NEWS, VIEWS and ISSUES

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Governmental Affairs

TIME, APRIL 22, 1974

WATERGATE

A Bipartisan End to Patience

The House Judiciary Committee finally lost patience last week with the cavalier and inconclusive White House responses to its six-week-old request for presidential tape recordings. Acting with impressive bipartisanship after a tense week of backstage maneuvering, the committee voted, 33 to 3, to subpoena the evidence.

In a sense the committee's historic action—it was the first resort by the House to a subpoena for evidence from a President in an impeachment inquiry—was more symbolic than practical. Although the committee was on solid legal ground in issuing the subpoena, it has no effective way to enforce it. If Nixon chooses not to honor it fully, the committee can seek a citation against him from the House for contempt of Congress. While ordinary citizens can be imprisoned for such contempt, the only effective recourse for the House in the case of a President apparently would be to add such defiance as another article of impeachment. For Nixon, however, failure to comply with the subpoena would have far more than symbolic impact; it would virtually confirm that there is incriminating material in the subpoenaed conversations that he is trying to hide.

The Judiciary Committee and Republican leaders in both chambers of Congress had worked frantically to avoid this newest constitutional confrontation spawned by Watergate. After Democrat Peter Rodino, chairman of the committee, set Tuesday, April 9, as the firm deadline for a definitive White House response to its Feb. 25 request for 41 tapes, congressional Republicans repeatedly implored Nixon's chief Watergate counsel, James St. Clair, to respond affirmatively and cooperatively. If he did not, they warned, the subpoena could not be avoided.

As the deadline approached on Tuesday, Dean Burch, Nixon's newest high-level assistant, carried a copy of St. Clair's proposed response to Capitol Hill. There the Senate's top G.O.P. leaders, including Hugh Scott, Robert Griffin, John Tower, Wallace Bennett, Norris Cotton and William Brock, read it and bluntly told Burch that it was inadequate. "It won't fly," snapped one of these leaders. "It doesn't go far enough," complained Scott. "You've got to get a line in there on your intent to cooperate with the committee." In partial explanation, Burch told the Senate Republican leaders that only one White House lawyer, J. Fred Buzhardt, and a secretary had been assigned to review the tapes. It took them a full day to transcribe just one confusing six-minute segment of conversation on one tape, Burch contended. Some of the Senators suggested that if that were true, more manpower should be assigned to the task. Burch relayed the senatorial complaints to the White House.

Insulting Letter. St. Clair then redrafted his letter, which was sent to House Judiciary Committee Counsel John Doar. Couched in condescending terms, it asked for two more weeks to "review" the requested material. St. Clair said he "was pleased" with Doar for a letter on April 4 clarifying the evidence sought. St. Clair wrote that this "goes a long way toward providing the additional specifications we felt were lacking in your original request." He said, "The additional material furnished will permit the committee to complete its inquiry promptly," after this week's congressional Easter recess. He did not say what that "material" would be. Nixon thus was reserving to himself the decision on what he finally would yield. St. Clair also seemed to link any further furnishing of evidence with his request that he be permitted to take part in the committee's impeachment deliberations.

Democratic members of the committee considered the letter insulting, but most kept silent and let the Republicans complain. "It was offensive to the House," protested Edward Hutchinson, the committee's ranking Republican. "If this is a ruse to prevent us from getting what we asked for, I don't want to fall for it," added Robert McClory, one of Nixon's staunchest backers on the committee. "The letter," conceded House Republican Leader John Rhodes in understatement, "left a great deal to be desired."

Rhodes and other Republicans phoned St. Clair to tell him that a subpoena was imminent unless he gave more ground. Rodino, for his part, knew he had a majority in favor of issuing a subpoena. But he did not want the vote to be along party lines. He was also aware of three continuing sources of Republican dissatisfaction with his handling of the committee so far: 1) he had prevented any vote on whether St. Clair should represent the President during committee proceedings; 2) he had similarly postponed any decision on the procedures the committee would follow as evidence on the President's conduct was considered; 3) he had not yet permitted a narrowing of the committee's inquiry, which included 56 areas of possible Nixon misconduct. Republicans were chafing under this Rodino rule.

Rodino then moved adroitly to eliminate these sources of partisan tension. He announced that he would convene the committee in the first week after the Easter recess to "decide on whether and how the issues can be narrowed." He and the committee Democrats caucused and agreed that St. Clair would be permitted to sit in on the presentation of evidence. Rodino said he would also convene the committee in the second week after the recess to "adopt rules to govern its procedures during the evidentiary hearings."

A partisan split threatened again, however, when St. Clair made a desperate last-minute attempt to arrange a deal with the committee. At 9:57 a.m., just 33 minutes before the committee was to consider the subpoena issue, St. Clair telephoned Doar. The review of the tapes, he now revealed, could be completed in "a day or two," after all, and he would then "try" to provide the tapes specified in the first four of six requests put forward by the committee staff. St. Clair asked: Wouldn't that make a subpoena unnecessary? Replied Doar: "I cannot speak for the committee."

When the committee met, Doar related St. Clair's offer. Massachusetts Democrat Harold Donohue nevertheless quickly offered a motion to subpoena all of the requested tapes by April 25. That is three days after the end of the Easter recess, and it more than met St. Clair's original request for added time to review. Donohue then moved that debate on his motion be limited to a half-hour (less than a minute for each of the 38 members). That set off Republican complaints.

Dilatory Tactics. With partisan passions rising, Doar was asked his opinion on whether St. Clair's belated offer was acceptable. "My recommendation," he replied in his flat, unemotional manner, "is that the committee issue the subpoena for all six items today." Doar's patience and fairness in the inquiry so far has won respect among Republicans. Some then backed his view. Republicans Hamilton Fish Jr. and Lawrence Hogan complained about the "dilatory tactics" of St. Clair. Republican David Dennis nonetheless asked to subpoena only the first four items. Republican Delbert Latta, a Nixon loyalist, offered a motion that the subpoena be perfected by making the last two items more precise, apparently an attempt to delay a subpoena vote.

Too Equivocal. Reacting cannily and quickly, Chairman Rodino saw a chance to diffuse the emotions. He asked Latta if he had any proposed clarifying language in writing. Caught short, Latta said it would require some time to prepare. Rodino suggested that the committee should recess until afternoon, which would also afford time for more extended debate. During the lunch hour, Latta searched for the proper wording for his amendment, finally adopted the language of a Doar memo explaining the last two items. Rodino gladly accepted it, declaring: "I'm not seeking a confrontation. I'm seeking evidence."

When the committee reconvened, Latta introduced his amendment, and it carried unanimously. The Republican resistance to subpoenaing all six items had virtually vanished. Robert McClory added a clinching revelation. He told the committee that during the lunch hour he had called St. Clair and asked whether Nixon's lawyer would put his latest offer in writing. St. Clair had refused. McClory's patience too thus had expired. "I think the offer is entirely too equivocal," he said of St. Clair's stand. When the roll was called, only three Republicans dissented. Among them was Hutchinson, who explained later: "One, the subpoena is unenforceable. Two, they offered to turn over voluntarily the material, and I think in the end would have turned it all over. And three, the subpoena is not returnable until after Easter, and they offered us some material sooner."

All of the subpoenaed evidence relates to whether Nixon discouraged efforts to cover up the true origins of the Watergate wiretap-burglary and tried to "get the truth out," as he has repeatedly contended, or whether he cooperated in that concealment. St.

Clair apparently was willing to turn over most of the requested conversations covered by the committee's first four requests, including talks among Nixon and his former aides, H.R. Haldeman, John Ehrlichman and John Dean, between Feb. 20 and March 20, 1973. He did not, however, agree to yield most of the requested tapes after March 21, when all parties agree that Dean told Nixon about the hush money and other cover-up activities of the President's associates. Two of the subpoenaed items after that date involve Nixon's conversations with 1) Ehrlichman and Haldeman between April 14 and April 17, and 2) then Attorney General Richard Kleindienst and Henry Petersen, head of the Justice Department's criminal division, between April 15 and April 18. It was during this period that the cover-up was unraveling.

Opaque Response. The White House response to the subpoena was opaque and critical. Presidential Press Secretary Ronald Ziegler would say only that "additional material" would be supplied by the due date of the subpoena and that this "will be comprehensive and conclusive in terms of the President's actions." The White House had not been stalling in delivering evidence, he insisted; any delay was due to the Judiciary Committee's slowness in getting specific about its requests.

The impact of the subpoena is still far from clear. Certainly, it further eroded Nixon's standing in Congress, where the Judiciary Committee's careful approach to its unwanted and awesome duty has been well received. The subpoena will hardly help Nixon's standing in the court of public opinion. A Harris poll showed last week that Nixon had gained five points in general approval, to 31%; the poll was taken before his huge tax liability was announced. Harris also reported that for the first time a plurality of Americans, 43% to 41%, feel that the President should be impeached and removed from office.

WALL STREET JOURNAL

8 APR 1974

Encounter and the CIA

Editor, The Wall Street Journal:

I have just seen the report in your issue of March 22, according to which I am supposed to have referred to the Congress for Cultural Freedom as a CIA front. I said no such thing. A "front" in common political usage refers to a phony body set up for manipulative purposes. The Congress for Cultural Freedom was never that, although most of its financial support came, as is now well known, from American foundations many of which derived their funds from the CIA. The Congress assembled writers and intellectuals who represented a wide variety of opinion: liberals, socialists, conservatives. Its resolutions—whether in the form of protests against cultural censorship, or in aid programs on behalf of refugee intellectuals—were determined by its own distinguished members. As for Encounter Magazine (and also Der Monat in Berlin which I edited), its policies—whether under the founders whom you mention, Stephen Spender and Irving Kristol, or subsequently—were always determined by its editors, and the freedom to choose the articles, stories, and poems which Encounter published was always absolute and complete. That was the point of cultural freedom. MELVIN J. LASKY

London

TIME, APRIL 22, 1974

Why Those Tapes Were Made

Out of thine own mouth will I judge thee.
—Luke 19: 22

One of the continuing ironies of Watergate is that Richard Nixon has become increasingly entangled in the scandal largely through a needless and voluntary creation of his own: his secret system for recording nearly all of his official conversations. If his clandestine tape recorders had not been silently capturing his words and those of his most intimate aides, he probably would not now be in so imminent a danger of impeachment. If he is finally forced out of office, it may well be largely due to those telltale tapes. Nearly forgotten in the endless struggles over access to those recordings is the question: Why did he ever install such a potentially dangerous system in the first place?

Men close to Nixon are now in fairly full agreement on the basic reasons. Foremost, according to them, was Nixon's awareness of history and his place in it. Nixon yearned to write one day a definitive work that would be the classic of presidential memoirs. With thousands of his conversations in the White House and the Executive Office Building available for precise—if selective—quotation, he could produce a detailed and colorful narrative far beyond the capability of any of his predecessors. "More than most Presidents," recalls one of his former assistants, "Nixon spent a lot of time poring over what he said and did. It was vital to him to have an accurate record." Adds another aide: "Nixon wants a record of everything."

■

The wondrous gadgetry of the system, with its tiny hidden mikes, its voice-actuated mechanism that required only a few spoken words to set recorder reels twirling in obscure recesses of the E.O.B., fascinated the President, his aides say. Moreover, what assistant could be more efficient than this omniscient and faithful monitor? Some presidential conversations, especially those with world leaders, were too important to permit misunderstandings. In the first 2½ years of the Nixon presidency, such advisers as Henry Kissinger, H.R. Haldeman and John Ehrlichman laboriously took notes at important meetings. All three soon became much too busy for that; the recording system, installed in the late spring of 1971, was a welcome substitute.

But a common-sense question intrudes: Would Nixon speak in total candor, knowing that his words were being preserved on tape? There is every indication that he did. Some investigators who have heard many of the tapes have said that they were appalled by the degrading conversation—talk that they did not expect to hear at a presidential level. "I wish I had not heard it," sighed one listener. Part of the offensiveness lies in Nixon's well-known private penchant for locker room language. What is less well known and more bothersome are the bitter and sometimes savage epithets he aims at individuals who have in some way angered or crossed him, and these highly personal comments include flecks of anti-Semitism.

Nixon's willingness to permit the recording of such language or possibly incriminatory material can be explained only by the hubris of the presidency, his absolute confidence that the tapes belonged to him and could never be wrested from him. The existence of the recorders was originally known only to a few Secret Service technicians and three trusted aides: Haldeman, Lawrence Higby and Alexander Butterfield. It was Butterfield who startlingly revealed the system in response to a throwaway question from a Senate Watergate-committee staff counsel on July 13. Even then the President must undoubtedly have felt that he could still protect the tapes with his claims of Executive privilege. Indeed, there had been discussions among those privy to the system about dismantling the recorders as early as six months after the Watergate burglary, and again when the cover-up began to unravel. But nothing was done. "He never in the world thought he would have to give up any of those tapes to anybody," insists one White House source.

Again common sense asks why, once the Watergate investigation began, Nixon did not destroy all of those tapes that even he concedes could be interpreted differently from the way he prefers? This could easily have been done before Butterfield revealed their existence—or even after, up until the time some were subpoenaed. Nixon was certainly under no legal obligation to keep them before they became sought-after evidence. It would have been embarrassing, of course—but not criminal—to have destroyed them in this interval.

Some former Nixon associates offer a plausible theory to explain why the tapes were kept available in the White House as the Watergate scandal unfolded and before the public was aware of the recording setup. If any member of the cover-up conspiracy were to make any false accusations about a talk with the President, Nixon could contend he had taped that conversation because he had felt it was especially important. Then he could produce the tape and destroy the credibility of the witness.

There is no clear indication yet of how damaging the tapes will prove to be for Nixon. Certainly his general reluctance to yield them to investigators has created widespread suspicion that they hurt rather than help his cause. So, too, has the report of a group of technical experts that part of one tape was deliberately erased. That conclusion is expected to be confirmed and strengthened when the panel presents its full scientific analysis, probably this week, to Federal Judge John Sirica in Washington. So far, two other tapes have been declared to be "nonexistent" by the White House. Never adequately explained has been the fact that Haldeman checked out 22 tapes on April 25, 1973, returned them the same day, then withdrew them again on April 26 and kept them until May 2. There is, indeed, still much to be explained about those fateful tapes that have contributed so much to Richard Nixon's difficulties and could even end his political career.

WASHINGTON STAR
17 April 1974

NIXON'S DILEMMA

Foreign Policy Fears Rise

By Osmald Johnston
Star-News Staff Writer

It is gradually being realized in the administration and on Capitol Hill that the impact of Watergate on foreign policy involves a great deal more than the survival of Richard Nixon's presidency.

The issue far transcends questions of short-term political expediency — for instance, the apparent manipulation of events that leads the White House to insist upon a June summit meeting in Moscow even when it is increasingly evident that impeachment proceedings in Congress will be approaching the crisis point about then.

More to the point, it is a question of whether the Nixon administration can continue to carry out its responsibility to conduct a foreign policy on behalf of the United States under circumstances such as it finds itself in today.

In the administration itself, where a solid chorus of official voices for months has insisted that Watergate and foreign policy have nothing to do with one another, some discords can now be heard.

Several weeks ago, a high-ranking official close to the ongoing strategic arms negotiations with the Soviets was confiding to associates his fear that the impeachment proceedings had injected a new uncertainty into the SALT negotiations. The Soviets, this official concluded, are determined to stall on the issue until the impeachment question is resolved.

SECRETARY OF State Henry A. Kissinger is sticking close to the official line in public, but his denials that foreign policy has been affected by Watergate have become less sweeping of late. The President, Kissinger told a group of reporters at the White House only last week, "does not conduct himself as if he were in a position of weakness."

Kissinger was addressing reporters in an effort to clarify his earlier admission, which he did not retract, that a comprehensive SALT agreement is unlikely this year — so the net effect of his remarks was negative.

Interpretation

There is, further, growing evidence that Kissinger is deeply worried by the impact of the coming impeachment crisis on the basic policy issues dividing the United States and the Soviet Union: In addition to SALT, these include the controversial trade package, the troop reduction and East-West security talks in Europe and the Middle East.

A congressional critic of administration detente policies summed it up in a sardonic aphorism recently: "Kissinger's current line is to blame Watergate for the fact that the Russians are behaving like Russians."

In a more friendly setting, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Kissinger is understood to have explored the problems at length last week. During an extended closed-door briefing, Kissinger reportedly gave the committee a somber account of his recent trip to Moscow and impressed on the members the urgency, in his view, of a SALT agreement in the next two or three years.

In the discussion, the growing weight of impeachment as a factor in U.S.-Soviet relations was a recurring subject, sources reported afterwards. One source close to the committee remarked that Kissinger's failure in Moscow to achieve the "conceptual breakthrough" toward a SALT agreement, which he had forecast earlier, was confirmation that the Russians have decided to mark time on arms negotiations until the fate of Nixon's presidency is known.

TO THIS TURMOIL within the administration's own policy-making apparatus must be added the growing determination of Congress to exert its influence on foreign affairs, an influence that is increasingly weighty as the executive appears to weaken.

But in Congress, also, there are conflicting currents. The Kissinger detente policies are meeting resistance from a disparate coalition of conservatives, cold warriors, trade protectionists and liberals who abhor Soviet repression of Jews and intellectuals. Some are hard-core adversaries of Nixon, others down-the-line Nixon loyalists. Most deeply distrust the role of Kissinger.

Opposing them are liberals and centrists who believe relaxation of tension with the Soviets is a basic necessity for survival and who fear a renewal of the Cold War would be inevitable if the Nixon-Kissinger detente policies are torpedoed. Their best hope, accordingly, is a continuance of Kissinger's role as master of U.S. foreign policy, no matter what happens to Nixon.

These opposing currents are still ill-defined and have not crystallized into coherent political movements. But it is not too much of an oversimplification to say that Sen. Henry M. Jackson, D-Wash., has clearly emerged as the leader of the first group, and that Sen. Edward M. Kennedy D-Mass., is moving into a position of prominence in the second.

Running through this complex tangle of political notives, national security interests and personal ambitions are three basic themes, layered one upon another and in some degree influencing every current estimate of the nation's relationship with the rest of the world at a time of domestic turbulence and uncertainty:

● **Nixon's motives.** Will a president weakened by Watergate and facing a Soviet leadership that senses an historic opportunity for nuclear dominance, yield too much on SALT in order to preserve his popular image as a peacemaker?

Conversely, will Nixon, realizing he must rely on a nucleus of 34 hard-line conservatives to escape conviction in an impeachment trial, revert to his Cold War persona of the 1950s as a man who "stands up to the Russians" and undercut his own detente policies?

● **Soviet motives.** Are the Soviets merely temperizing when they stall on SALT negotiations, or was the apparent bargaining reversal during Kissinger's recent Moscow trip a prelude to a new hard-line push against a weakened U.S. leadership?

Despite Pravda editorials denouncing Nixon's critics, does the Kremlin see the Nixon presidency near an end and are they preparing for President Ford? Will they try to do a deal now to forestall the emergence of Jackson as the Democratic candidate in 1976? Will their encouragement of Kennedy's still undefined presidential ambitions go beyond the current invitation to the reluctant Democratic frontrunner to visit Moscow this month?

● **Kissinger's motives.** Under this heading come the substantive criticisms of administration foreign policy, especially Kissinger's efforts to recast U.S. relations with allies and adversaries alike in terms of achievable national interests rather than ideologies and moralities. The questions here are posed by both Nixon loyalists and Nixon opponents, who alike can be counted on to use the President's difficulties against policies they dislike, aiming at Nixon's weakness when their real target is Kissinger.

One of the most cogent and, in its way, most sympathetic assessments of Nixon's foreign policy motives came recently from an unlikely source: Rep. Les Aspin, a liberal Democrat from Wisconsin whose views on foreign and defense policies are usually tinged with the academic-intellectual liberal orthodoxy Nixonn personally abhors.

ASPIN, URGING on his colleagues a sense-of-congress resolution to keep Nixon away from summitry and out of vital foreign policy negotiations so long as the impeachment issue is unresolved, presented this analysis:

"A FAKE CRISIS is bad enough, but there's some-

thing worse — and that's a real one. What happens during an impeachment trial if we really do have a confrontation with the Soviet Union, and when Mr. Nixon announces it to the nation, everyone thinks he's just playing politics? If this happens, there would clearly be a temptation for the other side to raise the stakes, perhaps even to the point of creating a genuine nuclear showdown."

Paradoxically, one of Nixon's theoretical defenders on this point is Kennedy, who is beginning to assert a more high-profile image on foreign policy questions than he has up to now.

Some political commentators are already suggesting Kennedy is preparing his ground for a concerted challenge to Jackson's presidential hopes as a harbinger of a renewed great-power rivalry with th Russians after Nixon's detente policies collapse with his shattered presidency.

Accordingly, Kennedy in an interview on the eve of his current extended trip to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union brushed aside any suggestion that a well negotiated SALT agreement would suffer from Nixon's own political misfortunes.

It would be a "catastrophic mistake" for Nixon to try to ease the pressure of Watergate by negotiating a "bad treaty" — "it wouldn't pass" when submitted to Senate ratification, Kennedy warned.

But, he added, "there would be overwhelming support for a good treaty," even if impeachment proceedings are well-advanced.

Much harder on Nixon is Sen. James Buckley, the New York conservative who was counted a staunch Nixon loyalist until his unexpected call a month ago for the President to resign before an impeachment proceeding cripples the country.

"I STRONGLY recommend against a presidential visit to Moscow while impeachment proceedings are under way," Buckley said in a formal statement a week ago. Explaining afterward, Buckley stressed that he was passing no judgment on Nixon's possible motivations under the stress of an impeachment proceeding, such as Aspin sought to put forward.

Rather, he was worried about the appearance of a weakened President in head-to-head neogitation with the Soviets, and how this would seem to U.S. allies in Western urope.

Buckley's basic assumption — that the Soviets have decided on a harder line as a result of Nixon's troubles — is widely held among those who hold detente policies suspect, but it is echoed also by those who see in the administration's foreign policies its only claim for distinction.

The recurrent theme here is that if the Soviets are not actually pressing an imagined bargaining advantage against a weakened president, they are at least stalling until the crisis is over.

ACCORDINGLY, that note of caution underscored last week's unusual message of confidency to Kissinger from a bipartisan group of senators — including majority leader Mike Mansfield, minority leader Hugh Scott, Charles McC. Mathias, R-Md., and Walter F. Mondale, D-Minn.

NEW YORK TIMES
13 April 1974

RUSSIANS REPORT IMPEACHMENT BID

Press Mentions Anti-Nixon Moves in Congress for First Time in Months

Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, April 12—The Soviet press, in a new sign of uneasiness over President Nixon's future, reported today for the first time in months on Congressional moves for impeachment.

The mere mention of the issue, which had not been raised explicitly since November, was regarded as an indicator that Moscow was taking the prospects of impeachment much more seriously than before and was concerned about repercussions on Soviet-American relations.

The news appeared as American officials disclosed that the Soviet leadership had privately expressed serious worry in the last few days over the prospects for American trade credits.

Pessimistic on Tariffs

Belatedly recognizing Mr. Nixon's lack of influence with Congress on the trade bill, the Soviet leader, Leonid I. Brezhnev, and other high offiicals were pictured this week as being somewhat reconciled to not receiving reduced tariffs.

But in talks with Secretary of Commerce Frederick B. Dent earlier this week, the Soviet leaders were said to have been disturbed at the prospect that Congress might block further credits from the Export-Import Bank.

In general, influential Soviet circles have lately displayed in one way or another increasing concern over Mr. Nixon's domestic difficulties and their likely impact on Soviet-American relations.

Kissinger Statement Worrisome

Secretary of State Kissinger's statement discounting the likelihood of a major agreement on strategic arms during President Nixon's scheduled June visit is also likely to bother Moscow, which has been taking a more optimistic line.

In a move that suggested that Moscow was more anxious than before to maintain contact with the Democratic opposition, usually well-informed sources said that Senator Edward M. Kennedy would probably be received by Mr. Brezhnev and other high officials here next week.

Nonetheless, some segments of the Soviet press, displaying obvious sympathy for Mr. Nixon, have been quite shrill lately in chiding his domestic critics.

Izvestia, the Government newspaper, reported last Friday that the President had been required to pay $432,787 in back taxes. It charged that the matter was being exploited by politicians and publications hostile to the President, who were conducting campaigns against him.

Impeachment Hearings Noted

Today's report, in the foreign-affairs weekly Novoye Vremya was the first, however, to link "the income-tax scandal" to pressures for impeachment—a topic not dealt with so directly in the Soviet press since November.

Without explaining what impeachment is, the magazine reported that the House Judiciary Committee was expected to start hearings on April 22 or 23 to determine whether sufficient grounds existed for impeachment.

It said that the hearings would last until mid-June, before the scheduled date of Mr. Nixon's visit.

The magazine concluded by quoting Vice President Ford as having said at a press conference that he did not see any constitutional basis for impeachment of Mr. Nixon.

Another foreign-policy weekly charged that the President's domestic critics were trying to cripple his negotiating power with the Soviet Union with the aim of "putting a mine under future Soviet-American negotiations."

The weekly, Za Rubezhom, directed its attack mainly at Representative Les Aspin, a Wisconsin Democrat, for having proposed legislation that would bar Mr. Nixon from reaching agreements that did not automatically require Congressional approval.

NEW YORK TIMES
16 April 1974

Nixon's Difficulties Likened in Moscow To Lincoln Murder

By CHRISTOPHER S. WREN
Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, April 15—A Communist youth newspaper here has drawn what appears to be a veiled parallel between the assassination of Abriham Lincoln and what it described as a press campaign against President Nixon.

Both the 1865 murder of Lincoln and press hostility toward Mr. Nixon were designed to eliminate political opponents from the American scene and thus change the course of history, the newspaper, Komsomolskaya Pravda, seemed to suggest yesterday in commemorating the 109th anniversary of Lincoln's assassination.

Contending that the event was reflected in "current political life in the United States," the organ of the Young Communist League said the assassination represented "almost the first major act of violent interference by reactionaries with the historical course of the American people."

Komsomolskaya Pravda did not mention Mr. Nixon by name. But in several references it implied that his domestic problems were similar to those that had contributed to Mr. Lincoln's death. The most prominent mentioned was hostility of the American press toward President Nixon.

The controlled Soviet press has generally avoided mention of the Watergate affair in deference to Mr. Nixon's Rapport with the Kremlin leadership.

Komsovolskaya Pravda observed that "in the arsenal of reaction, the bullet of the hired or fanatical killer is the extreme but not the only means of eliminating poltical opponents from the scene."

It said that the American press had set the stage for Lincoln's assassination by being "especially zealous" in attacking him.

"Again and again reactionaries have repeated their desperate gamble in the belief that, having eliminated a president (by whatever means) whose policy did not suit them, they would be able to turn back the course of history," Komsovolskaya Pravda said.

It recalled that Lincoln, before he was killed, had tried to improve relations between the United States and Russia.

NEW YORK TIMES
15 April 1974

Cuts That C.I.A. Sought in Book Touch on Official Slips

By ERIC PACE

The C.I.A. tried to censor from a forthcoming book about the agency slips of the tongue by the then Vice President Agnew and the then C.I.A. chief, Richard M. Helms, that seemed to betray ignorance of foreign affairs, a New York publisher has disclosed.

The Central Intelligence Agency demanded last year that 339 passages be cut from the book, "The C.I.A. and the Cult of Intelligence," written by Victor Marchetti, a former C.I.A. employe, and John Marks, a former State Department employe. But a Federal judge has ruled that the publisher, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., can bring it out with only 27 cuts despite the government's contention that publication would injure the national defense.

As disclosed by Knopf, though, some of the other, earlier cuts that were demanded seem merely embarrassing to the agency or to the Administration, such as this description of a Cabinet-level meeting attended by President Nixon:

"Vice President Spiro Agnew gave an impassioned speech on how the South Africans, now that they had recently declared their independence, were not about to be pushed around, and he went on to compare South Africa to the United States in its infant days. Finally, the President leaned over to Agnew and said gently, 'You mean Rhodesia, don't you, Ted?'"

Another deleted passage, which referred to Mr. Helms at a National Security Council meeting in 1969, went as follows:

"His otherwise flawless performance was marred only by his mispronounciation of 'Malagasy' (formerly Madagascar) when referring to the young republic."

The C.I.A.'s blue pencil also affected disclosures in the book that are reported in the current issue of Time magazine; and were characterized as "doubtless authentic" by an intelligence expert in Washington yesterday:

Time says the book recounts in the ninteen-sixties the agency helped the Government of President Fernando Belaunde Terry of Peru to crush a local insurgent movement by building a jungle military installation and recruiting an anti-guerrilla unit.

The book also reports that the agency learned of an airplane-hijacking by Brazilian radicals—but let the hijacking take place so as not to betray its knowledge of Brazilian guerrillas' activities, the magazine says.

Reference to Vietnam Group

The original deletions that were reported by Knopf included a passage that has to do with equipment used by members of an ethnic group in Vietnam, the Nungs, who were hired by the C.I.A. and sent on forays along the Ho Chi Minh trail. The passage says:

"Since most of the Nungs were illiterate and had great difficulty in sending back quick, accurate reports of what they saw, the C.I.A. technicians developed a special kind of radio transmitter for their use.

"Each transmitter had a set of buttons corresponding to pictures of a tank, a truck, an artillery piece or some other military-related object. When the Nung trail-watcher saw a Vietcong convoy, he would push the appropriate button as many times as he counted such objects go by him.

Each push sent a specially coded impulse back to a base camp which could in this way keep a running account of supply movements on the trail. In some instances, the signals would be recorded by observation planes that would relay the information to attack aircraft for immediate bombing raids on the trail."

Several other of the original cuts, as reported by Knopf, involved assertions that the C.I.A. had sent "special operations" personnel to Bolivia "to assist local forces in dealing with the rebel movement." The book also reports that a C.I.A. operative tried in vain to prevent the Bolivian authorities from having Ernesto Che, the rebel leader, executed.

Another of the cuts involved a passage describing agency-organized "guerrilla raids against North Vietnam, with special emphasis on intrusions by sea-borne commando groups"—although that aspect of the agency's operations had been disclosed before.

Also deleted was part of a passage saying the Federal Bureau of Investigation practiced wiretapping against numerous foreign embassies in Washington "in cooperation with the Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company (a Bell subsidiary)."

Commenting on the deletions, a Knopf senior editor, Charles Elliott, said in an interview that some of them had been frivolous, and he observed, "Some things were taken out simply to protect the C.I.A."

Knopf, the co-authors and the Government have all filed notices of appeal since the March ruling that reduced the cuts to 27. The Government, under pressure from opposing lawyers, had previously reduced its original list of 339 passages by half that number—including the ones now disclosed.

The legal status of the remaining deletions is unclear, pending further legal action, and Knopf fears that lack of time will require that these passages be left out of the first edition of the book, which is to come out in June.

TIME
22 APR 1974

ESPIONAGE

Trying to Expose the CIA

The controversy is not a *cause célèbre* of the proportions of the Pentagon papers, but for two years the Central Intelligence Agency has employed its wits, wiles and considerable manpower in an effort to stop publication of large chunks of a book called *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence*. The agency has fought so hard because the book's principal author, Victor Marchetti, 44, was a CIA officer with access to much secret material and a zeal to reveal it. Although its reliability will be questioned, the book is the most detailed exposé of CIA tactics to date and is bound to pose embarrassing questions about the aims and activities of American espionage.

The book is still involved in a legal tangle. The CIA is contending that, as the result of a contract that every CIA employee signs, Marchetti has no right to publish any material that the agency deems classified. Nonetheless the book will be published this June—in a most unusual form. Blank spaces will appear where 168 passages have been deleted at CIA insistence, and the courts have not yet finally resolved whether or not the missing material deserves national-security classification. A larger number of portions initially deleted by the agency and then reluctantly restored by it will be included; they will be printed in boldface type so that a reader can readily identify those tales, statistics and names that the CIA would just as soon not have had made public.

Some of the boldface incidents have appeared in print before or were generally known: the agency's loan of B-26 bombers and CIA pilots for the uprising against Indonesian President Sukarno in the late 1950s, the drifting of balloons laden with propaganda over mainland China during the Cultural Revolution, the training of the Dalai Lama's mountaineer troops when they were driven out of Tibet in 1959 by the Chinese Communists. But often the book adds fresh detail. For example, in one of their periodic raids on their homeland, the hardy Tibetans helped resolve a debate that had been going on in CIA headquarters in Washington: they captured documents showing that Mao Tse-tung's Great Leap Forward had been a flop.

Other episodes in the book are set down for the first time, and some of them will provide fuel for critics of the agency and perhaps trigger unpleasant cables to Henry Kissinger from foreign capitals. A likely instance is the book's recounting of how in the mid-1960s the CIA helped Peru to quash an indigenous guerrilla movement. At the request of the government, headed by Fernando Belaunde Terry, the agency erected a miniature Fort Bragg in the heart of the Peruvian jungle and recruited a crack counterinsurgency team, which made short work of the guerrillas. Another passage reports that in 1969 the agency learned of a scheme by radicals to hijack a Brazilian airliner. The CIA kept the news to itself for fear that it would expose the agency's penetration of Brazilian Guerrilla Leader Carlos Marighella's band and thus jeopardize a plan to capture him. The plane was hijacked on schedule—and Marighella was trapped on schedule.

Secret War. The book reports that contrary to the general impression, the CIA devotes about two-thirds of its annual budget of some $750 million to covert operations and only 10% to intelligence gathering. The $750 million, moreover, is merely part of the money spent on the CIA. The Pentagon contributes hundreds of millions of dollars for technical projects that do not show up in the CIA budget. The Air Force, for example, funds the overhead-reconnaissance program —mostly spy satellites—for the entire U.S. intelligence community. Though the CIA conducted a secret war in Laos for more than a decade, the bulk of the $500 million spent each year was supplied by the Defense Department. Another hidden source of funds is the C[illegible]'s America, Ir

Asia and others—which generate tens of millions of dollars every year by providing charter service for Government agencies.

For anyone not privy to the CIA's files, it is difficult to judge just how accurate the book is. The original manuscript was censored under the guidance of four CIA deputy directors. The CIA refuses to attest to or deny any portion of the book, and the court record is mixed on the point. During the long court battle, one of the deputy directors, William E. Nelson, deposed that he had not deleted any material on grounds of inaccuracy because "untrue [material] per se isn't classified." Yet another deputy director argued the opposite, claiming that false material could be classified and that there were errors in some portions that he censored. Says a high-ranking agency official: "Some of the book is true, some of it is slightly wrong, and a lot of it is totally wrong. Marchetti has strung a few facts together and done a lot of hypothesizing."

The authors, to put it mildly, are not sympathetic to the CIA. Marchetti, who is responsible for most of the book, and Co-Author John Marks, 31, a former Foreign Service officer, believe that the agency should not intervene in other nations' affairs in any circumstances. Pointing out the inefficiency of many CIA missions, the authors would restrict the agency to intelligence gathering and strip it of all its covert operations. That argument is sure to be aired fully once the book is published; for now, the CIA is arguing that the book is dangerous on narrower if no less vital grounds. It fears that the book will expose secret operations and covers, jeopardize if not eliminate relations with foreign secret services, and encourage other disgruntled employees to spill what they know or claim to know about the agency. The conflict is yet another example of the public's "right to know" *v.* the national interest; there is no easy answer.

For most of his 14 years with the CIA, Marchetti was a bright young agent on the way up. After serving with U.S. Army intelligence in West Germany during the early '50s, he returned to Penn State to major in Soviet studies. Because of his background, he was recruited for the CIA. He spent a year in training in covert operations, then became an intelligence analyst, concentrating largely on Soviet military matters. In 1968, he was named executive assistant to the agency's deputy director, Admiral Rufus Taylor. If he seemed to be something of a Boy Scout to his colleagues, it was appropriate that Scouts first caused him to have misgivings about his employment.

Sour Belly. While he was working with community organizations, he recalls, "Eagle Scouts came around with their long hair telling me they were not going to Viet Nam. I had a hard time arguing with them. It seemed to me that the world was changing quite a bit, and neither the CIA nor the Government was changing along with it."

Disillusioned, he quit the CIA in 1969, but stayed quiet. "I didn't feel free to speak at the time," he says. "I was too well trained." Instead, he wrote a veiled exposé, a novel called *The Rope-Dancer*, in which the head of an American intelligence agency turns out to be working for the Russians. The book was not widely noticed, but the agency communicated its displeasure to the author. Undeterred, Marchetti decided in the spring of 1972 to tell all—or almost all. An enterprising literary agent, David Obst, who is also the agent for Watergate reporters Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein (*see* THE PRESS) and Daniel Ellsberg, held an auction for the rights to Marchetti's book. Alfred A. Knopf Inc. was the winner. One of the losers leaked the outline to the CIA, which considered Marchetti to be a turncoat who had developed a "sour belly" over U.S. intervention in Southeast Asia.

A month later, two federal agents, whom Marchetti dubbed Marshal Dillon and Chester, appeared at his door with a temporary restraining order forbidding him to show the manuscript to the publisher until the CIA had examined it. The agency based its position on the contract restricting present or past employees from revealing anything about agency operations without first getting its consent. Marchetti phoned the American Civil Liberties Union, which went to trial on his behalf. It argued that the CIA was exercising prior restraint—preventing publication—and thereby violating the First Amendment. But the U.S. District Court Judge Albert V. Bryan Jr. ruled that the First Amendment did not apply in the case of contractual obligations. Marchetti lost on appeal, and the U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear the case.

Almost ready to abandon his project, Marchetti met John Marks, who was working as an aide to Senator Clifford Case. Together, Marchetti and Marks revised the manuscript, with Marks contributing a section on relations between the press and the CIA. They submitted the manuscript to the agency in August 1973. It was returned with 339 deletions indicated. Some of the excisions were baffling or perhaps simply inexpertly done. Chapter 2, for example, begins with a deleted remark by Henry Kissinger. Yet another passage makes clear that he was discussing a CIA project to prevent the 1970 election of Chilean President Salvador Allende Gossens.

Last October the authors and Knopf joined as co-plaintiffs in a suit against the CIA. They charged that most of the deleted material in the manuscript had never been formally classified and was actually in the public domain. By the time the trial began in February, CIA officials had reinstated the numerous segments that will appear in boldface. But the CIA continued to argue that whatever it said was classified had to be considered classified. Judge Bryan objected; he ruled in favor of restoring most of the remaining cuts of material that had not been properly classified. The CIA is appealing his decision, and so are the authors and Knopf, which anticipates that its legal fees will be between $50,000 and $100,000. In the meantime, the book will be published with 168 deletions, which present something of a structural problem for Knopf Editor Charles Elliott. He is puzzling over how to make a page break where there is a blank space. At one point, a footnote refers to a deleted passage. "We don't know where to put the asterisk," he says.

Quiet Offices. To the degree the book is accurate, it illuminates more than any previous exposé the fundamental dilemma of using covert activity as a tool in foreign policy, of a secret agency operating in an open society. How are the two to be reconciled? If the CIA is to be held accountable, are the present watchdog functions of congressional committees adequate? In a world of ever-shifting political currents that still present threats to American interests, can the nation conduct its foreign policy in a perfectly open manner without resorting to covert operations? Particularly in a dangerous world where other powers employ covert means to achieve their global aims? The book will sharpen that debate. And it is sure to be must reading in some quiet offices all around the world.

WASHINGTON POST
5 April 1974

Judge Stays Ruling on CIA Book

U.S. District Court Judge Albert V. Bryan yesterday granted a stay of his ruling allowing a controversial book about the Central Intelligence Agency to be published.

The stay will give attorneys for the government time to appeal to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Richmond.

The government had challenged the book, asking that hundreds of paragraphs be deleted because they endangered national security. After William Colby, CIA director, testified to that effect, Judge Bryan ordered that the CIA cutbacks should be limited to a handful, and that the book may be published.

The book is by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, former CIA employees. The case is considered a test of how far the government can go in the area of prior restraint on publishing in such cases.

HUMAN EVENTS
6 APR 1974

Media Harms U.S. Security Operations

Rep. John Ashbrook (R.-Ohio), the ranking minority member of the House Committee on Internal Security, has charged that "advocacy journalism" is playing a major role in doing serious injury to America's intelligence gathering and its internal security operations. We are weaker in this field "than ever before in our history," says Ashbrook. "When an American journalist revealed, as did Jack Anderson," said Ashbrook last week, "that the CIA was listening to the telephones in Soviet officials' cars, that operation had to be discontinued. We now have less information about Soviet plans for aggression."


ASHBROOK

U.S. intelligence operations in Europe recently canceled their investigations of Communist subversives working against our military personnel, even though these groups encourage "desertions and attempts to murder officers—fragging." The investigation, said Ashbrook, "was canceled after the cover on the operation was blown by an 'advocacy journalist.'"

Media pressures, argued Ashbrook, have had a baleful influence over our internal security operations as well. "The Subversive Activities Control Board, which had the responsibility of holding hearings on and citing Communist fronts, has been abolished....

> "The Internal Security Division of the Department of Justice has been reduced to a section of the Criminal Division. Police departments throughout the country that have done valuable work in watching the violence-prone radicals have cut back on their operations and in many cases have closed down their intelligence units."

These cutbacks, charged Ashbrook, "have often resulted from journalistic attacks which panicked timid city fathers. Or as in New York, where [Mayor John] Lindsay used it as an excuse for wholesale destruction of valuable files on violent organizations.

"The Army has stopped watching civilians. The Pentagon brass retreated when their surveillance of subversives was attacked by the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, chaired by Sen. Sam Ervin, and the hysterical elements in the press."

Army surveillance, Ashbrook asserted, had proved invaluable in gathering critical facts on subversives and potential rioters and in keeping police and national guard units well informed. But a star witness for the Ervin committee "and a hero to the press was John M. O'Brien, a former military intelligence agent who alleged that the military had engaged in widespread surveillance of innocent civilian activity and had used illegal methods to accomplish this." Yet the first opportunity anyone had to cross-examine O'Brien, said Ashbrook, suggested that he was less than a totally reliable witness.

After he testified for the defense last November in the "Chicago 7" contempt case, Federal Judge Edward T. Gignoux concluded that "Mr. O'Brien's testimony was flatly repudiated in all presently significant aspects.... The Court rejects as utterly incredible the testimony of Mr. O'Brien."

Just how far the military has retreated in the face of media pressure, said Ashbrook, was revealed in November 1971 when Rowland A. Morrow, the director of the Defense Investigation Program Office, testified in executive session before the House Committee on Internal Security. Morrow disclosed that the Department of Defense has destroyed all of its files relating to subversives, even files on those who have been active in subverting the military.

Morrow admitted, said Ashbrook, that we have reached the point where a member of the Armed Forces who leaves a military post to attend a subversive meeting cannot be observed by military intelligence.

"As you know," said Ashbrook, "the Federal Bureau of Investigation has the primary responsibility in the investigation of subversive activities. In the past, this work has been enhanced by the activities of military intelligence, local police departments and congressional committees. Now, even the FBI's responsibility to do this important work is under attack.

"All security conscious people breathed a sigh of relief when William Ruckelshaus was forced out of the Justice Department. On Sept. 13, 1973, during his confirmation hearing to be Deputy Attorney General, Ruckelshaus twice referred to his plan to separate 'the intelligence-gathering from the law enforcement functions of the FBI.' Translated from government gobbledygook into English, this means getting the FBI out of the field of investigating subversion."

But Ashbrook implied that such disastrous schemes are frequently promoted by the media. In the Ohioan's view, then, the media deserves no small share of the blame for the increasing weakness of America's internal security apparatus.

WASHINGTON STAR
15 April 1974

Downey 'Pretty Content'

John T. Downey, who spent 21 years in a Chinese prison camp on espionage charges, says he is "pretty content wit my life now" as a student at Harvard Law School and he plans to become a small town lawyer. Downey, 43, along with Richard Fecteau of Lynn, Mass. was shot down in a plane over China during a spy mission in November 1952. He was released in March 1973 at the request of President Nixon. Downey was

RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.

4435 WISCONSIN AVE. N.W., WASHINGTON, D. C. 20016, 244-3540

PROGRAM Eyewitness News STATION WTOP TV

DATE April 2, 1974 5:30 PM CITY Washington, D.C.

AN INTERVIEW WITH VICTOR MARCHETTI

GORDON PETERSON: A U. S. district court judge has handed the Central Intelligence Agency a setback in its battle to keep the lid not only on its covert activities, but on what its former employees say about the agency. Judge Albert Bryan ruled that the CIA exceeded its authority in ordering many deletions from a book on the CIA by a former CIA intelligence officer, Victor Marchetti, and former State Department intelligence officer, John Marks. In effect, the judge ruled that the CIA cannot declare something classified simply by saying it ought to be classified.

Two years ago, Judge Bryan had ruled that the CIA did have a right to censor Marchetti's manuscript. At that time, it hadn't even been written.

I talked to Marchetti at his suburban Virginia home today.

VICTOR MARCHETTI: The book is both a critique of the CIA and the U. S. intelligence community. But it also points out that the intelligence is a necessary function and that some of the things the agency does are worthwhile and should be continued.

The criticism is that -- focused on what is known as the covert action activities. This is propaganda, paramilitary activities, disinformation, the penetration of various student and cultural groups; the things that are usually described as dirty tricks.

PETERSON: Well, as I recall, the CIA was after you to stop publication of this book even before you had any of it down on paper. Is that right?

MARCHETTI: That's correct. About two years ago when they learned that I was going to write this book, I had first written a novel called "The Rope Dancer," in which I was critical of the agency in a fictional fashion. When I decided to go nonfiction and they found out about it, they immediately took me to court and managed to get a permanent injunction against me, so that as of today, anything I write about the CIA or intelligence, factual, fictional, or otherwise, must first be given to the CIA for censorship.

PETERSON: Is that true even in the light of this most recent court decision?

MARCHETTI: Yes, the injunction has not changed. All that the judge has done -- we won a great victory. But what he has done is he has let the injunction stand while saying that, in this particular instance, the CIA has been unreasonable and arbitrary in its attempt to censor my book. And so he reduced

their request for three hundred -- roughly three hundred and forty deletions down to something like twenty.

PETERSON: What were some of the things they wanted to delete?

MARCHETTI: Well, because we're under -- still under a protective order, I can only generalize about these things. But it's references to the CIA's activities in Chile in the overthrow of the Allende government; references to the CIA's relationships with certain leaders of foreign governments; references to various activities such as propaganda and disinformation, sponsoring books, for example, that are aimed at exposing, say, the KGB, for example, but, in the process of doing that, they're also propagandizing the American public.

And it's a wide variety of matters that they tried to stop. In essence, whenever I would make a general criticism in the book and then try to support it with specific examples from my experience and those of other officers whom I knew, these were the things they tried to take out, the examples.

PETERSON: Under the heading of national security?

MARCHETTI: Under the heading of national security.

PETERSON: I understand that Mr. Colby, the Director of the CIA, is suggesting legislation to tighten up security in government.

MARCHETTI: Yes, he is. He has drafted a bill which the administration, I assume, is going to shortly submit to Congress. There will be, in effect, the same thing as the British National Secrets Act that will give the government carte blanche on maintaining secrecy, particularly with regard to former personnel.

But already the FBI has informed its agents that if they speak out that they will be prosecuted under the Marchetti precedent. So it's getting a little spooky. I mean if they can beat me down and pass this new law, you'll have more secrecy in government than ever before, and that's bad.

PETERSON: Marchetti says he'll continue his fight for release of the book, which is to be published by Alfred A. Knopf under the title, "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence."

GUARDIAN (MANCHESTER)
4 APR 1974

On acccunt

THE GNOMES of Zurich are having a quiet smirk at the knots the United States Government is tying itself in over its dealings with the Swiss banking community. On one hand the FBI is trying to pressure the Swiss to make known to them the identities of American individuals and business concerns who are taking advantage of traditional Swiss secrecy in order to avoid taxes, while on the other hand the CIA is making full use of the Swiss system in order to conceal its activities from other intelligence groups, and other US Government agencies.

But that's not all. The CIA is also dealing in gold on the Zurich market, which is illegal under US law, which reserves this right for the Treasury alone. One Swiss banker has revealed that the CIA uses gold rather than currency to fund its agents in certain parts of the world, and that the CIA buys bullion which it then deposits in Swiss bank accounts for this purpose. Presumably the US Treasury could provide the necessary bullion, but it is thought that the CIA would rather handle its budgetary dealing well away from any possible survey by other sections of the Administration, and continues to guard its privacy and independence jealously.

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PROGRAM All Things Considered... STATION WETA Radio NPR Network

DATE April 1, 1974 5:00 PM CITY Washington, D.C.

AN INTERVIEW WITH JOHN MARKS

MIKE WATERS: For the last two years the CIA has been blocking publication of many sections of a book about intelligence activities. It's co-authored by a former CIA agent and former State Department employee.

On Friday Judge Albert Bryan Jr. ruled that only 15 of the 162 CIA-censored portions of the book should not be published on grounds of national security.

John Marks, one of the co-authors, learned of the court's decision today. Judy Miller interviewed him this afternoon in our studios.

JUDY MILLER: Mr. Marks, the CIA seems to have suffered a major defeat in their efforts to censor Victor Marchetti's and your book on the CIA. What, in effect, has Judge Albert Bryan decided?

JOHN MARKS: Well, we got word today that Judge Bryan has decided that of the 162 items that the CIA demanded be censored from our book, that 147 of them would be returned to us. In other words, the CIA now is only successful in censoring 15 items, not 162. And I can say we're very happy about this decision.

MILLER: What kind of items were censored and what reasons were given for their being censored?

MARKS: Well, the CIA in court didn't give very many reasons at all. They essentially said, "We know what the national security of the United States is and it is up to us to decide what items contravene or hurt the national security, and we say these items are bad and therefore they're bad."

They were things that discussed, for instance, the CIA's role in Chile in 1970, the CIA's black propaganda efforts around the world, the CIA's use of dummy front companies, in other words, companies that are supposedly private, but actually belong to CIA. Things of that sort.

MILLER: And how many items will now remain censored from your book and how will your publishing company handle the deletion of these items?

MARKS: Well, we're not exactly sure on how we're going to handle them because the decision just came through today. We were originally planning to publish a book that had blank spaces spread across its pages. I've just seen the gallye proofs and it's quite impressive. I mean some pages are all white.

But now with this material returned, I think what

we're going to do is put it in, but in bold-face type so the public can see the kind of material that the CIA did not want in the book.

Incidentally, I might add that the government still has the option to appeal this, and considering the unprecedented legal effort that they've gone through in the last two years to block publication of this book, I would be very surprised if they didn't appeal. But we're hopeful that the appelate courts will quickly clear the material because Judge Bryan made a decision and under the terms of the laws and the injunction he was working under and everything of that sort -- that we were working under and that sort -- and I think that it would be unlikely that an appelate court is going to overthrow.

MILLER: What kind of evidence did the CIA present to the court that the information that you wanted to publish was in fact classified?

MARKS: Their main tactic was to bring in front of the court -- and I might add it was a closed courtroom, at the insistence of CIA, but they brought in the four deputy directors of the agency who said, "We are men who are authorized to classify material and we hereby say that this material is classified."

And they didn't submit much evidence beyond that, though they did put various pieces of paper on the record, on the secret record, which supposedly showed why the information -- that the information was in fact classified, but the judge carefully read through that information and he found only in 15 cases did it prove the fact of classification.

MILLER: Is this a total victory for you and Victor Marchetti, or do you feel there's still something that has to be done?

MARKS: Well, in practical terms, it's a very large victory for us, but on First Amendment grounds, we won absolutely nothing.

MILLER: How so?

MARKS: Well, the judge did not address the fact of whether or not the CIA had the right to censor our book. All he addressed was the question of whether they had properly or improperly censored, and he ruled that in the large part they improperly censored it. But we feel that under the First Amendment, that the government has no right to censor our book and that this whole framework of censorship we've been working under is unconstitutional.

You might remember that the reason the government says they have the right to censor is that Marchetti used to work for the CIA and I used to work for the State Department, and when we joined our respective agencies, we called what are called secrecy agreements in which we signed a piece of paper saying we would not reveal any information without the permission of the government. And the government's position all along has been that they are trying to enforce a contract, the contract being that secrecy agreement and it has nothing to do with the First Amendment.

Our position is that you can't sign a piece of paper that signs away your First Amendment rights.

MILLER: So the First Amendment issues in this

are still to be decided.

MARKS: That's right. And we plan to appeal up to the Supreme Court on the First Amendment question. The American Civil Liberties Union has been representing us. And I might say, without the ACLU, we never would have been able to come this far. They've been wonderful. And the ACLU is more interested in the constitutional issue than the technical issue we won on today. But I can say it's very nice to win on some technical issues, too.

MILLER: Thank you very much, Mr. Marks. John Marks, co-author with Victor Marchetti, of "The CIA: the Cult of Intelligence."

OKLAHOMAN, Oklahoma City
24 March 1974

CIA Dossiers on Tourists Revealed

By Jack Taylor

The Central Intelligence Agency apparently keeps dossiers on American tourists, some of whom are asked to act as part-time spies during trips abroad, The Sunday Oklahoman has learned.

There are indications the same files are used for loyalty checks by other government agencies interested in whether a particular individual can be considered a "team player."

Such a scenario was indicated in a newly disclosed Defense Department document and confirmed in an interview with a former CIA officer.

It has been known for some time that CIA agents often interview returning tourists who may have picked up useful information while overseas.

But it has not been generally known that the CIA apparently approaches tourists in advance, suggesting they volunteer for specific missions, generally minor in nature.

And there has never been an indication that the intelligence agency keeps track of who has or has not cooperated, with such lists used for loyalty checks.

A CIA spokesman acknowledged the long-standing practice of interviewing returning tourists, but refused to discuss whether advance contact is made with overseas travelers.

The spokesman did admit such a tactic is probable, but stressed that any such activity on the part of tourists would be strictly voluntary.

One former CIA official told The Oklahoman the agency began the program of contacting tourists in advance of trips abroad in the 1950s.

The agency would ask the tourists to take on specific chores without jeopardizing themselves—tasks such as picking up road maps, taking photographs and so on.

Occasionally, some of those tourists would be arrested and kicked out of the country in which they were traveling, the former agent said.

He said the Soviet Union's accusations of espionage against some participants in the Helsinki Youth Conference in the early 1960s was partially valid because they had undertaken certain CIA-suggested chores.

The former CIA agent said, however, he did not know the agency may be keeping track of such assistance for possible loyalty checks.

He said based on his knowledge of the CIA's operations, the agency probably "wanted to find out if they're a 'team player,' the way they operate. Loyalty is the top order of the day."

The suggestion that the CIA maintains such dossiers is contained in a Defense Department directive governing background investigations of military and civilian personnel assigned to presidential support activities.

The directive had been restricted for official use only, but was released to the public after The Oklahoman appealed under the Freedom of Information Act.

The military document mentions in three specific instances that CIA records should be checked during background investigations of anyone who has traveled abroad or had contact with persons or organizations in communist areas.

When asked about CIA contact with American tourists, Angus McLean Thuermer, assistant to the CIA director, readily acknowledged the well-known 'debriefing' policy, but was less candid on advance contact.

"If there is a chance that a private American citizen traveling abroad has acquired foreign information that can be useful to the American policy-maker, we are certainly going to try to interview him," Thuermer quoted from remarks made by former CIA Director Richard Helms in a 1971 speech to the American Society of Newspaper Editors.

When asked specifically if the CIA contacts tourists in advance and asks them to undertake certain tasks, however minor, Thuermer replied:

"Sometimes I suppose this is done, yes. But it's a volunteer thing and they're not paid for it and they're not — these are not agents."

Asked if such requests have been made of tourists who have been among the increasing number of Americans traveling to mainland China, Thuermer said:

"I don't know any of the specifics or any particular country involved, nor do I think it's probably appropriate to discuss that sort of thing."

The State Department reports that following the 1971 Ping-Pong diplomacy, at least 23 U.S. groups traveled to China through the end of 1973.

One of those was the American Society of Newspaper Editors-sponsored tour in September, 1972.

Robert Fichenberg, executive editor of the Knickerbocker News-Union-Star in Albany, N.Y., who was in the China group, said he is sure no one in the group was asked by the CIA to undertake any chores.

He said during the group's briefing at the U.S. consulate in Hong Kong, however, they were sort of "plaintively asked" if, upon their return, they would report anything of interest.

EDITOR AND PUBLISHER
30 MAR 1974

letters

JOURNALIST 'SPIES'

Your righteously indignant editorial concerning the 40 Central Intelligence Agency persons employed in news media capacities overseas surprised me.

It is a reasonable assumption that there are at least 400 trained intelligence agents employed in news capacities inside the U.S., and the figure may well be closer to 4,000.

It is further reasonable to assume that substantial numbers of these men and women—if not all—are, or have occasionally been employed in intelligence contract work while functioning publicly as reporters, editors and publishers of newspapers or broadcasting stations.

The U.S. government has trained thousands of men and women during and since World War II for clandestine operations in the intelligence branches of the Army, Navy, Air Force and State Department and Department of Defense in addition to the CIA and other intelligence units. Additional thousands have received other kinds of intelligence training, all of it quite rigorous.

These men and women may well resign, retire or be discharged from formal duties, but no one who ever took the oath to serve the country and obey the provisions of the U.S. secrets act, formally known as Title 18, ever really leaves that service in the ultimate sense except by death or imprisonment or incarceration in a mental hospital.

Thus, when some service needs them, they usually respond by serving.

And news people are in an ideal situation to perform useful intelligence and counter-intelligence service.

I think your indignation is misplaced.

It is possible such government service might compromise some noble journalistic ethic, but it seems to me to be unlikely.

And in a free country how else could your government agencies defend you and I against similar incursions by foreign governments, including the USSR and China, who, incidentally, can secure phenomenally valuable intelligence about our military, industrial, economic and social weaknesses and strengths by detailed intelligence analysis of daily newspapers and news broadcasts.

Any intelligent person who thinks about the true meaning of government intelligence values can find a dozen breaches of good judgement on someone's part concerning military secrets and other useful-to-an-enemy information in any daily newspaper of even medium size.

We are grateful for the Constitutional guarantee of a free press in the U.S., and we should be, but that very freedom allows the uncontrolled hazards to our national well being to exist.

No one who loves freedom will suggest the hazard should be eliminated, least of all me.

But let us hear no more prattle about infiltration of news media by U.S. intelligence personnel.

I don't like it either, but I am willing to accept it as a compromise price which must be paid to avoid paying the far more costly price of revoking that constitutional guarantee by imposing censorship.

At that point, neither you nor anyone else could complain about anything at all.

And like it or not, one of the benefits of this legion of "spies" in our midst is the kind of investigative reporting that would be unavailable to the press without the frequently used surreptitious "old boy" network of those very spies.

A close examination of the rosters of network newsmen and newspaper reporters exposing local, state and national political co ruption, crime and scandal will reveal numerous men and women with close access to that "old boy" network.

Close access solely because they are a part of it.

And if an overtrained machine sometimes produces excesses, like Liddy, Hunt and Co., perhaps it is unfortunate, but I think the record will show most such excesses get stopped, many before they become a hazard.

EARL BRADSHAW
(Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.)

Jack Anderson

WASHINGTON POST
24 MAR 1974

Secret Agent Diplomacy

The world of diplomacy like the moon has its hidden side where intelligence operatives and agents provacateur cavort in the half light.

We have had access to the latest secret intelligence reports which provide fleeting glimpses into this shadowy, subterranean world.

Behind the cordial handshakes and cocktail parties of detente, the reports reveal, the power struggle rages on. In Africa, for instance, the Chinese are conducting guerrilla schools, the Russians are training and equipping troops, the Arabs are supplying arms and the Americans are wheeling and dealing.

American Ambassador Robert Yost reports from Burundi that President Micombero "suspects the Chinese and has great dislike for the Russians." Nevertheless, Yost says, Burundi has "moved closer to the Arabs and Chinese and, to a much lesser extent, the Soviets . . .

"A substantial number of Burundi military officers are now being trained" in Communist and Arab countries, he asserts. These include "30 in the Soviet Union, 60 in Algeria, 10 in Egypt, that we are aware of."

Yost reports "regular shipments of arms and ammunition have been coming . . . from Algeria on Algerian planes. One shipment of arms and ammunition from Libya was received."

In another confidential dispatch from Burundi, he urges strengthening the U.S. embassy "to monitor PRC (People's Republic of China), North Korean, Arab and Soviet activities in Central Africa." A confidential State Department memo to the White House urges improving "access to Burundi leaders who might be influenced to support the U.S. on international issues."

Throughout Africa, the scenario is the same: the Chinese, Russians and Arabs train and equip friendly troops or insurgents while the U.S. maneuvers desperately to stay in the ballgame.

In Guinea and Tanzania, for example, the Chinese are conducting guerrilla schools. The graduates are supplied with arms and ammunition to stir up revolution in such countries as South Africa, Mozambique and Angola. State Department documents reveal that Rhodesia, in particular, has Chinese and Russian trained guerrillas operating from bases in Zambia and Mozambique.

Surprisingly, tiny North Korea is active in terrorist movements around the world. Both Communist China and North Korea have provided revolutionary groups with guerrilla instructors. They have written guerrilla manuals which encourage, among other things, political kidnapings.

These manuals have now reached the United States where extracts have been printed in underground newspapers.

The kidnaping of Patricia Hearst by the Symbionese Liberation Army, for example, appears to have been taken right out of a Chinese text. The manual even suggests that the kidnap victim should be ransomed for food to feed the poor.

In the Mideast, Soviet and American diplomats ostensibly are cooperating to bring peace. But the detente apparently doesn't extend to the subterranean level. Intelligence reports warn that the Soviets believe Secretary of State Henry Kissinger is trying to diminish their influence in the Arab World. They reportedly are working behind his back, therefore, to belittle his efforts.

The U.S. and Russia also support opposite sides in the unpublicized struggle over Oman, which controls the entrance to the strategic Persian Gulf. Most of the Mideast oil, the economic lifeblood of the West, must flow past Oman. The U.S. is working behind the scenes to bolster the reigning sheikhdom; the Soviets would like to establish a Kremlin-controlled government in Oman.

In Iraq, the tables are turned. The Soviets support government troops in their campaign to quell the fierce Kurdish tribesmen in their rugged mountains. The U.S. has used its Mideastern ally, Iran, as a front to supply military aid to both the Sheik of Oman and the Kurdish rebels.

Our intelligence report from Iraq warns ominously that the Iraqi troops are now getting chemical warfare training from the Soviets and may use Soviet-supplied gas to route the Kurds from their mountain hideouts.

In Southeast Asia, Burma has become the latest theater of two-faced diplomacy. China and Burma resumed diplomatic ties just three years ago. Yet Chinese troops have been filtering across the border into the misty mountains and deep gorges of northern

Burma.

They have joined forces with insurgents, known as "white flag" Communists, in attacking settlements in the remote highlands. One intelligence report estimates that 10,000 Chinese troops, led by Peking-trained guerrilla officers, are now operating inside Burma.

But in Rangoon and Peking, the Burmese and Chinese leaders still clink their cocktail glasses and engage in cordial chitchat.

Throughout the netherworld, meanwhile, secret agents specialize in torrid boudoir romance, violent death on fog-sheathed waterfronts, low treachery and high courage.

WASHINGTON POST
5 April 1974

V. A. Jovick, Retired Agent With CIA

Vance A. Jovick, 69, a retired Central Intelligence Agency agent, died Tuesday at his home, 1600 S. Eads St., Arlington, after a long illness.

He had retired from the CIA in 1959 because of ill health. He had been with the agency since 1946.

Born in Butte, Mont., Mr. Jovick attended Carroll College in Helena and came to Washington in 1930, where he attended George Washington University and received bachelor and master's degrees in law from Columbus Law School.

He had worked for a number of federal government agencies, including the Agriculture Department, before joining CIA.

Mr. Jovick was active for many years in the Montana State Society here, serving at one time as its president.

He is survived by his wife, Virginia M., of the home, and four brothers, Thomas A., Edward J. and Frank, of San Francisco, and William J., of Riverside, Calif.

WASHINGTON POST
7 April 1974

Kissinger Races Clock in Quest for Lasting Impact

"Anyone wishing to affect events must be [an] opportunist to some extent. The real distinction is between those who adapt their purposes to reality and those who seek to mold reality in the light of their purposes . . . pure opportunism tends to be sterile . . ."

—Prof. Henry A. Kissinger, on the strategy of Otto von Bismarck, Germany's "Iron Chancellor."

By Murrey Marder
Washington Post Staff Writer

In six months as Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger has been running a frenetic race against a domestic clock that can strike at the power, and indeed the life, of the Nixon administration.

No man below the rank of President ever held so much influence over American global power as Kissinger now possesses. The Haldemans and the Ehrlichmans are gone; Treasury Secretary George P. Shultz is departing, Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger, although an intellectual challenger in his own right, is usually more of an associate of Kissinger than an adversary, and Schlesinger's international scope is admittedly smaller.

As the world sees him Kissinger is virtually acting president for international affairs. This is an exaggerated perception. But in terms of the power he commands, there is more truth than falsehood in the characterization.

Unbelievable as it may seem to Kissinger's critics, the man who jocularly concedes his own "megalomania" privately says he is troubled now by the magnitude of his image, for it really represents presidential weakness. As much as he relishes adulation, what preoccupies Kissinger is usable, not illusory, power, and the only tangible power he commands flows from the President.

There have been very powerful secretaries of state before him; Dean Acheson for Truman, John Foster Dulles for Eisenhower. Sometimes they too eclipsed their masters, but none served a President simultaneously crippled by a crumbling domestic base and a threat of impeachment.

Exceptional authority has piled up in Kissinger's hands through a series of extraordinary coincidences. Kissinger moved to State replacing William P. Rogers, leaving no foreign policy rival at the White House; Kissinger's hat remained there, too. Watergate removed almost all the Kissinger second-guessers and outright antagonists from the President's inner circle, where they had warily guarded presidential power and prerogatives. Other power centers were vacated; less-dominant personalities moved in.

And, while Kissinger is not a free agent in the literal sense, his clout in the bureaucracy is massive.

It is an illusion that President Nixon ever did grapple with the details of most foreign-policy issues, many sources report. "Perhaps the whole secret of Kissinger's success with the President," said one associate, is his ability to anticipate "where the President will come down on an issue." The President, it is said, will frequently tell Kissinger, "We have to get this done; work it out, you have my support."

"On a lot of things," one source said, "he [now] can make a decision without going to the President. For remember, this is the second term of an administration, and the basic policy is set."

"This has been invaluable in working with the Russians," said another associate. "Henry is able to report to the President without constantly seeking instructions and holding meetings." When Kissinger goes to the President, said another source, "he goes with confidence that he will be supported, and he is."

But not always. Sometimes even Kissinger loses, or is obliged to give way to a combination of forces. The most potent combination is the Joint Chiefs of Staff, joined by the Secretary of Defense, if they can more strongly appeal to a presidential inclination.

Within two weeks of the day Kissinger was sworn in as Secretary of State, the Arab-Israeli October war crashed over the American-Soviet detente policy that he had done so much to create, over his ambition to "institutionalize" the concept and style of foreign policy identified with him, and over the entire pace of activity he envisioned in his two-hat role as both Secretary of State and presidential national security adviser.

Six months later, with more than 120,000 intervening miles of air travel, and hectic visits to 25 countries—sometimes three or four of them in a single day—Kissinger is still picking up the pieces and the thread of his original objectives.

In between, the shadow of Watergate and the threat of impeachment has expanded from a possible hazard for the conduct of American foreign policy to an engulfing challenge without precedent in the nation's life. Officially, all goes on as before; in reality, almost nothing is the same.

Now the course of East-West detente, the search for peace and stability in the Middle East and other objectives of U.S. policy have personal, as well as national, significance for a President under siege.

The Nixon administration's foreign-policy record is itself the ultimate fallback defense for the survival of President Nixon. And that too has now become a domestic political issue, as evidenced by the eruption in Congress last week of extraordinary demands to put tight strings on the President's negotiating power during the impeachment-consideration process, to prevent him from succumbing to any Soviet strong-arm negotiating demands.

This pattern inevitably intensifies the pressure on Kissinger.

"It's going to be a bitch of a time" operating through the impeachment sequence in Congress, said one high-ranking foreign policy strategist. "It is going to be damn tough to have a foreign policy if it comes to an indictment"—an impeachment vote by the House of Representatives.

There is a widespread impression in official Washington that if President Nixon should resign or be impeached, Vice President Gerald R. Ford, who succeeds him, would be certain to keep Kissinger as his foreign-policy architect, and therefore there would be no particulr obstacle about maintaining the continuity of American foreign policy.

But many experts (possibly including Kissinger himself) see this as too simplistic an assumption. A change of

Presidents is a fundamental shift, altering internal relationships in the federal power structure and almost invariably producing at least an interlude of reconsideration in the policy process, as well as a recalculation by foreign governments.

There is no immutable plan that projects U.S. policy on the most complex subjects, which are highly susceptible to interaction among nations.

For all its international accomplishments, the Nixon administration so far has penetrated only the outer layers of many of the toughest international problems.

Only the easiest stages of American-Soviet nuclear strategic arms limitation (SALT I) have been accomplished; ahead is the problem of SALT II, achieving permanent control on the use of offensive nuclear weapons.

With all of Kissinger's furiously paced shuttle diplomacy in the Middle East, only a start has been made on Arab-Israeli military disengagement as a prelude to enormously complex peace negotiations. "Each success," Kissinger has said, "only buys an admission ticket to a more difficult problem."

The recent open clash between the United States and its European allies over allied consultation exposed the depth of the breach to be repaired in Western policy coordination. The oil crisis revealed, monumental dangers for international stability in an uncontrolled scramble for energy, and the profound economic consequences of tripled or quadrupled oil prices even if there is international cooperation.

There is no built-in uniformity of position even in the present administration on the most critical world issues.

For example, inside the administration there was not universal dismay that the Kissinger mission to Moscow last month failed to achieve the desired "conceptual breakthrough" for limiting multiple nuclear warheads for SALT II.

As one authoritative source at the Pentagon put it, there was even "a little mood of relief" at top levels of the Defense Department, especially among the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Before Kissinger left for Moscow, these sources said, Pentagon strategists were determined that the United States should take and hold a "tough enough" position to assure a decidedly more favorable outcome for the United States in SALT II than the SALT I results in 1972, which made the Joint Chiefs uneasy.

According to these sources, President Nixon favored the more demanding Pentagon position over the State Department's preferences, and this was the approach that Kissinger carried to Moscow. He encountered an equally firm Soviet counter-proposal on the method of controlling mutliple nuclear warheads.

"You could be sorry, of course, that the Russians were so obstinate," said one Pentagon source, "but it won't be disastrous for us if we have to wait another year" for an initial SALT II accord.

With the impeachment threat hanging over President Nixon, one Pentagon source said, "all of the (official Washington) pressures, it seems to me, are going to be, 'Don't be pushed into anything, be prudent, be cautious.' That seems to be the same mood on the Hill too."

For Kissinger this presents a multiple dilemma. He already faces, in Congress, powerful demands to extract a freer emigration policy from the Soviet Union as the price of tariff and trade benefits for promised expansion of U.S.-Soviet trade. With all his enhanced authority, he is obliged to bargain, simultaneously, with the Soviet Union, with the Arab-Israeli complex, with European and other allies, with the Congress, and with the federal bureaucracy.

"No man, not even Henry Kissinger, can sustain this pace for three more years," a core member of the Kissinger apparatus said, troubled, last week.

Kissinger's specialty and reputation in world affairs is as a "great conceptualizer" of balance of power diplomacy. This tends to create the impression, as some diplomats put it, "that Henry can walk on water."

The reputation of diplomatic genius is an invaluable asset for him; but it also has its great drawbacks when he missteps, or fails. With the world spotlight on Kissinger, one aide said ruefully, "If he belches, it becomes an international incident."

Kissinger has achieved a remarkable honeymoon relationship with the Congress, with the expenditure of great time, effort and blandishments. Even so, he has not taken into camp and bent to his will such a prime challenger on SALT and Soviet trade-emigration terms as Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.).

The "co-opting of Congress" by Kissinger is described in this manner by one insider: "In many ways, this is the same phenomenon Henry accomplished with the press. He is highly articulate, he conveys a sense of intimacy—and he gets them to do so much listening that they have very little time for questions."

Kissinger has overwhelmed the Congress, individually and in groups, with private breakfasts, leadership breakfasts, lunches, invitations to accompany him on trips, appearances in closed hearings—but notably, he has had only one public hearing in the entire six months.

Significantly, he has not been pressed for public testimony and tough public questioning. Most congressmen exult, instead, over their "inside" off-the-record access, while Kissinger employs press conferences, airborne background talks with newsmen, plus private individual meetings with columnists and editors, for his unprecedentedly extensive public-relations operations. This mix gives Kissinger enormous influence over what is reported or broadcast about him.

He has a major advantage over his immediate predecessors, Dean Rusk and William P. Rogers. Rusk had fundamental differences with Congress over Vietnam policy; he was caught in an almost constant adversary relationship. Rogers' appearances before Congress were much easier; but Rogers could never convince Congress that he, not Kissinger, was in charge of foreign policy.

Kissinger has no such problem. And yet, he has fallen considerably short of his pledge to initiate, with his secretaryship, "an open articulation of our philosophy, our purposes and our actions" in order to restore the American consensus on foreign policy shattered by the Indochina war.

Some of his associates readily acknowledge that there also [illegible] knowledge that the Kissinger pledge "to infuse the Department of State with a sense of participation, intellectual excitement and mission" remains largely illusory.

The abnormal demands on his time and energy imposed by the unexpected blow of the Middle East war, with its diplomatic requirements for secrecy, have largely thwarted these public and institutional objectives, many Kissinger subordinates maintain.

Other Kissinger associates agree—but only up to a limited point. The natural, not the aberrational, style of Kissinger, they concede, more candidly, is essentially secretive: working in small, intimate groups of tested, self-effacing loyalists, with the publicly visible results of the output carefully orchestrated only by Kissinger himself.

As the revelations lumped under the term Watergate show, there was virtually a conspiratorial attitude inside the Nixon administration from the outset, with the President and his original inner group looking on much of the outside world as enemies—including the federal bureaucracy, inherited from Democratic administrations.

Kissinger arrived at the White House with his own long-standing antipathy toward bureaucracies, but for different reasons. Bureaucracies, to him, were grossly overstaffed, slow-witted, initiative-stifling, press-leaking, foot-dragging, responsibility-shirking institutions. They needed to be circumvented until they could be slashed to the bone, drastically reoriented and made responsive to the will of the White House.

"The only way secrecy can be kept," Kissinger wrote in 1968, "is to exclude from the making of the decision all those who are theoretically charged with carrying it out."

To the brittle, suspicious "Berlin Wall" types around the President, however, Kissinger, the German-Jewish professor from Harvard, was himself an intruder, and a subject of distrust.

The full story of the rivalry between the Kissinger apparat at the White House and the Haldeman-Ehrlichman apparat has yet to be revealed. The impending Watergate trials, and a lawsuit filed by a former Kissinger aide, Morton Halperin, over the wiretapping of Halperin's telephone during and after the time he worked on the National Security Council staff, raise some hazards for Kissinger's determined attempt to disassociate himself completely from the Watergate scandals.

"I'm told that he [Kissinger] is clean—that they can't lay a glove on him," a Kissinger insider hopefully said last week. The ousted presidential advisers however, are at least likely to try to put the onus on Kissinger for stimulating much of the near-paranoid obsession with secrecy at the White House, on grounds that he demanded it to cover his secret negotiations with China, the Soviet Union and North Vietnam.

There is no shortage of former Kissinger subordinates with caustic memories of operating under the whiplash of his work habits and massive ego. The most bitter of them describe Kissinger as an arch-manipulator of people, a dissembler, a liar on petty issues, a tyrant who succumbs to petulance, bitter scorn, shouting outbursts.

"No question about it," says a hide-hardened loyalist who survived; "he is an extremely difficult man to work for. He demands excellence. But this is

where the action is."

The action is now divided into two centers; the State Department and the White House. Kissinger spends mornings at the White House with his National Security Council hat, then leaves his deputy for the NSC staff, Brig. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, physically in command. Kissinger goes to State to put on his secretary hat.

This does not mean that Kissinger surrenders control of anything. At State, either he or his extremely able chief executive assistant, Lawrence S. Eagleburger, are in continual communication with the NSC operation.

With his NSC hat, Kissinger retains interdepartmental coordinating authority across the web of committees he created, with President Nixon's full blessing. Kissinger, of course, chairs, almost all the committees.

He brought his key NSC aides to State with him, including Eagleburger; Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Kissinger's alter ego; William G. Hyland, Winston Lord, and other top aides, and the action center has shifted to State, but the NSC has not withered on the vine.

One NSC official has a special function; young Peter W. Rodman, a Kissinger favorite, is keeper of the secretive record on all major Kissinger trips abroad.

On Aug. 1, 1973, there were 140 people on the NSC staff, 52 of them classed as substantive officials. On April 1, 1974, there were still 114 NSC employees, 41 counted as officials, with three more about to be added to fill vacancies.

Insiders are extremely wary about discussing how much time Kissinger spends with the Watergate-impeachment harassed President these days. After long hesitation, one authoritative source guardedly said, "Maybe somewhat less time face-to-face, but much more on the phone—so it probably works out to about the same." Others doubt that.

Inevitably, there has been "some resentment" inside the bureaucracy over Kissinger's doubled "two-hat" power, a senior aide concedes. But "it is smoother now," he insists, since Kissinger sorted out the roles more. At least one high Defense Department official agrees, perhaps in part because, as one State source added, "I think he [Kissinger] just has been too strong [for any one else] to do anything about" in any event.

Now that Kissinger is operating as the institutional head of the State Department, at least his selected top officials share in some of the secrets. The "old insiders" are amazed that the secretive Kissinger has widened his privileged circle as much as he has at State; the outsiders take just the opposite view.

"You are rid of that crazy business," said one knowledgeable insider, "where Rogers didn't know, Laird (former Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird) didn't know" what Kissinger was doing; "it was a crazy scheme." Now, he said, the system is "much better, and stronger."

This in no way means that Kissinger is now "Mr. Open." On the contrary, the essence of his operating style is basically unchanged: tightly knit groups of loyalists, sometimes deliberately put in competition with each other in rivalry for the boss's approval, as he sweats them through redrafting, rewriting to produce, in the magical Kissinger term, the proper "conceptual approach" to a problem.

"His managerial imagination does not run below the assistant secretary level," said one experienced "country director" official at State. But this is the way Kissinger wants it, with the assistant secretaries holding responsibility for running their regional bureaus while the peripatetic Kissinger jokes, "Someday, I will visit the State Department."

Some of his loyalists maintain that the existing pattern is aberrational, because of the preoccupying demands of the Middle East crisis; others contend the pattern is immutable Kissinger style. They worry that Kissinger has entrapped himself in endless, over-personalized diplomacy, a "Flying Dutchman," in effect.

Kissinger, by contrast, claims frustration with the "mediocrity" and lack of creativity he found at State.

One middle-level State official protests:

"The secretary keeps complaining about the lack of creativity . . . You can do all the shaking up in the world, but unless the man tells you what the architecture is, nobody can see the plans. You can tell it's a cathedral and not a beach house, but you have to know how it translates into flying buttresses and crypts. You can't be of use to him unless he tells you what the situation is."

Kissinger, writing in 1968 about the 19th Century German chancellor, Bismarck, said, "The impact of genius on institutions is bound to be unsettling, of course. The bureaucrat will consider originality as unsafe, and genius will resent the constrictions." However, Kissinger added, "Statesmen who build lastingly transform the personal act of creation into institutions that can be maintained by an average standard of performance. This, Bismarck proved incapable of doing."

Kissinger is not the unquestioning idolator of Bismarck or Metternich or Castlereagh many who have skimmed through the Kissinger writings tend to assume. He was intrigued by their diplomatic prowess, but also by their faults and miscalculations. His own total immodesty tempts him to try to surpass their accomplishments. But in his perception, the damnable threat of impeachment can confound his loftiest aspirations.

Washington Post staff writers Marilyn Berger and Dan Morgan both contributed to the assessment of Kissinger's first six months in office.

Washington Star-News
Friday, April 12, 1974

John S. Earman Jr., Aide To 3 Directors of CIA

John S. Earman Jr., 60, an aide to three directors of the Central Intelligence Agency, died Wednesday in Richmond following a massive coronary.

Mr. Earman joined a CIA predecessor, the Central Intelligence Group, in 1947. He then moved to the CIA and from 1950 to 1962 was special assistant to CIA Directors Walter Bedell Smith, Allen W. Dulles and John McCone.

From 1962 until he retired in 1969 he served as inspector general of the agency.

The Covington, Va., native attended Greenbrier Military Academy and the Hampton-Sydney College. He joined the Army in 1942 and after the war was president of Commonwealth Oil Co. of Virginia.

Mr. Earman leaves his wife, Olivia Harvey Earman of Irvington, Va.; a son, John S. III, of Minneapolis, and a daughter, Mrs. Bruce Earman Viles of Concord, N.H.

Graveside services will be at 2 p.m. tomorrow in Covington.

WASHINGTON STAR
4 APR 1974

British Ask CIA To Help Restrict Arms to Ulster

BELFAST, Northern Ireland (UPI) — Police said today they have asked the American Central Intelligence Agency and Interpol to help track down the supply routes for new, illegal automatic weapons reaching Northern Ireland.

Searches this week uncovered American, West German and Russian rifles which police said they believe are part of a large consignment of weapons entering the British province.

The weapons found are the American AR15, a sports version of the military M16, the German Landmann 22, which police said was recently outlawed in West Germany, and Russian World War II model guns. Police said dossiers were supplied to Interpol, which is checking possible links with arms dealers in Belgium.

GENERAL

WASHINGTON STAR
15 April 1974

FOOD CRISIS

U.S. Holds Cards

By Judith Randal
Star-News Staff Writer

The Nixon administration has been careful never to mention the words "energy crisis" and "food crisis" in the same breath. Yet the signs are unmistakable that one is taking shape from the other and, whereas the Arabs have been the villains in the first round of the scarcity saga, the United States very likely is going to be next.

Indeed, it has been predicted that unless the United States acknowledges what already is happening and begins to exert some leadership, people dying of hunger in droves in the underdeveloped countries will be featured on nightly television news within as little as a year.

Consider for example, the plight of such places as Bangladesh, Nepal, India and Pakistan. For years, these countries have depended on Japan to supply them with fertilizer. But now that Japan — which, of course, has no oil of its own — is having to pay more to import it, it has stopped making this energy-intensive product for export and so has none to sell. In addition, fuel for running irrigation pumps is perilously scarce. The result is that India alone may be short 10 million pounds of food this year, even if the weather holds up.

IN A paperback entitled "Agenda for Action: 1974," the Overseas Development Council points out that almost a billion people — a quarter of all those on the globe — live in the "fourth world" countries which, like India, are the poorest of the poor. It would be bad enough if fuel and fertilizer were their only agricultural problems. But, as the ODC report makes clear, the land in many of these nations has been so ravaged by growing numbers of people and livestock that it has become progressively more unsuitable for growing food.

Until World War II, most nations were food exporters and so were in a position to pitch in. But now only Australia, Canada and the United States have crop surpluses, and the margins are perilously slim — the more so because little or no idle agricultural acreage remains.

According to calculations based on government figures, the world grain reserve is down to the point where it could vanish in a mere 27 days. And if Canada and the United States, which share the same climate, were to have a season of bad weather, even this cushion would disappear.

ALL THIS would make it sound as if a scenario of mass starvation were inevitable. However, the United States is the major power least harmed by the energy crisis, and in the long run stands to benefit in trading relations with the newly wealthy Arabs because of the rebounding strength of the dollar.

Food — particularly protein — has, like energy, become the object of a seller's market and the United States holds all the cards. Clearly, we can, if we have the will, do something about making it more available to all. Among the options:

● **Diet** — The average per capita grain consumption in the United States and Canada is nearly a ton a year, most of which is consumed indirectly as meat, milk and eggs. The result is that it takes almost five times as much land, water and fertilizer to feed an average North American as it does an average Colombian, Nigerian or Indian.

Although many of the industrialized nations are creeping up on us as their mounting affluence increases the demand for meat, they still lag far behind. Millions of tons of grain could therefore be diverted to the hungry if North Americans made a commitment to curb their appetites for animal protein, particularly beef. Such a commitment, moreover, could pay dividends in public health. Evidence increasingly points to excessive intake of animal products as a major risk factor in heart disease and some of the more common forms of cancer as well.

● **Research** — The fourth world must become more nearly self-sufficient with regard to food. But if this is to come about, more must be learned about how to increase the productivity of soybeans and other vital plant crops when adverse factors such as aridity are taken into account. Scientists at the Department of Agriculture could provide the leadership. But under the stewardship of the Nixon administration, such expenditures have dropped.

International political cooperation — Except for the military variety, foreign aid has never been popular with Americans, many of whom regare it as a giveaway. However, people might feel differently if they realized that we spend less than 3 tenths of 1 percent of our gross national product on overseas aid — less by far than we spend on alcohol and tobacco, and less proportionately than all but two of the other 15 nations which extend a helping hand to the under-developed world.

The Food for Peace program has been cut, and in recent months the Nixon administration — fearing the political repercussions of a price rise for bread here at home — has stopped making wheat available to voluntary groups such as World Church Service. Nor has Congress behaved well. In January, for instance, the House voted down support for a vital aspect of the World Bank.

What it all means is that the peace the President is so proud of having achieved is threatened by our selfishness, whether intentional or not. If in a few years the world is again at war because so many have unjustly gone hungry, who will be to blame but ourselves?

Point of View

NEW YORK TIMES
10 April 1974

The Watergate Summit

Watergate, after a considerable lag, now has begun to impinge increasingly on President Nixon's ability to conduct the nation's foreign policy.

The White House chief of staff, Alexander Haig, drew a contrary conclusion from the President's Paris visit last weekend. "A viable Presidency is a cornerstone of world security," Mr. Haig said, drawing the questionable conclusion that the [illegible] was demonstrated by Mr. Nixon's reception in Paris. But Mr. Haig's judgment was premature. Mr. Nixon's diplomatic conferences and street appearances have come under bitter criticism in France as unseemly at a time of memorial services for the late President Pompidou. The charge is made that this activity was designed to counter Watergate by providing evidence of the President's continued influence abroad.

Even more important is the acknowledgement by Secretary of State Kissinger, the strong adviser that

Watergate played a negative role during Mr. Kissinger's recent talks — and many diplomatic disappointments— in Moscow. State Department Counselor Helmut Sonnenfeldt indicated that Soviet leaders, as a result of Watergate, hesitate to enter into new agreements with the Nixon Administration. They "are biding their time and checking their bidding a bit," he said, concerned whether the President can carry out agreements that require Congressional approval.

Congressional resistance on trade agreements made by Mr. Nixon two years ago was mentioned by Mr. Sonnenfeldt as a specific example. But a second strategic arms limitation treaty (SALT II) would also require Congressional approval. Mr. Kissinger's biggest disappointment was his inability to make an agreed "conceptual breakthrough" with the Russians on SALT II.

Soviet Communist party Secretary Brezhnev and Mr. Nixon both seem determined to maintain the détente atmosphere and to proceed with Mr. Nixon's Moscow visit this summer. But that does not assure the conclusion of important agreements.

The danger in regard to SALT is not, as some suppose, that a weakened Nixon will sacrifice American interests to obtain a Moscow agreement as a counter to Watergate. The real danger is that a reasonable SALT II agreement will be attacked even more violently than the reasonable SALT I agreement. Mr. Brezhnev or Mr. Nixon, or both, might prefer to delay a SALT II agreement rather than have it repudiated by the United States Senate.

The American national interest, however, lies in achieving a SALT II agreement this year. Otherwise, the approaching Soviet deployment of newly-developed MIRV multiple warhead missiles could take the arms race past another critical point of no return. If that deployment pattern is not limited in advance by mutual agreement, a further American buildup and a new spiral in the arms race will be hard to avoid.

All this points to a need for the Congress to proceed with all deliberate speed in resolving the Watergate debate. That would be so even if Mr. Nixon were not planning a Moscow trip this summer. But the prospect of that voyage and the need for a new SALT pact make it more desirable than ever that the national political crisis be resolved before many more months have gone by.

WASHINGTON POST
8 April 1974

Labor's Ties Abroad Wearing Thin

By Selig S. Harrison
Washington Post Staff Writer

American ties with Western Europe and Canada, already frayed in the diplomatic and economic arenas, are rapidly wearing thin in the labor field after three decades of postwar cooperation.

East-West detente has spurred the formation of a new European Trade Union Confederation stressing the common bonds of all European unions rather than the ideological struggle between Communist and non-Communist labor groups. The European group is on the verge of admitting the Communist-dominated Italian CGIL labor federation later this month despite the bitter protests of AFL-CIO leaders.

In Canada, rising nationalism has provoked mounting demands for the secession of the Canadian affiliates of American-based unions. Canadian local union presidents of the International Paperworkers have just voted to set up a separate Canadian group, and a referendum of the 52,000 Canadian members of the Paperworkers now under way is expected to give formal approval for the break by April 30.

By far the greatest concern of the AFL-CIO is focused on Western Europe, where American labor has channeled millions of dollars since World War II to build up anti-Communists labor forces, especially in France and Italy.

AFL-CIO leaders have lobbied intensely and unsuccessfully to block the soft-line trend reflected in the formation of the European Trade Union Confederation as an alternative to the moribund anti-Communist International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.

At its inception, the ETUC voted to omit the word "free" from its name, a decision acidly dismissed by AFL-CIO President George Meany, who observed that "they took the word 'free' out on the argument that putting it in there would in some way interfere with what they call 'detente.'"

In January, leaders of ETUC member unions joined in a Geneva meeting with Soviet labor chief Alexander Shelepin and representatives of the Communist bloc's WFTU. Early last month, the ETUC executive committee on April 10 looking to the admission authorized a key round of negotiations of the Italian CGIL at the May Copenhagen convention of the European federation.

"The Geneva meeting and the ETUC decision represent a complete reversal of the anti-Communist policy pursued by the European free labor movement during the last quarter of a century," declared the AFL-CIO Free Trade Union News in its current special issue, "European Labor in Crisis."

"There is no hiding the ugly truth that a major and crucial change has occurred on the European labor scene, a change benefiting Communism."

In AFL-CIO eyes, free unions and Communist unions have nothing in common, and contacts between them only give Communist forces an aura of respectability that could smooth their ultimate rise to power.

If the Communist-dominated CGIL in Italy is admitted to the ETUC, AFL-CIO leaders argue, the powerful CGT labor federation in France will soon have to be admitted. This, in turn, is expected to undermine the position of anti-Communist labor groups in France such as the American-backed Force Ouvriere—strengthening the bargaining power of the French Communists in their alliance with Socialist leader Francois Mitterand.

The AFL-CIO view is that the soft line of the ETUC serves Moscow's long-term strategy in Western Europe and basically reflects a dangerous ideological erosion of detente.

European diplomatic and labor sources believe this greatly oversimplifies the ETUC approach. These sources stress the growing resulting from the climate European desire to assert an identity separate from both the United States and the Soviet Union.

By bringing Communist unions into a European labor framework free of ideological barriers, these sources say, many ETUC leaders hope to advance the overall cause of European integration and to strengthen existing trends pushing the CGIL and CGT toward moderate, "national Communist" policies dictated by domestic political factors in their home countries.

In this view, the impending merger of the Italian CGIL and two rival labor federations, the Christian Democratic CSIL and the smaller UIL, reflects growing moderation on the part of the CGIL in foreign as well as domestic policies.

One example of this moderation often cited is the fact that CGIL officials and other Italian Communist leaders have criticized Soviet suppression of dissidents and were pro-Common Market well before Moscow reluctantly gave the green light for local Communist support of the Common Market in West Europea

countries.

The independent posture shown by CGIL leaders toward Moscow is widely contrasted with the comparative orthodoxy of the CGT. Unlike the CGIL's bid for admission to the ETUC, which has the backing of its non-Communist potential merger partners, a CGT effort to win entry would be strongly opposed not only by the Force Ouvriere and the Christian unions in France but by some other key unions.

Many observers feel that CGT entry to the new confederation could only come after a long battle, and some question whether the CGIL will actually be admitted in May, suggesting that a one-year postponement might be necessary to avoid a rift.

In most internal ETUC battles over policy toward Communist unions, AFL-CIO hostility toward admission of the CGIL has been echoed by the Force Ouvriere, the West German DGB and Austrian unions, with the British Trades Union Congress, the Belgians and the Italians leading the pro-CGIL camp.

At the key Executive Board meeting authorizing negotiations with the Italian group, however, the influential DGB abstained. This has been attributed partly to the labor group's close ties to Chancellor Willy Brandt's ruling SPD party, with its Ostpolitik policy, and partly, too, to the reported ambitions of DGB President Heinz Vetter to succeed the British TUC's Victor Feather as ETUC secretary-general.

British TUC sources promised to oppose the admission of the CGIL in private meetings with AFL-CIO leaders at their February Executive Council sessions, but ended up voting to authorize the negotiations with the Italian group now in progress, AFL-CIO sources said.

The AFL-CIO Free Trade Union News blames the British role in ETUC on the fact that "in Great Britain, the Communists and their sympathizers have gained increasing control in some of the major trade unions and have influenced the TUC more and more in a direction which favors Moscow's international labor policies."

Defenders of the new and other European and other Eureopean countries say that American-controlled multinational corporations pose a threat to Communist and free trade unionists alike irrespective of ideology. These sources see a kindred spirit in the current European effort to assert independence from the superpowers and the new Canadian nationalist posture toward U.S.-based unions.

All told, U.S.-based unions claim more than 1.4 million Canadian members, which is why they are known as "international" unions. The Steelworkers claim the biggest Canadian membership with 160,000, followed by the United Auto Workers with 120,000, 10 per cent of the union's total membership.

The defecting Canadian members of the Paperworkers represent some 20 per cent of the union's overall strength. With nationalism growing in Canada, informed sources say, Canadian Paperworkers leaders want autonomy from their American parent to gain nalonalist luster in their competition for recruits with the Pulp, Sulfite and Paper Mill Workers.

The Canadian branch of the Paperworkers union has long had autonomy in most spheres, with its own Canadian director, its own research program and its own bilingual newspaper. However, the union has not had the right to collect dues or to operate its finances independently.

Paperworkers president Joseph P. Tonelli greeted the separation move with a pledge that "we are taking every precaution and insulating our future arrangements with the Canadians so that we will have a continuing relationship that will be helpful to both the United States and Canadian paper workers."

"When something is inevitable," he said, "I do not believe in prolonging or holding onto a position just for the sake of retaining the status quo."

Explaining the secession move, Canadian director Henry Lorrain pointed to "an intangible, a mood which finds its expression in the popular press where one sees with increasing frequency the word 'Canadian' and the word 'Independence' linked together. It has to do with an awareness, with an understanding, with a feel for what the people are talking about in the mill towns in this nation of ours."

WASHINGTON POST
6 April 1974

Clayton Fritchey

Labor and Foreign Policy

When and if all other bonds fail, Britain and the United States will still have in common their labor movements. It is astonishing how the unions in both countries are so similar in their parochialism, their isolationism and often their shortsighted perception of their own interests.

There is nothing new about it, except at the moment the labor leadership in the United States as well as England is doing its utmost to resist the claims of the 20th century. British labor is doing all it can to fight off the economic advantages of the Common Market; American labor simultaneously is doing all it can to oppose detente with Russia and the expansion of international trade.

The best thing about the Industrial Revolution is that its high productivity has immeasurably improved the worker's standard of living. Yet the Anglo-American unions keep right on resisting new efforts to increase productivity. It is the same with foreign trade. Prosperity and high employment invariably are marked by flourishing free trade. Conversely, the depressions and recessions have usually coincided with inhibited trade and limited markets, distinguished by high tariffs, quotas and other restraints. But the unions never seem to learn.

It wouldn't be so bad if it affected only the unions, but in the United States and England the power of labor can and does influence the course of foreign policy. In Britain, for instance, the new Labor government of Prime Minister Harold Wilson is obliged to renegotiate England's place in the European Economic Community, which means further obstacles to European Economic Community, which means further obstacles to European unity and all it promises.

In the United States, the AFL-CIO opposition to a long-overdue new deal with Russia and the Third World could wreck the nation's hopes for an era of coexistence, disarmament and peace. It is one of the great ironies of our time that the most celebrated of all anti-Communists, Richard Nixon, should be accused of being soft on communism by the head of American labor, George Meany, president of the AFL-CIO.

As a result of Watergate, Mr. Nixon's public standing is so low these days that he is a vulnerable target for Mr. Meany's assaults on his foreign trade bill, regardless of the legislation's merits.

Among other things, the bill would permit the administration to restore normal trading relations with Russia and provide Moscow with the kind of credits that we give numerous other, but less important, nations.

Listening to Mr. Meany testify before the Senate Finance Committee, however, it might be thought Mr. Nixon and Dr. Kissinger were about to sell out to Moscow. Actually, their principal aim is to get a new trade bill that, irrespective of Russia, would give the President—any President—authority to negotiate internationally for lower worldwide trade barriers and freer trade.

What they are opposing is an amendment, sponsored by Sen. Henry Jackson (D-Wash.) and backed by Mr. Meany, that would require the administration to continue discriminating against Russia, even though this could undermine an already fragile detente.

The AFL-CIO boss calls the detente "an absolute fraud." And he adds, "I don't know anything we need so bad we have to give them the Washington Monument." The senators, who enjoyed Mr. Meany's extravagant language, seemed to be persuading themselves that Russia has done nothing to carry out its part of the bargain.

There is little acknowledgement of Moscow swallowing the U.S. mining of Haiphong harbor, of pressuring Hanoi toward a cease-fire, of easing tensions over Berlin and West Germany, of going along with Dr. Kissinger's peace effort in the Middle East, which could easily derail, and of joining the United States in the first steps toward arms limitation.

It can be guessed that behind the

scenes Moscow has done other things to further detente, which for diplomatic reasons it cannot afford to talk about publicly, and which, therefore, cannot be cited by Mr. Nixon in defending himself against charges that detente has been a one-way proposition.

Aside from detente, Mr. Meany is implacably opposed to the trade bill as a whole, for he believes freer trade will mean fewer jobs in the United States. Experience shows it is a short-sighted view. The greatest depression and the worst unemployment the United States has ever known occurred during the heyday of the Smoot-Hawley tariff wall enacted in 1930.

Mr. Meany, in any case, is a little tardy in accusing Mr. Nixon of being indifferent to unemployment and the worker's interest. After all, unemployment has characterized the Nixon administration from its start in 1969, but that didn't prevent Mr. Meany from helping to re-elect the President in 1972. Apparently, he can't forgive himself.

THE NEW REPUBLIC
6 APR 1974

Captive Families, Governments and Corporations

The Kidnapping Epidemic

by Eliot Marshall

Since February 4 the networks and papers have supplied an eager audience with details on Patricia Hearst, her family, her kidnappers, the messages passed between them and the many squabbles that have broken out. No one knows how it will end, but it is beginning to look as though it will end badly. What attracts the attention of the media more than the cruelty of the crime is its political coloring. Last year the Justice Department won 71 convictions against kidnappers and turned 146 other cases over to local prosecutors. None received anything like the attention the Hearst case is getting. It brings America its first bitter taste of political terrorism, pitting an articulate, wealthy businessman in a life-or-death struggle against local terrorists with a cause.

If we need reminding that ours has been made one world by rapid communication, no better example is needed than the speed at which bad examples now travel. Latin America has provided some of them. Kidnappers in Argentina have collected about $50 million since the beginning of 1973, most of it from foreign businesses. As a result about 60 percent of the US executives stationed there have left, their jobs taken over by Argentines. Those who stay must work, travel and live under constant guard. Exxon set a record last month when it paid the largest ransom ever, $14.2 million, to rescue a refinery manager in Argentina, Victor Samuelson. He has not been released yet.

What can be done to prevent such extortion? On the world stage the United States takes the position that kidnapping and hijacking can be discouraged only if the "parent" countries or companies refuse to negotiate with terrorists. A couple of years ago, when hijackings and political killings seemed to have reached an unbearable level, President Nixon created a Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism and asked it to coordinate the anti-terrorist policies of the CIA, State Department, Secret Service, FBI, Transportation Department and other federal agencies. The current chairman of the committee, Ambassador to the Cameroons Lewis Hoffacker, wrote an article in February that sums up the official view: "Tactics vary in each crisis situation, but one consistent factor should be understood by all parties concerned: the US government will not pay ransom to kidnappers. We urge all other governments and individuals to adopt the same position." He noted that in the last five years 25 American officials have been kidnapped abroad and 10 murdered. Last week another diplomat, John Patterson, was taken hostage in the town of Hermosillo, Mexico, by a "liberation army" that wants $500,000 in cash.

Since 1963 the US has been trying to persuade governments to adopt this uncompromising position, with partial success. Cuba signed an extradition agreement with the US in 1973 that classifies hijackers as criminals who must be returned to the country of origin. Several other important agreements have been reached, but Hoffacker says the program became "bogged down" at a 1972 UN conference "in a debate over what some countries called justifiable, as opposed to legal, violence even against innocent parties."

There are drawbacks to the US policy, the most obvious being that governments may see the logic in refusing ransom, but corporations find it difficult to live with that logic, and families, impossible. Exxon was tested to the breaking point in Argentina. It first refused to pay the $14.2 million, then after the guerrillas announced that Samuelson would be "executed" for the crimes of his company on February 25, Exxon relented.

The Hearst kidnapping has "worked" in the sense that it has been prolonged by similar, conciliatory tactics. The kidnappers chose as their victim the daughter of a man whose power lies in managing the news: publicity becomes a part of the ransom demand. Besides commanding the printing of legalistic tirades in Hearst's paper, the *San Francisco Examiner*, the Symbionese succeeded in having their symbol—a seven-headed cobra—printed on every package of free food paid for by Mr. Hearst. The Symbionese demanded that two of their members accused of killing Marcus Foster, a superintendent of schools in Oakland, be given national television time to plead their case. Here they failed, despite Hearst's lobbying. If it were in his power to grant the request, there is no doubt that he would. This media-napping is an insidious aspect of the case, and it hints at crimes yet to come.

Fanatics feed on publicity. Thus when Reg Murphy, editor of the *Atlanta Constitution*, was kidnapped not long after Patricia Hearst, it looked as though the East Coast would have its own version of California political terrorism. But after making a few reactionary swipes, Murphy's captors took a fat ransom and let it go at that. Two people have been arrested. The FBI handled a hoax in New York in March that worked on the inverse principle: the kidnappers had no hostage

(it turned out later) but demanded four hours free time on station WABC for the "alternative political action committee." Three have been arrested. Then there is the National Caucus of Labor Committees, which hasn't physically injured but has pestered professors and journalists in New York, Chicago and Boston.

There are some who imagine that the FBI, if only it had the authority to do so, might have infiltrated the SLA and prevented the Hearst kidnapping. This is a misconception. Although the FBI is under pressure to keep a low profile, there are no legal barriers to its infiltrating or spying on any group it suspects of violent, illegal intent, nor are any such barriers being proposed. The courts have somewhat limited the FBI's freedom to bug and wiretap, for there are important constitutional restrictions on surveillance, but not to the point of making it impossible to do so where reasonable cause is shown. The FBI's problem, well illustrated in Hoover's campaign against the antiwar activists, is that it misguesses. The groups it chose to infiltrate in the '60s were more vociferous than dangerous to the civil order. Double agents are not ordinarily invited to join the bomb throwers and kidnappers and the Hearst case is no exception. The FBI never learned of the Symbionese until after a crime had occurred. Indeed no one had heard of them until last November when they suddenly took credit for shooting Marcus Foster with cyanide bullets. Even today the names of only seven members are known, and of these, four are conjectures. The FBI has a good record for investigation. It has handled 10 major kidnapping cases since the Hearst case on February 4, and all 10 have been "solved." It probably knows where Patricia Hearst is being held too, and waits only for permission to act. But the bureau cannot be expected to keep tabs on and prevent crimes by groups whose very existence is deadly secret.

Realizing how difficult it is for the government to stop kidnappings, many businessmen are beginning to act on their own. Pinkerton's protective service reports a surge in demand for armed bodyguards since February. The Burns International Investigation Bureau in the last few weeks has run out of stock of a pamphlet called "Security Handbook for Businessmen Overseas." (It is hurriedly reprinting its book with the new title, "Executive Protection Handbook.") Fred Rayne, director of Burns' headquarters in Miami, says that today most inquiries about his work come from people who want protection inside the United States, whereas only a few weeks ago the demand was for protection abroad. Rayne speaks complacently about the epidemic: "Everybody's a potential target nowadays. I think the new thing won't be to go for millionaires, who are too well protected. Robbing banks is too hard now with numbered money and cameras. I think they'll go for small guys, it's much easier just to pick up the victim at the door." For $500 Burns will provide a day-long seminar for 25 executives, complete with handbooks, on how to guard against kidnapping and terrorism. Included in the fee is a specially tailored "emergency program" designed to give the group a systemized response to threat. With offices all over the world, the agency screens and trains domestic servants anywhere and provides year-round advice (minimum fee $2000) on keeping your office free of bugs, bombs and political terrorists. In South America several companies often share the cost of a Burns 24-hour radio alert system to keep watch on all the family.

WASHINGTON POST
14April1 1974

Jack Anderson

Lifting the Turkish Opium Ban

The streets of America have become safer since opium growing was outlawed in the distant hills of Turkey. But by early summer, barring a political miracle, the Turkish government will tell the impoverished opium farmers in the remote Afyon region that they can once again plant their traditional money crop: the opium poppy which gives Afyon its name.

This expected Turkish action would have an inevitable impact on the U.S. crime rate. For out of the new opium harvest would come an illegal flood of heroin into this country. As more heroin became available, hundreds of thousands of young people would try it and become addicted. Most of them would be forced to turn to crime to support their habit.

The effect on U.S. cities, narcotics officials tell us, would be measured in robbery, violence and death. They use words like "disastrous" and "catastrophic" to describe the consequences.

Yet the pressure to lift the opium ban is coming, in part, from a few U.S. pharmaceutical firms looking for cheap morphine. They are in strange company, ranging from opium growers and international smugglers to Mafia mobsters and corrupt Turkish legislators—all eager to revive the heroin traffic.

Before 1972, when opium growing was banned in Turkey in exchange for $35.7 million compensation from the American taxpayers, huge opium shipments were diverted to France for refining into heroin and then were smuggled into the United States.

We have obtained a secret House report, which estimates at one point "up to 80 per cent of heroin in the United States came from Turkish opium [illegible]. The 1972 ban dramatically reduced the flow into this country until only the hard-core addicts could obtain heroin. Suddenly, it became almost unavailable to the young drug 'chippers,' who like to live dangerously.

The House report, authored by Narcotics Subcommittee Chairman Lester Wolff (D-N.Y.), describes what happened after the Turkish connection was cut off. "Heroin addiction," it states, "(was) reduced from between 500,000 and 700,000 to about 200,000 active addicts . . .

"The price of one milligram of heroin in New York City was 44 cents in 1972; by mid-1973, (it) had risen to $1.52. The street level purity of heroin sold to addicts decreased . . . from 7.7 per cent to 3.7 per cent."

With the decline in addiction came a corresponding reduction in crime and

misery. "Overdose deaths, drug-related hepatitis and drug-related property crimes," declares the report, "have declined throughout most areas of the United States for the first time in six years."

The end of opium planting in Turkey caused repercussions, indeed, throughout the subterranean world of drugs. In Europe, the Corsican criminals who had made huge profits from heroin smuggling were compelled to invest their money in more or less legitimate businesses. The federal narcotics investigators warn, however, that the Mafia is keeping its investments semi-liquid in anticipation of a reopening of the opium traffic.

In Southeast Asia, opium traders in the mountainous Golden Triangle of Burma, Thailand and Laos began to feel out the United States on an exchange deal similar to that made with Turkey. One group offered to sell 400 tons of opium to the United States to get it off the market.

In India, the Soviets began buying up legal opium feverishly for medical purposes. Suddenly India, which leads the world in legitimate opium sales, also found about 25 per cent of its crop being diverted to criminal elements.

But in Turkey itself, an outcry against the ban began to swell. The farmers who were supposed to get the American aid complained it arrived late when it came at all. They suspected, with some justice, that the U.S. payments were going into the bottomless pockets of corrupt officials.

Chairman Wolff, accompanied by Rep. Charles Rangel (D-N.Y.) traveled into the Turkish hinterland to get, as the report puts it, "some insight into the poppy ban in Turkish eyes." Feeling among the opium traders ran so high that the two congressmen had to be guarded by armed Turkish and American security men.

The congressmen met a 70-year-old farmer who "had grown poppies on those hills every year until 1972," they relate. "He had, at the government's suggestion, grown sunflowers as a substitute . . . But he did not like the taste of sunflower seed oil. He also planted barley now . . . but it earned less money than the poppy."

Wolff asked him whether he wanted to grow poppies again. "Yes," said the old farmer simply.

Most of those interviewed along the rocky roads of Afyon felt the same way. Some said grudgingly they would abide by the government decree. But others were openly rebellious, admitting they had illegally sold opium gum.

"Two opium pressers spoke with indignation about how their small businesses disappeared with the end of the poppy seed supply," recounts the report. "A local doctor said that the ban was imposed with haste and without adequate consideration."

But perhaps Wolff's most disturbing discovery was the role of some U.S. pharmaceutical firms in the backstage campaign to lift the opium ban. He found the firms were quietly but actively lobbying with the Turkish government, Geneva narcotics conference and even the U.S. Congress. In short, these pharmaceutical firms are more interested in reducing the price they have to pay for opium than in preventing drug addiction and street crime.

The secret report concludes gloomily: "An apparently insoluble problem faces the United States and Turkey concerning the opium ban. Each has taken a course which, when fulfilled, will probably result in a frontal collision with the other."

The report urges that the channels be kept open with Turkey and that the crop diversification program be pursued. "Raising the level of understanding in Turkey about the international drug problem is a vital basis for any future cooperation," states the study.

NEW YORK TIMES
19 April 1974

Late in 1963, when he was a lower-echelon Navy officer, according to Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr., now Chief of Naval Operations, he wrote a report saying "our national interest would not be served by becoming militarily involved" in Vietnam. "The superior that overruled my recommendation was named Dr. Daniel J. Ellsberg," Admiral Zumwalt told a Tufts University audience in Medford, Mass. Dr. Ellsberg, who joined the Defense Department in 1964 to work in decision making regarding Vietnam, at first supported the war but later became disenchanted and made public what was to become known as the Pentagon papers.

THE ECONOMIST APRIL 13, 1974

The opium war

Money can't buy

Turkey's decision to reject further American anti-opium compensation and resume poppy-growing has cast a heavy shadow over the corresponding "honourable bribery" being offered by the United States to opium growers in the Golden Triangle where Thailand, Burma and Laos meet. The Americans, financing a similar campaign there, have already paid $7m to reward Thai tribesmen who agree to discard the opium petals for maize and vegetables with guaranteed markets. Thailand's King Bhumibol himself has intervened to encourage this Mafia-Rotarian switch from opium-growing.

A recent estimate claimed that in five north-eastern Thai villages where the compensation scheme had been operating opium production had fallen by 40–50 per cent. But the Golden Triangle produces more than 700 tons of opium each year and no one has been quite sure how much it would cost the Americans to seduce the thousands of villagers from their simple, traditional and rewarding poppy-growing. World opium prices have been soaring and this year's harvest in south-east Asia will double the local poppy-growers' return of $50 per chia (1.6 kilogrammes) last year to $100 this year.

The collapsed American venture in Turkey cost $36m in compensation over two years. The experiment in the Golden Triangle would greatly multiply the initial American investment if it were pressed to a conclusion. After the Turkish about-face, it is doubtful whether the south-east Asian project can go on getting that sort of money from the United States.

Eastern Europe

LOS ANGELES TIMES
31 March 1974

Two Americans Target of Russ Spy Mania

BY MURRAY SEEGER
Times Staff Writer

MOSCOW—The Soviet government has barred a Harvard University professor from leading independent tours through the country, and has recently expelled a man described as a CIA agent disguised as a tourist.

In both cases, the U.S. Embassy in Moscow was not notified of any such actions and the professor, Alexander Lipson, who has not visited here for a few years, said he knows nothing about the government's move against him.

The so-called CIA agent was only vaguely identified as H. Riegg, a graduate of the University of Pennsylvania, in the Communist Party newspaper, Selskaya Zhizn. There was no indication when he was expelled but his crime was distributing "anti-Soviet literature."

"We go through this nearly every spring," a Western diplomat said. "This is part of the campaign to warn the Soviet people about mingling with foreigners. It is part of the spy mania."

While the Soviet Union is always apprehensive about the visits by large numbers of foreigners and takes careful precautions against the importation of books, magazines and newspapers it considers likely to poison the pure Soviet cultural atmosphere, vigilance is especially high now.

The relaxation of political tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States and Western Europe has encouraged Russians to believe that all controls on their lives will be loosened. Since the ruling Communist Party is still engaged in a policy of "ideological warfare" with the West, however, it has tightened its controls on the flow of ideas into the country.

The recent exiling of novelist Alexander Solzhenitsyn to the West and efforts by Western countries to negotiate easier movement of people and ideas at the European security conference in Geneva have also heightened the official barriers against outside ideas.

For example, a 16-year-old Boston boy, who arrived in Leningrad in mid-March as part of a tourist group, was forced to turn over to customs agents a new English-language copy of Solzhenitsyn's "August, 1914," a travel gift from a friend. The book was not returned when he left the country.

According to Selskaya Zhizn, the anti-Communist world has failed to break down the walls of the Communist society with alternative theories and is now trying to bore from within.

Prof. Lipson, who teaches Russian language and literature at the Harvard graduate school of education, was accused of hiding the character of a "hardened anti-Sovietist" behind his academic exterior.

"Lipson visited the U.S.S.R. with the purpose of gathering as much dirt as possible for anti-Communist propaganda," the paper said. "He demanded that members of his tourist groups get the necessary information by their own 'independent' ways.

"Lipson himself behaved with lack of responsibility and sometimes was openly boorish. He was prohibited from entering the U.S.S.R. in the future."

From Cambridge, Mass., Lipson said he could "shed no light on what they are talking about."

He started taking groups of 50 to 100 students to the Soviet Union during summers starting in 1965 after attending Moscow University in 1964. He has not been in the Soviet Union this year.

Lipson said that he warned all his tourists about the restrictions Soviet law places on visitors and that he would disassociate himself from any tourist who got into trouble with the authorities.

"I don't know everything they do," he admitted. He never received any reports of trouble with his tourists.

For Moscow observers, however, the Lipson tours were the kind that make the internal security policy most nervous. They want all tourists in the country under the surveillance of the government agency, Intourist, which is associated with the secret police (KGB). The police are especially nervous about contacts between young people.

Alleged CIA agent Riegg, the paper said, had been recruited by the agency in college and tried to enter a scientific section of Leningrad University but was turned down.

He then entered the country as a tourist and "started spreading anti-Soviet literature, gathering tendentious information and fulfilling other unseemly errands," Selskaya Zhizn continued.

"The tourist was caught red-handed and thrown out of the U.S.S.R."

The paper did not explain why the government issued a tourist visa to a man the police knew had been recruited by the CIA in college.

Most tourists who get into trouble in the Soviet Union have problems when they try to take snapshots that are common in any other European country. In the Soviet Union, it is illegal to take pictures of railroad stations, factories, seaports, airports, telephone offices, radio stations and any thing of a military character.

A Pasadena tourist described how she and her husband visited Novgorod as part of an Intourist "art tour" and saw a retired American professor arrested after taking a picture of a large poster of Lenin on the side of a building.

The guide secured the tourist's release but he had to surrender his film because the building was a chemical works.

All air travelers in the Soviet Union are warned they cannot take photos out of airplane windows, and in airports tourists are told to cover their cameras or put them away.

THE TIMES, London
5 April 1974

Russia told of 'Klan crosses' in U S Army

From Edmund Stevens
Moscow, April 4

American press coverage and comment on the recent Moscow talks of Dr Kissinger, the United States Secretary of State, are sharply censured by Mr Boris Strelnikov, the Washington correspondent of *Pravda*.

Insisting that much was accomplished, he writes: "The role of mass information media consists of supporting the positive tendencies and in no case hindering the strengthening of mutual understanding and development of contacts between the two countries.

"However certain organs of the American bourgeois press and especially the influential *New York Times* and *Washington Post*, disregarding the facts, publish irresponsible information. They do their utmost to present matters as though Kissinger's Moscow mission failed completely because of Kremlin obduracy."

He darkly suggests that *The New York Times*, *Washington Post* and other newspapers may be involved in a plot, sponsored by the military-industrial complex and Zionist lobby, to disrupt the American-Soviet dialogue.

Mr Strelnikov's advice to the American media on the need to support the positive might well be heeded by the Soviet press, including his own newspaper. Despite certain improvements, much Soviet coverage of America is hardly calculated to further mutual understanding

Red Star, the organ of the armed forces, reports on "the activization of racist organizations in the armed forces of the United States, where the Ku-Klux-Klan burn their ritualistic crosses and beat up and kill Negroes, even on the territory of military installations, and where criminals of the Lieutenant Calley type are looked upon as heroes.

This comes from an article marking the twenty-fifth anniversary of Nato. The article also claims that the Nato staff is riddled with neo-Nazis

Another anniversary article, in *Sovietskaya Rossiya* says: "The militarist colossus has grown to such dangerous proportions that there are no grounds for a relaxation of vigilance by the peace-loving forces", a Soviet synonym for the Warsaw Pact forces.

Professor Nikolai Molchanov, an eminent Soviet historian, accuses the Institute of Strategic Studies in London of providing exaggerated, doctored figures on the strength of the Soviet military establishment, to justify the Nato build-up.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
9 April 1974

'U.S. press threatens detente': Pravda

By Leo Gruliow
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Moscow

The Russians are annoyed by current talk in the West about the need for strength in the face of Soviet military power and by Western calls for tough bargaining with Moscow over nuclear arms limitation.

Apparently what has stirred things up in Moscow is the comment in the Western — and particularly the American — press after Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger's failure to bring about a much-hoped-for breakthrough in strategic arms control when in Moscow last month and the speculation after Defense Secretary James Schlesinger's earlier adjustment in basic U.S. nuclear strategy.

While Pravda decries the American public discussion of defense needs and strategy, Soviet military spokesmen, in internal pronouncements, never cease to proclaim essentially the same doctrine as held by the Pentagon — that ultimately peace rests on their own country's strength.

Soviet strategy, however, is not subject to public discussion. When a strategy review brings debate in America and, as in this instance, an outcry for a stronger force or tough bargaining with Moscow, the Soviet press reacts sensitively to all the talk.

The sensitivity now appears compounded by Mr. Kissinger's failure to achieve a fresh accord on nuclear arms. Evidently Moscow feels that Western concern over this setback plays into the hands of what it calls a coalition of U.S. military-industry spokesmen, right-wingers, and Zionists.

To allay concern, all Soviet media have been presenting a bold front of optimism about prospects for a further arms limitation agreement by the time of Mr. Nixon's expected summer visit to Moscow.

Specifically Moscow is critical of Western press comment on two counts:

- Although Secretary of State Kissinger's Kremlin visit failed to bring a hoped-for breakthrough on a strategic arms agreement, the Soviet media have repeatedly complained that the Western press reported the situation with undue pessimism. Pravda even charged that the pessimism was deliberate "political sabotage" of detente.
- In the first major military commentary following Dr. Kissinger's visit, Pravda said Sunday that the American public discussion of a revised nuclear strategy "cast a shadow" on the Brezhnev-Nixon 1973 pledge to prevent nuclear warfare.

'Detente spirit' cited

A review of nuclear strategy would seem to be an internal matter for the Pentagon planners, the Pravda commentator admitted, but he implied that all the hubbub about the strategy review ran counter to the spirit of detente and could build up momentum for a new arms race.

Two months ago U.S. Defense Secretary Schlesinger announced plans to shift emphasis from the earlier nuclear strategy of retaliation against an enemy's urban centers to one of targeting part of the missile strike force on Soviet missile bases.

The Pentagon's strategy, Pravda said, also contemplated the use of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe so as not to leave U.S. allies at a disadvantage in conventional warfare. This would mean "mini-nuclear" war, the Moscow paper declared.

Pravda confessed that all of the hypothetical strategy could be ignored because there was a long way between belligerent plans and actual warfare. But what troubled the Soviet commentaor was the thought that military declarations and policy decisions might be used for psychological pressure on the Soviet Union. Mr. Schlesinger, the writer said, had talked of this.

Even more than psychological pressure, the commentator feared that advocates of an arms race might utilize the strategy review, if linked to moves to improve weapons and increase their range, to build up military power.

THE ECONOMIST APRIL 13, 1974

Jets for Russia

Boeing's turn

It is Boeing's turn to go to Russia next month to talk about the 20 wide-bodied jets that Aeroflot wants to buy from the west, and the factory that the Russians intend to build to turn out their own versions thereafter. These talks have been going on for more than three years. Nobody any longer doubts the Russians' serious intent. Although they have a huge military freighter in production, they have nothing approaching a wide-bodied civil aircraft. Even more important, there is no Russian engine.

This is the first difficulty. When Boeing at one stage suggested providing an American airframe for a Soviet-built engine, the Russians' embarrassment was obvious. The gap is going to be filled by the Rolls-Royce RB211, which the Russians intend to buy and later to build under licence as they did the first Rolls-Royce jets immediately after the war. So why not buy Lockheed's Tristar to go with it? After all, the Tristar is wide-bodied and the only aircraft using the RB211. Because, apparently, the Russians have misgivings about Lockheed's financial stability and about the company's announcement that it is not going to make any major developments to the Tristar. Lockheed teams have been to Moscow and may yet pull the deal off, but many in the company think their Moscow trips are a waste of time.

McDonnell Douglas has a suitable family of wide-bodied DC10s of all sizes and ranges, either developed or under development; but it is owned by a man not particularly interested in Russian business. That leaves Boeing as the other serious contender with a family of wide-bodied jets on offer to the airlines. But only the 747 is actually in production, so the Russians would be taking a chance on the rest.

Technical problems apart, money could be a difficulty. Up to $500m is at stake, and there could be political trouble in Washington when the question arises of providing such credit to Russia. One alternative would be to raise the funds in London. Preliminary soundings suggest this would be possible, but at a price the Russians might not like. The cost might, however, be concealed elsewhere in the accounts. This is what happened during Germany's negotiations with Russia over the Kursk steel complex.

WASHINGTON POST
16 April 1974

Victor Zorza

Soviets Prefer Ford

Could the Kremlin be considering whether to dump Mr. Nixon in favor of Vice President Ford?

In a remarkable interview with John Osborne of The New Republic, which Ford now says he intended should remain off the record, the Vice President has described the administration he might form if Mr. Nixon should step down. If he became President, Ford might drop Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger—the man Moscow regards as the Nixon administration's evil spirit responsible for blocking further progress on detente.

The Kremlin is obviously reassessing its attitude to the Nixon administration. The June summit in Moscow is still on, but Foreign Minister Gromyko's attitude in Washington last week made it clear that no real SALT agreement will be forthcoming.

The Kremlin's study of the options would presumably begin by asking whether Mr. Nixon's survival in office would still be to its advantage. Even if he survies, his position would be seriosuly weakened. He would no longer be able to conclude major agreements on arms reduction, trade, and the like, which have made his administration so attractive to Moscow. But Ford, as a new President, could start all over again—and Ford has said that he would keep Kissinger. That would be worth a lot to Moscow.

Mr. Nixon has had to default on his political debts to the Kremlin, but Ford would be able to repay some of them. Most important of all, Ford would be a natural candidate for re-election in 1976, and this would make him more susceptible to subtle pressures and bargaining offers from a Kremlin which now knows how to play the American election game.

It was Mr. Nixon who taught the Kremlin how to play the game, by intertwining his last election campaign to a President who is also a candidate: The television coverage, the promise of a generation of peace confirmed by an affectionate send-off from Moscow, an agreement to limit arms. There was, of course, also the new structure of peace. But Mr. Nixon got some votes, and Moscow got the American grain which averted possible food riots and may have saved Brezhnev.

On this count alone, it would clearly be in Moscow's interest that the man in the White House in 1976 should be running for re-election. But it would be doubly so if Sen. Henry Jackson (D-Wash.) gets the Democratic nomination. The Soviet press is creating the impression that Jackson and Schlesinger have already enough power between them to bring the cold war back, even if Nixon remains in the White House. Moscow press coverage of Jackson suggests that the Kremlin sees him as the most likely—and most dangerous—Democratic candidate in the next election. It implies that Jackson as President would not only bring back the cold war but even a hot war. The Kremlin regards him as so great a threat that it cannot simply sit back in the hope that perhaps Sen. Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.)—whom it recently invited to Moscow in another anti-Jackson move—will get the nomination.

One way to keep Jackson out is to help get Ford in now, and to strengthen him for the election campaign by tacit electoral bargains of the kind the Kremlin made with Mr. Nixon in 1972. The longer Mr. Nixon stays now, the more likely Jackson is to get in later.

But can the Kremlin seriously believe that it could influence the American electoral process, with all its vagaries? All we know is that it has tried to do so in the past. It does not need anyone to put ideas in its head.

Khrushchev used to boast that he had helped John F. Kennedy win the Presidency, in a very close election, by timing the release of the U.S. airmen then held captive in the Soviet Union in a way designed to favor Kennedy. Brezhnev helped Mr. Nixon. He will do anything to keep out Jackson.

So long as the Kremlin thought that Mr. Nixon could pay his debts, it conducted itself in a way designed to help him against his critics. To reverse its conduct would require no change of principle, only a change in its estimate of whether Mr. Nixon can pay his debts—and t is now clear that he cannot.

The Kremlin knows that by refusing to cooperate with Mr. Nixon on Salt, the Mideast, and the like, it is depriving him of his last line of defense—the argument that he should be allowed to remain in office to complete the structure of peace. Moscow cannot, by itself, dump Nixon, but it can add materially to the pressure on defenses that are growing weaker all the time. The Soviet press continues to be kind to Mr. Nixon, but deeds are more important than words.

Moscow's motives in refusing to cooperate with Mr. Nixon may be mixed, but if its uncooperative attitude persists, it will be clear that the Kremlin has indeed decided to dump Nixon and to help install Ford, in the expectation that it can gain more this way.

Western Europe

BALTIMORE SUN
8 April 1974

Austria suspects U.S. ploy

Soviet plan for invasion revealed

BY GENE OISHI
Sun Staff Correspondent

Vienna—Sensational disclosures in an Austrian magazine of a Soviet contingency plan to invade and occupy large parts of Western Europe have caused a political and diplomatic uproar here.

First published in *Profil* in February, the article, which stems from an interview with Jan Sejna, the Czech general who defected to the West in 1968 and now is living in the United States, has convinced Austrian officials that the U.S. deliberately planted the disclosures.

Though these officials express puzzlement over the possible motives of the U.S., they point out that Mr. Sejna, said to be under the care of the Central Intelligence Agency, could not have revealed the so-called Polarka Plan without U.S. government approval.

As revealed by Mr. Sejna, the scenario, which would be based on real, manipulated, or fabricated events, calls for the death of President Tito of Yugoslavia, subsequent unrest in the country and a call for Soviet help in quelling the disorder.

Austria would allow fascist groups to use the country for staging attacks on Yugoslavia in violation of the 1955 state treaty that established Austrian neutrality.

A blitz attack by 50,000 Czech and Hungarian troops into Austria would be coordinated with a Soviet invasion of Yugoslavia through Hungary. Most of Austria would be brought under control within 24 hours and another contingent of about 400,000 Soviet troops would march through the country and into Yugoslavia from the northwest.

The Sejna revelations were published in February by *Profil*, an Austrian news magazine, and a portion of the interview was broadcast on Austrian television.

Exactly why the Americans allowed full disclosure of the Polarka Plan at this time as is believed here—is a matter for speculation, though it is generally thought that it was intended to sway public opinion in Austria, widely criticized for a woefully inadequate defense system; to counter a marked pro-Soviet trend in Yugoslavia; and to gain support in West Germany, where the government is caught in the middle of a U.S.-French feud.

Most Austrians seem to take it for granted that the Americans arranged the interview with Mr. Sejna for some political purpose.

Werner Stanzl, a former Austrian television correspondent and now a staff writer for the Vienna-based *Profil* magazine, said he suspected that ex-General Sejna brought out plans involving Austria when he defected.

Mr. Stanzl said he tried to obtain an interview for three or four years. He tried through the Pentagon, various American embassies and through unofficial contacts, but without success. Last October, in the course of a conversation with an American contact, whom he had met though Czech emigre circles, he brought up his request again.

To his surprise, Mr. Stanzl said, the contact said that perhaps he could be of some help and Mr. Stanzl subsequently received a post office box number in a Washington suburb, to which he wrote.

Safeway parking lot

A few days later a cable came from Washington, instructing him to call a certain telephone number in Washington at a given time. Mr. Stanzl was in London on assignment at the time. When he called the number three days too late he received no reply.

A few days later he received a call from Washington from a man who identified himself as "Mr. Johnson" and as a friend of Mr. Sejna.

Over the next 10 days, Mr. Stanzl said, Mr. Johnson called him 6 or 7 times, each conversation lasting from 40 to 50 minutes, to find out all the questions Mr. Stanzl wanted to ask and to arrange details of his travel plans.

Mr. Stanzl said when he suggested that he might bring along a free-lance television cameraman, Mr. Johnson encouraged the idea.

Finally, Mr. Stanzl was instructed to show up with his cameraman at a Safeway parking lot on Cincinnati avenue in Washington at 9 A.M. Sunday, December 16. They were to take a taxi to get there, send the cab off, and they would be picked up by a black limousine.

All went according to schedule and Mr. Stanzl and his cameraman were met by Mr. Johnson. Mr. Stanzl described his host as definitely an American—judging from his English and mannerisms—but he spoke perfect German.

Heavy snowstorm

Mr. Johnson drove around in circles for some time, apparently to make sure they were not being followed, then drove to a house in a middle-class residential neighborhood, not far from the rendezvous point. Mr. Stanzl and his cameraman were told to forget the address and not to photograph the house.

Inside the house Mr. Stanzl and his cameraman were searched and their luggage checked by four men, who Mr. Sejna later identified as FBI men assigned to him as bodyguards. At one point during their stay, Mr. Stanzl said, he noticed that the men had submachine guns kept behind the draperies.

Mr. Stanzl was told that he must stay in the house and once he left it the interview would be over. As it turned out, there was a heavy snowstorm and he remained at the house for three days and two nights, talking to the general from 8 A.M. to 11 P.M.

He also received photocopies of the Polarka Plan that then-General Sejna smuggled out to the West in 1968.

Mr. Stanzl said no fee was requested or paid for the interview or his stay, and when he expressed his gratitude to Mr. Johnson, his host replied, "Don't mention it. We all serve a good cause."

When the *Profil* article appeared, there were rumors at the same time that the 81-year-old Marshal Tito was gravely ill. They were followed by reports, mainly in West German newspapers, of Warsaw Pact maneuvers in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, other unusual military activity, and the movement of two Soviet airborne brigades from Czechoslovakia to Hungary.

Called authentic

Military sources in West Germany and Austria insist that all the reports of extraordinary military activity in the East bloc were completely unfounded.

The American Embassy here disclaimed any prior knowledge of the Sejna interview and could shed no light on the subsequent scare stories.

The reaction of the Austrian government was also curious.

Mr. Stanzl said that upon this return to Vienna after interviewing Mr. Sejna, he went directly to Gen. Karl Luetgendorf, the Austrian defense minister, for confirmation of what he had learned.

Mr. Stanzl said the minister told him that the Austrian government had long ago been informed of the Polarka Plan and that what the Czech defector had told Mr. Stanzl was authentic.

General Luetgendorf, however, said he could not publicly confirm the plan before getting the approval of Chancellor Bruno Kreisky. It is not clear whether Mr. Kreisky ever gave the official green light to his defense minister, but it has been confirmed that Rudolf Kirschschlaeger, the foreign minister, gave his approval.

Subsequently, General Luetgendorf gave an interview to *Profil* as well as to ORF, the Austrian television station, in which he confirmed the authenticity of the Polarka Plan and said it should be taken seriously and was "not to be belittled."

Had refused broadcast

This decision was of some importance since ORF had refused to broadcast the Sejna interview unless some authoritative Austrian official agreed to go on television and speak on the subject.

Profil, with a circulation of only 200,000, is not widely read in Austria. The Sejna story would not have had the impact that it did had it not also appeared on Austrian television, which is seen nationwide and in parts of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and western Yugosla-

via.

Whereas his government added greatly to the impact of the disclosures, Chancellor Kreisky expressed public indignation over them, attributing the work to "Cold Warriors." He added that he did not rule out the possibility that some American services might be interested in disturbing Austrian-Soviet relations.

In an apparent attempt to calm Soviet furor over the broadcast, Mr. Kreisky noted that Polarka was only a contingency plan and that Western powers have ones that are even more drastic.

Nevertheless, indications are that the Austrian government was not altogether displeased with the disclosures, though Austrian officials say they doubt that Austria was the primary target for the American ploy.

One high Defense Ministry official expressed privately a view, apparently shared by many Austrians, that the primary target was Yugoslavia. While *Profil* does not circulate in Yugoslavia, the West German newspapers, which picked up the story and amplified it, do. The Yugoslav popular press had also picked up the Sejna interview, though only the part that applies to Austria.

The interview is thought to be an attempt to counter President Tito's drive for closer relations with the Soviet Union and to influence public opinion toward a more pro-Western orientation.

Another major target, according to some Austrian sources, are the United States' Western European partners, West Germany in particular at a time when strains have developed in trans-Atlantic solidarity.

The Austrian Defense Ministry source said he did not think it was just a coincidence that the Americans allowed the Sejna interview at the time when the U.S. and West Germany were about to conclude a new agreement requiring Bonn to offset more than $2 billion of the cost of stationing U.S troops in the country over the next two years.

NEW YORK TIMES
9 April 1974

Nixon's Demeanor During Paris Visit Draws Sharp Criticism From French

By NAN ROBERTSON
Special to The New York Times

PARIS, April 8—President Nixon's talks with world leaders and his activities on the streets of Paris this weekend brought sharp criticism in France today, as well as some grudging acknowledgment of continuing United States power.

On three occasions on Saturday and Sunday, Mr. Nixon plunged through police lines to shake hands and talk with curbside crowds. This was in addition to talks with foreign leaders assembled here to honor the memory of President Georges Pompidou, who died on Tuesday.

A letter circulated to journalists and made available today to the bureau of The New York Times by a high official of a French ministry said Mr. Nixon had "shamelessly substituted a publicity campaign for the mourning of an entire nation, introducing an atmosphere of loud feverishness, the discourtesy of which is equaled only by its clumsiness."

Le Monde, the most respected newspaper in France, joined in the indignation in a front-page editorial titled "The Nixon Festival." But it added that the American President had spectacularly demonstrated his continuing ability to dominate international politics — even without the presence of Secretary of State Kissinger.

The newspaper said Mr. Nixon had asked for and received the allegiance of the European statesmen he saw one after the other and that he had continued the "superpower dialogue" with President Nikolai N. Podgorny of the Soviet Union.

The mass-circulation daily France-Soir said Mr. Nixon had set up a virtual White House at the residence of his host, Ambassador John N. Irwin 2d. France-Soir said the President had hammered away at the need for Atlantic cooperation and close consultation between the United States and Europe. He was in fact countering France's policy "in our very own capital," the paper said.

And the conservative Le Figaro squarely titled its account of the President's doings: "The Sovereign of the Western World."

Le Figaro's article spoke of Mr. Nixon's "operation Charlemagne" in which—just as a sovereign would—he accorded audiences to Italian, British, West Germany and Danish statesmen, all worried about deteriorating relations between the European community and the United States.

A cartoon next to the article makes clear how Le Figaro sees the power relationship between Mr. Nixon and Europe. A crowned woman depicting Europe kneels before Mr. Nixon, seated in a throne-like chair. She is about to kis a ring on the extended hand of the President. His feet are on a black-bordered death notice.

The French man-in-the-street was not at all puzzled that Mr. Nixon and other world leaders were conducting "mini-summits," as they were called here, after the memorial service for Mr. Pompidou on Saturday. More than 50 chiefs of state and government had converged on Paris to pay homage to President Pompidou.

It seemed natural to the French that the leaders thus assembled would also do a little business with each other. Mr. Nixon spoke with nearly 40 of them during his 40 minutes at a reception at the Foreign Ministry and conducted more extensive talks elsewhere.

The universal bafflement was about why a foreign president would seek to press the flesh and speak with the crowds of several hundred gathered to watch the celebrities streaming in and out of buildings on the Rue du Faubourg-St.-Honoré.

One block of the south side of that street contains not only the residence of the American Ambassador, but the embassies of Britain and Japan and the Elysée Palace, now occupied by the acting President of France, Alain Poher.

The crowds Mr. Nixon rushed into on the north side of the Rue du Faubourg-St. Honoré were uniformly friendly, cheered him and pressed around him. At one point he asked a French policeman holding back the straining throng: "How do you like your job?" The President spoke in English. The policeman stared back uncomprehendingly.

Mr. Nixon told one group, also in English: "Forty years ago I majored in French. After four years I could speak it, I could write it. I read all of the classics. And today I just understand a little."

NEW YORK TIMES
13 April 1974

Another Decline Of the West

By C. L. Sulzberger

PARIS—The idea of "Europe" formally signalized by the Common Market Treaty of Rome seventeen years ago is now going backward, not forward. When the European Community was enlarged to include Britain, Ireland and Denmark in 1972, there was a revival of the old spirit that envisaged advance toward political unity, a common monetary policy and ultimately a unified system of defense.

The concept of a twin-pillared Atlantic alliance based on coherent North American and West European contributions had started to flicker once again last year. But a combination of economic and political setbacks has shoved the project into reverse. There are few observers around who are ready to guess when that trend will halt.

The most critical setback was the October Arab-Israeli war, which exposed gaping divisions between United States and European policy and which produced an energy crisis that widened the gap still further. On the heels of this came a British election that brought into power a minority Labor Government that is trying to gain favor with a puzzled electorate by picking "European" scabs.

If carried too far this would be unwise. About the only clear-cut indication in Britain's vote was a demonstration that about 60 per cent of the electorate supported British adherence to the Community. Such support came in the Conservative and Liberal parties. The pro-Common Market faction in Labor over-balanced the anti-Market Tory group.

As the Italian newspaper La Stampa

observes: "Europe, almost everywhere, now seems a remote, academic concept in the face of the seriousness of these [Community] countries' internal problems, and this is encouraging a selfish, nationalistic approach." One might add that this approach is even more disheartening as a result of the sag in leadership among Western lands.

Whatever happens to President Nixon as the Watergate procedures continue to unfold, he can never again be in a position to give the North Atlantic world dynamic guidance. The French war of political succession following President Pompidou's death gives Frenchmen concern; Chancellor Willy Brandt is depressed following a popularity slump; and Britain's Harold Wilson is fighting to surmount a tidal wave of problems.

Amid these developments, the Common Market is being forced to face the fact that transnational economic and commercial projects worked out among European nations are simply not producing expected results. Thus the Anglo-French supersonic plane, Concorde, is in desperate straits.

France has already invested so much in it that she had to cut research and development for military aircraft to the bone. Now Britain seems on the verge of deciding to dump the entire venture, despite enormous sums invested in it, as too costly and impractical.

New doubts are developing about the future of the swing-wing multirole combat aircraft (MRCA), which Britain, Germany and Italy undertook to build six years ago. And, generally speaking, there is increasing realization that despite the technical ability of European manufacturers, they may be wiser to limit their enterprises to less ambitious dreams.

All this provided an unhappy background to this month's meeting of Community foreign ministers in Luxembourg when James Callaghan, representing the new Labor diplomacy, said his Government opposes British "European" membership on terms previously negotiated by the Conservative Government of Edward Heath.

Although it is unlikely that Britain will actually pull out (for political reasons), this attitude gives rise to new talk of "perfidious Albion" prodded on by an Uncle Sam who, fearful of "European" competition, wants to break up the Common Market (as de Gaulle always predicted in the past).

Such talk, in which France—never outstandingly "European" in its own concepts—has been taking a tactless lead, comes at an exceedingly bad time for all the countries concerned, which means not only the Community members but the signatories to the Atlantic alliance. The economics of the energy crisis have cut deeply into Western defense planning at a moment when both U.S. strategic negotiations with Moscow and European security discussions are approaching critical phases.

To have the West start to fall apart at such a moment, with its leadership losing vigor, its economic cooperation running into difficulties, its diplomacy lapsing into mutual recrimination and its statesmen bickering with each other is a deeply saddening event.

Still worse is the disappearance from the political horizon of any thought of realizing former dreams of advance to genuine European unity that could make of this talented but discouraged area a valid world force.

TIME
8 APR 1974

WEST GERMANY

Help Wanted: Spies

Bored with your job? Well, there's this outfit in West Germany that has quite a few positions available, offering not only security, fringe benefits, promotion and good pay, but also foreign travel and exciting assignments. According to an eight-page brochure available at government employment offices, men and women are needed in more than 40 professions—from map makers and pharmacologists to computer programmers and historians. The eyebrow-raiser is the address to which prospective applicants should write: the headquarters of the *Bundesnachrichtendienst*, or Federal Intelligence Service, Bonn's equivalent of the CIA. What that agency wants to hire is spies.

Advertising for cloak-and-dagger men and women may sound strange, but the BND, as the agency is generally called, maintains that it works. Since the search began six months ago, there have been hundreds of applicants from a variety of backgrounds. The biggest single group is young lawyers (sniffs a BND personnel officer: "Lawyers think they can do anything"). Most of the applicants were weeded out early, including one 13-year-old aspiring James Bond. This week a handful of survivors will be selected for training after final tests for IQ, language ability and extemporaneous-speaking talent—presumably on the assumption that spies must sometimes talk their way out of tight places. Most will fill routine assignments at BND headquarters in the Bavarian village of Pullach. But a few will be sent out as "spooks."

Though other intelligence agencies, including the CIA, run public advertisements to recruit technical specialists and other personnel, such candor is a bizarre turnabout for the BND, which has been supersecretive since the postwar days when Reinhard Gehlen organized it out of the ashes of Nazi Germany's military intelligence. The "Gehlen Organization" was as mysterious as its founder, who generally stayed behind the wire-topped, 10-ft. concrete walls at Pullach and refused to be photographed. But the old guard, including Gehlen himself, finally retired; and new recruits for an organization of 5,000 people could no longer be found by the traditional word-of-mouth method.

Gehlen's successor, Gerhard Wessel, 60, first attempted to remedy his growing staff shortages with blind newspaper ads: "Multinational company with worldwide operations seeks multilingual executive assistant willing to travel." Other multinational companies, however, outbid him with more intriguing ads and better pay. In desperation, Wessel decided to go public. He ordered his small public relations staff, whose major function previously had been to keep the BND out of the news, to thrust it into the limelight instead.

Unreconstructed intelligence men protest that this is no way for a secret organization to behave. They argue that the BND can now be infiltrated by counterspies armed with nothing more lethal than an application form. One answer to that, of course, is that the BND was unable to keep out double agents even when it was most secretive. To Gehlen's embarrassment, in the 1950s the Soviets stocked his organization with so many former SS intelligence men that Moscow had to do its own personnel work. When too many counterspies became concentrated in certain BND departments, the Kremlin pressured them to seek transfers elsewhere in the organization.

FIGARO, Paris



Near East

THE NEW LEADER
4 March 1974

Euro Vista

BY RAY ALAN

Questions for the CIA

THE WATERGATE serial seems to have reached its penultimate installment, but addicts should not despair. Another fascinating American mystery is at present looking for a producer. Its theme is the CIA's supposed ignorance of Egyptian and Syrian preparations to attack Israel last fall.

People who know about such things believe that at least two European intelligence services deduced or guessed that an attack was coming and informed their governments —weeks in advance. Economic officials of the European Community warned members confidentially in July to expect a Mideast oil crisis by Christmas. Britain's Department of Trade and Industry was told by the Prime Minister's office early in August to be prepared for a fuel shortage provoked by military action in the Near East. Coupons for gasoline rationing were issued to British post offices before the end of the month, and oil imports were stepped up. By mid-October, when the fighting was at its peak, the immediate problem in Britain, France and some other Common Market countries was not to obtain petroleum but to find storage capacity for the stuff.

Consequently, it seems inconceivable that the CIA was left out in the cold, or that it failed to tell the White House what European services, if not its own agents, were anticipating. Yet, if Washington knew, why did it not alert Tel Aviv? Presumably, Israel would then have taken countermeasures, the war would have been much shorter, many lives would have been saved, and there would probably have been no oil embargo. For it was Egypt's initial military success, and President Anwar el-Sadat's heightened prestige, that persuaded Saudi Arabia and other Arab producers to join the victory parade and decree oil cuts.

One British view is that the White House did know what was coming but wished to shake Israeli complacency and allow Sadat a tactical success that would give him sufficent self-confidence to open peace talks with Israel and accept American assistance in exploring for oil and realizing his ambition to make Egypt a major refining and petrochemicals center. Whether or not this was the case, Sadat has in fact told his ministers that Cairo must attract U.S. capital and knowhow. His economic advisers would like U.S. petroleum experts to prospect the Libyan border zone north and south of the Siwa oasis (where five years of Soviet exploration failed to find oil) and the northern fringes of the Nile delta.

Other Arab governments are aware of this and are annoyed—the nominally "Left-wing" juntas of Syria and Iraq for ideological reasons, the Saudis because they are eager to acquire oil-based industries and suspect Sadat of cutting in on the relatively close relationship they have had with Washington in recent years. Some Saudis even accuse Sadat and American oilmen of wanting to keep Saudi Arabia underdeveloped, a mere exporter of energy to Western and Egyptian industry. Though the Saudi oil minister, Sheik Ahmed Yamani, does not go quite so far, he adopted an anti-American posture during his recent talks with European governments, warning them not to join the United States in a defensive grouping of consumer nations. The Saudis are now trying hard to attract Japanese and European investment. Their bait: cheaper petroleum than that available to industries established in Egypt.

Meanwhile, French officials interpret U.S. Mideast policy in cruder, more hostile, terms than the British. They believe Washington not only knew the Egyptian-Syrian attack was being prepared but decided to use it to reassert American economic influence in Egypt and provoke the oil producers into taking restrictive measures harmful to Western European and Japanese industry. Paris is convinced that the rapid industrial growth of the European Community and Japan in the past decade has given the U.S. a bad shock, and that Washington is grateful to the Arabs for having halted it.

Collusion Theories

SOME FRENCH commentators have, indeed, attributed the Mideast war and oil crisis to American-Soviet collusion. Contributors to *Le Monde* and other relatively sober papers have written of "a high-level plot between the Big Two" and "another Yalta." The purpose of the plot is allegedly to wreck the Common Market, to strengthen each superpower's hold on "its" half of Europe, and to partition the Near East. A second school of collusion theorists believes that Egypt will henceforth lie in America's sphere of influence, together with Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia; that the CIA will have a free hand to sort out Libya; and that Kuwait will in due course join Iraq, Syria, South Yemen and Somalia in the USSR's shadow.

This last theory is undoubtedly far-fetched. One does not need to be a collusion maniac to realize that the Soviet Union would not be sorry to have the United States share its Egyptian burden and may soon give priority to strategic and economic interests east of Suez. NATO officials take it for granted that when the Suez Canal is reopened, the Kremlin will double the size of its naval force in the Indian Ocean and try to improve on its present Iraqi toehold in the Persian Gulf.

The Soviets are becoming increasingly interested in Arab oil, which they need in order to keep their own oil exports flowing to Central and Western Europe. They imported 12 million tons in 1972 and plan to take 25 million tons this year, mostly from Iraq via a Western-built pipeline across Syria. (Both Iraq and Syria are, by a convenient coincidence, under the rule of military juntas that profess allegiance to the pro-Soviet Baath party.) Moscow pays for the oil with military hardware—a trade that may tempt it to stir the Mideast cauldron occasionally.

In October, the Kremlin urged

Baghdad to send troops to fight the Israelis. Now Soviet advisers are helping Iraq's Army plan a spring campaign against the irrepressible Kurds in the northern part of the country, whom Moscow supported until it needed foreign oil. Kurdish sources charge that the advisers are training Iraqis in the use of gas and another chemical weapon, and that the Army has taken delivery of thousands of Russian gas-masks. (I have no means of checking their claims. To date, gas has been used in Mideast conflicts only by the Egyptians during the late Gamal Abdel Nasser's campaign against the Yemenis.)

Kuwait—which, as I have noted, balances Egypt in some French collusion theories—is certainly becoming a focus of Soviet interest in the Persian Gulf. The emirate sent a military mission to visit Moscow in January; its Foreign Minister is expected to make a trip there; and Soviet officers are due to arrive in Kuwait soon. The USSR's Iraqi friends are eager for closer links with the Kuwaitis, but the latter are wary, remembering Baghdad's past schemings to take over their incredibly rich little territory.

The Kuwait government is hoping to buy a quiet life by subsidizing Palestinian organizations, taking over the Anglo-American Kuwait Oil Company, and paying for Syria's new Soviet arms and aircraft. It may succeed, though a number of Arabs assume that the territory will one day be part of Iraq. A Syrian Baathist said recently that his party would like to see a union of Iraq, Kuwait and Syria, and then added, "no doubt the CIA will break it up." He is probably in a minority, however. After the October War, there are not very many people around with that much faith in the CIA.

THE GUARDIAN MANCHESTER
9 April 1974

Old myths obstacle to unity of Left

From DAVID TONGE, Athens, April 8

EACH SUNDAY in recent weeks, Echo, the newspaper of the Greek armed forces, has published articles aimed at reviving memories of the country's bitter civil wars of the 1940s. It has been dragging from the cupboard such skeletons as the Communists' "kidnapping" of 28,000 children and their calls for the creation of an independent Macedonia. Now, it writes, "the aims are unaltered, but the tactics have changed, become more crafty, more treacherous."

The Communist Party has not been letting these attacks go unanswered and each Monday its foreign-based radio station, The Voice of Truth, has been giving the alternative view, pointing out, for instance, how the "kidnapping" was designed to protect the children from "re-education" in the royalist schools — though it was often without the parents' consent — and how the plans for an independent Macedonia were severely condemned by the party after the two brief periods when they were proposed.

This raising of old bogys reflects the extent to which the Greeks remain caught by their past. It is also indicative of the way that today the Communists are the most active of the groups opposing the present Greek regime, showing their strength particularly during the student and worker demonstrations in November last year.

Their powers have, however, been considerably reduced by the subsequent mass arrests and in particular by the seizing of key groups from the various sections into which the Greek Left, like other European Lefts, is divided.

The only group to have been left in relative peace, apart from a few members being deported, is the so-called Communist Party of the Interior — as against the pro-Moscow or Exterior Party — but this is less because the security police are unaware of its leaders than because they know this faction at present threatens less immediate danger to the regime.

There are, however, suggestions that the authorities may extend to this group the same practice of frequent short-term arrests as it applies to the other groups.

Such arrests harm the Left's chances of building up the organisation necessary to take advantage of the resistance opportunities which may emerge. But they do not affect the factors which contribute to the Left's appeal. Having benefited from the economic boom of the years 1967-72, urban workers are suddenly coming face to face with mounting unemployment and the worst inflation in the OECD and are beginning to understand that the Colonels' "economic miracle" benefited the rich more than the poor with the tax system increasing income differences rather than reducing them.

The unions offer little solace in this, as their leadership has been so purged since the 1967 coup that they fail to offer a viable channel of protest to those calling for social change. The regime appears to have been more concerned about further trouble from the students.

The students have been more concerned with political than economic problems but they too express a growing dissatisfaction with the opposition to the regime by the old political Centre. Instead, the wide availability of the standard text books of the Left and the 30 Eastern block radio broadcasts in Greek each day help to direct their opposition to the Left.

"When the regime considers every opponent an anarcho-Communist one can have few objections to becoming one," a recent visitor to Athens said.

The past seven years have helped to gain the Left the image of a party of social justice among the opponents of the Government which it seeks and which, in 1958, won it 25 per cent of the vote in Greece. But memories of the earlier history remain and the articles of Echo and other pro-regime newspapers seem designed to prevent them from fading.

Their results affect the whole political spectrum. They cause the armed forces to preserve the strongest traditions of the cold war, and contribute to the non-Communist opposition leaders avoiding talk of cooperation with the Left. They played a part in causing the Greek Communist Party to split in 1968.

Today members of the Left describe the new wave of anti-Communism as designed to make the unity of the opposition more difficult owing to bourgeois sensitiveness to the old myths. But even though leaders of the Communist Party of the Interior accept the need for the leadership to respond to what they describe as the growing unity of the base, the chances of unification seem remote. The Interior Party insists on the right to examine critically by itself international problems. It rejects the accusation that it is anti-Soviet but says that it is no unconditionally pro-Soviet — as it proved when it criticised the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.

More serious problems arise on internal matters. The Exterior Party refuses to accept that there are two parties. It is not prepared to adopt such flexible tactics as the Interior Party to obtain the cooperation of the bourgeois parties in forming a common front to call for the creation of a popularly based constituent assembly to settle the future direction and framework for the country.

It agrees with the Interior Party on the need to avoid isolated actions of resistance which separate the party from the people, as both consider that isolated explosions do. But whereas the Interior Party argues in favour of mass strikes as the "decisive weapon" in the struggle to force the regime to withdraw, the Exterior Party believes that more extreme methods may be necessary.

It argues with the Interior Party's line that socialism can be achieved in Greece through the parliamentary system, as Allende believed in Chile and Togliatti in Italy.

Until mid-1973 it was far less a force than the Interior Party but its control of most of the Eastern block radios contributed to its gradual build up so that now it has become a serious factor in Greece's fractured but uncrushed Left.

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, THURSDAY, APRIL 4, 1974

The Debate Over Diego Garcia

By Richard J. Levine

WASHINGTON—Diego Garcia is a tiny coral island in the middle of the Indian Ocean, lying a thousand miles off the southern tip of India and halfway around the world from Washington.

Isolated and uninspiring, the small hunk of British real estate would seem an unlikely candidate for attention in this crisis-oriented capital.

But a Pentagon plan to build a naval support base on Diego Garcia—unveiled in the aftermath of the Middle East war and the Arab oil embargo—has begun to generate a lively though limited foreign policy-national security debate here. Nixon administration officials see the proposed base as a logical and effective means of protecting America's interests in that part of the world, offsetting growing Soviet naval power. But some in Congress fear the base could lead to a U.S.-Soviet naval race in the Indian Ocean, an area that has been largely spared superpower rivalry, and eventually add billions of dollars to Navy shipbuilding budgets without enhancing U.S. security.

While U.S. Senators call for Washington-Moscow talks on naval limitations in the Indian Ocean, many of America's friends and foes denounce the Diego Garcia plan. In the end, the debate could provide important clues to how serious Congress is about playing a larger, more forceful role in foreign policy as America emerges from its painful decade in Vietnam.

"From our experience in Indochina, we know too well the cost of early, easy congressional and State Department acquiescence to Pentagon demands," says Sen. Claiborne Pell (D., R.I.), a leading opponent of the base plan. "We must profit from our past errors. Our handling of this authorization request for Diego Garcia offers such an opportunity."

Narrow Issues

Unfortunately, much of the debate thus far has focused on such relatively narrow issues as the comparative number of U.S. and Soviet "ship days" in the Indian Ocean and the length of the runway on the island. Often lost in the din of detail are the basic questions raised by the Pentagon plan—whether the U.S. should be involved in the project at all; whether, or how, U.S. interests are served by increasing the Navy's still limited presence in this far-off ocean; whether, as one former Pentagon planner put it, "we would be willing to let events take their course around the rim of the Indian Ocean."

Specifically, the Defense Department is asking Congress for $32.3 million to expand an existing communications station on Diego Garcia into a base capable of refueling and restocking U.S. warships, including aircraft carriers, operating in the Indian Ocean. The base would be manned by about 600 men and would enable the Navy to increase its Indian Ocean deployments—either routinely or in a crisis—without weakening its forces in the Western Pacific.

Yesterday the Senate Armed Services Committee postponed "without prejudice" a request for $29 million for Diego Garcia construction contained in a supplemental budget bill for the Pentagon—a setback that is likely to be challenged by administration supporters in the full Senate. And today the House is scheduled to vote on a proposal to delete the same $29 million from a companion measure.

To justify the U.S. buildup, the Nixon administration has stressed the expanding operations of the Soviet Navy in the Indian

Ocean (which Navy men expect to accelerate with the reopening of the Suez Canal) and the increasing reliance of the U.S. on Persian Gulf oil that must be transported across the Indian Ocean. "Our military presence in the Indian Ocean provides tangible evidence of our concern for security and stability in a region where significant U.S. interests are located," declares James Noyes, Deputy Defense Secretary for Near Eastern, African and South Asian Affairs.

By Pentagon standards, the Diego Garcia request is a mere pittance, less than one-third the price of a modern destroyer. Moreover, Defense Department and State Department officials have sought to downplay the potential long-range significance of the naval base by referring repeatedly to their plans for a "*modest* support facility."

Still, a number of lawmakers and outside experts remain uneasy, fearful that congressional approval of the construction money could prove a fateful step down an unmarked road toward yet another expensive and, conceivably, dangerous security commitment. Adding to their concern is the small-step-by-small-step pattern of U.S. involvement in the Indian Ocean: first a few warships; next a communications station; then a support base. Where, they worry, is it leading?

Despite administration assertions to the contrary, U.S. interest in the Indian Ocean has been rather limited until recently. Only three years ago, Ronald Spiers, then director of the State Department's Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, could tell Congress: "The Indian Ocean area, unlike Europe and Asia, is one which has been only on the margins of U.S. attention. Never considered of great importance to the central balance of power, it has been on the edges of great-power rivalry."

Since 1948, the U.S. presence in this part of the world has consisted mainly of the Middle East force—a flagship based in the Sheikdom of Bahrain and two destroyers that make periodic port calls. That such a modest force was considered adequate testifies to the low strategic importance Washington attached to the world's third largest ocean.

U.S. interest began building in the early 1960s. One result was the British Indian Ocean territory agreement between the United Kingdom and the U.S. in 1966, under which Washington acquired the basic right to build military facilities on Diego Garcia. Washington's interest quickened in 1968, with the British announcement of plans to withdraw military forces east of Suez and the appearance of the first Soviet warships. Since then, the Soviets have steadily increased their naval forces, and current navy estimates give them a four-to-one advantage over the U.S. in the Indian Ocean.

Soviet ships have also gained increasing access to port facilities. For example, Russian vessels currently use the expanded Iraqi port of Umm Qasr and the former British base at Aden; meanwhile, the Soviets are expanding their naval facilities at the Somali port of Berbera. "The Soviets possess a support system in the (Indian Ocean) area that is substantially more extensive than that of the U.S.," asserts Adm. Elmo Zumwalt, Chief of Naval Operations.

As the Soviet presence increased, the U.S. responded by sending carrier task forces into the Indian Ocean twice in 1971, in April and again in December, during the Indo-Pakistan war. Last October, a few months after the Diego Garcia communications station opened and as the Mideast ceasefire was taking effect, the Defense Department unexpectedly moved a task force headed by the carrier Hancock into the Indian Ocean.

On Nov. 30, Defense Secretary James Schlesinger, disclosing that the Hancock would be replaced by the Oriskany, announced that in the future the Navy would establish a "pattern of regular visits into the Indian Ocean and we expect that our presence there will be more frequent and more regular than in the past." Since then, major U.S. vessels have been in the ocean without letup.

Why? Administration officials offer a variety of explanations—to counterbalance Soviet "influence" on states around the Indian Ocean; to maintain "continued access" to vital Mideast oil supplies; to insure freedom of the seas; simply to demonstrate our "interest" in that area of the world.

The State Department emphasizes the diplomatic value of the Navy. "A military presence can support effective diplomacy without its ever having to be used," says Seymour Weiss, director of State's politico-military affairs bureau. Privately Pentagon officials, not surprisingly, place greater weight on the military value of warships in the Indian Ocean. The increasing U.S. Navy operations, a Navy man says, are needed "to show we are a credible military power in that part of the world."

But critics of the Diego Garcia proposal are troubled by these explanations, which, they believe, raise more questions than they answer.

Gunboat Diplomacy

Some critics wonder whether the presence of larger numbers of U.S. warships in the Indian Ocean will, as Naval Chief Zumwalt claims, help preserve "regimes that are friendly to the U.S." in the area. "Gunboat diplomacy doesn't really seem to work" in this age, argues a government analyst. Internal problems and economic assistance, he believes, have a much greater bearing on the political course followed by foreign governments. What is clear is that several states in the area—including Australia, New Zealand, India, Madagascar and Sri Lanka (Ceylon)—have publicly opposed the Diego Garcia support base, arguing that the Indian Ocean should be a "zone of peace."

Furthermore, there are some military experts who doubt that Soviet ships in the Indian Ocean pose a serious threat to Western tankers carrying precious Arab oil. In the opinion of Gene La Rocque, a retired rear admiral who often criticizes Pentagon policies, an attack on, or interference with, such shipping "doesn't appear to be a plausible action on the part of the Soviet Union when one takes into account such important factors as relative military power, time and distance and the

alternative means of exerting influence and power at the disposal of the Soviet Union."

Other military analysts have argued that it is highly improbable the Soviets would attack Western ships since such a hostile act would likely trigger the outbreak of a major war between the superpowers. Geoffrey Jukes, an Australian analyst, has written: "It is difficult to envisage a situation, short of world nuclear war, in which the Soviet government would be prepared to place the bulk of its merchant fleet at risk by engaging to 'interfere' with Western shipping in the Indian or any other ocean."

Much more likely, critics of the Diego Garcia plan stress, is a repetition of the recent Arab oil embargo, a political act designed to achieve political aims. It is argued that the presence of sizable naval forces can, at best, have only a minimal impact in such a situation.

Finally, there is the unsettling prospect that a base at Diego Garcia, coupled with increased naval depolyments in the Indian Ocean, will provide the Navy in years to come with new rationales for an "Indian Ocean fleet" and ever-bigger shipbuilding budgets, especially for carriers and escorts. The Navy, a Pentagon insider notes, "has been panting on the edges of the opportunity" represented by enlarged Indian Ocean commitments.

A Call for Negotiations

To prevent a costly U.S.-Soviet naval race, which might not enhance either nation's security, Sen. Pell and Sen. Edward Kennedy (D., Mass.) have jointly introduced a resolution calling for negotiations between the superpowers on limiting naval facilities and warships in the Indian Ocean.

As in the past, the U.S. remains reluctant to agree in writing to any restrictions on its use of the high seas. Moreover, U.S. officials say efforts to follow up a Soviet hint in 1971 of interest in naval limitation talks failed to produce a response from the Kremlin.

Still, in view of the potential long-range costs and dangers involved in an expanded naval presence in the Indian Ocean, it would seem worthwhile to pursue the matter further. For, as Sen. Kennedy has said, "It may in time prove necessary and desirable for the U.S. to compete with the Soviet Union in military and naval force in this distant part of the globe. But before that happens we owe it to ourselves, as well as to all the people of the region, to try preventing yet another arms race."

Mr. Levine, a member of the Journal's Washington bureau, writes on military affairs.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
27 March 1974

Naval rivalry in Indian Ocean

The Middle East October war, the oil crisis, and the projected reopening of the Suez Canal have combined to focus attention on the Indian Ocean as an arena of superpower naval rivalry.

And the littoral states, headed by India, are increasingly concerned about the actual and potential buildup of the Soviet and American navies in this vital expanse of water. Their concern has touched off a wave of protests against American plans to convert the existing U.S. communications station on the British-owned Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia into a naval support base able to handle long-range aircraft.

There are doubts now whether the American-British agreement on Diego Garcia will ever go through, not so much because of the outcry of the Indian Ocean states and their friends, but because of opposition to the agreement in the American Congress and the change of government in London.

Announced just before the British elections last month, the agreement had the full support of Edward Heath's Conservative government. It was the type of arrangement that the Conservatives, with their traditional concept of a global strategy to counter Soviet naval expansion, would back to the hilt. But the Labour Party, despite their desire to cultivate friendship with the U.S., has a different approach and is more sensitive to the feelings of the Indian Ocean countries. The new Labour government is now reviewing the agreement and the whole problem of superpower rivalry in the Indian Ocean.

In the meantime the Labour government in Australia, which sides with the Indian Ocean countries, has sought to place the matter on the agenda of the Kissinger-Brezhnev talks in Moscow by sending messages to the superpowers urging them to limit their naval operations in the ocean.

India and its neighbors say that the U.S. by developing the Diego Garcia base would be guilty of escalating the superpower navies already in the ocean. The U.S. contends that the base is needed to counter the Soviet naval buildup which has doubled in the past year and is likely to be further increased once the Suez Canal is reopened. It says a strong Western naval force is essential to protect the vital oil routes from the Persian Gulf, and the trade routes to the Far East.

It is the prospect of the presence in their ocean of nuclear submarines and nuclear-armed planes that worries the littoral states the most. Understandably enough they ask: Where will the naval race stop?

They point to the fact that the United Nations General Assembly in three resolutions since 1971 has declared the Indian Ocean a "zone of peace," and has called on the big powers to halt escalation of their military presence there and to keep the ocean free from military bases and nuclear weapons. The UN appeals have been ignored by the superpowers.

An agreement to keep the warships of all nonlittoral states out of the ocean is hardly realistic. But an undertaking by the superpowers to balance their forces there — and place a ceiling on them — would surely be feasible.

LOS ANGELES TIMES
7 April 1974

Proposed U.S. Base Seen as Threat in India

BY WILLIAM DRUMMOND
Times Staff Writer

NEW DELHI—Day in and day out, the biggest naval power in the Indian Ocean is, surprisingly, India.

However, if the Pentagon succeeds in convincing Congress to supply funds for setting up a naval installation on the tiny Indian Ocean Island of Diego Garcia, the United States will again gain a permanent foothold in this region and its naval strength would grow.

When the Suez Canal reopens, the Soviet Union is expected to boost its presence in the Indian Ocean by sending in vessels from the Black Sea.

From New Delhi's vantage point, successive rounds of naval buildups by the Russians and Americans would be bound to overshadow India's predominance in her own mare nostrum—our sea.

Fears that Indian prestige would be buried under a great power naval race lie behind New Delhi's outcry against the Pentagon's plan to spend $29 million expanding harbor and airstrip facilities on the British-owned island, 1,400 miles southwest of the southern tip of the Hindustan Peninsula.

India and a number of other littoral states have demanded that the entire Indian Ocean be declared a "zone of peace" —thus making it off limits to foreign warships.

To win support for its view, India has launched a diplomatic offensive.

New Delhi has successfully lined up such normally pro-American countries as Australia, New Zealand, Indonesia and Malaysia in the chorus of protests against a Diego Garcia naval facility.

Under the proposed ban on foreign men-of-war, India with her aircraft carrier Vikrant, two cruisers, six destroyers, 21 frigates and four patrol submarines would by default assume a permanent role as the leading naval power in the South Asian region.

While the United States' strategic case for the Diego Garcia facility is well known—to check Russian naval expansion around the oil-rich Persian Gulf—little attention has been paid to India's remarkable status as leader of world opposition to the plan.

One reason for this oversight is that American officialdom does not take the Indian protests seriously.

"Of course, the Indian leaders would rather not have this (Diego Garcia base), but their protests have been restrained and limited. They seem to be satisfying their own internal leftist constituency," said a senior American government source here.

"They are not going to let the Diego Garcia dispute stand in the way of the improvement in Indo-American relations," he added.

However, the cool self-assurance of American officials contrasts sharply with the emotional views of highly placed Indian sources, who in private talks revealed a deep-seated suspicion of American intentions in the Indian Ocean.

"Twenty-eight countries in the Indian Ocean area have memories of the white man ruling us," said a well placed Indian source, a responsible figure and by no means a leftist.

"It was the maritime rivalry between the British and French in the 18th century that brought the English rule here to begin with.

"We don't want that. Our memories of foreign occupation are fresher than our memories of the Second World War.

"The Americans say they want a balance with the Soviet Union. Well, you can have balance at a high level, or at a minimum level. India is advising a balance of no level."

The creation of a power vacuum has been the result of Britain's military withdrawal east of Suez in recent years.

New Delhi's ambition is to see that the void goes unfilled by another nuclear power.

While one third of the world population lives on the fringes of the 28 million square miles of the Indian Ocean, India is the largest and most powerful country in the area.

India's protests against foreign powers in the Indian Ocean have risen in intensity only in the last five years.

In 1963 when the 7th Fleet was reported cruising the Indian Ocean, New Delhi's reaction was mild.

India was then recovering from wounds inflicted by China in the 1962 border war and was receiving American military assistance.

Today, India is one of the chief backers of the 1971 U.N. General Assembly resolution declaring the Indian Ocean a zone of peace.

The motion passed 60 to 0, with 55 abstentions.

The United States, Britain, France and even the Soviet Union abstained.

None of the great maritime powers accepts the principle that traffic on the high seas should be interfered with in any way.

In December, 1972, Secretary General Kurt Waldheim set up a 15-nation ad hoc committee to suggest practical steps to promote peace in the Indian Ocean.

Last November, the U.N. Political Committee asked Waldheim to prepare a "factual statement" regarding military presence of the big powers in all its aspects.

This report is expected to be submitted at the next General Assembly session.

NEW YORK TIMES
17 April 1974

India Is Sinking Deeper Into Crisis and Anguish

By BERNARD WEINRAUB
Special to The New York Times

NEW DELHI, April 16—India, a democracy in anguish, is immersed in a deepening economic and political crisis marked by agitation, self-questioning and drift.

Food shortages, corruption, radicalism, inflation, indecision, oil prices, the sluggish bureaucracy, the population spiral, declining income, and lagging production have interlocked, creating a sense of gloom and cynicism.

What makes the crisis especially painful to critics as well as supporters of the Government is that the nation is a genuine democracy—a rarity in Asia—and its myriad problems are in part a result of an open system that combines free-wheeling politics and Government accountability with tough economic choices.

Prime Minister Indiar Gandhi, the dominant figure in the nation, concedes that India is facing a severe test but attributes the situation to forces beyond her control: increased oil costs, drought, labor and student tensions fueled by opposition parties, the rising expectations of tens of millions in a nation where 200 million earn less than $40 a year.

But a chorus of opposition places the blame squarely upon Mrs. Gandhi. They say that the 56-year-old Prime Minister, in power since 1966, has failed to shape a coherent policy, has tolerated bungling and corruption to keep her party in firm power, has surrounded herself with "courtiers" and inept advisors and, perhaps most significant, has been unable to articulate a realistic vision.

"The Prime Minister has no program, no world view, no grand design," B. G. Verghese, a former advisor to Mrs. Gandhi and now editor of The Hindustan Times, said in a recent attack on the Government. "Bereft of a frame, she has merely reacted to events and failed to shape them."

"Not since independence has the country faced such a deep and all-pervasive crisis as it does today," he added. "There are visible signs of disintegration. The rot has spread so far and so deep that it will not be easy to restore credibility to the Government."

Large-scale violence over food shortages and corruption in two Indian states—Gujarat, where 90 people have been killed, and Bihar, with 28 deaths—has underlined the discontent. "The general feeling is that something has gone very wrong somewhere," said Rajni Kothari, a prominent political scientist.

A sense of rot—it is a commonly used word these days—is pervasive.

The capital's electricity and water supply break down with increasing frequency. A businessman slams down his phone and says it is an official of the governing Congress party who is threatening him again with denunciation unless a job, set aside for an untouchable, is given to the politician's son. Wheat, sugar and milk are scarce except at rising black-market prices.

A member of Parliament asks a Cabinet minister about the source of the Congress party's recent campaign funds, and the minister replies that it is no one's business. A woman, asked by an airline steward to give up her front-row seat to a government official, says: "Why should I? They're all corrupt!

A farmer in Orissa says that his family lives on one meal every two days. A banker says: "It's more and more a soft so[illegible] start working at

10:30 a.m. and leave in the middle of the afternoon. There's no dynamism, no sense of effort. It's flabby."

The central problem of India—rooted poverty—remains unchecked and seems to be getting worse. For the third year out of four per capita income is expected to drop. Nearly 80 per cent of the children are malnourished. Consumption of food, edible oil and cotton cloth has declined. More than 70 per cent of the populace are illiterate. The educational system, which one critic terms callously neglected, is turning out men and women for the unemployment rolls at an astonishing pace. Over 70 per cent of the 140,000 doctors remain in the cities, and usually in the affluent districts, while 80 per cent of the people are in rural areas.

Inflation is the worst on record here, and there has been a 50 per cent increase in food prices in two years. This has jolted virtually all classes in a country where food costs may amount to 50 to 70 per cent of a family budget.

Coal Output Declines

Industrial production is expected to show no growth this year. Coal output, providing 70 per cent of industrial energy, is lagging because of sloppy management in the nationalized industry and railway bottlenecks.

In turn, the railroads are deteriorating, and a threatened strike may cripple the nation. Steel production, vital to economic development, slipped badly last year, and some plants are working at 20 to 40 per cent of capacity. Fertilizer plants, key to food production, are operating at less than 60 per cent of capacity, also because of inept management and shortages.

Food production is the most glaring omen. Minimum requirements are 106 million to 110 million tons of grain a year. Last year, mostly because of drought, production fell to 95 million tons, for the 1973-74 agricultural year, ending in June, the expectation is 103 million to 105 million tons, partly because of a Government policy that soured.

The Government's decision to take over the distribution of wheat resulted in a booming black market, angry resentment among farmers and traders and a breakdown in supplies. "Tampering with food for the sake of socialist ideology is dangerous unless a government knows what it's getting into," an economist said. "This Government didn't." Last month the Government scrapped the take-over.

Clearly India is suffering from some of the same ills as other countries, only more so. Oil bills this year may account for 50 per cent of export earning, compared with 20 per cent last year. The population of 508 million is increasing at 13 million a year and will probably reach a billion in less than 30 years.

The economic torpor seems symptomatic of deeper problems. Cynicism is rampant: The Government's socialist slogans and calls for austerity are mocked in view of bribes and corruption, luxury construction and virtually open illegal contributions by businessmen to the Congress party.

Said Mr. Varghese, the editor: "Radical rhetoric has become an affectation, a game, another gimmick, a promise of jam tomorrow even while inflation, corruption and economic stagnation are taking the bread out of people's mouths today."

The cynicism is breeding labor unrest and indiscipline among workers, who feel they are not sharing the fruits of the acquisitiveness and flow of money.

As for ministerial fumbling, Mrs. Gandhi's angriest critics maintain that she has surrounded herself with non-entities and "tired yes men." Disgruntled officials in the Government concede privately that the caliber of the Cabinet is poor and, more significant, that Mrs. Gandhi has retained men whose performance has proved dismal. Two key ministers are openly derided: Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed, the Food Minister, and D. P. Dhar, the Planning Minister.

"Of all the poverties facing India today it is the poverty of the mind that is the most serious," said G. K. Reddy, a leading commentator. "The politicians are a feeble and frightened lot, intellectually mediocre. They remain bogged down in their own inconsistencies as the country goes through political and moral confusion."

Her Popularity Soared

Three years ago Mrs. Gandhi toppled the old guard in her party and won a striking election victory. India's triumph over Pakistan in the Bangladesh war plus Mrs. Gandhi's populist slogan, "abolish poverty" and her radical rhetoric buoyed her to a level of popularity that seemed to surpass that of her father, Jawaharlal Nehru.

"She had tremendous guts and determination," a former senior official, commented. "People thought she could be a new Gandhi. But it all somehow got lost in the process of politicking. Gandhi was a rebel and a change agent. Mrs. Gandhi only turned out to be a rebel."

"You can't change India without paying a heavy social price — breaking up the caste and hierarchical system, trying to put an end to corruption, having the tenacity to identify and meet the problems," the official added. "We indulge in all the luxuries that a poor society can't afford. We resist change.'

What has gone wrong in the last three years? The impact of 10 million refugees from Bangladesh, the cost of the war with Pakistan and two subsequent years of drought have severely dislocated an already shaky economy. Drought relief, deficit financing and raises for Government servants have intensified inflation.

Critics of the Government increasingly discuss what they term India's self-created difficulties and man-made shortages. These include the failure to build irrigation facilities and fertilizer plants and continuing allocations of funds for heavy industries, such as steel, that are unprofitable and create little mass employment; a restrictive licensing policy that thwarts business growth and private investment; wildcat strikes; reduced coal production and the breakdown of the railways and power supplies; inept and unrealistic planning, projecting growth figures that planners concede are distorted; a mood of inertia, perhaps even paralysis, in government caused by Mrs. Gandhi's highly private and intuitive style.

Nehru's Paths Avoided

The critics say the Government is afflicted by factionalism, random-shot policies and a failure to involve state leaders in decisions or endow them with autonomy — paths that Prime Minister Nehru strenuously shaped.

"The kind of centralization that has taken place has paralyzed the normal processes of Bureaucratic functioning," said Mr. Kothari, a prominent political scientist. "Everyone knows how vital decisions on food, power, transportation and other key policy issues have been delayed and the economy brought to a near-standstill because top politicians, too involved in sorting out day-to-day pressures, have not been able to make up their minds. The upshot of all this is that the mechanism perfected by Mr. Nehru is not performing any longer."

Linked to this seems to be a loss of credibility by the Government and the Congress party and a gap between tough socialist rhetoric and deeds.

"The first thing the Government needs to do is establish its true identity, said Sham Lal, editor of The Times of India. "It is no use pretending what it is not. It cannot flick off the inhibitions which the middle-class character of the ruling party imposes on it. By feigning to profess something which it has neithe the will nor capacity to put into practice, it can only dither and vacillate."

The most enduring problems have been met, by all accounts, with only tentative steps. Included are the following:

LAND REFORM—Although this is pivotal to any major social and economic uplift, the government has been unable to achieve a breakthrough. Ceilings are on the books, but enforcement has been minimal.

FAMILY PLANNING — Because of Hindu and Moslem religious strictures, because of poverty and a lack of any social-security system, because of the dimensions of the problem and lack of resources, the Government, veering from policy to policy, has been unable to check population growth. Government spending on family planning, with 57,000 babies born daily, totals about $80-million a year.

CASTE—There are more than 80 million untouchables, the lowest Hindu caste, most of them steeped in misery and humiliation. The Constitution makes it illegal to discriminate against untouchables—a remarkable measure since untouchability is intrinsic to Hinduism—and the Government has established job and education quotas. But discrimination and violence against harijans, as they are now known, especially those seeking to improve their lot, remain a severe problem. One report says that more than 200 are murdered each year by upper-caste Hindus.

WASHINGTON POST
Sunday, April 14, 1974

Anti-Soviet Cairo Stand Upsets U.S.

By Jack Serkoff

PARIS, April 13—President Nixon has asked West German Chancellor Willy Brandt, due to visit Egypt later this month, to take a personal message to President Anwar Sadat saying, in effect, "be a little nicer to the Russians."

An informed source said Mr. Nixon made the request when he met Brandt at the memorial service for President Pompidou last week.

Disclosing the gist of the conversation, the source said that Mr. Nixon had conveyed the impression that the rapid deterioration of relations between Moscow and Cairo was beginning to worry the Americans almost as much as the Russians. Mr. Nixon's message to Sadat, the source said, points out that a frosty climate between the Soviet Union and Egypt is not likely to make the search for peace in the Middle East easier.

The message reflects American fears that growing alienation from Cairo will inevitably recult in even stronger Moscow backing of Syria. The Syrians insist that disengagement of Syrian and Israeli forces must be an integral part of an overal lsettlement, an attitude supported by the Soviet Union.

In Mr. Nixon's view, the kind of outspoken criticism Sadat has recently levelled at the Soviet Union is doing more harm than good.

Far East

WASHINGTON POST
7 April 1974

The Spies Who Came In From Sakhon Nakhon

By H. D. S. Greenway
Washington Post Foreign Service

SAKHON NAKHON, Thailand, April 6—What was a master spy novelist like John Le Carre, author of "The Spy Who Came in From the Cold" and "A Small Town in Germany" doing here in a small dusty town in northeast Thailand?

The average tourist in Thailand settles for Bangkok's floating market or maybe a day trip to the Bridge on the River Kwai. But John Le Caree was observed here inspecting a nondescript and deserted house, across the street from a gas station, with empty holes where the air conditioners used to be. Baleful water buffaloes watched him as he circled around the house taking notes and an occasional photograph.

Until a few months ago the house was the CIA headquarters in Sakhon Nakhon, 350 miles northeast of Bangkok. But in December the CIA's cover was "blown" in one of the more bizarre and embarrassing incidents in the history of espionage. A visit to the CIA house in Sakhon Nakhon, for spy fans, may rank one day with a trip to the Berlin Wall or a ride on the Orient Express.

Northeast Thailand is the scene of a sputtering Communist rebellion, and last December Thailand's premier and several newspapers received a letter purporting to be from a Communist rebel chief. The letter offered to negotiate with Thailand's new civilian government which came to power following student riots last October. But the letter had been sent by registered mail and the return address given the post office was none other than the CIA headquarters in Sakhon Nakhon. It seems that a CIA agent had given the letter to a Thai office boy to mail and, in an excess of zeal, the office boy had registered the letter. Thus was the offer to negotiate revealed to be a CIA forgery.

The Thai government was furious, students howled, protested and burned the American flag. The U.S. embassy owned up to the whole affair and said that "it was a regrettable and uauthorized intiative."

The new American ambassador, William Kintner, said that the local agent in Sakhon Nakhon had acted on his own initiative without anyone's authority in a "gungho" spirit. Kintner apologized to the government and the king and announced that the offending agent had been sent home and the Sakhon Nakhon office closed.

The number of persons in Thailand who believed the U.S. embassy's version of what happened could all quite comfortably sit on the back of one very small water buffalo.

But no one could say what really did happen. Sources here say that there were two CIA agents—both in their 30s "They never said what they actually did," one source said. "When you asked them they would say, 'Oh, a little of this and a little of that,' and we all figured they were into drug suppression."

According to our informant, the agents were seen on New Year's Eve and they asked some of their friends around for a drink the following afternoon. When the guests arrived the next day the agents were gone and were not seen again.

"It's called 'leaving in your socks' in the espionage business," Le Carre said, writing it all down. The CIA office stood locked and deserted for a while and in early January the news of the agents' departure broke in the Bangkok press. Finally, the Thai landlord asked the local Americans to come and take away their strange machines, according to our source, but none of the Americans left in town had any responsibility for the equipment and no one knew what to do. Our source thought the machines had something to do with codes and radios. At last, some Americans arrived to reclaim the equipment.

Some Thai youths broke in to steal the air conditioners, and today the house stands forlorn and empty.

Le Carre said that if he were writing a spy story about the whole affair he could not possibly have the agent write such a letter on his own without authority from his bosses in Bangkok. That would be too unbelievable.

More likely the letter had been written in Bangkok and sent to the agent for mailing so that it would have a northeastern postmark.

What about the mail boy registering the letter? We asked. Is it possible that a first-rate intelligence service like the CIA would make a stupid mistake like that?

"Oh yes, quite possible," Le Carre said with some delight. "It happens all the time. When indoubt about something like this assume a screw-up."

If he were to write a novel about the spies who came in from Sakhon Nakhon, Le Carre said he might assume two possible scenarios. If the operation were in the "clean tricks department," Le Carre said, the motive might have been to "put two imponderable forces into collision to see how both would react." There was Thailand with a new civilian government. A fake letter from the insurgents might bring a genuine response.

"I would also assume that the CIA had the means to observe the effect of this collision on the rebels, that the CIA was engaged here in reinfliltrating defectors back into the insurgent ranks."

If the CIA had burned a defector into their trousers, which is spy talk for blackmailing somebody into becoming a double agent, perhaps they had someone high up in the rebel ranks?

"If it were a clean trick it might have been a genuine effort to bring about conciliation," Le Carre said. If, on the other hand, it were a "dirty trick" the motive might have been to prevent negotiations by "interposing the CIA as a bogey between the two parties."

One can always tell a CIA house in northeast Thailand because, no matter how innocent-looking they are, they bristle with air conditioners. They often have big electric transformers outside as well—something to do with the radios and the code machines?

Of course, Le Carre did not claim to have any real knowledge of what happened here. He was merely looking at the plot with a novelist's eye.

"Suppose that somewhere in the world of signals they had broken down a code used by the rebels, or part of the code and they needed the rebels to broadcast a text which would give them the indicators . . ."

Le Carre was writing in his notebook as we headed out of town to Nakhon Phanom on the border with Laos, where there is a bigger and better CIA house still in operation.

NEW YORK TIMES
6 April 1974

Whose Ambassador?

The tendency for ambassadors abroad to lose contact at home after a while and to become in effect the spokesman to their own country of the government to which they are accredited is common and probably unavoidable. The extent to which this affliction has impaired the judgment of the American ambassador to South Vietnam, Graham Martin, is evident in his proposal that Senator Edward Kennedy not be given an "honest and detailed answer" to questions the Senator had raised about American policy in Indochina.

Ambassador Martin urged Secretary Kissinger to avoid "any substantive answer" to Senator Kennedy's letter because it "would permit another calculated campaign of distortion." He suggested that the letter could be answered in future testimony before "approriate" Congressional committees. Instead, Mr. Kissinger wisely ignored his ambassador's advice and sent Senator

Kennedy a 14-page letter responding in detail to all the questions posed.

It undoubtedly was within the prerogative of Ambassador Martin in a confidential cable to his superiors to challenge the motives of a Senator or his aides. The country has suffered in the past from the victimization of some diplomats, which led to others pulling their punches for many years. But it was not proper of Ambassador Martin to suggest a less than honest answer about basic policy matters to a member of Congress. In fact, it is characteristic of the contempt that many members of this Administration have shown for representatives of the American people, particularly in regard to Vietnam.

It was nothing short of outrageous for Ambassador Martin to suggest, even by innuendo, that those who favor holding down American military aid to Saigon are somehow linked to Hanoi's views or secretly desire Hanoi to take over South Vietnam. Secretary Kissinger has expressed disbelief that this was what Mr. Martin meant. But a direct denial by the Ambassador that he intended any such implication undoubtedly is in order.

WASHINGTON POST
13 April 1974

Clayton Fritchey

The Continuing Cost of Vietnam

In proclaiming March 29 (only two days short of April Fools' Day) as "Vietnam Veterans' Day," President Nixon once more assured the country that the long war he waged in Southeast Asia was America's finest hour, but he hastily added that he wouldn't let it happen again.

Apparently Graham Martin, his ambassador to South Vietnam, heard only the first part of the proclamation for, like U.S. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker before him, Martin is doing all he can to keep the United States deeply involved with Gen. Nguyen Van Thieu, the military dictator of South Vietnam, as he carries on the war with North Vietnam.

Considering Martin's dedication to Thieu's cause, it is not surprising to discover that he has secretly been advising the State Department to deny Congress an "honest and detailed" answer to inquiries about U.S. policy in Indochina.

In fairness to Martin, it must be conceded that his recommendation against dealing candidly with Congress is right in line with the policy pursued by the government for the last 10 years under both Mr. Nixon and former President Lyndon Johnson.

If Johnson had been open and above board with Congress and the American people, the United States would not have become involved in a shooting war in the first place; and if Mr. Nixon had also not practiced to deceive, it would not have been prolonged for four more years in the second place.

Ambassador Martin is alarmed because Sen. Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.) and a bipartisan group of fellow senators are resisting administration efforts to keep on pouring more billions of dollars in military and economic aid into Indochina and thereby sustain a war that was supposed to have ended on Jan. 27, 1973, when Mr. Nixon proclaimed "peace with honor."

Since then, it is hard to say whether there has been less peace or less honor, but, as the mounting casualties show, there has been a lot less of both. So much so that even that grand old cold warrior, Sen. Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.), has come to the conclusion that Vietnam is a bottomless pit for U.S. assistance. "Let's scratch it" is his advice.

Ambassador Martin, on the other hand, goes right on talking—almost word for word — as L.B.J. and Mr. Nixon did when they were trying to justify the expenditure of 500,000 American casualties and $100 billion in a prolongation of the Vietnamese war.

Even though the war supposedly ended more than 14 months ago, Martin urgently calls for increasing, rather than reducing, military and economic support for President Thieu's authoritarian government. Echoing countless old speeches by Johnson and Mr. Nixon, he says victory is just around the corner. All that is needed is just one more big U.S. push.

"To walk away from it just at this moment," he cabled Washington, would be disastrous. The United States, he warns, "would pay an enormous cost, a cost in its own self-respect, a cost in a turning inward in a new kind of isolationism which would provide enormous dangers for the people of the United States and for the peoples of the world." And so on, and so on.

After getting his hands on the secret Martin cable, which recommended against an "honest" response to congressional inquiries about the present state of things in Vietnam, Sen. Kennedy said, "The cable raises the most profound questions about which country and whose interests Ambassador Martin is truly representing."

Fortunately, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger did not take Martin's advice, but he is not in a position to remove the ambassador even though his usefulness is now largely compromised because, in the final analysis, the ambassador has merely been parroting the old Nixon line on Vietnam. The only trouble is that the parroting is a little crude and a little out of date. It makes Dr. Kissinger, who is sometimes wrong but seldom out of date, flinch a bit.

In the next fiscal year beginning July 1, the administration wants to spend about $3.5 billion in southeast Asia. This figure is more than the Administration plans to spend for foreign aid on all the other countries of the world combined.

It represents a boost of about 65% in aid for South Vietnam.

The Pentagon lobby is still the most powerful on Capitol Hill, but an increasing number of senators and representatives, alarmed over recession and unemployment in the United States, would rather spend those billions at home, and Ambassador Martin's inflammatory cablegram has stiffened their resistance.

WASHINGTON POST
10 April 1974

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

Hanoi's New Strategy in South Vietnam

A Communist document captured by government forces in Binh Thuan province on South Vietnam's central coast six weeks ago points to tragedy growing out of the Nixon administration's bungled campaign in Congress for continued aid to Saigon.

The document spells out unequivocally what the Communist high command in Hanoi really wants: "The revolution in South Vietnam can only be won by means of armed violence in close coordination with the political violence of the masses." This is not local bombast. Rather, the directive is based on a secret resolution setting out a muscular strategy for the entire south.

That sharply contradicts propaganda spread in Congress by radical "peace" groups that continued bloodshed in South Vietnam is caused by Saigon. Beyond that, the Communist strategy reveals the danger facing South Vietnam, if as now seems increasingly possible, it is threatened by drastically reduced U.S. aid. Thanks to failing resolve and uncertain leadership, the

root of the new Vietnam crisis is in Washington.

Early last autumn, U.S. intelligence experts still expected a massive Communist offensive this year from 210,000 North Vietnamese regulars in Northern and Western parts of South Vietnam. But the 21st Communist Party Conference in Hanoi decided Saigon's army was too strong. What resulted was a new strategy outlined in COSVN Resolution 13, secretly issued in December. In turn, COSVN 13 was incorporated in provincial directives, such as the guidelines sent out in Binh Thuan province.

The directive, dated Feb. 5, is remarkable, omitting the usual propaganda about general elections and a coalition government (required by the Paris peace treaty). Instead, it bluntly admits that Hanoi's political progress in South Vietnam since U.S. forces pulled out has been disappointing.

"The enemy temporarily has the upper hand," says the directive. ". . . Puppet soldiers are still plentiful" and are "still able to control populated areas." In contrast, Communist forces "are still weak and undermanned; the guerrilla warfare movement has not yet become strong." The answer: "push our attacks strongly in all areas."

As viewed here, such directives and other intelligence data mean the Communists will continue sharp military attacks locally this year while preparing for a possible general offensive in the future. In sum, Hanoi is not abandoning force as the means to unite Indochina; the strength of the Saigon regime has simply delayed the showdown.

The one factor that could advance the showdown is an economic breakdown, to which Communist headquarters have been alerting their cadre. A drastic, sudden reduction of U.S. aid would surely trigger such a breakdown. Thus, defecting Communists report that Hanoi's strategy is designed to undermine U.S. confidence in President Nguyen Van Thieu's government.

This dovetails with the campaign laid out last October when veteran radical Tom Hayden invited 200 anti-war activists to Germantown, Ohio, for a strategy session. The propaganda lines set forth then have been vigoriously relayed on Capitol Hill: the Thieu government, not Hanoi, is the aggressor and would collapse without provocation should the U.S. withdraw aid.

Even though such propaganda is contradicted by the Communists' own documents, it has found fertile soil in a Congress sick and tired of the Indochina burden. Hawkish leaders of a decade ago, such as Democratic Rep. Otis Pike of New York, have joined the aid slashers. In the Senate, old super-hawk Barry Goldwater has defected.

Joining this widening congressional fatigue is a combination of ineptitude and lassitude by the Watergate-obessed Nixon administration. No effective lobbying effort ahs been launched. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's letter to Sen. Edward M. Kennedy justifying the aid on the basis of private and verbal Paris peace agreements, did not help. Far worse was disclosure of an outrageous and self-defeating cablegram by the usually astute Graham Martin, U.S. Ambassador to Saigon, urging that Kennedy not be given an "honest and detailed answer" about Vietnam aid.

The major administration effort was a plea before a closed-door House Republican caucus March 26 by Vice President Ford. Shortly thereafter, the adminstration lost a critical test for more military aid on the House floor by 20 votes. Some Republican congressmen feel the anti-Saigon tide on Capitol Hill is so strong that even an all-out Nixon adminstration effort could not reverse it.

If so, the last chapter of the tragic Vietnam story may be drenched in irony. At the cost of so much American blood, treasure and political turmoil, the Saigon regime at last has established itself politically and militarily, as even Communists documents concede. Having reached this point, however, its worst threat now is not Hanoi's aggrssive designs but ineptitude and battle fatigue in Washington.

NEW YORK TIMES
7 April 1974

Once More, Defining the Commitment To Indochina

By LESLIE H. GELB

WASHINGTON—The scene has a strong sense of dejá vu: two American leaders engaging on the subject of the American commitment to Indochina.

Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Democrat of Massachusetts, has received a letter from Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. It is a response, dated March 13, 1974, to Mr. Kennedy's queries about American obligations and other matters concerning Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. The Senator reads these words:

"The U.S. has no bilateral written commitment to the Government of the Republic of Vietnam. However, as a signator of the Paris agreement . . . the United States committed itself to strengthening the conditions which made the cease-fire possible and to the goal of the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination. . . . We also recognize that we have derived a certain obligation from our long and deep involvement. . . . We have thus committed ourselves very substantially, both politically and morally. . . ."

Senator Kennedy issues a press release welcoming the secretary's candor, but calling it a "disturbing clarification of our present policy in Indochina." He says "it shatters the hope that we could finally disengage from our direct and often manipulative involvement . . ."

Was Mr. Kissinger's letter an enlargement of his or the President's other recent statements on this subject? Should Senator Kennedy have been surprised by the "clarification"?

Before the signing of the Paris accords, Mr. Kissinger was asked at a press conference how the agreement affected the American commitment. He answered that Washington would continue to provide economic and military aid as permitted by the accords. He added that the "United States expects all countries to live up to the provisions of the agreement."

The Nixon Administration feels it is committed to resist the forcible overthrow of the Saigon regime. The President and Mr. Kissinger have said this repeatedly. This assuredly came as no surprise to Senator Kennedy.

What did seem surprising was that Mr. Kissinger directly linked the present American commitment to the Paris accords themselves. Is there a basis for this? Here, from their known positions, is a hypothetical discussion of the question.

Mr. Kissinger apparently would argue that the accords carry with them an obligation by the parties to assure implementation. But critics would say that the accords are like a contract. Each party has the right, but not necessarily the commitment, to insure compliance. They would add that even if the Nixon Administration feels itself bound, the United States is not. The accords were not sent to the Senate as a treaty for approval. The Administration would answer that actions taken by the executive are binding on the nation.

The critics would respond that there is nothing in the accords that binds the Nixon Administration to an open-ended commitment. The responsibility for control and supervision is supposed to rest with a four-power international commission which was to work with the great powers, convened in an international conference, to guarantee the accords.

The Nixon Administration would retort that the international conference did not assume responsibility for guaranteeing the agreement and that the international commission cannot do more than bear witness to violations. Then, guaranteeing the accords is an American responsibility.

But apart from the Paris accords, does the United States have some kind of secret arrangement with Saigon? Mr. Kissinger's letter said that Washington had "no bilateral written commitment." But this does not mean that Washington has not given Saigon secret assurances.

Administration Threats

But what more could the Administration have said to

Saigon secretly than it has said or done publicly?

President Nixon publicly threatened reprisals should Hanoi launch a massive attack. American bombers are available in Thailand, Guam and on aircraft carriers. The law prohibits such action without Congressional assent, but Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Nixon have stated they might well seek such Congressional approval.

Aid has poured into Indochina. By Mr. Kissinger's figures, South Vietnam received about $3-billion in military aid during fiscal year 1973, over $1-billion in fiscal year 1974, and the request for the new year is for $1.45-billion. Economic aid is also substantial. Senator Kennedy claims the real figure is $3-billion for this year.

Washington still has 200 military and over 900 civilian personnel in South Vietnam, over 100 military in Cambodia, and 30 in Laos. Aid to Laos and Cambodia totals in the hundreds of millions.

Few legislators have called for a cessation of military aid to Saigon. Editorial writers and students seem to have lost interest in Indochina.

Former Secretary of Defense Clark M. Clifford is one of the few prominent exceptions. He continues to preach that the only way to end the on-going war is to dump President Nguyen Van Thieu, and that the way to do that is to stop supplying the military forces that sustain him. In this way, Mr. Clifford has said, a neutralist government would emerge in Saigon which would negotiate a settlement with the Vietcong.

The Administration says that stopping military aid would lead to a takeover in the south by the Vietcong and Hanoi, depriving the people of South Vietnam the free choice over which the war was fought in the first place.

WASHINGTON POST
15 April 1974

U.S. Aid Still Heavy In Cambodia

By Jack Foisie
Los Angeles Times

PHNOM PENH—The United States now is spending more than $1.5 million daily in military and economic support for the embattled government forces in Cambodia.

This is about the same level as American support in Vietnam in early 1965 before the United States entered the war with combat forces.

Except for dollar imput, however, no one is suggesting there is a parallel in U.S. involvement here. The American determination to avoid direct participation in any futher Asian conflict is well known—and is accepted—by Khmers here.

The hope remains that American generosity will continue at its present flow, or even increase, Cambodian officials emphasized.

Seeing the Lon Nol government through its present peril is also the desire of the American official establishment here—military an ddiplomatic — which is limited by congressional edict to no more than 200 persons.

"It's a moral obligation, as I view it," said one American official.

While Cambodia's civil war was triggered by the ouster of Prince Norodom Sihanouk in 1970, no evidence was surfaced to support claims that the upheaval had American backing. The moral obligation began, the official said, when "American forces from Vietnam crossed into North Vietnamese sanctuaries in Cambodia and the war here became general."

American intentions are of particular interest in Phenom Penh at the moment because of the arrival of the new U.S. ambassador, John Gunther Dean. Fresh from service in Laos, where as No. 2 diplomat (the Ambasadorship was open), Dean is credited with being a skillful middleman negotiator who helped bring about the just-formed coalition government in Laos composed of wartime enemies.

So the youthful Dean—who like Dr. Henry Kissinger is a German-born, naturalized American—comes to his new assignment with the laurel of "peacemaker." However, for the time being it seems apparent that he must continue current American policy of helping Lon Nol make war.

Dean is just settling in and not ready to express opinions. But other diplomats contend there still is a pressing need for Non Nol to demonstrate that the rebels cannot impose their will militarily—that a negotiated settlement is the only solution.

Already controlling four-fifths of the countryside and about half of Cambodia's 8 million people, the insurgents were believed ready to deliver knockout punches against government-held cities and towns during the dry season, now within a month of ending.

While the pressure on embattled government forces continues, the resiliance of the Lon Nol forces has upset the pessimistic predictions of observers made last fall. It was in August that American bombing in support of government forces ended, at the demand of Congress, and the Cambodian government army was left to fend entirely by itself in combat.

However, without American-provided rice and an ever-increasing supply of ammunition and replacement weapons for government forces, Lon Nol's defense of this capital city and most of the provincial towns would soon collapse.

Despite congressional restrictions on U.S. activities in Cambodia, the American diplomats, aid people and military men (they wear civilian clothes most of the time) are experts in the manipulating arts most of them practiced in Vietnam, and particularly in Laos. They are bending, without busting, the restraints put upon them by legislative act, bureaucratic instruction and congressional resolution.

With a crusader's zeal, and buoyed by the grit and somewhat improved performance of Cambodian forces in the field, the Americans happily operate in the "gray area" of compliance with orders.

A furor arose in Congress recently when Washington Post correspondent Elizabeth Becker identified by name an American officer who she said was advising a Cambodian unit—a violation of congressional declaration. With 76 members of the U.S. "military equipment delivery team" and 27 American military attaches in Cambodia, half are out in the field every day doing their job—checking the distribution of U.S. military equipment to government forces and seeing how the war is going. The difference between that and "advising" is zero.

It is remarkable that there haven't been any official Americans killed in the field recently. One of these days, there could be. Those who are in Cambodia—buoyed also by evidence of some disarray in the insurgent structure and not just confusion in government ranks—accept that slight risk.

Is the congressional ceiling on U.S. official presence in Cambodia really being limited to 200 persons? The computers say it is.

From lessons learned in Laos, the U.S. establishment here knows how to do without Americans. They used foreigners such as Filipinos, Koreans and Thais in some-slots. The foreigners are paid well and also are usually veterans of Laos and Vietnam. The only limit on their number is that the influx makes the Cambodians indignant at so many "job-stealers" from other parts of Asia.

With Cambodian refugees now numbering over 200,000, the U.S. aid mission has taken over much of the responsibility and virtually all of the funding for their relief. But except for Jack Williamson from Laos and a small staff, the care-and-feeding has been allocated to a half-dozen private relief organizations. In that way, the Americans keep under the congressional ceiling.

Another involvement that bends, but does not break, restrictions is the use of "day-time temporary-assignment" people. Air America and other contractors fly in from Thailand bases to do their daily chores. They don't count on the roll of officially paid Americans in Cambodia.

With all the effort, with all the money pouring in, there are still seething problems. Knowledgeable Americans with insights into Cambodia practices, contend that top-level corruption, particularly among the military, remains rampant.

Western Hemisphere

BALTIMORE NEWS AMERICAN
4 APR 1974

U.S. Will Downplay New Ties with Cuba

By JOHN P. WALLACH

WASHINGTON — The administration has set the stage for a mid-April shift in U.S. Cuban policy, with assists from the Mexican foreign minister and unprecedented, secret use of the U.S. Air Force.

The White House is expected to soft-pedal the policy change largely because of the domestic explosiveness of any action to renew ties with Cuba. The initial step will resemble the economic one taken when the United States first began to seek better relations with Communist China.

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger is expected to announce, in a policy speech when the Organization of American States (OAS) holds its next foreign ministers meeting in Atlanta, that the United States is bowing to the will of many Latin nations to remove trade obstacles, chiefly the 12-year-old OAS embargo.

Kissinger already has informed several Latin foreign ministers that he will reach a decision, before their meeting, on the precipitating issue—the request of the U.S. big-three auto manufacturers and Studebaker-Worthington, in separate deals, for government licenses to make multi-million dollar sales to Cuba. Kissinger has invited the Latin ministers to Washington for "consultations" beginning two days before the Atlanta conclave in April.

The U.S. Air Force last month provided eight officers, including two navigators with colonel rank and several pilots, to fly Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, aboard his Russian-built jet, to Havana.

This hush-hush operation—with Brezhnev's plane landing at Homestead Air Force Base near Miami both going and coming from Moscow—was ordered by President Nixon to facilitate the Soviet leader's Cuban visit.

Nixon last week also okayed use of a similar Air Force team to fly the Vatican's foreign ministers to Cuba.

Mexican Foreign Minister Emilio Rabasa late Monday sped from Havana to Acapulco, with less than a four-hour stopover in Mexico City to brief President Luis Echeverria, so that he could report to the honey-mooning Kissinger on his Cuban mission.

Rabasa's secret intermediary role was mapped during a four-hour meeting in Washington just prior to the Mexican summit of Latin American foreign ministers attended last month by Kissinger.

Rabasa, the first Mexican foreign minister to have visited Cuba in 30 years, spent four days in Havana and conferred twice with Premier Fidel Castro.

Kissinger, after a one-hour White House session with Nixon, indicated to Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko last month that the United States no longer opposed a Latin move to end the embargo. Moscow strongly desires any move that would help end its million-dollar-plus daily bankrolling of the Castro regime.

Gromyko—flying directly from Homestead, courtesy of the Air Force—stopped in Washington after Brezhnev returned to the Soviet capital. While in Havana, the Soviet leader delivered a stern warning to Castro that his days of "exporting revolution" must be ended.

That was interpreted by Cuban analysts here as a clear prodding to Castro to get on with the process of normalizing ties with the United States. The Soviet "gentle shove," as one official here called it, may in fact have pursuaded Castro to make the next move.

In response to numerous administration proddings, Cuba floated what appeared to be a trial balloon earlier this year when Havana's ambassador to Mexico implied only the embargo prevented the start of U.S.-Cuban negotiations.

"We are not in a holy war with the United States," Ambassador Fernando L. Lopez Muino said. "We would be willing to talk to the United States, given a single and irrevocable condition—that it end the blockade of Cuba."

It was shortly after this apparent Cuban "feeler" that Kissinger met for four hours with Rabasa, the Mexican gobetween. In 1964 Mexico was the only OAS member to resist U.S. pressure to break relations with Castro's Socialist government.

"The ingredients are most intriguing," a high State Department official said when asked about the meaning of these developments. He disclosed only that the auto deal had gone to the White House, where Nixon reportedly will make the final decision.

"The atmosphere has been created to force a decision," the official said. "The Latins are expecting to be told something when they come here for two days of talks before the Atlanta session. Kissinger implied, if not actually committing himself, to a decision before they meet again."

The sales by American corporate subsidiaries in Canada and Argentina are thought likely to take place, with or without Washington's consent. Like the China model, more trade would be seen as a step toward enventual diplomatic relations or what Latin specialists call bringing Cuba back into the Western Hemisphere's "family of nations."

The embargo on trade with Cuba was proclaimed by President John F. Kennedy on Feb. 3, 1962, "in light of the subversive" activities "publicly proclaimed" by the "Sino-Soviet government of Cuba."

Under the Trading-with-the-Enemy Act, the embargo applies to foreign subsidiaries of U.S. corporations as well as to the parent companies. American directors of those subsidiaries are said to be liable to the act's penalties of 10 years in prison and $10,000 fine.

The $150 million sale of 44,000 cars and trucks would be made by Argentine plants of Chrysler, Ford and General Motors as part of a $1.2 billion trade agreement between Argentina and Cuba.

The $14 million deal for 25 new diesel locomotives and the reconditioning of nine old ones involves MLW-Worthington, Ltd., of Montreal. It is 59 per cent owned by Studebaker-Worthington, Inc. of New Jersey.

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Status of Justice in Chile Worries Many Backers of Junta

By JONATHAN KANDELL
Special to The New York Times

SANTIAGO, Chile, April 17—The legality of Chile's current Government and the state of justice in Chile continue to trouble a growing number of supporters of the new regime.

More than seven months after the military coup in which the junta took power, lawyers, judges and clergymen say privately, and even publicly, that human rights are being violated daily.

One notable exception to this view is the Supreme Court, most of whose members share the opinion of the court's president, who holds that the Government of President Salvador Allende Gossens, who died during the coup, had "lost its legality by constitutionally dubious actions, and that human rights are being fully safeguarded by the new junta.

With the beginning today of the trials of 57 air force officials and 10 civilians accused of having attempted to aid the Marxist Allende Government and its member parties before the coup, the military courts will be put to a public test.

There have been widespread charges of mistreatment and torture of prisoners. The number of persons detained for political reasons has dropped from a high of more than 10,000 to a figure closer to 6,000, according to church sources providing legal aid. But there are still numerous cases of arbitrary arrests and of

persons being detained indefinitely without formal charges or access to family or lawyers.

Judicial Branch in Retreat

The judicial branch — from the Supreme Court down — has steadily retreated before the growing executive power of the Government to a point where civilian courts have virtually declared themselves incompetent to deal with the cases of thousands of people who have been placed under detention for political reasons.

The military courts, which have tried hundreds of civilians in closed sessions in recent months, appear frequently to be violating the rules set forth in the military code of justice, according to lawyers familiar with some of these cases.

It is generally acknowledged, however, that deterioration in the Chilean court system began during the Allende years. Although the country has had one of the strongest legal traditions in Latin America, the courts were drawn into the political polarization between Marxists and anti-Marxists that was evident throughout Chilean society during Dr. Allende's Presidency.

Judges ordered workers to evacuate illegally seized factories and peasants to return illegally occupied land. But almost invariably the Interior Ministry refused to authorize the police force to carry out the orders.

During the final months of the leftist Government, Dr. Allende and the Supreme Court exchanged acrimonious public letters and Government officials and supporters dismissed the court system as reactionary.

Only weeks before the coup, the President of the Supreme Court, Enrique Urrutia Manzano, a crusty, conservative septuagenarian, virtually legitimized a future military uprising by expounding the thesis that the Allende Government, though legally elected, had "lost its legality by acting on the margin of the law."

A few days after the coup, Justice Urrutia welcomed the junta members to the Supreme Court chambers and declared:

"This Supreme Court, which I have the honor of presiding over, receives your visit with satisfaction and optimism, and appreciates its historical and judicial value."

President Augusto Pinochet Ugarte responded by reasserting the junta's intention to preserve the autonomy of the judicial branch—in marked contrast to its dissolution of Congress and its disbandment of political parties.

"Dr. Urrutia and the Supreme Court have set the tone for relations between the judicial branch and the junta," a Court of Appeals judge said. "There has been an unstated desire throughout the court system to try not to clash with the executive power."

As recently as a month ago, Justice Urrutia asserted that human rights were "fully respected in our country." He has made similar statements in trips abroad to defend the junta.

The Supreme Court has also presided over the dismissal of at least 15 lower court judges appointed during the Allende years. Although this number is a small fraction of the court system, a few judges have asserted that the message has not gone unheeded among their colleagues.

Most important, a number of landmark decisions by the Supreme Court have effectively handcuffed lower courts in dealing with the human rights of political prisoners.

Perhaps the most significant decision came last month in a case involving a 15-year-old boy who was arrested and has been detained incommunicado without formal charges since Dec. 19.

A Court of Appeals had approved a motion of habeas corpus, ordering the Interior Ministry to make known the charges against the boy, or release him.

In an appeal to the Supreme Court, the Interior Minister, Gen. Oscar Bonilla Bradanovic, acknowledged that no formal charges existed against the boy but alleged that he had been a member of the Communist party since the age of 11 and that he was being held "as a preventive measure" in "defense of the state."

The Supreme Court upheld the Interior Minister and ruled that under the state of siege declared by the junta the authorities had the right to detain minors for whatever reason and for as long they deemed necessary.

The Supreme Court went even further in declaring that "the motives for the decree of arrest are the executive concern of the authorities."

According to Judge Ruben Galesio of Santiago's Court of Appeals, the civilian courts can now legally exercise control over the executive power only by demanding that arrests be made on the basis of decrees issues by the Minister of Interior, and by ascertaining that detained pesons are brought before a military court within 48 hours, as required by law under the state of siege.

Violations Acknowledged

Yet he acknowledged that in practice "many areests" were made without any sort of decree, or that decrees were signed days after a person had been detained. Further, he note that the authorities rarely brought detainees before a court within 48 hours.

"Often we cannot even find out who made the arrest and where a person is beingheld," he said.

He added that hundreds of motions for habeas corpus had been ignored by the autorities and the courts, including a motion filed in his court last month by leading representatives of the Roman Catholic and Protestant churches and the Jewish community on behal of 131 persons woo were arrested during the months since the coup and have not been heard from.

The pervasive feeling of helplessness in the face of the authoritarian junta has led lawyers and judges to justify their conduct on the grounds of the "lesser evil."

Thus thousands of workers have illegally been dismissed from their jobs for poltical reasons or unproved charges of "extremism," while the labor courts accept new decrees by the junta arbitrarily expanding the grounds for dismissal of laborers.

In the universities, where thousands of students and hundreds of professors were suspended under an anti-Marxist purge after the coup, law professors served as "prosecutors," receiving written or oral denunciations of reported extremists. Tht accused were not allowed to face their accusers.

"If I don't do this, somebody worse will," said a professor of constitutional law, explaning hi decision to act as a prosecutor in a science department of the University of Chile. "The way I see it, it is a choice between throwing out some innocent Marxists and throwing them all out."

Now that the meting out of justice has shifted to the military courts, the same feeling of acquiescence is evident among civilian defense attorneys.

Lawyers have noted that even under the state of siege, the Constitution does not permit a military court to try individuals for alleged crimes committed before the state of siege was put into effect.