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Governmental Affairs

PENTHOUSE
JUNE, 1975

KISSINGER'S SECRET EMPIRE

AMERICA'S VAST "INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY" IS A HIDDEN $25-BILLION NETWORK OF 200,000 SPIES CONTROLLED BY OUR ROVING SECRETARY OF STATE

BY TAD SZULC



The United States government today maintains one of the largest, most expensive secret intelligence networks the world has ever known. This network, personally directed by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, stretches around the earth and through the skies above. It costs the American taxpayer some $25 *billion* a year—an expenditure most congressmen don't even know about. It has been responsible—directly or indirectly—for the deaths of many thousands of innocent people. And—most ironically—it poses a great threat to the freedoms of the American people—or, as the administration would put it, to our national security.

It would not be too difficult to establish a police state in America today—given the 200,000 employees of the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the various military intelligence services, and local police departments, and the web of over twenty official agencies—including the Internal Revenue Service—that form what is euphemistically known in Washington as the "Intelligence Community."

Moreover, America's foreign policy (and a significant part of our foreign trade) is almost totally formulated and executed in concert with these agencies. For example, the CIA is invisibly involved in major U.S. government economic negotiations—oil is a case in point—and has special "arrangements" with big corporations. All this is especially convenient for Kissinger, who controls the official agencies of the Intelligence Community as well as the State Department. Kissinger's secret practices have included wiretapping his closest aides to insure their *personal* loyalty, and overthrowing "irresponsible" governments, even if they happen to be democratically elected. Kissinger resents having to answer for his actions to anyone, except—possibly—the president. This, then, raises the fundamental question of moral—and probably legal—responsibility on the part of presidents of the United States and their National Security Advisers (this is the post that Kissinger holds along with that of Secretary of State) for the resultant deaths of men in foreign lands.

Typically, Congress is the last to learn of these actions, although Kissinger needs it for the $25 billion a year it gives his intelligence network. But even this huge amount of money (about 8 percent of our overall national budget) is artfully hidden under innocent-sounding line items in the federal budget. It is another of Henry Kissinger's many secrets. The $25 billion figure may sound excessively high—most published estimates have set it at around $10 billion—but in calculating the real total one must take into account the huge sums spent through military appropriations for the Intelligence Community's ever-growing technological requirements. Billions are spent on satellite reconnaissance. (A recent example of the Intelligence Community's expenditures is the nearly $600 million spent, with Kissinger's specific approval, on building and operating a deep-sea salvage ship designed to recover secretly a Soviet submarine that sank in the Pacific in 1968.)

After the publication of disclosures last December that the CIA had been heavily involved in domestic spying activities, President Ford named a "blue-ribbon" panel headed by Vice President Nelson Rockefeller (until recently a presidential adviser on foreign intelligence) to investigate just what the agency had been doing at home. Under a broader mandate, covering overseas intelligence operations as well, special Senate and House committees undertook parallel in-depth investigations of their own. Senator Frank Church of Idaho, chairman of the Senate's Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, summed it all up in these words: "My overriding concern is the growth of Big Brother government in this country, and the implicit threat that this represents to the freedom of the people." And later, when were circulated of possible CIA involvement in assassination plots, Church added, "In the absence of war, no agency of the government can have a license to murder; the president can't be a 'Godfather.'"

There have been many disclosures in recent months about spying by the CIA and the FBI on American citizens suspected—sometimes for grotesque reasons—of ties or involvements with Soviet, Cuban, North Korean, and many other intelligence services. There have been endless well-documented stories of wiretaps, illegal break-ins, and the tens of thousands of political files kept, Gestapo-like, on American citizens by the CIA, the FBI, and the Army Counterintelligence Corps.

The CIA has admitted keeping dossiers on New York's Democratic Congresswoman Bella Abzug and three other members of Congress. It refused to name these other congressmen, but *Penthouse* has learned that they are Wisconsin's Senator Joseph McCarthy and Oklahoma's Robert Kerr—both now deceased—and Senator Hubert H. Humphrey of Minnesota. According to authoritative sources, in the early 1950s the CIA engineered the burglarizing of McCarthy's and Kerr's offices to gain access to their files. The files were photographed on the spot and, presumably, are still kept by the CIA.

In McCarthy's case, the CIA was especially interested in the private sources that fed him the information to conduct his witch-hunt. The agency evidently didn't like the

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idea of Joe McCarthy knowing something hat the CIA's chiefs didn't know.

Senator Kerr was in his time one of the most powerful and influential politicians in he U.S. The CIA was hungry for secret political knowledge. Furthermore, Kerr, a millionaire, was highly active in worldwide oil operations, particularly in the Middle East. Oil intelligence was as crucial to the CIA wenty years ago as it is today.

The CIA reportedly began its dossier on Senator Humphrey just before he became vice president in 1965. *Penthouse* sources were unable to say either why the CIA kept a file on Humphrey or what it contained, except that the agency evidently wanted to have as much confidential material as possible on the man who held our second-highest elective office.

The disclosure that the CIA, which is legally only supposed to operate overseas, has been spying on Americans and their elected representatives is obviously disquieting. However, the public testimony of CIA Director William E. Colby before Congress raises more questions than it answers; and it serves to cast doubt on all his denials of illegal CIA activity.

Let's look at the record: On January 15, 1975, Colby denied that the CIA engaged in "surveillance, technical or otherwise," on members of Congress. On February 20 he testified that "over the past eight years, our counterintelligence program holdings have included files on four members of Congress." On March 5, Mrs. Abzug made public contents of her CIA file, which went back to the 1950s—thus contradicting Colby's claim that such surveillance went back only eight years. Moreover, on March 5, Colby testified that Mrs. Abzug was one of four members of Congress on whom files were kept as part of the agency's operations against Vietnam war protesters. He also said that one of the other congressmen was no longer alive.

Innumerable questions are raised by this testimony. Three of the more obvious are: How many members of Congress have been spied upon by the CIA since it was established in 1947? Colby testified that files were kept on four members of Congress "over the past eight years." But at least three of the congressmen we know of (McCarthy, Kerr, and Abzug) have or had files going back to the 1950s. Secondly, are the four people we know of Vietnam war protesters? And thirdly, Colby said that *one* of the congressmen was dead—but we know of two who are deceased. The questions can go on and on. Ron Ziegler clearly has to take a backseat to Colby as the master of the "inoperative" statement.

Since Watergate, Americans have learned of the Nixon plan for a massive domestic intelligence apparatus—the nearest thing we've ever had in the U.S. to a blueprint for a police state. But, as is clear from the above testimony by Colby, the Intelligence Community has not reformed since Nixon left the White House. Here is some more of what *Penthouse* has learned of the "Community's" more recent activities:

• Despite the outcry over its intervention in Chile, the CIA was involved early in 1975 in an attempt to overthrow the government of the Malagasy Republic (the Indian Ocean island once known as Madagascar). Colonel Richard Ratsimand[illegible] served as president of the Malagasy Republic for only six days, was killed on February 11 by members of the Mobile Police Group, a special police unit; in a crisis that—even from the CIA's viewpoint—had gotten out of hand. Ratsimandrava had replaced General Gabriel Ramanantsoa as a result of a coup carried out by the special police. However, Ratsimandrava was apparently unacceptable to the Mobile Police Group, which is known to have CIA ties. American interest in Malagasy lay chiefly in the securing of military facilities at the former French naval base at Diego-Suarez to fit into the broader scheme of new U.S. bases in the Indian Ocean, most importantly at the entrance to the oil-rich Persian Gulf. This was the second known U.S. attempt to obtain base rights from a reluctant Malagasy government. In January 1972 the American ambassador to Malagasy, Anthony D. Marshall, a career CIA officer elevated to ambassador by Nixon in 1969, was asked to leave amidst charges that he was directing a plot against the government. However, the government fell anyway four months later. Marshall, whose CIA cover was never blown publicly, is now ambassador to Trinidad and Tobago, a strategic Caribbean nation.

• In both 1974 and 1975 the CIA was also deeply engaged in covert operations in Portugal, where the world's oldest dictatorship had just been thrown out of power. There are reasons to believe that the CIA was in close touch with the military group of General António de Spínola, who led an abortive coup against the provisional government on March 11. The actual extent of direct CIA involvement is still unclear, but it is known that the coup failed because the plotters' group was infiltrated by government agents; it is also possible that the CIA's own operation in Portugal was similarly infiltrated. The presumed reason for this CIA activity was Kissinger's fear that the U.S. might lose its air-naval bases in the Azores if left-leaning Portuguese military rulers remained in power. (The Azores, of course, are considered vital for refueling U.S. aircraft flying to Israel in the event of a new Arab-Israeli war.) Although there are experts who disagree with Kissinger on the absolute need to retain bases in the Azores, the administration felt so strongly about the Portugal operation that it gave the CIA the go-ahead to establish a working relationship with General Spínola.

• Notwithstanding an earlier window-dressing reduction in personnel, the Intelligence Community has continued to expand its global operations, with emphasis on technological intelligence both at home and abroad. This accounts for its total yearly budget of some $25 billion. This money includes immensely expensive research and development of science-fiction intelligence equipment. The funds are buried in the Pentagon's budget. For example, the Air Force budget conceals nearly $1.5 billion for worldwide satellite reconnaissance.

• Despite public disclosures, the intelligence agencies have failed to destroy all their secret files on Americans although not one has been proved to be a foreign intelligence agent. (Ironically, the CIA announced publicly that it has stopped destroying files while investigations of the Intelligence Community are in progress.) These master lists, combined with the steadily growing capabilities of intelligence units of state, county, and municipal police departments, make an American police state a real possibility—should a new Nixon come along, or even if one doesn't. The Intelligence Community, originally intended as an instrument for gathering foreign intelligence, has grown into such an immense and powerful bureaucracy that, in effect, it virtually constitutes a federal police force—something we have always rejected as anathema. And, of course, we still have "national security" wiretaps.

• The National Security Agency, the Pentagon-linked electronic intelligence organization that covers the world with its 125,000 employees and a $11 *billion* annual budget, still selectively monitors and transcribes each day uncounted thousands of international telephone calls between the U.S. and foreign points. Considering that over sixty million overseas calls—both incoming and outgoing—will have been made this year, the magnitude of this eavesdropping operation is staggering. It violates, needless to say, the civil rights of Americans using international telephone communications for family or business matters (what spy in his right mind would use an open phone line to discuss espionage or sabotage?). The NSA falls back on the lame excuse that this practice is part of foreign intelligence protection for the U.S. It goes without saying that all international calls by foreign diplomats are monitored for intelligence-collection purposes. Transcripts of *all* monitored overseas calls—and, in many cases of intercepted radiograms and telegrams—are given to the CIA and the FBI and, when requested, to Kissinger's National Security Council. The NSA has also quietly encouraged illegal break-ins by agents of other intelligence agencies of the foreign embassies in Washington to steal code books. Code-breaking is one of the NSA's chief functions.

• An obscure "private airline" with strong CIA ties, an outfit called Birdair (after its "owner," William H. Bird), suddenly in September 1974 became a major carrier of ammunition and food from Thailand to Cambodia aboard huge C-130 Air Force transports provided under a Pentagon contract. Birdair has a close relationship to the worldwide network of CIA-owned "airlines," the most notorious of which is Air America, Inc., operating in Indochina.

When outraged Americans try to discover exactly what this vast Intelligence Community *is*, what it does (and how and why), and whether it protects their security, rights, and liberties or threatens them, the official answer—and the answer usually accepted in the past by both a basically indifferent public and the blindly trusting and unquestioning congressional committees theoretically in charge of CIA "oversight"—is that U.S. Intelligence concerns itself with the collection overseas of information vital to the national security. This, of course, is only an elegant phrase for espionage—and it is part of a tacit international "gentlemen's agreement" that everybody spies on everybody else: the CIA, the Soviet KGB, the British MI-6, the French SDT, the Israeli Ha-Mosad, the Cuban DGS, and so on.

But more recently, U.S. Intelligence has admitted conducting—even if usually only when caught red-handed at it—a number of covert political and paramilitary operations around the world. Sanctimoniously, the CIA and its partners always justify themselves

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on the grounds that their destruction of foreign governments, or attempts at it, is in the best interests of the cause of democracy in the affected countries. This was the excuse for doing away with leftist regimes in Iran in 1953, in Guatemala in 1954, in the Congo in 1960, and in Chile in 1973. It was also the excuse for the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1961. And, among many others, the Congo's Patrice Lumumba, Chile's Salvador Allende Gossens, and Colonel Ratsimandrava of the Malagasy Republic were killed in the process of democracy being subverted by the CIA. The agency had also considered assassinating Cuba's Premier Fidel Castro and Haiti's President François Duvalier—and it may well have had a hand in the 1961 murder of the Dominican Republic's dictator, Rafael Trujillo. The CIA had no ideological problems with Duvalier and Trujillo, but they were apparently "getting out of control." In connection with these murder plans, the CIA developed a cozy relationship with the Mafia.

Nobody knows exactly how many other foreign politicians of lesser renown—to say nothing of various American and foreign intelligence agents and quite innocent people who just found themselves caught in the midst of some CIA operation—lost either their lives or their freedom in the last quarter-century as a consequence of our government's meddling in the affairs of other nations. And nobody knows just how many foreign politicians, military officials, labor and student leaders, and the like were bought, suborned, and corrupted by the CIA as it insouciantly went about weaving networks of secret agents.

When earlier this year congressional committees began probing into the activities of the Intelligence Community, President Ford expressed private concern that if carried too far the investigations could unearth political assassinations abroad authorized by his predecessors. Subsequently Ford said that he would personally look into assassination charges, and he added that he "condemned" such operations. The unwritten law is that the president of the United States must personally approve the order for the political murder of an important foreign figure by American agents. If an assassination "contract" is given a CIA-employed foreigner, however, the agency can act on its own. While these would be "selective" assassinations, the agency has been indirectly responsible for thousands of deaths in such foreign operations as the war waged by its "Clandestine Army" in Laos, the Phoenix program in Vietnam (see below), the 1954 Guatemala Civil War, the Bay of Pigs, the secret air operations in the Congo in the 1960s, and supporting the Indonesian rebellion in 1965.

Additionally, the CIA has trained right-wing Cambodian and Ugandan guerrillas at secret bases in Greece and Tibetan guerrillas in the mountains of Colorado.

The question the CIA and other members of the Intelligence Community never answered was why, in the light of their democratic protestations, they have always allied themselves with the most repressive and reactionary regimes in the world. In Vietnam, for example, the CIA pioneered the infamous "Operation Phoenix," which was nothing less than a wholesale program for assassinating over 20,000 real or suspected Vietcong sympathizers in South Vietnam. At the same time, police experts provided by the Agency for International Development (supposedly the humanitarian supplier of economic development funds) were busy supervising President Nguyen Van Thieu's "tiger-cage" prisons for political opponents (the cages themselves were designed and built by the U.S. Navy in California under an AID contract). In Greece, the key leaders of the now ousted "colonels' junta," a singularly brutal dictatorship, were actually on the CIA's payroll. In Bolivia, CIA agents were involved in flushing out and killing the hapless Che Guevara and his ill-advised revolutionary companions. In short, wherever there is a nasty dictatorship in power, you can be certain of finding CIA representatives in bed with the local executioners and prison-masters, many of whom were trained in the United States by the CIA and federal police academies.

In the United States all the crisscrossing intelligence operations are supposedly conducted for the purpose of counterespionage—in other words, to intercept foreign spies and political operatives.

(One should note in passing, however, the double standard implicit in this whole concept: we consider it criminal for foreign agents to operate covertly in the U.S., and rightly so, but the CIA and its *confrères* think nothing of subverting the governments of other countries. Although there is no American law against it, such subversion clearly violates international law. It is a form of aggression prohibited by the UN Charter—which the United States helped to draft.)

In any event, what the Intelligence Community has been doing domestically—and continues to do—far exceeds counterespionage needs. And this is where the danger of a police state comes in. In the mid-1960s (no, Nixon wasn't the original culprit although he raised domestic snooping to the level of an art), the Intelligence Community took it upon itself to police any form of dissent against the Establishment. Everything—from the antiwar movement to civil rights campaigns—was suspect.

The late J. Edgar Hoover assembled immense files on just about everybody in public life, from congressmen (fourteen of them) to actors and newspaper scribes. His FBI wiretapped such civil rights leaders as Dr. Martin Luther King. The paranoid notion behind it all was that American dissenters simply must be under sinister foreign influences; why else would they object to American policy? (But Attorney General Edward Levi also testified in February that the FBI had been repeatedly "misused" by past presidents for political purposes.)

More recently, Army counterintelligence agents, who legally have no business spying on civilians, built a computerized data bank, reportedly containing around 100,000 names, at their Fort Holabird, Maryland, headquarters. The Air Force's Office of Special Investigations (OSI), which theoretically is responsible for the physical security of installations, launched a program to identify and weed out Black Panthers from among the ranks of airmen. Internal OSI documents depicted perilous Black Panther conspiracies in the Air Force. Then the CIA, whose charter clearly restricts it to intelligence operations abroad, entered the domestic picture. Joining the FBI and the [illegible] it assigned its own agents to penetrate peace groups and radi[cal] cal movements. Not to be left behind by th[e] FBI and the Pentagon, the CIA put togeth[er] its own secret lists, which include at lea[st] the four congressmen. Because of its eno[r]mous manpower, financial, and technolog[i]cal resources, the CIA proceeded secret[ly] to train domestic police forces—most nota[]bly in Washington, New York, and Chica[]go—in complex intelligence crafts so th[at] local cops could better anticipate, monito[r] and control antiwar demonstrations an[d] other civil disturbances. The Washingto[n] police department has officially admitte[d] that its links to the CIA go back to the la[te] 1940s and that they were "intensified" [in] 1969—the year Nixon took office. Inasmuc[h] as the 1947 law that created the CIA specifi[]cally bars it from domestic police function[s] this friendly effort was a flagrant violation [of] the statute. Returning the favor, selecte[d] police departments began providing CI[A] agents with local police credentials to facil[i]tate their undercover work at home.

When the CIA's involvement in domest[ic] political espionage was publicly disclose[d] late in 1974, the agency, in the midst of th[e] gathering scandal, rather incredibly to[ld] astonished congressmen that there wer[e] reasons to suspect that such radical group[s] as the Black Panthers were trained in Alge[]ria, the Soviet Union, and North Korea. Th[e] CIA kept insisting on this, even though [a] presidential commission *which include[d] agency representatives* had concluded a[s] far back as 1968 that there were no tie[s] between antiwar activists and other mil[i]tants and foreign intelligence services.

Another explanation offered the con[]gressmen was that, because of Hoover's i[r]rationality, the FBI dropped its counteres[]pionage functions—and the CIA simply ha[d] to fill the vacuum. When, for example, fo[r]eign agents were known to be traveling t[o] the United States—their movements abroa[d] were tracked by the agency's counterintel[]ligence staff—the CIA, according to this a[r]gument, had no choice but to assign its ow[n] men to establish surveillance over the[m] upon their arrival here. This may well be tru[e] and quite reasonable in the CIA's eyes, *bu[t] the agency was violating the law*. And onc[e] the agency violates the law for presumab[ly] valid reasons, there is simply no telling wha[t] the next "one-time exception" is going to b[e]. The temptation to keep increasing domesti[c] operations is just too great.

In fact, these temptations *were* dange[r]ously increased when Nixon, one of th[e] CIA's best friends from his vice-presidenti[al] days, assumed office in 1969 and realize[d] the extraordinary possibilities that the grow[]ing domestic intelligence apparatus offere[d] him politically. Nixon was the chief Whi[te] House executive officer in the planning [of] the Bay of Pigs operation. He was one of th[e] few people outside the Intelligence Com[]munity to receive what the CIA calls "n[o] shit" briefings—that is, the whole unva[r]nished truth about covert operations—du[r]ing his tenure as vice president, and one [of] his first acts as president was to appoint hi[s] old friend, Marine Corps General Robert E[.] Cushman, Jr., as Deputy Director of Centr[al] Intelligence and Deputy CIA Director. B[y] this appointment, Nixon gained a privat[e] link to the CIA, allowing him to bypass, if h[e] wished, career director Richard M. Helms. [It] just so happened that at the inception of th[e] Watergate period it was General Cushma[n]

rather than Helms (conveniently out of town that day) who received E. Howard Hunt, the White House "plumber," to arrange for CIA logistics support for the planned break-ins.

At the Justice Department (where the Internal Security Division performs an intelligence function alongside the FBI), Nixon was represented by his close friend Attorney General John Mitchell. This was particularly crucial for Nixon's gradual takeover of the whole domestic intelligence apparatus during the period before Hoover's death in May 1972. Despite Hoover's strenuous objections, Nixon succeeded in July 1970 in setting up the Interagency Committee on Intelligence—the members were the CIA, the FBI, the National Security Agency, and the Defense Intelligence Agency—to expand domestic intelligence activities. This concept emerged from a "For Eyes Only" memorandum drafted for Nixon by his aide, Tom Charles Huston, which proposed that "present procedures should be changed to permit intensification of coverage of individuals and groups in the United States who pose a major threat to the internal security." Huston, admitting in his memo that much of what he was recommending was unlawful, observed that "present restrictions on legal coverage should be relaxed on selective targets of priority foreign intelligence and internal security interest. . . . Covert coverage is illegal and there are serious risks involved. However, the advantages to be derived from its use outweigh the risks. This technique is particularly valuable in identifying espionage agents and other contacts of foreign intelligence services."

Given Nixon's turn of mind, it should come as no surprise that he enthusiastically endorsed Huston's reasoning and forced the Intelligence Community to go along with it. After all, Nixon had a "police" mentality. Few people may know it, but his first ambition on graduating from law school was to become an FBI agent—Nixon himself told this story to the FBI National Academy in May 1969 as he received from Hoover an honorary membership in the FBI. He recalled applying to the FBI in 1937 and being approved as an agent. But he never made it. This was because, as Nixon put it, "the Congress did not appropriate the necessary funds requested for the Bureau in the year 1937." And, typically, he added: "I just want to say in Mr. Hoover's presence and in Mr. Mitchell's presence that will never happen again."

And now for a look at the Intelligence Community as it exists today. Its "board of directors" is the United States Intelligence Board (USIB). USIB's chairman is the Director of Central Intelligence, currently Colby—a thin-lipped, cold-eyed CIA clandestine services career official. His greatest notoriety derives from "Operation Phoenix," the Vietnam assassination program which he supervised from Saigon before being recalled to the agency's headquarters at Langley, Virginia, just outside Washington.

As USIB's chairman, Colby is directly responsible to the National Security Council and, through it, to President Ford. In practice, however, Colby's real boss is Henry Kissinger (in his separate incarnation as Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and thus manager of the National Security Council). Kissinger—as we've noted—has virtually taken over the workings of the Intelligence Community in recent years. Under Eisenhower, foreign policy was controlled by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and his brother Allen W. Dulles, the Director of Central Intelligence. Under Nixon, and now under Ford, Kissinger alone controls both these strands of foreign policymaking. Since coherent policy cannot be formulated without the input of intelligence, Kissinger acts both as the producer of intelligence and its principal consumer. This is one of the main sources of his extraordinary power.

Kissinger is also the chairman of the top-secret "Forty Committee" of the National Security Council, the five-man body in charge of major covert intelligence operations abroad. In this context, Kissinger reports only to the president (one likes to assume that he does so in every case). Colby is Kissinger's subordinate in the Forty Committee (the name is derived from the number of the NSC document that set up this group in 1969, replacing similar past committees with other numerical designations), which further strengthens Kissinger's hold over U.S. Intelligence. In addition, Kissinger runs the NSC Intelligence Committee and the Net Assessments Group.

The members of the USIB are the CIA (making Colby both the chairman and a constituent member), the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the State Department's small but excellent Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), the FBI, and, most recently, the Treasury Department. The Treasury was added because of its participation in the antinarcotics program (the CIA is also working on narcotics though, ironically, its agents often collaborate with heroin smugglers in Indochina) and because of the fact that it runs the expanded Secret Service. The Atomic Energy Commission was a USIB member until it was absorbed in early 1975 into the new Energy Research and Development Administration. The Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (which until recently had Vice President Rockefeller as a member) theoretically advises the president, but it plays no effective role. In the Nixon years, an informal Intelligence Evaluation Committee, designed for domestic intelligence, also met at the White House.

The Intelligence Community is a formidable empire both in terms of money and personnel. This is how it breaks down:

(1) *The National Security Agency*. Established in 1952 by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it is the biggest and richest and most secret of them all. Its annual budget of $11 billion includes the special funds for research and overhead reconnaissance; and it employs 25,000 U.S. military and civilian personnel at its headquarters at Fort George G. Meade in Maryland, and 100,000 more Americans all over the world. In addition, the NSA employs between 10,000 and 15,000 foreign personnel abroad, mainly for the physical protection of its facilities. The NSA's present director is Lt. Gen. Lew Allen, Jr., who has worked both for the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency. Obviously, the USIB agencies cross-fertilize.

The NSA's general operation is known as SIGINT (signal intelligence). It runs overhead satellite and SR-71 spy aircraft reconnaissance, COMINT (communications intelligence), and ELINT (electronic intelligence). It specializes in code-making and code-breaking, and in all forms of cryptog[illegible] monitoring international telephone and cable communications. The NSA's authority for this kind of domestic monitoring is at best murky. Privately, officials say that the agency currently derives its authority from the 1968 wiretap law providing that nothing in it "shall limit the Constitutional power of the President to take such measures as he deems necessary to protect the nation against actual or potential or other hostile acts by foreign powers, to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States, or to protect national security information against foreign activities." The question that results, however, is whether the president must obtain an across-the-board court order authorizing the massive surveillance represented by the NSA's monitoring of private international communications, or whether separate court orders are needed in each case. This is a point on which the Supreme Court must rule.

In the meantime, the NSA claims that it derives its authority from the president, and that—given the volume of overseas phone calls it monitors—it would simply be impractical to seek individual court orders. What we do not know, however, is whether President Ford has moved for a blanket court order, or whether he has authorized the NSA (as evidently his predecessors have done) to eavesdrop on international communications on the basis of his inherent powers.

In any event, it appears that the NSA is doing its monitoring from the seven locations in the United States where the American Telephone and Telegraph Company operates international phone exchanges—New York City; White Plains, N.Y.; Springfield, Mass.; Jacksonville, Fla.; Pittsburgh, Pa.; Oakland, Calif.; and Denver, Colo. AT&T officials insist that if the NSA is listening to its international traffic, it is being done without the company's official knowledge or cooperation. Technicians say, however, that the NSA surreptitiously plugs its own monitoring lines into the seven AT&T exchanges while the company conveniently looks the other way. "It's a case of seeing no evil and hearing no evil," an expert said.

Insofar as about 2 percent of all international phone calls go annually through U.S. exchanges (roughly 1.2 million classified as "interconnects" between Europe and Asia) the NSA gets the extra bonus of picking up these conversations, too, without having to go through the trouble of secretly listening to them from overseas points. Typically, an "interconnect" call may be between London and Peking, or Paris and Tokyo.

Several years ago, this reporter was shown at the State Department the transcript of a monitored conversation between Haiti's president, Jean-Claude Duvalier, in Port-au-Prince, and his mother, the widow of François Duvalier, in Miami. Because Mme. Duvalier was then acting as an adviser to her young son, the U.S. government was interested in the conversation. The transcript was a translation from the Creole dialect in which the Duvaliers spoke, but the official who was reading it commented that "She certainly sounds like a Jewish mother . . . worrying about him and his safety." Thousands of such conversations are picked up by the NSA every month.

In almost every case, the calls are recorded for immediate transcription—and translation and analysis, if required. If con[illegible] in English or a foreign

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language, are in code, then NSA experts are summoned to break the code. In principle, the monitoring is selective—it would probably be beyond anybody's capacity to transcribe sixty million conversations annually, but even so, these telephone transcriptions account for a large part of the hundred tons of paper the NSA uses up each day at its headquarters. The transcriptions are stored in huge computers for instant retrieval. The computers—in the case of stored telephone conversations as well as of other monitored communications and radio broadcasts—can immediately identify voices through "voice prints." An NSA official can, for example, ask the computer to produce everything said in the voice of a particular person. Harry Howe Ransom, an intelligence expert who teaches at Vanderbilt University, has said, "I have developed a disturbing fear that NSA, like the CIA, may have been engaged in electronic surveillance on American citizens."

COMINT, which includes the eavesdropping on international telephone conversations, is the NSA's largest single activity, and this explains why the NSA requires such an enormous budget and work force. Most NSA money goes for research and development of its fantastically complex technological intelligence—and, also, of course, for its huge payroll. In overhead reconnaissance, the NSA works closely with the Air Force's top-secret National Reconnaissance Office, which launches the Samos satellites and the SR-71 planes and has an annual budget around $1.5 billion from separate Defense Department funds. The CIA is its other partner in "spy-in-the-sky" operations; it concentrates on planning these missions and interpreting the overhead photography that is characterized by its incredibly high degree of resolution. A Samos camera can spot a golf ball from 100,000 feet or more.

SIGINT is designed to track the movements of foreign warplanes, warships, and troops everywhere in the world, as well as monitoring just about everybody's military communications traffic right down to, say, air chatter between pilots of Bulgarian MIG jet fighters. Should an ELINT unit spot a hostile military move—the launching of nuclear missiles or bombers—its CRITIC flash message would instantly roar over U.S. communications facilities to alert the North American defense network and prepare to set a retaliatory strike in motion.

NSA surveillance is conducted from secret installations in the U.S., the Aleutians, Iceland, Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, the Indian Himalayas, Ethiopia, Turkey, Morocco, and a score of other locations. There are some 2,000 secret "intercept positions" around the world. They are supplemented by ELINT ships and planes—such as the *Liberty*, mistakenly sunk by the Israelis in 1967, the *Pueblo*, captured by the North Koreans in 1967, and the EC-121 plane shot down off North Korea in 1969. NSA teams in Vietnam and Cambodia helped to direct air strikes by everything from B-52 bombers to helicopter gunships, but by and large the North Vietnamese outsmarted NSA's electronic devices along the trails.

(2) *The Central Intelligence Agency*. In existence since 1947, the agency has become synonymous with American intelligence operations in the eyes of Americans and foreigners alike. The CIA's annual budget is estimated at $6 billion and its U.S. staff stands at some 8,000 persons. In addition there are several thousand foreign agents controlled by CIA case officers. Abroad, U.S. officials belonging to the agency work out of CIA stations attached to every American embassy and CIA bases in American consulates. They have an official State Department cover, but CIA stations operate their own communications and do not always see eye to eye with the embassies. Other CIA officials work overseas under "deep covers," and even local CIA stations are often unaware of them. For operational purposes the world is divided into regional "commands" that report to their respective geographic divisions at the headquarters. No major operation is possible without clearance from the home office.

Broadly speaking, the CIA is divided into two principal areas: intelligence-gathering and covert operations under the Directorate of Operations (DDO) and intelligence and evaluation under the Directorate of Intelligence (DDI). These two function separately and indeed the whole CIA structure is based on compartmentalization. Even senior officers know only what they are supposed to know for their work—and no more. Only Colby and a few top associates in the seventh-floor executive suite (also known as the "Tower") at the CIA's modernistic headquarters in Langley are familiar with all operations. Because of growing technological requirements, the CIA is investing more and more money and manpower in the technology of intelligence; it now has a separate Office of Science and Technology.

The CIA's controversial domestic operations come under the Directorate of Operations (usually known informally as Clandestine Services). The agency's involvement in domestic spying is in the hands of the DDO's Foreign Resources Division (known until 1972 as the Domestic Operations Division), with offices in eight U.S. cities, and the elusive Counterintelligence Staff. Ostensibly, the division's mission is the collection of intelligence from foreigners in the U.S. and counterespionage cooperation with the FBI. But even Colby has admitted that the Domestic Division had been doing quite a bit more than just that (he confirmed, in effect, the CIA's political spying at home). Then there is the Domestic Collection Division with offices in thirty-six American cities, which supposedly interviews citizens who may possess information of intelligence value to the CIA. The Office of Training is in charge of training CIA personnel at special schools, the most important of which, "The Farm," is in southern Virginia. But the Office of Training had also been working with local police departments and, until recently, with the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. The LEAA is heavily staffed with ex-CIA personnel. The Office of Security, with eight field offices in the U.S., conducts security investigations of prospective agency employees—and, obviously, of others as well—and is responsible for the protection of intelligence sources and methods. The Recruitment Division has twelve domestic offices. Much of its work is done on campuses, but this division also recruits businessmen, scientists, and whoever else is willing and capable of performing full-time or part-time for "The Company," as the CIA is known among initiates. The Cover and Commercial Staff directs the CIA's corporate empire—the so-called proprietary activities—and arranges cover for the agency's operatives in bona fide U.S. corporations abroad. The full list of these corporations would be a *Who's Who* of American business and industry. American businessmen are instinctive ideological allies of the CIA—and there are reasons to think that the agency often reciprocates with economic information that the corporations could not otherwise obtain.

But the CIA is also into a variety of esoteric activities. It has an Operational Medicine branch, in the Office of Medical Services, that specializes in psychological conditioning of officers entrusted with unusual missions. And among the agency's "proprietaries" there are companies secretly and illegally working on psychological profiles of American citizens. Interestingly, CIA staff psychologists have been shying away from this particular kind of work.

(3) *The Defense Intelligence Agency*. It was created by the Pentagon in 1962 to centralize the intelligence work performed by the separate intelligence staffs of the three armed services. In the last thirteen years, it has grown to a force of 50,000 military intelligence specialists and support personnel and an annual $3 *billion* budget. The DIA, headed by Lt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham—a military intellectual, overhead reconnaissance expert, and CIA alumnus—is chiefly interested in classical military intelligence—both in gathering and evaluation. The Defense Department's policies are often based on DIA assessments of foreign military capabilities and presumed intentions. The DIA also has covert operators around the world, in addition to the Defense, Army, Air Force, and Navy attachés serving at American embassies.

(4) *The Federal Bureau of Investigation*. Its functions are overwhelmingly domestic (although it has representatives abroad who serve in American embassies as "legal attachés") and, broadly speaking, are divided between fighting crime—with emphasis on organized crime—and on counterespionage. The FBI spends roughly $2 billion annually and there are some 6,000 agents currently serving under FBI Director Clarence M. Kelley, formerly the police chief of Kansas City. Counterespionage is such an elusive concept and the preoccupation with the infiltration of dissenting and radical groups by foreign intelligence services is so great that, in the end, the FBI has become the principal arm of the government in domestic political spying. Ironically, as Director Kelley put it, the détente with the Soviet Union, China, and Eastern European countries has led to so many visits from the Communist world that the FBI now wants more agents to keep track of the visitors. The working assumption in the FBI is that most, if not all, visitors from Communist countries are likely to be intelligence agents—an assumption which smacks of a KGB-type insecurity and makes a mockery of Kissinger's policy of détente.

(5) *State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR)*. All it does is analyze foreign intelligence. Considering that it employs less than 500 persons and spends only around $5 million annually, the INR does an amazingly good job of evaluation—in fact, frequently superior to the CIA's. Its present director is William Hyland, a specialist in Soviet affairs who has served in the CIA and on Kissinger's National Security Council staff.

(6) *The Treasury Department*. It has recently formed its own National Security Affairs Office and it advises the Intelligence Community on increasingly important finan-

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cial matters. It also contributes intelligence concerning the traffic of narcotics and passes on the findings of the Secret Service.

Below the level of the United States Intelligence Board, the government has additional intelligence sources and resources: The Drug Enforcement Administration, the Bureau of Customs (part of the Treasury), the Internal Revenue Service (whose special investigations violated the secrecy of tax returns for political reasons during the Nixon years), the Treasury's Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, and the State Department's Passport Office, which has monumental files on American citizens based on passport applications.

It may seem that the Intelligence Community, and particularly the CIA, is "destabilized" these days in the midst of all the investigations set off by disclosures of domestic spying and such foreign crimes as the Chilean intervention. In fact, CIA Director Colby thinks that the efficacy of the agency has already been seriously impaired and that this poses a danger to national security. But the CIA will be—and has been—only what the rulers of this country want it to be. It is a common error to think of either the CIA or the whole Intelligence Community as an independent and irresponsible body—running completely wild on its own.

Neither the CIA nor any other intelligence agency, including the FBI, is finally responsible for its actions. The CIA's current illegal foreign and domestic activities are approved by the highest officials in our government—by Kissinger and Ford. So we shall have a police state only when these individuals—or their successors—order it. Until we make sure that such orders can never be given, and until we permanently dismantle the means by which such orders could be carried out, we cannot say we are a wholly free nation. O+—R

WASHINGTON POST
17 May 1975

Tom Braden

Do We Need Dirty Tricks?

In a hideaway office where his visitors can't be noted by the curious, Sen. Frank Church (D-Ida.) is hard at work investigating his country's intelligence services. It's not the mistakes of the past that most concern this normally lighthearted and friendly man. It's concern for the future.

"A wise preacher once told me to be careful now I selected an enemy. 'Once you begin to spend time thinking about your enemy,' he told me, 'you become like him.'"

This, Frank Church thinks, is what happened to the CIA. It became so obsessed with the power, the brilliance, the deeds and the deceptions of the Russian KGB that it became the mirror image of the KGB. If the KGB opposed a military regime, the CIA supported it; if the KGB set up a Communist front, the CIA set up its opposite; if the KGB supported a candidate, the CIA supported that candidate's opponent. Was the regime or the front or the candidate worth supporting? That didn't matter. Opposing the KGB was what mattered.

History suggests that there is a lot of sense to this analysis, and Frank Church is a sensible man. He is quite sure that his country needs a secret intelligence agency; he is fully aware of the fact that CIA gets the blame for much that CIA has never done or attempted to do; he knows that Secretary of State Henry Kissinger distrusts him and his investigation, and he is determined that there will be no security breaches, which might give Kissinger just cause to complain.

He also knows that the Ford administration will try to make the Rockefeller commission's investigation the basis for what to do with CIA in the future. "The Congress," he says confidently, "will wait to hear from us."

Sitting in his hideaway office under the portrait of predecessor William E. Borah, Frank Church does not look like a man who could be very much interested in spies and bagmen, dirty tricks and assassination plots. "Boyish" is the adjective most frequently used to describe him. But Frank Church is old enough to have served in intelligence during wartime, and he has given much thought to the problems secret intelligence attempts to solve and to the problems the attempt creates.

Church's present view is that the CIA ought to discontinue covert operations; that is, the attempt to influence foreign governments by secret means. "Eventually," he muses, "the secret operation nearly always becomes public. It is nearly always embarrassing, and nearly always seems in retrospect to have been a mistake. But so long as the machinery to mount the operations exists, so long as a huge bureaucracy depends upon mounting them, so long as men owe self-esteem and promotions to proving they can mount them, they will go on being mounted."

Church knows the counterargument: The Russians are doing it. Why shouldn't we?

"After nearly 30 years of buying that argument, we now own an organization which is feared all over the world, feared more perhaps even than the KGB. The Russians may not care about how the world regards them. But the United States does. The reputation of the CIA undermines the State Department, undermines the U.S. Information Agency, undermines the Peace Corps and makes the United States suspect wherever it wants to be trusted."

Frank Church seems to have made up his mind, and there's nothing wrong with that. The hard-liners on his committee, Sen. Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.), for example, will have a chance to argue with him. But Church's view is something new in this city, which for a long time has gone along with the idea that covert operations were essential and that the only problem was how to control them. Listening to Church is to be reminded that the United States got along without peacetime covert operations until after World War II, and our reputation, prestige, influence and power did not, in retrospect, seem to have been diminished thereby.

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WASHINGTON STAR
16 MAY 1975

Alleged CIA Plots

McGovern Cites Castro 'Proof'

United Press International

Sen. George McGovern says Cuban Premier Fidel Castro has offered to provide "documentation" to prove that the CIA was involved in plots to assassinate him.

The South Dakota Democrat, who visited Cuba last week, said in an interview yesterday he did not examine the evidence Castro offered. But he said he intended to recommend that the Rockefeller Commission or the Senate CIA committee look into it in their investigations of intelligence activities.

McGovern was asked whether the subject of attempts on Castro's life came up during his visit with the Cuban leader.

"Yes, it did. He's convinced that the CIA was at least indirectly involved in several attempts on his life," McGovern said. "He says that there have been about 100 such attempts, some of them involving direct assaults on him, some of them involving attacks or attempted assassinations on high-ranking officials, such as the deputy prime minister, Dr. Rodriquez.

"He told me that he was prepared to provide documentation that the CIA had been involved in some of those attempts, and then he quickly added: 'Not all of them, but some of them.'"

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ESQUIRE
JUNE, 1975

How Does It Feel To Be Bugged, Watched, Followed, Hounded and Pestered by the C.I.A.

by Andrew St. George

Better and worse than you'd expect

I have spent seven and a half years, perhaps even a bit more, under the most careful, unblinking, round-the-clock covert observation of which the Central Intelligence Agency's operational divisions are capable. Now that it is apparently, according to C.I.A. Director William E. Colby, all over—my name expunged from the foreign espionage "watchlist"—I think back with something like nostalgia on quite a few C.I.A. agents whom I met and liked during those years.

In this, I realize, I am somewhat unique. "To find myself in your files is outrageous," stormed Congresswoman Bella Abzug at Mr. Colby. *Oh*, she was angry! When the word arrived, the official confession that the C.I.A. kept them under surveillance, Eartha Kitt and Jane Fonda were *furious*. So were Dick Gregory and Miriam Makeba and Mort Sahl and probably, if we could find him to ask, Abbie Hoffman. The indignation overloaded the circuits coast to coast, even before we learned that in New York and San Francisco (and, it seems, Vegas, Miami and L.A.) the C.I.A. ran what Jack Anderson (being outraged) calls "love traps"—assignation apartments where diplomats, media influentials and other uppercreatives were filmed by agents through concealed peepholes in the nude embrace of what the report describes as "both male and female prostitutes."

But my own experience, I hope, has been more edifying, especially when I reconsider some of the events. I remember arriving late at Dulles Airport from Atlanta in August, 1969, arriving unannounced, unreserved, finally finding room at the downtown Harrington Hotel, where only the lobby pinballs stay open after midnight. I remember plunging carelessly through the double glass doors of the hotel to look for a nearby all-night diner known for its crisp crab cakes, only to run into three righteous dudes standing silently in a doorway on Tenth Street; I realized then that this was *Washington*, that it was well past *midnight*, and that I was most likely the only pedestrian within a mile without a knife. One of the dudes moved out lightly to meet me on the sidewalk, pulling an unlit cigarette from behind his ear in the familiar *introibo* of muggings ("Gotta light?"). On the instant, I heard a soft chugging engine throb on E Street, then saw the little olive Corvair nosing around the corner of Fifteenth Street after me, the Corvair that had been parked across and half a block down from the Harrington Hotel when I left it four minutes ago, now following me as faithfully as a pet skunk; beloved straggler, how glad I was to see it then! The dude stepped away in a single unbroken liquid movement, circling into the doorway. I stepped off the curb, into the thoroughfare and marched back to the hotel in front of the softly wheezing little government-issue machine like Music Man leading his fan club home.

Yes, there were times like that, avuncular encounters with The Shadow that one does not find in John Le Carré's stories, not even in the briefs of the American Civil Liberties Union. There was the arctic January morning in 1970 when my old MG, parked overnight in the street outside my motel on the outskirts of Boston, would not start, refused even to cough. Five-fifteen a.m., nine inches of snow with a fresh frozen top, the engine a hunk of permafrost; not a sign of life anywhere except for the grey two-door Ford with the little spike aerial about sixty yards behind me, parked patiently on the opposite side of the street, engine humming, a tall pale man behind the wheel, smoking a curved pipe, not looking at anything in particular, waiting.

My first attempt to thaw the motor splintered my fingernails and murdered my knuckles. The pain, as much as anything, snapped at me: "Do it." Just go and do it—why not? He's got his heater going, but basically *you are in this together*. Doesn't *he* want to get home when the regular shift ends? Bet he does.

So I did it. I went up to the grey government Ford with the chipped New Hampshire license plate—that plate had been on many an unmarked surveillance car, it looked dog-eared—and said: "Sorry to disturb you, but d'you maybe have a pair of jumper cables?"

He had lowered the window as I bent toward his car, but otherwise he remained expressionless and almost motionless. For a moment there was silence. He had a long, clean-shaven, droopy face; wore a pale green shirt, synthetic tie—civil servant, Eastern U.S. variant, grade GS-14, maybe 15, nineteen thou a year, not a bad-looking sort. He said, talking essentially to himself, "Let's see," and rolled the Ford gently up beside my car.

He had jumper cables and some cotton work gloves, and he took off his tan overcoat and gave me a hand, but in the end it was my electric gas pump that had frozen. He gave me a ride toward the city then, a mile or so to the nearest Mobil station. I think that last bit—the ride—was *really* against regulations.

"What a frozenass day," I said, but he only grunted. He made no effort to cover the little Motorola two-way set under the dashboard, or the federal motor-pool sticker on it. When we arrived at the service station, I said, "Thank you very much. This was truly most kind of you. My name is St. George, Andrew St. George," but, looking at the dashboard, he only said, "Yes." I saw him again intermittently during the morning, keeping up in that grey sedan, but after lunch he was relieved by a brown Vauxhall with Massachusetts plates, and I never saw him again.

I grew more direct, less constrained after that. Just before Christmas the same year, trying to deposit a groaning hoard of packages in a locker at Grand Central and unable to find the right coin, I shouted at the husky blond in the Tyrolean hat who had walked within a few steps of me to make certain he had the location of my locker, shouted at him as directly and naturally as old acquaintances do (he had been behind me for two afternoons that week), "Happen to have a quarter on you?" He stared,

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but his hand went to his topcoat pocket, and I dumped my packages on the marble floor, stepped over to him, took the coin from his fingers, said, "Listen, I really appreciate this," stuffed the parcels in the locker, and went on, leaving him to do the customary call-in on a pay phone (when a suspect deposits parcels on his trail, it must be reported in and sometimes reinforcements arrive to check through the stuff; it could be a "dead drop" concealing messages for a foreign power).

All this may sound like bad form on my part, a lot of sharpie city chutzpah, but basically I had the problem plumbed, and they knew it: we *were* in this together, me and the C.I.A. Perhaps a moment should be set aside to take a closer look at such a seemingly paradoxical situation.

An American citizen who is "targeted" for security surveillance becomes the Federal Government's second most valuable human asset. When Washington puts a man on the watchlist, it is prepared to spend more money on keeping up with him than on the Vice-President's salary. In fact, I am understating the finances here. The Vice-President makes $62,500 a year, while full-time surveillance of an individual "subject" comes closer to—these are *minimum* cost estimates—a hundred fifty to two hundred thousand per annum. The only other citizen on whom American taxpayers lavish comparable appropriated funds is the President.

Precise figures are hard to come by in these programs, but my own experience provides a fair idea of what is involved. Twenty-eight years ago, when the U.S. intelligence establishment was still a human-sized little shop, I was stationed in Vienna, a twenty-year-old investigator assigned to the 430th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment. I soon came to sense the promise and rewards of intelligence work, however, for I found myself assigned to Special Operations Division, a patrician phalanx within an elite unit, working in a downtown office where the sign on the door read, with bland hauteur, *Economic Research Branch.*

One of the things we were supposed to do behind that sign was monitor the phone lines, the *civilian* long-distance circuits, connecting the Western world with some of the neighboring Soviet-occupied cities—Prague, Budapest, Bratislava, Eisenstadt. There were never more than a half-dozen working circuits involved, sometimes less. Nevertheless, we discovered that systematic eavesdropping on phone circuits called for an exasperating amount of technical twiddling, mechanical maintenance, and above all, a huge typing pool: nine full-time secretaries, as I remember it. The conversations they transcribed were almost invariably useless, twaddle, and we learned quite soon to be glad of this, for when something suspicious did turn up in an intercept, it became a Case involving a direct tap on the "subject's" phone and some street surveillance. Then we had, as John Ehrlichman put it years later, a "full plate."

To keep watch on a "subject," if there were no special complications, required the following staff and logistics: three street units (radio cars with civilian license plates) staffed by a minimum of three Special Agents. On a two-shift rotation basis (again, the minimum—this is a Mickey Mouse case, remember) this means six Special Agents. One L.P. (listening post), two duty staffers, or E.M.s (enlisted men), taking the two shifts, one tech specialist (electrician, lockpick, et cetera). One C.P. (command post) manned by a senior S/A experienced in running the show by two-way transmitter. One secretary-typist, an E.M. but one with top secret special-intelligence clearance. (This job involved the coded card indexes.) One liaison personnel, E.M. (messenger). Twelve people, full time.

This modest overview, of course, makes no attempt to account for the myriad "support personnel" involved—motor pool, filing, report-writing and analysis, paper processing, and so forth. And this was only a little old-time one-horse operation, the sort of work aging ops do nowadays only in the Le Carré novels, to show the reader how shabby and seamy and superannuated they are. When, a generation later, I suddenly found *myself* under C.I.A. surveillance, it was a whole different show, involving chemical substances visible only through special spotters (applied to a "suspect vehicle" they make tailing through traffic immeasurably easier, especially at night) and "bumper beepers" which serve the same purpose; aerial tracking and photography (I've been shown a C.I.A. aerial shot of myself, a wide-angle color print eight by four inches, documenting that, along with some Cuban accomplices, I had committed a state offense, i.e., emptied an unattached lobster trap off Alligator Reef to provide seafood for all hands on our boat), and, on the whole, a towering technology unknown to us in the late Forties.

Nevertheless, even allowing for thirty years of improvement in equipment and methods, I am more sophisticated in these matters than your average citizen, maybe even than some congresspersons. Which is why I am able to tell you this story.

How did I, in the 1960's, no longer a member of the "intelligence community" but a humble reporter and photographer for *Life*, *Look* and the London *Sunday Times*, become an object of interest to the C.I.A.? I believe I can tell you exactly. They discovered me on March 31, 1965, on which day Senator James O. Eastland, conservative Democrat and chairman of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, traveled hastily and secretly to Florida for a sub-rosa session of his committee. The Central Intelligence Agency had scored a *grand coup*. It had acquired a key defector from Cuba, from the innermost cabal of the "Castro-Communist conspiracy." This was Dr. Juan Orta Cordoba, Fidel's former chief administrative assistant and staff director. At one-thirty p.m., Senator Eastland opened a hearing so secret that its location (a beach-front hotel) was kept from the record for "security reasons."

Meanwhile, on that very March 31, at my home in Westchester County, New York, I made an embarrassing discovery. I took a call from my father-in-law on the upstairs phone, asked him to hold for a few minutes, and went downstairs to raise a point with my wife. An argument ensued; I said some uncomplimentary things about my father-in-law. Then I remembered he was holding the line upstairs. I picked up the downstairs phone, expecting to cope with an impatient voice, but heard a furiously indignant one. He had overheard every single word we uttered about him. How on earth . . . the downstairs phone had been safely nestled in its cradle. A nauseous suspicion spread inside me as I made hasty, babbled apologies, hung up and unscrewed the mouthpiece. The microphone that dropped out looked like the customary phone company gizmo, maybe a little fatter, a little more . . . solid?

In Miami, meanwhile, the secret Internal Security Subcommittee session got down to business. Chief Subcommittee Counsel Jay Sourwine questioned Dr. Orta:

Mr. Sourwine: "Do you know of any other Americans who helped [i.e. the Cuban revolution in its early stage] other than Herbert Matthews, whom you have just mentioned?"

Mr. Orta: "I knew William Morgan and many others that were up in the mountains."

Mr. Sourwine: "Any others?"

Mr. Orta: "After the fall of Batista, when we returned to Cuba, I met James Gentry, who had helped the cause and the photographer Andrew St. George and Frank Fiorini. These were the Americans that were there that had helped the cause."

After a great deal of testimony about myself and others, Sourwine introduced Orta to an article I had written for the February 1, 1965, issue of *Life en Español*. Never mind what it was about; it was about something the C.I.A. didn't want known. Now it was Sourwine, not Orta, who was offering testimony to the committee:

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Mr. Sourwine: "When a newsman prints a story like that, whether he intends it or not, if he discusses the plans of an anti-Communist group, he is serving in fact as an unofficial espionage agent for Castro, isn't he?"

Mr. Orta: "Yes."

Up north, my wife and I had a stricken little discussion about the mouthless telephone. Is this thing a *bug*? Just another word, that, used casually like "syphilis" or "pink slip" or "highway smashup" until it *happens*. Then it's different—it's something viscous, filling one's chest, choking the lungs, racing the heart. Why . . . *who* the bloody hell would want to bug us? My troubles at the time, such as they were, stemmed not from a left-wing reputation but from gossip that I was a hawk, an imperialist, a spear carrier of the American century, a friend of the U.S. intelligence establishment, if not indeed its agent; a jealously competitive colleague had started a rumor that during the years when I was *Life* magazine's man in Havana, I was also working for the C.I.A. Now *this*?

My wife and I decided to call in an expert. We called in Denny Crook, a sixteen-year-old electronics enthusiast, the son of our neighbor across the street. After brief consultation with us, he decided to conduct a field test by unscrewing the handsets of the phones in *his* house and comparing mikes. He reported that ours were different, thicker in diameter, brown rather than olive drab, with some extra chrome screwheads and terminals on their backsides. Next morning, I took the suspicious mike downtown to show it to John "Steve" Broady, a private eye, an old friend who was, in the early Fifties, briefly notorious as Manhattan's top tapper.

"Yeah, we sell this one," Broady said jovially. "No, we sell the cheaper model. What it *is*? You don't know? It's an infinity transmitter. Looks like a standard phone company carbon button in the phone, but works different. These things will pick up an entire room, they have mini-amplifiers piggybacked onto them."

"You mean," I said, "that since the day this thing was slipped into my phone, the wiretapper on my phone line overheard everything in the house . . . every smack, every kiss, every fart? *Everything*?"

"Oh, they're very good," Broady said. "They can monitor any given room through any other extension on the same circuit. Take a janitor at General Dynamics. He could slip one of these into the boardroom handset the night before the new-model conference, then take it all down on his basement extension, have himself a tape Lockheed would pay twenty-five thousand for any day. It's a helluva gadget. But I think it'll be a wi[illegible] available commercially. Right now only the spooks have them, and I think even there it's in regulated supply."

"Then this thing is a government bug?"

"Oh, *that*," Broady said, "oh, absolutely. I'd bet on it. Who else? I'm sure it's the government."

Well, *was* I aiding and abetting Castro in Cuba? No. Was I reporting on his revolution? Yes. But the trouble was that once the Eastland and Sourwine Show had done its gig, once Orta had said my name, the national-security establishment was committed, if only to keep its hunting permit valid, to keep the case against me "active." And that meant, for "subject," wife and kids, the most colorful, instructive and surprise-filled experiences an American family on a limited budget can hope to have: seven years of round-the-clock surveillance. But to this day I cannot be certain how much of the national-security case against me the C.I.A. genuinely *believed* in its cynical gizzard.

There was what I came to think of as the "D watch"—"D" for diurnal, "D" for dull, "D" for depressing. This is the sort of tailing-about done by small teams—two to four—of plainclothesmen who dress and look mostly like stockroom clerks. (In New York they carry well-thumbed copies of the N.Y. *Daily News* with such uniform regularity that over the years I came to suspect it was a required item.) Many of these honest craftsmen are only what career case officers condescendingly call "contract personnel," but many of them spend decades on Company contract, and they're professionals. They follow the suspect from the moment he leaves his dwelling quarters in the morning until he returns to sleep at night. They attempt no communication or intimacy; the point of their surveillance is not to spot the highlights or key occurrences of one's day—they are not allowed to tail their quarry into meetings, conferences or other internal encounters—but simply to map its mundane ebb and flow, to chart the habitual life patterns, and—very importantly—to watch for sudden "breaks" or changes in them.

There was electronic surveillance, useful primarily to provide the suspect's advance schedule, where he plans to go, what he plans to do, and often why. If the men of the "D watch" lose their target, they can locate him as soon as he calls his wife or his office. When the suspect takes a trip, surveillance becomes far more thorough. His hotel rooms are searched, bugs are implanted and phone monitors connected in his path.

There was "infrastructural surveillance" of which the controversial "mail cov[illegible]er" is the most familiar. This means your letters arrive with a good-size hole beneath the left upper corner of the rear flap. Most of the mail cover dirty work is done with flexible reading probes which enable the agent to read letters without wholly opening them—the fiber-optic probe can even project the text from inside the envelope onto a screen—but it does involve an entry hole, and that's usually left the way it was. There's also the less well-known but systematic check on garbage, especially wastepaper; the monitoring of medical visits, hospital records, other indexes of health status; of periodicals subscribed, books purchased or borrowed; of wages, dividends, bank deposits, withdrawals, planned disbursements, unplanned ones, debts, bankruptcies, and so forth. All this ranks much higher than physical surveillance in terms of significance. Perhaps this is because, as someone observed, accountants seldom wear trench coats.

Finally there was the "mamka" system—the name indicating that it is a technique shared by Soviet-bloc and "free-world" security agencies. The only surprise here is that the public has never been acquainted with it by any of the experts writing about this field. So far as I can tell, Americans have never heard about these sturdy adjuncts of their national-security establishment, the mamkas. Yet as he passes through several years of *séjour* on the watchlist, every serious suspect acquires his mamka, in fact several of them in amiable succession. The mamka is the suspect's only direct contact with his uneasy government, and he contributes as much to his target's life-style as the other watchers combined. For whoever has a mamka has a friend. A mamka is not a cold-eyed agent peering through a metascope; he is someone who knows the suspect and strikes up friendly relations with him, chats with him on the phone a couple of times a week, visits him on weekends bringing good cheer and occasionally presents—a bottle of rum, a six-pack of favored cigars; when my wife sprained her neck in the winter of 1967, our mamka showed up with an expensive, electrically heated throat warmer which proved, in fact, greatly therapeutic.

This mamka, Gordon (not his real name), who watched us from mid-1966 through late 1968, was a charming, voluble, rascally Caribbean diplomat, long defected from his country's foreign service, now established as a U.S. citizen and an employee of the New York City bureaucracy. We became warm friends. Early in the game he ceased to make a secret of the fact that he was required to report on us to the Company, and conveyed instead the suggestion that if it wasn't he, it would be someone infinitely worse. He was right.

When Gordon remarried for the

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third time in 1968, I was an usher at my mamka's wedding. He married, of course, one of those large, blond girls from central Ohio who arrive in Manhattan in annual migrations to have "an experience," and she hit it off fine with my wife; there were family dinners at each other's houses, weekend invitations for the children, and a general air of bonhomie unadulterated by the lurking fact known to all of us that Gordon was an informer. I genuinely believe he did me no unnecessary harm. He did not pursue one of the mamka's less pleasant assignments, which is to introduce the suspect to the sort of complaisant girls who end up with him in nude and Laocoönian positions on official eight-by-ten glossies. That was the one disagreeable aspect of my relationship with the mamka who preceded Gordon, a heavyset con man from the Bronx whom we shall call Jerry, who became famous as a stock swindler and promoter of salted mining properties before he settled down, after a federal prison term, to become an honest government informer.

Jerry was older than I, a stocky, balding man who made his first bankroll hustling girls for the troops in another country. Having Jerry for one's mamka meant meeting an endless succession of preternaturally inviting and sexy girls. Jerry was not cast in the mold of your friendly family man; the method he preferred for getting to know his suspects was getting them laid, and while it wasn't an unfriendly approach, the temptation, the insistence, and my own sworn decision to refuse these acres of invitingly open beds, began to get under my skin. One of the unpleasant purposes of the mamka system is to try to drive a wedge between the suspect and his wife on the simple, thoroughly sound assumption that if a wife can be turned against her husband, the inside information will begin to flow like water. But by and large, Jerry was not the worst: after Jerry and Gordon, the simpatico rascals, I had a couple of mean-mouthed closet sadists for mamkas, who took superior attitudes, expected me to pay for drinks, and made any pretense at friendship just about impossible.

Eventually, applying the terms of transactional analysis made famous by Dr. Eric Berne, it occurred to me that being surveilled was a form of social intercourse which involved not only verbal but many unspoken transactions, and that suitable communication could be maintained if I analyzed the C.I.A.'s moves correctly and responded to them always at the proper ego level. For instance, I decided to do nothing to "evade" street surveillance. I gave up trying to beat my tails by walking through buildings with several exits, or jumping on and off buses, or doing any of the other juvenile things in spy thrillers. These, it seemed to me, constituted a childish response to a perfectly adult move on the C.I.A.'s part. It occurred more than once, even this way, that I distracted my tails by seeming to board a train or a bus and then failing to do so until the very last instant; in 1970, absorbed in talking to my older son and showing him something which had to be stuffed back in my briefcase, the two of us did not board the midday commuter train at Dobbs Ferry almost until it began to pull out. As we swung aboard, we confronted a large, plainly dressed, middle-aged man rushing toward us, anxious to get *off* the coach in the last instant, and we would have collided, if, on seeing *me* get aboard with my son, the fellow had not braked suddenly, stumbling, almost crashing to the floor, and then dropping, red faced, into the nearest seat. I said, "Sorry, that was my fault" to the man as we moved past him to find adjoining seats, and my son, who recognized what was happening as instantly as I did, complained. "Why on earth are you apologizing to that spook?"

"Because, Bandi," I said, "in a way we're together in this, he and I."

Whenever the C.I.A. made what struck me as a childish move, I responded on the same level. I knew that when I registered at a hotel, the surveillance team watching me rented a room, too, preferably one adjoining mine or situated in a strategic vantage position across the courtyard, which gave them a window at me. To improve the view, the spooks would often turn up several slats of the Venetian blinds in my room, either casually stepping in to do so or getting the maid or the hotel security chap to fix it.

I found the whole hotel scene irritating. Over the years, tens of thousands of American citizens have been tapped and bugged in expensive hotel rooms, and the record does not offer a single instance of the hotel management's refusing or protesting. It was infuriating to check into a room on a sweltering, sweaty afternoon, lower the blinds to change into a sport shirt, go downstairs for a cold beer, and then return to lie abed nakedly and contentedly scratching one's crotch, only to discover that in the forty-minute interval spent at the bar, someone had opened the three central blades of the blinds. On such occasions I would scribble on a sheet of stationery in large block letters, "CLOSED. GIRL COMING UP," stick it on the outside of the blinds with some tape, and close the open slats. I should like to be able to say that this sophomoric japery ended the nuisance, but it never did; with another town, another hotel, there was always another problem with the blinds.

There was a time, at the outset, when I would loudly tell my wife, "Jeanie, I want to tell you something very important if you give your word to keep it a secret" just before I sat down to read a book in silence. In fact I gradually dropped all the little humor bits. I stopped saying, "G'bye, bug, be back in an hour," when I left my house. Adult to adult—that was how one played the successful transactional game.

Nevertheless, my success was only partial, for though I was learning to cope with the C.I.A., the institution itself was fast growing nastier. Though the C.I.A. was not ever exactly *pleasant*, its own ways tended to become increasingly harsh and vicious during the Sixties as it expanded and grew to imperial dominance over innumerable smaller security and intelligence organizations in less well-endowed republics, especially in Latin America. As the Sixties turned into the Seventies, it was an open secret that, as Miles Copeland—not a critic, but the C.I.A.'s most knowledgeable defender—bluntly revealed in print in early 1974, spies who came to irritate the C.I.A. in stubborn and unteachable ways could expect to be "quietly liquidated—and under circumstances so terrifying as to defy description."

Around Washington I heard stories of chemical lobotomies brought on by overdoses of reserpine that shot up blood pressure so precipitously, part of the brain imploded; stories of "security suspects" like myself, who crumpled into twitching, slobbering vegetables after a C.I.A. administered OD of this kind —administered, I heard, on at least one occasion, in vitamin capsules nimbly refilled by an Agency operative. In the summer of 1971, returning from an Easter motor trip with my sons (the green Chevy and the dark blue Ford Galaxie with the dog-eared surveillance plates tripped right along), my frayed equilibrium broke for the first time. I lunged and knocked some B-complex Spansules from the hand of my son who was casually popping one in his mouth. In a flash I realized that we had left the pill bottle unguarded at home.

Surveillance itself began to saw at my nerves. But I didn't know what to do, and, in any event, it mattered less and less *what* I did as improvements in secret police technology—black boxes, "bumper beepers" and the like—made it more difficult for me to take successful initiatives against my observers.

Watergate was the last straw. I wrote a long article for *Harper's* magazine, presenting a pessimistic diagnosis on the intelligence establishment's condition. It would be unfair to complain that my effort went unnoticed. I received a telegraphic subpoena from Senator Stuart Symington, chairman of the subcommittee charged with overseeing the C.I.A. and a longtime defender and friend of the Agency. It felt [illegible] on my own behalf, but

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nothing much else did; as the hours wore on, I began to wilt and tire under Symington's astonishingly energetic vituperation. The good grey watchdog detested my article from start to finish, but what had enraged him most about it was the suggestion, toward the end, that in his sworn appearances as a Watergate witness the C.I.A.'s former director had not told the complete truth about his agency's role in that celebrated break-in.

Today all this seems sadly comic, but American stories seldom have drab endings, and this is an American story. A little after three p.m. on November 16, 1973, the cathedral-tall double doors of our cavernous hearing room swung open—this was, of course, another closed-door hearing, with the transcript classified "SECRET"—and, without a warning, there he stood, the director of central intelligence, William E. Colby. My arch foe had left his walled stronghold across the river and come to bear witness against me in the flesh. A thin, neat, controlled man, looking oddly unobtrusive in his circle of uniformed adjutants and tall, tanned lawyers, he stood for a moment on the threshold and our eyes met. I couldn't help staring—director, demigod, dark daimon of America's madness, fateful scourge of a myriad Oriental households, torturer, teacher who had taught me the meaning of my own time in history; confronting him face to face made me feel, humiliatingly, that it had been almost *worth it.*

In an instant it was over; Colby flicked his eyes from my face and his face sprang into a smile as Senator Symington advanced toward him with outstretched fingers. My two attorneys and I were asked to wait in an adjoining room while Director Colby testified, under oath, that on suspicion of being a "foreign agent" I had been kept under "various forms" of surveillance since January, 1965. No wonder, the director explained, I'd become a critic of the Agency; surveillance is "sometimes not an agreeable experience" and it may have made me resentful of the Agency's attentions. However, Mr. Colby assured the Senators, sweeping all five with a smile, a review of my case produced "no evidence warranting a continued active state." I had been found, if not innocent, tolerable. From now on, Director Colby concluded, I had not a single thing to be afraid of. ##

ESQUIRE
JUNE, 1975

Why I Split the C.I.A. and Spilled the Beans

by Philip Agee

In his own words, an ex-agent tells of the turning point

EDITOR'S NOTE: *Philip Agee is forty, a Florida-born graduate of Notre Dame, where he was recruited by the C.I.A. in 1957. His book,* Inside the Company: C.I.A. Diary, *is to be published in America this spring. It furnishes names of C.I.A. operatives known to Agee in Latin America, as well as extensive data on top-secret intelligence operations there.*

Are you a socialist? A revolutionary? A communist?"

"Who are you to decide whether the American intelligence service should be exposed and weakened?"

"How can anyone be certain you didn't really write this book on C.I.A.'s instructions? If you didn't, how is it possible that you're still alive?"

"What were the key events that turned you from C.I.A. loyalty to socialist revolution?"

These are some of the questions asked at public meetings at which I have spoken since the publication of my book in Britain and Canada. At times the questions are accompanied by the complaint that I remain, throughout the book, a mystery in terms of motivation and identity. Surprisingly to me, people seem more interested in me and my political trajectory than in what I can say about the Central Intelligence Agency.

I have answered affirmatively that I aspire to be a communist and a revolutionary. But I hasten to ease some questioners' instant nausea by assuring that I don't belong to any political party nor have I studied Marxism in depth. Nor do I believe that socialism in the U.S. would require copying foreign models except to profit from others' experience. But I also add that I accept the communists' belief that a higher form of economic and political organization is possible, to be constructed slowly and carefully, in which what little there is to go around goes around fairly. I don't believe the growing imbalance between rich and poor can be reversed by the very forces that have produced such inequity. Clearly, alternatives to capitalism need to be considered in light of the continuing failure of traditional leaders to solve the problems that affect us.

Why the C.I.A. didn't kill me to keep me from writing the book is a difficult question to answer. When one thinks of the suffering and death brought on through C.I.A. operations in Vietnam, Indonesia, Iran, Greece, Brazil, Uruguay, Chile—one could go on and on—one must wonder why my life was spared. Compare it to my exposure of hundreds of C.I.A. officers, agents and operations, indeed of a fairly complete methodology of secret repression executed for the benefit of powerful interests.

I answer that I bluffed, which I did, in order to make the Agency think that no matter what action they took against me the book was already written and couldn't be stopped. I say I lived in a secret place in Paris, which I did for some six months, regularly evading surveillance teams whose final purpose I can only imagine. I also believe the Agency would not have jeopardized its relationship with the British services by taking direct action against me in London. This would have required local British approval.

But these are partial answers. Perhaps the Agency simply couldn't decide what to do. And no one, after reading my book, has seriously maintained that I wrote it at Agency direction. It's simply too damaging—and the Agency can only continue [illegible] American press the fantasy that I'm a K.G.B. agent, or if not that then a Cuban agent, or at least an unstable, paranoid, alcoholic or generally freaked-out person.

Why aren't these matters addressed in my book? The original manuscript was half again as long as what was published. To retain a maximum of details on C.I.A. operations, an editorial decision was made to cut out much of the local color, characterizations of people, and my own personal evaluations. Defense mechanisms also operated during the reconstruction of my feelings of some years back. Then, too, no really complete picture was possible without causing pain to people who affected me profoundly and who today would prefer to remain private. Personal revelation was further limited by my never having undergone psychoanalysis or other therapies, and by my considerable fear of trapping myself in self-justification through all-too-neat arrangements of events and feelings.

Nevertheless, questions of motivation and political change must be addressed somehow. I insist the journey hasn't been very far. What happened to me politically is, in essence, that I came to reject gradualist reform as the path to a better society. This rejection led me to resign, finally, from the C.I.A. I did not, however, espouse any other ideology at first.

I accepted, during my youth and early years in the C.I.A., the textbook version that the American system of free enterprise was right and just. By adjusting here and there through antitrust legislation, subsidies, tax relief, minimum wage laws, welfare programs and other reforms, the political process would correct the system's aberrations. But seeing the failure of reform in Latin America over some years, seeing the failure of the Alliance for Progress, seeing, above all, that the more successful we were in counterinsurgency operations, the more remote reforms in Latin America became, I began to turn off to politics in general.

Reflecting on the violence at home against civil-rights workers, on the burning of cities, on political as-

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sassinations, on the escalation of intervention in Vietnam—all this from afar as I worked in C.I.A. operations in Latin America during the Sixties—I came to believe that in the U.S., as in Latin America, the situation was indeed getting worse rather than better: rich getting richer, poor poorer, resentment and bitterness growing, fear and insecurity mounting, cynicism and personal gain triumphant.

I began to comprehend that we were not one nation indivisible, but many conflicting nations divided according to how much wealth one enjoyed or lacked. Liberty and justice were available accordingly. Our leaders preached the sanctity of the rule of law, yet sent forth people like me to violate that law. So I quit the C.I.A., no longer able to accept the rationalization that my country's best interests were being served by the Agency. My plan was to remarry and settle permanently in Mexico and to forget I ever worked for the C.I.A. But I had to hide my true feelings because if the C.I.A. perceived me as a threat (which I wasn't then), they could have asked the Mexican authorities to expel me, deny me authorization to work, or worse.

Then my attitudes began to change. Once out of the C.I.A., in early 1969, I began to relate differently to people. I stopped trying to manipulate non-C.I.A. people, and I no longer feared those who criticized the U.S. government. I no longer felt I had a stake in the acquisitive aspects of the system. I spent hours and days nodding approval to Bob Dylan's music and poetry.

I began to attach great value to the positive side of American life—to the peace movement and the marches and demonstrations I longed to join. I began to feel I could make a contribution to the campaign against the Vietnam war by showing how that war was the result of the kind of activities I had been engaged in with the C.I.A. in Latin America. I felt I could show how Vietnams germinate wherever the C.I.A. is at work, propping up minority regimes that serve the interests of a small percentage of the population, those who encourage subordination of their national economies to the corporate interests of the developed world.

Perhaps most importantly, I perceived the peace movement within a new framework of respectability. It seemed decent, right, proper and humane. Somehow the middle-class values that had greased my slide into the C.I.A. came to be seen as chauvinistic and hypocritical. Nationalism, blind patriotism, and the specter of Soviet expansionism I came to perceive as covers for the furtherance of exploitative economic relationships with poorer and weaker peoples. I wanted to put my humanity *before* my nationality.

In early 1970, a year after I left the C.I.A., I began the book. My plan was to explain analytically C.I.A. operations such as agent and technical penetration of left-wing political groups, liaison operations with local foreign security services, political intelligence collection and its use in political action operations, penetration and manipulation of supposedly free trade unions, professional associations, youth and student groups, as well as the public information media. My purpose was to expose secret methodology.

In June, 1970, I went to New York with a couple of chapters and an outline. I was turned down by Viking, McGraw-Hill, Random House and Grove Press. Each editor said I would have to reject the analytical approach and give the reader a character with whom to identify. This meant elaborating a personal narrative. I couldn't accept such suggestions; I couldn't sensationalize or romanticize C.I.A. operations. I began to worry—that the C.I.A. might discover my intentions, that the C.I.A. might arrange action against me, that I might be subjected to legal action, that I might never get the book written. As my fears grew so also grew the sense of urgency to finish, intensified by my inability to find adequate research materials in Mexico City, where I was living throughout this period.

I enrolled, on the G.I. Bill, at the National Autonomous University of Mexico in a postgraduate program that would prepare me for an eventual teaching career in Latin American studies. Reading of the pre-Columbian cultures, of conquest and colonization, of conversion by the sword, enslavement of the Indians and their demographic collapse, of great ideals betrayed following the wars of independence, of gradual U.S. domination of Latin America in this century, I began to note parallels to the contemporary C.I.A. and the Vietnam war. By the end of 1970, I had changed my plan for the book and resolved to reveal the true names of C.I.A. officers and agents and the organizations manipulated by C.I.A. The book would be a reconstruction of the main political events in countries where I had worked, along with descriptions of C.I.A. participation in those events. These events would then be placed within a larger context of prevailing social and economic injustices.

But how could I actually name people with whom I had worked in confidence? Had I no sense of decency or loyalty to old comrades-in-arms, no matter how much I now rejected the past? On the other hand, if I really wanted to expose the C.I.A.'s methodology, so that concerned Americans and the victimized peoples could better struggle against them, why not also try to neutralize as many of C.I.A.'s people and organizations as possible? How could I protect C.I.A. officers or agents when many might still be at work promoting or assisting the political repression that was growing in so many places? Weren't these people the really aggressive forces victimizing the people who organized to resist oppression in the first instance? Was not the violence of insurgency in reality a counter-violence to the original violence of social and economic injustice?

Yes, a few might suffer if I revealed their names and some C.I.A. officers might not qualify again for overseas assignments. But what are these personal difficulties in comparison to the many thousands who were sacrificing comfort and risking their lives every day in the struggle against foreign domination and minority privilege? Whatever sentiments that remained for certain former colleagues now paled beside the comprehension that the results of their work brought ever greater suffering to many people. I decided not one could be concealed or protected by application of a double standard.

By early 1971, I still showed little progress after a year's work on the book. Not only were materials lacking in Mexico City, my fear of discovery had greatly increased after having left behind the chapters and outline during my unsuccessful New York trip the year before. Nor was I satisfied with my bohemian ways. But the most distressing condition at this time was the terrible feeling of isolation, of not being able to discuss what I was trying to do, of having to cultivate a new discipline of research and writing—so dreadfully solitary at the beginning—with little release through discussion with like-minded colleagues. Then a possible escape emerged.

Through mutual friends I obtained the financial support of left-wing publisher François Maspero in Paris and was able to go to Havana to continue research. I also yearned to see Cuba and what the Cuban revolution had done for the people.

Once the trip was firm I read every book I could find on the Cuban revolution. I left Mexico telling no one where I was going (friends would later turn back my apartment and divide my furniture and effects). During the final minutes before arrival in Havana, I feared I might have made a horrendous error, that I might be marched off to a prison on arrival. After all, I had been in charge of operations against the Cubans in both Ecuador and Uruguay, and in both places I had been responsible for considerable disruption of Cuban missions, for recruitment of Cubans to betray the revolution, and in part for the break in diplomatic rela-

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tions with Cuba by both Ecuador and Uruguay.

But the Cubans were serious and correct. They exerted no pressures while assisting considerably my efforts to get information from several documentation centers in Havana. I saw enough of the Cuban revolution to understand its appeal: full employment, extension of medical and other social services, expansion of education, progress in new housing—great strides in national development despite my government's efforts to strangle the revolution through economic blockade.

I was taken on a three-week trip with a driver and official guide, and later I managed to borrow a motorcycle for mobility from my house at a beach outside Havana (near the fishing village where Ernest Hemingway used to go). I could go anywhere but military bases, which were closed to the public anyway. Yes, widespread rationing was still necessary, long lines existed at food stores, restaurants and cinemas, and disruption continued from the mistaken effort to produce ten million tons of sugar the year before. But the people were without doubt supportive of the revolution and the Cuban leadership.

During the six months I was in Cuba, from May to December, 1971, I developed even greater curiosity about the peace movement at home, the development of the alternative culture, the alienation of increasing numbers of people from traditional values. I listened intently to Florida radio stations and sometimes could receive Miami television. Even the Voice of America appealed—not the propaganda but the nightly rock program. I was able to get such books as *The Greening of America* and *The Age of Aquarius*, also the fascinating and revealing story of the Venceremos Brigade, the group of Americans, mostly youths, who traveled each year to Cuba to assist at cane cutting. But I was affected most by Philip Slater's *The Pursuit of Loneliness*, a book that analyzed the isolation and selfishness of the liberal tradition. The publication of *The Pentagon Papers* was another tremendous inspiration. Never had I felt so positive and enthusiastic about the good things happening in America. I had come by now to acknowledge socialist revolution as the historical process that would lead to a higher form of social and economic organization. Not only had I comprehended what I was *against*, but also what I was *for*.

By December, 1971, I had finished my work in Havana, and I went to Paris to continue research with Mr. Maspero's support. At Christmas I was visited by a former colleague sent by the C.I.A., which by now knew of my writing project. I bluffed on my progress, hoping the C.I.A. would believe I'd already finished the first draft. But six months later, as my advance ran out, I fell out with my publisher, found lack of confidence on another trip to Cuba, discovered surveillance in the Paris streets, and decided to live in secrecy and isolation. All this contributed to my gloom and sense of failure. In October, 1972, I was again rejected by an American publisher, this on the eve of my departure for London to continue research at the British Museum. The final straw was the discovery that a typewriter given to me by two young Americans (who had supposedly befriended me) contained a directional transmitter that had allowed my secret hiding place to be discovered.

Within a month after arriving in London, however, my depressing slide reversed; I received financial support and effective editorial guidance from the Penguin Books company. For a year and a half I labored on the book. Those years of research paid off as I was able to write in diary form the detailed progression of many different types of real C.I.A. operations spanning a period of eighteen years.

When the book went immediately to the best-seller lists in England, I realized that the years of trouble and grief were worth my effort. The book would be an encouragement to other current and former C.I.A. employees who may see value in writing their diaries or other exposures. I shall support them in every possible way. And assuming the book will not be suppressed in the U.S. by government action, it should contribute to the debate now progressing on whether C.I.A. should be reformed or abolished.

Much remains to be done, however, and I consider my book simply a first step toward joining those thousands of Americans whose work I have admired from afar. While the radical movement in America has lost some of its impact, valuable work continues. Progressive and radical groups in the U.S. and abroad are adhering to a research and dissemination program, coordinated by the Fifth Estate in Washington, D.C., to identify and expose C.I.A. people and operations in as many countries as possible. I too will contribute to this solidarity campaign. Eventually, perhaps, C.I.A. people can be neutralized faster than Mr. Colby can hire them for mischief abroad. And, of equal importance, this people's campaign can serve to prevent any wider application of C.I.A. methods *within* the United States as well. ##

WASHINGTON POST
21 May 1975

Files Link CIA, Mafia In Castro Slaying Plot

By George Lardner Jr.
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Rockefeller commission has been informed of FBI files that link the Mafia and the Central Intelligence Agency in a 1961 scheme to assassinate Cuban Premier Fidel Castro, a well-placed source confirmed yesterday.

The Justice Department is expected to submit the documents to the commission shortly in connection with the panel's investigation of the CIA's clandestine domestic operations.

The New York Times, which first reported the existence of the file in yesterday's editions, said the file was brought to the commission's attention during secret testimony by a former high official of the Justice Department in the Nixon administration.

The documents reportedly confirmed that the CIA was in touch with both Sam Giancana, a Chicago rackets figure, and John Roselli, an alleged Mafia figure, about killing Castro.

The file, however, was somewhat vague, one official told The Washington Post, concerning how far the scheme went.

There have been long-standing allegations that the CIA sponsored repeated attempts on Castro's life, including one unsuccessful effort as far back as late 1959 or early 1960.

Columnist Jack Anderson reporrted in a series of columns in 1971 that the CIA was involved in as many as six attempts to kill Castro, the last in the spring of 1963. The assassination teams, composed of Cuban exiles, were said to have been lined up by Roselli.

Roselli was said to have been recruited to work for the CIA by Robert A. Maheu, a former FBI agent and later manager of billionaire Howard Hughes' Las Vegas properties.

According to Anderson's columns, Roselli once called on Giancana to line up a contact, but the Chicago rackets chief reportedly took no direct part in the assassination scheming.

Subsequently, the CIA is said to have engineered a break-in of comedian Dan Rowan's Las Vegas hotel room as a favor to Giancana. The Mafia boss was reportedly upset over Rowan's friendship with singer Phyllis McGuire, whom Gian-[illegible]

WASHINGTON POST
21 May 1975

Cuban Says Castro A Nixon-Era Target

Reuter

LONDON, May 20—An attempt was made on the life of Cuban leader Fidel Castro during the administration of Richard Nixon, Cuban Deputy Premier Carlos Rafael Rodriguez said here today.

Rodriguez was asked about press reports of CIA activity in Cuba.

"There have been more than 50 attempts on the life of Fidel Castro," he responded.

Asked if an attempt was made during the Nixon administration, he said: "Yes—less than five years ago—during the Nixon administration of course but also under Johnson . . ."

Rodriguez did not elaborate.

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

Photographed and researched
by Lynn Davis

GOOD SPIES (inactive)

In accordance with Esquire's policy to make public such information deemed useful and necessary for a viable democratic society, in accordance with everybody's weakness for a good spy story and tales of derring-do, and to counteract the disturbing look at spies presented before and after these pages, this file is hereby opened and its contents revealed for every person's eyes only. Pursuant to the operative philosophy that there is both good and bad in everybody--and that a couple of bad apples needn't spoil the whole barrel--these spies are herewith remembered and their fine deeds duly noted. For the spooks here are good spooks; their various actions in wartime so helped save the face of the free world that even the Russians wouldn't say nyet.

NAME: Serge Obolensky
BORN: 1890, Czarskoe Selo, Imperial Russia
PRESENT SITUATION: Public relations counsel, N.Y.C.
INTELLIGENCE DATA: At age 52, as oldest paratrooper in U.S. Army, led four-man team into Sardinia to establish liaison between Allied agents and sympathetic Italian personnel, Sept. 13, 1943. Risked capture and life in narrow escape from enemy forces. Awarded Bronze Star for successful mission accomplished. In 1944, led crack O.S.S. unit into France in advance of Allied invasion. Spent one month behind German lines. Awarded Croix de Guerre for successful mission accomplished. Shown here wearing wartime military uniform in present Manhattan residence.

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NAME: Paul Cyr
NOM DE GUERRE: Paul Cartier
BORN: 1921
PRESENT SITUATION: Director of Congressional Affairs for Federal Energy Administration. Lives in Falls Church, Va.
INTELLIGENCE DATA: Cyr joined the O.S.S. at age 22 as a paratrooper. Dropped into France twice: first in the Brittany peninsula; second north of Bordeaux. Awarded Distinguished Service Cross on Sept. 22, 1943, for extreme heroism in combat against armed enemy. Destroyed several enemy trucks carrying reinforcement troops, knowing such action endangered own life. Though known to Gestapo, Cyr continued actions against Germans, concentrating activity in the Loire Inferieure campaign. Obtained photostat of Wehrmacht fortress defenses and insisted on carrying document through German lines. Cyr: "After three months behind enemy lines, I could hardly remember my past. I mentally transformed myself, had to concentrate to remember I was a U.S. citizen. I never thought I'd come out alive. I could say I was always scared but also conditioned to it. It's the only time I lived with such great intensity."

NAME (man on left): John A. Blatnik
NOM DE GUERRE: Ivane
BORN: 1911
PRESENT SITUATION: Retired. Lives in Arlington, Va.
INTELLIGENCE DATA: Before joining O.S.S. served as Minnesota state senator, then in Air Force. Fluency in Slovene, etc., brought him into intelligence. Parachuted into Croatia, walked into Slovenia. Worked months with Tito partisans. Established escape routes for 350 downed American pilots. Awarded Bronze Star Medal with Oak Leaf Cluster.

NAME (man on right): Eli Popovich
BORN: 1908
PRESENT SITUATION: Ironworker, Washington, D.C.
INTELLIGENCE DATA: Made three jumps into Yugoslavia, spent nine months behind enemy lines, 1944. Served with Ivane, helping U.S. airmen find passage out. In '45 performed intelligence duties in Far East. Member of C.I.A until retirement in 1969. Will say nothing about said C.I.A. activities.

NAME: Douglas Bazata
NOM DE GUERRE: Dennis Lebeau
BORN: 1911
PRESENT SITUATION: Artist. Lives outside Washington, D.C.
INTELLIGENCE DATA: Scored highest officer rating in history of Fort Benning, higher than MacArthur and Eisenhower. Claims, "I copied, cheated, everything." With O.S.S. he parachuted behind Belfort Gap (Nazi retreat route). Purple Heart (four); D.S.C.; Croix de Guerre.

NAME: Mike Burke
NOM DE GUERRE: Michel
BORN: 1920
PRESENT SITUATION: President, Madison Square Garden, N.Y.C.
INTELLIGENCE DATA: A football star at U. of Pennsylvania, he met O.S.S. chief Donovan at a party. Spent three months training for intelligence, learned codes, ciphers, firearms, lock-picking, later identifications of German units. Dropped into France and joined the Maquis de Confracourt Haute-Saône. Organized, recruited, gathered intelligence. Lived off the land. Germans sent personnel to wipe out Maquis; Burke was nearly captured, got away as American Army advanced from the south. He returned to Paris, met Hemingway at the Ritz Bar. Civilian aftermath: worked in Hollywood as writer; joined Ringling circus; joined CBS, then appointed president of New York Yankees. Burke: "I've now forgotten all the codes; the best I could do today is blow up a bridge."

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NEW TIMES
May 30, 1975

The CIA and the Mafia

By Robert Sam Anson

There is an almost obscene glee in Washington these days; the kind of blood lust that sweeps over a bullring the moment before the big, black animal, wounded and wild-eyed, receives the final sword thrust to the brain. You don't want to look, and yet you can't help it. Despite, maybe because of, the gore, the spectacle that is about to be played out is deeply satisfying. After three decades of spying, lying, destabilizing governments and terminating with extreme prejudice, the CIA is about to get it in the neck.

The disclosures now are coming in torrents. CIA opening mail. CIA spying on Americans. CIA plotting murder. Even the Rockefeller Commission, in its rush to absolve the Agency of the worst of the charges that have been laid against it, has been obliged to dispatch investigators to Dallas, Texas, to clear up persistent questions about the Agency's possible involvement in the Kennedy assassination. The Church committee's investigation of the Agency is still weeks away, and yet the rumor mill is already grinding. One report has it that Sy Hersh, whose disclosures started it all and who has been ominously silent the last few weeks, is working on a story involving the killing of an unnamed American in this country by the CIA. Another rumor has it that James Angleton, the ousted director of domestic operations for the CIA, is unburdening his soul to Hersh, his former tormentor. Unlikely as both stories are, they are indicative of the mind set in

It was inevitable: gentlemen wishing to be killers gravitated to killers wishing to be gentlemen

Washington and Langley. "There's something pathetic about it and disgusting," says an old State Department hand from Laos. "All the guys in the Agency are tripping over one another to be the first to fink on a friend. The thing is coming apart. They're panicked. Everyone wants to save his ass."

The storm breaking over Langley has been years in coming. Even now, with the evidence rolling in, the image of the CIA as an aggregation of international gangsters is a difficult one to accept. Gentlemen, as Henry Stimson so memorably put it, do not open each other's mail, much less slit each other's throats, and, in the public imagination, CIA has always seemed a gentlemanly calling; a vocation for the thin-lipped and well turned-out, the products of good families and the right schools, who wished to serve their country and fight communism without getting their hands dirty. They were tweedy, civilized sorts, in the best traditions of the "Oh So Social" OSS, these agents of the imagination. And certainly, there were many who fit that mold. The quiet men of Langley's seventh floor executive suite—the analysts, the OSS veterans who went into business and publishing and wrote their memoirs of derring-do with the French *Maquis*—they were like that. But they were never the men on whom CIA relied. Those were a different sort. "I remember the first time I ran into them," says a former senior official of the New York Police Department. "And I remember the jolt I got. I expected Yale blue bloods. And you know what they were? Animals. Just animals."

The problem, of course, was the nature of the job. The real work of CIA, the sleaziness that went with it, was not for blue bloods. It was a task for those rather less squeamish about the unpleasant necessities of intelligence work—the dope running and blackmailing and "hits" of men gone sour. Thus, from the beginning, there was always a duality in CIA, a cleavage between what it wished to seem, even to itself, and what, given the nature of the world it worked in, it had to be. They were killers, as Harrison Salisbury recently put it, but always "gentlemen killers."

It was inevitable, then, that gentlemen wishing to be killers would gravitate to killers wishing to be gentlemen. And in their meeting would be the most bizarre alliance in the history of the United States: the Central Intelligence Agency and organized crime.

From the start, it was a natural affinity. According to the jaunty memoir of Miles Copeland, a former agent, General William "Wild Bill" Donovan, the founder and wartime chief of OSS, decided it would be useful to have a "corps of skilled safecrackers, housebreakers and assassins" on hand "who might be put to constructive purposes in wartime." And so, like the connoisseur of fine things that he was, General Donovan went out and got the best: the best in this case being Mr. Salvatore C. Luciana, more familiarly known as Charles "Lucky" Luciano, the boss of all bosses, the smartest and most ruthless man *La Cosa Nostra*—the Mafia—has ever seen.

"From the CIA's standpoint, the arrangement makes good sense," explains John Marks, a former State Department intelligence official and coauthor of *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence*. "There are things which organized crime can do which CIA either cannot or chooses not to do. They [the Mafia] have intelligence contacts all over the world. And their dealings are entirely secret. In fact, they are about the only people as secret as CIA."

That secrecy—the vow of *omerta*—still shrouds much of the nature and extent of CIA's dealings with *La Cosa Nostra*. But, incident by incident, the truth is slowly dribbling out. When the incidents are put together they form a mosaic of cooperation in everything from smuggling to drug pushing to attempted murder. All done in what the Agency likes to call "the national interest."

Thirty years ago, there was no quarrel about the national interest: it was winning the war. There is also little doubt that, at the behest of OSS, the Mafia contributed greatly to the effort. The reason was not so much patriotism as self-interest. In the United States, Luciano, who had been convicted in 1936 of forced prostitution, was moldering in Dannemora on a 30- to 50-year sentence. Meanwhile, in Italy and Sicily, the Mafia was being brutally uprooted by Mussolini, who quite properly regarded its sway over the rural countryside as a threat to Fascist rule. From his cell, Luciano let it be known that the mob could play a valuable role in protecting East Coast U.S. ports from Axis saboteurs. In the years that followed, American ports, now under the benign protection of the mob, never again suffered a serious incident of sabotage.

Luciano again put his talents to use when the Allies invaded Sicily in July 1943. On Luciano's instructions, the Mafia came out of the hills to clear the way for the American and British invaders, going so far as to organize welcoming demonstrations for the advancing troops. In gratitude, the Allies appointed local Mafia chieftains as mayors of a number of Sicilian towns. When the invasion spread to Italy, and Luciano proved useful again, the American military government indi-

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cated its thanks by appointing one of Luciano's lieutenants as translator/liaison officer in U.S. Army headquarters. The translator's name was Vito Genovese.

Luciano's own reward did not come until six months after the end of the war, when, in January 1946, New York Governor Thomas E. Dewey, the man who had sent him to prison, granted him executive clemency. Luciano was deported and, in the succeeding months, so were more than 100 of his brethren Mafiosi. Together in Italy, they resurrected their international heroin ring. By 1952, the number of U.S. addicts had tripled.

Much of the heroin that came into the United States moved through Marseilles, where, within a few years after the war, the CIA was once again calling on the Mafia for help. Marseilles was a traditional stronghold of the French left and, in mid-November 1947, the city's docks were hit by wildcat strikes organized by communist-dominated unions. The labor unrest quickly spread throughout the rest of the country. In response, the CIA struck a deal with the large Corsican Mafia in Marseilles. In return for CIA-supplied money and arms, Corsican gangs would break the strike. This they proceeded to do with bloody efficiency. In the ensuing weeks, a number of strikers were murdered until, finally, the dockers called it quits.

Trouble flared again in Marseilles in 1950, this time over the shipment of men and war material to Indochina, and again the CIA turned to the Mafia. Once more, the Mafia's terror squads went into operation, supplied, as always, by the CIA. Back in Washington, an Agency official wrote out a check to finance the operation with a certain sense of satisfaction. "It was my idea to give $15,000 to Irving Brown" (an AFL official), former agency hand and syndicated columnist Tom Braden recalled later. "He needed it to pay off his strong-arm squads in the Mediterranean ports so that American supplies could be unloaded against the opposition of communist dock workers."

Whatever Langley wanted, Langley got, even if, in the case of Indochina, the ends produced some highly questionable means. Throughout the '50s and into the '60s, as the U.S. involvement in Indochina deepened, CIA was increasingly hard-pressed to contain the growing communist insurgency in Southeast Asia. With only a handful of U.S. advisers on hand, and no combat troops, the CIA had to strike alliances where it could. The result was an informal tripartite pact between the Agency, the "secret armies" that fought for it and organized crime. What held the unlikely alliance together was expediency, money and heroin.

The CIA's "secret army" was actually a ragtag collection of irregulars—hill tribes in Laos and Vietnam and left over battalions of Nationalist Chinese in Burma and Thailand. As vividly documented in Albert McCoy's *The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia*, the agency provided its "army" with a steady infusion of money and arms, and looked the other way while commanders put their men to work cultivating and gathering opium. In Indochina, as one agent noted, opium was the coin of the realm. In the agency's view, if the job were to be done, there was no choice but to use it.

By the early '60s, CIA money was indirectly financing a vast opium industry. CIA-employed troops grew it, harvested it and shipped it out to Vientiane and Saigon aboard Air America, the CIA airline. Dozens if not hundreds of CIA operatives were enriched in the process, and few better than Vang Pao, the general of the CIA's *Armee Clandestine* that operated in Laos into the '70s.

The opium that flowed into Vientiane and Saigon was sold to the Corsican Mafia. The Corsicans turned the opium into heroin, shipped it out to Marseilles and other ports and, from there, to its final destinations—the streets of the United States. The Corsicans, allies of the Sicilian Mafia that operated in the United States, were a powerful factor in Vietnamese politics and, over the years, were courted assiduously by French intelligence and, later, by the CIA.

Many CIA men worked with the Corsican Mafia, but none more closely than Lucien Conein, a CIA agent in Saigon who reportedly had a hand in the overthrow and assassination of President Ngo Dinh Diem. Conein was unreserved in his praise for the Corsicans. "They are smarter, tougher and better organized than the Sicilians," Conein told McCoy. "They are absolutely ruthless." The Corsicans, in turn, held a high regard for CIA-man Conein. When, after years of service, Conein finally left Vietnam in 1970, the Corsicans presented him with a heavy gold medallion embossed with the Napoleonic eagle and the Corsican crest, and engraved with the inscription "*Perf Tu Amicu*, Conein" (For your friendship, Conein).

In 1973, Conein, the CIA man for whom the Mafia held so much affection, was appointed Chief of Special Operations for the newly created Drug Enforcement Administration, the super agency that was supposed to clean heroin off U.S. streets.

Conein has many enemies, in and out of the Agency, but largely the animosity grows out of personal style, not Conein's methods. For, quite clearly, they are understood to be the Agency's methods. "Look," says a prominent former CIA man who operated in Latin America, "the name of this game is getting intelligence, and you go about getting it as best you can from whomever you can. When the information is good, you don't ask any questions about the people who give it to you. You are damn glad to get it. Sometimes, getting intelligence from a source leads to a source doing other things for you, and you're doing other things for a source. Maybe it's not nice, but that's what happens."

It is certainly what happened in Cuba. The coming to power of Fidel Castro was a disaster not only for United States foreign policy but also organized crime. According to Frank Fiorini, a Philadelphia-born agent who worked for both Castro and the CIA before gaining unwanted notoriety in 1972 as Frank Sturgis (one of the Watergate burglars), the loss of the Havana gambling casinos represented a drop in revenue of $100,000,000 cash a year for organized crime. The Castro takeover also severely disrupted drug traffic into the United States, since Havana was the Caribbean anchor for the "French Connection." Taken together, they provided a powerful incentive for wanting Castro dead. Sturgis himself claimed in a recent interview to have been approached twice shortly after the Cuban revolution by organized crime figures wishing to enlist him as an assassin. On one occasion, according to Sturgis, Hyman Levine, a Lansky mobster and acquaintance of Sturgis, casually remarked that it "would be worth a million" to the Cosa Nostra to get rid of Castro. Later, while Castro was visiting New York, Sturgis says he was again approached, this time by an unnamed stranger who identified himself as a member of the Havana gambling mob. The stranger offered Sturgis $100,000 to assassinate Castro, with whom Sturgis was then on very good terms. Sturgis declined, but reported the conversation to CIA friends in Havana.

Coincidentally, the CIA itself had been talking of eliminating Castro since the closing days of the Eisenhower administration, and Sturgis' report may have freshened interest in the project. A mob hit, rather than an assassination by the Agency itself, would provide CIA with what was known in the trade as "plausible deniability" if, as ultimately turned out, the attempt went askew.

By early 1961, the Agency and organized crime were deep into discussions on how best to eliminate their common foe. Reports vary on how the initial contacts were made. One version has it that Norman Rothman, a syndicate figure in both Miami and Havana, was selected as the go-between. Rothman, according to the New York *Daily News*, consulted leading mafiosi, including Santo Trafficante, Jr. of Tampa, Sam Mannarino of Pittsburgh and John "Don Giovanni" Roselli of Las Vegas, about the feasibility of the project. Another story, from a source close to the FBI, identifies the contact man as a Washington attorney, himself a former agent, with several important mobsters as clients. In still another scenario, spun out by Jack Anderson, the person who made the necessary introductions was a former FBI agent and private investigator named Robert Maheu, who would later go on to become boss of Howard Hughes' Nevada [illegible] stories agree on is that

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after protracted discussions Roselli, the suavely vicious Mafia boss of Las Vegas, agreed to recruit a team of hit men for the CIA.

In March 1961, Roselli flew to Miami to iron out the final details of the project in separate meetings with Trafficante, whose specialty was drug traffic on the East Coast, and the CIA. Though accounts differ, the Agency apparently agreed to supply Roselli with money, weapons and transportation for the assassination attempt. Roselli himself volunteered to accompany one of the missions into Cuba.

For all the elaborate preparations, the Roselli hit men turned out to be the gang that couldn't shoot straight. The first group of assassins was successfully landed on the Cuban coast, and then simply disappeared. Another time, the landing party was driven off in a running gun battle with a Cuban patrol boat. A third time a Roselli operative tried to kill Castro with a CIA-supplied poison capsule which had been slipped into the Cuban leader's daily chocolate malted. The attempt went awry when the waiter bearing Castro the fated malt started shaking in terror and aroused Castro's suspicions.

Despite the foul-ups, the Agency remembered its friends, even years later. In 1969, shortly after Richard Nixon's inaugural, then-pending deportation proceedings against Roselli were dropped when government lawyers argued in court that Roselli had performed unspecified "valuable services to national security." Roselli was not the only beneficiary of the Agency's largesse. In 1971, Gabriel Mannarino, brother of Sam, was on trial in federal court in New York, along with a number of other Mafiosi—chief among them John Sebastion LaRocca, boss of the Pittsburgh family—for charges growing out of a union kickback scheme. When it came time for the defense to present its case, one of the star witnesses turned out to be the local head of the CIA. According to a source close to the FBI, the FBI men in the courtroom were stunned at the agent's appearance and, when court recessed for the day, physically hustled him out of the courthouse and into a waiting car. The CIA man was sped to the airport for a flight to Washington and, from there, on to Italy to "cool off," as the source puts it, until the conclusion of the trial. As it turned out, Mannarino and the other Mafiosi were acquitted.

But by far the most bizarre by-product of the Cuban caper was the burglary of comedian Dan Rowan's Las Vegas hotel room. It seems that Rowan was becoming overly friendly with singer Phyllis McGuire, a frequent girlfriend of Chicago Mafia Boss Sam "Momo" Giancana, another of the mafiosi involved in the attempted assassination of Castro. During a Las Vegas engagement, Rowan returned to his hotel room to find two burglars rummaging through his things. He summoned hotel security men who in turn summoned the Las Vegas sheriff. After a few days in jail, the burglars informed the FBI that they had been hired by a private detective agency in Miami. The proprietor of the detective agency, in turn, told the FBI that his contract had come from the CIA. Eventually, the CIA confirmed that it had engineered the break-in as a "favor" for Giancana.

The logical question is how far such "favors" go. In the late 1950s, a then-young Senate Rackets investigator named Robert Kennedy discovered that they extended to immunity for certain Las Vegas mobsters. Kennedy, according to a recent report by two of his former aides, didn't believe it when a *Cosa Nostra* figure told him he had "immunity" from the CIA. But Kennedy checked and the mobster was right. In New York, according to a high-ranking former police official, the favors CIA bestows include "protection" for some suspected drug couriers.

The list goes on. How far it stretches, what CIA or individual agents, acting on their own, have done with or for organized crime, and what chores, in turn, *La Cosa Nostra* has done in the CIA-defined national interest, can only be guessed at. Interviews with dozens of sources, including present and former CIA and FBI men, Justice Department officials and two former attorneys general of the United States, have uncovered only fragments of detail, brief glimpses into the shadow world of intelligence and espionage. Perhaps the most significant revelation is that those who know the workings of CIA best are also the most prepared to believe the worst.

Copeland, for one, reports that, by now, the assertion of partnership with the Agency has become "a well-known trick of international crooks. They offer their respective embassies political, military or economic information, some of it very good," Copeland writes, "and when they are caught at their crimes—smuggling gold, trafficking in drugs, fighting as mercenaries or whatever—they 'confess' that their illicit behavior was only cover for intelligence activity, and therefore was patriotically motivated." Indeed, it has gotten to the point where, in the words of one federal source, "LCN [*La Cosa Nostra*] people themselves are accusing CIA of 'dumping guys'"—murdering other mobsters.

Throughout it all, there is the constant assertion by both friends and enemies of the Agency, that, even if the worst is true, the fault lies not with CIA, but in the nature of the beast. "To understand how it works," explains Fletcher Prouty, a retired Air Force colonel who served as liaison officer between the Pentagon and CIA, "you have to think of CIA and organized crime as two huge concentric circles spread all over the world. Inevitably, in some places, the circles overlap." Only the most rabid of CIA's critics accuse the Agency of profiting from crime, and, in many ways, that is the saddest aspect of all. As a former FBI agent with long experience in organized crime work puts it: "The CIA does what they do out of love of country, not to put dollars in their pockets."

In a New York bar a few weeks ago, a former intelligence man, slightly in his cups, was reflecting on what his trade had become. "In the old days," he said quietly, "we had a code. There were certain things you did, things you had to do. But there was a line you didn't cross. But now..." his voice trailed off. Finally, with more melancholy than bitterness, he shook his head. "It's not CIA that changed. It's the country."

WASHINGTON POST
30 May 1975

Ex-Agent: CIA Warned Castro of Plot

From News Dispatches

LONDON, May 29 — The former CIA chief for Latin America said on British television tonight that the U.S. government warned Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro in 1968 of a plot to kill him.

David Phillips, who announced his retirement last month to take up public defense of the agency, seemed to hint of some CIA role in plots against Castro, however.

Interviewed by BBC, Phillips said, "In late June of 1968, I learned of a plot to assassinate Castro. It was a particularly vicious thing . . . made to look like it involved the U.S. government. I arranged for the Department of State, through the Swiss embassy, to warn Castro . . . I'd be surprised though if Castro knows it was the CIA who helped him."

Another guest on the taped show, Cuban Deputy Prime Minister Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, charged that the CIA was involved in 100 attempts against Castro over the last 15 years, by methods "including bombing, shooting and poison."

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WASHINGTON POST
20 May 1975

CIA Pledge Sought on Sanctity of Mail

By George Lardner Jr.
Washington Post Staff Writer

Less than four weeks after he took over as Postmaster General this year, Benjamin Franklin Bailar wrote a letter to the Central Intelligence Agency emphasizing that it was his job to guard the sanctity of the U.S. mail.

Accordingly, he demanded that CIA Director William E. Colby give his personal pledge that the CIA would never again surreptitiously open the letters of American citizens on the way to their destinations.

Colby replied, in a note dated March 13 that has yet to be made public, that the CIA had no intention of reinstituting such projects, but congressional investigators remain skeptical.

According to testimony before the House Post Office Subcommittee on postal facilities, the CIA not only illegally intercepted and copied first-class mail over a 20-year period, but it managed to do so without confiding in the Postmasters General or the chief postal inspectors of the Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson administrations.

- Thousands of letters mailed first class between the United States and the Soviet Union were secretly opened by CIA agents stationed at New York's LaGuardia Airport and later at Kennedy International since the mid-1950s. However, Eisenhower's Postmaster General, the late Arthur E. Summerfield, was apparently told only that the CIA was going to conduct a "mail cover" operation to record the information on outside wrappings and envelopes. Almost all of Summerfield's successors were told nothing at all.
- Hundreds of other letters air-mailed from Communist China were intercepted in San Francisco by CIA agents in 1969-71 in violation of an understanding with the U.S. Postal Service, which once again expressly authorized only a "mail cover." The letters, The Washington Post has reported, were surreptitiously plucked out of the mail stream despite surveillance by postal inspectors who were assigned to work alongside the CIA agents to prevent any such tampering.
- The CIA reportedly obtained access to Cuban mail passing through New Orleans without any notice to postal authorities, who have been told only that the Postal Service was "not involved" in this operation in any way. According to one source, it may have involved so-called "transit mail," which simply passes through the United States on its way from one foreign country to another. Colby has said in congressional testimony that "international mail passing through a U.S. port was opened in August, 1957," but he offered no other details.

Federal law prohibits the opening of first-class mail without a search warrant, and Colby himself has publicly acknowledged that the CIA's mail intercepts were "illegal." But the evidence involving the 20-year Russian mail project—which was not halted until February, 1973, in the midst of the Watergate scandal—suggests that, until recently at least, any CIA undertaking carried with it a heady bureaucratic momentum that brooked no questions.

According to chief U.S. postal inspector William J. Cotter, the CIA first expressed interest in incoming and outgoing Soviet mail in the closing days of the Truman administration and finally got approval from Summerfield, "presumably for mail cover," in 1953 after Eisenhower became President.

Sometime later, however, Cotter told the House postal facilities subcommittee headed by Rep. Charles H. Wilson (D-Calif.), the CIA went one step further and secretly began opening the mail with the approval of neither the postal authorities, nor the courts.

A retired postal clerk who sorted the Russian mail for CIA agents at the New York airports for 16 years, Peter F. McAuley, testified that he never knew for certain they were opening letters and didn't suspect it "until very late" in his career. He said he got the hunch one day when he spotted an envelope he thought he had seen the day before and remarked about that to the CIA agents he was helping.

"They smiled, the two men smiled, and that was the end of that," McAuley told the House subcommittee. "Nobody told me anything . . . I assisted them, that's all."

As Cotter has explained it, the CIA operatives would apparently slip selected letters into their pockets when no one was looking, make copies later, and return the originals into the mail flow the next day.

If clerk McAuley was kept in the dark, so apparently were top officials of the Postal Inspection Service whose job it is to protect the mail and investigate all violations of postal law. Interviewed recently by postal authorities, the chief postal inspector under Summerfield, David H. [illegible] had no idea that the CIA was opening letters.

With the advent of the Kennedy administration in 1961, then-CIA Director Allen Dulles offered to brief the new Postmaster General J. Edward Day, "about something that was very secret." But Day said he didn't want to hear about it—whatever it was—so that no fingers would be pointed at him in case the secret ever leaked.

In a recent hearing Rep. Wilson asked him, "Do you wish now that you had taken the briefing and learned more about it so that if you felt that it were illegal, you could have stopped it?"

Day replied, "No, I don't, because of the very reason I state . . . The CIA had its own lines of authority, I had my lines of authority and I didn't feel that I needed to get into their affairs and I'm very glad I didn't."

Perhaps because of Day's attitude, the CIA apparently never approached the next three Postmasters General, John Gronouski, Lawrence F. O'Brien and Marvin Watson, about the project.

"I had never heard of the CIA operation," O'Brien told the subcommittee this month. If the CIA had asked him about opening mail, he added, "I would [have] come close to throwing them out the window."

O'Brien also said he had intensive discussions with his chief postal inspector, Henry Montague, about mail covers and, in the course of them, O'Brien asked "the obvious question: 'Is there any set of circumstances in this program where the mail is opened?' And his answer was unequivocally no, the mail is sacred . . ."

Montague, who became chief postal inspector in 1961, had been inspector in charge of the New York City area when the CIA project was started in the 1950s. But he, too, Cotter has said, apparently throught they were conducting only an "exterior type" mail cover that does not require court approval.

As it turned out, Cotter was the first chief postal inspector who knew what was going on and then only because he had been a top-ranking CIA agent in New York when the project was started. He was appointed chief postal inspector in April, 1969, the first outsider to get the job since the Post Office was set up under Benjamin Franklin.

The subcommittee has suggested that Cotter was really representing the CIA more than the Postal Service in the mail-opening controversy, but he has denied the charge and pointed out that it was he who eventually got the program halted.

After he was named by then-Postmaster General Winston M. Blount, Cotter told the subcommittee, he concluded that "the top people in the organization were not aware" of the mail openings. As a result, he said he began pressing CIA oficals to get top-level approval for the project. Cotter said he didn't tell Blount about it directly because he still felt constrained by the oath of secrecy he had taken as a CIA man.

Finally, in June, 1971, as a result of Cotter's overtures, Blount was briefed on the project by then-CIA Director Richard Helms, although it remains unclear just what the Postmaster General was told.

In testimony before the subcommittee, Blount said Helms told him "that this was an extremely sensitive operation, one that was important to the United States . . ." But when asked if Helms told him that the CIA was opening the mail, Blount insisted, "I don't recall any such conversation."

The subcommittee did not ask Blount just what he thought the CIA was doing. In any event, Cotter has testified, the Postmaster General called him a few days after the Helms briefing and told him to "carry on" with the project.

The CIA finally halted it in February, 1973, following renewed insistence by Cotter, who said he was still concerned about it and once again told the agency to get the approval of "the highest people in government" or drop it.

The existence of the project, however, remained a secret until Colby alluded to it in congressional testimony in January and February, along with veiled references to the San Francisco and New Orleans mail openings.

Bailar, who became Postmaster General in mid-February, asked Colby several weeks later for "your personal assurance that there are no more of these types of operations presently going on, planned, or ever to be undertaken."

According to informed sources, however, Colby's reply appears to fall short of the "ironclad assurance" that the Wilson subcommittee has demanded.

"You could read some loopholes into it," one source said of the CIA director's response. According to a CIA spokesman, the agency still wants to reserve the right to conduct "mail covers."

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NEW YORK TIMES
25 May 1975

Submarines of U.S. Stage Spy Missions Inside Soviet Waters

By SEYMOUR M. HERSH
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 24—For nearly 15 years, the Navy has been using specially equipped electronic submarines to spy at times inside the three-mile limit of the Soviet Union and other nations.

The highly classified missions, code-named Holystone, have been credited by supporters with supplying vital information on the configuration, capabilities, noise patterns and missile-firing abilities of the Soviet submarine fleet.

It is not known how many men and submarines have been involved in the underseas spying, but at one point in the early seventies, at least four such ships were known to be in operation.

Concern About Detente

Critics of the program, who include past and present members of the National Security Council, the State Department, the Navy and the Central Intelligence Agency, contend that much of the inteligence gathered by the submarines can be obtained through other means, such as satellites, which are far less provocative and less vulnerable to Soviet interception.

The critics also question whether such intelligence operations have any place in the current atmosphere of détente between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Many of the critics acknowledged that they had agreed to discuss the operation in the hope of forcing changes in how intelligence was collected and utilized by the Government.

All the sources agreed that the Soviet Union was aware of the Holystone program, although perhaps not specifically of when and where the boats were on patrol.

Adding to the objections to the missions raised by the critics, according to many former high-level Government officials interviewed, has been the number of accidents and near-misses involving the submarines, such as the following:

¶Two known collisions with Soviet submarines.

¶The grounding—and eventual escape—of a Holystone submarine within the three-mile limit off the east coast of the Soviet Union.

¶The accidental sinking of a North Vietnamese [illegible] sweeper by a submarine on patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin during the Vietnam war.

¶The damaging of a Holystone submarine that surfaced underneath a Soviet ship in the midst of a Soviet fleet naval exercise. Despite a search by the Soviet vessels, the submarine, which suffered damage to its conning tower, escaped.

Question of Control

Furthermore, many former officials say that the Holystone program raises questions about the Government's over-all intelligence reconnaissance programs and their control, which thus far do not seem to be a major factor in the Congressional select committees' investigation of intelligence operations.

It could not be learned how often penetration inside the three-mile limit was made, nor could it be learned whether such penetration needed special clearance. All the sources agreed, however, that Holystone missions had repeatedly violated the territorial waters of the Soviet Union and other nations.

One source said that the submarines were able to plug into Soviet land communication cables strewn across the ocean bottom and thus were able to intercept high-level military messages and other communications considered too important to be sent by radio or other less secure means.

As outlined by the sources, Holystone was authorized in the early nineteen-sixties, and its reconnaissance operations were placed by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara under the direct control of the Chief of Naval Operations, the four-star admiral who heads the Navy.

At various times during the Vietnam war, officials in Washington reportedly delegated responsibility for missions to the Navy admiral in charge of Pacific operations.

Pueblo Seizure

Control over the program was apparently tightened after North Korea seized the United States spy ship Pueblo in 1968, sources said, and the schedule of Holystone missions now have to be approved every month by the 40 Committee, the high-level intelligence review panel headed by Secretary of State Kissinger.

Navy sources familiar with the program said that Holystone involved a minimum of cost because the Navy utilized nuclear-powered basic attack submarines of the Sturgeon, or 637 Class, and simply added more electronic gear and a special unit from the National Security Agency to turn the attack submarine into a reconnaissance vessel.

The National Security Agency, with headquarters at Fort Meade, Md., near Washington, serves as the major source for intelligence and interception communications. It also is in charge of developing unbreakable codes for electronic transmission and breaking the codes of other nations. A highly secret N.S.A. unit was aboard the Pueblo when it was captured.

Inside the Navy, the Holystone patrols are considered a source of pride; Pentagon officials recalled that the Mavy guarded clearances for the operation and that official knowledge of it outside the service was limited to a few high-ranking civilians.

No Sign of Office

The program still is under the direct control of the naval intelligence command and is known as OPPO 099U inside the Navy. There is no sign of that office in the published Pentagon telephone directory, nor is its chief operational officer, Capt. Jack B. Richard, listed.

The sensitivity of the program is dramatized by the fact that the Navy has set up a separate channel for recruiti g the seamen for the Holystone missions, according to men involved in the recruiting.

The recruiting, much of which is reportedly carried out at overseas Navy bases, is considered so sensitive that the candidates are not permitted to know exactly what they are beinig asked to do. Special tests are administered, including extensive psychiatric testing, before a seaman is judged qualified, sources said.

As of a few years ago, an intelligence summary of the program was made available every Thursday in the Chief of Naval Operations' briefing theater on the fourth floor of the Pentagon. One participant recalled that the Holystone missions were discussed after the regular intelligence briefing for high-ranking admirals and the top Navy civilian officials.

The lights were dimmed and slides were utilized to show where the missions were on station, the source said.

Photographs Shown

The participant recalled seeing close-up photographs of Soviet submarines that had been taken by a Holystone vessel.

At that meeting, which took place in the early seventies, the Navy officially briefed the program as if the Soviet Union had not detected any of its Holystone missions, the source said.

In numerous interviews, however, many Government officials described that belief as inconceivable, particularly in view of the known accidents involving Holystone vessels and Soviet submarines.

One former Goverment official recalled that the Navy once [illegible] recommendation that the Holystone operation be publicly disclosed. The argument was that the Navy had nothing to lose because the program was well-known to high officials in the United States and Soviet Union and because some Government lawyers said that it was at least arguable that the operation was in accord with international law and thus was legal.

The Navy declined the suggestion, the official said, in what was interpreted to be an admission that not all the Holystone operations could stand up to public scrutiny.

Briefing Recalled

One former Government intelligence official recalled a Hollystone briefing in the mid-sixties in which he and others were shown photographs of the underside of an E-Class Soviet submarine that appeared to be taken inside Vladisvostok harbor, a main Soviet submarine port.

"On that same mission," the official recalled, "the Holystonel submarine scraped the bottom of one of the E-Class submarines and knocked off some of its equipment."

He recalled that someone asked during the briefing whether that had been the only such incident, and was told "No. It's happened at least two other times."

On March 31, 1971, according to a copy of a C.I.A. memorandum made available to The New York Times, another Holystone collision involving a Soviet submarine took place.

The memo, sent on April 1 to Richard C. Helms, then the Director of Central Intelligence, said that "the collision is reported to have occurred about 17 nautical miles off-shore—beyond the 12-mile territorial limit claimed by the U.S.S.R. No Soviet reaction has been noted."

Eighteen months earlier, a Holystone submarine was beached for about two hours off the Soviet coast, a former Government aide recalled. The incident created concern inside the National Security Council, the aide said, because of the possibility that a major international incident would develop if the ship was discovered.

Another former Government official recalled being briefed in the late sixties about the collision of a Holystone vessel with a North Vietnamese minesweeper in the Gulf of Tonkin. The North Vietnamese vessel, which apparently had been provided to the Vietnamese by the Soviet Union, sank within minutes.

In January, 1974, Laurence Stern reported in The Washington Post the existence of the underwater intelligence operation and its code name, but details about the missions, including their extent and the difficulties they encountered, have never been previously disclosed. The dispatch drew no official reaction either from the Soviet Union or the United States.

One source said that there was no significant modification

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of the Holystone operations after the Post article, which angered the Pentagon, although the Russians now seem to be increasing their counter-detection efforts against the reconnaissance missions.

Much of the Soviet effort and similar detection efforts by the Chinese utilize radar in an attempt to track the periscopes of the Holystone submarines, the source said. On occasion, Holystone submarines have been subjected to intensive hunts by Soviet destroyers and aircraft, the source added.

The combination of the various misfortunes, the increased Soviet and Chinese detection efforts, and the apparent unwillingness of the Navy or the 40 Committee to monitor the operations closely have convinced many former Government officials that Holystone's risks now outweigh the acknowledged value of the intelligence collected.

"It provided useful stuff all right," one former high-level intelligence analyst said, "but it was a risky kind of business."

A former high-level C.I.A. official suggested that Holystone was symptomatic of many of the current Pentagon intelligence collection and reconnaissance programs. He specifically referred to a high-level briefing during which Navy intelligence officials showed close up photographs of an abandoned Soviet nuclear-powered vessel, the apparent victim of an on-board accident.

Kissinger Role Seen

Similarly, a former White House official recalled that Mr. Kissinger was known to be a strong supporter and close observer of the Holystone operations. Mr. Kissinger attended briefings on the project, the former aide said, in the early days of the Nixon Administration.

Despite the emphasis on photographs, most of those interviewed agreed that photography was the least significant aspect of the Holystone missions.

Far more important, they said, was the information obtained through the N.S.A.'s electronic means about Soviet long and short range submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

Since the Russians normally test-fire many of their sea-based missiles inland to avoid close United States observation, the Holystone missions often penetrated close to the Soviet shores to observe the missile launchings.

The missions were able to get what one official termed a "voice autograph" of various Soviet submarines. These were described as detailed tape recordings of the noises made by submarine engines and other equipment.

Such recordings were carefully maintained, the official said, and Navy technicians have been able to perfect a method for identifying specific Soviet submarines, even those tracked at long range under the ocean.

"We can follow boats through their life cycle," the expert said, meaning that technicians are able to keep track of a Soviet submarine from her launching until she is decommissioned.

The Russians are believed to be far behind in this kind of underwater intelligence, the source said.

A number of sources described the Holystone information as being important to the United States-Soviet Strategic Arms Limitations Talks that led in 1972 to an interim five-year accord. The accord, among other things, placed certain limits on the number of land-based and submarine-launched offensive ballistic missiles both sides could maintain.

"One of the reasons we can have a SALT agreement is because we know what the Soviets are doing," one official said, "and Holystone is an important part of what we know about the Soviet submarine force."

This official, who was involved in some aspects of the arms talks, described the submarine reconnaissance program as "the kind of intelligence operation that has a high pay-off and whose risks seem to be minimal."

But another official, who told of other important intelligence information that was obtained from Holystone, said that the project seemed to "very provocative" and was inadequately supervised.

In this official's view, the most significant information provided by Holystone was a readout of the various computer calculations and signals that the Russians put into effect before firing their long and short range submarine missiles.

The reconnaissance boats were also invaluable, he said, in following the flight and eventual crash of the Soviet missiles, providing constant information on guidance and electronic systems.

"What bothers me," the official said, "is the fact that the Soviets know we're there. This isn't like overhead [satellite] intelligence. This is provocative."

None of the issues raised by the Holystone program is known to have been seriously considered by any Congressional committee.

A member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence acknowledged this week that the committee had yet to focus on such reconnaissance operations.

"I suppose we'll hit it at some point," the official said. "This committee will look into all allegations."

WASHINGTON POST
21 May 1976

CIA Loses Access to U.S. Mail

By George Lardner Jr.
Washington Post Staff Writer

Postmaster General Benjamin F. Bailar has issued orders prohibiting the Central Intelligence Agency from access to "any kind of mail in the custody of the Postal Service."

Bailar notified CIA Director William E. Colby of the restrictions in a March 5 letter prompted by the CIA's disclosures earlier this year of unauthorized mail-intercepts over a 20-year period.

According to congressional testimony by postal authorities and other information that has since come to light, the CIA obtained approval to conduct various "mail covers" —which are limited to the recording of information on outside wrappings and envelopes —and then surreptitiously began opening selected mail without the knowledge of postal officials.

Thousands of first-class letters between the United States and the Soviet Union and hundreds of incoming airmail letters from China were intercepted by CIA agents before the CIA finally halted the projects in February, 1973. The practice, however, remained a closely held secret until Colby alluded to it in congressional testimony in January and February.

Bailar, who became Postmaster General in mid-February, said in his letter to Colby that the disclosures had given him "most serioucs concern."

"Consequently," Bailar wrote, "I have instructed the Postal Inspection Service to make sure that Central Intelligence Agency personnel are not permitted to have access to any kind of mail in the custody of the Postal Service, whether by way of cooperative mail covers or otherwise.'

Normally, "mail covers" are conducted by postal officials who handle the mail themselves and then supply the requested information, such as the names and addresses of the senders, to the law enforcement agencies requesting it. However, CIA agents themselves were permitted to process the Soviet and Chinese mail.

Bailar's orders were evidently designed to prevent that from happening again, although presumably postal officials might be willing to conduct mail covers on behalf of the CIA.

Postal officials released the correspondence, including Colby's March 13 reply, without comment.

In his reply, Colby said he shared the Postmaster General's concern over protecting the integrity of the mail and said the CIA had "no intention of reinstituting" its mail-opening program.

Bailar had asked for Colby's assurance that "no such operations are presently active or planned, and that in the future the Central Intelligence Agency will refrain from any undertaking that might draw the integrity of the mails into question."

U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, May 26, 1975

Washington Whispers

On the lecture circuit, it appears, denouncing the Central Intelligence Agency is far more profitable than defending it. David Phillips made that discovery after he resigned as CIA chief of operations for Latin America so he could speak out publicly in behalf of the Agency. When he tried to arrange a lecture tour, his agent told him he could expect to earn $5,000 to $10,000 a year if he defended the CIA, between $50,000 and $100,000 if he attacked it.

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LOS ANGELES TIMES
18 May 1975

Break-ins Lawful in Spy Cases, Justice Dept. Says

But Administration Stand on Warrantless Searches Is Disputed by Watergate Special Prosecutor Ruth

BY RONALD J. OSTROW
Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON—The Ford Administration has asserted that federal agents have the right to break into a citizen's home without a warrant to search for items in foreign espionage or intelligence cases.

Watergate special prosecutor Henry S. Ruth Jr., splitting with the Justice Department on the issue, said in a legal brief that such power would conflict with 200 years of American constitutional history.

The controversy over the extent of the Executive Branch's power in national security matters is reminiscent of the debate that raged but was never settled in the final, tumultuous year of the Nixon administration.

The dispute surfaced in a publicly unnoticed, two-page letter that the Justice Department filed with the U.S. Court of Appeals here in the appeal of former Nixon aide John D. Ehrlichman and three others of their convictions in the Ellsberg break-in case.

The letter, signed by John C. Keeney, acting assistant attorney general for the department's criminal division, was dated May 9. A legal source, familiar with its contents and import, called it to the attention of The Times.

A department spokesman said Saturday that the position had been cleared by Atty. Gen. Edward H. Levi and Solicitor Gen. Robert H. Bork, the department's chief advocate before the Supreme Court. It thus represents Administration policy.

Such searches without a judge's prior approval "must be very carefully controlled," Keeney said. "There must be solid reason to believe that foreign espionage or intelligence is involved."

Before agents can conduct a warrantless search, the operation must be personally authorized by the President or the attorney general, Keeney said.

"The intrusion into any zone of expected privacy must be kept to the minimum," he said.

At the heart of the dispute is the Constitution's Fourth Amendment, which protects citizens from "unreasonable searches and seizures."

"The history of the Fourth Amendment and the 200 years of precedent interpreting and shaping the Fourth Amendment do not cast any doubt on the principle that a warrant must be obtained in all cases for the physical search of a citizen's home or office and the seizure of his confidential paper," Ruth said in his brief opposing Ehrlichman's appeal.

Ehrlichman, G. Gordon Liddy, Bernard L. Barker and Eugenio R. Martinez were convicted last July of conspiring to violate the civil rights of Dr. Lewis J. Fielding, a Beverly Hills psychiatrist, in a 1971 search of his office for material on Daniel Ellsberg, one of his patients. It was Ellsberg who leaked the Pentagon Papers to the press.

During the Ehrlichman trial last July, U.S. Dist. Judge Gerhard A. Gesell, in his instruction to the jury, rejected the grounds of national security as a defense in the search of Fielding's office.

Concern for preventing leaks of national security material "would not have justified a warrantless search of Dr. Fielding's office without his permission," Gesell said.

"There is no evidence that the President authorized such a search, and as a matter of law neither he nor any official nor any agency such as the FBI or the CIA had the authority to order it," Gesell said.

Normally an answer to the defendants' appeal would be left to the special prosecutor's office. But the Justice Department letter by Keeney was submitted because of Ruth's argument that such searches were "a core violation of the Fourth Amendment—a physical break-in by the government to rummage through an individual's papers and effects."

Ruth's position "raises questions which, in our view, are not presented by this case," Keeney said.

The break-in at Fielding's office was "plainly unlawful," Keeney said. "The search was not controlled as we have suggested it must be, there was no proper authorization, there was no delegation to a proper officer and there was no sufficient predicate for the choice of the particular premises invaded."

But the Justice Department likened a physical search of a citizen's property without a warrant to wiretapping without a warrant when foreign espionage or intelligence was involved.

The Supreme Court and Congress have not resolved the question of whether the government can wiretap without a warrant in cases involving foreign espionage or intelligence.

However, the high court has ruled that the government cannot place wiretaps without court sanction to obtain information involving "the domestic aspects of national security."

"The department does not believe there is a constitutional difference between searches conducted by wiretapping and those involving physical entries into private premises," Keeney wrote.

"It is and has long been the department's view that warrantless searches involving physical entries into private premises are justified under the proper circumstances when related to foreign espionage or intelligence."

Ruth disagreed, asserting that "invasion of a person's home or office to seize his papers always has been treated as far more serious than tapping into the wires of a public utility or other eavesdropping."

The special prosecutor conceded that attorneys general in the past had permitted "a technical trespass"—but only for the purpose of placing an electronic bug and not for a physical search.

It was learned that Solicitor General Bork had conferred with Ruth before the special prosecutor had filed his brief, seeking to persuade him not to press the issue.

Ruth, in an interview Saturday, refused to say whether such a discussion had taken place and would say only: "As in the past, I'll say that the Justice Department has not interfered in our operations or tried to prevent us from doing anything."

In his brief, Ruth cited the words of the late Justice Felix Frankfurter in a 1949 search-and-seizure case, and said they were "as unquestionably binding today as then in describing what has historically been the central evil against which the FourtB Amendment protects."

Frankfurter had said: "The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police—which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment—is basic to a free society.

"The knock at the door, whether by day or by night as a prelude to a search, without authority of law but solely on the authority of the police, did not need the commentary of recent history to be condemned as inconsistent with the conception of human rights enshrined in the history and the basic constitutional documents of English-speaking peoples."

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NEW YORK TIMES
25 May 1975

This Is About (shh)

By David Atlee Phillips

BETHESDA, Md.—With all the speculation these days about Central Intelligence Agency dabblings in derring-do, domestic spying, assassination, political subversion and God knows what else, one could easily visualize a C.I.A. payroll swollen by a zealous, ubiquitous cloak-and-dagger corps impervious to good judgment and outside influence.

In fact, the majority of the C.I.A.'s employes are assigned to the Washington, D. C. area and involved with the preparation of intelligence estimates and reports, scientific and technical activities, and administration.

The problem area has always been with the members of the Clandestine Service, the covert employes who work abroad and who must hide their affiliation if they are to function and, indeed, survive in many overseas areas.

Almost inevitably though, public questions about that shadowy world and what it has been up to have been raised, multiplied and have festered. The result is the review now being conducted, essentially of the Clandestine Service, by a Presidential commission and two Congressional committees —an approach that should satisfy even our harshest critics. For the record, this certainly represents no problem for me so long as it is responsibly handled.

Conventional wisdom to the contrary, the Clandestine Service is not a glamorous, public-service refuge for the scions of the East Coast, Ivy League Establishment. A composite of the average officer shows that he or (more frequently now) she is probably 33 years of age, married and with perhaps two children. He holds a graduate degree from a state university, speaks at least one foreign language and has worked in at least two foreign countries. Abroad he often performs two functions, his cover job and, when that work day ends, his clandestine work. He claims no pay for overtime, whether working in headquarters or in the field, and contributes 15 per cent more time to the job than the ordinary 9 to 5 worker. Since his salary is about $20,000 a year, the Government gets an additional $4,500 of uncompensated overtime from him annually. In his cover role he is always ranked below his peers, but he recognizes that he must accomplish tasks other Government components should not be asked to do. He is an intellectual marine.

Perhaps soon the C.I.A. can fade back into the position of somewhat less prominence and interest to the news media, with which we have had and undoubtedly will continue to have our unique problems. Responsible, factual stories we can endure stoically, even though we find painfully gratuitous the exposure of active operations or agents. Egregious, sensationalist ones we can also endure because the ridiculous is patently short-lived. The type that really bothers us is the hybrid (fact-and-fallacy) story that refuses to die or be straightened out, and sinks into the public subconscious as durable myth.

An example: The persistence of the allegation that the C.I.A. encouraged the Chilean plotters who toppled President Salvador Allende Gossens and funded the strikes leading to the coup is just plain frustrating, after all of C.I.A. Director William E. Colby's testimony on the subject. This myth seems to hang on Mr. Colby's purported use of the term "destabilization" in Congressional hearings to characterize our Chilean operations. But, Mr. Colby did not use any such word. I know. I was there with him. I also know the other allegations are not true because I was chief of Latin-American operations at the time Dr. Allende was deposed.

I certainly do not want to leave the impression that the Clandestine Service considers itself without error and above criticism. We have made our quota of mistakes, some of which have been headlined for the world. Current investigations may assess us culpable of others related to loosely-defined areas of our basic charter such as covert action, or borderline cases involving domestic operations against foreign targets. Whatever the outcome, our hope is that a new consensus will emerge on ground rules for the Clandestine Service that will satisfy responsible critics and their concerns on the one hand and the C.I.A.'s critical responsibilities for the national security on the other.

David Atlee Phillips has retired early from his position as the C.I.A.'s chief of Latin-American operations to organize ex-intelligence officers from all services to explain intelligence in American society.

THE WASHINGTON POST *Wednesday, May 21, 1975*

Poking Fun at CIA

Americans in London Offer Tour of 'Stately Homes'

By Clay Harris
Special to The Washington Post

LONDON, May 20 — When Britain's newest tour of "stately homes" began earlier this week, the householder at the only stop on the first day's tour wasn't at home to his guests.

So the 60 or so participants stood a curbside vigil across the street from the Belgravia home of Cord Meyer Jr., chief of the U.S. embassy's political liaison section and widely reputed to be the Central Intelligence Agency's station chief in Britain.

If Meyer had answered the door, he would have been presented with a mock historical plaque like those that adorn the houses of the famous. His was a blue frisbee with the lettering: "CIA — 1970-?"

The invitation to "see how the underhand live" marked the introduction of street theater as a tactic in the growing campaign against the presence of CIA agents in Britain.

A group of Labor members of Parliament is expected to call soon for the expulsion of as many as 50 U.S. embassy employees. Names, and in some cases seven home addresses, of embassy officials reputed to be CIA agents have been printed in publications ranging from London Times to the leftish weekly, Time Out.

The tours have been organized by the Concerned Americans Abroad, a group of American residents in London which was originally formed in 1968 to protest the Vietnam war.

The group commissioned the Father Xmas Union under the direction of American Ed Berman to present the "Guided' Tour Homes."

Each day this week, Berman and a supporting cast from a London theater group lead the curious to the home of an alleged CIA operative. The tour is lighthearted in tone, intended humorously to focus publicity on the embassy personnel claimed to work for the CIA.

The tour begins in Sloane Square, where on the first day two black-clad members of the company conspicuously hid behind their cloaks as they perched on a monument to Chelsea's war dead.

Berman himself was dressed in a Santa Claus suit.

Berman's jokes, in most cases, were more music hall than revolutionary, and much of his monologue kept up the pretense of a guided tour. This was calculated, Berman revealed as the police began to make their inquiries, since bullhorns may be used without license if the occasion is "commercial."

CHICAGO TRIBUNE
16 MAY 1975

Maggie Daly

William Colby, chief of the CIA, will probably leave his post at the end of the year. The CIA wants to get more of an administrative-type person to straighten out CIA problems. . . . Jane Fonda is reported to be furious about ex-husband Roger Vadim's autobiography "Memoirs of the Devil." The French filmmaker is said to treat Jane about as unkindly as the CIA did.

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NEW YORK TIMES
30 May 1975

'61 MEMO IS CITED ON C.I.A.-MAFIA TIE

Hoover Is Said to Have Told Robert Kennedy of Link to 2 Racket Figures

By NICHOLAS M. HORROCK
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 29—Robert F. Kennedy knew as early as May 1, 1961, that the Central Intelligence Agency was secretly dealing with the Mafia, according to a Federal Bureau of Investigation memorandum now in the hands of the Rockefeller commission and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

The discovery of this new memorandum increases the mystery of whether senior members of the administration of President Kennedy, including his brother the Attorney General, ordered or approved an alleged C.I.A. plot to kill Cuban Premier Fidel Castro.

It is part of a growing pattern of indications, mentioned in press reports over the last two weeks, that a plan to assassinate Mr. Castro was discussed at the highest levels of the Government in the early nineteen sixties and that, with or without approval, the intelligence agency recruited two men with organized crime connections to attempt one such operation.

According to sources familiar with the investigation. J. Edgar Hoover, the director of the F.B.I., wrote a detailed secret memorandum to Robert Kennedy in May, 1961, asserting that during an investigation of two racket figures, Sam Giancana and John Roselli, agents had turned up an apparent connection with the C.I.A.

No Word on Assassination

The memorandum, one source said, went on to note that the F.B.I. requested and received a full C.I.A. briefing about the agency's dealings with Mr. Giancana and Mr. Roselli. The memorandum, this source . . said, never mentioned the words "assassination" or "eliminate," a eupheiism for assassination often used in spy circles. But the source said Mr. Hoover characterized the reported C.I.A. activities with Mr. Giancana and Mr. Roselli as "dirty business."

The memorandum is dated almost a year before Robert Kennedy was given a briefing by the intelligence agency on this same subject.

In that briefing, covered in testimony before the Rockefeller commission and in documents, according to reliable sources, the Attorney General appeared to learn of the C.I.A.'s dealings with the Mafia for the first time and admonished the agency official bri[illegible] that the next time the C.I.A. wanted to deal with organized crime it should come to him first.

As a result of this May, 1962, briefing, the Attorney General gave Mr. Hoover further details on the C.I.A. operation and Mr. Hoover wrote a memorandum that was kept in F.B.I. files and was known only to select members of the top echelon of bureau for many years.

Concern on Blackmail

TBat memorandum, authoritative sources disclosed last week, is also in the hands of the rockefeller commission, which is looking into intelligence operations. It reportedly contained Mr. Hoover's concern that Mr. Giancana could "blackmail" the Uetidn States Government.

The Associated Press reported last week what appears to be another piece of this puzzle. It quoted authoritative sources who said the Rockefeller commission had obtained the minutes of a meeting on Aug. 10, 1962, attended by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, John A. McCone, then Director of Central Intelligence, and McGeorge Bundy, President Kennedy's adviser for national security affairs. The meeting, the A.P. report said, included a "discussion" of killing Mr. Castro.

One source told the A.P. that the matter was "immediately dismissed," but the wire service quoted two other sources who said that a memo was written two days later by Mr. McNamara directing the C.I.A. to prepare contingency plans for the "elimination" of Mr. Castro.

Several highly placed sources within the C.I.A. and other intelligence circles of the early nineteen-sixties have said that after the Bay of Pigs invasion failed in April, 1961, there was a major effort to get rid of Mr. Castro. For instance, Newsweek magazine reported that a source described this as an "effort of the Kennedy Administration."

Most intelligence sources of the period appear to be anxious to stress that no plan for either an assassination, kidnapping or coup d'etat would have been brought to an operational level without the authority of the Administration, but the public record is by no means clear.

For instance, one source said that the top of the May, 1961, memorundum disclosed this week, a note had been jotted in what he said was Robrt Kennedy's handwriting saying, "Have this followed up vigorously," and that the memorandum bore the handwritten initials "RFK."AL The handwritten note had apparently been retyped by someone in the same period as the memo was written, the source said, apparently to make the note clear to readers. But there is no evidence yet public that it was "followed up vigorously" or what action was taken, if any.

A spokesman for the Senate committee declined to comment on whether the committee had any specific evidence.

This has been the committee's general response. But the spokesman went on to point out that the panel felt that "these leaks are outrageous" and that the question of whether there was a national policy to assassinate foreign leaders, or a plot against Mr. Castro, should be investigated carefully and thoroughly.

"Any partial analysis of evidence is dangerous and [illegible] [com]mittees" investigation will not put "reputations in jeopardv by a slapdash treatment involving a matter of such importance to national security," he added.

Another Capitol Hill source, however, said the committee had received some material that would be "embarrassing to the brothers Kennedy."

David W. Belin, counsel for the Rockefeller commission also declined to comment.

WASHINGTON POST
23 MAY 1975

Warren Report Foe Heads New Group

By Richard M. Cohen
Washington Post Staff Writer

Mark Lane, an indefatigable critic of the Warren Commission report, yesterday announced the formation here of the Citizens Commission of Inquiry, an umbrella organization designed to coordinate the activities of those who believe that Lee Harvey Oswald either did not kill President John F. Kennedy, or was not working alone.

Lane, the director of the newly formed organization, said its purpose would be to generate "a nationwide organizing project to urge Congress to investigate the assassination of President John F. Kennedy and the resultant cover-up of the facts by the FBI and the CIA."

The organization, Lane said, would begin legal action for the release of evidence still kept secret by the government. He said some of the most important evidence relating to Kennedy's murder was never seen by members of the commission headed by late Chief Justice Earl Warren and charged by President Lyndon Johnson to investigate the assassination of Kennedy.

The Warren Commission was established by Johnson a week after the Nov. 22, 1963 assassination and turned in its report a year later. Since then, its conclusion that Oswald was Kennedy's sole killer and not part of a conspiracy has come under attack from critics such as Lane.

At his press conference, Lane took some swipes at the commission headed by Vice President Rockefeller which is investigating the CIA, and attacked the commission's executive director, David W. Belin, who had been an assistant counsel for the Warren Commission.

Lane exhibited correspondence with the Rockefeller commission in which he had volunteered to appear as a witness to discuss the Kennedy killing and the CIA. He was told by Belin to first submit a letter and responded by addressing one to Rockefeller himself.

In announcing the formation of his commission, Lane released the names of its executive committee. It includes Richard Barnet and Marcus Raskin, both of the Institute for Policy Studies here; Morton Halperin, former deputy assistant secretary of defense; Linus Pauling, a Nobel Prize laureate in chemistry; John Marks, co-author of "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence"; Bernard Fensterwald Jr., a lawyer whose Committee to Investigate Assassinations was merged with Lane's organization; and George O'Toole, a former computer specialist with the CIA and the author of magazine articles saying the Oswald's voice prints indicates he was not lying when he told officials he did not kill Kennedy.

Despite a free-swinging attack on the Warren Commission and federal police and intelligence agencies, Lane said he himself did not know who—or who else—killed Kennedy.

Lane's press conference was the latest indication of a revival of interest in the Kennedy assassination, as well as the subsequent killings of Robert F. Kennedy and Martin Luther King. Lane, whose one-man lecture tour attacking the Warren Commission crisscrossed the country in the early and mid-1960s, said yesterday that he has recently completed a national speaking tour of 35 colleges.

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DIE PRESSE

Vienna, 2 January 1975

A SECOND WATERGATE ON THE HORIZON

The agent, the "superman" from the sphere of technified mythology, suits modern man's need for security and protection to a T. Yet the secrecy that surrounds, or ought to surround, this form of service, the elitist bent and often also the social membership of those who are employed in them also makes the intelligence services targets of mockery, scorn and scarcely hidden hatred.

Winston Churchill asked a question in connection with a military entanglement by his country: "Are all gentlemen of England fox-hunting?" To that question there is a more general answer today: They are no longer fox-hunting. They have long moved into the innocuous Pentagon offices of M-15. There, their language knowledge, international contacts and world experience are still of use.

Even when one has understood that the figure of the intelligence officer of necessity hovers between praise and condemnation, there still accrues an exceptional place, in this dialectical process, to the on-going campaign against the CIA. Most newspapers published the relevant news items in conjunction with the latest on Watergate. For good reason, as it were, a number of persons were involved in both affairs. Yet the disadvantage in these connections is that the position and problems of U.S. intelligence do not come out clearly enough.

Here one must first emphasize that the CIA by no means represents U.S. intelligence as such. The DIA, which handles the intelligence of the branches of the armed forces, is the largest organization of this kind. The NSA is responsible for the decoding and exploitation of messages from other states intercepted by satellites, spy-ships and monitoring stations. The Department of State has its own Bureau of Intelligence and Research. The Secret Service, again, is under the Treasury Department.

The Vietnam War it was, and the "Pentagon Papers," that put the public searchlight onto the CIA. The Agency was founded in 1947, and it probably is the Act of Congress setting it up that is now creating difficulties and discredit for it. That Act denies the CIA (and similar restrictions also apply in the FRG to the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution)any internal police authority, and also any "internal security sanctions."

Those had been reserved to J. Edgar Hoover, the respected and powerful head of the FBI. If the CIA and the FBI had worked closely together, the temptation to cross the legally established boundaries would probably not have been all that great. Hoover, however, holding the CIA methods suspect from the very beginning, refused any cooperation, in 1970 at the latest. The two organizations were working apart or against each other, as if they had been financed by hostile governments.

The CIA thereby, no doubt, became fallible. The question about motivation is something else again. And if now not only the present chief of counter-espionage, James Angleton, but three other high officals of the service also, resigned, it can indicate only a protest against the kind of attacks and the lack of protection the government has granted its officials. Inside the organization itself dramatic tensions must have broken out, so that the present head of the CIA, Colby, and also Secretary of Defense Schlesinger himself have chosen the escape into publicity. The most vehement attack, however, as in the case of Watergate, has come from the Eastern Establishment, with the NEW YORK TIMES serving as spear-point.

Even those who are familiar with the Washington scene have trouble saying whether there would not have been different ways and means, whether this suicidal catharsis was necessary, or inevitable. Again we have partly long known facts that are being put together for review, again we have the same researchers that gained their first spurs in the Watergate Case. Sure enough, the free press has done its job. But there is gloating in it, joy over the exposure, even pleasure in the destruction, that does not quite ease our mind.

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Watergate II am Horizont

VON JANKO MUSULIN

Dem Sicherheits- und Schutzbedürfnis des modernen Menschen ist der Agent, der „Superman" aus der Sphäre der technisierten Mythologie, wie auf den Leib geschrieben. Aber das Geheimnis, das diese Form der Dienstleistung umgibt oder umgeben sollte, das elitäre Bewußtsein und oft auch die soziale Zugehörigkeit der hier Beschäftigten machen die Geheimdienste auch zur Zielscheibe von Spott, Hohn und kaum verborgenem Haß.

Die Frage, die Winston Churchill anläßlich einer kriegerischen Verwicklung seines Landes stellte: Are all gentlemen of England foxhunting?, läßt sich heute allgemeiner beantworten: Sie sind nicht mehr auf der Fuchsjagd, sie sind längst in die unauffälligen Pentagon-Amtsräume der M 15 eingezogen, dort sind ihre Sprachkenntnisse, ihre internationalen Verbindungen und ihre Welterfahrung noch von Nutzen.

Hat man sich also klargemacht, daß die Figur des Geheimdienstlers notwendigerweise zwischen Lobpreis und Verdammung angesiedelt ist, so nimmt in diesem dialektischen Prozeß die gegenwärtige Kampagne gegen die CIA doch eine Sonderstellung ein. Die meisten Zeitungen haben die diesbezüglichen Nachrichten zusammen mit den letzten Neuigkeiten über Watergate veröffentlicht. Mit gutem Grund schließlich sind auch eine Reihe von Persönlichkeiten in beide Angelegenheiten verwickelt. Aber dieses Zusammenhängen hat doch auch den Nachteil, daß die Position und Problematik des amerikanischen Geheimdienstes nicht klar genug hervortreten.

Dabei muß zunächst hervorgehoben werden, daß die „Central Intelligence Agency" keinesfalls den amerikanischen Geheimdienst schlechthin darstellt. Die größte Organisation dieser Art ist die „Defense Intelligence Agency", in der der Nachrichtendienst der drei Streitkräfte gipfelt; für Entschlüsselung und Auswertung der durch Satelliten, Spionageschiffe und Abhörstationen aufgefangenen Nachrichten anderer Staaten ist die „National Security Agency" verantwortlich; das Außenamt verfügt über ein eigenes „Bureau of Intelligence and Research". Im Inland ist das „Federal Bureau of Investigation" zuständig, der „Secret Service" wieder untersteht dem Schatzamt.

Es waren der Vietnamkrieg und die „Pentagon-Papiere", die die CIA ins Scheinwerferlicht der Öffentlichkeit gebracht haben. Die Agentur wurde 1947 gegründet, und es ist wohl der Gesetzesakt, dem sie ihre Existenz verdankt, der sie nun in Schwierigkeiten und Mißkredit gebracht hat. Diese Gesetzesvorlage verweigert der CIA (ähnliche Beschränkungen gelten in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland für das Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz) jegliche Polizeivollmacht im Inland, aber auch jegliche „Internal Security Sanctions".

Diese waren J. Edgar Hoover, dem angesehenen und mächtigen Leiter des FBI, vorbehalten. Hätten CIA und FBI eng zusammengearbeitet, wäre die Versuchung, die im Gesetz festgelegten Grenzen zu überschreiten, wahrscheinlich nicht allzu groß gewesen. Aber Hoover, dem die Methoden der CIA von Anfang an suspekt waren, hat spätestens 1970 jede Zusammenarbeit abgelehnt. Die beiden Organisationen arbeiteten neben- oder gegeneinander, als wären sie von verfeindeten Regierungen finanziert.

Daß die CIA damit fehlbar geworden, untersteht keinem Zweifel. Etwas anderes ist die Frage nach den Motiven. Und wenn nicht nur der gegenwärtige Leiter der Gegenspionage, James Angleton, sondern auch drei weitere hohe Beamte des Dienstes ihren Rücktritt eingereicht haben, so kann dies nur ein Protest gegen die Art der Angriffe und den mangelnden Schutz, den die Regierung ihren Beamten gewährt hat, bedeuten. Auch muß es innerhalb der Organisation selbst zu dramatischen Spannungen gekommen sein, so daß der gegenwärtige Leiter der CIA, Colby, aber auch Verteidigungsminister Schlesinger selbst, die Flucht an die Öffentlichkeit wählten. Den vehementesten Angriff aber haben, wie in Watergate, Kräfte des „Eastern Establishment" geführt, wobei die „New York Times" als Speerspitze diente.

Selbst den mit der Szene in Washington Vertrauten fällt es schwer, zu sagen, ob es nicht andere Mittel und Wege gegeben hätte, ob diese selbstmörderische Katharsis nötig, ob sie unerläßlich war. Wieder sind es zum Teil seit langem bekannte Fakten, die nun gebündelt auf den Tisch gelegt werden, wieder sind es dieselben Rechercheure, die sich im Watergate-Fall erste Sporen verdient haben. Die freie Presse hat ihres Amtes gewaltet, gewiß. Aber es ist eine Schadenfreude dabei, eine Lust an der Bloßstellung, ja, eine Freude am Untergang, die einen nicht recht froh werden läßt.

NEW YORK TIMES
22 May 1975

C.I.A. Role in Coup Denied In Letter to Mrs. Allende

WASHINGTON, May 21 (UPI) —The former head of Latin-American operations for the Central Intelligence Agency wrote the widow of President Salvador Allende Gossens of Chile denying that the C.I.A. was in any way responsible for the Marxist leader's overthrow and death in 1973.

David A. Philipps, who retired from the agency May 9 after 24 years, wrote Hortensia Bussi de Allende the next day:

"You have been led to believe that evidence exists which makes the C.I.A. accountable for the circumstances which brought your husband to his untimely end. Because I supervised that component of C.I.A. concerned with Chile and its neighbors, the accusation bothers me personnal. The claim, I assure you, is untrue and the evidence tainted."

A copy of the letter had been obtained by United Press International.

WASHINGTON POST
16 May 1975

Colby Briefs Senate Inquiry

By George Lardner Jr.
Washington Post Staff Writer

Central Intelligence Agency Director William E. Colby gave the Senate committee on intelligence operations a secret briefing yesterday on the CIA's clandestine activities since its inception in 1947.

Testifying under oath, Colby spent nearly two hours before the committee in the windowless, cavesdrop-proof chambers of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy at the Capitol. He decline to comment on leaving.

Chairman Frank Church (D-Idaho) said the CIA director will be called back next week for questioning on the operations, which included disclosures concerning alleged assassination attempts and schemes.

Colby also [illegible] Church said [illegible] yesterday morning with Church and Sen. John G. Tower (R-Tex.) to propose withholding from the full committee some details that the CIA considers especially sensitive.

"We made it plain that all the Senators on this committee hold equal rank and all are entitled to equal information." Church told reporters. He said the 10-member committee might be willing not to press for certain information on a case-by-case basis, but has yet to make any such decisions.

Asked what might happen if Colby simply refused to share some secrets with the full committee, Church said he hoped "it doesn't come to that."

As the committee chairman, Church said he had already been made privy to the operations Colby testified about, but the senator avoided an answer when asked if he had heard anything that would "shock the public."

Accompanied by four aides, some carrying chart-sized cases, the CIA director brought some requested documentary materials with him for the hearing. Church said these will be turned over to the committee staff today.

Colby's testimony was the first to be presented to the committee under oath. Church said it amounted to an "overview" of current and past covert operations and left no time for questioning. Public hearings in the Senate investigation of the CIA and other government intelligence agencies are not expected to start until July.

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East Asia

U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT INC.
26 May 1975

NOW—A TOUGHER U.S.

Interview With James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense

Impact of Indo-China's fall is reshaping U.S. attitudes. Mideast, Russia, China, Europe all will be affected. Mr. Schlesinger came to this magazine's conference room to offer an assessment of what lies ahead for America.

Q Mr. Secretary, why did we take such tough action in dealing with the seizure of the American freighter *Mayaguez* by the Cambodians?

A American action must be firm when necessary and when important issues of principle are involved. In this case we were faced with a crude and illegal act of force.

American action was necessary not only to protect freedom of the seas and of innocent passage—long-term American objectives; more importantly, for the United States to countenance such an act or to have yielded to an illegal employment of force would have encouraged additional acts of hijacking or terrorism in the future.

Q Aside from the ship incident, is there a danger that the U.S. is losing prestige and power in the world as a result of our forced retreat from Indo-China?

A In terms of military balance in the world, Indo-China has had a relatively limited effect.

However, I do believe that the stature of the U.S. has been diminished, at least temporarily, by what's happened in Southeast Asia. In terms of the way the United States is viewed around the world, it has affected what is sometimes referred to as the credibility of the United States. An historical episode of the Vietnam sort, involving a great power like the United States, inevitably raises questions in the minds of some that have a detrimental influence on our world standing.

Q How long will these doubts about U.S. power last?

A It depends on the actions we take from this point out. It depends on how well we live up to other commitments, what we do about deployment of our forces overseas, what we do about the defense budget—the general cohesion that the United States exhibits. These other factors will perhaps be more significant than the Vietnam episode itself.

Q Are Americans losing their will to be world leaders?

A The real problem we face is what is happening to the moral stamina of the West, and in particular to Western leadership groups. That is not a problem confined to the United States. There is some tendency among our fashionable classes, first, to raise questions about whether power in itself is not immoral and, secondly, whether it is appropriate to fight for the values of the West—whether those values are even defensible.

So I think that our basic problem as a nation is not our physical strength or our stance. It is a question of reviving the underlying moral stamina and the internal fiber of this nation, as well as of other free-world nations.

Q How can the U.S. go about increasing its credibility?

A I think that we should act with sobriety and seriousness in the wake of Vietnam. We should demonstrate that the United States will continue to act with self-confidence, that it will not give way to an extended period of internal and destructive debate. Our energies should continue to be exerted in the outside world in a productive way from our own standpoint and the standpoint of our allies.

Q President Ford says the United States should stand by its commitments, but Congress says, "No more Vietnams." Who will prevail?

A The main point is that the United States fares far better under situations in which there is an unambiguous assault—an unprovoked aggression, an attack across a line of demarcation—than it does under conditions such as those which existed in Vietnam.

If the interests of the United States are openly and clearly attacked, I think that the response of the American public will be to fulfill the obligations into which we have entered. By contrast, I think the expression "No more Vietnams" refers to getting involved in what is perceived to be unclear and ambiguous internal turmoil—supposedly a civil war—which the Vietnam conflict seemed to be for so many years.

Q Are the Russians likely to try exploiting the situation today in the wake of the collapse in Indo-China?

A I think that the Soviets will be concerned that one of the reactions to events in Southeast Asia will be a weakening of forces in the United States supporting détente. For that reason, they will have good reasons not to rock the boat too soon. They may feel tempted, but they may decide this is not the time to give way to that temptation.

One must recognize that the Soviets look primarily at the realities of power—what they refer to as the "correlation of forces." They regard détente as a consequence of a shift of forces to the advantage of the Soviet Union. Their view is that the West is making accommodation to the expansion of Soviet military power. In the longer run, unless we are prepared to maintain a military balance vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, they will be inclined to take advantage of that shift.

Q Returning to Asia: What changes do you see now in our defense posture in that region?

A It depends in part on how the new governments in Cambodia and South Vietnam comport themselves. It depends also on the longer-term reactions of the American public, which are too early to assess.

Generally speaking, I think the United States will be less eager to involve itself in confusing domestic political and military turmoil on the Asian continent. But in all likelihood the U.S. commitments to Northeast Asia, to Korea as well as to Japan, will be perceived as something no one should challenge.

Q Does that include Taiwan?

A As long as we are bound by the treaty, of course, it would include Taiwan.

Q Is there a danger that North Korea will be tempted to start trouble in hopes that Congress would force withdrawal of U.S. troops rather than involve them in a war?

A I think that precipitating a crisis with the United States in this particular period would be a very rash action to take, especially where there are U.S. forces present. We have upwards of 40,000 men in South Korea.

South Korea guards the approaches to Japan. It lies in a confluence of four great powers—the U.S., the U.S.S.R., China and Japan. Also, it represents a historic involvement and commitment by the United States.

Any sudden weakening of that commitment—particularly after Vietnam—would be of such major significance that it could unravel the situation in Asia and possibly elsewhere.

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Q. Are you saying that the U.S. would resort to drastic action if South Korea were invaded?

A I wouldn't refer to "drastic action." But one of the lessons of the Vietnamese conflict is that rather than simply counter your opponent's thrusts, it is necessary to go for the heart of the opponent's power: destroy his military forces rather than simply being involved endlessly in ancillary military operations.

Q. Then North Korea would have to assume that the U.S. would strike back hard if South Korea were invaded—

A I think they would have to conclude that the United States would take more-vigorous action than we were inclined to take during much of the Vietnamese War.

The main point is that a conflict that extends for 10 years—or even over many years, as Vietnam did—is bound to lose the support of the American public. Therefore, action must be more vigorous at the outset, particularly where there are American forces involved.

Q. So the U.S. wouldn't feel the same constraints to avoid heavy bombing, blockades and that sort of thing in Korea that we felt in Vietnam—

A I would doubt it.

Q. What about fear of China's intervening?

A I think the Chinese would attempt to avoid any such conflict, or to tamp it down if it should get started in a small way, rather than to encourage or reinforce it.

Q. Mr. Secretary, who do you think gains from the Communist victory in Indo-China?

A Hanoi gains, the Soviet Union probably gains—and China loses to the extent that the other two gain.

Q. Why do you say China loses and Russia gains?

A There continues to be substantial tension between the Soviets and the Chinese. The Chinese now have a strong military state to their southeast, more closely associated with the Soviet Union than with China. To that extent, China's position is weakened.

Q. Does this mean China will become even more interested in cementing relations with the U.S.?

A I think that China's interest in maintaining reasonably warm relations with the United States continues. They will be concerned to maintain such connections if they have confidence that the United States is not suddenly going to withdraw from the Western Pacific.

Q. Do you mean that the Chinese, who for years have tried to drive the U.S. out of the Western Pacific, now are bent on keeping us there?

A I think that is correct. The Chinese no longer regard the Americans as the principal threat to their survival but as a useful balance against the Soviets.

Q. Will the Vietnamese allow the Soviet Union to establish naval bases in their country?

A Given the attitude of the North Vietnamese Communists, I think this is *not* the moment in history when they are likely to encourage the establishment of foreign bases on Vietnamese soil.

Q. Does the United States want Japan to spend more money on defense instead of relying so much on American forces?

A We would expect the Japanese to take seriously their role in the common defense. That includes particular emphasis on antisubmarine warfare, protection of lines of communication, air defense and the like. To the extent that this effort has been less vigorous in recent years than had been anticipated, we would expect a renewed emphasis.

Q. Switching to another part of the world: What is the impact of the Indo-China debacle in Western Europe?

A The Western Europeans are much less concerned about Vietnam than the effect of the psychological repercussions within the United States—the self-confidence and ability of this country to carry on as leader of the free world.

Q. Will there be less pressure now in Congress to pull American troops out of Europe?

A I hope it will not be a major issue this year. Somebody, of course, will raise it. But I think the general reaction will be that this is not the time to seem to be going back on American commitments. People who in the past have questioned the size of American forces in Western Europe will not be inclined to raise the question this year for fear that it will be misread.

The United States should maintain its forces in Europe and even be prepared to make some contributions to increase capability on the part of the NATO Alliance, provided that the European nations do their part.

MAJOR POINTS MADE BY THE DEFENSE CHIEF

Vietnam impact: "Relatively limited" in terms of the world's military balance, but U.S. credibility "has been diminished, at least temporarily."

Role in Asia: U.S. will be "less eager to involve itself in domestic turmoil" but will probably live up to commitments to Northeast Asia.

North Korea: If North Korea "precipitates a crisis" in South Korea, "the United States would take more-vigorous action than . . . during much of the Vietnam War."

Soviet reaction: Russia's interest in preserving détente will, in the short run, keep them from exploiting the collapse in Indo-China.

China's reaction: Hanoi's close ties to Russia make China more interested in "maintaining reasonably warm relations with the United States" and in keeping the U.S. from withdrawing from the Western Pacific.

Arab oil embargo: The U.S. is "less likely to be tolerant of a renewed embargo" than in 1973. "There are economic, political or conceivably military measures in response."

Communists in Portugal: "The United States cannot provide its most intimate plans and secrets" in NATO planning meetings "when there are Communists present."

Indian Ocean: Reopening of the Suez Canal will speed expansion of "the Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean. . . . We will have to offset any expansion of Soviet military or naval capacity in the Persian Gulf."

U.S.-Soviet balance: "We cannot live with the trend of recent years in which the Soviets continue to increase strength while the United States continues to shrink."

EUROPE'S "FREE RIDE" ON DEFENSE—

Q. On the other side of the coin, have U.S. allies learned any lessons from Vietnam?

A If our allies have learned a lesson, it's that the United States cannot do it by itself—that our allies must be at least equally serious about their responsibilities to themselves. That will be a very valuable lesson learned.

When we talk about credibility, one must remember that the credibility of the United States is not the only question. In the case of Western Europe, a number of the nations over there have enjoyed American protection and have felt they have had virtually a free ride with regard to their own defenses. It's less of an issue of whether the United States is inclined to abandon Europe than whether the Europeans are inclined to abandon themselves.

Q. What would you like them to do?

A The propensity has existed in Western Europe to base their defense budgets on hope, on illusion, on the prospects of arms reductions by the East. Many of them have wanted to cut their defense expenditures to respond to various naïve impulses within their electorates. That trend will have to be curbed.

The assumption that U.S protection in and of itself relieves some European states of building forces in their own behalf is something that disappeared with the growth of Soviet military capability in recent years. At this stage of the game the European nations must take defense very seriously. They cannot be driven primarily by domestic political or budgetary considerations.

Q. What leverage does the U.S. have—aside from the threat

to reduce forces—to persuade Europeans to spend more on their own defense?

A The problem one faces is that the Europeans are more likely to move toward an accommodation with the Soviets in the event of an American withdrawal—particularly an American withdrawal that has the symbolic significance that it might have in the wake of Vietnam. Our point should be that we are prepared to keep our forces there, depending on European actions and a European sense of responsibility.

Q What are the chances of persuading NATO countries to increase their armed forces?

A The real question is: Are they prepared to make additional sacrifices to the extent necessary to maintain the military security of Western Europe?

That is a question that can be answered differently for the several nations. Some of them have made major contributions and have expanded their military strength markedly in recent years. Others have come to believe that it's all over in the wake of détente, and that they're more or less free to lose interest in maintaining military capabilities.

We think these countries should be prepared to spend more than 3 per cent of their gross national product in order to obtain security and retain independence. If they're not willing to spend more than 3 per cent of their GNP, there is some question about how serious they are.

WEAKENING OF NATO'S FLANKS—

Q Mr. Schlesinger, how can NATO function now that one member—Portugal—has Communists in its Government?

A Undoubtedly some of the developments on both the eastern and western ends of the Mediterranean have diminished the cohesion of NATO. The United States cannot provide its most intimate plans and secrets when there are Communists present in any planning meeting.

Q Turning to the Middle East: Have the dangers of war in this area receded?

A Not notably. There have been periods of greater immediate tension than the present one, but I would not say that generally the prospects of war have receded. I do think that all parties in the Middle East recognize the advantages of avoiding a new conflagration.

Q Do the Israelis have the equipment they need to withstand another Arab attack?

A At the present moment, the military balance is far more favorable from Israel's standpoint than it was in October, 1973.

Q Would the U.S. be able to resupply the Israelis fast enough in event of war, despite the possible loss of plane-refueling stations such as the Azores?

A Yes. Assuming there is a policy decision to do it and Congress votes the funds, we are capable of starting to deliver supplies into Israel about 36 hours after an order is given by the President.

Q In view of congressional caution after Vietnam, what are the prospects of continued help for Israel?

A The historical attitudes of Congress toward requests for Vietnam and Israel are as different as night and day. Congress has shown signs of approving any requests made by the Administration—and, in fact, some propensity to augment requests of some Administrations—for aid to Israel.

Q If another Mideast war breaks out, is there anything the U.S. could do about another Arab oil embargo?

A The United States could, of course, take action in response to a hypothetical embargo. And I think that we are less likely to be tolerant of a renewed embargo than we were of the initial one in 1973.

Q What do you mean by "less tolerant"?

A That implies that we might not remain entirely passive to the imposition of such an embargo. I'm not going to indicate any prospective reaction other than to point out there are economic, political or conceivably military measures in response.

Q With reopening of the Suez Canal, do you expect a major Soviet naval build-up in the Indian Ocean?

A I would expect that the Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean will expand. Reopening of the Canal reduces their lines of communication by something like 6,500 miles, and that would undoubtedly have some effect.

The Soviets are building a major facility at Berbera on the Gulf of Aden—so expensive a facility that it's obviously not intended purely for show purposes or designed to provide a demonstration project for the Somalis.

Q What sort of installation is it?

A It consists of port facilities, an expanded airstrip. They are constructing barracks. They are building a rework facility for either air-to-surface missiles or surface-to-surface missiles. That kind of expansion suggests that they are more than mildly interested in their military power astride the lifeline of the industrialized world to the Persian Gulf. I don't think there's any other reading.

Q How will the United States respond?

A We will have to maintain a military balance and be prepared to offset any expansion of Soviet military or naval capacity in the Persian Gulf area.

We still have our request for expansion of our communications facility at Diego Garcia. We would plan to enlarge that facility, increase the size of the airstrip, provide berthing facilities to the extent necessary.

MIDEAST: "U.S. HAS TO HOLD THE RING"—

Q Then the U.S. is still determined to keep a strong force in the Mideast—

A I think that the United States has got to hold the ring in the Middle East. There's just nobody else who can stand up to the Soviet Union. Some Americans want to go off in a sulk for five years. But if we do, we'll wake up some bright day and discover that the Soviets have achieved paramount power in the Eastern Hemisphere. We just are not in a position to indulge in that luxury.

Q How does the United States stand in relation to the Soviet Union in terms of military strength?

A The military balance between ourselves and the Soviet Union is a product of long-term trends. Quite obviously, if Soviet strength goes on growing by 3 to 5 per cent a year in real terms and the United States continues to shrink in military power, we will not be able to say for much longer that the United States is second to none.

Q How much is Russia spending on its armed forces?

A At this point, they are outspending us by at least 20 to 25 per cent. One can live with a gap between ourselves and the Soviets as long as it remains modest and as long as our allies make serious contributions to mutual security. We do not have to compete with them in any particular fiscal year.

But what we cannot accept—what we cannot live with—is the trend of recent years in which the Soviets continue to increase strength while the United States continues to shrink. We cannot live with that over many years and maintain a military balance which will preclude Soviet preponderance in the Eastern Hemisphere.

Q Wasn't détente supposed to be a "live and let live" arrangement that would avoid more military build-ups?

A The Soviets do not use the term "détente." They use the term "peaceful coexistence," which is a phrase coined by Lenin and employed by Stalin. The Soviets see détente as a way to avoid the risk of war and expand their power relative to their former opponents. As long as they believe they can have things both ways, there will be no internal struggle over détente in the Soviet Union.

In the long run, the United States cannot accept an interpretation of détente that implies an ever-strengthening of the correlation of forces in favor of the Soviet Union. I think the Soviets will have to come closer to the view of détente as "live and let live."

A RETURN TO ISOLATIONISM? "NO"—

Q Is the isolationist trend in this country growing?

A No, I come to a different conclusion. I don't think that the neo-isolationist tendencies are indeed that strong. I think that everybody recognizes that the United States is in no position now to return to the kind of international policies we followed in the 1930s—that the rest of the world depends upon the very great counterweight to Soviet military strength that is represented by American power.

Q What about talk in Congress about the U.S. pulling back on some of its overseas obligations?

A I think that if one examines the reactions on the Hill, that they are not in the direction of isolationism by and large. It is a scrutiny of what are regarded as unwise commitments.

Most of the reactions are strongly in support of NATO, our commitments to Western Europe. There is a recognition that the United States has a major role to play in the Middle East. I have heard of no suggestions that the United States cease its support of Japan or withdraw from its involvement with Australia and New Zealand.

Undoubtedly there is a difference between the tone of today's discussions and the general post-World War II reaction in which the United States felt itself engaged in the world up to the hilt. We are going to be more selective, but that is not neo-isolationism.

Q Then you don't feel that the average American wants his country to pull into a shell—

A Not at all. If one examines reactions of the general public, it is plain that most people—in contrast to some so-called leadership groups—feel the United States must remain a very strong military power, second to none. They support a defense budget of the present size or larger.

Q What "leadership groups" are you talking about?

A I mean individuals who have been polled in business, education and communications.

Q The establishment—

A It's a peculiar kind of establishment. It's an antiestablishment establishment.

These groups have certain aspirations with regard to what the United States should accomplish in the world. But they raise questions about whether it's appropriate to have the means to achieve those objectives. They suffer from the illusion that, having discovered some of the inadequacies of a position of strength, that this will be compensated for by a position of weakness.

They're just totally wrong, and it is not an illusion shared by the general public.

Q Will voters support increased military spending?

A I think they will. We must recognize that at this point we have a smaller percentage of men under arms than we had in the rather carefree demobilization period after World War II. The proportion of our public expenditures going for defense is the lowest since before Pearl Harbor.

I do not think that it is all that difficult to convey to the U.S. public that a military equilibrium underlies détente. After all, it is implicit in the American emblem, in which the eagle holds in one talon an olive branch and in the other talon a clutch of arrows.

Military strength and peace go together. The abandonment of one will ultimately result in the loss of the other.

NEW YORK TIMES
26 MAY 1975

Bird Air Closes in Laos As U.S. Interests Get Out

VIENTIANE, Laos, May 25 (AP)—An American airline company on contract to the United States Government closed its doors today and another was down to one-third of its former size as the hasty dismantling of American interests in Laos continued.

More than 500 Americans, most of them women and children, have been evacuated in the last week, with about 80 leaving today. Some 400 to 500 Americans remain.

A United States Embassy spokesman said Bird Air, which had provided the United States mission here with six Bell helicopters, flew out its equipment and about 10 American employes and closed its operation.

Bird Air, with headquarters in Oakland, Calif., has been under contract to the United States Government in various parts of Southeast Asia and was one of the commercial airlines that flew supplies into Phnom Penh before the Communist take-over last month.

Larry Joseph, an official of Continental Air Services, said his company was down to two fixed-wing aircraft from the original six that were on contract to the United States Mission. Mr. Joseph said that Continental had no immediate plans to shut down and that the United States Embassy had asked it to keep two planes in Laos for service in possible emergencies.

The embassy spokesman said the mission no longer needed large-scale air support since its field operations in Laos had ended after student demonstrations and intensified Pathet Lao activity.

Students joined the police in searching the luggage of Americans leaving aboard embassy aircraft. The students said they wanted to stop Americans from taking out items that they say belong to Laos.

The students at the airport, who communicated over American field radios with colleagues elsewhere, said they had confiscated some items but refused to show them to newsmen.

The students said employes of the American Agency for International Development—the prime target of recent demonstrations—had illegally appropriated aid funds and had purchased items for their own use.

The students also said goods were brought into the country duty-free by the Americans and should have been subject to taxes.

American officials have denounced such searches as well as the student seizure of the agency's compound in Vientiane as a violation of diplomatic immunity but have been unable to stop these actions.

The students searched only the luggage of those Americans flying out aboard embassy aircraft, but mose of the Americans who were leaving for Bangkok on chartered jets were subject to searches by regular custom officials.

Besides one Royal Air Lao charter flight today, an embassy C-47 aircraft took out a few Americans and a C-46 brought out equipment belonging to Continental, the embassy spokesman said.

The pace of the evacuation has slowed somewhat because many passports and documents of those scheduled to leave were in safekeeping in the agency compound when it was seized by students Wednesday.

A consulate official said substitute passports were being issued as fast as possible.

Student protesters along with some top Laotian Government leaders, while demanding a speedy dissolution of the aid mission, have stressed that Laos would welcome direct aid from the United States.

"We want aid, but without political strings, without any conditions attached," a student leader said in an interview. "U.S. aid went to certain generals and not to the people. Our deputies, for example, should be for the people, but instead they are for dollars."

Bountteng Heavangsavath, student president at the Dong Dok teachers training school, said, "U.S. aid did not help the people. Now it is a struggle of the proletariat with the bourgeoisie.

"We think that the U.S. Government now knows that the Lao students have finally woken up. It would not have been courageous to remain asleep."

A United States Embassy official said that in the fiscal year 1975 the United States has given almost $30-million in military aid to Laos and $32-million in economic aid. It is generally believed that all aid to the country will be severely slashed next fiscal year, but sources said exact figures are still being discussed in Washington, as is the size of the U. S. Mission in Vientiane.

NEW YORK TIMES
21 May 1975

Thai Premier Says He Hopes to Avoid Hasty Exit by U.S.

BANGKOK, Thailand, May 20 (Reuters)—Premier Kukrit Pramoj said today that a hasty withdrawal of United States forces could create problems for the Thai Government.

He told reporters that it might be difficult for Thailand to take over the four United States air bases and other facilities without preparation.

Protest groups have demanded the withdrawal of the 27,000 United States servicemen from Thailand after an uproar over the Mayagüez incident.

Only yesterday, with demonstrators besieging its gates, the United States embassy was forced to express regret for American use of the U Taphao air base to airlift marines to help rescue the container ship Mayagüez from Cambodia.

The Thai Government said it would review its military and economic ties with Washington as a result of the incident.

As matters stand, the United States has agreed to remove its forces from Thailand by next March at the latest. But student protest groups are demanding a pullout by July 4.

"It is possible that the withdrawal could be sooner than March, but it would be difficult for us because we would have to take over all their facilities in a hurry," Mr. Kukrit said. "However, we will listen to the public and political parties' [illegible]ns."

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BALTIMORE SUN
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Three days in May may change U.S. history

Washington.

Along the northern shores of the Gulf of Thailand, where there are reefs, scrubby islands and good fishing, a bizarre collision of men, ideas and forces took place in three long days of May last week that may affect future American history.

The brief, bloody crisis over the ship Mayaguez was by all accounts an accident.

On one side, there was the spirited and victorious new Cambodian government that had directed vigorous patrolling of its share of the coast and somewhat questionable portion of offshore islets (some have a Vietnamese claim). For nine days, the new Cambodians had been stopping ships (at least four) and firing on others in long-established and undisputed international shipping channels.

Such a danger to freedom of navigation should have been flashed quickly to all mariners. It was not for still inexplicable reasons. From middle-level bureaucrats, the word was passed to the insurance companies on the usually sound theory that those who have something to lose will protect their interests with the greatest speed.

Policymakers in Washington—suffering post-Vietnam fatigue—were unaware of the flinty situation. Neither did they know of the voyage of the Mayaguez, a 10,000-ton converted container vessel, a U.S.-flag ship, that had left Hong Kong with a crew of 39 Americans, a cargo of considerable PX stores, for the Thai base of Sattahip (containing a port, a B-52 bomber base and hundreds of Americans connected with the military).

Early last Monday (Washington time), two Cambodian gunboats stopped the Mayaguez some 60 miles from the coast and some 8 miles from the Paule Wai Islands. Before the radio room was reached by the boarding party, messages went out that told of the removal of the crew and the capture of the American vessel on the high seas.

President Ford was given a full report as he awoke that Monday. A National Security Council meeting was called. Diplomatic efforts were started immediately through the People's Republic of China, the only country with ties and communications to the new Cambodia, for the return of crew and ship.

Later, a mystery developed whether any such demands had gotten through, for the Peking liaison chief here returned the United States note a day later. The Secretary of State, Henry A. Kissinger, however, has no doubts about delivery, for a copy was handed over to the Cambodian Embassy in Peking. What heightened the mystery in the first days was a blank lack of response. Nothing, until military operations were well under way late last Wednesday (Washington time) was anything heard from Cambodia. In one of the many "could have beens" in the incident, a quick response may have averted the use of force.

The United States took the seizure very seriously. Nothing raises American anger quicker than interference with lawful shipping or the capture of its merchant crews, a reflex action going back to Barbary Coast days and the founding of the republic. Mr. Ford labeled the seizure "an act of piracy" and "serious consequences" were predicted unless the men and their ship were returned.

What alarmed the policymakers more was the break in the Cambodian pattern. Unlike some of the other incidents, the Mayaguez crew had been removed. A Panamanian vessel had been simply stopped and searched for two hours.

The vision was raised of haggling for the lives of Americans with the Cambodian Communists. It might take months, as with the Pueblo seizure by North Korea in 1968. And it would be bartering with the sort of inhumane leaders who had ordered some of their own countrymen sent from hospitals and surgical tables to certain cruelties and likely deaths out of the city during the fighting last month.

Beyond the need to save American lives, there was a further vision of the United States, its credibility strained over the fall of Vietnam, taking a humbling stance when it clearly had a legal, historic right to protect its people and its shipping. Was the Mayaguez to be the start of a string of other seizures, other incidents?

President Ford made the ultimate decision to draw the line. There is no evidence of disagreement in the National Security Council by either the military men or the diplomats. There was strong sentiment in Congress for action.

The 45,000-ton carrier, the Coral Sea, that had started for World War II anniversary celebrations in Australia, was turned around. With it came destroyers. Marines from from Okinawa were alerted and then flown to Thailand, a nervous ally that now was opposed to antagonizing its new Communist neighbor. The Thais opposed use of their territory for any military operation. At least publicly, the protest was ignored.

The military tactics were dictated by what was known and what was guessed at last Tuesday and Wednesday. The ship had not been brought into the port of Kompong Som. It had traveled half-way from its seizure point and was still 30 miles from the coast "lying dead in the water" by the jungle-covered Tang Island. From continuous observation from Thai-based aircraft, it was concluded that the crew were either on one of three possible places—the 3-mile-long Tang Island, below-deck on the ship itself or somehow on the mainland. The first step was to prevent gunboats and other smaller Cambodian vessels, from moving back and forth, possibly transferring the American captives.

Early last Wednesday morning (again Washington time), American aircraft tried to prevent shore-to-island movement and sank three gunboats and damaged some others. One was allowed to escape to Kimpong Som when the pilot noticed a huddle of what might have been crewmen on deck.

Diplomatic messages were continued, the language escalated (an actual ultimatum was prepared but never sent) with no response. Last Wednesday afternoon, Mr. Ford gave the decisive order. The Marines would storm both Tang Island and the Mayaguez. Facilities on shore would also be struck, in part to prevent any T-28 fighters from attacking helicopters bringing in Marines and also to keep Cambodian forces "occupied" ashore.

The Marines were landing and taking fire at Tang Island as a domestic Cambodian service was issuing its first word on the Mayaguez. It was offering the ship back while denouncing the American action, saying nothing about returning the crew but attacking alleged spying attempts. It took less than than an hour for this word to reach the White House which immediately offered an end to military operations for the return of the men. To reach the Cambodians quickly, a special broadcast was made and the message also given the news services.

A 10.23 P.M. Wednesday, a Thai fishing vessel bearing a white flag, approached one of the destroyers. All of the crewmen were aboard but the count took until 11.07 P.M. Then, the White House ordered all "offensive" operations halted. Some of the bloodier fighting still came to extract the Marines from Tang Island, an operation that in hindsight proved unnecessary. Some of the heavier strikes on the Cambodian mainland took place later, starting at 10.57 P.M.

There has to be more than a suspicion that some of these attacks were reprisal messages—for the Cambodians in the future or for other potential adversaries.

Mr. Ford emerged out of the incident with a new reputation as a decisive leader.

It was Secretary Kissinger who doubted that the Cambodians had planned the entire operation. It appeared to be a case of a local commander taking an initiative but with his headquarters later taking advantage of it. Why were there no answers to diplomatic message for 60 hours? What was the Cambodian motive? The cries and charges of CIA-espionage are not taken seriously here. Phnom Penh's new rulers may be paranoid. They may mistake normal shipping for fishing squabbles in the area as threats to their authority.

In hindsight, it is easy to see some tactical mistakes. But without action the situation might also have been far more tragic. In one still disputed account, the Mayaguez crewmen are supposed to have credited the onshore bombing for their release.

The hope here is that the incident has served notice that the United States is not a toothless nor a paper tiger; that it has its limits of patience and that it will stay out of local Asian disputes unless it has no other choice.

By PETER J. KUMPA

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NEW YORK TIMES
23 May 1975

The Mayaguez Incident and the Constitution

By Raoul Berger

CAMBRIDGE, Mass. — Once more Congress has abdicated its constitutional responsibility, carried away by a wave of "rally round the flag" fever. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee hastened to set its seal on the President's "exercise of his constitutional powers" in sinking Cambodian patrol boats in order to regain the captured merchant vessel Mayagüez.

What powers? President Ford invoked his "constitutional executive power and his authority as Commander in Chief." His counsel, Roderick Hills, explained that Mr. Ford "acted under his constitutional war powers to protect the lives and property of Americans."

We are not, of course, at war with Cambodia, so that resort to the "war powers" is farfetched; and those powers were by design very limited.

As to "protection" of Americans abroad, President James Buchanan recognized in 1859 that the power to afford such protection resided in Congress. He advised Congress, "I deem it my duty to recommend the passage of a law authorizing the President to employ the naval forces for the purpose of protecting the lives and property of American citizens passing in transit across the Panama routes."

The Act of July 277, 1868, directs the President, when citizen is unjustly deprived of his liberty by a foreign country, "to use such means, not amounting to acts of war, to obtain the release, and promptly to report to Congress."

Suppose that the patrol boats that the United States sunk, instead of belonging to pygmy Cambodia, had been those of the Soviet Union. Is it for the President alone to make the fateful judgment that may plunge us into war? Such situations call for the "collective judgment" of President and Congress, as the War Powers Resolution of 1973 requires.

That requirement is not satisfied by merely "informing" selected members of Congress of the forthcoming hostilities, but by genuine "consultation" *before* a decision is made, as is stated in the conference committee report on the resolution.

By his invocation of the "constitutional executive power" and that of "Commander in Chief," Mr. Ford apparently signals that he does not consider his "constitutional" powers to be limited by the resolution, a view that seems to be shared by the Senate committee. Of course, if the President possesses the "constitutional powers" to which he lays claim, they cannot be limited by Congress, and the President is free to sink us into yet another Vietnam quagmire.

It is idle to look to the words "executive power" for war-making authority, for the powers comprehended therein were painstakingly enumerated by the Framers of the Constitution. In that enumeration the sole grant of "war power" is contained in the words "Commander in Chief," a limited grant.

Because opponents of the Constitution raised the specter of "detested" monarchical power, Alexander Hamilton downgraded the grant, explaining that the words "Commander in Chief" merely made the President "first General."

Louis Henkin, professor of constitutional law at Columbia University, has justly observed that generals "even when they are 'first' do not determine the political purposes for which troops are to be used; they command them in the execution of policy made by others"—by the Congress, as the Founders made abundantly clear.

The power to "declare war," meaning, as Justice Joseph Story stated, the "power to make and carry on war," was lodged in Congress exclusively. The purpose, James Wilson explained to the Pennsylvania ratification convention, was to guard against being "hurried" into war, so that no "single man [can] . . . involve us in such distress." It was designed, said James Madison, to hobble the "executive propensity to war." In addition to "commanding" troops in a war so "declared," the President is authorized to repel an invasion, and by the terms of the War Powers Resolution an attack upon the armed forces. Manifestly, the bombing of the Cambodian patrol boats falls in none of these categories.

Does the President have an "inherent right," as his counsel Mr. Hills postulates, to undertake hostilities for the "protection" of American citizens and property? President Buchanan did not think so. The constitutional records disclose that the Founders jealously insisted on a Federal Government of enumerated, strictly limited powers.

Defending the Constitution in the Virginia ratification convention, Gov. Edmund Randolph said that the powers of the Government "are enumerated," that it "has no power but what is expressly given it." In the same convention, it was stated that the "legality of any power" is to be tested by the question, "Is it enumerated in the Constitution." Such citations can be multiplied, and they are reinforced by the pervasive Colonial distrust of executive power. To conjure up an "inherent" executive power in the teeth of the Framers' studied efforts to limit it is to charge them with leaving the barn door wide open.

When the claim to "inherent power" was made in support of President Harry S. Truman's seizure of the steel mills to prevent a strike during the Korean war, it was emphatically rejected by Justice Robert H. Jackson.

In what is considered his finest opinion, Mr. Jackson stated that the Framers "made no provision for exercise of extraordinary authority because of a crisis." Emergency powers, he said, "are consistent with free government only when their control is lodged elsewhere than in the executive who exercises them"—that is, in Congress. Claims of "inherent power" are a euphemism for stepping out of bounds, for exercise of a power that was not conferred. Such claims, particularly when they assert power exclusively lodged in Congress, endanger our democratic system.

The paramount harm that flows from this fresh Cambodian adventure is the disruption of the constitutional allocation of powers, the invasion of powers confided exclusively to Congress. Approval by individual members cannot make such invasion constitutional. The Supreme Court has declared: "One branch of government cannot encroach on the domain of another without danger. The safety of our institutions depends in no small degree on strict observance of this salutary rule."

Richard M. Nixon has taught us anew that power grows by what it feeds on, and that to condone unauthorized expansion is to undermine the foundations of our democratic society.

It is a reproach to Congress that, having just shaken us loose from a disastrous war, sustained in no small part by Congressional acquiescence—it is once more ready to approve a Presidential exercise of its own power. Thereby it gives its sanction to yet another dismal "precedent" that future Presidents will not be slow to invoke against Congress.

Raoul Berger is Charles Warren senior fellow in American legal history at Harvard Law School and author of "Executive Privilege: A Constitutional Myth."

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BALTIMORE SUN
23 May 1975

Mary McGrory

Mayaguez Affair Was Typical for U.S.—Stealthy, Violent

Washington.

Before any more champagne is uncorked, it might be well to stop and consider what we are celebrating in the rescue of the Mayaguez, a notion as false as the first casualty reports to come out of the affair

The toasting and the boasting is over the ludicrous assumption that the United States is for the first time, finally and at last, resorting to force in its dealings with Cambodia.

Actually, from 1969, we have communicated with that wretched country solely through high explosives dropped from the sky We have shown them nothing but muscle. The seizure of the merchant ship Mayaguez and its crew of 39 presented what appears to have been a welcome opportunity to show it again.

Richard M. Nixon, whose spirit will dominate the foreign-policy thinking at the White House, began his vigorous search for "a generation of peace" by instituting a secret bombing campaign against Cambodia.

When the falsified reports were finally translated in Congress, it turned out that B-52's had carried out 3,650 bombing raids over Cambodia while then-President Nixon was protesting his respect for Cambodia's neutrality.

In 1971, of course still bent on peaceful solutions, we invaded Cambodia. Between 1969 and 1973, when Congress passed a resolution stopping all such activity, we had dropped 250,000 tons of bombs on Cambodia.

With that history, when the Mayaguez was captured no one in the government had reason to believe that the Cambodians would treat the ship's crew kindly.

As a matter of fact, they did, but we did not learn this until we had sent in the Marines—to the wrong island, as it happened—and until after, for good measure, we had dropped a superbomb on Koh Tang—to prevent a counterattack that seemed likely only in the lurid imaginations of the crisis-managers.

The Cambodians have been dealing harshly with their own people. They have taken victory badly, but giddy and furious as they were, they were hardly ready to go to war with the U.S. over a ship sailing in contested waters.

Still, little effort was made to find out what they had in mind. Diplomacy was given a perfunctory run-through before the usual action for that part of the world—hasty, stealthy and violent—was decided on.

The Mayaguez-rescue planners may have been goaded by their own recent rhetoric in which they had compared the defeat in Vietnam almost to the fall of Rome.

They may have seen a chance to smash the Cambodians and dazzle the right-wing in one "surgical" stroke. They accomplished both, at a cost still not known. The casualty list has fluctuated from 1 killed to 15 dead; from 22 wounded to 70 to 49.

The affair was supposed to restore American credibility in the world. It may return it to its old tarnished state in the country.

The Secretary of Defense, James R. Schlesinger, when confronted with the discrepancies, spoke of the "reassessment" of the casualties. Usually, they are simply counted. Inevitably the question arises whether an accurate count was withheld lest it cloud the victory celebration.

Were the tense councils —carefully snapped by the White House photographer at all great moments—moved by memories of the Cuban missile crisis, those 13 days in October, 1962, which added many cubits to John F Kennedy's stature with the public?

If so, there is one striking difference. On the 11th day, the White House received a conciliatory message from Nikita S. Khrushchev; on the 12th a bellicose one. Robert F. Kennedy decided to answer the first, ignore the second.

But Henry A. Kissinger, it is reliably reported, had a message handed to him through a shower curtain at the White House Wednesday night, May 14, announcing the Cambodians would give up the ship.

Instead of seizing on the good news, he was quick to note that the Cambodians had not mentioned the crew. The Marine assault had in any case begun and could not be called off. Apparently, the idea of canceling the punitive, post-rescue bombing raid never crossed anybody's mind.

For suggesting that "we did not even bother to give the negotiation process a fair trial," Senator Gaylord Nelson (D., Wis.), one of the few who declined to raise a glass to the affair, was berated by his constituency.

The most depressing aspect to the non-celebrants is the realization that what the Ford administration learned from Vietnam can be summed up in three words: Do it again.

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
17 MAY 1975

U. S. Had Failed To Warn Ship to Avoid Cambodia

By SAUL FRIEDMAN
Inquirer Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — Under procedures established more than 30 year ago, the State Dpeartment was supposed to notify U. S. ships to steer clear of the troubled waters off Cambodia at least a week before the S.S. Mayaguez was captured.

But no warning was issued until 7:15 p. m. Monday (Washington time), more than 12 hours after the Mayaguez had been seized.

The delay in issuing a "special warning" under international "notices to mariners" has prompted suggestions from at least two members of Congress that the capture of the Mayaguez might have been prevented and that an investigation of the affair is in order.

Sen. Frank Church (D., Idaho), after listening to closed door testimony on the subject by CIA Director William Colby, said yesterday that an administration investigation "is now being made."

And Rep. Bob Carr (D., Mich.) has called on colleagues on the House Armed Services Committee "to examine the chronology of the event and determine its cause and the correctness of our response."

President Ford, meanwhile, ordered his own inquiry into the earlier "episodes" of harassment to determine if a failure in communications contribut-

Neither Church nor Carr criticized President Ford's use of force to recover the ship and its crew. But both raised questions which suggested that the initial capture of the ship might have been prevented, thus making the subsequent U. S. actions and casualties unnecessary.

Who Was Responsible?

Their primary question was expressed by Church: "We did have information in advance that these were troubled waters. But we never communicated this to the ships in the area."

Beginning around May 1, several Thai ships were attacked, harrassed and stopped by Cambodian forces in gunboats, originally supplied by the United States to the anti-Communist Cambodian government.

On May 3, Cambodians attacked and attempted to board a South Korean vessel on its way from Bangkok to Borneo. On May 6, South Korea issued a shipping warning and passed it on to the U. S. State Department.

On May 7, a Panamanian freighter was captured by Cambodians in the same waters of the Gulf of Thailand, between the Cambodian mainland and the Cambodian-claimed island of Poulo Wai. The ship was released after 36

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Spokesmen earlier said that the knowledge of those incidents had not reached high State Department levels until after the seizure of the Mayaguez, on May 12. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissenger told a press conference yesterday that insurance companies had been informed of the incidents, and he assumed that they had the responsibility of telling their vessels.

On the contrary, according to Colby, the intelligence agencies had kept track of the incidents in the Gulf of Thailand and had informed the proper authorities in time to warn the Mayaguez away. Colby added, in testimony before Church's committee on intelligence activities, that it was the responsibility of the "Army Map Service" to disseminate the information to ships in the danger area.

A spokesman for the Defense Mapping Agency, which has replaced the old Army Map Service, said that all information on "political incidents involving ships, like seizures," must go to the State Department. And the State Department is supposed to write the "special warning" to American ships and other mariners. Insurance companies are not involved in this procedure, he said.

But Had It Known?

Carl McDowell, president of the American Institute of Marine Underwriters, said, in response to Kissinger's press conference remark, "As far as I could verify from my sources ... (the insurance companies) did not receive any forewarning from the U.S. government concerning trouble in Cambodian waters."

The procedures for funneling information on "political" incidents, like seizures, through the State Department were first set up in 1939. In 1942, according to a mapping agency spokesman, the procedures were changed to include "special warnings" to mariners on waters and routes which could hold political dangers to ships.

The spokesman added that "we received no messages on any seizures until the seizure of the Mayaguez. And at that time we were asked to issue a special warning."

"Special Warning Number 45," issued Monday night, advised ships to remain more than 35 nautical miles off Cambodia, noting, "Recent incidents have been reported of firing on, stopping and detention of ships within waters claimed by Cambodia, particularly in the vicinity of Poulo Wai Island. . . ."

BALTIMORE SUN
23 May 1975

Mayaguez said to hold CIA's Viet files

Bonn (Reuter)—The West German weekly magazine *Stern* said yesterday the United States had gone to great lengths to rescue the cargo vessel Mayaguez from Cambodian forces because it was carrying containers full of top-secret intelligence data and equipment from Saigon.

In a full-page, unsigned article *Stern* said the Mayaguez was deliberately chosen by the American Central Intelligence Agency to take its files from Saigon and another of its offices in South Vietnam to Thailand because of the vessel's insignificant appearance.

Also on board were all the electronic equipment, as well as radio and decoding equipment from the two former CIA offices.

Stern said that soon after the Mayaguez had been seized by the Cambodians, and well before the U.S. use of force to recover it, American frogmen attached mines to its hull at night while it lay at anchor off Koh Tang.

In New York, the owners of the Mayaguez denied the report.

WASHINGTON POST
18 May 1975

Joseph Kraft

Lessons of the Mayaguez

Tolstoy's famous insight into the chancy nature of battle finds vindication once again. The rescue of the Mayaguez and its crew abounds in ifs and maybes. The whole operation would have ended tragically, for example, if the master of the Mayaguez had not been an alert figure able to persuade his captors to turn him and his crew loose when American military operations got under way.

So nobody can confidently draw conclusions from the episode. But with the overriding importance of luck ackowledged, certain discreet and tentative lessons seem to emerge.

First is the utility of having a wide range of military options available to a President. When initial word came of the seizure of the Mayaguez, there was a push inside the National Security Council to punish Cambodia by B-52 bombing.

Defense Secretary James Schlesinger and the uniformed military in the Pentagon wanted nothing to do with such undiscriminating punishment. They were against tit-for-tat and other diplomatic games. They drove hard for the more limited and sharply targeted operation that was, in fact, ordered.

They thus gave the lie to the argument that all military forces ought to be cut because the Pentagon will inevitably use whatever is available. On the contrary, it seems clear that if the limited amphibious operation had not been available, President Ford would have felt obliged to go for the brutal, and probably useless, bombing.

A second lesson is the unreliability of intelligence filtered through the fog of war. There was no advance warning that the Mayaquez was traversing dangerous waters, although other ships had been recently seized by Cambodia in the same area.

While the off-loading of the Mayaguez crew on Kno Tang Island was spotted, the move of the whole crew from Kho Tang to another island was missed. Submarines were sent to Kho Tang in what might well have been a useless mission. Moreover, the estimate of resistance they would meet on Kho Tang was gravely understated. But all that, as anybody who has done wartime intelligence work knows, is par for the course.

The inflated claims of psychohistory were also unsaid by the rescue operation. Pop psychologists, trying to judge from a distance, assumed that President Ford, after a string of setbacks, was driven by the need to prove his method. In fact, far from acting tough, the President's main role was to go for the limited operation.

I happened to be in the White House during some of the most anxious moments of the crisis. I was struck by the apparent lack of psychological tension in men very close to Mr. Ford. Coming away, I asked the veteran White House correspondent of the Associated Press, Frank Cormier, his impression of the mood. "Calm," he said.

Another more subtle lesson emerges from the behavior of Thailand. Thai political leaders railed against the rescue operation in public and called for withdrawal of the U.S. force. Thai military leaders, privately, insisted that this country had to go in and [illegible] using force, and the sooner the better.

In the past Americans had a wide tolerance for such doubletalk by foreign nations. In the present case, the Thai behavior prompted U.S. demands for a withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Thailand.

The enduring lesson is that the need for candor in this country, plus a feeling that we shouldn't help countries that don't want our help, combines to reduce American tolerance for foreigners who say go away publicly while privately appealing for assistance. In the future, the commitments that are worth most to the United States will be the commitments foreign nations have the guts to acknowledge in public.

Yet another lesson applies to congressional control of foreign affairs. Precisely because ifs and buts bulked so large in the past few days, the Mayaguez affair demonstrates that it is impossible to foresee all contingencies.

A measure of discretion has to be left to the executive authorities. Congressional wisdom lies in not trying to anticipate what cannot be anticipated.

My impression is that the Congress, much as the President, acted in a responsible way during the Mayaguez affair. Which brings us to the final lesson. It is that the government can do some things and do them fairly well. The notion that government is condemned to bungle and fumble everything it touches is exposed as a wild generalization. That applies not only to foreign affairs, where President Ford is an activist, but equally to managing the economy.

[illegible] Field Enterprises, Inc.

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LOS ANGELES TIMES
25 May 1975

U.S. Should Take Hint and Leave Thailand

BY ROBERT S. ELEGANT

BANGKOK—"It would have been very easy to organize a counter-demonstration to the anti-American protests last week," a senior Asian diplomat mused. "The bar and massage girls, the tourist guides, hotel and restaurant employees—even the ordinary working Thais. It might not even have been necessary to pay them the 50 cents a day most of the passionate patriots got."

Times correspondent Robert Elegant is based in Hong Kong.

Perhaps, his was an overly cynical view, but it contained much more than a kernel of truth. Even student and labor leaders, who are, with good reason, ideologically motivated, don't really want to lose American protection.

The demonstrators were protesting partly because they felt the Americans had, in practical terms, already gone—and they didn't like facing their hostile, dynamic Communist neighbors on their own.

The sweeping takeover of Indochina has posed agonizing questions for both Thais and Americans. The Thais feel that the remaining American military presence provokes the Communists, but provides no real security for Thailand. Firm believers in the domino theory, they are convinced that the United States has lost the will to help defend them.

☆

In harsh reality, all of Southeast Asia north of the Kra Isthmus has already surrendered psychologically. That leaves Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines with a reasonable chance of survival as independent, potentially pluralistic societies.

Following hard upon the grievous trauma of South Vietnam's collapse, that general attitude has forced Americans to reconsider their role in Southeast Asia, in general, and in immediately threatened Thailand, in particular. No absolute consensus exists.

But the general view is that future policy can be based upon these facts and assumptions: 1) The Thais say they don't want the United States—for their own valid reasons—and they've given the United States military notice to quit by March, 1976. 2) Thailand's ability to weather the external and internal storms looming on the horizon is most questionable. 3) The United States has done as much as it can to assist the Thais, and we owe them nothing, morally or practically. 4) The United States derives little military, economic, or diplomatic advantage from remaining in Thailand. 5) Attempting to shore up the tottering kingdom could involve America in another debacle almost as catastrophic as South Vietnam and certainly as bad as China in the late 1940s.

The conclusion, then, ought to be that: 1) The United States should withdraw as rapidly as possible, following its own schedule, rather than the Thais'. 2) We should not deliberately damage the rickety Thai edifice, but must place U.S. interests first. 3) We should, by our actions, show other Asian nations that future cooperation with the United States must be mutual, rather than one-sided.

The presence of 20,000-odd American troops now makes the Thais nervous. Under Indochinese pressure, they have set their deadline for total withdrawal. Is there any good reason for Washington to dilly-dally?

The answer lies in the fundamental structure of the Thai nation—and its chances of survival.

On the credit side, Thailand is a nation, rather than the rump of a country striving to create a national consciousness. It is in good shape fiscally, with foreign exchange reserves of about $2 billion and a going economy. The attractive king and queen are not merely national symbols, but a major force for good and unity.

Nonetheless, the demoralization of the Thai upper classes renders Thailand's chances of survival very poor. The Thai oligarchy is not merely corrupt on a grand scale, spectacularly inefficient, and dedicated to its own pleasure, rather than the nation's good. It is, by and large, convinced that the end is fast approaching.

The Thai leadership has virtually lost the will to fight for its own survival—or the nation's. It will not surrender a jot of its privileges for the common good—or its own.

Earlier, lower-middle-class army officers might have formed an effective new leadership. But it is now far too late.

☆

The oligarchy's loss of confidence in its ability to defend the nation creates a classic self-fulfilling prophecy. That lack of confidence makes Thailand highly vulnerable to internal discontent and externally supported guerrilla assaults. The gap between the poor (who are not very poor by Asian standards) and the rich (who are very rich by any standards) has become a chasm. Therefore, Thiland's survival as an independent nation is most unlikely.

A new class of landless peasants, never a major problem historically, has been created during the past 15 years.

Idealistic students are disillusioned and, consequently, radicalized. A weak government, attempting to create a democracy after more than four decades of military rule, cannot possibly offer social justice. Moreover, guerrilla forces in the South and along the northern, eastern, and western borders have grown from some 2,500 to about 9,000 during the past four years.

Withal, the key factor is the leadership's demoralization. If the leadership were resolute, there might be some point in continuing American economic assistance—even after the military withdrawal.

In the present circumstances, economic aid, too, should cease. The United States must look to its own interests—and the interests of those Asian allies and friends who will strive for their own survival. Another debacle like South Vietnam would be disastrous for the United States and catastrophic for the rest of Asia.

Thai bases that cannot be used to preserve the freedom of the seas are virtually useless to the United States. In hard, unpleasant terms, the accounts are now balanced: A United States that has never really understood them can do very little to help the cowed Thais help themselves; Thais possess neither the ability nor the desire to help the United States.

Slavishly following Bangkok's schedule for the U.S. military withdrawal would cushion the economic shock to the Thais. But it could damage the interests of other Asian nations and of the United States. Besides, the schedule could be greatly accelerated tomorrow by the Thais, yielding to new Communist pressure.

The United States must not appear to be kicked out of Thailand; or to force "mutual cooperation" on an unwilling nation; or to accept continuing affronts from a nation where agitators already refer to the United States as "the enemy."

The American withdrawal should not be a pell-mell retreat. We should not leave in a huff. But we should leave—as soon as we possibly can.

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THE GLOBE (ARLINGTON, VA.)
8 MAY 1975

Thailand:
The One Domino That Won't Fall

by Lynne Watson

Thailand, with its 1000-nile long border with Camodia and its weak, left-eaning government, may iot be the "falling domino" hat it appears.

With the U.S. finally out of Indochina, the military support facilities, which account for most of the U.S. presence in Thailand, are being withdrawn. But a far nore sophisticated — hough less visible — ietwork of military communications and electronic nstallations will stay. These nstallations are capable of nonitoring anything from nissiles test-fired in China to ships sailing on the Indian Ocean.

To security planners in Washington, America's technological investment in Thailand is invaluable. The U.S. can move combat units — military personnel, mostly Air Force, now number 26,000 in Thailand — but the super-sophisticated satellite tracking station is another matter.

Some $3.7 billion was pumped into constructing and maintaining the U.S. military presence in Thailand, including four air bases, a huge port facility, and, at one point, 50,000 men. With this build up, Thailand became a hub for military communications in Southeast Asia and the Pacific. As former Thai Ambassador Leonard Unger told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1969, "There is nowhere where we have anything like the kind of relationship we have in Thailand ... nowhere where we have the possibility of establishing these various facilities that are of considerable interest to us

Those facilities now include a new $20 million radar station, code-named Pave Cobra, on the highest mountain on the Burma border, and an unknown number of "intelligence communications relay stations" linked to U.S. photographic and electronic reconnaissance satellites — "spies in the sky."

Other radar tracking stations are located at a string of bases in Thailand's remote northeast. Three LORAN radio navigation stations, operated by the Coast Guard, handle communications between ships and aircraft in the Gulf of Thailand and the South China Sea, and some 20 strategic communications (STRATCOM) stations throughout Thailand provide a para-communications network for Thai and U.S. military.

Finally, there is a highly sensitive electronic intelligence station at Ramasun, about five miles from the northeast air base of Udorn.

Unlike the conventional air bases which drew worldwide attention as the launching pads for U.S. bombing and reconnaissance flights over Indochina and — more recently — as takeoff points for the airlift into Cambodia, these sophisticated satellite-linked stations and other electronic installations have gone virtually unnoticed.

Typical of this low profile is Ramasun, innocuously known as the "7th Radio Research Field Station." From the road, one can see only a windowless cement building, surrounded by a screen of wires, rods and high antennas. The only signs warn in Thai and English that the area is patrolled by dangerous dogs.

American officials in Bangkok wave away questions about its functions — "no one is authorized to speak about it," one said — except to say "it provides rapid radio relay and service communications for the defense of the United States and the free world."

Similarly, the public did not know of the new radar station atop Doi Inthanond mountain until early last year, when students protested against the felling of thousands of trees to make way for recreation facilities for U.S. personnel based there.

During the war, the intelligence communications relay stations provided information on Chinese and Soviet missile and other military aid programs, as well as on North Vietnamese and North Korean troop movements. The radar tracking station at Nakorn Phanom — protected by armed guards, cyclone fencing, mines and a moat — was the command post for U.S. air attacks on Indochina, and headquarters for detecting movements of North Vietnamese and P.R.G. troops and supplies along the Ho Chi Minh trail. Ramasun and other listening posts monitored low frequency radio transmissions in North Vietnam and China, and planes flying into and out of Hanoi. The LORAN stations were able to guide bomb strikes, and relayed vital signals from aircraft carriers to bombers.

If the Indochina war provided the reason for these sophisticated installations, there are strong indications that at least some will remain to serve growing U.S. interests in the Indian Ocean.

For several years, reconnaissance flights over the Indian Ocean have originated from the U.S. air base at Utapao. And the huge U.S. multipurpose naval base at Sattahip — like Utapao, located on the northeast tip of the Indian Ocean, on the Gulf of Siam — is considered by naval strategists as an important plus in any future Indian Ocean moves.

Pentagon officials are confident of retaining use of at least Utapao, Sattahip and — possibly — Korat.

These same officials are convinced that the spy satellite-linked stations will remain intact.

Already, too, U.S. installations like Ramasun serve as intelligence collection points in a chain of U.S. communication bases stretching from Guam and the Philippines through Diego Garcia to Masira in the Persian Gulf — installations manned not by the overexposed CIA but by the National Security Administration.

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Pacific News Service

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THE NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, MAY 19, 1975

Thai Mob Burns Effigy of Uncle Sam

BANGKOK, Thailand, May 18 (UPI) — Demonstrators burned an effigy of Uncle Sam outside the United States embassy today in the second day of a protest over the use of Thai based in the Mariness operation to recapture the American freighter Mayaguez and her crew from Cambodian Communists.

About 2,000 Thais took part in the demonstration. Leaders won a pledge from Foreign Minister Chatichai Choonhaven to speed up the recall of the Thai Ambassador in Washington if a formal apology from the Ford Administration is not received by 6 P.M. Tuesday (7 A.M. New York Time).

Yesterday about 7,000 Thais protested outside the embassy. Some 300 remained through the night and by tonight the number had grown to 2,000. They squatted in the street outside the embassy and listener to anti-American speeches.

A delegation led by student activists visited Mr. Chatichai, who sent back a written note saying he would order the immediate recall of the Thai Ambassador in Washington if a written apology was not received by Tuesday night. The note was read to the cheering demonstrators outside the embassy.

Delegation Vists Official

The demonstrators then held a meeting at the embassy gate and "sentenced" President Ford to death. In addition to burning the effigy of Uncle Sam, they replaced the battered emblem of an eagle outside the gate with a cartoon of a vulture.

The Thai Government is yesterday issued note to the American charge d'affaires, Edward S. Masters, reviewing the Mayaguez incident and formally notifying the United States that all American troops in Thailand, numbering 23,000 at four major air bases, must be out of this country by next March.

Thais Silent on Planes

BANGKOK, May 18 (AP)—A second day of talks with a delegation from South Vietnam's Government produced no statement on Saigon's claim to 130 United States-supplied warplanes flown to Thailand by Vietnamese refugees. The United States also claims the aircraft and has already removed about 100 of them.

The Thai Under Secretary of State, Phan Wannamethee, said only a few formalities remained to be completed on the establishment of diplomatic relations the new South Vietnamese Government.

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CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
16 MAY 1975

Thais upset by American action, but...

By Daniel Southerland
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor
Bangkok, Thailand

Everyone, from Thailand's Prime Minister and activist students to each of its major newspaper editorialists, has sharply criticized the United States for its just-completed Thai-based military operation to rescue the merchant ship Mayaguez and its crew.

Much of the outrage and indignation seems real enough. But behind the storm of protest lurk considerable confusion and divisions of opinion. The Thai Government itself is far from united in its attitude toward the United States and the remaining U.S. bases in Thailand. And some Thais, including many military officers, quietly are applauding the U.S. rescue operation.

"Some people, especially among the privileged classes, feel the U.S. action proved the U.S. still has the power to block communist influence in this area," said a Thai journalist who has sampled public opinion in Bangkok.

"It's too early to say what the long-term diplomatic fallout will be," said an experienced Western diplomat based in the Thai capital.

Much will depend, he said, on how hard the country's activist students, who succeeded in overthrowing Thailand's old military government in 1973, press the current, fragile coalition government to speed up the American withdrawal from Thailand.

A small group of university students greeted the new U.S. Ambassador to Thailand, Charles S. Whitehouse, with placards and banners demanding a complete U.S. withdrawal when Mr. Whitehouse arrived at the Bangkok airport Wenesday. Two other student rallies denouncing the "U.S. imperialists" were held on Thurdsay. But the demonstrations were limited in scope compared with the massive rallies that have been held here in recent years.

It was announced earlier this month that the ceiling for American servicemen based in Thailand, most of them Air Force men, will be reduced from 27,000 to 19,500 over the next two months in accordance with the Thai Government's announced intention to have all the Americans withdrawn by next March. The United States has indicated, however, that it does not want a complete withdrawal and would like to retain a "residual force" here.

The Thai protests have focused on the dispatch, apparently without prior consultation with the Thai Government, of more than 1,000 U.S. marines to the air base at Utapao, on the Gulf of Siam. Some of these marines were used in the operation to rescue the Mayaquez and its crew.

Prime minister Kukrit Pramoj made the strongest statement concerning the dispatch of the marines to Thailand. He said that "This could lead to a suspension of association with the United States."

It was not entirely clear what Mr. Kukrit meant by this. But few observers thought it likely that Thailand would go so far as to break off relations with the U.S.

The main complaints of the Thai press were that the U.S. had failed to respect Thailand's soveriegnty and that the arrival of the marines may have damaged this country's efforts to improve its relations with the socialist countries, particularly North Vietnam and China.

The uproar over the U.S. marines followed an earlier outbreak of Thai protests over the unauthorized removal by the U.S. or more than 100 U.S.-supplied South Vietnamese aircraft flown to Thailand by pilots fleeing from South Vietnam.

NEW YORK TIMES
16 May 1975

After the Mayaguez

Only a profound sense of relief can follow the successful recovery of the American merchant vessel Mayagüez and its crew from their brief and bizarre Cambodian captivity. By all accounts so far, the swift military operation which President Ford ordered was conducted with admirable efficiency, against nerve-wracking difficulties.

It was a narrow escape. This fact alone, quite aside from the inevitable political questions arising from the incident, requires that the Mayagüez affair now be scrutinized in minute detail, from start to finish, by responsible committees of Congress. A quiet and careful study of all details pertaining to this fortunately short-lived crisis might draw significant lessons about foreign policy decision-making and execution, data that could be useful in avoiding any repetition of the nervous hours through which both Government and public have passed.

The list of unanswered questions is long: why was the Mayaguez passing through disputed waters, particularly after at least two incidents of unfriendly interference with other vessels had been reported in the immediately preceding days? Did the White House, after first news of the ship's seizure, exhaust all orderly diplomatic alternatives before moving in to recover the Mayagüez and crew by force? At some early date, the Administration should make available to Congress all the relevant diplomatic messages of the past days.

The support which President Ford is now receiving from much of the public, including this newspaper, for having acted as decisively as he did is premised on acceptance of official statements that the Mayagüez was on a genuinely innocent voyage, and not fulfilling any intelligence mission as the Cambodian Government belatedly claimed. This aspect should be fully explored now, lest subsequent suspicions and accusations arise to cast doubt on the whole incident.

Was the dispatch of the Marines to Thailand absolutely essential to the rescue operation? This raised the affair's most troublesome political side-effect, and may yet undermine United States attempts to retain working relationships with the Government of Thailand.

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NEW YORK TIMES
16 May 1975

Rebuilding Cambodia: A Daring Gamble

By Charles Meyer

PARIS—The Khmer Rouge have done in all Western specialists in Asiatic affairs, or those who were considered as such until now. The downfall of the Lon Nol regime was recognized as inevitable for a long time. But in Washington, Paris, and even in Moscow, it was taken for granted that its end would lead to the return of Prince Norodom Sihanouk.

The scenario called for him to return immediately to Phnom Penh, punish a few traitors and then grant amnesty; he would temper the revolutionary ardor of the conquerors, and would then establish an amiable "typically Cambodian" regime. No one took seriously Prince Sihanouk's own repeated statements that in the future power would rest "elsewhere."

But ever since the pro-American coup d'état in March, 1970, revolutionary political power resided with the guerrillas, not in Peking where Prince Sihanouk lived. The Prince was recognized as the symbol of Cambodian nationalism, not of a "monarchical legitimacy" that the Khmer Rouge never accepted.

Prince Sihanouk's declarations and those of his representatives never bound the guerrilla leaders in the slightest. Relations between the two were spasmodic and were limited to exchanges of messages of protocol.

Recent events have revealed the profoundly original character of the Cambodian revolution. For more than twenty years it germinated in the villages of the rice-growing area where, we had been told, the peasants were forever bound by their Buddhist traditions and their habit of submission to the king and his mandarins.

From a Maoist point of view, the victorious Cambodian revolution is exemplary. Long before moving to action, the Marxist intellectuals were learning from the peasants. A political line was patiently worked out, rectified when circumstances demanded, and applied with a minimum of compromise, all in the context of the peasants' experience and with their participation.

In Cambodia, where oral tradition is more important than writing, the fruits of the intellectual-and- peasant political education didn't need to be fixed in texts that would guarantee ideological orthodoxy or in a five- or eight- or ten-point program.

This lack of written "references" troubled the Western political specialists in revolutionary movements, especially since there was such abundant Chinese and Vietnamese documentation.

A new society was born in the Cambodian countryside. It was unified and hardened under the attacks of the B-52's. Even more important, over a five-year period it cut the lines that attached it to Phnom Penh. Between the revolutionary guerrilla leaders and the officials of the Lon Nol regime, who had earlier served Prince Sihanouk, the gap became an abyss. There was nothing that could fill it. The guerrilla leaders were always outside the family networks and the shared self-interest that bound together the ruling class for 25 years. This gap meant that any compromise that American diplomacy hoped would limit the ruin of its allies was a pipe dream. The victory of the new over the old, of the pure over the corrupt, had to be total.

The situation was aggravated by the relationship between rural Cambodia and Phnom Penh. The peasants had never liked the city that had been the seat of French colonial power. They grew even more hostile when, from 1955 to 1970, it became the citadel of the new mandarins, who adopted a Western life-style of great luxury in contrast to the dire poverty of the rural peasants.

As early as 1969, hostility toward the "great prostitute" on the banks of the Mekong River was evident in many villages. In 1970, Phnom Penh became even more clearly an enemy city where the Government and the Americans planned the bombing and raids on the villages.

Hence, the order to totally evacuate Phnom Penh surprised only those who were ignorant of the accumulated bitterness against a city that had been soiled by "the colonialists, the imperialists, the feudal lords, and the corrupt bourgeoisie."

In other times, the peasant army would undoubtedly have razed it, after having exterminated part of the population. In 1975, they were content to empty it of its citizens, who will be purified and re-educated by hard work in the rice fields.

Foreigners judge this measure inhuman, absurd, uneconomical. In reality, it is political, decided with clear cognizance of the facts, in order to reconstitute a Khmer community that has been profoundly altered by Westernization of part of the society.

The peasant revolutionaries' ambition is to reconstruct their country on the foundations they have freely chosen. They think they will only be able to do so if they totally destroy all the material symbols of foreign domination and create a "new man" within a peasant socialist society that is authentically Cambodian.

This is a political, economic and cultural revolution that certainly recalls the Chinese experience. It is perhaps even more radical, and certainly has a distinct style. Its nationalist character could lead to total indifference to the outside world. This is a daring gamble for little Cambodia—not the first in its long history.

Charles Meyer is a French economist who served as adviser to Prince Sihanouk and, for a time, to the Lon Nol Government. Translated from the French by Leonard Mayhew.

LOS ANGELES TIMES
20 May 1975

Korean CIA Places Agents in Offices of Mass Media

BY SAM JAMESON
Times Staff Writer

SEOUL—Agents of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) have been dispatched to offices of newspapers and broadcasting stations, symbolizing an end to the last vestige of freedom of the press in South Korea.

Three separate sources confirmed that the agents were assigned to the mass media offices almost immediately after President Park Chung Hee issued a decree banning criticism of the authoritarian constitution he implemented during martial law in 1972 and outlawing "fabrication and dissemination of falsehoods."

Although the decree, issued May 13, did not specifically outlaw all criticism of Park, the dispatch of the agents to mass media offices underscored that total government control of the press was being implemented.

Meanwhile, there were these related developments:

—North Korea said Monday in an official broadcast that the United States considers South Korea a forward defense area and that U.S. officials have said "they would not hesitate" to use nuclear weapons in Korea if necessary. Asked for comment Department spokesman Robert Funseth said, "That's nonsense," the Associated Press reported.

The Times last week quoted a top U.S. military commander in South Korea as saying the United States would consider the use of tactical nuclear weapons in the event of the outbreak of all-out war in Korea.

—South Korea's most popular poet, Kim Chi Ha, went on trial for his life Monday, accused of violating several anti-Communist statutes when he commented that eight men hanged on subversion charges last month were victims of a government [illegible] immediately chal-

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lenged the chief judge because the magistrate had sat in judgment on the eight convicted earlier. The trial adjourned without any action on the challenge.

At the Dong-A newspaper building five KCIA agents took up residence —two to control content of the newspaper, two to supervise the Dong-A radio station, and one to oversee magazines published by Dong-A, it was learned.

Park's new decree also appeared to make inevitable an eventual surrender to the government by the Dong-A newspaper in its seven-month struggle to report and print news freely. One of the provisions of the edict specified that the government could order any mass media firm to fire any employe or officer—and leaders of a band of 133 striking or fired Dong-A employes already were talking of seeking new jobs elsewhere.

Dong-A started defying Park's government last fall by calling for a revision of the 1972 constitution and publishing news stories of rallies, prayer meetings and protests by opposition leaders. Park struck back in December by surreptitiously ordering all private firms to stop placing advertisements in the newspaper.

"Advertisements of encouragement" placed by thousands of ordinary Koreans helped the paper tide over its financial difficulties through March.

On March 8, however, publisher Kim Sang Man, in a move viewed as a bid to curry government favor, fired 18 reporters and editors, labeling it "an economy measure." When 167 reporters, editors and other staff members of the Dong-A publishing company walked out in protest, Kim threatened to fire all of them.

Only 34 went back to work, however.

With Park's new edict enabling the government to dictate firings under threat of disbanding the company itself, it was considered unlikely that many of the 133 protesting Dong-A employes could return to their jobs.

Since firing the first 18 reporters and editors, Dong-A had toned down—but not abandoned—its criticism of the government.

The firings, however, cost the paper a total loss of the "encouragement ads"—and general advertising failed to return. In April, it was learned, the newspaper for the first time had to borrow cash from a private source to meet its payrolls.

Now that the government was in a position to dictate the contents of the newspaper and its affiliate media, it appeared that what the government was demanding of publisher Kim was some form of humiliation to symbolize an abject surrender as the price for regaining general advertising.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
29 MAY 1975

Charles W. Yost

Laos: how it happened

Washington

In 1954, just after the first Paris conference on Indo-China, I was appointed first resident United States Ambassador to Laos, which had recently become independent.

We had a very small staff. But in Vientiane, then no more than an overgrown village, there was not adequate housing even for that number. When I sought help from the State Department administrative people, I was told there was no use wasting American money there since within six months Laos would be "down the drain" — that is, taken over by the Communists. This prediction was premature by about two decades.

What happened was that the United States Government chose not to accept this fatalism and, as the French withdrew from Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia during subsequent months, stepped briskly into their shoes.

As a matter of fact there was at that time practically no indigenous communist "threat" in Laos, even less in Cambodia. At the Paris conference the Lao delegation had been under pressure from the French who wanted a quick settlement. To the intense indignation of the then Crown Prince — the present King of Laos — the Lao delegation agreed that the "Pathet Lao," or Lao Communist forces who had been fighting the French, should be allowed to "regroup" in two northern provinces adjacent to North Vietnam and China until they could be "reintegrated" into the Royal Lao Army. What actually happened, as the Prince had foreseen, was that the Pathet Lao, with Vietnamese backing, held onto these provinces permanently, thus creating a state within a state.

The literal truth was that at that time the Pathet Lao numbered only a few hundred and that the large majority of the troops occupying these two provinces were North Vietnamese, who remained there in flagrant violation of the Geneva Accords.

Communism at that time had no appeal to Laotians, first because the peasants — 90 percent of the population — owned their own land and, except for some primitive mountain tribes, lived comfortably; second, because the privileged class was small and unpretentious and there was no vestige of a "class struggle"; and third, because communism was associated with the Vietnamese, who were the traditional enemies of Laos.

The United States picked up "the white man's burden" from the French because the Laotians desperately needed and wanted us. Their national economy was not remotely self-supporting. They could barely fund a small police force. They could not begin to pay and arm the 30,000-man army inherited from the French which they and the U.S. considered necessary to contain the Vietnamese ensconced in their northern provinces.

Of course the U.S. had its own fish to fry. It was obsessed with what was very probably a delusion that, if undeterred, Chinese hordes would pour down into Indo-China. The U.S. had a more justified apprehension about North Vietnamese ambitions not only to reunite their own country but to dominate their neighbors.

For these reasons it seemed desirable to unite all noncommunist political forces — of the right, center, and moderate left — in a coalition government, and this was United States policy during my tenure. Subsequently, however, three developments occurred which led to the present unhappy denouement in Laos.

First, as soon as the United States commenced its military and economic aid programs, Parkinson's Law began to operate. The very modest American presence ballooned within a few years into legions of military officers in mufti, CIA agents in every sort of guise, economists and experts of every variety — all conspicuous, and many intrusive in a country of three million people.

Second, Washington embraced the thesis that coalition governments of any kind were dangerous, that it must exercise its predominant influence to ensure that only Simon-pure "rightists" were in the seats of power and all others purged. The result was to bring about the defection of many "neutralists" at the center and the occupation in 1960-61 of nearly half the country by the reinforced Pathet Lao and the North Vietnamese.

The third development was the renewal at the same time of the war in Vietnam, which caused the North Vietnamese to seize and hold the Ho Chi Minh Trail as a supply route to the South. As the U.S. became deeply involved in the war from 1965 on, this inevitably made Laos a main theater of military operations.

Thus, tragically, a Pacific Buddhist population, living in what had been a Shangri-la of sorts, having no serious quarrels among themselves, were involved by outsiders, Vietnamese and Americans, in a 15-year war which was not their own; were devastated, displaced, and unnaturally divided into warring factions; and finally, it would appear, have been delivered into the hands of the most politically extreme and the least characteristically Laotian among them.

There are many lessons for all of us in this fragment of history, but it is the Laotians who will have to pay the price. Let us hope that eventually their natural gentleness and tolerance will mellow the passions which outsiders have kindled.

The author of this article writes from a background of 40 years as a United States diplomat.

1975 Charles W. Yost

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LOS ANGELES TIMES
22 May 1975

ANALYSIS OF A NERVOUS NEIGHBOR

Thais Open Selves to Red Blackmail

BY ROBERT S. ELEGANT
Times Staff Writer

BANGKOK—Thailand has been hit too often and too hard in too short a time. The government is, almost literally, punchy.

After its intense psychological battering by the fall of Indochina, the Bangkok leadership's perception of its national interests is totally confused.

As a result, the bewildered Thais' own actions have laid them open to political and military blackmail from their Communist neighbors.

Assailed by their own militant students and by an unrelenting diplomatic-propaganda offensive mounted by the Vietnamese Communists, the Thais are staggering. Like a prizefighter with damaged eustachian tubes, their equilibrium is gravely disturbed.

Jolted further by each succeeding blow, the Thais, quite literally, don't know which way to turn. The result is a "policy" of conciliating the hard-hitting nearby Communists at almost any cost.

Regardless of ideological considerations, those are simply not intelligent tactics for a country that believes in acute peril as a result of the collapse of South Vietnam, the fall of Cambodia, the creeping takeover of Laos—and, above all, the manifest worthlessness of American guarantees of its security.

The Thais appear to have lost what little self-respect they once possessed. The only positive action they have taken is theatrical, meaningless protests against the actions of their nominal ally, the United States.

The Thais made histrionic objections and demonstrations against "unauthorized" American use of bases in Thailand to mount the amphibious assault that freed the merchant ship Mayaguez from its Cambodian captives. The dramatic performance was directed toward Hanoi, Saigon and Phnom Penh. Its purpose: To demonstrate that Thailand was purging itself of guilt by association with the United States and making itself fit to associate with the blameless Communist Nations. Bangkok has told the Communists that it desired, above all, amity with the new Indochina.

Those actions are wholly understandable on the part of a beleaguered nation just deprived of its chief psychological and military prop, the United States. Unfortunately, the same actions are certain to encourage further Commnnists demands and pressures, rather than to enhance Thailands' security.

The South Vietnamese Communist delegation that left Bangkok on Monday after inconclusive talks regarding the establishment of formal diplomatic relations between the two nations telegraphed the next punch. It is all but certain that Hanoi and Saigon will refuse to exchange ambassadors with Bangkok unless all American troops and facilities are removed from Thailand immediately.

However, Phon Hien, deputy foreign minister and leader of a group of North Vietnamese officials who visited here Wednesday, said in an arrival statement that "in our view in the present situation, conditions are extremely favorable for negotiations to normalize the relations between the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and Thailand."

Bangkok already has set the deadline of March, 1976, for the United States to withdraw approximately 20,000 remaining Americans troops and close down all American military facilities. Bangkok also has decided to "review" all agreements with the United States—political, economic and military.

But the Communists are pressing hard because the Thais are so obviously off balance. They are determined to dictate terms to Bangkok and to further humiliate both Bangkok and Washington.

Their immediate demand: The Thais must perform the virtually impossible feat of "returning" about 120 Republic of Vietnam air force planes flown to Thailand by fleeing pilots. Since all the warplanes and most of the transports are already in American hands and off Thai soil, Bangkok hardly can "return" them.

Still marginally concerned about U.S. reactions, the Thais have wavered over the remaining 20 or so transports, saying one day they would "return" them and stalling the next. Because Bangkok is so punchy, it has apparently not even occurred to the government to tell the Communists to come and fly off the planes—if they can repair damages and provide essential spare parts.

A number of other issues, not yet raised formally, are held in reserve by the Indochinese.

Almost 50,000 refugees from North Vietnam have been residing in northern Thailand for more than 20 years. Bangkok would like them to go home, but Hanoi so far has been unreceptive.

Another potential lever is visible on the tarmac at Bangkok's Don Muang airport. Two DC-6s and a Caravelle of Air Cambodge, Phnom Penh's former national airline, sit forlornly among Thai Airways' aircraft and a C-46 of Air America, the CIA's private airline.

Phnom Penh could soon demand that the Thais turn over those aircraft, thus creating a new issue. Yet the reeling Thais have not anticipated that problem and preempted it. They have not publicly offered to return the planes to a nation that, at this moment, might have difficulty in finding qualified pilots to fly them.

Despite the corruption, ineptitude and self-indulgence of their leaders, the Thais are at this moment more deserving of sympathy than censure. They have, with truly remarkable maladroitness, managed to make the wrong choice on almost every critical issue.

Granted, the United States has hardly proved a pillar of constant strength. Nonetheless, Bangkok has nothing to gain by deliberately affronting Washington.

It does not really matter whether the Thais' resurgent Indochinese neighbors are Communist. It is not wise of Bangkok to seek to placate those neighbors by an orgy of humiliating self-abnegation rarely displayed by an independent nation.

The Thais are not crawling on their bellies, but their posture is not far off.

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TIME
19 MAY 1975

Bitter Debate on Who Got Out

While the Communists embarked on a new phase of Vietnamese history, the Americans who left Viet Nam were carrying on a bitter debate about their final hours in Saigon. At issue was Operation Frequent Wind, the massive effort to get U.S. diplomats, businessmen and journalists, along with many of their Vietnamese employees, out of the country in the days and hours before the Communist tanks moved into Saigon.

Luckily, the entire program resulted in very few casualties. Two Marines were killed in the Communist rocket attack on Tan Son Nhut Airport, and last week it was learned that their bodies had been left behind at the Seventh Day Adventist Hospital in Saigon. Nonetheless, it was becoming embarrassingly clear that the hastily conceived operation had failed in its objective of evacuating all those Vietnamese whose lives might be endangered after the Communists came to power. U.S. officials conceded that many people had been left behind whose close connections to the Americans made them likely targets of Communist wrath. Others who had far less to fear from the new regime, including a number of prostitutes, were safely ferried to U.S. ships waiting off the Vietnamese coast.

Pet Poodle. The main problems were panic and haste. General contingency plans for the emergency departure of the Americans had been drawn up months in advance, but no definite lists of Vietnamese whose lives might have been endangered by the Communists were drawn up until practically the last minute. Many officers and officials on the evacuation flagship U.S.S. *Blue Ridge* were openly bitter about Ambassador Graham Martin's failure to make firm, clear decisions on how the plan would actually be carried out—feelings that were hardly helped by the sight of Nitnoi, Martin's pet poodle, being given its daily turn about the deck.

On evacuation day the emergency plan fell apart, leaving stranded hundreds of Vietnamese employees of the U.S. embassy, USAID and USIS. Some were never called, and buses were too crowded or failed to make their way to designated pickup points. In one shocking instance, a senior member of the embassy's Mission Council fled his post for the embassy hours before he should have, leaving his agency's evacuation program a shambles.

"Saigon didn't give a damn for us," a Foreign Service officer stationed at the U.S. consulate in the Mekong Delta city of Can Tho told TIME Correspondent William Stewart aboard the *Blue Ridge*. "We were promised Navy choppers, but the only thing we got was a phone call telling us there was an evacuation. Not just Vietnamese were abandoned but Americans too. The embassy was exercising no initiative, no control. We were told, 'We can't worry about Delta employees.'"

In the end, no Americans who wanted to get out were left behind in Viet Nam. Many escaped through their own efforts when it became clear that the official program was failing. In Can Tho, for example, notice of the evacuation only came at the very last minute. Since helicopters had been flown to Saigon or commandeered by the CIA, the consulate's American employees and a small proportion of its Vietnamese staff went by boat down the Mekong River to the coast. After six hours of futile searching for the ship that was to have met them there, they luckily chanced upon another U.S. vessel, the *Pioneer Contender*, which brought them to safety.

Thousands of Vietnamese employees of U.S. agencies did not escape. "Why did we promise evacuation to so many Vietnamese when there was no hope of carrying it out?" asked one senior U.S. diplomat. "The signal didn't get to everybody," recounted another. "All of a sudden some people got phone calls and were told, 'Get on the helicopters and go.' 'What about our [Vietnamese] people?' 'Forget about your people. Just go.'"

"I made decisions that were wrong because I didn't know what was going on, where to turn," added a USIS official based in Saigon. "My employees' lives depended on me. Even 24 hours notice could have saved hundreds. You *can* feel satisfied that you got all the Americans and many Vietnamese out. But others will have nightmares for the rest of their lives for promises made and broken."

It's Criminal. In all, 115,000 Vietnamese got out of Viet Nam. The problem is that perhaps only half were those whom the U.S. really wanted. One angry Foreign Service officer from the Delta told Stewart: "It's criminal. All these politicians and VIPs who have no goddam right to get out have got out, while people who have worked for us for ten years were left behind."

Still, given the lack of casualties and the tumultuous conditions of the evacuation, the operation was not a total failure. To the extent that it was a success, some credit goes to the Communists, who did not interfere with what they obviously knew was going on. No refugee chopper was shot out of the sky, no overloaded barge sunk in the Saigon or Mekong rivers. Nonetheless, for those thousands of Vietnamese with close U.S. connections left in Saigon, the only hope was that the leniency shown by the Communists during their first week in power would become a permanent feature of their rule.

NEW YORK TIMES
21 May 1975

The Broken Telephone Line

By James Reston

UNITED NATIONS, N. Y., May 20 — The mini-war in Cambodia, with its sudden attacks in the dark and bizarre misunderstandings, illustrates the need for a more efficient worldwide communication system, and suggests a new and practical peace-keeping role for the United Nations.

There were serious breakdowns in the transmission of messages from Washington to Phnom Penh in Cambodia after the seizure of the Mayagüez, during which President Ford landed the Marines in Thailand, without permission, and ordered the attack on Cambodia.

It is not clear, even now, whether the new Khmer Rouge regime ordered the seizure of the Mayagüez, or if it did, wanted to hand over the ship and its American crew before the Marines landed, but in any event, the orders from the Pentagon to attack moved much faster than the appeals from the State Department to Peking and Phnom Penh to make peace.

There were comparable problems at the height of the Greek-Turkish crisis over Cyprus, though not so serious, but the problem is the same: The military network of communications in the world is swift but diplomatic communications in many of the most inflammable areas are slow.

Without raking over the past in Cambodia or Cyprus, the point here is fairly obvious: We need, not only a hot line between Washington and Moscow to avoid atomic wars, but a worldwide fire-alarm or early-warning system that can communicate the facts to every capital of every nation.

The technology is available. There are now communications satellites in the heavens over every continent. Even the smallest capital of the newest nation in Africa, Asia, or Latin America can hook into this fantastic system by telephone, teletype or even television, if it has a ground satellite station.

These earth stations are not prohibitively expensive. They cost about $4 million. As modern technology improves, they are getting smaller and cheaper all the time. They are already portable, and can be folded up and transported in a Boeing 707.

Henry Kissinger took one along with him on his original mission to China. He could set one up in the desert in the Middle East, if his shuttle failed, and call securely through the scrambler system to the White House within an hour.

■

This is no secret superpower mystery. The International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (Intelsat) runs the communications satellites and sells its service. You have to put more than a dime in the slot, but if you have an earth satellite in Phnom Penh and a mob at the door, you can call up Secretary General Waldheim here at the U.N., or even Henry Kissinger in Georgetown, and discuss your problem.

With this kind of open communications technology available to every

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nation in the world, it is odd and even ridiculous that wars have to start or go on for lack of facts. We have communications but we don't communicate. "Natural folly is bad enough," Thomas Fuller observed back in 1732, "but learned folly is intolerable."

Maybe, then, there is a practical role here that can be played by the United Nations, as communicator or postmaster, if not as peace-maker. At San Francisco, a generation ago, the U.N. was conceived as a world organization with its own military organization that could impose peace on the world, but that dream has long since vanished.

Then it was seen as a research organization, gathering the facts of impending disasters in a hungry world, and as a debating society for conflicting views on the coming age, and occasionally as a weak but symbolic police force between contending armies in Cyprus and the Middle East.

But even in these limited roles, it has been hobbled by the most inadequate communications, and has been reduced to begging Intelsat for free access to the world satellite system, which Intelsat refused.

The experience of the Cambodian incident and the Cyprus war suggests at least a modest remedy. Namely, that an earth-communications satellite should be available to every nation in the world, financed through the United Nations budget, so that potential military crises can be reported and dealt with in time.

This would be no assurance that inexperienced and turbulent revolutionary regimes like the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia would pick up the phone when the bell rings in the Intelsat system; but at least there would be a line of communication that might save lives and might even avoid wars.

The major powers have recognized the need for emergency "hot lines" to avoid misunderstanding and even atomic wars, but the outlook is for conflict in places where there are no quick lines of communications.

Secretary General Waldheim here at the United Nations is eager to assist in the development of an early-warning system, but he has neither the power nor the money to set it up. He needs the support, or at least the understanding of the members of the world organization, and particularly the acquiescence of the major powers. All that is at issue here is merely that modern communications should be used to get the facts of potential wars to the world in time, and that is not asking very much.

NEW YORK TIMES
16 May 1975

U. S. Move Backed In Europe but Some Call it Overreaction

By ALVIN SHUSTER
Special to The New York Times

LONDON, May 15—The freeing of the American vessel Mayagüez was generally approved in Western Europe today but viewed as an effort by Washington to compensate for the recent defeats in Indochina.

Some critics charged that President Ford overreacted to a relatively minor incident and suggested that the Americans should have allowed more time before sending in the marines. And some newspaper editorials, particularly in France, were critical, describing the exercise as an example of unnecessary "gunboat politics."

Many of those interviewed by correspondents of The New York Times, however, reflected understanding of the American action and said that Washington appeared to have no other choice.

While governments withheld any formal comment, several officials said privately that they were relieved that the rescue operation had proved successful and that the United States had demonstrated, in even a limited way, that it was not a helpless giant in the aftermath of the loss of Indochina.

The British, of course, engaged in similar acts in the days when they ruled the waves. They call it the "Nelson touch" after the exploits of their favorite sailor, Admiral Lord Nelson.

"The reaction of the United States appears on present evidence to have been both right and effectively executed," said The Times of London. It said the rescue operation demonstrated that the United States had not lost the will to fight or the ability to mount a quick and effective operation far from its shores.

Some political analysts said that whatever the arguments over the issue of "overreaction," the swift action would serve to reassure those in Europe worried over whether the Americans would become gun-shy in view of the Indochina defeats.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
21 MAY 1975

Ford considering full relations with Peking; faces problems

By Geoffrey Godsell
Overseas news editor of
The Christian Science Monitor

The Ford administration is interested in establishing full diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China when the President visits Peking in the fall. But no final decision has yet been taken; and when it is taken, its nature could depend very much on what happens in Southeast Asia in the weeks ahead — and on China's role there.

Since former President Nixon's visit to China in 1972, mainland China and the U.S. have maintained diplomatic liaison offices in each other's capital. This arrangement left unimpaired the full and formal diplomatic relations between the U.S. and the Chinese Nationalist Government on Taiwan. This continued recognition by the U.S. of the Nationalists on Taiwan puts a brake on the development of any closer association between Washington and Peking.

There are two arguments, according to a well-informed source in Washington, why President Ford believes he must aim sooner rather than later for full diplomatic relations with Peking (and the inevitable accompanying downgrading of the U.S. Embassy in Taipei to perhaps a liaison office). These are:

1. *The desirability* of bringing this about while Chairman Mao Tse-tung and Premier Chou En-lai are still at the helm in China, since only these two veteran figures could probably sell to the rest of the Chinese leadership the hoped-for compromise whereby the U.S. would maintain most of its links with Taiwan and still be allowed to open a full embassy in Peking.

2. The need to complete any downgrading of Taiwan by the U.S. before the presidential election year of 1976. Anything that Mr. Ford's right-wing Republican critics could represent as a sell-out of the Chinese Nationalists might prove a potent weapon in their efforts to discredit him.

As recently as May 7, Mr. Ford said at a news conference that among his aims in the wake of events in Indo-China was "to reaffirm our commitments to Taiwan." Presumably, then, he would seek to keep operative the U.S. security treaty with Taiwan under which the U.S. is committed to help defend Taiwan against armed attack. An armed attempt by the People's Republic to take over Taiwan is in fact unlikely, given the magnitude of the operation that would be needed from the mainland across the 100 miles of the Formosa Strait.

In addition to this military commitment, it can be assumed the U.S. would try to preserve its economic ties with a separate Taiwan and the military and communications facilities it has hitherto had on the island.

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LOS ANGELES TIMES
18 May 1975

SPY PLANES AGAINST MISSILES

U.S. Fought Cloak-and-Dagger War

BY GEORGE MCARTHUR
Times Staff Writer

HONG KONG—In the months just before the American evacuation of Saigon, a cloak-and-dagger air war was going on over North Vietnam—with the Soviet Union playing a role that might have faced the American-Russian policy of detente with another U-2 incident.

The details of this cold war struggle over Hanoi remain secret. The general outlines, however, have been confirmed by several American officials. None, perhaps, was aware of the full story but they agreed on the essential points.

In this esoteric, high-altitude contest—which fortunately produced no casualties but which had the potential for serious repercussions—it was the Soviet Union that pushed aside the restraints that might have been expected from detente.

The struggle revolved around American reconnaissance flights by the SR-71, the super spy plane that flys so high and so fast that it had never even been threatened by the missiles at Hanoi's disposal. The Soviet Union had long given tacit recognition to the existence of these flights.

After the Paris agreements of 1973, the United States cut back sharply on such spy flights. In turn, the Soviet Union, which had always played a significant role in Hanoi's air defenses and kept technical experts on the scene, imposed a veto on the North Vietnamese use of missiles against the spy flights that did take place. In addition, Hanoi had very few of the big SAM missiles at the time—having fired almost all of them against the B-52 raids which preceded the Paris agreements.

In December, 1974, as North Vietnam's buildup aroused ever greater apprehensions in some intelligence circles, the SR-71 flights were increased. This became even more prounced after the battles in January which resulted in the loss of Phuoc Long province to fresh North Vietnamese troops who were evidently getting into position to threaten Saigon itself.

At this time, the chief of staff of the Soviet armed forces, Gen. V. G. Kulikov visted Hanoi. Official sources claim to have information that Kulikov removed whatever restraints then existed on the use of Soviet anti-aircraft missiles—the number of which had been greatly increased after the Paris agreements. The old "flying telephone poles" also had been improved with new modifications.

Kulikov's visit was follwed by another ranking soviet visitor, Deputy Foreign Minister Nikolai Firyubin, who apparently confirmed the earlier military agreements.

At this point the SR-71 flights began sometimes to take on new patterns. Normally the plane operates at altitudes higher than 12 miles. Some flights, according to one official, dropped down to levels close to the plane's margin of safety.

The aim evidently was to tempt the North Vietnamese into disclosing missile locations. The highly sophisticated SR-71 also could have obtained valuable information on electronic defenses on occasions when the North Vietnamese turned on the radar and other electronic gadgetry connected with the missiles.

It is not known whether any missiles were actually fired at the SR-71s. The planes did, however, get a lot of electronic intelligence.

Clearly American officials did not order SR-71 operations at altitudes or under conditions which would have seriously endangered the aircraft—at least in their opinion. But the secret maneuvers must have entailed some risks.

The United States has always been extremely coy about admitting to any SR-71 activity. Flights over the north and south probably have now ceased. The aircraft still has the potential, however, to photograph deep into Vietnam from a flight pattern well out to sea and from extreme altitudes. Such flights may be continuing. One purpose—admitted before the fall of South Vietnam—was to learn as much as possible about what Hanoi was doing with the mass of heavy war material it was capturing.

LOS ANGELES TIMES
14 May 1975

Spoils of War: Reds Inherit U.S. Supplies

Huge Stocks of Rice, Fertilizer Will Ease S. Vietnam Transition

BY GEORGE McARTHUR
Times Staff Writer

HONG KONG—The staggering value of the military plunder which Hanoi's forces captured in the south has been publicly if shamefacedly acknowledged. It is less well known that the North Vietnamese seized a nation relatively bulging with economic and agricultural assets—largely provided by the United States.

The implications of this are that only the grossest kind of mismanagement—which appears unlikely—could make the occupation of the south anything but economically benign.

Appearances to the contrary, South Vietnam was no war-ravaged country at the end. The damage that was evident had largely been wrought by the North Vietnamese themselves, often senselessly.

More important, the North Vietnamese soldiers took over warehouses bulging with rice. There was a mass of essential fertilizer on hand.

This means that the political problems of Hanoi in the south have been enormously lessened for probably one full year, allowing plenty of time for the next rice harvest. There will certainly be political unrest and possibly outbreaks of physical opposition here and there. But in a nation where hunger is the most potent of all political problems, there will be none.

The actual records in American office buildings were largely burned and the South Vietnamese government's records were always a mess. That will hardly be a problem to the military occupation which is now inventorying its assets very thoroughly.

The south had just completed one of its most successful rice harvests in years. There was also an estimated 300,000 tons of American AID rice on hand (plus some rice that had been intended for Cambodia and never got there). In fact, some southern economists were thinking of exporting rice this spring. Almost everyone agreed that with proper management exports could be achieved next year.

With the assistance of American AID experts and money, the Saigon

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government had also begun to build up fertilizer stocks—absolutely essential to the miracle strains that now make up a substantial percentage of delta crops. This fertilizer will go far toward easing any peasant resentment in the delta for at least one year—but by then Hanoi will face a problem.

Another delta problem is petroleum because the tractor, the powered plow and gasoline water pumps and outboard motors are now staples. The old water buffalo frequently went into the cooking pot. But with tight management and a little outside help from the north, the delta can easily be kept running for the next 12 months.

Doubtless the various Communist levels of government and management will take credit for this. The first year, however, will largely be a free gift from the United States and the old Saigon regime.

Hanoi will benefit in other quite visible, even glittering, ways.

Saigon's 15 tons of gold remain in the Central Bank. A good bit has already been written about efforts of President Nguyen Van Thieu to get the gold out of the country.

Evidently several efforts by the generals and others to smuggle at least some of it to Europe failed—the thieves couldn't get everybody paid off properly. The United States Embassy had made plans to get the gold more or less legally flown to American vaults. Again the plan fell through—and one must suspect foot-dragging on the part of officials who still hoped for personal profit—because all the red tape seemed to multiply and time ran out. There is still talk—and nothing more—that Thieu managed to get a few million dollars by ship to Taiwan. So far Asian gold markets have reflected no confirmation.

In addition to the gold, South Vietnam had about $130 million in foreign exchange holdings scattered around, some at home and some in American, French and Swiss banks. As the conquest of South Vietnam is internationally legalized as it probably will be, much of this money will also doubtless flow back to Hanoi, though the amount is obviously questionable.

In addition South Vietnam had about $50 million in drawing rights with the International Monetary Fund. The experts will have to untangle that.

Then there is a question of consumer goods, always in short supply in Hanoi. This may prove something of an embarrassment.

At the time of its collapse, South Vietnam had been in a severe economic depression for a year, mostly affecting the cities. But consumer goods were abundant, even overabundant. Many merchants had bulging warehouses they were unable to unload during a time of unemployment. The invading North Vietnamese troops have thus inherited more refrigerators, washing machines, radios, television sets, electric fans, hi-fi sets, gas and electric stoves and more than the economically pressed residents of Hanoi ever dreamed of.

In addition there is little doubt that the North Vietnamese military forces, already with an eye out for watches and similar items, will confiscate scooters and other motor vehicles in greater abundance than Hanoi has ever seen.

Undoubtedly the straitlaced economic morality of Communist North Vietnam will be tested to find a solution. Whatever the solution, living standards in the south are generally likely to remain higher than those in the north for some time to come.

The headlines of the last days of the war focused in good measure on the destructive battles starting at Ban Me Thout and ending at Bien Hoa. Measured by past standards, however, the overall destruction was minimal. The Communists were able to get the Hue-Da Nang railroad running almost immediately, not because of repair miracles but because the destruction had really been limited to a few bridges of relatively small size.

The vast destruction wrought by rockets and artillery on Bien Hoa, just outside Saigon, was largely a political demonstration. The south had lost the war and was teetering on surrender. Similarly, Communist rockets at Tan Son Nhut, on virtually the final night of the war, wrought widespread destruction, most notably wrecking a new international airline terminal that had been two years under construction.

The South Vietnamese troops gave way to some destruction in the final days but it was minor. Unlike those days of the French pullout of Hanoi in 1954—when some American "spooks" under Gen. Edward Lansdale had rather juvenile visions of leaving nothing but destruction behind—the Americans in Saigon destroyed very little besides communication equipment (one departing American emptied his .45 into an antenna atop the embassy). About the sneakiest thing the Americans did was to insist that all the safes in the embassy—and there were 50 or more—be emptied and then carefully closed so that the North Vietnamese would have to call in safe crackers to make sure no secrets were left behind.

All this is not to suggest that Hanoi took over a blossoming paradise with hardly a problem on the horizon. The reorganization of the country and the shortage of trained people will doubtless make for severe economic turmoil at some time in the future. But for the immediate future the North Vietnamese are getting something of a free ride—largely due to the United States—and they will certainly use it to make political capital.

NATIONAL REVIEW
May 23, 1975

He Will Be Missed

Sydney Schanberg, a reporter for the *New York Times*, was one of a handful of American journalists who chose to remain in Phnom Penh when the Khmer Rouge took over. In one of his last messages to reach the West, Schanberg reported: "I have seen the Khmer Rouge and they are not killing anyone." The sentence aptly summarizes the thousands of words that appeared under Schanberg's byline in the months before the fall of Phnom Penh.

In the March 13 *New York Times*, Schanberg reported that several Cambodian refugees who managed to escape from Communist-held territory had said adverse things about the Communists' authoritarian rule. "Such reports," said Schanberg, "come from areas that are either contested or close to [Lon Nol] government lines—areas where discipline could be expected to be rigid. . . . Such behavior has apparently not been widespread, and some diplomats and other longtime observers suggest that if the country passes to insurgent control there would be no need for random acts of terror. . . . most Cambodians do not talk about a possible massacre and do not expect one."

A few days ago Schanberg arrived in Thailand, just as reports of the Cambodian bloodbath were coming in. U.S. intelligence sources had intercepted Khmer Rouge radio communications. The orders were, according to *Newsweek*, that all members of the Lon Nol army "down to the rank of second lieutenant were to be killed along with their wives." A start had been made with the beheading of eighty officers and wives. It's a shame Schanberg left; the Cambodians need him now more than ever.

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CARL T. ROWAN

WASHINGTON STAR
16 May 1975

A Necessary Reaction

I don't know whether the Cambodian Communists seized the American freighter Mayaguez out of giddiness, stupidity or what. I do know that they could not have picked a more dangerous time for this gambit in small-power stupidity.

I don't know whether Sen. Henry Jackson of Washington and Sen. George McGovern of South Dakota thought about the grim national considerations or not. I am sure that they and some other Democrats erred, both in terms of this nation's well-being and their own political futures, when they implied the United States ought to take a "paper tiger" attitude toward a most grievous national affront.

This was no case of a man suddenly intervening in a matrimonial quarrel of strangers, as one might consider the earlier U.S. intervention in Indochina. This was a case of your boy or mine walking home from school on a public sidewalk, suddenly being grabbed by a hostile neighbor who is gloating over the fact that he dumped garbage on our lawns last week and we took it with little more than a whimper. It was inevitable that President Ford would react the way any proud parent would.

Cambodia created a situation where she either had to surrender the Mayaguez's crew unharmed or face slashing military attacks from the United States.

Why was this?

President Ford and his top advisers knew better than most Americans that the recent debacles in Indochina have had a devastating effect on U.S. prestige in the world. They knew that not only had the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China been further encouraged to "fish in troubled waters," but that even the puniest of nations wanted to make sport of kicking Uncle Sam in the shins.

Ringing in the minds of Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger were a thousand messages of criticism and derision, none more rapier-like than the following by Wolf H. Halsti, one of Finland's leading foreign affairs analysts:

"My confidence in American power is utterly destroyed. A country that does not know how to use the enormous power it has, has none."

Against the background of this kind of talk around the world, the United States simply cannot afford to look gutless and helpless in the face of a brazen act of piracy by a band of ragtag Cambodians.

Perhaps you think the situation was not so serious as to justify military strikes at Cambodia. You, like other Americans, have been inclined to dismiss the criticisms of Asians (Thailand, Singapore, the Philippines) as just the plaints of politicials worried about losing their power and privileges.

But Halsti has no such interest, and listen to what he says in an interview in "Freedom at Issue," the magazine published by Freedom House:

"Why should the East Europeans have any confidence in the United States on America's present showing? What do they see in the United States? An unprecedented moral crisis, a paralysis of leadership and a creeping isolationism. After Vietnam the Americans are in no mood and no position to undertake open-ended foreign commitments . . ."

It was against this sobering background that President Ford did what the circumstances demanded. I support him.

It was Cambodia that foolishly stuck its snickering head too far into the mouth of a wounded tiger.

WASHINGTON POST
17 May 1975

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

Mr. Ford and the Rule of Law

The gamble taken by President Ford in using armed force against Cambodia, starting with air strikes against Cambodian gunboats Tuesday evening, was based above all on this hard conclusion: The U.S. had to seize the occasion of Cambodian piracy to prove it both could and would react with decision and power to international lawlessness.

There was no split of any kind in the National Security Council (NSC). Indeed, every top official in the administration agreed that whatever the risk, a show of American will and power was absolutely essential following the humiliation of South Vietnam.

In ordering American attacks on the Cambodian gunboats to block an obvious Cambodian effort to remove the American crew of the Mayaguez to the Cambodian mainland, neither the President nor the NSC even attempted to figure out an answer to this potentially explosive question: What if the Cambodians should use the gunboat attack as the pretext for murdering some 40 American crewmen?

"Of course we had contingency plans," one top presidential aide told us. "But we couldn't sit around and try to estimate every possible contingency when we are dealing with a primitive government which has virtually no outside contacts with the world. We had to act." In the climatic triumph of Mr. Ford's policy, that question is mooted. But it shows the President's faith—and determination—in the plan he followed.

The underlying assumption of the President's aides was that the U.S. must deal with such an act of piracy as a Western nation acting in a civilized fashion: Demand immediate return of the ship and crew and map a contingency plan to seize both by force if the demand was not met within a reasonable time.

Following seizure of the Mayaguez by Cambodia just after midnight, Sunday, the President allowed almost 48 hours to go by without any military response. Next, the basic plan of isolating the little island in the Gulf of Thailand, where the Mayaguez was held, went astray when Cambodian gunboats moved toward the mainland about 15 miles away. The President then gave his order to halt the gunboats.

At that point, the U.S. went the full and necessary distance to prove what Mr. Ford and his Secretaries of State and Defense, Henry Kissinger and James Schlesinger, had been preaching nonstop ever since the catastrophic end of the Vietnam war: Despite that national humiliation, no foreign country should make the mistake that the United States was discarding its role as world leader, or was reluctant to take strong action where demanded.

Indeed, the private remarks of top officials here make it abundantly apparent that the Mayaguez seizure became the ideal case to prove the point.

In the background was the utter failure of all efforts to open some kind of circuitous diplomatic channel to the revolutionary Cambodian government of the Khmer Rouge. The Soviet Union has been kicked out of Phnom Penh for failure to break with the old regime. The People's Republic of China, according to one high official, informed the U.S. it would try to help, and did so, but proved the point that the jingoistic Cambodian regime was simply beyond reach.

On Tuesday evening, Mr. Ford ordered word passed to congressional leaders that "appropriate action" would be taken. Perhaps in retrospect the President should have summoned these leaders to the White House for a face-to-face conversation. Sen. Mike Mansfield of Montana, the Senate Democratic leader, for example, said later that he had not been "consulted," on the theory he was told, not asked.

Other criticism in a Congress now showing dangerous symptoms of taking over American foreign policy from its feuding committee rooms was also heard, raising ominous questions about a vicious partisan debate erupting from the President's bold action.

But on that point Mr. Ford and his top aides, often indecisive and vacillating on lesser matters, showed no concern this time. They assumed that whatever partisan outcry might ensue, the American people as a whole would react with overwhelming approval to the President's powerful response to an unprovoked act of piracy on the high seas.

"Sure they'll try to demagogue it," one senior presidential aide told us. "That's par for the course. But no one considered that as part of the problem."

Thus, in this first, clear show of American power since the Indochinese fiasco, Mr. Ford has demonstrated what he is often criticized for lacking: a talent for leadership and command, in a case void of ambiguity to him and his advisers. Despite political risks, no one around him exhibited second thoughts about the obligation of the U.S. to underwrite the rule of law in the world.

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U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
12 May, 1975

WITH SOUTH VIETNAM'S FALL— IS THAILAND THE NEXT DOMINO?

Communist victory flags are flying across Indo-China, and Bangkok is uneasy. Rebels are already shooting—and counting on Hanoi's help.

BANGKOK

The "domino theory"—sworn to by many people, scorned by others—will soon be tested here in Thailand.

Two dominoes, South Vietnam and Cambodia, have already fallen to the Communists. A third domino, Laos, is for all practical purposes controlled by Communists in Hanoi.

Now Thailand, once a staunch ally of the U.S. and a base for American air attacks on North Vietnam, is beginning to feel the heat as its neighbors collapse.

In faraway Washington, also, concern is felt about the domino impact of the Communist successes in Indo-China on Thailand and other Asian nations. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger underlined this concern at a news conference on April 29, saying:

"There is no question that the outcome in Indo-China will have consequences not only in Asia but in many other parts of the world.

"To deny these consequences is to miss the possibility of dealing with them. So, I believe there will be consequences. But I am confident that we can deal with them, and we are determined to manage and to progress along the road toward a permanent peace that we have sought, but there is no question that there will be consequences."

Thailand is already afflicted by Communist-run insurgencies in three separate areas—the Northeast, the North and in the Southern tip, along the border with Malaysia. China and, to a much greater extent, North Vietnam have given political support, some weapons and even training to the Thai rebels.

Once Hanoi has tightened its grip on the Indo-China peninsula, the flow of supplies across the Laotian and Cambodian borders is expected to increase. Some experts believe that recruiting inside Thailand will be made vastly easier by the Communist successes in Cambodia and South Vietnam.

Outlasting a welcome. Hoping to ease the anticipated pressure, Thailand already is moving to establish better relations with Hanoi and Peking. The Bangkok Government announced on May 1 that an "enormous withdrawal" of U.S. troops and planes would soon start. Up to 8,000 of the 25,000 U.S. servicemen there are expected to leave.

Hanoi earlier made it clear that it has little interest in a working relationship with Bangkok as long as U.S. forces are still on Thai soil.

Some diplomats believe it is already too late for Bangkok to mend its fences with North Vietnam. Says one:

"After all, Thailand provided bases from which Americans attacked the North Vietnamese. Thailand sent 'volunteers' to fight in Laos, at least 17,000 of them, and the 'Black Leopard' Division to fight Communists in South Vietnam. Hanoi isn't going to forget that easily or soon.

"Also, the Vietnamese Communists are somewhat to the left of the Chinese, and they will feel it important to throw their weight behind many revolutionary forces in Southeast Asia. Thailand is a made-to-order target for intensified insurgency—but without a direct invasion."

Some Thai officials hope that Peking, once it has diplomatic relations with Bangkok, will curb North Vietnam's expansionary designs. Other officials are not at all sure of that. Peking has diplomatic links with Burma and Malaysia—but radio stations in Southwest China continue to

(continued on next page)

TROUBLED THAILAND: Danger on All Sides



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support "liberation movements" in both countries.

A restricted rebellion. Communist insurgency in this country is relatively new—dating back only to the early 1960s. There has never been any full-scale uprising; fighting has been largely confined to light skirmishes between insurgent bands and police or local militia.

The bulk of Thailand's 120,000-man Army has never been put into the struggle, although units are based in the disaffected areas. Nevertheless, one rebel attack on an armored cavalry post in the North recently cost the lives of 17 Thai soldiers. Another firefight, in the Northeast on April 24, resulted in the death of 12 people, including an Army colonel and a major.

The three areas of insurgency:

- The North. In the rugged terrain along the border with Laos, Meo and other hill tribesmen have been in revolt since 1967. Although most of the weapons and other supplies come from Laos, Thai officials fear that China may send in supplies through Northeast Burma.
- The South. Poor plantation laborers and tin-mine workers form the backbone of the rebel organization. Some support is provided by ethnic Chinese Communists who are still dug in in jungle hideouts in neighboring Malaysia. Thai officials expect new weapons to be smuggled in by junk from Communist-controlled Cambodia.
- The Northeast. This is by far the most dangerous of the insurrections. The rebels are Thai citizens but ethnic Laotians, most of them with relatives in the Communist Pathet Lao—a partner in the coalition Government in Vientiane. Some of the Thai rebels have been trained in Hanoi, and supplies move easily across the Mekong River into Thailand. Laos is the "secure border area" that facilitates revolution in a neighboring country.

All told, the insurgents probably do not number more than 8,000 men under arms—3,000 in the North, 3,000 in the Northeast and 2,000 in the South, plus some Communist-led Moslem separatists in the deep South. The rebels probably can count on 10 times that number for support in nonmilitary activities.

In theory, the insurgents are all led by the illegal Communist Party of Thailand, but the propaganda and the ideology come from the "Voice of the People of Thailand," a radio station based at Kunming, China. A training camp called "Hoa Binh"—which, ironically, means peace—is in North Vietnam.

Attracting recruits. Recruiting, particularly in the North and Northeast, is relatively easy for trained Communist cadres. The people are poor and uneducated, and have long been neglected by the Government in Bangkok. And as the flow of weapons from North Vietnam increases, youths in the villages find the romance of taking up guns irresistible.

The Government, on the other hand, has difficulty recruiting officials to work in villages where living conditions are primitive, dialects are hard to learn and chances for promotion are few.

As a result, dealing with the rebels is left largely in the hands of the Thai military, which is in woeful shape. A senior officer explained:

"We are not in a position to defend ourselves. If the Khmer Rouge had kept going after taking Pnompenh, or if the Pathet Lao had crossed the Mekong River, they could have walked almost unhindered to Bangkok."

The Thai Armed Forces are also divided on the nature of the danger. One group wants internal security to be given top priority; another group insists the military should be geared up to resist aggression from outside. A Thai general comments: "Why worry about being invaded by a large army when we can't even subdue the guerrillas operating inside the country?"

One thing stressed by officials in Bangkok: Thailand is not going to go Communist except at gunpoint. The question, then, is whether the country needs and can afford a bigger, more-effective military force.

Since 1965, the United States has given this country more than 600 million dollars' worth of military equipment, plus additional millions in "funded assets"—an arrangement by which the U.S. pays part of the cost of a frigate, for example, and the Thais pay the remainder. The U.S also outfitted 20,000 Thai troops who served in Vietnam and 17,000 who fought in Laos.

Furthermore, the United States provided employment and profits when it began using Thai air bases for the wars in Indo-China. A deepwater port with huge warehouses was built at Sattahip, along with an air base for B-52 bombers at nearby U Tapao.

Now U.S. protection is to be withdrawn within a year, unless Thai leaders change their minds, and the flow of military support seems certain to dry up. There is a degree of bitterness in Bangkok directed at the U.S. over its failure to do more in the last days of Vietnam and Cambodia. Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Pramarn Adireksarn, for example, says the U.S. "can't be trusted." And referring to congressional restraints, Pramarn declared, "The U.S. cannot do what it promises, even if it wants to."

American military commanders believe that a U.S. pullout from Thailand is inevitable, no matter what the Thais finally decide they want. Nevertheless, suggestions are heard that a compromise might be worked out to keep some American forces here.

The U.S. Air Force now has eight tactical squadrons in Thailand—five of F-4 Phantoms, two of F-111s and one of A-7 Corsairs. In addition, there are 15 B-52s at U Tapao, plus support aircraft, totaling 350 planes.

Experts maintain that, with the exception of key bases at U Tapao and Sattahip, the Thai installations could be given up without damaging the U.S. military position. U Tapao would be designated home for a skeleton air force, and Sattahip would be the port for delivery of ammunition and supplies.

Sattahip, especially, is of strategic importance to the U.S., which is facing possible loss of facilities at Subic Bay in the Philippines.

Decision in Washington. The key to what happens may well rest in the hands of Congress. Without appropriated funds, the bases would have to be given back to Thailand.

On the Thai side, the decision depends to a large degree on the extent of hostile Communist activity along the nation's borders.

The Government wants to maintain some of its ties with America. It claims that the U.S. has pledged to honor its military commitments to Bangkok despite planned and future withdrawals of the American forces. With enemies on nearly every border, Thailand realizes it needs the U.S.—as friend and ally.

NEW YORK TIMES
21 May 1975

2 ENVOYS SOUGHT ASIA NEWS CURBS

Asked Voice of America to Play Down April Events

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 20—The United States ambassadors to South Vietnam and Cambodia asked the Voice of America to play down news of the deteriorating situation in Indochina in early April.

Representative Bella Abzug today produced texts of a message to this effect from John Gunther Dean, the last American envoy in Cambodia, and another cablegram from Graham A. Martin, the last American envoy in Saigon.

In testimony before the Government Operations subcommittee on Government information and individual rights, neither Eugene P. Kopp, deputy director of the United States Information Agency, nor Bernard Kamenske, news director of the Voice of America, questioned the authenticity of the messages.

Mr. Martin's cablegram, dated April 6 and classified as "confidential," said "speculation and unofficial comments" would "contribute to apprehentions amongst Vietnamese and Americans."

"Staying with minimum official announcements most helpful," the cablegram went on.

The cablegram from Mr. Dean, dated April 14, said he "strongly" advised the Voice of America against carrying an account of student demonstrations in Phnom Penh at which the resignation of President Lon Nol and the termination of American military aid were demanded. Voice of America coverage could be "misconstrued as representing [United States] mission support for student demands," he explained.

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WASHINGTON POST
18 May 1975

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

Another Foreign Policy Plus for Mr. Ford

On the heels of the spectacular triumph in the Mayaguez incident, Gerald R. Ford's embattled presidency is nearing a second successive foreign policy win: breaking the ominous deadlock with Congress over barring U.S. military aid to Turkey.

More important, the virtual certainty that the Senate will vote Monday to lift the arms embargo assures a delay in the expected closing down by Turkey of vital American base facilities. Once started, that process could erode even more dangerously the strained relations between the United States and its longtime valuable ally.

The private Senate headcount shows a minimum of 53 senators ready to vote to end the arms embargo imposed last fall by the Greek congressional lobby after Turkey's use of U.S. arms in invading Cyprus.

What makes the timing so important is next Wednesday's meeting of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in Ankara. In confidential negotiations with congressmen leading the Greek lobby, administration officials have pointedly warned that Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and his political deputy, Under Secretary Joseph J. Sisco, would find themselves in a diplomatic hornet's nest in Ankara unless Congress showed some give on the arms embargo.

That word has now switched a number of senators. Softening their anti-Turk animus even more, however, is the fact that Monday's vote, unlike the similar vote last fall, *follows* the November election. The well-financed Greek-American lobby had far more leverage last fall.

Sen. Thomas Eagleton (D-Mo.), who led last fall's Senate bar of all U.S. military aid to Ankara, is still opposed. However, Eagleton will confine himself to a speech opposing the amendment, and not make an all-out fight against it.

Only two weeks ago congressional leaders of the Greek lobby privately warned the White House that if the President insisted on forcing a Senate vote now, Kissinger would be "burned to a crisp" in the debate. Following Mr. Ford's new eminence as a strong President boldly moving to assert American rights in last week's dramatic Cambodian rescue, such threats have vanished.

A footnote: The administration has no intention of pressing for an early vote in the House, where the Greek lobby is stronger and shows little interest in compromise. The Turkish government, however, will accept the Senate vote as a signal of major change in Washington, enough to postpone the closing of U.S. bases.

•

Peter Camiel, the shrewd, Philadelphia Democratic Chairman, has moved to within an even shot of becoming a truly national power in his party by unseating tough-talking Mayor Frank Rizzo in Tuesday's Democratic primary.

When we reported from Philadelphia in January, such a political upheaval was out of the question. The law-and-order campaign of ex-Police Chief Rizzo seemed magnetic enough to overcome his flunking a lie-detector test in his poisonous feud with Camiel.

But the gap between Rizzo and state Sen. Louis G. Hill, the regular organization's candidate, has closed rapidly. Rizzo's defeat would be a badly needed plus for organization Democratic politics everywhere, ending the career of a maverick loner (who backed Richard M. Nixon for President in 1972).

It would be particularly remarkable since Hill is a dull and unexciting campaigner tapped by Camiel only after Rep. William Green Jr. chose to stay in Congress and not run for mayor. Camiel, a moderate Democrat, would then attain the level of Mayor Richard J. Daley of Chicago as a muscular proponent of old politics in the fight for the presidential nomination.

The most important reason for the gap closing is Camiel's skillful use of his party organization against what one neutral Democratic leader calls "tremendous pressure" from Rizzo. Despite the pressure, Camiel has harnessed at least 44 of the 69 ward leaders, including the most important wards in middle-income Northeast Philadelphia, where the primary vote will run comparatively high.

The primary has split Philadelphia's labor unions, denying Rizzo the strong AFL-CIO support his backers took for granted five months ago. Rizzo's selection of plumbers' union leader James O'Neill as campaign chief, while failing to consolidate labor backing as intended, has turned his operation over to an amateur not in Camiel's class.

Another major Rizzo mistake was to slate Rizzo-backed candidates for scores of lesser city offices against organization-backed candidates. By challenging Camiel across the board, Rizzo played into his hands and galvanized his organization.

A footnote: If Rizzo wins Tuesday, he could lose in November to Republican mayoral nominee Thomas Foglietta, a respected city councilman who would have strong support from anti-Rizzo Democrats.

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NEW YORK TIMES
18 May 1975

He Was Concerned

About the Legal Prohibition on All Indochina Combat

The Laws Under Which Mr. Ford Took Action

By ANTHONY LEWIS

As the affair of the Mayagüez was played out last week, public and Congressional attention focused largely on questions of war, diplomacy and politics. But the Mayagüez affair also raised profound questions of law and constitutionality. They were very much in the minds of White House lawyers and it was said, President Ford.

The "law" most quoted during the Mayagüez events was the War Powers Act passed by Congress late in 1973 over President Nixon's veto. It asks Presidents "in every possible instance" to "consult" with Congress before sending the armed forces into hostilities, and in any event commands them to "report" to Congress within 48 hours. White House aides did inform leading members of last week's military plans, if not exactly consult them, and the President did send a formal report thereafter.

But the really relevant law was not the general language of the War Powers Act but a specific statute prohibiting American military activity in Indochina. It was passed by Congress in June, 1973,

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and signed into law by President Nixon on July 1. It prohibited all combat activity in Indochina after Aug. 15 of that year.

The language has been re-enacted in each defense appropriations bill since then. In the current law it reads as follows: "None of the funds herein appropriated may be obligated or expended to finance directly or indirectly combat activities by U.S. military forces in or over or from off the shores of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia."

On their face, in the ordinary meaning of the language, the words totally and explicitly prohibit what President Ford did last week. So the question must be: Is there some loophole, some escape from the flat language that appears in the statute book as a command?

This question was discussed last week with President Ford's counsel Roderick Hills, who made clear that it had been a weighty one for him and his colleagues.

Some have suggested—Senator Henry Jackson did last week—that the 1973 law banning Indochina combat was somehow "superseded" by the later War Powers Act. Mr. Hills saw no force in this argument, and no legal comfort for the President. He said the law was on the books and, on its face, would seem to have prohibited use of the funds that in fact were used to send the Marines and aircraft to the Gulf of Siam. But in the unlikely event that a court will try to apply a statute, that would not end the discussion. The court would first look at the legislative history—the debates before passage—to see whether they suggested a different meaning for the words of the statute. And it would measure the act against the Constitution.

The 1973 Congressional debates are not very illuminating in this case. Members did not discuss a situation like that of the Mayagüez. Last week one of the bill's sponsors, Senator Frank Church of Idaho, said he had not intended to keep a President from using force to rescue American citizens. But even the most flexible ideas of statutory interpretation did not allow authors of bills to give ex post facto accounts of their meaning.

The Constitution confided to Congress the power to declare war. Money for the armed forces must also be voted by Congress, in regular appropriations. To use the power of the purse to restrict war-making by the United States thus sounds like an act well within Congress's power, and a traditional way of using the power.

On the other hand, Presidents have for many years committed the armed forces without asking Congress first. The business of fighting enormous wars without a formal declaration, as in Vietnam, is a recent and much-criticized development. But back into the 19th-century Presidents did use the military on their own for such lesser actions as protecting American lives and acceptance of the principle at the time helped set a precedent.

The great legal test of Presidential war powers came when President Truman seized the steel mills in 1952 to prevent a strike during the Korean war. The Supreme Court held the seizure unconstitutional. Justice Robert H. Jackson wrote that the branches of the United States Government are not totally separate; their powers overlap. A President's power is "at its lowest ebb" when he acts against the "will of Congress"; the courts can sustain him then only by holding Congress powerless in the area—and they would hesitate to do that.

Maintaining Equilibrium

"Presidential claim to a power at once so conclusive and preclusive," Justice Jackson wrote, "must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional system."

Mr. Hills, perhaps reflecting that outlook, did not argue directly that the 1973 appropriation act was unconstitutional if applied to restrict a President's power in the Mayagüez circumstances. He was careful, indeed, to say that President Ford had not treated the law as unconstitutional. Rather, he took a more sophisticated position often taken by the Supreme Court when faced with a grave Constitutional question over a statute. That is to give the statute's words a narrow meaning, even a strained meaning, in order to avoid the constitutional question. For example, the Supreme Court, rather than decide whether the Constitution allowed withholding of passports on political grounds, held that the old passport laws did not authorize such withholding.

A court might put it this way, Mr. Hills argued: "We should not assume that Congress would lightly interfere with the true constitutional war powers of the President—and what could be more at the heart of the true power than assuring the free passage of vessels in international waters and the safety of American citizens? Congress has the power of the purse. But if it gives the President armies to command, and the duty, he must exercise it..."

"There is a rational argument," Mr. Hills concluded, "to show that the President did not willy-nilly ignore the law or declare it unconstitutional." Mr. Hills added that the President had discussed the legal issues very seriously with him and his senior counsel and old friend, Philip Buchen.

One curious thing about the role of law in the Mayagüez affair was how little anyone mentioned it. Mr. Hills said he thought that that was unfortunate—that there should have been candid discussion of the law. Very likely politics overwhelmed concern for the law, as it occasionally does, at least during the drama of last week.

The years of Vietnam and Watergate were often said to have carried great lessons about respect for law and the Constitution. If those lessons were learned, there will be further reflection in Congress and the country about the legal basis for the President's military actions in the Mayagüez affair.

Anthony Lewis is a columnist for The New York Times.

NEW YORK TIMES
16 May 1975

CAMBODIANS TELL WHY THEY YIELDED

Official Declares 'Our Weak Country' Could Not Afford Confrontation With U.S.

By Reuters

BANGKOK, Thailand, May 15—The Cambodian Government said today that it had decided to let the American merchant ship Mayagüez go because "our weak country cannot have a confrontation with the U.S.A."

In a broadcast over the Phnom Penh radio, monitored here, Information Minister Hou Nim accused the United States of systematic spying on Cambodia since the Communists took over on April 17. He said the Mayagüez, which was captured last Monday, was only one of several spy vessels seized in the Gulf of Siam.

The minister asserted that the Cambodians had captured several ships "camouflaged as fishing boats and handled by Thai and Khmer crews" in waters near the port of Sihanoukville and near small Cambodian islands in the Gulf of Siam.

"These crews admitted," the minister said, "that they were agents of the C.I.A. who had to establish contact with other agents in hiding on Cambodian soil."

Mr. Hou Nim said that these vessels had moved to within a mile of the Cambodian mainland and that at times their crews had landed on Cambodian islands. He said they dared to undertake such actions "because Cambodia is a small and poor country with a small population that has just emerged from the U.S. imperialist war of aggression."

The minister asserted that the Mayagüez had been intercepted two and a half or three miles east of the Wai Islands. The United States had put the point of interception as eight miles south of the islands, which are about 60 miles off the Cambodian coast.

Mr. Hou Nim charged that the United States was "contesting our right to guard our own maritime domain because of our own weakness."

"The American Government and President Ford must be held responsible by our people and all the peoples of the world," he went on.

He said that on one of the vessels "camouflaged as a fishing boat" that had been intercepted off Pring Island, opposite Sihanoukville, "there were seven Thais, armed with two rifles, explosives, grenades, mines and ammunition as well as very powerful American-made telecommunications equipment."

According to the minister, the seven crewmen told the Cambodians that they were C.I.A. agents trained in Thailand with a mission "to carry out destruction and establish contact with other agents who had stayed in Cambodia after the defeat of the Americans."

He charged that the Mayagüez had clearly entered Cambodian waters on an espionage mission.

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Don Oberdorfer

East Asia: An Uncertain Future

TOKYO—A senior Philippine planner now "reassessing" his country's security wonders when and whether the Soviet fleet will base itself for Asian voyages at the former U.S. base at Camranh Bay. A Singapore businessman asks for a report on the size and competency of Thailand's army. A Soviet ambassador, over tennis, tells a ranking Japanese politician that the time is right for a Moscow-Tokyo nonaggression pact. An international banker with responsibility for energy matters inquires about the safety of South Korean investments in view of a possible new invasion from the North.

Throughout the vast and varied region of East Asia, the recent collapse in Indochina has set off tremors of speculation, reassessment and concern. Not for three decades has the region been so much in flux. All indications are that this is only the early stage of fundamental shifts in thought and action — quite possibly the most important changes in the area since the upheavals of World War II.

The view from Washington centers on American commitments and assurances, as if the region were waiting to be acted upon by the United States. The view from Asia is quite different. In five weeks of travel in Southeast and Northeast Asia since my departure from Saigon on April 10, I found alliances and allegiances to be shifting and new ideas in motion. The pieces on the chessboard have been suddenly shaken out of position, and even the rules seem to be changing. Nobody can quite identify the game yet, much less the intermediate moves or final outcome. Even so, some initial impressions come through clearly.

The United States, which has been the central power in East Asia since World War II, has become one of several central powers. U.S. decision and action are still important, but they are no longer nearly all-important.

Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik said recent events have brought about "a new geopolitical configuration in Southeast Asia to which all nations have to adapt themselves." Asians are masters at adapting to nature, to fate, to outside and internal forces beyond their control, and they are well into the process of adjustment now. Asian leaders could see what was coming well in advance of the final debacle in Indochina. For many months they had been cautiously forging or reinforcing their ties to China, the Soviet Union and the now-formidable regional power centered in Hanoi. This process has accelerated and taken on new meaning since the fall of Phnom Penh on April 17 and of Saigon on April 30.

The recent whirlwind U.S. action to to recapture the freighter Mayaguez and its crew has demonstrated the fact that the United States remains an important military power in the area. But new limitations, arising from the new configuration in East Asia, were also evident. The Thai government's strong objections to the use of Thai bases for the operation against Cambodia make these installations of doubtful value in any future Indochina incidents, even if Thailand should reconsider its earlier decision to close the bases within a year. In this, the Thais are motivated not by anti-Americanism so much as by the need to accommodate the suddenly important interests of the new and nearby regimes in Cambodia and Vietnam.

Use of the existing U.S. bases in Japan and the Philippines to mount future combat operations in Southeast Asia is likely to be sharply limited in view of newly-forged diplomatic relations of Tokyo and Manila with the Communist governments in the area. The Phillipines' seemingly puzzling restrictions on the use of Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Base by U.S.-sponsored Saigon refugees is a hint of what is to come. Manila's edginess had roots in a staff protest from the Hanoi government, delivered secretly in Paris, against Phillipine participation in the eariler evacuation of Danang.

Though diminished militarily, the United States remains the single most important power in the region economically. The only serious rival for trade and investment is Japan, which in turn is dependent in large degree on the United States for its markets and prosperity. If Washington's influence is reduced, the same cannot be said for that of New York, Chicago, Akron and Detroit. It is on these markets for raw materials and manufactured goods that Asian hopes for better living standards—a prerequisite for internal stability—largely depend.

In highly sophisticated fashion many Asians are turning to Communist diversity—rather than U.S. military strength—as a source of potential security. National leaders and diplomats are calculating and taking comfort from the deep antagonisms between China and the Soviet Union and, on a smaller but vitally important scale, between North Vietnamese and South Vietnamese, and between them both and Cambodians and Laotians.

In a number of Asian capitals the difference between optimists and pessimists is that the former believe it will take several years at least for the victors of Indochina to stabilize their relationships with one another before turning their new found power toward their neighbors. The pessimists are not sure that it will take so long.

One grave concern throughout the region centers on the billions of dollars in usable American weapons—particularly small arms, grenades, land mines, mortars, battlefield rockets and naval craft—recently inherited by a Vietnamese Communist army that does not need them. Almost every Southeast Asian country is afflicted by insurgent groups—often from ethnic minorities—in sparsely populated or disadvantaged areas. China and the Soviet Union have kept most of these fraternal insurgencies on short rations and outmoded weapons. This could change dramatically if the Vietnamese succumb to the temptation to become arms merchants or fraternal benefactors. The glut of modern weapons is considered a more serious threat than any spreading ideological infection among potential "dominoes."

In Northeast Asia, which is far more important to the United States than Southeast Asia, recent events seem to have enhanced the U.S.-Japan alliance in curious and unexpected fashion. Here the most significant thing is what hasn't happened in Japan.

Longstanding apprehension has been felt in many quarters—most recently expressed in blunt terms by Philippine Foreign Minister Carlos P. Romulo—that a worried Japan could turn away from the U.S. security umbrella toward its own remilitarization, conventional and nuclear. There is no sign of this, and every sign to the contrary. The initial reaction of Japan's government and power structure is to hug the U.S. "security blanket" a bit tighter in realization of its importance to stability in and around Japan.

The main concern of Tokyo at the moment is not Indochina, which is nearly 2,000 miles away and of peripheral interest, but South Korea, which is 115 miles away across a narrow strait. Given Japan's geography and resources, it is doubtful that a unified Korea under Communist rule would pose a realistic threat. But a Communist takeover of Korea by force under present circumstances would demolish the remaining credibility of the United States security treaty, the pillar of foreign policy for the world's first unarmed industrial power. This could indeed turn Japan toward revolution, whether from the right or left, and swift rearmament. As a major power, Japan is one of the few "swing countries" whose turn to new policies and alliances would profoundly affect events throughout the world. Japan's GNP is third in the world and about five times as large as the combined GNP of the rest of East Asia, excluding China. Japan's GNP is about twice that of China.

In East Asia today the greatest constant is uncertainty, and the greatest need is time to take account of events and changes and to sort things out. Despite the widespread expectation that South Vietnam would not survive in the long run, the collapse came so quickly that nearly every nation—Communist, U.S.-Allied and neutral—was caught unprepared. Because of the current American economic slump and political uncertainty, the sudden collapse probably made the United States seem more impotent than it really is.

Having failed in Indochina largely through ignorance of Asian ways, the United States needs to be more attentive—rather than less—to trends of thought and action in the region. The United States is still an important power, probably the most important single power. But it must find new ways to listen to and work with Asians, giving greater emphasis to political and economic relationships as military options are diminished.

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Why America will not be pushed around any more

In the second of three reports on a recent tour to study the American political scene, GEOFFREY SMITH examines the American response to Vietnam.

The episode of the Mayaguez illustrates one American response to the Vietnam catastrophe: the determination not to be pushed around. This is the reaction not only in the White House but also among senior legislators in both Houses of Congress. The danger of allowing friend and foe alike to become uncertain of the solidity of American assurances is fully appreciated. That is why, for example, there is for the moment less pressure from Congress than there used to be for the withdrawal of American troops from Europe. A number of those who favoured the proposal now concede that this is not the time.

The President's handling of this particular incident in the Gulf of Thailand may well have done something to restore the battered national self-esteem. But nobody travelling around the United States in recent weeks could doubt that the most widespread response to Vietnam is a general scepticism of foreign commitments. For the moment this is an inclination not a settled conviction, no more than the snap reaction of bewildered people in the first flush of failure. It is not strong enough to pressure men who know their own mind.

For the time being it will certainly be the attitude of the established men of power in Washington that will be decisive. But will that remain true once the United States has recovered from its sense of shock? One of the lessons of Vietnam is that the resolve of the Administration, even when supported initially by Congress, is not enough these days to safeguard a foreign policy against erosion by public opinion. To prevent that happening again there will have to be both a re-definition of American foreign policy, which is demanded on all sides,

It is easier, of course, to call for a new statement of foreign policy than to provide it. The dilemma is obvious. What is required is some limitation of commitments to remove the expectation that wherever a bomb may drop an American soldier must march. But if a shortened list of hard commitments is publicized it could be interpreted as an open invitation to attack any vulnerable friend not included. It would also force the United States Government to incur all the odium of making harsh choices in hypothetical situations.

Some thoughts are turning in a more hopeful direction: to specifying in broad terms the criteria that would have to be satisfied before American military assistance was provided. The best criteria would seem to be a combination of American national interest and the existence of a firmly established local regime with the effective support of its people. This would not mean that only parliamentary democracies could qualify, but it would seek to avoid a repetition of the tragedy that comes from defending and promoting a political shell. It would then be possible to indicate countries in sensitive areas which clearly met these conditions without setting out an exhaustive list. That would scale down the extent of American commitments while providing the most necessary assurances and preserving a reasonable freedom of manoeuvre.

Such a redefinition of foreign policy would have to come from the Administration. The cooler heads in Congress know that while they can intervene decisively on particular issues they cannot develop and pursue a consistent policy across the board. What they want is to participate more fully in the dialogue which goess to the making of a consistent foreign policy. The recent conflicts in this field between Congress and the Administration have revolved around the personality of Dr Kissinger. One respected and influential Democratic Senator remarked that if he were succeeded as Secretary of State by Mr Elliot Richardson to morrow there would be an immediate closing of the ranks to develop a new bipartisan foreign policy.

Now in the days of his travail, Dr Kissinger's achievements may be too easily undervalued. But they were obtained by a highly personalized style of diplomacy. It is not a style that is well suited either to fashioning a new concordat with Congress or to the careful elucidation of a revised foreign policy to a doubting public. The need for that becomes evident as one appreciates how many otherwise well informed Americans are unaware of the rationale for some of their most fundamental policies in this field.

Time and again, for example, there is the blithe assumption that American forces could safely be brought home from Europe if only their European allies would put more troops in the field, which fails to appreciate that only American troops on the ground in Europe can give credibility to the American nuclear guarantee—which in turn is still necessary to preserve the psychological balance in Europe.

Geoffrey Smith

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
23 MAY 1975

Democracies, unite!

By Adlai E. Stevenson III

Washington

The time has come for a serious debate over American foreign policy. If we learn from our mistakes in Indo-China, instead of repeating them, the United States could emerge again as the leader of the free world, the architect of new policies and new international institutions geared to the realities of a new, interdependent, revolutionary world.

The U.S. is, by any measurement but one, the strongest nation in the world. And I believe the American people, stripped of complacency by our failures in South Vietnam and elsewhere, are ready to unite behind a policy that will give the U.S. a new and more hopeful role in the world. The public is ready to be exalted to high purposes by leaders who will lead and not deceive. But that is the measurement by which we fall short. The leaders have not led. They have deceived. They have been proved wrong. And now they have no new ideas, and we are adrift upon a troubled sea.

We will be in danger of repeating past mistakes if the administration, in an effort to arrest operation of the domino theory, reaffirms commitments in Asia without first reexamining them. We must avoid reinforcing governments no more capable of governing than the succession of unpopular regimes which failed in South Vietnam.

The domino theory is valid. But the U.S. gave it validity by creating the dominoes in Cambodia and South Vietnam. It is time to stop creating dominoes. For 30 years our policy has been defensive; it has compulsively resisted a form of government called communism. To resist one form of repression in North Vietnam, it supported another in South Vietnam. It created a domino. And then, inconsistently, it subsidized war against communism in Indo-China at the same time it was subsidizing detente with the supercommunist power in Moscow.

It is such implausibilities that undermine U.S. authority in the world. Our efforts to contain communism in Indo-China failed not because of any mass adherence to the doctrines of Lenin and Marx, but because of nationalism. The U.S. was fighting history and forces that are irreversible. They were irreversible in China, before Indo-China. These forces of humanity seeking bread and freedom have been irreversible since 1776. The Soviets and Red Chinese discreetly aligned themselves with such forces in Indo-China; there, as in other parts of the world, the U.S. acted from habit which dictates indiscriminate commitments to the defense of noncommunist regimes.

The Secretary of State has said that the U.S. should honor its commitments. It should. But the crucial question, for the present and the future, is not how faithful we are — but how wise we are; not whether we honor our commitments — but whether we can make and maintain commitments in accordance with our law that conform to our best principles — commitments that justify the sacrifices we must make, commitments that offer hope of success rather then the prospect of failure,

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commitments that are clearly related to our strategic interests. The first lesson of our involvement in Indo-China is that there are commitments and commitments — wise and unwise commitments, worthy and unworthy commitments. And the challenge to our diplomacy in the immediate future is to learn how to distinguish between the two.

I believe with Jefferson and his compatriots of 200 years ago that America should be committed to liberty and not to despotism, that we should align ourselves not with the military dictators and juntas doomed by history, but with peoples and nations whose devotion is to human freedom and whose own energy and zeal and vitality make it clear that they are prepared and able to help themselves.

The commitments of the future must recognize the interdependence of the world, bound together, as all its parts are, by trade and investment and the necessities of national security in a nuclear world — a world crying out for common efforts against mankind's age-old scourges of hunger and disease and ignorance and oppression and war. Our national ideals and sound national commitments can pull that world together and bind us with true friends in high and common purposes.

We ought, I suggest, to make our first order of business the reconstruction of an alliance binding together the democracies of Europe, North America, and Japan. Such an alliance could once again become the collective basis for security, prosperity, and also for action upon such large questions as nuclear proliferation and access to such vital commodities as oil at reasonable prices. Such an endeavor will be led by the United States or not at all.

That is the choice and the hope, the opportunity which should be underscored as we put Vietnam behind us and face up to a murky but promising future.

Mr. Stevenson is a U.S. Senator from the state of Illinois.

NEW YORK TIMES
29 May 1975

Tokyo and Washington

By John W. Lewis and Franklin B. Weinstein

STANFORD, Calif.—No one can say for sure how Japan will respond in the long run to the Indochina debacle. Party factionalism, domestic preoccupations, and a disposition not to ponder questions that weigh so heavily on Americans all diffuse Japanese responses on such matters. Though the Vietnam issue has occasionally stirred passions in Japan, most Japanese have tended to view Vietnam as a remote land of peripheral interest to them.

The psychological distance between Japan and Vietnam is often forgotten by Americans. For example, Secretary Kissinger's reaffirmation of American security guarantees when Foreign Minister Kiichi Miyazawa visited Washington last month coincided with the collapse of America's Indochina allies.

Americans therefore tended to assume that Tokyo's interest in such guarantees had to be tied to that collapse. Senior Japanese officials, however, insist that the question of guarantees arose not because of Indochina, but in response to the ruling Liberal Democratic party's debate on ratification of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty.

While the initial Japanese reaction to the denouement in Indochina seems mainly one of relief that the war is over, the war's end creates troubling new uncertainties about American policy. The Japanese concern is no simple apprehension of a Japan buried beneath fallen dominoes. Nor is it a question of a clear-cut yes or no on America's credibility.

At the root of Japanese uneasiness lies a belief that Washington's limited understanding of Asia's changing realities and, indeed, insensitivity to those matters that most trouble Japan raise doubts about the possibility of any American security guarantees. Rocked by a series of Nixon shocks in recent years, many Japanese have grown fearful lest American leadership again act precipitously. This fear is heightened by concern about the adequacy of arrangements for Japanese-American consultation and sharing of intelligence data and by questions about the precise meaning of the American nuclear umbrella.

Japanese anxieties about their security tend to focus on Korea, but any either-or pronouncements about American commitments there usually fall wide of the mark. Even Japanese who view with alarm the prospect of a Communist South Korea are keenly aware of the Seoul Government's narrowing political base and the heightened possibility that an insurgency, perhaps with ambiguous North Korean support, might develop.

They can easily imagine circumstances where United States intervention to preserve a non-Communist South Korea might insure a Communist victory and deepen its ultimate impact. Though they prefer a divided Korea, they fear that a clumsy intrusion of American power might increase Chinese or Soviet involvement and make Japan a more inviting target.

The key unanswered questions for Japan concern the conditions under which American commitments to South Korea would be honored. How would Washington determine a minimal United States military-force level in Korea? Would the United States rush to the aid of a Seoul Government racked by internal dissension labeled pro-Communist? In a Korean crisis what role would Tokyo play in any decision to make use of United States bases in Japan?

Secretary Kissinger is probably right when he remarks that "we must be very careful in the commitments we make, but . . . we should scrupulously honor those commitments we do make." But what of commitments already made? If we allow ourselves to be bound indefinitely by commitments made under circumstances that have drastically changed, we invite disaster. If, as Mr. Kissinger says, we must be more selective in the commitments we make, does not the same logic lead us to be more discriminating concerning commitments already made?

As Washington continues seeking to minimize the impact of the Indochina debacle, we believe there is a distinct danger that the United States will overreact by rigidifying earlier commitments that, in light of changing circumstances, may no longer serve either American or Japanese interests.

About the continued mutuality of Japanese and American security interests there can be no doubt. But it is important to maintain a clear understanding of the specific hows and whys of implementing United States commitments in Asia. And we must distinguish between commitments and obsession, between actions that enhance mutual security and those that temporarily support particular ruling groups.

John W. Lewis is director of Stanford University's program for the study of arms control and disarmament. Franklin B. Weinstein is director of Stanford's project on United States-Japan relations.

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George F. Will

Victory in the Sheep Meadow

Last Sunday about 50,000 peace activists gathered for a last hurrah and hootenanny at the Sheep Meadow in Manhattan's Central Park. There, at the scene of so many peace rallies, they celebrated the peace that has come to Indochina.

It was like the good old days, with the folk singers and congressmen, and "the kids" who have kids now—kids clamoring for ice cream bars. Alas, one kid, that pest, little Peterkin, was not there to ask his question:

"But what good came of it at last?"
Quoth little Peterkin.
"Why that I cannot tell," said he
"But 'twas a famous victory."

'Twas a humdinger of a victory party but, according to the New York Times, it was tinged with melancholy:

"It was a joyous all-day carnival of songs and speeches in the perfect sunshine, hugging reunions of people who had last met at one demonstration or another. For some, there was an undercurrent of sadness, as if something more than the war—youth, perhaps—had ended too."

Ah, sweet bird of youth, flying away from the Sheep Meadow. But it was youth well spent, according to singer Peter Yarrow, who remembers singing during the moratorium in Washington in November 1969:

"I remember the feeling then—that somehow by coming together we could make a life in which people would not kill or hurt each other any more."

Sing a little louder, Yarrow. Your message has not been received by the victors in Cambodia who are administering the peace you craved. In Cambodia today life is less than an all-day hugging carnival.

With fire and sword the country 'round
Was wasted far and wide
And many a childing mother there
And newborn baby died.
But things like that, you know, must be
At every famous victory.

In Cambodia, the Communists, running true to form, are concentrating their fury on the ultimate enemy of any Communist regime, the people. The Communists have emptied the cities, driving upwards of 4 million people—young and old, childing mothers and newborn babies, the healthy, halt and lame—on a forced march to nowhere, deep into the countryside where food is scarce and shelter is scarcer still.

Even hospitals have been emptied, operations interrupted at gunpoint, doctors and patients sent packing. The Communists call this the "purification" of Cambodia.

This forced march will leave a trail of corpses, and many more at its destination, wherever that is. But this is, according to the Communists, not an atrocity, it is a stern "necessity."

The Detroit Free Press contained a droll (I hope it was meant to be droll) sub-headline on events in Cambodia: "Reds Decree Rural Society." If one kind of society offends you, decree another.

Communism, like its totalitarian sibling, fascism, is the culmination of a modern heresy: People are plastic, infinitely malleable under determined pounding. And society is a tinker toy, its shape being whatever the ruling class decrees.

To create a New (Soviet, Chinese, German, Cambodian) Man—and what totalitarian would aim lower?—you must shatter the old man, ripping him from the community that nourishes him. Send him on a forced march into a forbidding future.

He may die. If he survives he will be deracinated, demoralized, pliant.

There is no atrocity so gross that American voices will not pipe up in defense of it. Today they say: It is "cultural arrogance" for Americans to call this forced march an atrocity, when it is just different people pursuing their "vision."

This is the mock cosmopolitanism of the morally obtuse. Such people say: "Only ideologically blinkered" Americans mistake stern idealism for an atrocity just because it involves the slaughter of innocents. Such people will never face the fact that most atrocities, and all the large ones, from the Thirty Years War through Biafra, have been acts of idealism.

Of course, one must not discount sheer blood lust, and the joy of bullying. Totalitarian governments rest on dumb philosophy and are sustained by secret police. But they are a bully's delight.

Totalitarians have never been without apologists here, people who derive vicarious pleasure from watching—from a safe distance, of course; from the Sheep Meadow, with ice cream bars, if possible—other people ground up by stern "necessities."

Apologists say that totalitarians only want totalitarianism for the sake of the revolution. The apologists, being backward, have got things backward.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
16 MAY 1975

Ford's firmness

President Ford is to be commended for his handling of the Mayaguez incident. He acted with prudence, deliberation, and courage. Rightly, he tried first to secure return of the vessel and its crew by diplomatic means. Cambodia's failure to respond left him no choice but to take military action.

This was an instance of firm leadership under difficult and delicate circumstances.

There is need now to view the event with a sense of proportion. The tendency by some to gloat that the U.S. has demonstrated its "strength" in the aftermath of defeat in Vietnam should be suppressed. Hyperbole is self-defeating. This was not the use of power to safeguard America's or another nation's security. It was the use of power for the legitimate and circumscribed purpose of protecting American lives and property. The point is the U.S. could not permit a nation to flout international law and arbitrarily seize its ships and citizens on the seas.

This is not to deny, however, the complicating factors surrounding the capture and retrieval of the Mayaguez — and the impact of the American action in broader foreign policy terms. The seizure looked very much like a defiance of the U.S. In this context the use of counterforce is bound to be seen as a demonstration of Washington's willingness to protect its interests with toughness. Whatever the public rhetoric of governments, we suspect many nations in Asia (possibly even many Thais) are relieved to see this is so.

Nor should it be forgotten that Moscow and Peking, whose perceptions are most vital to America's security, are watching closely. Can it be doubted that the Chinese or Russians would read a failure of the U.S. to act in its legitimate interests as a sign of weakness?

The repercussions of the American action have yet to be fully felt. Many problems loom. Many questions will have to be sorted out in Washington. U.S. ties with Thailand are further frayed because of the landing of marines there to carry out the Mayaguez operation. Events in Laos are moving toward a communist takeover.

There seems little doubt that the marine operation will solidify communist anti-Americanism, and the crucial question is what the U.S.-Cambodian confrontation spells for future relations in the region. This is hardly an auspicious beginning for a new relationship with Phnom Penh, whose motives in seizing the Mayaguez are still unclear.

All one knows is that the Cambodians are extremely sensitive to what they term "foreign imperialism." The new leaders are militant, radical, and determined to demonstrate their country's independence.

That goal must be honored. It goes without saying Cambodia's territorial integrity must be respected and there must be no interference in its domestic affairs as it grows toward a new political and economic order. But a time will come when Cambodia will want trade and other relations with the rest of the world. It must therefore learn that if it is to be accepted as a member of the international community, it will have to abide by international norms of responsible behavior.