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CONFIDENTIAL

Governmental Affairs

NEW YORK TIMES
21 JUNE 1973

WHITE HOUSE DATA AND DEAN'S DIFFER ABOUT WATERGATE

Ex-Aide Said to Have Denied
Nixon Information About
Cover-Up Until March 21

PANEL GETS 2 VERSIONS

Dean Insists Before Senate
Inquiry President Knew
About the Plot Earlier

By DAVID E. ROSENBAUM
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 20—A White House account of President Nixon's conversations this year with John W. Dean 3d charges that Mr. Dean, despite constant pressure from the President, withheld from Mr. Nixon all information about White House involvement in the Watergate burglary and cover-up until March 21.

On the other hand, a summary prepared by lawyers on the Senate Watergate committee of their interrogation of Mr. Dean last Saturday contains Mr. Dean's assertion that Mr. Nixon knew earlier about the cover-up plot.

Much of the evidence against the President that Mr. Dean gave the committee staff is hearsay, according to the summary. But he told of some direct conversations with the President in which aspects of the cover-up had been discussed.

U. S.-Soviet Summity

With the Senate committee in recess for a week, the capital had planned to devote its full attention to the United States and Soviet summity.

But details of Mr. Dean's long interview last week have been filtering into print for several days, amid suggestions that the White House and the Senate investigators, each recognizing the importance of Mr. Dean's testimony in public, next week, were trying to shape the public's attitude toward his eventual appearance.

Much of what was contained, in both the White House document and the abbreviated ac-

count of Mr. Dean's testimony, had come to light previously. But there were some new or more detailed allegations by Mr. Dean, a central figure in the Watergate case. They included the following:

¶ That the President, in a conversation with Mr. Dean last September, directed an effort to block a Watergate investigation by a House committee and urged Mr. Dean to prepare to "take care of" reporters unfriendly to the White House.

¶ That Charles W. Colson, a former White House special counsel, and John D. Ehrlichman, the former domestic adviser to the President, had sought from Mr. Nixon permission to promise executive clemency to E. Howard Hunt Jr., one of the Watergate conspirators. Mr. Dean said that he had "heard this" from Mr. Colson and later this spring had a "discussion with the President" about the clemency offer.

¶ That Mr. Dean had been instructed by Mr. Ehrlichman and H. R. Haldeman, the former White House chief of staff, to enlist the aid of Lieut. Gen. Vernon A. Walters, the deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency, in covering up the Watergate conspiracy. Mr. Dean's account was that the White House aides said that General Walters "owed his allegiance to the White House," but that the C.I.A. official had declined to help.

¶ That Mr. Nixon had told Mr. Dean that the late director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, J. Edgar Hoover, had advised the President that he "had been bugged" in the 1968 campaign, and that Mr. Nixon believed the White House should use the information to its advantage at some point.

List of Dates Released

The White House released several days ago a list of the dates on which Mr. Dean had met with Mr. Nixon. But not until the summary sent to the Senate committee became available today had there been any indication of the substance of the discussions.

Papers Made Available

The White House account was submitted to the Senate committee this week. It and the summary of the investigators' interview with Mr. Dean, the former White House counsel, were made available to The New York Times by persons with access to committee documents.

The White House account was five pages long and, according to Senate sources, was prepared by J. Fred Buzhardt Jr., special counsel to the President. It contains the White House's version of the sub-

stance of 18 meetings this year between the President and Mr. Dean.

Mr. Dean and White House spokesman have agreed that there were more than 35 discussions between President Nixon and his former counsel between late January and April of this year, some face-to-face, and others by telephone.

Met Almost Daily

From March 1 until March 23, according to the account, the President and Mr. Dean met about the Watergate affair almost daily.

In answer to questions from the President, Mr. Dean said time and again at the early meetings that there was no White House involvement in the burglary or the cover-up, the account states. But it says that Mr. Nixon was told by Mr. Dean on March 13 that Gordon C. Strachan, then the top assistant to H. R. Haldeman, White House chief of staff, "could be involved."

It was not until March 21, the account states, that Mr. Dean "gave the President his theory of what happened."

He told the President "that Magruder probably knew, that Mitchell possibly knew, that Strachan probably knew, that Haldeman had possibly seen the fruits of the wiretaps through Strachan, that Ehrlichman was vulnerable because of his approval of Kalmbach's fund-raising efforts, the document states.

Members Got Summary

The Senate committee summary of Mr. Dean's private testimony — reducing his 5½ hours of testimony last Saturday to seven sparse and tantalizingly vague pages of allegations — was prepared by a junior staff member and distributed to the seven committee members on Monday by Samuel Dashi, the chief counsel.

The summary presented a vivid picture of widespread attempts within the upper reaches of the White House and the Committee for the Re-election of the President to cover up the magnitude of the Watergate case.

Mr. Dean accused H. R. Haldeman, the former White House chief of staff, of having ordered the destruction of information obtained from the Watergate wiretap, of having joined in planning efforts to obtain White House influence over the Republican members of the Senate investigating committee and of attempting to persuade John N. Mitchell, the former campaign director and Attorney General, to "take the heat" off other officials by assuming the blame for the Watergate break-in.

Mr. Dean, according to the summary, alleged that John D. Ehrlichman, the former Presidential adviser on domestic matters, had put pressure on Mr. Dean to "lean on" Lieut. Gen. Vernon A. Walters, the deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency, to involve the

agency in a cover-up.

According to the summary, General Walters "said it would be a bad idea," but Mr. Ehrlichman was "dissatisfied" when Mr. Dean reported the intelligence official's reluctance to help.

Linked to Meeting

Furthermore, Mr. Dean said that Mr. Ehrlichman had instructed him to throw wire-tapping equipment "in [the] river" after the material had been discovered in the White House safe of E. Hoard Hunt Jr., one of the Watergate conspirators.

Mr. Dean was said to have linked Mr. Ehrlichman to a meeting on Feb. 10 this year at which the plans to try to undermine the Senate investigations were discussed.

Mr. Dean, according to the summary, is prepared to testify to the full Senate committee when he appears before it next week that Mr. Mitchell admitted approving the plans to bug the Democratic headquarters but said that he believed at the time that more care would be taken to assure that the participants could not be traced to the President's campaign committee.

The summary contains the most serious allegations to date that Charles W. Colson, the former special counsel to the President, was involved in the Watergate conspiracy. According to Mr. Dean's account, Mr. Colson had pressed for approval of the bugging plan drafted by G. Gordon Liddy, one of the Watergate conspirators.

In addition, Mr. Dean was said to have told the Senate investigators that Mr. Colson was deeply involved in negotiations at the White House to arrange executive clemency for Hunt and to provide \$122,000 demanded by Hunt in return for silence about Watergate.

Mr. Colson has insisted that he was not involved either in the conspiracy or the attempted cover-up. Mr. Dean was said to have told the committee that he had tape recordings of a conversation in which Mr. Colson and Hunt discussed the demand for hush money.

The summary of Mr. Dean's testimony also related alleged involvement by Robert C. Mardian—the former Assistant Attorney General and political counselor to the campaign committee—in the cover-up. Mr. Dean contended that Mr. Mardian had gone to Mr. Dean's White House office, along with lawyers for the re-election committee, to read confidential F.B.I. summaries of interrogations of White House and campaign officials.

Criticism of Gray Cited

Mr. Dean also said, according to the summary, that Mr. Mardian had voiced criticism of the former acting F.B.I. director, L. Patrick Gray 3d, for "pushing too hard" with the Watergate investigation last year. Mr. Dean attributed to Mr. Mardian the suggestion that the White House try to get the Central Intelligence Agency to cooperate in a cover-up.

The Dean summary made other allegations, including the following:

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
22 June 1973

Watergate poser: trial by publicity

Versions in conflict over Nixon's role

By Richard L. Strout
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

Two widely conflicting and semi-official versions of President Nixon's relations to the Watergate cover-up now have emerged.

They are condensations by the staff of Sen. Sam J. Ervin's committee of pre-hearing evidence, the first from the White House and prepared by J. Fred Buzhardt Jr., special counsel of Mr. Nixon, and the second by John W. Dean III, former presidential counsel, based on sworn testimony which he gave the committee in executive session.

The White House version presents Mr. Nixon as repeatedly asking Mr. Dean, since late February, about Watergate and repeatedly being told, until March 21, that the White House was not involved.

The second, from Mr. Dean, postulates that several of the top staff at the White House knew of the progress of the unsuccessful cover-up. It also offers new, behind-the-scenes, details like blocking a proposed House committee inquiry, and a reported charge by J. Edgar Hoover, late FBI head, that Democrats bugged Republicans in 1968.

Much of the Dean testimony, summarized by the Ervin staff, rests on hearsay.

In turn, White House spokesmen say they do not vouch for the accuracy of the condensation of their versions of an analysis of Nixon-Dean talks, prepared by the Ervin committee.

The text of the two Ervin committee summaries was made available to the press in piecemeal form while the committee is in recess during the visit of Soviet Secretary-General Leonid I. Brezhnev.

Like it or not, Washington agrees that the trial-by-publicity is going on, despite absence of formal hearings, and that the issue is historically unique, whether President Nixon did, or did not, have knowledge of the illegal Washington cover-up attempt.

Dean called 'turncoat'

Without waiting for formal confrontation, partisans are taking sides: Senate Minority Leader Hugh Scott (R) of Pennsylvania, for example,

branding ousted White House counsel Dean as a "turncoat" and "embezzler."

Mr. Dean, through his lawyer, has refused to give further preliminary executive-session testimony until the public hearings.

In a separate development, the staff of Archibald Cox, special prosecutor in the Watergate case, reportedly is considering calling a new grand jury. This would hear allegations that the Nixon election organization used illegal pressure to force corporations with issues pending before the government, to contribute to campaign funds. Funds ultimately reached more than \$50 millions.

Primary attention centers here on the contrast between the summary of the Dean testimony, and the analysis of the Nixon-Dean talks coming from the White House.

Approach differs

These clash chronologically at a few points. But the big difference is the approach:

• Throughout the Dean version is the basic assumption that knowledge of the cover-up attempt was widespread in the White House.

• Throughout the White House analysis is the assumption that Mr. Dean was keeping the truth from President Nixon, and that the latter was innocent of the cover-up.

The two accounts do not really meet because they are interpretations of different matters; but they proceed on postulates which get to the heart of the issue on which Mr. Nixon's credibility may ultimately rest.

The White House analysis is based on the log kept on meetings and telephone conversations between Mr. Nixon and his then counsel. There was one meeting on Sept. 15 last year, and 37 meetings or phone calls since late February.

The White House repeatedly presents Mr. Nixon as asking Mr. Dean about Watergate, and the latter assuring the President that the White House wasn't involved.

Point withdrawn

How far afield these two were is indicated in a matter not discussed in the new chronology: Mr. Nixon told the nation, for example, that Mr. Dean had submitted a written report clearing the White House on Watergate. Mr. Dean denied submitting such a report, and the White House withdrew the point.

In the White House version of affairs (as condensed by the Ervin staff) there are repeated entries "the President asked Dean point-blank" (about Watergate) and was told no White House involvement; the President called Dean that night (March 20) and "Dean said 'There was not a scintilla of evidence' " of White House complicity.

¶That Lawrence F. O'Brien, then the Democratic party chairman, had been the subject of investigation by the White House as early as 1970.

¶That John J. Caulfield, a former White House and Treasury Department official who has told the Senate committee he helped to set up a private intelligence-gathering unit for the White House, had directed a "survey" in early 1972 of the Presidential primary campaign of Representative Paul N. McCloskey Jr., a California Republican who unsuccessfully challenged Mr. Nixon in New Hampshire.

¶That Richard A. Moore, a special counsel to the President, had been involved in unsuccessful efforts in February to persuade Mr. Mitchell to raise money for the defendants in the Watergate trial. The summary also said that Mr. Moore had been permitted to read the summaries of F.B.I. interviews in the Watergate case.

Details of Mr. Dean's private conversations with the Senate committee staff have been leaking into print since Monday, when the committee agreed to postpone its public hearings for one week.

NEW YORK TIMES
27 JUNE 1973

Data Burned at Dump May Have Been Hunt's

WASHINGTON, June 26 (UPI)—Eight cartons of documents from the office of E. Howard Hunt Jr. may have been locked in the trunk of a junked car for six months and then burned at a city dump, a Watergate witness told United Press International today.

Roy H. Sheppard, who operates a Washington-based delivery service, said that a woman he now believed was Hunt's wife, Dorothy, got in touch with him shortly after the Watergate break-in.

He said that the woman paid him "\$500 in \$100 bills to keep the cartons in transit."

He locked them in the trunk of a junked 1963 Plymouth he kept at his home in nearby Alexandria, Va., Mr. Sheppard said. He did not open the cartons until November, 1972.

"When no one asked about them," he said, he took them to the incinerator, "slit them open with my knife and dumped them into the incinerator chute."

Tuesday, June 26, 1973

THE WASHINGTON POST

Dean Recounts White House

By David S. Broder
Washington Post Staff Writer

In his Senate testimony yesterday, former presidential counsel John W. Dean III drew a picture of a pre-election White House neurotically concerned with the presence of anti-Nixon demonstrators and morbidly fascinated with gossip and intelligence about the Democratic opposition.

Others who worked there and in the Nixon campaign said in interviews yesterday that Dean's description matched their own recollections.

But Patrick J. Buchanan, then and now a consultant to the President, said there had been "a real diminution of concern" by the time of which Dean was speaking, compared to the atmosphere in 1969 and early 1970.

"I don't think there was paranoia," Buchanan said.

Dean did not use the word "paranoia" in his testimony, but he told the Senate Watergate investigators that he found "a climate of excessive concern over the political impact of demonstrators, excessive concern over leaks, an insatiable appetite for political intelligence, all coupled with a do-it-yourself White House staff, regardless of the law."

Dean called the break-in at Democratic headquarters an "inevitable outgrowth" of this climate, and said it was also responsible for such actions as:

- A threat by former presidential aide Dwight Chapin "to get some 'thugs' to remove" a single demonstrator the President had spotted in Lafayette Park.

- An order by the President, using "some rather blunt synonyms," for the Secret Service to remove a group of demonstrators in Akron, and a request from the President, just last March, for a speech to be drafted showing that "his opponents had employed demonstrators against him in his re-election campaign."

- A call from Richard G. Kleindienst, then deputy attorney general, instructing Dean to carry from the FBI to the White House "some very important information" of a "rather sensitive nature . . . regarding the foreign travels of Mary Jo Kopechne," the young woman killed in an auto accident involving Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.).

- The dispatch from the White House to Chappaquiddick Island, site of that accident, of special investigator

Anthony Ulasewicz, who, Dean said John Caulfield told him, was on the scene "within six hours of the accident" and posed as a reporter to dig out information on the case.

- A proposal from presidential aide H.R. (Bob) Haldeman, rejected as too dangerous, that Kennedy be kept under surveillance 24 hours a day.

- A special investigation of Kennedy's activities during a 24-hour stopover in Hawaii on a 1971 Far Eastern trip.

- And the delivery, during the spring of 1972, by "a top man at the Secret Service" of information regarding Democratic presidential contender George McGovern, which then White House aide Charles Colson "was very interested" in and "had . . . published."

White House press secretary Ronald Ziegler declined to comment on Dean's testimony and most others mentioned by Dean were unavailable to reporters.

Jack Warner, a spokesman for the Secret Service, said it had begun an internal investigation of the charges that Secret Service agents protecting McGovern were reporting back to the White House, at the time those charges first appeared, last November, in *The New York Times*.

Neither then or later, he said, "have we found anything to bear out these allegations. Our investigation is continuing."

Colson, in a separate interview, acknowledged receiving the report from Dean but said he had not been able to get it published, "because no one could ever check it out." He said the report concerned "a fund-raising affair McGovern attended in Philadelphia, where the fellow in charge had a questionable background."

Colson said Dean "just walked in with it, and never said where it came from. It's very characteristic of what Dean did throughout his testimony yesterday—laid off his own sins on others, and did it cleverly."

Colson said he had been interviewed about the case by the Secret Service and had told them the same thing. Asked if he now believed the report came from the Secret Service, Colson said, "Well, Dean said it was from the Secret Service, and they indicated it, frankly, when they came to see me."

Kennedy's press secretary, Richard Drayne, said the senator was unaware of any White House surveillance, or of the activities of Ulasewicz at Chappaquiddick. Drayne said Kennedy told him yesterday he knew nothing of any foreign travels by Miss Kopechne nor of any reason why his visit to Hawaii should have been of White House interest.

The report to the White House on Kennedy's visit to Honolulu on Aug. 17, 1971, submitted by Dean to the Senate committee, is very bland.

It said Kennedy held an airport press conference, left with two friends and made no public appearances except for a tennis game.

"Discreet inquiry determined that Kennedy used the estate (where he was staying) solely for sleeping purposes, took only his breakfast meal at that location and quietly visited friends at other locations on the island . . . An extensive survey of hotels, discreet cocktail lounges and other hideaways was conducted with a view towards determining a covert EMK (Kennedy) visit. The results were negative," the report said.

In his statement yesterday, Dean said that "it was not until I joined the White House staff in July of 1970 that I fully realized the strong feelings that the President and his staff had toward antiwar demonstrators—and demonstrators in general."

He said the White House continually sought information that would discredit the demonstration leaders, show that they were backed "by some foreign enemy" or had ties to some "major political figures, specifically members of the U.S. Senate, who opposed the President's war policies."

Dean said that in the late winter of 1971 "the President happened to look out the windows of the residence of the White House and saw a lone man with a large 10-foot sign stretched out in front of Lafayette Park."

He said Larry Higby, a Haldeman aide, "called me to his office to tell me of the President's displeasure . . . and told me that Mr. Haldeman said the sign had to come down."

Leaving Higby's office, he met Chapin, "who said that he was going to get some 'thugs' to remove that man," Dean said. He said he dissuaded him and,

Anxieties

with help from the Secret Service and the Park police, persuaded the man to move to the back side of the park, "out of sight from the White House."

Haldeman, he said, "was delighted."

Only three months ago, he said, Mr. Nixon himself told him that "as a part of the planned counter-offensive for dealing with the Senate Watergate investigation, the President wanted to show that his opponents had employed demonstrators against him during his re-election campaign."

The problem, said Dean, was that "we never found a scintilla of viable evidence indicating that these demonstrators were part of a master plan . . . funded by the Democratic political funds, nor that they had any direct connection with the McGovern campaign." For that reason, he said, William Baroody was never able to write the speech the President wanted on the subject.

"This was explained to Mr. Haldeman," Dean said, "but the President believed that the opposite was true."

Dean's view of a White House neurotically preoccupied with the threat of demonstrators was contradicted by Buchanan, who had been a close adviser to Mr. Nixon for the past seven years.

"There was a great deal more apprehension here in 1969 and at the time of Cambodia and Kent State," he said, "than in any subsequent period. By the time we were moving into the campaign—and certainly after the May Day demonstrations in 1971—there was a real diminution of concern. For one thing, every time a demonstration occurred, it was politically helpful."

Dean's statement to the committee yesterday differed in tone from his description of the same situation in a report he composed last March, before his forced resignation from the White House. That March statement was also entered in evidence yesterday.

In both statements, Dean referred to White House dissatisfaction with intelligence reports on the demonstrators. In March he said that "when Haldeman would read the reports regarding demonstrations he would — and rightly so — express continual dissatisfaction."

Dean's evidence would appear that the dem-

NEW YORK TIMES

26 JUNE 1973

Ex-Counsel Also Names White House Assistants

RECALLS WARNING

Declares He Told the President Episode Was 'a Cancer'

By JAMES M. NAUGHTON

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 25 —

John W. Dean 3d, asserting that President Nixon had failed to heed a warning that the Watergate case was "a cancer growing on the Presidency," testified today that the President had taken part in the Watergate cover-up for as long as eight months.

Mr. Dean, the dismissed White House legal counsel, told the Senate's investigating committee that he still clung to a belief that Mr. Nixon "did not realize or appreciate at any time the implications of his involvement."

Nonetheless, in a day-long, matter-of-fact recitation of Mr. Dean's own involvement in the Watergate cover-up and in 47 documents that he submitted to the Senate committee, he described a widespread effort to mask the extent of the conspiracy that he said spread from the White House staff, the Committee for the Re-election of the President, the Department of Justice and, ultimately, to the oval office of the White House.

245-Page Account

His head bowed as he read calmly from a 245-page prepared account, Mr. Dean publicly detailed for the first time the following allegations of Mr. Nixon's own involvement:

¶The President complimented him last September for having helped to assure that the Government's investigation of the Watergate case "had stopped with [G. Gordon] Liddy," one of the convicted Watergate conspirators.

¶In February, the President asked him to report directly to Mr. Nixon on what he learned of the continuing investigations because H. R. Haldeman and John D. Ehrlichman, the two senior domestic aides to the President, "were principals in the matter," and also meeting with Mr. Dean was taking up too much of their time.

¶The President discussed with him on March 13 the demands by the Watergate conspirators for large sums of money to maintain their silence and that when Mr. Dean told him it could cost more than \$1-million, Mr. Nixon "told me that was no problem."

¶The President had told him of discussions early this year with Mr. Ehrlichman and Charles W. Colson, a former special counsel to the President, about a promise to grant executive clemency to E. Howard Hunt Jr., another of the Watergate defendants.

¶The President directed that the Administration try to curtail the Senate investigation and block an attempted inquiry into Watergate by the House Banking and Currency Committee last September. The President also ordered aides to make sure that L. Patrick Gray 3d, the former acting director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, would be "pulled up short" in his testimony last spring to the Senate Judiciary Committee.

¶At one point, in a meeting on March 21, the President discussed with his aides the possibility that the cover-up might be kept secret if John N. Mitchell, the former Attorney General and director of Mr. Nixon's re-election campaign, could be persuaded to assume publicly responsibility for the burglary and wiretapping of the Democratic headquarters at Watergate a year ago.

¶After he (Dean) had resolved to try to "end the mess without mortally wounding the President" by giving information to Government prosecutors, the President apparently tape recorded an April 15 meeting with him and asked a number of "leading questions" in an evident effort to create a record that would "protect himself."

¶The President tried to get him, in a "tense conversation" on April 16, to sign two letters of resignation that tended to incriminate Mr. Dean, but he "looked the President squarely in the eyes and told him I would not sign the letters" or become a "White House scapegoat."

On Stand 2 More Days

Mr. Dean's recital to the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities consumed the entire hearing today. Members of the committee will interrogate him tomorrow and Wednesday and they plan to call Mr. Mitchell as the next witness on Thursday.

Mr. Dean did not provide any firsthand information to link the President to prior knowl-

edge of the Watergate burglary and the arrests of five men inside the Democratic National Committee offices. But he told, in a fourth-hand account, of having been advised in February that Mr. Haldeman had "cleared" with the President Liddy's \$250,000 master plan to gather information on the Democratic opposition in the 1972 campaign.

Furthermore, he said he was told last Nov. 15 by Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman that Mr. Nixon had decided he must obtain the resignation of Dwight L. Chapin, the former White House appointments secretary, because of Mr. Chapin's involvement with Donald H. Segretti, the alleged director of a broad campaign of sabotage of Democratic Presidential candidacies.

Reports Burglary Order

The former White House counsel said that another aide to Mr. Nixon, Egil Krogh Jr., had told him on March 29 that the authority for a September, 1971, burglary of the office of a psychiatrist treating Dr. Daniel Ellsberg had come "right out of the oval office."

Mr. Dean's account was the first before the Senate committee to accuse Mr. Nixon categorically of involvement in the cover-up. He sat alone at the witness table, his wife, Maureen, and his lawyers seated one row behind him, to dramatize what he had said last week was the loneliness of his plight in making accusations about the President.

He acknowledged to the committee—before which he appeared only after obtaining a grant of partial immunity from prosecution—that he had been involved himself in "obstructing justice," arranging for "perjured testimony" and in making personal use of \$4,850 of campaign funds.

As he began his appearance before the Senators, Mr. Dean said that he hoped that when all the facts were known "the President is forgiven." He apologized for having to describe illegal acts of "friends" and of individuals he said he admired, but he went on to recount, calmly, without passion and in narrative form, the involvement of several score Government and campaign officials in the Watergate case.

According to Mr. Dean's testimony, the effort of the Nixon Administration to limit the investigation of the Watergate break-in to those immediately arrested and to cover up any involvement of White House officials in surveillance operations against the Democratic National Committee and Democratic Presidential candidates began within two days of the June 17 break-in.

Furthermore, as Mr. Dean described a succession of meetings, the cover-up involved all those whose names have so far figured in the accounts that have dribbled out of testimony before the grand jury and in interviews with Federal prosecutors, staff lawyers of the Senate select committee and prior testimony before that

onstrations were well-orchestrated and well-financed," he wrote then, "no one could ever find hard information as to who was behind it and what motivation might exist, other than the obvious antiwar theme."

Back in March, he suggested two reasons why the President might be rightly concerned with the demonstration problem: "First," he said, "it made the atmosphere of public opinion much more difficult for the President to negotiate an honorable peace in Vietnam, and, secondly, when the government dealt firmly with the demonstrators, we would be charged with oppressive tactics even though the demonstrators were seeking to tie the government into knots."

Interviews with three former White House and campaign aides, on the other hand, brought support for the view of a White House preoccupation with security and political espionage, which Dean described yesterday.

One former campaign aide said Dean's testimony yesterday "rang very true." We all learned that what pleased them most was a tidbit they could pass on to Haldeman. That would get you rewards. Every one of us felt the need to supply that kind of information."

He recalled that as far back as Mr. Nixon's 1962 campaign for Governor of California, Haldeman, who was then the campaign manager and others "were so desperately afraid of letting Nixon see any hostile demonstrators that we had to organize groups of kids to lock arms and keep them away."

A second man, a former White House official, said, "It all goes back to his (Mr. Nixon's) problem with having the unexpected happen. It's part and parcel of that. His staff learns to go to any length to protect him from something for which he is not prepared."

A third man, now also retired from the White House, said "I never got the feeling that Nixon himself or the top staff guys—the ones at the 7:30 meeting — were that upset with the demonstrators."

"But I always had the feeling that the reaction accelerated as it went down the chain of command, and frequently by the time it hit the third or fourth guy, it was completely out of control. There was a lot of it with the guys who worked for Haldeman, Colson, Chapin and the deep-down underlings of (John) Ehrlichman — Boy Scout stuff."

committee.

In his testimony today, Mr. Dean implicated in the cover-up Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Ehrlichman, Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Stans, Mr. Colson; Mr. Gray, Mr. Mardian, Mr. Petersen, Mr. Kalmbach and a host of other officials at the White House and the Committee for the Re-election of the President.

Dean's Story

This, in brief, is the story Mr. Dean told today of the mounting efforts, at times approaching the frenetic, to prevent the investigation of the Watergate episode from engulfing the White House:

Landing in San Francisco on June 18, 1972, from Manila, Mr. Dean said, he learned of the break-in in a call from Fred Fielding, his assistant, and immediately departed for Washington.

He said that on Monday, the 19th, he had a succession of meetings and telephone conversations with Jack Caulfield, then with the Treasury; Jeb Stuart Magruder deputy director of the reelection committee, who volunteered that the whole thing was "all Liddy's fault;" Mr. Ehrlichman, who told him to find out what he could; Mr. Strachan and Mr. Colson, the latter assuring him that he had "no involvement in the matter whatsoever" but expressing concern about "the contents" in the safe of E. Howard Hunt Jr.; G. Gordon Liddy, who said Mr. Magruder "had pushed him into doing it" and apologized for his men being caught, and Attorney General Kleindienst, who said the F.B.I. and the District of Columbia police were investigating.

The most important developments on that day, he related, were (1) that Mr. Strachan said to Mr. Dean that Mr. Haldeman had instructed him to winnow the Haldeman files of "damaging materials" such as "Wirefax information from the DNX" and destroy them, and (2) that Mr. Ehrlichman ordered Mr. Dean to "call Liddy to have him tell Hunt to get out of the country," and also to remove the contents of Hunt's safe.

At Mitchell's Place

On the evening of the 19th or 20th, Mr. Dean said, he went to Mr. Mitchell's apartment. Mr. Mardian and Mr. Magruder were there, and Mr. Dean recalled only that there was a discussion of "how to handle the matter from a public relations standpoint."

At a meeting with Mr. Kleindienst—Mr. Dean could not remember whether it was the 19th or the 20th—he said, "I told him that I did not know if the President was involved, but I was concerned" because of the investigation led to the White House "the chances of re-electing the President would be severely damaged."

At this point, Mr. Dean related, Mr. Kleindienst sent for Mr. Petersen and left the two men together.

"I told him I had a hunch where this thing might end," Mr. Dean said, "but I told him

I didn't think the White House could withstand a wide-open investigation [and] I had reason—without being specific with him—to suspect the worst."

At mid-morning of June 20, he said, men from the Government Services Administration who had opened Hunt's safe brought the contents to him. He said the contents included a hand gun; a large briefcase containing electronic equipment; a large batch of classified State Department cables from the early years of the Vietnam war, a "bogus cable" implicating the Kennedy Administration in the fall of the Diem regime in 1963; "a number of materials relating to Daniel Ellsberg," who made the Pentagon study of the Vietnam war available to the press; "some materials relating to an investigation Hunt had conducted for Colson at Chappaquiddick," and many memorandums to Mr. Colson on the performance of the "plumbers unit" under Egil Krogh Jr., White House aide, that had been formed on the President's orders to investigate leaks.

Separating Documents

Mr. Dean said that, on his orders, Mr. Fielding separated out the "politically sensitive documents" which were then placed in Mr. Dean's safe. The briefcase was put in a locked closet in his office, he said, and the State Department documents stored in an aide's office pending their return to the department.

Later, he said, when he reported to Mr. Ehrlichman on the contents of Hunt's safe, Mr. Ehrlichman told him "to shred" the bogus cable, the documents relating to Dr. Ellsberg and other politically sensitive material, and to "deep six" the briefcase with the electronic equipment. Then, Mr. Dean testified:

"I asked him what he meant by 'deep six.' He leaned back in his chair and said, 'You drive across the river on your way home at night, don't you?' I said yes. He said, 'Well, when you cross over the bridge on your way home, just toss the briefcase into the river.'"

Mr. Dean said that he suggested to Mr. Ehrlichman that he get rid of the bugging equipment since he also crossed the river. "He said, no thank you," said Mr. Dean.

Decided Not to Obey

He said he was "very troubled" about Mr. Ehrlichman's instruction, and Mr. Fielding shared his feeling that it would be "an incredible action to destroy potential evidence." Therefore, he said, he decided not to follow the instructions.

On June 21, he stated, he met with Mr. Gray, who told him the F.B.I. had traced four checks totaling \$89,000 contributed by a group of wealthy Texans to a bank in Mexico City, and a \$25,000 check to Kenneth Dahlberg, a Nixon middle Western fund raiser, from Dwayne Andreas, a wealthy Minneapolis business-

man who had been a long-time backer of Senator Hubert H. Humphrey. The total of \$114,000 had turned up in the Miami bank account of Bernard L. Barker, one of the Cubans arrested in the Watergate break-in.

Mr. Dean said that Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Stans were concerned that Mr. Andreas not be embarrassed and were worried about the four Mexican checks, possibly, he said, because they might have been illegal corporate contributions.

Mr. Dean said that Mr. Stans had asked Hugh W. Sloan Jr., the campaign treasurer, how the money ended up in Barker's account. Mr. Sloan had explained that he had given the checks to Liddy to cash, and Liddy had evidently "used Barker to cash them."

Explaining that this money was unconnected with Watergate, Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Stans, Mr. Dean said, asked him "to see if there was anything the White House could do to prevent this unnecessary embarrassment."

Therefore, he said, he talked to Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman, and at their request went to see Mr. Gray on June 22. Mr. Gray, he said, had one theory that "Watergate might have been 'a C.I.A. operation' because of the former C.I.A. employees in-

involved and planned to talk to agency officials about it. He also, Mr. Dean said, "expressed his awareness of the potential problems" for the administration in the F.B.I. investigation.

Mr. Dean said that on June 23 he reported on his conference with Mr. Gray to Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Ehrlichman and, in a meeting with Mr. Mitchell, Frederick C. LaRue, an aide to Mr. Mitchell, and Mr. Mardian. It was in this meeting, he said, that he first heard discussion of "the need for money to take care of those who were involved in the break-in."

It was at the June 23 meeting, he said, following his report that Mr. Gray believed the C.I.A. might be involved, that Mr. Mardian suggested the C.I.A. "could take care of this entire matter if they wished."

Role for C.I.A.

Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Dean said, suggested that he explore with Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman "having the White House contact the C.I.A. for assistance." By this, apparently, Mr. Mitchell meant that the agency should assume responsibility for Watergate by paying those apprehended to keep silent.

Mr. Ehrlichman, Mr. Dean testified, thought Mr. Mitchell's suggestion "a good idea" and ordered Mr. Dean to explore it with Lieut. Gen. Vernon A. Walters, the C.I.A. deputy director, rather than the director, Richard Helms.

WASHINGTON POST

27 June 1973

Haldeman Expects To Clear Nixon, Self

NEW YORK, June 28 (AP)—Former White House chief of staff H. R. Haldeman said today he hopes for "the chance to tell the whole story" about Watergate and when he does it will completely clear the President and himself.

Haldeman was interviewed in Newport Beach, Calif., by CBS News. He was one of those named by another former White House aide, John W. Dean III, as having knowledge of the plan to bug the Democratic headquarters in the Watergate, and of being involved in the subsequent cover-up of White House involvement.

Asked if he had been watching the Senate Watergate Committee hearings at which Dean is testifying, Haldeman replied, "Sure I have," but declined to comment specifically on Dean's charges "except in the proper forum."

He said he expected to "Have that opportunity . . . in the next few weeks," and added:

"I have confidence that I will then have the chance to

it and that as the facts are fully known—as the truth is completely known in the case, it will be clear, legally and clear to the American people, that, most importantly, the President had absolutely no involvement in the Watergate matter in any way, shape or form and absolutely no involvement in any supposed or alleged cover-up of any matters relating to the Watergate.

"It will also be further equally obvious that I had no involvement of that kind, either in the planning or execution of the Watergate or in the cover-up of the Watergate."

Asked if he thought it was a "good thing" the hearings are being aired publicly, Haldeman replied: "Absolutely."

He added that "the important thing is that they be carried in their entirety. And that people judge on the basis of the totality of the information they get rather than on the basis of any little bit . . . on any day by any one wit- one source."

NEW YORK TIMES
26 JUNE 1973

Dean Says White House Put a 'Friend' in C.I.A.

By MARJORIE HUNTER
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 25 — John W. Dean 3d testified today that he had been told by a top Nixon aide that the White House had put its own "good friend" into the Central Intelligence Agency in order to "have some influence over the agency."

That "good friend," Mr. Dean told the Senate Watergate committee, is Lieut. Gen. Vernon A. Walters, Deputy Director of the C.I.A. and frequent interpreter for President Nixon on foreign trips.

This latest disclosure of alleged White House efforts to involve the C.I.A. in domestic activities came amid increasing demands by Congress for tighter control over the top secret agency.

Within the last few weeks, former and present officials of the C.I.A. have trooped to Capitol Hill in unprecedented numbers to be questioned for hours at a time upon the agency's role in the Watergate affair.

Out of these harings by both Senate and House committees and subcommittees have come startling revelations of C.I.A. cooperation with the White House on strictly domestic operations—a field that its own charter would seemingly rule out of bounds.

And out of these hearings have come equally stunning accounts of White House efforts to enlist C.I.A. aid in covering up the Watergate scandals.

Mr. Dean's testimony today supported earlier accounts by General Walters and other C.I.A. officials of White House efforts to get the agency to shoulder the blame for the break-in at the Democratic National Committee headquarters in the Watergate complex last June 17.

At the same time, the Dean testimony appeared to shed light on what had been a publicly unanswered question: Why had the White House passed over Richard M. Helms, at that time Director of Central Intelligence, to negotiate almost solely with his deputy on the Watergate matter?

Mr. Dean testified that, a few days after the Watergate break-in, L. Patrick Gray, then acting Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, suggested to him that it might have been a C.I.A. operation because of the number of former agency people involved.

Mr. Dean said that he later told John D. Ehrlichman, the President's domestic affairs adviser, of Mr. Gray's suggestion and that Mr. Ehrlichman told him to call the agency and explore the matter.

"He then told me that I should deal with General Walters because he was a good friend of the White House and the White House had put him

in the Deputy Director position so they could have some influence over the agency," Mr. Dean testified.

Assurance for Ehrlichman

Mr. Dean said he later informed Mr. Ehrlichman that General Walters had assured him that agency involvement in the Watergate was impossible.

Mr. Dean said that Mr. Ehrlichman responded by saying "something to the effect that General Walters seems to have forgotten how he got where he is today."

A spokesman for the C.I.A. said that General Walters would have no comment on the Dean testimony.

Shocked by these and other disclosures, Congressional critics and supporters alike are now calling for stern measures to assert firmer control over the agency.

Won House Approval

Just last week, the first move to curb C.I.A. activities came with House approval of a ban on agency assistance to domestic law enforcement agencies. The Senate has not acted.

The provision, sponsored by Representative Elizabeth Holtzman, Democrat of Brooklyn, was promoted by disclosures that agency employees had been training police officers in New York City and other cities in clandestine activities.

Mike Mansfield, Democrat of Montana, the Senate majority leader, plans to renew his unsuccessful drive of many years ago to establish a joint Senate-House committee to oversee operations of the C.I.A. and other Government intelligence agencies.

Senator Stuart Symington, Democrat of Missouri, the acting chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, has said that he will conduct a full-scale investigation of the evolving "secret charter" under which the agency has operated since its establishment 25 years ago.

There are also proposals to revise the agency's basic law either to outlaw domestic operations specifically or to require that any such domestic involvement be permitted only upon the personal request of the President.

The National Security Act of 1947, under which the intelligence agency was created, was designed to prohibit it from conducting domestic operations by stating that it "shall have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement or internal security functions."

But the act also contains two major loopholes:

First, it gives the Director of Central Intelligence the responsibility of "protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure."

Second, the act gives the agency authority "to perform

such other functions and duties relating to intelligence" as the National Security Council, an arm of the Presidency, "may from time to time direct."

Furthermore, secret executive orders, interpreting the National Security Act, have been issued through the years, creating what some call the C.I.A.'s "secret charter," now the target of Senator Symington's planned investigation.

While earlier efforts to assert greater Congressional control over the C.I.A. were successfully blocked by successive Administrations, the recent disclosures in the Watergate affair have stunned Congress.

Cushman Agreed

Among the disclosures were the following:

In the summer of 1971 Gen. Robert A. Cushman, at that time deputy director of the agency and now commandant of the Marine Corps, agreed to a White House request to supply E. Howard Hunt Jr. with a wig, false identification papers and other items later used in burglarizing the California office of Dr. Daniel Ellsberg's former

psychiatrist.

Scarcely weeks later, Mr. Helms, then director of the agency and now Ambassador to Iran, agreed to another White House request for preparation of a psychological profile of Dr. Ellsberg, who was later indicted for leaking the secret Pentagon papers on American involvement in Southeast Asia.

Mr. Helms and General Walters, the deputy director of the agency, have told of Mr. Ehrlichman, two of President Nixon's top aides, to persuade the agency to halt an inquiry by the Federal Bureau of Investigation into Nixon re-election campaign funds that were channeled through a Mexico City bank to hide their source. Some of these funds were found on the persons of the men caught breaking into the Democratic National Committee headquarters.

General Walters also has told of efforts by Mr. Dean to get the C.I.A. involved in a further cover-up of the Watergate affair by asking the agency to pay bail and salaries for the jailed burglars.

WASHINGTON POST

27 June 1973

Papers Support President

By Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein

Washington Post Staff Writers

Classified papers, taken from the White House in April by former presidential counsel John W. Dean III and released yesterday by the Senate Watergate committee, tend to support President Nixon's May 22 statement that a domestic security plan authorizing wiretapping and break-ins was never formally implemented.

The highly touted documents, including eight memos released in full and the sanitized version of another document, show that plans were formulated for domestic security in 1970, but show no implementation of potentially illegal operations.

The documents show that former White House intelligence aide Thomas C. Huston and Dean continued to formulate plans for domestic security after July 28, 1970, when Mr. Nixon said the plans were rescinded.

In testimony yesterday before the Watergate committee, Dean said, however, that he knew of no illegal operations that grew from the plans or from the later establishment of an Intelligence Evaluation Committee to coordinate efforts of existing government intelligence agencies, including the FBI, CIA, and Defense Intelligence Agency.

In an interview yesterday, Huston said that he continued to push for implementation of the plan "but it died and it had been stopped July 28, 1970." He also said

he knew of no operations that grew out of the plan.

The Huston memos to then-White House chief of staff H.R. Haldeman show that FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover had forced the White House to review the plan and delay implementation.

Huston continued to push the plan in memos dated Aug. 5, Aug. 7 and Sept. 10, 1970, but said yesterday that the language in the memos is "optimistic," as if the plan had not been killed in hopes of getting Haldeman's support, which he said he never got.

In a September 18, 1970, "top secret" memo released yesterday, Dean wrote to then Attorney General John N. Mitchell to suggest "procedures to commence our domestic intelligence operation as quickly as possible."

This was about two months after the basic domestic intelligence plan authorizing wiretapping, break-ins, mail cover and development of sources on college campuses had been rescinded.

In the memo Dean said that there should be no "blanket removal of restrictions" on such illegal operations as there was in the initial, rejected plan. In his testimony yesterday Dean said the memo led to the establishment of a secret intelligence group, the Intelligence Evaluation Committee. It was the first step in setting up a domestic intelli-

New York Times

27 June 1973

A NEW CHALLENGE

Ex-Counsel Is Firm —
Differs on Series
of Explanations

By JAMES M. NAUGHTON

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 26—

John W. Dean 3d said today, in a new clash with the White House, that President Nixon had misled the nation in his public statements on the Watergate case, and he insisted that his charges of Presidential complicity in a Watergate cover-up were factual.

The former White House counsel asserted, toward the end of day-long cross-examination by the Senate Watergate investigating committee, that Mr. Nixon had been "less than accurate" in a May 22 denial of involvement in the Watergate

affair. Further, in a long colloquy with Senator Joseph M. Montoya, Democrat of New Mexico, Mr. Dean disputed each of a series of Presidential explanations of the Watergate burglary, describing them as misleading, unfounded or overly "broad."

Crucial Conflict Seen

Mr. Dean's steadfast adherence today to the accusations contained in the 245-page statement that he read yesterday to the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities posed an immediate—and potentially crucial—conflict with the White House.

In San Clemente, Calif., at nearly the same time that Mr. Dean was disputing a string of Presidential statements on Watergate, a spokesman at the Western White House said that Mr. Nixon would stand on the May 22 statement disavowing any participation in the planning of the Watergate break-in, or the subsequent cover-up.

His Word Against Nixon's

Mr. Dean acknowledged, during rambling cross-examination by the Senate panel, that he was in the position of presenting his word, as a 34-year-old deposed White House lawyer, against that of the President.

But he insisted that his only motive in testifying was to end his personal involvement in the cover-up and to respond to the committee's request for his knowledge of it.

"What makes you think that your credibility is greater than that of the President, who denies what you have said?" Senator Herman E. Talmadge, Democrat of Georgia, asked Mr. Dean.

"Well, Senator," Mr. Dean replied, his elbows propped atop the felt-covered witness table, "I have been asked to come up here and tell the truth. I have told it exactly the way I know it."

Differences With Nixon

The way Mr. Dean told it presented clear and sharp discrepancies with the public record of Mr. Nixon's Watergate statements, and Senator Montoya proceeded late today to explore the conflicts.

The Senator asked Mr. Dean to appraise Mr. Nixon's statement, at a news conference last Aug. 29, that a "complete investigation" by Mr. Dean had cleared everyone in the White House of involvement in the June 17 break-in at the Watergate.

Taken literally, Mr. Dean replied, the statement that no one employed in the White House on June 17 had been a participant in the break-in

might have been true, but he said that the flat assertion "was a little broad."

Similarly, Mr. Dean told Senator Montoya that he had not provided any basis for the President to declare, last Oct. 5, that the Watergate investigation conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation had pursued every possible lead "to the end."

Mr. Dean said that "it was true that the F.B.I. investigation was extensive, but it obviously was not complete."

No Report From Dean

The former legal counsel to Mr. Nixon said that he was also "quite aware" that the President had never received a report on Watergate from Mr. Dean when the President said, on March 17, that Mr. Dean had undertaken such an investigation.

The most direct rebuttal of the President by Mr. Dean occurred during Senator Montoya's inquiry into an April 17 assertion by Mr. Nixon that he would "condemn any attempts to cover up in this case."

"Do you believe he was telling the truth on that date?" asked Senator Montoya.

"No sir," Mr. Dean replied crisply.

The Senator and the witness discussed for several minutes Mr. Dean's point-by-point quarrel with the President's May 22 statement. Mr. Dean said he had no "first-hand knowledge" to rebut Mr. Nixon's disavowal of prior knowledge of the break-in, but he went on at great length to recount, as he had yesterday, Mr. Nixon's alleged involvement in the cover-up.

A Shift on Peterson

Under close questioning by Fred D. Thompson, the committee's Republican counsel, Mr. Dean backed down today from his suggestion yesterday that Henry E. Petersen, an Assistant Attorney General, had acted improperly when he was in charge of the Government's Watergate investigation.

Mr. Dean flatly declared that Ronald L. Ziegler, the White House press secretary, had not been told the truth about Watergate and thus had not deliberately misled the media during the 10 months in which he denied any White House involvement in the case.

But Mr. Dean, in response to interrogation, added new charges today of efforts within the Nixon Administration to use investigative agencies improperly.

He testified that the White House maintained, and constantly updated, an "enemies list" of individuals unfriendly to the Administration. Mr. Dean promised to submit to the committee a memorandum he had written about possible uses of the list.

Tax Audit for Writer

He charged that after the publication in Newsday, the Long Island newspaper, of an article unfavorable to Mr. Nixon's close personal friend, C. G. Rebozo, he had received communications that one of the authors of the article should

gence operation, Dean said, but he knew of no illegal operations that resulted.

Nevertheless, Senate and Justice Department attorneys are investigating about 25 break-ins and additional surveillance activities to determine if a White House intelligence operation using the techniques of the plan was ever implemented, according to reliable sources.

The break-in and bugging at the Democrats' Watergate headquarters and the burglary of the office of the psychiatrist to former Pentagon Papers defendant Daniel Ellsberg seem to fit the pattern outlined in the intelligence plan.

The Ellsberg burglary was carried out in September, 1971, by a White House intelligence group called the "plumbers," which included E. Howard Hunt Jr. and G. Gordon Liddy, who were later convicted in the Watergate conspiracy.

Another of the documents released yesterday, a memo from Huston to the Internal Revenue Service dated Aug. 14, 1970, asks for a "progressive report on the activities of the compliance divisions in reviewing the operations of ideological organizations."

In a reply, the IRS said that the special service group had referred 26 organizations and 43 individuals for enforcement action, and applications for tax-exempt status has been denied eight organizations in the period of about one year.

The ideological organizations included groups on the political left and right, according to an IRS spokesman.

In a Sept. 21, 1970, memo to Haldeman, Huston complained about the IRS response: "You will note that the report is long on words and short on substance. Nearly 18 months ago, the President indicated a desire for IRS to move against leftist organizations taking advantage of tax shelters. I have been pressing IRS since that time to no avail."

In the Aug. 5, 1970, memo Huston pushed for reconsideration of the domestic intelligence plan by attacking then-FBI Director Hoover:

"At some point, Hoover has to be told who is President. He has become totally unreasonable and his conduct is detrimental to our domestic intelligence operations."

"Hoover can be expected to raise the following points (opposing the plan) in our meeting: 'Our present ef-

forts are adequate.' The answer is bullshit! This is particularly true with regard to FBI campus coverage."

That memo continues:

"The biggest risk we could take, in my opinion, is to continue to regard the violence on the campus and in the cities as a temporary phenomenon. . . . I believe we are talking about the future of this country, for surely domestic violence and disorder threaten the very fabric of our society."

"For eighteen months we have watched people in this government ignore the President's orders, take actions to embarrass him, promote themselves at his expense, and generally make his job more difficult. It makes me fighting mad, and what Hoover is doing here is putting himself above the President."

The Huston memos also say that Attorney General Mitchell joined Hoover in opposing the domestic security plan.

The top secret memos describing the basic intelligence plan were printed June 7 by The New York Times, and later by The Washington Post.

Those documents showed that President Nixon approved the expanded intelligence gathering plan after being warned by Huston that parts of it were "clearly illegal" and involved "serious risks" to his administration if the operations ever became known. Because of Hoover's objections, the plan was revised, according to the President's May 22 statement.

NEW YORK TIMES
27 JUNE 1973

Documents Give Insight On White House Efforts

By ANTHONY RIPLEY

Special to The New York Times

have some problems" with the Internal Revenue Service. Mr. Dean said that he had arranged for the writer, whose name he could not recall, to be subjected to an income tax audit.

He stated that an official of the Secret Service, whom Mr. Dean did not identify, had given him a "small intelligence printout" alleging that Senator George McGovern, the 1972 Democratic Presidential nominee, would attend a fund-raising function in Philadelphia at which "either Communist money or former Communist supporters" would be involved.

He said that he passed the item to Charles W. Colson, a former White House special counsel, who told him he arranged to have it published.

Mr. Dean also alleged that Frederick V. Malek, the former White House personnel administrator who now is deputy director of the Office of Management and Budget, had not been truthful in accounting for a background investigation conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation on Daniel Schorr, a Washington correspondent for the Columbia Broadcasting System.

Questions on Monologue

Mr. Dean said — as Mr. Schorr, who is reporting on the Watergate hearings, looked on — that he had learned "after the fact" that H. R. Haldeman, the former White House chief of staff, had ordered the investigation through Lawrence M. Higby, who was Mr. Haldeman's deputy.

Mr. Dean said that J. Edgar Hoover, then the F.B.I. director, had pursued a "wide-open" field investigation, "to the dismay of the White House," and that Mr. Malek, "who at the time knew nothing of this," subsequently explained that Mr. Schorr was under consideration for a key position with the Administration.

The bulk of Mr. Dean's first day of questioning by the Senate committee—he will return for more questions tomorrow—dealt with the credibility of his long monologue yesterday, in which he described the participation of the President, the White House, the Committee for the Re-Election of the President, the Department of Justice and assorted individuals in a "massive" Watergate cover-up.

With almost stoic repose, Mr. Dean sat barely an inch away from the public address and television microphones in the hearing room, placidly replying to questions that alternately appeared to bolster or try to poke holes in his earlier testimony.

He told Samuel Dash, the committee's Democratic chief counsel, that, in his opinion, Mr. Haldeman would have been advised in advance of the plans to wiretap the Democratic party offices in the Watergate office complex last year and that Mr. Haldeman "probably would have reported it" to the President. But Mr. Dean balked later when Mr. Dash sought to elicit his "opinion" as to whether Mr. Nixon had probably been advised by aides of the cover-up at its incep-

tion.

The former lawyer for President Nixon agreed with Mr. Dash's leading questions, in which the committee counsel suggested that from last Sept. 15 on, Mr. Dean had no doubt about the participation of the President in the cover-up effort.

Executive Clemency Cited

Mr. Dean testified yesterday that on Sept. 15 the President congratulated him on his efforts to guarantee that Federal indictments in the Watergate case handed down that day had not reached any but the seven individuals first arrested.

He also described yesterday a series of conversations with the President about arrangements for executive clemency for one of the Watergate defendants, about "silence money" to assure that the original defendants would not talk and about Mr. Nixon's direction of efforts to curtail Congressional, Government and court investigations of the case.

The tone of Mr. Dean's persistent declarations today that he had told the truth was set in this exchange with Mr. Dash:

Mr. Dash: I guess you are fully aware, Mr. Dean, of the gravity of the charges you have made under oath against the highest official of our land, the President of the United States.

Mr. Dean: Yes, I am.

Mr. Dash: And being so aware, do you still stand on your statement?

Mr. Dean: Yes, I do.

Unshakably, Mr. Dean maintained the same position throughout the interrogation. He explained that he had waited until April 15 to begin telling what he knew to Government prosecutors because "I was hopeful the President himself would step forward and tell of his involvement in some of these things."

'Almost Impossible Task'

He said that he realized that the 47 documents he submitted to the Senate committee yesterday did not deal directly with his conversations with the President and that he had no evidence to support his assertions.

"I realize," Mr. Dean stated, "it is almost an impossible task, if it is one man against the other, that I am up against, and it is not a very pleasant situation. But I can only speak what I know to be the facts and that is what I am providing this committee."

Some of the sharpest interrogation of Mr. Dean was conducted, after the fashion of the former prosecutor that he once was, by Mr. Thompson.

Asked how he became involved in the cover-up, Mr. Dean said, "I was in the process before I began thinking about the process."

At one point, Mr. Thompson apologized if he appeared to be "badgering you in any way" as he explored the possibility that Mr. Dean had offered his testimony in hope of gaining immunity from criminal prosecution.

"In fact," Mr. Dean said, a

WASHINGTON, June 26 — The documents that John W. Dean 3d submitted with his testimony before the Senate Watergate committee give a rare insight into the White House and related 1972 Presidential campaign activities.

There are glimpses of Presidential attitudes and fears of news leaks and demonstrators.

There are the thoughts and pawns of those who served the President.

There are conversations over the handling of campaign funds.

There is the reluctance of James W. McCord Jr. to go along with part of the cover-up of Watergate.

There is the penetration of Representative Paul N. McCloskey Jr.'s rival campaign.

There is even the attempt to keep the Senate hearings themselves under control and a number of other points in the still unfolded scandals.

In all, Mr. Dean submitted 50 documents to back up his written testimony of 245 pages.

Excerpts Given

Following are excerpts from some of the documents gathered by Mr. Dean, who served for almost three years as Mr. Nixon's counsel until his dismissal April 30:

A memorandum from Gordon Strachan to his boss, H. R. Haldeman, then the White House chief of staff, undated and dealing with news leaks:

"It would be helpful to realize that there are five distinct types of leaks: only some of these are deterrable. The types include: A) the August SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation

bit bitingly, to Mr. Thompson, "if I were still at the White House I would probably be feeding you the questions to ask the person who is sitting here."

Mr. Thompson retorted, "If I were here, as I am, I would have responded that I do not need questions to be fed to me from anybody."

Nonetheless, it was Mr. Thompson who elicited from Mr. Dean the statement that Mr. Dean had not meant to imply yesterday that Mr. Petersen had acted unethically in providing information to the White House about the scope and conduct of the Government's inquiry into the Watergate case last year.

"I know of no impropriety," Mr. Dean said of Mr. Petersen's dealings with the White House. "I think he tried to be very fair—in dealing with the White House and that fact that we had an investigation going on in a political year, that it could result in embarrassment on countless occasions."

Talks] leak prompting the lie detector tests at State. The individual consciously violated the law to protect his own view of national interest—non-deterrable;

"(B) The September SALT (accidental war agreement) leak: too many individuals (all of Congress and our NATO allies) knew and so the information is not controllable—non-deterrable;

"(C) The self-serving leak which strengthens the individual policy position by acquiring public support before the final decision is made—deterrable;

"(D) The ego-stroke leak where the individual either wants to see his name in print or to be known as one with influence—deterrable;

"And (E) the careless leak resulting from either a slow individual with information and a foot reporter or too much liquor—deterrable."

Monthly Reporting Plan

The memo stated that 11 cases for "possible Haldeman action as 'Lord High Executioner' to stop leaks" had been studied but that none had been acted upon. A monthly reporting plan, with investigations and use of politically loyal personnel, was put into action with the approval of Mr. Haldeman.

In another of the memos, a long one drawn up this year at Camp David, Mr. Dean attempted to review how a domestic intelligence program that came to disaster in the Watergate burglary on June 17, 1972, had begun.

He said officials had been very concerned about the 1972 Republican national convention, fearing that it might explode in violence, as had the 1968 Democratic convention.

I told HRH (Mr. Haldeman) that we would push the Federal intelligence agencies to keep us informed, but I doubted if we would get much better intelligence than we had. In short, I was instructed to assist the re-election committee in preparing itself for expected intense demonstrations.

"I discussed this matter with Mr. Hoover (the former director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, J. Edgar Hoover) approximately — [no date given], and he agreed that we would have a problem, that the F.B.I. would help but that the re-election committee should develop its own capacity to gather such intelligence. He offered to provide names of former agents that might be of assistance but I never asked him for such names."

Instead, the White House developed its own campaign intelligence team headed by G. Gordon Liddy. Mr. Dean said, Liddy was convicted at the

WASHINGTON POST
28 June 1973

Nixon Plans To Answer, Laird Says

By David S. Broder
Washington Post Staff Writer

President Nixon is willing to respond to "all questions" about his role in the Watergate affair after the major witnesses have given their stories to the Senate investigating committee, the new White House domestic counselor, Melvin R. Laird, said yesterday.

In an interview with The Washington Post, the former Defense Secretary said Mr. Nixon would not "respond to every witness" but would answer "questions, all questions . . . at a press conference, 'when we get near the conclusion of the hearings.'"

Laird said he had discussed the timing of a press conference with the President and "I think he's willing to do that . . . I don't think there will be any problem with that."

Laird also strongly suggested that despite his recent elevation on the White House staff, Ronald L. Ziegler will be replaced as the President's principal press spokesman by his current deputy, Gerald L. Warren.

"I have an appreciation for Ron's problem," Laird said. "I'm convinced he didn't knowingly mislead (the press). But from the information I've been able to get, I think it's good to have some other press spokesman for a while."

"Sometimes people are caught up in a series of circumstances where you have to make certain changes. And I think those changes will be made. I don't think you have to make a big announcement over something like that."

Ziegler, recently designated as an Assistant to the President as well as press secretary, has been under fire from press groups for providing inaccurate information to its reporters during the period of the Watergate crime and alleged White House cover-up.

Former White House counsel John W. Dean III has testified this week that Ziegler was rehearsed by other White House staff members for his press briefings on Watergate and was repeatedly denied knowledge of what really had taken place.

Laird said Ziegler's experience showed that "anybody who's going to

every meeting."

"I think that can be changed," he said, referring to the shielding of the press secretary from vital knowledge. "I think Jerry (Warren) has to take over that responsibility, and I hope he can. I'm not sure, but I hope that he can."

(In San Clemente, Calif., a White House official said that Ziegler will continue in his responsibilities as outlined when Mr. Nixon elevated him to the position of assistant to the President earlier this month.

(At that time, the President said that Ziegler also would continue as press secretary.

("The observation that Ziegler's usefulness is impaired is not shared by the President," the official said.)

(He said that the President is contemplating a general press conference "at some point." But the President has not decided when it will be, the official said.)

In a wide-ranging interview in the west-wing White House office he has taken over from his resigned predecessor, John D. Ehrlichman, Laird also said:

• He is cutting back the Domestic Council staff he inherited from Ehrlichman and trying to shift decision-making to the Cabinet departments, but running into resistance from congressmen and bureaucrats who don't want to act "unless they get White House guidance."

• He has asked first-term domestic counselor Daniel Patrick Moynihan, now ambassador to India, to suggest ways of reviving the family assistance welfare reform plan abandoned by Mr. Nixon this year after an unsuccessful, three-year effort for congressional passage.

• He is doubtful that the President's expressed wish to scrap controls and return to a free economy can be accomplished in the face of a "very difficult" worldwide food shortage, but acknowledged that the temporary freeze of market prices itself is "causing some problems" of future food supply.

Recalled to government service early this month in the wake of the Watergate scandal, the former Wisconsin congressman and Defense Secretary seemed more subdued than customary in an hour-long interview.

Asked about the mood of the White House and the President, Laird paused for a long moment and said:

"Well, of course, this is a tough period for the President. No question about that. But I have the feeling . . . that morale about getting the government has improved."

Laird paused again, and said: "You're talking to me in one of the most difficult weeks, as far as the past is concerned, that I can think of. But if I didn't feel that we could move forward and get some of these programs working, I wouldn't be here."

The new presidential adviser said one of the "pluses" from the Watergate may be that "the operations of the Executive Branch will be strengthened."

"We just have to open this place (the White House) up," he said, "but it's not easy to do. There's been a tendency on the part of people to concentrate everything in the White House and the White House staff. The situation has to be switched back, so the departments and the line agencies really have the staff to do the work and can carry on their consultations with the governors, the mayors and the congressmen on their own programs."

Laird said that "its going to take a little time to change" habits, after years of centralized decision-making, because "there is a tendency among some members of Congress to like having one place to call, rather than going to the departments, and there is a tendency on the part of some of the departments not to make a decision or specific recommendation unless they get White House guidance."

To counter that habit, Laird said, he had been visiting a different Cabinet department almost every day since taking his job. "I don't ask them to come here," he said. "I go there. I try to make it clear to each of the Cabinet officers that he is going to be responsible for the department, for the people he's putting into jobs, and that they're going to be responsible to him. You can't have any Cabinet officer in a position where he doesn't have complete trust and faith in the people who are working for him."

Second Laird said, he is trying to stimulate closer consultation between the departments and members of Congress.

Laird himself has taken advantage of his privilege as press and has appeared on the floor of the House several times in the last three weeks, engaging in long conferences with former colleagues.

Watergate trial.

Message by McCord

After the Watergate burglars were caught and indicted, Mr. Dean said, McCord "was not cooperating with his lawyer" and alleged plans for blaming the Central Intelligence Agency for the break-in were not working.

McCord sent the following message to John J. Caulfield, a former White House aide:

"Dear Jack:

"I'm sorry to have to write you this letter but felt you had to know."

"If Helms [Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms] goes and the Watergate operation is laid at C.I.A.'s feet, where it does not belong, every tree in the forest will fall."

"It will be a scorched desert. The whole matter is at the precipice now."

"Just pass the message that if they want it to blow, they are on exactly the right course."

"I'm sorry that you will get hurt in the fallout."

McCloskey Incident

On Dec. 11 and 12 an "operational intelligence gathering scheme 'penetrated' Representative McCloskey's Washington campaign headquarters, Mr. Dean memorandums show.

At the time the California Republican was opposing Mr. Nixon in the Presidential primaries.

The "operative" found little money, few volunteers and almost everyone gone off to New Hampshire, according to reports that went from Mr. Caulfield to Mr. Dean to John N. Mitchell, then the Attorney General and later campaign manager for Mr. Nixon.

In late February this year, Mr. Dean prepared the President for a meeting with Senator Howard H. Baker Jr., Republican of Tennessee and vice chairman of the Senate Watergate committee.

Among Mr. Dean's suggestions on a briefing paper were to "take Baker's pulse and find out how much he wants to help keep this from becoming a political circus."

"If Baker appears to be truly desirous of cooperating—and the fact he is seeking guidance may so indicate—he might be told that there are matters unrelated to the bugging incident per se (E. G. Segretti, Kalmbach) that could be embarrassing and tarnish good people whose motives were the highest," the memo said.

The reference was to Donald H. Segretti, an alleged organizer of campaign sabotage who has been indicted in Florida in connection with a forged campaign letter.

NEW YORK TIMES
28 June 1973

Excerpts From Testimony by Dean Before Senate Panel Investigating Watergate

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 27—Following are excerpts from a transcript of the testimony on the 14th day of hearings on the Watergate case today before the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activity:

MORNING SESSION

John W. Dean 3d

SENATOR ERVIN: We have two very peculiar questions which have been addressed to the committee, apparently by Mr. J. Fred Buzhardt, special counsel to the President. The first question addressed to the committee by Mr. Buzhardt is this:

"Did you and your counsel develop a strategy for obtaining immunity from prosecution? What were the elements of that strategy?"

On behalf of the committee, I would reply to Mr. Buzhardt that the only strategy we developed was to pursue the course outlined by the act of Congress codified as Sections 6002 and 6005 of Title 18 of the United States Code.

The second question is this—this is to the committee—the second question is: "Didn't your strategy include deliberate leaks of information to the media on what you had told investigators? Maybe this is addressed to Mr. Dean, I do not know.

It is probably addressed to Mr. Dean.

Well, Mr. Dean, I will ask you these questions—well, maybe I had just better let us proceed in orderly fashion, am sorry I misconstrued the question.

I might state these were just handed to me about one second before I read them and I drew the inference, since the questions were separated as they were, some of them were addressed to the committee rather than the witness. But perhaps I am mistaken in that but I would say that the only strategy this committee has followed to secure immunity for any witness has been to pursue the law strictly.

Now, on yesterday the witness was asked to produce some exhibits and I just wanted to ask him if he had provided them.

DEAN: Yes, I did. These are from a file that is entitled Opponents List and Political Enemies Project.

Back to the Beginning

SENATOR GURNEY: We have had a great deal of testimony, 245 pages of your statement as well as the testimony yesterday, and I must say it is hard to know where to begin in all this. I think probably the best place to start always is at the beginning. Would you say that it is fair to say that Gordon Liddy's plan of bugging and electronic espionage really started out the whole Watergate affair?

A. Well, there was an atmosphere that might have been several precursors source to that plan. The plan was an accident of fate where they culminated into Mr. Liddy's specific proposal that was presented in the Attorney General's office in the two meetings which occurred in late January and early February.

Q. But as far as the Watergate break-in itself is concerned, it really stemmed from Mr. Liddy's plan of bugging and electronic espionage, did it not? Now, who recommended Mr. Liddy to the committee to re-elect the President?

A. I passed on a recommendation that I had received from Mr. Krogh to Mr. Mitchell and he in turn, endorsed that recommendation and sent him over to the re-election committee.

Q. Did you interview Mr. Liddy after Krogh recommended him to you?

A. Not to my recollection, no. I was present when he was interviewed by Mr. Mitchell and again when he was interviewed by Mr. Magruder.

Q. Did you ask any questions about his qualifications at that time or did Mr. Liddy just simply answer questions?

A. I asked Mr. Krogh about his qualifications at that time when he first mentioned him to me. And they asked questions during those interviews, yes.

Q. Did you ever ask him what he had been doing for Mr. Krogh? Or Mr. Hunt?

A. No, I did not.

Liddy's Qualifications

Q. Would that not be important in finding out his qualifications, his previous employment?

A. Well, I was told, for example, when I met him—when I talked to Mr. Krogh about him, I can recall Mr. Krogh very specifically telling me that he had written some of the best legal memorandums that he had run

across in a long time. He explained that Gordon had taken some rather complex subjects and analyzed them in a very precise way. One of these memoranda had gone in to the President and the President had complimented Mr. Liddy through Mr. Krogh on the quality of the document that he had prepared.

Q. Was it under that part of his duties would he, in charge of security or things like that? A. That is correct.

Q. Well, did you ask any questions of him as to what he had been doing in the area of security?

A. I was told that he had an F.B.I. Treasury Department, law enforcement background. There was not a great focus on that at that time. I knew Mr. Krogh had worked in the past before I came to the White House, and partially after, I was still at the White House with the demonstrator problem.

Q. You never did go into what he had been doing with Krogh and Hunt? A. No, I did not.

Q. The Jan. 27 meeting occurred and as I recall, you testified that the original plan—and I do not know what the word was that you used to describe it, but—A. I think I called it a "Mission Impossible" plan.

Q. Did you ever talk to Mr. Mitchell or Mr. Magruder after this horrendous plan? A. As I recall, the only conversation I had was a very brief conversation. Mr. Liddy was taking the charts off the easel and they were preparing to leave the office when I paused in front of Mr. Mitchell's desk and he told me that this was certainly out of the question.

Plan Caused Worries

Q. Well, did it worry you that this man came up with kidnapping, prostitution, mugging, and all the rest of it? A. Yes, sir, it did.

Q. But you never really discussed it with Mitchell and Magruder as to Liddy's capability of staying on at the job? A. Well, sir, you would have had to have been there to believe it and I might say that it was so far out that there was no hope in my mind that anyone was ever going to approve any plan like this. So I just assumed that it was going to die a natural death.

Q. Now we come to the second meeting that occurred on Feb. 4. My recollection al-

so is that you testified that you were again very disturbed at what he was proposing. A. That is correct and I was injecting myself into the meeting in an effort to terminate the meeting, which I did.

Q. Well, did you have any discussion after the meeting with Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Magruder about his continuing?

A. I had a direct discussion with Mr. Liddy at that time. I might add, after the first meeting, I had told Mr. Liddy he should destroy the charts. After the second meeting, as we were leaving the office, I told him that I would not discuss this with him any further, I indicated to him that it still was not what was necessary, and it was a rather brief discussion. I must say I felt very sorry for Gordon Liddy during much of this because of the fact that he had received no guidance from anybody that I could tell—certainly none from me—as to what was expected of him.

Q. Was what you testified that you told him that he was never to discuss this thing again with you, that if any plan was approved like this that you did not want to know about it? A. That is correct.

Reported to Haldeman

Q. Why did you not go back to the President and tell him about this hair-raising scheme? A. Well, I did go back, but I did not have access to the President, as I think I explained. I went to Mr. Haldeman.

Q. Did you try to gain access to the President? A. Senator, I did not try. I had never been into the President or called by the President before. My reporting channel was through Mr. Haldeman and I went back and told what I thought was the proper reporting channel. I told him what I had seen, told him my reaction to it, told him that I thought it was unwise, unnecessary, and Mr. Haldeman agreed with me.

Q. Did you ever discuss after this meeting with Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Magruder, whether this plan was going to be implemented or what ever happened to it?

A. I never heard about the plan again until, as I have testified, Mr. Liddy came into my office some time in February or March—I do not know the precise date—and told me that he could not get his plan approved. I reminded

him that I was not going to talk with him about it, and he said that he understood and he did not talk about it.

Q. Did you ever report that to the President?

A. No, I didn't, sir.

Q. Now, to get back to the break-in at the Watergate, as I recall your testimony, there really wasn't anything in Watergate or much of anything in the activities surrounding the committee to re-elect the President from that Feb. 4 meeting until the Watergate Break-in. And I understand you got back from the Philippine Islands on the 18th, and then returned here to Washington and went in your office on the 18th.

Then, as I recall, you said that you had received phone calls that day and talked to a number of people—Caulfield, Magruder, Ehrlichman, Strachan, Colson, Sloan, and you later called Liddy and Kleindienst. Why all these calls if you weren't that closely associated with what they were doing over there in the political field?

Investigative Office

A. Well, Senator, I would say that my office was one that, one, I did have some dealings with the re-election committee, I did know all the parties involved. My office normally was asked to investigate or look into any problem that came up of that nature. When any wrongdoing was charged—an Administration office, for example, when the grain deal came up—and I think as the Senator will recall, during the T.T.T. matter, my office had some peripheral involvement in that. And I believe we had some dealings with you office on that matter.

Q. Not my office. I think we met in Senator Hruska's office, the Republican members of the committee. A. Well, Senator, I recall one time that Mr. Fielding and I came up to your office on the matter and Mr. Fielding provided some material for your staff.

Q. What does that have to do with the Watergate? A. Well, I was explaining the type of thing that would come to my office and my office was a fire-fighting office and would get into various—

Q. Did you do other fire-fighting before June 18th? A. Yes, sir.

Q. At the committee to re-elect? A. Not to my knowledge, no. That was the only fire I recall over there, and it was the biggest one.

Q. Now, then, you mentioned in your testimony yesterday in response to Mr. Dash that you inherited the cover-up. Would you tell how you inherited the cover-up?

A. When I came back to the office on the 18th and talked to Mr. Strachan, I realized that the cover-up was already in effect, in being, and I realized that when Mr. Strachan told me of the

documents that he had destroyed and Mr. Haldeman's instruction, that there certainly wasn't going to be a revelation of the White House involvement in the matter. I didn't at that point in time know the potentials of the White House involvement.

Early Meeting Recalled

Q. Was not one of the first meetings of the cover-up held in John Mitchell's apartment on the 19th of June?

A. Senator, I would say that the day of, to my knowledge, the day of the 19th at the White House was a very busy day. That the calls I received from Mr. Ehrlichman, from Mr. Colson, the meetings I had with Mr. Ehrlichman and then again later with Mr. Colson about the safe were long before I went to the meeting at Mr. Mitchell's apartment, which I do not recall was on the 19th or 20th. I do recall a meeting in Mr. Mitchell's office but I do not recall specifically which day it was.

Q. Well, what you are saying is then that these several phone calls you had with all of these people really had to do with at least the beginnings of the cover-up, is that right? Well, you were in on it from the beginning, were you not? A. Yes, sir.

Q. You really did not inherit anything. You were in on the sort of hatching of it, were you not? Who set the policy on the cover-up?

A. I do not think it was a policy set. There was just no alternative at that point in time. Q. Did you advise the President of what was going on?

A. Senator, the first time I ever talked to the President was one occasion that I recall before Sept. 15th which was in late August. To the best of my recollection, and that certainly was not an occasion to talk to the President about anything because his former law partners were in the office, Mrs. Nixon was in the office, there were several notaries or one notary there, some other members of the staff and it had to do with the signing of the President's testamentary papers and it was—just was not a very appropriate occasion to even give a whisper to the President that I would like to talk to him. So I must say that any time between June 19th and Sept. 15th I had no conversations with the President, and nor did I approach the President at any time other than through reporting to Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman.

Did Not Try to See Nixon

Q. Do you not think as the President's attorney, you should have tried to go to him and warn him about what was being done? A. I probably should have but I was assuming everything I reported to Mr. Haldeman and Ehrlichman was also being reported to the President.

Q. Let us go and discuss for a moment the F.B.I. reports of the investigation. Did you first go to Mr. Kleindienst for these reports? A. Right. I do not recall whether it was Mr. Kleindienst or Mr. Petersen that I first discussed this with.

Q. Who asked you to get the reports? A. Initially the request came from Mr. Mitchell and I believe that was a result of Mr. Mardian's desire to see the reports. Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr. Haldeman thought it was a good idea that I see the reports, and I had—at what point in time I actually raised this with either Petersen or Kleindienst my recollection is I did talk to Mr. Petersen about it at some time and he suggested I go directly to Mr. Gray, and I do recall discussing it with Mr. Gray.

Q. Let us get back to Mr. Kleindienst. Are you sure you cannot recall whether you ever talked to him about getting these 302 forms? A. It is very possible, as I said, Senator, it is very possible I did.

Q. Well, do you recall if you talked to Mr. Petersen? What did you recall of that conversation? A. I recall he suggested that I go directly to Mr. Gray.

Q. Did either Mr. Petersen or Mr. Kleindienst or anybody, according to your recollection, tell you that you could not get these F.B.I. reports, that the President himself would have to get them? A. I was told that the best way to deal with this situation is go directly to Mr. Gray.

Q. Then, you have no recollection that the Attorney General or Mr. Petersen told you that you could not have them unless you get them through the President? A. I do not recall it, frankly.

Conversations With Gray

Q. Well, then let's go to Mr. Gray and your conversations with him.

A. Mr. Gray told me that he thought that I could read them in his office, I told him I thought that was awkward, and when we discussed it, he wanted some assurance that this information was being reported to the President. As I recall, I gave him such an assurance.

To the best of my recollection Mr. Gray said to me that, after I gave him assurance it was going to be reported, that he would work something out. Now I don't recall when I first received the initial reports. I only recall that it was after a summary report was prepared on the 21st of July, as I recall the date, and I showed that report to the people at the White House and the people at the re-election committee, that the pressure began that I let others read the raw F.B.I. reports.

Q. Let me get back again now to the conversation with Mr. Gray. Wasn't he pretty specific with you that

the only reason he would turn these things over to you is because the President of the United States requested them through you?

A. Well, Senator, in my dealings with Mr. Gray from the very outset was very anxious to be of any assistance he could.

When he told me, for example, he was traveling around the country a lot and I should deal with Mark Felt that to me evidenced that Mr. Gray wanted to be of assistance if he wasn't there I should talk to others. The same tenor was in the conversation that he would have to check and he wanted assurances these were going to the President, this information would go to the President. I am sure he knew very well that the President didn't want to sit down and read a stack of raw F.B.I. materials.

Q. Did you ever report to the President what was in those 302 forms? A. There was never anything in those F.B.I. reports that I read worth reporting even to Mr. Haldeman or Mr. Ehrlichman.

82 F.B.I. Files

Q. Did you ever show a single one of the 82,302 files to the President? Did you ever report a single information that was in those files to the President?

A. Not to my recollection, no. I may have reported the general tenor of the investigation which was, I might say, very vigorous. I would report that to Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman and as my channel of reporting.

Q. Did you ever get a call from Mr. Gray about this newspaper story about one of the reports being shown to Mr. Segretti?

A. Well, I recall that when the story broke, Mr. Gray called me and asked me if that were true, and I said absolutely not, that the FBI reports have never left my office and I have never showed an FBI report to Mr. Segretti which, in fact, is true.

Q. Who did you show them to?

A. Mr. Mardian was anxious to see them, Mr. Mitchell thought that was a good idea and also that Mr. O'Brien and Mr. Parkinson also come see them. They came to my office. I recall them scanning them. The only other occasion I recall anybody else looking at the files is when Mr. Dick Moore who was special counsel to the President was given those documents to look at.

Q. Now, as I understand it some material was turned over to the F.B.I. but certain materials were held out, is that correct? What was turned over to Gray? A. Two envelopes containing sensitive political documents.

Q. That was turned over at a meeting in Mr. Ehrlichman's office, is that right? A. That is correct. You will recall I had been instructed

to "deep-six" and shred documents. I had to come up in my own mind with a persuasive argument for Mr. Ehrlichman as to why not to "deep-six" and destroy documents.

Q. Now then what transpired when they [the documents] were turned over?

A. As I said, I took the documents and had a very brief discussion with Ehrlichman.

It was pretty well understood what the meeting was for, so it was not necessary to have any extended discussion other than the fact that the documents were very politically sensitive, that as I recall, I called them political dynamite when I raised them with Gray, that he should take custody of them, and that would be the way to handle it as far as the White House was concerned. I do not recall any discussion of telling Mr. Gray to destroy the documents.

He at that point in time, as I recall, placed the documents in a small sort of briefcase and seemed quite willing to take them.

Spoke to Petersen

Q. Did you ever ask him again on any occasion what he had done with the documents? A. After I had disclosed this matter to Mr. Petersen, I recall that I was at luncheon at the Justice Department. This was probably in early January. At that time, Mr. Gray came up to me and sort of took me by the arm and said: "John, you have got to hang tight on not disclosing these documents." And I said nothing to him.

Q. Let us go to the August press conference, where the President referred to the Dean report. My understanding is that you indicated great surprise at this so-called Dean report? A. That is correct.

Q. Did you ever protest to the President? A. No sir, but others I did. I talked to Mr. Mitchell about it; I talked to Mr. Moore about it; I talked to my associate, Mr. Fielding.

Q. Let's turn now to the Sept. 15th meeting with the President and Mr. Haldeman and yourself. A. The President asked me to sit down and told me that Bob had told him what I had been doing and he expressed appreciation for it.

Q. Did you discuss the criminal cases that were coming on for trial; the civil suits that were filed by the Democrats, the Common Cause suit that had been filed by Common Cause, the Patman hearings? A. That is correct, we did.

Q. Did you discuss any aspects of the Watergate at that meeting with the President?

A. Well, given the fact that he told me I had done a good job I assumed he had been very pleased with what had been going on. The fact that

the indictments, he was pleased that the indictments had stopped at Liddy because the only other link into the White House was Magruder.

Q. Did you discuss what Magruder knew about Watergate, the cover-up money, Strachan bringing wiretap information into Haldeman, [or] Haldeman instructing Strachan to destroy all of these materials? A. No, I did not.

Q. Well now how can you say that the President knew all about these things from a simple observation by him that "Bob tells me you are doing a good job?"

A. I was aware of the fact that Mr. Haldeman had often made notes. Mr. Haldeman has a good memory. This was the hottest issue that was going in the campaign. I can't believe that the fact that we were going to contain this matter would totally escape the President's attention and it was to me a confirmation and a compliment to me that I had done this.

Q. Did he say that "Bob has been telling me everything you have been doing." A. He said, "Bob has been reporting to me," something of this nature.

Q. I thought you said that he said that "Bob has been telling me what a good job you have been doing." A. Well, we are quibbling over words but I remember—

Gurney Denies Quibbling

Q. We are not quibbling over words. We are talking about something very important, whether the President of the United States knew on Sept. 15th about the Watergate and the cover-up.

A. I am quite aware of that and I have told you I am trying to recall. My mind is not a tape-recorder. It does recall impressions of conversations very well, and the impression I had was that he had told, he told me that, Bob had reported to him what I had been doing. That was the impression that very clearly came out.

Q. Now then let's go to October, going along there in chronological fashion, and the money that was turned over to you, the \$15,200. Who brought it to you? A. Gordon Strachan and Mr. Richard Howard.

Q. Now then, I understand that you withdrew \$4,850 from it.

A. When I took it out, I took out, I was seeking to take out about \$5,000. I thought that would cover my expenses. I might put this in context: When my prospective bride came back I was working around the clock on this. I had been given a couple of assignments. I was supposed to get the minister or I was looking for a judge to do that, and also to get some wedding music because the wedding was going to be held in a home. Come Thursday I hadn't even gotten a chance to take care of these matters. I counted out what I thought was going to be

roughly five and it came up to \$4,850. I put a check, wrote a check out and put it in, wrote it to cash.

Q. Do you know this is a crime, Mr. Dean? Isn't it embezzlement?

A. Well, I had very clearly made, there was no intention on my part never to account for the full amount.

CHARLES SHAFFER: Excuse me. I would like to say as counsel for Mr. Dean that, based upon the fact that have been discussed with Mr. Dean, if they are true, Mr. Gurney says that is embezzlement. I disagree with him, and I think there are enough lawyers in the room to know what embezzlement is.

SENATOR GURNEY: As I recall, in the testimony there was discussion sometimes around November about a written report that was to be written by you on Watergate? A. That is correct.

Q. Who requested that report? A. It was Mr. Haldeman.

Q. Did you ever write this report? A. Yes, sir, and I have submitted that as a document to the committee.

Q. Did you ever tell the President about this report or give him a copy of it? A. No, sir, I used my normal reporting channels.

Clemency for McCord

Q. Turning to the offer of clemency to Mr. McCord, did you ever advise the President of the United States about that?

A. No, Sir. I was proceeding on a conversation I had with Mr. Ehrlichman after Mr. Ehrlichman indicated and Mr. Colson also had indicated that they had talked directly with the President about the matter, something which was later confirmed by the President himself in conversations with him.

Q. Let us go to the meeting now of March 21st in the White House with you and the President. That, as I understand it, is when you gave him a pretty complete run-down of the story about the Watergate, is that correct?

A. That is correct. The President had been rather nonchalant in dealing with the million dollar issue. We had discussed on the 13th the fact that he had discussed clemency with Colson and Ehrlichman. I really felt that the President did not understand the full implications of some of these activities and I did not know if he knew the full involvement of everybody, and I thought that I should report it.

I also would like to add one other thing. On a number of occasions, I asked Mr. Ehrlichman, particularly after the first of the year, if the President were being kept fully informed still. Ehrlichman assured me that the President was being kept regularly posted.

Q. Could you summarize briefly for us the points you touched upon?

A. I had tried back as early as the second meeting, I believe, to tell him that I felt that I was involved in an obstruction of justice, particularly after he had told me that I should report to him and made the comment to me that Haldeman and Ehrlichman were principals.

That stuck in my mind so very clearly that I thought maybe he did not understand everything that I was doing. When I raised this with him, I gave him a few of the facts and he began to debate with me about the fact that he did not think I had any legal problem based on what I was telling him and I said I did. He did not want to get into it at that time.

Data on Later Meeting

Q. Did you have a later meeting with the President and Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman?

A. Yes sir. I went from the President's office to a subsequent meeting with Ehrlichman and Haldeman and the discussions began to focus on Mitchell coming down and having Mitchell step forward and if Mitchell stepped forward and would account for this thing, then maybe the problems that had followed for the White House after the break-in would be forgotten. And we went to a meeting in the President's office that afternoon to discuss that.

Q. Was there also a discussion at this meeting and later at the one on the 22d that all of you might put this down on paper as to what you viewed as your role in the Watergate? You and Haldeman and Ehrlichman?

A. Yes sir. The first time I heard about writing a report again occurred when I arrived at Camp David on the afternoon of the 23d. The telephone was ringing as I walked into the cabin my wife and I were staying in. The operator told me it was the President on the phone. It was not the President. It was Mr. Haldeman on the phone and he said, while you are up there, why don't you sit down and write a report on this thing.

AFTERNOON SESSION

SENATOR GURNEY: When you put the check in the envelop that contained the \$15,200, your check, I understand, of \$4,850—what account was that drawn on? A. It was drawn on my personal checking account.

Q. Was there enough money in the checking account to cover it? A. No, there was not at that time, but on previous occasions, I had overdrawn my account and it had been covered.

Q. I have here a copy of a bank statement that came in a noon time from the National Savings and Trust Company, showing an account to John Wesley Dean 3d. I wonder if you would

look at the bank statement and tell the committee how much money you had in the checking account at that time, Mr. Dean.

\$1,625.12, is that not correct? Yet, you put in your file where you were keeping the money in trust a check for \$4,850.

A. That is correct.

Q. Mr. Dean, we were discussing the time lapse between those meetings with the President, the last meetings on the 20th and 21st and 22d and your next communication with him, which was April 15, as I recall.

All of these meetings on the 20th, 21st, 22d, as I understand it, they were the first meetings between what I would call perhaps the most principal people involved in Watergate, at least those in the White House, to where you were coming to serious discussion about what ought to be done and all of you realized that something certainly had to be done, and done rather fast, as I understand it?

A. I would not characterize the meetings as to what had to be done. In fact, the meetings were, as I believe I described them in my testimony, very similar to many, many meetings I had occurred, or I had been in earlier where we talked about, you know, how do we deal with the Senate committee, the President at one point in the meeting picked up the phone and called the Attorney General and asked him why he had not been meet-

ing with Senator Baker.

Q. Mr. Dean, finally, before wrapping up here, I would like to pin down the occasions this year prior to March 21st, the meeting with the President, when you and he discussed the cover-up of Watergate.

A. All right. It was the meeting on the 27th [February] that I had with the President when he told me to report directly to him. Well, also, I might add at the conclusion of that meeting, as we were walking to the door to leave the office, he again complimented me on the fact that I had done a good job during the campaign, that this had been the only issue that they had had, that they had tried to make something of it but they had been unable to make anything of it and he was very complimentary of my handling of the job.

He then told me we have got, you know, you have got to fight back on situations like this. And I can recall something I cannot express in writing, a gesture when he sort of put his fist into his hand and said, you have just got to really keep fighting back and I have got confidence in you that you can do that and this thing will not get out of hand.

I am now at the March 13 meeting, where the matter of executive clemency and the million dollars came up. That would be the next instance in the sequence. At March 13, there was a number of unspecified demands for money that had come to

me through Mr. O'Brien. I had also been having conversations with Mr. Mitchell.

So there was this general problem that was existing before the 13th of March as the support money and how it was going to get there. That is what prompted me to raise it with the President at the end of the meeting, because it was on my mind, and I told him that, you know, there were money problems, there was no money to pay these people and he said, "How much will it cost?"

I said, "My best estimate is a million dollars or more." He asked me who the demands were coming from. I told him principally from Mr. Hunt through his attorney. At that point in time, he said something to the effect that, well, Mr. Hunt has already been given an assurance of clemency.

He said, I talked to Mr. Ehrlichman about that and then Mr. Colson came and talked to me about it after he had been instructed not to talk to me about it.

Q. I am just trying to shorten it up. Did you discuss Watergate with him at all? A. Not specifically, no.

Q. March 17. You had a meeting that day? A. Yes, that was St. Patrick's Day, and I recall the President had a green tie on and sitting in the Oval Office. He was very relaxed and he had his feet up on the desk and was very — the thing that stuck in my mind from that particular conversation was that he wondered if the Senate would bite the bait that he had put out at his press

conference on litigating over the question of Dean and executive privilege because he was convinced if they did you would never see any of the White House staff before the Senate.

Q. Then, I think it is also true, at least, according to my understanding, that during the rest of the year 1972 between the June 16 or was it if the 17th, the 17th, the day of the break-in, except for a meeting on Sept. 15, even you have not testified to any discussions with the President about Watergate. Isn't that correct? A. That is correct.

Q. Now, then we come to the year 1973 and from what I have been able to gather in the questioning I have just finished your testimony is that on Feb. 28 you did discuss this matter of obstruction of justice and then you also testified to what you did here on March 13, and then, of course, we come to the meeting on March 21 when you told him most of what Watergate was all about. And the summary that I can see from the testimony, the President of the United States certainly didn't know anything about all this business, to this one Senator, until this thing on Feb. 28, according to your testimony, and on March 13 but especially, of course, the meeting on March 21 where you did discuss with him at great length the Watergate and he a later press conference said that he learned about it on that date.

HOUSTON POST
18 June 1973

Behind The Secrecy

The Central Intelligence Agency has operated for 25 years without much inspection by Congress. The Federal Bureau of Investigation under the late J. Edgar Hoover went on for nearly a half-century without any substantial questioning in Congress. The secrecy that has shielded the two agencies from public information or criticism has left both open to the description of being akin to secret police — something for which America presumably had no room.

Perhaps that will now be changed. Senator Symington of Missouri says he will lead his Senate Armed Services subcommittee in a thorough investigation of the CIA. Representative Rodino of New Jersey, new chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, promises an inquiry into the FBI.

The reasoning of the two men is similar. Revelations stemming from the Watergate affair indicate that both agencies were compromised by White House political control and could have been compromised further had Presi-

dent Nixon's plan to broaden the domestic intelligence network been left in effect for a longer period.

Representative Rodino says the situation regarding potential "politicization" of the FBI is unhealthy. Senator Symington questions the legality of a "secret charter" of presidential directives under which the CIA has long operated without the knowledge of Congress, which created the CIA and the legal basis for its operations.

The plain fact of the matter is that Congress can hardly expect agencies it establishes to follow its legislative definitions closely, if it leaves those agencies entirely to presidential control hidden by the cloak of secrecy. Such agencies then become repositories of unchecked arbitrary power, as well as possible political exploitation. They can become a danger to the rights and liberties of the people they are meant to serve. And the people should know about it. Congress has a duty to subject the CIA and FBI to an incisive review.

NEW YORK TIMES
28 JUNE 1973

Text of White House Analysis of Dean's Testimony Before Senate Watergate Unit

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 27—Following is a draft of a White House analysis of the testimony of John W. Dean 3d submitted to the Senate Watergate committee today together with a series of questions to be asked of Mr. Dean. A revised version of the draft analysis was read at the committee's hearing today by Senator Daniel K. Inouye, Democrat of Hawaii, and commented on at various points by Mr. Dean. The transcript of the hearings, including the final version of the draft analysis and Mr. Dean's comments, was not available for publication for this edition. The questions will be asked of Mr. Dean tomorrow.

It is a matter of record that John Dean knew of and participated in the planning that went into the break-in at Watergate, though the extent of his knowledge of that specific operation or of his approval of the plan ultimately adopted have not yet been established. There is no reason to doubt, however, that John Dean was the principal actor in the Watergate cover-up, and that while other motivations may have played a part, he had a great interest in covering up for himself.

Dean came to the White House from Justice from a background of working on problems of demonstrations and intelligence. Among those working under him at the White House were Tom Huston and Caulfield. Dean was involved in discussions in 1971 about the Sandwedge Plan Caulfield proposed. Ehrlichman was told that the original authors of the \$1-million plan were Dean and Liddy. Whatever the fact about this, it is clear that Dean attended the meetings that led up to adoption of the Watergate plan. Dean introduced Mitchell (who had sponsored Dean for his White House position) to Liddy.

Dean Liddy, and Magruder met to discuss intelligence plans of this kind on Jan. 27, 1972, and, together with Mitchell, on some later date. Dean was not present at the final meeting on March 30 when the \$250,000 plan was approved. It is not clear whether he was not there because he disapproved or simply because he was not in Key Biscayne or because he wanted to try to keep his own record clean. He is reported as having said that he "didn't think it was appropriate for him to be in on these conversations." He is

also reported to have said, at a meeting in Mitchell's office, that "we shouldn't discuss this in front of Mitchell or in the Attorney General's office."

At some point during the spring Magruder phoned Dean and asked him to talk to Liddy to try and calm him down. Also on March 26, 1973, Dean told Haldeman that in the spring of 1972 he had told Haldeman that he had been to two meetings at which unacceptable and outlandish ideas and intelligence gathering had been rejected by himself and by Mitchell and that he, Dean, proposed not to attend any more such meetings. (Haldeman may be off on this date—compare Haldeman deposition). Haldeman has no personal recollection of Dean telling him about the meetings at the time but is "willing to accept that as a possibility."

Whatever the facts may be on the matters that are uncertain in the spring of 1972 about Dean's knowledge or approval of the break-in, it must have been clear to Dean, as a lawyer, when he heard on June 17th of Watergate, that he was in personal difficulty. The Watergate affair was so clearly the outgrowth of the discussions and plans he had been in on that he might be well be regarded as a conspirator with regard to them. He must immediately have had reason to realize that his patron, Mitchell, would also be involved.

There is some indication that Ehrlichman called Dean on June 17th to advise him of the problem and to direct him to take charge of it for the White House. Even without an instruction, this would have been his responsibility, as counsel for the President, from the time of the occurrence and he was active in that role from the moment of his return to the city a day or two after the break-in.

On June 19th Dean met with Liddy and learned, among other things, of the Ellsberg break-in. (that Dean met with Liddy and others is confirmed in Magruder testimony) There was also a meeting that day by Dean with Mitchell, Strachan, Mardian, and Magruder to discuss a cover-up. A series of meetings, also including LaRue, followed throughout the summer.

Dean was not merely one of the architects of the cover-up plan. He was also perhaps its most active participant. It was Dean who suggested to Haldeman that the F.B.I.

was concerned that it might run into a C.I.A. operation, on behalf of Mitchell, who it was Dean, purportedly came to Ehrlichman several weeks after the break-in to obtain approval for fund-raising by Kalmbach for the arrested persons. It was Dean who reviewed the papers found in Hunt's safe and declared that they were "politically sensitive" and should be given special treatment.

It was Dean and Mitchell who prepared Magruder for his perjurious grand jury testimony. On Aug. 29th when Colson prepared a memorandum stating the facts as he knew them, and suggested it be sent to Silbert, it was Dean who said: "For God's sake destroy the memo, it impeaches Magruder." It was Dean who was the agent in some of the money dealings with the arrested persons. It was Dean who gave Caulfield instructions on how he was to handle McCord.

'Perfectly Situated'

Throughout all of this Dean was perfectly situated to master-mind and to carry out a cover-up since, as counsel to the President and the man in charge for the White House, he had full access to what was happening in the investigation by the F.B.I. He sat in on F.B.I. interviews with White House witnesses and received investigative reports. Dean and Ehrlichman met with Attorney General Kleindienst late in July. The Attorney General described the investigation and said that "it did not appear that any White House people or any high-ranking committee people were involved in the preparation or execution of the break-in."

History fails to record that at that moment Dean corrected the Attorney General's erroneous impression by pointing out that, however innocently Mitchell, Magruder, and Dean had all been involved in planning of operations of which Watergate was an obvious derivative, or that Strachan had knowledge of the fruits of this kind of operation, or that all of them were suborning perjury and otherwise seeking to conceal the facts.

Dean's activity in the cover-up also made him, perhaps unwittingly, the principal author of the political and constitutional crisis that Watergate now epitomizes. It would have been embarrassing to the President if the true facts had become known

shortly after June 17th, but it is the kind of embarrassment that an immensely popular President could have easily have weathered.

The political problem has been magnified 1000-fold because the truth is coming to light so belatedly, because of insinuations that the White House was a party to the cover-up, and, above all, because the White House was led to say things about Watergate that have since been found to have been untrue. These added consequences were John Dean's doing.

Dean was responsible within the White House for becoming apprised of what had happened. From June 17th on Dean had periodic conversations with Ehrlichman "about virtually every aspect of this case." Dean reported also to Haldeman and to Ziegler, to him he gave repeated assurance that he made an "intensive investigation" and had found no White House involvement. Dean was "the foundation of the proposition that the White House was not involved."

With the election passed and public interest in Watergate on the wane, Dean may have thought that this cover-up had been a success, although he purported to continue an ongoing investigation. In February, however, with the Ervin committee beginning its work, the President was concerned that all of the available facts be made known.

In the middle of February, 1973, Dean and Richard Moore met with Ehrlichman and Haldeman at San Clemente. Dean was assigned to reduce "to written form all of the detailed facts as they related both to the committee to re-elect and the White House." Dean was pressed continually for that statement, particularly by Haldeman, but never produced it.

QUESTIONS

1. You quote the President as saying on Feb. 27th that Haldeman and Ehrlichman were "principals" in the Watergate matter and that therefore you could be more objective. What did you understand by this? Did you have any evidence then or now that Ehrlichman had prior knowledge of the break-in?

2. If the President was referring to post June 17th events, were you not equally a "principal" as you claim

to have indicated to the President on Sept. 15th?

3. Your 245 page statement is remarkable for the detail with which it recounts events and conversations occurring over a period of many months. It is particularly remarkable in view of the fact that you indicated that it was prepared without benefit of notes or a daily diary. Would you describe what documents were available to you in addition to those which have been identified as exhibits?

4. Would you tell the committee on what other sources, if any, your process of reconstruction was based?

5. Have you always had a facility for recalling the details of conversations which took place many months ago?

6. Specifically with regard to the meeting of Sept. 15, 1972, were there any notes or other documents that you used to refresh your recollection?

7. Did you discuss this meeting with anyone at that time or at any time since?

8. Would you again restate for the record your recollection of that meeting. Compare with the version in the prepared statement to see if it appears either inconsistent or memorized.

9. You indicated in your testimony yesterday that you were certain after the Sept. 15th meeting that the President was fully aware of the cover-up, did you not?

'Won Your Spurs'

10. And you further testified that you believed that you "had won your spurs" in handling the cover-up by Feb. 27th when you were told by the President that you would report to him directly, isn't that correct?

11. If that was the case, why did you feel it necessary on Feb. 27th to tell the President that you had been participating in a cover-up and therefore might be chargeable with obstruction of justice?

12. If, as you assume, the President was aware of the cover-up and you had "won your spurs," wouldn't that have been perfectly obvious?

13. Did you and your counsel develop a strategy for obtaining immunity from prosecution? What were the elements of that strategy?

14. Didn't your strategy include deliberate leaks of information to the media on what you had told investigators and what you might be prepared to testify about in the future? How were these contacts with the media handled? Who represented you and what individual members of the press were contacted? Were any of the stories or quotes attributed to you or sources close to you inaccurate? If so, what if any steps did you take to correct these stories?

15. Mr. Dean, one point of distinction you drew in your testimony puzzles me. You have testified that you had received and placed in your safe the sum of \$22,000

which you never turned over to anyone because you didn't want funds you had physically handled to be used for payments to the Watergate defendants. You also testified that you called Mr. Stans and asked him for \$22,000 to make the \$350,000 fund whole, and that you had your deputy, Mr. Fielding, go to Mr. Stans's office, pick up the money and later deliver it directly to Mr. Strachan, knowing that \$22,000 would probably be used for payments to the Watergate defendants. Now do you mean to imply that you think there is some moral basis for this distinction, or were you just being cautious to protect yourself technically from committing the criminal offense of obstructing justice (at the expense of implicating your deputy)?

Role of Fielding

16. Mr. Dean, you have testified as to your close working relationship to your deputy, Mr. Fielding. It was he who you sent to pick up the \$22,000 from Mr. Stans, he who helped you sort the documents from Mr. Hunt's safe and he who went to England to retrieve Mr. Young's secretary. Did Mr. Fielding know that you were involved in a conspiracy to obstruct justice, perjure testimony and pay defendants for their silence?

17. (If answer "no"): If your deputy, Mr. Fielding, who worked so closely with you, and who carried out some of your missions connected with the conspiracy, had absolutely no knowledge of the cover-up conspiracy, how do you so blithely assume that others on the White House staff and even the President did know of your conspiracy?

18. Mr. Dean, beginning in late May and early June, there were a series of newspaper stories reporting with what you had told various investigators as quoted sources close to you as to what you had said. A number of these reports, for example the one story in The Washington Post of June 3, alleged that you began your private meetings with the President either early in the year, or as in the case of this particular story beginning on January 1st. According to your testimony today, your first private meeting with the President in 1973 was not until Feb. 27. Did you or did you not tell investigators and/or friends that you began meeting with the President personally either the first of the year or beginning Jan. 1, and were these stories an attempt to exaggerate the length of time which you had been dealing directly with the President and by implication imparting to him knowledge of the Watergate?

Leaks and Immunity

19. Mr. Dean, the number of source stories containing allegations against the President attributed directly or

indirectly to you over the last four or five weeks have been most numerous. Do you deny that these stories were planted in a calculated attempt to influence Federal prosecutors to believe you had such important testimony that they should give you transactional immunity from the crimes which you have committed in return for your testimony against others?

20. Mr. Dean, the May 14, 1973 edition of Newsweek carried a long article about you and your prospective testimony. In this article you were quoted a number of times and in many instances the quotes in that article were word-by-word identical to the testimony you have given this week. Indeed, for the most part this Newsweek article was a very accurate preview summary of the lengthy statement which you detailed before this committee. There are, however, several very noticeable differences. One difference is an omission from the testimony you gave here.

You told this committee that when the President discussed the matter of your investigation of Watergate, you did not tell him you made no such investigation. The Newsweek article, however, reports that in your meeting with the President of March 21, and I quote, "Dean also bore down hard, he said, on the fact that there had never been any study clearing White House staffers."

"Mr. Nixon replied that he had had verbal reports of Dean's work, but the counsel insisted, 'nobody asked me for a report, Mr. President,' he said. 'I did not go around asking people questions in their offices. There was no report.' At this point, sources quoted Dean as saying that 'the President came out of his chair' into a half crouch of astonishment and shock."

If the Newsweek account is correct, Mr. Dean, the President's reaction was most inconsistent with that to which you have testified before this committee. Did you or did you not tell the President that you had never conducted an investigation, and have you made the statement previously that "the President came out of his chair into a half crouch of astonishment and shock"?

Operation Sandwedge

21. Mr. Dean, did I understand you to testify earlier that you had led Mr. Caulfield to believe you were assisting him in obtaining approval and funding for what he called Operation Sandwedge, but that in fact you let Operation Sandwedge die a natural death?

22. If answer is affirmative: I call your attention to Exhibit No. 11 which is a memorandum for the Attorney General from John Dean, dated Jan. 12, 1972, and I call your attention to the first sentence of the second paragraph which says, "Operation Sandwedge will be in need for refunding at the

end of this month, so the time is quite appropriate for such a review." Mr. Dean, if you let Operation Sandwedge die a natural death, why did you state to Mr. Mitchell that it would be in need of refunding at the end of January?

23. Mr. Dean, if I recall correctly you testified to this committee that it was not your idea for Magruder's diary to be altered nor were you aware before Mr. Magruder testified before the grand jury last September that Mr. Magruder would testify that the first meeting appearing in his diary had been canceled, and the second meeting had been to discuss election laws. On both of these points your testimony is in direct conflict with the sworn testimony of Mr. Magruder. Are we to believe that Mr. Magruder lied as to these details concerning you, and if that is your position, what could Mr. Magruder's motive be for lying about the details of the manner in which Mr. Magruder's perjury was conceived?

24. Mr. Dean, Mr. Magruder also testified that Mr. Liddy told him that you, among others, had indicated he would have a million dollars for his plans which he had been working on before he even came to the committee. You testified, on the other hand, that you were surprised when Mr. Liddy briefed his million dollar intelligence plan to Mr. Mitchell in your presence. To what motive do you attribute Mr. Liddy's report to Mr. Magruder that you knew about his extensive plan before you saw them in Mr. Mitchell's office?

Meeting With Krogh

25. Mr. Dean, just prior to taking Mr. Liddy to meet Mr. Magruder in early December, 1972, did you and Mr. Liddy not have a meeting with Mr. Egil Krogh and did you not at that time tell Mr. Liddy he would have one million dollars for intelligence gathering at the committee?

26. Mr. Dean, Mr. Magruder testified that in March 1972, Mr. Liddy had threatened to kill Mr. Magruder and that Mr. Magruder made a decision to terminate Mr. Liddy's employment. In this connection, Mr. Magruder testified that he received a call from you encouraging him not to become personally concerned about Mr. Liddy and not to let personal animosity get in the way of Mr. Liddy's project. Did you in March intercede with Mr. Magruder on Mr. Liddy's behalf and if so, since you have said you assumed Mr. Liddy's intelligence project died after your meeting in February, what was the project of Mr. Liddy that you urged Mr. Magruder to give priority over his personal animosities?

27. Mr. Dean, Mr. Magruder testified under oath that prior to his August 16 grand jury appearance at a meeting

in your office, you told him that if the worst happened, "everything would be taken care of, even executive clemency." Did you make such a promise of executive clemency to Mr. Magruder as he testified and if so, did you have authority from anyone else to make such an offer, or was it on your own initiative?

28. Mr. Dean, you have depicted all others in the White House as excessively preoccupied with political intelligence, use of court methods and security, and yourself as a restraining influence on these preoccupations. Yet your background of responsibilities at the Justice Department seems to suggest that your experience in these very types of activities might have contributed to your being invited to join the White House staff. What precisely were your duties in connection with demonstrations while you were at the Justice Department?

29. Immediately after you were appointed counsel to the President, did you not take over the responsibilities of Mr. Tom Huston in connection with intelligence activities?

30. You did testify, did you not, that political intelligence was routed to you in the White House?

Memorandum Cited

31. Mr. Dean, I believe that you were the author of the memorandum to the Attorney General which led to the establishment of the intelligence evaluation committee. Did you hold the first meeting of that committee in your office?

32. Were you not the one on the White House staff

who levied requirements on and received the reports from the intelligence evaluation committee?

33. In interagency meetings to plan for handling demonstrations, were you not the White House representative?

34. In The St. Louis Post-Dispatch of May 14, 1973, there is a report that you attempted to recruit a Department of Interior employee, Mr. Kenneth Tapman, for undercover work at the Democratic convention. Did you attempt to recruit Mr. Tapman, or any others for undercover work, and what prior experience did you have in recruiting for undercover work?

35. Mr. Dean, you have testified concerning your conversations on three different occasions with Gen. Vernon Walters, the deputy director of C.I.A., beginning on the 26th of June. General Walters prepared a memorandum for the record of each of these conversations with you. In General Walter's memorandum for the record for your meeting with him on 26 June, you are reported to have asked General Walters whether there was not some way that the Central Intelligence Agency could pay bail for the Watergate defendants, and if the men went to prison could C.I.A. find some way to pay their salaries while they were in jail out of covert actions funds. In your testimony you made no mention of asking General Walters whether the C.I.A. could pay the Watergate defendants' bail or salaries while they were in prison. Was this an intended omission on your part in the interests of saving them, or do you deny that you made

these specific requests of General Walters?

36. Mr. Dean, I believe you testified that on March 26th, while you were at Camp David, you called Mr. Maroulis, the attorney for Mr. Liddy, and asked for a statement by Mr. Liddy that you had no prior knowledge of the Watergate break-in. Is that correct?

37. Now you also testified, did you not, that it was on March 28th that Mr. Halde-man called you to meet with Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Magruder and that it was at that time you became convinced you had to look out for yourself, isn't that correct?

38. If you were, as you testified, still a part of the cover-up team on March 26th, why were you trying to get material to absolve yourself at that point?

39. If on March 26th, after you, according to your testimony, had admitted to making payments to Watergate defendants to obstruct justice, offering clemency to the defendants to obstruct justice and suborning perjury, you were still actively trying to build your defense against having prior knowledge of the break-in on March 26th, doesn't this demonstrate that throughout this affair your motivation was to protect yourself against the criminal charge of authorizing and directing the Watergate break-in?

40. You stated that Mr. Maroulis called you back on the 29th of March and told you he could not get you the statement you wanted from Mr. Liddy. Did you record either of these telephone conversations you had with Mr. Maroulis?

41. A central credibility question is: What prompted Dean's tactics in March and April 1973—the desire to have the truth told or the effort to achieve immunity from prosecution. The following sequence of events is important:

—Dean's admitted personal connection with the offer of clemency to McCord in January (Dean to Caulfield to McCord via Ulasevicz) (p. 141).

—Dean's admitted personal connection with Hunt's demand for more money on March 19 (Hunt to O'Brien to Dean).

—Dean's meeting with the President on March 21-22. On any version of this meeting is was an effort to get the President to take action on what was becoming a personal problem for Dean.

—McCord's letter to Judge Sirica on March 23. This was the critical break in the cover-up. Dean learned via a call from O'Brien. On March 25 press comments directly linked Dean with knowledge of the Watergate break-in. He called Liddy's attorney, Maroulis, on March 27th to get a statement that he did not have prior knowledge of break-in. Maroulis called back on March 29th with word that he couldn't give him a statement. This statement might have been taped. On March 28th and March 29th he solicited names of criminal counsel. On March 30th, he decided to retain Mr. Shaffer.

Time had run out; the cover-up had come apart; Dean was centrally involved. He sent his lawyers to the U. S. attorney on Monday, April 2, and commenced his negotiations for immunity.

WASHINGTON POST
27 June 1973

Documents on U.S. Intelligence-Gathering Plan Released

The following documents, released by the Senate select Watergate committee yesterday, are memos discussing a domestic intelligence-gathering plan — which included possible burglaries, wiretaps and mail searches—that President Nixon said he approved in mid-July, 1970, but then rescinded on July 28, 1970.

The plan was drafted at the President's direction by a federal interagency committee, according to Thomas Charles Huston, then a presidential aide, who typed up the plan and corresponded about it with various federal agencies and presidential assistant H. R. (Bob) Haldeinan in a series of memos.

The first memo, dated July 14, 1970, indicates President Nixon's approval of the plan, as submitted by Huston.

July 14, 1970

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. HUSTON
SUBJECT:

Domestic Intelligence Review

The recommendations you have proposed as a result of the review have been approved by the President.

He does not, however, want to follow the procedure you outlined on page 4 of your memorandum regarding implementation. He would prefer that the thing simply be put into motion on the basis of this approval.

The formal official memorandum should, of course, be prepared and that should be the device by which to carry it out.

I realize this is contrary to your feeling as to the best way to get this done. If you feel very strongly that this procedure won't work you had better let me know and we'll take another stab at it. Otherwise let's go ahead.

H. R. HALDEMAN

(In May, 1973, President Nixon, in first informing the nation of this plan, said that he had rescinded it on July 28, 1970, just five days after word to implement it had gone out from Huston to the various agencies.

(The rest of the memos released yesterday by the Senate committee, however, are dated after July 28, 1970.

(The first, dated Aug. 5, 1970, refers to a scheduled meeting at which Haldeinan was to discuss the plan with the late FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover and then Attorney General John N. Mitchell.)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 5, 1970

Top Secret
Handle Via Comint Channels Only
Eyes Only
Memorandum For H. R. Haldeinan

From: Tom Charles Huston
Subject: Domestic Intelligence

In anticipation of your meeting with Mr. Hoover and the Attorney General, I would like to pass on these thoughts:

1. More than the FBI is involved in this operation. NSA, DIA, CIA, and the military services all have a great stake and a great interest. All of these agencies supported the options selected by the President. For your private information, so did all the members of Mr. Hoover's staff who worked on the report (he'd fire them if he knew this.)

(Paragraph 2. has been deleted by the Senate committee for national security reasons.)

3. We are not getting the type of hard intelligence we need at the White House. We will not get it until greater effort is made through community-wide coordination to dig out the information by using all the resources potentially available. It is, of course, a matter of balancing the obvious risks against the desired results. I thought we balanced these risks rather objectively in the report, and Hoover is escalating the risks in order to cloak his determination to continue to do business as usual.

4. At some point, Hoover has to be told who is President. He has become totally unreasonable and his conduct is detrimental to our domestic intelligence operations. In the past two weeks, he has terminated all FBI liaison with NSA, DIA, the military services, Secret Service — everyone except the White House. He terminated liaison with CIA in May. This is bound to have a crippling effect upon the entire community and is contrary to his public assurance to the President at the meeting that there was close and effective coordination and cooperation within the intelligence community. It is important to remember that the entire intelligence community knows that the President made a positive decision to go ahead and Hoover has now succeeded in forcing a review. If he gets his way it is going to look like he is more powerful than the President. He had his say in the footnotes and RN decided against him. That should close the matter and I can't understand why the AG is a party to reopening it. All of us are going to look damn silly in the eyes of Helms, Gayler, Bennett, and the military chiefs if Hoover can unilaterally reverse a Presidential decision based on a report that many people worked their asses off to prepare and which, on its merits, was a first-rate, objective job.

5. The biggest risk we could take, in my opinion, is to continue to regard the violence on the campus and in the cities as a temporary phenomenon

which will simply go away as soon as the Scranton Commission files its report. The one statement that Rennie Davis made at HEW which I thought made sense was that the Attorney General was kidding himself when he said the campuses would be quiet this fall. Davis predicted that at least 30 would be closed down in September. I don't like to make predictions, but I am not at all convinced, on the basis of the intelligence I have seen, that we are any way near over the hump on this problem, and I am convinced that the potential for even greater violence is present, and we have a positive obligation to take every step within our power to prevent it.

6. Hoover can be expected to raise the following points in your meeting:

(a) "Our present efforts are adequate." The answer is bullshit! This is particularly true with regard to FBI campus coverage.

(b) "The risks are too great; these folks are going to get the President into trouble and RN had better listen to me." The answer is that we have considered the risks, we believe they are acceptable and justified under the circumstances. We are willing to weigh each exceptionally sensitive operation on its merits, but the Director of the FBI is paid to take risks where the security of the country is at stake. Nothing we propose to do has not been done in the past — and in the past it was always done successfully.

(c) "I don't have the personnel to do the job the President wants done." The answer is (1) he has the people and/or (2) he can get them.

(d) "I don't object to NSA conducting surreptitious entry if they want to." The answer is that NSA doesn't have the people, can't get them, has no authority to get them, and shouldn't have to get them. It is an FBI job.

(e) "If we do these things the 'jackals' (sic) of the press' and the ACLU will find out; we can't avoid leaks." Answer: We can avoid leaks by using trained, trusted agents and restricting knowledge of sensitive operations on a strict need to know basis. We do this on other sensitive operations every day.

(f) "If I have to do these things, the Attorney General will have to approve them in writing." This is up to the AG, but I would tell Hoover that he has been instructed to do them by the President and he is to do them on that authority. He needn't look for a scape goat. He has his authority from the President and he doesn't need a written memo from the AG. To maintain security, we should avoid written communications in this area.

(g) "We don't need an Inter-Agency Committee on Intelligence Operations because (1) we're doing fine right now—good coordination, etc.—and (2) there are other existing groups which can handle this assignment." The answer is that we are doing lousy right now and there aren't other groups which can do the job we have in mind because: (1) they don't meet; (2) they don't have the people on them we want or have some people we don't want; (3) they don't have the authority to do what we want done; (4) ultimately this new operation will replace them; and (5) they aren't linked to the White House staff.

There are doubtless another dozen or so specious arguments that Hoover will raise, but they will be of similar quality. I hope that you will be able to convince the AG of the importance and necessity of getting Hoover to go along. We have worked for nearly a year to reach this point; others have worked far longer and had abandoned hope. I believe we are talking about the future of this country, for surely domestic violence and disorder threaten the very fabric of our society. Intelligence is not the cure, but it can provide the diagnosis that makes a cure possible. More importantly, it can provide us with the means to prevent the deterioration of the situation. Perhaps lowered voices and peace in Vietnam will defuse the tense situation we face, but I wouldn't want to rely on it exclusively.

There is this final point. For eighteen months we have watched people in this government ignore the President's orders, take actions to embarrass him, promote themselves at his expense, and generally make his job more difficult. It makes me fighting mad, and what Hoover is doing here is putting himself above the President. If he thought the Attorney General's advice should be solicited, he should have done so before the report was sent to the President. After all, Hoover was chairman of the committee and he could have asked the AG for his comments. But no, he didn't do so for it never occurred to him that the President would not agree with his footnoted objections. He thought all he had to do was put in a footnote and the matter was settled. He had absolutely no interest in the views of NSA, CIA, DIA, and the military services, and obviously he has little interest in our views, or apparently even in the decisions of the President. I don't see how we can tolerate this, but being a fatalist, if not a realist, I am prepared to accept the fact that we may have to do so.

(Signed) Tom
TOM CHARLES HUSTON

MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
CONFIDENTIAL

August 7, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR H.R. HALDEMAN
SUBJECT: DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE REVIEW

Mr. Hoover has departed for the West Coast where he plans to vacation for three weeks. If you wait until his return to clear up the problems surrounding our Domestic Intelligence operations, we will be into the new school year without any preparation.

The situation in Portland is beginning to look very tense—the American

Leigon Convention could become the first battleground for a new wave of youthful violence. Coming just as the school year begins, it could serve as a catalyst for widespread campus disorders.

I recommend that you meet with the Attorney General and secure his support for the President's decisions, that the Director be informed that the decisions will stand, and that all intelligence agencies are to proceed to implement them at once.

(Signed) Tom
TOM CHARLES HUSTON

(The next memo went to the Internal Revenue Service which had been asked, as part of the domestic intelligence plan, to review the income tax compliance of certain individuals and organizations.)

August 14, 1970
Memorandum For: ROGER V. BARTH
Assistant to the
Commissioner, IRS
Subject: Ideological Organizations

Could you give a progress report on the activities of the Compliance Divisions in reviewing the operations of Ideological Organizations?

I would be interested in knowing what progress has been made since July 1, 1969, when we first expressed our interest in this matter.

Thank you.

TOM CHARLES HUSTON

September 19, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR: Honorable
Tom Charles
Huston
The White
House
FROM: Commissioner
of Internal
Revenue

In response to your memorandum dated August 14, 1970, we have prepared the attached status report on the Special Service Group. I would stress that knowledge of the existence and operations of this Group should be carefully limited.

RANDOLPH W. THROWER
Attachment

STATUS REPORT ON
SPECIAL SERVICE GROUP

In August 1969 the Senate Committee on Government Operations held open hearings on several controversial organizations including the Black Panther Party, Student National Coordinating Committee, Republic of New Africa, and Students for Democratic Society. Information developed during these hearings established that various organizations, categorized as extremists on the right or left, presented problems to the Internal Revenue in the organizations were not in compliance with Internal Revenue laws. Information developed in these hearings indicated that extremist organizations were receiving financial support from various sources. Some of the individuals involved in the forefront of these organizations filed tax returns reflecting very nominal income, or did not file at all, although they were obviously expending substantial amounts of funds.

Recognizing the responsibilities of the Internal Revenue Service to administer taxing statutes without regard to the social or political objec-

tives of individuals or organizations, a decision was made to establish a method of accumulating and disseminating information on all activist groups to insure that the organizations and the leaders of the organizations are complying with Internal Revenue Service, functioning under the Assistant Commissioner (Compliance), a special compliance group was established to receive and analyze all available information on organizations and individuals promoting extremist views and philosophies. The identification of organizations and individuals included in the program is without regard to the philosophy of political posture involved; rather, it is directed to the notoriety of the individual or organization and the probability of publicity that might result from their activities and the likelihood that this notoriety would lead to inquiries regarding their tax status. Another important consideration was the degree of probability that the individuals might be deliberately avoiding their tax responsibilities.

The staff responsible for this activity was first designated as the Activist Organizations Group, but it recently was changed to "Special Service Group" to avoid any erroneous impression of its objectives. The function of the Special Service Group is to obtain, consolidate and disseminate any information on individuals or organizations (including major financial sponsors of the individuals or organizations) that would have tax implications under the Internal Revenue laws. Liaison has been established with all investigative and law enforcement agencies and with Senate and House Investigating Committees. The Group also subscribes to various underground publications as a source of information on matters involving taxable income of individuals, activities of organizations having or seeking tax exempt status, and identity of individuals or exempt organizations providing financial support to activist groups. In the case of "financial support" our interest is to be able to determine that donors do not receive tax benefit from the financial assistance where such benefit is not clearly allowable by law.

As information is accumulated on the activities or financial support of particular organizations or taxable income of individuals it is referred to the appropriate field office of the Internal Revenue Service for enforcement action. Field offices may be asked to investigate the activities of organizations which have been held to be exempt as charitable organizations; they may be asked to investigate the income tax liability of individuals who have openly expended substantial sums of money without obvious means of support or they may be asked to investigate alleged violations of the firearms statutes falling within the jurisdiction of the Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Division.

It is important to note that although various types of information about organizations or individuals is obtained by the Service from cooperating agencies, only that information relating to tax status is recorded and disseminated to field offices. The sole objective of the Special Service Group is to provide a greater degree of assurance of maximum compliance with the In-

Internal Revenue laws by those involved in extremist activities and those providing financial support to these activities.

To date the efforts of the Special Service Group has been confined to manual compilation and consolidation of information on approximately 1,025 organizations and 4,300 individuals. Data on 26 organizations and 43 individuals has been referred to the field for enforcement action. While it is still too early to have completed many of the field investigations, criminal investigations are under way on 4 individuals and 1 organization. Delinquent tax returns have been obtained from 2 organizations with combined tax liability of \$29,559. On the basis of information furnished by this "group" application for exempt status has been denied to 8 organizations. It is the view of officials of the Internal Revenue Service that this "intelligence" activity and field enforcement is necessary to avoid allegation that extremist organizations ignore taxing statutes with impunity.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

September 21, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. Haldeman
SUBJECT: IRS & Ideological Organizations

I am attaching a copy of a report from the IRS on the activities of its "Special Service Group" which is supposed to monitor the activities of ideological organizations [e.g., Jerry Rubin Fund, Black Panthers, etc.] and take appropriate action when violations of IRS regulations turn up. You will note that the report is long on words and short on substance.

Nearly 18 months ago, the President indicated a desire for IRS to move against leftist organizations taking advantage of tax shelters. I have been pressing IRS since that time to no avail.

What we cannot do in a courtroom via criminal prosecutions to curtail the activities of some of these groups, IRS could do by administrative action. Moreover, valuable intelligence-type information could be turned up by IRS as a result of their field audits.

(signed) T. H.

TOM CHARLES HUSTON

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

August 25, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR
H. R. HALDEMAN
SUBJECT: SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES
CONTROL BOARD

On Monday, August 24, the Senate approved the budget for SACB by a vote of 44 to 28. The principal objection—as might be expected—was that the Board has nothing to do to justify the \$400,000 a year budgeted. Among those supporting Senator Proxmire in this argument were John Williams, Peter Dominick, and Len Jordan—conservatives all.

In defending the appropriation, Senator McClellan for the majority and Senator Javits for the minority argued that the Administration intends to make effective use of the Board. Senator McClellan was quite specific in his opinion that the current internal security threat requires prompt and effective action from the Administration.

The appropriations measure should come down for the President's signature later this week. I believe that we

should now proceed to fill the two vacancies on the Board and give serious consideration to the Executive Order expanding the powers of the Board.

I have recommended to Harry Fleming that we reappoint John Mahan as Chairman and Otto Otepka as member of the Board. Mahan is under the patronage of Mike Mansfield whose support is crucial. Moreover, he is a competent enough fellow who is a team player and will cooperate with us completely. Otepka's reappointment strikes me as imperative.

There is some question whether we should appoint a Republican as Board chairman. Normally, I would think so, but I believe the unique circumstances we face with this Board suggest otherwise. Otepka is too controversial to be chairman, Paul O'Neal is too impetuous, and John Patterson is too old. We can work well with Mahan and I see no reason for replacing him as chairman. The fact that he is a Democrat and close to Mansfield is a plus in my opinion.

As soon as a decision is made on these nominations, I plan to meet with John Ashbrook and Dick Ichord to discuss some of the legislative proposals pending before the House Internal Security Committee which pertain to the activities of the Board. Once we get a feel for what these people believe we should do, we will be in a position to re-evaluate the alternatives open to us. The point, however, which we need to keep in mind is that we cannot afford to let the Board sit idle or content itself with investigating old line Communist fronts which are largely irrelevant to our current problem.

After the bombing at Madison, I suspect that the public is fully prepared to accept the concept that the Federal Government ought to take an active interest in the activities of violent action organizations, as we propose in the Executive Order.

(Signed) T. H.

TOM CHARLES HUSTON

(The next memo suggests using the interagency intelligence network to help stop airplane hijackings. White House aide Peter Flanagan, who often served as liaison with the business community, had been detailed by some higher White House official to deal with the hijacking problem.)

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

September 10, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR H. R. HALDEMAN

I understand that in the course of Peter Flanagan's (sic) meeting on steps to minimize the risk of future air hijackings the question of increased use of intelligence information arose and that the Bureau is to submit recommendations in this regard.

It strikes me that this exercise will amount to nothing more than a retracing of the steps we took in June to no avail. This is but one more example of the crying need for inter-community coordination on a systematic and formal basis. In this area, for example, there are resources yet untapped, i.e., Customs, the military services, etc., which will remain untapped so long as Mr. Hoover runs a one-man show.

I don't know the extent of Peter's experience in intelligence matters, but he should be aware that paper plans don't always translate into effective action.

I might add that we haven't seen anything yet. If this incident in the Midwest poses problems, wait until some of our home-grown fedayeen decide to emulate their peers.

(Signed) T. H.

TOM CHARLES HUSTON

THE WHITE HOUSE

September 18, 1970

TOP SECRET

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Pursuant to our conversation yesterday, September 17, 1970, I suggest the following procedures to commence our domestic intelligence operation as quickly as possible.

1. Interagency Domestic Intelligence Unit. A key to the entire operation will be the creation of an interagency intelligence unit for both operational and evaluation purposes. Obviously, the selection of persons to this unit will be of vital importance to the success of the mission. As we discussed, the selection of the personnel for this unit is an appropriate first step for several reasons. First, effective coordination of the different agencies must be developed at an early stage through the establishment of the unit. Second, Hoover has indicated a strong opposition to the creation of such a unit and to bring the FBI fully on board, this seems an appropriate first step to guarantee their proper and full participation in the program. Third, the unit can serve to make appropriate recommendations for the type of intelligence that should be immediately pursued by the various agencies. In regard to this third point, I believe we agreed that it would be inappropriate to have any blanket removal of restrictions; rather, the most appropriate procedure would be to decide on the type of intelligence we need, based on an assessment of the recommendations of this unit, and then to proceed to remove the restraints as necessary to obtain such intelligence.

To proceed to create the interagency intelligence unit, particularly the evaluation group or committee, I recommend that we request the names of four nominees from each of the intelligence agencies involved. While the precise composition of the unit may vary as we gain experience, I think that two members should be appointed initially from each agency in addition to your personal representative who should also be involved in the proceedings. Because of the interagency aspects of this request, it would probably be best if the request came from the White House. If you agree, I will make such a request of the agency heads; however, I feel that it is essential that you work this out with Hoover before I have any dealings with him directly.

2. Housing. We discussed the appropriate housing of this operation and, upon reflection, I believe that rather than a White House staffer looking for suitable space, that a professional intelligence person should be assigned the task of locating such space. Accordingly, I would suggest that a request be made that Mr. Hoover assign an agent to this task. In connection with the housing problem, I think serious consideration must be given to the appropriate Justice Department cover for the domestic intelligence operation. We discussed yesterday using IDIU as a cover and as I in-

dedicated I believe that that is a most appropriate cover. I believe that it is generally felt that IDIU is already a far more extensive intelligence operation than has been mentioned publicly, and that the IDIU operation cover would eliminate the problem of discovering a new intelligence operation in the Department of Justice. However, I have reservations about the personnel in IDIU and its present operation activities and would suggest that they either be given a minor function within the new intelligence operation or that the staff be completely removed. I have had only incidental dealings with the personnel, other than Jim Devine, and cannot speak to their discretion and loyalty for such an operation. I do not believe that Jim Devine is capable of any major position within the new intelligence operation. However, I do believe that he could help perpetuate the cover and he has evidenced a loyalty to you, the Deputy, and other key people in the Department of Justice, despite his strong links with the prior Administration. I would defer to your judgement, of course, on any recommendation regarding Jim Devine's continued presence

in such an intelligence operation.

3. Assistant to Attorney General. We also discussed the need for you to have a right hand man to assist in running this operation. It would seem that what is needed is a man with administrative skills, a sensitivity to the implications of the current radical and subversive movements within the United States, and preferably, some background in intelligence work. To maintain the cover, I would think it appropriate for the man to have a law degree in that he will be a part of the Department of Justice. You suggested the possibility of using a prosecutor who had had experience with cases of this type. Accordingly, I have spoken with Harlington Wood to ask him to submit the names of five Assistant U.S. Attorneys who have had experience in dealing with demonstrations or riot type cases and who are mature individuals that might be appropriately given a sensitive assignment in the Department of Justice. I did not discuss the matter in any further detail with Wood other than to request the submission of some nominees. I would also like to suggest that we request names from the various

intelligence agencies involved for personnel that might be appropriately involved in this activity or who might serve as your assistant.

In summary, I recommend the following immediate action:

- (1) You meet with Hoover, explain what must be done, and request his nominees for the interagency unit.
- (2) You request that Hoover assign an agent to the task of locating appropriate housing for the operations.
- (3) I request that other involved intelligence agencies submit nominees for the interagency unit.
- (4) I request from the agencies names of appropriate personnel for assignment to the operation.

Finally, I would suggest that you call weekly meetings to monitor the problems as they emerge and to make certain that we are moving this program into implementation as quickly as possible.

(Signed) John
JOHN DEAN

N.B. Bob Haldeman has suggested to me that if you would like him to join you in a meeting with Hoover he will be happy to do so.

WASHINGTON POST
17 June 1973

Watergate Case Bewilders Soviets

By Robert G. Kaiser
Washington Post Staff Writer

At a reception in Moscow recently, a Soviet journalist who once lived in Washington was explaining the Watergate affair to an American colleague. One thing, the Russian said, was certain—President Nixon would survive Watergate.

The American tried to explain that the situation was complicated—that Mr. Nixon was in serious difficulty. "Well," the Russian conceded, "I'll always remember what Jim Garrison said. He said that they got Kennedy, and if another American president ever tries to turn the United States away from militarism, they'll get him too."

What do Leonid I. Brezhnev and his Soviet colleagues really think about Watergate? The question is unanswerable, but the anecdote about the New Orleans district attorney who failed to prove a conspiracy to kill Kennedy gives a hint of the confusion Watergate has created in Soviet minds.

For a Soviet Communist, Watergate is a bewildering. Its every element contradicts Marxist-Leninist ideology. The gravity of the affair defies Soviet notions of common sense.

Perhaps most important, the Soviets seem to interpret a threat to President Nixon as a threat to them-

selves, largely because they have invested so much in their new relationship with Mr. Nixon.

Officially, the Soviets have made no substantive comment on Watergate. Ordinary Soviet citizens—apart from those who listen to foreign radio broadcasts—know virtually nothing about it. Brezhnev has insisted publicly that he will neither exploit nor even mention Watergate in his talks this week with President Nixon.

Unofficially, Soviet journalists in East Europe and elsewhere have suggested that the furor over Watergate is the work of a right-wing conspiracy designed to frustrate Mr. Nixon's detente policy. One journalist in Moscow recently slammed his desk in mock anger and said with a stern expression and a wink, "You can't do this to our Nixon!"

But what the Soviets really think is a mystery. Much depends on the reportorial skill of Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, who is known in Washington as a brilliant diplomat, though no one in Washington reads the messages he dispatches to Moscow.

Dobrynin was away from his post and in Moscow when the crucial decision was made to announce firm

dates for this summit meeting. He didn't have an opportunity to report from here on the significance of then-recent events: the dismissal of the Ellsberg prosecution, L. Patrick Gray's assertion that he had warned President Nixon about a Watergate cover-up, the indictments of John N. Mitchell and Maurice H. Stans, and the shakeup of Mr. Nixon's Cabinet.

Despite that coincidence of ominous events during the second week of May, the Soviets agreed on May 12 to announce firm dates for the Brezhnev visit. Some cynics suggested at the time that the Soviet leader knew exactly what he was doing, and would demand appropriate gestures of appreciation from Mr. Nixon in return for his willingness to weather the Watergate tempest.

This argument may tempt the cynics, but it is too simple. It seems much more likely that the Soviets simply don't take the Watergate affair as seriously as many Americans. After all, the kind of behavior for which Mr. Nixon's associates are now under investigation is perfectly normal for the Soviet political police.

The Russians, who are always inclined to believe that other societies are much like their own, probably can't imagine that Watergate-style activities aren't typical here as well.

The Soviets are great admirers of authority. They must find it hard to believe that the President of the United States, after an unprecedented electoral victory, is believed by some to be in danger of losing his authority now.

Brezhnev himself suggested this attitude when he was asked about Watergate on his visit to West Germany last month. "What do you expect," he asked, "an earthquake?" He obviously did not.

The history of the Watergate affair also suggests that the American system of checks and balances has some vitality, a proposition that is ideologically inadmissible in the Soviet Union.

Ideology plays a more important role in determining the Soviet view of the world than many Westerners appreciate.

Events may prove that Soviet skepticism about the importance of Watergate was justified. But if the scandal grew worse and the President's position were threatened, the Russians would be likely to regard that the turn of events as a threat to them. The Soviets—like Americans—assume that they must be an important factor in important events. As they have already revealed, Soviets watching the Watergate affair unfold tend to see a plot against themselves just below the surface.

WASHINGTON POST
15 June 1973

Hunt Alleged To Blackmail White House

By Bob Woodward
and Carl Bernstein
Washington Post Staff Writers

Watergate conspirator E. Howard Hunt Jr. effectively blackmailed the White House by threatening to disclose the involvement of high Nixon administration officials in secret illegal activities unless he received large sums of money and a guarantee of executive clemency, according to government sources.

Since the Watergate break-in almost a year ago, the sources reported, Hunt has been paid more than \$200,000 to remain silent and received repeated assurances of clemency. Shortly before he was to be sentenced in March, Hunt demanded an additional \$130,000 that was never paid, the sources said.

Investigators have established that White House and Nixon campaign officials, including former presidential special counsel Charles W. Colson, received at least five "messages" from Hunt demanding money and clemency between June, 1972, and March, 1973, the sources reported.

Senate and Justice Department investigators now believe that the acquiescence of high White House officials in the Watergate cover-up was in part related to their fears that Hunt would reveal the Nixon administration's secret operations against radicals, political opponents and the press.

Testimony at the Senate Watergate hearings has established that an obstruction of justice was contemplated immediately after the June 17 arrests in the Democrats' Watergate headquarters.

Another factor, however, according to one source, was that "from the beginning Hunt began blackmailing the White House." The source added:

"They (White House officials) went along . . . In fact, it is Hunt's demands and threats that make the case a clear example of obstruction of justice. Hunt was being paid to keep quiet. It demolishes the argument that the money was just for lawyers' fees and care for the families of the defendants."

Sources said that without the crucial element of a conspirator clearly

paid for silence, it would be difficult to prove obstruction of justice on anyone's part in connection with payments to the defendants.

One source said: "It would have been embarrassing for it to get out that the White House was paying legal fees, but that's not illegal. The evidence that the payment (to Hunt) was for silence proves the case of obstruction."

The prosecutors in the Watergate case also have testimony from conspirator James W. McCord Jr. that he was offered money to remain silent.

Hunt, the author of more than 40 spy-and-sex novels, relayed his initial demand to the White House within days of the Watergate arrests, investigative sources said, by cryptically warning: "The writer has a manuscript of a play to sell."

M. Douglas Caddy, the first attorney retained by Hunt and the other Watergate conspirators, relayed the message to Paul O'Brien, an attorney for the President's re-election committee, the sources said.

In turn, O'Brien, who has told investigators he was not aware of the identity of the "writer" or the precise meaning of the message, relayed it to John W. Dean III, then President Nixon's White House counsel, according to the sources.

At the White House, the sources said, the message about selling a manuscript or a play was clearly recognized as a threat from Hunt and shortly thereafter large cash disbursements began flowing to the conspirators, especially Hunt.

The initial payments to Hunt, according to the sources, were made by Frederick C. LaRue, an aide at the Nixon campaign committee, who delivered the cash either directly to Hunt or to Hunt's present attorney, William O. Bittman.

Bittman, the sources said, has acknowledged to investigators that he received three or four sealed envelopes from LaRue for delivery to Hunt, but maintains that he did not know that the envelopes contained money.

Meanwhile, the sources said, Hunt had been assured through representatives of the Committee for the Re-election of the President that he would receive executive clemency if he remained silent.

"Hunt viewed it as similar to a CIA operation," one source observed. "If a deal blows up, everybody's taken care of."

However, by the fall of 1972, Hunt "said he was damn dissatisfied with his channels to the White House and he was nervous whether the promises of executive

clemency were real," another source reported.

"So he wrote a three-page letter that he gave to Bittman with new demands . . . he upped the ante and demanded more direct channels with the White House and assurance of an executive clemency." The source added: "It kicked up a crisis at the White House."

At about this time, the sources reported, Hunt contacted then-presidential special counsel Colson, who had originally hired Hunt as a White House consultant.

Colson, according to the sources, taped the conversation with Hunt to protect his own interests and has supplied the recording to investigators. One source described the conversation as follows: "Hunt was very upset and threatened to talk, making it clear in some strong, if not wild language that he had better get more attention."

Later, at least two other threats by Hunt were conveyed to high White House officials, one of them by Bittman, who visited with Colson in the White House in December, according to investigators.

As previously reported, former White House counsel Dean told investigators that Bittman approached Colson in December to say that "something had to be done" to avoid a long jail term for Hunt.

Colson then passed the request along to Dean and John D. Ehrlichman, then the President's top domestic adviser, who answered, "I'll check," according to accounts of Dean's allegations.

Ehrlichman then walked into the President's Oval Office and returned with what he said was a promise of executive clemency for Hunt, according to Dean's version of events.

Ehrlichman instructed Colson to tell Bittman that "everything is ok" but not to be too specific in relaying the clemency offer, according to this account, which has been provided to the Washington Post by two sources and was initially reported in Newsweek magazine last month.

Bittman has declined to comment on the matter.

Hunt's final demand to the White House came on March 16, according to investigators, one week before he and his co-conspirators were to be sentenced.

"His wife was dead and he was going to jail. There was no one to take care of his children," one source said, and again Hunt asked for more money—\$130,000, according to several sources.

The demand, calling for \$130,000 plus legal fees and \$60,000 for legal

NEW YORK TIMES
18 JUNE 1973

To Check on C.I.A.

To the Editor:

On June 7 you printed a letter from Robert F. Drinan, Member of Congress, 4th Dist. Mass., in which he called "incredible" my statement, "... in my opinion the Congress has done a good job of checking on C.I.A. activities" (Op-Ed May 17).

Father Drinan then goes on to say that he was advised that only two members of Congress knew how much money was voted for C.I.A. in 1971, and the even more misleading statement, "... no one in the Congress yet knows how much money the C.I.A. spends or how it expends the amount allotted."

From 1953 through 1961, as Inspector General of C.I.A. I was charged by the Director with assisting in the supervision of the Agency's work with the Congress. From 1962 until I left the Government in 1965 as the Executive Director-Comptroller, I was in charge of the preparation of the budget and its presentation to the Appropriations Committees. In fact, the first budget hearing I attended was with C.I.A. Director Walter Bedell Smith in 1951 when Clarence Cannon of Missouri was chairman.

In this period covering some fifteen years C.I.A. gave to the committee a full report on its budget. In fact, under the chairmanship of Representative George Mahon of Texas, the House Appropriations Committee examined in even greater detail the amounts allotted and the rationale behind the expenditures. Further, members of the subcommittee were invited to examine details of the budget to whatever extent their time permitted.

As far as the Armed Services Committees are concerned, there never was any question but that the C.I.A. subcommittee members could inform themselves of whatever details about C.I.A., within whatever guidelines the chairman prescribed. Thus my statement about the quality of the Congressional check on C.I.A.

Father Drinan's letter does illustrate what I consider to be a situation not in the best interests of the nation: that some members of the Congress are not even aware of the extent of review of C.I.A. performed by the subcommittees in Appropriations and Armed Services in both houses.

(Prof.) LYMAN B. KIRKPATRICK JR.
Brown University
Providence, R. I., June 9, 1973

fees, was conveyed to White House counsel Dean, according to investigative sources.

Dean "hit the ceiling" upon receiving the message, in the words of one source, and refused to provide the funds, according to several sources.

"It was the beginning of the end," said one source. "By then the cover-up was falling apart."

Hunt's wife, Dorothy, was killed in a Chicago plane crash in December, and Hunt pleaded guilty to all charges against him at the Watergate trial in January. He is serving a 35-year provisional jail sentence. Children are being cared for by relatives.)

WASHINGTON POST
22 June 1973

President Opposed Hunt Hush Money

By Peter Osnos
Washington Post Staff Writer

President Nixon said on March 21 that a demand from Watergate conspirator E. Howard Hunt Jr. that he be paid as much as \$1 million for his continued silence about White House-initiated intelligence operations was "wrong, that it would not work (and) that the truth would come out anyway," according to a Senate Watergate committee memorandum.

The demand for money was relayed by then White House counsel John W. Dean III, according to the memorandum, which is based on information supplied the committee by the White House.

The President's response, the memorandum states, was: "How could it (the money) possibly be paid, 'What makes you think he would be satisfied with that?'"

The Senate Watergate committee memorandum is a summary compiled from information supplied orally and in writing by White House officials on the President's meetings with Dean from April, 1972, until April, 1973. Included are 37 meetings or telephone conversations that the White House says Mr. Nixon had with Dean between Feb. 27 and April 22 of this year.

Dean has reportedly told Senate investigators and federal prosecutors that he discussed aspects of the Watergate cover-up with Mr. Nixon or in Mr. Nixon's presence on at least 35 occasions between January and April, 1973. Dean has not yet, however, made those allegations under oath.

The White House version of those meetings disputes Dean's by stating that he did not tell Mr. Nixon until March 21 that a number of White House officials probably knew either about the bugging in advance or participated in the cover-up.

One of the charges reportedly made by Dean is that the President told Dean at a meeting shortly before the sentencing of the seven Watergate defendants March 23 that there would be no problem paying \$1 million to the conspirators for their continued silence. That money, Dean has supposedly told investigators, was to be in addition to \$460,000 paid to the conspir-

ators that Dean contends the President knew about.

The White House account of a discussion about the payment of \$1 million, which it says took place on March 21, deals with Hunt's demand for money. The Senate memorandum says that "Hunt was trying to blackmail (Presidential aide John D.) Ehrlichman about Hunt's prior plumber activities unless he was paid what ultimately might amount to \$1 million."

The "plumber" reference is to the White House "Special Investigations Unit" set up in July, 1971, after the publication of the Pentagon Papers, to plug news leaks to newspapers. Hunt was member of the unit. Ehrlichman has admitted knowing that Hunt broke into the Los Angeles office of the psychiatrist of Daniel Ellsberg, who leaked the Pentagon Papers to the press, but Ehrlichman did not report that break-in to police.

After Dean told Mr. Nixon of Hunt's demand, according to the Senate memorandum, the president said it was wrong, would not work and the truth would come out anyway.

Dean then said, the memorandum continues, "that a Cuban group could possibly be used to transfer the payments." No other mention of a \$1 million figure appears in the White House version of the Nixon-Dean meetings.

The memorandum, made available to some newspapers Wednesday and confirmed as authentic yesterday by knowledgeable sources, is the latest in a series of leaks this week concerning Dean's forthcoming testimony before the Senate select committee on the Watergate affair.

Dean had been scheduled to testify this week, but his appearance was put off until next week because of the visit of Soviet Communist Party General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev.

The purpose of the leaks is not clear. Some are evidently designed to discredit Dean's testimony; others may be intended to bolster his credibility; still others may have been leaked because of internal political friction within the Senate Watergate committee itself. In any event, the general intention of the leaks appears to be to influence public

opinion about Dean in advance of his nationally televised appearance next week.

The Senate committee's memorandum about the Dean-Nixon meetings began with the committee's request of White House logs of the sessions after the publication of Dean's allegations about what went on there. The White House turned over a seven-page listing of the dates, times and place of the meetings, along with who else was there and, in a few cases, what was discussed.

In response to the committee's request for more detailed information, White House officials, including Leonard Garment, the present White House counsel, and J. Fred Buzhardt, the President's special counsel, orally described the sessions for committee staff.

White House officials refused to comment yesterday on the substance of the Senate committee's memorandum, as it appeared in the press, saying it is based on the interpretation made by the Senate staff members of what Garment, Buzhardt and others told them.

The memorandum begins with a meeting September 15, 1972, the date of the indictments of the seven Watergate conspirators: "Dean reports on (Internal Revenue Service) IRS investigation of Larry (Lawrence F.) O'Brien (then the chairman of the Democratic Party). Dean reported on Watergate indictments."

(O'Brien, reacting yesterday to the disclosure that IRS was conducting an investigation of him, commented: "I have been subjected to intensive scrutiny by the IRS since 1970 upon my return as Democratic national chairman. Up to this point I had no reason to believe that the audits were on anything but the merits, now I'm not sure.")

(An O'Brien associate said that O'Brien had to hire a lawyer and accountant to deal with the IRS audit and the cost to him in fees was about \$10,000. The result of the audit was an adjustment upward in O'Brien's taxes of a few hundred dollars.)

On Feb. 28, 1973, the memorandum continues, "President inquired of Watergate, Dean said no White House involvement." Dean added that Nixon associates mentioned in connection with Watergate, including then special counsel Charles W. Colson and Maurice H. Stans, the Nixon campaign's chief fund-raiser, were victims of circumstance. "Dean suggested," according to the memorandum, "they make sure that wiretaps of previous years (other administrations) be made known."

On March 1, the President

was preparing for a press conference: "Was decided the question would come up as to why Dean was sitting in on FBI interviews and that reason was he was conducting an investigation for the President. President asked Dean to write a report. Dean was also critical of Gray (a reference to L. Patrick Gray III, then acting FBI director.)"

On March 13, the memorandum goes on, the President again asked about the involvement in Watergate of specific White House and campaign officials. For the first time, Dean said that Gordon Strachan, an aide to then White House chief of staff H. R. (Bob) Haldeman could have been involved.

March 17: "Dean again suggested they bring out the 1968 bugging and President said (then Attorney General Richard) Kleindienst had advised against it. Several names were discussed as possibly subject to attack: Colson, Haldeman, Ehrlichman, (former Attorney General and Nixon campaign director John N.) Mitchell and Dean."

The President asked Dean point-blank if he knew about the planned break-in in advance. Dean said no, there was no actual White House involvement regardless of appearances except possibly Strachan. Dean told President (that deputy campaign director Jeb Stuart) Magruder pushed (Watergate conspirator G. Gordon) Liddy hard but that Haldeman was not involved.

March 20: "The President called Dean that night and Dean said there was 'not a scintilla of evidence' to indicate White House involvement and Dean suggested he give the President a more in-depth briefing of what had transpired."

That call set the stage, according to the memorandum, for the meeting on March 21 when the President first learned of the probable involvement of his close associates in the Watergate affair. It was that meeting the President was apparently referring to when on April 17 he said he had learned important new facts about the case on March 21.

Two days later, Watergate conspirator James W. McCord Jr. made his celebrated accusation before U.S. District Court Judge John J. Sirica that perjury had been committed at the Watergate trial in January and political pressure applied on the defendants to keep them silent. Following McCord's public letter, disclosures about those in-

NEW YORK TIMES
22 JUNE 1973

Hunt Said to Get \$72,000 After a Threat to 'Tell All'

By SEYMOUR M. HERSH

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 21—E. Howard Hunt Jr. received a final cash payment of \$72,000 in mid-March after he had warned John D. Ehrlichman that he was ready to "tell all" about the White House operations against Dr. Daniel Ellsberg in 1971, sources close to the Watergate case said today.

The warning, the sources said, was included in a letter that Hunt sent to John W. Dean 3d, the former White House counsel, for relay to Mr. Ehrlichman, then President Nixon's domestic affairs adviser.

"He said 'Pass this along to Ehrlichman,'" according to a person who has seen the message. This source added that Hunt, who was given a provisional 35-year jail term on March 23 for his role in the Watergate break-in in June, 1972, demanded a payment of \$72,000 for himself and \$50,000 for attorney fees.

A few days before the letter was sent, another source said, Hunt told a former White House official that he was planning to write a book about Watergate unless he got more money. The Washington Post reported last week that the former Central Intelligence Agency official had received more than \$200,000 at the time of his renewed request.

Hunt, along with G. Gordon Liddy, the leader of the Watergate break-in team has been linked to the attempted burglary of the Los Angeles office of Dr. Ellsberg's psychiatrist in September, 1971. At the time, the two men were members of a special investigations unit that was set up under Mr. Ehrlichman inside the White House after the publication of the Pentagon papers in June, 1971.

On Sunday, The New York Times reported that Mr. Dean was prepared to tell the Senate Watergate committee in his televised testimony that he was told that President Nixon had authorized the break-in of the office of Dr. Ellsberg's psychiatrist.

Mr. Dean referred indirectly to the Hunt letter in his private testimony before the Senate Watergate committee last Saturday. Excerpts from that testimony were published in The New York Times today.

According to the summary, which was signed by Samuel Hays, the committee's secretary, Mr. Dean told of receiv-

ing the Hunt message containing the money demand. "Dean told Ehrlichman," the summary continued, "and Ehrlichman told Dean to call [former Attorney General John N.] Mitchell."

Package Delivered

The summary then quoted Mr. Dean as saying that on March 21 or March 22 of this year, "Ehrlichman asked Mitchell if Hunt's problem had been taken care of, and Mitchell said 'Yes.'"

A number of sources confirmed today that on either March 20 or March 21—days on which key White House advisers were discussing Watergate with President Nixon—a package containing \$72,000 was delivered by Frederick C. LaRue to the office of William O. Bittman, Hunt's attorney.

Mr. LaRue has been identified as the recipient of more than \$400,000 in cash that was ultimately used to help to finance the elaborate cover-up that began with cash payments in late summer of last year.

Both Mr. Dean and Mr. Ehrlichman have been repeatedly linked to payments reportedly made to the seven Watergate defendants in return for their silence.

The General Accounting Office reported last month that at least \$210,000 was raised last year by Herbert W. Kalmbach, President Nixon's former personnel attorney and a leading campaign fund-raiser. Investigators have determined that other cash was taken from a secret \$350,000 campaign fund that was set up in April, 1972, in the office of H. R. Haldeman, the former White House chief of staff.

Special Bank Account

In August, 1972, Mr. LaRue reportedly received \$70,000 in cash taken from the safe of Maurice H. Stans, the chairman of the Republican finance committee, for payoff purposes. In November, according to the published grand jury testimony of Gordon C. Strachan, then an aide to Mr. Haldeman, the entire \$350,000 cash fund was taken to Mr. LaRue's apartment.

Sources close to Mr. LaRue, who is now believed to be cooperating with Federal prosecu-

tors in the case, said that he had since placed the unused cover-up funds—totaling more than \$112,000—in a special bank account. He also returned some cash to representatives of Mr. Stans, who served as the chief Republican fund-raiser in the campaign, sources said.

Mr. LaRue will keep the cash in the bank, a friend said today, "until he finds somebody to take it back."

Some sources said today that they were puzzled by the discrepancy between the \$122,000 sought by Hunt in his message to Mr. Dean and the \$72,000 that was eventually provided him.

"They wouldn't dare bargain with a guy who's going to plow them out of the water," one lawyer close to the case said. The lawyer suggested that some of the cash had been "skimmed" by the participants in the payoff scheme.

According to the official White House version of the meetings between the President and Mr. Dean which was provided to the Senate this week and also published today in The New York Times, Mr. Nixon was told of the Hunt demand on March 21.

The summary quoted Mr. Dean as stating to the President that "Hunt was trying to blackmail Ehrlichman about Hunt's prior plumber [the informal name for the 1971 investigations unit] activities unless he was paid what, ultimately might amount to \$1-million."

The summary continued:

"The President said how could it possibly be paid. 'What makes you think he would be satisfied with that?' [He] stated it was blackmail, that it was wrong, that it would not work, that the truth would come out anyway."

One Justice Department official characterized Mr. Nixon's discussions with Mr. Dean—as described in the White House summary—as "very damaging" to the President.

"The moment he heard about this," the official said, "the President should have had Hunt arrested for blackmail."

In a memorandum submitted to the Senate Watergate committee early last month, James W. McCord Jr., another member of the Watergate team, told of a Hunt threat to a Republican lawyer in late 1972 in which he said that he could "blow the White House out of the Water." McCord also quoted Hunt as saying at another point that he had information that could impeach the President.

volved in the Watergate increased markedly.

There had been speculation that it was McCord's letter that forced the White House to confront the Watergate affair, but according to the Senate memorandum, Dean finally "gave the President his theory of what had happened" on March 21 and from then on the President moved quickly to deal with the situation.

"He (Dean) still said no prior June 17 White House knowledge," the memorandum states, "that Magruder probably knew, that Mitchell probably knew that Strachan probably knew, that Haldeman had possibly seen the fruits of the wiretaps through Strachan, that Ehrlichman was vulnerable because of his approval of (Herbert W.) Kalmbach's (fund-raising activity). [Kalmbach was then the President's personal lawyer who had allegedly raised hush money for the Watergate defendants], Colson had made the call to Magruder (urging him to approve a Liddy intelligence plan)."

Then came the discussion about Hunt's demand for more money. "Dean said Colson had talked to Hunt about executive clemency," the memorandum goes on.

"Dean said nothing of his role in regard to the cover-up money . . . This information was gone over twice, the last time in Haldeman's presence."

"Later that afternoon it was tentatively decided that everyone would go to the grand jury, however, Dean wanted immunity. Haldeman suggested that they write the whole thing out and release it from the White House. Ehrlichman said there should be no executive privilege claim and that no one should ask for immunity. The President told them to discuss these matters with Mitchell."

On March 23, the memorandum says, the President told Dean to go to Camp David and on March 30 "after it became obvious Dean would write no report the President directed Ehrlichman to investigate."

The final meeting was on April 16: "The President asks Dean to resign. Had two drafts prepared for Dean's signature. Dean demanded Haldeman and Ehrlichman resign also."

On April 30, the President ordered Dean to submit his resignation—which Dean did—but the two did not meet that day.

WASHINGTON POST

21 June 1973

Hunt Says Colson Ordered Break-In at Bremer Home

By Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein
Washington Post Staff Writers

About an hour after the attempt to assassinate Alabama Gov. George C. Wallace last year, special presidential counsel Charles W. Colson ordered E. Howard Hunt Jr. to fly immediately to Milwaukee and illegally break into the apartment of Wallace's suspected assailant, according to accounts of sworn testimony by Hunt.

Colson told Hunt to bring back information from the apartment of the suspect, Arthur H. Bremer, that might be useful in linking Bremer to left-wing political causes, according to the accounts of Hunt's testimony.

Hunt, then a White House consultant, said he never went to Milwaukee. He told Colson he could not get there soon enough to commit the burglary without running a high risk of getting caught, according to accounts of recent testimony by Hunt to a closed-door session of the Senate's Watergate investigating committee.

Colson categorically denied to The Washington Post that he had ordered Hunt to Milwaukee for any purpose.

Hunt's attorney, William O. Bittman, confirmed on Tuesday that Hunt told Senate investigators that he was ordered by Colson to bring back information from Milwaukee about Bremer, the 21-year-old busboy who has since been convicted in the May 15, 1972, Wallace assassination attempt.

"There is no question," Bittman said, "that there was testimony about that . . . Colson asked him (Hunt) to go to Milwaukee and go into Bremer's apartment . . . I don't have a clear recollection of the reason why he was to go out there. I don't recall whether the word 'break-in' was involved."

Hunt, a former CIA agent, pleaded guilty in January to all charges against him in the Watergate conspiracy and is now serving a 35-year, provisional jail sentence.

Within hours of the Wallace assassination attempt, a White House official was asked by the Washington Post about the identity of the governor's attacker. During a subsequent conversation that evening, the official raised the possibility of Bremer's connection to leftist causes and the campaign of Sen. George McGovern, through literature found in his apartment.

The Associated Press, in a dispatch that May night, quoted a source close to the investigation as saying that scraps of paper found in Bremer's apartment "showed he allied himself with 'left-wing causes.'"

On the evening of the Wallace shooting, reporters said they were able to enter the Bremer apartment during a 1½-hour period shortly after the assassination attempt. Several said they entered only after FBI

agents had been there once and left, and that agents later arrived at the apartment again, sealed it off and thereafter refused to let reporters enter.

The FBI, which moved into the case immediately, has never fully explained why Bremer's apartment was not guarded to prevent access to the apartment by reporters.

Among items found by reporters in Bremer's untidy apartment were a Black Panther newspaper, a book depicting comic strip characters performing sexual acts, a Confederate flag, some Wallace campaign literature, two boxes of bullets and seven targets for pistol shooting.

According to the accounts of Hunt's sworn testimony to the Watergate committee, Hunt said that after a telephone call from Colson ordering him to Milwaukee, Hunt went to his home in Potomac, Md.

Apparently in a second telephone conversation, according to the accounts of his testimony, Hunt told Colson that it would take at least four hours to reach Milwaukee, at which time Bremer's apartment would be staked out by the FBI—thus making a successful burglary impossible.

After that, the sources said, Hunt testified the mission was aborted because it was apparent that an illegal entry was clearly impossible.

In denying that he asked Hunt to go to Milwaukee, Colson said it is "absolutely untrue and I'd swear it is untrue under oath."

Colson, in a telephone call to The Washington Post last night, called the "charge . . . an utterly preposterous one." He said he did "not believe that it could be an accurate report of any testimony that the Senate committee has received."

Colson said last night that it would be irresponsible "to take that (Hunt's testimony) seriously without checking the conditions" and "great duress" under which Hunt testified—a reference to an altercation between Hunt and his cellmate the night before Hunt appeared before the Senate committee on June 11.

Hunt's attorney, Bittman, said last night that Hunt had only three hours sleep "in a day and half" before he appeared before the committee and that he (Bittman) had therefore asked the

committee for permission to review the record of Hunt's testimony and amend it later, if necessary. Bittman said he and Hunt had not yet reviewed the testimony and that "there is always the possibility for mistakes" under what he called "the unfortunate timing of Mr. Hunt's appearance."

Colson provided a reporter a copy of a memo dated June 20, 1972, five weeks after the Wallace shooting and the day that Hunt's possible involvement in the Watergate operation was first made public. In the memo, titled "memorandum for the files," Colson said:

"I also talked to him (Hunt) on the telephone the night Governor Wallace was shot simply to ask for his reactions on what he thought might have been the cause of the attempted assassination. (Hunt was known of something of an expert of psychological warfare and motivations when in the CIA.)"

Colson said he provided a copy of the memo to then presidential counsel John W. Dean III on Aug. 29. In a covering memo to Dean, however, Colson said "I cannot be sure that my memory is all that precise."

After checking White House logs, Colson said Tuesday that he had dinner with the President the night of the Wallace assassination attempt and could not have talked to Hunt until after 10:45 p.m. Colson said it would have been wholly illogical for him to order Hunt to Milwaukee at that hour when there were no planes and the FBI should have been swarming all over Bremer's apartment.

(Hunt's testimony places the order from Colson about an hour after the 4 p.m. assassination attempt.)

In addition, Colson said that he was in regular contact that night with Assistant FBI Director W. Mark Felt, urging Felt to insure that the FBI was on the case fully. "Would it have been logical for me to push in the FBI and simultaneously order Hunt to Milwaukee?" Colson asked.

FBI sources said that the FBI moved immediately into the case before receiving word from the White House, but confirmed that Colson had talked several times with Felt. The President asked for a personal FBI briefing every 30 minutes the evening of May 15 on developments in the case, the sources said.

Senate sources said they place a different interpretation on Colson's June 20, 1972, memo for the files. One Senate attorney said, "The Watergate had blown,

Hunt was going to be nailed, and Colson writes a memo for his files to get his version down on paper of all the other expeditions Hunt had done, for the White House."

In the three-page Colson memo, Colson attempts generally to dissociate himself from Hunt's activities, including the Watergate operation.

Gov. Wallace, a candidate for the Democratic presidential nomination at the time of the attempt on his life, was shot by Bremer in a shopping center at Laurel, Md.

It has been established that Bremer stalked President Nixon to Canada during the President's 1972 state visit to Ottawa from April 12 to 15—a month before the Wallace assassination attempt. In his diary, Bremer contended that he narrowly missed several opportunities to shoot the President.

One White House source said that when President Nixon was informed of the shooting, he became deeply upset and voiced concern that the attempt on Gov. Wallace's life might have been made by someone with ties to the Republican Party or the Nixon campaign.

If such a tie existed, the source said, the President indicated it could cost him the election, which was then less than six months away.

"The President was agitated and wanted the political background on Bremer," the source said.

Hunt's allegations represent the third time in recent weeks that Colson's name has figured in reports of burglaries that purportedly were planned or carried out under White House supervision.

In the first instance, Hunt told the Watergate grand jury that, after returning from the 1971 break-in at the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist in Los Angeles, he went to Colson's office with photographs taken during the burglary.

"I have something that might be of interest to you," Hunt testified he told Colson, adding: "It has to do with my activities this past weekend."

According to Hunt's testimony, Colson told him "I don't want to hear anything about them" and left the room.

In the other instance, John J. Caulfield, a White House intelligence operative, told federal prosecutors that Colson had suggested to him that he burglarize and fire-bomb an office in the Brookings Institution occupied by Morton Halperin, a friend of Ellsberg and a former aide to Dr. Henry Kissinger, Mr.

Nixon's chief aide in foreign affairs.

Colson denied making the fire-bombing suggestion to Caulfield, and an associate of Colson said such a remark might have been made as a "joke." Colson has acknowledged attending a discussion among other White House aides about the possibility of retrieving information from the Brookings Institution by unspecified means.

Last week, Jeb Stuart Magruder, the deputy director of the Nixon re-election campaign, testified before the Senate committee that he made "the assumption" that Colson knew of plans to bug the Watergate before Democratic headquarters were placed under illegal electronic surveillance.

According to Magruder's testimony, Colson called him during February "and asked me in a sense would we get off the stick and get the budget approved for Mr. Liddy's plans"—a reference to Watergate conspirator G. Gordon Liddy. Magruder testified, that Colson "did not mention . . . anything relating to wiretapping or espionage at that time."

Magruder, added however, that Liddy only had one set of plans and those involved wiretapping.

In Colson's memo for the files that he said was dictated on June 20, 1972, he states:

"... Hunt dropped by my office with Gordon Liddy from the (Nixon re-election) committee. I believe this was in February . . . Both he and Liddy said that they had some elaborate proposals prepared for security activities for the committee, but they had been unable to get approval from the Attorney General (John N. Mitchell).

"I explained that Mitchell would soon be at the committee (as campaign manager) and that they should be persistent and see him because he was the only one who could authorize work they would be doing.

"While Liddy and Hunt were in my office, I called Jeb Magruder and urged them to resolve whatever it was that Hunt and Liddy wanted to do and to be sure he had an opportunity to listen to their plans. At this point Hunt said he wanted to fill me in and I said it wasn't necessary because it was of no concern to me, but that I would be glad to urge that their proposals, whatever they were, be considered.

"There was no discussion that I can recall of what it was that they were planning to do other than the fact that I have the distinct impression that it involved security at the convention and/or gathering intelligence

tional Convention."

In an interview an associate of Colson's said that despite Colson's realization that Hunt "came up with some very crazy ideas," Colson had no curiosity about the details of the intelligence-gathering plan and recommended its consideration sight-unseen.

"Colson was too busy, too involved in other things," the associate said.

Colson and his law partner, David I. Shapiro, have been actively campaigning in recent weeks to prove that neither Colson nor President Nixon knew of the

Watergate bugging nor were they involved in the Watergate cover-up and that both have been unjustly accused.

According to reliable sources, Colson has several documents showing that former White House chief of staff H. R. Haldeman and others attempted to blame Colson for some campaign espionage and sabotage.

Despite repeated charges that Colson was involved in the Watergate and other questionable if not illegal campaign tactics, some government investigators, now believe that Colson may not be charged with any law violations.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, SATURDAY, JUNE 23, 1973

McCord Says He Alerted C.I.A. To Scapegoat Plan in Break-In

By MAJORIE HUNTER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 22 — James McCord Jr., one of the convicted Watergate conspirators, said today that he had alerted the director of Central Intelligence last year that efforts were being made to get the agency to take the blame for the Watergate break-in.

McCord said that he issued his warning in a letter to Richard M. Helms, at that time director of the agency and now Ambassador to Iran.

The Helms letter, he said, was one of seven that he had sent to officials of the agency between July 29 of last year and Jan. 5 of this year.

"I felt that an attempt was being made to wrongfully lay the blame for Watergate on the C.I.A.," he said.

McCord spoke as he emerged from three hours of questioning by the House Armed Services subcommittee on Intelligence Operations, which is looking into the agency's affair.

The session was closed, but both McCord and the subcommittee chairman, Representative Lucien N. Nedzi, Democrat of Michigan, confirmed that McCord had discussed the letters extensively during his testimony.

That earliest letter, sent to Mr. Helms, was signed "Jim" but the others were unsigned, according to Mr. McCord.

Asked why he had not signed the others, McCord said that he "wanted to be sure" his name would not be generally known "in case the letters got out of channels."

McCord had worked as a C.I.A. agent for some 20 years before retiring several years before the Watergate break-in last June 17. At the time of the Watergate affair, he was secu-

rity officer for the Republican re-election committee.

Officials of the agency had told the Nedzi subcommittee several weeks ago that letters believed to have been written by McCord had been received, but that nothing had been done about them because various persons who read them assumed "the other guy" would take some action.

McCord said today that he had mentioned the name of his former attorney, Gerald Alch, as being among those who had suggested to him that the agency shoulder the blame.

"I don't recall specifically if others were mentioned in the letters," he said.

McCord had testified before the Senate Watergate committee in May that Mr. Alch had suggested to him that James Schlesinger, who succeeded Mr. Helms as C.I.A. director, would "go along" with a plan to have the agency say that McCord was on its payroll at the time of the break-in.

Mr. Schlesinger later denied any knowledge of such a plan.

Representative Nedzi said that McCord told the subcommittee today that he first suspected efforts to involve the C.I.A. last summer after a conversation he had with Mrs. E. Howard Hunt Jr., wife of another Watergate conspirator.

"He was vague about what she had told him," Mr. Nedzi said, "but he said it planted a definite suspicion in his mind."

Mrs. Hunt was killed in the crash of an airplane over Chicago. She had \$10,000 in cash in her purse at the time.

The Nedzi subcommittee hopes to explore this matter further by questioning Hunt, who has been subpoenaed for questioning next Thursday. He has not appeared before any of the Congressional panels investigating the Watergate affair.

THE EVENING STAR and DAILY NEWS
Washington, D. C., Wednesday, June 20, 1973

Ervin Panel to Probe CIA Links

By Fred Barnes
Star-News Staff Writer

The special Senate Watergate committee has decided to investigate the possible involvement of the Central Intelligence Agency in the Watergate affair.

Staff members for committee, which is to resume its public hearings next week, have already begun work in preparation for calling witnesses to testify about any CIA link, sources said.

Specifically, these steps have been taken:

○ The committee has requested the transcripts of closed-door hearings of a Senate Appropriations subcommittee which looked into the CIA matter. The subcommittee agreed yesterday to provide the transcripts.

○ Committee staffers are drawing up a list of likely witnesses for the CIA probe which includes Gen. Vernon Walters, the deputy director of the agency, and Gen. Robert Cushman, his predecessor in that job.

○ A Senate Armed Services subcommittee has handed over to the Watergate committee a collection of classified documents which it had obtained in the course of its own CIA inquiry.

Walters and Cushman are not included on the list of Watergate witnesses which the committee released earlier, nor is former CIA director Richard Helms,

another potential witness.

But the list includes several witnesses who are now expected to be questioned by the committee about possible CIA involvement as well as about other Watergate matters.

These are former acting FBI director L. Patrick Gray and one-time White House aides John W. Dean III, John L. Ehrlichman, H. R. Haldeman, Egil Krogh, David Young and Charles Colson.

Walters, Cushman and Helms have already testified before one or more of the three congressional subcommittees, two in the Senate and one in the House, which have been looking into the CIA question in recent weeks.

THOUGH THE hearings have been in executive session, a series of revelations have emerged from them which have fueled speculation about a CIA link to the Watergate.

Among other things, a memorandum written a year ago by Walters was disclosed in which he said that Haldeman, then chief of the White House staff, had ordered him to interfere with the FBI's investigation of the Watergate case.

And Cushman told the Senate Appropriations subcommittee that Ehrlichman called him in 1971 to clear the way for E. Howard Hunt to make contact with the

that summer.

But it supported testimony made recently by Gen. Robert E. Cushman Jr., commandant of the United States Marine Corps.

Hunt had been employed that summer by the White House as a member of a special team—dubbed "the plumbers"—created to track down leaks of sensitive national security information, including the Pentagon papers detailing American involvement in Southeast Asia.

Using a wig and various other equipment supplied to him by the C.I.A., Hunt was subsequently involved in burglarizing the California office of the former psychiatrist to Dr. Daniel Ellsberg, the principal defendant in the Pentagon papers trial.

Hunt was also later convicted of conspiracy in the break-in at Democratic national headquarters in the Watergate complex on June 17, 1972.

Mr. Colson's testimony today appeared to deepen the mystery of White House efforts to involve the C.I.A. in domestic

CIA.

At the time, Hunt was a member of a special White House team—the "plumbers"—which was assigned to track down leaks of sensitive national security information.

Later in 1971, Hunt was able to get in touch with CIA officials, and he obtained equipment from them that was reportedly used in the September 1971 burglary of the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist in Los Angeles.

EHRlichman, however, has denied that he ever talked to Cushman about allowing Hunt access to CIA officials. The Watergate committee is expected to attempt to clear up this conflict in testimony.

Haldeman, too, has denied the allegation against him, saying that he never sought to have the CIA block the FBI investigation of the Watergate break-in.

Sen. John L. McClellan, D-Ark., said yesterday he has concluded from his Appropriations subcommittee's CIA probe that the agency has acted improperly in involving itself in domestic affairs.

According to the law which established the agency, the CIA is supposed to deal only in intelligence matters related to foreign affairs.

McClellan said that his subcommittee has complet-

activities, both before and after the Watergate affair.

During a two-hour appearance before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Intelligence Operations, Mr. Colson testified:

"On the 7th or possibly the 8th of July [which would have been by phone] I told Mr. Ehrlichman that Mr. Hunt wanted to establish liaison with the C.I.A. as well as with other Government agencies.

"The need for contact with the C.I.A. was immediate in that one of Mr. Hunt's first assignments was to interview a Lieut. Col. Lucien Conein, who had been a principal C.I.A. operative during the period of the Diem coup (in South Vietnam)."

Previous testimony by C.I.A. officials had made no mention of Hunt's interest in Colonel Conein during his initial efforts to obtain assistance from the intelligence agency.

General Cushman, at that time deputy director of the

ed its investigation for the time being, even though three witnesses—Young, Dean and Krogh—declined invitations to testify.

IN THE FINAL session yesterday, the subcommittee questioned Colson for more than two hours. Colson revealed at the hearing that he had acted in 1971 to clear the way for Hunt to contact a top CIA agent.

He said that he spoke to Ehrlichman about Hunt's interest in talking to the agent, Lt. Col. Lucien Conein. It was unclear exactly why Hunt wanted to contact Conein, whose field of expertise was South Vietnam.

Meanwhile, the Senate Armed Services subcommittee headed by Sen. Stuart Symington, D-Mo., is continuing its work on declassifying some of the secret documents it has collected during continuing probe of a possible CIA-Watergate link.

And the House Armed Services subcommittee headed by Rep. Lucien Nedzi, D-Mich., will continue its CIA hearings on Friday when James McCord, one of the seven convicted Watergate conspirators, will testify.

Hunt is also a convicted conspirator in the Watergate scandal and is currently serving a 35-year term at D. C. Jail.

agency, told several Congressional committees in recent weeks that Mr. Ehrlichman had telephoned him on July 7, 1971, to ask that Hunt be given some assistance, at that time unspecified.

General Cushman also testified that Hunt had appeared at the C.I.A. headquarters on July 22 of that year to ask for "technical services" to enable him to conduct "a very sensitive one-time interview that the White House wanted him to hold."

General Cushman testified that he then supplied Hunt with a wig, a small camera, a device to alter the voice, and false identification papers. He said, however, he had been unaware that the equipment would be used in a burglary. Asked today if Hunt had also sought help in locating Colonel Conein—as suggested in the Colson testimony—General Cushman replied, "I have no further comment."

Colonel Conein, now a con-

NEW YORK TIMES
20 JUNE 1973

COLSON CITES CALL ON C.I.A. 'LIAISON'

By MARJORIE HUNTER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 19—Charles W. Colson, a former White House aide, told a Senate panel today that he had personally asked John D. Ehrlichman to help E. Howard Hunt Jr. establish "liaison with the C.I.A." in the summer of 1971.

Mr. Colson's testimony would seem to refute the recent denial by Mr. Ehrlichman, the former top Nixon domestic aide, that he had made any approach to the Central Intelligence Agency to ask that Hunt be given whatever assistance he might need

NEW YORK TIMES
15 JUNE 1973

Colson Says He Put Hunt on I.T.T. Job

By E. W. KENWORTHY

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 14 — Charles W. Colson, former White House special counsel, confirmed publicly today that he had directed E. Howard Hunt Jr. to go to Denver in March, 1972, and interview Mrs. Dita D. Beard, Washington lobbyist for the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation, about her memorandum linking a promised \$400,000 campaign contribution with Administration help in settling an antitrust suit.

Disclosure of that memo by Jack Anderson, the columnist, on Feb. 29, 1972, was the occasion for the reopening of hearings by the Senate Judiciary Committee on the nomination of Richard G. Kleindienst to be Attorney General.

During the two months of hearings, high Administration officials denied that an out-of-court settlement that allowed I.T.T. to retain the Hartford Fire Insurance Company in return for divestiture of several other companies was related in any way to the I.T.T. pledge of up to \$400,000 in support for the Republican National Convention then planned for San Diego.

'Noble Commitment' Cited

Mrs. Beard had written her superior, William R. Merriam, vice president in charge of I.T.T.'s Washington office, that "our noble commitment has gone a long way toward our negotiations on the merger coming out as Hal [Harold S. Geneen, I.T.T. president] wants them."

After the memo was disclosed, Mrs. Beard disappeared from sight for several days. She was discovered in a Denver hospital under treatment for a heart attack. Later her attorney there, David Fleming, issued a statement by her that the Anderson memo was fraudulent, although some of its phrasing was identical to a memo she had actually written.

Last Feb. 8, Newsday reported that Mr. Hunt, the Watergate conspirator, had gone to Denver under Mr. Colson's orders and

interviewed Mrs. Beard. It was later reported that Mr. Hunt had appeared before Mrs. Beard in a red wig.

Today before the House Commerce Subcommittee on Investigations, Mr. Colson said under questioning that Mr. Hunt had suggested that he interview Mrs. Beard, and that he, Mr. Colson, had agreed to the plan.

Authenticity Issue 'Central'

Mr. Colson explained that at the time a task force investigating the Beard memo had become suspicious that the Anderson version was "not authentic."

The question of authenticity "had become critical for the Administration," Mr. Colson said, because the memo had become "central to whether Kleindienst would be confirmed."

Mr. Colson said he was firmly convinced now that the Anderson memo was not authentic. He gave as his reasons the fact that Mrs. Beard's secretary had denied typing it, that Mr. Merriam had never seen it, and that "the most incriminating sentences were non sequiturs."

Later, Intertel, a concern of private investigators, said first that the Anderson memo had not been typed on Mrs. Beard's typewriter. Intertel later said the memo had been typed on her typewriter, but that its authenticity was doubted. The Federal Bureau of Investigation had obtained the Anderson memo, which was an original copy, and stated that it had been typed on Mrs. Beard's typewriter and roughly on the date at the top, June 24, 1971.

Mr. Colson told the subcommittee that he had seen the copy given by the Senate committee to the F.B.I., and that John W. Dean 3d, the White House counsel, had shown it to him. He said he did not know how Mr. Dean had obtained it, but added that Mr. Dean was White House "liaison with the F.B.I."

Other Memos Discussed

Mr. Colson was also questioned at length about several interoffice memos and letters by I.T.T. officers to Administration officials dealing with a meeting that he and John D.

Ehrlichman, former Presidential assistant for domestic affairs, had had with Mr. Geneen and Mr. Merriam in Mr. Ehrlichman's office on Aug. 4, 1970.

Mr. Colson said that the "thrill" of the discussion was "the Administration's antitrust suits against I.T.T. even though they were obviously on Mr. Geneen's mind."

At the outset of the hearing, Charles Morin, Mr. Colson's law partner, sought to explain a memo he had written to Mr. Colson and Henry C. Cashen, another partner, last April 13.

In that memo, Mr. Morin had suggested that they "lean" on G. Bradford Cook, then chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, but since resigned, to get him to name King Mallory as S.E.C. general counsel. Mr. Morin proposed that they solicit influence from Mr. Ehrlichman, Kenneth Cole, his deputy, and Jerry Jones, a White House aide in charge of recruiting for top Administration posts.

"This is one of the chips we really should pick up, because it is a key job in the commission and one of extreme importance to us in representing our clients," Mr. Morin had written.

Today Mr. Morin told the subcommittee that the memo was "a silly document" dictated "off the top of my head." He said that he had no idea of "placing" a general counsel at the S.E.C. who would be beholden to the firm, and that he was simply concerned to get Mr. Mallory in the post because of his qualifications for dealing with "antitrust problems" before the S.E.C.

"I never heard the expression 'pick up the chips,'" Mr. Morin said.

"I am known for my colorful language," he said. "I guess I am pretty naive about politics and the language of politics. Perhaps this is the result of the fact that I come from Boston."

Mr. Colson said that neither he nor Mr. Cashen ever did anything about the memo, although Mr. Colson acknowledged that he had written a note on the memo to Mr. Cashen saying: "I'll call Cook if necessary, but I think Jerry Jones could lock this one for us."

sultant in the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, said later today that Hunt talked to him "some-time that summer," seeking information about Dr. Ellsberg and "asking what I might know about the Pentagon papers case."

Colonel Conein said that he told Hunt he had had no contact with Dr. Ellsberg since 1967 and knew nothing about the Pentagon papers.

Colonel Conein was the C.I.A.'s liaison with the group of Vietnamese generals who overthrew the regime of Ngo Dinh Diem, the President of South Vietnam, in 1963. Mr. Diem was killed in the coup. Colonel Conein was also part of a team, along with Dr. Ellsberg, that served as advisers to Henry Cabot Lodge when he was named Ambassador to South Vietnam.

Public Disclosure

Mr. Colson testified in closed session today, but his comments about asking Mr. Ehrlichman to help establish intelligence agency liaison for Hunt were made public later by Senator John L. McClellan, chairman of the subcommittee investigating C.I.A. involvement in the Watergate affair.

Senator McClellan noted what he termed the discrepancies between the Colson and Ehrlichman testimony over White House efforts to involve the intelligence agency.

NEW YORK TIMES
16 JUNE 1973

British Journalist Attacks U.S. Press As Unfair to Nixon

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 15—A British journalist accused the American press today of failing to discharge its duty "to be fair to the President" in the Watergate affair.

"The press of the United States has a duty to be fair to the President," William Rees-Mogg, editor of The Times of London, said in a speech at the National Press Club. But the nation's press, taken together and not individually, is not discharging that duty, he said.

The 44-year-old Mr. Rees-Mogg, in an editorial in The Times on June 5, described the President as in the "unenviable position of being tried by his fellow countrymen in three different forums"—the Senate Watergate committee, the Watergate grand jury and the press.

Mr. Rees-Mogg accused the press of failing to give credit to Mr. Nixon for his "major contributions" in foreign affairs. "The press is not willing to give credit where credit is due," he said.

In a question-and-answer session after his talk, Mr. Rees-Mogg said that the "role of a fair trial is even more fundamental than a free press."

"The press cannot claim that the First Amendment is a shield of override on the Constitution," he said.

NEW YORK TIMES

15 JUNE 1973

Nixon Not Implicated in the Conspiracy by Campaign Aide

By WALTER RUGABER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 14—Jet Stuart Magruder, the former deputy director of President Nixon's 1972 re-election campaign, told a first-hand story today of how he and other high-ranking officials had plotted the bugging of the Democrats and then tried to cover it up.

In 5½ hours of nationally televised testimony before the Senate Watergate committee, the 38-year-old Mr. Magruder confessed his own guilt and implicated a number of former Administration officials—including John N. Mitchell, John W. Dean 3d and H. R. Haldeman—but not the President.

Mr. Magruder said that Mr. Mitchell, a former Attorney General, and Mr. Dean, former White House counsel, had been among those who planned the Watergate bugging as part of a broader espionage campaign. He said that he told Mr. Haldeman, the President's former chief of staff, the full story last January.

An Early Decision

The cover-up effort was decided on almost immediately after the arrests on June 17, 1972, of five men inside the Watergate headquarters of the Democratic National Committee, Mr. Magruder testified, and among those who knew that he would lie to authorities about the case were Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Dean and H. R. Haldeman, then the White House chief of staff.

Mr. Magruder said that he had felt the President had had no knowledge of the spying operation but added that he had been afraid Mr. Nixon's re-election "would be probably negated" if the story was revealed.

Senator Howard H. Baker Jr. of Tennessee, the Republican vice chairman of the committee, asked Mr. Magruder whether the decision on concealing the truth should have been made by the President.

"Sir, I can't comment as to whether he did or did not or was involved in it," Mr. Magruder testified. "I had no dealings directly with the President."

The tanned witness traced for a closely listening audience what he said was the development of the conspiracy. He said that at one point it included plans to kidnap radicals and

entice Democrats with "call girls" operating on a yacht in Miami Beach.

He said that a principal aim in wiretapping telephones at Watergate was to cripple politically Lawrence F. O'Brien, then Democratic National Chairman and a man "who could be very difficult in the coming campaign."

Mr. Magruder, once a rising White House figure with large political ambitions, testified readily, calmly and almost matter-of-factly about the events that finally broke his career.

Scattered through his testimony were glimpses of the personal relations and the stresses and conflicts that finally led him to tell his story in mid-April to the United States Attorney's office here.

He said, for example, that tensions shot up on March 23 when Chief Judge John J. Sirica of the United States District Court here read a letter from a convicted conspirator, James W. McCord.

McCord has indicated that it was a picture of Mr. Magruder and his family, showing them in a relaxed pose during the Watergate trial, that contributed to his decision to tell what he knew about higher-ups in the plot.

Mr. Magruder, once reported to be badly shaken by the impending collapse of the cover-up, said today that he had agreed to plead guilty to one count of conspiracy and to become a prosecution witness in the trial of others.

He has been granted immunity from prosecution on his testimony before the Senate, but this does not preclude criminal prosecution, and he told the committee today that "for those errors in judgment that I made, I take full responsibility."

As early as September, 1971, Mr. Magruder began, there were discussions with Mr. Dean on political intelligence operations. The talk began in earnest in December, when G. Gordon Liddy arrived at the Committee for the Re-election of the President, he said.

Liddy, convicted with McCord in January, was to be the Nixon organization's lawyer, but Mr. Magruder testified that Liddy and Mr. Dean and unidentified other people on the White House staff had been discussing a "broad-gauged intelligence plan."

Projects Are Described

On Jan. 27, 1972, Liddy presented his plan to Messrs. Mitchell, Dean and Magruder at a meeting in the then Attorney General's office at the Department of Justice, Mr. Magruder said.

The projects included "wiretapping, electronic surveillance and photography [of documents]," Mr. Magruder said, and theretore plans "relating to the abduction of individuals."

"Mr. Liddy had a plan where the leaders [of radical groups] would be abducted and detained in a place like Mexico, and that they would then be returned to this country at the

end of the convention," the witness said.

There were also the call girls, and Liddy "envisioned renting a yacht in Miami and having it set up for sound and photographs" during the Democratic National Convention there.

All this would cost \$1-million, Mr. Magruder said, and "all three of us were appalled" at the "scope and size of the project." Mr. Mitchell was said to have told Liddy to "go back to the drawing boards and come up with a more realistic plan."

The "general nature" of the first Liddy plan was relayed to Gordon C. Strachan, an assistant to Mr. Haldeman who dealt with the President's political organization.

The committee was voted to seek immunity for Mr. Strachan, but the Department of Justice has moved under the immunity statutes to delay his appearance on Capitol Hill for 30 days.

A \$500,000 Plan

Mr. Magruder said that he and Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Dean gathered again on Feb. 4, 1972, and that Liddy presented them with a \$500,000 plan, trimmed of everything but wiretapping and photography.

The four men talked over prospective "targets," the witness said, and these included the Democratic National Committee headquarters, the party's convention headquarters at the Fontainebleau Hotel in Miami Beach and Democratic Presidential campaign offices.

Either Mr. Mitchell or Mr. Dean—Mr. Magruder said he couldn't remember who it was—talked about the "potential for an entry" at the offices of Hank Greenspun, publisher of the Las Vegas Sun. He was thought to have "information relating to Senator [Edmund S.] Muskie, then a leading Presidential contender."

Samuel Dash, the committee's chief counsel, asked Mr. Magruder about the object of the plan. At the time, the witness said, there was concern about Mr. O'Brien. He explained:

"... I think there was a general concern that if he was allowed to continue as Democratic National Chairman—because he was certainly their most professional, at least from our standpoint, their most professional political operator—that he could be very difficult in the coming campaign. So we had hoped that information might discredit him."

Despite this increasing interest, Mr. Magruder said, Mr. Mitchell still "just didn't feel comfortable" with the plan, even at the reduced level. But Liddy was encouraged to keep trying.

Sometime after the Feb. 4 meeting, Mr. Magruder testified he received a telephone call from Charles W. Colson, then special counsel to the President.

"[He] called me one evening and asked me in a sense to get off the stick and get the budget approved for Mr. Liddy's

plans, that we needed information, particularly on Mr. O'Brien," the witness said. "He did not mention... anything about wiretapping or espionage at that time."

On March 30, 1972, Mr. Magruder said, he took Liddy's third proposal to Key Biscayne, Fla., and discussed it with Mr. Mitchell and Frederick S. Larue, an assistant to the former Attorney General.

Liddy had cut the cost to \$250,000, with the wiretapping and photography projects retained. No one "particularly overwhelmed," Mr. Magruder said, but he quoted Mr. Mitchell as giving his approval as follows:

"Okay, let's give him a quarter of a million dollars, and let's see what he [Liddy] can come up with." Mr. Magruder came back to Washington "and notified the parties of Mr. Mitchell's approval." Liddy and Mr. Strachan were informed, the witness said.

Mr. Mitchell has acknowledged that the bugging plans were presented to him at various times, but he has insisted that he disapproved them on each occasion. The former Attorney General made no comment today.

Mr. LaRue, a Jackson, Miss., businessman, has refused to talk with reporters. He could not be reached today, nor could Mr. Strachan. Mr. Dean is expected to testify before the Senate committee next week.

The loss of the wiretapped conversations and photographs of documents in the Democratic files reached Mr. Magruder in two packages, the first one a week or so after the tap was installed in May.

Mr. Mitchell was shown the illicitly gathered information at a morning meeting, Mr. Magruder said, and the former Attorney General "reviewed the documents" and reacted as follows:

"He simply indicated that this was not satisfactory, and it was worthless and not worth the money that he [Liddy] had been paid for it. ... There was no information relating to any of the subjects he hoped to receive. ..."

'Lack of Substance'

Mr. Strachan came over from the White House to examine the data, Mr. Magruder said, and he, too, talked about "the lack of substance" in them.

A second tap at the Watergate worked, but the one on Mr. O'Brien's telephone did not, and early on the morning of June 17 five men under Liddy's direction broke in again to repair things.

Mr. Magruder was in Los Angeles when the news of the arrests came through later that day. He was having breakfast at the Beverly Hills Hotel, and Liddy called to say "there had been a problem the night before."

Mr. Haldeman called the next day, Mr. Magruder said, "and asked me the basic background of the break-in and what happened." The White House adviser said "I should get back to Washington immediately," the witness added.

Washington Post
17 June 1973

FBI and Domestic Spying: What Was and Is Its Role?

Bureau Hurt By Watergate

By Laurence Stern
Washington Post Staff Writer

Once upon a time the FBI had the highest public relations profile in Washington—its exploits celebrated on radio, television, film and the annual appearance on Capitol Hill of the late J. Edgar Hoover.

But the Watergate scandal has brought egg to its face and demoralization to its ranks. The bureau has been accused of leaking like a sieve, relaxing surveillance of domestic subversives and turning its back on the rest of the intelligence community.

Its former acting director L. Patrick Gray III, was a prime casualty of Watergate. He has been heavily discredited for his role in the investigation and the subsequent White House cover-up operation.

The reputation of Hoover, who was in his lifetime beyond the reproach of Presidents, has been posthumously muddled by President Nixon and the revelations of the "Dean papers."

The President's statement of May 22 strongly suggested that Hoover had become a cranky misanthrope who cut himself and the bureau off from the rest of the federal intelligence establishment.

This picture of Hoover was reinforced by the recently published top secret memoranda of former White House internal security adviser Tom Charles Huston. The Huston papers portrayed in unflattering terms the former director's successful obstruction to the controversial "1970 Intelligence Plan" disclosed by the President on May 22.

It was largely because of Hoover's alleged bureaucratic isolationism that the President said he had to set the 1970 plan in motion. And it was Hoover's opposition to the plan's opening up the FBI's zealously-guarded internal security turf to other intelligence agencies that caused President Nixon to shelve it after five days.

The bureau has remained silent in the face of its current adversities. It is bereft of the protection of Hoover, the Compleat Bureaucratic Infighter, and it is un-

transition in 13 months. The bureau is anxiously awaiting confirmation of its new director-designate, Clarence M. Kelley, the Kansas City police chief.

Acting FBI Director William D. Ruckelshaus, the bureau's departing temporary trustee, insists that when Kelley comes aboard the malaise in the bureau will evaporate.

"When Kelley is confirmed we may be in a position to do some talking," said one old bureau hand.

The old boy network of Hoover loyalists both in the bureau and among its alumni has been severely stung by the recent attacks and is thirsting for a chance at rebuttal.

"The charge that we cut off liaison with all other intelligence agencies is just not true," said one high-ranking FBI official. "We did cut out a lot of the messenger boy stuff—having agents stationed in other agencies and serving as high-priced couriers. But we have maintained constant liaison with everyone."

In 1970, when the troubles began in earnest for the bureau, the public relationship between Hoover and President Nixon seemed to be a model of cordiality. Only in recent weeks, with publication of the Huston documents, has it been revealed that a grim struggle was already under way with the Nixon administration over reorganizing and expanding the government's powers of domestic surveillance to the point of illegal entry.

The deeds and rhetoric of such groups as the Black Panthers, Weathermen, Students for a Democratic Society, and the post-Cambodia ferment on the campuses were raising a high state of alarm in the White House and Justice Department.

Hoover himself went to Capitol Hill with shrill denunciations of black activists and student demonstrators and their organizations. At one point he proclaimed the Panthers to be the leading internal security threat to the nation.

But the underlying truth was that it was a new ball game for the bureau, one for which the traditional informants and infiltration tactics did not seem to be working.

The response at high levels of the Justice Department and in the White House was to be pointing finger at the FBI for

failing to keep abreast of the agitated domestic scene.

It was in this climate that President Nixon set in motion the 1970 plan, which was allegedly abandoned in the face of Hoover's objections. Ensuing steps were taken by the President—establishment of an inter-agency Intelligence Evaluation Committee and creation of the President's own Special Investigation Unit (the Plumbers)—to operate on the internal security turf that was once Hoover's exclusive preserve.

"The White House was getting people with no ex-

perience. My God, that man Liddy was a wild man when he was in the bureau—a super-klutz," grouched one of Hoover's most senior aides. "They were amateurs who were bound to get into trouble. And they did."

Relations worsened. Hoover cut off formal liaison with the Central Intelligence Agency in 1970 because of an incident in Denver in which an FBI agent passed information on to an agency operative. Hoover insisted on knowing the identity of the agent. The CIA refused.

The ragged relations between the bureau and the administration surfaced in Hoover's summary dismissal in October, 1971, of William C. Sullivan, the No. 3 man in the bureau and once Hoover's most valued deputy.

Sullivan had insisted, publicly and privately, on tougher surveillance of New Left and Black Panther activities, as well as of foreign nationals. He openly criticized Hoover for preoccupying himself with such nearly defunct groups as the Communist Party, USA, by then a virtual geriatric society, and the Ku Klux Klan.

Sullivan was a minority voice in the bureau. But he was paid serious heed in the Justice Department where he had the ear of then-Attorney General John N. Mitchell and Assistant Attorney General Robert C. Mardian, a principal adviser on national security affairs.

One measure of Sullivan's prior loyalty to the administration was his removal of records of controversial national security wiretaps ordered by the White House, from the FBI to Mardian's office in Justice. The former Hoover aide let it be known that he feared the wiretap material would be used

Hoover to embarrass the White House.

And Hoover, in one of his most celebrated "sudden death" reprisals for disloyalty, ordered the locks changed overnight in Sullivan's office and his name removed from the door. Afterward, Sullivan was appointed to a high Justice Department post, chief of narcotics intelligence.

Even after Hoover died the bureau was not wholly passive in its defense. The nomination of Gray and his conduct of the Watergate investigation touched off a form of guerrilla warfare against the administration from within the ranks of the FBI.

One highly placed FBI executive acknowledged that FBI agents may have been instrumental in getting the initial Watergate revelations into public print. Reporters who covered the case acknowledged the role of the agents in opening up the initial peepholes in the cover-up facade some administration officials were trying to erect.

"It wasn't a matter of getting a rancorous leak dumped in your lap," said one Watergate reportorial specialist. "You'd have to go to them and say, what about this or what about that? They'd respond, 'Yes, that's right.' I can think of one guy in the bureau without whom we wouldn't have gotten anywhere."

Acting FBI Director Ruckelshaus acknowledged that "some of our agents were getting nervous about the pace of the Watergate investigation and probably talked to the press. It's against bureau regulations but not against the law."

Former White House domestic counselor John D. Ehrlichman charged in recent congressional testimony that the bureau was "hemorrhaging" with leaks under Gray. The White House, he said, "strongly suspected that Time magazine had a freely running leak at the top of Gray's staff."

In the days immediately after the Watergate arrests in June, 1972, former White House counsel John W. Dean III was on the phone to Gray with repeated complaints about bureau leaks. Dean has been pictured in Watergate testimony as a key presidential operative for insulating the White House from the scandal.

"When Gray first arrived we all wanted him to succeed," said a recently retired senior official with more than a quarter of a century in the bureau. "When we became aware of

-Thurs., June 14, 1973 Los Angeles Times

Top-Secret Directives for CIA Role Revealed

Orders From Security Council Permit Activities Not Authorized in 1947 Statute

BY RUDY ABRAMSON
Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON — The Central Intelligence Agency, precluded by Congress 26 years ago from engaging in domestic operations, operates under a top-secret charter from the President's National Security Council that may directly conflict with its congressional mandate.

The secret charter, in the form of National Security Council Intelligence Directives, or "enskids," is known only to a few high-level operatives in the intelligence bureaucracy and fewer, if any, members of Congress.

The "enskids" take advantage of loopholes in Congress' 1947 National Security Act to permit CIA activities not authorized when the agency was created by that statute.

"The secret charter," said a congressional expert on CIA operations, "is a curse."

"We must have publicly confirmed what authority is given to the intelligence community in this country."

chest loyalists concede that the bureau was not keeping step with the violent political activism in the campuses and ghettos that swept to its peak in the 1968-1970 period.

"We still haven't solved the Capitol bombing or the Pentagon washroom bombing," admitted one retired senior bureau official loyal to Hoover. "We've still got fugitives from the Weathermen and SDS even though they've been on the 'Ten Most Wanted' list. We did a great job on the Communist Party and the Klan. This was different."

Yet even those concerns may have been outdistanced by events. The colleges and ghettos have quieted down. So have the styles of political protest.

These are facts with which Kelley will have to reckon as he ponders the other revelations of the most traumatic years in the bureau's history, just passed.

The controversial "enskids" apparently spell out in specific terms just what authority is granted for covert operations overseas and just what the CIA can do in the United States—even though the National Security Act specifies that the agency is not to be involved in intelligence activities at home.

Disclosures in the Watergate scandal have resulted in new concern that Congress has failed to properly oversee CIA operations.

Publication of secret White House documents last week revealed that a 1970 intelligence plan—approved by President Nixon, then canceled five days later—involved the CIA in discussions of a widespread scheme for spying on domestic "targets."

Though memorandums written by White House aide Tom Charles Huston cited the cooperation of then-CIA Director Richard Helms in putting together the plan, some sources argue that the documents failed to show that the CIA had agreed to become involved in the White House operations for domestic spying.

Nevertheless, a former CIA analyst who is now an intelligence expert on Capitol Hill said, "Helms never should have participated in discussions like that, and when the subject was raised he should have walked out."

According to sources familiar with operations of the agency, the CIA's activities in the United States include recruitment of and assistance to students from "Third World" countries attending colleges and universities.

Such activities are termed "building future assets," establishing relations with students who stand to become figures in government in their home countries.

It is also widely believed that the CIA infiltrates U.S. peace groups in order to gain access to countries like China, North Vietnam, North Korea and Cuba.

It is fairly common knowledge that the agency also operates a domestic contact service which interviews some Americans, mainly businessmen, who return from abroad with potentially useful information.

Several years ago, it was disclosed that the agency, through various foundations and front organizations, had funneled money into more than 200 domestic groups, chiefly the National Student Assn.

More recently, the CIA has been connected with giving training to a number of police departments.

Much of the domestic CIA activity is reported to be carried out from offices in downtown Washington, a block from the White House, rather than at the agency's headquarters at Langley, Va.

Disclosure that John D. Ehrlichman, President Nixon's former domestic affairs adviser, had solicited CIA assistance for men plotting the burglary of the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist, triggered three congressional investigations of possible agency involvement in the Watergate affair and related matters.

Inquiries Ended

Sen. John L. McClellan (D-Ark.), chairman of an appropriations subcommittee, and Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.), acting chairman of an armed services subcommittee on CIA oversight, have ended their inquiries for the time being while they consider their next step.

Closed-door hearings are still being conducted by a House armed services subcommittee headed by Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi (D-Mich.).

Sen. William Proxmire (D-Wis.), who has recently renewed efforts to get disclosure of the CIA's secret budget, Tuesday launched a campaign to obtain release of the secret "enskids."

Prof. Harry Howe Ransom of Vanderbilt University, an authority on the CIA, Tuesday called for creation of a nongovernment commission to carry out a major investigation

those speaking trips, the frequent absences from Washington. That's when he got the nickname, 'Two-Day Gray.' Whatever you say about Hoover, he never missed a day of school."

Now Gray is under investigation by the FBI to determine what role he played in the Watergate cover-up.

One of the major ironies of Watergate's impact on the FBI was the apparent inversion of Hoover's reputation as an obsessive anti-Communist warrior who kicked the door down and asked questions later.

Some of Hoover's long-standing liberal critics have acclaimed him for stopping the 1970 intelligence plan with its burglary, mail-opening, bugging and wiretapping provisions.

But as one of the chief lieutenants of the departed director emphasized in an interview, Hoover had not become a sudden convert to civil libertarianism.

"For Mr. Hoover, jurisdiction was paramount. He felt this plan was whittling away at the essence of the FBI and its responsibilities. He didn't object to clandestine entries. We opened mail but we never talked about it or wrote memos. We cracked safes when we felt it was a case of compelling national security. Hoover's law was that you didn't get caught and bring embarrassment on the bureau," said the veteran Hoover loyalist.

The FBI documents burglarized from a bureau office at Media, Pa., in March, 1971, showed that late into 1970 the FBI was wiretapping Black Panther activities and trying laboriously to infiltrate the ghettos with thousands of informants.

The intensity of FBI surveillance against black organizations with the slightest political overtones suggests that at least one part of the 1970 White House plan may have continued in effect through the year.

But is also a matter of widespread agreement, in and outside the bureau, that as Hoover brooded increasingly on his place in history, he became more fastidious about legal procedure.

Bag jobs — burglaries — were out. So was mail snooping. Phones were tapped only on written authorization of the Attorney General. The same with electronic bugs, concealed microphones.

"I was very confident of Hoover in the wiretap area," says former Attorney General Ramsey Clark. "He knew we'd prosecute if we found anything wrong. Hoover was protecting the bureau."

But even Hoover's staunch

of the entire U.S. intelligence apparatus.

Calling the 1970 plan drawn up in the White House "scandalous," Ransom said in an interview that a major reorganization may be called for, including changes in the authority of the FBI and the CIA.

A seemingly major question related to the CIA and the 1970 White House intelligence plan is still open.

Outlining His Work

When asked about the plan last February, CIA's Helms told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "I do not recall whether we were asked, but we were not involved because, it seemed to me, that was a clear violation of what our charter was."

The question was raised when the committee considered Helms' nomination to be U.S. Ambassador to Iran.

Yet last week, in the secret White House documents published by the New York Times, domestic security aide Huston, outlining his work on the White House domestic intelligence unit, said "I went into this exercise fearful that the CIA would refuse to cooperate. In fact, Dick Helms was most cooperative and helpful, and the only stumbling block was Mr. (J. Edgar) Hoover."

Development of a secret charter through the National Security Council directives, Prof. Ransom said, amounts to the council writing law, a situation which he partly blames on Congress for not exercising stronger oversight.

Ransom said he also believes that the time may have come when the CIA's plans division—the "department of dirty tricks"—"should have some ma-

for surgery."

He said there are legitimate questions as to whether release of the "en-skids" would jeopardize the national security.

"But we don't know what the basic structure of our national intelligence apparatus is. But the 'enemy' probably knows, and in the long run, disclosure is the better risk. The worst thing is that the law is being violated in secret."

Oversight of the CIA has been made especially difficult because there are few staff members to support committees with the responsibility.

Over the years, communication between the CIA and the congressional committees charged with oversight has been between the committee chairmen and the agency director.

Even the agency's budget is kept from all but members of Congress charged with oversight, being hidden in appropriations publicly announced for other departments in the federal bureaucracy.

That secrecy is now being challenged in a citizen's suit before the Supreme Court. The U.S. Court of Appeals in Philadelphia has ruled that William B. Richardson has the right to sue the government for disclosure of how the CIA spends its budget.

The Supreme Court is due to hear arguments in October on the issue of whether Richardson has the right to sue.

The Federation of American Scientists has estimated that the United States' total intelligence budget runs from \$4 billion to \$6 billion per year. The CIA alone, it estimates, has a budget of as much as \$1 billion per year and a staff of 18,000, or 8,000 more than the Department of State.

VIRGINIAN, Covington

29 May 1973

The Functions of The CIA

Disclosures about Central Intelligence Agency involvement in domestic espionage have given rise to a call for curtailment of CIA functions. It is being proposed that the spy agency's operating functions be turned over to State Department and military personnel, confining the CIA to the task of evaluating and coordinating intelligence.

This proposal derives weight from the fact that one of those advancing the idea is Morton H. Halperin, a former adviser to the National Security Council. He and Jeremy J. Stone of the Federation of American Scientists joined in making the proposal at a New York University conference on governmental secrecy.

Their recommendations appear to focus mainly on the role of the Central Intelligence Agency abroad. "The time has come," they argue, "for America to change its strategy from covert intervention to setting a standard on non-intervention." They rightly note that whenever an instance of CIA manipulation of affairs abroad becomes known—and this has frequently happened—harm is done America's reputation and credibility.

Halperin and Stone also are concerned about the intrusion of the CIA into domestic affairs, both directly and to some extent indirectly through the use of CIA-trained personnel. "The greatest presidential scandal of modern times," they say in their paper, "has arisen from the injection of covert methods, used by CIA graduates, into American society."

Just what changes should be made remains debatable. Certainly action should not be hasty, but ought to be taken on the basis of a thoroughgoing review of past CIA activities and a searching consideration of what its future role should be. But in our judgment Congress could do well to adopt as a working principle that the policy-making function of the Central Intelligence Agency should be eliminated or at very least strictly defined and limited. In addition, steps should be taken to force the CIA not to depart in any way from the legal structure on involvement in domestic affairs.

THE NEW YORK TIMES BOOK REVIEW

17 JUNE 1973

*The trouble with the truth***The Politics
Of Lying***Government by Deception,
Secrecy and Power.*

By David Wise.

415 pp. New York:

Random House. \$8.95.

By RICHARD HOLBROOKE

Multiple Choice Question for the 1970's: The Government of the United States lies: (a) never; (b) only when it has to for reasons of national security; (c) whenever it feels like it, whether or not it affects national security; (d) whenever it feels like it, to protect itself from domestic political embarrassment; (e) most of the time; (f) all of the time.

By now, many Americans would pick one of the last two choices to the question posed above. Turned off by Vietnam and Watergate and two Presidents in a row who have had low credibility ratings (for good reason), disillusioned by recent revelations of deception and even during the exciting 1,000 days of the Kennedy Administration, many educated people see deceit even where there is none, and trickery behind even routine announcements. Like the Boy Who Cried Wolf, the Government often has trouble being believed when it is telling the truth. (Try convincing people, for example, that the Peace Corps is completely clean of any C.I.A. involvement, as I firmly believe it is; even Peace Corps staff and volunteers sometimes doubt it, although three Presidents have issued orders to this effect, and no evidence has ever emerged to the contrary.)

It was not always thus. As recently as 1960, when the United States announced that it had lost a "weather research plane" near the Turkish border, most Americans accepted the official State Department explanation—until, confronted by a C.I.A. pilot alive and well in Soviet hands, President Eisenhower admitted the deception and accepted personal responsibility for the U-2 spy flights.

Did the President of the United States lie? And, especially, Dwight D. Eisenhower? Ike realized the cost of the lie, apparently, for in retirement he said that "the lie we told about the U-2" was his "greatest regret."

Thirteen years after the U-2 was shot down, the trust the United States Government once

had has been seriously eroded. (Who would believe that cover story today?) Disbelief and cynicism are widespread. And it is not unusual to hear some of the more cynical among us argue that lying and deception are nothing to get upset about. After all, as I was told recently while debating some undergraduates who were seven years old at the time of the U-2 incident and who view their Government with appalling cynicism, "Everybody in the Government lies, so why get excited?"

Astounding, that one should even have to defend the proposition that our Government should not lie to us. Yet it has become necessary to make the case. Anthony Lake, who resigned as Henry Kissinger's assistant after the 1970 Cambodian "incursion" (and who recently learned that, while working for Kissinger, he was having his home telephone tapped for "national security reasons") has written: "The essential first step is for the Government to realize that it cannot lead the public while misleading it."

"The Politics of Lying" is thus a title and theme of great promise. Major national issues transcending partisan politics are at stake. The Government is using its power to classify material, as David Wise correctly puts it, in order "to deprive the American people of vital information." The system that has grown up, he adds, "has played a significant role in the general expansion of Presidential power" since World War II, and he concludes that "the Government's capacity to distort information in order to preserve its own political power is almost limitless."

Unfortunately, Mr. Wise's book is not equal to the ambitious task he has set out to accomplish. It never lives up to the promise of its title. Anecdote follows anecdote to shock or amuse the reader, but they do not form a coherent picture of why and when the Government chooses to lie; what it gains or loses by lying; and when and why the liars get away with it. The complex reasons that lead officials into public deception are not explored here.

The extraordinary irony of the way in which public lying creates self-deception within the executive branch (and the great costs of such self-deception) is overlooked entirely. Instead, one finds a collection of stories, some old, some new, some borrowed—all designed to convince the reader of what Wise himself says the reader already knows: the Government

lies a lot. We want more than this, but it is not here.

The whys and hows of lying, as well as its real costs, are only glimpsed through the uneven anecdotalage of this book. As for solutions, we can all agree with Mr. Wise that "the only 'solution' to Government lying is to tell the truth," but his recommendations are both brief and unrealistic. (To suggest, for example, that all classified documents should become public after three years unless the President personally keeps them classified is simply not workable.)

Too much of "The Politics of Lying" is devoted to a compendium of essentially minor complaints about the treatment of the press by the White House. It is a shame, because Mr. Wise is addressing one of the major problems of our times, one that is far deeper than the "credibility gap." There seems little likelihood of it diminishing, either, despite the hopeful statement with which the President's Communications Director, Herb Klein, ushered in the Age of Nixon in November, 1968: "Truth will be the hallmark of the Nixon Administration. . . . We feel that we will be able to eliminate any possibility of a credibility gap in this Administration."

Credibility gap. The very phrase, which entered our vocabulary only a few years ago, both identifies a colossal problem for every administration, and obscures the even more important question of why Presidents, other politicians, and bureaucrats lie. Take Watergate, for example—a classic and staggering case of lying, apparently at every level of the Government. But why? Mr. Wise's book (which was finished before the more recent spectacular events) does not provide us with many clues. But in the Watergate tragedy, lying must be viewed as the public front edge of a much larger failure—a failure on the part of our leaders to believe in, and live by, the democratic principles on which our nation is supposedly based.

The evidence relentlessly emerging supports this gloomy assessment; our leaders lied publicly because they were acting in an anti-democratic manner privately. In the brilliant perception of columnist Stewart Alsop, they were using the techniques of war, not politics. And when their private (and illegal) action began to emerge they had no recourse but to lie as a defense.

The credibility gap, then, may be viewed in a somewhat different way. The Government

has lost the confidence of many Americans because it lies; it lies because it has lost confidence in the values of a genuinely open and democratic society. Secrecy—a product of fear and a perennial sanctuary for insecure people—is the inevitable first step in such a process. Lying, under pressure and probing from 'outsiders' (usually the press and Congress), is, equally inevitably, the next step. The circle is vicious. Or, to use an image North Vietnamese Prime Minister Phan van Dong used 11 years ago in predicting our

Vietnam nightmare, it is really a descending spiral.

Much of the deception is done in the name of "national security" a traditional and usually successful justification. Over the last 28 years, and growing out of a legitimate need in World War II and the cold war to protect sensitive information, the national security umbrella has been expanded continually. Perhaps—but only perhaps—it reached its apogee on May 22, 1973 when the President of the United States invoked the national security rationale to explain and excuse

a series of admittedly illegal acts taken by members of the White House staff—the now famous plumbers—against American citizens.

In times like these, what we need is a relentless analysis of what leads politicians and officials to "lie" in order to survive, what is behind the deception, and what can be done to reduce it—if anything. "The Politics of Lying" is a title that deserves a better book. □

Richard Holbrooke is managing editor of Foreign Policy.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
26 June 1973

Arab editor comments on Nixon, Brezhnev:

Watergate limits effectiveness in Mideast

By John K. Cooley
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Beirut, Lebanon

A leading Arab commentator says that Watergate and Soviet policy have made it impossible for President Nixon and Soviet Communist Party leader Leonid I. Brezhnev to deal effectively with the Middle East crisis.

Muhammad Haykal, chief editor of the Cairo Daily Al-Ahram, bitterly criticized the Soviet Union in a commentary published June 22. He accused Moscow of cutting its aid to the Arabs in half, while the U.S. doubled its own help to Israel.

Though its terms are more dramatic than most other Arab reactions to the Nixon-Brezhnev summit, Mr. Haykal's article reflects the growing Arab disenchantment with Moscow.

Earlier a Kuwait newspaper, Al-Siyassa, expressed this by calling on Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and other Arab oil states to cut down their dependence on both the U.S. and the Soviet Union for aid and oil markets, and take the solution of the conflict with Israel into their own hands.

A Lebanese writer, Clovis Mak-soud, reported from Washington in the Beirut newspaper Al-Nahar that Zionist quarters in the United States were conducting a powerful campaign to "submerge" the Nixon-Brezhnev summit in the issue of Soviet Jewish emigration to Israel.

In his article, Mr. Haykal said Watergate had reduced the ability of the White House to deal with the Mideast by strengthening the hand of the U.S. Congress, where Watergate had left Israel's supporters even stronger than before.

This may have ended all plans for a Mideast policymaking role by Henry Kissinger who even before Watergate had been reluctant to attack the Mideast issue, Mr. Haykal added.

Kissinger described

(In an article in the latest issue of the Beirut quarterly magazine, Journal of Palestine Studies, U.S. political scientist and Mideast expert Malcolm Kerr writes that "Kissinger has shown no great interest in Middle Eastern problems in the past."

"... even if Nixon as a second-term President cared nothing for his party's loss of electoral favor, the heat and anger of public debate that a get-tough policy toward Israel would surely generate and the prospect of revolt from a Democratic Congress ... are bound to make him wonder whether he could even control, let alone justify, a controversial Middle East policy," Dr. Kerr writes.

("What would he plan to do if Congress suddenly seized the initiative over his veto and voted for new arms shipments to Israel, accompanied by a resolution endorsing her bargaining position?" Dr. Kerr asks.)

Soviet position 'neutralized'

Mr. Haykal contends in his article

that while the United States knows what it wants in the Middle East, the Soviet Union does not.

Israel, he says, has "neutralized" the Soviet position in the Mideast. If U.S. support to Israel in the past was "100 percent, it is now 200 percent," while if Soviet backing for the Arabs "was only 50 percent in the past, at present it is 25 percent."

What Moscow does not want, Mr. Haykal says, is another Arab defeat that would destroy residual Soviet prestige in the Mideast. Moscow fears to use its strength to change the power balance, since it might dislike the results and come into confrontation with the United States.

Finally, says Mr. Haykal, the U.S.S.R. does not want an "American solution," Mr. Haykal sees American strategy as aiming at keeping the cease-fire and Israeli military superiority; halting efforts inside and outside the UN for a real settlement; and draining Egypt's strength and isolating her.

Further, writes Mr. Haykal, Washington concentrates on the Persian Gulf area, which Mr. Haykal calls "the potential focus of war;" deepening Arab-Iranian tensions; wiping out "revolutionary centers;" telling the Arabs that Washington holds the key to the Mideast problem and offering pragmatic solutions "which are really a way of keeping the Mideast situation as it is, rather than changing it."

VOCE REPUBBLICANA, Rome
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WATERGATE AND US
THE QUALITY OF DEMOCRACY

Frankly, it seems to us that even now, when the "Watergate Case" concerning wiretapping in America has fully exploded, even now when the eyes of the entire world are fixed on this new, dramatic crack in American society, when the temptation to make comparisons with what is going on in our own house is quite legitimate, very few here in Italy have fully understood the profound but evident meaning and lesson that is being imparted to us by this event. By this it is meant that very few have had the courage--not to mention decency--to admit that the difference between the United States and us is this: on the one hand there is a country that is struggling for the defense, or rather the strengthening of democracy and, on the other hand, the country is a quagmire in which democracy is suffocating. And the lack of awareness of this unbridgeable difference constitutes an element--but certainly not the only element--of the botched democracy that we see around us whose manifestation every day and in every domain we can only note and lament.

The most widespread sentiment which we hear expressed in all political and public opinion sectors is, in broad terms, as follows: political structures in America are creaking, and the "Watergate Case" is a clear demonstration that there is no true democracy; with us, however, things are even worse: scandals of this type, when they do not abort, die at birth. Political corruption in the United States exists, but it just so happens that it is denounced, even if the "system" remains what it is; with us, corruption is just as widespread (if not more so) but, as soon as it comes to light, it is enmeshed in such a tangle of competing interests as to be suffocated immediately, with the result that no one even has the satisfaction of learning the details. In other words, between the two failures of true democracy, ours is worse. From this derives, if one can so express it, a quantitative difference of non-qualitative democracy--or lack of democracy.

Whoever says this, either in good faith or bad, has not, so far as we can see, grasped the true connection between what is happening in the U.S. and what we are witnessing in Italy. Democracy is not something that exists in the abstract and, where it does exist, does not need continuous examination, continuous checking. The democratic system is not for those who once they have obtained it need no longer think about it--that holds, for example, for dictatorships; precisely because its structure is "open" to all components, the good and the bad, democracy requires the constant surveillance of the society of which it is the expression. Democracy is always imperfect, is always a tormented dialectic game, is always running risks of involution. For this reason, Churchill's phrase is valid, that it is a bad system but that the others are worse. But, if its principal danger is that of being corrupted, its principal virtue is that of knowing how to correct itself.

All this is so evident that the type of uninformed regurgitation underlying almost all Italian comments on these events on the other side of the Atlantic seems incredible--the idea, in short, that if things are not going well in our country, they are not going much better in America. The truth is quite otherwise. At issue is not corruption, which is a human activity in every political system and in every latitude. What is to be judged is the manner of fighting it. And here the difference between the U.S. and Italy is unbridgeable. Is it necessary to repeat that the American system is not only the Administration, is not only the White House, but is rather that particular combination of constitutional guarantees, that particular system of political checks and balances, that type of control and of public opinion participation. The "Watergate Case," after Vietnam, after Johnson, after the Pentagon Papers, is the umpteenth confirmation of it. What, if not "the system," has led to the dismantling of almost the entire White House general staff, to the removal of those whom public opinion had identified as being primarily responsible for the scandal, and to the insertion of others, like Richardson, considered "liberal"? Whence, if not out of the system, came the courage and energy to correct the system?

Let us repeat, to consider that American society is now politically healthy would be to close one's eyes to reality: the scandal has revealed a profound rot reaching to Washington's political summits. But let us recognize that we are dealing with a democracy capable of defending and correcting itself with pitiless determination and rigor, without fear of the "eyes of the world." This is precisely the unique lesson that we can draw from the event.

It would be a salutary lesson, if it were heard. But given the comments it has elicited in Italy, the American scandal does not induce many hopes. Commentators have harped on the scandalous aspects--sacrosanct, certainly--and have underrated the gigantic effort that American society has exerted, and is exerting, to emerge from them with justice. Of such a collective effort in Italy, one sees not even a trace as regards our own affairs. Energies here are dedicated to party interests, to personal benefits, to shady relationships of currents. One navigates among scandals, still unborn or born maimed and then asphyxiated. There is, in all strata, a sense of suffocation and strangulation of true democracy, which has few positive turns. One notes the spread of a fragmented, obscure, corporatized, uncontrolled power, which is born and dies in the darkness of corridors and under-the-table negotiations. A democracy without checks and balances is not a democracy; it has neither the chance nor the capacity to correct itself that is indispensable for keeping itself vital. This is the lesson of the "Watergate Case": whoever draws other lessons from it has not understood the always more dramatic problems of our democracy or has understood them and speaks only for the sake of convenience.

Il "Watergate,, e noi

La qualità della democrazia

Ci sembra francamente che, anche ora che il « caso Watergate » sulle intercettazioni telefoniche in America è esploso in pieno, anche ora che gli occhi di tutto il mondo sono fissi su questa nuova drammatica frattura della società americana, anche ora che più legittima tentazione di fare confron-

ti con le cose di casa nostra, ben pochi in Italia abbiano capito appieno il senso profondo eppure lampante e la lezione che ci vengono da questa vicenda. Vogliamo dire che ben pochi hanno il coraggio (e il pudore) di dire che la differenza tra noi che da una parte c'è un

paese che lotta per la difesa (diciamo di più: per il rafforzamento) della democrazia, dall'altro lato c'è un pantano in cui la democrazia sta annegando. E la mancata consapevolezza di questa abissale diversità ci sembra elemento non ultimo della nostra crisi. Diciamo intorno a noi, di

cul ogni giorno e in ogni campo registriamo e lamentiamo le manifestazioni.

Il sentimento più diffuso che si avverte in tutti i settori politici e di opinione è grosso modo il seguente. Le strutture politiche in America scricchiolano, è la dimostrazione palmaria

che non c'è vera democrazia: ma da noi va anche peggio: scandali di questo tipo, quando non abortiscono, muoiono appena nati. La corruzione politica negli Stati Uniti esiste, ma capita che venga denunciata, anche se il « sistema » rimane quello che è; da noi la corruzione è altrettanto (se non più) dilagante, ma appena accenna a venire alla luce è subito presa da tale un groviglio di interessi contrastanti da essere subito soffocata. Con il risultato di non avere neanche la soddisfazione di conoscerla a fondo. Si dice in altre parole che, tra due mancanze di vera democrazia, la nostra è la peggiore. Ne deriva, se così si può dire, una differenza quantitativa di democrazia (o di mancanza di democrazia), non qualitativa.

Chi dice questo, in buona o in cattiva fede, non ci sembra abbia colto il vero nesso tra ciò che sta succedendo negli Stati Uniti e ciò a cui assistiamo in Italia. La democrazia non è qualcosa che esista in astratto e, là dove esiste, non abbia bisogno di una continua verifica, di un continuo controllo. Il sistema democratico non è tale per cui, una volta fissato, non ci si debba pensare più (ciò vale caso-

mai per le dittature): proprio perché la sua struttura è « aperta » a tutte le componenti, le buone e le cattive, della società di cui è espressione. La democrazia è sempre imperfetta, è sempre un gioco dialettico tormentato, corre sempre pericoli di involuzione. Per essa vale ancora la frase di Churchill che è un sistema cattivo, ma che gli altri sono peggiori. Ma, se il suo principale pericolo è di rompersi, la sua principale virtù è di sapersi correggere.

Tutto questo è talmente evidente che appare incredibile quella specie di inconsapevole rigurgito che è sotteso a quasi tutti i commenti italiani agli avvenimenti d'oltre Atlantico: il senso, appunto, che se nel nostro paese le cose vanno male, in America non vanno molto meglio. La verità è ben diversa. In discussione non è la corruzione, che è pure un'attività umana in ogni sistema politico e sotto ogni latitudine. Ciò che va giudicato è il modo di combatterla. E qui la differenza tra gli Stati Uniti e l'Italia è abissale. C'è bisogno di ripetere che il sistema americano non è solo l'amministrazione, non è solo la Casa Bianca, ma è quella particolare articolazione di ga-

ranzie costituzionali, quei particolare sistema di contrappesi politici, quel tipo di controllo e di partecipazione dell'opinione pubblica? Il « caso Watergate », dopo il Vietnam, dopo Johnson, dopo i « dossier » del Pentagono, ne è l'ennesima conferma. Chi, se non il « sistema », ha portato allo smantellamento di quasi tutto lo stato maggiore della Casa Bianca, alla estromissione di coloro che l'opinione pubblica aveva identificato nei principali responsabili dello scandalo e all'immissione di altri, come Richardson, considerati « liberal »? Chi, se non il sistema, ha trovato il coraggio e l'energia di correggere il sistema?

Ripetiamo, ritenere con ciò che la società americana sia politicamente sana, sarebbe chiudere gli occhi di fronte alla realtà: lo scandalo ha rivelato un marcio profondo ai vertici politici di Washington. Ma che sia una democrazia capace di difendersi e correggersi con spietata determinazione e rigore, senza paura per gli « occhi del mondo », questo è precisamente la unica lezione che noi possiamo trarre dalla vicenda.

Lezione salutare, se fosse ascoltata. Ma proprio il modo in cui da noi

è stato commentato lo scandalo americano non induce a molte speranze. Si è insistito sugli aspetti scandalistici (sacrosanti, certamente) e si è sottovalutato il gigantesco sforzo che la società americana ha compiuto e compie per uscirne secondo giustizia. Di questo sforzo collettivo da noi, per le cose nostre, non si vede neppure un atomo. Le energie si dedicano agli interessi di partito, ai tornaconti di parte, agli intrallazzi di corrente. Si naviga tra gli scandali, non ancora nati o nati monchi e asfittici. C'è, in tutti gli strati, un senso di soffocamento e strangolamento della democrazia vera, che ha ben scarsi risvolti positivi. Si avverte il dilagare di un potere frammentato, oscuro, corporativizzato, senza controlli, che nasce e muore nel buio dei corridoi e dei negoziati sotto-banco. Una democrazia senza contrappesi non è una democrazia: non ha quella possibilità e capacità di correggersi che è indispensabile per mantenersi vitale. Questa è la lezione del « caso Watergate »: chi ne trae altre non ha capito i problemi sempre più drammatici della nostra democrazia: o li ha capti e parla solo per comodo.

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A SPECIAL JACK ANDERSON REPORT

How We Get Inside Information on World Leaders

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President Nixon will know enough about Leonid Brezhnev to write a biography when the two leaders finally sit down together at the summit. Brezhnev's health? The President will have a complete medical report. Brezhnev's temperament? A detailed psychological profile will be available. Brezhnev's beliefs? The President will have transcripts of private Kremlin conversations.

Intimate information

Nixon even has the name of Brezhnev's favorite masseuse. In the privacy of the Kremlin, Brezhnev confided to Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny that he was looking forward to a rubdown from a masseuse named Olga. American spies were listening when Podgorny answered, with a knowing chuckle: "Oh, ho! Olga!"

In the rarefied atmosphere of international power politics, such intimate information can be a powerful bargaining chip. Thick dossiers on world leaders are compiled by the Central Intelligence Agency, which gathers its information by every method, from electronic eavesdropping to routine research.

The secret profile of Leonid Brezhnev, according to those who have seen it, portrays him as an amiable, robust, hard-drinking outdoorsman. He likes to gossip about his colleagues in the Kremlin, and he engages in the constant bickering and backbiting that goes on behind those Byzantine walls. His private conversations are heavily laced with locker-room language. He likes to relax at a place Soviet leaders call the "Clinic" near the Kremlin. This is the Soviet equivalent of a private health club.

The profile also contains incidents and insights from CIA intelligence reports. During the 1968 Czechoslovakian crisis, for example, the man Brezhnev ousted as Premier, Nikita Khrushchev, suddenly showed up at the Kremlin and demanded to see his successor. Khrush-

chev loudly warned that the Czech invasion could turn into a disaster unless Soviet troops were pulled out at once. Brezhnev gruffly refused to see Khrushchev and ignored his advice.

A profile of Castro

The profile on Fidel Castro contains a CIA report that the Kremlin has asked the Cuban dictator "to try to regain control over Latin American revolutionary movements" and has promised to "pay all the costs involved."

The CIA also reported Castro's private opinion of the Marxist regime in Chile and its leader, President Salvador Allende. Castro correctly predicted a year in advance "a breakdown in public order." This, he said, could come about at any time because the opposition, especially the middle class, had lost its fear of government. Castro opined that a government must have fear if it is to control the country.

"Another factor listed by Castro," continued the secret CIA report, "was the possible deterioration of Allende's health. Castro said he is worried about Allende because the latter is physically 'spent.' Castro also observed that [Chilean] leaders live too well and are not under sufficient tension to take the offensive."

The CIA not only keeps Communist leaders under scrutiny; it also checks on friendly leaders. The financial difficulties of Costa Rica's respected President Jose Figueres, for example, were quietly relayed to Washington. The CIA quoted a family member as complaining that "all the members of the President's family are deeply concerned with family financial matters."

The CIA also gleefully reported an awkward confrontation between France's President Georges Pompidou and West Germany's Chancellor Willy Brandt a few months ago. "A heated exchange took place after the Brandt-Pompidou dinner," said the CIA. A secret account of the CIA report claimed Johann Baptist Schoellhorn, a

German economics official, "told Pompidou that France was profiting from and encouraging the inflation afflicting other European countries . . . According to members of Brandt's party, Brandt stood by and visibly enjoyed Pompidou's discomfiture. Schoellhorn supported his accusations with details which Pompidou was unable to refute."

The world's two most celebrated women leaders, Israel's Golda Meir and India's Indira Gandhi, are reported by the CIA to have a long-distance feud brewing. According to the CIA account, Mrs. Meir regards Mrs. Gandhi as "neutral . . . on the side of Egypt," while Mrs. Gandhi sees Israel as a "warmonger."

The dossiers on Arab leaders are loaded with CIA tidbits. Egypt's President Anwar Sadat, "when threatening Israel with an all-out war, was bluffing," reported the CIA. Jordan's King Hussein threatened "to go on a ghazou" unless he received more American aid. A ghazou, it was explained, "is a Bedouin raid against neighbors for the purpose of looting." Syria's President Hafez-al-Assad was portrayed by the CIA as an outspoken militant who doesn't "expect too much from Egyptians." Assad uses the Arabic word "lamma" when he speaks of war with Israel. "Lamma" means "when" not "if," explained a CIA report.

Spying on foreign leaders is a routine operation, involving CIA agents in the field and researchers at headquarters. Reports from diplomats and military attachés also go into the dossiers. If Washington suddenly wants more information about a certain dignitary, say in advance of a summit meeting, he becomes "targeted." Then the full resources of the clandestine agency are trained upon laying his life bare.

The first step in the daily spying process is known as the "library search." Researchers routinely clip newspaper and magazine articles about foreign notables and send them into the CIA's "Biographic Registry" computer.

As part of the "library search," field agents are asked to fill out forms on foreign leaders, which resemble job applications. To the extent possible, relatives, friends and acquaintances are casually contacted. Information is gathered helter-skelter, with rumor and fact carefully noted. It is left to the experts in Washington to assemble the jigsaw pieces and make the final distinctions.

Nothing taken for granted

Even the most rudimentary facts, however, are not taken for granted. "In many foreign societies, the leaders mask their backgrounds as much as possible," a CIA man told us. "It's not like in the United States where you have everything from FBI files to job applications to track down a person's personal history." An astonishing amount of informa-

tion can be picked up quite legitimately by America's observers overseas. For example, a military attaché in Moscow became great friends with the Soviet Defense Minister during the Khrushchev years. While the stuffy Soviet big-wigs would shuffle about at official receptions, the attaché and minister would toss down vodka and swap stories about their superiors.

Of course, electronic eavesdropping is often used. In Belgium a CIA operative learned that the Chinese Communist embassy was planning to move. He quickly located the new site and rented the house next door. Bugs were placed in the new embassy before the Chinese moved in. The CIA picked up an earful before the bugs were eventually discovered.

While the field operatives are poking into every dark corner of the subject's life, academics back at the CIA compile anthropological and sociological data on the area in which the subject grew up. This is done in the CIA's "Geographic Office." The structure of the society, its mores and customs, are depicted. Even the type of diet adds to the portrait of the person.

The "Geographic Office" report on Mao Tse-tung, for instance, noted that he traveled as a beggar through the country in his youth, seeing firsthand the poverty and corruption. This profoundly affected the young Mao and

helped ignite the revolutionary fire that caused him to help found the Chinese Communist Party in the early 1920's. Today, intelligence reports confirm that Mao is still the purest of revolutionaries.

Medical diagnosis

The CIA also directs its agents to dredge up all possible medical information for the medical researchers to diagnose. Once, agents tapped into washroom pipes in one of Monte Carlo's most glamorous casinos to get a urine sample from the oil-rich King of Saudi Arabia, who was rumored to be ailing. Inside the washroom, crouched behind a commode door, an agent waited with an electronic signaling device. The King, a heavy drinker and addicted gambler, finally entered in a swirl of white robe. The agent alerted his colleague in the plumbing closet, and the nozzle was turned on the pipe tapped into the washroom plumbing.

But the greatest coup in the annals of the CIA's medical espionage occurred during Nikita Khrushchev's state visit to the United States in 1959. CIA men managed to isolate and bore triumphantly to the labs the Soviet leader's solid waste for medical analysis.

Sophisticated photographic techniques are also used to observe leaders at long distance. Called "targets of opportunity" in CIA jargon, the photos are compared with old ones for signs of stress, aging and disease. A blotchy skin,

for example, can indicate a liver problem.

Through long-range observation, the CIA learned of the late Egyptian President Nasser's heart condition and of the late Indonesian President Sukarno's visits to a Viennese specialist. (Surveillance of Sukarno, incidentally, revealed he liked his hosts to have a woman for him on state visits.)

Photographic evidence

Long-range photography settled a rumor, back before the Chinese-American detente, whether Mao Tse-tung was sick and using a double for public appearances. A photograph was taken of Mao in public. By measuring the length of the earlobe and by determining that his facial wart was in exactly the right place, the agency certified him as genuine. Then by closely examining the picture, CIA analysts learned that the aging leader was not critically ill as had been rumored.

For all the sophisticated methods the CIA uses to gather intelligence on world leaders, however, nothing is quite as revealing as a face-to-face meeting. More can be learned from one tough negotiating session than from a 10,000-page report prepared by the CIA. For it's not the juicy tidbits so much as the basic attitudes that matter in the world of power politics.