NEWS, VIEWS and ISSUES

INTERNAL USE ONLY

This publication contains clippings from the domestic and foreign press for YOUR BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use of selected items would rarely be advisable.

No. 10

16 MAY 1975

25X1A

[redacted]

Destroy after backgrounder has served its purpose or within 60 days.

Governmental Affairs

THE NEW YORK TIMES, SATURDAY, MAY 10, 1975

Chief of C.I.A.'s Latin Operations Quits To Defend Agency Before the Public

By LINDA CHARLTON
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 9—For 25 years David A. Phillips has been, by trade, a spy, and, although he might protest the label—he would call himself a clandestine employe of the Central Intelligence Agency—he does not apologize for the occupation.

"There's no question in my mind that I have spent the last quarter of a century being useful," he said in an interview.

But there are questions in many other minds, questions raised by allegations that the agency has conducted domestic spying operations, proscribed by its charter, questions that have now spread to include the C.I.A.'s permitted function abroad.

And so David Phillips, 52 years old, chief of Latin-American operations at the C.I.A. for the last two years and station chief in several Latin-American countries before that, resigned yesterday to start a self-assigned job as defender of the agency. In his words, he wants "to explain the C.I.A. and the intelligence establishment and the role that it has in an American society."

Group Organized

To do this he has organized the Association of Retired Intelligence Officers, and says about 160 of the 400 persons he has sent letters to have already joined, paying a $10 fee. Its role, he said, is to make speakers available, at no cost beyond expenses, to anyone who wants to listen.

Mr. Phillips who says his income dropped from $36,000 to $16,000 at retirement, already has a couple of speeches in New York City scheduled for next week.

He seems likely to be a good speaker, for even in an informal interview over drinks he talked in what sounded at first almost like prepared statements, careful in syntax, excellent in diction and inflection, the sentences complete.

It turned out that he was once an actor—"an incompetent actor," he said firmly—before a stint as a World War II bombardier and, briefly, as editor of an English-language paper in Chile called The South Pacific Mail.

"It was there," he said, "that I was first approached by United States intelligence to cooperate." By 1950, he said, he was working fulltime for the agency—but posing either as a Foreign Service officer or a businessman.

He said he had chosen Chile as a place to work from an encyclopedia "because it said you could ski in the Andes in the morning and swim in the Pacific in the afternoon. This is possible, but it is arduous."

He lived in Chile for more than six and a half years, and was running the agency's Latin-American operations at the time that the Marxist government of President Salvador Allende Gossens was violently overthrown—allegedly with the active encouragement of the agency.

Tomorrow Mr. Phillips plans a news conference to talk about what the C.I.A. actually did do in Chile, he said, as opposed to what it is rumored to have done. He would say nothing more until then, nothing beyond a statement that "we were indeed preserving some sectors of Chilean society." He would not explain.

But the "freedom to talk" about it is perhaps the basic reason for his resignation, he said. He says he wants to "help dispel the myth" that "the C.I.A. is composed of unprincipled people interfering in the private lives of other people around the world."

Mr. Phillips, who denied that he is receiving support other than moral from the agency or any of his colleagues there, is obviously not planning to disclose anything that the agency wants kept secret. Besides, he said, there are "good secrets, bad secrets and nonsecrets."

There are also some entirely personal and domestic reasons for his decision to speak up for the C.I.A., beyond his conviction that the agency is being defamed and, perhaps, destroyed, he said.

There was, he recalled, the moment when he had to tell one of his teen-age children—he and his wife, both married before, have seven children between them—that "father, after all, had not been a foreign service officer or a businessman but an intelligence officer."

'But That's Dirty'

This was the fifth time he had done this, he said, and in the past it had been a "pleasant experience." But, he said, "the reaction this time was, 'But that's dirty!' My reaction to that was that it's just a part of the current misconception about C.I.A., period."

He said his decision to get out of the agency to "defend and explain" it, also was based on a feeling that the agency was the victim of a "time lag."

"The activities that were deemed necessary and indeed were popular previously are no longer so," he explained.

What sort of activities? "Such as sustaining democratic institutions in Europe in the postwar era." He would not elaborate, but gave another example: such as "helping friends to maintain themselves" during the time in the nineteen-sixties when "Fidel Castro was sponsoring the export of violent revolution" in Latin America. Again, no details.

Mr. Phillips believes that the agency will be found "not guilty of having established a pattern which threatens the civil liberties of Americans" when the Congressional investigations of the C.I.A. are completed, and for that reason he believes that Congress is "the absolute salvation of the C.I.A."

Beyond that, there is another question being asked in some quarters these days: Should this country have such an agency? This is not a question for him to answer, Mr. Phillips said. But when he gave an answer:

"The world has been a tough place from the beginning. I know, after spending my adult life abroad, that it continues to be a tough place filled with dark alleys. Some of the nation's work has had to be performed in these byways."

What is the nation's work, then? "Aaah"—a sign of acknowledgement. "An important part of this nation's work is to guarantee its survival."

So it is survival that makes the C.I.A. necessary? "Absolutely."

Are there some things a nation should not do to survive? "You are asking me a question that others should answer."

Earlier, after internal turmoil that was visible in his face, Mr. Phillips had agreed to let himself be quoted in acknowledging, "The question of whether any country needs or should have an intelligence organization such as C.I.A. is a valid subject for argument."

LOS ANGELES TIMES
11 May 1975

CIA Kept Out of Plot on Allende, Ex-Agent Says

BY RONALD J. OSTROW
Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON—The former chief of Latin American operations for the CIA said Saturday that the agency, breaking its practice, twice instructed its agents to sever contacts with Chileans plotting the overthrow of President Salvador Allende.

David A. Phillips, who retired Friday from his CIA post to organize a defense of the embattled agency, said the unusual step had been taken because CIA officials were convinced that the United States would be accused of helping overthrow the world's first popularly elected Marxist president.

The assertion by Phillips, 52, who is forming what he calls the Assn. of Retired Intelligence Officers, is fresh evidence in that continuing controversy over what role the United States may have played in Allende's overthrow and subsequent death in 1973.

Government officials have testified at congressional hearings that the United States had reports that a coup was planned but had no way of verifying them.

Phillips told a press conference that a major responsibility of CIA station chiefs abroad was to advise the American ambassador and Washington policymakers if an unexpected change of government was imminent.

"If any group achieved the clout where they might actually carry out assassination, CIA is derelict if they do not have an agent in that group to forewarn our country," Phillips said.

But in the Chilean case, he said, his office sent two cables—one on May 8, 1973, and the other 15 days later—instructing CIA operatives to terminate contacts with any coup plotters.

Phillips said that the agents had protested after receiving the first cable that they could not do their job if they discontinued such involvement.

Phillips recalled the second cable as saying: "This one is a little different. It looks like there is really going to be a coup, and we certainly will be accused, and consequently you are not to be in touch with the coup plotters . . . you are not to give them any encouragement."

Asked whether, despite the break-off with the plotters, the CIA had known in advance of the coup, Phillips said, "indeed we did. We knew it was going to take place about 30 times in the 10 months before it took place—because that's the way coups go."

He added that "it is true that just before the coup we had information that indicated more strongly than [illegible] probably would occur

when it did—and it did."

Phillips said the CIA had not warned Allende because there was no way of being sure the coup would be carried out.

"If we were to go in Chile—or almost every other Latin country—and tell the local government every time we had heard information there was about to be a coup, they would stop talking to us in about two months," he said, "because they're nearly always called off."

Phillips asserted that the CIA had not supported or encouraged the plotters and said the overthrow of Allende "was a tragic event."

"It should never have happened," he said. "Where you have your first elected Marxist president anywhere in the world, obviously the way that man should leave office is to be voted out of office, and that's the only way. . . .

"We and the U.S. government would have much preferred for the coup not to have taken place so there could have been elections."

Phillips denied several times "that CIA was responsible for the death of Allende . . . CIA did not fund the strikes which led to the coup that deposed Mr. Allende nor did we encourage the plotters who planned and conducted the coup.

"Other activities we did undertake in Chile, to preserve its democratic sectors until the 1976 elections could be held. It was our estimate that, given the absolutely disastrous decline in the Chilean economy during Mr. Allende's presidency, he had little chance to win those elections if the democratic sectors could hold out that long."

He did not elaborate on what steps the CIA had taken, but U.S. officials have acknowledged that $8 million was channeled into Chile during the Allende era to certain newspapers and non-Communist political parties. Officials said the purpose had been to bolster Democratic institutions in Chile that they contended were threatened by Allende's rule.

If the CIA's information about the coup had been assessed as solid, the question of whether to advise Allende "would have been a decision reached at the highest levels of the U.S. government—much higher than the forum in which I sat," Phillips said.

Phillips' choice of words was interesting because Jack Kubisch, an assistant secretary of state, told a Senate foreign relations subcommittee in 1973 that officials at "the highest level" in Washington had decided not to intervene in the Chilean turmoil, although they had word of the coup 10 to 16 hours before it occurred.

Spokesmen for the Department of State and for the White House later denied that the United States had known about the coup in advance, saying the information had been regarded as false.

Phillips, commenting on Cuban Premier Fidel Castro's recent denial of reports that he had somehow been involved in the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, said he agreed completely with Castro.

"Based on all the information available to me, which is considerable," Phillips said, he is convinced Lee Harvey Oswald assassinated Kennedy and "that he did it alone."

Phillips said he had been stationed in Mexico City, watching the Cuban Embassy, when Oswald went there seeking permission to travel to Cuba.

"It is my conviction that the Cubans in Mexico City rebuffed Lee Harvey Oswald and sent him on his way," Phillips said. "They thought he was some sort of kook."

As for reports of CIA involvement in plots to kill foreign leaders, Phillips said he had no personal knowledge of such activity but added that "there must be something there. There have been discussions."

After saying he had talked with friends in the agency about any CIA involvement, Phillips added, "There's no question that in those traumatic times something took place which might have been termed discussions. Whether there were plans or not, I don't know . . .

"Where there's so much smoke, there must be some fire," Phillips said. "However in 25 years as an intelligence officer, I have learned that where there is smoke, there are sometimes small fires—and a great big smoke-making machine."

Over the last two years, during which Phillips has headed the CIA's Latin American and Caribbean operations, there have been no agency discussions or planning of assassinations, he said, "and I am in a position to know that is true."

Phillips was asked for information on any CIA operations with which he had disagreed. He said he was saving such discussion for a series of lectures he will begin giving this week for $500 to $750 each.

WASHINGTON POST
11 May 1975

Denies Agency Role in Anti-Allende Coup

CIA Defender Cites Chile Cables

By Austin Scott
Washington Post Staff Writer

The man who ran Central Intelligence Agency activities in Chile during the overthrow and death of President Salvador Allende said yesterday that he sent out two cables ordering CIA agents to "cut off contacts with people who are planning coups" nearly five months before Allende was toppled.

David Atlee Phillips told a news conference he did so because, as he noted in the first cable he sent on May 8, 1973: "It has begun to look as if there is more and more chance for a coup . "

Phillips said some of the agents wired back to ask how, if they severed such ties, they were to carry out what Phillips said was a major intelligence task—giving the U.S. government advance warning of any major change in a foreign government. Phillips said he replied in a May 23 cable:

"This one is a little different, because it looks like there will be a coup. You are not to be in touch with the coup plotters."

There were no CIA agents in the groups that overthrew Allende on Sept. 11, 1973, Phillips said. Asked if the CIA had advanced knowledge of the coup, he said:

"We did. We knew it was going to take place about 30 times before it did take place." But despite the rumors that were sweeping Santiago in the months before the Allende overthrow, as the time for the successful coup approached, Phillips said, ". . . It is true that we had stronger information than ever before that it probably would have taken place, and it did."

Asked if the CIA tried to warn Allende, Phillips said, "Now, we did not warn him, we didn't prevent it, because we had no way to be sure."

Until recently, Phillips was the CIA's chief of Latin American operations, with 25 years as a key spy behind him, most of it in Latin America and the Caribbean, including Cuba and the Dominican Republic.

Yesterday he called a news conference to launch the first day of his newly chosen career, that of a defender of the CIA working outside the agency. Phillips said he resigned from the CIA to form an association of retired intelligence officers to try to "put the current controversy about CIA into reasonable perspective."

Asked how people could be sure his new role is not just another CIA operation, Phillips said, "I suppose the only people who are really going to know it's not an operation are my wife, those who know Bill Colby [CIA Director William E. Colby] and those who know me intimately."

A Communication:

CIA: 'Things Have Changed'

WHEN TOM BRADEN'S recent article, "CIA: Power and Arrogance," appeared in Saturday Review, I was concerned about its basic line, but I was not roused to reply, as I have become somewhat inured to adverse comment. Its reprinting in The Washington Post, however, suggests that through repetition it might acquire more cachet, to the extent that I feel I must challenge its accuracy and its wisdom.

In it, Mr. Braden talks of a CIA he may have known some 10 and 20 years ago. I have news for him. Things have changed. CIA is no longer a sacred establishment of insiders "different" from outsiders in commitment and in freedom from the rules that bind ordinary men. It may have some of the restraints of American bureaucracy, and its personnel may live in Fairfax rather than Georgetown, but I think we have a stronger intelligence structure today, rather than one whose "power is gone," whose "arrogance has turned to fear," and which "is divided and torn."

Indeed, we now have a modern intelligence system. Its engineers and its scientists produce marvels of technology which deliver to our nation information about the world of which Mr. Braden could not have dreamed in his time. Its research and analysis staffs stand for independent and objective assessments, however much policymakers might wish more pleasing ones, or whatever the reflection on departmental budgets and program proposals. Our clandestine operations are perhaps less exhilarating but are more productive than Mr. Braden's and my parachuting days together. The unfettered "power" which produced the "arrogance" he recalls has been replaced by intensive supervision and public as well as closed-door accountability.

Mr. Braden cites our box score in the usual partial way, only the strikes, not the hits. I note, for example, that he omits his own contribution to preventing Communist monopoly of the cause of "peace" during the 1950s and 1960s. Had they achieved this, our own anti-war movement might have become a vehicle for penetration comparable to that which produced the Philbys out of the anti-Fascist cause in the 1930s. His May, 1967, article in the Saturday Evening Post praised this work ("I'm glad the CIA Is 'Immoral' "). I find it as strange to see him now repudiating that praise as I then questioned his violation of his secrecy agreement by wrongfully revealing the details of his operation without authorization.

Most serious is Mr. Braden's solution to the "ridiculous myths" that exist about CIA and intelligence. Instead of undertaking to reveal the untold story of modern intelligence in the best journalistic tradition, he would "shut it down" in abject retreat before its critics. Indeed, this would in my view lead precisely to James Madison's injunction which he cited that "A popular government without the means to popular information is a farce or a tragedy, perhaps both" in the world in which we live.

BECAUSE our intelligence information today *is* popular information. Some of its sources and techniques must be kept secret if they are to endure, but its substance is made available in many and proper ways to our "popular government." It is provided to the executive branch and used in its deliberations and its discussions with the press. Our intelligence goes to a number of our congressional committees and members on a regular basis, where it is highly valued as a contribution to their role in American decision-making. And an increasing number of our colleagues of the press are finding that a visit to Langley can expose them to independent, intelligent and learned spokesmen on subjects of interest to them, from nuclear proliferation to economic trends within the Soviet Union. If our government really should "shut it down," I do fear the result could be "a farce or a tragedy, perhaps both."

Mr. Braden's solution of turning the overt intelligence function to the State Department flies in the face of the proven desirability of separating from that policy-oriented institution an independent intelligence collection and assessment capability, a lesson learned in China in the 1940s and in Vietnam in the 1960s. I question even more seriously his reflection on the fine job the agency's paramilitary elements did in Laos with a handful of American personnnel and a miniscule budget compared to some other experiences. "Paratroopers" like Mr. Braden and me have been replaced by a new generation who understand that political will is at the base of successful paramilitary work, and that parachutes and even helicopters play only a supporting role in such situations.

I note Mr. Braden's formula for future clandestine work to be run "out of some obscure toolshed." I have no comment on his name for the leader of such an effort, but I question whether such obscurity would not reestablish the "inside-outside syndrome, so essential to secrecy . . . making a mockery of representative government," which he wrongfully ascribes to today's CIA.

May I suggest that a better solution is the serious review being undertaken by the Vice President's Commission and the Select Committees of the Congress, to determine how outdated "ridiculous myths" about American intelligence can be replaced by a better understanding of the reality of modern intelligence and how it should fit within our free society. In this process, we will indeed replace the unaccountable power and the arrogance which Mr. Braden seems to remember from an earlier day by a new and American concept of responsible intelligence. And in the process, I believe that public understanding of the importance of our modern "means to popular information" will be increased so that we can strengthen them for the future rather than dwell only on the past.

W. E. COLBY
Director, Central Intelligence Agency

WASHINGTON POST
8 May 1975

Braden Replies to Colby

In his letter published in Outlook May 4, Director of Central Intelligence William Colby states that I once violated a secrecy agreement.

His reference is to a magazine article I wrote defending certain CIA operations. Every one of these operations had been "blown"; that is, each mentioned by me had already been the subject of expose, public debate and newspaper comment.

If Mr. Colby is right in his assertion that we now have a modern, responsible, accountable, objective and popular intelligence service, it ought not to be defended by a resort to the ad hominem particularly when the ad hominem is not true.

Tom Braden.

Tuesday, May 6, 1975 The Washington Star

Schlesinger Reinforces View of CIA Role as Passive

By Jeremiah O'Leary
Washington Star Staff Writer

The finality of Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger's declaration that the CIA has never resorted to assassination could be construed as reinforcing the contention of administration sources that the agency discussed and knew about political murder plots but never was involved in a successful one.

Schlesinger made his statement late yesterday after testifying before the Rockefeller commission investigating illegal domestic activities of the CIA.

He emerged from his closed-door appearance and, unlike some former CIA officials, appeared almost eager to set the record straight. He said, "Let me make it very clear now that assassination has not been used as a tool by the CIA at any time, and I don't think that applies prospectively any more than it does retrospectively."

Analysis

THE FORMER CIA director was even more emphatic in denying CIA involvement in the slaying of President John F. Kennedy.

"The suggestion of any CIA involvement is preposterous," Schlesinger said. "It is psychologically and intellectually impossible that the CIA could in any way be involved in the tragic event."

He said any such suggestions could only emanate from sick imaginations. The agency's whole role, he said, has been to serve and protect the United States and its leaders.

Schlesinger refused to comment directly on reports of CIA involvement in plots to assassinate foreign leaders, but he said appropriate review bodies such as the Rockefeller commission and the congressional committees will want to review those issues.

THE SUM of Schlesinger's declarations are strongly supportive of statements to The Star by White House and CIA officials that the agency knew of, and even discussed, political murder but never was involved in a successful one.

This leaves open the implication that the CIA may have had direct involvement in plots for political murder that did not succeed — for example, perhaps plots against Fidel Castro, whose death was certainly desired by many Cubans. It is even more suggestive that the CIA knew of such plots but was not directly involved.

Commission officials said yesterday that the group, appointed by President Ford and headed by Vice President Nelson A. Rockefeller, is nearing the end of the labors it began last February. The hearings will be completed Monday, and then the commission will begin writing its report and recommendations for the President.

THE REPORT is to be handed to Ford on June 4 and will be released publicly soon after that. At that stage, the Senate Intelligence Committee, headed by Sen. Frank Church, D-Idaho, will commence its hearings into the activities of all American intelligence agencies. Its House counterpart is almost totally dormant.

Also testifying yesterday was Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger. He denied having any knowledge or involvement in either alleged CIA domestic spying or foreign assassination plots.

"Since I have been in Washington, the National Security Council or the NSC staff, or the assistant to the president for national security affairs (Kissinger's other title) did not concern themselves with domestic intelligence; nor were they informed about domestic intelligence," Kissinger declared.

Asked about allegations of CIA assassination plots, Kissinger said none of those allegations pertain to the period of his service in Washington from 1968 until the present.

ANOTHER WITNESS yesterday, former CIA Director John A. McCone (1961-1965) said, "During my term of office, there was no, absolutely no assassination plot against Castro or any other foreign leader.

McCone said such plots were not consistent with the moral values of the United States or the CIA.

LOS ANGELES TIMES
8 May 1975

Colby Defends Need to Keep 'Family Secrets'

BY PHILIP HAGER
Times Staff Writer

SAN FRANCISCO—CIA Director William E. Colby defended Wednesday the need to maintain "national family secrets" but suggested his agency's mission should be clarified by new laws and guidelines.

Speaking to more than 900 persons at a Commonwealth Club luncheon here, Colby declared:

"I fully support procedures to ensure supervision, control and accountability with respect to our intelligence. I only plead that these procedures take into consideration the unique and fragile character of our sensitive intelligence operations."

Noting charges of illegal domestic operations and other recent criticisms of the CIA—and resulting governmental investigations of the agency—Colby asked that the ". . . laws and guidelines be clarified so that we in the intelligence profession are given a clear expression of the mission the American people and government want us to undertake."

"I ask also that necessary secrets of intelligence be preserved in the interest of our nation . . . We believe these secrets need better laws and especially we need to arrive at a consensus that we Americans do have some national family secrets which must be kept.

"To make an open book of our intelligence sources is to invite steps—many quite simple—to deny us information vital to our nation's welfare and safety."

The director stressed the unusual nature of his appearance, pointing out that in many countries the chief intelligence officer is not even known, let along out making speeches.

"Most of us grew up with the image of intelligence drawn from Nathan Hale, Mata Hari, James Bond and perhaps even Maxwell Smart. This image is no longer valid today," he said.

He noted that collecting intelligence now far more often involves a scholarly, intellectual process rather than clandestine operations and that this process was greatly enhanced by technological advances.

"This now allows us to see, hear and sometimes even touch information previously totally inaccessible and in quantities hitherto totally unmanageable," he said.

CIA information now is often provided to congressmen, ambassadors, scholars and the press—in unclassified, background sessions—in addition to its traditional recipients, such as generals and admirals, he said.

Colby acknowledged that the agency had made some "missteps" in its 27-year history but added that action had been taken to "correct them and prevent their recurrence."

As for the current investigations of secret, political or paramilitary CIA operations in recent years, Colby asserted:

"I am confident it will be demonstrated that any such activities in past years were conducted under legal authority then existing, reflecting the political climate of those times, and were carried according to prop-

erly constituted procedures.

"I must point out that this changed world seems to be changing again. Our country may again need the capability to provide some quiet influence or assistance to friends abroad without engaging the formal diplomatic or military might of the U.S."

In answering questions from the audience, Colby said that in the last five years, "between 400 and 500" Americans overseas had been approached to serve as agents for foreign powers.

WASHINGTON STAR
13 May 1975

Q and A

John Marks Talks About The CIA

John D. Marks worked as an intelligence analyst for the State department before writing, with Victor Marchetti, "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence" — publication of which the CIA attempted to stop in court. Marks, now director of the CIA research project being conducted by the Center for National Security Studies has worked to get Congress to investigate intelligence agencies. He was interviewed by Washington Staff Writer Allan Frank.

Question: *In what areas of ordinary life has the CIA been involved that you think will surprise or shock the American people if evidence comes out during the hearings about such activities?*

Marks: The CIA has been heavily involved in church activities, religious activities. They've infiltrated the church and used the church or church groups as funding mechanisms. They solicit information from missionaries, try to hire missionaries. Things of that sort will shock a lot of people. They also had a contributory pension plan and the investment programs were regularly run through the CIA's bank of computers at Langley, which are some of the most advanced computers in the world. This is a profit-making plan for private employes and government computers are not supposed to be used for that sort of thing. I think that will shock people. We also know that the CIA has made use of private investigating firms in this country to do some of its domestic operations. Again, I think this may shock the American people.

Q: *Have you read any stories lately about the CIA that surprised you?*

A: It's hard to be surprised by anything now, but I guess I have to say I was surprised when I found out that the CIA had gone to the Mafia to take an assassination contract out on Fidel Castro. I always thought that our government didn't [illegible] Mafia. Maybe that's naive, but that surprised me.

Q: *Do you believe the stories that the CIA went to the Mafia? Or the stories about Howard Hughes' connection with the Soviet submarine and the CIA?*

A: Yes, I believe them. I've confirmed them through my own sources. I knew that U.S. intelligence was doing an awful lot of underseas research and other kinds of activities, but I didn't know that they had gone in specifically after a Soviet submarine. I do know in a general way that the CIA has been very actively working with all kinds of American businesses and that they have working agreements with quite a few American companies, so this kind of thing with Hughes didn't surprise me. For example, one former CIA guy with 20 years in the agency told me about how, in one Latin American country the CIA had a deal with Pan American Airlines where the CIA was given access to all the baggage and mail that went through on Pan American planes. To facilitate the CIA's access, Pan Am even supplied the CIA's men with Pan Am overalls, which would give them a better excuse to be rummaging around in the baggage compartments of Pan Am's planes. This kind of arrangement has existed all over the world with American business.

Q: *Do you feel that U.S. intelligence efforts in that kind of operation will be hampered, particularly with regard to Pan Am, now that the Iranians are about to buy a major portion of Pan Am?*

A: No, in this case because the Iranian government has very closely cooperated with, and was put in by, the CIA. Iranian intelligence cooperates very closely with the CIA. I think some of the exposures that have come out recently of American business contacts and cooperation may have some effect because I think foreign countries now are going to be putting much more pressure on American businesses operating in their countries not to be espionage operations. And (CIA director) William Colby himself told the press last year that over 200 businessmen, or so-called businessmen overseas, were really CIA operatives. Now, the press didn't report that it was William Colby — it was a "high U.S. official," but I can tell you it was Colby.

Q: *But what will the exposures really mean?*

A: Exposures are going to limit this kind of close cooperation between American businesses and the CIA because the primary business of American business should not be espionage. The companies are going to see that they are not going to be able to get away with this kind of close coooperation without anybody knowing it and they are going to have to be responsible for their acts. If they want to own up to the fact that they're cooperating with the CIA, that's fine. But I have a feeling — and some of the CIA supporters agree — that American businesses are going to back off some of its close cooperation with the CIA because it doesn't want to get nationalized or have its public interest tarnished. I know for a fact that ITT (International Telephone and Telegraph), Pan Am and W.R. Grace Shipping Co. have all provided cover for the CIA overseas in the past. I don't think that's consistent with their proper roles.

Q: *How do you know that for a fact?*

A: I've talked to CIA people who have told me. I've said it publicly in speeches and no one has challenged me.

Q: *Will it hurt American businesses not to be connected with the CIA?*

A: It may in some areas. American business cooperation with the CIA has been a two-way street. These businesses have done favors for the CIA and the CIA in return, either formally or informally, has passed information — economic intelligence — to the American businesses which has been very helpful to them. One longtime CIA operative in South America told me that while he had no official directive to help out American businessmen overseas, he would pass on information that was helpful. Information, for instance, on which companies were about to be nationalized, which companies were in trouble with the local government. I believe this goes on on a broader scale.

Q: *Do you then agree with Mr. Colby's analysis that if the CIA is limited overseas, it will hurt the United States' economic position in the world?*

A: No. I think it would be a much healthier situation if American business concentrated on being a good corporate citizen overseas and didn't make itself an extension of American intelligence operations. And I should emphasize that it's not all American business that is doing this.

Q: *What to you is the most important lead the congressional investigating committees could pursue? For instance, do you have any proof that the CIA ever assassinated anybody?*

A: Do I have any proof? I don't have any proof I could go into a court of law with. I know from my own sources and from things that have come out in major magazines and newspapers that the CIA has certainly been involved in assassination plots. With the Trujillo assassination in the Dominican Republic, for instance, the CIA sent guns into the group that did do the actual assassination. Now it has never been proved whether those particular guns were used to shoot Trujillo, but the CIA seems to have been involved. Jeremiah O'Leary of the Washington Star wrote that story.

Q: *Do you believe, as some people do, that the CIA will be irreparably harmed by all these disclosures?*

A: Let's say that I hope the CIA is irreparably harmed by the disclosures on assassinatons, the disclosures on domestic surveliance. In [illegible] those activities are irreparably harmed, that the U.S

government just cuts them out. I think that would be very useful. I don't think the legitimate parts of the CIA will be irreparably harmed. The intelligence analysts are not being called on the carpet at this point. It is not they who have done those improper things. They are the people who should be encouraged and whose functions should be strengthened.

Q: *Do you feel there is anything inherently evil about the CIA?*

A: I feel a lot of their activities in the past have been wrong, and illegal. And some of those activities, such as the surveillance of Americans in this county, are clearly illegal. These kinds of activities present a danger to our own democratic institutions. What we need is a return to President Truman's original intent in setting up the CIA, and that was to have an agency to coordinate intelligence and make the best possible evidence of what was happening in the world, which has nothing to do with the dirty tricks of the CIA. I think we should strengthen the good part of the CIA, the intelligence estimating part of the CIA, and we should eliminate the clandestine services, which have caused the country a good deal of harm.

Q: *Some CIA officers argue that to be effective in intelligence, you have to be able to break into embassies to steal current codes.*

A: I'm sure you can slightly increase your effectiveness by breaking into embassies and stealing codes, but I don't think that is any justificaton for breaking the law.

Q: *How do you answer the criticism that other intelligence agencies operate this way, and we're tying our own hands if the CIA is not allowed to operate in whatever fashion it deems necessary?*

A: The Soviet Union's intelligence system operates a vast string of concentration camps. *The Gulag Archipelago* documented that. I don't think we need to emulate the Soviets by setting up concentration camps. There are certain weapons the United States could use, such as bacteriological warfare, which we don't use because we feel they are below our minimum standards of decency of what we want to do in the world. I would maintain that the CIA's dirty tricks are also below our minimal standard of decency, and to be true to our ideals, we shouldn't be using these things. We don't have to emulate the ways of tyrannical governments in order to protect our own society.

Q: *When has decency become a factor in intelligence operations?*

A: Never. It is not something that is factored into what the CIA people do. What is important to the CIA is what works. There is virtually no criminal activity known to man that the CIA hasn't used at one time or another in the furtherance of its clandestine goals. That kind of morality, or lack of morality, is something we don't need in officers of the United States government. That kind of morality is what brought down the Nixon administration. That kind of morality is what brought us Watergate, in fact, with a cast of characters partly supplied by the CIA. It seems to me we should be eliminating that kind of morality from our government, not praising it, not saying it's necessary.

Q: *Do you feel that the CIA has any legitimate operational functions inside this country? For instance, Mr. Colby says that the CIA may have to spy on people at the United Nations?*

A: No, absolutely not.

Q: *Do you feel that is legitimate?*

A: The law says that the CIA will have no domestic police or internal security functions. If there has to be spying at the U.N., why don't they use the FBI? Why does the CIA insist on breaking the law? I don't think our own government should be breaking our laws.

Q: *The scuttlebutt is that the CIA does not get along with the FBI. Is that true?*

A: The CIA officers have little or no confidence in the FBI and vice versa. I don't think the solution to that problem is government agencies to break the law. If there is a problem with the FBI and their domestic surveillance or domestic counterespionage, let's improve the FBI. Move some of the geniuses from the CIA to the FBI so that it can be done legally. I'll give you a hypothetical example of this domestic security business. If a Russian spy is discovered in Washington, the first impulse of the FBI is to arrest him. The first impulse of the CIA is to manipulate him, and that is the basic difference between the two organizations. The CIA is always looking for that clever way to turn things to their own advantage, whereas the FBI, certainly in the eyes of the CIA, tend to be gumshoes more concerned with internal security and things of that sort, which I think is perfectly proper. I'm just giving you an idea of the perception of the mentalities of the two agencies. I wasn't using it as an example of anything proper or improper.

Q: *Do you agree with with Mr. Colby when he says 'Well, we could publish all our budget figures for one year but if we did it for three or four years, the opposition would be able to establish a trend and figure out how much we're spending and what we're doing.'*

A: No, I don't agree with that reasoning. When you publish a budget figure like that of the CIA's, like $700 million, and then when you increase it to $800 million, then the Russians will know we have increased our intelligence operations slightly. I don't see where that gives them any access to knowledge of our secrets. I think the KGB knows a great deal more about U.S. intelligence operations than either the American public or the American Congress does. And a lot of that secrecy is aimed not so much at the Russians or the so-called enemies as at the people here in this country. Just to give you my favorite example, the CIA for 10 or 12 years fought a secret war in Laos. That war was no secret to the people in Laos — the enemy — because they were being shot. They knew there were Americans involved. They knew who was shooting them and who was bombing them. It was a secret from the Congress and the American people. I don't think there is any reason to have that kind of secrecy.

Q: *Have any of the stories that have come out dealt with matters that have been deleted from your book under the court order obtained by the CIA?*

A: I'm not sure I can say and remain within terms of the injunction. Now, you have quite a few reporters looking into what the intelligence agencies were doing so it's natural that some of these stories are coming out. I'm sure people would be shocked by some of the things in the book, but I don't think there was any justification to censor our book. But because we are under court order, I can't really talk about it. We have at least a half dozen front page stories in that book remaining under censorship.

NEW YORK TIMES
3 May 1975

A.C.L.U. Critical on Intelligence Panel

By JOHN CREWDSON
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 2—The American Civil Liberties Union called today upon Representative Lucien N. Nedzi to affirm his intention to investigate the activities of American intelligence-gathering organizations or to resign the chairmanship of a House select committee set up for that purpose.

In a letter to the Michigan Democrat and House Speaker Carl Albert, two A.C.L.U. officials pointed out that 71 days had passed since the House established the panel that Mr. Nedzi heads and that no chief counsel, staff director or staff had been appointed.

The officials, Aryeh Neier, the A.C.L.U.'s executive director, and Charles Morgan Jr., who heads its national office here, asserted that Mr. Nedzi's "failure to staff the committee raises grave doubts as to the ability "of the House of Representatives to oversee and investigate the Central Intelligence Agency."

A Senate select committee, set up three weeks earlier for the same purpose, has long since retained officials and staff investigators and is interviewing prospective witnesses for the public hearings it plans to begin in June.

Mr. Nedzi, who also heads a separate House subcommittee that acts as a "watchdog" for the C.I.A., has reportedly been unable to obtain a consensus among the Democratic and Republican members of his panel on a candidate for staff director.

Mr. Nedzi, who has not spoken with the press since he was named to the chairmanship, is nonetheless known to believe that the director's post must be filled before the staff-selection process can begin.

In their letter, Mr. Neier and Mr. Morgan asked that Mr. Nedzi advise them "and the public generally, of the plans, if any, you have to aggressively undertake the duties of your chairmanship.

"If you have no such plans or decline to reveal them," the letter concluded, "we suggest you resign your chairmanship to allow the appointment of a House member willing to investigate the C.I.A."

WASHINGTON POST
14 May 1975

Big CIA Fees for Releasing Data Hit

By George Lardner Jr
Washington Post Staff Writer

A prominent critic of the Central Intelligence Agency charged yesterday that the CIA is trying to "subvert" the new freedom-of-information law by setting heavy fees for unearthing requested records.

Former White House aide Morton Halperin, who demanded the records under the new law nearly three months ago, said the CIA is now insisting that it will cost "thousands of dollars" simply to find the documents.

Halperin said he was baffled by the CIA's stance because he assumed that most of the documents had already been found in connection with the disclosures the CIA has already made about its domestic spying activities.

In a letter to Halperin this week, however, the CIA billed him $964 in "chargeable search costs" and said it would cost $640 a week for the agency to keep looking from now on.

Now affiliated with the nonprofit Center for National Security Studies, Halperin filed his freedom-of-information request in February, asking for 44 categories of records suggested by the public congressional testimony of CIA Director William E. Colby.

In addition, Halperin said, Colby and the CIA made other, still-secret disclosures in reports to President Ford and the Rockefeller Commission and in response to requests from the Senate committee on intelligence operations headed by Frank Church (D-Idaho).

"What on earth did they look at [as the basis] for the Colby report [to President Ford]?" Halperin demanded. "Why haven't they found this material? Either they're trying to subvert the Freedom of Information Act with big fees for documents they've already located or they haven't searched their files."

Aside from the discomfiture posed for the CIA by the new legislation, Halperin said he suspected the agency has yet to check all the files that might bear on illegal or improper domestic spying operations.

CIA Director Colby, in disclosing what he described as a few "missteps" by the CIA over the past 27 years, told the House and Senate Appropriations committees that the agency had recruited or inserted "about a dozen individuals into American dissident circles . . ." Halperin asked for "all files" pertaining to the activities of these 12 individuals.

He said he has yet to get more than a few scattered CIA directives and memos in response to his requests, along with a 39-page report compiled in 1968 about worldwide student protests entitled "Restless Youth."

Halperin had asked for a waiver of all search fees under a provision of the Freedom of Information Act allowing this when release of the information would benefit the general public. The CIA denied the request.

Halperin said he is appealing that decision and will seek a review of the CIA's estimated fees for finding the documents.

Meanwhile, Halperin said he has asked the CIA to stop all document searches and to concentrate on reviewing those already found. In a reply to the agency dated yesterday, he emphasized that the Senate-House conference report on the new Freedom of Information Act stated that "fees should not be used for the purpose of discouraging requests for information or as obstacles to disclosure of requested information."

NEW YORK TIMES
14 May 1975

New Law Is Dislodging C.I.A.'s Secrets

By NICHOLAS M. HORROCK
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 13—Applications under the Freedom of Information Act are slowly beginning to dislodge documents from the Central Intelligence Agency, and tidbits from the agency's secret files are floating all over Washington.

Among the individuals and groups that have obtained formerly secret documents is Morton Halperin, a former aide to Secretary of State Kissinger who is now with the Center for National Security Studies.

Mr. Halperin has obtained the C.I.A.'s side of the original agreement on responsibilities between the CiliAi and Federal Bureau of Investigation. The C.I.A. obtained the right to keep contact in the United States with "individuals and groups of foreign nationalities." This was supposedly to permit the C.I.A. to recruit agents from among various emigré groups living within the United States.

Lawyers for the Political Rights Defense Fund have obtained part of a C.I.A. dossier on the Socialist Workers party's Presidential candidate, Peter Camejo.

Cables Surrendered

The C.I.A. surrendered several heavily edited cables in which it instructed its offices in Bogota, Colombia and Buenos Aires to keep track of Mr. Camejo while he was abroad. It also submitted several documents apparently based on newspaper clippings, and a transcript of an interview that Mr. Camejo had over Havana Radio while he was in Cuba.

Most significant in Mr. Camejo's case was that the agency said it had 81 other documents that it did not have to release under provisions of the law.

John Marks, co-author of a book on the C.I.A. and a former State Department officer, has obtained a secret study prepared by the C.I.A. in September, 1968, called "Restless Youth."

It is an erudite, if conservative, view of youthful militancy and radicalism around the world. There is no question of impropriety in the agency's preparing such a document, and it has offered study papers throughout Government on other subjects.

The paper contained an up-to-date analysis of Students for a Democratic Society and antiwar activities that suggested that it had its own sources of information.

It offered the conclusion that "the Communists can take little comfort from any of this, even though Moscow and its allies may exact fleeting advantage from the disruption sowed by the dissidents."

"In the long run, they will have to cope with young people who are alienated by the more oppressive features of Soviet life," it said.

Richard Helms, former Director of the C.I.A., and other Government officials have said that the C.I.A. began to gather intelligence on domestic dissidents because of concern by [illegible] might be financed by Soviet-bloc intelligence agencies.

The Socialist Workers party was kept under surveillance by the F.B.I. for three decades. It is not clear from the C.I.A. material released last week whether it was privy to the F.B.I.'s files on Mr. Camejo.

An amendment to the Freedom of Information Act that went into effect in February has vastly increased the number of documents that are being declassified. Keeping track of the material has become so big a job that Carrollton Press, Inc., which has several other library services, is now offering a service that obtains, catalogues and examines documents released under various aspects of the law.

Both the C.I.A. and the F.B.I. have felt the full burden of the new law. An F.B.I. spokesman said that the bureau averaged 113 F.O.I. requests a day in April, and that, though the flow had tapered off somewhat, it still had 101 employes assigned to processing the applications.

The C.I.A. has a 50-man complement processing the requests, and received 1,600 since Jan. 1. Each request must be searched through the records, the material read and a decision then made on whether the agency must release the document under the law.

Under the amendment to the act, any citizen may apply to a Government agency to discover whether it has prepared a dossier or file on him. Within certain ranges of time or national security, the agency must surrender the file. If it does not, or withholds portions of the file, the citizen may appeal and ultimately get a court hearing.

WASHINGTON STAR
1 MAY 1975

Glomar to Be Taxed

LOS ANGELES — The Los Angeles county assessor says he'll slap a tax assessment of more than $1 million on the secret salvage ship Glomar Explorer which, as purported property of the federal government, has been tax exempt.

Assessor Philip Watson said yesterday he believes the 618-foot ship — used to raise part of a sunken Soviet submarine off Hawaii last year — is the legal property of Howard Hughes' Summa Corp. and at an assessed value of $40 million should be taxable in the amount of $1.24 million.

Watson said there is about $250 million worth of sophisticated electronics equipment on the ship but suspects most of it is owned by the Central Intelligence Agency and is therefore tax exempt.

WASHINGTON POST
13 May 1975

Rockefeller Panel Ends CIA Probe

By George Lardner Jr.
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Rockefeller commission completed its investigation of the Central Intelligence Agency's domestic activities yesterday except for the finishing touches required for a report to President Ford.

The commission's vice chairman, C. Douglas Dillon, told reporters that "we didn't dig up anything" surprising beyond the allegations and disclosures already made public in the press.

The inquiry ranged from a covert CIA program of intercepting first-class mail to reports of CIA involvement in assassination schemes against foreign leaders such as Cuban Premier Fidel Castro.

Headed by Vice President Rockefeller, the commission heard 48 witnesses at closed, once-a-week hearings that started Jan. 13. Its staff took depositions from scores of others.

The eight-member panel will now embark on an accelerated round of private sessions to edit a draft report for Mr. Ford that already covers at least 600 pages. Spokesmen said staff lawyers and investigators are still doing some wrap-up work and several sections of the draft report remain incomplete.

Dillon, however, said he felt that "with one or two major exceptions, everything that was done was rather peripheral and was connected in one way or another to the legitimate work of the agency." He did not spell out what he would regard as the "major exceptions" to that conclusion.

The deadline for the report to Mr. Ford is June 6. It is being written with the expectation that it will be made public, but the President will make the final decision after he has reviewed it.

Commission spokesmen were unclear about how detailed the report would be in recounting various episodes, although one said "certainly the names of top officials will be used."

The transcripts of testimony taken by the commission and its staff will be kept secret, he added.

President Ford created the commission on Jan. 5 to investigate charges that the CIA spied on Americans in the United States in violation of its charter.

CIA Director William E. Colby subsequently acknowledged in congressional testimony that the agency engaged in surveillance of American journalists and political dissenters, opened first-class mail over a 20-year period between the United States and Communist countries, planted informers inside domestic protest groups, assembled files on more than 10,000 Americans, and kept counterintelligence files on at least four members of Congress.

Dillon said he would not characterize what the CIA did as "massive" domestic spying.

"The allegation is that the agency was devoting a large part of its time on domestic areas when it was supposed to be operating abroad," he said. "I don't think this was the case."

The commission was originally scheduled to report to the President in March, but it was granted an extension after Mr. Ford asked it to explore any violations of domestic law arising out of the CIA's alleged involvement in assassination plots against Castro and others.

Dillon said yesterday he has "no knowledge" that President Kennedy was killed in retaliation for CIA plotting against Castro, as one persistent rumor has it.

But he was more reserved about the commission's inquiry into assassination plots against foreign leaders. Without characterizing the findings, he said the investigation of these allegations involved "largely Castro" although others concerned the late Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic.

The commission also checked into claims by activist Dick Gregory and associates that a photograph of several shabbily dressed men picked up in Dallas shortly after the November, 1963, assassination of President Kennedy showed two persons resembling Watergate burglars E. Howard Hunt and Frank Sturgis, both former CIA operatives.

The FBI, which looked into the same claims last year and found no substance to them, dispatched a photographic expert to Dallas recently to review its findings and apparently came up with the same results.

Hunt and Sturgis have denied being in Dallas the day the President was killed.

The final two witnesses before the commission yesterday were retired Navy Adm. George B. Anderson, chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, and chief U. S. Postal Inspector William J. Cotter, who told of his repeated and finally successful efforts to get the CIA to abandon its illegal mail-interception program.

NEW YORK TIMES
8 May 1975

Assassination Denials of C.I.A. Termed 'Incomplete' by Church

By NICHALOS M. HORROCK
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 7—Senator Frank Church said today that he had information in his possession indicating that the published denials of any complicity of the Central Intelligence Agency in assassination plots were "incomplete."

Mr. Church, Idaho Democrat who is chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, cited statements in the press by a former Director of Central Intelligence, Richard Helms, and the current director, William E. Colby, and others. He pledged that his committee would look into the matters "very thoroughly" and would later decide whether to make its findings public.

Under questioning by reporters, after meeting with Vice President Rockefeller, Mr. Church also said that the evidence his committee was seeking from such diverse agencies as the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the C.I.A., was being "funneled" through the White House and that this was delaying the Senate committee inquiry.

Mr. Church and the committee vice chairman, Senator John G. Tower, Republican of Texas, met briefly with Mr. Rockefeller today to make a formal request for all the transcripts, evidence and "raw data" that the Rockefeller Commission has gathered on the C.I.A.

Mr. Church said that the Vice President had told him that since the commission had been created and appointed by President Ford it was up to the President to decide whether Congressional investigating committees could have the material. Mr. Rockefeller, Mr. Church sadi, had no objection to the material going to the Senate committee.

No White House Denial

Both Mr. Church and Mr. Tower said that no White House official had yet flatly refused to provide any piece of evidence sought by the committee and that there had been no objection yet to turning over the material to the Rockefeller Commission.

It was during this question period that Mr. Church responded to a query of whether, after reviewing the evidence he now had, he could "endorse" statements by Mr. Helms and Mr. Colby that said there had been no planning of assassinations within the C.I.A.

Mr. Church said that 'based upon information in my possession, those statements that appeared in the press by Mr. Colby and Mr. Helms and others have been correct but not complete."

Presumably, Mr. Church was referring to recent statements by several senior former C.I.A. officials, including Mr. Helms, that there was never an "authorized" plot to assassinate a foreign leader or C.I.A. involvement in several assassinations over the last two decades. But Mr. Church refused to expand on his first answer to the question.

Church Lacks Evidence

Under questioning, Senator Tower said he had "no evidence to convince me" that any of the statements were "incorrect" but he did not contradict Mr. Church's statement.

The entire matter of whether the C.I.A. has been involved in assassination plots of foreign leaders or actually committed assassinations has swirled through the city for nearly two months with little hard data to clear the air.

On another matter Mr. Church said that his committee felt that evidence from individual government agencies should not have to be reviewed by the White House before it was turned over. "We think a good deal of this material could be delivered directly but the White House takes a different view. So far we have been unable to cut that particular knot."

Mr. Church said that this funnel system was delaying the Senate committee's inquiry. He said that in the interests of expediting the investigation, the committee had agreed to tell the White House which pieces of evidence it thought were most important and which should be delivered first.

SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, London
4 March 1975

C.I.A. 'tried to kill Philby'

By Our Staff Correspondent in Washington

The Central Intelligence Agency planned to assassinate Kim Philby in 1963 in Beirut, according to Jack Anderson, the syndicated columnist.

At that time, he wrote yesterday "The C.I.A. was 100 per cent. certain that Philby was a Russian spy. Fed up with British dilly-dallying, the C.I.A. decided to murder him. But as the C.I.A. 'torpedoes' closed in the elusive Philby skipped off to the Soviets."

8

WASHINGTON STAR
7 May 1975

Mail Opened 431 Times On Warrants

United Press International

The chief U.S. Postal Service inspector has testified that there have been 431 cases during the past two years in which an individual's mail was opened after issuance of a search warrant.

William J. Cotter also indicated yesterday that the CIA may have been involved in mail openings beyond the 431 authorized by court orders, but he refused to comment publicly on the number.

Appearing before a House subcommittee on postal facilities and mail, Cotter gave further information on CIA mail opening activities to lawmakers in executive session.

When committee members asked Cotter about how extensive past CIA mail opening practices had been, he replied, "I would feel much freer ... to discuss this if we were in executive session." He refused to publicly reveal any details of the CIA mail openings, including what criteria is used in allowing the agency to engage in such activities.

During the public part of the hearing, Cotter reviewed current practices on mail openings and mail covers as well as a CIA "20-year project" during which mail to and from the Soviet Union was opened.

Cotter, a former CIA agent, said a mail cover involves recording information from the outside of the envelope, but not actual opening of letters. A cover may be instituted to assist in locating a fugitive, to obtain evidence on the commission or attempted commission of a crime and to "protect the national security," he said.

At present there are 353 mail covers in place around the country, but during a year there might be 1,000 covers, he said. Cover authority is issued for a 30-day period, but can be renewed.

Only the chief postal inspector can authorize national security category covers, Cotter said, and 95 percent of those requests come from the FBI.

NEW YORK TIMES
4 May 1975

Assassination Is a Subject That Just Won't Go Away

By DANIEL SCHORR

WASINGTON—Four months ago, topic "A" in investigations of The Central Intelligence Agency was "domestic surveillance." Now it is "assassinations," foreign and/or domestic, plotted and/or committed. The subject has become a preoccupation of the Presidential commission headed by Vice President Rockefeller despite its primary mandate, an inquiry into allegations that the C.I.A. paid considerable attention, improperly and perhaps illegally, to the activities of thousands of Americans.

The shift in attention is a development that President Ford had hoped to avoid, but unwittingly helped to bring about. Meeting with the President on Jan. 3 for a confidential briefing after filing a written report responding to Seymour Hersh's revelations in The New York Times about domestic surveillance, C.I.A. Director William Colby described other matters potentially much more troublesome if exposed.

Whether by deliberate design or not, a course was followed that would keep the skeletons safely locked in the closet. The surveillance issue, where little more damage was expected, would be addressed by appointment of a Presidential commission, but it would work within guidelines carefully framed and its members would be carefully chosen to avoid more perilous areas.

Unfortunately for the success of that approach, the candid President talked about his concern to subordinates, and even at a luncheon with executives of The New York Times. To illustrate his worries about an uninhibited inquiry he mentioned "assassinations" without being specific about what he had in mind.

Though The Times executives respected Mr. Ford's confidence, word eventually leaked, and the President's worry was reported by CBS News on Feb. 28. Senator Stuart Symington, because he shared responsibility for overseeing C.I.A. activities immediately called Mr. Colby to ask if the C.I.A. had killed anybody, and quoted the director's initial response as "not in this country." Asked if anyone had been killed anywhere, Mr. Colby replied negatively, Mr. Symington said, but added the matter was "complicated."

President Ford inferentially confirmed an "assassination" problem at his March 7 news conference, saying, in reply to a question on assassinations, that he had received "a full report from Mr. Colby on the operations that have been alluded to in the news media in the last week or so, really involving such actions that might have taken place beginning back in the 1960's."

The issue, once publicly raised, had to be dealt with. It was tossed to the Rockefeller Commission, whose staff had become interested on its own. The Vice President was left to explain the new concern. The best he could do was, "We see the possibility of a situation which we didn't anticipate." Part of the "situation" was the revival of public interest in revisionist theories about the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. The staff conducted dozens of interviews and made an extensive review of documents, including the Kennedy autopsy report.

Richard Bissell, who had retired as the C.I.A.'s Deputy Director for Plans (clandestine operations) in 1962, before domestic surveillance had started, was asked what he knew about the unnatural deaths of foreign personalities, such as Patrice Lumumba of the Congo and Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic. Mr. Bissell disclaimed direct C.I.A. involvement. What became apparent was that the standard pattern of covert activity was to support opposition groups, and hope they would do what the C.I.A. wanted done.

An exception was Fidel Castro. The commission staff found evidence that the C.I.A. was more directly involved—at times in concert with American underworld figures—in a series of attempts on Mr. Castro's life that started before the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion and continued as late as 1963. Mr. Bissell had been succeeded in 1962 as deputy director of plans by Richard Helms.

Mr. Helms was recalled from his post as Ambassador to Iran for a third round of testimony—two arduous days with the staff, almost four hours before the full commission. He was described by commission sources as a "not very helpful" witness, with frequent lapses of memory. He emerged, agitated, to tell newsmen, "I don't know of any foreign leader that was ever assassinated by the C.I.A." But he would not be drawn into discussion of indirect involvement or abortive conspiracies.

The Castro issue took on a special significance for the commission staff. David Belin, the staff director, had been chosen by President Ford, with whom he served on the Warren Commission to investigate the Kennedy assassination. They agreed, as Mr. Ford expressed it on April 4, that there was no doubt that Lee Harvey Oswald was the sole assassin, but there could be a "problem" about the conclusion that there was no evidence of a conspiracy. Mr. Ford meant that any indications of others influencing Oswald could technically be taken as evidence that he was part of a conspiratorial undertaking.

The Castro Factor

The "problem" can never be resolved because Oswald is dead, and only he could describe his motives with certainty. The Warren Commission had reported his activity in the Fair Play for Cuba Committee and his visit to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City, but the commission conceded Oswald's Cuba connection was murky. The commission knew nothing about the plots on Castro's life.

President Lyndon Johnson learned about them accidentally, when J. Edgar Hoover made a bureaucrat's complaint. He told Mr. Johnson that F.B.I. agents had trapped a major underworld figure, only to find that the criminal was working for the C.I.A. in one of its attempts on Premier Castro's life. Presumably, that information led to speculation by Mr. Johnson, recently disclosed, that Oswald may have been "influenced or directed" by the Castro Government to murder Mr. Kennedy in retaliation. The C.I.A. designs on Mr. Castro occurred only months before Mr. Kennedy was killed. What Mr. Johnson considered a possible connection was also obvious to the Rockefeller Commission.

The commission's report is scheduled to be given to Mr. Ford by June 6 and is expected to be made public shortly thereafter. Its main subject will be domestic surveillance, but the matter of assassinations cannot now be avoided, Mr. Ford's original wishes notwithstanding. He and everyone else will then find out whether the public is reassured or horrified about some of the things the Central Intelligence Agency has contemplated or done, here and abroad.

Daniel Schorr is a Washington correspondent for C.B.S. News.

LOS ANGELES TIMES
11 May 1975

Kennedy Conspiracy Discounted

BY W. DAVID SLAWSON and RICHARD M. MOSK

There were always those who believed there was a conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy, and many of these persons brushed aside the report of the Warren Commission, which found no evidence to support the conspiracy theory and concluded that Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone.

Recently, talk of plots to assassinate foreign leaders, and investigations into what role, if any, the American CIA may have had in such plots, has revived speculation over the Kennedy assassination.

David Slawson is a professor of law at USC, Richard Mosk is a Los Angeles attorney. Both were attorneys on the staff of the Warren Commission.

The conspiracy theory persists partly because some persons find it difficult to believe that such a momentous act could be done so capriciously, and by such an insignificant, hapless man as Lee Harvey Oswald.

Few persons not familiar with the Warren Report realize the large number of chance occurrences underlying the assassination. It is very unlikely that Oswald would ever have killed Kennedy had the President not gone to Dallas when he did and passed the building in which Oswald was working. At the time Oswald took his job, there was no way of knowing that the presidential parade route would go right by the building in which he worked, or that there would be a presidential parade at all in the foreseeable future in Dallas.

The night before the assassination, Oswald hitched a ride with a friend out to a suburb to see his wife, Marina, from whom he was then separated. He begged her to come back and live with him. He offered to rent an apartment in Dallas for the two of them *the next day*. She refused. The next morning Oswald left his wedding ring and almost all his money on the dresser, and departed with the same friend for work, with the rifle dismantled and concealed in a package. Kennedy might be alive today had Marina relented.

★

Allegations concerning CIA activities in the late 1950s and the 1960s have created added doubts, because the CIA assisted the commission in its investigation. However, the CIA was only one such outside source of assistance, and it was not the most important one. (The most important was the FBI.) Moreover, the commission double-checked and cross-checked all significant information among a variety of sources—governmental and private.

The principal reason for the criticisms and conspiracy theories, however, is the breadth of the Warren Report. The published materials comprise 27 volumes. The National Archives contain additional material, which has for the most part been made public. Critics of the report, by selective and inaccurate citations, have turned this vast amount of material against the commission.

The commission took testimony from over 500 people. Thousands more were interviewed or gave affidavits. The FBI alone conducted approximately 25,000 interviews. As is true with even the simplest accident case, some people's reactions, memories, observations and actions were imperfect.

For example, critics have claimed that one of the doctors who worked to save the President's life said the wound on the President's throat was an entry wound, which if true would prove that there was a second gunman since Oswald was behind the President.

What these critics fail to disclose is that the doctor, at a raucous news conference right after the President died, said that it was possible that a bullet had entered the throat. He later testified that at the time he made the remark, he had not seen the wounds on the back of the President. Although the throat wound could not thereafter be definitely analyzed, because of a tracheotomy which this doctor, among others, had performed, other doctors later said the wound probably was an exit wound.

The commission, on the basis of this and other expert testimony, fiber analysis of the clothes, the location of bullets and other evidence concluded that the hole in the throat was an exit wound, which would demonstrate that the bullet came from the rear where Oswald was located.

Quite apart from eyewitnesses, the evidence supporting Oswald's guilt is overwhelming. Ballistics evidence demonstrated that Oswald's rifle was the murder weapon; Oswald's prints were on the rifle; handwriting analysis of order forms and pictures of Oswald with the rifle demonstrated that the rifle was his; the rifle was found in the building where Oswald worked and where Oswald was seen shortly before the shooting; his prints were located in the part of the room where the rifle and spent cartridges were found and from which witnesses saw the rifle protruding at the time of the assassination; X rays, photographs and the autopsy show that the bullet came from the area where Oswald was located; after the shooting, Oswald promptly left the premises and resisted apprehension by killing a policeman. Finally, he lied about a number of facts during his interrogation.

Thus, the claims that the rifle was inaccurate, that the shot was difficult, that Oswald was a poor shot and that stress analysis tests of Oswald's voice allegedly show him to have been telling the truth when he denied his guilt are all unpersuasive in light of so much uncontroverted evidence. These claims, even in isolation, are misleading: Oswald was a former Marine and hunter. He practiced with the rifle when he was a civilian. Tests showed that his rifle was sufficiently accurate. The shot was not particularly difficult. It was from a stable, prepared position at a target moving 11 m.p.h. almost straight away at a range of 177 to 266 feet. The rifle had a telescopic sight. The voice stress analysis has not achieved general acceptance as a reliable lie detector test.

Most critical commentaries focus on suggestions that there had to be at least two gunmen.

One of the oldest claims is that Oswald could not have fired three shots in the time he had and have two of them hit the President. The commission utilized the film of the event by Abraham Zapruder to determine that the interval between the two hits was between 4.8 and 5.6 seconds (the exact time is not determinable since the first shot hit the President while a road sign was between him and Zapruder's camera).

Some have said that 4.8 to 5.6 seconds is too short a time for three shots to be fired and two of them to hit. But the time interval is between two shots—the two that hit—not three. The commission found the evidence inconclusive as to whether, of the three shots fired, it was the first, second or third that missed. Since the time interval is that *between* the two shots which hit, Oswald had all the time he needed to fire the first shot. A period of 4.8 to 5.6 seconds is ample time for aiming and firing one shot—the second one that hit.

The evidence concerning the wounds conclusively dispels the idea of shots from the front, another part of the conspiracy theory. The wounds both slanted *downward* from Kennedy's back. This is clear beyond doubt from the autopsy and from the photographs and X rays of the body. The photographs and X rays are still not open to public view, because of Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis' wishes, but to doubt the evidence of the wounds is to label as liars the doctors who examined the body, the pictures and the X rays for the commission.

The inward pointing of the threads of the back of Kennedy's clothing and the outward pointing of the threads in the front of his clothing demonstrate that the bullet which first hit him entered from the rear and exited from the front. Since the car was in a low underpass, a bullet from any direction would have to have been going downward, and would have hit the car after leaving Kennedy. All the bullet damage to the car was in front of Kennedy, which is consistent with a bullet entering from the rear.

A great deal of publicity has been given recently to the claim that Kennedy must have been hit from the

front because the Zapruder film shows his head jerking back.

In fact, the head jerks back not when the bullet hits it but slightly later. Actually, at the time of the hit, the President's head appears to move slightly forward and the sprayed flesh also moves forward. The jerk, therefore, cannot have been a momentum reaction. It must have been a neural or muscular reaction caused by either bullet or by a reaction to some other stimulus.

Many critices have pointed to a rough sketch of the location of the neck wound and to the location of the bullet hole in the President's shirt and suit jacket as proving that the rear wound was lower on the President's body than the wound in front. From this it follows, supposedly, that some other gunman must have been firing in a downward direction from the front.

But the best evidence of the wound's location are the autopsy records and the photos and X-rays of the body itself. These unambiguously show the rear wounds higher than the wound at the front. The rough sketch was just that: rough. The holes in the shirt and jacket seem to indicate a low wound on the body only because the clothing, when photographed, was laid flat and because, presumably, when the President was sitting in the car his clothing was slightly bunched up his back.

Critics have criticized the "single-bullet theory," which is the commission's conclusion that the first bullet passed through the President and also hit, and eventually came to a stop in, Gov. Connally. Why anyone should think it unlikely that a rifle bullet should go through one man and hit another, when the men were sitting close together, escapes us.

Of course, it was difficult for the commission to reconstruct exactly what the path through both men was, but a reconstruction proved possible, and the conclusion that it was a single bullet which hit both men makes, by far, the most sense in the context of all the other evidence. No bullet was left inside the President; the nature of the President's wound shows that the bullet that made it was hardly slowed down and so must have been stopped by something else, but there was no appreciable damage to the car in front of the President; the films show Connally to have been hit at or near the same time as the President; the nature of Connally's wounds show that he, too, was hit from the rear.

The fact that the recovered bullet that apparently went through both Kennedy and Connally was not greatly distorted itself actually supports the single-bullet theory. In order that a bullet be recovered without being greatly distorted, it must be brought to a slow and gentle stop. By going through two men, and by tumbling end over end through flesh and muscle and by glancing off, rather than penetrating, large bones, the bullet was brought to a slow and gentle stop and so was able to emerge in a relatively unscathed condition.

The photographs supposedly showing shadowy outlines of gunmen in the bushes or trees actually show this only to someone with a wild imagination. What they really show are only shadows such as can be seen on almost any photograph taken from a distance of trees or shrubbery.

There has been speculation recently that various people masqueraded before the assassination as Oswald and, thus, there must have been a conspiracy.

Just as thousands of people claim to have seen Patty Hearst in various places at the same time, many people reported seeing Oswald. The Oswald "identifications" were even more doubtful because many of them allegedly took place months and years before the assassination. If there was a conspiracy, what possible purpose would have been served by sending fake "Oswalds" around the country?

The recent surge in speculation about purported CIA or FBI connections with, or coverup of, the assassination is not a result of any newly discovered link between those agencies and the assassination. It is a result of the revelations of alleged unsavory practices in other matters by these agencies.

In October, 1963, the CIA's Mexican department sent a message and a photograph to the FBI saying, in effect, that the man in the photograph was thought to be Lee Harvey Oswald. The photograph was not of Oswald, but it was not until shortly after the assassination that this fact was established. These events have led to the speculation that either the man in the photograph was a CIA agent masquerading as Oswald or that Oswald was a CIA agent.

This happened because the CIA had several secret sources of information operating in Mexico and, as is frequently the case in this kind of work, the central headquarters had difficulty in putting the bits of information from the different sources together properly. One source reported that a man calling himself Oswald had visited the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. Another source obtained a photograph of a man who probably visited the same embassy about the same time. No source was able to get a photograph of Oswald in Mexico City, and no source was able to obtain the name of the man in the photograph who visited the Embassy. Someone in the CIA who was responsible for putting bits of information together guessed, mistakenly it turned out, that the two men were the same.

With all of this confusion, the time has come for everything on the assassination in the National Archives to be made available to the public, unless its disclosure can be shown to be definitely detrimental to the national security.

We do not believe that a reopening of the inquiry, in the sense of establishing a new commission to carry on its own investigation or to hear argument from private investigators, would serve any useful purpose.

The legitimate interest of the American people in knowing as surely as possible that they have found out the whole truth can be served, we think, by the creation of special, limited new investigations if and when a need for one of them arises. Currently, for example, the news media has reported that the White House commission on the CIA is investigating the allegation that the CIA may not have fully disclosed all relevant information to the Warren Commission in an effort to cover up its own involvement with an assassination attempt on Castro. Such an issue should be investigated and apparently it is.

BALTIMORE SUN
4 May 1975

Cult of the Secret Agent

The man who touched off the greatest political scandal in our entire national existence—the former CIA officer, ex-White House consultant and convicted Watergate conspirator E. Howard Hunt—has by now dwindled to a relatively secondary figure in the drama. . . . The conspiratorial dream world Hunt lived in was clearly built on his identification with the romanticized and idealized image of the secret agent, one of the most characteristic projections of Twentieth-Century mass culture.

This glamorous figure has served as the hero of countless films, plays, comic strips, pulp-magazine stories and novels. . . . James Bond, the steel-thewed sexual athlete, jet-set name dropper, and bureaucratized killer invented by the late Ian Fleming is probably the most famous of these synthetic modern heroes. . . . Fictional depictions of the secret agent as hero are validated by an almost equally abundant flow of nonfictional accounts.

In all secret service literature, fiction and nonfiction alike, there is an ambiguous and extremely complex relationship between myth and reality. Such a relationship exists, indeed, within the covert organizations themselves. . . . The writer of spy thrillers or romanticized secret service history and the real-life covert operator are dialectical partners. The former, by glamorizing the secret agent, creates an archetype upon which the latter tends to model his professional behavior, and he in turn authenticates the writer's fantasy.

—Edmond Taylor in Horizon magazine

NEW YORK REVIEW
3 April 1975

The CIA and the Man Who Was Not Oswald

Bernard Fensterwald and
George O'Toole

Six weeks before the assassination of President Kennedy on November 22, 1963, the Central Intelligence Agency sent the following teletype message to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Departments of State and the Navy:

> Subject: Lee Henry OSWALD
>
> 1. On 1 October 1963 a reliable and sensitive source in Mexico reported that an American male, who identified himself as Lee OSWALD, contacted the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City inquiring whether the Embassy had received any news concerning a telegram which had been sent to Washington. The American was described as approximately 35 years old, with an athletic build, about six feet tall, with a receding hairline.
>
> 2. It is believed that OSWALD may be identical to Lee Henry OSWALD, born on 18 October 1939 in New Orleans, Louisiana. A former U.S. Marine who defected to the Soviet Union in October 1959 and later made arrangement through the United States Embassy in Moscow to return to the United States with his Russian-born wife, Marina Nikolaevna Pusakova, and their child.
>
> 3. The information in paragraph one is being disseminated to your representatives in Mexico City. Any further information received on this subject will be furnished you. This information is being made available to the Immigration and Naturalization Service.[1]

Was the Lee *Henry* Oswald of the CIA message Lee Harvey Oswald? Yes, according to Richard Helms, then chief of the Agency's Clandestine Services. In a March 1964 memorandum to J. Lee Rankin, general counsel to the Warren Commission, Helms explained that "OSWALD'S middle name was erroneously given as 'Henry' in the subject line and in paragraph two of the dissemination. . . . The maiden surname of Mrs. OSWALD was mistakenly listed as 'PUSAKOVA.' "[2]

But Lee Harvey Oswald was not "approximately 35 years old, with an athletic build"; he was twenty-three years old and slender.[3] Apparently the CIA was concerned about the discrepancy, for on October 23 it sent the following message to the Department of the Navy:

> Subject: Lee Henry OSWALD
>
> Reference is made to CIA Out Teletype No. 74673 [the earlier message], dated 10 October 1963, regarding possible presence of subject in Mexico City. It is requested that you forward to this office as soon as possible two copies of the most recent photograph you have of subject. We will forward them to our representative in Mexico, who will attempt to determine if the Lee OSWALD in Mexico City and subject are the same individual.[4]

Since Oswald had served in the Marine Corps, which comes under the administration of the Navy, his personnel records would have included his photograph.

What the Agency did not say in this cable is that it had in its possession a photograph of the man who had apparently "identified himself" as Oswald. The man in the CIA photo was not Lee Harvey Oswald; he was, just as the Agency's "reliable and sensitive source" had described him, approximately thirty-five years old, with an athletic build and a receding hairline.

According to a memorandum by Helms, the CIA never received the Navy's pictures of Oswald and only concluded after the assassination that two different people were involved.[5] Meanwhile, the photograph was delivered to the FBI on November 22, 1963.[6]

One can only guess at the confusion caused by the picture. The FBI needed no Navy photograph to establish that the mystery man was not Oswald—Lee Harvey Oswald was sitting handcuffed in a third-floor office of the Dallas police headquarters. The next day Special Agent Bardwell D. Odum was dispatched with the photograph to the motel where Oswald's wife and mother were hidden. He showed the picture to Mrs. Marguerite Oswald, mother of the accused assassin. Mrs. Oswald looked at the photo and told Odum she didn't recognize the man.[7] The following day, however, shortly after her son was murdered in the basement of Dallas City Hall, Mrs. Oswald erroneously identified the mystery man. She told the press the FBI had shown her a picture of Jack Ruby the night before.

Mrs. Oswald's mistake was understandable—the mystery man bore a superficial resemblance to Jack Ruby, and in her recollection of a brief glance at the photograph, two faces became one. But the misidentification made it necessary for the Warren Commission to refer, however obliquely, to the affair of the mystery man. In the twenty-six volumes of published testimony and evidence supplementary to the Warren Report, the Commission printed the picture that was shown to Mrs. Oswald.[8] The Warren Report contains a very brief account of the incident.

According to the Report, the CIA had provided the FBI with a photograph of "a man who, it was thought at the time, might have been associated with Oswald."[9] The Report quoted an affidavit by Richard Helms that "the original photograph had been taken by the CIA outside of the United States sometime between July 1, 1963 and November 22, 1963."[10]

The Commission's explanation is both inaccurate and misleading. The implication that the CIA thought the mystery man was "associated with Oswald" only masks the true situation. On the basis of its own evidence, the Agency must have concluded either that the mystery man was impersonating Oswald or that an unlikely chain of errors had accidentally linked both the man in the photograph and the man who "contacted" the Soviet Embassy to Lee Harvey Oswald.

The truth was further obscured by the Report's reference to the Helms affidavit, which described the circumstances in which the mystery man was photographed only in the most vague and general terms. The affidavit was dated August 7, 1964.[11] However, the Commission never mentioned in its Report or in its twenty-six supplementary volumes that it had obtained an earlier affidavit from Helms on July 22, 1964 in which he was much more specific.[12] "The original photograph," Helms testified, "was taken in Mexico City on October 4, 1963."[13] (This earlier Helms affidavit was released in 1967 through the efforts of Paul Hoch, a private researcher.)

There is no available record that Richard Helms ever told the Warren Commission exactly where in Mexico City the mystery man was photographed, but the circumstances in which the photograph was given to the

[1] Warren Commission Document 631, The National Archives, Washington, DC.

[2] Ibid. Her correct maiden name was Prusakova.

[3] *Report of the Presiaent's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy* (US Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 144. (Hereafter, *Report.*)

[4] Commission Document 631, op cit.

[5] Ibid.

[6] *Hearings Before the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy* (US Government Printing Office, 1964), Vol. 11, p. 469 (hereafter, *Hearings*).

[7] Ibid., p. 468.

[8] Ibid., Odum Exhibit 1.

[9] *Report*, p. 364.

[10] Ibid., pp. 364-365.

[11] *Hearings*, Vol. 11, p. 469.

[12] Commission Document 1287, The National Archives, Washington, DC.

[13] Ibid.

Commission offer a very plausible suggestion. The CIA required the FBI to crop out the background in the photo before handing it over to the Commission.[14] The obvious conclusion is that the photograph was taken by a hidden surveillance camera, and the CIA wished to avoid disclosing its location. According to knowledgeable former employees of the CIA, the Soviet and Cuban embassies, among others in Mexico City, were under constant photographic surveillance at the time. It seems likely then that the man who, according to the CIA, "identified himself as Lee Oswald" was photographed leaving the Mexico City embassy of the Soviet Union or of some other communist country.

The first public hint that the mystery man may have been impersonating Oswald came in 1966, with the publication of Edward Jay Epstein's *Inquest*, a scholarly study of the Warren Commission.[15] Epstein interviewed one of the Commission's legal staff who recalled the incident. He said he had asked Raymond G. Rocca, the Agency's liaison with the Commission,[16] about the photograph. The lawyer later received word from the Agency that the mystery man was thought to be Oswald at the time the photograph was given to the FBI. Why, he asked, did the Agency mistake someone so dissimilar in appearance for Lee Harvey Oswald? The CIA said they would check further and call him back. The lawyer told Epstein that they never called him back and the Warren Report contains no explanation of the Agency's mistake.[17]

Another piece of the puzzle fell into place early in 1971, when the National Archives released a previously classified memorandum about the mystery man from Richard Helms to the Commission's general counsel, J. Lee Rankin.[18] Dated March 24, 1964, the memo informed Rankin:

> On 22 and 23 November, immediately following the assassination of President Kennedy, three cabled reports were received from [deleted] in Mexico City relative to photographs of an unidentified man who visited the Cuban and Soviet Embassies in that city during October and November 1963....[19]

On the basis of these cables, Helms went on to say, the CIA had sent several reports to the Secret Service. Attached to the Helms memorandum were paraphrases of these reports.[20] Two dealt with the mystery man:

> Message to the Protective Research Staff, The Secret Service, delivered by hand on 23 November 1963, at 1030 hours.
>
> Through sources available to it, the CIA [deleted] had come into possession of a photograph of an unidentified person thought to have visited the Cuban Embassy in mid-October. This individual, it was believed at the time, might be identical with Lee Harvey OSWALD.[21]

and,

> Message to the Protective Research Staff, The Secret Service, delivered by hand on 23 November 1963, at 1030 hours.
>
> CIA Headquarters was informed [deleted] on 23 November that several photographs of a person known to frequent the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, and who might be identical with Lee Harvey OSWALD, had been forwarded to Washington by the hand of a United States official returning to this country.[22]

Helms's covering memorandum affirmed that "the subject of the photographs mentioned in these reports is not Lee Harvey OSWALD."[23]

Several photographs, then, of a mysterious stranger who kept being confused with Lee Harvey Oswald, and who had visited *both* the Soviet and Cuban embassies. Was it the same mystery man whose picture had been shown to Mrs. Oswald? Or was it yet another Oswald Doppelgänger?

Firm evidence of the existence of additional photographs of the unidentified man mentioned in the Warren Report was turned up by Robert Smith, a private researcher. In 1972 Smith, then research director for the Commission to Investigate Assassinations, was poring over some recently declassified Warren Commission documents when he found reference to the mystery photo *and two other views of the same person.*[24] Smith called his discovery to the attention of one of the authors, Bernard Fensterwald, who instituted a suit under the Freedom of Information Act for release of the two pictures. The government yielded and turned over the photographs to Fensterwald and Smith. They are published here for the first time.

The two new views of the mystery man were taken at a different time from the first picture. In the first picture, the one published in the Warren Commission volumes, he is wearing a long-sleeved dark shirt and appears empty-handed; in the two new photos he is wearing a short-sleeved white shirt and is carrying some kind of bag or pouch. The new photos also show him holding a small, passport-sized booklet and what appears to be a wallet. As in the first photograph, the backgrounds of the two new photos have been cropped out. Whoever he was, he managed to be photographed, apparently by the CIA's hidden surveillance cameras, on at least two separate occasions. And neither of the new photographs reveals any resemblance between the mystery man and Lee Harvey Oswald.

The Warren Commission concluded that Oswald had been in Mexico in late September and early October 1963. Records of Mexican Customs and Immigration, bus lines, and a Mexico City hotel indicate that Oswald entered Mexico at Nuevo Laredo on the US border on September 26, traveled by bus to Mexico City, arriving there the next morning, and returned to the United States on October 3.[25] Passengers on the bus to Mexico City remembered Oswald, but there is almost no eyewitness testimony to support the Commission's reconstruction of Oswald's movements after he arrived in that city.[26] The Commission's finding that Oswald made repeated visits to both the Soviet and Cuban embassies rests heavily upon the affidavit of one witness, a Mexican woman who worked at the Cuban Embassy.[27]

Silvia Tirado de Duran was secretary to the Cuban Consul in Mexico City. In a sworn statement[28] she gave to the

[14] *Hearings*, Vol. 11, p. 469.

[15] Edward Jay Epstein, *Inquest: The Warren Commission and the Establishment of Truth* (Viking, 1966).

[16] Mr. Rocca, deputy chief of the CIA's Counterintelligence Staff, was one of the four senior Agency officials who resigned last December in the wake of *The New York Times*'s revelations of illegal domestic operations by the CIA's Clandestine Services.

[17] Epstein, *Inquest*, p. 94.

[18] Commission Document 674, The National Archives, Washington, DC.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Commission Document 566, The National Archives, Washington, DC, pp. 3-4.

[25] *Report*, p. 299.

[26] Ibid., pp. 733-736.

[27] Ibid., p. 734. Two other witnesses told the FBI they saw Oswald at the Cuban Embassy. A Mexican private detective who had visited the embassy on October 1, 1963, identified Oswald from newspaper photographs as someone he had seen leaving the embassy on that date in the company of a Cuban. The detective was shown other photos of Oswald and failed to identify him, and the FBI seems to have concluded that he was mistaken (Commission Document 566). The Warren Report does not offer the detective's testimony as evidence of Oswald's visit. Another witness who claimed to have seen Oswald at the Cuban Embassy retracted his testimony after failing to pass a polygraph examination (*Report*, p. 299).

[28] Commission Document 776a, The National Archives, Washington, DC.

deputy director of Mexican Federal Security on November 23, 1963, she said that Oswald had visited the Cuban Embassy in late September to apply for a visa to visit Cuba during a planned trip to the Soviet Union. Mrs. Duran recalled a heated exchange between Oswald and the Consul when the Cuban official told him his request could not be granted immediately. She remembered making a "semiofficial" phone call to the Soviet Embassy to try to speed up action on Oswald's application. She identified the Lee Harvey Oswald who visited the Cuban Embassy as the accused assassin whose photograph appeared in the Mexican newspapers on November 23.[29]

Apparently the Warren Commission staff did not interview Silvia Duran, but instead relied solely on her affidavit. Whether any attempt to talk to her was made is not recorded in any available document. However, according to the Commission files, a Mexican newspaper reporter tried to interview her in April 1964. Her husband would not permit the man to speak with her, saying "she had suffered a nervous breakdown following her interrogation by the Mexican authorities and had been prohibited by her physician ... from discussing the Oswald matter further."[30] If this report is correct, the interrogation of Silvia Duran may have been a more emotional interview than one would conclude from the report forwarded by the Mexican police. The report gives the impression that the police were routinely collecting information about Oswald's Mexican trip for the American authorities. One question that arises is whether Duran's statement was given voluntarily, and, if not, whether her identification of Oswald as the visitor to the embassy is valid.

The Warren Commission may have omitted a full exploration of this question because it had collateral evidence of Oswald's visit to the Cuban Embassy. There were, for example, Oswald's application for a Cuban visa, bearing his photograph and signature,[31] and a letter reportedly written by Oswald to the Soviet Embassy in Washington, referring to his visit to the Cuban Embassy.[32] The address book found among Oswald's possessions, moreover, contained Duran's name and telephone number. But the only credible eyewitness testimony that Oswald in fact visited the embassy is the statement of Silvia Duran.

When viewed in the light of the recently disclosed evidence suggesting that someone might have visited the embassy impersonating Oswald, the Commission's failure to settle completely the question of the three misidentified photos seems extraordinary. It is probable that the CIA did in fact supply an explanation of the photographs that was enough to satisfy the Commission at the time. If so, that explanation remains a part of the classified Warren Commission documents not available to the public.

Raymond Rocca (who, until his recent resignation, was the Agency's action officer for all post-Warren Report inquiries about the matter) told one of the authors that the CIA could not identify the mystery man. If this is so, we may wonder how the Agency could have offered a satisfactory explanation of the incident to the Commission. Until additional documents bearing on this matter are declassified, the conclusion that Oswald really visited the Cuban Embassy must remain in some doubt. But even if he did, the question whether someone was nevertheless trying to impersonate him remains a crucial one.

If someone posing as Oswald visited the Soviet and Cuban embassies in the early autumn of 1963, what implications might be drawn from this discovery? One obvious interpretation is that someone sought to counterfeit a fresh connection between the man who was soon to become the accused presidential assassin and the governments of those two communist countries. But it is not necessary to speculate further. If someone were trying to impersonate Oswald eight weeks before the assassination, the Warren Commission's theory of a lone assassin, unconnected with any conspiracy, is seriously undermined and the case should be reopened.

There could be, of course, an innocent explanation of how the CIA came to misidentify the mystery man as Lee Harvey Oswald: Oswald may actually have visited the Cuban and Soviet embassies. If this were the case, then somewhere in the CIA's files there should be photographs of the real Lee Harvey Oswald departing from the Soviet and Cuban embassies in Mexico City. If those photographs exist, their publication would help to settle the question. If they don't, the CIA should now explain why not. In either case, it should also disclose what it knows about the man it wrongly identified as Oswald on two separate occasions. It should explain why it believes that this man was not impersonating Oswald. All these matters should be clarified both by the CIA itself and by the congressional committees that are about to investigate its activities. □

[29] Ibid., p. 5.

[30] Commission Document 963, The National Archives, Washington, DC, p. 16.

[31] *Hearings*, Commission Exhibit 2564.

[32] Ibid., Commission Exhibit 15.

THE ECONOMIST MAY 3, 1975

CIA

Who killed Kennedy?

Washington, DC

Currents of doubt about the findings of the Warren commission on the assassination of President Kennedy at Dallas in 1963 have never quite ceased to swirl. The films of the event are open to different interpretations. A disparate group of self-appointed examiners has chewed over, in books, articles and pamphlets, the forensic evidence, which in any event is incomplete. Some possible, if fanciful, leads to the former associations of the presumed assassin, Lee Harvey Oswald, were not followed up. The important question is whether Oswald was the sole assassin acting of his own motion, as the Warren commission concluded, or whether he had controllers or associates. If it were shown that he was not acting on his own, then the question might arise whether any connection existed between the killing of President Kennedy and some other notable American assassinations of the period.

The most recent hypothesis is that the president may have been killed in retaliation for attempts on the life of Mr Fidel Castro, and this has arisen in connection with the recently circulating suggestions that the Central Intelligence Agency had something to do with plans for, or discussions about, the assassination of various foreign rulers, Mr Castro among them. Step by step the Rockefeller commission, appointed by President Ford in January to look into allegations of domestic spying by the Central Intelligence Agency, has found itself casting its net wider. This week it recalled for prolonged questioning two witnesses previously heard: Mr William Colby, the present director of the CIA, and Mr Richard Helms, the former director, now ambassador in Iran. Mr Helms had already been questioned at length by the committee staff on two days last week.

After his appearance before the commission Mr Helms denied once again that, so far as he knew, the CIA had ever assassinated any foreign leader. Unfortunately he showed signs of being overwrought, calling one reporter who questioned him (Mr Daniel Schorr, who first aired the allegations about foreign assassinations by the CIA on Columbia Broadcasting System) "killer Schorr" and obscene names.

On the following day, there was Mr Schorr on the CBS news questioning a retired air force officer formerly in the Office of Special Operations at the Defence Department, Colonel Fleycher Prouty, one of whose duties was liaison with the CIA. Colonel Prouty wrote a book about his experiences, "The Secret Team". Watching his television set on Monday, he became incensed at seeing Mr Schorr abused by Mr Helms, and volunteered his recollection that there was indeed a plot to kill Mr Castro in 1959 or 1960, and that in the course of his duties he had helped to supply the CIA with a specially equipped small

WASHINGTON POST
11 MAY 1975

Oswald and the KGB

Soviet Security Vetoed His Return in '63

By Daniel Schorr
Special to The Washington Post

On Feb. 4, 1964, ten weeks after President Kennedy's assassination, Lt. Col. Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko of the KGB (Soviet state security) defected to the United States in Geneva. He said, among other things, that he had handled the file on Lee Harvey Oswald since the ex-Marine's arrival in Moscow in 1959.

Brought to the United States by the Central Intelligence Agency, Nosenko was turned over to the FBI on Feb. 26, 1964, for several days of interrogation about Oswald, who the Warren Commission said acted alone in assassinating Kennedy in Dallas on Nov. 22, 1963. The interrogation report—part of the Warren Commission's secret file, but never cited in testimony or in conclusions—has been declassified. This account is taken from Nosenko's interrogation.

Nosenko painted a picture of Soviet security officers so leery of Oswald, who they considered mentally unstable and possibly a "sleeper" American agent, that they tried to get him out of the country and vetoed his return when he applied in Mexico City in September, 1963.

The security officer said that an inspection of the Soviets' file after the Dallas murder started a Kremlin flap that reached as high as Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev when a notation was found indicating that a KGB officer in Minsk, in violation of instructions, might have tried to recruit Oswald before his return to the United States.

According to Nosenko, it was with relief that it was finally concluded that the entry was a self-serving lie by a bureaucrat, who was ignorant of the implications.

Nosenko's offer to testify in secret before the Warren Commission was declined. John McCone, then director of the CIA, told this reporter that his counterintelligence officers suspected Nosenko might be a plant to exonerate the Soviets of conspiracy.

When McCone appeared before the Warren Commission with his deputy, Richard Helms, in June, 1964, they said that there was "no evidence" of a Soviet conspiracy in Kennedy's assassination. But they did not say they might have evidence to the contrary.

Rep. Gerald R. Ford, a member of the Warren Commission, asked, "Is the Central Intelligence Agency continuing any investigation into this area?"

McCone replied, "No, because at the present time we have no information in our files that we have not exhaustively investigated and disposed of to our satisfaction."

Today, McCone says that Nosenko's bona fides "subsequently were proven" and that "it is today the position of the CIA that the information given by Nosenko was correct." Within the agency, it is understood, that is still a subject of dispute.

Whether the Nosenko report would have affected the conclusions of the Warren Commission is hard to judge. Some former staff members said the conclusion that there was "no evidence" of a conspiracy might have been more strongly worded.

Not only did Nosenko deny any Soviet conspiracy, but he said he knew of "no Cuban involvement in the assassination."

The account contained in three interrogations of Nosenko by the FBI can be summarized as follows:

As deputy chief of a KGB counterintelligence section dealing with American and British tourists, Nosenko received a report from an Intourist guide, after Oswald's arrival in Moscow, saying Oswald wanted to stay permanently and become a Soviet citizen.

Deciding that Oswald was "of no interest to the KGB" and "somewhat abnormal," Nosenko had the Intourist guide advise Oswald that he would have to leave when his tourist visa expired.

After slashing his wrist in a Moscow hotel, Oswald was taken to a hospital, where an evaluation of "mental instability" was made. Despite Oswald's threat to try suicide again if he had to leave the country, the KGB advised his expulsion, but later learned that some other authority—the foreign ministry or the Red Cross—permitted him to stay in the Soviet Union and sent him to Minsk.

The KGB's file on Oswald was transferred to Minsk with a cover letter containing instructions that the KGB there "take no action concerning Oswald except to 'passively' observe his activities to make sure he was not a United States intelligence agent temporarily dormant."

The next time Nosenko heard of Oswald was in September, 1963, when Oswald applied for a re-entry visa at the Soviet embassy in Mexico City. An exchange of memos between the foreign intelligence and domestic intelligence directorates of the KGB resulted in a decision that Oswald "not be granted permission to return to the Soviet Union."

Two hours after Kennedy's assassination, Nosenko was called into a KGB office and asked about Oswald. He telephoned Minsk for a summary of Oswald's file. The summary contained a notation that the KGB in Minsk had tried to "influence Oswald in the right direction."

That stirred further investigation, and the entire file was flown to Moscow by military plane. Vladimir Semichastny, chairman of the KGB, was obliged to report to the party central committee and to Khrushchev.

The investigation concluded that the KGB "had no personal contact with Oswald and had not attempted to utilize him in any manner." The entry about trying to "influence Oswald" was attributed to the KGB in Minsk, "unaware of the international significance of Oswald's activities . . . reporting their endeavors to influence Oswald as a self-serving effort to impress the KGB center."

Nosenko said "the Oswald affair was a source of great concern for KGB headquarters, where a large staff was assembled and records were reviewed "to make certain that the KGB had not utilized Oswald as an agent."

Schorr is a CBS News Correspondent.

aircraft to land the assassins, two Cuban exiles, in Cuba. They failed, and were captured. Denials and counter-denials abound, but the CIA investigation is making a new inquiry into the death of President Kennedy more likely.

NEWSWEEK
12 May 1975

CIA Controversy

I agree wholeheartedly with A.J. Langguth when he says "Abolish the CIA!" (MY TURN, April 7). We should dismiss this secretive elitist cult of agents and administrators for all the reasons put forward by Langguth, *and* as a matter of retribution on behalf of the contribution the CIA has made to the countless thousands of war dead in Southeast Asia, for the victimized peoples of other Third World countries, for those oppressed or tortured or even murdered as a result of CIA interference, for the people of our own country whose constitutional liberties lie trampled under secretive CIA "expedience" and on behalf of all the untold victims of other CIA "horror stories" still to be uncovered.

JIM BLICKENSTAFF
Concord, Calif.

■ The CIA has done more good for the U.S. than Mr. Langguth's narrow-minded article has done for NEWSWEEK. As long as we face Communists, who want world domination, let us not abolish any agencies for preserving freedom for Americans.

PAUL KANTOR
Fairport Harbor, Ohio

■ Let's abolish A.J. Langguth—at least from the pages of NEWSWEEK!

HURLEY M. MULKEY
Durham, N.C.

C.I.A. Covert Activities Abroad Shielded by Major U.S. Companies

The following article was written by John M. Crewdson based on reporting by him and Nicholas M. Horrock.

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 10—The Central Intelligence Agency's use of the Howard R. Hughes organization to disguise its recovery of a sunken Soviet submarine is but the most recent example of a long-standing practice in which dozens, perhaps scores, of American companies have lent their names and reputations—usually for a price—to shield covert C.I.A.

According to one intelligence source thoroughly familiar with the practice, these relationships between the C.I.A. and American-based multinational corporations, known as "commerciial cover agreements," have resulted in the placing of career C.I.A. officers in the overseas offices of legitimate companies that range from some of the laregst in the world to others unknown to the general public.

The source named more than 20 American companies that he said had entered into such agreements with the C.I.A. over the last 15 years.

The list, which reads like a "Who's Who" of business and finance, includes such diverse fields as petroleum, rubber products, heavy manufacturing, banking, consumer products and services, travel, advertising, publishing, public relations and the import-export trade.

A C.I.A. official said that the agency would remain silent on the details of its cover arrangements with American businesses, but other officials have previously conceded that operatives posed as journalists and businessmen while working abroad.

Spokesmen for most of the corporations identified by the intelligence source said, after checking, that they had been unable to find any evidence of a relationship between their organizations and the C.I.A.

Some of the companies declined to comment, and others said that they had been asked by the C.I.A. to enter into such relationships but had rebuffed the agency.

There have been recent published assertions, however, that Fodor's Travel Guides, Inc., has provided operating cover for intelligence agents abroad, and an article in the Feb. 3, 1975, issue of Advertising Age suggested that the J. Walter Thompson Company, the nation's largest advertising agency, had performed a similar function for the C.I.A.

Assertion Denied

The Thompson organization has denied the assertion, but a spokesman did confirm that two individuals named by the source as C.I.A. agents who had operated under Thompson cover were employed at one time in the company's offices in Paris and Tokyo.

Eugene Fodor, the head of the Travel Publishing Company, has denied allegations by E. Howard Hunt Jr., the retired C.I.A. operative and convicted Watergate burglar, that he himself is a former C.I.A. agent. Mr. Fodor declined comment, however, on Mr. Hunt's assertion that Fodor's had provided operating covers for American intelligence agents abroad.

Officials of the Summa Corporation, Mr. Hughes's umbrella organization, has said privately that the reclusive billionaire received no remuneration for allowing the C.I.A. to place his imprimateur on the Hughes Glomar Explorer, the salvage ship that, disguised as a deep-sea mining vessel, raised part of a Soviet submarine from the floor of the Pacific last summer.

There are, nevertheless, indications that Mr. Hughes may have reaped some long-term rewards for his operation, and many of the other companies that have entered into commercial cover arrangements, according to the intelligence source, have received various forms of compensation in return. The source said that some had forced the C.I.A. to "pay through the teeth" for the use of their names.

Maintaining 'Cover'

The source gave this description of how the arrangement works:

To maintain their "cover," the C.I.A. operatives working under such agreements must spend a certainport ion of their time on legitimate business activities. In most instances, these activities produce income that is shared by the C.I.A. and the covering company.

The operative's salary is paid by the C.I.A., which also underwrites the expenses incurred if an overseas "business" office must be enlarged or opened to accommodate the agency's purposes. The company then benefits by gaining a corporate presence in an area where it otherwise would have none.

On some occasions, the source went on, companies having commercial cover agreements with the C.I.A. have attempted to take advantage of their special relationships by approaching the agency to seek some official favor from the Government. But he said that, to his knowledge, they had invariably been turned away.

The corporations involved in these relationships may benefit in yet another way. Although most agents operating under commercial cover allot the minimum time possible to corporate matters, the reverse is sometimes true.

Some clandestine agents, another intelligence source has said, have given the C.I.A. "a pain in the neck" and company sales an unexpected lift by spending "only 10 minutes a day" gathering intelligence and devoting the remainder of their time to business dealings.

Other agents have proved to be such talented businessmen that they reportedly have eventually been hired away from their intelligence positions as full-time executives by the companies that provided their covers.

Although there are no published estimates of how many C.I.A. agents are working under commercial cover, the number is believed to be around 200, according to the intelligence source. Similarly, no one outside the C.I.A., and few within, know precisely how many commercial cover arrangements are in force at any one time, the source said.

Nor is the existence of such arrangements broadly known within the participating corporations, the source said, where, typically, only one or two top executives are made "witting"—the C.I.A. term for one who is knowledgeable—of the cover operator's true affiliation.

For this reason, smaller companies, or large ones with small overseas offices, are reportedly preferred by the C.I.A. For such relationships. Since virtually all the agent's business colleagues are left unwitting, the source said, it is far easier for hhim to carry out his intelligence work if he is not required to maintain the appearance of a corporate executive in front of a large number of genuine businessmen.

Corporations that are wholly owned by a single individual, closely held, or headed by a dominant and aggressive chief executive officer are likewise more attractive to the agency, the source said, although several with broad public ownership allgedly have been used for cover purposes as well.

Not surprisingly, Mr. Hughes's various entities reportedly have proved particularly useful to the C.I.A. as "front" organizations. The intelligence source, who said that the agency had employed Mr. Hughes for other covers before he became involved in the submarine salvage project, recalled that members of the C.I.A.'s central cover staff, which oversees such arrangements, "always referred to him as 'the stockholder.'"

Mr. Hughes, whose Summa Corporation is wholly owned by him, was "ideal for certain projects," the source said, "because once he comes down and says, 'do a certain thing,' you do it."

The source recalled one instance in which the C.I.A. needed to arrange quickly for an agent to attend an international air exposition in Paris at which the Soviet Union's TU-144 supersonic transport was scheduled to perform.

The Hughes organization, the source said, was able on short notice to slip a C.I.A. agent onto the show grounds disguised as an employe of the Hughes Aircraft Corporation, which reportedly has undertaken a number of highly sensitive projects for the agency in past years.

A spokesman for the Summa Corporation said that he had "no knowledge of that incident."

The tax problem generated by C.I.A. agents who lead double lives as businessmen, the source said, are handled by a secret "tax committee" within the agency that works closely with the Internal Revenue Service.

Two Returns Filed

Each year, he said, the 200 or so businessmen-spies file two Federal income-tax returns — and "overt" return that lists the salary ostensibly paid by the covering company, and a "covert" return that shows the true Government salary.

The "covert" return, he said, although inspected by the I.R.S., never finds its way outside the C.I.A.'s modernistic marble headquarters building across the Potomac River from Washington.

There are about 6,000 employes of the C.I.A.'s Division of Crandestine Services, the "cloak and dagger" branch of the agency that sends intelligence operatives abroad under a variety of covers. These include "official" covers, in which the agent is passed off as an economic or political officer attached to an American Embassy or foreign aid mission.

It is, however, the clandestine services' "deep cover" agents, like the bogus businessmen, who are the elite of the C.I.A., the source said They are the nearest thing in the American intelligence community to the secret agent, he said, the men who work most often with such paraphernalia as physical disguises, fale passports and disappearing inks.

They are, in most cases, highly individualistic and resourceful types, he said, who prefer to work overseas and on their own, frequently in dangerous circumstances, rather at C.I.A. headquarters or in American Embassies.

Since their extended absences from Washington deny most of them the contacts necessary for promotion within the C.I.A., they are generally men with little ambition for advancement, the source continued. Their only tangible reward is a 10 per cent salary bonus awarded annually for working under dangerous conditions, he said.

The nature of their work denies them both security and genuine friendships. If a deep-cover agent should be exposed and captured, the source said, he cannot depend on the C.I.A. to secure his return, and the agency, in fact, may be forced to deny knowledge of him.

Moreover, while he is "in place," or on assignment under cover, the source said, the agent continually presents a fabricated identity to his associates and acquaintances, fending off the ones who attempt to come too close. Even other deep-cover agents with whom he may work off and on

WASHINGTON STAR
1 MAY 1975

GARRY WILLS

A Word for Warren Commission

It is time to say a word for the Warren Commission. Even those who believe that Oswald was the sole assassin of President Kennedy are beginning to grant that the Warren Commission did a bad job. They say we should "reopen the case," if for no other reason, just to resolve doubts caused by sloppy detective work. But most doubts are caused by two classes of men — those who have not really read what the Warren Commission said and those whose doubts would not be resolved by the Second Coming (which they would treat as a CIA plot).

The attacks on the Warren Commission come from three main directions:

1. Some think the commission was part of the plot itself. These people are at least consistent. If one could mobilize all the resources most conspiratorial theories demand, then controlling the commission should have been no problem at all. But this, like most such theories, proves too much. If one can "control" a chief justice, a future president, a bunch of prominent lawyers on the make, an attorney general who happens to be the assassinated man's brother, then one controls everything, and there is no longer any need to hide — i.e., to be a conspiracy.

2. Others think the CIA and/or the FBI bamboozled the commission — which is a rather touching exercise in credulity. Even if those agencies were efficient, they would have to tread carefully where so many other factions and rival interests were at play — and where the results were going to be published in 26 volumes. But, of course, the record of both the FBI and the CIA is enough to make any criticism of the commission look like praise. If the conspiracy depended on the FBI and the CIA, then Howard Hunt's whole career tells us what would have happened to it.

3. Others, by far the most numerous, think the commission just fumbled the job out of haste, incompetence or unconscious prejudices. Most of the evidence for this is the citing of "leads" that the commission did not track down. In fact, many of these were tracked down, or were patently false leads from the start.

A fair example is Mark Lane's use of testimony by Nancy Perrin Rich. He devoted a whole chapter of this book to this woman's bizarre tale. He neglected to tell the readers that the same woman appeared two other times, in two different places, to volunteer evidence to the commission. The investigators listened politely, though she told three totally different stories. At one of these appearances, deliberately omitted from Lane's chapter, she took (and flunked) a polygraph test.

Ovid Demaris and I, back in the '60s, took Lane's advice and followed up this woman's testimony. We found that she was an unstable woman, had been in and out of psychiatric care and police stations, that she loved to "testify" about all her famous friends in mob trials and other celebrated crimes. We also found that Lane knew all this, that he told the woman's husband he would not be able to make anything of her testimony. But he made an entire tendentious chapter out of one third of that testimony.

Here is a simple rule of thumb for dealing with conspiratorialists: If they question the integrity of the Warren Commission yet quote Mark Lane with approval, they are intellectually very ill-equipped or intellectually dishonest.

for years are likely to know him only by his "funny," or cover, name.

The deep-cover agent's true vocation, the source said, is carefully hidden at the outset of his career from most of his colleagues in other branches of the C.I.A. One such former agent described how, near the end of his espionage training at Camp Peary, a C.I.A. facility in southeast Virginia, he and a handful of classmates were taken aside and asked about their interest in deep-cover work.

Those who agreed to join that branch of the agency, he said, then became the principal actors in an attempt to convince their fellow trainees, by their casual comments, that they had become disillusioned with the C.I.A.

Their efforts, the source said, accompanied by asides from their professors that cast doubt on their potential for espionage work, culminated in their "resignations" from the six-month training program.

Fellow trainees who had unsuccessfully urged such friends to stay on perhaps then received letters or telephone calls from a departed colleague reporting that he had taken a job as an overseas executive or sales representative for a well-known corporation, the source said. Regrets were exchanged, and there were promises to keep in touch, he said. The deep-cover agent was in place."

The agent working under a commercial cover abroad has the primary responsibility to create and reinforce his second identity, the source said. He reportedly receives periodic help from the C.I.A., but is left largely to rely on his own resources in convincing business associates and others that he is what he is not.

In supporting a deep-cover identity, an operative sometimes finds it necessary to violate Federal laws. One agent who reportedly posed as a businessman in Western Europe, for example, accepted the leadership of an organization of Republican party members living abroad.

The man's political work may have helped allay suspicion about his true identity, according to the source. But it also amounted to a violation of the Hatch Act, which prohibits Federal employes from taking part in partisan political activity.

WASHINGTON POST
14 May 1975

• Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, two American-financed stations that broadcast to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, will reduce their staffs by about 300 persons this year, management spokesmen in Munich said.

NEW YORK TIMES
12 May 1975

C.I.A. SAID TO EASE BUSINESS SPY ROLE

Agency Reported Reducing Companies That It Uses

WASHINGTON, May 11 — The Central Intelligence Agency is cutting back on the size and number of companies that it owns and has used in past clandestine activities, but it appears to retain the power to revive them if needed, Newsweek magazine said today.

The agency's Washington-based Pacific Corporation, with 11,200 employes in 1970—compared with 16,500 in the agency itself—is down to little more than 1,100, the magazine said.

Other companies are being sold, Newsweek said, some possibly in the manner that the agency disposed of Southern Air Transport, it reported, was sold at a "bargain rate" to the man who operated it for the agency for a decade.

The agency operates and maintains a number of contingency funds in connection with the compaies it owns, including a $26-million insurance fund, the magazine said. Much of that money is reportedly invested in stocks and securities chosen by C.I.A. economists in Langley, Va., partly on the basis of classified information not available to ordinary investors.

In addition, the magazine said, an "old-boy" network of former C.I.A. agents, officials and cooperative private businessmen was found to include connections with 16 banks and investment houses, including New York's Manufacturers Hanover Bank and the Chemical Bank.

Connections also lead to two dozen major corporations, Newsweek said, including I.T.&T., United Aircraft and W. R. Grace & Co., as well as some prestigious law firms, including Boston's Hale & Dorr,

NEW YORK TIMES
6 May 1975

Chief of U.S.I.A. Opposes Abolition of His Agency

WASHINGTON, May 5 (AP) — James Keogh, director of the United States Information Agency, said today that he opposed the recommendation of a panel that the agency be abolished and its functions reorganized.

The 21-member panel had proposed that the advocacy of United States foreign policy be transfered to the State Department, that a new cultural affairs agency be established for long-range portrayal of American society overseas, and that the Voice of America be placed under an independent five-member board of directors.

"Our information and cultural programs should be coordinated with U.S. policy, and the agency which runs them should have close and cooperative relations with the White House and the Department of State," Mr. Keogh told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

NEWSWEEK
19 MAY 1975

How the CIA Does 'Business'

It began as a blend of patriotism and old school spirit. Back in 1961, an Arlington, Va., lawyer named L. Lee Bean was contacted by a former classmate at the University of Virginia. The old chum had an intriguing proposition: would Bean help the U.S. Government set up several companies to do special work in the interest of national security?

With the approval of his partners, Bean agreed. Next he was directed to a prominent Boston lawyer, Paul Hellmuth at the firm of Hale and Dorr, who provided the actual instructions on incorporation and operation. In short order, Bean's firm was a mailing address for two newly minted concerns: Anderson Security Consultants and Zenith Technical Enterprises. Anderson provided security services for various other U.S. firms (destroying classified documents, investigating employees) while Zenith, headquartered in a deserted blimp base on the campus of the University of Miami, conducted a variety of anti-Castro propaganda and paramilitary operations. What both companies had in common—besides Bean—was that they were wholly owned domestic subsidiaries of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

Bean's case is just one example of how the CIA over the years built a multimillion-dollar commercial empire of diverse and deftly disguised "proprietary" companies—owned by the agency itself—to help carry out and cover up many of its most clandestine operations. In recent years, as embarrassing publicity about the proprietaries has spread and scientific intelligence techniques have become more effective, there has been a drastic cutback in the proprietary network; significantly, NEWSWEEK has learned that the CIA's biggest single company, the Washington-based Pacific Corp., has trimmed 90 per cent of its staff since 1970. But given the CIA's power and proclivities, there is no reason why the network couldn't expand again if it seemed useful. And in any case, the proprietaries are a fertile field for the multiple investigations of the agency's activities now gaining momentum on Capitol Hill.

DESCENDANTS OF TIGERS

In their heyday, the agency's proprietaries helped bomb villages in the Congo, fly mercenaries and supplies into Laos and train Tibetan guerrillas for sneak attacks on China. They also published books, broadcast propaganda and provided "cover" for CIA agents in their own news agencies and free-wheeling public-relations firms in the U.S. and around the world. Even with the current cutbacks, a hard core of proprietaries remains—including, NEWSWEEK has learned, a small news service in Europe, a company supplying technical services in the Middle East, and Fairways Corp., a small Washington airline. And agency veterans suggest that the phasing out is a sign that the CIA is shifting to tactics that avoid the long-term costs of large proprietaries. One example of the new style may be the recently revealed sub-raising efforts by the mystery ship Glomar Explorer—operated for the CIA by Howard Hughes.

The history of CIA proprietaries goes back almost as far as the agency's original division into intelligence-gathering and "special operations" branches. It was in the summer of 1948 that National Security Council Order 10/2 created an Office of Policy Coordination to conduct small and "plausibly deniable" spying, subversion and secret propaganda activities. That office quickly attached itself to the recently created Central Intelligence Agency, where it was known officially as the Plans Division and unofficially as the "Department of Dirty Tricks."

Over the next two years, the agency took increasing control of an unusual Far East airline—Civil Air Transport—which had been formed by seasoned veterans of Air Force Gen. Claire Chennault's daredevil Flying Tigers. CAT's risky missions to harass mainland Communists were financed at first by the Chinese Nationalists, then by the American Airdale Corp. Airdale soon metamorphosed—in the corporate records of Delaware—into the Pacific Corp., subsequently revealed as a linchpin of CIA proprietaries.

Soon other proprietaries came under the umbrella of Pacific Corp., including a number of ostensibly independent firms whose role as CIA covers was later blown by a series of journalistic exposés and books such as former agent Philip Agee's "CIA Diary" and "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence" by John Marks and CIA alumnus Victor Marchetti. Among the first proprietaries:

- Air America, which grew from CAT's Asian operations, became a major airline with 165 planes and about 5,000 employees. Its CIA missions included parachuting Meo tribesmen as guerrillas into Laos, dropping rice to refugees in the Vietnamese highlands, carrying payrolls for CIA mercenaries and transporting prisoners for the Saigon government. In the course of all this, the airline has also been accused of playing a role in the massive Southeast Asian narcotics trade. But most of its activities are open commercial contracts to transport U.S. servicemen and government personnel; it even played a major part in the recent evacuation of Saigon. The airline formerly ran a large maintenance base at Udorn, Thailand, providing the airfield with weather and communications systems, tactical air control and even fire-protection services.
- Air Asia Co., Ltd., based on Taiwan, until recently ran the largest aircraft maintenance-and-repair facility in southeast Asia. Operated as an Air America subsidiary with nearly 6,000 workers and pilots at its peak payroll, Air Asia serviced craft not only for Air America but for the U.S. military as well. According to one former intelligence officer, it could actually build entire aircraft from prototypes (to the sputtering dismay of some U.S. manufacturers).
- Pacific Engineering Co., an operating division of Air America, provided supervising engineers for local work teams assigned to build airstrips for Vietnam and the "secret war" in Laos. Hugh L. Grundy, the division's president, says these were mainly "up-country, mountaintop strips . . . in primitive areas."

Outside the Pacific Corp. framework, the CIA set up dozens of other proprietary companies around the world. These ranged from tiny one- or two-man offices ("singletons" and "doubletons," in agency parlance) to larger operations such as Anderson Security, Zenith Technical Enterprises and the major international broadcasting stations Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe.

Originally created to provide logistical support for CIA undercover operations, many of the proprietaries themselves soon became involved in intelligence gathering and moved on to more active operations. A CIA-owned print shop in Latin America, for example, might first have been set up merely to provide cover for a CIA agent in the area. But it would soon seek to gain influence with a local political party or labor group by printing their propaganda, providing jobs for movement leaders or offering office space for political meetings. "When the agency was deeply involved in political activities, proprietaries made a lot of sense," says one former CIA employee. "To have a handle on a foreign labor union was important."

As with lawyer Bean, many prominent Americans were recruited to give the proprietaries credibility. "Anybody who looked closely would know that most of the people actually running the company were having a hard time meeting their own mortgages," says one close observer of the process. The big names were signed up to suggest solid sources of private capital. When the CIA acquired the Miami-based Southern Air Transport in the early 1960s, it apparently persuaded former U.S. budget director Percival Brundage, a consultant to the prestigious Price, Waterhouse & Company, and former Assistant Defense Secretary Perkins McGuire, a board member in various corporations, to hold most of the airline's stock in name only.

In practice, the proprietaries were used as needed to cover CIA operations. A fleet of twelve to fifteen B-26 bombers from the Korean War, for example, passed back and forth among the agency and its companies in the course of being used in the Indonesian war, the Congo rebellion, the Bay of Pigs invasion and Vietnam. Sometimes the planes required no cover at all, but at other times they were flown by pilots working for such CIA proprietaries as the Double-Chek Corp. and Caramar—the Caribbean Aero Marine Corp. Between assignments, the planes were frequently ferried back to the U.S. by Air America pilots and then stored by Intermountain Aviation, another proprietary that has recently been spun off to a private buyer.

The operations of the proprietaries have raised larger questions about the CIA's barely glimpsed finances. At best estimates, the agency receives about $750 million from Congress each year; it also has large amounts of cash available on short notice for covert projects ($8 million was channeled to anti-Allende forces in Chile from 1970 to 1973) and sizable sums were set aside in contingency funds for the insurance and fringe-benefit needs of its proprietaries, particularly the airlines. The insurance funds totaled more than $26 million by 1971, NEWSWEEK has learned. Rather than collect dust, says one former CIA

employee, much of that money was reinvested in choice stocks and securities chosen by economists in CIA headquarters at Langley, Va.—partly on the basis of classified information not available to ordinary investors.

A COVER IS BLOWN

A clandestine service with independent income? The potential for mischief is clear, and Wisconsin Sen. William Proxmire recently introduced legislation that would require stricter audits of CIA investments and other finances. "Do profits go into the CIA budget?" Proxmire asked. "Does the director of the CIA have a special 'Director's Fund' which can be used without justification to any other person?" The CIA, for its part, has declined to answer a series of similar questions from NEWSWEEK, replying to a written request: "Please excuse us from answering . . . We are in full compliance with the law."

Most CIA proprietaries, of course, have been too small to make much profit on their own; indeed, agency policy is generally to avoid doing too well in the world of private enterprise. But the charade still requires two or three sets of records to keep track of private and government funds, as well as complicated intercessions with other arms of government such as the Federal Aviation Agency and the Internal Revenue Service. One temptation is to slip several agents into the same proprietary, but while that might save on bookkeeping, it makes all the agents vulnerable if the cover of any one of them is blown.

This was the undoing of the Washington-based Robert R. Mullen & Co., a public-relations firm which, while not owned by the CIA, had agreed to provide slots for several of its overseas operatives. When the CIA learned that a forthcoming book would disclose that Mullen had provided cover for an agent in Mexico City, Mullen fronts in Amsterdam and Singapore had to be closed—and the cover man in Singapore disappeared. Mullen itself expired of embarrassment in 1974, though its former president, Robert R. Bennett, is still in the PR trade.

The policy of not doing *too* well in business also takes a psychic toll. "You look like a horse's ass," one former agent now complains to friends. "Even your kids think you're a loser." Some operatives even begin straining to supercharge their little firms, often at the expense of their cloak-and-daggering. "They'd start trying to make the goddamn airline run better," grumbles an agency veteran. "That's not the purpose of the drill. Pretty soon they'd become more businessman than an intelligence officer."

DROPOUTS AND OLD BOYS

A few agents actually quit "the company"—as the CIA is known—to join real companies for which their work in the proprietaries had provided on-the-job training. Other agents are not quite so well prepared, however. In fact, NEWSWEEK reporters found surprisingly widespread complaints that CIA case officers and contract workers whose commercial covers were *blown often found themselves* abruptly dropped by the agency—and unable to parlay their past experience into straight-world jobs. "Say you're working for the X-Corp. or some such, and you make a mistake or someone else does and you are out on your ear," explains one veteran of commercial-cover assignments. "When you try to find another job they ask, 'What does X-Corp. do?' Well, you stutter around—a man 40 or 45 is supposed to have a reputation for *something*, but there's not much for them to go on. You can't say, 'I worked for the CIA'."

More and more agents may be experiencing such hardships as the CIA trims back its proprietary program. The Pacific Corp., for example, has shrunk from 11,200 employees in 1970 (compared with 16,500 for the CIA itself) to little more than 1,100 today. Other firms have been sold off or shut down. But one former CIA employee suggests that the agency may be trying to sell the proprietaries "in such a way that they might be recalled someday"—and such suspicions have been bolstered by some recent transactions. Southern Air Transport, a $5 million operation at its peak, was sold not long ago—at a bargain rate—to the man who managed it for the CIA for more than a decade. The sale of Air Asia to E-Systems, Inc., puts the firm in the hands of a company whose board of directors includes retired Adm. William F. Raborn, a former CIA director.

The same sort of "old boy" network of former CIA agents, officials and cooperative businessmen has grown to include influential corporate leaders, lawyers and foundation executives. Through them, NEWSWEEK has traced connections of one sort or another with at least six een banks and investment houses (Manufacturers Hanover, Chemical Bank, Fiduciary Trust), several major law firms (including Boston's Hale and Dorr and the equally prestigious Ropes & Gray), more than two dozen large corporations (ITT, United Aircraft, E-Systems, W.R. Grace & Co.) and several dozen associations and foundations, including the highly respected Council on Foreign Relations.

Evidence that the old boys do errands for the CIA is intriguing but largely circumstantial. Boston lawyer Hellmuth, who concedes that he helped set up Anderson Security as a CIA proprietary, is also head of two charitable organizations (the Independence Foundation and the J. Frederick Brown Foundation) which, he admits, have been used to channel CIA funds. Former CIA director Raborn is a consultant to Aerojet-General Corp., while another former boss of the agency, John McCone, serves as a board member of ITT, Standard Oil of California, Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co., United California Bank and Western Bancorporation.

Whether through the network or not, multinational companies have often done favors for the CIA. The agency said last year it had 200 agents abroad posing as corporate employees. For years, NEWSWEEK learned, some companies have served as conduits for CIA funds, including money used as bribes and campaign contributions to foreign officials.

Were the favors repaid? When a conduit company had its taxes audited, says a former U.S. official, the Internal Revenue Service would sometimes "get a call from the CIA saying, 'Get your people off their backs'." A former agency case officer recalled one company with investments in pre-Castro Cuba that was "extremely appreciative" of information that then CIA director Allen Dulles provided just before the revolution. "It saved them a lot of money," said the former case officer. And John McCone, the record shows, was quite willing to trade on his old agency connections in behalf of ITT when he offered the CIA $1 million to help prevent the election of Marxist President Salvador Allende in Chile—where ITT had holdings worth nearly $150 million.

THE NEW LOOK

Such corporate connections are harder to make these days; after the recent publicity, many companies are refusing to provide cover slots for CIA agents. "In fact," says a Congressional investigator, "you can almost hear them bouncing on the steps after they've been thrown out." But he adds, "I doubt they're getting totally out. Don't forget, the best cover is for everyone to believe that they can't get any cover." Thus there is still pressure in Congress for a law that would prohibit what Idaho Sen. Frank Church calls "this incestuous relationship between government and private corporations."

Are the CIA's proprietaries a dying breed? There are those who think that authority for almost all of the CIA's covert operations should be shifted to the Defense Department, leaving the CIA to concentrate on its original mission: the collection of intelligence. Others believe the reformers may be content with better Congressional control and review of the agency's current activities; one step in that direction is the new legislation that requires the Administration to brief both the House and Senate Foreign Relations Committees on CIA cover operations overseas.

But as long as there is a CIA, it will surely resist the idea of forswearing any tactics at the risk of letting other countries gain advantage. The idea that there are "rigid rules" in the intelligence business is nonsense, says a veteran of the U.S. intelligence establishment. "If I don't need a man in a white suit poking around somewhere today, I won't put him there. But I'm not saying I won't put him there tomorrow."

—DAVID M. ALPERN with ANTHONY MARRO, EVERT CLARK and HENRY McGEE in Washington

PUBLISHER'S WEEKLY
5 MAY 1975

THE WEEK
Editor:
Daisy Maryles

Stonehill To Publish Agee's Exposé Of The CIA

"INSIDE THE COMPANY: CIA Diary," one of the "hottest" book properties in recent years, has finally been signed by an American publisher, Stonehill Publishing Company who, unlike many large corporate firms, decided to grab the "hot potato" instead of passing it on. In this exposé of the CIA, former agent Philip Agee describes in complete detail his 12 years (1957-1969) with "The Company" in Ecuador, Uruguay, Mexico and Washington. According to published reports, his book names every CIA officer and agent whom he encountered and describes every operation that he took part in. The book gives an account of the author's disillusion, both with CIA methods and United States foreign policy. Among the figures listed as CIA collaborators by Agee are the current president of Mexico and his two predecessors, a former vice-president of Ecuador, ranking Communist Party members and scores of politicians, high military and police officials.

Agee, who wanted to avoid the problems encountered by fellow agents like Marchetti, decided to publish his book outside the country. Penguin released the book in London on January 2 and it became an instant best seller. In mid-1974 when Penguin offered the U.S. publications rights to the Agee book to American houses, the advance offers were reputed to be high. There was a report that one major publisher offered $250,000. However, when Penguin made it clear that they would not honor the warranty clause in any contract signed with an American publisher, publishers began to back down. With the CIA-Knopf action on Marchetti's "Cult of Intelligence" going from court to higher court and involving huge legal costs on the part of the publisher, interest quickly waned.

Except for the United States, the book has been available, since early January, in all English-speaking countries, including Canada. "Inside the Company" has been widely and favorably reviewed in the English and Canadian press. There was even one review in an American paper—the *Washington Post* on February 23. The *Post* departed from its usual practice of reviewing only books available to the U.S. because of "the unusual interest the book has generated and because of the relevance to the current investigation of the aims and methods of the CIA." Among other comments, the review said that "Agee has provided the most complete description yet of what the CIA does abroad. In entry after numbing entry, U.S. foreign policy is pictured as a web of deceit, hypocrisy and corruption."

The book was available for a few days in a few bookstores in Washington, D.C. (Discount and Sydney Kramer Book Store) and in New York (Classics Book Store). Copies sold out almost immediately. However, since then U.S. Customs officials have interceded and all copies (a few at the stores, the rest at the docks) have been seized.

About six months ago, for a $12,000 advance, Straight Arrow Books had an oral agreement with Penguin to publish the Agee book. The West Coast publisher dealt first with Penguin, then with the author and finally with the Scott Meredith Agency. A conflict over what rights were agreed on arose. Straight Arrow claimed that it had bought both hardcover and mass market rights from Penguin; the English publisher denied this. Straight Arrow, aware that the Meredith agency was offering the book to other publishers, stated that it was not interested in the hardcover rights without the paperback rights. But in the interim the book was listed in the Straight Arrow catalogue as the lead spring title. Simon and Schuster, the firm's distributor, was taking orders for it. Charles Williams, S&S sales manager, said that 15,000 orders have been logged in for the book.



The Meredith agency, according to Jack Scovill, who handled the deal, offered the book to about 25 American publishing houses including the major paperback firms. The best offer came from Warner Publishing Company for $60,000. That deal also fell through when Warner's insurance company refused to cover the risks involved. Scott Meredith came back to Straight Arrow, this time with an agreement that also included paperback rights. However, the firm at that point was curtailing operations and honoring only contracts already signed.

Scovill told *PW* that "he was astonished that publishers were running so scared of the CIA." This sentiment was echoed by Melvin Wulf, legal director of the American Civil Liberties Union, who told *PW* that he had made it clear in publishing circles that the ACLU was willing to represent them if there were any attempt on the part of the government to suppress the publication of the book.

However, it was not until April 22 when Stonehill's president, Jeffrey Steinberg, signed an agreement to publish the book in the United States that the picture changed. Steinberg, who was a founder with his father of Chelsea House, launched his Stonehill firm in 1971 and recently successfully published (good reviews, strong hardcover sales and a substantial paperback reprint sale) Sigmund Freud's "Cocaine Papers." Steinberg is very excited about his newest book which will have "heavy national publicity." He told *PW* that the first printing of 25,000 will be off the presses and shipped to bookstores in mid-June. A second printing will be available a few weeks later. Stonehill's distributor, George Braziller, will be handling book orders. Arrangements are being made with S&S for their orders.

The ACLU has promised to represent Stonehill "in the event that the U.S. seeks in any way to interfere with publication of the book." Steinberg's counsel is Greenbaum, Wolff & Ernst.

Priced at $9.95, "Inside the Company" will be serialized prior to publication in both *Rolling Stone* and the *Washington Post*. Agee will be interviewed in the August *Playboy*; articles by and about him are scheduled to appear in the coming months in *Esquire*, *Oui*, the *Washington Post*, *Village Voice* and others. For the time being, Stonehill has no plans to sell paperback rights. "We will wait until we have a better legal background and can offer the paperback publisher some protection," Steinberg said.

BALTIMORE SUN
13 May 1975

CIA behind Kennedy's death, young researcher thinks

By ISAAC REHERT

Now that the Rockefeller Commission investigating the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency is taking another look at some aspects of the Kennedy assassination, Henry Wegrocki feels vindicated.

He has been saying for months that the Warren Commission was wrong, that the time is ripe now for an official reinvestigation of that murder.

Henry is only 18, a senior at McDonogh School — he concedes he is no old and practiced hand at accomplished sleuthing. But the facts, he insists, speak for themselves; it is not a question of the youth or age of the person pointing the finger.

Henry believes that in the light of present-day events, the conclusion of the Warren Commission would never stand up against the facts. He thinks that the commission's report was molded in part by the political climate of the day.

But that climate has changed, Henry says, and a new look will expose the single-assassin, no-conspiracy interpretation of that crime as untenable.

Henry has been taking such a new look. During the past 16 months, he has read dozens of books on the subject, visited the National Archives in Washington where the evidence is kept and studied the Warren Report.

The nature of the wounds that were inflicted, the films showing the actions of President Kennedy and former Texas Gov. John Connally in the open limousine, Governor Connally's own eye-witness testimony, the recovered bullets and the rifle, which is supposed to have been the only weapon used — all this evidence does not point, Henry believes, to a solitary and emotionally distraught Lee Harvey Oswald planning and doing the deed all alone.

Henry beleves there had to be more than one sharpshooter. Someone else had to be firing from another spot besides the top floor of the Texas Book Depository where Oswald had been.

There was a conspiracy, Henry believes, and adding what we know today to the information the Warren Commission had then suggests a conspiracy involving officials in the government.

Henry thinks that the Warren Commission eliminated the possibility of conspiracy because at the time there seemed to be no motive for one and it was unthinkable then that high American officials might be involved in such a thing.

But, he says, we are a lot better informed today, a lot wiser about some of the sinister capabilities of men in high office. Since the Warren Report, we have lived through My Lai, the Agnew resignation, Watergate and now the most recent revelations about some of the muddy activities of the CIA.

Today, Henry believes, the nation would be more ready to face the truth about what happened in Dallas.

Henry began his study in November, 1973, after watching a television program on the 10th anniversary of the assassination. He borrowed his father's car and drove to the Archives in Washington to study the evidence.

First of all, he decided, it couldn't have happened as the Warren Commission explained it. The commission said that three shots were fired, all of them by Lee Harvey Oswald, hitting the Kennedy car from above and behind.

One of the bullets is supposed to have passed through Kennedy's shoulder and then to have struck Governor Connally. A second missed, the third hit Kennedy in the head.

Impossible, says Henry Wegrocki. He has looked at the bullet; it is hardly at all deformed. He has looked at the rifle, an Italian Mannlicher-Carcano bolt-action weapon of 1940 vintage. No one could possibly fire the thing as fast as the actual shots rang out that day.

He looked at the films. While President Kennedy was being hit the first time, Governor Connally was still sitting in comfort. His own testimony was that there was an interval between the moment he heard the first shot ring out and when he himself was hit.

And the shot that struck the President's head could not have come from the rear, for parts of the flying debris struck police officers on motorcycles behind. It had to come from up front.

So Oswald could not have been the only person doing the shooting. There was more than one assassin, Henry believes; there was a group, and the brains behind the group, in his opinion, was the CIA.

The CIA had a motive, for President Kennedy had expressed disapproval of the worst of their cloak-and-dagger activities. It would suit them for him to be out of the way.

And there is evidence, too, that Lee Harvey Oswald himself had links to the CIA.

It was the CIA that had masterminded the invasion of the Bay of Pigs and a short time later, President Kennedy is known to have demurred from a proposed CIA plot to assassinate Fidel Castro.

Nevertheless, in spite of this disapproval, a CIA-backed team was picked up in Havana intent on just such an act of political murder. This is what the Rockefeller Commission recently has been concerned about.

As for Oswald, Henry's research raised a lot of unanswered questions that suggest he may have worked for the CIA.

When in Russia in the early 1960's, was he spying on the Soviet development of a U-2 spy plane?

As an insignificant Marine private at Atsugi Air Force Base in Japan, he was given a high security clearance. Why?

And the Dallas police maintained that Oswald had a CIA number, 110669. Is there any verification?

Unfortunately, unless there is a change in policy, the American public cannot find out until the year 2038, for many documents relating to the assassination have been consigned unopened into the National Archives for 75 years.

Lyndon Johnson believed there might have been a conspiracy — perhaps by the CIA, perhaps by Castro, in retaliation for the attempts made on his life. And Senator Richard Russell of Georgia, who was a member of the Warren Commission, dissented from its final explanation.

But back in 1964, Henry believes, agencies such as the CIA were too sacrosanct even for the Warren Commission to take on.

That is all changed now. No agency of government is beyond suspicion today.

Henry believes that the time is ripe to reopen the matter of the assassination and when the Rockefeller Commission's report is delivered next month, he hopes it will spark public demand for a new and more thorough investigation.

Henry will lecture on his own private studies at McDonogh's Cultural Fair Friday.

U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
12 MAY 1975

Washington Whispers®

The CIA is having trouble getting Secretary Kissinger to read its assessments of world trouble spots, particularly those dealing with Asia and the Middle East. The CIA complaint is that he prefers to rely on information provided by [illegible] handpicked analysts.

LEBANON DAILY NEWS
15 APRIL 1975

CIA's Big Problem Is Seen As Attacks From All Sides

By TED GRESS
Executive Editor,
Lebanon Daily News
First of Three

Nathan Hale, one of our earliest national heroes, was an intelligence agent. Probably our first.

Remember him? He was a U.S. Army officer who disguised himself as a Dutch schoolmaster and sought intelligence information behind the British lines on Long Island in 1776.

He was captured and hanged. Before he died he made a statement that nearly every school child has heard in history class. It was: "I regret that I have but one life to give for my country."

He was an early practitioner of a service which ultimately would become the Central Intelligence Agency. (CIA).

The agency has come a long way in training of American intelligence officers and agents since the time Nathan Hale received a one-day briefing and was told to put his reports in his shoe.

The depth of today's training would amaze you. I'll touch on it later. In another article I will give you a full report on a private interview I had in Washington with William E. Colby, CIA director.

It lasted nearly an hour. Colby was frank in discussing problems facing the agency. He also told me what he thought about his future.

First I'd like to tell you about some of the problems confronting the CIA. They really started when the New York Times came out in December of 1974 with charges that the CIA directly violated its charter and conducted massive illegal domestic intelligence operations during the Nixon administration against the anti-war movement and other dissident groups in the United States.

There have been almost continuous assaults on it ever since; mostly by the leftist-liberal news media. The New York Times leads the way; the others follow.

Let me cite a few examples:

Dick Cavett, well known talk-show host, was the master of ceremonies on a big TV special featuring Barbra Streisand.

One of his "witticisms" was: "I know a way to speed up mail delivery and that is to give speed-reading lessons to the CIA."

Hit By Cartoon

Another was an editorial cartoon sent out by McNaught's, one of the major newspaper syndicates in the country. Based in New York it is a highly respected organization.

The cartoon shows an office door on which is lettered: "Central Intelligence Agency." In the corner of the glass panel in small letters is "The Godfathers.".

The implication, of course, links the CIA with the mafia.

In fairness to McNaughts it should be mentioned that the following week it distributed a cartoon showing a man from the CIA in boxing trunks. He is wearing a boxing glove on one hand. The other is tied behind his back. He is blindfolded and his feet shackled.

His opponent is wearing big brass knuckle and a mask on which is the emblem of the Soviet Union.

The referee is telling the CIA man: "And you fight fair. No tricks."

An article in New York magazine (not The New Yorker) was written by Aaron Latham. It deals with James J. Angelton, who was let go by the CIA. It is based largely on supposition.

It discussed the fact that "maybe" it was Kissinger who initiated the action which led to Angelton's firing.

It is loaded with statements like "The CIA gave the impression"; "Now it looks as though . . ." and "it is likely."

Fiction Approach

The same magazine followed in a later issue with an article by the same author. Only this time, believe it or not, it is a fictionalized account of CIA operations.

Aaron Latham claims this is the only way he can deal with the story. Treating it as fiction certainly gave him a wide latitude in dealing with facts.

It's a rather obvious bit of character assassination. Readers, unless they are aware of what actually is going on, will be inclined to believe it all despite Latham's disclaimer.

Seldom does a week go by that the CIA is not the subject to an attack.

It may be a cartoon such as appeared in the respected National Observer, which showed a cutaway section of a mailbox. Inside a man labeled CIA is reading letters.

A woman is approaching with a handful of letters. Her briefcase indicates she is Congressman Bella Abzug. She's the lady who is carrying on a feud with the intelligence agency for opening her mail.

Or it may be a TV episode of "Cannon" which was aired March 12. In it a murder suspect was identified as being with the CIA. Later it was revealed that the suspect, a rather nasty fellow, didn't work for CIA but the damage already had been done.

The CIA also comes under assault in a recent issue of the Saturday Review by a former CIA executive, Tom Braden. The ex-official is unhappy with the organization and charges it with having an excess of power. He would do away with it completely.

Recalls Rumors

However, he recounts the myths about the agency that have collected through the years and labels them as false. Such as the rumors that the CIA killed John Kennedy; that it shot George Wallace; that it was responsible for an airplane crash and that it pulled off a big gold heist.

These he admits were not true.

The rumors continue to grow as is to be expected when an organization operates under the veil of secrecy as it must.

Now let's talk about the articles and derogatory reference which often appear in Parade magazine, a Sunday supplement with a circulation of over a million.

Among these were a long article and also a question and answer interview with Philip Agee, former agent who left the service and now has written a book about it.

The book was published recently in England, where the author cannot be stopped from publishing CIA secrets. He names names. He lists his former CIA associates so as to "neutralize" them, according to Parade.

The magazine reports that Agee, when asked if he didn't feel any obligation to protect other CIA men in the field, replied: "Why should I be delicate with them? These people are promoting fascism around the world."

Agee now lives in Cornwall, England, with a Brazilian beauty he says was tortured in her own country by the secret police. He has since become an ardent socialist, Parade reports.

"Why did Agee turn against the CIA? One reason was that he couldn't tolerate the brutal tortures which the various Latin American police practice on their political enemies. The thought that he was in part responsible for such cruelty turned him off his work."

Now let's look at the other side of the coin. This information was taken from my long interview with Colby.

I asked the director about the Agee case. Here is what he said:

"Agee left the country and wrote the book abroad. Because he was out of the country he was not subject to the kind of injunction which we did get against another former agent to force him to abide by his secrecy agreement.

"This agreement says that secrets that he learned here he leaves here. We have enforced these because revealing names and things like that could be most harmful.

"Mr. Agee went abroad where we couldn't possibly get an injunction and he has published a book using every name he can possibly remember. The book which was published in England has been spread around but it has not been published here."

There are amusing . . . amusing may not be the right word . . . overtones to the situation as Colby explains:

"When Agee left here, he wrote a letter in which he said he thought this was a great institution and he appreciated all we had done for him to help him with his problems.

"He said he had the highest opinion of the importance and the security needs of the agency and then he went and did that."

"What do you think happened?" I asked.

Thanks Communists

"I think he got into bad circles," Colby replied. "He makes a point in his book of thanking the Communist Party of Cuba for its help in his research. I think you can judge from that what has happened to him."

The director went on to explain he has asked for certain legislation that would

give firmer control over the disclose of official, secre information.

He pointed out this is jeopardizing the lives of agents and jeopardizing millions of dollars worth of technical machinery which the other side can turn off if it knows it is there.

"We have laws that make a crime," he said, "of the unauthorized exposure of your income and income tax by Internal Revenue Service or your census returns by Census Bureau workers or of certain statistics by an agricultural department employe."

"I can't see why we can't have criminal penalties for disclosure of an agent's name or a secret of this nature. I do believe that it has to meet the demands of the First Amendment. I believe in the First Amendment. (The First Amendment is the one which guarantees Freedom of the Press.)

"So this restriction could only apply to us who assume the obligation to keep a secret. It should not apply to a journalist who may pick up information."

Takes Secrecy Oath

When a man joins the Central Intelligence Agency he takes an oath of secrecy. He knows what he is doing. This is part of the price of joining one of the most important institutions in our government.

Nathan Hale didn't have to take such a pledge but the intelligence service has come a long way since then. It has grown and expanded. It is important that it be nourished and supported so this nation can survive.

NEW YORK TIMES
4 May 1975

EXPOSE OF C.I.A. WINS THE HILLMAN AWARD

Seymour M. Hersh of the New York Times, who uncovered Central Intelligence Agency surveillance in the United States, was among six recipients of Sidney Hillman Foundation awards yesterday at the Commodore Hotel.

Other winners were CBS for "The Autobiography of Miss Jane Pittman"; Noel Mostert for his book, "Supership"; The Boston Globe for its coverage of Boston school integration; Richard Barnet and Ronald Muller for their book "Global Reach," and a special award to WNET/Channel 13 television for "outstanding programming." The award consists of $750 and a scroll.

Mr. Hersh, a Washington-based correspondent for The Times, was named a winner of the George Polk award [illegible] in the week for the same series exposing C.I.A. activity.

Murray H Finley, president of the 340,00-member Amalgamated Clothing Workers Union, which set up the Sidney Hillman Foundation in memorial to its first president, praised Mr. Hersh for his "skill at finding wrongdoing" in military and law-enforcement agencies at a time when these sectors "seem to be growing almost beyond the control of democratic restraints."

NEW YORK TIMES
8 May 1975

On U.S. Intelligence

By Hanson W. Baldwin

ROXBURY, Conn. — There is not much doubt that the K.G.B., the Soviet secret police, is gloating in Moscow.

In the last few months, exaggerated, inaccurate or irresponsible press accounts and self-serving politicians have greatly damaged United States intelligence organizations.

Some crippling restrictions already imposed are now being followed by extensive and numerous investigations into every facet of intelligence and counterintelligence, which may result in new and dangerous exposure of organizations, methods and personnel.

One of the most damaging and irresponsible leaks in United States intelligence history—the widely published accounts of the salvaging of the sunken Soviet submarine—already has occurred, with the media, in the name of freedom damaging the defense of freedom.

Nor is it encouraging that The New York Times allowed the columnist Jack Anderson to trigger its own actions. The consequent publication by The Times and all other media of a fantastic technological feat and an intelligence coup still incomplete could cause immense potential damage. One need only recall the broken codes of World War II, and, in recent history, the nasty surprises new Soviet weapons provided in Vietnam and in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war.

The current investigations, therefore —unless they are to be of great aid and comfort to those who would destroy the system of political freedom that makes such investigations possible—must concentrate on the constructive, not the destructive; on the future, not past.

They must avoid, at all costs, any more public exposure of secret intelligence methods, technology or personnel. No intelligence organization, even in a democracy, can be a completely open book if it is to be worth its cost.

But there are some key questions that require reassessment.

Are there, for instance, too many semi-independent intelligence agencies, each vying for power? Or does each have its important specialized role and does each act as check-rein on the others?

Should the director of Central Intelligence be given more power—to knock heads together, to merge, to allocate tasks? Or would this continue and expand an already dangerous centralization of power?

Intelligence and counterintelligence are twins. What, particularly, should be the relationships between the Central Intelligence Agency and Federal Bureau of Investigation, and who should do what in counterespionage and countersubversion?

It is easy to dismiss the Communist and radical and terrorist threats as bogeymen; yet the capability of Puerto Rican nationalists and radical Weathermen to bomb public places repeatedly without detection and the ability of so well-known a figure as Patty Hearst to remain hidden in an American underground speaks badly indeed for present and recent attempts of our intelligence services to combat espionage, subversion or even simple anarchy.

How does one define the thin line between freedom and license, security and repression, the "right to know" and irresponsibility? The political extremists and fanatics, in pursuit of revolution, believe that the ends literally justify *any* means.

United States intelligence agencies can never embrace such a concept, without ultimately aiding the hidden enemy. The adoption of such a policy —the ends justifying any means— would subvert our own institutions. Yet there is a nagging problem here; a threat exists and it cannot be met by mouthing shibboleths.

How should authority over our intelligence services at the top level be exercised? Intelligence is a tool of government; as such it can be turned by those who control it to good or evil purposes. Who should be the guardians of the good, who the monitors? The more people that get into the act the less secrecy. Congress is noted for its blabbermouth proclivities; if there is to be any secret intelligence it is clear that only a handful of Congressmen, picked for ability, judgment and discretion and devotion to the common good, can be kept fully informed.

Intelligence—facts, secrets, our own and the opposition's—means today and for the future, security—the difference between the life and death of a nation.

Granted the need, how then do you keep intelligence apolitical, freed from the ambivalent pressures of domestic politics, in a milieu such as Washington, which is highly partisan?

And, ultimately, the larger question —the unresolved residue of Watergate —how do you curb executive power without crippling it, and how do you operate a democratic government, or for that matter, any government, without secrecy?

Hanson W. Baldwin, now retired, was military affairs editor of The New York Times.

LEBANON DAILY NEWS
17 APRIL 1975

Colby Sees CIA As Vital Function

By TED GRESS
Executive Editor
Lebanon Daily News

(Second of Three)

What kind of a man is William E. Colby, head of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)?

His name is in the headlines a great deal as the spotlight of a Congressional investigation plays upon the once completely secret agency, an agency responsible for collecting and evaluating intelligence information from around the world.

The information plays a vital part in shaping the foreign policies of this country. It enables us to know what friendly and not-so-friendly countries are thinking and doing and planning for the future.

It's not an easy task and its problems are now compounded by a vicious attack from the leftist-liberal community. I've dealt with that subject in detail in a previous article.

Now I want to turn to a closeup look at Colby. His picture has appeared in numerous publications. It shows a serious-faced middle-aged man wearing light-colored glasses.

When you walk into his office you find a man wearing a conservative grey suit, white shirt with button-down collar and a blue and gold striped tie. He could easily pass for a banker.

Not Big Man

Colby is not a big man. Later I learned he is five feet eight inches tall and weighs 160 pounds.

His hair, well tinged with grey, is starting to recede slightly. His voice is soft but crisp. His handshake firm but friendly.

He acknowledges Angus MacClean Thuermer's explanation about my using the tape recorder for the interview. Thuermer is the Number Two man in the agency.

I set the recorder on a table next to his chair but he picks up the microphone and holds it in his hand throughout the interview.

First I asked him about his personal background.

Briefly, here it is. He was born in St. Paul, Minn., in 1920 and spent his early years on various army posts, including a three-year stay in Tienstin, China. His father was an army officer.

He became a Boy Scout when he lived in China and later when his own family was growing up, he was active as a scouter. He graduated from Princeton University in 1941, joined the army and served in Europe with the Office of Strategic Services.

After the war he got his law degree from Columbia Law School and became a member of the New York State and U.S. Supreme Court bars.

After that were a succession of governmental posts including diplomatic service in Vietnam. He was deputy director of operations for the CIA when he was named director last year.

Colby lives at Bethesda, which is only a hop, skip and jump from his office.

Starts Early

His typical day starts at 6:30 with exercises, including calisthenics and jogging. He's at his desk at eight and gets an update on what is going on in the agency.

Then a briefing from senior staff members at 9 o'clock. After that it is anything. It might be a meeting downtown or testimony on the Hill or visits at his office with "some of our people."

"I'm on the telephone a lot," he said. "There are always meetings to attend: meetings of intelligence experts on various subjects such as Vietnam or the Middle East or whatever.

"Usually, I go home about seven. I take some work home but not too much. I've avoided the social circuit fairly successfully. I don't waste much time on that."

The director said he leads a normal family life. "I guess you could say we are an average middle-class American family."

The Colbys live next to a Catholic church where they are regular attendants. Two sons have left home; one is a lawyer and the other is in college. A son and a daughter remain at home.

About once a month he visits Los Angeles, Chicago or New York speaking about the Central Intelligence Agency. Monday of last week he addressed the Associated Press meeting in New Orleans.

He takes a trip overseas about every six months to "keep in touch with things."

I asked what is the specific role of the CIA.

"Its whole purpose," he replied, "is to get in one place all the information and then subject it to some expert opnion and analysis."

He's very proud of the quality of the people working for the agency.

"We have more people with doctor's and master's degrees and Ph.D's on anything from agricultural economics to nuclear programs than you find in most universities.

"They have access to all the fanciest forms of information collected through photography and electronics and from all normal kinds of regular reporting and radio broadcasts. Information also that has been collected by agents by clandestine means in some limited situations.

"If anyone likes to do pure research this is the best place in the world to do it. The raw material is fantastic. The freedom to make a decision unaffected by policy is here. And it is on an important subject."

He said it is important that the people have confidence in the agency which he points out is important to this country's future.

"Do you have trouble getting recruits for the agency?" I asked.

"We have no trouble getting them," he replied. "We get good people but don't recruit like we used to because we have gone down in strength in the last five years."

Budgetary limitations and inflation have taken their toll.

It's been rather amusing, though, that since all the recent unfavorable publicity about the CIA, the number of applicants has increased.

Normally they used to get about 600 every two weeks. The first two weeks in January which was just after the New York Times started screaming its head off about the agency, there were 1,700 requests for jobs.

Colby is pleased with the type of people applying for positions.

"They have tremendous academic records from some of the best schools in the country. They have good work experience and are very alive.

"They are psychologically mature, intelligent people. They're great. Of course, we don't hire them all by any means, but that's a fine group to be able to select from.

"What about yourself?" I inquired. "Have you ever been tempted to quit this rat race, particularly since all this trouble has developed?"

"No I haven't. We are dealing with something important. It's important to the country. It's important to the intelligence profession.

"I've spent more than 30 years in this profession and I'm not going to quit. I serve of course at the pleasure of the President and am at his disposal totally. And I'll stay as long as I think I'm useful."

We turned then to what I reguarded as one of the most important questions of the interview: "Do you see any conflict between the people's right to know and the need for secrecy in operating an agency such as the CIA?"

"This is one of the most difficult things in a way in operating an intelligence agency in our free society," he replied. "We are Americans. We like our free society. We believe in it. And yet if we are going to protect it we have to have some intelligence work.

Protect Ourselves

"In this country we are sitting 30 minutes away from a nuclear missile aimed at us. If we live in this kind of a world we obviously must have protection and we must not only be able to protect ourselves but we have to be able to negotiate about that kind of a problem and that kind of a threat and be able to reduce it.

"And that, I think, is what intelligence can do. So I think we have to define rather sharply those things which are good secrets and need to be kept secret and keep them secret and those which are "bad" secrets and which do not deserve to be kept secret. In other words they are non-secrets and don't deserve to be kept secrets."

He pointed out that formerly there was no sign on the headquarters building.

"This is an awfully big building and everybody knows where it is. All the aircraft pilots used to point it out as they flew down the river, before they had Watergate to point out.

"As a result we were a non-secret. It's wrong to be obscure about things like that. But there are things that need to be kept secret and I think that now we have procedures to clearly delineate which are secret and which aren't.

"If there is supervision by Congress and the executive branch, we can accept this. And the American people will accept it.

"Americans today have accepted that grand jury proceedings have to be kept secret. They accept that the Pentagon's plans are secret and also accepted the idea that Congress has to have executive sessions.

"They understand similarly with respect to intelligence and I think they'll accept the need

for some secrets."

My next question was: Do you flinch at the word "spying" instead of "intelligence?"

"Well, I think in the old days it was synonymous, but today it isn't," he replied. "Intelligence is a much bigger word. Intelligence involves the technical collection of information involving analytical work that I referred to, and to research; all that sort of thing.

"Spying and intelligence are not the same. We still have agents. We still collect material in the old fashioned way but we only do it when we have societies that are otherwise closed.

"A Russian attache can walk downtown in Washington and get a lot of information by buying a magazine for a dollar. We have to spend millions of dollars and take enormous risks to obtain comparable information."

He pointed out that spying is only a small portion of the entire intelligence operation.

"We then discussed the personal rewards of intelligence work.

"If you do your work there is a real satisfaction in it," he explained. "When they come into intelligence work we tell our people they can't expect to get public recognition. It's not like the military or the diplomatic service or politics.

"The satisfaction you get in intelligence is the satisfaction of doing something important and doing it well.

"It's important to your country, to the safety and to the welfare of this great nation. And it is a great nation. There is no question about that.

"If you understand that when you come in and if you stick with that understanding that's the reward."

LEBANON DAILY NEWS
21 APRIL 1975

CIA Reworking Philosophy To Avoid Errors Of Past

By TED GRESS
Executive Editor,
Lebanon Daily News
(Last of Three)

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) now under Congressional investigation is making some changes of its own to keep in step with the times.

William E. Colby, CIA director, made this statement during an interview recently in his headquarters at Langley, Va.

"The United States set up an intelligence system right after World War Two," he said, "which reflected the opionion of that time about intelligence. Intelligence was something to be put under the table and never talked about and never looked at.

"That's not good enough today. So we are relooking at the philosophical approach toward intelligence. What we are saying is that now we have to have a view of intelligence responsibility.

"We must have some secrets but we also have to be reassured as to what its real function is.

Philosophy Outdated

"We are in the process of re-evaluation. We are setting up the structure here and understanding, a philosophy if you will, of intelligence in our free society which I think will go on for 10 to 20 years. Then I think it will be relooked again."

Colby pointed out the original philosophy is nearly 30 years old and outdated.

"I think the changes being made will bring us up to date and that people will be satisfied; that after they take a look at our intelligence structure they will find it a good structure; that it does a good job and an important job."

He also repeated what he has said earlier at a hearing that there have been mistakes made in the past.

"There have been some transgressions in the past," he said, "but today I'm pretty sure we are clear. We've taken considerable steps around here to make sure that we stay right within our charter. People here want to do the right thing.

"If we have done anything wrong in the past, they have been very few things, very infrequent things. They were done in the belief at that time that they were somehow justified.

"It's hard to apply the standards of one time to the situations of another time. I'm sure that someone will come along in 1990 and be critical of what I did. Maybe they'd say I didn't do enough or maybe that I did too much. I'm sure they will be critical because they will have a different perspective or viewpoint."

Being Corrected

He said he is leaning over backward to make certain that everything is being done correctly by the agency today.

The intelligence machine, he said, will either be "corrected or adjusted" to make sure it doesn't make any mistakes in the future. "Then public confidence will be re-established and we can go back to work," he added.

Some of the internal adjustments being made include the use of a system whereby anyone in the organization can speak up if he thinks the director is wrong.

This is a remarkable thing in a governmental operation where the lower echelon seldom can reach the top with their views.

"And we encourage this," Colby said.

Colby also makes a point [illegible] with a half-dozen junior CIA employes in order "to get a feel about what they are doing and thinking and are concerned about."

Encourages Differences

A difference of opinion is not only permitted but encouraged. This particularly applies to evaluation of intelligence material.

Out of this will come decisions which may govern future actions of this country in dealing with critical situations in other parts of the world.

I referred to charges the CIA opened private mail in this country. I asked if this was true.

"Yes, unfortunately it is," he replied. "I've testified to that. We thought we were doing the right thing. I don't think it was the right thing and we've stopped it."

"It was mail going to a communist country. We picked it out to learn who was communicating with whom and with what organization back in that country. Sometimes we were looking for the kinds of censorship that might be used. The reason we did this was because we would have an agent who might be sent to that country and have to write back to us.

"We wanted to protect our agents and warn them so they would not get caught. That sort of technical inspection wasn't to study the substance of the mail but nevertheless it was not proper and we shouldn't have done it."

One of the charges made in the investigations was that CIA was exceeding the limits of its charter which designated it to handle worldwide intelligence whereas the Federal Bureau of Investigation handled the intelligence within the United States.

The charge was made that the CIA was involved in anti-war dissidents in this country.

Colby replied: "There has been a lot of exaggeration about the CIA operating some domestic police function. This is not true.

"We made a few mistakes such as, some of our people were in contact with anti-war dissidents. These were made so that our people could get credentials with which they could work abroad.

"Some people tried to say we were working against Americans. This was not true. This was not the purpose of this activity, but unfortunately it was said to be a terrible thing.

"This bothered the morale of our people, they felt this was unfair. Some of them got out of the service. Some felt that if we ever did anything improper we should reveal everything and wear a hair shirt and so forth.

Different Views

"There are different views in the agency and this pulls and tugs a little. It's a natural reaction of both sides. It is my job to try and keep them both together and not let them go off at 180 degrees apart."

Then he turned to a sensitive subject, that of keeping secrets.

"I must confess that we are having a great deal of concern about our ability to keep secrets. Not so much secrets as much as the impressions we are giving to some people abroad. Some of our friends abroad are worried that their names will come out.

"Some foreign governments that are working quietly and secretly with us couldn't do it publicly. They are concerned and wondering if we can keep our secrets. Some of our people, some of our agents abroad, have resigned. They say they can't take a chance anymore.

"Some governments have expressed great concern about whether they should give us

LEBANON DAILY NEWS
17 APRIL 1975

Ted Gress

Notes From A Newsman's Notebook

WOULD YOU care to join me on my journey to Central Intelligence Agency headquarters located in a densely wooded area at Langley, Va., eight miles from the heart of Washington?

As you approach the area from the direction of McLean, Va., you see a sign ahead. It is green on white and says: "CIA-Turn Here." The road sweeps in a big arch to the left and leads to a high wire enclosure.

There's a gap in the fence in which is set a large guardhouse. It is manned by courteous guards who ask your name.

They quickly check a list and find my name on it. What happens when your name is not on the list is simple: You don't get in.

Maybe you'd like to know how I got my name on the list.

I had been corresponding with Angus MacClean Thuermer, assistant director. Then we exchanged telephone calls. He first doubted that I would be able to interview Colby who has a full schedule.

So I was pleasantly surprised when I got a call that the Colby interview was on.

The guard gave me a three-hour pass which I placed in the car window, then headed into the giant compound.

THE MAIN BUILDING quickly came into view. It is seven stories high with two basement levels. It has over a million square feet of office space. Up to now this was classified information.

The number of employes and the amount of the payroll still is classified.

The building is surrounded by trees, flowers and shrubbery. There is a grassy area out back which is used in the summer by employes who sit on rustic benches to eat lunch.

A seldom-used helicopter pad is located near the building.

The parking area in front of the building is known as the Quadrangle. Right now is is a picture of quiet charm as a number of tulip trees are in bloom.

I was greeted by a loquacious guard when I pulled up in front of the building.

He noticed my press sign on the car and gave me a warm welcome. "We want to take good care of the press" he assured me.

He was as good as his word, for he parked me in the number one spot.

I climbed out, tucked my dispatch case and tape recorder under my arm. Then I reached for my camera.

"Sorry," he said, "you can't take the camera into headquarters."

"Well," I replied, "I'll just leave in on the front seat."

"Oh no, that's not good. Someone might steal it."

I looked at him and then the high wire enclosure around the campus, as it is called. Later I was to learn that during the gas shortage gasoline had been stolen from cars parked on campus.

The guard was doubtful about my tape recorder but remarked as I turned away, "They will probably take it from you when you get inside."

They did, too, but when I met Thuermer he got it back for me. He still wasn't sure that the director would permit me to use it during the interviews. However, it turned out all right and there was no further question about it.

Word had been sent upstairs and a well-built young man came down to meet us. He was quiet and courteous. He had to use a key to open the door to the elevator which took us to the seventh floor.

Here we waited in a small room adjoining Colby's office. Finally came the word that he could see us and we strode into his office.

It was a long room flanked on one side almost entirely by tall windows which looked out over the Potomac River.

And so we settled down for nearly an hour of conversation about the Central Intelligence Agency.

their sensitive materials if we can't protect them. I think we can. I think that the Congressional investigations that will take place shortly will be a responsible inquiry.

"Both senators and congressmen have given us every indication that they are going about this seriously and responsibly. They are going to get answers but if I have a good reason to keep a name secret I believe they will be convinced of the need for such secrecy."

Earlier in the interview he pointed out that since the CIA has been in the limelight any reference to the agency immediately took a news story from an inside page and moved it out to the top of the front page.

The CIA is required by law not to confirm or deny published reports, whether true or false, favorable or unfavorable to the agency or its personnel.

CIA does not publicly discuss its organization, its budget or its personnel. Nor does it discuss its methods of operation or its sources of information.

It can't by the terms of its charter. It's a secret organization that is committed to protecting this country from foreign influences.

Get Blamed

As a result, the CIA often gets the blame for things it has had no hand in.

U.S. Sen. Stuart Symington, Missouri, did a great deal of the cross-examination of witnesses when Colby appeared before a Senate committee to be confirmed as director of the agency a year and a half ago.

At one point in the testimony Symington said that other government agencies have the tendency to "dump any ill-fated operation on the CIA because they can't defend themselves."

He cited one incident when an enemy agent was killed and the CIA was blamed. Symington said he knew for a fact that the CIA had "recommended urgently" that the agent not be killed.

"I know about this case because I investigated it personally," the senator said.

Yet the Central Intelligence Agency was blamed.

The CIA is accountable directly to the President.

What have some of our leaders felt about the agency?

Harry Truman once sent a message to the CIA in which he said: "The Central Intelligence Agency is a necessity to the President of the United States. From one who knows."

President Eisenhower added some thoughts of his own when they laid the cornerstone for the headquarters at Langley, Va., when he said:

"No task could be more important. In the work of the intelligence, heroes are undecorated and unsung; often even among their own fraternity. Their inspiration is rooted in patriotism — their reward can be little except their conviction that they are performing a unique and indispensable service for their country, and the knowledge that America needs and appreciates their efforts. I assure you this is true."

Several presidents have repeated the phrase: "the CIA successes will never be published and their failures will always be publicized."

There are many unanswered questions about the agency. Among them, what happened in Chile in the overthrow of the government. What about the Soviet submarine which sank in the Pacific and was raised to the surface under a CIA contract with the Howard Hughes firm?

There are many things which the public would like to know but never will because of the terms of its charter which seals its lips. What will happen after the Congressional investigation only time will tell.

Colby in a recent interview acknowledged he is aware of the presence of foreign spies in this country. He said "it's accepted that we all engage in that clandestine gathering of intelligence. Nobody gets emotional about it. It's been going on since Moses sent a man from each tribe to spy on the Land of Canaan".

WASHINGTON POST
10 May 1975

Fred Griffin, Retired Executive With CIA

Fred Griffin, 58, a former senior executive with the Central Intelligence Agency, died of a stroke Thursday at Suburban Hospital in Bethesda. He lived at 8901 Kensington Pkwy., Chevy Chase.

A native of Grapevine, Tex., Mr. Griffin attended schools there, and later graduated in 1936 from Texas Tech University in Lubbock with a liberal arts degree.

He taught English at the university and later served as its director of public relations.

During World War II, Mr. Griffin worked for the Army as a cryptanalyst. In that capacity he worked on breaking the Japanese code.

After the war he came to Washington as a staff assistant to a Texas congressman. In 1946, he joined the War Department as a security expert. He joined the CIA in 1952 and remained there until his retirement. Mr. Griffin is survived by his wife, Lorna, of the home; and three children, Lorna Lilly, of Stoneville, N.C.; Bryan of the home; and Melanie, of Washington.

FREE LABOUR WORLD, Brussels
March 1975

UNION BOOKSHELF

Philip AGEE

Inside the Company, a CIA Diary

Penguin Books, 1975.

This is a badly written and surprisingly boring book. One wonders how many of those who buy it because the publisher's hullaballoo has whetted their appetite will manage to read it from cover to cover. This reviewer, at any rate, found the task impossible. But perhaps it was one of the author's intentions to show how dull and dreary the CIA agent's life is. In describing at great length the way the CIA organisation is built up and functions, Agee lists countless names and abbreviations which no reader could possibly take in, let alone remember. — all this obviously with the intention of proving the authenticity of his story. We are supposed to think that the author could not have made up so many details: hence he must be a genuine agent. Actually, of course, this does not prove anything. But supposing that Agee really did work for the CIA in Latin America and actively participated in many shady activities (to use no stronger term), he has done a very poor job in writing this book. He could not only have entertained a public which loves to read about bugging, spying, secret inks and codes, but he might have done some useful service in exposing the CIA machinations in that continent. However, he completely destroys his own credibility by drawing all kinds of reckless conclusions and referring to things of which he has no first hand experience or reliable information. In fact, the only startling thing in the book is the effrontery with which the author denounces persons and organisations as CIA agents without the slightest concrete evidence. In many cases, his allegations are not merely unfounded, but can quite easily be proved to be untrue. But unless somebody takes the trouble to establish the facts in a court action, this rubbish will no doubt find enough gullible readers and will be used by others for their own political purposes.

G.F.

JAPAN TIMES
30 April 1975

Government in the Open

By Max Lerner

GAINESVILLE, Fla. — How open dare government be? How closed must it be? These were the questions put at a University of Florida conference on openness in government, which used Florida's "sunshine law" as its kickoff point. It was the first time I have pushed to explore my thinking on the difficult limits of secrecy and openness, the right to know and the right of privacy. The two-day exchange of views with a number of legislators, private and public lobbyists, can professors and public officials help all of us to reach some conclusions.

One is that it is healthy to let more sunshine into the dark places of governmental secrecy by opening as much as possible of the decision-making process to the public.

Although it is as old as Ponce de Leon's early quest for the fountain of youth, Florida is — along with California — also one of the fastest-growing states, and in that sense one of youngest and most rootless. When a whole culture is unrooted and wholly fluid, public officials are tempted to be on the make. Covertness becomes their weapon, and the "sunshine law" takes it away from them.

It is a vaguely drawn, embracing law that leaves much to the courts to interpret. The trend has been to apply it to informal as well as formal meetings of governmental boards and committees, and to preliminary ones as well as to those at which decisions are announced.

If other states and the federal government adopted the Florida law, we would get a double flow between the government and the people. One would be outward to the public — that of letting the people know what is happening. The other would be inward into the government — that of letting various interest groups and people's lobbies compete with the private lobbyists who so often have an inside track into legislative committees and regulatory agencies.

This would create an equalizing situation between the two sets of groups. By making government more accessible to the people it might heal some of the current feeling of helplessness, especially of the young who see politics as a rigged game.

If this were all, I would throw my hat in the air and cheer for total sunshine. But it isn't all. There are two major problems with the idea of total openness in government.

One is that there will always be areas where secrecy is indispensable. The present hearings on the CIA operations, both by the Rockefeller commission and the Senate subcommittee, have to be held in closed session. This is also true of much of diplomacy. President Woodrow Wilson's idea of "open covenants, openly arrived at," was a dead pigeon even before he came up with it. Consider what chance there would be for a Middle East peace if all negotiations had to be carried on in the open. The best we can hope for is open covenants, arrived at openly possible and secretly if necessary.

There are processes of government — in mediating labor disputes as well as in diplomacy — where the crux of it lies in a compromise between publicly held positions. There is also a second area where the deliberative process cannot be a public one without paralyzing whatever creativeness government can still have, in an era where many of the governmental processes are nonthinking ones.

The arguments in a case before the U.S. Supreme Court are held in the open, but the discussion of the case by the judges is held in closed session. Similarly the convention which framed the U.S. Constitution had to be a closed one, although we are now in James Madison's debt because he kept notes about its deliberations.

For the rest, there is still room for far more sunshine in government than we have yet achieved. Yet I must add the kind of warning that Theodore Loewi has sounded in his strong book, "The End of Liberalism" — about the fallacy of our belief that whatever gives more scope to pressure groups makes government better. A government of pressure groups may become a competition of group selfishness and rivalries, and more access to committees and commissions may only make their struggle more naked.

GENERAL

TIME, MAY 5, 1975

SOVIET UNION

All the Ships at Sea

Around the world last week, ships of the Soviet navy were under full steam. Off the Azores, NATO spotter planes reported one of the 10,000-ton *Kara*-class two-year-old missile cruisers that Western naval experts rate among the world's best modern warships. In the Mediterranean, where the U.S. Sixth Fleet customarily roams while Soviet vessels lie in Syrian and North African ports—except for a few "tattletale" scouts dogging American carriers—the roles were reversed. The Soviet fleet was out in force and the Sixth Fleet was doing the tattling. Other Soviet task forces were sighted in the Pacific Ocean, in the Sea of Japan and off the Philippines.

The global flurry of activity was no accident. At least 200 surface ships and 100 submarines, along with land-based aircraft, were involved in a massive naval exercise, the first such worldwide maneuvers that the Soviet navy has run in five years. The Soviets dubbed the maneuvers "Spring"; the West called them "Okean 1975," a reference to the Okean (Russian for ocean) maneuvers that the Soviets held in 1970. The new exercise was apparently scheduled for the same length of time as the last one —about three weeks.

Varied Aims. Far from screening the maneuvers, the Soviet navy took pains to advertise its muscle flexing. It passed routine naval orders over regularly monitored radio channels. Okean's essential message was a now familiar one: under Soviet Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, the Soviet navy is no longer a coastal force but an impressive blue-water global fleet. Said one U.S. officer last week as he busily monitored the Soviet fleet at sea: "What they've done in just ten years is absolutely fantastic. From almost nothing, they've built up a first-rate navy, and it's an imposing threat."

What interested Western observers more than the disposition of the ships was the basic aims of Okean 1975. They appeared to be varied. Judging from groupings of Soviet merchant and hydrographic ships off the Azores and Japan, convoy maneuvers were involved. But whether Russian warships were practicing convoy escort or postulating the convoys as U.S. fleets—or U.S. tanker convoys—would await the same sort of computer analysis that the Pentagon carried out in connection with the first Okean. Even without computers, however, it was obvious that the Soviets had also practiced air reconnaissance and antisubmarine warfare, using not only ships but land-based aircraft, including the intercontinental-range nuclear bomber "Backfire," and TU-95 "Bears" flying out from Cuba and Guinea.

Most significant for a global fleet, Okean 1975 tested "command and control" communications networks employing satellites and satellite relay. Using a mixture of very high and very low frequencies and linking even submerged submarines, the Russian navy apparently achieved near-instant communications. That would be a considerable asset in Gorshkov's "first salvo" concept, in which scattered Soviet fleets are supposed to undertake simultaneous attacks within a 90-second period.

As in all such maneuvers, East or West, Okean 1975 had another aim as well. Gorshkov, whose code name during the exercise was "Seagull," observed it aboard a warship in the Barents Sea, along with Soviet Defense Minister Andrei Grechko. They obviously meant to impress the Politburo as well as the West with the capability and reach of Soviet forces. One fallout from the first Okean exercise, for instance, was the decision to upgrade the Soviet carrier forces. Their third and most sophisticated carrier, the 35,000-ton *Kiev*, is now outfitting in the Black Sea port of Nikolayev and will undergo sea trials this summer.



THE NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, APRIL 28, 1975

Vast Soviet Naval Exercise Raises Urgent Questions for West

More than 220 of the Soviet Navy's most powerful surface ships and perhaps half that many submarines reached home ports at the weekend after the largest and most extensive air and sea exercise the Soviet Union has ever staged.

Defense Department analysts, studying preliminary reports from American and other uninvited observers, say that Exercise Okean (Ocean) 1975—which for the first time employed convoys of merchantmen in an exercise—raised questions whose answers could be of the greatest significance to the United States and its allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

¶Does this foreshadow the future use of Soviet sea power to escort a merchant fleet or an expeditionary force en route to a crisis area?

¶Or do the convoys reflect greater emphasis in Soviet naval planning on the destruction in war of allied military convoys loaded with troops and supplies for Europe and of merchantmen carrying oil and other vital materials to North America and Europe?

¶Was this a demonstration as much for the benefit of the Soviet Government as for the West of what the new navy can do, a signal that the navy can no longer be considered merely na extension of the army but a force capable of implementing Russian policy at great distances?

Secretary of the Navy J. William Middendorf 2d reported

in a speech to the Navy League that the Russians used the exercise to evaluate command and control of naval forces worldwide, ocean surveillance, anticarrier, antisubmarine nad anticonvoy warfare operations and weapons and electronic systems.

"In my view," he said, "this Soviet naval exercise clearly demonstrates the fact that the Soviet Navy is capable of operating effectively in all the oceans of the world."

Intensive analysis of Okean 1975 is expected to provide further details on the modern Soviet Navy. Enough is known now, defense analysts said, to depict the dimensions of the exercise and its chief tactical themes.

Soviet squadrons exercised from the Sea of Japan to the Caribbean and from Norway's North Cape to the Azores Islands. A task force by two missile-armed cruisers conducted what were believed to be anticarrier operations in the Tyrrhenian Sea area of the Mediterranean. There were four naval task groups in the Western Pacific and a heavy concentration of submarines and surface ships drawn from the northern, Baltic and Black Sea fleets, in the North Atlantic.

The Soviet naval air force participated on a scale well beyond its role in the last global exercise five years ago. Il-38 reconnaissance aircraft flew over the North Pacific and the North Atlantic. Other Il-38's, based near Berbera in Somalia, worked with the Indian Ocean squadron. Tu-95's from Cienfuegos in Cuba cooperated with surface ships and submarines in the Caribbean and other Tu-95's exercised off the coast of Africa, presumably from bases in Guinea.

In the Indian Ocean exercise, squadrons of Tu-95's flew from bases in Soviet Central Asia over Iran to the Arabian Sea.

Tankers a Factor

The emphasis on the exercise in this area, where surface strength was higher than usual, indicates to analysts that the Soviet Union is as unaware as the West of the importance of the tanker traffic originating in the Persian Gulf.

The important role played by the air force, analysts believe, symbolizes the attention given to antisubmarine warfare in Okean 1975.

The anti-submarine warfare phase was followed by what appeared to be simulated anti-carrier attacks by surface ships and by a large number of TU-16 strike aircraft based in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union has completed one 40,000-ton aircraft carrier and is authoritatively reported to be building a second. But neither the completed carrier, the Kiev, nor the two helicopter carriers, the Moskva and Leningrad, were sighted in the maneuvers.

New Role for Navy

If they were employed, they may have been assigned to the extensive Black Sea fleet maneuvers about which relatively little is known.

The presence of merchant ship convoys in the North Atlantic and east of Japan puzzled Defense Department analysts. Were the convoys supposed to be American or Soviet? The attacks on the convoys by ships and aircraft might argue that they were considered American and that the exercise was intended to perfect operations against allied maritime communications.

Some analysts point out that Soviet naval literature, especially the writings of the Commander in Chief, Adm. S. G. Gorshkov, recently has stressed the role the navy can play in carrying out Soviet overseas policy. Such a role could involve the movement of ground forces in a convoy.

"If the use of convoys signifies changes either way," one analyst said, "it encourages the view that Admiral Gorshkov has made his point that the navy can deal with military-politico matters."

He added that there is "a need to rethink our ideas on the uses of the Soviet Navy, there's clearly been a change."

Despite the attention paid to antisubmarine operations, especially in the North Atlantic, analysts do not believe that Soviet technology in this field has reached the point where Russian antisubmarine forces can be considered a "significant threat" to American submarines armed with ballistic missiles.

Analysts also reported greater emphasis on the quality of new Soviet surface ships that are being commissioned in the growing fleet.

Mr. Middendorf noted the "disturbing fact" that the Soviet Navy today "has twice the number of major surface combatants and submarines as the United States Navy."

There are more to come, the analysts noted. The Soviet Union, one reported, now has more ways for shipbuilding in one shipyard near Severomorsk in the Kola Peninsula than exist in the whole of the United States.

WASHINGTON POST
15 May 1975

Broadcasting to Closed Societies

RADIO FREE EUROPE, broadcasting to East Europe, and Radio Liberty, broadcasting to the Soviet Union, have successfully weathered a difficult transition from CIA sponsorship to open operation under a public board, and from cold-war programming to a more careful and responsible programming consistent with the changing international scene. Not being the official voices of America, these stations have the independence to offer their large and attentive audiences unvarnished news—especially news of those domestic developments which the local governments customarily censor. The purpose of the stations is simply to satisfy a continued longing, in the closed societies to which they broadcast, for honest communication and facts.

Americans could, of course, join with the local Communist governments in a partnership to suppress the local news. But this would serve no useful or legitimate political purpose and and it would be a crude violation of our own values. There is no contradiction between the existence of detente and the *broadcasting* of news. On the contrary, the real contradiction is between the existence of detente and the *suppression* of news, which is what the Communist authorities try to do by jamming Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe. Americans have exactly the same right to broadcast to the Russians that they have to broadcast to us. No one has to listen who doesn't so choose.

In the last year, and at specific congressional bidding, substantial changes have been made in the organization and operation of the two stations in order to make them more efficient and economical. By informed consensus, they are now better fit than ever to perform their essential service of communication. It remains only for the Congress, as it weighs their budget requests in the current cycle, to provide the small additional sums necessary to let them do their job.

Western Europe

BALTIMORE SUN
12 May 1975

Congress is gaining as NATO bad guy

By GENE OISHI
Sun Staff Corresponaent

Brussels—Here at headquarters of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the United States Congress is running a close second to the Soviet Union as the No. 1 enemy.

The reason is the congressional arms embargo on Turkey, which NATO sources say threatens the southeastern flank of the Western alliance as much as the Cyprus conflict, which has placed two NATO allies—Greece and Turkey—on the verge of war with one another.

Congress has never been one of NATO's favorite institutions, particularly in view of periodic attempts within Congress—so far unsuccessful—to reduce U.S. forces in Europe.

There have been successful legislative moves, such as an amendment that seems to call for unilateral reductions of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe. Another amendment threatened troop cuts unless Europeans offset the balance-of-payments costs of stationing U.S. forces here.

The congressional arms embargo to Turkey, however, is especially deplored because it is viewed here as a dilletantish attempt to influence events in a manner contrary to even U.S. interests.

Congress imposed the embargo because of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus last summer and the continuing occupation of more than a third of the island by Turkish forces.

Diplomats in several national delegations as well as NATO staff members said, however, the embargo has only increased Turkish intransigence on the Cyprus question. And if continued, they said, it could lead to irreparable damage to Western defenses.

Diplomats and officials, who declined to be identified except as "NATO sources," were unanimous in condemning the embargo—imposed over strong objections by the Ford administration—though they varied in their forecasts of possible consequences.

Some expressed concern that the cutoff, if continued, could lead to an eventual withdrawal of Turkey from NATO and the crumbling of the alliance's southeast flank, which guards access to the Aegean and Mediterranean.

With the recent development of the Soviet Navy as the second most powerful in the world, Turkey, which controls the Straits of Bosporus and the Dardanelles, has become an even more essential ally.

Others doubted Turkey would leave the alliance, though it is likely it would reduce its commitments and close U.S. bases in the country, if the embargo continued.

In Ankara, Turkish officials themselves have said they do not intend to take the country out of NATO, though they have noted events have a way of gaining their own momentum.

In view of the historial enmity between Turks and Russians, the assessment here is that there is little likelihood Turkey would be driven into the Soviet camp. But there is concern Ankara could begin orienting its foreign policy more toward the third world, in particular the Arab states.

There have been reports of contacts between Turkey and Libya on possible arms deliveries. Libya, rich in oil revenues, would be in a position to extend credit to Ankara for purchases of arms, for example, from France.

Though considered unlikely, there is a remote possibility Turkey eventually could consider purchases of Soviet arms, with Libya serving as the broker and providing the credit.

Even if the embargo is lifted, it is said Turkey will never depend again so heavily on U.S. arms, which accounts for about 90 per cent of the weapons and equipment used by the country's armed forces.

In the effort to ease the embargo's effects, several NATO countries, in particular West Germany, have resumed arms aid and sales to Turkey.

Bonn suspended aid and sales last summer after the outbreak of the Cyprus conflict because West German policy forbids arms deliveries to areas of tension.

Arms deliveries from European NATO stocks, however, are said to be only a stopgap measure since some of the equipment and spare parts are only available from the U.S.

There is also concern that should the embargo continue, it would increase domestic political pressure in Turkey for retaliatory measures, such as closing U.S. military bases.

In addition to air bases, the U.S. has radar installations in Turkey that are important for monitoring the Soviet missile-development program and for verifying strategic-arms limitation agreements, according to one NATO source.

Once these installations are taken down, it would be technically possible to put them up again, this source noted, "but politically it would be very, very difficult."

As seen here, the embargo not only has made negotiations over Cyprus more difficult, but it has added a further dimension to the problem, which was already bad enough with the Greek decision to withdraw from NATO's military structure.

In the long run, the embargo could have a more damaging effect than Greece's partial withdrawal from the alliance, since Athens appears to be having second thoughts about the decision.

NATO sources point out that Greek representatives continue to participate in such bodies as the military committee and the nuclear planning group and at the command headquarters at Mons, Belgium, and the Southern command headquarters at Naples.

The Greeks also were represented at a recent meeting of European defense ministers in London. And NATO communications lines that pass through Greece into Turkey remain open and continue to function, all of which lead NATO officials to hope for the official return of Greece to the alliance.

WASHINGTON STAR
8 May 1975

CIA Role In Lisbon Is Doubted

Portugese Information Minister Jorge Jusuino says he does not think the CIA has had anything to do with his country's internal troubles.

"If I knew anything about this," said Jusuino, a naval officer and member of the military Council of the Revolution, "I would tell you with pleasure."

Jusuino, who is touring the United States at the invitation of the State Department, said at a press conference yesterday that the time is ripe for renewing negotiations between the United States and Portugal on the agreement by which the United States maintains a military base in the mid-Atlantic Portugese Azores. Cmdr. Jusuino said negotiations must be resumed very soon but said there was no deadline for doing so, even though the last base agreement has already expired.

The Azores, he said, can be used by the United States with only one stipulation: That America refrain from any airlift from there to the Middle East. In the Yom Kippur war of 1973, Portugal alone of the NATO allies permitted refueling in the Azores for the U. S. effort to resupply Israel.

Portugal belongs to NATO and will remain in the alliance, Jusuino declared. Asked if Portugal was being isolated from some NATO matters by the other members because of Communist influence in the Lisbon government, Jusuino said, "Yes, but we ignore that."

He pointed out that France and Italy are NATO partners and have much stronger Communist parties than Portugal. But he said in any case defense is not a concern of the cabinet but of the ruling military council and the military is not affiliated with any party. There is no danger of security problems as far as Portugal is concerned with NATO, he added.

Jeremiah O'Leary

Africa

WASHINGTON POST
11 May 1975

World Bank Seeks African 'Take-off'

By David K. Ottaway
Washington Post Foreign Service

ADDIS ABABA—The World Bank, widely regarded by Third World radicals as a pillar of the international American-dominated Capitalist world order, has turned to financing in a big way Africa's most radical Socialist experiments in its pursuit of the seemingly illusive "rural breakthrough" and industrial "take-off" haunting all developing countries.

In Tanzania, Algeria, Somalia and now Ethiopia—countries all dedicated to "Socialist revolution" of one kind or another, the bank is playing a major role by pouring hundreds of millions of dollars into their Socialist programs and economies.

If these African Socialist experiments succeed, it is conceivable that the World Bank will end by becoming a prime promoter of socialism over capitalism throughout the Third World, a turn of events that should give both Western Capitalist and Eastern Communist capitals pause to think.

Already, the bank has adopted in its latest policy paper on rural development terms like "group arrangements" and "land management," which are barely disguised euphemisms for cooperatives, collectivization and land reform. "Group approaches enjoy widespread support among governments, even though the results have been mixed," says the February paper. "They provide the impetus to rural development that is difficult to secure in any other way."

Altogether, the World Bank has given Tanzania about $310 million in soft and hard loans ($111 million alone in the 1975 fiscal year ending June 30); Algeria, $305 million ($43 million this year with an enormous increase scheduled for 1976); Somalia, $60 million; and Ethiopia, $370 million, including $81 million this year and about the same amount planned for 1976.

Tanzania is moving 6 to 8 million peasants by persuasion or force into so-called planned villages in the largest mass movement of population ever attempted on this continent. Ethiopia has just proclaimed the nationalization of all rural lands as part of a radical land reform program that unleashed violent struggles between peasants and landlords in many areas.

Somalia has hoisted the banner of "scientific socialism" over its largely nomadic 3 million people, while Algeria is pressing forward at breakneck speed with an intensive multi-billion-dollar industrialization program aimed at achieving an economic take-off by 1980.

In some cases, the World Bank has become a crucial factor in the continuing stability of these Socialist governments. For instance, it has given Tanzania, now in the throes of the worst economic crisis since its independence 14 years ago, a $30 million loan to purchase key food and other commodities abroad to feed its people, and stave off financial and political bankruptcy.

Here in Ethiopia, a $21.4 million bank-financed water and sewerage project for the capital has provided 9,000 jobs over the past few months. It has been a time of rising unemployment and labor unrest that threatened to erupt into strikes that might possibly have sparked the overthrow of the new Socialist military government.

John M. Malone Jr., the bank's resident representative in Ethiopia, repeatedly cites Section X of the bank's articles of agreement, or charter, which states it and its officers "shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member; nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political character of the member or members concerned. Only economic considerations shell be relevant to their decisions," the article saye.

He also points out that the bank is giving "a hell of a lot of money these days to everybody," including probably the two most Capitalist-oriented countries on the continent, Kenya in East Africa and the Ivory Coast in West Africa. (Kenya alone has gotten $454 million in loans with a whopping $186 million in the current fiscal year.)

But behind the bank's official policy of ideological neutrality and hard-nosed economics, there is an undisguised bias among many of its top officials toward the more daring attempts in Africa at the "big leap forward" in rural and industrial development.

"Somalia is one of (World Bank President Robert) McNamara's favorite countries," said Malone. The former American defense secretary, who has now turned his talents and energy to bettering the lot of the Third World peasantry, visited Somalia several years ago and "he was very, very impressed by what he saw," said Malone, citing the Somalian practice of government officials going out to cultivate land and dig ditches under the hot desert afternoon sun.

"It's an excellent example of a country trying to lift itself up by its own bootstraps; they are really serious there," remarked Malone.

But the real African darling of the World Bank is undoubtedly Tanzania, which another official termed a "bank workshop" of rural development schemes aimed at increasing production and presenting social services to the poorest peasantry. "An awful lot of the things the bank hopes to be doing in the future are now being done in Tanzania," says Malone. "McNamara is really for those countries where he can try out these ideas (of rural development) and Tanzania is one."

Much of the current fascination within the World Bank with countries such as Tanzania, Ethiopia and Somalia stems, too, from McNamara's focus on improving the lot of the very small farmers, tenants and the landless living in what he calls "absolute poverty," or earning $50 or less per year.

These countries rank among the poorest of the Third World's poor and, at the same time, they have leaderships willing to run the enormous risks of land reform, which the bank has concluded is often "a necessary part of a rural development program."

But there appears to be an undercurrent of concern among bank officers that some of the land reforms being attempted may be too ambitious and radical, and thus fall on their face. The bank produced a report on Tanzania last year that was openly critical of some aspects of Tanzania's current "villagization campaign" and Malone does not hide his concern about the extreme approach Ethiopia's new military leaders are taking toward land reform by nationalizing even small holdings.

East Asia

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
6 MAY 1975

Last days of Saigon: CIA view proved right

By Daniel Southerland
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Hong Kong

Graham Martin, the U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam, is the target of much criticism for the hasty and disorderly way in which the last Americans and some of their Vietnamese friends were evacuated from Saigon.

But as time moves on, the critics are likely to focus increasingly on the more weighty issue of Mr. Martin's entire Vietnam policy and what embassy insiders began to describe openly in recent days as the Ambassador's "illusions" and "overoptimism."

Prominent among those insiders were Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officials, who were painting a gloomier picture of Saigon's prospects for survival several weeks ago than Mr. Martin was.

Even well after the fall of the city of Da Nang at the end of March, the Ambassador persisted, according to embassy officials, in thinking that Saigon could hold the line at some point on the military front. The CIA, on the other hand, was convinced soon after the fall of Da Nang that the war was lost.

Last-ditch hopes held

With much of the country in Communist hands, Mr. Martin argued that the Communists actually held little more than "deficit," or nonproductive, areas, and that Saigon still had a hope of defending the more productive areas.

According to well-placed embassy sources, the CIA at that point saw the need to encourage the establishment of a new and more conciliatory leadership in Saigon. But Mr. Martin and some of his subordinates were advocating the formation of a "fighting cabinet" in Saigon under President Nguyen Van Thieu.

As it was, the "fighting cabinet" was ineffective, the CIA's pessimism over Saigon's prospects for survival seemed justified by further government retreats, and the CIA station chief in Saigon apparently had some success in helping persuade Mr. Martin that President Thieu's leadership was a liability.

It may remain one of those "ifs" of history, but some CIA officials are convinced that if Mr. Martin had foreseen more clearly the defeats that lay ahead of Saigon, he and Washington might have been able to move quickly enough to set up conditions for at least a gradual, phased Communist take-over, and a more graceful American exit, instead of the outright military take-over that eventually occurred.

Saigon bickered to the end

By the time Mr. Thieu resigned in late April and Saigon did shift to a negotiating posture, there was still much bickering among the Saigon politicians as to how power should be transferred from the old Thieu regime to a new "peace government."

The Communists began hardening their public position on negotiations, and, after halting major attacks for four or five days, they grew impatient and began pressing again militarily. The demoralized Saigon Army crumbled rapidly in the face of more concerted thrusts. And as senior Saigon Army officers began sending their families out of the country and then fleeing for their own lives, the smell of victory apparently became overpowering for the Communists. There was little left for them to do but walk into Saigon.

By late Monday, April 28, Ambassador Martin still thought the Communists probably would go through the motions of negotiating a final settlement that would amount to little more than a disguised surrender for Saigon but would permit the presence of a reduced U.S. Embassy staff in South Vietnam.

This view still prevailed at an embassy meeting that ended around 2 a.m. Tuesday. But by late that morning the risk that the Communists might soon overrun the city became apparent to all and the final evacuation was ordered.

Evacuation started late

Mr. Martin earlier had feared moving toward a complete evacuation of Americans, because he thought that it would amount to "pushing the panic button," and would undermine any further "will to resist" on the part of Saigon. A staged evacuation had been going on for weeks, but it had been orchestrated to give the impression that not all the Americans were leaving.

One mistake, in the view of many critics, was not to have evacuated earlier, along with their families, more of the Vietnamese who had worked for the Americans. But Ambassador Martin had thought he had more time to get them out. As it was, an undetermined number of these Vietnamese were left behind.

The irony was that some of the Vietnamese the Americans considered the most "deserving" were left behind, while quite a few corrupt officials and military officers, as well as bar girls and prostitutes, got out on the basis of personal friendships with Americans and hastily contrived "marriages."

About 180 Vietnamese, comprising employees of the U.S. Information Service (USIS) and their families, had gathered at the USIS offices in Saigon Tuesday to be taken to the airport. When buses for the airport began to load, people from the streets poured onto them, the employees were pinned inside the USIS compound, and left behind.

LOS ANGELES TIMES
4 May 1975

Peace at Last for the Vietnamese

BY CHESTER L. COOPER

America's ill-starred venture in Vietnam has ended. The flag has been struck; the ambassador has departed. The embassy is looted and empty. Even the name "Saigon" now must share billing with a nickname. Perhaps in the years to come "Ho Chi Minh City" will roll easily off the tongue, but at the moment it all seems very unreal. Two decades of deep economic, military, and emotional entanglement with the Saigon government are not easily shucked off.

And yet, the end seemed long foreordained. Surely, the beginning of the end was apparent more than two years ago when America withdrew its last remaining forces and the issue of war or peace was once again left for the Vietnamese themselves to decide.

They chose to continue fighting,

Chester Cooper, formerly an Asian specialist in the CIA, the State Department, and later a White House aide, served on the U.S. delegations to the 1954 and 1962 Geneva conferences. He is the author of "The Lost Crusade," a book on the American involvement in Vietnam.

the "cease-fire" notwithstanding. And for a host of reasons, including our own determination to remain aloof once extricated, the armies of Hanoi won the day against the dispirited and demoralized military forces of the Republic of Vietnam.

The seeds of our bitter harvest were planted a long time ago. Long before we disengaged our forces in 1973. Long before we engaged them in 1965. And long before we first allied ourselves with a Saigon regime in 1954.

★

The seeds were sown three decades ago during World War II. It was in 1944 that Franklin Roosevelt dreamt of a postwar Indochina that would evolve into three independent countries after a period of United Nations trusteeship. Roosevelt's plans were never carefully spelled out, however, and his dream died with him.

President Truman (who had been unaware of Roosevelt's thoughts on Indochina) soon became so preoccupied with the final defeat and the subsequent occupation of Japan that Indochina reverted back to the French almost by inadvertence.

Within a few years, the French were mired down in a colonial war. But in the zeal of Washington's anti-Communist crusade, France's stubborn efforts to retain Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam as colonies were transformed into a lofty struggle against the spreading influence of Peking and Moscow. We aligned ourselves with Paris and against the Vietnamese nationalists—non-Communists as well as Communists.

America was a grudging participant in the 1954 Geneva Conference which gave the three Indochinese states their independence and which divided Vietnam, like Germany and Korea, into two parts. The area north of the 17th parallel was to be under the control of Ho Chi Minh and his Communist party; the area south of the parallel was to be under the control of the non-Communists. An election, which was never held—and which by the very nature of the two sides could not have been held—was to settle the ultimate leadership of a unified Vietnam.

★

The French, defeated at Dien Bien Phu as the Geneva Conference was in progress, moved out of Vietnam after the conference concluded a few weeks later.

But before the last of the French forces left, the Americans had moved in. We took with us military and economic advisers and a strong statement of support for the government of Ngo Dinh Diem.

For almost 10 years we remained as the mentor, the supplier, and the banker to the Diem regime. Our support increased year by year, as did our political stake in Diem's success against ever-growing pressure from determined South Vietnamese guerrillas supported and reinforced by the regime in Hanoi. But, paradoxically, the more we committed ourselves to an increasingly ineffectual and byzantine regime in Saigon, the less leverage we seemed able to exert. We embraced Diem—and wound up being smothered by him and his conniving, corrupt family.

When in late 1963 Diem was ousted by his own generals, with American acquiescence, and subsequently murdered by Vietnamese officers, there seemed a chance for a fresh start. But the generals quickly came to prefer the scent of politics to the smell of battle. Washington writhed and suffered through late 1963 and 1964 as it watched the spectacle of one military politician after another trying fruitlessly to run the country and fight off the Viet Cong while reaping the perquisites that came with sitting in the presidential palace.

During this period, at least a half dozen prime ministers had their brief moment in the sun. With each new coup, the South Vietnamese army became more demoralized and the Communist forces became stronger.

We yearned for stability in Saigon and, in due course, it came with the advent of Nguyen Van Thieu. And when he consolidated his hold with election to the presidency, it had to be said, in fairness, that the balloting was no more tainted than the voting in any of 50 countries around the world. But once elected, Thieu dug himself in and brooked no serious opposition. He remained president to the end.

It was 10 years before the final death throes for South Vietnam—in February, 1965—that an American airbase was attacked by Communist troops, and the United States entered the war on a large scale, with masses of troops and sustained bombing of the North.

It was to be the longest war in American history; eight years of ugly, unresolved fighting; more than 50,000 Americans killed; hundreds of thousands wounded; one hundred and fifty billion dollars expended; the rending of America's political fabric and of its domestic tranquility.

★

Richard Nixon inherited the war in Vietnam and its nasty side effects in America. For a brief period, the combination of eliminating the draft and removing troops gradually from Vietnam restored some sense of quiet on the home front.

But then in the spring of 1970, Americans invaded Cambodia. The immediate effect was to intensify antiwar feeling. The ultimate effect was to set in train a series of consequences which culminated in tragedy for the Cambodians.

The "peace talks" which had been under way in Paris since the summer of 1968 had long since become a sterile exercise, and Henry Kissinger had started his secret sessions with his counterpart from Hanoi. Kissinger's major mission was to bring American POWs home, to disengage the United States from its military involvement, and to carry both tasks off with as much grace and dignity as possible.

★

The talks sputtered along for more than a year with little progress. But in January, 1973, we reached an agreement. It provided something of value for everybody—or almost everybody. The Americans accomplished the immediate release of the prisoners. The North Vietnamese achieved the removal of the last remaining American soldiers and the acceptance of the continued presence of approximately 150,000 Communist troops in South Vietnam. The National Liberation Front, at long

last, was given an opportunity to engage in political steps leading to its participation in the national government. The government of South Vietnam . . . well, Saigon was permitted to maintain President Thieu in power until the agreement's political arrangements were put into effect.

The cease-fire was generally regarded as a diplomatic coup. In the euphoria of the long-awaited end of the American entanglement and the emotional homecoming of American prisoners, Nixon's "peace with honor" aroused neither cynicism nor ridicule.

Not very long afterward, however, —just about the time Kissinger was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize—it became clear that, although "honor" may or may not have been preserved in Vietnam, "peace" was still elusive. In 1973, alone, several hundred thousand Vietnamese were casualties of the "cease-fire".

It has been only recently, two years after the cease-fire was first violated, that we became conscious of what the agreement of 1973 meant—and did not mean. But surely no one, least of all those in Washington who long have been close to the events, should profess indignation or feign surprise.

☆

Those who knew anything about the personality of President Thieu had no reason to believe that he would voluntarily comply with the political provisions of the agreement, which could only lead to his loss of power, or with the military provision, which required his troops to refrain from offensive activity. And those who knew anything about the single-minded determination of the men in Hanoi could hardly assume that the 150,000 North Vietnamese troops remaining in South Vietnam would do anything but try to expand the territory under Communist control.

On April 29, 1975, the Vietnam war ended. Definitively. Tragically.

What went wrong? A thousand things, most of which we will never know.

In retrospect however, we do know that we made a profound mistake almost from the very beginning: We allied ourselves with a regime, but not with a people. And for the people of South Vietnam, that regime and all the ones which were to follow were regarded as only the lesser of two evils. In the event, this turned out to be insufficient—grossly, fatally insufficient—to motivate the South Vietnamese in a long war against a stubborn enemy.

☆

The dolorous story of America's entanglement in Vietnam is over. Over, but not quite finished. We will not get away so easily. America faces a dreary and bitter postlude, punctuated by sounds of "j'accuse" and "mea culpa."

The saga of America in Vietnam is replete with wise men and fools, villains and heroes, good intentions and evil deeds, innocence and ignorance. They all combine to create a crowded and blurred mosaic which extends from Paris to Hanoi, from Washington to Saigon. It spans a whole generation. The tale lends itself nicely to heated, self-serving oratory by critics and participants, by the Right and the Left.

Can Vietnam happen again? Probably not soon again; the experience of the past 20 years taught us much, and cost us too much. Surely, no President in the foreseeable future will wish to slip and slide into war unless he is first confident of support of Congress and the American public. But "never again"? Who can say? "Never" is a long time.

Will America now turn "isolationist"? No. More nationalist perhaps, but not isolationist. Energy, food, monetary issues, pollution, trade, raw materials have all become international problems. We could not retreat from them behind our ocean moats, even if we wanted to after the humiliating shocks that culminated last week in Saigon.

THE ECONOMIST MAY 3, 1975

The view from Peking

Will the rout of American policy in Indochina make Chairman Mao think again about the value of China's American connection?

The most important single question about the after-effect of the American defeat in Indochina could be what it does to China's policy towards the United States. It takes some remembering today that when President Kennedy first committed the United States to a major military role in South Vietnam the real enemy was seen to be not North Vietnam but China. The Americans had abandoned that argument by the time Mr Kissinger went to Peking in 1971 to create the new relationship with China that was to be the centrepiece of his foreign policy. Yet there was always a grain of truth in the idea: the Chinese did say that they saw North Vietnam's campaign as an application of their own model of revolution; and they did, indeed, supply the North Vietnamese with arms, ammunition and other essentials, though not as much as the Russians did.

In recent weeks the Chinese have been hailing the imminent victory of the North Vietnamese with all the fraternal enthusiasm expected of comrades "as close as lips and teeth". Yet, contrary to the assumptions of the mid-1960s, the pleasure in Peking today is unlikely to be unalloyed. For one thing, the effect of a North Vietnamese victory, particularly one so sweeping and spectacular, may be not to extend China's influence at all, but to limit it in the area of its own backyard. For another, the humiliating exit of the Americans from Indochina could upset Chinese calculations about its whole detente policy.

At the very least, North Vietnam's takeover of the whole of Vietnam will confront the Chinese with several old problems in a new form. The first is China's long-standing rivalry with the Soviet Union for North Vietnam's favour, a rivalry now sharpened because the stakes are higher. The Russians start out with the advantage their greater aid may have given them, and although the Chinese carry the indisputable weight of a giant neighbour they no longer have the leverage that control of Russia's railway route into North Vietnam gave them during American sea blockades of Haiphong. The North Vietnamese will almost certainly attempt to keep both suitors ardent and anxious, as they have done so profitably for so long; they will need all the help they can get for the massive reconstruction job ahead. But the North Vietnamese are not just in the happy position of being wooed. When the scene shifts outside the borders of Vietnam, they in turn become suitors for the allegiances of the local communist movements. And their main rival in this contest is their own close ally, China.

Will China back the next "people's war"?

This is where the Chinese will come up against some difficult choices. The North Vietnamese may make things easy for them by concentrating their resources and manpower on rebuilding Vietnam. But if, as they have done during decades of war, the North Vietnamese also find time for active involvement in guerrilla struggles in neighbouring countries, the Chinese may feel compelled to step up their own support for local insurgents, however this may damage their nascent

diplomatic relations with the local governments and their unspoken agreements with the United States. The unpalatable alternative, as the Chinese may see it, would be to allow a newly powerful North Vietnam to extend its sway first to the rest of Indochina and eventually throughout mainland south-east Asia.

A revving up of the rivalries between Moscow and Peking in Vietnam, and between Peking and Hanoi in south-east Asia, has always been on the cards as the by-product of a communist victory in Vietnam. And so has a total American withdrawal. It was Mr Kissinger's assurances to the Chinese way back in 1970–71 that the United States would indeed be extricating itself from the Indochina wars that made possible the talks which produced the Chinese-American detente. But what was not allowed for when the Chinese were playing host to Mr Nixon was the humiliation that would be heaped on the United States in the course of its final scramble out of Saigon; or the demands this would provoke for further precipitate American troop withdrawals; or the concurrent congressional backlash against American involvement in foreign conflicts.

The Chinese are most unlikely to conclude from all this that the Americans are retreating into isolationism; they are too cool and realistic to take such an apocalyptic view. But they may nonetheless be having second thoughts these days about some of the assumptions they made four years ago about the value of the American connection. What was then the most important reason for making friends with their former enemy was the political leverage and even protection this gave them against the greater threat posed by the Soviet Union. This threat is still there today, although the immediate prospect of a border war between China and Russia has diminished. But the Chinese may well be wondering whether Mr Kissinger's past hints about some kind of American response to Soviet pressure on China could still be cashed into suitable currency. If they cannot, then the Chinese, like the Thais and the Filipinos, might start to look for alternative security arrangements. And for China there can be only one, however violent the distaste for each other in Peking and Moscow: a rapprochement with the Soviet Union.

And now for Taiwan

Another powerful reason for China's opening to America was its expectation that Taiwan would eventually be delivered to it on a peaceable platter. For over a year now the Chinese have been signalling their impatience with the lack of progress on the Taiwan issue; North Vietnam's conquest of its southern neighbour could well be seized upon by militants in Peking as a shaming contrast with China's passivity towards regaining its last unconquered province. So one Chinese reaction to Vietnam might be to push the Americans harder than ever for action on Taiwan: not only the promised reduction of American forces, but also a removal of the American embassy in Taipei and the transfer of formal recognition to Peking.

There would, of course, be dangers for the Chinese in pushing the Americans too far: they effectively acknowledged this last week when they refrained from giving Kim Il Sung the go-ahead he seemed to be seeking, post-Vietnam, for another Korean war. Any destabilising moves in east Asia would be bound to affect not only China's ties with the United States but also with Japan; and, for all their amicable relations with Tokyo, the Chinese are not yet ready to encourage their old occupiers to rearm and possibly even to replace the Americans in countries like South Korea. Nor do the Chinese want to create any opportunities for the Russians to rush in.

It is still far too early for China to measure the full consequences of the North Vietnamese victory. When the Chinese do their sums they may well conclude that their American relationship is no longer bringing in profits at the same rate as in 1972. But what investments are, these days? And, as Mao might be saying to his restless radicals, where else can China put its money? Russia, maybe; but they will want to be sure of the profit there, too.

NEW YORK TIMES
6 May 1975

Congress's 'Inaction' On War

By Thomas F. Eagleton

WASHINGTON—On Jan. 5, 1957, President Dwight D. Eisenhower, concerned about possible Communist advances in the Middle East, addressed a joint session of Congress to request authority to use military force, if needed, in the region.

Congressional liberals, feeling that the United States was best served by a strong and flexible President, were suspicious of the request. They moved in the Senate to strike the word "authorized" from the draft of the White House resolution and, when the resolution passed, it read part "if the President determines the necessity thereof, the United States is prepared to use armed forces."

The Middle East resolution was considered a great liberal victory. In fact, it also represented a virtual renunciation of Congress's constitutional duty to authorize—and proscribe—the use of American forces in a war.

In the Congressional handling of the recent Vietnam evacuation, history has repeated itself.

On April 10, 1975, President Ford requested "clarification" of his legal authority to use United States forces in South Vietnam to rescue American and foreign nationals. Clarification was needed.

I share the view of many constitutional scholars that the President, as Commander in Chief, possesses an inherent right to rescue endangered Americans. However, there is no precedent to support an inherent right to use United States forces to rescue foreign nationals.

The President's request presented an important opportunity to proscribe by law the use of force for the Vietnam evacuation. More important, Congress had the chance to resurrect the concept, advanced by the Founding Fathers, thatthe executive and Congress would participate together in decisions potentially involving war.

But Congress fumbled the ball. When the President was forced by events to order the evacuation from South Vietnam on April 29, the House of Representatives had not yet completed the final stage in enacting the necessary legislation. Two days later, when the House finally had the opportunity to express Congressional will and intent, the House voted overwhelmingly not to act.

This unfortunate decision raises grave questions about the willingness of Congress to fulfill its constitutional responsibilities. The President obviously had no authority to use the United States forces to rescue foreign nationals in Vietnam. Yet our forces evacuated thousands of Vietnamese. Asked to explain, President Ford tried to justify his action on "moral" rather than legal grounds. Yet Congress let the precedent stand. Future Presidents might now conclude that the Commander in Chief had an inherent right to do what Mr. Ford did.

The failure of the war-powers resolution to specify those emergency situations wherein the President may unilaterally commit United States forces to battle has left the war powers of Congress and the President as vague as ever.

Lacking such a statutory definition, power accrues to the branch that invokes it. And, once again, in rescuing foreign nationals from Vietnam the President has invoked powers the Presidency.

The President can move all too quickly to usurp Congressional powers. He has only to order troops into battle. Congress, on the other hand, can only impose its will through the legislative process.

That is the tragedy of the House's recent action. On the verge of reimposing itself in the decision-making process, Congress rejected the opportunity to legislate.

From the beginning the debate over the President's request for "clarification" was marked by distrust of the executive branch, fear of military reinvolvement in Vietnam, and a conspicuous lack of confidence that a law, however tightly drafted, would be faithfully executed. In the end, liberals, long disenchanted by the imperial Presidency they helped create, unintentionally threw their considerable weight in the direction of Presidential omnipotence.

To avoid the remotest of possibilities—that President Ford would send forces back into Vietnam despite his written promise not to—Congress chose to leave a precedent for unilateral and unrestricted Presidential rescue authority.

White House references to "moral" justification and the pleasure Congress seems to derive in abrogating its constitutional responsibilities should alarm those who see the rule of law as America's primary source of strength.

Congress has again failed to act in a forthright and timely manner to proscribe a Presidential war-making initiative. By its inaction, and by its refusal even to provide expost facto authorization for the Vietnam evacuation, Congress has once again shirked its constitutional duty.

Thomas F. Eagleton, junior Democratic Senator From Missouri, is author of "War and Presidential Power: A Chronicle of Congressional Surrender."

WASHINGTON POST
18 April 1975

Vietnam: Looking Back—And Ahead

In my opinion your editorial efforts to assess the blame for the debacle in South Vietnam have missed the point. The failures behind what is happening now are failures of perception in which many, if not most of us, share—not the least including The Washington Post.

Because their colonial past had left them weak and the destruction and demoralization of the war and the Japanese occupation had further exaggerated that weakness, the countries of Southeast Asia were especially severe casualties of World War II. And because they started so far behind they were slower than most countries to recover from the war and its aftermath.

Through local Communist and pro-Communist political parties and through armed and other subversion the USSR and the Chinese People's Republic, sometimes separately, sometimes in tandem, have persisted in their efforts to extend their influence in the area, despite occasional setbacks. The impetus this has given to internal political conflict and chaos has also slowed development.

Considering this background, with our help and that of some of our allies, most of the countries of Southeast Asia—including South Vietnam—have made remarkable economic progress and have contributed importantly to the spectacular growth in recent years of the strength, stability and self-reliance of countries of the Pacific Basin—the area most geopoliticians agree is the one that will most affect our—indeed the world's—future.

Until it began to weaken on Vietnam, the U.S. had made a major contribution to the area, helping to bring independence, to stimulate and assist economic development, to encourage the use of free-market economies and to promote self-reliance and self-expression. It had wisely—though sometimes belatedly—realized that helping those who could help themselves and encouraging the maximum of self-motivation, self-choice and self-help, was the key to helping development of these countries. The fragility of some of them, for example that revealed by the recent rout in South Vietnam, only underlines the importance of our role.

No one should be deluded that these areas will not be closed to the U.S. as they come under Communist control or that this will not mean an increased threat to the pluralistic way of life for ourselves and our friends in Southeast Asia, who belong to some of the most pluralistic of societies.

Preoccupation with blame, recrimination and the debate on the past will only make a bad situation worse. Concentrating on and quarreling over the poor Vietnamese orphans, for example, will only add to the image of a U.S. that is cutting and running in Southeast Asia.

What is needed is a new sense of U.S. interest, determination and involvement in an area that every postwar President and Congress have realized important—a concept which until recently, the press and public supported. What is needed is new words and new actions that will convince the Thais, Malaysians, Singaporeans, Filipinos and Indonesians, as well as others interested in the area—but mainly ourselves—that while the U.S. may have stumbled badly in Indochina it has no intention of abandoning its strong friendship and relationship of mutual assistance with countries in that area. There is a need for dispelling some discernible doubt on that score.

Francis J. Galbraith,
Former U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia and Singapore.

Washington.

WASHINGTON STAR
13 May 1975

Intelligence Blunder? Danger Signs Ignored

By Henry S. Bradsher
Washington Star Staff Writer

The capture of an American ship by the tough new Communist regime in Cambodia may have resulted from a major blunder of U.S. intelligence, which failed to head off the new international crisis.

The U.S. government had received a number of danger signs before the merchantman Mayaguez was boarded by armed Cambodians yesterday and taken with its 39 American seamen closer to the mainland.

But, in answer to questions, officials could not find any indication that the danger signs had registered sufficiently to cause precautionary steps to be taken so as to avoid the capture of an American ship.

THIS SUGGESTED that the situation is comparable to the capture of the Pueblo by North Korea in 1968 after Pyongyang had warned against the American spy ship's operations off its coast but the warnings were ignored. In the case of the Mayaguez, however, the White House said that the vessel is not a spy ship.

The danger signs known here before the Mayaguez's capture include the following:

©Since Cambodia's major seaport Kompong Som — now renamed Sihanoukville by the new government — was taken over by the Khmer Rouge, at least one American-supplied gunboat had been put into operation by the Communists.

©A Cambodian gunboat had stopped a Panamanian ship last Thursday in the same area approximately 60 miles off shore where the Mayaguez was captured. It was later released and the Khmer Rouge were apparently searching for other maritime prizes.

©At least three ships in which Cambodian refugees fled after Phnom Penh fell are now at the U.S. naval base at Subic Bay in the Philippines, giving the new regime a motive to take a U.S. prize for barter purposes.

©Cambodia claims Wai Island, the rock about eight miles from the point of capture, and therefore claims the waters around it which U.S. shipping had regularly been using. The island is also claimed by Vietnam.

©According to one report received at the Pentagon some days ago, the new Cambodian regime has also claimed territorial waters up to 90 nautical miles (about 100 statute miles) from

shore, which would include not only Wai Island but also a sizable stretch of the shipping lane around Vietnam and Cambodia to Thailand from the East.

Perhaps most important in adding all these up, the new Cambodian regime has openly shown bitter hostility to the United States.

It has also been so deliberately isolated from the outside world that the only country the United States could contact yesterday which might get a message through about the ship was China. The Chinese liaison office here was approached but U.S. officials were not very optimistic that this channel would produce results.

SOME of the danger signs, officials disclosed yesterday after the capture, were buried in secret intelligence reports. Others were registered in collections of material on the changing situation in Cambodia.

But the most critical fact of all, the stopping of the Panamanian ship, failed to cause a sufficient assessment of possible dangers to shipping in the Gulf of Thailand from which might have been drawn the conclusion that U.S. vessels would be in danger.

After the capture, officials saw that it would have been possible to warn American ships to sail around the claimed territorial waters where the gunboat was known to have been operating.

The United States might also have sent a warship protectively close to the area until the situation was clarified.

These were the same steps which had been possible when the North Korean warnings about the Pueblo's operations were given. But in neither case was the danger taken seriously enough to cause any reaction.

ONLY AFTER the Pueblo and Mayaguez captures did officials begin to search for motives which would have led to such an action.

Since Phnom Penh fell to the Khmer Rouge on April 17, five days after the American helicopter evacuation, officials here have been watching the Cambodian situation from several sources.

Both normal domestic radio broadcasts and internal military radio traffic have been monitored. Reports from refugees coming out of Cambodia have been noted. Statements by Cambodian spokesmen abroad have been studied.

All have indicated continuing hostility toward the United States, which armed, financed and wholly sustained the now-defeated Lon Nol government. Recent broadcasts have expressed particular anger at the destruction of Cambodia's roads, bridges, railroads and other infrastructure during the war, with the blame being put — not always accurately — on the United States.

OFFICIALS HERE saw a possibility that the Mayaguez was seized in retalitation for this damage. It might also have been taken for barter purposes.

The three ships at Subic Bay sailed from Kompong Som with 625 refugees as the war ended. They went first to a Malaysian port and then to the Philippines. Some reports said that a fourth warship had also escaped and was at Subic Bay.

Records show that the United States had provided six gunboats to the old Lon Nol government.

Some American officials were not convinced that the seizure was a deliberate act of policy by the Khmer Rouge, whose government remains shadowy and ill-defined. One official said the action, which President Ford denounced as "piracy," might have been a local initiative rather than an order from Phnom Penh. Or it "might have been just a general warning" to foreign ships to stay away from Cambodia.

THIS INTERPRETATION gained possible support from information conveyed by Ford to some congressional leaders that the Cambodian boarding party did not speak English. The gunboat might not have set out to capture an American ship.

But some officials thought the fact that the Panamanian ship had been released earlier argued the opposite. They added that the Cambodians presumably could identify an American flag and knew at whom they were shooting.

The White House spokesman, Ronald Nessen, announced that the ship was about 60 miles from the Cambodian coast and 8 miles from Wai Island.

A spokesman for the ship's owners, Sea-Land Corpoation, said later it was 85 miles off shore. That would have put it much farther than 8 miles from the island but still within the reported 90-nautical-mile claim.

The United States does not recognize such extensive claims for shipping rights, but it has not prevented Peru from seizing American fishing boats even farther from its shores.

AMONG THE mixed reactions on Capitol Hill, ranging from caution and a wait-and-see attitude to demands for U.S. government action, was a call by Sen. James L. Buckley, R-N.Y., for an "immediately clinical air strike."

Buckley suggested that U.S. planes might bomb such targets as ports and bridges. But the new Communist rulers in Phnom Penh have been complaining that they do not have many of those left unbombed after the war, so the choice of targets now would be poor.

By emptying the cities of population since its victory and emphasizing rural self-reliance, the new regime has made itself virtually invulnerable to any military or economic pressure which the United States might now try to bring in hopes of winning the release of the 39 seamen.

The White House had warned yesterday that failure by Cambodia to release the ship immediately "would have the most serious consequences." A U.S. aircraft carrier and supporting warships were sent to the Gulf of Thailand.

The United States also still has war planes at air bases in Thailand which were used to bomb Cambodia before a congressionally imposed halt on such raids on Aug. 15, 1973.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
5 MAY 1975

How Saigon's new regime profits from past injustice

By Daniel Southerland
Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor
Hong Kong

Saigon's new revolutionary government has begun to show the tactics by which it plans to take complete control of the country.

Its first moves were to take over the press and labor unions.

This approach may be broader in its influence than it seems at first glance, when one considers the following:

• In the last months of the old Thieu regime the few newspapers that remained open toed the Saigon government line for the most part. Articles that deviated from that line were heavily censored, and the papers often appeared with gaping blank spaces in them. Last February, the Saigon government closed five opposition newspapers and arrested 14 leading newsmen, virtually emasculating what was left of an independent press.

• The Vietnamese Confederation of Labor, which has now been taken over by the Communists, was the largest non-Communist labor grouping in South Vietnam. But it would be wrong to think that it had the support or cooperation of most laborers.

The overriding fact in the eyes of many Vietnamese workers was that South Vietnam's society was riddled with corruption and injustice. The Confederation of Labor, known by its French initials as the CVT, was headed by Tran Quoc Buu, a man suspected by the Communists of having once worked for the French security service, something that hardly made him popular.

Mr. Buu has, over the years, secured strong support from the AFL-CIO in the United States. He is wealthy enough to have maintained several "minor wives," and in the eyes of many Vietnamese, this has done little to enhance his prestige.

In recent years, Mr. Buu did little to challenge the Saigon government and often cooperated with it in a quiet way.

Thus, for many workers, the important question is not likely to be whether the CVT was taken over or not but whether the workers' standard of living will improve under the new revolutionary government. South Vietnam has suffered over the past few years from rampant inflation and massive unemployment. Coping with these problems will be basic tests for the new government.

Under the old government, some workers, such as Saigon's pedicab drivers, have stood outside the ranks of organized labor unions.

More than 10,000 pedicab drivers were thrown out of work about a month ago when the Thieu government concluded that some of them were working for the Communists and bringing explosives into the city of Saigon. They were ordered off the streets, and most of them had no place to go to find new work. One man who had started out 40 years ago as a rickshaw puller under the French was found living destitute on a 9-by-6 foot platform in a tiny house in Saigon when this reporter talked with him two weeks ago. His family had left him — the worst disgrace for a Vietnamese — because he had been unable to provide for them.

After the pedicab owner, fearful of the police, took the man's only means of support away from him, he was living day to day thanks to small contributions from a Roman Catholic priest who was trying to organize the pedicab drivers and to occasional offers of rice from the family that rented the platform to him.

The man, Nguyen Dau, said that politics was beyond him and that he would accept any government that would guarantee him enough work so that he could pay for a few bowls of rice each day.

It is hard to imagine that Nguyen Dau will be worse off under the new revolutionary government than he was under the old regime.

WASHINGTON POST
5 May 1975

2 Aides Go Underground, Rescue 200 in Saigon

By Marilyn Berger
Washington Post Staff Writer

Using their own money and ingenuity and despite the displeasure of the State Department, two young Foreign Service officers flew to Saigon and got about 200 Vietnamese friends out of the country in the last days before South Vietnam's surrender.

Larry Craig Johnstone and Lionel A. Rosenblatt said they believed their friends' lives were in danger but that they were not high-ranking enough to get on the U.S. evacuation flights without help.

The rescue involved dramatic races through Saigon in a black 1940s Citroen with escapees hidden in the trunk, falsified papers, lack of sleep and hunger.

Johnstone, 32, answered questions about his adventure at his Washington home. Rosenblatt, 31, stayed on Guam to continue to try to reunite Vietnamese families separated in the confusion of the evacuation.

"They were good friends and they worked with us," Johnstone said of the Vietnamese.

"To leave them and not express the slightest concern was repugnant to us. There were many who felt there was nothing they could do. But we knew Saigon, we spoke Vietnamese and we felt we could do something," he said.

They were not the only Foreign Service officers who tried. Johnstone said about 40 Americans were on the plane he and Rosenblatt took to Saigon. Among them were four other officers who had come from other parts of the world to help their Vietnamese friends. He would not identify them.

"We had grave reservations when we left, fear of becoming a burden to the embassy, which didn't need another burden, concern that we wouldn't get anyone out, realization that we'd be spending a lot of money possibly for nothing and jeopardizing ourselves in the process," Johnstone said. "But we wouldn't have gone if we thought we'd fail."

They took part of their annual leave "for personal reasons" and did not tell anyone at the State Department where they were going. When their superiors discovered they had gone to Vietnam, the State Department cabled the embassy ordering that they be stopped.

According to top department officials, the embassy made a brief effort to find them and then turned to its more urgent problems, cabling back that the two had gone "underground."

Johnstone said he believes he will get into trouble with the State Department because of what he did. But he felt he had no moral alternative.

When they left April 20 Johnstone and Rosenblatt said they thought they would have only a day or two to reach the people they wanted to help. But the Communist advance slowed and they had five days for their efforts, which Johnstone said became like "a dime-store novel."

On arriving in Saigon, the pair stopped at a street corner stand and bought bowls of soup—which turned out to be almost all they got to eat. During the effort Johnstone lost about 10 pounds.

They checked into the Caravelle Hotel, which they had hoped to use as a staging area for evacuees, but after deciding it was too public, they took over an abandoned Agency for International Development apartment. Then the cloak-and-dagger work began.

They made their first contact directly, then tried to use only Vietnamese to contact other Vietnamese. They met their friends in the crowds in front of the post office or the national cathedral—some of the Vietnamese contacted knew Rosenblatt, some knew Johnstone, but few knew both.

The method: Rosenblatt would give the person a note telling him to meet Johnstone at the Continental Hotel. He would know Johnstone because he would be wearing a brown coat.

Johnstone keenly remembers sitting in the Saigon heat sweltering in his brown coat. At other times he had to wait on street corners, where, in addition to the coat, Rosenblatt had arranged for him to be carrying his briefcase—which he said weighed about 15 pounds.

Each Vietnamese contacted was informed that the two Americans could arrange transportation out. Johnstone said there was no problem getting space on evacuation planes, for they were going out partially empty. The principal problem was getting the Vietnamese to Tansonnhut airfield, because the national police were being very strict.

Johnstone said they scrounged up an old typewriter and the necessary forms and did the required paperwork. Occasionally, Johnstone recalls, he dozed off over the typewriter, for the only sleep he got during the stretch was 2½ hours, and that was in the pin-setting mechanism of a bowling alley at Tansonnhut.

All of the Vietnamese, Johnstone said, faced difficult decisions. "There was a sense of obligation to country, to family." But only seven or eight of those contacted chose to stay.

"We were being very cautious, even a little paranoid," said Johnstone, smiling. "We didn't want to be discovered by the national police."

The Americans picked up those who wanted to go in the Citroen or in an abandoned Pan American bus they appropriated.

They brought the Vietnamese, with their families and the few belongings they could carry, to the AID one stairway apartment, going up and down another to avoid detection, filled out the forms, and when enough people were assembled, took them to the airfield and the evacuation planes.

In all, they got out about 20 Vietnamese who were in what they considered the "high risk" category, and their families, a total of 200. At first they limited them to immediate family members. When they found there was space for more they went back for aunts and grandparents.

When time was running out, they stopped the street-corner meetings and went directly to the homes of the Vietnamese, announcing that they could help them get out of the country and giving them five minutes to decide.

In retrospect, Johnstone said it was all very "melodramatic," "not very Foreign Service."

No one has told him it was a foolish thing to do since he returned, although he thinks it was foolish. "We thought it was insane the whole time we were doing it," he said.

Johnstone is now at Fort Chaffee, Ark., helping set up a refugee center. He is one of the three assistants

to Ambassador L. Dean Brown, who heads the Vietnam refugee task force.

He spent five years in Vietnam, winning three awards for his work there. It was his job to do "critical evaluation," and, he recalled, "that was not a hard job in Vietnam." His awards include one from the State Department for "constructive dissent."

Johnstone worked in the Mekong Delta and then in Saigon, and he said he was able to help improve the lives of at least some Vietnamese during the course of the struggle, and perhaps to ward off bombing raids in populated areas.

It was during those years that he met the Vietnamese who became his friends, "honorable decent men who deserve to be saved."

Johnstone said he and Rosenblatt came out of Saigon without using an evacuation plane but he wouldn't say how. Now that he is back he said he is disheartened with the attitude he finds here. He conceded that there are a lot of Vietnamese "fat cats" who benefitted from the war.

But, he said, "I wish the American people would know that there are a lot of Vietnamese who are honest and who had humanitarian objectives and strong feelings of anti-Communism and that they worked hard with us and that we have a residual obligation to help them."

NEW YORK TIMES
6 May 1975

Feuds and Bad Planning In Saigon Exit Recalled

By FOX BUTTERFIELD
Special to The New York Times

MANILA, May 5—Although more than 100,000 Vietnamese successfully escaped from Saigon, the evacuation was marred by what diplomats and newsmen now recall as bad planning, bitter feuding between sections of the United States Mission and often an every-man-for-himself attitude.

As a result, many key Vietnamese officials and others who had long worked for the Americans were left behind. Many fearing reprisals from the Communists.

Moreover, the selection of those to be evacuated often seemed arbitrary. Dozens of prostitutes, for example, were taken out by American contractors and officials who listed them as wives or fiancées. But the chief spokesman for the Saigon Government and his staff, who would be major Communist targets, were apparently not helped despite repeated pleas.

In addition, same officials in the United States Embassy and Consulate—partly because of panic and partly out of concern for their own Vietnamese staffs—are known to have deceived each other or failed to notify subordinates about the final evacuation on Tuesday, endangering many lives.

In the end, no American officials are known to have been left behind, and the loss of life in the evacuation was minimal.

But the series of mix-ups and the haggling that accompanied the final American exit angered many American officials, and on the evacuation ships that carried them here they talked of their bitterness toward Ambassador Graham A. Martin.

It was Ambassador Martin, they say, who by delaying evacuation until the last possible minute—to avoid throwing Saigon into chaos—was responsible for the failure to rescue many endangered Vietnamese.

Some officials go further, accusing Mr. Martin of having been so isolated inside his walled embassy that he was blind to the inevitability of the Communist victory. The Ambassador, an aloof, secretive man who strongly supported former President Nguyen Van Thieu, became ill with pneumonia in the last few days before Washington finally ordered him, last Tuesday, to "pull the plug."

Leaving Saigon among the last American evacuees, the Ambassador boarded the Seventh Fleet flagship, the carrier Blue Ridge, and—except for a chance encounter with a few newsmen—remained unavailable to the press. He could not be asked about criticisms of his role.

According to knowledgeable diplomatic informants, when some American officials began to push for evacuation planning after the loss of the northern two-thinds of the country in March, Mr. Martin's opposition delayed it.

As a consequence, some parts of the United States Mission—composed of the embassy, the Agency for International Development, the United States Information Service, the Defense Attaché's Office and the Central Intelligence Agency—privately began their own withdrawal scheme.

This worked best for those institutions with their own air transportation and money to bribe Vienamese officials and guards — namely the Defense Attachés office and the C.I.A. But the embassy and the aid and information agencies, which did not have their own "assets," in the popular term, were much less successful in getting their staffs out.

General Is Dismissed

On April 12, with North Vietnamese troops beginning to tighten around Saigon, Brig. Gen. Richard M. Baughn, the senior Air Force officer in the Defense Attaché's Office, was abruptly dismissed and transferred out of Vietnam by Ambassador Martin. According to [illegible] angered the Ambassador by beginning to fly Vietnamese employes in the office to the Philippines aboard Air Force planes.

It was not until April 20, after the siege of Xuan Loc had begun 40 miles northeast of Saigon that Ambassador Martin on orders from Washington assented to the first legal evacuation flights by Air Force C-141 planes.

Thereafter the evacuation was pushed hard, with the embassy pressing the Saigon Government to accelerate granting exit permits and special passes for Vietnamese dependents and employes of Americans. In some cases the embassy actually helped in secretly taking Vietnamese out of the country without officials permission.

But there appeared to be little coordination or careful planning to separate cases of Vietnamese seriously endangered from those who merely wanted to leave.

Thus, for instance, a Vietnamese who had worked 10 years for the C.I.A. in Pleiku in the Central Highlands, before it was abandoned to the Communists, discovered no one in the embassy would help him when he managed to flee to Saigon. All his friends from the agency had already been transferred out of Vietnam and there was no one who recognized him.

But by contrast, on Saturday, April 26, a blue compact car of the type used by the embassy pulled up in front of Annie's Bar on Tu Do Street and took away three bar girls carrying suitcases.

Perhaps the worst case of confusion involved the United States Consulate General in Can Tho, the center of Military Region IV in the Mekong delta.

Officials from the consulate say they were never given any notice at all to evacuate their Vietnamese personnel until 11:30 Tuesday morning, when they were suddenly ordered to withdraw only their remaining Americans. By that time, the last emergency evacuation had already begun in Saigon.

As a result, the Con Tho office acting on its own at the last minute was able to get out only 42 of 573 Vietnamese employes, and 312 of over 3,000 Vietnamese dependents.

One Can Tho official who made three special trips to Saigon to discuss evacuation was reportedly turned away with the answer that Ambassador Martin would not accept puling out the Vietnamese employes.

Another Can Tho official who was dispatched to Saigon over the last weekend to try to press for help in evacuating Vietnamese staff, was in the office of Donald Anderson, the embassy administrative officer in charge of pulling out field staff, on Tuesday morning when the order for final evacuation was given.

"Anderson got up and left his office with some of his own Vietnamese without telling our men anything," recalled a furious Can Tho official. "He just went out to get on an airplane with his people, leaving our man sitting there."

The Can Tho consulate at its own initiative had prepared several evacuation plans, including its main one using four Air America helicopters stationed in Can Tho. However, at 8 A.M. on Tuesday the local C.I.A. officials asked to borrow the four Air America helicopters for their own personnel and flew off to Saigon without returning the aircraft.

WASHINGTON POST
15 May 1975

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

Laos: A Domino Falls

Laos became the first post-Vietnam domino to fall, some three months earlier than even pessimists in the U.S. government thought possible, with a shove from the now imperial North Vietnamese politburo in Hanoi.

This points to wishful thinking, presently being modified, in high-level Washington [illegible] drift on in a neutralist never-never

land while Communists tightened their hold on the rest of Indochina reflected an underestimation of how deeply the U.S. humiliation has affected Asian governments (and buttressed popular anti-Western jingoism). This misjudgment was compounded by another: A belief Hanoi would pause to digest South Vietnam before consolidating its hegemony over Indochina.

Thus, the widely derided domino theory is fully revived thanks both to the shock effect of the Vietnam debacle and the militancy of Asian Communists. The lightning collapse of Laos speeds and heightens the danger for Thailand. Future dominoes may be Malaysia and Singapore, with the Philippines and Indonesia menaced in the future.

Laos was the inevitable domino, its fate always determined by events elsewhere. Militant revolutionary communism was exported to dreamy, superstitious Laos by the armies of North Vietnam. All that prevented their quick triumph was intervention by Washington in the form of CIA military advisers, military aid and air support.

No Laotian better understood his country's future dependence on external events than its philosophic prime minister, Prince Souvanna Phouma. Recognizing that Hanoi sought the old French imperial role of ruling all Indochina, Souvanna believed that only "the great powers" — that is, the United States — could prevent it by guaranteeing Laotian independence. Thus, in the late 1960's he changed from neutralist to staunch anti-Communist, defending U.S. bombing of the Ho Chi Minh Trail in the panhandle of Laos. As recently as April 1973, when we last interviewed the Prince, he stoutly opposed unilateral withdrawal of CIA advisers and royal Thai army units.

What returned Souvanna to neutralism was the U.S. congressional surge for disengagement from Indochina. If the Americans were going to abandon South Vietnam and Cambodia, he knew Laos was doomed to conquest unless it accommodated to the Communists. The result was the one-sided 1973 peace treaty establishing a coalition government.

There was strong feeling in the State Department and U.S. embassy in Vientiane that the Lao coalition would muddle along idefinitely even after the Communist conquest of Cambodia and South Vietnam. If the nonviolent Laotians had been left to their own devices, perhaps it would have.

Saigon had not even fallen when, according to well-informed specialists here, the North Vietnamese politburo ordered an offensive. Communist Pathet Lao troops attacked Maj. Gen. Vang Pao's royal Lao army units at the crossroads town of Sala Phou Khoun between Vientiane and the royal capital of Luang Prabang.

If the Pathet Lao had run into trouble, there was help in reserve from 30,000 North Vietnamese regulars, supplied with Soviet tanks and heavy artillery, stationed in Laos. These crack troops no longer could be neutralized by U.S. B52 bombing strikes. Nor did Vang Pao's troops any longer benefit from CIA guidance or Thai artillery support. Demoralized, the royal Lao troops retreated.

Vang Pao called on air support from obsolete T28 propeller-driven fighter-bombers piloted by plucky Meo tribesmen, but that only fit into Hanoi's scenario. The Communists listed this as one of many provocations by royal Lao armed forces and demanded the resignation of right-wing ministers and generals.

Old (73), sick and terribly tired, Prince Souvanna Phouma backed this virtual coup to prevent bloodshed. With no possibility of outside help, the domino fell. Rightist cabinet ministers decamped to Thailand along with top officers in Vang Pao's command. Vang Pao himself, leader of the Meo people as well as a royal Lao army general, surrendered his command but stayed with the Meos in their once doughty fortress of Long Tieng to await the grim future. Souvanna and King Savang Vatthana may remain as figureheads, but will be followed by the People's Republic of Laos.

The case of Laos as a domino is unique in inevitablity and speed but not in kind. The same conditions prevail in Thailand. While Bangkok frenetically seeks to cut ties with Washington and accommodate to its Communist neighbors, three separate insurgencies intensify, with help from Peking and Hanoi. The northeast Thai insurgents, with a remarkable record for cutting up government troops, are guided by the Chinese and supplied by the North Vietnamese. The long-range prognosis for preserving Thailand from Communist control: mediocre.

How quickly other dominoes fall cannot be forecast. But Asia today faces confident revolutionary communism with Hanoi, far from immersed in postwar reconstruction, encouraging it everywhere. If that pattern holds, the Laos domino is only the first. Others will fall, more slowly, but with stakes incomparably higher.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
7 MAY 1975

Viet 'bloodbath' fears may be dissolving

Monitor queries find little evidence that Communists instituted a pogrom

By Daniel Southerland
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Hong Kong

If one were to believe the United States embassy in Saigon, a "bloodbath" was well under way within days after the Communists took over large parts of South Vietnam.

But independent investigation by this reporter and interviews with a number of refugees from areas occupied by the Communists show that a number of the reports of alleged killing carried out by the Communists that the embassy was transmitting to Washington were derived from second-hand sources and were poorly documented.

There is little doubt that the staunchly anti-Communist embassy officials who passed on the reports tended to believe them. This apparently was not a case of deliberate fabrication. After all, there had been executions throughout the long history of the Vietnam war.

Once the reports went out in the form of official cables, with high-level signatures attached, there was apparently even more of a tendency in Washington to accept their veracity. Pentagon officials soon began to speak of the summary executions of "thousands" of Vietnamese.

The 'why' of the issue

The "bloodbath" issue is important, first because of what it would mean in human terms if it did occur and, second, because it could become a political issue in the United States once politicians start trying to apportion the blame for "why Vietnam was lost" and "whether more should have been done to prevent its loss."

There were some lower-level American officials in Saigon who doubted the reports of widespread killings in the initial stages of the Communist take-over simply because they thought, based on past history, that the Communists would not operate thay way. They predicted executions would come only after the Communists held firm control.

But is is worth noting that high-level members of the Roman Catholic Church in South Vietnam, who might be thought to have much to fear from a Communist take-over, were convinced that the Communists were anxious not to repeat mistakes of the past. Leftist sources in Saigon reported that when Communist officials briefed their cadres on the "reconciliation policy" of the Provisional Revolutionary Government, they sometimes specifically said that it was designed to "avoid the excesses of the past."

Some killings reported

Many Vietnamese refugees suggested that if there was a "bloodbath" in the early stages of the Communist take-over, it was carried out by fleeing Saigon government troops who took control of several refugee ships and terrorized the passengers.

Quite a few refugees reported that the Communists, while attempting to reestablish order, did kill looters among Saigon troops. Prominent among the looters were Vietnamese marines, supposedly the best troops Saigon could field.

But when an American official interviewed a marine who reported that eight of his friends were executed in the city of Da Nang, the interviewer apparently failed to try to determine if any of the marines in question had

done any looting.

To point up the contrast between what the U.S. Embassy in Saigon reported and this correspondent's own interviews with refugees, it might suffice to examine two embassy cables that indicated widespread killings occurred in Da Nang.

One cable, drafted April 19th, said that information on the alleged killings was supplied by an officer assigned to the national police headquarters in Da Nang.

No support for allegations

The cable said that shortly after seizing Da Nang at the end of March, the Communists began "detaining" Buddhist youths who had participated in a demonstration aimed at helping the Communists take control. The Buddhists, it said, belonged to the National Reconciliation Force (NRF), a non-Communist group that actively had cooperated with the Communists following their take-over of a number of cities.

But when asked about the alleged killings, a leading member of the NRF in Saigon said that he had no information from NRF refugees to support such allegations. One refugee whose cousin was a Buddhist leader in Da Nang said the allegations amounted to sheer fantasy.

The U.S. Embassy cable said that 30 persons were executed at one time in a widely known public market in Da Nang. An earlier cable, citing a report from an elderly, educated refugee, said that 1,000 people were killed in a mass execution within three hours after the Communist take-over. Among them, it said, were "primarily uniformed military men, policemen, long-haired 'hippie' types, and looters."

A Vietnamese Air Force officer who escaped from Da Nang two weeks after the take-over confirmed that Buddhists belonging to the NRF had circulated throughout the city in the early stages urging the people to remain calm and not to loot. But the officer, who could hardly be accused of having pro-Communist sympathies, laughed when told about the embassy reports of widespread executions.

He said that military officers were being told by the Communists to report to assembly points and that they were later sent to "education courses" outside Da Nang. He said that there was some fear as Communist troops entered the city but that gradually people began to relax.

The officer predicted that eventually the Communists would get around to arresting those persons who were considered "bad" or "corrupt," and that they would be tried by "people's courts." But he said that he doubted strongly that anything like a bloodbath would occur.

A businessman from Da Nang who escaped about 10 days after the take-over gave a similar account to newsmen of events in "post-liberation" Da Nang.

WASHINGTON POST
13 May 1975

See News, Views & Issues - 2 May 1975, page 45

Adm. Moorer on Aerial Conduct of the War

Although it is not normally my habit to challenge newspaper columnists, I simply cannot overlook the April 29 column by Marquis Childs, entitled, "Sky Writing and Carpet Bombing." It is typical of the half-truths, and one-sided, misleading conclusions that are fed to the American people in an unending stream by Mr. Childs and others of his profession—as if they are speaking to us from a burning bush.

No wonder our people are confused and our country divided and torn asunder.

Let me be more specific:

Quote 1: "That can only mean that if he (President Ford) had not been hobbled by Congress he would have reopened American participation in the war as the only way to save Thieu."

Comment: Who is Mr. Childs to draw such a firm conclusion? It is highly likely, that if the President had not been "hobbled by Congress," as he puts it, the North Vietnamese would have been deterred from their blatant disregard of agreements the United States made in good faith. When all possibility of retaliation was removed, the North Vietnamese, aided fully by the Soviets and Chinese, launched their attack to the South. Secondly, the objective of the United States was not to "save Thieu" but rather to insure the viability of South Vietnam as a sovereign, independent state free from aggression from the North.

Quote 2: "When that deadline passed, he (President Nixon) unleased terror bombing on a scale never known before . . . In a two-week period much of Hanoi was *razed* . . . The two principal hospitals and a dispensary were destroyed."

Comment: Here again is a series of half-truths. Hanoi was hit, yes, but with precision. It was certainly not "razed." As a matter of fact, the North Vietnamese ordered their people to move into the center of the city and bring supplies with them for protection. In addition, members of the foreign diplomatic corp did not consider it necessary to leave town. Unless Mr. Childs uses a different dictionary than most people, an examination of the aerial photographs taken immediately after the bombing, or a visit to Hanoi will convince him that his use of the words "razed" and "destroyed" are gross and misleading exaggerations. Neither were the hospitals "destroyed," although they did receive some damage.

Quote 3: "Le Monde, the Paris newspaper, compared the bombing to the Nazi levelling of Guernica in the Spanish civil war."

Comment: One can lie in French just as easily as he can in English!

Quote 4: "At the end of two weeks of *carpet bombing*, which by its very nature could have little relation to *military targets*, the Communists agreed to resume negotiations." (Emphasis added.)

Comment: This statement is patently false. There was no "carpet bombing" of any kind. Every target was an important military target. I personally selected the targets and followed the operations sortie by sortie. This was a highly professional operation conducted with courage, precision, and skill. If Mr. Childs is interested, I will be happy to set him straight. For instance, Thai Nguyen is not a "suburb": it is 30 miles from Hanoi. As to whether it is a legitimate military target, it was heavily defended, the railroad marshalling yard packed with railroad cars loaded with weapons donated by our "friends," the Soviets and Chinese.

I note that Mr. Childs made no mention of the several hundred American POWs who were held for several years and subjected to savage torture over and over again. Without the bombing, these fine, young men would still be in Hanoi suffering more torture from these little revolutionists who obviously understand, nothing but brute force. I don't know about Mr. Childs, but as for me, I wouldn't trade one American POW for the entire "suburb of Thai Nguyen" and everyone in it. And, why does Mr. Childs love the North Vietnamese so? Where was he when they fired 80,000 rounds of artillery fire into the little town of An Loc? That was the time to use his words "razed" and "destroyed."

One word about President Nixon with whom I discussed this operation several times. He was well aware that he would be the object of "intense feeling" not only from "almost every chancellery in the West" but also from the media and most of the Congress, including members of his own party. That he directed the execution of the operation knowing full well the criticism in store for him is a tribute to his courage. You can be sure that the self-righteous groups that criticize him for this operation do not include the tortured POWs and their grateful families and friends.

After reading such articles as written by Mr. Childs, I can only conclude that he and his fellow oracles do not have the solution—they are part of the problem!

T. H. Moorer,
Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.).

The writer was chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1970-1974.

The New Leader
May 12, 1975

Thinking Aloud

THE NEED FOR AMERICAN SELF-CONFIDENCE

BY CARL LANDAUER

TODAY THE overwhelming majority of Americans is convinced that the United States should never have sent troops into Indochina. So far, so good. Like many others, I was from the outset opposed to the venture. But if we are to learn from the difficult experience, it is necessary now to determine how and in what sense the war was wrong.

A fight to achieve total victory in Southeast Asia was beyond our power from the very beginning; it would have required so large a commitment as to leave our more vital domestic and foreign interests unattended. This we should have foreseen. War, moreover, has its own logic, and since Vietnam strained our patience, making us feel cornered, we pursued cruel expedients; we came close to the paradox of trying to protect a country by destroying it. This, too, we should have foreseen.

Why did we get involved in the first place? Not for economic reasons; there was no American investment to speak of in Vietnam, and future economic opportunities seemed remote and doubtful. We intervened because we regarded North Vietnam and its followers in the South as a spearhead for World Communism, and we believed such aggression could not be allowed to succeed anywhere beyond the Iron Curtain lest a fatal precedent be set and countries everywhere start to fall. In other words, we felt obliged to play the role of universal policeman against Communism.

At present, ridicule and contempt are being heaped upon that thinking; it is widely regarded as a sign of arrogance that has finally met with its nemesis. Yet would the world not be a better place if one nation had power enough to be the global guardian of peace, assuming it had a concept of government and international relations more conducive to liberty and happiness than competing concepts? Only a minority outside the Communist nations would say that the pluralist notion of political relations America feels committed to is not vastly superior to its Communist rival from a humanitarian point of view. Nor can it be validly argued that the United States is unfit to be a protector of liberty and tranquility because it is no paragon of virtue: Moral purity is not an indispensable qualification for preserving peace either on the domestic or on the international scene. The Roman peace was a boon for the peoples of antiquity although much in the Empire was evil.

A good case can of course be made for the proposition that a group of countries, instead of one, can best fill the role of guardian. This was the original inspiration behind the United Nations. But in reality no trustworthy collectivity now exists in the world, and there was none at the time America intervened in Indochina. The UN General Assembly has clearly been unwilling to censure even the most palpable acts of aggression when these have served what the majority of member states regards as the struggle against imperialism, and the Security Council more often than not has been paralyzed by the veto. An optimist might imagine détente advancing sufficiently to permit the United States and the Soviet Union to keep the peace together. At the moment, though, such an arrangement is not possible, and in the 1950s, as the initial decisions on Vietnam were being made, its impossibility was, if anything, greater still.

CONSEQUENTLY, when the U.S. sought to become a universal policeman, it tried to do something no other nation or collectivity could do, and something that would definitely have made for a better world. The tragedy of Vietnam was due to an error in judgment, not a fundamental moral defect. Condemnation of U.S. efforts there was deserved only because, in any political effort, one has an obligation to measure the means required for the end and to estimate what might be thought necessary, should it turn out that one has overrated one's strength. This the United States failed to do.

Yet, to repeat, American aims in Southeast Asia were eminently worthwhile and went beyond mere national interest. Therefore, to reprove the U.S. for its "arrogance of power," as many have done, is to raise an objection based on a half-truth. Nations, political groupings or individuals pursuing a laudable objective rarely remain free from excessive pride, from undue pleasure in a virtuous endeavor; that a policy maker succumbs to the temptations of hubris does not detract from the value of his goal.

Nor is that goal negated by the need to work with those who are essentially unsympathetic to it. The United States has often been blamed for allying itself with reactionaries. Indeed, it is indisputable that Washington has frequently accepted anti-Communism as the

CARL LANDAUER *is an Emeritus Professor of Economics at the Berkeley campus of the University of California.*

only credential necessary for its support—without considering a government's moral qualities or carefully examining what contribution the regime might make to the strengthening of the American cause. In this way we have acquired "friends" whose methods were neither more democratic nor more humanitarian than those of our Communist adversaries.

In addition, we have burdened ourselves with false rhetoric: Speaking of the late Chiang Kai-shek's one-party state as "Free China," or describing our backing of the Kys and Thieus in Saigon as an effort to establish freedom for the people of Indochina simply did not square with the facts. And we probably could have done more than we did to impress governments dependent upon us that we would not tolerate medieval abuses like South Vietnam's "tiger cages."

Still, critics of American policy have often underrated the limitations objective circumstances impose on the selection of allies. If a country controls straits, ports or other vital locations, or possesses raw materials we would need in the event of a conflict with the Soviet Union or China, we have to seek its friendship irrespective of its internal policies. Even if a nation has no strategic significance, and from a democratic standpoint is no better than the Soviet Union and its satellites, the fact that it is not part of a hostile world-wide bloc could make its existence important for the United States. A lover of liberty in the '50s or '60s may have found little to choose between Saigon and Hanoi, yet North Vietnam's allegiance to an utterly repressive global philosophy rendered its expansion much more undesirable than a continuation of South Vietnam's home-grown despotism. (That one cannot always choose one's allies, I should also point out, was demonstrated on the grandest scale during World War II: The only justification—but a sufficient one—for fighting on the side of Stalin was the recognition that Hitler represented the larger immediate threat to democracy.)

The age of the Cold War fostered smugness and self-glorification in the U.S. Now that Communism has broken through some of the dikes built in those years, thanks to the strain on American resources and various unwise policies, there is an opposite tendency toward self-condemnation without limit. But a nation, like an individual, with great tasks to fulfill, needs self-respect more than anything else. Surely, we must not close our eyes to the mistakes we have committed, but we must not let our acknowledgment of these things crush our sense of self-reliance. Although Martin Luther's advice, *"pecca fortiter,"* sin with strength, may be open to a great deal of misinterpretation, it expresses the truth that one cannot live without sinning and that the most valuable and necessary achievements would not be possible if people permitted themselves to be paralyzed by the consciousness of sin.

The recognition of the wrongness of our Vietnam policy has spread far beyond the circle of people who opposed it from the outset. In fact, those who cannot forgive themselves for once having approved the intervention seem particularly susceptible to crippling guilt feelings. Now they tend to join those who have long opposed every exercise of American power in international affairs.

These guilt feelings also account for one kind of opposition to the "baby lift" out of Vietnam. No doubt quite a few problems will arise in assimilating Vietnamese children into American life. But it is against common sense to argue that these orphans would have a better chance for happiness in a war-ravaged Vietnam (whose internal peace after a Communist takeover is by no means assured) than in the United States. To accuse the U.S. of wrongfully depriving Vietnam of some of its children—when Southeast Asia, despite its high infant mortality rate, is threatened with overpopulation—does not make any more sense. These arguments, it would appear, are rationalizations of an emotional disapproval of all U.S. activity in the international sphere.

To be sure, the baby lift is "tokenism." But there is nothing wrong with the token of a humanitarian spirit if no more can be done. It is to a large extent a "guilt trip," too. But again, there is nothing wrong with this. Doing a little good to reduce our guilt, even by a trifle, is a perfectly honorable undertaking.

A CONNECTION exists, it seems to me, between the fanaticism of the present self-accusation and the failure to develop a realistic attitude toward the Soviet Union and Communism. Many Americans lack a clear understanding of the task their country must fulfill in the world, and have difficulty recognizing shifts in the international situation smaller than total upheavals. The leopard is supposed to either change his spots or remain exactly the same as before. Very often, however, spots simply lose some of their color. In real terms, this means we can perhaps do a little more business with the other side than in the past, but we still have to be on our guard.

The Soviet Union is not now posed for an attack on the United States or its allies; it is not even trying to eliminate America's global prestige and power, because it both hopes to profit from our economic strength and needs us as a counterweight to China. To ignore the possibilities a relatively relaxed atmosphere opens up would be a great mistake; on the other hand, to assume that the potential for conflict has entirely disappeared, that we are no longer confronted by a serious rival, would be at least as great an error. We must continue to expect the USSR to take advantage of opportunities where it finds them. The Mideast is one example. There is also reason to believe—despite the absence of conclusive evidence—that Moscow has given free rein to the Portuguese Communists because Communist influence in Portugal would weaken NATO without offering the United States an occasion for effective counteraction.

In the light of all this, to play the role we must play, an adequate military is clearly a necessity—though whether we need the nuclear overkill capacity we have or whether our conventional armaments and those of our allies are sufficient are questions I do not have the expertise to answer. I do know that even the best equipment would not allow us to function as we must in the world if we lack confidence in ourselves. We should recognize our mistakes in Vietnam. We should not try to minimize their consequences. Yet we should realize as well that, in the main, our errors originated not in arrogance or in a lust for power, but in striving for an unattainable goal that, could it have

been attained, would have benefited everybody.

A similar judgment holds true for the Cold War in general: Our mistakes have resulted from knowing that we stood for human liberty while losing sight of the limitations objective conditions imposed on us. Remembering this is critical at the present time. It will help us to assess our recent unfortunate experiences and to realistically plot our future course. It will help us to overcome the danger of moral despair.

NEW YORK TIMES
9 May 1975

The 'Vietnam Disaster' and U.S. Security

By Maxwell D. Taylor

WASHINGTON—In our attempts to appraise the significance of the Vietnam disaster, we must reflect on its bearing on our national security. If we mean the protection of our most important national valuables wherever found against dangers from whatever sources, it is obvious that in the collapse of our Vietnam policy we have suffered loss of protective power in many forms.

As the world watched on television screens the masses of South Vietnamese fleeing before the victorious Communist forces, the message conveyed was a simple one: "See what is happening to the South Vietnamese abandoned by their American friends." No elaborate explanations of past American sacrifices or of South Vietnamese shortcomings can change that visual impression; it is now a part of history. It will remain vivid until replaced in time by a new concept of American character based upon more-recent conduct.

One is obliged to assume that an immediate consequence of this tragedy will be widespread loss of confidence in our reliability, particularly among allies nearest the scene.

Already Thailand and the Philippines are displaying intentions of disengaging from American ties. The attitude of Japan will be far more important. There the Government may decide to assume full responsibility for national defense, to the exclusion of an American role, even to the point of seeking its own nuclear weapons. It might also perceive profit in developing its own détente with the Soviet Union, which has raw materials to offer Japanese industry and, as further bait, the former Japanese-owned Kurile Islands taken at the end of World War II.

The internal weaknesses revealed in our behavior toward Vietnam particularly since the 1973 cease-fire will have an even broader impact on our standing in the international community.

A conspicuous development of the period has been the continuing conflict between the President and Congress over the control of foreign policy and the conduct of military operations. One outcome has been the war powers resolution of 1973, which though ambiguous in some respects is sufficiently clear to eliminate much possibility of a quick Presidential response to a violation of existing treaties such as that with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or to a violent Treaty of the peace such as the invasion of South Korea in 1950. For the moment at least, crisis management seems to have passed to the leaderless, unpredictable Congress that has played such a dominant part in the last days of American policy in South Vietnam. In its defense, however, Congressmen may have represented fairly accurately the mood of a large segment of their constituents.

It seems likely that the evidence of shackled leadership and impaired national will perceived abroad may invite probes of American strength in places as widely separated as Korea and the Middle East.

Troublemakers, particularly practiced Muscovite fishermen at home in troubled waters, may be expected to sound the depths of American debility while anxious friends and allies, Israel in particular, await the outcome. With the decline in American prestige, our diplomats will work at a disadvantage attempting to improve matters, and the big stick represented by the armed forces under present circumstances can hardly add credible authority to their voice. A perceptible national will to use military power when necessary is an indispensable element of its deterrent effectiveness.

For the foregoing reasons, I am obliged to conclude that the Vietnam finale, by impairing our reputation for reliability, weakening our alliances, and exposing our internal weaknesses to friend and foe has been highly detrimental to the many forms of national power that contribute to our national security—power derived from unity, self-confidence, allies, reputation, and military strength.

Fortunately, many of the basic causes of our predicament are within ourselves and hence subject to self-correction. We can diminish factional strife by uniting in a common effort to resolve problems of general concern such as inflation, recession, unemployment and inadequate government. We can renounce the national pastime of hounding scapegoats of whom the current favorites include President Ford, Secretary of State Kissinger, Congress, the news media and the unfortunate people of South Vietnam.

It would also help to restore respectability to a few old-time virtues like a sense of duty, tolerance for differing point of view, gratitude for American citizenship, and willingness to perform public service. In such an atmosphere, the Presidency and Congress might return to a collaboration of effort without which our vaunted system of checks and balances becomes one of governmental futility and eventual stalemate.

Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor (Ret.) served as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Ambassador to South Vietnam.

WASHINGTON POST
11 May 1975

A Nation Reunited With Its History

By Frances FitzGerald

The writer, whose book, "Fire in the Lake," was published in 1972, visited Hanoi early this year.

IT ENDED so abruptly. The Saigon government with its million men under arms, the Americans with their computers, their intelligence networks and their billion-dollar and programs disappeared from Vietnam as if they had been ripped like the words on the plastic of child's magic slate. The war stopped; there was silence in the airports; new flags flew in the streets. A day later Ambassador Graham Martin was discovered, haggard, eating an apple on a ship somewhere in the South China Sea.

The war ended so quickly that the history of Vietnam seemed flung off its tracks into the unpredictable. It was not, of course. It is just that Vietnamese rhythms are different. For in many ways the war was all continuity and repetition, and the end of it—this particular end—was for 20 or 30 years as inevitable as the fall of

Valhalla in Wagner's "Ring."

True, the war has changed a great deal in South Vietnam. The Vietnamese have lost a generation of young men; their farmland has been plowed by bombs, their forests stripped to a permanent, chemical winter, their population uprooted and spilled from the countryside into the cities and towns. The vast majority of adult men have served the Saigon government and/or worked for the Americans. Villages are divided, and there is hardly a family on one side or the other without blood on its hands. And yet in many ways the war has changed nothing; it has merely delayed what was to come. Many of the new questions are the old ones held in abeyance, and their resolution will be the same as it would have been in 1965, in 1954 or even in 1945 had there been no foreign intervention in Vietnam.

The continuity lies in the continued existence of the revolutionary movement in the South. American officials have always maintained that the Vietcong was nothing but an arm of Hanoi; the North Vietnamese have said that there is only one Vietnam, and the Liberation Front in the South was but the other half of a national revolutionary movement. The perspectives are different, but the two claims are not wholly contradictory, for the facts behind both of them are the same.

Before the regular American troops came into the war in 1965, the southern guerrillas had on their own all but defeated the American-backed Saigon regime. The American divisions decimated the guerrillas by destroying the very society from which they came and brought the northern troops into the war.

Still, since 1971 the Liberation Front has shown a regenerative capacity equal to that of the earthworm. By 1973, when the Paris peace accord was signed, it was governing large areas of the countryside in much the same way as it had in the early '60s, and, as became clear to reporters at that time, many of the people in Saigon-controlled zones still belonged to the alternate society, the alternate culture that it had created alongside that of the government. Its program, much of it written into the political articles of the Paris peace accord, was very little changed from the manifesto it had written at the time of its foundation in 1960. It is this program and this alternate society that will shape the future of the South.

No Sign of "Bloodbath"

FOR YEARS American officials have predicted that the Communists, if they won, would massacre millions of people in cold blood. But the prediction was never founded in reality.

In the first place, the Liberation Front was a revolutionary movement—that is, inclusive rather than exclusive. Its goal was not the conquest of one part of society—as in a civil war—but the enfolding of all Vietnamese within its own structure. In the second place its armed forces were extraordinarily disciplined—their behavior in Hue in 1968 may be the exception that proves the rule—and their guerrillas economical in their use of violence for political ends.

Having achieved victory, the revolutionaries may try and execute, or simply kill, a number of former officials and former American agents; in certain areas there may be considerable public pressure on them to do just that. But it is extremely unlikely that they will conduct a large-scale bloodbath. Their stated policy is that of reconciliation, and their actions over the past month have indicated that they were sincere in proclaiming it.

According to the many foreign observers who watched the transition in Danang and Saigon, the Provisional Revolutionary Government and North Vietnamese troops behaved impeccably, restoring both cities to order a day or two after they invested them. A week after the terrible panic in the Danang airport, when the ARVN troops mobbed the last departing planes, the city was functioning normally: churches were open, children were back in school and the markets were busy. In Saigon and in Danang former municipal officials and traffic police signed up for jobs with the new government.

Three weeks after the ARVN surrender, Europeans in Danang said that the new regime had demoted some people—the principal of one high school, for instance, had ended up as a school teacher—but that there had been no reprisals that they knew about. One French reporter had the odd experience of talking with the former police chief of Hoian City (the capital of Quangnam province) and hearing him confess to having tortured political prisoners "but only a bit"; mysteriously, the man was sitting in his old office, talking conversationally.

Forming a Government

THE LEADERSHIP of the revolutionary government has not yet surfaced except as a series of military and administrative committees. What will probably emerge in the next week or so is a coalition composed partly of the old leadership of the NLF and the PRG, partly of members of the old Front alliance groups and partly of Third Force representatives, including, perhaps, Gen. Duong Van Minh.

The Communists will undoubtedly take the leading role in the new government, but the non-Communists will not be there for display purposes alone. The National Liberation Front was always a coalition in that it always had non-Communist individuals and groups surrounding its Marxist core. In times of difficulty, of military setback, these groups tended to fall away, but in times of success the Front would widen out. The party always gave political direction, but it would, to its political advantage, take the desires of other groups into account.

Now, after its rapid military victory, the party is once again reaching out. Its task is, of course, much larger and more complicated than it has ever been before, for it is suddenly faced with millions of city people who have not seen its cadre in years. It must first reassure these people and then attempt to gain their support for the difficult times that lie ahead. The problem is not really an ideological one—there has never really been a competing ideology, and therein lies the failure of all the American-supported regimes. It is rather one of persons: who in the politically atomized society of the South will be seen as legitimate or representative?

When it appears, the new government will, no doubt, schedule an election, such as envisioned in the Paris peace accord, and there will be, eventually, a national assembly that will include representatives of all religious groups, and economic "strata" and recognized political parties. Much more important, however, the new authorities will begin to organize in the traditional manner of the Front, forming labor unions, farmers' assocations, women's groups, student groups and so on. These groups will receive political training and in choosing their own leaders create a new infrastructure of government. The political reunification of North and South Vietnam will undoubtedly wait upon the completion of this task, for it is difficult to imagine that the Vietnamese would combine a highly organized part of the country with a highly disorganized one.

Economic Problems

THE EFFORT at organization will proceed in tandem with an attempt to solve some of the enormous economic problems of South Vietnam. The most pressing of those is simply how to feed and employ the millions of soldiers and city people who for the past 10 years have lived directly or indirectly on American aid.

There will be food shortages over the next few months; in central Vietnam, where shortages have existed for the past year or so, the situation could become critical. Already the new authorities in Danang have instituted a rationing system for rice and urged refugees who have come into the city over the past 10 years to return to their villages — or the places where their villages were.

Undoubtedly many people will go back to the countryside, and gladly. But not everyone can, or will want to, go back and the country cannot return to the *status quo ante*.

For one thing, the population has grown; for another, much of the now-fallow agricultural land is so cratered, hardened over and filled with unexploded ordnance as to be untillable without major reconstruction work. Last year South Vietnam grew almost enough rice to feed its population, but it did so only with the help of large American aid subsidies for chemical fertilizer, agricultural machinery and

gasoline. South Vietnamese agriculture is potentially valuable, but it will require a good deal of capital investment, and the country has at the moment no industry to speak of and no capital—its assets in the United States, reportedly including its gold reserves, have been frozen.

North Vietnam, the Soviet Union and China will undoubtedly contribute to the reconstruction of South Vietnam—two Soviet supply ships have already landed at Danang—but the new government is clearly hoping for aid and investment from other sources. Officials in Danang and Paris have restated their policy of nonalignment—a policy that goes back to the original NLF program of 1960. They have also said that until reunification South Vietnam will conduct its economic and foreign affairs independently of North Vietnam.

Already they have asked for membership in the United Nations and called for humanitarian assistance from any source, including the United States. They have declared willingness to enter into economic relations with capitalist countries and corporations. Specifically, they have said that they would like the Western companies that were doing offshore oil exploration and drilling to continue with their work. As yet there has been no talk of cooperativizing agricultural land, and, according to Liberation Radio, "commercial and industrial enterprises serving national economic life and the normalization of living will be guaranteed their property and assets and may carry on operations."

Whether or not Western countries and Japan respond to this policy and invest in South Vietnam will surely make a good deal of difference to the future domestic and external policies of the southern government. In the first place the harder economic recovery is, the harsher the measures the regime will have to take—and any downward change in living standards will be felt most acutely by those who sided with the United States and the Thieu regime. In the second place the closer the ties the new regime develops with the West and Japan, the greater will be the incentive for it—and for the North—to place itself on the margins of the Soviet and Chinese economic systems and in the context of the Third World and a neutral Southeast Asia.

The new regime will not close itself off from the outside world, but Saigon will no longer be the cosmopolitan city of the French and the Americans. From the perspective of the revolutionaries, recovery from the war consists largely in shucking off American influence from the society.

What this influence means to them is not just the inequalities of wealth (capitalism is not really an issue since so few capitalist enterprises actually exist) but a whole series of habits and attitudes: a psychology and a culture. As the revolutionaries see it, the corruption of the old regime, the drug-taking, the mini-skirts and the prostitution were but the outward signs of a profound deracination. As they see it, it was long dependency on Americans that made the Saigonese so negative, so passive, so egotistical.

Radical egalitarians, the revolutionaries are at the same time cultural conservatives who support the values of the country people against those of the city, authoritarianism over libertarianism. And unlike many Communist elites, they are perfectly consistent in their defense of the community against the individual. As their leadership is collective and their poverty collective, so they see "individualism" as a kind of anarchy—an alienation of the individual. Consistently they have closed the newspapers and the nightclubs at the same time. They believe—they really believe—that the society will be positivist and unanimous as soon as American influence is gone. This faith in moral rehabilitation is useful in that it admits of no permanent enemies: all Vietnamese can be taken back into the fold. And the faith may not be entirely misplaced. Certainly the new anti-Americanism of Saigon will do a great deal to bring the society back together again.

Ho Chi Minh's picture now hangs in the streets of Saigon. His is the only picture there, and the only one in the streets of Hanoi. For northern and southern revolutionaries alike, this picture is the symbol not of northern dominance but of a national struggle for independence and reunification. Already North Vietnam has announced that it will build roads between North and South and hotels in Hanoi so that the southerners can come to visit. There will, officials say, be a "complex period" of economic, political and psychological adjustment that may last three years or five years, or more; it is not certain. But in the end this country will be reunified and the dream of Ho Chi Minh fulfilled.

The "Hidden Dramas"

FOR THOSE who have been faithful to that dream it is even now as if the years of the war did not exist—as if they were nothing but frozen time. A French journalist wrote recently from Hanoi:

"Many of my old friends, old southern cadre, regrouped to the North after Geneva [the Geneva Conference of 1954], come to me these days with tears in their eyes saying, 'My village is liberated . . . my region is liberated . . .' And then you discover incredible, hidden dramas. One man I have been friendly with for a long time, and who knows how to laugh, told me that his wife lived in Hue: she had been obliged to remain there as the mistress of an old French planter, and he had had no news of her in 40 years. Many people come and tell me, joyously, 'I am going to see my father again.' It is odd to hear that from a man of 50, and so you ask how long it has been, and they say, 'Thirty years.' . . . It is true that the Vietnamese live less in the context of space than of time. They seem to have put their entire lives between parentheses waiting for this one day, and the day has arrived. You see people of 70—you don't dare call them 'old'—impatiently making plans to visit the places of their childhood. But today in Hanoi everyone is 20 years old."

I saw the same kind of dramas in the villages of the South in the moment of false hope just after the Paris peace accord was signed. There was a woman who had waited 20 years to marry her fiance and a man who after 12 years in prison had returned—a cripple—to his job of political organizing in his village. For many Vietnamese the end of the war is a liberation not just of their country but of their history.

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Monday, May 5, 1975

What Follows Vietnam?

By ARTHUR SCHLESINGER JR.

A miserable war has come to a miserable conclusion. Now we must consider what the Indochina episode has done to the position of the United States in the world.

The Ford administration argues, or at least began by arguing, that the downfall of the Saigon government is a grave and fateful defeat for the United States, and that our failure to go the last mile with General Thieu is proof that no ally should trust us in the future. Even though the administration, in its zigzags of the last fortnight, has somewhat backed away from these arresting propositions, they will be heard again, especially (as Vice President Rockefeller has candidly said) during the 1976 campaign. They are entitled to discussion on their merits. But what is initially peculiar is the masochistic relish with which our government for a couple of crucial weeks demanded that the rest of the world look on the United States as a feeble, undependable and perfidious nation.

Thus the President of the United States felt it urgent to proclaim to the planet that the "present tragic situation in South Vietnam would not have occurred" had the United States only carried out "its commitment" to Saigon. The Secretary of State of the United States talked of the deliberate destruction of an ally and wondered whether any foreign state could believe in America again. The Secretary of Defense of the United States condemned our aid to South Vietnam as "niggardly." What a band of patriots! When has any government ever conducted such a strange campaign against its own country? One does not recall Khrushchev, for example, after he took his missiles out of Cuba, explaining to the world that he had betrayed his commitments and deserted an ally; nor de Gaulle when he gave up in Algeria.

Of course, if these things were true, a strong case could be made for saying them. But have we, for example, really proved to the rest of the world that no ally can hereafter trust the United States? If 50,000 American dead, $150 billion, inflation and recession in the domestic economy were not enough in President Ford's eyes to prove our fidelity to alleged commitments to Saigon, one can only conclude that he feels—or felt when he spoke in this vein—that we were committed to guaran-

tee the Saigon regime in perpetuity.

A Prodigious Fantasy?

It is hard to believe that our President was "absolutely convinced," as he claimed to the American Society of Newspaper Editors on April 16, that, if Congress only voted $722 million more in military aid, "the South Vietnamese could stabilize the military situation." His protege General Thieu certainly did not believe that. "I have told the Americans," he had said 12 days earlier, "that we need at least $1.5 billion *per year* to defend the entire territory of South Vietnam." President Ford's contention that further military aid to Thieu's army in 1975 could accomplish what half a million American troops on the ground had failed to accomplish in 1968 is surely one of the more prodigious fantasies of the decade. A wiser President might have noted the extraordinary things the United States has done over the last dozen years to preserve South Vietnam from communism and have concluded that, as President Kennedy said in 1963, "In the final analysis, it is *their* war. They are the ones who have to win it or lose it."

Nor is it any more probable that this need be taken as a fateful American defeat —unless, of course, our leaders succeed in convincing the rest of the world that this is the case. Most of the world had long since come to regard our intervention in Vietnam as senseless and mistaken. Does the Ford administration seriously believe that other countries would have respected us more if we had persisted in a foolish and futile policy? The decision to withdraw from an exposed and vulnerable position and to establish ourselves on a defensible line is rather more likely to increase than to reduce the confidence of other governments in our leadership. I do not know anyone who has argued that the Soviet Union destroyed its influence and credibility by pulling its missiles out of Cuba, or France by leaving Algeria.

Fortunately, despite the administration's clamor, most countries will note that our fundamental sources of power, as Henry Brandon of the London Sunday Times recently put it, remain intact. One doubts whether in the long run other states will be unduly impressed by President Ford's bizarre exercise in national masochism. Life will go on, even without President Thieu. I remember President Kennedy saying during the Bay of Pigs, "What is prestige? Is it the shadow of power or the substance of power?" He had no doubt that it was the substance of power. The American failure to attain unattainable ends in Indochina will not greatly affect the substance of power. This is surely the point the President, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense should have been making during the last fortnight instead of insisting to the world that America was an unreliable friend on the road back to isolationism.

Board of Contributors

Withdrawal from Vietnam, among other things, will permit us at last to concentrate our concern on really essential allies and interests.

This isolationist theory is not only gratuitously damaging to our world position; it is quite false. The idea that, if we decline to go the last mile in Vietnam, we have turned isolationist is ridiculous. The choice is not between fighting everywhere and fighting nowhere. The choice is between a policy of globalism, according to which our interests are omnipresent everywhere on the planet, and a policy of responsible internationalism founded on a realistic view of the national interest. This choice expresses what has been the latent division in the internationalist camp since Pearl Harbor—the division, in essence, between the messianists and the realists.

Vietnam brought that division into the open. Our great champions of realism in foreign affairs—Walter Lippmann, Hans Morgenthau, George Kennan, Reinhold Niebuhr—were entirely consistent in favoring American participation in the Second World War and in opposing the Americanization of the war in Vietnam. In the first case, American vital interests were clearly involved. German victory would have produced a direct threat to the security of the United States. In the second case, American vital interests were clearly not involved. North Vietnamese victory will not produce a direct threat to the security of the United States.

The argument that it would was founded in assumptions derived from another age—from the age of Stalin, when communism was a relatively unitary and coordinated international movement serving as an arm of the Soviet Union. But nationalism has long since undermined the old Stalinist empire. The victory of Hanoi, as we now belatedly understand, will not mean an automatic extension of Soviet power—or, for that matter, of Chinese power. It will simply mean the enlargement of a national Communist state which will continue to respond to national motives and may even want American support to reduce its dependence on Moscow and Peking. The result will unquestionably be tough for the people of South Vietnam. But it is beyond our power to do for the people of South Vietnam what they do not seem inclined to do for themselves. No country can dedicate itself to world salvation without destroying its own integrity and safety.

George Washington long ago called it "a maxim founded on the universal experience of mankind, that no nation is to be trusted farther than it is bound by its interest." Any nation that acts beyond its interest is likely to become a bull elephant in the world, incalculable, destructive, leaving ruin in its path. Any government that makes "commitments" beyond the national interest is a menace not only to the world but to its own citizens.

The Present Danger

The great danger now—a real danger considering the highly emotional state of our leaders—is that we will try to throw our weight around somewhere else on the theory that this will show we have not been intimidated by defeat in Vietnam. Again, the shadow of power; not the substance of power. For our real power remains unaltered. We have just as many nuclear weapons, just as strong an army, navy and air force, just as strong (or weak) a national economy. Withdrawal from Vietnam, among other things, will permit us at last to concentrate our concern on really essential allies and interests. A wise national leadership would tell the world that the legacy of Indochina is, not the defeat of the United States and the loss of American credibility, but the rejection of a hopeless policy of indiscriminate, illegitimate and sentimental world-saving and the return to earlier ideas of realistic and responsible internationalism.

This would mean a reexamination of the whole process of commitment and a repudiation of the Ford administration's recent argument that a President can secretly make "moral" commitments that supersede the legal commitments required by the American Constitution. It would mean, I trust, relentless skepticism about any thought on foreign policy emanating from the Pentagon. Richard J. Levine's devastating piece in this newspaper on April 23 began, "Rarely has a Defense Secretary been so probably and consistently wrong as James Schlesinger was in his public statements about the Vietnam war last month." The piece was especially disheartening because the military in 1975 repeated every military misjudgment with which the American people have been drearily familiar since 1961 and before. How many times do we have to be taught this particular lesson?

American foreign policy after Vietnam will not become mindlessly isolationist. It will, however, begin to bear a clear and demonstrable relationship to the primary interests of the United States. Secondary interests certainly exist, but secondary interests call for secondary, not primary, involvement. The Indochina folly, one trusts, will banish forever the dreams of glory, the illusions of American omniscience and omnipotence, the fantasies of universal responsibility and universal control, that have led to such shameful and atrocious results. If we had national leadership with a sense of history, we would now be rejoicing that, having finally freed ourselves from an unnecessary and disastrous obsession, we can start to play a role in the world consistent with our character as a people and our dignity as a democratic republic.

Mr. Schlesinger is Albert Schweitzer Professor of the Humanities at the City University of New York and winner of Pulitzer prizes in history and biography. He is also a member of the Journal's Board of Contributors, five distinguished professors who contribute periodic articles reflecting a broad range of views.

WASHINGTON STAR
5 May 1975

ERNEST B. FURGURSON

Another War Casualty: American Generosity

The saddest casualty will be our idealism.

However serious the military and political consequences of the fall of Vietnam, they are minor beside the prospect that we now will spend years accusing each other of being the villains responsible. All the strategic implications will not matter much, relatively, if we react with such cynicism that we replace our once unlimited generosity with personal and national selfishness.

When the last image of the U.S. presence is of troops battering the fingers of Vietnamese trying to climb the embassy wall to escape, it is hard for many to remember that there ever was any simple goodwill involved in our being there. There was, and even now I cannot believe it was all wasted.

I think of two civilians I met in my first days there, who in their different ways symbolized our whole long effort. One was George Gibbs, a high school principal from suburban Virginia. He was in Saigon to try to teach educational administration to a Buddhist monks' school out the Vung Tau road.

With him I entered the teachers' room there, partitioned off with tin sheeting stamped with American beer labels. He clasped his hands in front of his broad chest and bowed solemnly to the ascetic little man before us. We chatted circuitously as the tin walls vibrated to the drumming of bombs falling in the jungle. We had some perfumed tea, and as we sat I understood the earnestness of this big American, once an all-American guard at William and Mary. Then as we drove away, I also realized that the monk would go right on smiling, bowing, offering tea and administering his school as he had before.

The other civilian was Peter Hunting. He came to Vietnam in 1963 with the International Voluntary Service, a kind of religiously motivated Peace Corps that paid him about $8 a month. He worked closely and alone with teachers and officials in a hamlet near Cam Ranh Bay.

He told how one day earlier the Viet Cong came in, shot the teacher's wife in the legs, killed the hamlet chief and condemned the school as an American imperialist tool. And he told how after that he just kept on working, on the school, on a windmill pump, whatever needed doing. He said seriously, "I'll never forget the Ba Thap project because it was that hamlet that brought me the greatest single opportunity to serve."

When his two years were up, Hunting elected to stay. He was moved to the Delta, and one day in November 1965 he was driving alone toward Soc Trang when his car was ambushed. His body was found with 15 bullet holes in it. He was 24 when he died.

Yes, I know that while they tried their way, many more Americans were saying it with bombs, but most of those thought it was right and necessary. Men in uniform were being gentle, too. I remember the Special Forces squad that put on a puppet show to entice peasants to get cholera shots; the doctors and nurses at Pleiku, working to find a shot for the resistant falciparum malaria; the Marines who played Santa Claus at the leper colony; the senior adviser who organized an airlift of Christmas gifts from home.

Clumsy, almost all of it. Unsubtle. Old-fashioned, too reminiscent of World War II. But seriously well-meant, against the odds of success. The same can be said of what we set out to do there on the larger scale.

Now there is the chance that in bitterness we will abandon our idealism because it got us into such a painful experience. I hope not.

The first opportunity we have to show it remains is in the way we treat the Vietnamese who believed in us, and have now turned to America.

NEW YORK TIMES
6 May 1975

U.S. Trustworthiness

By Robert Kleiman

LONDON—The post-Vietnam questioning in Europe on whether American security assurances can still be trusted is scheduled to produce a ringing reaffirmation of confidence on May 29-30 at the NATO summit conference in Brussels. But that is unlikely to end the questioning.

A subtle but important change has occurred in the character of this unusual meeting of chiefs of government—only the third in the 26 years of the West's grand alliance—since it was proposed by British Foreign Secretary James Callaghan. The proposal first was made to Secretary Kissinger during his brief London stopover March 23 en route from his Mideast failure to a Washington divided over the impending defeat in Indochina.

British correspondents and diplomats in Washington were reporting rising pressure for the resignation of the Republican Secretary of State, whom Britain's socialist Foreign Secretary regarded as the main point of strength in the Ford Administration and the chief hope of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

"We must save Henry," Mr. Callaghan reportedly told his closest associates; he evidently also foresaw an American trauma dangerous to Western solidarity that might be eased if the European allies rallied around. But in the weeks that since have passed, the primary concern has shifted from Kissinger's fate to Europe's.

Most Europeans are less troubled by American disengagement from Indochina, which they favored years before most Americans, than by the way it was done.

The key NATO governments have noted that Congress for six months withheld all major replacement equipment and half or more of the fuel, ammunition, spare parts and maintenance aid needed by the South Vietnamese armed forces; triggering the retreat order that led to rout.

They see an isolationist trend in American opinion with only 39 per cent in a national Harris poll prepared to defend West Europe, 34 per cent Berlin and half that number such Asian areas as Taiwan and South Korea.

Finally, the impotence of the post-Watergate Administration in the face of these challenges has raised questions about the solidity of America's commitments everywhere.

"After the first betrayal of a lover, the second is much easier," said a former Belgian cabinet minister. "I've experienced that."

In separate London conversations, a Labor Cabinet minister and a leading member of the former Conservative Government said, "Europe is not Vietnam," adding that vital American interests were involved in West Europe. But within minutes each independently recalled the long, tortuous effort of Franklin D. Roosevelt to come to Europe's support in World War II and, had it not been for Pearl Harbor, the likelihood that American intervention would have been delayed much longer.

"Europe is not Vietnam." One hears the same supposedly reassuring phrase in Paris, Brussels, Bonn. Unlike the Nixon-Thieu letters, the NATO alliance is based on a binding treaty, ratified by Congress, open and above board. Right? Wrong. On American insistence, the treaty binds no one to anything. It obligates each of its 15 members in the event of an attack only to take "such action as it deems necessary" through its "constitutional processes." That means Congress will decide.

NATO theology has it that West Europe's security is assured by the presence of American troops, which would trigger American tactical and strategic nuclear forces if threatened with defeat. But Congressional visitors in recent weeks have told Europeans they strongly favor American troop reductions.

As for American strategic forces, not since John F. Kennedy in 1963 has an American President said to Europeans, "The United States will risk its cities to defend your freedom." After many years of denials, official American doctrine now acknowledges the declining credibility of the nuclear guarantee in an era of strategic parity. Vietnam has carried that decline further.

There is renewed talk in Brussels,

Paris and Bonn of a European defense community, presumably including a European nuclear force based on the French and British deterrents. Some of President Giscard d'Estaing's advisers want to start by putting France's new tactical nuclear weapons at the disposal of West German forces under a system of joint control.

Neutralism looks more attractive to others. The left wing of West Germany's Socialist party argues for withdrawal of American troops as untrustworthy and no longer needed anyway because of détente. Neutralist tendencies are growing in Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece and Turkey.

Just as Thailand and the Philippines are moving toward neutralism and South Korea is attempting to acquire nuclear know-how, Vietnam has given many West Europeans the feeling that they must move toward the neutralization or nuclearization of Europe—or both. It's a trend that, after Vietnam, will not be halted by lip-service at a NATO summit meeting to the steadiness of the American commitment and Europe's confidence in it.

Robert Kleiman is a member of the Editorial Board of The Times.

WASHINGTON STAR
12 May 1975

148 S. Koreans Left Behind in Evacuation Rush

The following dispatch was written by UPI's Saigon bureau manager on Friday. It was delayed in transmission and arrived in Hong Kong yesterday.

By Alan Dawson
United Press International

SAIGON — U.S. officials abandoned 148 South Koreans, including 10 diplomats, in Saigon during the U.S. evacuation even though the Koreans were in the American Embassy compound, the Koreans say.

"We were told to line up in the embassy compound and we did," said one of those left behind.

"But when the last helicopter came into the compound it just settled down and then lifted off and it did not carry out anyone."

Prior to the hasty and disorganized evacuation April 28 and 29 all foreigners — and especially diplomatic staffs — were assured by the U.S. Embassy they would be able to get aboard the evacuation helicoters.

EMBASSY officials told newsmen in a briefing two weeks before the actual evacuation that up to 10,000 persons could be taken out in the final departure.

In fact, hundreds of persons, including several Americans, were left behind and virtually all Vietnamese working for U.S. government agencies still are here in Saigon.

Those abandoned by the evacuating Americans, including an official of the U.S. Agency for International Development, have been highly critical of the organization of the evacuation.

The Korean officials said they were told by U.S. officials to line up outside the embassy compound early in the afternoon of April 28.

The Korean Embassy charge d'affaires entered the compound and spoke briefly with a U.S. Marine officer who reportedly assured the diplomat all Koreans would be taken out.

LATE IN THE afternoon, with a growing crowd of Vietnamese trying to get out and panic threatening, the Koreans were allowed into the rear of the embassy compound and told to form an orderly line.

"So we did that," one Korean said. "And we waited and waited."

Helicopters came and went, carrying groups of 50 persons each and the Koreans were never called.

The last helicopter to land on the embassy grounds quickly took off again, presumably because by that time — dawn of April 29 — the Marines had abandoned the compound and barricaded themselves inside the embassy building.

Later reports indicated they were afraid of the crowds of Vietnamese trying to get out of the country, including large numbers of Vietnamese embassy employes.

So, the source said, the Koreans left the embassy and sought shelter and safety elsewhere.

NOW THEY ARE bitter, especially the diplomats, who said they feared for their lives in a Communist takeover because of the large Korean commitment to Vietnam during the American war here.

In fact they have been well treated by Viet Cong officials, as have all foreigners who were forced or chose to remain in Vietnam.

They now are free to walk the streets of Saigon, although few do. The Koreans mostly remain out of sight at the home of the former Korean ambassador, a Korean club and another embassy residence.

Like the other foreigners trapped here they wait day by day for word of a Red Cross flight to take them out.

The latest word from International Red Cross officials is that such a flight is at least 10 days away.

LOS ANGELES TIMES
11 May 1975

U.S. Reports About Red Reprisals Called False

WASHINGTON (UPI)—A private research group charged the Administration Saturday with deliberately circulating unsubstantiated and false reports of Communist reprisals against Vietnamese who once allied themselves with the United States or Saigon governments.

The church-sponsored group, the Indochina Resource Center, said the Administration's claims were based on State Department memos from Saigon which proved "unworthy of credibility."

There has been no hard evidence of widespread reprisals in Vietnam since the Communist takeover, it said.

The group charged that the U.S. Embassy in Saigon began collecting material last March and April to prove that the Communists were "conducting a bloodbath" in the northern provinces they had captured in South Vietnam.

"After sifting through its reports to eliminate all those that indicated a peaceful transition," it said, "the embassy then forwarded to Washington only the most extreme reports of killing or threatened killing of Saigon officials.

"The intention apparently was to paint a lurid picture of Communist reprisals that would, in the words of one embassy official, 'affect on-going deliberations about the aid program here.'"

It said President Ford adopted the reprisal theme when he said that the United States had evacuated about 120,000 Vietnamese from Saigon to keep them from being by the Communists.

"Nevertheless," the group said, "there is no evidence whatsoever to substantiate the design for wholesale slaughter that U.S. officials have always attributed to our adversaries in Vietnam."

Latin America

NEW YORK TIMES
12 May 1975

Chile Gives Free Rein to Secret Police

By JONATHAN KANDELL
Special to The New York Times

SANTIAGO, Chile, May 5—After 20 months in power Chile's military junta shows few signs of dismantling the vast apparatus of political repression created to "extirpate the Marxist cancer."

The military took over when the country was bitterly polarized between an anti-Marxist majority and a leftist minority, and rapidly drifting toward economic chaos and a possible civil war. But from its beginning the junta has chosen to treat the followers of the late President Salvador Allende Gossens as a vanquished enemy capable at any time of posing a strong terrorist threat.

According to Government estimates more than 41,000 people — one of every 250 Chileans—have been detained at least temporarily for political reasons.

Church sources who have concerned themselves with political prisoners believe that the figure is closer to 95,000, one of every 100. Both the Government and its domestic critics appear agreed that there are still 5,000 people in prison camps for political reasons.

While vast numbers of people passed through detention in the aftermath of the coup that toppled President Allende in 1973, the arrests and charges of torture have declined in recent months. Nonetheless, virtually all international human-rights organizations, including the United Nations and the Organization of American States, have reported systematic and gross violations after repeated visits to Chile.

Earlier this year, in an unprecedented move, the Western European nations that are among Chile's largest creditors refused to consider renegotiating payments on her foreign debt until progress had been achieved in human rights.

The junta and its supporters have attributed their still-deteriorating image to a concerted Marxist campaign that has infiltrated the highest international organizations and the mass media, unversities and governmental circles in Western countries.

Last week President Augusto Pinochet Ugarte unveiled a new series of rules to prevent "abuses of power that the Government has never approved." They call for the punishment of torturers and require that new detainees be released within five days or turned over to the courts. Intelligence services must inform a detainee's nearest relatives within 48 hours of his arrest.

The junta's domestic critics remain skeptical because scores are still arrested every week and allegations of torture continue to make their way into public records.

On March 19 Luis Guillermo Núñez, one of Chile's best-known painters, was invited to exhibit a series of his works at the French-Chilean Institute of Culture. About 500 people turned up at the opening exhibit of his abstracts, on such themes as social conventions, alienation and loss of freedom.

Despite the fact that the show was partly sponsored by the French Embassy, it was quickly closed by the secret police. The next day Mr. Núñez was arrested at home by secret policemen who, according to the neighbors, arrived in a small pickup truck. His relatives lodged an appeal for a writ of habeas corpus. But he has not been heard from.

Last month Juan Sepúlveda Arancibia, 47-year-old owner of an auto repair shop, was arrested with two of his sons by police detectives who were looking for a third son, Alejandro, allegedly a member of an extreme left-wing organization.

"A detective named Igor Allende comes every day to my home, said Mr. Sepúlveda's wife in a sworn statement to the Santiago Court of Appeals. "On Sunday he told me they were looking for my son Alejandro, who we have not heard from, and he warned us that we better turn him in because 'it is better to have one dead son instead of three.'"

The court records show that Mr. Sepúlveda was severely beaten and hung by his arms, and then "they began to apply electric current to the soles of his feet, behind his ears, in his mouth, on his wrists," and to other parts of his body.

The Sepúlvedas were released nine days after they had been detained.

The secret police apparatus has grown to such a degree that it has become a parallel government, in the view of human-rights lawyers and concerned clergymen. There are five intelligence services, with one or two of them rapidly gaining more power than the rest. A network of informers has expanded throughout the shantytowns, factories, schools and universities. Applicants to public agencies are often screened by the intelligence services.

The agents are able to ignore standards of conduct set by the Government for other officials and ordinary citizens. Occasionally, an intelligence official's eccentric reputation spreads beyond the confines of clandestine interrogation centers.

This is true of Comdr. Edgar Ceballos, a leader of air force intelligence, a burly man in his early forties who has reportedly often taken a personal hand in torture.

"With leftist military officers who were detained he was a beast and worked them over with an uncontrolled animal fury," said a man well-acquainted with several of the victims.

With civilian suspects, some of them left-wing extremists, he has mixed severe torture with personal courtesies, it is said. He has invited some to snacks at Nico's, a well-known pizzeria in an upper-class neighborhood. Sometimes he arranges rendezvous for prisoners with their woman friends in apartments rented by air force intelligence. After a vacation on Easter Island he brought back key chains as gifts for favorite prisoners.

Recently he has had a running battle with another agency, called National Intelligence Headquarters, which has emerged as the most powerful of the secret police services. Commander Ceballos has retained several political prisoners as part of his personal entourage in an effort to keep them from the organization, known as DINA.

Among his proteges is Robinson Pérez, a former head of the Socialist party's paramilitary group, formed shortly before the 1972 coup when suspicions were growing that the military were planning to overthrow Dr. Allende's Marxist regime. Commander Ceballos succeeded in obtaining for Mr. Peré a relatively light 15-year sentence, which he has been serving as a sort of personal secretary for the commander.

Another protege is Adolfo Puz, a Socialist who led a bazooka attack against a police bus during the coup. One of the few incidents of resistance, the attack killed more than a dozen policemen.

Mr. Puz has not yet been sentenced; Commander Ceballos convinced the military courts to try him on violation of the arms control law, a far lesser charge than he could have expected.

Last month air force security officers under Commander Ceballos secretly spirited Tomás Gonzalez Reese to sanctuary in the Papal Nuncio's diplomatic residence rather than turn him over to DINA. Mr. González was allegedly a member of an extreme left-wing group.

Civilians Hurt by Rivalry

The intelligence rivalry has occasionally enveloped civilians beyond suspicion of leftist activities.

On April 8 Elena Abalos Formes, a businesswoman, sat in her living room negotiating with an officer to rent an apartment to air force intelligence for an interrogation center.

Two men in civilian clothes knocked on her door, identified themselves as members of DINA and announced that they had come to arrest her. When the air force officer and Mrs. Abalos Formes protested that she was a stanch supporter of the junta, one of the agents said: "I will give you 10 minutes to get ready and come with me. If you do not I am going to get you out of here with my fists."

The incident was recounted by her son in an appeal to a Santiago court for a writ of habeas corpus. He complained that despite his efforts to locate his mother through Government and military channels, he had been unable to obtain any information.

Broad Mandate Given

DINA is led by an army colonel, Manual Contreras, and most of its agents, estimated at 1,000, are army intelligence officers and enlisted men, but it includes members of other military and police branches as well as a growing number of women.

The decree creating the agency at the beginning of 1974 gave it a mandate broad enough to grow into a full-fledged secret police force, theoretically responsible only to the junta.

The decree states that the mission is "to gather all information at a national level from the various theaters of operation with the purpose of producing the intelligence necessary to formulate policies, planning and the adoption of measures to assure national security and the development of the country."

The same decree gives the agency unlimited access to "the resources that are necessary for its financing" and allows it duty-free imports of equipment and accessories, presumably for interrogation and investigation.

Its agents almost always wear civilian clothes, rarely display identification documents and drive in unmarked cars or refrigerated meat trucks imported by the Allende Government's Public Development Corporation. Its interrogation centers include army garrisons as well as former private properties, the best known of which is Villa Grimaldi, a one-time discotheque on the outskirts of Santiago.