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NEWS, VIEWS and ISSUES

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11 April 1975

GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS

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THE NEW YORK TIMES, TUESDAY, APRIL 8, 1975

Colby Tells Publishers That C.I.A. Is Jeopardized by Sensational Headlines

By MARTIN ARNOLD
Special to The New York Times

NEW ORLEANS, April 7—William E. Colby, the Director of Central Intelligence, said today that the Central Intelligence Agency was being jeopardized by sensational and unjustified headlines.

He told a group of American newspaper publishers that his agency and its service to the country were being endangered "by its status as the nation's No. 1 sensational lead" in newspaper articles.

In his view, he indicated, the C.I.A. is too often used to give sensation to the lead, or opening, of a news article even when the agency is not a major part of the article.

Mr. Colby, who spoke at an Associated Press luncheon at the annual convention of the American Newspaper Publishers Association, also answered questions.

Intelligence directors before Mr. Colby appeared rarely at public meetings and almost never submitted to questions on the record.

Since the recent published

allegations of C.I.A. involvement in domestic operations in this country, however, Mr. Colby has appeared before a number of news-gathering organizations for discussions both on and off the record.

No Cases Discussed

Mr. Colby, in his warning on what he saw as American intelligence-gathering apparatus, declined to discuss any particular case. But he said that though the C.I.A. was "proud of our open society . . . we also believe that this open society must be protected, and that intelligence, and even secret intelligence, must play a part in that protection."

Because the agency has become "the nation's No. 1 sensational lead," he said, other intelligence agencies are "questioning our ability to keep their work for us secret," and American business concerns that have helped the C.I.A. are afraid that their "businesses abroad [will be] destroyed by a revelation of their patriotic assistance to the C.I.A."

Foreign officials from friendly governments are also wor-

ried about this, he said. He said that the military attaché from a foreign country "which our intelligence service must run the risk of life and death and spend hundreds of millions of dollars to obtain about his country."

"Sometimes the journalists assume the story can do no harm when, in reality, there are unrevealed facts about it which would change the journalists' mind," he said.

Protection of Sources

Mr. Colby, who appeared to be well received by the 1,300 publishers and their wives, said that he was not asking that "bad secrets" be suppressed, and I also believe that "non-secrets" should be exposed.

"But I do make a plea that 'good secrets' be respected," he added.

"I only ask," he said, "that we Americans protect our nation's sources in the same way the journalist protects his."

In the question-and-answer period, Mr. Colby defined "good secrets" as, for instance, the names appearing in a book written about the C.I.A. by Philip F. E. Agee, a former

agent. The book, "Inside the Company/C.I.A. Diary," has been published in England and can now be purchased in this country.

Mr. Colby denied in reply to a question that the C.I.A. had taken part in the overthrow of the Government of President Salvadore Allende Gossens in

At another session on the opening day of the publishers' convention, William E. Simon, Secretary of the Treasury, was critical of some of the economic reporting in American newspapers.

He said, "Your reporters and editorial writers must necessarily jump from crisis to crisis, from one complex subject to the next with little time or space for deep analysis, and often with little prior knowledge of the subject."

He said that there had "been marked improvement in the past year" in the reporting of economic news, but still asserted that his "greatest concern about the press today is they have failed to convey a better sense of perspective for the American people about the [economic] choices we face."

WASHINGTON POST
8 April 1975

Colby Calls Operations Vital

CIA Covert Action Defended

By George Lardner Jr.
Washington Post Staff Writer

Central Intelligence Agency Director William E. Colby yesterday defended covert activities and paramilitary operations abroad as an essential part of the nation's intelligence work.

Speaking in New Orleans to members of the Associated Press, Colby said such operations now constitute a "comparatively small proportion" of the CIA's efforts, but he declared they still "make a unique and important contribution to the safety of our country."

The CIA director asked for the help of the press in preserving what he called the nation's "good secrets." He said he believed, however, in exposure of "bad secrets"—or missteps of the past—as well as "non secrets," or known facts about intelligence which "in the old tradition would have been kept secret."

Colby did not offer any clear methods whereby the press could sort out whatever secrets it might come across, but he suggested at one point that the CIA would like to be consulted before publication.

"This does allow the presen-

tation of good reasons to write the story so as to protect important secrets or even, in exceptional cases, to withhold it," he said.

Recently, Colby was temporarily successful in urging a number of news organizations to withhold stories about the CIA's raising of part of a sunken Soviet submarine even after the plan had been publicly mentioned by the Los Angeles Times.

Colby said that modern-day intelligence gathering now relies primarily on technological advances in a variety of fields from photography to electronics.

Some critics of the CIA have cited the same developments in arguing that the agency could well afford to abandon the more controversial fields of paramilitary and covert operations.

Clearly unwilling to give them up, Colby said that "some things cannot be learned by the inquiring reporter or even the spy in the sky. Sources within a closed or authoritarian foreign society can let us know its secret in these days of mutual vulnerability to warfare. . . And there are occasions in which some quiet assistance to friends of America in some foreign country

can help them withstand hostile internal pressures before they become international pressures against the United States."

The CIA director has previously described paramilitary operations—such as the "secret war" in Laos—as "a little help to a few friends."

Colby said he still welcomes the current public inquiries and debate over the proper scope of the CIA's activities, but at the same time reiterated his fears that a "climate of sensationalism" is jeopardizing the agency's operations. He said some previously cooperative foreign officials have stopped dealing with the CIA or started to "constrict the information they provide us."

Meanwhile, the presidential

commission investigating the CIA heard private testimony yesterday from Ford Foundation President McGeorge Bundy, who was President Kennedy's special assistant for national security affairs, and Lawrence K. White, a former controller and executive director of the agency.

Though he declined to discuss most of his testimony, Bundy told reporters afterwards: "I was able to tell them that I knew of no effort to commit any assassinations" during the Kennedy years.

Bundy added, however, he could not exclude the possibility that some officials may have had discussions along the lines of "how nice it would be if such and such leader didn't exist."

The commission chaired by Vice President Rockefeller spent much of the day in executive session going over preliminary findings assembled by its investigative staff.

U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REPORT
7 APRIL 1975

While the Central Intelligence Agency is under the spotlight of critical exposure in the U.S., its counterparts in Communist countries—particularly the Soviet KGB—are still very busy. Known to the CIA, for example, are attempts by the Communist secret services to recruit about 400 Americans as spies in the last four years.

NEW YORK TIMES
9 April 1975

HOUSE PANEL LAGS IN INQUIRY OF C.I.A.

By JOHN M. CREWDSON
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 8—The House select committee set up in February to investigate intelligence gathering in Federal agencies will be seven weeks old tomorrow, and so far it has no staff director and no staff.

The seven Democrats and three Republicans who make up the panel have met a few times since they were appointed on Feb. 19, but much of the business they have conducted has been through informal conversations on the House floor and over the telephone.

Thus far, the principal topic of their discussions has been the selection of someone for the combined position of chief committee counsel and staff director. Until that post is filled, the process of selecting staff lawyers and investigators to conduct the committee's work cannot begin.

An aide to Representative Lucien N. Nedzi, the Michigan Democrat who heads the select committee, said today that, although a number of overtures had been made to potential candidates, "nobody's been offered the job."

Other sources close to the committee said, however, that a number of persons, including Richard Ben Veniste, the 32-year-old lawyer who helped prosecute the Watergate cover-up case, had rejected the committee's overtures.

Three weeks ago, the Nedzi aide conceded that if the committee "goes another 10 days" without choosing a counsel, "we'll be subject to the criticism that we haven't moved."

An aide to another Democratic member said today that the Representative he worked for had gone so far as to search out candidates for the job and bring them to Mr. Nedzi's attention, but without success.

"I think," the aide said, "that the question has to arise" as to whether Mr. Nedzi is deliberately delaying action out of some reluctance to set the committee in motion.

An aide to another Democratic committee member added that the delays had caused grumblings about "poor generalship" on Mr. Nedzi's part in the ranks of the majority.

The Nedzi aide countered, however, that the chairman was "getting quite restless" himself, and said that, "like a bit of home cooking," the committee's investigation "has to be done slowly to get the full flavor."

Mr. Nedzi is also chairman of the House Armed Services Committee's Subcommittee on Intelligence, which has an oversight responsibility for the Central Intelligence Agency.

His appointment by House

WASHINGTON POST
8 April 1975

Angleton Given CIA's Highest Award

Associated Press

James Jesus Angleton, once described as the mastermind of a massive illegal domestic spying operation by the Central Intelligence Agency, received the agency's highest award yesterday.

The Distinguished Intelligence Medal was presented to the ousted counterintelligence chief by Deputy Director Lt. Gen. Vernon A. Walters at a small, unannounced ceremony. Intelligence Director William E. Colby, who forced Angleton to retire at the end of last year, was out of town, addressing a meeting of news executives in New Orleans.

An agency spokesman con-

firmed that the award had been presented to Angleton and said it was "coincidence" that the ceremony had been scheduled for a day when Colby was out of town.

The citation presented to Angleton praised him "for long and distinguished service" in counterintelligence. Angleton's intelligence career spanned more than 30 years stretching back to World War II.

When Angleton and three of his top aides were forced by Colby to retire last December, their departure was widely linked to the publication by The New York Times of alle-

gations that Angleton headed a spy operation against antiwar dissidents in the late 1960s.

Colby has since stated publicly that Angleton left in a policy dispute over detente with the Soviet Union and liaison with the Israeli intelligence service.

Although officially retired, Angleton has continued to work at agency headquarters

in Langley, Va., where a spokesman said he is serving as a consultant aiding in the transition to an anonymous successor as head of counterintelligence.

NEW YORK TIMES
10 April 1975

Panel Asks Ford to Speed Study on Colby

By NICHOLAS M. HORROCK
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 9—The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence voted today to ask President Ford to expedite delivery of the Colby report and other top secret documents it has asked for in its investigation of the Government's intelligence apparatus, the committee chairman said.

In a briefing for reporters after a closed meeting of the committee, Senator Frank Church said that the White House had turned over the "least sensitive" materials sought in a committee request sent to the President in March. But the Idaho Democrat said that the White House was holding back the Presidential directives that authorized each covert operation over the last three decades and the report to the President made by William E. Colby, Director of Central Intelligence, in Vail, Colo., last January.

Mr. Church said that he did not know why the material had not been produced.

Mr. Church said that the White House has identified the materials in the request, reviewed them and that they were in the possession of White House staff members assigned to deal with the committees. He said that the White House had given no indication that it would not deliver the materials or that President Ford

would invoke executive privilege and keep the materials. "I see no reason for any further delay," Mr. Church said, "and neither did the committee."

The original request for information was sent to the President in letter form with addendums that sought all the directives covering the formation and operation of United States intelligence activities going back to 1947 and covering the terms of five Presidents. When the request was received at the White House, aides there complained it was not specific and to "sweeping." Mr. Church said again yesterday that he believed the request was "quite specific."

Mr. Church said the committee also voted to give the "green light" to the staff to begin actual field investigations in six areas of interest. The committee, its counsel F.A.O. Schwarz 3d, later said, will investigate the legal authority underlying intelligence operations, purposes of intelligence gathering, the techniques of intelligence gathering both domestically and abroad, the development of policies governing intelligence and the control of the apparatus and a survey of previous recommendations for changes.

The investigation of the techniques of intelligence, he said, would include covert operations and counterintelligence. Earlier, the committee staff

had been divided in four task forces to accomplish these aims. It announced today the appointment of the heads of the task forces.

William Bader, a former staff member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, will head the force on foreign intelligence.

A task force on domestic intelligence activities will be headed by John Elliff, a professor of law at Brandeis University. Alton Quanback, a defense expert with the Brookings Institution, will head a task force on military intelligence. David Aaron, who was a member of Henry Kissinger's national security staff, will head a task force on the command and control of the intelligence community.

Mr. Schwarz said the committee had been dealing with Roderick Hills, a recently appointed Presidential aide.

The committee voted today to request the authorizations and legal background materials from the Department of Defense covering the operations of the Defense Intelligence Agency.

It had already asked for similar material from the C.I.A. and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Neither of these agencies has complied and Senator Church speculated that they might be waiting to see what the White House did.

man of the select committee. Mr. Nedzi has so far declined all requests to make himself available to the press.

By contrast, Senator Frank Church, Democrat of Idaho who heads a counterpart select intelligence committee in the Senate, has held a number of news conferences and has provided several on-the-record interviews.

The select Senate committee, which was voted into existence barely three weeks before the Nedzi panel, named its staff

Speaker Carl Albert to head the select intelligence panel was criticized by some of Mr. Nedzi's colleagues on the ground that he was too closely identified with Congressional panels that in the past were unable to provide close supervision of the C.I.A.

The intelligence subcommittee headed by Mr. Nedzi held hearings in 1973 on possible C.I.A. involvement in the Watergate cover-up and produced testimony that Richard Helms, while Director of Central Intelligence, ordered a su-

bordinate to withhold Watergate information and deny the Justice Department access to a key witness in the first six weeks after the Watergate break-in on June 17, 1972.

But the subcommittee's report on Oct. 23, 1973, on its hearings did not cite Mr. Helms' personal role in withholding the information, and Mr. Nedzi did not call attention to the testimony when he declassified it late last year.

Except for initial interviews after his

10 April 1975

director and committee counsel within a month and has selected about 40 of its full complement of 50 staff members.

The Senate staff has begun to receive documents from the C.I.A. and other Federal agencies and to take sworn depositions from persons who will be called upon to testify when the panel begins public hear-

NEW YORK TIMES

7 April 1975

City Bar Association Study Says Many C.I.A. Activities Illegal

By TOM GOLDSTEIN

A city bar association report has concluded that many of the domestic and foreign activities undertaken by the Central Intelligence Agency has been unlawful.

The 46-page legal analysis of the agency was prepared by the committee on civil rights and the committee on international human rights of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York.

The report, which was released yesterday, accuses William E. Colby, Director of Central Intelligence, and Richard Helms, the director from 1966 to 1973, of "having had no consistent and common understanding of the activities prohibited to the agency by statute."

The report also accuses Congress of failing to provide proper review of C.I.A. operations. "Congress has relinquished to the C.I.A. its own constitutionally based responsibility in the formulation of our foreign policy," the report concludes.

Source of Data

The committees analyzed the constitutional and statutory provisions governing the agency, and the published statements of Mr. Colby and Mr. Helms. Among the specific findings in the report are the following:

¶ C.I.A. surveillance within the United States of any person who is not a C.I.A. employe is prohibited by existing statutes.

¶ The agency's maintenance of files on any individual in this country who has no clear and direct involvement with a foreign power is unlawful.

¶ Certain covert political activities engaged in by the agency appear to be "patently unconstitutional."

¶ The current secret procedures for financing the agency are unconstitutional since the Constitution requires that the total sum spent by any Government agency be published in the combined statement of Government expenditures.

Term Undefined

Under the National Security Act of 1947, which established the C.I.A., the agency was forbidden to have "police, subpoena, law enforcement powers or internal security functions" inside the United States.

The term "internal security functions" was not defined in the 1947 act and has no established legal meaning, the report states.

"The lack of statutory definition," the report finds, "per-

mits the agency to adjust its meaning or to carve out exceptions to it to fit the circumstances."

At a Senate hearing on Jan. 15, Mr. Colby acknowledged that his agency had infiltrated undercover agents into domestic antiwar and dissident political groups as part of a counterintelligence program that led to the accumulation of files on 10,000 United States citizens.

But he denied an allegation published in The New York Times that the agency had engaged in a "massive, illegal, domestic intelligence operation."

Protecting Sources

The 1947 security act also places responsibility upon the director to protect "intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure."

That provision, the report says, "has been used to justify C.I.A. domestic activity which in our view involves the exercise by the C.I.A. of internal security functions, and thus to nullify the statutory prohibition against such activity."

Among the activities undertaken by the agency that the report finds unlawful are the preparation of a psychological profile of Daniel Ellsberg and the wiretapping of telephones of private citizens.

The report also questions the legality of certain "disruptive political operations abroad that are not directly related to the gathering of information."

Overseas Activities Assailed

Many aspects of the agency's covert political activities overseas remain "unclear or unverified," the report finds. "However, certain C.I.A. operations which have been acknowledged by the agency appear to be patently unconstitutional. The Bay of Pigs invasion, for example, was a usurpation by the executive of Congress's power to 'raise and support Armies' and to 'declare war.'"

Similarly unconstitutional, the report states, "was the recruiting over a period of years of a large army in Laos without Congressional knowledge."

In still other actions, the report concludes, the C.I.A. "conducted activities which apparently breached treaties ratified by the Senate." According to the report, such a treaty violation occurred when the Nixon Administration authorized an \$8-million expenditure for opponents of Salvador Allende, Gossens, the late President of Chile.

A boundary for secret agencies

What they do is a recurrent issue

By Editorial Research Reports

Washington

A book about the American Intelligence community that was published 11 years ago had an apt title: "The Invisible Government."

The authors, David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, argued that the intelligence community had achieved "a quasi-independent status and a power of its own" and that "the public, the President, and the Congress must support steps to control the intelligence establishment, to place checks on its power and to make it truly accountable. . . ."

Such steps are now being taken. A presidential commission headed by Vice-President Nelson A. Rockefeller and several congressional committees are investigating charges that the Central Intelligence Agency violated its charter by engaging in domestic spying.

Two recent books by disgruntled former CIA employees have provided the agency's critics with additional ammunition. Demands for stricter control of intelligence activities are gathering force.

And yet, nothing much may come of all this, if experience is any guide.

"The pattern is established," Alan Wolfe wrote in The Nation. "Every few years, someone discovers that the CIA is not doing what it is supposed to be doing; there is loud declamation; commissions are established; legislators say that now, this time, they will do their job and find out what is really going on; a few agency officials resign; public interest, first intense, begins to wane; things return to 'normal,' until the next wave of recriminations sweeps in. Meanwhile, the spying goes on and on."

That is more or less what happened in the wake of the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961. President Kennedy told a high official in his administration that he wanted "to splinter the CIA in a thousand pieces and scatter it to the wind" after the Cuban debacle. He ordered a thorough investigation of the agency, replaced Allen Dulles with John A. McCone as director, and ordered that ambassadors once again assert their supremacy over CIA personnel in foreign countries.

Once the inquiry was completed, however, Mr. Kennedy dropped his plan to break up the CIA or limit it to intelligence gathering and shift clandestine operations to the Defense Department. The only significant outcome of the study was an order that sizable military operations be left to the Pentagon.

In the end, would-be reformers of the CIA, FBI, and other agencies must confront the fact that intelligence gathering requires an inordinate amount of secrecy. Thus, the CIA had the Howard Hughes organization build an ocean-mining vessel whose primary mission was to salvage a sunken Soviet missile submarine. This partially successful operation, which was recently disclosed by a

NATIONAL REVIEW
28 MARCH 1975

number of newspapers, stirred admiration for the CIA even among some of the agency's severest critics.

Regardless of the outcome of the various inquiries now in progress, it seems safe to assume that the CIA will think twice about undertaking domestic surveillance in the future. The adverse publicity such activities generates can inhibit the agency's ability to perform its legitimate functions and hamper its efforts to recruit capable personnel. Although a secret intelligence apparatus is to some extent incompatible with democracy, few would argue that reliable information about enemy capabilities is not essential to national security.

WALL STREET JOURNAL
4 APRIL 1975*Vessel Used in Bid
To Lift Russian Sub
Wasn't on Tax Rolls*

Los Angeles Assessor Claims
The CIA Convinced Him
To Keep It Off Listings

By STEPHEN J. SANSWEET
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

LOS ANGELES—The strange saga of the government-funded attempt to raise a Russian submarine from the floor of the Pacific Ocean took another bizarre twist with a story by Los Angeles County Assessor Philip E. Watson that the Central Intelligence Agency convinced him to keep the recovery vessel off the tax rolls.

Mr. Watson said that four men identified as CIA employees were brought to his office in late January by an agent from the local office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. At the time, Mr. Watson's office was considering how much to assess the Hughes Glomar Explorer and its accompanying barge, the HMB-1, both of which were said to be owned by Summa Corp., the personal and private holding company of billionaire recluse Howard Hughes.

Both vessels were used in a super-secret attempt to raise a sunken Russian submarine from the Pacific Ocean last summer. That attempt, only partly successful, reportedly was financed by the CIA.

One of the big remaining mysteries of the salvage operation is who owns the Glomar Explorer, which supposedly was being used for deep ocean mining. According to Mr. Watson's version, the CIA men told him the ship is owned by the government. Summa, as it has done in the past, again declined comment yesterday when asked who is the true owner of the ship and barge. A spokesman said he hopes the company could answer such questions "after we resolve a number of matters."

Assessed at \$40 Million

Mr. Watson said he had been under the impression that the Glomar Explorer was a mining ship and had tentatively assessed it at about \$40 million, but the CIA agents told him a different story—one that appears as misleading as the deep sea exploration cover story.

"These men told me it would be used for undersea detection of Polaris-type submarine missiles and other Russian ship and aircraft movements," Mr. Watson said. "They were afraid if the true cost of the boat was listed at perhaps \$300 million, it would ex-

Two aides of Senator Robert Kennedy say that Kennedy told them in 1967 that he had aborted a CIA plan to assassinate Castro using the services—so the story goes—of the Mafia. The significance of the story today lies in its attribution, for the first time, to the two aides, Adam Walinsky and Peter Edelman. They told the *New York Times* in 1973 about their conversation with Kennedy but had not allowed the *Times* to use their names. Jack Anderson reported back in 1967 that there had been six attempts on Castro's life by the CIA in 1961, just before and just after the Bay of Pigs. With the rampaging investigation of the CIA now going on, the Kennedy aides may have reasoned that details that will come out anyway, about the kind of thing routinely contemplated when JFK was President, are better brought out, preemptively, now: so as to focus not on what the CIA was doing, but on what a Kennedy brother prevented it from doing.

cite suspicion somewhere," he added.

The assessor said the CIA men tried to convince him to assess the ship at 1% of its market value (permissible for fishing and oceanographic ships) instead of the usual 25%. But Mr. Watson said that either way, there would be a public record of the true value of the ship.

Mr. Watson said he asked for a letter saying the Glomar Explorer and barge are U.S. government property, but the agents refused despite their insistence that "Hughes had no investment in either the boat or the barge."

Based on the agents' assurance, Mr. Watson said he agreed to keep the ship off the tax rolls altogether because such federal property isn't taxed. However, the assessor said he would change his mind and slap Summa with an annual tax of about \$9 million if the company doesn't specifically identify the Glomar Explorer as being government-owned when it files its annual declaration of business property next month.

Several Companies Involved

Several publicly held companies were involved in the Glomar Explorer operation, which the CIA reportedly called Project Jennifer. Global Marine Inc., Los Angeles, designed, supervised construction and operated the vessel under contract from Summa. The ship was built by Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., a unit of Sun Oil Co., Radnor, Pa. The barge was designed by a division of Lockheed Aircraft Corp., which also supervised its construction.

The Securities and Exchange Commission said earlier this week that it was investigating certain aspects of Global Marine's disclosures about the Glomar Explorer project.

A commission official in Washington declined comment yesterday on whether the investigation also involved Lockheed and Sun Oil, but spokesmen for the two companies said they hadn't received any notification that the SEC is interested in their roles in the project.

However, SEC sources confirmed that the commission's inquiry is being personally directed by Stanley Sporkin, the hard-nosed chief of the agency's Enforcement Division.

Mr. Watson, the county assessor, said the CIA men originally told him that the Glomar Explorer was an ocean mining vessel and even presented him with a souvenir black rock that they said was a manganese nodule scooped up from 17,000 feet below the ocean's surface. When he pressed them as to why the CIA was concerned about the ship being on the tax rolls, the men came up with the story about the vessel's undersea

detection mission, Mr. Watson added.

The assessor said he thought the CIA representatives (who he said included Los Angeles and Houston attorneys and a man reportedly employed by Summa) had also approached state taxing authorities.

In Sacramento, William W. Dunlop, executive secretary of the state Board of Equalization, which administers the sales and use tax, said that the agency's staff is currently auditing the companies involved in the Glomar Explorer project.

"There have been some discussions by the companies, during the course of the audit work, as to what is taxable and what isn't, possibly because of some government ownership," he said. "The staff is still working on the project." Mr. Dunlop said he hadn't any direct knowledge of the participation of CIA agents in the audits, but wouldn't rule it out.

The tax problems didn't arise until 1974 when the Glomar Explorer was brought to the West Coast for final outfitting of its sophisticated electronic equipment. This would subject the ship to California use tax, but the vessel was on sea trials on the date of assessment, so the problem didn't arise until this year, Mr. Watson explained.

The assessor said he was revealing the details of his involvement in the matter now because the story of the ship and Project Jennifer had already been told in the press. Thus there wasn't any harm in his telling his tale, despite the fact that the CIA men had him sign a secrecy agreement in quadruplicate, Mr. Watson added.

CHICAGO TRIBUNE

7 APRIL 1975

Police spies 'needed'

ELMHURST—Amid all the furor about secrecy and spying on the part of CIA, FBI, police, firemen, and the telephone company, there has been little or no evidence that anyone has been hurt. A few of us are very glad that someone is watching.

We have seen vociferous minorities that originally had good goals infiltrated by violent elements. It is good that FBI and police infiltrated also.

Investigation is a necessary part of our society. One cannot get a commission in the military, or an exclusive job with industry or government, without being subject to investigation. Instead of getting mad about it, why not feel complimented?
T. B. Holliday

CIA and the Powers of Darkness ?

By J. M. BRUCE LOCKHART

This book came to be written because two young Americans decided that it was their right and duty to reveal all that they knew about their country's secret service.

Victor Marchetti had worked in the Central Staff of the CIA for a number of years and had decided that the organisation was evil. John Marks had been one of the State Department's liaison officers with various intelligence agencies and felt strongly that he "should try to change what I knew was wrong in the way the United States conducts its foreign policy". They were natural collaborators and have produced a book* which will be welcomed in Moscow and fortify the belief that the CIA is a vast autonomous conspiracy with a life and motivation all its own. It will be read with regret by those who, in spite of provocation, prefer the policies and attitudes of the United States to those of their (and our) totalitarian adversaries.

The first point that strikes the reader is the absolute self-righteousness of the authors, which is shared by the collaborator, Mr Melvon Wulf of the American Civil Liberties Union. Did it ever occur to them that what they were doing might harm their country's interests? Apparently not, for when they were invited to make cuts and they worked away with scissors and paste in the ACLU office Wulf says (in the Introduction) that "It was the devil's work we did that day". This indicates the intellectual level and the emotional tone of the book generally. What happened was that the US government desired cuts to be made which were resisted by the authors and the ACLU which took up their case. To lend point to this, the clumsy typographical device has been resorted to of setting the uncensored portions in ordinary "roman" type, the passages objected to but restored after argument in "bold", and the excisions which had to be made as blanks. The effect is to confuse the reader.

The book has a certain significance and raises three important questions:

First, is it arguable that the United States would be better off without any secret service? On this the authors are clear. They do not like secret services. If, however, one must have a secret service, its operations must be ethical, and undertaken with the moral consequences in view. Operations should be undertaken with the consent of Congress, and with the knowledge of the American public. Leaving aside the delightful picture of a Department of Moral consequences at the centre of CIA's organisational structure, this is simply a formula for a non-secret secret service. But the plea at the heart of their case is: "The time has come for the United States to stand openly behind its actions overseas, to lead by example rather than by manipulation".

How often have we heard this high-minded nonsense in our own past! It ignores the reality that the adversary states are dictatorships established by force and maintained by force exercised without any moral restraints whatsoever. If their book is any evidence the authors seem totally unaware of this, and while innocence in the young may be moving and beautiful it is fatal when conducting foreign policy. If democracy is to survive in this world the democratic states must be allowed to defend themselves against well-organised enemies. This postulates an effective secret service to provide accurate information about the policies and

* *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence*, by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks (Jonathan Cape), £3.95, 398 pages.

plans of their adversaries and the means "to frustrate their knavish tricks". To throw away this protective would be suicidal.

Secondly, is the CIA a state within a state accountable only to itself, as the authors maintain?

To make the counter-assertion that the CIA experiment is above criticism and no mistakes have been made would be absurd, but equally it would be absurd to believe all the allegations now being made about CIA activities. It is more profitable to recall the early development of the CIA from its beginnings and so put the thinking behind this question into perspective. The Americans had no tradition of clandestine operations. Their clandestine contribution in World War II was only marginal, in spite of Hollywood's attempts to make us think otherwise. When the CIA was established in 1947 it assembled a group of patriotic, able and dedicated men. The fact that they mostly came from New England is made much of by the authors, implying some form of Ivy League, upper-class freemasonry, but it was not like that. The CIA had to find a group of people with some knowledge of the world outside the United States and some knowledge of foreign affairs. The only catchment area at that time was on the Eastern seaboard. The wonder is that the CIA learned so much so quickly rather than that it made so many mistakes.

Moreover, the CIA's original role was conceived as being intelligence gathering and intelligence collating. Policy was in the hands of the State Department which was, in terms of world power, itself in its infancy. We tend to forget the evil effect of Senator McCarthy's activities on the State Department, which he virtually castrated in 1953-54. The result was that there was a vacuum in the making of foreign policy, just at the time when the United States started to become involved in the affairs of SE Asia.

At that time the CIA was immensely strong in Washington politically. Bedell Smith was head of CIA, Alan Dulles was his Deputy, John Foster Dulles was Secretary of State and Eisenhower, Bedell Smith's close friend and admirer, was President.

McCarthy tried very hard to break the CIA and totally failed. The result of this was that the CIA was sucked into this vacuum of foreign policy making. Were it not for McCarthy, it is arguable that the Bay of Pigs and other similar semi-overt involvements might never have happened. Nevertheless, the CIA made mistakes, or perhaps it would be fairer to say that the sheer Americanism of CIA led it into certain areas of error. Behind these errors lay the scale of the whole project: too many people and too much money. Nothing concentrates a secret service so much on priorities as a shortage of cash and a shortage of operators!

Too much cash and too many operators tend to produce a large bureaucracy in which the left hand does not know what the right is up to, a dynamism which, if not exhausted with plenty of legitimate work, may cause the under-employed operatives to dream up tasks for themselves which in turn leads to the temptation to interfere in fields not the proper concern of a secret service.

But these are the errors the present US government (of which the CIA is an integral part) is probably well aware of, indeed the current Head of CIA recently made a public speech advocating the civilised distinction between "good" and "bad" secrets, "good" secrets being those which must be kept in the national

interest; bad being those which either are not secrets at all, or are secrets to cover up shortcomings—and he added that “bad” secrets must be eliminated. It may even be fair to say that the authors of this book may have made a contribution towards stimulating the US government to further self-examination of this problem. Where the authors are quite wrong is to bolster up the image of the CIA as a dark power occupying the place of former bodies such as the Freemasons in France at the time of Dreyfus, the British Secret Service in the middle part of the present century, the Mafia, and the CIA today. These images of darkness seem to be a human necessity; partly to explain the causation of otherwise inexplicable events, partly as a scapegoat for failure or incompetence. But in the long run these myths actively handicap sound political judgment and experience indicates that all these “ruthless exposures” achieve is an increase in the strength of the myth. Even here the authors do democracy a dis-service.

Thirdly, what were the real motives of the two authors? They claim the noblest of motives but one cannot help wondering. A lot of the language is the jargon of the fashionable Left. The CIA's activities in

opposing Soviet policies in the Third World are described as “determined efforts to reverse popular trends towards independence and democracy”. The constant references to “dirty tricks” indicates again a somewhat emotional approach. The description of US policy as “outmoded international policies and unattainable ends” has an all too familiar Left-wing note. Yet I doubt if the motives of the authors for writing this book were sinister. I suspect they were more a mixture of innocence, arrogance and personal gain (this last being a perfectly legitimate reason for authorship).

Nevertheless, when all is said and done, there is something unattractive about a public servant working for his country, promising to keep secret his work, and then deliberately breaking his promise. In other places or times Marchetti and Marks would certainly have been put up against a wall and shot. Democracies today are more enlightened. Yet democracies have to defend themselves and in order to do so have to make up their minds where treason lies, in a democracy. If they fail to do so, they will cease to be democracies; that at least is certain.

JAPAN TIMES
24 March 1975

Time of the Assassins



By Max Lerner

NEW YORK CITY —The flap over the CIA assassination stories — if valid — raises two questions. The first: Who was in charge of the store — the CIA or the President? And which ever was — this is the second question — what are the ethics of such assassination politics, and at what cost were they pursued?

What happened is still shrouded in hearsay, gossip and mystery. CIA director, William E. Colby, after this formal report on the CIA infractions of its charter, added an oral fill-in for President Ford about the CIA plans for assassinating heads of state, but is said to have denied that anyone had in fact been killed.

Yet there are dark stories out of Washington about the deaths of Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic and of Patrice Lumumba, the Congolese leader, and about such targets of unsuccessful plots as President Duvalier of Haiti and Premier Castro of Cuba.

If we add the deaths of President Diem of South Vietnam and his brother, who were killed in a military coup but presumably with the sufferance or complicity of the Kennedy Administration, it makes a considerable sum.

The American people have by now learned enough about the CIA's past operations to know that the agency suffered from the corrosive impact of secrecy and the arrogance of power, and had become a state within a state, sometimes weaving its own conspiracy webs. Yet it is hard to believe that anything as momentous as a death plan for a foreign head of state could have gone any distance without some knowledge on the part of the President in power at the time.

The question of President John Kennedy's role is especially complex. Did he know about the military coup against Diem in advance, as Ambassador Lodge, the State Department and the CIA did? Did he know — or should he have guessed — that

inevitably it would mean the deaths of Diem and his brother?

The memoirs and diplomatic studies are still unclear about it. There is a brilliantly written suspense novel — Charles McCarry's “The Tears of Autumn” — which argues that the family of the two men were convinced of Kennedy's responsibility, and carried through his assassination in turn, using the Cubans, the Mafia and Oswald as unknowing instruments. It is tall conjecture as well as high political suspense. But it is also a sign of how the cloud of suspicion around Kennedy's life and death still lingers.

Another theory of Kennedy's death has it that it was strictly a Cuban response to a CIA plot against Castro. Two of Robert Kennedy's former aides have said that when he was attorney general he learned of such a CIA assassination plan and insisted that it be called off. This may have been the plot which former Sen. Smathers of Florida — a close friend of President Kennedy — several times mentioned, but the press accounts about Smathers said nothing about Robert Kennedy's counteraction. There have been recent reports that a Mafia contract was involved in whatever plan there was. But Castro himself has denied any knowledge of a Kennedy Administration plot against him. Which again proves nothing, except the web of mystery surrounding whatever involves the deaths or attempted deaths of the modern kings.

One finds it hard to believe that President Kennedy could have stooped to any of this intrigue. But the real story is less about him than about the role of crucial political figures in history. Kennedy did believe — as Oswald or whoever else killed him believed — that the presence or absence of a particular leader made a huge difference in how history turned. Even the Communists, who profess contempt for any Great Man theory as against their own theory of historical determinism, have been known to practice assassinations.

In Western democracies as well as in tyrannies, the heads of governments have often found themselves caught up in death plots. It seems to go with the territory of the use and abuse of power, and it is primarily the disease of intelligence services. When men finally achieve power, after lusting for it long, they run the danger of confusing themselves with God and assuming that human lives are theirs to dispose of.

They rationalize it in a number of ways — by national interest or security, by reason of state or reason of history. But whatever the term used, it is still killing.

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LOS ANGELES TIMES
7 April 1975

SUB RECOVERY: ANATOMY OF A SUPER-SECRET MISSION

BY NICHOLAS C. CHRISS and JERRY COHEN
Times Staff Writers

About a year ago, a great mishapen mass of steel arrived on the Redwood City waterfront were, amid taut security, it was jockeyed into a large but ordinary appearing metal shed.

Its arrival was the signal that the Central Intelligence Agency's Project Azorian, which had begun as Project Jennifer, had advanced beyond the drawing boards, shipyard bustle and super-secret negotiation and planning.

Now, six years of intrigue which would lead to the recovery of part of a sunken Russian submarine had reached a long-awaited turning point.

Crewman of the Hughes Glomar Explorer, already intensively screened for the undertaking, would begin to learn at a secret school techniques by which they were to raise the sub from a Pacific Ocean depth of three miles.

... And discover what they must do to stay alive during the mission.

The project, U.S. intelligence sources claim, proved a stunning success, although some congressmen and other critics contend the mission has been overrated in terms of cost (an estimated \$400 million) and what was salvaged.

Intelligence sources insist that analysis of the recovered wreckage supplied evidence confirming that the Soviet Union was arming conventional undersea craft with Polaris-type nuclear missiles and with nuclear-tipped torpedoes.

Now, The Times has been told by an independent source possessing an intimate knowledge of Project Azorian, that much of its reputed success results from another find:

z... A 2-inch-thick journal kept by a young Soviet naval officer being groomed as an expert on the nuclear capabilities of the vessel which plunged to the ocean bottom in 1968.

The explorer crew also recovered the young officer's body, curled as if asleep in his bunk and so well preserved that intelligence agents were able to establish his identity.

His journal, the source said, details the suspected—but never before documented—nuclear potential of the submarine.

The misshapen steel mass transported into one of two big buildings at Lockheed's Redwood City Space and Missile Facility on the shore of San Francisco Bay resembled, said a Times source, "an old diving bell that had collapsed."

The contorted object—about 20 feet long—was to become a play-actor in one of the most remarkable intelligence feats in American military history.

Its role was to imitate the sub, a 320-foot-long Golf-class vessel built in 1958, which sank 750 miles north of Hawaii, carrying down with it Russian nuclear secrets. It became the centerpiece for an intensive two-week cram course for selected Glomar Explorer crewmen who attended a unique "school" in the Lockheed facility's two metal buildings.

In the placid bay waters alongside the structures floated the HMIB-1, the monster barge that was an integral part of the salvage operation and in which was constructed the giant "claw" designed to snatch the sunken sub from the ocean floor.

Classes in the meticulously equipped metal buildings included, among other instruction, a course which hammered the difficult Russian alphabet into the "students"—many of them former oil field roughnecks.

Sources have supplied The Times not only precise details about the school and its classes but also with new information about the total recovery enterprise.

Some of the information is at odds with that previously divulged by the CIA, which—using billionaire recluse

Howard Hughes as a front—was in charge of the project. For instance:

—The huge grappling hook planted aboard the Glomar Explorer from beneath by the barge off Avalon initially clutched the entire submarine, according to one Times source.

The sub, intact but badly damaged, was raised about 5,000 feet, said the source, before two-thirds of it broke away.

According to earlier information, the submarine was found in three separate sections, and only a part of one of these was raised into the Glomar by the claw.

—Two nuclear-tipped torpedoes were brought up with the 38-foot forward section that was salvaged, according to the source. He also said that a missile, believed nuclear tipped and relatively undamaged, slipped back to the ocean floor when one section broke away.

Neither nuclear-tipped torpedoes nor nuclear-tipped missiles were recovered, according to most previous reports which indicated, however, that:

Scientific analysis of the recovered section disclosed evidence that such missiles and torpedoes were contained in an unrecovered portion.

According to previous reports, one objective of a return trip scheduled this summer for the Explorer to the site of the sinking is to retrieve those missiles.

Another is to obtain evidence that would reveal secrets of the Russian code, long a mystery to U.S. cryptographers.

—Recovered parts of the submarine were not all dumped at sea before the Explorer returned to Long Beach, as intelligence sources previously maintained.

"Only the parts that were just hunks of metal, like the hull, were cut up and thrown overboard," said a source. "The important stuff was brought back."

CHRONOLOGY OF RECOVERY MISSION

Here is a brief chronology of the U.S. intelligence mission surrounding the sunken Soviet submarine:

1968—A Soviet Golf-class submarine built in 1958 sinks in the Pacific Ocean 750 miles north of Hawaii.

1968-69—Russians attempt unsuccessfully to locate the sunken submarine. During this same period, a super-secret U.S. Navy ship locates the sub.

1969—A U.S. ship, the Glomar I, takes deep-sea photographs of the Soviet sub.

1969—President Nixon and the Forty Committee, a group which monitors U.S. military intelligence activities, approve a proposal to raise the sub.

1970-73—The Glomar Explorer, the ship designed to retrieve the Soviet sub, is constructed at a Chester, Pa., shipyard. It is proclaimed to be a deep-sea mining vessel.

1973-74—Explorer crew members destined to participate in the recovery mission are chosen, cleared by the CIA, hired and sent to classes at Redwood City to learn details of retrieving the Russian sub.

July, 1974—The Explorer and its attendant barge begin and conclude the operation to retrieve the Soviet submarine and bring up a 38-foot forward section.

August, 1974—The Explorer anchors off the Hawaiian island of Maui. Experts comb the section of the Soviet sub to analyze its contents.

September, 1974—The Explorer and barge return to their base at Redwood City.

1975—A new claw is designed and constructed for the second trip to recover portions of the Soviet sub not retrieved.

July, 1975—A second trip is planned to the sunken sub site by the Glomar Explorer.

"Anything electronic. Valves and hatches. That kind of stuff. It was all shipped out," said another source.

Although less was retrieved than hoped for, the CIA had prepared carefully for what it might recover by stationing a series of "vans" on the Explorer, said the first source.

"Each van," he added, "had a specific purpose. One for anything that dealt with nuclear material. Another was for documents of any kind.

"It was just one hell of an operation, like everything else the CIA does. Their experts were the best you could find anywhere."

—The great height of the towering, eye-catching derrick on the Explorer serves no useful purpose, according to a Times source.

He said a much smaller derrick could handle the 60-foot lengths of thick-walled pipe which operated the claw with pressure from water or hydraulic fluid.

The derrick was built the way it was, he added, to jibe with the cover story supplied by Hughes' Summa Corp. personnel that the Explorer was constructed to mine the ocean for valuable mineral nodules.

The source also revealed that during barroom and bunkroom gossip, Explorer crewmen speculated that the United States somehow was responsible for the sinking of the submarine, built in 1958 but later supplied with nuclear warheads—presumably a violation of U.S.-Soviet arms agreements.

Intelligence sources insist, however, that the sub accidentally blew up and that the unprecedented recovery mission resulted simply from U.S. undersea technological advances unknown to the Soviet Union.

The discovery was made possible, they say, by sophisticated sounding equipment which only the United States has perfected.

Once the discovery was made, not long after the submarine sank, the recovery attempt was conceived.

After much debate, a Times source said, government leaders chose the CIA over the Navy to make the recovery attempt because of the need for secrecy.

But, in the interest of secrecy, the CIA itself needed a "front." Secrecy-prone Howard Hughes was the logical choice.

Explained The Times' source:

"Who would be stupid enough to mine the bottom of the ocean but Hughes? Who would have all those millions to pour into a goofy project like that? Who else would make such a mystery of it? And who else could take the heat?"

Ultrasensitive cameras took "hundreds of pictures" of the shattered submarine which showed it lying at a 33-degree angle, a Times source said.

Wheels began to turn within the CIA, and Project Jennifer—the name given to the preliminary stage of the recovery mission—was born. (Project Matador, said a Times source, is the code name for this summer's impending operation.)

The Glomar Explorer was built in a Pennsylvania shipyard. The giant barge was constructed in San Diego and towed to Redwood City, where the claw was assembled inside it.

The CIA marshaled its forces. Members of the agency who participated in the actual work and braintrusting on the project, said a Times source, were surprisingly few in number.

They recruited specialists in a variety of highly technical areas, he said, who were the true rambos of the project—"the contract men."

One of this particular breed, the source said, was a charismatic former Navy officer known to crew members by his code name of Blackjack.

Blackjack, the source added, was—and still is—the on-the-scenes boss of the recovery operation.

"Because of his easygoing ways and his camaraderie with the men, he got along famously with the boys," the source said. "Because of his vast knowledge and intelligence, he was greatly respected."

"When Blackjack talked, all the men listened."

Blackjack, the source said, visited the Lockheed facility in Redwood City last week to inspect a new claw being completed in the HMB-1 for this summer's projected mission.

The original claw was severely damaged last July when the major portion of the sub broke away and mauled its

tentacles.

The redesigned claw, or RV (for rescue vessel), said the source, will have the task of lifting the sub without penetrating or breaking the conning tower area where the missiles are housed.

For that reason, he added, its tentacles have been shortened and a single long scoop which will go under the sunken vessel has been added.

But a little more than a year ago no such return to the site of the sinking was anticipated.

At that time, the educational process which preceded the first salvage operation was the matter of great moment—or at least one of the primary concerns.

The Redwood City "school" where crew members received their crash education was as unique as any segment of the entire project.

The classes were to serve three basic functions:

—Provide crew members with detailed information about submarines, especially the one on the Pacific Ocean floor.

—Teach them the Russian alphabet so they could recognize letters on items aboard the sub and then relay them to Russian language specialists who would translate them into words during the process of picking the vessel apart, once it was recovered.

—Instruct them in ways of handling possibly contaminated components of the submarine when they worked on it after recovery and advise them of the nuclear danger.

The classes began at 8 a.m. and ran until 5 p.m. Crewmen spent much of this time in protective garb resembling spacesuits. The garments were designed to protect them against contamination.

Oxygen flowed through the back of the headgear which also contained a microphone and earphones that permitted communication with two Russian-speaking CIA agents, called by the crewmen "the two linguists."

"They're the ones who taught crew members the Russian alphabet. During training, the crew people would work on the ship (the mocksub) wearing those spacesuits."

"When they saw some Russian words that had been put on the sub, they would spell them out and the linguists would tell them what they meant. We knew there were some places that could be damn dangerous and we wanted to be prepared."

The source said of the linguists:

"They spoke with a heavy accent, and when they spoke to one another they spoke only Russian. But they were honest-to-goodness Americans, guys who were born here. But they had lived in Russia as agents for 10 years."

"They looked like Russians, too. They were kind of short and squat. They looked like Khrushchev. Wore those funny Russian suits, double-breasted with wide lapels, and funny pointed shoes. You talk about experts—the CIA's got them."

The source said talk was frequent among crew members about the mission's prospects for success and about the precise planning of the CIA men.

"Every part of both the ship and the barge had code names," the source said. "And lots of people had code names, too. Around the project you'd hear things like, 'Shark will be in town next week. Notify Rainbow.'"

Four or five two-week classes were held at the school, the source said, with eight to 10 men in each class.

Each class cut the mock submarine apart to familiarize itself with the operation planned at sea, if the recovery were a success. After each class, the hunk of steel was welded together again.

Each class also was warned that the mission ahead of them could prove perilous, even life-endangering.

They were instructed in fine detail what their rights would be under the Geneva Convention should Soviet trawlers known to be in the recovery area send armed men aboard the Explorer, the source said.

They were cautioned, the source added, that the lifting process itself could disable the recovery craft and kill everyone aboard.

And they were told, he said, that once the sub was pulled into a huge football-field sized hold in the vessel—the "moon pool"—it might be hot as hell, contaminated with radiation.

During this time of planning, the source recalls, he eith-

er experienced or learned of what he found to be intriguing ancillary developments:

—He said he saw what he found to be memos from both then President Richard M. Nixon and Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger applauding the mission. None, he added, was on official stationery but each was signed.

—He visited rented "cool pads," one in Santa Monica and one in Long Beach, where the CIA met with Global Marine, Inc. (designer and niminal operator of the Explorer) personnel to brief each other.

"We would get them cleaned up (checked for listening devices) once a week. We would discuss the ship and what was going on," the source said.

—The source said he was told during this time that Hughes himself had visited the Airport Marina Hotel here in 1959 and given permission for his name to be used as a front for the operation.

If such a visit by the wealthy billionaire who has not been seen publicly for a quarter of a century did occur, that in itself would have been remarkable.

Certainly it would have been a fitting prelude to what happened five years later when the Explorer, trailing its monster claw from the "moon pool," chugged (top speed 10 to 12 m.p.h.) one summer day into a preselected spot in the Pacific—and stopped.

Four Russian trawlers circled it.

Trawlers had been monitoring the area since the sub went down, said a Times source.

The Explorer crew set about "mining" the ocean depths for manganese nodules. That was the plan and that is how it must have appeared to the Russian trawlers.

But something else really was occurring aboard the Explorer. Here's what, according to one source:

Section after 60-foot section of exquisitely designed pipe is fed down through the "moon pool," driving the claw deeper and deeper into the ocean. The pipe's walls were 4 inches thick. The hollow core was 3 inches in diameter.

"Sometimes," the source remembers, "the four Russian trawlers came so close some of our guys would give them the finger—and the Russians would give the finger right back."

"I guess if they had come aboard, we just would have backed off. We didn't want any trouble."

By the time the claw reached the ocean floor, the pipe had spiraled down three miles, snaking through the water

to the depths like a giant eel. The special construction of the pipe, said a source, allowed it to "bend."

The claw reached for the wreckage, powered, said the source, by pressure from seawater or hydraulic fluid coursing through the pipe core.

"It lifted the sub slowly and cautiously for about a mile," the source said.

Then it happened.

The aft two-thirds of the sub snapped at least two of the claw's tentacles and plunged back into a three-mile-deep ocean trough.

The intake into the "moon pool" resumed.

What radiation experts had feared was found. Warheads which had been aboard the sub had contaminated it, either when it sank or during the years it had lain rusting on the ocean bottom.

As crew members assigned to the duty worked on the vessel, they wore the same heavy "spacesuits" in which they had trained in Redwood City.

"At first," said a source, "we wore two uniforms, one cotton and one of a paper-like material. But we found out we didn't need both and just wore the cloth one."

Despite the precautions, the source discovered that he had sustained radiation burns and that an expensive pair of his boots had been ruined.

"I had to shower for an hour and a half," he said.

A device in a specially designed "scrub room" aboard the ship which measured contamination "went all the way to the peg when he entered," the source said.

The young Soviet specialist's body was found along with five others, two well-preserved like his, in the sleeping quarters of the recovered submarine section.

"They (the CIA) learned the names and addresses" of the young officer and two other dead Russians," the source said. "I don't know how. Maybe from dog tags or something."

"They found a notebook, I know. He had been going to classes. He had been taking a lot of notes. They found lots of information from that."

The young officer's logbook, said another source, was kept on 8-by-10-inch sheets and "the covers were intact, both front and back."

"Three-fourths of this they were able to decipher. The other stuff recovered and kept was put in the vans. But the journal was considered so important a plane flew it right away to Washington."

EDITOR & PUBLISHER
29 MARCH 1975

Who else knew about it?

Disproving charges that the press is predominantly antigovernment, four major metropolitan newspapers plus two weekly news magazines, the three television networks and a wire service withheld for some time, at the personal request of CIA Director William E. Colby, reports of the agency's attempt to salvage a Russian submarine.

The reason for the request was said to be national security—to allow the CIA to make further attempts to recover the rest of the submarine from the floor of the Pacific Ocean.

It was a remarkable display of press cooperation in the interest of national security. The story was made public in a radio broadcast by Jack Anderson who said he did not believe it involved national security. The media thus were released from their pledge to delay publication.

In retrospect, one wonders how much national security could have been involved in such a well-known secret and how Colby or anyone else in government could hope to suppress or delay its publication. If reporters and editors of all those important media knew the story, or just part of it, isn't it naive to assume that a lot of other people in Washington and elsewhere didn't know it also? Including foreign agents.

The major media have demonstrated they can keep a secret when they are convinced it is in the national interest to do so, but we feel they will take a lot more convincing in the future when they realize a well-known secret cannot be a well-kept secret.

LONDON TIMES

31 March 1975

CIA agents in Britain

From Mr Stan Newens, Labour and Cooperative MP for Harlow

Sir, I hope you will permit me as the chief sponsor of the House of Commons early day motion on CIA agents at the United States Embassy in London to comment on Louis Heren's article published in your edition of March 22.

First, may I say that the intention was certainly not to discredit the new American Ambassador, Mr Elliot Richardson, but to object to the conduct of operations by the agents of a foreign government, using diplomatic credentials, in this country.

Secondly, is it not a highly dangerous situation, if Mr Heren is correct, for CIA agents to be permitted to combat "subversion" in Britain—whether in association with British intelligence and security services or not?

Surely it is for the British Government, which is responsible to Parliament, to deal with "subversion", not a foreign-based agency over which no British minister exercises any control.

Yours, etc,
STAN NEWENS,
House of Commons.
March 24.

NEW TIMES
4 APRIL 1975

By Larry L. King

The more the can is opened, the more worms are spilled: we now have the word of two former aides to the late Robert Kennedy that our CIA functionaries made such a pact with the Devil as to actually award the Mafia a "hit" contract on Fidel Castro.



Lyndon Johnson long privately opined that John F. Kennedy had been assassinated in retaliation of American efforts to kill Castro. As this information leaked in political and journalistic circles, many of us refused to believe. After all, late in his reign LBJ growled that he could not trust even his intimates; bad dreams of his own violent death followed him into retirement; he became convinced that the TV networks were communist-dominated. It all seemed but the pathetic gabble of a bitter, disappointed man: one who—worried about his place in history and resenting his reluctant abdication—had adopted the protective colorations of classic paranoia. In the Castro-Kennedy example, at least, it now appears that maybe ole Lyndon wasn't all that crazy.

CIA tracks long have been rumored near the assassinated remains of Leftists (Lumumba in the Belgian Congo, Allende in Chile, Che Guevara in Bolivia), those who flirted with them (Trujillo in the Dominican Republic) or even those formerly "friendly" leaders—as with Diem in South Vietnam—who had become embarrassing liabilities in our alleged common causes. Now we learn of the "hit" contract on Cuba's Castro even as information surfaces of when the CIA planned to assist in the killing of "Papa Doc" Duvalier in Haiti. Though Arbenz in Guatemala, Sukarno in Indonesia and Sihanouk of Cambodia escaped with their lives, the CIA clearly assisted in overthrowing their respective governments; judging by that tip of the iceberg we have seen, one must conclude that had these not gone quietly, then they, too, might literally have lost their heads.

These are dismal and astounding revelations to Americans nurtured on the belief that our system and our tradition honors ballots over bullets. We cannot easily accommodate the notion that the CIA—heavily peopled by Establishmentarian "Old Boys" from the Ivy League, "the best and the brightest" in David Halberstam's term—has so easily and coldly made unnoy alliances with

mercenaries, cheap adventurers and Mafia thugs in the name of doing Democracy's work. Though we enjoy or promote the smug absolute that we are the world's richest and freest and most favored nation, events are forcing us to face up to the inhumanities and chaos and terror our so-called agents increasingly have sponsored around the world.

It is not enough to be told in rebuttal that "the other side" plays dirty: that the Russians, the Chinese, or the Hottentots have equally stained themselves in committing their own international outrages. To the extent, yes, that we must

WANTED BY THE CIA	
ANTI-AMERICANISM FIDEL CASTRO RUZ	
	
DESCRIPTION	
Age: 34, born August 13, 1927, Havana, Cuba (not supported by birth records.)	
Height: 6'1"	Eyes: Brown
Weight: 180 pounds	Race: Latin
Hair: Black	Nationality: Caribbean
Occupations: Academic, ballplayer, premier.	
Scars and marks: Mole on right cheek, possible bullet scars on torso.	
Remarks: Has been known to wear a beard in the past.	
CRIMINAL RECORD	
RUZ IS A CONVICTED REVOLUTIONARY AND A KNOWN ANTI-CAPITALIST.	
CAUTION	
CASTRO RUZ MAY BE ACCOMPANIED BY ARMED BODY- GUARDS AND SHOULD BE CONSIDERED EXTREMELY DANGEROUS IF APPREHENDED, SELF-DESTRUCT.	
A FEDERAL WARRANT FOR HIS EXECUTION WAS ISSUED FEBRUARY 12, 1961, AT WASHINGTON, D.C.	
IF YOU HAVE ANY INFORMATION CONCERNING METHODS OF STIFFING THIS PERSON, PLEASE NOTIFY ME OR CONTACT YOUR LOCAL CIA AGENT.	
 DIRECTOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY	

gather intelligence so as to avoid nuclear Pearl Harbors or otherwise maintain a prudent alert, then—one reluctantly agrees—we realistically must condone a given amount of spying, peeping and spooking abroad; such is the disorderly state of the world community, where ambitious superpowers encounter conflicts of will causing them to reach for their gun

belts.

But if we would continue to preach that the United States somehow represents the last, best hope of the world—without flushing when we look in the shaving glass or expecting other than horse laughs from the denizens of a skeptical globe—then is it asking too much to demand of our power apparatus that it cease its tawdry political killings? How are we any less brutal than the brutes when we insist on performing brutalities of our own? Cold war mythology taught that those bastard communists must be rolled back because they enslaved liberty and murdered its sons: on that premise we continue to tax for arms and unsheath our sabers. What purpose is preventing their atrocities only to adopt them as our own? Are the citizens of this world any better off when killed by the red, white and blue rather than by the merely Red?

All this may seem terribly basic and elemental. If you and I understand it so quickly, however, then why can't we seem to drum it into the heads of our politicians and their hired guns? Well, for one thing, we've never really tried. We have sat on our duffs, turned our heads, held our tongues and our noses. Meanwhile, we have permitted much dirty business, soiling not only our flag but our souls. The sophisticated, I suppose, will find this preachment to be naive; but, then, aren't they the juiceless fellows who—refined and deacidened beyond a sense of corruption—assigned the mischief and the guns? When our so-called best people offer "hit" contracts to gangsters, it is proper to aggressively remind them that the time is long past when soldiers fought so that kings might become heroes. Maybe our politicians fail to pay much attention to random letters or complaints from their constituents, but if enough people stuff the mailboxes of Washington in protest, then it is possible for events to be turned around.

Especially would I hope that conservatives might join in demanding of their congressmen, senators and presidential hopefuls real evidence of their personal specific actions toward bringing the spook-and-spy elements under control. I know my conservative friends may not wish to go to school with wicked old liberals, or permit their daughters to marry one. But for all our diverse definitions, I believe we all can agree that Freedom's cause becomes disadvantaged when dependent upon murder. ☹

NATIONAL REVIEW
28 MARCH 1975

Quis Custodiet . . .

Miles Copeland's article on the CIA [Is There a CIA in Your Future? March 14] is persuasive and entertaining (I particularly liked his CIA-exegesis of "the dog chased the cat"—very lawyerly, and lawyers are badly in need of better repute). However, I still share the concern James Burnham expressed last fall at the end of his review of Copeland's book: who will guard the guardians? I suspect conservatives should be as suspicious of a secret arm of the government as they are of the limbs they can see. The problem is one of balance: the rights of the individual to be free

from snooping v. the rights of society, which need protecting from the espionage activities of foreign governments.

Scratch a liberal deep enough and you will find a man who truly believes the threat from the Soviet Union and Communist China is minimal or imaginary. He is free therefore to rail against all CIA activity directed against U.S. citizens—and to pose as the champion of the individual against Big Brother, a position that more naturally belongs to and has been occupied by men of the Right.

Greenwich, Conn.

FRANCIS SEWELL

NEW YORK TIMES
1 April 1975

C.I.A. Investigated Personal Life of a Top Nixon Adviser During 1968 G.O.P. Presidential Campaign

By JOHN M. CREWDSON
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 31—A Central Intelligence Agency operative, posing as a private detective, investigated the personal life of a top aide to Richard M. Nixon during his 1968 campaign for the Republican Presidential nomination, according to well-placed Federal officials.

The operative, Franklin R. Geraty, reportedly conducted the investigation under the auspices of a nonexistent New York City private detective firm that the officials said had been set up as a "front" for C.I.A. domestic operations.

The alleged target of the undercover inquiry was Richard V. Allen, a foreign affairs expert who shortly before had resigned from Stanford University's conservative Hoover Institution, a research center, to join Mr. Nixon as his national security adviser.

A high official of the C.I.A. confirmed that his agency had ordered a clandestine investigation of Mr. Allen, but he said it was entirely unrelated to his work in behalf of Mr. Nixon.

The C.I.A.'s domestic operations, about which relatively little is known, are under investigation by a Presidential commission and a Select Senate committee.

William E. Colby, the Director of Central Intelligence, has testified publicly about his agency's attempts, during the late nineteen-sixties and early seventies, to uncover foreign ties to the American antiwar movement.

But this is the first known instance of a domestic C.I.A. operative posing as a private detective in conducting an inquiry not directly related to the national security.

Personal Data Sought

On June 25, 1968, barely two weeks after Mr. Allen said he joined the Nixon campaign staff, Mr. Geraty appeared at the office of a banker in Palo Alto, Calif., where Mr. Allen had been living, and displayed a credential identifying himself as a representative of the Fidelity Reporting Service of New York City.

The banker, who asked that his name not be used, recalled in an interview that Mr. Geraty said he was seeking whatever personal information he might have on Mr. Allen. When asked the reason for the inquiry, the banker said, Mr. Geraty replied that he had been retained by "the Republicans" to conduct background checks on some Nixon aides.

The banker, who was not unknown in high Republican circles, said that he became suspicious and sent Mr. Geraty away with the request to call back later. Then, he said, he telephoned Rose Mary Woods, Mr. Nixon's personal secretary,

to verify the mysterious investigator's purpose.

According to the banker, Miss Woods checked and informed him that no such investigation of Mr. Allen or anyone else had been commissioned by the Nixon campaign.

Caulfield Made Inquiries

Sources familiar with the 1968 Nixon campaign said that the matter was referred to John J. Caulfield, a former New York City policeman who was then chief of staff security for Mr. Nixon.

Mr. Caulfield, who later gained prominence in the Watergate scandal through his subsequent role as a White House investigator, made inquiries about the Fidelity Reporting Service and reported back that it appeared to be a "C.I.A. outfit," the sources said.

They added, however, that the assertion that the C.I.A. had investigated a top Nixon aide was not made public by the Nixon campaign for fear that an attack on the Johnson Administration would move President Johnson to more enthusiastic support of Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, the Democratic nominee.

The investigation of Mr. Allen was first mentioned publicly by William Safire, a former Nixon speechwriter who is now a columnist for The New York Times, in "Before the Fall," Mr. Safire's recently published history of the Nixon Presidency.

Independent Investigation

An independent investigation by The Times established a number of details about the reported incident, all of which were subsequently confirmed by high officials of the C.I.A. One C.I.A. official conceded last week that it might appear, on the surface, as though "we were watching the other side" during the 1968 Presidential campaign.

He said, however, that six months before Mr. Allen joined Mr. Nixon's staff, he had approached the C.I.A. for assistance on a research project.

Mr. Allen, who is 39 years old, was then a senior staff member of Stanford's Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace and editor of its yearbook on international Communist affairs.

In that capacity, the C.I.A. official said, Mr. Allen met in January of 1968 with Richard Helms, then the Director of Central Intelligence, and asked to see various unclassified agency reports on the strengths of national Communist parties.

Mr. Helms agreed, the official said, to make the materials available, and Mr. Allen continued to deal with the agency on an informal basis during the spring of 1968.

On March 27 of that year, the official continued, the C.I.A. decided independently that it wished to make available to

Mr. Allen certain classified publications that bore on his work.

A "background investigation to secure the necessary clearance was ordered, the official said, "and we farmed the job out to one of our investigators in the San Francisco area."

The C.I.A. official during an interview produced a document relating to the investigation that carried the March 27 date and showed the name of the investigator as Franklin R. Geraty.

Mr. Geraty, whose present "cover" is that of a Defense Department investigator, repeatedly declined to answer questions about the Allen investigation that were put to him by a reporter at Mr. Geraty's home in San Francisco.

A Pentagon official, asked whether the Pentagon was aware that Mr. Geraty was working for the C.I.A. under Defense Department cover, said that it was. "I think we've done this for them before," he added.

The C.I.A. official conceded that his records showed no request from Mr. Allen to view any classified materials or anything else, beyond the agency's own initiative, that would have warranted a covert background security check.

Following Mr. Nixon's victory in November of 1968, Mr. Allen, a husky, bespectacled six-footer, joined the staff of Henry A. Kissinger, who by then had replaced him as Mr. Nixon's national security adviser.

Mr. Allen later became deputy assistant to Mr. Nixon for international economic affairs. He now operates a private economic consulting firm here.

Reached by telephone in Florida, where he is vacationing, Mr. Allen differed with the C.I.A. official on some details of his relations with the agency that it said had led to its investigation.

'Partly Precautionary'

His first approach of the C.I.A. in January of 1968, he said, was no more than a request "for them to look at our chapters [of the yearbook] when we finished them," with a view toward eliminating any "egregious errors" such as misspelled foreign names.

The approach was also "partly precautionary," he said, "because we didn't want them interfering or trying to offer

us money. We didn't want trouble from them." Mr. Allen explained that he was concerned that the C.I.A. might try to provide some financial support for the yearbook project, as he said it had for other publications that advanced certain political lines to which it was partial.

Mr. Allen said that, "to the best of my recollection," he had not asked Mr. Helms or anyone else at the C.I.A. for unclassified information on international Communism, and he asserted emphatically that he had never asked the agency for any classified materials.

The first indication that he had been the subject of a covert C.I.A. investigation came, he said, from Mr. Geraty's visit to the Palo Alto banker in June.

He said that well before March 27, 1968, the date that the C.I.A. documents show the investigation was begun, "it was generally widely known" in the Stanford community and Republican circles "that I would be going to the [Nixon] campaign."

Skepticism Expressed

Mr. Allen also expressed skepticism over the C.I.A.'s assertion that it had not learned of his month-old appointment to the Nixon Campaign staff until the end of July of 1968. He pointed to reports published before then referring to his appointment and also to the California banker's recollection that Mr. Geraty, when asked on June 25 for whom he was working, had replied "the Republicans."

Mr. Allen added that he was "categorically opposed" to the C.I.A.'s clandestine efforts to gather information about him, whether for legitimate or political motives, under the guise of a bogus detective agency. He termed the incident "a clear violation of the charter of the C.I.A."

The C.I.A. official, asked about the use of the Fidelity Reporting Service as an agency cover, replied with a chuckle that it had "worked fine up to now."

It could not be learned in what other domestic investigation, if any, either Mr. Geraty or the Fidelity Reporting Service have been employed by the C.I.A.

TIME

14 APRIL 1975

THE BUREAUCRACY

Opening Up Those Secrets

The Government has long been snooping too much and telling too little. Lately, however, Americans have been using new legal weapons to fight against excessive federal secrecy, and have been winning some battles.

The chief target: the bulging files in which U.S. agencies keep billions of classified documents, ranging from sensitive details about the nation's nuclear arsenal to dossiers on citizens who have been put under surveillance because they attended radical (or not so radical) political meetings. Late last year Congress moved to open up more of those files. It liberally amended the 1966 Freedom of Information Act in an effort to remove some of the procedural obstacles that bureaucrats had set up to frustrate the law's purpose, which was to make available to the public all but the most sensitive federal documents. As a result, officials are speedily granting many of the requests for information, and a mass of formerly withheld material is being turned over to academic researchers, reporters and other citizens.

Some agencies used to take more than two months to respond—if they responded at all—and charged up to \$1 per page to duplicate files. Now, they must reply within ten working days and limit charges to actual copying costs, usually 5¢ or 10¢ per page. Further, the new amendments permit a citizen to appeal to the courts if an agency refuses to turn over documents: it is up to the Government to prove that the material must be kept secret to preserve national security, protect confidential sources or for some other valid reason. If a judge agrees that the information was capriciously withheld, the official responsible may be reprimanded, suspended or even dismissed.

Mafia Call. In asking for documents, a citizen need not explain who he is or why he wants the information. An FBI official complains that a Mafia don could call for information on how the agency combats organized crime. A

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

4 April 1975

More time for CIA scrutiny

The Rockefeller commission on the CIA was supposed to have wound up its investigation today, but it has been given a two-month extension by President Ford. It is to be hoped that the extra time will give the panel an opportunity to address not only the original allegations of illegal domestic spying but what has emerged since.

One subsequent charge to be laid to rest is that the CIA was involved in foreign assassination plots. Then there is the issue of how far the press can responsibly go in preserving CIA secrecy as in the agreement by some papers to hold back reports of the CIA's linking itself with the Howard Hughes organization to salvage a Soviet submarine.

One question is whether the CIA connection gave Mr. Hughes the sort of influence on government which he had long been seeking, according to court testimony by a former aide. Mr. Hughes now faces a fraud suit by the Securities and Exchange Commission after the dismissal of two federal indictments

CIA official worries more about Soviet agents getting at secrets. Such fears are probably groundless; it seems unlikely that the courts will force agencies to release information that would compromise national security or FBI methods.

Since the amendments took effect on Feb. 19, bureaucrats have been inundated with demands for documents. Compared with the same period last year, requests have increased sixteenfold at the FBI. Altogether, the FBI, the CIA and the Internal Revenue Service have received more than 1,300 letters asking for information, mostly from people who want to know what files the Government is keeping on them.

Democratic Representative Bella Abzug of New York got the file that the CIA had on her, and found that for 22 years, the agency had been maintaining a dossier on some of her activities as lawyer and politician (TIME, March 17). Similarly, the CIA turned over to former Democratic Representative Charles Porter of Oregon 17 items from his file, including a report on his attendance at a 1968 meeting of the Congress of Racial Equality in Oakland, Calif. Asks Porter: "What the hell does that have to do with the CIA? They're treating me like a security risk."

Other people are using the amendments to extract information about historic events, for publication in newspapers and scholarly journals. That was the basis for 30 requests by Morton Halperin, who is working on a study of Government secrecy and national security. He asked for information from the FBI, the CIA, the State Department and the National Security Council. To his surprise, he has found that "generally, the agencies are proceeding in good faith. We've received much more than I would have predicted."

So far, he has been given portions of several secret documents, including Pentagon papers that had not been made public by Daniel Ellsberg, the Secretary of Defense's annual reports to the House and Senate Armed Services Com-

mittees on U.S. military strength from 1962 through 1972, a study that Halperin did for the Government on the Quemoy crisis of 1958, and transcripts of two off-the-record sessions in which Secretary of State Henry Kissinger briefed reporters on the Vladivostok arms agreement. Nothing of significance was revealed in the documents, but Halperin plans to appeal to the courts for portions that were deleted and for other information that was refused.

Foreign Gifts. Columnist Jack Anderson pried loose the State Department's and Pentagon's cables relating to the foreign travel of 250 members of Congress in 1973 and 1974, which led to his writing nine columns on freeloading and high living by legislators. He revealed, for example, that the State Department had shipped home carpeting that the wife of New Mexico Senator Joseph Montoya had bought in Hong Kong. The Washington Post got the State Department to open up files on official foreign gifts to former President Nixon and his family. The Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman obtained 17,000 pages of research and other materials that the Army had withheld on the My Lai massacre.

Robert and Michael Meeropol have been refused many documents, chiefly from the CIA and the FBI, that they believe would clear the names of their parents, Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, who were executed in 1953 as nuclear spies. Historian Allen Weinstein of Smith College, who has tried in vain for three years to open up the FBI files on the Rosenberg and Alger Hiss cases, complains: "The amendments haven't made any change as far as I can tell." Historian James MacGregor Burns agrees. After failing for two years to force the State Department to release thousands of pages of material on the diplomatic history of the 1950s and 1960s, he warns: "We should be learning things from U.S. interventions in Korea, Lebanon and Viet Nam and we aren't." Burns believes that the amendments "won't make much difference until the people who actually control the records are willing to live up to the spirit of the law." Indeed, old bureaucratic attitudes die hard. In a Catch-22 situation, the FBI automatically starts a file on everyone who writes asking the bureau whether he or she is in its files.

NEW YORK TIMES

22 March 1975

How to Start a C.I.A. File

To the Editor:

Apropos recent Colby-of-C.I.A. news reports, and reader Mark Oromaner's letter in the March 13 Times, the naive citizen (not meaning Mr. Oromaner, who was being rhetorical) should be warned that writing the C.I.A. and asking if it holds a file upon one—as Mr. Colby has invited one to do with the promise that if it is "insensitive" he'll reveal it—will in fact create a file, whose existence, being illegal, would likely be "sensitive" and go unrevealed. Hm; what're they worried about? is a hoary opener for the police. My advice to you, pal, is, turn yourself in.

ROBERT M. FRANKLIN

Plainfield, N. J., March 14, 1975

APRIL 1975

EXCERPTED

SOVIET IS SILENT ON SUB SALVAGING

Ministry Declines Comment
—No Reports in Media

By JAMES F. CLARITY
Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, March 19—The Foreign Ministry declined to comment today on the report that part of a Soviet submarine had been recovered from the Pacific Ocean by an American diving unit.

Responding to a request for comment, a ministry spokesman gave no indication whether the lack of comment was to be temporary or whether it meant that the Soviet Government had decided to react with permanent silence, as it often does in sensitive situations.

There was no mention of the report today in the Soviet press, on radio or on television. It was assumed by Western diplomats, however, that the Kremlin leadership, including Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Communist party leader, were aware of the report. Mr. Brezhnev has been in Budapest in recent days attending the congress of the Hungarian Communist party.

It is believed that the Soviet Union never publicly acknowledged that it had lost a submarine in the Pacific in 1968. This is in keeping with general Soviet policy that tends to repress publication of news about disasters and accidents, especially if they involve defense forces or equipment.

Sometimes, however, reports and rumors spread so wildly in the capital that the Government permits dissemination of tightly censored reports with a minimum of details. Reports reaching on foreign broadcasts add to pressure on the Government to confirm or deny stories likely to interest Soviet citizens.

The report of the recovery of part of the Soviet submarine last summer appeared to present the Government with a particularly complicated decision on publicity. This is because the situation involves not only an admission that Soviet military personnel were lost. There is also the involvement of the Central Intelligence Agency, a favorite Soviet propaganda target, and the overall question of the effect the submarine report might have on relations with Washington.

Seducing the Source

The first hazard of investigative reporting concerns the actual means used to collect the facts. There are many methods of investigation, some of which are clearly improper. Others, however, are well within the commonly accepted rules of this rough game. A journalist may pretend, for example, to know all about X in order to seduce his subject into confirming his information; this confirmation, in turn, may reveal bits about fact Y, the checking of which may lead for the first time to Z. Generally the reporter approaches his source indirectly: "We have enough to run with now, but in the interests of accuracy I'd like your version of what happened." A variant is to convince the source that you have heard an incredibly shocking tale about him but are uncertain whether to print it. In his anguish, he is bound to spill his side of the story.

Sometimes these calls will be timed to catch people off guard: phoning the subject at home in the evening after he has a chance to unwind from the day, and perhaps is loosened by a sip of Scotch; or at 6 a.m. in hopes of catching him half-asleep.

Perhaps the most accomplished telephone technician is Seymour Hersh, now of *The New York Times*, who unearthed the My Lai massacre, and since has been generally regarded as the best investigative reporter in the country. Hersh's technique is to wear down reluctant sources through tenacious pursuit by phone—often badgering, terrorizing, insulting. "I don't know of anyone other than Don Rickles who can be as disgustingly insulting, yet have the right touch for getting someone to respond," says a former colleague. Hersh makes one phone call after another, trading on fine bits of information, and then milking more with sarcastic bursts of "Ah-h, come *awwn*." Those who have experienced the Hersh treatment are usually either amazed by it, or appalled. "What's with this guy?" one subject said afterwards. "I tell him honestly I don't know anything, and he's yelling and screaming at me and going into tantrums."

James Angleton, who resigned from the CIA last December the day after a Hersh story charged him with being the overseer of a "massive, illegal" domestic intelligence operation against antiwar activists, had one term for Hersh: "son-of-a-bitch." Angleton said Hersh had awakened him one morning at seven to interrogate him about a story in that day's *Washington Post*. Angleton told a *Post* reporter, "I find Hersh's prose offen-

sive to the ear. And his speech... I won't go into how I find that."

Angleton, not unexpectedly, considers such calls improper. It should be remembered, though, that the subjects of Hersh's aggressive, often vulgar, approach are public servants. While they do have a right to privacy and a good night's sleep, they must be prepared to answer questions about their official conduct, even when the questions come in unorthodox forms. And, when dealing with a man like Hersh, the officials have fair warning that he represents the *Times* and is looking for information he can publish. At the opposite extreme is the reporter who hides his connection with a newspaper, and obtains a story under false pretenses. The distinction—between the Seymour Hersh who announces he is a reporter and the journalist who masquerades as a cop, a waiter, or whatever, in order to trick his source—is significant, although the ethical guidelines are not always easily drawn.

Al Lewis, *The Washington Post's* veteran police reporter, for example, was the only newsman inside the Democratic headquarters at the Watergate on the morning the five burglars were arrested. Wearing white socks and looking very much the cop, Lewis simply accompanied the acting police chief past the 50 reporters and cameramen cordoned off from the Watergate complex by the police. Once inside, Lewis took off his jacket, sat down at a desk, and occasionally pecked at a typewriter. He looked for all the world as if he was supposed to be working there. With a phone at his desk, he was able to provide the *Post* with a description of the office floor plan, details about the surgical gloves and lock-picks and jimmies used, and the name of the security guard who foiled the break-in. Lewis sees nothing deceitful in his actions—all he was doing was remaining anonymous. He never told anyone he was a policeman, and presumably had anyone asked, he would have disclosed his true identity.

A similar case occurred in the spring of 1969, when Richard Helms, then-director of the CIA, was scheduled to speak at a dinner meeting of the Business Council, an organization of some 150 top businessmen at the Homestead in Hot Springs, Virginia.

Helms' speech was officially off-the-record and closed to the press; moreover, Helms would not be briefing the press on his remarks afterwards. This caused some grumbling among the reporters at hand, but individually they began to make their own arrangements to have friends in the audience fill them in later. As followers of last summer's impeach-

ment hearings have learned, such second-hand accounts are not always the most accurate.

Jim Srodes, then with UPI, was in Hot Springs for his honeymoon. When he learned about the speech he went into the hall outside the dining room and twisted doorknobs until he found himself in the hotel kitchen. Helms' voice was booming through the room; a loudspeaker had been set up so that waiters would know when the speech was over and they could go in and clear off the tables. Srodes simply stood there and started taking notes.

Was this ethical? Most reporters would agree his actions showed more enterprise than deceit. The speech, as it happened, was a diatribe about the horrors of communism. Helms made a number of policy assertions which would normally be considered beyond his purview, referring to the "morally bankrupt Kremlin leaders" and the futility of disarmament talks. Russia and its satellites, in Helms' terms, were "the bear and its pack of wolves."

Once he had the story, however, Srodes' troubles had only begun. UPI refused to use it. When Srodes called in his exclusive, he says, the UPI night editor told him the story would hurt UPI's world-wide relations with the CIA and its ability to get other stories. The story finally ran, Srodes is convinced, only because a *Washington Post* reporter to whom he told his tale that night had the *Post* make a client request to UPI for the story—the gun-to-the-head for the wire services, where a client paper in effect says we know you have the story and we want it.

At a certain point, however, the reporter crosses the line that separates enterprise from deceit. Harry Rosenfeld, then the *Washington Post's* metropolitan editor, says that shortly after Howard Hunt became a suspect in the Watergate break-in, Rosenfeld could have obtained Hunt's telephone records through impersonation. The usual method of doing so is to call the phone company's business office and, posing as the person being investigated, claim that you don't recall making certain long-distance calls charged to you. You then request the business office to double-check the numbers and dates of the calls and report them back to you. (A similar pose is used with credit companies to "re-confirm" a loan, or with airlines to check a passenger's flight travel.) Rosenfeld says that *Post* executive editor Ben Bradlee vetoed the subterfuge.

Not all journalists are so moral.

There was Harry Romanoff of the now-defunct *Chicago American*, a police reporter who, without leaving his desk, would assume a dozen different disguises in his pursuit of a hot lead. Harry's colleagues referred to him as "the Heifetz of the telephone." He would work a phone 12 hours a day, masquerading as sheriff, governor, sympathetic stranger, or whatever character fit the occasion. After the 1966 mass murder of eight Chicago student nurses, he managed to get the gory details of the deaths from a policeman after introducing himself as the Cook County coroner, and to interview the mother of the suspect, Richard Speck, by pretending to be her son's attorney.

Few reporters use trickery as freely as Romanoff, but many have been tempted. What is wrong with this practice is not just its dishonesty—although that is no insignificant point. As James Polk of *The Washington Star*, who won a Pulitzer last year for his reporting on campaign spending, puts it: "The ethical question is clear. If reporters are dedicated to openness in government and openness in subjects they cover, then they can't use covert methods themselves."

There is, moreover, a practical problem—false premises can result in false information. A reporter conceals his identity in order to hear things the source would not intentionally tell the press. But he may also hear things the source would not tell the press because they are untrue: the source may be lying to impress a stranger; the information may be wrong, or couched in terms that are misunderstood; the person may be careless in what he says because he doesn't think he is speaking for the record.

The ethical rationale for misrepresentation, then, is that an individual has a right to keep his thoughts private and to know whom he's talking to. The practical rationale is that the reporter may get stuck with bad information.

The *Star's* Polk explains: "I think it's more effective to identify myself as a reporter for a Washington paper because, frankly, it carries a little more clout. Most persons you start asking questions of want to explain what they do, and why. They're leery of really getting a rap in the press and think if they turn the reporter off by being uncooperative they've got more chance of getting rapped—which is possibly true. So, if, instead of asking them to defend what they've done, you ask their help in explaining what they know about something so you can sort it out in your own mind—why, then you get results."

THE WASHINGTON POST

Thursday, April 10, 1975

Glomar Sets Test Cruise

By Leroy F. Aarons

Washington Post Staff Writer

LOS ANGELES, April 8—The Hughes Glomar Explorer, the CIA vessel which conducted a cloak and dagger mission to dredge up a sunken Soviet submarine last summer, will take to the sea again soon after a four-month layoff.

Corbett U. Allen, Jr., vice president for corporate planning at Global Marine, Inc., the Los Angeles firm that built Glomar, said today the giant ship would return to the Pacific for four weeks at the end of this month "to test modifications made since last December."

Allen refused to say what modifications were made during the ship's stay at a Long Beach dock since mid-December.

The Glomar Explorer was contracted for four years ago by Howard Hughes' Summa Corp. in a secret agreement with the Central Intelligence Agency to try to find and raise the sunken sub several hundred miles off the Hawaii coast and learn Soviet military secrets. Part of the sub was raised last July.

The Hughes-CIA arrangement was revealed last month, despite personal pleas by CIA Director William Colby that the press hold the story. Since then, it has been reported that the Glomar would return to the site of the sunken sub sometime this summer.

The Los Angeles Times said Monday that the vessel would seek to retrieve nuclear missiles aboard the remainder of the submarine and obtain information that could break a Soviet code. The Times also said a redesigned claw—to replace the huge grabbing hook that was affixed to the vessel's barge and used to scoop up a portion of the sub last July—was being completed.

Allen would not comment on these reports, except to say that "almost all, if not all, of the Los Angeles Times story is not accurate."

He added: "This ship is a prototype piece of equipment, and came in for modifications associated with a prototype piece of equipment. The whole project is a sensitive project and there are a lot of things we can't say about it."

Meanwhile, it also was learned today that the Securities and Exchange Commission, which has jurisdiction over Global's financial doings as a publicly held corporation, has investigated Global's involvement in the Glomar mis-

WASHINGTON POST (PARADE)

6 APRIL 1975

ANOTHER CIA ROLE What did an anonymous CIA agent play in obtaining the release of Robert Vesco, the fugitive financier, from a Swiss jail?

In 1971 Vesco and two of his associates were jailed by a Swiss judge on charges of misusing a shareholder's stock. They were sent to Geneva's 150-year-old St. Antoine Prison. Word was immediately relayed to Harry Sears, a lawyer who was Republican majority leader in the New Jersey Senate and chairman of the New Jersey Committee to Re-elect Richard Nixon.

Sears promptly notified Attorney General John N. Mitchell in Washington, D.C., who then phoned the U.S. embassy in Berne, asked counselor Richard Vine to investigate the matter. Vesco, after all, was a heavy Republican Party contributor.

Duly impressed, Vine contacted a top U.S. embassy official who was in reality a top CIA agent. The agent in turn called the chief of Swiss intelligence, told him of the "high government" interest in Vesco. The following day Vesco was released on \$125,000 bail and left Geneva.

Subsequently he paid Sears \$10,000 for his helpful phone call to Mitchell. Later he offered \$500,000 to Maurice Stans, Nixon's chief fund raiser.

Under the circumstances Stans thought it prudent to accept only \$250,000—

\$200,000 in cash and \$50,000 in a check—part of which was used to pay off the Watergate Plumbers. This led to the indictment of Maurice Stans and John Mitchell in New York and a court trial that Vesco declined to attend. Mitchell and Stans were acquitted, and Mitchell's Justice Department made "curiously weak" attempts to extradite Vesco from Costa Rica and the Bahamas.

Robert Vesco has been accused of looting at least \$224 million from overseas mutual funds -- some authorities estimate the loot as high as \$280 million. He has been accused of defrauding one company of \$50,000, and of making an illegal payoff to the 1972 Nixon re-election campaign. He still employs Nixon's nephew, Donald A. Nixon, who used to handle some of his prostitute traffic in London, and he may well be the top financial swindler of modern times.

Sen. Frank Church's committee, charged with investigating various government intelligence agencies, might well look into the CIA role in obtaining Vesco's release from St. Antoine Prison, and Edward Levi, President Ford's new Attorney General, might well examine the background of the Justice Department's failure to extradite Vesco who is now living in Costa Rican splendor.

NEWSWEEK

14 APRIL 1975

WHO'S SPYING ON WHOM?

Sen. Frank Church's Select Committee probing the CIA and other U.S. intelligence agencies has been swamped by former agents looking for staff jobs.

Church's problem in screening these recruits is that he has no way of knowing whether they are trying to get back at their old bosses—or are still working for them and want to infiltrate the committee's staff.

LOS ANGELES TIMES
7 April 1975

Men of 'True Grit' Manned CIA Vessel

**Roughnecks, Drinkers
Were Recruited for
Patriotism, Expertise**

Good old country boys from Dixie, two-fisted drinkers and oil roughnecks, all "men of good true grit," were recruited for their reliability, expertise and patriotism to man the CIA ship Glomar Explorer on its cloak-and-dagger mission.

Curley, Cowboy, Bimbo and Big John were some of the nicknames of men selected from Alabama, Louisiana, Texas and Mississippi—men familiar with drilling rigs and ships, men who wore their patriotism on their sleeves.

They were from towns like Houston and Floresville, Bridge City and Pasadena in Texas; Brookhaven, Miss.; Slidell, Vivian and Shreveport, La.; Millry, Ala., and Little Rock, Ark. "We were looking for a certain type of man," said a source familiar with CIA hiring procedures.

"He had to have a clearable background. You can't imagine how many men turned up with eight or ten arrests on their records and had to be turned away.

"The man the CIA wanted didn't have extreme intelligence or book-learning, but he did have a great sense of loyalty to his country and his family.

"He was patriotic, loyal, flag-saluting, apple-pie eatin', mother-lovin', tobacco-chewing and he swallowed the tobacco juice!

"He was an expert in what he did, a pipe handler or crane operator. And he knew how to stay quiet. Lots of these old boys don't have much to say anyway," he added.

"You can bet a lot of them didn't come in wearing suits. Somebody in a fancy suit might get thrown out.

"These were tough old boys who could get drunk and fight like a bear."

A few of them did mix it up during a party last April when 25 or so crew members gathered on the eve of the beginning of a class at Redwood City.

The CIA had provided about \$80 worth of liquor to a "den mother" whose responsibility was to look after the men's needs.

"We all got together, but nobody talked about the Russian sub. They just talked like all the oilfield roughnecks always talk—about how much casing they had laid, how much they earned an hour in Alaska or the Gulf of Mexico, the deepest holes they had drilled," he said.

Despite their hard drinking and hard talking, however, the roughneck Explorer crew turned out to be well-behaved, according to the source.

During the entire training period of a couple of months, only one of them was arrested and jailed—on a drunk charge, he said.

They all had been briefed about what to do in such an instance, and many places had been marked off-limits.

Few if any of them forgot they were there to attend classes.

"I remember Big John sitting in a classroom at Redwood City where we were studying up on the Geneva Convention Treaty. That was so we would know what to do if the Russians decided to come aboard the Explorer.

"And Big John sitting there memorizing some part of the Geneva Convention Treaty and kidding and saying, 'I'll just knock the hell out of any of them Russians who sets his foot on the ship!'

"Of course, we were told not anything like that was to be done and Big John knew it," the source related.

"All these men who met the CIA people had nothing but the highest respect for them. The CIA guys knew their jobs.

"They all signed documents pledging themselves to secrecy, and that's hanging over every goddamned one of us right today," he added.

The crew members hired for the mission were given 18-month contracts, which included bonuses of \$150 monthly.

But they knew the CIA treated everyone very well, and they are still hoping they will get bonuses of \$5,000 to \$10,000.

According to a crew member who made the July, 1974, trip to retrieve the sunken Soviet sub, living quarters on the Explorer were "spacious" and air-conditioned.

Like all offshore drilling rigs or drill ships, there was a well-paid "utility crew" to clean up the bathrooms, make the beds, mop floors and straighten up the day room.

The crew member who was aboard the Explorer said steak and lobster was plentiful and that he ate some things "that had names I never heard before."

There also were big bowls of fresh fruit, and candy was always available to the men.

There has been some contention from other sources that all was not so comfortable aboard the Explorer, at least on her maiden voyage from an East Coast shipyard to Long Beach.

Global Marine, which operated the ship for the CIA, was charged by the National Labor Relations Board in March, with violating federal labor laws by firing 10 engineers who sought union representation.

The men were fired in the fall of 1973. Global Marine has said it intends to appeal the ruling.

In seeing that the crew members were well treated, one man was delegated to act as a sort of "den mother," according to the source.

"He saw about motel reservations and rooms and all sorts of things like that. In his room he always kept a couple cases of whisky and beer. If the boys wanted a couple drinks at night, ol' den mother had it all there.

"These men considered it an honor to be selected when they found out what we were going to do," said a source who knew most of the 140-man crew.

Meanwhile, the CIA is keeping in constant contact with the crew members during the time the ship is docked at Long Beach.

Just three weeks ago an agent dropped into a large Southern city for a meeting with an employe of the Glomar Explorer venture.

"They wanted to let us know they were around," the source said of his meeting with a young CIA agent.

"They wanted to let us know there are future projects coming up. Sometimes it seems they want to remind you that when you get hooked up with a project like this (with the CIA), sometimes you can't ever get untangled from it or them.

"But they also want to pat you on the back. They're good at that. They tell you 'Don't worry. We're standing right behind you.' And, don't you know, it makes you feel fighting good!

"They want to tell you a lot of reporters may come

WASHINGTON MONTHLY
APRIL 1975

Who Lost Chile?

It sometimes seems that the Left loves nothing more than to follow the worst examples of the Right. Recently liberals have opposed the nomination of Nathaniel Davis as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs on the ground that Davis was Ambassador to Chile during the time the CIA was plotting against Allende, without offering any evidence that Davis was involved in any way in the plotting. Twenty years ago when the Right was drumming O. Edmund Clubb out of the Foreign Service because he had served in China while China was being lost to the Communists, without any proof he participated in the plot to give China to the Reds, Nathaniel Davis was the Foreign Service Officer who stood up and fought for Clubb.

WASHINGTON POST
10 April 1975

Assassination Try In Haiti Is Denied

Reuter

COPENHAGEN, April 9 — Former U.S. Ambassador to Haiti Claude G. Ross today denied a charge that the Central Intelligence Agency had tried to assassinate Haitian President Francois Duvalier in 1968.

The charge was made by syndicated American columnist Jack Anderson, who wrote last Monday that CIA agents had paid Haitian exiles to bomb the presidential palace in Port-au-Prince. The bombs dropped harmlessly outside the palace, Anderson wrote.

Ross, who was ambassador in Haiti at the time and is now retired, said the charge "is absolutely nonsense."

knocking on your door and that we should stay quiet. They're real nice about it, but I know they keep track of everyone.

"Some of 'em have told me maybe one of those reporters isn't a reporter, maybe he's a Russian agent," he said.

"They're worried, too, that someone may try to sell their story."

The crew members attended classes with eight to 10 men in a class. The basic courses consisted of elementary nuclear studies (because the Soviet ship would be contaminated by the nuclear warheads it carried), submarine design and the Russian alphabet.

The men learned that alphabet so they might recognize letters on various items aboard the Soviet submarine and then relay them through a communications system connecting them to two Russian language experts.

"I remember looking around and here's this old boy from Alabama, trying to talk Russian or pronounce the letters," a source said.

"But listen—remember this—there was no bull in these courses. I mean there was hard work.

"Still, I recall those tin cans on the floor. Five or six of them that the men used to spit in tobacco juice. It seemed kind of funny to me then and even funnier now."

The CIA used little advertising to attract men to the job. Rather, the intelligence agency men knew enough to realize that word would spread about the Explorer and its ostensible mission to draw off valuable mineral deposits from the ocean bottom.

They offered good money and adventure. And the adventure of being associated with Howard Hughes, the most mysterious man of all.

"We were hired, many of us, out of the fifth floor of the Tishman Bldg. at 5959 Century Blvd. in Los Angeles," said the source.

"There was a picture of the Glomar Explorer on the wall (in the interview room) and part of the pitch to the new employes was that Hughes had recently located a fantastic mineral deposit in the Pacific.

"Most of the time the response was something like 'We've heard a lot about this ship.'"

"It seems like everyone had heard about this ship, this strange and different ship that was going to do something nobody was sure what. They just knew there was some kind of vacuum apparatus that was going to suck up the nodules from the ocean floor," he said.

There always was a plentiful supply of nodules, as a constant reminder to the employes about the purpose of the project.

The Seascope, another Global Marine ship, had picked them up from the ocean bottom. Often the men sitting across from the CIA agent doing the hiring saw a nodule or two lying on the desk or on a nearby filing cabinet.

Sixteen divers were hired for the mission, and when it was learned that so many divers were sought a lot of questions were raised.

Why were so many divers needed if the vacuum sweeper under the ship was going to suck up the mineral nodules?

The prospective employes first met a CIA contract man who did the initial interviews in the Tishman Building.

In a room adjacent to his was a CIA man known as Howard Imamura, about 49, who was the ostensible assistant but who actually decided on whether a man was a good enough prospect to undergo the clearance procedures.

"Clearance took about three months for each man," said the source. "If a man got that far we would have him sign a contract saying he would be paid \$25 a month (during the security check if it took longer than three months you almost could be sure he wasn't going to make it.

"The men looking for jobs were told they would be working for Howard Hughes and that Howard Hughes is a strange man and not to be alarmed if someone came into their neighborhoods and asked about them," he said.

"They were . . . paid the retainer of \$25 a month so they couldn't file a suit for invasion of privacy.

"I heard it made hiring one helluva job because these men never knew how long it would take to hire them, and should they quit their jobs or not. They'd keep telephoning, asking how about the job. Somebody kept telling them just wait—a couple days and call back.

"The CIA man next door to the first interviewer would ask them a lot, like did they ever use drugs. One young man who said he smoked a lot of marijuana cigarettes was hired anyway because someone pulled some strings for him and he worked out fine.

"Nobody was hired who had ever belonged to a union because we didn't want union trouble. Sometimes we advertised for specialized experts, but most all the men came because they had heard about the job by word of mouth. In fact I heard 95% of the men who called in were not hired.

"No Jews were hired because of some possible involvement with Israel. No one from the Scripps Institute because it had been involved in some of kind of government work.

"A lot of these men were told the information on their background was needed for visa details," he added.

One employe, musing about his experiences, said: "Sometimes I would look around and see average people and I would wonder, 'Why can't I be like that?'"

Riding late at night in his car, smoking cigaret after cigaret, on the streets of a large Southern city where he now lives temporarily, he wonders about it all. He is pretty sure life will never be the same.

—NICHOLAS G. CHRIS

WASHINGTON POST
5 APRIL 1975

Personalities

The Guru Who Came In From The Cold?

Who turned the 17-year-old guru Maharaj Ji from the true spiritual path, from India and his mother? Probably the C.I.A., said the secretary general of the Divine Light Mission in India, C. L. Tandon.

"It is their intention to use guru Maharaj Ji's influence for political and financial gains," Tandon said in a statement concerning the Divine Light Mission in the United States, where the guru now lives with his wife and daughter. "An organization like the C.I.A. could use the Divine Light Mission, which has become a popular world phenomenon, as a front organization to find

out information about other countries," he said.

The guru's mother renounced him last week for following "a despicable, non-spiritual way of life" and is expected to name his brother as a replacement guru.

Carolyn Lewis

The Scandal Habit

The CIA is Washington's favorite whipping boy right now—a sort of poor man's substitute for Watergate. It seems that Washington reporters are unable to function without a government scapegoat to publicly humiliate and denounce.

Let William Colby don sackcloth and ashes and do penance on Pennsylvania Avenue! Let Richard Helms wash the feet of Bella Abzug on the steps of the Lincoln Monument!

We have become addicted to incessant scandal and shock. The daily revelations on Watergate, the banner headlines, the interminable courtroom struggles, the high drama of impeachment—all combined to create in us a craving for more, more, more.

In the sudden quiescence following Richard Nixon's departure, we suffer from excruciating withdrawal symptoms. We see spiders on the ceiling of every agency. Our alphabet soup—the FBI, the CIA, the NSA—is crawling with treacherous snakes and crouching rats. We need a "fix," but Watergate is gone. We settle instead for a pale and often incongruous substitute: a milque-toast methadone. We sock it to the spooks.

It's true, to a reporter, a spook is no more of a sacred cow than a senator or a member of the cabinet. And, when the CIA forgets its manners, transgresses its orders, or invades civil liberties, it should be properly chastised.

But the CIA isn't exactly the Purning Tree Country Club, or even the League of Women Voters. Spooks, after all, are hired to spook: to spy, and to be devious, and to fiddle in foreign intrigues, and yes, even to knock off an enemy or two. Surely a nation that can cheer James Bond as he whips old Goldfinger, or sit mesmerized by "Mission Impossible," can comprehend the nature of the CIA operative. And a nation that palpitates over all kinds of derring-do, from Evel Knievel to George Plimpton, can find in its heart a tiny crumb of awe for the effort to raise a Russian sub from the bowels of the ocean.

The News Business

One can of course argue the pros and cons of the morality of spooking and the secrecy of spookdom. One can even express pain over the expenditure of countless millions on seemingly fruitless quests. But, after all, these are men dedicated to a particular pursuit—the shadowy world of intelligence—and they do not live by your rules or mine.

The writer is a reporter for the National Public Affairs Center for Television in Washington.

We are feeling righteous now, after the victories of Watergate. We like the sensation of seeing the vanquished vanquished. We remember the heady rapture of riding rogues out of town on a rail.

So now, each day, we seek new "highs," new media excitements. We dig and probe and prod and cast a jaundiced eye on everyone and everything, exulting in the awful imperfection of our government—as though any government or government agency could possibly be perfect anyhow.

The headlines imply it all: the CIA is wicked, the CIA is evil, and the NSA is so secret, it is positively satanic. And behold the cool smug faces of the network correspondents, eyebrows silenced by ancient critics, but still transparently relishing the revelation of each juicy, half-baked tidbit. Clutching our tumultuous breasts, we thunder our journalistic hymn: "We of the media shall give you the truth and the truth shall make you free."

I do not challenge our right and our responsibility to expose whatever worm we upturn as we gravel in the dirt of government. But do we really have to clothe our findings in religious fury and the ecstasy of self-sainthood?

Do we have to besmirch and besmudge even the honest, innocent bureaucrat who did the right as he saw it, even though you and I in hindsight think he was wrong? Do we have to sanctify the paranoias of the fearful, and stoke up the slumbering fires of the subterranean haters?

In the name of sweet reason, have we lost our sense of proportion and our sense of humor?

We damn the CIA not just for things it did, but for things some of its people talked about doing. By that yardstick, most of us would be behind bars for our verbal transgressions.

In the end, a lot of it is funny. The idea of using the spooky Howard Hughes to secretly raise a Russian sub, the idea of government agents asking the Godfather to knock off Fidel Castro, the idea of plowing through reams of bills and junk mail in search of a traitorous tidbit—all of these are as silly as Gordon Liddy's plan to use a boatload of prostitutes to compromise the morals of Richard Nixon's political rivals.

What we need in Washington right now is a pot of black coffee, a large dose of castor oil, and the hair of the dog that bit us. Because this is the day after the night before, and it is time to settle down to the numdrum job of telling it gently, without savagery, and without shrieks and whoops of journalistic righteousness.

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER

21 MARCH 1975

Plot Against Nixon Denied by Russia

United Press International

MOSCOW — The Soviet Union has denounced as "gibberish" a suggestion that its secret agents drew up a contingency plan to assassinate former President Richard M. Nixon if he won the 1960 election against President John F. Kennedy.

The denunciation appeared in a commentary by the official Tass news agency, attacking syndicated columnist Jack Anderson for circulating the story.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

10 April 1975

Irish press spooked by CIA rumors

By Jonathan Harsch
Special correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Dublin

The CIA may be plagued by a new worry. . . . The ancient church of St. Senan on tiny Mutton Island off the Irish Coast 25 miles from Shannon international airport.

Irishmen are upset by the unpublicized sale of the 180-acre bird sanctuary to an American firm.

Irish newspapers speculate that with its position on the west coast, Mutton Island and its church will be packed with CIA agents and electronic gear to spy on Soviet submarines.


Soviet subs and trawlers, of course, do pass

by regularly trailing after NATO naval exercises.

Irish newsmen assert that by using an American holding company and an innocent Irish church as a front for spying, the CIA could compromise Ireland, which is proudly a neutral nation and not a NATO member. The wild rumors give Irish headline writers great opportunity for bold type.

But perhaps it is all an innocent exercise having nothing to do with the CIA.

There are even those who wonder whether press-battered CIA operatives are planning a quiet monastic life for themselves in St. Senan's church.



29 March 1975

Charles B. Seib

Censorship and Self-Censorship

The press and the law confronted each other in the Virginia mountains a few weeks ago. It was eyeball to eyeball and sometimes claw to claw. Both sides survived with convictions and prejudices intact for the most part, but with sensitivities raised.

The occasion was a conference of judges, prosecutor and lawyers and journalists from all branches of the media. It was held at the Homestead, a lovely, anachronistic Hot Springs resort hotel, courtesy of the Ford Foundation and The Washington Post.

The representatives of the law and the press worked over hypothetical cases concocted by three Harvard law

The writer is an associate editor of The Washington Post, serving as an internal "ombudsman." From time to time, he also writes a column of press criticism.

professors, two of whom served as moderators. One involved a sensational CIA document, publication of which might jeopardize the lives of overseas operatives. Another concerned a struggle between a crusading reporter and officials, possibly corrupt, over disclosure of hanky-panky in oil leases. The third involved an irresponsible investigative reporter and scandalous material on three candidates for high office.

Hardly the grist of a normal news day, but the cases served as launching pads for discussions that came closer to home:

• Should an editor publish a stolen document? The consensus among the journalists was that he should not publish it if his reporter stole it (although he might sneak a look at it), but he might publish it if someone else had stolen it and given it to his reporter. Some of the non-journalists seemed to find this an interesting bit of tight-rope walking.

• Do court-issued temporary restraining orders forbidding publication violate the First Amendment guarantee of a free press? The judges gen-

erally felt that short-term restraints are sometimes needed to insure justice and do not violate the rights of the press so long as they are not used capriciously. They seemed surprised that editors felt that a restraint of even a few hours can be seriously damaging and that, in fact, any restraint prior to publication is an unconstitutional abridgement of the free press.

The News Business

• Should an editor pay for information to be used in a news story? The journalistic consensus was that he should not and would not. That prompted the presiding professor to wonder whether this position was taken on ethical grounds or because purchase of information might set an expensive precedent.

• Since the press claims virtual autonomy under the First Amendment, should it set up some system of self-policing? The judges seemed to find this a reasonable idea, but the journalists were wary.

In broadest outline, the differences between the judges and the journalists boiled down to this: The press maintained that it has the right to get and print anything that is true, and that restraints on that right should be self-imposed. The judges maintained that in an orderly society someone has to have the power to say no, and that in our society the judiciary has that power, the First Amendment notwithstanding.

The moderators from Harvard were skillful practitioners of the Socratic method of teaching, and they used it to sustain a high level of tension. In the Socratic method, the teacher—or moderator in this case—asks aggressive and persistent questions, the object being to arrive eventually at a basic truth. No basic truth was produced at the Homestead, but the abrasive effect of the technique appeared to have rubbed away some encrusted misconceptions on both sides. The partici-

pants developed an awareness that on each side of the fence that separates the courts and the press there is a deep concern for the public interest—that the judges weigh it before they hand down orders or decisions that curtail the press and the journalists weigh it before they decide to publish sensitive material.

At the end, there was a sense of exhaustion; the Socratic method is draining for those who participate and even for those who watch. There was also evident a sense of mutual understanding and respect among the participants—perhaps partly the camaraderie of people who have gone through a difficult experience together. As they departed the Homestead, a neutral observer might have observed that the press was waving the First Amendment just a bit less defiantly and that the judges had lowered slightly, but not furied, their restraining orders. But the lawyers who attended had no reason to fear a drying up of First Amendment litigation in the months and years ahead. The Homestead conference, and a previous meeting at Chatham, Mass., were only the beginning in what must be a long dialogue before there is any broad understanding between the judiciary and the press.

There is a footnote to the above for those who might have noticed the absence of names and direct quotations: The Homestead meeting dealt with matters of great public interest. Participants included big guns from the judicial, legal, governmental and media worlds. But their names and what they said cannot be revealed without a prior agreement (restraint?) entered into by all participants and observers, including this writer. The agreement had the laudable purpose of encouraging free discussion. But there is something faintly ironic about the fact that among those who entered into it were the members of the press who, in the course of the conference, were to argue that not even the secrecy that surrounds the grand jury room can withstand the people's right to know.

Washington Post

2 April 1975

'Tools of the CIA'?

I should like to add my small bit to the debate over allegations of CIA involvement in the assassinations of foreign leaders, specifically of Lumumba.

Although never in the CIA, I was, until my retirement, a Foreign Service Officer, and I was following Congolese affairs from 1959-63 at the Embassy in Brussels and from 1963-67 in the Office of Central African Affairs in the State Department. During this period, I made four trips to Kinshasa and read most of the cable traffic, though not all CIA communications, admittedly. I feel certain, nevertheless, that the CIA could not have been responsible for the death of Patrice Lumumba without

my having heard of it. I feel certain that this rumor is groundless.

How do these charges, in the Congo and elsewhere, arise? In my opinion they come from the mistaken assumption that any host country national who was ever a source or beneficiary of the Agency is necessarily a tool or agent, so that anything he may subsequently do is attributable to the CIA. When the full history of the agency is written, I feel sure it will be replete with examples of such persons who, although widely regarded as tools of the CIA, were completely independent and frequently acting against U.S. interests.

Arlington.

Armistead Lee.

WASHINGTON STAR
12 March 1975

William F. Buckley Jr.: Leveling With Readers

In recent weeks several correspondents, thoughtfully sending me copies, have triumphantly advised editors of newspapers in which this feature appears, that "Mr. Buckley was himself a member of the CIA," and that under the circumstances, that fact should be noted every time a newspaper publishes a comment by me on the CIA.

Now the Boston Phoenix, which is that area's left-complement to the John Birch Society magazine, publishes an editorial on the subject that begins with the ominous sentence, "William F. Buckley Jr.'s past is catching up with him. In the '50s he served as E. Howard Hunt's assistant in the Mexico City CIA station..." Accordingly, the Phoenix has protested to the editor of the Boston Globe, and reports to its readers, "Ann Wyman, the new editor of the Globe's editorial pages, is now considering whether to append Buckley's past CIA affiliation to his column; which appears regularly in the Globe. Wyman intends to consult with other Globe editors. The Globe may finally be on to him."

IF SO, it would indeed have taken the Globe a very long

time, since it began publishing me in 1962, and my CIA involvement, a 25-year-old friendship with Howard Hunt, is, among newspaper readers, as well known as that Coca Cola is the pause that refreshes. But one pauses to wonder what is the planted axiom in the position taken by the Boston Phoenix?

It is true that I was in the CIA. I joined in July, 1951, and left in April, 1952. Now the assumption, not always stated, is that obviously anybody who was ever a member of an organization, defends that organization. But one wonders: Why should this be held to be true? The most prominent critics of the CIA are in fact former members of it.

I ATTENDED Yale University for four years. Is it the position of the Boston Phoenix that, therefore, everything I write about Yale is presumptively suspect, because as a Yale graduate I am obviously pro-Yale? But it happens that shortly before entering the CIA I wrote a book very critical of Yale. And, as a matter of fact, I have in recent years written critically about Yale on a dozen occasions. So consistently, indeed, that Miss Wyman may feel impelled to

identify me, at the end of every column I write about Yale, in some such way as: "Mr Buckley, a graduate of Yale, is, as one would expect, a critic of that university"

I am a Roman Catholic, and have written, oh, 20 columns in the last 10 years critical of developments within the Catholic Church. Should I be identified as a Roman Catholic?

I LIKE, roughly in the order described, 1. God, 2. my family, 3. my country, 4. J.S. Bach, 5. peanut butter, and 6. good English prose. Should these biases be identified when I write about, say, Satan, divorce, Czechoslovakia, Chopin, marmalade, and New York Times editorials?

I wonder if Miss Wyman is being asked, implicitly, to label the religious, or ethnic backgrounds, of her columnists? "Mr. Joseph Kraft, who writes today on Israel, is a Jew." That would presumably please the editors of the Boston Phoenix. Or, "Mr William Raspberry, who writes today about civil rights in the South, is black." Or how about "Mr John Roche, who writes today in favor of federal aid to education, receives a salary from Tufts whose in-

come depends substantially on federal grants."

PETE HAMILL, who laughed his head off a few years ago at the hallucinations of Robert Welch, asks in the Village Voice: "Is Bill Buckley still a member of CIA? Have any of Buckley's many foreign travels been paid for by CIA? One columnist recently wrote that National Review's defense of the CIA, and my own friendship for Howard Hunt might suggest that the CIA had indeed put up money for National Review over the years, though he conceded that if that were the case, the CIA was indeed a sting organization — Garry Williams knows, at first hand, something of the indigence of the journal. Unfortunately Williams is the exact complement of Rev. Dr. Oliver, who was booted out of the John Birch Society for excessive kookiness sometime after he revealed that JFK's funeral had been carefully rehearsed. Both are classic professors by background. Perhaps one should identify anyone who writes about politics and is also a classic professor as being that? The Boston Phoenix and Miss Wyman should ponder that one."

THE GUARDIAN MANCHESTER
7 March 1975

CIA gets cold shoulder

The Central Intelligence Agency, struggling hard to extricate itself from the sticky web of damaging allegations, appears to be getting itself still more fatally entangled.

It is being rumoured here that a number of foreign intelligence agencies which normally share confidences with the vast CIA spy machine, are becoming uneasy and are cutting down, at least temporarily, contacts with the US. Morale at CIA headquarters at Langley, Virginia, is said to be at an all-time low, and there is little doubt that the undignified gyrations of the organisation are producing disturbing lesions in America's current intelligence-gathering ability.

Two matters have arisen in the past few days to trouble the agency further. The more serious development, said to be of deep concern to President Ford, is that the current exposure of CIA activities to the various congressional committees — and investigative reporters following the trail — may well bring to light CIA connections with political assassinations, successful or attempted, in the last few years. At least three assassination efforts are strongly

rumoured to have been conceived at the CIA, and it is believed that investigations may uncover others. There is a very real fear, too, that exposure of an alleged plot to murder the Cuban leader Fidel Castro may jeopardise the recently unveiled Kissinger strategy of forging a Caribbean détente.

The three leaders said to have been at the crosswires of CIA-aimed weapons are Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic — shot dead during disturbances in 1961; Patrice Lumumba, who went missing from the Congo in the same year and died in mysterious circumstances; and Castro who, showing feline longevity, claims to have survived no fewer than seven attempts on his life — all of them, he claims, the work of CIA agents.

In today's Washington Post a senior CIA official is quoted as saying that it was "basically correct" for the agency to deny it had ever assassinated anybody, but then added: "I don't want to make a flat statement that we never had anything to do with any such thing. There were some things that were a little close to the edge."

Some aspects of the CIA's alleged assassination programme were unveiled in a recently published set of CIA diaries written by the former operative Mr Philip Agee; he suggests, for instance, that weapons used in the murder of Trujillo were sent to the Dominican Republic in the diplomatic bag and were handed to the assassins by US agents.

President Ford, according to reports at the weekend, was told of the assassination programme soon after the CIA story began to make the front pages last winter, and was reportedly horrified. He is persuaded, however, that there is some need for concealment of such activities, and is reported to be worried that committees like Senator Frank Church's new Select Committee on US Intelligence Operations may bring to light details that would be both embarrassing and diplomatically damaging for the US.

The CIA brouhaha, however, began last Christmas not over possible misconduct in the agency's overseas activities, but in connection with what was said at the time to be a "mas-

sive, illegal, domestic spying operation"; and the second matter that is proving newly damaging to the agency is this practice of detailed file-gathering by the CIA on thousands upon thousands of American citizens.

Much of this practice was admitted yesterday in testimony from the present Director of Intelligence, Mr William Colby, before the House Subcommittee on Government Information and Individual Rights; the interesting aspect of what could have been a tedious hearing was that the chairman of the committee, Mrs Bella Abzug, of New York, had managed to get hold of her own file from the CIA and used it to berate Mr Colby mercilessly.

Mrs Abzug is a formidable person at the best of times, with a penchant for vast hats and vocal strength. Her encounter with Colby, appearing by comparison to be a meek civil servant, was memorable.

"To find myself on your files is outrageous," she screamed at Mr Colby who drummed his finger on the table and sweated a little. "Let's get one thing clear right away — opening mail of a lawyer representing a client is clearly illegal."

NEWSWEEK
7 APRIL 1975

My Turn

A. J. Langguth



Abolish the CIA!

The continuing uproar over the Central Intelligence Agency has brought forth a number of suggestions for reform. I'd like to propose a simpler solution. But first, one of those anecdotes that we journalists count on to reveal a world in miniature:

The time was March 1965; I was a reporter in Saigon. One day in the line of duty, I arranged to interview the head of the CIA in Vietnam. He was operating under another title, of course, but his identity was no secret. Mannerly and well-tailored he was, as were most of his embassy colleagues.

We met in a masterful setting. Dimly lighted. Paneled walls. Shelves of volumes, thick and daunting. Any window in this lair had been so heavily draped that no glint escaped to the street below.

It was hardly the official's fault that nothing in his roseate briefing could be so impressive as his surroundings. I left unconvinced that the war was being won. But that office—so secure, so professional, so right—had made its mark. About 30 years old at the time and new to Asia, I was working out of a cubbyhole with one file drawer and a typewriter that stuck on the letter "v." Who was I to challenge the American Raj?

EMBASSY BOMBED

Not long afterward, I was walking down Tu Do Street when I heard an explosion. The U.S. Embassy had been bombed. As I came trotting up, I saw the man I had lately interviewed being led away with a bloody handkerchief held to his face.

Upstairs, I found the suite I had visited. The bomb had blown a hole through one wall and mocking Saigon sunshine played across the sequestered carpet.

It had been a lie, that office and everything it suggested. One wretched terrorist with a load of plastic explosive had finally opened my eyes. The interview with the CIA chief had owed nothing to Woodrow Wilson or the principle of SEATO. Nor, even, to Ian Fleming or John le Carré. It had been sheer L. Frank Baum.

Which brings me to the proposal: Let's not reform the CIA. Let's celebrate America's Bicentennial by abolishing it entirely.

I'm not thinking of savings in the

budget. No one who knows is talking, but evidence suggests that the CIA costs us several hundreds of millions of dollars per year. Since 80 per cent of its functions should be preserved, I don't look for a tax cut when the agency goes.

That 80 per cent represents the amount of the total information on hostile countries that intelligence experts estimate the CIA gets openly from printed sources. The agency receives 200,000 pieces of literature per month. From that welter, trained analysts extract most of what they need to know.

I've met such analysts, again in Saigon. This time the year was 1968, and I was inquiring around town for material about the Viet Cong. One afternoon, a stocky, bland fellow appeared at my hotel door. At his murmured suggestion, we went for coffee to the courtyard of the Continental-Palace Hotel.

RELIABLE SPECIALISTS

It was the beginning of an amicable acquaintance. This CIA employee—for so he proved to be—introduced me to other men from his office, reliable and dispassionate specialists who supplied me with reams of material and photographs. Usually the stuff was simply official handouts of the National Liberation Front, translated into English.

Except for two idiosyncrasies, my new friend could have been any American associate professor you'd chance to meet: he avoided using a telephone, even at the embassy, and in a café he would put his briefcase on his chair and then sit on top of it. But those are habits easily broken. I'm sure he and his fellows would be at least as contented doing their useful work openly, under the aegis of the State Department.

I've never seen an estimate, but I'd guess that the other 20 per cent of the CIA's contribution comes by way of the U.S. Air Force. How did this country confirm the existence of offensive missile sites in Cuba? Or the nuclear-bomb research under way in China? By aerial photographs. There is something clever, clean, quintessentially American about an "eye in the sky" satellite, and I'd like to see us routinely make our prints available to the world.

Such photography has helped the CIA over some bad bureaucratic moments in the last decade. It was widely under-

stood that Lyndon B. Johnson was dissatisfied with the results of the American intelligence performance on the ground in North Vietnam. Tight, autocratic governments—the only ones worth penetrating—have usually proved too great a challenge for American spies. Red wigs and voice modulators didn't help in Hanoi.

But if the photographs can be helpful and the newspaper analyses valuable, what am I suggesting that the United States forswear?

The sport. Simply, the sport of grown men with the nature of an E. Howard Hunt. The sport of traveling under code names, bribing foreign officials, collecting the material that overflows the computer banks at Langley, Va.

"In a period of eighteen months, the CIA accurately recorded six changes in the color of the hair of the mistress of a collective-farm official near Stalingrad." That quote, from Andrew Tully's pioneering work "CIA: The Inside Story," has much to recommend it, but surely its most marvelous aspect is the word "accurately." And now we learn they can supply no less about a Supreme Court Justice or a dissident congressman.

DUBIOUS ADVENTURES

A generation warped by the cold war may find the idea of giving up the CIA's cover or "black" operations almost suicidal. Still, the 1947 statute giving the CIA authority to undertake some of its more dubious adventures—such as the overthrow of the Arbenz regime in Guatemala—must be rescinded and such exploits put to a vote. Thus, when it is deemed vital to legitimate American interests that an Allende go in Chile, let the case be put to Congress. Then, send in the Marines or the airborne. Should there be another submarine to retrieve, our Navy seems avid for the task. But from here on, let the U.S. President who orders such enterprises be ready to sell them to Congress and to his constituents, or face an impeachment process, which, we have learned, is not so traumatic after all.


A. J. Langguth is a writer who covered Vietnam for *The New York Times*.

U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, March 31, 1975

Editor's Page

IN FROM THE COLD

BY HOWARD FLIEGER



In the pell-mell rush to investigate the past and present activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, nobody seems bothered about this bedrock issue:

Is the gathering of secret intelligence important to the security and well-being of the United States? If it is, can the job be done effectively in our open society?

These are not idle questions. They are urgent because separate inquiries are under way in the Senate, the House and by a presidential commission. Almost daily headlines herald new "exposés" or allegations concerning this or that about the operations of the CIA.

A tendency to suspect any Government secrecy and a continuing clamor over the public's right-to-know will at some point force our spies to come in from the cold.

When that day comes, we are going to have to decide whether the U. S. really needs a secret overseas intelligence system and, if so, is willing to pay the price.

The very essence of intelligence work demands a high degree of secrecy in many areas, though certainly not all. It is not being overly dramatic to say that such secrecy often is a matter of life or death.

Two examples will make the point—

In 1956, the CIA obtained the text of Nikita Khrushchev's secret "de-Stalinization" speech that marked a significant change in course by the Soviet Union. The United States and its allies were able to use to great advantage the knowledge of what had happened behind the closed doors of the Kremlin.

The speech came from a Communist leader who slipped it to the CIA. The slightest hint of that at the time would have cost his life. Furthermore, any doubt by him that the CIA would safeguard his identity would have instantly stifled this source of information.

Here's another case: For years in the 1950s and '60s, the CIA got confidential data on Moscow's most sensitive military secrets. It was

of supreme importance in shaping U. S. defense decisions. It helped dictate Washington's response to the Cuban missile crisis.

The information came from Col. Oleg Penkovsky. He was an American spy in the very heart of the Soviet military establishment. The CIA could not possibly have recruited him—nor could he have stayed alive—without a trusted guarantee of secrecy.

Secrecy also is a key in dealing with our allies. Without it, who would be willing to confide in us their sources and the identity of their agents for getting top secrets?

The British approach to intelligence operations is interesting. Britain, after all, has been in the spy business much longer than this country—and its people are no less jealous of their democratic rights.

Intelligence and counterespionage are widely accepted there—and protected. An Official Secrets Act makes it a serious crime for anyone to divulge intelligence matters. Even the name of the head man—the counterpart of the CIA's William Colby—is confidential.

On the whole, Britons accept the idea that special treatment is vital to maintain effective intelligence organizations. At the same time, they insist that these groups be under strict political control through a committee dominated by the Foreign Office.

The evidence indicates we in the United States have fallen short on both counts, neither providing adequate political control over the intelligence agency nor giving the CIA the means to keep its secrets.

It certainly was desirable to make a responsible assessment of the role of the CIA. The danger is that legitimate inquiries may turn into headline-grabbing witch-hunts.

The larger question is this: If American intelligence is destroyed by the hot glare of publicity, who is the real gainer—the American people or those who wish us ill?

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East Asia

WASHINGTON POST
11 April 1975

T. D. Allman

The Refugee Strategy

America's 21-year war in Vietnam is ending as it began—with massive population displacements encouraged by U.S. policy, which would not have occurred without American intervention, and which are storing up human and political problems which will afflict both Vietnam and America for years to come.

The American aircraft today fly ammunition into Saigon and fly babies out: The CIA's Col. Edward G. Lansdale was doing the same thing in Hanoi exactly 20 years ago. Unwary children were hustled into airplanes as they took off, to ensure their relatives followed on the next one. Before evacuating refugees stampeded into Haiphong by U.S. rumor campaigns, ships of the American "Mercy Flotilla" cached arms in the Tonkin delta.

Mr. Allman is a freelance writer who specializes in Indochina affairs. This article was written for The Manchester Guardian.

The American effort to convert South Vietnam from the "temporary regrouping zone" established by the 1954 Geneva Accord into "this valiant partner of the free world," as John Foster Dulles described the Saigon regime the United States established, always has rested on the deliberate production of refugees. Ever since the late Dr. Thomas A. Dooley provided the CIA cover story for the 1954 operation "Exodus" in his best selling "Deliver Us From Evil," it has been U.S. policy to deprive the guerrilla fish their water, by driving populations into vast urban shanty towns, or into "strategic hamlets" which were barely disguised concentration camps.

"Refugees make solid citizens," one USAID manifesto explained. As the firepower war began, Gen. William Westmoreland described the social and political rationale of his search-and-destroy operations: "I expect a tremendous increase in the number of refugees." The strategy was defined in the jargon of the time by Ambassador Robert Komer, who had overall responsibility for the Phoenix program of counter-terror: "If we can attrite the population base of the Vietcong," he said, "it'll accelerate the process of defeating the V.C."

Eight million South Vietnamese and half of Laos' three million people were made refugees, often dozens of times. The Nixon-Kissinger Cambodia invasion created two million refugees in three months. Official U.S. reports that the firepower war was killing twice as many children under 13 as fully armed U.S. combat troops; that refugee children were developing dis-

eases, such as night blindness, previously unknown in Indochina, were welcomed by U.S. officials as signs of "progress." Depopulating the countryside, not military progress, provided the U.S. statistics that the population of Vietnam was increasingly "friendly" and secure.

America, according to the Harvard counter-insurgency expert, and a long-time colleague of Kissinger, Professor Samuel Huntington, had discovered "the answer to wars of national liberation." It consisted of defeating a "rural revolutionary movement" by "forced-draft urbanization." Explaining the massive refugee movements produced by his Vietnamization program, the Cambodia invasion and the bombing of Laos, President Nixon declared: "The enemy will be denied all but the most limited and furtive access to the people."

It was this "refugee policy" that created what Sen. J. W. Fulbright called "a society of prostitutes and mercenaries"—and the caricature of civilization produced in South Vietnam by the American way of war is what now accounts for the collapse of a state that never had any economic, political or social basis except that provided by the Americans.

The South Vietnamese soldiers fleeing an enemy which has not yet attacked—and trying to push their motor bikes on to U.S. ships—sum up the product of American "nation-building"—a militarist society with nothing worth fighting for; a consumer society that produces nothing. The present Communist offensive has nudged the house of cards Vietnamization built.

Official U.S. concern with the victims of a 20-year refugee policy dates from last week. President Ford's "mission of mercy" is merciful principally to Americans. It camouflages responsibility for uprooting more than 12 million people in the satisfaction of providing spare bedrooms 8,000 miles away for children who will grow up in an alien society.

It provides the ideal emotional and bureaucratic escape from America's real responsibilities. Instead of planning comprehensive aid for redevelopment, the Washington task forces grind out scenarios for airlifting millions to freedom. As thousands claw and bribe their ways on to U.S. aircraft, U.S. officials, rather than trying to understand the bases of their Vietnam nature, assert yet again that a nation is "voting with its feet" against communism.

The validity of such assertions can be judged by imagining the chaos if a U.S. President suddenly announced that one million Bengalis, Ethiopians or Chileans were to be given free rides to America. The melodrama of

Danang, in this sense, was instructive. Thousands rushed to board U.S. transports, but when the city finally fell, no blood bath occurred. Instead, a population alienated from the roots of its own civilization by decades of dependence on the Americans was left to make its accommodation, no doubt very difficult, with an administration nonetheless independently capable of assuring the basic services, and law and order.

If President Ford's proposed mass evacuation is permitted to turn Saigon into another Danang, America's last "humanitarian" effort surely will seal the fate of South Vietnam more thoroughly than either the military strength of Hanoi or the corruption of Saigon.

Massive evacuations not only will destroy the Saigon administration and strip away the technical skills that were the Vietnamization program's sole potential contribution to Vietnam's future. They will also ensure automatic Communist control by removing the one group whose usefulness might have moderated a doctrinaire Marxist approach to Vietnamese reconstruction.

Americans consistently have refused to accept their efforts in Vietnam as a case of empire building. Yet the gap between the partition of India and the tragedy of Bangladesh; between the Bay of Pigs and hiring Cuban exiles to burgle Watergate; between empires taking their "loyalists" home with them, and the plight of the Indonesians in the Netherlands, and of the Uganda Asians in Britain, suggest the long range problems that mass evacuations will create.

At least so far as Americans are concerned, however, the principal disaster President Ford's evacuation will ensure may be psychological. America's 20-year war has become a striking historical example of a nation simply unwilling to admit a mistake—of the persistent refusal to search for the reasons for the greatest national misjudgment in American history.

Kissinger is no less locked into the Vietnam illusion than was John Kennedy or Dean Acheson. With his evacuation program, President Ford, like all his predecessors, has made his own Vietnam "commitment"—not to the people of South Vietnam, but to self-deception. The evacuation of Vietnamese orphans, emotionally understandable, can rightly be described as cradle-snatching. But its real significance, so far as Americans are concerned, is that it starkly reveals how many Americans still implicitly believe it is better for Vietnamese to become Americans, rather than to remain Vietnamese, as is their birthright, if it means living under a government that America does not like.

American power nevertheless has at last reached a situation in which it is impotent; nothing the United States can do now can prevent most Vietnamese at last from being left to work out their own destinies in their own country.

Friday, April 11, 1975 THE WASHINGTON POST

Resentment of Americans Mounts Among Cambodian Elite

By Denis D. Gray

Associated Press

PHNOM PENH — "The Americans appear to be great humanitarians. They give temporary aid, but ultimately they think only of themselves," the former government minister said. "We in Cambodia have been seduced and abandoned."

Resentment against the United States is mounting among Phnom Penh's political elite. It is being stoked by a growing feeling that the U.S. Congress will turn down further military aid to Cambodia and that its delay on the vote is a parting act of cruelty.

The domino theory is not a debating point here in higher political circles. It is accepted as an undeniable law.

Government leaders insist that if the United States deserts Cambodia, all of Southeast Asia will go Communist. They argue that U.S. honor will be spoiled and Asian allies may well side with the Communist regime in China rather than believe the bankrupt word of the Americans.

But there is little evidence of anti-Americanism among those who do not hear the latest news from Washington. Frontline soldiers and Phnom Penh's average citizens say they cannot believe there soon may be no America bullets for their rifles or rice for their

bowls. Loyalties are simply not severed in their insular world.

"I don't think America will let us die," said one young soldier on Phnom Penh's southern defense line.

An aging widow who sells soup greens in the capital's central market keeps repeating: "I love all people, but only the Americans are our fathers. They give us food to eat. Without them we would die."

The city people care chiefly about food to ward off starvation and report they are "so happy" when they wake up to the overhead roar of the U.S. jets carrying rice to the encircled capital.

The soldiers' concern is ammunition because they fear surrender will mean execution by Communist-led insurgents.

Among Phnom Penh's major groups, only the students have called for an end to U.S. aid, saying it prolongs the agony of war. Unlike South Vietnam, where an undercurrent of anti-Americanism has existed for years, no overt acts of hostility have been reported against Americans in areas of Cambodia still controlled by the government.

Many government leaders see American policy in Cambodia as oddly ineffective and any U.S. withdrawal of aid as pure betrayal. A com-

posite attitude gathered from numerous interviews runs this way:

• The United States supported the overthrow of Prince Norodom Sihanouk, and its troops invaded the country in 1970 to protect U.S. soldiers and hasten their withdrawal from South Vietnam. The United States also bound itself to the Phnom Penh government through vast monetary aid and until August, 1973, by air support.

• Americans obviously have interfered in internal Cambodian affairs, but they failed to exert the pressure needed to force out useless and corrupt generals and inert leaders, including President Lon Nol. By their almost schizophrenic approach, the Americans are largely responsible for the near collapse of the Phnom Penh government.

"The Americans used us so they could send their sons back to their families, and now they are letting us be chewed up by the Khmer Rouge," one senior legislator remarked bitterly. "With one telephone call, (U.S. Ambassador John Gunther) Dean could have put pressure on Lon Nol. But no, instead he even defended some of the worst generals to our faces.

"Now the Americans have caused a psychological shock by their endless aid debate. Who wants to fight

and maybe die thinking that perhaps aid will not come and it will be over anyway?"

Cabinet ministers, legislators and former officials insist that with more aid an energetic government could be generated and peace concluded through a formula of military strength and willingness to negotiate. Their solutions, however, are vague, almost fanciful, as are their explanations why five years of such aid have produced only military and political failure.

Dozens of interviews on the battlefields and streets of Phnom Penh show that soldiers and ordinary citizens still view the United States as their protector.

Many soldiers say they wish that Dean, viewed as more powerful and efficient than their own leaders, would provide them with more weapons and perhaps air power. Many of Phnom Penh's needy ask why Americans cannot simply take over the city's food distribution from often corrupt Cambodians.

The more powerless the Phnom Penh leadership becomes, the more many rely on Americans to keep them nourished and protect them from a Khmer Rouge takeover that many describe in both personal and figurative terms as "the end—death."

WASHINGTON POST
11 April 1975

Hanoi Faces Problem Of Policies For South

By Jean Thoraval
Agence France-Presse

HANOI, April 9—Beyond all questions of political ideology, recent events in South Vietnam have left the Communist-led Provisional Revolutionary Government and those South Vietnamese now under its administration with the problem of harmonizing two conflicting ways of life.

On one side there are the masses of people imbued

with a spartan philosophy whose symbol is the Ho Chi Minh sandal made of bits of motorcycle tire and inner tubes. Today this "sandal society" is rubbing up against one where people wear poplin shorts and caps with a "made in U.S.A." cut. For some in the South, pulling up at a filling station to get gasoline is as natural as eating a bowl of rice.

This difference is clearly recognized in Hanoi. In the corridors of power here, it is acknowledged that marrying the socialist bicycle with the capitalist motor scooter is going to be delicate.

When the first photographs of Danang appeared in the press here after its fall, many North Vietnamese did not hide their intense surprise that "down there" in the South a large number of people moved around on noisy, shiny motor scooters.

Hanoi residents still criticize the poor quality of bicycles imported from China and the Communist bloc.

It would be difficult to imagine North Vietnam's leaders sending half a million bicycles south to give people there a taste of proletarian existence and transferring 250,000 Mercedes north to add a consumer society gloss.

North Vietnam and the PRG have over the last decades made some remarkable efforts on several fronts to soften the image of the Vietnamese revolutionaries.

There has been the start of a dialogue with the Vatican and several statements on the freedom of worship, and a more global approach

on the diplomatic front.

Internally, the accent is now on reform. North Vietnamese do not hesitate to argue for increased production to satisfy consumer

needs.

These reforms got under way long before the situation below the 17th Parallel started changing fast. For this reason, Hanoi can pro-

ject the image of a country that knows how to evolve and revise its earlier judgments without renouncing its Marxist-Leninist philosophy.

LOS ANGELES TIMES
3 April 1975

'Indecent Interval' Led to Vietnam Rout

BY RAY S. CLINE

The loss of much of South Vietnam before a frontal assault by North Vietnam's military forces and the impending fall of Cambodia to Hanoi-controlled Communist guerrilla armies—these are sorry events from every point of view.

Even critics of earlier American policies in Vietnam cannot but be dismayed at the further human suffering caused by the war—this time in an organized invasion that by no stretch of the imagination can be classed a civil war (which the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong had been losing for years). Yet the attack is a logical sequel to Hanoi's Easter offensive of 1972, and this time there are no American forces and planes to stem the invasion.

The White House, the State Department and the Pentagon all profess to be surprised at the assault on South Vietnam. Why this is so is hard to understand, for, in the fall of 1973, the logistic buildup in the highlands of Vietnam and along the Cambodian border was so extensive that a national intelligence estimate of that period flatly predicted a major countrywide attack in the winter-spring fighting season of 1974-75, if not a year earlier.

Since then the CIA estimates system has been changed and the tone of pronouncements has evidently become more optimistic. Yet the handwriting has remained on the wall: As soon as Hanoi could be sure the United States would not intervene as it did in 1972, the poised Communist forces would try to crack South Vietnamese morale with a sharp attack. It came right on schedule, almost exactly three years after the Easter offensive of 1972.

The attack might have been mounted sooner if two judgments had not been missing in Hanoi's calculations which have now been made: an assessment of American determination to keep its forces out of Vietnam, whatever the provocation, and an assessment of American willingness to pay the heavy costs of supplying the munitions needed by South Vietnam. In the past couple of months, however, the new Congress has supplied all the assurance needed that the United States not only would stand aside but would also, sooner or later, cut off the military aid that allowed President Nguyen Van Thieu's government to protect its territory.

The shock that hit the defenders of South Vietnam's northern provinces came in part from realizing the U.S. government was debating not whether to give direct military assistance to Vietnam but whether merely to

bear the burden of the cost of military supplies. In terms of time, the most that Ford and Secretary Kissinger dared ask was three years, and few expected Congress to go along.

It is small wonder morale in South Vietnam cracked when it became clear that the mighty ally which had mobilized Vietnamese efforts for 20 years was in this time of travail arguing about when—not if—the United States would abandon its support of South Vietnamese efforts to defend themselves. Because Saigon had been shielded by some transpacific cultural lag from realizing how far American policy had shifted, the blow caused real panic and a series of defeats that could only be attributed to the sudden collapse of hope.

Back in 1972 and 1973 when Kissinger and President Richard M. Nixon were negotiating "peace with honor," a sharp, though secret, debate in the White House took place. Some, including Nixon, wanted to ensure South Vietnam a "decent chance" to survive on its own with massive American financial help but without direct involvement of American military forces. Others wanted to settle for providing only a "decent interval" before a Communist takeover. In the atmosphere of detente with Moscow and Peking, it was hard for Kissinger to argue persuasively that the advent to power of a Communist regime was really bad.

Once it was decided to permit North Vietnam's armed units to stay in South Vietnam while American forces withdrew, it seems clear the decision was for buying only an "interval." The December bombing of Hanoi and the simultaneous massive military supply surge for Saigon were designed to persuade President Thieu—and others—that he had that "decent chance."

Thieu was only partly convinced, but he acquiesced in the illusory cease-fire because Kissinger made it clear that otherwise support would stop altogether and there would be no chance of survival at all unless Thieu accepted the "peace" at hand.

Of course, the fighting in South Vietnam and Cambodia never really stopped. It was reported less because most newspaper and TV correspondents went home. And now, a mere two years after the cease-fire, Hanoi has made its move. The prospect for seizing all of Cambodia and most of South Vietnam must have been too good for Hanoi to pass up, especially in view of the manifest post-Watergate confusions in Washington.

Hanoi calculated the United States would, as of 1975, settle for an "indecent interval" of supporting Saigon. It looks as if Hanoi is right.

Ray S. Cline is executive director of research at the Center for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C. A former deputy director for intelligence at the CIA, he has also served as director of intelligence and research for the State Department.

WASHINGTON POST
9 April 1975

Asians Denounce Failure Of U.S. to Support Vietnam

HONG KONG, April 8 (UPI)—The United States' inability to assist South Vietnam has reaped a harvest of criticism in Asia's press. Governments are taking a wait-and-see attitude before writing off the reliability of the United States as an ally.

While officials were generally reserved in their comments about President Ford's omission of any call for military aid in his latest speeches, newspaper editorials focused on U.S. inaction in South Vietnam and what might happen if their own countries need military help.

Although the Philippine government officially remained silent, the Daily Express, whose owners are close to the government of President Ferdinand E. Marcos, said the Vietnam war has taught nations to strive for self-reliance.

"The tragedy in South Vi-

BALTIMORE SUN
8 April 1975

Reds discount aid in Saigon defeats

Hong Kong Bureau of The Sun

Hong Kong—North Vietnam, coincided with the resumption of debate in the Congress after its Easter recess on the \$300 million of additional military aid for South Vietnam requested by President Ford.

Noting with strong criticism the recent visit to Saigon by Gen. Frederick C. Weyand, the U.S. Army chief of staff, to discuss with President Thieu how to hold out the remaining areas in the South as well as the emergency airlift of weapons and ammunition to Saigon, the newspaper said the situation of the U.S. and the Saigon regime was hopeless.

"The more the U.S. tries to involve itself in Vietnam, the heavier defeats it will court," it warned. As for President Thieu's army and administration, it said it was hopeless for them to resist and offered its leaders two options: "either flee or to submit to the people's will."

On the Communist victories in the South, *Nhan Dan* said one month was equal to 30 years of trying to rid the country of colonialism.

Vietnam exposes the weakness of this country which has been dependent largely on American assistance," the Express said in an editorial. "When this kind of help stops, the recipient consequently crumbles."

"Other countries relying on any big power for their internal security and progress should learn and profit from the mistakes of South Vietnam. The day may come when their benefactors have a change of heart and they will be left fending for themselves."

The issue has caused considerable concern in South Korea, where officials and newspapers noted the differences between the Indochina and Korean situations. The fact that South Korea has a mutual defense treaty with the United States, unlike Vietnam, has been repeatedly emphasized.

The Korea Herald, which

usually speaks for the government, said: "The global mandate of the United States is entrusted with calls for an awakening to the plain, sober fact that isolationism is no answer to the increasing problems of the world."

Newspapers prominently displayed Defense Secretary James Schlesinger's statement that the United States abides by the South Korea-U.S. defense pact. One nationally circulated independent newspaper called upon the United States to modernize the South Korean armed forces as soon as possible.

In Bangkok, Prime Minister Kukrit Pramoj said that as the prime minister of a friendly country, he did not want to "say whether the United States has been a reliable ally or not, because it will affect our relations."

But Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, speak-

ing to the National Press Club in New Zealand, said: "Thais and others in Southeast Asia know that the patience and the preservation of the Americans has not matched that of the Communists—not simply Communists in Vietnam, but also their suppliers, the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union."

Japanese officials were also cautious. Mizuo Kuroda, head of the Foreign Ministry's bureau of culture and information, said only, "We are following developments in Indochina very carefully considering the policy we will follow and what steps to adopt."

Foreign Minister Kiichi Miyazawa called on third countries to withhold military aid to the warring parties so as not to aggravate the situation. Miyazawa said Indochina will be at the top of the list of topics to be discussed with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in Washington April 10.

NEW YORK TIMES
10 April 1975

U.S. Group Asserts Vietcong Are Giving Amnesty to Ex-Foes

By IVER PETERSON

A group of Americans seeking to end the fighting in South Vietnam reported yesterday that Vietcong representatives in Paris had told them that the Communists were following a policy of "general amnesty" toward those with anti-Communist connections in areas they now occupy in South Vietnam.

The group, which included a Congressman and several anti-war activists, said on their return from Paris that Dinh Ba Thi, head of the Vietcong's delegation in Paris, had assured them that the amnesty policy applied "even with regard to those who have been involved in the C.I.A. Phoenix program," which was designed to eliminate Communist agents.

"The only question in their treatment is whether they renounce their past," Mr. Thi was quoting as having said.

During a two-and-a-half-day visit to Paris, the group said they met with representatives of the Saigon Government, with North Vietnamese officials and with members of neu-

tralist Buddhist, student and intellectual groups.

In a statement read at John F. Kennedy Airport, the group asserted that peace could be achieved in the South provided a Saigon government without President Nguyen Van Thieu at its head cooperated with the Communists on formation of a government of national reconciliation and concord.

The group appealed for "medical aid and food, not military aid" to the South for relief of refugees. They repeated a warning from Mr. Thi, the Vietcong delegate, that sending United States marines to help evacuate Americans from the South would constitute a "threat" and would be unnecessary, since the Vietcong have pledged to protect foreigners.

The group of six consisted of Representative Edward W. Pattison, Democrat of Troy, N.Y.; the Rev. Sterling Cary, president of the National Council of Churches; Cora Weiss of Clergy and Laity Concerned and of Women Strike for Peace; Gareth Butler, co-director of the Indochina Resources Center of Washington, D.C.; Edward Snyder of Washington, head of the Friends Committee on National Legislation, and Prof. Grace Paley of Sarah Lawrence College, representing the War Resisters League.

NEW YORK TIMES
8 April 1975

AUSTRALIANS ASK BETTER DEFENSE

Dependability of the U.S. Is
Being Questioned

By IAN STEWART
Special to The New York Times

SYDNEY, Australia, April 7—The reversals suffered by Saigon Government forces have prompted calls here for a re-appraisal of Australian defense planning and the extent to which the country can rely on the United States for military aid.

The state of Australia's defenses and the future direction of her foreign policy are expected to become political is-

sues over the next few months. The opposition Liberal party has already accused the Labor Government of neglect in the field of defense.

Strategic thinking since the nineteen-fifties has revolved around an expectation that the United States could be relied upon to come to Australia's assistance in the event of an attack on Australian territory, under the terms of a security treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States.

But the spectacle of an embattled Saigon Government standing alone has diminished American dependability in the eyes of Australian strategists. At the same time, the swift collapse of the Saigon Government forces has reinforced concern over the state of Australia's defenses.

Lieut. Gen. Sir Mervyn Bro-

gan, former Chief of the General Staff, said in an interview that the threat to the security of the region "must be more manifest now."

Not an Overt Threat

"It is not necessarily an overt threat," he said. "But the situation gives greater scope for subversion in contiguous Southeast Asian countries. In the long run it could pose a similar subversive threat to Indonesia and ourselves."

"The domino theory has got to be given a certain amount of credence. If the dominoes don't fall down right before your eyes, a situation can nevertheless arise in which there will be a creeping paralysis throughout the whole area."

General Brogan said Australia could not rely on the United States in the same way as

in the past. He stated that it was certain that the United States would "never get embroiled on the land in Southeast Asia again" and Australia would have to "meet the enemy on our own shores."

He saw a need for Australia to build up her own defenses and become increasingly self-sufficient while at the same time exploiting her treaty relationship with the United States as fully as possible.

It is up to Australia, General Brogan said, to try to persuade the United States that "our threat is their threat." The United States is the only ally to whom Australia could turn, he added.

Peter Young, a former major in the intelligence corps of the Australian Army, who drew up a defense policy for the Labor party and subsequently became

a critic of the Government when the policy was not implemented, said recently in an article in The Sydney Morning Herald that morale in the armed forces was "at rock bottom," with 10 per cent of the officer corps resigning over the last two years.

He attacked a forecast made by Defense Minister Lance Barnard that Australia faced no defense threat for the next 10 to 15 years. Mr. Young said the assessment had been used as a 'rationale for inactivity.'

Australia, he asserted, can "deploy and maintain little more than one lightly armed battalion" although one regular division with supporting specialist units was accepted as the "minimum force level required to keep the army viable."

WASHINGTON POST
10 April 1975

Other Voices . . .

Indochina Agony

No matter how corrupt the Lon Nol regime may have been, there are a large number of politicians in Asia and elsewhere in the Third World who are profoundly upset by the way it has been left to its fate by the United States.

—Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Frankfurt (conservative).

The U.S. Congress can stomach no longer the misjudgments, failures, and plain lies of successive Secretaries of State about Indochina. . . . The great imperative now is to confine Congress' understandable retreat into isolationism. Dismantling NATO by such acts as withdrawing aid from Turkey is very much more dangerous to the world than abandoning Indochina.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
7 April 1975

West Europe reassesses American 'will'

By Takashi Oka
Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

London
Not American power, but American will is beginning to be questioned in Western Europe.

There is no immediate crisis in transatlantic relationships. But Indo-China, the Middle East, and Portugal are ingredients in an uneasy reassessment going on in European chancelleries both of the dangers and difficulties confronting the West and of American determination to face up to them.

"They are not criticizing the United States yet," one diplomat said of his European colleagues. "They know this is a difficult and delicate moment. Each problem, be it Vietnam or the Arab-Israeli conflict or Portugal, has its own raison d'etre, its own logic, and it would be absurd to say that because Congress is refusing further military aid to South Vietnam, the American commitment to the Atlantic alliance is in question."

"But relations between nations operate in a context, an atmosphere, just as do relations between individuals. What the Europeans see is a weakened President and an apparently headless congress. That is not a reassuring combination, at a time when the Europeans themselves are conscious as never

—Sunday Times, London
(independent).

The Western diplomatic dominoes are rapidly falling. As the Communists take Indochina, Thailand flirts with neutralism and Israel fears the specter of another Munich, America's friends are frightened and her enemies jeer at the paper tiger.

—Les Echos, Paris
(financial daily).

President Ford has said U.S. prestige will be damaged if aid to South Vietnam is cut off. But continued aid would merely prolong the war and still further impair U.S. prestige.

—Yomiuri, Tokyo (independent).

Cambodia is gone, Vietnam is gone Everybody from President Ford and Dr. Henry Kissinger down must accept this reality. . . .

—The Australian, Canberra
(independent).

before of their own weaknesses — militarily, politically, and economically."

The British, West German, and even the French foreign offices have not so much as hinted criticism of American actions, or lack of actions, either in Indo-China or in the Middle East.

The British, who came closest to supporting American actions in Vietnam by ordering, then canceling, the dispatch of a warship to pick up refugees, say it is far too early to make an official assessment.

It can be said already, however, that what worries the Europeans is not the fate of Indo-China, or even of Southeast Asia itself. What concerns them is the effect a Vietnam debate might have on American public opinion and on the Congress, on American determination to withstand challenges elsewhere that are much more complex than the Berlin wall or the Cuban missile crisis.

Take Portugal. What is happening in that country could be considered a progressive tightening of a communist-military coalition, the result of which could well be to sever Portugal from NATO and deny the United States an Azores air base, or to make of Portugal a communist Trojan horse within NATO.

What can the United States, or any of the European NATO allies do, besides warning of the dangers involved and trying to encourage genuinely democratic tendencies in Portugal?

The West European governments themselves are not in a heroic mood.

Margaret Thatcher, leader of the British Conservatives, was asked at a political meeting recently whether, in view of Vietnam-engendered doubts about American reliability, Britain should not look to an independent European defense system. Her quick answer was that it was much cheaper for the British to rely on American-supplied Polaris missiles.

The British remain in a parlous economic state. France is not much better off. But shouting headlines about Vietnamese

refugees hit a European population still largely determined to enjoy their spring holidays.

An inward-looking Western Europe, preoccupied with its own problems, looks across the Atlantic and fears it sees an inward-turning United States.

That has not happened yet. For 26 years the Atlantic alliance has endured, its keynote the resounding declaration that the allies would consider an attack against one as an attack against all.

When this premise begins to be eroded, not in explicit words, but in the minds of the Europeans, the alliance itself may have to look for a new definition of its commitments.

WASHINGTON POST
10 April 1975

Giscard Suggests Thieu Leave Office

By Bernard Kaplan

Special to The Washington Post

PARIS, April 9—French government informants indicated today that France's diplomatic endeavors during the last few days have laid the groundwork for new political negotiations in South Vietnam that could prevent the country from rapidly coming under Communist control.

However, such negotiations are contingent on formation of a new government excluding President Nguyen Van Thieu, the informants said after discussions with representatives of the Vietcong's Provisional Revolutionary Government and neutralist groups known collectively as Saigon's Third Force.

The French sources said Vietcong representatives here confirmed privately what they have been saying publicly that their only precondition to negotiations is ouster of Thieu.

French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing emerged from behind these backstage maneuvers today to give Thieu a shove. Obviously reflecting findings of the most recent French diplomatic

BALTIMORE SUN

7 April 1975

Martin quoted in letter on orphan propaganda

Saigon (AP)—Opposition politicians made public yesterday a letter from a top government official, which quotes United States Ambassador Graham Martin as saying the evacuation of orphans "will help create a shift in American public opinion in favor" of South Vietnam.

The politicians, headed by neutralist Tran Ngoc Lieng,

probe, Giscard told his Cabinet that "the political authority in Saigon must be exclusively in the hands of personalities who make known their determination to put into effect" Article 12 of the 1973 Paris peace agreement.

This was a reference to the peace agreement's provision for three-way negotiations on South Vietnam's political future among Saigon, the PRC and "third force" groups.

If Thieu remains in office, Giscard added, that could destroy "what chances remain of preserving the diversity of [South Vietnam's] beliefs and characteristics."

Giscard's action was possibly an unprecedented write-off of one chief of state by another even though their governments remain on formally friendly terms. The French have never ceased to regard themselves as privileged observers of Indochinese affairs because of their former colonial ties and continued cultural links to the region. Apparently, Giscard has concluded that the situation has become too critical

to be concerned with diplomatic niceties.

French informants profess reasonable confidence that something less than a totally Communist South Vietnam still could be salvaged if Thieu were persuaded to step aside during the next few weeks. Observers in Paris feel this is a positive action to which the United States government could contribute more than it is doing. But the French emphasize, time is a key factor and the reason why they acted so quickly to try at least to establish the framework for new political talks, and then deliberately made the fact public.

The "third force" factions, many of whose leaders have lived for years in France, returned in force here today with a news conference at which representatives of anti-Thieu Catholics, Buddhists, former ministers of the Diem government, "United Socialists" and the movement for National Self-Determination appeared together.

Speakers such as Catholic spokesman Nguyen Van Cong, Buddhist Tran Hai Hac and Ho Phong Minh,

the orphans." The spokesman said Dr. Dan and Mr. Martin met last week on the orphan airlift and that Dr. Dan said the evacuation "might also have some effect on U.S. public opinion."

The ambassador agreed with Dr. Dan's view but this was not the reason for bringing up the entire matter of the orphans. The ambassador's reason and concern was simply the welfare of the children.

The letter was written last Wednesday to the then-premier, Tran Thien Khiem, requesting prompt clearance for

who served as Minister of State under President Diem 15 years ago, echoed in virtually identical language, Giscard's call for Thieu's resignation.

Their call is, not surprising because several of those at the conference, including Cong and Hac, are anxious to participate in the kind of negotiations the French would like to arrange. They were among those persons the French reportedly have been consulting. How much genuine political strength these exiles represent inside South Vietnam has never been clear.

Meanwhile, an Air France cargo plane left Paris today for Laos carrying 15 tons of medical supplies and food ultimately destined for areas of South Vietnam newly occupied by the Communists.

The supplies are to be ferried to Hue and Danang by DC-3 planes belonging to the French Military Mission in Laos, in keeping with the French government's announced policy of providing emergency aid impartially to civilians both in conquered territory and that still held by Saigon.

the evacuation of about 1,400 Vietnamese orphans, most of them to the United States.

Dr. Dan confirmed the letter was authentic but denied quoting the American ambassador directly or indirectly. He said the letter's comment on creating favorable publicity for the South Vietnamese government "was my own opinion and that of my friends in the United States and Australia."

An unofficial translation of Dr. Dan's letter, however, clearly refers to the U.S. ambassador and his intervening "directly with me to ask for

permission to evacuate these children en masse aboard."

"He stressed that this evacuation along with the millions of refugees abandoning Communist-controlled zones, will help create a shift in American

public opinion in favor of the Republic of Vietnam. Especially when these children land in the United States, they will be subject to television, radio and press agency coverage and the effect will be tremendous."

NEW YORK TIMES
10 April 1975

Vietcong Aide Pledges Fairness For the Children Left by G.I.'s

Special to The New York Times

GENEVA, April 9—The Vietcong's representative here said today that the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam would treat the children left behind by American soldiers without "hatred or discrimination."

"We would raise them to be real Vietnamese who would contribute to national reconciliation," Pham Van Ba said at a news conference in response to a question about the American-fathered children of Vietnamese mothers.

In a statement Mr. Ba, who heads the Provisional Revolutionary Government's liaison office with the United Nations here, denounced the airlift of Vietnamese children to the United States as "kidnapping on a vast scale." He said the airlift was "serving evil political aims."

Asked whether the children of mixed Vietnamese-American parentage were viewed in a different way from other homeless children, Mr. Ba said that the children fathered by Americans, black and white, and South Korean and Thai troops who fought in South Vietnam were "all victims of the war."

"We have no hatred," he declared. "We are ready to give these children all our help and to raise them to be real Vietnamese patriots eager to serve their homeland."

Asked if Western journalists would be given visas to visit South Vietnamese areas under Vietcong control, Mr. Ba said it was "in our interest" to receive foreign newsmen. However, he said, because of the unsettled conditions and the difficulty of insuring the newsmen's "security," it is not possible to have them visit now.

Meanwhile, spokesman for the United Nations agencies involved in the international effort to get emergency supplies to refugees in South Vietnam announced that the agencies were stepping up the tempo of their mercy missions.

"We are getting a regular

emergency operation under way with planes and ships now leaving from many points with supplies for both sides in South Vietnam," a spokesman for the United Nations Children's Fund, known as UNICEF, said.

The office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has already spent half of the approximately \$5-million it has received so far for operations in Vietnam. "The remainder will be spent shortly, so we have an urgent need for funds," a spokesman for the office said.

Planes Sent From Copenhagen

Two plane-loads of food and emergency supplies, one for relief in areas controlled by the Vietcong and the other for Saigon, were dispatched by the high commissioner's office from Copenhagen. They are being followed by a second shipment by air from the Danish capital for the Provisional Revolutionary Government, according to the spokesman.

The total value of the supplies carried on the three flights was put at \$250,000.

The United Nations Refugee Agency has purchased \$300,000 worth of powdered milk, processed meats, antibiotics and vitamins in Australia with a donation of \$1.35-million from the Australian Government. Half of the supplies are to go to each side in South Vietnam.

The Australian Government has also given another \$1.35-million to pay the costs of transporting the supplies, the agency said.

The UNICEF spokesman said that although shipments were being speeded up, "unfortunately all do not go directly to Vietnam because we must await the authority of one or the other governments before landing them."

"We are now discussing landing rights in Hanoi for planes that the Australian Government has offered us," he said.

NEW YORK TIMES
10 April 1975

NIXON TOLD THIEU U.S. WOULD REACT TO RED OFFENSIVE

White House Says Private
Pledge Was Also Reflected
in Public Statements

RESPONSE TO JACKSON

Statement Asserts Promise
Was Made Before '73 Ban
on Military Operations

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 9—The White House said today that President Richard M. Nixon privately assured the Saigon Government in 1973 that the United States would react vigorously to a major Communist violation of the Vietnam cease-fire agreement.

A statement, issued in response to charges of "secret agreements" leveled by Senator Henry M. Jackson, said the assurances, which also included pledges of aid, did not differ in substance from what Mr. Nixon and others were saying publicly at the time.

It was the first time the American public was told that, as part of an effort to enlist Saigon's support for the cease-fire accord, Mr. Nixon had privately assured President Nguyen Van Thieu that the United States would not passively watch another Communist offensive.

Assurances Became Moot

The White House said the private assurance as well as public warnings issued by Mr. Nixon were no longer valid because of the Congressional ban on American combat activity in Indochina imposed in August, 1973.

The Saigon Government was informed of the Congressional action, which in effect made any assurance moot.

Ronn Nessen, the White House press secretary, said there had been letters between Mr. Nixon and Mr. Thieu as part of an exchange surrounding the signing of the cease-fire in Paris on Jan. 27, 1973.

A senior aide to Secretary of State Kissinger said that

Mr. Nixon, in one letter before the signing, promised that the United States would react to a major Communist attack similar to the 1972 spring offensive. The official said Mr. Nixon was not more specific about the nature of such reaction.

The question of assurances has been under discussion here because of efforts to induce Congress to live up to unspecified commitments made to Saigon.

When questioned about the commitments, President Ford and Mr. Kissinger have referred to moral obligations. In a news conference on March 26, Mr. Kissinger acknowledged that the Nixon Administration had told Saigon that if it cooperated with the cease-fire, Congress would probably appropriate needed aid funds. But no mention was made of assurances about reaction to a Communist offensive.

The question of a possible assurance in case of a Communist offensive was raised when the Ambassador Tran Kim Phuong of South Vietnam said on television last week that the United States had promised that "it would not stand idly by" in case of a new conflict, but was doing just that.

When the State Department was asked whether the United States had promised to intervene militarily, the State Department said "there was no such specific commitment." There is no record of Mr. Kissinger's being asked about such a pledge.

The entire development seemed to have more political than diplomatic ramifications. The White House seemed determined to demonstrate that Mr. Jackson's charges of "secret agreements," with the implication of deception, were unfounded.

Mr. Ford was reported to have told Congressional leaders today that there were no secret agreements.

Representative John B. Anderson, Republican of Illinois, said after the meeting:

"We were assured that there are no private, off-the-record assurances on the part of this Government to the Government of South Vietnam."

Mr. Anderson said that Mr. Ford had told the group there were "no hidden chapters yet to be revealed."

Accusation by Jackson

Yesterday, on the Senate floor, Mr. Jackson, Democrat of Washington and a leading contender for the 1976 Democratic Presidential nomination, said:

"I have been reliably informed that there exist between the governments of the United States and South Vietnam secret agreements which envision fateful American decisions yet whose very existence has never

been acknowledged."

Mr. Jackson said he did not actually know the details of the agreements but had been told of their existence in recent days by a highly reliable informant. He demanded that the White House make them public and that Secretary of State Kissinger, if necessary, be summoned under oath to testify. He repeated that demand today.

After consultations with Mr. Kissinger, Mr. Nessen issued the following statement:

"Assurances to the Republic of Vietnam as to both United States assistance and United States enforcement of the Paris agreement were stated clearly and publicly by President Nixon.

"The publicly stated policy and intention of the United States Government to continue to provide adequate economic and military assistance and to react vigorously to major violations of the Paris agreement reflected confidential exchanges between the Nixon Administration and President Thieu at the time.

"In substance, the private exchanges do not differ from what was stated publicly. The law of 1973, of course, ruled out the possibility of American military reaction to violations of the

agreement."

Documents Not Released

In answer to questions, Mr. Nessen said he would not make the private assurances public because such documents are not usually released.

Mr. Jackson said in his Senate speech that Mr. Ford had only just learned of the "secret agreements," but Mr. Nessen said the assurances were made known to President Ford "a day or so after taking office."

Mr. Nessen was pressed for the exact wording of the secret documents, particularly as they might relate to American military involvement, but he insisted that there was no difference between what was said in public and in private in early 1973.

Although the White House statement fell short of confirming that there were actual secret agreements, Mr. Jackson clearly felt his original charge had been vindicated.

At a news conference today, he said the White House should make public the communications to President Thieu.

Mr. Jackson said that if they were just a reiteration of what Mr. Nixon had said publicly, wouldn't have waited until today to engage in what I call a confession."

He repeated his call for a Congressional investigation, contending that the White House statement cast doubt on its whole Indochina policy.

Mike Mansfield, the Senate Majority Leader, said that there should be an investigation by the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees.

A review of public statements made by President Nixon in 1973 supports the White House contention that the United States had pledged continued aid to Saigon and had left open the possibility of military involvement. There was no record of any private assurances to President Thieu.

Mr. Kissinger, then President Nixon's adviser on national security affairs, began cease-fire negotiations with Le Duc Tho of North Vietnam in Paris in October, 1972. With an accord in sight, Mr. Kissinger flew to Saigon to persuade President Thieu to accept the accord.

From all accounts, Mr. Kissinger assured Mr. Thieu that the United States would keep air and naval forces in the area to be pressed into service in case of a new conflict.

Mr. Thieu refused to go along with the accord and this delayed an agreement until January, 1973, after the United

States had bombed Hanoi over Christmas.

In that period, Gen. Alexander M. Haig Jr., then Mr. Kissinger's deputy, went to Saigon with further assurances. This was the time when President Nixon's letter was delivered.

Accord barred U. S. Role

The Paris accord barred all combat activity by the United States, but allowed military aid on a one-for-one basis to replace equipment. There was no ban on economic aid.

In a news conference after the initialing of the accord, Mr. Kissinger said on Jan. 24, 1973, that aid would be sought for Saigon, but he refused to answer a "hypothetical question" on what the United States would do in case of a new offense.

The first threat by the United States to use force against North Vietnam occurred in Mr. Nixon's news conference on March 15, 1973. Alarmed by reported infiltration into the South, Mr. Nixon said:

"We have informed the North Vietnamese of our concern about this infiltration. I would suggest that the North Vietnamese should not lightly disregard such expressions of concern.

WASHINGTON POST

9 April 1975

S. Viet Aid Called Vital By Weyand

By George C. Wilson
Washington Post Staff Writer

South Vietnam will fall unless the United States rushes extra military aid to the Saigon government, the Army Chief of Staff said yesterday.

Gen. Fred C. Weyand, in giving this assessment to the Senate and House Armed Services Committees in separate closed hearings, declined to say how much he thought was needed, noting that he has not yet given President Ford detailed recommendations from Weyand's fact-finding mission to Vietnam.

The Associated Press said yesterday that State Department sources put Weyand's extra military aid figure at \$500 million. Members of both the Senate and House Armed Services Committees said Weyand did not disclose any specific figures.

Chairman John C. Stennis (D-Miss.) of the Senate Armed Services Committee said he did not recall Weyand's using any specific figures. Stennis said he would

be willing to support sending more military aid to South Vietnam, but declined to say how much.

The senator said that perhaps Congress would be willing to hasten payment to the Saigon government of money originally scheduled to go there in fiscal 1976, instead of continuing to argue whether the Ford administration's request for an extra \$300 million above the \$700 million already appropriated for military aid should be approved.

Summing up Weyand's testimony in the closed hearing, Stennis told reporters that it boiled down to the assertion that "some additional military aid was necessary for the survival of South Vietnam."

Weyand, in a brief appearance outside the Senate committee hearing room, said he felt that all was not lost in South Vietnam. "They're getting an opportunity now to put it back together again," Weyand said.

"I think they certainly have a chance to have the kind of life they've been trying to obtain under the sort of political system that would be acceptable to them," Weyand said of the South Vietnamese.

As Stennis and Weyand offered their assessments in an office building corridor, a choir from Ridgewood, N.J., was singing sacred and patriotic songs in the background—sometimes, drown-

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

10 April 1975

Effects of secret Viet pacts weighed

By Godfrey Sperling Jr.

and Robert P. Hey
Staff correspondents of

The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

Secret Nixon assurances to support Saigon militarily — now confirmed by the Ford White House — has a two-pronged impact on presidential foreign-policy planning:

- It will result in Congress demanding more detailed knowledge of future presidential foreign-policy actions.

- Specifically, the President could meet even more suspicion and opposition in Congress should he decide to push for additional military aid for Vietnam.

White House press secretary Ron Nessen, answering Sen. Henry M. Jackson's charge that there were secret agreements between the U.S. and South Vietnam, acknowledged that former President Nixon had "confidential exchanges" in which he assured the Saigon government the United States would "react vigorously" to violations by Hanoi of the Paris peace agreements.

However, Mr. Nessen sought to minimize this agreement by saying that "in substance the private exchanges do not differ from what was stated publicly."

He also said that the agreements were now moot because a law Congress subsequently passed "ruled out the possibility of American military reaction to violations" of the Paris peace agreement.

ing out both men.

Stennis argued that more military aid might help the Saigon government negotiate a more favorable peace with North Vietnam.

"If they make a strong military showing with some military aid," Stennis said, "then it's a question of what North Vietnam is willing to

pay in military effort to end the war."

If instead of putting up a strong fight the South Vietnamese "virtually surrender," Stennis said, they run the risk of "being annihilated as a people and murdered as individuals."

The House Armed Services Committee voted 27 to 2

to hear Weyand's report on the military situation in Vietnam in closed session after hearing that this was President Ford's desire. Reps. Bob Carr (D-Mich.) and Thomas J. Downey (D-N.Y.) voted against closing the hearing to the public.

BALTIMORE SUN
10 April 1975

Viet ferment brewing unity among Thieu foes

By MATTHEW J. SEIDEN
Sun Staff Correspondent

Saigon—South Vietnam's opposition figures of all stripes now are meeting and planning with a sense of urgency as they feel that their big moment on the stage of Vietnamese history soon may be at hand.

The Communists have said repeatedly that they will negotiate when President Nguyen Van Thieu resigns. Despite a unanimous vote of no-confidence in the Senate, which is controlled by men who used to be his strong supporters, Mr. Thieu adamantly refuses to step down.

President Thieu's intransigence and the imminent threat of a Communist attack on this city are pushing previously irreconcilable opposition figures together—at least on the immediate issues—for the first time.

With the growing possibility of a Communist victory, right-wing, establishment-oriented, anti-Thieu figures such as Tran Van Tuven, 62-year-old opposition leader in the lower house of the National Assembly, suddenly are moving to associate themselves with more radical leaders like Madame Ngo Ba Thanh, the outspoken opposition lawyer who is still under house arrest after two years in prison.

Mr. Tuyen said he is actively allied with former Premier Nguyen Cao Ky and retired Gen. Duong Van (Big) Minh, and "co-operating" with more radical Buddhist and Catholic clergymen and lay leaders such as Madame Thanh who call themselves the "third force."

Before this year's Commu-

nist victories, the "third force" was scorned by establishment politicians and largely ignored by the foreign press. Now it has found a sudden, new popularity.

"Many are turning to us now for security, hoping to be protected by the association with us if the Communists come," Madam Thanh said. "Still, we need to be united now to get rid of Thieu, so we welcome their support."

After years of physical suffering and political suppression under the Thieu government, Madam Thanh says: "We are most optimistic now. The situation is going in the direction we were expecting. If Thieu steps down we can help negotiate a peaceful settlement and create a new government of reconciliation."

She said members of her group, who stayed in Da Nang and Hue after those cities fell last month now are active in the new administration there.

While these developments in the opposition movement are interesting reflections of the current military situation, it seems unlikely that even an organized, unified opposition movement could succeed now in dislodging President Thieu.

So far, the opposition has said it would not resort to violence to get rid of President Thieu. However, Mr. Tuyen said yesterday that "if Thieu refuses to be moved by moderate means, we will be forced to use violence—a military coup, or an uprising in the streets."

NEW YORK TIMES
5 April 1975

The Cambodian- Bloodbath Debate

By Donald Kirk

Our national leader has forecast an "unbelievable horror show," and his opponents have adduced opinions and facts to show it isn't true—that there will not be any semblance of a "bloodbath" if Communist forces win in Cambodia and then in Vietnam. The dialogue resembles a shouting match in which one man accuses the other of lying, and neither has the final evidence to prove his point.

Yet, in a very short time the evidence may emerge—in the form of a "bloodbath" if President Ford is right about the consequences of Congressional refusal to provide aid for Cambodia.

Or, if some of his critics are right, then the Khmer Rouge after having conclusively defeated the Cambodian Army militarily will seek only to install their own peaceful rule in the central seat of power, thus solidifying the hold they have already gained over most of the countryside.

Regardless of the "right" or "wrong" of the bloodbath debate, however, one point emerges more clearly than any other—that the United States should seek to negotiate a surrender that will insure, as much as is possible, no chance of a bloodbath and, at the same time, forestall further fighting and killing of the nonbloodbath variety.

(Since the term "bloodbath" first came into vogue in the Indochinese conflict, no one seems to have applied it to the war itself—only to the possible consequences of ending the war.)

The President, while reiterating the bloodbath theory, should make the final concession in Cambodia by declaring that the United States now is prepared not only to cut off aid but to assist in the orderly transfer of power to the Khmer Rouge.

The only reason for continuing to proffer any aid at all should be to shore up an interim structure in Phnom Penh and other enclaves until completion of the transition to Khmer Rouge authority. The departure on Tuesday of President Lon Nol and Premier Long Boret provides the perfect pretext, if any were needed, for a clear, public offer of negotiations leading to surrender.

To charges that such a radical departure from previous policy would amount to "betrayal" of our "ally,"

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

4 April 1975

Richard L. Strout

Vietnam: the moral and the practical

the only answer can be that we have no choice. The American people have clearly demonstrated their will, not only through polls but through Congress as well.

Yet, a White House or State Department analyst might respond, is it conceivable that the United States can negotiate a surrender? Would the Khmer Rouge hierarchy, ranging from the titular chief of state, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, residing in Peking, to the de facto leader, Khieu Samphan in Cambodia, consider talks of any kind? In view of the frequent refusal of the Khmer Rouge to negotiate at all, the question is legitimate.

One must ask, however, whether any American leader has approached the backers of the Khmer Rouge, notably the Soviet Union and China, with a declaration of intent to surrender.

So far all the "peace" offers emanating from Phnom Penh have essentially been demands for a cessation of the fighting—something the Khmer Rouge clearly has no intention of doing so long as it keeps on winning. It does not help to accuse the Khmer Rouge of all manner of crimes, of seeking to enforce dictatorial rule, of failure to win the support of the peasantry, many of whom have fled Khmer Rouge regions when they had the chance.

The reality, regardless of the right or wrong, is that the Khmer Rouge has the leadership and the weapons. The American obligation, at this point, is not to encourage endless conflict, with the inevitability of more prolonged suffering and dying, by supplying stopgap infusions of aid. The United States, beyond recognizing the realities, must now acknowledge defeat, whatever the underlying causes, and then sue for orderly surrender. It is the only "way out."

Far from vainly attempting to persuade Moscow and Peking to scale down arms shipments or to dissuade North Vietnam from relaying them to the Khmer Rouge, American officials should admit the utter futility of any tactic other than that of yielding—quickly if not gracefully.

It may be the only way to prevent the "bloodbath" so often predicted by Washington. And, if applied successfully in Cambodia, the formula of orderly but definitive surrender may prove the only viable "way out" of South Vietnam as well.

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NEW YORK TIMES

6 April 1975

Commitment?

What, if anything, do the people and Government of the United States now owe to the people and Government of South Vietnam? This question does not admit of any easy answer, entangled as it is in considerations of ethical responsibility, political commitment, and strategic self-interest, as well as the ambiguities of a shared history between a very powerful nation and a very weak one.

Beyond the clear call of human fellow feeling, there resides the hard and complex political question of the

Washington

I find I must take exception to a sentence in the Monitor editorial "What kind of a people we are," March 23, 1975:

"This newspaper's position is in line with the expressed motive of Dr. Kissinger in honoring a moral if not a legal commitment to South Vietnam."

I may misunderstand this, and perhaps I express it too baldly, but I cannot accept the proposition that I have a moral commitment to support a war which I regard as immoral.

The argument divides itself, I think, in two: What is moral and what is practical. Let us approach them in that order. The United States blundered its way into a struggle which, I believe, it never understood. It was a political war in a remote area in a small country conducted by guerrillas and feeding on subversion, but a succession of American presidents interpreted it as a global test between rival ideologies where U.S. victory in any case would be easy over little brown men in black pajamas but where, on the other hand, if there were not victory, other nations as far away as the Philippines and Japan might topple to communism like falling dominoes.

Like many Americans I became gradually convinced that the postulates upon which we entered the war were mistaken if not fanciful, though I honor the idealism and sincerity of those who still accept them.

David Halberstam in his book "The Best and The Brightest" argues (Page 561) that American leadership never grasped the idea "that this was a revolutionary war, and that the other side held title to the revolution because of the colonial war" (i.e., against France) "which had just ended." It helps explain, says Halberstam, "why their soldiers would fight and die, and ours would not; why their leaders were skillful and brave, and ours were inept and corrupt."

Many will disagree with this, of course, but the opinion polls seem to indicate that the great mass of Americans now feel that the Vietnam adventure was a mistake, and that further military aid should be diminished to the limited amount voted by Congress and in

the pipeline. Although Dr. Kissinger and President Ford disagree, the House Democratic caucus upheld this 189 to 49. In short, has not America's "moral" obligation been met by the expenditure of billions of dollars and 55,000 lives? Who is wise enough to determine the "moral" cut-off point for an obligation to the corrupt government of President Thieu, which suppresses newspapers, allegedly has thousands of political prisoners, and declines to submit itself to a supervised election?

The second point is on the practical side: the wisdom and timing of Dr. Kissinger's appeal (editorially supported, March 23) for military aid beyond that proposed by Congress. "The problem we face in Indo-China is an elementary question of what kind of a people we are," Dr. Kissinger declared.

It seems to some (though hawks may disagree) that Cambodia is doomed. Perhaps we have an obligation to re-equip President Lon Nol on his visit abroad to return to his country and fight again, but how about the wisdom of such action simply as a cash investment?

And Vietnam? Compassionate aid, certainly, but Kissinger aid? Many will think twice. The decline of Thieu's territory has been precipitate — from the report of the North's capture of Kontum and Pleiku Provinces as a "psychological victory" (Monitor, Page 1, col. 8, March 19) to the stunning loss of half its territory. Anyone who heard the CBS eyewitness broadcast of Bruce Dunning of mutinous South Vietnam soldiers commanding an evacuation plane meant for women and children must feel that morale has sunk low. A dispatch to the New York Times by Bernard Weinraub from Saigon, March 23, estimates that the Communists have captured a billion dollars worth of abandoned U.S. military materiel. (The artillery bombardment of Cambodia's capital, Phnom Penh, is now reportedly being carried out more accurately with captured U.S. guns.) Is "Kissinger aid" wise as a cash investment?

Speaking personally it seems unwise to me, but I am even more bothered by being told it is a moral obligation.

relationship between the United States and South Vietnam. The South Vietnamese Ambassador to Washington stated bitterly that the world could draw "only one possible conclusion; . . . that is, it is safer to be an ally of the Communists, and it looks like it is fatal to be an ally of the United States."

At his news conference last week, President Ford implicitly criticized the Democratic-controlled Congress for its failure to appropriate all the funds he had requested for Vietnamese military aid. Secretary of Defense Schlesinger meanwhile has repeatedly stated his view that this country has a moral—though not a legal—commitment to continue aid indefinitely to South Vietnam, a commitment allegedly given before Saigon agreed to sign the Paris peace protocols in 1973.

"I think that it was strongly stated to the South Vietnamese Government that the United States Govern-

ment intended to see to it that the Paris accords were indeed enforced," Secretary Schlesinger said a few days ago.

It is clear that any such commitment, if it was ever made, has no legal basis. The Paris accords permit one-for-one replacement of military equipment but do not obligate the United States to provide such help. If Secretary of State Kissinger, the chief negotiator of those accords, offered private assurances of aid or, more ambitiously, intimated that the United States would respond to North Vietnamese violations with renewed bombing or the reintroduction of ground troops, he has never acknowledged doing so. At his news conference explaining the Paris agreements on Jan. 24, 1973, Mr. Kissinger said categorically: "There are no secret understandings."

If such understandings ever existed the Government of South Vietnam has been on notice for more than a year and a half that they would not be fulfilled. Effective Aug. 15, 1973, the Nixon Administration accepted a ban imposed by Congress against further bombing anywhere in Vietnam or Cambodia.

That leaves open the question of military aid, which has continued but on a declining basis. It has been the position of this newspaper, particularly in view of the intensified North Vietnamese attacks of recent months in open violation of the Paris agreements, that the United States should continue to provide military aid to South Vietnam for a definitely limited period, but possibly as much as the next three years. Legal commitments and diplomatic hints aside, there is always an implicit responsibility not to abandon a military ally if it has any prospect of making a go of it.

The sudden collapse of much of South Vietnam's army however, makes the military aid question moot. Poor generalship and a breakdown in morale—not an immediate shortage of equipment and ammunition—

caused the rout of recent days. Unless the Saigon Government can soon achieve a remarkable reversal of the military situation, the fate of the country will have been settled before further American equipment could make any difference.

It is never easy to come to terms with failure and disappointment, even if it is the failure of an effort that was mistaken in its basic premises, as America's involvement in Vietnam was. The United States made a fundamental miscalculation of its own national interests in intervening on a large-scale in 1965 and fighting there for three years. It then spent the next five years trying to extricate itself while at the same time hoping that "Vietnamization" of the war would gradually enable South Vietnam to fight successfully on its own. That gamble appears now to have failed.

If challenged, a nation's sense of its own honor can never much exceed its perception of its own vital interests. Southeast Asia has never been an area of vital American interest. Only the gratuitous American intervention made it appear to be such an area. The lives, money and energy expended were out of all proportion to any discernible American interest. When means and ends are so disproportionate, a shift in policy sooner or later becomes inevitable. For seven years since President Johnson withdrew as a candidate for re-election and initiated the Paris peace talks, the United States has been trying to withdraw from that over-commitment and yet create conditions in which South Vietnam could continue on its own. The events of recent weeks have sadly proved that South Vietnam could not prevail militarily unless helped by American bombing and probably also by American ground troops. Regardless of their lingering sense of obligation, the American people long ago rightly determined that those are heavy costs that they would not pay again in Southeast Asia.

WASHINGTON POST
5 April 1975

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

Why the Vietnamese Collapsed

The collapse in South Vietnam, so stunning and unexpected in both Washington and Hanoi, can be traced to disastrous interaction between President Nguyen Van Thieu's personality — authoritarian, stubborn but impulsive—with new military conditions.

For the White House to cast all blame on congressional reduction of military aid is propagandistic overkill, privately admitted as such by expert administration analysts. Even farther from the truth are American doves, dancing on South Vietnam's grave and proclaiming "insurgent" victory in a "civil war" as proof of their own rectitude.

Undeniable demoralization caused by diminished U.S. support cannot in itself explain units of the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) dissolving without firing a shot, nor can this be rationalized as a Communist political triumph. Actually, fear of communism helped produce panic that turned Thieu's attempts to cope with reduced military means into tragedy.

Understanding of the collapse must begin with this bedrock reality: not even in their most euphoric stage have old Vietnam hands ever felt the ARVN

"Military withdrawal without prior planning was unlikely to succeed. What doomed it was the flood of civilian refugees which began immediately."

could match the blend of discipline and fanaticism instilled into North Vietnamese troops by a police state.

Against the world's finest infantrymen, Saigon has had two equalizers the past decade. The primary equalizer: the threat of U.S. bombers devastating the North Vietnamese homeland, viewed with apprehension by the Politburo in Hanoi so long as Richard M. Nixon was in the White House no matter what Congress prohibited. The secondary equalizer: superior firepower and mobility supplied the ARVN by Washington. Those equalizers became even more vital after Saigon was forced to sign the January 1973 cease-fire that provided no enforcement of Communist compliance.

Communist capture three months

ago of Phuoc Binh, then only the second provincial capital to fall in the second Indochinese war, exposed disintegration of the two equalizers — a transcendent development duly noted in both Hanoi and Saigon. Hanoiologists here believe the absence of U.S. reaction to Phuoc Binh's fall finally convinced the Politburo that American bombers would menace the North no longer. That battle also brought home to Saigon the contrast between North Vietnamese regulars, splendidly supplied by Moscow and Peking, and the ARVN with no new equipment or spare parts received this fiscal year thanks to congressional cuts (which limited U.S. aid to fuel and ammunition).

Emboldened by Phuoc Binh, Hanoi last month struck at Ban Me Thuot. Loss of that remote provincial capital

in the Central Highlands, while unimportant strategically, may rival Dien Bien Phu as seminal battles of Indochina because of its impact on the mind of Nguyen Van Thieu.

The ARVN division, a notoriously weak unit inexplicably unprepared for the assault, was cut to shreds. More important than the division's loss was inability to reinforce Ban Me Thuot, thanks to the shortage of C-130 transport planes. That dramatized for Thieu the dissolution of the secondary equalizer, leading him to his fateful decision to abandon the Central Highlands.

No military operation is more difficult and hazardous than a retrograde movement—withdrawal under enemy pressure. Yet this retreat was ordered without any planning by the high command.

It was here that Thieu's stubbornness had tragic consequences. Under-

standably bitter over reduced U.S. aid, he did not consult Washington. Without warning or planning, Thieu ordered unprepared generals to move south — immediately. Lt. Gen. Ngô Quang Truong, corps commander in the northern provinces and the ARVN's most esteemed officer, objected but had no chance to debate.

Military withdrawal without prior planning was unlikely to succeed. What doomed it was the flood of civilian refugees which began immediately. That these refugees moved toward, not away from, the fighting to escape the Communists contradicts the crowing of American doves such as former Sen. J. W. Fulbright and Dr. Daniel Ellsberg about the people's victory in a civil war.

But the refugees made resistance impossible, spread panic and despair and perhaps unwittingly ensured Com-

munist victory. The crack 1st ARVN division, which fought valiantly in many battles, is no more—dispersed ignominiously without being defeated. Much of the elite marine division has suffered a similar fate.

The tragedy in South Vietnam cannot be compared to the disintegration of Chiang Kai-shek's army a generation ago. Unlike China in 1949, there is neither massive defection to Hanoi of government troops nor joyous welcomes to the conquerors by happy villagers. Rather, the inevitability of Hanoi's fierce legions, firmly backed by their allies, triumphing over Saigon's less spartan forces, slowly abandoned by their great ally, has been grotesquely accelerated by the strange conduct of President Thieu, so marked by haste and anger.

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NEW YORK TIMES
7 April 1975

Helping the Vietnamese: Time for Action.

By Anthony Lewis

BOSTON, Apr. 6—As World War II ended, millions of civilian lives were saved by emergency relief measures. The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration provided medicine, food and shelter without boundaries of place or politics, caring among others for eight million displaced persons. Many countries contributed. But the crucial factor was the extraordinary generosity of the United States, which supplied more than half of UNRRA's resources.

The American instinct for generosity is making itself felt again now, in response to the human tragedy in Vietnam. The reactions of ordinary people, the telephone calls flooding relief agencies, the offers to adopt Vietnamese children—all these show an overwhelming desire to help the innocent victims of the war.

But the good will has not, so far, produced much actual help for the people who need it. In Vietnam, American ships have picked up a few refugees—and taken them to other places of doubtful safety. In this country, the impression is of chaos: officials have given no clear view of what our policy is or how the public can help.

The problem is to join the mood here, the deep and genuine desire to help, with the need on the ground. The need is urgent. Millions of Vietnamese are separated from their homes, often from their families, living without adequate food or shelter or safe water. Help is required now.

President Ford has spoken more than once of sending humanitarian aid. Now the time has come for deeds. There are days that he and the country can take, at once, to relieve the misery of the Vietnamese.

• The President should appoint a single person to coordinate all American relief efforts, and to carry on

the necessary relationships with the United Nations and other countries. The appointee should be someone known and respected abroad and capable of attracting bipartisan support at home.

A single responsible head has always been essential to the success of large relief efforts. The American examples include Herbert Hoover after World War I and Herbert Lehman as chief of UNRRA after World War II. The United Nations has just chosen someone to coordinate all of its emergency Vietnam relief operations: Sir Robert Jackson, the eminent Australian who was deputy chief of UNRRA and has handled many international assignments since then.

• Some Americans apparently believe that we can end the nightmare of the Vietnamese, and save our own consciences, by flying people out of Vietnam. That is illusion, and we shall have to get over it if we are going to deal with the problem in its true scale.

There is an obligation to those high Vietnamese officials most closely associated with the United States over the years, and to children fathered by Americans. But even the flight of children that have taken place, for all the goodwill of the Americans involved, are a dubious symbol. A bitter South Vietnamese Army lieutenant said in Saigon the other day: "It is nice to see you Americans taking home souvenirs of our country as you leave—china elephants and orphans."

In any event, the real problem will remain after whatever air evacuations take place: the millions of Vietnamese who are not going to leave. A few dramatized flights cannot dispose of the concern for them.

• We must be prepared to aid the helpless wherever they are. Whether a child gets American medicine or

powdered milk should not depend on where her family was when the Saigon army collapsed. There are an estimated one million refugees on the other side of the line now, and there may be many more in time. Their survival should not rest on our politics or pride.

The French Government has already decided to send emergency aid to both sides in South Vietnam. The French consul remained in Da Nang when it fell, and he is arranging to fly supplies to the airport there or in Hue.

American voluntary agencies have said they are ready to reopen their offices in the areas abandoned by Saigon if arrangements can be made with the Provisional Revolutionary Government. The P.R.G. has indicated that it is ready to accept aid personnel from the United Nations Children's Fund and possibly other international bodies. It is through these agencies that relief will have to go to the other side, with all appropriate safeguards.

President Ford has a tremendous opportunity at this moment—a chance to begin repairing this country's wounds in the act of helping to heal Vietnam's. But he can do so only if he focuses his thoughts and ours on the humanitarian cause, eschewing any further attempts to assign blame to Congress or to find "promises" of military aid to Saigon where officials swore to Congress there were none.

Americans are ready to unite on something in Vietnam at last. Their hearts are open. Congress will surely approve any sympathetic relief program. It is up to the President to put politics aside and lead us in meeting our responsibility to the people of South Vietnam.

April 5, 1975

The wind in Asia

"It's not our war" was the fleeting word to reporters from President Ford's press secretary this week, although he later recovered himself sufficiently to add that America was exploring the chance of peace negotiations in Vietnam. His words are liable to haunt the governments of the other small countries of south-east Asia. As South Vietnam's army moves towards apparently inevitable defeat they are wondering whether the domino theory was true after all. Of course, the domino theory was only a crude way of making the point that the futures of the different bits of south-east Asia are linked to each other. The image of a chessboard, where the removal of even a pawn alters the relationship among the other pieces, is nearer the truth. And South Vietnam is more than a mere pawn.

There is still an outside chance that the South Vietnamese government, with or without President Thieu, can hold on to an enclave in the south of the country. But the odds are that it cannot; and, if it does not, the question that must now be asked is the effect that a complete communist victory in Vietnam will have on the region as a whole. Will the remaining non-communist governments in south-east Asia draw the conclusion that the United States is an unreliable ally, and seek their own special relationships with the communist powers? Will a communist Vietnam, equipped with the most formidable military machine in the area, be content to devote its resources to domestic reconstruction, or will it seek to export its revolution? Will the Chinese, who have continued to give residual support to guerrillas in the region but have shown declining interest in them, now revert to a more active foreign policy on the assumption that America has opted out?

Mr Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore's prime minister, remarked some time ago that

nothing would be more disastrous than to see South Vietnam just rot away and become absorbed into the communist group... If people start believing that non-communist Asia will be lost eventually to communist Asia, then everybody will take his decisions accordingly.

The first stages of that may now be apparent in Thailand's shift to a non-aligned policy under its new prime minister, Mr Kukrit Pramoj. The Thais want an end to the American airlift to Cambodia from bases in northern Thailand, and the withdrawal of all American forces in the country within a year. They are seeking full diplomatic relations with China, and are reported to have entered into negotiations with North Vietnam to the same end. It is not surprising that Thailand is trying to reinsure itself. It is particularly vulnerable to the possible overspill of communist victories in Indochina because of both its geographical position and its ethnic divisions. The community of 45,000 Vietnamese in the north-east of Thailand has provided a support-base for insurgents there, and there has been a steady traffic of Thai guerrillas over the Laotian frontier on their way to training camps in North Vietnam and China.

Indochina alone, or more?

There is little doubt that Cambodia and Laos will fall into the Vietnamese communists' sphere of influence after the war. It was the North Vietnamese in both countries who gave the local rebels the military help they needed, and they will claim the political return on their investment. There are a number of reasons for hoping that they will not now commit their own army to action

further afield. Neither part of Vietnam has land borders with a serious maritime power. The appalling economic legacy of the war, and the fact that the new government in southern Vietnam will have to consolidate its power in a process that is likely to be both long and bloody, probably mean that the time and resources to carry out an expansionist foreign policy on a major scale will be lacking, even if the will were there. But that does not rule out the possibility of arms and training for guerrillas in Thailand and Malaysia. And the demand for arms and training will be there: the success of the Vietnamese communists' long-drawn-out war will be a powerful encouragement to other Asian insurgents.

It is this impact of Vietnam that will count for most. A number of south-east Asian governments (most recently those of Burma and Malaysia) have been pronouncing that their local insurgencies are no longer a problem; last month, the leaders of the pro-Chinese Burmese Communist party were killed. But these movements will now hope that the victorious North Vietnamese will provide them with the means of turning the scales. The Chinese may not want North Vietnam to do that, because they do not wish to see it become too powerful. Whether the Vietnamese communists answer the appeal for help will therefore partly depend on the position that North Vietnam chooses to occupy between China and Russia. But the chances are that, with the emergence of another major communist power, the other south-east Asian guerrillas will stand as good a chance as the North Vietnamese before them of playing on the competitive instincts of several potential backers.

It is what China decides to do that counts for most. China's present policy is based on containing one principal enemy, Russia, and on building good relations with that enemy's enemies. If that remains true, the Chinese will shy away from offending the Americans by helping the Thai and Malaysian guerrillas. But China's present policy may not last very much longer. It is only the fairly recent policy of Chou En-lai's government. Chou is now an old and sick man, and even he may have begun to suspect that an informal alliance with America is not the safest basis for Chinese policy. His successors may prefer an accommodation with Russia that will relieve them of the pressure on their northern frontier and at the same time make it possible for them to put more resources into support for rebellions in the countries along their southern border. China's claim to be different from Russia, after all, rests partly on the assertion that it is the better natural leader of the world's revolutionaries. If that happens, it is hard to foresee any peace for south-east Asia.

This is a prospect that now has to be taken into account. South-east Asia, and particularly the parts with large communities of expatriate Chinese, was the principal poor area of the world that had seemed to be breaking through towards self-sustaining economic growth, towards a consumer society which was beginning to give a tolerable standard of living even to its urban areas, with many of the advantages of free market economies and some elements of political choice. Its governments have looked to the Americans for support in the face of communist invasion or insurrection. They can no longer do so. "The winds sweeping through the tower herald a rising storm in the mountains," was how Chou En-lai put it before the communists opened their present offensive in Vietnam.

WASHINGTON POST
10 April 1975

VC Official: Political Win Is Preferred

9—Vietcong foreign Minister Nguyen Thi Binh indicated here Wednesday that the National Liberation Front hopes to complete its takeover of South Vietnam by political means rather than through a possibly costly and bloody battle for Saigon.

But she said in an interview that the Vietcong would use "all means" including military ones to obtain "the application of the Paris accords" and that it is difficult at this point to foresee precisely how events leading to a final Communist victory will unfold.

"We are still for the application of the Paris peace accord. It depends on our adversaries whether we use military measures," she said. But she indicated no expectation of an imminent offensive on Saigon and hinted at one point that the Vietcong's objectives had been fixed last October. "We do not want our compatriots to die if we can obtain our objectives by other means," she said. During a 90-minute interview with The Washington Post and the Paris newspaper Le Monde, Mrs. Binh repeatedly made appeals to the United States to end what she called interference in the internal affairs of Vietnam and questioned whether American "propaganda" about millions of war refugees is not simply a pretext for renewed American involvement in the war.

[Mrs. Binh, denounced the U.S. orphan airlift as a mas-

WASHINGTON POST
10 April 1975

Vietcong Leader Speaks

From News Dispatches

The premier of the Vietcong's Provisional Revolutionary Government addressed a crowd of 4,000 persons last Sunday in a provincial capital seized early in this year's Communist offensive, the insurgents' Liberation Radio claimed yesterday.

Huynh Tan Phat reportedly spoke in Phuocbinh,

sive attempt to brainwash future generations of Vietnamese. In an interview with the Tanzanian newspaper Uhuru, she said the airlift was organized on the pretext of helping "orphans" but was really a "front" by the Vietcong to indoctrinate children who will later be used to try to subvert the revolutionary government. No one will believe the United States wants to help the Vietnamese people after slaughtering millions of them.]

The Vietcong foreign minister came to the Tanzanian capital after visiting Paris, Cyprus and Zaire, which has just established diplomatic relations with the Vietcong's Provisional Revolutionary Government. She said she had been inside South Vietnam about a month ago and is eager to return because of the fast-moving events there.

Mrs. Binh called the disintegration of Saigon's army in northern and central Vietnam "a very natural thing" which she attributed to low morale among its soldiers, the worsening economic situation in areas under its rule and a growing disenchantment with President Thieu's government.

But she would not predict a similar collapse of the Vietnamese military in Saigon and refused to speculate on how or when she thought the city might be taken. "We cannot say anything ahead of time," she remarked.

Nonetheless, it appeared from her general comments that she was both proud and surprised by the extent of Vietcong and North Vietnamese military successes and that she considered their struggle to have entered a new phase with the shifting of millions of Vietnamese from Saigon's con-

trol to "completely liberated zones." The capture of Da-nang she seemed to regard as almost more important militarily than that of Saigon.

Members of Mrs. Binh's family live in Da-nang.

The Vietcong's population of Vietnamese living in Vietcong-controlled territory had grown from 5 million to 9.3 million during the current military campaign.

Independent analysts put the number of Vietnamese living in Vietcong-held territory before the current offensive at about 3 million of the country's 20 million people. They say the population of the territories that have fallen to the Vietcong in the offensive is about 4 million.

Mrs. Binh carefully avoided saying anything to suggest that the Vietcong felt the Paris peace accord had been "overtaken by events," insisting that it is still a valid basis for settling Vietnam political crisis.

She said it was the Vietcong's Liberation Front that was the true defender of the accord and accused the United States of doing everything possible to avoid recognizing the Provisional Revolutionary Government or third "neutral" political force that could take part in the government of national reconciliation provided for by the Paris agreement. Such recognition, she said, is "one of the bases for a settlement."

The Vietcong's top diplomat listed what she said was an increasing number of American violations of the accord, including the sending of additional military advisers and military supplies to the South Vietnamese army and the use of American-piloted planes to aid Vietnamese air force fighters in coordinating attacks. "All this shows us the United States is doing everything to sabotage the accord and to keep Thieu as

the only government in Saigon."

"Our objectives are to get the United States to respect the Paris accords and stop interfering in Vietnamese affairs," she repeatedly re-

peatedly gave no indication that any diplomatic moves are afoot to arrange for a political settlement to the current crisis. She specifically said the French are not playing a role and had indicated that they did not want to provide anything other than humanitarian assistance for the moment.

Mrs. Binh said that another major Vietcong objective was to get rid not only of President Thieu but "all that clique and its policy." But she refused to name any other individual Vietnamese leader currently opposing Thieu who would be acceptable to her government and said that what it most important is a change in Saigon policy rather than in leaders.

The only time the graceful and composed Vietcong diplomat became slightly agitated during the interview in her room at the Kilimanjaro Hotel was when she herself raised the issue of war refugees, a term she pointedly avoided using.

She insisted that people were fleeing "under pressure" and under the fear of being bombed by Saigon's forces and were not seeking to escape advancing Vietcong and North Vietnamese troops. "They [American newspapers] talk as if we are responsible for these so-called refugees," she said, "but they left by force."

Mrs. Binh said an international campaign to raise assistance for the millions of Vietnamese now living under Vietcong control had been launched and that private donations from American organizations would be welcomed.

WASHINGTON POST
9 April 1975

Kenneth Crawford

Indochina Recriminations

In a recent talk show on the public television channel a lot of gratuitous advice was passed out. One panelist advised against "recriminations" in this country when the question becomes: Who lost Indochina? She

Mr. Crawford is a former columnist for Newsweek.

said such recriminations would be "divisive." Another member of the panel warned against discussion of the defeat in a cold-war context. He said the cold war was passe—a relic of the 1960s, now superseded by detente.

On a subsequent news show on one of the commercial channels Sen. Birch Bayh (D-Ind.) said he was tired of hearing Congress blamed for the rout of government troops from the northern provinces of South Vietnam. And Rep. Paul McCloskey (R-Calif.) said his first impulse, after visiting Cambodia, was to "string up" the American officials responsible for dragging that little nation into the war. He was so quoted, approvingly, by one of the most monotonous of the hand-wringing deplorers.

It is currently fashionable to blame Secretary of State Kissinger for the horrors we are seeing in the television news from Indochina. Even a national magazine of serious and fair-minded repute runs a cover cartoon ridiculing the secretary for the troubles his policies are in around the world. Yesterday's hero becomes today's scapegoat. It is one of our prerogatives, but one of the least attractive when exercised, to kick the mighty when they are down.

We are being invited to wallow in self-justification and self-deception. The national brain is being washed clean of guilt in connection with Indochina, and doubtless it wants to be so washed. Bayh may be tired of finger pointing at Congress but his fatigue doesn't alter the fact that Congress, when it decreed an end to military assistance for South Vietnam and Cambodia, pulled the plug and sent them down the drain.

True, they might have gone down anyway eventually. But their defeat would have been less ignominious—especially for us—had we stood by them to the end, to the extent of keeping military supplies flowing.

There will be recriminations. They are unavoidable short of forbidding debate. Perhaps we can learn something from this experience, such as not to start what we are unwilling to finish. As for the cold war being superseded by detente, tell it to the refugees on

"Congress has said that what is left of Cambodia and South Vietnam under non-Communist auspices must be defeated quickly to end the bloodshed of war."

the roads to Saigon under North Vietnamese rocket and artillery fire. It might be comforting to them to know that the explosives came from a branch of the one big happy world family brought together by detente.

But the troops going south refused to stand and fight. They abandoned their arms. They turned out to be a weak army. So they were not worthy of help? This was an army out of hope and on the run from an enemy superior in equipment and numbers and it panicked. Panic is a disease to which all humanity is vulnerable. We are not immune from it. We should be slow to judge.

We ourselves have been unkindly judged by Sir Robert Thompson, British Asia expert and friend and admirer of the United States, or former friend and admirer. He writes that we have run out on our allies, not only on South Vietnam and Cambodia, but on Israel as well, and as result have lost our credibility as a world power. As he sees it:

"The American retreat from Moscow, like that of Napoleon, is beginning to litter the route of corpses. Henry Kissinger has been vainly fighting a rear-guard action with no army, no air force, no navy and no money.

"The administration can no longer conduct a credible foreign policy. But, do not worry, a new policy line already has been laid down by Congress: If you surrender the killing will stop. It is a clean message, to the world, of the abject surrender of the United States."

Too harsh a judgment after the expenditure of 50,000 American lives, national morale and billions in treasure? Perhaps. It is part hyperbole. The United States still has an army, an air force, a navy and money. But Congress has decided that none of them shall be used further to bolster Indochina's defenders militarily. That amounts to the same thing, so far as Hanoi and Phnom Penh are concerned, as our not having them.

That equation may be lost for the moment on the American public, already being assured and reassured that Congress, the Congress it elected, bears no responsibility for the debacles of Indochina. But it is not being

lost on the Thais, the Filipinos, the Israelis, the Portuguese and, naturally, the Soviet and Chinese governments.

"This was an army out of hope and on the run from an enemy superior in equipment and numbers and it panicked."

Sir Robert is exactly right in his interpretation of what Congress has said. It has said that what is left of Cambodia and South Vietnam under non-Communist auspices must be defeated quickly to end the bloodshed of war. Washington, Lincoln and Roosevelt might have proposed to stop American war for the same reason—to end the bloodshed. Fortunately for us and for their places in history they didn't.

It can be argued that the two situations are wholly different—that these American heroes were fighting for American objectives, and winning, whereas a succession of later Presidents were fighting for no American objective in Vietnam, and losing. Yet Congress agreed for years that the objective of American free-world leadership in resistance to the spread of totalitarianism on the left was objective enough that American freedom is dependent to a degree on freedom elsewhere in the world.

President Ford still says it is. In his California press conference he paraphrased President Kennedy's inaugural address pledging American defense of freedom anywhere. It sounded hollow this time around. The President is not only hamstrung by Congress, but by a new and presumably improved Congress. It is a Congress chucked with Democratic neophytes determined to "change things." Insofar as foreign policy is concerned the change is for the worse.

These first-term members keep telling us that they are a new breed of forward-looking liberals. Their central idea is to take money away from defense and spend it on welfare. They have all but seized control of the House through the party caucus. That, they say, is what they were elected to do. Whether this is liberal statesmanship or demagoguery is a nice question.

They would be more bearable if they could refrain from wrapping themselves in a cloak of moral superiority while at the same time insisting that this country has no moral responsibility for allies it has been supporting over the years and encouraging to fight in their own defense. If these allies must surrender, it would be better for them to do it themselves than to have Congress doing it for them.

Morality aside, it would be better if Congress were not so clearly telling the world that the Communist supporters are more dependable allies than the United States. And it would be nice, too, if TV "personalities" were less eager to abet the telling.

WASHINGTON POST

8 April 1975

Motives for Leaving Many, Complex

Panic Spurred Vietnamese Flight

South

By H. D. S. Greenway,

Washington Post Foreign Service

SAIGON, April 7—Why did they run?

Almost like the spread of some dread disease, a great panic has overtaken this country. Starting first in the north, it sent hundreds of thousands of people fleeing from their homes, leaving everything behind. As it spread south, it infected thousands more with an all but irresistible urge to run.

Why? Was it fear of the advancing North Vietnamese—a hatred of communism? It is hard to imagine that staying behind could be worse than dying of hunger, thirst and exposure in the jungles and in packed evacuation boats, or surviving to sleep in the streets and in wretched camps where refugees are prisoners of their poverty and misery. Yet so many ran.

There can be little doubt that many fear the Communists. But many more seem to fear the unknown rather than the known. The security of government, and by far the most common comment, heard during several days of interviewing refugees was, "We left because everyone else was leaving."

Thus it would appear that people's motives for leaving their homes are too complex to ascribe what is happening here simply to anti-communism or people "voting with their feet."

President Ford said recently that "the will of the South Vietnamese people to fight for their freedom is best evidenced by the fact that they are fleeing from

the North Vietnamese."

The opposite appears to be true. All-over the northern part of the country the will to fight vanished when panic struck, and some of the South Vietnamese army's best units dissolved without firing a shot at the North Vietnamese. When discipline was gone some soldiers vented their rage and frustration by looting and killing people, and many refugees speak with contempt and hatred about the venality and corruption of the Saigon government.

Many central Vietnamese detest the Saigon government, but ran because of their fear of the North Vietnamese and the uncertainty of the future and simply because everyone else was running.

There are, to be sure, educated people among the refugees who dislike the regimentation and lack of intellectual freedom that the Communists demand. Others, especially Catholics, chose to leave Hanoi in 1954 when the country was partitioned and are now moving again.

Two women who fled from Nha Trang, for example, said they had come from North Vietnam on a U.S. Navy ship 21 years ago and had come farther south again last week on another U.S. Navy ship. They said they would willingly move again because they thought they could not stand the Communists' intolerance for religion.

There are other refugees who feel that their class background is not sufficiently proletarian for the

Communists, and it was noticeable that urban people appeared to outnumber country peasants in the refugee camps and makeshift settlements.

An 18-year-old student with a soft face and long fingernails, named Vo Minh Triem, said he came south because he was afraid the North Vietnamese would put him in the army.

Yet there were others among the refugees who could not possibly be considered members of an exploiting class. An old fisherman with gnarled hands and a classic Ho Chi Minh beard, for example, spoke of his life of poverty in Quinhon. Capitalism had not been kind to him. Bribes had to be paid for nearly everything, and inflation had forced him to sell his boat so that he had to work for others. Yet he came south, he said, because he had heard that the Communists were cruel to people.

Some people from Hue mentioned that the Communists had murdered many persons when they captured the city in 1968, and they said that those killed had not been important officials but unimportant people such as the postman and government clerks.

Many refugees are the wives and relatives of soldiers and other government officials, and many in this group said they felt that their association with the government might count against them in the eyes of the North Vietnamese.

Those who had worked for

deadline into Saigon in 1975, or could take a little longer. But barring an-

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other in the series of near-miracles that preserved the infant Republic of Vietnam for two decades, the Communists will triumph.

Communist victory in China loomed a flood of recriminations that roiled the 1950s in the United States. The mindless, vicious "anti-Communist" crusade of Sen. Joseph McCarthy had its roots in "our losing China."

A similar flood of recriminations for "our losing Vietnam" is not impossible. But the profound war-weariness of the American people could restrain its virulence.

the Americans were even more worried. Hoang Dong, for example, had worked for the American firm of Pacific Architects and Engineers as a baker in Nha Trang. He was clearly worried about the American connection. He also said that he hadn't been paid and that if he stayed to wait for the Communists in Nha Trang he would never be paid.

But it was most unusual for people to speak in terms of hatred for communism or of any political motivation other than a vague fear of the Vietcong.

Most of the people I talked to gave the same response as Mrs. Nguyen Thi Thanh, a 45-year-old widow who fled south with nine children. One child was separated from them on the way and is now lost:

"I don't know exactly why I left," she said. "I was just afraid like all the other people. We heard rumors that the government was planning to evacuate the city, and when everybody started to leave I left with them. No exact reason."

When the French evacuated Hanoi in 1954, the Geneva Treaty allowed people 90 days to decide whether to stay or move out. But for the people who fled south these last few weeks there was no time to consider anything, and the panic and fear of being left behind was highly contagious.

Mrs. Hong Kim Chau, 42, was making a living selling furniture in Banmethuot when the Communists came near.

Nonetheless, the close parallels and the sharp divergences between the Chinese and the Vietnamese catastrophes provide some answers to the overriding question: Why do the North Vietnamese and the Chinese Communists fight so effectively while the South Vietnamese and the Chinese Nationalists did so badly?"

Among the remarkably close parallels is the time frame. It took 22 years from the time the Chinese Communists set out to win power till their victory. It has been 21 years since the Republic of Vietnam's establishment ignited the current round of fighting in Indochina. Both wars, incidentally, were punctuated by truces that

LOS ANGELES TIMES

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Vietnam Like China in '40s

BY ROBERT S. ELEGANT

HONG KONG—The political and military atmosphere in South Vietnam today strikingly resembles the atmosphere in China in early 1949, when the Communists were routing the dispirited Nationalists. Like the South Vietnamese, the Nationalists were disintegrating.

The People's Republic of China was formally established in Peking on Oct. 1, 1949. The Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam could well beat the October

American negotiators hoped would endure.

Some causes of the two American debacles are obvious, while some are obscure. In both cases, the Communists possessed overwhelming determination to win at all costs, however long it took.

In both cases, America's proteges were indecisive because they were hamstrung by widespread corruption, political instability, and acute economic difficulties. In neither case could the non-Communist side muster even an appearance of unity.

The economic factors were critical.

In Shanghai, a year before its fall in April, 1949, inflation was so virulent that people dining out carried suitcases full of yuan—or a few American dollars. In Saigon a year ago, the family of a senior (and noncorrupt) brigadier general on active service elsewhere sat down to scanty meals of third-grade rice eked out with a few greens, while his children went to school in shirts patched and re-patched.

Common soldiers knew their families were on the verge of starvation. Such backgrounds were conducive neither to immediate courage nor to hopefulness for the future. In short, morale plummeted.

The psychological trauma was acute. The Chinese Nationalists felt their cause was hopeless after withdrawal of grudging American assistance. Having enjoyed lavish American assistance, the South Vietnamese were undercut by its abrupt dwindling.

Even before President Nguyen Van Thieu's decision to make a "strategic withdrawal" from the central highlands two weeks ago precipitated the collapse, the man in Saigon's streets knew the situation was desperate. He saw truckloads of corpses in plastic "body bags," which were, one Saigonese wrote, as numerous as during Tet in 1968 or the 1972 full-dress ar-

mored attack.

In both China and Vietnam, two wholly different social systems and their antagonistic philosophies opposed each other.

The Communists believed that the end justified any means, and they exerted iron discipline over both their adherents and their subject populace. Their opponents, riven by factional rivalries, hovered indecisively between the vaguely benevolent, vaguely self-serving—and largely outmoded—Confucian authoritarianism they would have liked to impose and the "democracy" demanded by both advanced domestic opinion and their allies.

A potentially pluralistic, splintered society faced a purposefully monolithic society. The result was political and psychological chaos for the Republic of China and the Republic of Vietnam.

There is at least one major difference between China and Vietnam—military.

The Chinese Communist forces were guerrillas arrayed in conventional formations and primarily equipped with weapons captured from the enemy. Of course, the Russians had turned large quantities of arms over to them, along with most of Manchuria. But they were technologically and, until the final stages, numerically inferior to the Nationalist armies.

The North Vietnamese forces not only outnumber their opponents and are much more lavishly supplied, but are actually superior technologically. Their antiaircraft and antitank weapons, as well as their armor, are more numerous and better than the corresponding armament of the American-equipped South Vietnamese.

Having devoted the two years since the cease-fire to resupply and reinforcement, the North Vietnamese forces are a centrally controlled,

highly mobile, highly sophisticated striking force—not a congeries of guerrilla bands. They are conducting a modern blitzkrieg against an enemy who is mired down in static defense of large areas and who is badly strapped for ammunition, gasoline, and funds.

Only in aircraft do the South Vietnamese have an advantage. But the aircraft—not quite 1,000 of all types, including transports and helicopters—originally supplied to the South have been eroded by at least 25% through normal wear and combat losses.

The decisive factor in both Vietnam and China was the Communists' utter dedication to victory. That was their greatest advantage, and it had far deeper historical roots than the hastily improvised defenses of either the Chinese Nationalists or the South Vietnamese.

The foundations of the North Vietnamese Communist structure were laid in the 1920s, while their strategic and revolutionary doctrine was forged even earlier. The South Vietnamese were forced to attempt to create both a nation and a viable defense in just two decades.

The internal contentiousness and inability to unite for a common cause displayed by both the Nationalists and the South Vietnamese were the major political reason for their defeat. They had very little time to reconcile bitterly antagonistic groups, and they possessed no central purpose or political philosophy around which to coalesce.

Finally, the character of the war changed. By escalating a guerrilla struggle into a conventional war, the United States won a conventional "victory." But that escalation and the consequent change in the nature of the war all but insured an eventual South Vietnamese defeat after the American withdrawal.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

7 April 1975

Erwin D. Canham

Peace beyond blame

The United States, we are frequently reminded, has never lost a war — until now.

The problem today is to behave like a mature and responsible world power toward the situation in Indo-China.

If the American people have the opportunity to contribute major humanitarian and economic aid to the tragic victims of this long war, they will undoubtedly do so generously. There is a heavy burden on the American conscience, and such aid can do something to relieve it.

The immediate problem, too, is to contribute if possible toward a political settlement which will make the final rout of South Vietnamese forces less terrible for the people there. If the United States can do anything to speed and support negotiations with the Hanoi government and the Viet Cong, surely it should do so.

So far, when this was written, there was little evidence that the United States had been

taking any useful part in the kind of talks which alone seem able to soften the blow of Communist take-over. But this is a primary need.

If the United States is blamed around the world as an unreliable ally, the best answer now is to assist in whatever kind of peace-making is available. If this criticism is based on Congress's decision to bar further American military participation — a decision taken in 1973 — or on reluctance to appropriate more vast sums now, it is a criticism inconsistent with much of the world's previous opinion on Vietnam.

Surely a considerable part of world opinion had doubted the efficacy of American involvement in Vietnam for years. Certainly for the last six years, most nations have yearned for peace in Vietnam, and have been reconciled in some measure to a Communist position in the South. It is inconsistent for blame today to be leveled at American unwillingness to pour additional military

resources to the rescue of the Thieu regime. Rather, criticism may be directed at the long-protracted unwillingness to read the handwriting on the wall, and to try earlier to make the inevitable more tolerable.

If the United States plunges into a domestic political search for scapegoats, it will harm the American position in the world. The political war about the Communist victory in mainland China ought not be repeated today.

Nor should the superhawks who believe the United States should have atomic-bombed the North Koreans (or the Chinese Communists) out of existence be listened to. That kind of escalation could only have led to greater tragedy, perhaps worldwide.

The simple fact, it seems to me, is that those we sought to aid in Vietnam did not have the national force, the ideological strength, the freedom from corruption, the total will which their fellow-Vietnamese in the North showed so successfully.

There is nothing so dangerous as a slippery slope, and the United States slid down a

slippery slope into its Vietnam involvement. The advice of Generals Eisenhower and MacArthur — never to get drawn into a land war on the Asian mainland — remains fundamental.

When the final collapse comes, and thereafter, the American people will have their opportunity to snap out of almost 15 years of illusion and to show the world their better side. American willingness to help those in distress can be almost unlimited. What opportunities, what circumstances will enable these sentiments to have practical effect, must be worked out.

To assume that Hanoi and the Viet Cong are going to launch into massacre may be quite wrong. If they have half the sense they have shown from time to time, they will try to conciliate and unite the whole country. Undoubtedly many of their political and military opponents will suffer. But beyond that, the world — with the United States playing whatever part it can — can strive for a true and humane peace.

NEW YORK TIMES

9 April 1975

Learning from the Past

American disengagement in Indochina and the military debacle in South Vietnam and Cambodia have aroused fears that the United States may be entering a new era of isolationism or at least impotence in the world arena. President Ford has even hinted darkly that those who sought the end of this country's military involvement with Saigon were advocating a retreat behind Fortress America.

The Army Chief of Staff says that only another half-billion dollars, if sent quickly enough, will enable Saigon to fight off enemy attack. General Weyand's request, reported yesterday, recalls the last-ditch conviction of Gen. William C. Westmoreland in 1968, that another 206,000 American troops would do the job in South Vietnam that twice that number had been unable to accomplish. Such requests for help are second-nature from worried strategists whose defenses are crumbling; they bear no relation to the national interests of the United States, or to its role in the world.

History cannot be undone; but errors committed in the past need not jeopardize a nation's future—provided its political leaders have the wisdom to recognize and the strength to admit those errors. No purpose is served by pinning familiar old labels on new and greatly different situations.

It is not the mark of isolationism for the United States to re-examine the validity of its role as automatic protector of any regime that calls itself the enemy of Communism. If the United States is to be unselective in its reliability, as Secretary of State Kissinger would

have it, then this country must exercise extreme selectivity in its military commitments.

Great powers have often tended to confuse their international obligations with an innate desire to fashion other nations in their own image. Thus the United States has deluded itself into believing that the symbols of American democracy could automatically turn allied forces into freedom fighters. Such illusions tend to corrupt clients, as well as patrons. The risk is compounded when the American flag is allowed to be identified with the power of privilege and the defense of the status quo. It is in this way that the United States has so often unwittingly forfeited its own advocacy of social reform to Communist propagandists.

To recognize such failures and to come to a realistic understanding of the limitations of American power is not to condemn ourselves to passivity or isolationism. There is much this country can do in honoring commitments legitimately entered into to protect its vital interests and in making common cause with those who truly speak for their people's aspirations. The success of the Marshall Plan offers ample illustration of America's potential to use its resources and its diplomacy as an effective bulwark against want and war.

Except for the remaining humanitarian task of alleviating the suffering left in the war's aftermath, the book will soon have to be closed on the tragic misreading of the United States' role in Indochina. This has nothing to do with isolationism nor the abrogation of a commitment. It is simply the honorable recognition, at long last, of the failure of a policy on which much blood and treasure have been tragically expended.