will say confidently that looking ahead just three years, this war will be over. It will be over on a basis which will promote lasting peace in the Pacific." *President Richard Nixon, Oct. 12, 1969.*

"This action [the invasion of Cambodia] is a decisive move." *President Richard Nixon, May 9, 1970.*

"General Abrams tells me that in both Laos and Cambodia his evaluation after three weeks of fighting is that—to use his terms—the South Vietnamese can hack it, and they can give an even better account of themselves than the North Vietnamese units. This means that our withdrawal program, our Vietnamization program, is a success . . ." *President Richard Nixon, March 4, 1971.*

"Peace is at hand." *Dr. Henry Kissinger, Oct. 26, 1972.*

"We have agreed on the major principles that I laid down in my speech to the nation of May 8: We have agreed that there will be a ceasefire, we have agreed that our prisoners of war will be returned and that the missing in action will be accounted for, and we have agreed that the people of South Vietnam shall have the right to determine their own future without having a Communist government or a coalition government imposed upon them against their will.

"There are still some details that I am insisting be worked out and nailed down because I want this not to be a temporary peace. I want, and I know you want it—to be a lasting peace. But I can say to you with complete confidence tonight that we will soon reach agreement on all the issues and bring this long and difficult war to an end." *President Nixon, Nov. 6, 1972.*

"The United States and North Vietnam are locked in a 'fundamental' impasse over whether they are negotiating an 'armistice' or 'peace,' Henry A. Kissinger acknowledged yesterday." *From The Washington Post, Dec. 17, 1972.*

"Waves of American warplanes, including a record number of almost 100 B-52 heavy bombers, pounded North Vietnam's heartland around Hanoi and Haiphong yesterday and today in the heaviest air raids of the Vietnam War." *From The Washington Post, Dec. 20, 1972.*

"Hundreds of U.S. fighter-bombers launched intensified attacks yesterday on North Vietnamese air defense sites in an all-out attempt to cut down the number of B-52 heavy bombers and their 6-man crews being shot down by surface-to-air missiles." *From The Washington Post, Dec. 30, 1972.*

"The President has asked me to announce that negotiations between Dr. Kissinger and special adviser Le Duc Tho and Minister Xuan Thuy will be resumed in Paris on Jan. 8. Technical talks between the experts will be resumed Jan. 2. . . . The President has ordered all bombing will be discontinued above the 20th parallel as long as serious negotiations are under way." *Barbara L. Warren, White House spokesman, Dec. 30, 1972.*



WASHINGTON POST  
27 December 1972

*Stewart Alsop*

## After the Bombing, What's Next If the Communists Refuse to Negotiate?

WHAT IS MR. NIXON going to do now? Nuke Hanoi? Hit the dikes? Or just go on bombing North Vietnam till hell freezes over?

These questions are being asked rather gloatingly, in a tone implying: little man, what now? They are being asked as though they were questions without an answer. And yet there is a perfectly sensible answer, and Mr. Nixon has already given it.

A few weeks before the election, he was asked at a San Clemente press conference what would happen if the Communists refused to negotiate a settlement. His answer:

"As far as the future is concerned, we believe that our training program for the South Vietnamese, not only on the ground but in the air, has gone forward so successfully that if the enemy still refuses to negotiate, then the South Vietnamese will be able to undertake the total defense of their country."

IF THAT ANSWER was valid then, it is more valid now. The South Vietnamese have been re-equipped with tanks, aircraft and other weaponry on a crash basis in anticipation of the cease-fire that never happened. More important, President Thieu now has for the first time a real political base. He has built this new base by the simple expedient of thumbing his nose at the United States, and thus appealing to the nationalism and xenophobia of his people.

Again and again, Thieu has reiterated the same theme: "The Republic of Vietnam has . . . the sole right to solve the war. Any solution must come from the right of self-determination of South Vietnam and only South Vietnam. And so on. The sensible answer to the little-man-what-now? question is to take President Thieu at his word, if and when it becomes clear that there is no hope for negotiating a "just and fair" settlement of the war.

There are those who think that is clear already. There are even those (including this writer) who think it has been clear from the very beginning. Obviously, it would be fine if Henry Kissinger could negotiate a settlement that was, in President Nixon's phrase "right for South Vietnam right for North Vietnam, and right for us." Obviously, it was worth trying to negotiate such a settlement. Obviously, if the thing could be done, Henry Kissinger was the man to do it. But could the thing really be done?

TO PUT THE QUESTION another way: Are there really words in the dictionary that would insure a genuine and lasting settlement of the endless,

hateful war? If the answer to that question is "yes," are they words that a self-respecting American President could put his name to? And if the answer to that question is "yes," are they words that the men in Hanoi and Saigon, who hate each others' very guts, could put their name to? And if the answer to that question is "yes," would the words have any real meaning at all?

A sentence from Henry Kissinger's sad press conference of Dec. 16 suggests the answer to the last question. At the end of October, he said, "it became apparent that there was in preparation a massive Communist effort to launch an attack throughout South Vietnam to begin several days before the cease-fire would have been declared, and to continue for some weeks after the cease-fire came into being."

The Communists, in short, were preparing to cheat on the whole Kissinger-Thieu agreement, and on a "massive" scale. To cheat on agreements with "the imperialists and their running dogs" is a Communist imperative sanctified in the Leninist holy books. No Communists have obeyed this imperative more assiduously than the Hanoi Communists. So what would all those words that Mr. Special Adviser Kissinger and Mr. Special Adviser Le Duc Tho (they thus address each other) have wrangled about so interminably really be worth?

There is a two-word answer: "Our prisoners." In listing the "main principles that the President has always enunciated as being part of the American position," Henry Kissinger listed "unconditional release of American prisoners" first. Getting the prisoners back is what the whole elaborate charade has mostly been about.

THE PRISONERS are the Communists' chief bargaining counter. Indeed, they are just about their only bargaining counter vis-a-vis the United States. The North Vietnamese can do a lot of things to hurt the South Vietnamese, but they can do only one thing to hurt this country—they can refuse to release the prisoners.

The North Vietnamese are, of course, perfectly aware of the bargaining power the prisoners provide. They have repeatedly offered a simple deal. We Americans can have our prisoners back, they have said in effect, if we agree to halt all logistic support for South Vietnam, thus cutting off the South Vietnamese at the knees and insuring a Communist take-over in Saigon. Not only George McGovern, but all the Democratic presidential hopefuls, except Henry Jackson, were willing to make this deal. President Nixon has repeatedly denounced it—

with good reason—as a "betrayal." He cannot now make such a deal, even if he wanted to, which he doesn't.

Then what can he do? His own answer for the moment seems to be: bomb the bejesus out of North Vietnam. It is conceivable, of course, that this may turn out to be an adequate answer, that the negotiations will start again and lead to an agreed settlement. Henry Kissinger is said to believe that there is at least a 50-50 chance of such an outcome, and Henry Kissinger is no fool.

But if there is no such outcome, the President surely cannot go on bombing the bejesus out of North Vietnam forever. To do so would make the United States look like a bully and a brute and, what is more, an ineffective bully and brute. If the bombing goes on much longer, the Senate is sure to pass another "date certain" withdrawal amendment and this time the House seems likely to go along.

IN SHORT, with every day that passes without a negotiated settlement, the President's real options are narrowing. They are narrowing down to the one remaining course, embodied in the answer he gave at that San Clemente press conference.

If the South Vietnamese "undertake the total defense of their country," there is no guarantee that they will be able to defend it, even with generous American logistic support. There is no guarantee either that our prisoners will be released. But at least the President will be able with justice to claim that he has done everything possible to free our prisoners, short of betrayal of a small ally, and that he has done everything possible to give that ally a "reasonable chance" to defend itself. There would be one added advantage. The United States would not be responsible for the failure of a settlement that is sure to fail.

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WASHINGTON POST  
30 December 1972

Charles W. Yost

## Renewed Bombing: A Threat to Detente . . .

IN WRITING a year-end retrospective of international relations during 1972 it had been my expectation to express real jubilation at what seemed to me a banner year. It had been a banner year, moreover, despite serious hazards which had at critical moments jeopardized each one of its major accomplishments.

From the United States' point of view, the outstanding achievements were the opening of the door to China, after so many years in which we ourselves had kept it shut, and the commencement of a new era in relations with the Soviet Union, after so many years of cold war and almost unmitigated hostility. That both of these were achieved was a tribute to the boldness and realism of the Nixon administration which, in these respects at least, was prepared to admit that old dogmas and delusions were dead. Yet each was at the last moment subjected to stresses from our side and preserved primarily by the tolerance or prudence of others.

The President's epoch-making visit to China in February was placed in hazard by the United States' effort in the previous U.N. General Assembly to push through a "two China" resolution which, if successful, would have made us responsible for once again excluding the Peoples Republic from the United Nations. Fortunately we were saved from this blunder by the defeat of our resolution by an Assembly majority which included most of our closest friends.

Similarly, the President's equally momentous visit to Moscow in May was called in question by his decision to mine Haiphong harbor and resume the bombing of North Vietnam, a direct affront both to the interests and prestige of the Soviet Union. Fortunately, again we were saved by the overriding interest of the Soviets in the summit and their decision to swallow the affront and proceed with the meet-

ing, which proved an extraordinary success.

The achievements of the year were not by any means limited to United States' relations with the Communist great powers. Prime Minister Heath triumphantly brought Britain into the Common Market. Chancellor Willy Brandt resolutely carried through his

*"Reaction of most of our allies . . . makes clear that our title to leadership of the 'free world' is tarnished with each bomb that falls."*

ostpolitik, decently buried the cold war in Central Europe and won his greatest electoral victory on this platform.

In consequence of these auspicious developments, preparations for a European Security Conference are well under way, parallel negotiations concerning mutual force reductions in Europe are about to begin, and the second phase of the strategic arms talks between the United States and the Soviet Union has started. There seemed every justification, therefore, for hailing 1972, not perhaps as ushering in "a generation of peace," but at least as having removed some of the artificial obstacles to collaboration among all the great powers in coping with the real problems of the real world.

UNFORTUNATELY, these achievements, actual and potential, have been thrown into hazard at the end of the year by the cruel and foolish resumption of the bombing of North Vietnam. The detente with the Soviet Union and China removes the only convincing reason for United States' concern with a Vietnamese war, which was originally

conceived of as an instrument of their expansion.

One can therefore say that rarely in history has so much been risked for so little, as by the belated revival of the war risking that very detente and all it holds. Seriously as the Soviets and Chinese need and want mutually profitable relations with the United States, there are limits to what they can tolerate in the way of abuse of one of their allies. Brezhnev issued a clear warning to this effect last week, and so did the Chinese. The outraged reaction of many of our allies, moreover, makes clear that our title to leadership of the "free world" is more profoundly tarnished with each bomb that falls.

There seems to be an almost irresistible inclination among American presidents who win landslide electoral victories, to what Stalin called "giddiness from success." After Roosevelt's triumph in 1936, he attempted his "court-packing" and "purge," both of which failed miserably and might have ended his political career in deep disappointment but for the coming of the war. Johnson, within a few months of his 1964 victory, involved us so deeply and divisively in Vietnam that he soon squandered the decisive majority he had won. Hubris has been the greatest curse of captains, kings and presidents since human history began.

So one must, most regretfully, end one's assessment of 1972, which had seemed certain to be so positive, with a sombre question mark. We can only pray at this Christmas season that responsible men in Washington and Vietnam will quickly come to their senses, will resume with cooler heads the frivolously aborted negotiations, and will bring them to a rapid and successful conclusion. If they do, 1972 may still go down in history as marking the end of one era and the beginning of a very different one, more rational, more constructive, and more humane.

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WASHINGTON POST  
30 December 1972

*Michael Allen*

## ... and a Hazard to an Unweakening People

HANOI—It is Christmas Eve, and in an hour Joan Bacz and I will conduct a Christmas service. Afterwards, there will be Mass at the cathedral

*The writer is Assistant Dean of the Yale Divinity School. His account of the bombing of North Vietnam was written for Newsday.*

and then a party. It could be beautiful tonight. But the last six days have been horrible.

Monday afternoon, we walked around Hanoi among the thousands of bicycles that crowd the streets. Children everywhere were smiling at us, playing in the streets of what still looks like a lovely French city.

Then, Monday night, the bombs fell. No one expected them. I stood on the balcony with the French reporter, watching tracer bullets and an occasional rocket cut across the sky.

Then, to the north, the sky grew red and smoke billowed against a full moon. Then the sky grew red to the west and I heard the sound of jets overhead. My own fear mounted and the Frenchman led me to the shelter.

The sirens sounded again and again as wave after wave of bombers passed over. But the worst was around 5 a.m., when I was sure the hotel was next.

TUESDAY, we saw the first pilots captured during last week's bombing, apparently still in a state of shock. One had bandages around his head. They looked so confused, hurt and lost. We were no longer anonymous to them nor they to us.

Since then, the Vietnamese have shown us no more. They don't want to humiliate us, they say, and I believe them.

Afterwards, we saw the first site—the little village of Noc, west of the central city. Little shacks and rice paddies were all blown to bits and the ruins were still smoking from the fire. People were wandering about aimlessly, picking up their few belongings. I found it terrible and very painful to see. Bombs fell again that night and through Friday.

Wednesday, we saw 12 POWs. A bomb had fallen next to the camp and the ceilings of their rooms had caved in. I think they were as scared as we were. Joan and I conducted a brief Christmas service, took their names and promised to call their families.

But the worst was Friday, when we saw Bach-Mai Hospital—Hanoi's largest—totally destroyed. There were unexploded bombs here and there, and people were working to uncover the

shelters where victims were still trapped. Some of the workers could hear their cries.

A Vietnamese man, helmet on his head, passed by. He had a notebook over his face to hide his tears. I was crying too.

THE CHIEF DOCTOR talked to us in a voice touched with hysteria. No one will say how many died in the raid, but I am sure there were many.

We saw collapsed buildings, rubble everywhere, enormous bomb craters—some enlarging those from a previous raid this fall. And everywhere little groups of people standing, their faces blank with pain.

Most of the principal services in Hanoi are gone. There is almost no electricity for the city. The railroad station has been destroyed and the airport is only semi-operational.

That afternoon we saw the village of Anduong. A housing project built in the '50s for working people was totally destroyed.

I saw an old man standing in the ruins of his house, putting on his coat and taking it off again endlessly, as if the ritual act could recreate his past. There were impassive faces but also many tears.

Friday night was supposed to be our going-away party, but it was interrupted by the bombers and we finished it in the shelter, packed in like sardines. Joan sang freedom songs and two Vietnamese women sang folk songs among a ragtag group of Vietnamese and foreigners. We couldn't hear the bombs above the music.

So life goes on here. The streets still are full of bicycles and the children still smile as we four Americans pass by.

But many people are being evacuated. They say everything of any strategic worth has long since gone.

There are only the people, and I see no signs of weakening. They say they have fought for independence for 1,000 years and they won't stop now.

This afternoon I visited the Dominican Church. They are putting up decorations for Mass tonight, Chinese lanterns and light bulbs. What little electricity there is here is going for church decoration.

Over the altar a freshly painted sign in latin, "God has made His dwelling with men."

They say not as many people as usual will come tonight, but they will say Mass with or without bombs. We will be there, too.

NEW YORK TIMES  
29 December 72

## Red Cross Ends Some Vietnam Visits

Special to The New York Times

GENEVA, Dec. 28—The International Committee of the Red Cross has suspended indefinitely the visits it had been making to political prisoners in South Vietnam.

The suspension was decided upon because the South Vietnamese authorities have denied the Red Cross delegates the right to see the prisoners in the absence of all witnesses, a spokesman for the all-Swiss committee said today.

However, Red Cross visits to prisoners of war in South Vietnam continue in the normal way as provided in the 1949 Geneva conventions on the protection of war victims, the spokesman said.

The prisons in which civilians are held are officially called

"re-education centers." Because the term "political prisoner" is frowned upon by the authorities, the Red Cross refers to the inmates only as persons held "because of the events" in South Vietnam.

Red Cross delegates had been visiting the national centers in Saigon and in the provinces on an irregular basis for a number of years, the spokesman said.

### Occasional Private Talks

No general authorization for private talks with the prisoners was ever granted, but occasionally such discussions without witnesses were permitted by the official in charge of a provincial center.

The Red Cross source said that he did not know how many political prisoners there were

in South Vietnam but that it was estimated that there were 22,000 in the centers that the committee's delegates visited last year.

The visits were continued until last August in the hope that the authorities in Saigon would eventually grant the authorization to see the prisoners without witnesses as provided for in the Geneva convention dealing specifically with civilian war victims.

But after making another appeal for such an authorization the Red Cross decided against pursuing the visits without it. "We felt that if the prisoners could not speak freely in the absence of witnesses we could not determine precisely what the prisons' conditions were like," the Red Cross spokesman said.

NEW YORK TIMES  
26 December 72

## Issue and Debate

# Efficacy of the Bombing of North Vietnam

By DAVID E. ROSENBAUM

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 25—

The resumption of sustained bombing by the United States throughout North Vietnam has revived the debate here and abroad over the efficacy of the bombing strategy.

Does the bombing of military and industrial targets significantly hamper the capacity of North Vietnam to fight the war? Does it prevent the movement of North Vietnamese troops and supplies into the South? Does it make the Hanoi Government more willing to negotiate or concede, or does it strengthen resistance and determination to pursue the war?

If there are military and diplomatic benefits from the bombing, do they justify the civilian casualties? What were the provocations that triggered the latest campaign? Are the current raids different, in magnitude or in terms of the targets assaulted, from those of the past? Is it immoral, in time of war, for a large nation that itself is not under attack to drop bombs on a small nation that has no offensive capacity in the air?

These are the questions that provide the meat of the debate, although, clearly, only the North Vietnamese know precisely how badly the country, its people and its military system have been and are being hurt by the bombing.

## The Background

Early in the morning of Feb. 7, 1965, on orders from President Lyndon B. Johnson, 49 carrier-based fighter planes bombed and strafed barracks and staging areas of Vietcong guerrillas near Dong Hoi, just north of the border between North and South Vietnam. Once before—in August, 1964—there had been a day of raids on the North, in retaliation for alleged attacks on American ships in the Gulf of Tonkin. But the 1965 strikes, following several guerrilla attacks on major American installations in South Vietnam, were the first involving carefully planned, concerted raids north of the border.

President Johnson declared that they represented a limited response to "provocations ordered and directed by the Hanoi regime" and did not mean a widening of the war. Nonetheless, these first sorties marked a major turning point in the Indochina conflict.

In May the United States stopped bombing the North for a week in an effort to elicit peace feelers, but there was no response, so the bombing resumed. In December, 1965, a 37-day pause began as Mr. Johnson pursued a "peace offensive."

Bombardment of the North was resumed on Jan. 31, 1966, because, according to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, the only response from Hanoi had been "negative, harsh and unyielding." Mr. Johnson pledged that only lines of supply and other military targets would be bombed. As justification he asserted, "Those who direct and supply the aggression have no claim to immunity from military reply."

The bombing continued unabated for nearly three years. By 1967 the United States was flying about 300 planes a day over the North. In that year, according to the Air Force, 250 planes of all services were shot down.

In September, 1967, President Johnson, speaking in San Antonio, announced that Hanoi had been told the month before that the United States would stop the bombing of the North "when this will lead promptly to productive discussions."

Mr. Johnson started the nation on March 31, 1968, by announcing that he would not run for re-election. He also declared that he had ordered a halt in all bombardment north of the 20th Parallel, where more than 90 per cent of the North Vietnamese live.

Seven months later, a week before the Presidential election, Mr. Johnson ended all bombing of the North. He said he believed the action would lead to a peaceful settlement.

In the first year of the Nixon Administration, the Government acknowledged only occasional incidents of "suppressive fire" by small numbers of planes against antiaircraft installations in North Vietnam that threatened American reconnaissance aircraft.

But in May, 1970, following the movement of American troops into Cambodia, the United States conducted a series of heavy raids on supply dumps and other targets north of the Demilitarized zone. The raids were described as "protective reaction." Similar attacks continued over the next two years.

In April, 1972, in response to a North Vietnamese offensive, the rule of protective reaction was officially

lifted and intensive bombing resumed throughout the North. For the first time B-52's were used extensively and, for the first time since 1968, Hanoi and Haiphong were attacked.

The Hanoi government asserted, and visiting American newsmen confirmed, that civilian as well as military targets were damaged. Hanoi maintained that the American planes were deliberately bombing dikes, a charge that the United States repeatedly denied.

The Nixon Administration gave three principal reasons for the resumption. It was necessary, officials said, to choke off the movement of men and supplies into the South, to help Saigon's forces demonstrate that they could stem the most serious enemy attack in more than four years and to provide a new bargaining chip to obtain concessions from Hanoi.

President Nixon warned in May that the heavy bombing would continue, but he pledged to stop it when Hanoi agreed to a cease-fire and a return of American prisoners. The bombing was essential if a "genuine peace" was to be obtained, the President said, and it was necessary to support the dwindling American ground troops.

On Oct. 25, with peace negotiations at a delicate stage, the President ordered a bombing halt beyond the 20th Parallel as a sign of good faith. The pause lasted until Dec. 18.

In the eight years of the air war, the United States has dropped more than seven million tons of bombs on Indochina, more than three times the tonnage in World War II.

Through the end of November 1,056 American planes had been shot down by the North Vietnamese. Nearly all of the more than 430 prisoners of war in the North were airmen, as were most of the more than 1,200 men listed as missing.

## Current Bombing

On Dec. 18 waves of American B-52's began the heaviest raids of the war on North Vietnam. The strikes, which continued unabated until a Christmas halt, followed the breakdown in peace negotiations between Henry A. Kissinger, President Nixon's national security adviser, and Le Duc Tho, Hanoi's special negotiator.

Administration officials have said that President Nixon ordered the raids because he felt Hanoi was stalling at the peace negotiations. They said that he had suspended raids north of the 20th Parallel in return for Hanoi's "goodwill" in October and had reinstated full-scale bombing after the talks broke down. There has been no explanation for the massive scale of the bombing.

It was the first time that B-52's, which carry a crew of six or seven, had been used so extensively, and many military experts believed that it represented a shift in strategy.

The planes carry 20 to 30 tons of bombs and drop them from a height of five to seven miles in a pattern roughly half a mile wide and a mile and a half long. Pinpoint bombing is conducted by fighter-bombers.

According to some reports, as many as 500 planes, more than 100 of them B-52's, were being sent over the North each day. Such figures were discounted by the Pentagon spokesman, Jerry W. Friedheim, who would characterize the level of bombing only as "a very major effort."

Some reports from Saigon suggested that 20,000 tons of munitions—the equivalent of the atomic bomb used on Hiroshima—had been dropped in the first two days.

United States officials said that some targets in the Hanoi and Haiphong regions were attacked for the first time. The official North Vietnamese press agency reported attacks on the Gia Lam area, where the Hanoi airport is situated.

The Defense Department insisted that civilian areas were not on the target list, though they might be hit by accident, and it dismissed suggestions that the United States was involved in "terror bombing."

Mr. Friedheim asserted that the military targets being hit included "such categories as rail yards, shipyards, command and control facilities, warehouse and transshipment areas, communications facilities, vehicle-repair facilities, power plants, railway bridges, railroad rolling stock, truck parks, MIG bases, air-defense radars, and gun and missile sites."

Tass, the official Soviet press agency, reported, however, that the American raids had caused "heavy civilian casualties" and had destroyed "thousands of homes." The Tass correspondent reported that bombs repeatedly fell "on densely populated blocks, main streets and suburbs" of Hanoi.

The Hanoi raido asserted that thousands were killed and wounded from Dec. 13 to 24.

## The Justification

The objectives to be gained from bombing North Vietnam have varied over the course of the war. As a staff study for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee noted earlier this year, there have been five principal objectives:

¶To reduce the movement of men and supplies into South Vietnam.

¶To make North Vietnam pay a high cost for supporting the war in the South.

¶To break the will of North Vietnam.

¶To force the North Vietnamese to make concessions in the peace negotiations.

¶To strengthen morale in South Vietnam and the United States.

As public justification for the action, the Government has generally given military reasons—the first two listed above. However, officials of both the Johnson and Nixon Administrations have acknowledged privately that diplomatic and political considerations were as important as, if not more important than, the military ones.

Explanations of the current campaign fit this pattern. The official spokesmen in Washington — Ronald L. Ziegler at the White House and Mr. Friedheim at the Pentagon — have maintained that this phase is a military necessity. Official spokesmen in Saigon have also made that point. In individual interviews, however, top Government and military officials as well as lower-ranking analysts have acknowledged that the basic reasons are diplomatic and political.

Mr. Ziegler has not deviated from his statement on Dec. 18 that "we are not going to allow the peace talks to be used as a cover for another offensive." There was grave danger of such an offensive, he maintained, adding that "the President will continue to order any action he deems necessary by air or by sea to prevent any build-up he sees in the South."

At the same time top Administration officials declared that the resumption of heavy bombing was primarily a result of Hanoi's lack of seriousness at the Paris negotiations.

One official said that the bombing served the purpose of showing American anger at what Mr. Nixon regarded as Hanoi's delaying tactics.

Knowledgeable sources here believe that, by intensifying the bombing, President Nixon hoped to show Hanoi that he could take the political heat at home and abroad. He was also trying to indicate, they believe, that he was willing to discard any past restrictions on targets. Some experts said that by using B-52's, Mr. Nixon was implicitly threatening antipersonnel bombing as well.

Administration officials are willing to concede that the American bombing of Indochina has not always been effective. But that, they said, was because of the restrictions set by the Johnson Administration.

Administration officials are convinced that the heavy bombing of last spring—together with the President's trips to Moscow and Peking—led directly to the more productive negotiations in the fall.

On the one hand, according to this argument, Hanoi feared a lack of support from its chief allies and, on the other, it was being badly hurt. Those factors almost produced a peace agreement in October, the officials believe.

By fall American bombs had knocked out about 70 per cent of North Vietnam's power-generating facilities and the major bridges on the rail lines from China. Those facilities were being rebuilt in recent weeks, according to military intelligence, and the United States hopes to destroy them again.

## The Opposition

Since the outset of the bombing eight years ago, the strategy has engendered stiff

opposition. Many opponents have argued that it is a futile tactic — that it has not and will never accomplish either its political or its military objectives. Others have argued that, regardless of effectiveness, it is immoral to wreak devastation on a small country.

An early as 1967 a group of leading Government-oriented scientists, under the auspices of the Institute for Defense Analyses, concluded that "the U. S. bombing of North Vietnam has had no measurable effect on Hanoi's ability to mount and support military operations in the South."

As to the question whether the bombing could break the will of the Vietnamese people, the study declared:

"The expectation that bombing would erode the determination of Hanoi and its people clearly overestimated the persuasive and disruptive effects of the bombing and, correspondingly, underestimated the tenacity and recuperative capabilities of the North Vietnamese."

The study went on to cite "the fact well-documented in the historical and social scientific literature that a direct frontal attack on a society tends to strengthen the social fabric" and "to improve the determination of both the leadership and the populace to fight back."

In the Johnson Administration, proposals to bomb the Hanoi and Haiphong areas were repeatedly rejected. The Pentagon papers make clear that the principal reason was the expectation of heavy civilian casualties.

The critics of the bombing contend that it is preposterous for the Govern-

ment to assert that only military targets are scheduled when vast tonnages are being dropped from great heights on extensive areas.

A leading Congressional opponent of the bombing, Senator Mike Mansfield of Montana, the Democratic leader, declared at a news conference Wednesday:

"The bombing tactic is eight years old. It has not produced results in the past. It will not lead to a rational, peaceful settlement now. It is the 'Stone Age' strategy being used in a war almost unanimously recognized in this nation as a 'mistaken' one. It is a raw power play with human lives, American and others, and, as such, it is abhorrent."

Senator Harold E. Hughes, Democrat of Iowa, said in an interview that the bombing was futile and immoral.

"It is unbelievable savagery that we have unleashed in this holy season," he declared. "The only thing I can compare it with is the savagery at Hiroshima and Nagasaki."

Asked whether he would approve of the bombing if it could be proved effective in bringing concessions from Hanoi, the Senator said: "I cannot imagine the holocaust that the bombing must be causing. There can be no victory in this kind of war."

The critics of the bombing argue, furthermore, that American airmen are being killed and made prisoner and that the lives of prisoners endangered.

The staff study for the Senate committee concluded that "throughout the war, the results of the bombing of North Vietnam have consistently fallen far short of the claims made for it."

"Compared to the damage to U.S. prestige and the internal division created by the bombing policy, its meager gains must be seriously questioned," the study asserted.

NEW YORK TIMES  
22 December 72

# A French Comment

PARIS—There was a time not very long ago when one Guernica, while not actually provoking an offensive against barbarity, caused nausea in the West when the West discovered it was capable of the worst against mankind. It was already a case of airplanes massacring a civilian population, a case of airplanes dispatched by a foreign power to support dictatorship.

Since then, perversion has made headway. Today it has reached a new high in a North Vietnam covered with "big cemeteries under the moonlight." A hundred B-52's and hundreds of fighter-bombers unleashed night and day on the network of tightly knit webs of Delta villages—it is hard to imagine what this represents in terror, in blind murders, in atrocious physical and psychological mutilations.

The fact that the center of Hanoi has not been—or not yet been—annihilated is not reassuring: the heart of the capital which has long been evacuated has less population left than the immediate suburbs and the countryside, which is swarming with peasants, and also with children, with old people, with the inactive population from the cities dispersed among straw huts.

To cover this dense crowd of civilians with a carpet of bombs is perhaps not to exterminate a people, but it is to undertake a succession of localized exterminations. It is to put to sword and fire the houses and the huts, the hospitals, the schools, the shops and the cooperatives.

The American leadership believes that the era of contempt which they have entered without troubled conscience will be succeeded by the era of surrender of their adversaries. But the latter have toughness of mind because they have the intelligence which grows from pride. These people who call the Americans "the Huns of the Twentieth Century" have just published, in French, a very polished anthology of their most ancient poems.

But Mr. Nixon, on the other hand, is right: he is right in believing that hospital, hut and rice field must be destroyed, because it is from there as much as from military command posts that the resistance draws its ideals and its men. Mr. Nixon is translating this reality into his own language as "Communist offensive."

If he dared go to the very end of his logic, he should now bomb Saigon. A priest there has just let it be known that for the past ten days hundreds of prisoners have gone on a hunger strike at the capital's Chi Hoa prison. They are "politicals," picked up in the street by General Thieu's policemen or jailed because they are wrong-thinking Catholic or students disgusted with the dictatorship. They have dared ask for the freedom of their people and for the end of the massacres.

Perpetually in search of victory, Mr. Nixon is thus led to give harder and harder blows everywhere because his enemies are everywhere. In the view of many he still is given the benefit of tentative explanations or of justifications, because he has been re-elected and because the United States is not a totalitarian country. But may one not question one's self about the exact value of those liberal mechanisms which have been bypassed, betrayed as they have been by the logic of an imperial system and deviated from their original meaning to permit such abomination, the crushing of a small country that could well have been spared promotion to the rank of martyr?

*This commentary appeared in yesterday's editions of Le Monde. Translation by the Paris bureau of The Times.*

WASHINGTON POST  
27 December 1972

*Victor Zorza*

## Communists Watching Nixon To See If They Trust Him

REPORTS of a Nixon-Kissinger rift have upset the White House, which has denied them publicly. Privately, sources inside the Nixon administration have said that they are worried about "damage to Kissinger's credibility" as a negotiator. "A prime point of concern," according to The Washington Post's Murrey Marder, "is said to be what the North Vietnamese may conclude from these reports."

But the damage to Kissinger's credibility could be far greater than that. It could extend to his dealings with the Russians and the Chinese, and to Mr. Nixon's own grand design for an "era of negotiation" and for the "generation of peace" that was to crown his second term.

The Kremlin as well as Peking have been watching Mr. Nixon's negotiating strategy in order to determine how far they could trust him. If they decide that he has gone back on his own word in the Paris talks, or on Kissinger's, they will be less likely to enter into agreements with the United States which might expose them to similar risks.

THIS COLUMN has sometimes tried to analyze the administration's foreign policy from the standpoint of its foreign adversaries, in the belief that a better understanding of both sides' attitudes may be acquired thereby. When the Paris impasse is viewed from this angle, there is no doubt that powerful elements in all the Communist capitals are now claiming it as proof of gross deception by the White House. The hawks in Moscow and Peking were only narrowly defeated in the infighting that preceded Mr. Nixon's summit visits. But defeats in Communist power struggles are never as conclusive as they seem.

The hawks argued, to judge from the evidence between the lines of the Communist press, that Mr. Nixon was not to be trusted—not just on Vietnam, but on all the other issues which, to them, involve the very survival of the Communist system. The doves, on the other hand, maintained that the Communist concessions on strategic arms limitation, on trade and aid, on political issues, were paid for by American concessions as well as by promises of future benefits. But now the hawks

would claim that Soviet and Chinese agreements with the United States might be similarly broken, and American promises reneged upon, whenever Mr. Nixon decides that a little more pressure, another turn of the screw, might get him better terms than he had originally obtained.

If the administration is really concerned at the damage done to Kissinger's credibility by press speculation, of the kind which appeared in this column last week, the remedy is in its own hands. What the column suggested was that an attempt to look at the Paris breakdown through the eyes of Hanoi would lead the Communists to conclude that the agreement negotiated by Kissinger had been disowned by Mr. Nixon. The fuss now made by administration sources about the effect of such an analysis on Kissinger's credibility suggests that the analysis is correct, even in the administration's own view, in attributing this line of reasoning to the Communists. The administration can only prove the Communist hawks wrong by reverting to a less warlike posture.

THE DAMAGE, which is of the administration's own making, cannot be undone by denouncing press speculation about it as irresponsible. Where a government restricts the amount of publicly available information, for what may sometimes be good reasons of its own, it is the proper function of the press to speculate.

Where major issues of war and peace are concerned, the speculative reconstruction of the other side's thought processes is more necessary than ever, even if it should appear to reflect badly on one's own side's motives. It is an essential part of the search for an understanding of what is happening in the world, and why. American governments have too often neglected this process, but this is no reason why the press should eschew it.

Indeed, in an increasingly interdependent world of Great Powers engaged in the process of secret diplomacy, an insight into the policies of any one government will have to be sought more and more often in the shadows it casts on other countries.

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WASHINGTON POST  
28 December 1972

## *Terror Bombing in the Name of Peace*

How did we get in a few short weeks from a prospect for peace that "you can bank on," in the President's words, to the most savage and senseless act of war ever visited, over a scant 10 days, by one sovereign people upon another? And perhaps more to the point, what is the logic and where are the lessons of history that say we can run this reel backward after a time and proceed from terror bombing to "peace"—that there is, in other words, some rational cause and effect here, running either way?

The sad, hard answer is that while there are few conclusive lessons from history in this matter, the supposed "logic" of proceeding from bargaining to bombing and back to bargaining, in the name of peace, has been fundamental to this country's Vietnam strategy of "limited war" by "graduated response" over more than eight years and two administrations. In the beginning, it was accepted, with precious little protest, by Democrats and Republicans alike; and it was quietly acquiesced in by a good many of the people who now talk of "genocide" and "war crimes" and of the intolerable "immorality" of our current policy.

That we recite this background is in no way to suggest that we think Mr. Nixon is somehow mandated to continue to compound past follies. On the contrary, having promised us so many times to end this war within his first four years and having failed so dismally, for all that he might have learned from recent history, he is under greater obligation than any of his predecessors were to re-evaluate the mission, to reassess our capabilities, to recognize our limitations—and to change our strategy. But the change that is needed is not likely to be encouraged by denouncing the horror now unfolding in the skies over North Vietnam as something entirely new and different and essentially Nixonian. If this strategy is contrary to all we hold sacred, it would seem to follow that in some measure it always was. In short, we are not going to find it easy to work our way out of a 10-year-old war effort that has demonstrably failed of its early high hopes unless we are prepared to begin by admitting that this is so; that we are all caught up, in one degree or another, with the responsibility for a war plan gone horribly wrong; that this country undertook an enterprise it could not handle, at least in any time frame and at any expenditure of lives and resources worthy of the objective; and that it would be the mark of a big power to cut our losses and settle for the only reasonable outcome that we now must know could ever have been realistically expected.

We should begin, in other words, not simply by shouting about the immorality of what we are now doing, but by first acknowledging the tragic impracticality of what we set out to do, and the enormity of the miscalculations and misjudgments that have been made, however honestly, from the very start. For only from this admission can we proceed rationally to deal with the monumental contradiction in the administration's current strategy. The contradiction begins with the administration's seeming insistence on a fully-enforceable, guaranteed settle-

ment of the war on the old, familiar, original terms—"freedom" and "independence" and "enduring peace" for South Vietnam; anything seriously short of that, Mr. Nixon would have us believe, would be abject surrender, the abandonment of an ally, and a "stain upon the honor" of the United States.

Leaving aside the cliches which have come to be so inevitable a part of every serious presentation of our policy, there are two things tragically wrong about this statement of our aims, and the first is that such objectives are demonstrably unobtainable. The violent and embittered conflict that has engulfed Indochina for several decades is not going to be "settled" by any piece of paper that Dr. Henry Kissinger could conceivably persuade both North and South Vietnam to sign. That is the loud lesson of the collapse of the last peace plan; it asked too much of a situation which can only be resolved in ambiguity. Such is the conflict of purpose on both sides, in fact, that it can fairly be said that in negotiating a "settlement" we are in fact merely writing the rules of engagement for a continuing struggle for control of South Vietnam by other less openly military means.

So we are not talking about "peace," and still less about "abandoning an ally," for there can be no resolution of the fighting which will not present each side both with risks and with opportunities of losing—or winning—in large measure what each has been fighting for. To pretend that we are doing otherwise—that we are making "enduring peace" by carpet-bombing our way across downtown Hanoi with 52s—is to practice yet one more cruel deception upon an American public already cruelly deceived. It is, in brief, to compound what is perhaps the real immorality of this administration's policy—the continuing readiness to dissemble; to talk of "military targets" when what we are hitting are residential centers and hospitals and commercial airports; to speak of our dedication to the return of our POWs and our missing in action even while we add more than 70 to their number in little more than a week.

We think the American people could face the truth of how little there is we can really count on accomplishing in Vietnam—if they were to hear it from the President. But we have not heard from the President—not since "peace was at hand." Instead, we have heard from surrogates and spokesmen and military headquarters, cryptically, about the loss of men and aircraft and the alleged military significance of the raids. It is from others, around the world, that we hear about the havoc our bombers are wreaking on innocent civilians with the heaviest aerial onslaught of this or any other war. All this we are presumably doing to redeem the "honor of America" and this is the second part of what's wrong—and contradictory—about the President's bombing policy. For it is hard to envisage any settlement that we could realistically hope to negotiate which could justify the effort now being expended to achieve it or wash away the stains on this country's honor of the past 10 days.

WASHINGTON POST  
31 December 1972

# Viet War Study Urged

By Victor Cohn

Washington Post Staff Writer

The American Association for the Advancement of Science urged Congress yesterday to begin a full-scale study of the long-range effects of U.S. bombs, chemicals and other advance weapons on the land and people of Vietnam.

In another "emergency" resolution, the large scientific organization's legislative council overwhelmingly condemned U.S. actions in Vietnam, and urged immediate withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

It was the first time antiwar forces have been able to get such a resolution through the largely middle-of-the-road group, a federation of 300 scientific bodies who have a total of 7 million members.

By an amendment offered by Lewis M. Branscomb, research director of IBM, the group deleted clauses opposing U.S. military participation in Thailand. "We're there by treaty, and I'm not sure that the situation parallels" that in the other countries said Branscomb, who until recently headed the National Bureau of Standards. He favored the remainder of the resolution.

The study of Vietnamese war damage was urged in a resolution stating that both scientists and the public deserve a full assessment of all that "American science" has done in Vietnam, "constructive as well as destructive."

"We have done some constructive forestry, built highways and some hospitals and medical care," said Professor E. W. Pfeiffer of the University of Montana, one of the action's sponsors. "But the damage we've done far outweighs these."

Dr. Leonard Rieser, vice president of Dartmouth Col-

lege and AAAS president starting in January, said, "We need a body like the U.S. Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission, which studied the long-range effects of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings after World War II.

"Unless Congress sets up such a study, we'll never know" the truth about many allegations—for example the charge that U.S. chemicals have begun to cause genetic mutations and consequent malformations in Vietnamese children, he said.

Also, he said, such a study is vital if the United States is to help rehabilitate Vietnam intelligently—a goal that President Nixon has endorsed, according to reports of U.S.-North Vietnamese peace talks.

Specifically, the AAS council backed a bill proposed by Sen. Gaylord Nelson (D-Wis.) and Rep. Gilbert Gude (R-Md.) calling on President Nixon to ask the National Academy of Sciences to determine both the war's ecological effects and "effective ways and means of rectifying" them.

It called for assessment of the results of "aerial bombing, including so-called carpet bombing," of wide use of "CS" gas and of bulldozing large areas of land with "Rome plows," a defoliation method sometimes called more destructive than chemicals.

Every government department would have to give the science academy any information it said it needed, according to the Nelson-Gude bill, and there would have to be a "final" report within six months.

But AAAS proponents of a Vietnam study envision this first report as only a start on the kind of long-range observations that the federally financed Atomic Bomb Casualty

Commission has made in Japan, observing cancers and other delayed results of the A-bombs.

The AAAS council has some 550 members, but only 175 were present yesterday. The vote on the anti-Vietnam war resolution was 80 to 41, with many abstentions. These included those of the presiding officers, including Dr. Glenn T. Seaborg, until recently Atomic Energy Commission chairman.

The council also voted to pare down its size to make it less unwieldy, and to give major power to the NNNs's some 150,000 direct dues-paying members, rather than to the federated organizations. These groups will still be represented through broad sections representing scientific disciplines such as physics and chemistry.

Despite a plea from Dr. Garland Allan of Washington University in St. Louis, the council refused to assure future space to the anti-establishment Scientists and Engineers for Social and Political Action. Eight SESPA members were arrested Wednesday after refusing to take down an unauthorized exhibit table.

But the table stood yesterday in a new area provided by the AAAS, and some AAAS leaders indicated that they will be willing to provide such space again rather than face disorders and arrests. SESPA members said they intend to continue "orderly protest" against uses of science for war and oppression, and will reappear at future AAAS sessions.

The organization ended its annual meeting here. It will reconvene in Mexico City in late June for a largely international American session.

BALTIMORE SUN  
4 January 1973

## Bengali students raise Viet flags

Dacca, Bangladesh (Reuter)

—Left-wing students yesterday burned an effigy of President Nixon in this Bangladesh capital, and ran up the flags of North Vietnam and South Vietnam's Provisional Revolutionary Government (the Viet Cong) atop the United States Information Agency's library building.

Members of a break-away faction of the Bangladesh Students League joined the pro-Moscow Bangladesh Students Union to stage the demonstration in the city center.

Earlier yesterday, demonstrators belonging to the regular, pro-government Bangladesh Students League ransacked the office of Dacca University's central students union.

Yesterday's violence—as well as protest marches and political meetings—came 48 hours after two civilians were shot to death and six others wounded in clashes with students who were demonstrating over the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam.

BALTIMORE SUN  
4 January 1973

## Hanoi hospital to get aid, Berrigan says

Paris (Reuter)—The Rev. Daniel J. Berrigan yesterday informed the North Vietnamese delegation to the Paris peace talks that \$250,000 had been raised in the United States to help reconstruct Bach Mai Hospital, hit during the recent United States bombing of Hanoi.

The money was raised by the U.S. Medical Aid Committee for Indochina.

(A French government spokesman said earlier yesterday that France would set aside \$400,000 this year to mod-

ernize and re-equip St. Paul Hospital in Hanoi to replace installations destroyed in recent U.S. bombing raids.)

Father Berrigan, on parole after serving a prison term for helping to burn draft files in Catonsville, said he also told the Hanoi emissaries he would continue to oppose the war.

Father Berrigan told a group of newsmen that he was very skeptical about the impending resumption of peace talks between the U.S. presidential envoy, Henry A. Kissinger and North Vietnam's Le Duc Tho.

"We are profoundly skeptical because we have been tricked so many times in the past," he said. "We have been had, in the old American sense."

Father Berrigan, who is on his way to Britain to attend a seminary in Huddersfield, added: "For all sorts of complicated reasons, I believe it is impossible for President Nixon, the generals and high administration officials to renounce Vietnam to the Vietnamese. They cannot bear that."



CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR  
26 December 1972

# Thieu building new mass party

By Daniel Southerland  
Staff correspondent of  
The Christian Science Monitor  
Go Cong, Vietnam

The Saigon government has just established a new political party here, but many of its members are not quite sure what it is all about.

"We were told to go to a meeting at the province capital," said a farmer who claimed to be a member of the new Democracy Party. "We shouted some slogans, and then they let us go home."

The farmer didn't seem to mind the slogan shouting too much. But he was at a loss to explain what its purpose was.

Democracy Party organizers say the party is intended to lead a "political struggle" against the Communists once there is a cease-fire. They claim to have already recruited some 200,000 members. A national party convention is to be held in mid-February.

Organizers in Go Cong Province to the south of Saigon claim to have brought in more than 10,000 recruits. Go Cong is the party's pilot province for the Mekong Delta.

In some of the province's hamlets, it appears that just about every male over the age of 18 was expected by government authorities to join the new party. Many appear to regard joining as simply one more way of staying on the right side of the government. Some apparently fear that if they do not join, they will have trouble getting official licenses, residence permits, and other legal papers from the government.

A mason in the province capital explained how he came to join the party.

"Some government cadres came around and asked me to fill out application forms," he said. "So I filled them out."

"Everybody has to join," he said. "It's by order of the government. If you don't join, you might have trouble with the government."

In one hamlet, each house was flying not only the government flag but also the new party flag, which consists of a red star on a yellow background.

Hamlet residents said they were ordered by local authorities to buy the party flag, which cost 200 piasters (about 50 cents) each.

Party leaders said the flag is supposed to demonstrate the "anti-Communist spirit."

"The North Vietnamese flag has a red background with a yellow star," said one of the party's leaders. "So we chose the opposite — a yellow background with a red star."

Party leaders insist that they want to co-exist peacefully with other anti-Communist parties, and that they want to encourage the development of a two-party system. But the people who seem to be complaining the most in Go Cong about the formation of the new party are members of another political group called the Progressive Nationalist Movement (PNM).

HINDUSTAN TIMES  
7 December 1972

# Torture a way of life in Saigon prisons

From T. J. S. George Hindustan Times Correspondent

HONG KONG: The question of tens of thousands of political prisoners in South Vietnam may become a major bone of contention in the tortuous negotiations for cease-fire and immediately thereafter, according to political sources.

There were reports this week that American pressure on North Vietnamese negotiators for some sort of agreement on the withdrawal of North Vietnamese fighters from the South contributed to the impasse which first developed in Paris. North Vietnam does not admit to any of its regular troops being in the South. The reports implied that Hanoi would make a concessional gesture provided the U.S. agreed to get prisoners in South Vietnam released.

Western reaction to this idea was that Hanoi would withdraw its own men from the South if "communist sympathisers" now kept in prison in the South are freed so that the latter can play a crucial role in the post-cease-fire political struggle.

No detailed or authentic information on the prisoners in South Vietnam is available. But the exposure two years ago of the secret of the infamous "tiger cages"—complete with blood curdling photographs in American media—showed that the prison regime under the Saigon Government was a particularly cruel one. According to communist sources there are more than 1,000 public and secret prisons in the South detaining about three lakh persons. Large numbers of them were rounded up during various anti-

Victory campaigns conducted by the Saigon and U.S. authorities under such names as "Phoenix" and "Rural Pacification."

Torture, of course, is a way of life in these prisons. Often the task of "controlling" the inmates is handed over to regular criminal prisoners serving long sentences. The worst is when incidents break out in a prison camp or another. On such occasions, the authorities even throw grenades into prison cages killing whoever is around or unleash police dogs on them. In some major prisons, such as Thuc Duc in Gia Dinh province, as many as 150 persons are packed into a yard, 50 square yards, with no special toilet facilities. These have come to be known as "pig sties" and "stables."

A prisoner is allowed only half a litre of water a day—for drinking and washing combined. These conditions are believed to have made paralysis, beriberi, dysentery, TB and psychosis common diseases in the prisons.

The number of regular communist cadres taken prisoner is believed to be small. The bulk of the prisoners were taken in on suspicion of being sympathisers in operations such as eliminating an entire village and taking all inhabitants prisoner. Analysts believe that the experience they have gone through will have made them confirmed communists by the time they get out—if they get out at all. Released in any political settlement that may eventually emerge, these people are considered likely to become politically significant some time or the other.

is anti-Communist and usually basic government policies. But rs say that many of their followers coerced into joining the govern-

There is little they can do to resist since the full weight of the Saigon administration from President Nguyen Van Thieu down to the province and district chiefs is behind the new party. Key members of the new party are government administrators.

Despite all the government machinery that the new party has at its disposal, however, most independent political observers in Saigon are doubtful that meaningful support for a nationwide government party can be developed at this late date. What some anti-Communist politicians fear is that government pressure tactics may further alienate some people from the government even while formally adding their names to party membership lists.

So far, the amount of pressure being applied to prospective members of the new party has varied greatly from one province to another. In some provinces, the government province chiefs have been willing to tolerate noninvolvement by members of already existing parties. But in other provinces, it appears that village chiefs risk being sacked if they fail to join.

NEW YORK TIMES  
24 December 72

## State Department Urges End Of Pentagon Role in Pacification

By TAD SZULC

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 23—The State Department has recommended the virtual elimination of the Defense Department's role in pacification efforts in South Vietnam.

The proposal, according to officials here, is aimed at establishing civilian control over major United States social and economic programs. The long-dominant military role in running purely civilian and humanitarian programs has been the target of frequent criticism within the Administration and in Congress. The Pentagon and the intelligence agencies have been accused of often distorting the programs into operations with military objectives.

The change would be accomplished, the State Department said, through a transfer to the civilian Administration for International Development of the program to assist war victims in South Vietnam.

The bulk of this program is currently managed by the War Victims Directorate of an agency under the Pentagon's control known as CORDS, for Civilian Operations Rural Development Support. Heretofore, this agency, whose chief is directly subordinate to the United States military command in Saigon, has been responsible for most of the pacification efforts.

Parallel to the Vietnamization program, which gradually switched combat responsibilities from American to South Vietnamese forces, pacification was aimed at securing the Saigon Government's hold over rural populations through operations ranging from care of refugees and resettlement to the training of the Vietnamese national police and the joint anti-Vietcong program known as Operation Phoenix. The war victims' program, however, is currently the major operation of CORDS, as most of the other pacification ventures have collapsed since the start of the North Vietnamese offensive in the South last March 30.

### Based on Inspection Tour

The State Department said that long-range rehabilitation programs "are more compatible with the development aims of A.I.D. than with CORDS, which is a short-term agency."

The recommendation to transfer the refugee program to civilian control was contained in an internal departmental document sent on Dec. 6 by Anthony Faunce, the acting inspector general of foreign assistance, to John A. Hannah, the aid administrator. The document is based on a lengthy report by a team of foreign assistance inspectors who visited

Vietnam during the fall.

Mr. Faunce is a senior State Department official who is directly responsible to Secretary of State William P. Rogers. His office supervises all United States aid programs, which Mr. Hannah administers.

Administration officials said that the National Security Council would make the final decision to recommend the transfer of the program.

The 33-page report which concentrated almost entirely on the refugees in South Vietnam, said: The United States should support long-term physical and economic rehabilitation of war victims, including displaced persons, war widows, orphans and the physically and mentally handicapped.

"It will simply not be enough to help rebuild the Vietnamese economy," the report added. "This alone is not sufficient to restore the social fabric."

### South Vietnamese Criticized

The report was highly critical of the performance of South Vietnamese officials running the refugee programs in conjunction with the United States, urging the removal of "corrupt administrators" and charging South Vietnamese "sloppiness in administration."

The inspectors accused some South Vietnamese officials of the Social Welfare Ministry of falsifying name lists of refugees to steal commodities.

The inspectors said that on the basis of a count by the Saigon Government 1.2 million new refugees had been created by the fighting in South Vietnam between March 30 and Nov. 23.

The number of refugees is not precisely known but the report said that last June the United States and South Vietnam were preparing plans to care for 1.5 million refugees. According to the Senate subcommittee on refugees the total may be close to two million, including some 200,000 living in areas under Communist control.

The inspectors said they found that since March 30, when responsibility for relief resettlement and return-to-village programs was between CORDS and AID, that operations were characterized by "confusion and lack of coordination."

"This lack of coordination and duplication of effort between AID and CORDS, which is an old story, must be corrected as soon as possible," the report said. "We believe that in any case the war victims program could probably be more efficiently administered and that its long-range responsibilities would be better protected if the War Victims Directorate were transferred now to AID."

NEW YORK TIMES  
29 December 72

## Cambodian Confession

As the aerial blitz against North Vietnam continues in full fury, the American people have been treated to another sordid glimpse of what they are getting for the continuing high investment in lives, money and national honor throughout Indochina.

The United States-backed Government of Cambodia has acknowledged that because of corruption by military commanders and other "irregularities," it has paid salaries to as many as 100,000 nonexistent soldiers. The misappropriated funds for this phantom army have come almost exclusively from a \$300-million American aid program that President Nixon once called "probably the best investment in foreign assistance that the United States has made in my lifetime."

The President to the contrary notwithstanding, there is nothing remarkably new in the latest disclosure from Phnom Penh, except perhaps the surprising candor of a regime that has long shared with its neighbors in Vietnam and Saigon a reputation for corruption.

Only last month, a Times correspondent on the scene described Cambodia as a place where "the sons of generals drive Alfa Romeos and Cougar fastbacks . . . the governor of a province is known to sell ammunition and drugs to the enemy . . . other Government officials can be seen selling automatic rifles and uniforms to wealthy merchants, who in turn sell them to both sides . . . low-salaried colonels—some accused of pocketing the payrolls of their units—build luxury villas here in the capital and rent them to Americans for \$700 a month."

Is it any wonder that since Mr. Nixon threw American support—including briefly American troops—behind a new anti-Communist military regime in early 1970, Communist forces have overrun three-quarters of Cambodian soil and the indigenous resistance movement has expanded from a force of about 3,000 to an estimated 30,000?

Meanwhile, most of the country's towns and cities have been heavily damaged or destroyed either by allied bombs or by Communist shells, or both, and up to one-third of the seven million population has been rendered homeless. Neither the newly affluent generals nor the American Government has shown serious concern for these hapless refugees, caught up in a conflict that is beyond their understanding.

And all this goes on while the Administration weighs plans for an eighteen-month freeze of Federal housing construction and other "economy" cuts in programs to aid America's own disadvantaged. Some day perhaps the President will explain who at home or abroad is being helped by the extension of this war without end.

WASHINGTON POST  
1 JANUARY 1973

## Thieu Using State To Build His Party

By Thomas W. Lippman  
Washington Post Foreign Service

GOCONG, South Vietnam, Dec. 31—President Thieu is openly using soldiers, civil servants, and publicly owned equipment, including materials paid for by the United States, to promote the development of his new political party.

The party, known as Dan Chu or the Democracy Party, is theoretically an independent organization with voluntary membership and no formal connections with the president. But it represents a major part of his effort to solidify his personal grip on the country and its people in anticipation of a postwar political struggle.

The party's organizers have been at work for more than a year, but stepped up the pace sharply in late October, when a peace settlement that would legitimize a Communist presence in South Vietnam became a real possibility.

Thieu has used the delay in reaching a peace agreement to move on several levels to entrench himself in office. The chief public and ostensibly non-governmental move has been the unveiling of the party, which has opened chap-

ters around the country though it has largely avoided scrutiny from foreigners by postponing its debut in Saigon.

The chapter here in Gocong, a sleepy delta province capital 30 miles south of Saigon, is one of the most fully organized, and no attempt is being made to hide the extensive use of public resources and government personnel in its development.

The staff at the party's temporary office in a Buddhist temple consists of four civil servants—three young men from province headquarters assigned by the province chief to work at the party office, and a woman typist from the Agricultural Development Bureau. Printing and typing of party documents and letters are done in government offices on government equipment.

The party's permanent Gocong headquarters is being constructed a few blocks away by a platoon of army engineers, using American-supplied equipment and imported

Korean cement paid for by U.S. aid funds. The site is publicly owned land next to province police headquarters.

There are 2,673 names on the party's current Gocong province membership list. Among them are 459 policemen and 1,134 teachers, agricultural development officials, and other civil servants. According to party chairman Nguyen Minh Huan, the roster comprises all public employees in the province.

In addition, Huan said a legal ban on partisan politics by military officers has been partly circumvented with government approval, to permit officers assigned to non-military duties to join the party. He called them "civilian officers."

He said there are about 50 such officers in Gocong, a minor and generally peaceful province where the government's military presence is minimal. There are several thousand of them around the country, according to other sources.

Huan said he was one of about 30 persons recruited for the party by the Gocong province chief and that the application forms filled out by all the members were being kept at province headquarters by one of the province chief's assistants—a lieutenant colonel who failed to appear at his office after being informed by telephone that reporters were waiting to see him.

The ability of the party's organizers to command this kind of response from provincial officials illustrates the extent to which Thieu already controls the machinery of government. All province chiefs, or military governors, are appointed by Thieu to their lucrative and powerful positions, and they in turn control the lower levels of government down to the remotest hamlet—including jobs, government services, essential personal documents, and security operations.

It comes as no surprise to Vietnamese or Americans here that Thieu would take advantage of his position to promote the development of his party. It was expected that there would be pressure on government workers to join and that some public money would be used for party activities.

Political parties have not traditionally been a dominant

WASHINGTON POST  
3 JANUARY 1973

## Saigon Held Set to Foil Release of Dissidents

Agence France-Presse

PARIS, Jan. 2—Two Frenchmen released last week after 2½ years in a Saigon jail said here today that South Vietnamese authorities were reclassifying political prisoners as common criminals to avoid releasing them when a cease-fire comes into force.

Jean-Pierre Debris and André Menras, who were imprisoned for raising a Vietcong flag in Saigon in July 1970, said that South Vietnamese officials were making false records and documents to keep these prisoners in jail.

Political and criminal prisoners were now being mixed, they told a press conference here. Three days before they were freed, they witnessed a mass deportation of political prisoners from Saigon's Chi Chieu jail to the notorious penal settlement of Poula Condor.

"This is a sign that the liquidation of prisoners is about to begin," they said. Sixteen students who went on a hunger strike Dec. 10 to protest the conditions of their detention were among the prisoners shipped out, they said.

Torture against political

prisoners was rampant, the two men said.

A favorite of Saigon jailers was "the plane trip," dangling the prisoner in mid-air by his wrist and working him over with clubs. The prisoners also extinguished cigarettes on prisoners' bodies, they said.

Although they themselves had been beaten with iron bars and bicycle chains when first arrested, they said, they had never been tortured.

The two young men said they had presumed they would be released, since otherwise "they would have been embarrassing witnesses to what is to follow."

They also attributed their release to the campaign on their behalf by the French "Secours Populaire" (Popular Aid) organization, and claimed that they were not aware of any steps taken by the French government to obtain their release.

However, official sources said here tonight the release of the two imprisoned men was due mainly to "repeated and insistent" demands by French government representatives in Saigon.

force in Vietnamese political life because there is none that has nationwide membership and influence, and the existing parties have been subordinate to regional and religious interests.

Last week, however, Thieu issued a decree that is intended to change that. Under the new law, electoral politics in Vietnam will be dominated by large, national political parties—and if only the Democracy Party is able to meet the new law's membership criteria and is eligible to run candidates, that would leave Thieu in an even stronger position than now.

"We're not asking to participate in Thieu's government," an opposition party leader

said wistfully the other day. "We just want to be left alone to compete equally. How can we compete with this?"

It will be difficult, if not impossible, for any opposition party to compete with the Democracy Party, if its performance here is any indication.

Huan, the party chairman, a 61-year-old schoolteacher, said

he joined because "the province chief himself came into my home and invited me to attend the meeting. I am a supporter of Thieu and an anti-Communist. It would have been very difficult to refuse."

As party chairman for Gocong, he said, he has sought out "all the people I know personally" to explain the party's purposes to them and persuade them to join. "Nobody has refused," he said.

There is still a debate within the U.S. Mission in Saigon over what Thieu's likely political moves will be in the event of a cease-fire.

Basically the argument is between those who believe he will "move to the left"—broaden the base of his government, reestablish contact with the opposition, liberalize some of his political policies—and those who believe he will "move to the right"—further harden his uncompromising anti-Communist, anti-neutralist stand and exclude from the councils of power all those whose agreement with him is less than total.

WASHINGTON POST  
14 December 1972

# Cambodian Hopes For Peace Subside

By Martin Woolacott  
Manchester Guardian

PHNOM PENH—The wide-spread hopes of instant peace fostered among Cambodians by Henry Kissinger's magical aura and their own government's pronouncements have now largely subsided.

They have been replaced, at least among educated people, by the glum realization that Cambodia is further away from even a limited settlement than any of

## News Analysis

the other countries of Indo-China. For even if a cease-fire were to extend to Cambodia it is difficult to see what kind of political follow-up there could possibly be.

The mood of pessimism deepened with recent Communist military successes. For a time the Communists had closed four of the country's six main railroads and were threatening the other two. They crowned their temporary dominance with the destruction of a heavily escorted convoy and consequent hutchery of the government troops and a number of women and children, the soldiers' dependents.

President Lon Nol has given his new prime minister, Hang Thun Hak, a brief to arrange talks with the other side at the local level. Officially all that is on offer is service in the government, army or re-settlement on the land. According to rumor, there may also have been some vague suggestions of a "place in political life."

The official government line has always been that if the North Vietnamese withdrew, Khmers—as the Cambodians are historically known—would soon settle their differences amicably. Since it is unlikely that all Vietnamese will withdraw and since it is reluctantly conceded that there is such a thing as a dedicated Khmer Communist, the actual government strategy is to try to make little local settlements with the less committed Khmer dissidents.

It is recognized that a "hard core" will be left. Western diplomats who share the Cambodian gov-

ernment view suggest that "over time" the Cambodian army will be able to get the better of these units.

The government's plan is thus essentially to bring about the capitulation of some hostile units and to destroy the others, a plan for continuing the war rather than ending it. It is based on the hope that the majority of North Vietnamese units, advisers and support personnel will indeed depart, or at least, even if they stay on Cambodian territory, will cease to intervene

in a major way in the Cambodian war.

It ignores the signs over recent months that the Khmer dissidents are increasing in number, now to an estimated 30,000-35,000, and in combat effectiveness while the Cambodian army doesn't seem to be getting significantly better. It ignores, too, the possibility that there may soon be a major reduction in American supplies of arms and equipment, even if the United States provides straight cash for arms purchases to circumvent any restriction in a cease-fire agreement on direct supply.

One Khmer opposition party member commented: "Lon Nol isn't interested in any settlement. He tells Hang Thun Hak to get some talks going but he won't let him offer anything that the other side would accept."

Other critics of Lon Nol who take the same view would like to see him replaced, somehow, by a more honest and less lackadaisical government.

What would the other side accept? The answer seems to be that, like the Phnom Penh government, it too is opposed to a settlement. Exiled Prince Norodom Sihanouk has, of course, already announced his opposition loudly and vociferously in Peking. But he speaks only for the Sihanoukists among the dissidents, if he speaks for them.

However, in this case he may well be voicing the common attitude. The Khmer dissidents make up an uneasy and complicated alliance and its complica-

NEW YORK TIMES  
28 December 72

## One-Third of Army In Cambodia Found To Be Nonexistent

By SYDNEY H. SCHANBERG  
Special to the New York Times

PHNOM PENH, Cambodia, Dec. 27—The Cambodian Government acknowledged today that, because of corruption by military commanders and other "irregularities," it has "at times" paid salaries to as many as 100,000 nonexistent soldiers.

The Government said that it had sometimes met payrolls of 300,000 troops even though it has now found that the actual number of men in the army is about 200,000. These "phantom" troops—a creation of false payrolls submitted by unit commanders—represent the most widespread form of corruption in Cambodia and have become the focus of bitter popular complaint.

A private in the Cambodian Army receives about \$20 a month, so 100,000 "phantom" privates would put \$2-million a month into the pockets of commanders. Virtually all of this money comes through United States aid, which will total about \$300-million this year.

The information about Cambodia's inflated army was disclosed by the Information Minister, Keam Reth, at a news conference.

The Government has mentioned the problem of corruption in general terms before, but has never discussed it with such candor and in such detail.

The Information Minister said the Government had almost completed a payroll survey of the Army and had so far found only 180,000 real soldiers on

tions are further compounded by the policy differences among Peking, Hanoi, and Moscow.

"If they tried to get together a national leadership that could negotiate with Phnom Penh," one informed student of their affairs here said, "they would bring into the open so many problems and differences within their own ranks, it just wouldn't be worth it for them at this stage."

Others would argue that there is no need to go into the internal problems of the Khmer Rouge, one of three major rebel groups, to consider a settlement. Communists and non-Communists alike, the Khmer Rouge leaders want off into the jungle with the aim of ultimately seizing power in Cambodia.

duty. He said this survey would be finished by the end of this month.

The Minister said that at present the number of soldiers "on paper" was 220,000, having been reduced recently from the paper high of 300,000.

The Government of President Lon Nol is reportedly under heavy pressure from the United States, its principal benefactor, to crack down on the military corruption and improve the performance of the Cambodian armed forces. There were reports, not confirmed officially, that this was one of the messages conveyed to President Lon Nol by Gen. Alexander M. Haig Jr., President Nixon's representative during his brief visit to Phnom Penh last week.

There have also been unofficial reports that men from the American Embassy's large military aid team are assisting and overseeing the Cambodians in the current army payroll check.

False payrolls are but one of the methods of military corruption here. Military supplies, from uniforms to medicines, often find their way to the open market—and sometimes into enemy hands.

There is no doubt that the Government's awareness of the seriousness of the corruption

problem has increased. But the Government has not taken a punitive approach toward the perpetrators, and reports of corruption continue.

Just two days ago, a local newspaper reported that, in one largely "phantom" unit, the commander—because he feared his false payroll was about to be exposed—suddenly reported that 733 men had deserted over the past month out of the unit's supposed total of 1,100.

Other newspapers reported this week that \$1-million in uniforms provided through American aid had been unaccounted for since last year.

The Government has charged a few unit commanders with falsifying payrolls and has jailed them pending trial, but officials acknowledge privately that this only scratches the surface of the problem. Some officials say that if every guilty commander was put behind bars, the army would lose the bulk of its leadership and would disintegrate.

The Information Minister said the Government was attacking the problem "not by suppression but through prevention and education." Asked later why the Government had not adopted a policy of stern punishment, he said: "The Khmer mentality does not depend on whether or not you punish a person. That's why we have chosen education and prevention first. But if we have to punish, we will punish, because it has been prescribed by law."

The minister said the Government was essentially aiming at an army of 250,000 trained regular troops, not counting the militia and para-military

THE EVENING STAR and DAILY NEWS  
Washington, D. C., Wednesday, December 13, 1972

# Air America: Flying for U.S. and Profit

By JOHN BURGESS  
Special to The Star-News

**BANGKOK** — "The flying is non-military; in other words, civilian flying. You are flying for the U.S. government, that is government agencies such as USOM, USAID, USIS, etc. While these agencies may be under CIA direction, you don't know and you don't care. The government agencies direct the routings and schedulings, your company provides the technical know-how and you fly the airplane."

Thus an unnamed American pilot describes "civilian flying" in Southeast Asia for Air America and the lesser known Continental Air Services — both private companies on contract to the U.S. government. The pilot's comments are part of a confidential, 16-page brochure available at certain Air Force personnel offices. It is shown to Air Force pilots interested in flying for one of the companies upon completing their military service.

The brochure lists no author or publisher, but it offers an illuminating view into the internal operations of Air America, which has played a crucial role in the Indochina war theater since the 1950s. Air America, along with the other companies, has airlifted troops, refugees, CIA agents, American politicians, war material, food and occasionally prisoners all over Southeast Asia.

## Extravagant Salaries

The brochure, dated June 29, 1972, boasts that Air America ranked as one of the most profitable corporations in the United States in 1969, a year when most of the world's airlines lost heavily. Air America's customer is the U.S. government.

It employs about 436 pilots, according to the pamphlet, of

which 304 are working in Southeast Asia. The center of Air America's operation is Laos, where the presence of military or military-related personnel is prohibited by the much-abused Geneva Conference of 1962.

Air America's profits are high despite the somewhat extravagant salaries it pays for flying personnel. According to the report, a pilot with 11 years experience, flying a UH-34D helicopter based at Udorn air base in Thailand an average of 100 hours monthly, will take home \$51,525. All salaries are tax free.

A newly hired pilot flying a C-7 Caribou transport based in Vientiane, averaging 100 hours flying time monthly, would earn a minimum \$29,442. The U.S. commercial pilot average is \$24,000.

Also available to Air America personnel, in addition to a liberal expense account, is life and medical insurance, two-weeks leave, tickets on other airlines at 20 percent normal cost, PX and government mailing privileges and educational allowances for dependents. Many Air America pilots are retired military men receiving military pensions.

## 'Good' Investment

Americans can also become "air freight specialists", commonly called kickers. Their job is to push cargo out over drop zones. Salary is \$1,600-\$1,800 per month. Qualifications: American citizenship, air borne training, experience with the U.S. Air Force preferred.

Air America, Inc., is owned by a private aviation investment concern called the Pacific Corp. Dunn and Bradstreet's investment directory places its assets in the \$10-\$50 million category, and rates it "good" as an investment risk. Air America itself employs al-

together about 8,000 persons, ranking in size just below National Airlines and above most of the smaller U.S. domestic airlines.

Formerly called Civil Air Transport (CAT), Air America was organized after World War II by General Claire Chennault, commander of the American fighter squadrons in Burma and China known as the Flying Tigers. CAT played a major role in post-war China supplying Nationalist troops. CAT also supplied the French during their phase of the war in Indochina.

Air America is commonly considered an arm of the CIA. In Laos, the CIA for the past 10 years or more has maintained an army of hill tribesmen, mainly Thai and Lao mercenaries. Most of the air supply and transport needs for this army have been handled by Air America.

## Military Assistance

Though the brochure does not mention opium explicitly, it hints at the subject of contraband:

"Although flights mainly serve U.S. official personnel movement and native officials and civilians, you sometimes engage in the movement of friendly troops, or of enemy captives; or in the transport of cargo much more potent than rice and beans! There's a war going on. Use your imagination!"

Air America works hand-in-hand with the U.S. Air Force. At Udorn air base in Thailand, Air Force mechanics repair the airline's transports and helicopters, many of them unmarked. The Air Force has reportedly leased giant C130 transports when the planes were needed for operations in Laos. In the section on Air America's benefits, the brochure lists in addition to normal home and sick leave:

"Military leave will be granted appropriately" — an apparent acknowledgement that there are military people working directly with Air America.

One should not conclude, however, that the salaries, excitement and tax advantages mean that Air America pilots

## in Asia

hope the war will continue. As the brochure's author notes in a typed postscript:

"Foreign aid situation unclear pending outcome military situation in RVN (Republic of Vietnam), but it looks as if we'll finish the war (and peace terms favorable for our side); if so, it is expected that a boom among contract operators will result when implemented, due to inevitable rehabilitation and reconstruction aid in wartorn areas. . . . Job market highly competitive and you'll need all the help you can get."

According to Pacific News Service, the following men sit on the Air America board of directors:

Samuel Randolph Walker — chairman of the board of Wm. C. Walker's Son, New York; director of Equitable Life Assurance Society; member of Federal City Council, Washington, D.C.; member of Action Council for Better Cities, Urban America, Inc., and life trustee, Columbia University.

William A. Reed — chairman of the board of Simpson Timber Co.; chairman of the board, Simpson Lee Paper Co.; director of Crown Simpson Timber Co.; director of Seattle First National Bank; director of General Insurance Co.; director of Boeing Co.;

director of Pacific Car Foundry Co.; director of Northern Pacific Railroad; director of Stanford Research Institute.

Arthur Berry Richardson — foreign service officer in Russia, China and England from 1914 to 1936; chairman of the board of Cheeseborough Ponds, Inc. from 1955 to 1961; director of United Hospital Fund, New York; trustee of Lenox Hill Hospital.

James Barr Ames — law partner in Ropes & Gray, Boston; director of Air Asia Co., Ltd., director of International Student Association; member, Cambridge Civic Association and trustee of Mt. Auburn Hospital.

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Dispatch News Service International)

NEW YORK TIMES  
23 December 72

## Laos Drug Curb Hailed But Outflow Continues

By MALCOLM W. BROWNE  
Special to The New York Times

VIENTIANE, Laos, Dec. 22—In hard narcotics were made illegal in Laos, authorities here have confiscated 602 kilograms of opium and 30 kilograms of heroin, United States Ambassador G. McMurtrie Godley said in a speech today.

Meantime, the Laotian Government has been purchasing opium grown by farmers so as to reduce the hardship to them of changing crops.

But the Government price for opium is only about one-fifth the price obtained on the open market in Laos, and the latter price is rising. Consequently, officials say there is evidence that, if anything, farmers in some areas are increasing production to take advantage of the high price.

### Dens Continue To Flourish

Opium dens continue to flourish here because under the new law—although production, sale and possession of hard drugs are illegal—it is not illegal to operate opium dens or consume drugs.

Consequently, police are given considerable flexibility in deciding whether to crack down on a given opium den or not.

There has been sharp criticism, both from some Laotians and some American officials working here of the emphasis the United States has lately placed on the suppression of opium in Laos.

### Laos Is Transfer Point

"The narcs are fundamentally cops with a very specific job," one American here said, adding:

"They are concerned mainly with enforcement and not with the economic and political effects their work produces. When they make Meo or Yao tribesmen angry with their sometimes heavy-handed approach to these things, it may be hurting our other efforts to keep these tribesmen on our side and not with the Communists. The situation in north-west Laos is dangerous enough as it is without extra antagonizing of the tribes."

Enforcement officials hope that narcotics passing through Laos will be steadily reduced, but they acknowledge that the smugglers involved are experts, generally a step or two ahead of them.

One enforcement official said: "The old days when Corsican adventurers flew a fleet of light planes from Laos to deliver their stuff around Indochina are over. Now the big dealers seem to be relying on military aviation, and that is very much harder to control. We hope military police will cut the traffic down, but you can imagine the problem, having to check every T-28 fighter before it takes off on a mission."

And then, referring to a Baltimore Federal Court case reported on last week, he added: "And when you hear that heroin has been shipped to the States inside the bodies of G.I.'s killed in action, you know you're up against people who will stop when production of traffic."

Paradoxically, narcotics experts say, the success achieved in recent months in blocking narcotics traffics between the royal capital of Luang Prabang and Vientiane has apparently provided an incentive to poppy farmers to grow more opium.

Since September 17, 1971, when production of traffic

THE WASHINGTON POST Saturday, Dec. 30, 1972

## Saigon Dope Dealers Riding High

By Jack Anderson

The feverish U.S. effort to build up the South Vietnamese Air Force, apparently, is giving wings to the opium smugglers in Southeast Asia.

This is the ironic conclusion to be drawn from a new, highly classified General Accounting Office report on worldwide opium traffic. Numbered copies of the 151-page document, classified "Secret," have been distributed to a few top administration and congressional leaders.

The report declares bluntly that "the Vietnamese military, especially the air force" could not be trusted and should be subjected to tougher "customs controls."

That dope runners are working with the air force brass, the report suggests, to smuggle opium into South Vietnam by air. But Vietnamese officials have been unable to stop it because "there were just simply too many military airfields (about 300) and too few customs officials."

Yet the U.S. has been turning over to the South Vietnamese Air Force the very types of planes most useful for transporting illegal drugs. These include fat C-130 transports, UH-1 helicopters and prop-driven, A-1 fighters.

In the gloomiest assessment we have ever seen of the dope problem in Vietnam, the secret report contradicts official propaganda about South Vietnamese-American cooperation on narcotics and cites estimates that "only an insignificant amount of heroin had actually been interdicted and seized."

### Heroin for GIs

The top U.S. drug suppression coordinator in Vietnam is

quoted in the report as saying:

"Even if (Saigon and Washington) were totally successful from now on in stopping all heroin from entering Vietnam, there (is) enough heroin in-country to keep every soldier high until the last U.S. serviceman has withdrawn from South Vietnam."

The reason smuggling can't be brought under control, of course, is corruption throughout the Saigon government. The GAO report describes one secret meeting, for example, between American Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker and South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu.

"The U.S. ambassador again met with the Vietnamese president," states the report, "to discuss the progress of a campaign . . . against smuggling and narcotics."

After an exchange of polite words, "the Vietnamese president was told, however, that the results of the antidrug campaign thus far had not been sufficient to remove the issue as a threat to continued American support.

"Arrests to date had been mostly of small peddlers and street pushers who were not adequately punished when brought to trial. The ambassador stated that it was essential that big traffickers be investigated, prosecuted and severely punished."

But invariably, diplomatic pressure would produce only a small flurry of activity, and then the corruption would take hold again.

Or, as the secret report succinctly puts it: "Vietnamese officials acknowledge that there were still significant problem areas."

THE ECONOMIST DECEMBER 30, 1972



## Quadruple Parking

South Korea's president has got himself a lifetime option on the job. His country will pay a price for it

South Korea's President Park has provided for his old age. Not for him the prospect of compulsory retirement at 58 after the end of his third four-year term. Three years before that constitutional deadline he took the simple course of writing it out of the constitution. Last month 90 per cent of the electorate duly trooped to the polls to vote 90 per cent in favour of the revised constitution in a referendum. (Not a bad score by any standard, except that of North Korea, where, a few weeks later, 100 per cent of the voters approved a new constitution by noon on polling day.) Then, last weekend, President Park was re-elected for a six-year term by a new body, itself newly elected, called the National Council for Unification. The vote was 2,357 for and 2 invalid. The result of these two polls is that, unless there is another military coup like the one which brought Major-General Park into power 11 years ago, or unless he makes an uncharacteristic rejection of the burdens of office, the president will stay on in Seoul's Blue House for the indefinite future.

A longer reign for President Park would not, in itself, necessarily be a bad thing for South Korea. He has proved himself an able chief executive. He made a quick transition from military to civilian rule, and submitted himself to three reasonably fair elections. His administration may have been guilty of corruption, and it may not have stuck strictly to the accepted rules when these were inconvenient, but it permitted more political freedom than some of its neighbours. At the same time it promoted an economic boom in which income per head rose from \$100 to \$250. And in the past year President Park has shown the courage—or canniness—to start talking about that well-beloved chimera called Korean unification with his arch enemy across the 38th parallel, Mr Kim Il Sung. All this, plus the absence of an obvious successor, might anyway have persuaded South Koreans to allow President Park to stand, and win, in a proper popular election once again. But a major-general's impatience with uncertainty led him to opt for a sure thing.

The chief casualty of his coup by constitution—a fashionable phenomenon in Asia these days—is the long-term possibility of a peaceful change of government in South Korea. By definition, a political body loses power as it gains size, and the elephantine National Council for Unification, which has been entrusted with choosing the president, was plainly designed for impotence. Its 2,359 delegates, who were elected two weeks ago for six-year terms, are unpaid; and, on the president's express instructions, they were chosen from among those “not tainted with political pollution”—in other words, those who

would not oppose the re-election of President Park.

The short-term political prospects are also ominous. The new constitution eliminates all checks on presidential authority, including civil rights safeguards like habeas corpus, and such limited powers as the legislature and courts once enjoyed. And the very means of its enactment suggest that Acton's dictum, about the absolute corruption of people who enjoy absolute power, may be fulfilled once again in South Korea.

### No debate, no comment

The campaigns for the referendum and for the election of the Unification Council were conducted under ground rules which prohibited any debate about the constitution in the press, in public, or even, as the rules were applied, in private letters. To express doubts about the “October revitalisation movement” was to be guilty of rumour-mongering. Martial law courts were crowded with offenders; in one two-day period earlier this month (ironically, during what South Korea proclaimed as Human Rights Week), 24 people were sentenced to imprisonment for “spreading groundless rumours.” The government had earlier taken the precaution of putting the people most likely to speak their minds under house arrest; these included opposition politicians and the bishop of Wonju. Although martial law has since been revoked these people seem still to be in detention. At least one opposition politician was seen in a Seoul hospital with injuries attributed to rough handling by South Korea's Central Intelligence Agency. A more alarming example of the agency's style of operation was brought to international attention this month during the appeal of a South Korean convicted of spying for North Korea. Mr Suh Sung emerged from interrogation with 45 per cent of his body covered in third-degree burns, allegedly from an attempt at suicide. His conviction rested on a “confession” signed with a toeprint. If this confession was extracted, as it seems to have been, by torture, it was inadmissible under the old constitution but valid under the new one.

President Park does not comment on such unsavoury affairs, which are not mentioned in South Korean newspapers. He would presumably justify draconian police measures in the same way as he justifies the necessity for the new constitution—as part of the toughening process required for the new type of confrontation with the north. But he gave no answer to the local journalist who asked: “Why not detente and democracy too?”

## Eastern Europe

DAILY WORLD, New York (Communist)  
7 December 1972

Dear  
Editor,

### PERLO REPLIES

Mrs. Seigel appeals for a change in Soviet policies and propoganda. Her points, it seems to me, are based partly on misinformation and partly on false analogies.

1. The million Jews rescued by the USSR from death in Nazi-occupied lands returned to their homelands after the war. They are not involved in the present emigration to Israel from the USSR.

2. Mrs. Seigel calls on the Soviet government to say it doesn't want Jews to leave, to reiterate the laws against anti-Semitism, to discuss ideological problems in relation to Jews.

The Soviet government has been doing exactly that and much more. It has been widely publicizing the tremendous contributions of the Jewish people to the USSR, in military, economic and cultural fields, paying them high honor. An example is the pamphlet by the Soviet Jewish writer, Solomon Rabinowitz, which has been translated into English. Criticism should be directed at the United States media and commercial publishing houses, which in effect censor all material telling the truth about Soviet Jews so that it becomes accessible only to the handful that know about left-wing bookstores or read the Daily World and Peoples World.

3. Under socialism, the two trends — a flowering of national cultures and a merging of peoples — go on simultaneously. Because the Jewish people are spread out all over the country, because so many of them are in advanced professional and political positions, the tendency towards blending into a multinational Soviet cultural pattern is particularly strong. It is for that reason, rather than the absence of a daily Yiddish newspaper, etc., that only one-sixth of the Soviet Jews consider Yiddish their mother tongue. The same blending into a common United States cultural pattern goes on in this country, marred by the vicious racism being stirred up by our reactionaries.

4. Comparison with Bulgarian postwar emigration policy is not valid. It is true, by the way, that the Bulgarian state, alone among those wholly occupied by the Nazis, protected the Jews from the invaders and saved them from the Nazi death camps. However, in the immediate postwar period, the Bulgarian Jews did not constitute a group with special qualifications for building the country, they had not lived most of their lives under socialism, they were relatively few in numbers, and they were going to a country which, at the time, was not engaged in acting as spearhead for the imperialist offensive against the national liberation movement.

5. It seems to be true, as Mrs. Seigel points out, that assiduous efforts of the United States Information Agency, the CIA and Zionist organizations have succeeded in creating among a minority of Soviet Jews — amounting to thousands, even — a fever to emigrate to Israel. But, according to recent press reports, many of the Soviet Jews going to Israel are settled in occupied lands, for use in fighting against neighboring peoples who are struggling to regain the lands seized from them by Israeli aggressors. It's too bad that some Soviet Jews are lured by the pied piper of bourgeois nationalism. But the Soviet government has a right, in relation to the national liberation struggles in the Middle East — which it rightfully supports — to restrain emigration which would aid the aggressor.

6. I gather Mrs. Seigel is criticizing me for "badgering and blaming" those who slander the USSR in connection with the so-called Jewish question and for showing the basic correctness of the Soviet position. The trouble in this country is that there aren't many more writers, with access to much wider circulating media, to tell the truth. I would hope that Mrs. Seigel, who herself understands much on this issue, will help the cause of combating anti-Sovietism by using letters to the editor or other means to get some of the truth to people in her own community.



# Western Europe

NEW YORK TIMES  
24 December 72

## Europe Reacts to Bombing With Increasing Protests

By ALVIN TRUSTER  
Special to The New York Times

LONDON, Dec. 23—Western Europe is reacting to the American bombing of North Vietnam with growing protests and a mixture of sadness, disgust and anger.

Correspondents in major capitals report that almost all shades of opinion have joined in denouncing the resumption of the heavy American raids. There was talk among some left-wing groups and unions of organizing boycotts of American goods and ships.

Street demonstrations have been held in London, Rome, Copenhagen, Zurich and Amsterdam. In Rome 25,000 people heeded the call of the Italy-Vietnam Committee, a left-wing group, and turned out in a parade and rally last night. About 7,000 joined in a protest in Copenhagen today.

At official levels in the capitals, there were expressions of regret over the continued warfare and of concern that the raids might jeopardize the new relationship developed between the Soviet Union and the United States after President Nixon's visit in May. Other officials in Bonn, London and elsewhere took the view that the bombing would serve further to tarnish the image of the United States.

[At the United Nations, Secretary General Waldheim said he was greatly concerned at the continuing bombing and called for a resumption of the cease-fire negotiations.]

Despite the scattered street demonstrations, the depth of

feeling among Europeans toward the bombing is difficult to gauge. The mining of Haiphong and bombing earlier this year failed to stir widespread protests. And some officials believe that, like many Americans, Europeans have grown rather numb to the events in Indochina after all the years of warfare.

The harshest official attack came today from Premier Olof Palme of Sweden, who has been a sharp critic of American policy in Vietnam. In a statement, Mr. Palme said the bombing was an outrage to be listed with Nazi massacres in World War II.

"One should call things by their proper name," he said. "What is happening today in Vietnam is a form of torture. There are no military grounds for the bombing."

The tone of newspaper editorials throughout Western Europe has been the bitterest in some time. The Daily Mirror here, a mass circulation tabloid of the left, called President Nixon a "frustrated, glib and secretive man" whose name will be blackened by the bombing. "It is an act of insane ferocity," the Mirror said. "A crude exercise in the politics of terror. A blunder of tragic magnitude."

The Times of London said the bombing has "a particular horror because of its massive scale, its indiscriminate character and its apparent employment as an act of negotiation rather than an act of war." The Guardian joined in the protests, asking whether "Mr. Nixon wants to go down in history as one of the most mur-

derous and bloodthirsty of American Presidents."

The President received more understanding from the conservative Daily Telegraph, which said that Mr. Nixon was clearly using power "in a just cause." It said that the kind of agreement backed by Hanoi would "in no way have squared with Mr. Nixon's requirements of a just and fair agreement."

In Paris, however, even the conservative Figaro, normally friendly to the United States, expressed disapproval over the attacks. Roger Massip, the foreign editor, asked some worried questions about the effects of the bombing.

Washington says that its honor would be saved only by a just and equitable peace, Mr. Massip wrote, but "will it not be tarnished by the destruction of a country executed by the cold determination that seems to have taken over among the leaders of the United States?"

France-Soir said that it served no purpose for "a little country, whatever the judgment that one may have about its policy, to be crushed by the greatest world power that wants to be the standard-bearer of our civilization's values."

So far, there has been only one demonstration of several thousand in France. The Government has refrained from any recent statements although it has previously deplored recourse to efforts to achieve a military solution.

In West Germany, there has been an absence of demonstrations, attributed partly to the dispersal of potential demonstrators by the holidays. Officially, the Government expressed its regrets over the continuation of the war.

The criticism in West Ger-

man newspapers has been relatively muted, although the Munich Abendzeitung called the bombing "the most senseless air raids of all time."

The Norwegian Government renewed its appeal to the United States to stop the bombing and resume peace talks. In Copenhagen, even conservative newspapers denounced the raids along with Danish officials.

"It is objectionable that the United States has resumed the bombings and mining," said Premier Anker Jorgensen in a note to Washington. "It is a situation in which Denmark must express its denunciation."

The Danish dockers union said it would start action against United States ships in Danish ports, and other labor unions there proposed a boycott of American goods. The dockers union in Genoa, Italy, also said it would boycott American vessels until the end of the year as a protest.

### Waldheim Voices Concern

UNITED NATIONS, N. Y., Dec. 23 (Reuters)—Secretary General Waldheim said today that he was greatly concerned at the continued United States bombing of North Vietnam.

He called for a resumption of the cease-fire negotiations in Paris and urged an end to all act of violence that could impede their success.

In a statement referring specifically to the bombing, Mr. Waldheim said: "I deeply regret that the long and strenuous efforts to achieve peace in Vietnam have again been interrupted. I am greatly concerned at the deterioration of the situation and the continuing bombing."

NEW YORK TIMES  
3 January 1973

## War Raids Incite Anti-U.S. Feelings in Italy

By PAUL HOFMANN  
Special to The New York Times

ROME, Jan. 2—The United States bombing strikes in North Vietnam have caused a wave of anti-American feeling in Italy that the halt of the raids above the 20th Parallel has not stopped.

Expressions of hostility toward the United States range from protests by newsmen, intellectuals and some Roman Catholic priests to attacks on

American offices.

An anti-American demonstration received a seal of official approval in Bologna when the Communist-controlled city government formally voted to greet the new year by burning a "father napalm" figure symbolizing the United States in the main square, the Piazza Maggiore.

The cardboard figure carried a wooden scale model of an airplane, marked "B-52" with a tail assembly in the shape of the Statue of Liberty.

In the past, the Bolognese burned a cardboard figure representing the outgoing year.

Bologna, which has a population of 600,000, is the largest Communist-ruled city in Western Europe. It is also host to 1,000 American students who attend medical school or the local center of Johns Hopkins University, an American graduate institution on international affairs.

### Action Draws Protests

The innovation in Bolognese folklore elicited some protests.

A former Finance Minister, Luigi Preti, who is a Social Democrat, wrote in a letter to Bologna's Communist mayor, Renato Zangheri, that he found it "disreputable" that an old, harmless custom had been turned into a political manifestation.

Mr. Preti, who is a member of Bologna's city parliament, suggested that the mayor convene that body for a discussion on Vietnam, and stated he expressed an anti-Communist's view of that conflict. The mayor, in a counterstatement, re-

minded critics that President Nixon's decision to resume the bombings in North Vietnam in December had been attacked by the world's most influential newspapers, from The New York Times to Le Monde of Paris and Corriere della Sera of Milan.

Elsewhere in Italy, Communists and non-Communists are marching jointly these days in anti-American demonstrations. In Pisa, Palermo and many other cities, local units—especially youth groups—of Premier Giulio Andreotti's Christian Democratic party are among the sponsors of such rallies and parades.

Fire in Front of U. S. Embassy  
In Rome, youthful leftists have during the last few days lit a bonfire in front of the United States Embassy, painted anti-American slogans on the American Express office, and hurled gasoline bombs at two local affiliates of United States concerns, International Business Machines Corp. and Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company.

News men of various political and ideological camps throughout Italy are endorsing a state-

ment condemning the bombing raids on North Vietnam. Editors and writers of La Stampa of Turin, a newspaper owned by the Fiat Motor Company, are circulating the statement.

Some United States residents of Italy said that they are sensing a new coolness among their local acquaintances. An American was told by an old friend, a professor of English literature who has repeatedly visited the United States: "America during those terrible last few weeks when the B-52's were pounding Hanoi has shown us a face that we hadn't known to exist, and it deeply frightened and repelled us."

Italy made representations in Washington during the bombings. The Communist party here asserted that a result of this was a broad mobilization of public opinion in Italy.

#### Brandt's Silence Assailed

Special to The New York Times

BONN, Jan. 2—Chancellor Willy Brandt is coming under increasingly sharp criticism from European Social Democrats and Communists for not raising his voice against the recent intensive American bombing of North Vietnam

above the 20th Parallel.

Today the Federal executive board of West Germany's Young Socialists, the junior arm of his governing party, accused him of "hush-up tactics."

Mr. Brandt has also been criticized for his silence on Vietnam by Swedish Social Democrats and by the East German Communist leadership.

Privately Mr. Brandt has been quoted by colleagues as saying that he found the bombing policy of the Nixon Administration "disgusting and unfathomable," and his ministerial aide, Egon Bahr, is expected to say more on behalf of West Germany when he confers with American officials in Washington later this week.

So far as the public record is concerned, however, Mr. Brandt is understood to feel that no German head of Government has the moral right to condemn other countries as committing war crimes after what was done by Germans during the Hitler era. For this reason he has avoided using what authority he might command even as the latest winner of the Nobel Peace Prize.

Oslo Parties Ask Bombing End

OSLO, Norway, Jan. 2 (Reuters)—Norway's eight political parties issued a statement tonight calling for a complete and final end to all bombings in Vietnam, followed by a full cease-fire and the speedy signing of a peace agreement.

A spokesman said at a news conference tonight that the statement was addressed to all parties involved in the Vietnam war.

#### Danish Aid to Hanoi Proposed

COPENHAGEN, Denmark, Jan. 2 (Reuters)—The Danish Government today proposed to give special humanitarian aid totaling \$750,000 to North Vietnam.

Premier Anker Jorgensen said after a special Cabinet meeting that the aid was proposed because of the heavy need created by the recent American bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong.

The grant must first be approved by the Finance Committee of Parliament but it is expected to go through despite opposition objections.

WASHINGTON POST  
19 December 1972

Joseph Kraft

## Reknitting Ties With Europe; 'A More Deliberate Approach'

BRUSSELS—Europe "is a tortoise not a hare," a Foreign Office diplomat said at the end of the years of negotiation which finally resulted in the decision to admit Britain to the Common Market based here in Brussels.

Now that lesson has to be learned by Washington. For President Nixon's announced intention to reknit ties with the allies can only be realized if the United States deliberately comes off the hot pace developed for the doing of big deals with Russia and China.

The central fact here is that the builders of Europe have lost confidence. They no longer believe there is public enthusiasm for their projects to organize a unified state around the Common Market. Nor do they any longer have General de Gaulle to kick around as the source of all troubles.

INDEED, far from being engendered by arbitrary one-man actions, the mood of self-doubt has been nourished by popular decisions taken in the pure spirit of democracy. First there was the low turn-out last spring in the national referendum called by President Georges Pompidou to develop an expression of French public opinion in favor of British entry.

Then there was Norway's decision, by popular referendum last fall, not to join the Common Market. Now Sicco Manshold, the Dutch agricultural expert who is president of the Com-

mon Market's executive body, acknowledges there is probably no member country in which the European cause would win big in a popular referendum.

Lack of public support for European unity has, of course, not escaped the notice of the national political leaders. At their summit meeting in Paris last October, the nine heads of state in the expanded Common Market blocked out a timetable for creeping towards unity.

THEY PUT immediate stress on further economic and monetary unification. Only after more harmonization of daily life are they prepared to move towards common defense and foreign policies. Steps towards political unity are out of sight.

In these circumstances, the United States cannot suddenly turn to the Europeans and say: "Come on, let's get going on our mutual problems." What is needed is a far more deliberate approach.

Deeper cooperation with the Europeans in the on-going negotiations affecting their security is the first requirement. The Europeans have a right to be associated, for more than they are now, with the formulation of the American positions for the second round of the arms limitation talks now under way with the Russians in Geneva. Similarly with respect to the

upcoming round of talks with Moscow on mutual troop withdrawal from Europe.

A SECOND REQUIREMENT involves a new American trade bill. The Europeans have put trade first on their agenda of deals to do with Washington. The Nixon administration ought to reply in kind. That means prevailing upon Chairman Wilbur Mills of the House Ways and Means Committee to take up a new trade bill before he plunges into the almost endless business of tax reform.

After these steps are taken, it makes sense for President Nixon, sometime in February, to pay a round of visits here, and to London, Paris and Bonn. But European backs will only go up if the trip is purely a pageant of pomp and ceremony. Mr. Nixon needs to set forward the issues on which the United States wants European cooperation. He can come out loud and strong on the need for more European cooperation in defense, and in a joint policy on energy, and in a common approach to the absorption of Japanese exports.

The American case in all these matters seems to me very good. Whether, even with a maximum application of American patience and restraint, the Europeans will respond favorably is not so clear. Still the maximum effort seems worthwhile. For the United States cannot be comfortable in a world where the only available opposite numbers for the making of strategic and political decisions are Peking and Moscow.

NEW YORK TIMES  
30 December 72

## Sweden Asked Not to Send A New Ambassador to U.S.

By ROBERT H. PHELPS

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 29—The United States, irritated by a statement by President Olof Palme of Sweden comparing the bombing of North Vietnam to Nazi massacres of World War II, has asked Stockholm not to send a new ambassador to Washington.

The United States has not had an ambassador in Stockholm since August. The State Department ordered the American chargé d'affaires, John C. Guthrie, who is vacationing in the United States, not to return to Stockholm "at this time."

The American action does not constitute a trend in diplomatic relations with Sweden, since each country would continue to maintain an embassy in the other's capital. But the step does represent a strong diplomatic protest.

The present Swedish Ambassador, Hubert De Hesche, is scheduled to leave his post Jan. 8. The Swedish Embassy said tonight that he would leave on that date, but would not comment on the American action except to call it "unusual."

The request not to send a new envoy was made to Mr. De Besche last Saturday, when he was called in by the acting Secretary of State, U. Alexis Johnson.

Mr. Johnson delivered what the State Department has described as a strong protest to Mr. Palme's statement of Dec. 23 on the bombing.

Mr. de Besche told Mr. Johnson that the protest was based on distorted accounts and, on Sunday, gave a text of the complete statement to the State Department. According to the Swedish Embassy, it reads as follows:

"Things should be called by their proper name. What happens today in Vietnam is a form of torture. There can be no military motives for the bombings. Military spokesmen in Saigon have denied that there is any step-up of military activ-

ity on the part of the North Vietnamese. Nor could it be Vietnamese obstinacy at the negotiation table.

"Resistance against the October agreement in Paris comes primarily, as was pointed out by The New York Times, from President Thieu in Saigon. What is being done is that people are being tormented, that a nation is being tormented, to humiliate them to force them to submit to the language of force. That is why the bombings are an outrage.

"There are many of this kind in modern history. They are often connected with names—Guernica, Oradour, Babi Yar, Katyn, Lidice, Sharpeville, Treblinka. Violence has triumphed but the judgment of history has been hard on those who carried the responsibility. Now there is one more name to add to the list—Hanoi, Christmas, 1972."

Oradour, Babi Yar, Katyn, Lidice and Treblinka are places where atrocities were carried out during World War II, in each case but Katyn the killings were indisputably by the Nazis.

Mr. Palme has joined with the leaders of four opposition parties in Sweden in a campaign to get two million signatures for a petition calling on President Nixon to end the bombing of North Vietnam.

Mr. Palme irritated American officials, in February, 1968, when he marched in a demonstration against the Vietnam war with the North Vietnamese Ambassador to Moscow.

Later that year he joined in a demonstration against the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Sweden's granting of sanctuary to some 400 American deserters and draft dodgers is also a source of contention between the two countries.

### Palme Would Debate Nixon

Special to The New York Times

LONDON, Dec. 29—The Swedish Premier, Olof Palme, said tonight that he was ready at any time to have a public discussion with President Nixon on the "principles of democracy."

He made that statement in indicating regret that the United States has asked Sweden not to send a new Ambassador to Washington. Mr. Palme said diplomats, as civil servants, should be allowed to get on

with their jobs regardless of national political differences.

Mr. Palme's statement was relayed by a Swedish Foreign Ministry official who was asked, by telephone from London, to comment on the move by Washington.

Mr. Palme's Statement said: "The weapon of democracy is argument, discussion. Bombing is no argument. And you should not prevent civil servants from doing their jobs.

"I would like to have a public discussion with the President of the United States any time, any place, in any medium, on these principles of democracy."

### Europeans Protesting

LONDON, Dec. 29 (AP)—Anxiety is increasing among European governments over the United States bombing of North Vietnam, and there were mounting protests today at official level.

Some governments, including Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden, have officially condemned the raids.

A second group, including Belgium and Austria, have limited official declarations to expressions of concern, while a third group that includes Britain, France and West Germany has officially maintained silence in face of public demands for condemnation.

On a non-governmental level, the first direct action against the bombing reported in Western Europe appeared to be a boycott by longshoremen in Genoa, Italy, of all United States ships calling at the port. The ban was voted by the men without their leaders' authority.

The Italian Government said Foreign Minister Giuseppe Medici had been instructed to "renew his insistence for the bombing to be stopped and peace negotiations to be resumed."

In the Netherlands, Foreign Minister Norbert Schmelzer announced his Government's condemnation of the bombing yesterday with "a protest against this flagrant violation of the best American traditions."

All Norway's political parties agreed to join a Vietnam conference next week. The Government will discuss the raids at a Cabinet meeting Tuesday.

Denmark's Premier Anker Joergensen called an extraordinary Cabinet meeting to consider an appeal to the

United Nations to put pressure on the United States to stop the bombing.

Denmark's Foreign Minister, Knud B. Andersen, said it could only be hoped that "it will soon dawn up the U.S. Government that the Vietnam conflict cannot be settled through military means."

Finland's four major labor unions urged the United States to stop the bombing, while one declared its readiness to boycott American goods.

Belgium's acting Foreign Minister, Henri Fayat, told the United States Ambassador of "deep emotion" in Belgium over the toll of civilian dead.

The Austrian Government has expressed "serious concern."

In Paris the government's attitude seemed to be that some negotiations were being held there the French should observe strict neutrality.

"West Germany, there was no official reaction, but six members of Chancellor Willy Brandt's Social Democratic party compared the raids to Nazi bombing of civilians in the Spanish Civil War. They accused United States pilots of attacking open cities, hospitals and schools.

Karl-Hermann Flach, general secretary of the Free Democrats, the other member of the Coalition Government, said the United States should know that "it is not only destroying Vietnam with its carpet bombing but also damaging its world reputation among its friends."

### Australian Boycott Grows

SYDNEY, Australia, Dec. 29 (UPI)—Two more maritime unions joined the Australian Seamen's Union today in refusing to handle American ships in Australian ports as a protest against United States bombing of North Vietnam.

The ban will apply to ships flying the United States flag or American-owned and remain in effect until the bombing ceases.

### Flag Burned in Auckland

AUCKLAND, New Zealand, Dec. 29 (AP)—Demonstrators in Wellington today burned a United States flag that had been flying at half staff in tribute to former President Harry S. Truman.

THE WASHINGTON POST Sunday, Dec. 31, 1972

# Palme Says U.S. Rebuff Won't Halt Swedish Protest

From News Dispatches

STOCKHOLM, Dec. 30 —Prime Minister Olof Palme said today that President Nixon's decision not to accept a new Swedish ambassador to Washington would not stop him from criticizing the Indochina war.

"This type of reaction does not prevent us from continuing to express our opinion," Palme said. "By now we are accustomed to this sort of thing."

Palme, in fact, personally collected signatures among shoppers in a department store in Flen today for a nationwide appeal to President Nixon to halt the bombing of North Vietnam.

Palme and his wife Lisbeth gathered 1,100 signatures in less than an hour for the appeal. The petition urges the U.S. government to stop the bombing immediately.

Palme said the decision to halt the U.S. bombing for the New Year, however, represented a "satisfactory step in the right direction."

"I am persuaded," he said, "that the vast demonstration of world opinion against the bombing had a great importance in this decision."

The government also announced that Palme had sent a personal message to President Nixon on Christmas Eve appealing for an immediate halt to the bombings of Hanoi.

Palme's statement came after the State Department in Washington and the Swedish Foreign Ministry had confirmed that the Nixon administration had asked Sweden to delay the arrival in Washington of a new Swedish ambassador.

The State Department said this request as well as the recall earlier this week of the U. S. charge d'affaires in Stockholm were in protest against Palme's outspoken criticism of the re-

newed bombings of North Vietnam.

Sweden's Foreign Minister Krister Wickman said he was astonished by the American request.

Commenting on the Nixon administration's action, Wickman said, "My government does not use these methods. We believe in the principle of universality when it comes to diplomatic relations. I am astonished by the American moves. Sweden is not an enemy country."

Palme was supported by most of the other major party leaders, who said that Sweden should not change its mind because of pressure from Washington.

Only moderate Conservative Party leader Goesta Bohman expressed concern over the worsening relations, which he said were caused by "Palme's one-sided statement on Indochina in the course of many years."

"For many years I have warned Mr. Palme against his insulting choice of words when attacking the United States," said Bohman. "In my view, the step which the Americans have now taken is entirely a result of Mr. Palme's personal utterances."

Diplomats said the new crisis was touched off by Palme's statement the day before Christmas when he compared the bombing of Hanoi with Nazi atrocities during World War II.

Sweden's outgoing Washington Ambassador Hubert de Besche is due to leave Washington Jan. 8 to take up a new post as ambassador to Denmark.

Ingve Moeller, a 60-year-old Social Democratic newspaperman, has been picked as De Besche's successor.

He was scheduled to arrive in Washington at the end of January, but his departure will now be delayed for an undisclosed period of time.

Special correspondent Roland Huntford wrote the following analysis:

Palme's public statement on Dec. 23, in which he compared the American bombing to Nazi atrocities was merely the last straw for the United States in a long succession of differences with Sweden over Vietnam. By most diplomatic standards, the United States was almost compelled to act.

The latest contretemps is considered by American, as well as other, diplomats here as a deliberate provocation. Palme's comparison of U.S. conduct in Vietnam to Nazi atrocities, one said, was not comment but "libelous abuse."

It is an odd twist of fortune. Until about 10 years ago, there was no more pro-American country in Europe than Sweden. That changed after 1963, as the United States became involved in Vietnam.

Diplomatic observers suggested that as American difficulties increased in Vietnam, official Swedish attitudes became increasingly hostile. As far as the State Department is concerned, the watershed in Swedish-American relations was in the spring of 1968, when Palme, who studied at Kenyon College in Ohio and was then minister of education, marched with North Vietnamese and Vietcong representatives in an anti-American demonstration through the streets of Stockholm.

When Palme became prime minister, U.S. diplomats expected Sweden to take a more militant anti-American posture. Their expectations were fulfilled. At regular intervals, Palme or his foreign minister would attack the United States in public over Vietnam, while supporting Hanoi and the Vietcong.

The state-owned radio and television stations also acquired a marked anti-American bias, apparently with official approval. American dip-

lomats found none of this pleasant, but were prepared to grin and bear it.

Certain specific issues, however, generated a further deterioration in Swedish-American relations. Swedish treatment of U. S. deserters was one. It was not simply that they were allowed to stay—many countries have done the same without causing official American irritation—but they were received and treated in such a way that U.S. representatives were forced to interpret it as a deliberate insult at their government and country.

There was some irritation over this year's May Day rally of Palme's ruling Social Democratic Party and the closely related labor movement. It became virtually an anti-American demonstration and, since Cabinet ministers participated, it had the cachet of a semi-official function.

Moreover, Palme's failure to comment on President Nixon's visit to Peking earlier this year seems to have made some impression on American officials. It may have confirmed in some of them a belief that they are facing a deep-seated animosity.

When Palme took office, there was no American ambassador in Stockholm. The previous incumbent, William Heath, was recalled by President Johnson at the end of 1968. President Nixon deliberately left the post vacant until March 1970, when Jerome Holland, an academic, was appointed. Holland retired this summer, and the embassy has since been run by the No. 3 man, political counselor Arthur J. Olsen.

U.S. officials accept that a great deal of Palme's pro-Hanoi stance is explicable in terms of domestic politics. Past experience shows it has been a profitable vote-getter and there is a general election in less than a year. It is in this light, they say, that some of Palme's recent actions must be judged.

## Near East

THE ECONOMIST DECEMBER 23, 1972

### Greece and Turkey

## Neighbours in the pillory

The governments of Greece and Turkey, countries which belong to Nato and aspire to full membership of the European community, are both under attack for their policies of imprisoning people for their political views. This is nothing new for the Greek regime, which during its five and a half years' existence has faced bitter criticism for depriving the Greek people of many of their civil rights, and more subtle pressures from its western allies to liberalise its rule. But it is a new experience for the present Turkish government.

The campaign for the release of all political prisoners in Greece was launched in London on Tuesday by a committee of Greek exiles led by Lady Fleming and Mrs Helen Vlachos. Similar movements are being organised elsewhere in western Europe. Had the Greek prime minister, Mr George Papadopoulos, done what it was hoped he would do when he addressed the Greeks last Saturday, the committee would have had the ground cut from under its feet.

But Mr Papadopoulos's Christmas offering was a meagre morsel. There was no mention of an amnesty: his only tangible concession on prisoners was the release of nine men who had been exiled to distant villages by administrative decrees. Among them is Mr John Pasmazoglou, who negotiated Greece's association with the common market and was a strong critic of the regime's economic policies. The prime minister did, however, promise that some 250 prisoners held for political offences may now appeal to a higher military tribunal for a review of their sentences. This could mean that some who were given long terms of imprisonment in the regime's early days will have their sentences reduced.

Last weekend the Athens newspaper To Vima published a list of all these prisoners. Out of 255 convicted persons, 29 are serving life sentences, 111 sen-

tences of 10-25 years, and 115 terms of less than 10 years. A further 35 have temporarily been released on health grounds and 23 are still awaiting trial. Five foreigners (four Germans and an Italian woman) have been told they may apply for expulsion. The one man who will not be allowed to appeal is Alexander Panagoulis, the former army officer who was sentenced to death, afterwards commuted to life imprisonment, for desertion during a state of emergency and for attempting to assassinate Mr Papadopoulos. He has been held by the army in solitary confinement for four years. His younger brother, Stathis, was lured back to Greece last August and then arrested. No charges have been brought against him and nobody has been allowed to visit him since then. His family fear he is being subjected to the torture his brother is said to have suffered.

The committee working for the release of the Greek prisoners refuses to make any distinction between those convicted of crimes involving violence and those who have merely talked too much or protested too openly. It asserts that, since the Greeks have been deprived of political rights, all politically motivated acts, whether violent or not, are legitimate. This view is not shared by Amnesty International, which does not regard those who have been convicted for acts of violence, or for advocating violence, as true political prisoners.

It is Amnesty International which has drawn attention to the situation in Turkey—although it is still far from clear what the true position is. The Turkish government maintains that no more than 1,000 people are being held for what could be called political offences; other sources say the figure is nearer 12,000. Officially the parliamentary system continues to function in Turkey and new elections are due next October. But since March, 1971, military men have held a heavy stick over the government's head. Martial law is still in force in 11 provinces, all student organisations have been banned, the marxist-orientated Turkish Labour party has been outlawed and many of its leaders imprisoned, and

a number of writers, professors, journalists and left-wing intellectuals have been arrested.

Recently there have been allegations that the Turkish security forces have been adopting methods that were also alleged to have been used, at least until very recently, by the Greek military police to get information from detainees—beatings on the soles of the feet, electric shocks and sexual cruelty. A mission from Amnesty International, led by Mr Muir Hunter, QC, visited Turkey at the end of November and reported last week that it was convinced that the allegations were true. It was allowed to speak to only one of the 32 prisoners it had asked to see; the Turkish ministry of justice said it had no authority over the others, who were in military hands. The woman they did see, Mrs Necmi Demir, had not been harmed but she said she knew of others, including her husband, who had.

The Turkish government has been faced with a well-organised and ruthless campaign of urban terrorism aimed at overthrowing the structure of the state. There have been numerous acts of terrorism, including the murder of the Israeli consul in Istanbul, the killing of three Nato radar technicians (two British and one Canadian), the kidnapping of American servicemen and numerous bomb attacks and bank robberies. By comparison, the opposition to the military regime in Greece is mild; only one innocent person, a policeman, has been killed in bomb attacks.

The counter-measures in Turkey appear to be equally ruthless. The martial law commander in Istanbul has announced that 450 people are to be tried in connection with the Nato men's deaths. At the last meeting of the Council of Europe's political committee on December 13th the question of torture in Turkey was brought up. The Turkish foreign minister denied there was any truth in the allegations. The European Commission on Human Rights has not, as yet, been asked to investigate what is happening in Turkish jails. But the pressure is on.

WASHINGTON POST  
21 December 1972

## U.S. Embassy Blasted By Rockets in Beirut

From News Dispatches

BEIRUT, Dec. 20—Several rockets were fired at the U.S. embassy here tonight, causing "considerable" damage but no casualties.

Lebanese police sources said

"Vietnam" were reportedly found in a damaged car, from which the rockets apparently were fired, across the street from the embassy.

Two or three of the American-made anti-tank rockets exploded in the upper floors of the building, according to various accounts, and another unexploded rocket was reportedly found in the car.

Police said the rockets had been rigged to fire automatically with a timing device. The

car, which was severely damaged, had been reported stolen in Beirut several days ago.

The attack took place at 8:30 p.m. local time, well after most embassy personnel had left for the day.

WASHINGTON POST  
17 December 1972

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

## Greek Aid and Israeli Safety:

### Scuttling the Nixon Connection

HIDDEN in an unnoticed report to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is a revelation demolishing President Nixon's public rationale for military aid to the Greek military dictatorship: A frank admission from Israel's military high command that U.S. naval bases in Greece are not essential to Israeli security.

The report, submitted by Sen. Frank Church of Idaho following a trip to the Middle East, quotes "high military officials" in Israel as contradicting Mr. Nixon's linkage of U.S. military aid to Greece with Israel's safety. Nor was Church quoting bureaucratic underlings or street rumors: In Tel Aviv, he conferred with two of Israel's top generals.

Thus, Israel for the first time has conceded semiofficially that Greece, apprehensive about 60,000 Greek nationals in the Arab world, would never permit its naval bases to be used against Arab powers no matter what the form of government in Athens. Heretofore, the Israelis have refrained from admitting the obvious for fear of antagonizing the Nixon administration. They have broken this reticence because of a series of domestic American political maneuvers last summer.

The chain of events began July 17 when Sen. George McGovern, the new Democratic presidential nominee, wrote Greek exile leader Elias P. Demetracopolous in Washington promising, if elected, to halt all U.S. aid to the Greek dictatorship. The release of McGovern's letter July 22 generated an orchestrated Republican response based on this hoary political tactic: Tie an unpopular cause (the Greek dictators) to a popular one (Israel's

survival).

On NBC's "Meet the Press" July 23, Nixon intimate John B. Connally claimed eliminating Greek aid would destroy "the very foundation of any security . . . in the Middle East." On July 24, Sens. Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania, Senate minority leader, and Robert Dole of Kansas, Republican national chairman, delivered similar pronouncements.

On July 27, Mr. Nixon himself waded in. At one of his infrequent press conferences, the President brought up Greek aid, though no question was asked. "Without aid to Greece," he said, ". . . you have no viable policy to save Israel."

IN ATHENS, the colonels were apoplectic, fearful the Republican campaign barrage would undermine their relations with the Arabs. Greek newspapers, which had routinely received a wire service dispatch on Mr. Nixon's statement, were sent this frantic message from the government's Athens News Agency at 5:45 a.m., July 28: "To the editors: Please ignore cable from Washington concerning Nixon." The controlled Greek press obediently killed the story.

On Aug. 5, the Greek government officially repudiated Mr. Nixon by declaring, quite unmistakably, that Greek bases could never be used against the Arabs. Pressed by Athens to patch up Greek-Arab relations, the White House on Aug. 7 backed away from Mr. Nixon's remarks. Deputy Press Secretary Gerald Warren indicated that the President meant to say Greek bases would help all allies, not just Israel. That modification, intended to placate the Greeks, was ignored by

the U.S. press.

Nearly three weeks later, Sen. Church arrived in Israel to find officials irritated over being the shuttlecock in three-cornered political badminton between Greeks, Americans and Arabs. On Aug. 24, he visited Maj. Gen. Aharon Yariv, director of Israeli military intelligence. On Aug. 26, he visited Lt. Gen. David Lazar, chief of the Israeli general staff.

THE CONVERSATIONS were off the record. But in his September report to the Foreign Relations Committee, Church quoted "high military officials" as follows: "It was made clear that, contrary to a recent statement by President Nixon . . . the crucial factor for Israel is only the maintenance of a strong U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. They do not consider U.S. bases in Greece as essential to their security."

U.S. policy-makers were unaware of Church's report. But Church informed Demetracopolous of the Israeli military appraisal in an Oct. 30 letter. Fully appreciating its political importance, Demetracopolous traveled to Europe last month to brief top Greek exile leaders.

With the Israeli contradiction, Mr. Nixon is running out of reasons for continuing to support the Greek dictatorship. As we reported earlier, the Navy selected Greece for Sixth Fleet home ports without investigating alternative possibilities. Now, the Israeli military has ruined the argument, absurd from the start, that the Sixth Fleet can come to Israel's rescue only if based in Greece.

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NEW YORK TIMES

17 December 72

## Greece Rules Out Early Return To Representative Government

By JUAN de ONIS

Special to The New York Times

ATHENS, Dec. 16—Premier George Papadopoulos announced today the release of a few political prisoners, but ruled out any return in the near future to elected, representative government here.

The Premier, a retired army colonel who led the military takeover in 1967, also announced the lifting of martial law in the northern district of Salonika, but martial law remained in effect in this capital for the fifth straight year.

In an address from what used to be the parliament building, Mr. Papadopoulos

Greece as enjoying economic progress and internal security "that is a model for the world."

"If we are asked to bring back representative government, and at the same time allow the overthrow of all we have done because of the blackmail of a small group of people, we prefer to take the responsibility not to transfer power before time," the Greek Premier said.

Emphasizes Economics

Mr. Papadopoulos said that within the coming year this group would make its own

its views on Greece's political future, but he laid heavier emphasis on the need to assure higher rates of investment, combat inflation and broaden education.

He spoke of the need to reach an annual economic growth of 8 per cent, saying that Greece had to develop more rapidly than the rest of Europe before 1984, when Greece is scheduled to enter the European Common Market.

The speech of one hour and 15 minutes was to an audience of military chiefs, businessmen, university authorities and Government officials and contained no indication that a political shift was in view.

Mr. Papadopoulos said that Greece, a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, was a firm friend and supporter of the United States and West-

reciprocal respect from our ally," he said.

Greece has been excluded from the Council of Europe and the European Parliament because of charges that democratic government has been suppressed by Athens and because of reports of torture of political prisoners.

Mr. Papadopoulos's voice turned angry as he attacked "those who accuse us of holding on to power too long" and critics abroad who "accuse us as tyrants."

9 Prisoners To Be Freed

He then announced that nine persons who have been confined in remote villages as "security risks" would be "back with their families before these include Prof.

Ioannis Pasmazoglou, a deputy governor of the Bank of Greece until 1967 who negotiated Greece's entry into the European Common Market.

The Greek Premier said that five foreigners who have been sentenced by courts as "importers of revolution" would be allowed to appeal to a civil court for deportation.

Alas, 250 persons who have been sentenced by courts-martial without right to appeal for security and political crimes will have their cases reviewed by a military appeals court, Mr.

Papadopoulos said. But he added that he believed that in no country would bomb throwers be considered with leniency.

George Mavros, acting head of the Center Union party, which is outlawed along with four other political parties, said that the Premier's speech "shows that nothing has changed."

"What matters is not the number of people detained or released, but the fact that every citizen may be arrested at will without judicial warrant," he said.

WASHINGTON POST  
19 December 1972

### Israeli Arabs Offered Money to Emigrate

JERUSALEM, Dec. 18 (AP)—Rabbi Meir Kahane's Jewish Defense League launched a campaign today to prod Arabs in Israel and Israeli-occupied territories to emigrate voluntarily with money collected by the JDL.

Kahane said he hoped to raise \$50 million to pay the

Arabs to leave. He said that, otherwise, even if Israel and the Arab governments reached a peace settlement, the country could turn into another Northern Ireland, referring to the three years of Protestant-Roman Catholic strife there.

Kahane began the campaign with 150 letters to Arabs in major towns on the West Bank of Jordan and plans to send another 100 letters a week.

*The Daily Telegraph, Friday, December 15, 1972*

JOHN BULLOCH, in Istanbul, on Turkey's difficulties in evolving towards democracy

## The Turks & the Generals

TELEVISION viewers in Turkey are used to odd standards of news selection. Exhortations to obey the directions of the traffic police may well precede items of world interest. But even by Turkish standards, a broadcast this week seemed unusual.

Read in emotionless tones, it was a statement from "the Command Council of the Armed Forces", a body unknown to the Turkish Constitution, and said the Army "could not be responsible for the grave consequences" if Parliament passed a Bill it was considering. At the same time, of course, the Army affirmed its belief in democracy.

This new intervention brought Turkey one step nearer the outright military dictatorship which is just around the corner. And it showed once more how fragile is the veneer of democracy in this sprawling State trying so hard to catch up with the Europe it aspires to join.

The affair started in March last year. Officers from the Army, Navy and Air Force presented themselves at the radio, television and news agency offices and politely asked that a statement from the Forces should be published. Heavily armed troops sitting in vehicles around the various offices helped to persuade those responsible to do as the officers asked.

The result was that the then Prime Minister, Mr Demirel, was forced to resign. Since then the heavy hand of the Army has made itself felt in every sphere. A General now runs the television service, another is the head of the national airline, and away from the main centres of Ankara or Istanbul it is the local military commander who holds the real power.

It was a wave of lawlessness which impelled the Army to move: bombings, bank raids, kidnappings and assassinations in every part of the country, the work of a small band of fanatics bent on destroying all government. And the

Demirel régime, according to the Army, was too weak to curb it.

Certainly the two administrations which have held power since then have succeeded very well in halting the anarchy. The price has perhaps been a little high: almost 4,000 people in prison, martial law in 11 provinces, university life disrupted, freedom of speech denied. The dawn knock on the door, the swift and silent disappearance of people who return months later broken and afraid, are realities in Turkey today.

But anarchy is curbed for the moment — Turkish officials point proudly to the fact that the last "incidents" were more than a month ago, when a plane was hijacked to Sofia and a bomb was sent to an American office. But in other fields the Army was less successful in getting its way. For not only did the March "coup by memorandum" demand a return of law and order, it was also supposed to lead to a number of reforms, mainly in the fields of agriculture and taxation.

The Generals told Parliament to pass the necessary Bills, and settled back to await results. Yet after almost two years, not one of the reforms demanded has been put into effect. With the shadow of a gun at their backs, the members of the National Assembly have still spent their time in party squabbles, filibusters, and all the other diversions dear to the hearts of Parliamentarians the world over. On only one thing have they managed to agree: that members of the Democratic party ousted in a previous military coup in 1960 should have their constitutional rights restored.

It was this decision, taking precedence over the reforms everyone acknowledges are urgently needed, which prompted this week's intervention by the military.

There seems no doubt that Mr Demirel, the man dismissed in March last year as incompetent, will be elected by a thumping

majority when—and if—elections are held a year from now. In the labyrinth of Turkish politics, next year's General Election depends a great deal on the Presidential election due to be held in March. President Sunay has said many times that he does not wish to have his term extended for a further period, so it looks as if there will be a real contest on this occasion. The President is elected by the two Houses of Parliament, the Assembly and the Senate, and it has become traditional for the army to provide an agreed candidate.

### Army rivalry

Gen. Gurler, present Chief of Staff and the most powerful man in the country, would probably like to be President if he could be sure of continuing to exercise real power through loyal and acquiescent subordinates. But if he took over as President, he would be succeeded by Gen. Samih Sancar, the present Commander of Land Forces who is the first of a new breed of senior military men — professionals who are not committed to the idea of the Army as the guardian of Ataturk's revolution as Gurler and his contemporaries see themselves.

Gen. Sancar and his ally Gen. Turan, are due to be retired in August if they are not promoted, so there is some inducement for Gen. Gurler to remain in his present post, if only as a barrier to further promotion for his rivals.

Turkey, the bridge between Asia and Europe, with its culture rooted in the Orient and its future committed to the West, has to establish itself as part of Europe. It is a member of Nato and an associate member of the European Economic Community. But in the mind of every thinking Turk there is a lurking feeling that his country has still not been fully accepted as part of the West. It is for this reason that the meeting of the Council of Europe, at which Turkish membership is in question, is of particular

importance.

Unlike the Greeks, who have hugged off their expulsion, the Turks would take it as a crisis if they were drummed out. To be cast out into the limbo between East and West would not persuade them to mend their method of administering justice, but would rather drive them to further extremes.

For Turkey today is at one of those decisive moments which creep up on all nations. Economically, the prospect is fair: wage-price inflation is being contained, secondary industries are being developed, and the drift from the land is being halted. But the kind of country Turkey will be in 10 or 20 years has to be decided.

If the Generals have their way it will be a rigid autocracy, governing through a sham Parliamentary democracy. If the politicians triumph, which seems increasingly unlikely, there will be a system in which every group is represented by its own party, with the few haves exercising much more power

than the many have-nots. But if the Turkish people have their way, the country seems bound to emerge as a Right-of-Centre democracy.

That is an outcome most people would like to see and, paradoxically, it is one of the relatively Left-wing organisations, the Turkish Confederation of Trade Unions, which is exercising the greatest influence to this end. The union secretary, a tough and brave man, has given a warning that all the workers will go on strike, and more important, workers abroad will refuse to remit any part of their earnings, if the Army moves to take overt control. Senior officers privately admit that it is this threat from the unions which gives them real pause.

This hard-won period of grace may be just enough to save the country's democratic institutions. Mr Demirel's Justice party, a strange hybrid which derives its support both from the peasants and from the rich landowners — some still own whole villages —

will certainly win the next election, and because of its populist base, will govern with moderation if allowed to do so. But Mr Bulent Ecevit's Republican People's party, a Left-wing group by Turkish standards though it seems very moderate to a British eye, is fast gaining ground.

If the Turkish Army allows Mr Ecevit to continue, the wild extremism of such bodies as the Turkish People's Liberation Army may well be diverted into acceptable channels.

The people who will decide Turkey's future do not want a new Ataturk, still less a Gen Guler: they want a moderate party which will foster development and govern with justice.

The chances of such a party being allowed to rule are increasingly slim. But if Europe turns its back on Turkey, then it will be ensuring the continuance of the very form of Government it would be attempting to condemn.

HINDUSTAN TIMES  
13 December 1972

## Enough heat, little light on CIA

Hindustan Times Correspondent

NEW DELHI, Dec. 12 — The 3-1/2-hour debate in the Lok Sabha today on the CIA generated enough heat but shed little light on what anti-national activities the American intelligence has been engaged in.

Curiously, Mr K. C. Pant, Minister of State for Home Affairs, in his reply, did not mention the CIA by name but referred generally to the financial assistance "received from foreign agencies" by certain social, economic and political institutions in the country.

Earlier, Opposition speakers (except the Swatantra) and the Congress benches spoke bitterly against the CIA for having indulged in subversive activities in Ceylon, Indonesia, Ghana and some Latin American countries, and quoted incriminating passages from books and magazines about the CIA. But they invariably turned to the Minister for a precise reply on the activities of the CIA which had put the country's security in jeopardy.

In a bantering and hard-hitting speech, Mr P. H. Mody (Sw.) said the CIA had been paraded as a monster subverting the country's interest. The House had been told what it was doing in other countries. "But we do not know what it is doing in India. What a tragedy!"

Only three persons—Mr Pant, who would reply but not reveal, the President of the Indian National Congress and the Prime Minister—knew what the CIA was doing in India, Mr Mody said.

It was "a sanctimonious humbug" to say that the Prime Minister, Mrs Indira Gandhi, deserved congratulations for having warned the nation against the CIA's stepped-up activities. "Why warn us? Warn yourself (the Government). If the CIA has to get in-

formation it will not approach the Swatantra Party, but it will get it from Mr Pant, Mrs Gandhi and officers of the Government. The Government can alone supply what the CIA wants."

Mr Pant said that all countries had their intelligence services. They would be living in a world of self-delusion if they thought that countries would not have intelligence networks in various parts of the world. But it was one thing to collect information from various countries, about which there could be no objection, and a different and serious matter to indulge in subversion and interference in the internal affairs of countries in the guise of collecting intelligence.

While India desired to have friendly relations with all countries, it could not permit foreign intelligence services "to corrode our values and cultural life." Mr Pant said that since the liberation of Bangladesh, foreign intelligence agencies had stepped up their activities.

Mr Pant said that on a demand from all sections of the House the Intelligence Bureau of the Home Ministry conducted a probe some time ago. This revealed that though the precise quantum of financial assistance from foreign agencies by certain social, economic and political institutions could not be ascertained, the assistance had been "selective and not a small amount to be ignored."

Mr Pant declined to disclose the findings of the Intelligence Bureau inquiry on the ground that the intelligence Bureau had to depend on "secret sources of information" which could not be made public.

### Exchange Bill

The Government was aware, he said, that the foreign agencies had been trying to influence the nation's social, cultural and educational life through indirect assistance. Such assistance came in the shape of large commissions on imported books, high advertisement rates, etc. The Government, he disclosed, had

created special cells to watch the inflow of foreign money and take appropriate corrective measures. The Foreign Exchange Regulations Bill, now before a Joint Select Committee, was also aimed at curbing the inflow of foreign money.

Guidelines were being prepared directing the work of foreign scholars who come to India on various research and academic exchange programmes. They would not be permitted to do research on sensitive subjects like defence and security. But the Government would nevertheless welcome "genuine scholars" from other countries.

Mr Pant disclosed that the Bill on foreign money was in a "drafting stage" and it would be introduced in Parliament "very shortly". While the interests of bonafide users of foreign money would be protected, Mr Pant declared there would be considerable restrictions on parliamentary, educational, social and cultural bodies in order to prevent them from using such money for questionable purposes. The Government had set up the Council of Social Sciences Research to reduce the dependence of Indian research institutions on foreign money, Mr Pant said.

Mr Mody alleged that the Government had taken the help of foreign intelligence services when it needed them. But when it did not want them it was using them to justify its failures and to attack the Opposition.

Mr Mody said that the Indian society was less open than the American. He asked why this country had failed to produce a Jack Anderson to write books on RAW and the CBI. The Swatantra leader said that the Government had found during an inquiry that Russian money had been given to seven political parties "excluding my party". Mr Mody's charge that 175 members of Parliament were on the pay rolls of Russia was described by Mr Pant as an incorrect statement which should not have come from a responsible member of Parliament.

### Favourite place

Initiating the discussion, Mr Indrajit Gupta (CPI) said educational institutions had become the CIA's favourite hunting ground, while the bureaucracy was a "honeycomb" fill-

ed with its agents. He demanded a thorough enquiry into the use of "the undisclosed amount of PL-480 funds".

Mr Vayalar Ravi (Cong.) asked all political parties to co-operate with the Government in curbing the CIA menace and not to ridicule the Prime Minister when she asked the country to be vigilant against CIA activities.

Mr Samar Guha (Socialist) asked the Government to pass a Bill which among other things would stop embassies from circulating propaganda material in this country as well as extending invitations to journalists, politicians and others to visit their country with a view to influencing Indian life and politics.

Mr C. M. Stephen (Cong.) disputed Mr Guha's plea that the "CIA bogey" had been raised by the Government to divert the attention of the people from such vital issues as unemployment, rising prices and food scarcity.

Mr Jyotirmoy Bose (CPM) said the Government was to be blamed for the increasing CIA activities because it had extended many facilities to the United States and got help from it in return. He alleged that the Border Security Force had received training in jungle warfare in Vietnam under the aegis of the CIA. (Mr Pant described this allegation as "fantastic nonsense".) U.S. B-52 planes had been secretly allowed to use Indian airfields to photograph strategic points in China. He asked the Government to move that it was not "a disfavoured Government of the CIA".

Mr Bose mentioned the names of several educational institutions, including the Delhi School of Economics, which had harboured CIA agents.

Mr Raj Bahadur, Union Minister for Parliamentary Affairs, clashed with Mr Bose when the latter quoted the statement of a Jan Sauch member of the Rajasthan Assembly which alleged that Mr Raj Bahadur had used CIA funds in his 1971 election campaign for his Lok Sabha seat. Mr Raj Bahadur said that the Rajasthan MLA should prove his allegation or resign from the Assembly. Alternatively, Mr Raj Bahadur was prepared to resign from the Government and the Lok Sabha.

Mr Vishwanathan (DMK) wanted the Government to pass a Bill making espionage and treason a serious crime.



LOS ANGELES TIMES  
15 December 1972

## Algerians Keep Tight Rein on U.S. Hijackers

### Seven Find Country Unpleasant Refuge; Americans Not Allowed to Leave Capital

ALGIERS (AP) — Seven Americans who hijacked two airliners in the United States and forced them to fly here last summer are finding that Algeria is not a pleasant refuge.

Taken under the protective wing of Eldridge Cleaver, former leader of the Black Panther Party, they have been kept muzzled and restrained by the Algerian government.

The hijackers are not prisoners but the government does not allow them to move out of the capital.

"The government has no enthusiasm for them or for whatever cause they think they are upholding," said one source close to the situation.

President Houari Boumedienne prides himself on being a revolutionary Socialist who gives a helping hand to liberation movements and victims of political oppression. He allowed Cleaver to open a Black Panther office here in 1970.

#### Returned Money

The hijackers apparently had no political motives and they extorted \$1.5 million from Western and Delta airlines in the two incidents. Boumedienne returned the money and the planes, but has not responded to extradition requests from the United States, nor has he put the hijackers on trial in an Algerian court.

"The Algerians don't want to seem to be prosecuting blacks on behalf of Washington," said one source.

But the treatment of the hijackers has been far from relaxed. Boumedienne has not replied to their demand for official political asylum.

Underlying the Algerian mood is the possibility of improved relations with the United States after a Vietnam peace pact.

There is speculation that negotiations between the United States and Cuba for an antihijacking agreement might prompt Algeria to openly declare its opposition to skyjacking for ransom.

Those who first flew here last summer were William Holder, a 23-year-old Vietnam deserter from Oakland, Calif., who claims he is a member of the Panthers, and his white girl friend, Catherine Kerkow, 20, formerly of Coos Bay, Ore. They forced a Western Airlines jet to fly here June 3 after collecting \$500,000 in ransom.

On Aug. 1, a "hijacking family" arrived on a Delta DC-8 after pirating it over Florida and extorting \$1 million. The suspects are George Wright, 20; George Brown, 28; Joyce Tillerson, 21; Melvin McNair, 24, and his wife, Jean, 25. All are from Detroit. They took three small children along.

The FBI said Wright escaped in 1970 from state prison at Leesburg, N.J., where he was serving time for murder. Brown, who was held for armed robbery, escaped from the same prison at the same time.

Holder announced here in September that he was the new leader of the "international section" of the Black Panthers, a job Cleaver formerly held.

#### Live in Suburb

The "hijacking family" lives somewhere in the Pointe Pescade suburb five miles west of the city.

Officials of Algeria's state party, the National Liberation Front, refuse to disclose where they are or what they are doing. The party reportedly gives them a meager subsidy.

The family declined, through Cleaver, to be interviewed.

"They don't see where it would do them any good to meet the press," Cleaver said.

Holder also doesn't want to see newsmen, Cleaver said in a telephone conversation. Asked about Holder's alleged Panther connections, Cleaver said: "This is something that concerns him and since he doesn't want to talk about it, I won't."

Cleaver jumped \$50,000

bail in 1963 and made his way to Algeria when his parole was revoked on a conviction for attempted murder in a shootout between Panthers and Oakland police. He refused to discuss his personal plans.

Asked what had become of his announced intentions to return to the United States to lead a battle for liberation, he replied:

"It's not something I would want anyone to print anything about. It's private information. My legal situation has not changed so there is nothing to talk about."

Cleaver and the hijackers provoked Boumedienne's displeasure by publicizing open letters to the president asking him to give them back the money they had extorted.

Cleaver further embarrassed the Algerians by demanding that Boumedienne turn over \$1 million in hijacking funds to the Palestinian guerrilla movement. Without giving a reason, Boumedienne declined.

While supporting the Palestinian guerrilla

movement, Algeria has not specifically approved of the Palestinians' multiple hijackings. It has, however, said they should be excused because their actions were the result of desperation.

Algeria has been tough with its own hijackers. Three Algerians who diverted an Algerian plane to Yugoslavia in August, 1970, were returned by the Yugoslavs. Two went to prison for 12 years and the third drew six years.

# Western Hemisphere

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

16 December 1972

## The Kremlin and Señor Allende

The other day in this space we urged Washington to be slow and careful about doing those things which might unnecessarily alienate the Allende government in Chile and drive it into the arms of Moscow. We noted that some of Chile's economic troubles date from a long time before the present regime and are not all due to what we regard as serious mistakes on the part of the Allende government.

Now we would like to turn to the other side of that particular problem and urge Moscow to be equally slow and cautious about taking advantage of the present economic ills of Chile and of the rising suspicions in the relationship between Chile and Washington.

A great deal is at stake in the triangular relationship which now exists between Moscow, Washington, and the government of Chile. Here, more clearly than anywhere else, is the question whether the "cold war" really is over and whether Moscow and Washington can enter into a true "detente."

In a condition of true detente Chile would be free to go Marxist in a free election, as it has, but also be free at some subsequent election to return to a non-Marxist form of government.

Washington has entered into a novel experiment in keeping hands off while Chile has its experiment in Marxism. But that hands-off policy is based on the assumption that nothing will happen during the experiment to freeze Chile into Russia's political and military orbit. If the men in Moscow were to take advantage of Chile's present condition as it did in the case of Cuba, and draw Chile into the Warsaw Pact, and then apply the "Brezhnev doctrine" — we would be right back in the "cold war."

The Brezhnev doctrine is a one-way street. It preaches that whoever once goes Marxist must forever be Marxist. A true detente would mean that small countries living between the United States and Russia would be free to opt at any time for whichever form of social

and economic order they may at that moment prefer. They should be free to shop around.

Washington has twice allowed such shopping around within its own natural "sphere of influence," which Latin America plainly is. It tolerated Castroism in Cuba. The results were anything but reassuring. It took a mobilization of the land, sea, and air forces of the United States and full-scale preparations for an invasion of Cuba to make Moscow realize that it must not use Cuba as a strategic weapons base against the United States.

Moscow did "get the message" over Cuba. But it is most important that it remember the message. Washington can allow Chile to choose its own economic and social way of life, provided that does not mean a permanent Russian military establishment in Chile.

Someday, if detente comes and matures, there will be freedom of movement for all small countries. Czechoslovakia and Poland should be as free to throw off Marxism as Chile is now to accept it. We have no doubt that Poles and Czechs would do so, instantly, were they free to make the choice.

But Washington cannot accept a situation in which freedom exists only to go Marxist. Freedom must be a two-way street.

Moscow claims to want a detente with the West. It is pushing for a new and easier relationship with the United States and with Western Europe. Such an improved relationship is certainly desirable, if it is to be fair, and fairly balanced. But it will work and can come into being, only if and when the Russians can give as much as they expect — and recognize that other people have a right to other beliefs.

Chile is an immediate test of whether Moscow thinks it can have a hunting license in the Americas while clinging possessively to Eastern Europe. We urge Moscow to be careful to avoid spoiling detente by foolish behavior toward Chile.

WASHINGTON STAR

21 December 1972

## U.S. Presses Bolivia On Jailed Ex-Nun

The State Department said today it has called in Bolivia's charge d'affaires here to demand consular access to Mary Elizabeth Harding, who has been in jail in Bolivia on a charge of revolutionary activity.

At the same time, the U.S. charge d'affaires in La Paz has sought a meeting with the Bolivian foreign minister to relay the same demand to Bolivian authorities in the case of the former Maryknoll sister from Fairhaven, Mass.

These developments came after several members of Congress, including Sen. Edward M. Kennedy, D-Mass., made pointed inquiries to the State Department about the conditions of Miss Harding's imprisonment since Dec. 5. Reports from La Paz indicate that Miss Harding's face shows signs of a black eye, that she is being held without counsel and that the American consul has only been able to see Miss

Harding once since her arrest.

The Bolivian government had indicated last week that it intended to deport Miss Harding but this has not happened. It is believed the Bolivians are holding Miss Harding in an attempt to discover the names of some of her associations in the Army of National Liberation (ELN) an extreme leftist group in which she allegedly has admitted membership.

ship.

Miss Harding was working in the Bolivian-U.S. B-National Center, a USIS-sponsored library and teaching service in La Paz when police seized her. From all reports, Miss Har-

ding is an outspoken critic of the right-wing, pro-U.S. military government of Bolivia. But her plight, including reports that she has been beaten during interrogation, has aroused exceptional interest in her case in Washington.

WASHINGTON POST  
26 December 1972

## *A Good Second Term Start With Latin America*

The administration's decision to seek from Congress the full \$1 billion over three years pledged to the key soft-loan branch of the Inter-American Development Bank is a major initiative boding well for a more positive Latin policy in Mr. Nixon's second term than was evident in his first. The easy thing, popular at least with some aid-weary Congressmen and with those accepting John Connally's view that the United States has no Latin friends anyway, would be to tell the Latins that, gee, fellows, we'd like to deliver the money but Congress won't cough it up. Instead, reportedly at the determination of Treasury Secretary Shultz, the United States is taking the technical steps necessary to keep the soft-loan branch open and to trigger release to it of contributions offered by the better-off Latins. The administration has further accepted the responsibility of doing the difficult political work necessary to get the balance of the \$1 billion actually appropriated by Congress.

Latins are often no more sensitive to the complications and limitations of the American political process than Americans are to theirs. But such complications are no less real for being unacknowledged south of the border. Part of the hangup on the \$1 billion pledge arose from an accident of sorts; money for the Bank came in a bill including a military aid item on which the Senate and the House could not agree, and as a result a continuing resolution providing funds at minimal levels for all items in the bill was the only way out. A larger part of the hangup arose, and may arise again, from congressional reluctance to surrender to a multilateral institution (of which the United States is necessarily only one member) and to a multi-year process (which development lending necessarily is) the degree of tight annual control that Congress likes to exercise over items in the domestic budget.

The way to crack this nut, if there is a satisfactory

way, is by a certain quality and continuity of Executive consultation with Congress. To say that such consultation has not been a hallmark of the Nixon Presidency is surely no understatement. On the other side, we have sympathy for any administration required to deal, as every administration is, with some of the more arbitrary figures on the Hill. Latins may not appreciate that to a considerable extent their development hinges on Mr. Nixon's particular style of dealing with the Congress, and on Mr. Otto Passman's particular style of dealing with the President. But that's political reality.

So the politics is important. The development which the money will presumably help stimulate is important. And, finally, the diplomacy is important, too. Until now, Mr. Nixon has been in the inconsistent position of claiming in effect that the United States has a special interest in Latin America and looking suspiciously at changes made there under other than traditional or American auspices, while at the same time falling to accept the special obligations which a claim of special interest mandates. This general attitude has been at the core of Latin and American grumbling over Mr. Nixon's first-term Latin policy, as much as any of his specific acts.

Now, with a decision to proceed in the soft-loan funds for the region's own development bank, with a declared interest in focusing more Executive energies on shaping new ties with Latin America, and with certain other favorable omens, Mr. Nixon stands to do a good bit better by the hemisphere. We would not at all begrudge him a second-term ambition to visit Latin America and to receive there a reception wiping out the memory of the rocks and jeers hurled at him on his famous earlier hemispheric tour as Vice President nearly two decades ago.

WASHINGTON STAR  
13 December 1972

CARL T. ROWAN

## *The Views of a Genuine Latin Revolutionary*

CARACAS — Most readers of this column will never have heard of Teodoro Petkoff, even though he is something of a legend, both to this country's angry leftists and to its counter-emergency forces.

But any Yankee who cares about the political future of the hemisphere had better soon know more about Petkoff and his thousands of compatriots in Latin America.

Petkoff is a genuine Latin revolutionary (the son of a Bulgarian Communist who migrated to Venezuela in 1927

after the Bulgarian revolution failed) who helped to overthrow the dictatorship of Perez Jimenez in 1958 and subsequently failed to bring down the democratic governments of Romulo Betancourt and Raoul Leoni. In the process, he has organized urban and rural guerrilla insurrections that spread terror across this land.

Petkoff escaped from the seventh-floor prison ward of the military hospital here by sliding down a nylon cord. Four years later (1967) he escaped the San Carlos army

fortress in downtown Caracas by digging a tunnel.

Around these escapades, he spent years working for the Communist party, months in the mountains leading guerrilla units, many long periods in jail — and, finally, months of attacking the Soviet Union for the invasion of Czechoslovakia, an event which led to Petkoff's breaking with the party and starting the Movement to Socialism.

Almost incredibly, Teodoro Petkoff walks the streets of Venezuela as freely as most men these days, still preach-

ing revolution, still yearning for the day when he can bury the oligarchy and its Yankee co-conspirators, as he puts it, and give Venezuela to the masses who grovel in the wretched barrios (shums) which scar the verdant hillsides.

This 30-year-old insurrectionist's every sentence inspires the kind of fear of tomorrow that makes the tiny ruling class in Latin America more determined to cling ruthlessly to every advantage, every iota of power, lest

they be swept away in some moment of tenderness or largesse.

Asked why he gave up his gun and turned to the political process, Petkoff says bluntly: "We were defeated, militarily and politically. The spirit of the masses turned against us and it became just a private war between the government and the Communists. For a revolution, you must have the people."

Petkoff says he and his "Socialist" colleagues are using two techniques to educate and win the masses for the coming revolution.

First, he says, "this is an

explosive country. It is full of social and class conflicts, labor conflict, student conflicts, middle-class unhappiness. We are showing the people how one group's grievances are related to another's and how everyone's misery flows out of capitalism.

"Our second technique," Petkoff continued, "is to face the fact that we cannot turn our backs on the political process. We are participating in the elections because we need the exposure. After six months of campaigning our candidate had 12 percent of the voters. In its best moment in 1958 the Communist

party of Venezuela got only 6 percent of the vote. Never has there been such a wide Socialist movement in this country."

I reminded Petkoff that many people think he is dreaming—that he could never wrest control with his political movement. "If you are wrong, might you revert to armed struggle?" I asked.

"We are not married to elections, as we were not married to armed struggle," the muscular insurrectionist replied. "It is not possible for a revolutionary movement to discard or disavow any means

of fighting.

"Abe Lincoln once was defending a man who had shot a dog. The prosecutor demanded, 'Why didn't you hit the dog with a stick?' Lincoln jumped up and demanded, 'Why didn't the dog bite my client with its tail?'"

"More violence is not up to us, but to the exploiters here. If they bite us with the mouth, we will go back to the gun."

As I shall show later, a lot of people think Teodoro Petkoff is more dangerous politicking in Caracas than carrying a gun in the mountains.

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST Wednesday, Jan. 3, 1973

## Publicity Undermines Dictators

By Jack Anderson

To hide its dealings with dictators, the U.S. government customarily sweeps the embarrassing details under the secrecy stamp.

But the government has now admitted, in at least one case, that publicity was the best policy. The admission, of course, was classified "Secret."

The case involves Paraguay's Dictator Alfredo Stroessner, who has been drawing around \$11 million a year from the U.S. taxpayers. Apparently, this hasn't been enough to keep his generals in starched uniforms and other essentials. To supplement this income, he has parceled out smuggling franchises to his associates, who are plugged into the veins of America's street addicts.

Stroessner's smuggling operations have been no secret to our longtime Ambassador to Paraguay, Raymond Ylitalo. The details have also been known to the Central Intelligence Agency and the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs.

The taxpayers who help subsidize Stroessner were kept in the dark, however, until we published excerpts from a secret CIA report last April 22. While the report declared that the dictator "is willing to condone . . . smuggling of everything from watches to whiskey," it also added: "There

are strong indications that President Stroessner is opposed to the (narcotics) trade and is willing to take action."

We noted, nevertheless, that the CIA described his tight little dictatorship as "the Heroin Crossroads of South America," that some of his most trusted aides allegedly were deep in the narcotics traffic and that he had refused to extradite the notorious, French-born heroin kingpin, Auguste Ricord, to the U.S. to face drug charges.

Our column, widely quoted throughout Latin America, upset Stroessner. He sent word to us through his Ambassador to Washington, Dr. Roque Avilla, that he was surprised at the allegations and asked for the names of those behind Paraguay's drug trade.

### Culprits Named

We supplied Avilla with names and details implicating a dozen of Stroessner's closest associates, including his trusted chief of investigative police, Pastor Coronel.

We also continued to raise questions about Ricord, known in narcotics circles as "El Commandante," whom Stroessner had ensconced in a colorful, comfortable jail cell with a private bath and a nearby telephone where he could keep in touch with his drug business.

At one point, a State De-

partment official called us to warn that if we wrote about Ricord, it could upset the delicate negotiations and prevent his return to the U.S.

We contended that publicity would abet not prevent Ricord's extradition and that, in any case, the public was entitled to know what was happening. So we went ahead with our stories. Other newsmen also wrote about the "Paraguayan Connection," as Ricord was labeled.

The final result: Ricord was extradited to the U.S., where he was convicted. He now faces a long prison term. Ambassador Ylitalo was sacked, and Paraguay appears to be trying to stem the dope traffic.

Belatedly, the General Accounting Office, in a report on world drug trafficking, has given the press the credit for this turnabout.

"The American Embassy," states the GAO study, "has reported that the Government of Paraguay's concern about illicit international trafficking has increased recently because of unfavorable press reports about Paraguay's role as a smuggling center."

"Publicity regarding U.S. efforts to extradite (Ricord) has also increased the Government of Paraguay's concern . . . The fear of adverse publicity . . . has caused Paraguay to take some steps to control narcotics."

The embassy messages giving

WASHINGTON STAR  
15 December 1972

CARL T. ROWAN

## Allende Strums Raw Nerve of Latin America

CARACAS — It would be a colossal error for Americans to shrug off, or dismiss with anger, the attacks in the United Nations by Chilean president Salvador Allende.

A lot more than the rantings of a Marxist was involved when Allende accused giant American corporations of trying to sabotage his regime, wreck Chile economically and push his country to civil war.

You move through Latin America these days and see the outpourings of new nationalism, even in conservative, anti-Communist military governments, and you know that Allende was strumming on one of the rawest nerves in this part of the world.

The multinational corporation is being assailed everywhere by students, by leftist leaders, by local businessmen (who resent the competition) as the cutting edge of "American imperialism."

It seems inevitable that the cries are going to grow louder and that the nationalizations, expropriations and property seizures of the last few years in Chile and Peru are only the beginning of wider troubles for American firms, especially those extracting minerals and other raw resources.

Some firms have long anticipated the kind of hostility manifested by Allende, so they

moved to give their operations at least a Latin American facade. But this has served only to intensify the protests.

If these firms are not new, what is new is the leftist strategy of going after the wealthy families in Latin America which provide both a front and protection for the multinational corporations.

Teodoro Petkoff, the former Communist guerrilla who put down his gun to wage a political fight for a Socialist society, claims that wealth from oil is what has opened Venezuelan eyes to the real enemy.

"Before oil, we always felt the leftist fight was against the United States," he told me. "We didn't know we had classes. We now see that oil developed an imperialist class here working in concert with American imperialists. If we did not have these fat-cats here, the U.S. imperialists could not operate as effectively. We must attack our own anti-Venezuelan capitalism if we want anti-imperialism to mean anything concrete."

Petkoff says that "in leftist mythology in Latin America the most radical thing you can say is 'expropriate American property.' But we know that the first step is to expropriate our own capitalism. We must take the television channels, oil, cement, textiles, metal-

lurgical industries away from our super-millionaires and create a wide range of social property in this country."

Petkoff, like Allende, is a devout Marxist, but no North American ought to assume that his theories lack a following among non-Communists. In Argentina last August 140 priests from 32 dioceses met to deplore "the subjugation of the people's majorities to a privileged minority and the surrender to foreign domination." These priests are advocating "the taking of power by the people's majorities, liberation from foreign domination and the installation of a national and Latin American socialism."

In Recife, Brazil, Archbishop Helder Camara spoke movingly to me of the poverty and misery of the people of his area, and he stated flatly that "our wealthy who have links to multi-national corporations" are the barriers to progress for the masses. He said, "Capitalism offers no answer for us."

Last year at the Rome synod, Peruvian church leaders presented a document describing Peruvians as "victims of systems that exploit our economic resources, control our political decisions and impose on us the cultural domination of their values and their consumer civilization."

These priests asked the Church to support the masses "in the search for a proper path toward a socialist society with a humanistic and Christian content, acknowledging the right of expropriation of property and resources both when their ownership causes serious harm to the country and when the unjust accumulation of wealth is accomplished within legal frameworks."

There are, of course, many priests all over Latin America who not only do not endorse such views but who are horrified by them. There are government and business leaders who view the churchmen who call for "socialism" as greater threats to "national security" than ex-armed insurrectionist Petkoff.

So a grim, often violent, struggle is on in Latin America. The truth is that while Americans were ignoring the hemisphere, it has taken on new dimensions of bitterness and anger.

We had better face up to the fact that Salvador Allende's broadside against Uncle Sam was just a reflection of that increasingly angry mood which is reflected in student rioting here and terrorism and kidnappings in Argentina, Brazil and elsewhere.

marked by fire-bombings and spectacular kidnappings of diplomats, including the U.S. ambassador.

While protests arose around the world, the generals and their hand-picked civilian elite were borrowing money at a record pace. They succeeded in making Brazil the economic envy of Latin America and much of the rest of the world.

There's still an awful lot of coffee in Brazil, but this nation of 100 million people now boasts that it will soon be selling industrial equipment to Japan, with which Brazil's trade is rising at the rate of 30 percent a year (as compared with 6 percent for the U.S.). Ford will set up an automobile engine plant here, and operations already have begun in ship building, petrochemicals, tele-communications equipment and other high-technolo-

of dictatorship and to a gloomy outlook for real democracy in a country where so many people yearn for the development and national prestige that are becoming realities in Brazil.

For the ruling generals here, nothing has seemed to matter more than "development." They stripped civilian politicians of the right to hold office and ran some out of the country. They muzzled the press, canceled elections and even held a special presidential "election" in 1969 in which only generals could vote.

Professors were fired on political grounds without any semblance of legal process. Priests, students, others were harassed or jailed because their criticism made them suspected "enemies of the state."

This provoked a wave of terrorism in urban areas,

erable, poverty-wracked northeast area of Brazil. Yet, U.S. diplomats here now agree with Archbishop Helder Camara that the money went into capital-intensive projects which made the rich richer but produced precious few jobs for the poor residents of that long-neglected area of parched scrublands.

In 1963, with Brazil's last democratically-elected government in power, this vast country's industrial growth rate was an appalling 5.3 percent, and inflation roared on at a stunning rate of 02.1 percent.

It was not the Communists who exploited this malaise, but Brazil's generals, who seized power in 1964 and have ruled with utter ruthlessness ever since.

What has happened in this lovely country since that coup adds up to an "endorsement"

WASHINGTON STAR  
20 December 1972

CARL T. ROWAN

## Brazil Is Prospering, but at What Price?

RIO DE JANEIRO — President Kennedy's most eloquent justification for the Alliance for Progress was his assertion that, if the ruling elite would not promote and accept a peaceful revolution, they would have to face violent revolt.

The assumption in those days, when America's cares encompassed the globe, was that Latin America was in a race between democratic social change and a Communist takeover.

What few people quite accepted was that the real race was against right-wing military coups.

The much-ballyhooped Alliance was for the most part a failure, even when Uncle Sam backed rhetoric with money. A quarter-billion dollars of U.S. aid was pumped into the mis-

U. S. NEWS &amp; WORLD REPORT, Dec. 25, 1972

Whatever Happened to . . .

# U. S. BASE IN CUBA— “THERE TO STAY”

gy items.

Is this remarkable development worth the price in loss of liberty and the trampling of democratic and human values?

Most Brazilians seem to think like Father Viveiros de Castro, until recently the rector of Catholic University here, who said to me: “It is difficult to know how to feel. I often think about not being able to go into the streets to protest, or give a fiery speech criticizing the government. But then I say, well, protesting and giving speeches isn't all that important in my life.”

Still, there obviously are many thousands of students, clergymen, journalists and professors who do not think anything has happened that justifies the oppressions of the last eight years.

For all her new economic glories, they say, Brazil still has the worst distribution of income of all Latin American countries, with half of Brazil's people so poor they are not really in the money economy.

The critics complain that half the people still cannot read and write. They note that northeast Brazil is still a wasteland of degradation, with half the job force in Recife either unemployed or underemployed.

But the government insists that the economic boom will soon bear dramatic fruit for the masses. Minister of planning Joao Paulo de Reis Veloso cited a 142 percent increase in federal expenditures for education from 1963 to 1971, with school enrollments rising as follows: Primary, up from 9,300,000 to 13,325,000; secondary, up from 1,710,000 to 4,725,000; college and university, up from 124,000 to 543,000.

Veloso says housing units built rose from a 1937-1963 average of 4,600 a year to 114,000 units in 1971, with 238,000 units targeted for 1974.

This is the Brazilian record that led President Nixon to say: “As Brazil goes, so goes the rest of the Latin American continent.”

This galls leaders of other Latin countries, yet it is clear that many have mimicked Brazil's imposition of military dictatorship. What they have not yet emulated is Brazil's climb away from economic stagnation.

Despite a possibility of better relations with Fidel Castro, the U. S. plans to keep its major base in Communist Cuba indefinitely.

In fact, a multimillion-dollar building program is now under way at the famed Guantánamo Naval Base, with more spending already approved by Congress for other projects there.

**Why important.** American officials say that although Castro persistently demands that the U. S. get out, Washington has no intention of giving up the base where it has been for 70 years—even if the current antiskijacking negotiations with Cuba should lead to agreements on other matters.

Reasons given for the importance the U. S. attaches to the base:

**Concern over Russia.** There is uneasiness about Soviet naval and air “visits” to Cuba—and U. S. authorities view Guantánamo as a partial offset.

In late November, Russia sent a destroyer, cruiser, and tender into Cuban waters, the eighth Soviet naval visit in a little over three years. At the same time, some long-range Soviet reconnaissance planes were on a Cuban airfield, the tenth such flight in less than three years.

In September, two of the planes flew observation flights along the U. S. East Coast from Cuba, and returned there.

**Training-base value.** Naval officers rank Guantánamo as the best training base in the Atlantic—and perhaps in the world.

For example: From port, a destroyer reaches waters suitable for antisubmarine-warfare exercises in 15 minutes. At San Diego, it takes about 45 minutes to reach water deep enough for such exercises in the Pacific.

Each year, about 150 U. S. warships put into the Guantánamo base for training, outfitting and service at the naval yards there.

**In event of war—.** In wartime, Guantánamo is the most important naval base for protection of the Caribbean—and it serves as an assembly point for convoys.

One naval authority says the facility is “among the most important of all American bases overseas.”

**Current activity.** The present construction includes new barracks and a club for enlisted men, motel-like quarters for bachelor officers to replace World War I quarters, and 150 homes for families. A new school and Marine barracks are on the drawing boards—and funds are already available for them.

A water-conversion plant—built after Castro cut off the spigots in 1964—turns sea water into fresh water and is operat-

ing well below capacity.

About 3,500 GI's and 150 American civilian employes are assigned to the base. Many have dependents with them.

The Cuban work force, once considered essential, has dwindled to a relative handful. About 700 Cuban exiles and dependents live on the base. The number of workers who enter each day from Cuba proper has fallen from a onetime high of 2,700 to a mere 250 today.

Relations with the Cubans who surround the base—stormy during the early Castro years—are relatively calm now. Main reason is that the Cubans have pulled back from the steel fence around the 45-square-mile base. They have built a triple-fence complex of their own with guard houses and machine guns.

The fences have virtually ended U. S.-Cuban “confrontation” at the base, but they have also stopped the fence-jumping escape of Cubans into Guantánamo.

**The amenities.** The garrison is largely self-contained—except for food and a few other items. It has one television and three radio stations and a newspaper published four times weekly. There are bowling alleys, a golf course, swimming pools, movies, clubs, athletic fields—and ships and planes take groups to Haiti or Jamaica regularly for “rest and rehabilitation” week-ends.

Americans on the base perform a variety of functions, chiefly the training of crews on visiting ships. Ships in port for training and refitting are the keystone of the base defense system.

An average of 12 ships are in port at any given time. Marines handle ground defense—but sailors go through regular infantry training to back them up if the need arises.

The Marines maintain F-8 twin-jet close-support warplanes on the field at Leeward Point, across the bay from the main base. There are also two helicopters, two seaplanes and a C-54 transport to carry food and people.

**Treaty rights.** Set up by treaty in 1903, Guantánamo is America's oldest overseas military base. American treaty rights are in perpetuity—or until both Cuba and the U. S. agree the Americans should go. The U. S. pays Cuba rent of \$3,676.50 a year for Guantánamo—but Castro has cashed none of the checks since 1959.

The U. S. has spent about 84 million dollars on base facilities since 1903. Current maintenance and operating costs are 12 million a year.

One oddity: Under treaty, merchant ships of any nation can use the lower bay, which is American, to reach the upper bay, which is Cuban. Thus ships

from Russia, China, elsewhere steam in and out of the base—with U. S. escort.

Said an American authority:

"Guantánamo played an important role for us in both World Wars, and in the missile crisis of 1962. It might have to be used again—and all signs are that we are there to stay."

WASHINGTON STAR  
20 December 1972

## Panama Speech Angers U.S.

By JEREMIAH O'LEARY  
Star-News Staff Writer

The U.S. government is reported incensed at Panamanian foreign ministry adviser Jorge Illueca for laying bare in a public speech last week the main negotiating positions of the two countries for a new treaty on the Panama Canal.

"This is a hell of a way to try to negotiate," said one official heatedly. Illueca disclosed the U.S. and Panamanian positions in detail in a speech to the Panamanian Student Federation in Panama City, one of the more emotionally nationalistic centers of the isthmian republic.

The implication by U.S. officials was that public disclosure of the negotiating positions could make it more difficult to reach agreement on a treaty draft. Privately, U.S. officials say they are going to have trouble enough selling any canal to Congress without having their negotiating positions exposed.

"The United States proposed as the term of the duration of the treaty on the locks canal a period of 50 years which would be extended to 85 years if a third set of locks were to be constructed and to 90 years if a sea-level canal were built," Illueca declared.

### 'A Panamanian Canal'

After these dates, his speech indicated, the United States presumably would give up the perpetuity clause under which it acts as sovereign over the 10-mile wide Panama Canal Zone.

Illueca said these terms are unacceptable to Panama and added, "The Panamanian position is that the duration of the locks canal treaty should only last until 1994, a term of 22 years."

"We have colonialism encysted here," he said. "We have (the U.S.) army, we have its troops, we have its intelligence services, we have its spies, we have its cultural saboteurs, the psychological warfare, and that wide variety of methods which you know are utilized by imperialism to dominate the countries which it considers to be underdeveloped."

Illueca said "jurisdiction" means to Panama that the "Canal Zone will revert to us; it means a Panamanian canal, operated by Panamanians for Panamanians to benefit Panamanians." He said it also means Panama will decide how the canal will be run, how the fees will be charged, how the benefits will be distributed and within what period Panamanians will assume full responsibility for the canal.

### Criminal Jurisdiction

He said the United States has agreed that Panama should maintain public order in land and water areas of the zone for the time specified in the treaty. The United States also has agreed, he said, that Panamanian courts should have jurisdiction over all but the land-water areas of the present zone except that exempted for the period of the treaty from Panamanian control.

The U.S. position is, according to Illueca, that Panamanian law will prevail in some parts of the zone area, North American law in other parts and in certain areas jurisdiction would be concurrent.

"Panama will not compromise on its demands that Panama should have exclusive jurisdiction over Panamanian citizens at once. Over the others, there may be a transi-

tion period but over the Panamanians it must be immediate," Illueca said.

He added that Washington wanted to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Panamanian citizens in cases of sabotage but said the foreign ministry is implacable that the arrest of Panamanians by foreign policemen in its own territory must cease.

On police functions, Panama demands transfer of authority no later than in 5 years but Illueca said the United States insists on nothing short of 15 years. However, he said the United States accepts the possibility of joint police patrols during the transition period.

He said the United States is insisting on control of the 10 miles of air space over the existing zone and the right to make use of the entire air space of the Republic of Panama in event of serious threat to the canal. He said Panama has flatly rejected this.

Illueca said Washington has offered that commercial services provided to residents of the Canal Zone be taken over by Panamanian companies within five years of the date of the new treaty and to hold bids to transfer these services to private companies of any nationality. He said Panama holds that commercial activities of the U.S. government in the zone must be suspended immediately on the effective date of the treaty with jurisdiction over commercial services passing to Panama within one year.

Washington, according to Illueca, says it needs two-thirds of the present zone for operation and protection of the canal but is willing to turn over one-third of the zone to Panama when the treaty goes into effect. However, some of the

territory retained by the United States could be used by Panamanians for recreation, agriculture or commerce by mutual agreement of the two nations, he said. Such a formula cannot be accepted by Panama, Illueca declared.

The United States wants, he said, to maintain during the life of the treaty control of salaries, working conditions and labor relations with canal employees. In turn, he said Panama insists that the work force must be 85 percent Panamanian and he paid not less than 85 percent of the total amount spent on canal salaries.

The United States wants, Illueca said, to keep its military forces in the zone area with the right to take any necessary action to defend the canal. But he said Panama has repeatedly told Washington there is no treaty that insures its right to locate military forces there in time of peace.