

CONFIDENTIAL

# NEWS, VIEWS and ISSUES

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CONFIDENTIAL

# Governmental Affairs

WASHINGTON STAR  
19 Sept. 1974

## Poor Old CIA, Everybody's Millstone, Nobody's Patsy

By Tom Dowling  
Star-News Staff Writer

Here in brief is the meat of the CIA Chile scenario: \$11 million was shelled out to corrupt the free Chilean electoral process in order to guarantee the election of an incorruptible, democratic government. According to Gerry Ford, part of the money was spent to insure the survival of a free press and flourishing opposition parties so that Allende could be overthrown and murdered in order to install a regime that would shut down the press and jail the dissenting opposition.

Well, that's inflation for you. Why, in the old days we used to be able to destroy a Vietnamese village in order to save it for the PX price of a Zippo, a box of flints and a can of lighter fluid. No, the dollar just doesn't stretch that far any more, especially in Chile where a wheelbarrow of pesos doesn't buy a good steak dinner, much less a tidy, old-fashioned Yankee-sponsored coup.

THE CHILEAN ESCAPEDE has stirred up a considerable uproar; leaving some commentators to suggest that the CIA be abolished, a Gordian knot proposal with which I hasten to associate myself. All the same, it is bootless to waste any breath chastising the CIA as the culprit of this shameful affair. There is a maxim in the philosophy of logic known as Occam's razor which states that it is vain to explain the whole with more entities when fewer will do just as well. It is therefore not the vagaries of the CIA's operations which are at issue, but those who are ultimately responsible for supporting and activating the CIA. After all, the CIA is merely a bureaucratic instrument wielded by the President and his mystical 40 Committee, and overseen by Congressional committees.

The CIA Chilean conspiracy is scarcely a flabbergasting departure from what passes for normality in American post-war national security doctrine: right wing coups in Guatemala, Iran, Greece; U-2 flights; Bay of Pigs invasions; secret wars in Laos; Watergate complicity; the manipulation of the National Student Association. These schemes, whether they backfire or not, are fundamentally inimical to the idea of human freedom, which makes the CIA an institution repugnant to the democratic spirit that presidents and congressmen must necessarily support at least to get reelected.

NOT SURPRISINGLY then, the only honest statement to emerge from this whole Chilean fiasco was made by director William Colby, who questioned the wisdom of his agency's informing Congress of its future "delicate" activities since candor in the Chilean matter had revealed policies so outrageous that Congress had no choice but to expose them. In effect, Colby is saying that to efficiently subvert other democracies the president's 40 Committee members must either lie to the Congress, or exact a promise that truthful testimony in executive session, however grisly its moral content may be, will not be taken amiss by

a few loud-mouthed congressional hot-heads. To give Colby his due, he has a neat and unarguable point—as far as it goes.

The rub is that, on the one hand, there are perjury laws covering congressional testimony; and, on the other, there are increasingly fewer congressmen whose desire to hear the truth is strong enough to merit risking their political survival by an advance pledge of blanket support for the truth, however repellent it may be.

AS A RESULT, you have a CIA nominally controlled by a president and overseen by a congress, all of whose self-interest requires that they remain as profoundly ignorant of agency activity as possible. It's the Watergate principle of deniability all over again.

Of course, Chuck Colson doesn't want Howard Hunt to tell him what happened inside the DNC headquarters. Such information only makes Colson more liable to a perjury count when he goes before the grand jury. Of course, no president wants to know exactly what CIA projects his predecessor allegedly set in motion. If the scheme goes well, he can't take any public credit for it anyway; if, as seems more likely, it backfires, the blame can always be subtly shifted to a prior administration as with the Bay of Pigs.

Of course, Congress doesn't want to hear how the CIA actually plans to spend its appropriations. After all, no one wants to wake up one morning to see Allende's corpse in the newspaper and have to say to himself: Oh, yeah. I remember now. That's what they wanted that \$11 million bucks for.

AND SO THE CIA goes its way, in an instrument presidents and congresses are pleased to have at their disposal, as long as the honor precludes any responsibility for controlling it. Instead, the Congress instituted a gentlemen's agreement to this effect: OK, fellows, we'll ask you what you re-

up to, then you fuzz it up and lie a little bit and there'll be no hard feelings. What the hell, what we don't know can't hurt us.

By and large, it was a serviceable and safe compact. But, in these parlous Watergate times, the good bureaucrat is well advised to cover his tracks with maximum prudence. So when they hauled old Colby up to the House for closed CIA hearings, he told the truth, which is said to set men free—from perjury raps among other things. And in telling the truth the whole elaborate gentlemen's agreement came apart at the seams. Because, of course, Colby's predecessors and associates had all been expected to lie. Some of them did it with suppleness, others with baldness, but all of them with slavish élan. Their president and their congress thought highly of them for it.

SO NOW THE suave Richard Helms faces the clink for lying so loyally. Kissinger is once again accused of deception. Assorted other State Department and CIA minions can look forward to the ruination of their careers, if not convictions for perjury. With a unanimous tut-tut of horrified astonishment the Senate For-

eign Relations Committee will conduct hearings on the Chilean prevarications.

Even I am disinclined to accept such an estimate of congressional obtuseness. The fact, obvious to anyone, is that Kissinger's successful foreign policy machinations—to take merely the best example—are based on his immense gift as a liar. The enormous approbation he enjoys among presidents and congresses alike resides in the facility, the sober integrity, the self-effacing wit with which he envelops one whopper after another. His success abroad is predicated on the fact that foreigners believe him. Indeed, his lies are so credible that, even now that the rules of congressional testimony have been changed on him in midstream, the Congress and the President can look us right in the eye without blinking and say:

*Gosh, he sounded so convincing, I believed him. It looks like Henry, the 40 committee and the CIA pulled the wool right over our eyes.*

And mugs that we are, we'll buy it, content once more to let those with responsibility shift the blame to others.

WASHINGTON POST  
04 October 1974

### Anti-CIA Group

LONDON.—Former CIA agent Philip Agee announced that an international committee would be formed to campaign against the intelligence agency "wherever it operates." He said the group would include former CIA agents.

At a news conference here, Agee also released a list of people he said were CIA operatives in Mexico.

WASHINGTON STAR  
19 September 1974

## William F. Buckley Jr.: *Moynihan, Chile and CIA*

The word is out that Ambassador Daniel Patrick Moynihan has expressed in a secret cable the dismay with which he meets the news that the CIA attempted to "interfere" with the election of Chilean President Salvador Allende. Moynihan is a man of great principle, and he is especially embarrassed because he personally reassured Mrs. Gandhi that the United States was not interfering with Chilean politics.

A State Department official, while not conceding that we have done anything improper in Chile, acknowledged that Moynihan was indignant, but then remarked that "Pat is always indignant." He has a lot to be indignant about.

**THE CIA-CHILE** controversy is hugely subtle and interesting. Last year Moynihan persuaded the United States to tear up several billion dollars in notes owed by India to the United States.

Now India is a terribly mismanaged country, and the poverty there appalling. There are Indians (I know one, a very prominent Indian) who believe that U.S. aid to the governments of India during the post-

war period was arrant interference in Indian politics. We took the position that we were merely performing humanitarian deeds.

I do not doubt that was our motive. And I do not doubt that was our motive in attempting to help the resisters to Allende. Moreover, if we had succeeded, Chile would have been spared the miserable, dirty, despotical tribulations it is enduring at this moment.

That doesn't, of course, disprove the point that State Department officials apparently misled congressional committees. Put that aside, for the moment, as a democratic dilemma.

**IT IS A PITY** that critics of CIA involvement in Chile do not put the situation in context. It is made to appear as though we uniquely desired to fashion the will of the Chilean people. In the year before Allende came to power:

1) Soviet and East European films were shown regularly in commercial theaters, universities, clubs, and on television—paid for by the Soviets.

2) The Soviet Union published a picture magazine edited for Chilean consumption, with a circulation of 10,

000. (In U.S. terms, that would be the equivalent of 200,000.)

3) The Communist party of Chile, under Soviet domination, produced a bimonthly theoretical journal and a daily newspaper.

4) The Soviet Union, Cuba, Czechoslovakia and Poland participated in trade fairs including cultural and technical exhibits, including one exhibit of over 500 Marxist books contributed by the USSR. One exhibit was devoted to "Yankee aggression in Vietnam."

5) Communist news agencies included China, Cuba, East Germany, Tass, and Novosti.

6) The USSR broadcasts 73 hours per week in Latin America, East European countries 84 hours, Communist China 28 hours. And Cuba 163 hours.

7) Soviet officials made available program tapes to provincial radio stations. One station carried a weekly program produced by Chilean students at Lumumba University. The Communist party conducted regular programs on a Santiago station and on six provincial stations.

**WHAT SHOULD** the United States do, under such circumstances? In another connection,

Ambassador Moynihan, indignant over America's supine presence in the United Nations, cabled prescriptions not applicable in attempting to understand the Chilean situation. "There was a saying around the Kennedy White House: don't get mad, get even . . . what has come over us? Forget about a slander on our honor? What have we become? Any country that does not support us on a matter of consequence not only damages the United Nations, but must quietly be brought to understand it is damaging itself. I looked down the list of those who go along by abstaining. In half of them the present regimes would collapse without American support or American acquiescence. To hell with it.

"Something specifically bad should happen to each one of them, and when it has happened they should be told that Americans take the honor of their democracy most seriously, and never issue warnings to those who would besmirch that honor. When that happens, something extraordinarily disagreeable happens next, and the victim is left to figure it out for himself."

But for that sort of thing, don't bring in the CIA?

THE PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER

20 SEP 1974

### Should CIA go public?

To judge from his comments to the press this week about the Central Intelligence Agency, President Ford has decided on a new policy of candor and plain speaking. He frankly said the CIA will go right on being as deceptive and underhanded as ever. That's letting it all hang out.

Mr. Ford had to say something, of course, and his choices were rather limited. He couldn't very well denounce the CIA, particularly now when congressmen are queuing up on all sides to investigate its role in bringing down the Allende government in Chile. On the other hand, he couldn't come out four-square for unlimited undercover meddling by one nation in the internal politics of another.

So he took a middle course, explaining that everybody engages in this sort of meddling and suggesting that it is very bad except when we do it. The explanation is not, let us say, perfect.

After seeing one President destroyed by Watergate, it is not comforting to hear from the new President that there's something to be said for lawbreaking—

after all, it does help us get what we want. That, we hope, is a minority view right now. Beyond that, Mr. Ford seems convinced that the cold war is still on and still justifies any tactics we may care to use against governments we don't trust. Former President Nixon's optimism about an "era of cooperation instead of confrontation" evidently left the scene with him.

Obviously this country must have an efficient worldwide intelligence system. The rub comes when the system starts making other governments' decisions for them, and enforcing the decisions by criminal means. Whatever this approach may do for other countries [not much, we suspect], for us it succeeds mainly in setting off riots outside United States embassies and discrediting American intentions and policies everywhere.

The time may have come to change

our approach to the whole business. We might, for instance, deemphasize the cloak-and-dagger scene—which is getting a bit old-fashioned and counterproductive anyway—and try something really new: A public-spirited CIA. A force of frank, manly, plainspoken intelligence agents may be just what the world is waiting for.

CIA agents could be clearly identified by lapel badges. These should carry the agent's full name and say something engaging, like "Hi, there!" Operatives should be friendly but frank with the people they're spying on; interviewees should be asked to speak up and talk directly into the agent's martini olive. Any secret drawers around should be plainly labeled "Secret Drawer."

It would be a wholly new, thoroughly American approach to spying, and it would completely paralyze enemy agents. They'd spend all their time trying to figure out what we were really up to.

LONDON TIMES  
20 September 1974

## Activities of the CIA in Chile

From Mr Miles Copeland

Sir, In their present isolationist mood, many Americans will be as cross as you appear to be to learn that, once again, their Government has been meddling in the internal affairs of a foreign country. On the other hand, there is a growing realization in the United States of the extent to which we have allowed ourselves to become dependent on resources which must be imported from abroad, and that in the interests of survival we have no choice but to practice a bit of imperialism here and there.

For good or for bad, right or wrong, we have committed ourselves to a technologically based economy which requires imports ranging from platinum from South Africa to aluminum from Australia and Guinea, as well as a number of minerals, known facetiously to our national strategists as "chromium", required to make steel resistant to high temperatures, to manufacture high speed machinery, and to maintain our electronic industries. Our Government no longer publishes lists of "strategic" and "critical" materials (there is no reason we should advertise to our suppliers the extent to which we are at their mercy), but in the course of some enquiries I recently made on behalf of a client I was told that we are no more than "a few months" ahead in our stockpiling of some items on which our industrial complex is "absolutely" dependent.

We buy what we need at current world market prices. If we see one of our supplying countries about to come under the domination of hostile powers which might deny us what we need for survival we expect our Government to do something about it. Since gunboat diplomacy and other "overt" means are unworkable these days, we must turn to the covert means which are—or should be—in the hands of the agency which knows how to use them discreetly and efficiently. If helping independent electoral candidates to stand up to candidates supported by the Russians, the Chinese or the Cubans is "imperialism", so be it.

The fault of the CIA in Chile was that, being gunshy from the bad press it had been getting in the days of Vietnam, it came in with too little too late. Although intelligence estimates clearly indicated that something in the neighbourhood of \$12,000,000 would be required to match aid which Allende was getting from abroad, the CIA put up something less than \$5,000,000—most of which, American business concerns in Chile are convinced, was never spent.

That the CIA later spent \$8,000,000 to "destabilize" Allende's Government is nonsense. Mr Colby has explained himself badly. The CIA doesn't have political activists clever enough to top what Allende, with his socialist "reforms", was doing nicely on his own. Naturally, our Government did what it could to block financial aid which would ultimately come from the American taxpayers' pocket (why should we underwrite a socialist experiment any more than the socialist would underwrite a capitalist one?), but the CIA's efforts after Allende got into office

WASHINGTON STAR  
20 September 1974

Carl T. Rowan:

## 'Inside the '40 Committee'

When the White House press corps challenged President Ford on U.S. intervention in Chile, they squeezed him into a tight little crevice between the morality and practicality of foreign policy.

That press conference produced the rare spectacle of the President of the United States admitting that we use our wealth and our might to try to control the destinies of other nations, partly because we assume our ideological foes are doing the same.

As the only newsmen around who has been a member of the Forty Committee, that small offshoot of the National Security Council which approves and oversees U.S. clandestine activities abroad, it may help if I give you a report on just what goes on—and how the issues of morality sometimes conflict.

**THIS IS A RUTHLESS**, dirty world where, despite talk of detente, the ideological struggle never ends. So the powerful meddle constantly in the affairs of the weak—meaning, in truth, that there is no such thing as a truly independent small, weak or poor nation. For example:

The Forty Committee is told by the Director of the CIA that Russia, through Cuba, has put a thousand well-trained agents into Venezuela to try to stir up a guerrilla uprising. The Forty Committee decided to provide helicopters, communications equipment, weapons and millions of dollars—plus some "counterinsurgency" training—for Venezuela's military and police forces.

This action will be viewed by most of my readers as a legitimate intervention, for it can be construed as assistance given at the request of the legitimate Venezuelan government, which is threatened by a foreign power.

From that example of a neighbor being harassed and threatened, we move to Chile, where the mass of people are shifting leftward politically—mostly because of the greed of the local oligarchy, exploitation of resources by North Americans and the general low level of life of the masses.

It is 1964. The United States realizes that the Chilean conservatives who have helped outsiders in their plunder

of the country can no longer win. The only way to block the accession to power of avowed Marxist Salvador Allende is to give all-out support to Eduardo Frei, a Christian Democrat who in earlier times would have been unacceptable to Washington as "too leftist."

But what right does the United States have to say who gets elected in Chile? The CIA reports—accurately, most likely—that the Soviet Union is financing three Chilean newspapers which back Allende and has funneled several million dollars into the coffers of parties supporting him.

This report is justification enough for the Forty Committee to recommend that millions in U.S. funds be given to political parties, people and newspapers supporting Frei.

So Frei is elected. But in six years in office he cannot reform his friends in the oligarchy or reduce the greed of businessmen from abroad. With passion and no small measure of demagoguery, Marxist Allende has won more and more of the people.

So in the next election Allende wins the presidency.

**FEARS ABOUND IN** the CIA, the Defense Department, the State Department and the White House that Chile is about to become "another Cuba."

So, as President Ford has told us with no signs of guilt or regret, we pump millions in to finance, keep strong, the opposition news media and political parties.

Once Allende is under fire from the CIA-subsidized press and the politicians whom the United States is bribing, the next step comes easy. The United States moves to shut off Chile's credit at the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Export-Import Bank.

Pretty soon Chile's economy is in a mess and the natives are so restless that we might not have to bribe any generals to get a coup going. And we can say that we had nothing to do with any coup.

It is a dirty, immoral business. But we'll probably go on doing it because we think the Russians and Chinese and British and French will go on doing it.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR  
19 September 1974

## Soviets reported trying to discredit Kissinger

Washington

✶ Soviet agents in European capitals are busy spreading rumors calculated to discredit Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, according to the current U.S. News & World Report.

The weekly magazine said allied intelligence sources report the Russians are planting the suggestion that Secretary Kissinger is on the way out, supposedly because he is not on the same wave length as President Ford—the reason for the campaign being Soviet resentment over the way Mr. Kissinger handled the tables on the U.S.S.R. in the Mideast in recent months.

were supposed to be confined to backing those politicians who would be called upon to pick up the pieces after Allende fell of his own weight.

Alas, the Agency again moved too slowly and a group of "Greek colonels" took over—as part of a trend which, I fear, we are going to see developing apace throughout the Third World.

Yours,

MILES COPELAND,  
21 Marlborough Place, NW8,  
September 20

NEW YORK TIMES  
20 September 1974

## SENATORS ASKING TIGHTER C.I.A. REIN

By DAVID BINDER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 19 — While President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger conferred today with nine Congressional leaders over United States intelligence practices, two Senators introduced a bill to reform and broaden legislative control of the intelligence community.

Controversy over the covert operations of the Central Intelligence Agency, specifically in Chile in 1973, apparently prompted the President and Mr. Kissinger to meet for breakfast with the four Senators and five members of the House of Representatives for 90 minutes in which, a White House spokesman said, they had a "full and frank discussion" of intelligence procedures.

"The discussion also dealt with executive and legislative responsibility for intelligence policy," said the spokesman, John W. Hushen, the acting White House press secretary.

At the same time, Senators Lowell P. Weicker Jr. and Howard H. Baker were presenting their bill to create a "Joint Congressional Oversight Committee" to keep watch on the intelligence community.

Congressional overseeing of intelligence operations now is the responsibility of two Senate and two House subcommittees of the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees. The two Republican Senators sponsoring the bill said they believed that "there has been no effective oversight" of the intelligence community by Congress under the present system.

On the Senate floor, they swiftly gained 11 co-sponsors, almost all of them Democrats considered liberals. But skeptics, including some members of current committees dealing with overseeing, pointed out that over 100 similar proposals had failed in the past. They expressed doubt that the bill of Mr. Weicker, who is from Connecticut, and Mr. Baker, of Tennessee, would get any further.

A Congressional aide familiar with overseeing functions remarked that one unresolved problem was whether Congress would or should go beyond overseeing intelligence practices and actually participate alongside the executive branch in authorizing or rejecting specific operations.

Each is effectively canceled out, he said, "when the subcommittee on intelligence knows the intelligence but can't deal with the foreign-policy aspects, and the Foreign Relations Committee can deal with foreign policy but doesn't know the intelligence end of it."

At a news conference, neither Senator Weicker nor Senator Baker was very clear on this,

WASHINGTON STAR  
20 September 1974

Garry Wills:

## Licensed Thuggery

President Ford said in his press conference that he meant to continue a policy of openness and candor. But there was nothing very candid about his first answer on the CIA's crusade against Chile's deposed and murdered president, Salvador Allende.

Ford first said our \$8 million of CIA money was spent to "take certain actions in the intelligence field." If Allende's government had fallen, we would have heard about it, and it would not have cost us \$8 million to hear about it. The aim was not to find out anything about Allende, but to do him in.

Ford went on to half-admit this, all the while painting our actions in the guise of disinterested love for the free press.

So much for campaign spending reforms. The next time the government gets after big corporations for underwriting candidates, the officers of such corporations can just say they were being philanthropic and encouraging freedom of the press.

(ITT DID in fact offer the CIA an extra million dollars for the subversion of the Chilean government, but the CIA thought it would stick with the taxpayers' money.)

Then Ford made Henry Kissinger's distinction between our attacks on Allende and the coup that overturned him. We, he claimed, did not stage or run the coup. We are expected to take the government's word for that, but various officers of our government also gave their word under oath that we were not financing the opposition, and now it turns out that we were.

It is not only less than candid, it is dis-

though Mr. Weicker said that "we are not suggesting decision-making" by Congress on intelligence. "That is up to the executive," he added.

Their bill calls for appointment of a 14-member joint committee, chosen by the Congressional leadership, with membership periodically rotated.

In telephone interviews, several Congressmen on the present committees voiced opposition to the Weicker-Baker bill. Representative William G. Bray, Republican of Indiana, who is on the House Intelligence subcommittee, said his group had been "quite active" in recent months, particularly on questions related to security-classification of secrets and involvement of the C.I.A. in the Watergate affair.

"Naturally I am opposed," said Representative F. Edward Hebert, Louisiana Democrat and a member of the same committee. "As far as I am concerned the C.I.A. functions properly and our committee is totally informed."

In a brief speech this morning, Senator Stuart Symington, Democrat of Missouri, said: "What is needed is a serious effort to bring Congress into a meaningful relationship with

graceful, to pretend we are protecting another people's liberties when we undermine their economy to "prove" that communism is bad for them. If communism were so self-evidently bad, we would not need to help it along in proving its disastrous effects. And we would not have to lie to each other in the process.

Ford's first answer did not satisfy, so the question was raised again — and then he did approach candor on the subject, saying he would not quibble about whether the subversion of other peoples' governments is "permitted or authorized under international law." It is "recognized fact" that other governments do it, so we will do it too, for our own best interests. And international law be damned.

William Buckley, once a CIA agent himself, defends the Chile operation by saying that such acts are what the CIA exists for. He is right. And that is why the CIA should cease to exist.

IT BREAKS the laws of every country it operates in, beginning with our own — and makes any pretense to international morality simply ludicrous on our part. Through the CIA we proclaim a licensed thuggery to all the world.

We got along for a century and a half without an international secret police force; and it is only after we learned to live with one that we started toying with the idea of a domestic secret police plan. The development is not accidental. We had to be conditioned to our various Howard Hunts. We had to deserve them before we got them. Now we better deserve to be rid of them, and all their ilk, and all their works.

the intelligence community both as an observer and as a consumer."

### The Harrington Disclosure

In practice, a Congressional aide said, legislative oversight has been maintained by the seven-member House Intelligence subcommittee of the five-member Senate Central Intelligence subcommittee, under Senator John C. Stennis, Democrat of Mississippi.

The sessions, often extremely informal, are usually initiated by the committee chairman, but are sometimes called at the suggestion of William E. Colby, the Director of the C.I.A. Usually no written reports are made.

But last April, when Representative Nedzi was conducting a secret hearing on the intelligence agency's operations in Chile, there was a written report that he allowed Representative Michael J. Harrington, Democrat of Massachusetts, to read. Mr. Harrington's office later made his summary of that report available to the press.

This is regarded as "a breach of House rules" and, a Congressional aide said, may make for difficulties for the Weicker-Baker bill because of sensitivity about leaked security information.

BALTIMORE SUN  
25 September 1974  
*CIA curb rejected*

Washington (Reuter)—The House of Representatives yesterday defeated an attempt to restrict Central Intelligence Agency activities abroad, despite recent disclosures of covert CIA operations against the Allende government in Chile.

The House voted 291 to 168 against an amendment by Representative Elizabeth Holtzman (D., N.Y.) that would have barred use of funds by the CIA "to undermine or destabilize" any foreign government.

The move was prompted by the disclosures that the CIA spent \$11 million for covert operations to undermine the government of Salvador Allende who was overthrown last September in a military coup in which Mr. Allende was killed.

WASHINGTON STAR  
20 September 1974

Getlein's Commentary

# Where's That Intelligence In the CIA?

By Frank Getlein  
Star-News Staff Writer

The leading journalist defender of the CIA burglars at Watergate last week took the next logical step and became, second only to the President of the United States, the leading defender of CIA murderers in Chile and elsewhere.

What is the CIA to do?, he asked plaintively and rhetorically, expecting no answer because in a naughty world someone must be naughty or the rest of us cannot be nice.

That question about what is the CIA to do, however, is far from rhetorical. It is one of the burning questions the country faces in the wake of Watergate and the Cold War. We have got to recognize the connection between those two things and we have got to decide, through our elected representatives, just what it is the CIA is to do. The CIA has amply demonstrated that it can no longer be allowed to answer that question for itself.

ONE ANSWER TO the question is that the CIA might try doing what it was set up to do, which was not to go around assassinating people, overthrowing governments and burglarizing the headquarters of the Democratic party—which was not even to gather "intelligence," but was actually to coordinate intelligence gathered by the various other already-existing intelligence organizations of the government, chiefly the FBI and those of the military services.

As the "central" agency in the field, the CIA was to bring together the strands of fact or fancy dug up by the others, make sure that logical connections were not missed because their components existed in isolation from one another, and make sure that everyone in the "intelligence community" knew everything necessary to draw the most nearly true conclusions.

That's a far cry from rubbing out Allende or breaking and entering Larry O'Brien's office.

IF IT IS objected that there is no reason to assume the CIA had anything to do with Watergate, the obvious answer is that there is much less reason to assume the agency did not. Since President Ford has joined the Watergate cover-up crew, not so much by pardoning the master criminal as by giving him power to destroy the rest of the evidence, we may never know for certain one way or the other. But surely, starting with the overlap of personnel between the CIA's Bay of Pigs and Watergate, and going on to the supply by the

agency of special equipment to Howard Hunt, there is enough evidence to suggest that only the very naive or the self-serving can pretend there is no connection at all.

The most penetrating observation about the destruction of Allende was made by an American church group, which said, "Chile is Watergate with a passport."

By the same token, Watergate was Chile with an American visa.

Under the pretext of contacting foreign sources now here resident, the CIA has been active in the United States for years, enjoying all powers except the power to arrest.

THERE IS, THEN, a double question about what is the CIA to do. The more horrifying question is this: Is the agency finally to be turned loose against Americans on a large scale, a freeing of the hounds that Watergate powerfully suggests has already been accomplished at least on a small scale? The agency's charter specifically forbids it to operate in this country.

If congressional investigation shows that it has in fact done so, some one should go to jail, starting with the CIA director who authorized such action and the civil official, however admired by the diplomatic press, who authorized him.

The second question probably is more urgent: Is this country to operate as a bandit in the community of nations? Are we, through the CIA, to overthrow legally elected governments freely for the convenience of heavy conglomerate contributors to the party in power? Or for the pursuit of private fancies of cold-war valor?

A sub-question is this: With the Italian government apparently about to bring in the Italian Communists in an effort to stabilize the country, are we prepared to "destabilize" it by "direct action"? If Kissinger has CIA assassins in Rome waiting to rub out the first

Communist members of the Italian cabinet, they should be recalled at once and put on the leash at Langley until all of us, through our representatives, can decide if this is the way we wish to be now.

NEW YORK TIMES  
20 September 1974

# Was Ford Conned On Chile?

By Tom Wicker

WASHINGTON—The disclosure that the Central Intelligence Agency financed the series of strikes that preceded the overthrow of President Allende in Chile ought to make Gerald Ford hide his face. Either he has been conned by the C.I.A. into grossly misleading the American people and giving his approval to international gangsterism, or he did it on his own.

Mr. Ford, confirming at his recent news conference that the C.I.A. had carried out covert operations in Chile, suggested that it happened "three or four years ago" and that it was merely an attempt to "assist the preservation of opposition newspapers and electronic media and to preserve opposition political parties."

The facts are that the Allende Government did not try, as Mr. Ford charged it did, to "destroy opposition news media . . . and to destroy opposition political parties." The parties continued to function throughout the Allende regime. No Government censorship of the press was established. A one-day shutdown of an opposition paper, *El Mercurio*, was made possible by a libel law passed in the previous regime of Eduardo Frei, who was supported by the C.I.A.

Even that one-day shutdown did not occur until June 22, 1973, just a few months before the military coup that overthrew Mr. Allende. The Inter-American Press Association said then that the shutdown was the "first deliberate attempt to silence or intimidate" *El Mercurio*. Mr. Allende had been elected in 1970.

The Ford statement was misleading in every particular. Whatever pressures Mr. Allende occasionally brought on the opposition press, he imposed no censorship and made no attempt to "destroy" it. He did not try to destroy opposition parties. The C.I.A. intervention was not "three or four years ago." It was by no means

## IN THE NATION

limited to support for opposition press and parties, as the latest disclosures make clear.

Even if any part of Mr. Ford's statement had been true, the plain fact is that the United States supports any number of regimes where press and politics are harshly repressed—South Vietnam, South Korea, until recently Greece, just to name a few. But when the Chilean military junta, its path paved by the "destabilization" paid for and fomented by the C.I.A., took power, it immediately silenced both

the press and the political parties, murdered thousands of Chileans and jailed thousands more.

Aside from misleading the American people, Mr. Ford's statement was one of the most unfortunate ever made by the head of a supposedly law-abiding government. It claimed the right of this nation to go clandestinely into others and "take certain actions in the intelligence field to help implement foreign policy and protect national security." That is a beautified way of saying "to subvert legitimate governments by bribery, trickery and violence."

Mr. Ford then justified this claim by saying Communist governments did the same thing, and that other countries did too. He took this to the ultimate length of saying, that, in the

case of Chile, the subversion had been in the "best interest" of the Chilean people. Who gave the United States the right to make such a judgment in opposition to a free Chilean election?

The "candor" of Mr. Ford's remarks, far from being praiseworthy, had the effects not just of admitting that international subversion goes on, but of giving it public, official approval, and from the President of the United States. What does this tell us about a man who in pardoning Richard Nixon said he believed that "right makes might" and who has just called in the United Nations for a cooperative world order based on "accommodation, moderation and consideration of the interests of others?"

It probably tells us that Gerald Ford

has been sold a bill of goods by the C.I.A. and Secretary of State Kissinger, who presided over the national security body that authorized the C.I.A. interventions in Chile. Inexperienced in foreign affairs, no doubt intimidated by the "experts" at his elbow, unwilling to reverse long-standing policies of previous Presidents, politically dependent on Mr. Kissinger at home and abroad, Mr. Ford—an instinctive hawk anyway—no doubt said what they wanted him to say in their best interest.

And that tells us further that if the wings of the C.I.A. are to be clipped any time soon, and if Mr. Kissinger's responsibility for the reprehensible events in Chile is to be clarified, Congress will have to do it, with no help from the White House.

NEW REPUBLIC

21 Sept. 1974

## Exporting Revolution

New revelations that the Central Intelligence Agency was deeply involved in creating the climate for the bloody Chilean military coup d'état just a year ago—at least to the tune of over eight million dollars and the CIA only knows in what other ways—have set in motion a brand new Washington credibility game. It is no longer a question whether the administration as a whole may be lying about its covert foreign policies, which would be nothing new in this town, but whether CIA Director William E. Colby is a more credible witness than Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and his deputies—or vice versa.

Extraordinary as it may sound, it is Colby who admits that the CIA spent the eight million dollars to help bring about the coup in Chile (it had spent three million dollars in 1960 to prevent an earlier Marxist victory in the elections), while Kissinger and the State Department stubbornly deny any American involvement. For nearly a year now Colby and Kissinger have been disagreeing on this point in separate appearances before congressional committees. An honest difference of opinion? Nobody familiar with the Washington policymaking apparatus is likely to accept such an explanation.

Both Kissinger and Colby are members of the top-secret "40 Committee" of the National Security Council. This is the five-man supreme intelligence body in the US government (the State and Defense Departments and the office of the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff are the other agencies represented on it) which, according to Colby's testimony, approved in June and September 1970, the covert operations against the regime of the late President Salvador Allende Gossens. Top intelligence sources say that Chile was one of the most important operations, aside from Indochina and ongoing overhead satellite reconnaissance over the Soviet Union and China, handled by the "40 Committee." They say the US involvement may have been even greater than suggested in Colby's secret testimony last April 22. In some still unclear manner, Americans may have played a role in paramilitary operations against Allende before the coup.

Inasmuch as Kissinger all along has been chair-

ing the "40 Committee" in his capacity of special assistant to the President for national security affairs, it is highly improbable that he did not know what he had authorized. Besides it would have been his responsibility to obtain former President Nixon's final clearance. Colby, on the other hand, can hardly be accused of inventing an immensely damaging claim that the CIA was secretly financing Allende's right-wing foes and sabotaging his government. What, then, is the truth?

The first decision by the "40 Committee" to authorize the expenditure of \$400,000 to help Allende's opponents in the election was taken at a meeting presided over by Kissinger on June 27, 1970. This much was admitted by the CIA in hearings before a Senate subcommittee last year. Kissinger and Richard Helms, then CIA director, favored this move although the State Department (William P. Rogers was Secretary of State at the time) tended to oppose it. According to *The Washington Post* Kissinger remarked at the meeting that "I don't see why we need to stand by and watch a country go Communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people." Although the State Department said last week Kissinger did not remember making such a comment, the record shows that on July 24, 1970 he ordered the preparation of a National Security Council study memorandum on Chile. Known as NSSM-97, the study outlined a series of options for the administration in the event of Allende's victory. One of them was clandestine support for his opponents to help them overthrow the regime, just as the CIA helped Brazilian military and civilian groups to oust President João Goulart in 1964. Escalating the US intervention beyond covert CIA activities, the NSC study also recommended damaging the Chilean economy through an international credit and financial squeeze.

After Allende won a majority but not a plurality in the September 4, 1970 elections, Kissinger and the "40 Committee" refocused on Chile. He told a group of editors at a background briefing in Chicago on September 16 that "it is fairly easy for one to predict that if Allende wins there is a good chance that he will establish over a period of years some sort of Communist government." He said that if Allende was elected by the Chilean Congress in the October run-off, "mas-

sive problems" would arise for the United States and "pro-US forces in Latin America," and that communism might spread to Argentina, Brazil and Peru. Kissinger's sentiments about Allende were thus fairly clear when the "40 Committee" convened on September 18, 1970 to authorize \$850,000 in funds and "bribes" to get the Chilean Congress to elect Jorge Alessandri, the runner-up.

According to Colby's testimony last April 22, as disclosed by Rep. Michael Harrington, the "40 Committee" approved five million dollars for "destabilization" efforts in Chile between 1971 and 1973 as soon as it became known that Allende was the new President: Colby reportedly testified that 2.5 million dollars more was cleared by the "40 Committee" for covert actions in 1973.

The coup against Allende came on September 11, 1973. Within less than a month, Kissinger and Colby began contradicting each other before congressional committees. Appearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in closed session on October 9, and in answer to a direct question by Sen. Gale McGee as to whether "the CIA was deeply involved at this time," Kissinger said: "The CIA had nothing to do with the coup, to the best of my knowledge and belief, and I only put in that qualification in case some madman appears down there who, without instructions, talked to somebody. I have absolutely no reason to suppose it." The rest of his reply was deleted in the sanitized transcript.

Two days later, on October 11, before an executive session of a House Foreign Affairs subcommittee Colby, in effect, admitted a considerable degree of CIA involvement in Chilean politics. He said that "we have had . . . various relationships over the years in

Chile with various groups. In some cases this was approved by the National Security Council and it has meant some assistance to them." He acknowledged that the CIA had penetrated most of the Chilean political parties and, in a general way, conceded that covert operations existed. "The presumption under which we conduct that type of operation," he said, "is that it is a covert operation and that the United States hand is not to show."

But it was in his April 22 testimony before the House Armed Services subcommittee on intelligence that Colby in an amazingly candid manner gave away the story of the eight million dollars. Presumably unaware of Colby's testimony, several State Department officials continued in testimony in ensuing months to deny CIA involvement. The CIA's new policy under Colby is to answer fairly fully, while volunteering nothing, whatever questions are raised by congressional committees responsible for overseeing the intelligence community. Colby's view is that it is up to these committees to inform, or not, other members of Congress. Colby seems to be turning into the most candid CIA director in a quarter of a century. The disclosure of Colby's testimony by Harrington thus had something of a bombshell effect on Kissinger's State Department. Its spokesman said that "we stand by" the denials made by past and present State Department officials before congressional committees.

The continuing question, aside from the matter of Colby vs. Kissinger credibility, is what else the United States perpetrated in Chile. At least one highly informed official had this to say: "Colby's testimony is only the tip of the iceberg."

Tad Szulc

WASHINGTON STAR  
21 Sept. 1974

## David Braaten: Spying Among Gentlemen

"Gentlemen do not read each other's mail," said the secretary of state, as he cut off funds for his primitive decoding section.

"I don't see why we need to stand by and watch a country go Communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people," said a successor 40 years later, as he allotted \$8 million for his civilized "destabilizing" section.

THE DIFFERENCE, in both style and character, between Henry Stimson, a gentleman of the old school (Yale '88), and Henry Kissinger, an international hardhat of the new school (Harvard '50), shows how far we have progressed in matters of national sophistication since the laughably naive days of 1930.

Poor Stimson, with his funny, antiquated notions, probably thought secretaries of state shouldn't lie to congressional committees, either. No wonder he never won a Nobel Prize.

Fortunately for the nation's survival, Stimson's archaic code of conduct was circumvented successfully, and Uncle Sam's cryptographers eventually cracked the Japanese Purple Code. This gave our leaders advance warning of the 1941 sneak attack plans, enabling them to disperse the fleet at Pearl Harbor, as we all remember.

THAT FAILURE to profit from a hot espionage tip might be interpreted as demonstrating simply that gentlemen don't know what to do with information they get when they do read other people's mail. But the record shows that this same lack of appreciation held true for non-gentlemen as well: Stalin ignored the precise warning of the Nazi invasion provided by his master spy, Richard Sorge, and three years later Hitler ignored similarly authentic information on D-Day supplied by HIS super-snoop, Cicero.

All of which raised the question in the espionage community: Why should we stand by and watch our agents' good work go to waste due to the stupidity of our leaders?

The answer was obvious — we shouldn't — and the remedy was simple: Take the uncertainty out of spying by turning mere intelligence gatherers into self-fulfilling prophets.

THUS WAS BORN the activist spook, whose wondrous enthusiasm has applied blowtorches to the postwar world's tinderboxes from Latin America to the Middle East and beyond.

Is there a government in danger of toppling? Washington demands to know, so the enterprising CIA eliminates guesswork by financing the overthrow. Given time and a big enough budget, there's hardly an intelligence estimate in all of Langley that can't be made to come true.

The fact that irresponsible people, in the Kissingerian sense, always seem to wind up under a repressive, corrupt dictator after the CIA gets through is something only tedious, moralizing bleeding hearts need to worry about: The response to such carping was provided by President Ford at his press conference: A) We do it for their own good, and B) the dirty Communists spend even more on destabilization than we do.

IF A JUNTA loses control and war breaks out or a decent man is assassinated, the squeamish should console themselves with the aphorism popularized by Robespierre and cited with approval by every social tinkerer since: "You can't make an omelet without cracking eggs."

And they should forget, as Robespierre did, that when you crack eggs you don't always get an omelet; sometimes you just get egg on your face.



WASHINGTON STAR  
20 September 1974

# Ford Support Seen for Reform Of CIA Controls

By Jeremiah O'Leary  
Star-News Staff Writer

A perceptibly growing ground swell, reportedly including President Ford, is developing to overhaul existing procedures by which the Central Intelligence Agency is held accountable to the legislative branch for the way it operates.

This zeal for making the CIA more accountable to Congress may be more apparent than substantive but recent revelations about the agency's operations in Chile have aroused more interest than any of its activities since the Bay of Pigs more than 13 years ago.

## Analysis

It was Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, presiding officer of the "40 Committee" at the National Security Council which in turn has the final word on all CIA cover operations, who revealed yesterday that Ford is ready for some kind of change in espionage-intelligence operations.

Kissinger told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that Ford had told congressional leaders the administration is ready to work out procedures with Congress for accountability of the CIA.

Sen. Stuart Symington, D-Mo., who often sits in on CIA briefings and hearings as a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, announced yesterday that he hoped the President and Kissinger will support efforts in Congress to review existing procedures under which the CIA operates; vitalize and broaden the oversight committees of the Congress and obtain broader access for members of Congress to the product of the CIA so their deliberations may be better informed.

"A QUICK cosmetic fix will not suffice but will lead the continued erosion of the confidence in and effectiveness of the agency," Symington said.

"The Congress and past presidents are to blame, not the personnel of the agency," Symington said.

Sen. Frank Church, D-Idaho, told reporters, "The so-called watchdog committee had never really watched

the dog.

Sen. J. William Fulbright, D-Ark., chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, and others support a recurrent proposal to create a joint committee of the Senate and House to oversee all espionage and intelligence activities. At present, the overseeing of the CIA is best described as ad hoc, since only a handful of senior members of the Senate and House Appropriations and Armed Services Committee handle this chore.

It is generally conceded that even these legislators get only limited accounts of what the CIA is doing and more often than not it is well after the fact. As Church said, "We don't even have a way of knowing how much money CIA spends, let alone what for." The CIA budget is concealed among other departmental budgets.

It was the \$11 million CIA operation in Chile against Marxist politician Salvador Allende that set off the current wave of demands for reform. The instrument of disclosure was a letter written by Rep. Michael J. Harrington, D-Mass., after he had been allowed to scrutinize, but not take notes from, some of the testimony of Colby before the Nedzi subcommittee. This testimony was given long after the CIA operation in Chile allegedly had been terminated.

The Colby testimony was at such wide variance from testimony of State Department and CIA officials at other hearings on Chile that the staff of Church's multinational corporations subcommittee demanded perjury and contempt action against some witnesses and the recall of Kissinger for more testimony on his confirmation.

Fulbright and the majority of the Foreign Relations Committee this week acted to take charge of this matter themselves and will hold hearings on the Chile incident after a staff investigation has been completed. The intensity with which Church tried to interrogate Kissinger yesterday was interrupted several times by Fulbright who told his colleague to wait until the investigation is complete.

CHURCH CALLS the CIA action in Chile "unfettered intervention." He said that in the past influential senators have not wanted to know what CIA was doing but said he believed that feeling has disappeared in the wake of Vietnam and Chile.

The New York Times reported that most of the money authorized for the CIA activities in Chile was used in 1972 and 1973 to provide strike benefits and other means of support for anti-Allende strikers and workers.

The wave of notoriety about the CIA actions against a controversial but democratically elected president such as Allende in a friendly neighbor state brought Ford into the situation yesterday. When he and Kissinger called congressional leaders to the White House in the morning for a foreign policy meeting, Ford volunteered to try to work out some new and better procedure.

A veteran CIA agent, contacted separately about the Chile affair, commented merely, "We can't conduct our business in a goldfish bowl."

WASHINGTON POST  
20 Sept. 1974

**Hamill D. Jones**

## Retired Officer With CIA

Hamill D. Jones, 58, a retired intelligence officer with the Central Intelligence Agency, died Wednesday after a heart attack at Arlington Hospital.

Born in Monterey, Va., he was a graduate of Randolph-Macon College and the University of Richmond law school.

After serving with the Army in North Africa in World War II, Mr. Jones was associated with the Army Security Agency.

He joined the CIA in 1953 and held a number of posi-

tions, including assignment in the office of the inspector general before retirement in 1971.

Mr. Jones was a member of the Virginia Bar, the Country Club of Fairfax and Trinity Presbyterian Church in Arlington.

He is survived by his wife, Elizabeth, of the home, 2429 Claremont Dr., Falls Church; a son, Hamill D. Jr., of Richmond; a brother, Turner, of Monterey, and a sister, Mrs. Harry Patterson, of Lancaster, Va.

THE ECONOMIST SEPTEMBER 14, 1974

NEW YORK TIMES, SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 21, 1974

## Fingers in the Chile pie

Washington, DC

There seems, after all, to have been fire behind the smoke of rumours that the Central Intelligence Agency was involved in the overthrow of the late Chilean President, Salvador Allende. Earlier this year Representative Michael Harrington of Massachusetts was allowed to peruse, but not to take notes on, testimony given by the CIA director, Mr William Colby, on April 22nd before the Armed Services subcommittee on intelligence of the House of Representatives. What he read about the CIA's activities in Chile so appalled him that he has been pestering committee chairmen all summer for further inquiry into the matter. Mr Harrington's recollections of the Colby testimony came to light when the New York Times acquired a copy of a letter from Mr Harrington to the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, on which Mr Harrington sits.

According to the Harrington letter, Mr Colby testified that the CIA funnelled some \$11m into Chile to aid anti-Allende forces there. With the aim of preventing Sr Allende's election in 1964, \$3m was poured into the Christian Democratic party, whose candidate, Sr Eduardo Frei, in fact defeated Sr Allende; in 1970 \$500,000 went to anti-Allende groups before the presidential election; after the election, but before the Chilean congress decided between Sr Allende and the opposition candidate, another \$350,000 was spent on bribing Chilean congressmen. After Sr Allende was chosen, the CIA then switched, according to Mr Colby's reported testimony, to a plan of "destabilisation" or making the country ungovernable for the marxist president. To this end, \$5m were spent during the first three years of the Allende administration, and a further \$1.5m in the 1973 municipal elections.

The whole affair was, according to Mr Colby's reported testimony, a test case of whether a government could be brought down with well-placed amounts of cash. There was a public side to the exercise too. Development banks and American commercial banks applied a drastic credit and aid squeeze to the ailing Chilean economy.

Chilean reaction to these allegations has so far been placid. Many Chileans have long taken it for granted that this sort of thing goes on; and the present military regime is the presumed beneficiary of anything the CIA might have done. The Chilean ambassador to Washington remarked on Tuesday that intelligence services were necessary things, but that reports that the CIA was linked to the Chilean military government were an affront to his country. No activity of the CIA, he said, could compare with the help Cuban intelligence gave to Allende.

Has the Administration deliberately misled Congress and the public? Over the last year officials have issued a

## C.I.A. Briefings Said to Omit Data

By SEYMOUR M. HERSH

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 20 — Secretary of State Kissinger did not mention any Central Intelligence Agency involvement with labor unions and trade groups in Chile when he briefed Congressional leaders and the Ford Cabinet in separate meetings this week, reliable Administration and Congressional sources said today.

The sources said that Mr. Kissinger defended the C.I.A.'s clandestine operations in Chile during the regular Tuesday morning Cabinet meeting. According to one source with firsthand knowledge, he declared, "All we did was support newspapers and political opponents of Allende who were under siege."

A similar description of the C.I.A.'s role was given by President Ford at his news conference Monday and again by Mr. Kissinger in testimony yesterday before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

The New York Times reported today that the C.I.A. secretly financed striking labor unions and trade groups for more than 18 months before the government of Chilean President Salvador Allende Gossens was overthrown last September.

### Support for Strikers

More than half of the \$8-million authorized for covert C.I.A. operations during the three-year Government of President Allende was used to provide strike benefits and other support for striking middle-class workers. The Times's sources said.

In the Cabinet meeting, according to an Administration source, Mr. Kissinger gave as examples of the type of clandestine activities underwritten by the C.I.A. the granting of direct aid to a supposedly threatened newspaper and to anti-Allende politicians.

The source said that some Cabinet member noted at the time that Mr. Kissinger was

telling them, in effect, "here's the kind of thing we did" and did not fully reveal what actually had been undertaken by the C.I.A.

At no time during the meeting, the source said, did Mr. Kissinger mention the financing of labor unions or trade groups.

The Secretary of State also told the Cabinet members, the source said, that the C.I.A.'s total investment in Chile since 1964 — some \$11-million — was "marginal."

### Kissinger's Role

Mr. Kissinger served as Presidential Nixon's adviser on national security when the initial decisions about Chile's future were made in 1969 and 1970 and also was chairman of the 40 Committee, a high-level intelligence panel that oversees and authorizes clandestine C.I.A. activity.

During classified testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in September, 1973, shortly after the coup that overthrew the Allende Government, Mr. Kissinger did not mention any C.I.A. involvement with unions and trade groups. He depicted the C.I.A.'s role in Chile as "very minor" and said the efforts there were aimed at strengthening the "democratic political parties."

Congressional sources, in separate interviews, similarly said that there had been no mention of any C.I.A. involvement with labor or trade groups during a 90-minute briefing yesterday by Mr. Kissinger and President Ford for nine legislators at the White House.

One source said that two of the Congressmen present, Representatives F. Edward Hébert, Democrat of Louisiana, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, and William G. Bray, Republican of Indiana, a member of the Armed Services Intelligence Subcommittee, both expressed considerable concern over the leak of classified information that led to the newspaper revelations

two weeks ago of the C.I.A.'s involvement in Chile.

A number of senior House and Senate members are known to be angry at Representative Michael J. Harrington, Democrat of Massachusetts, who was permitted to read top-secret testimony on the C.I.A. activities three months ago and later wrote a confidential letter, based on that testimony, to the Chairman of the committee. A copy of Mr. Harrington's letter, supplied by an outside source, was made available to The New York Times three weeks ago.

The White House intelligence briefing also produced a public conflict over its scope. The White House spokesman, John W. Hushen, told newsmen afterward that the meeting included a "full and frank discussion of the full range of C.I.A. activities."

But House Speaker Carl Albert, who also attended the session, reported that "what the President and Secretary of State said was essentially what the President said at this news conference."

"There was some additional detail, but the story was there," he added.

The House Democratic leader, Thomas P. O'Neill Jr. of Massachusetts, also told newsmen after the briefing that the remarks of President Ford and Mr. Kissinger had generally been limited to a justification of C.I.A.'s activities in Chile previously disclosed. Before the session, White House officials had said the Congressmen would get a full review of the C.I.A. overseas operations.

spate of denials that the CIA had any role in Allende's overthrow. These denials were mostly confined to the actual coup of 1973; thus, Mr Kissinger told Congress last year that "the CIA had nothing to do with the coup, to the best of my knowledge and belief". This may be strictly true but artful nonetheless. The State Department spokesman went out of his way on Monday to point out that Mr Kissinger presides over the committee that approves intelligence plans and that decisions of that committee are generally unanimous. One or two officials, including Mr Edward Korry, the former

American ambassador to Santiago, have made sweeping denials to congressional committees of any CIA involvement.

The House subcommittee that originally took Mr Colby's testimony did a thorough job of investigating the misuse of the CIA by the Nixon White House. But when it comes to looking at possible failings of the CIA itself, the armed services committees in both houses of Congress have shown themselves less than vigilant over the years. Mr Harrington's request for a further investigation into the Chilean affair will probably have to be met by some other committee.

LOS ANGELES TIMES  
22 September 1974

## Peru Cautious in Condemning CIA Activities

BY DON SHANNON  
Times Staff Writer

**UNITED NATIONS** — The foreign minister of Peru's leftist junta government has said that CIA interference in the politics of foreign countries should be condemned but he cautioned that he had no proof of such activities.

Miguel Angel de la Flor Valle appeared almost protective towards Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger in the current congressional controversy over the alleged intervention of the intelligence agency in Chile, Peru's southern neighbor. He told newsmen repeatedly Friday that he had seen only newspaper reports of such CIA activities.

The foreign minister said if the report proved

true, such action would be "condemnable" and would harm relations between Peru and the United States. He added that should the press reports be confirmed, however, it might "clarify the problem once and for all so that such activities would end once and for all."

De la Flor firmly dissociated Kissinger's possible connection with espionage from the "new dialogue" the secretary of state began with the Latin American states last year. He spoke with enthusiasm of the intercontinental meetings which started in Mexico and have continued elsewhere, and of another ministerial conference scheduled for Buenos Aires in November at which Cuba will be present along with all other

Latin states.

"Our interest is that these meetings will lead to greater cooperation of the American states, particularly with regard to economic development," he said.

He said his government is committed to carrying out the revolution begun six years ago to "replace an antiquarian society with a new one based on equality and social justice." The foreign minister said Peru has been attacked—especially for its July takeover of five major newspapers—but he invited any doubters to "come and see that we have freedom."

De la Flor declined to comment on President Ford's linking of oil and food supplies in a speech to the General Assembly

Wednesday. Peru is not yet an oil exporting country but will become one on completion by a U.S.-Japanese consortium of a 540-mile pipeline from its Amazon territory to the Pacific Coast.

Asked about harassment of California importers of Peruvian fish, De la Flor said he was unaware of any difficulties. He recalled that the traditional exports of fish and fish meal to the United States declined drastically when anchovies almost disappeared from Peruvian waters several years ago. Now that the fish have returned, he said, the industry is reviving.

The declining anchovy catch was used by Peru as one of the reasons for extending its claimed territorial waters 200 miles from the coast.

NEW YORK DAILY NEWS  
22 Sept. 1974

### CHILE AND THE CIA

Our Central Intelligence Agency suddenly finds itself the focus of the kind of limelight public attention that no outfit engaged in the espionage business seeks or welcomes.



Sen. Church

President Gerald R. Ford did a lot to put the CIA in this uncomfortable spot. In a moment of excessive candor, he admitted that it had given money to democratic parties and media outlets in Chile. At the time, they were threatened with extinction by Chile's late Marxist president, Salvador Allende. Mr. Ford went on to defend such "intervention" where it served our national interest.

Those remarks stirred up quite a commotion, some of it prompted by genuine concern

over letting the CIA mix in the internal politics of other nations. But there was a considerable amount of sheer hypocrisy in the outcry, too.

Sen. Frank Church (D-Ida.) indulged in a hand-wringing, garment-renting, pity-our-poor-country orgy of denunciation.

But Sen. Church has been around long enough to know that the CIA has been involved in what it delicately calls "covert operations" since its establishment.

Such phony grandstanding aside, the dust raised by the Chile affair caused President Ford to call in nine Congressional leaders to discuss whether—

### CLANDESTINE ACTIVITIES

—should be continued and, if so, under what ground rules. All parties were mum about how the talks went.

In our view, the United States would be most unwise to renounce entirely the use of undercover political tactics. It is admittedly an unsavory business that runs contrary to much in our heritage and traditions.

We must face the reality that in these times aggression is not always heralded by clanking tanks and marching armies; it advances on the little cat feet of subversion.

Lacking a capacity to counter this type of stealthy conquest, we would have to choose between two equally unappealing alternatives: permit it to press ahead unchecked, or meet it with open force.

Covert operations should not be undertaken, however, unless it is imperative to do so, and then only under strictest supervision.

There is some merit to claims by lawmakers that they are entitled to know more than they are now being told about the details of CIA projects.

Better advance briefing may be called for. But if Congress asks and expects fuller information and greater trust from security agencies, it will have to demonstrate its ability to deal responsibly with confidential matters.

Intelligence is vital to our security, and secrecy is essential to effective intelligence work. The more people who have to be told about plans and operations, the greater the risk of leaks.

It would be tragic if the flap over Chile resulted in rules that forced the CIA to work in a fishbowl, so exposed to public view that it could not possibly carry out its assigned mission.

WASHINGTON POST  
22 September 1974

Michael J. Harrington

# Democracy and Secret Operations

*We are not going to run the kind of intelligence service that other countries run. We are going to run one in the American society and the American Constitutional structure . . .*

—CIA Director William Colby,  
July 2, 1973

Less than two months after Mr. Colby made that pledge to the senators who were to confirm his nomination as director of the Central Intelligence Agency, he, along with the other members of a secret committee chaired by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, authorized the expenditure of \$1 million to help destabilize the duly elected government of Chilean President Salvador Allende. The actual expenditure was made unnecessary by the violent military overthrow, less than a month later, of the Allende government. But even though no U. S. assistance was provided for the specific purpose of the coup, funding over \$8,000,000 had been secretly authorized by the United States since 1969 to help ensure that result.

The question rather starkly posed by the revelation of secret and deep involvement of the United States in efforts to bring down the Allende government comes to this: What type of international behavior is consistent with the principles of a democratic society, and what are its leaders' obligations to keep its citizens informed. Secret CIA operations abroad, if they are to remain covert, presumably cannot be publicly announced. But at what price — measured in the loss of integrity of our democratic process and its officials — do we preserve that secrecy? And to what end do we exercise our power covertly? These are the issues that must be explored in the context of the current furor over our current Chile policy and not brushed aside by sweeping references to "national security" and the "national interest."

Taking the Chilean intervention on its own terms, it surely must be seen as an utter failure. President Ford argues that we acted to help preserve the free media and opposition political parties in Chile. Such an analysis does not even begin to explain why \$3,000,000 was authorized to defeat Allende six years before he became President. Setting aside for the moment that question, as well as how \$350,000 in bribes to members of the Chilean Congress to reverse the results of a popular election could fulfill those goals, let us see what the United States received for its investment. A military junta now rules Chile for the foreseeable future under a "state of seige" declaration, which has resulted in the suspension of all political parties, the indefinite adjournment of the Congress, the usurpation of the power of the civilian courts, and the censorship of all news media. The response of the Nixon administration, which authorized the initial anti-Allende expenditures, was to request a \$65,000,000 increase in military and economic aid for the new government.

This is not to argue that our policies in Chile would have been justified if

*The writer, a Democrat, is a U.S. Representative from Massachusetts' 6th District.*

they had succeeded. Rather, the facts indicate that our real motive lay elsewhere. Perhaps, as Mr. Kissinger has reliably reported to have said at the time, "I don't see why we need standby and watch a country go Communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people."

Rightly or wrongly it seems evident that former President Nixon and Mr. Kissinger ordered covert action against the Allende government because they feared Chile would "go Communist." In light of that administration's opening of relations with China and search for detente with the Soviet Union, such a policy goal is clearly anomalous. In Chile during the 1970s, we were pursuing already discredited dogmas of the 1950s and 1960s.

Our real concern now ought to be why this happened. The answer will not be found in a runaway band of cloak and dagger sleuths on the CIA payroll who got out of control in Chile. President Ford himself stressed that the decisions on Chile were made in

*"The values of our domestic political structure are being severely challenged by the continuation of covert operations abroad."*

the White House, in meetings with senior representatives of the CIA, the State Department, the Defense Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and chaired by the President's national security adviser. All decisions by this body, known as the 40 Committee, must be approved by the President before implementation, a State Department spokesman recently observed.

During the course of its deliberations on Chile, the resolve of this body to intervene in Chile was apparently unmovable by some of the more tumultuous domestic political events of this century: a Senate committee publicly investigated the role of the CIA and the International Telephone and Telegraph Company in attempts to prevent the election of Allende in 1970 amid a national outcry over the impropriety of such plan; the investigation by the Senate Watergate Committee of illegal use of the CIA in the Watergate affair and related activities of the "plumbers"; strong congressional and public criticism of a secret policy to bomb the Cambodian people while the President was proclaiming our "neutrality" in that conflict. Perhaps, in the haughty atmosphere of the Nixon White House, the message never got through. But it is now time to make exclusive the obvious implication

of these events: The American people will no longer stand for secret U.S. interference in the affairs of other nations nor the official lies and deceptions that invariably accompany those policies. We must end the CIA coverup, just as we pierced the secrecy of the Watergate coverup, and remind those involved that such activities are at odds with the fundamental premises on which this nation's government was based.

In an era in which our avowed aim is to seek reconciliation and cooperation with other nations, regardless of their ideology, no useful purpose can be served by perpetuating a policy of covert intrusion in the internal affairs of others. Secret decisions to influence foreign elections, financially support foreign candidates or political parties, provide arms to local political groups, or disrupt foreign governments will easily undermine the well-intentioned public efforts of this country to further world peace.

Just as significantly the values of our domestic political structure are being severely challenged by the continuation of covert operations abroad. The system of CIA secrecy forces officials to mislead the Congress and the American people. The system prevents any effective review of important foreign policy decisions by anyone outside of a select club of covert decision-makers—and overly deferential legislators. The system invariably involves American power on the side of political corruption, international instability and interference with the principles of self-determination. We can no longer measure our conduct by that of our supposed rivals but by the standards we have set for ourselves as a nation. When covert activities abroad result in a serious threat to those standards—as they have in the case of our Chile policy—then the policy of covert activities must yield. I seriously question how long we can maintain a free society under the pressure that CIA covert operations exert on the principles of democracy in government truthfulness essential to such a society. CIA Director Colby himself recognized the need to operate his agency within the limits imposed by our constitutional structure. It is time once again to bring the governmental power of this nation within those limits.

The role of the CIA in foreign policy, as authorized by the highest officials of the executive branch, must be fully and openly re-examined. The fiction that Congress exercises any real control and scrutiny over CIA activities must be dispelled and the existing mechanisms replaced by an effective congressional review structure, consistent with the democratic process. The arbitrary exclusion of CIA oversight from the normal foreign policy deliberations in Congress must be ended. More fundamentally, the future direction of intelligence policy must be wrested from the exclusive and secret control of special interests in both the executive branch and in Congress and forced to face the more demanding test of free and open debate that our system of government requires.

WASHINGTON POST  
22 September 1974

## The CIA: Security and Oversight

**Q.** Mr. President, recent congressional testimony has indicated that the CIA, under the direction of a committee headed by Dr. Kissinger, attempted to destabilize the government of Chile under former President Allende. Is it the policy of your administration to attempt to destabilize the governments of other democracies?

**A.** ... Our government, like other governments, does take certain actions in the intelligence field to help implement foreign policy and to protect national security. I am informed reliably that Communist nations spend vastly more money than we do for the same kind of purposes.

*In a period of time three or four years ago there was an effort being made by the Allende government to destroy opposition news media—both the writing press as well as the electronic press—and to destroy opposition political parties. And the effort that was made in this case was to help and assist the preservation of opposition newspapers and electronic media and to preserve opposition political parties. I think this is in the best interests of the people in Chile and certainly in our best interest.*

THUS, PRESIDENT FORD put on the public record, apparently for the first time, a presidential acknowledgement of American complicity in the overthrow of a foreign government. The President claimed that the United States had no role in "the coup itself," which is double-talk, if not actually duplicitous, in light of the American support given to the late President Allende's opponents in the months and years leading up to the coup. His assertion that the Allende government was trying to "destroy" opposition news media and political parties may be true. But it hardly serves as an argument in favor of what the CIA did when you consider that neither the political opposition nor the media were in fact silenced by Allende but have been in fact wiped out by the American-backed military government that ousted him. By his acknowledgement of CIA complicity in Chile, however, and by his general defense of subversion as a continuing instrument of "foreign policy" and "national security," President Ford has joined a major and overdue debate.

Is subversion a necessary element in American foreign policy? This is the right question. The example of Chile provides powerful reasons for saying, No. There, in response to what must be considered at best fuzzy anxieties about the leftist proclivities of the Allende government, the United States, however marginally, helped topple a democracy and install a dictatorship. To say, with Mr. Ford, that this was "in the best interest of the people in Chile," is mindless and arrogant. Before the President got around to acknowledging a CIA role, moreover, the agency's machinations had involved American officials in a sorry sequence of lies and deceptions in their dealings with inquiring legislators on Capitol Hill. The mocking of American values and institutions is a very large price to pay for a policy whose benefits in real political terms are very difficult to perceive, let alone to defend.

In short, the Chilean example proves as well as any the point of those who contend that the conduct of "dirty tricks" can be corrupting and harmful to the vital interests of the United States. Does this mean, however, that we should never resort to any kind of covert subversive activity in pursuit of American foreign policy objectives under any circumstances? The answer is not that subversion is necessary because, as Mr. Ford put it, "other governments" do it—although this is not an irrelevant consideration. If you accept as a fact, and we do, that the United States has world interests that are threatened by extensive covert activities conducted by a self-proclaimed adversary, the Soviet Union, then

it does seem to us there may be circumstances when these interests, both strategic and economic, can be most effectively served by methods which, in the words of CIA Director William Colby, offer an alternative "between a diplomatic protest and sending in the Marines." If this country did not have such interests, or if it were willing to accept the consequences of having others make the crucial determinations on them, that would be one thing. But that is not the case.

Suppose, just to take one hypothetical example, that the oil policies of Upper Araby, or whatever, had brought the United States to the brink of a disastrous economic collapse. We are not so sure that in a life-and-death matter of this sort American devotion to nonintervention and the diplomatic niceties should be so absolute as to preclude taking extreme and necessarily covert measures to protect vital American interests.

Precisely here is where we must take issue with Rep. Michael Harrington (D-Mass.), whose article is printed on this page today, and with others who believe that the answer to this question lies in expanding congressional "oversight" over the CIA. This stands the issue on its head. If you are to conduct a foreign policy leaving open the option of covert operations, then you cannot avoid doing a certain damage—variously estimated—to the domestic process. To conduct prior public review of secret acts is simply impossible. Nor is it possible to conduct public post mortems on covert operations once they are held. The attempt to apply regular democratic procedures to dirty tricks can only produce the evasions, deceptions and embarrassments which we have seen in full measure in recent days.

No doubt it is feasible to improve oversight so as to better insure that operations are undertaken only in the most extreme cases and in the wisest possible ways. But as long as Congress condones a foreign policy served by secret deeds and delegates the oversight of these operations to a handful of members, it cannot groan when one goes sour and work off its chagrin in extremely damaging public examination of secret and sensitive operations, no matter how misguided these operations may have been or how badly they may have misfired. The solution for mistakes of this sort is not to be found in high-minded appeals for more intensive "oversight" for the current mode of oversight does not reflect congressional inattention. On the contrary, it derives from a considered—if publicly unacknowledged—judgment that there is no democratic way for a democracy to manage covert activities. No effort to improve oversight can ignore this fact of life.

WASHINGTON POST  
22 September 1974

# Abourezk Fights to End Aid to Foreign Police

By Jack Nelson  
Los Angeles Times

Shortly after taking office as South Dakota's junior senator in January, 1973, James Abourezk was visited by a secretive stranger who refused to give his name to the senator's secretary.

The visitor spilled out what the senator later described as "horrible stories" of police abuse of political prisoners in Brazil.

"He was a Brazilian and he identified himself to me," Abourezk told a reporter recently. "But I cannot name him because he would almost certainly be killed."

Among other things, the Brazilian said that U.S. aid in the training of Brazilian police had caused despair among dissenters who had been jailed for political reasons.

"This was a morally crushing thing for dissenters," Abourezk said, "and he told me it might give the political prisoners some hope if someone in the Senate would speak out against the aid."

Since the Brazilian's visit,

Abourezk, a 43-year-old Democrat, has led a bipartisan fight to abolish all U.S. aid for the training of foreign police.

He recently pushed through the Senate Foreign Relations Committee an amendment to the 1974 Foreign Assistance Act that would prohibit further disbursement of federal funds for training of foreign police officers at the International Police Academy in Washington.

The academy, which has trained police officers from 77 countries, operates under the public safety office of the Agency for International Development.

The program was started in the Kennedy administration to assist Central and South American countries in combating urban guerrilla action directed from Cuba. One of its most notable successes was in Venezuela in 1963 when guerrilla forces threatened to shoot a Caracas policeman every day.

The police academy pro-

vided weapons and training which enabled the Caracas police force to defeat the guerrillas and the following year Venezuela was able to conduct national elections which the guerrillas had threatened to disrupt.

Abourezk's amendment, which is opposed by law enforcement agencies, will be debated on the Senate floor within the next week or so when the Senate takes up the Foreign Assistance Act.

If the Senate passes his amendment, as approved by the committee, it will mean the end of the academy, but not necessarily the end of U.S. aid to foreign police forces.

Abourezk points out that a passage deleted from his original amendment by the committee because of an objection by the Central Intelligence Agency leaves a loophole under which funds not covered by the Foreign Assistance Act could be used to continue such training. Abourezk's original amendment would have prohibited the use of funds made available under the act "or any other law" for

training of foreign police officers.

The Foreign Relations committee deleted the phrase "or any other law" after CIA Director William E. Colby, in a letter to committee Chairman J. W. Fulbright (D-Ark.), objected to that phrase specifically and said that the amendment generally would have an adverse impact "on the Central Intelligence Agency's relationships with foreign intelligence and internal security services."

Abourezk said that, although the deletion of references to "any other law" leaves a loophole he fears the CIA will use to continue U.S. aid for foreign police forces, he is undecided about whether to try to restore it on the Senate floor and run the risk of jeopardizing the entire amendment.

Abourezk, who has heard nothing from or of his Brazilian informant since the 1973 visit, has charged that AID funds here are being used to "train police for foreign dictatorships, many of whom imprison their own people for political reasons and employ torture."

THE GUARDIAN MANCHESTER  
19 SEPTEMBER 1974

## 007 Ford joins CIA

President Ford has given two reasons — one disingenuous and the other irrelevant — for justifying the subversive activities of the CIA in Chile. Disingenuously, the President suggests the CIA money (about £4 millions) was given to opposition parties and newspapers because they were threatened by Allende's Government. Yet opposition parties and newspapers, having flourished under Allende, have disappeared under the military junta which followed. His second reason is even more lame: that Communist nations do it, so why shouldn't the US?

There are at least three important reasons why the US should have desisted. First, it was illegal. Secondly, it did not make sense. Chile, as Dr Kissinger once said dismissively, is "a dagger pointed at the heart of Antarctica." In relation to the global balance of power the US was pursuing, the country was of no importance. Thirdly, the interference was almost bound eventually to leak out, and cause more harm to the US. The American Ambassador in India has already warned the State Department that the news has confirmed Mrs Gandhi's "worst suspicions and genuine fears" of US foreign policy.

The exercise has exposed the double standards of US foreign policy. The purported reason for attempting to isolate Cuba has been because of Castro's support for subversion overseas. Now the US has been caught in the same act, on a much grander scale, and against a democratically

elected Government. It is one thing to try to impose international credit restrictions on Chile (it can be argued that this too, although legal, was wrong) but quite another to bribe Chilean Congressmen to overthrow the 1970 election returns. Not the least disturbing aspect of the affair has been the State Department denials over the past four years ("plausible denials" as the CIA describes the lies). It will not be so easy next time for the US to deny charges of CIA interference, particularly after President Ford's defence of these policies.

These were not unauthorised CIA activities but had been approved by the White House. Mr Ford should stop, not excuse, such policies. The excesses under Pinochet have surpassed by far anything that occurred under Allende, who had been democratically elected. It is estimated that in one year more than 15,000 people have lost their lives. Many thousands beside have been and are being detained. The press has been tamed, political parties banned, and the judiciary cowed. On the anniversary of the coup, Pinochet offered cynically to release prisoners if the Soviet Union and Cuba did the same. He reduced the "state of internal war" to a "state of siege," although there has been little enough resistance to justify even these measures. No end to this repression is in sight. The General said recently that his regime would remain in power as long as was necessary to achieve its goals "and that could be five, 10 or 20 years."

NEW YORK TIMES  
22 September 1974

# Should the C.I.A. Abandon Dirty Tricks? 'A Legitimate Question', Says Its Boss

By SEYMOUR M. HERSH

WASHINGTON—A former high-level Central Intelligence Agency official, in a recent conversation, said, "There's no question we've gotten into trouble and disrepute in this country and in other countries. But I think history will show that covert action was really a very liberal idea, perhaps even an idealistic concept aimed at the stabilization of pluralism and the diversity of society in Eastern Europe."

He was talking about the good old days.

The enemy, Communism, had not yet begun to buy American wheat, aircraft and computers; "nation building"—the C.I.A.'s clandestine effort to help create and support non-Communist governments—had yet to collapse into a series of military dictatorships; and national security still was a concept in which men like Daniel Ellsberg believed and for which they were willing to go to war.

The mystique is gone and now the C.I.A.'s covert activities, the so-called "dirty tricks" department, are in question. How did it all start and why have Presidents and Congressmen of both parties let it continue?

## The Enemy Was Monolithic

The C.I.A. was formally organized in the cold war days of 1947 and plunged into action during the era of the Berlin Airlift, atom spy trials and the Army-McCarthy hearings. The worldwide enemy was the Russian secret intelligence service, the K.G.B., once described by former C.I.A. director Allen W. Dulles as "more than an intelligence and counter-intelligence organization. It is an instrument for subversion, manipulation and violence, for secret intervention in the affairs of other countries."

For Mr. Dulles, who headed the C.I.A. throughout most of the 1950's, the issue was clear. He told a Senate committee: "We must deal with the problem of conflicting ideologies as democracy faces Communism, not only in the relations between Soviet Russia and the countries of the West but in the internal political conflicts with the countries of Europe, Asia and South America."

What one writer has described as the "false bottom world" of the C.I.A. was created in the late 1940's and 1950's. Secret Congressional authorizations led to secret arms caches and operational bases throughout Europe and Asia; hundreds of operatives—perhaps thousands—were recruited and trained, provided with new identities and turned out "into the cold"; dozens of C.I.A.-controlled corporations ranging from airlines to press syndicates were boldly put into action.

Only a few of the C.I.A.'s overseas operations in the past 25 years are known, but such activities have been instrumental in the failure and success of governments and politicians throughout the world. When former C.I.A. agent E. Howard Hunt was asked during the White House "Plumbers" trial this June what he had done during his 20-year career, he replied jauntily, "Oh, subversion of prominent figures abroad, the overthrow of governments, that sort of thing."

A partial list of covert operations, as described by private but informed sources and in such thoroughly documented works as "The Invisible Government," the first C.I.A. exposé written by journalists David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, include the following:

◦ In 1949, the C.I.A. supported more than 10,000 Nationalist Chinese troops who fled to Burma after the People Republic of China was established. The Nationalist Chinese troops, with C.I.A. financing,

eventually became heavily involved in the opium trade.

◦ Earlier, there had been a joint paramilitary operation with British intelligence in Albania in which hundreds of agents were parachuted into that country in hopes of triggering a revolution. The mission failed.

◦ In the 1950's, the agency provided support for Philippine Defense Minister and later President Ramon Magsaysay's campaigns against the Communist Huk guerrillas. A main figure in that successful operation was Edward Lansdale, who, operating undercover as an Air Force colonel, later emerged as an important C.I.A. operative in the early days of the Vietnam war.

◦ In a major success in 1953, the C.I.A. organized a coup d'état that overthrew the government of Premier Mohammed Mossadegh, who had nationalized the Iranian oil industry, and thus kept the Shah of Iran in power. A direct result of that overthrow was the first negotiated contract between Iran and American oil companies that gave the U.S. firms a 40 per cent share of the agreement.

◦ A year later, the agency helped overthrow the Communist-dominated government in Guatemala of Jacobo Arbenz Guzman. President Eisenhower later confirmed that he had approved the United States' role.

◦ In 1958, the C.I.A. utilized a secret air force of B-26 bombers to support rebels attempting to overthrow Indonesian President Sukarno. President Eisenhower insisted American policy was "careful neutrality" towards Indonesia, and said an American C.I.A. pilot who had been shot down and captured during the invasion was a "soldier of fortune."

◦ In the Congo, the C.I.A. financed Cuban exile pilots and another fleet of B-26 bombers to suppress a revolt against the central Congolese government. The agency eventually sided with Joseph Mobutu, who became president.

◦ In the early 1960's, the agency was reportedly heavily active in Ecuador in another as yet undisclosed clandestine operation. In a book to be published later this year in London, former C.I.A.

official Philip B.F. Agee alleges that he and five other agents were able to obtain political and economic control over Ecuador's labor movement, a step that eventually led to the overthrow of a non-Communist civilian government by a military dictatorship. "It was a tribute to what a six-man station can do," Mr. Agee wrote of the efforts of his group. "In the end, they owned almost everybody who was anybody."

◦ In 1967, a team of C.I.A. agents was sent to Bolivia to help track down Ernest "Che" Guevara, former aide to Fidel Castro, who was leading Bolivia's guerrilla movement. After Mr. Guevara was captured and killed, a Bolivian cabinet officer announced that he had been on the payroll of the C.I.A. for two years and subsequently released Guevara's diary.

Finally, there is Chile, where the full story of C.I.A. involvement is only now being learned.

These are hard days for the men who run the C.I.A. In recent public statements, there has been repeated emphasis on the agency's other important missions—the typical collection and academic analysis and interpretation of raw intelligence data. But that function has never been in serious dispute;

many C.I.A. officials were privately pleased with the publication of the Pentagon Papers in 1971 because the agency's skeptical reports throughout the 1960's from Vietnam were shown to be by far the most accurate and reliable of any of those being made.

What is very much in dispute for at least a number of Senators and Congressmen is the need for clandestine operations based on a psychology and rationale that they consider an immoral and dangerous anachronism. In place of monolithic Communism, the C.I.A. is now met with fierce nationalism, the same nationalism that has been a factor in the *détentes* so carefully being worked out by the world's big powers.

The C.I.A.'s clandestine operations reportedly still involve more than one-third of the agency's 16,500 employes and more than half of its \$750-million annual budget. That expenditure of men and money seems paradoxical in view of the recent—and remarkable—admission by the C.I.A.'s highest official that national security would not be jeopardized if

all clandestine activities were cancelled overnight.

In a speech 10 days ago, William E. Colby, a long-time clandestine service operative who was appointed C.I.A. director last year, declared: "It is advocated by some that the United States abandon covert action. This is a legitimate question, and in light of current American policy, as I have indicated, it would not have a major impact on our current activities or the current security of the United States."

Mr. Colby argued, nonetheless, that he could "envisage situations in which the United States might well need to conduct covert action in the face of some new threat that developed in the world."

For many C.I.A. officials, past and present, however, the only important and visible new threat is the one facing the agency on Capitol Hill. And there are a few who believe that unless the intelligence service begins its own house-cleaning, the Congress will — as one former high-level C.I.A. man said — "throw out the baby (intelligence) with the bath water (clandestine operations)."

LONDON TIMES  
23 September 1974

## DR KISSINGER UNDER FIRE

It is not easy to disentangle the crossed threads in Washington that have caught Dr Kissinger and exposed him to criticism. Inevitably President Ford's accession has made his position less secure in the eyes of his critics, some of them outright opponents of his policy of *détente* with both the Soviet Union and China, while others are critical more of his personality and manner than of his policies. On top of this have come revelations about the CIA's role in Chile that found Dr Kissinger ill-prepared in his defence, inviting in some of his comments a much more fierce attack from the left than he has had to face since he began proclaiming the virtues and the necessity of *détente* in Moscow and Peking. He has lately seemed to be under attack from all sides.

In his answers to questions about the CIA's effort to prevent the election of Dr Allende in 1970 and to "destabilize" him after his election, Dr Kissinger agreed that there was a case for abandoning such operations in view of the present United States policy of *détente*. Yet in 1970 the policy of *détente* was actively being pursued by President Nixon in partnership with Dr Kissinger. The opening to China was the subject of secret exchanges. The rift between China and the Soviet Union had reached its nadir in 1969 following the Soviet assault on Czechoslovakia in the previous year. If *détente* with both of the major communist powers was actively in train then under Dr Kissinger's direction, was not Dr Allende a somewhat peripheral figure, scarcely calling for the effort made to prevent his election and then to make things difficult for him?

Part of the explanation is that Chile is in a different continent. Nor does one have to go back

to the Monroe doctrine to throw light on the American political concern over events in South America; the emergence of Dr Castro's government, hurling abuse at Washington after 1960 and threatening worse with Mr Khrushchev's aid in 1962, had been quite enough to alert American anxiety. The momentum that began then was quite enough to outlast any change of policy based upon a revised reading of communist power elsewhere in the world. In Guyana the CIA had a hand in foiling Dr Cheddi Jagan's hopes of election in 1966. According to Dr Kissinger it was feared that Dr Allende's success could be followed by communist regimes in Argentina, Brazil and Peru.

Yet a natural American concern over Latin America does not go far to justify American action when Marxists such as Jagan and Allende were standing in ordinary democratic elections. The past three decades have seen the Latin American political pendulum swinging between democratic and military regimes. Not all the democratic ones have been good, not all the military ones bad; but when one recalls the moral fervour with which Dulles fought the cold war one should expect the American bias to be on the side of democracy. Of course global power will tend to discard such restraints. There was, said one witness in Washington, "nothing between diplomatic protest and sending in the marines". Such seemed to be British alternatives at the time of Suez, but few in Britain would like to think that they have been revised since 1956 only because our strength is less.

Of course there is no straight line down the middle in these matters. All that happens is that over a period of time rules come to be tacitly accepted. It was the

assumption of the cold war in its worst days that communist and anti-communist camps were each feverishly trying to bring about changes of regime wherever they could. It took a long time—and some years of worsening relations between China and the Soviet Union—before this assumption began to be revised. Unfortunately the policy of *détente* followed in the partnership of President Nixon and Dr Kissinger had not been a sufficient leaven in American policy to affect Dr Allende in 1970, especially when the CIA had already set about frustrating his political advance in Chile as early as 1966.

Dr Kissinger's credit may rest in the historian's eyes not so much on the policy of *détente* with the Soviet Union and China at the time when both were adopted—for Vietnam and much else had by then shown up the futility and emptiness of past American policy—but on the patient negotiation that he has conducted, in the course of which the rules of international behaviour that must accompany any successful *détente* are hammered out. Undoubtedly the process has begun to affect all three powers. Chairman Mao presides over a much less flamboyantly revolutionary China now than the one that saw the third world marching leftwards in the sixties. Mr Brezhnev loses few sleepless nights worrying about a change of government except around Russia's immediate periphery. And in Washington too such changes are no longer attributed to the machinations of something called "international communism". In that case one may hope that Dr Kissinger will be able to follow the logic of his *détente*, and that his present critics will acknowledge today's logic rather than pick over the illogicalities of the past.



WASHINGTON POST  
22 Sept. 1974

# A Question Of Truth In Congress

By Art Buchwald

There is some question as to whether State Department and CIA officials told the truth when they testified in front of congressional committees concerning U.S. involvement in the overthrow of the Allende regime in Chile. There is even some talk of perjury charges being brought against high U.S. government officials.

This could play havoc with congressional hearings, particularly where our foreign policy is concerned. If they can't lie, many State Department and CIA types say they may refuse to appear on Capitol Hill.

This is what could happen:

"Secretary Sangfroid, do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?"

"I didn't understand the question."

"We are going to ask certain questions regarding our foreign policy and we want to know if you intend to respond with honest answers."

"Hmnmn, can I consult with counsel?"

"Yes, you can."

"What was the question again, Senator?"

"Do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?"

"Is that a multiple-choice question?"

"Just answer yes or no, Mr. Secretary."

"Counsel advises me that since national security is involved I can't tell you whether I will tell the truth, the

whole truth and nothing but the truth without consulting with Dr. Kissinger."

"There will be a five-minute recess while you call Dr. Kissinger."

Five minutes later.

"All right, Secretary Sangfroid, I will pose the question again. Do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?"

"Dr. Kissinger says I can't swear to that unless you go into executive session."

"We are in executive session, Mr. Secretary."

"Then could you clarify something for me? If you ask me a question, do you expect me to give a truthful answer to it, even if it compromises the administration and the State Department and the CIA and gets somebody into trouble for making a stupid mistake?"

"That is correct."

"Dr. Kissinger was afraid of that. I'll have to consult with him again."

Five minutes later.

"Mr. Secretary, we really do have to get on with these hearings, and in order to do so we have to swear you in as a witness under oath."

"Why can't I lie?"

"Because it is essential that Congress be kept informed as to what to this country is doing abroad."

"In Russia I could lie."

"We're not in Russia, Mr. Secretary. The Constitution specifically gives the Senate the right to advise and consent on foreign policy."

"In order to do that we must have information from your department. You can see that, can't you?"

"But if you know what we're doing and you don't agree with it, you'll have to do something about it. How can we have a strong foreign policy if you keep asking the State Department to tell you the truth?"

"Mr. Secretary, I must warn you that if you refuse to tell us the truth we shall have to hold you in contempt of Congress."

"But if I took the oath seriously, Dr. Kissinger could get very angry with me. The way I see it, if I'm convicted for lying, I can always get a pardon from the President. But who would give a pardon to anyone who told the truth to Congress?"

NEWSDAY

26 Sep 1974

## Putting an End to the CIA's Secret Wars

It's time for the Central Intelligence Agency to get out of the dirty-tricks business.

That conclusion is inescapable not just on moral grounds but on coldly practical ones. As Chris Juergens Jr. of West Hempstead suggests on today's letters page, the CIA's \$8,000,000 attempt to undermine Chile's legally elected Marxist government is only the latest in a long series of clandestine operations whose failure has harmed the United States far more than their success could have helped it.

By no stretch of the imagination was President Salvador Allende's regime a threat to U.S. security. In fact, Allende's handling of the Chilean economy was so inept that he might well have soured his countrymen on Marxism for good. Instead he was martyred in a military coup precipitated at least in part by truckers' and shopkeepers' strikes subsidized by CIA funds. So the U.S. became the villain—just as it was the villain after the even more disastrous Bay of Pigs assault on Fidel Castro's Cuba in 1961.

The baneful effects of the CIA's blunders are felt at home as well as abroad. The agency does not embark on such covert operations without authorization from

higher up; they must be cleared by the so-called 40 Committee, chaired by Henry Kissinger in his capacity as White House national security adviser. Yet Kissinger, former CIA Director Richard Helms and at least two State Department officials assured Congress at various times that there had been no campaign to subvert the Allende government. When the men who make and execute foreign policy mislead the public, they risk dissipating the trust on which democratic government rests to a point where no change of officials can restore it.

The CIA's present director, William Colby, does not want to give up clandestine operations. But he admits there would be no great impact on national security if every one of the agency's cloak-and-dagger projects were terminated forthwith. Since these so-called black operations reportedly cost the nation some \$500,000,000 a year, the potential budgetary savings are obvious. Perhaps more important, closing out the agency's covert activities would put its emphasis where it belongs—on the gathering and analysis of information about other nations and their governments. That enterprise is no less appropriate for government employes than for college professors, businessmen or, for

that matter, journalists. But Americans ought to be as offended when their government tries to manipulate events in some other country as they would be by foreign meddling here.

President Ford's feeble defense of the CIA's Chilean adventure suggested that it was justified because Communist intelligence agencies spend far more on similar forms of subversion. But surely the point—even for an unreconstructed cold warrior—is to distinguish the U.S. from the Russians, not to justify our excesses by pointing to theirs.

Colby argues that it would be a mistake "to deprive our nation of the possibility of some moderate covert action response to a foreign problem and leave us with nothing between a diplomatic protest and sending in the Marines." Perhaps he's right, but Congress has recently redefined the President's power to send the Marines anywhere, without its approval. Since the executive apparently cannot control the CIA for the good of the country, Congress must prohibit all clandestine operations without explicit prior approval by a joint congressional committee whose members cannot hide behind executive privilege when their colleagues demand to know what the CIA is up to.

NEW YORK TIMES  
24 September 1974

## Washington Said to Have Authorized A 'Get-Rougher' Policy in Chile in '71

By SEYMOUR M. HERSH  
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 23—The Nixon Administration, in what amounted to a change of its clandestine policies toward the regime of President Salvador Allende Gossens of Chile, officially authorized the Central Intelligence Agency to begin supplying financial and other aid to anti-Allende factions in mid-October, 1971, highly reliable intelligence sources said today.

The Administration directive, characterized by one insider as an order to "get a little rougher," resulted in direct C.I.A. involvement six weeks later in the first large-scale, middle-class demonstrations against the Allende regime. Dr. Allende was overthrown last September in a coup d'etat in which he lost his life.

The street demonstrations, known as the "march of the empty pots," led to a series of violent clashes between supporters and opponents of Dr. Allende's Marxist coalition Government. More than 100 persons were injured before the Chilean Army could impose a curfew and restore order.

### Timing Is Unexplained

Journalists later characterized the demonstrations, initiated by middle-class housewives protesting food shortages, as the most violent since Dr. Allende became President in September, 1970.

The Times's sources were unable to explain why the Administration chose that October to step up its clandestine activities against Dr. Allende, but the following factors were cited in interviews:

In late September, 1971, the Chilean Government announced that it would not pay compensation for nationalized American copper assets, a step that threatened to cost two major corporations more than \$500-million.

A change in ambassadors took place on Oct. 12, 1971, with Edward M. Korry, a Kennedy Administration appointee, being replaced by Nathaniel M. Davis, a career diplomat who was experienced in Soviet Affairs. Mr. Korry had been mad Ambassador to Ethiopia in 1963.

A series of intelligence reports relayed from the United States mission in Santiago to Washington included allegations that Cuban arms were being smuggled to Chilean civilians; also that Soviet technicians, contrary to Dr. Allende's public assurances, had been sent to investigate the research

and techniques of the American corporations at the copper mines.

"It was a series of a lot of little things," a first-hand source recalled. "Signs that the leftists in the Allende Government were in the ascendency."

According to administration sources with first-hand knowledge, the change in American clandestine policies toward the Allende Government was communicated to Mr. Davis shortly after arrival in Chile on Oct. 13, 1971. Mr. Davis, who was reassigned to the State Department late last year, refused to comment today.

Another Ford Administration official, however, denied that there had been any direct C.I.A. involvement in the street demonstrations in December, 1971. "So far as I know, there was no direct or indirect support for that protest," the official said.

He acknowledged, however, that it was "possible" that some funds distributed to other anti-Allende groups in Chile could have been spent to further the protests.

### 'Get a Little Roughed'

One Administration official with first-hand knowledge of the events in Chile summarized the message sent to Ambassador Davis as saying, in effect, "from now on you may aid the opposition by any means possible." Another source said simply that the Ambassador had been told to "get a little rougher."

Other sources said that the subsequent success of the women's march in December, in a turnout that apparently surprised the unprepared Allende administration, was greeted with great pleasure by C.I.A. operatives in the United States Embassy.

The demonstrations led to the short-term suspension of three radio stations and an Opposition newspaper, as well as a "get-tough attitude" by the Allende administration toward dissenters, according to newspaper reports at the time.

The Times's sources were unable to specify who had signed the instructions forwarded to Ambassador Davis. But in previous interviews, high-ranking intelligence sources have said that all clandestine C.I.A. activities in Chile were authorized by the 40 Committee, a high-level intelligence review panel headed by Secretary of State, Kissinger, then President Nixon's adviser for national security.

The New York Times reported on Friday that the C.I.A. had secretly financed striking labor groups and trade unions in Chile for more than 18 months before the overthrow of Dr. Allende, and that most of the

In a brief telephone interview today, Mr. Korry said that he had not authorized, nor had he been aware of any direct C.I.A. participation in street demonstrations or other overt anti-Allende actions while he was the Ambassador of Chile.

He added, however, that he had met with President Allende shortly before leaving Santiago and had warned the President to begin compromising on key economic and other issues with the United States.

"I told him that the consequences of deliberately provoking the United States would be inescapable," Mr. Korry said from his home in Briarcliff Manor, N. Y. "I wasn't thinking of the C.I.A. at all."

On Sept. 28, 1971, President Allende announced that he had approved the deducting of \$774-million of what he described as excess profits from compensation that the Chilean Government had agreed to pay to the Anaconda Company and the Kennecott Copper Corporation. The Allende decision was announced shortly before the beginning of negotiations on compensation between the Chilean government and the two concerns, whose interest in three large copper mines had previously been expropriated.

A day later, the New York Times quoted United States officials as saying that Dr. Allende's decision, which angered the American business community, would undoubtedly spur "get-touch" moves by the Nixon Administration.

It was reported that senior American policy-makers were concerned that if the United States continued to appear "soft" toward underdeveloped countries that expropriated private American assets, a rush of similar actions would be precipitated in Africa, where American firms had private investments valued at the time at \$3-billion.

more than \$8-million authorized for clandestine C.I.A. activities in Chile was used to provide strike benefits and similar aid to middle-class workers who opposed the Marxist President.

President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger have publicly declared, however, that the agency's clandestine operations were aimed only at supporting opposition newspapers and politicians that were in danger of being suppressed by the Allende Government.

### 'Ambassador in Charge'

All the C.I.A.'s activities in Chile were conducted under the direct authority and supervision of Ambassador Davis, The Times's sources said. "The Ambassador is in charge of these operations," a well-informed source said, noting that Mr. Davis had previously served as a United States representative to Bulgaria and as Ambassador to Guatemala.

Another source confirmed Ambassador Davis's direct involvement in the C.I.A. activities, saying that Mr. Davis had "get their hands a little dirty," the source said.

The sources did confirm that the intelligence agency's covert activities had been confined to support of opposition newspapers and political parties during Mr. Korry's ambassadorship, from 1967 to Oct. 12, 1971.

Mr. Korry, a political appointee, did not have the confidence of Secretary of State William P. Rogers and Attorney General John N. Mitchell, the sources said. Mr. Mitchell was one of the six members of the 40 Committee while he was in the Nixon Cabinet.

## NEW YORK TIMES 22 September 1974 U.S. Communist Suggests C.I.A. Held Soviet Art Show

The leader of the American Communist party said yesterday that the nonconformist art show broken up in Moscow last Sunday night have been staged by the Central Intelligence Agency and that "local Soviet citizens seemingly overreacted."

The assessment was given by Gus Hall, general secretary of the Communist Party, U.S.A., in The Daily World, the party's newspaper.

"One would have to be

totally naive indeed not to see the fine hand of the C.I.A. in this affair," Mr. Hall said, expressing regret that the Russians had reacted so strongly. Vigilantes broke up the show and assaulted some Soviet citizen and American newsmen.

Five participants in the show who were sentenced to workhouse terms and fines after the incident have since been released, apparently as a result of widespread criticism abroad. Soviet authorities reportedly have given permission for another show to be held.

# The rot sets in for Kissinger

from JOHN GRAHAM: Washington, 21 September

EVIDENCE continues to emerge suggesting that the Ford-Kissinger defence of the Central Intelligence Agency's actions in Chile is false.

That defence is that the 11 million dollars spent in Chile between 1970 and 1973 was designed not to subvert President Allende's government but to keep alive opposition political parties, newspapers and radio stations, which, said President Ford this week, the Allende government was attempting to destroy.

It now appears that much of the money was spent in support of trade unions and other commercial groups, specifically to support or organise anti-Allende strikes.

Dr Kissinger is chairman of the five-man committee that authorises the CIA's covert actions, and the storm broke for him on Tuesday, when it was revealed that a Senate staff report accused him of having deceived the Senate foreign relations committee in testimony under oath last year.

It was not long, however, before the interaction of politics and the extraordinary capacity of Congress for pharisaic indignation came to his rescue.

When Kissinger went before the committee on Thursday to talk about détente and the Soviet Union, Senator Church, whose staff had prepared the report, quickly brought up Chile and was just as quickly ruled out of order by the chairman, Senator Fulbright.

Mr Church wants publicity for himself (Presidential aspirations are ascribed to him). Mr Fulbright wants to protect Kissinger, out of fear that if Kissinger's power is diminished, the anti-détente lobby in the Pentagon will be correspondingly strengthened.

Kissinger had an even lighter escape this week in the matter of General Haig's appointment as supreme allied commander in Europe. Now that his initial transition to the White House is done, President Ford clearly needed to get rid of General Haig and, being the sort of traditional politician he is, he wanted to give Haig a very top job.

Army Chief of Staff would have done, but the trouble with that was that it required confirmation by the Senate, who might have asked questions about General Haig's actions over the last year and a half as President Nixon's Chief of Staff.

Haig had a lot to do with the wire-tapping of the earlier Nixon years. He had a lot to do with the 'Saturday night massacre,' when the first

Watergate special prosecutor was dismissed.

It was while he was Chief of Staff at the White House that a lot of funny things happened to the subpoenaed tapes. He is generally credited with more or less running the Administration, and possibly President Nixon too during the latter's last months. But apparently he did not feel that Nixon had done anything critically wrong until the first week of August.

Despite all this, and despite a strong, adverse reaction from many NATO countries—stronger than has been reported—General Haig will take command in Europe. This will be most useful to Dr Kissinger, for it was as Kissinger's military aide during the conduct of the Vietnam War that Haig first entered the White House. He is, in short, Kissinger's Man and Kissinger is likely to need all the allies he can get.

Kissinger's current prestige has four supports: the new Administration's need to show the world that American authority has survived the collapse of the old Administration; his end-the-cold-war negotiations with the Russians and Chinese; his end-the-hot-war 'settlement' in Indochina; and his successes and continuing negotiations in the Middle East.

For different reasons, the rot is starting to erode each of the supports.

Of course, President Ford had to retain Kissinger as Secretary of State, as a symbol of continuity, quite apart from his experience and skills. But it does not take long for a new administration to form, to start acting, to persuade the rest of the world that there is an American Government which can be dealt with, that someone is in charge again.

Unless President Ford shows himself unusually incompetent, one of the benefits of Kissinger's remaining in office will quickly vanish. At that point, President Ford, like almost every President before him and for the best reasons, may well want his own man at the State Department.

From the Chinese, no especially rapid developments are likely, or indeed sought, but US-Soviet relations are at a critical stage. Some Soviet concession on Jewish emigration is apparently imminent, which will release the American Trade Bill, but in military matters there is less progress and less optimism. The latest round of strategic arms talks has just begun, and Kissinger is due to go to Moscow next month.

Both sides are going ahead with the development of nuclear weapons and the addition to nuclear stock-piles, and the familiar fear that the Russians will gain an advantage over the next few years has again surfaced. Even Kissinger, to the Foreign Relations Committee on Thursday, was obliged to say: 'If we are driven to it, the United States will sustain an arms race.'

As to those scenes of Kissinger's past glories, Vietnam and the Middle East, the news from both is disheartening, if not entirely surprising. The military and economic situation of South Vietnam is deteriorating fast.

Congress has just removed another thousand million dollars from the Administration's request for Indo-China. Some of this will no doubt be restored but there is little sentiment in Congress for South-East Asia, particularly with the mid-term Congressional elections only six weeks off. Some diplomats and officials who have been studying the area for years think that 1975 may end the relative stalemate since the 'peace' of two years ago, and that this will be accompanied by loud cries for help from Saigon.

This will do Kissinger no good, and a similar undoing of his plans may occur in the Middle East. He has recently completed one round of discussions with Middle East leaders in Washington and is about to return to the area.

But only the greatest optimist would say that the Israelis will make a sufficient deal with the Arabs, or that the Arabs will not go to war again, or that they will pay any attention to President Ford's rather pedagogic remarks at the United Nations this week. Since the Yom Kippur war last year, Dr Kissinger has achieved more in the Middle East than anyone before him in getting the Arabs and Israelis together. But the matter may be outside anyone's persuasive powers.

In short, there are many reasons why Dr Kissinger may not be a fixture as Secretary of State. The political need for him—genuine during the decline and disgrace of President Nixon—will dwindle away during the rise of President Ford. He is not without enemies in Washington. Events in general may move in a way that does not serve him.

He himself, if he decides there are no more rabbits in the hat and that some of his earlier tricks may soon be exposed, may also decide that there is no percentage in playing the magician any more.

# Self- Inflicted Wounds

By Anthony Lewis

The disclosures of covert C.I.A. operations in Chile raise questions on two distinct levels: Was the particular activity against the Allende Government justified? In general, is it wise for the United States to intervene surreptitiously in the internal politics of other countries?

Covert action by the C.I.A. has caused so much embarrassment to this country in recent years that only a serious threat to U.S. national security could begin to justify it. In those terms, putting aside all concern about American values and international proprieties, the intervention in Chile was plainly a mistake.

The Allende Government, whatever its faults, did not threaten anything of ours except the property of American businesses—which it had support from all Chilean parties in expropriating. Moreover, economic disaster was overtaking President Allende in any case. By becoming involved directly with the elements that brought him down, the United States unnecessarily made itself accessory to a bloody coup and a particularly cruel repression thereafter.

The argument offered by Secretary of State Kissinger for the operations in Chile must set some kind of record in cynical contempt for his listeners' intelligence. It is that the C.I.A. was only defending freedom by giving money to the opposition press and parties.

There is no evidence that Mr. Kissinger has ever shed a tear for freedom of the press—or done anything about the brutal repression of freedoms by a dozen right-wing tyrannies. The image Mr. Kissinger has given this

## ABROAD AT HOME

country is that of a friend to the Greek colonels. Now he is advising President Ford to visit South Korea, where the feeblest criticism of government may bring a death sentence.

Chile itself is a complete answer to the notion that our interest in intervening was liberty. The military regime that rules it now is one of the most repulsive governments in the world. A recent report by the International Commission of Jurists, confirming other studies, said that torture was in substantial use, including "electric shock, burning with acid or cigarettes, extraction of nails, crushing of testicles, sexual assaults, hanging. . . ." That is the regime that the U.S. rushed to support, after the coup, by resuming various forms of aid.

The argument that we were only

protecting the opposition press and parties in Chile is also unpersuasive because it is untrue. As Seymour Hersh of The New York Times has brought out, most of the millions spent by the C.I.A. in 1972 and 1973 went for support of striking truckers, shopkeepers and others whose activities played a significant part in bringing Mr. Allende down.

Official lies are a problem of covert activity in general. They inevitably become necessary. And then, again and again in this country, they are exposed, adding to the weight of public disbelief that has increasingly burdened American policy-makers.

Concern about the credibility of U.S. foreign policy is one strong reason for giving up the practice of covert C.I.A. operations. This case was made definitively just a year ago, in the magazine Foreign Affairs, by Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, former Undersecretary of State and Attorney Gen-

eral.

"Our foreign policy must be based on policy and factual premises which are accepted by the overwhelming majority of the American people," Mr. Katzenbach wrote. As one step toward re-establishing credibility, he said, "we should abandon publicly all covert operations designed to influence political results in foreign countries. . . . We should confine our covert activities overseas to the gathering of intelligence information."

Mr. Katzenbach was making not a moral but a pragmatic argument — that American covert operations were harming us more than others. Even the current C.I.A. director, William E. Colby, recently took a very limited view of their utility, saying that it was "legitimate" to consider abandoning them and that there would be no great impact on our security.

But there are questions of values, too. Does the United States want to proclaim to the world that covert political intervention abroad is a regular part of our national philosophy? President Ford came close to doing so the other day when he said that everyone does it — only the Communists spend more than we do. Are we really no different? We may not always live up to what we say, but do we want to set our standards so low?

Those like Mr. Kissinger who say that morality must give way to effectiveness in these matters really favor covert operations, and secrecy in general, because they are more convenient. It is easier to have a confidential chat with Bill Fulbright or John Stennis than to justify a policy in public. But in the long run it is more dangerous. The habit of dirty tricks abroad can slip into corrupting illegality at home. That, at least, we should have learned from Watergate.

CHICAGO TRIBUNE  
22 Sept. 1974

## If Kissinger has 2 faces, can't he have 2 hats?

By Frank Starr

WASHINGTON—One of the Capitol's wisest wags remarked of Henry Kissinger the other day, "When you've got two faces you need two hats."

A propensity for charming duplicity plus his dual role as Secretary of State and the President's National Security adviser have been catching up with Kissinger since before the Ford administration inherited and decided to keep him.

An inexperienced President's first brush with an embarrassing foreign policy issue brought both problems—already simmering since the spectacular Kissinger boomer in Salzburg, Austria, last June—back to the surface this week.

A GROWING handful of influential people are beginning to say openly that Kissinger is not indispensable, or if he becomes indispensable then he must perforce be dispensed with. The President, for the time being and despite advice to the contrary, said "no."

The issue arose again on Monday when President Ford, gallantly trying to explain away his predecessor's Central Intelligence Agency intervention in Chile, not only admitted that the United States did intervene but that it recognized the practice.

Only the Friday before CIA Chief William E. Colby had said on Capitol Hill that covert operations ["dirty tricks" as opposed to pure intelligence gathering] were conducted only on authorization of the National Security Council.

Who runs the National Security Council? Henry Kissinger.

In his press conference, Ford said that such operations were conducted only with the express approval of a semi-secret intelligence unit known as the "40 Committee."

Who dominates the 40 Committee? Henry Kissinger.

Officials of the State Department had been offering assurances, especially on Capitol Hill, that the United

States was not involved in any way in the domestic politics of Chile.

Who dominates the "40 Committee"? Henry Kissinger.

When Ford came to office, members of his transition team, Donald Rumsfeld, now ambassador to NATO, and former Pennsylvania Gov. William Scranton, suggested that the National Security Council ought to be restored to its original function.

That was to act as gatherer and winnower of information to assure that the President received a wide range of options and informed thought from all the agencies of government on any single foreign policy issue.

THIS WOULD mean replacing Kissinger as national security adviser to assure disinterested judgment and presentation of interagency views. But, sources said, it was not intended as a means of stripping Kissinger's power.

Nonetheless, when the Los Angeles Times broke the story last Tuesday, Kissinger's State Department and the White House in quick succession hurried to issue strong—perhaps overstrong—denials. John Hushen, the deputy White House press secretary, even said the transition team was instructed to avoid national security issues, a point sources extremely close to the team dispute.

Kissinger met with Ford that day and reportedly was reassured that he was staying in both jobs and, to the embarrassment of delegates who considered it none of their business, Ford chose the United Nations next day as a forum for again reassuring Kissinger and the world.

The message seemed clear. Kissinger was indispensable, at least to Ford at this time. White House sources believe Ford, recognizing his inexperience on the foreign front and desiring to continue the successful Nixon foreign policy, felt a strong need to keep Kissinger.

Further, these sources believe, Ford was acutely aware of Kissinger's extreme sensitivity, demonstrated by his threat to quit in Salzburg, toward any questioning of his authority or credibility. Kissinger is even thought to have mildly reminded Ford of this in the early days of Ford's succession.

IN ANY case, the issue was inflamed further the same morning when Rep. Albert Quie [R., Minn.], a close Ford confidant, told reporters he had mentioned to Melvin Laird and Rep. John Rhodes [R., Ariz.], also Ford confidants, his belief that Kissinger should be replaced as Secretary of State.

While Quie does not have or claim many supporters of that view, the effect of Kissinger's wearing of both foreign policy hats has been considerable. It has given him a virtual monopoly over not only diplomatic but also military and intelligence opinion on foreign policy issues reaching the President.

In the simplest of terms, it is this monopoly on the flow

of foreign policy information to the President which is the source of his well-publicized tension with another strong-minded intellectual in the Cabinet, Defense Secretary James Schlesinger.

The Defense Department's liaison officer on the National Security Council staff was abolished by Kissinger in the wake of the Pentagon spying affair, thus leaving no military monitor of NSC activity.

By virtue of wearing both his hats, Kissinger is the ranking member of the "40 Committee" altho his membership is as national security adviser not at Secretary of State.

That committee, created in 1948, is presently comprised of Kissinger, Undersecretary of State Joseph Sisco, Deputy Secretary William Clements Jr., CIA Chief Colby, and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. George S. Brown.

There is little evidence of conflict between Kissinger and the intelligence community, particularly over the need for discreet conduct of occasional covert operations, tho Kissinger did assure the Congress the executive branch was prepared to discuss fully accountability, if congressmen felt the need for it.

BALTIMORE SUN  
23 September 1974

Charles W. Yost

## With New CIA Black Eye, It May Be Time to Switch

New York.

Is it not high time that the United States government, Congress and people drew some operative conclusions from the repeated and embarrassing public predicaments in which the CIA has involved them over the past 15 years?

The most recent debate on the subject arises from the avowal by the director of the agency that it did expend considerable sums in Chile to prevent Salvador Allende's accession to power and, after he had nevertheless acceded, to weaken or undermine him.

I have not had an opportunity to examine the record sufficiently to judge whether, as claimed, other witnesses misled congressional committees on this point, though there certainly is prima facie evidence that they were not wholly candid. I should myself, however, support the United States government's contention that, whatever the CIA may or may not have done in Chile, it did not "overthrow" Dr. Allende.

He was overthrown by Chileans. He never at any time had the support of the majority of the people. He was overthrown because he and his more radical adherents alienated, frightened and ultimately radicalized in the opposite sense the unconquered majority, particularly its most powerful element, the military.

It is necessary to make this point in order to clarify the broad issue — whether

admitted CIA activities in Chile, even if they played no substantial part in the overthrow of Dr. Allende, were in the national interest of the United States. I would argue that they were not.

American and other Western spokesmen have for the past half century been pointing out that, while the Marxist revolutions in the Soviet Union and elsewhere were no doubt directed to noble ends, the atrocious means so often employed grossly distorted and even vitiated those ends. Yet since the onset of the cold war the United States has taken a leaf out of the Communist book and too often resorted to means so shabby we dare not avow them. In the long run this does not pay.

Ignoble means debase and demoralize the actors, corrupt and brutalize those acted upon and, in so doing, transform and disintegrate the end itself. This is as true for democrats as for Communists.

The consequence of a quarter century of "dirty tricks" by the CIA, that is, the United States government, has been to make the agency throughout the world a symbol for unscrupulous intervention in other people's internal affairs and hence often to undermine, rather than to serve, the objectives of U.S. foreign policy.

We see how today it is almost universally believed in Greece that the CIA inspired the July 15 coup in Cyprus which set in train the

subsequent disasters. I believe this is a mistaken judgment, because upsetting the status quo was so obviously counter to United States interest, but the fact that it is plausible to suppose that the CIA might have inspired the coup, if it had been in the U.S. interest, lends color to the accusation.

A New York Times story last week quotes a telegram from our ambassador in New Delhi to the effect that the recent revelations about CIA activities in Chile have confirmed the worst suspicions of the Indians about that agency and caused Indira Gandhi to wonder whether

her government may not be the next target for elimination. This is hardly the image of its foreign policy and practice the United States government should wish to see widely held around the world.

Supporters of CIA activities of this kind think of themselves as "hardnosed" realists. Actually they often live in a world of purest fantasy. The Bay of Pigs is one instructive example and Mr. Liddy's little operation at Watergate is another.

The fact is that "dirty tricks" conducted by agents of the United States government very rarely serve the national interest of the United States, even if one interprets these interests in strictly "cold war" terms. Experience has shown that they cannot be adequately "controlled" within the executive branch, because it is so often the controllers, as in the case of the Bay of Pigs

and perhaps of Chile, whose perceptions and judgments are at fault.

Vietnam has tragically demonstrated the limitations on the capacity of the United States to determine the structure of an alien society even by a massive injection of armed force. How much less likely that we could hope to do so by clandestine operations. We can, no doubt, occasionally contribute to the rise or fall of a particular government or politician, but over the longer run indigenous forces, which we cannot control, will determine whether this superficial change has any lasting effect.

In referring at a public meeting in Washington last week to proposals that CIA abandon its covert action programs, Director William Colby said: "In light of current American policy, it would not have a major impact on our current activities or the current security of the United States."

While the triple use of the word "current" is ominous, this statement is mildly reassuring. It is to be hoped that the President and secretary of state will be persuaded that, in the broader perspective, these "dirty tricks" do more harm than good to the national security and should be phased out.

THE SENSITIVE and embarrassing issue of admitting publicly that the U. S. government does interfere with other governments aroused demands in Congress for closer scrutiny of CIA activity, but there was much cynical opinion that despite moral outrage and congressional activity the thin moral line between public disclaimer and secret operations would in the end remain little changed.

"The issue surfaces from time to time," Sen. Frank Church [D., Idaho] said: "It has surfaced now and we must board it."

Neither is the intelligence sector the strongest in Kissinger's foreign policy monopoly.

Kissinger, who became Secretary of State after eclipsing a weak secretary from his NSC position close to the White House, knows well the advantage of having both jobs.

While it was not intended in the original transition team proposal to Ford, replacement of Kissinger as the national security adviser was Quie's suggestion as a first step toward removing him eventually as Secretary of State.

If longtime Kissinger watchers are right, that would be an effective route. They believe Kissinger no longer would keep one job without the other.

BALTIMORE SUN  
24 September 1974

Nick Thimmesch

## Ford's Defense at United Nations Shows Uneasiness

Washington.

The clock, a slow, relentless machine, runs out on the Secretary of State, Henry A. Kissinger. The fact that President Ford felt compelled to lobby the world for Dr. Kissinger at the United Nations reflects the uneasiness felt over Dr. Kissinger's status here.

Mr. Ford thought he was doing Dr. Kissinger a favor to scribble a quick insert into the U.N. speech, one where Mr. Ford declared "my full support and the unquestioned backing of the American people." The President acted as though he were facing Congress, not the United Nations, in speaking about an inside-the-U.S.-government matter.

Dr. Kissinger is restless and uncertain these days. A Senate staff committee report accuses him of having "deceived" the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in sworn testimony concerning the Central Intelligence Agency and Chile. The tigers in the Senate Democratic Caucus snarl at him over the same issue.

Stories circulate that he

and the Defense Secretary, James R. Schlesinger, are doomed to fateful collision, with Dr. Kissinger having only a 50-50 chance for survival. For Dr. Kissinger, who always has had a 98 per cent survival potential, this is damaging indeed.

And curious as it might seem to some Kissinger fans in this town, Dr. Kissinger misses the professional relationship he had with Richard M. Nixon. Indeed, he misses Mr. Nixon so much that he has phoned him many times since the former President left office. It is kind of sad.

Credibility in Dr. Kissinger has eroded in the press and in dealing with military and diplomatic affairs, because the men and women who study nuances and inflections have come to appreciate what an expert dissembler Dr. Kissinger is. It is this same skill that led to accomplishments winning him enormous public favor, here and across the world. Irony.

It is not necessarily what Dr. Kissinger was party to—responding to Daniel Ellsberg's thievery, trying to plug leaks, supporting actions

against Salvador Allende, the late Chilean president—as it is how he evades the truth about these tough questions when asked under oath.

It is now clear that the CIA, with Dr. Kissinger's knowledge, spent \$8 million to bring the Allende government down.

The way President Ford and Dr. Kissinger now tell it, that money was used to support a point of view opposite to Dr. Allende's in the press, radio and television because the Marxist regime was destroying that point of view.

According to sources cited in the *New York Times*, however, only half of that \$8 million went for this understandable effort and the rest was used to foment Chile's crippling truck and taxi driver strikes and other anti-Allende activities by shopkeepers and trade groups. The Intelligence Review Board, chaired by Dr. Kissinger, certainly would know of this CIA-financed assault on Chile's economy and political stability. Perhaps Dr. Kissinger did not know all the details, but he knew the intent.

Therefore, when Dr. Kissin-

## Over Kissinger

ger testified in secret executive session before the Foreign Relations Committee that the CIA was involved in the 1970 Chile elections "in a very minor way" and that the United States effort in Chile was only to "strengthen the democratic political parties," well, that caused some of the sleepyheads on Senator J. W. Fulbright's committee eventually to wake up.

A staff report by Senator Frank Church's subcommittee on Multinational Corporations was so damning of the CIA and Dr. Kissinger that Mr. Church (D., Idaho) tried to pursue Dr. Kissinger last week in committee hearings on Soviet detente. Dr. Kissinger's great protector, Mr. Fulbright, interrupted Mr. Church and stopped the questioning.

"I walked out in disgust over the chairman's ruling," Senator Church said, thus providing the first sign of life that the committee has shown in many months. As it stands, the committee does not like Mr. Church's report and is having it analyzed along with other testimony on Chile.

NEW YORK TIMES  
20 September 1974

## Covert Abuses

President Ford's defense of "covert action" by intelligence organizations against foreign governments is faulty both in its particular application to Chile and as a general tenet on foreign policy. The belatedly-revealed campaign against the government of the late President Salvador Allende adds just one more example of how executive powers can be abused when the element of effective accountability is absent.

Mr. Ford tried to put the most benign face upon the dubious Chilean exploits of his predecessor's Administration at his Monday news conference, and again yesterday in meeting Congressional leaders. Money was indeed spent to influence Chile's political process, he conceded, despite all the previous denials by senior government officials who knew better. But the President explained that this was done only "to help and assist the preservation of opposition newspapers and electronic media and to preserve opposition political parties." This explanation might be more convincing if there were any record of similar concern for democratic opposition voices in Greece under the military junta, for example, or in totalitarian South Vietnam or South Korea today—or for that matter in post-Allende Chile.

The broader question is whether such covert activities were properly conceived and policed inside the government, the legislative as well as executive branch. Key Congressional leaders who are supposed to be informed

of such operations claim they were kept in the dark. Responsible committees of Congress were misled in sworn testimony by Administration officials. Inside the Executive branch the so-called 40 Committee for intelligence oversight, chaired by Henry A. Kissinger as President Nixon's national security adviser, reportedly orchestrated the anti-Allende campaign, even as government spokesmen at all levels were insistently denying any intervention in Chilean affairs.

It is not enough for the President and Secretary of State simply to brief invited Congressmen on controversial actions once they become known, as happened yesterday. As we have long advocated, the Congress should insist on more effective oversight procedures than have been exercised so far; one aim should be to break up the concentration of decision-making power in the hands of one man or a small group of anonymous officials under the limited accountability that, more than anything else, invites free-wheeling abuse of power.

It would be a rash statement to say that there is never a need for covert intelligence operations in the modern world, but stringent criteria must be established and enforced before resorting to such dangerous techniques. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick Jr., one of the nation's most experienced intelligence executives, observed several years ago: "The use of 'covert action' for the implementation of foreign policy may be even counterproductive when successful; when unsuccessful it can be catastrophic."

TIME

23 Sept. 1974

## One Year Later: Absolute Order

"Chile," said Santiago's Ambassador to Washington Walter Heitmann last week, "is going to be a masterpiece of democracy." The occasion for that grandiose claim was the first anniversary of the death of Marxist President Salvador Allende Gossens and the replacement of his elected government by a military regime. In light of the junta's record of suspended civil rights, torture of political prisoners and abolition of Congress, the ambassador's assertion seemed an overstatement. The thousands of Chileans who gathered in Santiago to commemorate the coup of Sept. 11 seemed to be celebrating the absolute order imposed by the junta after the chaos of a year ago. The "new Chile" proclaimed by its military rulers resembles much more a totalitarian than a democratic state.

The junta did use the anniversary, however, to announce an end to some of its harsher measures. Army General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, Chile's stern-visaged chief of state, told a crowded assembly of coup supporters that political prisoners—"with the exception of a few particularly serious cases"—would be allowed "to leave forever the national territory." Already Orlando Letelier, former Foreign Minister and Ambassador to the U.S., had left his Chilean prison for exile in Venezuela. But Pinochet also put an end to any hopes that a genuine loosening of the junta's grip was in the making. He blandly told a crowded press conference that the military might well remain in power for "10, 15, 20 or even 25 years."

The junta leaders are determined never to permit a return to the rule of old-style politics and politicians who, they feel, brought the country to the brink of ruin. "Elections divide, political parties divide," explained one veteran diplomat in Santiago. "There isn't any room for either in this government's thought." Instead, the junta seems bent on building up family units, communities and unions. All carefully controlled from the top, as the best way of expressing Chilean interests.

**Police Sweeps.** Thus nobody sees much chance for an immediate end to such control devices as the 1 a.m. to 5:30 a.m. curfew, the operations of the five domestic intelligence services, or the pe-

riodic police sweeps through urban shantytowns in search of "subversives." The Congress remains closed (the building serves as a center where records of political detainees are kept), while political parties are still suspended. TIME Buenos Aires Bureau Chief Rudolph Rauch, who visited Chile last week, reports that even many who opposed Allende are fearful that complaining in public—about the high cost of living, for example—could have dire consequences. They have good reason for their fear, since large numbers of Chileans are still being arrested. Last week Amnesty International charged, moreover, that the torture of political prisoners was still going on in Chile. A report issued by the London-based human rights organization claims that beatings, electric shock and deprivation of food and sleep are common practices.

Another unsettling, and from the junta's point of view unwelcome, disclosure came from Washington. A letter by Democratic Congressman Michael Harrington of Massachusetts, leaked to the press last week, contained some devastating excerpts from testimony earlier this year by CIA Director William Colby before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Intelligence. Colby apparently admitted that the CIA, with White House approval, had funneled some \$8 million into Chile between 1970 and 1973, first to keep Allende from being elected and later to weaken his government. The revelations were potentially damaging to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who chaired the so-called Forty Committee that approved the covert CIA operations, as well as to former Ambassador to Santiago Edward M. Korry and former Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Charles A. Meyer. These and other Kissinger deputies have testified in congressional hearings that the U.S. did not interfere at any time in Chilean life.

Colby's testimony was also embarrassing to the military rulers of Chile. The disclosures cast doubt on the junta's claim that it was misrule by Allende and the politicians that brought ruin to Chile. Indeed, some experts believe that the CIA disruptions, combined with the curtailment of U.S. foreign aid credits and bank loans, contributed greatly to Allende's economic woes.

**Real Hunger.** The junta has had its problems in correcting those troubles. The Allende government, by exhausting reserves of foreign exchange, boosting wages and subsidizing food prices to an unreasonable degree, bequeathed an inflation that totaled 842%. The junta's team of fiscal technocrats, many of them disciples of University of Chicago Economist Milton Friedman, have applied a tough austerity program that has let prices rise while holding down wages to keep demand in check. So far, Chile's inflation has come down to a projected 250%-300% for 1974. Still, the average laborer needs to work four hours to earn enough for a kilo of bread; between October and June of 1974, milk increased 300% in price, sugar 192% and cooking oil 224%. Add to that an unemployment rate of around 10% and, as one foreign ambassador in Santiago puts it, "there is no way they can have avoided real hunger in the *poblaciones* [shantytowns] this winter." To ease the pressure on the poor, Pinochet last week announced a 23% hike in the minimum wage and regular wage adjustments every quarter, based on the consumer price index.

Despite these problems, and some muted criticism of the regime's regressive policies by Catholic churchmen and leaders of the divided Christian Democratic Party, there is little serious opposition to the junta. Reports TIME's Rauch: "The majority of Chileans I have talked to inside the country strongly favor what has happened here. Perhaps most people are too relieved at the restoration of order to be angry at the loss of their parliamentary liberties. Despite inflation, the middle class, which deserted Allende, can still manage to make ends meet. Many Chileans, even avid supporters of the coup, will concede that they are living under a dictatorship. But they see it as a necessary transition period and plead that, given enough time, they will come out of it in a uniquely Chilean way."

LONDON TIMES

16 September 1974

## Magazine says CIA undermined Dr Jagan

By Louis Heren

The American Central Intelligence Agency successfully intervened in Guyana to prevent Dr Cheddi Jagan from coming to power when the former British colony was granted independence in 1966, according to *The New Yorker* magazine.

The agency had the full support of President Kennedy from 1961, because he was determined to prevent "another Cuba".

The CIA moved into Guyana under a cover provided by the AFL-CIO, the American trade union organization, and financed strikes and riots against Dr Jagan's labour programme.

President Kennedy was persuaded that Dr Jagan was dangerous by Mr Arthur Schlesinger, Jr, who was then a member of the White House staff. He told the President that Dr Jagan had "that kind of deep pro-communist emotion which only sustained experience with communism could cure".

Jane Kramer, who wrote the article, suggests collusion between Britain and the United States, although the British authorities warned Mr Kennedy not to trust his client, Mr Forbes Burnham, who was to succeed Dr Jagan. They were soon to change their mind, the

article says, when Mr Burnham managed to deadlock the constitutional conference called by Britain to determine the terms of independence.

"No one here knows why Jagan finally agreed to let Duncan Sandys, the British Colonial Secretary, resolve the argument.

Jagan evidently thought this his friends in the Labour Party would support him. They talked a lot about it, but that was all, and Sandys' 'Guyana solution' ended up echoing an electoral scheme allegedly devised by Secretary of State Dean Rusk on the advice of the

CIA's Guyana agents, instead of anything the British had discussed."

A Staff Reporter writes: Mr Duncan Sandys said last night:

"It is quite true that the American Government were greatly worried about the possibility of another Cuba in Guyana. But it is quite untrue to suggest that the Americans in any way influenced the policy of the British Government.

"It is equally untrue to suggest that the independence constitution was in any way devised by Dean Rusk on the advice of the CIA."

TIME

30 Sept. 1974

## Chile: A Case Study

The U.S. began its heavy investment in the political fate of Chile in the early 1960s. President John Kennedy had met Eduardo Frei, leader of the Christian Democratic Party in Chile, and decided that he was the hope of Latin America. Frei was a man of the left, but not too far left, a man who was not hostile to U.S. interests and just might be able to achieve needed reform without violent revolution. When Frei faced Salvador Allende, a self-professed Marxist with a Communist following, in the 1964 election, the U.S. made no secret of where its sympathies lay.

Frei became the recipient of American political advice, encouragement and hefty financial aid. Between 1962 and 1965, the U.S. gave Chile \$618 million in direct economic assistance—more per capita than any other Latin American country. In a diary due to be published in Britain this year, former CIA Operative Philip Agee describes how he was called upon for assistance from his post in Montevideo in 1964: "The Santiago station has a really big operation going to keep Salvador Allende from being elected President. He was almost elected at the last elections in 1958, and this time nobody's taking any chances. The trouble is that the office of finance in headquarters [Langley, Va.] couldn't get enough Chilean escudos from the New York banks; so they had to set up regional purchasing offices in Lima and Rio. But even these offices can't satisfy the requirement, so we have been asked to help." The results were gratifying. Frei won with 56% of the vote, and the future of Chile seemed to be assured.

But from the outset, Frei ran into trouble. He was attacked by the right for moving too fast and by the left for going too slowly. Allende's Socialist Party continued to grow, picking up defecting left-wing Christian Democrats and uniting with other opposition parties. It became a case for the CIA. A station chief had been sent to Santiago in 1964; later the agency's presence began to multiply in preparation for the 1970 election, when Frei would be constitutionally barred from seeking a second term and Allende would pose more of a threat than before.

TIME has learned that a CIA team was posted to Chile with orders from the National Security Council to keep the election "fair." The agents interpreted these instructions to mean: Stop Allende, and they asked for a whopping \$20 million to do the job. They were given \$5 million and ultimately spent less than \$1 million. "You buy votes in Boston, you buy votes in Santiago," commented a former CIA agent assigned to the mission. But not enough votes were bought; Allende had a substantial following. He was prevented from winning a majority, but with only 36% of the vote he narrowly won a three-way race that was finally decided in the Chilean Congress. CIA officials in Washington were furious.

The Nixon Administration saw the Allende regime as more of a threat than Cuba to the hemisphere. The White House feared that Chile would serve as a base for South America's revolutionary left as well as a convenient outpost for the Soviet Union. So many Marxist activists were pouring in from Cuba, Czechoslovakia and China that a special team of CIA clerks was dispatched to Chile to start indexing thousands of cards on their activities. Publicly, Henry Kissinger warned of the domino effect in Latin America. If Communism could find a secure berth in Chile, it would be encouraged to spread throughout the continent. Privately, the 40 Committee, the top-level intelligence panel headed by Kissinger, authorized \$8 million to be spent to make life even tougher for Allende than he was making it for himself.

The extent of the CIA's involvement was revealed earlier this month by congressional sources who had been privy to earlier testimony by CIA Director William Colby. Further details have been supplied by other agency officials. Precisely how much was spent by foreign Communists—principally Moscow—to get Allende into office and then to keep him

there is not known. Most Western intelligence experts figure that the CIA campaign was scarcely comparable in terms of expenditures or intensity. Nonetheless, the agency went further than even many of its critics imagined.


For a Marxist government, the Allende regime had moved relatively slowly toward suppressing free institutions. But the CIA believed it was only a matter of time before all dissent would be muffled. Approximately half the CIA funds were funneled to the opposition press, notably the nation's leading daily *El Mercurio*; Allende had steered government advertising to the papers supporting him while encouraging newspaper prices to rise high enough to bankrupt the others. Additional CIA funds went to opposition politicians, private businesses and trade unions. "What we were really doing was supporting a civilian resistance movement against an arbitrary government," argues a CIA official. "Our target was the middle-class groups who were working against Allende."

Covert assistance went beyond help for the democratic opposition. The CIA infiltrated Chilean agents into the upper echelon of the Socialist Party. Provocateurs were paid to make deliberate mistakes in their jobs, thus adding to Allende's gross mismanagement of the economy. CIA agents organized street demonstrations against government policies.

As the economic crisis deepened, the agency supported striking shopkeepers and taxi drivers. Laundered CIA money, reportedly channeled to Santiago by way of Christian Democratic parties in Europe, helped finance the Chilean truckers' 45-day strike, one of the worst blows to the economy. Moreover, the strikers doubtless picked up additional CIA cash that was floating round the country. As an intelligence official notes, "If we give it to A, and then A gives it to B and C and D, in a sense it's true that D got it. But the question is: Did we give it to A knowing D would get it?"

While owning up to CIA efforts to weaken Allende, Colby insists: "We didn't support the coup, we didn't stimulate it, we didn't bring it about in any way. We were quite meticulous in making sure there was no encouragement from our side." Most U.S. policymakers would have preferred that Allende be ousted in democratic fashion at the election scheduled for 1976. That kind of exit, they feel, would have decisively proved the bankruptcy of his policies.

Clearly the CIA considers the junta to be the lesser of two evils. Still, it rates the Chilean enterprise a failure since it ended in military dictatorship. Several years of dangerous, costly and now nationally divisive intervention in another country's internal politics might better have been avoided. Though Soviet propaganda blames the CIA for the Chilean coup and the death of Allende, Soviet intelligence analysts do not give the CIA any credit. The Russians think the fault lay with Allende himself for not being enough of a strongman. He temporized with constitutional processes when he should have disregarded them. He did not follow the example of Fidel Castro, who executed more than 1,000 of his opponents when he came to power; 15 years later, he still rules Cuba. Nor did the CIA have any better luck against him.



ALLENDE'S LAST HOURS



TIME  
30 Sept. 1974

## Director Colby on the Record

In a rare on-the-record interview with TIME Correspondent Strobe Talbott, Director William Colby defended the CIA against its critics, ranged over the current functions of the agency, and discussed future prospects. Highlights:

### Why does the CIA intervene in other nations' internal affairs?

I'm not saying we're engaged in a campaign to bring democracy to the world. That's not what the U.S. Government expects from this agency. We're expected to carry out U.S. policy. Over the years, we've helped democratic forces rather broadly. In those cases where we have got involved with military regimes, we did so because there was a greater danger from some place else. I don't think we've toppled democratic regimes, and I don't think we did so in Chile. First, we didn't bring about the coup, and second, the Allende regime was not democratic. Granted the military regime is not democratic, I don't think a Communist regime is democratic.

Our program in Chile was to sustain the democratic forces against the Allende political forces, which were suppressing various democratic elements in a variety of ways—harassing radio stations, harassing some parts of the press and some political groups. We looked forward to the democratic forces coming to power in the elections of 1976.

### To what extent had Communist forces intervened in Chile?

Castro spent about a month down there in the late spring of 1973. There were a lot of extremist exiles in Chile from other countries in Latin America. There was a lot of assistance going into Chile from Cuba and other Communist sources. There are indications that there was some Soviet activity. They were putting some money in, as well as hardware of various sorts. This was a program to support an eventual takeover in what I would call a nondemocratic fashion—suppressing the opposition and extending Communist influence elsewhere in the hemisphere.

### Will the CIA continue to mount covert operations?

The CIA has three major functions: science and technological work, analysis, and the clandestine collection of intelligence. Now there's been a fourth responsibility, and that is positively influencing a situation through political or paramilitary means. That's the one that goes up and down depending on national policy. Right now it's way down.

The degree of our involvement in covert activities reflects the kind of world we live in. If it's a world where two superpowers are peering over the fence at each other, then it's a matter of concern when a hostile political group is about to take over a country. But if it's a world in which we've worked out a relationship of reasonable restraint, or détente, with the other superpowers, then it won't matter to us who runs one of these countries in a far-flung area.

Of course, something very close to us might still be important for political or security reasons. There may still be certain situations where U.S. interests—and I don't mean corporate interests, but fundamental political interests—can be adversely affected. In some of those cases it would be appropriate to take some modest action such as establishing a relationship with somebody who needs the help. But I stress: it's not now our Government's policy to engage in these situations around the world.

### How is a covert operation started?

We follow the traffic with the embassy. We follow the political attitudes that we have toward that country. We generate a specific suggestion in the light of what we think would be national policy. We don't do anything without approval.

Sometimes we get the specific suggestion from the outside—from an ambassador, from the State Department or from the National Security Council staff. They'll say: "Why don't you guys do so and so?" We have the technicians here who decide what is possible and what is not. It's the same sort of thing you get with military activity. How you land troops on a hostile shore is not developed in the White House. The Joint Chiefs develop a proposal. Then if the White House approves it, you go ahead.

But I want to emphasize that we're talking about a very small number of covert actions. Policy is generated at the NSC, not here.

### What would you regard as a successful covert action?

Laos. It was considered important to the U.S. that a country remain friendly and not be taken over by hostile forces. Rather than use our military force

BALTIMORE SUN  
24 September 1974

## Mondale assails CIA in speech here

By The Associated Press  
Senator Walter F. Mondale (D., Minn.) said yesterday that covert activity by the Central Intelligence Agency amounts to "a Watergate foreign policy." The nation, he said, will not be safe from future Watergates at home "unless we stop following a Watergate foreign policy abroad."

Senator Mondale made his remarks in a speech prepared for the Outstanding Speakers Series on the Baltimore campus of the University of Maryland.

"The odious collection"

"We must not ignore the fact that the odious collection of

or an enormous political effort, you try to influence some key people and key political groups. The Laos operation cost substantial amounts but was cheap compared with other ways of doing business. We were not involved in the 1967 coup in Greece or in the coup in Chile last year.

### Should the operational side of the CIA be separated from intelligence gathering?

That proposal stems from the Bay of Pigs. The problem there was that we didn't let the analysts in on the act. Now senior levels of the analyst community are aware of covert activities and have a chance to comment. In the early years of the agency, we tried conducting intelligence and action operations through two separate units, but they kept getting in each other's way.

### What alternatives to covert operations are possible for the CIA?

We could not—and did not—conduct the SALT negotiations and reach a SALT agreement until after our intelligence techniques had improved to the degree that we could tell whether the Soviets were going to abide by the agreements. On a number of occasions, we have identified a situation that was getting very sour in some country or between two countries. By reporting the facts and our assessment, we generated diplomatic action so that the trouble we predicted did not happen. For instance, peace arrangements might have broken down, but because of our intelligence, negotiations saved the situation.

In the future this sort of intelligence will help our country in negotiations and diplomatic relationships. As a result, we will be less likely to get into screaming crises, and there will be less need for covert action. It will be the increasing responsibility of the CIA to give our leaders the knowledge necessary to move into a dire situation and defuse it.

practices called Watergate — the break-ins, the buggings and wiretappings, the forgeries and fraud, and the coverup itself — were, and are, everyday activities of our foreign intelligence operations," Mr. Mondale said.

"The language of covert foreign operations, the techniques and the CIA operation themselves, were a major part of the infection we are now trying to purge from our domestic political system.

"I cannot see how we can effectively do so without also dealing with what is at least one source of infection — the underground operations of our intelligence service, and the purpose they serve and their

lack of accountability to the American people."

Mr. Mondale applauded United States initiatives to improve relations with the Soviet Union and China and to achieve peace in the Middle East, but said that "in other areas the United States has pursued unprincipled policies and engage in duplicity, deceit, wholesale undermining of democratic governments and shameful support of military dictatorships."

He said President Ford's explanation that CIA covert activity in Chile was intended to preserve political parties and news media opposed to the late President Salvador Allende was "unbelievable."

John P. Roche

CHICAGO TRIBUNE

24 SEP 1974

# Forked tongues lash CIA again

WASHINGTON—One can approach the recent allegations and quasirevelations about the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency in Chile from at least three different perspectives:

First, the moral question of the legitimacy of American interference in the internal affairs of any type of foreign state. Second, the moral question of the lack of candor of top American officials when queried by Congress on the matter. And third, the pragmatic issue of the wisdom of this particular attempt, or series of attempts, to affect the Chilean political balance.

As usual, all Washington discussions of the problem hopelessly mix up the moral and the pragmatic questions. A good dozen congressmen and senators are in search of a Mount from which to deliver their Sermons; commentators are arguing, some quite hysterically, that the President and his officials have no right to lie to Congress and the people, and poor Pat Moynihan, out there in India, is upset because he thinks Prime Minister Indira Gandhi will suspect the CIA of plotting her downfall. [Actually, as is well known, the CIA put her in office—if you don't believe me, check with Peking.]

I am the last man in the world to

TIME

7 Oct. 1974

## James Bond Is Irrelevant Now

To the Editors:

The Central Intelligence Agency is not a threat to our liberties and never has been. It is composed of dedicated officers who have high standards of integrity and patriotism. Should anyone attempt to subvert the agency to purposes that would threaten our society, CIA members would be the first to sound the alarm.

But the CIA is still a problem. Intelligence agencies rely on secrecy and deception. Yet secrecy corrodes public confidence in the Government and trust between the U.S. and other countries.

The problem is magnified when intelligence agencies engage in covert action, attempting to influence events, as we did in Chile. Covert action is questionable on moral grounds. It is expensive in dollars and in political repercussions. But the real irony is that these operations are rarely effective. The CIA is given credit for everything mysterious that happens in the world, but the truth is that the agency is not that good.

The main point to be

criticize morality, provided it is founded on a consistent body of principles.

BUT WHEN IT comes to characters who ooze piety in one area and sound like Machiavelli in others, I sign off.

Anybody in his right mind—who is not a saint—recognizes that the President and other high Administration figures must lie on occasion.

Saying this may get me thrown out of Sunday school, but I think it is vital that we penetrate the moralistic smog. The question is not, "Do we have the right to intervene in the internal affairs of other states?" We do that merely by existing: If Americans suddenly shifted from coffee to tea, 10 to 15 foreign economies would be destroyed.

MOREOVER, THE widespread support for the Jackson Amendment, relating to Soviet attitudes and actions towards would-be emigres, indicates that Congress is not perched on a high moral pinnacle. Indeed, I suspect that many of the "moral" critics of the CIA in Chile

pondered, however, is the way our policymakers use the CIA. In a world of sovereign states we need an intelligence agency, and as intelligence agencies go, the CIA is fairly good. The problem occurs when Presidents and Secretaries of State begin to think that James Bond has any relevancy to the real world. It is not William Colby who should be brought to judgment about the U.S. role in Chile, but Henry Kissinger.

Roger Hilsman  
New York City

The writer was an OSS combat officer during World War II, and in the 1960s served as the State Department's director of intelligence and research and as Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs. He is now a professor of politics at Columbia University.

President Ford's glib defense of the CIA's covert involvement in the internal political affairs of Chile represents a remarkable rejection of our professed foreign policy goals. One wonders how he squares such tactics with the oft-cited rationale for our involvement in Viet Nam: to allow national self-determination.

Richard G. Williams, M.D.

would have been delighted if the agency had helped oust the Greek junta.

So let us turn to the Chilean case and ask the serious questions. First, was the game worth the candle? Did an Allende "victory" [he only got a third of the popular vote] threaten any vital American interests?

Of course, he was going to put the screws on various U. S. multinational corporations, but if that justifies intervention, we should be trying to throw out every Arab oil sheik.

A reasonable prognosis was that Allende would do for Chile what Castro did for Cuba—turn a relatively advanced nation into an outdoor slum. That would be unfortunate for the Chileans, but their problem.

Second, I believe there should be thorough investigation of the way the CIA worked, the character of its operatives, and the extent to which the CIA payoff became a drunk-rolling operation on the part of the Chilean Christian Democratic politicians.

In my experience, the agency's "black" operatives are right out of a central casting bureau run by the novelist Graham Greene. Director William Colby, an extremely able man, should launch a massive purge of the "heavies," of the Howard Hunts who are still around.

The salutary cleansing of America, symbolized by the Administration of Gerald Ford, cannot be completed without inquiry into the operations of the CIA. If the superannuated sleuths of Watergate had their counterparts in the tragedy of Cyprus, it is time to call a halt. If investigation reveals CIA activity in relation to Cyprus, President Ford or Congress should terminate this virtually independent organization that has so often worked against the best interests of America and the world.

William L. Reese  
Athens

WASHINGTON STAR

30 SEP 1974

## Aussies for CIA

In Sidney, a weekly publication says Australian intelligence organizations secretly took over operations of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency when the United States was expelled from Cambodia in 1965. The operations were financed and largely controlled by the CIA, said the National Times.

# How Kissinger Runs Our 'Other Government'

By Tad Szulc

"... No such overt and covert power in foreign policy has ever been vested in any man, except the president, in our history..."

A shadowy group of five powerful officials silently directing America's clandestine foreign policy from the basement Situation Room in the White House in Washington—the so-called "40 Committee" of the National Security Council—is the nearest thing we have in this country to a secret super-government body.

Headed by Henry A. Kissinger, this committee is not always accountable even to the president of the United States, although it has access to virtually unlimited unvouchered government funds and holds the power to order far-ranging covert intelligence and paramilitary operations around the world. And during the Nixon Watergate era, it may have had links with secret domestic intelligence units, possibly including even the "Plumbers."

Deriving its name from National Security Council Intelligence Decision Memorandum No. 40, which set it up in its present form in 1969, the five-man 40 Committee is the current incarnation of similar top-secret White House groups that since 1947 have authorized dozens of major covert intelligence undertakings from Asia to Latin America and from Africa to Europe.

The most recent *known* large-scale operation conducted by the 40 Committee was the assignment given the Central Intelligence Agency, at the cost of \$8 million, to help orchestrate, from inside, the fall a year ago of the regime of Chile's late Socialist president, Salvador Allende Gossens, while other branches of the United States government applied a variety of simultaneous pressures from the outside.

This increasingly controversial enterprise was stunningly confirmed by President Ford at his news conference last Monday. His justification was both startling in philosophy and sparse on the facts, as he sought to give public legitimacy to the 40 Committee.

This was something no president had ever done before; actually, no senior official had ever publicly mentioned the committee.

Ford, in fact, institutionalized the concept of covert intelligence action (it was not even done during the cold war) when he commented that "Our government, like other governments, does take certain actions in the intelligence field to help implement foreign policy and protect national security... I am informed reliably that Communist nations spend vastly more money than

we do for the same kind of purposes."

Action against Allende between 1970 and 1973 was one of Kissinger's high-priority projects. He personally assumed control of the C.I.A.'s covert moves, through the 40 Committee, and of a parallel economic and financial blockade, working through an interdepartmental task force.

To Kissinger, it appears, Chile was a "laboratory" test case to determine whether a regime he opposed could be "destabilized" or dislodged without the use of military force that the United States had chosen to apply elsewhere in the past. Specifically, Chile was a test of whether a democratically elected leftist regime, as was Allende's, could be toppled through the creation of internal chaos by outside forces.

Recent revelations of Kissinger's alleged role in the Chilean affair—he has denied any American involvement, although the C.I.A., in effect, has confirmed it—have set off the latest controversy swirling around the secretary of state, and have raised again questions about his credibility and future intentions.

There are reasons to suspect, for example, that the 40 Committee is studying plans for possible covert American intervention in the confused political process in Italy, where the Communist party may soon share power in a coalition government. Actually, more than a year ago the former U.S. ambassador in Rome, Graham Martin, reportedly asked the Nixon administration for secret funds to bolster the Christian Democrats in Italy—just as the United States had done in the crucial 1948 elections.

The 40 Committee reportedly also has on its agenda the situations in Portugal and Greece—where rightist regimes collapsed earlier this year and leftist influences are feared by the U.S.—as well as dangers facing the white governments in southern Africa in view of Mozambique's impending independence. The C.I.A. has a working alliance with South African and Rhodesian intelligence services against leftist black "liberation" movements.

Contingency planning to assure United States access to oil reserves in the Middle East and elsewhere is likewise said to be on the agenda. In fact, the C.I.A., working under a National Security Council mandate, did overthrow the Iranian government in 1953 after it nationalized foreign oil holdings.

Past activities by the 40 Committee

and its predecessors have ranged from engineering the overthrow of foreign regimes disliked by Washington to the creation of secret armies and counter-insurgency units for the protection of governments enjoying our official favor. They have included political subversion, the subornation of statesmen, politicians, labor leaders, and others abroad, "black" propaganda, and the oversight of "spy-in-the-sky" espionage over the Soviet Union, China, and scores of other countries.

Overhead intelligence is the only form of actual espionage in the purview of the 40 Committee. The C.I.A., other intelligence agencies, and separate White House committees (also chaired by Kissinger) are concerned with the collection of normal intelligence.

The 40 Committee must approve, every month, overhead intelligence programs—from the regular launching of photo-satellites to secret flights by the SR-71 spy planes—because of the risk of serious international complications. The U-2 incident over the Soviet Union in 1960 has not been forgotten.

The monthly plans are submitted to the 40 Committee by a C.I.A. committee so secret that its existence and its name—Comrex—have never before, to my knowledge, been publicly discussed. The National Reconnaissance Office, another top-secret organization under the 40 Committee's overall control, is responsible for the actual launching of overhead intelligence vehicles.

For nearly six years, the 40 Committee has been run by Kissinger, acting as chairman in his capacity of special assistant to the president for national security affairs. It is not relevant in this context that he has also held for a year the post of secretary of state. His power in the field of clandestine foreign policy has been unchallenged since Nixon took office in 1969. It remains so under Ford.

Kissinger has been for years the de facto boss of the United States intelligence community, greatly cutting down the influence of the C.I.A. in decision-making. No such concentration of power in foreign policy has ever been vested in any man, except the president, in modern American history.

Presently associated with Kissinger on the 40 Committee are Director of Central Intelligence William E. Colby, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General George S. Brown, Deputy Secretary of Defense William P. Clements,

and Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Joseph J. Sisco. Membership on the committee is not personal: it goes with these four jobs. Because of successive changes in the other departments, Kissinger is the only man to have remained continuously on the committee for the whole period.

The possibility that the 40 Committee may have had connections with secret domestic intelligence stems from the fact that former Attorney General John N. Mitchell began attending meetings in 1970. Given the secrecy covering the 40 Committee, the White House never announced Mitchell's presence; it became known from congressional testimony. No other attorney general had ever before served on the 40 Committee or on any of its forerunners.

Richard Helms, the former C.I.A. head, also testified that he thought, but was not certain, that former White House Director of the Domestic Council John Ehrlichman and White House Chief of Staff H. R. Haldeman may have come to one or two 40 Committee sessions. He said that they attended either meetings of the 40 Committee or of the Washington Special Action Group (WASAG), the White House foreign policy crisis-management committee. Both bodies are headed by Kissinger and have identical memberships.

One intriguing question is whether the 40 Committee—or Kissinger—may have wanted the Plumbers to help out in the covert operations against Chile. A half-dozen unexplained break-ins into offices and homes of Chilean diplomats in Washington and New York in the spring of 1972, just before Watergate, have been attributed to the Plumbers, although there is no proof.

Kissinger had had indirect dealings with the Plumbers since 1971, when he listened to an interview tape-recorded by David Young, his former aide and subsequently a Plumber, with a navy yeoman charged with secretly passing National Security Council documents to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

To understand the basic functions of the 40 Committee it is essential to realize that almost invariably United States policy is executed on two parallel levels: overt and covert. The overt policy is visibly carried out by the State Department and other above-the-board agencies; the U.S. takes full responsibility for all their actions.

Covert policy, which must never be traced back to the president and the United States government (though it often is so traced because of failures or disclosures in the press or elsewhere), is the province of the 40 Committee today, as it was the responsibility of its predecessors.

It is thus an error to ascribe such American international adventures as the 1953 coup d' état in Iran, the overthrow of the leftist Guatemalan regime in 1954, the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, the 1964 intervention in the Congo, the formation of the "secret army" in Laos in 1961, or the most recent involvement in Chile, to aberrations by a wild-running C.I.A.

In every instance, major undercover

intelligence operations had been formally approved by secret political committees before the C.I.A. was free to proceed, although many, if not most, of these actions were unquestionably first proposed by the agency.

Because of the extraordinary secrecy surrounding the deliberations of the 40 Committee, and the complex system of special top-secret clearances designed to confine the number of officials apprised of covert operations to an absolute minimum, the government as a whole is kept totally in the dark about undercover foreign policy, even if it carries the risk of a full-fledged war.

There have been instances over the years when even secretaries of state remained uninformed about large covert operations and actually believed the White House-inspired "plausible denial" when the C.I.A. or the Pentagon were caught red-handed somewhere in the world. "Plausible denial" is one of the principles upon which the 40 Committee and its forerunners have operated. The idea is that the denial of a secret foreign enterprise must be believable enough to protect the president from embarrassment—or worse. Consequently, overt and covert policies often run at cross-purposes.

C.I.A. Director Colby, an old hand in clandestine operations, claims that covert activities have been sharply curtailed in recent years. But in a speech in Washington earlier this month before a conference on "C.I.A. and Covert Actions" organized by the Center for National Security Studies, Colby said that "in a world which can destroy itself through misunderstanding or miscalculation, it is important that our leaders have a clear perception of the motives, intentions, and strategies of other powers so that they can be deterred, negotiated about, or countered in the interests of peace or, if necessary, the ultimate security of our country.

"These kinds of insights," Colby said, "cannot be obtained only through technical means or analysis. From closed societies they can only be obtained by secret intelligence operations, without which our country must risk subordination to possible adversaries."

This, of course, referred to espionage by the C.I.A., presumably in Communist countries. But Colby also made a case for the kinds of covert political operations—such as those in Chile—that are of immediate concern to the 40 Committee.

"There have also been, and are still, certain situations in the world in which some discreet support can assist America's friends against her adversaries in their contest for control of a foreign nation's political direction," he said. "While these instances are few today compared to the 1950's, I believe it only prudent for our nation to be able to act in such situations, and thereby forestall greater difficulties for us in the future. . . . I would think it mistaken to deprive our nation of the possibility of some moderate, covert action response to a foreign problem and leave us with nothing between a diplomatic protest and sending the marines," Colby added.

In effect, Colby was saying that the United States *should* act to intervene covertly in the internal affairs of other nations if a new Chile-like situation arises in the future. He could well have been thinking of Italy, Greece, Portugal, or an African country when he spoke of the "control of a foreign nation's political direction." And, clearly, the definition of what constitutes "discreet support" and "moderate covert action" is left to the C.I.A. and the 40 Committee.

Colby was accurate in insisting that the C.I.A. performs covert intelligence operations—its "dirty tricks"—"only when specifically authorized by the National Security Council." In fact, the National Security Act of 1947, which created the C.I.A., provides that "it shall be the duty of the Agency, under the direction of the National Security Council . . . to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct."

Colby thus laid the responsibility for the C.I.A.'s far-flung subversive activities at the door of the 40 Committee, which is the National Security Council body in charge of approving covert intelligence operations. This was a way of saying that the C.I.A. will carry out whatever Henry Kissinger determines—and let him take the blame or the credit—even though Colby, too, sits on the secret committee.

In practice, a decision made by the 40 Committee is communicated to the director of Central Intelligence in a National Security Council Intelligence Decision Memorandum. The authorizing document, known as a N.S.C.I.D., is handed by Kissinger to Colby for implementation. Colby, of course, wears the two hats of director of the central intelligence community and of director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Colby then issues a D.C.I.D. (Director Central Intelligence Decision) to the C.I.A. (which means himself) or whatever other agency—the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, or the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research—may be involved in a covert operation.

At the C.I.A., projects approved by the 40 Committee are handled by the Covert Action Staff (formerly the Psychological and Paramilitary Division), one of the clandestine service branches in the Directorate of Operations.

In a case like Chile's, where the plan called for creating economic chaos, the C.A.S. would turn to its Economic Warfare Section as well as to other specialized sections. The Financial Section, for example, would be in charge of secretly purchasing currency of the target country for operational use.

In his new book on the C.I.A., Philip B. F. Agee, a former clandestine services agent, tells how the agency had to covertly buy hundreds of thousands of dollars' worth of Chilean escudos in New York, Lima, Rio de Janeiro, and Montevideo to help finance its covert operations against Allende during his unsuccessful presiden-

tial campaign in 1964. Massive conversion of dollars into escudos in Santiago would have aroused suspicion—recent testimony by Colby showed that the C.I.A. had invested \$3 million in the 1964 campaign—and the agency was thus forced to fly valises of Chilean money into the country.

Kissinger, caught in the recent Chilean controversy, has been telling friendly newsmen that he should not be blamed because, after all, "95 per cent" of operations proposed to the 40 Committee originate with the C.I.A.

The record and a certain knowledge of the 40 Committee's *modus operandi* do not entirely bear out Kissinger's exculpatory assertions. In the end, the final decision is his—or the president's.

All indications are that Kissinger raised the Chilean problem in the 40 Committee when it met in the White House Situation Room on June 27, 1970, to consider actions if Allende were elected on September 4. Kissinger was quoted as saying that "I don't see why we need to stand by and watch a country go Communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people." It was at that meeting that the committee authorized the C.I.A. to spend \$400,000 for covert political propaganda against Allende's candidacy.

A former White House official reports having seen a memorandum with an August, 1970, date, signed by the C.I.A. liaison officer with the 40 Committee, authorizing the expenditure of \$200,000 in unvouchered funds for the covert media campaign against Allende. The memorandum was on White House stationery and made no reference to the 40 Committee. The 40 Committee keeps no files, and written references to it in official documents, no matter how secret, are forbidden.

On July 24, 1970, Kissinger ordered his regular staff to prepare a National Security Study Memorandum on Chile. Known as NSSM-97, this secret document outlined options for the Nixon administration should Allende win. The options ranged from the type of clandestine C.I.A. action ultimately undertaken to severe economic measures designed to undermine the Allende government and create chaos that, it was hoped, would lead to a military revolution.

Allende won a plurality, but not a majority, in the election, and a runoff was to be held in the Chilean Congress on October 24 between Allende and Jorge Alessandri, the conservative runner-up supported by the United States. On September 18, therefore, Kissinger reportedly proposed to the 40 Committee that the C.I.A. be authorized to expend \$350,000 to bribe Chilean congressmen to vote for Alessandri.

By all accounts, then C.I.A. Director Richard Helms was cool to the idea on practical grounds, as was Charles A. Meyer, then assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs, who was invited to be present as an expert at the 40 Committee meeting. Kissinger, however, carried the day with the support of the other 40 Committee members, including U. Alexis Johnson, then under secretary of state for political

affairs. Helms fell into line.

As Colby testified in a closed congressional session last April, the 40 Committee ultimately approved a total of \$8 million to "destabilize" the Allende government. In earlier testimony, Kissinger had flatly denied any United States or C.I.A. involvement in the Chilean coup.

In his appearance at the Center for National Security Studies, Colby did not deny that the C.I.A. had spent the \$8 million in Chile. He insisted, however, that the money was not used to trigger the coup, but "to help our democratic friends in Chile" to vote the Socialist regime out of office in the 1976 elections.

Colby did not explain why America's friends were "democratic" while the Allende crowd, put in office in a free election, were not. But even if the C.I.A. and Kissinger really were not aiming at a coup, the fact remains that the U.S. had deeply intervened in Chile's internal politics. Intervention in internal affairs of a pro-U.S. or neutral country by Communists is, of course, regarded by Washington as a heinous act, justifying reprisals.

Ford's justification for the American interference in Chilean politics was that it was done "to help and assist the preservation of opposition newspapers and electronic media and to preserve opposition political parties." His previous sentence was, "There was an effort being made by the Allende government to destroy opposition news media, both the writing press as well as the electronic press. And to destroy opposition political parties."

The president then concluded, in words probably not heard publicly since Teddy Roosevelt's day, that what the United States had done in Chile was "in the best interest of the people in Chile, and certainly in our best interest." With this, Mr. Ford took us back to the "Father Knows Best" approach in American foreign policy.

However, the real problem with the Ford exposition is that it flies in the face of facts, and suggests that the new president does not do his homework in a crucial area of foreign policy. Instead, he seems to rely on advisers who either do not know any better or act self-servingly.

In the first place, the Allende regime never openly violated the Chilean constitution. The Chilean Congress, dominated by Allende's opponents, functioned until the last day (there is no Congress, nor even political parties, under the military junta that replaced Allende); there was no serious interference with the freedom of speech and press (now there are only pro-government newspapers); and there were no political prisoners other than a few persons charged with political crimes such as assassination (now there are at least 20,000 political prisoners, and torture is common). Allende, in fact, lost two important congressional and municipal elections after coming to power.

Obviously, the leftist Allende regime fought its opposition through a variety of means—not all that different

from what Mr. Ford's political party here did to the Democrats under his predecessor. To be sure, there were extreme leftist armed goons and terrorist squads, but the right-wing opposition had its own armed groups. It would be useful to learn whether any of the opposition's weapons came from the outside as the United States aided its "democratic friends."

In the second place, the opposition press in Chile (comprising the majority of important newspapers and radio stations) was never on the brink of destruction—certainly not to the tune of \$8 million or whatever sum the C.I.A. spread among its media clients. *El Mercurio*, the principal opposition newspaper in Santiago, was closed down once or twice for short periods for advocating insurrection. It is true that *El Mercurio*'s owners were divested of their banking and shipping holdings, but this was hardly an injury to the freedom of the press—and certainly none of our business.

Mr. Ford's astounding comments, coming in the wake of Colby's admissions on the role of the C.I.A. in Chile, not surprisingly led the Senate Foreign Relations Committee the next day to vote to reopen its investigation of the American participation in the Chilean events. It may become the president's first serious dispute with Congress over foreign policy (senators take a dim view of the Ford contention that the 40 Committee and covert "dirty tricks" abroad are fully justified), and former senior C.I.A. and State Department officials may face contempt and perjury charges for their earlier denials that the United States was involved in anti-Allende activities. Inevitably, Kissinger's credibility is once more at stake.

And there still remains the question of violating international law through such acts. Most international law experts agree, at least in theory, that U.S. covert activities violate it more frequently than anything perpetrated by the Russians or the Chinese outside their immediate area of influence.

President Ford, however, is not interested in legalities. He told his Monday news conference that "I'm not going to pass judgment on whether [the destabilizing of foreign governments] is permitted or authorized under international law. It's a recognized fact that, historically as well as presently, such actions are taken in the best interests of the countries involved." He was apparently making the point that what was good enough in the past is good enough today.

Then there is the problem of the 40 Committee's accountability. The C.I.A. is accountable to four special congressional subcommittees, though none of them ever seriously questions the agency's activities and expenditures. The Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Intelligence sometimes fails to meet more often than once a year.

But the 40 Committee is not accountable to anybody. There are no minutes of its formal meetings, which occur once or twice a month. Additionally, Kissinger also runs the 40 Committee through telephone consultations. But

inasmuch as the other four members are burdened by their day-to-day duties, Kissinger in effect often obtains unanimous decisions almost by default.

In the area of accountability, too, President Ford was either misinformed himself or misinforming the public. He said that the 40 Committee's decisions are "relayed to the responsible congressional committees, where [they are] reviewed. . . ." This, of course, is not so. There is no known instance of the 40 Committee—or its chairman—consulting with any congressional committee about what it orders the C.I.A. to do. When a committee discovers something, it comes from the press or, begrudgingly, from the C.I.A. after the fact.

Under the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, when the super-government body was known as the "303 Committee" (under Eisenhower it was called the "54/12 Committee" and under Truman it was first the "10/12" and then "10/15"), the preparatory staff work was of greater importance than it is today.

The 40 Committee, the State Department, the Pentagon, and the C.I.A. still prepare the agenda quite carefully, but it carries less weight. In the State Department, this function is in the hands of the Intelligence and Research Bureau. At the Pentagon, the work for the deputy secretary of defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is done by the special assistant to the secretary of defense for covert intelligence. The C.I.A. prepares the agenda in Colby's executive offices.

The tentative agenda is first reviewed by State, Defense, and C.I.A. officials to determine which projects should be presented to the full 40 Committee. But most operations—when they reach

Washington Post  
24 Sept. 1974

## \$82 Billion Approved By House for Defense

The House overwhelmingly passed a record \$82.6 billion defense appropriation bill yesterday over objections that it contains hidden CIA funds and money for an aircraft the Pentagon does not want.

Adopted 293 to 59, the conference compromise now goes to the Senate.

The measure is the largest single appropriation bill ever passed by the House even though it was cut \$4.4 billion below administration request.

Rep. Robert N. Giaino (D-Conn.) said a previous defense appropriation bill apparently was used to raise money to finance the covert CIA operations in Chile. He said most congressmen do not know how much money the CIA gets from the \$82.6 billion bill.

"It raises the question: can and should the United States

the 40 Committee—are approved with only limited scrutiny. They may range from ongoing operations in, say, Indochina, to the intervention in Chile, exploratory covert actions in Italy or Greece, or something as insignificant as authorizing the spending of \$50,000 to help out a friendly newspaper in a foreign country. For years, the 303 and 40 Committees approved expenditures through the C.I.A. to keep alive Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty—broadcasting, respectively, to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

Not surprisingly, for security reasons, the 40 Committee has virtually no staff of its own. Formally, a single C.I.A. official is assigned to the committee to handle the staff work; he is assisted by a typist who probably has the highest security clearance of any secretary in Washington.

There are indications, however, that Kissinger maintains private liaison with the C.I.A.'s clandestine services, known as the Directorate of Operations, through another C.I.A. operative. This would make it possible for Kissinger to bypass not only his own 40 Committee but even C.I.A. Director Colby. In the past, Kissinger had a similar personal "back channel" to the Joint Chiefs of Staff to bypass Melvin R. Laird, then secretary of defense, to order covert air strikes in Indochina.

The National Security Council is directly subordinate to the president. As an organ of the N.S.C., the 40 Committee is theoretically accountable to the full National Security Council as well as to the president. There is no evidence, however, that the 40 Committee ever reports to the Council. What is not known is whether Kissinger seeks presidential approval for every decision taken by the 40 Committee.

"You can argue that in some cases

Kissinger will not inform the president of the United States of a covert operation in order to protect him from knowledge and avoid embarrassment to him," a senior intelligence official said. "If the scheme works he can decide later whether the president should be bothered with the details. If it fails, there's plenty of time to tell him. And sometimes presidents figure that what they don't know doesn't hurt them, so long as it doesn't get out of hand."

There is a legend in the intelligence community that only the president can authorize the assassination of a foreign leader. This is, so the story goes, one time when the chairman of the 40 Committee simply must consult the president. But no official in Washington can say whether this has ever been tested. "The president doesn't order assassinations—period" is the answer to inquiries on the subject.

Still, one is haunted by the thought of such extraordinary power being so tightly held and exercised in absolute secrecy by a tiny group of men—even if it does sometimes include the president. C.I.A. Director Colby's claim that, in effect, the United States must have the option to covertly do away with any foreign government it finds objectionable—without the repugnant alternative of "sending the marines"—must sound alarming to a democratic society that says it stands for the rule of law in the world order. And it is Henry Kissinger, speaking for the United States, who rhetorically invokes the principle of world order.

As for President Ford and his "open administration," his view is that nothing needs changing: he told his news conference last Monday that "It seems to me that the 40 Committee should continue in existence."

### NEW YORK TIMES 02 October 1974 STATE DEPT. VOICES CONCERN ON LEAKS

WASHINGTON, Oct. 1 (AP)—The State Department, two of whose confidential cablegrams have found their way into the press recently, has acknowledged publicly that it is disturbed about security. But while openly expressing concern, a spokesman said he was unaware that any investigation of the problem had begun.

The most recent official criticism of the leaks followed the publication yesterday of part of a cable from the Ambassador to Egypt, Herman F. Eils, regarding foreign aid for Cairo. In a cablegram last week the Ambassador to Chile, David H. Popper, described a July 22 meeting he had with Chilean officials. This too was a rebuke to the Ambassador by Secretary of State Kissinger, which was reported in the press.

Asked at the State Department briefing yesterday if the department was initiating an investigation, the department spokesman, John F. King, replied: "There is no such investigation that I'm aware of, but you shouldn't take from that any notion the matter isn't taken seriously. It is very poor

Stratton, (D-N.Y.) said the Pentagon wants to halt production of the General Dynamics F-111 so Congress will have no alternative later but to approve the new advanced B-1 bomber.

The Air Force is building and testing B-1 prototypes before deciding whether to ask Congress to make it a standard heavy long-range successor to the present B-52.

The final \$82.6 billion compromise appropriation was worked out by House-Senate conferees. Military aid to South Vietnam was cut to \$700 million from an original administration request of \$1.6 billion.

The bill funds all weapons development and defense personnel and operations cost for the fiscal year started July 1.

Other defense funds are in a separate military construction bill and in the military aid section of the foreign aid bill.

continue to use covert operations to overthrow governments of other countries," Giaino said. "I think it is shameful and we should terminate it now."

Chairman George H. Mahon, (D-Tex.) of the House Appropriations Committee said the CIA money in the bill has been justified to him and other members of a special appropriations subcommittee.

"We of course do not want to telegraph to the Kremlin the inmost secrets of our country," Mahon said.

Rep. H. R. Gross (R-Iowa) objected that the bill for the second year, funds 12 more swinging F-111 jet bombers at a cost of \$205 million even though the Pentagon wants to halt production.

Mahon and Rep. Samuel S.

NEW YORK TIMES

29 September 1974

# The K.G.B. Plays Dirty Tricks, Too

By ROBERT CONQUEST

LONDON—Recent revelations about the Central Intelligence Agency's activities in Chile and elsewhere raise the questions of the nature and extent of comparable actions by its great rival, the K.G.B., the Soviets' Committee for Government Security. In fact there is a good deal of knowledge available, not from the Soviet press or Government, but from victims or intended victims who found out the hard way.

The K.G.B. is not simply a Soviet mirror-image of the C.I.A. (or even of the C.I.A. plus the Federal Bureau of Investigation). One difference was demonstrated a couple of weeks ago when Pravda announced the award, on his 70th birthday, of the Order of the October revolution to Semyon Ignatiev who was Stalin's last head of the organization and who was responsible for, among other things, the notorious doctors' plot purge. Yuri Andropov, the current K.G.B. chief, got the Order of Lenin and the title Hero of Socialist Labor earlier, after a speech in which President Nikolai Podgorny praised his "strengthening and improving" this important sector of state activity."

The sort of fears about the C.I.A. that have arisen in the United States, have no parallel in Soviet concerns about the K.G.B.

The C.I.A. and the K.G.B. also differ in size and resources. Perhaps 6 of every 10 Soviet diplomats and other representatives abroad are K.G.B. personnel; those not directly employed must also help out when called upon.

In 1971, the British expelled 105 members of the Soviet Embassy staff. Espionage figured largely in the British Government's explanation for its action, but it was also established that British intelligence had discovered plans for sabotage, not only of military installations but also of such things as water supplies.

The British incident was by no means a lone example. Since 1960, at least 380 Soviet diplomats have been expelled from their posts in 40 countries on all six continents. Oddly enough, men expelled by one country frequently turn up—without even a name change—in neighboring capitals.

Not that operations are always conducted through embassies. Sometimes the route is more direct. That was the case with arms supplied to the Provisional faction of the Irish Republican Army, several tons of which, en route from Prague to the Ulster terrorists, were seized at Amsterdam in October, 1971.

Financial intervention to support pro-Soviet elements is old-established practice but does not necessarily go through the K.G.B. channels, since practically every other Soviet channel is secret too. Communist parties have long been so funded: The details of subventions to the Italian Communist party, again via Prague, were established 20 years ago. Recently there have been other examples including the discovery by Mexican officials in 1963, and by Brazilians in 1972, of scores of thousands of dollars concealed in the luggage of party officials returning from Moscow. The Colombians, in 1968, intercepted a \$100,000 subsidy to terrorists, by the K.G.B. itself.

And when it comes to such matters as coups and plots, the last three years alone have seen the organization of the Ali Sabry plot against the regime in Egypt (1971); the plot against Gen. Gaafar al-Nimeiry in the Sudan (1971); the organization, arming and training of guerrillas, for which five Soviet diplomats were expelled from Mexico (1971); a plot in Rumania (1972); plots in Bolivia and Colombia for which Soviet diplomats and others were expelled (1972); a plot in Tunisia with the same results (1973); the recently discovered plot in Yugoslavia. There, on Sept. 12, Marshal Tito referred publicly to a case that had been brewing for some months and which involved the arrest and forthcoming trial of an underground "Stalinist" grouping, which relied on help from "abroad" and whose leaders are old Soviet nominees and K.G.B. contacts.

The fact that some of these occurred in Communist countries was no phenomenon. Earlier examples included the Soviet-sponsored "Natolin" plot against Wladyslaw Gomulka in 1956, and Admiral Teme Sejko's conspiracy in Albania in 1964. They even extended to Cuba where, in 1968, several Soviet diplomats and others were denounced and expelled for organizing and supporting an attempt to seize power.

Later, of course, differences between Premier Fidel Castro and Moscow were largely accommodated, and the Cuban secret service has been largely financed by Moscow for operations in South America, just as the Czechoslovak equivalent is the K.G.B.'s favored auxiliary in Western Europe. In the case of Chile, where the C.I.A.'s conduct is now under attack, it was through their Cuban subordinates that the K.G.B. directed the training of guerrillas. Their own direct operations in Chile were largely of the cash-and-organization type. In that, at least, there apparently is a parallel with the C.I.A.

Robert Conquest is an author of books on the Soviet Union, including "Power and Policy in the U.S.S.R."

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER

24 Sep 1974

## CIA Role Charged in Australia

United Press International

CANBERRA—Charges that the U. S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) offered funds in an unsuccessful effort to help defeat the Australian Labor Government in elections last May were lodged Monday in a book by an Australian political journalist.

Ray Aitchison, a former employe of the state-owned radio and television network and author of several books, made the charges in "Looking at the Liberals," a study of the opposition Liberal Party.

He did not say whether any CIA money was actually spent in Australia, nor did he name the sources of his information.

But, he said, he was told that CIA funds were available to help defeat the Labor government of Prime Minister E. Gough Whitlam.

(In Washington, Treasury sources Monday confirmed that Schulz was planning a visit to Australia early this year but that it was called off when the election date was announced. This was explained as normal diplomatic procedure to avoid becoming involved in campaign issues.)

Relations between Australia and the United States, traditionally close, have cooled since the nationalistic Labor Party, for the first time in 23 years, ousted the staunchly pro-American Liberals in elections in 1972.

They reached the lowest point in years when Whitlam sent former President Richard M. Nixon a personal note of protest about the U. S. bombing of North Vietnam during the 1972 Christmas season.

LOS ANGELES TIMES  
27 September 1974

## WHY THE CIA PROPPED UP THE CHILEAN PRESS

# Allende Attempted to Quash All Opposition

BY DAVID F. BELNAP

SANTIAGO—Chilean political parties and communications media unsympathetic to Marxist-Leninism were clearly targets of repressive and destructive efforts during the late President Salvador Allende's regime, as President Ford has said.

Mr. Ford admitted that the United States, through the Central Intelligence Agency, had intervened in Chilean affairs while Allende governed, seeking to justify such interference as an effort to keep alive "opposition newspapers, electronic media and to preserve opposition political parties."

An earlier, congressional source reported that up to \$8 million was spent by the CIA in Chile during the Allende years, 1970-73.

Given Mr. Ford's statement and the conditions that developed in Chile under Allende, it's fair to speculate that clandestine U.S. financial assistance went to a number of radio stations, to at least five newspapers, to perhaps three political parties and, directly or indirectly, to a manufacturer of newsprint.

(The purpose here is not to examine whether, ethically or strategically, these expenditures should have been made, but to outline the situation that incited them.)

Except for an exaggerated amount of verbal thunder, a characteristic of both sides in the long and bitter Chilean confrontation, the attacks by the People's Union (UP) on its political and media enemies were rarely frontal or overt. They were nearly always financial in some way. And in the media's case, they were almost never as heavyhanded as, say, censorship.

The printed and broadcast media opposed to Allende wrote and said what they wished during his nearly three years in office. The question was always their ability to survive, economically, to continue expressing themselves.

Just three months after Allende took office, the printed media got an idea of what might be in store when the government acquired a near-monopoly over slick-paper magazine and book publishing in Chile. It did so by buying out a private company that had first been softened up by a long strike of Communist-led printers followed by an arbitration award by a Communist arbitrator that threatened it with bankruptcy.

Radio stations, always important political tools in Chile, got an inkling of what lay ahead even before Allende's inauguration. Communist Party communications experts called on them suggesting they shake up their news staffs to make room for designated Marxist journalists or risk losing their licenses later on.

The government is Chile's largest advertiser. Under Allende, government entities—and, as they were taken over by the state, private industries—gave advertising only to media owned by or sympathetic to UP's elements and supporters. These included, by the time Allende fell, about one half of the nation's radio stations (one of them, the largest, owned by Allende himself) and five of the 11 daily newspapers

then publishing in this capital.

Commercial television in Chile is all university or state supported, and therefore not wholly dependent on advertising for survival. Moreover, during much of Allende's administration, nearly all Chilean television was controlled by Marxists or their sympathizers. This changed only after Santiago's Catholic University wrested control of its channel from Allende sympathizers and joined Valparaiso's Catholic University in a move to extend non-Marxist-oriented television to all Chileans, using homemade microwave relay stations. They succeeded to a remarkable degree in the face of strenuous, often even physical, efforts by the government to block them.

By mid-1971, Santiago's El Mercurio, the nation's largest newspaper, had lost 60% of its normal advertising volume, while the average non-UP radio station had suffered an average loss of 80%.

The erosion continued as small independent businesses stopped advertising altogether as their stocks of merchandise declined and demand far exceeded supplies. All the while, costs of publishing and broadcasting were rising in the face of double-digit inflation that became triple-digit in 1972 and thereafter.

Government authorities ignored requests for licenses to import spare parts and replacement equipment for deteriorating physical plants, and, in the case of radio stations, such essentials as tape recorder heads and magnetic tapes.

In the case of El Mercurio and of many radio stations, UP-manipulated unions tried to create pretenses for government takeovers. The El Mercurio company, which publishes three daily newspapers here and five elsewhere in the nation, was the target of tax investigations, allegations of illegal foreign exchange dealings and the personal vituperation of Allende.

The regime's strongest effort to get some kind of effective handle on the "unfriendly" printed media involved unceasing attempts to take over the nation's only independent paper manufacturer, the source of newsprint for all non-UP as well as many pro-UP publications.

First the government tried to buy up a controlling stock interest from the company's 16,000 shareholders, then to persuade congress to establish a state newsprint monopoly, and finally to create a takeover pretext through the paper company's unions, a tactic that had worked in the cases of other industries.

When these all failed, the economic squeeze began. Price controls on paper products were not relaxed to keep pace with rising production costs. The paper company posted a \$9.1 million loss for the 12 months ending June 30, 1972, and losses climbed to a rate of \$120,000 per day later that year. Authority to raise prices given by the government in October, 1972, provided less

than half the needed relief, according to declarations of the company's unions at that time.

By 1972, the plight of the non-UP radio stations was desperate. Twice that year congress authorized a special tax to help finance all radio stations, Allende vetoed both.

After the second veto in September, it appeared that the four main non-UP stations in this capital, as well as smaller outlets nationwide, might go under. Yet they survived, forming part of a voluntary hookup dubbed the "Democratic Network" that gave Allende's opposition an outlet in competition with UP's similarly organized, countrywide network.

The independent paper manufacturer survived, as did El Mercurio. So did La Prensa, bought by Christian Democratic interests after Allende's election but before his inauguration, and Tribuna, founded by the National Party early in his term. Both presumably received financial support from or through their parties, since neither ever carried much advertising. (La Prensa and Tribuna were closed by the military junta that toppled Allende, as part of its determination to place politics in "recess.")

UP employed economic and divide-and-conquer techniques against opposition political parties, decimating Chile's traditional radical party by the latter method and striving to sink the right-wing National Party by destroying the economic power of its major elements.

Since no accounting of political financing is required by Chilean law, it's difficult to trace how the parties themselves fared economically under Allende.

The principal political target of the UP was the Christian Democratic Party, the largest of the nation's single parties. Among the six members of the UP coalition, the Communists especially recognized that co-opting or dividing the Christian Democrats was essential to the stability of UP's minority administration.

But except for a small defection occurring a few days after 1970's presidential election, the Christian Democrats remained intact, moving gradually from a position of loyal opposition to one of rock-hard opposition.

Trying to save Allende, whose Marxist Socialist party formed the largest irrational element within the UP, the Communists even sought help from the Catholic church, asking it to mediate with the Christian Democrats to help shore up a collapsing regime.

By then, however, it was much too late. Allende had long since cooked his goose with the Christian Democrats by systematically breaking all of the promises he'd given in return for their runoff votes in congress, and cynically telling French Socialist intellectual Regis Debray in an interview that he made the promises in the first place solely to assure his election.



## Journalists Doubling as CIA Contacts

By Oswald Johnston  
The Washington Post

The Central Intelligence Agency has some three dozen American journalists working abroad on its payroll as undercover informants, some of them as full-time agents, the *Star-News* has learned.

After CIA director William E. Colby ordered a review of the practice two months ago, agency officials found the names of some 40 full-time reporters, free-lance journalists and correspondents for trade publications in their files

as regular undercover contacts who supplied information to agents in the field and who are regularly paid for their services.

The use of foreign correspondents by the CIA has been quietly suspected—and feared—for years by legitimate reporters who have worked overseas. But the suspicion has never been verifiable until now. The facts were made known by an authoritative source.

The continuing extent of the practice and its wide scope, which is believed to have been scaled down since the Cold War tensions of the

1960s, was apparently a surprise even to Colby, who last month ordered a significant cutback in the CIA relationship with journalists connected with major news organizations.

NO LONGER to remain on the agency payroll is the one category of journalist-agents whose continued existence could most seriously compromise the integrity of the American press in general and possibly cripple its ability to function overseas.

To be phased out is a small group of no more

than five full-time staff correspondents with general-circulation news organizations who function as undercover contacts for the CIA and are paid for their services on a regular contractual basis.

It is understood that three of these agents have maintained their CIA contacts without the knowledge of the news organizations involved, but that the CIA sideline of the other two is known to their civilian employers.

See CIA, A-18

—The story that was not pursued

### The CIA's use of the press: a 'mighty Wurlitzer'

Journalists themselves are involved, and that may explain media neglect of this story

STUART H. LOORY

American journalists relentlessly pursued every allegation they could find in the 1960's to document the Central Intelligence Agency's infiltration of student organizations, trade unions and foundations. Yet, when it was reported last November that newsmen themselves were on the payroll of the CIA, the story caused a brief stir, and then was dropped.

Still ignored by the news media is the story of the use and infiltration of the American news business by the CIA—a story that includes:

- CIA contracts with some 30 journalists (by the agency's own count) who work overseas as stringers, free-lance writers and full-time correspondents for small publications;
- CIA efforts to plant false or misleading news stories in world-wide news services;
- CIA requests for information, often accompanied by cash payments, made to U.S. newsmen in such diverse places as Spain, Italy, and Eastern Europe, and to newsmen at home awaiting foreign assignments;
- CIA access to information in the home offices of some large U.S. news organizations;
- Secret CIA ownership, for a period of seven years, of 40 per cent of a newspaper, the *Rome Daily American*.

The journalistic failure to investigate the CIA's use of the news business contrasts sharply with the aggressive exposure of ethical tangles in non-

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journalistic institutions.

A brief flurry of interest began last autumn when Jack Anderson's column reported that Seymour K. Freiden, a well-known and well-liked foreign correspondent, had spied on Democratic presidential candidates for the Nixon campaign organization in 1968 and 1972. Anderson also said that Freiden, who is bureau chief for the *Hearst* newspapers in London, had worked for the CIA. When telephoned for comment, Freiden did not deny the allegation.

"I gave my word to [former CIA director] Dick Helms," Freiden told Anderson's associate, Les Whitten. Whitten had asked the question on the basis of a tip.

Freiden's revelation meant potential trouble to William E. Colby, the CIA's current director. In October and November, he was asked by officials of the *New York Times* and the *Washington Star-News* whether any of their staff members were receiving payments from the CIA.

He ordered a search of the agency's files and early in November gave the *Star-News* information that Oswald E. Johnston, the paper's national security writer, developed into a front-page story that appeared on Nov. 30. The story reported the CIA had "some three dozen" American newsmen on its payroll at that time, including five who worked for "general-circulation news organizations." Johnston said the CIA was going to fire the five. He also reported that employers of two of the five knew of, and approved, their CIA activities. Colby gave this information on the stipulation that it be attributed to an "authoritative source."

While Johnston was preparing his story, Colby arranged a visit, on Nov. 15, to the *New York Times* Washington bureau; he met with James Reston and assured him that no *Times* staff members or stringers were in the agency's employ.

Reston did not question Colby further. Reston

said later he was more concerned with keeping the *Times* clean than with writing a story.

Colby's decision to leak was based on a time-tested public relations technique of the bureaucracy. Faced with the possibility of a story surfacing that is potentially embarrassing, the good bureaucrat releases his version first, claims it is complete and then, to use today's vogue term, he "stonewalls" subsequent public inquiries.

Oswald Johnston's story was complete enough to convince most reporters that there was no more to be uncovered. The *New York Times* reprinted the Johnston story on the front page on Dec. 1. The *Washington Post* rewrote it, added some congressional reaction, and ran the story inside the paper. The wire services excerpted the piece and ran items on their wires. It was an item on hourly radio newscasts around the country. The *Times* ran a follow-up by Martin Arnold on an inside page on Dec. 18, which contained some interesting leads, and then, save for a few editorials, letters to the editor and op-ed comments, there was little additional news coverage.

But the CIA did receive private queries from several news organizations about the involvement of their employees after Johnston's story was printed. Not all the organizations received full assurance that their journalists were uninvolved.

Only the *New York Times* received assurances from Colby that neither its staffers nor its stringers (part-time reporters) were working for the CIA.

Katharine Graham, the publisher of the *Washington Post*, called Colby and asked if either staffers or stringers working for her newspaper were involved. Colby assured her that none of her staff members were on his payroll. He refused to discuss stringers.

In addition, *Time*, *Newsweek*, *U.S. News and World Report* and the *Washington Star-News* were all assured personally by Colby that none of their full-time staffers were employed by the agency. And in each instance (except *U.S. News*, which has no stringers), Colby explicitly refused, though he had not refused with Reston, to discuss stringers.

While Colby gave assurances to some organizations, he refused to even talk to representatives of others. United Press International and CBS could not get beyond the CIA's press contact, Angus MacLean Thuermer. William Small, then CBS's Washington bureau chief, called the agency after Johnston's story to ask about the possible compromise of his organization.

"They refused to discuss the matter at all," Small said. "I asked to talk to Colby and was told that I could not. I left a message for him. He did not return my call. I wrote him a letter. He did not answer it."

Ronald E. Cohen, UPI's Washington news editor, also called Thuermer, who refused to amplify the Johnston story. Cohen left phone messages for

Colby, who did not return the calls.

"I finally gave up. It didn't seem worth it. I was interested in duplicating the *Star* story and finding out about our organization," Cohen said later. "But he wasn't talking and I didn't think it was worth the effort. I'm sure we don't have any CIA men on our staff."

Cohen said he wrote a memo to UPI headquarters in New York about his attempts and let it go at that.

Since most of the inquiring journalists did not discuss their checks with others, they did not realize they were getting different answers to their queries from the CIA. Thus, they did not realize that the various CIA responses might warrant further investigation within their news organizations. Few news executives initiated such investigations.

"I could ask all of my people if they were working for the CIA," said Richard C. Wald, president of NBC News. "But I can't expect that, if they were, they would tell me the truth."

Wald's comment, echoed by others, indicates a general frustration about cleaning up the situation without CIA cooperation.

There was little hope that Colby would give such cooperation. In addition to the attitude expressed by his various answers and refusals to answer, he specifically told the *Star-News* that, although he planned to fire the five full-time correspondents for big organizations, he planned to keep the other 30 on the payroll.

Colby himself will not speak for the record on the subject; an authoritative source represents the director as thinking that the agency's employment of stringers, free lances and employees of more obscure outlets does not compromise American journalism. The source does not make clear how Colby draws such distinctions; he leaves the impression that Colby does indeed wish to use any aid the news business is willing to give.

Journalists have no qualms about digging into the history of an unusual situation in other areas—the Pentagon Papers coverage and the continuing attention paid to Chappaquiddick come to mind immediately—but none of the news executives questioning Colby asked him whether any of their staff members *in the past* had been working for the CIA.

The failure to do so was explained either as an oversight (Mrs. Graham) or a greater interest in the immediate situation (Reston).

But the history is there. In a letter to me, Turner Catledge, former executive editor of the *New York Times*, had this to say:

I knew nothing of any involvement with the CIA . . . of any of our foreign correspondents on the *New York Times*. I heard many times of overtures to our men by the CIA, seeking to use their privileges, contacts, immunities and, shall we say, superior intelligence in the sordid business of spying and informing. If any one of them succumbed

to the blandishments or cash offers, I was not aware of it. Repeatedly the CIA and other hush-hush agencies sought to make arrangements for "cooperation" even with *Times* management, especially during or soon after World War II, but we always resisted. Our motive was to protect our credibility.

The history begins with the late Frank G. Wisner, an OSS veteran and New York lawyer who was brought back into government in 1948 to plan and orchestrate the "black" operations supporting the Truman Administration's newly adopted policy of containing the spread of communism. Wisner built an organization that he laughingly but lovingly called "my mighty Wurlitzer." It was a wondrous machine that used many instruments—charitable foundations, labor unions, book publishers, the student movement—to play variations on a theme: the discrediting of communism, the shaming of the Soviet Union, the promotion of the Christian Democratic movement in Western Europe and the building of a positive image for the United States abroad.

The press was an important instrument in Wisner's Wurlitzer.

Although he had some reservations about using American newsmen, he had no hesitation at all about suborning foreign journalists, according to a former Wisner subordinate.

To those working within the CIA at the time, it seemed as if there were unlimited amounts of money available to buy, as the agency did, the services of newsmen working for Reuters, *Agence France-Presse*, Tass, Hsinhua (the Red Chinese news agency) and the staffs of dozens of newspapers spread around the world.

These foreign newsmen were used to float false or misleading stories. Some reporters were directed by CIA agents in the same way any clandestine field man is run by his "control."

The United States government, for example, might decide to float a story discrediting the Soviet Union as an irresponsible nuclear power, one of Wisner's former subordinates recalls. The former CIA man described the process, using the Reuters news agency as his example: A CIA agent assigned to carry out the mission would contact a Reuters correspondent working under contract to the CIA. The Reuters man, stationed in the news agency's headquarters in London, would be given a phony story by the American agent describing a non-existent nuclear weapons test by the Soviet Union. The reporter, in turn, would pass the "facts" on to the Reuters correspondent in Stockholm, telling him he had the information on good authority, but to protect the source, the story should emanate from the Swedish capital. In some cases, the newsman agent in London might have thought the CIA information was true. Even so, the fact that his source was paying him to propagate information seriously corrupts journalism.

The Stockholm man, believing his colleague,

would put the story on the wire, not realizing he was handling a deliberately falsified plant. In the competitive world of wire service journalism, his competitors in Stockholm might duplicate his story without confirmation.

That such a story might find its way back into American newspapers and broadcasts was considered by the CIA an unfortunate by-product of the holy war to save the world from communism. And they had no qualms about feeding misinformation to the foreign press. It could not be avoided, agency officials said. This was outweighed by a greater good the false story sought to accomplish.

It was not only the bureaucrats of the clandestine services who were caught up in such games in those days. They had respectable support from some scientists within the academic community.

A member of a scientific group, for example, while consulting for the CIA, developed a scheme for misleading Soviet scientists by publishing articles containing false research results in American scientific journals. The thought was that the Soviets, with a smaller capacity for basic research, would waste their scientific resources pursuing false research reports. Whereas the American research efforts in such areas as nuclear physics would only be inconvenienced, a scientist said, the Soviet efforts could conceivably be crippled.

The CIA gave its consultant preliminary approval for the scheme; he asked an American newsman if he would leave his job to write the phony articles. The newsman balked and Allen Dulles, then CIA director, vetoed further consideration of the idea, the scientist said.

Other correspondents tell of other invitations. Crosby Noyes, now editorial page editor of the *Washington Star-News*, was asked by a CIA man if he would gather information for the agency when Noyes was working overseas years ago.

"He was a friend of mine," Noyes recalled. "We had a polite conversation and I said no."

Sam Jaffe, the former CBS and ABC foreign correspondent, has said he was approached by the CIA before he got his job with CBS and was told the network would hire him and send him to Moscow if he cooperated with the agency. Jaffe refused but was hired by CBS for a domestic assignment anyway. He was eventually sent to Moscow for CBS to help cover the trial of Francis Gary Powers, the CIA's U-2 pilot shot down on a mission over the Soviet Union.

Jaffe thinks the agency might have had a hand in helping him land that assignment. He says the day before he left New York, the CIA station chief there requested an urgent meeting in a restaurant. As the two talked, they were joined by a third man who was never introduced by name. The third man asked Jaffe to gather information for the agency at the trial.

"I never got that man's name and I never found out just what kind of information he

wanted," Jaffe said. "I just got up and left the restaurant. I didn't want any part of it."

John A. Bross, a former deputy to the director of the CIA, says he knows of one American newsman who did not refuse the agency overtures. This newsman, while a young correspondent working in Western Europe, joined the CIA as a full-fledged clandestine agent. He was not merely an informant who received a small retainer, expenses or occasional fees for his services. He was as much at the beck and call of the CIA as his overt employer. His identity was such a deeply held secret that Bross had served for two years as director of a division carrying out clandestine operations in Eastern Europe before he learned the identity of the newsman-agent.

The newsman's assignment was to keep tabs on Eastern European Communists traveling in Western Europe. "He's in a very responsible position right now," Bross says. Further than that Bross will not go.

One American journalist (again the identity is unknown) played a key role in one of the CIA's most successful propaganda campaigns of the 1950's, the publication of Milovan Djilas's book, *The New Class*.

The journalist received the manuscript from Djilas, once a member of the Yugoslav Politburo and a leading political philosopher in the Third World, with permission to have it published abroad. The journalist gave the document, a weighty but nonetheless scathing indictment of abuses of Communist rule, to a United States Information Agency employee. The USIA man in turn gave the manuscript to the CIA. The CIA translated it and had it taken to the then small New York publishing house of Frederick A. Praeger. Praeger has since admitted publishing "15 or 16 books" at the suggestion of the CIA without naming them. He has told associates that *The New Class* was not one of those books.

He may have thought he was telling the truth. *The New Class* was brought to him not by a CIA man but by a USIA man with a promise that the book would be subsidized if necessary.

"That book was probably a more important propaganda coup than Khrushchev's secret speech denouncing Stalin," one former member of Wisner's Wurlitzer staff said. "You have no idea what an impact it made."

Not all of the newsmen working for the agency took part in such important or dramatic events. Most of them simply collected the nuts-and-bolts information available to almost any untrained observer who happens to find himself in a relatively inaccessible locale. Or, at times, CIA agents leaked to them a piece of information designed to enhance the American image or confuse the KGB. Other examples were gleaned from conversations with a half dozen CIA officials and former officials who were willing to talk guardedly and who knew something of the situation.

The journalists were paid in four different ways.

Some received regular salaries and expenses. Others were placed on a small retainer (in the neighborhood of \$100-a-month which, in the 1950's and early '60's, was a substantial help in Europe). Still others were paid piece-rate for the information they provided—much as domestic police might reward an informant. And finally some received only expense money for missions they undertook. (It is not unreasonable to assume that the expense accounts were padded. In case they were not, the CIA often paid a little extra.)

The money was always paid in cash. In some instances, undercover CIA agents may not have revealed their agency connection, and journalists may have thought their money was not coming from the agency at all. It could be laundered through a bank, businessman or even, in cases where publishers back home knew of the arrangement, the paymasters of their own organizations.

In return for the cash, the newsmen performed various kinds of jobs.

In Italy, according to Tom McCoy, a former CIA man who now operates a fund-raising firm in Washington for liberal Democratic candidates, newsmen were used to gather information from politicians that could not be gathered with propriety by American diplomats or other CIA agents.

In Spain, they were paid for gathering information about Spanish military facilities in areas they might be visiting for other reasons.

In Eastern Europe, they were asked to make observations that would later be helpful to clandestine agents on a sensitive mission. "You never get enough of that kind of stuff," one former station chief said. "We asked them to remember whether their passports were picked up at the hotels they stayed in, whether the police of a certain city followed them, to locate the restaurants where the intelligentsia hung out.

"Most of this stuff came from tourists, particularly German tourists, but we took it from newsmen as well."

Station chiefs could not establish working relationships with American newsmen overseas whenever they wished. The operations, at the outset at least, were all approved at the director or deputy director level in Washington. Men such as Allen Dulles, John McCone, Admiral William F. Raborn or Richard M. Helms, all former directors, or Wisner, Richard M. Bissell, Jr. (who directed the Bay of Pigs invasion), Helms or Desmond Fitzgerald, all former deputy directors for plans, and, as such, in charge of clandestine activities, had to approve the hiring or retainer of an American newsman.

One former station chief described the original approach this way:

"Usually we dealt with stringers or people who worked for smaller newspapers—the hangers-on.

We would keep on the lookout for a guy who said to us, 'Gee, I know of a really good story in [say] Rumania but my newspaper is too cheap to send me there. They want me to sit in Paris and file the official communiqués.'

"So we would see an opening. First, we would check with our superiors in Washington. After we got the okay, we would get in touch with the guy and say, 'Look, if you want to go to Rumania, we'll buy you the airplane ticket and pick up the hotel bill and give you a little cash.'"

All the station chiefs asked in return was a debriefing when the newsman returned, an opportunity to look at his carbons and the answers to a few questions.

"He was free to file whatever he wanted to his paper," the station chief said. "We never interfered with that. I always tended to think that newsmen and ourselves were in the same business anyhow. We all collected information. And this was just some information he couldn't use in the paper for space reasons or because no one else was interested. That's all there was to it."

After a journalist did his first job for the agency, the former station chief said, CIA field men could use him at will without obtaining further approval from Washington. If the new informant was valuable enough, regular retainer payments were made. Otherwise, the agency paid piece rates.

Agency contacts at editorial offices in the U.S. also took place. *Nucleonics Week*, a McGraw-Hill Publishing Co. newsletter, is a case in point. In the late 1960's, the newsletter ran a story mentioning the use of nuclear energy in Thailand. The report was based on a file from a Thai stringer.

After the story appeared, Roger A. Newburger, an editor of the newsletter, received a call from the CIA's New York field office. The agent asked if *Nucleonics Week* had any additional information on the subject.

Newburger told the agent of the longer file. He asked if he could read it.

"We thought it a joke around here," Newburger said. "If they didn't have any better sources than us, they could not have had much of an intelligence system."

The editor told the agent he could come up and read the file. That began a relationship in which, over a period of three years, the agent visited McGraw-Hill several times to look at story files and photos the publication received from overseas. Most of the material related to the centrifuge process used for enriching uranium. (The experimental process could become a cheap way for small nations to make enough fuel for nuclear weapons.)

"There was a lot of interest in the centrifuge at the time," Newburger recalled. "The CIA wasn't the only government agency interested in

our material. For a time, we had a line here. One government agency would have to wait until another agency returned the photos before it could get them."

*Nucleonics Week* gave the agency copies of unpublished as well as published pictures.

In the summer of 1971, the CIA man paid his last visit to Newburger. He did not want to see files or photos. Instead, he asked the editor if he planned personally to cover the International Atomic Energy Agency's Fourth Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy in Geneva that September.

Newburger said he did.

From the ensuing discussion Newburger inferred that a request was about to be made that he supply reports to the CIA on the meeting and he was uncomfortable. The tension broke when Newburger's boss walked into the conference room and explained to the agent that Newburger had one job to do and that would consume most of his time.

The agent left. He has not been in touch with Newburger since.

At least one other newsgathering organization has cooperated in the past in providing the CIA information from its home office. When Joseph Harrison became overseas editor of the *Christian Science Monitor* in 1950, he discovered that agents had been frequently visiting his predecessor to question him about *Monitor* stories.

"I inherited the situation and I continued it," Harrison said recently. "I did it because we were Americans and we were helping out. Don't forget, this was during the Cold War. And everybody was doing it. They may deny it now. But they were doing it."

Harrison showed the agents, from the Boston field office of the CIA, uncut versions of stories, memos and cover letters from *Monitor* correspondents. "There was material in them that might have been cut for space or which was unverifiable," Harrison said. "I often thought the agency was using us to check up on reports from their own people."

Harrison served as overseas editor for 11 years. Sometime toward the end of his tenure, the Boston field office man stopped visiting. The former editor does not remember exactly when he stopped.

Harrison said the agency representatives never asked him to have *Monitor* correspondents look into specific subjects nor was the newspaper ever asked to allow its correspondents to work directly for the CIA.

"That would have been espionage," Harrison said.

The CIA—as well as the FBI—regularly sent its agents to Time, Inc., during those years but, according to Edward K. Thompson and George Hunt, both former *Life* managing editors, they

were rebuffed in their requests for information.

"We never showed them story files or unused photographs," said Thompson, who now edits *The Smithsonian Magazine*, "for the simple reason that our reporters and photographers would have lost their sources if word got out that we were cooperating with government agencies."

But Thompson did say that he allowed military intelligence agents to come to the *Life* offices regularly to look at *Life* photos of Red Square parades. "They were interested in pictures of the weapons and since those were in the public domain, we gave them prints." The visiting military intelligence agents received prints of rejects as well as the photos that had been published in the magazine.

Hunt said that from time to time, he allowed CIA agents to interview *Life* correspondents returning from overseas assignments.

"Sometimes we allowed it. Sometimes we didn't," he said. "But we never cooperated with the CIA. We didn't have any of that nonsense going on at *Life*."

Basil Walters, a former executive editor of the *Chicago Daily News*, issued a directive in the 1950's to all *Daily News* foreign correspondents ordering them not to moonlight for American intelligence agencies.

Walters says he thinks some publishers took advantage of the CIA's eagerness to hire newsmen to keep correspondents abroad on the cheap.

Tom McCoy said that while he worked for the agency he spoke to at least two publishers and received permission to hire their employees for the agency.

One journalist of note actually helped the CIA buy into a newspaper.

The *Rome Daily American* was founded by four Army master sergeants immediately after World War II as a privately owned successor to the Italian edition of *Stars and Stripes*.

From the beginning the paper was a shoe-string operation which did not long hold the interest of the four owners. Slowly the ownership of the stock diffused into the hands of people spread around the world. In 1953, a New York entrepreneur by the name of Ray VirDen succeeded in buying up all of the stock and became the publisher of the paper. When VirDen died, his estate put the property on the market.

The United States government, particularly the CIA which had become a protector of the American image abroad, feared that the paper would fall into anti-American hands. Allen Dulles, then director of central intelligence, was especially concerned that the paper, which circulated through the Mediterranean area, would take stands con-

trary to the American position on the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Mrs. Clare Booth Luce, then the American ambassador in Rome and a journalist in her own right, interested a banker-friend of her husband, Henry R. Luce, in buying the paper.

The banker was Landon K. Thorne, Jr., who had worked in the Marshall Plan program in Italy and who was working for the Bankers Trust Co. in Rome at the time.

"Mrs. Luce told me I would be doing something to help my country," Thorne recalled recently. "She offered to help me finance it. I thought the Luces were simply helping me to buy a paper."

In the summer of 1956, Thorne obtained a controlling interest in The Rome Daily American Co., SPA, an Italian corporation with a nominal Italian directorship.

He had three partners. Two were friends: Alfred Weld, who operated a small New York office for the paper, and Samuel W. Meek, an executive in the J. Walter Thompson advertising company. Thorne owned about 50 per cent of the stock. Meek and Weld each owned about five per cent.

The fourth partner was a financial interest whose identity was unknown to the other three. Thorne, the CIA's Bross, and the lawyer for the CIA, Benjamin Shute, then a partner in the prestigious Wall Street law firm of Cravath, Swaine & Moore, now acknowledge that the fourth partner was the Central Intelligence Agency. It put between \$80,000 and \$90,000 into the deal.

Thorne never found out just how the CIA's stock certificates were made out or who held them. But he had indications; by the time of settlement in 1956, he was pretty certain of where the money came from.

Within two years Thorne had developed the paper, and felt he might arrange a merger with a larger paper. Thorne's plans to merge meshed nicely with the agency's desire to end its involvement in the paper: The purchase of the *Daily American* was originally conceived in the same program that led the agency to subsidize *Encounter*, the high-brow magazine published by the Congress for Cultural Freedom, and the West German magazine, *Der Monat*.

The *Daily American* was never in that category. In addition to its wire service reports of the news, the paper had dwelled on Via Veneto doings by the beautiful people, baseball scores from back home, travel tips, and ads from the street stores selling gloves at bargain rate.

John Bross, by that time working in clandestine operations in Washington, got the job of "disentangling" the agency from the newspaper. He recently called the arrangement "atypical" of what the agency was doing, "a bad example."

If the agency accomplished anything with its Italian newspa-

### LARRIMORE-LARIMORE

In August, 1963, *Izvestia* denounced Don M. Larrimore, then newly arrived in Warsaw as UPI bureau chief, as a CIA agent. In short order, the Polish government took the hint and expelled him. Larrimore, who is fluent in Russian, had worked for Radio Liberation (which subsequently became Radio Liberty) in the 1950's, which was CIA-subsidized. He also had a history of showing up at crisis spots and at the big Communist youth meetings of the Cold War. He was, in short, such a good *prima facie* candidate as newsmen-agent that even American colleagues believed the *Izvestia* charges, particularly after he appeared in Saigon in 1966 as a historian for the U. S. Army.

Larrimore, now a Washington *Post-Newsweek*-Westinghouse Broadcasting stringer in Rome, cannot live down the reputation.

He wrote me:

"I never considered joining the CIA or any other U.S. government outfit, not leastly because I'd then, as a determined expatriate, have had to spend time in the U.S., pay U.S. taxes, and lose the prized mobility that journalism affords. In 18 years abroad, I've been back to the U.S. just four times, never for more than three weeks.

"Inevitably the *Izvestia* stain sticks and even close news friends still like to joke about my being some sort of a master spy, which perpetuates the fraud. It's damned irritating, of course, but something not a few of us newsmen have to live with."

Larrimore offers a possible explanation for his problem. Years ago, "Who's Who in the CIA" was published in East Germany, listing a Donald E. Larimore.

Don M. Larrimore, newsmen, met Donald E. Larimore, retired CIA agent, at a party in Rome last year. Larimore, admitting his past agency connections, apologized to Larrimore for the inconvenience caused by the dossier mixup, according to Larrimore.

S.L.

per, that accomplishment is unclear. Thorne remains convinced that none of his staff members used the paper as a cover for intelligence-gathering activities. There could not have been much propaganda value in publishing a small Roman tabloid (although one former CIA man did insist to me that the agency had full control over the paper and used it in the propaganda war with the Soviet Union).

"We had a bad case of indigestion in the 1950's," Bross said. "The programs were growing so rapidly that we took on a lot of people who should not have been hired."

Apparently, judging from the number of American journalists on the agency's payroll in 1974, the CIA does not consider them to be part of that indigestion. That's too bad.

There is little question that if even one American overseas carrying a press card is a paid informer for the CIA, then all Americans with those credentials are suspect. We automatically—and with good reason—consider Soviet and Chinese newsmen as mouthpieces and informants for their governments, while at the same time congratulating ourselves for our independence. Now we know

that some of that independence has, with the stealth required of clandestine operations, been taken from us—or given away.

Whether they work for large publications or small, whether they are full-time correspondents or stringers, any American journalist overseas who takes money from the CIA contaminates the reputations of all American foreign correspondents. In the past, American journalists abroad have been an effective source of distant early warnings, pinpointing potential crises important to the U.S. If foreign sources come to mistrust American journalists because of a suspected dual allegiance, the American public will be ill-served.

It was not enough for Colby to fire a few newsmen connected with large organizations. The other 30 represent as great a compromise. Similarly, it was not enough for just a few newsgathering organizations to make half-hearted inquiries about their own purity and accept less than adequate replies.

Part of the problem stems from the news business's need for the cooperation of the CIA and other intelligence agencies. This fosters a love-hate relationship that blurs ethical considerations.

During ten years of covering foreign relations and national security affairs, I have traded information with CIA people and I have eaten at the excellent table in the CIA director's private dining room (after taking a drink from a black-coated waiter in the director's private sitting room). Has such access hurt or helped the pursuit of information? Naturally, I think it has helped. Not all of my colleagues agree.

Is it possible to provide information to the agency, and still remain truthful to the public? Colby feels it is, even if money changes hands. Some newsmen feel that the payment of money is the only serious compromise. Many disagree.

Can news organizations surrender their confidential files to the CIA and still claim to be independent of the government? It is hard to imagine how any professional journalist can say yes to this question. Voluntary surrender of unpublished information and sources weakens the claim of journalists who seek to resist other government inquiries to preserve their access to news sources. Many responsible organizations throughout the country refuse requests for access to files from the FBI or local police. On the face of it, there would not seem to be any grounds for exception when the CIA is involved.

As I researched this piece, I was urged to abandon the story by as many newsmen as CIA officials. Colby is known to take the view that there is no need to discuss the specifics of past CIA involvement in American journalism. He tells visitors that the excesses of the CIA years ago have already been well documented and need no fur-

ther airing.

And some journalists feel it is bad form to criticize a colleague who has made only a few bucks moonlighting. They are also uneasy that the whole tangled web of relationships between reporters and intelligence agents so beneficial to reporters will come undone.

The idea that we are a privileged profession immune to public inquiry—as doctors, lawyers and others claim such immunity—no longer has validity. The news business exerts as important an influence on the public these days as the government or the other large institutions in our society and for that reason should be covered as intensively. The days when seasoned city editors told new reporters “nobody cares about the problems of the

newsman” have long since passed.

The CIA established its network of informants in the news business with the consent of some editors, publishers and other news executives. In some cases they specifically condoned the arrangement. In others, they tacitly permitted them.

The lack of reaction to the *Star-News* story is an indication that the news business—reporters, editors, publishers and other executives alike—did not probe the specifics of the CIA infiltration for fear of what might be learned, and published.

If the crisis of confidence faced by the news business—along with the government—is to be overcome, journalists must be willing to focus on themselves the same spotlight they so relentlessly train on others.

### Changing jobs: from journalism to the Agency, and vice versa

The open flow of personnel between the news business and the CIA is known to many Washington journalists but is accepted and no particular point is made of it. This is a mobile society in which career changes are made easily without damage to individuals or institutions.

Certainly such job changes do not in themselves reflect on any individual's integrity. It is, however, interesting to examine the flow as one measure of the community of interests between the clandestine world of intelligence and the open world of news-gathering.

For example:

#### From CIA to News Business

**Tom Braden**, international organizations director for CIA during early 1950's where he helped establish relationships between agency and the National Student Association. Now a syndicated columnist.

**Bonner Day**, worked for Foreign Broadcast Information Service, a CIA subsidiary which monitors and translates classified and unclassified radio transmissions of foreign nations. Now Pentagon correspondent for *U. S. News & World Report*.

**Robert J. Myers**, a former CIA station chief in Southeast Asia. Now publisher of *The New Republic*.

**George Packard**, a former CIA man in the Far East. Former *Newsweek* staffer in Washington, now executive editor of the *Philadelphia Bulletin*.

**Bruce van Voorst**, former CIA man in Africa. Now *Newsweek* diplomatic correspondent in Washington.

#### From News Business to CIA

**Richard M. Helms**, former United Press correspondent in pre-World-War-II Germany where he once

interviewed Adolph Hitler and former advertising department employee of Indianapolis *Star*. Joined OSS in World War II, stayed on with newly formed CIA after war, rose to directorship in Johnson Administration, well-known for luncheon meetings with newsmen at old Occidental Restaurant where he spoke not-for-attribution; now ambassador to Iran.

**Wallace R. Deuel** (died May 10, 1974), pre-World-War-II Chicago *Daily News* foreign correspondent; special assistant to Maj. Gen. William J. Donovan, OSS chief; Chicago *Daily News* and St. Louis *Post-Dispatch* Washington correspondent, Sigma Delta Chi award winner in 1947. Joined the CIA in 1953 where, officials say, he was a speech writer and policy planner.

**Joseph C. (Jake) Goodwin**, former Associated Press foreign and Washington correspondent. Left news business to join State Department. In 1966 transferred to CIA as press agent for Helms. Retired in 1972.

**Angus MacLean Thuermer**, former Associated Press reporter. Now the agency's press spokesman.

#### Two-Way Traffic

**Henry Pleasants**, former Philadelphia newsman who joined OSS during World War II, remained with CIA, became widely known mission chief in Bonn where he had good press contacts. An authority on classical music and jazz, he has authored at least two well-reviewed books. While working for CIA, he traveled to music festivals in Europe and free lanced articles about them to the *New York Times*. Now retired and living in London, he is a frequent contributor of music pieces to the *International Herald Tribune*. S.I.



Newsweek, September 30, 1974

# The War Over Secret Warfare

It was one thing for Dwight Eisenhower to try to save a summit by taking responsibility for the 1960 U-2 spy-plane incident, and there wasn't any way John Kennedy could have denied America's involvement in the 1961 Bay of Pigs fiasco. But it was an altogether different matter when Gerald Ford admitted at his press conference last week—in a way no President ever had before—that the CIA had been deeply involved over a period of years in a clandestine effort to oppose a foreign government. Ford then went on to endorse the CIA operation against Marxist President Salvador Allende as “in the best interest of the people of Chile” and dismissed questions about the morality of such activities with the explanation that “Communist nations spend vastly more money than we do for the same kind of purposes.”

“It is the first time in my memory,” said Prof. Richard N. Gardner, one of America's top experts on international law, “that a President has come out flatly and said: ‘The other side does it, and we do it.’” But Ford's effort to appear candid before the American people did nothing to stem the growing controversy in Washington over the CIA. And new revelations later in the week of the scope of CIA covert operations in Chile fueled the mounting debate.

**Monster:** While much of the surface anger was directed against the spy agency—with lawmakers like Sen. Frank Church talking of the need to “control the monster”—there was little in the latest disclosures that truly surprised many congressmen. And it was clear that the CIA was in fact only a pawn in a much larger domestic political game. For Congress was clearly hoping to use this latest controversy to further reduce the power of the White House. As the battle unfolded, concern was expressed in several foreign capitals about the potential impact on Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who as head of the secret 40 Committee authorized the CIA's Chile activities (NEWSWEEK, Sept. 23). Kissinger, already under fire for his handling of the Cyprus crisis, was accused of deceiving a Senate subcommittee panel on “the extent and object of the CIA's activities in Chile.”

Certainly, it appeared that neither Ford nor Kissinger was truly candid in suggesting that the CIA had merely been providing financial aid to Chile's opposition newspapers and political parties. For according to intelligence sources, the majority of the \$8 million allocated for CIA covert operations in Chile from 1970 to 1973 was actually used to subsidize strikes by truckers, shopkeepers and taxi drivers that crippled the Allende government and plunged Chile deeper into chaos. And many analysts believe those strikes made

the coup that toppled Allende inevitable.

Along with the new details about Chile, other reports began to appear last week of CIA involvement in unseating the governments of other countries. Former CIA agent Philip Agee, 39, now living in England, told NEWSWEEK's John Barnes of his involvement in bringing down two successive governments of Ecuador when the regimes refused to toe the U.S. policy line. In 1961, Agee related, the CIA decided to “destabilize” the government of President José Velasco Ibarra when he refused to break diplomatic relations with Cuba. A coup eventually followed, but to the CIA's distress, Velasco's successor, Carlos Julio Arosemena, proved equally obstinate on the Cuba question. “We again applied destabilizing tactics,” Agee said. “Arosemena finally backed down and cut relations with Cuba. But it was too late, and he was overthrown in 1963.”

Despite an assertion by CIA director William E. Colby that the CIA's covert operations have declined tremendously since the cold war days, there is still an impressive number of U.S. spies out in the cold. More than a third of the CIA's 16,500 full-time employees work for the clandestine branch—currently called the “Directorate of Operations”—and an estimated 1,800 of these are directly involved in so-called “dirty tricks.” Reports on the agency's covert operations around the world all find their way to the “head shed”—the seventh-floor office at the CIA's Langley, Va., headquarters of director Colby.

**Target:** Like most of his predecessors, Colby came up through the clandestine side of the CIA and close associates describe him as fundamentally an “operations-oriented” director. Most of the covert political operations he directs today are in the Middle East and Latin America. For with détente, the CIA sharply cut back the number of covert operations targeted against East Europe and the Soviet Union. And the technological explosion in intelligence gathering of the 1960s reduced the need to use agents to collect information on these countries.

The CIA has also made a major effort in recent years to improve the covers used by agents abroad. Under an agreement worked out in the early 1950s, most CIA operatives posed for almost two decades as State Department officers, AID officials or employees of the U.S. Information Agency. Many still use this kind of cover, but the Soviets have long since become adept at scanning American Embassy staff lists and picking out the spies. So in 1968, a special CIA unit was set up to put deep-cover “assets” in place. Some agents now even pose as missionaries.

As the Chilean disclosures illustrate, one of the clandestine tasks of CIA agents is distributing large amounts of under-the-table money. Millions of dol-

lars are secretly channeled each year to a broad spectrum of influential foreigners ranging from politicians to priests. Over the years the CIA has become increasingly expert at getting the maximum bang for its buck. Knowledgeable observers say the CIA was probably able to turn the \$8 million allocated for use against Allende into \$40 million worth of escudos through black-market dealings.

For all the furor over the CIA's activities, Ford was on solid ground in stating that the U.S. is hardly alone in the spy game. The Chilean operation pales beside the attempt by the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB) to foment a revolt in Mexico in the late 1960s. And the Russian spy agency is reliably credited with playing a major role in the coup that ousted Afghanistan's King Mohammed Zahir Shah in July 1973, and replaced him with Sardar Mohammed Daud, a long-time friend of Moscow. Officers of the KGB and its military counterpart, the Chief Intelligence Administration (GRU), fill as many as 80 per cent of the diplomatic posts in Soviet embassies in many African and Latin American nations. And the KGB also utilizes the intelligence services of Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Cuba.

**Thugs:** While Communist-bloc intelligence activities steadily expand, the roles of Britain's M.I.6 and France's Service de Documentation Extérieure et de Contre-Espionnage (SDECE) have been contracting. Britain's M.I.6 today concentrates on Ireland and Ulster. And the French agency—always scorned in the elitist intelligence community as a gang of thugs—hasn't had a triumph since it engineered the expulsion of the entire U.S. Embassy from Malagasy three years ago. But some new intelligence services have begun to play an increasingly important role. Since 1972, Israel's Mossad is credited by European police with assassinating more than thirteen Arab terrorists, including several top members of Black September, and is reported to be aiding the Kurdish rebellion in Iraq. And the Brazilians have developed an active intelligence agency which is now nervously regarded in Latin America as a potential “coup maker.”

Despite the competition, Congress is of a mind to impose some new checks on the CIA. Eleven senators introduced a bill last week to create a Joint Committee on Intelligence Oversight, which would take over responsibility from the handful of Congressional elders now charged with the task. There is nothing novel about the effort to establish genuine Congressional control over the CIA. But the bills have always been defeated when CIA supporters argued that overseers would be the source of leaks that would imperil national security.

Certainly, in view of the almost daily leaks of new details of the CIA's role in Chile, that would seem a valid concern. And CIA director Colby, while on record as willing to report to such a joint committee, is known to be worried that the intelligence agency's effectiveness is being seriously undercut by disclosure of its secret operations. Several agents out in the field, NEWSWEEK's Bruce van Voorst learned last week, have already resigned, and one foreign intelligence

agency has reduced its cooperation with the CIA for fear of what will appear in U.S. newspapers. And a former top CIA agent insisted that Congressional supervision of CIA covert activities is impossible. "You have to trust a small group of dedicated men," he argued, "and let them operate as they see fit."

But in the post-Watergate atmosphere of Washington, trust is a commodity in short supply. Arguing that it is necessary to plan operations in secrecy hardly seemed a course likely to win much sympathy for the CIA. For while most law-

makers are willing to concede the need to gather intelligence about other nations' intentions, many clearly feel the White House shouldn't be secretly trying to topple foreign governments. Sen. James Abourezk announced plans to introduce an amendment to the foreign-aid bill this week outlawing the "dirty-tricks branch" of the CIA.

While the prospects of Congress asserting increased control over the CIA appeared the strongest in years, some veteran lawmakers feel the current furor will fizzle as others have in the past. "The evidence all points to the need for

a watchdog committee," Sen. Mike Mansfield declared, "but I doubt there's much chance of it." But chairman Thomas Morgan of the House Foreign Affairs Committee vowed: "This is our one chance to get oversight of the CIA, and we're going to get it." And he appeared to have a lot of backing in the view that the time is now. "We've spent two years cleaning up our own house," said Sen. Walter Mondale. "It's time we start applying this same-yardstick to our activities abroad."

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR  
25 September 1974

## Chile: Legacy of the Allende years

**No Peaceful Way: Chile's Struggle for Dignity**, by Gary MacEoin. New York: Sheed and Ward. \$6.95.

**Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Chile**, edited by Paul M. Sweezy and Harry Magdoff. New York: Monthly Review Press. \$7.50.

By James Nelson Goodsell

Verdicts on Salvador Allende Gossens' three year of Marxist-leaning rule in Chile are coming in. Like the government itself when it was in power (1970-1973), opinions are divided.

But the authors of "No Peaceful Way" and "Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Chile" leave no doubt that they consider Allende's overthrow as a tragedy. The thwarted hopes of the workers and peasants will make it extremely difficult for the present military leaders to govern, they believe.

In fact, Mr. MacEoin, from his long experience with both Latin America and his native Ireland, worries that Chile might become "another Northern Ireland."

MacEoin's book, with its wise scholarship, able marshaling of facts, and clear writing, is easily the better book. It chronicles the years of Allende rule and his efforts to nudge Chile toward socialism, providing a solid look at his successes and failures (there were plenty of both), and the obstacles he encountered.

Chile was a heady place under Allende. "As a politician pursuing unconventional objectives by conventional means, he had few peers," MacEoin writes.

"Even when his overwhelmingly powerful enemies in Congress abandoned the role of a loyal opposition, without which representational democracy cannot function, and when the judiciary dropped its mask of objectivity to become an integral part with Congress of the openly disloyal opposition, he refused consistently to play by their rules."

There are readers who may quarrel with this view, but MacEoin documents the evidence and makes a fairly strong case. Some of his most telling analysis concerns what happened immediately before the military coup upset Allende's constitutional government just a year ago.

### Role of the CIA

In some prescient passages, he takes a hard look at the United States' role in the ouster. Writing before the Central Intelligence Agency's attempts to "destabilize" the Allende government were disclosed this month, MacEoin documents the agency's penetration of Chilean political parties, its support of anti-Allende demonstrations, and its financing of opposition newspapers. It is a grim tale.

The Sweezy-Magdoff book is a compilation of articles which have appeared in *Monthly Review* and other publications. All have a partisan Marxist tone and should be read with this in mind. But precisely because of their bias they have some value.

In the opening essay, Mr. Sweezy analyzes Allende's overthrow, arguing that "The Chilean tragedy confirms what should have been, and to many was, obvious all along, that there is no such thing as a peaceful road to socialism."

Editor Sweezy contends that Allende's Unidad Popular (UP) government — which was composed of the President's own Socialists, the Communists, and other left-leaning parties — made a series of mistakes once it had achieved power.

### Toward socialism

For instance, he says that the UP should have followed up the successful municipal elections by wresting "complete control of the state apparatus from the bourgeoisie" which was then in disarray. Failure to attempt at least to consolidate its

power was, in Mr. Sweezy's opinion, the fatal error of the Allende government.

Both the MacEoin and the Sweezy-Magdoff books suggest some of the forces which will be at work in Chile during the years ahead. Mr. MacEoin is correct in observing that "the meaning of UP's attempt to lead Chile toward socialism by constitutional methods must be sought less in the president than in the social movements on which he depended and within which he had to maneuver.

"As a corollary, his death did not alter radically the fundamental equations. The circumstances in which it occurred will undoubtedly influence future strategy, but the forces through which he worked are the same today as yesterday."

The Allende years in Chile are ended, but not the desire of millions of Chileans for some of the things Allende seemed to promise them. In a sense, the forces he unleashed are as real today as when he headed the government.

*James Goodsell is the Monitor's correspondent in Latin America.*

SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, London  
22 September 1974

# Spies moved in from the dark

By GORDON BROOK-SHEPHERD

WESTERN spies may not as yet have come in from the cold; indeed, given the essentially chilly nature of their calling, it is unlikely that they ever will. But, last week, they were officially brought in from the dark, and by no less a person than President Ford.

Questioned over the precise rôle the American C.I.A. had played in deliberately "de-stabilising" the Allende régime in Chile, the President replied: "Our Government, like other Governments, does take certain actions in the intelligence field to help implement foreign policy and protect national security."

Later, he commented on the specific rumpus which is now agitating Washington: whether the C.I.A. had really spent 8m. dollars to topple the near-Marxist Allende Government and, if so, why did various top people—including Dr. Kissinger—deceive Congress by claiming that the sum was merely 350,000 dollars? Without plumping for either figure, President Ford declared: "I think this was in the best interest of the people in Chile and certainly in our best interest."

Well, there you have it, the first general absolution for clandestine operations to come in public from a Western leader. The cloak has been removed, even if the dagger still remains.

There is a lot more to this than a row over one secret budget for one Western subversive operation. What the new man at the White House has just proclaimed may in fact go down as the Ford Doctrine, as opposed to, and compared with, the Brezhnev Doctrine.

Six years ago, after Soviet tanks had moved in to flatten that "new human face" which Mr. Dubcek was trying to give to Czech Communism, the Soviet party boss declared that Russia had the right—and would go on using that right—to restore the status quo whenever the "interests of Socialism" were threatened. Both the attitude and the practice were all too familiar. What was new was the declaration.

And so with President Ford. What he is now saying out loud is that whenever the interests of the capitalist system are menaced in Latin America (the equivalent of Eastern Europe on the United States' world map) he is entitled, for the good of everybody in the area, to protect those interests by direct intervention (though for force, read bribes, and for Soviet tanks, substitute American dollars).

Obviously, the implications of this go far beyond Latin America. Free-enterprise capitalism can be held to be threatened anywhere on the globe, and notably, at the moment, in Britain. Indeed, the

political ambitions and wrecking techniques of some of our militant, Communist-led trades unions could be construed by the White House as posing almost as grave a long-term danger of infection to the American system from across the Atlantic as do the ambitions and techniques of the Castro-ites at their own back door.

And, on the other hand, so long as we have a Left-inclined Labour Government, one of the basic ideological premises on which the C.I.A. conducts its world-wide operations must remain under a British question mark. Chile itself is the best example of this. The White House sought to destroy Allende; but Transport House reveres him.

By the same token, the British Labour movement was presumably only too delighted to see American big business take a severe, if temporary, knock in Chile. (Incidentally, as regards capitalism's image, it is, to put it mildly, unfortunate that the present Washington row over C.I.A. operations as opposed to intelligence gathering there should concern an alleged campaign to ensure, not so much the cause of freedom, as the cause of America's giant International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation).

In other words, the Ford Doctrine can produce awkward complications in the Western alliance just as the Brezhnev Doctrine caused deep trouble in the already divided Eastern camp. China, Yugoslavia, Rumania and Albania were all incensed and alarmed at the Soviet claim to a blanket privilege for intervention in the name of Socialism. A Labour Britain is only one of several Western countries who would dispute any American claim to intervene anywhere to preserve capitalism.

But fortunately, there is another side to the picture. The capitalist way of life is also, for most Americans (and for many Europeans) the democratic way of life. Those Europeans would include British Socialists of a genuinely moderate stamp, as well as almost everyone on these islands who votes Conservative or Liberal.

All would presumably agree that Britain, like any other Western Power, ought to play its part in countering a Communist philosophy dedicated to the overthrow of almost everything the West stands for and holds dear. They would also presumably agree

that, due to her sheer size, strength and scale of global commitments, America must remain the leader of any such campaign, haphazard and unco-ordinated though this may be.

However difficult it may be in practice to draw a distinction between the C.I.A. as the protector of Standard Telephones and the C.I.A. as the guardian of Magna Carta, the distinction is there. It is in this second sphere where we can almost feel sorry for this controversial agency (whose successes are never reported) and for its harassed political masters.

The West has always had to fight the battle of ideologies with one hand tied behind its back. Its opponents in the Kremlin, who equate the Police State with the political State, are held back by no moral scruples. They can try to undermine the outside world by precisely the same methods and machinery which they have always used to rule their own. The K.G.B., so far from being, like the C.I.A., a fairly recent intruder into politics, has always been, in its various re-incarnations, the very basis of Soviet power.

But latterly—and especially in the aftermath of Watergate—American intelligence, like every other White House activity, has suffered from the additional handicap of public exposure. That these clandestine operations may, in future, need to be subject to closer supervision and to a wider range of governmental or Congressional checks than has been the case so far seems pretty clear.

Indeed, the process seems already to have begun. But, in this instance, the Executive's claim to control what goes on should not be confused or equated with the public's right to know. There is no mandatory right to know what a Secret Service is up to, and to insist on it is to make a mockery of the organisation's very name and purpose in life.

Once America's recent past has been purged of Watergate and all its associated sins, it is surely time for the American people and for America's allies to put their trust in the man who has taken over the White House in Nixon's place, and to pry less. To have Big Brother watching too much over us is, of course, the biggest danger that a democracy can face. But there are times when no good is done by too many people trying to watch over Big Brother.

Christian Science Monitor  
23 September 1974

## Let's think

# Kissinger, the CIA, and history

By Erwin D. Canham

How much longer will Henry Kissinger serve the American Government as Secretary of State? What, finally, will the historians say about him? And, in a related question, what will the historians say about the Central Intelligence Agency?

President Ford has manfully — if unpersuasively — rallied to the defense both of Dr. Kissinger and of the CIA. But both remain in trouble. Both exemplify realpolitik at its starkest. And some Americans are beginning to ask whether this is good enough for a nation which must stand for principle in the world if it is to stand for anything.

Some creditable facts must be recognized. As an intelligence-gathering agency the CIA has been important and necessary. Only in its operations — its "dirty tricks" — all the way from the Bay of Pigs to Chile, and to Cambodia, and to Greece and Turkey, and to many other places — does it begin to raise very serious doubts.

### Invitation to espionage

I must confess a bias. I do not have a high regard for the CIA's judgment and common sense. It is violating no secrets to recall that once a CIA official came to Boston to ask me to perform a certain function: to be a "cover" for an operation in espionage. I told him I would be willing to serve my country, but my profession as an editor required me to remain strictly outside such clandestine activities. Moreover, I told him that what he wanted me to do was so transparently foolish as to be self-revealed to the "adversary" almost

as soon as it was undertaken. In fairness I must add that another CIA man told me afterward that he fully agreed with my feeling and he was glad I had turned the proposition down.

When the record of CIA "dirty tricks" is finally evaluated, I believe history will give this side of its activities a very low score. Moreover, such things are often merely imitations of the "adversary's" tactics. And it is more than questionable that a nation ever gains anything by stooping to such levels. There is much more to be gained by sticking to one's principles.

### Policy architect?

The United States has been badly damaged around the world by such tactics. It is blamed, manifestly, for much more than the CIA has actually attempted.

On the credit side for Dr. Kissinger is his immensely skillful implementation of policy for former President Richard M. Nixon. It may be asked whether he was in fact an architect, rather than simply a negotiator. Certainly Mr. Nixon originated the opening to China, the detente with Russia, and many other policies which his advisor and Secretary of State carried out.

Indeed, how much does Dr. Kissinger's role depend upon his special relationship with the former president? All recognize his powerful in-

tellect, which fitted well with Mr. Nixon's own hardheaded and experienced thinking. The Nixon-Kissinger team was unique. What will the Ford-Kissinger team be like? Will it be comfortable for either or both of them?

### Critics gather force

There is always the possibility that President Ford will find so highly charged a subordinate difficult. And Dr. Kissinger may one day decide the time has come to make his fortune, as well as fame, by resigning and writing his books.

Meantime, the domestic critics both of the CIA and Dr. Kissinger are gathering force. This is not just a cabal seeking to harm the administration. It is an expression of concern for the integrity of American policy. Cloak-and-dagger tactics have infected American domestic politics, as we all know. The age of dirty tricks, of clandestine intervention in the affairs of friendly nations, should come to an end. There are far better ways to support the American national interest and the nation's friends abroad than to subsidize them or subvert their opponents.

Much that has been achieved in international politics in recent years is still provisional. Real peace in the Middle East is unachieved. The arms race continues apace. The tightrope the United States walks between Russia and China is ever perilous. The American Government has cavalierly neglected its friends.

The verdict of history may be very good. But it is not yet in.

DAILY TELEGRAPH, London  
20 September 1974

## THE CIA FOOTBALL

GOVERNMENTS of all countries maintain secret services, operating abroad to gather intelligence, to help friends and frustrate potential enemies. The bigger the country, the bigger the service, with the more money at its disposal. The Central Intelligence Agency in the United States and the KGB in Russia are the two biggest. There has always been at least one important difference between them. The CIA is prohibited by law from operating inside the United States, whereas the KGB spies on Russians at home as well as everyone else abroad. Now we are seeing the emergence of another, and a surprising difference. Quite a few American Congressmen, it would seem, are under the impression that a secret service should not be secret.

This has emerged in the course of the present storm in a teacup in Washington over the extent of the CIA's involvement in Chile. Committees of both Houses have asked questions about this from officials at supposedly closed-door hearings. Quite naturally (for Washington),

the alleged answers have been leaked. According to them, the CIA spent about \$8 million in Chile during the three years of Allendé's rule. President Ford said at his last Press conference that efforts had been made to preserve opposition newspapers and political parties that the Allendé Government was trying to destroy. He said the United States had not part whatsoever in the coup against ALLENDE.

You would think that would be the end of the matter. You would think most Americans would be well content that their Administration was alert to American interests, their only doubt being whether much more money should not have been spent on such an admirable cause. Probably most Americans do in fact react so. But in Washington it is just another piece in the political in-fighting. There is a strong "get Kissinger" faction. Undeterred by President Ford's quite remarkable declaration of support for Dr. KISSINGER in his United Nations speech, they want to charge him with perjury because of testimony about Chile he gave to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. But if Senators ask to be told secrets, they should not be surprised if the answer is a lemon.

NEW YORK TIMES  
02 October 1974

# Helms, the C.I.A. and Public Trust

By Walter Pincus

WASHINGTON—The judgments that led to covert United States intervention in Chilean politics deserve to be criticized, but at least there the Central Intelligence Agency was within its legal authority under its charter. That was not the case with C.I.A. complicity in Watergate "extra-agency activities" and the subsequent cover-up.

The law barring the agency from undertaking domestic operations was clearly violated.

Moreover, when the former Director of Central Intelligence, Richard Helms, gave misleading and inaccurate answers to questions posed to him during Congressional committee hearings about C.I.A. assistance to Watergate conspirator E. Howard Hunt while Mr. Hunt worked for the Nixon White House, Mr. Helms was apparently covering up information relevant to a criminal investigation then under way.

On May 21, 1973, with the Watergate cover-up beginning to crack, Mr. Helms was called back from Iran, where he was Ambassador, and questioned under oath by members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

The break-in at the office of Dr. Daniel Ellsberg's former psychiatrist, Dr. Lewis Fielding, by then had been uncovered, along with information that the C.I.A. had given equipment and aid to Mr. Hunt, who had directed the illegal entry.

Mr. Helms testified that he had never heard of Dr. Fielding until the psychiatrist's name had appeared in the newspapers. When asked about photographs that Mr. Hunt had taken of Dr. Fielding's office with a C.I.A. camera and that the agency had developed for Mr. Hunt, Mr. Helms swore, "I do not know what the contents of the film were in the latter part of August, 1971."

One Senator asked if anyone at the agency who had reviewed the film had thought Mr. Hunt might be contemplating a break-in. "I never heard anybody at the agency mention such a

theory," Mr. Helms responded, adding later that "nobody had given us the slightest indication that anything underhanded was afoot."

Mr. Helms was asked why then had the C.I.A. halted its assistance to Mr. Hunt back on Aug. 27, 1971, the day the photographs had been returned to Mr. Hunt. Twice Mr. Helms said that it was solely because Mr. Hunt's requests had become "too extensive."

To support that, he recollected that Mr. Hunt had asked to have his former secretary brought back from Paris and that a covert New York telephone number and mailing address be established for him. Mr. Helms never mentioned the photos and what they appeared to show as the reason for the agency's having stopped its aid to Mr. Hunt.

Almost a year after the Helms testimony, the House Judiciary Committee released its material on the Ellsberg break-in and the C.I.A.'s role. Sworn statements from agency personnel along with other testimony indicate that Mr. Helms did not give the true story.

On Aug. 25, 1971, the new material shows, Mr. Hunt along with G. Gordon Liddy requested and received a high-speed camera, concealed in a tobacco pouch, designed for indoor clandestine photography.

A few days later, Mr. Hunt called long-distance and asked a C.I.A. technician to meet him at Dulles Airport, outside Washington, to pick up the camera and film and get it developed at the agency's laboratory.

The camera had been used by Mr. Hunt and Mr. Liddy to photograph Dr. Fielding's Beverly Hills office, inside and out, in order to plan the burglary.

When developed, but before they were delivered to Mr. Hunt at his White House office, the photos were reviewed by C.I.A. supervisory personnel. They showed a shot of a parking space with the name "Dr. Fielding" visible. They also showed shots of the doctor's office, including his file cabinets and safe.

One C.I.A. official speculated at the time, according to the House committee's records, that these were "casing" photographs. Since such "bag jobs" were carried out by C.I.A. agents abroad, these officials were familiar with the need for the type of photos Hunt had taken.

The C.I.A. Deputy Director, Gen. Robert E. Cushman Jr., was informed, since he had made the original arrangements to assist Mr. Hunt.

According to a Cushman aide, C.I.A. technical personnel had determined that the assistance already given to Mr. Hunt "appeared to involve the agency in domestic clandestine operations," a finding confirmed, if not initiated, by the C.I.A. general counsel's office, which also had reviewed the pictures.

The decision was made to end further assistance to Mr. Hunt unless Mr. Helms ordered it continued.

Mr. Hunt was so informed when the photographs were delivered to him the afternoon of Aug. 27, 1971. That day, Mr. Cushman called John D. Ehrlichman and told him of the agency's decision. That such steps would have been taken without Mr. Helms's knowledge is unthinkable.

In 1971, Mr. Helms in a public speech asked the American people to recognize that in the case of autonomous, secret agencies such as the C.I.A. "the nation must to a degree take it on faith that we too are honorable men devoted to her service."

Mr. Helms appears to have broken that faith and in a matter that involves corrupt activities at the highest Government level.

If he and his former agency are ever to again gain the public trust they need, they must make a full public accounting of past Watergate-related conduct. The Congressional committees with responsibility for overseeing the C.I.A. must now order that accounting to be made.

Walter Pincus is executive editor of The New Republic.

BALTIMORE SUN  
27 September 1974

## CIA held behind Argentine killings

By RICHARD O'MARA

Rio de Janeiro Bureau of The Sun

Rio de Janeiro—The hand of the Central Intelligence Agency has been alleged to be behind Argentina's newest and most frightening terrorist organization, the self-styled Argentine Anti-Communist Alliance.

Rodolfo Puiggrós, midway in his flight to Mexico this week, a trip precipitated by a death threat from the alliance,

blamed the CIA for much of the political violence now harrowing Argentina.

Observers of the Argentine situation here suspect that the recent revelations in Washington about CIA interference in Chile has inspired many of the suspicions now being voiced about the U.S. intelligence agency's connection with right-wing terrorist organizations in Argentina.

Mr. Puiggrós, a writer and left-wing Peronist, was appointed rector of the University of Buenos Aires in May, 1973, by then-President Hector A. Campora. Mr. Campora is also in exile in Mexico, under a threat from the alliance.

Another designated victim of the newly active right-wing terrorist organization is Hector Sandler, a congressman in Argentina. Mr. Sandler's name appeared on a list of prominent left-wing political figures sent out by the alliance to newspapers in Buenos Aires.

All the names on the list up to Mr. Sandler's belonged to people already murdered. The alliance claims it has killed nine people since the end of

July.

Mr. Sandler has asked the government of President Isabel Peron to interrogate the United States ambassador in Argentina, Robert Hill, on CIA activities. Ambassador Hill has been regarded as a CIA agent by Argentine leftists since his arrival in the country last February.

The most recent names, or intended victims of the alliance, belong to several of Argentina's most popular performers, including folk singers Horacio Guarany and Mercedes Sosa. Miss Sosa's songs are often political and dwell on themes concerning social problems in the rural areas of Argentina.

WASHINGTON POST  
29 September 1974

# CIA: Silent Partner of Foreign

By Laurence Stern

*Stern is a member of The Washington Post's national staff.*

**F**ROM THE ONSET of the Cold War to the outbreak of Watergate, covert warfare has been a silent partner of American foreign policy.

It was, in the beginning, a morally simple proposition for most Americans. The world was divided into two political hemispheres, one Free and one Communist. The two systems confronted each other around the globe. The rules of engagement were that anything went — preferably short of all-out war.

In the back alley combat of the Cold War years, the Central Intelligence Agency emerged as the secret team with the capability for bribing unions and chiefs of state, for training private armies and — if need be — for toppling governments.

Its leadership was composed of men who fought bravely and well together during World War II, many of them veterans of General William J. "Wild Bill" Donovan's Office of Strategic Services. They were, on the whole, sons of the American establishment — products of comfortable homes, good private colleges and a shared sense of dedication to what they perceived to be traditional American values and unstinting opposition to the common threat: communism.

One of these men was William Egan Colby, a man of meticulously gray quality, who jumped behind enemy lines in Nazi-occupied Europe, who planned and administered the deeply controversial "pacification" program in South Vietnam and who rose patiently through the secret bureaucracy of the CIA's directorate of operations (more popularly "dirty tricks") to the top job, director of central intelligence.

He finds himself today at the center of one of those recurrent public storms which engulfs the CIA when it stumbles by mistake out of the cold into the footlights of public attention.

**T**HE CONTROVERSY centers more on whether the United States should abandon its covert warfare capability and concentrate instead on the intelligence-gathering mission for which it was chartered in 1947.

"This is a legitimate question," Colby acknowledged during a recent teach-in on CIA covert operations conducted on Capitol Hill. He concluded, however, that the answer is no. "I can envision situations in which the United States might well need to conduct covert action in the face of some new threat that developed in the world."

President Ford was less qualified in his last press conference. Asked whether, under international law, the

United States has a right to subvert governments such as the one headed by the late Salvador Allende in Chile, the President said in effect: Sure, everyone does it.

Until Watergate the perception of most Americans of political espionage were formed by films and novels set in exotic foreign capitals against a background of creaky rattan and slow whirling fans.

But the Watergate tapes, with their revelations of "enemies lists," buggings, wiretappings, political fund laundering and the like, gave us a mild taste of how things are on the wrong end of a covert warfare capability.

Before Watergate, the Vietnam war had eroded public confidence in the presidency and sown distrust of the unbridled growth of the executive branch. The CIA has been, in effect, a President's army.

Also, the Nixon-Kissinger policy of detente with the Communist superpowers muddled the neat, bipolar view of the world in the early years of the CIA.

And so, when new details of the U.S. secret war against the Allende government in Chile surfaced recently, well over a year after the CIA role in Chile first came to light, the conditions were ripe for a backfire of public and congressional indignation.

President Ford did little to assuage the growing clamor of criticism with his declaration that the covert political operations against Allende were "in the best interests of the people in Chile . . ."

Secretary of State Kissinger put it with even more brutal directness during a meeting of the National Security Council's super-secret "Forty Committee" on June 27, 1970—some two months before Chile's presidential election.

"I don't see why we need to stand by and watch a country go Communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people," said Kissinger, the architect of the American detente policy, according to unchallenged classified minutes of the proceeding.

The dispute over whether the United States should be engaged in secret political warfare abroad is not a new one. Nothing was said in the national security charter establishing the CIA about political espionage.

When trapped in public disputes over clandestine operations abroad, CIA directors present and past pointed to a provision of the 1947 National Security Act authorizing the CIA "to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct."

Authors David Wise and Thomas Ross, pioneer investigative journalists of the CIA, described this as the agency's "secret charter" for carte blanche intervention. The charter is amplified

## Policy

in a series of highly classified National Security Council intelligence directives (described in the intelligence trade as "nonskids") as well as secret presidential authorizations.

President Truman lived to deplore the secret warfare capability of the CIA, which was created under his administration, because of its penchant for secret warfare enterprises. It was, he told biographer Merle Miller "a mistake . . . If I'd known what was going to happen I never would have done it . . . They (the CIA) don't have to account to anybody."

As far as Truman was concerned, the business of the CIA was intelligence gathering. In fact, Truman was responsible for implanting the covert war role in the CIA when he merged the Office of Policy Coordination and Office of Special Operations, both espionage organizations, into the CIA. At the time he may not have realized the consequences of his action.

Political scientist Harry Howe Ransom of Vanderbilt University writes that "one searches in vain in the public records . . . for any evidence of congressional intent or acquiescence to assign the functions of foreign political action or subversion to the Central Intelligence Agency."

Yet the secret war-making capability of the CIA continued to grow through the years and exercise an even greater influence on American foreign policy. It is a tribute to the expansionary thrust of the executive branch, especially when unchecked by serious congressional oversight.

There are no official figures on the size or spending programs of the clandestine services of CIA. The only published figures, which were subject to pre-publication CIA review, are contained in "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence" by former intelligence officers Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks.

It comprises, they say, 6,000 people and a budget of \$440 million. Within this overall total for clandestine services, some 1,800 persons are said to be assigned specifically to covert action and \$260 million is budgeted for such operations.

### Coordinator in Chile

**A** BROAD, clandestine operations are centered in CIA stations, usually domiciled in a secure wing of American embassies. In-country CIA operations are managed by station chiefs who operate under foreign service covers, such as political officer, labor attache or consul.

In Chile at the time of Allende's downfall, the secret programs to unsettle the incumbent government were coordinated through veteran CIA opera-

tive Raymond A. Warren, who was listed on embassy rolls as a member of the political section. Warren's cover was not deep enough to prevent his house from being stoned by supporters of the late president in the final months of 1973.

The 51-year-old operative arrived in Chile for his second tour in October, 1970, according to the State Department Biographical Register. He returned within a month of a Forty Committee meeting in Washington which, according to the reported testimony of Colby, resulted in a \$350,000 authorization to influence members of the Chilean Congress to oppose Allende in a run-off election.

It was during the same period that the International Telephone and Telegraph Co. through former CIA Director John A. McCone, then an ITT consultant and board member, offered \$1 million to the Nixon administration to seek Allende's defeat in the congressional run-off. The ITT offer was declined and the Forty Committee authorization cancelled on the grounds that the Congressional bribery scheme would be unworkable. Allende won—for the time being.

The programs of destabilization aimed at the Allende government were strongly reminiscent of those used in previous operations in Chile and Brazil. Strikes and demonstrations were funded and orchestrated with the help of the local CIA station.

Middle-class groups, hostile to Allende, were organized into such protests as the familiar "March of the Empty Pots" conducted by housewives banging empty cooking ware in suburban neighborhoods.

Trade unions were conscripted into the covert battle through regional labor organizations which coordinate with the American Institute for Free Labor Development, the foreign organizing arm of the AFL-CIO.

There has been evidence that goon squads and terrorist groups, such as the neo-fascist *Patria y Libertad* ("Country and Liberty") were recruited in the battle against Allende.

Two weeks before the military coup which ousted Allende a high-ranking executive of Chile's secret police told Washington Post special correspondent Marlise Simons that the CIA funds were being funneled to *Patria y Libertad*.

Because covert action programs are hatched under the heaviest secrecy restraints in government they remain obscure to Congress or even high officials in the executive branch, except in the rare cases where they are blown by a witting informant.

Probably the most detailed and authoritative account of covert warfare as it is conducted on a day-to-day basis at the station level will be contained in the forthcoming book by former CIA clandestine operations officer Philip B. F. Agee who was based in three Latin American stations—Ecuador, Uruguay and Mexico—during the 1960s.

Agee's manuscript describes how a local CIA station with a handful of operatives and an adequate budget of black funds can manipulate political

parties, trade unions, public rallies, police bureaucracies and political leaders in small countries such as Ecuador.

Richard M. Bissell Jr., who was the CIA's deputy director for plans (head of the dirty tricks department) at the time of the Bay of Pigs spoke openly of the vulnerability of countries like Ecuador and Uruguay to CIA operations.

"The underdeveloped world," Bissell told a 1968 Council of Foreign Relations meeting on intelligence, "presents greater opportunities for covert intelligence collection, simply because governments are much less highly organized: there is less security consciousness, and there is apt to be more actual or potential diffusion of power among parties, localities, organizations and individuals outside of the central governments."

Because of these conditions the Third World has been an inviting test laboratory not only for intelligence gathering but for secret warfare as well.

The map of the world is dotted with small countries which became battlegrounds of covert warfare because they were designated as the front lines in the anti-Communist struggle.

In the early 1960's the CIA organized the "clandestine army" of Meo Tribesmen in Laos, an ethnic minority which has been savagely decimated by more than a decade of war ending last year in the same inconclusive political stalemate in which it all began.

### Bay of Pigs

THE BAY OF PIGS invasion attempt in 1969 became President John F. Kennedy's most egregious foreign policy blunder. Though Dulles and Bissell were fired in the anguished aftermath, the Bay of Pigs raised no serious doubts about the CIA's secret warfare role, which by then was well institutionalized.

In 1962 and 1963 the CIA intervened massively against the government of Brazil's President Joao Goulart with secret political funding and manipulation of the press and labor movement, principal tools of covert political war. The Goulart government, considered too leftist for Washington's tastes (it had expropriated an ITT subsidiary) was overthrown by a military coup on April Fool's Day, 1964, which closed Congress, liquidated political opposition, shut down newspapers, jailed critics and instituted the systematic practice of torture for political interrogation.

In Vietnam, which began as a low-profile intervention on the part of the United States in the retreating shadow of French influence, the CIA played a key role in propping up our hand-picked candidate for premier, Ngo Dinh Diem, and in his demise after eight controversial years of rule. It administered pacification and counter-terror programs which non-Communist critics of the Saigon regime have branded as programs of repression.

The catalogue could go on: The overthrow of the Mossadegh government in Iran in 1953, engineered with the assistance of former CIA operative Kermit Roosevelt; the toppling of the Ar-

benz government in Guatemala in 1954 with U.S. arms and a CIA air force; covert support of anti-Sukarno rebel elements in Indonesia in 1958; assisting Bolivian troops in the capture of Che Guevara in 1967.

Covert warfare operations are hatched within a narrow spectrum of the intelligence bureaucracy from which dissent and countervailing interests are excluded. Under the system of security classification in which the clandestine services operate, those cleared for access to information are unlikely to be critics or trouble-makers.

Plans for the Bay of Pigs invasion, in many respects the classic covert warfare scenario, were restricted to a small working group in clandestine services. Even the highest officials in the analytical branch of the CIA, the directorate of intelligence, were kept in the dark.

The result, as former National Security Council staffer Morton H. Halperin recently described it, was that "when Mr. Allen Dulles, the director of Central Intelligence, informed the President that the chances of success were very high, this opinion was based entirely on the views of the covert operators planning the Bay of Pigs invasion and on his own hunches . . ."

### Kissinger's Role

TODAY the management of the U.S. secret warfare capability is centered in Kissinger in his capacity as national security advisor to the President. Kissinger presides over the Forty Committee, the top forum for the conduct of covert operations, whose other members are Colby, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Joseph J. Sisco, Deputy Defense Secretary William P. Clements Jr. and Gen. George S. Brown, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Kissinger is the only one with continuous service since the beginning of the Nixon Administration. As both Secretary of State and head of the national security apparatus, Kissinger has consolidated immense control over the intelligence community—probably more than any executive official in the nation's history, more than most Presidents.

On the issue of maintaining a covert warfare program he has made himself clear. Kissinger wants to maintain it for those situations in which the President and his chief advisors want to use it.

In the case of Chile, Kissinger's willingness to punch the covert warfare buttons was well demonstrated even though there is a serious question whether the late President Allende and his "socialism in democracy" experiment represented a compelling threat to U.S. national security.

The main threat in Chile was to a number of U.S. multinational corporations, such as ITT and the copper companies, whose assets were in the process of being nationalized through negotiation under a policy which had the endorsement of the Chilean Congress in 1971.

President Ford's post-facto justifica-

tion two weeks ago of the covert programs against Allende was based on an alleged scheme by the socialist government to destroy the press and opposition political parties. During the three years of Allende's rule the opposition press, led by the influential *El Mercurio* newspapers, continued to print. Political parties, including virulently anti-Allende factions calling openly for insurrection, continued to function.

Only after Allende's death and the overthrow of his government by the military junta on Sept. 11, 1973, did the events occur which the earlier CIA intervention was supposed to prevent.

As in Brazil nine years earlier, the Chilean junta closed the Congress, shut down opposition newspapers and banned all political parties.

### Trouble Spots

CIA DIRECTOR Colby, at the recent Washington conference on covert operations, indicated that there were no current programs of significance now underway.

Looking at the world, however, through the crisis binoculars in the White House west basement and CIA's Langley headquarters, there are several tempting trouble spots which could be ideal candidates for secret political intervention.

In Italy, which is wracked by economic turmoil, the Communist Party could rise to its most powerful point of influence since the end of World War II. The situation is strikingly analogous to the post-war period when CIA in Italy, France and Greece moved into a position of some influence in the internal politics of those countries.

There have been widespread accusations in the Italian press of CIA financing of right-wing terrorist groups coordinated through the Italian secret police, the *Servicio Intelligentsia Difesa* (SID). It is alleged that the SID is conducting a "strategy of tension" by provoking extremist right and left wing activity in order to justify strong governmental security measures.

In the Persian Gulf the steady rise of oil prices by the producer nations threaten to destabilize the economies of the industrial world. Both President Ford and Secretary Kissinger have issued stern warnings of unspecified reaction to the oil price increases by the United States and Western nations. It is one of those situations, to which Colby referred, in which it might be preferable to have an alternative to sending in the Marines.

In Greece there has been a national convulsion of anti-American feeling which could threaten military base arrangements considered vital to both NATO and U.S. operations along Europe's southern flank. The CIA has been publicly associated with the military junta which came to power in 1967 and, with some justification, the agency has become a political bogey man to opponents of junta rule.

Any one of the three points could justify a stronger case for covert intervention than was Chile, should anyone wish to argue it.

Certainly the machinery of covert intervention has begun rolling. Contin-

gency plans have been drawn up and it would be extraordinary if options have not already been discussed by Kissinger, wearing his national security advisorship hat, with his Forty Committee colleagues.

If action is recommended, it will come in the form of a formal recommendation from Kissinger to the President. Kissinger's memorandum will have all the awesome authority of the national security bureaucracy behind it. Only a handful of official men in Washington will be privy to the decision—as well as what flows from it. No one but the President could effectively question it.

If past behavior is any guide, Congress will receive perfunctory briefings after the fact.

Congressional oversight of CIA operations has been almost a laughing stock on Capitol Hill. It is clear that both the Senate and House overseers of CIA had the scantiest notion, if any at all, on what had been going on in Chile in 1970.

"You can say that I was very surprised," Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) remarked after recently hearing Colby's testimony on covert programs mounted against Allende between 1970 and 1973—details of which had already leaked to *The Washington Post* and *New York Times*.

Symington is one of a privileged handful of senators and congressmen who have been designated as legislative overseers of the CIA and are supposedly kept up to date by the agency on all major clandestine activities.

The attitude of the overseers is best typified by the remark of Sen. John Stennis (D-Miss.), chairman of the Senate Armed Service Committee and senior congressional overseer on intelligence matters.

"This agency," he told his colleagues in November, 1971, "is conducted in a splendid way. As has been said, spying is spying. . . You have to make up your mind that you are going to have an intelligence agency and protect it as such, and shut your eyes some and take what is coming."

Stennis' subcommittee counterpart on the House side is Rep. Lucien Nedzi (D-Mich.), who has taken his responsibilities more seriously than most congressmen associated with the oversight role. He is briefed on a biweekly basis by CIA officials and has become an important target for friendly co-option by the agency.

Nedzi doesn't feel that it would be appropriate for his subcommittee to push the investigation any further into CIA's programs of political and economic sabotage in Chile.

"It is obvious to us that the CIA's actions were approved by the administration," he explained. "It was carrying out the foreign policy of the govern-

ment. Foreign policy is outside our jurisdiction."

Foreign policy is the jurisdiction of the House and Senate Foreign Affairs Committees. But CIA won't talk in any detail to those committees. Colby will talk on operational matters only to the Armed Service subcommittees designated to review his agency's operations.

An interesting test is in prospect which will illuminate the paradox of congressional oversight of the CIA. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, supposedly conducting a study of the CIA undercover role in Chile, has formally asked Nedzi for a transcript of Colby's bombshell testimony detailing the 1970 interventions.

It would be a major political surprise if the House Armed Service Committee accedes to the request. Should the Senate committee call Colby it is doubtful that he would talk with the candor with which he addressed the two Armed Service subcommittees.

And so the prospect is for an investigative stalemate in Congress on Chile.

### Disciplinary Action

ALTHOUGH the House Oversight committee balked at pursuing the CIA's trail in Chile, it showed great alacrity in beginning what could become disciplinary proceedings against Rep. Michael Harrington (D-Mass.), the House member who blew the whistle on Colby's testimony in letters to the chairman of the House and Senate Foreign Relations Committees.

It was on Harrington's initiative that Colby was invited to testify before the Nedzi subcommittee on CIA activities in Chile. He was the only member of the House outside the Oversight subcommittee who took the trouble to read the testimony, which was kept under lock and key and made available to members only on request.

And so the question of whether covert operations of the CIA should be abolished may be academic. Congressional leadership, the President, the Secretary of State have all declared themselves openly or privately against any such change.

Yet the record shows that many of our secret interventions have been of dubious benefit to national security. In some instances they have been highly damaging. It is hard to believe that the CIA buries only its successes, of which we hear little.

The hallmark of covert operations—the doctrine of "plausible deniability"—flies in the face of the common assumption that public officials in the American system should be both accountable and moderately truthful.

Plausible deniability was the terrible watchword of the Watergate scandal, which was the very embodiment of the notion of secret intervention coming home to roost.



NEW YORK TIMES  
01 October 1974

# Our Uncle Is Now Dorian Sam

By Russell Baker

WASHINGTON, Sept. 30—The odd thing is not that we are in the business of overthrowing other peoples' governments, but that we can still be surprised when somebody reminds us of it. In Asia, Latin America, Africa, the Mediterranean and the Middle East we have been propping up and knocking down governments more or less openly for the last 25 years.

It is an established policy. Everybody knows it. It is supposed to be done covertly, which is only sensible if you hope to succeed since publicity in matters of this sort can only make the natives resentful and defeat the project. Imagine the chauvinistic rallying around President Ford that would occur if Canada, say, announced that her agents were going to destabilize United States society so that discontented Americans would leave the present Government out of office.

We have been so active in the field, however, that a number of our projects have come to light: Iran, Indonesia, South Vietnam, Greece, the Congo, Guatemala, Cuba — all have been secretly interfered with by the Central Intelligence Agency, in ways that made headlines.

One of the C.I.A.'s few endearing traits is its penchant for making headlines. It is the world's most fully headlined secret agency. This is as it should be in an open society and while it is doubtless embarrassing to the C.I.A. always to have its secrets turning up on page one, we are more than compensated for its ineptitude by the opportunity thus to know ourselves.

The difficulty may be that we prefer not to know ourselves. How else can we explain the cries of shock that follow each fresh disclosure that the C.I.A. has done it again? We hear them again about the Chile intervention. In Washington, wise men who are on a first-name basis with Professor Kissinger are shocked—shocked!—to discover that the United States is overthrowing other governments.

Professional moralizers of press and television are outraged by the bloodshed induced by the new United States-approved dictatorship in Chile, although it has been very slight compared to the mass murders that outraged them in Indonesia with the overthrow of President Sukarno.

Where have these people been for the last 25 years? They always seem to be hearing it for the first time.

President Ford's public approval of exported subversion—everybody else does it; why shouldn't we?, he said—ought to have had a healthy result. It was a candid statement of a national policy in which most of us have tacitly concurred since the Stalin era.

Instead, the President is widely criticized. It is as if we don't want the President telling us the truth despite the demands for Presidents who will tell us the truth.

It is not a difficult paradox to explain. We have listened to our publicity for so long that we believe it. Since 1945 our publicity agents have been telling us we are the good guys, the white hats, the idealists struggling for democracy and freedom along dark streets swarming with the kind of thugs who overthrow other peoples' governments and put their own axe men in charge.

This is a very pleasant picture to have of yourself. It is traumatic to have people as authoritative as the President tell you it is the picture of

## OBSERVER

Dorian Gray, and worse to have him pull the curtain away and show you what you have really come to look like after all these years of preening your beauty in the sunlight but taking all those clandestine nocturnal strolls down the back alleys of world power.

Overthrowing other peoples' governments is a habit of great imperial powers. Romans and Britons did it openly, as do the Russians today, and we differ from them only in insisting that our innocence has not been lost, that we are as pure today as we were when bedded down with empire thirty years ago.

In fact, the C.I.A. has been operating with tacit public consent from the beginning. Everybody knows it has been overthrowing governments, often bloodily, as a principle of American foreign policy for years.

The policy was never publicly adopted as such through the usual processes of debate, Congressional vote and publicly reviewed appropriations. To have done it publicly would have been too embarrassing for us. It would have required us to admit that we were not who our publicity said we were. We preferred it done out of sight, and the Government obliged.

The Government is sensitive about preserving our illusions. It does its best to keep the drearier realities from intruding upon us. Typically, the exposure of the subversion in Chile has resulted not in any Congressional demand to do away with the policy, but in a move by the House Armed Services Committee to punish Representative Harrington for telling us what we did down there.

If we are becoming the enemy we set out to thwart, the least Congress can do is punish anybody who threatens to let us know about it.

NEW YORK TIMES  
25 September 1974

# C.I.A. and Chile: 'This Story Does Not Wash'

To the Editor:

In his Sept. 18 letter, C.I.A. Director William Colby disclaimed his use of the word "destabilization" to describe the goals of the C.I.A. actions in Chile. I indeed attributed the quotation to Mr. Colby in my letters to Representative Morgan and Senator Fulbright and remain certain that the transcript I read of Mr. Colby's testimony to the House Armed Services Special Subcommittee on Intelligence contained that word.

I would suggest that rather than placing such emphasis on the exact wording used before the committee, and thus diverting the public debate over the desirability of C.I.A. activities in Chile, Mr. Colby should instead make public his testimony in order to enable public debate to be based on the best possible available evidence.

I also take issue with Mr. Colby's assertions that the word "destabilize" was not an accurate description of C.I.A. policy and that the C.I.A.'s covert operations in Chile represented a policy "from 1971 on of encouraging the continued existence of democratic forces looking toward free elections." That *ex post facto* rationale for clandestine intervention in internal Chilean affairs is at variance with Mr. Colby's own testimony on April 22, 1974, and represents a further attempt to mislead the American people about our Chilean misadventure.

As far as the over-all aims of our policy are concerned, I suggest that Mr. Colby once again review his own testimony, in which he describes our efforts in Chile as a laboratory experiment to test the techniques of heavy financial investment in discrediting and bringing down a government.

It is now becoming clear that Mr. Colby, along with President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger, is in the process of evolving what amounts to their own White Paper justifying after the fact United States intervention in Chile, similar to the White Paper issued by the Chilean junta last Oct. 26 justifying the need for its military coup. Rather than admitting that United States foreign policy was indeed aimed at "destabilizing" the Allende Government, the executive is unsuccessfully trying to sell the story that the United States acted only to save the principles of democracy being dismantled by Allende.

This story simply does not wash in light of the \$350,000 authorized to bribe the Chilean Congress before Allende took office and the \$500,000 authorized to aid Allende's opponents in both 1969 and 1970 before Allende ever had the chance to try to eliminate them.

MICHAEL J. HARRINGTON  
U.S. Representative, 6th Dist., Mass.  
Washington, Sept. 20, 1974

The writer is a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

WASHINGTON STAR  
25 September 1974

## Smith Hempstone: Destabilizing the CIA

The furor aroused by revelation of the Central Intelligence Agency's activities in Chile raises a number of interesting questions:

⊙ Was the CIA responsible for the overthrow and death of Marxist President Salvador Allende?

⊙ Should the United States get out of covert activities?

⊙ How much candor can be expected from officials testifying before congressional committees?

AS TO THE first, any government that can be "destabilized" for \$11 million, less than many American cities spend for snow removal, and about a quarter of what the Soviet Union has pumped into Portugal since April, can hardly enjoy much popular support, which Allende's did not. He was elected with barely more than a third of the popular vote. He was overthrown, as Charles W. Yost, former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, has observed, "because he and his more radical adherents alienated, frightened, and ultimately radicalized in the opposite sense the unconverted majority, particularly its most powerful element, the military."

Allende fell and died from the weight of his own incompetence and extremism. The disagreeable nature of the regime that succeeded him is itself indicative of Allende's immoderation: The totalitarianism of the left inevitably breeds the authoritarianism of the right, and vice versa.

Indeed, the \$11 million that the CIA spread around to bribe politicians and finance the opposition press undoubtedly was far less damaging to Allende than the perfectly justifiable withholding from him on American insistence of loans from the World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank. Unless one is prepared to argue that, with Cuba's DGI agents pumping money and guns into Chile, the United States had an obligation to assist in the perpetuation of a regime whose apparent ultimate objective was the subversion of democratic institutions.

As to the second question, there are those who maintain that a democratic nation cannot indulge in international dirty tricks and remain true to itself. That notion is defensible philosophically, but it has very

little to do with the real and brutal world in which we live. To leave the field of covert operations to totalitarians of the left and right would be to deny ourselves one means of defending our national security.

AS CIA DIRECTOR William Colby has put it, to completely rule out covert activities would "leave us with nothing between a diplomatic protest and sending in the Marines."

A stronger case can be made for the proposition that covert operations should be employed only against Communist and neo-fascist regimes that are not duly elected, as Allende's was. By such reasoning, the United States would have had to wait until Allende's thugs had totally subverted the Chilean constitution before moving against them.

As to the third question, the conflict between an official's duty not to reveal highly classified information — which almost certainly can be expected to turn up in tomorrow's newspaper — and his clear obligation to tell the truth when testifying under oath is apparent. Given the temper of the times, a refusal to comment on grounds of na-

tional security risks a contempt citation and is taken as an admission of guilt. Nevertheless, that has to be preferable to lying.

Probably the subcommittees of the Senate and House Armed Services committees that oversee the CIA's secret activities ought to tighten their procedures and be a little more skeptical of the agency's activities of this nature, which in any event are declining in both number and scope (and while they're at it, they ought to see to it if there's anything that can be done to keep at least a few secrets from showing up over the morning orange juice).

WITH THE BENEFIT of hindsight, it is probable that the decision to spend \$11 million to "destabilize" Chile was unwise. Given the nature of the present regime in Santiago, it may even have been immoral.

But that doesn't mean we should give up all covert operations.

The people of Czechoslovakia, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia — to name but a handful — would dearly love to see their governments "destabilized."

BALTIMORE SUN  
23 September 1974

## The Arrogance of Superpowers

Not since Leonid Brezhnev proclaimed the doctrine of limited sovereignty for socialist countries weaker than his own has superpower arrogance been enunciated in so frank a manner as that chosen by President Ford. Mr. Brezhnev's doctrine was used to justify the brutal 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia by Soviet tanks and troops. Mr. Ford's counterpart was his public contention that CIA covert operations in Chile from 1970 to 1973 were "in the best interest of the countries involved." There is, to be sure, a considerable difference between military rape and clandestine subversion, the latter at least being more subtle and less bloody. But both in Czechoslovakia and Chile there was one common element — the intrusion by a superpower (defended at the highest level of government) in the sovereign affairs of a smaller nation.

By CIA standards, the use of several million dollars to finance political parties, newspapers and trade unions opposed to Salvador Allende's Marxist regime in Chile was remarkable mainly for its reticence. It could not compare with the CIA role in the 1953 coup in Iran, the 1954 coup in Guatemala, the 1963 coup in South Vietnam, the 1970 coup in Cambodia, the organization of a secret army in Laos or the inglorious Bay of Pigs invasion of 1961.

Yet the anti-Allende operation raises matters of high policy for a number of reasons: First, it comes late in the game when even CIA Director William E. Colby is questioning the importance of most covert operations. Second, evidence of official deceit is surfacing after the nation has learned how much the CIA itself was manipulated by the Nixon White House in the Pentagon Papers and Watergate

scandals. Third, the purported right to interfere in another country, which is what covert operations are all about, has received the wrong-headed official endorsement of the President of the United States.

Congressional reaction to the whole brouhaha has been as predictable as it has been unconvincing. Liberal legislators long suspicious of the intelligence establishment have dusted off the old idea of a joint legislative oversight committee. Conservative lawmakers who already exercise a certain very gentle jurisdiction over the various intelligence agencies are having none of it. And it is likely—despite all the uproar over Watergate and involvements abroad—that the matter will wind up back in a Capitol Hill pigeonhole, as has been the case a couple of hundred times before.

Although closer congressional oversight would be welcome, it is more realistic to look to the executive branch for any real reform of intelligence activities. The President himself bears supreme responsibility. If he is to learn anything from his Chilean gaffe, hopefully it will be that the toleration level for clandestine operations has declined precipitously. Mr. Colby has suggested that there would be no "major impact" on national security if clandestine activities were halted, leaving only a capability to make "a moderate response somewhere . . . between a diplomatic protest and sending in the Marines." This appears to be a sensible formula, one that would leave the CIA free to pursue its wholly acceptable research and analysis work. It is now up to the President to act so that he will not again have to justify our conduct abroad by equating it with Soviet behavior.

WASHINGTON STAR

28 SEP 1974

## Richard Wilson: The CIA's Implacable Critics

Is the CIA necessary? This is something like asking if the Army, Navy and Air Force are necessary, but it underlies much of the agitation which periodically ensues whenever some facet of the super spy agency's operations is exposed.

When the question is considered apart from a controversial incident, such as the political intervention in Chile, it is easily recognizable as political. Opposition to the CIA unflinchingly originates from liberal Democratic sources. Either the Central Intelligence Agency is wrongly interfering in some other nation's business, or it is threatening to extend its tentacles to the domestic scene.

THE CIA IS SEEN as the working arm of the Cold War, but, if so, its record in this area, so far as it is known to the public, is not electrifying. Yet the CIA is the favorite whipping boy of the new and old left, replacing the FBI in this function since the demise of J. Edgar Hoover.

Take Chile for example. According to James Theberge, director of Latin American Studies of Georgetown University and also director of Latin American projects for Nelson

A. Rockefeller's "Commission on Critical Choices for Americans," Russia's KGB operatives were in Chile up to their necks. He wrote: "Soviet designs for Chile to serve as the vanguard of the anti-U.S. front in Latin America ended in a complete fiasco and left a deep impression on the non-Communist political parties and the armed forces in the region. It reminded them of the grave risks of entering into an alliance with totalitarian parties. It reinforced suspicions that despite protestations to the contrary, Marxist governments are driven inexorably to violate pledges to uphold the constitution, to destroy the private sector of the economy, and ultimately to install a totalitarian dictatorship."

If the CIA helped in the foregoing, then the \$8 million confessed to have been spent to preserve the anti-Allende elements of the press and political opposition in Chile would seem to have been a pretty cheap price. But Sen. Frank Church of Idaho has said the CIA oughtn't to be doing such things. For heaven's sake, why not?

IS IT SUPPOSED that it is in the interests of the United

States to have anti-American, Moscow-oriented, Communist governments in the Southern Hemisphere? Does it serve U.S. purposes to have, as Theberge states, Cuba transporting large supplies of Soviet and Czechoslovak weapons to the radical left in Chile on the Cuban airline and Cuban merchant ships?

At the same time, according to Theberge, Cuba established a guerrilla training base and coordinating center in Chile. All this with the blessing of the Soviet Union, with which liaison was maintained through their intelligence services, and Soviet army personnel helped train worker-revolutionaries for guerrilla warfare at a factory installed by the USSR near Valparaiso.

Washington was supposed to sit still while this was going on and do no more than say "tut tut!" while Allende, whose political coalition received merely 36.5 percent of the vote, followed the line of Russia's central intelligence agency.

It can be questioned whether or not that \$8 million of CIA money was necessary. The political, economic and social condition of Chile went to pot so fast under Allende that his Marxist political base could not hold him up. Inflation roar-

ed. Productivity fell. Housewives took to the streets beating their saucepans. The military took over and poor Salvador Allende Gossens lost his life.

THERE ARE other ways of achieving desired American political objectives, such as sending 1 million men to Vietnam or dispatching the Marines to Santo Domingo. But the CIA found an easier way in Chile, and is getting probably more credit for success than it deserves. The Chileans were fairly active themselves.

Now, the anti-CIA elements of Congress are outraged over the guarded and possibly deceptive way Secretary of State Kissinger and former CIA Director Richard Helms informed them of what had gone on in Chile. But the fact remains that the CIA's intervention was carried out in the approved way through the "40 Committee," whose cover has been blown.

This committee, established in 1948, reviews and conveys secretly to Congress ongoing covert operations. Possibly this procedure is perfectible but even so it will never satisfy those who think the CIA is not necessary.

THE WASHINGTON POST Wednesday, Oct. 2, 1974

# CIA to Share Operations Data With Foreign Affairs Panel

By Laurence Stern

Washington Post Staff Writer

Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger and Central Intelligence Director William E. Colby have concurred in an unprecedented agreement to share CIA secrets on covert political operations abroad with members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

At a closed meeting on Capitol Hill last Friday the two officials also affirmed that no covert operations comparable to those targeted against the Allende government in Chile are now in progress anywhere in the world.

The assurances stopped short, however, of a guarantee by Kissinger and Colby that the agency would not engage in future operations against incumbent governments or other political targets.

Until now the CIA has briefed only a subcommittee

of the House Armed Services Committee now headed by Rep. Lucien Nedzi (D-Mich.) on secret political operations abroad. Such briefings were also provided the Senate counterpart, an Armed Services subcommittee chaired by Sen. John Stennis (D-Miss.)

The agreement was greeted with a note of skeptical appreciation by Rep. Michael Harrington (D-Mass.), the man who touched off the recent Chile controversy with his letters demanding further congressional inquiry into U.S. covert activities against the late Salvador Allende in Chile.

"It's a positive, though belated, start," said Harrington who is petitioning along with Reps. Benjamin J. Rosenthal (D-N.Y.) and Donald W. Riegel Jr. (D-Mich.) for full House hearings on the U.S. role in Allende's election and subsequent downfall.

Nedzi, a prime mover, in

working out the new agreement, said Kissinger and Colby had also provided assurances that the congressional subcommittees would be briefed on any pending covert activities before they were undertaken. "Nobody said we're going to give you veto power," Nedzi commented "But my understanding is that we would be told before rather than after."

The Michigan Democrat, who has said that he personally disapproves of the Chilean operations, said the understanding with Colby and Kissinger covers decisions of the "Committee of Forty" of the National Security Council.

Until last year the existence of the "Forty Committee" was virtually unknown on Capitol Hill, even among the members of the CIA oversight committees.

Nedzi's subcommittee learned for the first time of

the scope of U.S.-financed anti-Allende activities—some \$11 million worth—last April 22. The covert programs were in effect in 1964 and again from 1969 to 1973, according to a summary of Colby's testimony before Nedzi compiled by Harrington from the secret transcript.

The new agreement was hinted at in an announcement yesterday by House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Thomas E. Morgan (D-Pa.) that his committee would receive information about overseas activities of the United States "which affect our foreign policy and United States relations with foreign countries — including covert activities."

It was unclear whether a corresponding arrangement is being considered in the Senate, where information on covert action is restricted now to the Senate Armed Services Committee.

NEW YORK TIMES  
28 September 1974

# This Dream Not For Export

By William V. Shannon

WASHINGTON, Sept. 27—For a quarter century, the United States has been trying to do good, encourage political liberty, and promote social justice in the Third World. But in Latin America where we have traditionally been a friend and protector and in Asia where we have made the most painful sacrifices of our young men and our wealth, our relationships have mostly proved to be a recurring source of sorrow, waste and tragedy. Ironically, we get on best today with the black African countries where, except for a brief flurry of enthusiasm in the Kennedy years, our relations have been marked mostly by indifference and mutual incomprehension.

We have been seeking in the Third World to exercise power beyond our capacity to devise political instruments that could make wise use of our power. In trying to do good, we have been living beyond our moral resources and have fallen into hypocrisy and self-righteousness. We have tried to export our idea of democracy and of the economically abundant good life, and have discovered this dream is not for export.

No morally sensitive people could be indifferent to the Third World's claims of human comradeship. A newspaper article about the miseries of

Calcutta or a photograph of the starving children in sub-Sahara Africa is enough to evoke anguish. We are all members of the human community and these are our brothers and sisters though we may never learn their names. Their plight impels us to action in the sphere of private charity or in the political realm as citizens urging our Government to adopt constructive policies on food and foreign aid.

But it is not individual or national humanitarianism that is in dispute. It is the use of our military, economic and political power—power that is immense but that still has limits. Events have shown that our military power is almost irrelevant in the Third World. After the Korean War and then the long ordeal in Vietnam, no American Government is likely to go to war again on the mainland of Asia or in Latin America.

But given the human misery and uneven economic development of much of Latin America, and given the fragility of such political freedoms and the liberal middle-class institutions as were developing there, mere nonintervention seemed sterile and inadequate. Thus through economic assistance and the training of anti-guerrilla army teams we have been intervening with the best of motives.

But benevolence, intelligence and hard work have proved not to be enough. Chile demonstrates the problem. The C.I.A.'s objective was to prevent a pre-emptive takeover of power by Salvador Allende and the radical minority supporting him. Having polled less than two-fifths of the vote in a three-way race, he had no mandate for the Socialist program he was trying to put into effect. The lower house of Parliament censured

him for violating the country's constitution. His own Marxist supporters intimidated the opposition press, bankrupted businessmen with strikes and plant seizures, organized themselves into para-military groups and were conspiring to seize total power.

But by intervening in this complicated situation, the C.I.A. implicated the United States in the unexpected sequel of a grim military dictatorship that employs torture and has destroyed the very freedom and liberal institutions we were trying to protect. The effort to play God with the fate of the Chilean people has been a fiasco. Only the Chilean people can save Chile's freedom.

The theologian Reinhold Niebuhr warned us at the beginning of the postwar era in 1945 when these secular missionary efforts first began: "No nation or individual, even the most righteous, is good enough to fulfill God's purposes in history."

We disregarded that warning. With our enthusiasm, our activist habits and our crisis-mongering we tried to advance our moral ideals and our political objectives and have rarely succeeded. From the Green Berets to the C.I.A.'s clandestine activities to the Marines proudly wading ashore at Camranh Bay, Americans have been imitating in life the ironic paradoxes of Graham Greene's characters in fiction.

If we are not to follow interventionist excesses by an equally unwise isolationist withdrawal, we need new habits of detachment and skepticism. Most of all we need a clearer perception that in history's long unfolding, we are not responsible for the final answers.

NEW YORK TIMES  
03 October 1974  
**SENATE SHELVES  
FOREIGN AID BILL  
IN FORD VICTORY**

By SEYMOUR M. HERSH  
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 2—The Senate upheld the Ford Administration tonight by voting to shelve—at least until after the November elections—this year's controversial \$2.5-billion foreign aid bill. The vote was 41 to 39.

The vote came after critics of the Administration's foreign policy forced through a series of restrictive amendments, including a ban on all clandestine activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, except those specifically listed by the President as vital to national security.

The foreign aid bill, with its 51

amendments, will now be sent back for further consideration to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee—a step that may possibly kill the measure for this year.

#### Early Move Fails

Earlier the Administrations' supporters failed by a vote of 43 to 39 in an attempt to recommit the bill. As debate proceeded, however, and more restrictive amendments were approved, pro-Administration forces were successful.

Among the amendments approved during the long day were measures putting a ceiling on economic aid to Indochina, phasing out military aid to South Korea, cutting out military aid to Turkey and eventually abolishing the entire military assistance program.

The recommittal vote was cast after a motion by Senator John O. Pastore, Democrat of Rhode Island, who termed the bill a "hodge-podge" that did not make legislative sense. The measure was further castigated as "a political punching bag" by Senator Robert P. Griffin of

Michigan, the assistant Republican leader.

#### 'A Fighting Chance'

Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, Democrat of Minnesota, the floor manager of the bill, accused the Administration of "a sorry lack of planning on the whole policy of foreign assistance" that, in effect, led to the amendments approved during debate.

"If the Administration would back this bill," he added, "we might have a fighting chance."

The C.I.A. amendment, adopted by voice vote, provided that the President must justify a request for secret foreign intelligence operations by describing his proposal in a written report to the appropriate committees of the House and Senate.

Without such specific notice, the amendment says, all covert C.I.A. activities now in progress would be forced to cease, and no new operations could be initiated.

"This is only a beginning toward the imperative of instituting some order and struc-

ture to the means by which the American people can exercise a measure of control over the cloak and dagger operations of our intelligence," Senator Harold E. Hughes, Democrat of Iowa, who sponsored the amendments.

#### Amendment has Compromise

Recent disclosures that the C.I.A. was heavily involved in undermining the Government of the former Chilean President, Salvador Allende Gossens, have led to increasingly bitter criticism of the morality and efficacy of clandestine activities.

Nonetheless, Mr. Hughes's amendment was a compromise whose approval came only after the Senate voted 68 to 17 to defeat an amendment that would have flatly barred all clandestine C.I.A. operations. That amendment was proposed by Senator James Abourzsk, Democrat of South Dakota.

Senator Hughes, in arguing for his version, recalled that at a conference last month William E. Colby, the Director of Central Intelligence, declared that there would be no "major impact" on the nation's security if the United States ceased

WASHINGTON POST  
Clayton Fritchey

## Leashing the CIA

We are now in the midst of the annual cloak-and-dagger scandal about the freewheeling CIA, a happening which regularly leads to hopes that Congress will finally bring the agency under effective control, except the hopes are always dashed. This year it may be different. But only maybe.

In the entire federal system there is nothing like the CIA. Unlike other agencies and departments of government, it alone is free of serious congressional accountability. It has often been a law unto itself, acting at times (before the Nixon-Kissinger era) even independently of the State Department.

Not even the supersensitive Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), which guards the most crucial secrets of all, is free of strict legislative supervision. At the very beginning of the dangerous new Atomic Age, the AEC was placed under firm congressional observation through the creation of the Joint Atomic Energy Committee, a solution which in practice has worked out extremely well over a long period of years.

Since 1948, when the CIA got going 150 resolutions have been introduced in Congress to provide different types of formal oversight of the agency, but it has unflinchingly escaped being leashed. It now reports to a phony, informal congressional "watchdog" group, which hardly ever meets and never asks questions when it does.

The agency's chief argument against having exacting overseers is the alleged danger of "leaks." Opponents of the Joint Atomic Committee once said the same thing, but in over two decades there has never been a serious breach of security by the senators and representatives on that committee.

Now, because of the disclosures which have shown how the government, primarily through the CIA, secretly subverted a popularly elected government in Chile, there is renewed interest on Capitol Hill in creating a permanent Joint Committee on Intelligence Activities.

Congress has been "outraged" before by "black" CIA operations in other countries. This time, however, the outrage appears to be more than speech-deep, chiefly because the interference in Chile was not only crude but paved the way for a despotic military government that is currently engaged in a reign of repression. Of

course, the Nixon-Kissinger regime also supported the generals who overthrew democratic government in Greece, but there the CIA role cannot yet be conclusively documented.

On Chile, though, the congressional investigators hit paydirt. Despite the denials under oath of high State Department officials that the United States meticulously kept hands off of domestic Chilean politics, Congress now has sworn testimony to the contrary from William Colby, the director of the CIA.

Colby's testimony that his agency, at White House orders, secretly spent \$8 million to undermine Salvador Allende, the popularly elected president of Chile, shows that Congress, if it is determined, can get the truth from the CIA. All it needs to do is to prove that it means business and that (as now proposed) it will seek perjury indictments if it is lied to.

The development that seems to have aroused the most new interest in Congress is a discovery that, during the Nixon-Kissinger administration, the black operations of the CIA (as in Chile) originated more in the White House than in the spy agency.

The last two chiefs of the CIA, Colby and his predecessor, Richard Helms, have both been career men. During their reign there has been less of the agency's old cloak-and-dagger adventurism, and there would have been still less had it not been for the White House. In the downfall of Mr. Allende, for instance, it is clear that Henry Kissinger, then the head of Nixon's National Security Council, was calling the signals on Chilean policy and CIA involvement.

If Congress were now to create a formal joint committee to oversee the CIA as a replacement for the present informal "watchdog" committee, it would be not only a restraint on the agency but a protection for it against abuses secretly ordered by the White House.

No President could improperly direct the agency to overthrow another government, say, without fear that the order would become known to members of the permanent overseeing committee. The right kind of overseeing might save a lot of mistakes all around, including ones like the Bay of Pigs disaster.

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its covert operations. His Amendment, the Senator said, "would translate" Mr. Colby's words into legislation.

C.I.A. officials had no comment on the amendment, but one intelligence official described the legislation as unprecedented and said if passed into law, it would "put a condition" not on the C.I.A. but on the President's right to order clandestine activities.

In a related development, House members said today that the Administration had agreed to provide the House Foreign Affairs Committee with official briefings on C.I.A. operations that could affect foreign affairs.

Representative Lucien N. Nedzi, Democrat of Michigan, who is chairman of the House Armed Services Intelligence subcommittee, said in a telephone interview that a basic agreement to broaden Congressional responsibility was worked out at a meeting last week involving Mr. Colby and Secretary of State Kissinger, as well as Congressional leaders.

"From now on," Mr. Nedzi said, "any matters involving the C.I.A. which affect foreign policy—including 40 Committee decisions—will be related to the House Foreign Affairs Committee."

The Congressman, who said he strongly supported the move, added that the understanding called for C.I.A. briefings before major clandestine activities were initiated. "This isn't a significant change," he said, "because this is what's been happening since I've been aboard" as committee chairman. — Mr. Nedzi and other officials denied a report published today in the Knight Newspapers that quoted Mr. Colby as having announced at last week's meeting that the C.I.A. had decided to end its overseas covert operations.

No such statement was made, Mr. Nedzi said. The Congressman noted, however, that Mr. Colby had publicly said in the past that covert activities had been cut back in recent years. "There's nothing going on now that can be remotely described as a Chilean situation," Mr. Nedzi said.

The revised procedure to broaden the Congressional role was depicted as not enough by Representative Michael J. Harrington, Democrat of Massachusetts, who has been demanding full-scale hearings into both the United States policies toward the Allende Government and what he has termed the lying of Administration officials about those policies.

"I'm not taken with assurances that all will be well," Mr. Harrington said. "This only contributes to the illusion of oversight; it doesn't solve the problems as they are."

The revision, he said, "has a distracting effort on the real issue—engaging in a thorough investigation of Chile."

Mr. Harrington, a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, has been unsuccessfully urging Representative Thomas E. Morgan, Democrat of Pennsylvania who is committee chairman, to initiate broad hearings into the Chilean policies.