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No. 48

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Governmental Affairs

WASHINGTON POST
28 October 1973

Impeachment Demands and More Investigations

By Lawrence Meyer
Washington Post Staff Writer

President Nixon's dramatic decision to finally turn over nine White House tape recordings and other materials to Chief U.S. District Judge John J. Sirica still leaves him facing three congressional resolutions for his impeachment and others calling for new investigations of his conduct in office.

"The President's belated action" on the tapes, the 29 cosponsors of one House impeachment resolution said in a statement last week, "removes only one of the grounds on which we sought impeachment.

Although White House actions connected with the Watergate affair are a focus of impeachment, the congressional and remaining prosecutorial investigations extend far beyond Watergate to include:

- President Nixon's personal finances.
- Receipt by President Nixon's close friend, Charles G. (Bebe) Rebozo, of \$100,000 in cash from an emissary of Howard Hughes in 1969 and 1970.
- Government actions affecting Rebozo's monopoly bank and a new savings and loan association in Key Biscayne.
- Campaign contributions made to President Nixon by dairymen who received an increase in milk price supports in a reversal of Administration policy.

- The settlement of the federal antitrust action against ITT.
- President Nixon's short-lived decision to implement a domestic surveillance plan that his advisers had told him contained "clearly illegal" elements.

Involved in the ITT matter is a pledge of a \$400,000 campaign contribution by ITT to the Republican Party and the settlement of the Justice Department's antitrust suit against the international conglomerate.

A March 30, 1972 memo from the special Presidential counsel Charles W. Colson to then White House chief of staff H. R. (Bob) Halde- man warned that Senate Judiciary Committee hearings then in progress could produce revelations about the ITT case that "would lay this case on the President's doorstep." Such testimony was not given at those hearings.

The Senate committee staff also is investigating the two separate contributions of \$50,000 each made in 1969 and 1970 by an emissary of billionaire recluse Howard Hughes to Charles G. (Bebe) Rebozo, Mr. Nixon's close friend.

According to Rebozo, he held the contributions in a

safe deposit box for three years and then returned them to one of Hughes' lawyers. Mr. Nixon said at his press conference Friday night that the money was intended to be a contribution for his 1972 campaign.

Richard G. Danner, managing director of the Hughes-owned Sands Hotel and gambling casino in Las Vegas, said in a Sept. 4 deposition that the first \$50,000 was intended for Mr. Nixon's 1968 presidential campaign—even though it was given after the fact—and that the second \$50,000 was for the 1970 congressional campaigns.

A deposition by Robert A. Maheu, former manager of Hughes' Nevada operations, gives no clear indication of why the first \$50,000 contribution was made, but states that the second \$50,000 payment was connected to efforts by Hughes to persuade Mitchell, then attorney general, to overrule objections by the Justice Department's antitrust division to a proposed acquisition of another hotel and gambling casino in Las Vegas.

Although Maheu and Danner disagree about the purpose of the contributions, their sworn statements also conflict with President Nixon's explanation.

Maheu also states in his deposition that Rebozo "had been chosen by Mr. Nixon as the person to whom the money should be delivered."

Questions also have been raised about the Nixon administration's decision to refuse to grant a bank charter to Florida businessmen seeking to open a competitor to Rebozo's bank on Key Biscayne. The administration twice overruled strong recommendations from two federal bank examiners recommending the competitive charter.

Just a month after the Treasury Department's comptroller of the currency ruled that the rival group had shown only a "marginal banking need" in Key Biscayne, the Federal Home Loan Board granted two directors of Rebozo's bank a charter for a new savings and loan institution in Key Biscayne. Rebozo will be the landlord for the new institution.

In addition, questions have been raised concerning Mr. Nixon's personal finances, including a \$200,000 tax savings he realized by the donation of prepresidential papers to the National Archives, the purchase of

Calif. with the aid of a loan from industrialist Robert Abplanalp who later purchased property back from Mr. Nixon with Rebozo as a silent partner, and the expenditure of nearly \$10 million in public funds to make improvements in and around Mr. Nixon's homes in San Clemente and Key Biscayne.

The most recent revelation concerning expenditures of public funds for Mr. Nixon's retreats was the report that almost \$2.4 million—more than was spent by his three immediate predecessors combined—has been spent on Camp David since Mr. Nixon assumed office five years ago. Of this total, \$150,000 was spent for a swimming pool next to the presidential lodge in 1969.

The Senate select Watergate committee is expected to inquire further into the ITT settlement when it resumes its hearings next week.

The Senate committee staff also is investigating the relationship between contributions of \$427,500 from three dairy cooperatives in 1971 and 1972 much of it to secret Nixon campaign committees, and the reversal of a decision by the Department of Agriculture not to increase its milk price support levels.

Dairy co-op leaders said the President's decision raising the price support level from 75 percent to 85 percent of parity added from \$500 million to \$700 million to dairy farmers' income. A document recently unearthed by the White House in connection with civil litigation shows that top White House aides and fund raisers originally expected \$2 million in contributions from segments of the dairy industry.

The most extensive public record to date, however, concerns the Watergate affair. President Nixon's own public statements as well as the testimony of present and former aides before the Senate select Watergate committee form a foundation for efforts to tie the President to the Watergate cover-up.

"Many times in the history of our country," Mr. Nixon said on May 9, "administrations have failed to meet the test of investigating those charges that might be embarrassing to the administration because they were made against high officials in an adminis-

"We have had such a situation, we have been confronted with it, we are dealing with it, and I will simply say to you tonight that this nation—Republicans, Democrats, Independents, all Americans—can have confidence in the fact that the (Attorney) General, Elliot Richardson, and the special prosecutor that he will appoint in this case will have the total cooperation of the executive branch of this government."

Less than six months later, Elliot Richardson resigned as Attorney General after stating his unwillingness to comply with an order from President Nixon to fire Special Watergate Prosecutor Archibald Cox. According to Cox' statements at a press conference earlier in the day he was fired, President Nixon had been giving less than "total cooperation" to the special prosecutor's investigation of the Watergate affair.

President Nixon's actions concerning Cox and the tapes form the basis of an impeachment resolution introduced by Rep. Jerome Waldie (D-Calif.) and cosponsored by 29 other Democrats. The resolution accuses Mr. Nixon of obstructing the administration of justice by forcing the resignation of Richardson, by firing Deputy Attorney General William D. Ruckelshaus and by firing Cox, contrary to the President's promise to the Senate, made through Richardson, not to interfere with the special prosecutor's investigation.

But the charges outlined in the Waldie resolution form only one potential basis for impeachment. In a statement by Waldie on Oct. 23 he described Mr. Nixon's actions as "a cover-up of a cover-up, an obstruction of processes of justice aimed at those guilty of obstructing justice."

President Nixon's own public statements acknowledge that he took steps to confine the original Watergate investigation so that it would not reveal activities of the special White House investigations unit popularly known as "the plumbers."

It was the plumbers, a group that included Watergate conspirators E. Howard Hunt Jr., G. Gordon Liddy, Bernard L. Barker and Eugenio R. Martinez, who were responsible for the break-in at the offices of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist in September 1971.

in a few days of the

June 17, 1972 break-in at the Watergate offices of the Democratic National Committee, the FBI had discovered that \$114,000 in five separate checks had passed through Barker's bank account from two sources, Kenneth Dahlberg, later identified as a fund-raiser for President Nixon's re-election campaign and from Manuel Ogarrio, a Mexican lawyer.

What the FBI did not know until sometime in July, 1972, according to the testimony of former acting FBI Director L. Patrick Gray, was that the money belonged to the Committee for the Re-election of the President.

Within a matter of hours after the break-in, the Washington metropolitan police and the FBI had found evidence connecting Hunt to the Watergate operation. Barker and Martinez were already in police custody.

The arrest of Barker and Martinez coupled with the leads to Hunt provided at least one possible motive for the White House cover-up — concern that the Ellsberg break-in and the other activities of the plumbers might be exposed.

The Dahlberg check and the checks from Ogarrio — which have come to be known as the "Mexican money" — provided a second possible motive for the cover-up since they were the only documentary evidence in the hands of law enforcement authorities linking the five men caught inside the Watergate with the Nixon re-election committee.

Had the Dahlberg and Mexican checks been suppressed in some way, a major link to the re-election committee would have been eliminated. Testimony before the Senate committee indicates that the White House did, in fact, attempt to suppress the Dahlberg and Mexican checks.

Mr. Nixon, for his part, has given the following account in his May 22 statement of what he had done and why:

"Elements of the early post-Watergate reports led me to suspect, incorrectly, that the CIA had been in some way involved. They also led me to surmise, correctly, that since persons originally recruited for covert national security activities had participated in Watergate, an unrestricted investigation of Watergate might lead to and expose those covert national security operations.

"I sought to prevent the exposure of these covert national security activities, while encouraging those conducting the investigation

to pursue their inquiry into the Watergate itself. I so instructed my staff, the Attorney General and the acting director of the FBI.

"I also instructed Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman (presidential domestic adviser John D. Ehrlichman) to ensure that the FBI would not carry its investigation into areas that might compromise these covert national security activities, or those of the CIA."

Former CIA Director Richard Helms testified that he had informed acting FBI Director Gray on June 22 "that the CIA had no involvement in the break-in. No involvement whatever."

On June 23 both Helms and deputy CIA Director Lt. Gen. Vernon A. Walters were summoned to an afternoon meeting at the White House where they met with Haldeman and Ehrlichman. Helms and Walters later testified in substantial agreement that at the meeting Haldeman did most of the talking. Helms said he assured Haldeman that the CIA had nothing to do with the break-in.

Nevertheless, according to Helms and Walters, Haldeman instructed Walters to speak to Gray, "and indicate to him," Helms testified, "that these operations — these investigations of the FBI might run into CIA operations in Mexico and that it was desirable that this not happen and that the investigation, therefore, should be either tapered off or reduced or something, but there was no language saying stopped, as far as I recall."

The testimonies of Walters and Gray differ in detail and emphasis over what happened in the following days. What emerges clearly, however, is an attempt by the White House, according to Gray's testimony, to stop the FBI from interviewing Ogarrio and Dahlberg on the grounds that the CIA had an "interest" in them.

Walters and Helms, according to their testimony and Gray's, at no time expressed any "interest" in either man, however, and by July 6, Gray said, he had decided to proceed with the interviews.

The importance of the interviews was underlined by Gray in his testimony when he pointed out that the checks written by Ogarrio and Dahlberg were "the only money chain that we had right at that point in time. Without it, the FBI and the prosecution team had nothing to connect the Watergate burglars financially with the re-election committee.

The other concern referred

to by President Nixon in his May 22 statement as justification for limiting the Watergate investigation was that the activities of the plumbers might be exposed.

President Nixon said in his May 22 statement that in instructing White House aide Egil M. (Bud) Krogh Jr. on the duties to be performed by the plumbers, "I did not authorize and had no knowledge of any illegal means to be used." Mr. Nixon went on to say, "As President, I must and do assume responsibility for such actions despite the fact that I, at no time approved or had knowledge of them."

When Mr. Nixon did learn of the Ellsberg break-in, on March 17, 1973, according to his statement on Aug. 15, he, apparently did nothing to disclose the incident to the judge in the Ellsberg trial. In fact, when he learned that the Justice Department had found out about the Ellsberg break-in, Mr. Nixon by his own admission attempted to stop them from investigating the incident.

"I considered it my responsibility to see that the Watergate investigation did not impinge adversely upon the national security area," Mr. Nixon said by way of explanation in his May 22 statement.

Mr. Nixon was informed by Attorney General Richard G. Kleindienst on April 25 that the trial judge in the Ellsberg trial, U.S. District Judge W. Matt Byrne Jr., should be informed of the Ellsberg break-in.

According to testimony before the Watergate committee, Kleindienst and Assistant Attorney General Henry Petersen had agreed that they would resign if Mr. Nixon refused to allow them to report their findings on the Ellsberg break-in to Byrne.

The report was made and Byrne declared a mistrial, dismissing the charges against Ellsberg and co-defendant Anthony Russo.

Mr. Nixon's assertion that the Ellsberg break-in involved a matter of national security apparently was not shared by Kleindienst, Petersen, Byrne or the Los Angeles County grand jury that indicted Ehrlichman, Krogh, Liddy and former White House aide David Young for their alleged participation in the incident.

Despite his acknowledgement that he attempted to restrain both the Watergate investigation and the Ellsberg break-in inquiry, Mr. Nixon said, in his statement of May 22, that it "appears that there were persons who may have gone beyond my directives, and sought to expand on my efforts to protect the national security op-

erations in order to cover up any involvement they or certain others might have had in Watergate."

In addition to questions that have been raised by the Los Angeles grand jury, the Watergate special prosecutor and by members of the Senate committee as to whether the Ellsberg break-in was a legitimate national security activity, the question must be confronted whether President Nixon bears legal responsibility for the allegedly illegal acts of his subordinates whether he was ignorant of those acts — as he claims — or not.

Although the law is not settled on the point, according to legal experts, some constitutional lawyers see precedent for holding Mr. Nixon responsible and culpable for illegal activities engaged in by his aides.

One U.S. Supreme Court case cited in re Yamashita, involving the commanding general of Japanese forces in the Philippine Islands in World War II who was charged, tried and convicted for war crimes committed by his troops. Yamashita, as the court pointed out in the majority opinion, was tried for his failure to take measures to prevent violations of the law of war.

"The law of war," the court said, "presupposes that its violation is to be avoided through the control of the operations of war by commanders who are to some extent responsible for their subordinates." The effect of the court's opinion was to uphold the conviction of Yamashita, who was executed.

In a dissenting opinion, Justice Frank Murphy warned of "dangerous implications of the procedure sanctioned today. No one in a position of command in an army, from sergeant to general, can escape those implications. Indeed, the fate of some future President of the United States and his chiefs of staff and military advisers may well have been sealed by this decision."

The United States government also has maintained in litigation from time to time, that corporation heads are responsible for the acts of subordinates, whether the officers knew of the acts or not.

What Mr. Nixon might have done to prevent the cover-up is not entirely clear from the public record. Haldeman and Ehrlichman testified that Mr. Nixon periodically asked about the status of the investigation and urged on several occasions that the White House issue statement setting forth the full facts on the Watergate affair.

Invariably, according to

NEW YORK TIMES
31 October 1973

House Panel Starts Inquiry On Impeachment Question

Approves Wide Subpoena Power for Chairman in Partisan Split

By JAMES M. NAUGHTON

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 30—The House Judiciary Committee began consideration of possible impeachment of President Nixon today with a partisan dispute over the grant of broad subpoena power to its chairman, Representative Peter W. Rodino Jr., Democrat of New Jersey.

In straight party-line votes, 21 to 17, the Democratic majority rejected two Republican amendments and then adopted a resolution permitting Mr. Rodino to issue subpoenas without the consent of the full committee.

The dispute marred Democratic efforts to set a bipartisan tone to the inquiry that will eventually culminate in a committee decision whether to urge the House of Representatives either to impeach the President or to drop the investigation.

Mr. Rodino pledged to use the authority judiciously and the Republicans portrayed the issues as no more than a procedural "test vote" on whether the inquiry into President Nixon's conduct would be bipartisan. However, the decision could ultimately have a significant impact on the impeachment process.

Some members of the committee believe that Mr. Nixon's assertion of executive privilege as the basis for denying White House tape recordings or documents to Government and Senate investigators

seeking them in court.

In refusing to turn over the tapes to the committee, Mr. Nixon made the following statement: "The fact is that the tapes would not finally settle the central issues before your committee. Before their existence became publicly known, I personally listened to a number of them. The tapes are entirely consistent with what I know to be the truth and what I have stated to be the truth. However, as in any verbatim recording of informal conversations, they contain comments that persons with different perspectives and motivations would inevitably interpret in different ways."

personally ordered those conducting the investigations to get all the facts and to report them directly to me, right here in this office."

None of the persons involved officially with the Watergate investigation—

Attorney General Kleindienst, Assistant Attorney General Petersen or acting FBI Director Gray—received any such instructions from Mr. Nixon according to their testimony before the committee. Ehrlichman said he was asked by Mr. Nixon on March 29 to conduct an inquiry, but Ehrlichman refused to characterize the interviews he had with half a dozen persons as an "investigation."

In his Aug. 22 press conference, Mr. Nixon said he was referring to an investigation conducted by Dean—which Dean denies conducting—to the investigation done by Ehrlichman, to Mr. Nixon's own interviews with Dean, Mitchell, Haldeman and Ehrlichman and to one other incident.

"I also had a contact made with the Attorney General himself," Mr. Nixon said, "and . . . told him—this was on the 27th of March—to report to me directly anything that he found in this particular area . . ." Kleindienst's testimony did not reflect such a contact.

On April 15, when nothing had yet been made public by Mr. Nixon about any investigation, he met with Kleindienst and Assistant Attorney General Petersen, who, according to their testimony, informed Mr. Nixon of evidence the Watergate prosecutors had implicating Mitchell, Haldeman and Ehrlichman among others. Petersen said he recommended that Haldeman and Ehrlichman be discharged.

Mr. Nixon did not announce the resignations of Haldeman and Ehrlichman, however, for another two weeks. In the interim, Mr. Nixon met twice with the lawyer, John J. Wilson, retained by both men. Neither Wilson nor Mr. Nixon has disclosed what those meetings involved.

In his Aug. 22 press conference, in response to a question, Mr. Nixon denied that he was coordinating any defense of himself with that for Haldeman and Ehrlichman.

Although Mr. Nixon asked Haldeman to listen to tape recordings of presidential conversations—once before Haldeman resigned and once after he resigned in July, 1973—Mr. Nixon has declined to turn over five tapes sought by the Senate committee, which is still

the testimony of Haldeman and Ehrlichman. White House counsel John Dean prevented full disclosure, arguing that it would jeopardize the rights of defendants to a fair trial.

Former Attorney General John N. Mitchell testified to the Senate committee that Mr. Nixon asked him only once about the Watergate affair, shortly after the break-in.

Gray testified that he warned President Nixon on July 6, 1972, that some of his aides were trying to "mortally wound" him. According to Gray, Mr. Nixon did not pursue the point.

According to Mr. Nixon's account, given at his Aug. 22, 1973, press conference, "whether the term used was 'mortally wounded' or not, I do not know. Some believe that it was. Some believe that it wasn't. That is irrelevant. He could have said that . . ."

"I told him to go forward, with a full press on the investigation, to which he has so testified. It seemed to me that with that kind of directive to Mr. Gray that was adequate for the purpose of carrying out the responsibilities. As far as the individuals were concerned, I assume that the individuals that he was referring to involved this operation with the CIA."

According to White House aide Richard Moore, on May 8, 1973, Mr. Nixon told him in a conversation: "I have racked my brain, I have searched my mind. Were there any clues I should have seen that should have tipped me off?" He said, "Maybe there were . . . I know how it is when you have a lot on your mind, and I did," but he said, "I still wonder."

According to Dean, President Nixon had indicated knowledge of the cover-up in conversations with Dean dating from September, 1972. Dean's testimony implicating Mr. Nixon has been denied by Haldeman, Ehrlichman and President Nixon.

In the course of several meetings between Feb. 27 and March 21, 1973, according to Dean, he laid out the cover-up for Mr. Nixon, giving the most detailed description in the meeting of March 21. Dean said his briefing of Mr. Nixon included allegations involving Mitchell, Haldeman and Ehrlichman.

In his speech to the nation on April 30, 1973, Mr. Nixon said that on March 21, "I personally assumed the responsibility for coordinating intensive new inquiries into the matter and I

would have no standing in a House impeachment inquiry.

That view was expressed by Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., the historian, in a letter he sent last Friday to Mr. Rodino and other members of the Judiciary Committee. The letter said, in part, that "whatever merit" Mr. Nixon's position might have in normal circumstances, "that claim is automatically and totally dissolved" when the President's continuance in office becomes the issue of impeachment proceedings.

Mr. Rodino sought this morning to assure the Republican members of the committee that "there will be no wholesale issuing of subpoenas." He said that on each subpoena he would consult with the panel's ranking Republican, Representative Edward Hutchinson of Michigan.

Partisan Maneuvering

But the subpoena issue soon became the focal point of less-than-subtle maneuvers by both sides.

Representative Tom Railsback, Republican of Illinois, warned that bipartisanship would be an essential ingredient in the impeachment inquiry and said that the Democratic majority could "demonstrate its good faith" by amending the resolution to permit Mr. Hutchinson to share in the authority to issue subpoenas.

"This is a kind of test vote," said another Republican, David W. Dennis of Indiana. "If we really mean it, here's the place to begin bipartisanship."

The resolution also gave Mr. Rodino authority to issue subpoenas in the committee's forthcoming hearings on President Nixon's nomination of Representative Gerald R. Ford, the House minority leader, to be Vice President.

Noting pleas from Republicans for quick action on the nomination, Mr. Rodino said pointedly that confirmation of the Michigan Republican could be facilitated by aiding complicated subpoena procedures.

Move to Halt Debate

After 40 minutes of disputing, Representative Jack Brooks, Democrat of Texas, demanded a vote on whether to "give the Republicans a veto on subpoenas."

Republican members noisily objected to shutting off the debate, amid loud groans among the Democrats and shouts of "regular order," a parliamentary call for adherence to the committee rules.

Mr. Rodino permitted the argument to continue after Mr. Dennis asked, "It is the desire of the majority to begin this inquiry by cutting off free debate?"

Some 20 minutes later, after Representative Lawrence J. Hogan, Republican of Maryland,

NEW YORK TIMES

29 OCT 1973

Why We Are Shaken

By Anthony Lewis

WASHINGTON, Oct. 28—In answering the first question at his press conference Friday, President Nixon brought up the case of Aaron Burr as a precedent to support his continued withholding of Presidential papers. He said:

"You remember the famous case involving Thomas Jefferson where Chief Justice Marshall, then sitting as a trial judge, subpoenaed a letter which Jefferson had written which Marshall thought or felt was necessary evidence in the trial of Aaron Burr. Jefferson refused to do so, but it did not result in a suit. What happened was, of course, a compromise in which a summary of the contents of the letter which was relevant to the trial was produced by Jefferson. . . ."

The historical facts are as follows: The letter at issue was not from Jefferson but to him, from Gen. James Wilkinson. Jefferson did not refuse to cooperate in the matter; indeed he offered to be examined under oath in Washington. And he did not produce a mere "summary" of the letter. He gave the entire original letter to the U.S. Attorney, George Hay, who offered it to the court for copying and use of "those parts which had relation to the cause."

In short, Mr. Nixon's account was a farrago of untruths. It may seem a minor matter in a press conference that also saw him falsely imply that Elliot Richardson had "approved" his course of action on the tapes. But the President's misuse of the Burr case is interesting precisely because it was so unnecessary, so minor, so gratuitous.

Why did he introduce such a historical episode into his discussion and then so gravely distort it? Did he consciously intend to deceive his audience? Or is there in him some unconscious process that reshapes the truth to his ends?

Those questions are not put down to suggest that there can be sure answers. What is disturbing is that the public cannot be sure. Even on so small a matter we cannot trust the President of the United States.

Trust is fundamental to the functioning of a free government. Those

ABROAD AT HOME

who wrote the American Constitution, understood that, and therefore tried to make sure that faith in our system of democracy would survive mistaken leadership. To that end they created institutions—in shorthand, government of laws, not men.

objected that "we seem to have a steamroller rolling here" and Representative James R. Mann, Democrat of South Carolina, suggested drily that Mr. Rodino was being prevented from "displaying his bipartisanship," the committee voted on the Rails-back amendment.

"Real Bipartisanship?"

One after another, the 21 Democrats voted no and the 17 Republicans voted yes.

"Real bipartisanship?" Representative Barbara C. Jordan, Democrat of Texas, observed in a stage whisper:

Undaunted, Representative Robert McClory, Republican of Illinois, offered an amendment that would have authorized Mr.

Hutchinson to issue subpoenas in addition to, rather than in concert with, Mr. Rodino.

The chairman said that he would "respect" and republican requests for subpoenas. Mr. McClory said that his amendment would merely "spell out precisely what the chairman said." And Representative George E. Danielson, Democrat of California, protested that the committee could not "operate with two chairmen."

A roll-call vote on the amendment failed, by the same partisan split, 21 to 17. The resolution itself finally passed on a third roll-call division along party lines.

Thus began the second formal inquiry in the nation's history, and the first in 105 years, into the possible impeachment of a President.

Mr. Rodino told the committee that he would not conduct a "witch hunt" and that he would not hold the nomination of Mr. Ford "hostage," as some House Democrats have urged, until the impeachment inquiry was completed.

The committee chairman gave no indication when hearings might begin on either the Ford nomination or the 13 impeachment resolutions submitted to the panel so far. He referred, however, to a "high level of intensity and urgency" surrounding the impeachment movement and said that he did not believe "this crisis in authority can be permitted to continue for a long duration."

In the Senate, one Democratic member took the floor today to suggest that Mr. Nixon resolve the issue by resigning.

"He must leave office for the common good," Senator John V. Tunney of California declared. "The people do not believe him, and he has shamed them."

"Our country simply cannot sustain three mor years of such distrust, despair and disillusionment," he went on. "The mystical bond that unites the governed with the governor has been severed. In the name of common decency, Mr. Nixon should put his nation ahead of himself and step aside so that the process of national renewal and revitalization an begin."

That Richard Nixon has made it impossible for the country to trust in him is not the worst he has done as President. The more grievous harm has been to damage trust in our institutions. Consider some examples.

The police are a particularly sensitive barometer of trust in any society.

The most respected American police institution has been the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In 1970 President Nixon sought to involve the F.B.I. in a program of illegal wiretapping, surveillance and burglaries. After protests from J. Edgar Hoover, the program was allegedly canceled, but the White House plumbers carried out some of the illegal activities. Americans' confidence that Federal law-enforcement institutions will respect the law has certainly been damaged.

The Central Intelligence Agency is another sensitive institution. The evidence indicates that Mr. Nixon's top assistants, almost certainly on the orders of the President, sought to involve the C.I.A. in the cover-up of Watergate.

Our military institutions suffered a painful loss of public confidence as a result of Mr. Nixon's secret bombing of Cambodia. It is not surprising that people should be shaken if our powerful forces can be used in secret, without the consent or even the advice of Congress, and with military men joining in a conspiracy to deceive Congress and the public by false reports.

It hardly needs to be said that the courts have been abused by this President, or that Congress has suffered as an institution from the attitude of open contempt displayed toward it by this White House.

Finally, one must mention a sordid episode in which Mr. Nixon did not hesitate to soil the institution of the Presidency itself—by innuendo directed at a dead President. At a press conference on Sept. 16, 1971, he said the United States had got into Vietnam "through overthrowing Diem and the complicity in the murder of Diem." We have no evidence of any such complicity. Mr. Nixon's remark came shortly after his White House consultant, E. Howard Hunt, tried to forge some—a "cable" made to look as if it had come from the Kennedy Administration.

These assaults on our institutions and on our trust have left the country in a state of nervous exhaustion. Before we can recover, we shall have more to endure. Investigating a President, and judging him, will require us to face hard questions of law and policy and politics. But there is no other way.

As we proceed, we should remember above all that we are trying to heal wounded institutions. That means that the whole process of investigation, impeachment and, hopefully, political accommodation must be carried forward with a deep concern for institutional regularity. We must answer disrespect for institutions with respect, lawlessness with law.

NEW YORK TIMES, THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 1, 1973

White House Says 2 of Tapes Promised Sirica Were Not Made

The Talks Were Those President Had With Mitchell and Dean

By WARREN WEAVER Jr.
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 31 — Two White House conversations that were believed to contain evidence critically important to the Watergate criminal investigation were never recorded at all, President Nixon's special counsel said in court today.

J. Fred Buzhardt Jr., the White House lawyer, told Federal District Judge John J. Sirica at a special hearing that Mr. Nixon would be unable to deliver tape recordings of the two conversations to the judge for his inspection, as the court had ordered, because they did not exist.

In one instance, the President's counsel said, Mr. Nixon's telephone had not been "hooked into" the system designed to record for history his important conversations. In the other, a tape recorder in the President's hideaway in the Executive Office Building had malfunctioned.

Two Conversations Cited

Government prosecutors had sought recordings believed to have been made of a telephone conversation between President Nixon and his campaign manager, John N. Mitchell, on June 20, 1972, three days after the Watergate burglary, and of a meeting between the President and John W. Dean 3d, then his counsel, on April 15, 1973.

Because of testimony by Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Dean before the Senate Watergate committee, investigators believed that

the two conversations would shed light on the President's possible involvement in the cover-up of the break-in at the headquarters of the Democratic National Committee at the Watergate hotel complex.

Today, for the first time in public, President Nixon's lawyer said that tapes of the two conversations had never existed during the entire legal controversy.

President Nixon had refused to deliver nine tapes, believed to include these two, sought by Archibald Cox, then the special Watergate prosecutor, on three separate occasions. When they were subpoenaed by the court, when Judge Sirica ordered him to surrender them and when the United States Court of Appeals upheld Judge Sirica's order.

Then, a week ago, the President reversed his position and announced that he would comply with the court orders and submit the nine tapes for a judicial screening.

Tonight, when asked why no announcement of the non-existence of the tapes had been made previously, Gerald L. Warren, the White House deputy press secretary, said that no effort had been made to find the recordings until last weekend.

Mr. Warren said that Mr. Buzhardt had discovered that the two conversations were not in the tapes when he ordered a search for them over the weekend.

Mr. Warren said that when Mr. Buzhardt was told the tapes did not exist, he asked experts in the Technical Security Division of the Secret Service to find out why.

Mr. Buzhardt's statement appeared to conflict with testimony given to Senate Watergate committee investigators

in closed session by Stephen B. Bull, a special assistant to the President, in August.

Mr. Bull reportedly said that President Nixon had ordered the April 15 tape of his conversation with Mr. Dean flown to his home at San Clemente, Calif., on June 27, but that no courier flight from Washington could be arranged.

As an alternative, the Senate investigators were told, Mr. Bull was instructed to make arrangements with the Secret Service to have Mr. Buzhardt listen to the tape and then brief Mr. Nixon on its contents by telephone. Whether those instructions were ever carried out could not be determined.

Judge Sirica first learned of the nonexistence of the two tapes in a closed meeting yesterday morning with Mr. Buzhardt and representatives of the Watergate Special Prosecution Force, the group that Mr. Cox formerly headed.

The judge then summoned both sides to an open court hearing this afternoon. He said there "the facts and circumstances" of the new White House statement "should be made a matter of public record."

After an opening statement, Mr. Buzhardt began calling witnesses for sworn testimony on the White House recording system, how it functioned and occasionally did not. The first witness, Raymond C. Zumwalt, a White House Secret Service agent, was cross-examined by Richard Ben-Veniste, assistant special prosecutor of the Special Prosecuting Force.

At 4:30 P.M., Judge Sirica recessed the hearing until tomorrow morning and ordered Mr. Buzhardt to bring with him a log showing who had had access to all the White House tape recordings and on what days they had withdrawn specific tapes from the file.

Judge Sirica gave no hint of what action he might take when both sides had completed submitting evidence on the matter.

of the missing tapes. Legally, they are under his jurisdiction—if they exist—since they are among the material that he has specifically ordered the White House to submit to him.

Under the Court of Appeals decision, President Nixon may delete national security material from the tapes, subject to later challenge by the Watergate prosecutors, and the judge will decide what portions of the conversations should be passed along to the grand jury as possible criminal evidence.

Mr. Cox, who was testifying today before the Senate Judiciary Committee on the circumstances of his dismissal as special prosecutor, said that he had been given a hint of today's White House disclosure a few days before his dismissal.

Mr. Cox said that an Assistant United States Attorney in New York, otherwise unidentified, had told him that Mr. Buzhardt, when questioned about the availability of other White House tapes, had said, "We sometimes had mechanical problems."

Mr. Zumwalt, the White House Secret Service agent, testified that there were two tape recorders in the President's suite in the Executive Office Building, just west of the White House. They were used on alternate days, with an automatic control activating the idle machine about midnight every night.

"I assume it failed to switch the machines" the night before the Sunday meeting between the President and Mr. Dean, Mr. Zumwalt said. "Evidently, the contacts did not work."

Mr. Warren said tonight that the call to Mr. Mitchell on June 20 was made by Mr. Nixon on a phone in the West Hall of the White House that was not connected with the recording system. The tapes operated only on calls from the Oval Office, the Lincoln Room on the second floor and the executive Office Building hideaway.

NEW YORK TIMES
24 October 1973

PLUMBERS' INQUIRY URGED BY ELLSBERG

SAN FRANCISCO, Oct. 23 Dr. Daniel J. Ellsberg has called for an investigation into the possibility that the White House "plumbers" engineered the shooting of Gov. George C. Wallace of Alabama.

Dr. Ellsberg said that some of the "plumbers" including E. Howard Hunt Jr. were "professional managers of assassination" and they believed that Mr. Wallace's not running for

President in 1972 was "crucial to their success."

Dr. Ellsberg said that he was calling for a re-examination of the shooting "knowing now what the President Nixon team was prepared to do to help his election."

The former employe of the Rand Corporation, acquitted of charges arising out of his release of the Pentagon paper discussed Mr. Wallace's attack in an interview with the magazine Rolling Stone on the newsstands today.

Sirica to Consider Issue of Privilege Before Tape Audit

By WARREN WEAVER Jr.

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 30—The first official steps toward moving the Watergate tape recordings out of the White House vaults toward the grand jury were taken in Federal District Court today, and it looked like a long, slow journey.

Judge John J. Sirica met for an hour and a half in his chambers this morning with representatives of the White House and the special Watergate prosecution force to work out procedures for his examination of the nine White House tapes that President Nixon agreed to surrender a week ago.

When the closed conference was over, the judge issued a brief statement that failed to clarify the question of what access assistants of the dismissed special prosecutor, Archibald Cox, would have to the hitherto secret records as part of the judicial screening process.

Judge Sirica said that before he listened to the tapes he would "hear argument in closed session on the various claims of privilege" made by the President to keep portions of the recorded conversations from going to the Watergate grand jury.

This clearly implied that lawyers for the special prosecution forces would be entitled to contest before the judge the President's contention that some parts of the tapes should remain secret because they involved national security or official Presidential activity that merited confidential status in the public interest.

Analysis 'Soon'

But whether these lawyers would base their arguments on any analysis of the tapes drafted by the White House, excerpts from the conversations made by the White House or the full text of the recordings Judge Sirica did not say.

Representatives of the judge, the President and the special prosecution force declined to provide any explanation of the judge's statement.

"All parties agreed," said the statement, "that the White House will prepare as soon as possible an analysis of materials which will be transmitted to the court, together with the tapes and documents themselves."

Participating in the conference with the judge were J. Fred Buzhardt, special counsel to the President, and Philip Lacovara and Henry S. Ruth, counsel and deputy prosecutor of the special Watergate prosecution force.

"Before the court examines

Pravda Hints Watergate Is Threat to President

MOSCOW, Oct. 28 (UPI)

The official Communist Party newspaper Pravda gave its readers their first inkling that the Watergate affair has raised questions of President Nixon's continuing in office today.

In reporting on Mr. Nixon's news conference in Washington Friday, Pravda wrote that a new Watergate prosecutor would be appointed and added: "Nixon said he would continue to fulfill his presidential duties."

Soviet newspapers have not reported demands by members of Congress, labor leaders and others that President Nixon be impeached or resign.

Pravda also hinted for the first time that the U.S. alert of its armed forces last week had been caused by some alleged Soviet action.

The disclosure in the strictly controlled Soviet press followed a government statement yesterday which called the U.S. explanation for the alert

"absurd." But the official Tass statement did not say what the explanation was.

Pravda, however, did not link the U.S. alert to a Soviet action in reporting Mr. Nixon's press conference remarks. Instead, it made reference to an earlier news conference by U.S. Defense Secretary James Schlesinger.

The United States said it acted because of indications that the Soviets might send troops to the Middle East. The Soviet statement stopped short of an outright denial of such plans.

Pravda said that Mr. Nixon tried to justify the U.S. alert by making reference to some "information" that allegedly pre-conditioned it but that he did not disclose the source of the information.

After denouncing the alert as harmful to international relaxation of tensions, Pravda added: "It is also indicative that Defense Secretary Schlesinger, who held a press conference before Nixon, had to admit that he

had no information about any actions of the Soviet Union which could give reasons for anxiety."

Schlesinger in fact said that all of the Soviet Union's paratroopers had been placed on alert but that no Soviet personnel had as of that time shown up in the Middle East.

(Pravda also accused China of opposing the establishment of peace in the middle east, Agence France-Presse reported from Moscow. Pravda termed China's statements in the U.N. Security Council and its refusal to participate in the voting "provocative maneuvers.")

Chi denounced "the attempts of the United States and the Soviet Union to impose on the Arab peoples a situation of neither war nor peace."

He described the ceasefire agreement as "a further betrayal of the Arab peoples by the Soviet Union."

the materials," Judge Sirica continued, "it will hear argument in a closed session on the various claims of privilege. The court will thereafter examine the tapes and written material and make individual decisions on each claim of privilege; however, all these rulings will be handed down at one time, when the court's examination is completed."

The judge added that no schedule had been adopted for submission of the tapes and the closed hearings held on portions that President Nixon wants to keep from the grand jury. The timing will probably be determined at another meeting on Friday.

The tapes were the subject of a fierce legal battle between Mr. Cox and the President, with the dismissed special prosecutor arguing that they were essential to his investigation of the Watergate burglary and cover-up. Mr. Nixon insisted that he had an absolute right to keep such White House records private.

Ever since the District Court's first attempt to resolve the politically charged dispute, the decisions have been clouded with uncertainty. Judge Sirica ruled that the President must surrender the tapes to him for a screening of privileged material, but he declined to say what he would regard as privileged.

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed Judge Sirica's ruling with some modifications, specifying that Mr. Nixon could

refuse to hand over parts of the tapes that related to "national defense or foreign relations," but said that the special prosecutor could "inspect the claim and showing" and challenge its validity in a closed hearing before the judge.

The appellate court also ruled that the special prosecutor could call for a private hearing on other claims of privilege made by the President but never revealed what the evidentiary basis for such challenges would be.

In fact, the court hinted that the prosecutor could only have access to the tapes and documents themselves "for the limited purpose of aiding the court in determining the relevance of the material to the grand jury's investigations."

Other White House tape recordings are being sought by two former Nixon Cabinet officers, John N. Mitchell and Maurice H. Stans, as part of their defense against charges of conspiracy and obstruction of justice that they face in New York as part of the prosecution of Robert L. Vesco, indicted for illegal campaign contributions.

The White House has not said whether it would make these tapes available voluntarily.

WASHINGTON POST
2 November 1973

President Picks Sen. Saxbe to Be Attorney General

Jaworski Chosen as Prosecutor

By Carroll Kilpatrick
Washington Post Staff Writer

President Nixon yesterday picked Sen. William B. Saxbe (R-Ohio) to be Attorney General and approved the appointment of Leon Jaworski, a Texas Democrat, to be Watergate special prosecutor.

On Capitol Hill there was praise for both selections, but Democrats said that they would continue to push for a court-appointed special prosecutor.

The President personally announced the selection of Saxbe to succeed Elliot L. Richardson, Acting Attorney General Robert H. Bork announced the appointment of Jaworski to succeed Archibald Cox, whom the President fired Oct. 20.

Bork said Mr. Nixon "has given his personal assurance" that he will not exercise his right to fire Jaworski without obtaining the consensus of the majority and minority leaders of the House and Senate and the chairmen and ranking members of the House and Senate Judiciary committees.

In both appointments, the President sacrificed some of his authority, first by nominating to the Cabinet an independent-minded senator who has never been his favorite and second in agreeing not to exercise his constitutional right to dismiss a member of the executive branch without first obtaining agreement from congressional leaders.

Mr. Nixon met early yesterday with Republican congressional leaders to give them the news and then walked into the White House press room.

Saxbe and Bork to announce his choice of Saxbe. Bork followed with the announcement about Jaworski.

Saxbe, who is subject to Senate confirmation, would normally be confirmed, as a member of the Senate in good standing, without difficulty.

But because of the crisis over the dismissal of Cox and the resignations of Richardson and Deputy Attorney General William D. Ruckelshaus, senators are expected to cross-examine Saxbe closely on Jaworski's independence.

In Houston, Jaworski told a news conference that he accepted appointment only after being satisfied that he would be entirely free to act.

"There are no restraints," he said, "I am not prohibited from taking any action I might feel should be taken."

He said he was confident that when members of Congress "examine the terms of my acceptance" they will "find the comfort and reassurances I found."

On Capitol Hill, as Democrats said that they wanted a special prosecutor entirely independent of the President, it was not immediately clear how much opposition to the selections would develop or how much the tapes controversy would affect confirmation.

"We've relied before on the promises of the President, and Congress has been burned," Sen. A. J. Stevens III (D-Ill.) said.

However, Senate Minority Leader Hugh Scott (R-Pa.) praised both appointments, and Sen. John G. Tower (R-Tex.) predicted that Jaworski's selection "should forestall any action that Congress might take to create an independent prosecutor by legislation of dubious constitutionality."

Mr. Nixon called Saxbe "eminently qualified" and said he had known the Ohioan, who was speaker of

the house in Ohio and twice the state's attorney general, for 25 years.

"Not only is he eminently qualified," the President added, "but he is an individual who wants to take this position and who will do everything that he possibly can to serve the nation as the first lawyer in the nation."

Recalling that Saxbe had announced he would not seek re-election next year but would return to his law practice, the President said he was giving him the opportunity to practice law as "head of the largest law firm in America, the Department of Justice."

After making the brief announcement, Mr. Nixon left the room. Also speaking briefly, Saxbe said he hoped that Bork would remain in the Department, and Bork said he would continue to serve as solicitor general.

"I am anxious to undertake this job," Saxbe said. "I have no reluctance and I have no doubts that I can handle it. I know it is going to be difficult, but it is going to be one that I am familiar with and one that I am happy to tackle."

"I do understand and comprehend the difficult times that I feel that our country is in, a crisis of leadership,"

Saxbe said. "I believe that I can help solve this problem."

"I think everyone in this country wants to get back to routine affairs and the very difficult things that we have to settle both nationally and internationally."

Bork said that Jaworski will have the same charter Cox did with the additional commitment the President made regarding his power to dismiss him.

Jaworski has been promised "the full cooperation of the executive branch in the pursuit of his investigation," Bork said. "Should he disagree with a decision of the

administration with regard to the release of presidential documents, there will be no restrictions placed on his freedom of action."

Bork said that the decision to name Jaworski "is one I made personally."

Saxbe participated "in the closing stages of the selection process and concurred in the result," Bork said. "The selection also has the approval of President Nixon."

Bork said that as one who has "committed his honor and professional reputation to achieving justice in this case, I am totally satisfied with the process of selection, with the terms of the new charter, and most especially with the man who is going to be taking on these new duties."

Jaworski is a man "of complete independence and integrity," Bork said.

In answer to a question, Bork said he had told Jaworski that he believed the staff assembled by former prosecutor Cox "is indispensable to the rapid investigation and prosecution of these cases, and Mr. Jaworski fully agrees."

Expressing confidence there would be no confrontation between the President and Jaworski, Bork said "the President told me he wanted full investigation, he wanted full prosecution."

"I believe that is what he wants," Bork added. "I think the President fully understands that with Mr. Jaworski that is what he is going to get, and I don't think anybody wants any further confrontations."

A question was raised last night whether Saxbe can qualify for appointment to the Cabinet since he was a member of Congress when the salary of Cabinet officers was increased.

Article I, Section 7, of the Constitution says that no member of Congress may be appointed "to any civil office . . . which shall have been created, or the emoluments whereof shall have been increased" during his time in Congress.

A spokesman for Saxbe said "we are aware of the constitutional provision. We believe there is precedent for a senator to be nominated and serve and we do not believe that this will be a bar."

Bork said last night that he believes remedial legislation can eliminate the problem and that such legislation will be proposed with the nomination.

29 October 1973

U.S. intelligence arm—weakened?

By Benjamin Welles
Special to
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

Nixon-administration budget cuts in the United States intelligence community over the past three years have seriously weakened the nation's intelligence arm, sources here believe.

During the recent Arab-Israeli fighting, for instance, the U.S. Intelligence Board — the composite group representing all six intelligence-connecting agencies — could deploy only one spy satellite which made two brief photographic passes over the fighting area.

By contrast the Soviet Union, according to trustworthy sources, had six satellites constantly circling the globe and passing repeatedly over the Middle East. Presumably most, if not all, the photographic intelligence collected, was furnished to Moscow's Arab collaborators.

United States spy satellites with cameras sharp enough to distinguish an officer's insignia of rank from 130 miles in the air cost \$35 million, apart from costly launching equipment at Vandenberg and other U.S. Air Force bases. There is a tendency to hoard these expensive devices; not to risk them prematurely.

"The Pentagon, which controls them, is always trying to keep everything back in case there's a World War III," said one veteran expert. "It's the old story of the best being the enemy of the good. We ought to use intelligence techniques now — not wait for a later crisis."

Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger told a press conference on Oct. 12, at the height of the fighting, that there are always two aspects to intelligence.

"One is a determination of the facts; the other is the interpretation of these facts," he said.

Dr. Kissinger conceded that both Israel's highly touted intelligence service and the U.S. intelligence, with which it collaborates closely, failed to plumb Arab intentions. In the week prior to hostilities, he said, the Israeli and U.S. services agreed in response to three separate questions from his

office that there was virtually no chance of an Arab attack.

That the attack plan was tightly held is evident: It is now thought that at most 12 Arab leaders in Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia knew of the coming invasion. Probably those in Jordan and Saudi Arabia knew only of the plan, not the date or time. Moreover, Western intelligence sources now suspect that, while the Israelis may have been dangerously overconfident that the Arabs would not dare attack, the Arab commanders of the Egyptian and Syrian forces themselves may have thought they were only conducting routine maneuvers — until fresh orders reached them at the last moment.

Yet a warning of suspicious Egyptian and Syrian troop concentrations was sent through, if not by, Jordan via a third country to Washington. The Pentagon ran the tip through its computers, and still concluded that no attack was imminent.

There is firm evidence that immediately prior to the war one Arab country near Israel virtually went off the air, a warning that any professional intelligence service would instantly heed, many believe. Just before the Battle of the Bulge in December, 1944, for instance, Hitler's attacking force abandoned radio communication that could be monitored for the slower but foolproof use of land lines and human couriers.

Examination urged

In short, it is being said, the grave misreading of various signals by both the Israeli and U.S. intelligence communities requires, and should provoke, a thoroughgoing examination.

The role of the U.S.S.R., for instance, not only in furnishing and teaching Arab armies to use complex modern weapons but also in the techniques of strategic deception, is increasingly evident, it is being said.

The Soviet Union appears to have been uttering reassuring, but deceptive, noises in diplomatic chanceries around the world prior to the attack.

"We were collecting tips minimizing any likelihood of war from many capitals," said one analyst. "The Soviets were swamping us with disinformation, and the few in-

dicators that pointed to war got buried in the mass."

Dr. Kissinger in his press conference drew attention to the "tendency of most intelligence services — and indeed of most senior officials and some newspapermen — to fit facts into existing preconceptions." In other words, he was admitting, the Soviet-Arab deception plan appears now to have gulled both the Israeli and American intelligence services — and brought Israel perilously near to having to sue for peace five days after the Arabs struck on Yom Kippur, Oct. 6.

Vital decision

Only the U.S. decision of Oct. 13 to rearm Israel allowed it to use its remaining planes, tanks, ammunition, and fuel swiftly and fully — with crushing effect against the Arab forces. Intelligence analysts here are certain that Moscow was deeply engaged in the Arab venture from start to finish — however much Secretary Kissinger might choose to play down Moscow's role to keep "detente" alive.

The highly touted Nixon "reorganization" of the U.S. intelligence community appears to critics, in short, to have brought forth a mouse; a confused and myopic mouse.

In the interests of "economy" the Nixon budgeteers have slashed \$400 million from Central Intelligence programs since 1970: cutting the community's yearly spending from \$3.6 billion to \$3.2 billion. Inflation, estimated now at about 12 percent per year; is thought to have pared another 25 percent so far from the intelligence community's available funds. Spy satellite and electronic intelligence both have been heavily cut back.

Moreover, Mr. Nixon's rapid-fire personnel shifts with three directors of Central Intelligence — Richard M. Helms, James R. Schlesinger, and William Colby — in six months have impaired the nation's intelligence arm. The CIA's tangential involvement in the Watergate scandal, moreover, has improved neither its morale nor its image.

BALTIMORE SUN
23 October 1973
Nick Thimmesch

New Chief Getting CIA Back on Its Feet After a Series of Stumbles

Langley, Va.

Like a middle-aged gent forced to suddenly run, the Central Intelligence Agency is catching its breath these days following a series of disquieting experiences.

Since it was established in 1947, the CIA has always been able to blunt congressional criticism, shield its staff and budget figures, win loyal support from presidents, and otherwise work in relative secrecy. The very nature of this organization makes powerful people curious, and then resentful when they can't find out what is going on.

But in recent months, its role in the Laotian war, the bad luck the agency fell into in the Watergate affair, hefty manpower cuts, and the departure of two directors within six months, left the CIA gasping.

Its new director, William Egan Colby, 53, an old pro who describes his job as "hiring out," has been a settling influence since he took over last month. His predecessor, James R. Schlesinger, in the few months he was in office, severed about 1,000 people from a payroll estimated at 18,000, and indicated changes designed to please Henry A. Kissinger, the Secretary of State.

Dr. Kissinger and others in the administration have not been satisfied with the use-

fulness of information provided by the CIA, particularly that coming out of the agency's top study unit, the Office of National Estimates. That body is about to be abolished, and some critics claim this means the CIA will consequently be less objective in its evaluations for the White House and State Department.

The CIA also seems to have pulled back from clandestine operations which, while forming only a small part of its overall activity, brought the agency an aura of intrigue and adventure, and also fierce criticism. The CIA's role in toppling governments has always been exaggerated, but even in its current "hold-down" phase, officials have not dismissed the possibility of such activities in the future.

The CIA's basic work is just what its title denotes—an information collecting agency, but one unsurpassed in the world. Its staff tends more to academic than spy-master types. Indeed, about 21 per cent hold advanced degrees, and fully one-third come from the social sciences. Increasingly, CIA staffers concern themselves with economic questions because the power-game in the world today moves toward that area.

The CIA also collects such

seeming trivia as depths of harbors, the conditions of caves, and biographical information about officialdom of every nation in the world. The biographies include tidbits about a leader's health, weaknesses and inclinations.—stuff any gossip columnist would drool over.

The U.S., like all major nations, had an intelligence collecting service through its history, but it was not until the intelligence disaster accompanying Pearl Harbor that we realized the need for a central information collecting agency. There are eight major intelligence-gathering units in the U.S. government, but the CIA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation have to be considered the key ones. Of the estimated \$4 billion to \$5 billion spent by the government on intelligence, the CIA receives about \$500 million.

The CIA, because it is supersecret, is credited or blamed for all manner of events. When Mr. Colby testified in Senate confirmation hearings, he had to deny that the CIA engineered the 1967 coup in Greece, ousted Cambodian Prince Norodom Sihanouk, made a private deal with Cambodian Prime Minister Lon Nol, and conducted the Phoenix program in Vietnam as one of assassination.

Denials aside, what is important is that many Ameri-

cans and certainly the majority of young people believe the CIA is responsible for these acts, and more.

The CIA has few opportunities or forums to make denials, and is vulnerable on this score. One consequence is that the CIA has a difficult time signing on the "cream" of college graduates. Yet some rather prominent names once worked in the CIA, or were involved in its projects—Yale's University's Rev. William Sloan Coffin is one, and feminist Gloria Steinem is another.

All major nations and many minor ones have their CIA's. The Russians have their KGB and GRU. France has its Service for Documentation and Counter-Espionage. The British will not admit to anything, but M-6 is their CIA, and its director, Maurice Oldfield, had to leave his post recently after his name was publicly revealed.

Perhaps one sign of the times concerning the CIA is the one put up this summer on the highway leading to its huge central building here. The sign, which directs traffic, is the first CIA sign ever seen in these parts, though thousands of people drive to work at the CIA each day.

WASHINGTON STAR

13 OCT 1973

Drain Picked for Post

Richard D. Drain, a career government official, has been elected administrator of the Protestant Episcopal Cathedral Foundation, it was announced by the Very Rev. Francis B. Sayre Jr., dean of the Washington Cathedral.

Drain will serve the foundation as a whole, including St. Alban's School, The National Cathedral School for Girls, Beauvoir School and the College of Preachers.

A native of Washington and a graduate of St. Alban's, Drain served in the Army from 1942 to 1946. He received his LLB in 1948 from Yale and his LLM in 1949 from George Washing-

ton University. He practiced law with the Washington firm of Drain and Weaver from 1948 to 1951, then left to join the CIA.

During his 22-year career with the government, he served in the Executive Office of the President and as special assistant to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles.

After working with the State Department in Athens and Nairobi, Drain rejoined the Army and was assigned to the pacification program in Vietnam from 1968 to 1970.

Drain is married and has two sons. He lives at 5120 Baltan Road, Surruner, Md.

CIA Seen Duped in Scandal

Hill Unit Cites Administration Contradictions

By Laurence Stern
Washington Post Staff Writer

The first congressional report on the Watergate scandal yesterday cited major contradictions in statements by President Nixon and his top aides, in efforts to draw a national security cover over the affair.

In completing its 12-week investigation, the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Intelligence concluded that the Central Intelligence Agency had been duped by top White House officials seeking to stall an FBI investigation of the Watergate break-in.

The report, at one point, strongly suggested that President Nixon publicly misrepresented his purpose in phoning former FBI acting Director L. Patrick Gray III on July 6, 1972—a crucial day in the Watergate investigation.

The President's call came half an hour after Gray telephoned Mr. Nixon's campaign manager, Clark MacGregor, to express his concern over White House pressures to suspend FBI inquiries into the Watergate case's Mexican connection. At issue were funds processed through a Mexico City bank linking members of the Watergate break-in team to the Nixon re-election committee.

In the President's account of the phone call, delivered in a statement last May 22, Mr. Nixon said he telephoned Gray "to congratulate him on the successful handling of the hijacking of a Pacific-Southwest Airlines plane the previous day. During the conversation Mr. Gray discussed with me the progress of the Watergate investigation."

But the subcommittee report cited testimony by former White House domestic counsel John D. Ehrlichman that the President's call was prompted by "MacGregor's conveying a request from

Gray to the President."

Ehrlichman acknowledged under questioning by subcommittee Chairman Lucien N. Nedzi (D-Mich.) that the President's public account of the conversation did not square with the version Mr. Nixon gave him.

The significance of the conversation is that it signaled the refusal of Gray and CIA Deputy Director Gen. Vernon A. Walters to go along any further with strong pressures by the President's then-counsel, John W. Dean III, to delay investigation of the Mexican fund connection.

These pressures originated, according to the testimony, with instructions from the President to his former chief of staff, H. R. (Bob) Haldeman, to get assurances that the FBI investigation of Watergate would not expose covert CIA operations or activities of the White House "plumbers."

Between June 22, 1972, and Gray's final declaration to the President in the July 6 conversation that "people on your staff are trying to mortally wound you by using the FBI and CIA," Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Dean interceded in efforts to stall the FBI investigation, according to the testimony in the case.

After Gray made clear to the President that neither he, on behalf of the FBI, nor Walters, on behalf of the CIA, could go along with the delay, Mr. Nixon said: "Pat, you continue to conduct your thorough and aggressive investigation." This was Gray's testimony.

The subcommittee noted that as early as June 22—the day the President expressed concern over possible FBI exposure of covert CIA activities—former CIA Director Richard M. Helms assured Gray there was no such danger. Helms reiterated his conclusion the following day at a White House meeting with Walters, Haldeman and Ehrlichman.

Yet Haldeman instructed Walters on June 23 to go to Gray immediately and tell him that the Watergate investigation might breach national security by exposing covert CIA activities. The effect of this and an ensuing series of contacts between Dean and Walters delayed for more than two weeks the FBI investigation of the most concrete tie-in at that point in the case between the Watergate break-in and the Nixon re-election committee.

The subcommittee criticized Walters for failing to tell Gray on June 23 that the White House concern over exposing CIA operations by pursuing the Water-

gate trail was unfounded.

"It remains a good question why General Walters failed to assure Mr. Gray of the lack of CIA conflict in the Mexico matter immediately after it was so determined on June 23, 1972," the report observed.

Walters testified that he assumed Dean would pass the word to Gray "that there was absolutely no CIA problem."

The subcommittee thought differently. "To be charitable," the report concluded, "the best that can be said for that explanation is that it is rather strange."

"General Walters, by his own admission, was concerned that Dean was attempting to blame CIA for Watergate, and in that frame of reference, one could hardly expect Dean to be the vehicle for informing Mr. Gray that there was no CIA-Mexican connection."

The subcommittee bared a major conflict in the testimony of Gray and Walters. Walters said he told Gray on June 23 that he had been "directed" by top White House officials to warn Gray that the FBI investigation in Mexico would jeopardize covert CIA operations there; that in view of the first five Watergate arrests it would "be better to taper the matter off there."

Gray denied that Walters mentioned senior White House officials as the source of this concern.

"Mr. Gray was vehement in his statement that Walters did not mention senior people at the White House. The important aspect of that

testimony is that Mr. Gray said he thought Walters was speaking for the CIA," the subcommittee said.

In his testimony to the subcommittee, the former FBI director expressed his own sense of helpless puzzlement.

"With both Helms and Walters present (at the June 23 White House meeting) they acquiesce in this move to send Walters over to give me a message they both know to be false. At least Helms does, because I talked to him on 6-22-73 and he said no CIA involvement."

The subcommittee did not pursue the question of why Gray needed the assurance of the No. 2 man in the CIA, when, by his own testimony, he had already received it from the man in charge of the agency, Helms.

As a result of the weeks of executive session testimony by CIA officials, former White House aides and Watergate defendants, the subcommittee proposed three legislative recommendations intended to tighten loopholes in the CIA's statutory charter. They would:

- Require the President to approve any violations of the prohibition in the National Security Act against domestic operations by the CIA.

- Tighten phraseology in the act that might otherwise permit the agency to intrude into the domestic sector.

- Prohibit dealings between former CIA employees and the agency "beyond purely routine administrative matters."

WASHINGTON POST
2 November 1973

Helms Tried To Curb FBI On Break-In

By Laurence Stern

Washington Post Staff Writer

Former CIA Director

Richard M. Helms ordered his deputy, 11 days after the Watergate break-in, to request that the FBI confine its investigation "to personalities already arrested or under suspicion."

The June 28, 1972, memo to Gen. Vernon A. Walters also urged that the FBI be requested to "desist from expanding this investigation into other areas which may, eventually, run afoul of our operations."

The Helms memorandum appears to be in sharp conflict with testimony by the former CIA director to five congressional committees and federal prosecutors investigating the June 17, 1972, break-in and subsequent cover-up conspiracy.

It emerged, in part, in the recently released transcript of a Senate Armed Services Committee executive session dealing with the confirmation of William E. Colby as CIA director.

The thrust of testimony both by Helms and Walters, as well as other principals in the case, has been that despite heavy White House pressure the CIA steadfastly denied that FBI inquiries into Watergate matters would expose CIA activities.

President Nixon, by his own admission and the testimony of top White House aides, initially raised this concern when the FBI was on the verge of investigating the channeling of funds through Mexico which established a link between the break-in team and the Nixon re-election committee.

Colby, in a series of written responses to Sen. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), said that Helms' memo to Walters was "consistent with our concern that investigations might reveal CIA activities and our belief that they were unnecessary since CIA had no involvement with the Watergate incident."

This was precisely the concern voiced by top White House officials, during the early days of the Watergate investigation, in urging that FBI investigation of the Watergate "Mexican connection" be suspended.

The White House pres-

ures directed at Helms, Walters and acting FBI Director L. Patrick Gray III had the effect of delaying the Mexican investigation from June 22 to July 10, when the first FBI interviews were conducted in Mexico City.

CIA officials declined to divulge the full memo or comment on the apparent contradiction between the earlier public testimony by CIA officials and the assertions in the Helms memo to Walters.

Colby, in his written responses to Nunn's questions, said that the gist of the memo on CIA relationships with the FBI in Watergate matters was first stated by Helms at a morning staff meeting of the CIA on June 19—two days after the break-in.

The memo was first alluded to, although without specific identification, by former Watergate Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox in his appearance Monday before the Senate Judiciary Committee. Cox said he had received a memorandum by a "major witness" in the Watergate scandal that was at odds with other testimony by that witness. Hearst News Service reporter Patrick J. Sloyan revealed the witness to be Helms in a dispatch Tuesday.

Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi (D-Mich.), chairman of a House Armed Services intelligence subcommittee, acknowledged that he obtained a copy of the full Helms-Walters memo in connection with his 12-week investigation of CIA involvement in Watergate. Nedzi insisted, however, that the requested curtailment of FBI activities was limited to a few CIA operatives whose covers Helms feared might be blown by FBI inquiries in Mexico.

Nedzi declined, however, to divulge the full contents of the memo. So did staff officials of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

Nedzi's subcommittee issued a report Tuesday charging that the CIA had been duped by top White House aides into becoming implicated in the Watergate case.

The Senate Watergate committee had the Helms memo in its files, but did not publicly question the former CIA director or any other witness about its contents.

Sen. Lowell P. Weicker Jr. (R-Conn.) asked Helms on Aug. 2 at a session of the Watergate committee whether he had ever told Gray that there might be some form of CIA involvement in Watergate.

"I don't recall ever discussing with Gray," Helms testified, "this question of its (the FBI's) uncovering other CIA operations."

Nevertheless Helms did phone Gray on June 28, according to Nedzi's report, and asked that the FBI "not interview" two CIA active agents, Carl Wagner and John Coswell.

Colby told Nunn that a check of the FBI's Watergate leads in Mexico "did not involve any current CIA assets or activities. Having satisfied ourselves that there was no CIA involvement in the Watergate incident, we were concerned that a possible broadening of the investigation which would reveal CIA foreign activities having no bearing on the Watergate incident would take place."

The FBI leads were focused specifically on Nixon re-election funds which were "laundered" through a Mexico City bank from Texas contributors to the safe of the President's 1972 re-election fund raiser, Maurice H. Stans. The money was ultimately traced to the account of convicted Watergate conspirator Bernard Barker.

In the course of the executive hearings Colby also acknowledged that he sought, unsuccessfully, to conceal from former Watergate prosecutor Earl Silbert at

an interview on Nov. 27, 1972, that it was White House domestic affairs adviser John D. Ehrlichman who requested CIA assistance for Howard Hunt Jr. in July, 1971, in connection with the break-in of the offices of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist.

In a "memorandum for the record" on the interview with Silbert, Colby said he "danced around the room several times for 10 minutes to try to avoid becoming specific on this, finally naming the White House, and was then pinned by Silbert with a demand for the name, at which point the name of the individual was given."

The name was Ehrlichman. Colby recited his efforts to withhold Ehrlichman's name in a White House meeting on Dec. 15, 1972, with Ehrlichman and then White House counsel John W. Dean III in the presence of Helms.

This was some six months after Helms and Walters realized, according to their subsequent testimony, that Ehrlichman and Dean were trying to implicate the CIA in the Watergate case.

Colby said he had hoped to withhold Ehrlichman's name from federal prosecutor Silbert because "there was a reluctance to drop somewhat inflammatory names into the kind of atmosphere that was around us at that time."

Knopf Sues Over C.I.A. Censoring of Book

By GEORGE GENT

In what their lawyers called the second Pentagon papers case, the authors and publisher of a forthcoming book about the Central Intelligence Agency filed suit in Federal Court yesterday to enjoin the Government from deleting roughly 10 per cent of the book's material and to halt all interference with its publication.

The suit was filed on behalf of Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., publisher of the book, which has the working title of "The C.I.A. and the Cult of Intelligence," and the co-authors, Victor L. Marchetti, a former executive assistant to the C.I.A.'s deputy director, and John D. Marks, a former State Department employee.

A previous court ruling on the case in March had led to a C.I.A. review of the unsubmitted manuscript.

Named as defendants in new action were William Colby, director of the C.I.A., and Secretary of State Kissinger, whose department employed Mr. Marks.

This is only the second time in the country's history

—the first was in the Pentagon papers suit—that legal action has been brought against the Federal Government to overturn an injunction against publication of material the Government wants to keep classified.

Prior Restraints Cited

The Government's action, the brief says, violates the Constitution's First and Fifth Amendments by prohibiting the plaintiffs from delivering an uncensored version of the manuscript to the publisher; a "forbidden prior restraint upon freedom of the press," in that publication of the censored material would not "surely result in direct, immediate and irreparable injury to the nation or its peo-

ple. The brief goes on to say, therefore, that the purported secrecy agreements signed by both Mr. Marchetti and Mr. Marks were unconstitutional prior restraints on the freedoms of speech and the press.

Floyd Abrams, who was one of the lawyers representing The New York Times in the Pentagon papers case and who now represents Knopf, said previous court rulings on the case in question had been concerned with Mr. Marchetti and his alleged obligations under the secrecy provision he signed when he joined the C.I.A. in 1955.

"What is new here is that Knopf has entered the case under the freedom of the press statutes," Mr. Abrams said.

The brief notes that on March 29, 1972, Knopf and Mr. Marchetti entered into a contract that stipulated that Mr. Marchetti would write and Knopf publish a book about the policies and practices of the C.I.A. that would provide the American people with "vital and timely" information about the secret agency. Subsequently, Mr. Marchetti and Mr. Marks agreed that they would write the book jointly.

Last March, a permanent injunction was issued in Federal Court in Alexandria, Va., forbidding Mr. Marchetti's "further breaching" the terms and conditions of the C.I.A.'s secrecy agreement, which he signed on joining the agency in 1955, and from disclosing any classified information relating to intelligence activities, sources and methods that had not previously been placed in the public domain by prior disclosure by the Government. The court further ruled that all material relating to the agency be submitted to the C.I.A. for

examination 30 days in advance of any publication.

In compliance with the order, Mr. Marchetti and Mr. Marks submitted to the C.I.A. on Aug. 27, 1973, a typewritten manuscript consisting of 517 pages. On Sept. 26, the C.I.A.'s acting general counsel delivered to the authors' lawyers a 19-page document specifying 339 deletions, amounting to between 15 and 20 per cent of the book, and asserted that the manuscript could not be released without the deletions of classified information.

The censored version of the manuscript was submitted to Knopf on that same date by the authors. The publisher has not yet seen an uncensored copy.

Subsequently meetings by Mr. Marchetti and his lawyers with C.I.A. officials brought out the information that some of the material censored by the agency had been acquired by Mr. Marchetti after his employment with the C.I.A. or was already in the public domain.

C.I.A. Restores Portions

The C.I.A. agreed and, on Oct. 15, the agency released 114 of the original 339 deletions for publication, leaving still censored 225 portions, or roughly 10 per cent of the manuscript.

By their act of censorship," the suit alleges, "defendants have substantially impaired and invaded the right of plaintiffs to publish the book 'The C.I.A. and the Cult of Intelligence,' and have deprived the public of the right to receive vital information regarding the conduct of the Government."

In seeking redress, the suit asks that the 225 deletions be restored, that the authors be permitted to submit, and Knopf to publish and sell, the uncensored manuscript, that all Governmental interfer-

ence with the publication cease, and that the secrecy agreements signed by Mr. Marchetti and Mr. Marks be declared "null and void."

In related actions, the suit asks that Mr. Colby and Secretary of State Kissinger provide, within 15 days, all data and documents relating to the decision to censor the 225 portions of the book, the security classifications of each item censored, the manner in which the decision to censor was made and the names and addresses of all those involved in the decision.

"An Incredible Thing"

Robert Bernstein, president of Knopf, said at a news conference in his office that "it was an incredible thing to receive from the Government a censored manuscript with the deleted portions actually cut out of the book with scissors." (The Knopf suit alleges that all of the deleted material had been placed in public domain.)

"I am seriously thinking of publishing the book with all the deleted material appearing as white spaces," he said.

Mr. Marchetti, who was present at the conference with Mr. Marks, said the suit sought to uncover just what the agency considers classified material. "Much of it is silly," he said yesterday. "One of the items originally deleted and then restored had to do with a training installation in Virginia called The Farm."

Mr. Marchetti and Mr. Marks are represented in the suit by Melvin L. Wulf and John H. F. Shattuck of the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation.

A spokesman for the C.I.A. said late yesterday that there would be no comment at this time because the case was before the courts. A State Department spokesman said, "We know nothing about the suit here."

WASHINGTON POST
31 October 1973

Ex-CIA Official Sues To Stop Censorship

By Stephen Isaacs
Washington Post Staff Writer

NEW YORK, Oct. 30—Former Central Intelligence Agency official Victor L. Marchetti, his co-author and his publisher sued today to try to enjoin the government's censoring Marchetti's book, which criticizes the CIA.

Named as defendants in the suit, filed in federal court here, are CIA Director William Colby and Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger.

Lawyers for Marchetti insist that the censorship of sections

of his book—about a 10th of it—constitutes prior restraint and is unconstitutional.

Marchetti was joined in the suit by co-author John D. Marks, a former State Department employee, and by Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.

Before Marchetti wrote the book, the CIA sought and won an injunction against him from U.S. Judge Albert V. Bryan Jr. in Alexandria. That injunction was upheld by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in September, 1972.

Last December, the Su-

preme Court refused to review the appeals judgment.

At issue is whether Marchetti and Marks retained rights to freedom of speech when they signed secrecy agreements upon joining their government agencies.

Melvin L. Wulf of the American Civil Liberties Union, representing Marchetti and Marks, said that "This is only the second case—the Pentagon Papers being the first—where the government of the United States, in its whole 200-year history, has gone to court or sought to enjoin by way of

prior restraint the publication of material concerning government practices."

Wulf warned that if the CIA's censorship is upheld, the practice of requiring secrecy oaths could spread through the government and shut off information about government affairs.

The suit asks that the prior restraint be enjoined, that the secrecy agreements be declared void, and that the government be kept from interfering with publication and sale of the book, tentatively titled "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence."

THE NEW REPUBLIC (D.C.)

OCTOBER 6, 1973

Banned in McLean

Victor Marchetti was a high-level clerk and analyst at the CIA until 1969, when he quit because he had become "disenchanted" with the spy business. At the peak of his career he was an executive aide to Admiral Rufus Taylor, deputy director of the agency. Marchetti quit after doing 14 years of CIA paper work because he felt his employers had become "too large, too inefficient, too tribal, too dangerously manipulated by the military. One of the things that bothered me," he said, "was the fact that we continued to perpetuate the cold war, we were over-concerned with what they called 'maintaining stability in the third world,' another way of saying supporting our dictators and reactionary friends. Also, to be frank, age was a factor. My boy scouts were coming back with long hair and beards and saying they didn't want to go to Vietnam. It was a time of personal reevaluation. At the time all I thought was, just get out, the hell with it." He thought he would write some spy novels, make some money and "get established in the writing game." Eventually he planned to write "the kind of fiction I wanted to write in high school."

Marchetti was disappointed when the critics panned his first book, a novel called *The Rope Dancer*, about espionage. "They completely misunderstood it," he complains. But he discovered that reporters were interested in him as news copy. He gave interviews, delivered some lectures and began work on a nonfiction analysis of all that he felt was wrong with US intelligence. He drew up an outline, found a co-author (John Marks, a former foreign service officer) and signed a contract with Knopf to write what was tentatively called *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence*. Then the CIA's lawyers moved in. Since April 1972 Marchetti has been prohibited by court injunction from showing his manuscript to anyone outside the CIA without its prior approval.

With the help of the American Civil Liberties Union Marchetti appealed his case to the Supreme Court, which denied him a hearing. Marchetti now remains bound by the lower court injunction, which he calls "an outrageous document, written by that juridical master, Clement Haynsworth." It applies to fiction and nonfiction, and apparently it binds him for life. Under threat of contempt charges Marchetti and Marks sent their book to the CIA last month for approval. They were told that 100 pages of the 530 they submitted were unacceptable and would have to be cut. The CIA argued that if published in its present form, the book would compromise national security and violate the CIA's right to protect its "sources and meth-

ods." Marchetti, on the other hand, said he put nothing in the book that hadn't already been exposed and that the only names he included were those of high officials ("who are in a sense public") and foreign heads of state.

Legally the case is interesting because it is not being argued as a violation of the espionage statutes, but as a civil dispute. The CIA won its injunction against Marchetti on a principle of business law. Many big corporations require new employees to sign a contract promising not to give away or exploit company secrets when they leave the company, a practice that is generally supported by legal precedent. When Marchetti joined the CIA he pledged not to "divulge, publish or reveal either by word, conduct or by any other means any classified information, intelligence or knowledge . . . unless authorized specifically in writing in each case by the Director of Central Intelligence." So when Marchetti signed his book contract the CIA went straight to court citing his oath and business law precedents. It won an injunction against breach of contract; Marchetti and the ACLU describe their case as a constitutional issue, an unprecedented attempt by the government to censor a book before it has been published. They warn that other government workers may find themselves bound by similar injunctions. Marchetti points out that on August 25 the FBI announced that all employees would be bound by a new secrecy code, enforced through contract pledges like the one he signed at the CIA. When a reporter asked for a legal justification of the new policy, the FBI spokesman cited the Marchetti case.

Marchetti believes the CIA has taken him to court to harass the book out of existence. He says "The CIA doesn't want the book published. And if we go ahead and publish anyway they want to punish the author to set an example for lots of other guys who are sitting around in the Washington suburbs thinking about what has happened and wanting to comment." Marchetti's only legal recourse now is to challenge each CIA objection individually and try to reinstate the 100 censored pages a word at a time.

Since it is not possible to read the Marchetti manuscript we cannot say whether his suspicions about the agency are justified or not. One former CIA official who has seen parts of the book believes that Marchetti simply used bad judgment, that he might have published his book by now if only he had not used the names of current CIA employees and projects. Marchetti says his book doesn't expose current operations; the CIA says it does and as of now the agency has the upper hand.

Cheer For CIA

Along with the scabies, psoriasis, elm blight and sundry popular causes of an adulatory era, let's hoist a cheer for the CIA, probably the most maligned for the least reason of any U.S. governmental activity.

The Central Intelligence Agency has done a superb job in its basic mission. Begun after World War II, when it became apparent the United States would have to assume some unaccustomed world responsibilities formerly borne largely by the British, the agency had to be built virtually from scratch.

There were a few operatives around from Wild Bill Donovan's cops-and-robbers wartime Office of Strategic Services, but that was not much of a base for an intelligence operation that would have to go up against the well entrenched, sophisticated Soviet apparatus.

The CIA borrowed a good bit from the British, but it soon began to operate on its own and to develop a reliable brand of intelligence. It gave U.S. officials an objective data base on which to make decisions.

Remember that this was being accomplished by penetration of closed societies, principally Russia and China. There are reasons to believe that the CIA was caught short by the speed with which the Soviet Union developed its first atomic bomb—but few other major developments escaped the agency.

Through the years, it maintained an objectivity of reporting that maddened the salesmen of particular causes in Washington and earned it some distinguished enemies. The agency never was popular with the State Department, for obvious reasons, or with the intelligence divisions of the various armed services, but it performed well.

Its failures were highly publicized, especially in one operational branch that probably never should have been incorporated within the intelligence-gathering agency. That is the "dirty-tricks" department, which brought on the Bay-of-Pigs fiasco and has been blamed for just about everything evil that has happened in the world—from droughts to assassinations.

Even the dirty-tricks branch had some spectacular successes against its even less principled adversaries in such places as Iran, Guatemala, et al, but its successes could never be advertised and it was tagged with failures on ventures it did not even involve itself in.

On the intelligence-gathering side, the CIA was helped enormously by technology. First the U-2, which was an important success, despite President Eisenhower's

Ex-aide fights to restore deletions in book on CIA

By Thomas Oliphant
Globe Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — A former senior Central Intelligence Agency official will be going back to Federal court shortly to try to win the right to publish the full version of a book about his 15 years with the agency.

The CIA, meanwhile, has told the former official, Victor Marchetti, that more than 100 of the 500-odd manuscript pages he has completed are objectionable, and it will seek to prevent their publication.

At issue is whether the government's defense and foreign policy agencies can control the writing and speaking activities of former employees. Marchetti resigned four years ago.

The CIA claims it has binding powers over Marchetti on the grounds that as an official, including a stretch as the executive assistant to its deputy director, he signed a standard form agreeing not to publish anything not approved by the CIA.

Marchetti claims the form violates his First Amendment right to free speech.

So far, the CIA is winning the battle. Late last winter, the Supreme Court declined to review a lower Federal court order that enjoined Marchetti from publishing the book without first submitting his manuscript to the agency for review.

Marchetti submitted his manuscript, and last week was informed in a general way of the deletions the CIA wants to make.

His New York lawyer, Mel Wolfe, said he was told that more than 100 pages of the manuscript are objectionable to the agency's general counsel, Gen. John Warner.

er's blunder in acknowledging it—a violation of the first law of intelligence collection. To do so only embarrasses your opponents.

The perfection of electronic snooping brought about the National Security Agency, an operation much larger than the CIA, but an invaluable source of information. Satellite reconnaissance, now that it has been developed and refined, provides an accurate and comprehensive check on weapons deployments all over the world.

How well has the CIA done at classic, cloak-and-dagger spying? For obvious reasons, few people know. There are some indications

Wolfe said he will receive the manuscript back this week, but assumes he will not be able to discuss publicly the nature of the deletions.

A CIA official confirmed that the manuscript has been submitted and is being returned, but insisted that the deletions are not final and that "there is room for give and take on this."

Marchetti, however, said the agency wants to keep him from publishing "anything in the way of supportive detail."

He said the book's principal focus is his contention that the "time has come to reform the CIA and bring it under the control not just of the President and the congressional senilities, but also of the public."

Marchetti said he is convinced that the detail he offers to support his contention would in no way endanger any person's life or the national security.

"I'm also trying to encourage others who've been on the inside to do this," he said, "and there are a lot of them. You'll never hear about them, though, if we don't win this case, which is why I'll fight as hard as I can all the way."

The injunction applies only as long as the merits of the actual case are being tried. It also limits the CIA's jurisdiction over Marchetti to classified information.

One aspect of that order is the extent to which a Federal court will be able to apply it without getting into discussions in the open of specific facts or events the CIA is seeking to keep secret.

This suggests that the government may seek to have a free speech case heard in secret, as was the case during portions of the Pentagon Papers controversy two years ago.

it has been moderately successful. That job is infinitely tougher when you are dealing with closed-society police states than with open ones such as ours.

Now the Nixon administration, according to the pro-administration Washington Star-News, is revamping the CIA to eliminate the Board of Estimates and the National Intelligence Estimates. These currently are our highest balance sheets of digested intelligence.

If so, the White House is making another tragic mistake, of a piece with some of the others that have risen lately to plague it. The beef against the CIA apparently boils

WASHINGTON POST
8 October 1973

Book World

No Secrets Behind the Stamp

THE ANDERSON PAPERS. By Jack Anderson with
George Clifford
(Random House, 275 pp. \$6.95)

Reviewed by
Julius Duscha

The reviewer, a former Washington Post reporter, is director of the Washington Journalism Center.

Jack Anderson, the all-American reporter, has written a disappointing book. The jacket has a large red "Secret" stamp on it along with the legend, "From the files of America's most famous investigative reporter," but inside there is only a rather flat rehash of Anderson's ITT, FBI and Bangladesh escapades as well as an apologia for his disgraceful role in the Eagleton affair.

There is too much preaching in the book, too. Like his predecessor Drew Pearson, Anderson has a disturbing, often cloying messianic streak which surfaces much more often in his public speaking than in his column. Anderson is a Mormon and Pearson was a Quaker and both of them have wanted the world to know that they are eager to save it.

In trying to explain away, for example, his unsubstantiated report that Sen. Thomas Eagleton (D-Mo.) had been cited for from six to 11 traffic violations ranging "from drunken and reckless driving to speeding," Anderson writes: "It was not the first mistake I have made. Being an optimist, I hope it will be the last. I have recounted it here in the hope that some who are down on the press will see how much effort and anguish it takes to produce a flop, and find in this failure not a confirmation of their general distrust, but rather a better understanding of the news business and, hopefully, new faith that a free press, in its stumbling way, is the best safeguard for ultimate truth."

Only a man like Anderson, with unbounded faith in himself and the goodness of his works could find that kind of comfort in what was a reckless error that not only damaged him but hurt all of journalism in the process.

I don't like to bad-mouth

Anderson because both he and Pearson have done much over the years to keep government honest, but the pressures on the Washington Merry-Go-Round column are tremendous. Published seven days a week, it promises a scandal a day, and not even Anderson and his handful of aides can come up with that many. Often the column is wrong, and sometimes a snippet of information is hoked up because yet another deadline is fast approaching. In addition to the column, Anderson also turns out television broadcasts and lectures around the country.

These same pressures apply to all of journalism, of course, but they are particularly virulent among columnists who must produce on schedule something that at least sounds new.

The largest part of book is given over to a retelling of the ITT affair, the famous Dita Beard memo and the allegations that the Justice Department settled an antitrust suit against the ITT in exchange for a \$400,000 contribution from the corporation to help pay for the Republican National Convention when it was originally scheduled to be held in San Diego. The convention was moved to Miami Beach after Anderson's revelations, which, more importantly, have led now to a thorough investigation of ITT by special Justice Department Prosecutor Archibald Cox. The role played by Anderson and his aide Brit Hume in this case was investigative journalism at its best.

From ITT Anderson moves on to his belabored account of the Eagleton affair and then to a retelling of the arrest by the FBI of his associate Les Whitten on charges of "receiving and possessing stolen property." The property in question constituted records taken from the Bureau of Indian Affairs when the building was looted during the Indians' sit-in last fall. Whitten and the two Indians arrested with him, said that they were returning the documents to the

NEW YORK TIMES
31 October 1973

NIXON'S 8TH VETO OF YEAR UPHeld

By RICHARD L. MADDEN
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 30 — President Nixon won his eighth consecutive veto battle of the year with Congress today as the Senate failed to override his veto of a bill authorizing funds for the United States Information Agency.

The vote was 54 to 42, or 10 votes short of the two-thirds required to override.

Despite Mr. Nixon's weak government, and a grand jury refused to bring an indictment in the case.

In an intriguing footnote to this episode, Anderson writes: "Because one of my reporters had been arrested on the streets by the FBI, I stepped out from behind my typewriter for the first time since taking over the column and helped to line up the Senate opposition to Patrick Gray." Gray's nomination to be FBI director was withdrawn by President Nixon because of his involvement in the Watergate scandal.

The book ends with a reconstruction of the accounts that Anderson published, verbatim, from government memos, of the frantic meetings held at the White House and the State and Defense Departments during the 1971 India-Pakistan war which led to the birth of Bangladesh as an independent state. These were the memos that showed Nixon privately ordering United States policy to "tilt" toward Pakistan while administration spokesmen, including now-Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, were publicly proclaiming American neutrality in the conflict. These remain fascinating glimpses into the way government sometime operates.

What I missed most of all in Anderson's book is his failure to go much beyond what I had already read in his columns over the last couple of years. One expects from a book bearing a "Secret" stamp some genuine revelations as to how Anderson operates, and they are missing except in the case of the Eagleton chapters.

Anderson does titillate the reader by mentioning that he secretly met his source for the India-Pakistan documents in a discount drugstore a couple of blocks from the White House, and now every time I go in the Dart Drug at 18th and Eye Streets NW, which I have patronized for years, I look surreptitiously, of course, for Anderson. I haven't seen him—yet. Am I in the right drugstore

ened position in the aftermath of the Watergate scandal and the dismissal of the special prosecutor, the vote indicated no discernible change in the pattern of the legislative battles.

Provision Drew Veto

Mr. Nixon vetoed the bill last Tuesday because it contained a provision requiring the U.S.I.A. to turn over any confidential information Congress demanded.

He said that the Justice Department had advised him that the provision was "an unconstitutional attempt on the part of Congress to undermine the President's constitutional responsibility to withhold the disclosure of information when, in his judgment, such disclosure would be contrary to the public interest."

The President also has indicated that he would veto bills still pending in Congress that would authorize funds for foreign aid. Both contain similar provisions requiring Federal agencies to make available information demanded by Congress or face a cut-off of their operating funds.

The provision originated before the recent controversy over whether the President should make available the Watergate tape recordings to the courts and was an outgrowth of complaints by some Democrats in Congress that the Administration had not been accommodating enough in providing information to Congress about foreign policy matters.

In the brief debate before the vote, Senator J. W. Fulbright, Democrat of Arkansas and chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, said that Congressional committees had been "completely thwarted" by Federal agencies in supplying what he said he was information needed by Congress, particularly on foreign policy developments.

But Senator William V. Roth Jr., Republican of Delaware, said that such provisions cutting off funds if agencies didn't heed Congressional demands for information were "overreaching and unnecessary."

He said it would put "unreasonable demands" on the agencies, such as the U.S.I.A., and could open the way for Congressional committees to demand confidential information on agency employees.

Twice this year the Senate has voted to override Nixon vetoes, but the House then sustains them.

However, Today's vote was well short of the two-thirds needed to override. The Senate originally passed the measure by a vote of 62 to 20 on Oct. 10.

Voting to override the veto were 47 Democrats and 7 Republicans, while 35 Republicans and 7 Democrats voting against overriding.

With the veto sustained, the Senate and House will now have to draft a new bill authorizing funds for the U.S.I.A. The vetoed bill would have authorized \$216.7-million for the agency in the current fiscal year.

Who's watching the watchers?

The U.S. Intelligence Community: Foreign Policy and Domestic Activities. By Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr. 203 pages. Hill & Wang. \$7.95.

This is a very sensible little handbook by an author who knows his subject as do few writing thereon today. Author of "The Real CIA" (1968) and now a professor of political science at Brown University, Mr. Kirkpatrick can look back on almost a quarter century of intelligence activity, culminating in his post as executive director-comptroller of the Central Intelligence Agency. In what he terms "neither a defense nor a whitewash but an evaluation of the U.S. effort as I see it," he begins his study with an explanation of what the so-called "intelligence community" centered in Washington is, analyzing the functions of its various components. He then sketches the controls built into and around this community to forestall gigantism or cancer, and singles out "the one with the sharpest cutting edge" as the Office of Management and Budget. He defends the secrecy pledge required of employees, thinks the case of Victor Marchetti "may well become a landmark . . . for legal action against intelligence personnel," and delves at some length into one of those rare episodes where international espionage briefly surfaced. This was the 1964 slander suit staged before Judge Roszel C. Thomson in District Court in Baltimore involving two Estonian nationals.

Government operations overseas and at home each receive a chapter, as does the subject of political support for, or criticism of, an administration's conduct in those fields. The author is solidly in favor of House and Senate "watchdog" commit-

tees overseeing intelligence activities, or at least their drift, but argues also that the professional community must appropriately withstand too much such access. If this situation were to predominate, "there would be no intelligence community and no security or secrecy in government."

Mr. Kirkpatrick's style is matter-of-fact, at times bordering on colorlessness. His index is skimpy, and he offers only two illustrations: charts of a sample electronics-communications system and of the Defense Intelligence Agency (within the armed forces). There is very little on espionage. The bibliography is almost ruthlessly selective. Offsetting such deficiencies is the author's masterly overview of a complex governmental structure, with the narrative occasionally enlivened by personal reminiscence. He recalls, for example, the photograph a grateful President Kennedy sent across the river to Langley inscribed, "To the CIA—with esteem."

Mr. Kirkpatrick finds "the modern American tragedy" to be that "many citizens have lost their confidence in the truthfulness of their government officials." Such citizens, he is convinced, are wrong. "How good is the U.S. intelligence community? Obviously, it is neither omniscient nor ubiquitous, nor could it be. There are gaps in knowledge in vital subjects. But based on what was missing in 1947, compared to what is missing today, the record is good."

Civil-libertarian types may be expected to pounce upon this volume with little grunts of slavering anticipation. But to at least one reviewer it stands as an admirably compressed, wisely instructive monograph for the restricted audience it patently addresses.

CURTIS CARROLL DAVIS
Mr. Davis is a veteran of both the OSS and the CIA.

down to the fact the CIA does not always tell Mr. Nixon what he wants to hear. Killing the slave who brings the bad news is an ancient remedy, but it doesn't work—at least not for more than a brief interlude of fantasy.

It's over, over there

The Berlin Ending. By E. Howard Hunt. 310 pages. Putnam's. \$6.95.

The picture Howard Hunt (one of the Watergate Seven) draws of international agents and the worlds they occupy strikes one as strangely egocentric, without much connection to ideal or country. Hunt himself was in the CIA for 20 years and reportedly missed the CIA way of life when he joined a Washington public relations firm. If a comparison can be fairly drawn between Hunt and the main character in his new book, Neal Thorpe, what he missed was not service to his country but rather excitement, danger, and a feeling of personal power.

So realizes Thorpe, speeding along in his car, after becoming involved in uncovering a Soviet plot designed to place an agent as Secretary General of the U.N. The zest has come back into his life since he picked up a young woman at National Airport and drove her into Washington during a taxi strike. Concern for her plight and a desire for excitement give Thorpe reason for leaving his dull job as architect and returning to the CIA.

The story ends

The novel jumps from person to person and location to location as the cast converges toward Berlin, where, as the title says, the story ends. The ending brings disillusionment to Thorpe. Minor players on both sides of the game have been liquidated but the prime target is still at large, untouchable. Thorpe himself, because of

his involvement, is charged with a murder he did not commit in the States and has no idea when, if ever, he can safely return. He doubts that the CIA, on whose fringes he has been working, will help him much.

Somehow though, the bitter ending is not effective. In a novel such as John Le Carre's "The Spy Who Came in from the Cold," the main characters become real and sympathetic by virtue of their weaknesses, idiosyncrasies, and distrust of power. When a cold organization crushes such people, the reader is naturally appalled. But when the characters are as slick, self-assured, and fashionable as Thorpe and his girl, it is difficult to feel much for their predicament. The impersonality of Hunt's style creates too much distance to involve the reader's compassion.

The agent as hero can be a dangerous image in reality. Literature reflects reality and sometimes influences it no matter how fantastic spy stories may seem. There is undeniably a desire in man to test his energy in the universe of his concern. Such testing is the subject of much literature.

At the book's end, Thorpe is indignant when faced with the fact that the machinery is more important than one cog. The reader is likely to feel similarly indignant unless he realizes that there are few, if any, individuals to whom one would entrust the responsibility for making decisions of national or international scope.

DALE MATTHEWS

CHICAGO TRIBUNE

30 OCT 1973

Hunt back in prison after taking stand

DANBURY, Conn., Oct. 29 [AP]—Convicted Watergate burglar E. Howard Hunt is back in the federal prison here, after a sojourn in Maryland in the custody of U. S. marshals. Hunt was in Maryland to testify before the Watergate grand jury and the congressional committee investigating the 1972 break-in of Democratic national headquarters.

NEWSWEEK

8 Oct. 1973

THE SPY WHO TOOK THE FALL

Prison-wan and faltering, he seemed anything but the superspy-cum-novelist whose Bondian career had crashed in the debacle of Watergate. Facing the Ervin committee, E. Howard Hunt was a burnt-out case—and as a fall guy in the Watergate scandal who has served long months in jail while higher-ups went free, he inspired considerable sympathy in the Senate Caucus Room and in living rooms across the nation. But the dark glasses he sometimes wore in the glare of the TV lights were fitting: in the end, he remained an enigma.

With two of his children, Lisa, 22, and St. John, 19, sitting behind him, Hunt, 54, recounted a Job-like ordeal. "I find myself confined under a sentence which may keep me in prison for the rest of my life," he told the senators. "I have been incarcerated for six months. For a time I was in solitary confinement. I have been physically attacked and robbed in jail. I have suffered a stroke. I have been ... manacled and chained, hand and foot. I am isolated from my four motherless children. The funds provided me ... have long been exhausted ... Beyond all this, I am crushed by the failure of my government to protect me and my family as in the past it has always done for its clandestine agents."

Naïve: But for all its pathos, Hunt's testimony suggested to some skeptical associates that the 21-year veteran of the Central Intelligence Agency was simply wearing a new disguise. "One thing Howard is not is politically naïve," a friend of Hunt told NEWSWEEK. "He had to know that this was the same kind of thing he had been doing in other countries for years. He had to know the risks were greater. He was playing for higher stakes, also. He wanted deputy director of the CIA, or something like that." One acquaintance suspects Hunt has held back hush money from his Cuban codefendants, who now feel as betrayed by their leader as he does by the men who directed him.

Some of Hunt's stories of prison life, knowledgeable sources say, are a bit embellished. When his children visited him in Danbury Federal prison, St. John said, "It was really nice. Almost like a boarding school." Hunt did have a fight with another inmate during a stay in the D.C. jail, but his attorneys tend to play down his account of his medical problems.

To be sure, the fifteen months since Watergate have cost Hunt dearly. Soon after the break-in, Hunt was fired from both his White House and his public-relations jobs. His wife died in a plane crash last December, on a financial mission for the Watergate cover-up. In fighting his 35-year provisional jail sentence, Hunt is piling up legal fees of \$1,500 a day—an expense that the reissue of seventeen of his 47 spy novels will do little to mitigate. No less painful for Hunt is the public

NATIONAL REVIEW

12 October 1973

Howard Hunt: Justice Outraged

A man caught breaking into Tiffany's at midnight and stuffing his sack with valuables might receive about six months in prison, if he were a first offender and otherwise had a good record.

For his role in the Watergate break-in, E. Howard Hunt was sentenced to 35 years by Judge John Sirica. Other defendants also received long sentences, with the exception of James McCord, whose sentencing was deferred on the assumption that he would talk. In Hunt's case, no mitigating circumstances of previous record, character, or motivation affected the sentence. In fact, Hunt had had a long and honorable record of service to his country as an OSS and CIA operative.

Since his imprisonment, Hunt has been shuttled from one cell to another, and from one hearing to another, usually in manacles. His health has declined. In his first appearance before the Ervin committee, he revealed that he had suffered a stroke since his imprisonment. His accommodations in prison have not prevented his being physically attacked and robbed by other inmates. In addition, his wife died in a Chicago plane crash carrying Watergate money. Numerous and often redundant court actions and hearings have exhausted Hunt's financial resources. His children have been effectively orphaned.

The extraordinary sentences imposed by Judge Sirica were an attempt, and widely recognized as such, to get the defendants to "sing." But Judge Sirica had no way of knowing what further information they possess, if any.

Hunt's 35-year sentence would appear, prima facie, to be unconstitutional. In the first place, it violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishments," a prohibition the relevance of which is strengthened by the accompanying language regarding "excessive bail" and "excessive fines." In the second place, it at least indirectly violated the Fifth Amendment, which was designed to eliminate the use of torture to extract incriminating information from a witness or a defendant.

In recent years, rivers of ink have been spilled about real and alleged abuses of justice: how Soledad Brother George Jackson received such a long prison term for a mere armed robbery; how the Berrigans were martyred by their months at Danbury; how felons at Attica have been abused; and how Black Panthers in New York have been persecuted by an unfeeling Judge Murtagh.

We are waiting to hear from Tom Wicker, Murray Kempton, and Kingman Brewster about the case of E. Howard Hunt and the Cubans.

ridicule that has greeted his escapades as a spy. The reportedly "ill-fitting red wig" that Hunt wore to his meeting with Dita Beard has become a national joke, and former CIA director Richard Helms has called him "a bit of a romantic" with a tendency "to get a little carried away."

But if last week's appearance before the committee was an act, it was

among the best in Hunt's career. "I am sorry that I did not have the wisdom to withdraw [from the Watergate operation]," he said. "At the same time, I cannot escape feeling that the country I have served for my entire life and which directed me to carry out the Watergate entry is punishing me for doing the very things it trained and directed me to do."

For Openness in Foreign Policy

By Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

In our political system the president enjoys — or suffers — enormous advantages of leadership. His is an extremely difficult role to share, and to a considerable extent the advantages interact with the problems, one upon the other, to cripple the political system.

His principal advantage is that the general public — even the best-informed public — views the world beyond our borders as confusing and dangerous.

To the extent that the average citizen is confused, he tends to place his trust in the president and in the experts. The feeling of danger — reduced and diffuse today but still very much present — brings with it a strong sense of the necessity for teamwork under a united leadership. And so the president operates from a protected position behind the high wall of the public's desire to delegate trust to one man.

Unfortunately, presidents are inclined to think this blind trust in their wisdom is wholly justified. Having almost sole access to the full range of classified information and expert opinion, presidents are tempted to think that the opinions of congressmen, academics, journalists and the public at large are, almost unavoidably, inadequately informed. The subtle insights of specialists or classified pieces of information are often accorded a totally undeserved attention and importance in comparison to more widely shared insights and knowledge.

ALL THIS REDUCES the politically healthy feeling of being constrained by the disagreement of many of one's peers. But that might not be particularly serious if the president and the executive branch were bias-free and single-minded in their desire to produce results representing the long-run preferences of the American public. Unfortunately, neither of these conditions is likely to prove true.

For there are biases built into the position of the president — and the advice he receives — that are likely to lead to departures from the needs of the country as perceived by others.

For one thing, the very factors which reduce the value of the opinion of others on tactical questions have a way of spreading to questions of basic values. There is a tendency to assume that such fundamentals as the amount of dollar cost the public will bear to reduce nuclear risks, or the loss of lives that we will bear to avoid a particularly offensive weapon, are technical decisions for experts — although these decisions plainly involve only value judgments, not specialized knowledge, once the choices are fairly laid out.

The problem is further complicated by the fact that presidents in recent years have become increasingly enamored of their role on the stage of world affairs and are likely to resist a more limited role even if the public were to assign it to them.

All of these pressures make a relatively retiring presidential role less likely whatever the public interest.

OVER THE YEARS, THEN, we have moved further and further away from the basic premises of our democratic political system to put important decisions on for-

eign policy in the hands of the president and, in effect, to charge him with its successful administration. Our almost total reliance on the president's leadership and accountability; the felt need to fight insurgency with counterinsurgency, often secretly; our unwillingness to test foreign policy initiatives in the ways in which we test domestic policy proposals — through debate and discussion; the appeal of "national security" as sufficient justification for a vague and extensive foreign policy; and, most of all, the fear of the president that his political popularity, his place in history and his capacity to lead all depend on not having another China, or Cuba, or other major loss to communism — all these considerations tempt a president to go it alone in the hope that the policy will succeed.

The temptation to let the end justify the means is clearly present, even if the means requires dissembling or misleading the Congress and the American people. Such conduct can, in the environment of the recent past, be rationalized as necessary to maintain that secrecy on which success depends. And, after all, it is unlikely that the president's honesty and good faith will be brought effectively into question if the policy is successful.

The Bay of Pigs debacle of 1961 is an illustrative example. The significant aspect of this incident is the fact that President Kennedy's *mea culpa* related to the failure of the mission, and the later investigation into how the president could be so misinformed. He felt no need to apologize for undertaking so extensive a covert activity on presidential authority alone.

Was the Bay of Pigs different in kind or quality from the secret bombing of Cambodia (and falsification of records) at President Nixon's direction? However justified by necessity, secrecy destroys our democratic process when it also deceives the American public on important and controversial matters.

The war in Vietnam has raised still deeper questions. Between 1961 and 1964 our operations in Vietnam through "military advisers" were, at most, partially covert. The fact of their number was known, and their roles only modestly concealed.

As the operation grew and the possibility of more massive intervention became clearer — and, I am convinced, well before he had made up his own mind how far he would intervene — President Johnson did go to the Congress for authority in the form of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. The form, at least, was observed, though unhappily in part as a political response to Senator Goldwater's position in the 1964 campaign.

YET I CANNOT, IN RETROSPECT, square the Vietnam War with my concept of democratic government. What President Johnson did not do, when he had made up his mind in 1965, was to lay out fairly and frankly for Congress and the American people the choices facing us, the risks we were taking, and the possible

consequences of our intervention. His failure to do so led in the end directly to attacks upon his credibility and to a serious erosion of the trust and confidence of the public in the president. And, of course, as the war unfolded, lack of candor was compounded by miscalculations that I am sure far outweighed conscious deceit.

Mr. Johnson did not want the war, felt he could not let Vietnam go without overt military assistance, and was genuinely concerned about its potential for expansion. Once committed, he saw no retreat without too great a loss of prestige both at home and abroad.

In 1965 I have no doubt the public and the Congress would have overwhelmingly accepted and supported our intervention in Vietnam, and that any alternative (harsher or softer) course, as I am sure President Johnson knew, would have badly divided the country. There was in 1965 no basic contrary view; virtually no one of any political weight was avowedly prepared to accept the collapse of the non-communist government in South Vietnam.

In these circumstances it would have been difficult for Mr. Johnson to have volunteered all the risks potentially involved, to have prepared the American people for the worst. His primary political interest was the Great Society — not Vietnam — and his political compromise was to downplay Vietnam in the hope that guns and butter were both possible. In retrospect he should have encouraged a Great Debate; had he known his worst fears would be realized, he undoubtedly would have. Yet the harsh fact is he did not, and that he did not importantly narrowed his future options.

Then, as the war dragged on, and as opposition to it became increasingly vocal, the administration's motivation subtly changed. Information withheld, promulgated half-truths, propagandizing the good news — all of which were to a degree misleading — were now justified by the necessity to minimize the degree of opposition so that peace could be more rapidly achieved. And so the credibility gap widened.

Mr. Nixon — prior to Watergate — recouped some credibility for the presidency. He did not, however, do so by frankness and candor. His technique was to reduce the levels of U.S. troops and casualties; to seek to focus attention on other matters by his China initiative; and to continue to dissemble and to restrain discussion on Vietnam. His excessive views of presidential power, his seeming disdain for congressional views, and his moving the center of decisions and operations from the State Department to the White House all have tended to reduce public discussion and, consequently, public opposition. And to a completely unprecedented degree he has conducted his foreign policy secretly. In his administration, neither the Congress nor the public has been informed about foreign affairs except at a level of high generality, and even then without the opportunity for discussion. Indeed, not even the bureaucracy has been consulted

or informed.

WHAT MUST BE DONE TODAY to put our foreign policy on a viable basis is, first, to promote discussion sufficient to establish the domestic consensus necessary to gain acceptance for, and support of, our foreign initiatives. We stand as a badly divided nation and we face some very tough problems. Second, we must restore confidence in the integrity of the presidency. The Congress and the people need to believe what the administration says. Both of these objectives mean dramatic changes in the style of the presidency in foreign affairs.

I would propose the following changes:

• The president must indicate that he needs and wants the support and participation of Congress and the public in formulating his foreign policy. He must welcome public discussion and criticism of his proposals. Clearly, he must do the proposing, he must provide the leadership. But he and his principal assistants must be far more willing than in the recent past to lay out candidly the problems, the choices, the recommended actions.

To involve the Congress in this fashion is, despite congressional protestations to the contrary, as much a problem for the Congress as for the president. The unpleasant fact is that most members of Congress find little political profit with their constituents in foreign affairs and in accepting the compromises necessarily involved. The role of critic after the fact is often more politically rewarding than that of a constructive participant. It is easy for opposition — especially in the Congress — to center around short-term considerations rather than long-term policies, to make appeals to national pride, to criticize almost any negotiation.

The record of Congress on many foreign policy issues, usually in the form of amendments to foreign aid bills, is far from a distinguished one; and the temptation of the executive to interpret away crippling amendments to its foreign policy has served to create still another tear in the fabric of constitutional government.

Secrecy in foreign affairs is not, therefore, a one-way street born of presidential ambition for power.

Nor is a compromise approach — secret consultations with relevant congressional committees and leaderships — much of an answer.

No, today there can be no substitute for a general rule of openness with the Congress. Congress must become truly involved in decisions and programs for action, and it must be told what the problems are, what the apparent options for action are, and why the executive has come forward with particular proposals. If, in the process, nations abroad come to know somewhat more about the way an administration's mind is working, I think the price — if it is that — eminently worth paying.

• It follows that the principal makers of foreign policy decisions must be exposed to Congress, the press and the public.

• We should abandon publicly all covert operations designed to influence political results in foreign countries. Specifically, there should be no secret subsidies of po-

lice or counterinsurgency forces, no efforts to influence elections, no secret monetary subsidies of groups sympathetic to the United States, whether governmental, nongovernmental or revolutionary. We should confine our covert activities overseas to the gathering of intelligence information.

I come to this conclusion with some reluctance, because in a few instances such activities have been legitimate and useful. But I believe the impossibility of controlling secret activities — and the public's apprehension about them — outweigh the losses which will be sustained. Much of this activity was phased out under Kennedy and Johnson, and I think the rest can go.

• We must minimize the role of secret information in foreign policy.

Prior efforts to revise the classification and declassification system have not worked, primarily because in no instance has major surgery been tried. Classifiers have mixed the desire to keep information confidential and "closely held" for whatever reason, good or bad, with information actually affecting the "national defense." To do this is a perversion of the law.

What exactly would be covered by a (revised) classification system, limited to matters affecting the national defense? Examples would be CIA and DIA intelligence material on foreign military capabilities, troop dispositions, missile placements, and weapons development; and defense and AEC information on our own weapons systems, future technological developments, current strength and disposition, mobilization estimates, and military plans to the extent such information is not already in the public domain. Even such a drastic cutback as this will result in some overclassification. But it should be more workable than the present morass.

I do not propose that all other information be made public or even generally available. I simply suggest that it not be classified as "national defense" information, carrying such exotic labels as "Top Secret" or "Cosmic Top Secret" or the like. I have no problem with limiting distribution within the bureaucracy of information which is politically "sensitive," or with general rules concerning the confidentiality of discussions with foreign diplomats, ambassadorial or other bureaucratic recommendations as to policy, or personal or investigative records. (In the case of diplomatic exchanges, such common-sense rules long antedate the postwar expansion of classification.) Frankly, I think we can rely on the good sense of bureaucrats to keep confidential what should be confidential most of the time, without employing bloated concepts of national security to do so.

• Classification will not stop leaks anyhow. What minimizes these is loyalty to superiors, based not so much on agreement with policy as on respect for their fairness, integrity and openness to recommendations and ideas. A part of the new style of operation must be far greater openness within the executive branch itself.

IN THE PRESENT WORLD SITUATION, far greater congressional and public involvement in formulating our foreign policy seems to me not only right but near-

ly inevitable. There are two reasons for this:

First, problems of trade, investment, resources, development and international monetary stability promise to take on increasing importance in the future. All of these problems will require legislative solutions and therefore extensive congressional participation and action. All will involve a continuity in policy over relatively long periods of time and thus need public understanding and support.

Second, as communism has become less monolithic, as China has emerged as a competing ideological center, as the Soviet Union has become less stridently revolutionary and more concerned with China and with its own domestic progress, and as Europe and Japan have become centers for wealth and power, security considerations in the United States' foreign policy have become less consuming and less global.

The shift to a more open style in foreign policy will not be without its difficulties. One is the extent to which openness may in fact reduce options or be perceived as doing so. I accept the fact that it sometimes does. But I also think the extent of that reduction is exaggerated, often for improper purposes. I accept, too, that there are circumstances where the president or the secretary cannot be totally candid without affecting the situation he is discussing. I think the press and public understand this. They know, for example, that high government officials cannot publicly discuss corruption of high South Vietnamese officials, or that high-level expressions of doubt about the viability of a foreign government may bring it down. But these inhibitions are not serious ones, because the underlying facts — if they are important to understanding policy — can be made available to the public in other ways.

THE MOST SERIOUS PROBLEM of a more open foreign policy lies in congressional response. In Congress controversy can lead to delay, to inaction, to unworkable compromise, to missed opportunities. Minorities can obstruct; special interests can sometimes manipulate policy more easily on the Hill than in the executive branch. The accident of committee leadership and membership can skew policy away from the national interest to more parochial concerns. No one should be sanguine about these risks. The danger of getting hopelessly bogged down in a congressional quagmire is clear and present.

Nonetheless, I am prepared to take some losses in our foreign affairs if by doing so we can restore the fundamentals of representative democracy to our foreign policy. As Watergate demonstrates, democracy is too fragile to be divided into foreign and domestic affairs. We cannot give the president a free hand in the one without eroding the whole of the governmental system that all policy seeks to preserve.

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McGeorge Bundy

Toward an Open Foreign Policy

There are many theories of the American presidency, and the style of the White House changes with every change of administration. But there is one element in the styles of the last 10 years which, if I am right, will be profoundly out of place in the next 25 years—the apparent belief that there is an indispensable need for secrecy and loneliness in the conduct of our major international affairs.

This attitude is seldom supported by reasoned argument, and its validity can be questioned even with respect to such interesting special cases as diplomacy toward China, the Soviet Union and Vietnam. An important element in the agenda of the nation could be a careful review of the real importance or lack of importance of the attitudes toward secrecy which developed in the generation marked by the opening of the nuclear age and the fears of the cold war, and which have reached their extreme point in arguments offered by President Nixon in defense of his plumbers. My own strongly held belief is that such a study would demonstrate the number of matters which need to remain secret over anything but a short space of time is exceedingly small, and that the balance of national advantage, both at home and abroad, rests with a presumption in favor of openness.

Because the subject is one with which for a time I was closely engaged, and because its history is frequently cited as evidence of everweakening strength in the presidency, let me here suggest that my argument may be most plainly demonstrated by the history of our deeply troubling engagement in the Vietnam war. There are many lessons in it, and the mode of learning, at least so far, has more often been hot debate than cool reflection, but my own conviction is that the history of the war in Vietnam, properly understood, will testify not to the dangers of excessive presidential power but to the perils of *secretiveness*—which is something very different. Seen as a matter of simple power, I think the story of Vietnam will tell more about the weakness and internal division of our government—including its presidency—than about any usurpation of excessive power by anybody. I know from direct experience that between 1961 and 1966 the dominant emotional reaction of the White House to the Vietnam problem was frustration—and while a great part of that sentiment derived from the intractable behavior of both friend and foe in Southeast Asia, a great deal more was the product of division, uncertainty, and a sense of limited ability to control men and events within the Executive Branch itself. I believe history will conclude that none of our last three Presidents has felt fully confident of his capacity to command and control his own subordinates in relation to Vietnam, and that no matter what policy may have been preferable at any stage—further in, faster out, or something in between—that policy would have been better managed if command and control in the Executive Branch had been stronger. There are

particularly significant questions, I think, about the relation between Presidents and military men, but there are lessons to be learned elsewhere as well. In this capital case, as in general, I believe evidence will show that the truly fundamental error has been to suppose that isolation, secrecy and surprise are the preconditions of strength. I think all those involved, and especially the last two Presidents, would have gained in effectiveness by a more open and confident approach, first to the rest of the Executive Branch, second to the Congress, and third to the country.

So I think it is usually a mistake to suppose that secrecy gives strength to foreign policy. In most cases, I believe, the strong presidency and an open style are not enemies, but friends. I believe this to be true in at least six major areas that are of critical importance. These are, in no particular order, the Executive Branch, the Congress, the press, the general public, the interested public, and foreign governments. Without attempting a detailed analysis of these different sectors and their meaning to the presidency, let me suggest some general arguments for openness.

The central requirements for an effective relation with each of these great forces is that there should be a sense of effective two-way communication based on trust. The shape of that trust will vary from one sector to another. In none of the six cases can we exclude the element of principled disagreement, and in none, alas, can a President neglect the possibility of betrayal. But the right objective, in each case, must be the establishment, and the zealous maintenance, of a process of communication that is mutually reinforcing.

The President and the press, to take a relatively simple but lively example, are natural adversaries every day, on the shallow plane of short-lived secrets. They can also be deeply opposed to each other on major issues of policy, though the press will rarely be monolithic on any large question. But the President who perceives the press as intrinsically his enemy is a President who has condemned himself to an isolation that limits the strength of his office.

But the two most immediate areas of concern for the advocates of openness are the relations between the presidency and the Executive Branch and the relations between the Executive Branch and the Congress. These relations, in any administration, are sensitive and complicated. Representative government, in Theodore Lowi's words, is "the most complex and delicate type of political organization that has yet been seen in world history," and in the American case the problem is compounded by our constitutional and institutional commitment to the separation of powers. The difficulties here are legion, and nowhere more troubling than in foreign affairs. It is extremely easy for Presidents, senators and foreign policy professionals (whether in the State Department, the Pentagon or the Treasury) to give up on the complexity and difficulty of

those relations and to try to "go it alone." But that does not work—not in the long run.

It is particularly unwise, I think, for the presidency to give up on the Executive Branch, and that happens to be one that has been most conspicuous in recent years. Seen from the White House, the bureaucracy can be a most irritating institution, and there are interesting special reasons why it may be even more irritating to Republican than to Democratic Presidents. But to surrender to this irritation is at least as self-defeating, and mutually shriveling, as to accept a relation of distant and hostile mistrust with the press. The right way to deal with the bureaucracy, at least in the field of foreign affairs, is to get close to it, and to build persistently and sympathetically on its own almost instinctive desire to turn toward the sunlight of presidential leadership.

It would be pleasant if we could say that a new policy of openness would resolve all our difficulties. But to see how much trouble remains we have only to look at the problem which currently faces our government in the Mideast. Here for the fourth time since 1948 there is open warfare, and the difficult and delicate effort to contain the struggle and to achieve a cease-fire is one in which the President and his principal advisers cannot be expected to disclose all that they are doing and saying, both in the Mideast and outside it. Moreover, the situation itself, as it evolves from one day to the next, will be of critical importance in shaping the next move of every government. So far, at least, it appears that this evolution may be both slower and more costly for all than was the case in the six-day war of 1967. But as one of those who was at work in the White House during that last occasion, I know how inescapably both battlefield news and private diplomatic communications are a necessary part of the conduct of policy at such a time. Thus both the sensitivity of what is said and done and the speed with which the situation changes do combine to enforce upon the President a special responsibility.

Yet precisely because it is so important and so dangerous, this situation does emphasize again the requirement that our basic policy here as elsewhere runs grave risks of failure if it does not rest upon informed and general public support. And so we must ask the deeper question whether the President's conduct of affairs in the present crisis can be said to rest upon such an agreed national sentiment.

The question is not an easy one. It is not hard to frame an American view of the Mideast that will command broad support if we use phrases that are broad enough to encompass our hopes and thin enough to leave our real obligations undefined. Thus we are for peace, and we believe in the independence and security of all the peoples in the Mideast. We favor justice for refugees and secure boundaries, and the President is able to write in each of his annual reports of our concern for friendship with all, and our responsible support for a nego-

tiated settlement. This much is easy. But behind the generalities there are much harder questions. The most important and the most sensitive of these turns on the degree to which the United States has become an indispensable force in assuring the survival of Israel. This has never, so far, become a question of direct American military engagement, and no American government has ever had to decide exactly what it would do or not do to prevent the destruction of that extraordinarily gallant and determined country. But at the lesser level of providing essential military supplies, usually by direct sale but sometimes on more favorable terms, the United States government, through five administrations, has made military equipment available in such quantities and at such times as were necessary, in our own view, to preserve the military balance in the area.

The most candid expressions of this policy have been those of the present administration, which has repeatedly announced its determination to do what is necessary to maintain that military balance. But what we now have to face is that any action by us to maintain balance, in the current situation, may have graver consequences than ever before. The danger has more to do with forces in the Middle East itself than with any threat of

great-power confrontation, simply because there are powerful forces—including those of geography—which limit the hazard of such confrontation. But the forces at work within the Middle East itself are now such that they may confront this country with extremely grave choices, and I do not believe that our government has yet offered the kind of open leadership, on this subject, which would lay the necessary basis for effective future policy. It is one thing to talk about "military balance" in reports which are read only by specialists, and it is another to enlist the American people in the acceptance of the possible consequences of perseverance in this policy.

It is possible, of course, that events will not force our government to very hard choices in this field, and I repeat that it is understandable from the diplomatic standpoint that the government should prefer to play its difficult hand quietly. In 1967 the Johnson administration said as little as possible in public while the fighting lasted, and nothing at all about the military balance. Even then, however, the repercussions from our association with Israel were severe, if temporary. I think it will be more serious this time, and I think our public is less prepared, if only because the Six-Day War came at the end of a prolonged international crisis which had aroused both attention and sympathies throughout the

country.

So I think there is a rapidly growing need for a comprehensive and authoritative exposition of our policy toward the Mideast, and that cryptic press conferences and back-channel conversations with journalists will no longer do the job. . . . My point is not . . . that I know just what should be said, or just when. My point is rather that quite a lot needs to be said, to us and to the world, and that no policy which requires public support can be sustained without such exposition. . . . For all too many years we have lacked the kind of open leadership, at the top, for which I plead. In the last eight months we have seen dismaying revelations of mistrust and suspiciousness at the highest levels. And even when there have been great achievements, as in our new relations with China and Russia, and in our effective self-extrication from Vietnam, the accompanying explanations have often fallen short of candor. It is time for all of us, in or out of office, in or out of politics, in or out of any party—to appeal to what is still our government to accept the charge of moving our great affairs into the open once again. It will not be easy, but it is the one sure path to a renewal of strength not only for the nation but for the President himself.

HOUSTON POST
25 Sept. 1973

Intelligence man's handy top-secret phrase book

By DONALD R. MORRIS
Post News Analyst

The classified document leak is a staple of journalism these days, and after lengthy deliberation I have decided to release an example that once came into my possession.

Although the Agency it came from is not identified, the document is marked "Office of Training." An accompanying note explains that it is for the use of intelligence officers stationed abroad who are charged with maintaining official liaison with the local intelligence service. The document consists of a glossary of phrases, and the author claims it is only necessary to have them translated into the local language for the liaison officer to be equipped to handle about 90 per cent of the problems that arise:

1. Good morning, Colonel. How are you? I am fine.
2. A cigarette, perhaps? No, please take the whole pack. I have more.
3. Yes, thank you. I will try one of yours.
4. No, no. I am quite all right. It is merely a bronchial condition of long standing. Please pass the water carafe.
5. Ho ho. That is extremely funny.
6. Have you heard the one about the Irishman and the Zen Buddhist?
7. Now, as to business. My organization has had second thoughts about what I told you yesterday.
8. Perhaps you had better disregard what I told you yesterday.

9. For the love of heaven, disregard what I told you yesterday.

10. What did I tell you yesterday?

11. Have you perhaps located the request I passed you last November marked "Urgent"?

12. We have a slight problem. The chief of your police has confiscated the driver's permit of our ambassador's wife.

13. Have you seen this morning's newspaper? They have again misspelled the name of our principal agent.

14. My headquarters feels there is distinct merit in your operational proposal. As soon as the man you have recommended is released from jail, we will consider funding him.

15. My superiors would also like a wee bit more information about the operational utilization of the Lincoln Continental you are requesting.

16. The polygraph of my aunt is broken.

17. Would you ask your surveillance team not to wear uniforms and to refrain from whistle signals? It is beginning to attract attention.

18. It could not have been our surveillance team, we do not maintain a surveillance team in your country.

19. Last night? That was no agent, that was my wife.

20. Nonsense. He was merely adjusting the license plate because it rattled.

21. Would you please return this tape record-

er to the chief of your counterintelligence service? He apparently left it by accident under my sofa during dinner last night. No, I do not remember seeing a reel in it.

22. If you want additional Minoxes, please ask me for them. Do not write letters to Mr. Colby.

23. Perhaps we could hold these meetings in my apartment instead of your office in the future. Yes, I know it is convenient, but I keep meeting the PRAVDA representative in the elevator.

24. I assure you the manager of the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Coconut Company has no connection with my organization.

25. Yes, I know he was in the Political Section of our Embassy until last month. The fact that he was then listed to my telephone extension was merely an error on the part of the printer.

26. I was just wondering, among the papers I gave you yesterday, was there one marked "Local Penetration Agents"?

27. I have been transferred to Upper Volta and must leave this afternoon. Yes, it is rather sudden.

28. Well, in a way you might call it a promotion. I will be the only man there, which makes me Chief.

29. Permit me to introduce my replacement. No, it is not a new style. He is wearing Bermuda shorts only because he did not have time to change before leaving Washington.

GENERALNEW YORK TIMES
24 October 1973**Scarcity Alters Drug-Trade Patterns**

By NICHOLAS GAGE

A sharp decline in heroin imports from Europe over the last two years has dramatically changed the methods used to obtain and distribute the drug in the New York market.

The shortage is not so acute as to cause a panic in the addict community, but Federal and local law enforcement officials as well as independent sources report the following shifts in dealer patterns.

Chinese-American drug dealers have been trying to fill the vacuum created by the current shortage by importing heroin from Asia, but they have not made major headway yet because they do not have the necessary distribution network. Lawmen believe, however, that in time Chinese-American dealers could become one of the major sources of illegal heroin in the city.

For the first time in history, major black drug dealers are able to buy heroin directly from overseas suppliers without going through the usual organized crime contacts.

The current shortage has forced many wholesalers who once sold only heroin to offer cocaine and other hard drugs as well.

The heroin now imported from Europe generally is half as pure as it has been traditionally and what is sold on the street is one-third as pure.

One reason the flow of heroin from Europe has declined is that such key countries as France have begun to fight the heroin traffic vigorously — motivated, in part, because they have begun to develop addict problems of their own.

During the last 18 months the French police uncovered seven heroin laboratories and seized about 2,500 pounds of heroin. In the previous five years, they uncovered only one laboratory and seized less than 1,000 pounds.

Coupled with the push overseas, a new cooperative effort by the police and Federal agents here has resulted in hundreds of indictments and the sentencing of major heroin dealers to long prison terms.

Eighty-six persons were arrested in raids last April, for instance, and 46 others were indicted earlier this month, including Carmine Tramunti, the reputed boss of one of New York's five Mafia families.

The law-enforcement pressure here and abroad has

made the traditional importers of heroin—who tend to be members of organized crime—cut down on their activities.

Their caution comes not only from fear of arrest, but from economic considerations. Whenever they contract for a shipment from Europe they have to put up half the purchase price in advance, and if shipments are seized at any point along

the way, the money is lost. In the face of the caution being shown by organized crime importers, more aggressive independent dealers, including blacks, have gone directly to suppliers overseas and made purchases on their own, often paying higher prices to gain entry.

"It was in late 1971 that we first heard that some black dealers had started buying directly from European suppliers," said Deputy Inspector Robert Howe, executive officer of the Police Department's intelligence division.

One such dealer, he said, was Frank Matthews, 29 years old, who jumped bail of \$325,000 last summer while awaiting trial on Federal charges of selling drugs and of income tax evasion.

The heroin both black and white importers have been buying in Europe lately has been only half as pure as in the past because pressure on European processors has kept them from producing as much heroin as before.

"The heroin shipments we've been intercepting from Europe have tested out at around 45 per cent pure compared to 85 to 90 per cent a few years ago," said John Fallon, acting deputy director of the Drug Enforcement Administration's regional office here.

Once imported, the heroin is "whacked"—cut—as much as 10 times at various distributing levels and by the time it is sold on the street it is sometimes as low as 2 per cent pure, he added. Traditionally, such heroin tested at 5 to 6 per cent.

"The decline in the purity of heroin has been so great that some addicts have involuntarily detoxified themselves because they've been buying increasingly weaker stuff," said Andrew J. Maloney, head of the New York Federal strike force on drugs.

Seeking New Sources

Addicts have been switching to other drugs in high numbers because of the shortage or have tried to find new sources of heroin beyond their usual suppliers. In that search some have turned to

Chinese-American heroin dealers.

For many years Chinese-American dealers have been importing heroin from Southeast Asia for their own limited market, which was made up almost entirely of Orientals. Generally, they were ignored by the law-enforcement community because they were not considered a major force in heroin traffic.

When it became apparent that the shortage in heroin from Europe was going to last, some Chinese-American dealers saw an opportunity to fill the vacuum and get richer in the process.

Taking advantage of the opportunity, however, proved to be more difficult than they had anticipated. While they could smuggle into the country large quantities of heroin from Southeast Asia, using such devices as hollowed statuettes, they had little experience in distributing the drug outside their community.

At first, they started selling heroin to anyone who approached them with enough money. But some of the buyers turned out to be undercover policemen or Federal narcotics agents, and several Chinese-American dealers were indicted on drug charges.

Since those indictments, Chinese-American dealers have been more cautious. "We heard of one dealer who brought in 18 pounds and held it for seven months before making any effort to move it," said Jerry N. Jenson, acting regional director of the Drug Enforcement Administration offices here.

Slowly, however, Chinese-American dealers with access to large quantities of heroin are trying to make contact with organized crime wholesalers in short supply of the drug.

"If they can work out a real alliance, the Chinese

could wind up being a major supplier of heroin to the New York market," said Deputy Chief John G. Schwaroch, head of the Police Department's narcotics division here.

Such an alliance, if it comes, will take some time, lawmen believe. Organized crime members are afraid that Chinese dealers do not have the experience to function in the high-risk general heroin market.

One Chinese-American dealer, Cheung Lam, was caught by Federal agents after he bought 18.7 pounds of heroin from a seaman and paid for it with a personal check.

The heroin Chinese-American dealers sell is different from European heroin. Most of it come in brown granules rather than white powder. Known as brown rock heroin, it is about 50 per cent pure. "It looks like the granules in a jar of Ovaltine," said James Beckner, a supervisor in the Far Eastern division of the Drug Enforcement Administration's regional office here.

He said it is made that way because Oriental addicts like to smoke heroin rather than inject it, and they prefer it in granule form.

There is another variety of Southeast Asian heroin that comes in white powder like European heroin and is close to 100 per cent pure. But it is fluffier than the European variety. A one-kilogram package of it would be more than twice the size of one kilo of European heroin.

Little of the white Southeast Asian heroin reaches America now, narcotics agents said, but more of it will be imported as Chinese-American dealers expand their distribution outlets.

When selling heroin, Chinese-American dealers use a double standard, the agents said. They have one set of prices for Orientals and another—higher—set for everyone else.

NEW YORK TIMES

21 October 1973

14 Tons of Bananas Used To Hide Cocaine Shipment

BALTIMORE (UPI)—Customs officers had to remove 14 tons of bananas from their cartons to get at almost 70 pounds of pure cocaine hidden in false bottoms.

The shipment had arrived from Ecuador on a Colombian freighter.

A truck driver who came to pick up the bananas was arrested.

WASHINGTON POST
21 OCT 1973

Youth's Plight Spotlights Harsh Foreign Drug Laws

By Kenneth J. Freed
Associated Press

July 17 was to have been a banner day for William Hayes of Babylon, N.Y. It was his release day after serving three years in a Turkish jail for possession of five pounds of hashish.

But instead of walking into freedom Hayes stayed in the Istanbul jail because a local court decided a mistake had been made.

The error was that Hayes had been wrongfully tried for possession. The court said he should have been charged with smuggling. The resulting trial ended in a new sentence of 30 years.

According to Turkish law, the young New Yorker cannot appeal, and his lawyer says the only hope is for a commutation that would lower Hayes' time to 10 to 15 years.

The severity of Hayes' situation is not entirely typical of the problems faced by Americans picked up on drug and marijuana charges in foreign countries.

But it underlines a problem State Department officials say too many young Americans don't comprehend—other nations are not lenient in drug cases and being a U.S. citizen generally won't get someone out of a jam.

In fact, it may have the opposite effect. At least there is an indication of that in the Hayes case.

His lawyer in Istanbul said Hayes might be the victim of a backlash against U.S. demands for abolition of Turkey's formerly legal opium poppy crops.

Even if not always as a backlash, many foreign governments have toughened drug laws and stepped up enforcement; and that has sent more and more Americans, particularly young ones, to jail overseas.

The significant increase in Americans in trouble overseas on drug charges is reflected in the arrest figures for the month of July, the height of the tourist season for young U.S. citizens, starting with 1969.

In July, 1969, 64 Americans were arrested in foreign countries on various charges relating to drugs and marijuana.

The figure more than doubled, to 144, in July, 1970.

At that point the State Department began a public relations campaign to warn citizens touring other countries that drug involvement could bring serious legal consequences.

This effort was low key at the beginning and it didn't pay off. The arrest records continued to climb.

In July, 1971, 172 Americans were arrested on drug charges, and the figure went up to 189 in July, 1972. Last July 261 Americans were picked up in foreign countries on drug-related charges.

The constant rise in arrests brought with it an increased State Department effort to warn Americans. In addition to the pamphlets circulated at the outset, the department began producing radio and television programs in 1971.

Officials appeared on broadcast interview programs and letters were sent to magazines thought to be read by the so-called youth culture, including "Playboy."

The success of this slick public relations campaign appears to be marginal at best.

The only sign of improvement has been a drop in the number of U.S. citizens actually in jail at the end of July, compared with the same time last year.

As of July 31, 910 Americans were in foreign jails for drug offenses. Last year at the same time 946 Americans were behind bars on similar charges.

Barbara Watson, assistant secretary of state for security and consular affairs, said the reduction "hopefully indicates our message is getting through."

There are some other figures that may back up her hope. For example, in 1972 Americans were arrested on a 3½-year term for attempting to smuggle 27 kilos of hashish. This year, the monthly average was 144.

But the officials are far from certain that these figures are valid indications of a permanent improvement in the situation.

They point out that the 1973 figures do not include August or September, both months during which large numbers of Americans tour abroad.

There also is a distinct likelihood that fewer Americans traveled overseas this year because of the lessened value of the dollar.

Another statistical indication that the State Department's effort to warn Americans may not be paying off is seen in the percentage of drug offenses involved in the total number of foreign arrests involving Americans.

Last year 64 per cent of the U.S. citizens arrested in foreign countries were involved in drug cases. This year the figure is 75 per cent.

What the State Department is trying to impress on travelers is simple: it is easy to get in trouble for drug involvement, punishment can be harsh and there is little the U.S. government can do to help.

To get this message across, the TV spots often show interviews with Americans still in jail who describe, often in nearly pitiful tones, the helplessness of their situation.

Some examples from State Department files and reports by Associated Press bureaus overseas:

- A 23-year-old American recently was arrested while attempting to smuggle two kilos of hashish out of a country in the Middle East. He could be sentenced to life in prison.

- In Denmark, one American is serving a six-year term for possession of LSD, another was sentenced to four years for selling a morphine base, a third was given a 3½-year term for attempting to smuggle 27 kilos of hashish.

- A young American was held for 56 days in Spain

after some friends were found with hashish. He had none on him but he admitted smoking hashish in the past.

Once an American is arrested, he more often than not is thrown into a jail that makes a U.S. prison appear to be a resort by comparison.

An example cited in Mexico involved a young girl charged with trafficking because marijuana seeds were found in her house. She was jailed in a broken down hospital for the violently insane.

With all the pamphlets, speeches, news stories and slick TV spots, State Department officials are bewildered by the apparent lack of attention paid by Americans.

One source chalked it up to the age of those arrested. At least 85 per cent of the Americans arrested overseas in drug cases are under 25.

The official says most people this age are more willing to listen to a faulty grapevine telling of easy drug situations than dour warnings from the establishment.

According to Miss Watson, nearly all the Americans in trouble for drugs abroad have been to college, a large majority have been overseas more than once and most come from middle to upper middle class families.

One State Department official said once it is learned why such a group would disregard the obvious dangers involved in drug use overseas, then perhaps something can be done.

Narcotics 'industry' is headache for Peru

Lima, Peru (Reuter)—Deep in the jungle-clad Andes of South America, police are waging a prolonged war to snuff out the multi-million-dollar "Peruvian connection."

International drug rings have chosen the vastness of the Peruvian Andes as the starting point for a clandestine drug trade aimed at the United States and Europe.

Networks of well-equipped laboratories produce huge quantities of cocaine, opium, marijuana and hallucinatory pills, according to the Narcotic Investigation Division of the Peruvian police.

The drugs are smuggled across Peru's northern borders with Colombia and Ecuador and from there to Panama for distribution to Western nations, police say.

But in the past two years, Peruvian police have seized 104 tons of drugs worth \$30 million across the counter, and estimated at 10 times as valua-

ble on the international black market.

About 50 local drug-running gangs have been smashed, with the arrest of 2,000 suspects including "chemists," financial backers, distributors and couriers, police add.

Detectives in the mountain province of Huanuco, 250 miles north of Lima, recently sailed for 24 hours down the rushing waters of the Huallaga River—one of the headwaters of the Amazon—to reach remote hide-outs of cocaine smugglers.

In the isolated localities of Monte Moena and Puerto Viejo they discovered the headquarters of a province-wide network of cocaine laboratories. It was the biggest single drug-producing chain smashed so far.

In the subsequent raids, police reported finding 661 pounds of cocaine worth \$21 million on the black market.

Another coup was the smashing of an international band of

more than 100 members led by a Cuban named Jose Antonion Gomez, who is now awaiting trial.

Another 440 pounds of cocaine—almost ready for transport to the Ecuadorean frontier town of Huaquillas—was seized when police broke up 20 gangs in the Andean provinces of Junin and Huancavelica just north and east of the capital, Quito.

But police believe the "Peruvian connection" is still well-organized and flourishing.

Its production centers and clandestine routes are difficult to detect amid the sheer, jungle-clad mountains of central Peru, which tower far higher than the European Alps.

One highly organized production center in a tiny, impoverished village in Jauja province, about 160 miles northeast of Lima, showed the difficulties the police are facing.

Apart from the drug "labo-

ratory" were steel silos that could be hidden at a moment's notice in huge specially prepared ditches, or quickly transported by road, police said.

Police are hammering home their spectacular successes against the drug traders over the past year.

Captured drugs are publicly burned before thousands of witnesses. One suspected drug-runner termed the procedure a "sacrilegious act" as he watched the drugs blazing after his capture.

Drug bonfires, on which narcotics worth \$300 million and the equipment used in their manufacture have been burned, are often supervised by Peru's interior minister, Gen. Pedro Richter Prada.

Police squads stand by in case of trouble, and in each case a public notary makes an official record of the proceedings.

LONDON TIMES
28 September 1973

The Golden Triangle loses its shine

The Chinese Nationalist government in Taiwan is involved in the opium traffic in the "Golden Triangle" where Burma, Laos and Thailand overlap, and has increased its clandestine operations in Burma during this year. I write this in some sorrow, since the regime of the Chinese People's Republic is not among my favourite politics, and I greatly admire the extraordinary achievements of Chiang Kai-shek's administration in Taiwan.

But I do not believe that the facts in these two articles can be successfully challenged, and I doubt whether, in the long run, such activities can possibly be in the best interests of Taipei, especially at a time when more and more of the governments that once recognised it are transferring their diplomatic links to Peking.

For years it has been common knowledge that the remnants of the Kuomintang (Nationalist) forces stranded in Burma after the Chinese civil war are involved in the drugs trade. Less familiar is the role of the Nationalist Intelligence Bureau of Taiwan's Ministry of National Defence. It is now known that the Intelligence Bureau worked closely with Lo Hsing-han, the biggest heroin tycoon of the Golden Triangle, who was captured in July by the Thai Special Narcotics Organization, after an American tip-off.

Lo, in fact, protected Intelligence Bureau personnel by claiming they were his own men. Since his word was law over much of the Golden Triangle, this protection, similar

in kind to that of a Mafia "godfather" in that those ignoring it did so at their peril, was normally effective. What Lo could not do was to prevent Intelligence Bureau men from getting killed in clashes with Burmese forces, as happened from time to time. But he could, and did provide facilities of various kinds for the Intelligence Bureau, so that their clandestine operations could continue.

At times, these deaths "in action" have seriously affected Taiwan's operations, but a well-organized machine always brought the Intelligence Bureau up to strength: replacements were sent to Burma from the Bureau's base in northern Thailand; and the base in turn got replacements direct from Taipei.

Until a press briefing in June by Colonel Tin Oo, Director of Burma's Defence Services Intelligence—which I believe to be well founded—the relationship between the Kuomintang remnants in Burma and the Nationalist Government in Taiwan were never other than murky. Now the murk is dispersing.

According to Colonel Tin, the Intelligence Bureau has deployed some 1,400 agents and troops in the north-eastern and eastern regions of Burma. The Bureau, he said, was based in Huai Mo, just over the Burmese border in Thailand. About 400 of Taiwan's agents are operating at Hsop Wo where, until recently, they were commanded by Major-General Ma Chun-kuo. But Gen. Ma is reported to

have been transferred to the Intelligence Bureau's mainland operations department at Huai Mo. From there, he reports directly to a Taipei official stationed in Bangkok. In charge of the mainland operations department is Major-General Chu Chi-liang, but the overall direction comes from Taipei, where the Intelligence Bureau headquarters is run by the Director, Lieutenant-General Yeh Hsiang-chih.

According to documents published recently in the Burmese press, the Intelligence Bureau is deeply involved in the most sensational coup of the captured opium king, Lo Hsing-han—the kidnapping on April 16 of two Soviet medical men, Dr Boris Pianitsky and Stanislav Vinogradov, a medical technician. The documents included photocopies of a letter dated October 1969, on the official stationery of Taiwan's Chinese National Liberation Organization, appointing a man jailed that year on charges of opium running, black marketeering, robbery, murder and other crimes, as counsellor to the Fourth Executive Committee of the Federation of Overseas Chinese Associations.

The kidnapped Soviet medical men had been working at a hospital at Taunggyi. The kidnapers had threatened to kill their hostages if the Burmese government gave any publicity to the incident. Both the government and the Soviet embassy in Rangoon decided to stay silent. It was the kidnapers themselves who leaked the news to a Bangkok paper, perhaps in an attempt to discredit the Burmese government.

The background to the kidnappings is an eloquent commentary on the perennial problem of insurgency that has plagued Burma since independ-

ence in 1948, and indeed was not unknown before that under the more realistic label of dacoity (or banditry).

In April, Burma's strong man General Ne Win, abolished the self-defence forces he had authorized 10 years earlier when the regular army was so deeply engaged with insurgents in central Burma that it could not also protect the north-east and east. During the decade many of these local forces had degenerated into private armies deeply involved in the opium traffic, gun-running, black marketeering and other illegal activities. After the April bar some of the groups turned in their weapons and their members were allowed to join the Burmese army.

Others, however, had been deeply infiltrated by Intelligence Bureau agents whose gold had brought them control. Refusing to turn in their weapons they went into open rebellion against Rangoon. The Bureau is also said to control the remnants of the former Kuomintang Third and Fifth armies based in Thailand under their respective commands of General Li Wen-huan and General Tu Shi-wen.

Both were involved in the opium trade, and both acted as mediators when that trade looked like being disrupted. In February this year when two of the private groups started fighting each other. One was Li Hsing-han's private army, Kokang; the other was the Li Maw group (named after a district) under Chang Shu-chua.

The Kuomintang mediator did their job well, for the two groups settled their differences and refused to turn their arms over to the Burmese army, and agreed to resume the opium trade under the protection

LONDON TIMES
10 October 1973

Taiwan and the 'golden triangle' - part two

What now for the Kuomintang?

Lo Hsin-han's arrest by the Thais is a real loss both for the Kuomintang drug-runners and for Taiwan's Intelligence Bureau, to the extent that it benefits from the opium trade. The "opium king" had been allotted an important role in the mediation agreement negotiated by the Kuomintang Generals Li and Tuan last spring with the blessing of the Intelligence Bureau. Indeed, at a meeting on May 24 in the Loi Se area, he was chosen as the leader of a new "Shan Land United Army", composed of a disparate collection of insurgent groups, including the defiant self-defence forces of Kokang, Wa and Loi Maw (who had refused to turn over their arms to the Burmese army), part of the Shan State Independence Army, the Kuomintang and members of the Intelligence Bureau.

When last heard of, at the time of Lo's capture, the kidnapped Russians were reported to be alive and well. However, a death threat hangs over their heads if the Burmese authorities refuse to release the former leader of the Loi Maw self-defence force, Chang Chi-fu, jailed in 1969 on opium trafficking, robbery, murder and other charges.

It is strongly doubted, however, whether Lo and his followers were particularly interested in securing Chang's release, which would merely embarrass them since a new leadership has dug itself in during his years in custody. Of greater interest to the Kuomintang, and especially to the nationalist government in Taiwan, is the possibility of inflicting yet another humiliation on the Burmese government.

It is this aspect of Taiwan's operations in Burma that is bound, at this late date, to be questioned by those—often known as the "friends of Free China"—who have at heart the best interests of those Chinese who, for one reason or another, have remained outside the control of Peking's totalitarian rule.

Ejected from Yunnan province

at the end of 1949 by Mao Tse-tung's "People's Liberation Army", the Kuomintang forces turned down a Burmese ultimatum in June, 1950, to leave Burma or surrender their weapons. Burmese army operations forced the Chinese to retreat through the mountains to Mong Hsat, in the Shan State of Burma.

They levied an opium tax on the highland villages, forcing output to climb. Ever since, they have collected the raw opium, sent it by mule caravan to Thailand and sold it to Thai dealers for money, supplies and weapons. It was not long before 90 per cent of Burma's opium exports passed through Kuomintang hands.

In March, 1953, the Burmese army repulsed a Kuomintang offensive, and referred the matter to the United Nations. Reluctantly, Taipeh bowed, or rather half-bowed, before UN censure, and shipped some troops out at the end of 1953. There was a further shipment—disproportionately composed of the old, the infirm and the female—after the Burmese army had seized the Kuomintang base in March, 1954. But 6,000 of the Chinese troops remained, and simply transferred their opium trade to a new base at Mon-Pa Liao.

This heavily fortified complex fell into Burmese hands in early 1961 and some months later about 4,200 Kuomintang troops were shipped out to Taiwan. The national government has never accepted responsibility of those who stayed behind, or admitted, even to this day, that the Intelligence Bureau works closely with them.

In fact, with Bureau men and local recruits, the Kuomintang could still muster between 2,000 and 3,000 armed men. The 1961 operations had driven them into Laos, but from there they moved to Thailand and set up two bases near the Burma border, from where they resumed their opium deals.

It is fair to ask at this stage just what Chiang Kai-shek's

Government hopes to get out of its clandestine involvement in Thailand and Burma.

Whatever the realism of earlier hopes to "return to the mainland", any chances that the Kuomintang remnants could play a part in an invasion of communist territory has long lost all credibility. The Kuomintang chieftains from time to time justify their opium-running on the ground that they need weapons to attack the Chinese communists, but nobody is fooled. If their motivation were political, they could try helping the Burmese to wipe out the Peking-controlled White Flag insurgents, instead of diverting Burmese firepower on to their own insurgents.

And what of the nationalist Intelligence Bureau? Even in 1973, it may still have a case for espionage against communist China; and possibly even for sabotage of communist installations. But are the possible advantages worth the involvement in the opium racket, in kidnapping and in the violation of Burmese territory at a time of shrinking international friendships?

In all this, Thailand's role is a curious one. In 1959, the Thai government banned its indigenous opium growing and trade, but continued to wink at Kuomintang activities. The Thai government is divided on the issue. The so-called "buffer" school, conscious of Thai affinities with the Shans and mistrustful of the Burmese, regard the Shan and other dissidents, together with the Kuomintang and Intelligence Bureau, as a buffer between Thailand and the Burmese and Chinese communists to the north.

Latterly, however, a strong "anti-buffer" school has gained ground. The anti-buffer school sees Thailand's security increasingly in good relations with China and Burma, which are hardly thinkable so long as Kuomintang and Taiwan people operate from Thai territory.

In May, the Thais ordered the nationalist Intelligence Bureau to close down a secret radio station in Mae Chan, in Chiang Rai province near the Burma border. And on July 1, the deputy Prime Minister, Field-Marshal Praphat Charusathien, ordered the Mainland Operations Department at Huai Mo to close down. The ball, now, is firmly in Taipeh's court.

Brian Crozier

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the mediators—and of the Nationalist Intelligence Bureau.

It was the Loi Maw group that kidnapped the two Russians, and Lo Hsing-han subsequently took them with him into the mountains before a Burmese army attack on May 30 drove Lo across the border and into the hands of the Thai authorities.

Brian Crozier

NEW YORK TIMES

23 October 1973

\$500,000 BAIL SET FOR DRUG SUSPECT

An Uruguyan national, described as the top supplier of cocaine in the United States, was arraigned yesterday in Federal Court in Manhattan and held in \$500,000 bail.

Assistant United States Attorney Walter Phillips asked for bail of \$2.5-million for Adolfo Sobocki Tobais, alleging the defendant was the "largest single supplier of cocaine into this country."

Mr. Sobocki, 50, years old, owned a hotel in Avica, Chile and lived in Santiago with his wife and five children. He was expelled from Chile Saturday and was taken in custody by United States authorities and flown to New York Sunday from Montevideo, Uruguay.

Mr. Sobocki had been a fugitive since March, when he was named in an 11-count narcotics indictment with Vincent Rizzo, 41, of Manhattan, a reputed Mafia figure, William Benjamin, a Philadelphia businessman, and Luis Ortero, an Uruguyan. The Government said Mr. Sobocki, who was born in Poland, supplied an average of more than 200 pounds of cocaine a month to New York outlets.

At his arraignment before Judge Edward Weinfeld, Mr. Sobocki indicated he intended to plead guilty "to some of the charges," Judge Weinfeld entered a plea of not guilty until the defendant acquired an attorney.

Rizzo was convicted on conspiracy charges last spring and sentenced to 15 years in prison. Benjamin was convicted and sentenced to seven years and Ortero got a five-year sentence.

The New York Times Book Review
September 30, 1973

The Intellectual as Faust or Quixote

By JOHN LEONARD

In some parts of the world, the relationship between politics and intellectuals is taken more seriously than most intellectuals would prefer; it can be a terminal case.

As I write, there is no word on the fate of Pablo Neruda, who is said to have been in Chile at the time of the junta take-over and the suicide of Allende. The Nobel Prize-winning Neruda has been considerably more than his country's Ambassador to France; he has been a remarkably skillful propagandist for Allende's Marxist government among intellectuals everywhere—a sort of André Malraux in reverse—and there is ample reason to believe that he is high on the enemies' list of the generals. So far, the generals have shown little regard for the niceties of due process; gunning down a poet could appeal to their Hispanic sense of fateful symmetry (García Lorca, remember, in Spain, 1936); a petition from PEN might not be enough to save him.

Nor is there any word on the prospects for Jorge Luis Borges now that Peron has resumed control in Argentina. Borges suffered before under Peron, but survived. Can he a second time? Already, the Book Review has run a "Guest Word" (Sept. 9) urging the Swedish Academy to make sure that Borges receives this year's Nobel Prize for Literature, as an insurance policy against his being liquidated. It worked for Pasternak, didn't it? And Solzhenitsyn?

Consider Solzhenitsyn's breathtaking highwire act: He proposes, in the *Aftenposten* of Oslo, Norway, and on the Op-Ed page of *The Times*, that dissident Soviet physicist Andrei Sakharov be given the Nobel Prize for Peace, for "opposing the persistent violence of the state against individuals." (The Prize, again: Is it a bullet-proof vest?) Solzhenitsyn proposes this while he himself is not allowed to move to Moscow; while Sakharov is under virtual house arrest; while Daniel is in prison; while Medvedev is in exile; while Yakir and Krasin "confess" to being "paid agents of Western subversive organizations"—as likely as Jacques Barzun's confessing he masterminded Watergate—and are sentenced to prison and exile; while *Pravda* attacks Westerners supporting this "tiny bunch of intellectuals" and praises David Rockefeller for saying we shouldn't let internal

The Last Word

differences within the Soviet Union interfere with a new trade agreement. (Chase Manhattan will move to Moscow, even if Solzhenitsyn can't.)

Moreover, in making the case for Sakharov, Solzhenitsyn has some unpleasant things to say about Palestinian terrorists, the massacre of Hue, the governments of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and China, and Ramsey Clark! That is making oneself a nuisance on a grand scale, like Sakharov writing to the United States Congress in opposition to a trade pact that isn't tied to democratic improvements in Russia: The courage of these men makes the rest of us look like parsley.

The Book Review is not the appropriate section of this newspaper to editorialize on trade agreements or on candidates for the Nobel Prize for Peace. And if the Swedish Academy had the slightest interest in our opinions on literature, Nabokov, Malraux, Borges and Günter Grass would already be Nobel laureates—for their books rather than their derring-do.

But this may be the appropriate section of the newspaper to say something about the reactions of American intellectuals to the bad news from abroad. Oh, petitions of protest are signed with a flourish—the fastest wrists in the West—but in the salons there is also a muttering, a hum. Solzhenitsyn, Sakharov, Neruda... are they not cinematic embodiments of our secret dream of ourselves, the intellectual as *Übermensch*? To be Faust instead of Quixote: the sexiness of it makes one sigh. An envy is apparent. Solzhenitsyn and Neruda are considered dangerous by their governments because they are taken seriously by their readers, whereas—hum, hum—we are allowed to get away with anything because no one takes us seriously; we are puppies whose heroic snarls are irrelevant to trade agreements; powerless.

In fact, intellectuals in this country

have an enormous amount of power, of the banal sort that decides how others must live. The trouble is, too often their constituency is not their readers; it seems to be whoever will pick up the tab. I'm not referring to the intellectual as pop-cultural jack-in-the-box; that's yesterday's sports pages. But the intellectual as hot-and-cold running warrior, world policeman, cost-benefits Geronimo, helps determine our foreign policy.

The intellectual as communitarian in the "think tank" group-grope competes with the "intelligence" agent to prescribe the "options" of our leaders. The "hardnosed" intellectual—what would Freud make of "hard-nosed"?—uses Vietnam or the inner city as a dart board. The jet-setting intellectual, the social scientist with a Pentagon credit card, shuttling from classroom to war room with his canonical variations and his counterinsurgency scenarios, has received from Washington an exclusive fried-chicken franchise in ideas, so long as those ideas serve whoever happens to be in charge in Washington. And the intellectual as "meritocrat" proclaims that the luck of his genes and the luck of his environment entitle him to all the blessings that flow from a grateful managerial class, with no questions asked by the plebes. (Thus, in discussions of "equal opportunity," "keeping up the standards" is a euphemism for "I'm all right, Jack." We need a few monographs on the intellectual as arriviste.)

In other words, our intellectuals are in a situation the reverse of Solzhenitsyn, et al. Whereas a Sakharov or a Neruda exists in an adversary relationship with his government, too many of our intellectuals are downright cuddly—"repressive tolerance," hell; cohabitation is more like it, with accountability to no one but whoever signs the bottom line. They are traded, or trade themselves, around, from bureaucracy to bureaucracy, like professional athletes—I'll play for anybody—moralizing and complaining all the while; the vulgar public doesn't understand me. They are probably lucky the public doesn't understand them. The adversary zeal, unto tiresomeness, of a Chomsky; the humorless gnawing of a Nader; the iconoclasm of a Paul Goodman; the serendipities and excesses of a Mailer—all are preferable, and exceptional to the careerist Muzak to be heard in the salons. Solzhenitsyn's contempt hits home. ■

THE GUARDIAN, MANCHESTER
10 October 1973

Turkey's poppies and politics

Religion may once have been the opium of the masses, but what the Turkish masses want is the real thing. It now seems certain that any Government likely to emerge from Sunday's general election will cancel the ban on the growing of opium poppies. The United States persuaded Turkey to accept the ban in return for \$35 millions. But that was two years ago, before the Turkish politicians got down among the poppy-roots. Mr Suleyman Demirel's Justice Party, which may well head the next Government, has promised to allow farmers to grow poppies again, though under state control. The Social Democrats have promised simply to abolish the ban. The left-wing Cumhuriyet says that \$35 millions are not enough to compensate the poppy-farmers, and that "if the United States wants to avoid trafficking it should buy all the product from Turkey." And then, presumably, burn it.

The US Government has not, so far, been much impressed. American officials do not take the threats of the Turkish parties seriously. They say that the ban on Turkish poppy-growing has been very helpful to the Administration's anti-narcotics drive. The Americans, along with all others who are fighting drugs, must obviously want to see the ban remain. It is easy enough to criticise the Turks who have, after all, shown little mercy to Timothy Davey, yet are not above

benefiting from the opium trade themselves. Only last year a Turkish senator was stopped by the French Customs at Nice in a car whose upholstery was stuffed with heroin instead of hair. (He said he was going to Lyons to buy his daughter a wedding dress.)

On the other hand the Turkish farmers can complain with a certain amount of justice that they are being asked to make financial sacrifices in order to solve the western world's drug problem. The 100,000 Turkish poppy-farmers say that they stand to lose more than ten times the amount they will receive in compensation. Nor do they see why the Americans should pick on Turkish poppy-farmers and let the Iranian ones corner the market. It is true, also, that the developed nations' attitude towards opium has sometimes been less than noble. It was Lord Melbourne, after all, who made war on China because the Chinese refused to allow the import of opium from British India.

The Turkish farmers ought not to have to suffer because the developed nations have now resolved more firmly than ever to stamp out the narcotics trade. But the trade has to be stopped. If \$35 millions is not fair compensation for the Turkish farmers, then they ought to be offered more. The money would not be Danegeld. It would be a justified expense in the war against narcotics.

NEW YORK TIMES
25 October 1973

PEACE ACTIVISTS DEFEND BOMBER

Cite Frustration Over War
at Hearing in Madison

By WILLIAM E. FARRELL
Special to The New York Times

MADISON, Wis., Oct. 24—

Three leading opponents of the Vietnam war today defended Karleton Lewis Armstrong, who bombed the University of Wisconsin's Army Mathematics Research Center in 1970 as a protest against the war. A physics researcher was killed in the bombing.

The three antiwar activists, the Rev. Philip F. Berrigan, Dr. Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony J. Russo Jr., all asserted that Armstrong, a 27-year-old native of Madison and a former Boy Scout turned radical, had been driven to a desperate act by his frustration over the escalation of the war and alleged war research conducted by the Army Mathematics Center.

Armstrong and his defense lawyers contend that the death of Robert Fassnacht, a 33-year-old physicist and father of three children, was "accidental," and that Armstrong

was unaware that he was in the building when the explosion took place on Aug. 24, 1970, some time after 3 A.M.

Today was the eighth day in a mitigation hearing on Armstrong's character before Dane County Circuit Judge William C. Sachtjen. Armstrong has pleaded guilty to reduced state charges of second degree murder and arson resulting from the bombing. He has also pleaded guilty to several Federal charges.

Sentencing Next Week

The hearing is expected to last through the week, and summation and sentencing are tentatively set for a week from Thursday.

The former University of Wisconsin student faces 70 Federal charges and 95 on the state charges. Defense lawyers have bargained with prosecutors, asking that the maximum penalty for Federal and state charges not exceed 25 years, with both sentences to run concurrently.

However, the plea agreement is not binding on the judges.

Father Berrigan, a longtime peace activist, and Mr. Ellsberg and Mr. Russo were among the 35 witnesses who have appeared to urge leniency for Armstrong. Dr. Ellsberg has said he made the Pentagon papers available to the press. Other witnesses told about the killing of Vietnamese civilians by American soldiers. Some

scholars testified that the conduct of the war had been illegal.

Because of illness, Dr. Ellsberg was represented here today on a tape recording made yesterday in New York and brought to the courtroom by William M. Kunstler, who is one of Armstrong's attorneys.

Asserting that he did not know Armstrong personally, Dr. Ellsberg said that he would like to live in a society which punished all who used explosives.

"But that's not the society we live in," he said, adding that the Nixon Administration and others had bombed Vietnam with impunity "without regard to domestic or international law."

To move toward a "just society," Dr. Ellsberg said, "the place to start is not by punishing the action of Karl Armstrong."

"One must recognize this prosecution is highly selective in terms of violation of the law," he said.

Armstrong should not serve in jail any longer than should Robert S. McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, Henry A. Kissinger or others involved in the conduct of the war, Dr. Ellsberg said.

'A Courageous Thing'

Mr. Russo told reporters at a news briefing that Armstrong's act was "a very courageous thing, though perhaps misguided."

In his testimony, Mr. Russo

said that after one trip back to the United States from Vietnam in 1968, when he was employed by the Rand Corporation, a "think tank" with government research contracts, "I brought a grenade back."

"I was angry, very angry," he said over the continuing escalation of the war. "I walked down the halls of Rand to the computer room and wanted to toss it in there. I thought I had to do this for mankind." He said that he finally thought better of it and threw the grenade off a pier at Santa Monica, Calif.

Father Berrigan and Armstrong embraced in the courtroom, and the gray-haired Jesuit said that as early as 1967 he felt that "people were going to have to break the law" to awaken a "somnolent" public to what was happening in Indochina.

Petitions, discussions with politicians, demonstrations of this war," he said "There have been bombings, and people have died," he said, referring to protests in the United States.

"Sad happenings like that have to be balanced off against the official crimes that decimated one-half of Vietnam, and those crimes will never be tried."

"Robert Fassnacht's death is mourned," the priest said, but "I believe very profoundly that it was accidental and has to be balanced by the calculated deaths of millions."

Near East

WASHINGTON POST
27 October 1973

U.S. Scores Mideast Role of NATO Allies

Alliance Rift Unprecedented

By Michael Getler and Dan Morgan

Washington Post Staff Writers

The Pentagon and the State Department yesterday both leveled unprecedented criticism at several U.S. allies in Western Europe for having "separated themselves publicly from us" during the still-simmering Middle East crisis.

The strongest words came from State Department spokesman Robert J. McCloskey.

But Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger, at a Pentagon news conference, also warned that the actions of several NATO governments—particularly West Germany's Foreign Ministry—were causing the Defense Department to "reflect on" previously established notions about the military alliance.

In his televised press conference last night, President Nixon also made clear that he believed U.S. efforts to arrange a settlement of the Middle East crisis had been in the interest of the Europeans.

"Europe, which gets 80 per cent of its oil, would have frozen to death this winter if there hadn't been a settlement," he said.

While sharp debate has frequently flared openly between the U.S. and its NATO allies on economic matters, there has rarely, if ever, been public U.S. criticism directed at the allies over military policy since NATO was founded 25 years ago.

Senior U.S. Defense officials are miffed over what they view as the ease with which Russian transport planes loaded with arms flew over Greece and Turkey, both NATO members, without much protest from those countries.

Furthermore, Greece and Turkey—along with all but one or two NATO countries—denied the United States use of their air fields or air space to aid in the resupply of Israel. "We didn't expect much," said one official, "but they didn't have to roll over from the first little hint of pressure."

Only Portugal overtly provided U.S. planes with land-

ing rights at the joint base in the Azores.

But the most serious concern involves the implications of the West German foreign ministry statement on Thursday proclaiming German "neutrality" in the Arab-Israeli war and demanding that the U.S. stop sending American military equipment based in West Germany to Israel.

"We maintain our forces in Germany because it provides us with enhanced readiness," Schlesinger said yesterday.

"The reactions of the foreign ministry of Germany raised some questions about whether they view readiness in the same way that we view readiness and consequently we will have to reflect on that matter."

Privately, high-ranking U.S. officials said they understood the European dependence on Middle Eastern oil. But they said they regarded NATO country actions that had the effect of restricting U.S. freedom with respect to American national interests as a more important issue, and a very serious one.

The United States maintains thousands of tanks and other arms in West Germany, and senior Defense officials said the question was whether the new war had revealed a major inconsistency in how the United States and other NATO members interpret readiness and the stationing of U.S. forces in Europe.

"Can those stocks (meaning U.S. tanks) be used only for Germany and NATO? If they're not available to us" for other U.S. interests, one Pentagon official said, "then maybe we'll have to keep some of them someplace else."

Some NATO members claim the diversion of U.S. tanks and other weapons during the crisis weakens NATO, but the Russians reportedly took large numbers of similar weapons from their East European arsenals for the Arab resupply effort.

Schlesinger, in general, reflected disappointment over the allies' performance, stating that the Pentagon

would investigate "all aspects of the responsiveness of various countries in this crisis and will take them into consideration in the future."

Schlesinger is scheduled to go to a NATO meeting early next month at the Hague and was considering visiting West Germany on the same trip. Now, aides say, he is considering dropping the German visit.

Berndt von Staden, the West German ambassador in Washington, met with Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger yesterday afternoon for 45 minutes for a

"general review of questions concerning the NATO alliance." The two sides said that the meeting, which Ambassador von Staden had requested on Monday, was "friendly and useful."

State Department spokesman McCloskey, more outspoken than Schlesinger, said, "We were struck by a number of our allies going to some lengths to in effect separate publicly from us."

McCloskey said that U.S. support for Israel was motivated by a desire to establish a durable peace in the Middle East. He said this was as much in the interest of Germany and the European allies as of the United States.

"We were and have been in a very critical period, a period which affected in many ways all of us and our allies in West Europe," he said.

He then added that European policies "raise questions as to how that action on their part can be squared with what the Europeans have often referred to as indivisibility on questions of security."

In light of the fact that the crisis posed the threat of a potential confrontation with the Soviet Union, McCloskey said, "We would have appreciated a little more unified support."

Senior Pentagon officials echo this view, claiming that if Israel is "pushed into the sea" it could only happen with massive Soviet support for the Arabs and that then "it would be Russia with its hand on the tap" of Middle East oil "and NATO won't be any better off that way."

An immediate concern to officials in the Nixon administration is the effect that the German position could

have on congressional moves to bring home some of the 229,000 troops stationed in Germany.

An effort led by Sen. Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.) to cut drastically the number of troops abroad was partially forestalled this year—but only after frantic maneuvering by administration supporters.

Some Pentagon officials said yesterday that the German position could lead congressional opponents of unilateral American cuts to change their thinking, since many of these lawmakers strongly support Israel.

The new note of acrimony in the Atlantic relationship comes at a time when U.S. and European negotiators are trying to draw up a declaration of principles about the future of NATO.

The purpose of this is to redefine and update the broad rationale for the Atlantic alliance. With the end of the post-war era in Europe, some have detected rising nationalism and anti-Americanism in certain segments of European society. In part, the aim of the leaders on both sides of the Atlantic is to counter this tendency and provide new cohesion to the alliance.

Some efforts were made in Bonn yesterday to tone down the dispute. A government spokesman, Armin Gruenewald, described Bonn's attempts to halt the resupply from its territory as only a "political request."

However, questions remained about the scope of the operation originating from Germany—and also about the extent of consultation.

German officials here said privately yesterday that the loading of Israeli ships in the German port of Bremerhaven from installations under U.S. control apparently took place in a "hidden" way.

John Goshko, correspondent of The Washington Post in Bonn, quoted sources in the German capital as saying that American Ambassador Marin Hillenbrandt apparently was himself unaware that the ships were being loaded in Bremerhaven.

At his press briefing in Bonn yesterday, Gruenewald said that Chancellor Willy Brandt's government has no power to dictate

BALTIMORE SUN
30 October 1973

More Frays in the Alliance

What the United States does with its military materiel stockpiled in West Germany.

Nevertheless, others said the episode had raised fundamental questions about the role and function of NATO.

German officials in Washington said privately that the American forces in Europe are "for NATO purposes—not for the Middle East or Latin America. They are there, as a credible deterrent against Soviet aggression in Central Europe."

In any event, Europeans and Americans yesterday both expressed concern that the flare-up could further strain the alliance at a time when confidence in U.S. leadership because of the domestic problems is at a low ebb.

Some Europeans also argued that the United States was only free to act as it did because only 12 per cent of its oil supplies originate in North Africa and the Middle East—compared with 80 per cent of the European supplies.

NEW YORK TIMES
31 October 1973

What 'Year of Europe'?

What the United States had envisioned as the Year of Europe, a period of imaginative updating and refurbishing of the NATO Alliance, capped with a new Atlantic Charter, has become instead the year in which Washington's relationship with its European partners has struck an all-time low.

The Administration's unprecedented decision last week to trumpet its resentment against the allies for not lining up solidly behind United States actions in the Middle East—not once but thrice in a day, the last shaft delivered by President Nixon himself—understandably provoked anger and bewilderment in nearly every NATO capital in Europe. The climate was not improved by Secretary of State Kissinger's alleged remark to visiting European parliamentarians this week that during the two-week Middle East crisis the Europeans "acted as though the Alliance didn't exist."

Most NATO members had made clear in advance, privately or publicly, either that they did not share Washington's assessment of the crisis or that they could not afford to take a stance that might have the result of cutting off the flow of Arab oil which, as Mr. Nixon pointed out, is far more vital to Western Europe than to the United States.

Apart from any desire to remain officially neutral between Israel and the Arab states, however, the allied governments felt strongly that once again they were being asked to support an American policy on which they had not been consulted. These feelings were exacerbated when Washington did not notify them in

There is a danger that one of the main sufferers of the Middle East war will be the NATO alliance, where trust already shaken over the past two years deteriorated greatly in recent weeks and days. If so, the lesson likely to be taken by Kremlin leaders reflecting on their costly adventurism with Syria and Egypt will be that they are still on to a good thing. It is time for Washington and the other NATO capitals, accepting their different interests in the Middle East, to perceive the danger as a Soviet diplomatic objective and to insure that it is not realized.

The danger erupted Friday in an American verbal assault on the allies. James R. Schlesinger, the Secretary of Defense, and Robert J. McCloskey, the chief spokesman of the State Department, criticized the Europeans in general and West Germany by name and raised questions that, in the language of diplomatic understatement, were hinted threats to bring American troops home from Europe.

Messrs. McCloskey and Schlesinger had reason enough to be annoyed. The Germans had stopped American tanks stockpiled in Germany from being shipped the best way to Israel. Turkey and Greece reportedly allowed Soviet arms shipments to Egypt to use their air space, but not American shipments to Israel. Britain's claim to an even-handed arms supply policy was a cover for banning the paid-for supply of spare parts to tanks which Britain had willingly sold Israel while initiating helicopter training for Egyptian pilots and the sale of tanks to other Arab states. France,

pursuing a six-year-old blatantly anti-Israel policy, simply denied that it was possible that Libyan Mirage fighters bought from France were used against Israel, when Israelis said they saw them.

European governments were knuckling under not to the Soviet Union, but to the Arab oil potentes. And not without good reason. The United States if it has to can do without Persian Gulf oil. Europe depends utterly on it. The Europeans have other reasons for, as Mr. McCloskey put it, "going to some lengths to in effect separate publicly from us." One is a long memory, especially in Paris, of Washington's pulling the rug out from the unwise Anglo-French attempt to invade Egypt in concert with Israel in 1956. Another is the false Washington assumption that it has or deserves a blank check on European support for any foreign policy regardless of whether Europeans are consulted. Added to this now is a large fear that Europe is imperiled by American alerts of nuclear forces on European soil, combined with a notion that Mr. Nixon acted for domestic reasons.

What is needed now is not recrimination but cooperation. If American and European interests diverged during the war, for reasons of which Europe has no cause to be proud, the interests have coalesced now. All NATO members have a powerful national interest in the attainment of a permanent Middle East peace. Continued rancor between the United States and its NATO partners over the Mideast will not only serve the hawks in the Kremlin leadership, but ill service the prospects for peace between Israelis and Arabs.

advance of its worldwide security alert, obviously of concern to every country allied with the United States and especially those in which American military bases are situated.

President Nixon was right about Western Europe's tremendous stake in a Middle East cease-fire. State Department spokesman Robert J. McCloskey stated the obvious in saying that maintenance of the military balance and establishment of a durable peace in the Middle East "is just as much in the vital interest of West Germany and the other NATO allies as it is in our interest." The relevant point, however, remains the right of the European allies to be consulted about policies crucial to their survival.

Washington's failure to consult, despite countless promises to do so, and its decision not to give its allies advance warning of a military alert that inevitably affected their interests, fits a dismally familiar pattern for this Administration. Mr. Nixon and Secretary Kissinger can speak eloquently about the indispensable American-European connection; but their actions, particularly in crisis, do not match their words.

Some allied governments did go to unnecessary lengths to "separate themselves publicly" from the United States—one of Mr. McCloskey's complaints. West Germany might at least have made through diplomatic channels, rather than by public pronouncement, its demand that the United States halt arms shipments to Israel from German territory. But no constructive purpose was served by the peevish public criticisms of allied behavior from an Administration whose policy in crisis had been carried out in disregard of the interests of its European partners.

Thursday, Nov. 1, 1973 THE WASHINGTON POST

U.S. Criticism Brings Angry Responses From Europeans

By Dan Morgan and
Michael Getler

Washington Post Staff Writers

American displeasure with the neutral Middle East policies of its closest allies provoked a number of angry European responses yesterday, as the dispute showed signs of spreading into other areas affecting Atlantic relationships.

In Paris, French President Georges Pompidou proposed a summit meeting of the nine Common Market countries to seek a joint European policy on the Middle East.

Pompidou noted that Western Europe had been left out of the American and Soviet moves even though its vital interests had been at stake.

In Washington, high-level European-American consultations on trade policy and future tariff reductions ended with both sides admitting that they were far from any agreement.

At the same time, Europeans who spoke with Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger earlier in the week said he was "very angry" about a wide range of Atlantic matters, not all of them directly connected with the Middle East.

One of the few bright signs in the otherwise dissonance-ridden atmosphere was a cautious resolution drafted here yesterday by American congressmen and

European members of parliament. It calls for the two sides to avoid trying to outbid each other in the scramble for oil supplies which have suddenly been restricted by Arab countries.

Far less harmonious, according to European sources, were talks held this week between Sir Christopher Soames and top administration economic officials. Soames, representing the Common Market countries, met with Treasury Secretary George P. Shultz, Under Secretary of State William Casey and the special White House representative for trade negotiations, William D. Eberle.

"After Sir Christopher's talks here there is broken china all over town," said one European. He said that Soames had refused to accept extremely tough administration criticism of European trade policy and had "given back what he got."

U.S. officials are angry over the refusal of European members of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, meeting in Geneva last week, to set up working groups pending passage of a U.S. trade bill that would give the administration authority to negotiate tariff cuts.

But the Europeans are equally angry over signs that the U.S. trade bill may not be passed until March—

and could conceivably be vetoed by President Nixon if Congress succeeds in inserting restrictions on trade with the Soviet Union.

In talks with European legislators this week, U.S. officials reportedly blamed "Zionists, isolationists and labor unions" for stalling the trade bill by demanding restrictions on Soviet trade.

At a meeting with reporters yesterday, Soames said that he had noticed "no signs of strain," but added that there is "no sweet harmony." He said, however, that this was "not such as to cast doubt on the good intentions of either partner."

The Europeans and Americans are trying to draft a joint declaration of economic principles. European sources said this week that Kissinger had blamed the Europeans for stalling on this.

A visiting member of parliament said, "He is very angry that the whole thing is hung up because the French and the British can't agree on the word 'partnership' as it refers to the United States."

He said Kissinger was also angry that Britain refused to submit a proposal for a Middle East cease-fire in the U.N. Security Council, "even though he knew very well that the British thought it was too early for such an initiative."

These developments came amid indications that a difference of opinion is developing within the Nixon administration over the way it has directed criticism at U.S. NATO allies for their failure to line up behind this country in the Middle East crisis.

Last Friday, the President, Secretary of Defense and the State Department all joined in leveling unprecedented criticism at the Europeans for their role.

However, some senior U.S. officials say the Pentagon would prefer that the State Department tone down its strong public chastisement of the Europeans in favor of more quiet discussions.

It is the Pentagon that must deal with the allies most directly on military matters, and the Defense Department's top official—Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger—will have to confront the Europeans face to face next week at a previously scheduled NATO meeting at the Hague.

Though Pentagon officials have criticized the Europeans, much broader criticism has come from the State Department. Yesterday, a State Department spokesman denied published reports that Kissinger had gone so far as to express "disgust" on Capitol Hill over the NATO countries' neutral stance in the Middle East crisis.

BALTIMORE SUN

30 October 1973

U.S. loses points in Europe over troop alert

By PHILIP POTTER

London Bureau of The Sun

London—Henry A. Kissinger's answer to a news conference question last week whether the Soviet Union had taken advantage of U.S. domestic problems by threatening a unilateral troop movement in the Middle East has

had a big impact here.

"One cannot have a crisis of authority in a society for a period of months without paying a price somewhere along the line," the U.S. Secretary of State replied.

It is an irony that the U.S. military alert in response to the threat may have dissuaded

the Russians and cost them points in Arab lands, but gained the Russians some points in Europe.

It long has been an aim of the Kremlin to see wedges driven between the United States and its European allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the military alert that caught Europe by surprise did open a gap.

The NATO alliance has been

thrown into some disarray as the allies took differing positions on the Israeli-Arab conflict.

As the Sunday Times put it in an editorial, "The crisis of the presidency is a crisis for the world. . . . A disaster which must mortally alarm all who are in any way engaged with American power."

NEW YORK TIMES
31 October 1973

War Signals Misjudged, U.S. Officials Concede

By JOHN W. FINNEY
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 30—United States officials said today that despite several suspicious signals, neither the United States nor Israel seriously believed at the start of October that the Arab countries were about to attack. This view began to change, they went on, when Soviet commercial airliners were diverted, some in midflight, to evacuate Soviet dependents from Egypt and Syria three days before the outbreak of the war.

Such was the prevailing belief that the Arabs would not attack that even the diversion of the Soviet Ilyushin 18 transports was misinterpreted in some United States intelligence circles, the officials added.

The immediate reaction of some intelligence officials was that the Soviet Union had received information that Israel was about to embark on some military operation. And for eight hours after the outbreak of the fourth Middle East war Oct. 6, sizable segments of the United States intelligence community continued to believe that Israel had launched the attack, not the Arabs.

The warning set off by the emergency Soviet evacuation beginning Oct. 3 was described today by officials as they discussed the deficiencies that developed in American and Israeli assessments of Arab intentions.

That an intelligence gap developed is now generally acknowledged within the Government, which is going through a re-examination, with inter-agency squabbles, of the intelligence machinery's operation before and during the war.

It is generally agreed, among United States officials, that the machinery performed well in accumulating facts about Arab military development and capabilities. Where it failed was in judging the facts in terms of Arab intentions.

Signs Were Misread

Officials now believe there were several signs, going back nearly two years, that Egypt and Syria were preparing for an attack. But almost right up to the outbreak of the war, officials said, these signs were all misread if not ignored, largely because of the prevailing Israeli and American view that the Arab countries, after their humiliating defeat in the 1967 war, would not dare initiate a new war.

As long as a year and a half

NEW YORK TIMES
30 October 1973

THE WHITE HOUSE NOW URGES DELAY ON RUSSIAN TRADE

By LESLIE H. GELB

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 29—The chief White House advisor on international economic policy said today that Congress should temporarily shelve legislation on trade benefits for the Soviet Union while Middle East negotiations were under way.

Testifying before the Senate Banking subcommittee, the advisor, Peter M. Flanigan, said it would be inappropriate for Congress to deal with the issue of improving the Soviet Union's trade position in this country through a grant of so-called most-favored-nation status when Soviet cooperation was needed to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Mr. Flanigan, who is executive director of the President's Council on International Economic Policy, denied that this was either an attempt to gain leverage against the Soviet Union on the Middle East or a reversal of President Nixon's

policy that North Korean pilots were flying planes in Egypt.

Signs Again Dismissed

Once again the signs were dismissed on the grounds that the Egyptians were engaged in annual fall maneuvers, officials said.

In remarks that seemed critical of the intelligence community's performance, Secretary of State Kissinger said in a news conference Oct. 12 that three times in the week immediately preceding the outbreak of war United States and Israeli intelligence agencies had been asked for assessments. They had come back with the conclusion, he said, that "hostilities were unlikely to the point of there being no chance of it."

To Mr. Kissinger, this illustrated "the gravest danger of intelligence assessments"—trying "to fit the facts into existing preconceptions and to make them consistent with what is anticipated." This is a judgment now widely shared in the intelligence community.

United States officials now believe that the Israeli Government knew 24 hours in advance that an Arab attack was imminent but decided not to launch a pre-emptive attack for fear of alienating the United States and other Western nations.

A wide belief in the intelligence community now is that the general Arab plan for war was worked out at the conference of nonaligned nations in

goal of normalizing commercial relations.

In a telephone interview Mr. Flanigan said that the Administration wanted to avoid a possible vote in the House of Representatives denying most-favored-nation treatment and credits to the Soviet Union. He added that since the Administration's strategy was "to let the trade bill move toward passage," it was now recommending that Title IV of the bill be dropped.

That segment, as drafted by the Administration, would grant most-favored-nation status to Communist nations, guaranteeing that tariffs on their exports, to the United States are no higher than tariffs on the same goods from any other country.

The bill was set for action last week, but the House leadership, at the request of the Administration, deferred floor debate until the fighting in the Middle East had ended.

According to a number of House sources, the Administration had little alternative at this point. The House Ways and Means Committee, contrary to Administration wishes, had already redrafted Title IV to make the granting of trade benefits contingent on free emigration of Soviet Jews and other citizens.

With 289 co-sponsors, the House, according to the same sources, was about to add an amendment that would also make the granting of Export-Import Bank credits to the Soviet Union contingent on free Jewish emigration. That amendment was proposed by Representative Charles A. Vanik, Democrat of Ohio.

In this form, combining tariff and credit issues, the legislation would be identical to an amendment proposed in the Senate by Senator Henry M. Jackson, Democrat of Washington, which has 77 co-sponsors.

The Jackson-Vanik strategy, Congressional sources say, is to bring the trade bill to a vote with Title IV written to their specifications. According to the sources, Soviet behavior in the Middle East crisis makes it all the more imperative to tie economic concessions to requirements for changes in Soviet society and government.

The White House strategy, as indicated by Mr. Flanigan's testimony, is to avoid a Congressional vote in which détente, as a White House source put it, would be "clobbered."

The Nixon Administration had lobbied hard on most-favored-nation status for the Soviet Union. Until yesterday it reportedly hoped to eliminate the Jackson and Vanik mea-

LONDON TIMES
23 October 1973
**Bitter taste
in Paris
of big power
diplomacy**

From Charles Hargrove
Paris, Oct 22

The resolution voted by the Security Council on the Middle East has this to be said for it, in the French Government's view: it acknowledges the necessary link between a ceasefire and the opening of negotiations for a peace settlement. France has insisted on the link since the outbreak of the conflict.

This modest satisfaction cannot conceal the bitter realization in Paris that western Europe in general, and France in particular, have had no part in ending the conflict. It has provided another sobering example of the collusion of the two superpowers, and of their ability to decide on questions of war and peace untrammelled and unaided.

The four-power mediation in the Middle East to which France has always clung could only work when the United States and Russia had decided to agree.

The newspaper *Le Figaro* says today: "events are contradicting cruelly those who persist in believing that the old European powers can still play a decisive role in world affairs: the contradiction is the more cruel because what is involved is the Middle East, that is to say a region where Britain and France long had privileged interests."

This view is shared by M Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, the president of the Radical Socialist Party, who says bluntly in this week's issue of *L'Express*: "The absence of Europe from the Middle East conflict is a tragedy — and a scandal."

Paris has some grounds for believing that it can play a more glorious role in the negotiations than it did in the war. There are reports that the Arab countries are not willing to leave their fate to Russia and the United States and that they want a return of the European presence

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
30 October 1973

The essential alliance

It is perhaps understandable that during the week of a Mideast crisis piled on top of a culminating point in the domestic political crisis over Watergate some officials in Washington got their priorities mixed up. But now that the cease-fire in the Mideast is in force it is time for Washington to remember that the bedrock on which the security of the United States rests is its alliance with the countries of Western Europe.

That alliance has been carelessly and dangerously damaged by Washington during the Mideast affair. Seldom since the alliance was formed has it been brought into so much question in the European capitals. The repair of the alliance should be the first task of American statecraft.

London, Paris, Bonn, and the other Western capitals are shaken by the fact that they were not even informed of the reason for the sudden military alert of last Thursday, let alone consulted before it was declared or even advised that it was happening. In the case of the Cuban missile crisis top American diplomats were flown to all European capitals with photographs of the Soviet missiles in Cuba — before the White House demanded removal of the missiles.

In the case of the Mideast crisis no one even telephoned the Prime Minister of Great Britain, the President of France, or the Chancellor of the West German Republic.

Carelessness was particularly marked in the case of the loading of American weapons into Israeli ships in Bremerhaven without even advising, let alone asking the consent of, the West German Government. This was done after Germany had declared its neutrality in the Arab-Israeli war. Sending American weapons from a German seaport to a belligerent compromised German neutrality. Bonn, on learning of what was happening, publicly ordered an immediate stop to the loadings.

To any diplomat it was incredible that two top officials of the American Government, the Secretary of Defense and the official spokesman for the Department of State, publicly scolded the Germans for "going to some lengths to separate themselves from us."

Who separated themselves from whom?

The Western Europeans declared their neutrality in the war and made their determination to

keep out of it loud and clear before the United States began to intervene on behalf of Israel. The American action was an act of separation from the neutral position taken up by the Western allies.

The fact of separation became public only over the arms shipments from a German seaport. The British and French, for example, were spared an act of open separation. They were not publicly asked to permit American planes flying arms to Israel to be allowed to refuel at British or French airfields. The permission if requested would have been refused. The only Western ally willing to allow arms to Israel through its territory was Portugal.

The brusqueness in the American treatment of its allies is all the more remarkable in view of what happened in a previous Middle East crisis. In 1956 Britain and France sided with Israel in an attack on Egypt. The United States intervened as a neutral. It applied oil sanctions to Britain for doing precisely what the United States was doing this time. It seems gratuitous in this case to complain in public of the allies doing now what Washington was doing — much more vigorously — in 1956.

If the United States wants an alliance with Western Europe it must treat its alliance with respect and consideration.

The unforgivable mistake in an alliance is to try to commit an ally without the knowledge or consent of the ally. The United States would not for an instant allow its seaports to be used in a manner which violated the foreign policies of the United States. The alliance simply cannot be held together if the allies are to be treated as they were last week.

It is to be remembered that the detente with Russia is an achievement made possible by the bedrock of the alliances with Western Europe and Japan and the new understanding with China. The United States has a powerful, a respectable, and a respected position in the world because it is the center of a group of allies and friends. It is this position at the center which makes it worthwhile for Moscow to enter into a detente with the United States.

Let the grouping fall apart, and Moscow would no longer need the detente, or need to be respectful of the United States.

LONDON TIMES
29 October 1973

CRISIS MISMANAGEMENT IN NATO

No one comes with much credit out of the present wrangle between the United States and her European allies. We must hope that the real strength of the Atlantic Alliance has not been damaged, but the impression of fragility which it has given to the rest of the world will not be easy to correct.

On the substance of the dispute both Americans and Europeans have valid arguments. The Americans quite naturally feel that, if Europe looks to them to ensure her own defence and expects them to make considerable sacrifices for it, the least she could do is to be cooperative in an emergency when they are trying to defend someone else: in this instance, Israel. The Europeans feel that Nato is a mutual self-help organization to which each partner makes his contribution. If one partner chooses to incur other obligations in another part of the world, those obligations are not automatically shared by all the rest. Each ally remains sovereign in the general conduct of his foreign policy. His interests in another part of the world are not necessarily identical with those of the United States; still less so is his perception of how those interests can best be served.

In this instance European governments may or may not feel that President Nixon was right to believe that it was in America's interest to help Israel maintain her hold on occupied Arab territories, but with virtual unanimity they reached the view that it was not in their own interests to do so, and therefore did not feel that this was a legitimate use of Nato

facilities in their countries. Some of them were irritated, moreover, by America's failure to consult them, especially before ordering the worldwide alert on Thursday morning.

The sources of resentment on both sides are therefore understandable. What is inexcusable is that both should have expressed their resentment publicly, or at least in such a way that it was bound to become public. The first offender was the West German Foreign Ministry, which on Thursday put out a public statement announcing that it had protested about American arms supplies being shipped to Israel from West German territory. The Germans apparently felt obliged to make this public because earlier private objections to the Americans had been ignored. Even so, this public airing of an inter-allied dispute on a day of acute international tension was tactless to say the least.

It was also a little tactless of Sir Alec Douglas-Home to say, on the same day, that there was "no evidence" that the Soviet Union was "seriously considering" moving troops into the Middle East. He meant, of course, that there was no evidence available to him—and he may have wished to hint that he felt the Americans ought to have made that evidence available to him. But he would have been a better ally if he had made it clearer that he was not in a position to know, and that the United States Administration was certainly better informed than he was.

The same criticism applies to

those participants in the Nato Council meeting on Friday, who allowed their view that "there was no good reason for the Americans to have gone so far as a full alert" to be leaked to the press. As Lord Kennet pointed out in *The Times* on Saturday, these people could not have had access to the information on which the American decision was based.

But the American reaction to these criticisms was equally ill-considered. By allowing both Mr Schlesinger and the State Department to make public attacks on the attitude of allied governments, and then going on to endorse those attacks in his own press conference the same night, Mr Nixon widened the rift in the alliance when he should have been doing his best to heal it. Moreover, the criticism as he himself phrased it was wrong in substance as well as in form. He said: "Our European friends haven't been as cooperative as they might have been in attempting to help us work out the Middle East settlement."

In fact European powers (or at least Britain) had been trying desperately to play a role in the peace-making process but had succeeded only in getting in the way because they were not really wanted or needed. What they had been uncooperative about was helping Israel to prosecute the war. Whether the President was right in thinking that this was a necessary precondition for working out a settlement is a matter of opinion, and one on which his allies can legitimately differ.

BALTIMORE SUN
25 October 1973

War straining U.S.-Europe ties

By PHILIP POTTER
London Bureau of The Sun

London—The Middle East crisis, it is becoming apparent here, could bring new fissures in the relationship between the United States and its European allies that would replace the "constructive dialogue" that was proclaimed only recently as having succeeded a period of trans-Atlantic "guerrilla warfare."

Washington officialdom, it is known, was not too happy that the British not only applied an embargo on arms to the combatants—that many Britons complain was weighted against Israel—but denied the use of British bases to American military planes carrying arms to Israel.

This, it is feared by some American officials, could be used in Congress by those who have been agitating for withdrawal of some American forces from Europe.

Now the possibility looms that the U.S. will get little help from its European partners, should the cutback in oil production by the Arab oil-producing states and the embargoes some of them have placed on shipments to the U.S. produce a need for pooling of the supplies available to the Western powers.

Yesterday, it was indicated that Britain may join Italy, Belgium, The Netherlands,

Austria, Sweden, Spain and Luxembourg in imposing controls and special conditions on the export of oil to the U.S.

Peter Walker, secretary for trade and industry in the Cabinet of Prime Minister Edward Heath, told the House of Commons that the government could not permit uncontrolled exports.

Therefore, he said, it would be prepared to control the export of oil and oil products other than to the European Economic Community. Under Common Market rules, petro-

leum-export restrictions are not permitted by one member country against another. But against third countries, the members can do what they like.

The United States, which came to the aid of Europe in the 1956-1957 oil crisis following the second Arab-Israeli war, during which France and Britain joined Israel in frustrated efforts to gain control of the Suez Canal, would obviously dislike a European rejection of pooling now when the Arabs are directing their oil weapon at the U.S.

Allies Crimp U.S. Airlift for Israel

By Leslie H. Gelb
New York Times News Service

The United States was forced to set up a special system to rush supplies to the Israelis because some of its North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies, along with Spain, balked at any cooperation, according to diplomatic sources.

The sources said that the refusal was based on a fear that the Arab countries would cut off Europe's oil supplies.

The resupply effort, from bases in the United States, involved aircraft carriers and Air Force tanker planes, military officials disclosed.

The Navy and Air Force had to adopt this roundabout system, the diplomats said, because — with the exception of Portugal and, to some extent, West Germany — some key Western European countries along the supply route made it clear that aircraft bound for Israel could neither land on nor fly over their territory.

A MAIN REASON cited by Washington over the years for American military aid to Greece and Turkey has been to make it possible to use bases on their territory in Middle East crises. Air Force contingency plans, according to knowledgeable sources, have looked to at least tacit Greek government cooperation in an Arab-Israeli conflict.

The Turkish Foreign Ministry announced Oct. 11 that American military installations "are for the security and defense of the North Atlantic Treaty area and have been set up solely for defense cooperative purposes of Turkey." Nevertheless, a number of American officials report, Soviet resupply aircraft heading for Egypt and Syria have flown over Turkey.

The Greek government also ruled out any role in the supply flow to Israel.

UNDER A NAVY plan for the urgent supply of A4 Skyhawks — described by informed congressional

and government sources—the planes were flown from the East Coast to Israel, with stopoffs in the Azores, and the carriers John F. Kennedy and Franklin D. Roosevelt for refueling by tanker aircraft. The planes were also refueled midair in the eastern Mediterranean.

Twenty to 30 Skyhawks were ferried to Israel, and 30 to 50 were sent on Navy transport ships.

The Skyhawks and the Phantoms retained their U.S. markings until they landed in Israel where Israeli markings were applied. The American pilots returned home on transport planes

ANOTHER RESUPPLY issue that remains somewhat clouded concerns West Germany. Government officials concede that in the first days of the Arab-Israeli fighting, Air Force cargo planes flew from the American base at Ramstein, carrying small arms and munitions. Aviation Week, an authoritative source on such matters, says that these aircraft flew over Austria, Yugoslavia and Greece, all prohibited territory. Officials here deny this but will not suggest other possible routes.

The diplomatic effort became quite complicated, according to the diplomatic sources, with Washington and other NATO capitals jockeying to avoid open confrontation. At first, Washington, it was said, simply decided not to raise the question of landing and flight rights, hoping its allies would look the other way.

However, the governments of Greece, Turkey, Spain and Italy publicly forbade their territory to American aircraft, other governments, including that of Britain, made their positions clear privately.

The sources asserted that the U.S. representative at NATO, Donald Rumsfeld, was asked to win support for American policy in the Middle East but was unable to do so. The oil issue apparently outweighed unity

NEW YORK TIMES
30 October 1973

EUROPEANS IRKED BY U.S. COMPLAINT

By ALVIN SHUSTER
Special to The New York Times

LONDON, Oct. 29—European officials are expressing surprise and irritation over Washington's criticism of their lack of support in the Middle East war, but they remain uncertain about just how to respond.

The official inclination in several capitals today was to try to play down the possibility of repercussions from the harsh words from Washington. President Nixon and other officials, reflecting their resentment over the way most allies detached themselves from the American airlift of supplies to Israel, complained on Friday that Europe should have been more helpful to the United States in the war.

For their part, some European officials said privately today that membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization did not mean blind support for every American policy.

The questions debated today included whether bad feelings

would slow the pace of the emerging declarations sought by Washington as the framework for revitalizing trans-Atlantic relations. Some officials said privately that the task would go on but would be somewhat complicated by the change in atmosphere.

"The whole thing is bound to have some effect on the spirit of the discussions now under way," said one diplomat in Brussels. "But the impact on the substance remains to be seen."

The new strains in the alliance come at a particularly sensitive time in what Washington had hoped would be the "Year of Europe." Apart from the declarations now under discussion, the North Atlantic Treaty allies open negotiations with the Soviet Union tomorrow in Vienna on reducing forces in Central Europe.

Officials here and elsewhere stressed today, however, that the differences over the Middle East war would not disturb NATO's agreed position in dealing with Moscow on force cuts. But there is some concern that America's unhappiness over Europe's stand on the Middle East could spur demands in Washington for a unilateral reduction in American forces in Europe.

As usual, the private comments today about Washington's reaction more accurately

reflected the mood than the sparse official pronouncements. For the most part, the official effort was aimed at toning down suggestions of a serious rift between the NATO allies.

One bitter private remark came from a NATO diplomat in Brussels. "The United States is firing off salvos in all directions which are ill-timed and ill-conceived," he said. "Americans don't even consult and then complain we don't share their views."

British officials were among those who argued that there were no serious differences with the United States although Lord Carrington, the Minister of Defense, did agree that "Europe's interests were rather different from the interests of the United States."

In criticizing the European stand, American officials complained that most allies, with the notable exception of Portugal, divorced themselves from the American policy of support of Israel in the interests of preserving Europe's flow of oil from the Arab states. Washington is particularly unhappy that many of America's NATO allies made clear their opposition to allowing American planes bound for Israel either to fly over or land on their territories.

In turn, European officials complain about the lack of con-

sultation provided by the United States, not only on Middle East policy in general, but also on the worldwide alert proclaimed last Thursday. Word of the alert was passed officially to Europe and to NATO headquarters in Brussels only well after the orders had gone out.

The European unease over alliance differences was reflected today in editorials, with the French Newspaper Le Monde comparing the statements in Washington to school principals' giving bad marks for conduct to their European pupils. It noted that the American comments apparently dealt a fatal blow to the Year of Europe and said that Europeans were unhappy about the breezy offhandedness of the United States in deciding to solve the Middle East crisis with "the sole consent of the Kremlin."

The controversy, meanwhile, is expected to figure this week in talks between Walter Stoessel, the assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, and European officials. Mr. Stoessel, who arrived in Bonn today and is due here later in the week, is trying to work out agreed language for a document setting forth guidelines on economic and political relations between the nine members of the European Economic Com-

WASHINGTON POST
26 October 1973

Western Europe Keeping Out Of Middle East Crisis Moves

By Dan Morgan

Washington Post Staff Writer

Western Europe's bystander role in the 20-year-old Middle East crisis—unable to influence events yet deeply affected by them—became even more evident yesterday in the unfolding superpower diplomacy.

According to U.S. sources, the American actions in response to possible Soviet "unilateral" moves were first conveyed to the Europeans in Brussels yesterday. The implication was that there was no advance consultation or warning.

The sources said that the United States was in touch with members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's standing council sometime after a U.S. National Security Council meeting broke up at 3 a.m. in Washington.

The military alert ordered by the United States apparently did not extend to the forces of the West European countries, most of which have been trying as best they can to disassociate themselves from American support of Israel and, in recent days, from the U.S. military re-supply of that country.

A West German defense ministry spokesman said in

Bonn yesterday that West Germany and other NATO troops did not join U.S. forces in their alert.

Diplomatic and other observers took the view yesterday that the independent U.S. action could only deepen the tensions between the United States and Europe flowing from their sharply divergent interests and policies in the Middle East crisis.

West Germany yesterday offered a fresh example of this when it demanded that the United States immediately stop reinforcing Israel from American military bases in Germany.

The foreign ministry in Bonn charged that weapons deliveries originating from German territory violated the "strict neutrality" policy of the government.

There have been unconfirmed reports of German acquiescence in the re-supply operations for days. Diplomatic sources here said this announcement therefore appeared to be intended mainly to protect Bonn against possible Arab retaliation.

Fear that the Arab countries (which supply roughly 80 per cent of Western Europe's oil) would impose total embargoes has been the primary factor in the neutrality of Europeans.

Of all the NATO countries, only Portugal offered the United States landing facilities for its re-supply operations. Last week, Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.) announced that Italy, France, Spain and Britain had all refused to cooperate in the re-supply effort.

Jackson said the Portuguese government, one of the two dictatorships in NATO, gave permission for U.S. military aircraft en route to Israel from the East Coast to refuel in the Azores.

The State Department denied last week that the United States had either asked for or been refused landing rights or military overflight permission by the governments named by Jackson. However, U.S. officials said that there had been "disappointing response" to the re-supply efforts by the Europeans. The implication was that some major governments made clear from the start that they would stay neutral.

"Nobody could deny that some Europeans were irritated," one official source

"individual views" had been expressed in NATO forums that "they wouldn't be in the position they are on oil if the U.S. had not engaged in the re-supply of Israel."

When asked if France was one of the countries, he replied, "certainment."

Since the start of the crisis on Oct. 6 there have been at least four major meetings of the NATO council at which the Middle East has been discussed.

U.S. sources in Washington said that the American position at these meetings was "tough." These sources described the attitude of Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger regarding Europe's oil worries as uncompromising.

"He made clear that the U.S. was going to re-supply Israel in order to maintain the military balance in the Middle East, and that was that," one source said.

At the same time, the United States was reported to be disappointed that Greece and Turkey, two countries which receive military assistance, had stayed neutral and had refused to allow the use of their facilities in the airlift. The United States maintains its own air bases in Greece. In Turkey, these bases are run jointly with the local government.

The lifting of the complex series of restrictions on production and export of oil imposed by the Arabs in the last seven days could reduce some of the immediate European-U.S. strains which have emerged in the present crisis.

However, American officials say that obvious divergence between European and U.S. interests in the crisis will affect the atmosphere for months.

The United States and the Europeans are now seeking to work out declarations of common principles about the future of NATO.

According to U.S. officials, European governments were angered by a recent proposal in Congress by Senator Jackson and Sen. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.). It would make U.S. troop levels in Europe contingent on European readiness to offset fully the balance of payments drain on the United States caused by the stationing of U.S. troops abroad.

More than \$1 billion in U.S. balance of payments costs resulting from troops are still not covered by the

munity and the United States.

The other key document, the military half of the "Atlantic Charter" called for by Secretary of State Kissinger last April, is being drafted in Brussels for eventual signature by all 15 members of NATO.

NEW YORK TIMES

1 November 1973

FRANCE RALLYING EUROPEAN ALLIES

By NAN ROBERTSON
Special to The New York Times

PARIS, Oct. 31 — France, smarting from what she sees as total Soviet-American disregard of Europe in the Middle East crisis, took the lead today in trying to restore Europe's world influence by tightening Common Market ties.

President Pompidou called for a meeting of the leaders of the nine Common Market nations before the end of 1973 to "compare and harmonize" their attitudes toward the Middle East and other political issues.

The proposal was expressed in letters sent to the heads of governments of Britain, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium, Luxembourg and Ireland.

Mr. Pompidou also urged regular meetings from now on at the highest level to coordinate Common Market political positions, stabilize its members' currencies and fight inflation.

The French President told the Cabinet at its weekly session today that the Middle East cease-fire, "planned and put into effect without the participation of Europe in any form," was a "dangerous" way to operate.

Experience, he said, has shown, he said, that private understandings between the United States and the Soviet Union can either help détente or lead to a general confrontation.

He declared that such agreements worked against Europe's direct, historical, geographic and economic links to the Middle East.

Mr. Pompidou said that Europe, while reaffirming its loyalty to its alliances and cooperation with the East, should "put to the proof and the test the strength of its structure and its ability to contribute to the settlement of world problems."

He said that at the meeting he proposed the Common Market partners should set down and harmonize their political attitudes and establish procedures for getting together quickly in times of crisis to define a common European positions.

The French leader also urged the Common Market finance ministers to meet soon to work out "indispensable measures" for insuring the stability of their currencies and shielding them against inflation.

He further asked that the economics ministers of the nine nations draw up a plan to fight

inflation, which, he said, would be aggravated throughout Europe by the rise in oil prices.

Mr. Pompidou reaffirmed France's readiness to assist "as best we can, under the authority of the United Nations Security Council, in establishing a just and lasting peace guaranteeing the security of all states" in the Middle East.

His call for quick, positive action by the Common Market chiefs of government came after United States criticism of its European allies for lack of support during the Middle East war.

Until the war broke out, the Common Market countries were deeply divided in their attitudes toward Israel. Israel's staunchest friends appeared to be the Netherlands and West Germany, with France the most pro-Arab. Others, such as Italy, claimed neutrality.

Because of the Arab oil boycott, a shift seems to have taken place aligning the nine governments, irrespective of public opinion at home, on a line somewhere between that of the French and that of the Italians.

Soviet rewards in By LAURENCE MARTIN Mid-East

A MILITARY tutor's report on the Arabs this weekend would have to read "much improved but must try harder." What the Arabs have or have not done, however, they have achieved with Soviet arms, Soviet advice, Soviet training and under the real if remote shadow of direct Soviet intervention that caused such a flurry last week. Thus, as we write a half-term report on the Arabs, we must also reassess Soviet policy in the Middle East.

It is the great good fortune of the Soviet Union that Arab failures are not incompatible with Soviet successes. The existence of Israel has always compelled the United States to play the balance of power game upside down in the Middle East. The Americans are compelled to side with the smaller legions.

True, the smaller legions have been infinitely tougher and more skilled militarily than the Arabs. But the Arabs sit on most of the region's natural resources and have title to, if not always the free use of, the Suez Canal, the area's single most important strategic prize. Moreover, as the present war shows, the Israeli lead in sophistication must inevitably be a wasting asset, so that gradually numbers will tell.

In the long run this erosion of Israel's advantage favours the Soviet Union, but the Soviets also profit from the disparity of scale in a more immediate way. The Arabs have a spongy imperviousness to disaster that enables the Russians to view the setbacks of their allies with an equanimity Americans cannot afford towards the much more delicately poised existence of Israel. Thus, with reasonable luck, the Russians can profit from either outcome of the present war.

The Arabs may, contrary to present probabilities, emerge with sufficient military credit to salve their pride, and sufficient bargaining power to enable the Superpowers to compel Israel to disgorge some of the territories won in 1967. In that case Russia has helped enough to earn some Arab gratitude and the United States has certainly done enough for Israel to attract even greater Arab hatred than before.

If, on the other hand, the Arabs feel humiliated and incur further losses, they may upbraid the Soviet Union for neglect, but they will survive and they will continue to need Russian help.

Indeed, though there can be no real substitute for a Super-power, the slim chance of offering the Arabs some alternatives is the

most plausible argument for the Western European efforts to remain aloof that have so annoyed the Nixon administration.

Soviet policy is not without its risks. The credence accorded rumours of Russian troop movements on Thursday rests on the belief that there are limits beyond which the Soviet Union could not let Israeli adventures go. It is, however, unlikely that we were really near the brink of war, for Soviet policy in the Middle East is based on calculations of diplomatic advantage.

The American position is very different, for American dedication to Israel has a domestic and emotional basis which goes beyond national self-interest. Thus Soviet policy involves the danger that unexpected Arab successes could certainly compel direct American intervention. So far, Arab incompetence has paradoxically permitted the Soviet Union to avoid this ultimate danger, and has enabled her to use Israel as a catalyst for extending Russian influence into the Moslem world.

As recently as 1956, when Sir Anthony Eden launched the ill-fated Anglo-French Suez operation to prevent a revolutionary Egyptian Government and a new Soviet policy of arms supply from delivering the Arab world and the Canal into Soviet hands, the prospect seemed a disaster justifying desperate counter-measures.

There could scarcely be more striking evidence of changed perspective than the widespread chorus of delight with which many British commentators last week, when faced with the idea that Russia might contribute the Red Army to a peace-keeping force on the Canal, greeted it as a triumph for *détente*. A realist like Dr. Kissinger was quick to scotch any such idea, but its very conception was dramatic testimony to Soviet success in winning acceptance as a legitimate pillar of the military balance in an area where, 20 years ago, they had scarcely a foothold.

The military instruments of this achievement have been the Soviet naval presence both in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean, the lavish programmes of military aid and training, and, at peak of the effort, the stationing of a Soviet air defence force of some 20,000 men in the United Arab Republic. Not only did Soviet maritime aircraft fly reconnaissance missions from Egyptian bases, but Soviet pilots briefly engaged and took casualties from Israeli Phantoms over Cairo; possibly a unique instance of Soviet armed forces being commit-

ted to overseas combat.

One motive for all this military deployment was undoubtedly to outflank N.A.T.O. to the south and to provide a strategic defence for Russia in an area which is second only to Eastern Europe in long-established Russian strategic concern. This concern doubtless persists in the Soviet rationale for their policy, even though changes in military technology and in the European political situation are sharply reducing the likelihood of general war and the strategic significance of the Mediterranean if it should come.

The other, and increasingly obvious, rôle of Soviet southern deployments is in a carefully orchestrated blend of military, political and economic policies intended to increase Soviet, and decrease Western, influence throughout the Middle East and South Asia.

It is important not to exaggerate or misconceive the military component in this strategy. It is by no means always the dominant element, and, even within the military component, the provision of supplies and training is probably more important than the direct presence of Soviet forces.

But if the military component, is only part of the mix, it is an inevitable one. The areas at stake are so turbulent and contain so many conflicts which the indigenous nations will militarise and not infrequently convert into active hostilities—witness the Middle East now and the Indo-Pakistan conflict of recent memory—that any outside power that seeks influence must be prepared to contribute to the military balance in one way or another. That is why recently revived hopes of strictly curbing and balancing military supplies will have little, if any, success.

What, then, will the military arm of Soviet policy in the Middle East and South Asia do next? As we have seen, there are signs that the Russians have mixed feelings about the wisdom of a conspicuous direct military presence, and the present Middle Eastern war has brought to the surface what may be a rather sharp debate in Moscow about the relationship between a global *détente* and a forward military policy in local theatres.

It seems inevitable, however, that military forces and supplies will continue to be a prominent instrument of Soviet policy. One reason is that military leaders can argue very plausibly that across the board—in strategic parity, European arms control negotiations, Vietnam, India and the

THE GUARDIAN, MANCHESTER
24 October 1973

Russia seeks the Nine's support

By HELLA PICK

Middle East—the Soviet Union has enjoyed a remarkable political return for its military investments.

What the rewards may be in future, not only in the Middle East but elsewhere too, will depend very much on Western policy. Perhaps the most salutary result the West could derive from the current Middle Eastern crisis would be for a great many people who should have known better to learn the real meaning of "détente." Dr. Kissinger himself may have been guilty of occasional euphoric phraseology, but he has repeatedly pointed out that *détente* is not a substitute for the balance of power but a particular form of it.

When, in his Thursday Press conference, he said that the United States was not in "confrontation" with the Soviet Union in the Middle East, he meant that there was in fact such a clear confrontation that it had every chance of being contained. If it is to survive, *détente* means not the absence of acute local crises, but, on the contrary, a painstaking care to take up and meet every challenge in areas which the West does not intend to concede to the Communist powers.

The rather hysterical outburst against his European allies delivered by the American Secretary of Defence on Friday shows that there are some special questions about the future of the Western alliance for Europeans to ponder this weekend. Though they may welcome the firmness shown by the United States in the Middle East, they must ask themselves how much was due to the special status of Israel in American opinion at a time when the President is under peculiar domestic pressures.

More important, perhaps, in the light of American displeasure, Europeans should not fail to notice that even Israel has to show independence and take risks to prevent her vital interests being sacrificed to the element of Super-power collusion which is as much a part of *détente* as the residual element of Soviet-American conflict on lesser issues.

Israel can do this only because of her own capabilities and resolution. Europeans should remember this when tempted by the idea that *détente* entitles them to neglect their own moral and material defences. This week's opening of the force reduction negotiations in Vienna would be a good time to begin.

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While Russia is still withholding diplomatic recognition from the EEC, its diplomats are quietly urging the Nine to take a common, pro-Arab stand on a Middle East settlement.

During the last few days the Soviet Ambassador to Britain has made repeated calls on the Foreign Secretary to discuss the Middle East. One reason for this interest appears to be a Soviet belief that Britain's policy on the issue is on the right lines and that she should be encouraged to propagate it among her partners in the Community.

Although the Russians no doubt recognise that there are considerable divisions among the EEC countries in their Middle East policies, they appear to welcome Britain's attempts to have the Community act together in seeking to resolve the crisis. There is, in this Soviet view, an implicit acceptance not merely that the Community is here to stay, but that it is also developing into a political power that counts on the international stage.

Neither Russia nor any other member of the 35 countries taking part in the European security conference in Geneva made any attempt yesterday to stop Israel from addressing them. All delegations were present, and silent, as Israel's Ambassador to Switzerland, Mr Levavi, delivered a low-key speech urging a peaceful settlement and "normal negotiations between Israel and her neighbours" to break the deadlock.

In a memo to the conference Israel stressed its close links with Europe and insisted that security was indivisible.

In an unmistakable allusion to Palestine terrorists, Israel called on the conference to draw up procedures for preventing hijackings and the holding of hostages.

It was argued that to grant help or asylum to terrorists would constitute a grave threat to the security of all nations, including Europe.

Israel came to the security conference as part of an agreement that was struck to allow Mediterranean countries to put forward their views on the relationships between their own security and European security. Algeria and Tunisia had been represented in Geneva during the first week of the Middle East fighting.

But there had been some concern that Israel's appearance might provoke heated debates between the conference members and there had been corridor moves last week to suspend the conference temporarily. Britain, as well as the US and other senior members of the conference, were, however, determined to continue business as usual in Geneva and would not even acknowledge moves for adjournment.

The US-Soviet ceasefire resolution in the UN Security Council removed the doubts of those who feared that *détente* was endangered and that the Geneva talks might develop into an empty charade. As a result, Israel was able yesterday to express "the hopes that the bloodshed and hostility which have tormented the Middle East for so many years will be replaced by an era of peace and cooperation."

NEW YORK TIMES
19 October 1973

Red Cross Pressing Israel On Step to Protect Civilians

Special to The New York Times

GENEVA, Oct. 18—Israel is being pressed to answer an appeal by the International Committee of the Red Cross urging her to observe new stringent rules of warfare designed to protect civilians in the Mideast.

A committee spokesman said today that a new call had gone out to Israel because she was the only one of the four prin-

cipal belligerents in the Middle East war had not replied to the first appeal.

Syria and Iraq have agreed to apply the new draft rules. Egypt has, too—but only on the condition that Israel also agree, according to the spokesman.

Drafted under Red Cross auspices, the proposed rules would outlaw all attacks aimed at terrorizing civilian populations. Also on such objectives as public transport service not banned would be attacks primarily involved in war efforts.

Bonn Silent on U.S. Criticism of Its Middle East Stand

By John M. Goshko
Washington Post Foreign Service

BONN, Oct. 27—Chancellor Willy Brandt's government declined comment today on Washington's criticism of West Germany and other NATO countries that have "separated themselves publicly" from U.S. efforts to supply Israel with arms.

"For the time being, the federal government has no intention of saying anything on this," Bonn spokesmen said when asked for comment.

At separate press conferences yesterday, President Nixon, Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger and State Department spokesman Robert J. McCloskey all expressed annoyance at the attitude of Washington's NATO partners toward the Middle East situation.

In large part, their anger was prompted by Bonn's action Thursday in protesting sharply against the delivery of U.S. arms to Israel from West German territory. The foreign ministry called the arms shipment a violation of Bonn's efforts to remain neutral in the Middle East conflict and called on the United States to halt such shipments.

Since then, however, the Brandt government has attempted to back away somewhat from the sharp tone of the foreign ministry statement.

Officials here noted only that Bonn's ambassador in Washington, Berndt Von Staden, met last night with Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger to discuss "NATO questions." As a result, they said "each side now understands better the position of the other."

It was obvious, however, that the Bonn government will not be able to maintain this low profile much beyond the weekend. News of Washington's reaction reached here too late to be published in most of this morning's newspapers. That, plus the fact that Brandt left today for a vacation in France, should give the government a breathing spell until Monday.

By then, however, the German press and the opposition Christian Democrats are expected to be besieging the government for explanations. As a result, Bonn might find itself in the position of either having to back down or risk the possibility of severe friction in its relations with Washington.

In this respect, particular concern is certain to be expressed here about Schlesinger's comment that the West

German protest may force the United States to review the depth of its military and diplomatic commitment to West Germany.

Underlying the dispute has been the effort of Brandt and Foreign Minister Walter Scheel to overcome West Germany's past reputation for partiality to Israel and to improve Bonn's relations with the Arab world. This is prompted in turn by two factors: West Germany's dependence for most of its oil supplies on the Arab countries, and the German desire to avoid a new outbreak of Arab terrorism such as last year's murder of Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics.

Bonn's attempt to pursue a policy of "strict neutrality" when the new Middle East war began immediately came into collision with the fact that the United States was drawing on military equipment stockpiled in West Germany to replace Israeli battle losses.

Privately, the West Germans imply that they tried to turn a blind eye to the resupply operation but that this was eventually made impossible by American lack of candor and discretion and by Washington's failure to understand the difficulty of Bonn's position.

According to authoritative sources, the Germans were informed by U.S. Ambassador Martin J. Hillenbrand on Tuesday that the shipments were being ended. But immediately after the Germans relayed this information to the Egyptian government, it became known that two Israeli freighters had been loaded with tanks and arms at the North Sea port of Bremerhaven.

The sources say that the sharp tone of the resulting public German protest was prompted in part by a desire to protect Bonn against Egyptian anger, and in part by a feeling that the foreign ministry had been duped by the Americans.

Subsequently, the sources add, the Germans became convinced that Hillenbrand had not misled them intentionally and that there had been some kind of misunderstanding. This led the government to conclude that its initial protest had been too strong, and it began the backpedaling operation set in motion yesterday.

Now, however, the question is whether the move came too

late to avoid charges of a threatened split with West Germany's most important ally. A sample of what the Brandt government can expect was supplied today by Karl Carstens, parliamentary leader of the Christian Democrats.

In a newspaper interview to be published tomorrow, Carstens charged that the Brandt government's policy had failed to serve "the cause of peace." Instead Carstens added, Bonn had erred badly by publicly criticizing Washington instead of recognizing the U.S. effort to "restore the balance of forces in the Middle East."

U.S. Criticism Stirs European Rejoinders

U.S. criticism of its European allies in NATO for allegedly letting the United States down during the Middle East war has brought some sharp reactions.

Greek Foreign Minister Christian Xanthopoulos-Palamas complained in Athens that Mediterranean nations directly affected by the war were "ignored" during the crisis. The Greek Embassy in Washington denied as completely unfounded U.S. reports that Soviet airplanes used Greek airspace in flying military supplies to the Middle East.

An Italian government spokesman said in Rome that Italy's membership in NATO did not obligate it to assist Washington's Middle East policy.

Widespread anger was reported in Europe at the U.S. failure to consult its allies before ordering a nuclear alert affecting bases in Europe.

British newspapers said the alert had shattered British illusions about the alliance. The London Daily Mail said that "Europe must now stand on its own feet."

BALTIMORE SUN
26 October 1973

Britain presses Soviet on goals

By PHILIP POTTER
London Bureau of The Sun

London—The British government insisted yesterday that although it had no confirmation of Soviet Mideast intentions, it did press in Moscow for word of what Russian aims were. This was in response to the United States military alert to counter any Soviet dispatch of troops to the Mideast.

Sir Alec Douglas-Home, the foreign secretary, responded in the House of Commons to a suggestion from Eric Heffer, a left-wing Labor party member, that the alleged threat of unilateral Soviet action was "mythical" and the American alert of its forces around the world had "more to do with President Nixon's internal difficulties than with the situation in the Middle East," by saying, "This may be mythical. I hope it is, but we shall know more in time."

At another point Sir Alec said he was "uncertain" as to the "actual state" of the American alert. Sir Alec said

of the U.S. alert being reportedly in response to a unilateral Soviet troop movement: "There is no evidence that the Soviet Union is seriously considering this. They are just reports which the House must note."

If the U.S. does come forward with proof, as Henry A. Kissinger put it, that high American officials were "not playing with the lives of American people," it can be said with authority that high British government sources would regard any Soviet provocation of the alert as having been a "monumental blunder" on Moscow's part.

As to possible Soviet intentions, it was said the plan might have been to send Soviet troops to Cairo to be barbed there, or, alternatively, that it considered the Egyptian forces on the Suez front in such "terrible" plight as to warrant "desperate" action.

THE GUARDIAN, MANCHESTER
26 October 1973

Middle East peace: too big a job for small Powers

Dr Strangelove's world was with us yesterday. An international crisis and an internal crisis coincided in the United States, with American nuclear forces on a precautionary alert throughout the world. The alert may have been ordered because of the Soviet military and diplomatic measures in the Middle East or because the President consciously or unconsciously wanted to divert attention from his blunders at home. The sacking of Professor Cox and the resignation of Mr Elliot Richardson have torn away the loyalty of many of his remaining supporters. The President is under extreme strain, both because his own future, in the White House is at stake and because his country's relations with the Soviet Union are also at stake. The strain and the evidence that he has recently reversed some of his own critical decisions call into question the balance of his judgment. Never since the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 have the President's sanity and sound judgment been of more importance to the world. Once again, both the Great Powers have played with the most deadly fire.

Whether the Soviet Union meant to move troops into the Middle East remains unclear. It has now undertaken not to do so and has supported the non-aligned countries' resolution for an international ceasefire contingent to which none of the big Powers will contribute. At the beginning of the week the Russians offered in the Security Council to contribute to a US-USSR peacekeeping force in the Middle East. The United States at that time and since then has refused. It was an ill-advised decision and one that may yet have to be reversed if the warring parties are to be kept separate.

With the collapse of the first ceasefire and with General Dayan's surrounding of the Egyptian Third Army, President Sadat is in great peril. Even if Dayan does not intend it, his tanks could be on the outskirts of Cairo also within a few hours. And if the Egyptian Third Army either surrenders or starves, President Sadat's political position will have been destroyed. In his telephone talks with Moscow he may have appealed for physical support. To do so must be profoundly against his own instincts, because he threw out his Soviet advisers only last year. Once they returned and returned not as advisers, but as a coherent fighting force—they would not soon be removed a second time. But Sadat's position is desperate, and Washington could have believed that Moscow was about to respond. The Soviet "readiness measures" mentioned by Dr Kissinger may have come at the same time.

To order an alert, to warn Israel, and to reply vigorously to Moscow would be the obvious reaction in Washington. The warning to Israel might well be in strong terms. By his activity before and during the so-called "ceasefire," General Dayan gravely overreached himself. Of course, Israel has every reason for punitive action having been caught by the Yom Kippur surprise attack and having suffered extremely painful casualties. But Mrs Meir, General Dayan, and their colleagues need to ask themselves whether

they want peace, either now or ever. They also need to ask themselves what their future relationship with Washington will be. By causing a new Soviet-US confrontation they have added to Washington's embarrassments. Even if Mr Nixon is not unhappy that the Middle East diverts attention from Watergate, he does not want to jeopardise his achievements in improving East-West relations. Above all, he does not want to be drawn into war. Dr Kissinger's warning yesterday—that there is a limit to American toleration of Soviet action—indicates the imminent danger.

The United Nations has now voted for a peacekeeping force drawn from UN members other than the US, USSR, China, France, and the UK. Dr Kissinger says that it is "inconceivable" that the Americans and Russians should place on the ground in Sinai and the Golan Heights forces strong enough to repel the Arabs or Israelis. He is right to talk of a peacekeeping force in terms of having to be strong enough to fight. But if for political reasons it is "inconceivable" to Washington that US and Soviet forces of that strength should be placed there, is it conceivable that anyone else can raise them? No: it is not. Countries like Nigeria and Yugoslavia could find strong contingents, but they could not be welded into a coherent force quickly enough.

If anyone is to do the job—and it is in every way a thoroughly unwelcome prospect—the Americans and Russians will have to do it. Each, after all, has powerful influence over its client. If the Russians tell the Egyptians and Syrians that they will allow no attack, then there will be no attack. The Americans are as well able to deliver the same message to the Israelis. Even from Israel's standpoint, it is better to have an agreed American force on the Negev frontier, with a demilitarised zone in Sinai, than to have the Russians on the canal ready to wage war. For everyone's sake a limited Soviet-American presence is the lesser evil—and an infinitely lesser evil than an outright Soviet-American conflict.

Mr Nixon may enjoy the immediate reprieve from a further Watergate inquisition. In the end, he will have to face it. He has been a unique blend of the conscientious, the unscrupulous, the competent, and the totally unlovable. His dedication to his job was never in doubt, yet he had no qualms about how he secured it. He has been maudlin to the point of nausea on television, yet he has presided over the most fruitful period in American foreign policy since the war. Truman, the unknown haberdasher, surprised the world by his instinctive mastery of America's problems, domestic and foreign; Nixon, the known trickster, pulled America out of Vietnam, made peace with China, and brought the two super Powers into a new relationship. With only one exception he has surrounded himself with the worst type of adviser; the exception is Henry Kissinger who in his earlier days was among America's foremost hawks and did not stop short of advocating a pre-emptive nuclear strike. Whatever other qualities historians find in Nixon's bizarre tenancy of the White House, there will be a quarry of irony for them to mine.

Ceylon sees lesson in Chile

Mrs. Bandaranaike tells supporters she fears coup attempt by CIA

By Eardley Suresh
Special to
The Christian Science Monitor

Colombo, Sri Lanka
Shock waves from the Chilean military coup are still being felt in little Sri Lanka (Ceylon), half a world away.

Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike's leftist Coalition government has grown increasingly concerned about its own safety from machinations of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, which it believes is activating anti-government forces and engineering parliamentary defections to topple the government from within.

There is concern that the conservative pro-West United National Party (UNP), the leading political opposition, may be aiding and abetting such a conspiracy.

Cracks have already appeared in the governing Coalition monolith with the recent expulsion of the ultra-left, Moscow-influenced Communist Party, one of its partners. The Communists have been attacking the Coalition for heaping unbearable burdens on the people by increasing the price of essential consumer items, and denigrating it for its tardiness in nationalizing major foreign and Ceylonese-owned industries and tea plantations which are the island's main money-spinners.

Communists expelled

"It is no longer possible to regard you as members of the United Front," wrote Prime Minister Bandaranaike in a letter to the Communist Party.

The expulsion may not endanger the government's stability immediately, since it has an enormous parliamentary majority, but unattached political sources here do not discount that this may be the beginning of more defections which Mrs. Bandaranaike may find hard to stem.

Partly this threat lies in the unreliability of Coalition parliamentary backbenchers who are of several minds about their membership in the government to begin with.

And partly it's because the government's popularity has been ebbing away rapidly due to its in-

competence to solve any of the pressing problems which have snowballed into dangerous proportions. Things have reached the point where economic crisis and famine threaten to blow the lid in the coming months, if not weeks, unless the Coalition government can obtain immediate cash and food aid for Sri Lanka from friendly countries.

Coalition loosely knit

Unlike its UNP opponent, the Coalition is not a closely knit organization backed by large resources. It is rather a medley of several forces ranging from Rightists, Socialists, Trotskyists, Communists (Moscow and Peking supporters) and ultra-left, each trying to pull the government in its own direction.

For several years, these factions had fought each other bitterly till they came together under Mrs. Bandaranaike's charismatic leadership to attain the power which had eluded them so long.

Since the Communist Party's exit, Mrs. Bandaranaike and her ministers have been keeping the Chilean coup in public focus and warning the people to be on the guard against attempts by "rightists and foreign forces" to overthrow the government with the help of "those within it."

In a statement on the Chilean coup, Mrs. Bandaranaike said:

"Events in that country are more proof that the real danger for democracy comes from vested interests and their political leadership. They always cover up their hostility to progressive social change and pick on economic difficulties which have been created by their economic system and their anti-social behavior to justify unconstitutional opposition to legally elected governments."

She called upon the people to draw the correct lessons from the events in Chile.

With Mrs. Bandaranaike a concern about assassinations, military coups and party defections is no mere obsession. Her husband, who rose to power in 1956 as prime minister, was assassinated in September, 1959; in January, 1962, she faced an abortive military coup led by high-ranking police, military and civilian officials;

in 1964, her government was toppled by some of her own Freedom Party members defecting to the UNP-led opposition; and in the summer of 1971, barely nine months after her advent to power with a sweeping majority, she faced a Maoist-style rebellion by over 17,000 ultra-left youths, which was quickly put down, thanks to timely foreign assistance.

In all this, it was alleged that the American CIA, the United National Party, local and foreign vested interests had engineered and financed subversive elements. The UNP denied this charge. However, all those involved in the attempted military coup later obtained top appointments in the private sector and in the State Corporation, while the UNP was in power between 1965 and 1970.

Though there now appears to be no danger of a military coup — because the armed services have been purged of UNP elements and replaced by Coalition loyalists and kinsmen of Mrs. Bandaranaike — the government evidently still fears more defections to the opposition and the recurrence of a rebellion by youths which could weaken and topple it.

Youth ardently wooed

Youths are now being wooed by the UNP, which has promised them everything under the sun.

Many of those arrested during the 1971 insurrection have been freed after an intensive rehabilitation program or released after trial on suspended sentences ranging from one to six years, but it is hard to say whether they will keep away from trouble.

Several hard-core insurgents are still at large, and they are believed to be behind the sporadic incidents of terrorism which are still being reported. Youth unrest is rampant throughout the island due to lack of employment opportunities. In the hands of government's opponents they could soon become a destructive force to cause a political upheaval.

Cashing in heavily on the Coalition's failure to keep all its election promises and on the simmering discontent within its ranks, the UNP is currently conducting an island-wide campaign to force its immediate resignation to enable the people to choose a new government.