NEWS, VIEWS and ISSUES

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Oil Diplomacy

Fuel Crisis May Force U.S. to Reduce Troops, Put Pressure on Israel

U.S. and Allies May Compete Bitterly to Get Supplies; What Role for Russians?

New Task for Mr. Kissinger

By Robert Keatley
Staff Reporter of The Wall Street Journal

WASHINGTON—When talk here turns to the "energy crisis," it usually dwells on domestic aspects—the price of natural gas in Texas, or perhaps a law someday requiring Detroit to make smaller auto engines.

But senior government officials realize increasingly that there's much more to be reckoned with. They're beginning serious study of the energy problem's international implications in hopes of fending off grave diplomatic, military and economic troubles.

At worst, experts fear that political disputes or a shooting war in the Middle East might eventually sever America's fuel-supply lines. Interior Secretary Rogers Morton warns that an interruption of the imported-oil flow for any reason "could cause great damage to our national economy and internal and external security."

The huge amounts of money that Arab nations will get from selling their oil could imperil the world monetary system and spur the U.S. to new political activity in the Mideast. This is the second of two stories examining the situation.

More Questions Than Answers

To date, the policy review involves drafting questions more than compiling answers; Henry Kissinger's staff has just started organizing the paperwork and soon will float it around the State Department, Pentagon, Central Intelligence Agency and other concerned agencies. But some of the topics are fairly obvious, and deeply worrisome. They include:

—Mideast policy. Some analysts see a growing contradiction between massive U.S. aid to Israel and this country's increased need for Arab oil. So far the Arab governments have been unwilling or unable to use their fuel exports for political blackmail, but there's doubt about how long this restraint can last. Rather than risk having supplies cut by another Arab-Israeli war, the study may recommend stronger U.S. efforts to settle Mideast conflicts soon. Pushing terms that the Israelis may not like much strikes some officials as wiser than letting events drift.

—Monetary dangers. This year fuel imports will account for $2.5 billion of the U.S. payments deficit; experts say the net cost in 1980 will be at least $10 billion. This drain alone threatens the dollar's stability, and there is another troublesome prospect besides. Mideast oil-producing nations will accumulate vast sums that they can't spend internally. These huge cash reserves if transferred erratically, could disrupt the international monetary system far more seriously than the 1971 crisis, which forced the dollar's devaluation.

—Defense shifts. The need to pay dearly for foreign oil could well reduce American ability to keep military forces overseas, especially in Europe. Though troop cuts are considered desirable by many officials anyway, U.S. strategists worry that money shortages may force much deeper slashes than they or American allies want. In addition, the Navy now claims it needs extra billions for destroyers to protect growing tanker fleets. Skeptics say this is merely a ploy to justify big Naval budgets and fancy sea and shore berths for admirals, but the matter is getting serious study.

—Relations with allies. America's best friends, the Western European nations and Japan, need Mideast oil even more than does the U.S.; they have no significant deposits of their own. An era of bitter competition, fraying alliances, could ensue as fuel-short industrial powers all bid for the same petroleum.

—Relations with Russia. There's big talk these days about buying fuel from the U.S.S.R. But some officials warn that dependence on Soviet sources could give Moscow an upper hand in relations with the West. (Others say the sales will create mutual interest in continued political stability. So far there is no clear U.S. official view.) In addition, the Kremlin is trying to extend its Mideast influence, partly by purchase of Arab oil for Russia's own use or for reexport into hard-currency markets. U.S. officials doubt this trend serves either Western or Arab interests.

"We Should Worry"

Because energy problems haven't seemed imminent, the subject has been shoved aside regularly by Washington's national security bureaucracy. Lately, though, growing awareness of fuel shortages has fostered new interest in the international complications ahead. Thus they stand high on Mr. Kissinger's list of things to cope with "after Vietnam."

"Suddenly we've realized we should worry about energy problems," says a Kissinger staffer who is helping organize the study. "We've been pondering which matters to stress over the next four years, and this is certainly one."

In fact, energy will soon be the subject of a National Security Council study memorandum. This is Mr. Kissinger's device for farming problems out to the bureaucracy for advice and information. The responses help form policy alternatives that go to President Nixon for decision.

The impetus for action arises from the changing relationship between petroleum buyers and sellers. Though some analysts claim the so-called "energy crisis" is a fraud and insist that huge oil reserves still exist, their arguments are somewhat irrelevant. Whether there's a shortage or a surplus, industrialized countries find themselves facing effective demands for higher prices from Arab and other oil nations, which are taking over much of the industry either by outright nationalization or by becoming partners of Western oil companies. Some experts predict Arab governments will be collecting as much as $40 billion annually in oil revenues by 1980, up from less than $5 billion in 1970; the Arabs are also ex-

pected to gain increased control over production and sales policies.

The U.S., willy-nilly, will contribute heavily to Arab wealth and power. According to James Akins, the State Department's senior energy authority, the U.S. has no short-term alternative to buying more foreign oil; he and others agree that new domestic resources—including gas manufactured from coal or oil extracted from shale—won't come along fast enough to ease the squeeze any time soon. By 1980, Mr. Akins expects, U.S. oil imports may reach 15 million barrels daily, up from six million this year and only 3.2 million in 1970.

What to Do?

Concern over the implications of the trend is mounting among private experts as well as government strategists. Walter Levy, a noted energy consultant, warns that "the U.S., as a major world power, simply cannot afford an ever-increasing over-dependence for its oil supplies on a handful of foreign countries. . . . Otherwise, its security in a narrow sense, as well as its prosperity and its freedom of action in foreign-policy formulation, will be in jeopardy."

What to do? The presidential energy message that Mr. Akins is drafting and that Mr. Nixon is expected to send Congress next month will stress the need for developing additional fuel sources. But that process threatens to take two decades or more. In the meantime, officials say, other government policies must be reexamined and perhaps modified in order to avoid the worst dangers.

High on the list comes Mideast policy. Washington doesn't want to face a future choice between preserving Israel or pacifying Arab oil producers, however unlikely that prospect now seems. To date, militant Arabs have been unable to get oil-exporting governments to use their fuel for political pressure. Despite much lofty talk about Arab brotherhood, even neighbors like Syria and Iraq have had a hard time agreeing on such things as proper tolls for a pipeline that carries oil from Iraq across Syria to the Mediterranean.

But some Arabs see greater unity as their wealth increases. Even conservative Saudi Arabia, which may be pocketing $20 billion annually by 1980, anticipates both affluence and influence. King Faisal, a devout Moslem, adamantly opposes Jewish occupation of Islamic holy places in Jerusalem and may yet use his oil to help get the Israelis out. Warns one White House staffer: "The question is: can we still import in the 1980s if there is no resolution of the Arab-Israeli dispute by then?"

It's a risk Washington may not choose to run. The present study could advocate new efforts to settle the area's problems peacefully before import needs skyrocket and the U.S. appears more vulnerable.

Military Issues

The White House study will also ponder military issues. If oil costs rise too far, Washington may have to call home its troops from Europe and Asia for purely fiscal reasons, upsetting its foreign friends and eroding alliances. Questions about reordering other military priorities are also arising.

Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, the Navy boss, already sees a budget opening through which he hopes to pilot a fleet of shiny new destroyers. Claiming the U.S. will need 1,000 large civilian tankers by 1980, he concludes "their safe passage will depend in large measure on our ability to deter interruption of this flow." Translation: more ships and men for his Navy. He also argues that new gunboats could conduct Mideast diplomacy for his State Department friends.

"To the citizen of a less technologically oriented society," he says, "nothing is quite like a shipshape destroyer making a call."

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
3 February 1973

U.S. worried about growing oil dependence

By Dana Adams Schmidt
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

The U.S. Defense Department is increasingly concerned about growing American dependence on oil imported from the eastern hemisphere:

Two aspects worry the Pentagon — and the Navy in particular:

- That the U.S. won't be able to transport and protect the flow of oil it vitally needs. That means defense experts fear a shortage of tankers and of escorts to guard them.
- That the U.S. will find paying for the imported oil an intolerable burden on its balance of payments. They see the Iranians and the Arabs engaged in leap-frogging demands on the Western oil companies, the end effect of which is higher cost to the consumer.

The U.S. military forces depend on imported oil for 50 percent of their supplies and 100 percent of the petroleum products consumed in Vietnam came from the Persian Gulf.

Dependence now is taken for granted in the Defense Department and by the Navy. In a little-noticed speech to the Chamber of Commerce of Beckley-Raleigh in West Virginia last December Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt laid the facts dramatically on the line:

"We have roughly enough reserves of natural gas to last 22 years and enough petroleum for 20," he said. "In other words, the wells of natural gas and petroleum are going to run dry within our boundaries within the life span of some here present and certainly within the life span of some of our children.

The admiral explained that only about 50 percent of demand for petroleum in the U.S. would be met by domestic production by the year 1985, even if Alaskan oil were brought into the picture.

"That means," he concluded, "that we are going to have to import something in the order of 12 million barrels of crude oil a day — each and every day."

Admiral Zumwalt went on to state the Navy's concern for protecting the oil's movement, as follows:

"Since all of this oil will be coming over the surface of the world oceans, I think you can see the Navy's concern. To move this oil is going to require more than 1,000 tankers averaging about 17,000 tons each. Their passage will depend on our ability to deter interruption of the flow."

For this purpose the Navy is seeking a new generation of simplified low-cost frigates which would escort the tankers as well as so-called "surface effect" ships such as hydrofoils for which prototype money has been included in the new budget. Admiral Zumwalt also has said that American aircraft carriers would be re-equipped to fly anti-submarine missions in order to protect the movement of oil and that the new nuclear submarines would be used for this purpose.

The concern for rising costs of imported oil is summarized by the estimate of Defense Department experts that the cost of imported petroleum products will rise from about $2 billion in 1972 to about $20 billion in 1985. The swift escalation is explained by the fact that whereas the U.S. hitherto imported mostly low-grade crude oils it now is beginning to require refined products as well as costly liquefied gas.

Far higher costs seen

One expert believed that the costs could run far higher than $20 billion if the Iranians and Arabs continued their leap-frogging.

The most recent stage therein is a decision by the Shah of Iran to overthrow his previous understanding that when the concessions of Western oil companies in his country expire in 1979 he would for at least 15 years make arrangements for them to continue operating oil fields and refineries and marketing the oil.

Now he has told the companies that in 1979 he is taking over the oil 100 percent and that they will have to join the queue of the world's customers to buy Iranian oil. But if they wished to save their special position as favored customers, they would have to turn over their assets in Iran at an earlier date and agree to help Iran immediately to step up production from its present level of 4.5 million barrels a day to a level of 8 million barrels a day. The 8-million-barrel goal previously had been set for 1980.

The Shah made no mystery of the fact that he had been incited to make these new demands by Arab oil companies' completing new agreements last December with Western oil companies. These agreements give the Arabs a 25 percent participation in the companies effective this year and a 51 percent participation by 1983.

Minister called author

The deal the Shah was talking about was worked out by the Saudi-Arabian Minister of Oil Ahmed Zaki Yamani representing Kuwait, Qatar, and Abu Dabi as well as Saudi Arabia.

Quietly watching the Iranian-Arab competition are the Iraqis who have nationalized the Iraq Petroleum Company and are having a hard time selling their oil. They will have to decide now whether to press on with their nationalization and attempts to sell their oil to the Soviet Union and the Communist bloc or whether to follow the pattern set by the Shah or that set by the other Arabs.

Meanwhile, Lybya is needling all concerned by demanding a immediate 50 percent share in the companies who have concessions on its territory.

Only one thing is certain about the future of the oil supplied by the Arabs and Iranians — it will cost more. A barrel of Kuwaiti oil which in 1968 cost $1.68 will cost $8 by Jan. 1, 1975.

LOS ANGELES TIMES
30 January 1973

Controversial 'Politics of Heroin' to Be Filmed

BY CHARLES CHAMPLIN
Times Entertainment Editor

"The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia," a controversial new book charging U.S. complicity —through the CIA—in the drug trade, has been acquired as the basis for a new film by Richard Brooks for Columbia Pictures.

The book, written by a young Yale scholar named Alfred W. McCoy and two associates, Cathleen B. Read and Leonard P. Adams II, first came to public attention last year when it became known that the CIA tried to dissuade Harper & Row from publishing it and then demanded the opportunity to read and review the text in galley form.

Despite a long rejoinder from the CIA, Harper & Row published the book in September essentially as written. McCoy's central thesis is that the U.S. government, inheriting the vacuum left by the departing French in Southeast Asia, also reluctantly inherited the politics of poppy-growing in the Golden Triangle of Laos, Thailand and Burma, where 70% of the world supply of illicit heroin is produced. The revenues enrich local economies and greatly enrich very high officials of Asian governments supported by the United States in its attempts to combat the spread of communism.

Battle in Opium War

McCoy's book is a meticulously documented look at the heroin trade worldwide, written in newsmagazine rather than pedantic style and containing a few scenes which could make even "The French Connection" seem like a pale footnote.

Most particularly, McCoy describes a battle in the Opium War of 1967 over a caravan of mules carrying 16 tons of opium to market. The shipment was destined for the commander-in-chief of the Laotian army, but two former Kuomintang generals who had been controlling the local trade routes attacked with several hundred men. Eventually the battle involved seven jet aircraft and a company of Laotian paratroopers, who captured the booty.

Brooks, fascinated by these goings-on and by the whole curious confrontation of American idealism and pragmatism with a notably sordid political reality, will call his movie "Flowers of Evil" and plans to shoot entirely on location. Second unit work on the planting of the poppies will begin in a few weeks' time.

The Truth? 'Tell It'

"I read an excerpt from the book in Harper's and clipped it out," Brooks says. "I read the book and was even more interested, but I couldn't believe

that any studio would dare to tackle material that tough. But Columbia was interested, too. I said, 'I want to tell the truth' and Stanley Schneider said, 'Tell it.'"

McCoy's book also suggests that American solicitation of Mafia support during the invasion of Sicily during World War II, at a time when the organization had been under severe harassment by the Mussolini government, gave the Mafia a power base from which it was able to enter the drug trade on a major scale in the postwar period.

McCoy, 27, will serve as a technical adviser to Brooks on his production.

"It won't be a documentary," says Brooks. "In the nature of things, I'm afraid it can't be. But it will tell the truth about an incredible situation."

McCoy testified last summer before a congressional committee about his researches into the reluctant complicity of American agents with the drug traffic, which included, he charges, the use of Air America, a CIA charter carrier operating in Southeast Asia, to haul raw opium. The charge has been denied.

The shocking rise in addiction among GIs serving in Vietnam focused attention on the equally shocking contradiction in U.S. postures.

CHICAGO TRIBUNE
6 February 1973
Bob Wiedrich

Tower Ticker

FOR THE first time in the history of United States Customs, 25 agents have been dispatched overseas to gather advance information so narcotics shipments to this country can be intercepted before disappearing into the labyrinth of Mafia distribution channels.

At the same time, the CIA has become increasingly active in probing the possible involvement of South American diplomats, police, and government officials in protecting the transshipment of heroin from Southeast Asia and Europe to the United States.

These moves are part of an effort by President Nixon to counter the ever changing drug routes to the U. S. as American participation in the Viet Nam war ends and Asiatic narcotics merchants shift gears to meet new areas of supply and demand.

PRIVATELY, ADMINISTRATION officials fear the racketeers of Southeast Asia's infamous Golden Triangle of Laos, Thailand, and Burma may have already selected the continental United States as a new merchandising arena because of sharply declining sales to American forces in Viet Nam.

There is evidence some of the high grade heroin from Southeast Asia is finding its way to South America for relay to the United States via Florida and Mexico.

Couple that with large amounts of European heroin and locally produced cocaine already being shipped here from South America, and the Southern Hemisphere assumes greater significance as a source of danger to United States efforts to combat the international narcotics traffic.

Exactly one year ago, this column was first to disclose emergence of the so-called Latin American Connection, a new drug route supplementing the traditional French Connection from Marseilles directly across the Atlantic to East Coast and Canadian ports.

The French trade route had become drastically curtailed because of U. S. pressure.

So, the Corsican and Mafia gangsters manipulating the drug racket began shipping large amounts of Middle East heroin refined in Southern France to South America, for transshipment to the United States by sea and air thru the Windward Islands and Mexico.

Thus a new symbol was drawn on the narcotics trade maps—the Triangle of Death—with its base line reaching from France to South America and its apex penetrating the United States from Europe and Latin America.

In time, another line may be added across the Pacific to mark the course of Southeast Asian heroin into the Triangle of Death.

On a Latin American survey for the House Foreign Affairs Committee last month, Rep. Morgan Murphy of Chicago and Robert Steele of Connecticut discovered European heroin is also being pumped directly into the Panama Canal Zone and Vera Cruz, Mexico, for shipment to the U. S.

The rest finds it way thru such nations as Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Colombia. Peru, Colombia, Bolivia, Chile and Brazil are prime producers of cocaine.

In fact, South America produces 90 per cent of the world cocaine supply and 100 per cent of that used in this country.

During their trip, Latin American officials readily admitted to the congressmen there is corruption among police and government personnel at lower levels which they are at a loss to control.

PRESIDENT MISAEL Pastrana Borrero of Colombia offered some hope of curbing the drug trade in his country by immediately appointing his minister of justice to coordinate a crackdown. He conceded laxity by his regime. He also admitted his police lacked training in this field.

Recently, for example, vital evidence in a case involving three American drug smugglers was destroyed by presumably inept Colombian police.

The Americans, enroute to Bogota from Florida to pick up a load of cocaine, crash landed near the Colombian capital with a cargo of empty crates for the narcotic and $53,000 in cash.

POLICE CONFISCATED the cash, but burned the crates and a list of names of cocaine merchants from whom the Americans planned to buy drugs worth $500,000 in the U. S.

The smugglers were later released and demanded return of the cash by the United States embassy. They were told to see the U. S. attorney in Southern Florida, where their flight had originated. Naturally, they didn't.

In another case, local Mexican police are believed to have tiped off racketeers holding a cache of 200 pounds of cocaine, 100 of marijuna, and 50 kilos of pure heroin before American agents and federal police could move in.

As you can see, addicts are not the only ones corrupted by the international narcotics racket.

WASHINGTON POST
4 February, 1973

After SALT, A Total Test Ban?

By Herbert Scoville Jr.

The writer is a former assistant director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS of SALT I have produced a totally new climate in which a comprehensive nuclear test ban—one covering underground as well as atmospheric explosions—becomes a negotiable arms control measure after nearly 10 years of drifting in the doldrums. Not since 1962, when Nikita Khrushchev made his offer of three on-site inspections to verify such a ban, have opportunities for agreement been so good.

This improved outlook, if we take advantage of it, is particularly timely since it comes just as steps are needed to prevent further spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries. That the patience of the non-nuclear-weapons countries is beginning to wear thin is shown by the overwhelming support, despite U.S. opposition, for a United Nations resolution in favor of a halt to all nuclear testing by August, 1973, the tenth anniversary of the limited test ban treaty. In addition, there is strong Senate support, led by Sens. Philip Hart, Edward Kennedy, Charles Mathias and Clifford Case, for a resolution urging the President to make a renewed effort to negotiate a comprehensive test ban and, in the interim, to suspend all testing immediately as long as the Russians reciprocate.

The limitations on strategic arms agreed to in Moscow, particularly the ABM treaty, have greatly reduced the desires for further nuclear weapons testing which have in the past been the major obstacle to a comprehensive test ban. With only 200 ABM interceptor missiles allowed each side, it is almost impossible to justify further improvements in the nuclear warheads for this purpose. The United States, and almost certainly the Russians as well, have nuclear weapons developed for such interceptors, and no improvements in warhead design can possibly overcome the complete ineffectiveness of the small ABM systems permitted by the treaty.

Strategic Warheads

THE EFFECTS of the ABM treaty also apply to the requirements for warheads for offensive weapons. Without any effective ABM to penetrate, the need for new warheads largely disappears. In addition, there is no further need for testing to develop special warheads to withstand high-altitude nuclear explosions, since the allowed ABMs can be overwhelmed by a small fraction of the existing strategic forces.

Only for a first-strike force able to destroy the enemy's missiles in their silos is there any need to design new offensive warheads. However, the stated U.S. policy has been to forego a "hard target" MIRV which might provoke Soviet concerns that we were seeking a first-strike capability, thus upsetting the present strategic balance. Even for such a MIRV, an improved warhead with five times the yield would be less important than potential improvements in accuracy.

Nor does the United States any longer need a "hard target" MIRV to provide the flexibility to attack key military targets instead of cities after a limited Soviet attack; this can now be achieved without further advances in weapon design since, as a result of the ABM treaty, the retaliatory attack no longer has to cope with large ABM defenses and can afford to direct several warheads at a single target.

A complete test ban would, on the other hand, increase U.S. confidence that the Soviet Union was not improving the yields and accuracy of its warheads in order to develop a first-strike MIRV system able to destroy a large fraction of our Minuteman force.

Another familiar justification for nuclear weapons testing has been the need to assure the continued reliability of already developed and stockpiled weapons. Although nuclear tests have never been carried out solely to check the proper functioning of a stockpiled weapon, it has been argued that the ability to test is necessary in case deterioration is found by other means and corrective action is required. This is not necessary, however, since it would always be possible to replace a warhead which had deteriorated with one of proven design. Furthermore, if mutual deterrence is the fundamental element in our strategic policy, as spelled out by the ABM treaty, then any unknown decrease in reliability on both sides can only improve deterrence. High reliability is only necessary for a nation contemplating a first strike. No aggressor could rely on the uncertain reliability of another nation's weapons as the means of surviving a retaliatory attack.

Thus, as a result of the Moscow agreements, a strong case can be made that no further nuclear testing of strategic weapons is required. Yet, during the past 10 years since the limited test ban treaty, more than two-thirds of the U.S. tests have been related to strategic weapons systems, and indeed the highest-priority tests have fallen in this category. The Moscow agreements have thus undercut the major rationale for continued nuclear testing. Even before SALT I, Drs. Carl Walske and John Foster of the Defense Department testified that they favored a comprehensive test ban provided it could be adequately verified. This Pentagon position, which is the U.S. position at the Geneva disarmament talks, is even further reinforced by the Moscow agreements.

Signals and Satellites

THE BENEFITS of SALT I, however, are not limited to the weapons development part of the problem alone; the ABM treaty also creates a mechanism by which the verification difficulties, for years the ostensible stumbling block to a test ban, can also be solved.

Since 1963, the United States has insisted that on-site inspections were required for adequate policing against secret underground tests, while the Soviet Union has consistently claimed that these inspections were unnecessary. The verification provisions of the ABM treaty afford a means of bridging this gap. In this, and in the interim agreement on offensive weapons, both nations agree that national technical means of verification will be used; that neither nation will interfere with such means; and, finally, that neither will

use deliberate concealment to impede verification. In addition, a standing consultative commission is set up to consider questions concerning compliance with the obligations of the agreement. Similar provisions, but multi-national in scope, attached to a comprehensive test ban treaty, might satisfactorily reconcile the U.S. and the Soviet points of view.

The primary problem in verifying a ban on underground tests has been the difficulty in telling apart the seismic signals from small earthquakes and explosions. Now, with greatly improved seismic methods and sophisticated computer processing, it is possible to classify almost any detectable seismic event as an earthquake or an explosion.

For those few small events which are detected seismically but not identified, the United States has in the past sought the reassurance of on-site inspections despite Pentagon testimony that the value of such on-site inspections is marginal at best. Today's U.S. verification techniques, however, are superior to our earlier capabilities, even combined with the on-site inspections we were seeking.

Observation satellites are one agreed method capable of providing increased assurance. A photographic satellite scanning an area in which an unidentified seismic event was detected could obtain information useful for evaluating whether the seismic signals originated from a secret nuclear test. Most of the natural earthquake areas within the Soviet Union are remote from human activity, so that a large fraction of these unidentified events could be clearly classified as natural in origin when evidence of man-made disturbances was absent. Whenever a satellite obtained evidence of mining or drilling operations in the area where the seismic signals originated, a satisfactory explanation could be demanded through an international commission on the SALT I model. If not satisfied, the United States could resume testing or take whatever other action it thought necessary.

Evasion Techniques

SOME EXPERTS have worried that an underground test ban could be violated by use of sophisticated evasion techniques, such as a detonation in a large cavity. But theoretical studies show that a very large chamber, 300 feet in diameter and several thousand feet underground, would be required to muffle the seismic signal of a 5-to-10-kiloton explosion sufficiently to make it undetectable. The use of such concealment techniques for even so small a test would involve a mammoth construction operation which would be easily visible by observation satellites.

Other exotic evasion techniques have been proposed: a nuclear explosion could be conducted in the immediate aftermath of a large earthquake, or a series of nuclear explosions could be timed to give additive seismic signals that more nearly resemble an earthquake than an explosion. Both of these techniques are vulnerable to detection by sophisticated seismic measuring and data analysis systems. However, even if these techniques successfully hid the signals, there would be a considerable probability that the operations required to carry them out would be noticed by observation satellites and challenged through the mechanism of the consultative commission.

Finally, the use of nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes is now generally recognized, at least in this country, to have few economic advantages and many environmental and safety problems. This program, nicknamed Plowshare, has always been a roadblock to a ban on nuclear tests, since it could provide an ideal cover for disguised weapons testing. In fact, the greatest enthusiasts for Plowshare have been the most ardent nuclear weapons developers.

Now the proposed nuclear excavation of the sea-level Panama Canal has been dropped, and the use of nuclear explosives for the release of natural gas is the only project being given serious study in the United States. Tests even for this purpose are in trouble with environmentalists and significant gas recovery would require thousands of nuclear explosions. The Atomic Energy Commission budget for Plowshare has just been cut almost in half and no tests are planned for the next fiscal year. Considerable interest in peaceful nuclear explosions has, unfortunately, been stimulated by U.S. propaganda in other countries, particularly Russia, India and Brazil, and could interfere with negotiations for a comprehensive test ban if they are unduly delayed.

The time has now come for the United States to take a new initiative in negotiating a comprehensive test ban treaty. It would be an important next step after the Moscow agreements to place some overall ceiling on qualitative improvements in strategic nuclear warheads.

CHICAGO TRIBUNE
8 FEB 1973

Pressure on other sources cited

Hong Kong supplying more U.S. heroin

HONG KONG, Feb. 7 [AP]—Among the farm houses, tenements, and sprawling mansions of this colony are about 20 secret laboratories producing more and more of the heroin sold in American street corners, according to Western narcotics experts.

This "Chinese Connection" is expanding as legal and diplomatic pressure threatens the traditional "French Connection" of Turkish opium or morphine processed into heroin in France and then smuggled to the United States.

The U. S. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs estimates the percentage of Southeast Asian heroin supplying the American market has at least doubled recently, to almost a third of the total U. S. supply.

BUT NARCOTICS agents tend to scoff at precise figures.

"The traffickers don't publish balance sheets, so how can we know how much they are smuggling. They don't even know the overall amount themselves," says one agent.

Norman Rolph, Hong Kong's commissioner of narcotics, says: "All the people in this business are very security and surveillance conscious. They have a high degree of mobility. The laboratories in which they refine the morphine are everywhere, from chicken runs to villas. They spend just a day or two in each one and then move on to another."

The opium and heroin trade in this part of the world is almost exclusively run by Chinese, and the bulk of their trafficking is for Asian addicts. Officials say there is no indication mainland China is exporting any of the narcotics.

IF ARRESTED, the traffickers almost never tell authorities about their smuggling network. "The Mafia are publicity hounds compared to the Chinese," says an informant in Bangkok, the capital of Thailand.

"Money and fear are the only things that hold this dirty business together, and money is the only thing we can chip at it with," he adds.

Thailand and Hong Kong use a reward system based on the value of drug seizures to at-

tract informers. In Hong Kong, an informer can earn as much as $100,000 for a tip that leads to a major seizure and arrests. And nearly all major seizures come from such information.

But generally it is only the small fry that are caught. The rich financiers pulling the strings from the top evade arrest. They carefully avoid any direct contact with the people handling drugs. Even when authorities know who they are, no evidence can be obtained to convict them, agents say.

NARCOTICS officials agree the trafficking in Southeast Asia has not been hurt or even slowed by law-enforcement efforts. Some believe, however, recent large seizures are a promising start to a widened drive.

It seems doubtful any progress is being made in the most vital country of all — Burma. . .

WASHINGTON STAR
12 February 1973

DAVID LAWRENCE

Far-Reaching Radio Voices

Probably one of the most important problems faced by the American government is how to reach the populations of Europe and Asia so that there might be "people to people" communication.

When Richard Helms, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, was testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last week, he endorsed the continuation of both Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, which he said are well worth the annual budget of $38 million. He declared these had been one factor in improving relations between Eastern and Western Europe.

Behind the Iron Curtain, the number of foreign publications admitted are few, and the government dictates the contents of newspapers and magazines as well as radio and television programs. So there is no way to get any news or views about what's going on in the world except what might be heard over the radio from other lands.

Radio Free Europe sends information programs to Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. These are transmitted in the languages of each of the countries. Radio Liberty concentrates wholly on broadcasts to the Soviet Union. These two agencies are financed in large part by our government, but there is another project—known as Radio Free Asia—which is entirely a private organization started in 1951 by the Korean Cultural and Freedom Foundation. It was endorsed at the time by Gen. Eisenhower, and it has been broadcasting information programs into North Korea, mainland China and North Vietnam.

Reports from embassies and consulates in countries where these American programs are made available to people behind the Iron Curtain indicate that they are listened to widely and well received. Peoples who are living under a government which excludes information from outside its territory welcome the data they get over such devices as Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty and Radio Free Asia.

Incidentally, there is no way to cut off a radio program entirely from another land, though "jamming" sometimes has been used to impair reception. When the information about important happenings is conveyed to the owner of a radio set, the chances are that it will be communicated to many other persons in the neighborhood or in the area. Radio, indeed, has served a useful purpose in trying to improve the relations between the people of the United States and peoples abroad.

Sen. J. William Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, asked Helms this question:

"Are you saying that the spirit of detente between East and West and such developments as Germany's *Ostpolitik* policy have been caused by Radio Free Europe?"

"I am saying it was one factor among others," Helms insisted.

During the years that these services have been aided by means of the Central Intelligence Agency, this has been criticized by some members of Congress as an improper activity. But actually the government of the United States has a right to broadcast throughout the world information about what the policies of this country are and the principles underlying them.

There is no reason why Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty should not have been carried on entirely by private foundations and given financial support solely by the general public. Some day this may turn out to be the method used for all the international radio programs devoted to a presentation of what the United States is doing and what its true feelings are toward other peoples in the world.

Currently both Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty are known to be backed by the government, and this gives them an even more important status in the realm of news. For editors in foreign countries listen to Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty and every now and then carry in their newspapers information obtained from these two big broadcasting services.

The fact that the programs are broadcast in the languages spoken in each of the nations to which they are directed makes them very valuable in the task of improving relations between the American people and peoples of other countries. When it is considered that governments on the Communist side engage in propaganda broadcasts and transmit them not only into western Europe but throughout the world, it can be inferred that counter-broadcasts from the United States are essential if only to answer some of the misrepresentations that are made about the policies of the government in Washington.

NEW YORK TIMES
9 February 1973

Fighting A New Opium War

By C. L. Sulzberger

WASHINGTON — One area of U.S. foreign policy rarely discussed by diplomatic observers has shown considerable success during recent years. This is the curbing of shipment to America of hard drugs.

Dope addiction remains a most disagreeable, worrisome blot in the United States; yet this cannot wholly obscure achievements registered by coordinated efforts of the State Department, Treasury, C.I.A. and F.B.I. in tracking down illegal traffic or alerting friendly governments.

In February, 1972, Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam (now Army Chief of Staff)

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

"French gangs involved in drug operations have found increasing difficulty in getting heroin to the U.S."

told me recent troop figures showed 3.7 per cent users of whom 1.6 per cent were at least temporarily cured before being sent home. There were 2.1 per cent users of hard drugs among troops going home. "Pot is not a serious problem," he added.

Speaking of hard drugs, Abrams said: "There's an awful lot of money in it. And the whole drug traffic is a monstrous and sophisticated operation. The poppies for opium aren't grown in South Vietnam. . . . All that is done in Thailand, in Burma, in Laos, in North Vietnam, in China. The whole structure of this business has to get its raw opium to certain points for distillation. The heroin that's in South Vietnam has

all been distilled somewhere else."

Mohammed Hassanein Heykal, the well-known Cairo editor and friend of Presidents Nasser and Sadat, says that when Chou En-lai dined with Nasser in Alexandria, June 23, 1965: "One of the remarkable things he said that night when talking about the demoralization of the American soldiers [in Indochina] was that 'some of them are trying opium, and we are helping them. We are planting the best kinds of opium especially for the American soldiers in Vietnam.'"

In his book, "The Cairo Documents," just published this year, Heykal says Chou continued: "Do you remember when the West imposed opium on us? They fought us with opium. And we are going to fight them with their own weapons. We are going to use their own methods against them." But Chou has since indicated to more recent interlocutors that China does not now pursue any such deliberate policy. Whether this is because of better relationships with Washington is impossible to say.

One area where there is certainly a direct relationship between diplomacy and drugs is Turkey which, in 1972, officially put an end to legal growing of opium poppies. Aug. 19, 1971, Gen. Cevdet Sunay, President of the Turkish republic, told me: "In recent months our main problem with the United States was opium. Washington claimed 80 per cent of U.S. heroin came from Turkish sources. It is hard to believe this when one knows how many Asian countries produce this drug."

Notwithstanding, Turkey agreed to terminate legal opium growing and the United States sent financial aid and agricultural experts to help farmers develop substitute crops. Sunay said: "The government did the right thing in suppressing production. We are aware that the United States is gratified. And we are too. We don't want to contribute to poisoning of the world's youth."

Exchange of information between antinarcotic agents of the U.S. and those of France, Turkey, Germany, Italy and South America has become speedier and more complete. French gangs involved in drug operations have found increasing difficulty in getting heroin to the United States directly and have come to depend on Latin American transit shipments.

No mysterious organizations like the Mafia or the Union Corse are involved in the French trade. It is generally a question of individual criminals seeking to make a killing. American Mafiosi in Italy are carefully watched by Rome; until recently French criminals had a freer hand.

France's anticriminal branches, under Interior Minister Raymond Marcellin, have been cracking down, aware that French youth faces the same drug danger as American youth. Libelous rumors that the French intelligence agency, S.D.E.C.E., was financing operations from drug sales have virtually ceased since S.D.E.C.E. was quietly cleaned up by a new director, Count Alexander de Marenches.

Furthermore, the French are applying a squeeze around Marseilles, the principal entrepot for Mediterranean hard drugs. Just after World War II, that port became a shipping point for the American East Coast and Marseilles laboratories were developed to refine opium smuggled from Turkey.

Marseilles became a kind of thieves' den during the heyday of the French North African empire. Unemployed crooks were drawn into the American drug trade when that empire disappeared.

HOUSTON POST
2 FEB 1973

State Department in dispute over drug abuse overseas

WASHINGTON (UPI) — A conflict has broken out in the State Department over the seriousness of drug abuse by children of American diplomats and other U.S. officials overseas.

The controversy centers on a special mission now in Southeast Asia in connection with drug use by dependents of U.S. officials.

Dr. Frank K. Johnson, head of the Drug Abuse Prevention Working Group that was scheduled to arrive Thursday in Indonesia, said his mission was primarily educational — one of research and study.

"There aren't any real problems now," he said. The working group will be checking into the reasons why the situation seems so stable in order to use this experience in the future, he added.

"That's the attitude of somebody with his head in the sand," according to another department official. "There have been increasing reports from all over (the world) about our kids using drugs."

This source, who asked not to be identified, said some areas of Southeast Asia are particularly troublesome; he mentioned Bangkok where there was a drug-related death in December involving an American dependent.

But "we hear of problems in Europe, too," the official continued, saying that wherever there are enough Americans to have a school there seems to be trouble in drugs.

When asked to document his charges, the official said it was difficult to do so for several reasons: one, there really isn't any system for accumulating such reports; second, "there is a tendency to try to hide these incidents."

The purpose of the drug mission is to find out exactly the bounds of the problem, the official said, as well as to line out solutions.

A department publication last month said the working group was organized "in response to increasing evidence of drug abuse problems among adolescent dependents at home and abroad."

Another department notice pointed to the need "to deal with this new and tragic threat to our children."

NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE
11 FEB 1973

They shoot opium smugglers in Iran, but . . .

By Henry Kamm

TEHERAN. From the air, the landscape looks as forbidding as the face of the moon. On the ground it is worse: a burning summer sun against which the treeless mountain slopes offer no shelter, or winter storms that obliterate the winding trails with masses of snow and ice. Spring brings the "120-day wind," swirling, hot gusts that fill the pores and blind the eyes with the fine brown sand that covers the barren mountainsides. But the caravans from Afghanistan inch their way along the ridges and through the gorges every day except at the depth of winter. They carry tea, and guns, and silks, and cigarettes, and opium. Above all, opium.

Even if the pack animals—mainly sturdy little horses of a Mongolian strain—don't carry opium in their saddle bags, the brownish black gum which makes men dream happy dreams also makes the caravans move. Opium wrapped around the bit makes the horses go at a prancy gait for days on end, without rest and with little food or drink, and to eventual death from exhaustion, to speed the smugglers' journey.

The smugglers want the trip to go fast particularly when the cargo is opium. The faster they reach their destination in Iran, the smaller is the risk of detection by the Imperial Iranian Gendarmerie. If the gendarmes spot the smugglers, a gunfight will follow. The lucky ones will get away; the others will die. To be wounded increases the risk of capture, and those who are captured are tried and, most often, shot by firing squads.

To escape the gendarmes is not to escape danger. Those who get away had better not lose their cargo. To return to Afghanistan without the opium, or the money or gold for it, is to face the vengeance of the tribal leader who organized the caravan and is responsible to the khan who owns the shipment. The smugglers' wives and children have remained in the chief's grip, as hostages.

The risks are immense and the rewards a pittance—perhaps $13 for a trip that may take as long as a month. But the poverty of the tribesmen of the Afghan border is so great, their ignorance and their bondage to their feudal overlords so complete, that most of Afghanistan's opium, perhaps 100 tons yearly, is carried over the mountains to Iran, where hundreds of thousands of addicts depend on it. About 85 tons of it makes it through a border where the guards are on a constant war footing.

To deal with the problems created by an addict population that is among the largest of any country, Iran has tried total permissiveness, total prohibition and — now — limited toleration. Under a 1969 law, Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlevi ended prohibition, lifted a 14-year-old ban on the cultivation of the opium poppy in his country and gave some official sanction to addiction by permitting 110,000 card-carrying addicts to buy daily doses of opium at designated pharmacies. At the same time, the law provided Draconian punishment for possession or trading of *illicit* narcotics. Mere possession of 2 kilograms (4.4 pounds) of illicit opium or 10 grams (about one-third of an ounce) of heroin, morphine or cocaine is enough to merit the firing squad, as is trading in any quantity of narcotics.

In the three years of the law's operation, about 160 smugglers and pushers have been dispatched by firing squads after rather summary military-court proceedings. Nevertheless, despite the opium-dispensing program and the harsh smuggling penalties, there has been no noticeable drop in either addiction or the steady flow of opium that comes across the border from Afghanistan to the east.

While Iran faces some of the same enforcement dilemmas as the United States, the similarity just about ends there. Addiction in Iran is not what it is in the United States, in its nature, causes or its effects; but the differences are instructive.

The American problem is heroin, as "hard" a drug as there is. The Iranian national narcotic is opium, a milder and far less addictive substance than heroin, which is the most potent concentrate of opium. The "highs" produced by heroin are much higher than those of opium, and the "lows" lower. The social problems caused by the use of heroin are correspondingly more dramatic.

Iranian opium users fit into their culture, not only because they have always been part of it but also because opium is in itself less corrosive to the social fabric than heroin. Trafficking in narcotics and their surreptitious use remain crimes, but they do not significantly raise the general level of criminality as they do in the United States. Opium is, comparatively, a penny habit that can be sustained even by the poor, not something that drives addicts to turn to crime to raise money. In the United States, the use of heroin leads to street crime, because the street provides a meeting place between moneyless addicts desperate for a fix and people with money in their pockets or shops to be held up. Most of Iran's opium users live in the impoverished countryside, where there are no stores and where rich men rarely visit with money in their pockets.

While regular use of opium induces a dependence that makes persons irritable and unable to concentrate when deprived and lowers general health, these decidedly negative effects are less socially disruptive in an undeveloped country than in a technologically modern environment. For that reason, Iran has been tough on Government employes who use opium. Nevertheless, in a largely agricultural country with widespread underemployment, the social effects of opium use are less grave. If three laborers hired to do a job work too slowly because of their smoking habits, the boss can hire

one or two more for the same total cost because labor is plentiful. "I pay my workers 80 rials [a little more than $1] a day," said the innkeeper at Tayabad, a village of high addiction on the Afghan border. "They disappear twice a day. I know they go to an old lady where for 20 rials a day they are allowed to come to smoke twice. They can't smoke in their houses because then the wife and children would also want to smoke. But the wife goes out to smoke herself." When the workers don't disappear to smoke, the innkeeper said, they are unhappy. In view of the fact that the little town seemed filled with underemployed men, this did not give him much concern.

The number of addicts in Iran is a question surrounded by myth, as it is in the United States. "The estimate is what rules in this domain," said Dr. H. A. Azarakhsh, Director General of the Iranian Health Ministry and the country's chief representative at all international meetings on the subject. Dr. Azarakhsh ventured an estimate of 200,000 to 300,000 opium users in his country. American narcotics experts consider Dr. Azarakhsh's estimate modest by perhaps one-half.

The 110,000 legitimate users consist of two groups, whose relative strength remains one of the many subjects involving narcotics that the Iranian Government considers sensitive and therefore secret. The first are opium users more than 60 years old. To be issued a card allowing them to buy their 2 to 5 grams daily at a designated pharmacy, they need merely establish that they are so accustomed to opium that their health could not stand deprivation. Persons under 60 must bring a certificate from their regular doctor stating that they should not be deprived of opium. Then they are examined by a commission of three Government physicians and subjected to laboratory tests before receiving their permits.

The fact that as many as 110,000 addicts have been registered is a strong indication of a far greater number of opium addicts. Most habitual users are villagers who would find it difficult to register even if they wanted to. They have no private physicians, live out of reach of Government medical commissions and miles from any pharmacy and all means of transport.

An old man I picked up walking along the dirt road from his own village to the next, which he said he hoped to reach in a few hours, didn't know how to close a car door, nor indeed whether it should be closed. Asked whether people still smoked the forbidden substance in his village, he regarded the questioner suspiciously and said, "Nobody uses it any more. Besides, it's too expensive."

Iranian peasants in the village or peasants living in the city have eaten opium for centuries—or smoked it since the last century when the habit was introduced from across the border with old imperial India—for reasons that make Westerners reach for an aspirin or a drink, and with generally undisastrous effects. Opium helped men and women forget their headaches and rheumatism when doctors and medicines were little known or available, and provided a distraction from the dreary and unchanging routine of a life always on the brink of calamities, against which the villagers had little defense. They gave opium to their children when they were teething, or ill, or just cranky. It may not have killed the pain, but it certainly killed any inhibitions over the use of opium when the children grew older.

From the villages, the opium habit spread to the cities, to prosperous and high-ranking people always ready to try new distractions in a luxurious life that provided a surfeit of everything. Many of the homes of the Teheran upper class used to have a well-appointed room to which male guests retired after dinner and from which the sweet smell of first-rate smoking opium soon wafted out to the ladies in the drawing room. Those who liked opium entered the room for a sociable pipe or two; those who didn't stayed with the ladies, very much like some take an after-dinner brandy when the tray is brought around and others pass it up. No stigma was attached. Similarly, most teahouses used to sell opium, and even the Iranian Parliament had a lounge that, while not an opium den, served as a place where deputies gathered to smoke opium. "Before, if you looked at Parliament, you saw opium addicts," said Dr. Jehanshah Saleh, a Syracuse University-educated gynecologist who is a Senator.

As Health Minister in 1955, Saleh steered a total ban on opium cultivation and use through Parliament—"with the full support of His Majesty," he adds. "Without his support, it would have been impossible."

Prohibition was motivated largely by prestige reasons. At a time of modernization, which in most developing countries means imitation of Western models, the use of opium was considered a shameful hangover of a dark, Oriental past. It did not fit with the image of an awakening, Westernizing Iran that the Shah was creating.

All cultivation was stopped, over the opposition of many big landowners who had found the poppy a profitable crop. So strong were the protests that Dr. Saleh recalled receiving threatening letters written in blood. For a long period he did not leave his house without a bodyguard, but production was stopped, illegally planted fields were plowed under and reduced availability caused use to drop drastically.

Before prohibition in Iran, an estimated 1.5 million people out of a population of 20 million ate or smoked opium often. Afterward, two-thirds of the users are estimated to have dropped out of the market. These ex-users were rural folk who had been eating their homegrown product and, being practically out of the money economy, could not easily afford the imported stuff.

Still, about half a million persons with enough cash to support a penny habit were a tempting market to the low-level, rural economies of Turkey and Afghanistan, and neither neighbor lacked for hardy and hard-up men ready to run the rugged borders. "Success in stopping cultivation was 100 per cent," Dr. Saleh said, "but illicit traffic ruined the program. It poured into this country. How the hell can you stop the camels? People started swearing at me: 'He's ruining our economy. Gold goes out, opium comes in.' We couldn't enforce that part of the law. We stopped cultivation, we gave treatment to addicts. But the Turks said, 'Your country has lots of oil, we have opium.'"

By 1969, angered at his neighbors' continued toleration of the growing of poppies and illegal export of opium to

Iran, the Shah braved the disapproval of Western nations, particularly the United States, and turned the clock backward. He reintroduced limited cultivation of the poppy under strict supervision, and along with recognizing addiction by putting users on maintenance rations, he provided for an expanded voluntary treatment program—and for the threat of the firing squad for trafficking and illegal use.

Now, an inexorable law of markets and comparative economic development has all but solved the problem of smuggling from Turkey into Iran—but not from Afghanistan. Almost overnight, the passage of the 1969 law reduced the Turkish share of the illicit Iranian market from about half to about 5 per cent. Turkey never depended on Iran as sole market for her excellent, if illicit, opium. At the same time as the Iranian market became less accessible—because of the border patrols—another, far more prosperous clientele began to clamor for all the heroin it could get. What the Turkish smugglers no longer dared carry to Iran, they channeled into the well-established network that buys raw opium from the farmer, refines it to morphine base at various rustic spots in Turkey before secreting it among less lucrative cargoes heading toward France by ship or truck. There it is converted to heroin for delivery to the United States.

Beyond this purely commercial reason, experts believe there is another justification for the fact that far fewer Turks will risk the death penalty than Afghans. While the mountains and plains of Eastern Anatolia are unlikely to remind the traveler of the American or Western European countryside, they are worlds apart from Afghanistan's poverty, which is unrelieved by even glimmers of hope for a better life. The Turkish smuggler has more to lose: poor as he is, he has left behind him the horizonless state that makes an Afghan risk his life for $13.

When Turkey's leaders, acting under heavy American pressure, outlawed the growing of poppies after last year's harvest, they hoped that Iran would follow suit. But, no doubt because of the certainty that Afghanistan cannot stop her poppies from making their way across the border, Iran continues legal production. In any case, enforcement experts are convinced that it will be some years before the stocks of narcotics hidden in Turkey will all have been channeled into the United States and the effects of the Turkish ban—if it is maintained—will become noticeable on the market.

Iran's present opium problem is created by two classes of victims of underdevelopment: poor Iranian peasants who use narcotics because nothing else has yet come along strong enough to break a tradition imposed by the hardships of their lives, and Afghan smugglers who are even poorer. These victims live in a world dominated by their own poverty; wealthy Afghan merchants who own the supplies; wealthy Iranian merchants who handle the distribution; the Afghan Government, which is so weak that it surrenders to feudal chiefs control over its citizens, and the Shah's Government with its Imperial Gendarmerie, courts-martial and firing squads.

"We can't really blame them from the depths of our hearts," said an Iranian who through a long-standing association with the Gendarmerie has a close acquaintance with Afghan smugglers. "They are serfs."

The Turkmen, Pashtoon and Baluchi tribesmen of the Afghan-Iranian-Pakistani border live a seminomadic life of dismal poverty under limited control of their respective central governments. Nowhere is the absence of control or care more complete than in Afghanistan, where the King's rule extends only over Kabul, his capital, and along the major highways the United States and the Soviet Union have built for him, each for its own strategic purposes. The rest of the country belongs to clan and tribal chiefs.

Merchants in Kabul, Kandahar and Herat, the principal towns, buy opium from the growers through tribal middlemen. Eventually, most of the 100 tons of Afghan opium grown yearly finds its way to the Herat region, from where the caravans set out. Clan leaders put together the caravans, from 10 to 20 men strong, chosen from among those over whom their rule is complete. Usually only the leader of the caravan is told about the delivery arrangements, whether the Iranian contact will meet them at a prearranged place or whether they are to take their cargo across the border, bury it and post guards around the spot while the leader goes to make contact in a village or town to arrange for delivery and payment. The caravans sometimes penetrate as deeply as 100 miles into Iran, in regions where people of the same tribe live on both sides of the border and neither Iran's nor Afghanistan's writ runs fully.

The Gendarmerie patrols the nearly 500 miles of the Afghan border from 55 posts, each manned by 6 to 10 men. They walk the forbidding terrain between posts, looking for smugglers' tracks. Recently the American advisory mission, which has worked with the gendarmes since 1942, persuaded them to buy 100 Japanese cross-country motorcycles. This mechanization would increase surveillance of the border and speed the calling of reinforcements from rear areas when a caravan's tracks have been spotted.

The smugglers, facing the death penalty if they are caught or the vengeance of their chiefs if they lose the opium, fight back when engaged during the day, usually scrambling for high ground to fire down on the gendarmes. On occasion, the troops have used mortars to dislodge the brigands. At nightfall, the smugglers break off contact and flee, sometimes back toward Afghanistan, sometimes deeper into Iran. Bandits often raid Iranian villages, looting or seizing hostages for ransom, so that they need not return empty-handed to their villages.

A COUNTRY is plagued with the narcotic that its level of development allows it to afford: America can afford the best, heroin that is pure enough to be injected. Iran, except for a minority estimated at between 10,000 and 50,000 who in the last decade have discovered the attraction of low-grade, "snorting" heroin, remains underdeveloped, content to eat or smoke opium.

Iran has made handsome progress in applying some of her annual petroleum income of approximately $1.3-billion to development, and as the country advances economically, Iranian opium habits will become increasingly harmful. But much progress will have to be made before the lot of the impoverished Iranian will be seriously worsened because he uses opium. He would always be better off, physically and financially, if he didn't use it, but the low standard of life in the mud villages is not greatly depressed by the villagers' opium habit.

Nevertheless, such men as Dr. Saleh and Dr. Azarakhsh deplore the smoking of opium because as physicians as well as patriots it pains them to see Persians on a large scale indulge in a habit that is unhealthy. "It's like you bring up a child until he's 14 years old and then you cut his head off," Dr. Saleh said.

They are unhappy that the resumption of opium-growing after 14 years of total ban and the official sanction of registered addiction seemingly restore some respectability to a habit they hate. In addition, even though a number of new treatment centers have been opened under the Shah's program, Dr. Azarakhsh, a man given to prudent understatement, says, "As of now, the treatment of addicts doesn't work too well."

Perhaps one day Iran will reach a level of development at which few people will find opium the easiest escape route or a necessary painkiller. And perhaps some day, too, Afghanistan will provide for her people a possibility of survival free from bondage to tribal chiefs and with enough possibilities of earning a living to consider $13 too low a price for their lives.

Does Iran offer a lesson to other countries with a major

addiction problem? Perhaps only that strong laws and rigorous enforcement can have only minor impact while the social, economic and cultural conditions that make people turn to narcotics persist. If more developed countries like the United States can offer a lesson to Iran, it is, perhaps, that a higher level of development does not necessarily bring a solution to the problem of addiction. It may also bring addiction to more expensive and more dangerous narcotics. ☒

Henry Kamm is a Paris-based roving correspondent for The Times.

Teheran's swingers

One of the effects of Iran's experiment in opium prohibition (1955-69) remains: The social acceptability of the narcotic has been compromised, particularly among well-off and city users. "Every family still has someone who smokes," said a foreign-educated member of Teheran's gilded youth. "But nowadays you wouldn't admit to an outsider that he does. We consider him like you would an uncle who drinks too much."

Illustrating the modernity of his class, the young man took a sip from his whisky and soda, forbidden by the Koran, and said that he and his friends smoked only hashish, which is easily available but used largely by those who lay stock in being "with" whatever is "it" at the moment.—H.K.

WASHINGTON POST PARADE
4 Feb 1973

A SPECIAL JACK ANDERSON REPORT

'The Latin American Connection'

How Hard Drugs Are Now Reaching U.S. Cities Via South America

WASHINGTON, D.C.

The notorious "French Connection," which has brought a blizzard of illegal white heroin powder upon the East Coast in years past, has now been replaced by a "Latin American Connection." While President Nixon's crackdown on smuggling has shut down many of the underground drug routes in Europe, it has opened up new smuggling routes in Latin America.

From Mexico, Panama, Paraguay and the Caribbean isles, heroin and cocaine are pouring into the country through our soft underbelly. The "Latin American Connection" has also introduced daring new smuggling methods.

Cadavers of South Americans who died in Europe have been filled with plastic-wrapped packets of heroin before being shipped home. Once they arrive, the heroin is removed, the body is delivered to the grieving family, and another dose of drugs is on its way to the U.S. Drugs with a telltale smell, like marijuana, have been hidden among fruits with pungent odors destined for U.S. Gulf ports.

Cocaine grows popular

Cocaine, increasingly popular in the U.S., is back-packed across desolate Andes borders by peasants, who are scornfully called *hormigas* (ants) by the wealthy drug overseers. Sometimes small planes, called *Mau Maus*, will haul the narcotics, skipping from one airstrip to the next through Latin America on into Florida in a daring game of hopscotch.

A fascinating story has been hidden under the secrecy stamp, because the government would prefer to have the public believe the smuggling crackdown has been a success. But the General Accounting Office has summarized the facts for a few select Congressmen and officials, in a 152-page document so secret that each copy has been numbered. Because this is information the public is entitled to know, we have picked out the highlights, country by country:

ARGENTINA—"Argentina has become a significant transit point for hard narcotics destined for the United States . . . cocaine is moved in . . . from Bolivia in the form of coca paste and then is refined into cocaine in Argentina. The Argentine government . . . is acting against the traffickers [but] provincial police, whose jurisdiction is outside Buenos Aires, have virtually no narcotics capabilities."

BOLIVIA—"Cocaine is illegally processed . . . by about 100 clandestine manufacturers. A portion . . . is routed to the United States." The U.S. is supplying jeeps and training to Bolivian narcotics men and "will provide funds for rewards and information" in an effort to develop undercover informants.

BRAZIL—"Brazil has the potential for becoming a major transshipment point because of its numerous harbors and airports . . . There is evidence that the Amazon River is a highway for cocaine entering the international market."

CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES—"All types of narcotics flow from Europe into the Caribbean and are transshipped to the United States. Thousands of small craft cruise the Caribbean waters, which makes it almost impossible to monitor and prevent smuggling . . . It is very difficult to control the transfer of drugs from ship to ship in many harbors . . . The Netherlands Antilles has become a major hard drug transit point and . . . Jamaica is becoming one." Guyana may be "used as a stopover point for planes from Paraguay."

CHILE—"Chile is one of the world's leading illegal manufacturers of cocaine . . . U.S. officials believe the Chileans are heavily involved in smuggling cocaine into the United States. Chile is believed to be an increasingly important transit point for heroin shipments from Europe to the United States . . . Chilean law enforcement officials are reportedly willing to cooperate [but] the narcotics and gambling squad [of Chile] were not well trained in narcotics control."

COLOMBIA—"U.S. officials state that the considerable amount of smuggling of U.S. cigarettes, radios, whiskey and other consumer goods into Colombia offers a return route for smuggling heroin and cocaine into the United States. Various means are used, including hidden landing fields and travelers on commercial airplanes."

ECUADOR—"Clandestine laboratories in the coastal area are believed to be producing cocaine and heroin . . . shipments of narcotics from other countries pass through Ecuador on their way to the United States . . . there are serious difficulties to be overcome . . . because the national police and other governmental authorities are susceptible to bribes and because the police force is undermanned, ill-trained and ill-equipped."

MEXICO—"Significant quantities of heroin and cocaine originate in or transit through Mexico to the illicit U.S. market; Mexico continues to be the principal source of marijuana coming into the United States . . . Use of Mexico as a transshipment country . . . is increasing. At least 20 percent of all heroin reaching the United States originates or passes through Mexico . . . presently, the Mexican narcotics police force is understaffed and undertrained."

PANAMA—"The crossroads of major sea and air traffic routes (and) a major contraband and smuggling center . . . Heroin and cocaine pass through Panama bound for the United States [from] Chile, Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Colombia . . . Panamanian officials do not seem to fully comprehend the steps needed to control drug production and traffic. The U.S. mission also reported that there were some indications that Panamanian officials and security agents might have been involved in narcotics trafficking."

PARAGUAY—"A major transit area for the smuggling, storage, and distribution of heroin from Europe . . . the network established to transport American cigarettes and other consumer goods to Paraguay for illegal transshipment to other countries has become the channel for smuggling drugs into the United States . . . Paraguay's concern about illicit international trafficking has increased recently because of unfavorable press reports about Paraguay's role as a smuggling center . . . There have been persistent but unconfirmed rumors that a small number of high-level Paraguayan officials are involved in drug trafficking . . . The Latin American Interagency Committee for Narcotics Control was not confident that a crackdown on officials involved in drug trafficking would take place."

PERU—"Coca leaf . . . . is refined in simple, clandestine laboratories near the coca fields and then is exported for the illegal international trade . . . Peruvian officials have indicated that they would be receptive to a United States-Peruvian bilateral program of aid in phasing out" this cocaine traffic.

URUGUAY—"When drug control is tightened in nearby countries, Uruguay may become an important transshipment point. Because of its internal security problem and the assumption that it is not a major transshipment point, it has not placed a high priority on drug control."

VENEZUELA—"Venezuela has become important as a transshipment point for drugs from Europe en route to the United States . . . the transshipment of heroin and cocaine [has] become more visible and significant . . . Venezuela is serviced by numerous international airline flights; there is a significant volume of light-aircraft movement over the country; and its land and sea frontiers are clearly vulnerable."

In summary, the report says Latin American governments had been indifferent to the flow of drugs through their countries en route to the U.S. until their own youths began taking them. "The use of narcotics, hallucinogens, amphetamines and barbiturates in Latin America is increasing, particularly among the young people."

Concludes the secret report: "There is increasing awareness in Latin America that narcotics addiction is a worldwide problem."

Far East

LOS ANGELES TIMES
28 January 1973

Vietnam's 'Mandate of Heaven' May Mandate More Fighting

JOHN McALISTER JR.

A public policy analyst, John T. McAlister Jr. is a professor in the department of engineering-economics at Stanford University. He is the author of "Vietnam: The Origins of Revolution."

Despite the buoyant mood of optimism produced by yesterday's signing of the cease-fire agreement, the prospects for durable peace in Vietnam are still dim.

While America's direct involvement in any continued fighting will be ended, at least for the present, the possibility remains that a U.S. combat role could reemerge if Saigon were to become threatened with humiliation through renewed conflict.

Even before the cease-fire agreement was signed, President Thieu had warned that "it does not mean that there is a genuine and lasting peace yet."

And Hanoi's Le Duc Tho had told a Paris news conference that the political struggle in the war-torn country would enter a new phase once the cease-fire began. The Viet Cong, he announced, would establish a capital in South Vietnam and, presumably, would service their governmental structure in areas under their control.

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If Saigon could not compete politically with effectiveness—as it has not been able to do over the past 18 years—then presumably its leaders might resort to force rather than see their power eroded through negotiations and elections.

From the perspective of his own self-interest, President Thieu had a right to be skeptical about a program for peace that he had no major role in negotiating. The agreement leaves 145,000 of Hanoi's regular troops in strategic locations in South Vietnam, creates only the vaguest and flimsiest kind of machinery for preserving the cease-fire, and forces Saigon to acknowledge that it is not the sovereign government in South Vietnam but only a party to a new, ill-defined coalition machine.

Moreover, the agreement seems to prohibit any further U.S. military aid to Thieu's regime, just as it clearly requires the dismantling of all American military bases in South Vietnam.

Le Duc Tho, therefore, was clearly justified, from the perspective of his government's self-interest, to call the agreement a "great victory." Not only had he gotten the United States to agree to leave Vietnam entirely, but he had also forced the American government to abandon its stance that South Vietnam is a separate and distinct nation—the victim of aggression by a "foreign" nation.

Reverting to the principles of the 1954 Geneva Agreements, which no U.S. government has ever fully accepted or obeyed, the United States has now—at least for the present—agreed that Vietnam is one country and that eventually it should be governed by one government. In addition, the United States has recognized the Viet Cong as a legitimate force—one with which Saigon must reach an accommodation and enter into a "National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord," aiming for what in effect is a coalition government.

It is one thing for the United States to negotiate a peaceful political settlement for an agonizing and brutalizing war, and then withdraw from Vietnam. It is quite another thing for Saigon to live up completely to the negotiated terms. The price for the return of American POWs and a negotiated cease-fire was obviously high when measured against initial American objectives of an "independent South Vietnam free from attack."

Americans, of course, are more than ready to pay the price. But what about Saigon?

Although Saigon has failed to uphold its claim as the sole legitimate government in South Vietnam by either securing the necessary popular support or utilizing American firepower to punish its enemies, the goal has not been abandoned. Yet, the agreement signed yesterday by Saigon's representative Tran Van Lam, pledges Thieu's regime to hold consultations with the Viet Cong in the spirit of national reconciliation and concord, mutual respect and mutual non-elimination and to organize "free and democratic general elections under international supervision" so that the people of South Vietnam can decide their political future.

There are some very strong reasons that these elections—like those called for in the 1954 Geneva agreement—will never occur and that reconciliation, if it does happen, will take some form of stalemated coexistence. Some of these reasons are purely political, while others go beyond current politics deep into the cultural fabric of Vietnamese society.

President Thieu has already asserted that there will be no elections so long as Hanoi's 145,000 regular troops are stationed south of the 17th parallel. Their withdrawal is unlikely to occur so long as the future status of the Viet Cong as a legitimate political movement lacks guarantees and sanction by Saigon. If the political stalemate is to be broken, then more concessions by Saigon seem necessary—ones that are almost certain to lead to President Thieu's loss of his present position of power.

Stronger reasons can be cited than simply Thieu's desire for personal power that make the prospects dim for concessions and reconciliation. There is little precedent in the Vietnamese character—whether north or south, Communist or anti-Communist—for reconciliation. This is not because the Vietnamese are inhumane but because their traditions tell them that the single correct solution to social organization lies in individual ethics and governmental order.

The tradition is often called "The Mandate of Heaven," by which the Vietnamese mean that heaven has revealed a way that family groups can live in harmony with its will.

Reconciliation and compromise are, by their very nature, anathema to the tradition of "The Mandate of Heaven." Such gestures are admissions not only that one's own concept of social and political order—be it communism, Catholicism, Buddhism — is not totally correct, but that there is no single correct solution for the organization of society.

Amid the carnage and exhaustion of Vietnamese society, such traditions as "The Mandate of Heaven" may well die away. But if so, its passage will not come soon. The past decades of Vietnamese life have been so chaotic that established traditions have proved virtually the only social anchor for the predominantly rural—now almost half-refugee—society.

Reconciliation and compromise are characteristics of "pluralist" societies of Western civilization, but they are alien to traditionalist societies

like Vietnam that still must deal with the "pluralist" challenges of modernization and industrialization.

In "pluralist" societies, parliamentary debates and popular elections are useful means of resolving conflicts. But in traditionalist societies like Vietnam, elections and debates are only rituals glorifying the correctness of the particular regime in power—whether it be the Communist one in Hanoi or the anti-Communist one in Saigon—such glorification providing additional verification of "The Mandate of Heaven."

Dr. Henry Kissinger is, of course, to be praised for the brilliance of his negotiating skills and for the usefulness of his formulas for achieving a graceful American withdrawal from Vietnam. Neither he nor his Vietnamese counterparts, however, are capable of changing some basic cultural patterns of a people tragically caught halfway between the traditional and the modern worlds.

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Theirs is a society in the midst of revolution, and this revolution will determine which way Vietnam enters the modern world. The solution will be either Communist or some form of anticommunism, but it will not be a mixture of both unless the Vietnamese abandon their most fundamental traditions and become a sort of "pluralist" society in the process.

Such a prospect seems remote indeed. As evidence, there came a report last week from Saigon, where one of America's most experienced scholars on Vietnam revealed the results of a field trip throughout the countryside.

"The cease-fire is unlikely to last 60 to 90 days beyond the date of American withdrawal," he observed. "So certain is Saigon over its own future and so intense are the feelings of bitterness and fear in the countryside that only a miracle could prevent the conflict from reoccuring."

If peace does not come and the war continues, what will America do—especially if Saigon seems threatened by military humiliation? Will congressional figures equate Saigon's difficulties with the Amerian national interest? Will there be calls to redeem the blood of American boys by going to Saigon's aid? Will there by "protective reaction" raids as warnings to Hanoi?

To forestall such difficulties, the agreement signed yesterday calls for the convening within 30 days of a major international conference to establish guarantees that will convert the cease-fire into a durable peace. The conferees will include Russia, China, France and Great Britain, as well as the various parties to the negotiations.

Over the next several months, the future of peace in Vietnam will hinge on whether this conference can develop methods for persuading the various Vietnamese parties to limit their struggle for power among themselves to peaceful means. It is on these prospects for the future of peace in Vietnam—dim though they may be just now—that the hopes of Americans rest in entering the new era of national promise and fulfillment.

If that era itself is to be durable, then perhaps we ourselves will have to learn from the tragedy of our Vietnam involvement. One lesson, surely, is this: that ancient cultures like the Vietnamese share quite different traditions from our own, and unless we take these differences into account, our own conduct toward them—even in their "defense"—is foredoomed to failure.

NEW YORK TIMES
7 February 1973

Vietnam's Joy in Victory

By Rennie Davis

WASHINGTON—Recently I met with Mrs. Nguyen Thi Binh. My only disappointment was that every American could not share in the joy of Vietnam's victory. By any standards, it is incredible.

A 100-year French-American campaign, pitting the most advanced machines of destruction against an ancient nation of rice farmers has been defeated. Except for the generals and merchants whose lives were purchased by the American dollar, the Vietnamese people today overflow with hope and anticipation. Every American who spoke out against this war, every demonstrator and resister and anti-war organizer, anyone who contributed to peace even with the smallest gesture, can feel joy in the mutual accomplishment of this peace accord.

Perhaps the greatest American loss of this war lies not in the lives or the dollars wasted but in the endless stream of ugly distortions flowing out of Washington about the men and women and children who have defeated America's military goliath. Even now, the media trumpet the official propaganda line that bombs and mines crushed the powerful spring-summer offensive in Vietnam and the Christmas Hanoi-Haiphong massacre "forced" the North Vietnamese back to "serious negotiations."

Time will show the opposite. President Nixon's "peace with honor" is a face-saving disguise for a "Vietcong" victory. Or, as Mrs. Binh said: "Nixon has failed. If you asked us who is the winner in the war, we would like to say, peace is the winner. And it is a true peace because it is peace with independence."

On Jan. 29, an American peace delegation was invited to a Paris reception by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam.

It was an incredible mix of people, from high officials of the French, Soviet, People's Republic of China and other governments to ordinary people, like the Vietnamese taxi drivers who were the guests of Xuan Thuy. What struck me most was the open love that so many different people felt and showed for the Vietnamese representatives, especially Mrs. Binh, whose presence evoked a thousand embraces and tears and smiles.

We spent an afternoon with Mrs. Binh on the eve of Vietnam's lunar holiday, Tet. She thought it sad that so many friends of Vietnam did not understand the significance of their victory. "Many friends see only the difficulties that lie ahead and do not see the great victory we have won," she said. This agreement "not only speaks to the failure of aggression of the United States in Vietnam, it marks the failure of the global strategy of the United States to stop the liberation struggles of people in many places."

Mrs. Binh said bluntly that Saigon "is not willing to implement the agreement" and that Saigon's leaders had "adopted a militaristic line and line of repression and terror against the people."

Particularly, she said, President Thieu will resist the release of over 200,000 civilian prisoners jailed and tortured during the war, the establishment of a third force as a significant group to help implement the accords and recognition of the spirit of the accords calling for national reconciliation and concord.

But the underlying perspective of the Vietnamese we met in Paris was that the accords represented a victory that has grown out of the success of the recent spring-summer offensive. While every effort was made by Le Duc Tho and the other Vietnamese representatives to find language to give America "honor" and fig leaves for their withdrawal, the United States has been forced "to respect our fight for self-determination."

I have never seen the Vietnamese leadership in Paris more confident of their strength and more hopeful for their future. Mrs. Binh said, "We are strong and we will force the Saigon administration to abide by the agreement. We are confident that the South Vietnamese people will be victorious in the end."

When I read about a U.S. Congressman making foolish declarations that "hell will be a skating rink before I vote any foreign aid for that bunch of murderers," or watch the media reduce the ending of the war to the sensation of returning a few hundred American prisoners of war without a word of the hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese prisoners who remain in cells, I feel surely the time has come for America to learn the hidden truth about the "Vietcong."

The Vietnamese people are already forgiving America for the greatest atrocity of the twentieth century and they are probably the most forgiving people on the planet.

Perhaps Mrs. Binh should be invited to the United States. She or her representative would be happy to come, if Congress would have the courage to hear her and demand a visa. Perhaps those television and public-opinion makers who blinded us to Vietnam and

taught us hate for the "other side," might travel in future days to My Lai, where the P.R.G. is building a hospital for the village our soldiers massacred. In fact, airfields are being built in the P.R.G. controlled zones that will make it possible to compare honestly the life offered by the U.S. Government in Saigon with the life the P.R.G. offers My Lai and the rest of South Vietnam.

Rennie Davis, an antiwar activist, has traveled widely in Vietnam. He recently returned from Paris and discussions with Xuan Thuy and Mrs. Nguyen Thi Binh.

NEW YORK TIMES
4 February 1973

NIXON AIDES MOVE AGAINST WAR FOES

Past Critics of President's Policies Are Assailed

By JOHN HERBERS
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 3—Now that a peace agreement in Vietnam has been reached, members of the Nixon Administration have undertaken to discredit the critics of the President's conduct of the war and of peace negotiations.

In the last week, Administration officials have charged that the criticism delayed the peace agreement, that columnists and commentators fabricated reports of disagreement between Mr. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger during the December bombing and that the President has been subjected to unfair criticism.

The charges were leveled at members of Congress, the media and officials in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations. One of the Administration spokesmen applied the term "sellout brigade" to those who favored an earlier withdrawal of United States forces from Vietnam and opposed the use of saturation bombing, mining and other activity by the United States.

Mr. Nixon, at his news conference last Wednesday, said that "the least pleasure out of the peace agreement comes from those who were the most outspoken advocates of peace at any price."

Peace Seen Delayed

On Thursday night, Charles W. Colson, special counsel to the President, interviewed by Elizabeth Drew on the Public Broadcasting Service television network, said that the opposition to the President's conduct of the war in Congress had delayed the negotiation of peace.

If there had been bipartisan support of what the President was doing, he said, "I think the war would have ended much sooner than it did."

Pressed for specifics about the criticism of Mr. Nixon, Mr. Colson said that Clark Clifford, President Johnson's last Secretary of Defense, was "representative, really, of a group of people who would have compromised this country's position in Vietnam." What those people were advocating, Mr. Colson said, was a "dishonorable peace."

He identified four Senators—J. W. Fulbright of Arkansas, George McGovern of South Dakota, Frank Church of Idaho and Edward M. Kennedy of Massachusetts—as "part of the 'sellout brigade.'"

"I think they would have had us leave Vietnam without regard to the consequences," he said.

Mr. Colson used the words "sell-out brigade" in an "Op-Ed column" in The New York Times last Tuesday in which he charged that reports of differences between the President and Mr. Kissinger were a "full-blown myth born in Washington Georgetown cocktail circuit that had made Mr. Kissinger's peace efforts more difficult.

Ronald S. Ziegler, the White House press secretary, reinforced Mr. Colson's argument in a long discourse with reporters, who wanted to know if the column had the President's approval. He said that Mr. Colson was speaking for himself but he sought to show that there was no evidence for high-level division on the war.

Flat Stand on Kissinger

"There was no difference of view on the matter of the bombing that took place in December," Mr. Ziegler said. "I can state flatly that he [Mr. Kissinger] did not oppose it." Asked if it were possible as widely believed, that Mr. Kissinger had been the source of the reports, Mr. Ziegler said that he could not believe anyone who so completely agreed with the President in White House meetings could spread reports of division.

During the week, Senator Barry Goldwater, Republican of Arizona, distributed an unsigned "Vietname white paper" that was reported to have originated in the Administration. Mr. Goldwater, in his accompanying letter, endorsed the paper without identifying its source. Several thousand copies were distributed.

"For four agonizing years Richard Nixon has stood virtually alone in the nation's capital while little, petty men flayed him over American involvement in Indochina," the paper said. "No President has been under more constant and unremitting harassment."

Attached to the text was a list of quotations from newspapers, columnists, commentators, magazines, and Democrats in Congress to show "how wrong and how harsh were the critics when things were most difficult."

DAILY TELEGRAPH, London
5 February 1973

VIETNAM'S PHONEY PEACE

ROUND ONE of the Vietnam "cease-fire," after a week in which the fighting flared and spread instead of subsiding, has ended more quietly. But there is no sign so far of any of the hopeful factors in the agreements showing tender shoots, and plenty of confirmation for the first grim forebodings. The North Vietnamese demonstrated their ability to take the initiative in the new situation, and although they may have suffered heavier losses than the Southern troops, they scored more points. Now they are preparing for what could be Round Two in the shape of an assault on the provincial capital of Quang Tri.

With the South, under the agreements, denied arms supplies other than replacements, its only hope of containing the North Vietnamese forces in their "leopard-spot" enclaves lies in these also being held to the mutual restrictions. Yet, on the contrary, supplies and reinforcements are pouring in through the Demilitarised Zone, Laos and Cambodia faster than ever, considerably facilitated by the "cease-fire." The International Supervisory Commission, and the military committees composed of the parties to the war, although gradually taking shape, are still bogged down in procedural, administrative and logistical problems. Not that anyone can imagine the Polish and Hungarian members, even if they ever get out on the long, long Ho Chi-minh trail, ever being parties to discovering or denouncing any violations committed by their comrades.

Meanwhile Dr KISSINGER, for whose "peace with honour" North Vietnam is showing such derision, will visit Hanoi on Friday and Peking next week. To Hanoi he will take those familiar instruments of President NIXON's Vietnam policy, the carrot and the stick—now in that order. The former is as succulent as a few billion dollars can make it. Dr KISSINGER dwells on Hanoi's need for peace and reconstruction after 20 years of war. He may be misunderstanding the North Vietnamese Communists if he thinks that, with victory suddenly seeming so much closer, with no public opinion or democratic qualms of conscience, they can be bought off with offers of American aid and friendship. They may be more impressed with the stick, the weight of which they have felt so recently. It would be politically difficult for Mr NIXON to resume the bombing; but he has shown that he is a determined man, adept at devising appropriate responses.

As for China, she very much wants peace and a further rapid improvement in relations with America to balance Russian expansion. She would like to curb Hanoi's upstart mini-imperialism, but could hardly be seen to be letting a Communist protégé down. Dr KISSINGER's next case?

THE GUARDIAN MANCHESTER
25 January 1973

Vietnam: peace and conflict

A ceasefire after a quarter of a century of bloody, destructive fighting in Vietnam is something the whole world as well as the Vietnamese can be relieved at and grateful for. It is not important that President Nixon called it "peace with honour" and Hanoi a "great victory" at the same time. The vital and decisive point is that the scale of fighting and killing now is likely to be drastically reduced and that the Americans should be leaving. The Vietnamese are now left to sort things out for themselves after their tensions had been exacerbated by the French, the Japanese, the French again, and then the Americans.

The ghastliness of the war can be offset only in part by President Nixon's statement that the US was prepared to make a major effort to "build a peace of reconciliation." This will not bring back to life or heal the two and a half million Vietnamese dead and wounded, nor can it restore homes to the millions of refugees. It will not restore trees and crops to the defoliated acres, nor will it re-create the cities, villages, and countryside turned to rubble under the rain of bombs dropped on Indo-China (mainly on South Vietnam) since 1966. It has been a war of wrong tactics used at the wrong time, with hideous results for Vietnam, South and North.

If Dr Kissinger has brought back peace for the Americans in their time, has he done the same for the Vietnamese? President Nixon put a sturdy face and voice on his ceasefire announcement. But the vague nature of the agreement—after years of fighting, bombing, and negotiating—appears in fact to have raised a smokescreen behind which the US can disappear with a minimum of dignity lost.

And on the ground in Vietnam? Unless there is an unprecedented demonstration of goodwill and resolution by all Vietnamese parties to make the published terms work, the long term prospects must be gloomy. The major concession that the US has obtained is that Saigon and the Vietcong will try to do their utmost to bring about the release, within 90 days of the ceasefire, of Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and retained in South Vietnam. It is easy to see how President Thieu's best efforts could be insufficient. Thieu has issued a stern injunction to suppress by shooting, if necessary, any support for the Communists. He is keen to postpone as long as possible any opportunity for the Communists to rebuild their cadres. There is no hurry, in his eyes, to let the prisoners out.

Nor is he in any hurry to let the refugees if home is in a Vietcong-controlled district, or to desist from using the apparatus of arrest and terror to hold his remaining areas in the South. The prescribed 90 days, of course, are too short a time in which to relax the tensions and establish an easier way of life. A beginning could be made if the will were there. Perhaps, when Vietnamese face Vietnamese on their own, it will prove nearer than seems probable. More than the 90 days will pass before the reality is seen.

The National Council of National Reconciliation looks as unpromising as it always has. Both Thieu and the Communists are determined to canvass strength by force. Neutrals to make up the third party will be hard to find, and unanimity within the council even harder. The limited size of the ceasefire control commission (always a notional force), the continued presence of North Vietnamese troops, and the lack of troop regroupment areas makes more likely the eventual renewal of fighting—with the commission just making notes. On a wider scale, the prevention of military activity in Laos and Cambodia seems fragile. The US appears still to have leeway enough to continue bombing the trails from Thailand. Will it not be warned by past experience to avoid further involvement?

The legacy of eight years of deep American involvement in the Vietnamese war will be felt far beyond Vietnam. The frustration, loss of self-confidence, and fear of foreign involvement among Americans will affect international relations for the remainder of this century. President Nixon was putting a gentle gloss on it all when he said, in his inaugural address, that America will no longer make every other nation's conflict its own or every other nation's future its responsibility. Although intervention in Vietnam was in the end a disaster, America's withdrawal from world responsibility is the world's loss.

Monday, Feb. 5, 1973 THE WASHINGTON POST

Hanoi Regards Unanimity Rule As Useful Tool

(The writer recently returned from a two-week trip to North Vietnam.)

By Murrey Marder
Washington Post Staff Writer

National concord and reconciliation, "unity," Vietnamese style, hardly mean exactly the same thing to Vietnamese as they do to Westerners, the coming struggle for political control in Saigon is bound to accept.

Westerners, including some American strategists, were surprised during the prolonged cease-fire negotiations in Paris by the North

News Analysis

Vietnamese insistence that the rule of unanimity must apply in the projected three-segment National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord for South Vietnam.

To American ears this sounds like a procedure guaranteed to produce deadlock and to make the Council powerless.

As a result, many American officials have reasoned, the intended Council should pose no threat whatever to the continued rule in South Vietnam of President Nguyen Van Thieu.

With the unanimity rule operating in the Council, it has been argued privately inside the Nixon administration, Thieu's regime faces no real challenge that a potential "coalition" government may emerge from the Paris accord. With decisions requiring unanimity for action, it is claimed, Thieu's forces on the Council can block with ease anything they oppose.

Contention Rejected

North Vietnamese plan-

ners, however, who are not noted for political naivete, reject this contention.

In probing conversations conducted in Hanoi, the initial responses of North Vietnamese officials to inquiries on why they insisted upon "unanimity" in the Council, produced superficial replies that matched the comforting language in the Paris agreement: to achieve "a spirit of national reconciliation and concord" with "respect" for opposing viewpoints.

But under further questioning, the North Vietnamese conceded that their underlying dual rationale for the "unanimity" rule was to prevent Thieu's forces from imposing their will on the Vietcong faction in the National Council, and to use the process to isolate Thieu's supporters by portraying them as the barriers to peace in South Vietnam.

In a Vietnamese context, as alien as this may sound to Westerners, officials in Hanoi maintain that this form of political encirclement can prove quite effective.

The process, as explained by Hoang Tung, editor of the official newspaper Nhan Dan, and an alternate member of North Vietnam's Communist Central Committee, is that "first you try to get unanimity." If there are "differences between the various forces," he said, an attempt is then made to resolve them. Should that fail, the dissenters are then isolated and shown up to the public as intransigent obstructionists.

No one can risk "trying to block everything" under this formula, Tung maintained.

Nguyen Van Tien, suave chief of the provisional Revolutionary Government (Vietcong) representation in Hanoi, and often an adviser in the Paris talks, said: "This way of working must take time, because it is difficult. Although it takes time, if it comes to results it is a good thing."

'Our Tradition'

"A spirit of national concord is our tradition," he said. "Now we must face reality . . . We must have confidence I only say that we are confident about the general principle"

"Of course," Tien continued archly, "there are some men like Nguyen Van Thieu who are always difficult. But there are other men who have good will.

"This is the general aspiration," he said, and then Tien added bluntly, "And those who are against the spirit will be abandoned."

Tien said, "the Saigon administration has many cunning means which we have already denounced."

But he and other officials in Hanoi displayed confidence that what they choose to label "the spirit of national concord" will prevail in the end—with or without the consent, or the participation, of the Thieu regime.

WASHINGTON POST
14 February, 1973

Chalmers M. Roberts

After Vietnam: What Role For the U.S.?

OF THE several fascinating things President Nixon had to say in his last press conference, one in particular struck me:

In response to a question as to whether he had "anything specifically in mind to help heal the wounds in this country, the divisions over the war . . ." he replied, in part: "Well, it takes two to heal wounds and I must say, when I see that the most vigorous criticism or, shall we say, the least pleasure out of the peace agreement comes from those who were the most outspoken advocates of peace at any price, it makes one realize whether some want the wounds healed. We do."

The President went on to say that his administration had "done the very best that we can against very great obstacles," that "most Americans" realize the result was what he termed "a peace with honor" even though he felt that it "gags" some of the reporters present that day "to write that phrase."

I prefer to leave to the historians the verdict on whether "peace with honor" has been achieved (and they probably will have to await the events of the next decade to make that determination) and to decide whether the press, or part of it, and others in our society produced "very great obstacles" that delayed a conclusion to the American participation in the Second Indochina War. For now it is enough to deal with the more immediate question: what is going to be the post-Vietnam posture of the United States in world affairs? I remember vividly that I was told by European leaders, during the Nixon trip to Western Europe in the early part of his first year in the White House, that the President had told them he felt his priority task was to keep America from going isolationist. In one way or another, including the development of the Nixon Doctrine and in his annual foreign policy reports, the President has reiterated that theme.

The questioner at the Nixon press conference had such domestic war repercussions as amnesty in mind in asking about "healing wounds." I have in mind, however, bringing the vast majority together in support of a new and altered American role abroad, one both consistent with our past history in the best sense and with the new realities we see before us, post-Vietnam. Nixon himself was prescient on that in his Foreign Affairs article on "Asia after Vietnam," published in October, 1967.

It seems to me that the *sina qua non* of arriving at a new consensus requires the agreement of the executive and the legislative branches of government, an agreement reached through discussion and consultation between the President and the majority of members of both parties in Senate and House. Nixon remarked on the negative response of some to his Vietnam settlement, questioning "whether some want the wounds healed." But he added: "We do."

Perhaps some really don't, perhaps it will take some time. But if the President does want the wounds healed, in the sense of creating a consensus on America's post-Vietnam role in the world, then both he and the legislators will have to adopt the late President Johnson's Biblical admonition, "come, let us reason together." Given the fact that today the White House and the majority in Congress are locked in some major executive-legislative disputes of constitutional proportions this, obviously, is not going to be easy. But shouldn't the effort be made? And couldn't such an effort in the foreign policy field be separated from the domestic differences with Congress?

History sometimes is useful in providing a way. I am thinking now of the events of 1943 here in Washington, and specifically of what then was called the "B2-H2" resolution. Much of the history of this can be found in the diary of Republican Sen. Arthur H. Vandenberg and there is some mention of it in President Truman's memoirs.

Briefly, two Republican and two Democratic senators, Messrs. Ball, Burton, Hatch and Hill, put forward a Senate "advise" resolution on post-World War II peace objectives. The central point was that the United States should take the lead in creating a new international organization to keep the peace. Then Sen. Truman and Wendell Willkie both were strong proponents of that resolution.

Sen. Vandenberg and Secretary of State Hull both were leary of the move in the midst of war when there were problems enough already in dealing with our two major allies, Britain and the Soviet Union. But "B2-H2" caught the public mood and in the end, after a great deal of consultation, especially between Vandenberg and Hull with FDR's consent, a compromise resolution of the same general purport passed the Senate, 85-to-5, to provide the initiative for what was to become the United Nations and the American role in post-war affairs.

The parallel, of course, is inexact. But it seems to me that the route to a new consensus on America's world role after this war is the same. And now that the rancor born of the war is at least receding perhaps the time is approaching for an effort to produce that new consensus through public discussion and joint consultation between the Congress and the Executive Branch.

THE ECONOMIST FEBRUARY 3, 1973

It went on

Even if the shooting after the Vietnam ceasefire does die away, the question is whether North Vietnam will keep the guns silent beyond April

There was no ceasefire in South Vietnam last weekend. There never was a chance that the fighting would stop just like that. The communists made use of the last few hours before the deadline to block as many of the roads that link Saigon to the market towns around it as they could ; the government had to roll them back in order to preserve its lines of communication, and to keep food flowing into the capital. The fighting continued this week as the communists tried to hold on to as much new land as possible before the supervisors from the International Commission of Control and Supervision turned up. As it happened, the North Vietnamese and Vietcong need not have been in so much of a hurry. By Thursday, neither the ICCS nor the four-party military commission that is supposed to help it to supervise the ceasefire over the next two months had managed to get more than a handful of men out of their Saigon offices. The sighs and groans coming from Mr Trudeau, the Canadian prime minister, suggest that it might not be very long before Canada walks out of the commission altogether.

Even if the Americans do come up with the transport that is needed, and the supervisors do fan out into the provinces, it will take more than their presence to enforce the ceasefire. The white faces of the Poles, Hungarians and Canadians will be a signal to local commanders to silence the guns until they have driven past—unless some isolated Vietcong patrol mistakes them for Americans. There are a lot of villages that a force of 1,160 men, even split up into halfpenny packets, is never going to get round to visiting in a country the size of South Vietnam. And it is proving very difficult for people to agree on what their function is anyway.

Standstill ceasefire is a phrase that trips easily off the pen in an hotel room in Paris, but the concept is enforceable in Vietnam only if both sides can be persuaded to accept a ceasefire line. The war cannot simply be frozen when villages are contested and Vietcong ambush squads are camping on vital roads. But the division of power in the countryside is so fluid and so complex that the only way of hitting upon a workable sharing-out is to rely on local commanders to make their own terms with each other. There is not much sign of that happening yet. The distrust is too great, and too much is at stake. And even if there is a significant lowering of hostilities between the big units over the next few days, there is small chance of either side paying more than lip-service to the ceasefire agreement within the areas that it controls. Article 11 of that agreement, for example, upholds the principles of freedom of movement, speech and assembly in all parts of the country. But President Thieu saw fit to remind the communists last week that they are liable to get shot if they enter a government-held village. To people more familiar with legal documents than with life on a battlefield that was a wicked thing to say. To the people doing the fighting it was more understandable. Until it becomes clear whether the communists are genuinely ready to respect the ceasefire terms (and whether it will really lead on to any sort of political settlement) it would be suicide for the other side to give them the benefit of the doubt.

Not until the fighting ends

While the men in the ICCS are trying to work out just what their job entails, other problems are looming up. An international conference on Indochina is supposed to meet by the end of February (see page 28). Its agenda still has to be worked out, but the chances are that if Mr Thieu and the Vietcong have made no progress towards setting up the Council of Reconciliation that is supposed to organise new elections they will come under a lot of pressure to get on with it. The balance of advantage in this is unclear. Mr Thieu himself appears to believe that an early presidential election would give him a strong chance of winning, although he would probably be opposed by one, and possibly two, other non-communist candidates. The National Liberation Front would prefer elections for an assembly to draw up a new constitution, or at least elections for a new parliament, through which they could hope to establish a strong voting block in Saigon. Mr Thieu will certainly resist any timetable for this kind of election unless and until the fighting really has died down.

The other thing he has to fear from the conference, of course, is that it will be the occasion for a renewed war of words in which the communists will say that it is the government that has been doing most of the violating of the ceasefire, and will bring up the special question of the civilian prisoners held in South Vietnam. Under the terms of the agreement, the two sides are supposed to try to solve the question of "civilian internees" within 90 days. The term is defined, as in the 1954 Geneva agreement, to cover anyone who contributed "to the political and armed struggle between the two parties." The communists claim that the Saigon government is holding between 100,000 and 200,000 people who fit that definition. The South Vietnamese claim that the number is nothing like that, and that many of their prisoners have been charged under normal criminal law. They also claim to have prepared a detailed list of 42,000 civilians who have been detained by the communists since 1965. Before the debate on the rights and wrongs of each side kindles too much heat, it is worth pointing out that the issue demonstrates the impracticality of demanding that a government should do all of the things normally associated with the end of a war until it has reason to believe the war really is over. Mr Thieu will not open his jails to people who have been trying to shoot him out of power before there is evidence that that is no longer their intention.

The three ways it could go

To pass judgment on the present state of things in Vietnam, it is necessary to have some clear conception of the way things are going to work out over the next few months. There are three broad possibilities. The first, and most optimistic, is that the communists will accept that they have failed, at least for the moment, to win a military victory, and will concentrate on a political campaign designed to draw votes in a free election and to win over many of the neutralist or non-committed politicians in Saigon. If they accepted this, Mr Thieu could

hold an election in which he would win a sizeable plurality. There would continue to be skirmishing in the countryside, but this would involve only small groups of men seeking their own local advantage.

The second possibility is that, although the communists and the government will fail to reach agreement on holding new elections, the North Vietnamese government will not authorise a major new offensive for fear of American reprisals. The Soviet Union's policy could be decisive here (see the next article). The Russians and the Chinese may both now be in favour of at least a lull in the war. They may be telling North Vietnam to pin its hopes on some future campaign, not on a major push now that might prove as costly as last year's offensive and might provoke Mr Nixon into sending the American bombers back. The men in Hanoi may also be influenced by the offer of American money for their country's reconstruction. Mr Kissinger will be talking about that in Hanoi next weekend.

The third possibility, and the gloomiest, is that the communists are going to push for a decisive victory this year, and that they intend to make it politically impossible for Mr Nixon to retaliate when they launch their next big offensive—possibly this time in the shape of a direct assault on Saigon. They might hope to tie Mr Nixon's hands by returning the American prisoners, and by launching a propaganda campaign intended to show that Mr Thieu's government has violated the ceasefire agreement more frequently and more seriously than the Vietcong. They may also calculate that the final breakdown of the ceasefire might panic Mr Thieu into seizing wider powers for himself and rounding up a new batch of political prisoners. That would enable the critics of the war abroad to argue that Mr Thieu had lost any claim to be a democratic ally.

Whether Mr Nixon would be able to resist the pressures that this sequence of events would bring to bear on him is a matter for debate. He seems to believe that the North Vietnamese are not going to pull the rug from under his feet ; he may think the Russians will stop them. But if he found that he had been betrayed he might be prepared to risk considerable unpopularity in order to preserve the Saigon government. If the bombing of Hanoi in December proved anything, it proved that Mr Nixon is still ready to use most of the military means at his disposal to establish an acceptable peace.

Whichever of these scenarios proves accurate, the war is still going on in Vietnam, and it is a war that must now be seen as a straight fight between the two sides within Vietnam. People are comparing the situation to what happened in the early 1960s, but things have changed since then. Mr Thieu is a shrewder politician than Diem, and he has a bigger, better trained army—with a lot of new American hardware—than his ill-fated predecessor had. But he also has to deal with the 150,000 North Vietnamese regulars who are now camped in his country—those men nowhere mentioned in the ceasefire agreement. So long as that foreign army is there, it is hard to see how any arrangement that would allow for a peaceful evolution of the country's political future can be made to work. General Giap's soldiers are not tamely waiting to cast their votes in the next Saigon election.

NEW YORK TIMES
13 February 1973

In a Complex Struggle P.O.W. Became Pawn

By JOHN W. FINNEY
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 12—With the first release today of American prisoners in Vietnam, Washington and Hanoi began the final act of a lengthy drama in which the prisoners became pawns in a political and military struggle.

Apparently it is a drama each side plans to play right down to the last man. The Communist side will not release all prisoners until it sees the United States withdrawing all its troops from South Vietnam. And the United States will not remove all its forces until it is certain that all the prisoners are being released by the Communist side.

This link — defined in the Vietnam peace agreement and the accompanying protocols — underscores the way in which the international code on humanitarian treatment of prisoners, set forth in the 1919 and 1949 Geneva conventions, was overtaken in this war by political considerations.

For North Vietnam the prisoners became hostages to be used to force the United States into political concessions in South Vietnam. But critics of the Johnson and Nixon Administrations felt that the prisoners were used by the United States in turn as pawns to justify military actions and negotiating positions.

In the history of modern wars—with the possible exception of the Korean War, which also ended in a truce — never has such political use been made of prisoners. The Korean truce was held up for several weeks by political disagreement over whether prisoners should be repatriated to their homelands against their will.

A Complicating Element

While the issue of American prisoners was resolved relatively quickly in the Korean negotiations, it complicated the negotiations between the United States and North Vietnam and became a highly emotional aspect of the debate on the war.

The first effort to make political use of the prisoners was by North Vietnam, which in 1966 threatened to try captured American pilots as war criminals. By 1969 the North Vietnamese had backed off this threat, but in the process, intentionally or not, they had raised a legal point—whether they were obliged to conform to the Geneva conventions, which they had signed. They had withheld approval of Section 85, which provides that prisoners classified as war criminals are entitled to the same protection as others.

Through diplomatic channels the State Department—which had set up a special prisoner office under the direction of Frank Sieverts, a Foreign Service officer—repeatedly sought international inspection of the prisoner camps, a requirement of the Geneva conventions. Hanoi refused to admit the International Committee on the Red Cross, a Swiss group that it viewed as pro-Western. Not until the peace agreement was signed did the North Vietnamese consent to Red Cross inspection.

Hanoi also declined to comply with a provision requiring the submission of an official list of names. Instead, starting in 1969, it submitted unofficial lists through such channels as the Committee of Liaison, an antiwar coalition, and Senators Edward M. Kennedy and J. W. Fulbright, both critics of the war. The United States refused to accept the lists as official or complete, but in the end they proved to be fairly accurate.

As the controversy over the prisoners intensified, the United States seized upon North Vietnam's refusal to comply fully with the conventions as proof that the prisoners were being maltreated.

Hanoi's Intentions Clearer

Early in 1968, according to State Department officials who have been following the prisoner question, it became apparent that North Vietnam was intent on using the prisoners as hostages.

From then on, in the view of Administration officials, the prisoners became an increasingly political issue, with their release inextricably linked by both sides to the withdrawal of American forces.

That the Communists were demanding a political price became evident, but the price was not clearly defined.

In mid-1971, when the Vietcong presented a peace plan, it seemed to some that the Communist side would agree to release the prisoners in return for a firm commitment by the United States to withdraw all forces from the South. That, at least, was the impression that several American politicians and journalists got from talking with Communist representatives.

Then, as the Administration had all along contended would happen, the Communists' price was raised. Perhaps, as Admin-

istration officials suspect, North Vietnam concluded that the prisoners were worth more than just a troop withdrawal. At any rate it became evident that the price included the end of American support for the Saigon Government and acceptance of a coalition government in South Vietnam.

The Nixon Administration's policy on the prisoners also changed, partly in response to the Communists but also for domestic political reasons.

The Johnson Administration had maintained silence, on the theory, according to officials, that quiet diplomacy rather than publicity was the best way to obtain the prisoners' release.

'Decision to Go Public'

Early in 1969 the Nixon Administration, which had just taken office, decided "to go public" on the prisoner issue—a course recommended to the President by his Secretary of Defense, Melvin R. Laird, architect of the plan for Vietnamization and troop withdrawal and a shrewd student of Congressional moods.

Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in November, 1970, after the dramatic but unsuccessful American raid on the Son Tay prison camp in North Vietnam, Mr. Laird, himself a former Representative, said the object of the new policy was "to bring world opinion to bear on the North Vietnamese" to provide better treatment of the prisoners and to release them.

At a Pentagon news conference in May, 1969, he had suggested that the prisoners were being maltreated and called for their prompt release.

In the course of a concerted publicity campaign, the astronaut Frank Borman was sent around the world to publicize the prisoners' plight. Presidential proclamations were issued establishing "national weeks of concern." With the encouragement of Senator Robert J. Dole of Kansas, chairman of the Republican National Committee, the National League of Families of Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia was formed.

In April, 1971, President Nixon declared that the North Vietnamese "without question have been the most barbaric in the handling of prisoners of any nation in history."

Humanitarian Basis Stressed

Administration officials insist that the decision to carry the issue to the public was motivated by the humanitarian considerations. As evidence that the campaign was successful, the officials note that, starting in 1969, the North Vietnamese began to supply prisoner lists and permitted the men to send out mail. Another factor may have been that the United States stopped bombing North Vietnam late in 1968.

Increasingly, any humanitarian motivation was overtaken—whether deliberately or not is still unclear—by political considerations. As the American force was reduced, the Administration placed even more emphasis on the prisoners, forging the link between release and withdrawal. President Nixon declared in February, 1971, that the United States would maintain a residual force in South Vietnam until all the prisoners were free.

Critics of the Administration objected that the more the issue was publicized, the greater became the hostage value of the prisoners. The Administration rebuttal was that the link between release and withdrawal had been established by the Communist side.

The prisoner issue was useful to the Administration in keeping domestic critics of the war on the defensive. Every time a Senate dove would propose withdrawal, a supporter of the Administration would protest that such a course would "let American boys rot in Communist prison camps."

The prisoners became such an emotional issue, indeed, that with the exception of John Sherman Cooper, Republican of Kentucky, no Senate dove dared offer a proposal requiring troop withdrawals that did not also specify release. In Senator Cooper's view the doves had been maneuvered into playing into the Administration's hand, since neither it nor North Vietnam was prepared to accept release as the sole condition for ending the war.

Mansfield Move Defied

That became evident in the fall of 1971, when the Senate majority leader, Mike Mansfield of Montana, pushed it through a declaration that it be national policy to withdraw American forces from Indochina by a firm deadline, subject only to release of the prisoners. Mr. Nixon announced that he would ignore the move, explaining that his goal was a negotiated settlement that would provide not only for release but also for a cease-fire throughout Indochina.

The Mansfield proposal proved to be the high-water mark for the Congressional doves. As the Presidential election approached, Senator George McGovern, Democrat of South Dakota, and others would periodically raise the charge that the President was using the prisoners to justify continued involvement in the war. But the doves were never willing to push the matter too forcefully lest it boomerang.

For a time the league of families was a potent political force, allied with the Administration in dramatizing the prisoner issue. League officials were sought for Congressional testimony and were granted access to the White House. The league was supplied with mailing lists by the Republican National Committee, and relatives of captives were encouraged to go on what proved to be futile trips to Paris to get information from the North Vietnamese representatives there.

Toward the end a split developed in the original hawkish league, with a faction protesting that the prisoners were being used to justify continuation of the war. At about that time the Administration began to modulate its publicity campaign.

THE WASHINGTON MONTHLY
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Patrick J. McGarvey

Intelligence to Please

From 1964-65, when U. S. involvement in Vietnam began to be considerable, until late 1966 or early 1967, the generals in Saigon worked to build up U. S. troop strength. Therefore, they wanted every bit of evidence brought to the fore that could show that infiltration was increasing. The Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) obliged and also emphasized in all reports the enemy's capability to recruit forces from the South Vietnamese population. In 1967 a second period began. The high priests of Saigon decided that we were "winning." Then the paramount interest became to show the enemy's reduced capability to recruit and a slowdown in infiltration due to our bombing. The tune and emphasis of reports from the field changed radically, and so did those put out by DIA.

Adapted from an article in the July, 1970, issue of The Washington Monthly.

It should not be concluded that any one person suppressed evidence. No one did. The military in Saigon sent all the facts back to Washington eventually. During the build-up period, infiltration data and recruitment data came in via General Westmoreland's daily cablegram. Data from field contact with enemy units came amid the more mundane cables or by courier up to five weeks later. Cables from West-

moreland, of course, were given higher priority in Washington. When we started "winning," detailed reports highlighting "body counts" and statistics on how many villages were pacified were cabled with Westmoreland's signature; recruitment studies were pouched or cabled with the reports on the fluctuating price of rice. It was all a matter of emphasis.

During all this time DIA was thoroughly enmeshed in the numbers game. It paid little or no attention to what Hanoi was saying on the radio, discounting it as propaganda. It made little effort to perceive the enemy's view of the war. It made little effort to reason out what the enemy's strategy was, why he believed he was winning, what he was saying publicly about how he was going to fight the war, or how the bombing was affecting his morale. It was too busy keeping up with the flow of numbers from Saigon.

Find Us a Target

As the air campaign crept northward, the Operations people on the Joint Staff wanted bigger and better targets. They didn't ask the intelligence people what was worth hitting or what a rational plan of attack might be. On the contrary, they demanded targets that a certain weapons system could attack. They had a TV-guided missile, and they wanted to use it. "Pick out a building for us to hit," they'd say. DIA could have told the JCS this was the wrong approach, but it played the game. It sent photo-interpreters scurrying to their scanners to find, say, a two- or three-story building in an area open to U. S. raids. If they saw no signs of military activity around the building they would dub it a "possible military storage area," a description that gave Intelligence the right to go hunting.

The Operations staff's biggest hangup was over the prohibition on bombing the port of Haiphong. It refused to accept the judgment of the CIA that bombing the port wouldn't stop the flow of goods into North Vietnam. It refused to accept that the North Vietnamese man-packed arms across the Chinese border and imported little by sea. DIA, bowing to the pressure, came up with a list of several hundred small, insignificant targets in and near Haiphong, listing them as crucial and suggesting that the cumulative effect of hitting all 200 or more barge and ferry landings, rail spurs, bridges, and road intersections would be the same as flattening Haiphong—again a triumph for the art of compromise and no doubt small comfort to the pilots shot down in that heavily defended area.

Well before the Tet Offensive of January, 1968, when the enemy build-up at Khe Sanh first became obvious, two DIA analysts who had been studying enemy tactics and strategy for four years sat down and wrote a paper that concluded that the enemy was planning a feint at Khe Sanh. They based this judgment on their interpretation of General Giap's fighting methods over the past two years. They outlined a likely enemy course of action designed to draw American forces to the Khe Sanh area so that the populous coastal plains would be left thinly defended and concluded that perhaps it would be unwise to react to the Khe Sanh build-up. They presented the findings of their paper at a briefing, much to the amusement of all present. They suggested that the paper be cabled to Saigon as a DIA assessment of the situation and that the JCS be given the benefit of their thoughts. This, too, caused merriment among the assembled. "How could you possibly know more than General Westmoreland?" they were asked. Their boss, an Army colonel, finally got angry at their persistence and taped the paper to the wall beside his desk, claiming that the analysts had just stuck their professional reputations on the line and adding he hoped they were wrong. The paper hung there until late in March, 1968, after the Tet Offensive, which occurred largely on the coastal plain, and after the enemy ended the siege of Khe Sanh without ever assaulting it. Then it was taken down quietly. The Colonel never mentioned the subject again. The JCS was never given a copy, and it was never cabled to Saigon.

Backdoor Pressure

The pressures on DIA to conform to the views of the military are hard to resist. Take a mechanism known as the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), which is supposed to represent the best judgment of the intelligence community on a particular issue and is used by the President and his Cabinet in formulating policy. Everyone in the intelligence business has a chance to assert his point of view in these estimates, and it is here that DIA's role is crucial. DIA is well aware that many service judgments are biased and don't reflect reality. Its obligation, in those cases, is to assume its responsibility as arbiter among the services and establish a Defense position on

the issue, and it works hard at doing just that. But strong pressures usually come in through the back door.

For one thing, there is something called the "Eyes Only" cable that is sent "back channel" and is severely restricted in dissemination. Usually no more than five people see it. I have seen "Eyes Only" cables come in from the U. S. Commanders in Honolulu and Saigon to the Director of DIA requesting that he give more than a passing consideration to the command viewpoint about this or that. The language is always moving. Such a cable is likely to start off complimenting the recipient for the fine job he is doing and then work in high-sounding phrases which evoke motherhood, apple pie, the American flag, and, of course, the uniform. It then implies that the sender would like to see a particular judgment or set of figures changed to conform to the command view. It rarely offers any evidence to support this request. It is sure to close with a veiled threat that the recipient's career is in jeopardy if he doesn't play the game and "get on the team." Many estimates have been changed or reworded because of an "Eyes Only" cable from a field commander. In one instance the Air Force Chief of Intelligence called my boss at DIA about a nearly completed estimate on U. S. bombing in Laos. He told him that he was sending a team down to change the wording of the estimate and that my boss had better remember what color his uniform was. Of course it was the same as the General's—blue. The team arrived, and, over the protests of the DIA analysts, a compromise was reached.

The classic example of command influence on intelligence matters occurred just after the Tet Offensive in January, 1968. In the early weeks of February the JCS insisted that the offensive was total military defeat for the enemy—General Westmoreland told them so in his daily cables. DIA didn't agree with this interpretation, but it watered down every paper it wrote on this subject so that its position was impossible to determine. Then General Wheeler went to Saigon and came back with Westmoreland's request for 206,000 troops to "clean up" the "defeated" enemy. Suddenly it was legitimate to say that the Tet Offensive had really "set us back." Everybody on the service staffs, with DIA leading the pack, started writing gloomy estimates with unaccustomed forthrightness and clarity.

Wave-Makers Always Sink

Everyone connected with DIA is partially at fault for the agency's shortcomings. This includes the military who run it, the civilians who staff it, the Secretary of Defense, the JCS, and the individual service staffs. As far as the military men who manage the agency are concerned, their guilt or incompetence results simply from the fact that they are uniformed men with a parent service. Imagine, if you will, what the prospect of a tour with DIA looks like to a military officer. He knows or soon learns that he will be thrust into a position in which, on occasion, his professional judgment will vary markedly from that of his parent service. He will be expected to defend a position that could enrage his chief of staff—but officers who do so more than once get known fast and are accorded an appropriate "reward" at a later date in terms of promotion and assignment. Consider also that a tour at DIA—normally two to three years—is very short when compared to a 20- to 30-year military career. And so most officers assigned to DIA go through a predictable pattern. They come on board as "hard-chargers," ready to set the world on fire. They stick to their principles through one or two scrapes. Then they become a little more circumspect, letting individual issues slide by and rationalizing that it wasn't a crunch question anyway. Finally, they resign themselves to "sweating out" their tours and playing every situation by ear. They avoid committing themselves or making decisions. They refuse to tackle the agency's long-term organizational ills because doing so would make too many waves.

The shortness of the tours of duty of the military managers of the agency (about nine-tenths of management jobs are filled by military officers) causes some long-term problems. These officers are interested largely in getting good performance out of staff while they are there, not in building up long-run staff or agency capabilities. They want to impress the General, let him know that he's running a "cracker-jack" outfit. The General, of course, is largely occupied with current problems, so his subordinates gear up to service his needs. This has resulted over the years in the reduction of DIA's long-term research capability to near zero. More than 95 per cent of the effort expended in DIA on Vietnam, for example, is on current problems. Long-term study groups have been disbanded and the staffs reassigned to the current problem area. Basic intelligence for detailed studies is simply not getting done or is whipped out with a weekend's furious overtime. The managers who choose

to cut the long-term staff don't worry about the ultimate effect, because by the time it becomes evident they'll be off on other assignments.

Another problem is the "can do" attitude that prevails among the officer corps. It is unthinkable for an officer to tell his superior that he cannot complete a task. It is a form of heresy. Officers accept a requirement for four or six extra hours' work a day when they know their staff already puts in 12- or-14-hour days. Rarely, if ever, does anyone say no, or point out that certain jobs take time. "Yes sir, can do!" is all that is heard. The result is an attitude among DIA staff members that is captured in their motto. "If you want it real bad, you're gonna get it real bad." ■

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ROBERT WHYMANT, in Saigon, assesses Korea's contribution to the ground war in Vietnam

Losing hearts and minds by Tiger terror

Vietnam is most likely to be rememberd as the white man's folly, but it has also taught that one Asian's war is another Asian's poison. For all its elaborate public relations effort, South Korea — the ally which fielded the most men after the United States — has emerged from the Indo-China conflict with an image that might most charitably be described as murky.

Vietnamese who watch the withdrawal of American troops with mixed feelings view the Korean departure with barely disguised relief. The Koreans' toughness and ferocity, which inspired glowing tributes from officialdom in Saigon and from the other allies, did nothing to endear them to the local population which appears from reliable evidence to have suffered more from the "ally" than from the "enemy."

Korean combat troops first arrived in Vietnam in 1965 and grew to a strength of 50,000 by 1967. It was the first time in her history that Korea had sent fighting men to a foreign war. Their job was to "pacify" the heavily populated coastal plains between Nha Trang and Quang Ngai, centring on Binh Dinh province.

According to the Korean command in Saigon, 96 per cent of the territory was secured, but Korean army officers admit that since the ceasefire large parts of Phuyen, Binh Dinh and Quang Ngai provinces are back where they were before they arrived — in Vietcong hands.

The code of conduct of the Republic of Korea forces emphasised there should be "no damaging to even a single one of innocent civilian people" Yet the Koreans, often going into villages without a Vietnamese interpreter, were no better equipped to distinguish between enemy and innocent civilian than the Americans. In a densely populated, high-risk area teeming with Vietcong, the Koreans apparently chose a strategy of terrorising the local population as a means of self-protection.

Vietcong guerrillas came to understand that if they engaged Korean troops the local population would suffer harsh reprisals. The legend of the "Blue Dragon" Second Marine Brigade and the "Fierce Tiger" and "White Horse" infantry divisions as valiant and intrepid fighters is not wholly false. But it would seem that if they inspired fear in the enemy, they also planted terror in innocent civilians.

A common reaction of Vietnamese when questioned about Korean atrocities is a shrug and a sigh almost as if they were not regarded as out of the "ordinary" run of war. As Diane and Michael Jones — until last autumn American Friends Service Committee volunteers in Vietnam — point out in their report on Korean atrocities, peasants accustomed to the greater dangers of annihilation by bombing and artillery attacks may minimise the "lesser" incidents of war. Nevertheless, the interviews with survivors of such incidents in the report present a chilling picture of the sufferings of Vietnamese peasants in Quang Ngai, and Binh Dinh province.

They record one particularly horrific day—December 6, 1966—when several hundred unarmed villagers were slaughtered by Blue Dragon marines in a series of massacres. The day of terror began at 4 am when the Korean soldiers arrived at Long Binh hamlet in Binh Ky village. Thirty people were rounded up, women, children and old men (younger men always left their homes when there were soldiers in the area). They were led to the top of a hill, and made to stand at the edge of a bomb crater.

The Koreans moved some distance away and set up machine guns and mortars, and then shot the people, whose bodies either fell or were pushed into the crater. The same morning, Korean marines entered the hamlet of An Phuoc, also in Binh Ky village, and slaughtered 140 women, children, and old men.

Lac Son, another hamlet in Binh Ky, was similarly visited that morning. An eye-witness, who survived by hiding in near-by bushes, told the Joneses that the Koreans gathered a large group of villagers and handed out sweets to the children and cigarettes to the adults. Then they were all shot.

"Around noon, about an hour after the Koreans left, I came out of my hiding place and went to look at the bodies. I saw that there were still pieces of candy and cigarettes in some of their mouths," the survivor reported. At least 400 people are believed to have been killed in the An Phuoc and Lac Son massacres.

Other eye-witness accounts of massacres are contained in the report covering 1965 to 1972. One man told the Joneses: "The Koreans called everyone 'VC'. They called the animals 'VC' too and shot and killed all that they found, including about 500 cattle and a great number of pigs and chickens." It seems that Americans and South Vietnamese, while on occasion making half-hearted investigations, generally did their best to suppress accounts of Korean atrocities.

Lieutenant-Colonel Chung Yuk-Jin, the chief public information officer of Republic of Korea-Vietnam (ROK-V) forces, told me that the Communists had made concerted propaganda efforts to defame the Korean forces. But the Joneses say, "since such stories are numerous and come from many independent sources, they provide a significant statement about the conduct of Korean troops in Vietnam.

"In all we heard from local sources of more than 45 specific incidents in which Korean soldiers were said to have killed groups of over 20 unarmed civilians. In 13 of the cases over 100 civilians were reported killed." In most of the cases not a single shot had been fired on the days of the massacres to warrant such "reprisals."

Korea sent her elite divisions to fight the war — but the exhilaration of fighting on foreign soil for the first time, and the limitless possibilities to profit from the black market were too much temptation. They built roads, schools and houses, and taught Taekwondo, Korea's own fighting art, to some half-million Vietnamese.

They pushed a "civic action" programme strenuously, and boasted that they were "fearsom to the enemy, friend to the people reliable to the allies." They claimed to have won most of the hearts and minds in the area under their tactical control.

Since the ceasefire, however, they had the galling experience of watching much of it slip back to Vietcong colours. It was with obvious relief that one Vietnamese refugee commented: "The Americans killed from the air, the Koreans on the land. After all that what would we have to fear from the VC?" If the Korean army—or any other foreign army — ever won any hearts, they were the kind that frightened people wear prominently on their sleeves.

A small clue to the impact Koreans made on hearts is perhaps to be found in the number of Korean-Vietnamese weddings: Only 19 soldiers returned home with a Vietnamese bride. Salt Lake City must have seemed a more appealing prospect than Seoul. In the same period of seven years American military personnel were worth some 2,500 bridal visas to the States. The Korean attitude to the Vietnamese was one of scorn and condescension for a gentle, willowy people not unduly dedicated to efficiency and discipline.

A total of 3,800 Koreans were killed, and 8,400 wounded in a country which in most respects is as alien to Korea as Iceland. The Korean public was never enthralled with the nation. In 1971 US procurements related to the war from South Korea were worth $190 million (2.5 per cent of Korea's GNP), and

...gure was even higher in 1969.

...rean civilians employed in Vietnam received US-scale salaries, and the US Government paid Korean military personnel special allowances which gave rise to charges that they were "mercenary soldiers."

The United States also supplied rations, military equipment, and the indispensable tax privileges. In addition she undertook to modernise Korea's forces,

The United States was delighted with the performance of her ally. She wanted as many Korean troops as possible for as long as possible in Vietnam. Shifting the brunt of ground fighting on to the Koreans seemed an ideal and honourable American solution. Perhaps Washington thought they blended better with the local foliage. But the American burden was already too heavy, the war was becoming increasingly unpopular in a Korea where North-South detente was blossoming, and it was becoming uncomfortbly obvious that more hearts were being lost than won by Korean tactics.

The Koreans are now going home to a hero's welcome. Since they were assigned some of the most difficult territory to control, and sometimes fought tenaciously and bravely, perhaps they have deserved it.

NEW YORK TIMES
11 February 1973

VIETCONG VILLAGE RECEIVES VISITOR

Western Newsman Greeted —Copter Attacks Area

The following dispatch is by Neil Davis, a cameraman for Visnews, an international news film agency, who spent 24 hours in a Vietcong-controlled zone in South Vietnam.

IN A VIETCONG ZONE, South Vietnam, Feb. 8 (Reuters) —In 24 hours with the Vietcong I drank tea, shared a meal, chatted about the West—and ran for cover with them when a South Vietnamese helicopter gunship sprayed a village in a raid lasting more than half an hour.

To get to the area, having practiced the Vietnamese words for "liberation soldiers," I walked half a mile with my camera from the main highway leading to the Mekong Delta about 50 miles southwest of Saigon.

I asked the first farmer I saw. He pointed to a line of trees and I walked straight in.

An old man welcomed me with an outstretched hand and a group of children dancing around us pointed to my new guide and shouted, "VC! VC!"

A rickety sampan carried us into the "liberated area." All along the river bank the Vietcong flag—a yellow star on a blue and red ground—fluttered from houses and huts. "Nothing to liberate here," the old man said with a grin.

Village Chief Is Escort

We were met by the village chief, who spoke French and was to remain with me during my stay.

We were only about two miles from the busy highway running to Saigon.

None of the soldiers I saw wore the legendary black pajama-like garb. Most wore tattered black trousers and blue shirts and looked like the hard-working sons of farmers. Some carried captured American rifles, but most had Soviet or Chinese rifles.

Everyone wanted to offer tea to the foreign newsman. I drank at least 30 cups of scalding green tea in about five hours.

During a meeting of village elders under a Vietcong flag swaying high on a bamboo pole, there was a faint shudder as a South Vietnamese Government helicopter went by. No one gave it a second look.

Five minutes later the helicopter came back, flying a little lower. Everyone immediately faded from sight. We had run 100 yards before the soldiers shouted "down," and I was shoved into the undergrowth.

The guns on the helicopter, spewing bullets at a rate of 6,000 a minute, sent a long burst all around the tumbledown buildings we had left behind.

Safe in a Bunker

As the helicopter swung upward for a second run, we all sprinted again, this time to squeeze into an underground bunker covered with foliage.

The helicopter sprayed the area for 30 minutes as we sweated underground. Bullets got through the thick earth-and-bamboo ceiling.

When we finally climbed out dusk was approaching and I was led off with an escort of two soldiers.

"We must be careful of Saigon soldiers," one of my guides said. "They sometimes send small squads into this area."

Before it began to grow dark one looked at his watch and said: "There'll be Saigon artillery at 6 o'clock." He was wrong; the shells came at 6:05.

We spoke of many things during the night, but oddly, I thought, politics was never mentioned.

NEW YORK TIMES
9 February 1973

Civilians Taking Over U.S. Task in Vietnam

By JOSEPH B. TREASTER
Special to The New York Times

SAIGON, South Vietnam Feb. 8—Young diplomats and paunchy middle-aged airplane mechanics are quietly replacing the professional soldiers who have been in the forefront of the United States establishment in South Vietnam for 10 years.

As the soldiers withdraw, in accordance with the Paris peace agreement, a major reorganization of the official American community is under way, with the dominant role going to civilians.

Estimates of the number of civilian technicians now being signed up by the United States to work in South Vietnam range from 5,000 to 10,000. According to informed officials, the order from Washington is to keep the force as small as possible.

Most on Pentagon Contracts

Most of the civilians are being hired on Defense Department contracts, but some perhaps 1,000 or so, are going to work for the State Department and the United States Agency for International Development.

One of the largest companies working on contract to the agency for International Development is Air America, a private airline that is said to have been started by the Central Intelligence Agency and which also does work for the United States Government in Laos. The airline is expected to enlarge its operations in South Vietnam as the last American military planes leave. Some officials say it may be given the job of transporting teams of the Internal Commission of Control and Supervision, which is to monitor the cease-fire.

When reconstruction gets under way, one of the biggest projects, officials say, will be repairing South Vietnam's road network and the 160 "critical" bridges that have been destroyed or heavily damaged during the North Vietnamese offensive last spring. The officials say that some of the contracts for this work may go to American construction companies. But they say that this would probably add only a few hundred men to the American civilian population here.

Vietnamese to Be Trained

The Defense Department turned to the civilians, informed officials say, primarily as a stopgap measure to gain time for the South Vietnamese to acquire technical skills.

The civilians are doing such jobs as operating computers and complex communications equipment and assembling and repairing airplanes and their delicately balanced accessories.

"You can't expect the Vietnamese to learn skills like these overnight," an American military officer said. "But they'll get there eventually, and then the civilians will go home too."

Senior American military men and diplomats will not talk about the civilian technicians and officials. But privately they insist that the United States sees their employment as a short-term venture.

"The idea that we're trying to replace the military with civilians is completely wrong," an official said. "There is no secret desire for the United States to maintain a military or quasi-military role in South Vietnam. This is just a job-oriented structure, and when the job is finished the civilians will be phased out."

The most visible sign of the transition has been the appearance throughout the country of men in gray twill uniforms and sport shirts who work with the South Vietnamese armed forces.

But perhaps even more significant are the structural changes, which will leave the United States Embassy in the pre-eminent position in South Vietnam after its having been overshadowed for years by the military.

With the dissolution of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, or MACV, the Ameri-

can high command for the war, only about 50 servicement will remain here, and they will be moved to an office in the embassy. The highest-ranking officer will be Maj. Gen. John E. Murray, who will be known as the defense attaché.

One of General Murray's main responsibilities will be to oversee the work of most of the civilian technicians. He will also head a unit similar to the military equipment delivery team that the United States has in Cambodia, which will be charged with resupplying the South Vietnamese armed forces on the item basis spelled out in the peace agreement.

Some officers under General Murray will also be engaged in gathering and analyzing military intelligence.

CORDS Being Abolished

In another significant change, the quasi-military agency called CORDS, for Civil Operations and Rural Development Support, which has been in charge of the pacification program, is being abolished. Its director, George Jacobson, who has been a deputy to the head of the Military Assistance Command, is to become a special assistant to Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker and will move into a new office in the embassy.

Mr. Jacobson will have about 300 men, mainly United States employes, working for him throughout the country, compared with the roughly 1,300 soldiers and civilians who were in CORDS at the beginning of this month.

The four regional headquarters of CORDS are being replaced with consulates. The United States already has a consulate in Da Nang, and it is planning to establish others in Nha Vrang on the central coast, Bien Hoa, north of Saigon, and Can Tho, in the Mekong delta.

The consulates will help meet the needs of American civilians in their areas. They will also serve as bases of operation for continued American aid efforts and some intelligence activity.

Diplomats to Oversee Truce

The United States is sending 40 to 50 junior Foreign Service officers into the countryside to report on whether the cease-fire is being observed, and the consulates will serve as field headquarters for them.

Although the South Vietnamese Government has not yet formally approved the United States request to establish the new consulates, the consuls general have been selected and have already started work.

Informed officials identified the four consuls general as Frederick Z. Brown, James B. Engle, Robert L. Walkinshaw and Thomas J. Barnes. All are senior Foreign Service officers with previous service in Vietnam.

Mr. Brown is consul in Da Nang and Mr. Walkinshaw is in charge of the CORDS headquarters in Bien Hoa. The others returned to Vietnam a few days ago—Mr. Engle from an assignment in Washington and Mr. Barnes from the United States Embassy in Rabat, Morocco.

United States officials say they are hopeful that American economic aid to South Vietnam will continue at the present level of about $500-million a year, even though there will be far fewer Americans in the country to carry out the programs.

Aid Channeled by Saigon

These officials say the bulk of the American aid has always flowed into Saigon and then gone out to the countryside through Vietnamese channels. They say there will be no changes in the size or the functions of the American staff in Saigon, which has been advising the Government on economic programs and policy.

The focus of American aid aid during the postwar period, the officials say, will be on reconstruction and the resettlement and rehabilitation of South Vietnam's more than one million refugees.

CORDS grew to its maximum size in the summer of 1970 with more than 8,000 Americans. Only about 1,200 were civilians.

There were CORDS teams in all of the country's 44 provinces, which are roughly equivalent to counties in the United States, and in about 250 of the 274 districts, which are about equivalent to townships. They worked on programs in public health, land reform and farm production, but well over half of the effort was in military or paramilitary activities, such as training and advising militiamen, armed rural development workers, police and the assassination squads of the Phoenix program, whose targets were key Vietcong leaders.

All Speak Vietnamese

The newly arriving technicians are supplanting another force of civilians that was brought in to facilitate the withdrawal of American troops. These civilians, who reached a peak strength of 10,000 in 1970, handled baggage and moved cargo, maintained helicopters, and duplicating machines and ran mess halls, garbage dumps and laundries.

All of the young diplomats who will monitor the cease-fire speak Vietnamese and have served previously in Vietnam. Wherever possible they are being sent to areas with which they are familiar.

They have been directed to look into the political as well as military aspects of the cease-fire, giving the United States a line of information independent from the supervisory commission.

"We want to see that the cease-fire works," an American official said. "If there are violations we want to know about them. And we know the best way to find out what's happening is to send out people with experience."

Similar to C.I.A. Activity

Few of the delegates to the supervisory commission have been in Vietnam before and only a handful speak Vietnamese.

Some of the information that the Foreign Service officers will be gathering — such as power relationships in villages and hamlets, relationships between the people and the Saigo Government and the Vietcong —will be similar to data that the Central Intelligence Agency routinely collects in Vietnam.

The diplomats, in general, dislike comparison's that link them with intelligence agents.

One slightly ruffled Foreign Service officer emphasized that his colleagues were meant to serve as an "independent check" on the cease-fire. He said that they would certainly not be doing anything "operational" in the field of intelligence adding, "They're not going to be running any paid intelligence nets or anything like that."

NEW YORK TIMES
12 February 1973

More Than an Armistice

W. Averell Harriman

WASHINGTON—In 1973, as in 1962 and 1954, warring parties in Indochina entered into military and political agreements to stop the fighting and move toward a stable peace. For the sake of the long-suffering Vietnamese and other Indochinese people to whose tragic plight we have undeniably contributed and also in our own self-interest, the United States should take all reasonable steps to reduce the likelihood of a resumption of war.

One of the major dangers to the fragile truce is that Hanoi may decide to resume the military struggle. Having fought so long and with such determination to reunify what they regard as one country, it is hard to believe that the North Vietnamese will simply give up their objective. Hanoi has not been defeated militarily. Indeed, its major offensive last spring was stopped only through massive American air support. Hanoi clearly retains the ability of again waging open war or at least disruptive guerrilla action.

The Paris agreement, however, commits the Communist-controlled National Liberation Front to a peaceful struggle for control of the South. In Paris they received assurances that they would be permitted to engage in a political contest—that their adherents would be released from prison, and that they would have a reasonable chance to campaign for public backing. If, instead, the alleged Communist prisoners are not released, if those politically opposing the Thieu Government continue to be arrested, if the flying of a N.L.F. flag remains a punishable offense, it will not be long before Hanoi supports the N.L.F. in renewed guerrilla activity or in direct military action.

However, this will hardly happen until after the end of the sixty-day period for the withdrawal of all American forces and the return of American prisoners. Hanoi has made too many concessions to obtain our withdrawal to jeopardize that primary goal.

For the oncoming weeks then, the threat to peace emerges primarily from Saigon. President Thieu has for years been an obstacle to a settlement and has finally accepted the present agreement with such obvious reluctance. Thus Thieu could engineer a breakdown of the cease-fire if he thinks that will keep the United States in the war on his side.

Although Thieu presents the greatest immediate threat he is also the one over whom we can have the greatest influence if we care to exercise it. His Government is dependent for its continued existence on our support. It should be made clear that if Saigon is not substantially carrying out its Paris commitments in good faith not only will we not join in renewed

hostilities but will stop economic and military aid.

In April, 1965, President Johnson offered United States financial support for the reconstruction and regional development of Indochina, including North Vietnam. President Nixon is now preparing to arrange a program of assistance as suggested in the agreement. Most thoughtful Americans recognize we have such an obligation. It is vital that when the time comes Congress provide promptly the necessary funds, unpopular as it may be in some quarters. Reconstruction aid should be provided not only because having created so much of the devastation it is only right that we should help in rehabilitation but because of the influence long-term American aid could have for peace in the area, particularly in North Vietnam.

It would be foolhardy to think that such a fund alone would induce Hanoi to remain at peace, but other factors will also be at work.

As a result of President Nixon's and Mr. Kissinger's skillful diplomacy, China as well as the Soviet Union are both strongly against the continuation of the war. Furthermore, the North Vietnamese are characteristically patient in achieving their objectives. Also, they have indicated that they want normal trade and other relations with us to offset too great dependence on China or Rusia.

A long-term reconstruction program participated in by other nations plus the prospect for eventual peaceful unification could lead Hanoi to accept as its best policy adherence to the Paris agreements while focusing its energies on the restoration of its war-devastated society.

Thus, by holding President Thieu to his agreements and by offering Hano the prospect of assistance conditioned on peace in the area, we can influence the likelihood that 1973 will mark more than another armistice.

As to Laos, if the North Vietnamese will withdraw their troops from support of the local Communist party, the 1962 settlement can become effective.

As to Cambodia, it is difficult to foresee the end of the fighting unless the present ruling group comes to an agreement with Prince Sihanouk, now backed by Peking.

Let's hope that Mr. Kissinger will be successful in reaching understandings on these matters during his journey to Hanoi and Peking.

Peace could then become real.

Former Governor W. Averell Harriman served as Ambassador to the Paris peace talks in the Johnson Administration.

NEW YORK TIMES
12 February 1973

Building the Peace

By Earl Warren

In his Inaugural Address, President Nixon declared that "the time has passed when America will make every other nation's conflict our own." A determination to refrain from unilateral assertions of our power should have the support of us all. But if the policy is to have any real meaning in a world where conflicts abound, there must be increased efforts to build better multilateral methods for building and keeping the peace. The multilateral half of any effective policy of unilateral restraint is not yet in evidence.

The end of fighting in Vietnam will open the way to thinking on building the structure of peace—peace that can avoid the mistakes of the past—peace that can achieve the sharing of responsibility that the President has called for—peace that can last for generations only if it is built on the principles of the United Nations Charter and is intimately linked to a much stronger United Nations.

This new opportunity requires us to confront a basic imbalance in our own government; an imbalance which poses grave dangers for the structure of the Republic.

Our Founding Fathers recognized that in the conduct of foreign affairs the first responsibility rested with the executive branch. Clearly, the responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs, for the initiation of programs, and for the implementation of agreed upon national policies resides there. An important role for the Congress—most especially the Senate—also was explicitly as well as implicitly set forth.

Yet, over the last two decades, deep and disturbing changes have been occurring in the relationship of the executive and legislative branches. Now, even secretaries of state can decline to discuss major policy decisions with appropriate Senate committees. In doing so, they join a growing line of officials who apparently can escape from reporting to the elected representatives of the people.

Defense and foreign policy decisions now involve massive allocations of resources, to say nothing of living. The decision to put a billion dollars into a single Trident submarine cannot help but affect decisions regarding our slums. Nuclear weaponry and the ability to deliver them accurately over long distances puts the home of every family on the front lines and in the path of total destruction. Even outside the military sphere, a cloud-seeding experiment in Montana can affect the farms of Manitoba. The weather of Milwaukee or Chicago tends to be formed over Mongolia or Siberia and can be drastically influenced by what happens there.

In such an increasingly interrelated and interdependent world, better ways must be found to bring citizen and government closer together in the decisions and actions that now inevitably affect us all. I am convinced that the most urgent point of concentration should be in rebuilding and restoring the role of the Congress. The constitutional role of the Senate in relation to treaties, increasingly is being bypassed through the device of nontreaty agreements between the executive and foreign governments. Congress should develop an agreed procedure for subjecting these agreements to Congressional scrutiny.

President Nixon initiated the praiseworthy practice of sending to Congress an annual report on the state of the world. This provides Congress with an excellent opportunity for a post hoc audit on the performance of the executive branch. It also provides Congress with an excellent opportunity to solicit expressions from the public regarding the performance of the executive branch. Thus far, the Congress has not taken advantage of the President's initiative. It should.

Committees of Congress concerned with foreign policy, defense, arms control and reduction, atomic energy, government operations, and so on, all are grossly understaffed in relation to the huge bureaucracies whose policies they should guide and whose performance they should monitor. Concerned citizen groups should urge Congress to organize itself in a manner commensurate with its enormous responsibility;

In searching for ways in which to enhance the role of Congress in international affairs, we can greatly help our country move toward a foreign policy more truly based on the principles of the United Nations Charter.

Former Chief Justice Earl Warren delivered these remarks before the United Nations Association, of which he is chairman.

WASHINGTON POST
9 February, 1973

U.S. to Keep Thousands In Vietnam

By Peter Osnos
Washington Post Foreign Service

SAIGON, Feb. 8—The United States is shaping a new presence in South Vietnam that assures a continuing deep involvement in this country's affairs.

In a matter of days, the last of the troops that once numbered over half a million will be gone, but thousands of Americans are remaining behind in official roles or to advise and support the Saigon government and its armed forces in technical matters.

While the size of even this non-military presence is down substantially from what it was at its peak, the U.S. Mission to South Vietnam will still be the largest in the world.

Moreover, some of the changes under way are a good deal less sweeping than might have been expected. A major feature of the revamped American structure, for example, is a new "directorate" within the U S. embassy. It closely resembles in personnel and purpose the pacification programs known in the jargon of a few years ago as WHAM—winning hearts and mind.

Despite a shift in emphasis to postwar reconstruction, the United States is retaining a sizable commitment to keeping up the standard of Saigon's armies.

The once massive U.S. military establishment here is being reduced to an attache's office of fewer than 100 servicemen, but for the foreseeable future there will be between 5,000 and 6,000 civilians on contracts paid for by the Defense Department, according to the latest estimate.

These contract employees, most of whom have been here for some time, will be performing what informed sources described as "logistical, supply and training functions" for the South Vietnamese, intended primarily to assist in the maintenance of sophisticated U.S.-supplied aircraft and equipment.

U.S. officials say that the funding of civilian technicians to work with South Vietnam's armed forces does not violate the provisions in the cease-fire agreement prohibiting "military advisers . . including technical military personnel." The technicians will not be supporting combat activities in any way, the officials contend.

The contractors will be under the direction of the attache's office, which, at least initally, is scheduled to take over the spacious "Pentagon East" headquarters of the dismantled U.S. command. The ranking officer, whose appointment was announced by the State Department, is Maj. Gen. John E. Murray.

Murray is a logistics expert, but his staff will range far beyond military supply problems in their work. Military sources said that about half the attaches will be watching—mainly from Saigon—the activities of Communist forces throughout the country and serving as liaison with the International Commission for Control and Supervision

The cease-fire and the departure of U.S. forces has also meant a reorganization of the U.S. embassy, substantially increasing its responsibilities.

Through a network of four consulates—three of them newly established—and the "Resettlement and Reconstruction Directorate," the embassy will have hundreds of people in the field monitoring political developments and supervising American-financed efforts to get South Vietnam back on its feet.

The consulates, located in Danang, Nhatrang, Bienhoa and Cantho, are to be headed by high-ranking U.S. Foreign Service officers and the political reporting will be done by 40 Vietnamese-speaking FSOs just transferred back to South Vietnam from posts around the world.

The FSOs, some of whom were less than happy about being ordered on short notice to leave comfortable positions and their families for the hardships and uncertainty they face here, will be scattered around the country for tours lasting up to six months. Whether they are extended or replaced depends, officials said, on how the situation in South Vietnam develops.

Significant Innovations

The most significant innovation at the embassy, at least in numerical terms is the "R and R" directorate. The unit will have about 250 staff members drawn primarily from the former pacification program, including a number of retired military men who have been around South Vietnam for years.

Virtually all of the senior civilians in CORDS (Civil Operations and Rural Development Support), the acronym for the pacification effort under the U.S. Military Assistance Command, are being kept on.

George D. Jacobson, a retired colonel who has been the operational head of CORDS for almost two years, has been named a special assistant to Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker.

The structure of the R and R directorate will be very similar to the civilian side of the old pacification program. The scale will be very different, however, with teams of six to eight persons covering an average of two provinces instead of the teams of 200 military and civilian personnel assigned to the larger provinces in 1969-70.

For some of the Americans involved the end of the war will not even mean a change of scenery. Albert I. (Buck) Kotzebue, for instance, a former army officer who has been the senior American adviser in the Mekong Delta province of Kienhoa for more than four years, will be staying there indefinitely.

Other officials are simply being transferred to different locations. In a typical case, John Virgil Swango, another retired lieutenant colonel and one time Peoria, Ill., bar owner, is leaving difficult Binhdinh province to become a ranking aide in the delta.

Many of the province teams will be living in the same compounds used by CORDS. Ground transportation will be supplemented by a beef-up contract for Air America, the private CIA airline that has long served pacification and intellegence operation in South Vietnam and Laos.

Private Criticism

The decision to set-up a unit within the embassy so closly patterned on the apparatus of the war years has been privately criticized by some U.S. officials. They argue that the retired militarymen, in particular, identify themselves with policies of the past anl are likely to miss the significance of political accommodations and adjustments that doubtless lie ahead for the Vietnamese.

The other view is that experienced people, whatever their background, should be utilized in the difficult transition period between war and peace. The task of the Resettlement and Reconstruction Directorate, according to Jacobson, will be "to assist GVN (Government of Vietnam) officials at the lower levels in the non-military programs of the 1972-75 'community defense and local development plan.'"

This basically means continuing the existing projects in agriculture, public health, land reform and community development as well as refugee relief. The level of financial assistance is still to be determined by Congress. Planning, however, is based on the expectation of a major and costly reconstruction effort.

One important change in the present set-up, in keeping with the requirements of the Paris cease-fire agreement, is that all civilian public safety advisers who worked with the South Vietnamese police have been withdrawn. (It has been quietly decided, however, to leave a handful of the police experts in Saigon, U.S. sources said.)

In the revised mission structure, the province teams will report to the consuls general in the four regions who will then report to Deputy Ambassador Charles Whitehouse and so on through the State Department's chain of command. But the teams will also be working closely with the Agency for International Development headquarters in Saigon.

The number of U.S. AID officials in South Vietnam is currently about 900, including those assigned to the R and R Directorate. Although only a third of what it once was, the AID mission there is still three or four times larger than other big American missions around the globe.

New Officer Added

Besides the addition of the consulate and the directorate, the embassy has added two new offices within the political section. One will coordinate the flow of reports coming in from the field and the other will serve as liaison with the ICCS.

To serve the ICCS, the State Department has dispatched officers from its embassies in the four member countries: Canada, Hungary, Poland and Indonesia. The U.S. diplomat from Warsaw, for example, is a fluent Polish speaker and can keep tabs on the mood

of the 285-man Polish contingent. The Hungarian specialist, it is said, is arranging for delivery of Budapest newspapers.

The arrival of the FSOs — they number about 50 in all—has enlivened the Saigon embassy, at least temporarily, giving it something of the flavor of a class reunion, as old friends meet before being sent onwards to the hinterlands.

As for the other principal American agencies—the United States Information Service and the Central Intelligence Agency—they will go on about as before. USIS was converted last year from the mammoth press and propaganda enterprise it was at the height of the war to a more conventional post. The CIA has also withdrawn some of its field staff and analysts in the past two years and has apparently stabilized, officials said.

(The mission leadership is likely to change soon. Ellsworth Bunker, who has served in the demanding ambassadorial job for almost six years, is nearing 80 and is expected to leave very soon. The State department has proposed Graham Martin to replace him. Martin is a former ambassador to Thailand and has just completed a tour as U.S. envoy in Italy.)

Probably the most controversial aspect of the American presence in South Vietnam in the coming months are the Defense Department-funded contractors. The specter has been raised by war critics of a semi-covert army of mercenaries picking up where the regular army left off.

The reality, at this stage, seems to fall short of the dangers portrayed, although it is undeniable that South Vietnam's military readiness will depend to a large extent on the ability of U.S. technicians to keep the equipment running.

In the first place, U.S. officials directly concerned with the contracts insist that the number of 5,000 to 6,000 civilians will be gradually reduced as the Vietnamese become more proficient in servicing themselves.

Sensitive Subject

In an interview last month, Wilfred J. Curley, the civilian Defense Department official here in charge of defense-awarded contracts, said the number would go down steadily. He said that reports of an influx of several thousand advisers and technicians, as much as doubling the present number, were incorrect. "There are absolutely no indications of that happening," he said.

Efforts to interview Curley a second time have been unsuccessful because Pentagon officials are apparently worried about the sensitive nature of the subject.

One measure of the situation, however, is that contractors themselves are not talking of any great windfall after the final departure of U.S. forces. Some technicians say their salaries have been cut and contracts suddenly terminated.

But it is an indisputable fact that for the foreseeable future there will be Americans in and around every major South Vietnamese military installation working on the helicopters, aircraft and complex communications systems given the South Vietnamese by the United States.

In other areas of South Vietnamese life as well, Americans will go on watching and prodding the Vietnamese.

WASHINGTON STAR
9 February 1973

WILLIAM F. BUCKLEY JR.

It Appears the Bombing Won the Peace

Forgive me if it just happens that I missed them, but in fact I have not seen anything from the Great Denunciators about the success of President Nixon's December bombings. I thought, for instance, that Gloria Emerson (of the New York Times) might rise from the catacombs to which she repaired after the bombings resumed, in order to express a word or two of gratitude that the war is, so to speak, ended; but she has not been heard from. Perhaps she is writing a *mea culpa*— it would in her case take time, notwithstanding her training in deadlines.

Tom Wicker wrote in mid-bombing: "Why *should* bombing a people make them want to deal in good faith?" Well, why *did* bombing a people make them deal in good faith? Why doesn't Wicker tell us? The New York Times, at about the same period, was very pointed on the matter. "The American bombs . . . have dimmed prospects . . . for peace in Indochina."

Well, in fact the American bombs didn't dim, but clearly enhanced prospects for peace *in Indochina* where, as a matter of fact, things are at this moment almost preternaturally peaceful, by Indochinese standards. What about it? We fear that the cat has got hold of the New York Times' tongue, though the silence probably is worth it, come to think of it.

James Reston, also of the Times, said that the bombing was "war by tantrum." Well, if it was, then he should meditate on whether strategy by tantrum is necessarily undesirable, inasmuch as this one clearly paid off.

Anthony Lewis, also of the Times, said that Nixon, in ordering the bombing, was behaving "like a maddened tyrant." Two weeks later we had peace. Lewis would appear to be obliged either to diminish his respect for peace, or else increase his respect for maddened tyrants, no?

But, my children, it is altogether obvious how these doctrinaire gentlemen are going to handle this sequence of events. They will in the first place try to ignore them. If that does not work, they will say that after all, the November terms, rejected by Nixon, are not substantially different from the January terms, accepted by Nixon.

The answer to that is: The people best equipped to judge the differences — the South Vietnamese — accepted the January terms, having rejected the November terms. A supplementary point is that the November terms were different from the October terms.

Or they will ask: "In what sense did the bombing figure at all?" The answer is: It must have figured in *some* way. One can understand people who say that the bombing would have a negative effect, i.e., that it would harden the opposition of the people. Or the opposite, that it would embolden the peace party in Hanoi. Hardly that it would be without effect. As it happens, the bombing turned Le Duc Tho into a parade marshal at Nixon's inaugural.

No, a sensible reading is this: Bombing, unless it is done with crushing force over a period of time sufficient to knock off critically needed lubricants of war (See "The Memoirs of Albert Speer"), doesn't do much good against firm leadership over a united country. The bombing of the early years under Lyndon Johnson was not of a character either to divide the people, or to cripple the war-making potential.

When Richard Nixon decided finally to bomb, he decided to bomb definitively, and he decided to do so at a moment when the peace group within the presidium at Hanoi was on the defensive. The doves, as we look back on it, were in the saddle in October. In November, when Nixon was reelected and did not immediately take tough military measures, the hawks gained the ascendancy.

The bombings reversed their positions. During this period, held up to the world by Olof Palme and others of the Hieronymous Bosch school of U.S. diplomacy as a rebirth of Hiroshima, Dresden and Ravensbruck, 1,400 North Vietnamese civilians died and twice that number were wounded. Would that such a sacrifice had been exacted many years ago. A half-million North Vietnamese might now be alive, not to mention hundreds of thousands of South Vietnamese, and thousands of Americans.

Dogmatic opposition to Richard Nixon (as opposed to discriminating opposition) will unquestionably be accepted by future epistemologists as a single greatest impediment to knowledge in the 20th century. If only the gentlemen would not only concede that Nixon was right, which would be the gallant thing to do; but learn from his having been right! Wars would certainly be shorter, and almost as certainly less frequent.

WASHINGTON POST
8 February, 1973

Charles W. Yost

What Role For the U.S. In Asia?

IN A MONTH to be marked by Kissinger visits to Hanoi and Peking, the Vice-President's tour of Southeast Asia, the opening of an international conference to guarantee the Vietnam cease-fire agreements, and probably the application of parallel cease-fires in Laos and Cambodia, it is timely to consider what role the United States should plan to play in the coming decade throughout East Asia and the Western Pacific.

A number of questions come to mind. Should the United States endeavor itself to enforce the cease-fire agreements in the three Indochina states, or should it leave enforcement to the opposing parties in these countries, supplemented by international machinery which cannot be expected to have strong teeth?

Should the United States maintain intact all of the various alliances, defense pacts, commitments, bases and military deployments which we have built up over the past quarter century throughout the area? These include the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, bilateral defense treaties with Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines, the Anzus Pact with Australia and New Zealand and substantial United States military forces in Korea, Japan and Thailand, as well as the Seventh Fleet patrolling the coasts of East and Southeast Asia.

All this adds up to a still very large American military involvement in a part of the world where the rationale for such involvement seems to have diminished, if not disappeared.

The power orginally responsible for our involvement, Japan, is now one of our closest friends. Communist China, which for 20 years we perceived to be, first, an instrument of the Soviet Union and, second, inveterately expansionist itself, is now perceived to be neither.

While is would be hazardous to predict the more distant future, it seems reasonably certain that for some years to come China will be preoccupied with its own domestic economic and political problems and with its anxieties about the Soviet Union. For that time at least it will pose no serious threat to its neighbors.

There is likely to be for some time a continuing zone of instability in Southeast Asia, where our prolonged and excessive intervention has delayed establishment of an equilibrium among indigenous forces which alone could be durable.

As a correspondent of The Washington Post, Thomas Lippman, wrote from Saigon a few days ago, the Indochina war "lasted longer and decided less than any other conflict in modern history." Who wins how and when in that conflict has still to be determined.

The future ambitions of Hanoi outside Vietnam remain uncertain, though it seems doubtful that either Peking or Moscow would encourage them now. However, outside Indochina no dominoes seem likely to fall, unless they fall of their own weight.

Consequently it would be consistent both with the Nixon Doctrine and with United States national interest to turn over primary responsibility for the security of this region—insofar as outsiders need concern themselves with it at all—to international instrumentalities.

The 12-nation conference on Vietnam meeting later this month is rather curiously and unsatisfactorily composed, since only four states from the area will be present—China, North and South Vietnam, and Indonesia. One of the main objectives of the conference, after doing what little it can to solidify the recent agreements, should be to pass on the mandate for guaranteeing,

WASHINGTON POST
8 February, 1973

Victor Zorza

. . . And Power Politics

DR. KISSINGER will carry to China this month the payoff for Peking's help in settling the Vietnam war, but it looks as if Mao Tse-tung is in for a disappointment. The United States has made promises both to Peking and to Moscow. If it tries to give full satisfaction to either capital, the other will feel cheated.

A year ago Mr. Nixon promised that Russia as well as China "will play a role in shaping a new structure of regional stability" after the war. The United States would no longer provide "the principal means of guaranteeing Asian security. But as the triangular balance proposed by Mr. Nixon began to take shape, both China and the Soviet Union set to work to keep the other out of the area.

Peking now complains that although China and the United States had agreed to forgo supremacy in Asia and the Pacific, the Soviet Union refused to give up "its attempt to dominate the area." It was trying to achieve this, said Chou En-lai, the Chinese premiere, by promoting an Asian "collective security system" designed to encircle China.

The Russians are not content with Mr. Nixon's promise to share with them and with China the influence which the United States has exercised in the past. They seem to fear that they may be cheated out of what they believe is their due.

The fears which the Kremlin was voicing so freely before Mr. Nixon's visit to Peking, and which were allayed somewhat by his visit to Moscow, are rampant again. "Peking and Washington have agreed to divide the sphere of influence in Southeast Asia between them," says Moscow radio, "at the expense of third countries," that is, of Russia. China, it says, wants the United States to remain in the area, since this would make it difficult for the countries of Southeast Asia to acquire "new allies"—such as the Soviet Union.

Before Mr. Nixon's trip to China, the Kremlin let it be known that it favored the post-war "neutralization" of the area, which would be "guaranteed," as Pravda put it, by the United States, China, and the Soviet Union. This was what the Kremlin hoped to get eventually in exchange for its own help in settling the war. Mr. Nixon responded by promising the Soviet Union a "role" in shaping the post-war structure of power.

Chou En-lai's objections to Russia's supposed attempts to "dominate" the area are really designed to serve notice that China does not wish any such American-Soviet deal to be consummated. This is the kind of complication that was to be expected as Mr. Nixon began to shape the "balance of power" which, he believes, will maintain the peace of the world, not just of Indochina, after the Vietnam war.

Peking and Moscow are as intrigued by Mr. Nixon's balance-of-power formula as everybody else. By a happy coincidence, some of the questions raised about it in this column last week were promptly answered in Dr. Kissinger's TV interview with CBS. The shifting alliances which characterized the balance of power in the 19th century, he explained, were not applicable in the nuclear age.

The Kremlin will certainly be glad to have this reassurance on the eve of Dr. Kissinger's trip to Peking. Its own study of Mr. Nixon's "five-polar world," in which the United States and the Soviet Union are to be joined as super-powers by China, Europe and Japan, has given Moscow cause for concern. Soviet studies now conclude that the new "poles" are intended to "counter-balance" the Soviet Union and "to ease the burden of imperialism's struggle against socialism," that is, to help the United States to prevail over the Soviet Union.

They argue that China's role as the "third pole" has been designed by the United States "to accord exclusively with the interests of capitalism." This, they believe, explains the "marked activity" of the United States in building up China's role.

The Kremlin evidently does not accept Mr. Nixon's assurances that he does not want to play off Russia against China. The balance of power does not balance—yet. But a balance of sorts was achieved by the most brilliant diplomatic operation known to history when Russia and China helped the United States to end the war. The men who accomplished this—in all three countries—could surely accomplish more, and build a world structure of peace, in the face of difficulties that sometimes seem insuperable.

long-range security in Southeast Asia to more broadly and regionally representative bodies.

Because of the war in Vietnam and the tension between China and the United States, regional organizations in East Asia—both the Asian and Pacific Council spanning the western Pacific from Japan and Korea all the way to Australia and New Zealand, and the more restricted association of Southeast Asian nations—have hardly ventured to involve themselves in the security field.

Now they should be encouraged to do so—under the broad umbrella of the United Nations, which likewise, now that Peking is represented in New York and the Vietnam war is officially ended, should no longer be inhibited from concerning itself with East Asia. The presence of the U.N. Secretary-General at the forthcoming conference, and perhaps U.N. participation in relief and reconstruction in Indochina, should facilitate this involvement.

This does not mean that U.S. treaty commitments should be relaxed without our friends' **consent**, or that there should be sudden massive withdrawals of United States forces from areas other than Indochina. It should mean, however, that the military disengagement and the detente so wisely initiated by President Nixon can in the near future be carried considerably further, from Korea to Taiwan to Thailand, and that the primary duty for maintaining international peace and security in East Asia can be placed where it belongs—in the governments of the area, their regional organizations and the United Nations Security Council.

WASHINGTON STAR
7 February 1973

Reconciliation Mood Troubles Thieu

By HENRY S. BRADSHER
Star-News Staff Writer

Interpretation

SAIGON – A spirit of peaceful coexistence with the Communists seems to be spreading across South Vietnam. It apparently worries President Nguyen Van Thieu.

The relaxed attitude of reconciliation that is noticeable among many Vietnamese has caused Thieu's government to begin seeking a quick political agreement with the Communists and elections before the official anti-Communist position is eroded too much.

When the cease-fire theoretically went into effect 10 days ago, Thieu exhorted his people to continue their struggle against the Communists in what he called a dangerous new phase. There could be no relaxation against a treacherous enemy, he warned.

If Communists come into your village", you should immediately shoot them in the head," Thieu said. Those who suddenly begin talking "in a Communist tone should be killed immediately."

Tired of War

But reports from around the country say that there now seems to be a widespread desire to let the hostility die. People are tired of war and its tensions and hatreds.

Some sporadic fighting continues to mar the cease fire, and in some places the anti-Communist struggle is reported to be continuing. But the reports indicate little of the staunch rejection of Communist influences which Thieu had sought.

Officials of the government here consider this situation very dangerous. They had wanted to keep the Communists quarantined in their enclaves of control so that they could not infect the people. But Communist political workers reportedly are operating widely.

Thieu has several themes which he can use in elections. One is the relative prosperity of South Vietnam—htanks to American aid—compared with North Vietnam. Another theme is stability.

Dangerous Preachers

But his main theme always has been the essentially negative one of anti-Communism, on which his leadership is based. If the Communists can erode this by preaching reconciliation and finding the people receptive, Thieu will be in trouble.

The cease-fire agreement provides for the Saigon government and the Viet Cong to "do their utmost" to agree on internal matters within 90 days. They are to "organize free and democratic general elections. . . ."

When Thieu finally accepted the agreement two weeks ago, officials here were emphasizing the difficulties of the two sides being able to agree on internal matters and holding elections. There seemed to be no hurry, since Thieu was left in control of the government for however long it took.

But between Thieu's speech at the time the cease-fire 10 days ago and his Lunar New Year address to the nation six days later (last Saturday), the government's attitude seems to have changed.

New Emphasis

The speech last Saturday emphasized for the first time the importance of reaching a political agreement with the Viet Cong quickly, so that the way could be cleared for elections.

Thieu said then he was instructing his special negotiator in Paris, ambassador Pham Dang Lam, to begin the preparatory consultations with the Viet Cong provided for in the cease-fire agreement. These talks began Monday and were continuing today in Paris.

The opening attitude was that procedural matters could be cleared up speedily. Lam told reporters later that the Viet Cong foreign minister, Mrs. Nguyen Thi Binh, "Can come to Saigon when she likes to begin her consultations."

This reversed an earlier feeling here that the potentially infectious Mrs. Binh and her comrades should be kept away as long as possible. The Saigon government now sees early elections as possibly being to its benefit, so wants to move along.

What Election?

This does not mean that early elections will necessarily follow. As Lam also said, procedural matters are going smoothly but "it might be more difficult when fundamental problems were reached." The most fundamental problem is what kind of elections. Thieu has advocated a presidential race, with the winner to form a cabinet which reflects the percentage of votes polled by various factions. Thieu is conficent of winning, a view shared by most independent observers at the present time.

Knowing this, the Communists want an election for a constituent assembly which would then decide what form of government South Vietnam should have. Even a relatively small Communist bloc in such an assebly could be noisily effective, and if things would not go their way at first they could try to break up the assembly and have another election.

That process could go on for long enough to cause those less dedicated than the Communists to lose their persistence.

So a difficult fight over the elections is generally expected here. And that presumably worries the government, too, because it will take time which the Communist might be using in the countryside to try to erode Thieu's support.

WASHINGTON STAR
7 February 1973

New U.S. Escalation Feared

By JAMES DOYLE
Star-News Staff Writer

The Indochina war is in danger of major escalation into a new "secret war" which would involve thousands of U.S. advisers under the leadership of the Central Intelligence Agency, according to a former worker among the refugees of Laos who has made a study of the "secret war" in that country.

Fred Branfman, a leading critic of American involvement in Indochina who has written extensively about the covert U.S. bombing of Laos, presented a collection of 32 reports from major American newspapers at a news conference yesterday, to back up his contention that the U.S. appears headed for a major reinvestment of civilian forces and paramilitary air and ground units in Vietnam.

"This is the period when a President could pull out," Branfman said, "but if these press clippings turn out to be right, then new escalation of the air war is likely.

"I think it's likely to happen again. It has happened several times before in Indochina."

The news dispatches outlined reports that 10,000 civilian advisers, double the present number, under Defense Department contract will remain in Vietnam; that the Saigon government has been recruiting Air Force technicians in American newspaper classified ads; that the access of American reporters to the scenes of incidents and battles already has been curtailed drastically, and that South Vietnamese officials and local police are blocking the release of political prisoners and ordeering the shooting of suspected Communists in violation of the cease-fire accord.

(South Vietnamese sources said however, that Saigon has released about 20,000 military and civilian prisoners in the past few days, turning them lose on their own despite provisions in the cease-fire agreement that they be turned over to the North Vietnamese or the Viet Cong, the New York Times reported Monday.

Many of the articles were written before the peace agreement was signed, and some referred to plans for a continuing American presence as only contingency plans.

"If President Nixon was prepared to allow the Vietnamese to settle their own affairs, he would presumably back away from Vietnam while soft-pedalling his public identification with Thieu," Branfman said.

If the President does allow a covert war to continue, Branfman said, the history of past actions in Vietnam suggests that eventually the hidden military and paramilitary activities will be supplemented by new bombing, either openly or, as in Laos in the past, in secret.

"The American government simply lied about it (the bombing) in Laos," Branfman said. He predicted that if President Nixon "intervenes in a covert manner in Vietnam" then the likelihood of renewed bombing there will be very high.

He said widespread publicity of such actions would effectively stop them, but that both the American press and the international observers would have difficulty seeing such violations first hand if the Saigon government refuses them access to areas of the country, as has happened in Laos.

(U.S. planes have continued to bomb Communist concentrations in Laos since the Vietnam truce went into effect at the request of the Laotian government, the commander of U.S. forces in the Pacific said Monday.)

Jerry Gordon, coordinator of the National Peace Action Coalition who appeared at the same news conference, predicted a "tidal wave of protest" would engulf the country if the bombing is resumed in Vietnam. "That would be the last straw for many Americans," he said.

Gordon said his organization would continue to protest American support of the Thieu government and call for immediate and complete withdrawal from Indochina.

Members plan to picket the White House on Saturday, Feb. 24, before holding a discussion session on activities for the anti-war movement in the aftermath of the cease-fire. The discussion session at the Metropolitan AME Church on M St., replaces an "anti-war convention" planned for that day.

BALTIMORE SUN
2 FEBRUARY 1973

Russian reports POW's in China

London (Reuter)—American prisoners captured in Vietnam by Northern troops have been held in secret maximum-security camps in China, according to a Moscow-datelined report by Victor Louis in the London *Evening News* yesterday.

Mr. Louis, a Soviet citizen with a reputation for securing exclusive stories connected with the Communist world, said evidence had been building up strongly in the Soviet capital that 600 Americans were housed in the Chinese province of Yunan, close to the border with North Vietnam.

But, says Mr. Louis, the camps were sufficiently far away from the border to foil possible United States commando rescue bids and to protect the prisoners from the recent massive bombardment of the North carried out with B-52 bombers.

The Americans were placed in typically Vietnamese conditions—their food, guards and even their clothes were Vietnamese—to convince them that they were still in North Vietnam, the report said.

Mr. Louis said their presence in China meant the POW's could be used by Hanoi to maximum advantage in the Paris peace talks, while it provided China with a means of demonstrating solidarity with North Vietnam without direct involvement in the war.

WASHINGTON POST
7 February, 1973

Tad Szulc

A Time for Rebuilding

PRESIDENT Nixon said at his Jan. 31 news conference that with the advent of the Vietnamese peace agreement the United States would now consider a postwar "reconstruction program" for the two Vietnams along with the rest of Indochina. This, he said, would be an incentive for the preservation of peace. Besides, as we know, postwar reconstruction of ravaged territories of allied and enemy nations alike has become in this century an American tradition.

But an analysis of political, military, economic and—quite importantly—ecological realities involved in such a reconstruction effort raises major questions about its feasibility in the foreseeable future. The result might well be that reconstruction pledges (as distinct from the U.S. commitment to continued aid for South Vietnam's economic survival) will become meaningless and lose even their psychological value as a possible comprehensive package for encouraging peace maintenance.

The writer is a former diplomatic and foreign correspondent for the New York Times.

Mr. Nixon and others have spoken of a possible comprehensive package for all Indochina. He has instructed Henry Kissinger, while he is in Hanoi this month, to discuss Indochina-wide reconstruction with the North Vietnamese. Administration officials have even thrown around the figure of $7.5-billion as the cost of reconstruction although nobody here is quite sure what it means in terms of projects.

For the purpose of clarity, it is necessary to break down the overall reconstruction concept into realistic component parts.

1. *Immediate problems in South Vietnam.* The immediate problem is to keep the Saigon economy going as much for political reasons as anything else. President Thieu, who has to maintain his 1,000,000-man army indefinitely and lacks resources for it, may not survive politically in the new phase of the power contest with the National Liberation Front if his artificial economy collapses under him.

Considering the military costs, the needs of the Saigon middle class (whom Thieu cannot afford to antagonize) and the urgency of social programs for an estimated 8,000,000 refugees and other war victims, the first priority is budget support and stabilization. The annual tag for these expenditures may exceed $750,000,000 in U.S. funds. Without it, long-range reconstruction is not possible.

2. *Reconstruction policies in South Vietnam.* Even assuming that the Saigon regime acts strongly and responsibly (i.e. eliminates corruption and favoritism), coherent national postwar planning is virtually impossible so long as South Vietnam remains a patchwork of areas controlled here by Saigon and there by the Communists. But the Paris accords, allowing the 160,000 North Vietnamese troops to stay in the South, may perpetuate this mind-boggling mosaic for months if not for years. It would be preposterous to expect local South Vietnamese and Communist commanders to cooperate in reconstruction in contested areas under a stand-still ceasefire.

Vietnam economic specialists believe that Thieu's next pressing problem is to start moving the masses of refugees from the suffocatingly overcrowded Saigon and other cities (only 650,000 refugees are in camps) back to the countryside. Otherwise urban unemployment could become political dynamite for Thieu and a boon for the Communists. Likewise, the South's agricultural economy desperately needs manpower.

3. *Reconstruction policy problems.* But the complications is, specialists say, that insecurity in the countryside—the "leopard spots" situation—is unlikely to draw back enough refugees, especially the younger people who have tasted city life.

Another major problem, generally overlooked in current discussions, is the economic and ecological damage inflicted on the countryside by nine years of herbicide and defoliation practiced by the U.S. against Communist-held areas in the South in crop-destruction and forest denuding operations. Thus far the extent of the ecological damage is unknown except that it is considerable.

The National Academy of Sciences, working on a $2,000,000 grant from the Defense Department, is expected to complete on Aug. 1 a detailed study of ecological damage in South Vietnam. Experts say that until the survey is completed, no serious planning for agricultural reconstruction can be undertaken.

An earlier study of damage resulting from herbicides is contained in the still-secret "Report on the Herbicide Policy Review." It was prepared by a U.S. government task force under the direction of Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker and is dated August 28, 1968—some 18 months before the use of these chemicals was suspended.

The report, obtained by this writer, states, among other things, that 20 per cent of South Vietnam's forests were "treated" by herbicides and defoliants through the end of 1967—and many areas were sprayed repeatedly. In the provinces north and northwest of Saigon, 70 per cent of the timber has been affected. This is vital because, as the report stresses, "the forests of Vietnam are one of its most important renewable natural resources and future sources of employment . . . Repeated application of defoliants in these zones could seriously retard regeneration of these forests." The wood industry is one of the most important in South Vietnam, normally employing 80,000 people. By 1968, the herbicides war led to the destruction around Saigon alone of 2,000,000 cubic meters of timber which compares to potential national annual production of 3.5-million cubic meters.

". . . post war reconstruction of ravaged territories . . . has become an American tradition . . ."

Bamboo invasion resulting from forest-canopy defoliation may delay tree regeneration because seedlings are killed. The report estimates that 20 years will be required to restore mangroves destroyed by herbicides. In mangroves, ecological balances and the food-chain have been upset, affecting fish and birds.

Rice fields are ecologically immune to herbicide damage, but rubber, fruit and beans are highly sensitive. The extent of damage to the latter is unknown.

So the question is to *what* would the refugees be returning?

4. *North Vietnam.* Only after Kissinger returns from Hanoi will the administration learn whether North Vietnam is interested in Indochina-wide cooperative reconstruction programs.

The first question is whether Hanoi would accept any U.S. or multilateral package pending the "unification" of the two Vietnams. Secondly, it is unknown under what conditions North Vietnam would enter aid arrangements for itself; many specialists think it would insist on reconstruction disguised as "reparations," which probably would be unacceptable to Mr. Nixon.

5. *Indochina.* So long as the fighting persists in Laos and Cambodia—and it may go on for a long time—such grandiose plans as the development of the whole Mekong River Valley basin by an international consortium are fated to remain on the drawing board. And even if all the fighting stops, who knows whether Hanoi and its Laotian and Cambodian allies desire such a program in conjunction with the Saigon regime.

In sum, postwar reconstruction in Indochina may long remain a dream while the U.S. and even the international community are forced to concentrate on measures to keep South Vietnam away from the brink of economic and political catastrophe.

NEW YORK TIMES
6 February 1973

After War and Cease-Fire, the South Vietnamese Communist Groups Remain a Mystery

By SEYMOUR M. HERSH
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 5—One of the mysteries of the Vietnam war has been the other side, those South Vietnamese Communists and nationalists who—with the support of North Vietnam—have battled the Saigon Government and the United States to a standstill.

They have been called by the names Vietcong, a phrase—pejorative, in their view—meaning Vietnamese Communists, and National Liberation Front and now Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam.

Today, with the sanction of the recently signed Vietnam peace accords, this group of guerrilla fighters controls upward of 30 per cent of the area of South Vietnam and is in the process of tightening its administrative grip in "liberated" zones.

Despite its existence, the Nixon Administration has said that it will recognize the Saigon leadership of President Nguyen Van Thieu as the "sole legitimate government" of South Vietnam. In a recent television interview, William H. Sullivan, a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, noted that what he termed the "so called" Provisional Revolutionary Government "does not have a capital, does not have any outward manifestations that make it feasible to be called a government."

Almost a Way of Life

This absence of "outward manifestations"—in the Western view, at least—has been almost a way of life for the South Vietnamese guerrillas.

United States and South Vietnamese military forces have looked, and bombed, in vain for the famed political and military headquarters of the guerrillas—known as COSVN, for Central Office of South Vietnam—since the early 1960s.

It was then that the guerrilla movement, led largely by Communists, announced the formation of the National Liberation Front, described as a coalition of Communist and non-Communist forces against the Saigon Government. The announcement, in a clandestine radio broadcast, told of a convention in December, 1960, somewhere in the jungles of Vietnam at which the Liberation Front was set up.

Similarly, the formation of the Provisional Revolutionary Government was announced in June, 1969, by the guerrilla radio, which described a three-day meeting somewhere in South Vietnam. The meeting was apparently attended by scores of delegates representing what the guerrillas said were "various political parties, mass organizations, nationalities, religious and patriotic personalities from both the rural and urban areas."

United States officials described the coalition at the time as "old wine in new bottles."

'Aggression' From North

The official view of the United States Government, as expressed in a State Department white paper in 1965 and repeatedly stated since, is that the war in South Vietnam was directed and financed by North Vietnam. United States officials have characterized the war as a product of "aggression" from the North.

Some scholars argue, however, that there is equally persuasive eidence indicating that the conflict was a civil war, one that might be aided and abetted, but could not have been instigated, by outsiders.

That basic division of view extends to the analysis, now going on, of the background of the Provisional Revolutionary Government's delegates to the joint four-member Military Commission meeting this week in Saigon. United States officials and scholars are also closely watching the names suggested by the guerrilla radio as possible members of the National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord, the three-party group whose functions, according to the peace agreement, would revolve around the organization of general and local elections in the South as soon as possible.

United States officials, convinced that those they call hard-core Communists have control, maintain that while the non-Communist members of the coalition may have nominal authority, they lack real political power.

One relatively well-known figure much in dispute is Nguyen Huu Tho, a former Saigon lawyer who has been chairman of the Central Committee of the Liberation Front and its leading official since it was set up 13 years ago. He is not a member of the Communist party of South Vietnam—the People's Revolutionary party, which is the southern branch of the North Vietnam Communist party — and is, therefore, widely considered by United States experts to be more of a figurehead than a policy maker.

Two Views of the Man

In a published analysis of what he termed "the faceless Vietcong," George A. Carver Jr., former head of Central Intelligence Agency operations in South Vietnam, described Mr. Tho as having "little political repute or professional standing among his former colleagues at the South Vietnamese bar."

In an interview last week, Tran Van Dinh, a former deputy South Vietnamese Ambassador to the United States, noted that Mr. Tho led the first anti-United States demonstration in Saigon more than 20 years ago to protest American support of the French.

"He is extremely popular with the people in South Vietnam," said Mr. Dinh, a critic of the war who has been living in exile in Washington since he left the South Vietnamese diplomatic service in 1964. "It is wrong to assume that he was just a figurehead. You Americans exaggerate party affiliation too much as a key to power."

On the other hand, a well-informed intelligence expert in an interview, reaffirmed his belief that "there's no question that Tho has been a front guy for years for North Vietnam."

He added that in his view the real powers in the Provisional Revolutionary Government were its president, Huynh Tan Phat, and its minister of defense, Tran Nam Trung. Both were born in South Vietnam, long served in revolutionary activities against the French and are principal leaders of the Communist party in the South.

Named as a General

There is some confusion over Mr. Trung, whose name has been said by some intelligence officials to be a pseudonym of Lieut Gen. Tran Van Tra, second-ranking member of the Provisional Revolutionary Government, who arrived in Saigon last week to head his group's delegation to the Military Commission.

Further research shows that in 1969 the South Vietnamese newspaper Tien Tuyen, which is published by the army, asserted that Mr. Trung was really a Vietcong general named Tran Luong.

In addition, Douglas Pike, the United States Information Agency official who is considered by many to be a leading expert on the Vietcong, has written that Mr. Trung may be General Tra, "but it is more likely" that he is North Vietnam's political commissiar for all of the guerrilla forces.

The formed deputy Ambassador, Mr. Dinhi, said he had served with General Tra in 1944 during the Japanese occupation and noted that he was a "formidable" officer who eventually attained high rank in North Vietnam. Mr. Dinh said "it would be incredible" if Mr. Trung and General Tra were the same man because "sooner or later the N.L.F. would have to publish the lists of who is in the cabinet" and both would have to be identified.

Yet, Mr. Dinh added, the photograph in the New York Times last Friday of an officer said to be General Tra was not that of the man he had served with in South Vietnam.

"The answer," said a United States intelligence officer who is handling Vietnam matters, "is that nobody knows very much about these people, and I don't care who's talking. We just don't know who's in what position or how they interrelate, its the same thing we can say about the top leaders of North Vietnam and the N.L.F.

Direct Influence From Hanoi

Most experts—critics of the war and those who support it—acknowledge that the most significant members of the Provisional Revolutionary Government are also members of the Communist party, and all agree that Hanoi exerts direct influence on its policies.

But it was also suggested in interviews that there may be more autonomy than is generally realized.

A Government expert noted that there were three potential clashes between the North and South Vietnamese Communists: personality disputes, bureaucratic disputes between operatives in the field and higher officials and—most significant, in this official's view—"the obvious fact that the South has been told by the North that they're on heir own."

"The North is saying that 'we'll keep supporting you,'" this official added, "but that 'now you must keep making the political effort by yourself.'"

Two leading Vietnam scholars, David G. Marr and D. Gareth Porter, both critics of the war, said in separate interviews that in their opinion the Communist officials of the Provisional Revolutionary Government were aware that they had to compromise with nationalist forces to achieve their goal of a complete political victory in the South.

Mr. Marr, a former professor of Vietnamese history at the University of California who is now director of the Washington-based Indochina Resource Center, said that while Communist officials would continue to play a major role, "they know it's not in their interest" to

attempt to take over the coalition.

Need for Compromise Seen

"They know the special situation in the South is terrible from an organizational point of view," he explained. "There's been total chaos and the class structure has been destroyed. The basic distinction in the next few years will be between the few who made a killing on the war and those who lost everything. It's not going to be between landlord and tenant."

Mr. Porter, now a doctoral candidaate in Cornell University's Southeast Asian studies program, suggested similarly that the Communists and the Provisional Revolutionary Government know that "they have to compromise with the third force"—the large group of non-Communist but anti-American people in the South.

"They can't plan their strategy simply on the basis of disciplined adherence to the movement," said Mr. Porter, who has taught political science at the University of Akron, Ohio, has spent several years in Vietnam doing research and has written widely for magazines on the war. "They know they have to have a degree of sympathy and support in terms of the non-Communists."

Nonetheless, Mr. Porter added, only the Communist party in South Vietnam has what he termed the "leadership and discipline" to match the political power of President Thieu.

United States experts have estimated the number of clandestine Communist party members in the South at more than 100,000. The party structure has been described in State Department documents as closely paralleling at each level—from region down to village—the open political organization of the Provisional Revolutionary Government.

The party has its own political geography and often uses names different from Saigon's for the same areas. The party also recognizes separate areas of political and military responsibility in its geographic divisions, with central administrations coming from COSVN. At least two regions in the South, however, were known to be under the direct supervision of the North Vietnamese high command at various times during the war, according to State Department records.

The guerrilla political organization, or infrastructure, is also known to operate clandestine cells in South Vietnamese cities that are otherwise believed to be under Saigon's complete control.

THE GUARDIAN MANCHESTER
7 February 1973

Thailand now has the biggest concentration of foreign-based US forces outside Europe. T. D. ALLMAN examines their inflammatory potential

The interventionist's base

EVER SINCE John Foster Dulles formed the South-east Asia Treaty Organisation in 1954, Thailand has been the keystone of United States efforts to impose its will on Indo-China.

In Bangkok, the effort has always been rationalised as essentially defensive. In practice, however, America's use of Thailand has been one of continuing imilitary offence. Without Thai bases, America could never have prosecuted its long secret war in Laos, used Laos to support attacks against North Vietnam, or supported mercenary bands operating in Cambodia.

From Thailand, the US has also mounted para-military and espionage activities into Burma and China. The final, massive B-52 raids on Hanoi were mounted from Thai bases. Over the last eight years, it has been Thailand that has intervened in a Vietnam war, not the other way around.

With the US evacuation of South Vietnam, Thailand now has the largest single concentration of foreign-based US forces outside Europe. Much of South-east Asia's future now hinges on whether President Nixon will use his Thai bases, like the ones in Europe, as a defensive deterrent or whether he will continue to use Thailand as a springboard for continuing military intervention throughout the region.

If US tactics in Thailand do change, leaders ranging from Prince Sihanouk to Lee Kuan Yew — perhaps even the North Vietnamese leadership — may find an American presence there a useful element in a peaceful, multi-polar, non-ideological South-east Asia in which the US, China, Japan, and Russia all have a rôle to play. But if the US continues to use Thailand indefinitely as an offensive base, the result will be continuing, chronic war.

So far the portents are not hopeful. Chou En-lai recently called on the US to end its military intervention in Laos and Cambodia. Secret peace talks are under way in Laos, and both Cambodian sides are now willing to accept a Cambodian cease fire, if not to agree to negotiated peace.

On paper, the Paris ceasefire constituted an unprecedented renunciation of America's Indo-China ambitions. The first article of the Paris accords pledges that America will respect "the independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Vietnam as recognised by the 1954 Geneva agreements." It was US refusal to accept the 1954 Geneva accords, and their provisions for a peaceful Vietnamese reunification that led to the foundation of SEATO, Thailand's conversion into a US beach-head, unremitting American pressure on Laos and Cambodia, and the Vietnam war itself.

Military action, however, continues to be much more important than diplomatic words. The intensive US bombing of Laos and Cambodia has continued in spite of the Vietnam ceasefire. With more than 80,000 military personnel at air bases in Thailand and in naval squadrons off the coast of Vietnam, the last US troop withdrawals from Vietnam will not greatly diminish President Nixon's ability to intervene with bombs and napalm whenever events in Indo-China displease him.

There is a clear message in the continuing US arms shipments to Indo-China and Thailand; President Nixon's pre-truce bombings of Hanoi, his statement that the US will continue to recognise only President Thieu, Vice-President Agnew's South-east Asia mission, and continuing US military activities in Laos and Cambodia.

The Nixon Administration, for the moment, is not so much ending the Indo-China conflict as continuing it by other means. The easiest targets for the President to keep hitting are Communist supply routes and sanctuaries in Laos and Cambodia, where the Paris accords oblige neither side to end its military operations immediately.

Laos's and Cambodia's problems are the products of traditional Thai-Vietnamese rivalries, which have been greatly deepened by 17 years of direct US intervention. The present military divisions in both countries roughly correspond to the old Thai-Vietnamese spheres of influence. Even without American involvement, both small countries would have severe problems with their two large neighbours.

Traditional Thai and Vietnamese intervention, of course, is distasteful in Phnom Penh and Vientiane under any circumstances. But both past history and the present situation make an important point for the future: both Laos and Cambodia lack the ability to be neutral without great restraint on the part of Thailand and Vietnam.

Such restraint is impossible so long as each side's sense of insecurity is continuously inflamed by chronic US intervention. Communist Vietnam cannot refrain from using its two neighbours' territory so long as the US maintains the Thieu regime in South Vietnam, Thailand is reluctant to leave the US shadow so long as Indo-China is the theatre of full-scale war.

Is there any way to break the circle? The initiative, for the foreseeable future, will lie with an America that has never understood the inherently disruptive effects of its efforts to control Indo-China. But the continuing Thai emphasis in US strategic thinking has not only vastly exaggerated North Vietnam's intentions and abilities, it has also amounted to a serious underestimation of Thailand's own abilities to fend for itself.

With a population of about 37 million, Thailand is nearly as populous as both Vietnams combined. It is the most geographically, ethnically and politically united nation in South-east Asia, and one of the richest. It has not had a civil war or been successfully invaded since the eighteenth century.

But following Thailand's alliance with Japan during the Second World War, Thailand found itself isolated. Subsequent US links provided it with psychological, financial, and military support. Twenty-five years as America's most loyal ally, however, have severely limited Thailand's horizons, and isolated it in new ways.

Recently, Thai officials have suggested that following an Indo-China settlement US troops will be withdrawn and that Thailand will follow a neutralist policy. Such plans for the future, however, do not solve present problems.

Thailand has hesitated even to establish diplomatic relations with China. It is committed to letting the Nixon Administration use its territory for acts of war indefinitely, and its ruling generals would lose the raison d'être of their regime if Thailand's policies substantially changed.

A reunited Vietnam and a Thailand less dependent on America could probably arrive at working arrangements that would free Laos and Cambodia to pick their ways out of the rubble of other people's wars.

But with the political struggle in Vietnam unresolved and Thailand willing to let itself be used indefinitely for US inter-

vention in Indo-China, the chances for stable relations among all four countries remain minimal. The American refusal to accept the provisions of the 1954 Geneva Convention meant a generation of bad blood between Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand.

The greatest danger now is that the Nixon Administration's efforts to prevent a "peace with honour" from turning into a Communist success in Vietnam may mean another generation of war. And this time, it may not be so easy for Thailand to avoid an extension of Indo-China's turmoil over its own borders.

The old maxim in Laos and Cambodia has always been that no peace there is possible until a Vietnam settlement occurs. But an even older maxim states that war is a test of wills. Neither North Vietnam nor America abandoned their hopes of achieving antithetical futures for South Vietnam when they signed the Paris ceasefire. And both — through America's bases in Thailand, and North Vietnam's bases in Laos and Cambodia — retain the ability to fight for what they want.

The Paris accords' failure to provide a political settlement for Vietnam, like the similar inability of the 1954 treaty, in time may be the much more important fact than the ceasefire both were able to arrange.

WASHINGTON POST
15 February, 1973

The 'Post-Vietnam' Period Begins

To watch the first prisoners arriving at Clark Field gave most Americans, we are sure, not only personal joy but the best kind of evidence that for this country at least, the war is coming to an end. This is a feeling shared by President Nixon, who rather gratuitously chose to take the returned men's salute to their commander-in-chief as vindication of his goal of a "peace with honor," and by those who realize that most of the returning Americans are professional military men whose particular mission, the bombing, was among the most controversial of the war.

The evident vigor and cheer of most men in the first contingents released by Hanoi and the Vietcong were cause for particular satisfaction, since many Americans had probably feared Mr. Nixon was right when he said in 1971 that the North Vietnamese "without question have been the most barbaric in the handling of prisoners of any nation in history." Homecoming is sure to be an arduous psychological process. But if the Americans due to be freed in forthcoming prisoner exchanges are in the same apparently good physical condition, then that will be a boon. As the North Vietnamese certainly have calculated, it will also bring them a politically useful measure of good will. The contrast of the smiling released Americans and the grim and gaunt Communist prisoners released by Saigon, could not be more sobering.

The prisoners' return is, of course, only one aspect, an especially poignant one, of a range of "post-Vietnam" issues likely now to move toward the fore of American public life. Among these are the situation of Vietnam veterans in general, the place of young men who chose to leave the country or otherwise avoid military service—or to desert after they were in uniform rather than serve in Vietnam; and the separate but in a sense politically equal question of furnishing reconstruction aid to Indochina, including North and South Vietnam.

Vietnam veterans, especially the physically and psychologically wounded, would seem to command universal sympathy. Too many signs already indicate, however, that the same general attitude which led a disproportionate number of poor, less educated and black Americans to be sent to fight and die in Vietnam is affecting treatment of the survivors at home. Incredibly, for instance, even as we prepared to celebrate the return of the POWs, the administration was proposing to reduce federal benefits for Vietnam amputees. Under congressional pressure, that plan has now been recalled by the White House. The proposal should be discarded permanently. It is hard to imagine a more damaging and disrespectful gesture toward our Vietnam veterans.

The amnesty issue is recognized as compelling by many Americans—those who respect the motives of young men who in conscience avoided military service and those whose prime concern is to close the domestic divisions opened by the war. President Nixon, to be sure, has spoken forcefully for those who believe that a respect for authority, and a respect for the men who accepted service and risked or lost their lives, rule out a policy of forgiveness. We intend to elaborate our own views on this issue on another occasion. For now, we would merely note that this is an issue peculiarly vulnerable to the atmosphere in which it is discussed. That atmosphere can hardly fail to soften as the cease-fire takes firmer hold and prisoners come home and veterans receive the care they deserve. Those who sympathize for the men who did not fight have practical political grounds as well as sound moral compulsion for helping see to it that the men who did fight and return now fare well.

Reconstruction aid to Indochina may become the most tortured issue of them all. The President has promised substantial funds but by his failure to ask Congress for the money he has called into question his own seriousness on the matter and by his general combative posture toward Congress he has compromised whatever aid appeal he might eventually make. Within Congress, if it ever gets to the question, a difficult alliance of convenience may be forced upon legislators whose main Indochina interests are to sustain Saigon and help Hanoi respectively. We regard Indochina reconstruction as imperative morally, essential politically for purposes of domestic healing, and equally vital diplomatically as a means of turning our involvement in Indochina into an international responsibility.

It is scarcely too soon, as the prisoners begin to come home, for the President to start developing a balanced, fair and comprehensive program to deal with all the interrelated problems arising out of our long and costly entanglement in the Vietnam conflict.

WASHINGTON POST
15 February, 1973

Edwin O. Reischauer

The Two Vietnam Pacts:

One Endangers the Other

Assessments of the Vietnam agreement have varied greatly. Some see it as a tremendous achievement of realistic statesmanship; to others it appears an obvious farce. Historical hindsight will probably show it to have been something of both. This is because it is not a single agreement but two very different ones.

The one agreement is for the complete withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam and the return of Amer-

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The writer, former ambassador to Japan, is University Professor at Harvard.

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ican prisoners, both within a 60-day period, during which time the four participating parties, as the agreement calls them, observe a cease-fire in place. This is all quite simple and straightforward. It is also probably achievable, because three of the parties—the United States, Hanoi, and the Vietcong—sincerely wish to see it achieved, and the fourth, Saigon, which is probably less happy about the agreement, remains so dependent on continuing material support from the United States that it apparently has felt constrained to go along.

Even then, it is no simple matter to shift suddenly from years of warfare to a cease-fire, especially when no clear military boundary separates the combatants. The shooting may never stop entirely. However, there seems to be enough will on both sides to tune the fighting down to a tolerable level, and mechanisms have been created to police the cease-fire, at least for a while. A four-party Joint Military Commission, operating only during the 60-day period, is to supervise the execution of the agreement. An International Commission of Control and Supervision, consisting of something over 1,000 men from Canada, Hungary, Indonesia and Poland; and an "international conference," which is to be convened within 30 days and is to include China, the Soviet Union, France, and, somewhat incongruously, the United Kingdom, while not providing mechanisms to enforce the cease-fire, still may focus enough international attention on the combatants to discourage blatant violations, at least for the crucial 60-day period.

The other so-called agreement is hardly simple, straightforward, or workable. The two "South Vietnamese parties" are to set up a National Council of National Reconcilation and Concord, consisting of three equal segments (apparently unspecified neutrals, who lack the military power base of the other two, are to be the third segment). Operating on "the principle of unanimity," this body is to achieve its work of peaceful unification of South Vietnam within 90 days (a significant variation from the 60-day deadline for the other agreement) and is to organize "free and democratic general elections." All this is to be achieved in a country that has never had truly free and democratic elections, is made up of people who have no experience with or faith in elections, and is chaotically divided between two military-based regimes that have fought each other fanatically for years and still so hate each other that they refused to sign a version of the agreement that named the other and on a more vaguely worded version insisted on signing on different pages.

Saigon appears to have some chance of surviving, but, if so, it would probably remain beleaguered, at least for the foreseeable future. A slightly more probable outcome might be the undermining of the Saigon regime and its eventual takeover by Hanoi. The speed of such a development, the degree of the South's autonomy, if any, and the manner of takeover—that is, whether it would be primarily through subversion or through military attack—are all quite beyond prediction. Whatever the outcome, however a divided or unified Vietnam will probably cast a heavy shadow across the independence of Laos and Cambodia but is likely to be so absorbed in its own problems as to be little threat to Thailand or other countries. Certainly it will not be controlled by China or any other outside power. And the useful American role in the whole region will be, as it always should have been, not military involvement, but sympathetic concern and, where possible, economic and technical aid.

Whether or not the two agreements —the one on American military disengagement and the so-called political settlement in Indochina—together constitute "peace with honor" is a semantic question that is not worth arguing over. The important point is that the first agreement is overwhelmingly in American and world interests and, in my judgment, is fortunately irreversible. There is not much profit either in discussing the historical might-have-beens. One cannot but wonder, however, if this sort of American disentanglement from our Vietnam fiasco could not have been achieved by simpler, less Byzantine means a long time ago. My own guess is that the essentials — a standstill cease-fire maintained long enough to permit American withdrawal and the return of our prisoners, together with the safe acceptance of such a solution by both the American public and the world in general—could have been attained at least two years earlier, if we had admitted to ourselves the obvious fact that this was indeed the only safe and possible outcome. But this is a bit of history that can never be rerun.

The crucial question that remains is whether we have endangered the wise and essential first agreement by wrapping it up with the unrealistic second one. A cease-fire for the limited purpose of the first agreement would have been less susceptible to disruption than the present more generalized cease-fire, ostensibly for the purposes of both agreements. The involvement of our "honor" in the domestic peace of the Indochinese states may justify in some minds a thoroughly unwise continued American military presence in Thailand and runs some risk of sucking us back into the military quagmire of Indochina. Our advocacy of entirely unrealistic plans to resolve old and bitter disputes in Vietnam by harmonious unanimity and elections and our emphasis on "great power" international conferences in settling the affairs of Indochina can only confuse the American public about Southeast Asian realities and could lead to dangerous self-delusions on the part of the administration. In short, while the gossamer of the second agreement may seem to some a helpful cloak of "honor," I am afraid that it is more likely to prove an embarrassingly invisible new suit of clothes for the emperor.

WASHINGTON POST
6 February, 1973

The Role of the French in Helping to Secure a Ceasefire in Southeast Asia

A. N. Spanel, founder of the International Playtex Corporation, has expressed views on national and international issues for many years through advertising. Many of these views were reasonable and well argued. His latest release, however, headlined "The Active Participation of Our Friends" (in your issue of January 27, p. A-2), claims significant credit for the French government in bringing about the ceasefire in Vietnam, quoting French Foreign Minister Schumann that the French role in the negotiations "could be qualified as essential" and praising that role as "little short of a miracle of diplomatic discretion."

Monsieur Spanel omits, though, many relevant facts—most of which are presumably unknown to most American newspaper readers. To judge France's role in the Vietnam conflict, we ought to remember that Vietnam (together with Laos and Cambodia) was the French colony of Indochina until World War Two, controlling the education, legal and civic status of several generations of Vietnamese. During the war, the Japanese occupied Vietnam, without signal resistance on the part of the French colonial authorities.

In 1945, after the Japanese troops had been forced to evacuate Vietnam, De Gaulle, then President of France, somehow induced the British and U.S. governments to have their navies convoy French troops to the Far East to restore French colonial rule in Vietnam—an attempt which ended disastrously at Dien Bien Phu. Most former colonies gained independence since 1945 without having to fight wars against their rulers— but Vietnam and Algeria, France's two richest colonies, had to battle the colonial power for years, at the loss of many tens of thousands of lives.

Spanel quotes several statements by Pompidou and Schumann, but omits how these and other French leaders repeatedly denounced the U.S. conduct of the war in Vietnam, bombing and mining of the North etc., without criticizing a single time the Communists who invaded the South with most of their regular army, crossing either the "demilitarized" zone or violating the neutrality of Laos and Cambodia, thus provoking U.S. retaliation.

Even in her modest role as host to the negotiations (a role which a dozen other places could have filled as well, probably better) the French government leaned clearly to the Communist side, permitting Communist, anti-U.S. and anti-Saigon demonstrations, obviously designed to exert mob pressure on the negotiators.

The role of France concerning Vietnam is therefore far from having confirmed "the deep friendship between the peoples of France and the United States," as Spanel asserts at the end of his ad. But it cannot be based on falsification of the historic record. Perhaps Monsieur Spanel could help to base relations between our two countries on the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, by inducing the French government to publish all its classified documents related to Vietnam, from colonial days to the present? (Could Dr. Ellsberg help?)

HENRY C. SUTTON.
Washington.

NEW YORK TIMES
4 February 1973

ALSOP LOOKS BACK ON CHINA STORIES

Columnist Sees Accuracy in Reporting in 1950's

By DAVID K. SHIPLER
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 31—To a reader whose memory reaches back a decade or so, it might have seemed as if Joseph Alsop had done a sudden about-face on the subject of Communist China.

Writing from Washington in 1959, the columnist had described China's agricultural communes with adjectives such as "fearful" and "hideous" and "ruthless," concluding that in pursuing their policy of "forced labor," Chinese leaders had "chosen to out-Stalin Stalin."

In December, 1972, beneath the dateline "Fei Cheng Commune, Yunnan Province," Mr. Alsop wrote of the "prosperous affairs" of a commune of "comparative wealth." "Amid the bougainvillea vines in the lovely courtyard it was all strangely similar to a businesslike discussion with the management of one of our large American industrial farms."

Which is Alsop's Fable? Neither, says the 62-year-old columnist. He has not changed; China has.

Everything Changed But People

"Everything in China has changed, in truth," he wrote from Nanking, "except the endlessly resilient, hard-working and clever Chinese people. The quality of life has changed, vastly for the worse for the ancient ruling class but for the better for everyone else."

Joseph Alsop's month-long journey through China last autumn was a journey of perceptions, and his flood of columns from the mainland reflected much of the new warmth of the revised American image of Chint.

He described his trip as "the most significant reportorial work I have ever done," and his columns, which are distributed to 250 newspapers, were full of a sense of amazement and admiration at what he called "the new China." Thre productive commune, the efficient tool factory, the formerly squalid city transformed by industry, all were discussed in laudatory terms.

Spent 4 Years in China

Mr. Alsop spent four years In China in the nineteen-forties ardently backing Gen. Chiang Kai-shek against the Communists and castigating American officials whose support for the Generalissimo seemed infirm. After the Communists took power, Mr. Alsop became known as an exponent of the containment policy, and later as a hawk on Vietnam.

Now, during an interview in his Georgetown home, Mr. Alsop speaks of the evolution of "a significant,, even a strong, community of interests between the United States and China from the moment the Soviet threat began to be serious."

Even though China might ultimately become a formidable nuclear power, he said, "Given the consequences of a successful Soviet attack against Chi[na] I'm convinced that if the danger becomes much more serious, we ought to do everything in our power, which is limited, to go to China's aid."

Would he have made such a statement 15 years ago? "No, because the situation hadn't evolved, the Chinese Government hadn't evolved, and we were relatively vastly stronger. And the Soviets wouldn't have dared to do all the things you would have to expect the Soviets to do after a success in China. I would have said it three years ago, four years ago —two, certainly. One's always a little slow in catching up with things."

And what of his support for Chiang? "That was 28 years ago, and everybody in those days believed that Communism was a unitary phenomenon." Furthermore, he said: "If the other side had won in China, I think the chances are that China would appear more prosperous than it does today . . . although wealth would be less evenly distributed, certainly."

Despite Mr. Alsop's firsthand reporting of the current China, he has no doubts about the over-all accuracy of the second-hand reporting made necessary by the absence of American journalists in China during the nineteen-fifties and sixties.

Only a Few Surprises

Based on what he had known from the outside, he said he was surprised by only a few things. First, "that the aftermath of the second great convulsion—the Cultural Revolution—was so relatively invisible."

"Then, given one's experience of other Communist governments, you didn't expect it to work quite so well," he said. "Finally, there's just the plain natural physical surprise. You go to a province that literally had no industry at all and find it bulging with industry."

Mr. Alsop said in one column that he kept "thinking nervously of all the woolly minded Westerners who made such fools of themselves in Russia in the cruel thirties," and he said in an interview, speaking of the Chinese system, "I may think it works better than it does work." But he added that the Chinese did not seem eager to hide anything. "They seemed awfully pleased to show me what they'd done."

NEW YORK TIMES
1 February 1973

Vietnam: A Soviet View

By Spartak Beglov

MOSCOW—The agreement on ending the war which opens the way to restoration of peace in Vietnam and the whole of Indochina has been received in the Soviet Union, as in the world, with great satisfaction.

A war is being extinguished whose flames constantly threatened to spread to other areas with ensuing noncontrollable consequences. The right of the Vietnamese people to determine their own destiny, without interference from outside, is triumphing.

Expressing respect and admiration for the stanchness of the forces of the Vietnam National Liberation Front and of the people of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in rebuffing the foreign intervention, we also note the important role of international solidarity in the struggle of the patriots of Vietnam for the just cause.

Millions of words have been written about this war. There is no doubt that in the future, too, historians will derive ever new material for the assessment of what has happened.

Today, however, I would like to express my observation only on one salient feature of this war. It has been an unusual war in the sense that it has not been a war of one nation against another. It has been a war between illusion and reality. The illusion of world domination and the pretensions it produced for playing the role of world policeman have come up against the reality of the national liberation movement that steeled itself in the course of decades of struggle against French colonial rule, the Japanese occupation and other invasions and encroachments.

The vicissitudes of the war have graphically shown how any escalation of the American war effort inevitably doomed its sponsors to further moral and political defeats in the eyes of the rest of the world. And, conversely, every new step along the road of political realism took America nearer to honorable withdrawal from the war.

That is why, I think, all the Americans who considered it the wrong war at the wrong time and for the wrong cause and who persistently sought the way out along nonmilitary lines have every reason to tell themselves now that this is their victory, too.

The war has had its effect on Soviet-American relations. The greater has been a turn in America from the illusions of a policy of strength to recognition of the political realities, the wider have opened goodwill sluices in search of more fruitful relations on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence.

It will be recalled that the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Central Committee, Leonid Brezhnev, somewhat more than a month ago stressed that "if the two countries—the U.S.S.R. and U.S.A.—really follow the course charted jointly during the Moscow negotiations, then, we think, new substantial steps developing Soviet-American relations for the benefit of the peoples of the two countries and for universal peace may become possible during further contacts. However—and this should be emphatically stressed—much will depend on the course of events in the immediate future, and, in particular, on the turn in the question of ending the war in Vietnam."

By linking these words with the signing of the agreement on ending the war, it is not hard to find the clue to how this is to influence further prospects for development of Soviet-American relations. Of course, the work of restoring peace in Vietnam is only begun. The implementation of a just peace will depend to a large extent on how unswervingly and consistently this agreement is put into practice by the parties.

The Soviet public is not going to relax its vigilance against intrigues of reactionary forces and those unable to break away from the grip of the old illusions. We have always sided with the Vietnamese brothers and friends in days of severe military trials. We will remain loyal to our duty in days of peaceful restoration.

Spartak Beglov is political commentator of the Novosti press agency.

WASHINGTON POST
9 February, 1973

Joseph Alsop

Good Ceasefire Signs

ON THE SURFACE, the signs in Vietnam are far better than you might suppose from the reports from the scene. Two ironically comic stories and a statistic offer proof enough of this.

The North Vietnamese and Vietcong groups that went from Paris to Saigon made an odd request of the pilot of their special plane when they left Bangkok. They asked to fly low over Tay Ninh, on the South Vietnamese border. Nothing loath, the pilot took them in low over Tay Ninh. The shock and disappointment of those who looked out the airplane's windows were far too strong to be concealed. The passengers from Paris had, of course, been told that Tay Ninh, a minor provincial capital, had already been seized by the North Vietnamese to serve as the permanent capital of the Vietcong "government." But there is was, with South Vietnamese government flags flying at almost every house.

One reason Tay Ninh was saved was a "popular uprising," as the V.C. call it—but the wrong kind of popular uprising, in which the people joined furiously in their town's defense against the North Vietnamese. The failure to take Tay Ninh must at least have been known to the Vietcong "military representative," North Vietnamese Lt. Gen. Tran Van Tra, when he later headed for Saigon. Yet he asked to see Tay Ninh, too.

The American chopper that picked him up in the jungle circled low and long. Again, the general's disappointment was bitter and obvious. NVA lying to higher headquarters has long been common. So the unit commanders had told their general they still held Tay Ninh's suburbs. Instead they were at least 10 miles away in deep jungle.

As to the statistic, it has been loudly announced from Saigon that the V.C. and North Vietnamese still hold 34 per cent of South Vietnam's land area. The more important fact is that they now control barely more than 5 per cent of the population. The famous "leopard spots" are pretty desolate, in short, and the ceasefire-round of the struggle has been won by the government in Saigon.

IT IS NOT the last round, however. The intelligence suggests that all the North Vietnamese units now in Cambodia may be thrown into the III Corps area of Sounth Vietnam to mount a massive attack in a matter of two or three months.

Again, infiltration down the Ho Chi Minh Trail has apparently ended; but a massive supply movement is still going on. Furthermore, most of the North Vietnamese armed force has been transferred into the southern Laos panhandle, in a part of the Ho Chi Minh Trail from which the II Corps area of South Vietnam can be easily attacked. All these facts point toward massive future violations of the ceasefire agreement.

If this is the intention, the accord obtained by President Nixon and Dr. Henry A. Kissinger is to be treated by Hanoi like the accord obtained by President Kennedy and Gov. Averill Harriman in 1962—as a scrap of paper to be torn up and tossed away as soon as convenient. But the President is not ready to go through the kind of charade the U.S. government went through in 1962.

In 1962, a handful of North Vietnamese soldiers ostentatiously parading

past a checkpoint, were accepted as "proof" that Hanoi was keeping the promise to Gov. Harriman to withdraw utterly from Laos. Now, President Nixon is grimly determined to accept nothing less than literal compliance with every promise embodied in the ceasefire agreement. That is the real object of Dr. Kissinger's journey to Hanoi, and it is also an important object of his trip to Peking.

THIS WILL PRESENT Hanoi with an acutely painful choice. The key clause in the ceasefire agreement is the one covering Cambodia and Laos, from which all "foreign troops"—including North Vietnamese—are to be withdrawn. For the North Vietnamese, that means no Cambodian bases; no Laotian bases; above all, no enormous, manpower-consuming supply system in Laos to keep the Ho Chi Minh Trail in operation. Without these crucial assets, and with the VC-NVA only controlling 5 per cent plus of the South Vietnamese population, Hanoi cannot conceivably sustain a serious struggle in South Vietnam.

On the other side of the balance, there is the prospect of none of the American aid for reconstruction that the North Vietnamese leaders have been loudly boasting about. There is also the prospect of possible pressure from China, for the Chinese more and more seem to lean toward insisting that Hanoi keep the promises already made. There is even the prospect that President Nixon may once again prove to be cruelly unpredictable. So the betting is even, either way.

BALTIMORE SUN
9 FEBRUARY 1973

Manila curbs 'excess'

U.S. way called 'slow bungling'

By THOMAS PEPPER
Sun Staff Correspondent

Manila—Gen. Carlos P. Romulo, the Philippine secretary of foreign affairs and a former ambassador to the United States and the United Nations, said yesterday that Western-style democracy is not well suited to developing countries.

Defending his government's imposition of martial law and the decision of Philippine political leaders to replace the American-inspired Constitution of 1935, General Romulo said that when Western-style democracy was implanted in various developing societies, "the result was excessive freedom."

This was particularly true in the Philippines, he said.

"While democracy may be the best form of government," General Romulo said, "it is slow, bungling and inefficient. An advanced society like the U.S. can be slow, bumbling and inefficient, and still continue to forge ahead."

But, he continued, "in this day and age, a developing society has to develop fast. It cannot afford to bungle. Among people who never know where their next meal is coming from, free speech is a remote ideal, and certainly less important than finding a means for bare survival."

General Romulo, who has been called by his military rank ever since he served as an aide to the late Gen. Douglas MacArthur in the World War II Philippine-American command, said he came to this view of democracy about two years ago, largely as a result of trips to South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia.

Those countries, he said, have what he called a "modified democracy," and each of them "is forging ahead much farther and faster than we.

"I felt," he said, "that there was something wrong in our trying to make a carbon copy of American democracy here."

General Romulo spoke in his somewhat faded office in a classically designed building once used by the prewar American colonial administration.

In a reference to the old constitution and to the country's slam-bang, circus-style politics, General Romulo said the Philippines "had the skeleton of democracy, but not its flesh and blood.

"Politics," he said, "became an industry here. The politicians began to think they were the rulers. They each had bodyguards, and we were starting to have, as China had, warlords, each with an army. This was a replica of the American West, the frontier days."

Part of the trend toward bodyguards and private armies came, he said, from a decline in respect for law during the wartime Japanese occupation.

"Our youth then were taught to cheat, lie, and kill in order to survive. It's not easy to shake off this moral tone. Those kids then, some of them are our leaders now."

A former journalist and university president, General Romulo was a longtime advocate of Westernization for Asia. He was one of the original signers of the United Nations Charter, and the first Asian to become president of the U.N. General Assembly. In 1947, he was chairman of a U.N.-sponsored Conference on Freedom of Information and of his past record, he said:

"I have no regrets. I will still fight for freedom of speech and civil liberties. However, we must understand there are priorities in every country. We [in the Philippines] have tried to ignore the priorities that a developing society should impose on its people."

"What we have needed here," he said in conclusion, "is national discipline—the same discipline that De Gaulle instilled in the French people."

NEW YORK TIMES
5 February 1973

Pope Says Vietnam Truce Is Ambiguous and Violated

ROME, Feb. 4 (Reuters)—Pope Paul VI said today that the Vietnam cease-fire was full of violations and stressed the need for justice, brotherhood and universal peace.

The Pope, addressing people gathered in St. Peter's Square for his Sunday blessing, added: "Enough with war and guerrilla warfare."

Pope Paul said it was necessary rather to see how the damage to Vietnam could be repaired, and he reminded Italians they could help by giving money during special collections for Vietnam in Italian Catholic churches today.

The Pope lamented what he said was increasing "violence, delinquency, selfish social struggle and tolerated outrage to honest custom" in society.

Eastern Europe

SOVIET NEWS, London
23 January 1973
Published by the Press Dept.
of the Soviet Embassy

RETURNED DEFECTOR EXPOSES ANTI-SOVIET ORGANISATION

VICTOR SHISHELYAKIN, who defected to the West eight years ago, has returned to the Soviet Union bitterly disillusioned and has described in *Sovietskaya Rossia* his relations with the United States Central Intelligence Agency and the anti-Soviet People's Labour Union (NTS) organisation which operates from West Germany.

He gives a detailed account of his experiences and supplies the names of the CIA agents and NTS officials with whom he became involved.

He describes the close links between the CIA, the NTS and the anti-Soviet radio station "Radio Liberty."

He not only makes it clear that the NTS draws its income from the CIA, but describes how the staff of *Posev*, the NTS journal, comb the Soviet press for criticisms and complaints from readers and dress these up as reports from secret "NTS agents" in the Soviet Union to impress their CIA paymasters.

Shishelyakin's disillusionment with his position as émigré started early as soon as he arrived in Frankfurt-am-Main.

He was at once installed, and held prisoner, in a CIA flat at 45 Mendelssohnstrasse.

"In the room were a small table, two chairs, a bed and a sideboard with dishes. In the corner was a television set and a radio. American newspapers and magazines lay on the table.

"I was left alone, and the door was locked from the outside," he says.

Interrogation

For weeks he was questioned, cross-examined and interrogated, asked the same questions over and over again, for details of his life, about all the people he had known in the Soviet Union, the crew of the ship on which he had sailed, the names of the commanders of the Soviet Far Eastern Flotilla and its ships, details about the ports of Vladivostok and Nakhodka, their depth, their quays and how they were guarded.

So the questioning went on — for details about Western Siberia, where he had previously lived, of industrial enterprises and their output, of laboratories and research institutes, military units, schools, airfields, radio stations, rocket installations — even cinemas and hospitals.

Long before the end of the questioning, the strain made him ill, he slept badly and came out in a rash.

When it finally came to an end, the CIA got him a job with a U.S. concern manufacturing trucks for the army.

The work was heavy, and the living conditions, sharing a room in a hostel, both bad and expensive.

He left the job — and found himself on the street. The CIA was not interested.

In the meantime he had met the family of one of the NTS leaders, V. Gorachek, the publisher of *Posev*, and he asked for help from the NTS.

They saw him as a source of information which could be processed to make it suitable for anti-Soviet purposes.

It was planned to concoct a book about Shishelyakin's life in the USSR, presenting him as a "political protester" and a champion of "Russian democracy."

Ideas, actions and even words of which he had no knowledge were attributed to him.

This opened his eyes to the methods used to concoct anti-Soviet material and the nature of the evidence of "lack of democracy in the USSR."

He tells of a meeting of Russian émigrés, at which the hit of the evening was a certain Yevgeny E, whom NTS agents had persuaded to "flee" to the West.

This Yevgeny E has since returned to the Soviet Union, but at that time he was in the hands of the NTS leaders and was being used for their propaganda.

Prompted by them, he described "popular uprisings" he had witnessed in the Soviet Union.

When Shishelyakin asked him afterwards where he had seen such events, Yevgeny E replied: "One has to eat!"

Shishelyakin also describes how *Posev* over a long period published material written by a certain Boris Yevdokimov, who presented himself to an NTS agent as a descendant of one of the Scandinavian royal families who was going to "transform the Soviet system."

His unbalanced ravings were accompanied by a black picture of the situation in the Soviet Union.

This was what interested the NTS leaders, who required only that the material should be strongly anti-Soviet and should include an ample supply of such expressions as "barred windows," "prison uniform" and "barbed wire."

These effusions were published under the pseudonyms Sergei Razumny and Ivan Ruslanov.

The NTS paid Yevdokimov over a thousand dollars for *Kuzma* and over 8,000 dollars for *Variant of a Gas Chamber*.

The latter, after being "touched up," was broadcast in instalments by "Radio Liberty."

To the CIA, the NTS claimed Yevdokimov as a genuine Russian intellectual and a writer. His name was also on the NTS list of secret agents in the USSR.

So, too, were the names of two old women who were relations of Yevdokimov. One of them was so weak that she could not leave her bed, but she had a code-name and was on the NTS pay list.

There was a great scandal when this was exposed and the CIA threatened to stop financing the NTS.

There was never any doubt that the CIA paid NTS salaries and financed *Posev*.

A few years ago, when the *Posev* printing works were being re-equipped, the NTS leaders spread the tale that the new press was paid for by gifts and loans from NTS members.

When Shishelyakin asked who had contributed, he got the answer:

"Don't ask naive questions. We got the money from the Americans, but keep quiet about it."

Espionage

Shishelyakin gives the names of the "booksellers" in Munich and France who are responsible for dispatching NTS material to France, Italy, Austria and Finland, from where it is taken into the USSR.

NTS agents are also instructed by the CIA to present such "literature" to members of Soviet delegations and Soviet citizens abroad. More often than not, however, the pamphlets are dumped in dustbins, and the claim is made that they have been "distributed."

The NTS, of course, does more than engage in anti-Soviet propaganda. It also takes part in subversive and espionage activities.

It organises provocations against Soviet delegations abroad. This is done by "the closed section." The NTS recommends its people as guides and interpreters for Soviet delegations.

It is also active among students of Russian in Western countries and

seeks to recruit likely individuals to carry out subversive acts during visits to the USSR.

There is also the "German-Russian Society" in Frankfurt-am-Main, which is strongly anti-Soviet. The NTS maintains contacts with it and seeks recruits among the younger members.

In conclusion, Shishelyakin says that the NTS leaders are increasingly losing credibility even among their own rank and file.

NEW YORK TIMES
11 February 1973

HUNGARIANS HOPE TO REGAIN CROWN

By RAYMOND H. ANDERSON
Special to The New York Times

BUDAPEST, Feb. 9 — More than 28 years ago, as artillery of the advancing Soviet Army rumbled in the distance, a special train left Budapest for the Austrian border.

Aboard was an old black cask that required three keys to open. Inside was the golden Crown of St. Stephen, the symbol of Hungarian sovereignty since it was presented to Stephen nearly 1,000 years ago by Pope Sylvester II.

The crown fell into the hands of American troops near Salzburg, Austria, in the spring of 1945, and ever since has been an issue of contention between Hungary and the United States.

There is expectation in Budapest that this may be the year Hungary recovers the Crown of St. Stephen.

Relations Improve

The condition imposed by the United States for return of the crown has been a substantial improvement in relations, and in the last year this appears to have been largely met. Last July Secretary of State William P. Rogers visited Budapest and Peter Valyi, a Hungarian Deputy Premier, is scheduled to visit Washington.

During the cold war and Hungary's imprisonment of Jozsef Cardinal Mindszenty, return of the crown was politically inconceivable. It was also beyond discussion when Cardinal Mindszenty was in asylum in the United States Embassy from 1956 until 1971.

The Cardinal has opposed any move to return the crown while Hungary is under Communist rule. He is reported to have proposed that it be sent to the Vatican.

A year ago President Nixon reportedly sent a message to Cardinal Mindszenty saying that the United States would safeguard the crown "for the time being." Some European diplomats here are convinced that the Valyi visit will be followed by an announcement on its return.

Hungarian officials, who talked freely before, now refuse to discuss the crown. Requests for meetings with Foreign Ministry officials were turned aside with explanations that there were more important issues between Hungary and the United States.

One such issue is Hungary's desire to obtain most-favored-nation tariff privileges for her exports.

"The crown is important to Hungary," a Foreign Ministry official said, "but there is nothing further Hungary need do. The next move is up to the United States."

The crown of St. Stephen acquired a mystic aura of Hungarian identity over the centuries. It was used for coronations, last in 1916 when Charles was crowned emperor of Austria-Hungary. According to an old saying, "he who holds the crown rules Hungary."

Palace Search in Vain

This symbolism was one reason for the annoyance of the Communist leadership that the crown was being held in the United States, reportedly at Fort Knox, Ky.

In the first years immediately following World War II, the Hungarians, uncertain where the crown was, dug through the ruins of the royal palace overlooking the Danube. Only later did they learn it was in American hands.

Children are led daily up stone steps inside the Neo-Gothic Matthias Cathedral to look at a reproduction. The guides end every lecture with the information that the original is in the United States.

As a group of schoolgirls listened to the lecture this week, a middle-aged woman guard left her electric heater and approached a visitor. "The original is in the United States, you know," she said.

To a joking remark that she might be guarding the original one of these days, the woman said in German, "Please be so kind."

WASHINGTON STAR
6 February 1973

WASHINGTON CLOSE-UP

Soviet Weapon Surprises

By ORR KELLY

For most of the 1960s, the Russians appeared to be playing a game of catch-up with the United States in the field of strategic nuclear weapons. And where they were not obviously trying to match American weapons, they were doing things that didn't make much sense to experts at the Pentagon.

Now, the Soviet Union is not only moving out on initiatives of its own but doing things — especially in its undersea strategic force — that make excellent sense to U.S. experts.

Responding to the first Soviet Sputnik and the false missile gap scare of 1960, the United States moved very rapidly in the early years of the decade. It developed and deployed a sophisticated land-based missile, developed and deployed a fleet of invulnerable missile-carrying submarines and began to upgrade both of these weapons systems.

☆

It was not until near the end of the 1960s that the Soviet Union began to match these American developments. In some cases, the Soviet weapons were pretty close to carbon copies of those of the United States. This was particularly true with the Yankee class submarine which is very much like the early model Polaris subs.

In other cases, the Soviets went off on what still appear to many U.S. experts to be expensive tangents. The most notable example was the development of the fractional orbital bombardment system or FOBS. American scientists considered—and rejected—the development of such a system a decade ago and it is still not clear why the Russians thought it worth the enormous expense to develop and deploy such a weapon.

In an entirely new category is what the United States calls the Delta class submarine. It is quite different from anything in the U.S. arsenal — and it makes excellent sense to U.S. experts.

★

The Delta is similar to the Yankee class submarine. But it carries 12 missiles instead of 16. The extra space provided by removal of four missile tubes makes it possible for the Delta to carry a much longer missile — with a range of something like 4,500 miles compared to about 1,300 for the missile carried by the Yankee class.

This means the Delta class subs can be on station, their missiles aimed at targets in the United States, without passing through the gap between Iceland and the Faeroe Islands into the main body of the North Atlantic.

The Delta class sub thus has some of the advantages the United States hopes to achieve with its Trident submarines, the first of which will not be ready until 1978.

Moreover, the Russians are probably getting these advantages at a substantially lower price than the United States. The Delta is being built in the same yards as the Yankee and appears to be a natural follow-on design, talking full advantage of the skills learned by those who built the Yankees.

In contrast to what appears to be a smooth transition in the Soviet yards from the Yankee to the Delta, the construction of the Trident submarines will be largely a fresh start. Even though the Trident will be superior, technologically, to the Delta, it will probably also far surpass it in cost.

The development of the Delta did not come entirely as a surprise to American experts. For several years now, it has been known that a long-range missile that would not fit into existing boats was under development and it was assumed that, at some point, we would see the development of a new submarine.

★

But when it did show up, it did so with startling speed. It was not until last spring that the United States became aware, from satellite photos, that a 12-missile submarine was being built. This was only seven or eight months before the first of the new subs put to sea.

Pentagon experts fully expect that we will see more such rapid, significant technological developments by the Soviet Union in the next few years and that some of them will be true, and disturbing, surprises.

IE NEW YORK TIMES, THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 8, 1973

U.S. Executive Faces Trial in Hungary

By RAYMOND H. ANDERSON
Special to The New York Times

BUDAPEST, Hungary, Feb. 7—An American business representative is expected to face a court here early next month accused of running a flamboyant commercial operation involving alleged bribery, gifts of new cars, bank accounts abroad for Hungarian accomplices, black-market currency dealings and "violation of official secrets."

The American citizen, Dr. Tibor Glaz, is described here as the East European manager of the Ralston Purina Company. Dr. Glaz was arrested last year. About 20 Hungarians have been implicated in the case. Two are said to have committed suicide.

The indictment, as published, would suggest that the affiar is an epic in chicken-feed and pig-feed salesmanship.

After months of what one resident here called "embarrassed silence," the case came to light when a Budapest weekly, Hetfoi Hirek, printed an account of the indictment.

Hetfoi Hirek stressed that the Hungarians facing trial were "responsible officials" and that some had salaries as high as 10,000 forints a month ($370), virtually the upper limit in Hungary.

There is no evidence of any political implications in the affair. On the contrary, the long silence seemed to reflect concern about possible disruption of a recent significant improvement in relations between the United States and Hungary.

According to the report on the indictment, Dr. Glaz first made an arrangement with Imr Szilagyi, manager of the Pig-Fattening and Fodder-Mixing Joint Enterprise of the Kondoros collective farm.

Car Received is Left

Under the arrangement, it was said, Dr. Glaz was to pay Mr. Szilagyi a commission of 30 cents a ton upon the signing of a contract for 60,000 tons of pig-feed nutritives, or a total of $18,000, to be deposited in a West German bank.

The police intervened, the report continued, before the arrangements were completed. But Mr. Szilagyi was said to have received 80,000 forints ($3,000) from a "motorcar manipulation" as well as money fro a West German account during a toruist trip abroad.

Another Hungarian accused in the case, Laszlo Miklos, was a department head in the Trust of Poultry Processing Enterprises. Mr. Miklos was said to have received $100 a month for "promoting" the feed sold by Dr. Glaz. Mr. Miklos also is accused of having received an automobile as a gift and a West German bank account.

More ominously, the indictment charged that Mr. Miklos had drawn up for Dr. Glaz "an accurate list of the collective farms dealing with the processing of poultry." This, it appears, is the basis for the charge of "violation of official secrets."

A state farm director, Karoly Mohacsi, was reported to have received about $1,000 from Dr. Glaz after a contract was reached to buy pig feed and a mixer.

"He could have earned more—$15,000—from this deal, but he was unmasked, "Hetfoi Hirek said. "In this case, too, the usual gift of an automobile was not lacking."

The account of the indictment cited other Hungarians involved in the case and charged that one employed as a secretary, Gyula Rajos, had been helping Dr. Glaz for years in illegal sales of dollars.

WASHINGTON POST
14 February, 1973

U.S. Novelist Indifferent To Solzhenitsyn's Plight

From News Dispatches

MOSCOW, Feb. 13—American novelist Erskine Caldwell expressed indifference today to the plight of Soviet novelist Alexander Solzhenitsyn. "There's no law requiring a person to be a writer," he said.

"If he prefers to write as he wishes to, then it's up to him to take the consequences, that's all I can say", Caldwell added. "He lives in a society and a system of government which makes certain requirements so he is subject to those requirements."

Only one of Solzhenitsyn's books, "One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich," has been published here. He was expelled from the Soviet Writers Union in 1969 after other works critical of Soviet society were published abroad. The action denied him the right to earn a living here as an author.

Asked if he would follow the example of other American writers who have offered to turn over ruble royalties to Solzhenitsyn to help his financial situation, Caldwell replied:

"I am willing to help writers in distress. I don't know how much he's in. I have no idea. No one has suggested that I do it so I have given it no thought or consideration."

Caldwell, whose reputation rests on books like "Tobacco Road" and "God's Little Acre", depression-era novels about the American South, said some 10,000 rubles (about $12,000) in royalties had accumulated in his account here since his last visit in 1963.

"I'm overloaded with rubles which I can't exchange and I can't take out," he said.

Caldwell said this was his fifth visit to the Soviet Union.

WASHINGTON POST
9 February, 1973

M's Cover Is Blown; Spy Chief Resigning

By Bernard D. Nossiter
Washington Post Foreign Service

LONDON, Feb. 8—M's cover has been blown.

Britain's spy master turns out to be Sir John Ogilvy Rennie, a handsome, 59-year-old Foreign Office official.

His exposure is the result of a personal tragedy. Sir John's son, Charles, 25, and daughter-in-law Christine, 23, were arrested last month and charged with possessing heroin.

Sir John's name and role as head of M.I. 6 were well known to Fleet Street defense and police reporters. But, under a uniquely British system, their newspapers voluntarily refrained from publishing this informaion.

The papers, however, had briefly reported the arrest of an unnamed young couple on the drugs charge and had identified the man simply as the son of the M.I.6 chief. Stern, the German weekly magazine, followed up this clue and disclosed Sir John's name in its issue distributed on Wednesday.

That released the British press from its obligation and the story was reported in this morning's London newspapers.

Sir John either is about to or already has resigned from his post, which is officially described as "deputy under secretary of state."

Some newspapers here have suggested that Sir John has spent most of his professional life as a dry-as-dust commercial diplomat and was lately brought into M.I.6 because of his administrative skills. Knowing persons scoff at this. Indeed, the bare facts of his life available in the British "Who's Who" suggest a background and series of cover posts to delight Ian Fleming, Graham Greene and Compton MacKenzie.

Sir John, an only son, attended Wellington College, a "public" —that is private —school in Berkshire. He studied at Balliol College, Oxford, and then worked for four years in New York until 1939 at an advertising agency. The next year, he was a British vice consul in Baltimore. He then moved back to New York and the British information services during the war.

His official list of posts brings him back to London for an undisclosed Foreign Office job from 1946 to 1949; then "first secretary (commercial)" at the British embassy in Washington.

His sole posting in Eastern Europe was from 1951 to 1953, when he was first secretary at the embassy in Warsaw. This was followed by "counsellor, Foreign Office" and "head of information, research department, Foreign Office." From 1960 to 1963, his biography simply says "Washington."

He was "on loan to Civil Services Commission during 1966." The biography does not disclose when he became deputy under secretary and boss of M.I.6, although the Daily Express said he took over as "M" four years ago.

Sir John, who lives in the fashionable Belgravia section of London, apparently was a painter of promise in his youth. He exhibited at the Royal Academy in 1930 and 1931 and the Paris Salon in 1932. He still lists painting as a hobby — along with "electronics," a nice suggestion of British irony.

Official sources tried to discourage the drawing of any connection between the arrest of Charles and Sir John's resignation, stressing that the spy chief is only 11 months away from the normal retirement age of 60.

However, persons thoroughly familiar with intelligence procedures here said that the arrest of his son on so serious a charge made it impossible for Sir John to continue. "There is a Caesar's wife doctrine, you know" one knowledgable man said.

Four years ago, Charles was convicted of possession of marijuana and fined $60, but his father's career was not affected by that incident.

Sir John's exposure and departure are not expected to have any major repercussions on M.I.6, Sir John was too far up in the hierarchy, too remote from actual operations, to compromise any British spies in the field.

Sir John will be or already has been replaced by another Foreign Office official whose different personality could affect the tone, but not the essential nature of the intelligence gathering machine. Characteristically, it works from a nondescript office building not far from the US embassy.

The fact that M.I.6 is under the Foreign Office and is not a separate bureaucracy is another major difference from American practice. The British believe that keeping their spies under Foreign Office control helps prevent them from straying off on courses of their own and embarrassing the professional diplomats.

The reaction in the intelligence community to Sir John's downfall was summed up this way: "Hard luck on the poor bastard—what a twit of a son—I'd like to kick him in the crotch."

Sir John belongs to the right club. He has been awarded the right decorations.

From his picture published in the Manchester Guardian, he appears typecast for his role. He has a distinguished, oval face, strong chin and aquiline nose, and stares out from under slightly hooded brows.

The surfacing of Sir John's name illustrates the curious and peculiarly British system of D (for Defense) notices. Essentially, this is a voluntary agreement between media and government that tries to prevent the disclosure of material seen as harmful to national security.

Its key figure is a retired rear admiral, Kenneth Farnhill, secretary of the Defense, Press and Broadcasting Committee. Newspapers fearful of breaching security call Farnhill, who makes himself available around the clock, for an opinion. The media need not follow his advice. But, in an interview, he said they have without fail during at least his three months in the job and the nearly two years of his predecessor.

His committee consists of four high-ranking civil servants and media representatives—editors from national and provincial newspapers, television executives and representatives of news agencies.

After a D-notice flap two years ago, this group codified 12 guidelines covering weapons, military plans, intelligence and other sensitive subjects. These guidelines are bound in a 25-page green book marked "confidential" and 900 copies are in the media's hands.

Why does Britain make a mystery of the head of M.I. 6 as well as its counter-intelligence counterpart, M.I. 5?.

Adm. Farnhill, himself a former high-ranking intelligence official in the Defense Ministry, readily acknowledged that the spy chiefs' names are well known in the Soviet Union and elsewhere.

But their anonymity is preserved, to enable them to live as normal and private a life as possible, sparing them bodyguards, cranks and other occupational hazards of an identified spy chief.

NEW YORK TIMES
9 February 1973

All Britain Learns a Top Spy 'Secret'

By RICHARD EDER
Special to The New York Times

LONDON, Feb. 8—When Charles Tatham Ogilvie Rennie was remanded last week to the Old Bailey on a charge of possessing heroin, he received a privilege that almost no other adult Briton would have enjoyed. The newspapers did not print his name.

The reason was that Mr. Rennie, who is 23 and who works as an electrician in West London, had been identified in the press as the son of the head of Britain's foreign intelligence service, popularly known as M.I. 6. The British press is not permitted to disclose the name of this man—whose working title "C," was transmuted to "M," for James Bond readers—nor that of the head of counter-intelligence, somtimes known as M.I.5.

The ironies of the situation became fully apparent here yesterday. Stern, a West German magazine, printed C's name: Sir John Ogilvie Rennie. The Government's Press Security Committee decided that there was no point in maintaining the so-called D Notice—a notification to editors that a particular news item could violate the security laws.

And so last night and this morning the press displayed the news about Sir John with varying discretion—The Times of London tucked it away in a tiny corner of page 2. The Daily Telegraph front-paged it, The Guardian printed a large portrait.

It's No Secret

The oddity about all this is that Stern was not revealing anything that could be called a secret when it used Sir John's name. Everyone with a serious professional interest in such matters—journalists, diplomats and rival intelligence services—knew it already.

Similarly, they knew the name of his deputy, Maurice Oldfield, a former military intelligence officer who once served as embassy counselor in Washington. Sir John has announced his retirement and Mr. Oldfield is mentioned as a likely candidate to head the organization, officially known as the Secret Intelligence Service.

Why the British insist that such a commonly available bit of information is a secret puzzles foreigners and many Britons. They note that the identities and policies of the heads of the American Central Intelligence Agency and of many of its Western European equivalents are widely discussed in the press in each country.

British officials in charge of explaining such things were keeping their upper lips very rigid today. "What is the use of having a secret service if you aren't going to be secret about it?" was the way one put it.

Chapman Pincher, who writes on defense matters for The Daily Express, denounced today what he termed "this absurd secret" and argued that the identities of the heads of both M.I.6 and M.I.5 should be public.

The present system, he said, is due to the "the pathological preoccupation of Whitehall with secrecy." In addition, he wrote, it serves to shield the heads of the service when security scandals—of which M.I.6 has known several—blow up.

E. H. Cookridge, an author who specializes in intelligence topics and who is currently writing a book about Sir Mansfield Cummings, founder of the British secret service's foreign operation, said that it was Sir Mansfield who began the tradition of anonymity.

Originally a naval officer, Sir Mansfield, who died in 1923, insisted on being known simply as "C," and the initial has stuck.

Officials maintain that anonymity helps preserve the private life of Britain's intelligence chiefs. But the tradition that "C" is known to everybody in his club, and is pointed out to guests, is almost as venerable as the service itself. Sir John's club is Brooks's, but White's is more traditional for M.I. 6 chiefs.

Some Cozy Assumptions

The rather cozy class assumptions that lie behind the notion that what is all right for members of White's or Brook's to know is a security breach when other readers of The Times know about it have tended to pervade M.I. 6 itself.

Originally both the Secret Intelligence Service and its counterespionage counterpart, the Security Service, were branches of Military Intelligence. It is from that time that the initials M.I. 6 and M.I. 5 under the Home Office, though both retain a Defense Ministry link.

The traditions of M.I. 6, as put together by Sir Mansfield and more or less continued by his successors, have rested largely on what has been called brilliant amateurism. One of the earliest British spies was the poet Christopher Marlowe, who inflitrated British Roman Catholic exile circles in the service of the Duke of Guise in Rheims.

The literary tradition was continued in modern times not only by Ian Fleming but by Graham Greene and Malcolm Muggeridge, who joined the service during World War II. The talent that wartime could attract tended to drop off in peace time, however, and the improvisation often remained, but without the brilliance.

The combination of improvisation with the kind of camaraderie that earned for M. I. 6 operatives the nickname "the Friends" — the counterspies in M.I. 5, several degrees down socially, were regarded by M.I. 6 as crude policemen and were called "the Snoopers"—nearly destroyed the service in the nineteen fifties."

A Blow to Tradition

The exposure of Kim Philby, a high M.I. 6 official, as the "third man" in the Burgess-Maclean affair was long delayed because his colleagues simply could not credit the assertions of the Snoopers that here was a spy in their midst.

The appointment in the late nineteen-fifties of Sir Dick White, head of M.I. 5, as "C" was a heavy blow to the tradition of the secret service. According to those who have written on the subject, professionalism was increased and some free-swinging tendencies were curbed.

The appointment of Sir John Rennie four years ago was another move to bring M.I. 6 into the normal channels of bureaucracy. Sir John, a diplomat, was the first "C" who came from outside the intelligence community, and his background made it possible for the Foreign Office to exercise more control.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
7 February 1973

Sweden explains 'freeze' with U.S.

Prime Minister Palme blames war with Vietnam, calls for reconstruction 'channeled through UN'

By Takashi Oka
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Stockholm

Prime Minister Olof Palme of Sweden hopes for an "integrated international effort," channeled if possible through the United Nations, to aid the postwar reconstruction of North and South Vietnam. Sweden, he said in an interview here, would "definitely" participate in such an effort.

Outside the Prime Minister's office, furnished in clean-lined Swedish modern, the sky was gray, and rain drifted across the window panes. Despite the unseasonal lack of snow, it seemed a far cry from this handsome northern city, capital of one of the world's richest, most thoroughgoing welfare states, to the red dirt, the beating sun, the palm-leaf shelters, and black-trousered farmers of Vietnam.

Yet Vietnam casts its long shadow across Swedish relations with the United States. "Few people are so pro-American as the Swedes," Mr. Palme says. But since the American military involvement in Vietnam began, Stockholm's official ties with Washington have been as wintry as the chill winds blowing in across the Baltic Sea from Russia.

What causes freeze

The freeze is not of their choice, Swedes of many different shades of opinion say. Thorbjorn Falldin — a rugged, blue-eyed farmer from Harnosand in the north and leader of the Center Party, principal opposition to Mr. Palme's Social Democrats, characterizes Vietnam as the only problem between the United States and Sweden, and maintains that while his countrymen want good relations with America, they feel they have the right to say they cannot understand America's role in Vietnam.

Posters of grieving Vietnamese mothers festoon Stockholm's windows alongside enticing displays of the latest gadgets of a consumer society. Leftist demonstrators shouting fierce slogans march up to Parliament Square without disturbing youngsters briskly selling buttoms opposing "leftist extremism" and showing a Swedish-American handshake. "We've sold 300,000 of these buttons," said Peter, a student in languages, "and Sweden has a population of only 8 million."

Attitudes explained

Mr. Palme, who treats his enormous prime ministerial office like a book-lined professor's study, and who flings himself into a chair to confront a visitor with the relish of a tutor confident of instant rapport with his students, explains Swedish attitudes on Vietnam as a compound of three major factors:

First, he says, comes the "human reaction against the bombing and against the uprooting of a whole society."

Second is the feeling that the Vietnam war represented the continuation of an old colonial war, the Americans having taken over for their own, global, anti-Communist purposes, the war the French had been waging to preserve their colonial empire.

Third, as a small, nonaliegned nation, Sweden feels it was very much in its own interest to assert Vietnam's right to independence and self-determination free of superpower intervention. Detente between the superpowers was to be welcomed, but it did involve a certain danger for smaller countries in between — the danger that their voices would be ignored.

Comparison defended

Asked if he did not think that his references in a pre-Christmas broadcast comparing the American bombing of Hanoi with Guernica, Lidice, and other instances of mass slaughter were not too strong, Mr. Palme replied:

"You must remember the circumstances. The bombing had been going on for nearly a week. I had just received a telephoned report from our embassy in Hanoi about the destruction of the Bach Mai Hospital, to which Sweden had contributed equipment and medical supplies. The call came through as clearly as someone talking in the next room. So as I went on the air I was thinking of burning patients, of terror-stricken children."

Repercussions noted

Mr. Palme's broadcast comments caused President Nixon to ask Stockholm not to send a newly appointed ambassador to Washington, and to keep the American charge d'afaires in Sweden, who had been home in the United States on holiday, from returning to his post. This situation still continues.

But the Paris peace agreement now opens the possibility of a new period, both in Vietnamese history and in that of Sweden's relations with the United States. "Once this frightful war is over, I have no fear for the future of American-Swedish contacts," Mr. Palme affirms.

Near East

WASHINGTON POST
11 February, 1973

Middle Man in the Middle East

THE CAIRO DOCUMENTS
The Inside Story of Nasser and His Relationship with World Leaders, Rebels and Statesmen
By Mohamed Hassanein Heikal
Doubleday. 360 pp. $10

By MILES COPELAND

LET'S FACE IT. Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, the late President Nasser's confidant and closest friend, is an arrogant, opinionated, rude and generally objectionable character. But even those who dislike him (including myself) must admit that he is also highly intelligent, a shrewd observer of world affairs and a loyal and courageous friend.

I would even go so far as to say that Heikal is one of the world's great journalists—but that is taking full account of the handicaps he is operating under, the filters through which he sees what he sees.

Heikal, who is editor of Al Ahram, Cairo, is an uncritical admirer of Nasser and an Egyptian. He sees the world as a Nasserist Egyptian must see it. To him there is nothing odd about Nasser's having behaved as though he were the leader of a great world power, obligated to match the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union move for move in such far-off games as the Vietnam war, the troubles in the Congo in 1961 and the Cuban missile crisis. He is not bothered by the fact that Nasser was concerned less with solving his own country's severe economic problems than with such non-starter objectives as bringing about "Arab unity," defeating Israel in war and establishing "positive neutrality" (whatever that means) as a basis for policy not only for Egypt but for the whole Third World. And he is able to regard Nasser's efforts as successful despite the fact that on the day of his demise the Arabs were less united than ever before, the Israelis were in occupation of two thirds of Egypt, and Egypt was "neutral on the side of the Soviets," as Heikal's own newspaper admitted.

"The struggle for which he lived and died continues," says Heikal; and "he started the basic social transformation of his country," and "his most important achievement was the linking of Egypt to the rest of the Arab world and the linking of the Arabs as an entity to the ideas and values prevailing in the world today." If a Western newsman wrote as Heikal does he would be a fool. But Heikal is no fool; he is writing "honestly" as any good pro-Nasser Egyptian journalist must write. And we can learn more from his newly published book, *The Cairo Documents*, than from all other books about Nasser put together.

Take Heikal's constant reference to the CIA, for example. What those *Invisible Government* chaps wrote about the CIA is mere uninformed nonsense, but when Heikal speaks up on the subject he is telling us what Gamal Abdel Nasser and other history-making leaders of the Third World were, in fact, capable of believing. Heikal does not doubt that the U.S. Embassy in Cairo was loaded with CIA agents, one of them James Eichelberger ("the top agent in the embassy," according to Heikal, but actually a top flight contract economist), and that "the CIA laid the ground for a change of regime" when its many agents in Cairo got bored with Nasser's insistence on being neutral between the West and the Soviets.

Anyone who was privy to what was happening in the period in question knows that Heikal is simply in error. (The truth is that Nasser got only such experts from the CIA as he explicitly asked for, and the experts were brought in from the outside world, recruited especially for the job, and were by no means agents of the CIA.) But Heikal says, no doubt correctly, that Nasser was "disturbed by CIA's machinations," and we may therefore assume that Egyptian policies and behavior were affected accordingly. That is what is important.

And then there are Heikal's views of what went on on the American and British side of the fence. Although Heikal got most of his information from books by Westerners (myself included: I know that he took many of his stories from my book because they exist nowhere else—not even in reality), the way he interprets the information gives us brand-new insights into the thinking behind many of Nasser's most important decisions. I am reminded of the Syrian military attaché in Washington who, in 1951, witnessed the rising popularity of General Eisenhower, the removal of General MacArthur from his command in Korea and the somewhat rebellious statements of a few Pentagon generals, then sent a cable to his government in Damascus predicting a coup d'état in Washington. To an intelligent Syrian, no other conclusion made sense. In the American legation in Damascus (I was political attaché at the time) we thought this was howlingly funny. But then it dawned on us that we were undoubtedly making the same kind of mistakes. And now, as I witness an observer as perceptive as Heikal seeing the United States as he does, I feel enlightened not only with respect to how much of the Third World must be interpreting our moves both in international and in domestic politics, but with respect to how wrong our American "Heikals" (e.g. Joe Alsop) must be when the interpreting is the other way around.

Much of *The Cairo Documents* is straight propaganda, of course—forgivable since it comes from a newsman who has lived for so long under state censorship and who, therefore, is a "government spokesman" whether intentionally or not. But much of it—most of it—is a valuable behind-the-scenes historical account which is fascinating from any viewpoint. Although colored to give Nasser maximum credit (in all the conversations between Nasser and Dulles, Nasser and Khrushchev, Nasser and Chou En-lai, etc., Nasser gets all the catch lines), there are such items as the background to Nasser's initial deal with the Soviets (the arms deal of 1955). And then there is the "National Estimate," more or less following the outline used by the CIA's "Office of National Estimates," in which Nasser's intelligence advisers correctly sized up Anthony Eden's probable reaction to the nationalization of the Suez Canal. And what went on around Nasser during the most important crises—the Anglo-French-Israeli attack on Suez and the Six-Day War of 1967. And there is Chou En-lai telling Nasser he was happy to have American soldiers in Vietnam, so close to China, because "some of them are trying opium. And we are helping them. We are planting the best kinds of opium especially for the American soldiers in Vietnam." That sort of thing.

A review of this fascinating, if highly irritating, book cannot be complete without mention of Edward Sheehan's brilliant introduction. He alleges that Heikal is "the most powerful journalist in the world," then goes ahead to support the point. But the real accomplishment of the introduction is that it qualifies the witness, as lawyers say, and in a way which makes virtually anything he has to say irresistible. And, when we quote Heikal's closing words, "Nasser will go down in history as the embodiment of Egypt," we know exactly what he must mean—even if the phrase is followed with "just as Napoleon became the embodiment of France."

MILES COPELAND, who wrote *The Game of Nations*, has been a corporate consultant on security matters in the Middle East and recently completed a study of Palestinian terrorism.

BALTIMORE NEWS AMERICAN
7 February 1973

HENRY J. TAYLOR

Reds at Egypt's Back Door

Our Central Intelligence Agency has discovered a new Red thrust behind the scenes in Africa's Sudan, the back door to Egypt.

The Sudan is a big order for anybody. It is as large as Alaska, Texas and New Mexico combined. In the wet season, the Sudan's Sudd region alone, probably the world's most desolate and dangerous swamp, covers an area larger than England. And, flanking the Red Sea, where the expanded Soviet Fleet is filling the vacuum left by the British withdrawal, the Sudan is of vital strategic importance to the United States.

This rival of India in size was a former Anglo-Egyptian condominium. But, on Jan. 1, 1956, the Sudan declared itself the Republic of the Sudan and promptly gave the British the boot.

This climaxed long attempts. In 1885, Mohammed Ahmed, calling himself the holy Mahdi (The Expected One), burst from a sanctuary on the Nile Island of Aba and led a revolution which besieged Britain's garrison at Khartoum. The Mahdi's savage dervishes beheaded the British commander, Gen. Charles George (Chinese) Gordon and impaled his head on a pole at Omdurman across the Nile.

This slaughter of Britain's hero was not avenged until 13 years later when Gen. Horatio Kitchener staged his famous charge at Omdurman and young Winston Churchill rode with the 21st Lancers.

Now the CIA finds that the same Island of Aba is the headquarters for the new Red thrust and that the vehicle the Kremlin is using is the Ansari (Followers of the Prophet) sect, the Sudan's largest religious movement. Its members were originally the same savage tribesmen who fought under holy man Mahdi. But this time they are in Russia's pay.

CIA agents in the Sudan find that the Ansari's leader is Oxford-educated Sadik Imam el-Hardi el-Mahdi, the great-grandson of the legendary holy man. He was Africa's youngest Prime Minister when he took office in the Sudan for nine months in July, 1966, and the target is, of course, Maj. Gen. Gaafar al-Nimeiry, the so-called president of the Sudan's current military regime who likewise shot his way to power.

Some time ago, al-Nimeiry demanded that a number of American diplomats leave our Khartoum Embassy. He falsely accused them of counterrevolutionary contacts and activities. Al-Nimeiry also claimed (untrue) that a CIA plane had landed on a deserted East Sudanese airfield to scout a location for an insurgent headquarters. He topped this off by bombing the U.S. Information Services library in Khartoum.

As one result, we have closed our Embassy in Khartoum except for a limited staff. President Nixon has appointed no ambassador, and the Sudan now has no ambassador to Washington.

On Jan. 26, al-Nimeiry reported an assassination attempt on his life. In this attempt (others preceded it), the current Mahdi escaped but presidential soldiers captured and imprisoned retired Brig. Gen. Rahim Mohammed Kheir Shannan and 11 subordinates of the Mahdi. The CIA belives they already have been shot.

An undisclosed web of Soviet intrigue is involved in this new Red thrust through the Ansari. Libyan dictator Muammar el-Qaddafi was originally a Soviet stooge. On June 11, 1970, our stars and stripes came down after 16 years from our immense $600 million Wheelus Air Force Base near Tripoli, Libya. It was the last major U.S. military base in all of Africa. El-Qaddafi's revolutionary red, green and black flag went up, he immediately changed Wheelus's name to Uqbah Ben Naffa and promptly welcomed incoming planes.

El-Qaddafi secretly agreed to airlift Libyan troops to the Sudan to overthrow President al-Nimeiry. He did so and at first the Communist-led putsch (July, 1971) succeeded. But Al-Nimeiry regained power in a countercoup a few days later.

Louis Azrael, whose column customarily appears on this page, is traveling overseas.

Publication of his columns will be resumed upon his return.

DAILY TELEGRAPH, London
6 February 1973

HUSSEIN AT THE WHITE HOUSE

COMPARED WITH THREE YEAR AGO, King HUSSEIN of Jordan's star in the Arab world is in the ascendant. He is more likely now than for some time to gain the ear of President NIXON, whom he meets in Washington today, and of other American policy-makers, on future prospects for a Middle East settlement. This is not only because of his own enhanced position in Arab politics but also because Washington itself will be more eager to listen to his views than for years past. The Vietnam problem, so far as Washington at least is concerned, has been moved towards "the back burner," as they say there. Long-term prospects for American oil imports from the Middle East are becoming increasingly a matter of serious attention as the possible size of America's prospective energy-resources shortfall becomes apparent. Mr NIXON is no longer subject to electoral pressures for blind support of Israel.

All these factors—King HUSSEIN's improved standing and Washington's increased readiness to give renewed serious attention to the Middle East—make the visits of the King, and of Mrs GOLDA MEIR next month, extremely timely. The King's proposals last March for a United Kingdom of Jordan, to include in one federation a Palestinian State on the West Bank and a Transjordan State on the East Bank, are the most serious and sensible plan for a solution of the Palestinian problem that anyone has yet put forward. They were spurned by Israel when he announced them, but there are reasons to think this may have been only a tactical reaction. The major problem would be Jerusalem, but even that need not be insoluble. However, it probably remains true that it is still out of the question for King HUSSEIN to contemplate a separate peace agreement with Israel.

NEW YORK TIMES
7 February 1973

MRS. GANDHI HITS U.S. POLICY IN ASIA

She Voices Bitter Doubts on "Manner" of Ending War

By BERNARD WEINRAUB
Special to The New York Times

NEW DELHI, Feb. 6—Prime Minister Indira Gandhi bitterly attacked American policy in Asia today, despite quiet diplomatic efforts in recent weeks to soothe the strained and chilly relations between India and the United States.

"Would this sort of war or the savage bombing which has taken place in Vietnam have been tolerated for so long had the people been European?" Mrs. Gandhi asked in a rising voice in a speech to Asian delegates at a conference to discuss the problems on the subcontinent.

"I cannot help feeling that the very manner of ending the Vietnam war may create new tensions," Mrs. Gandhi said. "The cease-fire should not lull us into comfort that there will be peace all the way. To many nations, peace itself has often been war by other means."

Although Mrs. Gandhi's tough comments on United States policies in Vietnam—and Asia—have been made before, her current speech came as something of a surprise.

Yesterday Daniel P. Moynihan, President Nixon's nominee to be Ambassador here, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in Washington that Mrs. Gandhi and President Nixon had exchanged notes recently and that United States-Indian relations seemed to be improving.

Appointment Favored

At the same time, Indians have been somewhat pleased by Mr. Moynihan's appointment, saying that it was a clear indication that the Nixon Administration was seeking to heal the rift with Mrs. Gandhi. Mr. Moynihan is widely considered an intellectual and—even more important here—a prominent former White House aide respected by Mr. Nixon.

Today, however, Mrs. Gandhi, a stern figure in a silk sari, spoke bluntly and acidly of the United States.

"Except in a few known and glaring instances," she said, "Western nations have withdrawn as colonial powers, but their political or military presence continues on our continent. This has been done in the name of filling a vacuum or to wage a crusade against Communism or other doctrines.

"The interests of trade and commerce and of the manufacturers of armaments do not distinguish between ideologies and have no compunction about making an about turn should it suit them to do so," Mrs. Gandhi said. "A declaration of love for democracy does not seem to be incompatible with open admiration for dictatorship. While this attitude remains can there be clear thinking or positive action for real peace?

In the last two decades the United States has had a deep emotional and financial commitment to India—aid alone totaled $9-billion. But the ties weakened, partly because the United States felt that Indians, despite their vows of nonalignment, had taken pro-Soviet stands and been strongly antagonistic to American policies in Asia, the Middle East and the United Nations.

The anger between the two nations grew—and India became outraged—when the United States supported Pakistan in the brief but bloody war in December, 1971, that resulted in the creation of Bangladesh, formerly East Pakistan. India sent her armed forces into East Pakistan on behalf of the Bengali rebels.

At the same time, President Nixon's effort to repair communications with China, whom India fears, also strained relations between Washington and New Delhi.

Today, Mrs. Gandhi spoke with some vehemence at the One-Asia Assembly, sponsored by the Press Foundation of Asia.

"We have been non aligned," she said, "and what we meant by nonalignment is, firstly, that we did not belong to any military bloc and, secondly, that we reserve the right to judge an issue and to take action according to our own interests and waht we consider to be the interests of world peace."

NEW YORK TIMES
8 February 1973

Administration Is Stung By Mrs. Gandhi's Charge

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 7—The Nixon Administration responded today with a combination of shock and irritation at statements by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi of India yesterday that were sharply critical of the United States.

Daniel P. Moynihan, named by President Nixon to be the new Ambassador to India, has now put off his scheduled trip to New Delhi, and the State Department said today that he now had "no firm departure plans," a clear sign to the Indians of the pique here.

Mrs. Gandhi, speaking at a meeting in New Delhi, said that the "savage bombing" that took place in Vietnam would not have been tolerated if the people had been European. She also said: "I cannot help feeling that the very manner of ending the Vietnam war may create new tensions."

Criticisim Unexpected

Her remarks were unexpected here. In recent weeks, top Administration officials had been talking about a new era beginning in Indian-American relations, and it was widely believed that the appointment of Mr. Moynihan was a major step forward.

His appointment was approved by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Monday and is expected to be approved by the full Senate later this week. Mr. Moynihan had been planning to depart for his new post on Sunday.

Charles W. Bray 3d, the State department spokesman, said that Secretary of State William P. Rogers had instructed Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, to ask the Indian Ambassador, L. K. Jha, for clarification of Mrs. Gandhi's statements.

Mr. Bray noted that "her statements are quite inconsistent with the messages we have received from the Government of India expressing gratification for the peace which has been achieved in Vietnam."

"It contradicts the recent indications from New Delhi suggesting a desire to improve the relationship between our two countries," Mrs. Bray said. "The Secretary of State has asked Mr. Sisco to point this out to the Ambassador."

Mr. Bray then quoted from a private letter that Mrs. Gandhi had sent to Mr. Nixon in November, which had not previously been made public. In that letter, referring to the Vietnam negotiations, she said:

'Outburst' Is Charged

"We now have the best opportunity for building a new structure of lasting peace. The vision itself is inspiring. Its translation into reality would indeed contribute a glorious chapter to the tortured history of mankind."

The department spokesman said that "against this background, the remarks of the Prime Minister are difficult to comprehend and unwelcome."

One top official said that he had no idea what had prompted what he called Mrs. Gandhi's "outburst." He said he hoped that it would not lead to a new round of polemics between the two countries.

He said that what particularly infuriated the Administration was the following paragraph in her speech, given to a group called One Asia Assembly in New Delhi:

"Indian tradition has always spoken of one world — I have grown up in this belief and I abhor chauvinistic nationalism or racialism of any color and type, but I would like to ask a question: Would this sort of war or the savage bombing which has taken place in Vietnam have been tolerated for so long had the people been European?"

Suggestion Held 'Inadmissible'

The official said it was "inadmissible" to suggest that the American military actions were motivated out of any racial considerations."

Relations between Mrs. Gandhi and Mr. Nixon reached a low point in December, 1971, when Indian forces entered what was then East Pakistan, siding with the Bengali rebles in the war that resulted in the creation of the new state of Bangladesh. The United States believed that the invasion was unwarranted, and took Pakistan's side during the conflict.

Since then, relations have gradually improved, although Washington was irked last summer by charges in India that the Central Intelligence Agency was involved in improper activities.

But relations have seemed better in recent months, and there has been a series of messages between Mr. Nixon and Mrs. Gandhi talking about hopes for better ties.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
10 February 1973

Mrs. Gandhi raps India's exclusion

Prime Minister bitter that New Delhi's counsel not sought in reaching Vietnam peace settlement

By Seville Davis
Special to
The Christian Science Monitor
New Delhi

India was excluded by the United States from any role in the Southeast Asian peace settlement.

More important from India's point of view, it was given no part in the broader negotiations, sponsored by the United States, to design the new shape of Asia. Therefore India will make its voice heard by other means.

This was the main reasoning behind Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's sharp speech questioning President Nixon's arrangements for the future of Asia, it is learned here.

Mrs. Gandhi's view

The Prime Minister is said to have concluded that Mr. Nixon regards India as a dissenter and troublemaker. She, on the other hand, considers that India's position in South Asia entitles it to a strong voice in the future of the continent.

She also considers India to be the spokesman for popular government and the common people in an Asian world dominated by dictatorships of left and right.

Therefore her speech, which was called "unwelcome" by the State Department spokesman in Washington, was a public warning that in her opinion there was danger of Asia being divided into spheres of influence by governments out of touch with their own people.

Many persons in New Delhi who understand the motives of both sides in this dispute are saddened by a fresh outbreak of tension. Just as relations between the two nations were slowly mending.

Deliberate airing

However, it is known here that Mrs. Gandhi spoke her piece deliberately. There is reason to conclude that she does not want the kind of outward goodwill that conceals serious differences of conviction. If the two countries are to draw closer after their very serious break of last year, she wants the new relationship to be based on candor and plain speaking.

One observer here noted that the frank acknowledgement of differences was also the explicit, publicly stated basis of the detente arranged by President Nixon with Moscow and Peking.

The Indian Government is aware of the technical answer by the United States that the forthcoming Paris conference on Vietnam is composed of a narrow group directly concerned with the settlement, and that Japan was excluded on the same ground as India. But India's experience was quite different from Japan's, it is emphasized here.

Member of old ICC

India held the balance in the old three-sided International Control Commission in Indo-China between the cold-war position of the United States and the counter position of the Communist nations. Since India dissented from the cold-war military strategy of the United States, it found itself often at variance with Washington.

Now that the cold war has been rejected, Mrs. Gandhi made it clear in not very diplomatic language that India does not enjoy being penalized for having been right.

Since India is still being treated as a dissenter and troublemaker, according to persons who are informed as to her thinking, the Prime Minister is concerned that Mr. Nixon still might be pursuing big-power military and political aims, together with China now, and at the expense of the cause of independence and free government in the smaller countries of Asia for which India stands.

In other words, the issue between the two countries that was set forth in Mrs. Gandhi's speech is not merely a matter of personal friction between the two political leaders or of a temperamental outburst on the part of a woman Prime Minister, as some have said.

Mrs. Gandhi sees an issue of conscience and political conviction, here, and is determined to press it publicly as long as she is doubtful of Mr. Nixon's intentions.

"Mr. Nixon confidently says peace is now assured for a generation," recalled one well-informed person. "Mrs. Gandhi doesn't think the problems are solved."

No Kissinger talks

At the outset of the new era, Henry A. Kissinger came through Delhi and Mrs. Gandhi expected to be consulted on plans for the reshaping of Asia after the Vietnam war.

There was no such consultation. Instead she was left thinking that India had merely been used as a security cover for the secret Kissinger flight to Peking shortly thereafter, from nearby Pakistan.

Like Japan, which protested violently, India was left in the dark.

Like Japan, India felt it had a right to be consulted on matters intimately affecting its future. This sense of rejection has continued to the present.

If the White House has any intention to replace it by facing India's doubts at close range, it is not known here.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
9 February 1973

Mrs. Gandhi concerned for Asians amid big-power rivalries

By Saville Davis
Special correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor
New Delhi

There is serious danger, according to India's Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, that after the cease-fire in Vietnam the big powers will conduct rivalries as usual, under the guise of detente.

Mrs. Gandhi is doubtful of the aims of both the United States and China in the period ahead. She thinks the small countries of Asia may continue to be hurt.

In a speech that was by turns biting in its criticism of dictatorship and glowing in its advocacy of popular government for the peoples of Asia, Mrs. Gandhi made her first comprehensive review of the outlook for Asia after the Vietnam war.

(India, it should be recalled, is unhappy about its exclusion from the arrangements worked out by the United States and North Vietnam for a cease-fire in Vietnam. India is excluded from both the international postwar conference of 13 parties to meet in Paris Feb. 26 and from the new four-power International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS) in Vietnam. This is all the more an affront because India was chairman of the three-power International Control Commission set up after the 1954 Geneva conference on Indo-China. The Canadians and Poles, who served with Indians on that ICC, have been included in the new ICCS.)

"We welcome any effort toward peace," Mrs. Gandhi said of the cease-fire. "But we are aware of the dangers which still hover over us. Detente should not become an occasion to build new balances of power and to redraw spheres of influence, or to reinforce the opinion of certain big powers that they alone can be responsible for shaping the destinies of small nations."

There is still a "military presence" in Asia, she told the One Asia Assembly, a four-day meeting on the human dimensions of economic development, sponsored by the Press Foundation of Asia.

India, she said, is against military presence anywhere. The presence of one power attracts another, because the second big power cannot permit the first to extend its influence. "One gives the excuse to the other to intervene," she said. "That's how tensions build."

"I cannot help feeling that the very manner of ending the Vietnam war may create new tensions," Mrs. Gandhi continued with obvious reference to the Christmas bombing of North Vietnam by the United States. "The cease-fire should not lull us into comfort that there will be peace all the way. To many nations, peace itself has often been war by other means."

Of the United States, she said, "The interests of trade and commerce and of the manufacturers of armaments do not distinguish between ideologies and have no compunction about making an about turn should it suit them to do so." The reference was to the about-face of U.S. policy toward China.

She continued: "A declaration of love for democracy does not seem to be incompatible with open admiration for dictatorship. While this attitude remains, can there be clear thinking or positive action for real peace?"

As to China, the Prime Minister was asked whether poor countries will be able to develop rapidly without totalitarianism — a question that has been asked widely since the recent visits of many American newsmen to China and their reports that poverty had largely been eliminated in that country. Mrs. Gandhi spent some time in dealing with this issue, both in her speech and in answers to questions, suggesting that it was very much on her mind.

"Democracy is full of contradictions and confrontations," she said, "but these strengthen the people, who are the ultimate strength of our country." A totalitarian country could have a leader who was a good person and who could move it ahead fast, she suggested, "but there is no guarantee that the next leader will not go in the opposite direction.

"When the people are strong," she continued, they can see to it that nothing is done against their interest, "and they do see to it.

"We are not dealing with machines. We are dealing with individuals, seeking their identity. In a democracy you can let out steam. But in totalitarianism there is danger that tension will build up inside you and explode, in one form or another."

Persons familiar with Mrs. Gandhi's ideas say she is concerned with the apparent success of both Communist and anti-Communist dictatorships on the present Asian scene. "Our present system is being buffeted from all sides, but it has inherent strength," she argued.

"What other structure can have the flexibility to accommodate our contradictions, our diversity, and our high aspirations? The prevailing mood amongst many intellectuals is one of cynicism and lack of faith in ordinary people, the inability to enjoy ordinary, everyday things and happenings.

"I have found that the way to replenish one's faith is to go to the people and to harness their enormous inner reserves of strength to meet the challenges which confront us. Perhaps it is a help not to be advanced in some directions. We have faith in our people and they have faith in the future."

NEW YORK TIMES
11 February 1973

India and U.S.

Mrs. Gandhi Speaks Her Mind

NEW DELHI—Outside the Ashoka Hotel each morning last week, delegates to the "One Asia" assembly of scientists, journalists and economists strolled in the sunshine, admiring the garden of marigolds and the girls in their colorful saris. Inside the conference the rhetoric seemed equally bland—except for the spicy comments of a guest speaker, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.

Mrs. Gandhi's speech, dealing with the "fluid" situation in Asia following the cease-fire in Vietnam, was partly an attack on American policies in Asia. What upset officials in Washington was not so much the speech but its tone. What especially irked Washington was Mrs. Gandhi's question: "Would this sort of war or the savage bombing which has taken place in Vietnam have been tolerated for so long had the people been European?" A Washington official promptly said it was "inadmissible" to suggest that the American military actions were influenced by racial considerations.

Indian officials, for their part, were annoyed by Washington's decision to delay the departure of the Ambassador-designate, Daniel P. Moynihan, as a way of registering displeasure over Mrs. Gandhi's remarks. Indian officials said that Mrs. Gandhi had made similar comments before, that many Americans had said the same thing and that the United States was expecting perhaps too much gratitude for finally ending the war.

To many observers, the incident was a reflection of a confusing and oddly ambivalent relationship between India and the United States, a relationship in which both nations appear to harbor the deepest angers and affections for each other.

One thing that seemed clear last week was that both sides want to try again. With power blocs loosening and the East-West political spectrum a blur, Washington cannot afford to dispense with this country of 550 million people—a country struggling to work out a democracy amid its most grueling problems.

And India, despite massive Soviet aid and affinities to Eastern bloc countries, realizes that ties must be maintained with Washington. To remain a powerful democracy in the midst of a subcontinent of dictatorship and military rule, India cannot ignore the role of the United States in terms of aid, strength and democratic tradition.

President Nixon and Mrs. Gandhi had exchanged diplomatic notes recently in an effort to heal the breach. Mr. Moynihan's appointment was also greeted here with satisfaction. Yet the essential problems remain.

On one level, a key difficulty is the vastly different way that Americans and Indian politicians deal with rhetoric. "Indians always seem to be able to separate words from deeds," said one American who has lived here many years. "There's no direct causal relationship. What they're saying is always for the consumption of the immediate audience—so that Mrs. Gandhi makes her speech before an all-Asian audience and doesn't quite realize that it will have an impact outside of that audience."

One American recalled a speech by an Indian official who denounced all foreign aid as neocolonial. The American asked: "But how can you say that when you took our aid year after year?" The Indian replied with a shrug, "But I was talking to an Afro-Asian conference."

On another level, however, the seeds of discord have gone beyond the misunderstandings of East and West. In the past two decades, United States aid to India totaled $9-billion, but the friendship grew strained because the United States felt that the Indians had taken pro-Soviet stands and delighted in lecturing Washington about policies in Asia, the Middle East and the United Nations.

India, on the other hand, felt that American military and economic aid to Pakistan posed a deliberate threat to peace on the subcontinent. Relations worsened when Washington openly supported Pakistan against India in the 1971 war that resulted in the creation of Bangladesh, formerly East Pakistan. Washington's closer ties to China cemented the fears of Indians that the United States was no longer an ally.

More recently, India was hurt at having been left out of the four-nation group supervising the truce in Vietnam and not invited to the post-war conference in Paris on Feb. 26.

Nevertheless, on Friday, Mrs. Gandhi, apparently uneasy over the controversy, made it clear in Katmandu that her remarks on Vietnam were not intended to offend any country. The olive branch—once again—was being waved. —BERNARD WEINRAUB

BALTIMORE SUN
10 FEBRUARY 1973

Mrs. Gandhi expresses regrets for talk attacking U.S. on Vietnam

By PRAN SABHARWAL
New Delhi Bureau of The Sun

New Delhi—Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in a major policy statement yesterday in Katmandu, Nepal, expressed regret that some of her remarks in a speech to the "One Asia Assembly" in New Delhi Tuesday had drawn adverse reaction from Washington.

Addressing the Nepal Council of World Affairs, Mrs. Gandhi said her comments on the Vietnam settlement were not directed against any country. "They represented my assessment of what the future could be," she said.

Dangers "face all of us"

She said she was trying to say that there were elements of danger in the peace agreement and her remarks should be taken in the light of the Versailles Treaty at the end of World War I that many feel led to World War II.

"What I tried to say was that there are some of those elements in the Paris agreement—these are dangers which face all of us, even in Southeast Asia," she said.

Mrs. Gandhi expressed the hope yesterday that the cease-fire in Vietnam would result in a stable peace in Asia.

Mrs. Gandhi is on the third day of a four-day official visit to the Himalayan Hindu kingdom of Nepal. She took the first available opportunity to clarify her speech which was not well received in Washington.

No line to aid

Mrs. Gandhi's response to Washington's strong reaction and her clarification would indicate that she is not deliberately trying to stop the process of improving Indo-U.S. relations.

Mrs. Gandhi and her government have consistently stated that their efforts to improve relations with the U.S. do not depend on the latter's resuming economic aid which was cut off in 1971.

Many responsible officials, who are by no means unimportant now in Mrs. Gandhi's Council of Advisers, realize that improvement of relations with the U.S. would be to India's advantage. However, there is a minority, remembering the heyday of the Indo-Soviet friendship treaty, which is always ready to sow seeds of misunderstanding between "two democracies working together," an official said.

Statement welcomed

Washington (AP)—The State Department said yesterday that it "welcomes and is encouraged" by a statement from the Indian Foreign Office that it is still India's policy to work for normal and friendly relations with the United States.

The comment was made before the department had full knowledge of remarks made in Nepal by Indira Gandhi, India's prime minister.

WASHINGTON STAR
7 February 1973

Greece Upstages U.S. Aid Cutback

By MARY ANNE WEAVER
Special to The Star-News

ATHENS — The announcement that Greece no longer wanted or required direct American military aid came five days before the inauguration of President Nixon. It came five days after a navy-to-navy agreement establishing Athens as a homeport for the U.S. Sixth Fleet. It also coincided with the return from Washington of Deputy Premier Stylianos Pattakos, whose series of meetings with ranking American officials reportedly left the former tank commander visibly upset.

Coincidence?

Authoritative sources say not, and that the surprise announcement, though preemptory indeed, was carefully orchestrated to coincide with events. The government of Prime Minister George Papadopoulos had exercised a simple political expedient — it had renounced grant aid before it was cut-off and had boosted national pride in the process.

High-Handed Affront

The move also appears to have given the 53-year-old premier at least a temporary advantage in his subtle tug of war with U.S. government officials whose policy here, over the past six years, has had the untenable objective of proding Papadopoulos's military regime into restoring democratic rule but, at the same time, maintaining friendly ties in order to protect strategic U.S. interests.

By acting unilaterally as he did, and presenting the Americans with a fait accompli, Papadopoulos was, according to Greek sources, reacting to what he considered a high-handed American affront.

To be sure, the U.S. embassy had been preparing Greek officials for the eventual phasing out of the aid program which, since the advent of the Truman Doctrine 25 years ago, has poured over two billion dollars worth of military assistance into this strategic Mediterranean land. What the Americans reportedly had not told the Greeks was that the cut-off could come as early as July, or that the Pentagon was already considering the expediency of not requesting congressional funds for the coming fiscal year.

When the Greeks found out, their reaction was swift, delayed only long enough to affix their signature to the controversial homeport agreement, then, on January 15th, following it up with the public acclaim that they had become the first country to voluntarily renounce American grant aid.

Depreciated Considerably

Despite all the local fanfare however, their decision, in the final analysis, was more symbolic than significant. With total grant aid totalling only $10 million during the present fiscal year, as compared to 60 million in foreign military sales credits, its renunciation is not expected to have serious reprecussions on the Greek economy or on the preparedness of the country's armed forces.

This is particularly true as grant aid, which has depreciated considerably over the last three years, is now largely restricted to administrative expenses, training of Greek forces in American installations and transporting surplus equipment and supplies into the greater Athens area.

Diplomatic observers consequently give little serious thought to reports that the decision portends a change in Greece's basic foreign policy orientation, or that it indicates another arms patron has been found, either within or outside the NATO alliance.

Pressures Will Ease

They likewise scoff at the significance of carefully placed press reports, timed to coincide with the aid announcement, that Papadopoulos will visit Bucharest within the next six months, that a delegation of Polish foreign office officials is soon to arrive in Athens or that a direct rail link will open between Greece and the Soviet Union. It's only part of a war of nerves, they say, on the Washington-Athens axis.

Eastern detente whether real or imagined aside, it appears likely that Greece will continue to look to America as its prime arms market for some time to come. And now, or so sources close to the Greek premier opine, American credit sales of military equipment could be available under even more favorable financing terms.

After all, or so the logic goes, by renouncing direct grant aid, Greece has provided the Nixon administration with a valuable weapon in its downhill fight with Congress over aiding a military dictatorship.

Legislative censure will consequently ease, as will corresponding pressure on Papadopoulos to liberalize his present iron-clad rule. By thus circumventing congressional debates, Greece can deal directly with what presumably will be an appreciative American executive on the question of foreign military sales credits.

With this in mnid, Chief of the Greek air force Lt. Gen. Th. Mitsanas began a 10-day official visit to Washingon, hours before Papadopoulos's most recent tour de force was revealed.

WASHINGTON POST
13 February, 1973

Tom Braden

India: Are We Getting the Message?

BOMBAY, INDIA—"I have a feeling," said Sen. Charles McC. Mathias (R-Md.) as he left this city the other day, "that these people are trying to send us a message and that if we don't pay attention to it we may lose India for another generation."

The phrase "lose India" is not like the phrase "lose China" which was so widely used in the '40s and '50s, subject to the same counterargument. "We never had China," was the Democrats' response to Republican charges of losing it. Republicans cannot respond that we never had India. In terms of such intangibles as loyalty and affection and example, we did have India, and Mathias is right when he expresses the fear that we may lose it.

Does it make any difference that India no longer considers the United States as her prime protector and friend? Does it make any difference that Soviet consular officers and commerical attaches are everywhere here, turning up at folk festivals and product exhibitions in distant villages, the most difficult of access?

Does it make any difference that India's military command considers evidence that China is provoking and paying for rebellion among tribes along its northeast frontier to be hard?

TEN YEARS AGO, these facts would have been cause for alarm in the United States and there would have been much talk about not letting down the world's newest and largest experiment in democracy. Today, obsessed with our own rapprochement with China and Russia, we seem to be looking the other way.

But some kind of balance sheet must sooner or later be struck here on the subcontinent because India's ambitions seem destined eventually to clash with

those of China and the United States will have to make up its mind which way it wants to go.

There is, for example, the problem of the northern frontier. In 1962, the Chinese grabbed a lot of territory which India long considered to be its own. India is not saying anything about recovering that territory, but a noticeable hard glint comes to the eyes of Indian military leaders when the subject is mentioned.

And how can it not be mentioned: the endless argument between India and Pakistan over who owns Kashmir still constitutes an unsettled problem. Any settlement which favors India—or, for that matter, any attempt to settle the problem by ignoring it, which also favors India—is certain to evoke Chinese displeasure, and perhaps Chinese intervention.

IN SHORT, it could happen that all hell will break loose between India and China and that the Soviets will then intervene. Does Dr. Kissinger's new balance of power for the East envision the United States as providing a counterweight on the Chinese side?

Some balance-of-power formula must be devised to keep India safe and to prevent it from an attempt to ensure its own safety by building nuclear weapons. Nuclear knowledge is already there; money is not. India's leaders assure every questioner that the subject of building nuclear weapons is not even being considered. In the next breath, they admit that they are under pressure to build nuclear weapons.

It would be wrong, it seems to me, if in drawing up its balance sheet the United States permitted the current infatuation with China to blind us to

"Some balance-of-power formula must be devised to keep India safe and to prevent it from an attempt to ensure its own safety by building nuclear weapons."

difference in ideology. From an equally impoverished base, China has developed more rapidly than India. It is entitled to admiration for the end achieved.

But the United States has been a great respecter of means as well as ends. India has attempted to pull itself up from poverty and refugees, pestilence and population by democratic means.

It has succeeded remarkably well. That it has not succeeded as rapidly as China is only a reminder of an old American principle; that decent and humane means are in themselves a worthwhile end.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
3 February 1973

U.S. and Iran ambassadors face testing time abroad

By John K. Cooley
Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

Tehran, Iran

What, the riddlemakers of Tehran's political salons are asking, do Ardeshir Zahedi and Richard Helms have in common?

The first answer is that like Mr. Zahedi's chief, Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi of Iran, and Mr. Helm's superior, President Richard Nixon, the two are personal friends.

Second, each has been appointed new ambassador to the other's country. Mr. Helms's arrival in Tehran and Mr. Zahedi's start of service in his second term as Iranian envoy in Washington are both due soon.

Policy shapers

Each has played a considerable role in shaping his own country's policies. Both have many friends in the other's country.

When Richard Helms began his career in the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1947, Iran, as its Prime Minister Amir Abbas Hoveida recently reminded this reporter, "was one of the least-developed countries in the world."

But by 1953, the year when the CIA helped the young Shah defeat rebellious opponents and return victorious from a brief exile, Iran had already nationalized, and was approaching full control of, its vast oil reserves. This proved the key to its present state of booming development.

Road of progress

Intense education and other reforms financed by Iran's expanding oil revenues have led to a situation where Prime Minister Hoveida now talks of Iran's "royal road to progress," and the Shah speaks of "the great civilization."

Though prosperity has rubbed off on much if not all of Iran's fast-growing population of 31 million, its restless university students are still restless. A nucleus of about 90, expelled from Tehran University after demonstrations in 1970 and unable to find jobs, became urban and rural guerrillas.

After trials that were for the most part secret prosecutions by SAVAK, the ruthlessly efficient Iranian state security service, about 65 were executed last year alone for acts of terrorism and violence.

Opposition to Shah

Many of the 15,000 Iranian students in Europe and 9,000 in the United States are in active and bitter opposition to the Shah.

The Shah himself is deeply concerned about this situation and this is where Mr. Zahedi's mission to Washington comes in. He is going with a determination to reason with the students, find out their real grievances and beliefs.

"It's not just a matter of getting them to work within the present system," Mr. Zahedi has told friends. "We have to find ways to enlist their aid in building a better system." Many of the students already know that Mr. Zahedi was the only member of the Shah's entourage who dared to speak out against the expensive anniversary celebrations of the Persian Empire's foundation at Persepolis in October, 1971, as wasteful and extravagant.

Mr. Helms, after running the CIA since 1966, comes to Iran at a moment when, to use the Shah's own words, Iranian-U.S. relations "have never been better," despite qualms among some diplomats and economists over Iran's huge military expenditures, mainly for American and British advanced arms — soon to include, it is rumored here, two aircraft carriers for Iran's Navy in the Indian Ocean.

Africa

LOS ANGELES TIMES
28 January 1973

AN INCIPIENT EXPLOSION

How U.S. Could Get Burned in Africa

RONALD SEGAL

The persisting horror of the Vietnam war hid from general, and particularly American, public concern the course of a struggle that may soon emerge as no less significant.

In several parts of Africa, and with implications not only for the rest of the continent but for the world at large, black guerrilla movements are engaged in confronting white regimes.

In Angola, Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea, the engagement is a classically anticolonial one—directed against a Portuguese presence that continues to treat the indigenous peoples as a labor force without rights of any kind, while claiming that the territories are integrated provinces of Portugal.

Ronald Segal is a South African author who is now a visiting fellow at the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions in Santa Barbara.

Rhodesia, formally in rebellion against Britain, is increasingly a miniversion of South Africa, with a rigorously racist rule by a white minority, whose residual pretenses to moral justification are based on the doctrine of "apartheid," or the separation of ultimately self-governing racial groups.

In South-West Africa (Namibia), originally placed under South African trusteeship by the League of Nations, white South African rule is under pressure not only from an indigenous guerrilla movement, but from the United Nations, which no longer recognizes the league mandate.

The present condition of black challenge differs from territory to territory. In Portuguese Guinea an enormous Portuguese military force, proportionately equivalent to an American army of some 8 million men in Vietnam, has been unable to pacify the countryside and, indeed, has been continually forced to yield effective control. Much of its provisioning can now be done only by air; many districts, quiet by day, cease to be so at nightfall.

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Were it not for the impact on morale in the other colonies and in metropolitan Portugal, the decision might have been made to abandon a possession that costs so much more than it is worth. But to countenance the loss of Portuguese Guinea would be to make more credible, and probable, the loss of the entire empire. And such would mean not only an end to the flow of profits from oil, coffee and diamonds in Angola; sugar, cotton and tourism in Mozambique.

The Portuguese role in the world would be reduced to that commensurate with a small, backward state on the edge of Europe. It is unthinkable for the Portuguese.

Yet realities intrude. FRELIMO, the leading guerrilla movement in Portuguese Mozambique, now exercises effective control over the two northern provinces, with hospitals, schools, and trading posts in the liberated areas. Guerrillas have infiltrated the site of the Cabora Bassa dam to sabotage equipment, and threaten to cut transport links with Rhodesia.

Indeed, so precarious has Portuguese rule become that the white regime in Rhodesia has been embarrassing Lisbon with its expressions of alarm and rebuke.

In Angola, the rancorous conflict among rival guerrilla movements, with independent Africa states taking different sides, has done small service to the engagement against the Portuguese. But one guerrilla group, the MLPA, is now clearly emerging as the major force of resistance, and increasingly receiving recognition and assistance as such.

Meanwhile, the domestic difficulties of Portugal mount. A revolutionary movement at home has carried out some spectacular coups, including the destruction of aircraft in supposedly impregnable camps and the bombing last October of the new NATO naval headquarters outside Lisbon on the eve of its dedication.

Desertions from the Portuguese armed forces increase and there is a rising flow of illegal emigration across the frontiers—to escape military service, as well as to find employment unavailable in Portugal itself.

Indeed, it is difficult to see how a state whose working population has significantly declined over the last decade, and whose relative position in the European statistical tables is rather like that of Mississippi in the statistical tables of the United States, could continue to prosecute three simultaneous colonial wars without the financial and military support that it obtains from the West.

Loans, private investment, and military supplies granted through NATO for solely domestic use, but dispatched to the colonial fronts nonetheless, have helped to secure Portugal from defeat. They have not helped, and cannot help, to insure victory.

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Where do the guerrilla movements get their arms? Some portion comes, unquestionably, from Portuguese supplies — through capture and theft. But, of course, there are purchases and gifts from the Soviet Union, Eastern European states and China, as well as assistance by independent African states.

The Sino-Soviet dispute has been reflected by divisions within several guerrilla movements, but the leading revolutionary groups in Portuguese Guinea and Portuguese Mozambique have been remarkably adept at evading any pressure to take sides and continuing to enjoy the regard of both.

In doing so, they have also established their credentials as essentially movements of national liberation, with revolutionary objectives and some reliance on Marxist theory and rhetoric, but uniting forces of disparate outlook with a program of "first things first." A close acquaintance with the guerrilla leaderships reveals their healthy freedom from dogma.

The success of the Rhodesian white regime in surviving its unilateral declaration of independence from Britain has been due not only to the ineffectual response of the British government in particular, and of the organized international community in general, but to the self-destructive rivalry of the two leading black nationalist movements, ZANU and ZAPU.

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Britain, which had never before responded to colonial rebellion without attempting to crush it by force, immediately announced its refusal

to use force against the Rhodesian white regime. (And to underline the racial implications of this decision, the Wilson government made clear it would consider the use of force only in the event of a breakdown in law and order, which, in effect, meant an adequate African challenge to the security of the white administration.)

Western representation on the U.N. Security Council blocked any effort to expand economic sanctions beyond Rhodesia, allowing South Africa and Portugal to act as enterpreneurial supply routes.

Yet now Rhodesia is proving to be scarcely less vulnerable a component in the alliance of white rule than the Portuguese possessions. Sanctions are at last beginning to hurt, with the growing need to replace outworn and expensive capital equipment.

The futility and disrepute into which their quarreling cast them has begun to concentrate the minds of the African nationalist movements on their supposed primary purposes.

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The failure of a settlement between Britain and the Rhodesian white regime, with the provocative publicity that attended the British commission of inquiry, fueled African morale while the increasingly repressive measures of the Rhodesian white regime spread resistance. The popular mood is changing from one that avoided and even betrayed guerrilla infiltrators, into one that succors their operations.

In South-West Africa (Namibia), the long dormant labor force has awakened into strikes and tribal unrest. The activities of guerrillas (mainly members of a group named SWAPO) are still marginal in their impact.

But South African rule has been deprived of all basis in international law by successive judgments of the World Court and successive decisions of the United Nations.

The substance of South African dominion is not yet seriously threatened, but the recognition is growing, in South Africa and abroad, that even the cynicism with which international affairs are conducted cannot much longer ignore the unequivocal act of aggression that continued South African possession of South-West Africa constitutes.

South Africa demands a long article on its own. Sufficient here to say that despite the enormous material power of white South Africa, certain factors are rapidly changing the hitherto confident assumption of its capacity to survive for as long as matters.

The tribal politics of "apartheid" has promoted a vigorous black power movement, even among government-appointed officials whose previous subservience seemed permanent. Despite the multiplying measures of separation, the shortage of sufficient white skills for a dynamic industrial society is continuing to suck black labor into the cities, and even into jobs traditionally the preserve of whites.

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But, above all, the weakness of the white South African position is the weakness of its buffer allies. To abandon Rhodesia and the Portuguese colonies to their fate, for a policy of fortress South Africa, would provide sanctuaries across the border for the indigenous guerrilla movement.

Yet to take an increasingly direct responsibility for the survival of white rule beyond would dangerously expand the terrain of warfare and to it many millions of hostile Africans for the gain of a few hundred thousand supporting whites.

And a related challenge presses. Tanzania and Zambia are effective sanctuaries for Mozambique, Angolan, Rhodesian, South-West African and South African guerrillas. To leave the sanctuaries alone is to encourage the movements that employ them. To attack the sanctuaries would be to bring not only Zambia and Tanzania directly into the conflict, but all too possibly other African states.

Here, indeed, would be the continental race war that many observers have long predicted. Yet the temptation is great, and experience in Southeast Asia suggests that the trap, however clear, may prove irresistible.

Certainly the South African prime minister has issued repeated threats, which white public opinion at home may insist that he carries out. There is a kind of claustrophobia, moral and physical, in white South Africa that finds merely waiting upon events less and less tolerable.

There can be small doubt on whose side the U.S. government has placed itself. Its warm relationship with Portugal, bilaterally and through NATO; its indulgence of the Rhodesian regime, with its lifting of the embargo on imports of Rhodesian chrome; the profound economic relationship with South Africa, despite all its rhetoric of hostility to "apartheid"—such is scarcely balanced by any commitment to the cause of the guerrillas.

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But soon the United States may be confronted by an inescapable dilemma: to allow the defeat of white rule in Africa, or attempt to secure it by massive intervention. To choose the second would be a disaster for the United States—which is not, unhappily, to say that this choice is certain to be rejected.

To be sure, the course of the Vietnam war has not enhanced the appeal of another, similar engagement. But then the economic arguments for American intervention in southern and central Africa may well constitute, for many Americans, a case far more convincing than the arguments for intervention in Vietnam seem, at least now, ever to have provided.

The spread of race war over much of the world outside and inevitably, as well, inside American society, would not recommend itself to a rational assessment of results. Yet recent history suggests that results are not always rationally assessed by those who conduct the government of the United States.

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The immediate challenge summons an immediate response from apparent strength, as though the process ended there. But, instead, new challenges emerge—summoning further immediate responses that are no more than an increasing, and self-defeating, reliance on the efficacy of force.

And yet there is a creative, a rational alternative. It is to accept the rightful, and essentially undefeatable, aspirations of people to reject the oppressions of privilege and liberate their lives.

It is an alternative to which Americans should for the sake of their own decent survival, urgently direct their government.

NEW YORK TIMES
2 February 1973

Libya Said to Have Lent Black Muslims $3-Million

By PAUL DELANEY
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 1—The North African nation of Libya lent American Black Muslims $3-million last year but has refused a request for a second loan, according to persons close to both parties.

These sources reported that the Muslims had asked for the same interest-free amount the second time.

But, the sources said, Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi, leader of Libya's ruling council, came under pressure from other Arab states and especially from Arab student organizations in this country to turn down the request for more money.

They contended that an Islamic country should not finance a movement whose religious practices they considered questionable. Besides, the sources said, the protesters feel that the money can be put to better use in financing Arab endeavors.

Increasing friction has been reported recently between Black Muslims and black followers of traditional Islam over the American sect's religious practices and beliefs. Black Muslims consider whites to be "devils" who therefore cannot become members of the Islamic religion.

Further, the black group looks upon its leader, Elijah Muhammad, as a messenger of Allah, or God. Most other Moslems reject those two beliefs and accept whites as Moslems and consider Mohammad as the last prophet of Allah.

The Black Muslims borrowed the money from Libya last year to purchase a church for use as a mosque on Chicago's South Side. Total price of the building was $4-million. Chicago is the national headquarters of the Muslims.

The loan enhanced the Black Muslims' standing as followers of Islam but caused concern among some Arabs.

Meanwhile, the sources said, the Muslims, who reportedly have holdings up to $70-million, have been experiencing financial difficulties.

"The Muslims have a lot of small businesses, and small businesses just don't make money any more," one source said. "They also have a lot of farmland, but they don't pay off that much. So they applied for another loan, but Colonel Qaddafi turned them down.

"Several Arab nations expressed concern, and Arab students in this country complained that they were catching hell from Black Muslims, thus why lend them money? The Arabs also thought the money could be put to better use."

Colonel Qaddafi, a strong but erratic nationalist, has boasted of supporting liberation movements in other countries. He once said that he had provided financial aid to the Irish Republican Army, but I.R.A. officials denied his assertion.

Other Movements Helped

Colonel Qaddafi has made it a policy to help liberation movements around the world. Libya has contributed money and arms to the Palestinian guerrillas and has established ties with movements in black Africa and in South America.

The loan to the American Muslims was seen as an attempt to gain a foothold among black Americans. Indeed, the Muslims boasted of their ties to a foreign country.

At a meeting at the Chicago Mosque last September with 500 blacks who hold professional jobs, Mr. Muhammad said that he had "good credit throughout the world."

"I can borrow money in no time, but I want you to help pay it back," he said to the blacks from New York and other Eastern cities in appealing to them to sign up for jobs with the Muslims.

"We want to build a world for the black man. I've got the world in back of me, now."

More meetings are scheduled with the black professionals.

The Black Muslims have mosques in more than 50 cities, and the group has been growing since the mid-fifties. Muslims put membership at several hundred thousand, but the police and other authorities say that the figure is less than 10,000.

Besides financial difficulties, the group has been beset by an internal dispute caused by a small number of dissidents who complain that the Muslim leadership spends too much money on administrative salaries and the purchase of property.

WASHINGTON POST
26 JANUARY 1973

An African Nationalist Dies: His Cause Endures

The murder of Amilcar Cabral removes the dominant figure in the struggle to substitute African for Portuguese rule in the West African land known to Lisbon as "Portuguese Guinea" and to Mr. Cabral's nationalist movement ("PAIGC") as Guinea Bissau. His towering stature——among his people and to a lesser extent in the international community—raises the serious question of whether and how his movement will proceed without him. His guerrillas are credited with having wrested about half the country from the 25,000 Portuguese soldiers and 15,000 African irregulars contesting them, and with having set up a civil administration in the "liberated" territory. Mr. Cabral, whose role is evaluated elsewhere on this page today, had planned to announce Guinea Bissau's independence shortly, and to seek international recognition for it.

The Portuguese presumably hope that by his death the momentum and morale of the "terrorists" will be broken. They have been in Africa five centuries. Such is their insularity that the intensity of their sense of mission is hard for outsiders to believe. Building a peaceful multiracial society, Premier Caetano said just last week, "is the correct path for the whole of Africa, the only one likely to prevent painful tragedies in the territories south of the Equator where a great number of whites have set down and have created cities, industrial achievements, which would not last without them . . ." It is this sense of mission rather than any common imperialist lust for profit which sustains Portugal's disproportionate and anachronistic military efforts to retain its "overseas territories."

Here is the real tragedy. Not only does Lisbon's clutch on its colonies produce much suffering, injustice and expense now, it steadily prejudices the possibility that—when Africans finally do take over their own homelands—they will feel inclined to treat the long-resident Portuguese well. Mr. Caetano does his overseas countrymen ill service by failing to anticipate their vulnerability in conditions of guerrilla-won African rule.

Cabral supporters often claim that American support of Portugal is at once crucial to Lisbon's continued colonialism and certain to rebound against the United States when the nationalists eventually prevail. Both claims are considerably overstated. Not Washington's small NATO-connected aid but Lisbon's own perversity keeps it in the field. And if the nationalists triumph, in Angola or Mozambique or in Guinea, they will have the same practical reasons every other such movement has had to consider what advantages may lie in good relations with the United States. Unwilling to condone guerrilla attacks across established state frontiers, the United States has tended to limit itself to statements of general support for the principle of self-determination. Such a posture, the African-American Institute has noted, "allows the United States to express dissatisfaction with Portugal without having to face the discomfort of major policy alterations."

Many Americans, feeling that the nationalists' cause is just, would like to see their government end its ambivalence and come down hard, in word if not in deed, on the side of the nationalists. But neither as ideology nor policy is this a course likely to commend itself to a Nixon administration oriented toward both Europe and the business world. The nationalists do get weapons from socialist countries (and from the world marketplace), and they receive sanctuary in neighboring Guinea—where Mr. Cabral was assassinated—and Senegal. But they must know their cause is largely theirs alone to win or lose.

THE WASHINGTON POST Sunday, Feb. 11, 1973

Five Faces of Cuba

By Robert del Quiaro

A British freelance journalist specializing in Latin American affairs, the writer visited Cuba last year. He has changed the names of the people whose lives he describes.

FRANCISCO was not raised to be a New Cuban. A scion of one of the oldest families in Cuba, he was a young executive in a prospering company in Havana when Fidel Castro's revolution took place in 1959. Now, in his mid-30s, he is a writer of some repute, with work published in translations abroad as well as in Cuba. He is married, with two small children in school. His wife was born in the fragrant, high-ceilinged house where the family now lives with her parents, and she went to the American School in Havana.

Basically, Francisco is in sympathy with the revolution, or he would have quit long ago for Miami, as thousands of others of his background have done. But he does not live as well as he did before rationing took effect. Rationing means three eggs a week, four pounds of sugar a month, two packs of cigarettes every two weeks per adult, and orange juice only for children under 8. Francisco misses his cigarettes badly, and smokes what he has down to the last puff. (He could buy unrationed cigarettes, at about $2.35 a pack last summer; a rationed pack cost about 20 cents.)

The children—"born to be happy," the slogan says—can be put into a nursery from the age of 45 days to 5 years, when they start school, while mother goes out to work. When Francisco's children are in high school—probably a boarding school in the country where they will spend about three hours each working day in the fields—he will be able to draw their rations at home while they are fed and clothed at school. They will visit their home from Saturday noon to Sunday night.

Francisco is among that band of Cubans who still patch up and fret over their pre-1959 American cars. Cuba, and Havana especially, is a museum of Detroitiana; 1947 De Sotos and 1956 Fords chug gingerly among the Russian trucks and Italian police cars. Gas-guzzlers in their prime, now they go through the gasoline ration (25 gallons a month, with variations according to engine size) pretty quickly. However, Havana has one of the best public transport networks in the world, if you don't mind packing closely in the heat; any ride costs only a nickel, and the buses run 24 hours a day.

Eating out is a frustration. To get a table, you have to call the restaurant between 10 p.m. and midnight the day before.

For eating at home, Francisco's wife has learned thrifty ways her upper-class grandmother did not have to know. If she can find meat for three meals in a week, she is doing very well. Most of her cooking is based on rice and beans. The diet is monotonous, and is not enough to prevent fatigue for some Cubans. But none starves, and every child of the hundreds I saw looked healthy. Few other countries in the Americas could equal that.

Francisco misses foreign contacts. Many foreigners who have been critical of the regime are not allowed in, and travel abroad for Cubans is a rare privilege, mainly because the Cuban peso cannot be spent outside the country. As a writer, Francisco felt a chill when, in 1971, the young poet Heberto Padilla was whisked away for a month of "dialogues with the state security comrades," as he reported during a self-lacerating recantation in front of the Union of Writers and Artists after his release. Padilla remains at liberty, but the warning was clear.

Still, Francisco is lucky to live in a roomy house with running water, and he enjoys being part of a great cultural and social ferment while much of his world remains intact. His children, he and his wife already realize, are something else. Cuban parents are becoming amazed at the self-assurance and independence of the rising generation, a change with a powerful impact on the fabric of a family-oriented Latin American society.

OUTSIDE Havana is the countryside, where the main investment is, and Olga, a woman with a mission. She is no tedious zealot, although they are around, but an actress who decided to give her talent to the revolution. Not long after she emerged from her convent education in the United States, she went on the stage in Havana. Nearly four years ago, she and a group of colleagues moved to the Sierra del Escambray, halfway along Cuba's southern coast, to start a theater troupe among the peasants.

The Escambray was not a soft choice. It is far from the main spinal highway of the island and was long a badly neglected area. The troupe, now nearly three dozen, shares the life of the farm workers, sleeping under the stars in cane-cutters' camps, riding with solitary herdsmen, visiting new housing projects perched on lonely ridges. The aim of the troupe's plays—which they write in consultation with the local people—is to sell a region of traditionally independent and crusty farmers on the advantages of becoming wage earners in an agricultural collective plan. The plays also encourage school attendance, rehabilitation of peasants who collaborated with counter-revolutionary guerrillas, and resistance to the Jehovah's Witnesses who have a stubborn hold on parts of the area. Olga promises a play on women's liberation—and that's a touchy subject in Cuba.

Olga, with her unshaven legs and torn denims, does not look out of place in the Escambray. But she has made a decision to give up silk blouses and depilation, whereas the Escambray women have never had the choice. Olga, unattached but with two children, has a footloose though responsible morality which is beyond the range of the peasant women with whom she shares chores, confidences and field work. *Machismo* remains strong. Striking a blow against it, the Cuban Young Communists passed a resolution last year declaring that any wife who was prevented by her husband from going out to work or to get an education was beach near Havana, he doen't feel hemmed in. The sea is clear, even if there is no boardwalk, no beach balls, no surf boards and a long line for the local substitute for Coke.

No Cuban generation before Ernesto's had such opportunities for sports. The Cuban track and boxing teams did quite well at the Munich Olympics, partly thanks to East European coaches but also to young blacks being brought fully into society.

Ernesto says he would not get uptight if his sister was seen holding hands with a black. Racial discrimination still hangs on in Cuba—one foreign diplomat could not get an adopted African boy into one supposedly public building until the doorman was convinced that the boy was non-Cuban. But coupling across the color line, while still exceptional, is much more common than it was even a half-generation ago. Ernesto takes this easing-up for granted, and he dismisses his elders' complaints about hair length and coming-home times. Yet the only long-haired male head I saw in Cuba was pictorial—Che Guevara challenging his successors from a thousand posters.

Apart from a few skeptical reservations, Ernesto believes in the way things are going in Cuba, and he works hard in the common cause. But he wants to have a look at the outside world. I wasn't the first foreigner he had ever met, but I was for at least a

few other students at Havana University. A few of the elite leave the island to study or show the flag in "brother countries" but, although there is a genuine concern for North Vietnam, which has attracted Cuban medical personnel and technicians, the countries of Eastern Europe do not fire the imagination the way an open passport would.

The student turnouts for voluntary work are impressive. Grades and promotions do not depend on voluntary overtime, but thousands of students give up weekend after weekend, particularly during the back-breaking sugar harvest. The books of Jose Marti, the Cuban poet and revolutionary who was killed in the 19th Century wars against the Spanish, outnumber those of Lenin on Cuban school and college shelves, and it is in the spirit of Marti that many young Cubans put in their extraordinary efforts.

NOT MANY foreigners are in evidence. The Soviet presence is discreet, although it touches many aspects of life—technical and military assistance, flying long reconnaissance missions over the western Atlantic from Cuban bases, for instance. There is a capitalist presence, too, particularly now that Cuba is buying from Western European and Japanese industries. So Charlie is there, a brash young Britisher who services the heavy equipment his company has sold to Cuba.

Charlie believes that, except for right-winger Enoch Powell, nothing good has happened in British politics since Winston Churchill left Downing Street, so he has little patience with Cuban sloganeering and is full of stories about Cuban inefficiency. The mistakes do exist and Charlie, traveling around the island as widely as anyone, sees them.

There are the 2,000 Alfa-Romeo cars bought from Italy for official uses before it was discovered they needed special and expensive gasoline and brake fluid. There were the fork-lift trucks from Britain which arrived to lie idle for months because the Cubans had omitted to acquire the gear for charging their electric motors. Soviet machinery, much of it still years behind American counterparts, is often ill-suited for the tropical climate. Wildly wasteful programs of stock-breeding and crop-raising have been self-inflicted body blows for the economy.

There are human problems, too. Sitting in hotel bars around Havana, Charlie sees a head waiter finding a good table in return for a few foreign cigarettes slipped him by an official who just walked in with a girl who has a new handbag, new sunglasses and new shoes—a combination beyond any Cuban girl's ration cards without a little help from her friends. Charlie can't get spare parts moved because truck drivers have stayed away from work for a few days in protest against tobacco rationing. Charlie has to drive half a day to fix some simple mechanical hitch which Cubans on the spot could have put right themselves, but preferred to call the foreign supplier—an old habit from before 1959 when a call to Pittsburgh or Cleveland could bring in ready-made expertise. "This bloody country could do with a thousand really good foremen," Charlie says.

At least Charlie has a clear record with security police, or so a Cuban official told him once. Not every foreign businessman does so well. A handful have been expelled—for dabbling in the black market (buying 600 gallons of gas per month, ostensibly for one Volkswagen, in one case), for too-flagrant relations with local girls, or for trying to smooth the way with a kickback to a ministry official who wouldn't play.

Charlie claims he plays it pretty straight. He spreads a few cases of whiskey around, but not enough to make anyone envious or over-indulged. He would dearly like to hit the Cubans with a full-blast public relations presentation for his products—"lights, streamers, a band and go-go dancers in hot pants. The locals would love it."

THE LAST CUBAN to be mentioned is Andreas Cao Mendiguren. That is his real name. He has been serving a 20-year sentence since 1961 for his opposition to the regime, and is reportedly in poor health. I didn't meet him. Amnesty International made him one of its Prisoners of Conscience last November. Perhaps, in its new confidence, Cuba will feel able to release him, and others like him.

entitled to leave him and find herself "a more revolutionary companion." Olga would concur, but many of her Cuban sisters would hardly dare, or be given a chance by their husbands to do so.

But changes are on the way, if only because the leadership can't afford to have so many potentially productive minds and hands at home cooking the black beans and waiting for the master to return from the cockfight with a skinful of warm beer. Intra-uterine devices are freely available and abortion is permitted in a variety of circumstances. Strangely, the regime tightened up lax divorce regulations last year, mainly to cramp the style of a young, partner-switching Havana set.

But Olga is happy—"with the people, feeling alive, not staying in Havana hoping to pay great roles." Like a lot of people in the Cuban theater, films and other arts, she feels the need to break the cycle which makes the arts by and for the middle classes. Olga and her group, for instance, draw extensively on the folk tales of the Escambray, using the region's strong oral tradition of story-telling and myth. Comedy and local dialect are used to lighten the message. Olga enjoys playing in "Little Red Riding Hood" as much as in "The Trial of the Collaborator."

EDUCATION is Cuba's massive and long-term investment, and caught up in it is Ernesto, a 20-year-old reading English at the University of Havana. He is relaxed, keen to exchange views with a foreigner, and, being from Oriente, he makes sure I understand that Havana is not the be-all and end-all of Cuba. His hair is short and he says that he has never seen "a marijuana cigarette."

Ernesto is a product of one of the most ambitious and comprehensive school systems in the Third World, providing free and compulsory education for everyone to the age of 16 and liberal admissions to college. But compulsory education, like democracy, has a thin tradition in Cuba; 200,000 youths aged 13 to 16 neither attend school nor have jobs, and there is a high college dropout rate.

Materials are scarce. Ernesto has only one textbook to share among the class of workers to whom he teaches English in the evenings, after his own studies. Most students and faculty members teach adult classes in factories and farms. Through education, the theory goes, the New Cuban will be neither blue-collar nor white-collar and social tensions will disappear.

Cuba is not the worst place for a boy to grow up. The island is over 600 miles long yet has fewer than 9 million people. When Ernesto goes to the

THE GUARDIAN MANCHESTER
9 February 1973

PATRICK KNIGHT, in Santiago, reports on election prospects in a country with the worst inflation in the world

Chile: temperature up as polls draw closer

MUCH FURIOUS energy is being put into preparing for the Chilean elections of March 4 by Allende's Unidad Popular and the Federation of Democratic Parties, a new coalition of the Christian Democrat and Nationalist parties.

It is unlikely, however, that the election result will change the balance of power significantly. It is not expected that the Opposition will get the two thirds majority required to impeach the President, or to be able to pass measures through Parliament which could restrain him.

The present political deadlock will probably continue until the presidential elections of 1976, but after March 4 there will definitely be some new and tough economic measures aimed at cutting the runaway inflation of last year. It is thought likely that there will be a last desperate attempt by the Right to cause severe civil disturbances when the election results are announced, as a further three and a half years will elapse after that before the next chance comes to change the Government. All the 150 seats in the House of Deputies, and 25 of the 50 seats in the Senate are to be contested.

Opinion polls point to a voting pattern similar to that which brought Allende to power in November, 1970, with the UP, getting between 35 per cent and 42 per cent of the vote. Although it is almost certain that the Opposition will get a majority, they already control both Houses of Parliament, and in spite of this, Allende has managed to achieve a great deal. There are some imponderable factors. Some 881,000 new voters (18.5 per cent of the total) have registered. Many of these are young people, but a significant number are illiterates voting for the first time.

In four very poor states with a high proportion of Mapuche Indians, new voters account for more than 25 per cent of the electorate. Although peasants are generally conservative, the Indian population have had specially favourable treatment during the past two years. In many cases tribal lands have been returned to them, cooperatives have been set up, and credit made available. The distribution of free milk to children, which helped cut infant mortality by 10.5 per cent in 1971, also benefited this group.

During 1972, Chile had the highest rate of inflation in the world: 163 per cent. To many this was the year when many of the economic measures the UP introduced in the early months of government went wrong. Others see it as part of a planned strategy aimed at weakening the resistance of the Opposition. Certainly much of private industry is now virtually bankrupt and those firms not in State hands are largely dependent on the goodwill of the nationalised banks to keep going.

One of the first measures the UP took was to give all salary and wage earners an increase which has amounted to about 20 per cent in real terms, and to fix the price of many goods. This policy produced good results for 12 months. The GNP rose by 8.5 per cent in 1971, compared with an average of 3.1 per cent in the previous six year term of the Christian Democrats. Unemployment dropped from 8.8 per cent to 3.7 per cent.

The economic thinking behind these brave moves was that there was enough spare capacity in industry to meet the increase in demand, and that any extra raw materials or spare parts needed from overseas could be paid for by extra earnings from copper, with the mines entirely in State hands. A substantial investment aimed at raising production had been made in the industry in recent years, and it was anticipated that the price of copper would stay at the fairly high level of 1970.

In fact copper production has hardly risen. Hundreds of engineers and technicians left the country when they ceased to be a priveleged class paid in dollars, and there have been difficulties in obtaining spare parts from the United States. The price of copper has gone down, cutting Chile's income from that source by some £60-£65 millions a year (20 per cent).

The increase in internal demand, still strong, went far beyond that planned and has also put severe pressure on agriculture. It would have been surprising if, during a period when 3,400 farms of over 80 hectares, forming some 35 per cent of all agricultural land, changed ownership or control, production had remained the same. In fact it dropped by about 8 per cent in 1972. Supply is not meeting demand and there have been shortages and the growth of a black market. Chile's food import bill rose from £51 millions in 1970 to £162 millions last year, and will be up again this.

Political difficulties, coupled with having to man not only all the expanding Government agencies, but also to put managers into all the nationalised firms, supervise agricultural reform and try to control the distribution of goods and the black market, have put great strains on the resources of the parties which form the UP. Although there are tensions, the coalition has held together well. The pressure of work caused by the great speed with which the Government introduced such a large number of radical measures has probably helped.

The law has been bent a good deal to achieve the changes the UP wanted. In particular use has been made of decrees passed by a short-lived Socialist dictatorship of 1931, until now either implemented or repealed. These permitted State takeovers of industries or commerce vital to the control of the cost of living.

In spite of the fact that the working classes have benefited from increases in wages, the middle classes have profited more. Although very slightly narrowed during the past two years, salary differentials between an operative and a manager of a small concern are still between 20 and 30 times.

Nevertheless, the political sympathies of the large middle class have not changed, although Allende would like to win over part of this sector and form a new coalition with splinter groups from the Christian Democrats. Observers feel that after the election, the fragile Right-wing coalition will split, and political positions within Chile will polarise. The Christian Democrat Party will decline, its supporters shifting either to the UP or the National Party.

The failure to win over many of these middle voters is blamed partly on the activities of the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR). Extremists of this party have proposed that farms of down to 40 hectares, and many small businesses, should also be taken over. These are precisely sectors which new policies of the nationalised banks are trying to help, by extending new lines of credit. Such statements have clearly frightened small farmers and business men, who are less inclined to plant, or invest, if they feel it is only a question of time before their property is taken over.

As time passes, the freedom of manoeuvre of the UP is becoming more and more limited, and there are less and less unorthodox paths open to it. The opposition is finding new ways of curbing effects of changes, or reversing measures already in force. By a simple majority in Parliament they are able to force the resignation of a Minister they feel has resorted to illegal tactics. This simply means that the Minister concerned changes offices with the man next door, but nevertheless causes delays and complications. The effects, of the strikes last October, were severe, although little concrete was achieved. Positions of both sides have hardened.

Three senior officers now occupy Cabinet posts, but they have said or done very little and would appear to be just holding the ring until the elections. It has recently been announced that the armed forces will shortly take over the administration of food distribution. It is clear that Allende is attempting to involve the armed forces in the process of political change and bring to an end the long-standing tradition of the Chilean armed forces to remain aloof from politics.

It is a dangerous tactic for both him and the country, as the armed forces are by no means united in agreement that the direction in which Allende is taking the country is the correct one.

Critics say the economy is in a terrible mess, and in traditional terms, this is true. Huge losses are being made in the newly nationalised concerns and productivity has gone down, although overall GNP still managed to grow by around 5 per cent last year. This chaos is not something which causes everyone equal concern. In the hundreds of industries and farms which have changed ownership, each day workers involved in productivity committees and management become more conscious of the economic circumstances which affect their concerns, and the nation as a whole.

There are no longer any closed doors, any secrets to divide management and men. Workers are gradually becoming aware that, with guidance, they are able to master those techniques until now forbidden to them, and use them to benefit society rather than a small group. For this process to become so ingrained that it cannot be erased, only time is

needed. Errors are inevitable; cuts in productivity are inevitable, but irrelevant to the process. So Allende, who is constantly urging workers to become more involved and aware, is playing for time, so that whatever happens in the elections of 1976 the institutions in society which have been taken over by the workers will never escape their grasp again.

It is anticipated that several projects will shortly come to fruition and help the economic situation. A large wood allulose processing plant will shortly come into operation and be a new source of foreign currency, and it is hoped agricultural productivity will soon begin to rise again.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
10 February 1973

Time runs short in search for Panama accord

By James Nelson Goodsell
Latin America correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

The United States is trying to get its negotiations with Panama over the canal off dead center.

One idea being widely mentioned here would scrap the present negotiating team headed by former Eisenhower official Robert B. Anderson. Instead, a single negotiator would in effect camp in Panama City in hopes of working out some kind of accord.

At the moment, however, there has been no general agreement on new ways of dealing with Panama's increasingly strident demand for a take-over of the canal.

Moreover, Washington is worried that the meeting of the United Nations Security Council, which will meet in Panama City beginning March 15, may aggravate the situation, making it increasingly difficult to carry on any talks with Panama.

The Panamanians are expected to use the UN session as a forum for airing their side of the case — and are expected to pick up a good deal of world sympathy for their position.

Actually, Washington regards the UN meeting as "something of a disaster for our efforts to work out a solution to the problem," as one official termed it. On the other hand, Washington is trying to make the best of a difficult arrangement, knowing full well that Panama is going to reap benefits from the session.

Meanwhile, however, the search for new approaches goes on. A number of ideas are being advanced, none of which has any stamp of approval as yet.

The concept of a single negotiator is not new. It was advanced before at the time of the 1964 Panama riots over the canal, which resulted in Panama's breaking of relations with Washington.

It is now being dusted off again.

Other proposals include the possibility of starting a whole new round of talks with Panama, using the present negotiating team headed by Mr. Anderson who has been carrying on the talks intermittently for eight years.

Search for a forumla

The basic desire here, however, is to find a formula that would have appeal to Panama — and also that would lead to some fruitful talks.

Washington's position is a difficult one. Many of those in the administration and in the State Department appear willing to go to some lengths to satisfy the Panamanian desires, knowing full well, however, that Congress is not as disposed to go very far.

A powerful group particularly in the House of Representatives, is very determined to keep U.S. control of the canal. This congressional group is supported by the U.S. military as well.

As seen here, the whole controversy with Panama is a three-fold affair: the canal itself, the 500-square mile zone that surrounds it, and the U.S. defense establishment located in the zone.

Some people in Washington are quick to assert that there is no real reason for the huge defense operation in the zone. But military men disagree and thus Washington is faced with an inner struggle between the executive and Congress, and between elements in the executive and the military, over the whole Panama issue.

It is realized that unless a new approach on negotiations is opened soon, the impasse could become explosive again and perhaps even cause a major flare-up similar to that in 1964, which resulted in two dozen deaths, hundreds of injuries, and a legacy of bad feeling between Panama and the United States.

WASHINGTON STAR
4 February 1973

Panama Threatens Violence Over Treaty Negotiations

By JEREMIAH O'LEARY
Star-News Staff Writer

Panama's leaders have informed a former senior American diplomat that the isthmian republic has exhausted its patience over the canal treaty negotiations and is at the point of resorting to violence, The Star-News learned today.

This dire message was given to the ex-diplomat by Foreign Minister Juan Tack last month in Panama City after a discussion that included the Panamanian dictator, Brig. Gen. Omar Torrijos. The message was relayed immediately to the State Department which is already in a state of deep apprehension over the upcoming meeting of the United Nations Security Council in Panama March 15 through 21.

The fears of the State Department range from the possibility of an outbreak of nationalistic violence by Panama's citizenry, similar to that which led to fighting with the U.S. Army in 1964, to the near-certainty that the United States will be the target of severe attack on charges of colonialism by several Latin nations at the UN sessions.

Criticism Expected

There also is apprehension in Foggy Bottom that the anti-U.S. atmosphere at the Security Council meeting will be increased by the possible presence there of Prime Minister Fidel Castro of Cuba.

Castro, some diplomats feel, will not overlook this chance to castigate the United States on a wide range of subjects from the American-held naval base at Guantanamo Bay to the occasional anti-Castro exile activity against the Havana regime.

Observers believe the United States may be assailed by: Chile, because of its problems in selling copper as a result of U.S. pressure in behalf of an American firm and the failure of any multinational loans to be approved for Santiago since Marxist President Salvador Allende took office; Ecuador and Peru, over the tuna-fishing problem off their coasts and Venezuela, because of the touchy oil quota situation. Panama is regarded as certain to use the UN Security Council as a sounding board for fierce denunciations of the long-drawnout negotiations over the Canal Zone.

Denunciatory Speeches

Torrijos and Tack reportedly told the former diplomat that they knew the State Department was powerless in the negotiations over the canal and the U.S.-occupied zone on either side of it. They indicated that President Nixon, if he chose, could take action to make major concessions in Panama just as he did in the case of returning Okinawa to Japan.

But they said that they also knew that they had no other way of attracting Nixon's interest in Panama and the canal controversy than by resorting to violence. And they urged the ex-diplomat to relay this word to Washington.

The general assessment in the U.S. is that Torrijos, who commands Panama's 5,000-man Guardia National, has the power to turn on the heat or to suppress it as he wishes. Recent speeches and broadcasts by Panamanian officials subservient to Torrijos have been couched in denunciatory and implacable terms.

Some Washington sources believe the Panamanian strategy will be to try to make a strong propaganda and legal case for their aspirations for major concessions from the United States on the canal. Torrijos, they believe, would not permit violence to break

out while the U.N. is in his capital but after the meeting ends no one knows.

The United States in turn, is attempting to influence other Latin diplomats to help keep the U.N. session in a low-key on the grounds that nothing will be gained by airing a long string of frustrations and disagreements in Panama.

The meeting will be the first severe test for the new U.S. ambassador to the U.N., John Scali. Scali is already busily preparing for the meeting by adding Latin specialists to his staff in event the session turns into a palpable anti-U.S. meeting. These preparations are being made in the assumption that the United States will be the whipping boy.

NEW YORK TIMES
13 February 1973

Neither Fish Nor Fowl

By Tom Wicker

SAN JUAN, P. R.—The major problem with the commonwealth status of Puerto Rico is that it leaves the island neither fish nor fowl. As an offshore part of the United States without much in the way of natural resources, Puerto Rico needs numerous special provisions in the mainland law; but since its people have no real political voice in mainland affairs, it has none of the usual political means to get the kind of exclusions and preferments that it needs.

For only one example, the island's liberal political leaders—such as Gov. Rafael Hernandes Colon and Resident Commissioner Jaime Benitez, the nonvoting delegate to Congress—are strongly, if somewhat paradoxically, opposed to provisions in a bill to increase the American minimum wage that would extend it to the Puerto Rican work force.

Puerto Rican workers are, in fact, underpaid by mainland standards, particularly since the cost of living here is rising faster than in the United States, due largely to transportation costs of goods in great demand. But although Puerto Rico has one of the most prosperous economies of any Latin society and one of the highest economic growth rates anywhere in the world, unemployment here runs at an officially estimated level of 12 per cent; at any one time, it may be as high as 30 per cent.

Production costs on the island, despite lower wages, are actually higher than on the mainland—again due primarily to the cost of importing raw materials and transporting the finished goods to distant markets. So if the mainland minimum wage also were imposed on Puerto Rico—which now maintains its own lower minimum wage standards through a joint U.S.-Puerto Rican committee for each industry—authorities estimate that the immediate result might be the loss of as many as 25,000 jobs in island industries that would no longer be competitive. The longer-term consequence, they warn, could be renewed migration of jobless Puerto Ricans to mainland cities that already have massive unemployment, housing and welfare problems.

Yet, Puerto Rico has little political clout in Congress against the relevant part of the proposed minimum wage increase, which is believed in San Juan to be a short-sighted effort by the A.F.L.-C.I.O. to stop the "export" of American jobs to Puerto Rico.

For another example, questions have been raised in the Puerto Rican press and elsewhere as to whether the recent Supreme Court decision substantially eliminating state prohibitions on abortions applied to the largely Catholic population of Puerto Rico, which is not a state. Gov. Hernandes Colon, a lawyer, believes the decision probably does apply, since the ruling was based on constitutional questions; but no quick or agreed-upon machinery exists for testing such questions, particularly decisions which are not constitutional but are based instead on the interpretation of statutes.

Examples abound. Mainland surplus food programs are not compatible with the traditional island diet. Phase 2 wage and price controls did not apply here. Federal housing regulations favor big housing developments not especially adapted to the needs of a low-income people on an overpopulated semitropical island. Puerto Rican radio and television do not much interfere with the mainland airwaves, but they are as subject to Federal control as if they did.

More dramatically, on the controversial Culebra question, Puerto Rico basically must depend on friends and the American sense of fair play, not on its own raw political power. Culebra is the inhabited island just off Puerto Rico which is used by the U.S. Navy as a gunnery range; just before going out of office, former Defense Secretary Laird reversed himself and declared that the Navy would continue to use Culebra for its target practice.

These are not only practical political problems; they are at the root of the so-called "status issue" which has kept Puerto Rico enough interested in either statehood or independence so that commonwealth status has never been accepted here as a final arrangement.

In the sixties, a special commission recommended that the President and the Governor of Puerto Rico jointly appoint a number of mainland-Puerto Rican committees to consider a variety of such issues and make recommendations to Congress — not only for specific solutions to existing problems, but for institutional methods of resolving knotty questions as to which laws and court decisions must apply to Puerto Rico, and which should take notice of the island's traditions, culture and special circumstances.

Governor Hernandes Colon says he wants above all to restimulate Puerto Rico's basic economic growth, and for this purpose he has recalled Teodoro Moscoso, major architect of the boom of the 1940's and 1950's. But the Governor hopes also to cope decisively with the unresolved problems of commonwealth status—a goal, he freely concedes, which is highly dependent upon the cooperation of President Nixon and Congress.

IN THE NATION

WASHINGTON STAR
7 February 1973

NIXON GRANTED REPRIEVE FROM ASSASSIN LABEL

Panama's dictator, Brig. Gen. Omar Torrijos, has passed the word to his nation's obedient newspapers to stop calling President Nixon an "asesino" (assassin) during the United Nations Security Council meeting there next month.

The policy change is only for the duration of the meeting, from March 15 to 21, according to informed sources. Torrijos also has passed the word that the United States is not to be referred to as imperialistic during the session.

No word has reached Washington about any ban on other commonplace epithets for the United States, such as colonialist, capitalistic and hegemonious.

BALTIMORE SUN
6 FEBRUARY 1973

A List of Grievances

When the U.N. Goes to Panama

By RICHARD O'MARA

During the past four years the United Nations and Latin America have not very often captured President Nixon's attention. But next month the U.N., in the form of the Security Council, will transfer itself to Latin America, to Panama to be precise, where many of the long neglected disputes between the upper and lower halves of the hemisphere will be brought into sharper focus.

The Security Council's decision to meet in Panama on March 15 is something of an event. Only three times previousiy has the council met outside New York (once in Addis Ababa, twice in Paris). It also raises several problems, since Panama is embroiled in a bilateral dispute with the United States, one of the council's permanent members.

• • •

The council decided to come to Panama at the invitation of General Omar Torrijos. He's Panama's *numero uno*, and apparently he thinks that having the council right there at the water's edge, so to speak, will give him and his government added leverage in its negotiations with Washington on a new canal treaty.

Panama wants absolute sovereignty over the canal zone which, the Panamanian legislature has declared, is being "occupied arbitrarily." The United States is not yet prepared to give everything away in Panama, and so negotiations on a new canal and new treaty have continued for over half a decade and have led virtually nowhere.

Whether the Security Council's presence in Panama will provide Torrijos the edge he seeks is open to question. There is little doubt it will present him with the perfect stage from which to appeal for world sympathy, to plead as a spokesman for a little country against the depredations of a big one.

Nationalism of the overemphatic sort is rampant these days in Latin America and for that reason Torrijos will find the stage crowded; there are other people and other countries with gripes against the United States who have been looking for a place and opportunity to express them.

Cuba, for instance, will not let the Panama Security Council meeting slip by without trying to raise the question of its own territorial dispute with Washington over the Guantanamo naval base.

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The embarrassment potential of a Panama-Cuba effort to double team the United States is not great, and if that were all the Nixon administration had to expect at the ides of March there would be no compelling reason for concern. But it isn't; there is more to be worried about. Heading the list is a broad bloc of potential antagonists: the coastal states of Latin America, all claiming hundreds and hundreds of square miles of sea as their sovereign territory.

The tuna wars and the seizure of American fishing boats by Ecuador and Peru have been the subject of endless negotiations.

Though public contention on the above issues is probable in Panama, they are not the only points of controversy. Other questions are likely to be raised and discussed at some length; these concern the activities of multi-national corporations in Latin America.

Right now there is no more important issue bearing on the relations between the United States and Latin America than this one. The nationalism that is expressing itself in all the diverse countries of the region is fueling anti-foreign business sentiment from Chile in the south, up the chain of the Andean countries to Venezuela and across the isthmus to Mexico.

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There have been expropriations in some countries and tough new investment codes imposed in others. There have also been charges of political meddling leveled at American firms resident in some Latin American countries, and resentment over a wide-spread belief that the multi-national lending agencies like the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank are being subverted to further the interests of American business.

The Latins' list of outstanding grievances against the Nixon administration is long. In Panama, given the opportunity, they will do their best to read it aloud.

BALTIMORE SUN
15 FEBRUARY 1973

Tupamaro Victory?

The Tupamaros, once the most infamous urban guerrillas in South America, were crushed in a long bloody campaign by the army of Uruguay. The guerrilla war, however, effected a drastic change in that benign country with the crystal beaches. Politically, Uruguay was once a model small state. It had an enduring democratic process re-enforced by egalitarian traditions. Uruguayans tolerated all forms of dissent, and their country was a refuge for those politically persecuted by the dictatorships that surrounded her.

Surely, Uruguayans were overly complacent, economically over-extended, but then so were the dictatorships. During the past decade a thousand [illegible] and [illegible] by the examples of guay and wrote premonitory articles about the tiny welfare state teetering on the brink of economic disaster. Yet there was a certain permanency to the teetering. Uruguayan politics were fast, brutal at times, and there was some corruption. But at the heart of it was the vote. Always the vote counted and elections were the way national policy was determined. If the policy was not always wise, well, no one ever said the majority had to be right all the time.

Today it is no longer certain the vote in Uruguay will count for all it used to. A new element, the military, has moved into politics. Having had their consciousness raised by their test against the guerrillas, their interfering brothers in arms in Argentina and Brazil, the Uruguyan military is now dictating national policy to the elected civilian government. It is not the first time this has happened, but it hasn't happened in such a long time that it represents a fundamental and sad change. President Juan M. Bordaberry has capitulated before the military's demand that he fire his defense secretary, and he has given away in other areas. He is reportedly considering resigning. If he does, the collapse of civilian control in Uruguay will be complete; the country's democracy will be destroyed. The irony of that, of course, is that it was precisely what the Tupamaros were trying to do all along.

THE EVENING STAR and DAILY NEWS
Washington, D. C., Monday, February 5, 1973

Latins Await Clues in Nixon's Policy Pledge

By JEREMIAH O'LEARY
Star-News Staff Writer

President Nixon's promise of "priority attention" for Latin America during his second term was duly delivered last week in Bogota, Columbia, to leading officials of the region but Nixon gave the Latins no real clues on the magnitude of this attention.

Most of the Latin countries are waiting to see who Nixon will name to be his new assistant secretary of State for inter-American affairs replacing Charles A. Meyer before making an assessment of the future U.S. attitude and role in Western Hemisphere affairs.

Even so, Nixon's message, delivered by Meyer at the annual meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council of the Organization of American States, did give the Latins an indication that the end of the Vietnamese war could mean the United States will now rediscover Latin America.

The Latin states generally consider that their priority for the past four years has been only slightly above that of Africa in the U.S. view of foreign affairs.

Consultation Promised

Many Latin diplomats have believed that the end of the U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia would bring about a renaissance of North American interest in an area that has long been neglected. There is a clear indication that U.S. policy will be assessed in the Latin capitals by the political and economic record of whoever Nixon names to replace Meyer.

Some individuals mentioned include Ambassador Joseph Farland, who will be leaving Iran; Assistant Secretary of the Treasury John Hennessy; and Ambassador William Rountree, now assigned to Brazil.

Nixon said in his message: "I have been impressed by the increasing ability of the countries of Latin America to marshal resources for their own development and to contribute to the development of other Latin nations. Though the economic position of the United States has changed, we intend to fulfil our pledge to support your efforts to achieve economic and social development in the hemisphere.

"You can be sure that my government will consult closely with yours as new international monetary and trade negotiations get underway.

Aid to Underdeveloped

Nixon injected a hint on his view of Latin nations that have expropriated American-owned properties without compensation by saying, "The most promising areas for hemispheric cooperation of course, will be those areas where the interests of our nations already converge."

Meyer was more specific when he addressed the ministerial-level meeting. He said a major part of external aid would be applied to the lower end of the economic spectrum. And he urged increased assistance by the few developed Latin nations for all the underdeveloped ones, seemingly a clear message to Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela and Argentina to step up their level to help to less developed neighbor states.

Nixon's general policy toward Latin America has been to keep a low profile and to avoid the traditional paternalistic role of the United States in Latin affairs. But he has said so little about the region that some Latins have considered Nixon had no policy at all. To that extent, even the promise of "priority attention" seems like a giant step even when it is not precisely defined.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
6 February 1973

Latin America watches Nixon with concern

By James Nelson Goodsell
Latin America correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

Latin America views President Nixon's second term with a good deal of apprehension and concern.

Despite a promise by President Nixon last week to give "priority attention" to United States-Latin American relations, hemisphere circles here remain skeptical of the Nixon administration's interest in the area.

There are a number of specific problems awaiting solution — relating to Panama, Chile, Cuba, Peru, and other countries. But the major Latin American concern boils down to a feeling that Washington simply does not care about its neighbors to the south.

Latin American diplomats here point to the sharply curtailed United States aid now flowing to Latin America and to trade barriers which, in their view, adversely affect the economies of their countries.

"Much was made of President Nixon's promise to do something about these problems," a leading hemisphere diplomat with long experience here said in a recent interview, "but after the fanfare was over a couple of years ago, we were in the same situation as before — little more than client states unable to sell our raw materials at good prices, but forced to purchase manufactured goods at high prices."

Trade barriers steep

Moreover, a common complaint heard here in Latin American circles has to do with the sale of Latin American products on the United States market. "We simply cannot sell much of our light manufactures in the United States because the trade barriers imposed by the United States Government do not permit us to do so," a Latin American ambassador commented.

State Department sources, as well as other administration spokesmen, admit that trade barriers are still serious obstacles to be overcome. But they tend to blame Congress for its refusal to eliminate some of these barriers.

"This may be true," a Latin American diplomat here said, "but I do not see the Nixon administration leading a campaign to get Congress to do something about these barriers. It merely offers promises of improvement."

The Nixon statement last week promising new attention to Latin America was delivered in Bogota, the Colombian capital, by Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Charles Appleton Meyer, who read a letter from the President to Latin Americans attending the Inter-American Economic and Social Council meeting.

"We intend to fulfill our pledge to support your efforts to achieve economic and social development in the hemisphere," the President wrote.

For his part, Mr. Meyer claimed that "the total flow of United States funds through all channels, bilateral and multilateral, is today as high as it has ever been, a fact sometimes lost sight of." The United States official said that more and more U.S. aid is going into international and hemispheric agencies — and not directly to the individual countries — but that Latin America is today receiving as much total aid as ever.

To Latin Americans in Washington, such a claim is seen as untrue and an effort to "cover up the reality of the situation," as one Latin American diplomat termed it.

Some critical problems

In addition to the disagreement over aid and trade, a number of individual problems exist which are simultaneously coming to a critical stage:

— Panama is pressing with renewed vigor its claim to control of the Panama Canal and the zone surrounding it, an issue which will undoubtedly be a major topic at the March meeting of the United Security Council which will meet in Panama City.

— Peru and Ecuador are renewing their claims to 200-mile ocean territoriality, seizing and fining United States fishing boats within these waters and pressing other Latin American nations to do the same.

— Cuban-United States negotiations over a possible treaty or agreement on skyjacking and other forms of piracy have run into difficulties, according to sources here, and there is some doubt whether Washington is going to be able to get an arrangement on the issue from the government of Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro.

The snag apparently revolves around Cuba's demand that the agreement cover those using aircraft and ocean transport to flee Cuba as well as those who hijack aircraft to go to Cuba.

— There is also the major issue of the steady deterioration in United States-Chilean relations following the expropriation of United States-owned copper mines by the Chilean Government in 1971. Washington and Santiago have begun low-level talks on their differences, but they are not far advanced, and with each passing month, the once-cordial ties between the two governments continue to disintegrate.

NEW YORK TIMES
15 February 1973

Pact With Cuba

The anti-hijacking agreement about to be concluded by the United States and Cuba represents a significant breakthrough in the fight against terrorism in the skies. With some additional goodwill on both sides it could also become a breakthrough for the gradual normalization of relations between the two countries and the lifting by the Organization of American States of an increasingly ineffective quarantine of Cuba.

Details of the agreement have been withheld, but it is known to require the prosecution or extradition of anyone who seizes a boat or aircraft by force in either country to escape to the other. The welcome announcement yesterday of a similar agreement between Cuba and Canada will extend substantially the effectiveness of curbs on hijacking in the Western Hemisphere.

It is unfortunate that the language of the agreement is "conveniently ambiguous," as an official put it, about treatment of legitimate political refugees who might steal a small boat for an escape that would endanger only themselves; but Washington obviously hopes Cuba will treat such ventures as "minor violations," which are exempt from the terms of the pact.

If this agreement is faithfully observed its significance for the international hijacking problem is highlighted by a single statistic: there have been 101 attempts to divert aircraft from the United States to Cuba since the hijacking craze began a few years ago. It is much less clear what significance the pact will have for improving relations between Washington and Havana and for returning Cuba to the Inter-American System.

The Administration publicly maintains the hard line taken by President Nixon last November: "no change, no change whatever, in our policy toward Cuba unless and until—and I do not anticipate this will happen—Castro changes his policy toward Latin America and the United States." This line could, however, be a cover for quiet exploration of the possibilities for additional steps toward improved relations.

The anti-hijacking pact reflects clear recognition by both Governments of the need for joint action to solve a mutual problem. Such hardboiled pragmatism was used by Mr. Nixon to defend his unprecedented approaches to China and the Soviet Union last year. Why should comparable pragmatism be absent from Washington's stance toward a tiny country just off the Florida coast that poses no threat to the United States?

NEW YORK TIMES
11 February 1973

Dominican Republic

Overkill In Hunt For Rebels

MEXICO CITY—The scenario was bizarre. Last Monday, President Joaquin Balaguer of the Dominican Republic announced that 10 armed guerrillas had landed on the country's southwest coast. For the next few days, radios and newspapers reported that hundreds — perhaps as many as 2,000 — Dominican soldiers were chasing the 10 guerrillas through the woods. Tanks and armored cars moved into Santo Domingo, the capital, and took up positions near the university and a key bridge. Police occupied the home of former President Juan Bosch, and the Government claimed that Mr. Bosch was at least partly responsible for the invasion.

Mr. Bosch, a man who recently told a reporter that he was not afraid of anything, fled into hiding to avoid arrest but issued a statement saying he didn't know a thing about the rebels. President Balaguer then made a nationwide address, telling Dominicans that the 10 guerrillas were a diversionary measure and that somebody, somewhere, might be planning a revolution.

The affair would be reminiscent of comic opera if it were not for the tragedy that so frequently accompanies such maneuvers in the Dominican Republic.

Last April, reacting to reports that there was a Cuban-trained Communist lurking somewhere in the Autonomous University, police invaded the campus, failed to find a single leftist but managed to shoot in the head a coed, who died two weeks later.

Four months earlier, 2,500 troops converged on a suburban Santo Domingo home to do battle with four suspected leftists who had allegedly taken part in a bank robbery. The troops were supported by a helicopter, numerous mortars, two tanks and a 105-millimeter cannon. The cannon and the guns on the tanks were not used — somebody forgot to bring the firing pins — but enough firepower was left to blow the suspected bandits to bits, after they had killed eight of the attacking policemen.

Despite the violence, President Balaguer is secure in office. He has started an ambitious land-reform program which relocated 5,500 peasants last year and seeks to relocate 10,000 this year. The sugar crop looks good and there is increasing interest in the tourist business.

But traditions of violence going back to the brutal reign of the dictator Rafael Trujillo are slow to die. In 1970-71 "la Banda," a group of organized thugs who went about assaulting and murdering political "undesirables," was tolerated by President Balaguer. And in defending his actions last week against the 10 alleged invaders — who he said had been "trained in Cuba and other Communist countries" — Mr. Balaguer said the measures were necessary "to continue peace and tranquility in our country."

—RICHARD SEVERO

Mr. Severo, The Times correspondent in Mexico City, is a frequent visitor to the Dominican Republic.

NEW YORK TIMES
9 February 1973

Dominican 'Invasion'

Unless President Balaguer's Government is holding back significant information, there is no reason to get too excited about the "invasion" of the Dominican Republic by a small band of guerrillas said to have come from Cuba. What must be taken seriously, however, is the possibility that the military will use the incident as a pretext for trying to destroy former President Juan Bosch and his Dominican Revolutionary Party (P.R.D.).

For all his fiery oratory and foggy advocacy of a "dictatorship with popular support," Dr. Bosch has never shown a disposition to violence in a country addicted to violence. Whatever use of his name the guerrillas may have made in documents supposedly left in their invasion boat, there is no reason to doubt his denial—issued from hiding—of any knowledge of the landing.

Why then was Dr. Balaguer so hasty about ordering Dr. Bosch's arrest? His hand may have been forced by the military, even as he was evidently persuaded to ignore for months in 1971 the wholesale murder of leaders of Dr. Bosch's party and other leftist organizations by a right-wing terrorist group tolerated, if not actively encouraged, by the military.

Dr. Balaguer finally halted the 1971 killings, broke up the terrorist group and replaced the police chief who allegedly organized it. He should now take comparable steps to insure protection for Dr. Bosch and his colleagues unless solid evidence of their complicity in the "invasion" can be produced. Despite its divisions, the P.R.D. remains the most formidable Dominican opposition party; but it poses no serious threat to Dr. Balaguer's re-election if he decides to run for a third term next year.

Dr. Balaguer can best combat the P.R.D. and defeat any attempts to emulate Fidel Castro's invasion of Cuba by allowing greater freedom for all legal opposition groups while persisting in the country's economic development, particularly the land reform program he announced nearly a year ago.