

NEWS, VIEWS and ISSUES

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No. 8

21 April 1975

GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS

1

GENERAL

25

WEST EUROPE

27

EAST ASIA

28

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CONFIDENTIAL

Governmental Affairs

WASHINGTON POST
17 April 1975

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

Protecting the CIA

Tucked into President Ford's speech to Congress, and ignored in the emotional controversy over Vietnam, was a carefully worded warning that secret operations of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) must be protected from "altered" congressional oversight that threatens "essential secrets."

Mr. Ford's purpose: repeal of an oversight provision stuck into a new law last December. That provision requires the President to notify "appropriate committees" including the notoriously leaky Senate Foreign Relations and House International Relations Committees, before approving any covert CIA operation abroad. Such wide distribution of this country's most secret operations "makes the protection of vital information very, very difficult," Mr. Ford said.

This presidential concern comes not a moment too soon for the few friends of the CIA still willing to buck the political lynch-mob psychology which began with disclosures about the CIA's clandestine work in Chile and illegal spying on American citizens.

Indeed, the apparent reluctance of both the White House and embattled CIA Director William Colby to shout their fears about destruction of the agency has infuriated serious-minded intelligence experts. "For the life of me," one such expert told us, "I cannot figure out why President Ford and Colby have handled this 'assassination' issue so ineptly."

Asking anonymity, this uniquely well-informed official continued: "As far as I know the CIA never killed any foreign leaders. Plotting may be something else again, but if every thought a man had were translated automatically into action, there would be few of us out of jail or still alive. Would you like to be hung for every

nasty fantasy in which you indulged? But assassination, no, sir, and I defy anyone to prove differently."

But when the charge of possible CIA assassinations of foreign leaders surfaced, the instinctive White House reaction was to hand that hot issue to the presidential commission headed by Vice President Nelson Rockefeller. That only gave new wings to rumors that CIA may, indeed, have been executioner at high levels.

Colby, a straight arrow without guile, is desperately trying to hold back the floodgates by offering his full cooperation to the separate, year-long probes about to start in the Senate and House. Intimates say that when the assassination charge first came up, he refused categorical denials on grounds that these probes might turn up shreds of evidence—unknown to him—tending to link CIA with summit murders.

Colby's policy is passionately debated by him and top-level CIA officials with their own conflicting views. Colby contends that in today's rancid political climate, his job is to reveal almost everything to any duly-constituted congressional committee and claim executive privilege only in extraordinary cases.

Some former intelligence officials believe he has no alternative. Within the agency itself, one group of officials has pressed for total exposure of everything the agency has ever done and for prosecution of officials who broke laws.

But another faction violently disagrees. Their thesis: almost everything the CIA has done was under direct orders from a President of the United States. Yet the agency is now asked to take the rap for extra-legal activity. So, take the heat—but tell nothing that

could compromise the CIA's daily routine.

In fact, daily routine is already compromised to a point that the agency is now engaging in a bare handful of covert "operations" abroad, none particularly sensitive. Moreover, exchange deals with foreign intelligence agencies are drying up and U.S. businessmen, acting for years as invaluable informants and CIA fronts, have become "impassioned" in breaking off all CIA contacts.

Also evaporating are the highly useful deals by which a foreign nation's intelligence service does field work for the CIA in "coattail operations" financed by the CIA. When one such foreign service demanded a signed letter from the CIA that a particular operation would never surface, the agency could not give such assurance; the operation was aborted.

Colby is well aware of criticism against his policy of total cooperation with the multitude of investigators. His aim is to avoid an "adversary relationship" with congressional probes, depending on their self-control to preserve national security. But critics fear that as the House and Senate probes get up steam, the penchant for leaking long-buried secrets extremely harmful to U.S. foreign policy will prove irresistible.

The President's signal that he intends to tighten the new scatter-gun oversight role of Congress serves as a somber warning to the two investigating committees. If their 21 members cannot keep the CIA's past and present secrets, Congress will not have a long-range oversight role. The CIA will have died an unnatural death.

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NEW YORK TIMES
16 April 1975

White House Gives Secret C.I.A. Data To Senate Inquiry

WASHINGTON, April 15 (Reuters)—The Ford Administration has handed over a secret report on the Central Intelligence Agency and other highly classified information to the Senate committee investigating United States intelligence operations, the White House announced today.

The White House press secretary Ron Nessen said that a report by William E. Colby, Director of Central Intelligence, to President Ford, dealing with allegations that the C.I.A. had violated its charter, had been sent to the committee in its entirety.

He added that the committee is headed by Senator Frank

Church, Democrat of Idaho, had also been given copies of confidential Presidential orders setting up the intelligence agencies and setting out the organization of the National Security Council.

He said that other materials furnished to the committee had included "a number of highly classified intelligence directives" and "other categories of sensitive information." He did not elaborate.

Mr. Nessen said the handover had been arranged with Senator Church's committee in a "cooperative and easy way" and added: "As far as I know, nothing has been denied although some things are still under discussion."

Senator Church's committee originally asked to receive copies of the Colby report, Presidential orders dealing with the security council and other intelligence organizations and staffing patterns for intelligence White House.

NEW YORK TIMES
17 April 1975

DR. ERIK VESELY, 70, SOVIET UNION EXPERT

WASHINGTON, April 16 —Dr. Erik Vesely, an expert on the Soviet Union, died at Georgetown Hospital in Washington on Monday. He was 70 years old.

Surviving are his widow, a son, a stepson and two grandchildren.

Dr. Vesely at his death was director of education for the Freedoms Study Center at Boston, Va., which gives seminars on national defense. He was also a consultant to the Amer-

ican Security Council, which operates the center, and to several Congressional committees.

Dr. Vesely was the author of "The Red Interpreter," an eight-volume dictionary of Communist terminology and usages, in wide use in this country and abroad.

For some years he was a member of the faculty of American University, where he conducted graduate seminars on the Soviet Union.

Dr. Vesely was born in Czechoslovakia. He was a naturalized citizen of the United States and served with the Office of Strategic Services in World War II.

12 April 1975

12 April 1975

Ford Stresses Support Of Intelligence Agencies

Keeping Secrets

D. NICHOLAS J. FOREMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 10—The members of the Senate President Ford made an impassioned appeal to Congress to support the Central Intelligence Agency's request for a secure and responsible procedure for accessing and reviewing the documents.

The President's warning, made during his address to a joint session of Congress, came after he had dealt with Vietnam and economic matters. In a world where information is power, the President said in his prepared text, "a vital element of our national security lies in our intelligence services. They are as essential to our nation's security in peace as in war."

"Americans can be grateful for the important, but largely unshared, contributions and achievements of the intelligence services of this nation. It is entirely proper that this system be subject to Congressional review. But a sensationalized public debate over legitimate intelligence activities is a disservice to this nation and a threat to our intelligence system. It ties our hands while our potential enemies operate with secrecy, skill and vast resources. Any investigation must be conducted with maximum discretion and dispatch, to avoid crippling a vital national institution," he said.

It was at this point that Mr. Ford departed from the text to make his remarks on the C.I.A. "As Congress oversees intelligence activities, it must organize itself to do so in a responsible way. It has been traditional for the executive to consult with the Congress through specially protected procedures that safeguarded essential secrets."

Fromises Cooperation
"But recently those procedures have been altered in a way that makes the protection of vital information next to impossible. I will work with the leaders of the House and Senate to devise procedures which will meet the needs of the Congress for review and the needs of the nation for an effective intelligent service."

The system of consultations between the executive and Congress over intelligent matters has been the very system that has come under so much recent criticism. It was a system whereby C.I.A. officials and others with top intelligence responsibilities conducted secret briefings for selected senior members of four separate Congressional committees. Although there have been few charges of national security matters being leaked as a result of this type of exchange, many in Congress believe that it also deprived them of a way to control the operations of intelligence agencies, moreover there have been repeated charges, with considerable evidence, that Government officials have lied to the Congress during these sessions.

Washington Post
15 April 1975
No CIA Link in JFK Death
Visited From International
The executive director of the presidential commission investigating the Central Intelligence Agency said yesterday that so far there has been no evidence to support allegations, that it was involved in the 1963 assassination of President Kennedy.

David W. Belin, who was also a member of the Warren Commission that found that Lee Harvey Oswald was solely responsible for Kennedy's killing, talked to reporters after the 13th closed meeting of the commission headed by Vice President Rockefeller.

"Thus far we have not found any credible evidence that the CIA was involved as a party in the assassination," he said in answer to questions. He said

any other queries would have to wait until the Rockefeller commission finishes its work June 15 and makes its report.

The commission, with Ronald Reagan making a rare appearance as a member, heard three witnesses yesterday: Donald Chamberlain, inspector general of the CIA, and agency general counsel John S. Warner—both of whom declined to meet with reporters—and Norman Dorsen, professor of law at New York University.

Dorsen released a prepared summary of his testimony which said that the CIA's exemption from "normal constitutional restraints has resulted in unfortunate consequences."

BALTIMORE SUN
15 April 1975

Bella wasn't laughing about the CIA

By RANDI HENDERSON

Bella Abzug gets enough laughs a minute to turn a comedian green with envy.

What delights the New York congresswoman's audiences most are her total lack of self-consciousness and forthright denunciation of that with which she disagrees.

"What do I have to come all the way out here for?" she demanded in humorous indignation at one of the few negative responses she got to her speech last night in the Johns Hopkins Shriver Hall. "I'm tired—what am I doing here anyway?"

It had been a rough evening for Mrs. Abzug. Tearing herself away early from a White House reception of the national committee for international women's year, she resignedly told the representatives of the Hopkins women's center who had come to pick her up. "The last time I spoke in Maryland, they were mean to me when I was late."

The Hopkins crowd didn't mind their 45-minute wait, though, and the feisty congresswoman soon had them chuckling at her witticisms and applauding her philosophies.

One of seven congressional representatives who recently returned from a fact-finding mission in Southeast Asia, the consequences of actions in that war-torn area are uppermost in her mind.

"It's terrible over there, just terri-

ble," she said. "There is a total erosion of [President] Thieu's power and more repression than before.

"There is a lot of killing that goes on when there's a war. The way to stop that killing is to negotiate an agreement. Our obligation is to find a way to use our political and diplomatic strength to urge Thieu to resign."

The outspoken representative had harsh words for U.S. foreign policy makers. "The administration and Dr. [Henry] Kissinger refuse to admit they're wrong," she accused. "A strong nation like ours can afford to admit a mistake.

"The American people decided many years ago that they didn't want to be the policemen of the world—but somehow the Pentagon and the administration haven't gotten the message.

"It is sheer weakness to say that we can't allow ourselves to lose Vietnam or Cambodia. Vietnam and Cambodia were never ours to lose."

Another matter that has kept Mrs. Abzug preoccupied lately is the current investigation of domestic spying by the Central Intelligence Agency.

Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Information and Individual Rights, Mrs. Abzug disclosed recently that the CIA had opened her mail and kept a file on her anti-war activities.

"The CIA is interfering with people's private lives," she said as her car pulled away from the White House. "What they should be doing is watching for lunatics

who might shoot the President."

She continued the theme at the Hopkins. "Watergate is not over yet, my friends," she warned. "The CIA has set itself up as a supergovernment."

Entertaining the audience with details of the trivialities in her personal file ("The hottest thing in my file was that I saw the North Vietnamese representative in Paris—a public visit reported by the newspapers"), she did not minimize the seriousness of domestic surveillance.

"They're paying a lot of attention to your affairs and my affairs instead of taking care of the affairs of the country like they're supposed to. This country has never recovered from the McCarthy era. We have to erase and cut out all the poisons that are permeating government agencies."

The subject of a spate of newspaper and magazine articles analyzing her behavior in Congress, Mrs. Abzug, who plans to run for the Senate seat of James Buckley (C.-R., N.Y.) in 1976 is amused at the Bella-watchers.

"They keep debating whether I've allowed," she laughed on the ride to Baltimore, her ubiquitous hat next to her on the car seat, her toes wriggling in freedom from her shoes. "I haven't changed. They've all gotten used to me. They used to think I was just a hell-raiser. Now they know the other sides of me. They see I'm a hard worker, a good legislator."

LOS ANGELES TIMES
13 April 1975

Detective Tells of Spying on Dan Rowan

By ROBERT L. JACKSON
Times Staff Writer

MIAMI—In the living room of his small stucco home, a private detective named Arthur J. Balletti spoke quietly about a domestic surveillance job he might have pulled for the Central Intelligence Agency.

Balletti said he did not really know. The surveillance, involving comedian Dan Rowan, occurred back in 1960. Some records of it have mysteriously disappeared.

Rowan's Las Vegas hotel room also was bugged at that time. But Balletti said this was done by "Fred Harris," the apparent code name of a coworker he claimed he had met for the first time. Balletti said it was Harris who carried all the electronic equipment.

Who ordered the job done on Rowan, and why? Balletti said Robert A. Maheu, then a paid consultant to industrialist Howard R. Hughes, gave the order, but that he—Balletti—was not told why.

"Maheu may only have been the middleman," Balletti said.

Maheu, who was fired by the Hughes organization in 1970, declined to discuss Balletti's statements with a reporter.

The Rowan incident, which is ex-

pected to be probed by Senate CIA investigators, is significant because it may have grown out of a CIA-Mafia connection in which Maheu allegedly played a role.

Sources have told The Times that Chicago mobster Sam Giancana worked with the CIA in the early 1960s on plans to assassinate Cuban Premier Fidel Castro. Johnny Rosselli, an associate of Giancana, said in court four years ago that he figured in those assassination plans himself and that he worked with Maheu. But Rosselli has refused further comment.

According to a story in Time magazine last month, Rowan was friendly in 1960 with singer Phyllis McGuire, who was described as Giancana's girlfriend. As a favor to Giancana, the magazine said, the CIA sought to provide him with information on Rowan's involvement with Miss McGuire and bugged Rowan's hotel room in the process.

A stocky man of 44, Balletti was formerly employed by a Miami detective firm called Investigators, Inc. In October, 1960, his boss, Edward L. DuBois Jr., "told me I had a surveillance to work in Nevada," he relates.

"He was a good friend of Maheu's

and both were former FBI agents," Balletti said. "We had done occasional work for Maheu—checking the background of individuals or companies—and Ed said this was another job Maheu had given us."

"But DuBois didn't tell me who the surveillance was on. He said I should call in for details once I got to Las Vegas."

When he phoned in, Balletti said he was instructed to put Rowan under surveillance at the Riviera Hotel and to watch for the appearance of Phyllis McGuire. He also was put in touch with "Harris," who Balletti said had checked into the Riviera to bug Rowan's room.

"Harris was the wire man, and I was to handle the physical surveillance of Rowan," Balletti said. "We were supposed to work together."

He said Harris was tight-lipped and told him only that he was from Los Angeles. The wire man never said for whom he was working, Balletti related.

Asked about the results of his surveillance, Balletti said that he followed Rowan for a week-and-a-half—"on the golf course, at his club, everywhere"—and never spotted Miss McGuire. He said he dictated regular

2 APRIL 1975

WITCH HUNT AGAINST CIA

reports to his Miami office.

Toward the end of October, Harris said he would have to leave Las Vegas for two days, but left his electronic gear in the hotel room. Balletti said. The room was directly above Rowan's.

On the night of Oct. 31, 1960, Clark County deputy sheriffs raided the room, arrested Balletti and confiscated all the equipment. He was charged with invasion of privacy by use of a listening device and with operating as a detective in Nevada without a state license.

Balletti said the raid resulted from a case of mistaken identity—that the officers had been searching for "Beer Bottle" Harris, a local burglar who had pulled a job the day before. As to Fred Harris, Balletti said he never saw him again, and no such person was charged in the Rowan bugging.

Once in custody, Balletti said he telephoned his boss, DuBois, and that Maheu arranged a bondsman for him. He was released from jail the next day. Charges against Balletti later were dropped at Rowan's request.

Adding to the mystery is the fact that the Clark County sheriff's department has no record of any arrest in the Rowan case. Rowan, however, said he clearly remembers the incident and confronted the man now identified as Balletti after his arrest.

"He claimed to be a private investigator out of Miami," Rowan said. "He was the coolest thing you ever saw. He didn't seem the least bit concerned. And I found out he was sprung (released from jail) quickly."

Edward L. Du Bois III, who succeeded his late father as head of Investigators, Inc., agreed with Balletti that the Rowan surveillance was instituted at Maheu's request. Both DuBois and Balletti said that they had never knowingly worked for the CIA.

DuBois told a reporter he would look up his own file on the case. But a few days later he said he had discovered that his file was missing.

Maheu, while declining comment, testified in a civil suit last year that he had done "sensitive" work for the CIA in 1960 and 1961 in the Miami area. At that time he headed his own consultant firm, called Maheu & Associates.

WASHINGTON POST

16 April 1975

Harris Questions
Necessity of CIA

Associated Press

Former Sen. Fred Harris, a candidate for the 1976 Democratic presidential nomination, said yesterday the Central Intelligence Agency should be eliminated.

Harris said that while many critics of the agency are asking how it can be better controlled, "I believe the CIA should be abolished."

For more than three months, the Central Intelligence Agency has been under attack, not for anything it is doing now but for what it did or allegedly did in the first quarter-century of its existence prior to 1973. It has become clear in the last three months that the attacks are ideological and political in nature, that the charges are largely without merit when examined in context, and that the CIA charges are merely the vehicle for an attack on United States foreign policy.

Sensational, unsubstantiated articles last December claimed that the CIA engaged in a "massive illegal domestic intelligence operation" against possible foreign agents, complete with intelligence files, break-ins, wiretaps and mail inspections.

The director of the CIA, William E. Colby, has testified that: CIA agents infiltrated dissident circles in a search for "possible foreign links with American dissidents;" that "files were established on about 10,000 citizens," and that there have been "rare occasions" of physical surveillance of Americans to "identify the source of leaks" of classified information. Colby has acknowledged that from 1953 to 1973, the CIA "conducted several programs to survey and open selected mail between the United States and two Communist countries;" that there were telephone taps "against 21 residents of the United States between 1951 and 1965, and none thereafter" to check on leaks of classified information; and that there was one break-in in 1966, 1969, and 1971, each involving "premises related to agency employees and ex-employees."

* * *

NONE OF THIS can be considered "massive" except the files on 10,000 persons. And even that must be put in perspective. Some 2,000 Americans each year are known to be contacted by foreign agents. Many others are members of groups with Communist/revolutionary connections overseas. A file of 10,000 persons in a nation of 210 million is hardly extraordinary.

Was the CIA activity — all of which had ended by 1973 when then-director James R. Schlesinger took over and put an end to it — "illegal"? Critics point to the CIA charter which forbids the CIA from exercising "internal-security functions." But that same charter makes the CIA director "responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure." Furthermore, does the CIA's mission of evaluating "intelligence relating to the national security" end at the water's edge if foreign agents in this country utilize Americans, if foreign sources control American subversive groups, if Americans return from Communist training abroad, and so forth?

Further complicating the haziness of the existing jurisdiction is the reported refusal of the FBI under the late J. Edgar Hoover to accept surveillance tasks resulting from foreign CIA cases traced back to the U.S. Thus the CIA, or no one, would follow cases originating abroad.

Even if the CIA charges do not involve "massive" offenses or "illegal" ones, was what the CIA did immoral or repugnant? Based on the evidence, the answer must be a

resounding no. Most of the allegations involve the CIA's counterintelligence unit, which has the task of guarding the CIA from penetration by foreign spies, protecting its sources of information, and preventing intelligence secrets from falling into enemy hands. This is called domestic counterintelligence action, and is authorized by law. Domestic counterespionage is not an authorized function of the CIA, but the CIA evidently did not engage in this by any reasonable interpretation.

The CIA did investigate some of the anti-war movement to determine the extent of foreign involvement, reportedly, on direct orders from the President. Some of the dissidents had gone to Havana and Hanoi, and the extent of foreign influence could be detailed in a thick book. Former CIA Director Richard Helms has testified as to this involvement. He categorically denies any illegal CIA activity, as do other directors.

The work that the CIA does is absolutely vital to national security. Even most liberals recognize this, but they are trying to stir up a false Watergate style scandal by questioning the role of secrecy in an open society. The question is of more than academic interest, but there is no such thing as an open intelligence operation — it is a contradiction in terms. Those who are demanding more openness in CIA affairs, particularly through further congressional supervision, would severely weaken the effectiveness of the CIA. They are as blind to that as they have been over the potential internal and external security threats that motivated the CIA to take the actions it did.

* * *

THOSE WHO SEE THE CIA as a threat to civil liberties know better, if they have examined the evidence to date. The few persons who were subjects of CIA surveillance were those who contacted foreign agents, who were suspected for reasonable cause of espionage or other subversive activity involving foreign powers, or who are or were CIA employees. In each case, the CIA surveillance was reasonable, probably lawful under the hazy CIA charter, and certainly necessary even in a free society.

The CIA already is overseen by the President, National Security Council and four subcommittees of Congress. It is now being investigated by a "blue ribbon" presidential citizens panel, two select committees of Congress, several regular committees, and the Justice Department. It's becoming a political circus, with ideological purists trying to turn it into a campaign against CIA operations anywhere. The witch hunt is designed to destroy the CIA as an instrument of American foreign policy in the apparent belief that it is an outdated relic of the Cold War, unnecessary in the era of détente.

The campaign against the CIA must not be allowed to succeed. The role of the CIA needs to be more exactly defined than it is now, but the agency should not be saddled with restrictions which will impair the invaluable intelligence role it plays in protecting U.S. security and interests.

The Oklahoman, a former chairman of the Democratic National Committee, told a breakfast audience that if he were President, he would increase employment from the cur-

rent 88 million persons to 100 million within 13 months and would fight for a \$30 billion tax cut, nearly \$10 billion more than that approved by President Ford.

LOS ANGELES TIMES
9 April 1975

Lisbon's Press Rough on U.S. Envoy

Ambassador's Denial of CIA Ties Treated With Skepticism

BY DON COOK
Times Staff Writer

LISBON—Ever since American Ambassador Frank Carlucci arrived here three months ago, he has been busy shooting down stories that he really works for the Central Intelligence Agency, and it has been like killing flies with an air rifle.

He has now tried the "flypaper technique," facing a Lisbon press conference arranged at the unusual invitation of the Information Ministry, with about 100 Portuguese and foreign journalists. But however successful he might have been, the CIA complex goes on buzzing in Lisbon and probably never will expire.

The ambassador at least won plaudits for his fluent Portuguese which was reported to be grammatically almost perfect if somewhat marred for Lisbon perfectionists by a Brazilian accent. As for the press conference itself, the questions were, predictably, along the lines of "have you stopped beating your wife?" (as it happens, Carlucci has no wife). And his replies were greeted, predictably, with "Methinks he doth protest too much."

The Portuguese press these days is Leftist-controlled almost across the board, much of it openly Communist. And about all that Carlucci could really expect when he decided to face the mob was that they would spell his name right and quote him correctly. That was about what his CIA disclaimers got, along with a large dose of skepticism.

The weekly newspaper Sempre Fixe carried the story of the press conference under a headline "One Hour to Say No" with a cartoon of Carlucci holding a halo over his own head and

a lead to the article which read: "Lured to the press conference by promises of clarification, instead all we got were denials."

The Lisbon daily Diario de Noticias, one of the more responsible papers in the country, leaped for its headline on the circumstances under which Carlucci had been forced to leave Zanzibar where he served as head of the American diplomatic mission. Their headline read: "Munitions was the word Frank Carlucci used when he was thrown out of Zanzibar."

It was indeed true, for it seems that at some particularly tense point in a Zambian governmental upheaval, Carlucci got on the telephone to Washington and said over an open line that he wanted more "ammunition" in the form of policy decisions and instructions to deal with the situation. The gleeful Zanzibarians listening in on the conversation declared him persona non grata and tossed him out. Try to explain this to the Portuguese press these days and have it understood.

Carlucci, as can be surmised, is a combative personality and not exactly a low-profile diplomat. Having served in such exotic trouble posts as Zanzibar, Kinshasa and Brazil, and having been sent to Lisbon because Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger did not think the embassy here was being tough enough about the local Communist problems, it really is not very surprising that he has gotten stuck with the CIA label.

Whether an open press conference, exposing himself to some impossible questions ("can you produce documents to prove you were not involved in the March coup?") was the best way to deal with the situation,

most of Carlucci's diplomatic colleagues in Lisbon would doubt. But at least he is on the record as having denied any CIA connection.

"It is inconceivable that someone from the CIA could occupy the foreign and domestic posts that I have, which need careful clearance by the United States Senate," Carlucci said. "I have not nor ever have been a CIA member, and the United States had no part whatsoever in the events of March 11 (the attempted counter-coup in Portugal which failed)."

Before the press conference, Carlucci had given several on-the-record interviews to American journalists on the subject of his alleged CIA involvement and sent a formal protest to the Portuguese Foreign Ministry about an article on the subject which appeared in the Lisbon newspaper, Capital. At the same time he wrote to the Ministry of Information to complain about a "well-oiled, well-directed smear campaign" against him. The result was the invitation from Information Minister Jorge Jesusino to come to the ministry in person—which Carlucci promptly accepted.

Whether his efforts have been effective or counterproductive, whether it will now die away or whether there is enough inuendo from the press conference to keep things going, remains to be seen. The fact that the deputy director of the CIA, Lt. Gen. Vernon A. Walters, made a visit to Portugal last August at a particularly difficult period in the short-lived era of Gen. Antonio de Spínola's presidency is not much help to Carlucci and the American Embassy today.

THE GUARDIAN MANCHESTER
21 March 1975

CIA row ruffles few feathers

From our own Correspondent, Washington, March 20

The request by a group of Labour Members of Parliament for the withdrawal of the CIA station chief in London, Mr Cord Meyer, together with nine other US embassy officials said to be working for the CIA, has caused some annoyance here that is not being taken too seriously.

Britain and the US have a long record of collaboration on intelligence matters, and CIA personnel have been stationed in London with the evident knowledge and agreement of successive British Governments. Equally, both MI5 and MI6 have senior British personnel in Washington working

of the cover of regular diplomatic postings in the British embassy. But because Britain is far more secretive about these matters than the Americans, there is no official British acknowledgment that the embassy here harbours intelligence officers, and, again unlike the CIA, the British would never allow their intelligence agents here to be identified like Mr Cord Meyer has been in London.

There has been some evidence in recent weeks that the CIA has not merely indulged in friendly cooperation with British intelligence services but has also done some rather ludicrous industrial spying in

HUMAN EVENTS
12 APRIL 1975

★ According to exceptionally well-informed Washington sources, President Ford initially okayed the sending of money to non-Communist labor unions, parties and newspapers in Portugal to stop any extreme leftist takeover of our NATO ally. Though the money had already been legally allocated to the appropriate CIA fund, Secretary of State Kissinger convinced Ford not to send the money just prior to the release date. The only reason cited: a bad press if word of the decision ever got out.

WASHINGTON POST

31 March 1975

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

Lisbon's Big Lie

Continuing the chilling techniques by which Portugal's Communist-leaning regime is systematically undermining U.S. influence, the weekly news magazine, *Vida Mundial*, has cunningly linked an anti-CIA U.S. congressman to charges that the U.S. embassy has become a CIA haven.

Tucked into the March 27 article was the implication—totally untrue—that Rep. Michael Harrington (D-Mass.) leaked to the magazine a list of all U.S. personnel assigned to the U.S. embassy in Portugal since the April 1974 revolution overthrew 40 years of right-wing dictatorship.

Since playing a major role in uncovering classified information, later leaked to the press, which revealed covert CIA activities in Chile, Harrington has been the CIA's most prickly congressional hairshirt. By portraying so prominent an American liberal as a conduit to the Communist-controlled Portuguese press, the new far-left militarist regime in Lisbon attempts to claim—and display—support within the respectable American left. That, in turn, reflects how important total control of the press in Lisbon has been in guiding Portugal on its tragic leftward path.

Publishing what it called the "list" of American personnel posted to the embassy after the April revolution, *Vida Mundial* said its "list" was identical to the "list" that was "provided by the State Department to Rep. Harrington's office in December 1974."

Testifying last November to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee against the nomination of Frank Carlucci as ambassador to Portugal, Harrington made the sensational but preposterous charge that the embassy after the revolution was stacked with CIA agents and other intelligence specialists. To try to prove his accusation, Harrington then asked the State Department to supply him with a list of all personnel sent to Lisbon after April.

But Harrington did not follow up the request. His statement to us that neither he nor his office ever received such a list is fully supported by the State Department.

Indeed, Harrington, while an intransigent foe of the CIA, is no admirer of Portugal's new leftist regime. He told us the "deliberate, planned disruption" of center parties "by forces under the internal discipline of the Communist Party" gravely concerns him.

Such criticism from the American left, however, finds no place in the controlled Lisbon press. Harrington was used for one reason: Having placed himself in the vanguard of the attack on CIA intervention in the internal politics of Chile and other nations under Communist political siege, he becomes a foil for the sinister forces seemingly on the verge of consolidating Communist power in NATO ally Portugal.

The Communist-controlled press has become a vital weapon in this totalitarian takeover, marking a significant change between Portugal (with its 40-year tradition of totalitarianism) and

events following the left takeover of Chile (which had a strong parliamentary tradition). The Soviet Union, which played and lost the high-stakes game in Chile, is known to hold the uncontrolled Chilean press at least partially responsible for the overthrow of Marxist President Salvador Allende.

The mistake is not being repeated in Portugal, where the far left totally regulates what people hear and read. Accordingly, the United States and particularly the CIA are painted in ugly colors with no rebuttal possible.

An article in the March 27 edition of *Diaria de Noticias* charged that the

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

20 March 1975

State of the nations

Portugal minus the CIA

By Joseph C. Harsch

We learned from Chile what happens when the CIA moves into a country to block a possible Communist take-over.

We are about to learn from Portugal what happens when the CIA is no longer able to play such a role.

The Communists are active in the new political movements in Portugal. They do not yet control the Supreme Council which is the new political instrument of the now dominant Armed Forces Movement. Nor do the Communists yet seem to have full control over the armed forces. But they have much strengthened their influence of recent weeks and seem to be making fresh gains almost daily. One of their more interesting recent actions was to persuade the Supreme Council to banish the small Maoist and Trotskyist splinter groups on their left. Moscow-disciplined Communists abhor above all else anything to their own left.

This is a condition which until very recent times would have brought the CIA into massive but clandestine action. They would have been assigned the job of preventing a decisive Communist take-over. They would have worked with or through whatever political forces in Portugal were ready and willing to make a fight of it. They would have spent money freely and provided weapons when and if deemed useful.

But right now the CIA is hog-tied by special investigations of their activities by both House and Senate, and by a new law passed by Congress last December. It was an amendment to the foreign aid bill which prohibits any covert political activities by the CIA unless the President of the United States has first made a finding of a clear threat to American security and has so informed the members of the respective Senate and House oversight committees.

It is estimated that compliance with the law would result in at least 150

U.S. embassy and other American outlets in Portugal have been packed with "hundreds of functionaries" by the CIA.

The afternoon *A Capital* on March 3 smeared Carlucci as an "agent and strategist for the CIA" who has made his embassy "a CIA base." The United States, it also said, "is blocking Portuguese efforts to secure foreign credits" (though President Ford asked and the Congress last week appropriated \$20 million in aid to Portugal). The worst lie published in the *Vida Mundial* article charged that Carlucci himself had been a CIA agent in the U.S. embassy in Chile (where he has never been assigned).

Little wonder, then, that the United States finds itself powerless to counter the fast-paced threat of a Communist takeover in Portugal, and that left-of-center American politicians such as Rep. Harrington find themselves used as cat's-paws along the way.

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formed of the President's finding. Such a finding would therefore "leak" within a matter of minutes of the time the committees were informed. There is no evidence whatever of any presidential finding in regard to present conditions in Portugal. And it is inconceivable that under present circumstances in Washington the covert branch of CIA would deliberately flout an act of Congress less than four months old.

There is already doubt about the survival of the CIA. It is under mounting pressure and criticism. Congress seems disposed at the moment even to abolish the covert side of CIA and reduce the organization exclusively to the gathering of intelligence by open means. For the CIA to flout the new law and do anything clandestine in Portugal right now would be to court disaster for itself. Hence denials of any role in Portugal can, on this occasion, be taken at face value.

This means that if Portugal is to survive as a non-Communist country — it must do it on its own. There can be no help for the anti-Communists from the big building in McLean, Virginia. Its covert side is hors de combat.

The stakes are fairly high. Portugal is almost as important to the southwestern corner of the NATO alliance as Turkey is to the southeastern. The U.S. Air Force constantly uses air bases in the Portuguese Azores. The Soviets have requested refueling rights for their fishing fleets on the island of Madeira. Those fleets are assumed to be the eyes and ears of Soviet naval intelligence in the Atlantic Ocean.

To this day no country which has come under decisive Communist control has ever recovered from that control. Someday there may be an exception, but it hasn't happened yet.

Hence Washington, helpless to do anything about it, watches the evolution of Portugal's new revolution —

PENTHOUSE MAY 1975

HOUSECALL

In the wake of Watergate, Americans have become totally disenchanted with certain federal institutions whose undercover activities were seldom questioned in the past. Prodded on by newspaper reports and the incredible revelations of murder and mayhem both at home and abroad by men like top CIA official Victor Marchetti (*Penthouse*, January 1975), many government committees are currently investigating the inner workings of the Central Intelligence Agency. Much of what the CIA has done—under the convenient cloak of national security—is now coming to light. But *Penthouse* feels that the CIA's activities represent only the tip of an iceberg, and that it is of vital interest to examine the entire sinister network of some nineteen overlapping agencies that make up this nation's intelligence community—organizations whose methods have often gone far beyond the limits and safeguards provided for and guaranteed under our Constitution.

To this end, we have assigned top investigative reporters to make their own independent inquiries and present their findings in a series of articles for *Penthouse*. And—as a guide to his investigation—we sent a memo to Senator Frank Church, chairman of the Senate CIA probe, telling him of ways to pierce the elaborate web of self-protection the CIA has carefully woven about itself. This memo, written by specialists who have spent years studying the CIA at first hand, is reproduced on pages 50 and 51. (II)

Harrison E. Salisbury's shattering account of the hidden mechanisms and inner psychology of *The Gentlemen Killers of the CIA* is the first article in our series. According to Salisbury, a Pulitzer Prize-winning correspondent and retired associate editor of the *New York Times*, CIA operatives routinely subvert free elections in other countries, assassinate leaders, and overthrow unfriendly governments: Their allegiance to "The Company" is total. "Like the Mafia, the Agency is a true brotherhood," says Salisbury. "Members of the Company will do anything for each other—lie, cheat, subvert, bribe, corrupt, kill and kill again. If you are of the blood, the Company will care for you . . . except that in the clutch, alas, everyone is expendable." (III)

E. Howard Hunt, however, was not considered expendable until after he left the CIA and went on to the less protected turf of White House espionage. Arrested in 1972 for masterminding the Watergate break-in, Hunt's subsequent demand for \$132,000 in "hush money" broke the back of the Watergate case and left him a disillusioned and beaten man. In this month's exclusive *Penthouse* interview with Ken Kelley, Hunt reveals that his wounds are far from healed. "I've served eleven months in prison and I may serve more," he says. "I've lost my wife and I've certainly lost the way of life I knew and enjoyed and was dedicated to for many, many years. I've been humiliated, ridiculed—and lost a lot of what I now realize were so-called friends. And I wonder what further price I have to pay. If they want to see my blood running in the gutter, I'm sure that can be achieved too." (IV)

THE CIA FELONIES

The Central Intelligence Agency was created by act of Congress, and its lawful powers, duties, activities, and purposes are wholly defined and circumscribed by The National Security Act of 1947. Under this law, the agency is authorized to act solely in matters related to intelligence affecting the national security. All other activities are illegal as being in violation of Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution, which vests all legislative powers in the Congress. The National Security Act does not authorize the agency to engage in activities designed to manipulate political, military, economic, or social developments in foreign countries. It is restricted to collecting, analyzing, integrating, interpreting, and disseminating information. However, the agency has made a practice of engaging in non-intelligence-related activities.

The CIA has admitted some of these activities. Among them are:

- (a) assisting individuals, organizations, and factions contesting for control of foreign nations;
- (b) providing paramilitary support to foreign groups and nations;
- (c) providing financial and other support for counterinsurgency efforts;
- (d) providing financial support from 1950 to 1967 for the overseas work of

various private cultural, labor, and educational organizations in the U.S., such as the National Students Association, which espoused positions favorable to the United States in international conferences and other forums;

- (e) providing virtually all of the funding for, and exercising control over broadcasting by Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty into Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union during the 1950's and 1960's;
- (f) participating in the organization, funding, and direction of the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1961;
- (g) participating until 1973 in the organization, funding, and direction of armies in Laos composed of Laotian and Thai mercenaries;
- (h) supplying financial assistance to Chilean political parties and media opposed to the government of Salvador Allende from 1970 to 1973.

In addition, the agency, without publicly acknowledging the extent of its role, has engaged in such related activities as:

- (a) providing funds to Italian parties, candidates, and organizations opposed to the Italian Communist Party;
- (b) participating in the successful coup against Premier Mohammed Mosaddegh of Iran in 1953;

(c) participating in a successful attempt to overthrow the Guatemalan government of Jacobo Arbenz in 1954;

(d) supporting a rebellion against President Sukarno of Indonesia in 1958;

(e) supporting the Khmer rebels in Tibet in the late 1950's and early 1960's;

(f) supporting the forces of Moise Tshombe of the Congo during the 1960's;

(g) financially assisting those opposed to the election of Salvador Allende as president of the Republic of Chile in the elections of 1964 and 1970, and providing financial support to Chilean trade organizations and others opposed to the government of Salvador Allende until the successful coup against his government and his death on September 11, 1973;

(h) advising and assisting a counterinsurgency effort of the Bolivian government in 1967 to capture and kill Che Guevara;

(i) attempting a coup in Syria in 1957. The coup failed, and agency personnel had to scramble aboard airplanes to escape from Damascus.

Given the nature of these admitted felonies, we can logically suspect that the CIA has committed other felonies, has engaged in undemocratic behavior, and is properly the subject of intensive congressional investigation.

WASHINGTON STAR
19 March 1975

Oswald in Dallas:

How About Tippit?

Regarding your story concerning Lee Harvey Oswald and George O'Toole, a former agent of the CIA, in which O'Toole stated that a machine called the psychological stress evaluator (PSE) had proved that Oswald was telling the truth when he stated, "I didn't kill any-

one" in Dallas the day President Kennedy was assassinated, the machine probably malfunctioned, as Oswald did indeed kill someone in Dallas that day. He shot to death Officer J. D. Tippit on East 10th St. prior to going into the theater where he was captured. O'Toole should check his facts.

William H. Neild
Woodbridge, Va.

PENTHOUSE
MAY 1975

MEMORANDUM TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE CIA

After Seymour Hersh of the New York Times reported last December that the CIA had engaged in widespread illegal spying on American citizens, the public outcry was so great that a number of investigations were launched. President Ford ordered Vice President Rockefeller to head a "blue-ribbon" panel to investigate Hersh's charges. Most observers, however, felt that the Rockefeller panel was compromised by the long-standing connections of many of its members to the CIA and other intelligence agencies. To insure a thorough investigation, the Senate established a special committee—headed by Senator Frank Church of Idaho—to examine government intelligence. In addition, the House of Representatives set up a similar committee. Penthouse sent the following memorandum to Senator Church in February:

TO: The Chairman, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities

FROM: Penthouse Editorial Staff

RE: Suggested Guidelines for the Select Committee's Investigation

Background: Penthouse's interest and concern in the matters under consideration by the Select Committee has been manifested over the years in a variety of articles dealing with the intelligence community's operations, both at home and abroad.

Consequently, the following guidelines are suggested to indicate some initial lines of inquiry which may not be immediately apparent from the results of previous investigations of the intelligence community.

As Penthouse sees it, the Select Committee should examine the organization and procedures of the intelligence community to determine how and in what ways those procedures have been in violation of human and civil rights and how the various agencies have exceeded their statutory authority. Although organization and operations are often thought to be separable, they are closely related and should be approached on a common front.

The agencies are large, influential, and costly. Our nation's well-being depends in part on them. However, the agencies derive their character from their thousands of employees. These persons constitute "the intelligence community." They are your best source of information for resolving the paradox between our government's officially stated policy and its implementation. As in all matters affecting government operations, it is often the so-called little people who hold the key to the knowledge about what actually occurs. Penthouse, therefore, suggests:

(a) The Senate Select Committee should protect intelligence community personnel, who are called to testify, against bureaucratic reprisals which might be taken to silence or intimidate them either before or after the fact. This assurance is vitally important in view of personally damaging information held in personnel and operational files derived from psychological "de-briefings," polygraph interrogations, and the like. If individuals are to testify fully and freely about operations they have been involved in or have knowledge of, this protection is essential.

(b) In connection with the majority leader's letter to the intelligence agencies covered under the Select Committee's investigation not to destroy files and documents or deny the Committee access to them, Penthouse believes the Committee should identify the actual keepers of those files and documents before requests for information are directed to the agencies involved. Since entry into the intelligence community's files is so difficult, persons interested in covering up an agency's nonintelligence or illegal activities may be able to create "shadow" cross-files and hide relevant material. These conditions, which are designed to help hide information from Congress, still exist in the intelligence community, and it's unlikely that damaging information will be provided voluntarily unless it is precisely identified by the Senate Select Committee.

(c) Because of the CIA's dominant position in the intelligence community there is a necessity to understand the role of its director—both as the head of the CIA and as the director of Central Intelligence with responsibilities over the entire intelligence community. The Committee should review the study of the CIA and the intelligence community prepared at White House direction by former CIA Director James Schlesinger during 1971 and 1972 while he was at the White House Office of Management and Budget. This study—which documents the difference between the intelligence community's promise and performance—was later used by President Nixon to recast the responsibility and accountability of the CIA and the other elements of the intelligence community. It shows how far out of control the intelligence community has gone since the National Security Act of 1947, and it may be used to determine how directors of agencies carried out, or exceeded, their statutory responsibilities.

(d) The Select Committee and its staff should review the results of previous congressional commissions organized to examine intelligence operations, as well as the background and authority of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the Drug Enforcement Administration, among others, insofar as their charters may have empowered them to engage in clandestine

operations. Although there is no easy way to penetrate the organizational thicket that protects the intelligence community, it must be penetrated if the Select Committee is to establish guilt—to find out who did what to whom and at whose behest. For purposes of the Select Committee's investigation, the intelligence community should be looked upon as a multinational conglomerate with national as well as international interests and loyalties.

(e) Only after the organizational relationships among the members of the intelligence community are understood can the examination of the specifics of unrelated nonintelligence illegal operations such as the Chilean coup, the use of mercenaries in the Congo, the overthrow and attempted overthrow of governments in Guatemala, Iran, and Syria be undertaken. It's convenient to lay the blame or credit for such operations solely at the CIA's doorstep, but these activities require the support and assistance of other intelligence community members as well. To this end the various interagency programs which have been established by the White House as well as the director of Central Intelligence (such as those involving domestic surveillance, front organizations, and penetration operations) deserve the Committee's scrutiny in order to establish what laws were violated in carrying them out. Furthermore, these interagency programs' operations provide the means for the Select Committee to examine the informal networks of field operatives which have evolved over the years.

(f) Once the intelligence community relationships are clear it is possible to deal with such questions as who ordered a specific break-in, mail intercept, or surveillance, and to whom the information was provided. For example, contrary to published reports, the operations of the Domestic Contacts Division of the CIA's counterintelligence staff precede the National Security Act of 1947, and its activities have encompassed a wide variety of nonintelligence-related functions—some of which, but not all, have involved many other elements of the intelligence community.

(g) Understanding the organizational relationships among the intelligence community's members constitutes a formidable investigative task, but no greater in magnitude than the one posed by the Senate's current investigation of multinational firms. Consequently, the Select Committee should use their understanding of the organizational relationships to identify those actually responsible for initiating illegal nonintelligence-related activities. This issue may become crucial to the Committee's efforts in order to avoid being bogged down in the abstract political question of whether the responsibility for initiating illegal activities—which involve the tacit or overt acceptance of these activities by other agencies—is

that of the President, or Henry Kissinger, the chairman of the 40 Committee, which oversees the CIA.

Beyond these generalized suggestions designed to pierce the intelligence community's veil of self-protection and establish a method to get at the material necessary for a successful investigation of the intelligence community's operations and procedures, *Penthouse* further believes that certain other specific actions, primarily carried out by the CIA, deserve the Select Committee's immediate attention. Among these specific actions to be investigated are:

(a) The CIA's proprietary activities—including their scope, financing, and operations. Initially, the Select Committee should subpoena the books, corporate chartering information, and personnel records of the Pacific Corporation. The Pacific Corporation, located at 1725 K Street NW, Washington, D.C., incorporated in Dover, Delaware, on July 10, 1950, by the Prentice-Hall Corporation, serves as one of the CIA's holding companies for its far-flung corporate empire. It is by no means the only proprietary activity designed to manage the CIA's interest. Nonetheless, it represents a valid starting point, especially because the transportation organizations under its control are worldwide.

In addition, examining the activities of the International Police Service Company, 1812 R Street NW, Washington, D.C., run by Dennis Fleming, might clear up the question of the CIA's traffic in contraband arms and military equipment as well as the distribution of electronic surveillance devices to "contract" personnel for illegal operations.

Also, the Fairways Corporation at Washington National Airport, which specializes in short-haul domestic flights of sensitive cargo and clandestine personnel, should be a matter of concern to the Committee.

The CIA proprietary activities mentioned above are not exhaustive, but they represent an adequate starting point for your investigation. What is at issue is the necessity to examine all the proprietary activities in a total context, at home and abroad.

(b) Another area of inquiry should be the CIA's encouragement of the publication of supposedly scholarly works by

agency staffers under pseudonyms. This practice has spawned a considerable literature designed to influence public opinion on matters of foreign policy, and as such has been used to promote the Agency's view of the world and America's relationship to it. These books and the names of the persons who actually authored them are located in the CIA's Office of Security's files. The Office of Security holds the original manuscripts, which were cleared for publication—a process including directives on what should and should not be said—by this CIA branch.

(c) In addition to the "dirty tricks" carried out by the CIA's undercover services in connection with coups, counter-coups, operations of the Phoenix program in Vietnam, the use of mercenaries etc., the Select Committee needs to probe the relationship between the CIA's clandestine services, its counterintelligence staff, and its innocent-sounding Technical Services Division. This last organization and its relationship to the entire intelligence community spectrum of illegal nonintelligence activities is crucial to the Select Committee's investigation. It has been and continues to be the central point for control of what are euphemistically referred to as "lethal operations." TSD serves as the sign-off for operations, both at home and abroad, which are designed to be without U.S. government attribution.

(d) A further fruitful line of inquiry for the Committee involves an investigation of the CIA's medical experiments. The specifics are rightly the concern of the Select Committee, who should seek justification and explanation for activities which are contrary to the intent and purposes of the Geneva Convention as well as other international treaties.

(e) Another area for investigation is the CIA's Domestic Contracts branch, which was a subordinate element of former Assistant Director James Angleton's counterintelligence staff. As such, Domestic Contracts has a long and checkered history within the CIA as well as in its relations with other agencies in the intelligence community. Its activities have included, but are not limited to, programs designed to enlist the efforts of U.S. commercial and private tourists traveling abroad to report on the things they observed or to acquire information on certain intelligence targets.

Also, Domestic Contracts has been used to help identify American citizens contacted by foreign intelligence services and to coordinate with other elements of the counterintelligence staff these citizens use as "double" agents. Moreover, Domestic Contracts initiates surveillance of citizens by friends or associates—and in some cases active surveillance by elements of the intelligence community other than, or in addition to, those from the CIA or FBI.

For example, active surveillance of potential intelligence targets within the U.S. has been carried out by such organizations as the U.S. Coast Guard, so-called friendly foreign intelligence services, and proprietary activities having no official connection to the U.S. government. In addition, Domestic Contracts is the source for control over such CIA activities as the covert funding of the National Student Association and *Encounter* in addition to other organizations and publications. These activities, including the control of the National Endowment for the Humanities and secret college recruiting services, have been part of the Domestic Contracts Division's responsibility over the years.

(f) Beyond determining the extent of the illegal nonintelligence-related activities suggested above, the Select Committee must also examine the operations of the CIA's job referral and out-placement services.

These services, which include the "sanitization" of a CIA employee's record, deserve scrutiny because they may camouflage an individual's past performance. Such altering of records is used to cover the placement of "former" CIA employees in organizations that have been targeted for penetration and to carry out surveillance and intelligence-gathering functions.

Also, these same records can be used to determine the extent of the placement of "retired" CIA employees, such as E. Howard Hunt and James McCord among others, in the Agency's so-called proprietary activities.

Conclusion: Because the issues involve murder and subversion of the democratic process at home and abroad, *Penthouse* enthusiastically endorses the congressional investigations. O—B

CHICAGO TRIBUNE
14 APRIL 1975

CIA 'insurance'

CHICAGO — It is foolish to undermine or destroy the CIA at a time when every government has an agency like it.

The CIA is really the Country's Insurance Arm. It is to protect the United States against its internal and external enemies. Its strength is in its secrecy.

Let's consider that America, Russia, China, and other nations are individu-

als, each with its CIA or insurance. The insurer or insured would not be expected to aid or give information to any party making a claim against it. Rather it will take care not to divulge anything prejudicial. Otherwise those depending upon it for security would quickly lose faith in it.

The CIA must guard its activities if it is to continue as an effective security agency. Hanging it all out only benefits those who want to see America weakened and destroyed. Thales Kaster

PENTHOUSE
MAY 1975

**THE GENTLEMEN
KILLERS OF
THE CIA**

AS THE SENATE
INVESTIGATION
PROCEEDS WE
SHOULD
REMEMBER THAT
THE AGENCY
HAS ALWAYS
EMPLOYED
MURDER AND
SUBVERSION

BY GARRISON K. SALGUBA

In the days when I was occasionally invited to drop in on Allen Dulles, the CIA was housed in a rambling end-of-land Victorian building on a small hill overlooking the Potomac. Before the arrival of the State Department building in the early 1950s, those visits were made out of a black telephone booth in a small room named Colonel Stanley Grogan, who served as Dulles's personal secretary. Although the room was nothing so grand as the relations in Dulles's CIA, the architect Grogan would say had heard that was back from Moscow. He'd be friendly, pleased to have my impressions of how things were going over there. In the course of a quick and chatted would pick me up after supper from a rooming house in the Navy Medical Research Center. A guard would clear me. We would go on up the circular driveway almost to the top of the hill and pause at the entrance of a building whose name I could not recall. The inquiry receptionist would direct me to the entrance hall and then Colonel Grogan would usher me into a pleasant waiting room with Happlewhite chairs and a Queen Anne sofa and make a bit of small talk about the weather or football (never baseball—baseball, it was clear, was not the thing in the CIA).

The short wait for Dulles gave him a chance to apologize to me and to express his pleasure that I had been able to find time to drop by. There were always others with him, tweedy men like Dulles—and you knew that these were excellent tweeds, cut by

good London tailors or by Brooks. And the men's faces were lean, handsome faces, the kind you saw in good whiskey ads, leaning indolently beside tall fireplaces in English country houses or perhaps their Long Island equivalents.

Allen Dulles's office suited its occupant. No clutter, a fire in the fireplace except during the hottest Washington Julys. (Did he chuck his most secret notes into the flames and watch them burn?) There were no windows behind the director's desk, so that his back was to a blank wall. To one side, there was a window that seemed to face outside but through which you could not really see anything except some shrub plantings (and this, I was certain, was not accidental—no access would be provided to the director's office from the outside).

The conversation in Dulles's office was of a piece with the setting—mellow, informal, informed, a conversation among sophisticated, rather world-weary but gentlemanly individuals. No talk of spies or dirty tricks or double agents. Everything was nuanced, sketched in quick pencil strokes, flavored with the aromatic smoke that came from Allen Dulles's pipe (none of his companions ever seemed to smoke, at least in his presence), wry expressions of the face, self-deprecating stories, and droll shrugs of the shoulder.

The questions from Dulles would be shrewd: Where did Malenkov rank in the Kremlin hierarchy? Was he really being groomed to take over when Stalin died? What was the real reaction in the Kremlin to the failure of the Berlin blockade? Was it possible that Stalin simply didn't understand modern air power?

So the talk would go, with occasional interjections by others—interjections a bit more close to the bone, but all in the style set by Dulles. No voices were raised, no harsh opinions expressed; there were no suggestions of bloodshed, no hints of violence or dark deeds. All was civilized; even "clubbable." The men's haberdashery was of a pattern, the ties diagonal stripes or simple small figures, the colors subdued browns or heathers. There were no sharp edges—well, almost no sharp edges. Usually there would be one man in the small group who was silent throughout the polite talk. His suit did not come from Brooks. It came off the rack. And his face did not come from the Ivy League. It was not relaxed or handsome. It was harsh-featured and there was likely to be the look of a weasel in it. This man would sit through the whole conversation, his back to the wall, saying nothing, ignored by the others. When the conversation was over and Allen Dulles was shaking hands and expressing his deep appreciation, the silent man would slide into the background, saying nothing, not offering to shake hands; as you were walking out, you would remember that he had never been introduced.

Times have changed at the CIA. Dulles has gone to his grave. Headquarters has moved across the river to the enormous complex at Langley (although the old building is still in use). Bureaucracy has given the agency a new face—efficient, button-pushing, computerized. There is nothing Victorian about the director's office these days. The old accents of Harvard and Brown and Princeton have been diluted by the bland tones of Illinois. There are more and more ethnics on the staff rolls. Recruiting teams work the

Panhandle colleges of Texas more vigorously nowadays than the citadels of the Northeast Triangle.

The style of the CIA today is a clean-shaven, gray-suited, credit-card-carrying, rent-a-car businessman's style. The last of the tweedy generation has almost been phased out and this, too, is not accidental.

But the fundamental question remains what it has been all along. Which is the real face of the CIA—the clubbable avuncular face of Dulles, or the hawklike visage of the silent man with the ill-fitting clothes, suggestion of garlic breath, and deft hand with a short angle iron?

Any doubt on this score—and there should have been no real doubt from the beginning—has been totally eradicated by a remarkable stream of firsthand name-date-and-place accounts put down on paper in very recent times by a succession of writers most of whom are themselves graduates or longtime inmates of that curious human zoo concealed behind the three innocuous initials.

The tweeds, the pipe, the aromatic tobacco, the fine accents of Boston and Philadelphia were never more than a con. Just as the computers, the aluminum decor, the Bauhaus chairs, and space technology of the new bureaucracy is a con.

The real face of the CIA is the man with the angle iron. The enforcer. Of course, neither the tweedy man nor the organization man of today wields the angle iron or the silenced revolver himself. The enforcer is hired help—as he is, for the most part, in the Mafia. There is a difference. The Mafia enforcer is killing or blackmailing for profit. He is trying to establish a monopoly for the Family. The CIA men (at least those in tweeds or gray flannel) have convinced themselves, or been convinced, that they are acting for their country—for the old red, white, and blue. But the bottom line at the CIA is blackmail, the squeeze, and, if necessary, killing.

Probably some people have known this simple truth from the beginning. But the CIA con was plausible, and it had a lot going for it. It was bought by many who worked for the CIA, and by most of the country. I have no doubt that Allen Dulles himself believed the con. The argument was that our existence ("our democratic way of life" or whatever cast-iron rhetoric was used to convey the concept) was threatened by a worldwide Communist conspiracy which halted at nothing. We had to fight fire with fire.

How did the con work? Probably the most comprehensive picture of the hidden mechanisms and inner psychology of the CIA is given by Philip Agee, who was recruited into "the Company" upon graduating from Notre Dame in 1956 and who resigned in 1969, thoroughly disillusioned after thirteen years of service (largely in Latin America). His account, *Inside the Company*, has recently been published in England by Penguin and is being brought out in the U.S. by Straight Arrow. It was difficult to find an American publisher because American firms were understandably leery about publishing a former CIA agent's work after the ferocious battle waged by the agency to suppress *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence*, a similar work by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks (see *Penthouse*, January 1975). That fight cost Alfred A. Knopf, the publisher, more than \$100,000 in legal fees and hasn't ended yet, even though a version with 168 dele-

tions insisted upon by the CIA (these are indicated by blank spaces in the text) has finally been published.

The fact is that the CIA not only cons the public and the rest of the government—it cons itself. Even today, Marchetti feels that the CIA almost never assassinates, and certainly never by its own hand. The killing may be set up, but someone else carries out the mission. "Why, CIA men don't even carry guns," says Thomas McCoy, another former CIA man; "it's not allowed." And he and Marchetti gleefully recall one colleague who had carried a gun that was taken away from him with enormous difficulty. "But he was nuts," the two agree.

Obviously, the con still works. Because the CIA staffer himself does not carry a gun and does not personally shoot his victims, he feels relieved of moral responsibility. Thus, CIA men feel no remorse over the killing of Premier Mossadegh of Iran, or of Che Guevara, because in the first place they were "targets," and in the second place the killing was done by local allies. The fact that the security police of Ecuador or Uruguay killed and tortured men who were on the CIA target list hardly bothered Philip Agee until one day, happening by chance to be in the Montevideo police headquarters, he heard loud moans from another room. He learned that the moans were coming from a "target" he had named to the police as the *picana*, a hand-operated generator, was applied to the man's genitals. Agee was so shocked he decided not to give the police any more names.

In real life, the CIA resembles nothing so much as a great fraternity—something like the Elks, but more like Sigma Chi. It doesn't seem to have an official grip or class rings, but it does issue agency medals. The medals are of differing grades and they are presented to agency personnel who have accomplished great feats of intelligence. The only rub is that the medals, which resemble the army's Medal of Honor and are awarded during ceremonies at CIA headquarters, can be worn only on CIA territory and at official CIA functions. They are, naturally, classified as top secret, and no medal holder is ever allowed to refer to them to "nonwitting" individuals.

"Nonwitting" is an expression from the CIA's secret lingo (remember the secret codes you made up as a kid?). A "witting" person, in CIA-speak, means a person in the know, that is, an agency man. A "nonwitting" or "unwitting" person is a nonagency person who is not clued in.

No witting man ever calls his employer the CIA or the agency—it is always "the Company." No witting man ever talks about technique—he speaks of "tradeecraft." Much of this lingo is now familiar to the nonwitting public via James Bond. There are "safe houses," "dead drops," "cut-outs," "flutter" (lie-detector tests), "walk-ins" (recruits who walk in off the street), "cold picks" (attempts to recruit agents cold by simply walking up to them on the street), "infil-exfil," "burn-and-blow" (sabotage), "false-flag" recruitment (hiring a man without letting him know he works for the CIA), and "black" operators and operations ("black" meaning covert).

The list can be expanded indefinitely. It is possible for two CIA men to gossip for hours using nothing but the jargon of the trade. The men might know each other only by the cryptonyms (code names) which all CIA men in clandestine service bear. In the

Company, a man's cryptonym, and the nickname stemming from it, may after many years become more familiar than his true name. Desmond Fitzgerald, for instance, longtime top clandestine executive of the CIA, is better known as "Chet"—that is, Chester D. DAINOLD. (The last name of the cryptonym, incidentally, is always given in capital letters in agency communications.) Agee's cryptonym was Jeremy S. HODAPP. Company cryptonyms tend to sound like names out of *Tom Swift and the Electric Submarine*. The process of their selection is, of course, top secret.

Like the Mafia, the agency forms a true brotherhood—one for all and all for one—except that, in the clutch, alas, everyone is expendable. But up to that final point, the members of the Company will do anything for each other—lie, cheat, steal, kidnap, suborn perjury, bribe, corrupt, subvert, kill, and kill again. If you are of the blood, the Company will care for you. (No wonder E. Howard Hunt felt betrayed by the unwonted treatment he and his CIA crew got from the White House after Watergate.)

When an employee leaves the Company and needs a new job, the Company placement agency finds something suitable to his talents, temperament, and training. It's a big, active department and it does excellent work. Of course, if it is a matter of a nonstaff man or woman—that is, a hired agent—who is being terminated "with extreme prejudice," no employment or financial benefits are involved. It's a job for the coroner, if the body ever turns up. But these cases are rare, and top agency approval is said to be required for such terminations. Nonetheless, the similarity to the Mafia is noticeable. But so far as is known, the agency has never terminated one of its own career employees in this manner.

To become a member of the brotherhood is not easy. You have to be chosen. In the old days it was simpler: a matter of family, college, school tie, connections... the right names, the right places, the right accents. Today, the Company is very big. It has to cast its net far and wide, but it tries to maintain traditional forms.

Having been chosen, you must be tested. MI-6, the Company's sister service in England, was for many years so clubbable and cozy that it tested the candidate by inviting him to a weekend at a country house. There, his wit and politics would be put to the test by a group of his peers. Although the candidate didn't know it, all of the guests at the party, including the sophisticated and beautiful young woman who invited him to share her bed, were MI-6 personnel. Very British. Very low key. Wonderfully effective at separating out potential deviates—or so it seemed until Burgess and Maclean and all the other scandals.

The Company's testing is more typically American. As described by Agee, in fact, it resembles nothing so much as a high-school fraternity initiation, except that it goes on for several months. It is applied not to intelligence analysts but to future "case officers"—those slated to be covert agents, the Richard Helmses and William Colbys of the future. These men will make their careers "running" paid agents, subverting governments, carrying out occasional assassinations, instigating coups d'etat, corrupting political parties and newspapers, and possibly, if they are able and shrewd, climbing high enough up the ladder to run

such major (and scandalous) operations as the infamous Phoenix program of political murder in South Vietnam.

(The Phoenix program was officially described as a program of "pacification" in South Vietnam. Actually, it involved political murder and execution on a large scale. Suspected members of the Vietcong "infrastructure" were rounded up in large numbers. There are authenticated instances of victims being "interrogated" in helicopters, some being simply hurled overboard in order to encourage "confessions" on the part of others. Colby directed this program, and while he has denied participating in political murders, he admits that Phoenix took 20,500 lives.)

The Company maintains what is appropriately called "the farm" in southern Virginia on the banks of the York River, not far from Williamsburg on the Richmond road. Ostensibly, this is a military reservation called Camp Peary. It is surrounded by chain-link and barbed-wire fencing and is the CIA's big U.S. playground and campsite, a training base not only for newly recruited personnel but for foreign agents, secretly flown in from abroad, who aren't even supposed to know what country they're in. The Company, of course, has other training sites. It used one in Colorado to train Tibetans who were supposed to go back to Tibet and lead an insurrection that would wrest their land from Chinese Communist rule. There is a permanent installation in Panama that is used for guerrilla training, and, of course, there were the famous sites in Guatemala used for the Bay of Pigs fiasco.

But Camp Peary is the principal permanent training base in the U.S. It has its own plane service to and from Washington, its own small navy, simulated Iron Curtain borders complete with watchtowers and police dogs, landing zones on the York River to practice "infil-exfil," classrooms, barracks, gymnasiums, swimming pools, and, naturally, playing fields. Baseball is permitted but not encouraged. The training program is rigorous.

Here the novice is sent to be tested and trained. Unlike the pledge of Sigma Chi, he does not have to carry around a brick fished from a specified construction site, or fashion his own paddle and belabor his fellow pledges while they belabor him. But he has other ordeals. He trains under his cryptonym, as do all other pledges. One of the first tasks assigned is to ferret out others' identities. If you can get your best friend drunk and find out his name while concealing your own, your rating goes up three points—and your best friend may be thrown out of training. It is an early and pertinent exercise in the kind of morality represented by the Company.

The pledges are sent off on "intelligence missions." They are ordered to break into a nearby power plant and take photographs. There they are often caught on the three-strand barbed wire topping the fence that surrounds the installation, then seized at gunpoint by weary (but witting) power-plant guards. Or they are sent into Richmond to run paper chases through department stores with other pledges and instructors, some trying to "surveil," some trying to evade surveillance. It is great sport for the pledges, but the plainclothes details at the stores have gotten a bit tired of the fun and games over the years.

Pledges may be put down in strange territory late at night without money and or-

nered to make their way to a rendezvous point inside of four hours. Sometimes a bold pledge will steal a farmer's car and arrive in his time. He gets a high score for his achievement, and an instructor quietly arranges for the return of the car to its owner. There's no sweat—the local police and sheriff have become accustomed to the cut-up kids of the CIA and have been given an occasional twenty-dollar bill to look the other way. After all, it's a matter of "national security," isn't it?

After some months of these puerile stunts, comes a deadening series of political lectures on the dangers of the Communist conspiracy (these concentrate on Soviet secret-police techniques, goals, and objectives—Marx and Lenin and Communist political doctrine get scant attention), along with a comprehensive survey of the Company's own bureaucracy, rules, and regulations. The new Company man is ready to graduate. He enters an unreal world, in which he will be "living his cover," that is to say, existing 24 hours a day, 365 days a year as someone else. Another way of saying it would be: *living his lie*. His superficial identity may be that of a quiet young U.S. embassy clerk in Ecuador, while in fact he is the young tiger who "runs" street mobs. Such mobs are assembled by a local agent (for convenient sums paid in gold or deposited in a Swiss bank account) in order to "destabilize" (i.e., overturn) a shaky liberal government and to enable a bunch of fascist officers to take over and "stabilize" the situation, thus (in the standard CIA cliché) increasing U.S. security and holding back that tidal wave of Communism which it sees as rising ever higher.

A mass of personal material about the CIA has recently become available. There are the exposés by Marchetti and Agee, the rather sympathetic but revealing *Without Cloak and Dagger* by Miles Copeland, and more individually oriented books such as Patrick J. McGarvey's *The CIA: The Myth and the Madness* and E. Howard Hunt's *Under Cover*.

A glance at these works quickly disposes of any notion that, for example, CIA intervention in Chile against the government of the late Salvador Allende was any kind of a freak. The "destabilization" of Allende was CIA business as usual. The CIA has attempted to "destabilize" many governments, sometimes successfully, sometimes not. The suspicions of some Asian governments that CIA efforts have been made to topple existing regimes are accurate. Some attempts have become public, others have not. Two of the most notorious were the CIA effort in Iran against Mossadegh (successful) and that against Sukarno in Indonesia (unsuccessful).

There is hardly a government in Latin America which has not been "stabilized"—that is, supported with U.S. money, U.S. political influence, U.S. aid to the army and the police—through the normal operations of the CIA. The CIA has links to the police departments and especially to the security police of countless countries and to those of every Latin American government. If the tie chances to be broken because of a coup d'état it is immediately reformed with the new administration. The same is true of all general staffs and armed forces of all Latin American countries.

Long ago it became cut and dried. The CIA funnels money and equipment to the police agencies, as well as information from

its own espionage network (not all of that information, of course, is true; it is carefully tailored to CIA objectives). Police chiefs and assistants are brought into Washington to attend International Police Institute courses and are routinely put on CIA payrolls. The co-optation of Latin American armed forces occurs through "training" programs which bring candidate officers to the U.S. The ties are kept operative by the CIA and its golden stream of funds when the men go back to their countries.

If there are any exceptions to this universal rule, they are chalked up as black marks for the CIA station chiefs. Total subversion of national-security forces is the CIA objective.

Every CIA operation of any size in a foreign country has what might be called a "creative talent" section—one devoted to concocting forged documents, falsified speeches, and other tendentious materials for circulation in the local press. Ordinarily, the CIA doesn't own newspapers; it simply buys editors and provides them with the necessary copy. For example, forged documents were an important element in the CIA-sponsored overthrow of President Arosemena in Ecuador in 1963. The same technique was used to provoke a diplomatic break between Peru and Cuba. The CIA authors are clever. They take genuine materials and insert a few false phrases. Or they take two or three Communist documents, run them together, include a favorable reference to some local official whose reputation they wish to taint, and then let the materials surface, possibly in an airport customs examination. Or they plant them with the police to be "found" on an innocent victim. The most famous of such concoctions were the "Penkovsky Papers," a compilation of partly true, partly invented materials, supposedly written as a memoir by the famous Soviet double agent.

Anyone familiar with CIA documentary techniques could hardly be surprised at E. Howard Hunt's effort to cut and splice State Department cables in order to create a false document linking the Kennedy administration with the assassination of Diem in Saigon in 1963. Hunt was merely applying the standard CIA "creative" techniques.

Perhaps Iran provides the classic example of CIA "destabilization" and "stabilization." The current government of the Shah is the virtual creation of the CIA. The agency engineered the overthrow of Mossadegh in a coup planned by one of the CIA's most skillful "black" operators, Kermit Roosevelt. The Shah's security forces were trained and equipped by a succession of American and CIA specialists. For many years, the CIA station chief in Tehran was underpinned by foreigner and Persian alike to be the second most important man in the country. Many felt he was the most important. He lived in grandiose style in an exquisite suburban villa and his dinners were a gourmet's delight. The Shah hardly made a move without consulting his CIA adviser.

Gradually, of course, with the increasing flow of oil monies, the Shah began to assert his independence. For the last two years, the Iranian situation has intrigued foreign-intelligence specialists. When Richard Helms was compelled to resign as head of the CIA, he was promptly sent to Tehran, not as CIA station chief but as U.S. ambassador. There are many who believe Helms's secret mission was to build up Iran as a U.S. bastion in the Middle East should Italy go Communist, or should the new non-CIA regimes

of Greece and Turkey prove unstable and war break out again between Israel and the Arabs. Another theory is that the CIA sees Iran as a replacement for Pakistan, long a reliable ally but now regarded as insufficiently stable.

How does the CIA work in a foreign country? The constant elements of CIA policy, as revealed by ex-CIA men, are bribery, subversion, corruption, and intrigue. Almost every unsavory suspicion advanced about the agency has been confirmed. It seems, in fact, that there are no redeeming qualities about the covert-operations branch (Dulles, Helms, and Colby in turn have headed this division).

For example, Agee estimates that in a single year the CIA poured at least \$300,000 into the Uruguayan police apparatus—in bribes, equipment, and "training" trips to Washington. In Brazil, in a fairly typical election campaign, the CIA funded 8 of 11 state governorship races, 15 candidates for the senate, 250 candidates for the chamber of deputies, and about 600 candidates for the state legislatures. The operation cost \$12,000,000. There is hardly a political leader, newspaper editor, student leader, or labor chief in Latin America who has not been approached by the CIA at one time or another (usually through third parties) in an attempt, often successful, to put him on the payroll. When an Ecuadorian legislator became vice-president, his monthly CIA stipend rose from \$800 to \$1,000.

Small wonder that Latin America has been turned into the happy hunting ground of corrupt military dictatorships. One becomes convinced that, as Senator James Abourezk of South Dakota has said, the only cure for this disease is absolute prohibition of any CIA covert operations whatever.

The CIA's effort against Allende did not begin only a year or so before his downfall in 1973. It began in the early 1960's. The CIA was so heavily involved in fighting Allende in the 1964 Chilean election that the Company could not obtain enough Chilean escudos on the open market to finance its operations. It had to send out an emergency call to stations in Lima, Rio, Montevideo, and possibly others to buy all the foreign exchange they could lay hands on. The CIA won in 1964. But in 1970, even more frantic efforts failed to keep Allende from power. His ouster and murder merely culminated a policy that had been applied continuously for a decade.

Dulles always defended himself by claiming that while everyone heard of CIA failures, they couldn't brag about their successes. If true at all, this contention is only half true. Certainly, some of the CIA's failures have defied suppression—the Bay of Pigs, the shooting down of Francis Gary Powers's U-2 spy plane in 1960, and the collaboration with the Kuomintang's opium troops in Southeast Asia.

But so far as "successes" are concerned, the CIA has never ceased to congratulate itself on the overthrow (and assassination) of Mossadegh in Iran in 1953 when he threatened to nationalize British oil properties, the 1954 overthrow of the Arbenz leftist government, and the killing in 1967 of Cuban revolutionary leader Che Guevara in Bolivia. It is not without interest that two of these most-prized coups involved murder.

When the CIA is asked what long-term benefits accrued to the U.S. from "stabilizing" the Shah so that he, rather than Mos-

deh, can join in the Arab oil blackmail, they are hard put to answer. One thing they don't mention is that the overthrow of Mosaddegh enabled American oil interests to take over a substantial share of the British petroleum investment in Iran.

The extent to which the larger U.S. multinational corporations collaborate with the CIA is a little-investigated area. Many of these relationships are very long-standing and have been institutionalized over the years. Cover is provided for CIA operations and intelligence is traded. Colby often expresses his gratitude for corporate collaboration in his speeches to business groups. The community of interest between U.S. multinational business and the CIA was, of course, classically demonstrated by ITT in Chile. The question of Rockefeller corporation assistance to the CIA was raised in Nelson Rockefeller's confirmation hearings, but the careful examination that the subject deserved did not take place.

The CIA shrugs off the dictatorial terror and suppression of democracy that occurred in Guatemala after Arbenz's fall, just as they shrug off what happened in Chile after Allende. They claim the killing of Che Guevara "stabilized" Latin America by halting the spread of Cuba-inspired revolution. But they ignore the fact that Che's Bolivian venture had failed pitifully long before he met his tragic end at the hands of the CIA and its trained Bolivian antiguerrillas, and that the killing's real effect was to turn Che into a martyr.

The CIA's suspect "achievements" must be set against an endless series of negatives. In the late 1940's, the CIA attempted to overthrow the Albanian Communist regime. The effort came just when the Communist regime itself, in fear of Stalin, was moving into the independent orbit that eventually led to its alliance with China. It is difficult to imagine what possible advantage the CIA operatives saw in this intervention. When I was in Tirana in 1957, the Albanians told me angrily that the United States had attempted to overthrow their regime. The idea seemed so silly that I laughed in their faces. I guess I had better apologize. It was silly—but, as Marchetti has revealed, the CIA did try. They also tried to overthrow Sukarno in Indonesia but botched the attempt; the Indonesians themselves did the job a year later. Their bungling attempts against Prince Sihanouk in Cambodia played a major role in driving the hard-pressed prince into the hands of the Chinese. The CIA spent enormous sums to take over the famous Gehlen intelligence network in West Germany, only to find over the years that no organization was so badly infiltrated by Soviet agents, so compromised by double, triple, and quadruple agents. The CIA's famous Colonel Penkovsky, its highest-level Soviet spy (for whom it forged the "Penkovsky Papers") actually was an MI-6 British acquisition. The CIA had rebuffed an earlier attempt by Penkovsky to defect to them.

The U-2 incident was only the most famous of a series involving the Soviet interception and shooting down of CIA data-collecting aircraft of various types. In the years 1955-65 one such incident followed the other—almost invariably (like that of the U-2) at a critical moment when a turn toward easier Soviet-U.S. relations seemed imminent. Was the timing of these incidents accidental? Were there those in the CIA (and perhaps also in the Soviet KGB) with a vested interest in cold-war espionage, who

feared easier relations might clip their wings? The possibility should not be discarded. Remember, at the time of the U-2 incident both Eisenhower and Khrushchev were deeply committed to the policy of better relations. It is not likely that either of them gave orders to torpedo the policy on which their political fortunes were staked.

Harold Ford, a top CIA intelligence analyst who retired from the agency last year, is convinced that many covert operations are generated by "eager beavers" anxious to make a record and enhance the prestige of the "black" operations of the CIA. He does not cite any specific examples but points to the natural bureaucratic tendency of any division to try to enhance its power and status. But in recent years, he believes, there occurred a number of ill-advised "eager beaver" responses to ill-advised suggestions from the top of the government—from, as he put it, "the president and his prime minister." He referred, of course, to Mr. Nixon and Henry Kissinger. Some observers place the Allende operation in this category. The CIA operations against the antiwar movement in the U.S. are another example of the workings of this tendency.

The late Premier Nikita Khrushchev once suggested to President Eisenhower that Russia and the United States could save a lot of money by pooling espionage information. "After all we are both paying the same people most of the time," he observed. It was hardly a serious offer, but there was a kernel of common sense to it.

But, many people ask, isn't the CIA changing? Hasn't Bill Colby opened things up? Isn't he going around the country speaking two or three times a week? Hasn't he ventured into the lion's den by attending the Washington Conference on the Central Intelligence Agency and Covert Action and taking on all comers in a question-and-answer session? Haven't he and his aides appeared before eighteen congressional committees nearly thirty times over the last year? Doesn't he see three or four newsmen a week?

The fact that informed people can ask these questions suggests that the CIA can still work. There is no evidence from the field to support the idea that William Colby—one of the Company's best-known, most resourceful "black" operators—has suddenly gone "white." On the contrary—despite his statements that national security would not be jeopardized if all covert operations were terminated and that, in fact, covert operations have been greatly reduced, Colby is very careful to qualify both these remarks as being true only at the present time. Moreover, he has admitted that if he had a covert operation under way he certainly wouldn't talk about it.

When Henry Kissinger visited India last year, he was compelled to give a pledge to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi that the CIA would not attempt to "destabilize" her government. The Indian public heard of the pledge with some skepticism. After all, two young Americans charged by the Indians with being CIA covert operators were languishing in a Calcutta jail at that very moment. They had been caught red-handed in scuba-diving suits in Calcutta harbor. Exactly what they were up to has not been revealed by the Indians, but it is believed they were engaged in an operation against Indian shipping.

Nor do the Greeks feel that the CIA has

sworn off its deep and long-standing involvement in their affairs, despite the fall of the fascist colonels. The CIA and its connections with Greek political and military figures was a major issue in last year's Greek election. Few Greeks think that anything has changed—except perhaps the cryptonyms.

Nor is there any sign that the CIA has changed its spots in Portugal, one of its most "stable" preserves until the Portuguese finally rose up against half a century of dictatorship. For a while, the CIA was rumored to be operating from a ship anchored in Lisbon harbor. Now it has gone back, it is said, to conventional deep cover—that is, U.S. embassy cover and the cover provided by U.S. corporations.

If there are so many signs of CIA business as usual, is Colby's talk about cutbacks in covert operations just another con? Not entirely. There has been a major cutback in volume of operations and expenditures; but this was not really the CIA's doing. It occurred because of the Vietnam settlement and the gradual phaseout of U.S. operations in Southeast Asia. The enormous CIA establishment in Vietnam has been cut to a fraction of its former size. The same is true of Thailand, where the CIA's Air America (now phased out) once was the biggest air transport system. And as for Laos, where for more than ten years the CIA ran a secret war, directing the fighting of some 15,000 to 20,000 Meo tribesmen through a command force of 300 to 400 CIA personnel, the game is over.

When you remove the costs and totals of these covert operations from the CIA budget, you understand how Bill Colby can say with complete honesty that covert operations today are only a fraction of what they once were.

But even this is largely misleading. True, the U.S. shooting is over in Southeast Asia. But those Meo tribesmen haven't lost their CIA connection. The CIA is financing chicken-farming and cattle-raising operations for them now. It's still spending hundreds of thousands of dollars, possibly millions, to maintain its ties with the Meos, and General Vang Pao, who led the CIA's Meo army, is now chicken-farmer-in-chief. Why? One reason may be that the CIA, as several scholars have pointed out, has a vested interest in the delivery of raw Meo opium to some political leaders of southeast Asia. Much of this eventually reaches American addicts.

Some veteran CIA men feel that the great days of the Company are over, that Watergate and more recent exposures have damaged its reputation and morale beyond recovery. They are fearful, too, that the CIA agents and their covert operations have lost out to the technicians of the National Security Agency with its 25,000 employees, its \$10- or \$15-billion budget (compared to the CIA's \$6 billion), its remarkable technology of satellites and electronic interceptors, its electronic (and unbreakable) encoding apparatus, its fleets of planes and ships and remote observation stations.

Some are bitter about the NSA—which most of the public doesn't even know exists. They say that for all its technology it can't really break codes, because all the big powers have the same kind of electronically secure cryptographic methods. "Jesus," an old CIA man said the other day, "they spend fifteen billion dollars a year and all they can read is the traffic between Somali and the Central African Republic—unless they do a

bag job."

By which he meant that electronics are fine but the only way NSA could really break the Russian code would be by stealing "one-time pads" (codes to be used for single transmissions and then discarded) in a conventional burglary, copying them, and returning them without the Russians realizing what had happened.

Product, however, that doomsday prophets about the future of the CIA will prove naive. The CIA exists as a colossal bureaucracy. Its sheer momentum and weight will enable it to survive the current crisis and emerge even larger and more powerful. For, regardless of failures and stupidities, the CIA gives the president an extra button to push. And they all love to have it—Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, and Ford.

In the old days, Bill Colby used to laugh at

his friends' jokes about him as a superspy. He doesn't laugh anymore. It's far too serious for that. The sentiment in Congress, in the press, and in the public has never been more hostile. Every time things begin to cool off, they are heated up by new revelations. But Colby did not become director in order to preside over the dissolution of the CIA. He's working his hardest to change the public image of the Company while desperately trying to continue operations much as before. It's an uphill fight, but still, who knows? Something may come along—some gift from the gods—another Colonel Penkovsky with a direct link to the Kremlin council chambers; or maybe a new Alger Hiss case to reveal untoward doings in high American counsels; or a new "secret" speech like Khrushchev's to show the agency's ability to penetrate high Soviet circles; or some other unpredictable coup that would give the CIA the kudos it so badly needs to withstand

what has become a powerful tide of public antagonism.

Carved on the wall of the CIA's Langley headquarters is a verse from the Gospel of John: "And ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free."

Of course, if the truth can't be done with, there is always the CIA's creative imagination. It has turned out some fine imitations of the truth in the past. In the classic annals of intelligence, famous forgeries have often had the most resounding political repercussions—the so-called Zinoviev letter, which caused England to break off diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in the 1920s; or the famous Zimmerman telegram, which played a role in involving the United States in World War I. If worst comes to absolute worst, maybe the black-chamber boys can cook up some document to help turn the tide. It wouldn't be the first time. □

PENTHOUSE
MAY 1975

E. HOWARD HUNT

Howard Hunt is certainly the most famous, if not the most successful, agent in the twenty-five-year history of the CIA. He is also a prolific author, having published more than forty novels under various pseudonyms since his first book, *East of Farewell*, in 1942. He was twenty-four years old at the time, and he had just been discharged from the Navy. Reenlisting in the Army Air Corps the next year, he joined the Office of Strategic Services—the OSS, the forerunner of the CIA—and thereby embarked on a career as a spy that was to take him to far-flung places over the next quarter-century, a career that culminated in his arrest for masterminding the Watergate break-in in 1972.

The CIA's image as the exotic but essential protector of American democracy has lately been eroded by revelations of massive illegal spying on American citizens, and also by charges that it is a law unto itself, cloaked and daggered with secrecy, intrigue and murder—charges that include the often repeated rumor that the agency even had a hand in the assassination of John F. Kennedy. But in the Cold War deep-freeze, in the years immediately following World War II, the CIA was a useful refuge for superpatriots like E. Howard Hunt, to whom the Red Menace and the Yellow Peril seemed both frightful and imminent. In that atmosphere, virtually anyone to the left of Joe McCarthy was suspect as a pinko dupe.

In the early 1950's, Hunt began his CIA career as an operative in Mexico, where he befriended a young recruit who was later to become both his ideological mentor and the godfather of several of his children—William F. Buckley, Jr. In 1954, Hunt had his first taste of the CIA nitty-gritty when he helped overthrow the freely elected government of President Jacobo Arbenz of Guatemala. At about the same time Fidel Castro, a young Cuban lawyer, was organizing his band of guerrillas in the Sierra Maestra mountains, and within a few years he had deposed the Batista regime.

Hunt was moved from his post in the American embassy in Montevideo, Uruguay—where he had been photographed proudly pumping Eisenhower's hand on the president's official visit—to Miami, to begin organizing the colony of anti-Castro expatriates, the *gusanos*, for an attempt to overthrow Castro. For two years, Hunt worked feverishly in Florida and at the CIA operations base in Guatemala to prepare for the landing in the Bay of Pigs in 1961.

"It was the hardest thing I ever had to do," he told *Penthouse* interviewer Ken Kelley. "The great strengths and the great weaknesses of the Latin people were on hourly display."

Hunt was embittered by President Kennedy's refusal to commit air support to the Bay of Pigs mercenaries, and when the popular uprising of the Cuban people, which he had predicted, failed to materialize, Hunt's dream of becoming the Bolivar of Cuba was shattered. All was not in vain, however, for Hunt became very close friends with many Cubans; and a decade later, when he and G. Gordon Liddy were charged with the task of recruiting a spy/burglar team for break-ins at Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office and Democratic Party headquarters in the Watergate, Hunt chose four

of his Cuban friends to work with him.

The Watergate operation, of course, was as big a disaster as the Bay of Pigs. Some of the story is now well known: As the payment for his early silence in jail, Hunt was promised "hush money" by Richard Nixon through the White House frontmen, and Hunt's wife Dorothy, who acted as his agent, was killed in a plane crash near Chicago in December 1972. Her body was found with \$10,000 in her purse. Some "experts" on Watergate have claimed that sabotage was involved. But Hunt doesn't think so, though he is suing the airline for negligence.

Hunt also has a spate of other lawsuits on his hands, including a recent one he brought against the *National Tattler* for printing pictures purporting to show him in Dallas on November 22, 1963. He denies being in Dallas at the time and professes outrage that anyone should think he was involved in the assassination of John Kennedy. He also denies having anything to do with the attempted assassination of Alabama Governor George Wallace, although he doubts that Arthur Bremer acted alone.

An interesting historical footnote was revealed to *Penthouse* in this interview. Hunt had originally demanded \$132,000 as payment for his silence; and Fred LaRue, the White House emissary, was authorized by President Nixon through John Dean to pay the entire sum in cash. For some reason, according to Hunt, LaRue only delivered \$75,000. When he then had to come back to Dean for a further authorization—as Hunt would not accept the smaller sum—Dean presumed that Hunt was trying to blackmail the White House for more money, unaware that LaRue had simply been short-changing the original authorization. Dean then went to the prosecutors with his information. And therein, as Hunt told interviewer Kelley, "lay the seeds of the falling apart."

Hunt freely admits his knowledge and involvement in CIA domestic operations—illegal under the CIA's charter from Congress. He maintains that he objected to the CIA's funding of the National Student Association, and that there was "a serious fraud against the American people because contributions were being solicited by the Advertising Council on behalf of Radio Free Europe, which was simply a funding cover."

His latest book, *Undercover* (Putnam), contains by his own admission an outright lie in at least one crucial passage, a fact that emerged in last year's Watergate cover-up trial. Later editions of the book have deleted the passage.

As this interview reveals, E. Howard Hunt is a beaten man, bereft of most of his old friends, a widower who sees himself as despised by many of his fellow citizens. He blames the media—in much the same way the convicted felon and former vice president, Spiro Agnew, does—for many of his troubles.

He plans to forsake America permanently for Italy once his legal problems permit him to do so. "I'll leave others to face the problem of getting America going again," he says. "The people I put my trust in did not come through."

ouse: Your latest book, *Undercover*, with a quote from Tacitus: "A man defend himself from all enemies, save who are resolved that such a man as could not exist." Who did you mean?

Well, I was thinking of journalistic ene- particularly, and certainly of some po- people too. Given the fact that I'm not y popular figure in America—and I rec- te this—I don't even want to fight the ion. Nevertheless, when I see these tive allusions to the death of my wife- iving somehow been caused by myself, e CIA, by the Watergate people, or by e unnamed assassins; when I see my e continually linked to that of Arthur er, the man who is in jail for crippling eror Wallace; and when I see stories earing both in this country and abroad t the possible role I may have had in the ssination of John Kennedy—then I think ough really is enough.

e served eleven months in prison, and I rve more. I've lost my wife, and I've ainly lost the way of life I knew and en- d and was dedicated to for many, many s. I've been humiliated, ridiculed—and a lot of what I now realize were only- called friends. And I wonder, really, what er price I have to pay. If they want to see blood running in the gutter, I'm sure that e be achieved too.

think that the humanists, or so-called anists, in the journalistic community e been pretty intolerable in my case, and oped that with my jailing these personal cks would cease. For example, when my k, *The Berlin Ending*, was published a e over a year ago, it was a rare reviewer eed who decided to review the book and me. They seemed incensed that Howard t of Watergate should be capable of tng two consecutive words.

thouse: You mentioned the press spec- tion that you were somehow involved in e Kennedy assassination and the at- mpted assassination of George Wallace. t true that you were in charge of the CIA tion in Mexico City when Lee Harvey Os- ld visited there in September 1963?

unt: Untrue. I wasn't even in Mexico during t entire year. This is the type of unsub- ntiated rumor that really does damage. ese things make me very concerned who knows how many more Jack Rubys e walking around? Moreover, there are rtainly plenty of pro-Kennedy people ound . . . a great many admirers of Gover- r Wallace, too. And the more I'm linked to ese things in a totally irresponsible way, e more danger I run. And my children, too, n very unhappy about it.

enthouse: You must be aware of the pic- re that allegedly shows you and Frank rurgis, one of the Watergate burglars, be- ng collared by the Dallas police in 1963.

unt: No, I've never seen that one. The one m familiar with is the one that appeared in e *National Tattler*—for which I've sued hem. I didn't know Sturgis until '71 or '72.

enthouse: Well, just for the record, if you eren't in Dallas, then where were you No- ember 22, 1963?

unt: In D.C. with my wife and children. We ere buying Chinese groceries when the ord came over. Interestingly enough, this Dallas story has had sufficient impetus that e Director of the FBI, Clarence Kelley, asked my attorney if I would submit to a oluntary interview on the subject. And I welcomed the opportunity to do so—to pro-

vide the names of witnesses and so forth. Then, a week later, I was interviewed about the Bremer affair. So again I come back to the quote from Tacitus—there's just no end to the harassment.

Penthouse: Did you go to Milwaukee after the Bremer shooting?

Hunt: No, I never went to Milwaukee.

Penthouse: But you were asked to go to Milwaukee by White House Counsel Chuck Colson?

Hunt: Yes, but I didn't go.

Penthouse: Why not?

Hunt: Well, I didn't want to go because the FBI had been stamping around there for about twenty-four hours, the place was sealed off, and I couldn't see any reason to go. I resisted it. I went home and dallied over the packing—I wish now I'd done that with Watergate too, but I didn't—and after a while Colson's office called and said it wouldn't be necessary to go.

Penthouse: Do you think there was a conspiracy involved in the Bremer attempt?

Hunt: Well, I'm not much of a fan of conspiracy theories, but I do wonder about Arthur Bremer's life and his movements just prior to the attempt on Governor Wallace. As I recall, he had been making frequent trips to Canada, and I've never heard that these were followed up. Why did he go to Canada? Who did he see there? Who paid for his trips? I don't think these facts have ever surfaced.

Penthouse: It seems a little strange that Bremer, who was virtually illiterate, could write such exacting accounts of his travels. It has been said that someone else—perhaps even you—must have written the diary.

Hunt: I think that Gore Vidal made that suggestion. I've never read Arthur Bremer's diary, but I've seen photographs of pages in magazines and I never paid much attention to it. But I do pay attention to allegations that link me to him and other people.

Penthouse: Do you have any theories about John Kennedy's assassination?

Hunt: I don't have any theories about that. I know that there are people restlessly shifting the ashes—committees, commissions, and self-appointed investigators, much the same sort of thing that's going on in the case of my wife's death—despite the fact that competent government authorities made a certain pronouncement. Some people will never be satisfied, regardless of what evidence you present them with, unless the evidence conforms with their preformed theories.

Penthouse: Obviously, you don't regard the death of your wife as part of a conspiracy.

Hunt: No, absolutely not. That crash was investigated by the FBI, by the FAA, and by the National Safety Transportation Board. Of course, I am now in litigation against the air carrier, but my wife was not the only one who perished. I think there were forty-four or forty-five other people who were also killed. If there really was foul play, and there's never been any serious suggestion of that, I would be the one most interested to make such a determination. I would want to find out about it myself. And certainly the families and survivors of the other forty-odd people would also want to. . . . If my wife had been the only one killed, well, that might be one thing; but where you have a major disaster with over forty victims, it seems just ridiculous to me that people could maintain there had been foul play. Sensible people don't, really.

There are some cranks who are making a living out of this—and I very much resent

their work, because it keeps the wound open for my children and for myself. It's very painful, and I'm invariably asked about it wherever I go.

Penthouse: About the \$10,000 that was in her possession at the time. . . .

Hunt: Do you really want me to go into that? It was for investment for a management company that owned two Holiday Inns. The major stockholder was her cousin's husband. He's testified to that, given depositions. He's been constantly harassed . . . the poor guy.

Penthouse: Is it true that you engineered plans to assassinate Fidel Castro both before and after the Bay of Pigs invasion?

Hunt: Only before. I didn't want to engineer the plan—it was just something where I said, this is one of my recommendations. But I think in hindsight that it was a good recommendation, because without Fidel Castro nobody could have rallied the Cuban troops after the landing. That was a suggestion I made well prior to the invasion—years prior. But, as far as I know, nothing was ever done with it. I had nothing further to do with Cuban affairs after the Bay of Pigs.

Penthouse: Can you, on principle, oppose the assassination of John Kennedy while supporting the assassination of another national leader?

Hunt: Sure—just as I can approve the assassination of Adolf Hitler or General Tojo.

Penthouse: Is Castro in the same category?

Hunt: Oh, yes! But at the same time, I'm shocked and horrified—stunned—that not just foreign enemies but domestic enemies also attempt—and in the case of John Kennedy succeed—in assassinating our leaders. Don't forget there were a bunch of wild-eyed, wild-assed Puerto Rican nationalists that shot up Congress and tried to kill Harry Truman.

Penthouse: Were American businessmen contributing to the overthrow of Castro?

Hunt: They were both supporting him and, at the same time, supporting his enemies. When Castro was still in the Sierra Maestra, contributions were made to him by Cuban and American businessmen who were concerned that if he did take over he would make their lives more difficult. I think the Bacardi interests were among the most prominent. They were playing both sides, which is a typical ploy in any political situation. We certainly see it here in this country, where corporations and individuals contribute to both parties, and of course there were some American firms and businessmen that were contributing to one or more of these 140 political fragmentations in Havana. But the principal money for the Bay of Pigs came from the U.S. government.

Penthouse: Did you approve of all the CIA operations when you were an agent?

Hunt: No, there were a lot of things I objected to. I objected to the CIA's support of the National Student Association.

Penthouse: Did you know about that before it was public?

Hunt: Christ, yes—for ten years! I thought it was a waste of money. I thought that Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty were a waste of time and furthermore a serious fraud against the American people, because contributions were being solicited by the Advertising Council on behalf of Radio Free Europe, which was simply a funding cover.

Penthouse: You first met William Buckley when you were his boss in CIA operations in Mexico in the early 1950's. Is that right?

Hunt: He came to work for me, but he was an

agent.

Penthouse: Do you share Mr. Buckley's political philosophy?

Hunt: I wouldn't put it on so grand a scale. I would say that I'm a follower of his philosophy on most germane issues.

Penthouse: What was the hardest thing about being a CIA agent?

Hunt: Explaining to one's children one's constant departures from one's post—and such prolonged absences as when I was involved in the Guatemalan coup. Or explaining why I was living alone in Florida, while my family was in Washington, during the Bay of Pigs affair—why I had taken them down to Mexico, resettled them down there, got them started in school, and then two months later pulled up and come back. This was the hardest part, but maintaining a false identity isn't hard when your backstops are authentic-appearing documents. Although I suppose most people think that's a hard thing to do, it's not. It becomes a way of life.

Penthouse: Would you want your sons to work for the CIA?

Hunt: Not today's CIA. There isn't much future in being in the clandestine business anymore; there's a lack of opportunity because national policy has changed. I don't see any future in the covert arm right now.

Penthouse: Did you read Victor Marchetti's book on the CIA?

Hunt: No, I was shown passages from it in galleys, but that was before a good deal of material was restored to it.

Penthouse: Do you agree with the right of the CIA to cut certain portions for "national security reasons"?

Hunt: In principle, yes. I agree with the concept of the National Secrets Act, which the CIA is drafting and which will probably never be passed.

Penthouse: You are a strict constitutionalist—a believer in the American Constitution. The First Amendment says that Congress shall not abridge the freedom of the press. How do you reconcile that with the National Secrets Act?

Hunt: I think the right of the press to know and investigate has got to end where the national interest becomes endangered or debased. I believe it was Justice Holmes who said that no man has a right to shout fire in a crowded theater. Well, that's basically how I feel about the preservation of secrets. We've had examples very recently of members of Congress who in the performance of their committee duties have come by classified information, and who have taken it upon themselves to reveal this information to the press. This is wrong.

Penthouse: One deleted quote from the Marchetti book later came to light. Henry Kissinger is talking about Chile and he says, "I don't see why we have to stand by and watch a country go Communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people." Do you agree with that philosophy?

Hunt: I associate myself with that philosophy. I always have. In fact, the *United States* has always associated itself with it. Since the days of President Monroe that has been a cornerstone of our foreign policy: When I was in prison, I received a great number of letters from Guatemalans who, as a result of government revelations, had become aware that I had been involved in the Arbenz ouster. They wrote from Guatemala and other parts of Latin America to thank me.

Penthouse: Are you proud of your role in Guatemala?

Hunt: Well, I don't beat my breast about it. I had a job to do, under the Eisenhower administration. I guess pride is a subjective thing—I never think of being proud of a particular operation.

Penthouse: Is it moral to oppose a democratically elected government through covert actions such as those conducted by the CIA in Chile?

Hunt: I'm not much of a moralist. I'm more of a pragmatist. The posture of our government over the years—and we can go back to the days of Teddy Roosevelt's gunboat diplomacy in the partition of Colombia—has been to act in its own self-interest. I think the government has no right to exist if it doesn't continue to do things in its self-interest.

Penthouse: Yes, but that leaves the U.S. government in constant conflict with other governments, who are doing things in their self-interests that are different from the self-interest of the United States.

Hunt: Well, I think that anyone with any degree of political sophistication would go along with that.

Penthouse: Then you also go along with the concept that might equals right?

Hunt: The fact of the matter is that big nations, like the Soviet Union or Red China, get away with a lot of things that the small nations can't.

Penthouse: And the United States?

Hunt: Yes, but we're less successful at getting away with it. The Soviet Union and Red China get away with bloodbaths—and nobody complains. There's a good deal of international hypocrisy around today.

Penthouse: Were you sad to retire from the CIA?

Hunt: No, I was delighted to leave. I was going into promising work for which I had professional competence, work that would give me an opportunity to be almost uninterruptedly with my family and to recover to some extent from the financial reverses I had suffered. I looked forward to it very much. I wasn't forced out of the CIA—I applied for retirement six months in advance and I had to get special permission from the Director to retire.

Penthouse: When Chuck Colson asked you to take part in the same kind of operations that you had done for the CIA, were you gladdened by the opportunity?

Hunt: That wasn't the upfront thing. The upfront thing was to look into the origins of the Vietnam War, the research type of thing, and it was laid on me in terms that I had to. I was familiar with classified documents, policy papers, State Department policy papers—that was true—and they needed someone competent to go through them. It was really the same old ball game. But then I wasn't entirely happy about moving over to the Special Investigations Unit. Every time a proposition was submitted, I would say to Liddy or someone, "Can't the FBI do this? Can't the Secret Service do that?" And then they'd come back and say, "No, they've decided it's too sensitive—the FBI can't do it."

Penthouse: How did you feel when you were first approached about Watergate?

Hunt: I thought the entries were unnecessary to begin with—but I went along with them. But when Gordon Liddy told me the second entry had to be made, I pointed out that we were getting reports from the monitor across the street, Al Baldwin, and that through James McCord that there was an outward movement of personnel and files and everything else. Our friends in Miami reported that Larry O'Brien, the Democratic

Party Chairman, was actually down there. So it seemed ridiculous to me to go in and out; a man who had moved and was probably not coming back. We knew he wasn't going to continue as Chairman after the election of a candidate had been effected. And in fact he didn't. So I would say there was a real lack of professionalism both in the concept of the Watergate entries and in the orders that were given.

Penthouse: If you knew what you know now, would you have done the same thing?

Hunt: Of course not.

Penthouse: What changed your mind?

Hunt: Well, I had assumed that we were operating under the authority of a very highly placed cabinet member and that that authority was sufficient. Certainly, in the past, no U.S. government agent has ever been tried for an entry whether it was illegal or not, and there were a great many of them over the years—organized crime usually being the target, but also foreign embassies. Also, I don't think that any of us seriously thought there would be any hesitancy about conducting a rescue mission—which was actually undertaken rather halfheartedly and then abandoned altogether.

Penthouse: Similar to the Bay of Pigs in some respects?

Hunt: Yes, that's true. It has startling similarities. Our government put men ashore at the Bay of Pigs and abandoned them there to be slaughtered; then later on they were ransomed back for four or five million dollars. But the Watergate people haven't yet been ransomed back.

Penthouse: It was said that James McCord—when he wrote the famous letter to Judge Sirica that ultimately led to the unraveling of the Watergate puzzle—did so because he was unwilling to have the CIA, an organization for which he felt a great sense of loyalty, get blamed for the incident by the White House, which was attempting to do just that at the time. You obviously don't feel that way.

Hunt: No, don't put it that way—I would object to that. I don't feel the same sense of dull loyalty to an institution that McCord may have, but I don't want you to put me in the position of saying I was prepared for a false defense to be mounted involving the CIA.

Penthouse: But the White House was trying to blame it on the CIA—or at least was considering blaming it on the CIA.

Hunt: Yes, but who knew that at that time? It really didn't come out until later. It had become a matter of controversy between McCord and his lawyers, and of course their communications were secret from me. They had access to information that I didn't. I had been asked many times—before the Senate, before the House—"Do you have any reason to believe there was any CIA involvement?" And I always steadfastly said no.

Penthouse: Are you bitter about the CIA? About how you've been treated by the CIA since Watergate?

Hunt: I was a great deal more bitter in the past than I am now. I realized that I could become a nonperson very quickly and that some highly placed officials were doing all they could to distance themselves from me—affecting not to have known me at all, or if they were forced into a position of admitting that they'd known me, then saying it was only on a casual basis.

Penthouse: In October 1974 you admitted to Judge Sirica that you had lied about certain things in your book, *Undercover*. How can you now expect people to believe any-

thing in it?

Hunt: Well, the book's about 165,000 words long, and the statements that I have since repudiated under oath in the Watergate trial amount to probably no more than 100 words. And I wrote those words at a time last spring when I hadn't really determined to disclose certain things that I decided later on to disclose. They were totally consistent with everything that I had testified to before. And, actually, it was a personal decision, perhaps at cost to the book—who knows?—to get the truth out during the trial. I've testified how it all came out—the feeling of unease on my part, the unspoken questions of my children after their first readings of the White House transcripts. But between the time I wrote *Undercover* and the time it was published, let's say there was no forum available to me: Nobody was asking me any questions at that time. It actually wasn't until I was sworn in at the trial that I had an opportunity to tell the whole truth. As I say, there are only about 100 words in the book out of a total of 165,000 in which I was being less than candid.

Penthouse: Nevertheless, there are people who will say, "Well, if he admits he lied about this, then who knows what else he probably lied about?"

Hunt: That's true, and I expect it. They've said that about John Dean, too: "He took money that didn't belong to him; how can you believe the man?"

Penthouse: One of the most universally despised characters down through the ages has been the person who implicates his friends to gain his own freedom. John Dean certainly has been the object of a lot of this kind of feeling, even among people who felt that he only did what had to be done. Was there any remorse on your part at having to testify against your former bosses?

Hunt: Very much so, I would say. At the Watergate trial, I was indifferent, really. I didn't have much feeling one way or the other. But I was very bitter at being forced to testify at the trial of Ehrlichman and Liddy and two of my Miami friends for breaking into the office of Dr. Fielding, Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist. On the other hand, I don't think my testimony did them any harm. It only substantiated that a team had been formed and that we had been authorized to go to the West Coast and effect this entry. That was really all I could testify to, but I felt that insofar as I was personally concerned it was terribly unfortunate for me to be forced to testify. Because that was the working level, the guys—hell, I brought them together! And there was Liddy, who wasn't taking the stand. Ehrlichman, a man I had met once before—well, of course, I had no feeling about him one way or the other. As it turned out, none of my work associates got more time because of my testimony, and so I'm able to console myself to some extent.

Penthouse: Did you ever consider playing mute like Liddy did?

Hunt: No, there was no reason to. Our paths were totally divergent from the legal point of view. Gordon had stood trial and been convicted along with McCord, and he was pinning his hopes on appeal—which has now been denied him. I could understand his silence. As for myself, I was immunized and made many appearances before the grand jury. From that time on, there was never any question in my mind that I was going to testify until Gordon separated himself. It was a traumatic time for everyone, but I understood his decision. That was his choice and I respect him for it. I don't know that he

ever understood mine. He would probably be incapable of understanding John Dean's performance—except on the basis of youth, fear, and inexperience.

Penthouse: And saving his own scalp?

Hunt: Of course, we're all involved in that these days. But I think that as it turned out there were better men at the bottom of the pyramid than there were at the top.

Penthouse: You would include John Dean at the top of the pyramid?

Hunt: Well, he and Magruder and Mitchell helped Liddy put Gemstone together. [Gemstone was the large-scale espionage scheme against the Democrats that included the Watergate break-in.]

Penthouse: You come out quite strongly in your book against Richard Nixon. What first turned you against him?

Hunt: I think it goes back as far as April 1973, when I was in the D.C. jail with the four men from Miami. We watched with rapt attention as the president of the United States said that, yes, he had in fact organized the special investigations unit in the White House, and that in reference to the Dr. Fielding entry on the West Coast, he assumed full responsibility. We thought, quite naïvely, that this was cause for rejoicing. But nothing ever happened. Then we realized some days later that the president, while assuming responsibility, had neglected to assume any of the blame. This didn't enhance our position at all, and there was more distancing that took place then than had happened before. We felt that it lay in the president's power to get the whole thing into focus and that he didn't do it. Then, later on, when the White House tapes became available—at first piecemeal, then in a flood—I think that anyone with an open mind realized that the people in the White House were not terribly concerned with the sufferings of others. They were primarily concerned with putting the best face on their own performance.

Penthouse: Is it true that you were trying to blackmail the White House for \$200,000 as hush money?

Hunt: No, and the Special Prosecutor's office agreed with me. Blackmail and extortion are attempts to obtain by pressure something that is *not* your due. Quite to the contrary, the support money, the lawyers fees, had all been agreed to in the past—they were our due. I was exerting on behalf of myself and others what pressures I could to have our contracts kept. And bear in mind that Watergate was not our idea. We were approached—very much in the clandestine tradition. We were sought out specifically. My wife was appointed to serve as the channel, and our requirements were inquired about. They were translated, or "conveyed" I should say, and we were given an understanding that everything would be taken care of. Subsequently, at the House Judiciary proceedings last summer when the impeachment activities began, Mitchell's assistant, Fred LaRue—who was the most heavily involved person in the procurement and couring of the funds—made some astonishing statements to me. He was describing how he had an emissary get in touch with my wife, and how he had provided the budget in good faith. But he said that he—and in other instances too—arbitrarily cut the sum of money. I'd like an opportunity to ask Mr. LaRue why he arbitrarily cut these sums. Because therein lay the seeds of the falling apart. I would look at it this way: the president is on tape saying that a sum of X dollars is needed. I think this happened about March 21 or 22. And he asks, "Is that right?" and somebody

in the room says yes. Then Nixon says, "Get it." But they *didn't* get it. They got part of it. It was \$132,000 that was required at that point, and only \$75,000 was delivered. And when LaRue was asked by the House members, "How much money did you have on hand at that time?" he said \$190,000. So one wonders, *why* those false accountings?

Let's suppose that the principal had entrusted taking care of these financial matters to LaRue and/or others, and had assumed that these commitments were being kept. But LaRue kept coming back for further authorizations. Now, by this time the men who were disposing the money probably believed that all the commitments to us had been met—when in fact, from the very first delivery, there were arrears. So you had a false perception on the part of the principals that everything was being taken care of. And we, for our part, knew that they hadn't been.

This middleman, Mr. LaRue, had never told his bosses or superiors that he was shortchanging the people for whom he was responsible. This only came out very recently, and in that context I can understand how John Dean, as of late March when he was being asked for more money—not knowing the background and believing all along that the orders had been carried out—got panicky. Dean translated what was simply a reiterated demand into a threat of blackmail. So he got panicky. He didn't know what to do; he didn't make the correct assessment of the situation. He believed that our demands were escalating, while in fact we were still talking about the same funds that we had been talking about from the very beginning.

Penthouse: Why did you ever support Richard Nixon?

Hunt: I felt that he was probably the only game in town. He was never really embraced by conservatives, you know, but I would guess that they also felt that he was the lesser of a number of evils.

Penthouse: Do you think that Nixon was just an opportunist?

Hunt: What politician isn't an opportunist? To single him out for one more epithet does seem just a little unfair at this point.

Penthouse: After Francis Gary Powers's spy plane was shot down over Russia in 1959, much was said about the fact that Powers was equipped with a suicide device to use if he was caught. What about you? Were you ever on a mission for the CIA where you were equipped with a suicide device?

Hunt: Not with the CIA—but with the OSS, yes. But those devices are used to avoid torture. That's not too tough a decision to make.

Penthouse: Was there ever any other time when you were ready to face suicide? Other than the time with the OSS?

Hunt: No, not in modern times—that is, not since World War II. I was never equipped with anything like that after the war.

Penthouse: You spent almost a year in jail after Watergate. What was it like?

Hunt: It was a brutal experience, and I may be facing still more of it. All I can say is, imprisonment, like military service, affects each man differently and he has to meet it on his own terms as best he can. *And survive.* You do this, first, by following instructions—following orders without questioning them is a very good start. And the second way to survive is to keep your nose clean and your mouth shut.

Penthouse: Is that the policy you followed in jail?

Hunt: Yes.

Penthouse: How did the other inmates react to you?

Hunt: Well, that depended on the institution. I was in ten different institutions in an eleven-month period because I was brought back to Washington so frequently to testify.

That's unusual in itself. I was in Danbury for about seven months of my total imprisonment, and about half of the prison population there spoke Spanish. There was an overlay of white-collar criminals doing thirty days, lawyers doing sixty, and so forth. I never felt that I had any particular problems in prison. Down in the D.C. jail there was one attempt to beat me up. But other than that I thought I was well received.

Penthouse: What did they do to you in the D.C. jail?

Hunt: Well, I had been brought down from Danbury and it was a Sunday—hotter than hell, about 104 degrees. I was in a two-man cell with nobody else in it. I finally got to sleep about two o'clock in the morning. About four I heard the cell door open and close, and I was aware of somebody coming in and taking the lower bunk. Then I heard paper rustling around, the john flushing, and so forth. Well, the guard got me up soon after that to dress for court, and when I got down and began looking for my shoes and socks I couldn't find them. Then I looked for my manila envelope with my legal papers in it—couldn't find that. Couldn't find my address book; couldn't find my glasses. So I woke up this guy in the lower bunk and said, "What about this?" He said, "Well, I haven't got them." So I called the guard and said, "I think this man has taken some of my possessions." The guard prodded the guy and the fella got up . . . and he was wearing my socks, wearing my shoes. I looked over at the toilet, and there were all my papers torn up in there. And I said, "All right, get out of my shoes!" The guy swung at me and broke my other pair of glasses, the ones I was wearing. So the guard finally came into the cell and held the guy. He asked me, "Are you going to prefer charges?" And I said, "No why?" And he said, "Cause I didn't see nothing." So I said, "All I want is what's left here." Then I left.

Penthouse: When Jimmy Hoffa got out of jail, he did an awful lot of talking about prison reform.

Hunt: So do I. There's a basic problem to be resolved among penologists and by the Bureau of Prisons. It has to do with the purpose of incarceration. Is it to punish? Or is it to rehabilitate? This question has never been resolved satisfactorily—at least not satisfactorily in terms of the prisoner. Now we're supposed to be an advanced, progressive society. Yet we seem to insist on the medieval practice of taking a pound of flesh—flesh gushing blood. And the blood seems to come mostly from the innocent members of the family of the imprisoned man. For certain crimes—for the protection of society—incarceration is clearly the answer. Nevertheless, it seems far in excess of what the law should require to deprive a family—a wife and children—of the financial support their father could provide. And to have the children grow up with the shame of belonging to the family of a convict. For some reason I'm taking the male point of view, though I don't necessarily mean to, except that the male is usually the breadwinner. But is it proper to deny a man his sexuality because he has cheated on his

income tax? Is it proper to destroy his home, to drive his dependents on welfare, to create a never-ending cycle of dependence, crime, and so on? I think these are very real questions that are faced by prisoners and by every family of every prisoner every day. And I think that a more adequate solution has got to be found. The states—much more than the federal government, I suppose because they're closer to their constituents—are trying to get men out on the streets as wage-earners, as job-holders at least.

Penthouse: You befriended Clifford Irving in jail?

Hunt: Well, we kind of flowed together.

Penthouse: Did you find you had a lot in common with him?

Hunt: Well, we had the book world in common—literary agents and that sort of thing—but he comes from a younger generation than I do. He was an avid baseball player, and I was a little old for baseball. But we got along well—he was well-liked. We used to eat together a good deal.

Penthouse: Have you resumed the friendship now, being out?

Hunt: By the terms of any man's parole, he can't be known to associate with known criminals.

Penthouse: Is it strange to be called a "known criminal"?

Hunt: Well, it takes a couple of years to get used to it.

Penthouse: What do you think of the Rolling Stone interview with two of your children that was done last year?

Hunt: I think they exploited my children at a very delicate point in their lives. And I think it shouldn't have been done. It was a cruel thing to do, and it has caused quite a bit of family disharmony. It's the type of journalism I call "coffin riding." It's just unnecessary. They set these kids up and then they slugged them.

Penthouse: Where do you think the country is headed? Do you think there's a healthier atmosphere today because of Watergate—as many people seem to believe?

Hunt: I think there will be. I think it's impossible to distinguish between the political and the economic in this country. They're so closely interwoven. I think it's certainly reflected very vividly by the market. There is a great deal of confusion, politically speaking, in this country about what can be done, and about what's going to be done. And I think this is one of the negative aftereffects of Watergate. It's still going on. The sooner we can get away from the tape-playing sensations of yesterday, and turn the national mind into more productive channels, the country will be infinitely better off.

We've dealt far too long in rehashing—with a lot of really voluptuous gore—every detail of Watergate. And of course politicians, journalists, and lawyers are all going to continue to be very interested in Watergate. But the average guy out in Iowa is much more concerned about the price of feed grain for his cattle.

But I don't think that the nation is going to be able to fully free itself from Watergate as long as men who have been convicted for what we generally call "Watergate" remain in prison. I think the time will come when they will be very much on the national conscience. And I think that the country, in permitting itself this unprecedented orgy, has lost far more than it could possibly gain.

Penthouse: Do you think there's a new sense of honesty in government that has come about as a result of Watergate?

Hunt: Well, there's been some legislation having to do with campaign contributions and so forth. And that's good. I think the basic honesty of the politician is probably always going to be open to question, and that it should always be rigidly examined by his constituents, by the media, and so forth.

It takes a rather special kind of person to go into politics. In the first place, we have an ego trip. I think that anybody is entitled to inquire into a politician's background, for the influence of money will always be felt in this country's politics. We're a money-oriented society.

Penthouse: Is that bad?

Hunt: I've never liked to think of senators' and representatives' votes being bought and sold. But they always have been. It's not a situation I'm comfortable with.

Penthouse: But do you think it's bad that we are a money-oriented society?

Hunt: That would get us into a discussion of the capitalist system and profits. I don't want to go into that, except to say that waves of congressmen complain they can't keep house on \$36,000 or \$38,000 a year and they want the guy to get more. So he does! The pressure is on every politician.

Penthouse: In view of President Ford's offer of limited amnesty to Vietnam war resisters, do you think the Watergate conspirators should also be offered amnesty?

Hunt: If President Ford forgave those who evaded national service their violations of the law, then surely the Watergate conspirators—many of whom engaged in work for the United States—should receive some easing of their situation—whether you call it commutation, pardon, amnesty, or whatever. But I would not personally accept amnesty myself. If somebody said to me, "If we give you amnesty, we'll have to give it to these guys in Canada and Sweden," I would say, "Forget it." When you've lost as many friends as I did in World War II, well, I guess it's just something that remains with you for the rest of your life.

Penthouse: What do you think is America's position in the world today?

Hunt: I think this country is losing on every front. I can't think of one where we're winning. And if we continue along the same lines that we've been following . . . well, I'm very pessimistic. We go into the SALT talks. We don't seem to have a really defined national objective. You can't build the country up when you're tearing it down. You've got to stop and say this is the end. No more bullsh—today we're going to do something positive for the first time in the thirty months that this national convulsion has been going on. Only our enemies are benefitting from what this country is going through now.

But I don't really think the American bloodlust against the perpetrators of Watergate, without further stimulation from the press, is going to maintain any kind of high threshold. I think that left alone, we'll just let the judicial process take place.

Penthouse: Five of the congressmen who were Nixon's staunchest supporters on the impeachment question were all voted out of office. There is a public concern.

Hunt: Sure, there's a revulsion against all aspects of Watergate. Watergate doesn't have any constituency, I'm the first to admit that. There are no fans or supporters of the Watergate five—or seven, or fifteen, or twenty-five, or however many there are—and people have suffered the loss and ruination of their careers and will continue to suffer for a long, long time.

But I think that we've got to stop talking

about it. As one pundit said back in the Thirties, "Bury the dead." I think that Watergate has got to be buried. Then, in effect, our wounds must be bound up and something positive done, because this is all negative stuff.

Penthouse: Is it going to be harder for the CIA to operate in light of Watergate and all the more recent revelations?

Hunt: I don't know that it's doing much operating at all. It was set up to do things, but Congress has gone beyond the original intent of limiting CIA knowledge to a certain specified number of people. There's a revolution today against it. Nobody ever said, "I wonder what the KGB is doing?" Well, I'll tell you what the KGB is doing. The KGB is dancing and laughing and issuing free rations of vodka, because it's just great. They weren't responsible for the demise of the CIA—we were.

Penthouse: Do you think—in the light of your estimation that this country is losing more than it's winning globally—that today it's more necessary than ever to have the kind of CIA that existed twenty-five years ago?

Hunt: I think Bill Colby, the current director of the CIA, put it pretty well when he said that the country really shouldn't be without the

means to effect an international response that isn't limited to (a) a diplomatic protest or (b) landing the Marines. The covert-action arm of CIA was intended to be just that. And it did serve successfully for many years in that capacity. And if we do away with that, what are our alternatives? Our alternatives are to accept unendingly a second- or even third-rate role in global affairs. And if nobody's afraid of the CIA anymore, then these tinhorn dictatorships will go bananas.

Penthouse: Do you ever stop to consider that the concept of the U.S. versus the rest of the world, in terms of power supremacy, is perhaps no longer relevant, given the developments of the last twenty years? That perhaps countries can coexist without interfering with each other? You're pretty much aware that the Cold War has largely ended in the last few years?

Hunt: Well, on certain levels perhaps. But I haven't heard of the KGB laying off any workers. And certainly the Chinese Communist intelligence service hasn't. On one level the Cold War is dying—that is to say simply by our nonparticipation in it—but the objectives of our self-declared enemies remain the same.

Penthouse: You don't think it's possible that

China and the Soviet Union are not out to conquer the world?

Hunt: Well, maybe not today, but I feel that that's certainly their end goal. Meanwhile, Castro, despite the pleadings of Senators Javits and Pell, has declined to prohibit the export of revolution. And you can't find any responsible Chinese or Soviet leader who will disavow armed struggle. That is the way things are in that part of the world.

Penthouse: The Marxist president of Chile, Salvador Allende, did disavow armed struggle, yet the CIA helped overthrow him.

Hunt: I'll have to confess that I'm really only an amateur on Chile. I was not in the CIA—or in any aspect of the government really—while those deliberations were going on. I wouldn't want to put myself in a corner on that.

Penthouse: Do you think that your stature will change over the years?

Hunt: I don't really know. If I'm ever freed, I'm just going to move abroad and not have any problems to face up to. My country has treated me shoddily. The people I trusted in didn't come through. And as a result I'm far less happy than I used to be. I'll leave others to face the problem of getting America going again. O—

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST Saturday, April 12, 1975

Watergate Burglar Quizzed on CIA

By Jack Anderson
and Lee Whitten

In secret testimony before the Rockefeller Commission, Watergate burglar Frank Sturgis has confessed that he was involved in several CIA assassination plots.

But he has emphatically denied charges that he was in Dallas on the day President Kennedy was shot or that he had anything to do with the Kennedy assassination.

Sturgis offered to take a lie detector test if the commission had any doubt that he was telling the truth. No polygraph test, however, was administered.

Watergate conspirator E. Howard Hunt Jr., who was also called before the commission to answer the same charges, delivered similar denials that he was linked in any way to the tragic events in Dallas.

Questioned for two days by senior counsel Robert Olsen, Sturgis described assassination plots in Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Haiti and Panama. He had participated in the plotting against leaders, both high and low, in all these countries, he testified.

The conspirators included persons he knew to be connected with the CIA, he said. His own role had been limited to helping "set up" assassination attempts. He had never taken part in any actual murders, he swore.

All the assassination plots, he explained, had been aimed

against foreign leaders, none against American citizens. Most of the attempts had failed, he said, although he was involved in the advance work that led to the successful assassination of dictator Trujillo in the Dominican Republic.

Sturgis described Cuba as the "hub" of assassination schemes. He personally had participated in plots, he said, against several Cuban leaders from Fidel Castro on down. Sturgis had been one of Castro's commanders after the takeover of Havana. During this period, Sturgis claimed, he had reported to a CIA contact in the U.S. embassy.

The special commission, headed by Vice President Rockefeller, is examining "evidence" which allegedly links Sturgis and Hunt to the Kennedy assassination. The chief exhibit is a picture of two vagrants, resembling Sturgis and Hunt, who were picked up in Dallas after the assassination.

Upon close examination, the picture of the man who is supposed to be Sturgis does not resemble him in some important details. The relative height of the two men in the picture also doesn't correspond to the actual height of Sturgis and Hunt.

Nevertheless, counsel Olsen cross-examined Sturgis closely about the Kennedy assassination. Had Sturgis ever been in Dallas, Olsen asked. Yes, Sturgis acknowledged, "several times."

Had he been there on the day of the assassination, asked Cl-

sen. No, said Sturgis, he had spent the day at this home in Miami. As witnesses, his wife, nephew and mother-in-law could place him in Miami on that day, he testified.

Had he gone to Dallas on the day before or after the assassination, Olsen demanded. Sturgis replied with a flat "no."

Had he ever visited the assassination site, Olsen pressed. Again Sturgis said he had not. Then he offered to take a lie detector test and answer questions about both the Kennedy assassination and his involvement in CIA assassination plots.

Sturgis also denied that he had anything to do with the assassinations of Robert F. Kennedy or Martin Luther King. He was questioned, too, about reports that the Watergate burglars had broken into the Chilean embassy in Washington. Sturgis denied that he had ever participated in the burglary of the Washington embassy but volunteered that he had once broken into the Chilean embassy in Havana.

Footnote: Both Sturgis and a spokesman for the Rockefeller Commission refused to comment on Sturgis' testimony. "The final report will speak for itself," said the spokesman.

Pentagon Prediction—The Joint Chiefs of Staff expected President Nguyen Van Thieu to lose South Vietnam all along, although the great retreat was more sudden and spectacular than they had anticipated.

As far back as Feb. 1, 1972, we

reported: "The secret estimate of the Joint Chiefs is that the cease-fire will break down and the Communists ultimately will gain control of all Vietnam."

"This would mean . . . that nine years of American dying have been in vain. For the U.S. government has spilled the blood of 55,000 American boys and squandered \$100 billion to prevent a Communist takeover of South Vietnam."

"One intelligence analysis suggests that a sporadic cease-fire, at least, should endure for several months . . . But once the Communist infrastructure has been rebuilt in the South, warns the analysis, the Communists will seek to end their long struggle for control of all Vietnam with a final military offensive."

"Secretly, the Joint Chiefs don't believe President Thieu can survive. He is preparing for the political ravages by tightening his military control over the country. This will make his regime even more unpopular with the people and, therefore, more vulnerable to Communist agitation."

"After Thieu has been weakened politically, Hanoi presumably will try to finish him off . . . The Joint Chiefs have grave doubts about the South Vietnamese army's ability to repel an offensive without massive American air and artillery support."

The Joint Chiefs more than two years ago predicted almost precisely what is happening.

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DAILY TELEGRAPH, London
10 March 1975

Shot Russian may have spied for CIA

By JOHN MILLER,
Diplomatic Staff

A RUSSIAN executed in mysterious circumstances last month after being found guilty of spying may have been working for the CIA.

Reports from Moscow yesterday said that Soviet journalists were asking it known that the man named as V. G. Kalinin was a 50-year-old Leningrad engineer who had had contacts with American Embassy officials.

The Russians said a full report of the trial before the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court had been prepared for publication but its release was stopped at the last minute by the Kremlin.

The Government decision was said to have been taken so as not to "complicate" Soviet-American détente. The Kremlin apparently considered that a major diplomatic and political row over the issue would be counter-productive.

Caught by K G B

The official Soviet account of the breaking of the spy-ring was confined to a two-paragraph report which appeared only in *Izvestia*. It said Kalinin had been caught red-handed by the K G B after collecting and transmitting state and military secrets to "foreign intelligence".

But it hinted that Kalinin had been operating for some time and was well equipped with espionage materials such as codes, a radio, notebooks and instructions.

The Russians responsible for what was clearly a deliberate leak of unsolicited information were unable to name the American diplomat "working" Kalinin but said he had left Moscow, presumably when the K G B swooped.

Kalinin was understood to have been the first Russian shot for spying for 12 years.

Soviet readiness to suggest now that American intelligence was involved in Kalinin's activities is clearly calculated. But it could simply mean that some "hardline" Russian officials suspicious of détente are bent on trouble-making.

U.S. Intelligence and a Free Press

By ERNEST CUNEO

Mr. Cuneo served as chief liaison of the Office of Strategic Services with British intelligence and the FBI, reporting directly to the President of the United States and Gen. Donovan, who headed the OSS.

The human body has a nervous system. Governments have supersecret codes. The secret codes of a government are even more important to its functioning than the nervous system is to the human body. Without a nervous system, the human body is merely paralyzed, but with possession of its enemies' codes, an adversary government not only knows what the next move of its opponent will be, it can use the information to destroy it.

It is extremely valuable, therefore, for a government to obtain an enemy code. It is even more valuable to the enemy to know that its code has been cracked. If it has information that its adversary has its code, it can mislead its adversary to its destruction.

The United States broke the Japanese naval code, unbeknownst to the Japanese. This information was directly responsible for the interception of the plane bearing Adm. Yamamoto, chief of Japanese naval operations in the South Pacific theater. He was shot down. And the breaking of the Japanese naval code was an important factor in the crucial Battle of Midway.

This invaluable secret that their code was broken was made known to the Japanese by a front-page story in an American newspaper.

It was, of course, a tremendous scoop. But it blinded the U.S. Navy for three months. According to the British, it took 35,000 people that length of time to break the new Japanese code. This was because the computer was not yet invented and the work had to be done by vast numbers of mathematical processes.

The Battle of the Atlantic was won because the Nazi submarine code was broken. Coupled with precise direction-finders, the U.S. Navy knew within a quarter of a mile the exact location of a German submarine the minute it broke radio silence to give its midnight report to the German admiralty.

Moreover, the full message of the German submarine was translated instantly by superior American equipment. Between the code-breakers, the location-finders, radar and sonic detection, the German submarine fleet was annihilated.

As the war ended, the German submarines became iron coffins. As a German submarine put out to sea, it might

as well have been lit like a Christmas tree. Four out of five would never return; they didn't have a chance.

Hitler used the same code to communicate with the pro-Nazi government of Argentina.

The U.S. government, of course, knew what was going on. It also knew that the Argentine government was telling anything but the truth to Washington. The principal problem of U.S. intelligence was to convince the Argentinians that Washington was completely fooled by them. Had there been the slightest indication that the Americans knew the truth, the Nazis would have understood that their submarine code was broken and the Battle of the Atlantic would have received a severe setback.

All of these codes were broken at 620 Fifth Avenue in New York City. Both German and Japanese combat orders were broken and transmitted to the Allied battle fleets without delay. The operation was appropriately called "Magic."

But no thanks was due the American free press. Again during the war, a Washington story revealed publicly that American submarines were escaping death because they could run much deeper than the Japanese navy believed, and that hence the Japanese depth charges were exploding above them.

This same American newspaper revelation has been of immense assistance to Russian intelligence. The pictures of American submarines revealed to the Russians new hull designs which nearly doubled the underwater speed and which took years to develop.

The U.S. Navy developed a sonar technique by which it could identify every submerged Russian submarine, along with its course and speed. This operation was so secret that several U.S. senators declined to receive information about it, lest their office be held responsible for any subsequent leak so vital to the security of our country and the lives of its sailors at sea.

They needn't have bothered; the vital secret was revealed in a national news magazine.

Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho) is a gentleman and an American whose integrity and patriotism are beyond question. But of his investigation of the Central Intelligence Agency, and particularly the exposure of the CIA raising of parts of a Russian submarine, one can only say of the Senate investigation, "Forgive them, for they know not what they do."

North American Newspaper Alliance

LOS ANGELES TIMES
28 March 1975

DRVTRY VPFR EPLF JSBR NRRM HTRSY VOS JSI.*

That Russian Sub and Its Sunken Secrets

BY IB MELCHIOR

Wherever there are governments, there are codes. And wherever there is a code, someone is trying to break it.

George Washington had hardly taken office in 1789 when this nation's first secret code was prepared for military and diplomatic use. That first code was simple enough: It consisted of about 1,700 numbers that corresponded to a random selection of letters, syllables and words.

Over the years, our system has grown into an incredibly complicated and sophisticated method of ciphers and codes by which the necessary confidentiality of our nation's diplomatic and military affairs is safeguarded. Quite obviously, we do everything in our power to keep our codes secret—and to break those of other nations.

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So it comes as no surprise that the Central Intelligence Agency over the past six years has conducted an intensive and expensive effort to retrieve a sunken Soviet submarine, presumed to contain codes and related deciphering equipment.

Part of the submarine was retrieved, but the CIA denies that code secrets have been discovered. This denial by itself means nothing, for it is imperative to keep an opponent in the dark concerning the compromise of his codes. If the code material had been recovered, it would have been a great plus for the United States, especially if knowledge of the discovery could have been kept from the Russians. Any country whose military and diplomatic ciphers and codes become known to opponents is instantly at an insurmountable disadvantage.

All of this has an aura of cloak-and-dagger intrigue, but there is really nothing mysterious about codes and ciphers. We all use them—every day. All written language is a form of cipher. We use symbols, called letters, which have no intrinsic meaning. They convey a message only when they are deciphered as part of a system, the secret of which is known to both writer and reader.

Though the terms "cipher" and "code" are often used synonymously, to the cryptographer and cryptanalyst (the specialists who

A motion picture writer-director based in Hollywood, Ib Melchior was a U.S. intelligence agent in World War II. He is the author of "Order of Battle" and a new novel, "Sleeper Agent," to be published this summer.

**Translation: "SECRET CODE WOULD HAVE BEEN GREAT CIA HAUL." Each letter in this cipher system is one key to the right of its standard position on a typewriter keyboard.*

deal with secret writing) they are worlds apart.

A cipher implies a system or method of converting the message of a plain or "clear" text into an enciphered message, which makes it a cryptogram. By knowing only the method used and a key word or word combination, the cryptogram can be solved or deciphered. There are two main techniques, transposition ciphers and substitution ciphers.

In a transposition cipher, the original letters of the "clear" text are scrambled or transposed according to a predetermined, complicated system or key. In a substitution cipher, the letters of the "clear" are replaced by cipher symbols arranged in the same order as in the "clear." These symbols may be other letters, numerals, syllables, picturegraphs—in short, any type of substitution. Elaborate enciphering machines and devices exist today and the methods employed are legion. But in this age of computer wizardry any cipher is considered to have a safety factor measured only in hours.

★

A code, on the other hand, is virtually unbreakable without detailed intelligence or the actual, physical duplication of the code itself. A code is like a wholly different, alien language in which each word or phrase has been changed. In government codes, this usually means a change to a series of random numbers. Anyone knowing the key of a cipher requires only paper and pencil to read it, but even when a cryptogram's code is known, special equipment is needed, and reading a code message without a code book—or code dictionary, often with the page count of a Webster's—is impossible.

Cryptographic annals abound with the breaking of codes, however, that have changed the course of history: from the decipherment of war dispatches sent by Julius Caesar who used a simple substitution cipher of his own invention (in which he shifted each letter in the "clear" three places down the alphabet) to the unraveling of Japan's navy code which gave the United States a tremendous edge at the Washington Disarmament Conference in 1922.

In every case of code breaking, it is, of course, imperative that the enemy does not know his code had been broken. Perhaps the

most dramatic example of the need for countersecrecy can be found in World War II.

Just before the war broke out, British intelligence officers obtained a precise copy of Germany's top secret—and theoretically unbreakable—coding machine called "Enigma." As a result, the British were able to intercept and decode most of the secret radio messages transmitted between Hitler and his commanders throughout the war. This intelligence operation, known as Ultra and not disclosed until last year, was perhaps the single most significant coup of the war.

It was Ultra that gave Montgomery his "intuitive" knowledge of Rommel's timetable at El Alamein. It was Ultra that supplied information enabling American pilots to shoot down Admiral Yamamoto, Pacific chief of the Japanese Imperial Navy—a deed that dealt a crushing blow to the country's naval leadership. In fact, much of history may well have to be rewritten when the full story of Ultra becomes known.

The fact that the British possessed "Enigma" was one of the best guarded secrets of World War II, ranking with the Manhattan Project. So all-important was the necessity for secrecy that when Ultra in 1940 intercepted orders to the Luftwaffe to blitz the cathedral city of Coventry, no steps were taken to evacuate the town. Such action would have revealed to the Nazis that their top code had been penetrated.

★

Against this background, it is easy to see one likely reason that the CIA went to such great lengths to seek an old Soviet submarine. Even though the sub went down seven years ago, the code keys and cryptographic equipment it must have carried would still be basically operative and, in any case, of extraordinary value to U.S. intelligence.

Constructing an entire diplomatic and military code and cipher system is a mammoth task involving great expenditure of time, effort and money. Consequently, a country undertakes to change its basic system only if there is serious evidence that it has been compromised.

Whether we have actually recovered any Soviet code secrets, the Russians must now assume we have, and so the disclosure of the CIA salvage operation almost certainly will lead the Russians to change their code system. Nevertheless, any recovery of code keys or cryptographic equipment would afford important insight into the method and system of current Russian codes and ciphers.

LOS ANGELES TIMES
9 April 1975

Codes Article

As a former member of the U.S. intelligence community I wish to express to The Times my appreciation for publishing Ib Melchior's excellent article (Editorial Pages, March 28) on ciphers and codes prompted by the

salvage operation of the Russian sub, excellently conceived and executed by the CIA. The informative and interesting article brought a complicated and difficult subject into popular focus.

L. HANDEL
Los Angeles

CHICAGO TRIBUNE
11 APRIL 1975
Bob Wiedrich

I spy, you spy... everybody spies

NATHAN HALE was a spy, a revolutionary one.

When the British hanged him 200 years ago, he died with honor for his country. History books record him as a great American hero.

But in the context of today's definition of spying, Nathan Hale would be classified as an insidious bum whose intelligence-gathering techniques as an agent of the fledgling United States intruded on the individual right to privacy of established British colonials.

Further, were Nathan Hale employed at this moment as an undercover operative of the Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, or Chicago Police Intelligence Division, he probably would be branded by some as an enemy of personal freedom functioning under the guise of protecting the nation's security.

IN THE POLITICAL lexicon of today, with the sorry spectacle of the excesses of Watergate still on the horizon, some Americans have gone overboard in labeling as reprehensible, intelligence-gathering operations of any sort.

The CIA is under fire in the press and on Capitol Hill. A Presidential commission is probing its innards. And foreign governments with well established spy networks of their own in the United States are watching this orgy of self-examination with glee.

That's okay with us. They don't understand that one significant American institution involves constant reappraisal and reexamination of our processes to make sure they have not been abused.

That is what is going on now on Capitol Hill and across the nation, including Chicago, where police are being called on to justify intelligence-gathering methods.

There is nothing wrong with that. People entrusted with so sensitive a mission should always be subject to review.

However, in the process of baring our chest to the congressional stethoscope, we should also make certain we aren't giving away secrets that will imperil our national security or destroy the vital intelligence apparatus that safeguards the liberties we fear have been abused.

Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty, said Thomas Jefferson. Loosely, he was declaring that surveillance is the name of the game. It starts with our mothers at birth and remains with us most of our lives.

Ever since original sin, man has monitored other men to make sure they

don't stray too far and intrude on others or endanger society.

Department store owners hire guards to make sure no one walks off with the merchandise. That is a form of surveillance. So are the closed-circuit TV cameras that watch your movements thru the aisles of a jewelry store.

There are all kinds of surveillance systems or spying, if you prefer.

Teachers keep an eye on their flocks. College professors do the same and would be outraged if a civil libertarian leapt to his feet and demanded, "Stop watching that cheater!"

But then, not even the libertarian would want a brain surgeon who had cribbed his way thru medical school.

Whether it is a teacher or a preacher making sure nobody steals the poor box during the Sunday service, someone is nearly always watching our actions because it is the nature of man to sometimes lapse into excesses.

It is also the nature of monitors to sometimes get out of bounds. When that happens, it is time for reappraisal and reexamination, as the Congress and other authorities are doing now.

However, there is no reason for Americans to get their water hot at the thought that some government or police agent may have kept an eye on them. Their major concern should be how it was done and, more important, why.

In their anger at Watergate, too many have been too quick to equate the words intelligence-gathering with the words spying and dirty. Each should stand alone on its own as we examine the methods used to insure our national safety.

THERE ARE radical groups in this country dedicated to its downfall. Those bombs we occasionally hear bursting in air are not Francis Scott Key reenacting the British bombardment of Fort McHenry in Baltimore Harbor. They're for real.

So are the clandestine agents of virtually every foreign power who skulk about our countryside in search of secrets. We do the same to them. And they spy on our spies.

Thus, the basic premise of intelligence work should not become so repugnant to Americans they totally reject the idea. There is a time and a place for everything, including spying. It can be vital to our survival as a nation.

And we could sometime rue the day we threw out the CIA and its sister agencies in a burst of self-righteous indignation.

YALE ALUMNI MAGAZINE
March 1975

Spooked by Bad Press, CIA Stops Recruiting

The recent resignation from the Central Intelligence Agency of one Yale man, James Angleton, '41, created quite a stir and presumably created at least one vacancy within the agency.

However, if any soon-to-graduate Yale student wants to fill that void, it will not be as easy to make contact as in recent years. In a letter to Priscilla Hartke, Associate Dean of Yale College for Career Counseling, a C.I.A. personnel representative explained that "in view of the recent adverse publicity the agency has asked that we cancel all scheduled recruiting visits," which at Yale were planned for mid-February.

Last year the personnel representative, J. Byron Crossman, "was here for three days and must have interviewed between 25 and 40 students," Dean Hartke says. "That was his first year recruiting at Yale, and he offered to do his recruiting off-campus, but I said that since we'd had no trouble with the Marines, I couldn't imagine we would have any with the C.I.A."

This year might have been different. The New Haven Spartacus Youth League, a branch of the national Trotskyist organization, had been distributing pamphlets protesting the expected visit and calling for demonstrations against the agency on campus.

"I don't know," Dean Hartke says, "if any students joined the C.I.A. last year. I do know that a few were invited down to Washington for a follow-up interview, but I don't know if any went."

"It seems to me that when I talked with Mr. Crossman he said that quite a number [of agents] are from Yale, although he himself is Princeton."

Mr. Crossman, reached by phone at C.I.A. headquarters in Virginia, said that Yale students wishing to apply would have to submit resumés and applications by mail, but he advised that "we have very few jobs as it stands right now—considerably fewer than in recent years because of cutbacks in funding." When asked whether Yale was a prime resource for the agency, he replied, "not any more than any other school. Yale is just another supplier of talent."

Dean Hartke said she found the cancellation in keeping with the way the agency works. "I think it's agency policy," she said, "that they simply will not go where there's a feeling that they are not welcome."

Tell that to Salvador Allende.

CHICAGO TRIBUNE
16 MARCH 1975

Climate of suspicion

The Oswald-CIA link won't connect

By Jim Squires

WASHINGTON—A prominent Midwestern governor, respected for his intelligence and rational judgment privately expressed concern recently that investigations of the Central Intelligence Agency might uncover, among other things, agency links to the assassinations of the Kennedys, Martin Luther King, and the shooting of George Wallace.

"Do you really believe that?" reporters asked incredulously.

"No," the governor replied, "but I no longer consider it beyond the realm of possibility."

WHILE GOVERNORS are not necessarily more stable than anyone else, they generally should have more faith in the system and be less suspicious of grand conspiracies. But it may be that the mind-shattering experience of Watergate has propelled all Americans to a new threshold of insecurity about their government.

Perhaps the trail of punctured balloons, broken pedestals, and fallen heroes has left us as skeptical as Europeans, who generally tend to disbelieve their government's official pronouncements.

We now read daily what we only suspected in the past: that Presidents lie, that J. Edgar Hoover was not a saint; that the Central Intelligence Agency won't even bother to deny it was involved in political assassinations abroad.

In such an atmosphere it is only natural that old questions about the nation's most infamous crimes—political murders at home—are again being raised.

Conspiracy theories surrounding the deaths of John and Robert Kennedy, King, and the attempted assassination of Wallace never died, even tho in more recent years the debate has been limited to conspiracy freaks and amateur sleuths.

Haunting, unanswered questions still linger around all four cases. But the most fertile ground for conspiracy breeding is the first—the murder of the President in Dallas in 1963.

WITHIN THE MONTH, another new book on a worn topic has appeared, alleging that voice-stress evaluation tests prove that Lee Harvey Oswald was not Kennedy's assassin.

A skeptic of some stature, former Democratic Sen. Ralph Yarborough of Texas has called for the reopening of the Warren Commission investigation. And, almost casually, the Rockefeller Commission investigating the CIA has confirmed that it is indeed examining possible links between the agency and

Oswald.

Because Oswald once defected to the Soviet Union and then returned to the United States, it was quickly and widely assumed that such a relationship existed. But on May 18, 1964, CIA Director John McCone swore before the Warren Commission that the agency had never communicated, directly or indirectly, with Oswald; that he was not an agent, employe, or informant and the agency was never connected with him "in any way whatsoever. . ."

In 1964, a sworn declaration by such a high-ranking government official was enough. In 1975, it is not. And now amateur sleuths, professional sleuths, and journalists are plowing thru a lot of dusty information in search of new clues that might link Oswald to the nation's intelligence apparatus.

WHAT THEY WILL find is fascinating.

Oswald's potential for contact with the CIA is great. But the actual connections, if any at all, appear restricted to rather tenuous relationships with three individuals, during his lifetime all of whom are suspected of having had ties to the CIA.

The first is Clay Shaw, the late New Orleans businessman who was a target of District Atty. Jim Garrison's discredited assassination investigation. While Shaw had all the earmarks of a CIA operator, Garrison, for all his efforts, never proved a single link between Shaw and Oswald.

The best anyone can do in that regard is that Oswald once passed out pro-Castro leaflets in a building owned by Shaw. And that the well-traveled Shaw, in his role as international trader, most likely passed information to the CIA at one time or another.

The second relationship is hardly more fruitful. Oswald considered as his best friend a man named George de Mohrenschildt, a Russian-born petroleum engineer who came to the United States in 1938. He and his wife knew the Oswalds when they lived in Dallas.

The Warren Commission concluded that de Mohrenschildt had no connection with the assassination. But it did not make the same claim about his relationship with the CIA.

IT SEEMS THAT de Mohrenschildt and his wife took an eight-month hiking tour from the U. S.-Mexican border to Panama in 1950 and were in Guatemala when the CIA launched part of its ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion from there. The Warren report said de Mohrenschildt later turned over films and a full account of his travels "to the U. S. government."

This fact alone has led many conspiracy buffs to conclude that de Mohrenschildt was at least an informer for the

CIA and undoubtedly had told the agency of his friend Oswald, who was already prominent in the files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Researchers who suspect de Mohrenschildt of CIA contact are far more certain of a third man who was in a position to cross paths with Oswald—Guy W. Banister of New Orleans. The question is whether he ever did.

In August, 1963, Oswald was arrested in New Orleans following a fracas with anti-Castro Cubans upset by his distribution of pro-Castro leaflets. Oswald's leaflets bore the address of 544 Camp St., an office he apparently never occupied.

The office at 544 Camp St. had been used, however, as the headquarters for an anti-Castro organization known as the Cuban Democratic Revolutionary Front, which was widely rumored to be a CIA-funded operation.

IT WAS ADJACENT to a second office [fronting at 531 Lafayette St. around the corner] occupied by Banister, a former Chicago FBI agent, and an ex-deputy New Orleans police commissioner who doubled as a private detective and government contact with the community of Cuban revolutionaries in New Orleans.

More than one witness remembers seeing boxes of rifles, ammunition, and grenades in Banister's office. Altho their credibility is not unchallenged, they all profess a common belief: Banister was a CIA or military intelligence contact with a contingent of Cubans being trained for the Bay of Pigs invasion.

The mysterious David Ferris, a key figure in the Garrison investigation, often boasted of his own involvement in the Bay of Pigs and of burning Cuban cane fields for the U. S. government. He was a frequent visitor to Banister's office, as were many of the Cuban revolutionary leaders.

If that is not enough to stir up interest in Banister, there are witnesses who will say he helped mobster Carlos Marcello in his battle against deportation and also was visited in his office by the late George Lincoln Rockwell, the American Nazi Party boss.

The files of Garrison's old investigation and the personal inquiries of journalists and conspiracy buffs are full of the names of former Banister associates who add more intrigue to the brew.

One is a former Banister aide, Jerry Brooks, an ex-Minute Man who connects Banister with Maurice Brooks Gatlin Sr., who represented some mysterious organization known as the Anti-

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
26 APRIL 1975

Debate on CIA activities didn't begin in a void

Communist League of the Caribbean.

The league, it is often said, was intimately involved in the coup in Guatemala in 1954, something for which the CIA is now given credit.

IN ADDITION, Gatlin, who fell to his death from the sixth floor of a Panama Hotel in 1964, once remarked that he could get \$100,000 in CIA money for a French right-wing clique that planned to assassinate President De Gaulle in 1962.

Now, the circle is complete. The Banister connection has brought us to the current topic of the CIA investigation—alleged assassinations of foreign leaders.

The only missing ingredient is someone who ever saw Guy Banister and Lee Harvey Oswald together. In an atmosphere like today's, that could be completely forgotten.

Jim Squires is The Tribune's Washington bureau chief.

BALTIMORE NEWS AMERICAN
31 MARCH 1975

Who Needs Anderson?

The United States needs Jack Anderson like Mississippi needs more quicksand bogs, and any doubt should have been quelled by his childish blurring out of the existence of our deep-sea recovery vessel and its use to salvage part of a Russian nuclear armed submarine.

Cadres of pin-headed newscasters are ridiculing the expense of the construction of this vessel without having an inkling of such a technological achievement! It's pathetic to listen to these boobs pass off this development as a waste of the taxpayers' money.

I wonder how these characters would have reported the story if the situation had been reversed; that is, if the Russians had developed this equipment and raised an unfortunate submarine of ours?

This is an excellent example of advocacy journalism, and it was exploited in a negative view because of the involvement of the CIA and the Howard Hughes Co. The media must live up to their commitments and flood the people with propaganda. Any doubters should do a little research and thinking; this achievement has been a dream fulfilled.

HENRY J. LAQUE JR.

DAILY TELEGRAPH, London
21 March 1975

KNOCKING THE CIA

"SINISTER" and "ludicrous" are epithets that on mention of the American Central Intelligence Agency spring to the minds of the Left. The blinkered apparatchik puts emphasis on the menace to the peace-loving proletariat of all countries, while the more sophisticated Lefty-Lib is more intrigued by the comic blunderings of this egregious Yankee cloak-and-dagger giant. The British like this combination in a "hate" image, which makes it an ideal propaganda recipe. The Nazis who still goose-step through the comic strips are the eternal archetypes of this dual nasty personality.

Thus at one extreme a group of Labour MPs, in a Pavlovian reaction to allegations that some members of the American Embassy in London have links with the CIA, are demanding their expulsion. They have two special scores to settle. One is the expulsion by the

No one is likely to quarrel with President Ford's observation, in his address to Congress on foreign affairs, that "in a world where information is power, a vital element of our national security lies in our intelligence services."

Nor is Mr. Ford likely to get an argument, certainly not out of Congress, when he states that "it is entirely proper that this system be subject to congressional review." That is exactly what a Senate Special Committee headed by Sen. Frank Church is currently engaged in.

"But," Mr. Ford went on to say, "a sensationalized public debate over legitimate intelligence activities is a disservice to this nation and a threat to our intelligence system."

And, emphasizing the "maximum importance" of the Central Intelligence Agency to his predecessors, himself and his successors, Mr. Ford solemnly declared:

"I think it would be catastrophic for the Congress or anyone else to destroy the usefulness by dismantling in effect our intelligence system upon which we rest so heavily."

Mr. Ford resorted in these passages to a couple of disquieting techniques. One is the "straw man" technique. Those investigating the CIA and criticizing some of its activities are not trying to "destroy" the CIA. Nor are they trying to "dismantle" it.

What Congress is concerned about—what Congress must be concerned about—is not "legitimate intelligence activities" but illegitimate intelligence activities.

CIA Director William E. Colby has himself confirmed that the CIA went beyond its legal mandate in engaging in domestic surveillance, even to the

extent of keeping files on "anti-war" members of Congress. There are questions about the CIA's activities in "destabilizing" foreign governments, such as Chile's, and these are serious questions which must be examined. And President Nixon's attempts to use the CIA for partisan purposes and to cover up his own crimes are well-documented in the entire Watergate record.

Mr. Ford's other technique is to imply, at least, that it is the critics of the CIA who are doing a disservice to the nation, not those in the agency and in the White House who abused and misused it. That deflects the argument to the motives of the critics rather than the substance of their criticism.

Mr. Ford notes that "it has been traditional for the Executive to consult with the Congress through specially protected procedures that safeguard essential secrets." That, of course, is one issue involved in the arguments—whether those procedures have enabled Congress to do its job of overseeing America's intelligence agencies.

And another issue is whether Congress, specifically the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, can do its job of ascertaining whether the CIA, the FBI and other government agencies have exceeded their authority.

Plainly, the bipartisan panel must, as it has promised, safeguard legitimate secrets. The President, however, must guard against falling back on the national security argument to deny the committee legitimate information, such as the Colby report which the committee has sought but has not received. Neither the President nor the Congress needs any more angry confrontations over Executive power, secrecy and accountability. Nor does the nation.

Conservative Government in 1971 of 105 Russian diplomats as spies. The other is the outcry against the visit to London next month of Mr. SHELEPIN, former KGB boss, now trade union commissar. In fact, many who do not share the views of the Left about the relative ratings of the CIA and the KGB will hope that the former organization is well represented in London, as the latter certainly is. Expert friendly help is always welcome.

It was the turn of the jokey genre in the BBC-I television news at 9 p.m. on Wednesday, which made fun of the CIA effort to raise the sunken Russian submarine as a £152 million fiasco. Hold your sides, viewers! When at last the Soviet submarine "broke surface, it broke up," and the best bits went back to the bottom. In fact, given Russian secretiveness, compared with America's all-too-open society—witness the inability of the CIA to stop publication of this affair—the intelligence would have been cheap at the real cost.

GENERALNEW YORK TIMES
14 April 1975**U.S. Arms Exports Boom,
Particularly to the Mideast****Orders, at Record, Top \$8-Billion a Year
—Manufacturers, While Delighted, Are
Troubled by Congressional Criticism**

By MICHAEL C. JENSEN

The worldwide arms buildup, particularly in the Middle East, has brought boom times for United States exporters of arms.

Foreign orders for American-made arms have reached a high of more than \$8-billion a year, and deliveries of weapons to foreign customers are growing at the fastest rate in the nation's history.

Spurred by the feverish arms build-up in the Middle East, the arms boom is being financed in part by huge surpluses of petrodollars.

For some American arms manufacturers, the sale of weapons systems abroad has become one of their most profitable lines of business. For others, it has compensated for the decline in domestic military sales that followed America's disengagement from Vietnam.

Although the surge in business has delighted American manufacturers, it has also caused them some problems:

It has stirred Congressional criticism that exports are getting out of hand and that the United States is stimulating an arms race in the Middle East.

It has renewed charges of a conflict of interest on the part of former military officers who now work for arms contractors.

It has revived the label of war profiteer, which weapons manufacturers wish to avoid. It's that old "merchant of death" stigma," said one Defense Department official.

Grumbling Heard

Also, some manufacturers are grumbling that they are not getting the cooperation they feel they deserve from the State Department and Defense Department.

Defense experts say that the boom in military sales will continue at least several more years and that a surge in multi-year contracts for future arms sales insures a continuing increase in weapon production

in the years ahead.

United States manufacturers of weapons have recently sold antitank missiles to Oman, air defense missiles to Kuwait, jet fighters to Iran and Saudi Arabia and missiles to Israel that are capable of carrying nuclear warheads.

In the fiscal year ended last June 30, overseas customers ordered a record total of \$8.3-billion worth of American-made fighter planes, tanks, missiles and other military equipment and technical assistance. The Pentagon served as a middleman, adding 2 per cent to the price as an administrative charge. Direct sales by manufacturers plus aid provided by the United States Government brought the total of arms orders from foreigners to about \$10-billion.

Of the \$8.3-billion in "foreign military sales" orders, more than \$6.5-billion were placed by Mideast countries — with \$3.8-billion of that from Iran and \$2.1-billion from Israel.

Main Beneficiaries

The increase in foreign orders for American arms has been rapid. Orders in fiscal 1974 totaled more than twice the year-earlier level and about eight times the average level of the late nineteen-sixties.

Manufacturers that were the leading beneficiaries of foreign military contracts were such traditional suppliers as the Bell Helicopter Company (a subsidiary of Textron, Inc.), the Northrop Corporation, the McDonnell Douglas Corporation, the General Electric Company, the FMC Corporation and the Raytheon Company.

These six companies, according to the Pentagon, received prime contract awards totaling more than \$2-billion from foreign military customers over the last two fiscal years.

Although scores of United States companies manufacture weapons, a mere handful of them do the bulk of the business. The Defense Department announced in February that 132 technical assistance and training teams were operating in or for 34 foreign countries under "foreign military sales" contracts. An analysis of these contracts indicated that 90 per cent of the dollar volume (about \$650-million of the \$727-

million involved) was accounted for by five companies. They were:

• Bell Helicopter, with a \$255-million contract for training helicopter pilots and mechanics in Iran and for developing a logistics system.

• Raytheon, with a \$32.5-million contract for the use and maintenance of the Hawk missile in Iran.

• The Bendix Corporation, with a \$139-million contract to establish a logistics system for the Saudi Arabian army.

• Northrop, with a \$146-million contract to train F-5 fighter pilots and mechanics in Saudi Arabia.

• The Vinnell Corporation, with a \$76.9-million contract to train Saudi Arabia's national guard.

Candid Discussions

Many arms manufacturers are reluctant to discuss their sales to foreigners, fearful of arousing controversy. However, some of the aerospace companies that are traditionally military-oriented were willing to talk candidly in recent weeks about current trends in their business.

McDonnell Douglas, for example, was clearly pleased by the prospect for foreign sales of its Phantom fighter, one of the mainstays in its line of military and commercial aircraft.

Last year the big aerospace company delivered 24 Phantoms to the United States armed forces. During the same period it delivered more than 100 Phantoms to Iran and Greece.

Over the next two and a half years, McDonnell Douglas expects the growth of sales abroad to accelerate, with an additional 349 Phantoms to be delivered to foreign governments but none to the United States military.

"Those F-4's [sold to foreigners] will be a very large part of our total production," an official of the company said in Washington.

McDonnell Douglas disclosed that, even though its overall business was down in 1974, exports rose \$292-million to \$1.4-billion. One-third of its exports, it said, were sales to foreign governments.

Bell Helicopter, another major exporter, said that despite a decline in United States military sales, its dollar volume in 1974 increased 25 per cent and its exports rose to \$160-million. Especially helpful, Bell said, was a five-year \$700-million contract to supply Iran with helicopters and training and logistic services.

Foreign military sales are engineered through a complex set of procedures and relationships that link the Pentagon, the State Department, the Washington offices of arms manufacturers and a number of associations that serve as a common

meeting ground for government and industry representatives.

Indeed, there are so many of these associations that a "Council of Defense and Space Industry Associations" coordinates their activities. Among the most influential of its members are the Aerospace Industries Association of America and the Electronic Industries Association.

Another important organization is the American Defense Preparedness Association, administered by H. A. Miley Jr., a four-star general who retired two months ago as head of the Army Materiel Command.

"What we do is develop a rapport between the services and industry," General Miley said in an interview.

An Image Campaign

Although former officers such as General Miley tend to talk without embarrassment about sales of military hardware, many manufacturers' spokesmen are not so forthcoming. The FMC Corporation, for example, objects to being listed as an important arms supplier.

"We don't exactly like being labeled international warmongers," said an FMC spokesman.

Part of the company's current image-making program is a four-color advertisement that shows a worker planting seeds in a rice paddy. The headline of the ad (for an FMC insecticide) says: "Every seed has one precious chance at life."

Documents filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, however, portray another side of FMC. They disclose what every arms buyer knows — that in addition to insecticides and food machinery, FMC produces tracked personnel carriers, automatic naval gun mounts and guided-missile launching systems.

The documents also show how profitable the sale of such products can be. In 1974 FMC's defense business of \$170.5-million accounted for only 8.5 per cent of the company's sales but contributed 20 per cent of its pretax earnings.

Vast Export Trade

How do foreign arms sales of American companies compare with domestic military sales? In fiscal 1974, the Defense Department spent \$15.2-billion for weapons and other items such as food and uniforms. During the same period, foreign orders for American-made weapons totaled more than \$8-billion.

The United States is by far the world's largest exporter of weapons. According to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the United States was responsible in 1973 (the last full year for which such statistics are available) for 54.4 per cent of the world's arms exports. The Soviet Union was second with 27.5 per cent.

Other countries, such as France and Britain, also sell

large quantities of military equipment. Britain, for example, is reported to be negotiating a major arms deal with Libya that could include hundreds of millions of dollars worth of fighters, warships and other military hardware.

In the past, weapons produced by American manufacturers often were given away to allies by the United States Government or were financed with loans guaranteed by the Defense Department or the Export-Import Bank.

Most arms sales today, however, are for cash. In fiscal 1974 the Defense Department made loans of only \$1.4-billion, mostly to Israel. The Export-Import Bank extended credits of \$200-million, all for Iran. Outright gifts of arms amounted to \$789-million, nearly half for Cambodia.

One increasingly controversial aspect of foreign arms sales involves their influence on domestic sales and product development.

Paul Kinsinger, a researcher at the Brookings Institution in Washington, recently chronicled Iran's increasing involvement in American weapon procurement.

A decade ago, he pointed out, Iran purchased the F-5A interceptor, a relatively unsophisticated plane designed by Northrop exclusively for export to less-developed countries.

By 1970 Iran had progressed by buying the up-to-date F-4E, manufactured by McDonnell Douglas.

In 1973 Iran, was allowed to buy the Grumman F-14 fighter, regarded by the Pentagon as the most advanced equipment available.

Last February the Secretary of Defense reported that the United States Navy had agreed to stretch its delivery schedule to give Iran equal priority during the F-14 production run. In effect, this would give Iran delivery of its F-14's before the Navy was fully supplied. In addition, Mr. Kinsinger said, both Iran and Israel have reportedly expressed interest in buying the Rockwell International Corporation's Condor missiles for their fighters, even though the Defense Department has not yet decided to use the Condor because of its high cost.

Critics in Congress

One of the most voluble watchdogs in Congress has been Senator Gaylord Nelson, a Wisconsin Democrat. He recently warned, "The level of United States weapons and training being provided into Iran and Saudi Arabia lead some people to believe that the United States is actually stimulating an arms race in the Persian Gulf."

One concession Congress has wrung out of the Pentagon is the right to veto any pending foreign military sale of more than \$25-million. However, a number of these notifications have been classified, effectively preventing any public debate.

Some of the classified transactions (such as an order for surface-to-surface Lance mis-

siles, sold to Israel by LTV) were later made public.

Others, however, remain classified. It is openly discussed on Capitol Hill that classified deals are now pending on jet fighters for Switzerland and rockets for Iran. The Swiss currently fly fighters made by the French and British.

In one analysis of arms sales abroad, the General Accounting Office, which represents Congressional interests, reported early this year that nearly 500 military technical assistance personnel in Iran had skills that were in "critically short" supply in United States military units.

Costs Are Noted

The G.A.O. also said that the Government had failed to recover at least \$10.5-million in administrative costs and \$24.2-million in interest costs on Export-Import Bank loans for foreign arms sales. The bank, it said, made the loans at lower interest rates than it paid for its borrowings, some of which were from the United States Treasury.

Arms manufacturers and their associations are quick to respond that they are maligned and misunderstood.

"Sometimes you get the feeling that the whole world is against you," said Jean A. Caffiaux, a vice president of the Electronic Industries Association.

"The assistance that foreign companies get from their governments is much greater than we get," he said. "Why, the ministers of defense in France and Britain are salesmen for their country's products."

Marshall J. Garret, an official

WASHINGTON POST

14 April 1975

S. Africa Gets A-Bomb Type U.S. Uranium

By Thomas O'Toole

Washington Post Staff Writer

The United States has shipped enough weapons-grade uranium for seven atomic bombs to South Africa, a nation that disarmament experts around the world believe has the means and motivation to make and test a nuclear weapon.

Under a contract with a company called U.S. Nuclear Corp. of Oak Ridge, Tenn., the United States has sent 97 pounds of highly enriched uranium to South Africa over the last year. A balance of 28 pounds of the same type of uranium is due to be delivered to South Africa under terms of the same contract.

The uranium has been sold to the South Africans for a large research reactor in the Transvaal, where South Africa makes its own radioisotopes

of the Aerospace Industries Association of America, agreed.

"Our buddies up on Capitol Hill have no concept of the hell we have to go through to make a sale," he said. "Probably the least-known fact in the United States is the Government's absolute and utter control of the export of munitions. We have to get a license from Munitions Control of the State Department before we talk to even a friendly country."

Notwithstanding the red tape, the aerospace industry clearly has profited from its military exports. The Defense Department was its biggest customer last year spending more than \$13-billion with aerospace companies. And military exports were up 27 per cent from the year-earlier level.

The aerospace industry's profit margin has improved dramatically from a low in 1971, when earnings after taxes were 1.8 per cent of sales, to 2.4 per cent in 1972, then 2.9 per cent in 1973 and 3.4 per cent in 1974. While the aerospace margin is still well below the average of 6 per cent for all manufacturers, its improvement has been steady.

One subject that arises when foreign military contracts are discussed is kickbacks, which often must be paid by American suppliers to middlemen in the buying country.

Richard R. Violette, director of sales negotiations for the Defense Security Assistance Agency in the Pentagon, testified last summer that "commissions" of up to 10 per cent were required in some commercial foreign arms sales but that larger sales often required pay-

ments of only 2 per cent.

"In many countries, corruption is a serious problem," said a Senate aide. "In Lebanon, the size of the kickback is the determining factor in what weapons system is selected."

Company and association officials take a more benign view of such "commissions" or "agents' fees." They dislike them, they say, but find them a necessary part of doing business in many parts of the world.

Although some countries remain more difficult to deal with than others, there has been some attempt to reduce the kickback problem. Shab Mohammed Riza Pahlevi of Iran, for example, has barred all commissions on sales of military equipment in his country.

Although arms manufacturers are not happy with kickbacks abroad, they are more likely to complain in private about too much United States Government "massaging" of their deals with foreigners.

Leonard A. Alne, who spent five years as director of the Defense Department's office of military sales and is now a consultant to Northrop, Raytheon and the Westinghouse Electric Corporation, sketched a picture of resentful arms manufacturers entangled in red tape and engulfed by a rising tide of criticism from Congress.

"As far as I'm concerned," he said, "the less 'policy' we have the better. There's a knee-jerk reaction about this business—that it's inherently villainous. But every transaction and every country are different."

and studies the effects of neutrons on metallic materials.

The amount of uranium already shipped to South Africa would be enough for seven nuclear weapons, according to disarmament experts. With the 28 pounds owed South Africa under contract, it could make another two.

"South Africa has the fear to want to build a bomb, and it has the technical skill to be able to build a bomb," said Rep. Les Aspin (D-Wis.), who broke the news that the federal government had authorized the uranium shipment to South Africa. "All it needs is weapons-grade uranium, and the U.S. government is now supplying that," he said.

Weapons-grade uranium is that form of the metal that contains 80 per cent or more of uranium-235, the isotope that undergoes nuclear fission and creates a chain reaction. The normal nuclear power fuel is enriched with no more than 3 to 6 per cent uranium-235, just enough to produce some fissioning but nowhere near enough for a nuclear explosion.

The uranium shipped and still owed to South Africa is

93.32 per cent uranium-235, making it the "highly enriched" uranium prized for weapons. It is used in research reactors because it produces a high power level for more types of study into nuclear physics.

The United States shipped South Africa 83.4 pounds of the highly enriched uranium last year. It has made two shipments so far this year, one in January of seven pounds and another earlier this month of seven pounds. Another 28.4 pounds of the highly enriched uranium is still owed.

Experts disagree how much weapons-grade uranium is needed to make a bomb, but most say that 14 pounds of the metal is enough to fashion a small weapon.

In confirming that the uranium shipments were authorized to South Africa, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission said the sales were approved only after South Africa agreed to safeguards that would prohibit the diversion of the uranium out of the research reactor.

Western Europe

Friday, April 4, 1975

THE WASHINGTON POST

Soviet Envoy Exploits Openings in Lisbon

By Miguel Acoca

Special to The Washington Post

LISBON, April 2 — The most successful diplomat in Portugal today is Arnold I. Kalinin, 45, the dapper new-breed Soviet ambassador who moves discreetly amid headlines stressing Moscow's support and sympathy for the Portuguese revolution.

Ambassador Kalinin's task has been made easy by U.S. and North Atlantic Alliance hostility toward the ruling leftwing military, who have made it clear that they cannot govern Portugal without sharing power with the Portuguese Communist Party, nor free the country's colonies without the international cooperation of the Communist world.

In the mini-Cold War raging over Portugal, the position of the bright and affable U.S. ambassador, Frank C. Carlucci, has been made difficult, if not impossible, by continuing NATO maneuvers off the coast of Portugal and by the statements of U.S. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger. Recently Kissinger contradicted the essence of a Carlucci speech in which he had expressed a measure of understanding for the idealism of the officers who deposed Portugal's rightist dictatorship last year.

While nobody talks about Soviet KGB agents using Kalinin's embassy for cover, Carlucci's image has been tarred with allegations that he is a top CIA operative assigned to destabilize Portugal and reverse the socialist thrust of the revolution.

In the past week, while the Soviet Union won applause from the labor minister following his week-long visit to Moscow, arranged by Kalinin, the U.S. ambassador was reduced to defending himself against sensational CIA charges. The embassy went so far as to invoke the press law, which carries penalties for insulting foreign diplomats.

Ruling military moderates, among them senior advisers of President Francisco da Costa Gomes, are frankly distressed by a situation forcing them to strengthen Portugal's ties with the Soviet Union because "Nobody in the West is willing to help us so long as Washington remains aloof."

They added: "Before our revolution, nobody wanted to help us because we were a right-wing colonialist dictatorship. Now that we are freeing the colonies and trying to create a pluralistic democracy, nobody wants to help us because we're left-wing. We can only conclude that the sad truth is that nobody really wants to help Portugal because it is Portugal."

This bitterness extends to the United States in particular and NATO in general. President Costa Gomes and Premier Vasco dos Santos Goncalves had assured Carlucci and ambassadors from other NATO countries that Portugal fully intends to remain an active and loyal NATO member despite its revolutionary process.

In an interview with Sen. Edward Brooke (R-Mass.), the premier expressed dismay that the United States and NATO question Portugal's commitment to the Western alliance. Both the president and the premier, in fact, have repeatedly tried to allay NATO fears, but without any apparent success.

As far as can be determined, Kalinin, like the Portuguese Communists, has not made NATO an issue. The Soviet ambassador reportedly gave Carlucci assurances, during an informal lunch given by the American, that Moscow has no designs on Portugal other than to expand contacts and influence as in other NATO countries.

Yet there is no question that Moscow is carefully moving into the power vacuum caused by the loss of influence and prestige during its long association with the deposed dictatorship and its apparent support for Gen. Antonio de Spinola. Spinola's hostility to his former revolutionary associates led to an attempted coup last month.

According to senior moderate officers, the United States and NATO appeared prepared to help Portugal until Spinola resigned as president last September, warning that the country was headed for a Communist takeover. These officers charged that the turning point of relations with the United States was Spinola's

dismissal of President Richard Nixon on the Azores Islands last summer.

Officers at the meeting said the original friendly communique, implying massive U.S. aid, was withdrawn following the general's private talk with Nixon. No other Portuguese official was present at this conversation. Nixon's interpreter acted as translator and Spinoza never disclosed the content of the discussion to the Cabinet.

Spinoza told an aide, however, that he had corrected a number of American misconceptions on the revolution conveyed by the embassy in Lisbon, giving the impression that the general had been highly critical of former U.S. Ambassador Stuart Nash Scott.

Unlike Carlucci, the Soviet ambassador has good revolutionary credentials. Moscow supported the Portuguese Communist Party throughout 50 years of persecution under the dictatorship. A lawyer by education, Kalinin served in Cuba before becoming the Soviet Union's first ambassador to Portugal. He arrived last spring, and almost at once Portugal began to trade with Russia and Communist Europe.

Kalinin and his delegation of some 35 diplomats moved into a modern, six-story apartment building a block away from Communist Party headquarters in Lisbon. Indications are that he has been careful to avoid conspicuous contact with Communist Party Secretary General Alvaro Cunhal, a Moscow protege who adheres to the Soviet ideological line.

Most Soviet embassy personnel speak excellent Portuguese, receive visitors politely, often offer them coffee or vodka in a second floor waiting room. The Soviets have also opened a consulate, a commercial mission and a merchant marine office for tourist, cargo and fishing vessels which have been docking in Portugal since last summer.

In all there are an estimated 80 Soviet officials in Lisbon, plus a resident Tass correspondent. Western sources estimate that among them are five or six KGB

agents.

At present Kalinin is looking for an embassy residence to match the elegant "palacos" of the Western ambassadors.

Whatever Moscow's long-term strategy may be, Kalinin has played his role with professional discretion. He has invited key Armed Forces Movement officers to visit Moscow, congratulated the ruling military after putting down last month's attempted coup, and made no waves in Portugal's tense Cold War atmosphere. He speaks Portuguese with a Cuban Spanish accent.

Significantly, his best friend in Lisbon is the Cuban ambassador, whose legation is among the most active in Portugal. Moscow, in fact, may well be using Cuba as a model for Portugal even though Western diplomats insisted that the "Kremlin doesn't want the responsibility of carrying this country."

The stakes are much bigger than the tiny Iberian country of 9 million. They include the future of Portugal's former African empire as well as the pattern of Communist power in southern Europe.

When asked about the danger of a confrontation with the West over the increasing Soviet influence in strategic Portugal and its former African colonies, a Soviet diplomat replied: "It's happening all over the world. Are you afraid?"

Pravda Criticizes NATO on Portugal'

Agence France-Presse

Moscow, April 3 — The Soviet Communist Party daily Pravda, today accused NATO of interfering in Portuguese internal affairs.

The newspaper quoted the deputy commander of NATO's Lisbon-based command as saying: "NATO is essentially an organization directed against Communism and since the Communists are participating in the government we have taken the logical necessary measure."

East Asia

NEW YORK TIMES
13 April 1975

Indochina Without Americans: For Most, a Better Life

By SYDNEY H. SCHANBERG

PHNOM PENH—The spectacle of the Americans being evacuated from Cambodia—with helicopters dropping from the skies and stony-faced Marines armed to the teeth protecting the Embassy evacuees from nothing, with curious crowds of Cambodians watching another American spectacle they did not understand and with Embassy homes being ransacked by military police immediately after the officials' departure—is perhaps a fair epitaph for American policy in Indochina, or at least in Cambodia.

After five years of helping a feudal government it scorned and fighting a war it knew was hopeless, the United States has nothing to show for it except a sad evacuation in which the Ambassador carried out the American flag in one hand and his Samsonite suitcase in the other.

There are, however, a million Cambodians killed or wounded (one seventh of the population), hundreds of thousands of refugees living in shanties, a devastated countryside, children dying of starvation and carpenters turning out a steady stream of coffins made from ammunition crates.

It's hard to declare that the Americans had good intentions in Cambodia—though some individual Americans did—because from the beginning, by Washington's own admission, its policy had nothing to do with Cambodians. It had to do with trying to distract and deflect the North Vietnamese long enough to remove American troops from Vietnam. And after that was done, in 1973, the Phnom Penh Government became an albatross that Washington did not know how to dispose of. So yesterday the Americans went home.

Many people have asked, over the long years of the Indochina war, what the consequences of American withdrawal from this peninsula will be.

Secretary of Defense Schlesinger has said flatly—and Secretary of State Kissinger obliquely—that Indochina is of no significant strategic or political importance to American interests. Its only importance, they have said, is in whether the rest of the world will interpret an American withdrawal from the region as a failure of Washington's credibility in failing to honor commitments.

But these concepts mean nothing to the ordinary people of Indochina and it is difficult to imagine how their lives could be anything but better with the Americans gone. For the American presence meant war to them, not paternal colonialism. The Americans brought them planes and Napalm and B-52 raids, not schools and roads and medical programs.

This is not to say that the Communist-backed governments which will replace the American clients can be expected to be benvolent. Already in Cambodia, there is evidence in the areas held by the Communist-led Cambodian insurgents that life is hard and inflexible, everything that Cambodians are not.

The insurgents have committed several village massacres in their present offensive, and the Americans have predicted a "bloodbath" when the rebels take over. On the other hand, Government troops who recently emerged from a besieged provincial town southwest of Phnom Penh reported matter-of-factly that they had cooked and eaten the bodies of dead insurgents when they ran short of food and that they had grown to enjoy it.

Wars nourish brutality and sadism, and sometimes certain people are executed by the victors but it would be tendentious to forecast such abnormal behavior as a national

policy under a Communist government once the war is over. Cambodia, being a country blessed with rich agricultural land and a relatively small population, can be revived without any major reconstruction program as would be necessary in an industrialized nation. In South Vietnam, the Mekong Delta can feed the population if the fighting stops and the land can be tilled.

A Different Asia

Both countries can expect economic aid from China and the Soviet Union, who may compete against each other for the dominant influence. It is also not unimaginable that under certain circumstances, such as through the United Nations, the United States might continue humanitarian aid. "The world changes fast these days," said an American Embassy official here the other day. "We'll be back here. It may take a couple of years, but we'll be back."

American troops came to Indochina because of what President Eisenhower first called the "domino theory." The theory was revived recently by President Ford, and while some political leaders in Thailand still subscribe to it because they have an active insurgency in their northern districts, no one else in Southeast Asia seems to. Some governments, such as that of Malaysia, believe that regional stability will be promoted if the Indochina states under Communist or Socialist governments join the present Association of Southeast Asian Nations known as ASEAN.

Some critics of American policy in Indochina have gone so far as to predict that the peninsula will become a virtual paradise once the Americans have gone. This is perhaps wishful polemics, for it is difficult to predict with any degree of confidence what Indochina will be like under Communism.

Some Indochinese, politically conscious Cambodians for example, are hoping that the insurgent leaders will be more nationalist than Communist, which would mean a future government would reflect more the gentle and flexible Khmer character than the rigid outlook of Hanoi or Peking.

But regardless of the final shape of these governments, the solutions that will be worked out will be essentially Asian. American ideas never stuck here because they were alien notions with time frames that demanded results in months, not generations.

And for Americans, whatever the sense of loss or frustration or failure for those who were involved, it has to be better not to be supporting Asian wars.

It is difficult to forget such scenes as an American military adviser from the Alabama countryside slapping his Vietnamese-officer counterpart on the back and condescendingly calling him "my little tiger." The Vietnamese officer, who had a Doctorate in Philosophy from the Sorbonne, could only lower his head and wince.

And the other day in Phnom Penh, an American military officer at the embassy was telling some newsmen about a successful government operation. "They killed 22 on the ground," he said zestfully, with a smile, "and that's pretty nice." This military officer is not a raving sadist and is in fact a rather civilized man in his other interests. But killing people is not "pretty," and it will be nice when Americans get out of the killing business in Indochina.

Sydney H. Schanberg, a New York Times correspondent who has been reporting on the war in Cambodia, chose to stay in Phnom Penh when other Americans were evacuated.

WASHINGTON POST
18 April 1975

The Refugee Strategy: 'A Fabrication'

The Post has printed another "vicious fabrication" in T. D. Allman's allegation that the U. S. deliberately followed a "refugee strategy" in Vietnam. At a time when you're calling for an end to mutual recriminations, why revive this old canard that U. S. policy "always has rested on the deliberate production of refugees"?

The massive refugee flow was a tragic but unplanned consequence of the way the war was fought—on both sides. True, our firepower created refugees but were the Tet offensive, the 1972 Easter offensive, and the present cataclysm (long after all U. S. troops had left) the product of U. S. strategy? And the fact that almost all refugees fled to the government side has long frustrated those who would have us believe that only U.S. shoring up of our puppet governments was what frustrated popular preference for the other side.

Allman's citations of USAID, General Westmoreland, and myself are grossly misleading. Of course, we sought to attrit the VC population base; control and support of the people is what the war was all about. But the way we sought to do it was by bringing security and economic revival to the countryside, not by forcing the farmers into the cities. Forced draft urbanization was never part of our policy, regardless of what Professor Huntington wrote (and as I told him at the time). In fact, once the tide turned our way in 1969-71 after Hanoi's Tet offensive was crushed, refugees began returning to the countryside.

The Pentagon Papers contain every secret policy directive issued from Washington from 1950 through 1968. Find me a single one that called for "depopulating the countryside." We made many mistakes in Vietnam, but this was not one of them.

R. W. Komer,
(former chief pacification
adviser to the GVN, 1967-68)

Alexandria.

How can a reader commend you for publishing such a needed, thoughtful, and balanced editorial as yours on "The Evacuation of Vietnam" on April 11, when next to it you place such a blatantly Hanoi-biased bit of propaganda as the article by T. D. Allman on "The Refugee Strategy"? Since my

WASHINGTON STAR
14 April 1975

Magazine Says Thieu Tried to Ship Gold Bars

NEW YORK (UPI) — South Vietnamese government officials tried unsuccessfully to persuade a Swiss charter airline to fly \$73 million worth of gold bullion from Saigon to Switzerland, Time Magazine reports.

Time said the Saigon officials last month asked Bal-

air, a charter line affiliated with Swissair, if it would airlift "some personal belongings" of South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu and Cambodian President Lon Nol.

The Magazine reported that Balair refused when it learned the cargo was 16 tons of gold, on the grounds

name was mentioned in the latter, which I look upon as a piece of shoddy, yellow journalism not worthy of your pages, I feel that I must respond to it since you saw fit to display it prominently.

The Allman piece is so filled with artful "disinformation" that I will limit myself only to the part in it referring to myself and the implications he draws from this. I trust that other Americans will respond to his calumny about them.

Allman credits me with stampeding a million Vietnamese to flee from North to South Vietnam 20 years ago. Perhaps I should feel flattered that anyone should believe that I have such persuasive powers. Instead, I am angry at his implied belittling of the intelligence and strong character of the Vietnamese people. There were far deeper, more profound reasons for the flight of these huge masses of the Vietnamese people 20 years ago than a few words that any foreigner among them could say. The same holds true for the great exodus from Vietnamese homes we are seeing today.

The Vietnamese have deep roots in their homes. Anyone who has lived among them cannot help but be struck by the closeness with which they hold their ancestors. Any uprooting from their ancestral homes is a climactic experience, a separation from a most meaningful and cherished part of their lives. Only great fear, terror about harm to a family can cause a Vietnamese family to move away from what is so dear to it. Today, as they did 20 years ago, the Vietnamese refugees are not fleeing from possible bombing by Americans. There were no American bombers then. There are none today. These Vietnamese are fleeing from Communist rule. This rule is an experience that the Vietnamese have seen at first hand. After 30 years of war, they are deaf to propaganda from any side. They judge only from what they have seen for themselves. And they're running away from the Communists, not towards them.

Admittedly, the leaders in Hanoi must feel a great loss of face that their behavior towards the Vietnamese people has caused so many to flee from them when given the chance. I can un-

derstand why they have lackeys provide alibis for them in the Western press. The great flight today, as 20 years ago, is taking place in front of the whole world, not behind the bamboo curtain of their authoritarian rule where what is seen and heard is under their control.

In the face of military victories, today's reaction of the Vietnamese people must be an excruciating humiliation to those who claim to lead the people. The recoiling reaction of the masses of Vietnamese people underscores the falseness of the self-appointed position of the Politburo in Hanoi and the leadership of the Lao Dong Party as spokesmen for the people. Self-appointed? The Vietnamese people have had little or no say in picking such spokesmen in the controlled and rigged elections of North Vietnam. Nor can the Vietnamese people believe that this Communist leadership stands for any values recognized as being Vietnamese. A foreign ideology and organization of society are being forced upon them by a determined group of "true believers". Or does Mr. Allman, or anyone else, actually think that Marx and Lenin, with their ideas and systems of control, are Vietnamese in origin?

The Vietnamese might appear to be hapless in the face of the overwhelming tragedy overtaking them, but they are not stupid. They might well turn upon Americans for deserting them in the agony of their desperate hour of need. Yet, this cannot be translated as meaning that they welcome Communist rule, as Mr. Allman implies. It astounds me that he tried to sell so shoddy an argument to Americans. After all, most of us are the descendants of our forefathers, refugees and slaves. We know how great is the longing for individual liberty among those who don't have it.

Give us honest information as we try to determine what best to do at this moment of history. We are close to our 205th anniversary as a nation. Help us be true to the principles towards which we have striven.

E. G. Lansdale,
Maj. Gen., U.S.A.F. (Ret.)

Alexandria.

NEW YORK TIMES
17 April 1975

FORD ASSERTS U.S. HAS FAILED SAIGON

Says Commitments on Aid
Were Not Met, Creating
a 'Tragic Situation'

By PHILIP SHABECOFF
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 16— President Ford said today that the failure of the United States to meet its commitments to Saigon had created "this present tragic situation" in South Vietnam.

Responding to questions at the annual convention of the American Society of Newspaper Editors, the President compared the United States behavior toward its South Vietnamese ally unfavorably with what he characterized as the fidelity of Moscow and Peking to Hanoi.

He said that this country had promised Saigon when the Paris peace accords were signed in January, 1973, that it would supply replacement war material to South Vietnam. He said he assumed that the Soviet Union and China had made similar commitments to North Vietnam.

"It appears that they have maintained that commitment,"

the President said. "Unfortunately the United States did not carry out its commitment in the supplying of military hardware and economic aid to South Vietnam."

"I wish we had," he continued. "I think if we had, this present tragic situation in South Vietnam would not have occurred."

Then, referring to a question about the estimated \$1.5-billion in aid to Hanoi from Moscow and Peking, the President added: "I don't think we can blame the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China in this case. If we had done with our allies what we promised, I think this whole tragedy could have been eliminated."

While not mentioning Congress, the President used some of the strongest language he has employed yet to condemn what he said was the American failure to keep its commitments to South Vietnam.

"For just a relatively small additional commitment in economic and military aid, relatively small compared to the \$150-billion that we spent, that at the last minute of the last quarter we don't make that special effort and now we are faced with this human tragedy. It just makes me sick every day I hear about it, read about it and see it."

'More Commitment'

Mr. Ford said that even now he was "absolutely convinced" that if Congress made available soon the \$722-million he had requested for military aid to Saigon, "the South Viet-

namese could stabilize the military situation in South Vietnam today."

A White House aide, asked later to identify the specific commitments the President was talking about, said that the United States had made no legal commitment to provide arms to South Vietnam. He also said that the Paris peace accords set a ceiling of a one-for-one replacement of arms in Indochina but did not bind the United States to provide the arms.

But the White House aid insisted that the United States had entered into a "moral commitment" to replace all South Vietnamese arms and ammunition. He said that this commitment was made in public statements by former President Nixon and members of his administration and affirmed in private communications from Mr. Nixon to President Nguyen Van Thieu of South Vietnam. The private communications said the same as the public statements, the aide said.

The aide cited three public documents that he described as the basis for the moral commitment. One was a United State-South Vietnamese communique issued at San Clemente, Calif., on April 3, 1973, in which Mr. Nixon "affirmed that the United States, for its part, expected to continue, in accordance with its Constitutional processes, to supply the Republic of Vietnam with the material for its defense consistent with the agreement on ending the war,"—that is, the Paris accord.

The communiqué and the two other documents cited—a tran-

script of a news conference of March 15, 1973, and President Nixon's report on foreign policy issued on May 3, 1973—refer chiefly to a generalized United States response to a violation of the Paris accord, and they contain no reference to a specific level of military aid. The United States has accused Hanoi of violating the accords.

In the question-and-answer session today, Mr. Ford said that he had personally reviewed the correspondence between President Nixon and President Thieu "and I can assure you that there was nothing in any of those communications that was different from what was stated as our public policy."

Not to Be Made Public

Mr. Ford also indicated that he would not make the Nixon-Thieu letters public, saying that "it is not the usual custom for correspondence between heads of states, as I understand it, to be released."

Senator Henry M. Jackson, Democrat of Washington, charged last week that the United States had made secret agreements with South Vietnam.

Answering questions from a panel of five editors at the convention, the President said that the United States would continue to supply military and economic aid to countries around the world.

But he said that such aid was not intended for the "containment of Communism." It was, he said, for "a furtherance of the policy of the United States aimed at our security and the maintenance of peace on a global basis."

Thursday, April 10, 1975

The Washington Star

How Assurances Pushed Thieu Into Paris Deal

By Henry S. Bradsher
Washington Star Staff Writer

The situation was sticky.

In Saigon, President Nguyen Van Thieu was refusing to sign the cease-fire agreement which Henry A. Kissinger had worked out with North Vietnam's Le Duc Tho.

After turning back the Communists' Easter 1972 offensive with the help of American air power, Thieu did not want to agree to political arrangements that would give the Viet Cong a foothold in the Saigon government or military arrangements for North Vietnamese troops to remain in the south.

But in Washington, the administration of then-President Richard M. Nixon felt itself under pressure.

The American people were tired of the war. They wanted U. S. troops home and prisoners back from North Vietnam. The 1972 presidential elec-

tion was imminent.

Kissinger, then Nixon's assistant for national security affairs, recognized this in promising that "peace is at hand" even while Thieu was obstructing an agreement.

TO OBTAIN what would for Americans be peace, even if not for the Vietnamese, intensive efforts were made to get Thieu to go along with a cease-fire agreement.

These efforts, according to Vietnamese officials, took several forms. There was a combination of threats to withdraw, even without Thieu's acquiescence if necessary, promises of massive supplies of military equipment to beef up the South Vietnamese armed forces, and assurances of continued American support.

These assurances have now become controversial. Sen. Henry M. Jackson, D-Wash., said Tuesday there were "secret agreements" be-

tween the United States and South Vietnam. The White House said yesterday there had been "private exchanges" along the same lines as public assurances.

Nixon sent letters — which might be termed either secret or private, for they were not disclosed at the time — to Thieu with the assurances. They were taken by Kissinger's then-deputy, Gen. Alexander M. Haig Jr., because Thieu had come to distrust Kissinger.

These were, the Vietnamese felt, pretty much take-it-or-leave-it assurances, because the American intention to disengage was clear. What is not clear even now is just how explicit the assurances were.

BASICALLY, official sources indicate, they amounted to pleas by Nixon for Thieu to trust him to maintain a tough policy. This left the situation somewhat fuzzy, at best.

It seemed to some observers to be

a typical Kissinger solution to a sticky problem — to leave the difficult details fuzzy and hope that the situation would work itself out in the future. But this time it fell apart.

The White House declined to disclose the terms of the assurances yesterday. Instead, it cited several statements by Nixon which repeated publicly in early 1973 the assurances of late 1972.

No one said at the time that the assurances had already been given privately. The fact that Nixon was firming up the private messages by going public with them was unspecified.

In his tough anti-Communist role, Nixon said on March 15, 1973, almost

two months after the Paris agreement was signed, that "I would only suggest that, based on my actions over the past four years, that the North Vietnamese should not lightly disregard" American expressions of concern over cease-fire violations.

NIXON TOLD Congress May 3, 1973, that "we have told Hanoi, privately and publicly, that we will not tolerate violations of the

agreement."

But did such warnings, and the assurances, specifically envisage renewed American military actions in Vietnam? The White House would neither confirm or deny it yesterday. The Vietnamese thought it did.

The key phrase, which by implication was in the Nixon letters to Thieu, was that the United States would "react vigorously" to any massive North Vietnamese violations. The White House said yesterday that the "private exchanges" were the same as public statements on providing "adequate economic and military assistance and to react vigorously to major violations. . . ."

Thieu used the phrase in a bitter complaint last Friday of American betrayal.

"When the Paris agreement was signed," Thieu said in a speech stating his determination to remain president in South Vietnam's present dire plight, "the U. S. government pledged that it would react

vigorously if the North Vietnamese Communists resumed their aggression and brazenly violated the Paris agreement."

WASHINGTON also pledged "sufficient economic and military aid" for South Vietnam to go on resisting the Communists, Thieu added.

But "U. S. economic aid has decreased and U. S. military aid has decreased even more," Thieu said. "The United States has not reacted vigorously as the government pledged it would, and it has tacitly let the Communists devote all of their armed forces to attacking the South while almost no troops remain in the North."

The idea that the United States let North Vietnamese troops go south implied an assurance that either diplomatic or military pressure would be applied to keep them at home. How was unclear.

The U. S. Air Force has continued to keep warplanes in Thailand for

possible use in Vietnam ever since the cease-fire. But, as the White House pointed out yesterday, Congress in 1973 "ruled out the possibility of American military reaction to violations of the agreement."

THE PUBLICIZED part of the American commitment at the time of the supposed cease-fire was a one-for-one replacement of South Vietnamese military equipment. This was not controversial in early 1973, seeming in Washington to be a relatively reasonable price for the expected peace.

But "replacements on the 'one for one' basis have not been made with regard to the damaged or lost equipment, tanks and artillery pieces," Thieu complained. This was true even before the massive South Vietnamese losses on recent weeks' panicky territorial losses.

LOS ANGELES TIMES

13 April 1975

What Kind of People?

Secretary of State Kissinger thought it was necessary, in urging more aid for South Vietnam, to exhort this nation "to show what kind of people we are."

The statement carried the implication that, because of the disaster in Vietnam, we have suffered a loss of courage, and are on a course that will betray our commitment to the South Vietnamese and to other allies.

Are we that kind of people?

A short 23 years after World War I—the war to make the world safe for democracy—the American people responded to Hitler, and 292,000 Americans died on battlefields scattered around the world.

In response to the needs of shattered nations—friends and foes alike—the American people spent \$12 billion under the Marshall Plan.

Only five years after the end of World War II, the American people responded to the invasion of South Korea. More than 33,000 Americans died in combat.

In little over a decade later, the American people went to the aid of South Vietnam and fought the longest—nearly 12 years—and most divisive war in our history, at a cost of 55,000 combat dead.

The motives and the wisdom of our leaders can be left to the judgment of history.

But nearly 500,000 combat dead, and the expen-

diture of hundreds of billions of dollars in little more than half a century, testify to the commitment of the American people.

To say that self-interest was part of this terrible sacrifice is only to say that the American people are not apart from other members of the human race. Whoever thought otherwise?

But in the American character, from the time of the founding of this nation to, yes, the present time, is a generosity of spirit and courage that cannot be denied.

If our allies, as a result of the tragedy of Vietnam, suggest that they have doubts about the will of this nation to undertake its responsibilities in the world, can they point to another nation that has more faithfully kept its commitments at greater sacrifice?

It long ago became obvious that Vietnam was a quagmire. Only the full military power of the United States, exerted at the sacrifice of millions of innocent lives, could have resolved the struggle in favor of South Vietnam. As it was, thousands died needlessly as the war was prolonged far past the possibility of victory at any rational cost.

What kind of people are we?

The history of this nation gives the answer. No friend should entertain any doubts, and no adversary should retain any delusion.

WASHINGTON POST
13 April 1975

Lee Kuan Yew

Southeast Asia: 'The End of an Era'

Lee Kuan Yew, prime minister of Singapore, delivered the following address April 7 to the New Zealand National Press Club:

I am not going to talk about dominoes. I have never played the game. Nor do I think it an appropriate figure of speech for the tragedy we are witnessing in South Vietnam and Cambodia. What is happening there is having a profound effect on the minds of other in Southeast Asia, particularly Cambodia's immediate neighbors, the Thais.

The Nixon Doctrine, announced in Guam in 1969, that America will materially help those who are ready to help themselves, died with Watergate. Everyone knew that no American soldier would ever fight a guerrilla in Asia after the Paris agreement of January 1973 allowed the Americans to disengage with honor. By August 1973, the American Congress has interdicted their President from using American bombers in Southeast Asia without congressional approval.

Nixon resigned in August 1974. There has been no time to spell out a Ford Doctrine. But he did try to define his aid policy on South Vietnam, namely three more years of military and economic aid before a final cutoff. We knew that the American Congress did not agree with their President.

The new Thai prime minister has now publicly asked American forces to leave within a year. Since American forces cannot help them on land or in the air, the Thais might as well make a virtue of requesting an American military withdrawal. From a symbol of power and security, they have become obstacles to a change in posture, which must precede a change of relationships with the other great powers.

I doubt if any Thai government, civilian or military, will want to be engaged in the kind of guerrilla insurgency that has crushed Cambodia and South Vietnam. Rather than go through that mincing machine, it makes more sense to seek political and diplomatic solutions. Adjustment and accommodation to changed circumstances are necessary. Thais and others in Southeast Asia know that the patience and perseverance of Americans have not matched that of the Communists, not simply Communists in Vietnam, but also their suppliers,

*"From a symbol
of power and security,
Americans have become
obstacles to a change
in posture."*

the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union. Since the Thais are unlikely to be able to make amends to the North Vietnamese for the damage which the American B52s, using air bases in Thailand, have caused, it will be easier for them to befriend China than North Vietnam. After all, Thailand did no harm to China. In any case, the Chinese have shown themselves to be more reliable friends, to judge from their support of what once looked the hopeless cause of Prince Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge.

The rest of Southeast Asia will have to live with whatever political accommodation the Thais make. Fortunately, Thailand has ample time to work out what is in her best interests, for the North Vietnamese will take many years to mend a war-shattered Vietnam before undertaking further adventure in helping Thai insurgents. And the Khmer Rouge or GRUNK, the acronym for Prince Sihanouk's government, will be busy not only repairing the shattered economy of Cambodia and her displaced people, but also preventing the Vietnamese Communists from becoming the dominant influence over their country. In fact, Prince Sihanouk took elaborate pains to state that Cambodia's number one friend will always be the People's Republic of China. If Khieu Sam Phan and any other Khmer Rouge leaders share this view, then Hanoi's capacity for aiding and abetting insurgency may not reach Thailand other than through Laos to the northeast of Thailand.

Thailand's southern neighbor, Peninsular Malaysia, has a completely different situation. Malaysia's guerrilla movement has always been, and still is, led by ethnic Chinese. For a Com-

munist insurgency to succeed, the rebels must throw up Malay leaders to have a better ethnic balance in the leadership. Only in this way can they get more representative support from the ground. While this is not impossible, it will take a very long time, if it can be done at all.

An era has come to an end. America was the dominant power in Southeast Asia for 30 years since the end of World War II. Once America acknowledged that she could no longer intervene in Southeast Asia, it is fair to assume that the contest for influence over the peoples in the region will be mainly between the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union, both of whom openly avow their duty to help Communists everywhere and to promote revolution. The fate of Southeast Asian countries is to be caught in a competitive clash between these two.

China has the advantage of historic associations with the region. Memories of past tributes paid and an awareness of geographical proximity make all in Southeast Asia anxious not to take sides with the Soviet Union against the Chinese, even though the Soviet Union is ahead on military technology. Most hope to maintain equal relations with both China and the Soviet Union. But this may not be possible unless these two Communist centers cease to compete for ideological and nationalist supremacy—a prospect which appears remote.

Meanwhile, a continuing American naval presence and increased economic relations will help the rest of Southeast Asia to adjust less abruptly and to make the task of learning to live with a Communist Indochina less painful.

LOS ANGELES TIMES
13 April 1975

National Interest Has Not Been Seriously Damaged

BY RICHARD HOLBROOKE

The world as portrayed on television and in print suddenly looked grim and hostile. The secretary of state talked freely of the decline of the West and discerned "a moment of potentially grave danger." Time and Newsweek splashed across their covers dramatic

Richard Holbrooke is managing editor of Foreign Policy magazine. As a Foreign Service officer, he was stationed in South Vietnam for three years. He also was a member of the U.S. delegation to the Paris peace talks on Vietnam.

cartoons and photographs to reinforce the image of worldwide crisis. "A historic seven days in March," Time said, "that saw the decline of old hopes and the rise of new dangers. The world had not witnessed such a week . . . since early November, 1956 . . ."

The President went before Congress to appeal for renewed military assistance to South Vietnam, saying that the national interest and world stability were at stake, and that our allies elsewhere—particularly in other parts of Asia—feared desertion.

How serious is the danger to the United States, and who is in fact hurt by recent "setbacks" in Portugal, the Middle East and, most important, Indochina? What damage has been done to our national security and international standing?

The answer, I think, is not very much. There are serious issues at stake in each area, and certain interests have been battered, but they are not—with one possible exception, the Middle East—the national interests of our nation that have been seriously hurt. Let us look more closely.

In Vietnam a human tragedy of historic proportions is unfolding. In Cambodia the situation is, if anything, even grimmer. The United States is powerless to act in either case, its hands tied by a law enacted by Congress in 1973 prohibiting all U.S. military activity in, on, or over Indochina as of Aug. 15, 1973.

Three times in the years before that historic prohibition—which we can see in retrospect as even more important than it seemed at the time—the North Vietnamese had staged a major offensive. Each time the South Vietnamese were "saved" only by the massive use of American military muscle.

Where, then, was the basis of the American hope that if the North Vietnamese came again, the Saigon government could hold out without any American military help?

It is by no means simply an exercise in history to examine what went wrong. The Paris

ceasefire agreements, signed with such fanfare in January of 1973, were a relatively simple deal. The positive part of the deal was simplicity itself: we would remove our remaining troops from Vietnam and stop bombing in return for the release of American prisoners of war. The two negative elements were more important, because each side gave up something which it had long sought through both warfare and negotiations. The United States gave up its demand that the North Vietnamese remove their troops from South Vietnam, and Hanoi dropped its insistence that the United States dump President Thieu before it released our prisoners. It was these two concessions that made the ceasefire possible.

The final part of the deal was potentially the most important—a series of deliberately loose and ambiguous clauses that it was hoped would start the two Vietnamese sides toward a political compromise.

★

But this fell apart rapidly, as most people expected. And in the American failure to use our full influence and leverage on Saigon to try to make a compromise with the other side, we laid the ground for the present debacle.

Why then portray the collapse of the Thieu regime as a blow to America? Why escalate the rhetoric and overdramatize the strategic importance of the event, already long ago discounted by every knowledgeable observer?

The answer must lie deep in the private thoughts of two people, President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger. They have reacted to events in a way which has been, in my estimation, the single greatest contributor to the sense of alarm.

The debacle in Indochina undoubtedly has made an impact on some of the other countries of Asia, particularly Thailand, Japan and Korea. It is possible, as feared by Kissinger, that these countries will view Saigon's difficulties in gaining more American assistance as warnings of things to come in their own relationships with the United States. But this fear is one which can and must be dealt with—not by pouring more treasure down the sinkhole of Indochina, but by reaffirming or building anew our bilateral relations with those countries which are of genuine importance to us. Japan and Korea, closely interrelated, certainly are countries which fall into such a definition.

As the military protector of Japan, we play a unique role in the Pacific. If we were to abandon that role, I suspect that in time, say over a 10-year period, the Japanese would

move toward rebuilding their own military capability, and that would have serious adverse consequences for stability and peace in Asia. The key to our relations with Japan, however, does not lie in events in Saigon, but in direct communication with Tokyo. The same goes for Bangkok, Seoul and the other key capitals of Asia. The domino theory, even in its new sophisticated form, should not trap us into remaining forever in the Indochina quagmire; indeed, it is that entrapment which has done more to weaken us than any other thing.

As for the Middle East, the situation is totally different, and if it were not for the coincidence of the two events happening simultaneously, there would be no connection in anyone's mind. The reason for the setback to step-by-step diplomacy in the Middle East lies in the problem of the Middle East itself. That Kissinger failed was a shame; that he tried was to his credit.

The situation is dangerous but not hopeless. There is no effort here to dismiss it lightly. But we must recognize the difference between personal setbacks and national crises, and between human tragedies and strategic defeats.

Our real strength as a nation must be recognized. It is not jingoistic for us to recognize that around the world we are still regarded, and rightly, as the most powerful political, military, economic and cultural force that has existed since World War II. In an era when inflation and unemployment are serious concerns, we have been hurt less by inflation than any other major country except Germany; our strength as an agricultural power, despite the current problems of our farmers, remains a unique part of our international strength; and our currency still forms the base of the world financial system.

I am not trying to wave the flag blindly. We do not need to dominate the world in order to live peacefully in it. We have many problems, one of which is the erosion of self-confidence of Americans, particularly among our so-called leadership elite. Nevertheless, Indochina and the Middle East are, if the harsh truth be spoken, old crises, remnants of the past.

To confuse setbacks on either front with basic weaknesses in our nation is wrong. What is wrong with our nation lies within us, not in events overseas, events that yield only slightly to American influence. What is happening is compelling and tragic, but it should not be confused with the decline of the West.

BALTIMORE SUN
17 April 1975

Five years of agony

Cambodia went to war, plunged into disaster

By ARNOLD R. ISAACS
Sun Staff Correspondent

Saigon—All wars are tragedies, but the war in Cambodia had a ghastly agony all its own.

The Cambodians were victims not of their own actions but of the conflict between the Americans and the Vietnamese-Communists. Under Prince Norodom Sihanouk Cambodia managed to stay out of the earlier phases of the Vietnam war, but in 1969 both the Americans and the Viet Cong began stepping up their activities on the Cambodian side of the frontier.

In March, 1970, the prince was overthrown and the war next door fell on his helpless country like a brick wall.

By the end of the first year, the American-backed Lon Nol government had already lost, and watching the rest of the conflict was like watching someone die, far too slowly and in terrible pain.

At the end Cambodians were dying not only in battle but also of starvation and disease in the few government-held cities, and as the final months wore on it grew increasingly harder to see any purpose in the continued carnage.

American aid kept the corpse of the Khmer Republic twitching long after its ultimate fate was certain, and one of the heaviest U.S. bombing campaigns of the whole Indochina conflict contributed to the devastation of the country, its people and its spirit.

At the end, no American aim had been accomplished. The war's conclusion left the battered, bleeding country in the hands of the world's least-known Communist movement, led by men who remained virtually anonymous shadows.

The question of who was to blame for the Cambodian tragedy is still debated, but the only fair answer must be that both the Vietnamese Communists and the United States bear a deep responsibility.

For years, the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong had used base areas in Cambodia near the border as sanctuaries where they could train, rest, and organize for their war in Vietnam.

Prince Sihanouk tacitly sanctioned their activities, realistically recognizing that he was powerless to prevent them without drawing his country into a war it could only lose.

Despite the urging of his military commanders, President Lyndon B. Johnson refused to allow military action in Cambodian territory. But when former President Nixon took office he authorized bombing of the sanctuaries.

The bombing, which was kept secret, began in Mr. Nixon's first year in office, 1969, with false records of the raids made up to show the missions carried out in Vietnam.

Perhaps as a result of the bombing, perhaps because of other factors, Viet Cong forces in the area began to expand their areas and clashed more frequently with units of Cambodia's small paratrooper Army.

More for racial than for political reasons, the Cambodians were deeply angered. Anti-Vietnamese demonstrations broke out and the prince's policy of sanctioning Viet Cong activity came under attack.

Finally March 18, 1970, while the prince was traveling abroad, the oncedocile National Assembly voted him out of office, and a new government headed by Marshal Lon Nol was installed to go openly to war against the Communists.

Vietnamese civilians were among the first victims, with thousands murdered in massacres and the survivors fleeing to Vietnam.

In the first months, Cambodians went to war willingly. Historical anti-Vietnamese feeling was one factor. Among urban Cambodians there was also genuine enthusiasm for the new government, since Prince Sihanouk's eccentric personal autocracy had become unpopular.

Six weeks after the overthrow, President Nixon took advantage of the new political circumstances to order U.S. units into Cambodia to join South Vietnamese forces that already had begun to cross the border.

The invasion touched off an inflamed debate in the United States where people were already hoping for an American exit from the war, and Mr. Nixon set a two-month time limit on the American presence in Cambodia. He described the operation as needed to save American lives in Vietnam, and explicitly denied a commitment to defend the new government. But in Cambodia, the expectations of American help were raised.

"They were naive," a diplomat in the Cambodian capital said a couple of years later. "They thought the Americans were the same Americans of 1963, that they would rain down money, soldiers, and so on.

"Somehow the Cambodians seemed unable to grasp that by the time their war began, the Americans were on the way out of Indochina, not in, and the last thing the American public would allow would be a major commitment of American forces to a new Southeast Asia war."

The early enthusiasm was not enough to match the superior arms and quality of the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese infantry. The Cambodians suffered defeat after defeat, and the last traces of morale were shattered in late 1971, when the most ambitious Cambodian offensive of the war ended in disaster.

The operation was launched up High-

way 6 northeast of Phnom Penh to relieve the province capital of Kompong Thom. The advancing troops actually reached the town, to a fanfare of triumphant communiques in the capital, but as the lead elements reached the objective the Communists cut the road behind them, trapping and destroying 20 battalions.

After that defeat the Army's spirit evaporated. It hardly ever went on the offensive again, and the following spring it gave up virtually all of Cambodia east of the Mekong River except for a few isolated enclaves.

Among the units largely destroyed in the first years of the war were those considered Cambodia's best—the Khmer Krom units, recruited from ethnic Cambodians in Vietnam.

By mid-1972, Cambodians already had lost hope of victory.

"The country is broken," a journalist said then, repeating a common Khmer expression. Phnom Penh, an attractive city of broad boulevards lined with flowering trees and low mustard-colored buildings, was already filling up with refugees from the fighting.

Although their plight was nowhere near as tragic as it would become later in the war, they already were finding it difficult to find work in the overcrowded city and to buy food at war-inflated prices. The refugees were getting little assistance from the government.

The disintegration of the Army's spirit also was apparent by the second year of the war. At one forward position, government howitzers that had been banging away all one cloudless afternoon fell silent after a single Communist recoilless rifle round cracked into the earthworks around the command post. "If we don't shoot," an officer shamefacedly explained, "they don't shoot."

The flaws in the Army were never to be rectified. Road-bound because there was no ration system, troops were unable to operate off the main routes and secure their flanks. Troops in combat normally had to retreat after only a day or so because they would run out of food. This remained a crippling handicap right to the end of the war.

While the Army was losing battle after battle, the Lon Nol government quickly fell into a swamp of sickening corruption and inefficiency from which it never emerged, and which rapidly drained away the popular support it had enjoyed in the beginning.

Truck drivers told of paying bribes at 17 police or Army checkpoints in a 35-mile journey. Almost any item of U.S.-supplied equipment could be bought on the black market. The Army at one point had 300,000 troops on the payroll but probably only half that many actually in service, with corrupt officers pocketing the salaries of the other half. The simplest transaction at any government office could not be carried out without a bribe.

High-ranking officers who benefited

from the graft lived at what one diplomat once called "Hollywood heights" of luxury—hundreds of posh villas costing \$50 to \$70 a month.

Ordinary civilians and soldiers paid a heavy price for the venality of the military elite.

In the mediocally filthy military hospitals, wounded soldiers had to pay for medicine or go untreated, because so much medicine had been sold on the black market. Soldiers went unpaid for weeks and their families lived on one inadequate meal a day while their officers bought gleaming new cars.

"This government," one diplomat declared several years ago, "doesn't give anyone in the country any reason to fight for it." Right up to the war's end there was no reason to change that assessment.

In the fortress-like U.S. Embassy in Phnom Penh, the 200 military and civilian American officials regularly wrung their hands, asked the Cambodians to change things, and sent hopeful messages back to Washington predicting the situation would improve.

The Cambodians just as regularly promised to reform and did nothing, and the American government continued to finance the whole mess.

It did not take long for the Americans to conclude that Marshal Lon Nol was not proving an effective leader, to put it mildly, and there was some relief when the marshal, who then held the title of prime minister, suffered a stroke in 1971 and left for medical treatment in Hawaii.

He returned, though, and the following March he assumed dictatorial powers, declared himself president, legalized his actions with a personally tailored Constitution, and was elected president in voting that was widely believed to have been flagrantly rigged.

From then on, though successive American ambassadors regarded him as a liability, the partially paralyzed president stayed on—finally leaving early this month, when it could no longer make much difference.

There was one hope in the early years of the war—that if the Vietnamese could somehow be gotten out of the picture, the normally peaceful Cambodians could settle their affairs rather easily.

To many on the government side it was a hopeful development when, beginning in 1972, Khmer Communist units began appearing on the battlefields along with the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong.

Khmer would not fight Khmer, many Cambodians thought. There were even hopes that the Cambodian Communist units would, once they were strong enough, turn against the North Vietnamese and join with elements on the republic's side.

Those hopes were crushed. As Khmer units took over more and more of the combat on the insurgent side they proved just as implacable enemies—and came to be crueler to civilians than the North Vietnamese had ever been.

The "Khmerization" of the war was virtually complete by mid-1973. North Vietnamese advisers remained with most Khmer units for another year, and Vietnamese specialists continued to man artillery and sapper units.

bore a striking resemblance to President Nixon's Vietnamization of the war across the border.

American involvement in the Cambodian war was wrapped from its beginning in controversy, official deception, false hopes and tragic miscalculations.

President Ford, in announcing his request for a military aid supplement this year, said the U.S. objective in Cambodia "is to restore peace and to allow the Khmer people an opportunity to decide freely who will govern them. To this end, our immediate goal in Cambodia is to facilitate an early negotiated settlement."

Other administration statements spoke of a commitment to Cambodia as if that had been the U.S. position from the start. In fact, at the beginning of the war the United States specifically rejected a commitment to defend the Khmer regime, and none was explicitly acknowledged until fairly late in the war.

When President Nixon sent U.S. troops into Cambodia in 1970 he declared that his purpose—and the legal justification for his decision—was the protection of American soldiers in Vietnam, not the protection of another client state in Indochina.

Indeed, the initial American military aid grant of a few million dollars to the Cambodian government came, in effect, from the petty cash drawer, with no congressional appropriation.

However, in the first three years American military aid amounted to about a half-billion dollars, not counting the cost of the American bombing, which Mr. Nixon authorized after the ground troops were withdrawn.

Still, the rationale was protecting Americans, not defending Cambodians, and it did not change until the signing of the Paris peace agreement, which took effect January 28, 1973, and led to the pullout of the remaining U.S. troops in Vietnam.

The agreement proclaimed no cease-fire in Cambodia or Laos. It required the signatories to withdraw their troops and "put an end to all military activities" in those two countries—but without setting any timetable. The American bombing in Cambodia stopped briefly but within days President Nixon ordered it resumed on the ground the North Vietnamese were violating the agreement by remaining in the country.

The North Vietnamese, of course, might just as well have argued it was the Americans who were violating the clause against military activities.

In the first weeks after the Paris pact, Henry A. Kissinger, the chief U.S. negotiator, kept predicting a "de facto cease-fire" in Cambodia, hinting though not saying explicitly that it would come as the result of an unpublished understanding with the North Vietnamese.

No cease-fire developed, and in a decision that still has not been fully explained, the United States began in late March to intensify the bombing.

The five-month air war that followed was as deeply disturbing as any American action in the entire Indochina war. It was undoubtedly far more destructive than the Christmas bombing of Hanoi a few months earlier, and though there

most journalists and non-American diplomats who were there at the time believe the toll of civilian deaths must have been very high.

The sortie rate was greatly increased, with an average of 50 B-52 raids and about 150 to 200 fighter-bomber strikes a day.

At times, though, the bombing was heavier. There were days when every available B-52 in Southeast Asia, about 120 bombers, hit Cambodian targets.

In addition, while the previous bombing had been in the thinly populated eastern third of the country—code-named "Freedom Deal" by the Air Force—the spring campaign in 1973 shifted much of the air power to direct support of Cambodian troops fighting in populated areas near Phnom Penh.

Numerous villages were simply pulverized, whole stretches of major highways were so thoroughly carpet-bombed that not a house or tree stood on the blackened earth for miles.

The intensified bombing was designed, American officials said, to convince the insurgents they could not win on the battlefields and thus force a negotiated settlement.

No peace talks developed, however, and the dispirited government Army continued to lose ground even while the air support was continuing. When the U.S. Congress legislated an end to American bombing, few believed Phnom Penh would hold out long past the August 15, 1973, cut-off date.

Somehow it did, and for the rest of the war Phnom Penh's survival had a grimly surrealistic quality. While all logic pointed to its collapse, the city hung on. It became impossible to believe the city would last and equally impossible to believe it would fall.

For the few privileged elite, the good life of tennis, nightclubs, expensive French meals and opulent brandy-drenched dinner parties went on almost to the very end, while the vast majority of the city's refugee swollen population sank into deeper and deeper misery.

One thing the United States did not do in the first four years of the war was give much help to its victims—and there were appalling numbers of them.

Precise estimates were impossible, but it was calculated that 10 per cent of the entire population of seven million was killed or wounded in the war. Of the five million remaining in Phnom Penh and other government-held enclaves, fully two million were refugees, by the government's estimate.

Another half-million military dependents were also refugees, in effect, since the lack of an allotment system forced nearly all of them to leave their homes and camp alongside the soldiers, even in the front lines, and inadequate Army pay left them in the same hunger and despair as the uprooted villagers in the towns.

Many more were certainly driven from their homes in insurgent zones. Altogether it is possible that half of all Cambodians lost their homes in the war. For long after it had become apparent that the war-ruined economy could no longer absorb the flood of refugees, the Americans spent only token sums for relief—less than \$1 million a year

for the first three years.

Until late 1973, only one of the 200 military and civilian officials in the American Embassy was assigned to refugee problems.

The policy began to shift after sharp criticism in the U.S. Congress and some strong recommendations from officials in the embassy itself. In early 1974, the United States began to support larger-scale relief activities to be carried out by private relief agencies, principally Catholic Relief Services, Care, and World Vision.

Funds increased to \$10 million and then to \$13 million. It took until midyear to get the program organized, and by the time it was in full swing malnutrition, hunger and disease had long since overtaken scores of thousands.

It was also too late to hope for any resettlement since the government no longer controlled enough of the countryside. A U.S.-financed resettlement plan had to be aborted because almost all the land involved turned into a battleground in January.

"We are just keeping people alive," one refugee official acknowledged a few months ago. By this year, instead of the small handful of relief workers one had known in the past, there were hundreds, swarming about in cars and vans and chattering with each other over the walkie-talkies that had become Phnom Penh's symbols of official status.

Yet the food was still not enough. Refugees received only about 33 pounds of rice a month, only a week's supply for the average family of five or six members.

The devastated economy no longer provided jobs and the terrible wartime inflation meant that most refugees simply could not afford enough food. It was not only the refugees who went hungry, so did poor families who always had lived in the capital.

The uprooted—a million in Phnom Penh alone—had become permanent refugees, with no place to go and nothing to do. "I would leave if the government gave me some land to plant," said a farmer, "but I don't know where to go."

A sobbing mother, who had lived for over a year on the cement floor of an unfinished Phnom Penh hotel with her sick husband, aged mother and eight children, said she could earn only about 50 cents a day, enough for only one meager meal for her family. "My mother is too old, we have many children," she wept.

"There is no place to go."

In the central market, it seemed that more than half the people moving through the still well-stocked stalls were not buyers—instead they were refugees hoping to sell a handful of greens or a pepper or two they had found on the city's outskirts. The capital seemed to have become a city of beggars, with women, children, and maimed men in wheelchairs or on crutches moving through the streets everywhere seeking a little money.

The last battle began January 1, 1975, with insurgent assaults on the Phnom Penh defenses and the strongest attacks of the war on Mekong River supply convoys. In all January only pieces of three convoys reached the capital, and after January 30 the river route was closed permanently, threatening Phnom Penh with strangulation.

The capital and its airfield came under daily rocket attack—a form of random terror warfare that brought death and maiming once or twice or a half-dozen times a day. News stories and television film may have given the impression of a continuous terrifying bombardment but it was not like that.

Normal life continued, and there was little physical destruction, since rockets explode outward on impact and do not leave large craters or destroy solid buildings. But the randomness of the attacks, the periodic whistling of an incoming round amid the more distant boom of artillery at the fronts, added to the pall of fear and misery that hung over the city.

There was a sense of a slow running down. The electricity supply was cut again and again, finally disappearing almost altogether for civilian homes and businesses. With the early sunset the city was gloomily dark.

The telephone system lapsed into longer and longer silences. With fans and air-conditioners not working, patrons in hotels and restaurants sweltered in the dry season heat. American diplomats, using the embassy's own supplies of gasoline, were able to keep their homes comfortably lighted and cooled with household generators.)

For those with the money to pay for it, food was still plentiful, and Phnom Penh's French restaurants continued to serve souffles and fancy pastries.

Among the fairly large corps of for-

eign diplomats, journalists and relief workers, conversations revolved endlessly around a few subjects—evacuation, rocket attacks, and scenarios for the final chapter of the war.

To keep the city and the Army supplied, the Americans in mid-February expanded a small airlift and added more flights, first carrying munitions from U.S. bases in Thailand and then rice from Vietnam. While President Ford was haggling with Congress over his request for a \$220 million military aid supplement, American officials kept disclosing conflicting versions of when the money would run out.

First it was that the Cambodians would be out of ammunition in mid-March, but the planes kept flying and the new word was that funds would be exhausted in mid-April. The official U.S. line was still the threadbare incantation that if the insurgents could be persuaded that a military victory was unattainable they would negotiate a peace.

In the embassy, if not in Washington, there was a growing recognition that the insurgents were winning after all, and all that could be negotiated was a surrender.

In the official view a "controlled solution" would look a bit less humiliating for Americans than an outright military defeat. To get even a negotiated surrender it seemed more and more necessary to remove Lon Nol, whom the insurgents had vowed they would never deal with.

Finally, 5 years and 14 days after he took power, the marshal left for the Indonesian resort of Bali, leaving behind him a country numbed with agony and waiting for the end.

The marshal's departure came far too late to change anything. With victory in sight the insurgents continued to press in on the encircled capital, and only 12 days after Lon Nol left, the American ambassador, John Gunther Dean, and the remaining American Embassy aides were evacuated by Marine helicopters. Saukham Khoy, the acting president, left with the Americans.

In Phnom Penh the Army command took control of the government and vowed to fight on. But it was clear that resistance could not last long, and its only effect would be to add more needless deaths to the thousands that had gone before.

NEW YORK TIMES, THURSDAY, APRIL 17, 1975

Cambodian Diplomat Is Bitter About 'Way the U.S. Used Us'

By R. W. APPLE Jr.
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 16 — Abdulgaffar Peang-Meth sat solemnly in the cool, sparsely furnished drawing room of the Cambodian Embassy today, far from the gummy heat and crashing shells of Phnom Penh.

He discussed what seemed to be the final hours of his Government with composure and unflagging politeness, but the anger and hurt showed.

"I feel frustrated, bitter," the 31-year-old diplomat said. "The desire to do something is very strong. I would go back to Cambodia tomorrow, tonight, if I could do something, but I guess that nobody can help much now."

Mr. Peang-Meth, the embassy's press attaché, was the only person on duty today. The Sec-holiday, the ambassador was out of town making a speech, the minister-counselor was "off

at meetings."

"What hurts," the diplomat said in his colloquial English, the products of an American education, "is the way the United States used us. You marched into our country, you promised us aid, you encouraged us to keep fighting, you told us you were our friends, and now you drop us."

"A prostitute at least gets paid. For us, our lives, our blood, our country is ended because we helped the United States when it wanted to get its troops out. So your sons are home, and our people are left to die."

Recites Patrick Henry

The attaché grew emotional

as he talked about his own attachment to the United States. As a young boy, he said, he learned Patrick Henry's speech made 200 years ago. And he began to quote from it:

"Is life so dear or peace so sweet as to be purchased at the price of chains and slavery? Forbid it, Almighty God. I know not what course others may take—"

Mr. Peang-Meth did not bother to repeat the final famous phrases, "But as for me, give me liberty or give me death!"

"That kind of idealism," he said softly, "is gone from this country now. Millions of people in Cambodia are reaching out and saying, help, send us food at least, and the Congressmen

sit up there and debate and then go home for Easter Holidays."

At lunchtime today, a visitor found the embassy, situated in a relatively low-rent district, locked up tight. A sign on the door said, "Today holiday."

Soldiers Visit Pentagon

Mr. Peang-Meth later said he had taken some Cambodian soldiers who are studying here

to visit the Pentagon. Receiving his visitor, he emptied dirty ashtrays and jumped up to answer the phone from time to time.

The embassy has not heard from its Government since midnight, when a cablegram said that Phnom Penh had not yet fallen.

"We always operate on the assumption that as long as

Phnom Penh holds, we go on as usual," Mr. Peang-Meth said. "But now it looks as if we have reached a dead end."

Still later, driving downtown in his own small car, the young diplomat talked about his parents and his sisters and brother, who fled from their small town northwest of Phnom Penh several weeks ago.

"They're all refugees now," he said. "Every time I read about the rockets falling, I

wonder. I have no word at all from them. Who knows whether I shall ever see them or my country again? I just can't say what I will do."

He did not think he could live in Cambodia under the Communists, he said, and despite his American wife, despite 13 years in the United States, at Hiram College in Ohio, Georgetown University and the University of Michigan, he felt uneasy about remaining in this country.

LOS ANGELES TIMES
10 April 1975

ANALYSIS: THE SEARCH FOR STABILITY

Asia Moves to Fill Vacuum Left

BY ROBERT S. ELEGANT
Times Staff Writer

HONG KONG—The name of the Southeast Asian game is now stability. With the map being altered daily by major military moves, statesmen are searching, perhaps in vain, for stable foundations on which to build the future.

From the end of World War II until just last year, American power was a major stabilizing factor in an area undergoing rapid internal alterations. The U.S. presence has now lost most of its capability to reassure and stabilize just when those changes are again accelerating.

Shortly after the war came the emergence of independent nations followed by three other disruptive forces: violent political rivalries within those new countries, the reemergence of traditional frictions between those new countries and the avowed determination of the "international socialist movement" to "liberate" those new countries, a dedication that ignited major revolts as early as 1948.

Nonetheless, the 1950's and 1960's appeared, somewhat illusorily in retrospect, to promise minimal stability. It seemed that the American economic and military presence would, at the least, contrive and equilibrium of antagonistic forces. Men planned for the future with some confidence, tempered by intelligent caution.

For many reasons, including their colonial heritage, the nations of Southeast Asia are still incapable of getting together to create regional stability. As a result of the essential deficiency and dwindling American influence, new forces are now coming to bear on the area with greater rapidity and force: the triumphant, evangelical North Vietnamese. The more cautious Chinese Communists, impelled at the moment primarily by their economic interests, the Russians, who are in Asia old-fashioned, 19th century, great power imperialists, and those self-declared "economic animals" the Japanese, who have nonetheless, already fought one war

in Southeast Asia and are now concerned about preserving their oil lifeline to the Middle East by a naval presence in the region.

All are drawn into the power vacuum created by the American debacle in Indochina.

The name of the game might therefore be vacuum, rather than dominoes or stability. Statesmen all the way from Thailand to Singapore and Australia are assessing the new situation and seeking new policies to cope with utterly new problems.

The Thais, next in the line of fire after the collapse of Indochina, are performing a series of maneuvers that would be totally bewildering without reference to the kingdom's implicit motto: "The bamboo bends before the wind, but does not break!"

Bangkok has extended martial law in 28 of the kingdom's 71 provinces because of the immediate threat from armed guerrillas. New Prime Minister Kukrit Pramoj, a civilian and a democrat, has warned that 3,000 of about 10,000 Communist-trained Thai guerrillas entered northeast Thailand recently.

Kukrit also has told the United States it could fly only "humanitarian" supplies but not weapons to embattled Phnom Penh, made new approaches to both Peking and Hanoi and declared that all U.S. forces must leave his country within a year.

His strategy is obvious in light of the motto. The bamboo is bending in anticipation, though the wind is just beginning to rise to gale force.

This time, however, the bamboo may break. Bangkok is, for the first time, dealing not with the economic imperialism it understands, but with ideologized zealots.

Besides the new international power balance, Thailand is troubled by major internal problems created by a succession of short-sighted, rapacious military governments. A hasty land reform is attempting to reverse the extreme social dislocation created in the 1960's by agglomeration of land into large estates owned by a few landlords.

by U.S.

Bangkok's financiers and entrepreneurs still have pretty much their own way—and their way doesn't display much concern for the peasants. Consequently, student unrest continues as a major threat to stability and an honest seismograph of rural instability.

Thailand is only the most obvious representative of the new group of dominoes that appear eager to hurl themselves over before they are forcibly toppled. They presumably feel that falling voluntarily will hurt less than being pushed.

Malaysia is particularly troubled. Its recognition of Peking, the first "non-socialist" nation of the area to do so, did not allay either of its main internal problems—as Kuala Lumpur had hoped.

Both stemming from the overseas Chinese who make up 40% of the populace, those problems are racial friction and a continuing Chinese Communist armed revolt. Almost on the day the new Peking ambassador arrived, the terrorists staged a major "incident" by blowing up a train.

Singapore, ruled by tough-minded, authoritarian Lee Kwan Yew, is nobody's volunteer domino. But it is very small and very vulnerable, a predominantly Chinese, presumably social democratic chip between Moslem Malaysia and Indonesia. The analogy with Israel does not escape Prime Minister Lee, though his chief fear is the regions instability, rather than direct military pressure.

Lee recently stressed the central importance of Thailand and Thai decisions to the area's future.

"The Thais," he said, "know that the patience and perseverance of the Americans have not matched that of the Communists—not simply the Communists in Vietnam, but their suppliers, the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union. Rath-

er than go through the mincing machine, it makes more sense (for the Thais) to seek diplomatic and political solutions."

Lee forthrightly expressed almost total loss of confidence in the United States. He did not, however, express great confidence in the viability of the "political and diplomatic solutions" to which the Thais have been forced.

In Australia, a curiously inverted debate is going on.

Labor Prime Minister Gough Whitlam, goaded by his ideologically motivated guru, Dep. Prime Minister Jim Cairns, has seen the future in terms of accommodations with "Southeast Asia's indigenous forces." His professional foreign affairs advisers with much difficulty prevented his recognizing the Viet Cong more than a

year ago.

Canberra also began dismantling Australia's armed forces after a short term defense study was politically interpreted to mean that Australia faced no conceivable military threat in the long term, leaving aside the making of defense policy virtually by occult soothsaying. The Australian decision was based upon implicit confidence that U.S. power would remain a secure buffer for the subcontinent.

The newly elected leader of the opposition Liberal Party has just taken a different tack. Malcolm Fraser is a political backwoodsman while his party's former Prime Minister Harold Holt once proclaimed "All the way with LBJ!" Those facts make Fraser's disillusionment with the United States even more striking.

The former defense minister is equally concerned with Australia's two neighboring regions, the Indian Ocean area and Southeast Asia. He feels that reopening the Suez Canal, with Americans' enthusiastic backing and assistance, will result in major Soviet influence in both regions. "The straits of Malacca (between Malaysia and Indonesia) and the waters to our north," he has just warned, "are likely to become a highway for the Russian navy."

Fraser further fears that Russian presence will "give the Chinese a great feeling of insecurity and result in instability."

The name of the game is stability. Asian statesmen of quite different ideological stripes are all worrying desperately about a highly unstable future—while seeking solutions that may not work.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
15 April 1975

U.S. allies skeptical of Ford tactics

By a staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

When a warship is hit by an enemy torpedo a system of damage control immediately goes into operation. Bulkheads are closed, fires are put out, and the ship tries to move on to successful action.

That is what the Ford administration hopes to do in its wider, global foreign policies after the disasters of Indo-China. Limit the damage and move on to positive new relationships above all with Western Europe, as well as with the Soviet Union and China, and in the Middle

East.

This was the intent, well-placed officials explain, of President Ford's April 10 State of the World address. The State Department officials who must translate intent into real diplomacy say they are finding it an uphill task. They are encountering a good deal of sympathy, but even more skepticism.

Some Western diplomats found the President's positive intent all but crushed by the weight of the tragedy in Indo-China, and what seemed to them the futility of the remedies he proposed.

He asked a Congress, which already had shown itself unwilling to supply \$300 million for Vietnam, to vote an immediate \$722 million in 11th-hour military aid for Vietnam. Not only would he not get it, observers said, but if he did it would be too late.

He appealed to North Vietnam by means of notes addressed to the nations who participated in the Paris agreement of 1973, including the Soviet Union and China, to cease fire and observe the agreement. This, too, in the diplomats' opinion, was unrealistic at a moment when the North Vietnamese are on

the threshold of victory.

"Pathetic" was the description one diplomat applied to the fact that the President omitted any appeal for military aid to Cambodia where the capital, Phnom Penh, was on the verge of falling to the communists.

On the positive side, the President announced that he soon would go to a summit meeting of NATO members with whom relations "have never been stronger." He said he would meet leaders of Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, and Indonesia and would visit China later this year. He said he looked forward to translating the Vladivostok agreements on nuclear-arms limitation into permanent accords with the Soviet Union.

The free nations of Asia, the President said, "must not think for a minute that the United States is pulling out on them. . . ."

But a diplomat accompanying the Japanese foreign minister during his visit here was heard to observe: "Anyone who would get up on the floor of the Diet [the Japanese parliament] and affirm that we need not worry about the future of our mutual-security agreement with the United States would be laughed out of the house."

WASHINGTON POST
14 April 1975

Victor Zorza

Refugees and Hostages

Nothing could be more dangerous than the assumption that Hanoi might be quite willing to let the United States evacuate the thousands of South Vietnamese whom President Ford would like to help, just as Fidel Castro would be willing to let thousands of anti-Communists go. Hanoi, the argument runs, ought to welcome the opportunity to get rid of a potentially dangerous opposition movement.

Even before Mr. Ford's speech the Communists began denouncing U.S. plans to evacuate South Vietnamese refugees to the United States as "an extremely crude and cunning scheme"

with many "sinister purposes." The immediate purpose of the scheme was to show that "many Vietnamese are anti-Communists," and to give the United States "a pretext to prolong its involvement in our country." For the long term, Washington wanted "to force" many South Vietnamese to leave their country in order to carry out its "future sinister schemes."

What Hanoi is evidently concerned about is that large numbers of anti-Communist Vietnamese abroad might form a permanent outside threat to the Communist regime. The Cuban emigres in Florida, the Chinese nationalist regime on Taiwan, the "White Russian" emigres in Western Europe after the Soviet revolution provide some of

the precedents that Hanoi will be thinking of now. In each of those cases the revolutionary regimes at home saw themselves as being constantly and repeatedly threatened by the refugees, by the terrorist organizations they formed, and by the political intrigues in which they engaged.

By linking the evacuation of the Americans remaining in Vietnam to the evacuation of South Vietnamese anti-Communists, the United States may well endanger the first objective without accomplishing the second.

With the Communists unalterably opposed to any such mass evacuation of Vietnamese, the operation could be accomplished only by a massive U.S. military intervention—which is some-

thing that Congress may not authorize. But if the attempt to evacuate Americans is not clearly and distinctly differentiated from the attempt to evacuate the South Vietnamese, the Communists will attack the evacuation operation in force—thus creating pressure for an American intervention in force.

If Washington "really" wants to bring the Americans home, says a statement by the Foreign Ministry in Hanoi, "there is no difficulty or obstacle." And the U.S. claim that a naval force is needed to protect the evacuation "is mere eyewash." The Americans, adds a statement by the Provisional Revolutionary Government, "must be totally and immediately withdrawn." Also, the United States "must immediately withdraw all its warships from the territorial waters of South Vietnam"—an intimation that any evacuation conducted under the protection of such ships might be attacked.

The Communists would certainly welcome an immediate evacuation of all Americans, since nothing would be more likely to bring the Thieu regime down. But if the evacuation is delayed until the last moment, they might well seek to prevent it, in order to use the

Americans as hostages in a final settlement. They have learned the value of Americans as hostages in their protracted negotiations with Dr. Kissinger—and there are still a number of claims they have on the United States which they cannot enforce without "bargaining chips" of their own.

The promise of economic aid which was part of the 1973 "peace" package has been obliterated by the resumption of hostilities, but Hanoi regarded the "aid" as "reparations"—and it has not given it up, even if the United States has.

Hanoi might also feel the need for hostages in order to secure the return of the Vietnamese children who, it says, have been "abducted" to the United States. The strength of the Communists' denunciations of the "babylift" makes it clear that they are not just going to accept it as an accomplished fact.

There is a third sense in which the Americans might become hostages. What the U.S. military planners, anticipating an attack on Saigon, seem to have forgotten is the prediction—in all the Communist strategic writings—that the final victory will take the form of a city uprising. But the Viet-

cong spokesmen have now reminded them of this possibility by reviving talk of a "general uprising."

The Communists might now seek to fulfill this prophecy by stopping their regular forces outside Saigon and by activating inside the city the urban guerrilla units which have long been trained for this final act of the drama.

The "people's victory" which the Communists could then proclaim would have obvious political and propaganda advantages—but it would also make Washington's final Vietnam nightmare a reality. For in the chaos of an "urban uprising," not only the Vietcong but many embittered, desperate South Vietnamese might seek to curry favor with the new masters by turning on such Americans as still remain in the country.

But it need not happen—if Thieu is made to resign first, and if an interim administration is formed in Saigon to seek a cease-fire during which the "coalition government" demanded by the Communists is put together—and the Americans are evacuated.

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NEW YORK TIMES

14 April 1975

Agency Says U.S. Airlifts Carry Some Children of Saigon Elite

SAN FRANCISCO, April 13 (UPI)—Some of the Vietnamese children airlifted to the United States are sons and daughters of political and military officials, an official of a United States adoption agency said today.

How these children got aboard the transports flying refugees from Vietnam is not clear. Maria Eitz, an official of Friends for All Children, which has sponsored most of the flights, said that bribes might have been involved.

More than 800 children have been brought from Saigon to the temporary center at the Presidio of San Francisco Army Base for adoption by United States families. The flights began shortly after the offensive by North Vietnamese and Provisional Revolutionary Government forces in South Vietnam.

Mrs. Eitz said that she had seen several children whose identification papers indicated they had parents and relatives in South Vietnam. She said that their families might have paid bribes to get them aboard.

"There may have been cases where [a South Vietnamese official] said, 'If you take these four children, then you can take these 60 orphans.'" In other cases, she said, orphans "may have been replaced on the planes by children from families that had money."

It was not known how many nonorphans were placed aboard

the refugee flights, she said.

Officials of Orphans Airlift, a nonprofit agency established here to receive the children, said that they assumed all the children were orphans and relied on United States adoption agencies based in Saigon to authenticate the children.

Jane Barton, a spokeswoman for the American Friends Services Committee, who opposes evacuation of the children, said that she had talked to the three children of a South Vietnamese colonel who flew here with their young cousin.

"There are unquestionably children in the airlift who are true orphans," she said. "But I talked to a number of children who said they are not orphans."

Tran Tuong Nhu of the International Children's Fund in Berkeley, which also has attacked the flights, said that she and other Vietnamese-speaking members had talked to several children who arrived on flights.

"We picked 10 children at random at the Presidio on Wednesday," she said. "Not one of them said they were orphans."

Muoi McConnell, a Vietnamese-born volunteer nurse's aide who has worked with the orphans, said, "There are some children here who were in Saigon orphanages for only a couple of days before they were flown here."

WASHINGTON POST

17 April 1975

Vietnamese Hold Key to Rescue Plans

Attack, Panic Threaten Rescue

By Michael Getler and George C. Wilson

Washington Post Staff Writers

Although President Ford has said the United States has a "profound moral obligation" to thousands of South Vietnamese, Saigon and Hanoi, more than Washington, hold the key to getting them out of South Vietnam.

If either the South Vietnamese or the North Vietnamese—for different reasons—go all out to stop the evacuation of the 175,000 persons considered most vulnerable to Hanoi's retribution, U.S. contingency plans now on paper won't work.

There are two main reasons:

- If the evacuation is opposed, either by attacking Northern armies or panicking Southern forces, it would take far more U.S. troops than Congress is expected to allow to make secure an evacuation route.

- It would also require many more troops—possibly up to five or six divisions in some estimates—than the United States could get to Southeast Asia fast enough to handle such a vast emergency undertaking, even if Congress approved it.

As a result, according to many experienced U.S. defense planners, it is the Vi-

etnamese who hold the key to getting at least some of their civilians out of the country.

If the South Vietnamese army protects an evacuation corridor, or if the North Vietnamese, for one reason or another, decide not to prevent such an evacuation or are too busy elsewhere, then it could work.

In that case, the some two dozen U.S. Navy ships and private transport vessels under Navy contract already in the area could be used to pick up evacuees from one or two ports southeast of Saigon.

The roughly 4,000 U.S. Marines already in the area on Navy ships or in the Philippines could be used to protect a smaller area around the loading docks to prevent panic and to keep order aboard the vessels themselves.

It is estimated that at most the United States could rush another one or two divisions to the area on short notice and that anything more would take many weeks.

Troops from the 82d Airborne Division at Ft. Bragg, N.C., and elements of a single Marine Corps division

on Okinawa and an under-strength Army division on Hawaii would probably be the first used if there was a need to beef up quickly the Marine force already there.

Yesterday, however, Congress was still debating how much, if any, leeway to give the administration in deploying any U.S. troops for evacuation of South Vietnamese.

Meanwhile, the Navy is building up supplies aboard the vessels that could suddenly find themselves jammed with thousands of fleeing civilians, according to sources here.

Sources say that no final and specific evacuation plan for the South Vietnamese has yet gone to President Ford from the Pentagon, and thus no additional U.S. forces have been alerted.

For one thing, there is not yet any clear authorization from Congress.

There also seems to be some uncertainty here about how President Thieu plans to select those who are to be evacuated, identify them to loading authorities, and keep the rest of the population from rushing toward the ships. Some U.S. planners believe as many as 3 million to 4 million South Vietnamese have ample reason to want to leave.

Finally, there is no public indication of where the evacuees would go.

Nearby countries such as Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines and others might allow some to land temporarily.

But there does not yet appear any indication whether

countries other than the United States would allow large-scale permanent immigrations.

Yesterday, for example, it was reported from Bangkok that several hundred Cambodians evacuated last week by the Americans to the U-Tapao air base in Thailand would have to leave Thailand within two weeks.

As matters stand now, the view among defense specialists is that as the number of Americans in Saigon is reduced from the current 3,900 to 1,000 or 2,000, remain quickly lifted out of the capital, using only the helicopters and Marines already on station aboard U.S. aircraft carriers off the coast.

If Saigon's airport comes under attack and is closed, the only way sizable num-

bers of South Vietnamese could be brought out is by sea. A land corridor would have to be formed and protected from Saigon to ports such as Vungtau, 40 miles southeast of the capital, where U.S. ships could then carry the refugees to safety.

If Saigon's armies keep the North Vietnamese away, and don't themselves turn on those chosen to escape, then the evacuation could work with relatively few U.S. troops, in the view of some officials.

On the other hand, there is very little sense of certainty that such a mass evacuation will not get completely out of hand.

It is the prospect of securing such a long land corridor and possibly the airport that has caused some estimates of required U.S. forces under the worst conditions to be as high as five or six divisions.

WASHINGTON POST
17 April 1975

U.S. Envoy to Saigon Faulted Over Planning of Evacuation

By Spencer Rich and George C. Wilson
Washington Post Staff Writers

Saigon may be strangled by the North Vietnamese as early as May 1 in the climax of what is now an "irretrievable" military situation for the South Vietnamese, according to a secret Senate report obtained yesterday.

Civilian and military intelligence officials agree that "only decisive military action by the United States could reverse the situation," the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff report adds, without recommending any such action.

The emphasis instead, the report suggests, should be on evacuating Americans from Saigon while there is still time.

But, complains the report, U.S. Ambassador Graham Martin in Saigon is "actively" resisting such a "dangerously overdue" evacuation to the point that Central Intelligence Agency officials are making withdrawal plans of their own.

"Serious embassy planning for full-scale evacuation of Americans and Vietnamese began only last week," say Senate Foreign Relations Committee staffers Charles F. Meissner and Richard M. Moose in their report dated April 14.

"The anxiety of the American community," the report adds, "is compounded by the absence of a cohesive, well-understood evacuation procedure and by what outside

ers perceive as an air of unreality pervading the highest level of the (American) embassy" in Saigon.

Meissner and Moose conducted a series of interviews with CIA and military officials in Cambodia and Vietnam from April 2 to 13 and reported these other findings to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in a report labeled "secret."

• "Current intelligence indicates that the North Vietnamese wish to consolidate their hold over the area around Saigon by May 1. By that time four or possibly five additional NVA (North Vietnamese Army) divisions from North Vietnam and the occupied territories are expected to arrive in the Saigon area . . .

• "Intelligence analysts cannot decide whether the North Vietnamese will attack the city directly, or seek to cut its land and sea routes, thereby strangling the city. The objective of either strategy would be the same: to force the South Vietnamese government into a negotiated settlement on Hanoi's terms . . .

• "Intelligence services report the presence of a number of Communist sapper units" in Saigon. Large-scale panic could easily be induced by bombs or rockets (the Communists could soon be in range for either), the collapse and flight of a nearby ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) unit

or a sudden influx of refugees . . .

• "Virtually all Vietnamese military and civilian leaders agree that (South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van) Thieu must go if the armed forces are to be rallied to Saigon's defense and the nation readied for what they regard as the inevitable political showdown with Hanoi . . . The Vietnamese military does not consider" extra military aid as critical "in the short run" as removing Thieu.

Meissner and Moose made a series of suggestions in their 16-page report—some of which were discussed by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee yesterday. The staffers' suggestions in the report include:

• Exerting congressional pressure on the U.S. embassy in Saigon "to accelerate" evacuation."

• Cutting red tape so Vietnamese can get out of Saigon faster and be moved directly onto U.S. territory rather than continue to be delayed at Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines.

• Launching "a fresh U.S. effort" to negotiate an end to the war.

• Ambassador to Cambodia John Gunther Dean, Meissner and Moose said, felt "deeply disappointed that Washington had not supported his efforts to bring about a controlled solution to the Cambodian conflict. Dean believes that the Cambodians might have found a way out had we

committed ourselves to a negotiated settlement—even if it were tantamount to a Phnom Penh surrender."

The staffers assert in their report that American officials "are beginning to appear, both to the Vietnamese and Cambodians, more hung up on negotiations than the people whom we are supposed to be helping."

Their report states that discussions with representatives of the Provisional Revolutionary Government (Vietcong) indicated that a way might be worked out to provide American humanitarian aid to South Vietnamese living in areas now controlled by the Communists.

LONDON TIMES
7 April 1975

AMERICA'S LOSS OF CONFIDENCE

The influence of the United States in the world rests not only on military and economic power but on the belief among friends and foes that this power will be used rationally and reliably in the defence of the United States itself, its allies and the political principles which form the basis of America's moral authority, economic strength, and political success. Through all the crises and compromises since the end of the Second World War this belief has, on the whole, survived. It now seems challenged by the crumbling of South Vietnam.

This is not to accept Dr Kissinger's assumption that the commitment to Vietnam was itself a test of America's reliability as an ally. On the contrary, the commitment, because it was based on so many false assumptions, did a great deal to erode America's alliances and to destroy the cohesion of the American political system. Nor is it to accept that the United States was, in the traditional sense, militarily defeated in Vietnam. It could have wiped North Vietnam off the face of the earth in five minutes instead of sending its young men to die in the rice fields and jungles. It failed partly because, in spite of all the brutality which it did employ, it rightly accepted some restraints on the use of military force. It also failed because it backed the politically weaker side.

The result of this multiple failure of political judgment and military enterprise has been a serious loss of confidence—not

in the first instance among America's allies but within the United States itself. It is this, rather than the fall of Vietnam, that could gradually erode America's influence abroad if it is not resolved within reasonable time. Not for a long time have the Americans themselves shown such doubt about America's role in the world, about the limits of her power, the principles for which she stands, and the assumptions which should guide her conduct in the future. Not for a long time has America's image of herself seemed so fractured. The debate is valuable but it cannot be indefinitely prolonged.

The spasm of united concern for the children of South Vietnam will provide only temporary relief. It is heartwarming and it bolsters faith in the fundamental generosity of the American people but it touches only the fringe of the problem and is in many ways misdirected. The North Vietnamese do not kill children as a matter of policy. They do tend to kill officials, soldiers and members of the middle classes who have been closely associated with the South Vietnamese regime. These are the people whose lives are really in danger, who relied on American assurances, and to whom the moral obligation of the United States is greatest.

What the United States will do for them remains to be seen but when it is done, and when all the children who can be rescued are rescued, the political problems will come surging back. Accord-

ing to a recent Harris poll only 39 per cent of the American population would favour sending troops to save Europe from a Russian attack; defending allies comes only fifteenth in a list of priorities in foreign policy. This mood could very quickly change in the face of a real challenge. It should not be taken wholly at its face value, and certainly not as a measure of how an American Administration would behave in a crisis. It does, however, indicate a mood which is partly reflected in Congress and which the Administration is going to have to approach with something more than cries of anger against Congress.

What will be needed first is a restoration of confidence in the American system itself, in its ability to combine personal freedom with collective security, economic prosperity with social justice, and political pluralism with the consensus necessary for coherent policies. The gap between the American dream and reality has come to seem wider than it used to be; so has the gap between Congress and the Administration. Both will have to be narrowed.

In foreign policy the gap is between the now suspect idealism of the early 1960s and the almost equally suspect "realism" of Dr Kissinger. Neither seems wholly appropriate to the complex task of sustaining the influence of the United States both as a military power and as the representative of certain political and moral values. Neither provided the right answers in Vietnam.

NEW YORK TIMES
17 April 1975

"The Peace Must Be 'Vietnamized'"

By Nguyen Khanh

PARIS—History, we are told, never repeats itself. Yet we can remember as yesterday the end of Kuomintang China on the mainland, we have just witnessed the end of Lon Nol's "republican regime" in Cambodia, and tomorrow will see the end of "nationalist" South Vietnam.

Innumerable errors have been committed. But this is not the time to assess the blame attached to the successive American and Vietnamese administrations. They all without exception share responsibility. Time is short. We have to pull ourselves together, and quickly. We must resolutely face our obligation to honor the solemn word we gave when we signed the Paris peace accords in January, 1973.

We have to make hard choices—between continuing a policy of war or inaugurating a policy of peace; between the "shiftless, unimaginative" solution of the past or a more dynamic, effective solution that demands effort and sacrifice; between a Nguyen Van Thieu and his team of warmakers—the quintessential symbol of

corruption, ineptitude and despotism—or the millions of South Vietnamese who desire only peace and national reconciliation; between politics in the style of Louis XV (*Après nous le déluge*) and an intermediate solution that would safeguard the principles of democracy and freedom.

In the face of the failure of the war policy—both Americanization and "Vietnamization"—the only reasonable, logical option is peace. Everything humanly possible must be done to achieve a peaceful solution. The peace must be "Vietnamized."

Every obstacle to this must be eliminated. Every organization and individual that has served as active instruments of the war policy must be removed from the scene. A new administration must be installed, one dedicated to peace, reconciliation, and national concord, resolved to apply the Paris accords strictly.

This new government, composed of those nationalist elements known for their active and open opposition to the war, would immediately begin talks with the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam to implement forthwith the military and po-

litical provisions of the Paris agreements.

An agreement on a cease-fire in place could be concluded within 48 hours after the resumption of negotiations between the two South Vietnamese parties. The cessation of hostilities would spare the lives of thousands of courageous soldiers and of millions of refugees and civilian war victims. The South Vietnamese armed forces would then turn their full attention to their peacetime mission, the maintenance of peace, order and security. South Vietnam would be able to forget its total concern with military aid and concentrate on humanitarian and economic problems.

In addition, the implementation of the political provisions of the Paris agreement would make possible the establishment of the National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord in which a third element, besides the P.R.G. and the Saigon regime, would participate with all the prerogatives set forth in the agreement.

The release of political and military prisoners, along with the establishment of democratic liberties in both zones, would allow families that have

been scattered by the fighting to be reunited and the initiation of attempts to solve the immense humanitarian problems of the refugees.

Finally, really free and democratic elections would confirm the Government's absolute respect for the right to self-determination of the entire South Vietnamese population, with nobody excluded and no foreign interference.

Whatever the results of the elections, the formation of a government of national unity in Saigon would be most desirable. This government should include persons who belong to all three groups represented on the National Council. The equitable distribution of power is the essential condition of a lasting peace in South Vietnam. Only such a government could create a truly independent, free, democratic, non-aligned South Vietnam.

A regime like this in Saigon would naturally encourage the investment of foreign capital to foster the quickest possible development of the country's natural resources, especially oil. A properly conceived development program could pave the way for a prosperous future in Indochina, and that in turn could guarantee the equilibrium of Southeast Asia.

In my opinion, this solution would serve the best interests not only of the Vietnamese people but of the entire world, because the explosive situation

we have been living with could cause a third world war.

I am profoundly convinced of this position. During my ten-year exile in Paris, I have been in constant touch with a number of interested parties, in particular with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam [North Vietnam] and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam. From these contacts, which have continued up to the present, I can affirm that we are as close as ever to a political solution.

The strategic retreat of Saigon's military forces has left us with a situation that is, in fact, balanced between the two contending South Vietnamese parties.

Saigon and the Provisional Revolutionary Government control almost the same proportion of the population; the "useful territory" under their governance is roughly of the same order; and even their armed forces are close to being balanced both in numbers and in matériel.

But this precarious balance risks being thrown off-center again, this time toward the left. In such a situation, the Paris accords would be dead once and for all and the prospect of lasting peace in South Vietnam would disappear forever.

For this reason, I am certain that all the dynamic elements of the South Vietnamese community—political and religious groupings of every kind, the

armed forces, citizens both at home and abroad—will unite in support of a policy of peace and reconciliation.

We refuse to leave the fate of our country in the hands of one man, Nguyen Van Thieu, whose ten years of power and past several weeks of grievous miscalculations have led the country to the brink of disaster.

Important voices have been raised throughout the world in favor of a just peace in South Vietnam. I am confident that the American people as a whole, including the Congress and executive branch, are aware of the seriousness of the political and military situation in the Indochinese peninsula. I am certain that they will, as a consequence, exert every effort to support the Indochinese people in their efforts to achieve peace. We can only achieve such an overwhelmingly important goal by joining forces.

I feel justified in my faith that we shall find a solution that will lead to peace and reconciliation—a solution that Huynh Tan Phat, the present president of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam, and I advocated as long ago as 1964.

Gen. Nguyen Khanh led the Government of South Vietnam in 1964 and commanded its armed forces. Translated from the French by Leonard Mayhew.

LONDON TIMES
11 April 1975

Why the US wants to wash its hands of Vietnam

New York, April 10

One of the most remarkable features of the collapse in Vietnam has been the passivity and resignation of American public opinion as the situation developed. It has certainly been a painful time for most Americans, as they watched the crumbling of something that they had supported with so much effort. Yet barely a voice has been raised to suggest that the United States should involve itself again in trying to hold back the communist forces from Saigon.

The only significant move has been the rush to adopt orphans being evacuated from Vietnam. This has been a generous response, and one well in the American tradition. It also serves to purge the feelings of guilt that many Americans undoubtedly feel. Yet it is a wholly inadequate response to the scale of the upheaval in Vietnam.

The fact is that most Americans, even those who supported involvement in Indo-China, feel that they have done enough. When President Ford or Dr Kissinger speak of an obligation to Saigon, the reply is that the Americans have poured \$150,000m into Vietnam, lost 55,000 men dead, and launched a divisive issue which is still having its effects in American Society. What more can be expected of them?

This feeling has been reinforced by the completeness of the collapse of the South Vietnamese forces, and reports that they abandoned as much as \$1,000m worth of equipment. What is the good, it is asked, of pouring more money and equipment into South Vietnam if it is simply going to go down the drain the same way?

The result is that Professor Walt Rostow, one of the architects of Vietnam policy under President Johnson, is laughed out of court when he suggests landing the marines in North Vietnam in order to create a diversion. Most Americans, according to soundings by the opinion polls and by Congressmen, do not want even to send any more military aid to South Vietnam, let alone American troops.

Aid for humanitarian purposes is another question, though even on this there is the feeling that Americans have plenty of problems of their own as a result of the recession and the high level of unemployment. But in Congress this is bound to get a more sympathetic reception. Men such as Senator Humphrey and Senator Kennedy have been speaking of aid to the refugees on both sides, those under communist rule and those still coming under Saigon.

Time magazine reported

recently that Americans were "fed up and turned off" by South-east Asia in general, and were far more concerned by their own economic problems at home. It quoted Mr Don Bonker, a Democratic congressman from Washington state, as saying: "People are drained. They want to bury the memory of Indo-China. They regard it as a tragic chapter in American life, but they want no further part of it."

More than that, they are more sceptical than ever before of the claims made to them by the Administration. This is one of the long term effects of the Vietnam involvement and of the Watergate crisis that followed it. People feel that they have been lied to on too many occasions by the Administration, and do not want to be taken for another ride.

This attitude is reflected in Congress, whose members are always close to their constituents' ideas. Congress, too, is determined to stand up for its rights in the decision-making process, and to block adventurous moves by the Administration that it disapproves of.

This state of affairs is bound to be a disturbing one for other countries which rely on the United States for their protection. Much is going to depend on whether Americans, in many ways a volatile people, find

their confidence in themselves and the American way again. At the moment, there is a strong tendency to regard the world as full of more or less hostile foreigners, whether communists, extortionate Arabs, or rich and complacent Europeans, and to concentrate on internal affairs.

Meanwhile most of them still have to come to terms with Vietnam. Attempts are being made to do this, and it was significant that the other night, while Hollywood was gaudily distributing its Oscars in its traditional tinsel style, one of the main television networks chose to run a background investigation into American involvement in both Vietnam and Cambodia. It was quite a contrast.

Yet *Hearts and Minds*, the Vietnam film that won an Oscar as best documentary of the year, suggests that there is a long way to go before a really balanced view is formed. The film is intended as a look at both sides of the issue, but it succeeds in doing little more than presenting the war as one between brutal Americans with bombers and unarmed Vietnamese peasants.

One does not have to be a supporter of American policies in Vietnam to find that inadequate. The film presents no coherent explanation of how the Americans got themselves

into Vietnam and, perhaps more significant, absolutely no attempt to explain the realities in Vietnam itself which led to the war. It was, after all, the Americans' failure to understand these realities in a society so very different from their own that was responsible for so many miscalculations.

The film does, however, say much about the mood of self-accusation in many parts of the United States. Americans are disconcerted and disillusioned by their experience in Vietnam, and while some are going in for breast-bearing, others want to forget all about it.

Peter Strafford

NEW YORK TIMES
13 April 1975

Ex-Advisers Link Saigon's Defeats to the Defects of

By JAMES P. STERBA

Special to The New York Times

FORT BRAGG, N.C., April 10—In the summer of 1969, when the Vietnam war was costing the United States roughly 40 lives and \$83-million a day, President Nixon ordered the Pentagon to make top priority a program called "Vietnamization."

Thousands of United States officers and men were put to work advising, training and equipping Saigon's forces to take over the war from departing American combat units. From 1969 to 1973, steady improvement in the quality of South Vietnam's military was reported by the Pentagon and the President.

Now, many American soldiers who worked on Vietnamization are shaking their heads. In the last six weeks, five of Saigon's combat divisions have disintegrated, hundreds of millions of dollars worth of hardware has been lost, and three-fourths of the country has been relinquished to the Communists.

What happened?

A twice-wounded United States Army Colonel made the following observation:

"That classic film of the last plane out of Danang two weeks ago typifies my whole experience in Vietnam. That's the way it was when I got there as an adviser in 1962, and it tells me we've gotten nowhere in 13 years.

"When soldiers push aboard planes before babies and mothers, they ain't got no pride. Nationalistic pride is essential. When you can't rally around the flag, there's no point in going to war."

In recent interviews, dozens of other United States military men who trained and advised Saigon's forces agreed that pride, motivation and good leadership were lacking, in varying degrees.

But many of them asserted that the United States shared much of the blame for Saigon's failures because the Vietnamization program was carried out hastily, haphazardly and deceptively our rush to get out of Vietnam.

Reports of improvements transmitted to Washington were consistently more rosy than the assessments of advisers on the ground with South Vietnamese units, many officers said.

"Everyone said they were

'Vietnamization'

getting better and better, but they weren't," said a sergeant who worked with South Vietnamese ground forces.

United States military men who were interviewed declined to be quoted by name. Regardless of how intimately the United States was involved, an Army spokesman said, "we cannot comment on the performance of a foreign government's armed forces." Privately, however, the comments were generally unfavorable to both the United States and South Vietnamese training efforts.

South Korean Experience

One key factor cited was a constant change in goals for Saigon's forces. When Vietnamization started, it was said, American officers explained that the South Vietnamese forces were being trained to fight only local Vietcong guerrillas, with United States troops fighting major North Vietnamese units. Then, South Vietnamese troops were given the task of doing all the ground fighting—with the aid of massive American air support. Then, United States air support was stopped, but America promised to continue supplying weapons and ammunition. Finally, even the latter tapered off.

All this happened too quickly, former advisers contend. Some of them cite our military aid to South Korea, where ample help and money was given over many years, as an example of the way the Vietnamization Program should have been handled.

For South Vietnam, it was feast to famine in roughly four years, the advisers said. If Saigon's forces currently spent as much on equipment and supplies as Americans did in 1969, or example, President Ford's request for \$722-million in military aid would last only one week.

Training was geared toward continuing United States support, some advisers said. Although systems were simplified, it was said, they were still basically United States military systems, which included huge expenditures of ammunition and lots of artillery and air support for ground troops.

"We definitely trained them to fight the way we fought, which means waste ammunition," said a former artillery officer with the United States Fourth Division who advised South Vietnamese artillery units.

"We'd fire our guns all day and all night—just pick a grid and fire away—and we always got resupplied. And they'd do the same thing, shoot their guns just to shoot them, thinking they would always get more rounds to shoot."

Following the American model, the former advisers said, Saigon's officers came to depend on massive artillery bombardments and air strikes on targets before they would attack on the ground.

"Unless they were actually pushed, they wouldn't attack," said a sergeant who advised a South Vietnamese battalion north of Hue in 1973. "If they had to go, they'd want all sorts of air strikes and artillery so there wouldn't be any resistance when they got to their objective. We'd be moving, say, just 600 yards to take a hill and they'd want to call in B-52 strikes first."

Even more important, he said, South Vietnam commanders in the field constantly turned to their United States counterparts for American artillery and air support because getting it through their own channels was slow and undependable. United States ground advisers, with their access by radio to American fire power, became crutches, he said.

"We were trying to break them of the habit, but they were still doing it right up to when I left," the sergeant said.

Logistics and maintenance problems abounded in the Saigon forces, the advisers agreed.

"A lot of stuff was stolen, but a lot of it simply got lost in the system," said a former logistics adviser. "Sometimes they knew they had it but they couldn't find it."

Maintenance training was often lax, said a sergeant who worked as a United States general's aide in communication training.

"I worked directly with the South Vietnamese Army on their communications, and we did most of the work for them," he said. "We'd go to some unit to show them how to fix their radio, and it such a waste of time that we'd end up fixing it ourselves. Then we'd lie and tell our major that they fixed it."

Rating of Advisers

American officers, at all levels in the Vietnamization program, were rated by their su-

periors at least partly on the basis of the improvement of Saigon units they were in charge of training and advising. This system, some advisers said, led to many an unwarranted optimistic report to Saigon and Washington.

"I was with the ARVN [Army of Vietnam] Ninth Division in 1970, and our battalion was nearly wiped out twice, just routed," said a sergeant now with the 82d Airborne Division at Fort Bragg. "The troops just ran away, but word came down that I was supposed to report it as an orderly retreat."

He continued:

"We had 50 per cent AWOLs all the time and most of the company and platoon leaders were gone all the time. The battalion commander used to have to literally kick people to get them to go on operations. And they'd always go around the woods the V.C. were in and say they went through it."

"This was in 1970 and somebody selected me to brief the Secretary of the Army, Stanley Resor. And I was told what to say. You know, polished. And I said, 'Oh yes sir, they're coming along just fine. Real good soldiers' and all that bull."

In the early nineteen-sixties, United States Special Forces soldiers and other advisers tried to erase the French Military influence and train South Vietnamese troops to fight more like their adversary, the Vietcong.

When American combat units began pouring into the country in 1965, they took over the war, relegating Saigon troops largely to duty behind the lines. Some training continued, but American commanders were more concerned with defeating the Communists quickly themselves. After the effective 1963 Tet offensive by the Communists the Vietnamization program was initiated under President Johnson, then accelerated under President Nixon.

"If you want to see what a great job we did training them," quipped an Army major here yesterday, "just look at that guy who tried to bomb the palace. He missed. And if he can't hit a target like the Presidential palace, how in hell is he supposed to hit a North Vietnamese tank."

WASHINGTON POST
17 April 1975

Rod MacLeish

End Game in Vietnam

The great Vietnam debate in Washington has become, at last, a small, gnarled argument about how to play end game. The streets and congressional chambers of this city once rang with Jovian rationales for and against the morals, politics and philosophy of the war in Indochina. Now the old advocates declaim over the miserable choices presented at the terminus: Should we use U.S. troops to evacuate American civilians from Saigon? Should we also take out those Vietnamese whose lives are hostage to their loyalty toward us? Are the orphans symptomatic of our guilt feelings?

Former President Nixon used to say that his plan for withdrawing American troops (with honor) from Vietnam was not "an inelegant bug-out." What is now being planned and debated is most definitely a bug-out—and if it isn't inelegant it will do until something even

NEW YORK TIMES
12 April 1975

'Give me your tired,
your poor...'

By Edward G. Lansdale

ALEXANDRIA, Va.—Last Sunday evening, with an unseasonal April wind storm chilling frail bodies and blowing out candles, several hundred Vietnamese—mostly women and children—gathered on the sidewalk in front of the White House for a prayer vigil. They prayed that Americans would help save their families left behind in Vietnam.

As the wind whisked away their words and tears, it seemed that nobody was listening. The President was not in the White House. Members of Congress were on their way back to Washington from Easter recess. The press, which had covered so many other gatherings about Vietnam in the past, was noticeably absent. Washington, and with it the American people, gave the appearance of a callous indifference to whatever happens next to the people of Vietnam.

Let us hope that we haven't turned callous and indifferent to the plight of friends in need. It is not only that people throughout the world are judging the American character as the tragedy of Vietnam reaches yet another crisis point, so that they can determine our strength of purpose.

It is more important that we do not lose our belief in the principles and ideals towards which we have striven as a people these 200 years.

Many of the women who kept the vigil in front of the White House last

Rod MacLeish is senior commentator for Westinghouse Broadcasting Co.

more ignominious happens.

To say that is not to say that we should be planning or debating anything else. What depresses one, rather, is the way the symbolism of the classic old Vietnam debate manages to live on in the present, mewling quarrel about packing up what's left of the American presence in Saigon. A few weeks ago the President implied that history

will find the 94th Congress treacherous for not granting administration requests for military aid. This week alarm rattles viscerally in Washington when Mr. Ford says he wants to use troops to help evacuate American civilians and Vietnamese from Saigon.

It is that sort of suspicion of each other's motives which gives

the present situation its inelegance. The Congress' refusal to rush through more military aid was a practical judgment. Using troops to help evacuate civilians presents serious and complex problems—but they are all logistic problems having to do with the situation on the ground in Vietnam.

The 94th Congress is not hoisting the bloody shirt of isolationism and Mr. Ford isn't trying to crank up the war again when he asks for clarification of the law of troop use. All of this really is just an argument about tidying up. The old symbolism doesn't apply any more.

Somehow, sometime we have got to stop our own internal bleeding from the Vietnam wound. This is as good a moment as any to start trying.

in equal jeopardy. About 200,000 Vietnamese worked for American agencies and organizations, serving loyally enough to earn the label of "class enemies." Adding their immediate families to this number, the total of people in this category with ties to Americans amounts to some 500,000 or more Vietnamese. Most of these Vietnamese have neither funds nor ways of their own to escape what fate seems to hold in store for them in Vietnam. They are poignantly dependent upon American help.

Beyond this 550,000 or more Vietnamese who have a close relationship to Americans, there are a huge number of other Vietnamese who feel life under the Communists is unthinkable. Death or punishment awaits them. Their number can only be guessed; there are probably one to two million.

Among them are those who fled from North Vietnam to South Vietnam in 1954-55, in the great exodus of nearly a million refugees. There are thousands who fought in the nationalist cause, broke away when the Communists pre-empted that cause and thereafter fought the Communists.

Others have been in the fight all their lives. There are religious leaders and their adherents, civil servants, military men, village and hamlet militia, politicians, journalists, business people, lawyers, doctors, dentists, nurses, farmers, shopkeepers, composers, performing artists—and even some of the people now in South Vietnamese jails, the political prisoners whose only "crime" was their outspoken activity against the Saigon Government for not defending the needs of the people more intelligently or honestly or diligently.

Some of this great mass of Vietnamese who feel condemned now will insist upon remaining and fighting

against the Communists to the end. But, a million or more of them are praying for a miracle to save them from Communist rule. They believe only the Americans can provide such a miracle. Many would flee their country, given the chance and means to do so.

Twenty years ago, it took ten months to move nearly a million Vietnamese in orderly fashion from Hanoi and Haiphong to air and sea ports in South Vietnam. Today's prospects are that at least twice as many Vietnamese are in desperate need of another exodus, over a greater distance—with time running short for such a movement.

Many of us who served in Vietnam

and who came to know the Vietnamese people believe strongly that they are a bright, industrious, and courageous people who are worthy of the best efforts of the United States to strive to save those who are desirous of being saved.

The emergency demands an organized effort to rescue these desperate Vietnamese. It will require transport and temporary care for the refugees. There is need for a safe enclave in Vietnam from which refugees can be evacuated, made safe by the protection of the United States or the United Nations.

There also is need for making sure of the transit of noncombatant refugees away from military combat zones

to the port of embarkation. (Perhaps Moscow and Peking can be induced to help silence the weapons they have heaped upon the North Vietnamese divisions long enough to let the refugees gather and depart.)

American states and communities should be now determining how many of these worthy Vietnamese can be settled among them. They are a splendid citizenry who would make fine neighbors.

Let us be humanitarians, truly.

Maj. Gen. Edward G. Lansdale, Ret., worked for the Central Intelligence Agency as a political adviser in South Vietnam, 1954-56. He returned to South Vietnam as Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge's special assistant, 1965-68.

NEW YORK TIMES

13 April 1975

Laos Is Worried by Indochina Setbacks

By BERNARD WEINRAUB

Special to The New York Times

VIENTIANE, Laos, April 12—

The kingdom of Laos, which last year set up a coalition of neutralists, rightists and pro-Communist Pathet Lao, is in the grip of anxiety and confusion because of the deteriorating situation in Cambodia and South Vietnam.

Neutralists and rightists in this drowsy, dusty capital are plainly alarmed about North Vietnamese intensions and contended that the American withdrawal from Indochina, the disintegration of Government forces in Cambodia and South Vietnam and the vulnerability of the Laotian coalition have now emboldened Hanoi to step up its activities in Laos.

Several Western diplomats disagree and say, in effect, that the North Vietnamese are content to let the coalition run its course, but the mood among non-Communist Laotians is bleak.

If Vietnam falls, all of Indochina falls under the umbrella of Hanoi and we will be a colony of Hanoi, that's all, said Defense Minister Sisouk Na Champassak, a dapper, pragmatic rightist from southern Laos. "I am afraid that they will force the issue now. They feel the winds are in their favor."

Other Laotians Comment

Another Cabinet official said: "If Vietnam falls, Laos will

fall also. As simple as that. This will merely follow the trend. Obviously they will be more aggressive here. What are we? A small country, weak, at their mercy."

Another Laotian official said: "The people in the commercial sectors, the Chinese and Indian businessmen, are talking about leaving. In the last few weeks we have all become very frightened because of the Vietnam situation. No one thinks the Pathet Lao will take over immediately or that the North Vietnamese will suddenly launch an attack here. But the situation now seems irreversible. The pressure is being stepped up. We know that they will be stronger, bolder."

The landlocked nation, with an intricate political history and a strategic geographic position, is bounded by China, North and South Vietnam, Thailand, Burma and Cambodia.

Last year the third coalition since 1957 united opponents of 20 years of civil war.

The two key figures in the coalition are Souvanna Phouma, the ailing 73-year-old neutralist Premier, and his half-brother, Prince Souphanouvong, the Pathet Lao leader.

Relationship Undear

The Pathet Lao are supported and nurtured by the North Vietnamese, but the exact relationship between them remains enigmatic. Several Western European diplomats insist that

Prince Souphanouvong, a dynamic, 62-year-old aristocrat is more a nationalist than a doctrinaire Communist.

The coalition was born of the Laotian cease-fire agreement signed on Feb. 21, 1973, which ended a war in which most of the fighting was between irregulars supported by the Central Intelligence Agency and North Vietnamese troops. American bombing in the early nineteen-seventies was aimed at North Vietnamese supply routes through Laos to South Vietnam.

The North Vietnamese are estimated to have about 30,000 troops in Laos compared with 60,000 to 70,000 two years ago.

What frightens non-Communists is what the North Vietnamese will do when South Vietnam falls under Hanoi's control. Officials are puzzled by the declining American military support and contend that this is a key factor in the behavior of the North Vietnamese.

U.S. Aid Declining

In 1973, American aid to Laos reached \$410.5-million, including \$360-million for military expenditures. In the current fiscal year ending June 30, aid will probably be \$80-million, including \$30-million for the somewhat bedgagged 52,000-man army. Western military analysts say virtually all the money will be spent on rice, cloth for uniforms, petroleum and some Western European

diplomats are convinced that the increasing influence of the Pathet Lao in various ministries is more the result of discipline and single-mindedness rather than of events in Cambodia and South Vietnam.

The Government under Premier Souvanna Phouma has 12 Cabinet ministers—five from the Pathet Lao and two ministers agreeable to both sides. Prince Souphanouvong has set up his own advisory body called the National Political Council, which rightists have dubbed the "Politburo" and which is expected ultimately to form the base of a new Cabinet.

Western European diplomats say that the military failures in Cambodia and South Vietnam have merely accelerated the process that is making Lao a nation serving as a buffer in Indochina, but responsive to Hanoi's wishes.

This is especially evident in comments by the Deputy Premier Phoumi Vongvichit, a Pathet Lao member who also functions as the Foreign Minister.

He said the other day that the "fall of Cambodia and South Vietnam would bring peace and prosperity" to both countries. He added that the Laotian Government should immediately recognize the Vietcong's Provisional Revolutionary Government in South Vietnam and the Insurgents in Cambodia. Rightists and neutralists in the Government have refused so far to recognize these groups.

BALTIMORE SUN
14 April 1975

Closing the Embassy in Cambodia

The closing of the American embassy in Phnom Penh and the evacuation of the U.S. diplomatic and military staff punctuate the end of the most inglorious chapter of the nation's Indochina misadventures. Whatever history says about America's step-by-step catastrophe in Vietnam, or about the exotic "special war" in Laos, its judgment of the United States role in Cambodia must be still harsher. Cambodia never had the slightest strategic significance to the United States. Even its import as a staging area for Communist attacks on the South Vietnamese heartland in the Mekong Delta was peripheral, and was tolerated throughout the years of massive American troop involvement. It was only as the Americans were about to pull out of a tattered Vietnam that they decided, almost as an afterthought, to tear Cambodia apart, too.

Yet it was possible in 1970, as Peter A. Jay wrote on this page six weeks ago, "to be a hawk on Cambodia and a dove on Vietnam." That possibility was created by the sight of a small country throwing out a ruler who had allowed its territory to be used in a neighbor's civil war and fighting against preposterous odds to drive Vietnamese Communist forces out of Cambodian border areas. The sight was the more seductive for the elan with which Khmer soldiers threw themselves into even the most hopeless battles; their naive enthusiasm formed a refreshing contrast with the jaded reluctance of South Vietnamese fighters, many of whom had been "in for the duration" for a decade or more.

But it was impossible to see the newly made refugees of Snuol, the first Cambodian town demolished by American bombardment in May, 1970,

without wondering whether Cambodia, too, was to be a victim of American military help. At first, the Nixon administration insisted that there would be no American role in Cambodia after the Vietnamese Communists' border sanctuaries were cleaned out by the limited "incursion" that destroyed Snuol and a few other towns. Even after the "incursion," it might have been possible to bring back a left-leaning but still relatively independent Sihanouk, thereby sparing the Cambodians destruction and heading off the growth the Khmer pro-Communists have since had. Washington chose not to try. By the next summer, the Nixon administration was publicly sending weapons to Cambodia and would soon be secretly sending B-52's to carpet-bomb large areas of Cambodia as they had Vietnam. Snuol barely existed as a town any more but had become a verb to use when another Indochinese town was to be bombard-ed: "We'll have to Snuol it." By last August, nearly one Cambodian in every ten had been killed or wounded.

What makes the fate of the Khmer people a crime, and not just a mistake, is that by 1970 Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger had seen what America's weight did to Vietnam and knew what would happen if they spread the war to Cambodia. America will now pay for that crime, for when Prince Norodom Sihanouk returns to Cambodia he will be little more than a unifying national symbol. He will be even that only so long as he is useful to his disparate pro-Communist allies. And he will have little power to resume his former erratic "neutrality," which would neatly suit America's needs in Cambodia now that South Vietnam is collapsing.

BALTIMORE SUN
14 April 1975

Garry Wills

Vietnam, a Tragic Puppet Show

The plain truth is that South Vietnam's forces (the ARVN) cut and ran. History will record that. It will see the pattern, which is obvious. But our leaders still try to cover up for our "brave allies." Why?

There is nothing puzzling on the surface of the matter. Diplomatic protocol makes all allies brave. We glorified Stalin, and DeGaulle, and Chiang Kai-shek in World War II, though Churchill feared Stalin, Roosevelt despised DeGaulle, and Stillwell called Chiang "The Peanut." The endearments were most formality, and they have yielded to truth in retrospect—quickly for Stalin, slowly for DeGaulle, and finally for Chiang. We were not exactly backing the wrong horses, but we were letting very spotted nags wear our colors.

Even this does not quite explain our whitewash job done on Thieu and his regime and its soldiery in World War II, we inflated the French res-

istance movement, and DeGaulle's importance to that movement—much as China stressed the rebel bravery of the Viet Cong. We were betting on a myth we made come true—as China has done. But in Vietnam, we have reversed our role, standing by a lie when its emptiness became apparent. We have given more than the respect demanded of allies, because Vietnam was never an ally. We accord it the irrational dotting excuses one must give to one's own creature, to a puppet.

A great deal of wasted sympathy can be spent on ARVN's personnel. They are part of an historical tragedy; they stand to lose everything because they do not feel disposed to risk anything. They are no doubt just as brave as most human beings; and the moral to be drawn from their disarray is not that they lack military virtue. The point is that their leaders have none of the political virtues that

count most in war. But a point beyond that point gets back to us, and explains our unwillingness to let analysis wend this far back to causes. The local leaders failed in virtue because they were puppets—and we were the puppet masters. The NFL fought better than the ARVN because it believed the struggle was worth winning. ARVN didn't know what to believe, because it had been lied to so long, flattered, and confused—just as our own troops (like our own Congress) were lied to, led into a war for reasons inadequate when not contradictory.

Our soldiers, too, were demoralized by Vietnam—the impact on our military is still being felt, and can only be fully assessed some time from now. We, losing but a fraction of our population in a distant war, underwent a national spasm of recoil and disillusionment. How can we expect less of the Vietnamese, used, bargained for, thrown into battle, on their own land, by foreign masters? They ran be-

cause we betrayed them—and we betrayed them when we made them our puppets, not caring for cheap Oriental lives. That is the hard truth the President does not want to look at, and no wonder. But not looking at hard truths brought us to our present disgrace, and our Vietnam clients to disaster.

That is why President Ford talks patent nonsense like this: "I don't believe we miscalculated the will of the South Vietnamese to carry on their fight for their own freedom." It is five years since we had to kick the ARVN troops off helicopter skids in Laos. They were trying to hitchhike their way out of the war zone then, while President Nixon said the same pleasant nothings about that nothing army. Mr. Ford now repeats it all, proving that his worst mistake was not in pardoning Nixon but in parroting him.

The right wing has become lyric in its excuses for the ARVN. The army was undercut by America's refusal to ship spare parts. But weapons not used hardly need spare parts. Perhaps, if we sent them three guns per man, they would stop throwing guns away after the second one?

LOS ANGELES TIMES

13 April 1975

Ky Calls Military Victory Impossible for S. Vietnam

BY WILLIAM TUOHY
Times Staff Writer

SAIGON—Former Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky declared Saturday that any military victory by the South Vietnamese armed forces was "impossible."

"We are only trying to stop the debacle of collapse," he said in an interview. "We couldn't think of a military victory now. We must face up to reality."

Air Marshall Ky was successively head of the Vietnamese air force, national premier, and vice president during President Nguyen Van Thieu's first term, from 1967 to 1971. He later broke with Thieu and is now one of the president's most vocal critics.

"Thieu has shown he is not capable of leading the country in war," said Ky, at his heavily guarded villa at Tan Son Nhut Air Base outside Saigon. "And he is incapable of achieving peace."

Ky again called on Thieu to resign and be replaced by a government of a "National Salvation front" representing both military and civilian leaders.

Ky said he estimated that 85% of the armed forces officer corps was anti-Thieu, and that some of the top military leadership indicated they want to pressure Thieu to resign.

Ky said that he was still against the use of a coup d'etat as a means of deposing Thieu, and that he and other military leaders preferred to see Thieu resign.

Ky indicated that he had been in touch with the U.S. Embassy in recent days, though he did not spell out the nature of his conversations.

Political speculation here has increased that the U.S. Embassy, which formerly staunchly supported Thieu, is now beginning to suggest in ever stronger terms to the president that he step down, in the interest of giving Saigon another lease of life under a "reconciliation regime" acceptable to Hanoi.

Ky is thought to be a leading candidate for the ruling committee, representing the South Vietnamese military.

"One more military defeat is all that Thieu can stand," said Ky. "He is responsible for the debacle because he made all the decisions about the withdrawal personally. He gave orders directly to the corps commanders, by passing the military high command."

"He has become isolated from the senior military leadership. His chief adviser is General Dang Van Quang, a corrupt man with a bad reputation, hated even more than Thieu."

The new government that Ky would like to see installed would be a committee, "not a one-man show."

Other potential members of the committee are believed

'For the first time in my whole life, I feel really pessimistic. The situation is desperate.'

to be Father Tran Huu Thanh, the Catholic priest who favors some kind of negotiations with the Communists, and General Duong Van (Big) Minh, who led the coup against the late President Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963.

If he were to come back to power, Ky said, "I would first reorganize the army and give it new motivation so the soldiers would have the will to resist. After that, we could talk about negotiations. All of us are aware that this war must be ended by negotiations."

"But whether we would be negotiating a surrender or not would depend on how strong or weak we are. And right now we are very weak militarily."

Ky said that he planned to remain in Vietnam even in the face of a Communist takeover in order to help organize a potential mass evacuation of Vietnamese.

"In the event of a communist take-over," he said, "between five million and six million Vietnamese would choose to leave the country. Someone must stay on to organize this biggest mass exodus in history. We have to arrange for countries to accept these refugees and to get transportation. The Communists would probably refuse to let them go once they take over."

Ky said he did not think the U.S. bore the overriding responsibility for what is happening, but in the event of an exodus, "you can help."

Other observers, however, suggested that it was highly doubtful that any evacuation on such a scale could ever be effected. And perhaps Ky sensed that when he said:

"For the first time in my whole life, I feel really pessimistic. The situation is desperate."

DAILY TELEGRAPH, London

3 April 1975

Well-placed rumours helped to win battles

By Our Staff Correspondent
in Saigon

THE use of rumour and half truths has played an important part in the success of the North Vietnamese army's drive south.

At the outset, the rumour was that the Government made a

deal with the Communists and that a line was to be drawn at the 16th parallel in the vicinity of Hue and Da Nang. As a result the Quang Tri line collapsed and so did the western defence lines in the northern reaches of the First Corps military zone.

Simultaneously, front line forces began asking themselves

why they should fight when the politicians in Saigon had made an accommodation? During this critical period Saigon leaders, particularly Thieu, made no attempt to quash the rumours with some firmly enunciated fact.

Indeed, up to now the President's only message to the nation has been a four-minute pre-recorded radio speech that did practically nothing to explain the situation to the front line troops who were anxiously awaiting information from their side.

As the defences collapsed so the rumoured "deal" brought the demarcation line further south. Last night it was said to

be at the 12th parallel.

As it stands now there appears to be two main options open to the Communists in their operation for Saigon. First, they could drive from the Tay Ninh front, 55 miles north-west of Saigon. They have at least three divisions available in that area.

The second, and perhaps more likely option, would be to infiltrate sappers into the capital and create maximum confusion in much the same way as they did in Da Nang. This way, given Saigon's tenuous political situation, the city could topple by itself.