NEWS, VIEWS and ISSUES

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No. 16 15 October 1974

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Governmental Affairs

LONDON TIMES
30 September 1974

Lord Chalfont

The grim alternative to secret diplomacy

There have been two fairly predictable reactions to the disclosures of the role of the American Central Intelligence Agency in the fall of the Allende government in Chile. Some people have expressed a sense of great outrage and anger at the interference of the Americans in the internal political affairs of a foreign country; others have argued that the only fault to be found with the CIA's action was that "it came in with too little and too late". The uproar which has surrounded the affair has some profound implications, not only for American foreign policy, but also for the whole structure of international relations.

It is, of course, possible to argue that the nation state power game is intrinsically corrupt and degrading. The whole apparatus of diplomacy is regarded by some of the more starry eyed internationalists as superfluous and obstructive; people, they say with more passion than logic, should be allowed to speak to other people without the intervention of ambassadors.

It would indeed be an enchanted world if nations could be persuaded to place the universal good before the narrow interests of their own people. They do not, however, do so. We live in a jungle of nation states in which governments pursue their national interests with every means at their disposal, including, if the occasion demands, armed force.

It is in this context that the function of secret diplomacy must be considered. It is, as matters stand, quite acceptable for one country to attempt to influence the policies of another, if it believes that it can advance its own legitimate interests by doing so. Respectable ambassadors of unassailable probity daily expend substantial sums of money in this very process. Most people would wish to draw the line at the use or threat of force, or at direct intervention in the political affairs of another country; but these are very difficult lines to draw. One of the functions of diplomacy is to convince the Government of a foreign power that if it pursues policies which are congenial, economic and political, benefits may follow; and that if it does not, it will receive the diplomatic equivalent of a kick in the teeth.

The suggestion that a certain course of action "might have a serious effect on the relations between our two countries" is a polite but unmistakable threat; and the promise of economic aid is almost invariably a discreet but equally unmistakable bribe.

It can be argued, and indeed has been, that the activities of the CIA in Chile were no more than a manifestation, in a somewhat dramatic form, of this kind of secret diplomacy. The argument, in its simplest form, goes something like this. America buys, at prevailing market prices, the materials it requires to sustain its highly technological economy, from a variety of countries all over the world. If it sees one of those countries coming under communist domination, it has a duty to its people to ensure the continued supply of its essential raw materials. As a communist government might terminate that supply, the United States is entitled to do something to prevent it from coming to power, or, at any rate, from remaining in power too long. As the use or threat of force is inconceivable, it has to rely upon secret diplomacy; and the use of American agents and money in pursuit of that diplomacy is entirely defensible.

So far the argument is a persuasive one, and, by the standards of modern international relations relatively respectable. It is only when the Central Intelligence Agency gets in on the act that the picture starts to break up. The world of "intelligence" is a squalid and nasty world (indeed there are sensitive souls in this country who will sue you for libel if you even suggest that they once belonged to it). Its activities cover a wide spectrum from the collection of documents in barrack latrines to the discreet assassination of uncooperative politicians. So it is important to be clear, as far as possible, about exactly what the CIA was up to in Chile. The official version is that it dispersed funds with the exclusive aim of keeping opposition to the Chilean government alive, at a time when Allende was seeking to destroy it. It is no secret that substantial CIA funds went to newspapers and radio stations; and the claim of those who defend the action of the American administration is that they were designed to ensure that there was a measure of democratic control over an increasingly authoritarian government.

Any suggestion that the CIA actually took part in the military coup which led to the death of Allende and the installation of the right-wing government are strenuously denied. Critics of the administration, however, may be forgiven for displaying a certain scepticism. The record of the agency in the more aggressive forms of secret service work—known in the macabre imagery of the Russian secret service as "wet affairs"—is a lurid one; and there is now a vigorous campaign in the United States to investigate the whole affair and disclose in detail the activities of the CIA in Chile. One possible outcome of such an inquiry might be the political destruction of Dr Kissinger, who, as Secretary of State, is considered to be primarily responsible for United States policy in Chile and, in particular, for the operations of the CIA there.

It would be as well for those who may now be rubbing their hands at the prospect of another Watergate and of swift retribution for yet another batch of ruthless American hatchetmen, to ponder some of the deeper implications.

One of the factors which should be kept clearly in mind is the activity of the KGB the Soviet equivalent of the Central Intelligence Agency. It is an organization as pervasive and ruthless as any secret service in the world. One of its principal aims is the subversion of the political institutions of the West; and those who now condemn Dr Kissinger and the State Department should not ignore the fact that the Allende government received nearly £200m from the Soviet Union in contrast to the £2m the CIA is alleged to have spent on the opposition.

If there should now be, as a result of an inquiry into the events in Chile, a full disclosure of the methods, contacts and sources of the CIA in Latin America, it will undoubtedly be regarded as a victory for the open society. As Louis Heren pointed out in his article on Victor Marchetti's The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence (September 5, *The Times*) secret agencies in any country are uneasy partners for democratic governments and the idea of individual liberty. There is a real danger that if democracy uses the methods of its enemies it may destroy the very freedom which it is concerned to preserve.

Yet, if the United States is debarred from access to some of the less attractive instruments of secret diplomacy, while its enemies, unhampered by the pressures of public opinion, continue to use them the power structure of the world might be gradually but irreversibly changed; and the change is not likely to be one to delight those who believe in an open society.

NEW YORK TIMES
29 September 1974

The K.G.B. Plays Dirty Tricks

By ROBERT CONQUEST

LONDON—Recent revelations about the Central Intelligence Agency's activities in Chile and elsewhere raise the questions of the nature and extent of comparable actions by its great rival, the K.G.B., the Soviets' Committee for Government Security. In fact there is a good deal of knowledge available, not from the Soviet press or Government, but from victims or intended victims who found out the hard way.

The K.G.B. is not simply a Soviet mirror-image of the C.I.A. (or even of the C.I.A. plus the Federal Bureau of Investigation). One difference was demonstrated a couple of weeks ago when Pravda announced the award, on his 70th birthday, of the Order of the October revolution to Semyon Ignatiev who was Stalin's last head of the organization and who was responsible for, among other things, the notorious doctors' plot purge. Yuri Andropov, the current K.G.B. chief, got the Order of Lenin and the title Hero of Socialist Labor earlier, after a speech in which President Nikolai Podgorny praised his "strengthening and improving this important sector of state activity."

The sort of fears about the C.I.A. that have arisen in the United States, have no parallel in Soviet concerns about the K.G.B.

The C.I.A. and the K.G.B. also differ in size and resources. Perhaps 6 of every 10 Soviet diplomats and other representatives abroad are K.G.B. personnel; those not directly employed must also help out when called upon.

In 1971, the British expelled 105 members of the Soviet Embassy staff. Espionage figured largely in the British Government's explanation for its action, but it was also established that British intelligence had discovered plans for sabotage, not only of military installations but also of such things as water supplies.

The British incident was by no means a lone example. Since 1960, at least 380 Soviet diplomats have been expelled from their posts in 40 countries on all six continents. Oddly enough, men expelled by one country frequently turn up—without even a name change—in neighboring capitals.

Not that operations are always conducted through embassies. Sometimes the route is more direct. That was the case with arms supplied to the Provisional faction of the Irish Republican Army, several tons of which, en route from Prague to the Ulster terrorists, were seized at Amsterdam in October, 1971.

Financial intervention to support pro-Soviet elements is old-established practice but does not necessarily go through the K.G.B. channels, since practically every other Soviet channel is secret too. Communist parties have long been so funded: The details of subventions to the Italian Communist party, again via Prague, were established 20 years ago. Recently there have been other examples including the discovery by Mexican officials in 1968, and by Brazilians in 1972, of scores of thousands of dollars concealed in the luggage of party officials returning from Moscow. The Colombians, in 1968, intercepted a $100,000 subsidy to terrorists, by the K.G.B. itself.

And when it comes to such matters as coups and plots, the last three years alone have seen the organization of the Ali Sabry plot against the regime in Egypt (1971); the plot against Gen. Gaafer al-Nimeiry in the Sudan (1971); the organization, arming and training of guerrillas, for which five Soviet diplomats were expelled from Mexico (1971); a plot in Rumania (1972); plots in Bolivia and Colombia for which Soviet diplomats and others were expelled (1972); a plot in Tunisia with the same results (1973); the recently discovered plot in Yugoslavia. There, on Sept. 12, Marshal Tito referred publicly to a case that had been brewing for some months and which involved the arrest and forthcoming trial of an underground "Stalinist" grouping, which relied on help from "abroad" and whose leaders are old Soviet nominees and K.G.B. contacts.

The fact that some of these occurred in Communist countries was no phenomenon. Earlier examples included the Soviet-sponsored "Natolin" plot against Wladyslaw Gomulka in 1956, and Admiral Teme Sejko's conspiracy in Albania in 1964. They even extended to Cuba where, in 1968, several Soviet diplomats and others were denounced and expelled for organizing and supporting an attempt to seize power.

Later, of course, differences between Premier Fidel Castro and Moscow were largely accommodated, and the Cuban secret service has been largely financed by Moscow for operations in South America, just as the Czechoslovak equivalent is the K.G.B.'s favored auxiliary in Western Europe. In the case of Chile, where the C.I.A.'s conduct is now under attack, it was through their Cuban subordinates that the K.G.B. directed the training of guerrillas. Their own direct operations in Chile were largely of the cash-and-organization type. In that, at least, there apparently is a parallel with the C.I.A.

Robert Conquest is an author of books on the Soviet Union, including "Power and Policy in the U.S.S.R."

WASHINGTON POST
06 October 1974

Chilean Editor Denies Receiving CIA Funds

United Press International

A Chilean editor denied in a letter made public yesterday that his newspaper received funds from the CIA during the three-year government of President Salvador Allende.

Rene Silva, editor of Mercurio of Santiago, made the denial in a letter to the Inter-American Press Association. Mercurio has been mentioned as the recipient of clandestine funds in Washington reports.

President Ford said funds went to threatened opposition parties and press.

"Although I don't participate in the financial side of the company," Silva wrote, "I am certain that its incomes have legitimate and normal origins, they are known by all and controlled by the legal authorities of the country." Silva said the Allende government had attempted—but failed—to prove charges of CIA backing for Mercurio.

In Santiago, Gen. Augusto Pinochet, president of the military junta, said policy changes in Chile's state of internal war that were recommended by Sen. Edward Kennedy were "unacceptable coming from a foreign politician."

Pinochet's comment on the Kennedy suggestions, which the senator said would encourage support for bilateral cooperation if adopted, appeared in publication of correspondence between the two men last May. Kennedy asked that constitutional guarantees and civil courts be reinstated.

Pinochet replied that Kennedy's suggestions were a clear demonstration of "imperialist mentality."

New Statesman 27 September 1974

Laurence Stern

What's Good for America . . .

An off-hand remark by Henry Kissinger, recorded in the secret minutes of a 27 June 1970 meeting of the National Security Council's 'committee of 40' tells us all we need to know about the Washington political climate in which the the CIA interventions in Chile were hatched. 'I don't see why we need to stand by and watch a country go communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people,' the architect of the American détente policy declared some two months before Chileans would vote for their new president. It was this meeting which produced the authorisation for a 'modest' programme of political espionage — a mere $400,000 worth – against Salvador Allende.

At other such meetings, also chaired by Kissinger, the rest of some $8m. in black funds was targeted at the leader of Chile's Leftist coalition. This was the amount which was reportedly acknowledged by CIA director William E. Colby in testimony delivered to an executive session of the House of Representatives sub-committee on intelligence oversight. Estimates by other government officials familiar with US covert operations in Chile during the past decade are considerably higher.

This runs counter to the popular notion of the CIA as an unguided missile, a runaway espionage apparatus blithely toppling governments and installing reactionary juntas in capitals around the world beyond the control of its superiors. The truth is far more sinister. In Chile, in Cuba, in Guatemala, in Greece, in Vietnam, in the Congo and in Laos the CIA was operating under a direct presidential charter in a framework of executive authority insulated by thick wraps of official secrecy from control by any other sector of national leadership. It is, in every sense, a king's army commanded by the President through his National Security Adviser.

President Ford's defence last week of the CIA's covert intervention against a lawfully elected government in Santiago as 'in the best interests of the people of Chile' was in the tradition of kingly Hubris. Mr Ford, at heart a man of touching humility, put himself in this instance beyond the restraints of logic, historical accuracy and good sense.

His justification for the CIA-financed programme of political and economic espionage against the Allende government – that it planned in its inception to destroy opposition newspapers, radio and television media as well as political parties – echoes against the gruesome silence today of the closed newspaper plants and political party headquarters in Chile. While Allende was not able to accomplish the evil designs imputed to him by President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger during three years in power, the junta which replaced him managed to do it all within 24 hours.

Senator Walter F. Mondale of Minnesota bitterly inquired whether the CIA is now engaged in any covert programmes designed to reopen the newspapers, radio stations, political parties and even the National Congress which were padlocked by Chile's new rulers. If the present Administration in Washington is so concerned about the maintenance of political liberties in Chile, how can it continue to shovel millions of dollars in economic assistance to the men who have brought an unprecedented dark age of repression to Chile? Why is the same US influence in the World Bank, the Export-Import bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, which was used to cut Chile's credit lifeline during the Allende years, now being applied to restore it?

There are many here – including members in good standing of the Henry Kissinger appreciation society – who are being forced to the conclusion that Washington was less interested in political freedom in Chile than in supplanting the Allende government with one which would adopt a more 'reasonable' policy in dealing with the US transnational corporations. It is these corporate interests in Chile which were, for all practical purposes, defined by the Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy to be at one with the national interest. 'National interest' was the shibboleth which lay at the heart of the worst deceptions of the Watergate scandals. That President Ford should invoke it in justifying CIA efforts to sabotage a constitutional government in Chile demonstrates how thin a lesson Watergate has been.

The Chile revelations have now rekindled the debate over the CIA and what should be done to bring it to heel. Legislation has been introduced to establish a joint congressional oversight committee to replace the hand-picked review sub-committees which have through the years served as Congressional claques for the CIA. The traditional attitude towards the CIA overseership on Capitol Hill was unforgettably articulated by Senator John Stennis, senior Senate watchdog of the agency: 'Spying is spying . . . you have to make up your mind that you are going to have an intelligence agency and protect it as such, and shut your eyes some, and take what is coming.'

It has been a customary practice in the orchestration of covert action programmes within the '40 committee' and the CIA to prepare cover stories not only for the press and public but for Congress as well. And so congressional oversight has amounted to little more than the blindfolder leading the blind. The CIA director, William E. Colby, has announced a new policy of public candour for his appearances before Congress: he will not lie about clandestine operations hereafter; he will simply refuse to talk about them.

Realistically speaking, any overhaul in the congressional oversight system will result either in more legislators being taken into camp or more bent testimony by the CIA, Assistant Secretaries of State and Kissinger as well. As long as the agency is provided a charter for operations to evict, install or harass governments, it will have to rely on the principle of plausible deniability.

which is the watchword of clandestine activity.

Another approach, which in the reformist spirit of the moment has gained at least debating-hall respectability, is abolition of covert action programmes and confining the role of the CIA to intelligence collection – its original charter.

Such a policy would condone quiet penetration but proscribe the noisy climax. It is a position which can be persuasively argued in the light of the results of most covert operations that have surfaced over the past decade or so. They range across a spectrum of accomplishment from the dubious to the disastrous in their impact on the national interest and world opinion.

The CIA maintains that it buries its successes and that is why we don't hear of them. Perhaps we may be forgiven for suspecting that this, too, might be a cover story.

Washington

WASHINGTON POST
07 October 1974

The Senate and the CIA

THE HOT AND HEAVY protests which followed disclosure of the CIA's subversion in Chile have produced an official affirmation of "dirty tricks" of unprecedented scope and explicitness. Mr. Ford reacted two weeks ago not only by acknowledging an American role in the overthrow of the Allende government but by declaring his readiness to take future "actions in the intelligence field." No American President had previously either defended a particular operation or justified such operations as a whole. To be sure, it was not the substance of what Mr. Ford said but his public statement of it that was new. It is not surprising that a President would support established presidential policy. But the response of Congress is something else again.

We print on this page today excerpts from a historical Senate debate of last Wednesday, "historical" because it marks the first time that either house of Congress has conducted an open debate and openly voted on whether the United States should engage in secret foreign operations in peacetime, intelligence gathering aside. A leading student of the CIA, Harry Howe Ransom, wrote recently that "one searches in vain in the public records . . . for any evidence of congressional intent or acquiescence to assign the functions of foreign political action or subversion to the CIA." The "search" can now end. Last Wednesday the Senate considered an amendment by Sen. James Abourezk (D-S.D.) to end dirty tricks completely. The amendment was swamped, 68 to 17.

The CIA and its supporters can now claim—fairly, we believe—that for the first time the agency has a congressional mandate, if only from one house, for covert operations. No longer can CIA operations be regarded as an unauthorized presidential habit or cold-war carryover. Though only briefly and without hearings or committee recommendations, the Senate did join the debate and express its judgment. It was, moreover, a judgment we happen to share. As we have said, given American interests and global uncertainties, the United States should not deny itself the CIA option in all circumstances.

We think, nonetheless, that Mr. Abourezk performed a service by forcing a vote on an issue from which most legislators have traditionally averted their eyes. The senator was under no illusion that his amendment would win. But he wished to make the Senate accept accountability for CIA operations and to establish the issue as one deserving regular review. If the CIA can now claim a new mandate for covert operations, then senators must now be ready publicly to justify their own stands. The furor over CIA activity in Chile, the Watergate disclosure that the CIA is not immune from political usage, the fading of the congressional traditionalists who have protected the CIA from critical congressional scrutiny—all these factors have opened up the issue in a major way. Sen. John Stennis (D-Miss.), one of the leading traditionalists, remarked on the change last Wednesday. "It is not an easy job that I have had on this matter," he said. "I will not relate the incidents that have come up. It was my duty, and that was it. After all, we are working for the same country."

Just what the new attitude personified by Sen. Abourezk will finally lead to is, of course, uncertain. It is noteworthy, however, that since the Chile affair became known, the administration has been conducting a kind of preemptive retreat by offering certain concessions to Congress on "oversight." Its latest move is to promise timely briefings on operations to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, as well as to the oversight committee of the Armed Services Committee. This broadens the circle of those who can offer the CIA their advice on operations, though the agency still does not ask for legislators' consent. It also broadens the circle of those whom the CIA can swear to secrecy. A legislator so sworn, who finds himself opposed to a proposed operation, will still face the intolerable choice of breaking his oath or swallowing his best judgment.

We do not think there is a good way to square the circle: to have effective public oversight of secret operations. It is a humbling contradiction for a democratic society. Sen. Abourezk's answer—to abolish secret operations and to meet all foreign threats openly and publicly or not at all—has the virtue of consistency but, in our view, falls short in terms of policy. The portions of the debate published here today indicate, if nothing else, just how difficult the issue is.

WASHINGTON POST
07 October 1974

The 'Covert Operations' Debate

The following are excerpts from the Senate debate of Oct. 2 on an amendment to the foreign aid bill which would have ordered the Central Intelligence Agency immediately to halt all covert operations not related to intelligence. The amendment was defeated, 68 to 17. This marked the first time either house of Congress had debated and voted on this issue.

Sen. James Abourezk (D-S.D.): This amendment will, if enacted, abolish all clandestine or covert operations by the Central Intelligence Agency.

I believe very strongly that we must have an intelligence-gathering organization and I believe the CIA and our defense intelligence agencies do an adequate job in this respect.

We have every right to defend ourselves from foreign attack and that right includes intelligence gathering to protect our security.

But there is no justification in our legal, moral, or religious principles for operations of a U.S. agency which result in assassinations, sabotage, political disruptions, or other meddling in another country's internal affairs, all in the name of the American people. It amounts to nothing more than an arm of the U.S. government conducting a secret war without either the approval of Congress or the knowledge of the American people.

I want to remind the Senate that the present director of the CIA, William Colby, said a couple of weeks ago that while he preferred to retain the clandestine or covert services, the Capitol would not fall if it were abolished.

He also said that there was not any activity going on anywhere in the world at this time that required the use of clandestine activity.

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Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho): I have decided to vote for this amendment, but I do so with the expectation that it will not pass.

The intrusion of the CIA into the internal political affairs of Chile for the purpose of subverting and bringing down the elected government of that country is an episode that I find both unsavory and unprincipled and in direct contradiction of the traditional principles for which this country has stood.

I think the fact this has now come to light demonstrates that the covert activities of the CIA are presently under no effective restraint.

I would hope that it will be possible to establish, either through a joint committee or by some other means, adequate congressional surveillance over the activities of the CIA, in order to avoid in the future such unseemly interference with the rights of other peoples. If so, then we will have solved this problem without having to outlaw covert activity outright.

I can envision situations in which the national security of the United States, or the survival of the republic, or the avoidance of nuclear war, would have such overriding importance as to justify covert activity.

But none of those factors was present in the Chilean case and none of those factors has been present in previous cases which later came to light, wherein the CIA has undertaken to covertly subvert the government of other countries, contrary to our treaties, contrary to the principles of international law, and contrary to the historic role played by the United States in world affairs.

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Sen. Hubert H. Humphrey (D-Minn.): It involves, as I see it, too important a matter of public policy to be made summarily here on the floor of the Senate.

This amendment was not presented to the committee. It has not had hearings, even though the whole subject of the Central Intelligence operations has, here and there in the committees of Congress, been looked at.

It is my judgment that the Central Intelligence Agency needs to be carefully examined and that a whole set of new directives need to be evolved, but under what circumstances the CIA should be allowed to continue to engage in covert operations abroad is a legitimate and timely question.

I have offered repeatedly a resolution for a joint committee on national security that would represent both bodies of the Congress; that would represent leadership in Congress as well as those who are not in leadership positions; members from the Foreign Relations Committee, Armed Services, Appropriations; members from the Foreign Affairs, Armed Services, and Appropriations Committees as well as those appointed by the Chair and the Speaker, to oversee the entire operation of our national security apparatus. I believe it is needed.

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Sen. John Stennis (D-Miss.): I have had some responsibility in the Senate for a good number of years with reference to the CIA activities. Frankly, I have been more interested in the military part, the surveillance over that, and the very highly valuable information that they have brought us.

I have talked to many senators about this. I have not found a single one, except the author of this amendment—and there are others—who firmly believe that we ought to abolish covert actions and have no capacity in that field.

I say it is a dangerous thing to do. This surveillance is quite a problem, members of the Senate. We have had it up for many, many angles. As an individual senator, I am ready and willing to just get out of the picture. I do not want to run the thing, so to speak. But as chairman of the Armed Services Committee, which has primary jurisdiction here, I am not going to be put out, nor run over, either. I do not think anyone wants to do that.

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Sen. Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.): If we destroy our right to engage in covert activity altogether by the adoption of this amendment—in fact, I think the language [illegible] would even prevent us from going to war—I think we would be making a very grave mistake.

I do not support everything that the CIA has done. On the other hand, I do not know everything it has done, and I do not think we necessarily have to know. I think this would be dangerous.

I cite the example of a member of the House of Representatives who happened to have seen, so he says, a page of testimony. We do not know whether he saw that testimony or not. But on this one statement, in which, in my opinion, he violated his pledge to secrecy, the whole CIA has come under criticism. I do not believe it is fair of this body to accept the hearsay words of a man who divulged classified material.

So, I hope we will defeat this amendment and defeat it soundly. I think I am safe in saying that the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, together with the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, would be willing to institute proper hearings, at which time we could hear all arguments for and against the operation of our intelligence collecting agencies.

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Sen. Clifford Case (R-N.J.): If I may express my own view about covert activities, it is that they all should be regarded as wrong. There ought not to be an institutionalization of them, even to the extent that we have now. I do not think that a committee is the answer. We have a committee downtown, a Committee of 40, which is supposed to review this matter and advise the President; and he acts on their advice in most cases, I understand.

We have a committee here, when it meets. I am not complaining that it does not meet more often, because I do not think a committee is the answer.

Once we get into an institutionalization of this kind of thing, we begin to make it respectable, and that I do not like. There ought to be a general rule against it, with a general understanding of the American people that on occasion the President has to act in violation of the law, if you will—our law, other laws—and take action in the interest of a country, in great emergency. This I think he does at his own peril and subject to being either supported or turned down by the country, after the fact. I think this is about as close as we can come to any statement about how this matter ought to be handled.

I would, of course, consider any proposal made for procedural reform here, but I want to state now that I do not think any such thing is possible because of the nature of the animal with which we are dealing.

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Sen. Howard Baker (R-Tenn.): The thing that really disturbs and distresses me is that I am not sure in my mind that any of us have any way to know whether or not covert operations are being properly conducted, or conducted at all, or for what purpose.

I do not think there is a man in the legislative part of the government who really knows what is going on in the intelligence community, and I am terribly upset about it. I am afraid of this lack of knowledge. For the first time, I suppose, in my senatorial career I am

frightened. I am generally frightened of the unknown.

I have proposed, with 32 co-sponsors in the Senate, to create a special Joint Committee on Intelligence Oversight. Through such a committee, I hope we will know. We do not know today, so it is with great reluctance that I will vote against this amendment.

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Mr. Abourezk: I have just heard some of the most incredible arguments I have heard in my life, arguments in favor of continued breaking and violation of the laws of the United States and of other countries, promoted by the agents of the Central Intelligence Agency.

I do not know why anybody in Congress or in this country wants to finance a secret army—and that is exactly what the CIA has been—a secret army going around fighting undeclared wars, without the knowledge of any of us in Congress until it is too late, without the knowledge of anybody in the country until it is too late.

It seems to me that the arguments in favor of having covert operations which can at some points break the law have as little validity as the argument that we ought to maintain a covert operation permanently. I say that because, if this country is ever in danger of atack or under threat from another country, we have a right to declare war and to operate under the rules of warfare that we have agreed to in the various Geneva Conventions, in which I am convinced we would then be legally operating in the manner that the CIA is now operating.

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Sen. Mark O. Hatfield (R-Ore.): To me, it is transparently obvious that the CIA's covert operations, undertaken in Chile to "destabilize" the Allende government, were in violation of these commitments of international law. At the very least, such operations compromise the sincerity of our loudly proclaimed desire for world peace and world freedom, I think we ought to address ourselves to the legal obligations this nation has undertaken when it has affixed its signature to these various statements and these various charters.

That is why I feel that the amendment offered by the senator from South Dakota really does not go far enough. I should like to see it go farther, to put this Senate on record that we totally and completely oppose any involvement whatsoever in covert activity. That does not deny the gathering of information and intelligence, but indicates the refusal of this Senate to permit the CIA to go beyond gathering intelligence into an action of covert activity.

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Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.): I am in great sympathy with much of this thinking of the senator from South Dakota—but I agree with the able senator from Minnesota. I do not believe this is the way it should be done.

What should be done is the establishment of a joint committee of the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services—and I have so presented to the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee for many years. We have a strange dichotomy here.

In every country of the world, the head of the CIA reports to the ambassador. That has been true ever since the issuance of the so-called Kennedy Letter. But when information comes back here, whereas the State Department supervises ambassadors, the Armed Services Committee supervises the CIA.

This situation should be corrected, and I believe it will be corrected. On the other hand, I do not think this is the bill where it should be considered. Inasmuch as 95 per cent or more of the work of the CIA has to do with countries with which we are not at war, normally at least some of the matters of the CIA should come under the Foreign Relations Committee, it is clear that the Foreign Relations Committee should at least have some interest in reviewing the work of the Central Intelligence Agency.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
4 October 1974

Winds of change

CIA cloak and dagger

By William H. Stringer

A short while after the Communist regime of Jacobo Arbenz was overthrown in Guatemala, with some help from the United States Central Intelligence Agency, the United Fruit Company took a group of newsmen on a junket to Central America. I was one of the newsmen. There, among the mountains and the volcanos, we saw banana plantations, palm oil plantings, experimental farms, all maintained by the United Fruit Company. We were brought home on a spic-and-span boat full of bananas.

My conclusion, at that point, was that if Arbenz aimed at upsetting this setup, he was doing Guatemala a major disservice. And that it was a "good thing" that the CIA had helped to get rid of this Communist regime. (Particularly since it was close to the Panama Canal.)

Still, of course, the U.S. was, by means of the CIA, interfering with Central American politics.

Later, when in the Philippines, I heard numerous individuals, both officials and laymen, lament that Ramon Magsaysay had been killed when his airplane hit a mountain. He was a man of great promise, a leader who could have done much to set the Philippines on a clear road to democratic self-government. That the CIA had helped Magsaysay and helped in putting down the threat of the Communist Huk guerrillas seemed to me a worthwhile contribution to Asian peace.

Was the U.S. interfering in Philippine affairs?

Then there was Iranian Premier Mohammed Mossadegh. He was a wily individual who took to his bed and wept when affairs went wrong. He nationalized the Iranian oil industry and he threatened to overthrow the Shah. He was abruptly ousted from office, with assistance, apparently, from the CIA.

Should the CIA have left well enough alone and let things take their course?

Each individual must make up his own mind about such matters. What I am saying is that the CIA's record is hardly one of repeated failures.

Now what about Chile and the end of the Allende regime? I know a lady in Chile who, speaking for the middle-class point of view, declares that Chile could not have settled down to solid government so long as Allende was seeking constantly to nudge it into communism. Of course, neither she nor most Chileans expected that the overthrow of Allende would be accompanied by harsh repressive measures.

What is at issue here is whether, at all times, the CIA must eschew covert operations. CIA director William E. Colby recently said that the CIA could abandon every kind of covert action, without "a major impact on our current activities, or the current security of the United States."

Is this actually so? There is an "old boy network," the Committee of 40, long-experienced American officials who believe it to be worthwhile to retain the CIA's capacity for covert activities. These people believe they are aware of the basic interests of the U.S., and that there are times when covert "interference" can help.

Director Colby has moved to reduce covert actions and to focus more of the CIA's activities back to its original mission, which is the gathering of intelligence. This is probably wise. What is not so clear is whether Congress, which is notoriously loose-jawed when it comes to a question of keeping one's mouth shut, should be given any more control of the CIA than it now has. Every attempt in the past few years to give Congress more effective supervision of the CIA has been voted down.

Crosby S. Noyes writes in the Washington Star: "There are a good many areas in the world today where the future of democratic government hangs in precarious balance and where action — or lack of action — by the United States could well be decisive."

There could be situations where we certainly would not want to send in the marines. Nor do we want our potential opponents to indulge in a lot of shoving around, with impunity. This leaves a very occasional situation where covert action is advisable.

NEW YORK TIMES
07 October 1974

Controlling Secret Operations

By Harry Rositzke

MIDDLEBURG, Va. — The dramatic and divisive issue of secret operations abroad has again been raised by the recent exposures of the United States role in Chile. These operations have been challenged as an illegal and immoral form of diplomacy impermissible in an open society. They have been derided as antiquated holdovers from the cold war, and have been denounced as acts of the executive not open to Congressional or popular judgment.

The basic questions raised are simple: What, if any, secret operations should the United States carry out abroad? Who is to control them?

With Harry S. Truman's assignment to the Central Intelligence Agency in 1948 of a charter for secret-action operations, in addition to its espionage and counterespionage missions, successive Administrations have without exception used their secret arm of Government to achieve foreign policy objectives for which they could not, or would not, openly use the resources of the State and Defense Departments.

Two main types of action operations, political and paramilitary, vary in method, scale and degree of secrecy.

The most expensive, conspicuous and flagrantly illegal are paramilitary operations. During the early stages of the cold war, they were directed against the Soviet orbit itself, many in support of resistance groups in the Baltic countries, the Ukraine, Poland and Albania, and after the Korean war in northern China.

In the nineteen-fifties, President Dwight D. Eisenhower approved support for the Indonesian rebels against President Sukarno and authorized the invasion of Guatemala to prevent the introduction of Soviet arms into the Western Hemisphere.

He left to his successor, John F. Kennedy, the legacy of paramilitary action, which resulted in disaster against Premier Fidel Castro's regime. After the Bay of Pigs, the C.I.A.'s paramilitary capability was concentrated almost exclusively in Indochina.

Political-action operations — secret support of foreign leaders, political parties and labor unions, and the preparation of coups and countercoups —have been carried out under the aegis of every postwar President.

Under Mr. Truman, the anti-Communist fight focused on Europe, starting with substantial open and secret support for Italy's democratic forces to stave off a Communist victory in the 1948 elections. Mr. Eisenhower's main political-action moves were in the Middle East, both with backdoor diplomacy in the Arab countries and the unseating of the regime of Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran.

A C.I.A. political-action role was an intrinsic part of Mr. Kennedy's counterinsurgency program, which was carried on by Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard M. Nixon. The Alliance for Progress in Latin America entailed support for friendly governments in countering domestic insurgencies as well as action against regimes sympathetic to Havana or Moscow.

In friendly countries, the C.I.A. trained and equipped national police and security organs to deal on their own with active insurgencies, mainly in Bolivia and Venezuela, but on a smaller scale in other countries as well. In countries such as Ecuador or Brazil, which were willing or eager to recognize Mr. Castro's Cuba, it helped to weaken or replace regimes.

Chile's place in this over-simple paradigm is unique. In a society with a solid democratic tradition, a "friendly" Government not facing a domestic insurgency was replaced in a free election by an "unfriendly" coalition of parties enjoying strong financial and political support from Moscow and Havana. Secret political action was called upon to supplement American policy both before and after the election of Dr. Salvador Allende Gossens as President in 1970.

Although the legal and moral issues involved in interfering in the affairs of other countries may never be settled to the satisfaction of the Congress, the news media or the public, there are some steps President Ford can take now to reduce the confusion, and possibly the debate, about American secret operations abroad.

A first simple step would be to transfer the responsibility for secret paramilitary operations to the Defense Department. Never totally secret, demanding complex logistic support, they do not belong in a secret civilian agency.

Political contacts ranging from senior government officials to labor leaders are a natural element in any secret intelligence service. If such contacts are used for action purposes, they can normally be kept secret—short of coups or high-level leaks.

There will be occasions, even in a world of détente, when the executive will decide that secret political action is required.

The President can most effectively appease some critics by inviting selected representatives of Congress to sit with the National Security Council when it considers secret-action proposals. What Congress needs are previews—not more post-mortems.

Harry Rositzke worked in secret operations for 27 years with the Office of Strategic Services and the Central Intelligence Agency before his retirement in 1970.

WASHINGTON POST
04 October 1974

Hill Leaders Join Senate CIA Panel

United Press International

The Senate oversight subcommittee on the Central Intelligence Agency was expanded yesterday to include the Senate's two party leaders.

Sen. John C. Stennis (D-Miss.), chairman of the Armed Services CIA subcommittee, said Democratic leader Mike Mansfield of Montana and Republican leader Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania had agreed to "sit and participate in the activities" of the panel.

The subcommittee and its counterpart in the House exist to keep a congressional watch on CIA activities and spending. The two are the only groups in Congress that are told exactly how much money the CIA spends. But neither subcommittee submits reports, and their activities are almost as secret as the CA itself.

Stennis' announcement came after the Senate accepted Wednesday a foreign aid bill amendment, offered by liberals, that would have banned secret CIA activities abroad unless the President himself declared them to be in the interest of national secu-

BALTIMORE SUN
4 October 1974

Ex-spy tilts with CIA

London (Reuter)—A former United States spy turned Marxist, Philip Agee, yesterday moved to embarrass the Central Intelligence Agency by making public a list said to be the agency's operatives in Mexico.

A book by Mr. Agee, to be published here in January, tells of his work with the CIA in Latin America up to the time he resigned, disillusioned, in 1969.

Yesterday he told a press conference held above a Fleet street pub that he wanted to expose CIA officers and drive them out of the countries where they operated.

He said his list of agency personnel in Mexico, under Richard Sampson, a station chief, was drawn up recently "by comrades who I trained to follow the comings and goings of the CIA."

The 39-year-old writer, who now lives in southwest England, painted the agency as the "secret political police of American capitalism and the enforcer of economic exploita-

LOS ANGELES TIMES
6 October 1974

U.S. Ought to Suspend Covert Activities Abroad

BY DAVID WISE

When Soviet party chief Leonid Brezhnev was in Washington in 1973 for a summit meeting, Richard Nixon introduced him to a short, thin man with graying black hair, sharp features and very cold blue eyes behind glasses rimmed in flesh-colored plastic frames.

Brezhnev stared for a moment at William E. Colby, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and asked: "Is he a dangerous man?"

Colby replied soothingly: "The more we know of each other, the safer we both will be."

The answer was disarming, but it also was consistent with the CIA's current strategy of emphasizing its information, intelligence-gathering, and analytic functions, and downplaying its covert operations or "dirty tricks."

The CIA does indeed collect foreign intelligence. But its Directorate of Operations—which Colby formerly headed—also conducts secret political operations around the globe. These have ranged from payments to foreign political leaders and attempts to rig elections, to overthrowing governments and paramilitary invasions. CIA-backed coups have sometimes resulted in the assassination of the political leaders who are overthrown. At times, the CIA has even operated its own air force, army and navy.

Increasingly, these secret operations have come under criticism, in and out of Congress. Covert activities have focused public attention on the question of whether the United States has the right to intervene secretly in the internal affairs of other nations. And secret operations have raised basic questions about the role of an intelligence agency in a democracy.

Recent disclosures that the CIA, apparently with the approval of high officials of the Nixon Administration, spent $8 million in Chile to "destabilize" the Marxist government of Salvador Allende have increased demands for either an end to such secret political operations, or tighter control by Congress over CIA, or both.

The CIA was created in 1947 as the successor to the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). The same legislation created the National Security Council. The purpose of the CIA, as set forth in the law, was to pull together the intelligence information that the President needs to make decisions in the field of foreign policy. There is nothing in the law about overthrowing governments; there is language, however, permitting the CIA to perform such "other functions" as the NSC may direct.

Under this umbrella clause, the CIA has engaged in its global dirty tricks, manipulated the politics of other countries, directed a secret war in Laos, funneled millions of dollars through foundation conduits into student, academic and labor groups, dropped agents by parachute in various countries and served as the clandestine arm of the U.S. foreign policy.

A partial list of such covert operations includes the following:

Burma: In the 1950's the CIA financed approximately 12,000 Chinese Nationalist troops who fled to Burma as the Communists took over mainland China in 1949. The CIA's troops, discovering poppies to be more profitable than politics, soon became heavily involved in the opium trade.

China: In the early 1950's, the intelligence agency air-dropped agents into the People's Republic of China. Two CIA men, John T. Downey and Richard Fecteau, were captured and spent 20 years in Chinese prisons before they were released.

Philippines: Also in the early 1950's, the CIA backed Ramon Magsaysay's campaign against the Communist Huk guerrillas.

Iran: In 1953, the CIA overthrew the government of Premier Mohammed Mossadegh, who had nationalized the Iranian oil industry. The coup was led by CIA agent Kermit "Kim" Roosevelt, grandson of President Theodore Roosevelt. The operation kept the shah in power, and in its wake, American oil companies were permitted into Iran.

Guatemala: In 1954, the CIA toppled the Communist-dominated government of President Jacobo Arbenz Guzman of Guatemala with the help of a CIA air force of old World War II fighter planes. President Eisenhower later confirmed that he had approved the CIA operation.

Indonesia: In 1958, with a secret air force of B-26 bombers the CIA backed Indonesian rebels against the government of President Sukarno. One of the CIA pilots, Allen Lawrence Pope, was shot down and captured; he was freed in 1962 through the intervention of Robert F. Kennedy.

Tibet: In the late 1950's, the CIA established a secret base at Camp Hale, Colo., nearly 10,000 feet high in the Rockies, and there trained Tibetan guerrillas to return to their homeland to fight against the Chinese Communists. CIA covert operators later claimed that some of the Tibetans trained in Colorado helped the Dalai Lama to escape to India in 1959.

Cuba: In 1961, a brigade of Cuban exiles trained by the CIA on a coffee plantation in Guatemala invaded Cuba at the Bay of Pigs in an unsuccessful attempt to overthrow the government of Fidel Castro. More than 200 of the invaders died on the beaches and almost 1,200 were captured in President Kennedy's worst foreign policy disaster.

Vietnam: In 1963, the CIA worked closely with the South Vietnamese generals who carried out the coup against President Ngo Dinh Diem, who was killed. In Vietnam, the CIA also created the Phoenix program, which killed 20,587 Vietcong during the period William Colby headed it, between 1968 and 1971.

Bolivia: In 1967, a team of CIA operatives was sent to Bolivia, where they helped to track down Ernesto "Che" Guevara, former aide to Castro. Guevara was captured and killed.

The rationale for all such covert CIA operations is that they are justified and necessary to protect American national security. A secret five-man government committee, known over the years by various names and currently as the Forty Committee, has the responsibility of approving covert operations in advance. At present, the chairman of the committee is Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger. Its other members are Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Joseph J. Sisco; William P. Clements, Jr., the deputy secretary of defense; Air Force Gen. George S. Brown, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Colby.

The extent to which the Forty Committee controls secret CIA operations remains uncertain for the very reason that the committee, like the CIA itself, operates in great secrecy. In any event, what control does exist is within the executive branch; the Forty Committee does not include any members of Congress in its ranks. Nor, as far as can be determined, does the CIA discuss its covert operations to any significant extent with the four shadowy House and Senate subcommittees that supposedly monitor CIA acitivities. In the case of Chile, various Executive branch witnesses assured congressional committees that the United States had not intervened against Allende.

In an era of cold war, secret intervention in other countries might have seemed justified to many Americans. They do not appear justified today. There is no moral or legal basis for covert operations—the 1947

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act does not specifically authorize them—and such intervention violates the charter of the United Nations, which the United States is pledged to respect.

Moreover, the Constitution gives Congress the war power; secret operations involving paramilitary action and the overthrow of governments are clearly the equivalent of undeclared war and, on their face, unconstitutional.

The price of secret operations is too high in a democracy that rests on the consent of the governed. Often, the government has lied to protect covert CIA activities. Such official lying has eroded confidence in our national leaders and the American system of government.

It is high time that the CIA put away its cloak and dagger and packed up its bag of deadly tricks. The CIA should be confined to gathering intelligence overseas. President Ford, Secretary Kissinger and their successors should conduct a foreign policy that is visible and accountable to the American people.

LONDON TIMES
2 October 1974

A dangerous gamble by the junta ruling Chile

There was a good deal of irony about President Ford's recent justification of the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency in Chile. The CIA had been authorized to intervene, he said, because of the threat to the opposition news media and the opposition parties under President Allende. But Mr Ford did not mention the fate of the news media and the parties under the present military regime which, unlike that of President Allende, has simply suppressed all opposition.

The fact is that the CIA was throwing its weight, once again, on the side of the right-wing elements in Latin America—those which opposed the socialist experiment of the Unidad popular government, regardless of the fact that it had been constitutionally elected. This intervention is not likely to have been decisive (the CIA, after all, failed in its original objective of preventing the election of Dr Allende). But it must have helped.

The most interesting question now is where the Chilean military regime is heading. It was not, after all, a typical Latin American takeover last year. The Chilean armed forces have not made a habit of taking over the government of the country, and they only moved last year after a period of some hesitation.

Once they had taken the plunge, however, they surprised almost everyone by the thoroughness and ruthlessness with which they acted—and still continue to act. They were not a government of transition, they said, but intended to re-shape Chile's national life. They decided that Marxism was the enemy, and that it must be rooted out. But they went even further than that, and now blame the country's political parties for virtually all the troubles of this century.

They have shown no urgency at all about handing power back to civilians. When they first took over, they appointed a special committee to write a new constitution—one that would exclude Marxist parties. But members of the committee say that it may take another year, or even two, to complete their work, and General Augusto Pinochet, the head of state, has said that it may take the junta 20 years to achieve its goals.

The junta's philosophy was set out with some vigour in a long speech which General Pinochet made on September 11, the first anniversary of the military coup.

The present "recess" of the political parties would have to continue for several years more, he said. It could only be lifted when "a new generation of Chileans, formed healthy civic and patriotic habits, and inspired by an authentic national feeling, can assume the direction of public life".

General Pinochet showed nothing but defiance towards criticism of the military regime from abroad. "It is one of the most infamous campaigns," he said, "though well financed and orchestrated, that has been directed against a country in modern times. It has one single origin—international communism."

The fact of the matter, he said, was that Chile offered lessons from which other countries could learn. The military takeover was "the culmination of the greatest defeat that communism has suffered in the world in the past 30 years.

This is the way that Chile's military rulers think today, and one wonders if the CIA is pleased with them.

Many of the junta's supporters would in fact like to see an easing of the military grip. Some such easing is regularly said to be imminent, and there is talk, for instance, of releasing political prisoners.

In the long run, the future of the military regime will depend on its success in handling the economy. Many members of the middle class remember the shortages and queues of the Allende period, and are glad to see things returning to normal for them. But things are not bright for everyone and, by their violent tactics, the military men are taking a gamble. If ever there was a reaction against them, it too could be violent.

Peter Strafford

THE OBSERVER, London
29 September 1974

Now India fears CIA subversion

from WALTER SCHWARZ

NEW DELHI, 28 September

INDIAN fears of subversion by the CIA, rudely reawakened by disclosure of the American role in the overthrow of Allende in Chile, are now embodied in a Bill to check the flow of secret foreign funds into India.

The Foreign Contributions (Regulation) Bill puts a check on politicians, officials and journalists. But there are fears that the measure may backfire.

While controlling the inflow of secret money could prove to be impossible, church leaders, trade unionists and journalists fear that the Government may use its new powers to curtail their freedom.

Mrs Gandhi, the Prime Minister, was reported as telling a party meeting recently that the disclosures over Chile were highly relevant to India, and that 'some countries' were 'still capable' of interfering in India.

Her main expressed fear, based on 1967 disclosures about CIA money in foundations and institutions throughout the world, is that Washington may try to limit the degree of socialism to be allowed in India. But a deeper, unspoken fear may be that the US will oppose India's attempts to consolidate its hegemony on the sub-continent.

After the Chile disclosures in Washington, the American Ambassador here, Mr Patrick Moynihan, cabled Dr. Kissinger saying: 'Mrs Gandhi does not think we accept her regime. She thinks we are a profoundly selfish and cynical counter-revolutionary power.'

The cable concluded that because of these fears Mrs Gandhi 'will, accordingly, proceed to develop nuclear weapons and a missile delivery system—preaching nonviolence all the way.'

Demand for action came

from all Indian parties after disclosures that American money had influenced both Government and Opposition candidates in the 1967 elections. These in turn led to a mass of fresh disclosures of Soviet money in friendship societies, youth groups, student orgainsations and trade unions, and American money in foundations.

A leaked Indian intelligence report showed that all parties, including the ruling Congress, got money from dubious sources.

It was also revealed that some newspapers and journalist received disguised bribes, either in cash or in the form of inflated payments for advertisements or bulk-buying of copies that were never printed.

Under the new Bill, Parliamentary candidates, journalists, officials and MPs will be absolutely forbidden to accept foreign 'contributions'—money, gifts or hospitality.

Organisations 'of a political nature but not being political parties' will have to seek Government permission before accepting similar benefits. Associations such as churches will have to submit detailed accounts of foreign remittances.

A clause which has been described as sinister by critics of the Bill gives the Government power to extend the Bill's categories to include 'any person,' and to exempt any body it chooses. A writer in the *Indian Express* says this is 'nothing short of dispensing power.' Penalties range up to five years' imprisonment.

Indian journalists writing for foreign newspapers will not be affected, because payments by way of salary or remuneration are exempted from the Bill's provisions. But some journalists fear that the Government could abuse its powers under the Bill to discriminate between writers it likes and those it does not.

Church and trade union leaders are reported to be worried that the Bill might open the door to harassment. The fear is especially alive in predominantly Christian areas with active resistance movements, like Nagaland, where the Church is closely identified with the people.

Trade unions also fear discrimination. 'The Bill was originally meant to control the CIA. But when the civil servants of the Home Ministry got to drafting it, it turned out to be directed mainly against Communist money,' complained a left-wing critic. But the Bill seems to be directed impartially at the CIA and the KGB.

The most plausible fear expressed is that the Bill's declared objectives will prove unenforceable, while it will enable officialdom to harass opponents and critics.

Perhaps, after all, Mrs Gandhi's best guarantee against CIA subversion was given in Dr Kissinger's promise to her last week—that if she sent him the name of any American in India interfering in politics, he would 'have him out of India within 24 hours.'

TIME, SEPTEMBER 30, 1974

INTELLIGENCE/COVER STORY

The CIA: Time to Come In from the Cold

Question: "Under what international law do we have a right to attempt to destabilize the constitutionally elected government of another country?"

Answer: "I am not going to pass judgment on whether it is permitted or authorized under international law. It is a recognized fact that historically as well as presently, such actions are taken in the best interest of the countries involved."

That blunt response by President Gerald Ford at his press conference last week was either remarkably careless or remarkably candid. It left the troubling impression, which the Administration afterward did nothing to dispel, that the U.S. feels free to subvert another government whenever it suits American policy. In an era of détente with the Soviet Union and improving relations with China, Ford's words seemed to represent an anachronistic, cold-war view of national security reminiscent of the 1950s. Complained Democratic Senator Frank Church of Idaho with considerable hyperbole: "[It is] tantamount to saying that we respect no law save the law of the jungle."

The question on "destabilizing" foreign governments followed Ford's confirmation that the Nixon Administration had authorized the Central Intelligence Agency to wage an $8 million campaign in 1970-73 to aid opponents of Chilean President Salvador Allende's Marxist government *(see box page 21)*. Until last week, members of both the Nixon and Ford Administrations had flatly denied that the U.S. had been involved in undermining Allende's regime. They continue to insist that the CIA was not responsible for the 1973 coup that left Allende dead and a repressive right-wing junta in his place.

Congressmen were outraged by the news that they had once again been misled by the Executive Branch. More important, disclosure of the Chile operation helped focus and intensify the debate in Congress and the nation over the CIA: Has the agency gone too far in recent years? Should it be barred from interfering in other countries' domestic affairs? Where it has erred, was the CIA out of control or was the White House at fault for misdirecting and misusing the agency? Should it be more tightly supervised, and if so, by whom? In addition, the controversy spotlighted the fundamental dilemma posed by an open, democratic society using covert activity —the "dirty tricks" or "black" side of intelligence organizations—as an instrument of foreign policy.

At the center of the storm was William Egan Colby, 54, the CIA's director for the past year. Shrewd and capable, Colby has sought from the day he took office as director to channel more of the CIA's efforts into the gathering, evaluation and analysis of information and less into covert actions—the "operational" side of the intelligence business. Says he: "The CIA's cloak-and-dagger days have ended."

Certain Actions. But obviously, not quite. It was Colby who oversaw the last months of the CIA activity in Chile as the agency's deputy director for operations in 1973, though this operation apparently ended shortly after he became director. But it was also Colby who disclosed details of the covert action to a closed hearing of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Intelligence last April 22. A summary of his testimony was leaked to the press two weeks ago. By the time Ford met with the press, Colby's revelations were more than a week old; the President had been briefed by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and doubtless was ready to field reporters' questions. Said Ford: "Our Government, like other governments, does take certain actions in the intelligence field to help implement foreign policy and protect national security. I am informed reliably that Communist nations spend vastly more money than we do for the same kind of purposes."

Since so much had already leaked out, Ford perhaps had no choice but to make an admission. But his statement seemed to set no or few limits on clandestine intervention in another country. A somewhat sharper but still highly flexible limit was set afterward by Kissinger. He told TIME: "A democracy can engage in clandestine operations only with restraint, and only in circumstances in which it can say to itself in good conscience that this is the only way to achieve vital objectives."

Moreover, there was an unsettlingly disingenuous quality to Ford's words. Was the intent of the Chilean operation really to preserve freedom of the press and opposition political parties, as he insisted, or simply to undermine Allende? In this context, it is worth noting that after the coup, the U.S. did not object when the new military regime banned all political parties and shut down all opposition publications.

There were other disquieting notes in the statement. Ford described the operation as being "in the best interest of the people of Chile"—a throwback to an America-knows-what's-best-for-you line of years past that was particularly offensive to many countries. In addition, Ford did not make the small but crucial distinction between intelligence gathering and covert operations, which led some critics to suspect that he was not wholly familiar with the subject.

Misled Congress. There was a degree of ingenuousness, perhaps even hypocrisy, in much of the indignation, since the CIA is widely known to have carried out Chile-style operations elsewhere before. What galled Congress and many other U.S. and foreign leaders was the fact that members of the Nixon Administration had repeatedly misled Congress about the Chile operation. At his confirmation last year as Secretary of State, Kissinger assured the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that since 1970, the U.S. had done nothing in Chile except try to "strengthen the democratic political parties"—although critics argue that fostering strikes and demonstrations amounted to a lot more than that. During another hearing, then CIA Director Richard Helms was asked if the CIA had passed money to Allende's political opponents. Helms' response: "No, sir." Former Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs Charles A. Meyer, former Ambassador to Chile Edward Korry and other Ad-

ministration officials gave similar testimony, though they may not have known about the operation.

The revelations, and Ford's confirmation of them, stunned many in Congress. "Unbelievable," declared Democratic Senator Walter F. Mondale of Minnesota. "Unsavory and unprincipled," said Church. Democratic Senator Stuart Symington said that the disclosure "certainly does not coincide with the testimony that this committee [Foreign Relations] has received." The committee launched a review of the testimony and a probe into the Chilean affair.

Anxious to heal the rift with Congress, Ford and Kissinger briefed nine senior Congressmen at breakfast the next day on Chile and covert affairs in general. Later, at a previously scheduled hearing on détente, Kissinger reiterated before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the intent of the CIA operation in Chile was merely to keep the Allende opposition alive and "not to destabilize or subvert" his government. Kissinger also conducted two separate briefings at the Senate. Still, Congress was neither convinced nor mollified. As the week progressed, growing numbers of Representatives and Senators called for an all-out review of the CIA.

The affair served to confirm all the worst suspicions about the CIA and its exaggerated image as a vast conspiracy. Reaction abroad ranged from incredulity to dismay. The London *Times* called the revelations "a bitter draught" for those who regard the U.S. as "sometimes clumsy, often misunderstood, but fundamentally honorable in its conduct of international affairs." West Germany's *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* predicted that "the disconcerting naiveté with which President Ford enunciated his secret service philosophy" would have a "provocative" effect.

Grave Decadence. That was the case in the capitals of the so-called Third World. From New Delhi, U.S. Ambassador Daniel Patrick Moynihan angrily cabled the State Department that he had assured Prime Minister Indira Gandhi that the CIA had not been involved in the Chilean coup. Now, he said, she wondered whether India might not be next. Many Latin Americans shrugged; the episode seemed to confirm their suspicions that the CIA invariably is behind the continent's frequent upheavals—political and otherwise.

Some cynical foreign reaction was not so much concerned with the CIA activities themselves as with their becoming known. Said a former President of Argentina: "If you ask me as an Argentine, the CIA intervention in Chile was wholly illegal interference in the sovereignty of another state. If you ask me to see it from the point of view of an American, the fact that Senators and Congressmen can interfere with the national security interests of the country for political motives indicates a grave decadence in the system."

The uproar recalled two earlier CIA fiascos: the Bay of Pigs disaster in 1961 and the revelation in 1967 that the agency for years had partly funded and manipulated the National Student Association and dozens of business, labor, religious and cultural groups. Both flaps overshadowed the positive services that the CIA had rendered before; there were demands for greater restraint by the CIA and closer control by the Executive Branch, but no real changes came.

The Chilean affair, however, potentially has more lasting impact, for the agency has already been badly bruised by the Watergate scandals. Says Michigan Representative Lucien Nedzi, chairman of a House committee that oversees the agency: "I don't believe that the CIA will ever be what it was before."

Agency officials have admitted that despite laws against domestic CIA activity, they supplied one of the White House "plumbers," former CIA Employee E. Howard Hunt, with bogus identification papers, a wig, a speech-alteration device, and a camera in a tobacco pouch. In addition, the agency provided the White House with a psychological profile of Daniel Ellsberg.

Political Police. Much to the agency's discomfiture, criticism has come from disillusioned former CIA employees. For two years, the agency struggled in court to stop publication of *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence*, whose principal author is ex-CIA Officer Victor Marchetti. The book accused the agency of using outmoded cold war methods and urged that it be prohibited from intervening in other nations' affairs under any circumstances (TIME, April 22).

Another critical book, *Inside the Company: A C.I.A. Diary*, will be published in London this January. In it Author Philip Agee, who, after twelve years of undercover exploits for the CIA in Latin America, switched to the side of the leftist revolutionaries he had been hired to defeat, calls the CIA "the secret political police of American capitalism."

On the contrary, CIA directors have maintained since the agency's founding 27 years ago last week that clandestine actions constitute only a small part of CIA activities. Indeed, over the years, the agency has provided a huge volume of reliable analysis and intelligence data that has served in part as the basis for U.S. defense and foreign policies. But Marchetti reports that the CIA devotes two-thirds of its annual budget (which totals around $750 million) and some 60% to 70% of its estimated 5,000 overseas employees to clandestine operations.

That evidently was not the intent of Congress in creating the CIA and giving it almost complete autonomy to safeguard its secrecy. Originally the agency's principal task was to gather intelligence and keep the Government informed about other countries, particularly the Communist nations.

That mission was incorporated symbolically into the CIA's seal: an eagle signifying strength and alertness, and a compass rose representing the collection of intelligence data from all over the world. But as the cold war grew, so did the scope of the CIA's duties. The law provided that in addition to collecting information, the CIA was "to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct." Under that directive, the CIA actively began trying to penetrate and even roll back the Bamboo and Iron Curtains, and to counter Communist influence in other countries. Its methods included support of pro-American political parties and individuals, covert propaganda, economic sabotage and paramilitary operations.

Under Cover. In theory, at least, the station chiefs who head CIA offices overseas operate under the cover of some innocuous-sounding embassy job such as attaché or special assistant. In practice, some chiefs are well known and some remain under deep cover, depending on the nature of the country. In London, for example, practically anyone who is interested can learn the identity of the CIA station chief; his arrival was even disclosed in the Manchester *Guardian*. In Saigon, the station chief's identity is well known but, by tacit agreement, never publicized by reporters. In politically turbulent countries, the identity of the station chief is a closely guarded secret. Warns one U.S. ambassador in South America: "If he is named, he will have to be recalled or his life won't be worth a nickel."

The extent of their duties also varies widely. In Hong Kong and Taiwan, the CIA operatives are all ears but no hands, their activities confined to monitoring radio broadcasts from the mainland, interviewing refugees and other information gathering.

By his own less than impartial account, Agee's main function for the CIA was to recruit agents in Latin America. In nearly every case, he says, the lure was money. He describes the CIA method of snaring an agent: "You start out by giving him money for his organization—lots of it—knowing that he will eventually take some for himself. When he gets dependent on it, you move in." Once hooked, the recruit is given a lie detector test to discover his weaknesses. Continues Agee: "Then it all hangs out. He can go on serving you as a spy for the rest of his life."

Americans usually learn of the agency's covert actions only when they fail so spectacularly that they cannot be kept secret. Examples: the U-2 incident in 1960, when the Soviets shot down the spy plane piloted by Francis Gary Powers; the CIA-directed invasion of Cuba in 1961; the Chilean operation. Over the years, there were successes for the CIA as well: the 1953 coup that deposed Premier Mohammed Mossadegh (who had nationalized a British-owned oil company and was believed to be in league with Iran's Communist Party) and kept pro-American Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi on the throne of Iran; the 1954 revolution that overthrew the Communist-dominated government of President Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala. The CIA has been suspected of participating in the 1967 military coup in Greece, the capture and killing in 1967 of Cuban Revolutionary Che Guevara in Bolivia, and the 1970 overthrow of Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia.

The CIA was deeply involved in the war in Southeast Asia. Starting in 1962, it organized and equipped an army in Laos to fight the Communist Pathet Lao. The army, which grew to 30,000 men, costs the U.S. at least $300 million a year, but Colby credits it with having prevented a Communist takeover.

Prison Camps. The chief justification for CIA operations is that the other side is doing the same—and more. Communist powers have an advantage over Western democracies. Communist parties can get orders from Moscow or

other Communist centers (although in recent years many have become more independent) but take the guise of local political movements. Moreover, Communist dictatorships without inquisitive legislatures or press can organize and finance secret operations in other countries in a way that no open society can. Unlike American leaders, Communist leaders never acknowledge such activities. The Soviet Union's KGB, headed by Yuri Andropov, regularly runs what the Russian bureaucrats call *aktivniye meropriyatiye* (literal translation: active measures). The KGB's budget is unknown, but it has about 300,000 employees, many of them assigned to domestic duties like operating the vast network of prison camps. Overseas, a majority of the Soviet embassy personnel are KGB officers.

As with the CIA, the KGB's failures are better known than its successes. The organization apparently no longer commits political assassinations abroad, but it does try to subvert or overthrow unfriendly governments—as in the Congo (now Zaïre) in 1963 and Ghana in 1966. In Mexico, authorities uncovered a KGB-sponsored guerrilla group in 1971. Just last week officials in Belgrade disclosed an unsuccessful Soviet attempt to set up a pro-Moscow underground party in Yugoslavia. Moreover, the KGB's Disinformation Department tries to sow suspicion abroad by circulating false rumors and forged documents. A case in point: the KGB campaign now going on to convince Indians that American exchange scholars and Peace Corps volunteers are actually CIA agents.

Communist China's equivalent of the CIA and KGB is so secret that the Chinese are believed not to even have a name for it. Among Western Sinologists, it is known as the Chinese Intelligence Service and is believed to be part of the foreign ministry's information department. The service's primary job is to sift intelligence data from members of Chinese embassies and overseas news correspondents, who act as secret agents. The Chinese Communist Party, however, does funnel funds to revolutionary groups abroad, particularly in Asia and Africa. From time to time, Chinese covert operations also have failed spectacularly. In 1965, Indonesia reacted to China's attempt to sponsor a revolution in the archipelago by butchering tens of thousands of Communists.

Phoenix Program. Few men understand better these clashes of anonymous armies on darkling plains or are more practiced in the covert arts than the CIA's William Colby, who has spent most of his adult years in the world of spies. Son of a career Army colonel, he is a Princeton graduate who worked for the Office of Strategic Services during World War II. In 1943 he parachuted into France to join a Resistance outfit. Later, he headed a unit that was dropped into Norway to sabotage a railway line.

Mustered out as a major, Colby earned a law degree from Columbia. He practiced law in New York until the Korean War, when he joined the successor organization to the OSS, the CIA. After serving in Stockholm and Rome, he was named CIA station chief in Saigon in 1959. Three years later he became chief of the CIA's Far East division in Washington. He returned to Saigon in 1968 to take charge of the pacification effort, which included the notorious Phoenix program. By 1971, Phoenix had caused the deaths of 20,587 Viet Cong members and sympathizers, according to Colby's own count. He explains, however, that when he took over, a year after the program began, he "laid stress on capturing rather than killing." In discussing the victims, he claims that "87% were killed by regular military in skirmishes."

To all outward appearances, Colby is unsuited for dirty tricks. "I'd call him an enlightened cold warrior," says a CIA officer. "But remember that this business is cold." In 1971, Colby went back to the CIA labyrinth in Langley, Va.

His private life-style matches his professional modesty. Father of four (a fifth child died last year), he lives inconspicuously in an unpretentious house in suburban Maryland. He does not smoke, drinks only an occasional gin-and-tonic or glass of wine, and is a devout Catholic. His favorite recreations are sailing and bicycling.

Since taking over as director, Colby has tried to reform the CIA's operations and rehabilitate its reputation. To woo support, he has made a point of being more open and candid than his predecessors. He has in effect undertaken a task that to many seems self-contradictory: to be open about operations that by definition must be secret. Who ever heard of an espionage chief being publicly accountable? So far this year, Colby and other CIA officials have testified before 18 congressional committees on 30 occasions. Colby estimates that he has talked with 132 reporters in the last year, though rarely for quotation.

He has also made more public speeches than any previous CIA director. Recently, for example, he agreed to speak at a conference on the CIA and covert actions, which was sponsored in Washington, D.C., by the Center for National Security Studies. When associates warned that he would be up against a stacked deck, Colby shrugged: "There's nothing wrong with accountability." The conference was dominated by critics like Ellsberg, who harangued Colby for 20 minutes, and Fred Branfman of the Indochina Resource Center, who accused the director of telling "outrageous lies." Colby kept his temper.

With Colby's encouragement, eleven agency analysts, wearing lapel tags labeled CIA, attended the recent Chicago convention of the American Political Science Association. Explains Gary Foster, the agency's coordinator for academic relations: "We wanted to demonstrate that we are a functioning, bona fide research organization." In addition, Colby has permitted the agency's analysts to publish articles in scholarly and popular journals under their own names and CIA titles. At the same time, however, Colby has lobbied in Congress for a bill that would make unauthorized disclosures of CIA activities by past and present employees a criminal offense. The bill is now bottled up in committee. If it is enacted, ex-CIA employees like Marchetti and Agee would risk jail for exposing the agency's secrets.

An Appendage. Above all, Colby has taken steps to reduce covert actions and direct more of the CIA's energies back to its original mission of intelligence gathering. Spies still have a role in the modern CIA, but the U.S. now depends less on men and more on satellites, high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft like the SR-71, and equipment that intercepts rival nations' secret communications. Such technical advances make the CIA highly successful in collecting military and other strategic information.

Even so, Kissinger complained throughout Nixon's first term that CIA assessments of the state of the world, which were prepared by the agency's Board of National Estimates, were unfocused and useless for policymaking. Last year Colby abolished the twelve-member board and replaced it with experts assigned to a country or region. Now they periodically make concrete recommendations through Colby to the National Security Council. The result has been to make the CIA in its intelligence work less of a semiautonomous think tank and more of an appendage of the NSC and the White House.

Many skeptics view Colby's greening of the CIA, his assurances of reform and restraint *(see interview page 18)* as deceptive. They think these steps are designed merely to enable "the firm" (as it is sometimes known) to carry on business as usual. But Colby clearly realizes that he faces a serious questioning of the agency's purposes and function, which is closely related to America's view of its own role in the world.

In the postwar era, covert action seemed eminently justifiable on the grounds that the U.S. was in a mortal struggle with the Communist world. Now that the cold war has abated and Communism is no longer a monolith, many scholars, diplomats and congressional leaders favor ending the CIA's covert operations altogether, leaving it an intelligence-gathering agency.

No Secret. The reasons are both moral and practical. Says Richard N. Gardner, an international-law specialist at Columbia University: "Dirty tricks have always been immoral and illegal. Now they also have outlived their usefulness." Former Ambassador to the Soviet Union George Kennan disapproves of covert operations as "improper and undesirable." But he also disapproves for pragmatic reasons: "The fact that we can't keep them secret is reason enough to desist." U.C.L.A. Soviet Specialist Roman Kolkowicz argues: "The track record is deplorable. By and large, these operations have been a series of disasters." Adds Eugene Skolnikoff, director of M.I.T.'s Center for International Studies: "The resulting scandals provide grist for attacks on the U.S., retroactively validate charges—true or false—that the U.S. makes a habit of overthrowing governments, and even exacerbate domestic distrust of public officials."

Last week Democratic Senator James M. Abourezk of South Dakota sponsored legislation that would prohibit the CIA from "assassination, sabotage, political disruption or other meddling in a nation's internal affairs, without the approval of Congress or the knowledge of the American people." That proposal is unlikely to be enacted because most Congressmen believe that restricting the CIA would unwisely limit the President's freedom of action.

Further, says William Bundy, for-

mer CIA officer and now editor of *Foreign Affairs:* "The last thing in the world that is ever going to disappear is Soviet covert activities of a political nature. To say détente stops them is grossly naive." Thus Bundy argues that the U.S. should not be precluded from covert actions, but should not use such actions as extensively as in the 1950s. Bowdoin College Provost Olin Robinson, an authority on intelligence organizations in democratic societies, agrees: "Unless you've got a cast of world characters who are willing to play by a certain set of rules, you're going to have covert operations." In other words, the CIA should be left the capacity for covert action but forbidden to use it except in tightly restricted circumstances.

Colby himself believes that more stress on intelligence gathering will make it less likely that various situations will develop into crises; the occasions where covert action might be considered would thus be reduced. But he maintains that to prohibit the CIA from conducting any covert actions would "leave us with nothing between a diplomatic protest and sending in the Marines."

Ideas vary about what limits should be set. Harry Howe Ransom, professor of political science and an intelligence specialist at Vanderbilt University, believes that "covert operations represent an act just short of war. If we use them, it should be where acts of war would otherwise be necessary." Ransom would permit covert actions only when U.S. security is clearly in jeopardy. William T.R. Fox, professor of international relations at Columbia University, would additionally permit them "to undo the spread of Hitler and other like governments." Dean Harvey Picker of Columbia's School of International Affairs would allow clandestine operations to prevent nuclear war. As Senator Church points out, however, the "national security considerations must be compelling" for covert action to be justified. For his part, Colby declines to say under what precise circumstances he would favor covert action.

Many critics who concede the need for covert action in some cases nevertheless propose two other reforms: 1) separating intelligence gathering from covert operations and 2) tighter control.

Most experts doubt that "dirty tricks" can be separated from intelligence gathering. Explains Richard Bissell, onetime head of CIA covert operations: "The gathering of information inevitably edges over into more active functions, simply because the process of making covert contacts with high-ranking officials of other nations gives the U.S. influence in them." To eliminate that problem, the U.S. could run two separate agencies. Bissell claims that this idea was found to be impractical by both Britain and Germany in World War II because agents kept "running into each other."

The case for closer surveillance is much stronger. Says Kolkowicz: "Entrusting covert operations to a secretive agency lacking effective supervision amounts to leaving policy to faceless bureaucrats whose judgment is questionable." Although somewhat exaggerated, his warning reflects widespread concern that the CIA may be too independent.

The CIA takes its orders from the 40 Committee, which has existed under various names since 1948. It screens every proposal for clandestine activity. Chaired by Kissinger, the committee is made up of Colby, Deputy Secretary of State Robert S. Ingersoll, Deputy Secretary of Defense William P. Clements Jr., and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General George S. Brown. In his book, Marchetti describes the committee as a rubber stamp that is predisposed to give the CIA what it wants. But others say that the committee frequently rejects or orders revision of CIA proposals. Moreover, recommendations for major covert actions like the Chile operation require presidential approval.

Congress's supervision of the CIA is inadequate; in some respects, it is a myth. A Senate subcommittee headed by conservative Democrat John Stennis of Mississippi meets irregularly and has almost no staff. Member Symington complains that, from the U-2 incident to the Chile affair, the subcommittee has known less about CIA activities than the press. A House subcommittee chaired by liberal Democrat Nedzi meets more often, but he looks on his responsibility "as making a determination as to whether or not the CIA has acted legally, after or during the fact." Thus no one in Congress knows in advance about potentially controversial CIA operations. Complains Democratic Representative Michael J. Harrington of Massachusetts: "There is a studied inclination in Congress toward noninvolvement, superimposed on a pattern of deference toward the Executive Branch. If the Executive is in the dock, you have got to put the Congress in there too—and firmly."

More than 200 times in the past two decades, Congressmen have sponsored bills and resolutions calling for more effective supervision of the CIA. At least twice, Congress has voted on such legislation, and both times the bills were soundly defeated. Last week Republican Senators Howard H. Baker Jr. of Tennessee and Lowell P. Weicker Jr. of Connecticut made another attempt. Their bill would create a committee of House and Senate members to supervise and regulate the CIA and all other members of the U.S. intelligence committee.

Possible Leaks. Its chances of passage are rated better than even, because of the storm over the CIA and because the bill was referred to reform-minded Sam Ervin's Government Operations Committee. But the bill may yet be defeated. Even many members of Congress believe that they should not be entrusted with CIA secrets because of possible leaks. The alternative is to keep Congress uninformed, which seems equally unacceptable.

Whatever the degree to which Congress can be informed—and even critics of the CIA concede that it is tricky for legislators to be in on the decision-making of an espionage agency—there is a clear necessity for Congress to hold the Executive more accountable for what the CIA does.

To some extent, the dilemma over the CIA has to do with an American need to have it both ways: the U.S. wants to be (and to see itself as) a morally responsible country and yet function as a great power in an immoral world. As Bowdoin's Robinson puts it, "There is an inevitable tension between an organization like the CIA and a democratic society. From time to time there will be pulling back when the organization may have gone too far." The U.S. has reached such a point with the revelations about its actions in Chile, which, on balance, are hard to justify. While it cannot rule out covert operations in all circumstances, the nation must remember that it has better and stronger weapons to rely on: its economic and technological weight, its diplomacy, its cultural impact and —though tarnished—its freedom.

TIME, SEPTEMBER 30, 1974

Director Colby on the Record

In a rare on-the-record interview with TIME Correspondent Strobe Talbott, Director William Colby defended the CIA against its critics, ranged over the current functions of the agency, and discussed future prospects. Highlights:

Why does the CIA intervene in other nations' internal affairs?

I'm not saying we're engaged in a campaign to bring democracy to the world. That's not what the U.S. Government expects from this agency. We're expected to carry out U.S. policy. Over the years, we've helped democratic forces rather broadly. In those cases where we have got involved with military regimes, we did so because there was a greater danger from some place else. I don't think we've toppled democratic regimes, and I don't think we did so in Chile. First, we didn't bring about the coup, and second, the Allende regime was not democratic. Granted the military regime is not democratic, I don't think a Communist regime is democratic.

Our program in Chile was to sustain the democratic forces against the Allende political forces, which were suppressing various democratic elements in a variety of ways—harassing radio stations, harassing some parts of the press and some political groups. We looked forward to the democratic forces coming to power in the elections of 1976.

To what extent had Communist forces intervened in Chile?

Castro spent about a month down there in the late spring of 1973. There were a lot of extremist exiles in Chile from other countries in Latin America. There was a lot of assistance going into Chile from Cuba and other Communist sources. There are indications that there was some Soviet activity. They were putting some money in, as well as hardware of various sorts. This was a program to support an eventual takeover in what I would call a nondemocratic fashion—suppressing the opposition and extending Communist influence elsewhere in the hemisphere.

Will the CIA continue to mount covert operations?

The CIA has three major functions: science and technological work, analysis, and the clandestine collection of intelligence. Now there's been a fourth responsibility, and that is positively influencing a situation through political or paramilitary means. That's the one that goes up and down depending on national policy. Right now it's way down.

The degree of our involvement in covert activities reflects the kind of world we live in. If it's a world where two superpowers are peering over the fence at each other, then it's a matter of concern when a hostile political group is about to take over a country. But if it's a world in which we've worked out a relationship of reasonable restraint, or détente, with the other superpowers, then it won't matter to us who runs one of these countries in a far-flung area. Of course, something very close to us might still be important for political or security reasons. There may still be certain situations where U.S. interests —and I don't mean corporate interests, but fundamental political interests—can be adversely affected. In some of those cases it would be appropriate to take some modest action such as establishing a relationship with somebody who needs the help. But I stress: it's not now our Government's policy to engage in these situations around the world.

How is a covert operation started?

We follow the traffic with the embassy. We follow the political attitudes that we have toward that country. We generate a specific suggestion in the light of what we think would be national policy. We don't do anything without approval.

Sometimes we get the specific suggestion from the outside—from an ambassador, from the State Department or from the National Security Council staff. They'll say: "Why don't you guys do so and so?" We have the technicians here who decide what is possible and what is not. It's the same sort of thing you get with military activity. How you land troops on a hostile shore is not developed in the White House. The Joint Chiefs develop a proposal. Then if the White House approves it, you go ahead.

But I want to emphasize that we're talking about a very small number of covert actions. Policy is generated at the NSC, not here.

What would you regard as a successful covert action?

Laos. It was considered important to the U.S. that a country remain friendly and not be taken over by hostile forces. Rather than use our military force or an enormous political effort, you try to influence some key people and key political groups. The Laos operation cost substantial amounts but was cheap compared with other ways of doing business. We were not involved in the 1967 coup in Greece or in the coup in Chile last year.

Should the operational side of the CIA be separated from intelligence gathering?

That proposal stems from the Bay of Pigs. The problem there was that we didn't let the analysts in on the act. Now senior levels of the analyst community are aware of covert activities and have a chance to comment. In the early years of the agency, we tried conducting intelligence and action operations through two separate units, but they kept getting in each other's way.

What alternatives to covert operations are possible for the CIA?

We could not—and did not—conduct the SALT negotiations and reach a SALT agreement until after our intelligence techniques had improved to the degree that we could tell whether the Soviets were going to abide by the agreements. On a number of occasions, we have identified a situation that was getting very sour in some country or between two countries. By reporting the facts and our assessment, we generated diplomatic action so that the trouble we predicted did not happen. For instance, peace arrangements might have broken down, but because of our intelligence, negotiations saved the situation.

In the future this sort of intelligence will help our country in negotiations and diplomatic relationships. As a result, we will be less likely to get into screaming crises, and there will be less need for covert action. It will be the increasing responsibility of the CIA to give our leaders the knowledge necessary to move into a dire situation and defuse it.

CHICAGO TRIBUNE
3 October 1974

The CIA success a surprise failure

John Chamberlain

THE CIA, WHICH was started by President Harry Truman to counter the wiles of the Soviet "spywar" apparatchiks in promoting international subversion, may have had its successes [in Guatemala, for example], but, insofar as the American public can judge from the part of the iceberg that shows above the water, it has never been noteworthy for its ability to carry off a really important covert operation. It messed things up in Albania, in Indonesia, and at the Bay of Pigs in Cuba.

But now we are being told, by journalists who never minded its failures, that it has accomplished something terrible by its success in "destabilizing" the regime of Marxist President Salvador Allende in Chile.

I find this an odd commentary on the journalists involved. If you are a patriotic American who remembers that we once meant business about keeping European powers from obtaining sinister beachheads in the Western Hemisphere, you might think that the CIA, at long last, merits a little public praise. But if this is the way you do happen to think, it merely labels you as a mossback who still believes there was a good reason for the Monroe Doctrine.

WHAT THE anti-CIA claque is trying to tell us is that the day of the Monroe Doctrine has gone forever. It is no longer our business to give help to Latin Americans who want to fight back against Marxist conspiracies dominated by Moscow or Peking whose aims are to close in on the United States and the Panama Canal from the southern part of the hemisphere.

The New York Time's Tom Wicker tells us that it is nonsense to believe the Allende government was anything other than legit. It did not try, so Wicker insists, to destroy opposition parties or newspapers. An innocent of innocents, Wicker has never read the late Garet Garrett on the subject of "revolution within the forms."

Senor Allende, a Marxist who came to power as a minority president with no real mandate to push Chile into Communism, had necessarily to proceed by working "within the forms." He had almost succeeded in his policy of eating out the substance of his opposition by closing in on their methods of earning their livelihoods. The middle class and the Chilean trade unions reacted just in time to save their necks.

If the CIA really managed to give considerable aid to Chilean believers in individual freedom in a fight against Marxist collectivism, then all honor it. But who, in the present Washington climate, can distinguish between a good covert operation aimed at sustaining our friends in the outer world and a bad covert operation undertaken against Americans at home? Everything has been confused by Watergate, with the effect that we are now being rendered helpless against the continuing Marxist campaign to isolate Western Europe and the U. S. and take over the world.

Ed Hunter, the astute editor of a little magazine called Tactics, has recently reminded us of the CIA's long history of failure. Because it could not cope with superior Communist espionage, it sent men to their deaths in Albania and at the Bay of Pigs.

Skipping over the CIA's one great success in Guatemala, Hunter lists what he calls "Watergate-ITT" as another CIA bungling. We didn't act on the ITT offer to fend off Allende in the first place. The Reds, he says, pulled off a propagandist ten-strike when they managed to link a felonious domestic Watergate with the ITT's wholly legitimate concern for the fate of its properties in Chile.

SAYS HUNTER: "Our Central Intelligence Agency and the International Telephone and Telegraph Company should be rebuked for failure to act on behalf of free peoples everywhere, where this coincides with the survival of our own country."

TIME, SEPTEMBER 30, 1974

Chile: A Case Study

The U.S. began its heavy investment in the political fate of Chile in the early 1960s. President John Kennedy had met Eduardo Frei, leader of the Christian Democratic Party in Chile, and decided that he was the hope of Latin America. Frei was a man of the left, but not too far left, a man who was not hostile to U.S. interests and just might be able to achieve needed reform without violent revolution. When Frei faced Salvador Allende, a self-professed Marxist with a Communist following, in the 1964 election, the U.S. made no secret of where its sympathies lay.

Frei became the recipient of American political advice, encouragement and hefty financial aid. Between 1962 and 1965, the U.S. gave Chile $618 million in direct economic assistance —more per capita than any other Latin American country. In a diary due to be published in Britain this year, former CIA Operative Philip Agee describes how he was called upon for assistance from his post in Montevideo in 1964: "The Santiago station has a really big operation going to keep Salvador Allende from being elected President. He was almost elected at the last elections in 1958, and this time nobody's taking any chances. The trouble is that the office of finance in headquarters [Langley, Va.] couldn't get enough Chilean escudos from the New York banks; so they had to set up regional purchasing offices in Lima and Rio. But even these offices can't satisfy the requirement, so we have been asked to help." The results were gratifying. Frei won with 56% of the vote, and the future of Chile seemed to be assured.

But from the outset, Frei ran into trouble. He was attacked by the right for moving too fast and by the left for going too slowly. Allende's Socialist Party continued to grow, picking up defecting left-wing Christian Democrats and uniting with other opposition parties. It became a case for the CIA. A station chief had been sent to Santiago in 1964; later the agency's presence began to multiply in preparation for the 1970 election, when Frei would be constitutionally barred from seeking a second term and Allende would pose more of a threat than before.

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TIME has learned that a CIA team was posted to Chile with orders from the National Security Council to keep the election "fair." The agents interpreted these instructions to mean: Stop Allende, and they asked for a whopping $20 million to do the job. They were given $5 million and ultimately spent less than $1 million. "You buy votes in Boston, you buy votes in Santiago," commented a former CIA agent assigned to the mission. But not enough votes were bought; Allende had a substantial following. He was prevented from winning a majority, but with only 36% of the vote he narrowly won a three-way race that was finally decided in the Chilean Congress. CIA officials in Washington were furious.

The Nixon Administration saw the Allende regime as more of a threat than Cuba to the hemisphere. The White House feared that Chile would serve as a base for South America's revolutionary left as well as a convenient outpost for the Soviet Union. So many Marxist activists were pouring in from Cuba, Czechoslovakia and China that a special team of CIA clerks was dispatched to Chile to start indexing thousands of cards on their activities. Publicly, Henry Kissinger warned of the domino effect in Latin America. If Communism could find a secure berth in Chile, it would be encouraged to spread throughout the continent. Privately, the 40 Committee, the top-level intelligence panel headed by Kissinger, authorized $8 million to be spent to make life even tougher for Allende than he was making it for himself.

The extent of the CIA's involvement was revealed earlier this month by congressional sources who had been privy to earlier testimony by CIA Director William Colby. Further details have been supplied by other agency officials. Precisely how much was spent by foreign Communists—principally Moscow—to get Allende into office and then to keep him there is not known. Most Western intelligence experts figure that the CIA campaign was scarcely comparable in terms of expenditures or intensity. Nonetheless, the agency went further than even many of its critics imagined.

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For a Marxist government, the Allende regime had moved relatively slowly toward suppressing free institutions. But the CIA believed it was only a matter of time before all dissent would be muffled. Approximately half the CIA funds were funneled to the opposition press, notably the nation's leading daily *El Mercurio;* Allende had steered government advertising to the papers supporting him while encouraging newsprint prices to rise high enough to bankrupt the others. Additional CIA funds went to opposition politicians, private businesses and trade unions. "What we were really doing was supporting a civilian resistance movement against an arbitrary government," argues a CIA official. "Our target was the middle-class groups who were working against Allende."

Covert assistance went beyond help for the democratic opposition. The CIA infiltrated Chilean agents into the upper echelon of the Socialist Party. Provocateurs were paid to make deliberate mistakes in their jobs, thus adding to Allende's gross mismanagement of the economy. CIA agents organized street demonstrations against government policies.

As the economic crisis deepened, the agency supported striking shopkeepers and taxi drivers. Laundered CIA money, reportedly channeled to Santiago by way of Christian Democratic parties in Europe, helped finance the Chilean truckers' 45-day strike, one of the worst blows to the economy. Moreover, the strikers doubtless picked up additional CIA cash that was floating round the country. As an intelligence official notes, "If we give it to A, and then A gives it to B and C and D, in a sense it's true that D got it. But the question is: Did we give it to A knowing D would get it?"

THE NEW YORK TIMES



ALLENDE'S LAST HOURS

While owning up to CIA efforts to weaken Allende, Colby insists: "We didn't support the coup, we didn't stimulate it, we didn't bring it about in any way. We were quite meticulous in making sure there was no encouragement from our side." Most U.S. policymakers would have preferred that Allende be ousted in democratic fashion at the election scheduled for 1976. That kind of exit, they feel, would have decisively proved the bankruptcy of his policies.

Clearly the CIA considers the junta to be the lesser of two evils. Still, it rates the Chilean enterprise a failure since it ended in military dictatorship. Several years of dangerous, costly and now nationally divisive intervention in another country's internal politics might better have been avoided. Though Soviet propaganda blames the CIA for the Chilean coup and the death of Allende, Soviet intelligence analysts do not give the CIA any credit. The Russians think the fault lay with Allende himself for not being enough of a strongman. He temporized with constitutional processes when he should have disregarded them. He did not follow the example of Fidel Castro, who executed more than 1,000 of his opponents when he came to power; 15 years later, he still rules Cuba. Nor did the CIA have any better luck against him.

NEWS AMERICAN, Baltimore
29 September 1974

Editor's Report

More on the CIA

By WILLIAM RANDOLPH HEARST JR.
Editor-in-Chief, The Hearst Newspapers

NEW YORK—It is unusual for this column to dwell on the same news subject for two weeks in a row—in this case the CIA and its challenged role in Chile. Exception is being made because the left-leaning news media have been keeping the subject alive with a continuing barrage of poisonous and misleading attacks which disparage not only the CIA but Secretary of State Kissinger and even the President of the United States.

William Randolph Hearst Jr.

I simply cannot stand idly by and let them get away with such stuff. It damages public confidence in our national security operations and in our leaders. Possibly even worse, it soft-pedals or ignores the sinister activities of those international forces whose ultimate admitted goal — despite detente — is the weakening and overthrow of our political system and its influence in the world.

It would be quite wrong to suggest that the newspaper columnists, TV commentators and lawmakers who keep hammering away at the CIA in self-righteous horror are Communist sympathizers. The simple fact is that they and most other self-dubbed liberals have a curious and automatic hatred for anyone or anything committed to fighting Communism. They are more anti anti-Communists than anything else.

All the same, knowingly or not, they serve the purposes of our ideological enemies by consistently impugning the motives of this country and its leaders in the ceaseless global political struggle. The Communists in the Kremlin have got to be delighted that the CIA-Chile affair has been getting so much domestic criticism—criticism which cannot help but weaken the future effectiveness of the chief U. S. agency which keeps a constant expert watch on them and so frequently helps to thwart their plots.

You naturally have heard very little about the Communist plot to take over the Chilean government of self-styled "Marxist" President Salvador Allende. All our liberal press has been harping on is the disclosure—subsequently frankly confirmed by President Ford—that the CIA spent $8 million in Chile between 1970 and 1973 to support legally organized groups opposed to the Allende regime. This action, which had been approved by Dr. Kissinger, is damned by the critics as somehow un-American, sneaky and disgraceful.

The fact is, contrary to the impression created by the critics, that the CIA and its expenditures had very little to do with the bloody coup which overthrew Dr. Allende a year ago, and in which he died. He was deposed by the present military junta, acting with majority public support, because the Communists were on the verge of taking over a government which had become ever more oppressive and less democratic.

Last week, in this space, it was told how tons and tons of guns and ammunition had been smuggled into Chile by thousands of Communist agents who infiltrated the country under Allende—some of whom became his closest advisers. Anyone who doubts what was being planned needs only to read the rash of articles by Soviet political and military experts which have been appearing in Communist theoretical journals this summer explaining the major reasons for their setback in Chile.

The Kremlin-approved analysis, as reported by James Burnham in the Sept. 27 issue of National Review, boils down to six factors cited as errors to be avoided in future would-be seizures of power. Mr. Burnham sums them up as follows:

1. The counterrevolutionary (free) press was not quickly enough muzzled. Chile's influential conservative paper, El Mercurio, is cited for its role in wrecking the Allende regime.

2. The Allende government moved too slowly on both the political and economic fronts, thus giving the counterrevolution time to prepare its forces.

3. The Chilean Communists failed to push Allende into speedy nationalization of private business without compensation.

4. The Chilean Communists did not go far and fast enough in creating grass roots organizations of workers and peasants under Communist control which could act as an extralegal power apparatus.

5. The adventurous and disorganized seizures of farms and some factories by ultraleft Maoists and Trotskyists antagonized potential sympathizers and aroused the reactionary elements.

6. Communist penetration of the armed forces, though considerable, was not sufficient to deter the coup by the higher military echelons.

Don't forget—all this is on record in the official Soviet press. So what the CIA did in Chile was virtually nothing compared with the other side. The upshot, unfortunately, was another dictatorship in our hemisphere, but at least it is not another Communist tyranny.

A large part of the current anti-CIA criticism charges that the secret agency has become a kind of supra-government whose actions are directed by a handful of men without adequate control by Congress. In actuality it is simply a modern version of the intelligence apparatus which every sovereign nation since ancient Rome has had to maintain for its safety. Furthermore EVERY CENT it spends has to be approved by Congress after recommendations of four of its committees.

These bodies are the Senate committees on Foreign Relations and Military Affairs, and their two counterparts in the House. Top members of each comprise what is badly named the Congressional Oversight Committee, a small group which reviews, studies and passes on the more delicate CIA activities.

Thus for Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman J. William Fulbright and senior member Frank Church to claim they didn't really know what went on in Chile was at best a political pose.

Sen. Church actually came up with this sanctimonious remark. "We now learn," the Idaho Democrat intoned, "that there is no difference between American and Soviet policy in subverting foreign governments. I had always thought the United States stood for different principles."

That was a lot of two-faced nonsense. He knew damned well what had happened in Chile, and if he somehow didn't he hadn't done his homework.

I don't mean to be too rough on the CIA critics. After all there are two sides to any controversy and matters look different depending on where you sit. For example, it certainly is easy for me to understand and sympathize with fears that we may

have created a kind of gestapo or unlimited, self-directed dirty tricks department. Nobody wants that.

But such is not the case. Unlike its Communist counterparts, the CIA and its actions invariably become answerable to a public whose surrogates in Congress already have passed on them. If they have done so without fully understanding the facts, it is the fault of the lawmakers who hold the purse strings.

The basic explanation for the CIA-Chile hubbub, it seems to me, is the inability or refusal of the liberal critics to recognize Communism as a deadly, continuing threat to this nation and its interests.

They view it instead with benevolence as a form of socialism, dedicated to the welfare of the people, and see any contrary view or activity as not only demeaning for noble-minded Americans but suggestive of Hitler and uniformed fascism. Nonuniformed Red fascism doesn't bother them.

That's their view, and they certainly are free to express it.

But I remember Czechoslovakia.

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
2 Oct 1974

Secret Activity Abroad Ends, CIA Reports

Agrees To Tight Controls

By SAUL FRIEDMAN
Inquirer Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director William Colby has given members of Congress private assurances that the United States has ended all covert political operations abroad.

And an understanding has been reached with the administration under which key lawmakers are to be notified regularly and in advance of major intelligence-gathering projects as well as clandestine operations planned by the super-secret "Forty Committee."

At President Ford's urging, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Colby met secretly last Friday on Capitol Hill with Reps. Edward Hebert (D., La.), chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Lucien Nedzi (D., Mich.), chairman of the subcommittee on intelligence operations, and Thomas E. (Doc) Morgan (D., Pa.), chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

At the meeting, arranged by Nedzi, Kissinger and Colby, it was agreed to provide the Foreign Affairs Committee or any subcommittee Morgan designates with all intelligence-gathering information "relating to foreign affairs." Nedzi's subcommittee already receives such information in addition to other intelligence material.

Tighter Reins

The agreement, which for the first time will give the Foreign Affairs Committee advance information on CIA operations, is designed to give a congressional body with a foreign policy jurisdiction closer control over CIA ventures like those in Chile and Greece.

Nedzi said Kissinger and Colby specifically had agreed to provide them the same intelligence information that is in the hands of the exclusive Forty Committee.

According to congressional and White House sources, this policy will have the effect of limiting Kissinger's personal authority to use the CIA as an instrument of global power politics.

The Forty Committee, which oversees and authorizes covert intelligence operations, is run by Kissinger, who also heads the National Security Council. It has only five members who, in addition to Kissinger are Joseph Sisco, under secretary of state for political Affairs; William Clements, deputy secretary of Defense; Gen. George Brown, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Colby.

Although the CIA is supposed to be largely independent, to better supply objective intelligence data, Kissinger has dominated the Forty Committee and the agency because of his dual role as Secretary of State and the President's National security chief. And until now, the committee has been accountable to no one except the President.

But, President Ford, following a meeting with congressional leaders, approved the idea of closer cooperation between Congress and agencies involved with intelligence operations.

The decision to let members of Congress in on decisions of the Forty Committee is part of an administration effort to blunt rising criticism of the American role in the downfall of the elected government in Chile and the subsequent assassination of its president, Salvador Allende.

Nedzi said he has been assured that the CIA and the Forty Committee no longer are engaging in covert political operations like the one in Chile.

And he said the CIA administration has pledged to keep members of Congress informed in advance for the first time on plans for major intelligence operations, which

The understanding, Nedzi said, may afford members the opportunity to give advice and even help kill some proposed projects which they feel could damage American interests. The House Foreign Affairs Committee includes a number of liberals who for the first time will be privy to intelligence information.

Previous inquiries by Nedzi, who has wrestled with the problem of congressional control of intelligence operations since he took over his subcommittee in 1971, have disclosed an increased tendency toward White House control of the CIA for its own purposes — in the Watergate coverup and the harassment of Pentagon papers leaker Daniel Ellsberg and in the Chile Affair.

Watergate Use

In Watergate, the President and his top aides sought to use the CIA in the coverup. And there was evidence that Kissinger authorized a request to the CIA for a psychiatric profile of Ellsberg.

In the Chile affair, the Forty Committee, acting on Kissinger's suggestion, authorized the use of $8 million to support opponents of Allende. These opponents, sponsored by the CIA, created the climate that toppled Allende and his government.

As a result, the CIA again has come under fire from congressional critics, including Sen. Frank Church (D., Idaho), a ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Rep. Michael Harrington (D.,

Mass.), a member of the House Armed Services Committee who leaked Colby's testimony on the Chile operation.

The congressional critics, noting that CIA intervention has resulted in a military dictatorship in Chile, again are calling for tighter controls of the agency.

Another Culprit

But Nedzi, who at Harrington's request had gotten Colby's frank testimony, said that the target of criticism should not be the CIA alone but the Forty Committee.

Nedzi is concerned that the Forty Committee, dominated by Kissinger, has become a "super-intelligence agency," which, unlike the CIA, is not governed by the National Security Act of 1947.

Thus, under pressure from congressional critics, and with Nedzi and Armed Services Committee Chairman Hebert acting as intermediaries, the arrangement was worked out for closer relations between the Foreign Affairs Committee and the intelligence agencies.

Their hope, which the CIA shares, is that Kissinger will not use the CIA as easily as he has if he knows that congressional outsiders are being kept informed.

Whether this new arrangement guarantees that Congress will in fact exercise closer control of CIA ventures remains to be seen.

LOS ANGELES TIMES
6 October 1974

The Intrigues Before Allende Fell

BY RICHARD R. FAGEN

My wife and I gained first-hand experience of American involvement in Chilean affairs a few months after we arrived in Santiago in February, 1972.

That was when a U.S. Foreign Service officer—an acquaintance of mine—got in touch with me and said that the U.S. Embassy in Santiago had succeeded in infiltrating all parties of the Popular Unity coalition, but that it had not yet managed to infiltrate the Movement of the Revolutionary Left, a group outside the government and critical of it.

This U.S. official thought my university connections—which he knew about at first hand—might provide links for infiltrating that group. He offered to change money for me on the black market. Because of our old association and strictly for my own information, he also sketched the number and distribution of CIA agents masked as regular diplomats in the U.S. Embassy in Chile—about one-third of the total.

I doubt that I was the only American citizen approached in this manner. I hope I was not the only one to refuse. The incident is a measure of how blatantly the U.S. Embassy operated during that period.

There was no question by the middle of 1972 that the Allende Government was in serious trouble. The inflationary spiral was twisting upward, shortages of foodstuffs had developed — although much was available on the black market—and the centrist Christian Democrats, led by ex-President Eduardo Frei, (whom the United States had once actively supported) were in open alliance with the right-wing National Party. Many members of this center-right coalition has passed in word and deed far beyond the point of "loyal opposition."

The political and economical situation was ripe for what later came to be known as "destabilization."

In October, 1972, the massive walkout of truckers, shopowners, and businessmen in opposition began. Those of us living in Santiago were amazed at the seeming ease with which tens of thousands of persons without visible income—and without savings because of the inflationary spiral—were able to support themselves. The dollar rate on the black market dropped, indicating that fresh sources of currency were flowing into the country. It was everyday speculation in Santiago, both on the Right and Left, that the United States was funding the walkouts, speculation later confirmed in the recent disclosures about CIA activities.

Despite political and economic difficulties, however, the government was actually gaining support at the polls. Much to the dismay of his opponents, in the congressional elections of March, 1973, the Allende coalition gained electoral strength, receiving 44% of the total vote.

Ironically, this election was the first step toward the military coup. Convinced that Allende could not be removed constitutionally—his congressional support would have had to drop below 33% for him to be impeached—the Right began to plot in earnest. Violence, sabotage, and a final series of crippling strikes wracked Chile during July and August of 1973. The full role of the CIA in these events is yet to be told.

Throughout this period, the Chilean political situation was fragile, the economy was in trouble, and class and political tensions ran high. We now know that $8 to $11 million were used covertly to support opposition newspapers, parties and strikers. The United States infiltrated political parties, and, as now conceded, attempted to buy votes in order to prevent the election of Allende.

Furthermore, because the CIA and its friends certainly had the means to change their dollars into Chilean currency somewhere other than at the Central Bank, the money pumped into Chile may actually have bought $40 to $50 million worth of subversive activities and services. With a raging black market, opposition parties, newspapers, and operatives could be purchased in dollars at a very substantial discount. All of this makes a mockery of official claims that the United States did nothing—in Mr. Ford's words—"but ensure that democratic institutions and parties survived." What Washington *did* do was put a very substantial thumb on the scales, tipping them against the freely elected government of Chile.

Against the background of what we now know of CIA involvement in Chile, the statements by high U.S. officials that "we did not participate in the overthrow of the Allende Government" are seriously misleading. Perhaps the United States did not participate in the planning or help in the attack on the Presidential palace. But as is well recognized in the American legal system, accessories-before-the-fact must share responsibility with those who actually commit the criminal act, even though the former may not be present at the scene of the crime.

As tragic as the events in Chile are, of perhaps even more significance to Americans is the incredible web of coverup, false justifications, and outright lies being told to the American people by the highest officials of the Ford Administration. For example, in justifying covert CIA activities, the President has claimed that "there was an effort being made by the government of Salvador Allende to destroy opposition news media and to destroy opposition political parties."

This does not reflect the true precoup situation in Chile. Actually, the opposition parties and newspapers kept functioning from 1970 to 1973—and not only because our government was pouring money into them. In fact, one of the most significant attempts to tamper with Chilean constitutionalism had occurred in 1970 when the CIA tried to buy opposition votes in Congress so as to prevent Allende from assuming the presidency.

In all of this sorry recent history,

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the key actor and prime villain has been Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger. As head of the Forty Committee, Kissinger was the chief architect of covert operations against the Allende government. It was he who first articulated the "domino theory" of the "threat" that Chile (with a population 5%, and wealth less than 1%, that of the United States) posed to this country. "I don't think we should delude ourselves that an Allende takeover in Chile would not present massive problems for us . . ." Kissinger said in 1970.

This is the same man who just a few weeks ago told the U.S. ambassador in Chile to "cut out the political science lectures" because the ambassador brought up the question of human rights with members of the junta when he "should have been" discussing military aid.

All of this betrays a scenario in which the U.S. government—once again—has set itself implacably against political and economic experimentation in the Third World.

It's the spirit of Vietnam and Watergate at work in hemispheric politics. This scenario, in Chile as in Vietnam, involved disregard for the sovereignty and rights of others, the violation of national and international law, dirty tricks by the CIA and other agencies, cozying up to repressive governments, and withholding vital information from Congress and the American electorate.

The people of Chile and Latin America deserve better from the government of the United States—and so do the American people.

LOS ANGELES TIMES
6 October 1974

President Must Balance Interests, Share Planning

BY HARRY ROSITZKE

From the Bay of Pigs to the current Chilean case, there have been sporadic denunciations of the CIA's action operations abroad—in the press, in books from inside and outside Washington's intelligence establishment, and occasionally in Congress.

The issue is heightened rather than resolved by President Ford's statement that "our government, like other governments, does take certain actions in the intelligence field to help implement foreign policies and protect national security."

The central question: Should the United States employ secret means to interfere in the affairs of other countries? The debate is waged on two levels—moral and pragmatic.

For pure men of principle, covert action is impermissable as a means, whatever the end. Covert actions are immoral not only because they are secret and therefore violate the canons of an open society, but also because by interfering in the domestic affairs of another country they violate the U.N. Charter and the moral and legal principles of American society.

Harry Rositzke, retired after many years in operations with the OSS and the CIA, is the author of "U.S.S.R. Today."

At a more realistic level, the critique of secret operations addresses itself to profit and loss: Are secret operations worth carrying out?

On the loss side are not only the moral objections, but the conspicuous failures of the past (the Bay of Pigs), the sinister image of the CIA abroad (the bogie of "American imperialism"), the compulsion of the executive to lie in public and to Congress in order to keep secret its sponsorship of "unofficial" actions (Chile), and the domestic disenchantment with secrecy deepened by Watergate.

What are the entries on the profit side? The list of pass successes on the public record is short. President Truman authorized large-scale official and unofficial support for the democratic parties in the 1948 Italian elections to prevent a Communist victory—and the Communists lost. President Eisenhower triggered a coup in Tehran in 1953 to keep Iran out of the Soviet sphere—and it still is. The following year he authorized a coup in Guatemala to prevent the export of Soviet arms into the Western hemisphere—and the coup succeeded without bloodshed.

What are the secret successes? No one knows outside the small elite in the executive.

Political action operations have played a marginal role in American foreign policy since 1948, but the full record is not available either to Congress or the public. For a decade after World War II they played a tangible but minor role in the American effort to restore a stabilized, democratic Europe. Through its contacts with non-Communist politicians and government officials, with labor leaders and media figures, the CIA added its influence to that of the State and Defense Departments in containing the expansion of Soviet power west of the Elbe.

In the late 1950s and 1960s, the focus of political operations shifted to the Third World, the terrain chosen by Moscow to weaken the "imperlists." In the Near East, in Africa briefly, and in Southeast Asia, covert operations played their part in furthering overall American objectives, however ill-conceived some of these objectives may appear in retrospect.

In Latin America the political situation became even more challenging after Castro's victory, and counterinsurgency became the order of the day for half a dozen federal agencies. The CIA's political action operations were aimed mainly at the legal and illegal Communist parties supported by Moscow with money, training and advice, at the insurgent groups working out of Havana, and at the minor rash of "Chinese parties" that broke out in the mid-60s. The evolution of purely domestic insurgencies and of urban terrorist groups further broadened the challenge to local security agencies working in concert with the CIA.

It is a mistake to think that all CIA operations in Latin America were aimed at supporting right-wing militarists. America's ultimate goal in Chile's 1964 election, of course, was to thwart the election of Salvador Allende, but Washington put its money on a reform-minded Christian Democrat, Eduardo Frei, and actively sought the achievement of his goals —breaking up the dominant financial oligarchy, for instance.

Indeed, as an action arm of government, the CIA historically has attracted many liberals to its ranks, for they saw in it a chance to bring democratic reforms to parts of the world that most needed it. One reason that the CIA now is widely perceived as far-right is that its failures have been more publicized than its successes, and these usually have involved strictly anti-Communist activities, as in Allende's Chile.

In the new world of detente, it is often argued, secret action operations are no longer needed. Detente, however broadly defined, has not affected Soviet competition on the ideological and political front. Moscow continues to exploit the resources of its built-in political action instruments—the Communist parties abroad. It continues to export strong anti-American propaganda on its own radios and news services and by the distribution of anti-capitalist "literature and general subsidies to local editors and columnists." The KGB continues to recruit "agents of influence"

Secret political action is not the only antidote for secret Soviet actions, but it is one instrument. Situations are bound to arise, especially in Latin America or the Near East, in

which the President will find a secret American action is the only effective response. Such occasions may be rare, but it would be foolish to deprive him of the secret option.

Who will measure the profit and loss of such operations?

It is a fundamental and frustrating fact that the pragmatic equation can be written only within the executive. The broad moral-pragmatic issue is inevitably reduced to the question of controlling the action of the executive—and here frustration persists, for there are no adequate answers.

A Hoover-type commission on intelligence and secret operations can, at best, make broad bureaucratic and policy recommendations. Congressional oversight can do no more than rubber stamp executive decisions or hold dramatic post mortems. Legislation, a "foreign intervention control act", for example, is impossible to write on such a rarified subject, nor can Congress or a committee vote on individual strategic operations that are to be carried out secretly.

The burden is clearly on the President to resolve at least some of the public suspicion and distrust about secret political actions abroad. He can change the machinery of secret committees to bring in a broader adversary point of view in the initial stages of secret action proposals. He can make the National Security Council as a whole responsible for final recommendations to him. He can exercise his sharpest judgment on the possible profit and cost of each operation. And he is the only man who can bring to bear a moral judgment that reflects the values of the electorate as a whole.

The President can take one further step to bring in the people. He can arrange for the participation of select congressmen in the National Security Council's deliberations on secret action proposals.

Who monitors the President? In any government, secret activities are peculiarly the province of the executive: secret negotiations, backdoor diplomacy, foreign intelligence and domestic security operations, covert action operations. In a republic without an official secrets act there is only one check on what he does in secret—the press.

The adversary relationship between the media and the executive on official secrets may in individual cases entail some damage to national interests, but without private investigators, we cannot know who is doing what to us or for us. Exposes of the government's secret operations, whether on Cambodia or Chile, can throw light on the acts of the past, and provide a cautionary signal for the decisions of tomorrow.

WASHINGTON STAR
10 October 1974

Leaks Cut Copying Of Cables

By Jeremiah O'Leary
Star-News Staff Writer

The State Department this week ordered a 50 percent reduction in the distribution of diplomatic cables both within the department and to other government agencies because of concern over security leaks and the mounting cost of producing up to 180,000 copies a day.

Deputy Undersecretary for Management L. Dean Brown said the order would take effect Monday. He said he issued the order to the departmental communications center with the approval of Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger and will meet today with the assistant secretaries of state to explain the measure.

Brown said in an interview that two recent leaks of classified cables were precipitating factors but that the volume and cost of the reproduction and distribution of the cables also figured in his decision. The State Department receives anywhere from 2,500 to 2,800 cables a day from embassies and consulates around the world.

These are classified according to content, both at the source and on arrival in Washington, and distribution in the past has been based on interest in all government agencies.

TWO SECRET cables were leaked to the press in September, one from Ambassador David H. Popper in Santiago, Chile, and the other from Ambassador Herman Eilts in Cairo. Both leaks reportedly resulted in temperamental outbursts by Kissinger to the extent that he authorized his press spokesman, Ambassador Robert Anderson, to say that Foreign Service officers who leak cables are a disgrace to the service.

In turn, a number of career Foreign Service officers were outraged by the slur that could only have been made with Kissinger's approval.

"Kissinger is the biggest leaker in the building," said one career officer.

The Popper cable reported a conversation the ambassador had with Chilean military officials, pointing out that the administration might experience difficulty in getting congressional approval for military assistance to the Chilean junta. As leaked to The New York Times, the cable apparently had a Kissinger response scribbled across it saying, "Tell Popper to knock off the political-science lectures."

The Eilts cable referred to a similar problem regarding a portion of the foreign-aid bill affecting funds promised to Egypt by Kissinger. The reaction on the seventh floor at the State Department was bitter because the last thing Kissinger wants is anyone rocking the boat of his affable relationship with President Anwar Sadat.

TEAMS OF STATE Department security agents fanned out over the building after each leak but were reportedly unable to discover how the cables found their way to the press.

Brown said he ordered the reduction in distribution of the cables, many of which have been going to the White House, CIA, Pentagon, Treasury Department, Commerce Department and other agencies of government on a selective basis.

"These cables generate huge amounts of paper," Brown said. "Especially the unclassified messages that cover non-sensitive subjects such as, for example, potato production.

A number of FSOs agreed that there is far too much paper generated by the cables from overseas, but some expressed the fear that if Brown's ax is wielded too strongly it might isolate country desk officers from what is going on elsewhere in the regions for which they are responsible.

FOREIGN REPORT, London
18 September 1974

Can Kissinger survive Chile?

President Ford followed **Mr Henry Kissinger's** advice on how to handle the Chile debate and decided to brazen it out. In his press conference on Monday, he argued that the use of secret funds by the Central Intelligence Agency in Chile was justified in order to keep opposition news media – and political parties – alive during the Allende period; that the CIA was not involved in the preparation of last year's coup; and that, anyway, the Russians are spending much more on clandestine operations than the Americans. It needed to be said; but the debate does not end there. The process that was started by the leaking of secret testimony by **Mr William Colby,** the Director of Central Intelligence, will result in a new round of congressional hearings and, in the long run, its effects on American foreign policy could be as shattering as the effects of the Watergate affair on domestic administration.

New hearings were expected to begin this week before the House of Representatives' sub-committee on inter-American affairs, chaired by **Mr Dante Fascell,** where the driving force is **Mr Michael Harrington,** a left-wing Democrat from Massachusetts whose version of the Colby testimony (the CIA has refused to make the transcript available) is what started the ball rolling. There are discrepancies between his account of what was said and accounts that are privately given by those who were present; whereas he quotes Mr Colby as saying that secret funds were used to "destabilise" the Allende regime, for example, other sources claim that that word was never used. These discrepancies can be resolved only if the transcript is released or if Mr Colby is called to testify again.

The Fascell sub-committee was scheduled to hear a number of academic specialists this week, and to call some of the participants next week; the second group could include **Mr Charles Meyer,** formerly Assistant Secretary of State for inter-American affairs, **Mr Jack Kubisch,** his successor (now on his way to take over the embassy in Athens), **Mr Harry Schlaudemann,** a Deputy Assistant Secretary formerly in the Santiago embassy, and **Mr Edward Korry,** the American ambassador in Chile during the first 14 months of the Allende regime.

At the same time, **Senator Frank Church,** the chairman of the Senate sub-committee on multinational companies, has initiated his own staff study on the possible contradictions between what some of these officials, and Mr Kissinger, have said in previous statements on American involvement in Chile – notably during the hearings on the International Telephone and Telegraph corporation before his own sub-committee in 1972 – and what was disclosed in the Colby testimony. Sources close to the senator are talking about possible perjury charges, and describe what has so far been disclosed as only "the tip of the iceberg", suggesting that the inquiry could be broadened out into an attack on similar operations in other countries.

Senator Church is known to be anxious to set up fresh hearings before his own sub-committee; the timing and the scope of these will largely depend on the attitude taken by **Senator Fulbright,** who has the ultimate word until next January, when he will leave his post as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Mr Fulbright is thought to be worried about the extent to which new hearings could turn into a witchhunt against Mr Kissinger, who has been shown to be the prime architect of America's Chile policy.

There are a number of very disturbing features about the way that the Chile inquiry, fuelled by leaks to the New York Times, is developing. These include:

(*i*) *The possible naming of Chileans in contact with the CIA.* It is now widely known that three leading opposition papers, as well as some radio stations and opposition parties, were the recipients of CIA funds during the Allende period. It is clear that the newspapers and radio stations would probably not have survived the tremendous economic pressures that the Allende government brought to bear on them without outside help. For example, the sources of advertising dried up as the state took over private firms and refused official advertising, and prices were held artificially low while costs soared in conditions of hyper-inflation. The CIA funding did not involve any measure of editorial control, and one of the papers that benefited actually applauded the confiscation of American copper companies. The aim was to keep in being a democratic curb on the marxist government.

The likelihood now, unfortunately, is that this rationale will be forgotten and that – through either the hearings or the press – the names of the recipients of secret funds, and of those who "laundered" the money, will be made public. This could have devastating effects on the lives of those concerned, perhaps literally, since they would become automatic targets for the guerrilla left. It would have equally dramatic implications for American foreign policy elsewhere, since it would become plain to anyone seeking such American support that he might be exposed and discredited through the inability of the American Administration to keep such matters secret.

(*ii*) *The lop-sided nature of the debate.* Little attention has been paid to evidence of the much greater Russian and Cuban involvement in Chile during the Allende years; the Allende government was the recipient of some $620m from the Soviet block, and the Cubans were deeply engaged in training and arming paramilitary groups. And testimony that conflicts with the notion that the American government was engaged, all along, in trying to topple Allende has been studiously ignored by some major American papers.

Mr Korry has testified, for example, that he followed a policy of accommodation with Allende during the first eight months he was in power. This broke down only when Allende himself rejected an offer that would have enabled Chile to compensate nationalised American companies without, in effect, having to pay for it – since compensation would have been paid in Chilean bonds guaranteed by the United States Treasury that would have been negotiable on the international market. Even more significantly, Mr Korry has testified that a representative of Allende approached the American embassy for a secret subsidy of $1m before the September, 1970, election. Things are more complex than Mr Harrington and the New York Times make out.

(*iii*) *The witchhunt against the makers of the Chile policy.* It is a time-honoured principle that officials do not always own up to everything an intelligence service is doing. But in America now the statements of senior officials on Chile are being treated in some quarters as part of a Watergate-style cover-up for which those involved (up to and including Mr Kissinger) should be punished. If perjury – or contempt of court – charges are threatened, some of the people affected may feel that they have to tell all in order to defend themselves. There are a number of legal, and factual, questions to be resolved before things come to that. But it may not be too soon to ask: who is the John Dean of the Chile hearings going to be?

The conclusion to be drawn from all this is that, unless the American Administration manages to preserve the minimal amount of secrecy indispensable to the conduct of foreign policy, it will lose the means to function as a great power. That, as well as Mr Kissinger's own survival, is what is now at stake.

GENERAL

WASHINGTON POST
06 October 1974

Jack Anderson

A 200-Mile Fishing Limit

The 200-mile fishing limit, an obscure issue in the 1960s, suddenly ranks with the oil crisis and nuclear testing as one of the most dangerous controversies of the 1970s.

Already, gunboats have clashed on the high seas over the fishing boundaries. At stake are not only profitable fishing catches but undersea mining rights and the control of strategic naval straits.

Confidential documents show the Pentagon is gravely worried that the 200-mile limit would close off the Gibralter straits, the Bosporus and other vital passageways to shipping. This would have a "serious impact on national security," Deputy Defense Secretary William Clements has written in a letter to selected senators.

But the 12-mile limit, on the other hand, has opened U.S. coastal waters to Russian and Japanese fishing boats. This has forced the United States to import fish, which has added a staggering $1.3 billion to the balance of payments deficit.

Busy Pentagon lobbyists, meanwhile, are sneaking confidential briefing papers to senators who oppose the 200-mile limit. Down in Foggy Bottom, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has made what appear to be badly misleading statements on the controversy, and old Senate friends are feuding over the issue.

Simply stated, here is how the problem came up:

In 1608, a Dutch lawyer named Hugo Grotius made a convincing case for free fishing on the high seas. For some 330 years thereafter, boats of all lands pursued fish virtually at will.

By 1940, the simple fishing boats were being replaced in coastal waters by floating factories, and the supply of fish was dwindling. To protect its fishing, Chile extended its jurisdiction 200 miles out to sea, far beyond the traditional 3-mile and 12-mile limits.

This started an international scramble for fishing rights. Now 36 lands, most of them small, poor nations, have laid claim to additional coastal waters as far out as 200 miles.

Indeed, a naval battle almost broke out between British and Icelandic warships over Iceland's arbitrary 50-mile limit. Because the United States failed to support Iceland, NATO came within a hair of being kicked out of its vital Icelandic bases. More crises are likely.

The United States had held firm to the three-mile limit until Congress extended the boundaries to 12 miles in 1966. The object was to bring offshore oil within our territorial waters.

Now the fishing interests are pressing to push out the territorial limits still farther, for the U.S. share of Atlantic coast fishing has fallen from 93 per cent in 1960 to less than 50 per cent today. The price of fish in the United States has soared, accordingly, as Russian and Japanese trawlers have hauled in shrimp, mackerel, haddock, halibut and herring along the U.S. coast.

A world conference on laws of the seas, meeting this summer in Caracas, took up the 200-mile limit. The results have become a matter of enormous controversy.

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had advised key senators in private letters, for example, that the Caracas conference made "substantial progress." Coastal countries "will be meeting again next spring with a view toward concluding an agreement in 1975," Kissinger assured the senators.

But a secret Senate Commerce Committee memo charges that the Caracas meeting, far from accomplishing "substantial progress," really broke up in disagreement. "Nations felt no desire to negotiate (and) the Caracas session failed to make as much progress as had been hoped for," states the Senate document.

The forthcoming 1975 session, viewed so hopefully by Kissinger, "will be unable to deal with all the many complex issues left unresolved," the memo adds. Still other conferences may have to be called and, even if an agreement is reached, it will take the nations "at least two to eight years to ratify such an important and contentious multilateral document."

The Senate memo estimates that a final agreement, far from Kissinger's 1975 forecast, couldn't be reached until 1980. This will be too late, the memo warns, to save U.S. fishing.

Lobbyists from the White House, Pentagon and Commerce Department, meanwhile, have been swarming over Capitol Hill to oppose the 200-mile limit. We have obtained briefing papers prepared by the Pentagon for the use of its lobbyists in contacting senators.

One briefing paper, labeled "Talking points . . . for use in discussions with bipartisan leaders of Congress," suggests the lobbyists assure senators that a new world conference will settle the matter by April.

Another briefing paper notes that a bill to extend the offshore boundaries, introduced by Sen. Warren Magnuson (D-Wash.), "would unilaterally abrogate . . . the 1958 Convention on the High Seas" and badly hamper the U.S. Sixth and Seventh Fleets. In a lengthy, private letter to Magnuson, Commerce Secretary Frederick Dent has joined in trying to dissuade him from "pushing the legislation at this time."

Regardless of how the issue is decided—and the odds are heavily against successful congressional action this season—the tides and times are running out on peaceful settlement. More confrontations are likely on the high seas, as nations with trillion-dollar stakes in offshore oil, minerals and fish manipulate their boundaries.

NEWSWEEK
7 October 1974

THINKING THE UNTHINKABLE

Q. *Is the Pentagon game-planning any military action against the Arab oil producers in the Middle East?*

A. *We are not contemplating any such action of that sort.*

Although Defense Secretary James Schlesinger dismissed that possibility out of hand at a press conference last week, the fact that the subject was raised at all was indicative of a growing concern in Washington that the U.S. might eventually decide to take drastic steps to bring an end to the oil crisis. At the moment, it is true, the Ford Administration seems to believe that it can solve the problem through diplomatic jawboning rather than military muscle. And U.S. officials insist that any kind of punitive action against the Arabs would be doomed to failure. Yet if the current strategy of verbal suasion fails, many people believe the public mood will shift in favor of trying harsher measures. Last week, NEWSWEEK asked a number of government officials, military strategists and experts on the Mideast to speculate on the options open to the U.S. The three most talked-about options and their implications:

1 Psychological Warfare

Although it takes many forms, psychological warfare has one basic aim—unnerving the enemy. That was clearly the intent of the verbal salvos fired at the major oil-producing nations last week by the Ford Administration. "To understand the oil poker game," said one top U.S. official, "you have to know what the last chips are in each player's stack. For the oil producers who have four or five

years' worth of foreign exchange, the last bet is to shut off the oil. For the West, which has only 60 to 90 days' worth of oil, the final ante is not commercial. It's military."

Before that final bet is made, however, "psywar" strategists cite ways in which the West could try to rattle the nerves of a few oil sheiks with a combination of propaganda moves and economic sanctions. With the oil producers still heavily dependent on the developed nations for food and technology, the West could hike prices dramatically or declare an embargo on all such goods. Military assistance and arms sales to the OPEC nations could be frozen until prices were cut. The billions of dollars that the Arabs have invested or deposited in the West could be seized. And repeated hints of possible future military action could be dropped to feed the fears of the oil producers that if the West got desperate enough, it might decide to opt for war.

Psychological-warfare tactics have their shortcomings and their risks, however. They would fail overnight unless the U.S., Japan and Western Europe formed an unbreakable united front. Without that, the Arabs would quickly turn to any defectors for their needed goods. The industrialized nations would also have to be prepared to follow up talk with action. "I cannot see it working," says British historian Walter Laqueur, "unless the industrialized nations are seen to be determined to back it up with military intervention. Otherwise, the oil producers will call the bluff."

Attempts to squeeze the oil producers could also create new problems. Sealing off Western markets, for example, could send the Arabs running into the arms of the Soviets. Or, they could decide to retaliate and cut off all oil supplies to the West. Still, the most popular and least risky step the West could take at the moment is some type of psychological warfare. But most experts agree that the campaign would have to be accompanied by stringent energy conservation measures to prove that the industrialized nations meant business.

2 Covert Operations

The last time the Central Intelligence Agency is known to have mounted a full-scale covert operation in the Middle East—to oust Iran's anti-American Premier Mohammed Mossadegh in 1953—it worked. Whether similar action to oust balky oil sheiks would work today is doubtful. Even if it did, it would perilously escalate the battle for oil and might create grave new problems for the U.S.

But it is possible.

Agents in the pay of the West could borrow a tactic from the Palestinian guerrillas and set up terror squads to stalk traveling Arab oil barons. "It would be an attempt to deny to the sheiks the pleasures their money can buy," said one former CIA agent. "Flights overseas, foreign residences, visits to Nice—all that would be out." Assassinations—accompanied by blunt hints to other Arab leaders that they could be next—might be carried out. Or undercover operatives could attempt to stir up riots and protests within a country. "We could give the sheiks a sharp lesson by getting the radicals in the country to cause trouble," said an ex-CIA man. "The rationale behind this would be to come back and say: 'See what could happen'."

The peril is that what could happen would probably harm the U.S. as much as the sheiks. The leaders who replaced those now in power would undoubtedly be at least as nationalistic as their predecessors and equally anxious to use the oil weapon against the West. The Soviet Union, even if it did not threaten a direct confrontation with the U.S., would be in a position to expand its influence in the Arab world. And once the news leaked out of what the U.S. had done, the public uproar would be deafening.

Thus, such "dirty tricks" probably would take second place to more discreet moves—such as trying to exploit the existing differences between nations such as Iran and Saudi Arabia in the hope of shattering the cartel's unity. "I believe that the cartel will break up on inherent internal conflict," says one high U.S. official. "But I also believe we should do everything reasonable in our power to make sure it does."

3 Military Intervention

Historically, depriving a nation of access to vital natural resources has been considered a *casus belli*. And as one top U.S. official noted last week, "If the oil-producing nations drive the world into depression in their greed, the West might be forced into a desperate military adventure. But it would be a nightmare—trying to pump oil for decades in the midst of what would amount to guerrilla war and probable worldwide terror." Beyond any doubt, then, an armed attack would have such enormous and frightening ramifications that only the imminent breakdown of Western society could spur Washington to launch it.

To be meaningful, a military intervention would have to be directed against Saudi Arabia, the largest oil producer, and it would need to be both quick and massive. In addition to seizing the major oil fields, troops would have to secure the loading facilities at Ras Tanura 125 miles away on the Persian Gulf and control the narrow Strait of Hormuz through which tankers have to pass. The U.S. would need to mass enough airpower to repel a counterattack by Arab air forces and perhaps even land in neighboring sheikdoms to block them from reinforcing the Saudis. It would have to be done with enough speed to take the oil fields before they could be blown up. And the initial attack would have to be carried out by the 82nd Airborne Division—the only U.S. force trained for parachute assaults—plus perhaps whatever allied (and Israeli) units that could be persuaded to join up.

Formidable as the obstacles are, there are some who think that the industrialized nations may be in such desperate straits as early as next spring that an invasion would be thinkable. As Walter Laqueur put it, "There will be a call for action as countries are hit by massive unemployment and bankruptcy. By then the oil producers will have become so unpopular that even military intervention may receive worldwide support." But the consequences of invasion could be catastrophic. The oil fields could be so badly damaged that the West would have even less oil than it does now. The Soviet Union might react with some military action of its own—on the side of the Arabs. And that could draw the two superpowers into a head-on confrontation that could turn into a nuclear showdown.

Eastern Europe

BALTIMORE SUN
24 September 1974

Czechs resent U.S. curbs

By MICHAEL PARKS
Sun Staff Correspondent

Prague—Czechoslovak industrial firms, under heavy pressure to modernize and automate their plants, are covetously eyeing American equipment but with little expectation of being able to buy what they want.

The firms are drawing up extensive shopping lists for hundreds of millions of dollars worth of advanced Western equipment and technology, but almost all the orders are expected to go to America's competitors.

Czech officials say that prospects for American machinery sales here are limited by a number of political factors that they see as imposed by Washington.

These include strategic controls on exports, restrictions on credits, American refusal to reduce tariffs on Czech goods imported to the United States and the still-unresolved dispute over American property nationalized by the Communist government here after World War II.

"We would really like to increase our trade and to broaden it considerably, but the United States still is playing politics, cold war politics if you will, with trade," Josef Keller, a senior official of the Czech Foreign Trade Ministry, said.

A number of American businessmen, returning from Czechoslovakia's annual trade fair at Brno, were highly critical of the American government's position on trade with Czechoslovakia. "This is a small but highly lucrative market, and we are being shut out of it," the European vice president of a major electronics firm, said. "All the alleged reasons don't make much sense because we do the same deals with Poland and the Soviet Union."

The biggest current dispute is over the settlement of the 26-year-old property claims, totaling about $72.6 million, for the nationalized property of American citizens and companies and about $7 million for the sale of surplus U.S. government property.

Prague agreed to pay about $37 million, according to unofficial reports, but settlement has been blocked by a Senate amendment to the trade reform bill now pending before Congress. Under the amendment, the claims would have to be settled in full before the U.S. would release 18.4 metric tons of Czech gold, now worth about $96.8 million, that was seized from German troops at the end of the war.

"About on same terms"

Although the amendment has not yet come before the whole Senate, its adoption by a committee has both baffled and infuriated Czechs. "Our settlement was on about the same terms as other American settlements with East European nations—about 40 cents for every $1 claimed, one Czech official said. "But that is our gold that the United States is holding, not American gold, and to sell it or seize it to pay these claims is just theft."

The settlement agreement, which had been negotiated by the State Department with the Czech Foreign Ministry, actually was the second such agreement. The first, concluded in 1964, was repudiated by Washington after being initialled here.

Mr. Keller said his government sees settlement of the financial questions as the first of several trade barriers to be removed.

"Two things are preventing an increase in our purchases from the United States—the first is the system of strategic controls, which really hamstring regular trade and seem to be applied more rigorously in our case than in others, and the second is the restriction on credits," Mr. Keller said.

"In the long run, however, the question of what we are able to sell to you is just as important, for we want a balanced trade, just as every country does. If we can sell more, we will buy more. But that means we must be able to sell our goods on an equal basis with our competitors; as it stands now, we often pay tariffs three, four, five or even more than they pay."

The trade reform bill would authorize the President to grant Czechoslovakia the reduced tariffs of most-favored-nation status, which it had until 1951, but this provision has been involved with the fight over Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union.

NEW YORK TIMES
25 September 1974

MOSCOW STEPS UP ANTI-U.S. CARTOONS

By KEDRICK SMITH
Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, Sept. 24—After a honeymoon with the new Administration of President Ford, the Soviet press has embarked on an upswing in anti-American propaganda described by the United State embassy as the strongest in a year or more.

A rash of political cartoons, a staple of Soviet newspapers during the cold-war years, has again appeared.

Today Pravda published a cartoon showing a lurking, dark - hatted, teeth - gritting agent in dark glasses holding up his fingers to make the initials C.I.A., which turn into the legs of a gun-toting, hatchet-wielding ruler of Chile.

Yesterday, another cartoon in the Communist party daily showed the Cambodian leader, Lon Nol, beaten up and bandaged from head to foot, sitting in one hand of Uncle Sam and prayerfully catching a silver dollar from the other.

Last Thursday, Pravda's main cartoon should an Israeli suitor serenading a fat old courtesan, who was standing on a balcony labeled "pentagon" and was waving a fan made of rockets, while the Israeli held his hat to catch anything that might fall his way.

Boston Schools a Topic

Another newspaper, Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya, published a cartoon of a little black student in Boston being menaced by the shadow of a hooded Klansman with a submachine gun. Izvestia, the Government newspaper, printed an article today on the Boston school crisis and on racial problems in New York.

Soviet cartoons, especially if printed in newspapers under the direct control of the party's Central Committee, are regarded as a barometer of the prevailing propaganda line. It has been a number of months since Pravda has run more than a random anti-American cartoon.

The recent upsurge suggests that the Kremlin no longer feels a need to avoid offending President Ford. The attacks on American policy in Cambodia and on Israel, repeated in commentaries, are taken by some Western diplomats as signs of Moscow's unhappiness about Mr. Ford's policies in these areas.

There is no indication that the Kremlin's interest in detente or in doing business with the White House has slackened.

The surge of anti-American propaganda is part of a generally more critical treatment of the West in the Soviet press, West European diplomats observe.

One theory is that Moscow now sees little prospect of early completion of the European security conference because of changes in Western governments and therefore sees no need to soften its propaganda.

Another theory is that the Kremlin is engaged in one of its periodic ideological retrenchments. On Aug. 31, the party's Central Committee issued a decree chastising the party organization in Byelorussia for slack ideological work and ordering it to improve the training of indoctrinators. This was read as a decree with national significance.

For weeks now, Soviet propagandists have played up the bad economic news from the West, projecting a picture of inflation, unemployment and depression.

But the negative portrayal of American society has ranged more widely. In addition to standard items about the economic slump, rising prices and racial problems, the press has reported that educational standards are deteriorating because of financial problems, that some Americans are eating pet food and that industrial accidents and occupational diseases are on the rise.

Soviet readers have also been told that 10 million Amricans are chronic alcoholics, that surveillance of individuals and invasion of privacy are an increasing problem, libraries are caught in a financial crisis, sailors are absent without leave in Japan, bicycle thieves and defective motor cars are plaguing ordinary people, the numbers of train derailments is rising, and more than 420,000 Americans were arrested on marijuana charges last year.

Such items appear fairly regularly in the newspapers, but their volume tends to rise and fall as the Kremlin places high or low priority on maintaining a favorable relationship with Washington.

Not since the controversy over the war in Vietnam do American officials recall such a steady flow of anti-American news. But it still falls short of cold-war levels, they say.

WASHINGTON POST
10 October 1974

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

Anti-Americanism in Greece

The Greek government has quietly withdrawn some of its top military officers from North Altantic Treaty Organization (NATO) headquarters in Brussels, one more indication of how seriously the Karamanlis government views anti-Amoican sentiment now sweeping Greece.

Facing the first parliamentary election on Nov. 17 since the military coup dietat of 1967, the new civilian government of Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis is torn between conflicting political realities.

The merest fragment of public display of pro-American sentiment could boomerang, giving the Greek left a dangerous opening that Andreas Papandreou would be quick to exploit. Karamanlis dealt with this hard political fact by pulling Greece out of the military organization of NATO. Now he has followed up by withdrawing some of the 400-odd Greek officers from their regular military billets in Brussels, Naples and other NATO commands.

But the domestic political demands for anti-U.S. actions raise the gravest future problems for Greece. Friendship with the West, and particularly the U.S., is absolutely essential for Greece in the long run, as a glance at the map proves. Greece is bordered by three Communist states to the north and by muscle-flexing Turkey on the east.

Karamanalis and his foreign minister, the astute George Mavros, along with most other leading Greek politicians of the center and right, fully understand that fact. But despite strong pressure from the U.S., they are unable to impede the move toward what looks like a form of dangerous neutrality for fear that the anti-American currents now sweeping Greece would pull them under. Accordingly, rational diplomacy dictated by long-term Greek security needs has been inundated by short-term domestic politics. The foundation for this was built by Washington's long love affair with the hated military dictatorship.

A case in point was the asbolutely futile effort by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger last week to enlist sub rosa Greek support against the then-pending congressional ban on U.S. military assistance to Turkey.

Conferring at his own request at the Plaza Hotel in Manhattan last week with Mavros, Kissinger explained that the effect of a congressionally-imposed Turkish aid ban was predictable: it would make the Turks dig in their heels against U.S. mediation efforts to remove Turkish troops from Cyprus and return part of Turkey's Cyprus conquest to Greek Cypriots. Thus, it was in the self-interest of Athens to keep the U.S. on good terms with Turkey.

Mavros was stunned. "That," he told Kissinger, "is not something for a Greek to do."

Indeed, far from discouraging Greek sympathizers in the U.S. Congress from voting against the ban on aid to Turkey, top Greek diplomats in the U.S. encouraged it. One active promoter of the aid ban was the consul-general in the influential Greek consulate in San Francisco, who quietly spread the word to friendly congressmen: stop American aid no matter what the impact on Cyprus.

In short, the political imperatives in Athens on the eve of the parliamentary election far outweigh the long-range necessity of gradually restoring the Athens-Washington link. No Greek leader caught secretly lobbying Congress to vote against the Turkish aid-ban could be elected sewer inspector in a provincial Greek village.

The unannounced decision to withdraw top Greek military men from NATO hadquarters is simply the newest signal. Having heard American pledges for over two months that Turkey would be glad to give up some of it Cyprus conquest once talks started (pledges wholly unredeemed), the Greek government continues to advertise itself as anti-American.

There is no hope that this will change between now and the mid-November election, and little expectation that it could change soon thereafter. Likewise, the hostility for Turkey so vividly expressed in Congress over the aid-ban threatens political retaliation against Washington there, too.

With an outstanding IOU debt to Russia for its acquiescence in the invasion of Cyprus last July, Turkey may find it harder than before to deny any Soviet request for overflight privileges in a future Middle Eastern war, particularly with the U.S. Congress so virulently anti-Turkey.

As these Cyprus chickens come home to roost, the once-mighty U.S. is an impotent bystander.

THE ECONOMIST
28 SEP 1974

Greece and America

SIR—Your article of September 7th was an exceptionally sane voice in the midst of the emotional accusations which the Greek press has been launching against the Americans, blaming them for organising the Cyprus crisis for their own purposes. Your article not only succeeded in showing the logical flaws of such arbitrary accusations but also made it clear that there is no proof whatsoever to support such allegations. Not surprisingly the mass-circulation right-wing Vradini, when mentioning your article, "failed" to refer to the essence of your viewpoint but simply asserted that "the United States played no part in the return of Karamanlis, writes today the English magazine *The Economist*".

The anti-American campaign was triggered off by some violent editorials of the right-wing Akropolis, which being for some time a staunch supporter of the junta was probably in this way trying to obtain "patriotic" credentials. From then on everything has been blamed on the CIA and a smear campaign has been directed against Henry Kissinger. There is no doubt that Mr Kissinger has committed certain blunders during the Cyprus crisis but this does not justify petty and crude personal attacks against him. The CIA could also be guilty of some of these accusations but for the time being proof does not seem to be available, a fact which is for the Greek press of minimal importance.

A similar irresponsible stand has been adopted by Greek politicians like Professor Papandreou, who has accused Nato of preparing (a) the overthrow of Makarios and (b) the Turkish invasion (!), and by Cypriot politicians like Dr Lyssarides, who had no doubt that the attempt on his life was organised not only by Eoka B but also by Nato and the CIA (!). Maybe the most blatant example of this blind and nonsensical anti-Americanism can be found in the first page of the Athens News of August 21st in a heavily-printed "warning": "In view of the vigorous stance over Cyprus taken by the Greek prime minister, Mr Karamanlis, vis-à-vis Nato and the United States, rumours have begun to circulate that the CIA may strike again. Fully aware of the methods used by the CIA, we give warning that if a single hair of Mr Karamanlis's head is touched, we shall know who must be held responsible."

After seven years of stagnating dictatorship Greece needs more than anything else a moderate political climate, and a responsible press, neither of which can be achieved under this hysterical and irresponsible atmosphere of anti-Americanism.—Yours faithfully,

Athens JOHN E. LOULIS

WASHINGTON POST
23 September 1974

Uneasiness in Europe Over Haig

By John M. Goshko
Washington Post Staff Writer

BRUSSELS,—The controversy in the United States over Gen. Alexander M. Haig Jr.'s appointment as Supreme Allied Commander in Europe has failed to spark an echo from America's allies in NATO.

That does not mean there hasn't been considerable criticism on this side of the Atlantic about President Ford's selection of Haig for both the top NATO military post and the command of U.S. forces in Europe.

The weight of press comment in most NATO countries has been clearly unfavorable. And, among officers of the American forces stationed in Europe, the appointment has triggered a clearly discernible, though not openly displayed, feeling of bitterness about the elevation of a man regarded as a "political general."

But the reaction was quite different among those who make the decisions in the 12 countries that participate with the United States in NATO's integrated military structure. Here at NATO headquarters sources in the various national delegations say that their governments accepted the Haig nomination with barely a whisper of dissent.

The sole exception was the Netherlands, whose government made it clear that it was displeased and tried to sound out the other European allies about rejecting Haig. In the end, though, the Dutch, seeing that they had no support, withdrew their objections, and Haig's appointment sailed through NATO's Defense Planning Committee without incident.

The initial Dutch opposition was based on the same consideration that has caused controversy in the United States—namely, the contention that Haig has been compromised by his political role in the Nixon administration.

Dutch sources say that they have nothing against Haig personally and do not mean to imply that they think he was involved in the Watergate coverup. But, they add, Foreign Minister Max Van der Stoel feels that Haig is so closely identified with former President Nixon that his appointment as supreme commander amounts to "a public-relations disaster" for NATO.

Influencing the Dutch government is the fact that public opinion in the Netherlands, particularly among young people, has grown increasingly hostile to all things military. Much of this anti-military feeling springs from the Vietnam war, which European youth equates with Mr. Nixon.

As a result, the Netherlands government took the position that Haig's appointment was not exactly helpful to its attempts to convince its domestic constituency that Holland has a vested interest in remaining within NATO. Yet, while all the other European NATO members have essentially the same problem, they all steered clear of the Dutch effort to mount a campaign against Haig's appointment.

NATO sources say this was due to a number of reasons, chief among them a desire not to embarrass and possibly antagonize Mr. Ford at the very outset of his presidency. Therefore, even those with reservations about the wisdom of the appointment apparently decided that accepting Haig was the lesser evil.

A secondary reason cited by some is the fact that the present Netherlands government, which loomed as the spearhead of any opposition movement, has developed a reputation for eccentricity in NATO circles.

Earlier this year, Prime Minister Joop den Uyl's Socialist-led government provoked the anger of its allies by proposing cuts in the Dutch forces beyond what NATO regards as a safe level.

While the Haig appointment has made remarkably few waves within NATO, the story is somewhat different regarding his other job as commander of the 300,000 U.S. Army, Air and Naval personnel grouped in the European Command.

Although no one will say so publicly, Haig's appointment is clearly a bitter pill for many command officers. His takeover of the command, scheduled for Nov. 1, is the most talked-about subject in U.S. officers' messes throughout Europe, and military sources say that the sentiment, particularly among professional army officers, is overwhelmingly hostile.

Their objection is described as being based not on ideological grounds but on the fact that Haig achieved his position through service in the White House rather than coming up through the normal military channels.

In a service where most officers find promotion a slow and grinding process, there appears to be great resentment over the way that Haig, in the words of one officer, "jumped the line."

In private conversation, these officers point out that Haig was catapulted by Mr. Nixon over 240 generals to four-star rank, although he had never held a major field command during his army service.

This, many contend, is grossly unfair to the number of officers who have far greater experience and demonstrated records of achievement in traditional military command and staff areas.

As a result, the tendency is to regard the appointment as a bad precedent harmful to the morale of senior officers and likely to convince younger officers that the path to advancement lies in politics.

BALTIMORE SUN
10 October 1974

Bonn 'CIA' kept files on leading politicians

By ANTHONY MURRAY
Bonn Bureau of The Sun

Bonn—A former West German Cabinet member revealed yesterday in testimony to a parliamentary panel that the country's super-secret foreign intelligence branch had kept intimate personal files on more than 50 domestic politicians and other personalities in the 1950's and 1960's.

Horst Ehmke, head of the chancellory under former Chancellor Willy Brandt, said that he learned of the dossiers when he took office in 1969 and ordered their destruction. The panel is investigating security in the West German government.

He claimed the files were in violation of strict laws limiting the agency to intelligence-gathering beyond Germany's borders. He said they were assembled under the agency's former chief, Gen. Reinhard Gehlen, who headed the organization during most of the post-war era under a succession of Christian Democratic governments.

Among the 54 names Mr. Ehmke said were carried in the dossiers were those of Mr. Brandt, a Social Democrat: party lieutenant and parliamentary leader, Herbert Wehner, and a former federal president and Social Democratic leader, Gustav Heinemann.

But also included were Christian Democrats such as former Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger, a powerful Bavarian politician and former defense minister, Franz Josef Strauss, and a former party chief, Rainer Barzel, in addition to prominent businessmen, journalists and others of all political stripes.

Shortly after Mr. Ehmke's testimony to the committee, which is probing the circumstances behind the spy scandal that toppled Mr. Brandt from the government in May, the Federal Intelligence Agency's present chief, Gerhard Wessel, watered down the charges when he said he could not guarantee that the files were actually illegal.

Near East

THE WASHINGTON POST Sunday, Sept. 15, 1974

Lebanon: Rot, Impending Disaster

By Jonathan C. Randal

Randal is a Washington Post correspondent based in Paris who reports frequently from the Middle East.

BEIRUT — Shootings, politicians' private armies and do-nothing government are fast destroying what remains of Lebanon's reputation as a delicately balanced island of free enterprise calm in the topsy-turvy Middle East.

Pick up a newspaper—and there are more than two dozen to choose from—and you'll find politicians accusing each other and/or the half million Palestinian residents of graft, psychiatric disorders, subversion and other failings.

If politicians and private citizens are fascinated by the troubles on Cyprus—less than an hour's flight time away—their fascination gives every appearance of being the fatal attraction the moth feels toward the flame.

The most cursory lip service is paid to the notion that Lebanon can ill afford such trauma, if only because of the balance of Christians and Moslems distributed in 17 identifiable communities.

But the talk is no longer of Lebanon's political and economic miracle as the stable entrepot and banking center of the Middle East. Rather it is of the seeming inevitability of a civil war which even the considerable Levantine gifts for compromise may prove unable to prevent.

Somber Lebanese are once again discussing their recurring nightmare—a carveup of Lebanon by Syria and Israel. As one knowledgeable newspaper editor lamented, "Neither Damascus nor Tel Aviv has to pull any strings to bring the worst about since we're doing such a splendid job ourselves."

These telltale traces of rot and impending disaster are as visible as the litter in the streets and empty lots of Beirut, where half this nation's citizens live:

• Mail and cable service is fast rivaling Italy's in unreliability, scarcely an advertisement for the efficiency of what sometimes is called the "bankers' republic." Confirming suspicions was the recent discovery of more than 5,000 mail sacks, abandoned by overworked postal employees.

• Greed and real estate frenzy have done away with almost every green space in Beirut to satisfy the oil sheiks' penchant for safe Arab investment. Beirut's beautiful St. George's Bay is polluted for miles on either side of the capital.

• Reported murders have jumped from 27 in 1970 to 317 last year. Specialists estimate their real number is closer to 450, which, if borne out, would produce a homicide rate well ahead of that of Washington or most American cities.

• Although theoretically permits are required for carrying handguns and automatic weapons are banned, the number of arms per capita is believed to be among the highest in the world. The once tiny army of 18,000 is in the process of being beefed up to 34,000 by the end of the year, but is outgunned—at least numerically—by the Palestinians and various private armies maintained by political parties and local warlords.

Arrests for arms offenses are few and rarely lead to conviction. "What can be done," said one specialist, "if we had to arrest everyone? With a minimum of 150,000 arms in the country, where would we put them?"

Several months ago, a Bulgarian ship landed at the nearby port of Junieh a cargo of 6,700 automatic weapons—mostly AK-47, the Soviet-made assault rifle—for Christian militias.

No known attempt was made to stop the first such large-scale contraband operation. But at a social occasion for his party's youth movement, former president Camille Chamoun did discourage plans to present him with a silver-plated submachine gun. His discretion apparently was dictated by the presence of the defense and justice ministers at the gathering.

Nor are weapons simply for show. Earlier this summer, 13 persons were killed in a shootout at Dekouane, a Palestinian refugee camp near Beirut, between Palestinians and members of a Christian militia group.

Danger signals are flying that Beirut may have outlived its usefulness as a banking and service center now that the oil Arabs have become better educated and capable of investing their vastly increased revenues directly in the West. Such a warning was recently sounded publicly by the Kuwaiti director of planning, but the Beirut business community has seen the threat for a long time.

Moreover, the prospect of a reopened Suez Canal seems destined to hurt Beirut's prosperous trade as a port terminal for goods trucked to Persian Gulf states.

Even the local optimists have taken to reasoning in terms of a series of little crises rather than a single apocalyptic upheaval which would spell irreparable disaster.

What relative optimism exists is based on two events last year.

The first was the two-week mini-war in May, 1973, between the Lebanese army and the Palestinians holed up in refugee camps ringing the capital.

After much damage—both to real estate and to the country's reputation for calm—the army learned it could not liquidate the Palestinians. They, in turn, appear to have abandoned any idea of trying to take over the Lebanese government as they tried unsuccessfully to do in Jordan in 1970.

The second event was the October war. For the first time in a quarter century there was some hope of an overall Middle East peace settlement which would provide some kind of national homeland for the Palestinians.

Any such solution would make the Lebanese masters once again in their own house and rid them of the nightmare—and the pretext—of crying over their inability to solve their own pressing domestic problems.

The Lebanese hope many, if not all, the Palestinians would move to such a Palestinian national homeland and the others would cease to be members of the armed state within a state that their refugee camps now represent.

Organized, armed and motivated, the Palestinians have provided a useful alibi for the Lebanese themselves to indulge in a massive arms buildup.

A "Balance of Terror"

"THE NATIONAL Rifle Association would feel right at home here," said one longtime American resident, "except it should be renamed the National Submachine Gun Association for this place."

"It's a kind of machismo thing—having a submachine gun," he mused, "which started with the Palestinians' parading around with their virility symbol and then caught on with the Lebanese when they got frustrated about not running their own affairs. Boy, would a Freudian analyst have fun here." However, many Lebanese are convinced that their best chance of avoiding the worst may be due to the saturation level of weaponry.

"Face it," said a Lebanese politician who has spent many hours preventing local incidents from flaring into major conflagrations. "We may be saved by

the balance of terror.

"Don't smile, because it is a bit like the nuclear situation in that, sure, Hiroshima was terrible, but it has prevented world war since 1945.

"Here the Lebanese are armed, the Palestinians are armed, the state is armed," he said, "but so far the rapes, thefts, highway robberies, roadblocks, incidents galore haven't touched off the final conflagration because instinctively the players don't want to lay a hand on each other.

"Mind you," he said, "I don't like it one bit. I could go downstairs from my office and be knocked off by some gunslinger and it would cost exactly five piastres—the price of a bullet."

And while Lebanese newspapers roast the government for its jobbery, unending scandals and inability to deal with the country's more obvious problems, some cynics suggest that its very refusal to come to grips with reality may yet prove Lebanon's salvation.

"Every one of the groups in the Lebanese human mosaic are represented in the government," a diplomat observed, "even if they are obviously second stringers because the real *laims*, or local warlords, refuse to sit in the same cabinet with each other."

"At least there's a forum and no group can accuse any other of not having their hand either in the till or at the tiller," he added.

"Moslem Power"

SUCH GOVERNMENTAL paralysis is all the more surprising under the reign of President Suleiman Franjieh, a tough Maronite Catholic mountaineer from northern Lebanon who was elected in 1970 for a six-year term on a no-nonsense law-and-order platform.

But Franjieh, sometimes described as the Lebanese godfather for his role in overseeing the assassination of seven rivals in a church in his fief of Zegharta, has been forced to adopt a soft line despite his personal inclinations. For if the Palestinians are now so weak in Lebanon that they realize that Lebanese stability is necessary for their own survival, Franjieh seems to have understood—however reluctantly—that he cannot afford a major showdown either.

Inclining Franjieh to such moderation has been the emerging demands of the two big Moslem groups in Lebanon—the Sunnis and Shiites—who long have been dominated culturally, economically and politically by the better educated and more Westernized Christian minority.

Both Moslem groups are challenging the essential order laid down in the 1920s by the Franch, who ran the country between the two world wars under a League of Nations mandate. Unchanged has been the hierarchy under which the powerful presidency goes to a Maronite Catholic, the premiership to a Sunni and the Shiites make do with speaker of parliament.

Hanging on to an eroding power base, mindful that their relative edge would be swallowed up in the surrounding Moslem sea without Lebanon's borders, the Christians are showing increasing signs of schizophrenia.

Their hostility to the Palestinians has led many Christian leaders into arrogant self-confidence. At times they worry, especially since the Cyprus crisis. There they see Turkey, a Moslem power, invading the island and the rest of the world sitting back and doing nothing for the Christian majority—the Greek Cypriots.

The Christian Lebanese are all too aware that they are a minority in their own country. Yet there is an unreasoning belief that, as always in the past, a Western protector will appear to save them in the nick of time. Such was the French role in the 19th Century. And the United States intervened with the Marines in 1958, so why not again? Perhaps only in Lebanon do people believe post-Vietnam Washington would seriously consider such a possibility.

In the face of eroding, but still feisty, Christian leadership, "Moslem power" has on occasions sought—unsuccessfully so far—to enlist the Palestinians to their cause. Although the Palestinians do not want to water down their revolutionary zeal by indulging in Lebanese politics, the very thought has done little to allay Christian fears.

Seeking Equality

BUT THE LATEST Moslem cry is for "participation." For the Sunnis that means a bigger share of political power. For the Shia sect the demands are for a bigger economic stake for the country's traditional hewers of wood and drawers of water who suddenly have realized they have become the biggest single Lebanese community and who want satisfaction now.

Under the intelligent and effective leadership of their religious chief, Imam Moussa Sadre, the Shia community, perhaps unconsciously, is asking the real questions which the Palestinian presence has masked for so long.

If the Shia community goes through with announced plans to stage a march on Beirut by some 200,000 to 300,000 of its members next month, even the most ill-informed citizen is going to get the message.

And the message is meaningful equality. Of the top civil servants, only 14 of 85 are Shiites and of the next highest category only 28 of 331, scarcely an even shake for a community representing at least a quarter of the total population.

Forced by the vicissitudes of history into the poor, mountainous regions of the south, east and north, the Shia are demanding the government carry out development projects such as irrigation, modern roads and electrification, which have been promised for years but never carried out.

Many thoughtful Lebanese wonder if the Palestinian presence may not have both an accelerating effect on potential upheaval and a decelerating effect because the Palestinians have become Topic A to the exclusion of the country's indigenous problems.

"Our real problems may start when the Palestinians end up having a homeland," one Lebanese politician said, "when we have to face up to the lack of institutions and infrastructure and the truly revolutionary dangers that represents.

"Face it, what kind of society is it that does not provide free and decent schooling, that has no real city bus system or garbage collection worthy of the name, where the top income bracket pays only 11.8 per cent in income taxes, where there is no social security system?"

Or as parliamentary deputy Hussein Husseini recently put it, "You can find everything in Lebanon except the presence of the state."

Far East

NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG, Zurich
28 August 1974

INCREASING ANXIETY ABOUT CHINA IN THAILAND

"PLABPLACHAI" AND FEAR

When for three nights during the month of July "Chinese" unrest engulfed the Plabplachai police station, a few commentaries pointed out a historical parallel with the Yaowarat Street fighting in September 1945. The Plabplachai police station is not far from Yaowarat Street which runs through the Chinese section and where, after Japan's capitulation, Chinese immigrants enthusiastically celebrated the Allied and thus the Chinese victory. Since the occupation in 1941 by Japanese troops, Thailand had flexibly collaborated with Japan within the framework of Tokyo's "Greater East Asian Sphere of Wealth" and consequently also was very harsh on its Chinese immigrants. The latter gave vent to their feelings of extreme anger after the Japanese collapse in the many day-long Yaowarat riots accompanied by rifle fire against the Thais. During the disturbances last month, three times as many people lost their lives than did in the street fighting a generation age. Unlike "Yaowarat", the direct cause for "Plabplachai" was not a political one; rather the backdrop for the recent event was the acute yet old question whether and how the Southeast Asian border state of Siam will be able to find a modus vivendi with its northern colossus neighbor, China.

U.S. PROTECTION PUT CHINESE QUESTION ON BACKBURNER

Until 1946, Thailand had no diplomatic relations with China. The problem hardly existed during the past century when the Ching dynasty crumbled; in the earlier part of this century, the rudimentary-interstate relationship had been resolved by way of the establishment of a Thai tributary-legation in Peking, in which the Thais were interested primarily for trade and economic reasons. Siam's tributary relationship with China was a most informal one and different from all other countries bordering on China. Particularly after Sun Yat-Sen's revolution and the endless civil wars, there obtained a politically ideal situation as seen from Bangkok'g point of view, because the splintered Chinese empire did not represent a serious power factor on the Asian continent. Although after the end of World War I negotiations for diplomatic recognition were conducted in Tokyo with representatives of Peking, they could easily be led into non-productive channels on the basis of the arrogant Chinese demands that the new relationship must contain elements of the former tributary one. On 23 January 1946 Thailand, which cleverly had switched over to the side of the Allies, concluded a treaty of friendship with Tshang Kai-Shek's Kuomintang government, which then still ruled on the Chinese mainland. Only for the past year has there been a Chinese embassy in Bangkok -- representing the territory of the Chinese government on Taipei only.

After the American policy of the containment of Communist China had begun and particularly after the end of the Korean War, in which a Thai contingent saw action under the American-led U.N. Command, the Chinese question constituted no longer a problem related to international politics for the Thai government. It was in particular the ascending military dictator Sarit Thanarat who from 1957 on unequivocally joined the ranks of the Southeast Asian allies of the United States, seeking her and the SEATO shield's protection. Sarit's successors strengthened these policies: not only did Thailand serve the U.S. as an important base in the Indochina War but it became directly engaged with one division in the Vietnam war and finally with more than twenty thousand "volunteers" in Laos. The Sino-American rapprochement, announced in the summer of 1971, immediately began to undermine confidence in the very basis of the Thai foreign policy course. Peking's acceptance as member of the United Nations in October of the same year furnished one of the reasons for the Thai military rulers to justify their return to an absolute military dictatorship on 17 November 1971. This coup "from above," born out of panic, in actuality had predominently domestic political causes and finally ended two years later in the overthrow of the military regime and with a profound discreditation of the armed forces as a political power factor. Nevertheless, it is prudent to recall the Thai's anxiety over China which then was being played up, for in the meantime this anxiety has become more of a reality.

REBELLION CASTS A PARALYZING SHADOW

In all the years of dictatorship the Thai military partly due to an incomprehensible inefficiency, could not cope with the problem posed by the rebellion in the Northeast and North of the country which is supported materially mainly by Hanoi and politically and propagandistically mainly by China. The present civilian government is faced with an inheritance fought with dangers: the insurrection is now to be taken seriously and has a real chance in the period ahead-- marked by an inevitable phase of inner instability of a Thai regime again experimenting with democracy -- to spread at a rapid pace into many regions. The concern of serious observers in Bangkok can readily be noticed. At the same time many firm psychological concepts relating to the alliance with the departing Americans are being abandoned at this very moment, adding new feelings of insecurity. At no time has China been considered so revisionist moderate and reasonable in Southeast Asia as she has appeared particularly in the commentaries of American analysts of the new course of Nixon and Kissinger. Nevertheless, even the military in the last months of their rule and then also the civilian government in Bangkok have accommodated themselves to the "winds of change" and seek a modus vivendi with a China which has become stronger.

Thailand's achievements on this course are fragmentary as well as contradictory and have not led so far to substantive political results. Bangkok's diplomatic representation in Taipei has been cut back to what are minimum requirements of protocol. However, the relationship with Peking has not gone beyond symbolic exchanges. Moreover, Thai governmental statements to the contrary, the Chinese government on Taiwan still has a remarkable influence in the country: The radio broadcasts of "Free China" are continuing from North Thailand and in that part of the country there are still a few thousand Kuomintang troops who were pushed out of Yunnan. On the other hand, Communist China has not reduced its military presence in the Far northwest of Laos, which fact Bangkok has consistently and exaggeratedly characterized as a threat to Thailand . Peking keeps its options open, indeed; at the beginning of the year it has in no way committed itself to the full abandonment of a "just people's liberation war" in talks with Air Marshal Dawee Chullasapya. The broadcasts of the rebels continue in full force from Yunnan to Thailand. The shadow of the rebellion seems to retard Bangkok's rapproachment with Peking, although reliance on the Americans is dwindling.

FEAR OF ECONOMIC DEPRESSION

Nowhere has this become more evident during the last few months than in the case of the Decree 53, which already has become almost legendary: it is the connecting link in the chain of the Thai foreign and domestic political anxiety re China. The Decree of the dictator Sarit was issued in 1959 and until this day forbids trade with the People's Republic of China -- which has been conducted during the past fifteen years, nevertheless, indirectly via Hong Kong and Singapore. Shortly prior to its fall, the military regime had worked out a plan to abolish the Decree and to create a special organization in charge of trading with Peking. When the civilian government of Sanya turned the matter over to the parliament this spring, the latter blocked the motion under the pretext that it should be debated in closed committee session. Since then there has been no movement at all. It should be noted that even the former foreign minister Thanat Khoman -- who after 1971 campaigned against the presence of the U.S. Air Force with the industriousness of a renegate and advocated a fast recognition of Peking -- portrayed this maneuver, which continues the trade embargo with China, as a meaningful action putting Bankok's and Peking's positions on the same level at the conference table in the future.

The Thai's anxiety re China really comes to the fore in matters of Decree 53. They are fearful that in the future the Chinese Communists could easily identify their business partners in Bangkok and thus gain an enormous economic and political lever in Thailand, which would create havoc among business people. Thus comes about the complex situation that even Sino-Thais, who are not oriented toward Taipei, are not favoring a liberalization of the relationship with Peking and in some instances raise the question of the "loyalty of the Chinese" themselves. The some 170,000 stateless of Chinese extraction living in Thailand are little interested in becoming any sort of focal point for future economic-political lever for Peking, because they do not occupy higher economic positions. Who then are the members of Peking's Sino-Thai Fifth Column? Wild speculations are hardly of interest but the fact is that this question, even though only whispered, sows a germ of dissension stronger than never before in a society in which a meaningful, clear line between Thai and Chinese can no longer be

drawn.

RETROGRADE ASSIMILATION?

The "Plabplachai" riots have brought to the surface a level of reaction not evident in a long time concerning suspicions of questionable "loyalty" of Thai citizens of Chinese decent. This open suspicion is dangerous in itself for it could set a retrograde tendency in the assimilation process into motion and even push fully assimilated Sino-Thai into the "Chinese corner". This development is being nourished by the "Chinese" rebellion. Underpaid Plabplachai policemen annoy relatively well-off "Chinese" in a climate where not only politically trivial but economic corruption is present, the latter, becoming destructive over the long haul for it creates the impression of "modernization" without universal progress. It does create endless obstacles for clever, competent Sino-Thai business people and increases suspicions concerning harmless Sino-Thais as potential accomplices for anti-state activities.

The freer air of the "democratic enterprise" in Bangkok -- though giving the appearance of chaos to the many who are more familiar with the disciplines of dictatorship -- tends to accentuate the whole process. As happened, for instance, in the first half of the year when by Thai standards the starkly radical Thammasat students staged a large China exhibit with Mao poster, it was an upsetting new experience in Siam. Also, with the newly regained freedom of the press, the paper "Hsin Chung Ribao" appears in Bangkok in the Chinese language, containing articles which discreetly but unmistakably document the beauty of the Middle Kingdom (China). On occasion the paper uses simplified characters along the lines of the Peking model, characters which are not used on Taiwan and until now were not to be used in Thailand either.

DEFENSIVE REFLEXES OF THAI NATIONALISM

In November 1972, the military regime passed laws regulating foreign business activities in Thailand and issued prohibitions in certain professional categories. Because of a long laisser-faire policy and a resultant confusion and disorder, the step had become necessary; yet it was interpreted as a sign of the Siamese falling back into the old balance of power pattern. Next November the two-year "grace period", before the laws will be enacted, will expire. In the meantime many fears have been dispelled and many things could be "arranged" as heretofore. The rice, rubber, tin and timber trades are today primarily in "Chinese" hands.

Those business circles are surprisingly little concerned about the possibility of a new discrimination under these laws, although initially they had been interpreted as being anti-"Chinese". Literally interpreted, the laws do not represent a serious danger for the Sino-Thais. They say themselves with quite a degree of self-assurance that the times of primitive professional bans and discrimination,as practized in the early forties by Phibul, will not come back again because there is now the big, strong neighbor China. However, a suspicion full of resentment has come back which ominously could turn against Sino-Thai considered fully assimilated. And "Plabplachai" may mean that a Siamese nationalism which feels threatened, subjectively, by an ever-stronger China could produce more and more anti-"Chinese" defensive reflexes.

WASHINGTON POST
02 October 1974

Thieu Hits Back at His Critics, Blames Trouble on Communists

By Philip A. McCombs
Washington Post Foreign Service

SAIGON, Oct. 1—President Nguyen Van Thieu, responding to increasing criticism, told South Vietnam tonight that it was only "Communists or people working for the Communists . . . who say confidence in me is falling."

In a two-hour televised speech he answered his critics by saying that he had never engaged in personal corruption and by blaming the Communists for all the ills of the country.

At the same time the president announced he would take steps to liberalize the press censorship law and the decree limiting political party activity in South Vietnam—two major areas of complaint against his previous policies.

The speech, regarded here at Thieu's most important policy address in the 20 months since the Paris cease-fire agreement, came after a month of mounting antigovernment demonstrations by Buddhists, Catholics, newspapermen and others. These groups say that Thieu is corrupt and has thwarted peace efforts, and they criticize him for economic hardships, political repression and press censorship.

Tonight's speech touched on nearly all of these areas, and in each case it was the Communists, not Thieu or his government, who got the blame.

The American Congress also came in for criticism, and Thieu said that recent aid cuts "are tempting the Communists to further aggression in South Vietnam."

"The Communists are everywhere," he said. "They will cause incidents and then they can charge government repression." For this reason, press freedom and other democratic liberties must be exercised within constitutional restraints to prevent the Communists from turning them to their advantage, he said.

"We cannot allow a small number of people in a small number of papers to destroy the struggling spirit of the soldiers and create discontent among the people," Thieu said.

Nevertheless, Thieu said he would submit new legislation to the National assembly to liberalize the press censorship law.

Thieu said his decree placing limits on political parties had been aimed at bolstering a two-party system and eliminating the destructive effects of having dozens of small parties haggling at each other.

He said, however, that he would submit legislation and order administrative changes to make it easier for parties to form to stimulate an atmosphere of democracy for the presidential and assembly elections next year.

His own Democracy Party is at present the only legal party in the country.

Thieu announced no plans for further repression—a possibility that political opponents had said they feared—and his speech was generally mild in tone. Despite this, reaction among his opposition tonight was one of disappointment that he offered no specific responses to the charges of personal corruption.

One antigovernment politicial, Tran Van Tuyen, criticized even the president's conciliatory moves by saying, "Thieu promised that the press and political party laws will be improved but what we really need is for them to be cancelled."

The president did say "I cannot desert" the nation until peace comes. He added, however, somewhat cryptically, "But if the whole people have lost confidence in me as the Communist propaganda says, then please let me know."

"He seems to be losing confidence in himself, asking the people for their views like that," said an aide of opposition leader, Gen. Duong Van (Big) Minh.

Phu Xuan Huy, an An Quang Buddist and lower house deputy, said tonight, "If Thieu wants the people to let him know their confidence in him, we'll let him know all right with a few demonstrations."

Nguyen Van Kim, another deputy and a leader in the Catholic Anti-Corruption Movement, called the president's speech "nonsense."

"Thieu showed how far his thinking is from the people's when he suggested that corruption is caused by the war and the Communists."

Thieu said the Communists will launch a countrywide general offensive in 1975 and warned the nation not to believe analysts who say otherwise.

He said that the country's vast economic problems and refugee problems would not exist if the Communists "respected the Paris agreement even without the National Reconciliation Council and general elections."

The agreement calls for such elections, but the talks for setting them up have broken down.

The president tried to undercut the Catholic Anti-Corruption Movement and the Buddhist National Reconciliation movement—two of the strongest opposition forces now active—by claiming a lead role for himself both in fighting corruption and in trying to achieve peace.

He said the problem of "phantom troops," who exist on pay records but not in fact, would be solved in one month and that of corrupt civil servants in three months, but he warned, "Don't believe in miracles where corruption is concerned."

In large portions of the speech that seemed aimed at an American audience, Thieu strongly criticized the United States for cuttng military aid. "They promised to continue it, not formally, but they said it," he said.

Otherwise, he said, he was glad that the Americans are gone. "They gave enough blood and bones," he said. "Better for them to help us to build our own strong forces."

Thieu said that he met with Former President Nixon before the signing of the ceasefire and told him that aid must be continued "for up to 25 years, as with Korea, France, and so on."

He also had told Mr. Nixon, he said, that large infusions of aid would be needed for about three years, and then the amounts could taper off.

This is also the view of U.S. Ambassador Graham Martin, who returned here last night after a two-month absence, mostly in Washington, where he lobbied unsuccessfully to keep Vietnam aid levels high.

NEW YORK TIMES
03 October 1974

OPPOSITION SCORNS DEFENSE BY THIEU

Foes Say Speech Evades Specifics of Corruption

By JAMES M. MARKHAM
Special to The New York Times

SAIGON, South Vietnam, Oct. 2—Opposition politicians reacted today with disappointment, anger and scorn to a policy speech delivered last night by President Nguyen Van Thieu.

In a wide-ranging two-hour televised talk to the nation, Mr. Thieu said he would ease decrees restricting political party activity and press freedom, crack down on official corruption and continue to resist Communist pressure, both political and military.

Though much of the speech was conciliatory in tone, opposition legislators fastened on Mr. Thieu's frequent disparaging comments about their motivations and his reluctance to discuss in detail specific charges of corruption that have been brought against him.

Referendum Urged

"President Thieu said that if people have no more confidence in him, then let him know," observed Deputy Nguyen Trong Nho, a member of the Buddhist opposition. "I would suggest holding a nationwide referendum for the people to express their confidence or no-confidence."

Le Dinh Duyen, another opposition deputy who has been active in a new organization demanding greater press freedom, said: "Mr. Thieu repeated the old banalities about Communists, peaceniks and a renewed Communist offensive, to scare the people."

Like others, Mr. Duyen took offense at Mr. Thieu's contention that recent opposition activity was tied to next year's presidential and legislative elections.

Speech Denounced

Deputy Nguyen Van Binh, a retired colonel who is a mainstay of the Catholic-led anticorruption front that initially accused Mr. Thieu of corruption, called the discourse "the worst speech ever."

"I honestly believe that after yesterday's speech, the people, even those who admired him in the past, have found a strange President, distant, who does not understand their aspirations, thoroughly cut off from the people," Mr. Binh said.

Mr. Thieu made only a cursory denial of the Catholics' charges that he and his family had lined their pockets at the public's expense. But today, many of his listeners gleefully repeated a phrase used by the President—"There is a little something that has been exaggerated" — which seemed to concede at least minor transgressions.

"So Mr. Thieu is only 'a little corrupt,'" remarked Deputy Phan Xuan Huy, of the An Quang Buddhist faction, who likened the talk to Richard M. Nixon's resignation speech "That is quite significant. A little corruption!"

Support Meager

While opposition figures were universally critical of the speech, pro-Government deputies were notable for their unwillingness to rush to Mr. Thieu's defense.

One prominent political figure, who is somewhat sympathetic to Mr. Thieu's predicament, said the President seemed "embarrassed" as he spoke about the corruption issue.

This man, who preferred to remain anonymous, said that Mr. Thieu had become politically isolated and so instinctively fell back on tired, familiar arguments. "He has no staff," he said.

"Thieu is a man who hesitates to do big things," this man added. "And that is too bad."

In the streets of Saigon, it was hard to find anyone who reacted favorably to the speech.

"He said he was going to clean up the army in a month," commented a disabled veteran. "Is he kidding? Then there will be no more army next month, then no more Government—and no President in three months."

NEW YORK TIMES
10 October 1974

5,000 CATHOLICS PROTEST IN SEOUL

Gathering Opposing Park's Rule Is Largest Since '72 Martial-Law Edict

By RICHARD HALLORAN
Special to The New York Times

SEOUL, South Korea, Oct. 9—About 5,000 South Korean Roman Catholics demonstrated against President Park Chung Hee today in the largest anti-Government outburst since Mr. Park declared martial law two years ago.

The demonstration against Mr. Park came two days after a speech accusing him of extreme infringement of human rights was delivered by the opposition party leader, Kim Young Sam. In addition, small groups of Korean university students, after months of fear and apathy, have begun sit-in fasts to dramatize their opposition to the Government.

Ford's Visit a Factor

Any of these acts would have been punishable by death before Mr. Park lifted two emergency decrees on Aug. 24. But President Park warned yesterday that he would not tolerate demonstrations in the streets or demands that his power be curbed.

His opponents, however, are using the scheduled visit of President Ford here on Nov. 22 as a shield. Several adversaries said they did not think Mr. Park would crack down on them again, at least until after Mr. Ford's visit, because of concern about South Korea's public image in the United States.

Moreover, Korean political and church leaders critical of Mr. Park said they intended to ask President Ford, through letters, to urge Mr. Park to restore democratic rights here. In addition, a letter signed by 58 American Christians here is being sent to President Ford to make the same appeal.

Today, the outdoor protest mass attended by about 15,000 persons led to an attempt by about one-third of the congregation to march into the street carrying banners demanding the restoration of basic civil rights.

The march was led by five bishops, including the Most Rev. Kim Chae Duk, who celebrated the mass, and the Most Rev. Thomas Stewart, an American member of a missionary order. But the Papal Nuncio, the Most Rev. Luigi Dossena, left without partjcipating in the demonstration.

Marchers Are Stopped

The march from the hilltop grounds of the Holy Spirit Catholic Seminary was stopped by husky plainclothes policemen and helmeted riot policemen wielding nightsticks. Several American and Irish missionaries, invited by South Korean priests to participate, were pummeled during the melee.

Policemen also tore away the South Korean national flag carried by several South Korean priests; shoved many women, including nuns, and later beat up a young man who said he was trying to help direct traffic after the rally. So far as is known, however, no arrests were made.

Nor did the policemen, who were equipped with American-made Motorola radios and American Army gas masks, use the American-made pepper-gas sprayers that they have used in similar situations.

During a two-hour standoff, the Catholics chanted slogans demanding the release from prison of the Most Rev. Chi Hak Soun, other Christian clergymen, students and intellectuals—totaling 179 by official count but believed to number more than 200. The Government alleges that they conspired in April to overthrow it.

The stalemate was broken when priests and seminariams forced open a narrow path through the police ranks. Hundreds of South Korean nuns and thousands of others filed through, many singing a traditional martyr's hymn that has become to the anti-Government movement here what "We Shall Overcome" was to the American civil rights movement.

Fiery Sermon

The Catholics continued demonstrating in small groups outside the seminary until busloads of people from all over the country departed.

They had come for a long-planned mass to celebrate the Korean Holy Year. But it was quickly apparent that the mass would be turned into a strong denunciation of the Government Bishop Kim gave a fiery sermon in which he addressed to President Park, a departure from earlier indirect references.

Bishop Kim noted that President Park had asked South Koreans to sacrifice what he called small freedoms to maintain the larger freedom from conquest by North Korea. But Bishop Kim asserted that there was no such thing as a small freedom or a big freedom.

"I answer you," he said, referring to President Park, "by borrowing a Korean proverb: No one should wait three days without eating anything, because he might starve before the great feast."

Through Bishop Kim's sermon, and with their banners, placards, and pamphlets, the Catholics demanded that President Park revise the Constitution, which gives him unlimited power; elimnate corruption, and raise the standard of living.

WASHINGTON POST
09 October 1974

Jerome Alan Cohen

A Grim Anniversary In South Korea

This month will mark the grim first anniversary of the death of Prof. Tsche Chong Kil, a Korean who spent the years 1970-72 at Harvard Law School. Seoul National University, Korea's most prestigious educational institution, had selected Tsche, a member of its law faculty, for a highly prized Harvard-Yenching Fellowship. Indeed, the university's president had described him as one of Korea's most promising scholars.

Tsche was a likable, gentle person who spent his time in Cambridge analyzing Anglo-American and German theories of private international law and being with his wife and two young children. Like most Koreans who study abroad with their government's permission, he seldom took part in public political discussions. By criticizing the increasingly repressive measures of the Park regime, a few SNU law professors had landed in serious trouble. But Tsche concentrated on his professional interest and avoided controversy except for an occasional defense of harsh measures taken by his government in the name of anti-Communism.

Soon after Tsche returned to Seoul in the fall of 1972, President Park plunged the nation into crisis by declaring martial law and replacing the Constitution with a new charter that permits Park's total and permanent rule. These events provoked peaceful demonstrations by democratic-minded students, to whom Koreans have traditionally looked for leadership against tyrants. And this in turn exposed the students to the brutality of the ubiquitous Korean Central Intelligence Agency.

In one such incident just a year ago, KCIA thugs beat up and arrested some SNU law students, a professor and the associate dean. This was too much for even Prof. Tsche, who in earlier years had sought to pacify student unrest. He protested against the KCIA's actions at a meeting of the law faculty. Shortly after class on Oct. 16, 1973, Tsche was picked up by the KCIA. He was never seen alive again. Four days later the government announced that Tsche had been arrested for investigation of charges of spying for North Korea and that after making a confession he had committed suicide by jumping out the seventh-floor window of an interrogation center.

The writer is Director of East Asian Legal Studies at Harvard University.

"Koreans shy away from discussing the case even in America, for the tentacles of the KCIA extend throughout not only their country but also our own."

I have no way of knowing whether Tsche was actually a North Korean agent. I do know that the evidently embarrassed South Korean government failed to substantiate its post-mortem accusations with any persuasive evidence; nor was the confession supposedly extracted from Tsche made public. Moreover, South Korean friends who have survived KCIA de-

tention treat the report of Tsche's "suicide" with the utmost skepticism, for KCIA prisoners are said to be subject to the closest scrutiny. The fact that Tsche's widow, a medical doctor, was denied permission to examine his corpse hardly inspires confidence in what appears to have been a hastily contrived story.

Subsequent efforts to discover the truth about Prof. Tsche's demise have met a stone wall. His widow has been insulated from outside contacts. The intimidation and fear that prevail in Seoul prevent his colleagues from pursuing the matter. The press is muzzled, and the legal system controlled. Koreans shy away from discussing the case even in America, for the tentacles of the KCIA extend throughout not only their country but also our own.

Prof. Tsche's case is not unique. The exquisite tortures that have become the KCIA's hallmark have claimed many victims. Its mindless arrogance recognizes no bounds but power. It kidnapped from Japan President Park's last rival for the presidency, Kim Dae Jung, and was about to dump his weighted body into the sea when pressure from the Japanese and American governments saved his life, at least temporarily. Kim's offense was to poll 47 per cent of the vote despite grave government-imposed handicaps and to alert his people to Park's plan to abolish constitutional rule. Another notorious case is that of Soh Sung, a Korean student from Japan who was horribly disfigured during pretrial detention. Yet this is only to speak of

"South Korean friends who have survived KCIA detention treat the report of Tsche's 'suicide' with the utmost skepticism."

Koreans who are well-known or who have foreign friends to inquire after them. There are countless others.

All this took place before this year's emergency decrees that made it a capital offense for students to cut class "without plausible excuse" and that resulted in long prison sentences for hundreds of courageous intellectuals, Christian leaders and students whose crime was to call for the restoration of freedom. Thus the recent withdrawal of those decrees in the hope of luring President Ford to Seoul in November, improving South Korea's prospects at the U.N. this autumn and avoiding congressional reduction of military aid is essentially cosmetic, especially when the kangaroo courts-martial that made a farce of Korean justice continue to function.

Was it for this that some 33,000 Americans died in combat in Korea? Is this "the Free World" that our military and economic aid make possible and that we are still pledged to defend?

People in South Korea have few illusions about the kind of freedom they would share with their brothers in the North should Kim Il Sung forcibly reunify their tragically divided country. Yet they now suffer a KCIA-military dictatorship that uses American tanks to deprive them of most of their freedoms ostensibly to protect them from the North.

President Ford should not go to Seoul next month unless there is convincing evidence—not merely soothing secret assurances—that the Park regime will significantly relax its oppression for more than the few months of the U.N. General Assembly session. He should in any event make it clear to the Korean people and the world that the United States will henceforth refuse to support tyranny of the right as well as tyranny of the left. To do less than this is to inflict another moral disaster upon American foreign policy.

NEW YORK TIMES
08 October 1974

U.S. ATOMIC ARMS AGAIN STIR TOKYO

Weapons' Presence Aboard Navy Ships in Japanese Ports Is Questioned

By FOX BUTTERFIELD

TOKYO, Oct. 7—A new nuclear controversy broke out here today in the wake of reports from Washington quoting a retired American admiral as having told Congress that United States Navy ships carrying nuclear weapons had entered Japanese ports.

Premier Kakuei anaka and other Government leaders, including the director of the defense agency, Sadanori Yamanaka, held a meeting at the Premier's residence to discuss the reports.

[The Premier, in a request made through the Japanese Embassy in Washington, asked the United States Government for an explanation, United Press International reported.]

All of Tokyo's leading newspapers devoted much of their front pages today to reports saying that the retired officer, Rear Adm. Gene Robert LaRocque, had testified Sept. 10 that American warships had not unloaded their nuclear arms before entering Japanese ports.

If true, such action would run counter to pledges by Japanese officials that there were no United States nuclear weapons in Japan and could be construed to violate the United States-Japanese mutual security treaty. The treaty requires consultation before any major changes in the equipment of United States forces in Japan, and the introduction of nuclear arms is considered such a change.

Commanded Oklahoma City

Admiral LaRocque, a former captain of the cruiser Oklahoma City, a flagship of the Seventh Fleet, was said to have given his testimony to a subcommittee of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy. The admiral retired from the Navy in 1972.

According to diplomatic sources, Japanese officials attending a regular monthly session today of the Security Consultative Group, a group of senior United States and Japanese officials including the commander of United States forces in Japan, expressed concern that nuclear weapons had been brought into Japan.

However, the sources said, the American officials at the meeting replied that they had not officially heard of Admiral LaRocque's disclosure. The American Embassy and the United States Navy, in keeping with long-standing policy, declined comment on the reports of the admiral's testimony.

Meanwhile, 44 members of the 55-member crew of Japan's first nuclear-powered ship, the freighter Mutsu, which is at the center of another controversy, left the vessel today. The freighter, whose re-entry to port has been blocked by fishermen since its reactor began leaking radiation during trials in late August, continued to drift in the North Pacific off the coast of Honshu.

Stem From Wartime Bombing

All the other members of the crew, except the captain, are scheduled to abandon the ship on Wednesday, placing the Mutsu's future in serious doubt.

The nuclear controversies are an outgrowth of the bombing of Hiroshima and Negasaki at the close of World War II.

Almost no issue in Japanese politics rouses more emotions. Japan's development of nuclear energy, which is needed to offset the nation's costly reliances on imported oil, has been thrown far behind schedule by fear of radiation from nuclear power plants.

Japanese officials were said to fear that Admiral LaRocque's testimony might lead to demonstrations during the visit to Japan of President Ford. He is due to arrive Nov. 18.

The only previous American president who tried to come to Japan, President Eisenhower, was forced to cancel his trip in 1960 by demonstrations arising from opposition to renewal of the security treaty.

No Secret, U.S. Aide Says

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 7 — Although the Defense Department declined to comment publicly today on deployment of United States warship bearing nuclear weapons, a Pentagon official said it was no secret that such vessels called in foreign ports, including Japan, with the weapons on board.

The official said this was also known ot the Government of Japan.

The testimony that Admiral LaRocque gave Sept. 10 was made public yesterday by Senator Stuart Symington, Missouri Democrat, who heads the Joint Committee's subcommittee on military applications.

Admiral LaRocque who rose to the post of assistant director of strategic plans for the Chief of Naval Operations before his retirement two years ago, said in his testimony:

"Any ship that is capable of carrying nuclear weapons carries nuclear weapons. They do not unload them when they go into foreign ports such as Japan or other countries. If they are capable of carrying them they normally keep them on board ship at all times."

THE NEW YORK TIMES, SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 21, 1974

Vietnam Outlook: Still a Tunnel, Still a Light

By DAVID K. SHIPLER
Special to The New York Times

SAIGON, South Vietnam —There is a new version of the old light at the end of the tunnel in Vietnam.

The wishful thought used to be that the North Vietnamese, pounded by American firepower would finally find the price too high and give up. Now there is a belief that the South Vietnamese Government can defend itself militarily, "take off" economically and prove to be such a going concern that the North, frustrated, will abandon its aggressive designs.

News Analysis

Another new version comes from the left end of the political spectrum: No longer is it the expectation that with the withdrawal of American troops and planes, peace will come, but rather that further cuts in American aid —against which President Ford made a strong appeal yesterday — will force President Nguyen Van Thieu into a political settlement with the Communists that will end the war.

Central to these theories is a decade-old assumption about the power of Washington to determine the outcome of the struggle by adding or subtracting assistance.

For this fiscal year the White House has sought $1.45-billion in military aid and $750-million in economic aid, compared with $1.23-billion and $349-million respectively last year. The Administration maintains that the funds will prevent military deterioration and propel South Vietnam close to economic self-sufficiency in two or three years.

Cuts Voted in Congress

In contrast, the Senate and the House of Representatives have cut the military aid to $700-million and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has voted $420-million in economic aid. The cuts have been advocated by legislators who maintain that President Thieu, seeing American support flagging, will have no alternative but to follow the mandate for a political settlement set forth in the Paris cease-fire agreement.

Saigon is full of officials and analysts — Vietnamese, Europeans and even some Americans—who are not entirely comfortable with the arguments of either the Administration or Congress. They are convinced that Hanoi is determined to reunify Vietnam—if not politically, as the Paris agreement prescribes, then militarily. They note that it has been proved conclusively by the United States Army, Marines, Air Force and Navy that the North Vietnamese cannot be dislodged from the South.

Saigon, then, is left with only one realistic military goal: a continued stalemate in which the Government clings to highways, population centers and rice lands. This makes the economy highly vulnerable to disruption by the Communists, who can cut major roads, destroy bridges and sabotage factories erected with badly needed foreign capital.

In fact, the key to what Americans call South Vietnam's ability to take off economically, and the centerpiece of Government economists' plans, is precisely the weakest link in the military chain: the rural countryside, where, it is hoped, enough food and timber can be produced to form the basis of substantial export industries that, in turn, can generate employment and enough foreign exchange to redress a severe payments deficit.

Where the Conflict Is

The trouble is that the countryside is where the war is being fought. South Vietnam has not been able to export rice since 1964, the last year before the beginning of the American build-up that helped make much of the country unsafe for farming. Last year 6.6 million tons of rice were grown in Government-held parts of South Vietnam and 300,000 tons had to be imported.

Only the fledgling shrimp and fish industry remains relatively immune to military attack, and shore-based processing plants could still be targets if they became too lucrative.

Students of Hanoi policy believe that the North Vietnamese will do everything they can to prevent South Vietnam's economic development, for, it is thought, the Communist scenario for victory runs something like this: The economy worsens, governmental corruption increases, soldiers and civil servants cannot feed their families and at last, perhaps with a military push, the revolution inundates the crumbling Saigon regime.

This description of Hanoi's strategy, widely accepted now, has led an American diplomat who dissents from the official line to postulate more North Vietnamese military action if American aid is increased and South Vietnam makes economic progress. Conversely, he thinks that less aid would fit Hanoi's prognosis of continuing decline, thereby inducing deferment of an all-out offensive.

"If heavy injections of aid really do bring the country to the take-off point," he said, "that guarantees a military solution." And Saigon cannot win militarily, he observed, adding that the only chance of preserving a non-Communist government is through the political mechanism of the Paris agreement—democratic liberties and open general elections.

A Distrustful Government

"You have a government in Saigon so distrustful that it cannot possibly see itself implementing the Paris accords," the diplomat said. "If another regime would take over, willing to take the political risk, there's a real hope of keeping the place out of Communist control. I don't see any hope on the military side."

No one who knows President Thieu thinks he will be forced by aid cuts to open the political process to the Vietcong. Some believe the opposite: that if he is weakened he will be even less inclined to enter the political arena. "I think Thieu will be stubborn as hell," a Western diplomat remarked. "He'll have to be physically ejected before there can be a political settlement."

There are two basic views of the reasons for the lack of political progress since the Paris agreement.

One holds that the President simply wants to retain the power he has carefully accrued and that he has no motive to invite the Vietcong to try to take it from him. He is said to have been angered by the Paris agreement's political aspects when they were presented to him.

The other view—it is generally held by American officals —is that the Communists are blocking a political settlement because they know they could not win a truly free election.

"The Vietcong have no political ward heelers, no grassroots structure," said an expert on Communist affairs. It is the opposite of the 1954-56 period, when the Vietminh had the structure in the country and Ngo Dinh Diem had nothing."

Furthermore, there is a fundamental fear in the Government and the American Embassy that if the Vietcong were given the democratic freedom guaranteed by the Paris agreement, they would resort to terrorism. "Democratic freedoms?" an American official scoffed. "This is a pretext. You can't let thousands of armed people run around with mortars and machine guns."

Military Action Reduced

What, then, do aid cuts effect? The reduction in military aid has already prompted Government forces to retreat from some isolated outposts that would have been defended vigorously a few months ago. The army has stopped firing most of the artillery shells it used to lob randomly into Communist-held areas. This week the Saigon military command announced the curtailment of air force flights to conserve fuel and ammunition. Finally, the Pentagon was reported to be planning to postpone or cancel delivery of many of the F-5E jet fighters that South Vietnam has been promised.

According to military men, however, the cuts are not deep enough to cause Saigon's quick defeat.

Economic aid may still end up at a higher level than last year, but with oil and fertilizer prices soaring, the real benefit may be smaller. Economists prefer to cut projects aimed at building industry—agricultural and industrial credit banks, fertilizer plants, fish farms and the like —before curtailing the program that provides foreign exchange to permit the Government to import badly needed goods.

There is widespread agreement that standards of living will continue to decline, especially for the jobless in the urban areas, many of whom once worked for the American military establishment. Unemployment runs about 15 per cent, according to the best estimates. How this will translate into political discontent is anyone's guess.

"They're such a resilient people," a Western diplomat commented. "It seems to me they've got a long way to go before the mobs come out on the street."

WASHINGTON POST
05 October 1974

Cambodia Supplies

A civilian airline linked to the Central Intelligence Agency has begun parachuting military supplies to beleaguered Cambodian garrisons, officials in Bangkok said.

A U.S. spokesman there said U.S. Air Force C-130 transports operated by civilian crews from Bird Air, headquartered in Washington state, started supply flights from U Tapao Air Base in Thailand this week. Bird Air was expected to take over the airlift from the U.S. Air Force by Oct. 14, as part of an effort to reduce the U.S. military presence in Cambodia.

In Saigon, military sources reported that a North Vietnamese force overran the district town of Chuongnghia in the Central Highlands Thursday after the garrison fled under a 9,000-round artillery barrage.

Western Hemisphere

NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG, Zurich
13 September 1974

SOVIET "SOLIDARITY" WORDS VS. DEEDS

Foreign affairs reporting in the Soviet press, is decisively marked today by the attention devoted to the first anniversary of the bloody revolution in which the elected President Salvador Allende lost his life and which brought to power a very harsh military regime. A bold heading on the international news page of Pravda calls for "freedom for the Chilean patriots"; stories from numerous capital cities report on solidarity meetings and demonstrations in support of the tyrannized Chilean people; a caricature in the middle of the page shows a sinister looking junta-general with a machinegun and a death emblem on his cap and in the background a stylized "eleven" in the form of two gallows. Under the heading "The voice of the Soviet People" an appeal of the Soviet trade unions for "brotherly solidarity with the heroic Chilean workers' battle" is being published, listing also a whole string of Chile activities in factories, universities and kolchoses. In addition, this evening Soviet television is showing a fairly lengthly, East German-produced film also covering events and conditions in Chile.

This heavy accent on the Chilean theme in the mass media is nothing new as far as the Soviet newspaper reader is concerned. Since September 11 a year ago hardly a day has passed without coverage in a prominent space of cruelties by the uniformed successors of Allende. It is not surprising that in this context, and given the vulnerabilities, the role of the foreign influence and money of the CIA -- whose activities in Chile, according to latest information from the USA, is again raising eyebrows -- and the alleged friendship between Peking and the junta in Santiago are not favorably commented upon. However, despite the unrelenting barrage one cannot help but gain the impression that the Soviet press is not really interested in the advancement of humanitarian solidarity with the persecuted of the Pinochet regime. The propagandizing of that cause is massive but all too calculated. The Soviet press sees here a welcome propaganda opportunity, a highly exploitable one without a commitment to demonstrate one's own love for justice. In this instance, words of solidarity and concrete actions are not one and the same. Right after the revolution in Santiago, the real issue was to accept Chilean refugees in other countries; the Soviet authorities displayed a most reserved attitude: they accepted a very small number only. Also, while Allende was alive and it was necessary to assist his government which suffered from the American refusal to extend credits, Moscow acted most reservedly. While Allende was received in the Soviet capital with elaborate ceremonies, the requested monatary support was extended most sparingly. The shock officially expressed over the junta's arbitrary persecutions and tortures does not sound quite convincing, for there is after all utter silence in Soviet media about similar occurences in the Soviet Union. It is for the latter reason that Soviet labor camp prisoners sent an open letter to the "European Security Conference" in which it is stated: World public opinion is shocked that (Chilean) prisoners on the (Chilean) island Dawson are forced to build their own prison; here in our country, it is considered a normal activity.

Sowjetische «Solidarität»

Worte und Taten

Von unserem Korrespondenten

R. M. Moskau, 11. September

Den ersten Jahrestag des blutigen Umsturzes in Chile, der dem gewählten Präsidenten Salvador Allende das Leben kostete und ein gnadenloses Militärregime an die Macht brachte, gilt heute in der Auslandsberichterstattung der Sowjetpresse die Hauptaufmerksamkeit. Auf der internationalen Seite der *«Prawda»* fordert ein Balkentitel «Freiheit für die Patrioten von Chile»; Meldungen aus zahlreichen Hauptstädten berichten über Solidaritätskundgebungen mit dem geknechteten chilenischen Volk, eine Karikatur zeigt mitten auf der Seite einen finster dreinblickenden Juntageneral mit Maschinengewehr sowie Totenkopfabzeichen auf der Mütze, dahinter zwei zur heutigen Datumszahl stilisierte Galgengerüste. Unter der Ueberschrift «Die Stimme der sowjetischen Oeffentlichkeit» wird ferner eine Erklärung der sowjetischen Gewerkschaften zur «brüderlichen Solidarität mit dem Heldenkampf der chilenischen Werktätigen» veröffentlicht, daran anschließend eine längere Liste von Chileveranstaltungen in Fabriken, Universitäten und Kolchosen. Heute abend zeigt das sowjetische Fernsehen außerdem einen längeren Film aus der DDR, der ebenfalls den Ereignissen und Zuständen in der Andenrepublik gewidmet sein wird.

Für die sowjetischen Zeitungsleser ist dieser breite Aufwand, den die Massenmedien dem chilenischen Thema widmen, keineswegs neu. Seit dem vergangenen 11. September dürfte kein Tag verstrichen sein, an dem nicht an prominenter Stelle über Greueltaten der uniformierten Nachfolger Allendes berichtet wurde. Dabei [illegible]

Zusammenhang auch über die Rolle des Auslandskapitals, der CIA — deren Tätigkeit in Chile nach neuesten Informationen aus Amerika erneut ins Zwielicht geraten ist — und über die angebliche Freundschaft Pekings mit der Junta in Santiago wenig schmeichelhafte Dinge gesagt werden, darf angesichts der sich bietenden Angriffsflächen nicht verwundern. Bei all diesem pausenlosen Trommelfeuer überwiegt indessen der Eindruck, daß es der Sowjetpresse weniger um die vordergründig hochgespielte humanitäre Solidarisierung mit den vom Pinochet-Regime Verfolgten geht, als vielmehr um einen willkommenen *Propagandaanlaß*, der sich ohne viel Verbindlichkeit zur Demonstration der eigenen Gerechtigkeitsliebe ausnützen läßt. Solidarische Worte und konkrete Taten wollen in diesem Falle nicht ohne weiteres zusammenpassen. Als es nach dem Putsch in Santiago darum ging, chilenische Flüchtlinge in anderen Ländern aufzunehmen, nahmen die sowjetischen Behörden eine weit reserviertere Haltung ein; nur ein ganz kleines Kontingent konnte in die UdSSR einreisen. Auch als es sich noch zu Lebzeiten Allendes darum handelte, seiner durch die amerikanische Kreditsperre bedrängten Regierung tatkräftig unter die Arme zu greifen, gab man sich in Moskau wesentlich verschlossener. Zwar wurde Allende in der sowjetischen Hauptstadt mit allem Zeremoniell empfangen, die erbetenen Stützungsgelder aber flossen nur sehr spärlich nach Santiago. Nicht gerade konsequent mutet ferner die offizielle Entrüstung über die von der chilenischen Junta praktizierten willkürlichen *Verfolgungen und Folterungen* an, wenn man sie mit dem Schweigen vergleicht, das die sowjetischen Medien über nicht unähnliche Vorgänge im eigenen Lande ausbreiten. Mit einigem Recht schrieben deshalb sowjetische Lagerhäftlinge in einem offenen Brief an die «europäische Sicherheitskonferenz»: Die Weltöffentlichkeit ist empört, daß man die (chilenischen) Gefangenen auf der (chilenischen) Insel Dawson zwingt, für sich selber ein Gefängnis zu zimmern. Aber bei uns wird das ebenfalls als normal angesehen.

WALL STREET JOURNAL
3 October 1974

Will Cuba Rejoin the Club?

By ROBERT KEATLEY

WASHINGTON — Henry Kissinger enjoys the role of diplomatic superstar and usually plays it to the hilt. But when he flies into Buenos Aires next March for a Western Hemisphere foreign ministers' conference, he may find the spotlight pointed at someone else.

It could be aimed at Raul Roa Garcia, an elderly, bespectacled man, scholarly and distinguished-looking, who also happens to be minister of foreign relations for Fidel Castro's Cuba.

Mr. Roa's attendance isn't yet certain. But if he does go to Buenos Aires, and it now looks likely that he will, he will be the first Cuban to attend such a meeting of hemisphere countries in more than a decade. And his presence would mark the final collapse of an American-backed policy of isolating Cuba from its Latin neighbors in hopes of retarding its development or even toppling its regime.

It's obvious, of course, that the policy has failed. Communist Cuba, if something less than an economic showpiece, has made notable progress since a 1970 low point. These days, thanks to soaring sugar prices, it even has millions to spend abroad. Meanwhile, Havana's political relations with Latin and other states grow warmer as it settles into bureaucratic middle age after a capricious revolutionary youth. There's no longer much talk about exporting insurgency, nor fear Fidel can somehow lead a docile continent into militant Marxism.

For such reasons, nine Republican Congressmen months ago concluded a study of U.S.-Cuban relations by saying it's high time for an American policy change toward Cuba. "Action which was understandable, and even right, at one time and under one set of circumstances, may no longer be right or even wise at another date and under another set of circumstances," they said.

And change is coming. President Ford and Secretary Kissinger have been dropping broad hints. The Organization of American States (OAS), which voted economic sanctions against Cuba in 1964, will abandon them in November. Messages between Washington and Havana are being relayed by Mexico's foreign minister, who wants Cuba's isolation to end.

But as the pending OAS action indicates, more is involved than just the sensibilities of Cuba and the United States. There are four major parties in the affair, and change is coming because none of the four sees much to lose by reversing past policy, while all see something to gain.

These four are Cuba, the United States, the OAS, and the Soviet Union—which has been for years the main outsider in Western Hemisphere affairs in its role as Cuba's economic supplier and political tutor.

Here's a summary of the way each of these major parties views the situation now, along with an explanation of why each is ready for the change:

THE UNITED STATES: There's no longer much excuse for the U.S. to cling to its policy of seeking to isolate Cuba. In this officially proclaimed era of detente the old Cuba line seems increasingly anachronistic. Though Richard Nixon never overcame personal prejudices (or the influence, many believe, of his old friend, Bebe Rebozo), Gerald Ford has no such hangups. The new President is open to reconsideration.

That is especially so when current Cuba policy seems hypocritical, at best. The official excuse for sanctions against Cuba is that it meddles in internal affairs of others. Cuba trains agents and saboteurs, Mr. Nixon contended last year in a foreign policy report, "to carry out violence against established governments. . . . This activity continues to threaten the stability of our hemisphere."

There's no question this once was true; after all, Che Guevera, Castro's one-time top agent, died in a quixotic effort to whip up revolution in Bolivia. But most analysts, including many Washington officials, think that this stopped long ago, and that Mr. Castro is trying now to get chummy with other government chiefs.

In the meantime, new revelations show, the United States itself has done some meddling. The U.S. poured $8 million-plus into Chile to finance the late Salvador Allende's foes, while cash also has been funneled into Guyana and other South American states, according to recent reports. Continuing to brand Cuba as an international renegade for its subversive ventures is inconsistent, to say the least, in light of the U.S.'s own covert activities.

But there's a more positive way to view this country's changing Cuba policy. (The new policy could consist of some, or all, of the following elements: voting with the OAS majority to drop the organization's Cuba embargo; the subsequent lifting of the U.S. trade embargo against Cuba, and resuming diplomatic relations with the island.)

Importantly, a friendlier U.S. policy toward Cuba would remove a major irritant between the U.S. and its southern neighbors. For them, as one State Department official explains, America's Cuba policy "is a symbol of Yankee interference in Latin affairs." Washington's pressure was largely responsible for the 1964 OAS sanctions (only Mexico refused to participate). And Washington has been largely responsible for keeping the sanctions in force after many OAS members had concluded they were outdated. Many Latins perceive this pressure as an American effort to dictate their own policies.

There's something to gain economically as well. One guess is that high sugar prices, up sixfold in the past year or so, will give Cuba perhaps $1.9 billion of hard currency for imports. And there are indications Mr. Castro wants to spend some in the United States.

According to Edward Lamb, an Ohio businessman who recently had long talks with Premier Castro, the Cubans still admire American technology. They want agricultural equipment, especially for handling their sugar crops, and—Mr. Castro indicated—would like to buy U.S. corn, beans, poultry and medicines. "They've got the wherewithal to pay for it now," Mr. Lamb notes.

Finally, recognition of the Castro government would combine an acceptance of reality with a furtherance of global detente, which were two major effects of Mr. Nixon's China move. It wouldn't insure that relations would become cordial. Cuba will continue to oppose American influence in Latin America; ending that influence seems, in fact, to be Havana's main diplomatic objective. But recognition would be a conciliatory act fitting into broader U.S. foreign policy. Though it would mean accepting a Communist regime in the Western Hemisphere, something Messrs. Nixon and Kissinger once strongly opposed, there doesn't seem to be an alternative these days.

THE SOVIET UNION: For Moscow,

there are gains, plus a risk or two.

Detente remains the Russians' primary external policy, and gaining acceptance for Cuba by once-hostile America is a victory of sorts. It might also give the U.S.S.R. more acceptability in Latin America generally, an important, if not high-priority, consideration. It could also cut the cost of keeping Cuba afloat. Moscow sends aid worth an estimated $340 million annually, much of it as petroleum. If Cuba could buy this in nearby Venezuela—even with Soviet subsidy—it would be cheaper than shipping oil all the way from the Black Sea. Moreover, a trade-minded Cuba might eventually pay back the $4.1 billion it owes the Soviets.

The chief risk for the Russians, of course, is diminished influence. Henry Kissinger and others believe Mr. Castro wants looser ties with Moscow—not because of specific difficulties but rather to give Cuba a greater sense of independence. If this went too far, the Soviets could experience a diplomatic reverse like that in Egypt a couple of years ago. That's not expected, but the thought may cause Moscow to be a bit cautious about a conciliation trend the U.S.S.R. generally encourages.

CUBA: There are gains for the Castro regime other than decreased reliance on a foreign power.

The major one is respectability. Many Americans and some Latins have dismissed Fidel Castro for years as an erratic Communist who gave beards a bad name. Now he is about to be accepted, more or less fully, into the Latin American community—whatever private reservations many leaders still have.

However Mr. Castro wants more than acceptance; he seeks Latin leadership. He wants to ally Latin American governments to confront the U.S. on major economic and political issues. Within this forum, he would like to spread his influence in ways Cuban-backed guerrillas never could. That won't make life easier for Washington but it should mean less subversion.

Mr. Castro's speech last Saturday night was, in all likelihood, an example of what's ahead. He lambasted President Ford and the CIA for intervening in Chile, and he blamed world inflation on a U.S. "war budget," not on high oil prices. But he didn't veto closer ties to Washington and his two Sunday night dinner guests—Sen. Jacob Javits of New York and Sen. Claiborne Pell of Rhode Island—came away believing Mr. Castro wants "better relations with the United States."

The forum of the OAS won't serve his purposes, Mr. Castro stresses. "We have clearly said that we will not become members of the OAS again, because the OAS has been an instrument of imperialist domination in Latin America," he said the other day. But that doesn't apply to the Buenos Aires meeting, which is not an OAS function. "If we are invited we will go," the Cuban leader said. "Let there be no doubt about that."

THE OAS: This group of nations will gain from the lifting of sanctions even if Cuba doesn't rejoin. Argentina, for example, recently ignored the sanctions and granted Cuba a $1.2 billion credit for Argentine goods; nearly half has already been utilized by Havana, whose repayment record is excellent. With those sugar profits piling up, others probably sense sales for themselves with the embargo's lifting.

But the main gain is probably more a symbolic one. Renewed relations with Cuba would prove OAS members can do what they choose without getting American approval first. It would enhance their self-esteem and dignity, yet not really cause problems with the U.S.—or be unsafe.

"I do not think that Cuba's exporting the revolution," Mexican Foreign Minister Emilio O. Rabasa said recently. "And I do not think they are invading the life of the sphere of other countries."

So the old isolation policy is about over. The legal process by which the OAS will abolish restrictions is under way, with the final vote expected November 11 in Quito, Ecuador. The United States probably won't oppose it and, after dithering for a while, should move to restore bilateral relations with a Cuba it previously preferred to invade.

It's even possible that once Cuba regains full recognition emotions will cool so much that the country can become what the French writer Raymond Aron once said it should be: an obscure tropical dictatorship of no great significance to anyone.

New Statesman 13 September 1974

Chile and Us

The following document reached our office a few weeks ago, and was originally published in a Czech samizdat *paper* Národní Noviny. *We reprint it with thanks to the Committee to Defend Czechoslovak Socialists.*

Since 11 September a fascist terror has started raging in Chile together with everything that we always associate with it: raids, executions, arrests, killings 'while attempting to escape', liquidations of the basic freedoms of a citizen, return of land to the landowners and of nationalised enterprises to the capitalist owners. Honest people the world over denounce this kind of violence. Even Czechoslovak newspapers obligingly grant their space to various protesting voices. (With certain exceptions, of course. Czechoslovak mass media refused to grant their space to Pavel Kohout so that he could express his critical attitude.) Those delighted that someone somewhere managed to give a big kick to the communists are short sighted. For one thing it is not only the communists who are being kicked around in Chile at present and for another no real democrat can be really delighted when freedom is being strangled somewhere.

Without doubt there were more democratic rights and freedom in Chile under President Allende than there are under the government of the military junta, for the very fact that Allende ruled in a democratic fashion, solving his problems with opposition without violence and according to the law, greatly helped the military insurgents to carry out their plans.

No matter how paradoxical it sounds the USSR was in fact, in spite of its formal protests over the fate of Chile, satisfied. So was the USA of course. The almost meticulously preserved democratic methods in building a socialist society were a thorn in the eye for the Soviet Union. They were frightened that yet another socialism, a Chilean one and, furthermore, one with a human face, would be added to the four already existing ones. Soon the Moscow centre would no longer be a centre but just one of the provinces as, after all, Lenin predicted.

Not long ago Rudé Právo was upset that a West German CDU deputy spoke of the putsch as a 'check' as if one could mention in Czechoslovakia the word invasion or occupation. One is allowed to call it at the most an 'entry' or better still 'brotherly international aid'. Let's see what else upsets the normalised Czechoslovak press:

(1) That the local committees were broken up (just as the workers' committees were broken up in our country).

(2) That the junta banned lessons in Marxism at universities (yet in our country they went as far as liquidating all departments of Marxism-Leninism after August).

(3) That the freedom of assembly, association and both written and oral expression no longer exists (just try to get together the Club of Committed Non-Communists again or call a demonstration on any of the smaller squares of Prague or try to write freely what you think into your newspaper. Such a notion is ludicrous in present-day Czechoslovakia and in the Soviet Union they lock people up in lunatic asylums for similar demands).

(4) That in Chile just as under Hitler the junta burns books which are inconvenient or written by authors not appreciated by the junta (in our country they don't burn them publicly but [illegible] who

works in any public library just ask him to show you the list of books which had to be discarded, taken out of circulation or liquidated. The number of titles goes into thousands).

(5) That in Chile infringements of privacy became commonplace (yet how many Czech homes were broken into by the STB men without a court order, how many of our flats are fitted with bugging devices?).

(6) That 'thousands of Chileans from ordinary people to well-known personalities such as Dr Asonjo, the 1973 Nobel Prize winner for sciences, were expelled from their place of work or service, their only "crime" being that they served or sided with the progressive ideas'. (In this respect the junta has been acting clumsily. Where else but in Czechoslovakia were hundreds of thousands – from national artists to laureates, from academicians to professors, from journalists and students to ordinary workers – expelled from their places for the same things?).

(7) That the 'new rulers introduced complete control over television and radio' (and what is it like in our country? Just compare what the television and radio were like in 1968 and 1969 with what they are like now).

(8) That the junta ordered 'national work shifts' (an analogy so perfect that even the title corresponds).

(9) That it banned the left-wing press (it was a long list of journals which was banned under Husak. Let us just remember three which stood out: *Zitrek*, *Reportér* and even the communist *Politika*).

(10) That it interferes with trade union rights (perhaps it would be worth it to ask Karel Hoffman, this 'noted representative of the working class' who never worked in a factory, to name somewhere the rights of our trade unionists. A few seconds would last him well enough).

Oh yes, in this we must agree with our press: What goes on in Chile is indeed fascism. Fascism is simply fascism, no matter under which label it operates, whether it rages in Chile or in Czechoslovakia. That is why we are at one with the Chilean people and that is why we should protest, and not only against the threat to the life of Luis Corvalán (who by the way praised the occupation of our country in 1968), for the lives of hundreds and more people are threatened. We should underline that we are against it no matter where in the world it is happening. We should also be against it in reality and we should fight it.

WASHINGTON POST
05 October 1974

U.S Envoy To Brazil Hits Torture

From News Dispatches

BRASILIA, Oct. 4—U.S. Ambassador John Crimmins delivered a "strong protest" to Brazil's foreign minister today over treatment in jail of a former American missionary, the U.S. embassy reported.

Frederick Birten Morris, held since Monday on suspicion of subversion, told a U.S. consular officer in the northeastern city of Recife that he had been beaten and tortured with electric shocks "of high intensity" an embassy spokesman said.

The spokesman said the U.S. consul in Recife, Richard Brown, "saw bruises and contusions on Morris' back, buttocks and wrists."

The spokesman added Morris told the consul that he had been assaulted by the agents who hit him in the stomach, groin and lower back and slapped him in the face. Morris also said that electrodes had been attached at various times to several parts of his body and that he had been subjected to electric shocks which varied from light, annoying pulsations to sudden jolts of high intensity. Morris said he recalled losing consciousness on at least one occasion."

Crimmins met this evening with Foreign Minister Antonio Azeredo da Silveira, and delivered a "strong note," the spokesman said. He did not disclose the note's contents.

The Brazilian Foreign Ministry had no comment.

After Morris was detained Monday, another American was held by authorities at Morris' apartment for more than 24 hours, then released, the embassy spokesman said. He identified the second American as Philip Hanson, associated with Church World Services.

Hanson's U.S. hometown was not available.

Morris, 40, whose parents live in North Platte, Neb., was being held at the 4th Army headquarters in Recife, where he had served as a Methodist missionary for several years and more recently worked as a freelance reporter doing work for various American news organizations.

The embassy spokesman said that "as far as we know at this moment" there are no formal charges against Morris.

Police said Morris and a Brazilian were arrested at Morris' home. A police announcement said "highly compromising material" was found at Morris' home, but did not further describe the material.