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# NEWS, VIEWS and ISSUES

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No. 1

21 FEBRUARY 1974

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS	1
GENERAL	21
EASTERN EUROPE	27
WESTERN EUROPE	29
FAR EAST	33
WESTERN HEMISPHERE	36

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has served its purpose or  
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# Government Affairs

NEW YORK TIMES, WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 16, 1974

## TAPE EXPERTS TELL SIRICA THAT GAP IN 18-MINUTE WATERGATE RECORDING WAS DUE TO AT LEAST 5 ERASURES

### WORDS ARE LOST

### White House Cautions Against Drawing Any Conclusions

By LESLEY OELSNER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 15—A court-appointed panel of six technical experts reported today that the 18½-minute gap on a crucial Watergate tape recording was caused by at least five separate erasures and re-recordings, and not by a single accidental pressing of the wrong button on a tape recorder, as the White House has suggested.

The panel also reported that the conversation on the tape—in which President Nixon apparently ordered H. R. Haldeman to carry out a "public re-

Text of the advisory panel's report is on Page 16.

lations" offensive to counteract the effect of the Watergate break-in at the Democratic national headquarters three days earlier—could not be retrieved.

The disclosure seemed certain to strain the President's credibility even further, for it suggested, to many, that someone in the White House had purposely destroyed subpoenaed evidence.

Senators from both sides of the aisle said that the development was damaging to Mr. Nixon. So did Elliot L. Richardson, the former Attorney General.

United States District Judge John J. Sirica, who has presided over the Watergate case from the beginning, said that he wanted to find out whether, as he put it, the gap was "caused by an accident, or was it deliberately done?"

The next question, of course, if it was "deliberately done," was, Who did it? President Nixon, or Rose Mary Woods, his secretary, Whom the White

House had initially blamed for the gap? Or someone else who had had access to the tape?

Meanwhile, the White House refused to make a "premature comment" on the experts' findings, but asserted that conclusions should not be drawn while the matter was still before the court. [Page 16.]

The tape in question was subpoenaed last summer by the special Watergate prosecution. The White House first announced the existence of the gap on Nov. 21, nearly a month after President Nixon finally announced that he would abide by the court's order to comply with the subpoena.

According to legal experts, the fact that the White House did not report that there had been at least five separate acts of erasure on the subpoenaed tape could be the basis for a contempt of court citation against either Mr. Nixon or his lawyers, should a court determine that officials knew of the erasures.

Moreover, if it is determined that someone deliberately made the erasures, lawyers say, that person could be prosecuted for obstruction of justice.

The penalty for such an offense can go as high as five years in prison and a \$5,000 fine.

And if Mr. Nixon is charged—either with contempt or with obstruction of justice—that charge could seriously aggravate the President's position in any impeachment proceeding.

The matter is especially damaging because the erased gap apparently contained the only mention of Watergate in the Haldeman-Nixon conversation June 20, 1972. Handwritten notes of the meeting by Mr. Haldeman, introduced at an earlier stage of Judge Sirica's hearing into Mr. Nixon's compliance with the subpoenas, showed that Mr. Nixon had given his order for a public relations offensive during that conversation.

The only official explanation that the White House has ever given of the gap, was that it had apparently been caused by Miss Woods, through a mistake she made while listening to the tape to make a transcript.

In a document submitted to the court Nov. 26 on Mr. Nixon's behalf, J. Fred Buzhardt Jr., at that time the chief of

the President's Watergate legal defense team, stated that the gap had apparently been caused by Miss Woods' accidentally pressing of the wrong button on the machine.

#### No Conclusion on Cause

The panel, in its five-page report, released by Judge Sirica, and in testimony by its members in Federal Court, declined to say whether they thought the erasures had been caused accidentally or deliberately.

Under questioning by the Assistant special Watergate prosecutor, Richard Ben-Veniste, however, panel members agreed that the technical evidence they had found in examining the tape would be "consistent" with the results that would be found if their had been a deliberate attempt to erase the tape.

If it were an accident, "it would have to be an accident that was repeated at least five times?" Mr. Ben-Veniste asked at one point, his voice skeptical.

Correct, replied Richard H. Bolt of Lincoln, Mass., the first of the experts to take the witness stand.

#### Response by Nixon Aide

After court recessed this afternoon, James St. Clair—the latest of President Nixon's attorneys in the case—told reporters that "I think I'm going to talk to my own experts."

Mr. Bolt, who with the five other experts was appointed by Judge Sirica after the White House and the special prosecutor had given him the experts' names, was standing nearby.

"I thought we were your experts," he replied.

Miss Woods testified before the court on Nov. 26 about her "terrible accident." She said that her telephone had rung while she was in the midst of listening to the tape, Oct. 1, and that when she reached for it, she "must have" pressed down on the "record" rather than the "stop" button and kept her foot on the foot pedal while she talked.

As her testimony progressed, however, she insisted more and more vehemently that she had only been on the phone for four or five minutes and that thus she could have caused only a four-or five minute portion of the erasure.

Miss Woods also said that on the morning she began working on the tape, on the last weekend of September, President Nixon came to her cabin at Camp David, Md., and "listened to different parts of

the tape, pushing buttons back and forth."

She said, however, that he was in her cabin only for a few minutes, and indicated that the portion Mr. Nixon listened to was the first part of the tape, covering a conversation earlier on June 20, 1972, between Mr. Nixon and John D. Ehrlichman.

The White House has contended that it never discovered the gap until Nov. 14 because it was not until then that it realized the Nixon-Haldeman portion was also subpoenaed, in addition to the Ehrlichman segment, and that it had thus not checked the entire tape.

Mr. Buzhardt subsequently said that his explanation had only been "just a possibility." Gen. Alexander M. Haig Jr., President Nixon's chief of staff, then offered his own theory: He said that women often talk longer on the phone than they admit, and that Miss Woods had probably caused the entire gap.

#### Earlier Haig Testimony

General Haig also said that at one point—when the White House counsel could not determine the cause for the buzzing sound that could be heard for 18 minutes on the tape, in place of conversation—various persons in the White House had thought the gap was caused by "sinister forces." He said, though, that the staff had then determined that the buzzing was caused by the proximity of the tape recorder to a tensor lamp and an electric typewriter, and that the sinister forces theory was thus abandoned.

The panel of experts rejected the lamp-electric typewriter explanation of the buzzing sound, saying that it had apparently been caused by a combination of factors; a defective component in the recorder used by Miss Woods, certain sound levels on the electrical power line to which the recorder was plugged, and, perhaps, the placing of a hand near the machine.

Their key finding, however, was that the gap had been caused by a number of erasures rather than one—as Mr. Bolt put it during his cross-examination by Mr. St. Clair this afternoon, "just how the buzz started is not really relevant."

The experts—whose explanations turned the court into something of a university lecture hall, replete with charts and blackboard and dozens of listeners straining to understand—made their finding through a process described as

"developing" the tape. They covered the tape with a magnetic fluid that allowed them to see various markings on the tape.

The key marking was what they called the "quartet signature" — four tiny lines, each half a millimeter high, in a group three millimeters wide — which the "erase head" of the recorder marks onto the tape each time the erase function is halted. There were five such marks on the tape, according to the testimony.

There were also marks indicating a total of nine different "starts" to the erasing and re-recording process, but not all of these nine segments had what the experts called "certain endings" — apparently because they were superseded by the starts of erasures. According to the testimony, there were thus between five and nine separate actions taken to erase and record segments of the 18½-minute stretch of tape.

The quartet signature, according to the testimony, occurs only when the machine has been operating and then the "record" button is released — and, while the button can be released by pressing any of

four other buttons on the machine, it must be done manually. Judge Sirica interrupted the discussion at one point to ask the "significance" of the markings.

#### 'Button Was Deactivated'

"It definitely means that the record button was deactivated, which can only be done by release of the record head, which can only be done by pressing one of the four buttons," the witness at the moment, Thomas G. Stockham Jr. of the University of Utah, replied.

Pressing them "manually?" Judge Sirica asked.

"Or with a stick," the witness replied. The answer coming after months of testimony about "sinister forces" and descriptions of reaching for a phone while playing a machine several feet away, drew loud laughs from almost everyone in the courtroom, except for those who sat at the White House table.

The group at that table today included Miss Woods's attorney, Charles S. Rhyne, who in earlier stages of the case had insisted on sitting elsewhere.

The experts said that there were three small fragments of

"speech-like sound" on the portion of the tape bearing the 18½-minute gap, each next to a small silence.

Mr. Ben-Veniste pressed for an explanation, asking if those portions could be on the tape if someone erased a portion of the conversation then rewound the tape, then tried to advance it to the "exact spot" where the erasure ended and then began a new erasure on a subsequent portion of the tape.

Dr. Stockham replied that it was "conceivable," for, as he put it, "It's extremely difficult to arrange" for the subsequent erasure to begin at the precise point on the tape where the last erasure ended.

Several questions were phrased in terms of Miss Woods; at one point, in saying that to create a certain effect on the tape "he" would have to take a certain action, Mr. Bolt quickly stated that he had been using the "editorial 'he'."

But other than that, no one, in court at least, suggested that Miss Woods had made the various erasures and re-recordings. Mr. Rhyne, in fact, stated later that he considered the testimony "entirely consistent" with Miss Woods's previous

testimony, and that he did not expect his client to be recalled.

Mr. St. Clair began his cross-examination of the experts this afternoon, saving further questions until Friday when the experts will return to court.

He focused on the question of whether the Uher machine used by Miss Woods for transcribing was defective. The experts testified earlier in the day that a part of the tape machine, a bridge rectifier, used in changing alternating current to direct current, had to be replaced while the experts were using the machine for testing.

"Would it be reasonable to infer that the machine was in some manner defective causing the buzz on the tape?" asked Mr. St. Clair. The witness, Mark Weiss, said that was correct.

The experts' analysis also indicated that someone's hand was probably present near the tape machine at one point in the 18½-minute buzz, another comment that interested Mr. St. Clair. Wouldn't this phenomenon have been expected at other places on the tape? asked Mr. St. Clair.

"We didn't find it," replied Mr. Weiss.

New York Times  
7 Feb. 1974

# HOUSE, 410-4, GIVES SUBPOENA POWER IN NIXON INQUIRY

## Judiciary Panel Is Authorized to Summon Anyone, Including President, With Evidence

By JAMES M. NAUGHTON

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 6—The House of Representatives voted 410 to 4 today to grant the Judiciary Committee broad constitutional power to investigate President Nixon's conduct. The House thus formally ratified the impeachment inquiry begun by the committee last October and empow-

ered the panel to subpoena anyone, including the President, with evidence pertinent to the investigation.

It was only the second time in the nation's history that such a step, directed at a President, had been taken in the House. But the roll-call vote was not a test of impeachment sentiment.

The vote followed an hour of debate in which no one rose to defend Mr. Nixon, but Democrats and Republicans quarreled over the best method to

guarantee that the inquiry would not become partisan.

#### 'No Other Way'

The tone was struck by the Judiciary Committee chairman, Representative Peter W. Rodino Jr., Democrat of New Jersey, when he told an unusually attentive House:

"Whatever the result, whatever we learn or conclude, let us now proceed with such care and decency and thoroughness in honor that the vast majority of the American people, and

their children after them, will say: This was the right course. There was no other way."

The four members who opposed the resolution, all Republicans, were Ben B. Blackburn of Georgia, Earl F. Landrebe of Indiana, Carlos J. Moorhead of California and David C. Treen of Louisiana.

Mr. Moorhead, a member of the Judiciary Committee, objected that the resolution gave the panel such unrestricted subpoena power that it "can only precipitate a constitutional confrontation and further divide the people of our country."

The significance of the House action was illustrated by Mr. Rodino's statement that the power to issue and enforce a subpoena would be drawn directly from the Constitution, and would "not depend upon any statutory provisions or require judicial enforcement."

He said that a subpoena would be issued to Mr. Nixon only if the committee thought it necessary to reach a "fair" judgment whether there were grounds for impeachment.

"The gentleman from New Hampshire hopes that will not be necessary," Representative Louis C. Wyman, Republican of New Hampshire, said as he stared across the quiet chamber at Mr. Rodino.

"The gentleman from New Jersey does also," Mr. Rodino replied.

He told newsmen later that no decisions would be made within the next few days on requests for evidence to either the White House or to the Watergate special prosecutor.

Leon Jaworski.

The resolution was adopted after the House rejected, 342 to 70, a parliamentary effort to open the measure to amendments that would have set an April 30 deadline for completion of the inquiry and allowed the committee's senior Republican to issue subpoenas independently.

#### 'Good with Me'

Representative John J. Rhodes of Arizona, the House Republican Leader, signaled the fate of the parliamentary maneuver when he declared that Mr. Rodino's pledge to conduct the inquiry fairly and expeditiously was "good with me."

Only 67 of 178 Republicans voting on the issue and 3 of 234 Democrats disagreed and sought unsuccessfully adoption of the restrictions.

As approved, the measure provides no termination date for the investigation. It authorized Mr. Rodino and the ranking Republican, Representative Edward Hutchinson of Michigan, to issue subpoenas jointly. If either declines, the full committee, composed of 21 Democrats and 17 Republicans, must decide whether to issue a subpoena.

Representative Robert McClory, Republican of Illinois, asserted that a fixed deadline would assure a troubled nation that the Watergate turmoil would soon end.

"Imagine!" he protested, his voice and arms rising and falling together. "Imagine this important resolution, historic in its impact, being presented here without an opportunity for amendment."

Representative William L.

Hungate, Democrat of Missouri, retorted dryly that it would be irresponsible to set an "arbitrary" deadline that might put the committee in "the position of the skydiver whose chute failed to open and found he had jumped to a conclusion."

Several Republicans warned that the inquiry could degenerate into partisanship without a guarantee that the Democratic majority would not suppress a subpoena written by the senior Republican.

"Suppose we wanted to call [Senator] Hubert Humphrey or Bobby Baker?" asked Representative David W. Dennis, Republican of Indiana. Mr. Baker was convicted in 1967 of larceny, fraud and income tax evasion after an inquiry into

his activities as the secretary to Senate Democrats.

Republicans apparently took their cue, however, from Mr. Rhodes, who said that the minority would be able to "look at its options" later if the inquiry became partisan.

Despite the seriousness of the House action, there was no indication of influence having been exerted either by the White House or by groups lobbying on behalf of the impeachment of Mr. Nixon.

The President had breakfast at the White House this morning with 37 Republican Senators and Representatives who are members of two informal Capitol Hill groups, the Chawder and Marching Society and the S.O.S. Club. Only four of

Mr. Nixon's House guests supported the effort to amend the resolution, and none of them opposed its final approval.

The House has taken formal impeachment action only a dozen times before. The only instance in which a President's conduct was investigated was in 1867, when the House adopted a similar resolution directing the Judiciary Committee to inquire into the possible impeachment of Andrew Johnson.

#### Equally 'Solemn'

The House rejected the committee's articles of impeachment in December, 1867, but voted two months later to impeach President Johnson after he dismissed Secretary of War

Edward M. Stanton. The Senate subsequently acquitted Johnson.

Referring to the Johnson impeachment, Mr. Rhodes described the House proceeding today as an equally "solemn occasion."

What the House concludes in Mr. Nixon's case, said Representative Elizabeth Holtzman, Democrat of Brooklyn, "will stand for all time. We will act expeditiously, but we will act soundly."

Mr. Rodino also referred to the need for sensitivity and caution.

"For almost 200 years," he said, "Americans have undergone the stress of preserving their freedom and the Constitution that protects it. It is our turn now."

New York Times  
16 Jan. 1974

## Watergate Image Abroad

By C. L. Sulzberger

PARIS—Before 1940 the United States, reckoning "foreigners don't vote," paid relatively little heed to other countries. Nor, until it became a superpower and convinced itself that an "American century" had arrived, did foreign lands pay much attention to the U.S.A.

One result was a heritage of ignorance and even today, after 35 years of direct U.S. involvement abroad, some of that ignorance remains. One can see this in the puzzling failure of foreigners to assess the American sense of political morality as earnestly as Americans do. A glaring case is Watergate.

Maybe because they lack our Puritan ethic, or because they are more cynical in the Old World than the New, there are few places overseas where the affair is taken at nearly the same level of seriousness as in the United States.

Many Americans may think foreigners are fools and should learn better. However, there are enough problems in which foreigners have more tangible interest than they see for themselves. In Watergate, so after a brief flurry abroad there now exists a period of journalistic dimming.

The British, on the brink of economic disaster and possible elections, have little space for President Nixon in their atrophied newspapers. The French, obsessed by political mini-scandals including bugging of a humorous magazine, an event called Watergaffe, have small concern for troubles in another version of democracy.

The rest of Europe is worried by

the oil emergency, recent outbreaks of terror, slow disintegration of the European Community, or internal problems. For Italy—whose special gift to political theory is the art of governing without a government—Watergate is only a distant snicker.

Even among non-allies there is concern. The Russians are playing it pianissimo; after all, the embattled President is the man with whom they arranged détente from which grain, technology and quiet-on-the-Western-front have stemmed. The Israelis like Mr. Nixon more than they think they like Gerald Ford; and the Arabs appear to think he is the least bad President we've recently had.

And China? When I asked Chou En-lai what he thought of our famous scandal, he replied: "We never use the word scandal in discussing this. Since it is entirely your own internal affair, we have never published anything about it in our press. It doesn't affect the over-all situation."

"We think it perhaps reflects your

### FOREIGN AFFAIRS

political life and social system. . . . You have had such things occur in your society and undoubtedly will again. There are many social aspects interwoven into it and it is better not to discuss this issue. I hope your President will be able to overcome these difficulties."

The extraordinary thing is that just as Mr. Nixon seemed even more closely hemmed in, one could read a front-page column in the leading Paris morning daily by its foreign editor called "The Revival of America," which

concluded: "The Pax Americana of Richard Nixon is a fact before which one can only bow."

The same day I received a quote from an American history book, sent by a brilliant Italian friend, discussing the impeachment of President Andrew Johnson. This said: "In these matters General Grant cut a sorry figure."

"He was so eager to aid the impeachment counsel that he even bribed a White House janitor to send him the scraps from the President's wastebasket. He went to the trouble of calling on various Senators at their homes, urging them to vote for conviction. This was, of course, a bare-faced tampering with the jury."

For many foreigners, there is a suspicion that one of America's contemporary problems is not just misuse of the Presidency but its modernization. When one asks: "Has Mr. Nixon the right to tape conversations?" the answer is often, "Why not?"

French political "ins"—as distinguished from the "outs"—see Watergate as another version of their own clash between legislature and executive. The British are mildly surprised that the American public insists on seeing documents involving national security.

"Abroad"—as Secretary Kissinger knows while he rushes around patching it up—is a different world than that at home which still, amid the sordid devices of automatic spookery and instant copying, hopes to recapture the dream of America's Founding Fathers. The world abroad is not biting its nails over United States morality but over if and whether its foreign policy works. So far it does.

WASHINGTON POST Friday, Jan. 25, 1974

Stephen S. Rosenfeld

# Watergate: The Soviet Connection

One of the most curious things about Watergate is how it reminds Americans of Russia. Searching for examples to explain this administration's misuse of power, many observers have been led by the relative thinness of American precedents to turn to the Kremlin's ways. For despite the international changes of recent years, the Soviet Union still furnishes the general yardstick of totalitarianism, the standard by which the violence of state against citizen is commonly judged.

So last week the New Yorker magazine, in *Talk of the Town*, observed: "Our misfortune is that neither of the two men who hold the world's survival in their hands has an acceptable vision of what kind of world it should be. President Nixon (the leader of a free country that, owing to him, is in danger of losing its freedom) and Secretary-General Brezhnev (the leader of a totalitarian country that is trying to make sure that freedom stays lost there) have both used detente as a rationalization for dictatorial measures in their own countries." Brezhnev's crackdown on Solzhenitsyn, Nixon's on

Cox, were paired.

There is, granted, a general truth here at work. In an era of continuing international tension, it becomes easy if not habitual for any government under domestic siege to charge that its internal critics are aiding its external foes. When a certain thawing threatens to melt that rationale for restricting domestic critics, then governments all too quickly turn to the claim that, to preserve and enhance the new climate, the old restrictions are still required.

So it is right and necessary to ask, with the New Yorker, "how to reconcile our survival with our liberty." That is the issue Watergate poses to our national dialogue.

To say that all swimmers get wet, however, is not to say they all swim as fast as Mark Spitz. Brezhnev and Nixon wield state power and face internal critics, but there resemblance ends. If the children of the New Left have an emotional investment in detecting no difference, then others, the New Yorker included, have no similar excuse for not thinking straight.

The United States is a free country because it has the traditions and institutions which give the people the prospect of checking central power. The Soviet Union lacks those traditions and institutions and affords its citizens no similar prospect. The American system is open to political abuses but it is laughable to compare these to the abuses endemic in the Russian system.

The United States is not, "owing to Nixon, in danger of losing its freedom." At most it is, owing to Nixon, in a crisis from which it can recover. Russia is not "trying to make sure that freedom stays lost there": it is practicing business as usual. Unlike Nixon, Brezhnev does not need the cause of detente to "rationalize dictatorial measures": he simply applies power.

It is a notable feature of detente diplomacy that the U.S. now shuns the

kinds of comments on the values and internal practices of the Soviet Union which were common in the "cold war" days of more conspicuous ideological conflict. Periodically, Dr. Kissinger manages to let it be known that he does not approve of the way the Russians stuff dissenters into insane asylums, and the like. Such intimations are always accompanied by a warning that moral outrages should not be allowed to interfere with political affairs.

The bureaucracy carried this pragmatic tendency to a new extreme a few months ago, by the way, when the State Department, replying to a House Foreign Affairs subcommittee's request for a list of countries that had "lost their democracies since World War II," declined to provide a list. The department explained that "it is impossible to get an international consensus of what the term 'democracy' means. . . . Altogether, there are no hard and fast rules to go by."

Private citizens, however, are under no similar compunction to avoid bruising the sensibilities of the world's dictatorships. Thus a kind of high-low approach has evolved — the government delicately skirts public comment on, say, Solzhenitsyn or Soviet Jews, while private citizens say what they feel. This is how the New Yorker comes to make its remarks on Solzhenitsyn, and Watergate.

We owe it only to the fact that Nixon is their President of current choice that the Russians have not themselves jumped on the Watergate bandwagon. In other circumstances, they would use it as proof of our corruption and imminent ruin. In the actual circumstances, it embarrasses their political designs. One of the most curious things about Watergate is how it must remind Russians of Russia.

NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 1, 1974

## Transcript of Nixon's Watergate View

Following is a transcript of President Nixon's remarks on Watergate, delivered Wednesday night at the conclusion of his State of the Union Message, as recorded by The New York Times:

Mr. Speaker, and Mr. President and my distinguished colleagues and our guests, I would like to add a personal word with regard to an issue that has been of great concern to all Americans over the past year.

I refer, of course, to the investigations of the so-called Watergate affair.

As you know, I have provided to the special prosecutor voluntarily a great deal of material.

I believe that I have provided all the material that he needs to conclude his investi-

gations and to proceed to prosecute the guilty and to clear the innocent.

I believe the time has come to bring that investigation and the other investigations of this matter to an end. One year of Watergate is enough.

And the time has come, my colleagues, for not only the executive, the President, but the members of Congress, for all of us to join together in devoting our full energies to these great issues that I have discussed tonight which involve the welfare of all the American people in so many different ways as well as the peace of the world.

### Plans to Cooperate

I recognize that the House Judiciary Committee has a special responsibility in this area, and I want to indicate

on this occasion that I will cooperate with the Judiciary Committee in its investigation.

I will cooperate so that it can conclude its investigation, make its decision and I will cooperate in any way that I consider consistent with my responsibilities for the office of the Presidency of the United States.

There is only one limitation: I will follow the precedent that has been followed by and defended by every President from George Washington to Lyndon B. Johnson of never doing anything that weakens the office of the President of the United States or impairs the ability of the Presidents of the future to make the great decisions that are so essential to this nation and the world.

Another point I should like

to make very briefly. Like every member of the House and Senate assembled here tonight, I was elected to the office that I hold. And like every member of the House and Senate, when I was elected to that office I knew that I was elected for the purpose of doing a job, and doing it as well as I can possibly can.

And I want you to know that I have no intention whatever of ever walking away from the job that the people elected me to do for the people of the United States!

Now needless to say, it would be understatement if I were not to admit that the year 1973 was not a very easy year for me or personally or for my family. And as I've already indicated, the year 1974 presents

very great and serious problems as very great and serious opportunities are also presented.

But my colleagues, this I believe: With the help of God who has blessed this land so richly, with the cooperation of the Congress and with the

support of the American people, we can and we will make the year 1974 a year of unprecedented progress toward our goal, of building a structure of lasting peace in the world and a new prosperity without war in the United States of America.

THE ECONOMIST FEBRUARY 9, 1974

## Prosecutor's dilemma

Washington, DC

In the strategy of his Watergate defence, President Nixon's next vital decision may be how best to obstruct the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives now that it is armed, by a vote of 410 to 4, with full subpoena powers, but his is a defence on two fronts against antagonists whom he prefers to fight separately. His main concern this week was with the other one, the special prosecutor, Mr Jaworski, who "belongs" to the executive branch of government but who enjoys, or is burdened with, unusual powers. Against Mr Jaworski Mr Nixon is employing an interesting line of manoeuvre aimed at forcing the special prosecutor to bring his investigations to an early end and go speedily to court with arraignments of the chief alleged malefactors short of the President himself, but with evidence as incomplete as can be contrived. A resourceful, ingenious quarry, the President has got Mr Jaworski into an awkward corner for the moment.

From time to time Mr Nixon sighs deeply in public over the lamentable slowness, almost amounting to sluggishness, with which the special prosecutor does his work; as he told Congress last week, "one year of Watergate is enough". What slows the special prosecutor up is, chiefly, the tenacity with which the White House holds on to papers and tapes which he needs as evidence. Some of that evidence may lead the prosecuting lawyers to Mr Nixon personally, or it may not; in any event, once the existence of such evidence is known, others of his former cabinet or his former staff can use its absence to undermine the prosecution's case against themselves. Mr Jaworski needs it. On the other hand, he did say last month that he hoped to bring in indictments by the end of February; he feels the pressure from many quarters to get on with it, and he fears the further long delay that might follow if he now embarked on a new course of litigation to extract the tapes and documents from the White House.

Blandly Mr Nixon claimed in his State of the Union address last week to have "provided all the material that he (Mr Jaworski) needs to conclude his investigations". This is not what the special prosecutor believes at all. Several requests of his for papers and tapes have been at the White House for some weeks, and one for several months, awaiting the President's decision to hand them over or not. Among these are

some that could confirm or refute the account of his conversations with the President which Mr John Dean gave to the Ervin committee last summer. The eminent trial lawyer now in charge of Mr Nixon's Watergate defence, Mr St Clair, appeared this week to be challenging the special prosecutor to seek subpoenas and take the President to court to fight over again the battle of constitutional law which Mr Cox, Mr Jaworski's predecessor as Watergate prosecutor, won last year, and which led to Mr Cox's dismissal.

Whether the President could, in that event, dismiss Mr Jaworski as he did Mr Cox is something nobody really knows. He has given undertakings not to do so without the support of a consensus of the congressional leaders, but might he not temporarily bamboozle the congressional leaders as he bamboozled Senator Ervin and Senator Baker last autumn, or might he not, if up against it, break his undertaking and fall back on raw executive power? There is no act of Congress to prevent that, merely promises. In reality, however, Mr Nixon may consider his ability to entangle the special prosecutor in unwelcome delays a more effective weapon than any threat of dismissal.

Very carefully, Mr Jaworski explained in a television interview last Sunday that the White House had not given him everything he needed and that what he had been given had not been given exactly, as the President claimed, "voluntarily". "I had to go after it", said Mr Jaworski, and he indicated plainly that in December he had to threaten to take the President to court again. While he implied that he might decide to do it again, he also said that the decision would not be a simple one, since he had other things to consider: "for instance, the matter of when the indictments are to be returned, the matter of how much delay will be involved."

One of President Nixon's recent modes of counter-attack has been to circulate news of the existence in the White House of transcripts that show the President's innocence and the falseness of Mr John Dean's accounts of the talks they had. Senator Hugh Scott, the Republican leader in the Senate, a respectable man whose detestation of Mr Dean has long seemed inordinate, let himself be used as a vehicle for this purpose. At least Mr Scott read

some of the transcripts or summaries or whatever they are before pronouncing them a vindication of the President; Vice President Ford, who was briefly used for the same purpose, had not read them and later said he had no intention of reading them. Senator Scott's situation became embarrassing when it turned out that nobody else in the whole Congress had been shown the reputed evidence and that the White House had no present intention of letting it out. At Mr Scott's insistence the President's counsel, Mr St Clair, put out his own statement on Monday to the effect that the President's tape recordings "do not support" Mr Dean's testimony.

Unfortunately he had to make this statement on the same day on which he loftily rebuked the special prosecutor for giving his opinion of Mr Dean's veracity in public instead of leaving it all to judicial process. First Mr Jaworski's staff, and then the special prosecutor himself, found themselves forced to take a public position about Mr Dean by the repercussions of the White House campaign of suggestion.

One such repercussion was that, in the pre-trial proceedings in the prosecution of President Nixon's former appointments secretary, Mr Dwight Chapin, the defendant's lawyers challenged the acceptability of Mr Dean as a witness for the prosecution on the ground that Mr Dean was under suspicion of perjury. Mr Jaworski's lawyers had to say that, having studied the evidence accumulated so far, they knew of no basis for the suspicion. Naturally this caused Mr Jaworski to be questioned further in his television interview.

There Mr Jaworski said plainly that his lawyers would not be using Mr Dean as a witness if they believed his veracity was open to question. One thing that everybody knows about Watergate is that Mr Dean and President Nixon cannot possibly both be telling the truth. Thus the case of the relatively humble Mr Chapin has led the prosecutor perilously close to a new, direct collision with the White House, whether he takes the President to court for the needed tapes and documents, or not. Mr Nixon's system of promoting his defence indirectly through third parties has its pitfalls.

WASHINGTON POST Friday, Jan. 11, 1974

J. H. Plumb

# Watergate's Damage To America's Image

After so many months of Watergate, the credibility of the Nixon administration is at total risk, whatever dramatic action it may take. Not only experts in American affairs, but also ordinary men and women will now search for the hidden reason for dramatic actions. What is wrecking America's image is not whether the President has technically broken or not broken the law, but that a man so self-confessed in misjudgment of other men and their actions should still be in control of the world's most powerful nation. And the irony, for a British historian, is that no minister of George III, nor even George III himself, could have survived such a record of disaster. James III never broke the law, but he was chased from his kingdom. Many ministers in England have been impeached, or threatened with impeachment, for incompetence or for erroneous judgment, not for breaking a law or obstructing justice. Many Americans misunderstand the concept of impeachment, which is directly derived from English constitutional practice of the 17th and 18th centuries. It was a device developed by Parliament (the legislative branch) when it was weak, both in relation to the monarchy (the executive) and the judges — so that the king could be forced to part with ministers who were corrupt or incompetent, or whose policy Parliament loathed. It was a weapon, quite deliberately devised, to check the excesses of the executive; to bring not only criminals to justice, but also those who were bringing English institutions into disrepute.

If ministers or heads of state are removable only if they technically break

the law, the prospects for absolutism and tyranny must be very bright—even in America. And to many Englishmen the debate about Watergate seems to move away all too quickly from the central issue to peripheral and fundamentally unimportant arguments—the tapes, the real-estate purchases, the income-tax payments, or prior knowledge of the burglaries. The glaring enormity is that a man who chooses one self-confessed grafter for his deputy, whose aides are indicted on charges of perjury, conspiracy, burglary and the rest, has not been compelled to give up office. In no other country, Communist or free, would this be so. Not to recognize this, and not to recognize the intense harm that it is doing to America's image overseas, and therefore to America's power to influence the world, is the most dangerous of attitudes.

*The writer is a professor of modern English history at Christ's College, Cambridge. This article is excerpted from his "Letter from London" which appeared in The New York Times Magazine.*

At present, America's capacity to influence events depends upon one man and one man alone—Dr. Henry Kissinger; an extraordinarily dangerous situation for a great power. There is a great deal of anti-Americanism in Europe and elsewhere in the world, and now it has a glaring blemish upon which it can fasten and pump in its poison. Certainly Europe was developing a more independent attitude in

economic and foreign affairs before Watergate, but surely no one can doubt that the process has accelerated since that debacle.

And what should be realized is that Watergate is news, still headline news, in London, avidly read, avidly discussed day after day after day. Watergate is not a local, internal domestic affair. The schizophrenic attitude that American foreign policy sails on magnificently and effectively untouched by White House "horrors" or by the lies and evasions is a cruel delusion. Watergate is a cancerous growth eating at America's strength. Watergate is bad enough, but what worries America's friends far more deeply is the weakness of a constitutional system that renders a change of a President during his elected term almost impossible, except by death. This, in effect, becomes elected monarchy, and a monarchy far more powerful than George III ever enjoyed. The whole political and constitutional history of Britain centered on the Watergate problem—how to curb a monarch's bad judgment in choosing ministers; that is why we invented impeachment, and used it.

And one longs to hear some voices on Capitol Hill stating loudly and clearly the central issue: that the responsibility of a President is not to a mandate given one year, two years, three years previously, but a daily responsibility to the people's elected representatives, answerable at all times and on all matters, not only for keeping the law, but also in choosing men of integrity and honor. If the trust committed to the President is not honorably discharged, removal is essential for the well-being of the country.

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WASHINGTON POST Tuesday, Jan. 15, 1974

## The Pentagon Spying Case

WHAT FOLLOWS is a summary of those intricate and intriguing news accounts that have appeared in the last few days and dealt with a strange internecine conflict within the administration.

In mid-1971, the military command in the Pentagon, apparently feeling closed out of the President's tightly held major diplomatic initiatives, arranged on its own to get certain documents and notes of meetings from the White House. Some of this material seems to have found its way to columnist Jack Anderson. When Anderson published an account of a National Security Council meeting on the Indo-Pakistani war in December, 1971, an angry Henry Kissinger—he was then Mr. Nixon's national security adviser in the White House—ordered an investigation of the leak. The "plumbers,"

established some months earlier, turned to the task and found a "ring" of military personnel taking unauthorized information from Dr. Kissinger's files and meetings.

What then happened to those somehow involved? One junior person reportedly attempted "blackmail" by threatening to expose the operation to public view if he were not given a "very high post"; he did not get such a post but was not disciplined and was kept on in the government. The Joint Chiefs of Staff liaison at the NSC, a rear admiral, was given a new and important Pentagon position; he denies involvement. A clerical aide, a yeoman, was transferred; he says he promised the Navy "to never talk about what happened." A supposed recipient of the information, Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, who is the country's top military officer, was reappointed to a second two-year term as chairman of



the Joint Chiefs; he denies any link to unauthorized information "from Dr. Kissinger's office."

As for Mr. Nixon, for 18 months, ever since the existence of the "plumbers" came to light, he has resisted investigation of them on grounds that disclosure would harm the "national security." A number of officials now privately say that the Pentagon spying case is what he had particularly in mind. In its single public comment on the Pentagon spying case, made last Friday in response to the first limited press reports on it, the White House did not explicitly acknowledge even that a charge of Pentagon spying had been made. Rather, the statement singled out "deliberate leaks to the media of extremely sensitive information of interest to other nations" and said "the source of these leaks was a low-level employee [apparently the yeoman] whose clerical tasks gave him access to highly classified information." (Columnist Anderson denies the yeoman was his source.) Further disclosures would be "inappropriate," the White House said. "It may be that at a later time the facts can be made public without detriment to the national interest."

In brief: The Pentagon spied on Dr. Kissinger. When the operation came to light inside the government, it was covered up: the principals were given minimal or no reason for personal embarrassment, and preemptive disclosure of the matter was made to key legislators—complete with the usual "national security" argument for maintaining the strictest secrecy. Now that the operation has come to public attention, the White House is trying to breeze right by.

No doubt this is not the full story. It is enough to

make plain, however, that the "villain" of this piece, as of so many others, is President Nixon's obsession with secrecy, rationalized without warrant or compelling justification as an imperative of "national security." In making his openings to Peking and Moscow and in searching for a way out of Vietnam, he had a broad choice between soliciting, on the one hand, the understanding and support of the Executive bureaucracy—and, in their respective times and ways, the Congress and the public—and, on the other hand, conducting a lone operation. Mr. Nixon chose the latter course. Did he think the Pentagon would sabotage his diplomacy? Even for a President with Mr. Nixon's savvy for the possibilities of political ambush from the right, this seems an exaggerated not to say offensive consideration. Whatever his reason, his choice led in this instance to a shabby espionage operation that induces one not so much to gasp as to cringe. Discovery of the operation led all too inevitably to a coverup—and perhaps not only between the President and the Pentagon. Dr. Kissinger offered the Senate seemingly categorical assurances that he had no knowledge of the intelligence activities of David Young, his former aide who—according to the new reports—ran the investigation, which Kissinger ordered, that unearthed the Pentagon plot. These assurances look very strange now.

None of us needed at this time yet another demonstration of the dangers of running the presidency as though it were a game of solitaire. Quite enough damage to our institutions and our values has already been done. But we keep learning more and it is still not possible to tell when the lesson will be done.

WASHINGTON POST Tuesday, Feb. 5, 1974

Joseph Kraft

## Probing The NSC Leaks

One of the reasons Watergate goes on and on is that the full story of that sinister group, the White House plumbers, has never been told. In recent days alone, new revelations of their work have compromised the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Thomas Moorer, and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.

So all of us have to hope that the inquiry which the Senate Armed Services committee begins this week will get to the bottom of the mystery. Admiral Moorer and Dr. Kissinger, in particular, have a special interest in stepping into the issue, instead of bobbing and weaving as they have up to now.

Admiral Moorer comes into the picture because the Plumbers Unit, which was set up at the White House in 1971 to look into leaks, did in fact uncover one avenue for unauthorized distribution of secret material. That was a line of communication which passed papers generated by Dr. Kissinger at the National Security Council to Admiral Moorer at the Pentagon.

Admiral Moorer, in an appearance on the Today Show, acknowledged that he had in fact received papers through that channel in 1971. But he made it seem an insignificant event. He blamed, in what strikes me as a violation of the spirit of command responsibility, an enlisted man on the NSC staff, Yeoman 1st Class Charles Radford. And he declared, in a statement implausible to anybody who knew Washington well at the time, that "there was a free flow of information" from Dr. Kissinger to his office.

That story is now challenged in an unmistakable way. Sources in the military claim that the passing of documents to the Pentagon was not insignificant, but continued over a long period of time, and involved hundreds of papers, some of them meant only for the eyes of the President. The highest ranking military officer in the country, in other words, is being made to seem a liar, unfit for his high post.

Dr. Kissinger came into the picture because one of the operating heads of the plumbers was David Young, a former staff man on the National Security Council. In testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations committee on his nomination as Secretary of State, Dr. Kissinger was asked repeated questions about Mr. Young and his work on the plumbers. In response to one question he said:

"I have no knowledge of any such activities that David Young may have engaged in. I did not know of the 'Plumbers Group,' by that or any other name. Nor did I know that David Young was concerned with internal security matters . . . I had no contact with David Young either by telephone

or in my office or in any other way after he left my staff . . ."

When stories of the passing of documents to Admiral Moorer surfaced, Dr. Kissinger was questioned by newsmen about the plumbers. He said that he stood by "my statement to the Senate Foreign Relations committee." But under questioning it developed that he had known that an investigation had uncovered the irregular line of communication to the Pentagon. He had been allowed to listen to a tape of part of the investigation—the tape of an interrogation conducted by David Young.

Dr. Kissinger at that point cut off questions, pending further investigation by the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees. He has already appeared before the Foreign Relations committee. Though the transcript of his testimony has not been released as of this writing, it is known that he hedged his position still further. The blanket denials of contact with Young have now been modified. Dr. Kissinger's present position is that his office logs show no contact with Young.

Admiral Moorer and Dr. Kissinger have been asked to testify before the Senate Armed Services committee under Sen. John Stennis, (D-Miss.) But despite demands by two members—Senators Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) and Harold Hughes (D-Iowa)—it is not clear whether other officials, including Mr. Young, will be called, nor whether the hearings will be public.

The strange thing is that the demands for a full airing should have to come from the outside. Admiral



Moorer and Dr. Kissinger have the biggest interest in a complete plumbing of the plumbers. Their reputations are at stake, and their present standing is so high that they could far better absorb a few lumps now than risk a slow, painful, involuntary deflation over the weeks and months to come.

Logically, in other words, Admiral

Moorer and Dr. Kissinger should be pounding tables and insisting at the top of their lungs on a thorough public accounting. Failure to do that only builds the suspicion that they are part of a larger cover-up—the cover-up arranged by a President who now brandishes his cudgel in the dark and hits his own men.

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New York Times  
12 Jan. 1974

New York Times  
6 Feb. 1974

## White House Statement

SAN CLEMENTE, Calif., Jan. 11—Following is a statement issued by the President's office on the passing of information from the National Security Council to the Pentagon:

Today's news accounts relating to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Security Council touch on a matter peripheral to a national security issue which was found to involve deliberate leaks to the media of extremely sensitive information of interest to other nations.

This incident has been referred to on several occasions in recent months, and the Administration still considers it inappropriate for public disclosure. It may be that at a later time the facts can be made public without detriment to the national interest.

For the present, however, most that can properly be stated is that today's news accounts convey an incorrect impression of the knowledge and actions of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; that the matter was investigated at the time; that the source of these leaks was a low-level employee whose clerical tasks gave him access to highly classified information, and that today's news stories are based on fragmentary accounts of the incident.

At the President's direction, the information regarding this case has been provided on a confidential basis to the chairmen of the Armed Services Committees of the House and Senate, the special prosecutor and the chairman and vice chairman of the Senate Select Committee.

## MOORER CONCEDES HE GOT DOCUMENTS

Tells Senate Unit He Twice  
Received Unauthorized  
Kissinger Material

By SEYMOUR M. HERSH

Special to The New York Times

Washington, Feb. 5 —

Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has acknowledged to the Senate Armed Services Committee that twice in 1971 he knowingly received documents that a Navy clerk had "retained" while traveling to Asia and Southeast Asia with President Nixon's top national security advisers.

Admiral Moorer also disclosed that he was told in late 1971 that the clerk, Yeoman 1st Cl. Charles E. Radford, "had not only been retaining papers in the course of his clerical duties but, also, had been actively collecting them in a clearly unauthorized manner."

The statements by the admiral were made in a letter to Senator John C. Stennis, Democrat of Mississippi, the committee chairman.

### Confirmation of Reports

The letter confirmed the most significant allegation made since the first reports of the alleged military snooping—That documents were taken from the private files of Henry A. Kissinger and Gen. Alexander M. Haig Jr. while they traveled on secret negotiating trips.

The letter also confirmed that military personnel assigned to the White House were actively seeking to pilfer national security documents not intended for the Pentagon.

Mr. Kissinger, then President Nixon's national security adviser, is now Secretary of State. General Haig, then the chief deputy to Mr. Kissinger, is now the White House chief of staff.

In his letter, Admiral Moorer again asserted that he had given "no orders, no instructions and no encouragement" to anyone regarding the alleged military spying. Such activities were unneeded, he said, because he had easy access to Mr. Kissinger and "never had

the feeling of isolation from information."

Admiral Moorer challenged the supposition that he and other defense chiefs were being kept in the dark about certain White House military decisions and diplomatic moves.

### Testimony by Kissinger

He said that he frequently discussed secret operations in Indochina with President Nixon, helped Mr. Kissinger plan all his secret trips to China, and had discussions with Mr. Kissinger on arms limitations negotiations, "including contact from Moscow during the June, 1972, summit."

Today the Senate Foreign Relations Committee released testimony Mr. Kissinger gave in closed session last week dealing with David R. Young Jr. A former Kissinger aide on the National Security Council, Mr. Young helped investigate the military snooping at the White House.

Mr. Kissinger again asserted that he had known nothing of Mr. Young's activities in the White House "plumbers" group, set up to stop leaks of national security information. This time the Secretary based his denial in part on his office logs, which he said demonstrated that "I never saw David Young after he left my staff."

A copy of Admiral Moorer's seven-page letter was made available today to The New York Times. The admiral is scheduled to testify tomorrow in executive session before the Armed Services Committee, which has begun an inquiry into the allegations of snooping.

### Court-Martial Urged

In his letter, Admiral Moorer also disclosed that in late 1971 he personally recommended to Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird and J. Fred Buzhardt Jr., then general counsel at the Pentagon, that court-martial proceedings be initiated against Yeoman Radford for his role in purloining the White House documents.

"I was, however, advised," Admiral Moorer wrote, "that no disciplinary proceedings were to be conducted and that it had been decided by the civilian leadership that Yeoman Radford was to be immediately transferred. I accepted these orders and directed my staff to implement them without delay."

Former Secretary Laird denied to reporters last week that he had "officially" acted to prevent the court-martial of Yeoman Radford but said that he might have remarked, "If you don't have firm evidence, don't go to trial."

About the same time he first learned of the full scope of Yeoman Radford's activities, Admiral Moorer wrote, he ordered his aides to return all unauthorized documents in his office files to the National Security Council staff. "Acting on those instructions," the admiral said, "all such papers were returned."

### Statement Contradicted

Elsewhere in the letter, the admiral repeatedly sought to minimize the significance of the materials provided him by Yeoman Radford, noting that the documents he received "did not stimulate close attention to me because they contained no new information."

The admiral did not explain in his letter why, if the material provided had been insignificant, he had sought to have Yeoman Radford court-martialed had had also deemed it important to order the documents returned to the White House.

Furthermore, the admiral's statement contradicted his only previous public statements as to the importance of the documents provided to him and the method of their collection.

### Report by Young

In a television interview on Jan. 18, the admiral twice described the material provided him by Yeoman Radford as "just a collection of, you know, roughs and carbon copies, and things of that type." He also specifically rejected the suggestion that the material had been clandestinely collected, telling his interviewer "This young man has just engaged in typing many, many documents. And he just assembled a file of the documents he typed."

The New York Times reported Sunday that "eyes only" messages and other highly secret communications intended solely for Mr. Kissinger and President Nixon had been routinely funneled by Yeoman Radford to Admiral Moorer from September, 1970, when the yeoman began his White House assignment, to December, 1971. As many as five senior joint staff officers were involved in clandestinely receiving and delivering those documents, The Times said.

An extensive report on the military snooping is known to have been assembled by Mr. Young, one of those indicted in Los Angeles in the September, 1971, burglary of the office of the former psychiatrist of Daniel Ellsberg, who has said he gave the press the secret

Pentagon papers on the history of the Vietnam War.

#### Pentagon Inquiry Made

Reliable sources have said that the Young report, which has not been made public, concluded that Admiral Moorer played an active role in the military snooping operation.

In his letter, Admiral Moorer twice said that he had not been provided either the Young report or a separate inquiry reportedly made by the Pentagon at the direction of Mr. Buzhardt, who is now a White House counsel.

Admiral Moorer wrote that, "to the best of my memory," the two batches of documents he received had been provided him by Rear Adm. Robert O. Welander, who headed the military liaison office in the National Security Council, headed by Mr. Kissinger.

The first delivery, the admiral said, was made in July, 1971, shortly after Yeoman Radford completed a trip to Southeast Asia, Pakistan and Paris with Mr. Kissinger. It was on that trip that Mr. Kissinger, accompanied by only a few aides, made his first visit to China. Yeoman Radford and most of Mr. Kissinger's personal staff were left behind in Pakistan.

Admiral Moorer said that by the time he received these documents he had already met, on July 16, with President Nixon and Mr. Kissinger at San Clemente, Calif., to discuss the China trip.

The second delivery of unauthorized White House documents, Admiral Moorer wrote, was made in September, 1971, and involved reports stemming

from a visit to South Vietnam by General Haig.

"These papers had been overtaken by events," Admiral Moorer wrote, "and again, I did not scrutinize them as to their content or precise origin. I want to stress that these papers were provided me by a staff officer in a routine manner."

Other closely involved sources have told The Times, however, that a number of sensitive "eyes only" messages were transmitted to Mr. Nixon during Mr. Kissinger's July visits to Saigon, Peking and Paris and General Haig's September visit to Saigon.

#### Secret Peace Offer

In July, the sources said, the secret Kissinger negotiating efforts in Paris with Le Duc Tho of North Vietnam produced a secret peace offer. General

Haig, in September, reliable sources said, spent hours consulting with President Nguyen Van Thieu of South Vietnam about the secret peace talks.

"Eyes only" cables were sent daily by General Haig to Mr. Nixon and Mr. Kissinger, these sources said. Those cables, typed by Yeoman Radford, were sent through secure Central Intelligence Agency communications to keep them away from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the top echelon of the State Department.

Many of these cables, highly reliable sources said, were provided to Admiral Moorer's office by Yeoman Radford.

Yeoman Radford and Admiral Welander were both transferred in the aftermath of the investigations, but the admiral has since been reassigned to a key Navy post in the Pentagon.

#### WASHINGTON POST

Friday, Feb. 15, 1974

## Watergate Calls Helms Home Again

By Laurence Stern

Washington Post Staff Writer

Once again the Watergate quagmire is drawing Richard M. Helms back to Washington and the Central Intelligence Agency—he once headed back into the investigative limelight.

This time Helms is being summoned from his ambassadorial post in Tehran—his fourth Watergate recall—to testify on the CIA's destruction in January, 1973, of tape-recorded phone conversations to determine whether they bore on the White House scandal.

A statement circulated among CIA employees, presumably by authorization of director William E. Colby, said, "We do not know whether a presidential conversation may have been taped, although it is possible," an agency spokesman said yesterday.

Whether the tapes included presidential conversations is one of the central questions in this latest inquiry, which is being pressed by Sen. Howard Baker (R-Tenn.), co-chairman of the Senate Watergate committee.

Baker has been the most persistent and aggressive of the Senate Watergate investigators in pursuing the question of the CIA's implication in the affair—one of the concerns voiced by President Nixon as a "national security" question early in the case.

Mr. Nixon said his May 22 Watergate statement: "Elements of the early post-Watergate reports led me to suspect, incorrectly, that the CIA had been in some way involved." Helms has also steadfastly denied CIA involvement in the case during his repeated appearances before congressional investigators, prosecutors and the Watergate grand jury.

The first word on the CIA's destruction of its own tapes surfaced in a CBS broadcast on Jan. 29. Subsequently Colby acknowledged that the agency had destroyed through "normal procedure" all but one tape from that period.

The one surviving tape, of a conversation on June 22, 1971,

between the former CIA deputy director, Gen. Robert E. Cushman, and Watergate conspirator E. Howard Hunt Jr. was recovered because "it was put in a separate drawer somehow," Colby explained in response to original news reports of the CIA tape destruction.

A CIA spokesman also originally claimed that the tapes and transcripts were destroyed on Jan. 18, 1973, during Helms' last month as director. This was one day after a letter from Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.) was received by the CIA's congressional liaison office asking that all records or documents be preserved which might bear on the Watergate case "in any way."

Yesterday a CIA spokesman said that the Jan. 18 date "may not be correct" as the time the tapes were destroyed.

"We're trying to determine the exact date and circumstances of destruction and will report to the senator involved," the spokesman said.

The CIA statement said that tapes were "destroyed either shortly after their use or when collection became larger than convenient, specifically 1964 and 1971"—and again in January, 1973.

BALTIMORE NEWS AMERICAN

27 JAN 1974

# E. Howard Hunt: A Bungler Infected With the Spy Bug

COMPULSIVE SPY, by Tad Szulc, Viking, \$5.95.

Reviewed by VICTOR WILSON

Unable to turn up a CIA-painted psychiatric portrait of E. Howard Hunt Jr., Watergate break-in "mastermind," Tad Szulc, intelligence specialist, decided to compose one himself.

It's a rather gritty picture Szulc produces from official documents, court records and Hunt's former superiors and colleagues in the Central Intelligence Agency.

Szulc concludes that Hunt, now 55, was bitten by the spy bug during World War II service with the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and never recovered. For 22 years afterward, Hunt pursued his vocation with the CIA but mostly failed to cut the mustard, Szulc says, never being tapped for espionage duty but only political operations.

Hunt, Szulc continues in "Compulsive Spy" finally lapsed into "a life in which fantasy and reality overlapped," indulging his fancies in spy novels, of which he wrote 45.

When the CIA retired him in 1970, Hunt was like a fish

out of water in a very real-life world, grinding out releases for a publicity firm here.

Thus it was like a new lease on life when he was recruited to head the White House "plumbers" unit in 1971, recommended by President Nixon's then special counsel, Charles W. Colson.

Szulc points out the difference between a CIA clandestine political operator and an in-the-field agent is a question of skills. Lacking the latter's techniques, he goes on, it was almost inevitable that when "plumber" Hunt turned to domestic espionage and sabotage for his new masters, it was a dreary story of flop after flop after flop.

Of two "bugs" planted in the Democratic National committee's Watergate headquarters in the first raid, one didn't work. When the Los Angeles office of a psychiatrist treating Pentagon papers defendant Daniel Ellsberg was raided, all it produced was legal headaches for the future.

Documents forged the honor of former President John F. Kennedy's part in the Cuban missile affair, were so clumsy, a magazine writer spurned them. A CIA-provi-

ded auburn-colored wig was used so awkwardly by Hunt on a couple of missions his quarry laughed at him.

Finally the second raid on Democratic Watergate headquarters brought in the police, and through Hunt's ineptness, eventually led investigators to Nixon's Oval Office itself. Hunt had failed to order an elementary precaution: Strip the raiders of everything but their tools. A notebook on one man provided Hunt's White House telephone number. Wads of consecutively numbered \$100 bills were traced to the Committee to Re-Elect the President.

Given a tentative 35-year sentence after conviction of plotting the Watergate break-ins and bugging with a tacit understanding it would be less if he talked, Hunt remained silent — for a while. But, Szulc relates, even while he was "black-mailing" the White House of some \$200,000 for legal and family expenses, Hunt was drafting future plans.

The plans became operative when (A) the money stopped coming in, and (B) his once-beloved CIA publicity tried to disassociate itself from him. In short order, Hunt appeared willingly before Los Angeles and Wash-

ington grand juries and the Senate Watergate Committee.

"How does one explain Howard Hunt?" Szulc asks. Well, he sought power and importance, enjoyed both briefly, but never really achieved them. He also liked money, and finally obtained it, but the cost was terrible, the author explains.

When his wife died in a Chicago plane crash (with \$10,000 in cash in her handbag), Hunt was sole beneficiary of her \$250,000 flight insurance policy. Szulc says: Also, in late 1973, many of his old novels were republished plus two new books, with more on the drawing board. All should prove profitable.

But in the end, Szulc concludes, "Howard Hunt was a man who ... lost his way, and whose ultimate loyalty was to himself." He quotes the following epigraph from Hunt's latest novel:

"It is in the political agent's interest to betray all parties who use him, and to work for them all at the same time, so that he may move freely and penetrate everywhere."

THE WASHINGTON POST  
Saturday, Feb. 2, 1974

## Howard Hunt: 'The Post Continues Its Vendetta Against Me'

Daily and Sunday (Potomac, Jan. 27th) The Post continues its calculated vendetta against me, through innuendo, inaccuracies and inchoate rage that the Court of Appeals saw fit to release me from prison via a "complicated appeal ruling" which, I feel confident, The Post would have lauded had it applied to the Berrigans, Angela Davis or the Chicago Seven to name only a few beneficiaries of The Post's editorial sympathies.

Apparently The Post is wretchedly unhappy with the judicial system that permitted my unanticipated release. Sorry about that, fellows, but it can happen—even to non-militants.

I don't plan to spend a lot of time cataloguing The Post's gratuitous slurs on me since June 18, 1972; that may be more appropriate for something heavier than a Letter to the Editor. Nevertheless, it was the government, not Howard Hunt, that told the media I'd been a CIA officer ("spook" in your parlance), thus rendering my children and me vulnerable to reprisals by those nations and groups I'd worked against—on orders of the U.S. Government, which happens to be The Post's government, too. So, my 21-year

cover having been blown by government sources, why should I not point out to the American public, as I did before the Ervin hearings cameras, that in planning certain aspects of the Watergate entry operation I had been doing no more than what our government had trained me (and many others) to do?

The intense, almost necrophiliac interest in the books I've written and their sales suggests an envy-hatred mix that really has no place in serious — and honest — journalism. Although I've been deprecated as a "spy novelist" the fact is that only about eight of my perhaps 50 books have dealt with organized espionage. The asserted 18,000 copy sales of The Berlin Ending, if true, may reflect a triumph of public taste over the vicious East Coast literary "reviews" which attacked me as a Watergate villain rather than the style and faults of the book itself. If my publisher (Putnam) supplied your writers with the 18,000 figure they have been favored, for I will have no knowledge of the book's sales until Putnam's statement arrives sometime in April.

The "ludicrous image of (me) in the

"ill-fitting red wig" was, after all, a product of media glee, venom and again media inaccuracy. If the wig fitted illy blame CIA. And unless all involved are incurably color-blind the issue wig was BROWN, not red. But perhaps red is a more mirth-provoking color...

From the beginning I have not sought fame nor, much less, notoriety. The latter was thrust upon me by media adversaries, aimed, I suppose, at my total annihilation.

Within the U.S.S.R. the Soviet government is doing a pretty thorough job of defaming and discrediting Alexander Solzhenitsyn by among other techniques attributing to him sentiments and characteristics he never possessed. Without presuming to equate my creative skills with those of Solzhenitsyn, I find an interesting and depressing comparison with my own situation. The difference being that in America it's not the Presidium going for the author's jugular but the vindictive representatives of our free and "objective" media.

HOWARD HUNT.

**RADIO-TV MONITORING SERVICE, INC.**

3408 WISCONSIN AVENUE, N. W.

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20016

244-8682

PROGRAM:  FIRST LINE REPORT	DATE:  FEBRUARY 6, 1974
STATION OR NETWORK:  CBS RADIO	TIME:  7:40 AM, EDT

NEW PROBES REVEAL CIA INVOLVEMENT IN WATERGATE

DAN RATHER: New probes are under way to try to uncover additional information about Watergate and other crimes, suspected crimes, and questionable conduct by government officials. Some of President Nixon's closest aides are convinced that these investigations will at least serve to divert some attention away from Mr. Nixon and the White House.

Others, however, are wary, and feel that these additional investigations will serve, at the very least, to reflect badly on Mr. Nixon's judgment and control of subordinates. In one way or another, the Senate Armed Services Committee, the Watergate Committee, the House Committee considering impeachment, and the Special Prosecutor's office, all are involved in these new investigations.

The investigations reportedly center upon the following, among others. Number one, notes and memos made from secret tape recordings once stored by the CIA. The Central Intelligence Agency confirmed last week, after a CBS News report, that it had destroyed numerous such secret recordings which investigators believed contained important Watergate evidence. CIA Director William Colby has been asked to continue searching for tapes, or copies of tapes, made by CIA officials.

He also has been asked to search for transcripts, notes and memos made from the recordings. Colby, CBS News has learned, reported back that most, if not all, of the transcripts also have been destroyed. But Colby is believed to have found some notes and memos, and to have turned them over to investigators. This, however, has not yet been confirmed.

If true, this could shed new light on how deeply the CIA was involved with Howard Hunt, the one-time White House secret operative, and allegedly former CIA agent, convicted as a Watergate burglar, plus who said what to whom between White House officials and CIA leaders, about the Watergate affair, the Ellsberg psychiatrist's break-in, and related matters.

Number two, investigators believe they have found what is described as considerable important new information about the relationship of top White House officials and the CIA with the Mullen public relations firm in Washington. This is the firm which employed Howard Hunt at the time of the Watergate break-in.

CBS News has learned that the Mullen firm has had over a long period of years extensive associations with the CIA. Example, in 1971, shortly after a CIA agent was expelled from Singapore, the Mullen company opened a Singapore branch. The one employee there was a full-time agent for the CIA. Costs of the Singapore branch were paid by Mullen, and reimbursed directly to the company

through its bookkeeper, who was a former CIA officer. The Singapore office was closed last June.

Another Mullen branch, this one in Amsterdam, was operated through September of 1972. The branch manager there was a part-time CIA agent.

Since both CIA money and Republican campaign contributions were funnelled through the same Washington office of the Mullen firm, investigators have asked the CIA for copies of any memos about conversations CIA officials may have had with leaders of the Mullen firm. Robert Bennett, President of the firm, has sworn that there was absolutely no connection between what he says was his patriotic duty, meaning the CIA connection, and the strictly political contribution gathering he did for the Re-elect Nixon Committee, and the political contribution giving he did for billionaire Howard Hughes.

Bennett also has denied it, and made a strong case to support his denial, to CBS News.

Number three on the list of new, widening investigations is the length and depth of spying done on Henry Kissinger by Defense Department personnel, and whether there was any collusion in this between CIA and Defense Department officials. It is a maze, a complicated maze. Where it all leads and where it all ends, no one yet can say. But it's enough to keep investigators busy for many weeks.

SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, London  
27 January 1974

## Crisis in spy-land

THE world's most public secret service, the Central Intelligence Agency, is going through a crisis. It has grown a little fat with middle age perhaps, uncertain in its directions, and as a result has become vulnerable.

Flying into Washington one can glance down and see its handsome offices at Langley, set back from the Potomac River among the Virginia woods.

It looks such a solid, bureaucratic part of the Washington scene that it is hard to imagine it in difficulties. The annual budget is around £400 million a year and the staff is estimated at 15,000 to 18,000.

But that budget may be only one eighth of the total expenditure on intelligence, and its staff, according to some sources, account for only 15 per cent. of the whole, burgeoning intelligence community. However, the C.I.A. is the most prestigious and the most public part of the iceberg and sooner or later what happens at Langley receives some sort of scrutiny.

In recent months it has been accused of involvement in the Watergate scandals, seen the Pentagon move to assume closer control of some of its functions, witnessed its former director, Richard Helms, booted abruptly

into an ambassadorship in Tehran, been accused of inefficiency and subjected to a debate about the legitimacy of some of its operations.

If one accepts the analysis of a former member of its staff, Victor Marchetti, the heart of the problem can be found in the C.I.A.'s lack of success in penetrating the security of its prime objectives, Russia and China.

As a result it has turned more and more to objectives in the third world—Brazil, Greece, Chile, India, and so on. These are the places where a friendly dictator can be kept in power or an unfriendly one toppled with a little help from a well-organised clandestine operation, or some well-placed bribes.

Nations—Britain included in the past—have been doing that sort of thing for ages, but in the

telligence and co-ordination of intelligence activities are its major concerns. Nowadays, the most fruitful sources of information are satellites and electronic surveillance. Brezhnev's monitored conversations (mainly, it seems, about his masseuse) en route to work in the Kremlin were obtained not through some super spy but through a satellite tuned in to the radio-telephone in his car.

Super-spies, in fact, are in short supply in Moscow and Peking. Reports of the Nixon

Administration being worried lest further investigation of the Watergate scandal uncovers a top-level agent inside the Kremlin are scoffed at in knowledgeable circles in Washington.

The man concerned is said to be a Russian official at the United Nations who has not been trusted for some time.

On the other hand, the possibility that the Russians have penetrated the C.I.A. is said to cause sleepless nights among the agency's executives, particularly when Russian actions show signs of having been prompted either by exceptional prescience or first-rate information.

In such a large and relatively open operation it would be surprising if the Russians had failed to find a few openings. C.I.A. officials in Washington rarely make a secret of their employment. However, although convivial, they are generally

By DAVID ADAMSON  
in Washington

climate of today's American politics such activities are increasingly suspect. Since Vietnam, politicians, Left and Right, look askance at anything which smacks of intervention or involvement in someone else's messy politics.

The bulk of the C.I.A.'s work has nothing to do with clandestine operations. Analysis of in-

tight-lipped about the details of their occupation.

I must admit that after living among them for a year or two I knew little more than that they were conservative in their opinions, enjoyed chamber music and remarkably firm with their children.

Last week's stories about C.I.A. activities in Britain may

or may not be based on fact, but if they were, would they be so outrageous?

A crisis which has shaken a major ally and could cause prolonged instability is an event which needs detailed first-hand analysis. It would be surprising if the British had not made somewhat similar assessments of the American armed forces in the wake of Vietnam.

# WASHINGTON STAR-NEWS

Washington, D. C., Thursday, January 10, 1974

## U.S. Made Plan To Kill Castro, Journalist Says

NEW YORK (AP) — Free-lance journalist Tad Szulc says the United States during President Lyndon Johnson's administration planned a second invasion of Cuba combined with an effort to assassinate Premier Fidel Castro.

The plan had to be canceled, Szulc said in an article to be published in the Jan. 17 Esquire magazine, when rebellion unexpectedly erupted in the Dominican Republic in April 1965, and the United States sent troops to that country.

Szulc, a former diplomatic correspondent for the New York Times, said the operation was planned by the Central Intelligence Agency, "presumably acting with President Lyndon Johnson's authority unless it was another do-it-yourself undertaking."

He wrote:

"The new invasion was to be on a smaller scale than

the Bay of Pigs. The scenario was to bring ashore some 750 armed Cubans at the crucial moment when Castro would be dead and inevitable chaos had developed...

"The existence of the assassination plot, hatched by the CIA in Paris and Madrid, was disclosed by the Cuban government in March 1966, after the designated gunman — a bearded Cuban physician and former Cuban revolutionary army major named Rolando Cubela — was arrested in Havana following investigations by Castro's counterintelligence agents, who had become suspicious of him."

Szulc said that although the Cuban government revealed the assassination plot, it never reported the invasion plan, probably because it didn't know much about it.

The writer said his information was based on interviews with men who partici-

pated in the project, known by the code name "Second Naval Guerrilla." He said the CIA spent \$750,000 monthly for the operation and \$2 million of those funds had never been accounted for.

SZULC ALSO wrote that in 1961, seven months after the Bay of Pigs, President John F. Kennedy asked him about the wisdom of killing Castro and was pleased when Szulc said he opposed it.

"Kennedy leaned back in his chair, smiled, and said that he had been testing me because he was under great pressure from advisers in the intelligence community, whom he did not name, to have Castro killed, that he himself violently opposed it on the grounds that for moral reasons the United States should never be party to political assassinations. 'I'm glad you feel the same way,' he said," Szulc wrote.

Szulc said he did not know whether Kennedy was aware of a scheme elaborated by military intelligence officers soon after the Bay of Pigs to kill Castro and his brother Raul, the deputy premier, using marksmen infiltrated from the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo.

"Perhaps this is what he had in mind when he talked to me," Szulc said.

THE EISENHOWER

administration also turned down in 1960 a recommendation by a CIA operative to kill Castro, Szulc said.

Bill R. Moyers, who was Johnson's press secretary, said when reached at his Long Island home yesterday that he never heard any talk of a Cuban invasion or Castro assassination.

Moyers said he was present when the CIA proposed to Johnson early in 1964 "that frogmen be put into Cuba to harass and obstruct Castro."

"The President vetoed it," Moyers said.

WASHINGTON POST Sunday, Jan. 13, 1974

Stuart H. Loory

# Press Credibility And Journalist-Spies

In the old days — the pre-Watergate days — when even small deceptions by the government, once revealed, were considered scandalous, the revelation that the Central Intelligence Agency was using American foreign correspondents as spies would have provoked an uproar.

Remember the furore in 1967 when Ramparts magazine disclosed the CIA's infiltration of foundations, labor unions and student organizations? In contrast, there has been only muted criticism in the wake of the disclosure a few weeks ago that the CIA had on its payroll overseas some three dozen Americans who were either working as foreign correspondents or masquerading in such positions as a cover.

William E. Colby, director of the agency, has already promised that five of those operatives working full time

*The writer, a journalism professor at Ohio State University, was a Moscow correspondent for the New York Herald Tribune. He later served as White House correspondent for the Los Angeles Times.*

for general-circulation news-gathering organizations as well as for the CIA will be "phased out" of their spying roles. But he has also made the explicit decision to maintain contractual relationships with newsmen working for specialized publications or as freelance reporters.

Colby apparently draws a distinction between larger news-gathering organizations and smaller ones, between general-circulation organizations and trade publications. Foreigners do not make such nice distinctions; to them, an American newsmen is an American newsmen. Why should anyone believe that Colby has indeed removed the stigma of spying from American journalists overseas?

Putting aside the credibility problem of the American government, obvious in these Watergate-dominated days, consider the status of Soviet foreign correspondents: The Soviet Union's leadership repeatedly denies that any Soviet newsmen working overseas are government agents. It claims that Soviet newsmen are simply gatherers and interpreters of news for the benefit of the reading public in the Soviet

Union.

The claim, of course is laughable, and no American official talking to a Tass, Izvestia or Pravda correspondent in Washington is naive enough to think he is dealing with a bona fide reporter. For this reason, Soviet newsmen do not have an easy time with officials in countries outside the socialist bloc.

American newsmen have a far easier time of it abroad. They develop sources and uncover news because their reputation for freedom, fairness and nonentanglement with their own government has been respected over the years. Only in Moscow—and perhaps in Peking, where this writer has had no experience—are American newsmen treated as government agents. For years, American newsmen in the Soviet capital laughed off allegations of spying out of the feeling that the Russians were only applying the same standards to foreign newsmen that they used for their own.

The Russians have had the last laugh.

The CIA does not deny the news reports of its entanglement with the American press. "We cannot comment on covert activities," an agency spokesman said in virtual confirmation.

## The News Business

Nor would the agency comment on Colby's plan for disentanglement in the future. That plan—to fire some but keep other newsmen—does not go far enough. American newsmen abroad as well as at home must remain free of their government to act as a distant early-warning system in reporting problems and progress that might affect this country's interests abroad. Newsmen often do a better job of reporting than either covert CIA agents or overt members of the diplomatic corps.

That lesson was brought home to me 15 years ago in Czechoslovakia. Just out of graduate school, I had gone there as a freelance writer and had obtained interviews with Czech officials responsible for the country's television system and the youth movement. I also visited coal mines and steel mills in a part of Moravia generally off limits to Americans. Before I wrote my stories, I tried to check my information with American diplomats. The result of my effort—made only a few years after William N. Oatis, an Associated Press correspondent work-

ing in Prague, had been jailed as a spy—was terrifying.

The embassy officer led me to a secure room behind a door as heavy as a bank vault's. When I started talking, he began taking notes rapidly and then questioned me closely.

"What else did you learn? What else did they tell you? What else did you see?"

The officer grilled me until I re-

*"The plan—to fire some but keep other newsmen on the CIA payroll—does not go far enough. American newsmen abroad as well as at home must remain free of their government."*

fused to say more. Then he said: "You correspondents can find out a lot more than we diplomats because we simply cannot get access to the same people or travel as much."

Unwittingly, I had become an agent of my government rather than a representative of the American people. Now I could see how the Czechs might have misunderstood Oatis' role even if he were not, as charged, a CIA employee.

When I left the embassy that afternoon, it was with the fear that I was in far greater danger abroad from my own government than from a government which still, at that time, had a statue of Stalin looking down on the capital.

American newsmen must not be compromised in the same manner that so many—too many—officials, bureaucrats and military men have been corrupted in recent years. The public and Congress should demand that the CIA break all contractual relationships with bona fide newsmen. Beyond that, publishers maintaining foreign bureaus should seek out and discipline any employees with dual relationships.

Anything less makes the news business the handmaiden of the government and that cannot be tolerated. Otherwise, the free flow of news from overseas—so important to public awareness—will be seriously jeopardized.



PUBLISHERS WEEKLY (N.Y.)  
28 JAN 1974

## Marchetti: CIA Book Out Soon "Come Hell Or High Water"

VICTOR MARCHETTI and his coauthor John Marks, with a couple of court victories behind them, are preparing for spring publication of their book on the Central Intelligence Agency, "CIA: The Cult of Intelligence" by Alfred Knopf—in censored form if necessary.

In the meantime, the two former government intelligence officers are continuing to negotiate with the CIA over the censored portions of the manuscript. They are also preparing for a full-dress trial, possibly in February, on the assumption that CIA won't drop all its claims that portions of the book contain classified material.

Marks, a former State Department employee, has been told the Department intends to enjoin him against publication, but so far it has made no move in court. Marchetti was already under court when Marks joined him as coauthor.

"The book will be coming out in May, come hell or high water," Marchetti told *PW*. "We decided in December not to let the book be tied to the court case. The legal proceedings could drag on for a year or two."

The CIA obtained a restraining order in U. S. District Court in Northern Virginia in 1972 barring Marchetti from writing anything "factual, fictional or otherwise" based on his experience as a CIA employee from 1955 to 1969. The Government has never before exercised prior restraint over a book under court

order.

An Appeals Court ruled that the Agency had the right to delete classified material before the manuscript was submitted to the publisher. Last summer, the CIA told Marchetti's American Civil Liberties Union attorney, Melvin L. Wulf, it wanted about 100 pages, or 20% of the manuscript, deleted.

"We offered to take out anything that would jeopardize national security," Marchetti told this reporter in his home in Northern Virginia, just a few miles from CIA headquarters. "We want to reform, not destroy the CIA."

After prolonged negotiations, the CIA agreed to drop its objections to 114 of the original 319 specific cuts in the text. But the authors and their publisher believe the Agency cannot prove that the other cuts are necessary for national security.

"We want the book published because we believe it should be published," said Marchetti. "We explode a lot of myths about the CIA. But also we think the First Amendment issue should be resolved. If you've got secrecy, you've got control, and people are never going to know what's going on in government."

In October, 1973, the authors and their publisher sued the government in a first court test of CIA classification procedures. Recently, U. S. District Court Judge Albert V. Bryan, Jr., Alexandria, Va., ruled in their favor on several motions made by the CIA. Judge Bryan ordered the CIA to produce proof that the

material is classified and that it was properly classified. He also ordered the Agency to permit expert witnesses to examine the uncensored manuscript. "The plaintiffs," he said in a January 10 ruling, "may need expert assistance in inquiring into these matters."

At the same time, the judge turned down an appeal by Central Intelligence Director William E. Colby to testify *in camera* why the book should not be published.

Editors at Knopf have been working with the censored manuscript, which contains large blank spaces of various sizes and shapes where cuts were made.

Floyd Abrams, attorney for Knopf, makes the same point invoked by the *New York Times* in its defense in the Pentagon Papers case, that censorship would only be justified where publication would "surely result in direct, immediate and irreparable injury to the nation or its people." Abrams, member of the New York law firm of Cahill, Gordon & Miner, represented the *Times* in that case.

The two cases differ, however, in that the *Times* and the *Washington Post* went ahead and published without prior restraint having been exercised. Marchetti explained that he chose a different route because prior restraint is aimed at him personally. Failure to adhere to the conditions of the court order based on secrecy agreement, he signed with the CIA could make him liable for criminal charges and a possible prison term.

SUSAN WAGNER

SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, London  
31 January 1974

## Reminiscences of a retired spook

VICTOR MARCHETTI, the Central Intelligence Agency's most unwanted author, was leafing through a telephone book, looking up a name for our Washington colleague, who went to see him at his home near the American capital.

"Hey," said Marchetti, "did you know that in the C.I.A. we used to take our 'funny names'—by that he meant aliases—from the London directories? There was one guy who chose Mortimer D. Quewtermouse. It changed him. After a while, he became more of a Quewtermouse than Quewtermouse ever was."

These are difficult days for Marchetti. He is fighting the C.I.A. in court for the right to publish his book, "The C.I.A. and the Cult of Intelligence," without the 200 or so deletions the agency is demanding.

At the time there were 339;

it every so often Marchetti and a lawyer visit the C.I.A. headquarters, where Marchetti worked as a Russian analyst from 1955 to '69, for a conference on what's acceptable and what's not. If Marchetti can prove that some item has been referred to publicly, the C.I.A. representatives usually nod their heads and say all right.

Some of his old colleagues go out of their way to shake his hand when he walks through the C.I.A. corridors, but others treat him like a pariah. He had a shock on his first visit, when he was all set to eat lunch in the executive mess and was instead referred to the main cafeteria.

Marchetti was high up in the organisation when he left, assistant to the number two man. If he had stayed on, he says, his next promotion would have made him the equivalent of a Brigadier-General.

There is an air of the exile about him, as he sits at home, a bit paunchy, wearing a green cardigan, reminiscing about the C.I.A. He rebelled last week about going to the headquarters

for a conference on the book and said the meeting would have to take place in his publisher's lawyer's office.

"I just got ornery and said, 'I'm not going up there.' Brings back too many memories. I know it's just a big bureaucratic blob, but I'm very depressed afterwards. I like a lot of the people, even though I disagree with their policies, and they stopped thinking ten or 15 years ago. It was our whole life, the C.I.A., and my wife will often say 'I miss the old gang.' It's a very tightly-knit society."

Our colleague wondered whether he felt guilty because he'd broken the code by writing the book, but Marchetti dismissed that idea. He wants Congress to investigate the C.I.A., because it's wasteful and inefficient and has strayed into the field of clandestine political operations. "They're a bunch of stumblebums," he said.

"Lousy spies. They never have been able to spy on their prime targets, the Russians and Chinese. The only real good man the West had on the inside in Russia was Oleg Penkovsky, and he was a British spy. The British took him up after the C.I.A. rejected him when he walked in in Ankara."

Marchetti is a very unspook-like spook. He used to be a cutmaster and nowadays he is in time by coaching the

neighbourhood boys in soccer. His background is Roman Catholic, Middle America: father was a plumber in a Pennsylvania coalmining town. After a spell in Europe during the late 'forties and early 'fifties, during which he served in army intelligence, he returned home and married his boyhood sweetheart. He is 44, but looks five or seven years younger.

A sense of idealism betrayed led him to leave the C.I.A., he says. The agency "got slap-happy" in the underdeveloped countries. "It was so easy to prop up a rotten dictator that they lost sight of their principles. Things have been done that will come back to haunt us."

The court case will come to trial in February, with the American Civil Liberties Union backing Marchetti. The book will come out in the spring, even if it means printing it with blank spaces. Marchetti reckons he will end up with about 90 deletions. Readers may find a card inside the book inviting them to apply for the missing bits when they are cleared, or the case is won.

While this is going on, Marchetti is working on a spy novel, "The Rack in the Cellar," which is about the myths of the cold war. "The only way you can really deal with that kind of world is through fiction," he said. "You lose the human element and the mystique in non-fiction."

WASHINGTON STAR-NEWS  
Washington, D.C., Wednesday, January 30, 1974

# All Except One CIA Tape Recording Destroyed

By Martha Angle  
Star-News Staff Writer

The Central Intelligence Agency has destroyed all of its tape recordings of telephone conversations and office meetings except for the tape already made public in hearings of the Senate Watergate committee.

CIA Director William Colby said last night the agency destroyed the tapes sometime after January 1973, when it discontinued a "10 or 15" year practice of taping "selected" phone calls and meetings.

Destruction of the CIA tapes came to light when Republican Sen. Howard H. Baker Jr., R-Tenn., asked for the tape recording of a mid-1971 conversation between convicted Watergate burglar E. Howard Hunt Jr. and Marine Gen. Robert E. Cushman Jr., then deputy director of the CIA.

**BAKER ALSO** asked Colby for any other CIA tapes which might have a bearing on the Watergate investigation.

"When I first talked with

Sen. Baker on Saturday, I wasn't sure whether we had any other tapes or not," Colby said last night. "I checked and found that we didn't."

A transcript of the Hunt-Cushman conversation was introduced into evidence during the Senate Watergate hearings last year and in the past several months Baker has been conducting his own investigation into the CIA's role in Watergate-related activities.

Two of the seven men captured on June 17, 1972, in Watergate — Hunt and James W. McCord — were retired CIA employees, while three others — Eugenio Martinez, Bernard L. Barker and Frank Sturgis — had at various times been under contract with the agency.

**HUNT RECEIVED** a variety of materials, including false identification papers

and a speech alteration device, from the CIA in 1971 while working with the White House "plumbers" unit which broke into the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist.

Unlike the automatic voice-activated White House system which recorded President Nixon's phone calls and meetings, the CIA taping was done on a "selective" basis on manually operated recording devices, Colby said.

He said the tapes "were periodically destroyed, and about a year ago I decided I didn't want to use the system any longer and it was discontinued."

Colby, who became CIA director in September, was executive director of the agency when the decision was made a year ago to halt the taping. He said James R. Schlesinger, then CIA director and now secretary of defense, agreed

with the decision.

**AFTER THE** taping was discontinued, Colby said, all tapes on file at the CIA were destroyed.

The Associated Press quoted Colby as saying the Hunt-Cushman tape "survived normal procedures of destruction because it was put in a separate drawer somehow." Cushman made the tape when Hunt came to his office.

Colby said the agency has already turned over masses of documents to the Watergate committee, the Special Prosecutor's Office and congressional committees which exercise "oversight" functions regarding the CIA.

The CIA director said he is now preparing answers to other requests by Baker for information. Baker declined to say exactly what data he is seeking from the CIA except to say it included information about "agency contacts with any and all of the Watergate types."

Christian Science Monitor  
16 January 1974

## Report lists secret agency no official will admit exists

By Congressional Quarterly

Washington

A special Senate committee which recently recommended public disclosure of more information about federal intelligence agencies may have taken its own advice — inadvertently.

The ad hoc Senate committee on secret and confidential documents issued a report Oct. 12 in which it listed a hitherto secret intelligence agency, the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). Now no one will confirm officially that such an operation exists.

The report's subject was humdrum enough; it suggested that the government begin printing the overall budget figures for several agencies engaged in classified activities. Release of the information would give Congress some idea of the amount spent on intelligence operations and how the money is used, the committee said.

The report listed the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Security Agency (NSA) and the NRO as examples of intelligence groups Congress should know more about.

The existence of the first three agencies has been widely known. The NRO has not. It has maintained its anonymity on Capitol Hill, in the Pentagon, and the CIA.

### Unaware of slip

Both the authors of the committee report and the members of the committee were unaware of the security slip. Staff aides on the committee told Congressional Quarterly they were uncertain how reference to the NRO had appeared in print when, according to intelligence officials, the name of the agency itself was classified.

As one intelligence official said: "Even its initials were supposed to be classified."

Also baffled were committee members. Chairman Mike Mansfield (D) of Montana reported that he had never heard of the reconnaissance office. The same was true of committee members Mark O. Hatfield (R) of Oregon, Harold E. Hughes (D) of Iowa and Alan Cranston (D) of California, who originated the request for more information on the agency.

According to sources in Congress, who asked not to be identified, the NRO spends 1: the neighborhood of \$1

billon a year for high-altitude reconnaissance flights. Using both satellites and planes, the agency conducts surveillance for a number of intelligence organizations on a contract basis.

The emphasis on secrecy may explain why the agency was able to maintain its anonymity on Capitol Hill despite that each year it receives an appropriation from Congress.

Under the CIA act of 1949, certain intelligence agencies are exempted from the normal budget reporting procedures to Congress required of federal departments.

Instead, the agencies are required only to report their budgets and plans to a small group of members in the House and Senate who sit on the four congressional "intelligence oversight" committees. Membership on the committees — two in the House and two in the Senate — is based on seniority in the Appropriations and Armed Services Committees.

Because of the nature of their oversight functions, the committees never publish transcripts of their activities and rarely make notes of committee hearings, which are always held in executive session.

Consequently, little information on intelligence operations moves beyond

the oversight committees. Meanwhile, the members of the committees observe strict rules of secrecy toward intelligence matters, which partially explains why no one could or would confirm the existence of the National Reconnaissance Office.

### Discussion declined

The chairman of the Senate Appropriations oversight committee, John L. McClellan (D) of Arkansas, was

one who declined to discuss the secret agency. The committee's staff counsel, Guy G. McConnell, answered all questions about the office with a terse "no comment." He did disclose, however, that the CIA had notified the committee that inquiries were being made about the NRO.

Another member of one of the Senate oversight committees, Stuart Symington (D) of Missouri, agreed to discuss the agency, but then denied having ever heard of a National

Reconnaissance Office. He also denied being surprised that an intelligence office had surfaced that no one apparently had ever heard of. "Intelligence activities are the least supervised aspect of our national security policy," he said.

Perhaps the most typical response of those questioned was the one of Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi (D) of Michigan, chairman of the House armed services intelligence operations subcommittee and a member of that small congressional club privy to most intelligence information: "I've told you just about all that I can."

WASHINGTON POST Friday, Jan. 11, 1974

# Radio Free Europe —Staff Cuts, Static

By John M. Goshko  
Washington Post Foreign Service

BONN—Forced by financial difficulties to make heavy staff cutbacks, Radio Free Europe enters 1974 with new uncertainties about the long-term future of its broadcasts to Eastern Europe.

Since its founding at the height of the Cold War in 1911, the controversial, Munich-based station has beamed news, commentary and music to Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria in their respective languages.

For years, both RFE and a separate Munich-headquartered facility, Radio Liberty, which broadcasts to the Soviet Union, were covertly financed by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

This system was abandoned three years ago after heavy criticism from congressmen, including the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.).

In the ensuing shakeout, Congress began funding the two stations directly. But, because of a big gap between their requests and the amounts appropriated by Congress, both have been fighting an uphill battle against shrinking budgets.

Over the past 18 months, RFE, the larger organization, has trimmed approximately 130 employees from its staff of broadcasters, newsmen and technicians—roughly 10 per cent of the organization's former strength—and news director Anatole Shub conceded: "It's left us stretched very thin in many areas."

RFE executives admit that the cutbacks and continuing

worries about future funds have had a serious effect on morale.

"Things were at their worst in October and November when the decisions were being made about who to let go," Shub said. "When the blow fell in December, it was a pretty sad scene. Now, though, a lot of the uncertainty has been dispelled, and I think we're on the upswing."

Rank-and-file staffers seem to be much more pessimistic. They complain about "too many broken promises" from their bosses and the Nixon administration, the "ineffectiveness" of RFE's lobbying for appropriations and expectations of an increasing "hand-to-mouth kind of existence" in the future.

Most of all, they are haunted by fears that the Nixon administration is moving toward agreement with Fulbright's contention that both organizations belong in "the graveyard of Cold War relics." Despite a lack of substantiation, European diplomatic circles buzz with rumors that Washington, as part of its budding detente with the Soviet Union, has agreed to quietly phase out both Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty.

There is little question that such a move would be heartily welcomed by the Soviets and their Eastern European allies. Despite the staff morale problem, observers of East-West affairs agree that both organizations do a very effective job of maintaining a flow of news and ideas across the Iron Curtain.

The big question now is whether they will be able to maintain this effectiveness

on their current austere financial rations. In this fiscal year, for example, RFE and Radio Liberty jointly requested \$50 million, reportedly the maximum allowed by the White House's Office of Budget Management.

Congress only appropriated \$45 million. It was the need to make up the shortfall that led to the latest round of firings at RFE.

The cuts were spread fairly evenly between the Americans and others in the news department, the East European exiles staffing RFE's five "national networks" and administrative, technical and research personnel.

Shub said his news department, which serves all five national broadcasting operations, was forced to cut 52 staffers since June, 1972. Among other things, this has meant the closing of RFE's news bureaus in Berlin, Geneva, Athens and Stockholm.

The staff at RFE's 50-member New York bureau was severely cut. All full-time East European employees there were eliminated.

In private, RFE sources say that further austerity measures are under consideration, including the possibility of merging certain activities and facilities with Radio Liberty. Congress has held out the possibility of a supplemental \$4.9 million appropriation for the two organizations before the end of this fiscal year, but it would be granted on the understanding that the money's primary use would be to further such consolidation.

Sources within both outfits confirmed that some kind of limited merger seems inevitable. At the moment, they add, progress is inhibited by the need to resolve a number of legal obstacles and the fact that Radio Liberty, unlike RFE, has

not yet completed its own sizable staff cutbacks.

Eventually, the expectation is that Radio Liberty will give up most of its present office and broadcasting space and move a big part of its operations to the sprawling RFE building. It's also likely that Radio Liberty's two news bureaus in London and Paris will enter into some kind of space-sharing arrangement with the RFE bureaus in those cities.

So far, RFE has managed to avoid the threat of serious labor strife. The decisions on what jobs were to be eliminated were worked out in painstakingly close cooperation with the American Newspaper Guild, representing employees paid in dollars and the German unions representing other employees. All concerned seem to agree that firings were handled in the most equitable manner possible.

WASHINGTON POST Saturday, Jan. 26, 1974

Tom Bruden

# Who Is Making Foreign Policy?

Fresh from his personal triumphs in the Mideast, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger now confronts another crisis, this one involving his leadership and authority. Kissinger is on a collision course with Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger.

The tip-off was Schlesinger's astonishing remark about military action against Arab states. At the very moment that Kissinger was in Cairo, trying to persuade President Sadat to sign the peace agreement, Schlesinger announced from Washington that if

*"There is more trouble ahead, and the policy of detente with Russia may be at stake."*

the Arab states continued their oil embargo military action might result. It was about as unhelpful a hint from home as Kissinger could have received.

But there is more trouble ahead, and the policy of detente with Russia may be at stake. While Kissinger was abroad, Schlesinger announced the re-targeting of U.S. land-based missiles. Henceforth, he said, they would be aimed at Russian missile sites rather than at cities. The move will make the next step in the SALT talks exceedingly difficult, perhaps impossible, to negotiate.

An argument—and a very good argument—can be made for Schlesinger's move. Mr. Nixon has long deplored what he called his lack of options. In the event of a nuclear attack, he has had one choice and one choice only: to obliterate the Soviet Union or any city thereof. The shift in strategy will permit him another choice: to take out the Soviet missile system or any part of that system.

But the decision to make this option

possible is not only subject to misinterpretation; it may vastly increase the arms race. From Kissinger's standpoint, the timing—with SALT talks imminent—could hardly have been worse.

Add to all this the revelation that Adm. Thomas Moorer, chairman of the the Pentagon had been receiving, without authorization, secret documents of Henry Kissinger and you have the makings of a very serious argument. Who is making foreign policy? The Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of State?

Kissinger does not like argument. In five years under Mr. Nixon he has managed to avoid having any. He did not have to argue with his predecessor, William P. Rogers, because he knew more than Rogers, prepared himself more thoroughly and was ready with initiatives and information when Rogers was not.

Nor did Kissinger argue with former Defense Secretary Melvin Laird, who frequently tried to undercut him with President Nixon. Kissinger's technique in handling Laird was to touch base with Laird's constituency in Congress before Laird did. Thus when Laird called friends on The Hill to complain of Kissinger's initiatives, he would find—more than once to his astonishment—that Mr. Nixon's aide had beaten him to the telephone, and that those whom he thought might complain for him had already been taken aboard.

But neither Rogers nor Laird really wanted a fight. Rogers liked this title more than his job, and Laird, a man of immense ability to see the other side of any question, was never certain that the generals and the admirals to whom he had been listening were right and that Kissinger was wrong.

Schlesinger appears to be made of different stuff.

Los Angeles Times

WASHINGTON POST Saturday, Feb. 2, 1974

Clayton Fritchey

# The President 'Still Respected Abroad'

After visiting and reporting on a dozen different countries in the last month or so, I returned with the impression that despite Watergate President Nixon still commands substantial respect abroad.

The fact seems to be that most foreigners have little interest in, or understanding of, American domestic affairs, but they are keenly aware of our foreign policy, for the simple reason that nearly everything the United States does internationally affects the rest of the world. Mr. Nixon may not be liked or even admired abroad, but he is still seen as the man who ended or at least suspended the cold war and thus relieved the fear of a world-ending nuclear confrontation.

The great mass of people everywhere craves peace above all else. Their lives can be made uncomfortable by such crises as the energy shortage, but nothing is irreparable except nuclear extinction, and much of the world believes that awful prospect has been lessened by the Nixon-Kissinger de-

*"Mr. Nixon may not be liked or even admired abroad, but he is still seen as the man who ended or at least suspended the cold war."*

tente with Russia and China, the two great Communist powers.

As long as foreigners feel that they have a vital stake in the continuation and growth of the still fragile detente, they naturally want to see it nursed along by the man who initiated it—Richard Nixon—regardless of his domestic delinquencies, which are seen as deplorable but irrelevant internationally.

Mr. Nixon also seems to be benefiting from a somewhat similar attitude on the part of a number of Americans. This may help account for the fact that, while an overwhelming majority in the United States believe the President is guilty of personal misconduct, many are still not eager for his impeachment. If Mr. Nixon had failed on the foreign as well as domestic front, he wouldn't have a prayer of surviving.

Like most foreigners, Americans see detente as the path to peace. The latest Harris poll, for instance, shows majorities ranging from 72 per cent to 19 per cent favoring further accord between the superpowers on matters extending from control over nuclear submarines and antimissile weapons systems to mutual withdrawal of forces from Eu-

rope.

Despite record low levels of confidence expressed in Mr. Nixon as President, Harris reports that 70 per cent still give him high marks on "working for peace," 64 per cent on "handling relations with Russia" and 60 per cent plus on "handling relations with China."

Harris also has a warning for Democratic presidential aspirants who "might well be making a fatal tactical blunder in assuming that the strains resulting from the Soviet policy toward emigres and the Mideast war can be taken to mean that the country wants to return to a hard line in relations with Soviet Russia and other Communist countries."

It sounds as if Harris had in mind Sen. Henry Jackson (D-Wash.) who has been riding a presidential boom based on his criticism of the Nixon-Kissinger detente with Russia. Jackson seems to think that Mr. Nixon, of all people, is soft on communism and, in trusting Russia, is living in a fool's paradise. That's the way Mr. Nixon used to talk about Franklin D. Roosevelt and his Yalta agreement with Stalin.

The President, nevertheless, is betting that detente is the best thing he's

got going for himself. His apologists, notably Vice President Gerald Ford and Sen. Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.), have been encouraged to dwell on the administration's peace efforts. It is interesting to note, incidentally, that Goldwater, who had been sharply critical of the President, came back from a recent trip abroad in a more respectful attitude toward his leader.

Considering all the disclosures yet

to come, it is questionable whether anything can save the President, but if anything can it will be further successes abroad. The triumph of Dr. Kissinger in moving the Arabs and Israelis toward peace has been a big plus, and the Secretary of State has not hesitated to give Russia credit for its behind-the-scenes "constructive" help.

There is, of course, some risk for the President in gambling everything on

Soviet cooperation. He is, to some extent, putting himself in the hands of the Russians, for if they pull the rug from under detente, Mr. Nixon would be fatally embarrassed. It no doubt would be the end for him. But if his political opponents try to wreck detente merely to wound the President, they might in the process also wound the United States.

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WASHINGTON POST Sunday, Feb. 3, 1974

Stephen S. Rosenfeld

## Kissinger and Schlesinger

The word from Henry Kissinger, passed by a journalist friend, is that the Secretary of State faces an interior challenge of "crisis" dimensions from Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger in making foreign policy. This is juicy Washington stuff. It's indicative of where we are in the world, too.

The interesting question it raises—and this is already a matter of lively concern in the whole foreign affairs community—is whether President Nixon is hinting that the United States, while hoping to cooperate and improve relations with the Russians, has the resources to make its way in the world without cooperating with them. There is not necessarily a contradiction between those general lines, which are front and back of the same policy, but there is a vital nuance all the same. Europeans are especially sensitive to it.

The Russians, one notes, have been quick to pick this up. They have begun zeroing in on Schlesinger by name, most recently for his suggestion that, if NATO is weak, the Soviets could "bring political pressure to bear against Western Europe." Kissinger, who has said the same more delicately, still gets the kid-glove treatment in Moscow.

The intriguing thing is that, by a friend's account, Kissinger, an international celebrity coming off a Nobel Prize in Vietnam and a huge personal triumph in the Mideast, feels that his authority is threatened by a truly obscure bureaucrat who is a homebody to boot.

Partly it may be that Schlesinger is a more substantial figure than any that Kissinger has previously dealt with in the national security apparatus. Melvin Laird, the only other man worth counting, concentrated on withdrawing from Vietnam and paid relatively little heed to the first-term horses which Kissinger rode to clout and renown: the Peking and Moscow

breakthroughs, and the Vietnam negotiations.

Schlesinger, though he has been barely half a year in the Pentagon, arrived with a formidable substantive knowledge of what is emerging as the "big" national security issue of the second Nixon term—strategic arms. Previously Kissinger monopolized this issue with his intellectual, bureaucratic and public relations razzle dazzle. As a former defense intellectual at Rand with experience since at the top of OMB, AEC and CIA, Schlesinger breaks the monopoly.

Moreover, he arrived at the Pentagon just as doubts were escalating across the political spectrum about the enduring value and viability of some of the first-term achievements often identified with Kissinger: the Vietnam agreement, SALT I and Soviet-American detente. These doubts may yet be eased but, until they are, it is only to be expected that a certain amount of the loose deference available in this town will flow from the upbeat Kissinger to the more somber Schlesinger.

Kissinger represents the idea that the nations that count can be brought into a certain stable relationship, a "structure of peace." This is the sense in which Schlesinger calls Kissinger a "diplomatist," defined by Webster as "one who is dexterous, tactful, or artful in meeting situations without arousing antagonism." The Mideast affords plenty of scope still for a "diplomatist." But the sag of detente and the messiness of the energy crisis, which lends itself poorly to flashy crisis management or secret diplomacy, make the going somewhat rough for Kissinger these days.

By contrast, Schlesinger has spent much of his career in and out of government thinking about the size and shape of the force which the United States ought to possess in the world; how to project that force politically to foreigners; and how to win support for it—in terms of budget and in terms of a will to use it—from the American people. In the current conditions,

when for the first time the United States has lost its clear strategic and political predominance and there is widespread nervousness and confusion about where the country goes from here, Schlesinger's hour may have come.

In fact, anyone who looks at the public work of both men is struck much more by their likenesses than their differences. Both are tough-minded intellectuals long fascinated with the uses of power. In manner, Kissinger is smooth, Schlesinger a bit rougher. Whether this will make a difference in respect to Congress, where Schlesinger has a responsibility (unmatched by Kissinger) of gaining approval for a large defense budget, will be especially important to see. But it seems to me misleading to imagine that Kissinger is the sophisticate and Schlesinger the boor, or to suspect that either is more than momentarily the captive of pique.

There is a natural high-low approach in foreign affairs. One man holds the carrot, the other the stick. In this case, it's Kissinger and Schlesinger. Others can say whether there is personal tension between them. I would say just that there is a professional tension which is not only unavoidable but essential. Mr. Nixon and the rest of us are fortunate to have two such talented men in the government's service.

WASHINGTON POST Wednesday, Feb. 13, 1974

Michael Getler

# The Schlesinger Strategy

Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger, with an awesome array of military power at his command, has invoked "the words of the psalmist" as his best new weapon in defending a record peacetime Pentagon budget before Congress. "Where there is no vision," Schlesinger was saying last week before the Senate and House Armed Services Committees, "the people perish."

That ancient message, he claims, is still relevant to understanding why the U.S. must not shrink from high defense budgets and global responsibilities even after Vietnam and in the so-called era of detente. Out of the psalmist's words, Schlesinger has been skillfully spinning a web of explanations for almost everything the Pentagon wants to do:

- Because the Soviet Union continues to invest heavily in new nuclear-tipped missiles, the U.S. must be prepared to "match" those developments so as not to lose the strategic edge or even be "perceived" by others as having lost it.

- Because previous strategies of massive retaliation to deter a nuclear attack leave the U.S. only with a "suicide or surrender" choice, the U.S. must now have a strategy to respond in kind to less than an all-out attack.

In other words, the U.S. must have the ability to strike back in a limited fashion against certain military targets.

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In the hope that an automatic escalation to mutual "city bashing" can be avoided.

- Because both of these factors—the pledge to keep racing the Russians if necessary and the flexibility to respond in kind to any type of nuclear attack—make nuclear war even less likely than it was before, the most likely arena for combat would be with conventional forces. Thus, we have to strengthen and maintain those forces.

That is how the parts of Schlesinger's plan fit together.

In laying that out, he sets forth his view that, "In recent years, we have begun to lose the vision about the role of the United States in the world. There has been a trend . . . perhaps understandable . . . to self-flagellation and carping.

"But the burden for the maintenance of free societies around the world can only be borne by the United States. We must accept that," he says. "There is no alternative. If the United States drops the torch, there is no one else that can pick it up."

In Schlesinger, the Pentagon has its most articulate warrior-philosopher-spokesman in many years.

In contrast to the parade of civilian and military officials who come before committees to read formal, drowsy statements, Schlesinger's informal and more scholarly dissertations have been described as impressive—and possibly

disarming—even by critics on the mostly friendly armed services committees.

Aside from Schlesinger's performance, this is an election year for Congress. An economic downturn and still higher unemployment are forecast, and the energy crisis and talk of impeachment are attracting most attention. All of these factors, some lawmakers believe, will tend to reduce congressional scrutiny this year of what is probably the most important defense budget in a decade.

The budget contains the seeds for a major new round of nuclear weapons developments as "hedges" against lack of Soviet restraint. Schlesinger says he can control this. But in the past, weapons planners have usually found new rationales for development and production as original reasons faded.

The budget also reflects complex and far-reaching shifts in war-fighting strategy which cannot be challenged simply by voting against certain hardware projects. Schlesinger, for example, has said that by "beating fat into swords" the Army will increase from 13 to 14 divisions without increasing manpower.

While that seems like a good idea, the larger question is whether the U.S. needs 14 divisions rather than 13. If not, why shouldn't the "fat" simply be removed from the Army and the budget. Schlesinger has offered similar "bargains" to the other services but again, the broader question is: If existing force levels are correct, why not just remove the fat altogether.

It is Schlesinger's plans in the nuclear field, however, which are perhaps most important and deserve the "national debate" that he has called for. Hovering for years over the issue of introducing a limited nuclear war fighting capability has been the question of what could conceivably be so important to Russian national interests as to prompt them to launch a limited nuclear attack against the U.S. and risk being destroyed in return.

Schlesinger argues that adding this capability to respond in a "limited" way deters nuclear warfare at any level and helps keep the irrational or accidental attack from getting out of hand. Others argue that even talking about "limited" nuclear warfare reduces deterrence and increases the acceptance that some form of limited atomic war is possible.

The 1,000 multiple-warhead-carrying U.S. Minuteman land-based missiles are already accurate enough to knock out many types of Soviet military targets, though it would probably take a few warheads to knock out a single Soviet missile in an underground silo. Thus, for the time being, the shift of plans so that some of these weapons can be fired at some military targets—rather than exclusively at cities or industrial centers—does not cost much money. It is mostly done with computers.

The future of several new types of weapons—cruise missiles, new submarines and fixed and mobile land-based missiles—that are now requested for

early development, Schlesinger says, are mostly tied to what the Russians decide to do at the current round of the arms talks. If the Russians show restraint, then at least some of the

*"The budget contains the seeds for a major new round of nuclear weapons developments."*

new systems will not go ahead, though some undoubtedly will be pressed to modernize or replace existing weapons.

But between Schlesinger's so-called re-targeting strategy and the new weapons related to progress at the SALT talks, is the critical question of improved missile accuracy. Schlesinger says he wants to improve it, mostly because more accurate missiles in the future would mean fewer would have to be used in a limited counter-attack, and they would cause less damage to surrounding areas. Yet it has never been made clear just how extensively Schlesinger would like to improve the U.S. missile force. Whether he is talking about improving just some missiles or all of them and precisely whether he envisions those improvements as going ahead no matter what happens at SALT.

Critics have always argued that still more accurate missiles would enable hawks in the Kremlin—despite U.S. disclaimers—to argue that the U.S. is attempting to develop a first-strike force able to knock-out Russian missiles. The Russians, however, are working on the same improvements, and this creates temptations for either superpower to launch his missiles first rather than lose them. Because missile-firing submarines are virtually invulnerable to attack, neither superpower could effectively achieve a true first-strike force.

The critics agree, and some have been arguing lately with increased enthusiasm for the U.S. to press the Soviets for some mutual reductions in land-based missiles to remove what they view as the major cause of uncertainty and suspicion between two superpowers armed to the teeth.



# GENERAL

WASHINGTON POST Sunday, Feb. 10, 1974

Jack Anderson and Les Whitten

## Terrorists and Airports

When Britain moved tanks around London's Heathrow airport to protect Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, word leaked out that Arab terrorists had planned to kill him in order to abort Mideast peace efforts. But the leaks told only a fraction of the story.

Now, a warning to the House Commerce Committee by Rep. John Murphy (D-N.Y.), and a "need-to-know-only" CIA alert to the White House and other agencies, explain the Kissinger danger and harbinger new troubles for the great world air terminals.

A few days ago, Murphy spoke in confidence with Federal Aviation Administration special agents who insisted a "Heathrow-type" incident had actually been planned in the United States. With the agents' consent, Murphy took the matter to his chairman, Rep. Harley Staggers (D-W.Va.).

"Intelligence (the FAA agents) have received indications that terrorists in the United States have plans to park an automobile at the end of the runway of a major U.S. airport and fire one of these rockets right up the tailpipe of a 747 as it takes off," Murphy relayed to Staggers in a long private note.

"These rockets," as it turns out, were precisely the same kind of SA-7 "Strella" shoulder-fired missiles that had alarmed the British into their extraordinary precautions at Heathrow.

As we have now discovered, the CIA and its British counterparts had learned from informants that Arab terrorists planned to site a car at the end of a Heathrow runway and zoom a lightweight, but lethal rocket up the jet pipe of Kissinger's plane. The purpose, of course, was to wreck the modest Israeli-Egypt agreement then being worked out by the peripatetic Secretary of State. This would create the kind of whirlwind in the Mideast that the terrorists reap so well.

As soon as the CIA picked up the intelligence, it worked with other agencies, particularly the FAA, to get out all-points warnings that Strellas were in Arab hands.

"It is probable," began the cautionary wire sent on an internal circuit to the White House situation room, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the FBI, the Se-

cret Service and the State Department, "that the Fedayeen possess . . . Soviet SA-7 (Strella) ground to air missiles."

Some of the 30-pound weapons had already been "found by Italian Police in possession of Fedayeen terrorists near Rome's international airport (on) 5 September," the wire went on.

"In view of demonstrated capability of Fedayeen to operate worldwide, (this) information . . . is being furnished by United States government on a confidential and need-to-know basis . . ."

The FAA retransmitted the information to foreign security officials, foreign airlines and the U.S. Air Transport Association. In a careful technical evaluation of the Strella's danger, the message said the weapon had been developed by the Soviets as an infantryman's missile against aircraft flying below 10,000 feet.

The FAA-CIA warning told how two men, one carrying a launcher, the other lugging an extra round, can set up, fire and escape in less than a minute. "Preparing the missile to fire, acquiring the target and firing the missile requires 10 to 20 seconds," said the wire. "The person launching the missile may then leave the area."

Little care is needed in aiming. The missile has a heat-seeking infrared homing system that draws the rocket to heat as surely as iron filings are drawn to a magnet. The system works at ranges up to almost three miles, permitting the terrorists to waylay the plane hundreds of yards from the airport, particularly when the jet makes a slow climb.

The confidential message only hinted at an added threat of Strellas in the hands of reckless and unconscionable terrorists. If the rocket misses the tailpipe of a plane, it "might be diverted by alternate sources of heat." This means that it could plunge down the smokestack of a school, a factory or any other building nearby.

"At this point, there are no known countermeasures for these missiles which are both inexpensive and highly effective," warned the message. And, increasingly, the Strellas are being matched by other nations producing

anti-aircraft rocket weapons for their infantrymen.

The American warning, coupled with intelligence gathered by West German, Dutch, Belgian and British security networks, has led to a drastic change in protection around major air terminals.

"While the British display was played up in the press," Murphy wrote, "it is not generally known that the original deployment of mass military forces to deter missile bearing terrorists occurred at Brussels Airport when the Belgian government learned of the presence of Palestinian Arabs passing through the facility."

"Belgian intelligence justified the mass alert on the basis of information that the Arabs had in their possession Soviet SA-7 shoulder-launched surface-to-air launchers and missiles."

As a result of the international scare, U.S. troops and German security men with submachine guns are guarding the Frankfurt airport, and "patrolling flight paths in armored vehicles some distance from the airport," Murphy said. Troops are also on guard at the Amsterdam airport believed to be a major target of the terrorists "because of (the Netherlands') political support of Israel."

The CIA and American air security experts recommend a limit on slow climbs and descents and on low flights "over areas difficult to surveil. Local security forces may reduce the threats . . . by securing the area (for about three miles) each side of . . . the approach, takeoff and climbout areas of active runways . . ."

If there is an advance warning, the aircraft under attack can "jettison flares to attract the heat-seeking missiles." This, of course, could mean the rockets will then mindlessly find a new target if they miss both plane and flares.

While Murphy and others have introduced bills to bolster security at U.S. airports, experts we have talked with say the solution must be political, not technical. New legislation would help, say these experts, but until the Arab lands refuse hospitality to mass murderers, there is no protection but prayer, good luck or staying away from airports.

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WASHINGTON POST Tuesday, Jan. 29, 1974

## Victor Zorza Halting The Naval Race

Although the reopening of the Suez Canal is expected only later this year, it has already given a start to a naval race between the superpowers which may eclipse, in cost and intensity, all the arms races of earlier years.

It does not have to happen — but it is acquiring a mad momentum of its

own, as the nuclear missile race once did. If it is not halted now, before it really gets going, the opportunity to arrest it will not recur for a good many years.

The crucial lap of the naval race begins on the small island of Diego Garcia, barely a speck on the map of the Indian Ocean, which Britain is willing

to make available for a United States base in an area previously untaken by the superpowers. The Pentagon wants the base because the Soviet Navy will now be able to use Suez to increase its presence in the area. Soviet ships will now have to spend much less time at sea on their way to the Indian Ocean — a 2200 mile journey from the Black Sea, instead of 9,000 miles from Vladivostok in the Far East.

Some spokesmen for the U.S. naval lobby say that this would enable the Russians to quadruple the number of ships on station, without actually as-



signing more ships to the area, but other experts dispute this claim. To match the Russians, the United States would have to increase its own strength. The Diego Garcia base, the Navy argues, would provide support facilities for both ships and aircraft which would make it less necessary to bring other vessels from far off, leaving them free for other tasks, and would make the whole operation far less costly.

The argument may make good naval sense, but it leaves out of account the politics of the arms race. The Soviet naval lobby was pressing the Kremlin last year for permission to increase its own strength in the Indian Ocean — as was evident from the cries of alarm its spokesmen were uttering in the press about U.S. intentions. But Washington publicly signalled Moscow that its intentions were entirely honorable.

Administration officials let it be known that they did not want to do anything that would push the Soviet Union into a naval race in the area, and the Kremlin allowed itself to be taken in by this—or so it would now seem to Moscow. One Moscow journal associated with the Soviet anti-arms lobby even suggested at the time that, although U.S. hawks were trying to extend the superpower confrontation to the Indian Ocean, they would probably

fail to achieve their objective.

The publication of this article in Moscow, coupled with the unprovocative Soviet conduct in the Indian Ocean, suggested, as did the signs in Washington at the time, that both powers were leaning over backward to contain the naval race in the area. All this changed during the October war, when both navies sent in powerful reinforcements and Washington announced that it would henceforth maintain an increased and "regular" presence in the Indian Ocean. Then came Henry Kissinger's successful peace effort in the Mideast, with its promise of the reopening of the Suez Canal, which strengthened Washington's resolve to go back on its implied promise to the Kremlin to keep the Navy on a leash in the Indian Ocean.

But why should the building of naval support facilities on Diego Garcia, which the Pentagon says can be done for a paltry \$20 million, be viewed in such cataclysmic terms? Because, to begin with, it would destroy the delicate balance between the naval lobby and its opponents in the Kremlin. Both the United States and the Soviet Union are now embarked on major naval construction and modernization programs, but the political leaders in both countries have so far conceded much less than the naval lobbies are de-

manding.

In the United States, the Navy's inordinately costly ambitions are a matter of public record. In the Soviet Union, they are to be found between the lines of articles and speeches by naval leaders. They do not ask publicly for money. But their description of the navy's tasks leaves little doubt that, if these are to be fulfilled, far more money will have to be found than the Kremlin can now be seen to be spending.

In both countries, the naval lobbies have been using the Indian Ocean, because of its proximity to the Persian Gulf oil routes, as the bogey with which to push the politicians into crossing a new strategic threshold. The decision to build a base on Diego Garcia will, if it is maintained, represent the crossing of the threshold by the United States.

The Soviet Union will follow, as night follows day, and the last quarter of the century will witness a naval race which promises — because the ship is more versatile and ubiquitous than the missile — to outdo the great missile race that dominated the third quarter of the century.

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**The Washington Merry-Go-Round**

THE WASHINGTON POST

Tuesday, Feb. 5, 1974

## Aramco Backed Saudi Oil Price Rise

By Jack Anderson

The story behind the leap in oil prices is revealed, at least in part, in the secret corporate papers of the Arabian-American Oil Co. (Aramco).

The new Pike's Peak prices will cost the world's oil consumers billions of dollars and jolt the economies of oil-dependent nations.

Aramco is the world's largest oil producer. Its derricks outnumber the palms on the Saudi Arabian desert, which covers an underground sea of petroleum.

Aramco is a consortium of four of the five largest U.S. oil giants—Exxon, the biggest; Texaco, second; Mobil, fourth, and Standard Oil of California, fifth.

Over the past three decades, the four companies have earned enormous profits on the crude oil under the Saudi sands—profits that were sharply boosted by a secret 1950 Treasury Department ruling that permitted them to charge their royalty payments off their U.S. taxes, dollar for dollar.

The write-off, which has been worth hundreds of millions of dollars in tax credits to the Aramco partners, was justified on national security grounds. This special incentive was needed, Aramco pleaded, to preserve the Saudi oil for U.S. defense.

As a measure of the worth of

this multimillion-dollar argument, Aramco has cut off all Saudi oil to U.S. armed forces since Oct. 21 at King Faisal's request. The king was offended at U.S. arms shipments to Israel.

Aramco expects to lose its fabulous Saudi oil concessions eventually, but would dearly like to put off the dreadful day. The corporate papers predict that King Faisal will take over the oil fields "well before 1980."

In an anxious scramble for new sources of crude, the Aramco partners dusted off plans to reactivate U.S. wells that had been temporarily abandoned.

As long as there was plenty of cheap Saudi oil available, the four partners weren't interested in conducting costly pumping operations in the United States. But the threat of nationalization dramatically changed their outlook.

However, they didn't want to give up the fat profits they had become accustomed to piling up. They decided, therefore, that they needed higher oil prices to pay for reopening the U.S. wells.

Before they closed these wells, they had creamed off the oil that gushes out on its own power. Now they must pump gas or water into the wells to force out the "secondary" oil.

They are also studying "tertiary

techniques" for extracting oil from the oil sands.

To raise money for all this, Aramco encouraged Saudi Arabia to raise oil prices. The corporate papers tell of secret meetings with Zaki Yamani, the polished Saudi petroleum minister. The papers mention \$6 as the price they hoped to set for a barrel of oil.

The Saudis obligingly came through with a price rise in the form of a tax increase, which the Aramco partners could credit against their U.S. taxes. The secret papers contain complex charts, which show that their profits increased in proportion to the price rise.

Exxon's profits for the last three months of 1973 jumped 59 per cent over the same period in 1972. Mobil reported a 68 per cent increase, Texaco a 70 per cent increase, Standard of California 94 per cent.

The strategy of raising prices worked better than the Aramco partners bargained for: Other oil-producing countries joined in the clamor for higher profits, until the price soared out of bounds.

Alarmed Aramco officials, fearful of worldwide political repercussions, went back to Yamani with a plea to stabilize prices. Although the Aramco partners have benefited mightily from the high prices, they don't want to press their luck

too far and risk government controls.

The corporate papers show that the Aramco brass is preparing for another showdown with Yamani this month. They expect Yamani to call for "restructuring" Aramco, giving Saudi Arabia a greater share of the oil production. They believe that he will demand an increase from 25 to 51 per cent of the company.

Then Saudi Arabia will wind up controlling Aramco, and it will be just a matter of time before the Aramco partners will be left with whatever oil they can squeeze out of their U.S. fields.

Footnote: Aramco declared that "far from encouraging increased oil prices," it has "worked for reasonable prices." A corporate statement charged that we had failed to substantiate our story and that we couldn't possibly have any "valid evidence" to back it up.

On the contrary, we have given the Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations headed by Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho) a detailed description of the documents in our possession. We were called behind closed doors, where we testified under oath; read excerpts from the corporate papers and told the subcommittee which documents to subpoena.

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NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 1, 1974

## State Department Bungled In Oil Talks, Senator Says

By RICHARD D. LYONS  
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 31—The oil companies' failure to stand together and bungling by the State Department were major factors in the sharp rise in world petroleum prices, Senator Frank Church declared at a Senate hearing today.

The Idaho Democrat said that State Department officials engaged in "undercutting" the companies' joint front in negotiations with oil-producing countries both before and after the fallout among the big oil companies and the smaller independent producers.

The result was a "leap-frog" effect in which the companies were picked off one by one and gave ever-increasing royalties to the Middle Eastern oil states, Senator Church said.

The Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, which Mr. Church heads, made public a dozen documents from the State Department, the Justice Department and the oil companies in support of what the Senator termed "an incredible series of blunders and mismanagement."

Subcommittee members said the moral of the tale was that similar behavior by the United States and oil companies at a meeting here Feb. 11 would lead only to further chaos in world petroleum supplies.

The foreign ministers of major oil-producing countries are scheduled to meet then to set long-range and short-range policies that might help to ease the current world energy shortage.

She sweep of the day's testimony was reflected by the cast of characters referred to. It included John N. Irwin 2d, former Under Secretary of State, now Ambassador to France; H. L. Hunt, the Dallas oilman, considered one of the richest men in the world; Douglas MacArthur Jr., former Ambassador to Iran; Richard W. McLaren, former Assistant Attorney General, who was head of the Justice Department's Antitrust Division.

Also, the Shah of Iran; Dr. Armand Hammer, chairman of the Board of the Occidental Petroleum Corporation; J. K. Jamieson, chairman of the board of the Exxon Corporation; Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi, who headed the military coup that overthrew King Idris of Libya in 1969, and John J. McCloy, former United States High Commissioner for Germany, and now a New York lawyer.

The witnesses today were Henry M. Schuler, vice president for European operations at the Hunt International Petroleum Corporation and Norman L. Rooney, another of the company's executives.

The Hunt company, which received an oil concession from Libya and had producing wells in the country, is owned by Nelson Bunker Hunt, the son of H. L. Hunt.

Mr. Schuler, a former Foreign Service officer in Libya and former official of the Grace Petroleum Corporation, testified for three and one-half hours in the crowded hearing room. At the start, he noted that, over the course of the events outlined today, the price of a barrel of Libyan oil rose from \$1.50 in August, 1970 to more than \$16 today.

"If a political and economic monster has been loosed upon the world [by the oil crisis], it

is the creation of Western Governments and companies," Mr. Schuler said. "Together we created it and gave it the necessary push, so only we, acting in harmony, can slow it down."

Mr. Schuler was questioned by Senator Church; Senator Clifford P. Case, Republican of New Jersey, and Senator Charles H. Percy, Republican of Illinois. He said that smaller, independent oil companies had moved into Libya to obtain crude oil because the major corporations had cornered most of the production in the Persian Gulf states.

Charts prepared by the subcommittee showed that Libya had been carved into more than 50 concessions, while much of the Persian Gulf production had come from three huge concessions.

After the Libyan revolution in 1969, Mr. Schuler said, the new Government there wanted to obtain more revenues from the oil fields, not by increasing production, as was done in the Persian Gulf area, but by "increasing the unit price."

Mr. Schuler said that Libya initially exerted pressure on Occidental Petroleum in the spring of 1970, "claiming violation of good oil field practice."

He said that Occidental was particularly vulnerable to pressure because it had "No other source of crude" for its markets, which were primarily in Western Europe.

Mr. Schuler said he had heard of a request by Dr. Hammer of Occidental in July, 1970, to Mr. Jamieson of Exxon that Exxon help supply Occidental with crude oil if Occidental refused to pay higher royalties to the Libyans.

### Profit Share Rises

As Senator Church put it: "Qaddafi turns first to Occidental as being vulnerable; Occidental turns to Exxon so it won't have to deal with Qaddafi and Exxon turns it down;

subsequently, Occidental accepts the price because it has no alternative."

Mr. Schuler said that at that time the Sarir oilfield in Libya, which the Hunt concern was operating with the British Petroleum Corporation, was producing 450,000 barrels a day.

He added that after Occidental agreed to a new agreement in which Libya received 58 per cent of the profits, rather than the 50 per cent that had been common for 20 years, "it was readily recognized that the other governments [in the Middle East] would do the same."

The witness said that Libya had thus "picked off" the companies one by one and that this "leap-frog or ratchet effect" soon spread to the other nations.

### Meetings Reported

Mr. Schuler then described a series of meetings in London and New York starting in December, 1970, held by officials of the oil companies with Middle Eastern holdings. He said that he had represented the Hunt company as its chief negotiator.

The New York meetings, he said, were held at the University Club, the executive offices of the Mobil Oil Corporation and the Chase Manhattan Bank.

As a result, the Libyan producers agreement was settled on, a plan in which the companies tried to make a united effort to contain the leap-frog effect, Mr. Schuler said. The companies were based in Japan, Germany, Belgium, Spain, France, Holland and Britain, as well as the United States.

From this evolved the so-called London Policy Group, which was to negotiate with the oil-producing nations.

At this time, Senator Church said, Mr. McLaren of the Justice Department, in dealing with Mr. McCloy, who represented major oil corporations, agreed that the Federal Government would waive antitrust implications of the joint action.

Sunday, Feb. 17, 1974 THE WASHINGTON POST

# The Newest Left: Fighting the CIA, Saving the World

By Paul W. Valentine

Valentine is a writer on The Washington Post's metropolitan staff.

NEW YORK—Pale, intense, humorless, disciplined, the men and women work night and day in the cramped offices eight floors above the Manhattan streets.

Phones ring constantly. Staff workers take the calls, confer, snap brief orders to each other, rap memos on one of several typewriters, rummage through bulging file cabinets backed against the peeling walls and opaque painted windows.

The unmarked door to the offices is perpetually bolted. No stranger enters until security officers inside inspect him carefully through a peephole. Then there is a physical search.

This is the headquarters and nerve center of the National Caucus of Labor Committees (NCLC), a small, increasingly militant Marxist organization.

One of its obsessions is the Central Intelligence Agency. In emotionally supercharged tones, NCLC disciples proclaim they are gripped in a nightmarish web of CIA-directed conspiracy, brainwashing and assassination attempts designed to obliterate NCLC and its leader, Lyn Marcus.

The claims are shrouded in the demonic shadow world of psychological "programming," hypnotism, electroshock, drugs, sado-masochistic torture and sexual degradation forced on key NCLC members by CIA operatives and other sinister forces—not only to effect the assassination of NCLC leadership but also help trigger a fascist takeover of America.

Fervid NCLC followers see their organization—a spin-off of the now moribund Students for a Democratic Society (SDS)—as a pivotal force in bringing worldwide socialist revolution, and thus as a prime target of CIA "counter-insurgency."

"We must work all the time," says NCLC Washington member Bruce Director with apocalyptic urgency. "... because if we don't succeed, the end of the world as we know it is in sight."

## Like Early Christians

ONE OF THE MOST active radical groups in the doldrum-like aftermath of the Vietnam war, NCLC pursues its various missions with something akin to messianic hysteria, deluging the news media with crisis-pitch press releases, leafletting factories and plants, predicting chaos, class war and revolution in four to five years and accusing the government of fomenting inflation, unemployment, strikes, urban gang warfare and other disruptive acts to justify a fascist crackdown.

"CIA Plans Assassinations of Revolutionary Youth," screams one press release headline. "CIA Brainwash Victim Recovering," says another.

Though small in numbers (New York police estimate nationwide membership at 700 to 1,000), NCLC has attracted into its bizarre world not only sons and daughters of old-line radical families of the 1930s but also children of politically conventional and even prominent families, including the sons of a Ford Foundation vice president, the daughter of the president of Sarah Lawrence College and the son of a high-ranking State Department official.

NCLC is "like an early Christian sect," says W. McNeil Lowry, the Ford Foundation vice president whose son, Graham, is a Boston NCLC member. "They think they're the only ones who can save the world."

"I stumbled into an NCLC study group at the University of Michigan," says New York NCLC member Susan Wagner, 24. "I was attracted to it because it was the only serious group that seemed to know what it was doing and how to do it."

While other leftist organizations issued learned papers and spouted rhetoric, she says, NCLC organized support for a sanitation strike in Detroit. "It was direct action on a real issue—getting a living wage for the

workers."

Miss Wagner says she grew up in a conventional Midwestern family — "basically apolitical, but humanist." Her father is an executive for a "Detroit auto firm," she says, and her mother is a housewife and part-time secretary. Like many NCLC members, she is reluctant to give identifying particulars about family members.

Speaking in clipped, unemotional tones, Miss Wagner says she has one brother, "a very traditional engineer ... but at least he's useful. I told him we can use him after the revolution."

This utilitarian view of the family pervades much of NCLC thinking.

"Part of our work is organizing our parents," says 20-year-old Bruce Director.

"It's just like organizing workers at a plant," says Miss Wagner. "... It requires a fundamental change in the relationship with our families—from a child-parent relationship to an adult-to-adult relationship."

## The CIA Plot Theory

DIRECTOR, a small, wiry man with bright, darting eyes, who lives in Silver Spring, says that NCLC members are not congenitally conspiracy-minded, and that many like himself at first doubted the CIA "master plot" ballyhooed by NCLC.

"I received it with some skepticism at first," he says. "I knew the country was not run by bourgeois democracy, but I was not exactly sure who was running it. ... NCLC made it clear to me who it is and how these real powers have had to mount a worldwide psychological operation to implement what they want."

NCLC leaders acknowledge that they have little direct concrete evidence of the "master plot," but through a network of "sources" and 24-hour-a-day monitoring of political, economic, trade union and other developments throughout the world, they say they are able to construct their conclusions on "inferential reasoning."

Principal architect of the CIA plot theory is Lyn Marcus, the lean and garrulous national chairman of NCLC who leads his organization with an authoritarian hand from the eighth floor headquarters at 231 W. 29th St. in Manhattan's garment district.

During a five-hour nonstop interview, he described in minute detail what he said was the abduction last fall of a 26-year-old British member of his organization, Christopher White, by CIA operatives who forced him to undergo a series of harrowing brainwashing procedures in England over the course of 50 days.

White was subjected, Marcus claims, to heavy drugs, electroshock and actual or threatened homosexual acts, animal sodomy and the eating of his own excrement. Thus reduced to a

zombie-like servant of his captors, Marcus says, White was psychologically "programmed" to fly to New York Dec. 30 and trigger the assassination of Marcus the next day by calling in a seven-man Cuban hit squad.

The assassination was narrowly averted, Marcus continues, when on the night of Dec. 30, after seeing the dazed White close at hand, "I realized he was brainwashed." NCLC quickly threw up a specially trained 24-member "defense squad" cordon around Marcus' apartment in Manhattan, sequestered the stricken White and began an elaborate tape-recorded "de-programming" procedure, Marcus says.

That procedure is continuing on a periodic basis, says Marcus, with the layers of CIA-imposed programming being pulled back one by one through gentle psychotherapeutic prodding.

White, a quiet, soft-spoken Englishman, says he believes he was brainwashed. But when pressed for details he says his true memory, at this partially de-programmed stage, is still "scrambled" by an intricate set of false memories implanted during the original brainwashing.

The CIA refuses to comment on the NCLC claims. Specialists in psychological warfare, hypnotism and related fields say such brainwashing is theoretically possible but unlikely.

"It all sounds like fiction to me," says Harry Arons, founder of the American Association to Advance Ethical Hypnosis and a leading researcher in a classified U.S. Air Force study of Russian and Communist Chinese brainwashing techniques used in the Korean war. "It's Manchurian Candidate stuff."

In addition to its self-proclaimed struggle with the government, NCLC is locked in an ongoing feud with competing socialist organizations, exchanging vitriolic charges and denials of violence and hooliganism.

The Communist Party USA accused NCLC last summer of sending in trained "goon squads" to disrupt meetings and beat members with Japanese-style "numchuk" cudgels. NCLC denies the charges, contending its publicly avowed "Operation Mop-Up" to "destroy" the Communist Party and other socialist organizations is not based on violent tactics. It says its members have been forced to defend themselves when others initiated violence against them in verbal confrontations.

NCLC acknowledges existence of its elite "defense squad" of 30 to 40 members trained in the "martial arts," including karate, but emphasizes their purpose is solely defensive.

The abolition or absorption of all other leftist organizations is an essential first step to achieving revolution in America, according to NCLC doctrine. Members see NCLC as grandly destined for this task.

Since the 1930s, "I was resolved that no revolutionary movement was going to be brought into being in the U.S.A.

unless I brought it into being," says NCLC chieftain Marcus. For many years a Trotskyite activist in the Socialist Workers Party, Marcus formed NCLC in the late 1960s.

Dressed in a dark, double-breasted suit and natty bow tie, Marcus stands in stark contrast to the mostly youthful staff workers scurrying around him in blue jeans, boots and shaggy sweaters.

The headquarters is manned 24 hours a day by a 60-member staff. They function in a tightly structured, almost puritanical atmosphere, rejecting the free-wheeling self-indulgence of much of the radical counterculture. Clothing and hair styles are subdued. Workers rarely utter obscenities. The smoking of marijuana is specifically prohibited. An authoritarian air hangs in the offices.

"Pot and rock music are destructive to creative abilities—they're an escape thing," says Susan Wagner. "The counterculture motto 'do your own thing' is absolutely bestial... a hideous withdrawal from the whole human race."

### Proletarian Solidarity

NCLC MEMBERS perceive almost all major political and economic developments in the capitalist world (and the reporting of them in the press) as manipulated by the unseen hand of the CIA and its allies.

To educate the masses against this cabal, closely organized cadres of NCLC workers are under constant pressure to distribute leaflets and mobilize political action at factories and urban slum work sites. They often show up at industrial strikes to talk with disgruntled workers. During a brief work stoppage by printers at The Washington Post last November, NCLC staffers handed out leaflets at entrances to the Post building, urging employees to fight against "slave labor" conditions of capitalist industry.

NCLC also inveighs against local school decentralization, ghetto community control projects and other programs which it sees as factionalizing working class populations along neighborhood and racial lines and thus undermining proletarian solidarity. Imamu Baraka, black activist and playwright in Newark, N.J., is a special NCLC target and has been branded by NCLC as a CIA agent. Baraka denies the charge.

In organizational terms, NCLC stands as a central coordinating unit for three other groups:

- Revolutionary Youth Movement (RYM), a teen-age-oriented organization used for political organizing in urban ghettos.

- National Unemployed and Welfare Rights Organization (NU-WRO), formed in early 1973 in direct competition with the older and broader-based National Welfare Rights Organization (NWRO).

- U.S. Labor Party, electoral arm of NU-WRO. The party has run candidates for local office in cities through-

out the nation, gathering few votes. Tony Chaitkin, an NCLC member who lost in his recent bid for mayor of New York City, is now running for governor of New York.

Marcus estimates NCLC membership strength at 1,000 and the other organizations at 1,000 to 2,000 combined. There are some 23 NCLC chapters scattered among major American cities and several international affiliates in Canada and Europe.

As the central controlling agency for its far-flung operations, NCLC is a "cadre organization requiring intellectual discipline" among its members, Marcus says.

Members are required to undergo periodic 8-hour "leadership sessions" conducted by Marcus to learn the rigors of political organizing. Few members are salaried, and most must pay \$24 a month dues to NCLC, a remarkably high fee. Marcus says he receives a \$50-a-week stipend.

In addition to its other duties, NCLC puts out a weekly paper, *New Solidarity*, with a circulation of 40,000 to 42,000. Marcus estimates the monthly headquarters budget at \$30,000, with most of it coming from membership dues, newspaper sales and limited private contributions.

### Family Strains

THE ACTIVITIES of NCLC have generated family strains between some parents and their children who have joined NCLC.

"I have violent disagreements with my daughter about this whole thing," says Sarah Lawrence College president Charles deCarlo, whose 24-year-old daughter, Tessa, is an NCLC member. "I think their talk of CIA brainwashing is bizarre and out of reason."

McNeil Lowry of the Ford Foundation is reluctant to discuss family strains but describes his son, Graham, as having a "very inquiring, combative, skeptical mind," not easily captivated by any person or organization.

A former newsman, Lowry says he finds NCLC's brainwashing claims neither "believable... provable... or usable" in journalistic terms.

But he challenges the claim of some detractors that NCLC is violence-prone. "The members I've seen... are loving, smart, humane people," he says. "They've been surveilled and harassed by police... and have been in fights where I'm sure they had to defend themselves from others. But I have no evidence that they initiated any violence."

Recently, six NCLC members were arrested here and charged with unlawful imprisonment of fellow member Alice Weitzman, 22. She claims they held her in her Washington Heights apartment against her will, according to police. NCLC says she was a suspected brainwash victim who was voluntarily sequestered for her own protection and now wants to drop

the charges.

Daniel Snelder, son of Richard L. Snelder, deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian-Pacific affairs, was among those arrested in the case. His parents decline to discuss the matter.

### "The Human Race Is at Stake"

**L**YN MARCUS (a pseudonym he has used since the late 1940s, his real name being Lyndon Hermyle LaRouche Jr.), acknowledges he has no formal training in psychology or re-

lated fields for dealing with the issue of brainwashing. He says he is largely self-educated in political economics and "epistemology, the study of the actual nature and phenomenology of the mind."

Marcus was born in New Hampshire of a Quaker family. He never completed formal education, he says, becoming "bored" with studies in his first year at Northeastern University in Boston. He has worked periodically in marketing research and computer programming since then.

An indefatigable writer and talker,

Marcus peppers his conversation with computer jargon, arcane psychological references and foreign phrases.

Customarily aloof and academic, he occasionally blurts "swine" or "pig" at the mention of purported NCLC enemies.

Once, during a Jan. 3 speech in which he described details of the alleged CIA brainwashing to a group in New York, he reportedly shouted:

"Any of you who say this is a hoax—you're cruds! You're subhuman! You're not serious. The human race is at stake. Either we win or there is no humanity. That's the way she's cut."

WASHINGTON POST  
19 February 1974

### *The CIA Denies Charges*

The Washington Post's story about the National Caucus of Labor Committees (of Feb. 17, 1974) could leave the impression with some of your readers that the CIA, through its refusal to comment, indeed might be involved in the kinds of activities the NCLC alleges. Our recollection is that we told your reporter that the NCLC appeared to be

a domestic organization, so he should ask the Federal Bureau of Investigation rather than CIA for information about it. While it appeared self-evident that the NCLC charges are only twisted fantasy, your circulation of them forces CIA to deny them flatly as false.

W. E. COLBY,  
Director, Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington.

# Eastern Europe

NEW YORK TIMES, SUNDAY, JANUARY 27, 1974

## A Russian View of 'The Gulag Archipelago'

By Yuri V. Bondarev

MOSCOW—Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn's book "The Gulag Archipelago, 1918-1956," is not a story and not a novel, hence there is no disclosure of the truth via artistic truth, if we are to speak of literary means of expression.

The Second World War occupies a considerable place in the book. It is quite obvious that in speaking of that period no one has a right to forget the 56 million who perished in Europe and Asia, including twenty million Soviet citizens and six million Jews burned by the Nazis in their concentration camps' crematoriums.

These unprecedented victims of the world tragedy should serve as a tuning fork of morality. The history of war is inconceivable without facts. Facts divorced from history are dead. In this case they do not even resemble an amateur photo but the shadow of a photo, not an instant of truth but the shadow of an instant. It is that very ominous and vague shadow that now and again appears on the pages of Solzhenitsyn's book as soon as he, in the course of his narration, touches upon events of World War II.

The Stalingrad battle—which was for my generation of eighteen-year-olds their first baptism of fire and in the bloody fighting of which we matured and aged at least by ten years—turned the tide, as is known, of World War II.

This most trying of battles cost our country, my peers and me very dear. Too many common graves did we leave near the Volga, too many were no longer with us after the victory. It was hatred and love that kept us in the trenches on the hills of the Don in the dust-laden hot days of July and August, when the sun kept disappearing in the smoke and fire of explosions—hatred toward those who had come with arms to our country from Fascist Germany to destroy our state and our nation, and at the same time love for that which humans call mother, home, the school rink in Moscow lined and pitted by skates, the squeak of a gate somewhere in Yaroslavl, the green grass, the falling snow, the first kiss near the snow-piled porch.

At war a person experiences his most ineradicable feelings toward the past. And we fought in the present for the past that seemed inimitably happy. We dreamed of it, we wanted to return to it. We were romantics—and in that was the purity and faith that can be designated as a sense of one's homeland.

I know not only from documents that mainly young people, born in 1922, 1923 and 1924, tens of thousands of them, fought near Stalingrad, in Stalingrad and in the vicinity of

Stalingrad. And it was they who stood firm and didn't give Stalingrad away. It was they who shackled the Germans in the defense of the city, and then launched the offensive.

It was they who "cemented the foundation" of the Stalingrad victory; it was not the penal companies that did it as Solzhenitsyn writes. The last census in the Soviet Union revealed that only 3 per cent of those generations had remained. Yes, a very great many fell then on the banks of the Volga. That's why, thinking of my peers, of those who fell in the Stalingrad battle, I must say that Solzhenitsyn is making a malicious and tendentious error that insults the memory of the victims of the generation I mentioned.

To specify further, order No. 227, "Not a Step Back!", was read to us in August, 1942, after the Soviet troops had surrendered Rostov and Novocherkassk. We all felt its resolution and severity, but at the same time, no matter how paradoxical it may seem, we all felt the same thing: yes, enough retreating, enough!

Besides, the order "Not a Step Back!" (and the formation of penal companies was first mentioned in it) came into being and reached the army in the month of August. The Germans were then on the close approaches to Stalingrad, at a very short distance.

Could they, the penal companies, have held off the thrust of the tank army, of the Germans who had concentrated up to twenty infantry divisions in the direction of the main blow?

I must say that the penal companies, armed with light weapons, were, in general, incapable of holding up any more or less serious offensive. The German offensive was held up by armies, divisions and regiments.

For me, a person who went through the Stalingrad battle, such an attitude as Solzhenitsyn's to one of the most heroic and biggest battles that determined not only Russia's destiny but that of other peoples as well seems monstrous and unscrupulous. Is this a purposeful distortion of the truth?

Now a few remarks concerning the well-known Vlasov. Reading about and recalling him, I again asked myself: Why does Solzhenitsyn write with such sympathy of a general who rose with the tide of the war and gained the sad fame of a Herostratus, and depict him as an "outstanding," "real" man, an anti-Stalinist, a champion of the Russian people?

[Lieut. Gen. Andrei A. Vlasov was a Soviet Army officer who was taken prisoner by German forces in World War II and then led Russians who fought with the Nazis against the Red Army. He was seized by Soviet authorities at the end of the war and executed in 1946.]

The Second World War was grim and cruel, and there was no ambiguous yardstick in the mortal struggle. In the irreconcilable clash of hostile sides everything was gauged by the categories yes and no, either-or, to be or not to be, that determined the fate of the Soviet state, the fate of Russia and the fate of every person. Like a calamity or grief, war morally unites people, people ready to defend, to fight for their way of life, their children, their homes. But war also unites people in immorality, if those people invade other people's lands with the purpose of enslaving and seizing them. Thus, morality and immorality clash, not to mention the political aspect of the matter.

Treason, duplicity or betrayal of a community of people in moments of acute struggle are always immoral. A person who betrays the land of his fathers in his people's trying days betrays himself in the final count. He becomes a spiritual suicide.

Working on my latest novel "Hot Snow" and the film "Liberation," in which reference is made to the traitor Vlasov, I went through a great many documents and lent an ear to the opinions of many different people who once knew the man in everyday life and in the war.

What conclusion did I come to? Vlasov was a man of haughty mien, ambitious, easily offended, with careeristic inclinations. He was loath to commune with the soldiers and tried to stay away from the shell-bombed observation points. He preferred the deep dugout of the command post, the subterranean light of battery bulbs, the coziness of temporary quarters where he could settle down comfortably, and even a bit aristocratically.

A general of mediocre capacities, he showed no sharp tactical mentality. But a lucky star lighted his way at the beginning of the war, in the battles on the approaches of Peremishl and Moscow. Obviously it seemed to Vlasov then that success would follow him constantly and without fail. He desired it so fervently.

But encirclement and the rout of the Second Shock Army which he commanded on the Volkhov front in 1942 appeared to the nervous Vlasov as an inglorious end to his career, the fall of his lucky star—and he took a fatal step. At night, deserting the still-fighting units, together with his adjutant, he went to the village of Staraya Polist, opened the doors of the first log cabin occupied by sleeping German soldiers and said: "Don't shoot. I'm General Vlasov!" That was how it was.

However, Solzhenitsyn interprets Vlasov's surrender and treason as a purely studied anti-Stalin action: Vlasov, don't you know, received no shekels for his treachery; he did that

out of firm political conviction, disagreeing with Stalin's policy. I can easily surmise, of course, that Solzhenitsyn drew his information from, and carefully memorized, the German leaflets (I also read them at the front) or from the booklet written by Vlasov himself (we also found it at times on the fields of war), where the general explained his surrender to the enemy by his disagreement with Stalin's policy in the years 1936 and 1937.

Treachery, dissolution of the personality, immorality survive from an age only because by masquerading under the banners of apostles they justify themselves, now assuming the visage of a martyr to the truth, now of a "political messiah." Solzhenitsyn juggles with Vlasov's highly unsavory activities to make them suit his own concept, shamelessly inviting the general back from oblivion to cooperate with him, but first placing upon his head the thorny crown of the champion of justice.

I cannot overlook certain generalizations Solzhenitsyn makes on various pages in regard to the Russian people. Whence this anti-Slavonian sentiment? Frankly speaking, the answer conjures up highly gloomy memories, causing the ominous paragraphs of the Ger-

man East Plan to rise in my mind's eye.

That great titan, Dostoyevsky, passed through not seven but all nine rounds of life's hell. He saw the petty and the great, experienced more than a man can possibly experience (the expectation of execution, exile, convict labor, decline of the personality), but in no work of his stooped to national nihilism. On the contrary, he loved man and rejected in him what was bad and asserted what was good, just as most of the great writers of world literature, when studying the character of their nation. Dostoyevsky passionately sought God both within and outside of himself.

A feeling of mad hostility, as though he were picking bones with a whole nation which had offended him, seethes in Solzhenitsyn as in a volcano. He suspects every Russian of being unprincipled, hypocritical, adding to that a desire for easy living, for power. And as though glorifying in the throes of self-annihilation, he frenziedly tears his shirt, shouting that he himself could be a hangman. His vicious attack on Ivan Bunin only because that eminent writer of the twen-

tieth century remained a Russian to the end in emigration, also arouses astonishment, to say the least.

But Solzhenitsyn, despite his serious age and experience, does not know the Russian character "down to the bottom," nor does he know the character of the "freedom" of the West with which he so often compares life in Russia.

"The Gulag Archipelago, 1918-1956" could have been an "experiment in artistic study," as Solzhenitsyn calls it, had the author comprehended every word he wrote and comprehended the formula "the criterion of truth is morality, and the criterion of morality is truth," and if he had had the courage to realize that history deprived of truth was a widow.

Every artist of every country only harms himself by remaining for long in a state of constant resentment, for resentment devours his talent, and the writer becomes so biased that the bias devours truth itself.

Yuri V. Bondarev is a writer who won a Lenin Prize for Literature in 1972. This article was provided and translated into English by the Soviet press agency Novosti, which was asked by The New York Times for a critique of Mr. Solzhenitsyn's book.

Washington Post  
14 Feb. 1974  
Joseph Kraft

## Raising The Price For Detente

The deportation of Alexander Solzhenitsyn demonstrates how difficult it is to nurse the Soviet Union toward a civilized political regime. The mellowing of Soviet power is not going to be achieved by the mere force of economic modernization, nor by contact with the West and discreet diplomatic hints.

A full-court press, largely by the United States, is required. By the willful provocation which led to his expulsion, Mr. Solzhenitsyn has asked whether we in the West care enough about peace and freedom to go the distance—to keep the pressure on the Soviet regime.

Let us make no mistake about it. By repeated and well-publicized acts of defiance, Mr. Solzhenitsyn asked for trouble.

He probably could have gone on writing the powerful novels which won him the Nobel Prize. But that wasn't enough. He wrote "The Gulag Archipelago," an account of the Soviet prison system as it operated under Stalin, which named names. He published it in the West with indications that there was more to come if he were arrested.

As the police closed in, he kept Western reporters abreast at every turn. Twice he refused a summons from the secret police, and twice he let reporters in Moscow know about it. The comment he made the day before his expulsion was a particularly sharp challenge to the regime. He refused a summons because of what he called "a situation of general illegality" in the Soviet Union.

So his behavior poses a problem. Why did Solzhenitsyn ask for it? What was he trying to prove?

The answer lies in the achievement of party secretary Leonid Brezhnev. Mr. Brezhnev is on the way to solving the problem of achieving economic progress without abandoning the iron control of the Bolshevik system. His method is what we call detente—the easing of tensions with the West.

By a controlled flow of Western goods and technology and capital, Russia keeps moving forward. The standard of living has slowly improved. The frontiers of knowledge are explored. Television sets, automobiles and computers become part of the Soviet system.

Because this forward motion is achieved largely by borrowing the fruits of Western initiative and invention, the party maintains its supremacy and the military retains its all-powerful grip on Soviet resources.

To be sure, in return for its credits and technological assistance, the West does ask a price. Under prodding from the United States, the Soviet Union has lifted—a little—the barriers to emigration of Jews to Israel.

But political change is not set in motion. On the contrary, the dissidents who advocate real change are sent off one by one to the prison camps of Siberia, or to various asylums or into exile.

Against this background the logic

of deliberately needling the regime, of trying to force a confrontation, becomes clear. Mr. Solzhenitsyn, like the physicist Andrei Sakharov, has decided that it is no longer feasible to try and work within the system for reform. By courting trouble, and finally achieving it, Mr. Solzhenitsyn is signalling desperately to the West.

He was telling us that we should ask far more than we have in return for our capital and technology. He was asking us to insist on more changes in Russia, and more basic changes, as a price for Soviet entry to the advanced world. He was making the case that if the West cracks down hard now, Mr. Brezhnev will yield—not be forced to give way to a new set of hard-liners.

My own sense is that Mr. Solzhenitsyn is right. It seems to me very clear that the United States should raise the price for detente. It is not enough for the Soviet Union merely to let out several thousand Jews through the back door. If the Russians want to be part of the developed world, then they are going to have to behave like an advanced country. That means, at a minimum, whittling down the military occupation of Eastern Europe and allowing the basic freedoms which one of the greatest writers in the world needs to continue his work.

Up to now, President Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger could make the case for moving discreetly for an easing of the Soviet regime in the context of detente. Now the weakness of that quiet approach is clear. If they don't press the Russians in a more open manner, it will be hard to resist the conclusion that, where matters of liberty and morality are concerned, the President and the Secretary of State have a high threshold of pain. If nothing else, they will forfeit the American constituency for detente, which is already breaking up.



# Western Europe

WASHINGTON POST Wednesday, Jan. 23, 1974

## A CIA Non-Caper Inside

### British Labor

By Bernard D. Nossiter

Washington Post Foreign Service

LONDON, Jan. 22—The bizarre tale of CIA agents protecting Britons from their own security negligence today blew up in the letters column of The Times of London.

The destruct button was pushed by Miles Copeland, the American source of the original account and a self-described "consultant" for the Central Intelligence Agency.

Copeland wrote The Times, "I had no facts of my own to corroborate the information" he gave the paper. But, he went on, if his story was not true, it should be.

The curious caper began last Friday when The Times ran at the top of page one a story headlined: "CIA men in Britain checking on subversion."

The tale, essentially an interview with Copeland, disclosed that "between 30 and 40 extra American intelligence men have been drafted to Britain since the present state of emergency was introduced."

Their mission, Copeland told Christopher Walker, The Times reporter, was to ferret out subversives, particularly in British trade unions.

"Rightly or wrongly," Copeland was quoted as saying, "the top men in the CIA believe that the present spate of strikes in Britain has far more sinister motives than the mere winning of extra wages. They believe that the aim is to bring about a situation in which it would be impossible

for the kind of democratic government you continue to enjoy here. . . . There is no doubt at all that it [the CIA] has agents operating inside the British labor unions. . . . The CIA has been trying to convince the British for some time about the power of subversives within the unions. . . . The present state of Britain makes it a professional troublemaker's dream."

The Times did not report that Copeland, 57, makes a living in London advising what he says are multinational American corporations on "security problems." Nor did the newspaper disclose that Copeland has co-authored a novel entitled "Black September" for which, he says, Simon & Schuster has paid an advance of \$70,000.

When The Times story appeared, the American embassy here said that it "is so outside the area of truth that it must be denied categorically."

The next day, Louis Heren, The Times' deputy editor for foreign news and former

Washington correspondent, wrote a signed front-page article describing such denials as "automatic and understandable."

Heren suggested that the CIA was only doing its duty, that "From Washington, Britain must now be beginning to look like a Central American banana republic. . . . It must

seem that the Government is incapable of governing. Militant trade unionists are in direct confrontation with authority."

Today, however, Copeland confessed that his tale was a classic case of the wish fathering the thought.

He wrote:

"On the evening of January 16, I reviewed with Christopher Walker the information which provided the basis for his story on CIA men in Britain. Although I had no facts of my own with which to corroborate the information, it made sense to me in the light of my background knowledge of 'the war of the spooks' . . .

"I have chilling suspicions that the United States embassy might be speaking the truth in that pompous denial it issued on Friday and that the CIA really is in this instance as delinquent in the performance of its assigned duties as the denial claims. I hope my suspicions turn out to be unfounded. . . . Both Black September and the IRA have boasted that 1974 is to be 'the year of the killing'."

More prosaic intelligence sources here never took Copeland's yarn seriously. They said that even the CIA, which sometimes acts without considering political consequences, must know that industrial action by coal miners,

and railway engineers here does not reflect a plot to overthrow the government but simply a wish for more money in the case of the miners, and preservation of the engineers as a separate craft in the case of the railwaymen.

These sources, however, did say that Copeland had revealed a bureaucratic fact of marginal significance, that the CIA office here has put on a few additional men. But this expansion was attributed to the importance of the new station chief, Cord Meyer, rather than any increased activity. Meyer is the high CIA official credited with the ill-fated plan in the 1960s to buy up, through foundation funds, leaders in the American National Students Association and several American trade unions.

As for Copeland, he first achieved notoriety with the publication of "The Game of Nations," a purportedly factual account of his derring-do on behalf of the CIA in Egypt and elsewhere in the Middle East.

Today, Copeland says he was but is no longer a management specialist for the agency, sometimes working on the CIA payroll and sometimes working under contract for a prominent management firm.

New York Times  
23 Jan. 1974

## Time to Spook the Spooks?

By C. L. Sulzberger

MILAN, Italy—The role of intelligence in modern societies is now increasingly questioned as the result of scandals, wiretappings, failures to evaluate correctly what special services report, or inexcusable political interventions like the recent C.I.A. case in Thailand.

Thus, in the United States and France, there have been flamboyant bugging incidents which threaten to topple leading officials. Greece's own central intelligence agency, K.Y.P., has allegedly been at the heart of two successive putsches. And Israel's highly

expert spook apparatus produced correct information that war was coming last October—yet the Government ignored these warnings.

Many security organizations have acquired unsavory reputations. Both Britain's secret intelligence service (viz., Kim Philby) and the Soviet services (viz., Colonels Penkovsky and

### FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Popov) have been demonstrably penetrated by their adversaries.

Moreover, the ancient business of intelligence has been totally revolutionized by technological revolutions. The computer plays an enormous role in analyzing the information of spies and special agents. And electronic eavesdropping plus space satellite photography combine to open brand new fields of espionage, fields that remain closed to small, poor, underdeveloped countries.

Indeed, it is increasingly obvious that pooled intelligence among allies

is sensible even for rich and powerful nations. A former French Minister of Defense wonders whether France (whose intelligence services have been smudged with scandal) requires such agencies in peacetime.

He says: "France is not an important enough country to require a peacetime intelligence service anyway. All it needs is to have good relations with its allies and enough of a new intelligence service to be able to function should there be a serious threat of war."

The question of "intelligence policy" is pondered by Stevan Dedijer, a Yugoslav-born Swedish citizen now on the faculty of Lund University, Sweden. Dedijer has special expertise since he admits having worked successively for the Soviet N.K.V.D. (now M.G.B.), the American O.S.S. (precursor of the C.I.A.), then in "intelligence activities" for Yugoslavia—before moving to a Swedish ivory tower.

Mr. Dedijer reaches the novel conclusion that courses in "intelligence" should be given in universities—where

everything from hotel management to embalming is now taught. He says that despite a broad literature of case histories and spy novels, there are "very few systematic social studies" on the subject. Yet there exists a contradiction between "the need to democratize intelligence and to control it on the one hand, and its secrecy and illegality requirements on the other."

He points out that mass media and other groups "are making intelligence questions objects of public debate and political problems," adding: "The demands for the democratization of intelligence policy and its control are being raised." He suggests examining

tion of the following:

"Is a wider and greater public control of the intelligence production system, management system and policy system necessary, desirable and possible? What does intelligence cost us? How many are engaged in it, who and where are they and how selected? What is the return on our investment in intelligence? How much waste and abuse is involved: Is the intelligence community subverting our basic national values and quality of our life?"

Mr. Dedijer concludes: "We are learning that intelligence is too important to be left to professional intelligencers. Intelligence, as all other

key functions and institutions, has to be on tap but not on top of society."

He believes: "The basic intelligence goal for individual countries is changing from intelligence for national existence and security to intelligence for national growth and development."

There is much to be said for his fresh approach to a field hitherto cloaked in dark suspicion and speckled with gaudy romance. Surely, for a subject so vital to contemporary societies, there should be public discussion and even intellectual courses examining the needs and methods of what used to be an unmentionable trade.

LONDON TIMES

25 Jan. 1974

## US embassy denial on CIA agents accepted

MR DAVIDSON (Accrington, Lab) asked the Prime Minister to find out from President Nixon whether there was any truth in reports in certain newspapers that CIA agents had infiltrated British trade unions.

If there is any truth in it (he said) will he assure President Nixon that we are capable of dealing with industrial troubles in our own way and we do not need any help from him?

MR HEATH—A categorical denial has been issued by the American Embassy and I am confident there is absolutely no truth in the allegations whatever.

MR LOUGHLIN (West Gloucestershire, Lab) asked what information the Home Secretary had on increased activities of foreign intelligence agents in Great Britain.

MR CARR, in a written reply, said: It is a long-established practice that security matters are not discussed in public. But I think it right to say that as a matter of general practice any activities of foreign intelligence agents in this country are kept under close scrutiny.

Any evidence of improper activities is followed up at once and neither I nor the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary would hesitate to take any action we thought appropriate.

In view of concern which has been expressed about the CIA, I would add that the Government fully accept the statement by the United States Embassy that there is no truth in recently published allegations.

MR HUGH JENKINS (Putney, Lab) asked if the Home Secretary would deport to the United States any members of the CIA currently known to be in Great Britain?

MR CARR, in a written reply, said: No.

He joined the CIA in 1951 at a time when many liberal intellectuals did, and joined the department in charge of the secret funding of non-communist, left-wing publications. He ran into trouble during the period of McCarthyism because of his links with communists among world federalists. He was suspended without pay for three and a half months and then reinstated.

A recent article in *The New York Times* suggested that he was embittered by the experience and moved to the right politically.

LONDON TIMES

22 Jan. 1974

## CIA operations in Britain

From Mr Miles Copeland

Sir, On the evening of January 16, I reviewed with Christopher Walker the information which provided the basis for his story on "CIA men in Britain" (January 18). Although I had no facts of my own with which to corroborate the information, it made sense to me in the light of my background knowledge of "the war of the spooks", and although the sources were not revealed to me they could only have been persons, probably official, who knew what they were talking about.

I am delighted to see Louis Heren bring perspective to the matter in Saturday's paper, but I am afraid he may be in error on one point. I have chilling suspicions that the United States Embassy might be speaking the truth in that pompous denial it issued on Friday and that the CIA really is in this instance as delinquent in the performance of its assigned duties as the denial claims. I hope my suspicions turn out to be unfounded. While I can appreciate Mr Evert Barger's concern over the possibility that Big Brother may shortly be descending on the Athenaeum. (Letters, January 19), the only two alternatives to the "community surveillance" methods taught by the CIA are much more distasteful. The first is to put police protection around the thousands of persons and places in the country which might be targets of the "new terrorism"—thereby giving Britain the "police state" image the leftist extremists want it to have. The second is to tolerate the terrorism.

LONDON TIMES

26 Jan. 1974

## Scepticism over reports of CIA activity in Britain

From Peter Strafford

New York, Jan 25

Mr Victor Marchetti, a former official of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), said today that he was sceptical about reports that the agency was checking on "subversive" elements in British trade unions.

He had left the CIA in 1969, he said, and until that time he did not think such a "high risk" operation would have been approved.

On the other hand, attitudes in Washington had changed since Mr Nixon had become President and Dr Henry Kissinger, the Secretary of State, had become the most powerful man in American intelligence. The

attitudes of the present Administration, combined with the advanced methods and techniques available, provided "the ingredients for a frightening formula".

Mr Marchetti was with the CIA for 14 years, and ended as assistant to the deputy director, then Admiral Rufus Taylor, with a rank equivalent to that of colonel. He left the agency because of doubts about its policies, and about American policy in Vietnam, and has since become embroiled in a bitter legal battle with the CIA.

He has written a book called *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence* in which he outlines the agency's methods and advocates

reforms. He is now fighting the deletions that the CIA wants to make.

Because of the legal situation, Mr Marchetti was not able to talk in detail about CIA activities in Britain. But he emphasized that relations between the American and British intelligence services were very close.

Mr Cord Meyer, the station chief in London, has received a fair amount of publicity in the United States. A brilliant student at Yale, he lost an eye in the Pacific during the Second World War and emerged from his experiences a fervent idealist with a belief in world government.

SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, London  
27 January 1974

# 20-man C.I.A. base in London

By NORMAN KIRKHAM,  
Diplomatic Correspondent

**M**ORE than 20 officers of the Central Intelligence Agency are now operating in London. Their top priority at present is to avert future attacks by Arab terrorists in Europe and help Middle East peace moves.

But apart from Middle East issues, they are interested in possible effects of the British economic crisis and Communist influence on British trade union attitudes.

The agents are working in close liaison with M.I. 6 and the British Government. Regular meetings are held with officials from the Foreign Office at which secret information is exchanged.

A few men are believed to have joined the C.I.A. team during recent months. Mr. Cord Meyer, one of the top-ranking intelligence officers from Washington, is directing the operations centre at the American Embassy in Grosvenor Square.

At least five Middle East experts are among the London agents. They are consulting counterparts in the British Secret Service on movements of suspected Palestinian terrorists in European capitals.

## Man with grievance

Both the British and American Governments have been embarrassed by a recent report that more than 30 extra American agents have been sent into Lon-

don and that C.I.A. men have infiltrated trade unions.

A categorical denial of this by the American Embassy has reassured Whitehall completely.

The American Embassy believes that the story was circulated deliberately by an American citizen in London who apparently harbours a grievance. He complained that consular officials were not helpful when he tried to obtain a new passport.

A string of 10 names were also published in a London newspaper last week as being members of the C.I.A. who were serving or had served in London. Nearly all of these are diplomats engaged in other activities.

Since the 1939-45 war, pooling of information between the American and British intelligence services has become increasingly important.

This has led to detection of Russian and Communist spies in London and Washington.

Lord Harlech, a former British Ambassador in Washington, will mention the co-operation in a recorded interview to be broadcast on B.B.C. Radio 4 tonight.

Discussing the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, Lord Harlech says that some British intelligence people, led by Maj.-Gen. Sir Kenneth Strong, were then in Washington for consultations with the C.I.A.

Key figures had failed to attend scheduled meetings with Gen. Strong. As a result British diplomats guessed that a crisis was building up over Cuba.

Britain was consequently alerted before some members of the American Cabinet were told.

LONDON TIMES  
25 Jan. 1974

## THE CIA UP TO ITS TRICKS?

Information published in *The Times* last week concerning activity by the United States Central Intelligence Agency in this country was to the effect that the number of American intelligence personnel operating in Britain had recently been increased by some thirty or forty, and that part of the reason for this was to gather material about so-called "subversive elements" in the trade union movement. That information was denied by the United States Embassy and its denial was repeated and endorsed by the Prime Minister and Home Secretary in the House of Commons yesterday. It is in the nature of intelligence operations that the sources for information published about them cannot be publicly disclosed, and that denials of what is published about them cannot be reinforced by giving chapter and verse. A conflict of assertion remains and people must make their own judgments about it according to the inherent probabilities of the contradictory accounts and the credit and motives of those giving them.

This much is agreed. There is a CIA station in Britain, and it is here with the knowledge and consent of the British Government. In view of the record of that organization there is every reason to be watchful of it—although there is much more reason to be

concerned at the intelligence operations here of powers which are to be ranked as unfriendly.

In his reply yesterday Mr Carr drew an implicit distinction between proper and improper activities by foreign intelligence agents on British soil and said that he and the Foreign Secretary would not hesitate to take action to prevent improper activity. He did not indicate where in his view the line is drawn. As a starting point it may be suggested that for foreign intelligence operations within this country to be acceptable they must satisfy at least these two conditions: that what is going on is broadly speaking known to the security or intelligence authorities here and approved by them, and that the law is not broken.

There is a further general condition to be satisfied which can be illustrated from an administrative distinction within the CIA itself. It has an intelligence branch and an operations branch, the latter nicknamed the "department of dirty tricks". The primary function of the CIA is to provide the National Security Council and so the President with intelligence reports which may form a basis for policy decisions. It supplements and duplicates the information gathering function of United States diplomatic missions: most of that part of its work is unexciting and unexcep-

tionable from the point of view of the countries which are the objects of attention. It is also sometimes given authority—or takes it—to intervene actively in the domestic affairs of another country. The first type of activity is not in principle objectionable: the second most certainly is.

These distinctions can be applied in the two areas in which, according to our information, the CIA has recently become active here: international Arab terrorism, and "subversion" in trade unions. International guerrilla organizations must be countered by international action. If the intelligence agents of one country have a lead which brings them to the territory of another, they should be allowed to follow it provided they keep the authorities there fully in the picture, and provided that, if any rough stuff is required, the local enforcement agencies are called in to do it. In the case of the trade unions (or for that matter the newspapers) of this country, there is no objection to the United States through the CIA or any other agency gathering whatever information about them it thinks it needs, provided illegal or corrupt means are not employed, and provided the operation is not designed or executed in such a way as to attempt to influence the course of events. Information, yes: interference, no.

THE TIMES (LONDON)

25 JAN 1974

# Defector reveals MPs' part in spy ring

by Christopher Sweeney

Details of an elaborate spy ring involving members of parliament, civil servants and a double agent in London in the 1960s were given to the West by a defecting Czechoslovak intelligence officer.

The defector, Mr Josef Frolík, a former major in the Czech intelligence service, told *The Times* last week in London that he had given the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) the names of three people who were then MPs who had received money for spying.

He also named Mr Charles (Karel) Zbytek, a former Czech Army officer who was given political asylum in Britain, as the double agent. For £40,000, Mr Frolík claimed, Mr Zbytek systematically betrayed information gathered by British intelligence, the CIA and the West German intelligence service.

Among other startling details given to the CIA during his debriefing were:

That President Lyndon Johnson was secretly warned in advance by the Russians in 1968 of the impending Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia;

Details of espionage activity in Britain with the names of agents. Mr Frolík claims that his debriefing led directly to the arrest of Nicholas Pragge, who passed on radar secrets to the Czechs and was sentenced to 12 years' imprisonment in June 1971;

Evidence that Nazi documents incriminating prominent figures in Austria and West Germany were in fact forged in Prague in 1965 in an attempt to discredit Western political leaders;

Details of agent provocateur activities in London, the Middle East and Nato countries.

Mr Frolík also provided details of the rigging of anti-Soviet demonstrations in Prague in 1968 in order to embarrass Mr Alexander Dubcek, then the Czechoslovakian leader. These were planned by the Prague regional directorate of state security and gave the Russians "evidence" that Mr Dubcek was anti-Soviet and were used to justify the Russian action.

He claimed that the mysterious suicides in October, 1968 of two prominent West German military figures, Admiral Hermann Ludke and General Horst Wendtland, were prompted by the defection of Ladislav Bittman, a Czech intelligence agent, who knew about their betrayal of Nato secrets. They killed themselves after being tipped off by Prague of the defection.

Mr Frolík, who now lives in the United States under an assumed name, is one of the most senior communist espionage agents to defect since the war. For 17 years he worked for Czech intelligence in Prague, Britain and the Middle East.

Last week the details of Mr Frolík's defection and his position in Czech intelligence were confirmed in Whitehall. A 500-page manuscript based on his debriefing, and translated into English by the CIA, gives elaborate details of Czech espionage activities.

The manuscript was submitted to the CIA in July last year and in the version I saw the intelligence authorities in Washington had deleted many names and more than 100 pages.

According to Mr Frolík, the three then MPs who were named by him had not been arrested at the time because sufficient evidence could not be found to stand up in court. He told me last week in London however that after the information had been passed from Washington to London, the three were confronted with the available evidence and "their usefulness was finished".

"It is not so easy to get the evidence, it is standard practice in this business to cover all your traces and make sure that you protect your contacts. But the London people have other means up their sleeves to damage these men and they have already done so."

Two of the people who were then MPs were recruited by Czech intelligence officers, Lieutenant-Colonel Jan Paclík and Vaclav Taborsky, during the 1950s. "Both worked for many years", Mr Frolík said, "and delivered important information concerning British defence potential and the domestic and foreign policies of the Labour Party and the British Government."

Referring to his time in Britain, Mr Frolík said: "I knew of no other place in the world outside of Austria and West Germany where infiltration of the Government apparatus, of Parliament, of the trade unions and of scientific institutes was so complete and on such a grand scale as in Great Britain."

According to the account, by far the most effective agent was Mr Charles Zbytek, whose case officer Frolík briefly became in the 1960s. His file "looked like a small library consisting of thousands of pages which in fact was an encyclopedia on British intelligence."

Mr Zbytek, codenamed "Light", was a filing clerk for the Czechoslovak Intelligence Office (CIO), an intelligence gathering centre connected with British intelligence. It was composed of former Czech Army officers who came to Britain seeking political asylum after February 1948 and was headed by Colonel Prochazka.

From the spring of 1956, Mr Zbytek passed on the names of 1,800 people involved with Western intelligence actions against the Czech Government from the CIO office in Broadway, Whitehall. Because of a bureaucratic slip, Mr Zbytek, who died in 1962, was able to obtain the files of people who were agents or were involved in intelligence activities for the CIA, the West Germans and the British.

According to the procedure used in Mr Zbytek's office, names were attached to the files of people who were of interest to British and foreign intelligence agencies so that the Czech Intelligence Office would not overlap their work or try to recruit the same people.

Mr Frolík also claimed that the former Gestapo chief, Heinrich Müller, one of the most wanted Nazi war criminals, was kidnapped by Czech agents from Venezuela in 1954. He was imprisoned in Prague so that the Czech Government could establish from him the names of people who had worked for the Gestapo during the war.

During the "Prague Spring" in 1968, Mr Frolík revealed that officers of Prague's regional directorate of state security organized anti-Soviet riots to embarrass Mr Dubcek. These rigged demonstrations included the "hockey riots" and the damaging of Russian buildings.

In 1968, while working in Prague, he saw—"with my own eyes"—a message from the

Czech embassy in Washington reporting that the Russians had tipped off President Johnson that an invasion of Prague was imminent. This information was received by Mr Dubcek just before the notorious meeting with Soviet leaders at Cerna, near Cop.

Among activities in London was the infiltration of a Czech agent, Jaroslav Hodac (code-named agent Lev), on to the editorial board of the Czech exile newspaper *Czechoslovakia*. The exile leader, Mr Josef Josten, was twice set down for assassination, according to the account, but these plans were called off, as were plans to kidnap Antonin Buzek, a correspondent for the Czech Press Agency who had defected.

The forged Nazi documents were "uncovered" by Czech police in the Blake Lake area of Czechoslovakia, near the German border, in 1965. They were dramatically revealed by the then Minister of the Interior, Mr Lubomir Strougal, in an attempt to discredit German and Austrian politicians, and were accepted as genuine by various international agencies investigating Nazi war crimes.

Mr Frolík also revealed a bizarre episode in Wales in 1962 when he arranged for anti-Jewish slogans to be drawn on walls in German and cemeteries disturbed to try to galvanize feeling in Britain against the West German Panzer divisions which were allowed to undertake tank training in Wales.

# Far East

WASHINGTON POST Monday, Feb. 4, 1974

## What Are We Underwriting in Vietnam?

**I**N THE FIRST YEAR after the signing of the celebrated Vietnam cease-fire agreement of January 1973, there was good reason for Congress and most of the rest of us to hail America's disengagement from combat, to cheer the return of the POWs, to accept routinely the high cost of continuing military and economic aid to the Thieu government, and more or less to turn a blind eye to the fact that there was in fact no cease-fire and no perceptible progress toward a permanent peace. Soothingly, we were told that you couldn't expect the shooting to stop overnight, but that the foundations of a "structure for peace" were in place, and that the business of building upon this structure to produce elections and a division of territory and a sharing of political power was only a matter of time. With a year's experience, however, it is now clear that it hasn't worked out that way. (Well over 50,000 Vietnamese have reportedly been killed in combat during this "cease-fire" so far.) Worse, there is precious little prospect that it will. So it is not only appropriate but urgent for the Congress and the public to force their attention back to Vietnam. And the new budget, with its provision for continuing heavy military and economic aid for the Saigon government, offers a powerful argument as well as an opportunity for doing so.

In his State of the Union address, the President spoke witheringly of those who would abandon the South Vietnamese by abruptly shutting off all our aid—as if the issue was as simple as that. Of course, it is not. Most people, we suspect, are fully aware of this country's obligation to continue helping Saigon defend itself against flagrant violations of the cease-fire by the North Vietnamese; larger American policy interests over at least a decade and a half, after all, had a lot to do with creating Saigon's heavy dependence on our continuing patronage. But the real issue is much more complex, for it has to do with who is really responsible for the breakdown of the cease-fire. It has also to do with whether our aid, in conjunction with our diplomacy, is working to improve the chances of real peace in Indochina, or whether it is in fact working toward perpetuation of a vicious, costly war by discouraging the kinds of concessions on both sides that might bring about a genuine settlement.

We do not profess to have the answers—and that is just the point. Nobody in Washington seems to have the answers—or even particularly to care. For the past year, the general tendency has been to blame both sides for the myriad violations if not to ignore them; to cancel off these violations against each other; and to conclude somewhat cynically that this is the natural or inevitable or Vietnamese way of resolving conflicts. There is, moreover, the formidable difficulty of finding the facts. With their supreme interests at stake, both Vietnamese sides have had powerful incentives to highlight their own observances of the agreement and to hide their own violations. Field conditions limit the capacity of objective observers, such as journalists, to judge for themselves.

All this gives no reason, however, to avoid trying to get at the facts. For it should be understood that avoiding the question of which side is chiefly responsible for the collapse of the agreement is answering the question to the benefit of President Thieu. Time and again, administration figures have drawn public attention to the alleged violations of Hanoi and the Provisional Revolutionary Government (Vietcong). The imminence of a big Communist offensive has been built up as a special bugaboo, while the open threats of some sort of pre-emptive strike by the South, as well as the plain evidence of provocations by the Saigon government, have been presented to us as no more than legitimate acts of self-defense. To this have been added regular and wholly unrealistic suggestions of American re-entry into the war, including the possibility of renewed bombing of the North.

We have been down this road before and we should know by now where it leads—to blind and unquestioning support of a Saigon government lulled into a false sense of security by our aid, with no real capability to defend itself, by itself, and with no incentive to yield up anything for the sake of a compromise settlement. From this, one can safely project an open-ended conflict between the two Vietnams. True, it is largely *their* war now, which is a lot better than it being largely *our* war, as it was for seven agonizing years. But we are nonetheless subsidizing a substantial part of it. Thus, it seems only reasonable for the two sets of armed services and foreign relations committees in both houses of Congress to conduct a searching inquiry into the administration's current Vietnam policy. For this country has a moral as well as a political commitment to the objective of a cease-fire and an ultimate Vietnamese settlement which the administration so proudly proclaimed to be very nearly accomplished facts a year ago. And the American public has a right to know whether, and how, this objective is being served by our continuing aid to South Vietnam. We would not argue that the answer turns entirely on what this country does or doesn't do for President Thieu. Part of the answer obviously must come from Hanoi. Part of it also depends on the efficacy and validity of that larger "structure for peace," reaching from Moscow and Peking to Washington, of which the President had made so much. But a big part of the answer, nonetheless, depends upon Saigon. So we think that before Congress approves more billions for President Thieu, it ought to try to find out whether the easy availability of this subsidy may not be prolonging an intensified Vietnam war by consolidating a militant, recalcitrant and repressive regime in Saigon. For there is at least some reason to believe that a more selective and judicious application—or denial—of this money could make it work to far better effect as an integral part of a wider diplomatic effort to bring about something more nearly resembling a Vietnam peace.

THE WASHINGTON POST

Thursday, Jan. 17, 1974

## What Is the U.S. Doing in Thailand?

**A**N EXTRAORDINARY instance of American overreaching has just come to light in Thailand. It involves the CIA, an agency so habituated—at least in Thailand—to acting like a sovereign state that it seems to have been unable to adjust to the winds of Thai change. It seems that a CIA agent sent a letter to the new prime minister, who came to power last fall replacing the generals identified with a close military link to the United States. Signing the name of a Communist insurgent leader in Sakon Nakhon province, the agent sounded out the prime minister on his interest in opening talks with the insurgents. The letter's internal inconsistencies struck Thai officials, they now say. Since it had been sent by registered mail, it was easily traced to the CIA office in a particular province. The government then evidently leaked the story to the Thai press, which gave it a play worthy of the outrageousness of the event itself. "Really bad," the prime minister summed up.

The newly posted American ambassador, William R. Kintner, was forced to acknowledge and apologize for this "regrettable and unauthorized initiative." "No American official is to be involved in any activity which could be interpreted as interference in Thai internal affairs," he announced. Yet this hardly puts the matter to rest. Is it more believable that the agent was acting on his own or that, unmasked, his operation—whatever its purpose—was simply repudiated? Since CIA activities in Thailand are supposed to be confined to providing technical intelligence assistance to Thais, how is it that the CIA appears to have set up what the Thai press

calls "operation units in various areas"? The CIA's indiscretion "demonstrates to the people that the United States is involved in the fight to suppress the Communist terrorists," the Bangkok radio noted, and thus it compromises the Thai government claim that the insurgents, but not the government, lack independence and sovereignty. How could the CIA be insensitive to the central political value of this claim in a struggle against what is said to be a foreign-supported insurgency?

The most troubling aspect of this incident, however, goes beyond the damage that may have been done to U.S.-Thai relations. Just how deeply is the United States "involved in the fight to suppress the Communist terrorists," in the Bangkok radio's words? A Senate staff report issued last June stated that there were 545 Americans working in Thai counter-insurgency within the U.S. Military Assistance Command. But if, as the Thai counter-insurgency chief now says, "it has especially been the principle of [this program] that the fight to suppress the Communists is the Thai people's affair," then what are all those Americans doing, whether they are inside or outside the CIA? The new Thai leadership, by publicizing and protesting the affair of the letter, indicates its own decision to put some nationalistic distance between itself and Thailand's former American patrons. This is an understandable choice flowing from the winding down of the American role in all of Indochina. The Thais, who live there, are adjusting. But we Americans still have questions of our own to ask about any residual counter-insurgency role. It sounds too much like—one hesitates to say the word—Vietnam.

New York Times

21 Jan. 1974

## U.S.-Thai Relations Expected to Survive C.I.A. Blow

By JAMES F. CLARITY  
Special to The New York Times

**BANGKOK, Thailand, Jan. 20**—The admitted interference of the Central Intelligence Agency in an internal Thai affair does not mean, in the view of knowledgeable Western diplomats, that the C.I.A. has garroted itself with its own cloak in this country, but that it has at least pinked itself with its own dagger.

The incident, which stirred vigorous student protests in a country where students are the most influential political force, left Thai-American relations frayed, but not tattered, the diplomats say.

The affair focused new attention on the large American presence, mostly military, in Thailand. It also marred the entrance on the scene of a new United States Ambassador, William R. Kintner, and forced the interim Government here to disentangle itself from another problem in the midst of the difficulties it has been trying to solve since it replaced the military regime deposed in a student uprising in October.

In the view of some analysts here, the C.I.A. affair was an embarrassment to almost everyone concerned, including the office boy whose registration of an ersatz letter led to the blowing of the cover.

The plot itself seemed simple enough. An agent of the American intelligence agency, not identified but sent home earlier this month, composed a letter purportedly from an insurgent leader asking to discuss a cease-fire with the Government.

The purpose of the letter, according to Ambassador Kintner, was to produce dissension and defections among the insurgents who have been fighting the Bangkok Government for years. The registered letter found its way—how is not clear—to the offices of an English-language Bangkok newspaper, The Nation. The paper traced it to the C.I.A. and published it, the ambassador admitted the American involvement and the scandal was under way.

In the succeeding two weeks, Dr. Kintner has apologized for the incident several times, including personal apologies to

King Phumiphol Aduldet and Premier Sanya Dharmasakti, and said he had taken measures to prevent American officials from meddling in Thailand's internal affairs. The student organizations, which had first demanded the total ouster of the C.I.A. and the recall of Dr. Kintner to Washington, have not reacted to the Bangkok Government's relatively mild reprimand to the United States and the ambassador last Thursday.

Dr. Kintner, who was personally vulnerable to the student criticism because he worked for the Central Intelligence Agency for two years during the Korean war, said in a recent interview that the incident caused "chagrin" among Thai officials.

It also, the ambassador said, reflected a "patronizing attitude" that he has found among some of his embassy staff members—not necessarily members of the intelligence agency—toward the Thais. The employee who patronized, whose attitude the ambassador describes as "Look, Charlie, we'll show you how to do it," will be transferred, the ambassador indi-

cated.

The furor over the letter has had a number of other effects.

It has prompted the Government to say that it is reexamining the extent of Central Intelligence Agency operations here. In the process of saying this, the Government has acknowledged that the American intelligence organization provides it with various kinds of help in internal security, counterintelligence, counterinsurgency and narcotics-control programs.

The United States attitude toward this kind of help, as indicated by the ambassador and other competent diplomats here, is that in future the Thais will get only the intelligence assistance they ask for.

No Thai officials seriously expect the Central Intelligence Agency to stop operating here. They concede that a total ban would be foolish, as the agents would only continue to operate in mufti. There are now in Thailand, American officials say, 50 operating agents supported by 100 clerical and com-



munications assistants.

Ambassador Kintner, an outspoken man who has divided his professional life between the Army and the academic world, says Thai-American relations have survived the incident. He shrugs off questions whether it has caused friction between him and the intelligence agency chiefs in Wash-

ington.

Acknowledging that the incident took place without his knowledge after he became ambassador two months ago, Dr. Kintner said of the present structure at the embassy here: "I have full authority from the President and the Secretary of State."

New York Times  
18 Jan. 1974

## Thailand Officially Chides U.S. Over C.I.A. Interference There

By JAMES F. CLARITY  
Special to The New York Times

BANGKOK, Thailand, Jan. 17.—Thailand expressed official dissatisfaction to the United States today over the admitted interference by the Central Intelligence Agency in Thai affairs.

A Foreign Ministry statement was the first official reaction to the scandal, which erupted here nearly two weeks ago after it was disclosed that a C.I.A. agent had sent Premier Sanya Dharmasakti a letter purporting to be from an insurgent leader seeking peace with the Government. The incident caused vigorous protests from student organizations, the most influential political force here since the ouster of the military government in November.

The Foreign Ministry said that Ambassador William R. Kintner, at his request, met with Premier Sanya and was told of "the dissatisfaction of students and the people with the event that had happened as well as the dissatisfaction of the Thai people in general with the general behavior of C.I.A. units inside Thailand and their demand that the United States stop all actions of interference in the internal affairs of Thailand."

Dr. Kintner, who admitted the C.I.A. plot and apologized for it last week, was said by the ministry to have assured the Premier again today that "he would do everything to

prevent any action of interference in Thailand's internal affairs from happening again."

The statement said Thailand was examining the American agency's connections with Thai agencies, but it did not indicate whether the Government planned any further action. There was a widespread opinion among Western diplomats that unless the student organizations refused to accept the Government's handling of the issue in the statement today, the matter would be allowed to fade away.

Ambassador Kintner, in an interview after he visited the Premier and the Foreign Minister, Charunphan Issarangkun na Ayuthaya, said that the letter had caused chagrin among Thai officials but that senior officials had assured him that they wanted relations to remain cordial.

The ministry statement said Dr. Kintner had assured the Premier that the agent responsible for the plot had been sent back to the United States and that the C.I.A. office in the northern town of Sakon Nakhon, where the plot was born, had been closed.

In the interview Dr. Kintner, a one-time C.I.A. employee who became Ambassador two months ago, said that the plot had been stupidly conceived and executed. Its purpose, he said, was to produce dissension among the leaders of insurgent groups.

NEW YORK TIMES, SATURDAY, JANUARY 12, 1974

## Thai Paper Names C.I.A. Chief In Bangkok as Flare-Up Lasts

BANGKOK, Thailand, Jan. 11 (Reuters).—A Thai newspaper today identified the head of the United States Central Intelligence Agency in Thailand in the latest episode in a student and press campaign against the agency's activities in Thailand.

The English-language Nation, quoting the assistant police director general, Maj. Gen. Vitoon Yasawad, identified the agency chief as Hugh Tovar, who is listed in the diplomatic and consular list issued by the Thai Foreign Ministry.

It was the first time that Mr. Tovar had been publicly named as the agency chief in Thailand, although his role had been known in informed press circles for some time.

A former C.I.A. station chief in Laos, Mr. Tovar is no longer in Thailand.

The C.I.A. became the target of student and press attacks last week when the United States Embassy admitted that a C.I.A. agent in northeastern Thailand had sent a fake letter to Prime Minister Sanya Dharmasakti calling for a cease-fire against Communist insurgents.

The admission followed a report in The Nation that the agent had sent the letter to Mr. Sanya last month in the name of a Communist insurgent leader.

Since the admission, students have staged mass demonstration outside the United States Embassy and forced Ambassador William R. Kintner to leave a reception after burning paper American flags in front of him.

A Thai pressure group, People For Democracy, yesterday cabled the United States Senate calling for the removal of Mr. Kintner.

### Marshal Criticizes C.I.A.

BANGKOK, Jan. 11 (UP).—The United States Central Intelligence Agency has been operating in Thailand since World War II but "has no right to participate in our administration," the Defense Minister said today.

The minister, Air Chief Marshal Dawee Chullasapya, appeared at a news conference to discuss the letter written by a C.I.A. agent to the Thai Government under the name of a Communist insurgent leader offering a cease-fire in exchange for autonomy for the rebels.

"The writer of the letter did it with a lack of intelligence," the minister said. "The C.I.A. has no right to participate in our administration. The C.I.A. has absolutely nothing to do with our official activities."

cussed the incident today in an interview with some Western correspondents. An American Embassy official present at the interview said the Ambassador recalled that he was "madder than hell" when he learned of the letter. He said that he had personally apologized for it to Premier Sanya and to King Phumiphol Aduldet, according to the Embassy official.

The Ambassador also said, according to the Embassy official, that it was up to the Thai Government to decide whether it wanted the C.I.A. there to curtail or suspend the assistance it gives the Government on counterinsurgency and counterintelligence work.

The Ambassador was also said to have stated that he wanted to end the "gung ho attitude" of the American agents here. In the future, the Ambassador said, plots such as the one involving the fake letter would be left for the Thais themselves to carry out or reject.

The Government officials discussing the scandal today were said to include Premier Sanya and the Foreign Minister, Charoonphan Issarangkun Na Ayuthaya. The Foreign Minister was said to have drawn up alternate proposals for dealing

with the situation. One of them, according to the Government source, would order a total suspension of all C.I.A. activities in the country. Another would spell out in detail permissible activity.

Department officials, the source said, have been ordered to tell the Cabinet what services the agency might be providing and if the services should be continued.

Cabinet members were also discussing, the source said, the possibility of declaring Ambassador Kintner an unwelcome person. A demand for the Ambassador's recall was made last week by student organizations, which constitute the country's most influential political force since they overthrew the military government here in October.

Knowledgeable Western diplomats said here today, however, that they would be surprised if the Thai Government took such severe action.

The American Embassy also confirmed reports that Mr. Kintner planned to go to Washington in the next several weeks, but said the trip had been planned before the C.I.A. incident and was not stimulated by it.

NEW YORK TIMES, WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 15, 1974

## Thais Consider Ban or Curb on the C.I.A.

By JAMES F. CLARITY  
Special to The New York Times

BANGKOK, Thailand, Jan. 15.—Members of the Government met today and considered specific proposals to eliminate or sharply reduce the espionage and other activities of the United States Central Intelligence Agency in Thailand.

A well-placed Government source said that the Cabinet of Premier Sanya Dharmasakti would act on the proposals later this week or early next week. Privately, however, some Government officials say that a categorical ban of the C.I.A. would be impractical, the agents could continue to operate in varied groups.

At issue before the Cabinet was the scandal that erupted here 11 days ago involving the activities of the agency in Thailand. The United States Ambassador, William R. Kintner, admitted that an agency officer had written a letter to the Sanya Government, purportedly from an insurgent leader, offering to open peace talks with the premier. The Ambassador apologized for the letter and said that he had ordered American officials here to do nothing that might be interpreted as interference in internal Thai affairs.

Mr. Kintner, who became Ambassador in November, dis-



# Western Hemisphere

BALTIMORE SUN

3 Feb. 1974

## Cuba is a misfit in the scheme of East-West detente

By JAMES S. KEAT

Washington.

"You want to write a long article on our Cuba policy?" a State Department official asked in some surprise. "Hell, you can say it all in one sentence." Here's the sentence:

The administration will do nothing to improve relations with Cuba as long as President Nixon is in office.

There are buts, however. Mr. Nixon's dislike of Fidel Castro's regime is no more deep-seated than was his anti-communism in the 1950's—when no one would have predicted his seeking detente with the Soviet Union or the opening to China.

That kind of dramatic reversal aside, the Nixon administration displays no interest in resuming diplomatic relations with Cuba, broken in 1961, or in lifting the trade embargo imposed by the Organization of American States at United States behest in 1964. And, U.S. officials insist, they have no reason to suppose that Mr. Castro is any more interested in better relations. A brief flurry of speculation that Cuba was signaling a desire to open political contacts was touched off last month by a report of a press conference held in Mexico City by the Cuban ambassador there, Fernando Lopez Muino, but subsequent statements have cast doubt on it.

Last week's visit to Cuba by Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Soviet party leader, also raised questions here about a possible signal to Washington that Mr. Castro might be interested in repairing relations. Mr. Brezhnev pointedly spoke of the dividends of healing old wounds between the super-powers, and Mr. Castro for the first time had some kind words for detente.

However, the hints—if that is what they were—found no response here. U.S. officials coolly declined to take any notice of them. The more cynical among them suggested that Mr. Brezhnev might be trying to dump an expensive client on Washington, but the realistic Soviet chieftain could hardly believe that diplomatic relations would bring U.S. economic aid in its wake.

The fact remains that Mr. Brezhnev publicly rebutted some of the administration's favorite arguments against res-

toring relations with Cuba, something he would hardly do in Havana if he believed it would displease Mr. Castro.

There are two reasons for the administration's deep antipathy for the Castro regime. Probably the most important is the fact Mr. Nixon detests Mr. Castro and all that he represents. The President's visceral dislike of the Cuban

Mr. Kent is the diplomatic correspondent for The Sun.

leader is rooted in 1958, when Mr. Nixon, then Vice President, was spat on and mobbed by leftists in Caracas, Venezuela. He believes the rioters were inspired by Havana.

The other reason — the one that is publicly stated — is the administration's insistence that Cuba is trying to subject other governments in Latin America. Until Mr. Castro stops "exporting revolution," administration spokesmen assert, the United States will not normalize relations with him.

Whatever the merits of the first reason, the second is hard to document. Many U.S. officials privately refuse to repeat the charge that Mr. Castro is still sending agents to disrupt neighboring governments. Others insist there is such evidence but say they cannot disclose the secret intelligence reports that prove it.

Fewer of Mr. Castro's neighbors appear to believe it, however. Seven Latin American nations plus Canada recognize the Cuban government. A bare majority of the OAS membership was ready to vote last year against continuing the trade embargo despite strong lobbying from Washington. The overthrow of the Marxist president, Salvador Allende, in Chile, however, deflated the issue.

Perhaps the most effective argument against resuming normal relations with Cuba was put this way by a State Department Latin American specialist: "What's in it for us?" to critics who argue that the diplomatic isolation of Cuba is anachronistic after Mr. Nixon's summit visits to Moscow and Peking, officials reply that better relations with the Communist giants brought political dividends. With Cuba they would not.

"I think we have demonstrated our pragmatism with respect to Cuba," Robert A. Hurwitch, then a deputy assistant secretary of state, told a Senate foreign relations subcommittee last spring. "Where there is no overriding U.S. inter-

est, there are no grounds for seeking accommodation with an openly hostile nation. On matters of mutual interest, however, we have demonstrated that we can deal with each other."

Mr. Hurwitch cited in particular the hijacking agreement that had just been negotiated with Cuba, providing for punishment in one country or the other of persons forcing aircraft or ships to carry them across the 90-mile strait.

Aside from ending Cuba's attraction as a haven for hijackers—which it had not, in fact, been for some time before—the administration sees nothing to be gained from restoring relations with a government that speaks of it with venom.

Heavily dependent on roughly \$550 million in economic aid from the Soviet Union each year, Cuba has a whopping trade deficit for a nation of only 9.2 million persons. Sugar, by far its largest export, is not needed here. Politically an end to the war of words across the Straits of Florida would gain the United States nothing, in the official view. It would appear to condone not just Mr. Castro's ardent embrace of the Soviet Union in recent years, but also his introduction of Soviet weapons into this hemisphere.

For all that, the continued U.S. attempt to isolate Mr. Castro is hard to justify. Despite the argument that pragmatism dictated one policy with regard to the Soviet Union and China but another to Cuba, the policy appears hypocritical, especially to many Latin Americans.

The contrast between its adamant stand on Cuba and its warmth toward the Communist giants is not the administration's only problem with consistency. It has long proclaimed that diplomatic relations no longer imply political approval, and U.S. ambassadors live in capitals that are not much friendlier than Havana.

To many Latin Americans, the U.S. isolation of Cuba is more of the old Yankee paternalism that the administration has publicly renounced. Although the coup that deposed Dr. Allende caused rethinking of the growing feeling in Latin America that Marxism is the wave of the future, nationalism is still on the rise and dictates a different brand of pragmatism there than the one applied in Washington.

Argentina, for example, is stepping up its relations with Cuba although its new president, Juan D. Peron, is anything but a Communist sympathizer. Argentina has offered Cuba \$1 billion in trade credits and is bringing pressure on subsidiaries there of the three major U.S. automobile manufacturers to sell Cuba up to \$45 million worth of cars and trucks. The application of the General Motors, Ford and Chrysler subsidiaries for exemptions from the ban on trade with Cuba presents U.S. officials with a difficult decision. It would be the first breach in the embargo for U.S. companies and would be interpreted abroad as a weakening of U.S. resolve to maintain the sanctions. But under Argentine law the government can impose penalties on

the companies if they reject the orders. If it can be argued that the United States has nothing to gain by resuming diplomatic relations and ending the embargo, it can as well be argued it has little or nothing to lose. A Cuba free to trade with more nations, even including the United States, would not be a much

THE MANCHESTER GUARDIAN  
28 January 1974

As Havana prepares a festive reception for Mr Brezhnev RICHARD GOTT explains the timing of the Soviet leader's visit

## Cuba comes into the fold

CUBANS have been gearing themselves up to provide a lavish welcome for Mr Brezhnev, the General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, who is due in Havana today.

The Cuban press has described it as "the most important visit ever to take place in our revolutionary homeland," and the official daily newspaper Granma says that the people are anxious to give Mr Brezhnev "the warmest, most enthusiastic, and most massive welcome in the history of our revolution."

It is the Russian leader's first visit to the Caribbean and the first trip to Cuba by a prominent Russian since Mr Kosygin went there in October, 1971. The visit was planned last June and Mr Brezhnev was supposed to have been there for the fifteenth anniversary celebrations of the revolution, held at the beginning of the month. Fidel Castro went twice to the Soviet Union in 1972 and a return visit was long overdue.

But Mr Brezhnev has been extremely reluctant to do anything that would interfere with his new-found friendship with the United States. The Middle East crisis and the need to secure congressional approval for the lifting of restrictions on trade between the United States and the Soviet Union take precedence over the wishes of a minor ally. Mr Brezhnev told Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, Castro's emissary, in

stronger nation since it has little to pay for imports. If the administration was right in arguing last spring that economic ties with North Vietnam would turn its leaders to thoughts of peace, the same is true of Cuba.

What might be gained is some reinforcement of the administration's argu-

ment that it seeks a new era in relations within the hemisphere. The isolation of Cuba does smack of the old interventionist days. If Cuba represented a real threat to inter-American security, the stigma would be worthwhile. Without such persuasive evidence, the gesture would be taken as one of strength not weakness.

December that he could not risk the possibility of being forced to stand on a platform in the Plaza de la Revolucion while Castro pilloried his Washington friends.

Consequently the visit has been postponed until the Russians could be absolutely sure that their sometimes unpredictable friend would be on his best behaviour.

They need not have worried. Castro has been slavishly following the Russian line in the past year and even if he were to permit himself some verbal excesses in the course of a major speech, these would hardly deflect Dr Kissinger from his set purpose of making 1974 the "Year of Latin America." Kissinger is bent on resolving the minor, almost symbolic, problems of relations with Cuba and Panama in order to embark on a much more grandiose scheme for regulating the more real and fundamental problems that divide the United States from its allies in Latin America.

It is no part of Kissinger's scheme to exclude the Soviet Union entirely from decisions that will have to be made about the future of the continent. For while the Russians have few battalions in this part of the world, their control over the small but well organised local Communist parties has enabled them to play a not insignificant rôle in mobilising support for the nationalist governments of Peru and Argentina, governments that Kissinger, too, is anxious to cultivate.

Brezhnev is visiting Cuba

at a moment when the Russian Government, the Cuban Government, and the Latin-American Communist parties have a greater identity of purpose than at any time in the past. It is for this reason that the possibility of a conference of Latin-American Communist parties has been suggested, to precede the world conference that the Russians are anxious to hold to mobilise support for their campaign against the Chinese.

All this seems a far cry from the 1960s, when Castro was often at loggerheads with the continental parties and with Moscow, accusing them of betraying the cause of the Latin-American revolution. Now they all belong to a mutual admiration society, though the power and influence of the pro-Moscow parties in the continent has receded to its lowest ebb. In Chile and Uruguay, where huge parties had a real grip over the working class, military dictatorships have undone the work of decades.

In these circumstances the voice of revolutionary Cuba, once strident and dogmatic, has been strangely silent. Castro no longer claims unique ownership of the Holy Grail of revolution. He peers round the continent for friends, finding them in the barracks more often than in the hills. Where Cuba supports guerrilla movements it is more as the extension of the Cuban intelligence services than because Cuba subscribes to guerrilla doctrine.

The loss of Chile has been

a major blow to Cuba and to the Soviet Union, not just because of the brutal crushing of a promising Socialist experiment, but because of the appalling problem of picking up the pieces. The Chilean Left was never a cohesive force at the best of times. In defeat, the old division between Socialists and Communists is bound to reappear and may well prove a new bone of contention between Russia and Cuba.

For the moment, though, Castro seems to be soft-pedalling his interest in foreign affairs, and with regard to Cuba's internal economy he has good reason to be grateful to the Soviet Union. In December, 1972, new agreements were signed between the two countries which were highly favourable to Cuba. The oft-quoted figure of one million dollars a day in Russian aid, which was based on Russia's buying of Cuban sugar above the world price, seems now — with the huge increase in the

world price — a trifle exaggerated. But in nickel mining and oil prospecting, hundreds of Russian technicians are performing a useful role diversifying the Cuban economy.

These tangible benefits of the Russian connection will be much praised during Brezhnev's visit, but behind the scenes the Russian leader will be working as a negotiator for Henry Kissinger, discussing the United States proposal to re-establish diplomatic relations with the island that has caused it so much trouble for so long.

WASHINGTON POST Tuesday, Feb. 12, 1974

## Eaton: Castro Wants Better U.S. Ties

By Edward A. O'Neill  
Special to The Washington Post

BALTIMORE, Feb. 11—Cyrus S. Eaton, the 90-year-old multimillionaire industrialist, came here Sunday from six days in Cuba to say that Fidel Castro wants accommodation with the United States.

Eaton was in Cuba at Castro's invitation on the heels of a visit by Soviet Communist Party leader Leonid Brezhnev, who, according to press re-

ports, had talked to the Cuban prime minister about improving relations with the United States.

Eaton met twice with Castro for lengthy talks, as well as with Deputy Prime Minister Carlos Rafael Rodriguez; President Oswaldo Dorticos; Fidel's brother, Ramon Castro, minister of agriculture, and other Cuban leaders.

He said that he came away with an overwhelmingly posi-

tive feeling that Cuba wants to regularize its relations with this country, with which it has been at odds since 1960.

Eaton said in an interview, "Fidel said an indication of his real attitude toward the United States and its people is the fact that he moved swiftly to put an end to [airplane] hijacking."

From his conversations, Eaton concluded that the Cubans want only high-level talks.

"It really requires Kissinger or Nixon or someone with express authority to solve this matter. There is no use to put this to men down the line who do not have the authority to act. That's what happened when we first were trying to talk to Hanoi about the Vietnam war." (Eaton himself

went to Hanoi in 1969 to talk about negotiations with the North Vietnamese.)

Eaton, who used to have substantial business interests in Cuba, has kept up his connections since the Castro revolution in 1959 by other visits there and through the Cuban delegation at the United Nations. His basic interest is economic. He thinks an end to the separation would be advantageous to American industry.

"Twenty years ago they were going to put me in jail because I advocated trade with the Soviet Union," he said. "Now all kinds of Ameri-

can businessmen are rushing to get into the Soviet market."

U.S. policy toward Cuba, Eaton said, seems still to be based on "fanatical anti-communism."

"It is hard to believe that our businessmen and our State Department could be so shortsighted as to have assumed that Castro would have only a brief regime and all would be over shortly," he said. "He has successfully endured for 15 years. Right now he looks confident and is cheerful about the future."

Eaton said the Soviet Union recently sold Cuba 70 diesel

locomotives for \$28 million—"that we could have sold them"—and Argentina is making freight cars for Cuban use. While he was in Cuba, 20 Canadian businessmen were there talking about increasing trade, he said.

"A lot of the rest of the world is doing business with Castro," he said. "They didn't have to adopt his religion or lack of religion, or his system of government to do it."

Eaton said a small group of Cuban exiles in the United States, mostly centered in Miami, has been influential in the continuation of official

U.S. policy. He predicted a change in their thinking.

"They were all joined," he said, "in a policy to kill off Castro. As the years have gone by and that policy has failed, many of them now think, 'Why go on?'"

What they now want is to see "an end to it," he said. "I think we are going to have an expression from that group that will have a powerful effect on American opinion."

Use of a U.S. passport for travel to Cuba is forbidden. Eaton flew there from Nassau and returned the same way.

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## A Signal, Perhaps, From Havana

By Ben F. Meyer

WASHINGTON—There is the nagging thought here that Washington may have missed a signal indicating that Fidel Castro's Government may be ready to seek an end to the United States' 13-year boycott of Cuba.

Various circumstances suggest such a sounding by Havana. Cuba's economy still is in chaos and her dependence on the Soviet Union is increasing despite Premier Castro's known desire for greater freedom of action.

The question of United States-Cuban relations arose at a news conference of Cuba's Ambassador to Mexico, Fernando L. Lopez Muiño, when he said: "We are not in a holy war with the United States. We would be willing to talk to the United States, given a single and irrevocable condition—that it end the blockade of Cuba."

To many, this appeared a strong hint that if Washington dropped its boycott, imposed when it broke relations with Havana on Jan. 3, 1961, Washington might find it possible to end the thorny problem of relations with Havana.

Some newsmen in Moscow have even thought that the Soviet Union may have suggested such a feeler by Mr. Castro. The Soviet Union has been reported urging Cuba to drop her hostility toward other Western Hemisphere governments and also not to get caught in any more attempts at invasion or guerrilla warfare.

The reasoning here is that if the Cuban Ambassador was not putting out a feeler he could have answered the question by saying simply, "There is nothing new on that matter."

A Cuban Foreign Ministry comment, issued after Washington indicated no

enthusiasm for the idea, was couched in the tart language characteristic of Foreign Minister Raúl Roa. But it did not actually rule out the idea of negotiation.

If it was a feeler, it would not be the first time that Washington has fumbled in dealing with Cuba. A notable case occurred after a hijacked United States plane landed in Havana on Oct. 29, 1972. It had hardly touched ground before Havana suggested a discussion of means to end the bothersome hijacking business.

A few days later another hijacked United States plane, carrying two rapists who had escaped from a Tennessee prison, landed in Havana, adding to its growing problem of playing host to a collection of murderers and other criminals. Apparently still lacking a real response from Washington, the Castro Government decided to force the State Department's hand.

On Nov. 15—seventeen days after its original invitation—the Cuban Government jolted the United States with a broadcast announcement, patently aimed at public opinion and the Congress in this country, that Havana was ready to negotiate "without delay." Soon afterward, an agreement was negotiated and the hijackings from the United States ended.

Recently, editors of outstanding newspapers in the United States, members of Congress and others have become increasingly vocal in urging an end of the United States boycott. They say that the trade embargo has outlived any usefulness it may have had and that the United States stand on the sanctions voted by the Organization of American States in 1962 and 1964 disturbs inter-American relations.

In addition, the United States position patently forces Havana to remain

under Moscow's domination and gives the Soviet Union a splendid geographical base for military, economic, political and subversive activity in this hemisphere.

United States officials concede that Cuba has diminished her subversive activity in Latin America, but say she has not ended it altogether. They say also that the Cuban situation poses no military threat to the United States or to other hemisphere nations—a contention that most laymen find hard to believe in the light of Soviet submarine, air and ship activities in the Cuban area. It would seem highly advantageous to have relations that would permit much closer scrutiny of military and subversive activities in Cuba.

One thing bothering Washington is that Latin America is divided on the Cuban question. Only three countries, Argentina, Mexico and Peru, have relations with Havana, as do four former British colonies, Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad-Tobago.

The ideal solution for Washington would be for Latin-American nations to get together and make a decision. But some countries are reluctant to take the risks involved. For these, it would be much simpler for the United States to stick its neck out.

The issue might arise late this month when foreign ministers of the Americas meet with Secretary of State Kissinger to present their ideas and to hear his about the future of United States-Latin American relations. There would perhaps be much more time for discussion of Cuba at the April meeting in Atlanta of the General Assembly of the Organization of American States.

Ben F. Meyer is a retired Associated Press correspondent who has written about Latin America for thirty years.