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No. 49

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CONFIDENTIAL

Governmental Affairs

NEW YORK TIMES

2 November 1973

Excerpts From Transcript of Ford's Testimony at Hearing on Vice-Presidential Nomination

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 1—

Following are excerpts from a transcript of testimony today by Representative Gerald R. Ford, Republican of Michigan who is President Nixon's nominee for Vice President, before the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration:

OPENING STATEMENT

This is a new experience for me, I realize it is also a new experience for you, and for the American people. I feel that I am among friends; however I ask you only to treat me as true friends treat one another, with directness, with candor, without favor and without guile, in full and mutual awareness of the solemn oath we have all taken to the Constitution and our responsibility to the people of this great Republic.

I am deeply conscious that today the Congress and the citizens we represent are embarking upon a historic voyage into uncharted waters. I come before you as the nominee of the President to fill a vacancy in the office of Vice President of the United States under the provisions of the 25th Amendment to the Constitution, for which 65 Senators and 368 members of the House voted in 1965 and which the Legislatures of 48 states subsequently ratified.

I know you are going to have a lot of questions for me, but there are two big ones perhaps I can answer at the start.

First, what makes you, Jerry Ford, qualified to be Vice President of the United States? Second, what kind of a Vice President would you hope to be?

Let me take the second question first. How do I regard the office of the Vice Presidency—in the climate and context of right now, and in terms of the future. History isn't much help here, except recent history, through which we have all lived.

There are only three living Americans who have held this high office, and three weeks ago at the White House one of them told me he wanted me to take the job.

The first two telephone calls I got after that were from the two other former Vice Presidents. And for their generous good wishes I will always be grateful.

Events at home and abroad have moved so swiftly since that night that I have not had much time for scholarly homework on the duties of the Vice Presidency, or even to collect my own feelings at the sudden change in my own style of life.

My thoughts have been mixed—pride in the confidence which President Nixon has shown for me and deep satisfaction that apparently it is shared by hundreds of other old friends and colleagues, in the Congress, and throughout the country. I have felt a touch of sadness at the thought of leaving the House of Representatives which has been my home for nearly half my life.

I have also felt something like awe and astonishment at the magnitude of the new responsibilities I have been asked to assume. At the same time I have a new and invigorating sense of determination and purpose to do my best to meet them.

Perhaps the worst misgivings I have about the Vice Presidency are that such contacts with all kinds of people would be more difficult—and that my friends might stop calling me Jerry.

Not only has my public life been an open book but in the last three weeks my private life has been opened as well. Once I told the President I'd accept—I guess I told him as much—I made a firm decision, I decided to make available to this committee and to the House Committee on the Judiciary, without reservation except reliance on their good judgment, every record relating to my public service, my personal finances, my health and the health of my wife and children, and to respond as fully and accurately as possible to every reasonable inquiry.

I asked all public officials, Federal, state and local, and all persons or agencies that have custody of normally private records regarding me to make them fully and speedily available, including all of my campaign finances, office and personal bank accounts—even our children's savings accounts—my income tax records and confidential financial disclosure reports required by House rules, all correspondence of my Congressional office and the records of my, certified public accountant in Grand Rapids, including a statement of my net worth. It has been a monumental job, just locating and digging out the records I have, all in a very short time. I have answered every request unreservedly, and I want to give such answers because of the great importance of the present inquiry.

I believe you and the Congress and the American people must become fully satisfied that I am worthy of your trust and that I am fit to perform the duties of the Vice Presidency.

I am not a saint, and I'm sure I have done things I might have done better or differently or not at all. I have also left undone things that I should have done. But I believe and hope that I have been honest with myself and with others, that I have been faithful to my friends and fair to my opponents, and that I have tried my best to make this great government work for the good of all Americans.

President Eisenhower had a very simple rule—I have never heard of a better one for people in public office who have to make decisions: Get all the facts and all the good counsel you can, and then do what's best for America.

The constitutional duties of a Vice President are few, and his statutory duties while numerous do not really define his role. It is trite and cynical to sum it all up by saying the Vice President does whatever the President wants him to, and no more. I have a different idea, I hope a broader one. It is based on the uniqueness of my situation and, above all, on the greatest single need of our country today.

I realize, of course, that almost exactly a year ago President Nixon and Vice President Agnew were elected by majorities of the people in 49 of the 50 states. Not only that, but the President was running on his record of four years. He was re-elected by a massive majority who approved of his program and his policies as they had been tried and tested over that period. I fought hard for those programs in the Congress as Republican leader in the House. I defended them vigorously all over the country and on the campaign trail, and for that I have no apologies: If being for his President and for his party and for its candidates disqualified anyone from becoming Vice President, then we'll never have another Truman, Nixon, Johnson or Humphrey.

But while I feel a strong obligation to recognize the Presidential mandate of 1972, I am also very much mindful of the Congressional mandate on the same Election Day. The very same Americans who gave the Republican President a margin of 17,838,725 votes also gave the Senate a Democratic majority of 56 to 42, with one Independent and one Conservative and the House a Democratic majority of 243 to 192.

The Founding Fathers in 1787 never intended—and the American people in 1972 never intended—to paralyze

and cripple the Government in Washington. But responsible citizens and leaders in both parties are beginning to worry about our national Government becoming seriously weakened by partisan division.

I have served in one Republican Congress and a dozen Democratic Congresses. I have served during three Democratic and two Republican Presidencies. In the course of 25 years I've stood with the Congress when it was right and with the President when he was right, in my judgment, regardless of which party controlled the executive branch or the legislative branch of Government.

I know from first-hand experience that almost without exception the people in their wisdom send to Congress men and women who are reasonable, who prefer action to inaction, who are capable of compromise, who love their country and who are concerned for the future of the oldest representative republic on earth.

I know these men and women can work together because I have worked together with them the best years of my life.

So I come back to the first question: What makes you, Jerry Ford, qualified to be Vice President of the United States?

My answer is that I believe I can be a ready conciliator and calm communicator between the White House and Capitol Hill, between the re-election mandate of the Republican President and the equally emphatic mandate of the Democratic 93d Congress. I believe I can do this—not because I know much about the Vice Presidency—but because I know both the Congress of the United States and the President of the United States as well and as intimately as anybody who has known both for a quarter century.

I count most of the members of the Senate and of the House as my friends. They have been wonderfully kind and helpful during these hectic days of volunteering support and encouragement to me. The President of the United States has been my friend from the time he was a second-termer from California in the House and took time to make a freshman from Michigan feel welcome. He has always been truthful to me, as have my good friends in the Congress. I have never misled them even when they might have wanted to hear something gentler than the

truth. And if I change jobs that is the way I intend to continue.

Truth is the glue that holds government together, and not only government, but civilization itself.

So gentlemen, I readily promise to answer your questions truthfully I know you will not pull any punches—the American people will never forgive any of us if you do. Through my testimony it is my intention to replace misunderstanding with understanding and to substitute truth for untruths.

SENATOR HOWARD W. CANNON: It has been said that essentially you are a strict conservative, and that you represent a conservative district as a legislator from Grand Rapids. But the question has come to mind, would the entire country vote for you if they had a chance.

No '76 Race Planned

Now, I'm thinking that on previous occasions the nation rejected Senator Goldwater because perhaps they thought he was too conservative, and rejected Senator McGovern because possibly they thought he was too liberal. Even former Vice President Agnew did not become a strict conservative but rather was a moderate, in his public image preceding his election at least, and I wonder if you would care to comment on the question of your electability if you were to be confirmed, not by this committee, but by the vote of the people, and also do you think that some method should be devised for the people to vote on a vacancy in addition to the application of the 25th Amendment?

A. Mr. Chairman I first should reiterate a comment I've made many times since Oct. 12, that I have no intention of seeking any public office in 1976. So my observations in response to your question must be taken in that light.

I have been very successful, for which I'm happy and proud, in my district, on 13 occasions. I must differ with the interpretation as to the political attitudes of the Fifth Congressional District in Michigan.

It is in my opinion a moderate electorate. And my own views are not as conservative as might have been implied in that regard. I consider myself a moderate certainly on domestic affairs, conservative on fiscal affairs, but a very dyed-in-the-wool internationalist in foreign policy.

Now I think those moderate views, being an internationalist in foreign policy, a conservative in fiscal affairs and a moderate in general domestic matters, if I had ever had my name submitted, I might have done at least fairly well. I wouldn't forecast any victory, however.

Q. You didn't address yourself to the last part of the question. A. Oh, the last question, I'm sorry.

Q. Do you think we ought

to have some provision whereby the people of the country would have the opportunity to vote some way in connection with the 25th Amendment?

Separation of Power

A. Mr. Chairman, I don't think that's practical. In my judgment, the procedure set up under the 25th Amendment is a sound one. It does provide for immediate, or relatively immediate filling of the office of the Vice Presidency. It does give to the spokesmen of the American people in the 100 members of the Senate and the 435 members of the House, the opportunity to express the people's view on the person nominated by the President.

An election, I think, is unnecessary under the circumstances.

SENATOR MARLOW W. COOK: Congressman, as you know, there has been a great deal of controversy recently on the question of executive privilege and separation of power. Can you give the committee some idea of what your feelings are about providing the Congress or the courts information originating in the executive branch of government.

A. Let me make two comments. One, I don't think a President has unlimited authority in the area of executive privilege. On the other hand, which is just the opposite, I don't think the Congress or the public generally have unlimited right to the personal confidential conversations between a President and his advisers or any documents that go between a President and his advisers.

In other words, between the two extremes, it seems to me that we have to apply reasonable rules so that some confidentiality is maintained between the President and his advisers.

On the other hand, the Congress and the public have certain rights to have certain information.

There has been an effort in the House, and I suspect in the Senate as well. There have been some bills introduced to get one or more committees to draft some prescription or guidelines. No action has been taken but I think it might be well—it would be a lot easier for Presidents, for members of the Congress, and particularly for me if we had some definitive guidelines, but we don't.

So I think you really have to take each instance case-by-case, Senator, and judge what's actually in the best interest of the country. No. 1, should the President bend over backwards to cooperate, to make available documents, and if so, he ought to do it. On the other hand, if it's in the best interests of the country that the Congress shouldn't ask for certain documents, then I think they shouldn't ask.

And there are certain

documents involving national security, where perhaps the Congress should show some reservation. I wish I could give you a black or white answer, but the history of this country doesn't give us any precedents of that kind and I repeat I think it depends on the individual circumstances.

SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD: Now Mr. Ford, do you feel that executive privilege should be invoked by a chief executive, any chief executive, even though serious allegations of criminal conduct may have been made with respect to the Presidential office itself?

A. It seems to me in this situation the judgment would have to be what's in the best interest of the country. We certainly don't want any person who is a criminal to go free because of the refusal of any document to be made available to the proper authorities.

Q. Can you conceive of any justification for any President to invoke the doctrine of executive privilege to prevent the surrender of any documents, Presidential

papers, etc., that do not deal with foreign relations or national security, but which may have deep bearing upon the possible commission of serious felonies and which have been requested by a court through an order?

A. When the question is asked as I understand it, I think there should be cooperation by the chief executive.

Q. In other words, in your judgment the doctrine of executive privilege could not legitimately be invoked under those circumstances?

A. Where you have allegations—serious allegations—of criminality, where those documents have a material impact on the guilt or innocence of an individual, it seems to me that judgment, bearing in mind the best interest of the country, would be that they should be made available.

Concealment of Information

Q. Is it your opinion that concealment of information which may go to the commission of crimes is justified under any circumstances when invoked by a President?

A. I can't at this point fore-

see any. But that's a pretty broad statement. But at the moment I can't foresee any.

Q. Would not the concealment of such information constitute an obstruction of justice?

A. As I would understand the question and the determination: You have to make an honest determination as to what is actually obstructing justice. And that's not always a clear-cut question or a set of facts. But in the normal context I would say yes.

Q. You would say yes, that concealment of information which may bear upon the commission of crimes would constitute an obstruction of justice? A. Yes, I think under my interpretation.

Q. Can you conceive of any justification, Mr. Ford, for anyone, including a President of the United States, to disobey a final court order?

A. I would strongly say that any person, including the President, where a determination has been made by the highest court of the land, ought to obey the court order.

Q. Would you, Mr. Ford, if the high mantle of Presidential authority were bestowed upon you, invoke executive privilege to prevent the courts from seeing documents judicially ordered to be turned over to the courts?

The Proper Thing

A. Well I publicly stated several weeks or months ago that certain documents that have been widely publicized should be turned over to the courts or to a court as well as to a committee of the United States Senate. I said that would have been the proper thing politically to do. I have qualified it by saying that in my opinion there were serious legal and constitutional questions involved.

But if I had to weigh those two, the political public impact on the one hand and the legal or constitutional issues on the other I think my judgment would be to make them available and therefore I was pleased that the President has made available those tapes to the District Court here in the District of Columbia. That's the way I felt on the basis of the facts. It should have been handled.

Q. You think they should have been turned over? A. Right. That is correct, yes sir.

WASHINGTON POST
2 November 1973

Now the Russians Have a Word for It

MOSCOW, Nov. 1 (UPI)—The Soviet press coined a new Russian word today—"impichment"—and told its readers for the first time that it could happen to President Nixon.

Diplomatic observers saw the reference to possible impeachment, in the weekly New Times, as one more sign of Soviet displeasure with Mr.

Nixon, which erupted last week when the President alerted U.S. troops.

The New Times recalled the firing of Watergate special prosecutor Archibald Cox and the resignation of Attorney General Elliott Richardson and said that Democrats in Congress were considering the possibility of "impichment," a word not in any standard Russian dictionary.

The article avoided any direct criticism of the President.

NEW YORK TIMES
13 November 1973

Text of President Nixon's Statement on Status of Evidence in Watergate Case

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 12—Following is the text of President Nixon's statement issued by the White House today on the status of the evidence in the Watergate case:

As a consequence of the public disclosure, two weeks ago, that two conversations of the President were not recorded on the White House recording system, doubts have arisen about just what happened to these conversations and why they were not recorded. The purpose of this statement is to help dispel those doubts and to spell out certain steps I will take to offer information to the court that will help determine the substance of all nine conversations subpoenaed by the court.

First, there are no missing tapes. There are two conversations requested by the courts which were not recorded. The first is a four-minute conversation with the former Attorney General, John Mitchell, on June 20, 1972. The second is a meeting of 55 minutes with John Dean, late in the evening of Sunday, April 15, 1973.

There is no question in my mind but that the open court hearing, now being conducted, will demonstrate to the court's satisfaction the truth of our statements that these two conversations were never recorded. In fact there is no affirmative evidence to the contrary. I believe that when the court concludes its evaluation of the testimony and documentary evidence, public doubt on this issue will be completely and satisfactorily removed.

In the meantime, I believe it important to make a statement about this proceeding so that misconceptions about this matter do not persist simply because certain basic facts are not presented to the American public.

Prosecutor and Court

First, the Senate select committee did not subpoena the substance of the two unrecorded conversations. That material was requested only by the special prosecutor, and the court, who believed the substance of nine Presidential conversations was necessary for completion of the Watergate investigation.

We are complying fully with the Federal court decision. In seven of nine instances, the actual recording of the conversation is being submitted; this includes 5 conversations in which John Dean participated—September 15, 1972, March 13, 1973, two on March 21, 1973, one on March 22, 1973. For all nine conversations covered by the subpoena, such contemporaneous notes and

memoranda as were made of the conversations are being provided in accordance with the court order.

Before discussing these matters, the issue of when and why the recorded conversations were listened to by me, and by others on my behalf, should be placed in chronological perspective.

On June 4, 1973, I listened to the tape recordings of a number of conversations I had with John Dean in order to refresh my memory of those discussions. All of the conversations to which I listened that day had taken place prior to March 21, 1973. My purpose in reviewing the recordings of my conversations with Mr. Dean was to confirm my recollection that he had not reported certain facts to me prior to March 21, 1973. In late April, 1973, I asked H. R. Halde- man to listen and report on the conversation of March 21, 1973, in which he had been present for a substantial portion of time. My primary purpose in having Mr. Halde- man listen to this tape was to confirm my recollection that March 21, 1973, was the date on which John Dean had first reported certain facts to me.

The Precise Truth

There had been rumors and reports to the contrary—one of them suggesting that John Dean and I had met 30 or 40 times to discuss Watergate—and I wanted to refresh my recollection as to what was the precise and entire truth.

On September 29, 1973, I began a review of the tape recordings subpoenaed by the special prosecutor for the grand jury and by the Senate select committee. The reason was it had been my deliberate intention to litigate the matter up to the Supreme Court, if necessary, to protect the right of confidentiality and the related principle of separation of powers. By late September, however, I had come to the conclusion that the national interest would be better served by a reasonable compromise.

Thus, in late September, I began to consider various approaches which led to what has come to be known as the "Stennis Compromise" . . . turning over to both the Senate committee and the court the full substance of the relevant recorded conversations, leaving the verification of the precision and accuracy of that substance to Senate, Stennis. That compromise offer, accepted by the Senate committee chairman and vice chairman, proved unacceptable to the special prosecutor.

It was during this process that I first became aware of the possibility that two of the 10 conversations in ques-

tion had not been recorded.

A Search Was Ordered

I proceeded with a review of the eight recorded conversations and subsequently ordered a further search for recordings of the two conversations in question and an investigation into the circumstances which caused the conversations not to be recorded. The search and investigation were not finally completed until Oct. 27.

One of the conversations for which no recording could be found was a four-minute telephone call I made to John Mitchell on the evening of June 20, 1972. The only telephone calls which were recorded in the residence of the White House were those made in the Lincoln Sitting Room which I use as an office. Telephone conversations in the family quarters have never been recorded during this Administration. The telephone call with John Mitchell was one that I made on the telephone in the family quarters just before going in to dinner and consequently it was not recorded.

My conversation with John Dean on Sunday evening, April 15, 1973, was not recorded because the tape on the recording machine for my Executive Office Building office was used up and ran out earlier in the day. The tape which was on the operating recorder on Sunday, April 15, 1973, contains recordings of the conversations in my Executive Office Building office on Saturday, April 14, 1973. It also contains a portion of the first conversation I had in that office on Sunday, April 15, 1973, which was with Attorney General Kleindienst. During that conversation the tape ran out.

Normally, I see very few people in my Executive Office Building office on the weekends. However, on the weekend of April 14 and 15, the activity in my Executive Office Building office was unusual and unanticipated. Certain reports made to me by my staff early in the morning of April 14, 1973, led me to have lengthy discussions with staff members during the day in my office in the Executive Office Building. In addition, international developments required a lengthy meeting with my assistant for national security affairs late that morning.

On Sunday, April 15, 1973, I began another series of meetings in my Executive Office Building office at about one o'clock, P.M. The first meeting was with Attorney General Kleindienst. Thereafter the meetings continued until late in the evening with the exception of a break of about two hours for dinner. I did not meet with John Dean until approximately

nine o'clock that evening. Since the tape on the recorder for my Executive Office Building office had run out during my afternoon meeting with Attorney General Kleindienst, the Dean meeting was not recorded.

It should be pointed out that the court order calls for evidentiary materials such as notes and memoranda in addition to recordings of specified conversations. The court order spells out a detailed procedure for turning materials over for Judge Sirica's private review. In recent days, in an effort to locate materials for the court, a diligent search has been made for materials that might shed further light on the substance including the unrecorded conversations with John Mitchell on June 20, 1972, and with John Dean, on the evening of April 15.

Personal Diary File

Since I have been in office, I have maintained a personal diary file which consists of notes which I have personally taken during meetings and of record recollections. The dictation belts and notes are placed in my personal diary file by my secretary. They are sealed under specific instructions that they may not be transcribed.

In the course of searching my personal diary files, I have located a dictation belt that I dictated at 8:30 P.M. on June 20, 1972, on which, among other activities of the day, I referred to a telephone call with John Mitchell. The portion of the belt relating to the conversation with John Mitchell will be submitted to the court.

We have also located the dictation belt of my recollections of the conversations in question for March 21, 1973, and the relevant portions of these recollections together with the actual recordings of the conversations, of course, will also be submitted to the court in compliance with its order.

Over the weekend of Nov. 4 and 5, 1973, upon checking by personal diary file for April 15, 1973, to locate information to be produced in accordance with the court's order, I found that my file for that day consists of personal notes of the conversation held with John Dean the evening of April 15, 1973, but not a dictation belt. My original handwritten notes, made during my meeting with John Dean on the evening of April 15, 1973, will be submitted to the court.

On June 11, 1973, the special prosecutor requested a tape of a conversation I had with John Dean on April 15, 1973, (which I had previously offered to let Assistant

Attorney General Petersen hear).

As has been pointed out, my personal diary file consists of notes of conversations and dictation belts of recollections, and I believed in June that I had dictated my recollections of April 15, 1973, of conversations which occurred on that day. The response to the special prosecutor made on June 16, 1973, referred to such a dictation belt. At that time, however, I did not review my file to confirm that it contained the belt.

I have made a diligent search for other evidentiary materials that might shed light on the substance of my conversation with John Dean on the evening of April 15, 1973. Other than my contemporaneous notes of that meeting mentioned above, I have found no such evidence. However, I did meet with John Dean on Monday, April 16, 1973, on two occasions.

The first was in the morning in the Oval Office; the second was in the afternoon in the Executive Office Building office. This was my final meeting with Mr. Dean before he left the White House staff. Both of these conversations were recorded on the White House recording system. I recently reviewed the recordings of these conversations. A comparison of my notes of the April 15, 1973, meeting and the recording of the conversation with Mr. Dean on the morning of April 16, 1973, shows both conversations covered much the same subject matter. There are references throughout the conversation on the morning of April 16 to the conversation held the evening before.

I shall voluntarily submit to the court, under the procedures applicable to recordings of conversations already covered by the court order, these recordings of my two

conversations with John Dean on April 16, 1973.

Materials Listed

In addition, as stated above and consistent with the court order, the court will be provided with:

- (1) The portion of the dictation belt containing my recollection of the June 20, 1972 conversation with Mr. Mitchell.
 - (2) The portion of the dictation belt of my recollections of the meetings with Mr. Dean on March 21, 1973.
 - (3) Contemporaneous notes from the April 15, 1973 conversation with Mr. Dean.
 - (4) All other materials covered by the court order.
- I have also authorized my counsel to make available to the court certain tape recordings not covered by the court order to assist the court in verifying that the two conversations in question were not recorded. The additional

tape recordings to be provided are (a) the full reel of telephone recordings covering the period of June 20, 1972, and (b) the two reels of tape which were on the recorders for my Executive Office Building office on April 15, 1973. This will permit the court to check the sequence of the conversations against my daily logs of meetings and telephone conversations already provided to the court, and thus further demonstrate that the Mitchell and Dean conversations in question were not recorded.

I have also agreed that a group of court-approved independent experts employing the most advanced technological methods shall examine all tapes in question for any evidence of alterations to the tapes.

It is my hope that these steps will clear up this aspect of the Watergate matter once and for all.

NEW YORK TIMES

8 November 1973

Excerpts From the Statement by Aiken

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 7—

Following are excerpts from a statement made in the Senate today by Senator George D. Aiken, Republican of Vermont:

Ever since last March, when the series of events, real and imagined, wrapped up in the word "Watergate" began to dominate our public life, I have issued no prepared statements on this subject.

I have not spoken out because, in company with millions of others, I haven't discovered an easy way of escaping our present predicament. I don't want to contribute in any way to the destruction of the third Presidency in a row.

Poisoning the Wells

At the same time, the White House has handled its domestic troubles with such relentless incompetence that those of us who would like to help have been like swimmers searching for a way out of the water only to run into one smooth and slippery rock after another.

I am speaking out now because the developing hue and cry for the President's resignation suggests to me a veritable epidemic of emotionalism. It suggests that many prominent Americans, who ought to know better, find the task of holding the President accountable as just

too difficult.

Those who call for the President's resignation on the ground that he has lost their confidence risk poisoning the wells of politics for years to come.

A 'Ridiculous Position'

Within less than 10 years, we have seen one Presidency destroyed by an assassin's bullet; another by a bitter and devious war. To destroy the third in a row through the politics of righteous indignation cannot possibly restore confidence either at home or abroad.

The men who wrote our Constitution were fully aware how waves of emotionalism, if given an easy electoral outlet, could reduce any political system to anarchy. That's why in a nation governed by its laws they provided that Presidents should rule for four years.

They laid down that that period of rule could be interrupted only after Congress had framed a charge of high crimes and misdemeanors and had conducted a trial itself based on those charges. To ask the President now to resign and thus relieve the Congress of its clear Congressional duty amounts to a declaration of incompetence on the part of the Congress.

If I read correctly the signals sent out by the judicial branch of government, they are also saying that Congress

is the place where this crisis must be resolved.

The desperate search for a special prosecutor, with the virtues of Caesar's wife and the unfettered authority of her husband, only represents another effort to escape responsibility.

It makes no sense to me to ask the President to prosecute himself, yet any special prosecutor in the Justice Department will find himself in that ridiculous position.

Nor does it make sense to me for the Congress to ask the judicial branch to create a special prosecutor.

Of course, if the President resigns, we will be relieved of our duty. But I fail to see any great act of patriotism in such a drama. On the contrary, it is the President's duty to his country not to resign.

The President's public explanations of the Watergate mess have been astonishingly inept. But this is not of itself an impeachable offense, nor does it suggest that the President be scolded, publicly, in the presence of a Congressional committee.

It is the clear duty of the House, through whatever procedures it chooses, to frame a charge of impeachment and to set itself a deadline for the task. If a charge is framed and voted, the Senate's clear duty is to proceed in a trial with all delib-

erate speed.

Since I would be a juror in such a trial, I intend to say nothing in advance about any possible indictment or any possible verdict.

Righteous Indignation

Politicians I have known are no greater or less sinners than the average person listed in the telephone book. What bothers me much more are those who now would have us believe that President Nixon and his associates alone are the ones who corrupted America.

If the politics of righteous indignation succeeds in persuading the President to resign and relieving the Congress of its clear duty, how long will it be before our politics is corrupted by competitive self-righteousness?

I have spoken before of the dangers of moral aggression in foreign policy. That danger is clear and present now that the feuding families of the Middle East are at war again.

Only a fool would preach the politics of righteous indignation in the face of this grave tragedy.

Moral aggression here at home is hardly less dangerous than moral aggression in the Middle East.

May I now pass on to this Congress advice which I received from a fellow Vermonter — "Either impeach him or get off his back."

NEW YORK TIMES

15 November 1973

NIXON SEES PERIL TO NATION IN CALL FOR HIS REMOVAL

Said to Caution 75 in House
Country Will Lose 'if You
Cut Legs Off President'

By JAMES M. NAUGHTON

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 14 — President Nixon, cautioning against demands for his resignation or impeachment reportedly told Republican members of Congress today, "If you cut the legs off the President, America is going to lose."

In a new round of White House meetings intended to help to restore his public acceptance—which a new Gallup Poll reported had leveled off at 27 per cent approval of his official conduct—Mr. Nixon was said to have warned that United States allies might consider "leaning toward" the Soviet Union if domestic issues diminished the authority of the Presidency.

Mr. Nixon told 75 House Republicans this morning that he would not block any attempts by Leon Jaworski, the new Watergate special prosecutor, to go to court to obtain White House evidence. But he said that court action would be unlikely, because Mr. Jaworski "should have everything, and when he asks for it, he will get it."

Charges Are Disputed

Mr. Nixon specifically disputed charges that his Administration had abandoned antitrust action against the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation and that he had raised milk price supports in exchange for 1972 Presidential campaign contributions.

Moreover, he reportedly challenged suggestions that his estates in Key Biscayne, Fla., and San Clemente, Calif., had been improperly financed, and that he had secretly assembled a \$1-million fund. According to Representative Alphonzo Bell of California, the President said:

"If I wanted to make money, I would not be in this business. If I wanted to cheat, I wouldn't do it here."

Mr. Nixon, who began a series of meetings with members of Congress last Friday, met with 75 House Republicans this morning over corned beef hash and eggs in the State

Dining Room. Later today, he held a second meeting with Republican members of the Senate. The sessions are scheduled to continue tomorrow, when some 50 conservative House Democrats will be asked to participate.

The White House also announced that the President would address the National Association of Real Estate Boards here tomorrow, and Gov. Winfield Dunn, Republican of Tennessee, said that Mr. Nixon would meet privately with members of the Republican Governors Conference next Tuesday in Memphis.

According to Republicans who met with Mr. Nixon today—some of whom took notes on the dialogue—the President also made the following points:

¶The White House tape recordings of Mr. Nixon's Watergate conversations are being examined by officials of the National Security Agency to verify that they have not been altered, and the agency's report will be submitted to United States District Judge John J. Sirica.

¶Mr. Nixon is confident that documents and recordings will prove that John W. Dean 3d, the former White House legal counsel, erred in testifying to the Senate Watergate committee that the President was aware of the Watergate cover-up well before March 21.

"I'm not saying John Dean is a liar," Mr. Nixon was quoted as saying, "I'm just saying he's mistaken."

¶The President is seriously considering submitting to a televised interrogation by three senior network newsmen and, while ruling out even an informal meeting with the Senate Watergate committee because of the "predisposition" of some of its members to disbelieve him, he may meet soon with the Democratic chairman, Senator Sam J. Ervin Jr. of North Carolina, and the Republican vice chairman, Senator Howard H. Baker Jr. of Tennessee.

Suggestion Is Rejected

Mr. Nixon was said to have rejected this morning a suggestion from one House member that he offer an explanation for the Watergate-related scandals to a joint session of Congress.


Mr. Bell and Representative Marvin L. Esch of Michigan reported that the President had explained jokingly, "The Democrats would probably say 'The son of a bitch is lying,' and the Republicans would probably say, 'Well, he's lying, but he's our son of a bitch.'"

The earthy, occasionally humorous and direct manner of Mr. Nixon at his meeting this morning was cited by some of the House Republicans as an indication that the President had overcome the worst of the Watergate crisis.

Representative Albert H. Quie of Minnesota said that Mr. Nixon's answers were "satisfactory," and Representative Hamilton Fish Jr. of upstate New York said that the House members had cheered when Mr.

President Nixon's Popularity as Measured by the Gallup Poll

Question: Do you approve of the way Nixon is handling his job as President?



The New York Times/Nov. 15, 1973

Nixon said that he would not resign.

"If he's besieged, he surely didn't look like it," said Representative John M. Ashbrook of Ohio.

But Mr. Ashbrook and a number of his colleagues said that they were still not prepared to hail the President's decision to make a full disclosure of White House conduct in The Watergate affair.

"The content of the meeting boiled down to 'Believe us or believe them,'" Mr. Ashbrook said, "Some of us don't believe that's a good posture to go to the public with."

Conte of Massachusetts summed up his attitude this way:

"The President said he was going to make chapter and verse public. I'm reserving judgment until I find out what the chapter and verse are."

At least one House Republican, John Dellenback of Oregon, said that he had not been dissuaded from seeking a swift decision by the House Judiciary Committee on whether there were grounds for impeaching Mr. Nixon. He said that the meeting he attended this morning had "heightened" his impression that there was a "clear conflict" between the charges made against Mr. Nixon and the President's explanations.

Although Mr. Nixon took only about a dozen questions during the breakfast with House members this morning, he was said to have gone into considerably more detail in his answers than he did at the first such meeting, with Senate Republicans, last night.

Representative Mark Andrews of North Dakota asked the President why he had waited until now to provide a White House rebuttal to charges against him, and why he had not volunteered all his information to Archibald Cox, the Special prosecutor dismissed last month at Mr. Nixon's direction. Mr. Nixon reportedly replied

that he had turned over a good deal of material to Mr. Cox, but that the former special prosecutor had appeared intent on "a fishing expedition" into matters beyond his jurisdiction.

The President also explained his decision last year to raise Federal milk price supports by saying that Democrats in Congress had "put the gun to my head" to do so. He said that he had been warned by Representative Wilbur D. Mills, Democrat of Arkansas, and others that Congress wanted the support levels increased, so he had sought to avoid an even larger increase by taking action himself.

Mr. Nixon was quoted as saying that his action had had nothing to do with a pledge by milk producers to contribute \$2-million to his re-election campaign.

According to several accounts of Mr. Nixon's morning meeting, he said that he had been unaware of a pledge by officials of I.T.T. to provide up to \$400,000 to underwrite the 1972 Republican National Convention when he intervened in a Justice Department antitrust action against the conglomerate.

He said that he had telephoned Richard G. Kleindienst, then the Deputy Attorney General, to complain angrily about a Government appeal in the I.T.T. case because he had discussed with the Cabinet only a few days earlier his decision on a general basis not to oppose bigness per se in American corporations.

Mr. Nixon said that he had believed United States businesses would suffer if giant competitors in other nations—particularly Japan, the Soviet Union and nations of Western Europe in which governments subsidized some industry—were given an edge.

He said that former Attorney General John N. Mitchell had warned that it might appear improper to block the action against I.T.T., so Mr. Nixon had relented and permitted the appeal to be filed.

In response to questions about his personal finances, Mr. Nixon said that his net worth was about \$46,000 in 1960, when he lost his first bid for the Presidency, and that after he had earned more than \$300,000 yearly as a lawyer in New York, his net worth in 1968 was roughly \$800,000.

Survey on Credibility

The Gallup Poll reports issued today appeared to certify that Mr. Nixon's credibility had fallen to 27 per cent of the public. The Gallup organization said that a survey of 1,550 adults from Nov. 2 to 5 showed that 63 per cent disapproved of Mr. Nixon's conduct in office, and 10 per cent had no opinion. The figures were nearly the same as in a survey taken from Oct. 19 to 22.

In the latest opinion sample, the Gallup pollsters asked voters how strongly they ap-

WASHINGTON POST
16 November 1973

Nixon Hailed By Realtors On '73 Gains

By Carroll Kilpatrick
Washington Post Staff Writer

President Nixon told a cheering audience of realtors yesterday that he has "not violated his trust" and is proud of many accomplishments at home and abroad this year.

Some 3,000 members of the National Association of Realtors gave him a standing ovation when he defended his Watergate role.

He was frequently interrupted by applause from the sympathetic audience that packed a ballroom at the Sheraton Park Hotel.

The speech was the first of four the President has scheduled in the next few days in the wake of a week-long series of meetings with all House and Senate Republicans and with selected Democrats to answer Watergate questions.

While he had been expected to deal more explicitly in his speech with charges of scandal, he devoted only about a minute to the issue in his half-hour address and broke no new ground.

Mr. Nixon has scheduled a televised question-and-answer session with Associated Press managing editors in Orlando, Fla., Saturday evening when he will have an opportunity to produce evidence in his defense. The exact time has not been announced.

He will speak Sunday in Macon, Ga., at observances of the 100th anniversary of the Walter F. George School of Law at Mercer University and the 90th birthday of former Rep. Carl M. Vinson, onetime chairman of the House Armed Services Committee.

On Tuesday, the President will meet with Republican governors in Memphis, Tenn., then return to Washington for the remainder of the Thanksgiving week.

In his speech, the President announced that he would sign the trans-Alaska oil pipeline bill even though it contains provisions he will ask Congress to change manuscript with the deleted later. The bill signing is to portions actually cut out of the take place today.

Later in the day, Mr. Nixon will fly to Key Biscayne, Fla., to prepare for his three public meetings.

The White House said that the President's plane, which normally flies at 525 miles per hour, will reduce speed to 475 miles per hour. This will cut fuel consumption from 2,200 gallons per hour to 2,000 gallons, deputy press secretary Gerald L. Warren said. The flight to Key Biscayne takes about two hours.

Warren said that the fuel the President saves by flying slower will be like a "teaspoon out of Lake Michigan."

However, "if everyone reduces speeds and takes conservation seriously it won't go dry," Warren said.

Because the White House had said the President intended to meet Watergate charges "head-on" and because he apparently has convinced many congressmen that he is on the offensive, there had been much speculation about what the President would tell the realtors.

However, it was mainly a campaign-type review of the year's events, with little attention to charges of scandal, and an emphasis on the energy crisis. The President repeated his earlier declaration that he has no intention of resigning.

Emphasizing his devotion to working for peace, building a strong economy and fighting inflation, he said: "I am not going to walk away until I get that job done."

In his reference to Watergate and other campaign

abuses, the President blamed the mistakes on "overzealous" associates.

They made "mistakes that I never approved of, mistakes that I would never have tolerated, but mistakes for which I will have to take responsibility," he said.

However, he said that he would not resign regardless of what "some of my good-intentioned friends"—an apparent reference to Republican critics—and "honest opponents"—apparently Democrats—might say.

In a reference to criticisms about his personal finances, Mr. Nixon said, "All I own in the world is in real estate." In 1968, he said, he sold what stocks he owned and his New York apartment and bought the homes he now owns in California and Florida.

The President emphasized his reluctance to impose gasoline rationing when he urged "cooperation voluntarily" in conserving energy.

If "everybody sacrifices a little . . . no one then will have to suffer at all," he said.

Ticking off what he called "major accomplishments" of the year, the President said the Middle East cease-fire has laid the basis for negotiations to build a permanent peace "in this troubled spot of the world."

He said that Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger's visit this week to Peking was more successful than earlier ones and "went very well considering the state of our relationships."

On the domestic front, Mr. Nixon claimed the lowest level of unemployment in peacetime in 18 years.

The energy shortage, however, was serious before the Arab cutoff that followed last month's fighting, he said, and now it has reached "a crisis as a result of the Mideast."

Even should the cutoff be ended, "we have already lost six weeks of oil from the Mideast," he said.

The nation must find a way to make coal a cleaner fuel and it must de-regulate the price of natural gas in order to encourage more production, the President argued.

"It doesn't make any sense to keep the gas in the ground at a time that people in New England are going around cold," he said.

proved or disapproved of Mr. Nixon's performance. The survey showed that among the 2 per cent approving, 15 per cent expressed strong approval and 12 per cent "mild" approval.

Among the 63 per cent who took issue with Mr. Nixon's conduct, 19 per cent said their disapproval was "mild" and 44 per cent characterized it as "strong."

THE LONDON TIMES
1 NOV 1973

Legal action to stop censorship by CIA

From Peter Strafford
New York, Oct 31

Legal action has been taken in New York against an attempt to censor a forthcoming book about the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The suit has been filed by Alfred A. Knopf, the publishers, and claims that the censorship constitutes prior restraint on the freedom of speech and of the press.

Knopf's lawyers draw a parallel with the case of the Pentagon Papers, when the Federal Government tried and failed to prevent press publication of the documents, which deal with American involvement in Vietnam. As in that case, Knopf is trying to overturn a court injunction against publication.

The book, which has been given the title of *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence*, was written by Mr. Victor Marchetti, a former employee of the agency, and Mr. John Marks, a former official in the State Department. Last March, in a court order, Mr. Marchetti was forbidden to disclose any classified information not in the public domain, and to submit all information on the CIA to the agency before publication.

Since then, he has complied with that order, and the CIA has insisted on the removal of 225 sections of the book, amounting to about 10 per cent of its contents. It is to this demand by the CIA that Knopf is objecting.

"By their act of censorship," according to the suit filed yesterday, "defendants have substantially impaired and invaded the right of plaintiffs to publish the book, *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence*, and have deprived the public of the right to receive vital information regarding the conduct of the Government."

Mr. Robert Bernstein, the president of Random House, of which Knopf is a subsidiary, commented: "It was an incredible thing to receive from the Government a censored manuscript with the deleted later. The bill signing is to portions actually cut out of the book with scissors."

WASHINGTON POST

6 NOV 1973

Jaworski Takes Oath of Office as New Prosecutor

By William Claiborne
Washington Post Staff Writer

Leon Jaworski was sworn in as Watergate special prosecutor yesterday, moving from 42 years' experience in the board rooms of some of the nation's most powerful corporations into a \$33,000-a-year job that he described as the most important in his life.

In Texas business and politics, long friendships and the fierce loyalty of "good old boys" are enduring qualities, so it was not surprising that the man Jaworski selected to administer the oath of office was U.S. Court of Claims Judge Byron G. Skelton.

Jaworski and Skelton attended Baylor University in the 1920s and grew up together in the Texas Democratic politics of Lyndon B. Johnson and John B. Connally.

In a crowded ceremonial courtroom of the Court of Claims yesterday, Jaworski held a tattered Bible loaned by the judge, and said, "I have a feeling that in the days to come I will need it more than I've ever needed a Bible before."

Jaworski vowed to conduct his investigation independently of the White House and then left the courtroom to meet with the investigating staff left over by fired Watergate Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox. He said he planned to meet with Cox as soon as it could be arranged.

Jaworski could not be reached after the staff meeting, but James Doyle, spokesman for the special prosecutor's office, said last night that Jaworski told the investigators "he was not precluded from taking any action against the President he deems necessary, and that he had the right to move immediately if he chose."

Jaworski, according to Doyle, said he had no plans to make staff changes, and asked their help in an "awesome and gigantic task."

Legal and business associates of Jaworski in Houston, Austin and Dallas described Jaworski in telephone interviews as a brilliant and aggressive trial lawyer who has an intense reverence for the rule of law.

But the same associates also pictured the new prosecutor as a loyalist of the corporate establishment whose consummate skill is in smoothing antagonisms and settling controversies out of court in an unsensational, businesslike manner.

If there is a conflict between Jaworski's background and his new duties of prosecuting any misdeeds of the Nixon administration, the associates said, it will be a highly personal one, based, for the most part, on his long association with the fraternity of wealthy businessmen and powerful politicians.

For his part, Jaworski has taken what he regards as the first step in divorcing himself from associations that could give the appearance of conflict.

He has resigned as head of the Houston law firm of Fulbright, Crooker and Jaworski, which with 120 attorneys is the fourth biggest law firm in the nation.

He has also resigned as a director of the Bank of the Southwest, an institution with assets of more than \$1 billion; Anderson Clayton & Co., a food processing firm; Gulf Publishing Co. of Houston; Houston Intercontinental National Bank; Village National Bank of Houston, and Coastal States Gas Co.

In announcing the resignations on Thursday, Jaworski said, "There actually is very little chance of conflict of interest because of the narrow scope of the (Watergate) matter. ... Nothing involves any of our clients or could possibly involve any of our clients."

Coastal States Gas Co., however, was a defendant in an antitrust suit brought by

the government last June, charging that the firm entered into an agreement with Texaco, Inc., that illegally restrained the sale of gasoline to independent distributors.

The civil suit filed by the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department was the first federal action against an oil company resulting from the gasoline supply controversy of the energy crisis. Still pending, it asks that contracts between the two firms be set aside.

Jaworski was a board member of Coastal States and he owns 200 shares of the firm's stock, which he said he plans to sell. The firm of Fulbright, Crooker and Jaworski is listed as one of the defense counsels of Coastal States.

It was learned yesterday that Jaworski also was the trustee of a Houston foundation with close ties to the business community, and that in that capacity he approved in 1958 the use of the foundation as a conduit for about \$700,000 in covert Central Intelligence Agency contributions to a New York City legal foundation.

As trustee of the M.D. Anderson Foundation, Jaworski approved a CIA request that the money be passed along to the American Fund for Free Jurists, Inc., apparently without that organization's knowledge.

The president of the Anderson Foundation, John H. Freeman, a partner in Jaworski's law firm, yesterday confirmed the link between the CIA and the foundation, saying that he briefed Jaworski and other trustees on the arrangement in a meeting in 1958.

"This man from the CIA, whose credentials we examined, said that what we were doing was approved by the government. Where the money originated from, I don't know for sure, but I've got my idea that it came somewhere from the government," Freeman said.

The trustees of the Anderson Foundation, which owned major blocks of stock in the Bank of the Southwest and Anderson Clayton & Co., regarded the jurists' organization as "a patriotic organization headed by men known to us," Freeman said.

The main function of the jurists' organization was to raise money for the International Commission of Jurists of Geneva, a group of 31 legal scholars from non-Communist countries. The latter group promulgated the belief "that lawyers and jurists in the Free World should be as independent as they could of government influence," Freeman said.

It was disclosed in 1967 that the Anderson Foundation and a number of other organizations—including the National Students Association—received covert CIA funds or were used as conduits to funnel money to other groups.

Freeman said the money his organization received did not come directly from the CIA, but was sent through a number of other foundations.

He said Jaworski was informed of the CIA arrangement, but added, "I doubt if he knew too many of the details. The contacts with the CIA and the jurists were with me."

Jaworski said last night that he remembers contributions being funneled through the foundation to the jurists' group, but does not recall any CIA involvement.

He said that he "never acted directly or indirectly as a conduit for CIA funds used for any purposes," and added that he plans to remain as a director of the Anderson Foundation, "which is a charitable trust used to support medical research at Baylor University."

NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, NOVEMBER 12, 1973

Lawyers Cast Doubt on Admissibility of the Watergate Tapes

By WARREN WEAVER Jr.
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 11—Federal court hearings on the secret White House tapes have raised serious doubt among legal authorities that many of the tapes will ever be usable as evidence in Watergate criminal trials.

The fact-finding sessions before Judge John J. Sirica, which go into their third week tomorrow, have failed thus far to establish whether two conversations between President Nixon and aides went inadvertently unrecorded, as the White House insists, or were conveniently mislaid, as the Watergate prosecutors have suggested but not openly charged.

What the hearings have established is that the security system under which the tapes were kept, both by the Secret Service and the President's top deputies, was so haphazard and the custody records so uncertain that the recordings may have lost much of their potential evidential value.

'Opportunity to Edit'

"No judge is going to let one of those tapes go into evidence," one lawyer familiar with the case predicted, "when

there has been so much opportunity over the past few months to edit them into very different kinds of conversations."

If this analysis of the legal situation proves correct, the principal beneficiaries are likely to be former White House and administration officials charged with involvement in the Watergate cover-up and related events.

To the extent that the tapes ultimately are found to contain incriminating conversations, prosecutors in the resulting criminal trials may not be able to introduce them into evidence because sworn testimony before Judge Sirica during the last two weeks had cast serious doubt on their reliability.

This does not mean, however, that the Watergate grand jury cannot base criminal indictments on information in the tapes. The jury, guided by the special Watergate prosecution force, can issue formal accusations that rely on evidence too sketchy to meet the formal admissibility requirements of a trial.

White House Action

Under an order originally issued by Judge Sirica and affirmed with some modifications by the United States Court of Appeals, the White House was

required to surrender nine of the tapes to the judge, who will screen them for relevant evidence and pass it on to the grand jury.

When White House lawyers revealed for the first time two weeks ago that they could not produce two of these conversations because they had allegedly never been recorded, Judge Sirica ordered fact-finding hearings on the matter.

Throughout the hearings, the judge has maintained that one of the court's major purposes was the establishing of a "chain of custody" for each of the tapes that are legally under the court's jurisdiction, although they have not yet been delivered by the White House.

On the basis of testimony so far, that chain is going to be difficult to forge. For example, H. R. Haldeman, the former White House chief of staff, testified last week that he had withdrawn some tapes from the Executive Office Building vault last July 10 and more the following day.

All these tapes were left in a briefcase in the study closet of Mr. Haldeman's former Georgetown home for one or two nights, otherwise unguarded. The house was empty, except for Mr. Haldeman because the family to which he had rented it after his resigna-

tion from the Nixon staff was out of town.

During this same period, when the Secret Service had custody of the recordings, they were kept in combination-secured filing cabinets in a secret, locked room in the Executive Office Building, with an automatic alarm system and a record of who withdrew them and when.

But that record indicated only that the two sets of tapes went to Stephen V. Bull, a Presidential assistant, and made no mention of Mr. Haldeman, obviously leaving open the possibility that an unknown number of other persons had access to them.

The Secret Service log shows that three tapes withdrawn on July 10 were returned on July 12, but the notes on which that log was based show no return date at all. The notes, introduced in evidence at the hearing, consist of writing on scraps of paper, including one that appears to have been part of a brown paper lunch bag.

Mr. Haldeman testified that he returned on April 27 another batch of 22 tapes he had withdrawn the day before. But the Secret Service log shows that the recordings did not go back into the vault until May 22, and there is no evidence where they were in the interim.

WASHINGTON POST
13 November 1973

Jaworski Makes 1st Argument

National Security Claim Hit

United Press International

Leon A. Jaworski, in his first major legal argument since taking office as Watergate special prosecutor, said yesterday that "not even the highest office in the land" has the authority to break the law in the name of national security.

"In the recent past, national security has become a kind of talisman, invoked by officials at widely disparate levels of government service to justify a wide range of apparently illegal activities," Jaworski said.

His views were contained in a lengthy brief filed at U.S. District Court opposing a motion by Egil Krogh Jr. for dismissal of a two-count indictment on charges of lying to the Watergate grand jury.

Krogh, former co-director of the White House "plumbers" unit, had argued in seeking dismissal of the charges that he was not completely truthful in his testimony because proper answers would have disclosed information that had

been classified by President Nixon himself.

"Most frequently the claim has been made that the national security justifies warrantless wiretapping of domestic subversives, a claim that the Supreme Court has decisively rejected," Jaworski said.

"Recently, however, the debate over what may be done in the name of 'national security' has taken a more ambitious turn. It has been advanced by low-level personnel to justify an illegal break-in for the installation of microphones in the offices of the Democratic National Committee."

And, he said, former key Nixon aide John D. Ehrlichman advanced the claim in Senate testimony as a "legal umbrella" for the burglary of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office.

"Now it seems that defendant [Krogh] will claim that national security justifies lying under oath in a judicial proceeding," Jaworski said.

"While the claim of nation-

al security gives these claims of legalized burglary and perjury a deceptively compelling ring, ultimately they rest on a wholesale rejection of the rule of law and espouse a doctrine that government officials may ignore the requirements of positive criminal statutes when they feel the circumstances dictate.

"No government office, not even the highest office in the land, carries with it the right to ignore the law's command, any more than the orders of a superior can be used by government officers to justify illegal behavior."

He suggested that in Krogh's case, "political and personal self-preservation, rather than the national security, may have motivated his perjury."

Oral arguments on Krogh's motions were scheduled for this afternoon before Judge Gerhard A. Gesell. The case is expected to go to trial late this month.

Krogh was indicted Oct.

11 on two counts of making false declarations to the grand jury—charges similar to perjury—for saying he knew nothing of travels made by E. Howard Hunt Jr. and G. Gordon Liddy to California.

Both Hunt and Liddy were members of the "plumbers" operation and planned the break-in at the Los Angeles office of Ellsberg's psychiatrist on the Labor Day weekend of 1971. They were subsequently convicted in the Watergate bugging.

Krogh's sworn testimony was taken privately by prosecutors Aug. 28, 1972, and read to the grand jury two weeks later. Last May 4, after the doctor's office burglary had been revealed at Ellsberg's trial, Krogh submitted an affidavit to a federal court in Los Angeles detailing his knowledge of Hunt's and Liddy's travels.

Jaworski, who was sworn in last week to succeed the fired Archibald Cox, said Krogh had no legal excuse for lying initially.

NEW YORK TIMES
10 November 1973

6 Get Watergate Terms; Hunt Given 2½ to 8 Years

By LESLEY OELSNER
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 9 — E. Howard Hunt Jr., the former spy who was hired by the White House to carry out clandestine operations, was sentenced today to two and a half to eight years in prison and fined \$10,000 for his role in planning the Watergate break-in.

The five men who carried out the plan—only to be caught and arrested on the spot—were sentenced by Federal Judge John J. Sirica to lesser terms.

James W. McCord Jr., the former security coordinator for the Republican National Committee and the Committee for the Re-election of the President, was sentenced to a one-to-five-year term.

Frank A. Sturgis, Eugenio R. Martinez and Virgilio R. Gonzalez received terms of one to four years.

Bernard L. Barker, a Florida businessman who hired the three others, got 18 months to six years.

Sturgis, Martinez and Gonzalez, having already spent nearly a year in jail pending the outcome of the case, will be eligible for parole before Christmas.

The six men were, with G. Gordon Liddy, the original Watergate defendants, the first to be accused in the crime that shocked the country and jolted the Government.

They could each have been imprisoned for decades. Liddy, in fact, has already been sentenced to a maximum of 20 years, in part because of his refusal to cooperate with the prosecution. Hunt could have got 50 years, by Judge Sirica's count, and the others, between 60 and 65.

But they were also underlings, in the Watergate break-in itself and even more so in the cover-up that followed. And so, with a minimum of emotion and fuss, Judge Sirica sentenced them accordingly.

"I've given you the lowest minimum I thought is justified under the circumstances of this case," he said simply, after announcing the sentence of one-to-four years he was imposing on Martinez, Sturgis and Gonzalez.

Judge Sirica—who has been dubbed "Maximum John" by some local lawyers, as a result of what they consider his tough sentencing policy—did not even give that much of an ex-

planation in imposing his penalties on the other defendants.

But if the judge was low-keyed and unemotional, many of the others in his crowded courtroom were not.

The proceeding started off with a long plea for mercy by Daniel F. Schultz, lawyer for the four Floridians. He spoke of each of his clients in turn, describing Sturgis, for instance, as "that type of man representing the person who has historically made this country good."

Gonzales, he told the court, is "one of the nicest, most pleasant" persons one could meet. Martinez, the lawyer said, is the "victim of a cruel fraud." And Barker, he continued, has been turned by the Watergate conspiracy from a man who risked his life for his country to "the pathetic bumbling burglar."

Mr. Schultz repeated his contention that the four believed they were involved in a legitimate national security operation rather than in a crime, saying that his clients were "men convicted of a crime who are not criminals." Then, noting that the four had already been in jail for nearly a year, he made the plea that set the

tune for the rest of the proceedings:

"How much more punishment do you mete out to the soldiers when the architects of the plan, the generals, haven't spent a day in jail and may never do so?"

"How much longer," he asked, "is this Government—whether the special prosecutor or this court—going to vent its anger and its frustrations against these four little men from Miami?"

Pleas by the Defendants

Martinez followed his lawyer to the podium with his own statement, telling Judge Sirica, in his heavily accented voice, that he was "confused," unsure of what was going on, unsure what had happened to him.

Next came Barker, who said he had recruited the three men, who had long been involved in activities against Cuban Premier Fidel Castro, for patriotic rather than criminal reasons.

And then came the prosecution. The four men, according to Philip Locovara, of the special Watergate prosecution force, had acted out of "misguided loyalty." And, he said, "their position in this enterprise was at the bottom of this totem pole."

McCord also spoke for himself.

"My participation in Watergate was in error and wrong," he said. "I offer no excuse."

He joined the enterprise, he said, because "I believed then as I believe now" that the President authorized it.

Hunt let his lawyer, Sidney

Sachs, speak for him. As Mr. Sachs told it, Hunt, like the others, committed his offenses for "patriotic reasons."

Hunt and the four Floridians all pleaded guilty to the charges against them—charges ranging from burglary to conspiracy. McCord, like Liddy, went to trial and was convicted on Jan. 30.

Letter Brings Change

For months after their arrest the defendants kept silent, refusing to tell the story behind the break-in. But on March 23, the situation changed.

On that day Judge Sirica read to those in his courtroom here a letter he had just received from McCord in which McCord said that "others" had escaped capture and that witnesses had perjured themselves at his and Liddy's trial.

Judge Sirica sentenced Liddy that day, too, to a term of from six years and eight months to 20 years. He sentenced the five who had pleaded guilty to very long "provisional" terms, telling them that he would take into account, at the final sentencing day, any cooperation they gave to the authorities investigating the Watergate affair.

"I am making no promise of leniency," he said then, "but the sentence I will impose will depend primarily on whether or not you cooperate" with the Senate Watergate committee. He also recommended cooperation with the grand jury.

The sentences announced today indicated he was satisfied with their cooperation.

WASHINGTON POST
10 November 1973

Watergate Defendants Sentenced To Serve at Least 1 to 2½ Years

By Timothy S. Robinson
Washington Post Staff Writer

Federal Judge John J. Sirica sentenced six of the original Watergate burglary defendants yesterday to prison terms ranging from a minimum of 2½ years for former White House aide E. Howard Hunt to a minimum of one year for several others including former Nixon campaign security chief James W. McCord.

For five of the defendants, including Hunt, the sentences were substantial reductions from earlier 35- to 40-year prison terms "provisionally" imposed on them by Judge Sirica until they cooperated with the ongoing Watergate investigations.

Several of them told Sirica yesterday, however, that despite their cooperation they still do not believe the whole truth about the Wa-

tergate affair has yet come out.

Yesterday's sentencing was the first for McCord who originally aided in expanding the Watergate investigation with a letter to Judge Sirica last March, in which McCord declared that witnesses at the Watergate trial in January had perjured themselves.

The final sentences given the six men by Sirica yesterday also were considerably lighter than the final sentence he imposed in March on the seventh original Watergate defendant, former White House aide G. Gordon Liddy.

Liddy, who was steadfastly refused to cooperate with any Watergate investigation, must serve a term of at least six years and eight months in prison. He also was fined \$40,000. He is currently serving a contempt of court term that coincides with the life of the first;

Watergate grand jury.

The sentences imposed yesterday by Sirica were:

- Virgilio Gonzalez, Eugenio Martinez and Frank Sturgis, three Miami residents who were found inside the Democrats' Watergate headquarters at 2 a.m. on June 17, 1972, received matching terms of one year to four years in jail.

Judge Sirica made it clear to the three men that they would be eligible for parole in about one month. But he pointed out that he would not be able to influence the parole board's decision.

- Bernard L. Barker, a Miami resident who recruited the three others for the surreptitious entry into the Watergate and who also had pleaded guilty to seven counts, will serve a term of 18 months to six years.

Barker has also served about 11 months in jail, so he would be eligible for parole next summer.

- McCord, who also was

NEW YORK TIMES
12 November 1973

Justified Leniency

In fixing the final sentences for the Watergate conspirators, Chief District Judge John J. Sirica has put the actual break-in into the Democratic campaign headquarters in its proper perspective against a background of far more serious crimes committed at higher echelons. Only E. Howard Hunt, the former White House consultant and C.I.A. operative, faces long-term imprisonment of at least two and a half years for his part in planning the burglary. None of the five other defendants is likely to serve more than one year, and three of them may soon be eligible for parole.

The Government's recommendation for leniency seemed eminently justified. James W. McCord was the first of all those involved in the Watergate scandals to cooperate with the investigation; the four Cuban exiles' concept of patriotic loyalties had made them easy prey to exploitation by the plotters at higher echelons of power.

When Judge Sirica, in answer to the defendants' original silence, imposed harsh sentences, he was widely criticized for using the threat of long incarceration as a means of extracting testimony. Subsequent developments and the eventual reduction of the penalties, however, suggest that the judge wanted to prevent low-level hirelings from being unnecessarily and unfairly penalized by their misguided feelings of loyalty to unscrupulous superiors.

To assess the process of justice it must be recalled that the Government prosecutors had maintained during the original trial that the political espionage in the case reached no higher than the defendants. Nine months later, before final sentencing, the prosecution described the same defendants as "at the bottom of the totem pole" of the conspiracy. At the very least, Judge Sirica's skepticism has saved the prosecutors from being party, however unwittingly, to a cover-up that would have made the Watergate hirelings the scapegoats of a conspiracy that extended beyond their view and comprehension.

Sunday, Nov. 11, 1973 THE WASHINGTON POST

Robert A. Ortman, Retired CIA Officer

Robert A. Ortman, 58, a retired operations officer with the Central Intelligence Agency, died yesterday at Montgomery General Hospital after a stroke. He lived at 19000 Colfield Ct., Gaithersburg.

Mr. Ortman was born in Mount Vernon, N.Y., and graduated from Occidental

College in Los Angeles. During World War II he served as a lieutenant in the Navy.

He joined the CIA in 1951 and retired this year, after service both in Washington and overseas.

Survivors include his wife, Judith W., and two children, John B. and Susan, of the home.

found inside the Democratic headquarters at the Watergate, was sentenced to serve a term of from one year to five years in prison.

McCord, the only defendant who was free on bond pending sentencing, was given another 15 days of freedom to get his affairs in order before going to prison. However, in that time he could take legal steps that, if approved by the judge, would allow him to remain free pending appeal.

Hunt, a former member of the White House special investigative unit known as the plumbers who recruited Barker for the Watergate mission, was ordered to serve a prison term of 30 months to eight years and pay a \$10,000 fine.

Hunt, who already has been in jail for seven and one-half months, will be eligible for parole in the fall of 1975.

Sirica's courtroom on the second floor of the U.S. District Courthouse was packed when the jailed defendants were brought from the cell block for their final sentencing. McCord had waited in the public corridor, apparently unnoticed by about 100 spectators who also were waiting while the courtroom's doors were opened.

Barker smiled broadly and waved at his wife and daughter in the front row as he walked from the cell block to the defense table. He and his three Miami friends were the first persons called to the front of the courtroom by Judge Sirica.

Their attorney, Daniel Schultz, made an impassioned, 40-minute plea for mercy for his clients. He told Sirica, as he has often in past hearings, that his clients were duped by their friend, E. Howard Hunt, who came cloaked in the robes of a White House aide speaking of an intelligence operation bigger than the FBI and the CIA combined.

He described the four Miami men as "unwitting tools in illegal political espionage" who are "still confused . . . (and who) still don't know whether the whole truth will come out."

Schultz said his clients did not take part in the break-in for money but for patriotic reasons outlined to them by Hunt. "Prison is

not the place for patriotic men," Schultz said.

"How long will the government vent its anger at these four little men from Miami . . . these soldiers . . . when architects and generals of this plot haven't served a day in jail?" Schultz asked.

Martinez spoke with a heavy Spanish accent when the judge asked him if he wished to say anything. "I'm here because I'm a Cuban . . . that's why I have been so useful to this country in infiltrating other countries," Martinez said.

Martinez provoked the only laughter of the otherwise somber session and drew a smile from the judge when he said, "I don't believe you have all the facts yet. I read the paper and see

where you're still looking for two tapes." He was referring to Sirica's continuing hearing into White House tapes of the President's claims that two subpoenaed White House conversations about Watergate never existed.

Martinez spoke bitterly of his stay in the D.C. jail, where he said he was given only one mousetrap to put under his bed each night, a restriction that allowed other mice to run through his cell and steal his food.

Barker also spoke briefly to the judge, saying, "I can vouch that when I recruited these three men (the other Miami defendants) I did not recruit them for any criminal purpose."

Both McCord and Bernard Fensterwald Jr., his attorney, spoke before McCord's sentencing. Fensterwald said what McCord did was in a "gray area of strict legality and illegality."

McCord also said he did not believe the whole truth about Watergate has come out, and added he participated in the breaking "because I believed the President authorized it and set it in motion."

Sidney Sachs, the attorney for Hunt, spoke of Hunt's ill health and the death of Hunt's wife in a plane crash many months ago. Sachs also pointed to Hunt's past service to the country in the CIA.

"If this is a crime, it is a crime of patriotism," Sachs said. Hunt did not speak.

NEW YORK TIMES
4 November 1973

Misusing the CIA: A Final Report

Along with the confusion over the Presidential tapes last week came some clarification on another aspect of the Watergate imbroglio. The House Armed Services Committee Special Subcommittee on Intelligence—composed of four Democrats and three Republicans—probing into the CIA's role in Watergate and the Ellsberg case, concluded unanimously that, however reluctantly, the Agency had allowed itself to be used for "improper purposes" for which there was "no support in law or reason." Following are excerpts from its report:

Early on in his employment as a consultant, Mr. [E. Howard] Hunt [ex-CIA officer] requested through Mr. [Charles] Colson [former White House Counsel] that arrangements be made for certain alias and disguise gear in connection with an interview. . . . General [Robert] Cushman [former Deputy Director of the CIA] approved the request. . . . [Hunt then made] added demands on the Agency for technical assistance including disguise and alias material for Mr. George Gordon Liddy [former Counsel for the Committee for the Re-Election of the President]. On Aug. 27, 1971 . . . General Cushman . . . advised [Mr. John Ehrlichman, former White House staff member] that assistance to Mr. Hunt would have to end, since Hunt obviously was overreaching the original agreement.

As future events graphically illustrated, the deed had then been done, and Mr. Helms [former CIA Director], General Cushman, and the CIA had become unwitting dupes for purely domestic White House staff endeavors that were beyond the realm of CIA authority.

Former CIA Director Richard Helms testified that often the Executive Office of the President made requests of the CIA for assistance and advice. . . . Witnesses associated with the CIA were unanimous in their views that requests from top level White House aides in the present Administration were, almost without exception, taken as orders from people who were speaking for the President. . . . In that setting, then, we have the request from the White House staff for the cooperation of the CIA with Howard Hunt. . . . General Cushman concluded that Hunt was hired to work on the security leaks problem, and "the CIA was being ordered to assist him" (emphasis added).

In "hindsight," said Ambassador Helms, "maybe we should have asked (Hunt) a lot more questions."

. . . While E. Howard Hunt was making demands upon the CIA for additional technical material, he was doing it not for purposes of [an] interview, but rather for use in connection with the Room 16 Group's [Plumbers'] plan for the surreptitious entry into the office of . . . Dr. Henry Fielding [Dr. Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist]. . . .

Hunt asked CIA for a camera-concealing device for indoor photography. . . . Among other services, CIA provided Mr. Liddy with technical instructions for the use of camera and developing services when the job was completed. . . . In all fairness, it must be [said] that the CIA was not aware of the true purpose for which the camera and equipment was to be used.

[The panel delved into the Watergate scandal and the complex "CIA-FBI-Mexican connection" and concluded that there was no direct CIA involvement:]

- Efforts were made by Messrs. Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Dean of the White House staff to deflect the FBI investigation of the Watergate break-in by invoking nonexistent conflicts with CIA operations.

- Substantial efforts were made by Mr. John Dean, then White House Counsel, to involve CIA in the Watergate break-in without any foundation in fact. . . .

- Substantial evidence . . . leads to the inescapable conclusion that Mr. H. R. Haldeman, former White House Chief of Staff, and Mr. John Ehrlichman . . . were the sources of enormous executive authority and were considered by the Acting Director of the FBI and CIA officials to be speaking for the President.

The investigation has illustrated clearly that . . . there existed in the White House staff a propensity for using the CIA for purposes not intended by the Congress. . . . It is not only that the deeds were in fact done, but but also the propensity of certain White House aides to dip directly into the CIA for improper purposes, leaving in doubt the serious questions of whether this was done with authorization. However, we are convinced that the CIA did not know of the improper purposes for which the technical materials provided were to be used and resisted later efforts to involve the agency.

It is clear, then, that the National Security Act must be strengthened to assure that the CIA not engage in any activity [not specified in its charter] except as is personally approved by the President.

LOS ANGELES TIMES
5 November 1973

CIA Agent Released

WATERLOO, Ont. (UPI)—Ronald P. Lippert, a Canadian citizen imprisoned in Cuba as a CIA agent for 10 years, returned home Sunday.

Lippert, 41, arrived in Toronto aboard a chartered aircraft and was taken by family members to his sister's home here.

Lippert, a native of Kitchener, Ont., was arrested by the Cubans in 1962 when a search of his light plane at Havana Airport uncovered hand gre-

nades. He subsequently admitted that he had been working for the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. He was sentenced to 30 years in prison.

The Canadian government had repeatedly asked Cuba to release Lippert and last month the House of Commons passed a unanimous resolution to this effect.

Cuban Premier Fidel Castro had said earlier during a brief stop in

Newfoundland that Lippert would be freed if there were a request from the Canadian parliament.

He told newsmen he didn't want to talk about his ordeal for two or three days, but then attempted to make a statement.

"I don't know what to say. I just want to thank all the newspapers and everybody," he said, then broke down in tears.

Lippert was met by two sisters and his 18-year-old daughter, Ruth Ann.

WASHINGTON POST

Wednesday, Nov. 7, 1973

CIA Asked To Clarify Helms Note

The CIA has been asked to clarify a June 28, 1972, memorandum from its former director, Richard M. Helms, suggesting that the FBI "confine" its Watergate inquiries in Mexico.

Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.), ranking Democratic member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, made the request because of apparent discrepancies between the Helms memo and public testimony by Helms and other CIA witnesses.

It was understood that Helms was being contacted in Tehran, where he is serving as U.S. ambassador, for a clarifying explanation. Helms has been recalled twice from his post in Iran to testify on CIA involvement in the Watergate affair.

In the June 28 memo to his deputy, Gen. Vernon Walters, Helms left instructions for a prospective meeting with then acting FBI Director L. Patrick Gray III.

Helms advised Walters that he had instructed two key subordinates in the agency, who were unnamed, that the CIA is "attempting to 'distance itself' from this investigation and that . . . I wanted no free-wheeling exposition of hypotheses or any effort made to conjecture about responsibility or likely objectives of the Watergate intrusion.

"In short," the memo continued, "it is up to the FBI to lay some cards on the table. Otherwise we are unable to be of help.

"In addition, we still adhere to the request that they confine themselves to the personalities already arrested or directly under suspicion and that they desist from expanding this investigation into other areas which may well, eventually, run afoul of our operations."

It was the last sentence of the Helms memo that appeared, particularly, to conflict with previously public testimony by Helms and Walters staunchly denying that FBI inquiries into Watergate issues in Mexico would expose or jeopardize CIA operations.

White House officials, within a week of the Watergate break-in, succeeded in obtaining a delay of more than two weeks in the FBI's investigation of Watergate break-in funds "laundered" through a Mexican bank—and traced ultimately to the Nixon re-election committee.

NEW YORK TIMES

3 November 1973

Helms Memo on Watergate Disclosed

By DAVID E. ROSENBAUM
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 2 — Richard Helms, former Director of Central Intelligence, wrote a memorandum 11 days after the Watergate burglary that could be construed as showing that he tried to limit the Federal Bureau of Investigation's inquiry into the burglary.

However, one Representative familiar with the matter said that such an interpretation would not be accurate.

In his public testimony before the Senate Watergate committee and in closed testimony to four other Congressional panels, Mr. Helms said that he had resisted heavy White House pressure to restrict the FBI's investigation.

The full memorandum that Mr. Helms wrote to his deputy, Lieut. Gen. Vernon A. Walters, on June 28, 1972, has not been made public. But a passage from it appears in an edited transcript of Senate hearings last July on the confirmation of the present C.I.A. director, William E. Colby.

That passage contains instructions from Mr. Helms to General Walters to request that the F.B.I. "confine themselves to the personalities already arrested or under suspicion."

Mr. Helms further asked Mr. Walters to see that the bureau "desist from expanding this other areas which may well eventually run afoul of our operations."

The memorandum is in the possession of the Senate Armed Services Committee, a House Armed Services subcommittee that investigated the role of the C.I.A. in the Watergate affair, and the Senate Watergate committee.

All three panels refused today to release the full memorandum. But Representative Lucien N. Nedzi, chairman of the House subcommittee, said that to interpret the passage to mean that Mr. Helms had tried to put strings on the Watergate investigation would be "not accurate."

Asked if he felt that Mr. Helms had lied when he told Mr. Nedzi's subcommittee that

he had resisted pressure to stop the investigation, the Michigan Democrat replied, "Not so far as I'm concerned."

Mr. Nedzi's subcommittee released a report Tuesday that concluded that the C.I.A. and its top officials had been the "unwitting dupes" of White House aides involved in the Watergate burglary, but that the agency withstood pressure to become involved in the cover-up of the burglary.

Mr. Nedzi interpreted the passage from the Helms memorandum to mean that the former director was concerned over a possible "free-wheeling kind of operation" in which F.B.I. agents would be set loose to investigate C.I.A. personnel. Mr. Helms was not trying to curb the bureau's inquiry, only to insure that it went through proper channels, Mr. Nedzi said.

Mr. Helms, who is now Ambassador to Iran, could not be reached today, and both the C.I.A. and General Walters refused to comment on the matter.

NEW YORK TIMES

14 November 1973

McCord Appeals Conviction For Break-in at Watergate

WASHINGTON, Nov. 13 (AP) — James W. McCord Jr. appealed his conviction today for conspiracy, burglary and wire-tapping in the Watergate break-in, and asked to be released until a Federal appellate court acts.

McCord was sentenced last Friday to serve one to five years in prison for his part in the June 17, 1972, break-in at the Democratic party headquarters in the Watergate apartment and office complex. He is free on a \$50,000 appearance bond.

Five other Watergate conspirators, also sentenced Friday, made similar requests for release pending appeals, but were turned down yesterday by Chief Judge John J. Sirica of Federal District Court.

In sentencing McCord, Judge Sirica allowed him 15 days to file an appeal.

The delay was occasioned by President Nixon's concern, which he later acknowledged to be unfounded, that the FBI inquiries in Mexico could jeopardize covert CIA operations there.

BALTIMORE NEWS AMERICAN

8 November 1973

Helms Mised Probers On CIA Role--Weicker

By PATRICK J. SLOYAN
News American
Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — A Republican member of the Senate Watergate Committee says former CIA Director Richard Helms "mised" the panel about his role in efforts to limit the FBI investigation of the Watergate burglary.

Sen. Lowell Weicker, R-Conn., made the comment after the Senate Armed Services Committee made public a previously classified memo written by Helms shortly after the June 17, 1972, break-in of Democratic National Headquarters.

According to former Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox, the controversial memo is "at odds" with sworn testimony Helms gave Congress and the Watergate Grand Jury.

"I think that the memo shows that Helms tried to accommodate the White House request to use the CIA to cover up the Watergate break-in," Weicker said.

"I think that is the real big story we've seen in our inves-

tigation — the way the White House used all these government agencies. The CIA involvement is a case in point."

The Helms memo was declassified and released by chairman Stuart Symington, D-Mo., who has repeatedly praised Helms for blunting White House efforts to use the CIA to mask the Watergate scandal.

"The senator has requested appropriate officials to clarify the Helms memo," a spokesman for Symington said.

The Symington spokesman would not say whether the chairman had asked for details from the CIA or Helms, now U.S. Ambassador to Iran.

Symington and Chairman Lucien Nedzi, of the House Armed Services Intelligence Subcommittee, have insisted that the CIA resisted efforts by White House aides John Ehrlichman and H. R. Halde- man to involve the CIA in the Watergate cover up.

Nedzi last week refused to make public the memo but said it related directly to Helms' request to the FBI not to interview two individual CIA agents.

WASHINGTON POST

Thursday, Nov. 8, 1973

FBI Leaks Feared By Helms

By Laurence Stern

Washington Post Staff Writer

Fears that sensitive CIA operations might be compromised by "leakage in the FBI" led Richard M. Helms, the agency's former director, to propose sharply defined limits on the Watergate investigation in Mexico.

Helms was also concerned about an FBI "fishing expedition into CIA operations" when he laid down guidelines 11 days after the Watergate break-in designed to confine the FBI's inquiries to "personalities already arrested or directly under suspicion."

This was the gist of four-page memorandum submitted yesterday by CIA Director William E. Colby to Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.), acting chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

Colby's memo was intended to clear up what he described as "recent speculation in the press and elsewhere" over an apparent conflict between a June 28, 1972, memo from Helms to his deputy, Gen. Vernon Walters, and testimony by Helms to five congressional committees and federal Watergate prosecutors.

This conflict was first mentioned—although without any specific reference to Helms—by former Watergate Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox in an appearance last week before the Senate Judiciary Committee. Cox said he had evidence that a major witness in the Watergate inquiry had sharply contradicted his testimony in a memorandum that had come to the attention of the prosecuting staff.

The newly surfaced 1972 memo instructed Walters that "we (the CIA) still adhere to the request that they (the FBI) confine themselves to the personalities already arrested or directly under suspicion and that they desist from expending this investigation into other areas which may well, eventually, run afoul of our operations."

But Helms and Walters have repeatedly testified that they told White House

officials and former FBI Acting Director L. Patrick Gray III that the Watergate investigation in Mexico would not jeopardize any CIA activities.

Colby's memo to Symington alluded to a strong sense of suspicion within the CIA over the prospective FBI investigation of the Watergate scandal's Mexican connection.

He cited as one ingredient of the CIA's concern Gray's persistence—despite repeated denials by Helms—"in querying the Agency about possible CIA involvement in the Watergate incident."

He also recalled that the FBI refused to inform the CIA on June 22, 1972, of the status of its investigation into the activities of James McCord, a former CIA employee, who was one of the convicted Watergate conspirators.

"In light of these developments, and particularly because of the additional fact that there had been recent leaks of sensitive information provided by CIA to the FBI, Mr. Helms felt it necessary to give specific guidance for Agency officials acting during his forthcoming absence to discourage FBI investigation into Agency operations unless specific reason or justification therefor was offered," said Colby.

However, the FBI investigation that White House officials sought to shut off was not directed as the CIA but at the establishment of a link between Watergate funds and the Nixon re-election committee.

White House officials, acting on instructions from the President, first raised the prospect that the FBI pursuit of the Watergate funds through a Mexico City bank account could jeopardize covert CIA operations in Mexico. Helms and Walters had testified that they repeatedly assured White House officials that no agency operations would be so imperiled.

The Helms memo to Walters, however, tended to give legitimacy to the concern originally expressed by the White House and which President Nixon, in his Aug. 22 statement, said proved to be unfounded.

Colby's memo yesterday to Symington failed to clear up what is still a central contradiction in the record of the CIA's involvement in the Watergate cover-up.

BALTIMORE SUN

3 NOV 1973

Charles W. Yost

Security Cloak Has Way of Deceiving the Deceiver

It would really seem to be an elementary principle that in a democracy the people have a right to know what their government is up to. They may at times be too apathetic, too cynical or too absorbed in private affairs to act on what they know, but at least they should not be denied the knowledge which would enable them to act.

The practitioners of every profession have a congenital tendency to believe that they are wiser than the layman, that he lacks the training and insight on which sound judgments must be based and that he should therefore not be confused by awkward facts which might upset him.

This line of argument is of course a rationalization. What the expert really means is that, by virtue of his superior understanding and exclusive sources of information he knows best, not only for himself but for everyone else; and that he does not want the ill-informed complaining, criticizing, perhaps even upsetting the applecart he has, with great pains put on the road.

For such a state of mind—and most of us share it when we are inside rather than outside—"national security" is a godsend. It enables a government official to justify keeping his actions and intentions secret even when they might lead the nation into war.

Genuine considerations of national security may require secrecy in regard to the character and deployment of certain weapons. In my thirty-five years in foreign affairs, however, I almost never found that the public disclosure of political measures or plans could be truthfully said to jeopardize national security or be more than temporarily inconvenient.

Leaks frequently evoked enormous excitement and indignation, but almost always because they were embarrassing to presidents or secretaries of state endeavoring to pursue courses not frankly revealed to Congress and the electorate. The reduction ad absurdum is reached when military or political actions fully known to the adversary

are concealed from or misrepresented to one's own people.

Among the most sinister side effects of the Cold War is that the United States has over a period of years come to imitate many of the worst malpractices of the Soviet system—secrecy, deception, subversion and "dirty tricks"—which are bad enough in a totalitarian society but are absolutely inexcusable in a democracy. Progressively over the past two decades American political life has been more and more poisoned by these vices.

Once "national security" has come to be accepted as a cloak for the conduct of foreign affairs, it is all too likely that public officials will find it irresistibly convenient for cloaking also some of their more far-out domestic activities. In fact, once they slip into the national security psychosis, they easily begin to equate, as we have so often seen, the nation's security with their own political power or their own partisan aims.

One of the most frightening aspects of this syndrome is that it eventually becomes an addiction, and that those addicted are unaware what is happening to them. Concealment and misrepresentation, originally intended to avoid ill-informed or partisan interference, eventually come to deceive even, or most of all, their authors.

Jerome Doolittle, a former U.S. Information Service officer who was in Laos during the recent war, wrote in the New York Times of the concealment of our bombing of villages: "That secrecy was never so much a way to keep the facts about our bombing from leaking out of the executive branch as it was to keep those facts from leaking in. After all, the lies did serve to keep something from somebody, and the somebody was us." The credibility gap was sometimes so broad that it detached the right from the left hand of the same individual.

President Nixon once said: "In our public discussions we sorely need a kind of honesty that has too often

THE LONDON TIMES
31 OCT 1973

Congressmen accuse White House of trying to place blame for Watergate on CIA

From Patrick Brogan
Washington, Oct 30

A Congressional subcommittee has concluded that the White House had been using the Central Intelligence Agency for improper political purposes before the Watergate affair, and that it attempted to put the blame for Watergate itself on the CIA.

The subcommittee said it was puzzled by a flagrant contradiction between the account of one episode offered by President Nixon and that offered by witnesses in testimony.

The House of Representatives armed services committee's subcommittee on intelligence has the duty of keeping an eye on the CIA. The Senate Watergate committee heard the same witnesses on the same problems and may yet report in the same sense; but its work is far from complete while the House subcommittee, with a much smaller field to plough, has got in first. Its chairman is Representative Lucien Nedzi, a Democrat from Michigan.

The subcommittee's report states that the White House made frequent requests to the CIA for assistance and that these requests were treated as orders by the agency. When Mr. John Ehrlichman telephoned the agency's deputy director, General Robert Cushman, asking him to provide assistance

for Mr. E. Howard Hunt, the General agreed at once and never asked Mr. Hunt what the assistance was needed for.

Mr. Hunt was a member of the White House "plumbers' group", and in July, 1971, told the General that he was engaged in a matter of the gravest importance to national security. The General arranged for him to be given a wig, a voice-altering device, identity papers and other equipment to conduct a confidential interview.

In fact the interview was part of the White House attempt to find out anything discreditable it could about Senator Edward Kennedy. Mr. Hunt wanted to see someone who claimed to have some damaging information on the Kennedys.

Later, the agency was asked to provide more equipment, for Mr. Gordon Liddy (another "plumber") and cameras. All this was used in the burglary of the office of the psychiatrist treating Dr. Daniel Ellsberg, the Pentagon Papers case defendant, without its knowledge. The CIA was thus involved by the White House in one illegal and one extremely sordid affair.

Furthermore, even though the agency is forbidden by its statute to act as a secret police organization, it agreed to try to produce a "psychiatric" profile of Dr. Ellsberg.

A first version was produced in July, 1971. It was found to be inadequate, and the Ellsberg burglary followed in September

in an attempt to get more material. A second version of the profile (to which the burglary had contributed nothing) was produced in November.

After the Watergate break-in came the cover-up, and the House subcommittee report goes carefully through the conflicting testimony of the various people involved.

Its conclusion is that the White House, in the persons of the Presidential staff members, Mr. Ehrlichman, Mr. H. R. Halde- man, and Mr. John Dean, tried to persuade the CIA to accept the responsibility for an essential part of the cover-up, and even for the burglary itself.

The CIA, in the person of its new deputy director, General Vernon Walters, was persuaded to drop heavy hints to the Federal Bureau of Investigation that it should not pursue too closely the source of the money found in the burglars' possession, which, in fact, came from the committee to reelect the President.

The report notes that General Walters acquiesced in the proposal and was most cooperative, at least to begin with. The CIA kept on the right side of the White House, but when things got difficult it backed out of the cover-up which the FBI and the Justice Department were floundering into.

The report notes contradictions in General Walters's testimony and does not seem to believe him on some matters.

been lacking; the honesty of straight talk; a doing-away with hyperbole; a careful concern with the gradations of truth." What wise advice for his own and every other administration.

The nation would be well served by the application of one very simple rule to the conduct of foreign affairs—indeed, to all aspects of government:

Aside from the above mentioned exception about the construction and location of a few very special weapons, and from confidences explicitly imposed upon us for good reasons by other governments, it will be in the national interest of a democracy such as the United States that all its activities abroad, current or contemplated, be fully explained to Congress and people and their approval sought.

Activities in regard to which this is not feasible should not be undertaken. This rule should be applied as strictly by the White House, the Pentagon and the CIA as by the State Department.

The national unity, the sense of participation and common purpose, which would be achieved by the application of this simple rule would do far more to preserve national security than all the vast panoply of secrecy which has been so unnecessarily and perniciously used and misused.

Publisher's Weekly
5 NOV 1973

MARCHETTI TAKES HIS CASE TO U.S. DISTRICT COURT

Victor L. Marchetti has taken his long struggle to publish a book on CIA and other U. S. intelligence policies to court. A suit was filed on October 30 in the U. S. District court by Marchetti, his co-author John D. Marks and publisher Alfred A. Knopf against William Colby, as director of the CIA, and Henry Kissinger, as Secretary of State. The suit charged that the CIA's order to delete sections in Marchetti's manuscript is in violation of the First Amendment.

The CIA, after reviewing Marchetti's ms., ordered 339 specified deletions, stating they were "classified material" and could not be published. Subsequently Marchetti and his attorney conferred

with the Acting General Counsel of the CIA and pointed out that some of the material censored was acquired by Marchetti after his employment with the CIA, and/or was already in the public domain. CIA Counsel later agreed to release 114 of the original 339 deletions.

Marchetti, Marks and Knopf argued in their suit that the CIA's order to delete these 225 parts of the manuscript, now classified as "Top Secret: Sensitive," violated the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of the press, because publication of the censored portions "will not surely result in direct, immediate and irreparable injury to the Nation and its people."

Speaking at a press conference held in the executive offices of Knopf, Marchetti said that if he had convincing proof that any information in his book would be

harmful to the country's national interest he would consider changing it. He strongly upheld the public's right to know about government actions.

The suit also states that the secrecy agreements Marchetti and Marks signed when they were CIA and State Department employees are invalid because they are unconstitutional. Marchetti's attorney said that if these kinds of oaths had legal weight then other government agencies could also use oaths to enjoin citizens from writing books about government.

Marchetti said that this was the second time in this nation's history (the Pentagon Papers was the first) that the government has gone to court to enjoin by restraint material written by one of its citizens on government actions.

BOSTON HERALD AMERICAN, SATURDAY, SEPT. 29, 1973

William S. White

One 'Spy' In the Cold

However gross one sees Watergate, it is not necessary to be an habitual pro-underdog type to feel pain and anger at what has happened to E. Howard Hunt.

For this man so endlessly described as "that convicted Watergate conspirator" had also for three decades served, the United States in both open armed combat and in the even more dangerous business of a "spy," or in less prejudicial terms as an intelligence agent in the cold war.

When he accepted orders to participate in the break-in of Democratic headquarters he did so believing that he was only doing what all his adult life he had done. He thought he was serving the national security interests of the United States as these had been lawfully determined by the then attorney general of the United States, John Mitchell.

For Howard Hunt had been told by one of his trusted superiors, Gordon Liddy, that there was reason to suspect that Castro Communist money, and perhaps Hanoi money, was reaching the Democratic campaign. It is easy to ridicule such suspicions as feverish melodrama. But Howard Hunt did think it not inconceivable that two Communist countries deeply hostile to the United States might indeed have contributed clandestinely and without his knowledge or consent to a presidential candidate like George McGovern.

In simple fact, and in honorable but naive trust, George McGovern had publicly pledged an American capitulation

in Vietnam and had publicly offered to "beg" North Vietnamese for the release of our war prisoners.

One must remember that for many years Howard Hunt had been living in a world of murderous intrigue that was all too real — and a world that most of us have no smallest ability to appreciate, even as men who have never known combat can never know war.

At any rate, Hunt the soldier, Hunt the "spy," follows his directives in full faith in their integrity. He goes along with a disastrous Watergate entry — after trying in vain to abort it when it became plain to him that the whole affair was incredibly ham-handed, almost as though it were designed to be discovered and laid bare.

Then Howard Hunt goes before Judge "Maximum John" Sirica and pleads guilty. He is handed a provisional sentence of 35 — repeat 35 — years, at least twice that normally given in Washington for murder and five times that for rape. The "provisional" part of it is that if Hunt will be a good boy before the Ervin Senate Committee maybe the 35 years will be reduced.

In the meantime, Hunt's wife has been killed in an air crash and his four children deprived of both a mother and (for all practical purposes) of a father. For six months in prison he is chained as though he were some mass murderer. He is physically assaulted in prison. He suffers a stroke in prison. A sick and broken man, he is pitilessly interrogated 25 times before at last he appears for his 26th ordeal before the Ervin Senate Committee.

From his testimony it is plain to the end he tried to protect "The Old Company," the Central Intelligence Agency, at the certain cost of his liberty and at the possible cost of ending his life, a decorated war hero, behind stone walls. What of "The Old Company"? Well, the CIA has distinguished itself, from former Director Richard Helms down, with a careful neutrality on the subject of one E. Howard Hunt.

"I am crushed," he says in the exhausted voice of a spent man, "by the failure of my government to protect me and my family as in the past it has always done for its clandestine agents."

It is a self-epitaph that should crush a good many other people as well.

MORNING GLOBE, Boston
29 October 1973

CIA is bigger than Nixon, says Dick Gregory

By Joe Pilati
Globe Staff

"The biggest threat to America is not Dick Nixon, and its not Watergate," social commentator Dick Gregory told a capacity crowd at last night's Ford Hall Forum. "The biggest threat is the CIA."

Gregory said he is convinced that the Central Intelligence Agency was implicated in the assassinations of John and Robert Kennedy and in the shooting of Alabama Gov. George Wallace.

He described the agency as "a secret organization set up after World War II with a bunch of slick Ger-

mans." He said Americans "were told about the German scientists we got, but when did you ever hear about the intelligence agents?"

Most of the 1100 persons in Gregory's audience applauded and cheered his barbed references to the Nixon Administration and the Watergate scandal.

"Nixon has never lied to us," he said. "In 1968 his first promise was to take all the crime off the streets. It's your own fault if you didn't ask him where he was going to put it."

Gregory added: "You have to have one of two

things" to work for Mr. Nixon — "lots of unemployment insurance, or a good bail bondsman."

Then: "But I don't blame Nixon for firing Archibald Cox," he said. "He wanted someone more objective and detached, like Bebe Rebozo."

Gregory said he moved from Chicago to Massachusetts in September because the state opposed Mr. Nixon last year, but he had sharp words for two prominent Bay Staters.

He said Sen. Edward Kennedy "pulled one of the most lowdown tricks ever" when he appeared with Wallace at a July 4

rally, but he praised the Alabama Democrat. And former Attorney General Elliot Richardson "had the nerve to talk about the integrity of (Mississippi Sen.) John Stennis, one of the most blatant racists on earth."

"We've got a Congress that in less than 10 days could pass a bill banning football blackouts on TV, but it took them five years to pass a bill stopping the bombs from dropping on Vietnam," Gregory said. "That should show you young people what a big job is ahead of you . . . to give America her sanity back."

WASHINGTON STAR-NEWS
Washington, D. C., Sunday, November 11, 1973

The Secrecy Lid Is Tightening at State Dept.

By Jeremiah O'Leary
Star-News Staff Writer

In the seven weeks that Dr. Henry A. Kissinger has been Secretary of State, a curious role-reversal has taken place between the White House and the State Department.

The secrecy that once prevailed at the White House has been easing in recent days, but the State Department, a usually open society with a paucity of secrets, has buttoned up tightly since the advent of Kissinger.

Country desk officers and the press spokesmen at State have traditionally been accessible for background information on foreign affairs and they still are. The trouble is that Kissinger confides in only a few of his aides about the highest level of foreign policy. Playing his cards close to the chest, Kissinger has dried up the traditional sources of information.

It may be true that Kissinger's short tenure as secretary has not been a fair test of how open he will be once he is more comfortable and less busy. He has

been leaping from crisis to crisis: the Middle East war, the U.S. military alert and the defection of NATO, almost from the moment he assumed the mantle of office.

ON THE SURFACE, his record does not look bad. He has held one reception and two press conferences, plus one quick visit to the State Department press room and one short appearance at the briefing room when he won the Nobel Peace Prize.

But the reality is that the tone and modus operandi of Kissinger is developing into one of secretiveness, not only from the diplomatic correspondents but from most of the people who now work directly for Kissinger.

When he was nominated, Kissinger promised to be as open as he could and to make the State Department more accessible to congressional and public scrutiny. This does not gibe with Kissinger's refusal to tell a press conference on Oct. 25 why the armed forces of the United States had gone on a worldwide military alert.

He said he might reveal

the reason in about a week. Now nearly three weeks have passed and the American public still does not know why the U.S. armed forces were alerted for a confrontation with the Soviet Union.

Some senators, notably J. William Fulbright, D-Ark., and Henry Jackson, D-Wash., were given summaries of a mysterious Soviet note that evidently precipitated the alert but they have not seen the note.

If there had been no Watergate case, it might have been accepted on faith that Kissinger has good and sufficient reason to withhold the information. But in the credibility crisis until Kissinger or the President speak, no American can be sure whether we stood on the brink of nuclear confrontation or whether the government was knocking down a straw man.

KISSINGER, who is affable and good at small talk when exposed to it with newsmen, has hardly had time yet for anything like the Scotch-and-water sessions Dean Rusk used to have with reporters. Wear-

ing two hats as both secretary of state and head of the National Security Council, he has adopted a regimen of spending the mornings at the White House and the afternoons and evenings at State.

But his office has been in his suitcase much of the time. And when Kissinger is on the road, the office back in Washington is given very little leeway to confirm, deny or explain anything.

Some veteran reporters believe Kissinger will loosen up the one-man-show aspects of his office once he is more comfortable with the bureaucracy he used to ignore. He has, in a sense, gone public by accepting the secretaryship of state. He can continue to function like a latterday Metternich in his new role but he is also answerable to Congress as he never was when the NSC was his only portfolio.

And the press will be near him always at State as it could never be when he was hidden away in the White House. He is going to have to come to some terms with this new environment when the Middle East cools off.

WASHINGTON STAR-NEWS
Washington, D. C., Wednesday, November 7, 1973

State Department Officer Quits Over 'Political Climate'

Ray S. Cline, veteran director of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, has resigned effective Nov. 24, largely because of what he said was "frustration" with the difficulties created by the political climate in Washington.

Cline, who has had 31 years of service in the intelligence community, said in an interview today that he did not hand in his resignation because of the Watergate, as had been reported.

He also denied that his motive had to do with any planned cutbacks in the intelligence arm of the State Department.

"I FIND," Cline said, "that the political climate in Washington is not conducive to effective bureaucratic function and this is partly because of tensions that exist between the execu-

tive branch and the Congress. Watergate was only a peripheral cause of this climate. I also wanted an increase of 90 personnel in I & R because of the increasing complexity of world affairs and I was not going to get it because of budgetary reasons.

"When a man has 30 years of service behind him, he has to speak his mind and do what he must do."

For Cline, that will mean shifting to special research and writing projects for the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies. Cline said he was first approached by Dr. David Abshire, director of the center, more than six months ago.

"I HAVE no problems with Secretary of State (Henry A.) Kissinger," Cline said. "I have known

him since he was a professor at Harvard and he depended heavily on the I & R bureau since the Middle East crisis began. I'm not mad at anyone and I don't feel heroic."

Cline said Kissinger and he had discussed the future of I & R since the new secretary of State assumed charge and termed the talks inconclusive. But he denied that Kissinger had any plan to eliminate I & R or to

phase its work into his personal staff or the National Security Council apparatus.

He said he did not have an opportunity to tell Kissinger personally of his decision to retire Monday, the day Kissinger left for the Middle East. Word was relayed to the secretary, Cline said, and he has since sent Kissinger a message giving his reasons.

— JEREMIAH O'LEARY

THE WASHINGTON MONTHLY

1 November 1973

THE CULTURE OF BUREAUCRACY:

Rooting for the Other Team: Clientism in the Foreign Service

by Roger Morris

The Red-Headed League

"Tell Madam Ghandhi how lucky she is," Lyndon Johnson called after a startled Indian ambassador as he left a White House meeting in 1968. "She's got two ambassadors workin' for her... you here and Bowles out there."

Not that the President doubted the national loyalty of Chester Bowles or the U. S. embassy in India. But the Johnson sarcasm, an epitaph on years of bureaucratic battles, struck at a complex problem in the bureaucratic politics of foreign policy.

Charged to understand and interpret the views of other governments, U. S. diplomats are sometimes drawn on by career or conviction—by the peculiarly insular culture of their bureaucracy—to defend or at least acquiesce in those views. Ensnared in a parochial view of the national interest, some officials come to resist almost instinctively any policy that threatens to rub the client regimes they deal with the wrong way. The results of this "cliency," which makes diplomats align their interests with those of their hosts, are sometimes absurd, sometimes tragic.

Cliency has become a major occupational disease of modern American diplomacy. Although many American diplomats refuse to yield to its impulse, even at the expense of their careers, cliency influences much of what the United States does or does not do in the world—from its failure to speak out against genocide in Africa to the multiple tragedies of Vietnam. And it has taken a heavy toll on government—in honesty and objectivity, in time and energy sapped by bureaucratic conflict, in idealism, in enormous human costs abroad that might have been lessened, and in the further erosion of public trust in foreign policy.

Roger Morris, who has worked in the State Department and National Security Council staff and is a legislative assistant in the Senate, is writing a book about humanitarian problems in foreign policy.

In the summer of 1967, after a sequence of political intrigues and tribal massacres, civil war broke out between Nigeria and its secessionist Eastern Region, which became Biafra. When Biafra collapsed more than two years later, hundreds of thousands were dead, the vast majority from starvation caused when Nigeria blockaded rebel-held territory. The war was essentially a battle for power between post-colonial elites. Neither side would subordinate its political or military goals to relieve the enormous human cost.

Under both Presidents Johnson and Nixon, United States policy toward the conflict was a combination of political neutrality, including an arms embargo, and a major commitment, over \$100 million, to the international relief efforts operating on both sides. Behind the relief policy was an extraordinary outpouring of public concern and bipartisan congressional support across the political spectrum. All the major American religious relief agencies were involved in aiding Biafra, along with the International Committee of the Red Cross and several private European relief groups.

There were disputes in Washington over whether the U. S. should play an intermediary role in trying to end the conflict, but no apparent question that the United States should make some humanitarian response to the starving children of the Nigerian civil war. Or so it seemed. In the United States embassy in Lagos, ardently committed to its Nigerian clients, it was a different world.

Only weeks after the outbreak of the war, the wife of an American embassy official in Lagos startled her

Nigerian dinner guests with a toast to know what the enemy has." The "the destruction of Biafra." When speaker was a United States military numberless Biafran children, dying of attache talking to a visitor to Pakistan protein deficiency, their hair turned in 1967. It wasn't the American rust color, became symbols to the embassy that needed modern armor, world of the war's wanton suffering, but the Pakistani Army; the "enemy," United States embassy officers in of course, was India. Some months Lagos somberly explained to visitors later, an equally earnest Air Force

that the clever rebels had found an obscure red-haired tribe, starved its infants, and put them on display.

The mission's zeal was not always so overt. Sources that served in the Lagos embassy during the early months of the war recall a pervasive suspicion in the form of official restrictions on the contacts of junior officers lest they acquire rebel sympathies. Officials tell of recurrent attempts to alter or altogether suppress reports to Washington unfavorable to Nigeria, including eyewitness accounts of Nigerian atrocities. Dissent, according to many accounts, was severely punished by unfavorable performance ratings.

There was visible irritation with the embassy back in Washington, where Nigerian policy was guided by career officers who had served in the country earlier. Letters, then official visitors, were sent to urge more complete reporting. One source recalled that the CIA even sent an investigator to Lagos to discover why the embassy's intelligence was so different from all accounts of the war in the media and from other governments. But those efforts soon gave way to a weary resignation and State's own growing reluctance to offend victorious Nigeria as Biafra's collapse became imminent.

To the end, the Lagos mission resisted the awful reality of Biafra's starvation, refusing to support the presentation by Nigerian relief authorities of vital scientific data on the famine developed by U. S. public health experts. Convinced that the public, Congress, the White House, and the State Department were either duped by Biafran propaganda or else were conspiring to dismember an important client, the Lagos embassy largely followed its own foreign policy for the duration of the war.

Our Friends the Enemy

Cliency is seldom so bizarre or concentrated as the Lagos example. More often, missions inflict their bias through long battles of bureaucratic attrition. And nowhere have the campaigns been longer than on the South Asian subcontinent, where India and Pakistan—and the United States embassies in each country—are historic

attache used home leave in Washington to warn a White House aide "unofficially" that he believed the "enemy" was "up to something" around Kashmir. This, time the "enemy" was Pakistan.

Frequently, the United States missions in both countries seem to have believed there were also "enemies" in Washington—the New Delhi mission when the United States began to arm Pakistan in the early fifties, and Rawalpindi when congressional pressure forced a United States arms embargo against Pakistan during the 1965 war with India, and more permanently in 1967. Almost as soon as the 1967 decision was made, the United States embassy in Pakistan urged our government to circumvent the embargo by selling the Pakistanis United States-made tanks from some third country. This device, predictably enough, was anathema to the American embassy in India.

But the same mission in New Delhi which saw the wisdom of denying Pakistani generals their weapons in 1967 found no reason at all to recommend withholding food aid as a means of persuading a venal Indian bureaucracy to sustain long-overdue agricultural reforms. This and other disputes between the mission and Washington, leaving President Johnson to doubt if he had an ambassador to India, illustrate the pernicious character of *elieney*.

Chester Bowles was then on his second tour as ambassador in Delhi. An early casualty of the Washington bureaucracy under President Kennedy, he was to prove the most humane policy-maker of the glittering lot. In his earlier experience in Congress and the executive branch, Bowles had observed the anti-Indian prejudice that dominated parts of the government. To his New Delhi appointment, say several sources, Bowles brought an abiding determination to shield U.S.-Indian relations from the biases experienced. Former aides say Bowles was often privately frustrated with the Indians but usually concealed his criticism in reporting to Washington in the belief that long-run United States interests in India were more important than any single clash that might resurrect old hostilities.

Unlike his Lagos counterparts, Bowles was not imagining antagonism in Washington. Congressional distaste for India's neutrality was clear. LBJ and Dean Rusk fell into annual rages when Madame Gandhi sent birthday cables to Ho Chi Minh. "How long can you kick a cow in the udders and still expect it to give milk?" Rusk once asked with Georgian earthiness in an "eyes only" telegram to Bowles. Bowles must have felt the same

way himself at times, and if only he had posed that same question to Washington, he might have been taken more seriously by other policy-makers. As it was, his beleaguered, self-righteous *clieney* tended to provoke the very forces in Washington he hoped to disarm. After reading the cables from Delhi and hearing in person Bowles' spirited defense of the Indians, LBJ seems to have become convinced that if he didn't insist on Indian reforms, his embassy *never* would. And whatever the merits of the issue, he was probably right.

The Melady Lingers On

The reluctance of an American diplomat to break with his client can be less a matter of the size and importance of the country than of the official's personal investment. In 1969 Thomas Melady, a non-career ambassador but an author of books on Africa, was appointed ambassador to Burundi, a tiny and obscure Central African state with a history of savage tribal disputes between the Tutsi, the dominant minority, and the Hutu, who made up 85 per cent of the country's population but had been effectively denied political and economic power. The Tutsi's chronic worry was that the United States would take sides with the suppressed Hutu. "Painfully aware of what had brought down his predecessors," as one of his colleagues put it, Melady set about energetically to overcome his client's fears.

"He told them every chance he got," remembered an official who read Melady's telegrams, "that the United States was absolutely impartial as between Tutsi and Hutu, that their relations were their own affair, and he apparently got through to them."

United States-Burundi relations were never better. Then suddenly in May, 1972, the country was plunged into a frenzy of killing, with the Tutsi regime presiding over systematic murder of as many as a quarter million Hutu. When army units ran out of ammunition they used hammers and nails to continue the slaughter. Officials remember trucks loaded with corpses passing the U. S. embassy in the night, bound for bull-dozed graves outside the capital.

Those officials at the same time recall Melady late at night in his embassy office temporizing in sending the first reports of genocide to Washington, afraid that the State Department would somehow "over-react" and destroy his carefully nurtured relationship. Melady impressed upon the Burundian regime "the necessity of avoiding *undue* bloodshed" (as distinct from bloodshed

due). The U. S. embassy in Burundi initiated a joint letter to the government from several members of the diplomatic corps. "It was a low-key thing," explained one witness, "saying we were concerned with their difficulties." Another official remembered the letter as "tactful... and it got no real response."

Then on May 25, amid evidence that men, women, and children were being murdered at the rate of a thousand a day, in what one intelligence officer called Burundi's "final solution," Thomas Melady routinely left the country for a new assignment as ambassador to Uganda. He was never to speak out on the horror he had seen, his "access" to his Burundian clients presumably still intact. In the remorse and internal division that followed in the State Department when the U. S. government stood by silently throughout the carnage, there were differences over some individual motives, but little doubt about Melady's. "He wouldn't sacrifice the relations he'd built up," concluded several sources.*

Melady, it turned out, need not have worried so much that the State Department would react against the genocide. The Department's African bureau seems to have been equally worried about client this time their own, among the other African states. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) refused to take action on Burundi, all its members haunted by their own problems of tribalism and sensitive to any precedent for outside interference in the continent. The OAU Council of Ministers, in fact, sent the Burundian regime a message in June, 1972, which amounted to support of the repression. Once the Africans had reacted, the U. S. State Department had its policy.

Though the United States purchased the bulk of Burundi's coffee, which accounts for 65 per cent of the country's export earnings, American bureaucrats dismissed out of hand a proposal to suspend the coffee trade, if only to dissociate the U. S. from the murders. "If we'd involved ourselves in this," said a policy-maker, "we'd be creamed by every country in Africa for butting into an African state's internal affairs. We don't have an interest in Burundi that justifies taking that kind of flack." By the same reasoning, officials ignored an internal Department legal memorandum pointing out that the U. S. had obligations under international law and treaties in the face of human rights abuses. (These were "a reality, not just theoretical language," the memo said.)

*The Burundi policy is documented in a recent Carnegie Endowment study directed by the author, *Passing By: The U. S. and Genocide in Burundi, 1972*.

"The OAU didn't see it that way," said an official. "If the African countries don't want to get involved, where do we get off putting our nose in," demanded another U. S. diplomat. "The U. S. simply has no real interest in Burundi other than moral indignation and that's not enough."

Looking back on the Biafran tragedy, a ranking State Department officer made a similar judgment: "My regret is that there was such emotion generated in this country... today we have strained relations with one fifth of Africa because of the focus on relief..." For that official and others in the State Department's regional bureaus, relations smooth or strained with an entire region can be the daily reality of work, much as one client government can absorb the allegiance of an embassy abroad. The hungry children come and go from public sight; the clients are always there. Staffed predominantly by Foreign Service officers bearing career pressures and marked by a parochialism similar to that felt abroad, the Department often sees its role as protecting its clients from the special perils that American democracy holds for traditional diplomacy—public naivete ("emotion" over Biafra), a meddling press, an uninformed or partisan Congress.

Do Biafra and Burundi mean that cliency has kept us from intervening as often as we should? Not necessarily, for cliency distorts the way we make decisions more than it imposes any clear direction on our foreign policy. We may disagree about whether or how the U. S. should ever intervene in cases of starvation, slaughter, or rebellion, but we should be able to agree to make those policy choices with all the logic and clear-headedness we can muster.

The State Department is not alone in steering our foreign relations around obstacles to clear thought. The Pentagon, CIA, AID, Commerce, Treasury, Agriculture all crowd upon the scene in Washington and abroad with programs, bureaucratic prerogatives, various clear-cut views of the national interest, and, of course, foreign clients. Added to the personal stake and convictions of career officers there is a host of other concerns (domestic clients) that may put a premium on access with foreign regimes—from the munitions industry to Iowa farmers to ITT and Wall Street. To business or bureaucracy trail lines of interest from nearly every corner of the world, at once an index of our colossal power yet a mass of potential inhibitions on the independent and principled use of that power.

The extreme example of the interplay of bureaucracy and cliency, as of

much else, is obviously Vietnam. In a sense, it was a return to the medieval practice of cliency. A country can do no more for its client states, after all, than fight their wars for them. But to the bureaucracies in Washington and their proconsuls in Saigon, the war was often only another arena for the jousting of power and interests. "They could accept more easily a complete reversal of objectives or grand strategic design than a revision of their own roles," reflected a veteran of the bureaucratic battles both in Washington and Saigon.

Behind the lines and sometimes on them were the endless jurisdictional disputes—CIA operatives, generals, deputy ambassadors, AID administrators, each with Vietnamese clients on whom he was somehow dependent for success, each suspicious that his colleagues would expand their domain and advance *their* clients at his expense. The war, to be sure, was more complex than this single dimension. But the dishonesty, the zeal, the secrecy, the ambitions and fears that drove us on belong in large measure to such bureaucratic politics.

Cliency-in-Waiting

The most dependable clients for all these purposes are not always actually in power. But subtle intervention, a kind of cliency-in-waiting, can help put them there. Indonesia and Chile are cases in point. Economic pressure on left-wing regimes, coupled with a steady relationship with the colonels in the wings, helped to produce less troublesome client regimes in both countries, albeit again at a cost in human rights enormous in Indonesia and yet to be counted in Chile.

Ideology certainly plays a role in these decisions, which are customarily made in the White House. But bureaucrats may also find anti-Marxist dictators, especially the efficient martial variety, easier to deal with as clients than unruly democrats like the Indians.

Ideology has also explained one of the few consistent exceptions to cliency—our relations with the USSR. U. S. diplomats in Moscow and on the Soviet desk in Foggy Bottom are expected to be habitually aloof from their clients. In this they are unlike all their colleagues except, perhaps, those in South Africa. The Russian attitude may all be changing, however, with the latest detente. One wonders what new clients we may acquire when Chase Manhattan invests in Siberia.

Cliency seems both a cause and effect of the larger malaise enveloping the State Department and Foreign Service. Controlling its abuses probably begins with the long-needed

reform of that bureaucracy.

It flourishes, like other dubious practices, in the guild mentality of the State Department, in an elaborate career system that rewards caution, compliance, and evasion while punishing dissent or "mistakes." In an environment where advance depends on conforming to habit, it is perhaps the most common habit of all.

Cliency seems almost inherent in the psychology and sociology of diplomatic work abroad. The British used to mourn the victims of this parochialism as being "too long in the East." State Department desk officers now call it "localitis," certain that it afflicts only their colleagues in the "field."

The malady probably begins with the need to rationalize against the realities of foreign service, whatever the venue. While Henry Kissinger flits dramatically from Georgetown to Peking, most American diplomats in a hundred other capitals are locked in tedious, obscure, and rarely meaningful work. And people who spend most of their adult lives dealing with other bureaucrats in remote places tend to persuade themselves, sooner or later, that dealing with other bureaucrats in remote places is pretty important. From there it's a short step to the added conviction that good relations with a particular regime, are, or ought to be anyway, urgent national business.

In any event, to be without live clients, right or left, in or near power, is often to be bureaucratically impotent either in a mission abroad or in Washington. American officials assigned to forgotten arenas like the UN are seldom a bureaucratic match for their colleagues whose clients are actual governments with the real power. Special State Department offices responsible for international law, environmental matters, refugees, or population control may create an organizational illusion of authority, but none acts without the veto of the regional bureaus, whose clients generally frown on such concerns.

The assistant legal advisor who wrote the unheeded memorandum on human rights during the murders in Burundi personally carried a copy to each policy-maker in the African bureau, skeptical that it would ever reach them by regular staff channels. At the time, however, the legal advisor's office was *never asked* to prepare an opinion on whether events in Burundi constituted a violation of human rights. Moreover, career officers who are assigned to clientless duties like legal affairs know that the promotion system of the Foreign Service follows bureaucratic power, and that it rarely rewards such "mar-

ginal" work. "Did you ever know any official," asked a young diplomat, "whose career has been advanced because he spoke out for human rights?"

Bureaucratic and career interests reinforce this sense of priorities. If there is direct official involvement with the country, such as an aid program or arms sales, there may naturally develop close working relationships with the recipients. Some individual careers and bureaucratic prestige become inevitably linked to the "success" of programs which, in turn, may depend on U. S. influence with the foreign regime. For the American mission as a whole, these programs represent a tangible investment of time and reputation, a call on Washington's resources, and thus further proof of the mission's importance—all bureaucratic assets to be nurtured and protected, and all assuming continuing cooperation from the clients.

Even without major programs to dispense and husband, American missions in most countries are likely to acquire a strong collective tendency toward agreeable relations with the host government. U. S. diplomats of every rank depend on the regime and the elites around it for much of the information and influence by which their performance is measured. It is what the Foreign Service prizes as "access," the ability to hear and to be heard, which many career officers regard as the essence of their profession.

To that end, American diplomats may cultivate their contacts literally day and night. In many countries their universe is peopled largely by distinct groups—politicians who are sensitive to slight or interference, landowners who abhor economic reform, police who see conspiracy, and not the least, the ubiquitous colonels who exude authority and grow impatient with democracies. Over a desk or at a dinner party, the U. S. diplomat feels the importance of these citizens (a reflection of his own), their ardor, their wrath or approval at first hand—realities which may be scarcely appreciated in distant Washington, though they loom large from Athens to Jakarta, from Rio to Lagos.

That distance from Washington gives a U. S. mission abroad its strongest single impulse toward identifying with the interests of its hosts. Among diplomats who escort junketing congressmen and watch the steady shrinkage of their aid appropriations, who see departments recurrently placed under the direction of a new set of "amateurs" and ever hostage to politics or fickle public moods, there grows the conviction that one of the

major burdens of career foreign service is to protect U. S. relations with other regimes from the excesses of Washington. That perspective, too, can be personal as well as bureaucratic. Who indeed is the expert on the scene? Who, after all, spends his life defending the national interest on these frontiers? The view of Washington as ignorant and distracted, as the source of perhaps dangerous meddling for transient reasons, can give the career officialdom of a U. S. embassy a common zeal, sometimes a fervid sense of mission, in representing the position of another government.

There are also human commitments no institutional factor quite explains—an intense loyalty, some diplomats cultivate for a country or region, a matching of personalities and views that may leave an American official feeling more comfortable with a Pakistani general than with many of his own colleagues, the prejudices and emotions released by being witness to dramatic events such as civil wars.

Any of these influences may blur that critical boundary between the U. S. national interest, or simply what is right, and the bureaucratic or private interests of American officials abroad.

Then, too, the Department of State and its officers are still peculiarly isolated among the great agencies of government. The problem is not only that diplomats spend years out of the country. Even in Washington they seldom encounter the people they are supposed to represent. Nearly every other bureaucracy must face some public constituency—welfare mothers at HEW, rent strikers at HUD, truckers at Transportation. And nearly every other bureaucracy has felt recently the cleansing light of exposure in the era of public interest research. But State continues to govern by inertia and default, *in camera*, unaccountable except to bureaucratic self-interest.

Yet, ironically, State may also be the bureaucracy with the greatest potential for responding to the public interest. Foreign Service officers are free of the huge programs and special domestic interests that so often freeze their colleagues in other agencies.

It is ironic too that cliency, as a product of this isolation, has only served to deepen the eclipse of the State Department in the making of foreign policy. Presidents watching

some of the absurdities and distortions of State's efforts to protect their clients have been further confirmed in their accumulation of power in the White House.

The answer to the many problems of cliency surely starts with the opening of the foreign policy process—much as the habits of government are under challenge domestically. And of the many reforms that would mean for the Foreign Service, the most vital are genuine provision for internal dissent and a wider exposure of American diplomats to their own society.

Diplomacy can be a career truly open to talent, its ranks refreshed at all levels by the infusion of short-term officers from outside government, men and women chosen precisely for their independence and unorthodox and critical views of policy. Those who represent America in the world could usefully spend at least half their careers in the country that pays their salaries, in more than token positions on congressional staffs, on newspapers, in what State Department bureaucrats call with nervous sarcasm "the real world" of people and perspectives beyond the encapsulated worlds of embassies and bureaus.

But none of this is new. These steps are endlessly discussed, and the outlook for real change is still bleak. Foreign Service officers know that their pseudo-elitism, their parochialism, their penchant for cliency are all a malignant waste of individual talent and of the Department's potential role. Their reaction is too often a weary cynicism. Foreign Service reform may resemble nothing so much as the reforms of tsarist Russia—agreed necessary for survival, much heralded, never quite taken before it was too late.

They know more than any critic that an honest and sophisticated cliency—as a sensitive appreciation of other societies—is the heart of diplomacy. No government, however willful, can rationally dispense with that observation and interpretation, least of all in this incendiary age.

But only the career service can perform that essential role with integrity, unafraid of career or bureaucratic loss. Only they can ensure that the real clients of American foreign policy are the people beyond governments—people at home and abroad who must pay the flesh-and-blood costs of our decisions.

Near East

NEW YORK TIMES
13 November 1973

Tracing U.S.-Allied Clash: Attitudes Trailed Events

Basic Divergence on Middle East Crisis and Kissinger's Way of Doing Business Among Factors Alienating Europeans

By FLORA LEWIS

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 11 — Misunderstandings, lack of information and a basic divergence in perceptions of the nature of the Middle East crisis led to the recent sharp public rift between Europe and the United States, according to American and allied diplomats.

A series of interviews on what caused the United States to criticize the allies publicly for the position they took during the crisis has disclosed that the personality of Secretary of State Kissinger and the diplomatic history of the past two years were important factors.

There were also underlying changes in circumstance that developed in recent years that were not adequately weighed or even noticed, the diplomats said.

These include heavy European dependence on Arab oil supplies, the quantity and so-

phistication of weapons supplied to the Arabs by the Russians and the Arabs' unexpected ability to mount an effective joint diplomatic campaign.

"They knew exactly where to go and where to put the pressure in each capital," an American official said of the Arabs.

A Matter of Method

The serious new strains on Atlantic relations also flowed from factors not directly concerned with the war and the Arabs' oil weapon, stemming more directly from the way the United States and Europe have been conducting their diplomatic exchanges.

The officials said that a few days after the war began on Oct. 6 the United States' assessment shifted from viewing it as an Arab-Israeli confrontation to discerning evidence of a Soviet attempt to change the strategic balance in the Middle East. European officials, however, continued to see it as a local war.

American sources concede that the United States made little effort to explain its view to its allies. Mr. Kissinger was said to have felt that the allies should have understood the importance of the Soviet effort. When they did not independently reach the same conclusion as

Washington, he was said to have been angered and frustrated.

The Secretary was particularly irritated, according to American officials, that Britain and France did not support the United States in opposing the Soviet Union's attempt to include American and Russian troops in the international emergency force created to help keep the cease-fire.

A message from the Soviet Communist leader, Leonid I. Brezhnev, on Oct. 24 suggested that the United States and the Soviet Union send troops and that the Russians would act alone if Washington refused. That message and reported intelligence that the Russians had taken preparatory measures for a quick airlift of troops were the reason given the worldwide American military alert on Oct. 25.

Alert Explained Belatedly

It was only after the alert had been put into effect and Washington was sure Moscow knew about it that a rejection of the Soviet proposal was sent to Mr. Brezhnev (high-ranking State Department officials do not know whether the hot line was used). The allies were not informed until afterward, and then only sketchily.

"Things were moving too fast, there wasn't time to give them all the details," an official explained. He conceded that the State Department had facilities to reach allied heads of government in time of crisis that could easily have been utilized. But it was a one-man show, according to the officials at the State Department, so that could not be done.

The allies were bewildered and angered by the lack of information at the time of the alert because they felt directly involved in the crisis. They said the United States never made it clear to them just what the Moscow-Washington argument on troops was really about.

Inevitably, any period of intense American-Soviet diplomacy fans European suspicions. Moreover, there has been a widespread tendency in the wake of the two meetings between Mr. Brezhnev and President Nixon to suppose that So-

viet-American agreements are deeper and broader than the specific points announced.

Perceptions of Détente

The theme of American diplomats' comments about the European allies could be put this way: "We've told them it isn't so, and they should know better, but it's true that our rhetoric and style created an aura of something bigger which may have led to assumption."

In hindsight some Americans now believe those assumptions could have been the basis for the difference between the American and European perceptions of what was going on in the Middle East. The Europeans could have supposed that some elements underlying détente meant that the Russians would not really try to upset the strategic balance, as Washington came to believe they were doing.

In any event, when viewed from Washington, Mr. Kissinger's annoyance seems to have been aroused more by this difference in viewpoint than by the reaction of various allies to the United States crash program of military supply to Israel.

He was already short-tempered about allied behavior, State Department officials say, because of the difficulties in getting an agreed response to his proposal for a "New Atlantic charter" last April. That proposal, made without prior consultation, surprised and up-

set the allies.

Reportedly Mr. Kissinger, on the basis of his contacts with foreign envoys and leaders in the previous six months, had expected a quick favorable response.

Embassies Were Hampered

Officials at the State Department felt that this was another example of how difficulties had resulted from the decline in the department's traditional role in important diplomacy and the consequent deterioration in the ability of embassies to inform Washington effectively.

One phrase in Mr. Kissinger's April speech that particularly piqued the allies, especially President Pompidou, was a reference to Europe's "regional interests" in contrast to the "global" responsibilities of the United States.

The phrase "regional interests," included in the State Department's rebuke of the European allies last week, was taken to mean that Mr. Kissinger resented the way the Europeans had chided him about this and wanted them to know he felt that events had proved him right.

"One of Kissinger's basic precepts," a source said, "is that the United States must not be taken for granted and must show that it will react to what it considers lack of understanding of its interests. He wanted to make sure that was known publicly."

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

15 NOVEMBER 1973

Dr. Ashraf Ghorbal, Egypt ambassador to U.S.

Dr. Ashraf Ghorbal brings to his post as ambassador of Egypt to Washington the sophistication of an old, well-to-do, upper class Egyptian family, the erudition of a Harvard professor, a lively liking for things American, and a dauntless persistence in pursuit of his diplomatic objectives.

He was ambassador here before Egypt broke relations during the Six-Day 1967 war, and stayed on as head of the "Egyptian Interests Section," which was technically part of the Indian Embassy, until the summer of 1972.

He and his beautiful wife will be in a sense coming home to their many diplomatic and American friends. Their daughter Nahed is expected back as student at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service where she was enrolled in 1972.

Dr. Ghorbal, who got his masters and doctors degrees from Harvard in 1948 and '49, is very Western in his approach to his job. Unlike some of his Arab colleagues, he does not wait for the world to come to him.

His small, elegant, quick-moving figure was a familiar sight on Capitol Hill and on the campuses of universities to which he readily made himself available as a lecturer.

Hermann Frederick Eilts, U.S. ambassador to Egypt

A big man who usually wears suspenders and has a Teutonic air about him, the new American ambassador-designate to Cairo combines the qualities of scholar and diplomat.

German-born Hermann Frederick Eilts is thorough, serious, and extremely conscientious; he is a foreign service officer with a sharp eye for detail.

"A professional's professional," comments one State Department official.

Almost all his life has been devoted to a study of the Arab world. He speaks fluent Arabic and French and is the author of many articles on such scholarly subjects as the first Omani mission to the United States in the early 19th century.

Mr. Eilts has spent the bulk of his diplomatic career in the Middle East, serving in Tehran, Jidda, Aden, Baghdad, and Tripoli. From 1965 to 1971 he was ambassador to Saudi Arabia.

A co-worker who served with him in Riyadh says he is not afraid to talk frankly but is always polite. He is also patient in dealing with complex problems — a trait that should stand him in good stead in a sensitive post.

NEW YORK TIMES
11 November 1973

U.S.-NATO DISPUTE STILL UNRESOLVED

Europeans Feel Rift Over Mideast Underscores Chronic Differences

By CRAIG R. WHITNEY

Special to The New York Times

BONN, Nov. 10—Despite a week of soothing by American officials eager to heal the wounds opened in the Atlantic alliance by the Middle East war, European and American views of what their relations should be remain far apart.

Many European diplomats are privately surprised at the Nixon Administration for saying publicly that it was disappointed in its partners in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization for not taking a common stand with the United States when the Middle East crisis was at its peak. They are surprised, the diplomats say, because they were never asked to do that.

Criticism of members of the alliance for not acceding to suggestions made in the North Atlantic Council was irksome, NATO diplomats say, because NATO is a defensive alliance designed to protect all of its members against the threat of armed attack by the Soviet Union and its allies in Europe or North America.

Mideast Not in the Picture
The Middle East, the Europeans argue, was never meant to be included.

Europe vs. Superpowers
"Of what use would be a confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact over the Middle East?" a German source said.

"The alliance," said another, "is not just an instrument of American foreign policy."

European diplomats and officials in Bonn, Paris, Brussels, and The Hague insist, therefore, that the Middle East crisis, rather than creating a new rift between the United States and Europe, merely uncovered an old and chronic rift.

The crisis confirmed European views that, in a pinch, they still do not count for much against the two superpowers. It also caused some stirrings toward greater European unity, independent of the United States. The declaration last Tuesday in Brussels of a common European position on the Middle East was a sign

of this another was agreement between the nine foreign ministers of the European Economic Community for a Common Market summit meeting Dec. 14 and 15.

During the Middle East crisis each party to the disagreement complained about lack of cooperation on the part of the other. Here in Europe, officials feel that if they overreacted, so did Washington. Europeans point to the fact that, in some instances, what Nixon Administration officials said in public about European allies contradicted what they said in private.

The Nixon Letter to Brandt

In Bonn, West German officials point out that on Nov. 2 President Nixon sent a letter to Chancellor Willy Brandt that, they say, recognized the basic problem very clearly. This leaves the Germans wondering why, earlier, they were excoriated publicly by Mr. Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger.

In his letter to Mr. Brandt, classified "secret," Mr. Nixon says that the President recognized that there was no obligation to reach a common alliance position on the Middle East, since the Europeans have different interests from the American interests there.

Simply put—and Mr. Nixon went on to make this explicit—Europe gets most of its oil from the Middle East, the United States does not, and the Europeans cannot be expected to alienate their suppliers by joining a United States position backing Israel.

Mr. Nixon noted, however, that "the interests of the alliance as a whole" were involved. He said, "I do not believe we can draw such a fine line when the U.S.S.R. was and is so deeply involved" in the Middle East. "If the U.S.S.R. learns that it can exploit the Middle East to separate the United States from its European allies," he said, the consequences can be disastrous and not only in Europe.

"The alliance," the letter said, "cannot operate on a double standard" with Europe pursuing its own separate policy toward the Soviet Union and the United States another. But he conceded that there had been a "lack of adequate and timely coordination, produced by the rush of events," and promised "to move substantively in this direction."

The Worldwide U. S. Alert

From the European point of view, the United States raised a number of false issues in public criticisms that preceded this secret letter designed, as Mr. Nixon put it, "to put this incident behind us." For instance:

AMERICAN COMPLAINT — The United States got lukewarm backing from its European allies when it put its forces on worldwide alert Oct. 25 against the threat of Soviet intervention in the Middle East.

EUROPEAN VIEW — The United States put its forces on alert first and didn't inform its allies until at least three

hours—longer, some say—later about the decision and the reasons for it. Now American officials seem to have more understanding about European irritation about not being consulted first. Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger, at a NATO meeting at The Hague last week, made a "formal commitment" to better consultation in the future, according to his Dutch opposite number, Henk Vredeling.

Most allies told the United States that it could not use European bases for transfers of supplies to Israel. Made it known that she would not answer "yes" if asked for such permission. West Germany, where the bulk of the American armed forces in Europe is stationed, knew that transfers were being made from bases on its territory, German officials say, and let it pass in silence until after the Oct. 22 cease-fire. Then West Germany became angry—only, it says, because it was not kept informed of further arms shipments that used less-than-discreet methods, such as loading Israeli freighters with arms at Bremerhaven.

The Americans never asked the French for permission to fly over France and also in the case of Italy, officially, the question of United States overflight was never raised. Italy helped, however, by providing oil for the Sixth Fleet, which is based there. And Washington could hardly have been surprised by the refusals of Greece and Spain to let the Americans use bases and ports for support to Israel since they had long followed a policy of staying out of Middle East conflict. Both Greece and Spain, nevertheless, appeared to have tolerated American operations from the bases, which were, in fact, part of the support operation to Israel.

All this may sound disingenuous and self-serving to American ears. In Brussels Tuesday the Common Market ministers took a stand that could not have pleased the United States at all: It called for Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders and foil a recognition of the rights of Palestinians, two concessions to Arab demands that most Europeans who were present recognized for what they were.

Dutch Reversed Stand

Bonn's acceptance of the Brussels declaration has been privately criticized by some members of the Brandt Government as a shameful retreat from West Germany's special relationship with Israel. Mr. Brandt, apparently reacting, said in a speech yesterday that West Germany and Israel still have special ties resulting from the Nazi persecution of the Jews and he denied that West Germany was "hiding behind Europe."

As a Dutch journalist in The Hague noted, the Dutch, by joining in the declaration, reversed the position that had cost them their oil. Two weeks earlier they had called for the

Arabs to withdraw to their 1967 cease-fire positions, which are a long way from the borders, and had been rewarded by a total Arab oil-supply boycott.

Europeans do not like to be told to but many admit to a certain cravenness in their behavior toward the entire Middle East war. This is reflected also in domestic politics in Britain and West Germany, where Opposition parties are criticizing the governments for letting the United States down in a pinch.

The West German-United States disagreement was the most public and spectacular, but the Germans, at least, seem determined now to discount its significance. Much of it, on both sides, appears in hindsight to signify mostly nothing but the chronic European-American problem of too little consultation from the American side on critical decisions.

How Bonn-U.S. Rift Grew

According to well-informed German and American officials here, much of the problem arose from a combination of the pace of events in Washington and the Middle East and overreaction by Bonn and Washington to one another's actions.

These officials say that it was not until Oct. 23, a day after the United Nations' cease-fire resolution was to have taken effect, that West Germany asked the United States not to ship arms from depots here or deny American overflight to the Middle East. A week earlier, at an Oct. 16 meeting between Foreign Minister Walter Scheel and Martin J. Hillenbrand, the United States Ambassador, called at Mr. Hillenbrand's request, West Germany is said to have raised no objections to what were then incomplete reports about American supply movements to Israel.

But between the 16th and the 23d, after the cease-fire resolution, "the Arabs began to put heavy pressure on the Germans with oil," as one source puts it. The Bonn Government has not confirmed that that was the reason.

After the cease-fire on Oct. 23, Paul Frank, a high Foreign Ministry official, called in Ambassador Hillenbrand to ask for clarification of unofficial reports that American arms were still being shipped to Israel from United States Army piers at Bremerhaven and to request that this stop. Mr. Hillenbrand said his information was incomplete and he would have to seek guidance from Washington.

The next day, Mr. Hillenbrand was out of town. When a newspaper in Bremerhaven reported that shipments were still going on, and in Israeli ships, Mr. Frank called in the Ambassador's deputy, Frank E. Cash, and reiterated the demand. Mr. Cash still had no answer from Washington.

Then — through what the

WASHINGTON STAR
2 November 1973

CARL T. ROWAN

Is NATO Coming Apart?

Bonn Government says was a "mistake"—the Foreign Ministry issued to the press a strong statement publicizing the whole business and demanding a stop to it. Friday, Oct. 26, Washington blew up: There were strong words about the Germans and the other Europeans by Dr. Schlesinger, the State Department spokesman, Robert J. McCloskey, and President Nixon.

What particularly baffled the Germans and other NATO allies was Dr. Schlesinger's implied threat to withdraw American troops unilaterally from Europe, on the eve of force-reduction talks with the Soviet Union. They opened in Vienna on Oct. 30. "What is wrong with this man Schlesinger?" a German official asked the other day. "Is it that he's new in his job and doesn't know what he's doing?"

Schlesinger Sees NATO Aides

Dr. Schlesinger, who became Secretary of Defense this year, went to The Hague last week and apparently sought to soothe the hard feelings of fellow defense ministers who were there for a meeting on nuclear planning.

Mr. Schlesinger said later in Washington that "a common understanding" had been reached with the West German Defense Minister, Georg Lebe. It apparently provided that Israeli ships would not be used to transfer arms to Israel in a crisis.

What is clear now in Europe is that only a settlement between the warring parties in the Mideast will serve European interests. If there is no settlement, and Europeans start "freezing to death," they most probably will blame the Arabs or the Israelis—not the Americans. If there is a settlement, achieved through American mediation, the recent flap in the alliance may be hard to remember a few months from now.

Has the North Atlantic Treaty Organization grown moribund, sapped of its vitality by "detente" and the diverging national interests of its members?

That question took on disquieting importance during the recent Arab-Israeli warfare when West European leaders seemed to leave President Nixon alone to twist in the winds of confrontation.

It was clear in his press conference last week that Mr. Nixon was almost as angry at his NATO allies as he was at the press. He volunteered the acid comment that Western Europeans "would have frozen to death this winter" had he not pressured the Soviet Union into joining in the promotion of a cease-fire.

Mr. Nixon was angered by the fact that European allies would not grant landing or overflight rights for U.S. aircraft carrying arms to Israel. And when it appeared that the United States and the Soviet Union were going eyeball-to-eyeball again, leaders of most NATO countries struck timid "We're not in that mess" postures.

There are important lessons in this, and the United States would do well to discern them lest we go on for another quarter of a century putting troops and other vital resources into Western Europe on the assumption that they are the cement for a powerful anti-Soviet alliance.

The recent Western European cop-out simply illustrates anew that each of the NATO countries is going to look after its own vital interest first and foremost.

Only in a grave crisis (if then) will there be any automatic solidarity where all will say, "We conquer together, or we die together."

Western European leaders probably figured it was not in their interest to incur the wrath and retribution of the Arab countries by helping the United States to reararm Israel. That, our NATO friends probably assumed, would be the surest way to freeze to death—this winter, or next, or the year after.

If you think that Arab oil is important to the United States, with our growing energy crisis, think of what it means to Western Europe. The United States got 360 million barrels of oil from the Arab countries in 1972, or 5.8 percent of the total U.S. consumption. Western Europe got 2.75 billion barrels of Arab oil in 1972, or eight times as much as the United States. Half of the 5.5 billion barrels exported by the Arabs went to Western Europe.

Obviously, then, our NATO allies are more careful about making enemies of the Arabs than Mr. Nixon feels he needs to be (although it is estimated that by 1980 half the oil we consume will come from the Middle East).

Not that our NATO allies are necessarily naive about what the Soviet Union is up to. Eugene V. Rostow, sterling professor of law at Yale University and former undersecretary of State for political affairs, put it this way recently:

"Utilizing the Arab sense of grievance against the existence of Israel as a catalyst, the Soviets have trained and supplied the

Arab forces to initiate a war which, they hope, would draw the United States into conflict with all the Arab nations, and thus transform the Middle East and the Near East into a Soviet camp, outflanking NATO, and controlling space and oil supplies vital to the economies and the defense of Europe, the United States, and Japan."

If our NATO allies believe this to be the Soviet strategy, why did they not rally behind Mr. Nixon when he put U.S. forces on alert by way of warning the Russians not to intervene militarily? Surely they don't want the Soviets to control this oil by virtue of a military strike!

Did the Europeans believe that the brinkmanship employed by Mr. Nixon was far in excess of what was needed to restrain the Russians? Did they have some doubts about "the rationality" of the U.S. action and fear that the United States might really start throwing nuclear bombs around?

Whatever they thought, Mr. Nixon now has the hard-to-refute argument that his strategy worked. Western Europe can scarcely argue with any certainty that milder action would have worked as well.

The diplomats are out now with their baling wire and Band-aids, trying to heal this rift in the North Atlantic alliance. But that may not be so easy. We just may have seen the first truly meaningful evidence that finally NATO, like SEATO and CENTO, is merely the bureaucratic shell of a great idea that is now well past its time.

WASHINGTON STAR
9 November 1973

MISUNDERSTANDING BLAMED

NATO Rift Begins to Heal

By George Sherman
Star-News Staff Writer

"We certainly made a God-awful mess of it" — so said one insider, in an unguarded moment, about American handling of NATO allies during the recent Middle East war.

He and others speak of the U.S. government's emotional accusations against its European partners for separating themselves from American peace efforts. Whether Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger actually used "disgust" to describe his disenchantment with NATO at a closed-door briefing on Capitol Hill 10 days ago, that word aptly sums up the Nixon administration's reaction at the height of the crisis.

So serious is the concern over the consequences now that Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger and Kissinger have set up a special high-level working group to sort out what went wrong and which "procedures" must be corrected.

Today the public words have become much softer. Rallying of transAtlantic ranks has become the order of the day. Embarrassed diplomats and American officials speak of "misunderstanding" now overcome. Schlesinger returned last night from a NATO meeting at The Hague, Netherlands, with assurances that there now appears to be "an understanding among the allies of U.S. objectives in the Middle East." Schlesinger emphasized that his meetings "underscored the need for closer consultations" between the allies.

But behind the scenes is the realization that the Middle East crisis produced the biggest rift in the 24-year history of the alliance. By the time President Nixon suddenly ordered the worldwide alert of American forces the night of Oct. 24-25, a virtual communications breakdown existed between Washington and its chief European allies.

To be sure, events had moved swiftly — too swiftly for consultation — since the outbreak of the war on Oct.

OFFICIALS and foreign diplomats here, looking back over the debris of almost three weeks of crisis, acknowledge that a "perception gap" grew within the alliance about what was happening in the Middle East.

"At first, we handled it relatively calmly as the fourth round in the Israeli-Arab feud," said one American official. "Certainly it was seen as a test of Soviet-American detente, but that meant testing whether Moscow and Washington could swiftly bring an end to the fighting."

"At that early point, the European position was not of great concern to the United States."

"How could we be upset with many European declarations of neutrality, or the British embargo on arms shipments to the area," continued the official, "when we ourselves were holding off on arms resupply to Israel and pressuring the Russians to do the same with the Arabs." In short, he said, the common acceptance of Israeli invincibility since 1967 supported the luxury of Western division over tactics to follow in this latest war.

THE EUROPEANS made full use of that luxury. From the outset they made no secret that the oil weapon of the Arabs had great power. Since Western Europe depends upon the Mediterranean and Persian Gulf oil fields for between 70 and 80 percent of its fuel, governments quickly used neutrality in the "local conflict" to preserve that flow of oil.

But the initial estimate on both sides of the Atlantic about what would happen in the war soon proved false. Not only did Egypt and Syria show unexpected prowess on the battlefield, straining Israeli sources to the hilt, but the Russians also showed by Oct. 10 that they were moving to replenish Egyptian and Syrian weapons in an emergency air and sea lift.

By the end of the war's first week, American officials say, the United States was convinced that the Russians were out to upset the military balance in the

Middle East.

Here is where that perception gap first became evident. Persuasion having failed, Nixon responded in kind to the Russians. On Oct. 14, he began the American resupply of Israel.

BUT THE West Europeans were still left with the first assessment. Two days later the American representative to NATO, Donald Rumsfeld, went into the NATO council in Brussels with a whole new analysis of the East-West stakes in what had previously been a local war.

"It was a tough statement," said one official familiar with the American message. "We told our allies that we wanted to show the Soviet Union detente is a two-way street. We told them that the whole of Western security was now involved, since the Soviet Union was aiming for a strategic victory in the Middle East."

The European governments were taken aback. "They had no preparation for this assessment," said the official. And Rumsfeld's suggestion that Europe join with the United States in cooling relations with the Soviet Union, its Eastern European allies and Yugoslavia — which had permitted Soviet overflights to the Middle East — fell on deaf ears.

But at this stage different European governments had different reactions toward quietly helping the American airlift to Israel. The Western Germans, for instance, agreed "to close their eyes" to the airlifting of M60 tanks, aboard giant C5A air transports from among the 2,000-tank stockpile the Americans keep in Germany.

THE PORTUGUESE also agreed to the use of the American air base in the Azores as a staging area. That guaranteed the smooth air transport of Phantom F4 fighter-bombers from the United States to Israel with refueling in the air and hops from the aircraft carriers John F. Kennedy and Franklin D. Roosevelt near Gibraltar and farther east in the Mediterranean. Greece also made no move to curtail American 6th Fleet operations out of Ath-

ens.

But the British, according to informed sources, refused to allow any American use of their sovereign base at Akrotiri on Cyprus. In the past, this base has been used for refueling the secret Mach3 SR71 high-flying reconnaissance plane, the successor for the U2, used to photograph battle lines and weapons deployment in the Sinai and along the Suez Canal.

Furthermore, Spain — which does not recognize Israel — refused any American use of the \$500 million American air bases there. Spain, Italy and Britain also refused to allow any overflight to and from Israel.

France, which left the integrated NATO structure seven years ago and has a well-established pro-Arab tradition, was written off from the outset, say officials. In the other cases, the United States made no formal requests or protests, because Washington was given to understand in advance there would be no cooperation.

ON THE diplomatic front, Britain — previously the closest U.S. ally — upset Washington during the first 10 days of hostilities. Kissinger approached British Ambassador Lord Cromer to have Britain present a cease-fire resolution in the U.N. Security Council. Kissinger assured the British that the proposal had Soviet support.

But the British government, according to informed sources, checked with Egypt and Syria at the U.N. only to discover at that time of Arab triumph that they were in no mood for a cease-fire. Therefore, the British, according to these sources, spurned the Kissinger request. Today American officials say that was probably "a sound tactic" not to be labeled an "American fall guy."

All of these European disagreements were kept carefully quiet. But they festered beneath the surface. The perception gap grew broader. To Kissinger, Schlesinger and other American principals, say officials, the Europeans seemed to be acting out the somber picture drawn in Kissinger's "Year of Eu-

rope" speech last April 23.

In Washington the crisis seemed to threaten to achieve Soviet strategic gains in an area vital to the security of the Western alliance. Oil and the "soft underbelly" of Europe were at stake. Yet Europe was pursuing "narrow regional interests."

In his April 23 speech, Kissinger had warned that the alliance "cannot hold together if each country or region asserts its autonomy whenever it is to its benefit."

BUT IN EUROPE, say diplomats here, the perception was quite different. The Nixon administration appeared to never treat its Western European allies as more than a footnote to the main diplomacy with the Russians. Kissinger spent all his time hammering out a deal with Moscow, they say. For example, his sudden and unexplained visit to the Soviet capital Oct. 20 to work out a cease-fire resolution.

Not until Nov. 2 — well after the climax of the crisis — did the secretary of State meet here with European ambassadors to analyze what had happened and explain American unhappiness with the allies.

"We simply were not given information earlier to judge the seriousness of the Soviet threat," said one senior diplomat.

"It is true that the Kissinger style is to keep his cards close to the vest," acknowledged an American official. For instance, deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Rush, former ambassador to Germany and for-

mer deputy Defense Secretary, was not delegated the authority to inform allied ambassadors here about what was happening in the spectrum of American diplomacy.

NEXT CAME the shock of the worldwide alert of American forces the night of Oct. 24-25 in response to a still-secret letter of Soviet leader Leonid I. Brezhnev allegedly threatening to intervene in the Middle East. European diplomats agree that the action Nixon felt was imperative allowed no time for consultation across the Atlantic.

But they maintained the President failed to use the time he did have in the early hours of Thursday to give personal explanations to key European leaders about what he had done and why.

Telephone calls to British Prime Minister Edward Heath, West German Chancellor Willy Brandt and French President Georges Pompidou would have made a great difference, said one observer. "It would have enabled those leaders to tell their cabinets and parliaments that they knew exactly what the President was doing and why. As it was, the alert came out of nowhere when the United States and the Soviet Union had seemed to be working matters out in the Middle East."

UNFLATTERING comparisons are being drawn with the way President Kennedy handled the Cuban missile crisis by sending special envoys to allies in Europe. While the Cuban crisis

was an actual confrontation, and one where Kennedy had more time to act and prepare later moves, critics nevertheless maintain that in the Mideast case, too, the President could have gained understanding by simply telling his allies what he was up to.

To this day the exact timing of the decision for the alert is a matter of some confusion in Washington.

Officials explain that a worldwide alert is a complicated affair. It is in fact a series of orders to various American units, and in this case the putting together of the whole package took place over a three-hour period from midnight to 3 a.m. But no U.S. official has yet explained why the President — who first approved the idea of warning the Russians and later approved the whole alert package — could not have telephoned his allies during this three-hour period.

IRONICALLY, when the administration's simmering frustration with Europe came into the open, the Germans were the target. At first they had quietly cooperated in the airlift. But when a German newspaper in Bremerhaven, the Nordsee Zeitung, discovered that American tanks were being loaded in the port there aboard an Israeli freighter a day after the first cease-fire on Oct. 22, the German foreign ministry called on the United States to halt this violation of German "neutrality."

Later it turned out, that the public statement was a bureaucratic mistake. Ac-

cording to diplomatic sources, the spokesman of the German Foreign Ministry had been handed a "guidance" paper on how to answer the flood of inquiries about the loading in Bremerhaven. By accident, however, this guidance paper was stamped as a press release and its frank language released for publication. By that time the loaded Israeli ship had sailed — one had before it — but a third freighter was denied entry to Bremerhaven.

On Friday, Oct. 26, the immediate crisis with Moscow passed but the split with Germany was now out in the open. The President, the State Department and Schlesinger publicly chastized Europe for its lack of support. To the dismay of the Germans, Schlesinger openly suggested that the United States might have to "review" whether the United States and West Germany still have identical views about American forces and supplies kept in Germany.

Today that implied threat to the American commitment in Europe is seen more as a measure of irritation with the perfection of the alliance than as a practical alternative for the future. Schlesinger and Kissinger have said privately and publicly that NATO remains a cornerstone of American foreign policy. But the Mideast war has shown that unity between the two sides of the Atlantic can no longer be taken for granted in the age of superpower detente.

BALTIMORE SUN

5 November 1973

Russia shifts toward a cooler detente

By MICHAEL PARKS

Moscow Bureau of The Sun

Moscow—Despite the confrontation with the United States brought on by the Arab-Israeli war, the Soviet Union appears to remain strongly committed to detente as the basis for its relations with the West.

But Moscow is serving notice that its implementation of that policy is changing because of its experiences with Washington in the last month.

The Kremlin already has begun divorcing itself from the Nixon administration, now publicly described here as opportunistic, corrupt and perfidious, and is seeking broader contacts in the U.S.

This probably will weaken the Nixon administration's bargaining position with the Soviet leadership.

Moscow also apparently has decided to broaden the base of detente with more extensive dealings with Western Europe, not only on regional matters but on questions involving other areas, such as the Middle East.

Moscow hopes that Western Europe then would serve as a check on its American ally and become a guarantor of East-West detente. Until now, Moscow has preferred to deal with West European states individually and has prized its special relationship with Washington above all else.

The Soviet Union now takes a more cynical—and undoubtedly more realistic—view of the role of domestic politics in the formulation of foreign policy in the West.

This is likely to lead to greater Soviet involvement in the domestic affairs of the United States and other Western countries, for example by lobbying among politicians and legislators for trade concessions, rather than relying only upon agreements with the leadership.

Within the Kremlin, Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Soviet Communist party leader who has linked his political fortunes to detente, probably now finds himself under new restraints,

while the position of his critics has grown stronger.

Those who have warned against going too far too fast with the United States now most probably will renew their declarations that "peaceful co-existence does not end the implacable confrontation between the two systems."

The basic direction of Soviet foreign policy will remain the same, Moscow is saying, but there will be changes in the way it is put into practice.

There have been some signs of those changes already—a few policy declarations and numerous smaller indicators of the new trend.

For example, a top Soviet

foreign affairs specialist, commenting on Moscow television last night, said that the American military alert during the war probably was due to President Nixon's domestic political problems. It was the first time any Soviet official had even hinted at this.

The alert, the commentator reiterated, was "completely without foundation." *Pravda*, the Communist party newspaper, described it earlier yesterday as having "led to an artificial fanning of emotions with the spreading of fantastic allegations about the Soviet Union's intentions in the Middle East.

"But, as it should have been expected," *Pravda* continued, "the attempt to scare the Soviet Union has been a complete fiasco."

These commentaries represent a complete public reassessment of the relations between Moscow and Washington.

Soviet officials and commentators continue to speak of the "special responsibility" and the "tremendous possibilities" the two superpowers have for insuring world peace, but there is a more modest appraisal of what the two can do and the relationship that has been developed between them.

Soviet officials have shown particular alarm about the failure of the Nixon administration to keep its promises, first on Israeli observance of a cease-fire and later on securing congressional approval for trade concessions.

Mr. Brezhnev indicated that he felt President Nixon had failed to fulfill his part of the cease-fire agreement by obtaining Israeli compliance,

thus putting not only the credibility of Moscow but also of Mr. Brezhnev himself in doubt.

"It does not augur well for relations between our countries or between the two leaders," a well-placed Soviet citizen told an American last week. "We must be able to believe and rely on each other and in turn be believed by the world as a whole."

Izvestia, the Soviet government newspaper, attacked the Nixon administration, accusing it of blackmail in its decision to ask Congress not to consider reduced tariffs for the Soviet Union when it takes up the omnibus trade bill shortly.

Soviet leaders had accepted this maneuver, knowing that if trade concessions to the Soviet Union had been taken up, Congress either would have refused to approve such concessions or would have conditioned them on free emigration from the Soviet Union. But apparently they were angered when the White House linked the move to the Middle East war, making it appear that such concessions depended on Soviet compromises there.

"Different questions"

"There is no connection between these two different questions," *Izvestia* said in a commentary. "Calculations, if they really exist in official Washington, to use the question of foreign trade relations for some unseemly political purposes are fully inconsistent."

But Soviet commentators, following the line adopted by Mr. Brezhnev 10 days ago, continue to emphasize Moscow's desire for better relations with the United States and other Western countries.

The relations should be

grounded, they continue, on "the broadly based desires of the American and Soviet people to live in peace and friendship" and on a series of formal agreements, not just in political understandings between leaders.

This renewed distrust of Western political leaders has been underscored by the large volume of reports and commentaries in the Soviet press in the last week on Mr. Nixon's political problems, on what was described as the seamy corruption in his administration and on the prospect, mentioned for the first time Friday, that he might be impeached.

This has come as a shock to most Soviet citizens who only four months ago saw Mr. Brezhnev walking arm in arm with Mr. Nixon.

With the visit here last week of Walter Scheel, the West German foreign minister, Moscow inaugurated its policy of counterbalancing the United States with Western Europe, insuring that the gyrations of one will not upset its policy of detente.

Yevgeny Primakov, deputy director of the important Institute of World Economy and International Relations, told a Moscow television audience last night that America's European allies had played an important role in checking the United States' actions during the Middle East crisis.

Weekend commentaries in *Pravda* suggest that the Kremlin now is willing to deal with Western Europe as a group, something it previously had feared and refused to do, in order to keep detente on an even keel. This view also was expressed in Vienna last week by Soviet diplomats at the

opening of the negotiations on troop reductions in Central Europe.

Whether these adjustments will satisfy Mr. Brezhnev's domestic critics, whose opposition had grown fairly strong even before the Middle East war, is an open question.

During the fighting, the abrupt changes in the Kremlin's position indicated to many diplomats and other observers here that the leadership coalition was having difficulty working out a policy.

At first Moscow held aloof from the fighting, then, pushed by the military establishment, it became involved in a heavy resupply operation, reserved itself dramatically to search for a cease-fire when the battle turned against the Arabs, and then switched once again to deliver Israel an ultimatum warning of "grave consequences" and send Washington an even starker message about the danger of prolonged fighting.

The Soviet Union very early had characterized the war as a test of detente—that is a test of the foreign policy that Mr. Brezhnev has identified himself with—and the Kremlin saw that policy failing.

Moscow apparently feels that this policy was saved and will survive—but with changes.

Its version of detente most likely will be even more competitive now that it has concluded that Washington cannot be expected to act with rationality or even in close tandem with it on crisis situations.

Detente, in the Soviet view, lives, but Moscow now has a clearer, more modest appreciation of what it can and cannot do, and the Kremlin is adjusting its practice of detente to strengthen its position.

WASHINGTON POST 9 November (1973)

U.S. Alert

The Soviet Union and Australia both criticized the United States for placing its armed forces on worldwide alert during the Middle East crisis.

A Washington dispatch by the official Soviet news agency, Tass, suggested that the House decision to override President Nixon's veto of the war-powers bill had been influenced by the alert. The Soviet press has previously published reports that the alert was called to divert attention from Mr. Nixon's domestic difficulties.

In Canberra, Australian Prime Minister Gough Whitlam said he believed that President Nixon had called the alert "for domestic American consumption."

LONDON, OBSERVER
4 November 1973

A SHOCK FOR THE ALLIANCE

THE MIDDLE EAST crisis has brought some severe shocks on both sides of the Atlantic. They suggest that, even after 25 years' experience, the nature of the Western nuclear alliance is still not fully understood, even by its leading members. They underline the serious need to rethink Nato's purposes and methods, unavailingly proposed earlier this year by Dr Kissinger.

The United States Government has complained bitterly about the refusal of some European countries, chiefly Britain and West Germany, to co-operate in the arms airlift to Israel and in other military operations connected with the recent Middle Eastern war. Washington is also upset by the general European reluctance to share scarce oil supplies and to risk any extension of the Arab oil boycott. The Americans have discovered, apparently to their surprise, that they cannot move into a Middle East crisis and count on automatic Nato support.

The European members of Nato, for their part, have been angered because the US expected loyal support for an American policy in the Middle East which affects vital European interests adversely, but about which Europe had not been consulted. The anger was sharpened by what seemed an irresponsible use by President Nixon of the nuclear alert. There was astonishment, especially in Britain, that the US could proclaim such an alert inevitably involving the whole alliance and British bases, without prior consultation.

If there is any surprise about Europe's differing views on the Middle East, it is largely because of European restraint in not bringing the dispute into the open before now. For it has long been obvious that leading European countries—though not all fully united in their views—have been watching the evolution of Washington's Middle East policies with growing anxiety, because of their possibly disastrous impact on Western oil supplies. In hindsight, it would probably have been better if these differences had been more openly discussed before the crisis burst. But, like other differences between the US and Europe over trade and US forces in

Nato—which have added bitterness to the present recriminations, their settlement has been repeatedly postponed because of other major matters, such as the Vietnam war, the American rapprochement with Russia and China, and more recently the Watergate affair.

But if the US needs to consult her European allies more closely, the Europeans on their side are bound to accept certain inevitable consequences of belonging to a nuclear alliance. The vastly expensive American nuclear deterrent is still the vital element in the Atlantic alliance, a fact that is recognised, grudgingly, even by Gaullist France.

Mr Nixon's use of the nuclear alert, allegedly to block the dispatch of Soviet troops to Egypt, was unwise. But Europeans who accept the American nuclear protection must expect that in a genuine war crisis the US would inevitably have to act with a speed which precludes real consultation with other Nato members. A nuclear deterrent controlled by an international committee would scarcely be credible.

The alternative to accepting last-resort American decision-making is for the Europeans to renounce American nuclear protection, either by adopting an entire non-nuclear neutrality or by relying on their own nuclear weapons. Of course, the latter choice would involve exactly the same problems of committee decisions among the Europeans themselves and would be even less credible.

This question of America's paramount nuclear responsibility has naturally aroused deeper anxieties because of the present shaky situation of the American President, whose finger alone can press the nuclear button.

The disastrous impact of Mr Nixon's conduct on America's domestic affairs is obviously a matter for the American people to deal with. But the rest of the world is entitled to judge whether or not the conduct of American foreign policy would now benefit from Mr Nixon's departure. The continuous decline in Mr Nixon's authority at home must inevitably weaken his influence abroad. On the other hand, even a weakened Nixon, working with the capable Dr Kissinger, might well be able to sustain a more vigorous and imaginative foreign policy than any likely successor.

Even if Dr Kissinger were kept in office, any new occupant of the White House would probably try to avoid involvement in major international initiatives, such as are now urgently required to make and to guarantee peace in the Middle East. But, whatever the consequences, the signs are growing that Mr Nixon's Presidency can no longer be saved.

WASHINGTON POST
13 November 1973

Detente Eased Crisis, Says Dobrynin

By Marilyn Berger
Washington Post Staff Writer

NEW YORK, Nov. 12—Soviet Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin said today that the relaxation of tensions between Moscow and Washington had prevented the Middle East crisis from developing "in a very dangerous direction."

Taking up the same theme sounded by President Nixon a week ago, he said that the agreement signed Sunday by Israel and Egypt "in no small degree depended on Soviet-American understanding and cooperation."

He said nothing about the alert of U.S. forces called by Mr. Nixon when it appeared to Washington that the Soviet Union might directly intervene in Egypt.

While praising detente as "irreversible in character" and as "the only reasonable process," Dobrynin told 1,200 representatives at the National Foreign Trade Convention that "political detente cannot

go along without a real economic detente." Dobrynin told his listeners that one prerequisite for improved economic relations was the approval of most-favored-nation treatment for the Soviet Union to end tariff discrimination against Soviet products. He cited the expansion of trade and economic relations as "essential" to consolidating political detente.

At the same time, Dobrynin rejected what he called "economic blackmail." Any attempt to link MFN with "other things . . . damaging to our social system" would be rejected, he said, in a clear reference to the mood in Congress to deny MFN to Moscow unless it liberalizes its emigration policies.

"Economic blackmail," Dobrynin declared, "should be part of disarmament, too." There were those in the United States, he said, who "strive for the subversion of detente," but detente had already "proven its practical ef-

fectiveness" in the Middle East.

Dobrynin recalled that when President Franklin Delano Roosevelt established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1933 he made a special point of saying that Moscow should not interfere in the internal affairs of the United States. It is a "peculiar historical irony," Dobrynin said, that people in the United States are now trying to change Soviet internal affairs. But he said these "emotional issues" are "being solved in practice," a reference to increased emigration of Soviet Jews.

Just after Dobrynin was introduced four youths, apparently from the Jewish Defense League, started shouting: "Russian pig, go home." Let my people go now," and an assortment of curse words. The youths were roundly booed by the luncheon guests.

In his only acknowledgment of the disruption, Dobrynin

remarked that "it is sometimes difficult to be ambassador in your country."

Dobrynin used the platform of the National Foreign Trade Convention to answer complaints that the Soviet Union had "snookered" the United States in last year's massive grain purchases. "Last year's grain deal," he said, was a "purely commercial transaction" which is now being used "for rather unfriendly anti-Soviet purposes . . . to blame my country for the jump in food prices."

He said "everything was done strictly in accordance with American law and practice." Moreover, he said it was in line with American tradition, "to get the best possible prices." He then suggested that if the Soviet Union were ever to enter the international grain market again it would look for "wheat without political weeds." He said: "We need an unpolluted atmosphere in our deals."

WASHINGTON STAR
2 November 1973

Spain Cuts Effect of U.S. Bases

By Richard Scott Mowrer

Special to The Star-News

MADRID — A casualty of the Middle East war could turn out to be the American bases in Spain.

For although they are 2,000 miles from the area of conflict the air and naval installations here have come under the cross-fire of conflicting Spanish-American interests. This has impaired their usefulness, a fact certain to be weighed when the time comes to decide whether to extend beyond 1975, or terminate, America's 20-year-old military partnership with Spain.

Uncertainty about the Spanish bases stems from these contradictions:

- Spain wholeheartedly supports the Arab cause against Israel whereas the United States is committed to Israel's survival. Spain has never recognized the Jewish state, the only country in Western Europe not to do so.
- Shortly after the latest outbreak of Arab-Israeli hostilities Gen. Francisco Franco let it be known that he would not permit the American-manned bases here to be used in connection with the Middle East war "at any time, in any way, directly or indirectly."
- The prohibition is hard to reconcile with the fact that the operational scope of the American military presence in Spain extends the full length of the Mediterranean.

Torrejon, 14 miles from Madrid, is the headquarters of the U.S. 16th Air Force which commands units in Turkey, Greece and Italy as well as Spain. Apart from serving as an overseas base for American nuclear submarines Rota, near Cadiz, is an important logistics and communications relay point between the United States and the eastern Mediterranean. One of its functions is to replenish the U.S. 6th Fleet at sea wherever it may be, including the Middle East area.

IN OTHER MOMENTS of crisis the four American air bases and the big naval complex in Spain played useful back-up roles. In 1958 when U.S. Marines were

rushed to Lebanon the installations here served as staging areas for the movement of supplies eastward. Spanish official sources recall that "more than 1,000 U.S. aircraft crossed over Spain in 24 hours."

At the time of the six-day war in 1967 the bases were used in the evacuation of American families from hostile Arab lands.

According to the American embassy here the United States did not request permission to use the bases in connection with the airlifting of supplies to Israel so the question never arose. Presumably the Spain-based USAF tankers for in-flight refuelling played no part in the air-lift.

THE FACT REMAINS that Franco has drawn a gradually tightening noose of restrictions around the \$400 million naval installation and air bases the Americans built as part of the aid-for-bases deal signed in 1953.

At first they were defined as "joint" bases although as far as operations were concerned the bases were almost entirely American. Later they became "facilities" which the U.S. Navy and Air Force were allowed to use subject to Spanish consent.

In 1970 the bases agreements were renegotiated. The then minister of Foreign Affairs, Gregorio Lopez Bravo, was able to say afterwards that the new accords "have ended the understanding whereby U.S. forces could utilize areas and installations on Spanish soil with no other obligation than to communicate their intentions with the maximum urgency."

RECENTLY THE Spanish government stressed that the "sole" function of the bases deal with America is to counter threats or attacks against the security of the West. Whether Soviet-American confrontations in the Middle East constitute a threat to Western security so far has not been fully put to the test.

Behind Spain's expanding curtailment of American utilization of the bases are these motives:

- A-very keen wish to stay on good terms with the Arabs. One reason for this is oil. Another is the need to fend off Arab pressures on Spain to give up its African possessions.
- Discontent with the American relationship, which is regarded as too one-sided.

NEW YORK TIMES
11 November 1973

NAVAL FORCES IRK SOUTHERN EUROPE

Mediterranean Holds 300
Warships, Causing Anxiety
About Nuclear Arms

By PAUL HOFMANN

Special to The New York Times

ATHENS, Nov. 10—At least 300 warships are concentrated in the Mediterranean these days, and the people living around the crowded sea—and their governments—are increasingly anguished by all this display of naval power.

The gray vessels with their gun turrets, missile launchers, aircraft and electronics masts belong to the United States Sixth Fleet, the growing Soviet Mediterranean fleet and the navies of the coastal nations.

On any given day some 2,000 merchant ships are also between Gibraltar and the Bosphorus. Since the outbreak of the fourth Arab-Israeli war last month, they are navigating with particular caution because of the many warships.

The nuclear warheads that are presumed to be aboard some of the United States and Soviet craft make the situation even more ominous for the Mediterranean region, which has seen the rise and ruin of civilization since the dawn of history. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that proposals to bar extraneous warships and, above all, nuclear weapons are being discussed from Spain to Turkey and from Algeria to Yugoslavia.

Neutralization Suggested

When a Greek Government spokesman was asked at a press briefing about the feelings in official quarters about the armadas just outside territorial waters, he mentioned neutralization of the Mediterranean.

The spokesman, Under Secretary Spyros Zournatzis, recalling that a former Spanish Foreign Minister, Gregorio Lopez Bravo, had made a proposal to neutralize this sea, observed that this clearly required international and bilateral accords.

He did not sound convinced that Washington and Moscow would agree in the foreseeable future to withdraw their naval forces from the Mediterranean. The governments of the other coastal states are known to assume that they have to live with the superpowers' navies within aircraft and missile range for a long time.

Experts here and in Rome

even predict a further increase in naval strength in the Mediterranean next year, when the first Soviet aircraft carrier is to pass through the Dardanelles.

At present the power balance favors the Sixth Fleet, although it has fewer ships—about 60—than the Soviet fleet, which has about 90. The three American carriers in the Mediterranean make all the difference; the Soviet Navy has none, and it lost its shore-based air cover when Egypt asked the Russians to leave last year.

Resistance About Bases

Resigned though the coastal states may be to the situation, they have been unready to concede bases.

The Greek Premier, Spyros Markezinis, for one, came out publicly against an accord that granted the Sixth Fleet home-port rights at Eleusis, near Athens, early this year, before he became Premier. He does not appear to have changed his mind about the advisability of an American naval presence in Greek waters, and there is talk here that he may propose to shift the United States bases to remote spots.

Other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, among them Italy, have also become cagey about providing facilities to the Sixth Fleet. The Arabs' oil diplomacy has contributed to making the Mediterranean a less hospitable place for American naval power than it used to be.

Theoretically, the Sixth Fleet—like the Soviet fleet—is self-sustaining, but it makes a great difference if a fleet has local supply support. The Sixth Fleet has far more friendly seaports than do the Soviet warships.

Those Poor Guys

"Those poor guys over there," an officer aboard an American aircraft carrier said, pointing to a Soviet destroyer a few miles away. "Our sailors do get shore leave."

"The Soviet sailors and naval infantry must live very ascetic lives," he added. "Their vessels are crammed with electronic gear to listen in on us, and they hardly ever have a chance of feeling firm soil under their feet before they get home. Egypt and Syria let Soviet warships into their seaports only sparingly."

Shore leave may be important, but fleet commanders worry even more about logistic support and resupply. With the posture of the United States allies in the Mediterranean stiffening, the Sixth Fleet may be confronted with new problems.

One is fuel. The fleet is gobbling up 10,000 barrels a day, most of it supplied by refineries in Italy and Greece. Arab pressure on the two countries and the general shortage may reduce the flow, requiring supply by tanker from the East Coast.

NEW YORK TIMES
10 November 1973

Atlantic 'Partnership'

The crisis in the Western alliance set off by the Mideast war throws an ironic light on the draft text of the new "Atlantic Charter" submitted by the United States to its European allies on Sept. 29, and published in The Times on Friday.

The charter, a declaration of agreed principles for adoption at a proposed Western summit meeting this winter, is sought by President Nixon and Secretary Kissinger as part of an effort to revitalize the trans-Atlantic partnership. It is supposed to cap the wide-ranging discussions set in motion for that purpose in this so-called "Year of Europe."

Europe's initial draft declaration was criticized as "very thin" by a State Department note which accompanied the American version of September 29. The essence of the American revisions was summed up in that note's insistence that the charter must "reflect better the realities of our common concerns and our intention to deal meaningfully with them on a common basis."

One week later, when the Mideast burst into flames, this solemn American recommitment to the alliance was virtually ignored by Washington. Without significant consultation, the United States plunged into a unilateral effort to deal with this overriding "common concern," the Mideast, as if it were a purely American—and American-Soviet—problem.

Yet despite long-standing differences with some European governments over Mideast tactics, there was nothing the United States did during the 18-day war, from the decision to re-supply Israel to the Kissinger-Brezhnev cease-fire formula, that need have been impeded by fully informing and even "consulting" the NATO allies. Consultation in an emergency does not mean that action must be delayed until agreed decisions are reached.

During last month's Mideast war President Nixon put Europe at risk by an escalatory move that placed American nuclear and conventional forces in Europe as well as the United States on an alert, without informing the NATO allies beforehand to enable them, if they agreed, on the danger, to alert their forces as well.

All blame for the angry quarrel in October between the United States and its NATO allies does not, of course, rest on Washington's shoulder's. But the United States cannot expect West Europe to accept the risks of an oil cut-off unless it makes realistic energy-sharing proposals. The United States with less than 6 per cent of the world's population consumes almost one-third of its oil. It consumes more than twice as much energy per capita as its richest NATO allies. Unless Washington proposes to cut back consumption and share supplies for essential needs equitably with its allies (including Japan) in the event of a serious crisis, it is unrealistic to attempt to achieve a common Mideast policy.

What applies to the Mideast applies even more to all the issues of trade, money, defense and arms control in Europe that have strained the Atlantic partnership increasingly in recent years. Common action by the Atlantic allies in the common interest is essential in all these fields and it could be advanced by a strongly-worded "Atlantic Declaration of Principles."

But if the increasingly powerful Common Market countries are to agree to consult Washington before taking decisions that can damage the United States, Washington must demonstrate in action as well as words that consultation is a two-way street.

LONDON TIMES
7 November 1973

Personal view by Richard Crossman

Why Arabists in the Foreign Office are well content

Three weeks ago I roused quite a flurry by ascribing the behaviour of the Government in the Arab-Israeli war to the control of British Middle Eastern policy by a tight little group of Arabists in the Foreign Office. To judge by some of the letters I got there is a solid phalanx of Times readers who welcome this state of affairs. They feel that we just cannot afford to get mixed up in anything which would incur the enmity of the oil sheikhs of the Persian Gulf: instead we should follow the French example and deliberately cultivate the friendship of the Arab states.

No one can accuse Sir Alec Douglas-Home of not doing his level best to put this policy into effect. But is it proving successful? To answer this question we must recall the events of the past month. In retrospect we can see that Sir Alec's decision to deny the Israelis the spares and ammunition for their Centurion tanks came at the height of the military crisis caused by the Arab preemptive strike. It was touch and go whether the Syrian Army would pour down from the Golan Heights into Galilee and the Egyptians achieve a breakthrough to the Mitla Pass. The Israelis were already short of ammunition and if the Americans had not begun their immense airlift at once they would have been in serious peril.

Since Sir Alec has assured us that the preservation of Israel is one of his main concerns, we must assume that he decided to rely on Mr Nixon to supply arms to Israel while himself currying favour with the Arabs, by denying his Nato ally the use of the huge British base in Cyprus for transit purposes. When he treated the Americans in this way he was in quite good company. M Pompidou and Herr Brandt did the same for the same reasons; and they all then proceeded to complain bitterly that they were not consulted when Mr Nixon ordered the nuclear alert in order to deter the Russians from flying troops into Egypt. Since then, there has been an exchange of insults between the western capitals and at the time when our strength most depended on our unity, Nato has been in total disarray.

Nevertheless, the Arabists at the Foreign Office feel well content. A breach of faith with Israel and a split in Nato is, in their eyes a price well worth paying in order to seize an opportunity to improve British rela-

tions with the Arabs. Indeed, they can now claim that the neutrality Sir Alec announced at the beginning of the war has by now been transformed through their active diplomacy, into a positive pro-Arab posture. Mr Peter Walker was able on Monday to reaffirm to the House of Commons that Britain—which is now classed as a friendly nation by Arab spokesmen — "has received assurances to which we attach great value from certain of the Arab oil producers that our supplies will be maintained".

Meanwhile, however, the Arabs observing the disorder into which Nato has fallen, have decided to pick off its members one by one. The Dutch were selected as the first victims, and the Dutch Government was compelled as a first measure to forbid all motoring last Sunday. Next day the Foreign Minister appealed to his colleagues in the EEC to act in the spirit of the Community and organize collective resistance to this economic blockade. After six hours' talks the Foreign Ministers decided to disregard him, and Sir Alec led the way in emphasizing that there could be no question of Britain, which is relatively very well placed, diverting any supplies to Holland. Instead, the EEC Ministers would concern themselves with a peace settlement in the Middle East—though what on earth they were going to do about it was not made clear.

Here again our Arabists can, I suppose, be content. At the cost of deepening the disunity in the west and bringing the whole idea of a European Community into contempt, we have given the Arabs still further evidence of the price we are prepared to pay for their friendship.

Remembering Sir Alec's past, some friends of Israel are talking about appeasement and comparing his surrender to that of Munich. But, there is no comparison between the two situations. Then we faced a real threat of war by a powerful nation. Now we face the crudest form of economic blackmail applied by a motley collection of weak, divided and corrupt governments. Rather than call the Arab bluff at the risk of suffering a period of acute oil shortage, we are prepared to split Nato and disintegrate the European Community. Appeasement is far too complimentary a word with which to describe such a policy.

WASHINGTON POST
13 November 1973

Joseph Kraft

Arabs Force Europe to Pay Oil

Blackmail...

PARIS—The failure of Western Europe in the latest Mideast crisis is particularly striking to me in view of a visit I have just made to Cairo. For the Europeans paid oil blackmail in a visible way bound to inspire further Arab demands.

They also excluded themselves entirely from the diplomacy of ceasefire and possible settlement. So the Mideast crisis provides a case study in how not to bring Europe back into the world arena.

The paying of oil blackmail was especially evident in the resolution put out by the nine European Common Market countries a week ago. Among other things, the nine gave the wet mitten to Holland which, for the same noble reasons that inspired the Dutch wartime resistance to the Nazis, had refused to pay oil blackmail. In a sharp break with the community spirit of the Common Market, the other eight refused to make bits of their own oil stocks available to compensate for Arab retribution against the Dutch.

Before that the Europeans had divorced themselves entirely from the American effort to match Soviet supplies to the Arab states with assistance to Israel. Except for Portugal, all the NATO countries denied overflight rights to the planes of the American airlift. Britain even refused to allow American reconnaissance planes to use her Mediterranean bases.

The Arabs, not surprisingly, interpreted the European reaction as an ex-

pression of total weakness. It was even reported in Cairo—quite falsely I found out here in Paris where the weather has been fine—that Europe was in the grip of a cold spell. The Common Market resolution was seen as a mere apple-polishing device. "The Europeans," one official close to President Anwar Sadat of Egypt told me, "are running around trying to collect good conduct certificates from us." Given that attitude it is hard to believe the oil weapon will not be used to extract still further concessions.

Since the Europeans had played no part in containing the Russian push, moreover, there was no opening for them in the diplomatic follow-through. President Sadat and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger tied up their deal on a ceasefire and future peace conference without even keeping the Europeans informed. About the only concession to form was a dinner invitation extended to four leading European ambassadors for the final banquet offered to Dr. Kissinger in Cairo.

Since the Europeans were totally innocent of what was going on they could barely even make conversation. As one of the European ambassadors said of the occasion: "The company included 10 Egyptians, five Americans and four European imbeciles."

The absence of the Europeans from the Mideast scene is perhaps not so tragic. But getting the Europeans to play a more responsible role in such matters is important. So it is useful to

ask what went wrong in the Mideast.

The answer, I believe, is that Europe is belatedly paying the price of General de Gaulle. At the general's insistence progress toward joining political institutions was arrested in favor of a Europe of individual states. Inevitably, these states now jockey for position one against another—whether in dealing with the Mideast or the Soviet Union.

Moreover, the fight to get by the French veto exhausted British interest in the European community. Prime Minister Edward Heath has to seek immediate dividends from Europe. To have as a first consequence of the new association an oil shortage and rationing would have made joining Europe look like a total failure. So Mr. Heath has been under the strongest pressure to pay any price for oil the Arabs demanded.

What all this suggests is that it does no good simply to lecture the Europeans on their responsibilities. The right American tactic is to begin anew the slow painful and dull work of fostering European unity. That responsibility should be felt with particular keenness by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. For after all he played no small part in lending respectability to the Gaullist follies which have done so much to reduce Europe to its present pitiable condition.

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THE ECONOMIST NOVEMBER 10, 1973

The Arabs against peace

FROM OUR LEVANT CORRESPONDENT

In most of the Arab capitals he is visiting this week Mr. Kissinger has been to some extent talking to the converted. It is unfortunate that his formidable persuasive powers are not being used to convert those Arab leaders who reject the ceasefire, who reject peace negotiations and who are convinced that the Israelis understand only the language of the gun. These men are not the moderates in command in Morocco, Tunisia, and Jordan but the leaders of Iraq, Libya, South Yemen and maybe, although their stand is less intransigent, of Algeria, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

The no-negotiation block has been concentrating its efforts on stiffening the resolve of President Assad of Syria, who reluctantly accepted the ceasefire only because Egypt already had. (The meeting between him and President Sadat of Egypt, which had to be held on the neutral ground of far-distant Kuwait, was a distinctly frosty encounter.) In rejecting a ceasefire and negotiations these leaders are responding to the majority sentiment in Arab public opinion and the surge of Arab unity which has found Arab soldiers, oilmen

and diplomats joining in a big Arab shove aimed not at talking with Israel but at defeating it.

The ceasefire is unpopular because it left both sides in a mutually unsatisfactory political and military situation. The Israelis mind losing territory but don't really want to acquire any more in Egypt and Syria, which is what happened. Although the Arabs don't mind losing territory they do want to regain what they lost in 1967, which did not happen. What, they ask, are the long-term advantages Israel could gain if, after a breakdown of the ceasefire, it went on and captured Damascus, Homs and Hama and was advancing on Aleppo? Or if it captured Mansura and Tanta and was driving on Cairo? So much the worse for the Israelis if they did get themselves into such a situation, they say. A peace emerging from such an Israeli victory would be a disaster for Israel. This Arab attitude recalls the saying of the American general in the second world war: "They've got us surrounded, the poor bastards."

A second reason why the ceasefire is unpopular is the belief that Israel cheated after a previous ceasefire in 1948 when it seized Eilat during a truce over the protests of Glubb Pasha but with the connivance of the United Nations mediator, Ralph Bunche. And the United Nations was never able to

get Israel to go back to the old ceasefire line. Exactly the same thing, the Arabs argue, happened after October 22nd, with the result that the Arabs, especially the military men, once again feel the dangerous frustration of not having been defeated in a fair fight. The hard-liners know that on this particular issue they can make a strong appeal to the Egyptian army over President Sadat's head.

A third reason for the unpopularity of Egypt's conciliatory line is the general feeling that President Sadat has gone too far in making up to the United States. For him to say that his army was, in effect, defeated by America but to add that American diplomacy is being constructive, and then to go on to restore diplomatic relations with Washington, seems a betrayal of the Arab dignity regained on the field of battle. It is not difficult to understand why Mr. Sadat should not want to go to an Arab summit. He knows that one of the reasons why President Boumedienne of Algeria is calling for a meeting is to stiffen his backbone. And he realises that most of his colleagues, who did their bit in the struggle, will be in a reproachful or even critical mood. Even if Mr. Kissinger delivers the goods and gets the ceasefire to stick, this strong, uncompromising, Arab block against negotiations is going to make its weight felt during the talking.

LONDON TIMES

8 November 1973

Ronald Butt

Europe ploughs its furrow for peace

Until Tuesday, there existed nothing like a concerted European policy on the Middle East, and the absence of such a policy was a source of worry to pro-Europeans in Britain and of gibes from the anti-Europeans. Here we were (the latter could say) drifting further apart from the American connexion, both in policy formulation in respect of the Middle East and, more broadly and dangerously, over defence policy generally. The Euro-American defence concert appeared dangerously strained—and yet the Europeans themselves had no unified policy with which to compensate.

This argument, even before this week, produced some curious illogicalities. Mr Harold Wilson, for example, has repeatedly and bitterly charged the British Government with following a policy which was insufficiently pro-Israel and was motivated by our closer connexion with the French in the EEC context. At the same time, he has castigated the British Government for having let Britain become vulnerable to the US military alert which was itself the consequence of America's committed pro-Israel policy.

Yet, if Britain had gone along step-by-step in support of this policy, as Mr Wilson wanted, there would have been little chance of disengaging from any military gestures the Americans chose to make—or, indeed, of establishing, as the Brussels declaration has done, that there does exist a respectable position on Middle East policy which is not committed totally to one side, as the American, or to the other, as the Russian.

Now that the Europeans have, if belatedly, established something like a concerted policy, this in turn is bitterly attacked by those whose opinion, which often seems to border on fanaticism, is that only those who are totally in support of Israel's every demand and every policy position are to escape the deadly charge of being against her. In some of those who have attacked Tuesday's declaration by the Foreign Ministers, there does, of course, lurk the prejudice of hostility in principle (to which they are perfectly entitled—though the fact ought to be made clear) to British membership of the EEC and to any first step towards Community policy-making.

The main burden of complaint is, however, twofold. First, there is the charge that the rest of the Community is said to have leaned on Holland and therefore (the logic of this is curious) to have failed to exhibit Community solidarity. This is easily answered. When the Dutch fell foul of the Arab oil states, there existed no common European policy such as has since been formulated. Is it therefore sug-

gested that when that common policy was eventually devised, it should have been dictated by the temporary position of difficulty in which one member state had got itself beforehand? The idea that European unity is to be measured by the willingness of seven or eight members to adjust their policy to the accidental position already previously arrived at by one or two has only to be stated for its absurdity to be obvious.

Of course, if the Arab countries were to persist in putting pressure on Holland now that the Europeans have stated their policy, and if oil sanctions were turned against other members of the Community who then aided Holland with supplies,

Holland would have to be supported by the entire EEC, come what might. But there is no evidence that the Arabs will adopt any such line. Behind the scenes, there is now intense activity to change the Arab attitude to Holland and there are no grounds for supposing it will fail. Would it really have been preferred for the European Community to make a gesture of defiance against the Arab states which did nothing practical to help Holland but merely risked the rest of Europe's oil?

The second charge is that the Europeans have yielded to blackmail and that the Arabs will now apply pressure more firmly each time they feel it pays. But this assumes that the Arab states are going to behave much more irrationally than they show any signs of doing, and that they are going gratuitously to offend their European customers—who now offer them the only hope of a middle way which falls short of total reliance on Russia. Those who push this point have to answer the question: do they really want to see European industry (and specifically British industry at this crucial moment) brought to a halt for the sake of a gesture? Perhaps some do but surely most would only take the risk if the need were really great.

It is not. Analogies with Munich are misleading for two reasons. First, there is no question of weakening on the commitment to safeguard Israel's vital interests. The only question is whether the Europeans and the rest of the world are required indefinitely and passively to accept every policy that the Israeli Government, in its own wisdom, seeks to establish as vital to its interest—even such policies as the acquisition of territories which, far from safeguarding Israel's peace, have actually provoked another war.

What happens in Brussels is that the Europeans have adopted a policy which Britain has long advocated and which pre-dated

the oil danger, real though that is. It is a policy based on UN Resolution 242—for instance, in respect of the territories acquired by Israel in the Six-Day War—and on the elaboration of that policy in the Foreign Secretary's Harrogate speech of November, 1970, which acknowledged the legitimate rights of the Palestinians. Yet this last point is one feature of Tuesday's declaration which has annoyed Israel. Another is the call for a return to the ceasefire lines of October 22.

Adherence to such a long-standing policy is hardly surrender to blackmail, and it would be odd to abandon it just because it now brings the added

benefit of avoiding more trouble over oil.

The European declaration this week has probably facilitated Dr Kissinger's task, not only in Cairo but even in Israel, where it is now understood what can and cannot be expected from Europe in future. The war has given the opportunity of working for a peace that lasts. In these circumstances, it cannot be in Israel's real interest for its well-wishers in the West to give the impression that they will support the more extreme Israeli demands, even at a risk of a future conflict which really could endanger Israel's existence, and perhaps the peace of the world.

NEW YORK TIMES

13 November 1973

FRENCH CRITICIZE U.S.-SOVIET ROLE

Cabinet Aide Asserts 'Brutal'
Mideast Crisis Puts Ability
to Keep the Peace in Doubt

BY NAN ROBERTSON

Special to The New York Times

PARIS, Nov. 12—In the strongest official denunciation of Soviet-American accords yet heard in Western Europe, France's Foreign Minister said today that the "brutal crises" in the Middle East confirmed his Government's doubts about the superpowers' capacities to keep peace.

The minister, Michel Jobert, told Parliament in a major foreign-policy speech that understanding between the United States and the Soviet Union had not prevented war.

[The chief American negotiator will resume discussions in Brussels Tuesday with Atlantic alliance representatives on declarations designed to strengthen relations between the United States and Western Europe. Further negotiations will follow in Copenhagen with the European Common Market.]

The French Foreign Minister said the Americans and the Russians could reach results only by using "pressures and threats" aimed not just at Israel and the Arab states but at each other.

Mr. Jobert described Western Europe meantime as being "treated like a nonperson, humiliated all along the line," while the Soviet Union and the United States delivered vast arms supplies to their warring clients and then pursued secret negotiations toward a ceasefire.

The consequences of this "veritable condominium" ren-

dered Europe helpless during the crisis, the Foreign Minister declared. He added that it had also made Israel and the Arabs "directly dependent on their protectors."

The Foreign Minister called the cease-fire precarious, sketching out a situation in which both the Israelis and the Egyptians had the "illusion" that each was obtaining satisfactory results.

Mr. Jobert warned the United States that it was ignoring the fact that Europe was in the very center of the "second battle" of the Middle East war—the struggle for Arab oil, upon which the Continent desperately depends.

Faced with the superpower understandings, he said, Europe should "untiringly pursue" European union. But he conceded that it was nowhere close to political union, which he said was a condition for a common defense.

Consequently, he went on, that defense must include the United States as a continuing partner in the Atlantic alliance. He specifically referred to the American military role when he called for "the presence and the engagement of the United States in Europe."

In the coming disarmament and East-West round of talks, the Foreign Minister said, agreements must not be concluded between the great powers that would leave Europe unprotected—a way of saying, at the mercy of the Soviet Union. He declared himself opposed to any attitude that, "under cover of détente, and disarmament," would in reality "sacrifice Europe's autonomy and mortgage its future."

Mr. Jobert's speech was contradictory on occasion. He began by scolding the United States in the harshest terms yet for leaving France and Europe out in the cold during the Middle East crisis. He continued by pleading eloquently for continued American military involvement in Europe, despite the fact that France is still technically independent of the Atlantic alliance's military structure.

Finally, he added plaintively that France should remember to deepen her cooperation—in the economic field—with the Soviet Union.

WASHINGTON POST
13 November 1973

Israel Escalated Raid Targets

By George C. Wilson
Washington Post Staff Writer

LATAKIA, Syria, Nov. 12.—An on-the-spot examination of the bombing damage in this port city and elsewhere in Syria shows that Israel sharply escalated Middle East warfare this time and put her own industries in line for bombing if fighting is ever renewed.

Oil storage tanks blasted apart by bombs and shells; a demolished wood factory, and a bombed-out refinery and power plant all testify to the new dimension Israel added to the warfare between Arabs and Jews in the Mideast.

Given the action-reaction nature of modern warfare, it is virtually certain that Arab countries will seek the weapons to respond in kind in the future. The only real question in this regard is whether the Soviet Union will continue its restraint in not supplying Arab nations with offensive weapons.

So far, to the distress of some Arab leaders, Russia has stressed defense rather than offense in deciding what arms shall go to Syria and Egypt. The Soviet answer to the American F-4 Phantom fighter bomber, for example, was not other offensive bombers, but a strengthened and mobile air defense.

And while there have been threats from Egypt that surface-to-surface missiles will wing into Israeli cities, the evidence suggests Moscow has held a tight rein on such weapons.

Even so, Israeli ports like Haifa and industries like Aerospace Works in Tel Aviv are indeed in hostage to Arab and Soviet military strategy from now on as a result of this "first strike" at Syria's industrial base. In the 1967 war, Israel concentrated its bombing on Syrian air fields and made no comparable effort to knock apart the industrial base.

Mohamed Imadi, Syria's urban minister of economy and chief architect of the nation's economic development plan, contended in an interview that Israel's October bombing campaign was a premeditated effort to keep Syria from closing its technological gap with Israel.

"They wanted to destroy our economy completely," Imadi charged. "Unfortunately, they copied everything you did in Vietnam." He estimated that Israeli bombers inflicted \$500 million worth of damage on Syria's fledgling economic base in the short war.

"All our efforts have been to raise our standard of living," Imadi said, "toward building up the economy. It's very sad to see what you've been building for 10 years blown up like this."

Continued Imadi: "Any military force has to have an economic base. Israel tried to destroy our production machinery so we cannot afford to back our army."

With the cooperation of the Syrian government, which of course had a vested interest, this correspondent examined the bomb damage at the ports of Latakia and Tartus; at the plywood factory outside Latakia, and at the refinery and power plant at Homs. Imadi cited those as foundation stones in Syria's economic base.

I came away from the survey with these conclusions:

- The Israeli bombing disrupted but did not paralyze the Syrian economy.

- The bombing was fairly accurate and aimed against industrial targets rather than centers of population.

- Enough bombs missed their targets to kill a limited number of civilians, probably uniting rather than dispiriting the Syrian public against Israel.

Starting in Latakia in the north, Syria's biggest port, I saw petroleum tanks at the water's edge which had been blown up by bombs and punctured by shells fired from ships at sea. The Syrian manager of the tank farm said 10 out of the 24 storage tanks had been destroyed. That appeared to be an accurate count. He estimated damage at \$3.5 million.

The bomb craters among the storage tanks were big, looking as if they were created by 750-pound or 1,000-pound bombs. The manager said most of the 100 workers at the storage complex had left before the bombs fell, declaring one workman was wounded in the raids.

Adjacent to the tank farm is a huge masonry building that manufactured soap, according to Abdel Kader Sal, chief of commerce for Syria's Baath Party in Latakia. But the plant, surrounded by high barbed wire, could well have been a storage area for military equipment the Soviet Union delivered to Syria by sea. The building had been hit but not demolished.

About a half mile from the petroleum storage farm, a private home was demol-

ished. Sal asserted the bombing of the home had been deliberate as part of Israel's terror campaign. It looked to me like an overshoot of the target. There was no area-wide bombing in that residential section.

Azig Shahood, a Baath Party chairman in Latakia, said four persons were killed and 80 wounded in the October raids. This number could not be verified. But his figures indicate that Israel concentrated its fire on the oil storage center and associated facilities, not on civilian areas.

Baath Party executives in Latakia argued that the port storage tanks hold refined fuels for Syria's civilian economy and thus did not constitute a legitimate military target. But that point is of course arguable.

They said Israeli helicopters fired at targets in the harbor during the war. A Greek and a Japanese ship were damaged in the Israeli raids, according to the party leaders. They said no Soviet ships were in the port of Latakia during the war.

Two roads run south from Latakia toward the Golan fighting front where arms landed at the port would be taken. The parallel roads cross the big North River, about three miles outside Latakia. One of the bridges over that river had been hit by bombs, but the bridge parallel to it was intact. Bomb craters dotted the river bank by the missed bridge, indicating that Israeli pilots had tried to knock out the link.

The U.S. Air Force and Navy dropped thousands of tons of bombs on North Vietnamese bridges in an attempt to break transportation links, or what the military calls lines of communication. This could have been Israel's intention as well, although it appears the attempt to break the bridge links failed.

On the south side of the Latakia bridges is the plywood factory Sal manages. Its manufacturing sheds have indeed been obliterated, with the iron beams that used to support the roof twisted out of shape.

"They know this is a civilian wood factory," Sal said as he pulled up in front of the undamaged executive office adjacent to it. He said there were 200 working in the factory at the time of the raids but they fled to safety.

Sal put the civilian casualties as one person killed on the bridge, four killed on a bus near the bridge during the raid and 16 wounded on the bus and in nearby fields.

Declaring he was basing his information on eyewitness

accounts from factory employees, Sal said two Israeli planes fired rockets at the factory and raked the street with machine-gun fire. An Egyptian, who said he saw two rockets fired into the factory machine shop, claimed that the Israeli planes dropped anti-personnel bombs in the field next to the factory "to kill the workers."

The same witness said the factory was demolished by those two rockets. But the damage looked too massive to come from just two rockets. Also, the holes in the roof and metal piping were of various sizes.

A possibility which could not be verified was that the Syrian military had turned the big sheds of the Arab Company for Wood Industry into a storage area for military equipment moving toward the front. It would have made sense to store such arms south of the bridges. The extensive damage thus could have come in part from Soviet explosives blowing up inside the sheds.

Having said that, it will be recalled that the American military contended that Hanoi stored arms in civilian facilities and thus were legitimate bombing targets. This rationale was severely criticized. Israel, by bombing the plywood factory, is thus vulnerable to the same type of criticism.

The Syrian port of Tartus, south of Latakia in a picturesque Mediterranean setting, was raided Oct. 7 by 12 Israeli planes, a few helicopters and some ships, according to Ahmed Hassan, chairman of the Baath Party there.

He said 12 of the 28 oil storage tanks in Baniyas and eight of the 12 tanks in Tartus were destroyed by the air and sea raids. Baniyas is the terminus for the 30-inch pipeline that takes oil out of Iraq's Kirkuk oil fields.

That oil, as well as that stored in Tartus, is for export and thus not a legitimate military target in Syria, according to Syrian economic minister Imadi and other officials. "They cut the oil supply that was going to Europe," Imadi said of the bombing of Baniyas and Tartus.

Hassan said the civilian bombing casualties totaled three wounded at the Baniyas storage field and three killed and 12 wounded at Tartus. He said the Israeli helicopters concentrated their fire against Baniyas, just north of Tartus.

Again, the government official's estimate of the damage was in line with the visible evidence. His casualty

WASHINGTON STAR
1 November 1973

NATO and the Mideast

figures also indicated that the bombing and shooting were directed against the petroleum facilities, not civilian areas in the crowded port town of Tartus.

When asked how much the bombing and shelling interfered with port activity, Hassan said, "not at all." He said Syrian forces drove off Israeli ships before they could inflict major damage, adding that a Soviet cargo ship was hit in Tartus during the raids.

Homs is the site of Economic Minister Imadi's pride and joy — a refinery and electrical generating plant that he counted on to pull Syria up to a new plateau of prosperity. His dream is for a petrochemical industry which, starting with the Hom's refinery, would be an economic tonic for all of Syria.

Already, he said, through such modern facilities as those at Hom's, Syria increased its national income by record amounts in the last few years — an 11.3 per cent rise between 1970 and 1971 and 13.3 per cent between 1971 and 1972. This growth, Imadi added, has pushed up per capita income in Syria by 9 per cent.

Today, however, a good part of this dream at Hom's lies in rubble. Supervisors at the Hom's refinery said 40 per cent of the connected refinery and power plant were destroyed in Israeli bombing raids of Oct. 9.

The shattered buildings, twisted piping, collapsed storage tanks and general ruin at the Hom's complex makes that estimate credible. Both Party officials in Hom's estimated damage at \$35 million for the refinery and \$15 million for the power plant. Both facilities are only one year old.

The civilian casualties from the raids, they said, were 12 people killed at the refinery and four at the electrical plant. Another 50 people at both sites were wounded, they said.

A Czechoslovak company built the Hom's complex, covering 10,000 square yards and will now work to repair it. Mallouk estimated the repair job will take one year.

In front the entrance gate to the Hom's refinery there is an iron bomb casing on display. Plant executives said eight 500 pound bombs fell on the complex in the first day's raid and 15 in the second. They added that 20 of the 80 storage tanks were destroyed. The fire burned for eight days, they said.

Imadi said richer Arab nations — he did not disclose which ones — will pay "a fraction" of the \$500 million

An important side-effect of American involvement in the Middle East crisis is the acute embarrassment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The problem needs top-level attention to avoid a severe wrenching of the 24-year-old alliance.

The United States has pretty well gone it alone in its policy of supplying Israel to maintain a military balance between that country and its Soviet-supported Arab opponents, both to ensure Israel's survival and to promote an eventual settlement. The crunch came when, in the latest Arab-Israeli war, the Russians mounted a resupply effort for the Arab side and Washington decided it must do the same for Israel.

This produced a public scramble by most of our European allies to avoid identification with the American action and even, in the view of some U.S. officials, to hinder it. Only Portugal permitted overflight and landing by Israel-bound supply planes and fighters. West Germany made a public fuss over the discovery of American tanks being loaded aboard Israeli ships at Bremerhaven. Turkey and Greece, among the countries warning our planes off, reportedly permitted Soviet overflights (which Greece denied in its case).

The spectacle of our NATO allies treating us like lepers caused deep hurt in Washington, even after giving due weight to the European desire to avoid giving offense to the Arabs and jeopardizing the major part of their oil supplies. Defense Secretary Schlesinger and State Department spokesman McCloskey voiced unprecedented criticism of our NATO partners, and the President commented bitterly at his

generally bitter news conference Friday night. Mr. Nixon turned the oil argument around, saying Europe "would have frozen to death this winter" without the Mideast settlement that American policy seeks to promote.

The rift has pointed up the disparity between European and American attitudes toward the Mideast conflict. It also reveals some basic disagreements on the loyalty to be expected among NATO allies and on American freedom to shift Europe-based equipment and forces to trouble spots elsewhere, even to such a contiguous zone as the Mideast. Russia's role there as Arab sponsor and would-be oil broker can hardly be of no consequence to NATO.

Blame in the current misunderstanding surely belongs on both sides, with Washington still subject to reproach for failure to communicate and consult, especially on the near-confrontation with Moscow that provoked our military alert last Thursday. But the seeming desertion by our European partners could produce enough American resentment to hasten the withdrawal of substantial American forces from Europe. There is important congressional sentiment for doing this, and the administration now is restudying our NATO deployment especially with a view to our flexibility in using men and equipment wherever needed.

The NATO alliance obviously needs intense medication, and it is too bad the necessity has been shown this painfully as an unwanted highlight of Mr. Nixon's "Year of Europe." It is worth taking a moment to reflect that the Atlantic partnership still is vital to the security of all of us.

cost to repair Syria's industrial damages from the war. Thus, in yet another irony of the Mideast, American dollars which buy oil from the Arabs will be used in part to rebuild buildings that American bombs have knocked down.

WASHINGTON POST
12 November 1973

The News Business

Reporting the Mideast War

Bernard D. Nossiter

Israel: Tight Censorship

There is singular frustration in covering a war in progress. Nothing and no one is worthy of much belief and a reporter's own senses—sight, smell and instinct—are of remarkably limited use. Three weeks of reporting from the Israeli side left me more convinced than ever that journalism is much like firing a mortar. To get anywhere near the target, you must first overshoot, then undershoot and hopefully come close on the third round.


There were two ways of doing the job: Either sit in Tel Aviv to get the "big picture" or move out by press bus or rented car for a limited glimpse of a fighting front. Both were splendidly unsatisfactory.

To stay in Tel Aviv meant digesting the Israeli press, reading Israeli military communiques, listening to the radio, interviewing harassed officials a reporter or his friends had known in the past and, above all, attending the nightly briefing by an Israeli officer—a superb exercise in controlled communication. Out of this, something resembling a coherent account of what was supposed to have happened that day could be written. But coherence may have been its only virtue. It was necessarily partisan to an enormous degree and reflected neither more nor less than a nation at war wanted its friends and enemies to know.

The careful reporter heavily laced his copy with "according to Israeli sources" and "the military claimed" and "a spokesman asserted." Even so, he knew he was dispatching a one-sided version of events that may or may not have happened, afforded by people with the deepest vested interest—survival—in confusing the other side and enlisting maximum American support.

In the war's opening days, the military briefer spoke glowingly each night of Egyptian bridges across the Suez Canal that Israeli planes were destroying relentlessly. The number seemed and was incredible. Not until the fourth day did the authorities concede that the Russian pontoon bridges could be rebuilt in an hour or less. The suggestion that all Egyptian forces on the Israeli side of the canal had been cut off was patently misleading. As a result, the top branches of Israeli military information were given a thorough shaking.

Toward the end of the war, a crucial point was and is how far Israeli forces on the Egyptian side of the canal had improved their positions between the first cease-fire on Oct. 22 and the second on Oct. 24. At the briefing of Oct. 23, the spokesman gleefully boasted of gains—a sweep south below Suez, penetration inside the town of Suez and the like. But in a day or so, when this



Illustrations by David Gunderson

became politically sensitive material, the briefing became much less precise. It was suddenly impossible to determine the Oct. 22 line and censors would not permit mention of Israeli troops beyond the perimeter of the town of Suez.

Going to the front was just as frustrating for different reasons. The military acted like a combined Jewish mother-father toward foreign correspondents and threw up a series of obstacles in depth to keep reporters from the point of contact. A few carefully selected "pool" reporters were given access, but they were exceptions. The least comfortable but most believable way to look at a front is to attach yourself to a company or battalion in the line. Repeated requests for such permission were steadily turned down for non-Israeli correspondents.

So, one did the next best thing and traveled by private car or Israeli-organized bus to points a few miles behind the front, within artillery and strafing range of Arab arms, but no closer. In other words, correspondents took risks they thought were necessary to perform their craft for only the most limited returns.

In the absence of fact and sense, some colleagues inevitably drew on their imaginations. My favorite comes from the Egyptian side of the line, where a newsmagazine man, writing for an issue that closed three days after the second cease-fire, delivered a graphic account of his hair raising escape from death on "the road to El Arish."

By chance, El Arish, a scruffy Arab town in the Sinai, is a place I know at first hand. I spent much of the sixth day of the war driving in and out of that cheerless village, trying to evade Israeli checkpoints and get closer to the action. El Arish, in fact, is 96 miles from the Suez Canal and, with some luck, we finally succeeded in getting a long way past it. We drove down the El Arish road 81 miles before we were finally halted, just behind the Israeli artillery, in range of the Egyptians, but a good 10 miles from the frontmost Egyptian armor.

Recall that this was Day Six, a point of maximum Arab advance. If my newsmagazine colleague writing after the end of hostilities had reached the very

Mr. Nossiter, *The Post's* correspondent in London, filed this story from outside Israeli censorship.

lead Egyptian position, he could not have been closer than 91 miles from El Arish. I could have datelined my dispatch "On The Road To Cairo" with as much justice as his "On The Road To El Arish."

Among the most potent barriers to truth is Israeli censorship. All copy must be scrutinized and what is passed through is often capricious. One correspondent was allowed to give an unofficial estimate of Israeli casualties at the start of the third week; another using the same numbers was not. Some correspondents were permitted to quote the briefer who said Israeli troops were in Suez Town; others were not.

Israel, of course, is a country in a perpetual state of war and its unwillingness to help the enemy is perfectly understandable. No one could quarrel with the Israeli refusal to identify unit strengths and military objectives. But some of the censor's reasoning was strange. On the canal front, a pleasant young commander of an artillery battery told me that he would have to move his 155s soon, that the Egyptians were finding the range. He pointed to a crater 50 yards away and said three of his men had been wounded there. The story seemed innocent enough and I made a paragraph of it. But the censor wiped it out. "We mustn't let the enemy know how effective their guns are," he told me sternly.

The censorship is supposed to be purely military and all political comment should, in principle, pass. But in a garrison state the two are hopelessly intertwined and the censor serves the state's interest. For days after Gen. Ariel Sharon was known both in Israel and abroad as the leader of the daring Israeli assault on the West Bank, his name could not be mentioned in dispatches from Tel Aviv. Finally, the censors permitted reporters to say that Sharon was "one of the commanders."

Sharon, of course, happens to be the leader of Likud, the chief coalition opposing Mrs. Meir's government and a stern critic of the government's conduct of the war. The Israeli regime had no interest in building him up.

Again, I wanted to make the point in a dispatch five days after the second cease-fire that Israeli distaste for Washington's restraints must be tempered by the country's dependence on the United States for arms. This, I wrote, would serve as a check on any fresh adventures. To underline the point, I wrote of a remark Moshe Dayan had made to the Israeli cabinet. The defense minister reportedly told his colleagues, "If we get ammunition from them in the morning and shoot it off in the afternoon, we can't very well afford to quarrel."

But the censor wasn't having any and the anecdote was killed. The lame excuse was, "We must not let the enemy know we are short of ammunition."

NEW YORK TIMES
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India

A Need for Help, but Is It Wanted?

NEW DELHI—This is the festive Diwali season, when the Goddess Lakshmi is supposed to slip into homes in northern and western India and magically bestow prosperity for the new year. It is traditional to gamble—trusting in Lakshmi's good luck—and to close one's accounts and books in order to start anew after the holiday.

The Indian government has not quite decided to gamble on new policies and start anew. But it is appropriate that the holiday festival is coming at a moment when Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and an array of socialist advisers, businessmen, commentators and politicians are discussing fundamental shifts in the nation's economic and development policies.

The focus of the debate rests essentially on how to get India out of her financial rut. Mrs. Gandhi, herself, has conceded that 1973 is the most difficult year in India's twenty-six year history. "We need a financial wizard," she has said. "We do need an entirely new approach."

Within the past two weeks, Mrs. Gandhi has talked with her advisers about the possibility of seeking out foreign investment and easing the current policy of controls and licenses. Numerous critics have said that the squeeze on foreign companies and major industries here, coupled with labor indiscipline, poor planning, a grinding bureaucracy and "ideological rigidities," have soured the Indian economy.

The nation's economic growth rate is near zero. Wholesale prices have climbed more than 20 per cent in the past year, and production declined in the first quarter of 1973. The population is increasing on an average of 13 million people a year. In the 1961-71 decade, the percentage increase in the population was 24.6, and by the end of the century there will probably be one billion Indians. Despite huge investments in agriculture, food production has not increased as much as was hoped, and still depends heavily

on the vagaries of the monsoons. Nearly 40 per cent of the population, 220 million people, live below the poverty level, earning less than forty dollars a year.

Mrs. Gandhi's stated aim is "garibi hatao"—abolishing poverty. At India's current stage of development, Mrs. Gandhi and her advisers have decided that the path to social revolution within a democratic framework lies in a modified form of socialism that seeks to increase state control over the economy and to decrease dependence on foreign capital.

"We shall evolve our own type of socialism," Mrs. Gandhi has said. "We do not want to be the carbon copy of another country."

This restrictive policy has negated foreign investment through controls, taxation and licensing, and most Western embassies privately discourage businessmen from opening companies here. Though American private investment in India has reached about \$300-million, most of it involves companies who moved in about ten years ago.

One American businessman with a major company, asked to describe his experience here, repeated one word: "kafkaesque." He told a rambling saga of license delays, bribery attempts by officials, mismanagement and labor harassment. "There's a skilled labor force and there's talent here," he said, "but it's a nightmare."

Total private foreign investment in India is about \$2-billion dollars, and has declined in recent years. American investment in India follows that of Britain, whose businessmen have more than \$800-million dollars invested here. Other nations with major private investment are West Germany, Japan and Italy.

Ground rules for foreign investment are somewhat fuzzy. India has opened her doors to high technology industry, such as electronics, as well as to businesses who want to ship goods to India that could be used for exports. This may include textile piece goods for clothing exports, or spare parts for making radios here and then shipping them abroad. India usually demands a 40 per cent "equity limitation" or ceiling on foreign ownership, and does not welcome investment on consumer goods, such as toothpaste.

What some economists here are urging is that India loosen her policy on foreign investment and cut red tape, especially in the technology industries that have been reluctant to

open offices here because of high taxes and Government disinterest and because of their uncertainty over the possibilities of nationalization.

The advantages that some Indians see in increased investment is that, with shared profits and controls, outsiders can assist the nation with capital, technology and expertise. To moderate economists here, the experience of West Germany and especially Japan is especially embarrassing. West Germany and Japan, shattered after the war, welcomed foreign investment and aid, and are now economically powerful. India, on the other hand, flounders twenty-six years after Independence and is still immersed in ideological debates about whether or not to liberalize licensing laws.

To some of Mrs. Gandhi's militant advisers and supporters, an influx of foreign investment would clearly open the gates to "exploitation," primarily by American companies. The fact that the Soviet Union has sought out American investment is either ignored and brushed aside. Also ignored is the fact that General Motors and other multinational giants are not pleading to come to India.

The bluntest, and most widely shared, criticism of the form of Mrs. Gandhi's struggle to uplift the nation is that the Government is simply fearful of taking the steps necessary to distribute land, to bring trade union discipline and to end corruption.

Prof. V. M. Dandekar, a prominent economist and author, says that India has "socialist slogans without socialist discipline."

"If the power of the poor masses are to be attended to, the power base of the government must change."

And Era Sezhiyan, a widely respected legislative leader of the regional party from the southern state of Tamil Nadu, Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (D.M.K. or Dravidian Progressive Federation), has said: "There has so far been no earnest attempt to identify the causes of poverty, to assess the extent and enormity of the problem in the country, to estimate the resources available to meet the challenges, to chalk out a detailed program with realizable targets in terms of time and benefits." to the slogan of 'Garibi hatao.'"

Mrs. Indira Gandhi, he said, "has the strength and the popular support in ample measure . . . It is not too late, even now to redeem the pledges given to the people, to give a meaning to the slogan of 'garibi hatao.'"

—BERNARD WEINRAUB

Western Hemisphere

WASHINGTON POST
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The View From Langley

By Tad Szulc

Szulc is a Washington writer and a former foreign correspondent. His latest book is "Compulsive Spy: The Strange Career of E. Howard Hunt."

WAS THE United States, through the Central Intelligence Agency or otherwise, directly involved in the events that led to the bloody coup d'état in Chile last Sept. 11?

Actual involvement in the military revolution that ousted the late President Salvador Allende Gossens, a Socialist, has been roundly denied by the Nixon administration and the CIA in particular. But given the CIA's track record in overthrowing or attempting to overthrow foreign governments—Iran, Guatemala, the Bay of Pigs, Laos and so on—deep suspicions have persisted that the agency, operating under White House directives, has been much more than an innocent observer of the Chilean scene since Allende's election in 1970.

Ten days ago, the CIA rather surprisingly if most reluctantly, went quite a way to confirm many of these suspicions. It did so in secret testimony on Oct. 11 before the House Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs by its director, William E. Colby, and Frederick Dixon Davis, a senior official in the agency's Office of Current Intelligence. The transcript of the testimony was made available to this writer by sources in the intelligence community.

This extensive testimony touches principally on the CIA's own and very extensive covert role in Chilean politics, but it also helps in understanding and reconstructing the administration's basic policy of bringing about Allende's fall one way or another.

We are apprised not only that the CIA's estimate of the number of victims of the military government's repression is four times the official Santiago figures but that the United States, in effect, condones mass executions and

imprisonments in Chile because a civil war there remains "a real possibility." Yet, even Colby warned that the junta may "overdo" repression.

Colby's and Davis' testimony, in parts unclear and contradictory, offered a picture of the CIA's activities in Chile between Allende's election in 1970 and the Sept. 11 coup ranging from the "penetration" of all the major Chilean political parties, support for anti-regime demonstrations and financing of the opposition press and other groups to heretofore unsuspected Agency involvement in financial negotiations between Washington and Santiago in last 1972 and early 1973 when the Chileans were desperately seeking an accommodation.

There are indications that the CIA, acting on the basis of its own reports on the "deterioration" of the Chilean economic situation, was among the agencies counseling the White House to rebuff Allende's attempts to work out a settlement on the compensations to be paid for nationalized American property and a renegotiation of Chile's \$1.7 billion debt to the United States.

A No-Help Policy

ACTUALLY, the basic U.S. posture toward Allende was set forth by Henry A. Kissinger, then the White House special assistant for national security affairs, at a background briefing for the press in Chicago on Sept. 16, 1970, 12 days after Allende won a plurality in the elections and awaited a run-off vote in Congress. Kissinger said then that if Allende were confirmed, a Communist regime would emerge in Chile and that Argentina, Bolivia and Peru might follow this example.

For the next three years, the U.S. policy developed along two principal lines. One was the denial of all credits to the Allende government—Washington even blocked loans by international institutions—to aggravate Chile's economic situation when Allende himself was bogging down in vast mismanagement of his own. The other line was the supportive CIA activity to accelerate the economic crisis and thereby encourage domestic opposition to Allende's Marxist Popular Unity government coalition.

The only exception to the ban on credits was the sale of military equipment to the Chilean armed forces—including the decision last June 5 to sell Chile F-5E jet fighter planes—presumably to signal United States support for the military. Colby's testimony as well as other information showed that the United States had maintained close contacts with the Chilean military after Allende's election.

The Nixon administration's firm refusal to help Chile, even on humanitarian grounds, was emphasized about

a week before the military coup when it turned down Santiago's request for credits to buy 300,000 tons of wheat here at a time when the Chileans had run out of foreign currency and bread shortages were developing.

On Oct. 5, however, the new military junta was granted \$24.5 million in wheat credits after the White House overruled State Department objections. The department's Bureau of Inter-American Affairs reportedly believed that such a gesture was premature and could be politically embarrassing.

An "Unfortunate" Coup

PARADOXICALLY, Washington had not hoped for the kind of bloody military takeover that occurred on Sept. 11. For political reasons, it preferred a gradual destruction from within of the Chilean economy so that the Allende regime would collapse of its own weight. The CIA's role, it appeared, was to help quicken this process.

Under questioning by Rep. Michael J. Harrington (D-Mass.), Colby thus testified that the CIA's "appreciation" of the Chilean economy was that "it was on a declining plane on the economic ground in terms of internal economic problems—inflation, with 320 per cent inflation in one year, the closure of the copper mines, and so forth, your total foreign deficit was more than the need for it. They couldn't import the food because their deficit was such that over the long term they had no base for it." Elsewhere in his testimony, Colby said that the CIA reported "accurately an overall assessment of deterioration" and that with the Chilean navy pushing for a coup, it was only a question of time before it came.

But Colby also told the subcommittee that "our assessment was it might be unfortunate if a coup took place. The National Security Council policy was that it is consistent with the feeling it is not in the United States interest to promote it." He made this comment after Rep. Charles W. Whalen (R-Ohio) asked Colby whether he agreed with earlier testimony by Jack Kubisch, the assistant secretary of state for Inter-American affairs, that the administration believed that "it would be adverse to our own United States interest if the government of Chile were overthrown."

This theme was further developed in a letter on Oct. 8 from Richard A. Fagen, professor of political science at Stanford University, to Sen. J. William Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, reporting on a meeting between Kubisch and a group of scholars representing the Latin American Studies Association.

Fagen said that Kubisch took the view that "it was not in our interest to have the military take over in Chile. It would have been better had Allende

served his entire term taking the nation and the Chilean people into complete and total ruin. Only then would the full discrediting of socialism have taken place. Only then would people have gotten the message that socialism doesn't work. What has happened has confused this lesson."

"No Indication" of Support

COLBY'S TESTIMONY on the CIA's activities in Chile supplied a considerable amount of new information, some of it contradictory, under vigorous questioning by the subcommittee.

Thus at one point Colby said that "I can make a clear statement that certainly CIA had no connection with the coup itself, with the military coup. We didn't support it, we didn't stimulate it, we didn't bring it about in any way. We obviously had some intelligence coverage over the various moves being made but we were quite meticulous in making sure there was no indication of encouragement from our side."

Colby also insisted that the CIA was not involved with the prolonged strike by Chilean truckers that preceded the coup.

But pressed by Rep. Harrington, Colby acknowledged that the CIA may have assisted certain anti-Allende demonstrations. The following discussion ensued:

HARRINGTON: Did the CIA, directly or indirectly, assist these demonstrations through the use of subsidiaries of United States corporations in Brazil or other Latin American countries?

COLBY: I think I have said that the CIA did not assist the trucking strike.

HARRINGTON: I think it's a broader, and more intentionally broader, question—any of the demonstrations that are referred to in the course of this questioning.

COLBY: I am not quite sure of the scope of that question.

HARRINGTON: I make specific reference to two, one in the October period of 1972 and one in March of 1973.

COLBY: I would rather not answer the question than give you an assurance and be wrong, frankly. I would rather not. If we did, I don't want to be in a position of saying we didn't. But if we didn't, I really don't mind saying I won't reply because it doesn't hurt. But I don't want to be in a position of giving you a false answer. Therefore, I think I better just not answer that, although I frankly don't know the answer to that question right here as I sit here.

"A Covert Operation"

THOUGH COLBY consistently refused to tell the subcommittee whether the CIA's operations in Chile had been authorized by the "40 Committee," the top secret group headed by Kissinger in the National Security Council that approves clandestine intelligence operations, he admitted that "we have had . . . various relationships

over the years in Chile with various groups. In some cases this was approved by the National Security Council and it has meant some assistance to them. That has not fallen into the category we are talking about here — the turbulence or the military coup."

In previous testimony before a Senate subcommittee, former CIA Director Richard Helms disclosed that the CIA had earmarked \$400,000 to support anti-Allende news media shortly before his election. This was authorized by the "40 Committee" at a meeting in June, 1970. Colby, however, refused to say whether this effort was subsequently maintained, claiming that the secrecy of CIA operations had to be protected. He then became engaged in this exchange with Harrington:

COLBY: That does go precisely on to what we were operating and what our operations were. I would prefer to leave that out of this particular report . . .

HARRINGTON: I think we have run exactly into what makes this a purposeless kind of exercise . . .

COLBY: If I might comment, the presumption under which we conduct this type of operation is that it is a covert operation and that the United States hand is not to show. For that reason we in the executive branch restrict any knowledge of this type of operation very severely and conduct procedures so that very few people learn of any type of operation of this nature.

HARRINGTON: And we end up with a situation such as at Sept. 11 because you have a cozy arrangement.

Corporate Cooperation

ON THE QUESTION of support to anti-Allende forces, by United States or Brazilian corporations, Colby and Davis gave equivocal answers to the subcommittee. Colby said, "I am not sure." Davis said, "I have no evidence as to that," but Colby interrupted him to remark that "I wouldn't exclude it. Frankly, I don't know of any. However, I could not say it didn't happen."

Subcommittee members pursued at some length the possible involvement by American corporations in the Chilean coup because of previous disclosures that the International Telephone and Telegraph Corp. had offered the CIA \$1 million in 1970 to prevent Allende's election and subsequently proposed a detailed plan to plunge Chile into economic chaos.

Rep. Dante B. Fascell (D-Fla.), the subcommittee chairman, raised the question of involvement by Brazilian or other Latin American corporations, many of them subsidiaries of United States firms, because of reports that the anti-Allende moves were widely coordinated. Speaking for the CIA, Davis replied:

"There is some evidence of cooperation between business groups in Brazil and Chile. However, this is a small share of the financial support. Most of the support was internal. There is some

funding and cooperation among groups with similar outlooks in other Latin American countries. This is true with regard to most of those governments . . . I was not thinking so much of companies or firms so much as groups, organizations of businessmen, chambers of commerce, and that kind of thing in a country such as Brazil."

Discussing the CIA's intelligence operations in Chile, Colby said he "would assume" that the Agency had contacts with Chileans opposed to Allende. Asked by Harrington whether the CIA maintained such contacts in social contexts, Colby said:

"If a gentleman talks to us under the assurance he will not be revealed, which can be dangerous in some countries, it could have been very dangerous for those in Chile . . . the protection of that relationship, fiduciary relationship with the individual, requires that I be very restrictive of that kind of information."

Then the following dialogue developed:

FASCELL: Is it reasonable to assume that the Agency has penetrated all of the political parties in Chile?

COLBY: I wish I could say yes. I cannot assure you all, because we get into some splinters.

FASCELL: Major?

COLBY: I think we have an intelligence coverage of most of them. Let's put it that way.

FASCELL: Is that standard operating procedure?

COLBY: It depends on the country. For a country of the importance of Chile to the United States' decision-making, we would try to get an inside picture of what is going on there. I can think of a lot of countries where we really don't spend much time worrying about their political parties. I spend much of my time worrying about penetrating the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

The Economic Role

ONE OF THE MOST intriguing disclosures made by Colby in his testimony was that the CIA is actively engaged in economic negotiations between the United States and foreign countries. This has not been generally known here, but Colby told the subcommittee that "we would normally contribute to (a) negotiating team."

He said that "we would try to provide them intelligence as backdrop for their negotiations and sometimes help them with appreciation of the problem . . . We follow the day-to-day progress in negotiations. If it's an important economic negotiation, like (Treasury) Secretary Shultz over in Nairobi and places like that, we would be informed of what they are doing and try to help them."

In the context of the Chilean-American negotiations before the coup, the CIA's Davis said that "we did have

some quite reliable reporting at the time indicating that the Russians were advising Allende to put his relations with the United States in order, if not to settle compensation, at least to reach some sort of accommodation which would ease the strain between the two countries. There were reports indicating that, unlike the Cubans, they were in effect trying to move Allende toward a compromise agreement . . . It was our judgment that the [Chileans] were interested in working out some kind of *modus vivendi* without, however, retreating substantially from their position."

Davis added that "our intelligence requirement in the negotiations between the United States and Chile would be to try to find out, through our sources, what their reactions to a negotiating session were, what their reading of our position was, what their assessment of the state of negotiations is."

In his narration of the events leading to the coup, Colby said that "under the general deterioration, it was only a matter of getting the Army, the Navy and the Air Force to cover it. Eventually they did get them all in." Colby then compared the Chilean coup to the 1967 Indonesian revolution, reputedly assisted by the CIA, when the army ousted President Sukarno. He said the CIA shared the suspicions of the Chilean military that Allende was planning a coup of his own on Sept. 19 to neutralize the armed forces, but said the CIA had no firm information confirming these suspicions.

"Concern Over Security"

THROUGHOUT his testimony, Colby drew a grim picture of the junta's repression and, in effect, predicted that it would worsen even more because of the continued strength of the Chilean left. His estimates of the death toll were roughly four times the figures announced by the junta and he told the subcommittee that the Chilean military had a list of the "most wanted" Allende followers whom they hoped to find and

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Way Out for Chile

Chile's military rulers have finally ordered an end to summary executions, though military courts are still inflicting death penalties. The junta has also transferred the last group of foreign prisoners from the Santiago stadium to the care of refugee agencies. These overdue actions in themselves will not advance national reconciliation very far, nor halt the storm of criticism from abroad of the junta's excesses.

When they overthrew President Allende last month, the armed forces crushed organized resistance with an ease that astonished even themselves. That having been the case, the world simply could not accept the necessity for the subsequent campaign of indiscriminate killing and persecution. In portraying the worldwide condemnation of these excesses as Communist propaganda, General Pinochet and his colleagues deceive no one.

possibly execute.

"Communist Party chief Luis Corvalan is being or will be tried for treason. He may well be sentenced to death regardless of the effect on international opinion," Colby said. This information led to this exchange:

WHALEN: You mentioned those being accused of treason. Did these allegedly treasonable activities occur after the takeover by the military?

COLBY: I think what I referred to was the head of the Communist Party who would probably be tried for treason.

He would probably be tried for treason. He would probably be tried for activities prior to the takeover. You can have some question as to how valid that is in a constitutional legal sense. There have been some who have been accused of it since the takeover.

WHALEN: That confuses me. If he is tried for treason against a government [he] supported, I cannot understand that.

COLBY: You are right.

This was Colby's assessment of the present situation:

"Armed opposition now appears to be confined to sporadic, isolated attacks on security forces, but the regime believes that the left is regrouping for coordinated sabotage and guerrilla activity. The government probably is right in believing that its opponents have not been fully neutralized. Our reports indicate that the extremist movement of the Revolutionary Left believes its assets have not been damaged beyond repair. It wants to launch anti-government activity as soon as practical and is working to form a united front of leftist opposition parties. Other leftist groups, including the Communist and Socialist parties, are in disarray, but they have not been destroyed. Exiled supporters of the ousted government are organizing abroad, namely in Rome."

Colby told the subcommittee that "concern over security undoubtedly is what accounts for the junta's continued use of harsh measures to deal with the dissidents. The military leaders apparently are willing to alienate some

support at home and endure a bad press abroad, in order to consolidate their hold on the country and finish the job of rooting out Marxist influence."

Chance of "Civil War"

DESCRIBING the present situation, Colby said:

"Armed resisters continue to be executed where they are found, and a number of prisoners have been shot, supposedly while 'trying to escape.' Such deaths probably number 200 or more . . . Several thousand people remain under arrest, including high-ranking officials of the Allende government."

Answering questions, Colby agreed that the CIA's figure of more than 200 executions was higher than the junta's official estimate. He added that "there were a couple thousand, at least, killed during the fighting which surrounded the coup. It is quite possible that if you went to a city morgue you would find that number. The official figure of total killed is 476 civilians and 37 troops to a total of 513. We would guess, we would estimate, it is between 2,000 and 3,000 killed during the struggles. That would not be in my classification as execution . . . Some of those were shot down. There is no question about that. They are not just bystanders . . ."

Colby disagreed, however, with Rep. Robert H. Steele (R-Conn.) that the junta killings have "done no one any good."

"I think our appreciation is that it does them some good . . . The junta, their concern is whether they could take this action of taking over the government and not generate a real civil war, which was the real chance because the Allende supporters were fairly activist. There were armies in the country. There was at least a good chance of a real civil war occurring as a result of this coup," Colby said.

Asked whether civil war remained a possibility, Colby replied that, "It was. It's obviously declining, but it was a real possibility. Yes, I think it is a real possibility. Whether it's a certainty or not is not at all sure."

The fact that Chile's armed forces kept to their constitutional role for decades left them ill-equipped for government. All the more reason why they should now concentrate on national reconciliation while bringing in qualified civilians to run ministries and overhaul the ailing economy. There are signs that the officers are now at least recognizing their inadequacies and seeking talented help from civilian ranks.

They will find such assistance more readily if they halt their talk about "extricating" the Marxist idea by arms or decree and their suggestions that Chile's future should be that of a corporate state with a permanent legislative role for the military services. The excesses of Dr. Allende's Marxist-dominated coalition polarized Chile and paved the way for the coup. The junta must realize that its own excesses in time will prepare the way for violent counter-revolution and civil war.

The New York Review
November 1, 1973

The Death of Chile

Laurence Bims

It will take years to assess all the changes that President Allende was able to make before he died, midway through his six-year term. That he had done much for Chile is beyond question. His predecessor, Eduardo Frei, only began substantial reforms after the first half of his presidency. What will now happen to these changes is still an open question. It is likely that in the repression which we are now witnessing they may be washed away.

Before I describe the benefits and some of the costs of the Allende years, I must discuss the nature and policies of the ruling military junta and the *golpe* that it staged on the eleventh of September. We had heard that Chile's armed forces were institutionally loyal; that they had accepted their place in the life of the nation and were vigorous supporters of civilian supremacy and the rule of the constitution. This was certainly true since the civil war of 1891 in which the president, José Manuel Balmaceda, was overthrown. That struggle, in which segments of the armed forces were pitted against each other, cost the nation 10,000 lives out of what was then a population of under two million. The landed aristocracy and the nitrate barons were temporarily successful against an apostle of middle-class reforms, but their victory was short-lived since the middle class was able to win representation in national life through electoral means. During the following decades (and then only in the depression years following World War I) the military rarely acted. When it did, it did so with self-restraint. Now the violence, the systematic terror, and the well-planned barbarism of the military have astonished students of Chilean history and sociology and made obsolete the data and assumptions with which they were working.

The full force of the repression is hard to appreciate because statistics are concealed as military secrets and few foreign reporters are able to reconstruct them. It is only clear that the killings, beatings, and arrests go on as if Chile needs a new atrocity every day to remind it that it is now under the jackboot. We hear mainly of dramatic examples: Victor Jara, the Pete Seeger of Chile, was coolly killed in the National Stadium because his protest songs angered the military mind. The universities, once among Latin America's greatest, have been taken over by the military, their principle of autonomy now a joke, their dissident faculties and students pruned according to master lists compiled by a variety of

vengeance squads. The social sciences are proscribed as morally poisonous and will be replaced by such "safe" disciplines as science and technology.

For the moment the nation is entirely in the hands of the military. People are summarily dismissed from jobs because of their alleged political beliefs. Peremptory searches of neighborhoods are made at will, and their inhabitants are marched off to secret destinations. Those radio and television stations and newspapers that are permitted to operate do so under the threat of censorship; dissident books, journals, and magazines are burned or destroyed; the intellectual life of Chile is in hiding. Rather than a coup, what we have here is a putsch—the junta did not want merely to take over the government but to impose by terror a new system based on physical and psychological fear.

But its problems are just beginning. Obviously admiring of their military colleagues who rule in Brazil, the junta officers must avoid too close a relation with them if they are not to offend the other Pacific Coast countries that are members of the Andean Pact. If Chile aligns itself with Brazil it will find itself estranged from the Hispanic nations, led by its traditional enemy Argentina, who fear the growing power of Brazil. Furthermore, the generals can take little comfort from recent Argentine history. For while disposing of civilian rule has been easy for the Argentine generals, they have never been able to govern in its stead. Throughout last year Argentine trade unions were in turmoil in Córdoba, and in Chile similar trouble could well take place in an industrial city such as Concepción. Last year the Argentine military caused grave shock and resentment when it massacred political prisoners in the town of Trelew; the Chilean junta has been acting with equal ferocity each day of its short period in office. By outlawing the Peronist movement, Argentine officers only caused it to reappear in other forms.

Argentina was ungovernable after its military overthrew the constitutional government in 1968. How long can Chile's armed forces remain in power? And if the military dictators in Buenos Aires had to deliver power to Perón because of their own political ineptness, to whom could the Chilean generals turn over their power when their situation becomes equally desperate, as it may well do? None of the likely possibilities can offer them much comfort.

Two of the potential leaders are now out of the country and a third is about to leave. The first is Carlos Prats, the

former commander-in-chief of the Chilean army, who loyally served Allende as he would have served any other constitutional president. When he resigned simultaneously from the armed forces and from the president's cabinet in August he was trying to preserve the government and placate his colleagues. Respected by all and feared by many of them for his philosophy of military obedience to civilian authority, he was, in a rare act of kindness, spared by the military when he was in its hands. Now in Argentina, he may some day, in a symbolic if not literal sense—like O'Higgins a century and a half ago—cross the Andes to liberate his nation.

Another choice is Gabriel Valdés, now in New York as the director for Latin America of the United Nations Development Program. Although he has persistently disclaimed any political ambitions, he has many admirers among the left wing of his party. A Christian Democrat with fierce loyalties to democratic principles and the rule of law, he is respected throughout South America for his advocacy of regional autonomy and national self-development. When he was foreign minister under Frei he insisted at the Viña del Mar conference in 1969 that Latin America declare economic independence from the US; and he continuously nettled Edward Korry, then the US ambassador, because he resisted Korry's meddling in Chilean affairs. (Korry has now resurfaced in New York, amazingly enough, as the president of the United Nations Association. His part in helping to create the conditions for Allende's downfall should be one of the main tasks of the research that is now commencing on the Allende years.)

A third candidate for restoring traditional democratic rule in Chile is Radomiro Tomić, the Christian Democratic Party's (PDC) candidate in 1970. An outspoken man who espouses both socialist economics and Christian humanism, he is loathed by many of the middle class who feel that he helped to soften the electorate for Allende's victory when he ran on a platform similar to Allende's, including nationalization of the major industries and confiscation of the copper mines. But he is also widely admired as a man of probity and intellectual consistency. There is little doubt that he is now in personal danger, and efforts are being made to secure a university post for him in the US (he is one of Chile's leading social scientists and best-known university professors).

But the military junta is not likely to transfer its new authority to anyone. If it intends to stay in power,

where is its support?

The generals no longer lead a national army as they did just a few weeks ago, but have now become the force of the *oligarquía*, the coalition of big business and big landowners that opposed not only Allende but the reforms of Frei as well. I suspect that at least 40 percent of the population despises them, a proportion that will grow as members of the middle class and the professions come more and more to resent the new arrogance of the military and the policies that it is bound to pursue. What will the military junta do? It cannot return to its barracks after handing back the government to the regular political parties and parliament. It has nothing but scorn for them. And then there is all the blood that has been spilled, the executions by firing squads, and the torture that have taken place. After such terror the junta cannot summon normality as it would a class to school. But can the junta continue to rule, supported only by discipline and weapons?

It is now clear that the right wing of the Christian Democrats, led by Frei, thought a military solution was the only one feasible. They refused to work out compromises with Allende that would have kept the political system intact. But they were thinking of the 1920s when the military acted more gently and cleared the way for a resumption of normal political life. They seem to have forgotten the army's motto, "By reason or by force." At the beginning of the summer, General Pinochet, the leader of the junta, had proclaimed that if the military "came out" it would "kill." One cannot blame the middle class for misjudging its army; practically all Chilean experts did so too. What one can condemn them for is seeking a military solution in the first place. Why did they turn to the military? Was it because the military had guns and seemed to be apolitical? Why should Frei and his followers in the PDC have expected the military to be a more patriotic custodian of the national traditions than they were themselves?

The military has taken an irrevocable step. They came out and they "killed." In a recent story on the "Slaughterhouse in Santiago," *Newsweek's* Chilean correspondent estimated that between two and three thousand people had been killed or wounded in Santiago alone. My colleagues and I, using information secretly coming out of Santiago, estimate that from seven thousand to ten thousand people may have been killed throughout Chile, a figure that takes into account reports

of the repression that has been going on in the villages of the south.

Most of the urban casualties were in the neighborhoods of the poor and were under-reported. Foreign newsmen could not get to see these *poblaciones* and they were therefore temporarily invisible. But in fact the *rotos*, the broken ones, had, during Allende's regime, lost the habit of accepting invisibility. Having tasted the real power that their government gave them, they can't be expected to return to their former degradation. They too can kill. At the very least they can produce a Northern Ireland. They can bomb, they can kidnap, and they can assassinate. No military force is large enough to prevent this.

But the politics of counterviolence is not all that the military faces. It is unreasonable to expect that an important faction of the PDC—associates of Tomić and Valdés—will play the trained creatures of a military master. They are political men whose reformist party stood for due process and a democratic life. According to those who have been in touch with them, they, and many other members of the middle class, are appalled by the cruelty of the junta and its bold advocacy of a centurion corporate state. Already, in a statement unreported in the US or Chile, but printed in the European and Latin American press, Bernardo Leighton and Renan Fuentealba, joined by other left-wing PDC congressmen, attacked their own party for supporting the junta. This group will doubtless grow as the numbness wears off and they learn to live with, and master, fear. Even the editor of a right-wing newspaper recently declared that there was more press freedom under Allende than now exists. The military's fate will partly depend on the degree of terror that it is prepared to maintain. It may gain time by resorting to a policy of meticulous extermination of all opposition. But its fate will always be perilous.

In assessing the Allende years, one must recognize what he restrained his government from doing, as well as acknowledge the misdirection of some of his economic and social policies. Allende preserved the integrity of political institutions although he was thwarted by a highly political court and legislature, and in turn tried to outflank their power. There was far less intentional police brutality under Allende than existed under the previous Christian Democratic regime. There were hardly any cases of imprisonment on political grounds. The universities were entirely free although some faculties became heavily politicized. The radio and press, wretched as

they were, were free to give their often hysterical versions of events from all political points of view. Political life was almost entirely free of secret police surveillance. Under Allende, politics were difficult, frustrating, sectarian, but most of all they were dangerous. It was this last element that pronounced the final sentence on the president, the constitution, and the self-regulating apparatus of political life.

Why dangerous? Because Allende attempted to use politics to bring social justice to a nation that was lacking in it. Faced with a smug middle class that cared as little for its poor as we do for ours, Allende attempted to undo a system in which 5 percent of the families controlled some 35 percent of the agricultural land, in which the banks worked only for the established rich and industries underproduced products that were overpriced. He attempted, and with significant success, to bring health, housing, a better diet, and education to the poor, and a sense of dignity and of national participation to those for whom Chile's constitutional system had previously been unreal and fraudulent.

Now the military junta acts as if the old script can be replayed. The new regime's economic commissar, Raúl Sáez, has recently been touted by the *Wall Street Journal* correspondent, Everett Martin, as a no-nonsense man who will bring Chile's economy back to normalcy. What Martin doesn't mention is that Sáez, the son of a general who himself attempted a coup against President Ibañez, was artfully dismissed by Frei from his position of minister of the treasury after only twenty days because of his harsh and inhumane policies. When the junta's new foreign minister recently arrived in New York he was accompanied by Ricardo Claro, one of the leading members of the old group of unregenerate capitalists who were called *las pirañas* during the Frei regime. Claro had left Chile when Allende came to power. Now he and the rest of the *ancien régime* are back in business. Their first customers—and they are good prospects—are Nixon and Kissinger and their corporate allies. Already the US business community, as represented by the Council of the Americas, which has been mute about the suppression of human rights in Chile, has been told of the investment opportunities in the "new" Chile at a New York meeting addressed by the foreign minister.

A Brazilian exile, an expert on his own country's military dictatorship, stated in early October that since 1964, when the legal government of Brazil was overthrown, perhaps 1,000

dissenters lost their lives. In Chile, that figure was easily reached in a day. This was not a typical Latin American coup. It cannot be compared to what took place in Argentina in 1968 or Brazil in 1964. It was more in the Iraqi or Indonesian style. It was a ruthless move that destroyed national institutions in a far more sweeping manner than has ever before been attempted in the modern history of Latin America.

It will be interesting to hear the comments of those who insisted that Allende didn't have a sufficient popular mandate to bring about the changes which he attempted. For the military, without any mandate whatsoever, has accomplished changes more severe than any ever dared by Allende and has wiped out any pretense at pluralism in the Chilean social system. The Church and the military class, for example, were upset by Allende's plans to unify the educational system, cutting back the role of private schools, and introducing themes of national reform and the value of manual labor into the

curriculum. Although the American press barely reported them, these plans heavily contributed to the concentration of military and middle-class opposition against Allende. In fact his proposals grew out of discussions on education that have been going on for decades in Chile; they were never carried out and were undergoing modification when he fell. Now Chile has school "reforms" far more drastic than anything the Allende government ever contemplated.

The US bears major responsibility for what happened in Chile. Its systematic policy of economic strangulation created a momentum which led to the death of constitutional democracy. This policy reflected the demands of the American corporations that had been nationalized or controlled in Chile. It was conceived in 1971 by John Connally when he was Secretary of the Treasury, was carried out by his assistant, John Hennessy (a man with solid Wall Street connections), and openly stated by President Nixon in January, 1972. The Chilean economy,

we now might say, was sentenced to hang from its neck and turn slowly in the wind. The Nixon government exerted pressure to block Chile's customary sources of private financing and, by using the threat of a US veto, it stopped Allende from getting important loans from the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank. Chile has classically needed foreign exchange to buy the food and other consumer goods that it has not been able to produce for itself. Cut off from the funds on which it had counted, the Allende government was unable to supply the nation's middle class with the luxuries and essentials to which it was accustomed.

High inflation and economic shortages were not inaugurated by Allende's regime. Inflation has been characteristic of Chile's economy in this century and it soared during the last years of the Frei government. Although it is true that Allende's attempts at nationalization and land and income redistribution were often disorganized and inefficient, it is also true that the shortages that were so irritating to

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NEW TESTIMONY

CIA role revealed in Chile coup

By BARRY RUBIN

Secret testimony by William Colby, director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), has confirmed a number of charges made by Chileans who support the overthrown government of President Salvador Allende.

Colby had discussed the U.S. relationship to the military coup in Chile in Oct. 11 testimony before the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs. Washington Post correspondent Ted Szulc was given a transcript of the testimony by "sources in the intelligence community."

Although denying direct CIA involvement in the coup, Colby contradicted public government statements that the U.S. did not know ahead of time about the military's plans. He also said that the CIA had closely followed economic developments in Chile, resulting from an "invisible blockade" against Chile. This blockade came from U.S. efforts to prevent Chile from obtaining goods and credits abroad, from exporting copper to Western Europe and from re-negotiating Chile's external debts. U.S. aid and

exports to Chile were drastically cut although they have now resumed for the fascist junta.

The Chilean Temporary Resistance Bureau in Paris announced in mid-October that it had documents, soon to be released, showing that the plan of economic blockade was adopted by the National Security Council after Allende's election in November 1970. An alternate plan for overthrowing the government—rejected at that time—was kept in readiness and put into effect for the September coup.

Although denying CIA involvement in the coup and the preceding truck-owners lock-out, Colby had assisted the CIA had assisted various anti-Allende demonstrations. He refused to answer questions about CIA involvement in the rightist offensive in October 1972 and an abortive coup attempt in March 1973 because "I don't want to be in a position of giving you a false answer."

"VARIOUS RELATIONSHIPS"

"We have had," Colby told the closed session, "various relationships over the years in Chile with various groups. In some cases this was approved by the National Security Council" resulting in assistance to rightists. Colby's predecessor, Richard Helms, had earlier disclosed in testimony that the CIA had sent about \$400,000 to Chile to support anti-Allende newspapers and radio stations before the 1970 elections. This had been authorized by a high-level meeting of the "Committee of 40," a special "crisis management" team headed by Henry Kissinger. Colby refused to say if these subsidies were continued to the present.

Several Congress members at the hearings said some U.S. money had been sent into Chile via Latin American subsidiaries of U.S. corporations, particularly from Brazil.

Dante Fascell, a Florida representative, asked Colby if it "is reasonable to assume that the CIA has penetrated all of the political parties in Chile." Colby replied, "I wish I could say yes. I cannot assure you all, because we get into some splinters. I think we have an intelligence coverage of most of them. Let's put it that way." Colby continued that this is standard operating procedure for the CIA in many countries.

Colby also said that CIA representatives were often included on U.S. teams engaged in economic negotiations with other countries—a point particularly relevant to the U.S.'s economic offensive against Chile.

The CIA director was also asked what he thought of the post-coup situation. He compared it with the Indonesia coup of 1965 in which hundreds of thousands of people were massacred by the military. Repression in Chile, he said, would become worse than at present

because of the strength of the Chilean left. Colby gave CIA estimates of the number of people killed and imprisoned by the military which, while still low, are four times the number admitted by the ruling junta. Colby condoned the repression because civil war remains "a real possibility."

"Armed opposition," Colby said, "now appears to be confined to sporadic, isolated attacks on security forces, but the regime believes that the left is regrouping for coordinated sabotage and guerrilla activity. The government probably is right in believing that its opponents have not been fully neutralized. Our reports indicate that the 'extremist' Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) believes its assets have not been damaged beyond repair. It wants to launch anti-government activity as soon as practical and is working to form a united front of leftist opposition parties. Other leftist groups, including the Communist and Socialist parties, are in disarray, but they have not been destroyed."

Colby also noted: "Armed resisters continue to be executed where they are found, and a number of prisoners have been shot, supposedly while 'trying to escape.'"

Other reports indicate that, in addition to these killings, death squads are now in operation against supporters of the Allende government. Col. Jorge Espinosa, commander of the soccer stadium concentration camp in Santiago, said that about 50 people released from the stadium (where there are still about 3700 prisoners) have either disappeared or turned up dead before reaching home. The U.S. has organized rightist death squads in several countries, including Guatemala and the Dominican Republic, to torture and kill dissenters.

On the economic front, the junta is continuing its pro-imperialist policies. The vast majority of U.S. companies taken over by the Allende government will be returned, according to junta leader Gen. Augusto Pinochet Ugarte. These include about 40 of the over 300 Chilean and foreign companies nationalized during the three years of Allende's Popular Unity (UP) government. Most of these will also be returned to their former owners. The U.S. companies

include subsidiaries of ITT and Dow Chemical Company, with Dow technicians already preparing their factory for production. Other U.S. companies are dispatching executives to Chile to make arrangements with junta authorities.

The junta has said that while U.S. copper investments will not be returned, the military will negotiate with the companies over the amount of compensation to be paid. Allende refused to pay for the nationalizations because of the excess profits the companies had drained out of Chile. Earlier junta statements tended to indicate that U.S. investments would be readmitted in partnership with the government.

While favoring U.S. companies and wealthy Chileans, the junta is continuing to cut into the living standards of the country's workers and peasants. Prices on necessities have been raised from 200 to 1800 percent for bread, sugar, oil, tea, pastas, shoes, clothes and 70 other items. Sugar has gone up 500 percent and bread and milk are three times as expensive as before the coup. The junta has eliminated the popular program initiated by Allende of providing half a liter of milk free to all children. Tea, a heavily consumed drink in Chile, has increased in price from 16 to 300 escudos per kilo. These are the greatest price increases in Chilean history.

At the same time, the junta cancelled a wage increase scheduled by the UP for Oct. 1. While the dictatorship is promising a bonus for the last three months of the year, it will amount to only about one-fifth of the price hikes.

A massive currency devaluation announced recently by the junta should send prices even higher.

Meanwhile, a rigid labor discipline has been imposed on workers. Organizing strikes or engaging in other labor movement activities have become grounds for immediate firing and the work week has been increased to 48 hours—with no pay for the last four hours.

Still, reliable sources within Chile report that the failure of the junta to set up a pseudo-democratic facade has not enabled it to gain any important base of support among former UP supporters and the resistance is organizing for the long struggle ahead.

EDITOR AND PUBLISHER

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Allendes' widow charges U.S. firms control press

By Jerome H. Walker

Defending the late Salvador Allende's crusade to improve the plight of his people in Chile, his widow made an emotional appeal at EDICON in Mexico City (October 8) to the press of North America to stop "manipulating" information to serve the interests of imperialistic international corporations.

Mrs. Hortensia Bussí De Allende, who has taken political asylum in Mexico since the Junta seized the government of Chile, was given the privilege of addressing an audience of about 400 newspaper editors and publishers and their guests from the United States and Latin America.

After being introduced by UPI foreign news editors Wilbur G. Landry, Mrs. Allende read the text of her remarks in Spanish. They were translated simultaneously into English. At the outset she thanked UPI president Roderick W. Beaton for giving her the opportunity to speak at the session. Earlier, UPI executives arranged for a rebuttal speaker from Chile on the following day's program.

Fears North American press

"I will be frank with you," Mrs. Allende began, "I would be unable to hide the fact that deep down I am indignant and fearful of a certain North American

press."

This segment of the press, she asserted, serves the multinational corporations which "do not hesitate to trample the rights of other peoples." At a later point she referred to the "strange marriage of ITT and the CIA" in an attempt to overthrow the "victorious people" who had placed her husband in the presidency of Chile.

Mrs. Allende also alluded to the Watergate case as an indication of how the "cancer of the power of money" of the giant corporations can be used to exploit the common people.

Mildly, the former First Lady of Chile remarked that "you journalists are witnesses to the degree of freedom of the press that prevailed in Chile, and how it was misused by the opposition."

Mrs. Allende detailed the many ways in which her husband had sought in his socialistic ideals to help the workers and farmers with a program of social emancipation. His death, she said, was sacrificial.

'Villainy rules'

"Those who hide the truth," Mrs. Allende declared, "are accessories to crimes against humanity. Therefore, I appeal to your conscience. Let it be known to universal public opinion that villainy rules

today in my Fatherland.

"I do not ask your help to reinstate the liberties in Chile. That is a task for Chileans. I only ask you to help end the unfair and cruel punishment that my countrymen are suffering. I ask you to demand from the North American imperialist corporations, to which many of you belong, that they order their local servants to terminate the reprisals against workers, peasants, students and the people of my Fatherland.

Although Landry had announced that Mrs. Allende would answer questions at the close of her talk, she declined because it had been an emotional ordeal for her. But just before taking leave, she stepped again to the speakers platform and offered a batch of photographs which, she said, showed many burial and funeral scenes in Chile, soldiers destroying the home of the country's beloved poet, Neruda, and views of his burial with people in deep mourning.

Neruda, she said, had died because medicine was not allowed to reach him "in good time."

Mrs. Allende told reporters later that the pictures had been smuggled out of Chile but she would not identify the photographer. UPI moved several of the photos to its clients around the country.

A second section of the EDICON program concerned the issues of the Panama Canal Treaty of 1903. Mexico City publisher Romulo Ofarrill Jr. introduced the speakers, Dr. Carlos Lopez Guevara, special ambassador to the U.S., and Rep. Robert L. Leggett, Chairman of the House Committee on the Panama Canal.