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No. 19 6 DECEMBER 1974

SPECIAL

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U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Dec. 2, 1974

SPOTLIGHT ON CIA

What It Is . . . What It Does

Is spying on enemies and friends, or subversion of governments, immoral? Mr. Colby was invited to visit the magazine to give editors his first comprehensive interview dealing with CIA's worldwide operations.

Interview With William E. Colby, Director of Central Intelligence

Mr. Colby's first involvement in intelligence work was in the Office of Strategic Services in World War II. He then earned a law degree from Columbia Law School, and in 1950 joined the CIA. He served in Rome, Stockholm and Saigon, and as head of the Agency's clandestine services. He became Director of the CIA on Sept. 4, 1973. He appears, at right in photo, in the conference room of "U. S. News & World Report."

Q Mr. Colby, many people around the world question the moral right of the Central Intelligence Agency to spy on friendly countries, as opposed to countries that are potential enemies of the United States. How do you answer that?

A First, it's hard to distinguish so clearly between friends and potential enemies, as over our history a number of countries have been both. But basically the question comes down to the concept of state sovereignty and the right of a country to protect itself, which have long been recognized as part of international relations. That includes the right to carry out such operations in the world as are believed necessary for self-protection.

I think that moralists over the years have accepted some degree of clandestine work as part of the normal relationship between states. In any case, is spying any less moral than developing great weapons systems, or many of the other things that nations do in their self-interest?

Q How do you decide whether to operate in a friendly or neutral country?

A The decision concerning any intelligence operation is determined by the answer to four questions: What is the importance to our nation of the intelligence result being sought? What is the risk of exposure? What would be the impact of exposure? And how much does it cost?

In most open societies, you don't have to conduct clandestine operations to get information. So you would be foolish to run the risks and absorb the costs of a clandestine mission. Obviously, in a friendly country the adverse impact of exposure would be very great. So that is a very negative factor. But there will be situations in some parts of the world where a well-conceived, low-risk operation is necessary to get some information which could be terribly important to us.

Q What about covert operations such as the one the CIA conducted in Chile before the overthrow of Allende?

A Again, it's a matter of the United States taking a decision that a certain course of action is important in the best interests of our country, and friendly elements in another one. There have been exposures before. The U-2 [spy plane] operation, of course, is a notable example.

Q Do you, as the Director of the CIA, decide that a covert operation, such as against Chile, should be conducted?

A These decisions are very carefully structured. The authority for them stems from the National Security Act. This authorizes the CIA to carry out such other functions and duties related to foreign intelligence as the National Security Council may direct.

Furthermore, we explain to our congressional oversight subcommittees in general how we propose to use the funds that are appropriated annually for the CIA. We provide the most-sensitive information and have no secrets as far as these subcommittees are concerned. I don't necessarily describe each operation in each country in detail, but if a member of these subcommittees asks what we are doing in any particular country, I'll give him a full and fair picture.

Q Who actually makes the decision that a covert operation should be undertaken?

A The actual operation is approved by a committee of the *National Security Council*—the Forty Committee. If there is high-level policy concern about the situation in some country, we in CIA look at it and see what we might do that would help implement national policy. Then we go up to the National Security Council and say, "Here is what we think we can do to carry out the general policy with regard to that country." If the proposal is approved, we go ahead and carry it out.

I'm not suggesting that CIA has been pushed or shoved into undertaking actions of this sort; it's part of our job.

Q Is clandestine activity the major element in CIA activity—even in these days of détente?

A To answer that question, we have to stand back and examine what the United States intelligence "community" includes. It embraces the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the intelligence services of the Army, Navy and Air Force, the intelligence units in State, Treasury and the Atomic Energy Commission, and the FBI. All of these agencies collaborate on the intelligence job.

After all, intelligence consists essentially of the collection of information—by overt, technical and clandestine means—the assessment of all this information, and deriving conclusions and judgments about what is going on or is likely to go on in the world.

In 1971, President Nixon said that the Director of Central Intelligence should take a leadership role in this whole effort. And I've tried to do this.

Essentially I have four jobs:

One of my jobs is to be head of the intelligence community. Apart from the CIA, I don't have full authority over these other agencies, but I do have certain influence on them because of my responsibility to report on what they are doing.

A second job is running the CIA.

Third, I have to be substantively informed about situations around the world so that I can provide briefings, information and assessments to the National Security Council.

Fourth is the job of acting as a kind of public spokesman and handling problems like our recent troubles.

Now, to get back to your question: By reason of the way the community is structured, clandestine activity, most of which is clandestine collection rather than covert political or similar action, does represent a considerable percentage of CIA's activity. But if you measure it against the whole of the intelligence community, it's a rather small percentage of the total community effort.

Q Has détente changed the character of your work or reduced the need for clandestine intelligence?

A I wish it would. If you get to the logical end of détente, then we would have established a relationship with the Soviet Union of mutual respect for each other's strengths, so that our differences can be negotiated about rather than fought over. This, in turn, should encourage the Soviets to believe that they ought to be more open with their information. But that's not the situation now.

Today the Soviet attachés can go to almost any newsstand in this country, pick up a copy of a technical aviation or space magazine, and from it learn a vast amount of detail about our weapons systems. Unfortunately, we have to spend hundreds of millions of dollars to get comparable information about the Soviet Union. We couldn't fulfill our responsibilities to

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Congress and the nation unless we did spend those millions of dollars gathering that information.

Q **There is pressure for CIA to restrict itself to the collection of foreign intelligence such as you've described, and abandon covert operations—that is, aiming at the overthrow of governments. How do you react to that idea?**

A Given the state of the world today, the Capitol would not collapse tonight if the CIA were not permitted to conduct such covert operations any longer. In fact, we do considerably less of these than we did during the worldwide confrontation with the Soviets and the expansionist drive of the Communists in the 1950s. And we do considerably less than during the period in the '60s, when we were dealing with Communist insurgency and subversion in a number of countries. Changes in the world situation and our national policies have decreased such activities. We still do some; but covert actions of this type are a very small percentage of our total effort at the moment.

Q **Why is it needed at all?**

A There are a few situations where a little discreet help to a few friends of the United States or a little help to a few people espousing a certain policy or program in a foreign country can enable us to influence a local situation in a way that may avert a greater crisis in the future.

And times change. We might be faced with a real need for early, quiet influence against a rising threat, which otherwise we might have no alternative than to meet by force later. We no longer want to send the Marines to such situations. I think this flexible tool is important to preserve so that we can use it if we have to.

Q **Do you assume that undercover agents from friendly countries are operating in the United States?**

A Certainly I do. The FBI has identified a number in the past.

You have to recognize that, in dealing with a lot of countries around the world, it's accepted that we all engage in the clandestine gathering of intelligence. Nobody gets emotional about it. It's been going on since Moses sent a man from each tribe to spy out the Land of Canaan.

Q **There has been some comment that budget cutbacks have hurt intelligence gathering to the point where Secretary of State Kissinger goes into talks with the Russians with inadequate information. Is there any truth in that?**

A We obviously are suffering budgetary pressures from inflation. I think we are still giving a very good intelligence product to our Government. I have great confidence in it.

There have been some projects that we have turned down because they were totally out of reach financially. These have been in the category of things that would have made our intelligence more complete, but I don't think that we have yet dropped below a danger line. I don't think it has imperiled our ability to negotiate.

However, as we look ahead a few years, we do have a problem coming up because of the inflationary squeeze. We've tried to respond to this by focusing our effort on the more-important things and dropping off the things that we may have needed in a different world.

Q **Where have you been able to cut back?**

A Luckily, today we are not required to maintain the scale of effort that we did in Southeast Asia, for example. Our problems in some of the other parts of the world are more manageable than they were when we were deeply concerned about a large number of countries that were under pressure of Communist subversion or insurgency. The impact on the world balance then could have been quite substantial if any one country had made a change in political direction.

Today, I think the world balance is a little more stable, at least with respect to major military threats to our country.

The real challenge for intelligence is to provide the kind of information that enables us to negotiate and enables us to anticipate future developments in countries that would be of great importance to us. Obviously, the subject of economics has become more important in the past few years. Terrorism has become a threat to the safety of our citizens. Also, the narcotics problem has grown in the past few years. But other situations correspondingly have declined, and we've been able to compensate.

Q **Mr. Colby, the CIA has been widely criticized for its *involvement in Watergate*—**

A The CIA did two wrong things in the Watergate affair: The first was providing Howard Hunt paraphernalia for use in his work for the White House. The second was providing White House employes the psychological profile of Daniel Ellsberg. They weren't earthshaking, but they were wrong. We shouldn't have done them, and we have told our employes that we won't do them again.

Q **If someone called today from the White House and asked the CIA to do something improper, what could you do about it?**

A Well, that's very clear. In my confirmation hearing on July 2 last year, I said that if I was ordered to do something improper, I would object and quit if necessary. That's easy. Also our employes have been instructed that if they have any question about anything that they are asked to do, they are to come to me.

If anybody really tried to misuse the CIA in the future, I think the organization would explode from inside. It really would. And that's good, because it's the best protection we have against this kind of problem.

Q **Do you operate at all inside the United States?**

A We have no internal-security functions or police or law-enforcement powers. It is clear that our function is only foreign intelligence.

What do we do inside the United States?

We have a large building up on the Potomac River with a lot of employes. In order to know something about them before we hire them, we conduct security investigations. We also make contracts with people around the country to supply us with things that we can use in our activities abroad. And we have contracts for research projects so that we can expand the base of our knowledge.

We have a service in our agency that talks to Americans who may have knowledge of some foreign situation that they are willing to share with their Government. We identify ourselves as representatives of the CIA, and we assure these Americans that they will be protected as a source—and we will do so. But we don't pay them and we don't conduct clandestine operations to obtain such intelligence from Americans.

We have some support structures in this country for our work abroad. We also collect foreign intelligence from foreigners in America. This is intelligence about foreign countries and has nothing to do with protecting the internal security of this country against those foreigners. That is the job of the FBI, with which we have a clear understanding and good co-operation as to our respective functions.

Q **A number of Congressmen complain that there is no effective control over the CIA. Is there any reason why your agency shouldn't be subjected to tighter supervision?**

A I think we have responded to Congress's right and desire to know about the details of our activities over the years in the form that Congress itself has arranged. Now, the arrangements we have with our oversight committees in Congress are a lot more intense today than in past years. Twenty years ago, all of this was considered a very secret affair. Today, Congress is much more demanding. We answer any questions our oversight committees ask, and I must volunteer to them matters they might not know to ask about. That's the way Congress wants it, and we are responding. If we didn't, we'd be in real trouble.

Q **Mr. Colby, do you feel that the effectiveness of the CIA is impaired by all the publicity that you've been getting lately about secret operations?**

A Obviously this has raised questions among some of our foreign friends about the degree to which we can keep secrets. Leading officials of foreign governments have brought it up in discussions with me. Individuals who have worked with us in various parts of the world have indicated a disinclination to work with us any longer because of the very real dangers to them of exposure.

In that respect, we have been hurt. But I like the way our society runs. I think it is perhaps unique that the chief of intelligence has to be exposed, as he is in America. But we have a responsibility to the American people. We are as responsive as we can be and still run an intelligence service. We regularly brief newsmen on world situations, we talk publicly about our activities in general terms, and we

release our information and assessments whenever we can. I think America gains a great deal of strength from this, even though it's a big change from traditional intelligence secrecy.

Q How do leaks affect morale at the CIA?

A You have to draw a distinction between leaks that lead to criticism of our programs and policies and leaks that expose our people. I think that we can and should stand up to the criticism. But exposing our people can be very difficult and also very dangerous.

You will recall Mr. Mitrione, who was killed in Uruguay. [Dan Mitrione, a U. S. employe of the Agency for International Development assigned to train police in Uruguay, was kidnaped on July 31, 1970, and later killed by Tupamaro guerrillas.] He was murdered—that's the only word for it. He was alleged to have been a CIA officer, which he was not.

I think it is reckless to go around naming people as being identified with the CIA.

Q Why can't you prevent former CIA officials from publishing books that reveal secrets of your agency and the names of secret agents?

A There are criminal penalties for people who reveal income-tax returns or census returns or even cotton statistics. But there are no similar criminal penalties for people who reveal the name of an intelligence officer or agent or an intelligence secret, unless they give it to a foreigner or intend to injure the United States. I think it's just plain wrong for us not to protect our secrets better.

I am charged in the National Security Act with the protection of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. But the only tool I have is the secrecy agreement we require our people to sign as a condition of employment.

We invoked this agreement against one of our ex-employes who wrote a book. We didn't censor his opinions or criticisms; we just tried to prevent him from revealing names of people and sensitive operations, some still going on. We are currently engaged in a civil action in the courts to determine whether we can enforce the agreement he made.

I recommended legislation that would make it possible for us to protect intelligence secrets more effectively. My recommendations would apply only to those of us who voluntarily sign an agreement that gives us access to these secrets; it would not impinge on First Amendment guarantees.

Q Mr. Colby, can we get back to the question of the necessity for the United States to maintain a big, secret intelligence operation in an era of détente?

A Yes—I didn't fully reply to that.

I feel it is essential to the protection of our country, not only our military security but also in the sense of security against the other problems we face overseas—economic pressures, terrorism, local problems that can start in various parts of the world and eventually involve us. Through our intelligence work we must anticipate these problems and take protective steps. If we don't know that another country is developing a particular threat, we can be caught very badly off base.

Beyond that, our intelligence work makes it possible to engage in negotiations. The SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] agreement between U. S. and Russia is the most obvious example. Without the knowledge we had of Soviet weapons through our intelligence activities, it would not have been possible for us to negotiate.

We also have what I would call a peacekeeping role, which I see of increasing importance in the years ahead. On a number of occasions, we have seen situations developing in a dangerous manner. By alerting our Government in good time, it has been possible for it to defuse these situations.

Q What part do spy satellites and other forms of modern technology play in your work of collecting intelligence?

A Quite frankly, technology has revolutionized the intelligence business. You have seen the photographs that came out of the U-2 operation over Cuba. You can realize the great importance of this development if you think back to the great debate in 1960 about a missile gap. People took strong positions on both sides, and we at the CIA were trying to determine what really was happening—whether a missile gap actually was opening up in favor of the Soviet Union. Today it would be impossible to have that debate because the facts are known.

This kind of technical intelligence made the SALT agreement possible. For years we insisted that any arms agreement would require inspection teams to monitor on the ground what the Russians were doing. Given their closed society, they wouldn't permit it. That stalled negotiations for years. Finally our "national technical means," as we politely call them, were improved to the extent we could tell the President and Congress that we can monitor the 1972 SALT agreement without on-site inspection teams, and we could make the agreement.

Q Some argue that satellites and other forms of technical intelligence can do the job and that there is no real need for clandestine agents ferreting out information. Do you agree?

A Not at all. Technical systems and open observation can tell us a great deal of what is physically there in closed societies. But they can't tell us what is going to be there in three or four years' time because of decisions that are being made in board rooms today. They can't tell us the internal political dynamics to allow us to assess how such a society is changing. And they can't tell us the intentions of people who may be bent on deceiving us. Intelligence of this sort can be obtained only by what we call "clandestine collection."

Q Looking at Russia's intelligence operation—the KGB—how does it compare with ours in scale and effectiveness?

A I think Soviet intelligence is going through a change—a good change. For years the big thrust was on stealing secrets. You remember the atom spies in America and all that sort of thing. In the past few years the Soviets have apparently become aware of the significance of assessment—the analysis function of intelligence. They've set up institutes to study the United States, realizing that the facts are easy to obtain in America. Their real problem is assessing what we might do, which is a terribly complicated and difficult intelligence problem.

Q Are you suggesting that the KGB no longer maintains spies in this country?

A Oh, they do—sure, they do. What I am saying is that they have moved from heavy dependence on espionage to greater reliance on more-normal ways of collecting and assessing intelligence. You can only say that's a change for the good; it should give them a more accurate picture of us, and it could hopefully reduce their espionage someday.

But the Soviets still run very extensive covert operations around the world. In any kind of foreign mission they send abroad—for example, delegations to international organizations—there always will be KGB people or people from GRU, their military intelligence. They also conduct a long-term program of training people and putting them in place under false identities to stay for many years. Colonel Abel [Rudolf Abel, a convicted Soviet spy, was returned to Russia in exchange for U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers in 1962] was an example of that. They have the benefit, of course, of indirect support from a variety of Communist parties around the world.

Q The Director of the FBI has said that there now are so many Soviet spies in America that he is having trouble trailing them. Why do we let so many in?

A We let them in as diplomats, commercial travelers, or in some other capacity. You have to realize that there has been a very large increase in the number of Soviet citizens in the United States, as compared with 10 years ago—partly as a result of détente. Now, if you get an increase in Soviet citizens in this country, you are inevitably going to get an increase in Soviet agents.

You see, in the Soviet Union the intelligence service is a very, very powerful institution because of its responsibilities for internal security as well as foreign intelligence. They have, in effect, merged the CIA, the FBI and our State police forces. And their intelligence service carries a very high degree of responsibility for preserving the power of the Soviet state, for party discipline and for public discipline. Consequently, the KGB has an institutional power that is totally different from the FBI and CIA combined in our country.

I think our system makes us a better and a stronger nation.

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340002-8

AMERICA'S TOP INTELLIGENCE CHIEF SIZES UP WORLD'S TROUBLE SPOTS

The massive flow of information pouring into Washington requires William Colby, as Director of Central Intelligence, to make constant evaluations of fresh global developments bearing on U. S. interests.

Following, in his own words, is the appraisal Mr. Colby gave editors of "U. S. News & World Report" of tensions around the world, what they mean, what they could lead to, and the possible impact on the superpowers.

Strategic balance: U. S. vs. Russia. "The Soviets are developing new missile systems that will increase their strategic power considerably.

"But we do not see that in the foreseeable future they can dominate us. We have both reached the point where we can destroy each other, and the rest of the world—and they know it.

"You ask if the transfer of American technology to the Soviets is a matter of concern.

"We know that the military have a very high priority in Soviet decision-making. We have procedures that put limitations on giving them things of direct military value. And they have a problem of adapting our technology, which works because of our competitive system. That is a problem they've got to do some adjusting to.

"The Soviets are, of course, well behind us technologically. But they are able to challenge us in arms competition by taking a much-more-disciplined approach, particularly in assigning their best talent to arms work. One very interesting thing is to compare the Soviet military work in space with the Soviet civilian work in space. There is an obvious qualitative difference between the two. The military work is much, much better."

Détente: Why Soviets want it. "There are three main reasons for Soviet interest in promoting détente with the United States.

USN&WR

"First, they obviously want to prevent the kind of horrendous confrontation that is possible in this age of superweapons. The result of a nuclear exchange between us would be just so incredible now that they realize that something has to be done to avoid it.

"Secondly, they insist that they be recognized as one of the world's two superpowers and get the status that their strength implies. They might also benefit from a relaxation of the Western solidarity that characterized the 1950s and 1960s.

"Thirdly, they would like to accelerate their development in economic and technical terms, because as they look at the enormous power of the West—America particularly, but also the other countries—they see it moving at a tremendous rate. They hope to benefit by a greater degree of exchange and borrowing from that movement.

"Generally, the Soviet concern over their internal discipline is very high. This is partly a result of détente. They are nervous about what détente can do in terms of getting new thoughts and new political drives going within the Soviet Union. And they just don't want that to happen."

Soviet empire: Starting to crumble? "The Soviets face a problem as the states in Eastern Europe show signs of dissatisfaction over iron-fisted control from Moscow. The Russians have made it clear that they are not going to brook any substantial break in their Eastern European buffer zone.

"But, at the same time, they obviously have the problem of dealing with the new political ideas that are circulating in some of those countries—including demands for greater freedom of action.

"The old idea of total Soviet dominance and control is under challenge even from some of the Communist Party leaders in Eastern Europe."

Western Europe: Communist penetration. "One thing the Soviets want is Communist participation in the governments of Western Europe.

"This is in line with Communist ideology, which says that collapse of the European democratic system is inevitable, so that the movement of Communist forces from minority voices to participation will enable the Communists eventually to take over governments there and run them.

"Obviously, the Communists are playing a role in some countries by reason of the 25 per cent or 28 per cent of the votes they represent, and the difficulties of organizing governments among the fragmented non-Communist parties.

"There's been some increase in Communist Party influence. But several trends are running: One is the increase in European Communist Party influence in these countries; another is the apparent increase in the independence of European Communist parties from Moscow's control, and another is the non-Communist parties' reaction to this, to détente, and to each other. It's premature to tell where these trend lines are going to cross.

"We are certainly not saying, 'It doesn't matter whether the Communists participate in power.' What I'm saying is that this is a complicated, multifactored matter."

Cuba: Castro's policy now. "Fidel Castro's attempts to export his brand of Communist insurgency to other countries of Latin America didn't work.

"The Cubans have stressed in recent years the development of state-to-state relationships. And they've been quite successful with that new policy.

"As for Russia, the Soviets still rate Cuba as a geographic asset—no question about it. It's a very substantial geographic asset, but it's a very costly one to them in terms of the support the Cubans have required over the years.

"Cuba's present activities in Latin America—stressing state links—are, in general, of long-term use to Soviet interests."

War in Mideast: Quite possible. "Another round of war between Israel and the Arabs is possible—quite possible.

"It depends in great part on peacemaking diplomacy. Obviously, the Arab summit meeting at Rabat, which named the Palestine Liberation Organization as the sole legitimate representative of Palestinians living on Arab land held by Israel, raises new difficulties.

"As for the Soviet role: They desire to play the role of a major power in the Middle Eastern area. They are endeavoring to express that through their naval presence, through their military-aid programs, through their economic aid, and so forth. Their policy right now is to keep that presence active, keep the capability of influencing the situation. But at the same time they have a considerable interest in continuing détente with the United States. They've got to try to go along a rather narrow track without abandoning their influence, but, on the other hand, not seeing the whole thing derail.

"The Soviets do get a certain amount of benefit from the economic troubles that afflict the West as a result of the oil problems, but they don't have to do much about that. It's taking place pretty much on its own. On the other hand, they have to realize that an aggressive move by them to cut off oil could cause a reaction on our side. It would be a very direct affront to any détente hopes that they have."

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340002-8

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340002-8

BALTIMORE SUN
25 November 1974

Colby backs intelligence safeguards

Washington (AP)—The director of the Central Intelligence Agency says stronger protection is needed to safeguard intelligence secrets.

William E. Colby, in a copyrighted interview published yesterday in *U.S. News & World Report*, said he has recommended legislation to help protect such information.

"There are criminal penalties for people who reveal income tax returns or census returns or even cotton statistics. But there are no similar penalties for persons who reveal the name of an intelligence officer or agent or an intelligence secret, unless they give it to a foreigner or intend to injure the United States," he said.

"I think it's just plain wrong for us not to protect our secrets better."

Mr. Colby said recent publicity about secret CIA operations has raised questions among foreign friends about "the degree to which we can keep secrets."

Mr. Colby said that, while this may hurt the operation, he likes the way American society runs.

Open as possible

The agency, he said, is as open as possible, briefing newsmen and providing public information and assessments whenever possible.

"I think America gains a great deal of strength from this, even though it's a big change from traditional intelligence secrecy," he said.

Questioned about the Watergate scandal, Mr. Colby said the agency did two things wrong—providing paraphernalia for E. Howard Hunt, Jr., convicted Watergate burglar, and providing the psychological profile of Daniel Ellsberg, the man who leaked the Pentagon papers.

But he said steps have been taken to prevent any future misuse of the CIA, with employees instructed to report any such attempts directly to him.

"If anybody really tried to misuse the CIA in the future, he said, "I think the organization would explode from inside. It really would. And that's good, because it's the best protection we have against this kind of problem."

LOS ANGELES TIMES
18 November 1974

CIA Showing Its Secrets in Bid to Polish Its Image

Criticism, New International Attitude Bring Disclosures; Lid Still on Vital Operations

BY MURRAY SEEGER
Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON—One of the biggest of the bureaucratic icebergs in Washington, the Central Intelligence Agency, is riding a little higher in the water these days.

Under the heaviest internal and external attacks of its 27-year history, "the agency" or "the company"—as its employes and those who deal with the CIA call it—has initiated a subtle campaign to refurbish its political standing and generate new public support.

In this campaign the agency is disclosing more of itself to public view, while leaving what it considers to be vital dimensions well hidden beneath the surface of essential secrecy.

"If we don't protect the names of our people abroad and people who work with us, we won't have people who will work with us," William E. Colby, the career official who took over as CIA director last year in the midst of the agency's worst problems, said recently.

"If we can't protect some of our technical systems that give us information, then the other side can take countermeasures and we will no longer be able to benefit from those systems," he said.

The recent wave of criticism against the CIA, the keystone in an intelligence community that spends about $8 billion a year, was stimulated by disclosures of its peripheral involvement in the Watergate scandals and its direct involvement in Chilean politics.

CIA officials are equally disturbed by the more recent phenomenon of employes leaving the tightly closed circle, where morale and loyalty traditionally have been remarkably high, and selling their secrets in books and magazine articles.

Although the officials say they are willing to accept informed criticism of the agency's performance and adjust their operations to changes in national policy, they are apprehensive about the possibly fatal effects of disclosures made by former agents.

"People can be killed," one CIA man said in referring to some of the recent insider tales of agency life. "These are people who put their faith is us."

The agency has strong authority to guard against secrets being dispensed by its current employes but the only restraint against former employes telling all is a contract they sign when they joined the CIA and the general laws against espionage.

The agency has been involved for months in an embarrassing suit directed at blocking publication of parts of the book, "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence," by Victor Marchetti, a former agency official, and John D. Marks, who worked for the Department of State.

A more recent book, "Inside the Company: a CIA Diary," by former agent Philip Agee, has been published in Britain, where, of course, the agency cannot block the printing of anything it considers sensitive.

To counter such publications, the agency is supporting legislation that would make it a crime for former employes to disclose secret information.

Disclosures by former employes and other published information on the agency's activities have supplied ammunition for private individuals and congressmen who believe the CIA should give up its "dirty tricks."

"There is no justification in our legal, moral or religious principles for operations of a U.S. agency which result in assassinations, sabotage, political disruptions or other meddling in another country's internal affairs, all in the name of the American people," Sen. James G. Abourezk (D-S.D.) said.

"It amounts to nothing more than an arm of the U.S. government conducting a secret war without either the approval of Congress or the knowledge of the American people," he said.

The traditional rationale for such activity, that the Soviet Union works even harder to undermine and overturn legitimate governments, was given by President Ford at his Sept. 16 press conference when he was asked whether the CIA had an international right to interfere in the internal affairs of Chile.

"Our government, like other governments, does take certain actions in the intelligence field to help implement foreign policy and protect national security," Mr. Ford said. "I am informed reliably that Communist nations spend vastly more money than we do for the same kind of purposes."

He added: "I think this is in the best interest of the people in Chile, and certainly in our best interest."

Colby admits that the conflict between Western-style democracy and Communism has changed and that there is room for debate on the agency's future role.

"It is advocated by some that the United States abandon covert action," he said in a recent speech. "This is a legitimate question and in the light of current American policy . . . it would not have a major impact on our current activities or on the current security of the United States."

In recent history the CIA developed and sent an armed invasion against Cuba at the Bay of Pigs and armed a secret army in Laos in the Indochina war. However, it is supporting few, if any, such operations now.

In Chile the agency had subsidized opposition parties and newspapers in an attempt to block the election of Salvadore Allende, a Marxist, to the presidency and later to prevent his crushing of all political opposition.

Although such operations apparently are sanctioned under the general public authorization issued by President Harry S Truman when he established the CIA in 1947 from the remains of the wartime Office of Strategic Services, the agency has been given more recent, secret authority to carry on covert actions abroad.

More controversy than that generated by the overseas "dirty tricks" was stimulated by the disclosure that the CIA had helped one of its former "old boys," E. Howard Hunt Jr., in his clandestine White House assignments without knowing what they were.

Domestic use of CIA authority is clearly illegal. Although the agency wavered under the strong

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pressure of the Nixon White House, it finally fought back and saved its dented reputation.

"It was lower-level people who blew the whistle on Hunt," one agency member recalled. After giving the retired agent some equipment, the "lower-level" executives reported his requests to higher-ups, and Hunt was cut off from additional support.

On the international political scene, agency officials are examining the historic role of covert operations. They are convinced they must retain the capacity to take direct, secret actions but feel there is less demand for such operations than there was in the past.

In the contemporary world, American intelligence experts have made two major contributions, technology and research in their field.

Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger confirmed the skill of American intelligence last July in Moscow when he reported that Soviet experts had been startled by his knowledge of their missile installations as they discussed the next round of the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT).

"In the 1960s we had a great debate on the missile gap," an intelligence expert said. "Now we can't have that debate — we have the facts . . . the SALT talks depend on this kind of intelligence."

Research and analysis are the chief functions of the CIA. Most of its 16,000 employes work in a huge, isolated building in suburban Langley, Va., in academic-like pursuit of knowledge with the benefit of "total sources."

The CIA overseas agents collect secret information, which is combined with public material and data from electronic systems to produce reports that are supposed to be neutral in political content and as accurate as possible.

"If we learn when another power is developing a weapons system when it is on the drawing board instead of when it appears in the field, then we can do something about it," a CIA man said. "But if we see it only in the field, we may be three or four years behind."

Agency officials call themselves the "technicians" of intelligence because they are only part of a larger community and take their orders on operations from elsewhere.

Colby, an easy-going man of medium height who hardly looks the part of a secret agent who worked behind enemy lines in World War II, not only heads the CIA but holds the position of director of central intelligence to coordinate activities of all information-gathering agencies.

He sits as head of the U.S. Information Board, which includes the Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Atomic Energy commission, Federal Bureau of Investigation and Department of the Treasury.

Experts from each agency submit reports on different intelligence issues, and when conflicts in information develop, Colby resolves them.

The missions of the CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency and other intelligence gatherers are set out by another little known coordinating group called the 40 Committee, which is headed by Kissinger through his position as assistant to the President for national security.

In defending itself from criticism, the CIA pointed out that its instructions on covert operations came from this super secret committee whose decisions are approved personally by the President.

"Being under pressure is nothing novel to the agency," a CIA man said recently. "The thing that is different is the climate of opinion in America, which is more questioning, more demanding than it used to be . . .

"We have tried to come out and explain things to the American people.

To gain new credibility and political support, the CIA is conducting a modest public relations and lobbying campaign.

One agency source said Colby met every morning with his advisers on congressional and public affairs.

When it came time to receive congressional confirmation for his appointment last year, Colby passed the word that he had no objection to being the first intelligence chief to face the Senate Armed Services Committee in an open hearing.

"That's fine, I think it's great," Colby said recently. "Frankly, I think it is protection for the republic that the head of intellegence is subject to that kind of popular and congressional control."

The agency has established three levels of exposure, starting with a public stance that includes the congressional hearing and some speeches.

At the next level, the CIA makes some of its research available to different agencies, reporters and academic groups. A recent congressional report on the Soviet economy, for instance, includes chapters written by CIA experts that contain information to be found nowhere else.

On a more mundane level, the CIA prints the only accurate street map of Moscow, one based on aerial photographs of the city. The Russians publish for tourists only "schematic" maps of their cities.

At a third level, the CIA talks only to a small number of senators and representatives on two committees that have the official duty of overseeing its work. They get "total information," a CIA man said.

The agency's secret budget—estimated at $750 million a year, or less than 10% of what all intelligence activity costs—is approved by the congressional committees but is buried in various accounts.

The agency staff has been trimmed in an efficiency program started when Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger served a short term as CIA director. Targets of this campaign were older "romantic" officials and agents more attuned to the darker days of the cold war than the modern era of East-West relations.

Although the most severe critics of the CIA have not been satisfied with the changes the agency has made in its operations, there is little doubt that Colby has been able, so far, to neutralize the most serious opposition without giving away very much of what he considers the agency's vital secrets.

Washington Post
25 Nov. 1974

CIA: Secrets Need Added Protection

Associated Press

The director of the CIA, William E. Colby, says stronger protection is needed to safeguard intelligence secrets. In an interview published yesterday in U.S. News & World Report, Colby said he has recommended legislation to help protect such information.

"There are criminal penalties for people who reveal income tax returns or census returns or even cotton statistics. But there are no similar penalties for persons who reveal the name of an intelligence officer or agent or an intelligence secret, unless they give it to a foreigner or intend to injure the United States," he said.

"I think it's just plain wrong for us not to protect our secrets better."

Colby said recent publicity about secret CIA operations has raised questions among foreign allies about "the degree to which we can keep secrets."

The CIA, he said, is as open as possible, briefing newsmen and providing public information and assessments whenever it is able. "I think America gains a great deal of strength from this, even though it's a big change from traditional intelligence secrecy," Colby said.

Questioned about Watergate, he said the CIA made two errors—providing paraphernalia for E. Howard Hunt and releasing the psychological profile of Daniel Ellsberg. But he said steps have been taken to prevent future misuse of the CIA, with employees instructed to report such attempts directly to him.

"If anybody really tried to misuse the CIA in the future," he said, "I think the organization would explode from inside. It really would. And that's good, because it's the best protection we have against this kind of problem."

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340002-8

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HARPER'S MAGAZINE
Dec 1974

Jim Hougan

A SURFEIT OF SPIES

The proliferation of private intelligence agencies has made civilian espionage a growth industry

WASHINGTON IS A PARANOID CITY these days; if one listens intently enough, it's easy to imagine the strains of *Danse Macabre* welling up from the living rooms of Georgetown and the CIA suburbs of Virginia.

Dusk delivers a sense of impending *Walpurgisnacht*, and the reason is clear: never before have there been so many "spooks" abroad in the land, so many spies and counterspies, clandestine analysts, secret movers, shakers, agents, operatives, wiremen, and gumshoes. They come from the CIA, of course—but also from the DIA, FBI, NSA, AEC, and State Department; from the intelligence sections of the Army, Navy, Air Force, IRS, and the Treasury Department; from the Justice Department's Internal Security, Intelligence, and Organized Crime Strike Force divisions; from the Secret Service, narcotics-control agencies, and metropolitan "Red squads"; from the hundreds of "proprietaries," "conduits," and "covers" that some of these agencies have maintained.*

The "intelligence community," once a mere suburb of government, has grown to the dimensions of a metropolis, a secret Pittsburgh in our midst. For the most part, it is a new community, a postwar boomtown built upon the mining (and manufacture) of information. Its internal organization owes less to coherent federal planning than it does to the emergence of new perceptual hardware and techniques (e.g., satellites, computers, and systems analysis) whose very existence has transformed relationships between governments, industries, and people.

There is no way to determine the exact size, let alone the influence, of that community. Its budgets are secret, its operations clandestine, and its advice classified. At its fringes—where, for instance, the State Department and the CIA meet—an institutional osmosis takes place. Funds for one agency are concealed in the budget of another; military personnel are "sheep-dipped," or placed under cover, and loyalties of employees in one department are "turned" by operatives in a second.

It is difficult to accurately assess the number of intelligence workers, but Sen. William Proxmire estimated last year that the government employs at least 148,000 of them. That figure is low, however, since it encompasses only the "downtown district" of the community—the part concerned with "classic" intelligence objectives on a full-time basis. Specifically, Proxmire's number (the only one ever published by the government) includes only those employees of agencies seated on the U.S. Intelligence Advisory Board—CIA, NSA, DIA, Intelligence and Reports Bureau of the State Department, and the intelligence sections of the Army, Navy, Air Force, FBI, AEC, and Treasury Department. It does not include part-time operatives, subsidiary alien apparats,* businesses which exist by virtue of their contracts with the intelligence agencies,** and the vast number of de facto agents and investigators distributed throughout government in supposedly "open" entities such as the IRS and Justice Department.

Whatever its exact size may be, the intelligence community is huge and growing. At the very least, its wardrobe is large enough to accommodate 148,000 cloaks and perhaps an equal number of daggers. Its special skills (infiltration, subversion, surveillance, and espionage) are in increasing demand. While there are still many different sources of power in the United States, it is apparent that the nation's drift toward technocracy entails a more complete equivalence between data and power. More than ever before, political and economic strength accrues to those who have special access to, or control over, lines of communication and information that are not accessible to the public. The spectacular growth of the federal intelligence community, however, has resulted in the spin-off of an invisible industry, a security-industrial perplex whose influence is more insidious for the fact that its activities are mostly unseen.

Spying for profit

IN THE PAST DECADE, literally dozens of *private* intelligence agencies have been created, joining over 32,000 registered private eyes and 4,000-odd security firms. Staffed almost entirely by former government operatives, the mercenary apparats place their skills at the disposal of the rich and paranoid, or work for a single client. The proliferation of the private apparats is attributable to two causes. The first is that each year, hundreds of agents (fired, retired, or merely ambitious) leave government for private practice. Last year, for instance, the civilian work force absorbed the greatest number of CIA agents in its history. These were mostly middle-aged men who had been with the agency since its earliest days. Having risen to the upper echelons of the intelligence community, they found themselves (in their late forties and fifties) with ten or fifteen years remaining in their working lives—and with virtually no possibility of further advancement. Forced into re-

* Some CIA examples: Southern Air Transport (proprietary), the Kaplan Fund (conduit), and Robert R. Mullen Company (cover).

* Gen. Reinhard Gehlen's former apparat is an example of this.

** Until recently, according to statements of its former president in the *Washington Post*, Psychological Assessments Associates, Inc., was one of these.

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tirement by the CIA, more than 1,000 executive spies joined thousands of other retired spooks in studying a new kind of classified material: the want ads. But under what job headings should they look? "Putsch Director"? "Interrogation Engineer"? "Propagandist"? Or, more likely, "Management Consultant," "Personnel Adviser," and "Public Relations Specialist." Of course, if they preferred to work for themselves, they could follow the lead of James McCord and others who had set up their own firms and independently marketed their strange expertise to industry.

A second reason for the emergence of the private apparats is the multinational phenomenon. Some multinationals have been described as "sovereign states." The metaphor is more than apt, and one consequence of its currency is that the federal intelligence community no longer automatically equates the national interest with the multinationals' investments. It is increasingly apparent that what's good for the multinationals is not necessarily good for America (as the Navy learned when, during the last Mideast crisis, its ships were refused fuel by a supposedly "American" oil company whose executives feared to offend their Arab partners and hosts).

Certainly, the long-term foreign policy goals of the United States do not always coincide with the timetables of the multinationals, even when their interests are mutual. The CIA, as ITT director John McCone found out when he sought to sabotage the economy and manipulate the elections of Chile, does not make its operations contingent upon the availability of million-dollar grants from private industry.* Because the CIA is not for hire, it cannot be trusted.

Whether it's guarding "proprietary information" at home, encoding communications, infiltrating governments in the Middle East, or funding counterrevolutions in Latin America, the multinationals would rather do it themselves. To preserve their investments and increase their profits, corporate giants and paranoid tycoons therefore shell out millions to develop their own intelligence services or to hire the expertise of firms whose loyalties are for sale. The costs are tax deductible. There is nothing wrong with this per se (as they say). Gunboat capitalism has generally gone the way of gunboat diplomacy: in big business, as in international politics, a subtler strategy is required today than was ever necessary in the past. It is, however, a basically antidemocratic strategy in that it depends upon the surreptitious manipulation of institutions, information, and public opinion—an operational style inimical to, and destructive of, an open society. The skills of the intelligence community are, after all, the skills of war. The multinationals' reliance on those skills suggests that they recognize the sometimes martial nature of their relationship to other countries, to government regulation, and to the public.

Spookery's spread to the private sector therefore poses two dangers. First, by applying intelligence and counterintelligence tactics to public opinion, it threatens to transform the society into a nation of "friendlies" whose ordinary activities are controlled by hidden persuaders of which they know nothing. (In this regard one sees the oil companies' recent ad campaign for what it was: a propaganda fugue designed to pacify a countryside of raped consumers.) The second danger is that commercial intelligence activities threaten to compromise the neutrality of government, and thereby threaten the security and rights of all. Agents who leave federal service for private employment often take with them not just their special expertise but their "connections" as well. Frequently, former agents retain informal access to privileged information, and it is obvious that some even retain an ability to influence the actions of their old agencies.

After years of probing organized crime, the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (chaired by Sen. Henry Jackson) has begun an inquiry into precisely this area. Of particular concern are: the extent to which federal agents "moonlight"; former agents' continued access to secret or privileged data and dossiers; the ability of "retired" agents to inspire or otherwise influence federal investigations; "joint operations" between private apparats and federal agencies; and the suspicious transitions of some federal agents to extremely lucrative jobs with industry.

There is substantial evidence that all these practices take place and that, in fact, they may be rather common. In the area of "joint operations," for instance, one notes the extraordinary cooperation extended by Justice Department officials to Howard Hughes in his take-over of the Nevada gambling industry. As for "access to secret information," a government source recently complained to me that Exxon's Venezuelan subsidiary, Creole, Inc., has a larger intelligence budget than the local CIA station—and that, in recognition of this, the two organizations have consolidated their files: in Venezuela, at least, what's good for Creole is apparently good for America.

One might go on, scoring a litany of instances in which the federal intelligence and investigative machinery seems to have been penetrated by, or come under the undue influence of, special interests. More helpful than such a list, however, would be to understand how a private intelligence apparat actually works, how it came to exist, and who its clients and employees are. With that knowledge it may be possible to do more than take note of past abuses.

The ideal firm to look at is one which places a comprehensive array of sophisticated intelligence skills at the disposal of clients whose business directly affects the public.

There are a number of such firms, though exactly how many is unknown. The private intelligence agencies carry their penchant for discretion to the verge of anonymity; they are, as they prefer to be, an invisible industry.

Still, one or another firm occasionally finds its way into the headlines. Thus, one learns of the Wackenhut Corporation's aggressive compilation of dossiers on Florida citizens, and of its secret analysis of "Communist penetration" in the Caribbean. Dektor Counterintelligence, hired by the White House to account for gaps in the Presidential tapes, has also received pub-

* Actually, McCone should have known this since he is himself a former director of the CIA (1961-65).

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340002-8

licity. Maheu & Associates, reported to have organized two assassination attempts on Fidel Castro, has come under scrutiny through its owner's contretemps with Howard Hughes and its dealing with the Greek shipowner Stavros Niarchos. McCord Associates has received attention from the press ever since its owner, James McCord, was nabbed at the Watergate.

The best example of a private apparat, however, is probably International Intelligence, Inc. (Intertel), a mysterious firm whose activities have impinged on the affairs of Howard Hughes, Robert Maheu, Robert Vesco, the Plumbers, ITT, Bebe Rebozo, and even the Mafia. Indeed, it has a particular contemporary relevance in that its very existence seems to have cast a shadow of paranoia over Richard Nixon—and, at least indirectly, contributed to the former President's political reversal.

In 1971 Jack Caulfield, a White House operative, was so concerned about Intertel—which he described as "an intelligence gun for hire"—that he recommended a counterintelligence campaign to neutralize the firm. Caulfield alleged that one Intertel agent was expert at "bag jobs" and warned that the firm "continued to have unauthorized access to sensitive government files in many areas." What alarmed Caulfield was the volatile mixture of political and economic associations that surrounded the firm. Like Democratic superpol Larry O'Brien, many Intertel agents in the employ of Howard Hughes had a deep affection for the Kennedy family. The controversial relationship between members of the Nixon family and Hughes, coupled with the political sympathies of O'Brien and agents at Intertel, suggested the possibility of revelations embarrassing to the President in an election year. Partly to combat the private apparat, Caulfield concocted Operation Sand Wedge, a scheme that included the establishment of what he described as "a Republican Intertel." This was to be an "independent" intelligence agency called Security Consulting Group, Inc. Unable to decide who should head the firm (Caulfield nominated himself while others insisted on Rose Mary Woods's brother), the White House expanded the activities of its internal "plumbing unit"—with known results.

Caulfield's proposal illustrates a corollary of the private apparats: they feed upon each other's paranoia. It also tends to confirm what many journalists have come to believe: taps on the telephones in the Watergate complex seem to have been an exercise in *counter*intelligence.

International Intelligence, Inc.

THERE ARE A NUMBER OF WAYS to describe Intertel, but the most delightful comes from the Senate Watergate Hearings. In them, a special counsel to President Nixon defined it as "a commercial firm specializing in the identification of typewriters." That droll summation is akin to describing *Playboy* as a "Midwestern little magazine." In fact, Intertel is a network of paladin agents whose collective expertise includes specialties from within the fields of law enforcement, intelligence gathering, economics, data processing, accounting, systems engineering, and the behavioral sciences. The firm has its headquarters on the second floor of the Hill Building in Washington, a few steps up Seventeenth Street from the White House. It also has branch offices in London, the Bahamas, Toronto, Detroit, New York, and Los Angeles. The firm declines to provide a client list, but it is known to advise stock exchanges, investment bankers, newspapers, airports, insurance corporations, pension funds, billionaires, governments, gambling joints, and multinational corporations. Tom McKeon, Intertel's executive vice-president and general counsel, says that the organization accepts foreign and domestic clients alike but that its primary marketing target is the *Fortune* 1,000 group. Most of the firm's services are provided to clients under oral agreements, and the bulk of its revenues come from a handful of customers.

What Intertel does is protect proprietary information (secrets) whether it's on tape, in print, or in an employee's head; perform background investigations and "employee attitude assessments"; establish industrial "intelligence systems" and guard against corporate espionage; provide "defensive electronic surveys" to learn if their client is being bugged; authenticate or discredit documents; undertake "communications integrity analyses" to learn if their client needs scrambling or cryptographic equipment; hermeticize the data in computers; sanitize public images; shred red tape, monitor relevant government legislation, and lobby; advise on geopolitical "switch-trading opportunities";* identify stolen stocks and bonds; prevent the theft of securities; and make "industrial site relocation surveys," a sort of sociopolitical economic analysis that will tell you, among other things, whether the place you're moving to has enough railroads or too many Reds. And lots, lots more, all of it couched in the most recondite language imaginable.

What Intertel will *not* do is tell you if your wife is cheating, though that might come up if she's also stealing your money, selling your secrets, blabbing to Jack Anderson, or concealing her links to the mob.

Intertel is, in other words, a "management consulting firm" that specializes in confidential intelligence services. Lest anyone think that Intertel is just a group of depleted gumshoes, double-chinned cops cashing in on feet that long ago went flat, the following is a selection of roles its agents have fulfilled: chief, Special Projects Section, National Security Agency; director, Intelligence and Internal Security Divisions, Internal Revenue Service; deputy director of security, National Security Agency; chief, Intelligence Division and Organized Crime Strike Forces, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs; deputy director of security, U.S. Department of State; supervisor of Intelligence Activities, Federal Bureau of Investigation; chairman, Criminal Intelligence Services (Ontario); commissioner of Scotland Yard; supervisor of Espionage and Internal Security Investigations, FBI; senior adviser, U.S. Department of State, Southeast Asia; coordinator of INTERPOL operations for the Royal Canadian Mount-

* Switch-trades are international deals in which the seller is paid, at least in part, by valuable considerations other than [illegible]

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340002-8

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ed Police; supervisor, Organized Crime and Intelligence Squads, Internal Revenue Service; chief, Justice Department's Organized Crime Strike Force; detective supervisor, Special Investigating Unit and Narcotics Squad, New York City Police Department; director of enforcement, U.S. Bureau of Customs; chief, Market Surveillance Section, Securities and Exchange Commission; and J. Edgar Hoover's only nephew. There are, in addition, more than fifty professionals and special agents from virtually every other precinct of government, and it should be noted that Intertel's director of intelligence operations is Edward M. Mullin, formerly of the FBI and the CIA.

CLEARLY, INTERTEL IS to most other management consultants as the CIA is to the Planned Parenthood Federation. The firm is nothing less than the legal incorporation of an old-boy network whose ganglia reach into virtually every nerve cell of the federal investigative/intelligence community. There is nothing "wrong" in that. Civil servants are not chattels of the state, and if they decide to sell their skills in the marketplace, so what? But some who are skeptical of the motives of, for instance, Howard Hughes and ITT may become concerned upon learning of the special talents and knowledge that their assets command. To this, Tom McKeon says, "We don't act as a shield or umbrella for anybody. We won't let ourselves be used that way."

And one would like to believe him. But the fact is that the firm is for hire; it does what it's paid to do, and its clients are secret. "No one likes to admit they've got a problem," McKeon explains, "but each of our clients has or else he wouldn't come to us. That's why we don't disclose their names."

It's not the motivation of Intertel that deserves to be questioned but that of its clients. A "communications integrity analysis" sounds fine (it's meant to), but what if the resulting scramblers, codes, and cryptanalysis equipment are used to ruin the economy, or subvert the political institutions of a foreign democracy? Are the "analysts" responsible?

"Document authentication" also sounds fine, but what if the client twists the resulting information in order to deceive the public?

"Background" inquiries may also be of value, but not if the private investigators are part of an elaborate strategy involving federal agents and White House operatives acting in tandem on behalf of very special interests. ITT, a client of Intertel's, has tiptoed through all these areas, and used the intelligence agency in at least two of them.

The *potentials* for abuse are many, and suspicion of the private apparats is only natural. What makes Intertel of particular interest, however, is the notoriety of some of its known clients and the widely diverging views about its motives.

Some instances: Caulfield was convinced that Intertel was engaged in "black" operations. Intertel denies it does this and, in fact, says that it doesn't accept politicians as clients or engage in any political work at all. Huntington Hartford, heir to the A&P fortune, is suing Intertel's parent firm for millions, charging that profits from a casino that Intertel oversees have been fraudulently reported. Intertel denies the charge and points out that Hartford has yet to produce any meaningful evidence of his assertion. Yet another view of Intertel is held by Robert Maheu, former confidant of Howard Hughes. After Intertel took charge of the billionaire's Las Vegas casinos following Hughes's flight to the Bahamas, Maheu thought that his boss had been kidnapped. An attempt to "rescue" Hughes was thwarted by Bahamian officials accompanied by Intertel agents.

Not everyone agrees that Intertel is aptly compared to Ian Fleming's SPECTRE. Some insist that the firm is better compared to the Fantastic Four, and point out that it was organized for the express purpose of "crime prevention."

One Senate investigator who became curious about Intertel left their offices scratching his head. "It's surprising," he said. "The guy who owns the company is tight with Nixon and Rebozo, but almost all its operatives, from the top on down, are old Bobby Kennedy men. Really, they're plugged into all the good guys in Washington."

A check with Sen. Edward Kennedy's staff confirms that view. As one Kennedy aide said, "Intertel? They're our friends, man, that's who they are. I almost went to work for them myself." But, he hastens to add, Intertel's relationship to the Kennedys is platonic rather than contractual. "They've never done any work for us," he says. "In fact, my understanding is that they don't do any political work at all."

Trouble in paradise

INTERTEL WAS NURTURED in the geopolitical humus of the Bahamas, an archipelago of more than 2,500 rocks and islands that fan out from the southern coast of Florida. It was rich soil for the emergence of a mission-impossible agency, a milieu peopled by hustlers, hoods, high rollers, playboys, pimps, billionaires, British colonials, and dirt-poor blacks. For most of their history, the Bahamas were controlled by a group of white merchants known as the Bay Street Boys, a power bloc that ran the islands.

One of the most powerful Boys was Sir Stafford Sands, an attorney whose private practice did not suffer for his public work as Minister of Finance and Tourism. One of his clients, an ex-con named Wallace Groves, paid the barrister-knight almost $2 million in "legal fees."

Groves could afford it. Thanks to legislation drafted by Sir Stafford, Groves was able to buy up 211 square miles of Grand Bahama Island for $2.50 an acre. It was as if a national fire sale had been held because, only a few years later, some of those same acres sold for $50,000 each. Sands was also responsible for obtaining the permissions needed to allow gambling at Freeport, a keystone of Groves's financial empire.

By 1964 Groves's holdings were worth many millions of dollars, and his power was immense. Through one of his firms, he even had the authority to deport "undesirables." In achieving this, Groves had considerable help, and not just from Sir Stafford. Help also came from a partner in Groves's Lucayan Beach Hotel—Lou Chesler, a Canadian financier who went to the banks for cash and to Meyer Lansky

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340002-8

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340002-8

for advice.

It is unknown if Lansky, reputed comptroller of the mob, gave it—but he certainly had reason to. Ever since Castro nationalized mob assets in Cuba, organized crime had been seeking a new site for its offshore gambling facilities. The Bahamas were a reasonable alternative to Havana, and Lansky repeatedly sought to obtain influence there. Nevertheless, if he obtained that influence—as many believe he did—proof has so far eluded the courts.*

While these events were taking place at Freeport, Huntington Hartford was endeavoring to transform a dilapidated islet named Hog into the Monaco of the Caribbean. The eccentric grocery magnate renamed the island Paradise and poured millions into its development. But Paradise Island, located across the channel from Nassau, lacked two things that were essential to its success: a bridge to the mainland, and a permit for gambling. Hartford was unable to obtain either, possibly because his casino would compete with the one owned by Groves, and possibly because he'd made the blunder of contributing to the Progressive Liberal Party (PLP), the rival of the Bay Street Boys. To save his position, Hartford sold all but a minority share of his Paradise Island interests to the Mary Carter Paint Company—the firm that would become Resorts International, the founder of Intertel. Hartford's new partner, James M. Crosby, wasted no time in closing a deal with Wally Groves, acquiring the services of Sir Stafford Sands, and, shortly thereafter, securing the necessary permits to gamble and build a bridge. The Paradise Island casino was not due to open until January 1968, but already the facility had drawn the attention of the man who would become the president of Intertel: Robert Peloquin. At that time chief of the Justice Department's first Organized Crime Strike Force, Peloquin had spent his entire career in the inner precincts of the intelligence community: a commander in Naval Intelligence, he later joined the National Security Agency before moving on to the Internal Security Division of the Justice Department. One of the men most responsible for exposing, or popularizing, the concept of a national criminal conspiracy called La Cosa Nostra, Peloquin had this to say about the Paradise Island transactions: "The atmosphere seems ripe for a Lansky skim." *

A few months after making this notation, Peloquin received a visit at the Justice Department from James Crosby. Crosby asked Peloquin's assistance with two problems. First, he wanted the name of a firm capable of handling security and checking personnel at his new casino. Peloquin said he was unable to recommend any such firm. Second, Peloquin and McKeon agreed that Crosby was "literally scared to death" of a gambler named Mike McLaney, who, along with others, wanted a piece of the action on Paradise Island.

With this second problem Peloquin was forthcoming and admits initiating an investigation on Crosby's behalf. Just what else Peloquin did for Crosby remains unclear. What is certain is that a number of exposés appeared in the American press (*The Wall Street Journal*, *Life*, and *Look*) describing the influence of "organized crime" in the Bahamas. It has been alleged that Peloquin furnished information for at least one of those exposés, the one that appeared in *Life*.

Peloquin later admitted that he spent "a great amount of my time negotiating with the government of the Bahamas to exclude" various persons from the island. He also provided strategic, if unofficial, assistance and information to the Royal Commission of Inquiry convened by the Bahamian government to study the local gambling industry, its links to the mob, and its allegedly corrupt relationship with the Bay Street Boys. The commission was headed by Sir Ranulph Bacon, a former head of Scotland Yard, who was later to become a director of Intertel.*

By August 1967 the commission's work was mostly done, and so was Peloquin's. The Justice Department strategist retired from government, taking with him the department's annual award for outstanding service, conferred upon him for his Bahamian investigations.

A FEW MONTHS AFTER LEAVING the Justice Department, Peloquin was able to solve Crosby's other problem—taking charge of security at Paradise Island and checking out the casino's personnel. By then, the commission had accomplished several objectives. In exposing the Bay Street Boys, it destroyed their influence forever. A new government, headed by Lynden O. Pindling, a black, had taken power amid the shock waves of the gambling scandals. (Sir Stafford, whose activities figured prominently in the commission's inquiries, retired to Spain.) A second result of the commission's probe was that, in focusing on existing casino operations, it necessarily preoccupied itself with Crosby's competition. Hopelessly entangled in the affairs of Sir Stafford, Groves withdrew from the arrangements he'd made with Crosby. Meanwhile, Crosby's nemesis, Mike McLaney, had unexpectedly fallen on hard times.

McLaney is the former operator of a casino in Cuba, an ersatz socialite whose biggest long shot seemed to have paid off with the election of Pindling. Resentful of Sir Stafford and the Boys, McLaney claims that he financed the Pindling campaign almost single-handedly. The gambler insists that he would have helped Pindling in any case, but adds that the aspiring premier promised to reward his largesse by nationalizing the island's casinos and letting McLaney run them in return for a split of the profits.

Pindling is said to have reneged on his promises after his election. Indeed, he went even further and declared McLaney *persona non grata*. That may seem harsh treatment for a supporter, but McLaney wasn't surprised. In testimony before a Senate investigating committee, McLaney alleged that his banishment was the result of a conspiracy between Peloquin, agents of the IRS, and the owners of Paradise Island.

* *Sir Stafford* has testified that Lansky offered him $2 million for gambling concessions on the islands—and that he refused.

* This comment was contained in a Justice Department memo written in 1966.

* Among Intertel's other directors are men who are, or have been, president of the Dreyfus Corporation and publisher of *Life*; president of Carte Blanche; board chairman of the Royal Bank of Canada Trust Company; vice chairman of R. H. Macy; and director of the Prudential Life Insurance Company.

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After strenuously denying any connection with Meyer Lansky, and offering to take a polygraph test on the subject, McLaney was asked if he thought "Lansky had anything to do with the reneging of the prime minister" and the gambler's subsequent eviction from the archipelago.

"No," McLaney answered, "I thought Intertel had something to do with it. Mr. Peloquin, from the Justice Department, and three special agents from [the Internal Revenue Service]—they are the ones that conspired to run me out of the Bahamas. . . . Those are the people responsible for getting me . . . eighty-three days of conviction [on a tax charge], and everyone works for the gambling interests in the Bahamas. Intertel was formed for them. When they got rid of me, $2 million was furnished them by Resorts International, and that formed a thing called Intertel."*

Asked, "Who is behind Resorts International?" McLaney said, "I don't know. It is misty, shadows."

RESORTS INTERNATIONAL is an offspring of the Mary Carter Paint Company. After the casino on Paradise Island was built, Crosby severed the Bahamas holdings from the rest of Mary Carter, sold off the latter, and established the new imprimatur. When the casino opened, the new corporation's prospects seemed grand. Peloquin left the Justice Department and set up the law firm of Hundley and Peloquin, which took on Resorts as a client. His partner, William Hundley, was a lawyer who shared Peloquin's investigative background, having been chief of the Smith Act Section in the Justice Department's Internal Security Division.

Peloquin and Hundley served on the casino's operating committee, supervising the work of its manager, Eddie Cellini. The choice of Cellini to manage the gambling joint was an odd one, however, since his brother Dino has been described as Lansky's "top aide" and "right arm."** Before long, Eddie became an embarrassment. "The publicity was awful," Peloquin explains. "Whenever someone mentioned the casino at Paradise Island, they said it was run by a brother of Lansky's top man. It was pure guilt by association. After all, Eddie's fifteen or twenty years younger than his brother, hasn't got a record, and, besides, our bottom line was higher than anybody's. If Eddie was skimming, I'd like to know how he did it! Frankly, he was the best manager we've ever had: he loved the place and took real pride in it. But one day Jimmy Crosby couldn't take the publicity anymore. He told me, 'Look, I don't care if he's Pope Paul—can him.' So I did. And you know what happened when I told Eddie he was fired? He burst into tears. Does that sound like Mafia to you? Christ, I still feel bad about it."

One might have expected more consideration from the chairman of Resorts International, but there was a lot at stake. The new company's stock had begun to take off, thanks in part to a $4 million purchase of unregistered "letter stock" by the fund-managers of Investors Overseas Services (IOS). By 1969 (a little more than a year after the casino opened), Resorts' stock had climbed more than 1,000 percent in value—from about $5 per share to $60. Things were going so well that Crosby began to give money away. A close friend and business associate of Bebe Rebozo's (it was Crosby whom Rebozo called for advice when the banker got stuck with a wad of stolen IBM stock), Crosby donated $100,000 to Richard Nixon's 1968 campaign only a few weeks after Rebozo introduced the two men.*

The meeting between Nixon and Crosby seemed to be a matter of love at first sight. Crosby even placed the company yacht at the candidate's disposal and later became an occasional guest at the White House. Six months after the election, Crosby hired James O. Golden, reportedly at Nixon's request.

Like Peloquin and Hundley, Golden was at home in the intelligence community. A former Secret Service agent who'd served in Russia, Central America, and the Bahamas, he'd been Richard Nixon's personal attaché during the Eisenhower administration and held the curious distinction of being an honorary agent of the Philippine National Bureau of Investigation (for services rendered there). Before he took charge of security at Nixon's headquarters in 1968, he had worked as the international representative of the Lockheed Corporation. In 1969, Golden became deputy director of security for Resorts International. After this, Golden went on to other positions: vice-president of Intertel (1970) and security chief for the Hughes Tool Company (1971). He is now chief of the Organized Crime Section of the Justice Department's Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA), a job whose responsibilities include setting up intelligence and strike-force teams throughout the country.**

Despite the credentials of its security team, the halcyon days of Resorts International have been few: today its stock is trading at about $2 per share. The decline can be traced to a number of circumstances. First, the Bahamian movement toward independence greatly diminished the demand for local real estate, and thereby maimed the earnings of an important subsidiary. Second, Premier Pindling announced that all casinos will be nationalized by 1977. Third, casino profits are hard hit by special taxes. Fourth, Resorts apparently blundered when it sought, in 1969, to gain control of Pan American World Airways, whose subsidiaries own several casinos and hotels in the Caribbean. (It was as if Luxembourg had tried to annex Belgium: when the smoke cleared, Resorts owned only 3 percent of the airline's stock, having paid $27 million for shares that are now valued at less than $4 million.)

* Of the three IRS agents who probed into McLaney's affairs, two worked for Intertel while the third secured employment with the casino on Grand Bahama Island.

** Vincent Teresa, *My Life in the Mafia*, pp. 219 and 220.

* The donation took the form of thirty-three checks for $3,000 each and one in the amount of $1,000.

** Oddly, Peloquin and McKeon deny that Golden worked for Intertel, even though at least one Intertel brochure associates Golden with the firm. For his part, Golden says that he was "in on the ground floor" and insists that Crosby made him a vice-president of the apparat.

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The Hughes connection

AFTER YEARS OF DE FACTO existence, Intertel's long gestation ended. In January 1970 Resorts provided the financing that allowed the apparat to incorporate as a "consulting organization created specifically to safeguard business from the hidden risks of vulnerability to criminal elements and to assist the states and cities in development of comprehensive crime controls." Those in on the ground floor—Crosby, Peloquin, Hundley, and Golden—believed that the firm's services could be successfully marketed, and there was every reason to believe they were right. During the 1960s, the United States underwent a moral upheaval that resulted in a redefinition of many conventional views. Much attention has been paid to the effective legalization of pornography, but even more important, economically, was the new attitude toward gambling. What had once been a racket run by mobsters became, by the decade's end, an industry administered by government bureaucrats and corporations such as Hughes Tool, Pan Am, and ITT. The vacuum left by "known gamblers" was rapidly filled because no other business allows its owner to literally name the percentage of his profit. The man who pioneered the takeover of mob turf by legitimate business was Howard Hughes. With a $546 million check from his forced sale of Trans World Airlines, Hughes moved into Las Vegas under armed guard in 1966 and began making offers no one could refuse. Abetted to an embarrassing extent by federal bureaucrats and state politicians, Hughes quickly gained control of the state's major industry. His acquisitions were so many and so swift that the Justice Department's opinion of him was divided: while one faction insisted that Hughes was in violation of antitrust laws, the Criminal Division applauded his private war against the Mafia.

Hughes continued to look for new properties, and one of the places that interested him the most was the Bahamas. A secret study (entitled *Downhill Racer*) was commissioned prior to Hughes's move there. The report was anything but favorable, citing political instabilities, the likelihood of race riots, and the probability of an eventual social "cataclysm." Nevertheless, Hughes is now living in the Bahamas, acquiring property there, and issuing orders that his staff "wrap up" the government. What caused the billionaire to change his mind, or disregard the advice he'd commissioned, is unclear. What's certain about the move is that Intertel was deeply involved in his expatriation.

On Thanksgiving eve 1970, Hughes was scooped from his headquarters atop the Desert Inn and put aboard a plane bound for Paradise Island. Acting on orders from top executives of the Hughes Tool Company, Intertel took control of Hughes's casinos. Robert Maheu, the billionaire's longtime confidant and chargé d'affaires, was summarily fired, as were other trusted employees. Maheu charged that his boss was the victim of a "kidnapping," and marshaled "evidence" to back up the allegation. A physician who had seen Hughes a few weeks earlier claimed that the tycoon was too ill to have been safely moved, that he suffered from a heart condition, pneumonia, and anemia. He was, the doctor said, receiving blood transfusions and weighed less than 100 pounds. That Hughes should go to the Bahamas seemed—in view of the secret study, his illness, and his disaffection for blacks—eccentric in the extreme.

Tom McKeon, Intertel's general counsel, is still sensitive about the Hughes operation. Seated in his Washington office, feet propped on his desk, McKeon said, "The Hughes organization got in touch with us in the summer of 1970. A few months later, in August or so, Peloquin went to Los Angeles to discuss how the move should be made. Now, you see, we try to operate on the Five *P*s Principle: Proper planning prevents piss-poor performance. Well, we developed a plan, all right: it was about this thick. [His thumb and forefinger measured out a space that would hold *Gravity's Rainbow*.] While we were still preparing for D day—that's what we called it—the Hughes organization telephoned and said, in effect, 'Get every man you've got out here right away. We're moving tonight.' So there went the plan. I can understand why Maheu thought Mr. Hughes had been kidnapped; it was all so sudden."

The assignment to plan Hughes's exodus from Las Vegas was a large and sensitive one; that it should be entrusted to a firm which was only a few months old seemed extraordinary to many. A few, however, thought this was no accident, and speculated that perhaps Intertel was formed *expressly* for the purposes of "the Thanksgiving coup." McKeon denies that, pointing out that the firm's employees had proven their worth in federal service and that, moreover, no less a personage than J. Edgar Hoover sometimes recommended them for commercial assignments. Whatever the case, the Hughes contract was profitable and gave the fledgling apparat a spectacular start and plenty of continuing business.

Sailing to Byzantium

BY THE END OF INTERTEL'S first year, the firm was enmeshed in a tense, if sometimes farcical, game of spy-versus-counterspy. While Intertel was investigating Maheu, and vice versa, White House spy Jack Caulfield was investigating Intertel, convinced that the firm was a private CIA working in behalf of the Kennedy interests. What led Caulfield to that conclusion isn't hard to guess. In 1968, less than a month after Sen. Robert Kennedy was slain, Hughes ordered Maheu to hire Larry O'Brien and the "four or five key men in the Kennedy camp." Maheu eventually succeeded, and O'Brien's firm was retained by Hughes for the sum of $15,000 per month. Exactly what O'Brien did for that sum is unclear—"public-relations work" is the catchall description. But, whatever it was, he did it for less than two years. After the Thanksgiving coup of 1970, Hughes's relationship with O'Brien ended, and the public-relations account was transferred to Robert R. Mullen & Company—a firm with strong links to the Republican party and the CIA.

At this point, the situation became one of Byzantine complexity, and secret agents began stacking up like lemmings at the seashore.

While Caulfield and Maheu were tracking In- [illegible] IRS were investigating

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Maheu. (Intertel was also looking into Jack Anderson's affairs on behalf of ITT, and into Clifford Irving's affairs on behalf of Hughes.) At about the same time, E. Howard Hunt, an employee of both Mullen and the White House (who may or may not have also been an undercover agent for the CIA) was planning to burglarize the offices of a Las Vegas publisher in order to purloin a sheaf of secret Hughes memos. In these negotiations, Hunt conferred with Hughes security agents—not Intertel, and not Golden, but a third network headed by a fellow named Ralph Winte.

Who is Ralph Winte?

Frankly, this reporter doesn't know and doesn't want to ask. Enough is, allegedly, enough.

Or is it? While these events unfolded, yet another dimension was added to what had become a virtual plenum of intrigue: Robert Vesco.

Throughout 1972 Vesco was negotiating with James Crosby to purchase most of the Paradise Island assets, including the casino which Pindling had promised to nationalize. Vesco reportedly offered $60 million for the properties, a huge sum in view of their special problems. At the time of the negotiations, Vesco was the target of a massive investigation by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). As a result of that investigation, Vesco was accused by the SEC of having organized one of the biggest frauds in the history of money: an estimated $224 million was allegedly diverted from Investors Overseas Services (IOS) into the pockets of Vesco and his cronies.*

At the same time, Vesco was also under study by Intertel. One of Intertel's main functions as a subsidiary of Resorts International was to "advise management of their possible exposure to organized crime through companies with whom... they are considering business relationships." Considering the connections and expertise at Intertel, one would assume that Crosby's own apparat would have advised against the deal. In fact, however, Intertel raised no substantial objections. Asked how that could have happened, McKeon says, "Well, at what point does a man become suspect?"

That explanation, however, must be dismissed. The nature of Intertel's business is such that a man becomes suspect very early. Moreover, Intertel's second director of operations is the former chief of the SEC's Branch of Market Surveillance; certainly *he* was not without access to information. And, if these were not enough, Crosby himself ought to have known that Vesco deserved suspicion since no less an authority on the subject than Bernie Cornfeld told him so. The founder and former head of IOS, Cornfeld is a sometime backgammon partner of Crosby's. In a conversation with Cornfeld, the playboy-financier told me he had repeatedly warned Crosby that the SEC was about to come crashing down on Vesco, and that the deal shouldn't go through. Crosby ignored that advice, Cornfeld said. (According to the SEC, the transaction "came to a grinding halt" with the commencement of the SEC lawsuit.) By all accounts, it would have been a very profitable deal for Crosby.

* Interestingly, the SEC brief contends that an estimated $150 million of this sum was "hot" money illegally invested in IOS by tax evaders and others.

The dance goes on

THE INTRIGUES, OF COURSE, CONTINUE. While Vesco was under study by the SEC and Intertel, agents of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) were hired by an associate of Vesco's to search the financier's New Jersey headquarters for hidden bugging devices. (That was in the fateful month of June 1972). Vesco subsequently repaid the organizer of the search with $3,000 in gambling chips at a Bahamian casino.

Only a year after receiving assistance from the BNDD agents, Vesco was himself alleged to be the financier behind an international heroin transaction. That allegation, unsupported by other evidence, was repeatedly made in tape-recorded conversations between an important informant and a big-time Canadian smuggler.

In an apparently unrelated set of events, Intertel was itself involved with narcotics agents during the early part of 1973. BNDD officials approached Intertel in February with a proposal called Operation Silver Dollar. This was a plot to nab an unwelcome guest of the Hughes-owned Frontier Hotel—a guest who was thought to be dealing drugs. The BNDD promised to infiltrate the man's milieu if Intertel would prevail upon the Hughes organization to finance the operation. Intertel agreed, and, as a result, the Summa Corporation provided the undercover agents with a hefty bankroll. The agents dutifully gambled the money away, but the target of the operation was unimpressed by the flashing cash. No sale.

By this time the reader may be thoroughly, if thoughtfully, confused. That's probably as it should be, however. My purpose is not to make sense of all these intrigues (the task would defeat an Aquinas), or even to imply anything more than a coincidental relationship in the intersecting paths of Hunt, Hughes, Intertel, Vesco, and so forth. Rather, my intention is to indicate the degree to which America has haunted itself, and to describe some of the nodes in what seems to be a maze of espionage.

As to what legislation might be proposed to curb existing abuses, several possibilities come to mind. Private intelligence agencies, no matter what euphemism they go by, should be defined, identified, licensed, and regulated. At the very least, client lists should be made public. Moonlighting by employees of federal agencies having intelligence-gathering or investigative functions should be forbidden. Joint operations between such agencies and profit-making organizations should also be proscribed by law. Finally, the transition of workers from government to private industry should be closely observed to detect instances in which it appears that a former government worker retains influence over his old agency, or seems to have been rewarded by private industry for tasks performed in the federal service.

Of course, so long as there are skeletons in the closet, there will be spooks by the door. *Walpurgisnacht* is here to stay. While we cannot expect legislative incantations to exorcise the corridors of power, we may hope to conjure light enough to see, and count, our shadows. And that, at least, would make the *danse* a trifle less *macabre*. □

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340002-8

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340002-8

ROLLING STONE
21 November 1974

Ex-CIA Agent Plans to Tell A[illegible]

CIA men are not supposed to talk, but Philip Agee, ex-Agency man, does—in an exclusive interview with Daniel Yergin for ROLLING STONE. Agee's book, *Inside the CIA: A Company Diary*, will be published in England early next year. American publishers, wary of legal battles with the CIA, are hesitant to release the book in this country.

BY DANIEL YERGIN

In January 1972, a CIA station chief hurried to Paris to see one Philip Agee, formerly a CIA case officer in Latin America. The Agency's elaborate internal control mechanism had screwed up. Agee had just come back from several months in Havana—not exactly the place for a former CIA agent to take his holiday. The Agency had, apparently, found this out by accident. While in Havana, Agee had written a letter to a magazine in Uruguay, where he had formerly served, warning of CIA intervention in that country's 1971 elections. He had added that he was writing an exposé of the Agency's activities in Latin America based upon his own experiences.

It was that last item that really worried the Agency, and so now in Paris the station chief was blunt: The director of the CIA, he said, wanted to know just what in hell Agee was doing.

Agee realized that he had made a mistake with his letter. Instead of admitting that he was struggling to write a book, which might have provided sufficient motivation for a timely accident, he bluffed and said that he had already written a book.

The spooks were deeply disturbed. On July 9, 1974, Senator Howard Baker of the Watergate Committee released a report that mentioned CIA documents from the summer of 1972 that referred to a "WH Flap." When Senate investigators first encountered these documents, they assumed the WH referred to "White House" flap. Later, they discovered that the WH Flap in fact referred to a Western Hemisphere Flap—and that meant Agee and the revelations the Agency feared. After the belated discovery of Agee's literary interests, the CIA, according to one of the documents, had to "terminate projects and move assets subject to compromise."

In July of this year, someone tried to cover up the entire blunder by leaking a story that a drunk and despondent CIA officer, "down in his cups," had sat down somewhere in Latin America with a KGB agent and spilled the refried beans. The *New York Times* and other news organizations, with the conspicuous exception of Laurence Stern of the *Washington Post*, bought the story at first—but it was a fabrication. The CIA finally disowned that particular story.

However, in the years since the 1972 Paris conversation, Agee had finally written his book—*Inside the Company: A CIA Diary*. "No one has yet been able to give a full picture of what agents in the field do," Richard Barnet wrote recently in the *New York Review*, "although a book about to be published in England, by a secret agent in Latin America for many years, may begin to fill this gap." One long-time Agency watcher calls it—in its unpublished form—"an underground classic." Agee's story is already a sensation in the Latin American press—where that press is not censored to a shrivel.

Agee is modest, calling it only a "small window" on the CIA. Admittedly, in the years between 1956-68, he served in Ecuador, Uruguay and Mexico City, none of them famous hot spots. On one level, his story is a narrative of massive American intervention in Latin American politics. It's also the day-to-day story of CIA officers—busy, busy, busy—competent and incompetent—buying off politicians, tapping phones, funding strikes, organizing demonstrations and provocations, setting up massive propaganda campaigns. It's a description of office politics—or rather "station" politics, with officers fighting and bidding for prestige and importance.

Agee's book makes clear why the Watergate bugging was no "third-rate burglary," but rather, the whole mess—the burglars and the plumbers, the dirty tricks and the funneled money—was the pattern and technique of CIA intervention abroad being brought home, to disrupt and ultimately destroy the American political process.

Agee's story is also an American drama—the young, idealistic true believer, who enlisted in the cause of the Good and the Virtuous, but who could not finally understand the distance between his ideals and what he practiced. Driven by the memory of his own role in the relationship between CIA covert activities and the epidemic of repressive, right-wing juntas throughout Latin America, he has again become a true believer—but now pushed far to the other side.

The train from London's Paddington Station took more than six hours to roll through the West Country in a bleak rain to the station nearest Agee's quiet retreat near Cornwall. Then a cab across country to the tiny village on the edge of a tidal estuary that is a favorite nesting spot both for birds and for bird watchers. Agee, youngish (at 39), stocky, dark haired, wearing a floppy sweater and with a bounce to his step, came around the corner of the [illegible]

We chatted that evening, and then the next day we started talking in earnest. He did make clear that some areas he would only discuss at a later time.

I began with a simple question: Why believe him?

"There can be no doubt that I am who I say I am," he replied. "The CIA has already confirmed that—they have already taken measures to try to offset some of the damage. They closed that cover office in Mexico City, they transferred agents. So the CIA has lent credence. Anyone who wants to can check the events I say occurred. What's already been revealed about the CIA in other places also confirms what I say. I had so much material and such a small place to put it into—there was no need to embellish. I wasn't an important man in the CIA. I was only coming into my mid-career level when I resigned. And Ecuador and Uruguay and Mexico aren't in themselves all that important, but when taken as a pattern and extended to the rest of the Third World, it shows our secret foreign policy and our secret political police work."

Of course, the world of covert politics and secret agents is so confusing, convoluted and dark that no reader should uncritically accept what follows. We cannot dismiss the possibility that the "new" Agee works for the intelligence service of a hostile country or of a friendly one or even for the Pentagon, eager to besmirch the reputation of its bureaucratic rival. On balance, however, Agee is almost surely who he says he is. His story is consistent and has in many ways been confirmed.

In 1956, a CIA official suggested that the Agency recruit Agee, then graduating with a degree in liberal arts from Notre Dame. She knew his family well, and he was a good prospect—a God-fearing anticommunist, who as a student chaired the proceedings in which General Curtis "Bombs Away" LeMay had received the university's patriotism award. Agee at first rejected the overture, but then, after returning to Florida for law school (there's only a trace of Tampa in his speech), took up the offer to go into the Junior Officers Training Program. Apparently such activity was respectable, purposeful, vital and a great way to see the world—and was a good deal more interesting than the family's laundry and uniform business.

He signed a secrecy pledge, passed the lie-detector test and heard Allen Dulles and other senior officials explain to the new recruits that God Himself had instituted the practice of spying on this planet. Agee spent two years in the Air Force, in cooperation with the CIA, and then spent six months at the CIA's training camp—The Farm—outside Washington, D.C., learning the techniques of clandestine, covert and paramilitary operations. Foreign agents were

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340002-8

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periodically brought in for special training but security was so tight that some did not even know they were in the United States.

Finishing training in July 1960, Agee, equipped with the code name Jeremy S. Hodapp, was assigned to the Western Hemisphere Division—which was looked down upon elsewhere in the Agency because it was filled with old FBI men who had been absorbed into the Agency when the nascent CIA had assumed the FBI's Latin American operations after World War II.

Agee was assigned as a "case officer" to Ecuador, where seven employees operated on a budget of $500,000. During his years in Ecuador, two reformist presidents—Velasco (elected by the largest majority in the country's history), and Arosemena — were thrown out of office, primarily because of political disturbances resulting from their failure to break diplomatic relations with Cuba and to strike much harder at the local Left. These disturbances were instigated and directed by the CIA.

"We weren't trying to get them thrown out of office," Agee recalled. "We were trying to get them to adopt certain policies we wanted adopted. It so happened that they resisted—and they fell, both of them."

Essentially, the Agency carried out a covert program of destabilization to create the political pressures deemed necessary for a swing to the right. They worked through a wide variety of paid agents. The list stretched from top politicians and military figures (when a member of the legislature became Ecuador's vice-president, his CIA "retainer" increased from $800 to $1000 a month), to an official of the airmail section of the Central Post Office (you're always curious about the mail), to a leading liberal journalist in the country (who did at least stylistically touch up the columns the CIA provided for his byline), to a local distributor of American cars, even in an indirect fashion to the YMCA basketball team (a good way to make contacts—and they received their sneakers through the diplomatic bag). Others included a member of the Chamber of Deputies, Minister of the Treasury, Secretary-General of one socialist party and an Ecuadorian ambassador to the United Nations—at the time Agee left Ecuador, this man was recommended for the august status of Career Agent—sort of a CIA Hall of Fame.

This network was utilized to build up a fear of communism and instability. The Agency generated a campaign to mobilize a cardinal into a crusade against communism. It organized the disruption of a visit by the Soviet ambassador to Mexico. CIA agents in Peru broke into Ecuador's embassy in Lima, stole documents and faked others that showed Ecuador as aligning itself with Cuba—and led to Peru's breaking diplomatic relations. An effort to bug the Czechoslovak legation failed when, a la Watergate, four Indian guards sleeping in the room next door awakened. The CIA, through goon squads, organized a series of church bombings, as well as "spontaneous demonstrations" in protest.

All of this, Agee emphasized to me, should not be misunderstood. "That's the point," he said. "The CIA may destabilize and eventually bring about the fall of a government, but they will not necessarily say, 'now is the time, boys.' In many cases, the military will not necessarily know what the CIA is doing behind the scenes. They don't know that all this propaganda is coming out in the newspapers, or on the television or the walls or in the fly sheets that are distributed. The military in Ecuador did not know that we were behind all those events leading to the takeover by the military junta in 1963 and the overthrow of Arosemena—for instance, the false document that we wrote about Flores that was such a sensation.

"Flores was one of the leaders of an incipient guerrilla organization and we had heard through one of our infiltration agents that he had gone to Cuba. While he was gone, we wrote up a document that we made appear like his report to the Cubans on the progress within the organization, in which the group in Ecuador thanks the Cubans for their prior support and asks for more. We had enough information already to give it a flair of authenticity, and of course we added what we wanted to make it as damaging as possible and as alarming as possible to the military, to the ruling class, the bourgeoisie. So we put this into a toothpaste tube and gave it to a minister in the Treasury at the time, and he had his customs inspector plant it and then discover it in Flores's luggage when he returned. Flores was jailed that day—and he was still in jail when I left.

"Propaganda is very, very, very important in these operations," he continued. "You would have political commentators working for you. In those days, in Latin America, it was mostly journalists for newspapers or learned journals. For instance, in Ecuador, television was just beginning, and I would suppose that today television would be more and more used. Our propaganda would go all the way down from the highest levels to the semiliterate, with things like wall paintings in which symbolism is used. This keeps the issue before the public and the fear building up until pretty soon people are so disturbed that they are willing to accept strong action. It's very well thought out on class lines, too. If you think of a CIA campaign to destabilize, it's certainly based on a class analysis—just like a Marxist interpretation—to support a particular class ideology.

"It works both ways. There's headquarters guidance on propaganda, there are different publications. In fact, the officer in charge of propaganda is usually the officer who has the highest pile of papers on his desk, because he has so much printed matter to go through and get out to his different placement agencies.

"When these programs are undertaken, they are stated in documents, prepared sometimes in the CIA station, sometimes in headquarters. The approval process goes through the CIA and then over to the undersecretar level of the National Security Counc Once these documents are approv they go back to the CIA, so an assist secretary of state for inter-Americ affairs can say that the Agency has programs of destabilization or pro ganda or however they describe it. does not know all that is going on. N ther do the ambassadors."

Or, as Agee's first chief of station Ecuador explained to him: The amba sador knows nothing about the opera tions, and he doesn't want to know.

The CIA succeeded in its double goal in Ecuador. In April 1962 Ecuador broke diplomatic relations with Cuba, and on July 11th, 1963, the military seized power. Data from the CIA's Subversive Control Watch List was used for arrests.

The CIA's role in all this was hidden. The *Annual Register of World Events* for 1963 states: "The political unrest that was noticeable during President Arosemena's regime culminated in a coup . . . when a military junta seized power, thus ending a 15-year period of constitutional rule. The military officers accused the president of sympathizing with communism, of general inepti tude and of having failed to carry out long delayed programs for agrarian, social and government reforms . . . . With the 1964 presidential campaign already begun, partisan strife in addi tion to labor unrest further embarrassed the government which already lacked the support of Congress, and it was widely held that Dr. Arosemena would hardly serve out his term; the country accepted his fall as an accom plished fact."

Who would know of the CIA's pivotal role in accomplishing this fact?

Agee was transferred from Ecuador to Uruguay, still a believer in the anti-communist rationale, still convinced that all else in the world was subservient to the major clash between the United States and the Soviet Union: "When I left Ecuador, I felt that what the traditional politicians had not been able to do because of their own provincial interests and self-serving interests, the military junta would do. Beca the military had only taken over four five months before I had left, I still high hopes. It was military imposi of liberal reform that I belie in then."

The CIA was in the same busine Uruguay. For instance, the station pared a fake report linking the So Union to local labor-union officials order to force a break in diplom relations with Cuba. To get the loc chief of police to cooperate on buggi the North Korean trade mission, CI officials gave him details about a plane coming into the country with smuggled television sets—so that the chief and his associates could keep the haul. They cooperated.

Agee also became involved in larger issues. For instance, the CIA could not

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get enough money into Chile through all its major conduits in 1964 to support the campaign against Allende, and so, through the Montevideo branch of a major New York bank, Agee purchased a total of $200,000 worth of Chilean currency — which was then smuggled into Chile. Agee knew of millions and millions more spent in Brazilian elections and also saw the active support the U.S. gave to the military men who seized power in Brazil in April 1964.

Slowly, doubts had begun to creep into Agee's mind. In Uruguay only a few thousand people controlled most of the country's land. "The more I learned about Uruguay, the more I began to question the whole thing. I realized that there was something wrong here, because Uruguay had had the most extensive and earliest reform program of any country in Latin America, beginning with the early 1900s. In spite of all that, they were in an impossible position."

The landing of U.S. Marines in the Dominican Republic in April 1965 for no clear reason began to crystallize the doubts. We can now see that it was that intervention which in fact legitimized opposition to the Vietnam War and to the entire militant and until then unchallenged anticommunist consensus, for in response to that adventure Senator J. William Fulbright first began to publicly question the thrust and assumptions of U.S. policy. Far down the line, Agee began questioning too. "That Dominican affair certainly was a turning point. It destroyed all the pretenses, all the rationalizations for reform, for what we were doing—which was supposedly to buy time for the liberal reformers to install the reforms that had been lacking for so many centuries. It is very hard for me to put my finger on when I realized it, but it was the conclusion that the more successful we were in what we were supposed to do, the farther away the reforms got."

He said that the officers in the Uruguay station dismissed all the pious justifications—among themselves—for the intervention as a joke. "Everyone knew that someone high up had said, 'look, we have to justify this, so tell us how many communists were in the Caamaño forces.' So they came up with this list of 58. They just took the names right off the Subversive Control Watch List."

Agee was also shaken later in 1965 by a private incident—hearing the voice of one Oscar Bonaldi, a communist activist in Uruguay being tortured in the police station. "To be sitting there with the chief of station and the chief of police and the chief of the metropolitan guard—supposedly our friends—and to hear that voice and to see the police chief keep turning up the radio in order to drown out the noise—that was a shock. It was partly emotional revulsion. I was very ashamed and shattered to think I had given the name." He added quickly—"given the name for preventive detention, not for torture. That's the sort of name that was never in the newspapers and it never came out that he was tortured. But he'll remember—if he's still alive."

From then on Agee's dedication and his career began to go quietly downhill. "The period from 1965 to 1968 was a very down period," he remembered. "It was a period of being disillusioned, of trying to figure out what to do with my life." In 1966, he returned to the United States to work in the Agency's Mexico division, operating under a State Department cover. He says he began thinking about resigning in late 1966. Instead, he took another CIA assignment in Mexico City under the cover of the American Embassy's attache for the 1968 Olympic games. He was one of 50 people in the Mexico City CIA station.

Finally, disillusioned, embittered, confused, uncertain, Agee resigned from the Agency in 1968. He cited personal reasons—he was having marital problems—and remained in Mexico City dabbling in business and being a university student. "My purpose in resigning was just to forget it. I didn't have a Pauline conversion. But a lot happened during the first year after I had quit. There could be a whole pattern of motivation as to why I decided finally to write the book. Among all those motives certainly was the belief that the Vietnam War was a parallel activity to what I had been doing in Latin America, but on a higher level of intensity. It could be seen and heard by everybody, whereas the secret war of the CIA was successful—the purpose in CIA operations being to avoid the necessity for overt intervention."

Agee lived an oddly disjointed life for the next few years—in Mexico City, Paris, London—with three trips (arranged through radicals) to Cuba in search of research materials. "I was impressed because of the relationship of what I'd seen in Cuba to what I had seen in the rest of Latin America—the problem of integration of the people by the social services, education, health, public housing and the fact that people were participating in their government, and that they felt a real sense of pride. And this is like black and white, particularly compared to a country like Mexico which had this decade-long civil war, a great agrarian movement, and has practically nothing to show for it."

He says that his search for research materials in Cuba, however, was not as successful as the research he did in Paris and, even more so, in the newspaper room of the British Museum in London. The newspapers, he discovered, were almost a daily chronicle of CIA activities in the countries in which he had worked. It was also clear that intelligence services—he assumes CIA, but it might have been other services as well—were keeping him under surveillance and trying to find out exactly what he was writing.

Writing the book was a process of reeducation for him. "It's been a kind of revival or renaissance, because in the last years in the CIA, I was just thinking about getting out, forgetting it. My mind began to close to all sorts of things around me at the same time that it began to open in other respects. You might say that it began to open in a cultural way and close in a political way and then open again in a political way, differently.

"It's very important to get the idea of how CIA officers look at things—there are Friends and Enemies and not many people in between. The CIA itself tends to be a closed world, your friends tend to be CIA people because you can't be fully honest with anybody else. CIA people for example frequent a country club, called River Bend, in Virginia. When you get used to living a cover, preserving the secrecy of what you're doing, then you don't feel completely relaxed, open and honest in other company. That's why CIA people tend to be inward breeding socially. At the same time, there's tremendous pressure on the CIA officer always to be out developing his contacts, his potential agents, developing as wide a field of acquaintances as possible. This is the place where agents are spotted, then assessed, then recruited, and it could be in any area in a local scene—rich people at the country club, working class people, people in government and the political parties. You need all sorts of different agents, support agents for example just to rent automobiles or apartments, people to live in your places for you."

Agee maintains that he discussed with no one his disaffection while in the Agency. "I may have told a friend or two that I was thinking of retiring for personal reasons. But my guess is that I'm no exception, that I'm not really an odd case, that there are plenty of officers in the CIA who are staying in because of the inertia and the problems of readjustment, house payments, children in school, car payments, all those hooks. Because there's no way to do something like this and maintain the same living habits, friends, leisure activities, income. But I can't believe that hundreds and hundreds of CIA officers can really be believing in what they're doing, when they see the unspeakable horrors that are being committed against the peoples of Chile or Brazil or Iran, and until recently, Greece and Portugal. Only the real hard-line fanatical anticommunists could condone that, and the CIA certainly has those kind of people.

"I met, just one after another, officers who had become total cynics. They try to stay in headquarters and do as little as possible, but keep the papers moving. Headquarters is filled with people who have become experts at keeping the papers moving and avoiding decisions. If they had any idealism at the beginning, they've certainly lost it over the years. And they are technicians. As technicians, they perform without asking questions, and this takes me to my principal argument. For, in spite of all of this, my argument really isn't with the CIA but with the people behind American foreign policy. The CIA is only an instrument of the president and foreign policy makers."

Agee himself has moved from one enthusiasm to another, but where does

an ex-CIA officer go? If he's still one of the old boys, there are plenty of opportunities—witness E. Howard Hunt and James McCord. But, if he's disillusioned, if he's snapped his ties, then he has a problem—and Philip Agee certainly has a problem.

People in the CIA, even the internal "reformers," try to dismiss Agee by describing him as an alcoholic, obviously unstable, under surveillance for years, more than a little freaky. Who knows, maybe that's all true. On the other hand, they cannot comprehend the spiritual and material sacrifices he has made. Agee is trying to form a new life and is planning a new book, which he will write with a slight, Brazilian woman, Angela Seixas, a former student activist, who is his girlfriend. The relationship is an ironic one, for if Agee was a producer of CIA 'services' in Latin America, then Angela Seixas was a consumer.

"My family is middle class, and I was in Brazil at a Catholic university before I was arrested," she told me. "For some time the police were searching for me. I was with a friend for whom the police had been looking since 1964. We were entering an apartment, and the police were waiting inside the apartment. The police began to shoot at us immediately and killed my friend, and I was wounded. This was in the second week of 1970. They took me to the Army Police Headquarters where I was tortured. They beat me a lot until they finally saw that I was bleeding—they wanted the names of my friends, how they could find them. Finally they took me to the hospital. After ten days they took me back to the police, because they couldn't wait any longer, they wanted the names and I was tortured again. This time I was naked. They used electrical shocks on my whole body and they beat me until finally I lost consciousness, and then they took me back. But they took me from time to time for more 'sessions' as they were called."

She gave no names.

She spent two-and-a-half years in a Brazilian prison, and then was allowed to leave the country. She met Agee in Paris. "What she suffered," he said simply, "was the result of the CIA's work in Brazil."

In *The Quiet American*, Graham Greene wrote about Pyle, the idealistic young American, the nation builder: "He said a third force could do it. There was always a third force to be found, free from communism and the taint of colonialism — national democracy, he called it." Philip Agee was one such quiet American doing his part to advance the cause of the third force, between reaction and revolution. But he does not believe any of that any more.

Agee argues as a liberal: "Americans ought to reconsider the whole problem of secret intelligence services. If you're against Watergate at home, you have to be against the CIA abroad. If you're against the intervention in Laos or Cambodia, against a Vietnam war not just because we lost, if we're standing by our treaty obligations, if we're in favor of the liberal moral principles in our historical documents, then we must be against the CIA abroad. But it's up to the Congress, and the Congress should start first of all with an investigation—and the more that can be revealed, the better. For instance, destabilization programs in countries like Indonesia before the military coup, Greece prior to the military coup, destabilization of the Chilean government under Allende, Ghana under Nkrumah, Guyana under Jagan. There are lots of examples that the Congress can investigate and expose and then establish very tight control.

He has hope and yet he lacks hope. He points to a 1969 report on Latin America by vice-president-to-be Nelson Rockefeller. "It was very depressing, because of its call for a very strong repressive apparatus, expression of counter insurgency, programs of aid to the police." He points to Brazil, which is becoming a junior partner of the U.S. in the hemispheric secret police. He points to the fact that the current director of the CIA is William Colby, who during his CIA career specialized in the blackest arts—and of course, to what we learned about the CIA in Chile.

Henry Kissinger recently told *Time* magazine: "A democracy can engage in clandestine operations only with restraint, and only in circumstances in which it can say to itself in good conscience that this is the only way to achieve vital objectives."

The record—including the recent record—is one of lack of restraint, of massive interventions with little purpose. The Agency had the power, the resources, the opportunity and the black-and-white ideology—and used them. Is this epidemic of juntas really in our national interest? Is it in the interest of our democracy to have a huge intelligence covert agency specialize in antidemocracy?

"Destabilization"—as a description of CIA covert activities in regard to Chile—had only entered our language a few days before we sat on the sunny terrace of a pub having lunch. Agee said how fascinated he had become with the word, how exactly it described for him CIA activities.

"What I'm trying to do," he said with a small grin, at the railway station as I was departing, "is to destabilize the CIA."

NEW YORK TIMES
23 November 1974

Policy on C.I.A. and F.B.I. Lies Described by Allen Dulles in '64

WASHINGTON, Nov. 22 (AP) —The late Director of Central Intelligence, Allen W. Dulles, told the Warren Commission that the F.B.I. and C.I.A. directors might lie to anyone but the President to conceal identities of their undercover agents, according to recently declassified documents.

The documents are quoted in a book being published today about the investigation of President John F. Kennedy's assassination. The book, entitled "Whitewash IV," is by Harold Weisberg, a Frederick, Md., writer and investigator.

Mr. Weisberg lost a suit against the Government seeking release of the documents. However, the National Archives declassified the information and sent him copies.

Mr. Dulles, a member of the Warren Commission, who died in 1969, took part in a discussion Jan. 27, 1964, about whether J. Edgar Hoover, director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and John A. McCone, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, would truthfully answer questions on whether Lee Harvey Oswald had ever worked for either of their agencies.

The documents declassified included a verbatim transcript of that executive session of the commission.

"I think under any circumstances, I think Mr. Hoover would say certainly he didn't have anything to do with this fellow," said Mr. Dulles, who was no longer C.I.A. director at the time.

The book also quotes Mr. Dulles as saying: "I would tell the President of the United States anything, yes, I am under his control. I wouldn't necessarily tell anybody else, unless the President authorized me to do it."

At one point in the discussion the book quotes the late Senator Richard B. Russell as saying to Mr. Dulles: "If Oswald never had assassinated the President and had been in the employ of the F.B.I. and somebody had gone to the F.B.I., they would have denied he was an agent."

Mr. Dulles responded: "Oh, yes."

Mr. Russell, Democrat of Georgia, then said: "They would be the first to deny it. Your agents would have done exactly the same thing."

Mr. Dulles said: "Exactly."

Mr. Hoover told the commission when he was questioned on May 14, 1964:

"I can most emphatically say that at no time was he [Oswald] ever an employe of the bureau in any capacity, either as an agent or as a special employe, or as an informant."

Mr. McCone was asked by the committee's general counsel, J. Lee Rankin, whether Mr. Oswald "Had any connection with the C.I.A., informer, or indirectly as an employe, or any other capacity?"

Mr. McCone replied: "I have determined to my satisfaction that he had no such connection."

NEW YORK TIMES
21 November 1974

Richard H. Crowe, 63, Dies; C.I.A. Aide From '46 to '60

WASHINGTON, Nov. 20 — Richard H. Crowe, a Central Intelligence Agency official for nearly 15 years, died today. He was 63 years old.

Mr. Crowe joined the C.I.A. in 1946, after attaining the rank of Lieutenant Colonel with the United States Air Force in England. He resigned from the agency in 1960 because of illness.

Mr. Crowe graduated summa cum laude from Yale University. He later received a master's degree in international law from Columbia University and also studied in Paris at the Ecole des Sciences Politique.

Mr. Crowe leaves his wife, from whom he was separated; a daughter, Mrs. F. Herbert Prem Jr.; a brother, Philip K. Crowe, Ambassador to Denmark, and his stepmother, Mrs. E. R. Crowe.

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340002-8

WASHINGTON POST
22 NOvember 1974

Allen Dulles Testified CIA, FBI Would Lie

By Donald P. Baker
Washington Post Staff Writer

Newly declassified documents reveal that former CIA director Allen Dulles told the Warren Commission on the assassination of President Kennedy that the directors of the CIA and FBI might lie to anyone except the President to protect the identity of their operations and undercover agents.

The formerly top-secret documents, contained in a book being published today on the 11th anniversary of Kennedy's death, quotes Dulles, a member of the commission that investigated the assassination, as saying:

"I would tell the President of the United States anything, yes, I am under his control . . . I wouldn't necessarily tell anybody else, unless the President authorized me to do it. We had that come up a couple of times."

Dulles was no longer director of the CIA when he served on the commission headed by then-Chief Justice Earl Warren.

The newly-declassified documents are reproduced in a book called "Whitewash IV," by Harold Weisberg, a Frederick, Md., writer and investigator who sued the government for release of the documents. Weisberg lost the case, but shortly after the court decision last summer, the National Archives declassified the information and sent copies to Weisberg.

Dulles' comments were part of a discussion by Warren Commission members on Jan. 27, 1964, about whether directors J. Edgar Hoover of the FBI and John A. McCone of the CIA would truthfully answer questions about whether Lee Harvey Oswald, Kennedy's accused assassin, had ever worked for either of their agencies, as had been rumored in some press reports.

After Dulles had said that he, when he headed the CIA, would tell the President anything, commission member John J. McCloy asked Dulles: "You wouldn't tell the Secretary of Defense?"

"Well, it depends a little bit on the circumstances," *Dulles replied.* "If it was within the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Defense, but otherwise I would go to the President, and I do on some cases."

J. Lee Rankin, the commission's general counsel, said, "if that is all that is necessary, I think we could get the President to direct anybody working for the government to answer this question. If we have to we would get that direction."

Dulles continued: "What I was getting at, I think under any circumstances, I think Mr. Hoover would say certainly he didn't have anything to do with this fellow."

Earlier in the discussion, commission member Sen. Richard B. Russell said to Dulles, "If Oswald never had assassinated the President, or at least been charged with assassinating the President and had been in the employ of the FBI and somebody had gone to the FBI they would have denied he was an agent."

Dulles: "Oh, yes."

Russell: "They would be the first to deny it. Your agents would have done exactly the same thing."

Dulles: "Exactly."

James H. Lesar, a Washington attorney who has worked with Weisberg on private investigations of the assassinations of President Kennedy and the Rev. Martin Luther King Jr., said the documents show that "the Warren Commission had no investigative staff, and had to rely on the FBI and CIA, even while they recognized they may have had a 'fox in the hen house' problem."

Lesar said other previously disclosed testimony was "proof that the commission didn't have the courage to investigate Hoover."

When Hoover was questioned by the commission, on May 14, 1964, he testified that "I can most emphatically say that at no time was he (Oswald) ever an employee of the bureau in any capacity, either as an agent or as a special employee, or as an informant."

CIA director McCone testified the same day as Hoover. He was asked by Rankin whether Oswald "had any connection with the CIA, informer, or indirectly as an employee, or any other capacity?"

McCone replied that "I have determined to my satisfaction that he had no such connection . . ."

Other comments made during the Jan. 27, 1964, discussion among Warren Commission members were revealed in the book "Portrait of the Assassin," written in 1965 by then Rep. Gerald R. Ford.

President Ford, who also was a member of the Warren Commission, did not report Dulles' remarks concerning how he would answer the President about CIA operation, as posed by commission members.

The question of whether Oswald had ever worked for the FBI or the CIA had been raised in several newspaper and magazine articles shortly after Oswald was fatally shot in the Dallas police station by Jack Ruby on Nov. 24, 1963.

Because of his experience as director of the CIA from 1953 to 1961, other commission members turned to Dulles for advice on how to handle what author Ford described in his book as "this touchy matter."

Dulles at one point in the Jan. 27, 1964, transcript told commission members that in some instances CIA employees would not tell their superiors about the undercover agents they had employed, even if they were under oath.

Rep. Hale Boggs (D-La.), another commission member, responded: "What you do is to make out a problem if this be true (about Oswald), make our problem utterly impossible because you say this rumor can't be dissipated under any circumstances."

Dulles: "I don't think it can unless you believe Mr. Hoover, and so forth and so on, which probably most of the people will."

In his new book, Weisberg, a long-time critic of the Warren Report, said that the commission failed to interview any of the news reporters who had written that "sources" had told them that Oswald had been employed by the FBI or CIA, a statement corroborated by a check of witnesses called by the commission.

In an interview at his house in rural Frederick this week, Weisberg said, "I have no idea who killed JFK. That's a function of government. I just know it wasn't Oswald.

Weisberg, who published the book himself with money borrowed by attorney Lesar, has written three other books on the Kennedy assassination, and one on King's assassination.

Washington Post
19 Nov. 1974

John A. Thomson, 68, Ex-CIA Aide, Dies

John Alexander Thomson, a retired Central Intelligence Agency employee who was one of the first naturalized U.S. citizens to be involved with code work for the U.S. government, died of heart failure Saturday at his home, 1824 Panorama Ct., McLean. He was 68.

Mr. Thomson was a native of Scotland who came to this country in 1922. He became a U.S. citizen in 1935. He was a chief radioman with U.S. Naval Intelligence and served in the Southwest Pacific Theater during World War II.

He joined the CIA in 1952 and served as an electronics specialist here and overseas from 1962 to 1968, when he retired. Mr. Thomson was an amateur radio operator.

He is survived by his wife, Ernestine Pareya, of the home; two daughters, Carol T. Hemond of Cambridge, Mass., and Barbara T. Cahill of Fairfax; and a grandson.

Washington Post
15 Nov. 1974

INTELLIGENCE BACKGROUND—Needs someone for organizing research action against covert operations. John, 544-5380.

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340002-8

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340002-8

NEWSDAY
24 November 1974

E. Howard Hunt: Heroics to Redeem Blunders

"UNDERCOVER: Memoirs of an American Secret Agent," by E. Howard Hunt (Berkley Publishing Corp./G. P. Putnam's Sons, 329 pp., illustrated, $8.95).

Reviewed by Anthony Marro

E. Howard Hunt was standing in the waiting room outside Charles Colson's office, chatting with the secretaries and waiting to be ushered into the presence of the then-White House aide. Nixon's Irish setter, King Timahoe, bounded into the room, sniffed at Hunt and promptly lifted a leg. The former OSS operative, CIA agent and White House "plumber" jumped back, just managing to avoid—as he delicately phrased it—a stain on his trousers.

Besides reaffirming the opinion of those who considered King Timahoe to be one of the classier figures in the Nixon White House, the incident forces us to stop and consider: If Colson and the others had held Hunt in like regard, they probably would have saved themselves a great deal of embarrassment, not to mention grief. Instead, they chose to take him seriously, which is what Hunt is now asking us to do in this book.

For two years, Hunt has been portrayed in the press as something of a national joke—a man who in one lifetime managed to help engineer two national disasters, Watergate and the Bay of Pigs. But now he tells us that "because I have been depicted as at best a fumbler and at worst a pathological criminal, I am writing my personal record of events as I saw them develop, and so illuminate the truth of these events which for all time must bear the scrutiny of history."

Since writing those lines, Hunt has admitted under oath (in the Watergate coverup trial) that this book, like his earlier grand jury testimony, is shot through with lies. So much for illumination and truth.

But this is not only a dishonest book, and a poorly written one at that. It also is a somewhat pathetic one, prepared by a man who is trying to escape the ridicule of the present by searching for heroics in his own past. It thus seems very important to him that the nation, and his children, know that he once fired at Japanese soldiers from along the Yellow River, slept with a Russian woman in Shanghai in 1945, was one of the nation's staunchest Cold Warriors, and shook hands with Ike in Montevideo. (The Russian woman, whose photograph he has thoughtfully provided, is described in the photo caption as "The beautiful Soviet agent Marusha Chernikov, with whom OSS operative Hunt had a brief affair . . ." Hunt was so proud of this that he allowed the publisher to tout it on the dust jacket. But the two paragraphs that he devotes to it in the manuscript say that it was her husband—not she—who was the Russian agent.)

We are told that Hunt—in his eyes—served his country in dangerous circumstances, and served it well, picking up lessons along the way that were to last him a lifetime. For example: "With regard to the discipline I learned at the Naval Academy, I remember very clearly the three possible answers accorded a midshipman or a junior naval officer: Yes, sir; No, sir; or No Excuse, sir. These replies formed part of the indoctrination that led to unquestioning obedience to orders, otherwise, no naval unit could function effectively in combat. My indoctrination was thorough and lasting."

If Hunt means to imply that his Naval Academy training caused him to snap to attention for G. Gordon Liddy some 30 years later, one has to wonder if he went from World War II to the Cold War without having heard about Nuremberg.

Liddy and Hunt are presented as men of action; men who knew how to get things done. What he refuses to admit is the reality that they were, in the end, bunglers—men who attempted a break-in of the Democratic National Committee with less planning than a junkie would give to a shoplifting at Macy's.

Hunt's book makes clear that he allowed the Cuban Watergate burglars to leave enough incriminating evidence back in their hotel rooms—address books, numbered bills, false ID cards and the like—to lead police right back to himself and to Liddy. He sent them into Lawrence O'Brien's office with no clear idea—apparently—of which phones they were supposed to tap. He sent them off with no cover story and no plans for a standby attorney to push bail and whisk them out of town if anything went wrong. The first time they tried an entry it had to be scrapped; Hunt and one of the men got themselves locked in a lower-level banquet hall all night.

Hunt relates all this with a straight face—managing to place the blame for the oversights and stupidities on others, especially James W. McCord Jr. And he tells the story in a prose that resembles silent-movie titles, heavy with melodrama and suspense. Thus he tells us that while the police were arresting the men inside Watergate, he drove his car within two blocks of the site—"within pistol range of the police cars, I reflected." He tells us that the next day, when a reporter phoned to ask him if he knew Barker, he felt "as though I were in the center of a vise whose jaws were beginning slowly but inexorably to close." And he tells us that he hadn't really wanted to ask Sirica for mercy after pleading guilty to the break-in but that "the fate and welfare of my motherless children took precedence over my . . . reluctance."

There is a great deal of self-pity in this book. Hunt manages to make four days in a disciplinary cell at the District of Columbia jail sound like Papillon's penal-colony stint. He refers to the Senate Watergate Committee and the press as "harassers."

But the real problem with this book is that it is dishonest. Three times in the final chapters Hunt protests that Nixon's men had destroyed notebooks that contained his defense—materials that would have shown that he was working on a project he believed to be authorized by the Attorney General. These materials, he now admits, never existed.

And he cries in outrage that Daniel Ellsberg went free while he said others were convicted for breaking into the office of his psychiatrist, protesting that "the team that sought his personal secrets was authorized to do so by high and competent government officials, including the President's chief domestic-affairs adviser, reacting to the largest raid on national security in . . . [U.S.] history."

That's what he says in his book. But he knows what it really was, and when it came time for him to go to jail and he was trying to get money and promises of clemency from the Nixon White House, he reminded Nixon's men what it was: "seamy," he said, and "clearly illegal."

Hunt's editors at Putnam knew that the book contained lies, but decided to go ahead and publish it anyway, touting it as the "eagerly awaited . . . exclusive life story of America's most famous career secret agent..." The 16 pages of photos are very much like the memoir itself; they show Hunt in heroic poses, many of them blurred, out-of-focus or obviously staged.

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340002-8

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340002-8

NEW YORK
25 Nov 1974

Books/Eliot Fremont-Smith

HOOKED AGAIN: THE CASE OF HOWARD HUNT

"... Most publishers do not believe Nixon will tell the truth in his memoirs, nor that the public will accept half-truths ..."

Regardless of anybody's thoughts, feelings, wishes, exhaustion, or vows to the contrary; regardless of purgative elections and the necessity of focusing on more pressing matters; regardless of the passage of time and even of whatever new and stunning medical bulletins may be issued from the West—we will never be done with Watergate. Not in books, anyway.

The fall of Richard Nixon—everything that went and is still going with it—is simply the most dramatic large-scale, real-life political story of our experience. It rivals the most dramatic in all history. In this century, perhaps only the rise and fall of Hitler equals it in terms of *elemental public drama*—the stuff that compels and sustains endless fascination, and that renders such considerations as whether that fascination is "bad" or "morbid" or "too painful" or in other ways morally or socially reprehensible (an understandably constant refrain in the case of Hitler) beside the point.

Don't get me wrong. I am suggesting a parallel only in terms of drama (or maybe melodrama). Also, there are, without any doubt, other political sagas that contain similarly compelling elements. Yet these two stand in stark relief—in part because we know so much about them.

As drama, Watergate has everything. It has classically tragic scale, endless pathos and irony, reels (literally) of vulgarity and banana-peel humor. It has an extraordinary cast of characters—memorable, improbable, representative of every type. How Shakespeare would have itched for them! It has perfect pacing, symbolic richness, the suspense of a hundred capers and of evil nearly triumphant, a vast deception that nearly worked. It addresses great questions of history, ethics, and human responsibility—power and corruption and accountability, means and ends, the ambiguous connections between "possible," "necessary," and "right." And it has a unifying, timeless, mythic theme: high ambition painfully achieved and then brought low by prefigured flaws in character and failures of perception, by common and banal betrayals, and by the mysterious momentums of ongoing life, including those of a great many ordinary people going about their ordinary work (a night guard at the Watergate, a congressman from Newark), none anticipating the pivotal roles history would cast them in. All this and more—no matter how bone-weary we are of the subject, it's not what closes on Saturday night.

Over 100 books have been published about Nixon and Watergate (some put the figure closer to 500)—documentaries, studies of impeachment, psychobiographies, confessions, reportorial accounts, political analyses, fictions, polemics, collections of humor. Very few of these will last. The most popular, due shortly in paperback reprint, has been Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein's *All the President's Men*, in part because it was a "first" (and by the two most famous diggers), in greater part because it told its tale in highly dramatic terms, as suspense. (Some of it was possibly fictional: I was a believer in "Deep Throat" at first—was he Dean, Gray, Mark Felt?—but with the passage of time his existence as an individual seems less and less plausible. How *could* he have secretly marked up Woodward's *Times*, unless he loitered around the apartment house in the early morning or lived across the hall?)

Theodore H. White's forthcoming account (next spring, it is hoped, from Atheneum) will probably be the next great hit, since it promises, along with known-quantity authorship, needed perspective, as well as some spice: his *The Making of the President 1972* was highly admiring of Nixon's wisdom, judiciousness, and statesmanship, and it will be interesting to see just how the crow is eaten.

Meantime, the first-person insider accounts are of greatest interest. Of these, so far, Jeb Magruder's *An American Life: One Man's Road to Watergate*, remains by far the most apparently candid and insightful; maudlin, undoubtedly in some respects self-serving, but somehow giving off a persuasive metallic bong of truth. That bong is probably going to remain quite rare: books by the minors (Segretti), the majors (Haldeman), the bizarre (Martha Mitchell, Colson), and so on, may or may not materialize; it's more than likely that most of them will not give off this sound, which is one reason, probably the most important, why premanuscript publishing contracts have been so hard to come by. Far more than the public asking price, and more than his current medical incapacity, this has been the stumbling block for Nixon's own projected memoirs: most of the major prospective hardcover publishers do not believe he will tell the truth, nor that the public will accept half-truths.

That's how low his credibility has sunk. Even lying presidential memoirs have some value—but publishers have not forgotten the financial disaster, for Holt, Rinehart and Winston, of L.B.J.'s *The Vantage Point*, which was also not believed. Nor will they forget another publisher's current anguish in connection with E. Howard Hunt's just-published Undercover: Memoirs of an American Secret Agent (Berkley/Putnam, $8.95), which has been in the news because Hunt, as a witness at the Watergate trial, has confessed that the book, as well as his previous testimony, contains many lies.

It's fascinating: the drama continues. With as much dignity as possible (which ain't much, under the circumstances), Stephen Conland, president of Berkley, has sent to the reviewing press copies of "a memorandum from Hunt's own typewriter, and pages hand-marked by Hunt himself as to what inaccuracies and misstatements appear in the book—and why." It's great stuff. Here's a sample. On page 277 of the book, Hunt is talking about the contents of his White House safe which he thought the Justice Department had and was unfairly denying him access to in the preparation of his own defense. This material, he writes in *Undercover*, included "my operational notebooks, telephone lists and documents *in which I had recorded the progress of Gemstone from its inception, mentioning Liddy's three principals by name: Mitchell, Magruder and Dean.*" The part in italics is what Hunt crosses out on the photocopied page; in his memorandum to his publisher he writes: "P. 277: As I reconstruct it, this was literary license, to emphasize the nature of the government's failure to produce my entire safe's contents."

Does the book have any value? Yes. As an unwittingly revealing self-portrait of a hopeless romantic, displaced person, and boob. Nixon and Haldeman were dead right in thinking of Hunt and Liddy as clowns and idiots—what Hunt took umbrage at and is at constant pains to contradict. There is considerable poignancy in this: on the one hand, Hunt's almost desperate projected self-image as a dignified, professionally able, coolly expert spy and "undercover" man; and on the other, the pratfall lunacy—forget Shakespeare, it's Ritz Brothers stuff—of virtually every one of his and his bumbling colleagues' endeavors: the Bay of Pigs, the I.T.T.-Dita Beard caper, the Ellsberg's doctor break-in, the two Watergate fiascos. (There is poignancy also in this seen-it-all tough guy's being truly star-

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ed and aghast at what life is like
n prison.)

It is a struggle to remember that *ndercover* isn't pure farce: that Hunt s a real and suffering person, that he as a C.I.A. agent for umpteen years other questions about the C.I.A. aside —is *this* what they hire?), that in the ame of patriotism he accepted assignents clearly subversive to everything merican patriotism is supposed to be bout, and damn near got away with it. ut then—it's in the nature of much ama—the plots and plans of the most lculating of men are foiled by native mics. Sometimes, that is. It didn't rn out that way with the Nazis.

HARPER'S MAGAZINE
Dec 1974

THE JOINER

by Nelson W. Aldrich, Jr.

Undercover: Memoirs of an American Secret Agent, by E. Howard Hunt. Putnam, $8.95.

MORE THAN MOST MEN, E. Howard Hunt (alias Eduardo, alias Edward Hamilton, alias David St. ohn) managed to put his life at the ervice of his imagination. As such, is memoirs recommend him to our dmiration as earnestly as, in the nd, they solicit our pity. The attempt fails on both counts because he imagination he served was from e beginning a sorry thing, a miserble blend of juvenile fantasies and iddle-class strivings, of dumb pluck nd stupefying conventionality.

Such an imagination needs priming. Slow to learn to read, young Howard was placed in the hands of lice Robbins, who had taught his ather to read and who also happened o be the principal of the elementary chool in the Buffalo suburb where he Hunts lived. Miss Robbins was he first of the highly placed figures alled upon by the elder Hunt to intervene in his only child's career; hrough her he was "brought into the vorld of books, the world of imaginaion and adventure that was to occupy so large a portion of my later ears." More substantive thrills were pened to him by another family onnection in 1943. Languishing "at oose ends" as an Air Force officer n Florida, Hunt heard of an elite ush-hush outfit then being organized y Gen. "Wild Bill" Donovan, a Bufalo friend of his father's. Two calls —Orlando to Buffalo, Buffalo to Washington—and Howard found imself in the OSS.

No inference should be drawn that he young man who thus began his "long association with the clandestine services of the United States" was actually a pampered *fils de papa* masquerading as a bold adventurer. Howard so successfully passed the initiation rites of the OSS that his fellow candidates figured him for a plant. In any case, this papa's influence on his son's career was necessarily more moral than material. The elder Hunt seems to have been one of those millions for whom the Great Depression served at once to blast a dream of quick riches (in Miami real estate) and to confirm a death grip on respectability. His world (and Howard's) is that of John O'Hara's Gibbsville, a world of social distinctions so important, and at the same time so fine, that whole melodramas of self-esteem hinge on an invitation to tea, a dip in the stock market, or a date with a Smith girl for the Saturday dance. His son wistfully notes the occasions on which wealth eluded the family: twice his father took a fee rather than shares in return for legal work done for companies that later prospered mightily, and then, just before young Howard was to enter Brown University, his grandfather Hunt perished in an automobile accident that also killed his second wife —not soon enough, however, to prevent passage of the estate from the Hunt family to heirs of the second wife.

Memoirs recalled in the shadow of jail, as these were, are bound to muse on the might-have-been. There's less of that here than one could expect, however, and not enough even to forgive. Hunt's father appears to have taken his reverses philosophically— in the same spirit, perhaps, that Frank Nixon may have thought about the oil that was found under the old family farm after he sold it. But if Richard Nixon sought to redeem his father's bad luck by leaving little to chance and nothing at all to the good will of his adversaries, E. Howard Hunt seems to have looked on fortune more lightly. He recalls Brown University with fondness and gratitude, not for the satisfaction of having worked his way through as his richer classmates did not have to, but for introducing him to Ivy League fashion: "button-down shirts, foulard ties, [the year is 1936] a Shetland tweed jacket, gray flannel trousers and white bucks." He's grateful, too, for classmates through whom he "became familiar with and learned to appreciate the society and life-styles of Honolulu, Beverly Hills, San Francisco, Dallas, Milwaukee, and Chicago." Suburban Buffalo is here beginning to occupy the same place in Hunt's imagination that Yorba Linda had already found in Nixon's.

But not quite. Back home the elder Hunt is still a man if not of substance, then assuredly of contacts. He will belong, in his lifetime, to no fewer than thirteen clubs, and his son proudly lists them all: "The Buffalo Athletic Club... NewYork's Drug and Chemical Club ... the Lake Placid Club ... the Albany Country Club ..." and so forth. Hunt does not record how many clubs he himself belonged to, and the only one he mentions by name is the Brown University Club of Washington, D.C., where, with consequences more fateful than those attendant on his acquaintance with Miss Robbins and General Donovan, he became friendly with a redoubtable fellow alumnus, Charles Colson. Nevertheless, officers' clubs, country clubs, and hunting clubs do figure predominantly in Hunt's narrative of his adventures. Whether he is a naval officer in the North Atlantic, a *Life* war correspondent in the South Pacific, an Air Force officer, an OSS operative in China, a Marshall Plan staff member* in postwar Paris and Vienna, or a CIA officer in Mexico City, Tokyo, Uruguay, the Balkans, and various Florida staging areas— wherever he is, there, too, is some agreeable and exclusive spot to which he can repair, with drinks, tennis, or horses as effortless diversions.

ONE CLUB THAT HUNT does mention by name, but forgivably fails to characterize as a club, is the Republican party. Membership in the GOP, however, seems to have been as inheritable a fact of life as, say, a taste for shooting birds. As a political statement, its resonance extends no farther than the unshakable assumption that, just as all the best people will naturally be Republicans, so others, like "those unfortunate townies who brown-bagged it daily up the hill [to Brown]," will naturally be Democrats. Political affiliation is a matter of shoes—"white bucks" or "black leather."

This happy assumption encountered some empirical jostling at the Economic Cooperation Administration headquarters in Paris in the persons of Averell Harriman, Al Friendly, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Kingman Brewster—a veritable "briar-patch of liberalism," as he later described it. Hunt's reaction, however, was not to demote these figures from the ranks of the best people (almost all of them had, after all, like him, attended an Ivy League school), but rather to tolerate them as classmates who had

* "Through my father, I met Paul Hoffman.... Hoffman agreed to take me on and suggested that I join the staff of the European administrator in Paris, Ambassador Averell Harriman."

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had the misfortune to be rushed by a less suitable, if possibly ascendant, fraternity. He credits the Hiss case with having revealed to him "the ideological line between [himself] and [the] ninety-five percent of Harriman's staff" who were clearly members of the Hiss club.

Later, as a CIA officer in Washington, Hunt would meet a more fraternal spirit in William F. Buckley, Jr., "a young Yale graduate" who, Hunt was told, was seeking "the optimum way of working against the Stalinists." Impressed with Buckley, Hunt resolved to find a way to use his "demonstrated and potential" talents. Happily for both of them, a way was found, and we next meet the sophisticated pair on assignment in Mexico City: "One by one, my outside agents were arriving in Mexico, Bill Buckley among the first, with his pregnant wife, Pat. She and Dorothy [Hunt's wife] quickly became friends, as did Bill and I, frequently lunching at what was then the only good French restaurant in Mexico City: La Normandia."

Hunt's anti-Communism would always have this touch of the *fin bec.* It was never of the merely useful sort that Nixon's and McCarthy's was: a blunt instrument with which to beat Democrats. It was more visceral, more romantic than that. In Vienna Hunt had seen the consequences of genuine beatings: "Karpe's murder, I felt, was as vicious as Jordan's, and I took both personally. From these and related circumstances developed my conviction that Soviet Communism was a bloody and implacable enemy, ready to kill and destroy on the slightest provocation—or even on mere suspicion."

Hunt himself was later to commit a number of illegal acts "on mere suspicion," but there is no evidence in the memoirs that his CIA career involved him in anything more adventurous than the (albeit successful) bugging of some Latin-American embassies in Mexico City and Montevideo, or anything more dangerous than the mobilization of "freedom fighters" for the attacks on Guatemala and the Bay of Pigs. The "world of adventure and imagination" that Miss Robbins introduced him to in books seems to have been fully realized only in his own. Indeed, the suspicion is irrepressible that these novels (forty-five in all) functioned for their author, as for their audience, as an escape from the banal round of going to country-club dances and cocktail parties, choosing private schools for the kids, and ceaselessly relocating on company orders that made up his life, and theirs.

Hunt's company was, of course, "The Company," the CIA, but this account of service there makes it seem hardly distinguishable from service to, let us say, ARAMCO or Procter & Gamble. And the lessons it taught were the same—the same, in fact, that his father had taught him: it's not what you know, but whom you know; and if you know the right people, join the right clubs, then you will be looked after. There is far more truth than nonsense to that, of course, but it was Hunt's miscalculation to know Nixon and Colson. Perhaps by 1969 he had been too often out of the country to realize that the townies had taken over the hill, that white bucks had gone out of style, and that the black-leather types looked after their own only on sundays. It would have been better to have joined the Hiss club.

To the student of character Hunt's memoirs have rueful charms; to the student of Watergate they offer both dross and gold, and the delights of sifting one from the other. Fully half the book is devoted to Hunt's droll escapades on behalf of Colson and Nixon, and his subsequent travails as witness and jailbird. Not that he finds anything amusing in these events; his narrative, unsurprisingly, fairly reeks of that solemnity which results when dignity struggles with humiliation, when the silk top hat is hit by the snowballs of unwashed urchins. One story he tells may be considered representative, if not actually a parable:

> *One morning [in the Executive Office Building] I was waiting to see Colson when in bounded King Timahoe, the Presidential Irish setter.... The dog approached me, sniffed, and began lifting his leg on mine. I roared a warning and shoved the dog away before he could stain my trousers. The incident caused great hilarity among the viewers, but left me feeling surly.* ☐

Nelson W. Aldrich, Jr., is senior editor of Harper's.

CHICAGO TRIBUNE
17 November 1974

Didn't write book under oath—Hunt

Knight Newspapers

PHILADELPHIA—It appears that E. Howard Hunt, the Watergate "plumber," former C.I.A. agent, and author of more than 50 potboiler novels dealing with international intrigues, cannot even write his memoirs without becoming entwined in subterfuge.

Hunt's book, "Under-Cover," which was published last week by G. P. Putnam's Sons, contains an exciting narrative of the life and strange times of the man who became America's most famous spy. But it also includes a few lies and assorted inaccuracies designed to protect Hunt against his various past perjuries.

Or at least Hunt said it did when he gave what he billed as the real truth in his testimony before the Watergate coverup trial in Washington two weeks ago.

"I DIDN'T write under oath," explained Hunt, who is free from jail pending the outcome of an appeal, and who is on a national tour to promote the book. He discussed the inaccuracies, which he said were minor changes of dates and times, in an interview.

"My contract stipulated that I write nothing libelous or unlawful," he said, "and I fulfilled my contract. I was naive enough to think that I wouldn't be called to testify at the coverup trial.

"Sophisticated readers realize that one takes a certain amount of latitude in doing one's memoirs. In my case it involves 100 words out of more than 165,000 words."

THE ALLEGED [or admitted, as the case may be] errors do involve mainly small points. The more major problems with the book are the omissions of information and material that appear to implicate former Atty. Gen. John Mitchell as the authorizer of the Watergate escapades.

Hunt also alludes to, but omits specific mention of, the memorandum he send to the White House after he was jailed spelling out the payments and other emoluments

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LOS ANGELES TIMES
1 December 1974

A Spy With High Double Standards

Self-righteousness is a loud din raised to drown the voice of guilt within us.
— Eric Hoffer, "The True Believer"

BY ROBERT KIRSCH

E. Howard Hunt's "Undercover: Memoirs of an American Secret Agent" (Berkley-Putnam: $8.95; illustrated) is more interesting as a psychological case study than as any additional revelation about Watergate. And much of this interest is derived, I suspect, from the unintentional disclosures rather than the obvious advocacy.

One cannot read the book without sensing the double standard. Self-pity is here; but pity for others is carefully doled out. Self-justification is plentiful; but all justification for others is reserved only for those who helped Hunt. It is a work resonant with self-righteousness.

Let me give you an example: Hunt and Liddy, still riding high in their "Plumber" days, are investigating a young, plump and bespectacled man called "Donald Simmons" who is suspected to be "the instrument of a Democratic scheme to infiltrate Republican campaign machinery." Simmons had been "checked out" and Liddy told that he "indeed worked for a 'high level' in Washington."

But, the "bluntness" of Simmons' approach to several state Republican headquarters volunteering to sow "doubt and confusion in Democratic ranks" had brought his usefulness into question. "For that reason," Hunt says, "Liddy and I interviewed Simmons in his room at the Frolics Motel in Miami using our aliases of Warren and Leonard. We had decided in advance that we would use the good-cop-bad-cop routine with Simmons and I was to be the heavy.

Selective Outrage

"We listened to Simmons' description of pranks already carried out and future pranks planned and were as unimpressed by them as we were by Simmons himself. While I absented myself to use a pay phone outside the motel, Liddy said to Simmons, 'There's one thing about Warren you ought to know. We have trouble with him.'

"'Trouble? What kind of trouble?' Simmons asked.

"'Well,' Liddy told him, lowering his voice, 'Warren tends to kill without orders.'

"According to Liddy, Simmons paled at this unwelcome information and when I rejoined them, I noticed Simmons was reduced to monosyllabic responses."

This contrasts with Hunt's outrage over the questioning of his maid after the Watergate break-in: "On Monday FBI agents appeared at my home to interrogate our Guatemalan maid, who was terrified by them, I might add." Or over his own interrogations: "Since being sentenced, I have been questioned under oath on more than 25 occasions, often for many hours. I have answered thousands of questions by innumerable investigators, prosecutors, grand jurors and staff members of this committee. I am informed that such intensive and repeated interrogation is a most extraordinary procedure and of dubious legality."

In other words, it depends on whose ox is being gored.

The impression which Hunt leaves with the reader is that the trouble with Watergate was not the break-in and associated tactics but the failure of the cover-up and of those in authority to come through for their subordinate agents, including him. His contempt is unveiled for Dean ("Deficient in perspective, unfamiliar with clandestine tradition, he scampered like Chicken Little to the President crying, 'Blackmail'.") and McCord ("His bombshell letter to Judge Sirica successfully polished the judicial apple and prevented his serving time beyond the five days following his arrest ... Self-centered, devious and sanctimonious, McCord put his own welfare above that of his companions—and that of the nation itself.") but Liddy gets nothing but praise ("A keen combative mind, gifted raconteur and good companion, Gordon was an unquestioning believer in the prerogatives of high authority ... impatient with bureaucrats, ambitious and burdened with a sense of mission.").

Yet, what Hunt says of McCord is precisely the conclusion likely to be reached about himself: self-centered, devious and sanctimonious. He is particularly irked at his depiction "as at best a fumbler and at worst a pathological criminal," and at the suggestion that he betrayed his clandestine training and experience, that he "blackmailed" the President.

The way he tells it, he was simply demanding the two-way loyalty which operatives in espionage deserve. John Mitchell should never have allowed local law enforcement to act on the Watergate break-in, permitted "anger to interfere with his obligation to extricate the arrested men." Even now, Hunt seems much less concerned with his actions as a consultant doing dirty work for the White House than with the failure of these civilians to cover him according to the precedents and procedures of the CIA.

As he told the Ervin committee: "To put it unmistakably, I was an intelligence officer—a spy—for the government of the United States. There have been occasions, as one might expect, when covert operations by the United States or other nations have been exposed. Such episodes have not been uncommon. When such mishaps have occurred, it has been universally the practice for the operation to be disavowed and 'covered up.' Usually this has been done by official intervention with law-enforcement authorities. In addition, the employing governments have paid legal defense fees. Salaries and family living expenses have been continued."

This is either the height of con or an incredible glibness. Probably it is both. Can Hunt really believe that his intelligence work for the country, whatever its quality, is equatable with carrying out clandestine and illegal activities against his fellow citizens? This deficiency of moral and ethical discrimination is apparent throughout the book.

Hunt sees himself as a patriot, doing his duty. I use the present tense advisedly. He stills see himself that way, a man more sinned against than sinning. If there is bitterness here it comes out of the failure of his superiors to play the game, to protect their agents. It is no accident that the major sense of "disillusionment, betrayal, and sorrow" begins not with the crimes of Watergate but with his reading of the White House transcripts with their disparaging remarks about him and his colleagues.

"Nixon, the man I had believed in for so many years, turned out to be indecisive, petty and obsessed with self-preservation," he writes.

But, then we must ponder the terrible ifs: Suppose the Watergate burglars had never been caught, or suppose the White House had managed to quash the charges, or suppose Richard Nixon had turned out to be decisive, or magnanimous, or forthcoming and selfless. The nightmare thought is that Hunt and Liddy, even higher in the government, could indulge their tactics without hindrance, interrogating hundreds the way they interrogated "Simmons."

There is no hint of this possibility in Hunt's ac-

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count. The truth is that his own words, intentionally or unintentionally, reveal him clearly: arrogant, self-righteous, self-serving, morally shoddy.

Even at this late date, Hunt is jealous of his professional reputation. The break-in at Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office was impeccably done under his direction. The first Watergate break-in was fouled up by McCord's equipment. Hunt fought against the second break-in but gave in only out of friendship for Liddy, who had to face pressure for more information from Mitchell, Dean and Magruder. McCord is blamed for the failure of the second entry. He did not take off the lock, which aroused the suspicion of the building guard.

Semantic Exercise

Thus, the inexorable tide of Watergate is laid to others. Hunt's only real culpability, he suggests, lies in trusting the civilians and the amateurs. There is nothing like remorse or dignity or grandeur in these pages. The damage to the nation is scarcely mentioned. The laws broken are only an episode, though Hunt is quick to use those laws in his battle for freedom. Indeed, he regards himself as a victim of law.

What troubles him most is that he may be known "as a man who tried to blackmail the White House." He concludes:

"But let me make one thing perfectly clear: I did not try to 'blackmail' the White House, nor did anyone ever offer me 'executive clemency' either spontaneously or as an inducement to remain silent. Indeed, one of the great ironies of Watergate was, of course, that there was no 'silence' to 'buy'; my immunization meant that I had to testify to any and all questions or face additional charges of contempt."

That, as developments in the current Watergate trial indicate, may be an exercise in semantics. The production of Hunt's memo of Nov. 14, 1972, in the courtroom of Judge Sirica allows other interpretations.

In prison, Hunt read Eric Ambler's "Judgment on Deltchev." He cited one passage which he feels had singular relevance to what he had undergone: "His trial, therefore, is no formality, but a ceremony of preparation and precaution. He must be discredited and destroyed as a man so that he may safely be dealt with as criminal."

The great irony is that Hunt himself does more to achieve that erasure than any observer or commentator has so far.

LOS ANGELES TIMES
20 November 1974

For the Protection of the Republic

In itself, the statement by William E. Colby, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, was remarkable. Commenting on his appearance last year at an open hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Colby said recently: "Frankly, I think it is a protection for the republic that the head of intelligence should be subject to that kind of popular and congressional control."

It certainly is some protection, but such has been the mystique of the CIA that Colby's appearance was unique. He was the first intelligence chief ever brought before a committee at an open hearing. Before the session, he had passed the word that he had no objection to testifying. That he could give this assurance without the appearance of condescension toward the committee was an indication of the status and influence of the CIA. Congressional committees usually do not need to be informed whether a prospective witness approves.

But, as Times staff writer Murray Seeger reports from Washington, there is a change. A CIA man told Seeger, "Being under pressure is nothing novel to the agency. The thing that is different is the climate of opinion in America, which is more questioning, more demanding that it used to be . . ."

And for excellent reasons. Established 27 years ago at the beginning of the cold war, the CIA now has a budget of $750 million a year and 16,000 employes. It is the key agency of an "intelligence community" that spends $8 billion a year. The CIA director is head of the U.S. Information Board, which includes the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of the Treasury.

All this represents immense power, which can be deployed in secrecy by a coordinating group called the 40 Committee headed by Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger through his position as assistant to the President for national security.

Seeger reports that the CIA is responding to increased criticism of the way that power has been used, by beginning a subtle campaign to improve its public acceptance. That campaign includes a willingness to testify at congressional hearings and a decision to make some of its research available to different public agencies and to newsmen and academic groups. At another level, CIA officials talk to a small number of senators and representatives on two committees that oversee the CIA's work. The committees get "total information," a CIA representative said. But "total" may have to be redefined in the light of recent revelations about CIA involvement in Chile.

What is missing is not the fault of the CIA, but rather that of the absence of strict congressional oversight of the agency by Congress. Congress has that responsibility, but has only superficially exercised its authority. After an extensive review last fall, Times staff writers Rudy Abramson and John Averill concluded that oversight of the CIA was almost totally lacking.

Diffusion of power is basic to a democracy. The CIA, with its huge budget and the authority to carry out secret operations, represents largely unchecked power at the disposal of the executive department, and it is likely that even the executive branch is unaware of the full dimensions of all CIA operations.

This must change, and Congress must assume the responsibility for changing it by imposing effective oversight procedures. To paraphrase Colby's statement, the CIA should be subject to that kind of congressional control for the protection of the republic.

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340002-8

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340002-8

WASHINGTON POST
16 November 1974

CIA Role Debated at Cover-up Trial

By George Lardner Jr.
Washington Post Staff Writer

Former White House chief of staff H.R. (Bob) Haldeman's lawyers insisted yesterday that he had good reason to enlist the Central Intelligence Agency in an attempt to block the original Watergate break-in investigation.

The claim touched off an acrimonious, day-long debate at the Watergate cover-up trial that centered on the CIA's covert oprations in Mexico in 1972 when the Watergate burglars were arrested at Democratic National Committee headquarters.

Watergate prosecutors concluded the session with a confident air and promised to rest their case next Thursday, a week earlier than expected.

The dispute over the CIA caught the agency's deputy director, Lt. Gen. Vernon A. Walters, squarely in the crossfire. Before the day was done he found himself recanting secret testimony he gave last year before a House Armed Services subcommittee.

According to Walters' congressional testimony, then-CIA director Richard Helms told him shortly after the Watergate break-in June 17, 1972, that an investigation of its financing could expose some of the CIA's own banking techniques.

"Mr. Helms said there was no involvement by the CIA in the Watergate bugging, but investigation of the financial part of it might uncover some of the methods or techniques by which the agency moved money," Walters told the House subcommittee in May of 1973.

Confronted with that testimony yesterday, however, Walters said: "I must have misspoken. I have no recollection of Mr. Helms making this statement."

Haldeman's lawyers had evidently been relying heavily on Walters' congressional testimony in fashioning their defense strategy.

They maintained the CIA "did have assets south of the border which could have been compromised" by a full-fledged FBI investigation of the Watergate scandal's Mexican connection. Some of the Nixon campaign donations that financed the Watergate bugging and break-in had been laundered through a bank in Mexico City.

"We're not trying to put the blame (for the break-in) on the CIA," said one of Haldeman's lawyers, Frank H. Strickler. "I'm not trying to do that."

He said he was attempting to show, instead, that the CIA had agents as well as assets in Mexico that could have been jeopardized by an untrammeled investigation.

Chief trial prosecutor James F. Neal replied scornfully that there was no evidence that Haldeman knew of the CIA's activities or cared about them.

In a quick counterattack, first with the jurors out of the room and then with them present, Neal pointed out that Haldeman himself proposed the CIA strategem to President Nixon on June 23, 1972, because, in Haldeman's own words, "the FBI is not under control."

At one point during the dispute, U.S. District Court Judge John J. Sirica listened once again to the White House tapes recordings in question before allowing the scattershot questioning about the CIA to continue.

"I want to find out what their defense is," Sirica said of Haldeman and his lawyers.

Although the jurors were out of the room at the time, Haldeman's chief counsel, John J. Wilson, angrily chided the judge a few minutes later for making the remark.

"If I said it, it was in error," Sirica replied.

"You did say it," Wilson said testily, "and I object to it . . . We stand before you with the presumption of innocence."

The judge calmly told Wilson to put the protest in his "bag of errors" and let it go at that.

Throughout the day, the Haldeman lawyers tried to show that the former White House aide had every reason to think that the Watergate investigation might cramp the CIA's style.

Strickler questioned Walters repeatedly about a July 6, 1972 memo that the CIA official signed although it actually had been prepared by the agency's' security staff.

Walters, who had been with the CIA two months at the time, said he had only "hearsay knowledge" of many of the details, but he acknowledged that:

- Watergate burglar Eugenio Martinez had been on a $100-a-month retainer for the CIA, as an informant in Miami's Cuban exile community, at the time of the June, 1972, Watergate break-in. Martinez had first been hired by the CIA in 1960 and went on retainer in 1969.
- Watergate burglar Bernard Barker had been a regular FBI contact in Cuba who was "turned over to the CIA in 1969" and then evacuated from the country shortly after Fidel Castro took over in January, 1960.
- The public relations firm of Robert R. Mullen & Co., where Watergate spy E. Howard Hunt went to work in 1970 after his retirement as a CIA agent, had been "providing cover overseas for a number of years for agency employees."

The CIA began supplying all this information and more in a series of memorandums that began going to the FBI as early as June 20, 1972, three days after the break-in.

"What's all this leading up to?" Sirica demanded.

Strickler pointed out that Haldeman and former White House aide John D. Ehrlichman met with Helms and Walters on the afternoon of June 23, 1972, in an effort to limit the Watergate investigation.

The FBI was, at that point, hot on the trail of the so-called "Dahlberg-Ogarrio checks," which Bernard Barker had cashed and which helped finance the Watergate spy work. Strickler contended that there was also reason to believe at the same time that an investigation of the Ogarrio, or Mexican, checks could compromise CIA activities there.

Prosecutor Neal protested that all this was "irrelevant" unless the defense lawyers could show that Haldeman knew of the "CIA aspects" that were supposedly in jeopardy. He said the whole point of Haldeman's conversation with Mr. Nixon on June 23—just before the CIA officials were called to the White House—"was to stop the FBI investigation before they got on to the Dahlberg and Ogarrio checks, which had nothing to do with the CIA."

Wilson, however, insisted that "this is no shallow effort on our part." He said then-acting FBI director L. Patrick Gray himself told then-White House counsel John W. Dean III on the evening of June 22, 1972, that the FBI was leaning to the notion that Watergate bugging had been "a CIA operation."

Haldeman, in turn, learned this, and more, from Dean before the White House chief of staff went in to see Mr. Nixon, the defense lawyer said.

Neal said it was "utter foolishness" to suggest that Haldeman had the CIA's interests in mind when he got Mr. Nixon's approval to use the agency as a roadblock to the Watergate investigation. According to the testimony of Nixon campaign deputy Frederick C. LaRue earlier this week, the prosecutor pointed out, the real worry was that the pursuit of the suspect checks would sooner or later show that Nixon campaign lawyer G. Gordon Liddy, the head of the Watergate spy squad, had given them to Barker to cash.

"The real issue in this case is what Mr. Haldeman knew," Neal said. "The tape of June 23d is pristine clear."

Sirica listened to it again, along with other conversations Mr. Nixon had that crucial day with Haldeman, while the jurors waited in an adjoining room. It showed the President listening approvingly as Haldeman told him "that the way to handle this now is for us to have Walters call Pat Gray and just say, 'Stay the hell out of this.'"

Informed that the pressures for the bungled Watergate break-in had apparently come from former Attorney General John N. Mitchell, Mr. Nixon told Haldeman to get the CIA officials into the act. "Play it tough," the President said, adding later that "I don't want them [the CIA] to get any ideas we're doing it because our concern is political."

The CIA officials met with Haldeman and Ehrlichman shortly after 1 p.m. that day. Helms had told the FBI's Gray the day before that "there was no CIA involvement in Watergate," but now Walters was dispatched to tell him to rein in the investigation.

"Our theory is that they used General Walters to obstruct the investigation and one reason was that he had only been in there [at the CIA] six weeks and he was a ready tool," prosecutor Neal told the judge.

The testimony resumed in the afternoon and it left the CIA looking very pliable in response to the White House overtures. Walters said Haldeman announced early in the meeting with the CIA officials that "the Watergate affair was making a lot of noise, but the investigation was leading to important people, that it might get worse, that the Democrats were trying to maximize it."

The White House chief of staff suggested that the Watergate investigation might reopen scars from the

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CIA's Bay of Pigs operation, but, Walters testified, "Mr. Helms answered with some heat and said, 'I don't know what the Bay of Pigs has to do with this.' "

Finally, Walters said, Haldeman warned that "a further investigation might uncover CIA assets or money" and said the FBI should be informed of that.

"It was a directive, not a suggestion," Walters said. "I thought M. Halde[illegible] some information that I did not."

Under questioning by Strickler, the CIA deputy director said he did not think Haldeman was asking him to do anything improper. Accordingly, Walters said he immediately arranged a meeting with Gray at FBI headquarters, and told him that "continuation [of the investigation] might lead to some [CIA] projects."

At first, Walters denied that Helms had also told him the investigation might expose some of the methods by which the CIA "moved money." At that point, Strickler read his congressional testimony. In that appearance, Walters said the CIA officials drew distinction "between involvement [in the bugging] and uncovering assets."

The prosecutors, however, had the last word. Walters said Haldeman never told the CIA officials what "assets" he was talking about. And neither Walters nor Helms ever asked him.

"Did you ask him, 'What are you talking about, Mr. Haldeman?' " Neal demanded.

"We did not," Walters replied.

"Did he enlighten you?"

"No, he did not." That was just the warm-up. Within moments Haldeman's lawyers were protesting at every question as Neal hammered away in country-boy style. Walters played straight man.

Q. You presumed a man in his (Haldeman's) position wouldn't fool around with you, didn't you? . . . Did you have any reason to think he would ask you to do anything improper?

A. No, I did not. I just couldn't conceive of such a thing.

Q. Were you aware that Mr. Haldeman and the President of the United States had just discussed the political embarrassment this affair was causing?

A. No, I was not.

Q. Did you know that Mr. Haldeman had told the President, "We're back in the problem area because the FBI is not under control?"

A. I had no knowledge of such a conversation.

Q. Did Mr. Haldeman mention to you that the FBI was not under control?

A. He did not.

Under Neal's questioning, Walters went on to say that he "must have misspoken" in his congressional testimony when he quoted Helms as telling him, apparently on June 23, that CIA "assets" — which Walters defined broadly as offices, money, personnel, sources and the like—might be compromised. Meanwhile, Sirica prohibited defense lawyers from questioning Walters about an unexplained memo that Helms dictated on June 28, 1972.

By then, according to Walters, the CIA had determined beyond doubt that a full-fledged investigation would pose no problem. However, the Helms memo, which was addressed to Walters, suggested that the CIA was still playing along with the White House.

Entitled "Watergate Affair," the memo said, in part, that:

". . . we (the CIA) still adhere to the request that they (the FBI) confine themselves to the personalities already arrested or directly under suspicion and that they desist from expanding this investigation into other areas which may well, eventually, run afoul of our operations."

Although the directive was addressed to Walters, he said he never saw it until Helms' former secretary at the CIA found it in June, 1973, and brought it to his attention. Haldeman's lawyers maintained that Walters had alluded to the document a month eralier, at his appearance before the House Armed Service subcommittee, but Sirica ruled that only Helms could properly be questioned about it.

With the jurors out of the room, Sirica added that he would entertain any request to call Helms as "a court witness" so that no one at the coverup trial will "have to vouch for his credibility." Helms is now ambassador to Iran.

Evidently confident of the case they have made so far, the prosecutors told Sirica they have decided to cut it short and wind up next week with a few final witnesses and a batch of White House tapes.

"We'll play tapes until I guess we'll all be sick and tired of hearing tapes," Neal said.

Hopeful of completing the trial by Christmas, Sirica summoned Mr. Nixon's lawyer, Herbert J. Miller Jr., and began pressing him to get the go-ahead for a court-appointed medical examination of Mr. Nixon. The judge has a team of three prominent physicians standing by to determine whether the ailing ex-President can safely testify—at least by deposition. But Sirica has said he wants the doctors to get Mr. Nixon's approval first.

Miller said he has not yet had an opportunity to talk to Mr. Nixon, but plans to confer with him in California Sunday or Monday.

The judge asked for an answer by Tuesday, reminding Miller that "if we're going to do anything, time is of the essence." He said defense lawyers will need Mr. Nixon's testimony even sooner than expected in light of the prosecution's plans to rest their case on Thursday.

With a tired look on his face, Mr. Nixon's lawyer agreed to hurry back with a reply. Then he went back upstairs for a protracted hearing over custody of all the other presidential tapes still sitting at the White House, out of Mr. Nixon's reach.

WORLD-NEWS, Roanoke
30 October 1974

CIA is a whipping boy again

The State Department is caught in another bind because of the reputation of the CIA for covert operations. The problem is relatively minor this time: The North Vietnamese are accusing the CIA of meddling in the internal affairs of South Vietnam by supporting demonstrations against the Thieu government. Hanoi says that the U.S. is seeking to have a voice in the South's government no matter what non-Communist group is in control.

The United States, not surprisingly, has denied the charge. The allegation is relatively minor and lacks the solid force of moral authority because the North Vietnamese have been meddling in the affairs of the south for decades, both openly and furtively. But the charge is one more indication that the CIA and other agencies working in foreign lands are going to have an increasingly hard time denying such charges, legitimate or not.

President Ford, in effect, has placed his stamp of approval on covert operations in other countries, partially in the name of a kind of "equality of opportunity": The Soviet Union does it; therefore, should we be left out of the action?

The CIA has not been caught with its hands in the mechanisms of other countries all that often, but it has been caught often enough to make charges stick, at least for propaganda purposes. The habitual Peeping Tom has a difficult time convincing the populace that he is now spending all of his spare time memorizing the encyclopedia.

The CIA, as we have said so often before, has a good intelligence-gathering operation. It ought to restrict its activities to that function; then, when it finds a situation directly affecting our national security, it ought to pass the word to other agencies more accountable to Congress and the people.

The whole Vietnam exercise, from the point of view of the United States, should have proven that our national security is something that must be carefully defined. Our long participation was almost our national undoing. If the CIA is still operating there, covertly, it shouldn't be. Institutional habits are sometimes harder to break than personal ones, and they can be far more dangerous.

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NEW YORK TIMES
27 November 1974

C.I.A. INTERVENING IN LISBON IS DENIED

By DAVID BINDER
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 26—Frank C. Carlucci, who has been nominated to be Ambassador to Portugal, said at a Senate hearing today that "I know" there is no intervention by the United States Central Intelligence Agency in Portuguese affairs.

His statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was the first by an official of the Ford Administration denying reports and allegations from Lisbon that a covert C.I.A. operation involving 100 agents was under way in Portugal to counter Communist activity there. The committee subsequently voted to recommend that the Senate confirm him as Ambassador.

Mr. Carlucci, who is Under Secretary for Health, Education and Welfare and a Career Foreign Service officer, made the statement in response to questions by Representative Michael J. Harrington.

Mr. Harrington, the Massachusetts Democrat, had asked at the last minute to testify before the Senate body in its confirmation hearing on Mr. Carlucci's nomination.

He read a statement suggesting that there had been "a major policy dispute" in the Adminstration over Portugal, resulting in the dismissal of Ambassador Stuart Nash Scott and his replacement by Mr. Carlucci.

Representative Harrington called on the Foreign Relations Committee to look into the matter and, further, to investigate reports that "the United States Government, through the C.I.A., is secretly intervening in Portugal's internal affairs."

He referred to a dispatch by The Associated Press asserting that there were "more than 100 C.I.A. agents" active in Portugal.

In response Mr. Carlucci said: "to my knowledge there is no substance to that charge," and, pressed by a Senator, added, "it means I know that there isn't any C.I.A. intervention in Portugal.

Mr. Carlucci testified that he personally "welcomed" the advent of nondictatorial government in Portugal and the decision of the new Lisbon leadership to divest Portugal of her African colonies.

He added that he saw no "policy change" by the United States toward Portugal, but added that participation of Communists in an elected Portuguese Government would probably prompt a review of American policy with regard to economic aid and Portuguese membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

"I don't think the presence of a Communist minister in the Portuguese Government in itself makes a significant difference," Mr. Carlucci said.

Mr. Carlucci was referring to the appointment last summer by the governing military junta in Lisbon of Alvaro Cunhal secretary of the previously banned Communist party of Portugal, as a Cabinet Minister without Portfolio.

NEW YORK TIMES
3 December 1974

Rockefeller Is Reportedly Contradicted On Wiretapping and C.I.A.'s Chile Role

By SEYMOUR M. HERSH
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 2—The House Judiciary Committee has developed evidence contradicting Nelson A. Rockefeller's assertions that he was not privately told of the White House wiretapping and the secret operations in Chile before their newspaper disclosure, well-informed sources said today.

The newly assembled evidence was not viewed as an immediate threat to Mr. Rockefeller's seemingly inevitable confirmation as Vice President, but some House members were known to be preparing to inquire more deeply into his prior testimony on those issues before the Senate and House Judiciary Committees.

In his Senate testimony in September, Mr. Rockefeller denied any prior knowledge of the White House wiretaps on four newsmen and 13 members of Henry A. Kissinger's National Security Council staff and other Federal officials.

In a later written statement submitted to the Senate, Mr. Rockefeller said that "no information concerning any wiretaps was transmitted to me from the President, or from anyone else in the White House."

According to a memorandum recently circulated among committee members, A. Russell Ash, a former member of the National Security Council and the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, told House committee investigators six weeks ago of a conversation he held in late 1969 with Mr. Kissinger in which Mr. Kissinger, now the Secretary of State, complained about Mr. ro Rockefeller's knowledge of the then-secret wiretaps.

Mr. Ash is scheduled to testify tomorrow before the House committee about that conversation with Mr. Kissinger. The committee is expected to complete its hearings on Mr. Rockefeller by the end of the week.

On the Chile issue, Mr. Rockefeller, who received regular intelligence briefings since 1969 as a member of the Foreign Intelligence Board, denied furing testimony last week knowing of any Central Intelligence Agency activities against the Government of Chilean President A Salvador Allende Gossens.

"The reason I ask you this," said Representative Elizabeth Holtzman, Democrat of Brooklyn, "is because we have been advised that three was a briefing on Chile during the time that you were on the board at a meeting at which you were present, and I wonder whether that refreshes your recollection?"

"I will have to check it," Mr. Rockefeller replied. "It does not refresh my memory."

The sources said that the committee had learned that on Sept. 18, 1974, just two months before his testimony on Chile, Mr. Rockefeller was reminded by William E. Colby, director of Central Intelligence, of an intelligence board briefing on the Chile operation. The briefing took place in December, 1970.

Mr. Colby's letter to Mr. Rockefeller, who had just been nominated by President Ford to be Vice President, was apparently prompted by the published disclosures in early September about the C.I.A. intervention in Chile.

Hugh Morrow, Mr. Rockefeller's spokesman, acknowledged today that Mr. Rockefeller had been briefed on Chile during an intelligence board meeting in late 1970 but quoted Mr. Rockefeller as saying that the briefing had dealt only with the fall elections there that had been won by President Allende, a Marxist.

"This all hinges on the way Miss Holtzman posed the question," Mr. Morrow asserted. "She asked about events after the election—and he [Mr. Rockefeller] read that to be a question on the so-called 'destability' business."

In the initial news accounts of the C.I.A.'s involvement in Chile, Mr. Colby was quoted as telling a Congressional subcommittee that the intelligence agency's goal in Chile was to destabilize Mr. Allende's regime and make it impossible for him to govern. Mr. Colby later denied making such a statement to Congress.

Told of the Rockefeller explanation, Miss Holtzman angrily depicted it as misleading and said that she had purposedly phrased her query in a broad manner to prevent any misunderstanding.

Nonetheless, she said in a brief telephone conversation today, she was "very surprised" at what she termed Mr. Rockefeller's "lapse of memory" about the Chile issue during his testimony last week. "I still haven't had clarification on this matter," she added.

On the wiretap issue, Mr. Morrow said that Mr. Rockefeller would stand on his previous statements indicating that he had obtained no knowledge of the surveillance until newspaper accounts appeared during the Watergate scandal.

The press aide acknowledged, however, that he had not been able today to ask Mr. Rockefeller specifically about Mr. Ash's testimony naming Mr. Kissinger—one of Mr. Rockefeller's long-time associates—as the source for the allegation that Mr. Rockefeller was in fact informed in late 1969 of the tapping.

The issue arose last year when John W. Dean 3d, the former White House counsel, testified before the Senate Watergate committee that William C. Sullivan, a former official of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, had told him that he had heard the wiretap information had gone to Governor Rockefeller.

A subsequently released White House transcript of a Feb. 28, 1972, meeting between Mr. Dean and President Nixon showed that the two men had discussed an allegation by Mr. Sullivan that J. Edgar Hoover, the former F.B.I. director, had leaked word of the wiretaps to another former F.B.I. aide, J. Patrick Coyne. It was Mr. Coyne, as Mr. Dean depicted it on the tape recording, who relayed the word of wiretaps to Mr. Rockefeller, then the Governor of New York.

During his testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Mr. Rockefeller was asked specifically — and denied—the Dean testimony indicating that he had received information about the illegal wiretaps.

But a staff report of the House committee, made available to The New York Times, summarized an Oct. 24, 1974, interview with Mr. Ash this way:

"Mr. Ash stated that in the early fall of 1969, he was summoned to the office of National Security Council Director, Henry Kissinger. Mr. Kissinger, according to Mr. Ash, told Mr. Ash that Nelson Rockefeller, then a member of P.F.I.A.B., had told him [Mr. Kissinger] that he [Mr. Rockefeller] had been told by J. Patrick Coyne that the F.B.I. had placed wiretaps on the telephones of staff members of the National Security Council."

"According to Mr. Ash," the summary went on, "Mr. Kissinger asked him why this information had been imparted to Governor Rockefeller. Moreover, Mr. Ash recalled Mr. Kissinger asking him if he had any information that Mr. Coyne had, in fact, disclosed the existence of the wiretaps to Governor Rockefeller."

Mr. Ash also told the staff investigators, according to the summary, that he had not been asked by Mr. Kissinger how—and whether—Mr. Coyne had obtained the information.

In a subsequent staff interview, Mr. Coyne, who served as executive secretary of the intelligence board until his retirement in 1970, denied knowing of the wiretaps or discussing them with Mr. Rockefeller o any other member of the board.

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