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No. 18 18 November 1974

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NEW YORK TIMES
12 November 1974

Jury Hears Tape of Nixon Ordering Limit on Inquiry

By LESLEY OELSNER
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 11—Parts of the three White House tape recordings that led to Richard M. Nixon's resignation from the Presidency were played today to the jury in the Watergate cover-up trial.

Out of the presence of the jury but in open court, the chief prosecutor, James F. Neal, said that the tapes and the other evidence today proved "a direct agency" in which Mr. Nixon's "agents" obstructed justice at Mr. Nixon's order.

The tapes, made public last Aug. 5, contain Mr. Nixon's conversations with H.R. Haldeman, then his chief of staff and now one of the five defendants in the trial, on June 23, 1972, six days after the break-in at Democratic headquarters in the Watergate complex.

Tapes Often Faint

They show Mr. Nixon telling Mr. Haldeman to direct officials of the Central Intelligence Agency to tell the head of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to limit its inquiry into the break-in. They show that Mr. Nixon wanted the curtailment for political reasons rather than concern over national security.

The tapes, often faint and sometimes difficult to hear, were played in conjunction with testimony by Lieut. Gen. Vernon A. Walters, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, and L. Patrick Gray 3d, then acting head of the F. B. I.

General Walters testified about getting the directive from Mr. Haldeman, in the presence of John D. Ehrlichman, then the chief White House adviser on domestic matters and now another of the defendants, and passing it on to Mr. Gray; Mr. Gray told of receiving it.

When a defense lawyer objected to the prosecution's line of questioning, Mr. Neal replied:

"There's no other way you can show the agency—from the former President of the United States to Haldeman and Ehrlichman to Waters to Gray—and that is the obstruction [of justice]."

"It's the act itself," he added.

Mr. Neal then repeated his point: "We have a direct agency from the President to Haldeman to Ehrlichman—to Haldeman and Ehrlichman—to Walters to Gray."

After a recess, the questioning was allowed to proceed the way Mr. Neal wished.

Mr. Nixon, who was named an unindicted alleged co-conspirator in the case last March, was pardoned by President Ford on Sept. 8 for any Federal crimes he may have committed while in office. The former President has been subpoenaed by the prosecution and defense but whether he testifies depends on his health.

The other defendants in the case are John N. Mitchell, the former Attorney General and director of the Nixon re-election campaign; Robert C. Mardian, a former Assistant Attorney General and political coordinator for the re-election committee, and Kenneth Wells Parkinson, an attorney hired by the committee after the break-in.

Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman have made clear that they will attempt to shift the blame for Watergate to Mr Nixon. Mr. Ehrlichman's chief lawyer, William S. Frates, told the jury in his opening statement that Mr. Nixon "deceived" and "misled" Mr. Ehrlichman.

The testimony by General Walters and Mr. Gray, like the tapes, was laregly a repetition of what came out in the Senate Watergate hearings and the impeachment proceedings.

The story, as presented today, began at 9:30 A.M. on June 21, 1972, when Mr. Ehrlichman spoke to Mr. Gray on the telephone.

Mr. Ehrlichman, according to Mr. Gray, said that John W. Dean 3d, then a White House counsel who is now in a Federal prison, was going to conduct a Watergate inquiry for the White House. Mr. Gray, according to the testimony, was to deal directly with Mr. Dean, who was expecting a call from him.

Mr. Gray told the jury that he called Mr. Dean, who requested a meting, held at 11:30 that morning. Mr. Dean, according to Mr. Gray, said that the Watergate affair was "extremely sensitive" and that he would sit in on F.B.I. interviews with White House staffmen.

Mr. Gray said he had told Mr. Dean at a later meeting of the various "theories" the F.B.I. was considering, including one that the C.I.A. might be involved.

The C.I.A. theory, according to Mr. Gray, was considered because of the C.I.A. involvement of some of the Watergate burglars and because the C.I.A. was known to have complex financial arrangements.

What happened in the next few days, according to the testimony, was an attempt to keep the authorities from connecting the break-in with the Nixon re-election committee.

On June 23, Mr. Nixon and Mr. Haldeman met in the Oval Office. The tape of that meeting, particularly difficult to hear, shows Mr. Haldeman talking to Mr. Nixon. He says:

"The way to handle this now is for us to have Walters call Pat Gray and just say, 'Stay the hell out of this. This is, ah, business here we don't want you to go any further on it."

Then came the sequence that has caused much controversy at the trial. Mr. Haldeman says a word that the prosecution contends is "Gemstone," the name of the illegal intelligence-gathering operation that led to the break-in, and that Mr. Haldeman's lawyers contend is something like "convention" or "dovestome."

At the Haldeman lawyers' behest, the jury was given a transcript bearing the notation "unintelligible" instead of Gemstone.

The transcript Mr. Nixon released in August contains nothing.

The prosecutors then put on a second tape of a Haldeman-Nixon conversation an hour and a half later.

A Slight Delay

There was a slight delay when Judge John J. Sirica noticed that one of the jurors, Mrs. Marjorie Milbourne, did not have her earphones on.

"You have to listen," he told her.

She put the earset back on.

In this conversation, Mr. Nixon was more specific about the directive to be given to the C.I.A. officials.

Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Nixon said, should tell the C.I.A. officials "this is all involved in the Cuban thing, that it's a fiasco, and it's going to make the F.B.I. and C.I.A. look bad, and it's likely to blow the whole, uh, Bay of Pigs thing which we think would be very unfortunate for the C.I.A. and for the country at this time, and for American foreign policy, and he just better tough it and lay it on them. Isn't that what you . . ."

H. Yeah, that's the basis we'll do it on and just leave it at that.

P. I don't want them to get any ideas we're doing it because our concern is political."

According to the testimony, the conversation was immediately followed by a meeting among Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Ehrlichman, Mr. Walters and Mr. Helms.

As General Walters told it, Mr. Haldeman said "it was the President's wish" that General Walters inform Mr. Gray that continued investigation of campaign contribution checks might lead to C.I.A. assets and undercover operations in Mexico.

Then, as both Mr. Gray and General Walters testified, the Deputy Director of the C.I.A. went to the acting head of the F.B.I.

At a meeting between Mr. Gray and General Walters on July 6, according to testimony, General Walters turned over a written statement saying that the C.I.A. had no interest. The two men, apparently assuming that Mr. Nixon was unaware of the pressure from White House officials, agreed that Mr. Nixon should be told, and Mr. Gray ordered his inquiry into the checks to be resumed, according to the testimony.

At the Senate Watergate hearings, Mr. Gray said that he had warned Mr. Nixon on July 6, "People on your staff are trying to mortally wound you by using the C.I.A. and the F.B.I."

mony today. At a bench conference, Mr. Neal said that he was about to question Mr. Gray about the statement. Mr. Frates objected. It was agreed that the question would not b asked.

On direct examination, under questioning by Mr. Neal, Mr. Gray repeated his earlier testimony about destroying documents at the behest of Mr. Dean and with the apparent acquiesence of Mr. Ehrlichman.

On cross-examination, Mr. Frates sought to limit the effect of that testimony, getting Mr. Gray to concede that Mr. Ehrlichman had not been the one to tell Mr. Gray to halt the Watergate investigation.

Mr. Neal on redirect then sought to limit the effect of this concession.

Who had told Mr. Gray to limit the inquiry? The prosecutor asked.

Mr. Dean, the witness replied.

Who had told him to talk to Mr. Dean about Watergate?

Mr. Ehrlichman, he replied.

Thomas C. Green, William G. Hundley and Frank Strickler, all defense counsels, cross-examined Mr. Gray briefly.

Mr. Green and Mr. Hundley asked whether Mr. Gray had ever talked to their clients about limiting the F.B.I. investigation. Mr. Gray said he had not.

Mr. Strickler elicited a statement from Mr. Gray contradicting General Walters, that General Walters had not told him on June 23 that he had just been to the White House.

Subpoena Pending

Mr. Walters was not cross-examined today because of a pending subpoena for material that may be necessary for the cross-examination.

Mr. Haldeman's attorneys disclosed this morning that on Friday they subpoenaed Representative Lucien N. Nedzi of Michigan, chairman of the House Armed Forces Committee's Intelligence subcommittee, calling for transcripts and other material relating to testimony and interviews before the committee by Mr. Walters, Richard C. Helms, former Director of Central Intelligence, and Mr. Gray in the spring of 1973.

Mr. Strickler exlained the.

Washington Star-News
Monday, November 11, 1974

Walters Recalls Move to Involve CIA in Cover-Up

By Barry Kalb
Star-News Staff Writer

Deputy CIA Director Vernon A. Walters today testified that former Nixon aides H. R. Haldeman and John D. Ehrlichman attempted to involve the CIA in the FBI's Watergate investigation six days after the Watergate arrests.

Walter's testimony at the Watergate cover-up trial was in preparation for the playing of three June 23, 1972 tape recordings of conversations between Haldeman and then-President Richard M. Nixon — the recordings which triggered Nixon's resignation last August.

Haldeman and Ehrlichman are two of the five defendants in the trial.

WALTERS has told his story before, but not since the June 23 tapes were made public.

Walters said he and then-CIA director Richard Helms were summoned to the White House the morning of June 23 with Haldeman and Ehrlichman in Ehrlichman's White House office.

Walters said Haldeman began by saying the Watergate case was "making a lot of noise," that Democrats were trying to "maximize it," and that "the investigation was leading to some important people and it might get worse."

THE TRANSCRIPT of the first June 23 tape — which recorded a conversation held before the meeting with Helms and Walters — shows Nixon and Haldeman expressing concern that the FBI's investigation of some Nixon campaign checks which were routed through Mexico — and of another check which was not — might lead to the Finance Committee to Re-elect the President.

The transcript shows that Nixon instructed Haldeman to direct the CIA to ask the FBI not to pursue the Mexican investigation further.

Walters said that at the meeting, Haldeman told him and Helms "It is the President's wish that Gen. Walters go to the acting director of the FBI and direct him that the pursuit of the FBI investigation in Mexico . . . might uncover some operations of the CIA."

HELMS REPLIED that he had spoken the previous day with acting FBI Director L. Patrick Gray III "and had told him(Gray) that the agency was not involved (in the Watergate bugging)," Walters testified.

Walters said, however, that Haldeman was not swayed by this remark, replying, "Nevertheless, it has been decided that Gen. Walters will go" to tell Gray that the FBI's investigation "may uncover some assets of the CIA."

Walters said the only part he could recall Ehrlichman's taking in the conversation was to say that Walters could call Gray from the White House, if he wanted.

Ehrlichman's lawyers have contended that Ehrlichman did not know the true purpose of the June 23 meeting, and was tricked into the cover-up by Nixon and Haldeman that day.

WALTERS also recounted conversations later that day with Gray, and in the following days with then-White House Counsel John W. Dean III.

Walters said that he met with Gray the afternoon of June 23 and told him that he had been instructed by the White House to say that the FBI investigation in Mexico "could uncover some covert CIA assets for activities there."

He said he told Gray he was aware that Gray had spoken with Helms the previous day. However, Walters said, in view of his discussion with the White House, he told Gray that "since the five suspects have been arrested (at the Watergate), it would be better if the investigation tapered off there."

Walters said that after his meeting with Gray, he and Helms called in the CIA operatives responsible for operations in Mexico, to find out if the FBI investigation might jeopardize CIA activities there. He indicated their answer was that it would not.

IN CONVERSATIONS with Dean on June 26, 27 and 28, Walters said, Dean attempted to have Walters involve the CIA in the Watergate operation, even though Walters told him there was no such involvement. He said he finally dissuaded Dean.

On July 6, he said, he met with Gray and apparently in response to a request by Gray, said he could not write a letter saying the FBI investigation was jeopardizing CIA activities in Mexico. "and if I was asked to do so, I would resign."

subpoena in court by citing a committee report that, he said, indicated "inconsistencies" in Mr. Walters's testimony on May 16, 1973, and his statements on May 23, 1973, "both as to omissions and changes in language."

Judge Sirica said he would give the prosecution time to submit a memorandum on the subject. Then, told that a lawyer for the House subcommittee was in court, he asked what the panel's position would be.

The lawyer said that, under House procedures, it was a question of what the Speaker's or the full HOuse's position would be. He said that a House rule prohibited a committee's production of information submitted in executive session, and that when the Congress reconvenes on Nov. 18, the subpoena is to be delivered to the speaker.

The matter was left in abeyance.

In another development today, Judge Sirica denied the mistrial motions filed last week by lawyers for Mr. Mitchel and Mr. Parkinson following the Government's disclosure that one of its supposed witnesses, William O. Bittman, a former Justice Department official, had withheld and lied about a crucial memorandum.

The memorandum was prepared by E. Howard Hunt Jr., one of the seven original Watergate defendants, and described the "commitments" of money and pardons that had allegedly been offered to the seven men in return for their silence about Watergate.

Attorneys for Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Parkinson had contended that they had been prejudiced by the government's belated disclosure because their cross-examination of Mr. Hunt at the trial had been based on the assumption that Mr. Bittman was a credible witness.

Judge Sirica rejected the defendants' arguments, saying, "This was no mischievous surprise sprung on one side by the other."

"The Government promptly notified the defense of the new development," he said in a seven-page ruling, "and all parties have had time to prepare for the proffered admission of the new piece of evidence."

Rulings Postponed

Judge Sirica postponed a rulings on whether Mr. Hunt would be recalled to the witness stand and whether the memorandum was admissible as evidence. The matters had not been raised in the defendants' motions, he said, and "there will be time to consider them when they do arise."

Joan C. Hall, who was Charles W. Colson's secretary, testified that she received telephone calls in August and October of 1972 from Mr. Hunt and his wife, Dorothy. The Hunts, she said, were seeking Mr. Colson's aid, but Mr. Colson, then a White House special counsel, refused to talk to them.

Mr. Hunt was indicted in September, 1972, for having helped organize the Watergate burglary, and was later convicted. He had been hired by Mr. Colson to work at the White House.

The prosecution had said several times last week that today would be the day when the June 23 tapes were played, and that this would be the week that the prosecution got to the "important" part of the case.

As a result, the courtroom and the hallway outside were jammed. One woman stood in line crocheting a baby's jacket for a church bazaar, a "watergate jacket," she said; a half-dozen young men and women arrived early with sleeping bags; lawyers queued up for the attorneys' spectator section.

Johnny Cash, the singer, who is a friend of Mr. Neal, the chief prosecutor, attended the proceedings.

Washington Post
7 October 1974

Brazil Papers Report CIA Tie

Reuter

RIO DE JANEIRO, Oct. 6—A former American Methodist missionary, reported to have been tortured by Brazilian security police, admitted to being a U.S. Central Intelligance Agency agent, the Jornal do Brazil newspaper said here today.

The newspaper said Frederick Morris, 40, who works as a part-time journalist for American publications, made the confession to military security police who arrested him in the northeastern city of Recife Monday.

A U.S. embassy spokesman in Brasilia said the report was the first he had heard of Morris' alleged links with the CIA. Friday the U.S. embassy protested the reported torture of Morris.

The American consul in Recife confirmed bruises and contusions on Morris' lower back, buttocks and wrists when he visited him Thursday, the embassy announced.

The Estado de Sao Paulo and the Diario de Brazilia said Morris had confessed to having links with Brazilian ecclesiastical circles and a foreign security agency.

WASHINGTON MONTHLY
November 1974

How to Spot a Spook

by John Marks

Several times in the last few years, this magazine has suggested that the quickest single way to improve the conduct of American foreign policy would be to get rid of the covert agents and clandestine operators in the CIA. In the spirit of practicing what we preach, we present the following article, which tells how to identify a great number of the Agency's "secret" operators. Our purpose is to hasten the day when our intelligence organizations concentrate on their real work—collecting and analyzing information from open sources—and to cut the ground away from the James Bonds and the Gordon Liddys of the world before they get us all in any more trouble.

Both the Soviet and American intelligence establishments seem to share the obsession that the other side is always trying to bug them. Since the other side is, in fact, usually trying, our technicians and their technicians are constantly sweeping military installations and embassies to make sure no enemy, real or imagined, has succeeded. One night about ten years ago, a State Department security officer, prowling through the American embassy in Santiago, Chile, in search of communist microphones, found a listening device carefully hidden in the office of a senior "political officer." The security man, along with everyone else in the embassy, knew that this particular "political officer" was actually the Central Intelligence Agency's "station chief," or principal operative in Chile. Bugging his office would have indeed been a major coup for the opposition. Triumphantly, the security man ripped the microphone out of the wall—only to discover later that it had been installed by the CIA station chief himself.

The reason the CIA office was located in the embassy—as it is in most of the other countries in the world—is that by presidential order the State Department is responsible for hiding and housing the CIA. Like the intelligence services of most other countries, the CIA has been unwilling to set up foreign offices under its own name, so American embassies—and, less frequently, military bases—provide the needed cover. State confers respectability on the Agency's operatives, dressing them up with the same titles and calling cards that give legitimate diplomats entree into foreign government circles. Protected by diplomatic immunity, the operatives recruit local officials as CIA agents to supply secret intelligence and, especially in the Third World, to help in the Agency's manipulation of a country's internal affairs.

The CIA moves its men off the diplomatic lists only in Germany, Japan, and other countries where large numbers of American soldiers are stationed. In those countries, the CIA's command post is still in the U.S. embassy, but most of the CIA personnel are under military cover. With nearly 500,000 U.S. troops scattered around the world, the CIA "units" buried among them do not attract undue attention.

In contrast, it is difficult for the CIA to dwell inconspicuously within the American diplomatic corps, since more than a quarter of the 5,435 employees who purportedly work for State overseas are actually with the CIA. In places such as Argentina, Bolivia, Burma, and Guyana, where the Agency has special interests and projects, there are about as many CIA operatives under cover of substantive embassy jobs as there are legitimate State employees. The CIA also places smaller contingents in the ranks of other U.S. government agencies which operate overseas, particularly AID's police training program in Latin America.

What is surprising is that the CIA even bothers to camouflage its agents, since they are still easily identifiable. Let us see why the embassy cover is so transparent:

■ The CIA usually has a separate set of offices in the embassy, often with an exotic-looking cipher lock on the outside door. In Madrid, for example, a State Department source reports that the Agency occupied the whole sixth floor of the embassy. About 30 people worked there; half were disguised as "Air Force personnel" and half as State "political officers." The source says that all the local Spanish employees knew who worked on what floor of the embassy and that visitors could figure out the

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same thing.

■CIA personnel usually stick together. When they go to lunch or to a cocktail party or meet a plane from Washington, they are much more likely to go with each other than with legitimate diplomats. Once you have identified one, you can quickly figure out the rest.

■The CIA has a different health insurance plan from the State Department. The premium records, which are unclassified and usually available to local employees, are a dead giveaway.

■The Agency operative is taught early in training that loud background sounds interfere with bugging. You can be pretty sure the CIA man in the embassy is the one who leaves his radio on all the time.

■Ironically, despite the State Department's total refusal to comment on anything concerning the CIA, the Department regularly publishes two documents, the *Foreign Service List* and the *Biographic Register*, which, when cross-checked, yield the names of most CIA operatives under embassy cover. Here is how it works:

America's real diplomats have insisted on one thing in dealing with the CIA: that the corps of Foreign Service Officers (FSO) remain pure. Although there are rumors of exceptions, CIA personnel abroad are always given the cover rank of Foreign Service Reserve (FSR) or Staff (FSS) officers—not FSO. Of course, there are some legitimate officials from the State Department, AID, and USIA who hold FSR and FSS ratings, so care must be taken to avoid confusing these people with the spooks.

To winnow out the spooks, you start by looking up in the *Foreign Service List* the country in question, for example, China. The letters in the third column from the left signify the man or woman's personnel status and the number denotes his or her rank. On the China list, David Bruce is an "R-1," or Reserve Officer of class 1, the highest rank. John Holdridge is a regular Foreign Service Officer (FSO) of the same grade, and secretary Barbara Brooks is a Staff Officer, class 4.

PEKING (U.S. LIAISON OFFICE) (LO)

Bruce David K E	chief USLO	R-1	5-73
Holdridge John H	dep chief USLO	O-1	5-73
Jenkins Alfred Les	dep chief USLO	R-1	
Brooks Barbara A	sec	S-4	5-73
McKinley Brunson	spec asst	O-6	5-73
Zaelit Lucille	sec	S-5	5-73
Anderson Donald M	pol off	O-4	6-73
Hunt Janice E	sec	S-8	12-73
Lilley James R	pol off	R-3	
Pascoe B Lynn	pol off	O-5	7-73
Morowitz Herbert Eugene	econ/cml off	O-3	6-73
Morin Annabelle C	sec	S-7	7-73
Rope William Frederick	econ/cml off	O-4	4-73
Blackburn Robert R Jr	adm off	O-3	4-73
Herrera Delia L	sec	S-6	5-73
Lambert William F	coms/rec off	R-6	2-74
Lucas Robert T	coms/rec off	S-2	7-73
Morin Emile F	gen ser off	O-6	3-72
Peterson Robert D	coms/rec off	R-6	7-73
Riley Albert D	coms/rec off	S-5	5-73

Now Holdridge almost certainly can be ruled out as an operative, simply because he is an FSO. Not much can be told one way or the other about FSS Brooks because, as is the case with most secretaries, the State Department does not publish much information about her. David Bruce might be suspect because of his "R" status, but a quick glance at the *Biographic Register*, which gives a brief curriculum vitae of all State Department personnel, shows him to be one of the high-level political appointees who have "R" status because they are not members of the regular Foreign Service. Similarly, the *Register* report on FSR Jenkins shows that he had a long career as an FSO before taking on the State Department's special assignment in Peking as an FSR:

Bruce, David KE–b Md 2/21/98, m (Evangeline Bell). Princeton U AB 19. Mem Md bar. US Army 17-19, 42-45 col overseas. PRIV EXPER priv law practice 21-26, mem State legis 24-26, 39-42, with bank-priv bus 28-40, chief rep Am Red Cross (England) 40-41. GOVT EXPER with Off Strategic Sers 41-45, asst sec of Com 47-48, ECA Paris R-1 chief of mission 5/48. STATE AEP to France 5/49. Dept under sec of state 2/52, consult to sec of state 1/53. Paris R-1 pol off-US observer to Interim Com of EDC, also US rep to European Coal-Steel Community (Luxembourg) 2/53. Dept consult to sec of state 1/55. Bonn AEP to Germany 3/57-11/59. London AEP to Great Britian 2/61-3/69. Dept R-1 pers rep of Pres with pers rank amb to hd US del at Paris meetings on Viet-Nam 7/70-4/71. Peking chief liaison off 3/73.

Jenkins, Alfred leSesne–b Ca 9/14/16, m. Emory U AB 38, Duke U MA 46. US Army 42-46 1st lt. PRIV EXPER prin-supt pub schs 40-42. STATE Dept FSO unclass 6/46. Peiping Chin lang-area trainee 9/46, O-6 11/46. Tientsin pol off 7/48, O-5 4/49. Hong Kong chief pol sect 7/49. Taipei pol off 7/50, O-4 6/51. Dept 3/52, O-3 9/54. Jidda couns, dep chief mission 2/55. Dept det Nat War Coll 8/57, O-2 2/58, dep dir Off of SE Asian Aff 6/58, reg plan ad Bu of Far E Aff 8/59. Stockholm couns, dep chief mission 10/61, cons gen 3/62, O-1 3/63. Dept FS insp 8/65, det Nat Security Counc 7/66, FS insp 1/69, dir Off of Asian Communist Aff 7/70, superior honor award 71, dir for People's Rep of China, Mongolia, Hong Kong-Macao aff 2/73. Peking dep chief liaison off 4/73. Lang Ger. (w–Martha Lippiatt).

Note that there are no gaping holes in their career records, nor did either of these men serve long tours with nameless Pentagon agencies, nor did they regularly change their status from "R" to "S" to "GS" (civil service).

Now, for purposes of comparison, examine the record of the CIA's man in Peking, a "political officer" named James R. Lilley:

Lilley, James R–b China Am parents 1/15/28, m. Yale U BA 51. US Army 46-47. GOVT EXPER anal Dept of Army 51-58. STATE Manila R-6 7/58. Dept 10/60. Phnom Penh 9/61, R-5 3/63. Bangkok 4/63. Dept 8/64. Vientiane pol off 6/65, R-4 5/66. S-2 4/68. Hong Kong 5/68, R-4 5/69. Dept 7/70, GS-15 fgn aff off 4/71, R-4 det lang trng FSI 7/72-4/73. Lang Fr, Rom. (w–Sally Booth).

The *Foreign Service List* provides another clue, in the form of diplomats' official assignments. Of all the jobs real State Department representatives perform, political reporting is generally considered to be the most important. Although *genuine* FSRs frequently hold administrative and consular slots, they are almost never given the important political jobs. So where an FSR *does* appear in the listing with a political job, it is most likely that the CIA is using the position for cover. There is an exception to this rule: a comparatively few minority-group members who have been brought into the Foreign Service as Reserve Officers under a special program. They are found exclusively in the junior ranks, and their biographic data is complete in the way the CIA people's is not.

Finally there is another almost certain tip-off. If an agent is listed in the *Biographic Register* as having been an "analyst" for the Department of the Army (or Navy or Air Force), you can bet that he or she is really working for the CIA. A search of hundreds of names found no legitimate State Department personnel listed as ever having held such a job.

In an embassy like the one in Santo Domingo, the spooks in the political section outnumber the real FSOs by at least seven to three:

Political Section

Boyer Joel H	pol off	R-5	7-72
Brugger Frederick A	pol off	R-7	9-72
Bumpus James N	pol off	O-4	7-72
Chafin Gary E	pol off	O-6	8-73
Clayton Thomas A	pol off	R-3	5-71
Dwiggins Joan H	pol off	R-7	3-72
Fambrini Robert L	pol off	S-2	6-73
Greig David N Jr	pol off	R-5	8-71
Guell Janet E	sec	S-8	12-73
Markoff Stephanie M	sec	S-8	6-73
Merriam Geraldine C	clk-typist	S-9	2-73
Mooney Robert C	pol off	R-6	8-72
Morris Margaret A	clk-typist	S10	12-73
Pascoe Dorothy L	sec	S-7	2-74
Ryan Dondald G	pol off	R-8	8-73
Williams Albert N	pol off	O-3	7-73

While Dondald Ryan is an "R" in the political section, there is not sufficent data published about him to verify his status.

It was by studying these documents that I learned that the CIA has sent an operative to Peking. For confirmation, I called the State Department's ranking China expert, Acting Assistant Secretary of State Arthur Hummel. After I identified myself as a reporter working on a magazine article and explained where I had gotten my information, Hummel shouted, "I know what you're up to and I don't want to contribute. Thank you very much!" and slammed down the phone.

Another State official confirmed that the decision to send an operative to Peking was made in early 1973, but declared that making public the operative's existence could "jeopardize" Chinese-American relations. Neither this official nor any of his colleagues seemed willing to consider the notion that the U.S. government was under no obligation to assign a CIA man there—or anywhere else for that matter. The first American mission to China since 1949 certainly could have been staffed exclusively with real diplomats if concern about damaging relations were so high. To have excluded the Agency from Peking, however, would have gone against a basic axiom of the post-World War II foreign policy establishment: the CIA follows the flag into American embassies.

The Chinese government is presumably clever enough to identify the operative by sifting through the public documents available. In fact his arrival may well have been cleared with the Chinese, who probably wanted reciprocal privileges for their secret service in Washington. Such are the arrangements the world's spooks are so fond of working out with each other—the Soviet KGB and the CIA even exchange names of intelligence analysts assigned to the other's capital.

Sacrificing 'State'

Much to the alarm of a few high State Department officials, the proportion of CIA to State personnel abroad has been steadily rising in recent years. The precise figures are zealously guarded, but several State sources confirm the trend. They cite as the main reason for this tilt toward the CIA a series of government-wide cutbacks that have hit State proportionately harder than the CIA. What troubles State is not, as one career diplomat put it, "the principle" that State should provide the CIA with cover. That is unquestioned, he says. Rather, most legitimate diplomats do not like being a minority within their own profession or having the rest of the world confuse them with the CIA's dirty tricksters. They generally regard themselves as working at a higher calling.

While the State Department has been comparatively honest in accepting the personnel cuts ordered by the Johnson and Nixon administrations, two sources familiar with the CIA budget report that the Agency has done everything possible to escape the reductions. Traditionally, when outsiders—even presidents—have tried to meddle with the Agency's personnel allotment, the CIA has resisted on "national security" grounds. And when that argument failed, the CIA resorted to bureaucratic ruses: cutting out a job and then replacing the

person eliminated with a "contract" or "local" employee, who would not show up on the personnel roster; or sending home a clandestine support officer—a specialist in things like renting "safe houses," "laundering" money, and installing phone taps—and then having the same work done by experts sent out from Washington on "temporary duty."

Just this spring, the State Department took official, if secret, notice of its declining presence overseas compared to the CIA when Secretary Henry Kissinger authorized a high-level study of State-CIA staffing. The Department's top administrator, L. Dean Brown, who had urged the study be made in the first place, gave the job to Malcolm Toon, a career diplomat serving as U.S. ambassador to Yugoslavia. Toon returned to Washington to compile the top-secret report.

Asking not to be named and refusing to provide the specific figures, a source close to Kissinger says that Toon's report calls for a substantial reduction in the number of CIA operatives abroad under State cover. The source adds that Kissinger has not made up his mind on the issue.

> Not only does the State Department provide the CIA with cover, but the Senate—and especially its Foreign Relations Committee—encourages the current practice of sending over 25 percent of our "diplomatic" corps abroad under false pretenses. Every year the Foreign Relations Committee routinely approves and sends to the full Senate for its advice and consent lists of "Foreign Service Reserve Officers to be consular officers and secretaries in the Diplomatic Service of the United States of America." In 1973, of the 121 names submitted by the State Department, more than 70 were CIA operatives. According to a knowledgeable source, the committee is informally told the number of CIA people on the lists but "not who they are." No senator in memory has publicly objected to being an accomplice to this cover-building for the CIA.

Kissinger has always acted very carefully where the CIA is concerned. One of his former aides notes that the Secretary has regularly treated the Agency with great deference at government meetings although he has often been privately scornful of it afterwards. In any case, Kissinger is unquestionably a believer in the need for the CIA to intervene covertly in other countries' internal affairs—he was the prime mover behind the Agency's work against Salvador Allende in Chile. The question of how much cover State should provide the CIA, however, is chiefly a bureaucratic one, and is not basic to Kissinger's foreign policy. The Secretary therefore will probably not take a definite position until he sees how much opposition the CIA will be able to stir up in the White House and in the congressional subcommittees that supposedly oversee the Agency.

The CIA has lost no time in launching its counteroffensive. At a July 19 off-the-record session with key Democratic congressional aides, Carl Duckett, the CIA's Deputy Director for Intelligence, complained about the reductions recommended by the Toon report. According to a source who was present, Duckett said that even without further embassy cuts, the CIA now doesn't have enough people overseas.

CIA officials must be especially concerned about Toon's recommendations, since in countries where there are no U.S. military bases, the only alternative to embassy cover is "deep," or non-official, cover. American corporations operating overseas have long cooperated in making jobs available to the CIA and would probably continue to do so. Also, the Agency would probably have to make more use of smaller firms where fewer people would know of the clandestine connection. Two examples of this type are:

* Robert Mullen and Company, the Washington-based public relations concern for which E. Howard Hunt worked after he left the CIA and before the break-in at Democratic National Headquarters. Mullen provided CIA operatives with cover in Stockholm, Mexico City, and Singapore, and in 1971 set up a subsidiary in cooperation with the CIA called Interprogres, Ltd. According to a secret Agency document released with the House Judiciary Committee's impeachment evidence, "At least two [CIA] overseas assets have tangential tasks of promoting the acceptance of this company as a Mullen subsidiary."

* Psychological Assessment Associates, Inc., a Washington psychological consulting firm specializing in behavioral research and analysis. By the admission of its president John Gittinger, most of the company's business since it was founded in 1957 by three ex-CIA psychologists has come from Agency contracts. The firm had two "representatives" in Hong Kong, at least until June of this year.

Unless their cover is blown, companies of this sort and operatives who work for them cannot be linked to the U.S. government. But the Agency has

learned over the years that it is much more difficult and expensive to set up an operative as a businessman (or as a missionary or newsman) than to put him in an embassy. As a "private" citizen, the operative is not automatically exposed to the host country's key officials and to foreign diplomats, nor does he have direct access to the CIA communications and support facilities which are normally housed in embassies. Moreover, as an ex-CIA official explains, "The deep cover guy has no mobility. He doesn't have the right passport. He is subject to local laws and has to pay local taxes. If you try to put him in an influential business job, you've got to go through all the arrangements with the company."

Who Needs Gumshoes?

Everything argues for having the intelligence agent in the embassy—everything, that is except the need to keep his existence secret. The question then becomes whether it is really that important to keep his existence secret—which, in turn, depends on how important his clandestine activities are.

Could any rational person, after surveying the history of the last 20 years, from Guatemala to Cuba to Vietnam—and now Chile—contend that the CIA's clandestine activities have yielded anything but a steady stream of disaster? The time has come to abolish them. Most of the military and economic intelligence we need we can get from our satellites and sensors (which already provide nearly all our information about Russia's nuclear weaponry) and from reading the newspapers and the superabundant files of open reports. As for political intelligence—which is actually an assessment of the intentions of foreign leaders—we don't really need this kind of information from Third World countries unless we intend to muck about in their internal affairs. With the Soviet Union or China—countries powerful enough to really threaten our national security—timely political intelligence could be a great help. But for the past 25 years we have relied on open sources and machine-collected intelligence because our agents have proven incapable of penetrating these closed societies. There is not enough practical benefit gained from the CIA's espionage activities to compensate for our nation's moral and legal liability in maintaining thousands of highly trained bribers, subverters, and burglars overseas as "representatives" of our government. The problem of getting good, accurate, reliable information from abroad is a complicated one, beyond the scope of this article, but, to paraphrase Mae West, covert has nothing to do with it.

NEW YORK TIMES
11 November 1974

Anti-destabilization

By John D. Marks

WASHINGTON—Now that President Ford has publicly asserted that the United States has a right to "destabilize" foreign governments, other countries might consider whether to permit entry to America's agents of subversion, operatives of the Central Intelligence Agency.

These people, after all, engage in covert activities that the Director of Central Intelligence, William E. Colby, recently admitted would be crimes if committed in this country.

Why should any sovereign nation stand for that sort of thing, and, more important, what can a country do to protect itself from C.I.A. attack?

Foreign governments could inform the State Department that employes of the C.I.A. and other United States spy agencies are not welcome and must be withdrawn immediately if the United States wishes to continue diplomatic relations.

■

Admittedly, Britain, Canada and South Africa would probably not expel the C.I.A. because the agency operates in these countries mainly to exchange intelligence data and maintain close liaison.

Similarly, the Soviet Union almost certainly would not want to expel C.I.A. operatives, since the United States would surely retaliate with similar action, breaking an unwritten rule that both powers have a right to spy on the other.

But allied and third-world countries that have no wish to infiltrate our Government or to "destabilize" our democratic institutions—as the C.I.A. did to Chile's—might declare themselves espionage-free zones. They could make clear that their refusal to allow the operations of the C.I.A. (or K.G.B., or any other foreign intelligence service) should not be considered an unfriendly act.

Since all C.I.A. personnel are abroad on false pretenses, finding them in order to expel them would be a potential problem but one greatly simplified by the C.I.A.'s standard procedure of sending most of its operatives abroad as bogus State Department officers.

Over 25 per cent of the people who are listed as working for the department overseas are actually with the C.I.A. And by cross-checking two unclassified State Department publications, the Foreign Service List and the Biographic Register, most of the C.I.A. operatives, normally listed as Foreign Service Reserve Officers, can be distinguished from America's real diplomats, the Foreign Service Officers.

While there are Reserve Officers who do not work for the C.I.A., those who do are conspicuous by incomplete biographical data, which usually includes long service in such vague-sounding jobs as "political analyst, Department of the Army."

Identifying American military-intelligence personnel abroad is even easier. In countries where there are no United States forces stationed, most of them are simply called defense attachés.

C.I.A. operatives under "deep cover"—primarily as American businessmen but also as newsmen, missionaries, and students—would be more difficult to spot than their "diplomatic" brethren, but a government could handle many of these by announcing that any corporation knowingly concealing a C.I.A. man would be subject to expropriation.

Certainly not all United States intelligence operatives could be discovered, but such tactics could seriously disrupt C.I.A. operations. Nevertheless, even the most determined and clever government could probably not stop the flow of secret C.I.A. funds of the type that President Ford has admitted were secretly paid to Chilean Opposition leaders and newspapers.

As long as there are citizens willing to accept the laundered C.I.A. funds, the agency will contrive ways to get money to them.

For example, in Greece the C.I.A. has over the years recruited thousands of political, military, police, labor, news media, and academic figures. Now as Greece restores democracy and moves away from America's all-encompassing embrace, there is real fear in the Greek Government that the United States will act to stop what Washington policymakers perceive as a leftward drift.

■

While the Greek Government could probably identify and expel most of the C.I.A. operatives—60, according to one newspaper report—the many Greeks already in the C.I.A.'s employ would remain as potential fifth columnists to which the agency could provide assistance.

Perhaps the way for Greece to rid herself of the C.I.A.'s pervasive influence would be to declare a general amnesty for all citizens who are with the agency. If genuine forgiveness were promised in return for immediate cooperation, and stiff penalties promised for those convicted of staying on the C.I.A. payroll after the amnesty period, enough of the C.I.A.'s Greek contacts might provide sufficient information to enable the Government to start unraveling the agency's extensive agent network.

The point is that foreign governments do not need to stand by idly while the C.I.A. attempts to "destabilize" them.

John D. Marks is an Associate of the Center for National Security Studies in Washington and co-author, with Victor Marchetti, of "The C.I.A. and the Cult of Intelligence."

PRESS-SCIMITAR, Memphis
15 October 1974

The Spy Business

Super-Secret Agencies Are Spending Billions Gathering Military Information for U.S.

First of three articles

By ALAN HORTON
Scripps-Howard Staff Writer

A Scripps-Howard Special Report

WASHINGTON. — The recent publicity about "dirty tricks" in Chile and alleged ties to the ousted military junta in Greece have magnified public belief that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is THE cloak-and-dagger operation of the U.S. government.

Horton

But the fact is that at least three-fourths of the $4,000,000,000 to $6,000,000,000 which the United States budgets annually for intelligence goes to military agencies.

The CIA, with its vast network of spies, secret military units and secret funds, operates on an annual budget of only $750,000,000 and its full-time regular payroll includes only about 15,000 persons. The public seldom, if ever, hears about the military agencies.

Actually, the spy business has become so sophisticated that most intelligence-gathering is now done by exotic military sensors, satellites and spy planes, although the CIA director heads the board that picks the spy targets and the CIA helps develop spy technology.

* * *

MILITARY intelligence is handled by:

- The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). This is an "umbrella" outfit that analyzes data produced by the three military intelligence commands.
- The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). This is so secret its name is classified, although it has been identified publicly. It spends over $1,000,000,000 a year for spy satellite systems. It's part of Air Force intelligence.
- The National Security Agency (NSA). A little-known big spender — at least $1,000,000,000 a year — its two main jobs are to intercept foreign radio and electronic signals at listening posts around the world and to keep U.S. communications secure from enemy eavesdroppers.
- The Army Intelligence Command, Air Force Intelligence Agency and Naval Intelligence Command. These gather much of the data used by the DIA and CIA to estimate foreign military capabilities. They don't use cloak-and-dagger techniques but rather modern technological spies in airplanes, satellites, ships and submarines to gather information.

There are reports in intelligence circles of several other agencies, but they apparently are so secret nobody will admit they exist, if they do.

* * *

ACTUAL appropriations for all of these — and for the CIA — are secret, so the known figures have to be approximate, but it's estimated the military agencies budget $3,000,000,000 to $5,000,000,000 annually for a payroll of nearly 100,000.

Military spying is a hush-hush world of converted cargo planes and ships loaded with electronic gear, remotely piloted drone planes, high-altitude spy planes and satellites known as Big Bird, Big Ear, 647 and Vela. They carry high-resolution and infrared cameras; receivers to intercept, store and relay signals; the most sophisticated sensors and computers, and Laser communications.

Without those robot military spies — Russian models are less sophisticated but adequate — no strategic arms limitation agreement would have been possible in 1972. Neither side would have had a fool-proof way to watch for violations by the other.

Democratic Senator William Proxmire of Wisconsin, impressed with satellite technology, said recently: "It appears that U.S. photography can identify ground targets under one foot in size from 100 nautical miles in space. Furthermore, certain satellites collect electronic emissions which aid in the identification and pinpointing of targets."

* * *

AVIATION WEEK Magazine reported that one infrared scanner can find pleasure boats on the Potomac River from 600 miles up. Using such satellite sensors, U.S. experts long have spotted Russian nuclear blasts and rocket launches.

Soon satellites will beam television pictures of Russian objectives to U.S. photo analysts instantaneously.

But satellites cost too much to do the entire job. Besides, half the globe is dark and a fifth covered by clouds. So electronic intelligence (ELINT) planes routinely fly near the borders of foreign countries — especially those friendly with Russia or in the middle of potential trouble spots — listening and recording.

One such plane was downed by North Korean MIGs in 1969 and another ducked into clouds over the Mediterranean to escape Libyan jets 18 months ago.

The most revolutionary of the manned reconnaissance systems are the bullet-fast SR71 Blackbirds. For eight years they were so secret that Air Force spokesmen wouldn't admit they existed.

* * *

LAST MONTH defense officials permitted a Blackbird to compete for official international speed records which it had been setting secretly for years. But before the Blackbird made its public appearance, all its sophisticated sensors, cameras and other gear were stripped off.

No longer are Blackbirds flown over Russia and China — although the planes' cameras can see well into both countries by flying along the borders at 80,000 feet — but they do fly over North Korea, North Vietnam and the Middle East when necessary. If the planes did fly over Russia, experts are confident their missile fooling gear would protect Blackbirds from attack.

But Blackbirds have their faults, too. For

one thing, they cost $7,000,000 each per year to operate and maintain, and they use 12,000 gallons of fuel each on a normal mission. Only eight are flown regularly and 16 more are kept in storage.

All of those intelligence systems and many more collect prodigious amounts of data described by the mysterious acronyms ELINT, RADINT, PHOTINT, COMINT and SIGINT for electronic, radar, photo, communications and signal intelligence.

* * *

BUT EVEN with all the data, the system is not perfect — analysts have preconceived notions, data is subject to varying interpretations and clues are overlooked.

Both the DIA and CIA failed to predict the Egyptians and Syrians would attack Israel Oct. 6, 1973, although in retrospect significant clues were available.

In 1968, defense and CIA analysts goofed a chance to predict the precise timing of the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Military intelligence's image also has been hurt by Army spying on civilians — now allegedly stopped — and by the tendency to overestimate enemy capabilities in order to justify multibillion-dollar U.S. weapons systems.

The DIA head, Army Lieutenant General Daniel O. Graham, who has held various top jobs in the CIA and DIA, asks that the President have faith in DIA's estimates, saying they are now "credible."

In the meantime, much to the chagrin of the defense intelligence establishment, the CIA will continue to prepare military threat estimates which often are not so scary as those of the military.

* * *

THE MAN in charge of the vast military intelligence community is Albert C. Hall, graying, articulate assistant defense secretary for intelligence and a pioneer in missile control and space systems.

Hall's Pentagon office windows are equipped with devices to foil eavesdropping from outside, even by sophisticated instruments which measure and interpret voice vibrations on window panes.

"DIA is striving to be objective," Hall said, "with the defense secretary looking over its shoulders and the CIA making independent analyses. When there are differences, they are closely scrutinized. That's healthy."

He said military intelligence must improve its assessment of other nations' military training, leadership, morale and tactics.

But he admitted there is no remedy for the major disadvantage of U.S. intelligence — America's open and Russia's closed society.

"They get for free what we spend millions to learn," Hall said.

Before the first U.S. Trident submarine was under construction, the Pentagon told Congress how many missiles it would carry and their range. Even the number of warheads per missile soon became public knowledge. The United States, on the other hand, didn't know about Russia's new Delta submarine until one was being built.

* * *

NO MATTER how much America spends on intelligence, there never will be a satellite or a sensor that determines a potential enemy's intent, or analyzes consequences.

Old-fashioned cloak-and-dagger spying is needed for that.

NEWS-SENTINEL, Knoxville
16 October 1974

The Spy Business

CIA Is Despised, Respected, Feared

By ALAN HORTON
Scripps-Howard Staff Writer

WASHINGTON — With a budget that outsiders estimate is around $750 million annually — and a full-time payroll of 15,000, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) doesn't seem like much by Federal bureaucratic standards.

But it is not likely that any other U.S. Government agency is so revered and despised, respected and feared all at once.

That's because the CIA, while keeping a hard eye on the Soviet Union and other potential U.S. adversaries, secretly plays its own "dirty tricks" to protect American interests abroad.

And, despite its small budget and payroll — the figures are guesses because the real figures are highly secret — the CIA is bigger and more powerful than it looks. Its tentacles reach to the upper levels of industry, foreign trade, labor, finance and other power centers through a system of front companies, paid consultants, contracts with private industry and agents worldwide.

TERMED BEST-PAID

CIA agents are reputed to be the best-paid of Federal bureaucrats, starting at $11,600 annually, according to some sources. And senior agents quickly work up to $20,000 to $36,000 a year. The only unforgivable sins for agents, according to former employes, are homosexuality and drug addiction because they can lead to blackmail.

Workers at the headquarters here call their buildings and grounds "the campus." The

Second of a Series

seven-story, modernistic building stands in the middle of a 125-acre park on a bluff on the Virginia side of the Potomac River, eight miles from the White House.

Downstate, near Williamsburg, Va., is the CIA's 10,000-acre "farm," disguised as Camp Peary on the historic York River. Camp Peary is one of several bases — from North Carolina to Nevada and from the Panama Canal zone to Saipan — where CIA trainees are taught cloak-and-dagger techniques.

And near Tucson, Ariz., is another segment of the CIA jigsaw puzzle, the home base of Intermountain Aviation, probably still one of the many secretly owned and operated companies called "proprietaries." Intermountain purports to train, supply and deliver forest service "smoke jumpers."

To be truly secret, of course, the CIA needs its own fleet of airplanes. And when they are not needed for CIA operations, why not lease them? Many CIA "proprietaries" are believed to be profitmakers, employing tens of thou-

sands, conducting million-dollar businesses and providing "deep cover" for covert operations.

Basically, the CIA is divided into two parts — analysts and clandestine operators, including both spies and dirty tricksters. The clandestine services spend more than half the CIA budget.

Analysts look down on the clandestine service operatives as "athletes and policemen," according to one former agent. Many in the clandestine services don't have much use for analysts, who don't get their hands dirty.

Fewer than 5000 CIA personnel are said to be stationed overseas, and only about 3000 are in the clandestine services.

Many of those 3000 are assigned to U.S. embassies with covers as foreign aid, diplomatic and military officers. Others are in deep cover as businessmen, students and, allegedly, even missionaries.

CORPORATIONS PROVIDE COVER

In addition, there are the thousands of paid foreign agents, consultants, contractors, foreign security police and intelligence officers — often foreign politicians paid and trained by the CIA.

A number of multinational corporations provide cover for CIA agents in Western Europe, Latin America and the Far East. Offices in Amsterdam, Mexico City and Singapore had to be closed in a hurry recently when one CIA front was exposed.

Director William E. Colby, 54, who rose through the ranks of clandestine services, says the CIA is not conducting covert actions — dirty tricks — anywhere in the world today.

But neither he nor President Ford will foreswear covert actions in the future although they imply they will be used sparingly.

Some lawmakers insist, along with Rep. Michael J. Harrington (D-Mass.), that "we can no longer measure our conduct by that of our supposed rivals but by standards we have set for ourselves as a nation."

One former CIA agent, Philip B. Agee, said in disgust that the agency is "capitalism's police force." And when covert actions are exposed that's the way it looks to the world.

But when it comes to a congressional vote, as it has several times in the last month, most congressmen won't outlaw covert actions, saying the nations needs a third alternative to simple diplomacy and sending in U.S. troops.

Early this month, the Senate did pass an amendment outlawing covert actions except those thought by the President to be crucial to national security. But the bill was sent back to committee.

Many congressmen, in defense of the CIA and its functions, point out that the Soviet's KGB — the equivalent of the CIA — has 90,000 agents abroad, seducing, suborning, spying, subverting, sabotaging and training and arming guerillas.

KGB FINANCED CUBA OVERTHROW

Australian intelligence soucrces say the KGB has a total of 250,000 men and women devoted entirely to espionage and counterespionage — foiling enemy spies. That's 10 times the total of the United States and its major allies. And no one doubts that the KGB can call on Czechslovakia, Polish, East German, Hungarian or even Cuban spies for help any time.

Even the most optimistic Government sources doubt the FBI is able to catch even 30 per cent of Russian spies in the United States.

"The KGB financed the overthrow of Cuba," said Sen. Milton D. Young (R-N.D.), a member of one of Congress' four CIA oversight subcommittees. "And now they're doing a lot in the Middle East."

Will President Ford keep the CIA from meddling in the affairs of foreign nations? No president has been able to do that since the CIA was established in 1947.

President Harry S Truman, who was often quoted as opposing covert actions, ordered agents to Greece to help fight Communist guerillas, and to Italy to beat the Communists at the polls.

President Dwight D. Eisenhower used the CIA to put the Shah of Iran in power in 1953; help defeat the Communist Huks in the Philippines in the mid-1950s; overthrow the Communist-dominated government in Guatemala in 1954.

Several CIA covert actions failed miserably in the Eisenhower years.

The CIA in 1958 used B26 bombers in an attempt to depose Sukarno in Indonesia and not only failed but saw a CIA pilot captured and exposed to the world.

Efforts to roll back the Iron Curtain in Poland, Albania and the Ukraine also were fruitless.

U.S. SPY PLANE DOWNED

It was during the Eisenhower years that the CIA suffered its worst humiliation.

In 1960 Russia shot down a CIA U2 spy plane and captured its pilot. To focus the world's attention on that rare event, Russia cancelled the 1960 Eisenhower-Khrushchev summit meeting.

President John F. Kennedy's biggest mistake was approving a CIA-financed and planned covert action, using Cuban refugees, in a 1961 military attack on Cuba at the Bay of Pigs.

He later ordered the CIA to eastablish an army of Southeast Asian mercenaries backed by a secret CIA Air America Air Force to fight the North Vietnamese in Laos.

By the late 1960s, the Army had grown to 30,000 men.

President Lyndon B. Johnson ordered the CIA to track down Cuban revolutionary Che Guevara in 1967 in Bolivia; to use its secret Air Force to suppress a revolt in The Congo (now Zaire) in 1964 against President Mobutu.

It has also been charged that Johnson ordered the CIA to turn over some of its B26 bombers to Portugal in 1965 to help put down revolts in Portuguese African colonies, even though Congress banned arms exports for use in colonial wars.

LINKED TO GREEK MILITARY

In more recent times, President Nixon approved CIA plans to fund opposition parties, newspapers and, it has been charged, strikers in Chile during the Marxist reign of Salvador Allenda Gossens, who was killed during a military coup last year.

And there are charges that the CIA had close ties to the Greek military junta recently replaced, raising suspicions the CIA was connected somehow to both the originial coup and the junta's support for the Greek-backed coup on Cyprus earlier this year.

President Nixon also asked the CIA to block the FBI's Watergate investigation. The CIA, in violation of laws prohibiting domestic spying, had provided Watergate burglar E. Howard Hunt with a wig, speech-altering devices and false credentials and prepared a psychological profile on Daniel Ellsberg who leaked the so-called Pentagon Papers.

The CIA also has taken heat from a number of other directions lately.

Some congressmen have charged director Colby with seeking to develop a public image for himself and his agency, something previously considered taboo. Colby has said his agency should be accountable to the public.

SOME EXPECT MORE

And Administration officials — particularly Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger in recent years — continue to expect more from CIA intelligence analysts then they have been able to deliver.

Military officers occasionally have criticized CIA estimates of Russian and Chinese military power and have demanded a louder voice in judging enemy military tactics and equipment.

Navy admirals still are burning about Colby's recent congressional testimony that Navy plans to improve a base on the island of Diego Garcia could fuel a naval arms race in the Indian Ocean. They also believe the CIA does not give the Soviet Navy enough credit.

Complaints also are heard that the CIA

does not hire many blacks and has not promoted women to important supervisory and overseas positions.

It has long been said, for example, that the CIA will never use an American woman — a foreigner, yes — to seduce and compromise.

A CIA official conceded: "We perhaps could have more women in top jobs. And we've tried to recruit blacks. But we've found that few blacks have studied foreign relations and are interested in us."

BUDGET IS REVIEWED

But it is the charge that the CIA is preoccupied with covert actions that has triggered introduction of a flurry of bills in Congress to bring the CIA under tighter congressional control, and some proposals to outlaw covert actions.

Some 150 such bills have come and gone over the past 25 years.

Subcommittees of the House and Senate appropriations committees do review the intelligence budget including that of the CIA. And House and Senate armed services subcommittees, particularly that of Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi (D-Mich.), conduct increasingly frequent hearings into CIA operations.

"Listen," said an ex-CIA agent. "The CIA is right when it says you only hear about its failures, not its successes. There has never been a CIA agent who defected."

PRESS-SCIMITAR, Memphis
17 October 1974

The Spy Business

Never Any Rest in Cloak and Dagger World

Third of Three Articles

By ALAN HORTON
Scripps-Howard Staff Writer

A Scripps-Howard Special Report

WASHINGTON. — The cloak-and-dagger world doesn't recognize detente. In the intelligence community, the Cold War continues.

In fact, U.S. spies may have more work today than ever before, not because the United States no longer is the sole superpower but because there also are staggering economic and political threats to American interests — the energy crisis, worldwide inflation, international terrorists, etc.

Horton

In the back of U.S. policymakers' minds is always the nagging belief that the Russian KGB (Committee for State Security) supports such terrorists and works to undermine U.S. access to Mideast oil.

★ ★ ★

THERE WAS A SLIGHTLY serious ring to China's charge earlier this year that the KGB is humbling the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency in "worldwide espionage and subversive activities." China is in pretty good position to know.

Last year, for example, the KGB was said to have backed a coup in Afghanistan.

Russian spies have been caught planning sabotage in England and are now presumed to be arming the Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland. British intelligence is being kept busy there.

Other KGB plots were uncovered in recent years in the Sudan, Egypt, Mexico, Colombia, Bolivia, Tunisia, Ghana and the Congo.

Few doubt that Russia financed Fidel Castro's overthrow of the Cuban government.

★ ★ ★

TODAY RUSSIA is busy arming and training Palestinian guerrillas with the latest tactics and weapons including antiaircraft missiles. Israel's security forces continue to assassinate Russian-armed Arab terrorists.

Thus, much of the U.S. intelligence operation must be devoted to winning friends in nonaligned nations in the Mideast and Latin America, and predicting the political and economic consequences of world events.

But the CIA's main job is to judge Russian military intentions and capabilities.

It is a tricky job because the Russians are testing four new powerful intercontinental ballistic missiles and the CIA must learn the missiles' capabilities and which and how many will be deployed where.

Judging Russian tactics and intentions is extra tough because of the "closed" Soviet society and the army of Soviet counterintelligence agents.

"Monitoring detente" is the way some intelligence officials jokingly refer to that part of their job. Arms limitation talks depend on them.

★ ★ ★

BUT SEARCHING for Russia's secrets is only a part-time job. Other tasks now assigned to the CIA include:

- Collecting data on international terrorist groups and, as much as possible, neutralizing them.
- Protecting U.S. access to strategic materials around the world including oil and rare metals.
- Keeping a close eye on the economic climate worldwide and country by country.
- Helping dam the flow of illegal narcotics into America from overseas.
- Training and equipping the so-called security forces of friendly nations.

The CIA has on hand a bank of paid consultants, the top scholars at many universities and its own analysts, scholars in their own right.

And it has access to all the information gathered by the entire U.S. intelligence community and that of much of the Western world.

★ ★ ★

THE CIA HAS TIES to multinational corporations, labor and financial circles, student groups, even foreign government and business officials. And CIA agents are hidden in most U.S. embassies.

One can only surmise that the CIA is busy at this moment learning how the new leftist government in Portugal will view U.S. rights to Lajes air base on the Azores, a crucial way-stop for planes en route to the Mideast.

Some CIA analysts must also be asking themselves: "Will sky-high oil prices bring down Italy's next government too?"

There may well come a day — perhaps in

the not-too-distant future — when domestic attacks on the CIA will not involve alleged meddling in other nations, but rather over cozy CIA ties with multinational oil companies, or international money markets.

After all, critics reason, the CIA may have to supply information to get a little information or help in return. Some of that information could provide a competitive advantage to a multinational corporation.

* * *

AND THERE MAY BE more need for so-called friendly governments to be brought into line with American policy. The CIA also may be assigned that job.

That's what some congressmen fear.

That's why so many bills have been introduced to improve congressional oversight of the U.S. intelligence community.

"Congress must insist on becoming a CIA observer and consumer," as Senator Stuart Symington put it.

Over the past 25 years, 150 such bills have been introduced. None passed.

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
11 November 1974

Donald Kirk

You're a CIA agent, and a man says . . .

Imagine this scenario: A dissident Syrian colonel approaches you at the St. Georges' Hotel in Beirut and says he can overthrow the violently anti-American, Israel-hating regime in Damascus if you will be so kind as to put up $5 or $10 million for arms, ammunition, and other material support.

You're not a *total* idiot—in fact, you're a Central Intelligence Agency operative as fluent in Arabic as you are in French—so you check out the colonel thoroly and you discover he's for real. That is, behind his rather toothy, superficially suave but nonetheless engaging enough smile, he does quite honestly entertain the dream of toppling the government of Syria, reaching an agreement with Israel, and initiating a genuinely non-aligned foreign policy. "All for the good of my people," he says, reverting now to the French in which he was tutored as a teen-ager.

"My people" indeed. You're thinking of *your* people, or at least your standing with your superiors at "the agency," as everyone seems to refer to the CIA. You excitedly send long scrupulously coded messages outlining the terms of the proposition, the background of the good colonel, your assessment of his chances of success in the context of Syrian realities—all the "objective" facts you can muster.

The decision on what to do now rests presumably with the White House, with Henry Kissinger, with CIA Director William Colby and other policy-makers and advisers.

Does the foregoing provide merely the outline for the opening of a rather banal spy drama—or could it happen? Does anyone in the CIA, or in Washington, still entertain fantasies of supplying secret armies, buying politicians and entire political parties, subsidizing newspapers and magazines, and otherwise influencing the course of history?

If Syria itself might seem to offer few immediate possibilities for meddling, CIA operatives can point with a certain pride to some of their other "achievements." They did, after all, contribute to the downfall of the Leftist Allende in Chile even if they were not able to prevent his election. They did maintain an army in Laos that provided the only real defense on the ground for the American-supported regime in Vientiane before the signing of the peace agreement for "neutralizing" the country. They did prop up colonels in Greece, anti-Communist politicians in Italy, even a genuine, popular hero like President Magsaysay in the Philippines.

There were also some notable failures—that is, if these examples might be construed as "successes." There was the fiasco of a colonel's revolt in Indonesia in the late 1950s and of an elaborate plot against Prince Norodom Sihanouk in Cambodia in the early 1960s—to cite just a couple of blots on the record.

Yet, beyond the known facts, the question is what the CIA has really accomplished by these activities. Are America's interests truly served by an agency that rationalizes all manner of nondemocratic conduct in the name of preserving lines of defense against Communism? Does it matter that the Soviet Union spends five or six times as much as the United States on overseas intelligence activities? Or does the United States lose so much in the way of tarnished ideals and sunken self-esteem, not to mention a besmirched image abroad, as to negate any short-range gains? Intelligence types are asking these questions too—and wondering whether or not the CIA should revert solely to its original function as an intelligence-gathering agency and let it go at that.

The debate is not theoretical. It is a matter for **practical** consideration among high-level officials.

The question one of them asked was what would *you* do if some colonel offered to knock over the government of Syria for a few million dollars. The immediate issue seemed esoteric. There does not seem to have been any such offer. The CIA man on the St. Georges' terrace is not awaiting instructions from Washington—at least on that topic.

Yet the issue beneath the question is relevant and topical. As of this writing no one—no one in government, at any rate—has advanced a definite answer. There is no real policy, no overall view on the rights and wrongs involved.

NEWSWEEK
4 Nov 1974

THE UNEASY UNDERCOVER MEN

A book by a onetime Central Intelligence Agency man, soon to be published in England, has Washington's entire intelligence community on edge. The CIA understandably fears that any identification of its agents exposes them and their families to harassment or even physical danger. And the appendix to the new book, by ex-CIA man Philip Agee, lists the actual and code names of no fewer than 432 CIA staff members, agents and "cover" operations.

SUNDAY TIMES, London
27 October 1974

DESTABILI-SATION

By Godfrey Hodgson and William Shawcross

"I DON'T SEE WHY we need to stand by and watch a country go Communist because of the irresponsibility of its people."

The speaker was Dr Henry Kissinger. The date was June 27, 1970, and the occasion was a meeting, in the basement of the West Wing of the White House, of what might be called the most powerful sub-committee in the Western world.

Kissinger was talking to the chairman of the American Chiefs of Staff; the Under-Secretary of State; the Deputy-Secretary of Defence; and the Director of Central Intelligence. With Kissinger himself, in his capacity as President Nixon's national security adviser, these five made up the top secret Forty Committee, charged with the overall direction of US intelligence gathering and clandestine operations around the world.

The country which Dr Kissinger, in the summer of 1970, suspected of imminent "irresponsibility," was Chile. The Forty Committee was meeting that day to decide what line American policy ought to follow if Dr Salvador Allende were to win power at the elections that September. Allende, himself a Marxist, though also a constitutionalist and a parliamentarian of more than 30 years' standing, was the leader of a Popular Unity coalition which included five parties, one of them the Chilean Communists.

On September 16, shortly after Allende did indeed win the biggest share of the popular vote, and shortly before he was constitutionally installed as president by an overwhelming vote of both houses of the Chilean parliament, Dr Kissinger told a group of Mid-western journalists, in one of his famous "deep background" briefings, that the United States did not have much influence over what happened in Chile.

Three years later, on September 11, 1973, Allende's government was overthrown by a military coup, and Allende himself was killed. On October 9 Kissinger said: "The CIA had nothing to do with the coup, to the best of my knowledge and belief, and I only put in that qualification in case some madman appears down there who, without instructions, talked to somebody. I have absolutely no reason to suppose it."

But Kissinger was not telling the truth, either in 1970 or in 1973, if he meant to deny all American involvement in Allende's fall.

Kissinger and the Forty Committee did not stand by and do nothing.

On the contrary, from the autumn of 1970 until the spring of 1973, the United States Government, on Kissinger's orders, sought to destroy the Allende Government by all means short of a massive invasion like that mounted by President Johnson in the Dominican Republic in 1965.

Kissinger, in fact, treated Chile as a test case, or—as the present director of the CIA, William Colby, reportedly told a committee of Congress on April 22 this year—as a "prototype or laboratory experiment to test the techniques of heavy financial investment in an effort to discredit and bring down a government." It was a technique that became known by a memorable euphemism: "destabilisation."

The "experiment" in destabilisation took the form, not of a solo performance by the CIA, but of a broadly orchestrated campaign in which all the resources of the US government, short of actual military intervention, were deployed. Specifically, it is now clear that the US government, on Kissinger's orders, used economic pressures, diplomatic quarantine and clandestine internal interference in the effort to bring Allende down.

It made available—so the CIA director has now admitted to Congress—more than $8 million for secret CIA meddling in Chilean politics between 1970 and 1973.

The chaos

By withholding loans from its own agencies, and by using its (decisive) influence with international agencies, including the World Bank, it deliberately threw the Chilean economy into chaos—for which it then blamed the Chilean government.

It poured in money to support the Right-wing truck-owners' strike which all but paralaysed the Chilean economy after October 1972.

More than 100 Right-wing trade union leaders were flown to the US for training and indoctrination at a special school in Virginia which is supported both by the US government and by big corporations, with interests in Latin America, such as ITT, United Fruit and W. R. Grace.

In spite of everything, however, the experiment failed. By early 1973, there were signs that the Chilean economy might turn the corner. And in March, 1973, in national parliamentary elections, Allende confounded the CIA's predictions and increased his share of the popular vote from 36 per cent to 44 per cent.

It was at that point that Dr Kissinger decided to play it rough.

The evidence we have uncovered suggests that when the Chilean armed forces moved in to overthrow Allende in September, 1973, they did so with clandestine American help. Liaison seems to have been supplied, not by the CIA, but by the US navy.

In an unpublished interview before he was mysteriously murdered in Buenos Aires this month, General Carlos Prats, non-political Defence Minister in the Allende government until he was forced out shortly before the coup, told a free-lance journalist, Marlise Simons, that US backing of the coup was coordinated through the American naval mission in Valparaiso, where the coup began. Other sources support General Prats's account on several details, though there are still some questions about the degree of US military involvement.

What is more disconcerting is that Kissinger's decision to intervene surreptitiously in Chile appears on close examination to have been no freak. On the contrary, it fits in with the strategic logic of his, and President Nixon's, foreign policy as a whole.

And Kissinger's own words, taken in conjunction with his handling of the Chilean affair, raise in no remote or hypothetical form the question:—

What would Kissinger do if he thought there was imminent danger of a government in Western Europe "going Communist because of the irresponsibility of its people"?

There is already Communist participation in the present Government in Portugal. There is a realistic possibility of Communist participation in the Government of Italy and perhaps also in that of Greece—two countries where American strategic interests are far more important than in Chile. Before one can even attempt to answer that question, however, one must understand the depth and breadth of American involvement in the Chilean tragedy.

IN THE SUMMER of 1970, the CIA conducted its own private poll on the Chilean elections. It predicted—quite wrongly, as it turned out—that the conservative candidate, Jorge Alessandri, would win with 40% of the votes.

Washington, however, was taking no chances. Just how far the American intelligence services were prepared to go, even before Allende took power, is suggested by the farcical episode of the naval brass band.

The Chilean embassy in Washington was bemused to notice that the US Navy, in the first eight months of 1970, had applied for visas for no fewer than 87 officers, NCOs and civilian employees, all for the period of the Chilean election.

The embassy politely queried the applications, and was told by the State Department that the visas were for members of a US Navy band which planned to tour Chile, giving concerts in a spirit of US-Chilean friendship. The Chilean diplomats couldn't help noticing just how much brass there was in the band: to be exact, three full captains, three commanders and 15 lieutenant-commanders, many of them with previous ex-

perience of intelligence work.

The embassy therefore expressed scepticism about the musical nature of the band's duties, and was promptly honoured with a visit from two very senior American officials. There had been a stupid misunderstanding, one of them explained. Of course the navy men were not a band. Their visit was connected with the annual joint US-Latin American manoeuvres, code-named "Unitas." The Chileans reminded their visitors that Chilean participation in the 1970 Unitas had been cancelled some months before Jaws sagged. The officials withdrew, and the applications for visas were cancelled.

Without fanfare, however, the Navy was back in 1973.

AT THE JUNE 27 meeting of the Forty Committee, it was agreed that the CIA should spend $400,000 dollars in support of Allende's opponents. The agency may have done a little better than that. Three weeks later, on July 21, the offices of the public relations firm in Santiago, which was handling the Alessandri campaign were burgled. Within a few days its financial records were published in a Left-wing paper. They showed payments to the Right-wing Catholic Students' Federation, and to middle-class professional groups: nothing surprising in that. But they also recorded a mysterious payment of $600,000 from someone identified on the stub only as "Charlie." Not Carlos: Charlie. It seemed clear that there was some large—and non-Chilean—secret paymaster.

Three days later, Henry Kissinger ordered his staff to prepare a paper on Chile. This document, NSSM 97, laid out the American options in case Allende won. These included putting an international squeeze on the Chilean economy, and supporting his overthrow by his opponents in Chile, on the model of US support for the overthrow of President Goulart in Brazil in 1964.

On September 4, Allende duly emerged as the leader in the popular elections, by a short head. Kissinger did not hide his attitude. On September 16 he told editors in his background briefing in blunt terms: "If Allende wins there is a good chance that he will establish over a period of years some form of Communist government," and that this would present "massive problems for us."

He also told the editors that the US had little influence over what happened in Chile. But in that he was being more than a little disingenuous. For the secret Forty Committee had just met to discuss Chile again.

Late on the evening of September 15 the US ambassador in Santiago, Ed Korry, got a message from Washington "giving him the green light to move." His task: keep Allende from taking power.

AS THE EVIDENCE of Kissinger's "hard" policy in Chile has accumulated, many people have had difficulty in squaring it with his reputation as a "non-ideological" moderate and with his, on the whole, successful pursuit of *détente* with the Soviet Union.

Two clues help to resolve this apparent contradiction. The first is the correction of a widespred misunderstanding of Kissinger's, and Nixon's, foreign policy. The essence of that policy was not a reduction of the American commitment to contain Communism. On the contrary—as Nixon himself said in an interview with this newspaper in February 1970—it was an effort to resist a tendency fed by failure in Vietnam, to isolationism. It was not a policy of withdrawal, but "a revised policy of involvement." Kissinger's innovation lay only in the degree to which American involvement was to be direct and visible.

Nixon and Kissinger proposed to apply on a world scale, in fact, the idea of "Vietnamisation." Anti-Communists around the world were to do their own fighting, backed wherever possible not with American troops, but with money, arms, air power, and, if necessary, selective clandestine operations.

This was the meaning of the "Nixon Doctrine," enunciated in the spring of 1970, in the special context of South-East Asia, but with world-wide implications:

"In cases involving other types of aggression (ie non-nuclear aggression) "we shall furnish military and economic assistance . . . But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower."

It was the classic policy of eighteenth-century Britain: the golden cavalry of St George. And Chile was the first important test case.

The second clue is the realisation that Kissinger's pursuit of *détente* with the Soviet Union, so far from inhibiting the suppression of an independent Left-wing government such as Allende's, positively demanded it. Kissinger's plans for a stable world system, and Nixon's hopes of "a generation of peace," rested, as much as on anything else, on the Soviet Union and the United States agreeing to respect each other's spheres of interest—that is what *détente* means for Kissinger.

An independent Marxist government in Chile not only challenged American domination in the US sphere. By offering an alternative model of "revolution" to other Latin American countries, it threatened Soviet policy as well.

THE GREEN LIGHT message to Ambassador Korry illuminates another point that has been misunderstood. The Allende government's antagonist was not the Central Intelligence Agency. It was the government of the United States.

Kissinger has recently been telling sympathetic reporters that most of the suggestions for covert action in Chile were made by the CIA. But the CIA was under the orders of the Forty Committee, of which Kissinger was at all times the chairman. Kissinger took so much interest in Chile one official has told the New York Times, that he became "in effect, the Chilean desk officer. He made sure that policy was made in the way he and the President wanted it."

The CIA was only one of the instruments for Kissinger's will. He sat at the controls of a giant console, able to direct now the CIA, now the State Department, the Treasury or the Navy Department as each seemed best fitted for his purpose. That was to destroy the constitutional government of Chile.

After the Forty Committee meeting in mid-September the CIA began to show a new interest in the ambitious plans which the International Telephone and Telegraph corporation had been putting forward since the summer for saving democracy (and its own investment in the privately-owned telephone system) in Chile.

Contacts between ITT and the CIA were cosy to the point of a confusion of identity. John McCone, former CIA director, was on the board of ITT. He talked to his successor, Richard Helms, and to Dr Kissinger. The chairman of ITT, Harold Geneen, and the senior vice-president, Edward J. Gerrity, met William Broe, whose job bore the intriguing title: "Chief of the CIA clandestine services (also known as the Directorate of Plans), Western Hemisphere Division."

Before the Forty Committee meeting, ITT seems to have been the suitor. McCone and Geneen offered to put up a million dollars to defeat Allende. They were told by Kissinger, in effect, "don't call us, we'll call you."

Last-ditch bid

Then, on September 29, to quote the Senate sub-committee's report, "for the first time . . . the Government took the initiative." Broe, the man from Plans, contacted ITT's Gerrity. When they met in New York, Broe proposed an elaborate plan for disrupting the Chilean economy in a last-ditch bid to persuade the Chilean parliament to vote against Allende becoming President. Among other things, Broe suggested that US banks should not renew credits, that US companies should drag their feet in remitting money or shipping spare parts to Chile, and that the US should withdraw all technical help. Geneen, McCone and Gerrity decided—so they told the Senate sub-committee—to have nothing to do with this plan. But it is clear that the decision to strangle the Chilean economy was taken at the Forty Committee itself.

"FROM THE VERY DAY of our electoral triumph on September 4, 1970," Salvador Allende told the United Nations general assembly in 1972, "we have felt the effects of a large-scale external pressure against us which tried to prevent the inauguration of a government freely elected by the people . . . to cut us off from the world, to strangle our economy and paralyse trade in our principal export, copper, and to deprive us of access to sources of international funding."

He was not exaggerating.

The Nixon Administration tried to give the impression that its economic blockade of Chile was a response to Allende's nationalisation of the US-owned copper mines. Nationalisation, however, came as no surprise: it passed the Chilean parliament without a single negative vote. What was controversial was Allende's decision to offset the compensation due to the two big copper companies, Anaconda and Kennecott, with a deduction for what the Chilean Government regarded as "excess profits," so that the companies would receive no compensation in the end.

But that decision was not announced until September 28, 1971. By then the US Government had been using the economic weapon against the Chilean Government for months: indeed it was in the autumn of 1970 that Kissinger personally chaired a series of meetings whose whole purpose, one participant has said, "was to ensure that Allende wasn't going to get a penny."

US capital had poured into Chile in the 1960s. The return on capital for US firms operating there doubled over the decade, but the effect on the Chilean economy was not so happy. Almost all the profits made by US firms were repatriated, and Chilean per capita income rose by less than 1.5% per annum over the second half of the decade. In 1970 the US Agency for International Development reported officially to Congress that its programmes in Chile had "failed dismally."

In the meantime, Chile had become extraordinarily dependent on the US. By 1970 its foreign debt per head was the second highest in the world (after only Israel's). Imports, exports and investment were dominated by US corporations, and so were the more advanced sectors of the economy.

The US Government understood the leverage this economic grip gave it. "The best way to get at Chile," wrote Kissinger's aide Arnold Nachmanoff, "is through her economy."

On August 11 1971, almost

seven weeks before Allende announced his decision on "excess profits." Kissinger tightened the first screw. The Export-Import Bank (a US government agency) turned down Chile's request for $21 million in loans and loan guarantees to enable LAN, the Chilean national airline, to buy three Boeings, though LAN's repayment record was flawless.

In the meantime John Connally, then Secretary of the Treasury, had already ordered US representatives on international financial institutions to oppose all loans and aid to Chile. Two main institutions were involved. One was the Inter-American Development Bank, whose US director, responsible to Connally, was in a position to wield a veto on loans. He used it to see that a Chilean request for $30 million for a petrochemical complex never even came up for a vote. Between 1959 and 1970, the IADB had lent Chile over $300 million. After Allende took power, the only loans made, in three years, were to two Right-wing universities, for a total of under $12 million.

The pretext

The other was the World Bank, whose president is always an American and whose US director is answerable to the Secretary of the Treasury. Before 1970, the bank had lent Chile $234 million. After Allende became president, it did not so much as process a single loan request from Chile.

The pretext was US indignation over the copper mines. Yet the extent of Washington's true interest in the copper issue was revealed after the coup in 1973. In November that year Reuter's reported that Orlando Saenz, one of the junta's main economic advisers, had said: "Now the Government of the US considers this is a problem for the American mining companies."

Since 1946 Chile, as a showcase of liberal democracy, had received $540 million in development loans. After Allende was elected, all aid was cut off.

There were just two exceptions. In December 1972 the secretary of the white-collar "*gremios*" (Right-wing middle-class professional associations) was invited by the American Institute for Free Labor Development to enrol in a course on "advanced labour economics" at a university in Washington. Altogether 108 Chileans from the *gremios* and unions were trained at AIFLD's school at Front Royal, Virginia, 50 or so miles away. These were the cadres for the truck-owners' and other Right-wing strikes.

The other exception was military aid. In the fiscal year ending 1970, it was $800,000. In the year to mid-1971, it was $5.7 million. In 1971-2 it was $12.3 million.

The pattern of aid revealed all too clearly the strategy described with brutal frankness in an ITT memorandum in 1970: "A more realistic hope among those who want to block Allende is that a swiftly-deteriorating economy will touch off a wave of violence leading to a military coup."

THE ECONOMY deteriorated fast enough, and there was certainly a wave of violence. It would be a mistake, of course, to attribute all Allende's troubles to American intervention. Whether you call them reforms or revolution, the Popular Unity Government's own policies played their part in bringing on economic crisis.

Agriculture is an example. In 1960, fewer than 3 per cent of the landowners owned more than 40 per cent of the land. In 1971 and 1972 more than a third of the agricultural land in the country changed hands as these vast holdings were split up. As a result food production fell by 8 per cent in 1972, and wheat production by 16 per cent.

Food shortages and rising prices squeezed the lower middle class. They added a dimension of mass panic and anger to the tenacity with which the wealthier Chileans defended their privileges. None of that was created by the Americans.

Yet into this troubled and vulnerable country a massive weight of covert American influence was thrown, and it was thrown on the side of increasing economic chaos, and exacerbating social violence.

Over the three years from September 1970 to September 1973 the Forty Committee—so William Colby, director of the CIA, told the congressional committee last April—spent at least $8 million on "destabilising" the Allende Government. President Ford has said that the money was used "to help and assist the preservation of opposition papers and electronic media and to preserve opposition political papers." Quite apart from the fact that opposition newspapers and parties continued to operate throughout the Allende period, but were shut down immediately after the 1973 coup, it was a funny way to put it.

For the CIA money was used to subsidise El Mercurio, the Right-wing daily which kept up a running fusillade of scare stories throughout the Allende period, except for a couple of brief periods when it was temporarily closed for advocating armed insurrection. It was used to infiltrate almost every political party and movement in Chile.

American money also went to the extreme Right-wing paramilitary group, Patria y Libertad, which was formed in 1971. And it was used to finance a whole series of demonstrations and strikes, in a crescendo of violence.

In December 1971, there was the March of the Empty Pots. Five thousand women, organised by the Christian Democratic and National Parties, and including a noticeable proportion of upper middle-class ladies, many with their maids, marched through Santiago banging cooking pots to protest against food shortages and the visit of Fidel Castro. Left-wing counter-demonstrations led to rioting.

In October 1972 the middle-class opposition to Allende came to another climax with the strike called by the Confederation of Truck Owners, a serious matter in a country 2,500 miles long with few railways. This and a series of other "bosses' strikes" lasted for a month, threw the economy into chaos, and forced Allende to bring the military into his government. There is little doubt that the strikes were financed with CIA money.

Indeed William Colby himself, it would seem, has come close to admitting it, in what deserves to become a classic exposition of the clandestine operator's technique of the "cut-out." An unnamed official, thought with good reason in Washington to be Colby himself, told Seymour Hersh of the New York Times that the truck-owners could well have got some of the agency's money.

"If we give it to A and then A gives it to B and C and D, in a sense it's true that D got it, but the question is: Did we give it to A knowing that D would get it?"

AND YET, IN SPITE of everything, by early 1973 it was apparent to the cold-eyed watchers in Washington that their "laboratory experiment" had not worked.

Warning sign

There were several warning signs. Food supplies improved. Allende's government was strengthened politically by bringing in several generals as Ministers—and especially by General Carlos Prats as Minister of Defence. No man of the Left, he regarded it his professional duty to serve any constitutionally chosen government. Then came Allende's surprise success in the elections on March 4. Within three weeks the Forty Committee met again, and Washington's antagonism towards Chile moved into a new phase of masked hostility.

Experienced students of Latin American politics have assured us that you can usually tell when there is a coup coming, because the number of CIA men in the local US embassy under what is called "official cover" goes up. It may have been so elsewhere, but in Chile what happened was the exact opposite.

An official who was in the US embassy in Santiago at the time confirmed to us in an interview last week that in March 1973, Kissinger called off the CIA. He didn't want the agency too prominently associated with the coup which, from that month on, he knew was only a matter of time.

Instead, the indications are that communications were left to the US Navy. The naval brass band got into the act, after all.

From March on, events moved fast in Chile. The tempo of strikes and demonstrations against the government built up. Violence had not traditionally been a commonplace of Chilean politics. But from April on, Santiago got used to almost daily assassinations, riots and street-fighting between Patria y Libertad and government supporters.

On June 29, the 2nd tank regiment mutinied and moved on La Moneda, the presidential palace. Prats personally led the loyal troops who surrounded them and put down the mutiny.

In the last week in July the crisis went spinning into its final phase. The truck-owners went on strike again, followed by the taxi-drivers. Terrorism increased. And on July 26, in mysterious circumstances, Commander Arturo Araya, President Allende's naval ADC, was murdered at his home at night. The Right-wing Press blamed Left-wing terrorists. One of Allende's personal aides, however, has described to us the dramatic confrontation at which, in Allende's presence, army intelligence compelled the head of the Special Branch of the police to admit that Araya had been murdered by a Right-wing group, and that there had been a conspiracy to feed a false version of events to the Press.

On August 7 several hundred loyal sailors and naval officers were arrested by naval security. Two days later, the heads of all four armed services (Army, Navy, Air Force, and *Carabineros*, or national police) joined the Government.

On August 24, General Prats was forced from command. Allende was doomed. Even before Prats finally left, the Centre and Right in Congress had joined in voting for a declaration that the Allende government was "illegal" and calling upon the military to take power.

On September 10, for the first time, workers at a Santiago factory resisted an Air Force detachment which had come to search for arms. Before dawn the next morning the Navy occupied Valparaiso. The coup had begun.

Before it was over, Salvador Allende, lawyer and constitutionalist, was dead, gun in hand, in the Moneda Palace. Several thousand fellow-believers in Popular Unity died with him elsewhere.

A THREAD of navy blue runs through the secret history of Allende's downfall. One probable reason for the murder of Commander Araya, we were told by a former member of Allende's staff, was that it cut Allende off from all knowledge of what was going on at naval headquarters. For it seems to have been there that much of the planning of the coup was done. And it was through the US naval mission in Valparaiso, Chile's main seaport and naval base, that the US government would have kept in touch.

General Prats said so in so many words. Some two months after the coup, journalist Marlise Simons visited the exiled general in Buenos Aires, where he was working as a book-keeper in a tyre factory. (He was murdered in Buenos Aires earlier this month.)

"The real co-ordination and planning for the coup," Prats said, "took place in Valparaiso." That was where officers in the conspiracy secretly met the US Marine attaché. And Admiral Toribio Merino, second in command of the Chilean navy and senior naval officer at Valparaiso, kept close personal touch with the same man, Lt-Colonel Patrick Ryan, US Marine Corps.

On September 10, Prats said, the day before the coup, Merino requested that the American ships due to arrive for joint manoeuvres, stay out of Chilean waters, *but remain on the alert offshore.*

The nominal head of the US naval mission in Valparaiso was Captain Ray E. Davis, US Navy. But Davis was also head of the whole US embassy military group, with headquarters in Santiago, and normally spent only from Wednesday to Saturday each week in the naval mission office on the seventh floor at 749 Calle Prats — an ironic coincidence of name. It was Ryan who was responsible for liaison with Merino. And Merino was one of the chief coup planners, and is now a member of the Chilean junta.

By coincidence, we have a tantalising glimpse of the dashing Colonel Ryan and his helpers at work. Two Americans from Santiago, a girl called Terry Simon and Charles Horman, were stranded in Valparaiso by the coup. On the terrace of their hotel they met a man who introduced himself as having come to Chile

for the third time, "to do a job for the navy." Although the phone was not working, he showed detailed knowledge of what was happening.

Next day they were approached by none other than Colonel Ryan, who offered to help them get back to Santiago. He boasted that he had information on everything that happened 24-48 hours in advance and would know as soon as the road to Santiago was open.

Over the next two days both Simon and Horman saw a good deal of Ryan and his colleagues. They talked freely about the coup, of which they approved, and of their own inside knowledge. At one point they were driving with Ryan when he was stoped at a roadblock. He produced, and let Terry Simon examine, a card identifying him by name as an officer in the Armada de Chile.

Horman was later picked up by the Chilean military police and disappeared. His wife, parents and Terry Simon believe the Chileans may have killed him because he knew too much about American liaison activities.

Why might US naval intelligence have been used for liaison with the Chilean conspirators? Three reasons can be suggested. One is that in the late 1960s the US Navy set up a special secret communications network linking it with each of the navies of Latin America, the very existence of which is still classified. Using it, the US and Chilean navies could communicate directly in total secrecy, bypassing embassies and even the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington.

A second reason is that, as Admiral Gene La Rocque, former director of the Inter-American Defence College, told us, "relations between the US and Chilean navies have always been close." Largely this reflects professional admiration and common interests. But in this connection it is interesting that Colonel Ryan boasted to Terry Simon that he had escorted a Chilean admiral on a million-dollar shopping expedition for naval equipment in the US the month before the coup.

Above all there were the Unitas manoeuvres. Four US Navy vessels were involved: two guided missile destroyers, the USS Richmond K Turner and USS Tattnall, the destroyer Vesole, and the submarine USS Clamagore. On September 11, having finished their joint manoeuvres with the Peruvian Navy, they steamed southward to begin manoeuvres with the Chilean Navy.

The State Department announced that "on receipt of information about the situation in Chile they were redirected and ordered not to go into Chilean territorial water or ports." The ships, however, were just outside territorial waters, at the crucial period of the coup.

The manoeuvres had been planned eight months earlier, so the Chilean high command knew that US naval units would be off the coast on September 11. "Any time you have US naval forces offshore that suggests the support of the United States," Admiral La Rocque pointed out, and he conceded that the date of the coup was probably chosen, at least in part, because of the scheduled manoeuvres.

The abortive mutiny of late June had failed because the military were divided. In September, there were still some units loyal to Allende, but not enough to save him.

It looks as though contingency plans were made against the possibility of civil war, none the less. On August 22 a Communist deputy, Jorge Insunza, burst into a night session of the Chilean parliament and demanded that it go into immediate secret session. He had been told by President Allende, he said, that he had been informed by Prats that Bolivian troops were deploying near the frontier between Chile and Bolivia in the vicinity of the huge Anaconda copper mine at Chuquicamata. Insunza said that Allende had told him that Bolivia was backed by Brazil, and by the US Air Force. Opposition deputies cheered.

Whether any such double insurance policy had been taken out or not, it seems that the military conspirators had the symbolic support of the US Navy. And if General Prats is to be believed, they also had help with planning through the naval mission in Valparaiso.

KISSINGER never made any bones of the fact that when he was worrying about Chile, Europe was also on his mind.

On September 20 this year, Kissinger and President Ford received nine congressional leaders to the White House to discuss the CIA's covert operations in general as well as what the CIA did in Chile. He is reported to have expressed considerable concern at the prospect of Italy "going Communist," and to have said that whatever criticisms were now being made of the CIA, if Italy did go Communist, the United States would be criticised for not having done enough to save her.

Portugal now seems to be causing Dr Kissinger even more worry than Italy. While in Italy yet another effort is being made to establish a Centre-Left coalition that will exclude the Communists from power, in Portugal the Communist Party is already in the Government.

This week the Washington columnists Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, who in the past have had excellent access to Kissinger, revealed that "the depth of anxiety over Portugal's sharp move to the Left can be measured by the fact that the United States has cut Portugal off from certain highly classified military and nuclear information commonly available to all members of Nato."

Portugal talks

The decision, Evans and Novak say, seems to have been taken after Alvaro Cunhal, director general of the Portuguese Communist Party, joined the Government.

Our own interviews with Portuguese diplomats confirm Kissinger's concern. The talks between President Ford and Kissinger and the Portuguese president, General Costa Gomes, who was accompanied by the Socialist leader, Mario Soares, a few days ago were apparently not as easy as was generally reported. Kissinger apparently made it clear that the US could not tolerate a Communist government in Portugal.

In the circumstances, it is hardly surprising that there are widespread rumours and reports of American covert political activities in Portugal and, to a lesser extent in Italy, Greece and even Spain as well. The French satirical weekly, Le Canard Enchainé, for example, has reported that General Vernon Walters, deputy director of the CIA, has recently visited both Portugal and Italy. The general's office confirms that he has indeed been in Lisbon and elsewhere in Europe—on holiday.

Even more titillating, for connoisseurs of the CIA legend, is the news that Irving Brown has been on the warpath again. Brown runs the European operations of the AFL/CIO, the American equivalent of the TUC.

In 1948 and 1949 he played a key role in setting up "third force" trades unions in both France and Italy. Some would say he helped to save Western Europe from Communism, others that he helped to split the European Left.

In 1967, he was identified in the Saturday Evening Post by a former CIA official and by the Washington Post as having worked for the CIA, which channelled money to anti-Communist unions through him.

Last year he returned to Europe after eight years of concern with African affairs, because —he told us—George Meany, the fiercely anti-Communist head of the AFL/CIO thought that not enough was being done to strengthen the Centre in Europe.

In early May, after the Caetano dictatorship fell, Brown arrived in Lisbon to see what he could do to develop anti-Communist unions in Portugal.

In July he travelled to Rome, where his goal was to try to encourage splits in the Italian trade union movement and stop the trend towards a unified, Communist-dominated union movement.

When we asked this week whether he was still working for the CIA, he reacted wearily. "Why ask me? You know just as well as I do that if I was I wouldn't tell you, and if I say I am not, then you won't believe me. Nowadays if Mount Etna erupts, people say it's the fault of the CIA."

After what happened in Chile, that, too, is not perhaps altogether surprising.

Washington Post
30 October 1974

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

By Jack Anderson

CIA Plant—Despite the sensitivity of U.S.-China relations, the Central Intelligence Agency has quietly placed an operative in the U.S. mission in Peking. He is James R. Lilley, a "political officer" who has also served in Cambodia, Thailand, and Laos.

This is but one of the explosive revelations in a soon-to-be published Washington Monthly article by investigative journalist John Marks, co-author of "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence." Marks, now an associate of the Center for National Security Studies, also disclosed that over a fourth of the 5,435 State Department employees who work overseas are actually undercover CIA agents, and the number is steadily rising. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee routinely approves the appointment to sensitive posts of Foreign Service Reserve Officers who are in reality CIA agents. Of the 121 names submitted to the committee last year, 70 were agents, he wrote.

DAILY TELEGRAPH, London
1 November 1974

ROBERT MOSS on the implications of America's 'passion for disclosure'

Chile, the CIA and the Communists

THE fuss about CIA involvement in Chile has died down for the moment in Washington, but the chances are that, when Dr Kissinger returns from his present journeyings, he will find the issue still there to haunt him. Gen. Andropov, chief of the KGB, must be convulsed with laughter at the sight of so many American Senators and newspaper editors protesting that their country has no right to pursue any sort of covert foreign policy.

President Ford said the obvious when, in his attempt to justify the fact that the CIA spent $8 million to support opposition parties and media under President Allende, he pointed out that the Russians were spending considerably more on such operations and tend to conduct them far more ruthlessly. It is only necessary to glance back over the past few years to see that the Russians have made a tremendous investment in intelligence activities in the effort to depose non-Communist régimes. Even in Latin America, which has always ranked low on their order of priorities, the Russians have been doing some very curious things.

In March, 1971, the Mexicans expelled five KGB officers, who had been masquerading as Soviet diplomats, because they had helped to finance and organise a guerrilla group called the Revolutionary Action Movement. A few months later, Ecuador expelled another three Russian officials for their role in funding the Marxist-dominated Confederation of Ecuadorian Workers which had used the money to organise a general strike originally planned to co-ordinate with a Left-wing coup.

In Chile, Russia's hand was obvious again, although, as in many similar cases, the Cuban intelligence organisation, the DGI, served as Moscow's instrument. The DGI has now been completely colonised by the KGB and operates under the close surveillance of a KGB general in Havana. A DGI officer, Luis Fernández de Oña, occupied an office next to Allende's, reading his correspondence and screening his visitors. There was, it is true, a personal factor involved: he became Allende's son-in-law by marrying his daughter, "Tati," but it was more than a family affair.

The continuing inquest into the Chile affair is part of the malign legacy of Watergate and the Vietnam war. Both undermined the confidence of many Americans in the integrity of the Administration and have created an enormous bandwagon in favour of public supervision of every aspect of policy-making. They also created a passion for disclosure that now makes it impossible for anyone to assume that confidential information will be kept confidential.

One of the most dangerous aspects of the Chile affair is the way that the names of political parties, newspapers and radio stations and trade union organisations that are alleged to have received CIA funds have been bandied about.

If public hearings go further, the next step, no doubt, would be the naming of Chileans alleged to have had some relationship with the American Government. This would not only put them on the death lists of the terrorist organisations that have espoused the cause of "Allende the Martyr"; it would discourage people in other situations who might contemplate turning to the Americans, rather than Russians, for outside support.

The limits of the CIA involvement in Chile have been muddled beyond recognition. During the first months of Allende's government, before it became apparent that the Marxists in it were bent on a total seizure of power, the Americans experimented with a policy of conciliation. This was largely the work of Ambassador Korry, who, for example, tried to negotiate with Allende over the nationalisation of major American interests, such as the big copper companies. He actually offered Allende a deal that would have enabled the Chilean Government to pay compensation with official bonds underwritten by the American Treasury. The deal, however, was rejected by Allende after it was vetoed by the leader of the extremist wing of the Socialist party, Carlos Altamirano.

It was not the CIA funds that finally brought about the coup d'etat in September last year. At best, they served to keep in being a number of newspapers that would otherwise have collapsed as a result of spiralling costs, declining advertising and frozen prices. Without that critical voice, and without the major strikes, also partly financed by the Americans, that served to demonstrate widespread hostility to the régime, the Marxists in Chile would have found their road to power much less stony. It was not in the power of the Americans, however, to bring together the broad range of political forces that united to topple the régime. A cynic might even say that the conclusive proof that the coup was not essentially the work of the CIA was that it worked so smoothly.

Perhaps it is not good enough for Americans, or America's allies, to conclude that what "our" side does is justified because the "other" side is doing the same, or worse. But when it is seriously proposed, as in two recent books on the CIA, that covert operations should never be licensed, it has to be pointed out that this would leave a tremendous vacuum in many areas the Communists would not be slow to exploit. The things that were done in Chile would have provoked little comment if they had been done to oppose Hitler, or, for that matter, the Soviet régime (although, in the latter case, there might have been complaints about the threat to détente). Yet it often seems that it is only when the Communists have won that people realise that they had been on the way to winning.

Russia remains an expansionist power—and its chances for further expanion, given the effects of the oil crisis, the rising strength of the Marxist Left in southern Europe and the prospect of a new phase of American isolationism, are probably greater now than at any time since the immediate post-1945 period. The Americans and their allies are increasingly on the defensive.

The Americans exerted themselves, to a fairly minimal extent, in what was seen as an attempt to prevent Chile becoming a part of that expansionist bloc. There is no reason, in present conditions, why that should be regarded as a monstrous—or immoral—thing to do.

WASHINGTON POST
12 November 1974

Kissinger Stresses Need for High-Caliber Foreign Service

Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger said yesterday that the United States "cannot rely on star performers" to develop or carry out its foreign policy but must have a Foreign Service with a high standard of performance.

Speaking to the seventh annual awards luncheon of the American Foreign Service Association, Kissinger, who has been criticized for carrying out American diplomacy singlehandedly, said:

"We cannot rely . . . on the possibility that someone will come along every few years to manipulate events. This cannot be done by any President or Secretary of State. What we need is a high standard of performance that is carried out through the decades."

The secretary encouraged dissent — "for which we bear no visible grudges" — but said it must be kept within the service. Once decisions are made, he said, they must be carried out with discipline characteristic of the Foreign Service. Kissinger has angrily denounced "leaks," which he attributes to junior officers dissatisfied with his decisions.

The United States, Kissinger said, is passing through one of the most difficult periods in world affairs, complicated by "a very searing experience" domestically. Following World War II there was a period of great creativity, he said, in which America drew unconsciously from its own domestic experience, in effect bringing the techniques of the New Deal to other countries that shared the same democratic traditions.

EDITOR & PUBLISHER

26 OCT 1974

30th general assembly

IAPA asks Ford to identify papers that got CIA money

The 30th general assembly of the Inter American Press Association in Caracas, Venezuela, last week vigorously condemned the reported CIA "support" of the "opposition press" in Chile under the Allende regime and called on President Ford "to clarify once and for all" the scope of CIA intervention by naming the newspapers which accepted financial assistance of that nature.

"All free newspapers of the Americas are justly offended by this action of CIA which casts doubts on the integrity of the hemisphere's press and makes it possible for the enemies of a free press to circulate all sorts of slanders and defamations against it," the IAPA said.

The organization requested President Ford to "order the CIA to put a stop to any subsidization of newspapers or journalists" and condemned, at the same time, newspapers and journalists who accepted such assistance.

The IAPA action came after prolonged debate on the reports of CIA intervention in Chile and following vigorous denials by editors of *El Mercurio* in Santiago, *El Sur* in Conception, and *El Rancaguino* in Rancagua, that such payments had been made to them.

The general assembly condemned the military government of Peru for its expropriation of the independent press of Lima and declared "that government an enemy of the free press." The association deplored that some journalists and press organizations in various parts of the hemisphere have approved the attitude of the Peruvian government.

The action was taken after reports by two IAPA members who had visited Peru prior to the assembly—Guido Fernandez, editor of *La Nacion* of San Jose, Costa Rica, and Rafael Molina, editor of *El Nacional* of Santo Domingo. They had talked to previous owners, editors and reporters as well as the government-appointed editors and concluded that a free dialogue no longer exists under the "independent Marxism," as they called the new regime.

Following three days of reports, IAPA:

- Condemned the absence of freedom of the press and other civil rights in Chile;
- Said the tyranical regime in Haiti does not permit a free press;
- Protested to the government of Nicaragua for depriving newspaper editor Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, *La Prensa*, of his civil rights and denying him an exit visa from the country because of his published statements that his country's elections were a fraud;
- Declared that because of censorship there is no freedom of the press in Brazil;
- Denounced the lack of a free press and the violation of human rights in Cuba and asked the Organization of American States not to lift sanctions against that country until the Castro regime has given proof it is ready to restore a free press and human rights and release political prisoners including dozens of journalists.
- Declared that the existence of government agencies which monopolize distribution of governments' commercial advertising constitutes a threat against a free press;
- Noted that eight publications have been shut down by the Argentine government and said the recent adoption of an anti-subversion law throws shadows on the people's right to information;
- Reported that after IAPA had accused the government of Ecuador of refusing to authorize publication of a new newspaper, *Extra*, the government had changed its mind and expressed satisfaction to the President of Ecuador for that development.

IAPA found that in Panama the press is owned or controlled by the government and in Paraguay there is a state of permanent siege and censorship.

The association found that in Canada, Argentina, El Salvador, the United States, Trinidad/Tobago, Barbados, Puerto Rico, Dominican Republic, Venezuela, Jamaica, Costa Rica, and Colombia there are isolated obstacles but a deep foundation to support a free press.

Venezuelan President Carlos Andres Perez opened the IAPA meetings emphasizing the importance of a free press within democratic systems of government. Press freedom is indispensable to the democratic system and added the "system is defeated and losing prestige in a large part of Latin America. . . . Other banners are being raised up before our peoples which promise bread and order but not liberty. But we must not compromise liberty."

In a veiled complaint against the U.S. press, the president complained that mass media in industrialized nations are failing to inform the public adequately on events and issues in Latin America.

"I am aware of the fact that I am speaking to editors who have suffered exile and imprisonment but I am also aware that in their countries many citizens have been unable to express themselves because special interests have blocked them from doing so. This is a form of dominance exercised by the stronger over the weaker.

"The IAPA could be a powerful instrument for the demonstration that freedom of expression should not be compromised by special interests or ideological dogmas," the president said.

WASHINGTON POST
01 November 1974

CIA Activities: Focusing on the Wrong Issue

Recent discussion of CIA activities abroad has focused upon the wrong issue. If one accepts (as one must) that military action can sometimes be a rational step, then one must also accept that hostile measures short of war (such as subversion) also are rational measures. It is illogical, therefore, to argue that the U.S. should, never, under any circumstances, seek to "destablize" or, in plain words, undermine and destroy any other government. In a world where the activities of governments relative to each other are controlled by power and not by authority, virtually all seem to have some propensity to undermine some others. Arab governments undermine one another and presumably, would undermine the Israeli Government if they could. The Israelis must be presumed as well to undermine any governments they can. Bangla Desh exists, in part, because India collaborated in what was virtually—if not technically—the undermining of Pakistan. And, no doubt, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. each would undermine the other if they had the ability to do it and to get away with it.

The reported CIA activities are important and objectionable for other reasons.

1. They represent hostile acts taken with no evidence that the implications of those acts were considered maturely. Accordingly, while they might—if successful—achieve some immediate purpose, there is no evidence that they actually served the interest of the United States in the international political arena, and that they might actually serve to injure that interest.

2. They represent a species of grossly unacceptable Executive action, without any indication that that action is approved by a substantial majority in Congress and the nation.

3. Moreover, to speak of this action as within presidential prerogative—if there is such a thing—or any other variant of presidential authority is to be technically right, but factually wrong. It is now clear that much of this action is beyond the scope of presidential review, in that it is contemplated, organized, initiated, and executed before the incumbent President (whichever one one means) has an effective opportunity to approve or to disapprove.

The principal issue, then, is whether de-stabilization is wise at a given time and whether it is properly authorized, controlled, conducted, and terminated when it is no longer approved or effective. What we cannot wisely contemplate, in short, is hostile action taken without mature consideration, outside any framework of authoritative political approval, on the motion of some self-initiating bureaucratic nucleus which cannot be called to account.

Matthew Holden, Jr.
Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Wisconsin, Madison.

New York Times
27 October 1974

London Espionage: A Mystery to Britons

By ALVIN SHUSTER
Special to The New York Times

LONDON, Oct. 26—The British spy, as etched in fiction, is that handsome chap who wears the right clothes, appears in the right places at the right time, carries the right weapons, drinks martinis of the right mix and never does anything wrong.

In reality, what he does is a complete mystery. And the British these days are learning far more about activities of agents of the United States Central Intelligence Agency than they could ever hope to learn about their own espionage establishment.

The controversy over the covert operations of the C.I.A. has once more underscored major differences between the 400-year-old foreign intelligence service here and its much younger counterpart across the Atlantic.

Britain's intelligence service, popularly known as M.I. 6 and the most legendary spy organization around, operates under tighter reins, with far less money and much greater secrecy. Even if it did subvert foreign governments, the British public would not read about it in newspapers or hear politicians demand explanations.

There are no significant checks by committees of the House of Commons, no open appropriations for its activities. Books published by former agents usually deal, not with recent history, but with experiences during World War II, when British spies were in their glory.

A 'Shrinking' Service

The government rule barring public access to official documents for 30 years—relaxed six years ago from 50 years—means that new material on World War II has now become available.

"Our agents today are more tightly controlled despite the lack of Parliamentary watchings," said one expert. "The foreign intelligence service is responsible to the Foreign Office and it just doesn't run off and do things on its own without all-around clearance."

There is some question anyway as to just how active the service is these days in such "black arts" as throwing money to foreign politicians or engineering military coups. The general assumption is that covert operations of that nature are kept to a minimum and left more and more to the United States, which can afford far more cloaks and daggers, not to mention expensive satellites and electronics.

For one thing, the service is limited in funds. The estimates of its annual budget, well hidden in spending figures approved by Parliament, range from $25-million to about $100-million a year. Even the higher estimate pales in comparison with the C.I.A.'s expenditures, which are believed to be about $750-million.

Moreover, the British foreign intelligence service operates under a bureaucratic structure designed to confine the scope for free-wheeling activity. It does not work independently but reports directly to the Foreign Office, where some control is exercised by a Permanent Under Secretary.

Although the work of the two civilian Intelligence services is thus scrutinized, their directors have the right to go directly to the Prime Minister and bypass the formal chains of command. An intelligence

Unlike Congressmen, Members of Parliament rarely make demands for more control over the intelligence community and seem content with the present system. Questions are raised politely on those infrequent occasions when the spies get in trouble or their tactics are revealed.

The image of the intelligence service was, for example, badly tarnished in 1956 when a Royal Navy frogman, Comdr. Lionel Crabb, disappeared after diving near Soviet ships in Portsmouth Harbor at the time of the visit to Britain of Nikita S. Khrushchev. Even then, the Government said little. The Prime Minister, then Sir Anthony Eden, announced that it "would not be in the national interest to disclose the circumstances" of the frogman's death.

More recently, controversy has focused not on what the British agents are doing abroad but on what they are doing within Britain. M.I.5, the counterespionage group, is believed to be particularly active in dealing with terrorists in Northern Ireland, working closely with Scotland Yard's Special Branch.

The secrecy of it all seems to be generally accepted here. The name of the head of the foreign intelligence branch is published in the British press only after it appears abroad.

The British public would be more likely to recognize the name of William E. Colby, the Director of Central Intelligence in the United States, than they would that of Maurice Oldfield, who heads foreign intelligence operations for Britain. The name of Mr. Oldfield's predecessor, Sir John Rennie, appeared only after his son had been arrested on a heroin charge.

Normally, the press here is not permitted to name the intelligence chief, whose working title is "C." Newspapers are subject to a so-called D-notice system, under which the press is notified prior to publication that a particular news item could violate security laws.

"Yo can describe one major difference this way," said one official here. "Colby goes up to Congress to testify about what the C.I.A. has done. Here, if you just publish the name of Oldfield you could be in trouble."

THE HARVARD CRIMSON
6 Nov 1974

Ellsberg Says CIA Chief Anticipated Chilean Coup

By SETH KUPFERBERG and RICHARD H.P. SIA

Daniel Ellsberg '52 told an off-the-record Nieman fellows meeting Monday that William E. Colby, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, has acknowledged that he "knew of the imminence of" the September 1973 Chilean military coup.

Ellsberg also quoted Colby as saying that "a political decision was made not to inform" the Popular Unity government of Salvador Allende Gossens.

Colby's remarks came in the course of a conversation during a conference of former CIA agents, government officials and journalists on the CIA and covert actions. The Center for National Security Studies sponsored the Washington conference, which was held this September 13 and 14.

Ellsberg made public his talk with the Niemans yesterday, denouncing Colby's off-the-record meeting with Niemans last night and describing such briefings—in which journalists agree not to publish what they learn—as "a method of plugging newsmen into the government bureaucracy and making them part of it."

A Senate subcommittee learned last summer of CIA funding of opposition to Allende's government, beginning in 1970, The New York Times reported two days after the coup that "senior American officials" acknowledged having advance word of it.

But the Times reports did not specifically cite CIA foreknowledge of Allende's overthrow. And White House and State Department officials contended that reports of the coup did not reach responsible officials until after it began. They implied that the reports were not taken seriously because rumors of a coup had been current throughout 1973.

"There was absolutely no way of knowing beforehand that on any of these dates, including the September 11 date, a coup attempt would be made," Paul J. Hare, a State Department spokesman, said on September 14, 1973.

"The administration had been receiving rumors of unrest in the Chilean military for more than one year," Gerald L. Warren, White House spokesman, told reporters that week. "Aside from these rumors, the President had no advance knowledge of any specific plan for a coup."

Ellsberg said Colby told him he was aware of and agreed with the "political decision"—presumably made by then national security adviser Henry A. Kissinger '50 or then president Richard M. Nixon—not to alert Allende to the impending military revolt.

"I said, 'Did you know the plans for this coup just before it happened,'" Ellsberg told the Niemans. "Colby did not appear to be mincing any words about how much they knew. A political decision was made not to tell Allende what we knew—now, there would be no political decision if what we knew was what we read in UPI.'"

James C. Thomson Jr., curator of the Nieman Fellowships, released a tape of Ellsberg's talk with the Niemans yesterday

afternoon, after Ellsberg said his remarks should be on the public record.

Ellsberg also said he would not have agreed to meet with the Niemans if he had realized his appearance would help "legitimize" Colby's.

Ellsberg quoted Colby as saying that he would have "preferred" that the Popular Unity candidate for president of Chile lose the election scheduled for 1976.

But Ellsberg said there was an "unmistakable inference" that the CIA "preferred" this coup to happen than not to happen—and indeed Colby made that very clear during the day, that he preferred the current regime to the past regime."

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
16 October 1974

Mirror of opinion

CIA: a new mandate

Long before the recent disclosure that the CIA had played a relatively minor role in the overthrow of Chile's Marxist President Salvadore Allende, critics of the agency were forever noting that its secret operations abroad have been conducted with neither the knowledge nor the approval of Congress.

The charge was only partly true, for most of the CIA's activities have been scrutinized by at least a handful of congressional leaders. And they could scarcely have remained "secret" very long if they had to be explained, debated and approved by Rep. Mike Harrington and 534 other congressional overseers.

Now, however, Rep. Harrington and other critics of the CIA can no longer claim that the agency is operating without a congressional mandate. For in their zeal to blow the agency's cover and eliminate its secret operations, they forced their colleagues to make a choice between outright rejection or authorization of the CIA's covert activities. And predictably, the tactic boomeranged; the CIA won the contest hands down.

The issue was brought to a head in the Senate when Sen. James Abourezk, (D) South Dakota, offered an amendment to outlaw all the CIA's "dirty tricks" and other secret operations abroad, other than intelligence gathering, in peacetime. The issue was openly debated, and when the time came for a vote the Senate rejected the amendment overwhelmingly 68-17, a margin of 4 to 1.

Hence, by implication, one house of Congress has served notice that it is aware of the CIA's secret operations, and that it approves of and accepts responsibility for them. From now on it will be rather difficult for people like Rep. Harrington to complain that the Congress has been kept in the dark and that it hasn't given the CIA a mandate for its covert activities. — **Boston Herald American**

HARVARD CRIMSON
6 Nov 1974

CIA Director Confronted At Faculty Club Meeting

By GEOFFREY D. GARIN and GORDON D. MOTT

Central Intelligence Agency Director William Colby was briefly confronted by demonstrators last night during an off-the-record dinner meeting with this year's Neiman fellows at the Faculty Club.

While 150 demonstrators marched outside the Club, a delegation of six protesters entered the building to ask Colby to meet with the marchers and answer questions about the CIA's role in Chile.

After an interchange between Colby, the protesters and Nieman Curator James C. Thompson, the CIA director declined to meet outside with the demonstrators and the delegation rejoined the picket line outside.

The protest, the largest at Harvard since last winter's Honeywell demonstration, lasted an hour and a half and was marked by a series of chants condemning Colby and the CIA.

The demonstrators walked directly beneath the windows of the room where Colby ate and shouted "Colby, killer" in the direction of the windows.

The chants, which included a call to "destabilize the CIA," plainly could be heard by the participants at the Nieman session, but apparently did not disrupt the meeting.

Daniel Ellsberg '54, who spoke to the Nieman fellows Monday afternoon, was among the protesters. Ellsberg carried a placard that said "William Colby Murders Humans and Democracy."

When the six protesters confronted Colby inside the Faculty Club just before the dinner began, the CIA director said he would not come outside because "I've been invited to a private party."

Thomson then told the six protesters that Colby "has been doing a lot of open talking before a lot of public gatherings," adding, "He's the most open CIA director ever invented."

At the end of the confrontation, one demonstrator, Philip T. Aranow '69, turned to Colby and said, "You're a wonderful killer."

"Thank you," Colby responded.

After the six demonstrators departed, Colby said he did not mind the protest. "It's part of life," he said.

Thomson said he thought the protesters' request that Colby answer their questions was "reasonable, as was his [Colby's] response."

"I think the Niemans will give Colby a hard time," Thomson said before the dinner.

ASAHI EVENING NEWS, Tokyo
10 October 1974

—CIA Operations—

'In the Best Interests of Chile'

By Alain Clement
Le Monde

Every country has its intelligence service, and nobody minds that. But the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which grew out of the old OSS during the cold war, and has become a sort of spies' Pentagon and headquarters for mounting "destabilisation" operations, has acquired a reputation all its own. Highly secretive by definition, the CIA is practically outside the control of Congress.

In a recent interview he gave the U.S. newsmagazine Time, William Colby, the present director of the CIA, confirmed that one of the functions of his department was to "positively influence a situation through political and paramilitary means."

But these disclosures and the recent revelations of CIA activities in Chile have not impaired the confidence of the U.S. Congress in the most occult of American institutions: on September 24, the House of Representatives defeated by 291 votes to 108 a motion seeking to prevent the CIA from interfering in the domestic affairs of foreign states.

THERE was once an American republic, one of whose most illustrious founders, Thomas Jefferson, would have preferred not to have closer trade or maritime dealings with Europe than it had with China at the time.

The declaration of universal neutrality, which George Washington offered his countrymen as a political testament at the end of his second term as president in 1796, was in large part inspired by this autarky, this refusal to be involved in the Old World's wicked and degrading squabbles.

This is also the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine the fifth president of the United States proclaimed on December 2, 1823 as a warning to Europe not to meddle in the Americas. One important phrase of this celebrated message deserves to be quoted: "It is still the true policy of the United States to leave the parties concerned to themselves in the hope that other parties pursue the same course."

Non-Interference Concept

The story of how the United States rolled back the heirs of the Spanish Empire well beyond the Rio Grande, provoked Spain into an unequal combat and threw it out of Cuba and the philippines, and carved out for itself a piece of Colombian territory for building the Panama Canal is today a part of history, but it illustrates the North American concept of "non-interference" (it applies only to the others) in the destinies of Latin America.

Europe's "brigands" always found other brigands to challenge their plundering and trespassing, so giving rise to an infernal cycle of battles and return matches. But the United States intended to remain master in the closed field of the "hemisphere."

There is no need to go over the "doctrines" successively enunciated over the years and which, after the Second World War, justified American postwar interference by tacit or open reference to the liberation of Europe from under the Nazi heel. The U.S. intention then was to safeguard, not the "hemisphere," but the whole of the "free world."

European reconstruction could not have proceeded in an atmosphere of trust in the future if this protection had not been provided. The undoubted debt of gratitude European countries owed the United States earned Washington the pained or servile (depending on the nation) indulgence of its allies for its bloody bungling: the counter-revolution in Guatemala, Bay of Pigs, Marines sent to the Dominican Republic, the Vietnam war and so on.

All these weren't especially honorable undertakings, but weren't they also the result of over-zealousness? After all, how could one reasonably hesitate to choose between the U.S. cop and the Soviet commissar?

Finally along came Richard Nixon, with Henry Kissinger in tow. It was goodbye to ideological crusades, swift expeditions and the race for planetary supremacy! Washington went back to old-fashioned realpolitiking and the age-old defense of "national interests" (even if the dimension of the United States made the limits of such interests somewhat unclear). Washington launched detente as the first step toward a "concert of nations" without discrimination, and invited all the nations of the world to build a lasting "peace structure" benefiting everybody.

The frightening botch-up in Cambodia, Washington's irritation over Europe's uncooperative stand on logistics during the Arab-Israeli war in October 1973, and the false maneuvers over Cyprus were snags which proved quite simply that all the bugs had not been shaken out of the new system.

And now Mr. Colby discloses that things weren't that simple. As an honest man he doesn't deny that he had spread some small change around in Chile to "raise the morale" of those who opposed Allende's experiment, even though he swears he did nothing to hasten the Chilean leader's downfall. Nor does he deny "conducting" intelligence with the aid of the most up-to-date methods so as to enable U.S. diplomacy to know just where it is going.

CIA's Functions

It's clear, of course, that for him this diplomacy is not like any other. He admits it would be going too far to wish to impose democracy in the four corners of the globe, but he sees the CIA's various functions bound up by a philosophy of action. The mission he is assigned by the government sometimes calls for influencing "a situation by political or paramilitary means."

Suggestions for action may spring from within the CIA itself, from examination of specific data. Or they may come from outside, from "an ambassador, from the State Department or from the National Security Council staff. They'll say: 'Why don't you guys do so and so?" This is apparently how major policies are tackled. And indeed, why resort to intricate formulas when in so many places it is so much easier to buy, gull, and help change the course of "movements" which tend to develop in a direction contrary to that desired by American "security"?

What happens to the principle of non-interference in all this? Mr. Colby's reflections do not take him so far. The idea that a country may have the sovereign right to self-determination, even if this is at its own cost should it be mistaken, does not occur to him.

Chile had gone astray and had to be helped back on the straight and narrow. "The Allende regime was not democratic." And what was even more offensive, it was based only on a minority (a number of American presidents have also been elected on minority votes, but that is none of Chile's business).

The last word should be left to an American journalist, Everett G. Martin of the Wall Street Journal, who wrote on September 18: "The opposition forces demonstrated time and again through various by-elections and the 1973 congressional elections that they were the majority. It seems a kind of arrogance for Washington planners to think that the Chilean majority would let its protesting voice disappear entirely from print and from the airwaves even if established publications and stations collapsed by the dozens."

Why bother about this "protesting voice" since it is presumably the president of the United States who ruled that the CIA's field operations were "in the best interests of the people of Chile"? What if France had elected Francois Mitterrand president? It is comforting to know that the "best interests of the people of France" would have been in good hands at the White House.

ULTIMAS NOTICIAS, Caracas
27 September 1974

Commentary: "Venezuela and the CIA"

by: Movement for Socialism (MAS) leader Jose Vicente Rangel

(Text) It is silly to exaggerate the importance of the CIA and to see the CIA everywhere, but at the same time it is unforgivably naive to underestimate this organization and to see all the charges levied against it as a propaganda ploy or as an attempt to discredit an intelligence service merely because it is American. The CIA has too long a history to be taken lightly.

The influence of the CIA should be investigated within the framework of national policy and as befits a threatened nation. Its participation in the country's politics, economy and cultural activities should be investigated. There is no doubt that the persistent U.S. threats against petroleum producing countries--of which our country is a prime target for obvious reasons--demand a serious evaluation of the situation and a review of our mechanisms for defense.

The CIA has been participating in world affairs with varied success since it was created by special law during the Truman administration. It may be said that since 1947 it has been present at every major world event. It is worthwhile to note by way of reference that the CIA is very often depicted as being completely autonomous with regard to the presidency of the United States. This line of thinking attempts to portray the CIA as responsible for all the dirty work and as carrying out activities of which the president is hardly or very vaguely aware. In this connection it is worthwhile to cite the following excerpt from the book by Wise and Ross, The Invisible Government: "On 23 November 1963, during the first hour of his first full day in office, Johnson was taken by McGeorge Bundy--who had served as Kennedy's personel liaison with the Special Group--to the Situation Room, a small command post located in the depths of the White House basement. There, surrounded by super-secret maps, electronic equipment and communications lines, the new president was briefed by the head of the Invisible Government, John Alex McCone, Director of the CIA and member of the Special Group. Although Johnson knew the men who headed the Invisible Government and knew about much of their work he did not begin to understand and see the full scope of the Invisible Government's organization and secrets until that morning."

Claude Julien states in The American Empire: "The CIA never makes a major decision without agreement from the president of the United States." He adds: "There is no CIA policy distinct from that of the State Department or of the White House. Eisenhower's memoirs establish without the shadow of a doubt the collective responsibility of the U.S. Government in the operations carried out against Mossadeq in Iran and Arbenz in Guatemala."

But should there still be any doubt about the CIA's international activities and presidential support for them, one need only turn to the recent statements made by President Gerald Ford justifying the role of the CIA and to Kissinger's statements cynically accepting CIA intervention in the overthrow of Allende. And there is more: An AP dispatch datelined Washington, 25 September, reported that the CIA had won an important victory in the U.S Congress "when the House of Representatives rejected by a vote of 291 to 108 an amendment which would prevent the CIA from spending money to subvert or destabilize the government of any foreign country."

If there is a close link between the CIA and the presidency of the United States and if the congress of that nation refuses to cut off CIA funds so that it may continue operating against any foreign government, is it not then advisable that in view of the crisis which has arisen between the United States and Venezuela, we Venezuelans should be wary of CIA activities?

What is being done in this connection? Is there any program aimed at uncovering the activities of CIA agents in Venezuela? What record is being kept of the numerous personnel that service has scattered within the most varied activities of our country?

This is not an attempt to create a psychosis about the CIA in Venezuela; but we would be pretty stupid if we do not open our eyes and it would be unforgivable for our government to believe that a power of this kind can be challenged with impunity.

GENERAL

LONDON TIMES
23 October 1974

The man who upped the price of détente

Bernard Levin

In contemplating the agreement reached between the United States and the Soviet Union, by the terms of which the United States grants substantial and very valuable unilateral trading advantages in return for a promise that the Soviet regime will take a single step in the direction of an elementary act of national decency that has been common to all civilized states for centuries, the first thing to note is the Byzantine nature of the formalities involved; because of the Soviet leaders' understandable terror at the thought of telling even a small part of the truth to their people, the agreement takes the weird form of a concordat between President Ford and Dr Kissinger on the one hand, and Senator Henry Jackson on the other. The unspoken premise, of course, is that Dr Kissinger was empowered by the Soviet authorities, at the end of his protracted negotiations, to offer the terms laid down in the Ford-Jackson agreement; the deal obviously included a provision that no public reference to it need be made within the Soviet Union.

That is a small price to pay for an agreement of so historic a nature and with such enormous implications; indeed, if the Soviet dictatorship keeps the agreement, or even goes a substantial way towards doing so, the document enshrining it deserves to rank with the most significant statements ever made in the history of the United States, and I can envisage future generations of American children learning to recite its terms as they now do the Declaration of Independence, the Bill of Rights or the Gettysburg Address.

It is difficult to know where to start in examining this astonishing event, the true magnitude of which seems so far to have been scarcely understood. I might as well begin, therefore, with a resounding salute to the man who, almost single-handed, was responsible for bringing it to its triumphant conclusion. Senator Jackson is an American politician in the admirably forthright tradition of his namesake the seventh President. He fights for his country, his State and his own political career; he does not spare his political foes and does not ask them to spare him; he conceals, metaphorically speaking, a knife in his boot, knuckledusters behind his back and a cosh in his hip pocket, and uses them cheerfully whenever he thinks it necessary; and if he has a motto it is surely Pistol's assertion that Holdfast is the only dog, my duck.

Senator Jackson was determined to do something about the plight of the Soviet people, and in particular about their inability to leave their vast prison-house, even if they promised never to return. Instead of making indignant speeches to give himself and his hearers a feeling of virtue, he took the exact measure of the power which the American Constitution gives to a determined, popular and intelligent Senator, and proceeded to use that power. The trade Bill that was to give Soviet Russia "most favoured nation" status in commercial dealing with the United States was desperately needed by the Soviet leaders; more to the point, it was desperately wanted by Presidents Nixon and Ford, and by Dr Kissinger—in their case not on economic grounds, but because it was the Soviet price for détente.

But Henry Jackson's price was higher. It was an easing of the cruel restrictions on those who wished to leave the Soviet Union, and an end to the savage persecution of those who applied to do so. And he organized enough of his fellow-Senators to ensure that the Bill, provided they stood their ground, would not be passed without the Soviet leaders paying that price. Every kind of political pressure was brought to bear on him and his supporters; he stood firm, and kept them no less faithful. He was told that there was no chance of Soviet agreement to so humiliating a bargain; he greeted the news with thumb to nose. The President publicly pleaded for the Bill to be passed without strings attached; Jackson tied the strings more tightly.

Now I do not sing Senator Jackson's praises simply because he deserves it, but because among the most tremendous implications of what has happened is its demonstration that in the great debate between him and Dr Kissinger, he was right and Dr Kissinger was wrong. The Kissinger argument is that it is proper to give the Soviet Union what her leaders want, provided that we also get what we want; the corollary to the argument is that the nature of the things they want is no concern of ours. Senator Jackson's view is more positive. It is that we can, and should, judge the Soviet Union's demands in themselves, and not simply regard them as characterless weights on the other end of the seesaw, to be balanced by equal weights on this; the corollary to the Senator's argument is that the nature of the things they want does affect the price we ask. Dr Kissinger's devotion to freedom is not to be doubted; but he has maintained throughout the negotiations that it is useless to demand something as valuable as internal reform from the Soviet leaders, because they simply will not concede it, and we will therefore lose the chance of getting useful external concessions. The importance of Senator Jackson's victory is that it shows how low have been the prices we have hitherto asked from the Soviet Union, and how much more we can now ask.

Beyond that vital lesson, there are others to be learnt—and taught. It is widely believed that Senator Jackson's campaign, and the agreement itself, concerned the fate of the Soviet Jews. That belief is mistaken; nowhere in the agreement is the word Jew mentioned, and Senator Jackson has been scrupulously careful, throughout the battle, to make clear that he was fighting for the right of Soviet citizens to leave their country if they wished, irrespective of their religion or descent. Nothing less, after all, would have been proper; of course the Jews have led the fight to be allowed to emigrate from the Soviet Union, but only because of the historical accident that they have somewhere they can go. But I doubt if more than a minority, and possibly a small minority, of Soviet Jews positively want to live in Israel; many want only to get out of the Soviet Union, and that is a feeling that is certainly not confined to Jews. The word of mouth now spreads in the Soviet Union with astonishing speed; if the authorities keep the agreement, and Jews are seen to be leaving in large numbers and without prior suffering, there are bound to be others, perhaps ultimately millions of them, who would demand the right that their governors have conceded. (One of the most touching, and—in its implications appalling aspects of the Jewish emigration of recent years is the way in which Soviet citizens with remote Jewish ancestry which they have always tried to conceal or reject because of Soviet anti-semitism, have been demanding to be classified as Jews, in the hope that they might thus be able to get out.)

That is a prospect to stretch the imagination almost to breaking point. But it also carries with it another, less happy, implication. What sort of response are the new, non-Jewish emigrants to receive from the West? It may soon be that, at last, through the courage and determination of a great American patriot and humanitarian, they will have obtained from Russia's modern tyrants the right that even the worst of the Tsars freely accorded. Are we then to mock their right and deny their hope? Rather let us say, as was said to their grandfathers:

Give me your tired, your poor,
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore,
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tossed, to me:
I lift my lamp beside the golden door.

There are, of course, horizons still more distant. Dr Sakharov's immediate reaction to the announcement of the agreement was to say, quite rightly, that the Soviet people will be truly free when they can not only leave their country, but when they can leave *and return* at will. This is, indeed, almost a definition of freedon, and Dr. Sakharov, bravest of the brave, is right to demand it in those terms. To put it another way, there is yet another implication in the success of Senator Jackson's campaign—that in dealing with tyrants we must harden our hearts against feeling grateful; every concession they make must be used as a lever to pry open the next.

One step at a time. If this historic agreement is kept by the Soviet authorities, I shall soon be able to greet Colonels Ovsishcher, Davidov and Alshansky, to shake the hands of Professors Voronel and Levich, and to embrace Vladimir Bukovsky. And all because Senator Henry Jackson, that mastiff of freedom, bit deep and would not let go.

WASHINGTON POST
12 November 1974

Tad Szulc

Kissinger's Miscalculations

Secretary of State Kissinger has dangerously misjudged Soviet intentions in the Mideast, despite secret personal warnings to him by Chairman Leonid Brezhnev last March in Moscow that there would be no peace in the Mideast if the United States persisted in "going it alone" diplomatically with the Arabs and Israelis. At that time, Brezhnev accused Kissinger of "ruses" and "trickery."

The cumulative result of Kissingerian miscalculations—some diplomats call it Kissinger's "greed" in freezing out the Russians—is the latest crisis raising the threat of a new Arab-Israeli war.

Kissinger, in effect, helped to create a situation in which the Arabs, frustrated by the lack of diplomatic "movement" with Israel he had promised them after the 1973 war, have turned again toward Moscow for political and military help. For similar reasons, a new sense of unity against Israel emerged from the recent Rabat summit with the all-out support of the financially powerful oil-producing states.

The Soviets, feeling vindicated, are obviously delighted to oblige. They have been heavily rearming the Syrians for some time. And all indications are that Soviet military supplies will start flowing anew to Egypt even before Brezhnev visits Cairo in January.

Only six months after Nixon's and Kissinger's triumphal tour, it is Brezhnev's turn to be hailed once more as Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's favorite ally. President Ford's get-acquainted meeting with Brezhnev in Vladivostok late this month might well be overshadowed by the gathering Mideast crisis.

In the light of this developing situation, it is instructive to look at the secret record of Soviet-American differences, including Brezhnev's 1973 warnings that an Arab-Israeli war was in the offing. A part of this record, never before made public, was presented by Brezhnev himself to a Western statesman at the Kremlin earlier this year. Even allowing for Brezhnev's self-serving bent, his account is worth pondering.

Speaking of his conferences with Nixon three months before the eruption of the Yom Kippur war, Brezhnev recalled that "at San Clemente, I kept Nixon up almost all night on the Middle East, trying to convince him of the need to act together. Otherwise, there would be an explosion . . . Nixon didn't heed my words. And there was an explosion in the Middle East."

Mr. Szulc, a former foreign correspondent, is now a free-lance writer, working out of Washington.

We don't know Nixon's and Kissinger's response to Brezhnev's alleged entreaties, but American diplomacy was then singularly inactive in the Mideast, even though the administration already had intelligence that Egypt and Syria were preparing for war. But Brezhnev told his visitor that afterward "Nixon wrote a letter to me saying he had underestimated the gravity of the problem."

The United States and the Soviet Union did cooperate in a fashion in bringing about a cease-fire. Subsequently, a two-day Arab-Israeli peace conference was convened in Geneva under Soviet-American co-chairmanship, with only the Syrians staying away.

Kissinger quickly concluded, however, that Geneva was the wrong forum because the negotiations would bog down in propaganda. The Soviets would also acquire a permanent presence in Mideast affairs. Instead, he concentrated on military disengagement between Israel and Egypt and Syria, and then on the "second step" of seeking Israeli pullbacks in the Sinai and the occupied West Bank through separate negotiations with Egypt and Jordan.

The Russians inevitably saw it as an end-run to exclude them from Mideast diplomacy. As Brezhnev told his Western visitor, "I berated Kissinger here in Moscow," during the Secretary's visit late last March, "for the U.S. behavior in the Middle East."

Brezhnev said that "we had agreed at the United Nations and elsewhere that the United States and the Soviet Union would work together to secure peace." But, Brezhnev added, "then Kissinger began a series of ruses, and attempted to go it alone. . . . We must act together, or there will be no tranquility in the Middle East. . . . Israel, too, knows our strength, and would want us to guarantee. It was even agreed to better relations with Israel. Then, there was Kissinger's trickery, which is not the way to deal with this. . ."

Kissinger kept betting that his lonely diplomacy would succeed, but none of the contenders was willing to budge toward an "interim agreement." As Arab tensions and frustrations mounted, Kissinger's strategy began to disintegrate.

His hopes to minimize Russian involvement faded as Egypt sent its foreign minister and its army chief of staff to Moscow in late October. And at Rabat, the Arabs ended the chances for Kissinger's piecemeal negotiations when they recognized the Palestine Liberation Organization—with which Israel refuses to deal—as the *de facto* power, rather than Jordan, to govern the West Bank and East Jerusalem in the future.

This ruled out Israeli-Jordanian talks. Parallel negotiations between Israel and Egypt were similarly undercut, for Sadat lost in Rabat his freedom to bargain separately with Israel, despite the Egyptian President's public endorsement of Kissinger's diplomacy this week.

Could Kissinger have defused the Egyptian switch back toward the Soviet fold and forestalled Rabat's backing of the PLO if he had initially gone the Geneva way, despite Israel's objections and Sadat's lukewarmness?

Perhaps. Moscow, after all, is a fact of life in the Mideast. Even to Israel, a conference deadlock would be preferable to the prospects of war. The Soviets might have been locked in a diplomatic situation in which it would have been harder to rearm the Arabs and champion the PLO.

This may be why Kissinger is now rethinking the relative merits of Geneva which, as the Shah of Iran told him the other day, is better than nothing.

But with the ascendancy of the PLO, Israel's archenemy, it may no longer be possible to construct even a diplomatic charade in Geneva. Thus, Kissinger may have missed a great opportunity.

NEW YORK TIMES
5 November 1974

Soviet Reports Expulsion Of Two American Jews

Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, Nov. 4 — Two American Jews have been expelled from the Soviet Union for allegedly distributing Zionist literature, badges and cigarette lighters to Jews in Soviet Georgia, the official press agency Tass reported tonight.

Tass quoted the Georgian Communist party newspaper Zarya Vostoka as saying in an article today that the two Americans, identified as Ira Jeffner and Joel Michaels, were "hunters of souls" who had visited synagogues in Tbilisi, Sukhumi and Batumi by posing as religious Jews.

The newspaper article, Tass said, showed "to what tricks foreign Zionist circles resort to agitate Soviet Jews to emigrate to Israel."

American embassy officials, contacted here, said they were not aware of the reported ouster and knew nothing about the two men involved. Tass said that Jews in Batumi had "indignantly reported" to Soviet authorities an attempt by the two men to leave a bag of anti-Soviet literature" at the synagogue.

DAILY TELEGRAPH, London
25 October 1974

OLYMPICS IN MOSCOW

THAT RUSSIA SHOULD OFFER (indeed, clamour) to hold the 1980 Olympic Games in Moscow is odder than it looks at first glance; so is the Olympics Committee's acceptance Nothing wrong with the sporting facilities, it seems, if everything promised is ready in time. More hotels are promised too, and not without need. The thought of the existing establishments, in which at the best of times if can take an hour to get a plate of soup, coping with a million extra inmates is really petrifying. For the rest, the Russians have engaged to mend their ways utterly, at least while the Games are on. Anyone can come. Any qualified team can compete. There will be no visa troubles. Once in, visitors will apparently be free to wander where they will. No baffling bureaucracy; no rudeness, unpleasant incidents or "mistakes;" no packed audiences of soldiery jeering officially unfavoured teams. It all sounds too good to be true.

Will the KGB really stand by, fuming with impotent rage, while a million potential wreckers and enemies of the people pour in and wander all over the place? Or will it in fact redouble its vigilance at this time of dire peril? Will visitors really be free to wander about, not only in Moscow, but everywhere? Will they be free to bring in with them, and to take out, whatever reading matter they please? Will they be free to make contact with ordinary Russian people, or Russians with them? Can they visit Russian homes? Will they be free to commit with impunity such heinous crimes as changing money unofficially, or selling a pair of shoes? Will all the clamps really be off? And if so, what will happen? If the Olympic Games could help in any way to normalise the life of the poor Russian people, to allow them to rejoin the civilised world, there is a case for holding them in Moscow, not only in 1980, but as a permanent fixture.

THE GUARDIAN, MANCHESTER
1 NOVEMBER 1974

Another cruel deception

Agreements governing the liberty of people ought to be precise and transparent because the people have a right to know what will happen to them. Is there an agreement between Dr Kissinger and the Russians which foresees the emigration of 60,000 Jews a year? Or is there only an agreement between President Ford and Senator Jackson which says the same thing but is not acknowledged by the Russians? Ever since October 18 when the deal was stated to have been done, the Russians have been saying with increasing emphasis that as far as they are concerned the deal never existed. Mr Brezhnev has said so. Various east European radio and television commentators have said so. Last week the Soviet Ambassador in Paris said so. Even the White House has now begun to say so. A presidential spokesman was saying on October 21 that a statement made from the White House on October 18—one that appeared to be perfectly clear at the time—had been "widely misunderstood." What are the Soviet Jews to make of it all?

The evidence becomes more confusing and less encouraging as time goes on. The contents of the deal—if such a thing exists at all—seemed clear at the beginning. Senator Jackson described it as "an historic understanding in the area of human rights." He said that he "understood that the actual number of emigrants would rise promptly from the 1973 level and would continue to rise to correspond to the number of applicants and may therefore exceed 60,000 a year." Dr Kissinger's letter to Senator Jackson was not specific about numbers, nor did he say anything about historic understandings in the area of human rights. On the other hand he did seem to say that a deal had been done. There had been "discussions with Soviet representatives" who had assured the United States that emigration would be regulated from now on by specified criteria. Dr Kissinger said it was assumed that the application of these criteria would mean that the rate of emigration would "being to rise promptly from the 1973 level and would continue to rise to correspond to the number of applicants." He did not say who had made the assumption—the Russian representatives or the Americans.

It is easy for diplomats and White House officials to find reasons for saying that in these matters vagueness is a virtue. They can say that it would be unrealistic to expect the Soviet Government to admit that someone had been interfering in internal Soviet affairs. Equally they can say that it would be unrealistic to expect Senator Jackson to let the Soviet trade agreement through Congress except in return for some sort of triumphant public announcement from the White House. They can say that all will be well in the end provided no one tries to be too precise or to penetrate what is now a quite thick bank of diplomatic fog. This may satisfy the Russians. It may even satisfy Senator Jackson. But why should it satisfy the Soviet Jews? It is they, after all, who have had their hopes raised.

Western Europe

LOS ANGELES TIMES
10 November 1974

German Intelligence Plagued by Bunglings

Spy Business Found in a 'Desolate' State, Country Called 'Sieve' for Secrets

BY JOE ALEX MORRIS JR.
Times Staff Writer

BONN—The CIA may be in hot water over Chile, but nowhere does the spy business seem to be in such dreadful shape as in West Germany.

Horst Ehmke, who as a former cabinet minister had the responsibility of overseeing the Federal Intelligence Agency, recently said it was in "a desolate state." This appeared to be indirectly substantiated by recruiting ads the agency recently placed in West German papers, calling on patriotic young men to join in this exciting and adventurous business.

In Chile, the CIA and Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger are accused of engaging in nasty business designed to overthrow President Salvatore Allende. But at least the coup — whoever engineered it—was successful.

Here, the accusations against the West German agency are not of successful, only dubious operations. They include charges of delving into the bed and booze habits of local politicians, and of padding the spook network with relatives. Not to mention the dramatic, if dreadfully regular, disclosures of Communist successes in penetrating high echelons here.

If it sounds more amusing than alarming, that's the way it's always been with West German intelligence agencies, which employ about 12,000 people. But there is a serious side, too.

West Germany is a happy hunting ground for Communist spies, and untold secrets have found their way eastward through this land, which an American chief operative here once described as "a huge sieve through which secrets easily flow."

Recently, the truth of that statement has become increasingly obvious. A Communist spy, Guenter Guillaume, was arrested last April while working literally at former Chancellor Willy Brandt's elbow. But there is some doubt whether enough evidence can be collected to prosecute him. The disclosure forced Brandt to resign.

Since then, the fur has begun to fly as politicians and other concerned people demanded an explanation how a spy could, undetected, reach the exalted position of personal adviser to the Chancellor. The investigation is still under way on several levels, but already it has produced some startling disclosures and destroyed a few myths.

The most important of the latter concern the famous "Gehlen organization," the federal intelligence agency run until recently by a nebulous figure from the Nazi past, Gen. Reinhard Gehlen.

Gehlen ran Adolf Hitler's eastern intelligence service during the war. Afterwards, the U.S. Army happily took over his organization, located at Pullach near Munich, and eventually it became the core of the new-found Federal Republic's external intelligence network, always with the shadowy Gehlen at the helm.

The fact that so little was known about the Gehlen organization publicly only enhanced the aura of mystery about it. Even the disclosure in the early '60s that one of Gehlen's closest confidants was a Soviet spy failed to dim his luster.

The public furore over the Guillaume affair has led to the unlocking of previously tightly sealed doors. Gehlen emerges somewhat less shadowy, and a great deal more as a man of questionable professional ethics with a propensity for feathering the bed with his own relatives.

The spadework is now in the hands of a parliamentary investigating committee. But even beforehand, enough doubt about the true worth of Gehlen and his agents was raised to start up a bureaucratic investigation into the Gehlen organization, known by its German initials, the BND (for Bundesnachrichtendienst or federal intelligence service).

Some fascinating information has come to light. Although it has not been officially published, the report notes that among the BND employees were two of Gehlen's daughters and their husbands, the husband of a third daughter, Gehlen's brother, an illegitimate daughter by a former secretary, and Gehlen's brother-in-law. Altogether, more than 100 relatives of top BND officials were hired by the organization.

Testifying before the committee, Ehmke further subtracted from whatever luster remained on the image of the Gehlen organization. Ehmke revealed that he had ordered the destruction of BND dossiers on about 54 prominent West German politicians—dossiers apparently maintained despite a strict ban on internal and domestic activity by the organization.

A high official from the BND told the committee last week that there were more than 54 dossiers on politicians. But he stressed that the great majority were started during the years when the Gehlen organization was under U.S. government control.

As the Americans do with the CIA and FBI, the Germans have split domestic and foreign intelligence operations into two separate organizations, the domestic under the Interior Ministry and the foreign coming directly under the chancellor's office.

This division of authority obviously hasn't improved the efficiency of either the BND or its domestic counterpart, laboriously known as the Office for the Protection of the Constitution. The ineptitude of this office, which is supposed to protect West Germany against enemy spies, was well illustrated by the Guillaume case.

Even before Guillaume "fled" to West Germany in the mid-50s as a Communist agent in refugee's clothing, a private organization known as the Investigating Committee of Free Jurist had fingered him in Berlin for suspicious activities. When Guillaume was called to work in the Chancellor's office, the heart of West German government, a routine security check was made on him.

The West Berlin authorities—each of the 11 West German states has its own Office for the Protection of the Constitution, each one more jealous of its prerogatives than the next—sent an abbreviated report on Guillaume to headquarters in Cologne. There it was promptly misfiled, and Guillaume came out clean.

For this kind of service, the West German taxpayer shells out well over $100 million a year.

This was only the start of a series of curious goings-on. Some were so unusual that the political opposition began to smell what they suspect was the biggest coverup since Sally Rand put her fans back on.

The bizarre operations of the intelligence community here have been partly unclothed by the parliamentary investigation committee. Gehlen hasn't yet appeared, pleading illness, but the deputies have looked closely at the Office for the Protection of the Constitution.

What they have found

was a jumble of explanations as to what happened, none of which quite seemed to jibe. Most of the fingers point at the head of the office, one Guenter Nollau, a man with close links to the ruling Social Democratic Party.

Nollau's office comes directly under the competence of the Interior Ministry, then run by Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the current foreign minister and Free Democratic Party leader in the coalition cabinet. From testimony both gave to the investigating committee, it is evident that Nollau didn't inform his minister thoroughly of the suspicions about Guillaume's spying activities.

Nollau said he informed Genscher "as broadly as seemed necessary." Genscher retorted that he got "not a full, but only a partial briefing" from Nollau.

The two men also contradicted each other on whether Nollau recommended that Brandt should take Guillaume with him on a summer vacation in Norway in 1973. The spy was the only personal aide with Brandt on that trip, and it is alleged he had access to top secret military documents at the time.

Brandt said he kept Guillaume on as his aide at the recommendation of Nollau, even though he thought it a bad idea. He has said he resigned as chancellor because of this mistake. One unanswered question is whether Guillaume was protected by higher-ups in the Social Democratic Party.

A bigger unanswered question is what to do about the mess in Bonn's intelligence services. Even Prof. Ehmke, the most outspoken of the critics of the BND and a man who, as minister in the Chancellor's office during Brandt's tenure in office was responsible for watching the organization, has little to say in this respect.

An intelligence pool, in which all the various agencies would assemble their information, could have caught Guillaume at an early stage, he suggests. But any fusion or closer melding of the agencies would not only be unconstitutional but unwise.

"Would you like to see the CIA and the FBI under one roof?" he asks.

The prospects, then, are for more fun and games in the spook business here. At best, some of the more dubious and and most inefficient aspects of the operations will be eliminated. But there seems a good chance that West Germany will continue to be a happy hunting ground for enemy agents and other persons such as weapons dealers who in the past used the BND as a cover for their activities.

WASHINGTON POST
5 November 1974

Victor Zorza

Communists In NATO Countries

Repeated rumors of CIA plots to "de-stabilize" the Portuguese regime prompt the question: What did Dr. Kissinger mean when he said that "I don't see why we need to stand by and watch a country go Communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people."

The quotation is from the minutes of the "40 Committee" discussions in 1970 on secret operations in Chile.

It is difficult to credit the rumors from Lisbon, if only because informed opinion in Washington agrees that it would be the height of folly to prompt a coup in Portugal. But Kissinger has other ways of pursuing his objective, and some politicians in the NATO countries are worried that he may go too far. They believe that he is trying to use NATO to manipulate the internal politics of the member countries.

The Communists now in the Portuguese government, and Communist leaders in Italy, say that they don't want to take their countries out of NATO. To advocate departure from NATO would be to give the impression of moving toward the Soviet camp and to lose public support. NATO membership is seen by some people as a guarantee of democracy and thus, perversely, as the condition under which their country could afford to have Communists in the government.

Therefore Washington, by countenancing Portugal's membership of NATO, may appear to be signalling Rome that Italy too could stay in NATO as well as have Communists in the coalition. This is certainly not the message Washington wants to convey, and it has engaged in some elaborate behind-the-scenes maneuvering to get its point across.

Now the meeting of the NATO Defense Ministers comprising the Nuclear Planning Group, which was due to be held in Rome this week, has been postponed. One reason Washington gave was that it could not disclose highly secret information to a government whose Communist members or officials might pass it back to Moscow.

It was serving notice also on Italian politicians who favor a coalition with Communists that, ultimately, they might have to choose between such a coalition and NATO membership.

Portugal's request for economic aid during President Gomes' recent visit to Washington also elicited a polite lecture from Kissinger about the difficulty of getting congressional aid appropriations these days, especially for countries with Communist connections. Portuguese officials argue, as politely, that economic aid would avert the impending massive unemployment, and the concomitant political unrest which could push the country further to the left. By delaying the aid, and by using it as a political lever, Washington may be hastening the very result it wants to prevent.

Any basis for predicting the likely course of events has now been swept away by the new electoral law which increased the electorate from two million to five. Some public opinion polls taken privately in Portugal indicated a Communist vote of between 15 and 20 per cent, but that was before the new law. The March election will produce only a Constituent Assembly, not a new government, and therefore the chances are that the Communists will stay on in the coalition.

In a country where the Catholic religion and tradition count for so much, the danger is not of a massive vote for the Communists which would catapult them to power. Nor do present Communist tactics in Western Europe call for the use of coalitions to take over, slice by slice, the governments of which they are members.

The salami tactics they once used in Eastern Europe have been replaced by a strategy more suited to the Western democratic tradition. This may not be accepted by all Communists in all West European countries. Some party officials obviously find it difficult to shed the habits of a lifetime. But the political climate does not favor them.

What Europe's Communists now want is to convert the sizeable vote they often get in national elections into a share of government power commensurate with it. They want an opportunity to show that the policies they advocate are worthy of even wider support. And they want to engage, from the inside, in all the power games and intrigues which the established political parties have practiced in seeking to dominate the political life of their countries.

Non-Communists and anti-Communists in the West obviously have a political as well as an ideological stake in preventing such Communist domination. But unless they recognize the change which has come over Western Communist parties, and adjust their own tactics accordingly, they are more likely to advance the Communists' objectives than to thwart them. For the United States, and for NATO, this means evolving a new formula which would allow NATO membership of countries with Communists in their governments, rather than theatening to isolate or to cast out such countries.

The Soviet Union can afford to invade its allies. The United States cannot, and will not, and must therefore find other ways of dealing with the problem.

Near East

THE ECONOMIST NOVEMBER 9, 1974

Two noes that say yes to war

The rules of the game have changed. Mr Kissinger pushed his stamina by taking in the Middle East at the tail end of his prodigious tour that began in Moscow on October 23rd, but it was vital that he should learn at first hand just how much the decisions taken at the Arab summit at Rabat last week have hardened the Arab-Israeli bargaining scene. When he was last in the Middle East, less than a month ago, it was doubtful whether his piecemeal technique of separate agreements was still feasible; now, after Rabat, it almost certainly is not.

It's that "almost" which seems to have been foremost in Mr Kissinger's mind when he landed at Cairo on Tuesday evening. His main purpose was to find out whether a separate Egyptian-Israeli negotiation could yet be salvaged from the Arab rulers' argument that bargaining for the return of the Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian land that Israel occupied in 1967 should be collective and simultaneous. On Wednesday President Sadat said he saw no reason why the Rabat decisions should have "put any block" on the step-by-step procedures. But the Arabs are unlikely to let these procedures get very far until Israel accepts, at least in principle, the public and far more important Arab ruling that the Palestine Liberation Organisation should eventually control the Palestine territory (the West Bank and Gaza) now occupied by Israel.

There is no evidence that when Mr Kissinger visited Jerusalem on Thursday he tried to get Israel to rethink its flat refusal to treat with the PLO. Israelis, fearful that the pressure will come, were deeply concerned by President Ford's comment at his news conference on October 29th that Israel will have to negotiate "either with Jordan or the PLO". The State Department quickly said that this was merely a slip of the tongue, but then on Wednesday a spokesman said that the phrase still stood. The huge rally in New York on Monday protesting against the PLO's participation in the UN debate on the Middle East due next week is an early warning of the domestic difficulties the American Administration will run into if or when it starts leaning on Israel to qualify its attitude.

Forestalling Mr Kissinger's arrival, Israel's prime minister, Mr Rabin, reiterated on Tuesday his government's uncompromising rejection of the PLO as a negotiating partner. The sense of impending danger brought all his ministers and indeed all his party in what appeared to be a straight line behind him. There was not a whisper of the kind of deviation that in July had allowed Mr Aharon Yariv, the information minister and a former security chief, to suggest that negotiations with the PLO would be possible if the guerrilla organisation acknowledged the existence of the Jewish state and all that this implied. Mr Yariv's condition is of fundamental importance—and was no doubt a central issue in the long discussion that President Sadat had with Mr Arafat immediately before Mr Kissinger's arrival in Cairo. But so far Israel's official line is to reject any negotiation with the PLO, and the PLO's is to reject any acceptance of Israel.

Israel's refusal to consider talks with the PLO is not unlike the Arab refusal, after the 1967 war, to consider direct talks with Israel—a negative attitude based on fear. In fact, in both instances, the question of who negotiates with whom is less important than what is negotiated about. The PLO is reported to have delegated negotiating power to Egypt but this is basically irrelevant. The question Israel has to answer is whether it is prepared to consider handing over the West Bank to an independent Palestinian authority. That in turn is linked to the question of the PLO's recognition of Israel.

Mr Rabin on Tuesday repeated Mrs Meir's long-held view that there is room for two states only between the Mediterranean and the desert: Israel and one other. The implication left by various Israeli leaders is that it is for the Arabs themselves to work out whether the "other" state should be Palestine or Jordan. But now the chips are down, do the Israelis really mean this? One reason for thinking that they do not, really, is that there could scarcely be a clearer call for revolution in Jordan.

King Hussein, now obliged to accept that his claim to the West Bank is past history, is putting up the barricades. He has ruled out the possibility of a future confederation between Jordan and the envisaged Palestinian state (a compromise that a lot of Palestinians on both sides of the line were looking forward to); even more disconcertingly he has declared that the Palestinians in Jordan (believed to number more than half the 2m inhabitants) will soon have to stand up and be counted as Jordanians or as visiting Palestinians. The king used to be almost alone among leading Jordanians in insisting on the wider view of Jordan and its continuing responsibility to the Palestinians under Israeli occupation; he is now carrying the abandonment of this policy to its logical conclusions.

So King Hussein is out of the game. The Israelis are still in it, and in the West Bank, and the PLO still seems to say no to Israel. It is an impasse that could mean war again.

NEW YORK TIMES
11 November 1974

COAST U.N. CENTER DAMAGED BY BOMB

Special to The New York Times

LOS ANGELES, Nov. 10—A bomb went off early this morning and caused extensive damage in a United Nations information center bookstore in the Wilshire section of the city. No one was injured.

The Los Angeles police said that the bomb, which exploded at 2:45 A.M. in a deserted business district, had shattered glass in several buildings. The police estimated the damage at $6,000.

Shortly afterward, anonymous phone calls were received by The Los Angeles Times and by radio station KFWB.

The police said that the messages, similar in content, were made by a young man who referred to the bomb as "a thank-you note from the P.L.O. [Palestine Liberation Organization] to the United Nations." In the call to The Los Angeles Times, the man added, "for letting them address the United Nations."

In closing, the caller added the words "never again," which has been a slogan of the Jewish Defense League.

The United Nations has agreed to let representatives of the P.L.O. participate in the General Assembly debate on the Middle East, starting Wednesday.

A police spokesman said there have been a number of incidents recently involving the Palestine Liberation Organization which is opposed to the State of Israel, and the Jewish Defense League. Several bomb scares, picketing and protest marches, have occurred, he said, but he added that this was the first time a United Nations organization had been hit.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation announced it would investigate to determine if "revolutionary or terrorist activity" was involved.

The bookstore, run by the Los Angeles chapter of the United Nations Association, is a nonprofit organization that distributes United Nations literature and raises funds for United Nations organizations.

"The most immediate and serious loss is the destruction of U.N.I.C.E.F. [United Nations International Childrens Emergency Fund] Christmas cards," said Dr. John Erving, president of the local United Nations Association. The sale of the cards benefits starving and homeless children around the world. He said the blast destroyed about $10,000 to $15,000 worth of cards and U.N. calendars.

THE ECONOMIST NOVEMBER 9, 1974

If it has to be war

If war does break out again in the Middle East neither the Israelis nor the Arabs can achieve quite the surprise the Arabs brought off last year. The Israelis, supersensitised by their unreadiness in 1973, have overhauled their intelligence service, and are alert in their forward positions, on their radar sets and on their communications monitors. The Arabs, for their part, are keenly alive to the threat of an Israeli pre-emptive strike. And to launch a ground attack either side would have to build up its forces in one of the limited-force zones, which are inspected to some extent by UN troops, and would then have to cross the UN buffer zone itself. It is hard to see all this happening without the other side getting some warning.

But there are many ways to knock an enemy off balance: the time and place of the attack, and the size and weaponry of the attacking force, can be manipulated in unexpected ways. A boldly-executed quick strike by either side could well decide the outcome of a new conflict. To strike first has always been a good military tactic; it worked well for Israel in 1967 and for Egypt in 1973. And the 1973 fighting showed that there may now be a new kind of warfare—the short battle of attrition. Modern weapons have become so potent that they can kill large numbers of men and destroy enormous quantities of material in no time at all; the 1973 war ground up some £800m worth of equipment in a week. This puts an even bigger premium on getting in the first blow.

There is another reason why Israel in particular might decide to attack first. Time is against it. Arab money is buying an arsenal of modern equipment from the west, which could eventually find its way to the front-line countries. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have ordered large quantities of weapons recently, including supersonic fighters, air defence missiles and tanks.

Against this, one lesson of the 1973 war is that conventional warfare is now in one of those periods when technology favours the defence. Many aircraft were destroyed by missiles in the 1973 fighting, and by guns after being forced into the guns' range by the threat of the missiles. Tanks were broken up by new lightweight anti-tank missiles and by modern tank artillery using new kinds of ammunition. But the edge may have been taken off these novelties by now. The Israelis, who depend much more on air power than the Arabs do, now have new American electronic equipment which will go a long way towards countering the anti-aircraft missiles, the Sam-6 especially, that did so much damage in 1973. And they should have learned that tanks must be supported by infantry and artillery when attacking a well-armed enemy. They certainly learned that the Arabs are good soldiers when properly led and trained. The Arabs think so too. The trouble there is that Egypt and, even more, Syria may have forgotten the 1973 war's signal message to them: that at the end they were losing it.

If fighting starts again in the next few weeks, Israel will be relatively stronger than it was when the 1973 war began, although perhaps not by much. The United States has replaced its losses of equipment and provided some new things; it is reported that the rate of supply has been accelerated in the past few weeks. It has delivered some TV-guided "Maverick" missiles which are the sort of technical advance that could upset the lessons of the 1973 war by permitting accurate bombing at long ranges, with the planes less exposed to missiles and guns. But the central question here is whether the Americans have also given Israel laser equipment and the guided bombs that go with it.

One of the major question marks, if war breaks out again, is whether the United States will be willing—or indeed able—to undertake another immense resupply operation of 1973 proportions. Not only are its own stocks of weapons a lot lower now, but there is a serious question whether the present Portuguese regime would permit the transport planes to refuel in the Azores. If it would not, and the other nations along the route balk as they did last time, it would be virtually impossible for the United States to give the kind of emergency transfusion of weapons it did during the fighting in 1973.

Russia has also done a major re-equipping job, and Syria, like Israel, is probably better armed now than before the last war. Russia has let the Syrians have some Mig-23 "Flogger" aircraft—at least the equal of any plane Israel now has—and it has delivered more aircraft and other modern equipment to other Arab countries. But these deals have been kept very secret: an accurate assessment of the numerical balance of power in planes, tanks and other weapons is not possible.

How the fighting might go is pure guesswork. The most likely beginning is a first strike by Israel, possibly in the Golan Heights. The Israelis would try to drive deep into Syria in an attempt to destroy the Syrian army, and perhaps take Damascus. One objective would be to prevent the Syrians using their long-range Scud missiles against Israeli cities. Since the Syrian army is probably better equipped than Egypt's, and is closer to Israel, it would make one kind of sense for Israel to attack it first, while holding the Egyptians in the south.

As an immediate response to an Israeli attack, or conceivably as a first strike of their own, the Arabs might launch large-scale air strikes on Israeli oil-storage sites, and simultaneously mine Israel's deep-water ports from the air. They would lose a lot of aircraft to Israeli fighters, but this is probably the best use the Arabs could make of their air power; if it worked, it would reduce Israel's ability to fight a war to a few days. The entire Syrian army could be thrown at once into the fighting on the Golan Heights to try to stop the Israeli advance while the Egyptians attacked into Sinai, perhaps threatening the Abu Rudeis oil fields. It would be essential for the Arabs to keep the momentum up; once the front became static, the Israelis could reinforce the Syrian front rapidly.

Speculating on the result may be easier than trying to foresee the action. The probability, if Israel escapes being crippled in the first few days, is that it would win in the next 10 days. It would be a bloody fortnight.

Where the armies face each other



DAILY TELEGRAPH, London
4 November 1974

PETER GILL, in Dacca, on the diplomatically embarrassing famines of India and Bangladesh which the World Food Conference considers this week.

The skeletons in India's cupboard

COMPLIMENTS spilled from the lips of Dr Kissinger in India and Bangladesh last week as if they alone were the language of diplomacy. Yes, India was very much a major power, and no, it was not often you had the privilege of meeting someone of the vision of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, Prime Minister of Bangladesh. It is possible, but on past experience most unlikely, that this and much more besides will mute official Indian indignation when a C I A plot is next unearthed within ten thousand miles of New Delhi, and that the Bengalis will be constrained from burning down American libraries when Washington next upsets them.

On more important issues Dr Kissinger got nowhere. There is no prospect of the Indians ever viewing with sympathy the American plan to build up the British Indian Ocean base of Diego Waroia. As for any modest American arms shipment to Pakistan, that will be immediately and automatically interpreted in New Delhi as an act of appalling ill faith.

Diplomacy of this sort is no longer the priority it was when Governments in the region were moving with painful deliberation to clear up the mess left by the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war. The important factor now is food.

Left to himself, Dr Kissinger might even have liked to see at first hand the effects of the famine that now grips much of eastern India and Bangladesh. Tomorrow he addresses the opening session of the World Food Conference in Rome, and a vision of skeletal adults and starving children would have illuminated his speech rather more than statistics, but India is embarrassed by the famine; Bangladesh much less so.

It was Mrs Gandhi, the Indian Prime Minister, who proclaimed the country's self-sufficiency in food three years ago, and vowed never again to accept grain on the cheap from America. Later, as the gap between basic needs and anticipated production widened, her Government dithered about asking for help.

Several million tons were bought, but still the gap widened. Now the Indians have asked the Americans and others for help, although Dr Kissinger, in another delicate compliment, refrained from putting it quite like that.

The Bengalis have yet to find such self-respect. The world, it was argued, owed them a living after the 1971 war, and the world coughed up, in the largest United Nations disaster operation ever mounted. Since the present famine began, the begging bowl has been proferred to anyone who could help, American, European or Arab.

On the face of it, the famine in India and Bangladesh this year can be easily explained and precisely charted. In large parts of western India during the summer, rainfall was far below normal and crops withered. In Bangladesh and in the eastern Indian States of West Bengal, Assam and Orissa, the rains were far too plentiful. Crops did not ripen, or were washed away by floods.

A depressing cycle of poor crops throughout the world in the past three years has led to the most critical imbalance of demand over supply. It is this situation to which the world's food planners will address themselves this week and next in Rome.

Dr Kissinger himself, with solid achievement behind him in Vietnam, the Middle East and in détente, will be seeking to strike yet another blow for humanity. He told the Indians as much last week: "We will offer a comprehensive programme as our contribution to freeing mankind from the eternal struggle for sustenance. We will increase our production at home, so there will be more food available for shipment abroad, and we will help developing nations increase their own production, which is the only long-term solution to the problem."

Politically unpopular

Part of Dr Kissinger's plan appears to be to shame the oil producers into reducing their prices—"no nation or bloc of nations can impose its narrow interests without tearing the fabric of international co-operation"—and then harness surplus oil funds to the fight against famine.

Western agricultural technology, backed by Arab funds, could well lead to increased food production in India and Bangladesh. Reductions in the price of oil would also ease the foreign exchange shortage facing India and Bangladesh and enable them to spend rather more money on development than on survival.

There are other sides to the famine that the diplomatic Dr Kissinger will almost certainly side-step. He may even think it too indelicate to mention that famines are caused just as much by too many people as by too little food. India once enjoyed a fine reputation for her financial and political commitment to family planning, but in the past few years she has lost it. Politicians find that references to birth control win them no votes, and may even cost them a few, so they have almost stopped talking about it.

When the economic blizzard hit India last year, the family planning budget was drastically cut. Indeed, the grim facts of life confronting India and Bangladesh seem to require a more urgent and less sophisticated response.

The Bangladesh Planning Commission has hinted darkly at the possibility of introducing compulsory birth control. Sterilisation, compulsory abortion or disincentives for couples who err by having too many children naturally horrify liberal Westerners, but they do not have to stand by and watch whole communities battered and uprooted by famine.

There are other areas in which the Governments of India and Bangladesh can be held responsible for failing to guard against famine. The weather over the past few years has certainly been against the farmer, but Governments in planned economies have a more than usual duty to support their rural producers. Instead, farmers in the granaries of western India have gone without fuel with which to drive irrigation pumps and agricultural machinery. Many have also had to do without fertiliser because the factories that should produce it are either functioning at well below capacity or, in the case of Bangladesh, not functioning at all.

In predominantly agricultural societies, food production and distribution play an abnormally large part in national politics. Government parties, the Congress in India and the Awami League in Bangladesh, are deeply enmeshed in the politics of food and find themselves again and again coming out in favour of the bigger farmers and the bigger merchants, who are also their biggest vote gatherers.

In India, the Congress is wedded in theory to the notion of sweeping land reforms, but little is ever done about it. New Delhi regularly denounces hoarding, and does so even more fervently at a time of famine or elections, but at local and district level the biggest offenders are often Congress politicians.

In Bangladesh, such corruption and profiteering is a way of life. At a time of particular shortage and pronounced public disquiet, the Government announced another drive against the corrupt and the profiteering, but the politicians and officials who find themselves briefly behind bars are the unlucky ones. Honest officials who try to do their jobs conscientiously are watched like hawks by party bosses. Meanwhile the landless poor become poorer.

SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, London
27 October 1971

Squeeze on Indian Press crusaders

by PETER GILL in New Delhi

THE grave internal crisis threatening India — compounded of food shortages, industrial stagnation, inflation that makes British price rises seem modest and pervasive official corruption — has this year reawakened in Indian newspaper editors an almost dormant instinct for campaigning journalism.

Among national papers seeking to expose Government deficiencies, the *Hindustan Times* of New Delhi has led the way and it has now paid the penalty. George Verghese, 47, soft-spoken editor for almost six years, has been told to go.

A Cambridge economics graduate, he worked briefly for the *Glasgow Herald* and the *News Chronicle* in London before joining the *Times of India*, another of the big four Delhi papers, shortly after independence. But it was his three years as Press secretary to Mrs. Gandhi, Indian Prime Minister, that now provide the richest irony.

Trouble began in February when the *Hindustan Times* published two blistering articles itemising the "pre-election sweeteners" deployed by Mrs. Gandhi's Congress Government to win the assembly elections in Uttar Pradesh, India's largest state—"A factory here, an irrigation scheme there, a university everywhere, railway lines for the asking and gifts for everybody, all from an empty exchequer and in defiance of national plans, programmes and priorities."

"Whatever the result," wrote Mr. Verghese in an editorial before the anticipated Congress victory, "this much is certain, India has lost."

In March he returned to the attack in two signed articles in the *Sunday Supplement*, now closed for lack of newsprint. They were closely, almost densely, argued and largely constructive, but there were acid observations about Mrs. Gandhi.

"The Prime Minister has no programme, no world view, no grand design . . . bereft of a frame. She has merely reacted to events and failed to shape them. This has been her tragedy. She has a mandate, but no mission."

Last month the seal was set on Mr. Verghese's career when, under the withering headline "Kanchenjunga, here we come," he dismissed as fraudulent India's official justifications for incorporating Sikkim, her tiny Himalayan protectorate, into the union.

He called it "genteel annexation without representation," and added: "... A protectorate is moving to 'freedom with India' by annexation through constitutional legerdemain." The conclusion, approvingly quoted by Peking Radio, was even more damning: "Perhaps no need for the common man to ask for bread. He's getting Sikkim."

The man who sacked George Verghese (he is not due to go until the new year) is Urishna Kumar Birla, chairman of the *Hindustan Times* and scion of the mighty Birla industrial empire in Calcutta. The Birlas, who arrived in Calcutta some 80 years ago to trade in silver and opium, now control a network of more than 40 huge companies.

Although opposition newspapers have claimed that Mrs. Gandhi applied direct pressure on the Birlas to remove their editor, both Government spokesmen and Mr. U. K. Birla deny the charge. "I do not take orders from the Prime Minister," Mr. Birla told a deputation of *Hindustan Times* journalists.

But Mr. Birla is known to have political ambitions, and has twice tried without success for election to the Indian parliament. His last attempt, in Uttar Pradesh in February, failed when Mrs. Gandhi's Congress party refused to back him as an independent candidate for the upper house. "No one believes that George Verghese is saying all this independently," Mr. Birla is reported to have told a senior Indian journalist to whom he offered the *Hindustan Times* editorship.

"They always involve us with these criticisms, and our position is false."

Neither Mr. Birla nor Mr. Verghese is talking publicly about the sacking, but the issue may be forced into the open when the Indian Press council hears complaints from Mr. Verghese's supporters. A further dispute over the publication of private correspondence between the two men could land in the law courts.

So for Indian editors and independent journalists, the sacking of Mr. Verghese is further evidence of what they regard as an insidious official campaign to erode Press freedom in India.

In a series of adjudications this month, the Indian Press council has condemned State governments for withdrawing official advertising as punishment for papers refusing to toe the line. The council has also pronounced on the official Indian practice of offering journalists cut-price housing and precedence in obtaining telephones, scooters, and cars, yet withdrawing these same privileges when journalists criticise the Government.

The Poona High Court had to step in last month to order the State electricity board to restore power to a local newspaper group which had continued printing with the aid of a tractor engine despite official displeasure. The editor of one Bihar newspaper was murdered by "persons unknown" after running critical articles on smuggling rackets, and the offices of another were burnt down while, according to the Press council, officials stood by delighted.

Staff at the *Hindustan Times* fear that the future independence of the paper has been gravely compromised by the Verghese affair. Mr. Birla has already stated privately that the next editor will have to consult him on all matters of editorial policy, and the Indian government itself may be waiting in the wings.

"We can't say too much or else the Government will say that Birla is running the paper badly and appoint a couple of directors to the board," said Mr. C. P. Ramachandran, assistant editor of the *Hindustan Times* and chairman of a new committee to protect its independence. "Then we'd be finished."

THE ECONOMIST NOVEMBER 9, 1974

India

Love is war

FROM OUR INDIA CORRESPONDENT

India's backward and notoriously corrupt state of Bihar was the scene of a showdown this week between its government and Jayaprakash Narayan, the ageing Gandhian leader who has been campaigning for months to oust that government from power. On Monday Mr Narayan called for a massive siege around government offices in Patna, the state capital. Large numbers of police and para-military forces kept the demonstrators at bay but Mr Narayan himself was slightly injured. He responded by calling for a one-day general strike against the "barbarous atrocities" of the police.

Mr Narayan is demanding the dissolution of the Bihar assembly as a first step towards restructuring the entire Indian political system to rid it of corruption and the abuse of power. But Mrs Gandhi, who gave in to a similar demand in Gujarat last spring, has declared that she will not repeat that "mistake" under any circumstances. She realises that if she yields in Bihar she will soon be faced with the same situation in other states, especially nearby ones such as West Bengal. But there is no doubt that Mr Narayan's efforts are winning him considerable support throughout the country as he echoes the most pressing grievances of the Indian man in the street.

Modelling his method of agitation on Mahatma Gandhi's non-cooperation against the British, Mr Narayan has called upon Bihar farmers to stop paying land rent and talks of organising a "parallel legislative assembly". But most ominous for the ruling Congress party is his bid to win over the police by calling upon demonstrators, in effect, to make love not war. Despite his denunciation of the police, he invites his supporters to fraternise with them and persuade them to change sides. Police discipline has not broken down so far but the sheer numbers of the central government's forces despatched to Bihar this week indicate that Mrs Gandhi is taking no chances.

Far East

NEW YORK TIMES, SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 2, 1974

Montagnard Uprising Poses a Threat to Saigon Drive

By JAMES M. MARKHAM
Special to The New York Times

BAN ME THUOT, South Vietnam, Oct. 25—An armed rebellion of dissident montagnard tribesmen has broken out in the province of Darlac and may be spreading into neighboring corners of the strategic Central Highlands.

If it continues to grow, the uprising, which is thought to have some 500 men under arms, could imperil the Saigon Government's struggle against the Communists in the highlands.

Some people here believe that the Communists have infiltrated the nascent movement. Others argue that a Government crackdown on the rebels is rapidly alienating tribesmen who are not disposed to join the insurrection and who hate the Communists.

Warning by Official

"It's going to be very bad here," warned Y Jut Buon To, the dynamic, 31-year-old head of ethnic minority services in the highlands. "I don't think they can ever solve it with the military. It should be solved by the political."

"I don't want to get my people killed," he added. "They are ethnic minorities—they are going to be come more minority."

Compounding the problems, a wave of brutal killings and robberies—attributed by some to the rebels, by others to bandits who justify pillage in the name of rebellion—have heightened tension between Vietnamese and the montagnards. That word is the generic name for the Central Highlands tribesmen who are not of the same racial origin as the Vietnamese.

In August, when the violence reached a peak, about 50 people, mostly Vietnamese civilians, were reportedly killed in highway ambushes and holdups in remote villages in Darlac Province.

While the violence has abated, Vietnamese traders, taximen and truck drivers are still terrified of the lonely roads. Senior Vietnamese officials carry handguns for fear of assassination.

"There had been a certain union, an understanding, between the two communities," said a French priest who has lived in the highlands for many years. "But now a gulf has opened betwen them."

Sympathy and Fear

For their part, many montagnards find themselves caught between mixed feelings of sympathy and fear of the rebels and nervousness about the Government police reaction. A document issued in the name of the rebels charges that from July through September 160 tribesmen have been "lost, killed and massacred, others captured and subjected to savage torture."

Another, dispassionate source put the number of montagnards arrested by the Government at about 100. Some were reportedly taken as suspects in acts of banditry and murder, others for their presumed sympathies with the rebels.

At present, two battalions of Government rangers — about 800 men—are set up in blocking positions outside montagnard villages in Darlac Province while policemen and militiamen check the papers of young highlanders.

The rangers have so far not clashed with the lightly armed rebels, who have avoided direct fighting with regular military units and have devoted most of their energies to winning over villagers and trying to stay alive.

The montagnard revolt, which is thought to be led by a disaffected former civil servant named Y Kpa Koi, is not without precedent. In 1964 and again in late 1965, montagnard troops, rallying to the standard of the United Front for the Struggle of the Oppressed Races, staged bloody rebellions that had to be put down with force.

Grievances Are Many

But, until recently, the Government of President Nguyen Van Thieu had succeeded in mollifying most of the leaders of Fubro, asthe organization is known after its initials in French, and had brought many of them into the civillan administration. By comparison with previous Vietnamese regimes, the Thieu Government treated the montagnards fairly well.

But the montagnard grievances are legion. Vietnamese entrepreneurs and officials have encroached on and stolen their land, often swindling the highlanders with complicated bureaucratic and legal maneuvers.

Vietnamese dominate trade and, most importantly, government in the highlands.

Public services, particularly health and education, have been skimpily provided. Many montagnards live in squalor, with illiteracy and disease; their population growth rate appears to be close to nothing.

Moreover, the montagnard peoples — numbering perhaps 800,000—have suffered cruelly in the war. In 1972 and 1973 alone, 150,000 montagnards were reportedly made refugees by the fighting; some 70 per cent of all montagnards now live outside their original home areas, according to one study.

At a time of political unrest and economic stagnation throughout South Vietnam, many people here are not surprised to find the montagnards —or, so far, the advanced Rhade tribe—stirring, too.

But some informed montagnards find Mr. Y Kpa Koi, who is a strong-willed, little-educated veteran of the French colonial army, a somewhat unlikely figure to emerge as the Che Guevara of the highlands.

A Jarai tribesman in his early 40's, Mr. Y Kpa Koi, whose wife is Rhade, was, until late in November, 1973, a senior administrator in the Ban Me Thuot Labor Department. Then he vanished into the forests and proclaimed the rebellion in the name of Fulro.

No one has a convincing explanation for his action. Though he had headed the Darlac chapter of a short-lived montagnard political organization that succeeded Fulro after the reconciliation with Saigon in the late sixties, Mr. Y Kpa Koi was not a well-known figure in Fulro itself.

Some people say that he ran into double with the law over some shady lumber deals involving Chinese middlemen and that his idealism was colored by opportunism. A few suspect that the Communists may have had a hand in his defection.

Whatever his motivations, Mr. Y Kpa Koi gradually attracted a number of armed men, many of them demobilized irregulars who had kept the automatic rifles and grenade launchers that had been supplied by the departed America.

Took General's Title

Mr. Y Kpa Koi took the title of general and soon his troops were displaying a letter in the Darlac villages that purportedly gave their rebellion the endorsement of Y Bham Enuol, the principal Fulro leader.

The whereabouts of Mr. Y Bham Enuol is a mystery. His customary residence in Phnom Penh but some montagnards say he is in Indonesia, while yet another report says he is ill in France.

"Oh, Fulro, Fulro," said one French coffee planter, sipping a beer in Ban Me Thuot's dingy French restaurant. "Before, they put it all on the backs of the Viets. [Communists]. Now they blame the Fulros. The Fulros don't need to steal refrigerators; they don't kill old ladies in the middle of the streets."

Though the rebellion began in Darlac Province—whose population of 270,000 is estimated to be 45 per cent Vietnamese and 55 per cent montagnard—there are signs that it has begun to spread. Occasional acts of violence on the Darlac pattern have been noted in adjoining highlands provinces.

The movement's future may well depend on the Government's response. Nay Luett, the montagnard Minister of Ethnic Development, has so far taken a hard line. Mr. Nay Luett, who spent four years in jail a decade ago for agitating on behalf of his people, denied on a recent visit here that Fulro even existed.

The rebellion has produced considerable anguish among montagnard leaders who are not unsympathetic to the grievances that may have produced it.

"Right now there are a lot of montagnards in the middle—they cannot adjust to what they should do," said Mr. Y Jut Buon Jo, the head of the ethnic minority sources, adding that he has been threatened several times by Kpa Koi partisans who want him to join them.

"They need leaders" he said.

Judge Y Blieng Hmok, the president of the montagnard court here, expressed a pervasive sadness over the racial schism brought on by the revolt and the Government's response to it.

"Without the Vietnamese the montagnards cannot live," he said. "But without the montagnards, the Vietnamese cannot work in the Central Highlands.

"But now the Vietnamese do not understand the montagnards and the montagnards do not understand the Vietnamese."

BALTIMORE SUN
7 November 1974

Thieu's removal from office urged as Vietnamese fear dwindling U.S. support

By ARNOLD R. ISAACS
Sun Staff Correspondent

Saigon — To the dismay of American officials, events in South Vietnam in recent weeks have left many Vietnamese firmly convinced that the United States is no longer supporting President Nguyen Van Thieu.

Whether it is true or not — and American diplomats argue strenuously that it is not — the belief is real enough to play a significant role in the spreading movement to drive Mr. Thieu from office.

Sharp cutbacks in American military and economic aid this year have contributed to the widespread impression that the U.S. is ditching its old ally. But the most important factor was probably the resignation of former President Nixon.

The Americans have sought to persuade the Vietnamese that Washington's commitments remained unchanged in the shift of administrations. But the Vietnamese, schooled in a traditional culture, tend to view political events as flowing not from abstract values but from the interplay of powerful figures. In their eyes, Mr. Nixon was Mr. Thieu's patron, and his departure represented a heavy blow to Mr. Thieu.

A typical comment was that of Tran Van Tuyen, opposition leader in the lower house of South Vietnam's national assembly.

"One of the major reasons for the blossoming of these movements" — the protests against Mr. Thieu — "was former President Nixon's stepping down," Mr. Tuyen said in a recent interview.

"The Vietnamese consider America has been the most important supporter of Mr. Thieu, and the most enthusiastic was Mr. Nixon," Mr. Tuyen said. "Now Mr. Nixon is gone and Mr. [Henry A.] Kissinger [Secretary of State] who is unfriendly to Mr. Thieu, is still there."

Senator Vu Van Mau, head of the Buddhist-orjented National Reconcilation Force, remarked that "Mr. Thieu represented Mr. Nixon, but Mr. Nixon is no longer on the political scene . . . with the present difficulties it will be very difficult for Mr. Thieu to stay in office."

Mr. Nixon's political ghost haunts Mr. Thieu in other ways as well. The example of a President resigning after losing the confidence of his people was not lost on Vietnamese oppositionists. It is not at all unusual to hear Vietnamese hopefully cite Mr. Nixon's example in predicting that Mr. Thieu will step down voluntarily rather than risk chaos — and Communist advances — in the country.

They believe this not because they believe in Mr. Thieu's goodwill but because they regard him as being so thoroughly under the American thumb that when Washington decides it is time for him to go, he will obediently leave office.

The Nixon resignation and the decline of U.S. aid are far from the only causes of the recent wave of unrest, which stems from much more fundamental roots in the war-weariness and economic hardship of the Vietnamese population.

Still, American diplomats are spending a good deal of time in trying to convince their Vietnamese contacts that U.S. policy has not changed.

Last week, at the height of anti-Thieu disturbances in Saigon, U.S. officials in Washington leaked a story that the Ford administration is considering asking Congress for a supplemental $300 million in military aid for South Vietnam on top of the $700 million Congress has already approved.

The story was played prominently in Saigon newspapers — it was bannered in the english-language Saigon *Post* — and it appeared deliberately timed to underscore American support for Mr. Thieu at a time when he was under attack.

NEW YORK TIMES
9 November 1974

44 Saigon Legislators Complain To U.S. Congress About Thieu

By DAVID K. SHIPLER
Special to The New York Times

SAIGON, South Vietnam, Nov. 8—A group of 44 opposition legislators called on the United States Congress today to use its influence to stop the repressive tactics of the South Vietnamese Government.

The legislators, all Deaputies in the lower house of the National Assembly, issued a written appeal that denounced "before domestic and international public opinion the Nguyen Van Thieu authorities' pilicy of brutalizing Deputies, priests, reporters and of the savage repression of the people."

This was an apparent reference to the clash Oct. 31 between policemen and demonstrators in Saigon in which about 75 civilians and police men were injured. Some of those beaten were fvlegislators.

"The U. S. Government should bear responsibility for that policy of brutalizing the Deputies and massacring the people by the Nguyen Van Thaieu authorities, who have used U. S. aid and assistance to repress the people."

Immediate Action Sought

The Deputies appealed to "The U. S. Congress and parliaments of freedom-living countiries to exert their influence to immediately and efficiently put an end to President Nguyen Van Thieu's repression of the Deputies and the people."

They called for "leaders of associations, religious groups, cultural groups, intellectuals, journalists and all democracy and freedom-loving people in the country anl abroad to support our struggle for this miserable and repressed people."

At the same time, Tran Van Ti, president of the Saigon Bar Association, issued a statement that denounced the Government for the police behavior Oct. 31. He charged that the police had "committed acts of violence (pushing, rock-throwing, barbed wire barricading, etc.)"

The 44 deputies, part of a 156-member lower house, came mostly from two opposition blocs—the People Social bloc, made up mostly Buddhists, and the Nationalist bloc, a Roman Catholic group supporting the anticorruption protests of the Rev. Tran Huu Thanh.

Faith in U.S. Influence

Although their appeal contained no reference to last Tuesday's Democratic sweep of the United States Congressional elections, its significance can rardly have escaped them. There is a kind of unquestioned faith among manp Vietnamese that the United States Government has infinite capacities ti influence events in Vietnam.

Sime of those involved in the recent Anti-Government protests here rave hoped for some sign of approval frim the United States Embassp American officials have reportedly been ordered to stay far away from potrest groups and demonstrations, lest peiple read great significance into their presence in the vicinity.

The embassp, meanwhile, has sail nothing to alter the impression trat Washington continues to suppirt President Trieu as the legitimate head of state, but tre Congressional cuts in aid this year have diluted the perceived support nonetheless, and the oppinents of President Thieu today were clearly hoping ti turn the police violence if last week to their advantage with the new Congress.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
7 November 1974

Saigon aid cutbacks being felt

Political impact swift as Thieu foes rally

By Daniel Southerland
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Saigon

As a result of congressional cuts in American aid to South Vietnam, Saigon's armed forces have reduced their use of ammunition, fuel, helicopters, and fighter-bombers.

But experts here say that the cuts have not yet markedly weakened the South Vietnamese military machine. The "real crunch," they say, may not come until early next year.

"The danger point for ammunition would not be until perhaps next February," said one official, who keeps an eye on the supply situation.

But the aid cuts have already had their effect on local politics, and a political crunch could be coming before the military one. The cuts have helped convince many of the opponents of President Thieu that the United States is slowly withdrawing its support for Mr. Thieu. Their conviction that Mr. Thieu's position has thus grown wobbly has greatly emboldened them.

"Many Vietnamese felt that President Nixon's fall was a real blow to Thieu," said a Western diplomat in Saigon. "That plus the aid cuts indicated to them that Thieu was not so strong."

"There are two important factors in the background to the opposition movement against Mr. Thieu," said Tran Van Tuyen, leader of a block of opposition deputies in the lower house of South Vietnam's National Assembly.

"First there was the departure of Mr. Nixon — Thieu lost his protector," he said.

"Second, the U.S. Congress showed that it could withdraw aid from a repressive government."

"These are some of the reasons why the Vietnamese press grew more courageous and began violently criticizing Mr. Thieu's policies," the legislator said.

Air activity cut back

On the military side, Vietnamese Air Force officers say that they have reduced their fighter-bomber missions by about one third as a result of the aid cuts. The Air Force has permanently grounded about 70 of its A1 Skyraider fighter-bombers.

Military sources say that helicopter missions have been cut by about 45 percent in recent months. The South Vietnamese Navy is planning reductions in both its blue water and riverine forces.

"At some point, we're going to have to reduce the consumption rate for fuel to the point where we stop running some trucks," said one source. "There is a serious danger of our not having enough fuel to get through the fiscal year."

American staff reduced

The U.S. embassy in Saigon announced last month that as a result of aid reductions, the United States was cutting the jobs of some 1,300 American civilians working in South Vietnam. Most of them have been helping to maintain and repair Vietnamese aircraft.

American officials said the cuts were being made so that military aid could be concentrated on "high priority" items such as ammunition, fuel, spare parts, and medical supplies. But the officials added that even after these cuts are made, some 500 American technicians would continue to work with the Vietnamese Air Force.

The dilemma for President Thieu, as some observers see it, is that if he cracks down too hard on his political opponents, he will risk losing even more support from the U.S. Congress.

But if he fails to crack down hard, people may grow less and less fearful of coming out against him. Moreover, those who supported him might begin to feel that they were backing a loser, and that could prove dangerous for President Thieu as well.

NEW YORK TIMES
3 NOVEMBER 1974

U.S. Goals In Saigon Have Ring Of the 60's

By LESLIE H. GELB

WASHINGTON—From the beginning of American involvement in Vietnam, it has not been a geographical abstraction and not a people and a culture to most American leaders. And, even as the awareness of the war fades, Vietnam remains a landscape—or rather, an objective. "It" must not be taken over by the Communists.

Administration leaders do not usually talk about the American objective in Vietnam. That would be bad politics. But when they do talk, they stress Washington's willingness to accept any solution that comes about through peaceful means.

Many Administration officials ackowledge that this is more a hope than an objective. The reality is that the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong will not abandon their dream of liberating South Vietnam and unifying the country.

The impression seems to have grown that the American objective has changed. President Nguyen Van Thieu is under fire from Catholic and Buddhist groups, and Washington seems to be doing little about it. Perhaps, some speculate, the Ford Administration is getting ready to drop President Thieu. Congress is slashing aid to Saigon, and the White House does not seem to be complaining. Perhaps, some begin to hope, Mr. Ford will quietly let the Saigon regime slip away.

But again, the reality is otherwise. A glance at the battle between Congress and the executive over the new Foreign Aid Bill over the past two months shows how dearly the old objective is still held.

This is what happened. The Administration proposed a new $4-billion aid bill, including a $400-million Middle East "peace package" for Egypt, Syria and Jordan, $250-million in additional food aid, almost $500-million for Cambodia, almost $150-million for Laos, and about $1-billion in economic aid to Saigon. In a separate bill, the Administration also asked for $1.45-billion in military aid to Saigon.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved funds for the Middle East and food aid, but cut total aid to Cambodia down to $347-million, Laos to $100-million, and South Vietnam to $1.28-billion. Of equal importance, the committee eliminated the President's prerogative to juggle funds from one country to another and from one account to another. The House Foreign Affairs Committee seemed headed in the same direction.

Sensing that this was leading to a phase-out of American aid to Saigon, Secretary of State Kissinger

made a critical decision. He would sacrifice the new bill with money for the Middle East and food aid and save his flexibility on Indochina by pushing for Congressional continuation of the old bill.

This decision cost Mr. Kissinger on Capitol Hill, but it demonstrated the depths of his feelings about the Saigon regime. Mr. Ford's own feelings on the matter are not clear.

Together, the President and his Secretary are acting in other ways to sustain the "commitment." As in recent years, the bulk of the food aid program will again go to Indochina. Pentagon funds will continue to pay for more than 5,000 personnel in South Vietnam. The commitment, or objective, seems to endure.

An Echo From the Diem Era

President Thieu, according to news accounts from Vietnam, seems to be in deep trouble and has had to make concessions to lessen the effectiveness of protests over corruption and repression. Ford Administration officials maintain that Mr. Thieu is still strong and is gaining in support. The stories and the official responses have the ring of the early 1960's and the days of President Ngo Dinh Diem.

What the White House might do if Mr. Thieu were actually overthrown or if he stepped down voluntarily is something leaders do not like to think about. No one mentions going back with American forces. United States action, they say, depends on the exact circumstances of Mr. Thieu's possible removal.

In the early 1960's, a general and a diplomat were dispatched to South Vietnam to study the situation. When they returned and told their widely divergent tales, President Kennedy asked if they had gone to the same country.

In 1974 staff members of the Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs Committees paid separate visits to Vietnam.

The House staff report concluded: "U.S. economic and military assistance has strengthened South Vietnam economically, militarily, and politically. This strength makes it unlikely that the North Vietnamese can win a military or political victory in the South in the foreseeable future, if ever."

The Senate staff report concluded that in the absence of a true peace settlement, "there seems to be, at best, little prospect of anything but a continuing military struggle and, assuming that the maintenance of South Vietnam remains a U.S. policy objective, a continuing requirement for U.S. economic and military aid."

Administration officials continue to quote Henry Kissinger as saying "that to lose gracefully is still to lose."

WASHINGTON POST
Monday, Nov. 4, 1974

Viet Police Fire on Villagers

From News Dispatches

SAIGON, Nov 3—An opposition senator said today that South Vietnamese police fired into a crowd of antigovernment demonstrators, killing one and wounding 12.

Official sources said the shooting stemmed from a land dispute and had no political overtones. A government spokesman said the senator's story was a "fabrication" aimed at slandering the government of President Nguyen Van Thieu.

The government sources said police fired on the crowd, killing one civilian and wounding others, after a policeman was shot and seriously wounded.

Sen. Doan Van Luong said the incident occurred Saturday in the village of Cinhtam, 70 miles northeast of here. He said six witnesses had told him about it.

According to Sen. Luong's informants, 1,000 persons had gathered near the Roman Catholic church to protest against the Thieu government. He said fighting broke out when secret police tried to take microphones from the demonstrators and broke up two altars in front of the church. He said government troops burned 10 houses in the village.

The government sources said a Roman Catholic monk involved in a land dispute with the government had women and children lie on the road to block troops sent to free a policeman the monk was holding as a hostage.

They said one of the monk's bodyguards fired on the police, seriously wounding a policeman, before the police opened fire on the crowd.

Meanwhile, Sen. Vu Van Mau, leader of the Buddhist-backed National Reconciliation Forces, said that at least 50 legislators have signed a petition calling for Thieu's resignation. He said the full list of signers would be published soon.

The South Vietnamese command reported more than 100 casualties on both sides in heavy fighting near Highway 1 in the central coastal province of Binhdinh.

In Phnom Penh, the Cambodian command said 86 rebels and 3 government soldiers were killed in two days of fighting in the Parrot's Beak region near the border with South Vietnam.

NEW YORK TIMES
20 October 1974

Tanaka Tries to Damp Down Nuclear Issue, but Reports of Entry of Atom Arms Into Japan Persist

Special to The New York Times

TOKYO, Oct. 19—The cry of "Yankee go home!" sounded once again in Tokyo this week as Japanese demonstrators led by saffron-robed drummers and lantern-bearers marched past the Premier's office and the United States Embassy.

The demonstration, which involved about 1,600 men and women, according to the police, was organized by the Communist party and its antinuclear affiliate, an organization known as Gensuikyo. It was directed against the entry into Japan of nuclear weapons aboard United States warships—an emotional issue in this nation that still bears the emotional scars of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Premier Kakuei Tanaka and his Foreign Minister, Toshio Kimura, are vigorously trying to damp down the issue of American nuclear arms in Japan before President Ford's arrival here Nov. 18 for a four-day visit. But it refuses to go away as reports continue to circulate that the United States has brought nuclear weapons into Japan, with the secret permission of the Japanese Government.

Mr. Tanaka and Mr. Kimura deny that this has happened. The Premier told Japanese provincial governors Wednesday that "the Government's three-point nonnuclear policy of not manufacturing, not possessing and not allowing the entry of nuclear weapons will be firmly maintained."

Categorical Denial

Mr. Kimura has categorically denied the existence of any agreement permitting the United States to bring nuclear weapons into Japan and has declared that the United States would not do so without Japanese Government approval.

The United States State Department has been more cautious. When news reports of a secret "transit agreement" were published in 1971, the department categorically denied them. Now it has shifted its ground, refusing either to confirm or deny similar reports. As a matter of policy, the United States never confirms or denies the presence of nuclear arms anywhere.

The current nuclear issue divides into two parts. One involves the question of a possible secret transit agreement allowing the United States to bring nuclear weapons into Japan on ships or planes temporarily, but not to deploy or send them into action from here. The second is whether the United States is actually bringing in nuclear arms under that agreement.

The evidence that the transit agreement exists is contained in National Security Study Memoranda written in 1969 at the direction of Henry A. Kissinger, who was then President

Richard M. Nixon's adviser on national security.

withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Okinawa at the time of the island's return to Japanese control, the memoranda refer to the "transit agreement" with the notation that it was a sensitive and closely held secret. The Joint Chiefs of Staff insisted that the United States in any case retain its rights to move nuclear weapons through Japan itself and extend them to Okinawa after the transfer of administration there. They contended that this was essential to maintain the United States nuclear deterrent in East

The issue of withdrawal of all nuclear weapons from Okinawa was left unresolved and was passed up to President Nixon for his personal decision. He said he would decide after all other points had been settled with the Japanese Government.

In May, 1969, Mr. Kissinger wrote a National Security Decision Memorandum for the President agreeing to open negotiation with Japan. Among the points in that memo were that Japan must agree to permit the United States to continue using bases on Okinawa with only slight restrictions and must ease restrictions on American use of bases in Japan proper. Implicit in that memorandum was a continuation of the transit agreement.

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WASHINGTON POST
14 November 1974

Victor Zorza

The Sino-Soviet Reconciliation

The blind spot which causes so many officials, in Washington as well as in other capitals, to deny the significance of the warmer climate between Moscow and Peking could cause them to miss a truly historic turn of events. The reconciliation between Russia and China that is now taking shape could be as important for the world as the Sino-Soviet conflict was when it finally emerged in the open in the early 1960s, after simmering under the surface for several years.

The halting steps toward some sort of reconciliation became clearly visible when Peking began to play down the danger of war with Russia more than a year ago. The new Peking slogan proclaimed that Russia was making only "a feint to the East" while threatening the West—but it was accompanied, somewhat inconsistently, by the old accusations that Moscow was also preparing an attack on China. Most Western analysts chose to regard Peking's talk of an attack as significant and to dismiss the new theme as mere propaganda.

But it was propaganda with a difference. Peking was giving Moscow a choice. The Kremlin could respond to the new slogan, or ignore it. Moscow sent back a number of positive signals, but these were overlaid by the menacing noises generated by the continuing Peking power struggle. The reconciliation with Russia is obviously a major issue in the power struggle, and the anti-Soviet noises made by the hardline faction in the Chinese leadership were wrongly regarded in the West as a rejection of Soviet overtures by Peking.

More recently, however, Peking's preoccupation with a sudden Soviet attack on China has greatly diminished. Chinese leaders have instead taken to telling foreign visitors that the Soviet Union was *not* going to make war on China in the near future. This could only mean that those who last year coined the slogan about the "feint to the East" had since prevailed in the Peking struggle, and that the prospect of reconciliation implied in the slogan a year ago had now become a matter of practical politics.

The latest Chinese message of greetings to Moscow on the October Revolution anniversary, which hints at Peking's acceptance of the Soviet offer of a non-aggression treaty, thus does not come out of the blue. The analysts who last year refused to attach any importance to the early signals cannot easily switch tracks now. But higher officials who nourish Kissinger's view that a reconciliation is unlikely are taking upon themselves a major political responsibility, as did the officials who told the West's leaders in the late 1950s that there was no such thing as a Sino-Soviet conflict.

Just how far official blindness can go is shown by the response which the Assistant Secretary of State, Walter Robertson made in 1959 to a series of articles which argued that Russia and China were locked in a secret struggle. Peking, he insisted, "works closely with Moscow." It was wishful thinking, he maintained, to forecast that they would allow any differences between them to outweigh "the dominant practical military, political and economic advantages they derive through continued close cooperation."

The articles, which had argued that "friction between Moscow and Peking is just beginning, but it may yet become the most significant development in the long cold war that lies ahead," were based on much the same kind of evidence as the material which led me to write, more than a year ago, that signs of a Sino-Soviet reconciliation were now becoming apparent. The fact that I was right in 1959 does not necessarily make me right now. But the fact that most government analysts and officials were wrong then should serve as a reminder that they do not have a monopoly of wisdom, and that they could be as wrong now as they were then.

At that time officialdom refused to accept the evidence because it did not fit in with its preconceived notion of the Communist monolith. Dr. Kissinger and his associates, who have used the Sino-Soviet conflict to play off Moscow and Peking against each other, so that it became a key factor in the structure of detente, may now be affected by similar prejudices of their own.

The Sino-Soviet conflict helped Kissinger to get President Nixon to Peking, and it helped him to get from the Kremlin some of the concessions on SALT which made Nixon's Moscow summit such a spectacular pre-election success. The Sino-Soviet conflict certainly helped him to maneuver both sides into forcing Hanoi to negotiate for a peace agreement. Without such negotiations detente among the great powers would have been impossible.

Kissinger publicly rejects the very notion that he could play Russia and China off against each other, but he can hardly deny that the United States has derived great profit from their conflict. His diplomacy suggests that he and his associates expect to derive no less advantage from it in the future. Could they have been blinded to the emerging new reality by wishful thinking, as their predecessors were?

NEW YORK TIMES
11 November 1974

COMING FORD VISIT DEBATED IN SEOUL

A Token Endorsement of Park's Rule Is Feared by Oppositionists

By FOX BUTTERFIELD
Special to The New York Times

SEOUL, South Korea, Nov. 10—President Ford's forthcoming visit here later this month has set off angry opposition from many Koreans who feel his trip amounts to approval by the United States of President Park Chung Hee's tough one-man rule.

And in a country that has long been ardently pro-American, dependent on the United States for its very existence, Mr. Ford's visit has roused some of the first anti-American sentiment heard here in years.

In the last week alone a group of 300 Korean Roman Catholic priests, about half the nation's total, called for President Ford to "reconsider" his trip. At the same time 21 Protestant clergymen, including nine American missionaries, demanded in a statement that Mr. Ford cancel his visit "because it shows support for the Park regime, which does not have the trust of the Korean people."

One Presbyterian minister the Rev. Ho Byung Sup, was arrested by the Korean Central Intelligence Agency for trying to mimeograph the statement. There have been other demands that President Ford meet with opposition leaders and that he convey American concern to Mr. Park over his increasingly repressive actions.

Source of the Vehemence

The vehemence of Korean opposition to the Presidential visit, the first since Lyndon B. Johnson came here in 1966, stems in large measure from a Korean tradition difficult for Americans to understand.

For as a people often forced into subservience by their larger neighbors, Koreans have developed a mentality of looking

to others for both protection and legitimacy. In earlier centuries envoys from China confirmed Korea's kings in their power, and in more recent times, Koreans say, this function has been transferred to the United States.

But American diplomats insist that Mr. Ford's visit has nothing to do with Korean politics and that therefore Mr. Ford should not get involved in meetings with opposition figures, or express concern to President Park.

As Ambassador Richard L. Sneider put in a meeting with American missionaries last week, "the American Government does not interfere in Korean domestic affairs."

Instead, according to one of the participants, Mr. Sneider said that Mr. Ford "comes with broader purposes," to reaffirm U.S. commitments in this part of the world. If Mr. Ford did not come here, after his earlier stop in Japan, "North Korea would take this as a sign and might miscalculate," Mr. Sneider told the missionaries.

There are still 38,000 American troops in South Korea, two decades after the end of the Korean war, and Washington has provided Seoul with more than $10-billion in economic and military assistance.

Many Koreans clearly see the visit in different terms from the official American view.

"There is no question that most Koreans believe President Ford is coming here to bless Park Chung Hee, it is the natural assumption for us to make," explained the editor of a major newspaper. "It saddens me, because it reduces the high regard we have for the United States."

One Invitation Turned Down

The editor asked that his name not be used, lest he be detained by the secret police. Earlier this year 203 Koreans, including the only living former president of the country, a Catholic Bishop and Korea's best known young poet, were convicted of subversion by secret military courts.

There has been speculation that Mr. Park might release some of these prisoners as a gesture of moderation in connection with President Ford's visit. However, a ranking Korean official said yesterday that the Government instead would release a small number of Americans held in Korean jails as convicted criminals.

Whatever their officially stated position, there is evidence that some American diplomats believe President Ford's visit creates a dilemma for the United States.

A request by the Blue House, the Korean equivalent of the White House, for Mr. Ford to appear with President Park at a mass public rally was reportedly turned down.

American officials here are also known to feel that their hands are tied in trying to influence Mr. Park's conduct because the United States is in a conscious phase of decreasing its involvement in other nations' affairs. These officials recall that 10 years ago, in a different era, Samuel D. Berger, then American Ambassador in Seoul, put pressure on Mr. Park and got him to hold elections.

During Mr. Ford's one-day stay, he is scheduled to have a two-hour meeting with Mr. Park at the Blue House and later be a guest at a state dinner given by the Korean leader. Mr. Ford will also lunch with American troops at Camp Casey near Seoul.

FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW
18 October 1974

Ideological foes woo Japan

By Koji Nakamura

Tokyo: The Japanese ploy of using China as a lever to bargain with the Soviet Union – it was such strategy which saw the acquiescence of hawkish, anti-communist leaders in the establishment of formal relations with Peking – has once again produced diplomatic overtures. For in virtually simultaneous action, Peking and Moscow have broached the subject of concluding World War II peace treaties with Tokyo.

Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin was quoted by Komei Party Chairman Yoshikatsu Takeiri as having said, in Moscow on October 2, that the ground for peace treaty talks would be prepared when Japanese Foreign Minister Toshio Kimura visits the Soviet capital in December or January and that the agreement could be concluded when he (Kosygin) follows this with a visit to Japan.

The following day, Chinese Deputy Premier Teng Hsiao-peng told a Japan Socialist Party delegation in Peking that a peace treaty between China and Japan should be formalised as soon as possible and, to this end, all obstacles should be overcome, the controversial Senkaku Islands issue being shelved.

While neither Moscow nor Peking has made an official bid for peace treaty talks to be held at Government level, Tokyo believes it is only a matter of time. Meanwhile, the Japanese Government has adopted a non-committal stance. Whichever way Japan jumps on the question of treaties, it is dealing with loaded issues.

The Japanese are aware that the Soviets are interested in the incorporation of the Asian Collective Security System in any treaty; Tokyo sees this system as an instrument designed to contain China. Japan is not willing, therefore, to be a party to a Moscow-orientated deal if China will be antagonised.

At the other end of the scale, there is the ticklish problem of the northern territory, currently occupied by the Soviets but over which Japan claims sovereignty, which may be offered as strategic bait to induce Japan into accepting the collective security concept. Japan has long claimed four islands situated off the northern tip of Hokkaido. Moscow has been refuting the legitimacy of such claims for the past eighteen years. The reversion of two of the islands – Habomai and Shikotan, the closest of the group to Hokkaido – was promised in 1956 with a joint declaration about a peace treaty. But the Soviets have also claimed that the territorial issue has "long been resolved."

There is one school of Japanese diplomatic thought which believes the return of the two islands would be a cheap price for Moscow to pay if such a deal ensures Japan being party to the collective security philosophy.

Yet another side to any peace treaty with the Soviet Union is Japan's possible involvement in Siberian programmes for the development of crude oil and natural gas. Japan is not, however, as enthusiastic about such a joint undertaking as it was a year ago when there was the promise of an annual supply of 25 million tons of Tyumen crude oil. Despite this Japanese cooling over the project, the Soviets still have, in the crude oil idea, a powerful negotiating card. Oil is Japan's weakest suit.

In Peking, there is the realisation that a Soviet-Japanese treaty concluded ahead of a Sino-Japanese agreement would inevitably be used by Moscow as an anti-Chinese political weapon. It is because of this, Tokyo feels, that China has even offered to forget such a burning issue as the Senkaku Islands besides a Peking willingness to shelve the diplomatic determination of Taiwan as regards Japanese activity.

It is reasonably certain that China's crude oil offer to Japan contributed to Tokyo having second thoughts on involvement in Siberia. China, scheduled to supply the Japanese with 5 million tons of crude oil during 1975, told an economic delegation from Japan that it could export 10% of its crude output to Japan by 1980. That annual output is projected at 400 million tons.

Since Japan views the Soviet Union as its potential No. 1 enemy, it is likely that a treaty with China will precede any agreement with Moscow. From the other side, a "China treaty first" movement might be the death knell for not only a Japan-Soviet agreement, but also for any hopes of solving territorial disputes.

And, finally, there is the United States to consider. Washington's dealings with both China and the Soviet Union has a major bearing on Japanese policy. Japan's path might well be decided by American dealings with the two communist giants.

THE NEW LEADER
14 Oct. 1974

CIA Chickens

VIENTIANE—Over the past 10 years, CIA-employed U.S. operatives trained, transported, supplied, and advised a 15,000-man guerrilla army, composed mostly of Meo tribesmen, as it fought pro-Communist Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese forces. In addition, the Americans, many of them ex-Green Berets with Vietnam combat experience, taught the Meos to man radar installations that guided United States bombers toward targets in North Vietnam, and sent teams of tribesmen on forays into the People's Republic of China.

The China missions, however, were brought to a halt by the 1972 Sino-American détente; American bombing of North Vietnam stopped early in 1973; and the supply and training activities were terminated last spring, in accordance with peace agreements ending this nation's civil conflict. Consequently, CIA agents, looking for a fresh field of endeavor, have turned to civic action projects. Centered in Laos, where the Meos are concentrated, the new programs involve substantial sums of money and their purpose is plain: to retain influence over an important segment of the populace in a strategic part of the country.

The agency's primary contact in the area is the flamboyant General Vang Pao, a 46-year-old Meo who runs northern Laos like a feudal lord, and who is now reaping significant rewards from poultry raising, the CIA's most successful civic pursuit. In a transformation that took place at Long Cheng, the Meo leader's longtime base and formerly a CIA field headquarters, General Vang Pao has become Chicken Farmer Vang Pao.

Long Cheng lies about 100 miles north of Vientiane, the Laotian capital. Once dominated by the rattle of gunfire and the roar of American aircraft, it currently crackles with the sound of cackling chickens as a result of a $25,000 CIA investment. Some 2,500 birds, brought in batches from Bangkok every two weeks, are housed there in five specially designed structures. After being raised for eight or nine weeks, they are sold in a local market serving several thousand Meos.

The general, who for more than a decade used CIA funds not only to pay his irregular forces but also to build and furnish a number of lavish houses for his six wives, makes approximately $1,000 a month from the enterprise (the average per capita income in Laos is $60 a year). An American close to him is willing to overlook Vang Pao's income. "At first it bothered me," he says, "but after a while you come to realize that this is the system—and it works. Vang Pao can be called a dictator, yet he is basically a benevolent one, and his profits are not excessive by local standards." In fact, the community benefits because the chickens sell for below-normal prices.

Besides chicken-raising, the CIA has backed a cattle-breeding program and the establishment of farm-supply centers providing agricultural commodities at reduced rates. Although these projects are administered by the Agricultural Development Corporation (ADC), an agency nominally under Laotian government control, they depend upon American support for survival, and when budgetary cutbacks in the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) threatened to eliminate or severely curtail ADC operations last February, an infusion of CIA money put the organization back in business. Altogether, the CIA has spent over $100,000 on its civic action undertakings.

Six American agricultural experts at present supervise ADC ventures. All are genuine civic action workers, not CIA hands. "These men are my employes in the purest sense; they have no other professional concerns," explains Charles Mann, who has headed AID's annual $50 million program here since 1969. Still, when asked about the source of ADC funds, Mann replies: "No comment."

As for the six experts, they prefer to ignore the question of financing. "I'm not happy about where the money comes from," says one, "but I am concerned with civic development, and I care a great deal about the Meos. The source of our funds, and the motives behind them, mean little to me, compared to what we are doing for these people."

On the other hand, Senator Edward M. Kennedy, chairman of the Senate subcommittee on refugees, feels the CIA's current approach raises "troubling questions." He has long opposed the agency's use of humanitarian programs as a cover, and recently declared: "Despite our country's general support for the cease-fire agreement and the new government, several indicators suggest that the intent of some of our remaining presence in Laos can only help to perpetuate old relationships and the division of that country."—ARNOLD ABRAMS

Western Hemisphere

Sunday, Nov. 3, 1974 THE WASHINGTON POST

Latins Dismantling U.S.-Sponsored Wall Around Cuba

By Joseph Novitski
Special to The Washington Post

BOGOTA, Colombia, Nov. 2—The diplomatic and economic wall that was built around Cuba by the United States and its Latin American allies more than 10 years ago has begun to crumble under pressure from the Latin Americans.

For 14 years, three U.S. administrations have used economic aid, diplomatic pressure, military intervention and the CIA to enforce a political and economic embargo cutting Cuba off from Latin America.

Now, for the first time since Cold-War tensions began to ease, detente is being allowed into Latin America. But the Cold-War years left their mark and left Latin countries feeling more like the colonies of an empire than partners in an allinace.

"American economic dominance in this part of the world exists as a matter of fact," Carlos Lleras Restrepo, a former president of Colombia, said in a recent interview. "But the Latin countries have learned, after voting along to keep China out of the United Nations for 20 years, that the U. S. changes its diplomatic position strictly in accordance with its own interests and that there is no need to follow."

"The wall isolating Cuba from its natural neighbors and trading partners in the United States, the Caribbean and in South America was designed to keep Fidel Castro's formula for socialist revolution from spreading through the hemisphere. The United States began this isolation by cutting off Cuban sugar imports and all U. S. exports to the island in 1960, a year after Castro came to power, and by backing the abortive invasion at the Bay of Pigs the next year.

Latin American countries then helped to build the wall, slowly and reluctantly, under intense U.S. pressure, with unilateral actions and collective diplomatic decisions taken between 1961 and 1964. Recently, many of the same countries which helped start the quarantine have taken the initiative to end it.

Mexico originally voted against the 10-year-old collective decision forbidding trade and diplomatic relations and has never respected it. Over the last four years, first Chile, under the late President Salvador Allende, then Peru, Argentina and Panama have disregarded the collective decision and have exchanged diplomatic missions and goods with Cuba.

Others want to follow, but decorously. So Colombia, Costa Rica and Venezuela, the firmest U.S. allies when the embargo was set up by the Organization of American States, have requested that the original decision be reconsidered.

Next weekend, a conference of OAS delegates from 23 countries will meet in Quito and the required two-thirds majority is expected to vote to leave each member country free to choose its own kind of relations with Cuba. For the first time in the history of the Cuban controversy, the United States, so far as Latin diplomats in three countries have been able to determine, has no clear position.

"The problem is over now, said Arturo Frondizi, president of Argentina when the United States under the Kennedy administration began pushing for the isolation of Cuba. Frodizi was one of the former presidents, foreign ministers and diplomats interviewed in Argentina, Brazil and Colombia over the last two weeks on their role in resisting or helping the isolation of Cuba.

"Now we're heading toward the full reincorporation of Cuba in the Latin American community," Frondizi said. "But what has changed is the relation between the U.S. and Russia, not the relations with Latin America."

Isolating Cuba from Latin America failed to bring down Castro's government or force it to change course, as three U.S. Presidents apparently hoped it would. In the view of those interviewed, it halted the spread of Cuban-style revolution only when the United States was willing to intervene in Latin internal affairs. For these men, the policy had three other effects that were predicted by public figures as it was taking shape in 1961 and 1962.

Frondizi made his predictions in letters to and conversations with his friend President John F. Kennedy. The late Francisco San Tiago Dantas of Brazil, then foreign minister, made his publicly in speeches.

First, Cuba, despite Castro's vaunted nationalism, became a Soviet satellite. Frondizi, trying to head off the isolation in December 1961, warned Kennedy that it would. But the Argentine president come away with the impression that Kennedy was under strong domestic pressure to "do something" about Cuba.

"Imagine that Kennedy asked me, in Palm Beach, not to send my memoranda on Cuba through diplomatic channels," Frondizi said.

Then, the inter-American system of defense alliances and the OAS, which had been built on the principle of self-determination for all-member states, was strained to the breaking point. Some say it has broken down as the result of U.S. intervention and of internal differences.

All those interviewed asserted that the precedent for intervention set by the 1962 decision to expel Cuba from the inter-American system opened the way for the U.S. invasion of the Dominican Republic in 1965 and for massive CIA support for opposition to President Allende, who was closely allied to Cuba.

"The U.S. became the great judge of the fitness of governments in the hemisphere," said Sen. Julio C. Turbay, who argued with the United States in favor of diplomatic action against Cuba when he was Colombian foreign minister in 1961. "That was not what we had intended."

This was the second effect seen by the Latins. Finally, Latin domestic politics became increasingly radicalized under the pressure to line up on the U.S. side in the Cold War. Stumbling democratic governments that had favored Cuba's right to go its own way fell to military coups in Argentina in 1962, in Brazil in 1964 and in Chile last year.

"U.S. action in these years radicalized our internal processes and contributed to the failure of democratic experiments to change social and economic structures," Frondizi said.

"I believe opposition by our two countries to the expulsion of Cuba from the inter-American system was one of the factors contributing to the military coups in Argentina, and later, in Brazil," Frondizi stated. The former president added that there were, of course, strong internal political drives leading to the coups in both cases.

There were also internal reasons behind subsequent coups in Bolivia and Ecuador, which sided with Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Chile at the OAS conference in Punta del Este, Uruguay, in January 1962 and did not vote for the U.S. resolution expelling Cuba. Only Mexico, among the countries that opposed the measure, has kept the same form of government since 1962.

"Intervention is bad in any event," said Carlos Lleras, president of Colombia from 1966 to 1970 and a staunch U.S. ally. "It is not the U.S. role to decide the fate of individual countries. But it has, and the result has been that the U.S. winds up supporting right-wing

dictatorships in the name of anti-communism. These regimes are repressive of human rights and that gives the U.S. a verg bad image."

In the beginning, U.S. hostility to Cuba also took a more positive form. It was channeled into the Alliance for Progress, a huge, hemisphere-wide effort, underwritten by the United States, to show that democratic governments could also deal with social and economic development problems successfully.

The alliance, begun by President Kennedy in August 1961, was an instrument of U.S. policy under President Johnson. It faltered and died under President Nixon. But in the eight years between 1961 and 1969, the United States and international organizations committed more than $18 billion in aid to Latin American countries.

"Generally, the social situation of the Americas today is much better than it was before," Lleras argued. "What happened was that the U. S. mixed cooperation under the alliance with cases of political intervention and secondly, that alliance instruments were eventually used to protect American economic interests."

In the first years of the alliance, there were two cases of the kind of U. S. intervention that Lleras mentioned: in Brazil and Argentina.

The Alliance for Progress included an express commitment to representative democracy. In 1961, President Frondizi in Argentina and President Janio Quadros in Brazil felt they represented majority public opinion in their own countries when they opposed U. S. pressures to begin walling Cuba from the rest of the Americas. Quadros, although a conservative, had even campaigned on the issue of support for the Cuban revolution and won the 1960 elections by the largest majority in Brazilian history.

Frondizi and senior Argentine diplomats who served his government recalled in recent interviews that military and newspaper pressure on his government to change its Cuban policy was intense. Frondizi stated that Argentine intelligence services, which he said were in touch with the CIA, were recommending a break with Cuba and a vote at the OAS to isolate Castro's island.

Then, when he went to Washington on an official visit at the end of 1961, Frondizi recalled, Secretary of State Dean Rusk handed him a packet of letters that had allegedly been stolen from the Cuban embassy in Buenos Aires.

[Rusk, reached by phone in Athens, Ga., said, "I have no recollection of the incident," although he did recall meeting Frondizi on a visit to the United States.]

"The letters named men of my absolute confidence as Cuban agents," Frondizi said. "They were false on the face of it. Furthermore, the forgery was badly done. It was done by Argentine intelligence services. guided by the CIA, in cooperation with Argentine citizens and Cuban exiles."

That charge has been made before, but Frondizi's accusation has recently received indirect corroboration from Phillip Agee, a former CIA agent writing a book about his service in Latin America. At the time, Frondizi was faced with the allegedly forged letters, similar letters had served the Peruvian government as an excuse to break diplomatic relations with Cuba. Agee, then stationed in Ecuador, made an entry in his diary for Dec. 30, 1960.

"Peru's break in relations with Cuba today [is in part] the result of a Lima [CIA] station operation in November," says the Agee manuscript. It describes a raid by Cuban exiles on the Cuban embassy in Lima, when some documents were stolen. "The Lima station inserted among the authentic documents several that had been forged, including a list of persons in Peru who received payments from the Cuban embassy totaling about $15,000 monthly."

In Brazil, which was the leader among countries opposing American policy on Cuba, the traces of U.S. intervention are closer to the military coup in 1964 that toppled Joao Goulart, an ineffective vice president who succeeded Quadros after the latter resigned. The coup replaced Goulart with a pro-American military government that has been in power ever since.

President Kennedy tried hard to get first Quadros, then Goulart lined up with the U.S. Cuban policy and linked fully with the Alliance for Progress. He failed. An exasperated Johnson administration was considering a declaration in late 1963 that Brazil could not pay its debts.

With the threat of a declaration of international bankruptcy, three Brazilians went to Goulart on Dec. 31, 1963 — three months before the coup — seeking a presidential statement in favor of the Alliance for Progress, to head off the U.S. declaration.

The three were former Foreign Minister Dantas, Miguel Osorio, a career diplomat then serving in the Brazilian embassy in Washington, and Renato Archer, a congressman who had served as deputy foreign minister.

"Goulart said he would not make any such statement because the Americans were already conspiring against him with Brazilian army officers," Archer recalled last week in Rio de Janeiro. Goulart "reached behind his desk and brought out a folder and read a list of reports about meetings between Col. Vernon Walters, the U.S. army attache, and generals we all knew were against Goulart."

Col. Walters served until after the coup in the U.S. embassy and was promoted to general. He is now deputy director of the CIA.

"I think Walters became the liaison between several groups in the army that were plotting against Goulart," said Afonso Arinos de Mello Franco, another Brazilian former foreign minister. "He was the man who had access to all of them and could move around."

Governments and policies change and even Castro has been showing signs that he wants an end not only to Cuba's isolation from Latin America but from the United States as well.

The top of the wall around Cuba was completed in 1964, after the coup in Brazil, when the Democratic Action government of Venezuela presented evidence to the OAS of clandestine Cuban landing of arms on Venezuelan territory.

Under the collective defense treaty of Rio de Janeiro, with a two-thirds rule in effect, the membership voted to make the break in diplomatic and trade relations with Cuba mandatory.

It is that decision that will be under review starting Friday in Quito—with the Venezuelans, again under a Democratic Action Party government, among the leaders of those in favor of lifting the sanctions.

The U.S. embargo, in effect since 1960, was unilateral and is not under consideration.

But what has begun to be reconsidered in the United States, as seen from South America, is the ringing affirmation made 13 years ago by the chief of the U.S. delegation to the inter-American conference that drafted the Alliance for Progress. At that conference, Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon referred to Che Guevara, chief of the Cuban delegation, and declared:

"He has tried to give the impression that the United States somehow recognizes the permanence of the present regime in Cuba. This we do not do and never will do . . ."

BALTIMORE SUN
14 November 1974

Soviet calls OAS Cuba vote 'Pyrrhic victory' for U.S.

Moscow Bureau of The Sun

Moscow—The Soviet Union, which had been counting heavily on the lifting of political and economic sanctions against Cuba, blamed the United States yesterday when the Organization of American States failed to do so at its meeting in Quito, Ecuador.

Commenting on the abstentions of the U.S. and five Latin American representatives on the question, a commentator for Tass, the official news agency, said "It is not clear that this 'neutrality' means nothing else but striving to preserve the blockade of Cuba?"

The Soviet Union probably was hoping that an end to the economic blockade would ease the aid, now estimated at more than $1.5 million a day, that Cuba requires from it.

The Tass commentator called the vote, which favored the lifting of the sanctions but fell short of the two-thirds majority required, "A Pyrrhic victory" for Cuba's enemies and predicted that it probably will hasten the demise of the Organization of American States.

Other Soviet commentators predicted that a number of other Latin American countries will ignore the sanctions and establish diplomatic and economic relations with Cuba.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
7 November 1974

Latin Americans turn up heat on U.S.

Stands on food, Chile criticized

By James Nelson Goodsell
Latin America correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

As Western Hemisphere foreign ministers gather in Ecuador to take up the issue of ending diplomatic and economic sanctions against Cuba, the United States is coming in for a new round of criticism from Latin America.

In the first place, Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger will not attend the foreign ministers' sessions — an absence that, to many Latin Americans, is an affront.

But the criticism of the United States goes deeper than the Kissinger absence.

The meeting in Quito, the Ecuadorian capital, stems from a Latin American initiative to take a fresh look at the Cuba question: Should the government of Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro be restored to hemispheric good graces?

Washington is reluctant to support the move, questioning whether Cuba has stopped exporting its revolution and meddling in the internal affairs of Latin American nations — the reasons for the sanctions against Cuba in the first place.

But most Latin American governments think that Cuba has stopped those practices and that relations should be re-established.

Moreover, Latin Americans ask, in effect, who is the United States to cast a judgment about meddling in internal affairs? One Latin American ambassador in Washington last week noted that it was the United States that spent millions of dollars to "destabilize" the government of the late Salvador Allende Gossens in Chile.

"How can Washington talk of Cuba's export of revolution when it was engaged in exporting its concept of government to Chile, meddling in Chilean affairs, and trying to unseat a legitimate government?" this ambassador asked.

The view is widespread. Disclosures in early September of Central Intelligence Agency activities in Chile have had a decidedly negative effect on Latin America.

There is also growing Latin American cynicism over Washington's motives in the international arena. The United States came in for a scathing attack at the World Food Conference in Rome by Argentine Foreign Minister Alberto J. Vignes, who accused the U.S. of playing politics with food.

Equally strong criticism from several other Latin American delegations is the result of Washington's failure in recent months to consult with Latin American nations on key world issues, observers say.

Much of this criticism goes right to Mr. Kissinger's doorstep for, since the April conference of the Organization of American States in Atlanta, Dr. Kissinger has busied himself with other parts of the world.

Rather than using his powers of diplomatic persuasion with the Latin Americans, he seems to have shoved the region onto the back burner — or so runs the Latin American feeling.

What it all boils down to is an increasingly critical view of the United States by Latin Americans.

Such criticism is nothing new. But there had been a feeling in 1973 and again early this year that Latin America and the United States, with Henry Kissinger displaying interest in Washington's hemispheric neighbors, were on a smoother course than in the past.

Such hopes appear dashed, and the Quito session may well, in the view of observers of inter-American affairs, show increasing Latin American criticism of the United States.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
14 November 1974

A U.S. gaffe on Cuba?

Latin American efforts to end diplomatic and economic sanctions against Cuba came within two votes of success at the Quito, Ecuador, meeting of hemisphere foreign ministers. Guatemala and Haiti, originally lined up with the majority wanting an end to the sanctions, decided at the last minute to abstain from voting.

There is strong hemisphere suspicion that Washington had a hand in these two vote changes. The United States denies it, but it will take more than verbal denials to convince a growingly skeptical Latin America that all was open and aboveboard at Quito.

Robert Ingersoll, head of the U.S. delegation, claimed after the vote that "we have not worked against the resolution," noting that the U.S. abstained. But many Latin Americans agree with Gonzalo Facio, the Costa Rican foreign minister who said the abstention placed Washington "squarely with the minority" on the Cuba issue.

Given the present mood in Latin America, Washington stands the risk of becoming isolated from its hemisphere neighbors who disagree with the U.S. not only on Cuba, but also on a whole range of political and economic issues.

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's absence from the Quito session has come in for sharp criticism also. In explaining Dr. Kissinger's absence, Washington argued he was busy elsewhere and that anyway the Quito meeting was ill-timed and too hastily organized.

This sort of argument, however, really begs the question. Washington's closest neighbors deserve Dr. Kissinger's attention. Moreover, the Cuba issue itself has been on the hemisphere agenda for months.

The whole affair appears yet another U.S. gaffe in Latin American policy. Dr. Kissinger would be well advised to make amends by early consultations with hemisphere leaders. Delay in trying to undo the damage done at Quito will only make U.S. efforts in Latin America more difficult in [illegible]

WASHINGTON POST
14 November 1974

Peru President Lists Diplomats As CIA Agents

Reuter

LIMA, Nov. 13,—Peruvaian President Juan Velasco Alvarado said tonight that his government had quietly expelled several CIA agents including a senior U.S. embassy official, since taking over in 1968.

Answering press questions, General Velasco said: "Without any scandal and without publicity, we invited the ambassador of the United States to withdarw several members of the CIA from the country, including the number two at the embassy, named Siracusa, and a certain Ortiz."

[Ernest V. Siracusa was deputy chief of mission in Peru in the late 60s and Frank V. Ortiz Jr. was supervisor of the political section, according to State Department lists, which show both of them subsequently assigned to Uruguay.]

NEW YORK TIMES
14 November 1974

No 'Victors' at Quito

No winners emerged from the abortive meeting of foreign ministers in Ecuador that failed by two votes to repeal the official sanctions invoked against Cuba in 1964 by the Organization of American States. Fidel Castro may claim a psychological victory because twelve of twenty-one voting delegations favored repeal; but he cannot fail to be disappointed that the effort fell short of the necessary two-thirds majority.

The most conspicuous losers were the sponsors of the repeal resolution, Costa Rica, Colombia and Venezuela, who counted on support that did not materialize. Another loser was the United States, whose silence throughout the Quito deliberations hardly fitted the absent Secretary of State Kissinger's promise of a "new dialogue" with Latin America and whose abstention on the vote was widely regarded as abdication of responsibility on a critical problem.

In deciding on abstention, obviously in part for domestic political reasons, the Ford Administration ignored the recent recommendation of the non-partisan Commission on United States-Latin American Relations that Washington "take the initiative in seeking a more normal relationship with Cuba" and back repeal of the O.A.S. embargo. It also lined up with authoritarian military regimes and against the hemisphere's few remaining democracies.

The biggest loser of all, however, is the O.A.S. itself, whose relevance had already been sharply questioned by some member states. With some justice, the twelve who voted for repeal called the requirement for a two-thirds majority "a procedural absurdity," and rightly branded the sanctions "anachronistic, ineffectual and irksome." Seven members have already ignored the O.A.S. embargo to restore relations with the Castro regime. At least four more are likely to do so within a few months. The twelve supporters of the repeal resolution correctly asserted that its defeat at Quito "seriously compromises" the authority of the O.A.S.

NEW YORK TIMES
8 November 1974

Inter-American Blueprint

A privately-funded commission headed by former Ambassador Sol M. Linowitz has produced a report that could vastly improve this country's relations with Latin America if carried out by the Administration and Congress. The great virtue of this effort is that it substitutes specific recommendations—33 in all—for the highflown rhetoric that has characterized too many previous United States initiatives in the hemisphere.

The recommendation that commanded the most attention because it will be put to an immediate test at a meeing of American foreign ministers in Ecuador is the call for an end to the fourteen-year attempt to isolate Cuba in the Americas. The commission urges Washington to seek "a more normal" relationship with the Castro regime, to end its own embargo on trade with Havana, and to be willing, at the meeting that begins in Quito today, to support repeal of the sanctions invoked against Cuba by the Organization of American States in 1964.

Repeal may be voted at Quito whatever Washington does; but the commission rightly fears it may be the United States that is isolated in the hemisphere if it maintains the hardline policy. No miracles should be expected; but it is time to liquidate an ineffective policy and try to ease Cuba's return to a more constructive pattern of inter-American and international relations.

Of comparable importance for improving this country's relations with its hemisphere neighbors is the commission's strong support for a new and long overdue treaty under which jurisdiction over the Panama Canal Zone would eventually pass to the Republic of Panama. It is imperative for the United States to remove what the report calls "one of the last vestiges of Big Stick diplomacy" under terms that insure uninterrupted use of the canal and a continuing United States role in its defense.

In two other areas where decisive policy changes are critically overdue, the commission would ban unilateral United States military intervention in Latin America, such as that in the Dominican Republic in 1965, and would end all covert interference in the domestic politics of other American nations such as the activities supported by the C.I.A. in Chile in 1970-73.

* * *

The commission's recommendations on the more dramatic inter-American problems—Cuba, Panama, covert political interference—should not obscure its detailed suggestions for removing a host of other irritating and self-defeating policies and practices little known to the general public and often the products of special-interest lobbies. It would, for example, eliminate the United States veto over Inter-American Development Bank loans—a frequent target for Latin-American attack—while maintaining the level of this country's contributions to the Bank.

Congress is asked to repeal legislation that tries to mandate economic sanctions in disputes about such matters as fishing rights or the expropriation of North American properties. The report rightly says that these sanctions are usually counterproductive; and it makes the point that the national interest does not automatically coincide with "the perceived interest of an individual firm."

Here, in sum, is a report that clothes practical idealism in common sense. It never loses sight of genuine United States interests while ruthlessly pruning away presumed or imaginary or long-outdated interests. It would be hard to produce a better blueprint for the "new era" and "mature partnership" in inter-American relations that Secretary of State Kissinger has promised.

...The Missing American

It is a matter of regret that Secretary of State Kissinger is unable to attend what seems certain to be the most momentous meeting of the Organization of American States since it nearly foundered in the aftermath of the United States military intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965.

For many Latin Americans, no hemisphere issue has more immediate importance than the question of opening the door for Cuba's return to the inter-American system. This is the only item on the agenda for the meeting of American foreign ministers now getting under way in Ecuador.

Mr. Kissinger favorably impressed his Latin-American counterparts when he made a special effort to open a dialogue with them at the United Nations a year ago. In three subsequent encounters, he has made progress in defining a fresh United States approach that he called "the policy of the Good Partner," arousing enthusiasm with his proposal that the American foreign ministers meet regularly for candid, informal discussions of pressing hemisphere problems. It is particularly unfortunate that his excruciating schedule of world travel forces him to be absent at Quito.

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