

# NEWS, VIEWS and ISSUES

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4 April 1975

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Destroy after backgrounder  
has served its purpose or  
within 60 days.

CONFIDENTIAL

# Governmental Affairs

THE NEW YORK TIMES, WEDNESDAY, MARCH 19, 1975

## C.I.A. Ship Brought Up Part of Soviet Sub Lost in 1968 but Failed to Raise Missiles

### HUGHES BUILT SHIP

### Bodies of 70 Russians Were Found in Craft and Buried at Sea

By SEYMOUR HERSH

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 18—The Central Intelligence Agency financed the construction of a multimillion-dollar deep-sea salvage vessel and used it in an unsuccessful effort last summer to recover hydrogen-warhead missiles and codes from a sunken Soviet nuclear submarine in the Pacific Ocean, according to high Government officials.

The salvage vessel, constructed under disguise for the C.I.A. by Howard R. Hughes, the eccentric billionaire industrialist, did successfully recover about one-third of the submarine, the officials said, but the portion raised from the ocean bottom did not include either the ship's missiles or its code room.

Instead, the Government officials said, the C.I.A.-led expedition recovered the forward section of the ship containing the bodies of more than 70 Soviet seamen and officers who went down with the vessel when it mysteriously exploded in 1968 and sank in more than three miles of water. The Soviet submariners were buried at sea in military ceremonies that were filmed and recorded by C.I.A. technicians.

Although thousands of scientists and workmen had security clearance for the program, known as Project Jennifer, the submarine salvage operation remained one of the Nixon and Ford Administrations' closest secrets.

#### Debate on Project

The Jennifer operation had provoked extended debate inside the United States intelligence community since the C.I.A. proposal to build the salvage vessel, with the cooperation of Mr. Hughes, first underwent high-level evaluation in the early nineteen-seventies. Critics of the program have said that the value of the information that could be gleaned

from what they depict as out-moded code books and out-moded missiles did not justify either the high cost of the operation or its potential for jeopardizing the United States-Soviet détente.

The program's defenders, who include William E. Colby, Director of Central Intelligence, have said that the successful recovery of the whole submarine would have been the biggest single intelligence coup in history.

They argue that even a 1968 code book would give the Government's signal experts a chance to evaluate all of the Soviet submarine communications that were in existence then and perhaps for years before the ship sank. Recovery of the missiles also would help provide standards for judging the existing analysis of such weapons as compiled from the precise scrutiny of aerial photographs taken by satellites, Government experts have maintained.

In recent weeks, Mr. Colby has formally requested Secretary of State Kissinger for permission to stage another attempt next summer to salvage the rest of the submarine, which reportedly is lying in nearly 17,000 feet of water about 750 miles northwest of Oahu, Hawaii.

Mr. Kissinger, who serves as head of the 40 Committee, the secret Government panel that reviews and finances all intelligence operations, supported the efforts of the C.I.A. to keep the salvage program secret until a decision could be made on continuing it. Privately, however, he is known to have dismissed the Jennifer program as not being of sufficient immediacy to require much of his personal attention.

It was the 40 Committee that agreed to secretly authorize funds to the Hughes organization to subsidize construction of what was to be publicly described as the world's largest deep-sea mining ship, the Glomar Explorer. The vessel took its name from the first three letters in the first two words of the title of the company that operated it for Hughes—Global Marine, Inc.

A New Times reporter initially learned some details of the salvage operation in late 1973, when the Glomar Explorer was conducting tests in the Atlantic Ocean. He stopped his research on the matter after a request from Mr. Colby in February 1974.

Following the publication of some information about the operation by the Los Angeles Times last month, The New York Times investigated the matter further. The New York Times was informed by the C.I.A., in the course of the investigation, that publication would endanger the national security because the agency was considering an effort this summer to retrieve the remainder of the sunken submarine and publicity would thwart any such effort.

The Times decided at that time to withhold publication until the C.I.A. either made another effort to retrieve the submarine or decided not to go ahead with the project. Some other publications and broadcasters also decided to delay.

The Times also informed the C.I.A. that it would publish a comprehensive article on the operation if it became known that others were about to disclose details publicly.

Tonight the story of the Soviet submarine and the salvage effort was circulating widely in journalistic and Government circles in Washington. Publication by one or more correspondents appeared imminent, despite the efforts of the C.I.A. to convince the news media that its secret should be kept, for the time being.

High Government officials said Mr. Hughes was selected to provide the cover needed to shield the true purpose of the vessel because of his widely publicized penchant for secrecy, his known interest in deep-sea mining and the fact that his wholly owned company—the Summa Corporation—had experience in large-scale construction projects.

In addition, the Hughes Aircraft Company also has long been involved in the construction and development of space satellites for heavily classified intelligence purposes and now employs a number of former high-ranking C.I.A. and military men.

Another factor behind the selection of Mr. Hughes, the officials said, was his patriotism. The officials insisted that Mr. Hughes make very little money in the construction of the Glomar Explorer.

They also said Mr. Hughes was maintaining title on the vessel only under a series of complex trust agreements with the C.I.A. and the Government similar to those utilized for other proprietary "assets" of the C.I.A., such as Air America, its subsidized airline.

Government officials acknowledged that much more than \$250-million has been spent thus far on the Glomar Explorer and Project Jennifer, with the funds authorized at more

than \$350-million.

Senior members of the House and Senate were briefed on the program, the officials said, although it could not be learned which legislators were informed.

#### 1958 Model Craft

Operation Jennifer was initiated shortly after the Soviet submarine, a 1958 model of the "Hotel" class that was believed to have sailed from the Soviet port of Vladivostok, sustained a series of on-board explosions and sank while cruising in the Pacific.

American intelligence officials emphasized that the Soviet craft was found, after she sank, through what was described as "passive" means—that is, not from signal or other communications intercepts—and there was no chance for the United States Navy to rescue any crew members.

Other sources said the Navy's sonar underwater listening devices apparently were able to detect the sounds of underwater explosions at depths far deeper than the Soviet Union could intercept and thus knew the specific location of the submarine on the ocean floor.

During the recovery attempt last August, the official sources said, American technicians were successful in grabbing and lifting the submarine from the ocean floor and raising it about halfway to the surface—roughly 8,000 feet—when there was a failure in the lifting devices and part of the ship fell. One official talked of "overpressure" in connection with the failure of the lifting devices.

The salvage vessel was operated under subcontract for the Hughes corporation by Global Marine, Inc., of Los Angeles, a firm known for its expertise in deep-sea operations.

Government intelligence officials noted that Global Marine has cooperated with the Soviet Union in a series of underwater research and experimental drilling operations and suggested that public knowledge of its involvement in the submarine recovery operation would not only embarrass the firm but said it might limit its future joint research ventures with the Soviet Union.

#### A Bitter Dispute

Complicating the issue is a bitter dispute between officials of the Navy, whose Research and Development Branch was involved in the original planning to salvage the submarine, and the C.I.A., whose science and technology office developed the concept of constructing the Glomar Explorer under cover.

C.I.A. officials insisted that the operation with the Navy was smooth, but a number of

Navy officials have bitterly criticized the salvage operation in interviews.

At one point, Government officials acknowledged, the Navy expressed some reservations about the locality of attempting to interfere with another country's sunken vessel, but it ultimately was decided at high levels in the Nixon Administration that there were no legal bars to the operation.

One retired Navy admiral who was aware of the Jennifer operation while on active duty complained that the "only real intelligence [to be obtained from the Jennifer operation] is the metallurgical stuff" resulting from an analysis of the submarine's hull and various internal sections.

"The codes wouldn't mean that much today," the retired officer said in an interview, "even if you recovered their code machine. They [such machines] have a tremendous number of discs and circuits and you wouldn't know what combination was used."

The admiral added that even if the codes could be broken, they would be made intelligible only for a limited period because of what he depicted as a random restructuring of the various circuits and codes that was completed by the Soviet submarine communicators every 24 hours.

#### Burglary Revelation

The submarine project was first publicly mentioned by The Los Angeles Times on Feb. 8, in a report stemming from a police inquiry into a bizarre burglary last June 5 at the offices of the Summa Corporation, the Hughes holding company that—in the public's eyes—owned the Glomar Explorer.

Documents said to have been taken from a Hughes office safe in the burglary disclosed that the C.I.A. had contracted with the corporation to raise the sunken nuclear-powered submarine, the newspaper said. The report was denied at the time by Paul Reeves, general manager of the ocean mining division of Mr. Hughes's company.

At least four well-informed sources have said in recent interviews that in their opinion the initial justification for withholding publication of the story no longer existed because of the disclosures made in The Los Angeles Times. Until then, a number of past and present high-level intelligence officials said, the Russians did not know that the United States had found and attempted to salvage the submarine.

"What that story's done is blown the operation," one official said. "We can't use it again."

High-ranking American intelligence officials acknowledged in a recent discussion that they assumed "the Russians picked up the [Los Angeles Times] story. The question is what are they [the Russians] going to do about it."

The intelligence officials argued that further public discussion of the Jennifer operations would amount "to rubbing the Russians' noses in it" and could lead to adverse diplomatic

sequences.

They also suggested that, despite the published accounts, the Soviet Union still might not realize that the Glomar Explorer's next voyage this summer, should it be approved, would be aimed at recovering the remaining two-thirds of the sunken submarine. One high official said that "there's not a lot they [the Russians] can do."

"We have the legal right to pick something up off the bottom," he said.

#### Some Success Seen

One high-level member of the Ford Administration took exception to the description of the operation as a failure and said he had seen reports, which he acknowledged could have been based, describing the adventure as 50 per cent successful.

"If the project was sold on the basis of what we're going to get," the official added, however, "O.K., we didn't get it."

Another informed intelligence official said, "In terms of the initial objective of the project"—the rec-

—the recovery of Soviet missiles with hydrogen warheads, the submarine's nuclear power plant and its code books—"it was a failure"

Another source said the preliminary review of the materials salvaged last summer indicated that the Russians had significantly altered the structure and design of the 1958 submarine, initially configured to carry three intercontinental missiles, and noted that such information could prove invaluable in disarmament talks.

Even if only partly successful, one high-ranking American said, "It was a fantastic operation."

The official was referring to the fact that the C.I.A. was able to finance the construction of the Glomar Explorer and to successfully initiate salvage operations without any public inkling of the true intent of the mission. A number of officials who were interviewed praised repeatedly the C.I.A.'s "cover" for the mission.

One former high-level C.I.A. man noted that by financing the Glomar Explorer, publicly depicted as the most advanced deep-sea mining vessel in existence, the C.I.A. may have been responsible for the creation of a new industry—deep-sea mining of mineral deposits.

When completed in mid-1973, the 36,000 ton vessel was 618 feet long and more than 115 feet wide, and its six motors were capable of providing 12,000 horsepower to drive the ship at speeds up to 12 knots. In addition, the Glomar Explorer was equipped with a 209-foot derrick capable of lifting 800 tons and at least three other lifts nearly as powerful.

Throughout its construction, at the Chester, Pa., yards of the Sun Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company, there were newspaper reports about the eventual deep-sea mining mission of the vessel as well as

secrecy—a tradition of the Hughes empire—that marked her construction.

"If all sails smoothly," The Philadelphia Inquirer reported on May 13, 1973, as the Glomar Explorer neared completion, "the mystery ship may be at work next year scooping such metals as titanium, manganese, uranium, copper and nickel up out of the depths to add to the fortune of the world's wealthiest recluse."

The Government sources acknowledged that the C.I.A. turned to deep-sea mining as a possible cover early in 1970 because the Soviet submarine happened to sink in an area of the Pacific noted for its extremely large deposits of valuable manganese nodules. A 1973 study of the National Science Foundation concluded that the deposits off the Hawaiian plateau were the most abundant within the North Pacific and contained the highest values of copper and nickel.

This fact, coupled with the heavy publicity over the Glomar Explorer's alleged deep-sea mining mission, provided the "cover" needed by the C.I.A. to attempt the salvage operation without Soviet knowledge and, thus, without possible Soviet interference, the sources said.

They added that a key concern throughout the history of the secret operation was the possibility of violent interference—and possible military action—by the Russians if they happened to learn the true purpose of the Glomar Explorer's mission. The ship could not operate with any military escort or protection, for obvious reasons, the sources noted.

#### No Suspicions Raised

The refusal of the Hughes corporation to provide any detailed data on the workings of the Glomar Explorer and the company's order to all subcontractors that nothing be made public during construction of the vessel did not raise suspicions because of Mr. Hughes's known eccentricism.

In recent interviews, a number of senior officials of the Summa Corporation still denied knowledge of the Jennifer operation and insisted the secrecy was needed to protect the industrial techniques that they said were inherent in the ship's construction and mode of operation.

In addition to the Glomar Explorer, the salvage operation required a deep-diving barge that was constructed in 1971 and 1972 by the National Steel and Shipbuilding Company, in San Diego and designed by the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation's Ocean Systems Division. The 106-foot-wide barge, which reportedly has 15-foot-thick walls to help provide ballast, was not directly utilized in the submarine salvage operation, Government officials said, although there were numerous newspaper accounts in 1973 and 1974 saying that the barge played a direct role in the deep-sea mining operations.

As explained by intelligence officials, the barge's sole func-

submarine once it was brought up from the bottom. As such, it was built to be sunk, towed and then retrieved. This capability was built into the barge to help hide the salvage submarine from the possibility of inadvertent detection by Soviet satellites.

Precisely how the Glomar Explorer was outfitted to attempt the recovery of the downed submarine could not be learned; nor could any accurate cost estimate be made for the vessel. One official of the Summa Corporation said in an interview that the Glomar Explorer alone cost more than \$100-million. Some newspaper accounts have put the price tag for the ship at \$250-million.

It also could not be learned whether either of those estimates included the expensive dredging and derrick equipment utilized in the salvage operation.

#### New Technology


In recent interviews, high-level American intelligence officials seemed vague about the Glomar Explorer's potential for actually conducting deep-sea mining operations. One official said it would "take some doing" for the Glomar Explorer to be "rejiggered" into a deep-sea mining vessel.

Other officials have boasted in interviews, however, that the C.I.A. technology involved in the construction of the ship had led to breakthroughs in the feasibility of such mining.

Officials also noted that the Government was retaining the patent rights stemming from any technical breakthroughs in deep-sea mining techniques that resulted from the construction of the Glomar Explorer and from its attempted submarine recovery.

It could not be learned how—and from what Treasury accounts—funds for the construction of the vessel and other costs were appropriated by the C.I.A. and distributed to the Summa Corporations. The intelligence agency has long had contractual arrangements with the Hughes Aircraft Company and Lockheed's space and missile division for satellite work funded through the National Reconnaissance Office. This is the highly secret set up during the Kennedy Administration that—operating under cover inside the Air Force—is responsible for all of the research, development, procurement and targeting of America's satellites and other aerial intelligence programs.

The N.R.O. programs are directed by an executive committee, informally known at times as the Ex-Comm, whose official standing members include Mr. Colby, as Director of Central Intelligence, and Dr. Albert C. Hall, now the Assistant Secretary of Defense for intelligence. Other officials also participate in Ex-Comm meetings on a regular but ad hoc basis, including a representative of the National Security Council and James W. Plummer, the current Under Secretary of the Air Force, who also serves under cover as the director of the National Reconnaissance Of-



The New York Times/March 19, 1975

office.

A number of sources said that, in addition to the N.R.O.'s responsibility for aerial intelligence, the intelligence bureaucracy also maintains a secret office in the Navy for underwater intelligence reconnaissance programs.

It was this office, some sources said, that initially was responsible for financing the research into the problem the Navy suddenly found itself facing in 1968: how to recover a submarine in nearly 17,000 feet of water.

#### No Competitive Bidding

Because of the secrecy and the need for cover, none of the various contracts awarded to the Summa Corporation and its subcontractors involved competitive bidding, Government sources indicated. One official said the Government "paid the minimal overhead fee" for construction of the ship, suggesting that work was done on what is known as a "cost plus" contract, with the Summa Corporation getting a fixed percentage of the total construction costs.

The Glomar Explorer is now undergoing repair in anticipation of a second recovery effort this July in the Pacific.

Officials would not say with whom in the Hughes organization the C.I.A. initiated discussions about the secret project, but they specifically said that Mr. Hughes, now living in seclusion in the Bahamas, was not directly gotten in touch with. The officials also said no contact was initiated with A. D. Wheelon, the president of the Hughes Aircraft Company, who once was involved in the C.I.A.'s satellite reconnaissance programs.

As recounted by a number of intelligence sources, the United States initiated the submarine recovery program only upon realizing that the Soviet Union apparently had not been able to fix the location of its sunken submarine.

After the sinking was confirmed and the location determined, Navy and intelligence officials watched in 1971 as the Russians conducted a wide-

sea search for the submarine in the wrong area of the Pacific.

At some point, apparently still in 1968, the Russians withdrew their trawlers and stopped the patrols, which indicated that they had no idea where the submarine had gone down.

"If the Russians knew where the sub had gone down," one former intelligence official said, "they would have stayed there all the time [on patrol]."

#### Ship Photographed

Although the C.I.A. is known to have taken extensive undersea photographs of the sunken ship, there is apparently some dispute over its classification. It has been established, however, that the vessel, which carries three missile launchers, is in the ballistic missile class.

According to the 1973-74 edition of "Jane's Fighting Ships," a standard naval reference work, it could contain missiles with ranges of between 350 and 650 miles. Some sources said, however, that modifications to the vessel apparently had blurred the Navy's ability to determine its specific classification.

The Government sources said that Navy engineers initially sought means of merely penetrating into the ship—and not salvaging it—in an effort to obtain access to its code room and equipment, but were unable to develop a feasible concept because it was in such deep water.

The Navy eventually brought the problem to the C.I.A.'s directorate of science and technology, headed by Carl Duckett. Pentagon had become concerned because senior officials in the vined, one source said, that the military "had gotten no place" in solving the technical problems that prevented recovery of the submarine's codes and equipment.

The concept of building a deep-sea salvage vessel under cover of the Hughes organization reportedly caused sharp arguments inside the Nixon Administration throughout 1970 and 1971. At one point in 1971, the Navy was in deep trouble because there

were all kinds of technical problems," one source said. In later months, there were serious cost overruns that led to even more controversy.

There were other kinds of problems, another source recalled, many of them revolving around official concern about the potential impact that public revelation of the secret project could have on the highly Soviet-United States detente, which was beginning to flourish in the early days of the Nixon Administration.

#### Legal Discussions

And, although Government attorneys knew of no international law barring such salvage attempts, there was extended debate about whether the Russians legally would be justified in attempting to sink the Explorer if they happened to stumble onto or otherwise uncover the operation.

There also was some discussion, one source recalled, of what to do with the bodies of Soviet seamen if any were found aboard the sunken submarine.

Because of that, high officials noted, the C.I.A. made elaborate plans for protecting the rights, under the Geneva Convention, of any dead officers and men found aboard the ship. The Glomar Explorer was equipped with refrigeration capacity for up to 100 bodies, and copies of the relevant Soviet and American burial manuals were taken along. The burial ceremony, when it did take place, sources said, was conducted in both Russian and English and recorded in color by C.I.A. cameramen.

One C.I.A. official said that four of the agency's deep-sea specialists who had returned to Washington after the failure to recover the whole submarine insisted on flying back to the Glomar Explorer for the burial ceremonies. Despite the failure, the four men are designated to receive special intelligence awards from the Ford Administration, the official said.

Prior to the actual recovery operation, other objections were posed on more practical grounds. "Was it worth the hundreds

of millions of dollars involved to learn what kind of equipment was being utilized by the Soviets? Was there any information available that would have justified the operation?"

All these points were considered, one source said, and it still was determined that Operation Jennifer was worthwhile, even if its chances for complete success were slim.

One former White House aide revealed the surprise inside the Johnson Administration after the Israelis captured some Soviet weapons after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war.

"We'd spent a lot of time making estimates [on the capabilities of the Soviet weaponry] that turned out not to be very accurate," the former aide noted.

The capture indicated that too much reliance was being placed on the practice of compiling such estimates by the intelligence community, he said. Because of this, the official added, he believed that the sub-salvaging operation "would have been a real coup, a gold mine."

"It was an operation I personally would have endorsed if the cost was right," he added.

#### 'Navy Was Hot on It'

A former White House aide recalled that in the early nineteen-seventies Jennifer also was considered vital for the then pending United States negotiations with the Soviet Union on strategic arms limitations talks (SALT).

"We thought that if we could get hold of it [the submarine] and dissect it," the former aide said, "we'd have something to use as leverage in the negotiations. The Navy was really hot on it."

Mr. Kissinger and his aides, however, were reliably reported to have been less enthusiastic about the project, although as President Nixon's national security adviser Mr. Kissinger theoretically had the authority to cut it off immediately if he chose to do so.

A former Kissinger aide recalled that "when we first heard of it, we said, 'So what?' " the aide added, "I don't think we cared that much,

about it." By late 1971 the internal disputes inside the Nixon Administration had been quieted and contracts were authorized for the construction of the Glomar Explorer and the barge.

There is some evidence that the various ship builders and subcontractors were not told the ultimate mission of the vessels, and believed that they were solely involved in a deep-sea mining project for the secretive Howard Hughes.

Engineers who served aboard the Glomar Explorer on its first test run in July, 1973, later reported that major renovation projects were begun by Summa Corporation workmen on the hydraulic lifts and the derrick shortly after the ship left port.

Ed Bodson, a Los Angeles organizer for the Marino Engineers Benevolent Association, which sought to organize the engineers aboard the Glomar Explorer, said in a recent telephone interview that the engineers "didn't know what they [summer corp workmen] were doing, but we had the opinion that whatever it was, they didn't want the people at Sun [shipbuilding yards in Chester, Pa.] to know how they were wiring the ship."

#### N.L.R.B. Case Over Ship

The union eventually accused Global Marine of violating the National Labor Relations Act by discharging at least 10 members of the engineering crew allegedly because they signed cards authorizing the union to represent them. They men were dismissed as soon as the Glomar Explorer completed its initial test run at Long Beach, Calif., on Oct. 1, 1973. The issue is still pending before the N.L.R.B., although a tenta-

tive finding against Global Marine was made last June.

One clear sign that high officials of Global Marine did know of the Glomar Explorer's true mission came when the company refused to put any of its senior officers on the witness stand during the N.L.R.B. hearings, which were held in Los Angeles in early 1974. The company refused to permit such testimony apparently in fear that attorneys for the union would ask questions about the ship's mission.

In 1973 there also were numerous newspaper accounts of the Glomar Explorer that emphasized both its mystery and its potential for revolutionizing deep-sea mining. One such account, published by The Observer in London in October, 1973, told how the Glomar Explorer was beginning to mine minerals on the ocean floor near the coast of Nicaragua.

The article linked that venture to the fact that Mr. Hughes and his entourage had taken up residence for some months in 1972 in a hotel at Managua, Nicaragua.

A dispatch in the Washington Post in August, 1973, said that Mr. Hughes had invested \$250-million in the project, which was expected to such up to 5,000 tons of minerals daily from the ocean floor. The article which quoted high officials of the Summa Corporation noted that some of Mr. Hughes's reluctance to invest heavily in deep-sea mining venture's ventures, unless the Government provided assurances of financial protection in case the United States agreed to an international treaty—now being debated—that would limit or bar free exploitation of the ocean

bottom. A United Nations conference on the law of the sea resumed deliberations on that issue and others March 17 at Geneva.

In July, 1974, Hughes Corporation officials were quoted in The Philadelphia Inquirer as saying that the Glomar Explorer was "systems testing" in the Pacific Ocean. The tests were scheduled to be completed by the end of the year, officials said.

In fact, the salvage vessel had begun its submarine salvage efforts in the Pacific Ocean in June, the Government sources said. The precise date of the operation's failure could not be learned, but on Aug. 17, 1974, the Honolulu Advertiser reported the Glomar Explorer's surprise visit to Honolulu.

The Hawaiian newspaper accounts emphasized the secrecy that surrounded the vessel, describing it as a "mystery ship." The Glomar Explorer remained in port near Honolulu for about two weeks, disappeared for a week, reappeared for four days and then left in early September, according to the newspaper.

Ironically, its visit prompted an official investigation by state officials into the ownership of mineral rights in offshore Hawaiian waters.

According to one member of the crew, the Glomar Explorer did accomplish some mining of minerals in the waters off Hawaii during its Pacific cruise. The crew member, who was reluctant to permit his name to be used, also insisted during a brief telephone interview that he and his colleagues knew nothing of an attempted submarine salvage effort.

Since its failure last summer,

the Glomar Explorer has been anchored near Long Beach. Her delay in resuming mining operations has added to the vessel's public mystery, since many shipping experts have found it extremely unusual that such a costly ship would not be immediately put to work.

#### Questions Raised

A number of the Government sources said they believed that the role of the Hughes Corporation in the Jennifer operation as well as the company's unusual involvement in many of the Government's most sensitive intelligence missions raised fundamental questions.

Throughout the Watergate inquiry, these sources noted, the so-called Hughes connection—revolving around the fact that E. Howard Hunt, convicted in the Watergate burglary, was working for a public relations firm doing work for Mr. Hughes at the time of the Watergate break-in in 1972—was never publicly explored.

Similarly, questions were raised about the burglary last June at the Hughes headquarters in Los Angeles. There were reliable reports that the thieves sought to blackmail the Hughes organization and, apparently, the C.I.A. and other Government agencies, by offering to return the stolen documents detailing the submarine and other secret operations in return for \$1-million.

Intelligence officials, in interviews here, confirmed that pay-off discussions were seriously initiated.

A county grand jury began hearings evidence into the burglary and alleged blackmail attempt on Feb. 13, in a proceeding marked by extremely tight security.

NEW YORK TIMES  
20 March 1975

## Project Jennifer

The Central Intelligence Agency's assignment is to further the security of the United States by learning as much as it can about the capabilities and intentions of potential foreign foes, the most powerful of which is the Soviet Union. It has been common knowledge for many years now—at least since an American U-2 plane was shot down over Siberia fifteen years ago—that both sides use the latest technological achievements to spy on each other.

Soviet and American intelligence satellites course through the skies daily taking incredibly sharp pictures of earth 100 miles or more below. The late Premier Khrushchev once even publicly offered to exchange Soviet spy satellite pictures for corresponding American photographs taken from space. The most effective modern intelligence agents are much more likely to be electronic engineers than Mata Haris.

It is against this background that the tale of the Glomar Explorer—the C.I.A. ship that masqueraded as the property of Howard Hughes—must be judged. The basic idea behind Project Jennifer—the code name used—was certainly imaginative: to locate and raise from the ocean bottom three miles deep a Soviet submarine

that had sunk in 1968. After much behind-the-scenes debate, the decision to go ahead was taken; the Glomar Explorer was built and a specialized new technology was created; and then last year the attempt was made.

This really brilliant effort unfortunately fell short of full success, though it is still a major technological feat that a substantial portion of the sunken Soviet submarine was brought to the surface. If the full submarine could have been recovered (and it still may be), it would have been a master intelligence accomplishment.

This complex and fascinating technological adventure demonstrates that, once again, American technology has brought a hitherto inaccessible environment into the ambit of man's future activity. It also underlines the need for a body of appropriate international law, so that economic activity—such as the deep sea mining the Glomar Explorer was allegedly engaged in—can be carried out in this new environment and future clashes of rival national interests and power can be avoided.

The story is, furthermore, a useful reminder of how essential good intelligence is for the national security in a world of nuclear weapons, nuclear submarines and hydrogen bomb-tipped intercontinental missiles. The C.I.A. is only to be commended for this extraordinary effort to carry out its essential mission.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR  
20 March 1975

# Soviet sub salvage disclosure pits CIA against news diggers

Security agency's indignation questioned; nuclear sub importance put in spotlight

By Dana Adams Schmidt  
and Guy Halverson  
Staff correspondents of  
The Christian Science Monitor

## Washington

Chief among the questions raised here by public disclosure of the Central Intelligence Agency's work with a Howard Hughes Corporation to salvage part of a Russian submarine is this:

Do newspapers have the right to overrule CIA requests that information be kept secret?

After accounts of the CIA involvement were spread across front pages of the New York Times, the Washington Post, and the Los Angeles Times, despite repeated CIA requests that no publication be made, one CIA man commented:

"Of course we are outraged. How outraged can you get? Does this mean that in the final analysis the newspapers will publish anything they can get their hands on, no matter how secret or important we say it is?"

At the same time, the entire episode throws a new spotlight on what analysts see as the vital long-range importance of the nuclear submarine to both American and Russian military strategy.

The salvage was performed by the Glomar Explorer, ostensibly a deep-sea mining ship, constructed by the Summa Corporation, controlled by industrialist Hughes. After the Navy, with super-sensitive sonar devices, had located the Russian sub, sunk in 1968, the Americans raised the ship from 17,000 feet of water in July, 1974. At 8,000 feet however, it broke and the Navy and CIA got only one-third of the sub, but without missiles or code machines.

According to the New York Times, a Times reporter first learned of the operation in late 1973, but ceased research after a request by CIA director William Colby in early 1974. Some information was then published by the Los Angeles Times last month; the New York Times resumed its research.

The CIA said, according to the New York Times Wednesday, that publication would endanger national security, since the agency was considering an effort this summer to raise the rest of the submarine. The New York Times held up publication until the CIA made a final decision on the salvage. So did other news media.

CIA it would publish if it felt others were about to publish.

According to the Los Angeles Times, it published Wednesday because the New York Times was publishing. Columnist Jack Anderson gave details on a Tuesday evening radio broadcast. The story was being widely circulated in Washington Tuesday night, even as the CIA was still asking that it be withheld.

After publication of the first Pentagon papers stories in June, 1971, the government tried to prevent further publication also on the grounds of national security. The Supreme Court ruled against the government and permitted publication to continue.

While the salvage operation might be called in some ways a failure, intelligence sources point out that important information might nonetheless be gathered by studying the metallurgy, method of welding, and other features of construction.

The facts that this salvage ship could be built in total secrecy, that U.S. technicians were able to find the sunken submarine, and that at least part of it could be raised was, however, in itself such a remarkable achievement that some observers wondered how indignant the CIA really is about disclosure.

At a time when the agency is under

WASHINGTON POST  
21 March 1975

## Nixon Had Refused To Christen Vessel

SAN DIEGO, March 20 (AP)

—Former President Nixon inspected a giant barge without knowing the vessel was destined to salvage part of a sunken Soviet submarine, The San Diego Union reported today.

Nixon inspected the 324-foot submersible barge in 1972 while on a tour of the National Steel & Shipbuilding Co. yards, where it was built, the Union said.

But he refused an invitation to christen the auditorium-sized vessel because no one at NASSCO would tell him what it was or what it was intended for, said NASSCO president John Murphy.

severe criticism for quite different kinds of operations, this feat might stir admiration among most Americans and serve as a reminder of the agency's wide-ranging services.

It is being said by supporters of the CIA that construction of the Explorer, which cost \$250 million, might even open up new economic horizons in underwater mining. Some deep-sea mining sources, however, doubt this claim, saying that other systems have been shown capable of dredging minerals at great depths.

## International law

The Russians are believed not to have known the location of their submarine from which 70 bodies were removed by members of the Glomar Explorer operation.

While the Russians would presumably be annoyed at the American feat in raising part of a Russian vessel, international law experts say that once a ship is lost at sea it is fair game for whoever can find it. In other words, there would not be a legal basis for a Russian protest.

For this reason the affair is not expected to damage U.S.-Soviet relations or to affect detente.

The U.S. relies heavily on a tripartite nuclear defense strategy of nuclear-equipped submarines, land-based intercontinental missiles, and nuclear carrying B-52 and F-111 aircraft. In his recent annual report, Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger called the Polaris U.S. nuclear Poseidon submarine fleet the "least vulnerable element of our strategic triad."

Though the Soviets are ahead of the U.S. in overall numbers of submarines (315 for the Soviets vs. 115 for the U.S.), the two superpowers are roughly equal in the numbers of nuclear-powered subs (115 for the Soviets, compared with 101 for the U.S.).

NEW YORK TIMES  
19 March 1975

## Wilson Vows Inquiry on C.I.A. If It Is Linked to Britain

LONDON, March 18 (Reuters)—Prime Minister Wilson said today he would set up an inquiry into activity by the Central Intelligence Agency in Britain if there was evidence that its agents were operating in the country.

He was being questioned in Parliament about C.I.A. men said to be operating from the American Embassy in London with diplomatic immunity.

One member of Parliament from the ruling Labor party had drawn a comparison with 1971 when Britain demanded the recall of 105 Soviet diplomats said to be involved in espionage, and asked "if be here would you demand their recall?"

Mr. Wilson said that if any evidence on this came from the United States investigation into the agency, or in other words, if the U.S. did not hesitate to set up an independent British inquiry.



NEW YORK TIMES  
21 March 1975

# The Submarine Story

## IN THE NATION

By Tom Wicker

PITTSBURGH — More remarkable than the raising of the sunken Russian submarine is the reaction of the American press to the efforts of the Central Intelligence Agency to suppress the story. Coming on the heels of what is widely supposed to be the press's "triumph" in the Watergate matter, the submarine case suggests how inadequate it is to curse or bless the newspapers and television in easy generalities.

The extraordinary fact is that, despite all the revelations of recent years as to how Government officials routinely erect the screen of "national security" to shield themselves from political embarrassment, the C.I.A. was able to use that pretext to prevent publication of the submarine story in virtually a complete roster of what is usually referred to as the "Eastern press establishment."

So is the press, as frequently charged, so swollen with self-importance by the Watergate case that it is now a more aggressive power center than the Government? On the other hand, as also alleged, is the press really more aware than ever before of its function of disclosure, its role as a check and balance on Government? Is The Washington Post after all a bolder organ of "investigative journalism" than The New York Times? And when even the inimitable Jack Anderson—who forced disclosure of the submarine story—concedes that he has "withheld other stories at the behest of the C.I.A.," can it be said that to do so is in every case a dereliction of journalistic duty? Or that to "publish and be damned" should be the unvarying rule?

Several points seem worth making. All the news organizations involved appear to have made their own decisions to withhold what they knew of the story. That is, none seems auto-

matically to have acceded to the wishes of the C.I.A., and in some cases, William E. Colby, the agency's director, apparently had to work hard to gain his objective. In the end, like the boy at the dike, he did not have enough fingers to plug all the leaks, and the story could not be contained.

Yet, all these major news organizations for a time took the same attitude. They accepted the contention that national security was involved in the raising of an obsolete Soviet submarine, and they agreed to withhold publication of the story until the operation either was completed or abandoned. The unanimity of the response seems to lend support to those who suggest that the press "establishment," if it is not really a conspiracy, still is so consistently of one general attitude that it is a monolith. But the nature of the response does not support those who claim that this monolithic press is anti-Government, anti-security, anti-conservative or "pro-leftist."

Reports suggest, moreover, that most of the news organizations were determined to publish the story if anyone else did. This is a variation of the old newspaper rule-of-thumb that if something is known "off the record" it can't be published; but if someone else publishes the same information, it is no longer "off the record." Can this be applied to "national security"? If a newspaper is withholding information in genuine fear of damaging the national security, is it then justified in publishing the information just because someone else does so?

Does publication damage the national security less, in such an event? And in fact, major elements of the submarine story had been published, in The Los Angeles Times of Feb. 8.

Mr. Anderson suggested that one reason the story had been withheld was that the press itself was "shaken" by the fact that it had been instrumental in forcing the resignation of Richard Nixon, and that editors were trying hard, as a result, "to prove how patriotic and responsible we are, that we're not against the establishment, the Government, that we're not all gadflies."

That is plausible, even likely. So is the concern of an editor who is weighing journalistic duty and the public's right to know against a high claim of national security interest. Such decisions are not easily made and no responsible person should wish to abandon them to abstract rules.

Still—here was more money (\$350 million) being spent on a project of dubious value than President Ford now says would "save" Cambodia. Here was an exploit that could have been—and might yet prove—a provocation to the Soviets, without necessarily yielding vital intelligence information. Here was a linkage between the shadowy C.I.A. and the shadowy Howard Hughes, with the C.I.A. going to extraordinary lengths to suppress the story. Here, too, at a time of international dispute on the law of the sea, was a clandestine enterprise that potentially could give the United States an enormous, if not exactly proper, advantage in undersea mining techniques. As is almost always the case with "national security" stories, in retrospect it is hard to see how a news organization—let alone so many—could have thought such a story ought to be withheld.

NEW YORK TIMES  
16 March 1975

## C.I.A.'s Clandestine Work Assailed at Meeting Here

By DIANE HENRY

Covert political activities of the Central Intelligence Agency in foreign countries have been largely unsuccessful and should be abolished, according to many of the participants at a conference here yesterday on the role of clandestine operations in a democratic foreign policy.

Among the 28 participants, including political scientists, historians, professors and people with experience in intelligence, a few advocated that laws be written to prohibit the CIA from any covert activities to intelligence gathering.

Arthur J. Goldberg, the former Supreme Court Justice and

former United States Representative at the United Nations, found many supporters in the group when he said that only in cases where there was a "real and genuine threat to the security of the United States," should the CIA be permitted to conduct covert operations.

Mr. Goldberg suggested that high administration officials should be made to "set forth sworn testimony" on the necessity of any covert operation and he recommended that the President should apply his signature to any orders for covert operations.

Senator James Abourezk, Democrat of South Dakota, the

author of an amendment to abolish covert C.I.A. activity that was defeated last year, maintained that such operations "violate our promises of nonintervention into the internal affairs of other countries." In addition, he said, they "violate the constitution of this country."

Senator Abourezk said that "undeclared wars," and thus illegal and unconstitutional.

The conference, which took place at the City University Graduate School, is a yearly event held by Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., the historian,

who holds the Albert Schweitzer chair at the university.

Zygmunt Nagorski Jr., a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, defended the C.I.A. saying, "If you would eliminate the covert activity of the C.I.A. you would be taking away one of its arms."

"The fact is covert activities must be maintained in order for the C.I.A. to work," said Mr. Nagorski, who like several other participants, said it was difficult to differentiate between intelligence gathering and covert operations, which are often meshed in C.I.A. activities.

NEW YORK TIMES  
18 March 1975

# The C.I.A. And Free Speech

By Tom Wicker

Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks have asked the Supreme Court to overturn an Appeals Court ruling that permitted stringent Government censorship of their book, "The C.I.A. and the Cult of Intelligence." If the Court refuses to intervene, or sustains the Appeals Court, one of the most extraordinary prior restraints in history will have been allowed to stand, and the ability of the Government to classify and withhold information from the public will have been greatly enhanced.

The case arose when Mr. Marchetti left the employ of the Central Intelligence Agency in 1969—after 14 years—and began to write a book about it. C.I.A. officials learned of his plans and went into court, citing an employment contract he had signed pledging himself to secrecy about what he learned while working for the C.I.A. A temporary injunction against Mr. Marchetti was confirmed by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals on grounds that he planned an unauthorized disclosure of classified information. The Government's "need for secrecy in this area," the Appeals Court said, justified this prior restraint on publication.

The result was that Mr. Marchetti and his co-author, Mr. Marks, had to submit their manuscripts for clearance to the C.I.A., which deleted 339 portions of it. Subsequent negotiations reduced this number to 168 deletions, but the authors nevertheless filed suit to have the injunction—hence the deletions—set aside.

In hearings before Federal District Judge Albert V. Bryan Jr. in Alexandria, Va., the C.I.A. failed to sustain its deletions, despite testimony by four deputy directors, except in 26 instances and parts of two others. Meanwhile, however, the book had appeared with all 168 deletions represented by blank spaces. Then, on Feb. 7, the Fourth Circuit overruled Judge Bryan and upheld the Government's right to make the 168 deletions. That

## IN THE NATION

decision is the one now being appealed to the Supreme Court.

If upheld, it would vastly expand the Government's power to classify information. Appeals Court Judge Clement F. Haynsworth Jr., for example, based the majority's decision on what he called "a presumption of regularity in the performance by a public official of his public duty." Thus, he was able to rule that material subject to classification for all intents and purposes, had in fact been clas-

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR  
20 March 1975

# CIA and the sub

Was it stupid and wasteful? Or clever and justifiable?

The CIA's salvage of a part of a sunken Soviet submarine provides the stuff of movie drama. It has pushed Cambodia and the economy out of the banner headlines and will undoubtedly be talked about as a mystery-story relief from the gloomy news of the day.

Only intelligence experts can fully answer the above questions. But, on the face of it, the CIA was carrying out an operation well within its mandate.

This is a far cry from overthrowing legitimate governments or assassinating people. It was what many voices now demand the CIA confine itself to—gathering intelligence. Although Project Jennifer was unsuccessful, its avowed purpose was to obtain information about the Soviet Union's missiles and code systems. If the Russians had a chance to lay hands on an American nuclear ship, can it be doubted they would jump at it?

Detente, Americans should be reminded, does not end an adversary relationship with Moscow. Both nations engage in vigorous clandestine intelligence and counterintelligence activities. It would be negligent in the extreme if the U.S. failed to use every sensible means possible to determine Soviet strengths and intentions.

Moreover, the CIA's foresight in developing such a technologically advanced vessel for intelligence purposes will be admired by many. For a long time the Glomar

Explorer, as a deep-sea mining vessel, roamed the seas looking for mineral nodules and no one, including the Russians, suspected its other mission.

Whether or not the Jennifer Project itself was worth the high cost is controversial and is bound to be studied by the congressional panels now scrutinizing the CIA. It is possible the judgment was a mistaken one. But surely the ship is not a total loss. Although the cover has been blown and it can no longer be used for intelligence gathering, it is said to have enormous spin-off value for the development of resources.

Of greater concern to many is the role of industrialist Howard Hughes, whose name has cropped up repeatedly in connection with Watergate-related activities. Have his various CIA ties protected him from government investigation of his mysterious business activities? Has the CIA been financing a bonanza for him?

A broader concern is that the current furor over the CIA will totally discredit the agency. It is now fashionable to publicize the CIA's uglier sides and questionable judgments—usually made with presidential approval—but it should not be forgotten that the CIA has successes to its credit also. The nation needs a strong intelligence community—and it would be a disservice to the U.S. not to keep a balanced perspective on the CIA as current investigations of the organization go forward.

sified, whether or not it had been specifically stamped with a classification. This effectively overrode Judge Bryan's finding that in numerous instances C.I.A. officials had officially classified information only when they found it in the Marchetti-Marks manuscript, not before; and it meant that certain general assertions—something like "the C.I.A. was active in Greece"—would be considered classified information, even though not specifically contained in any classified documents.

In several other instances, moreover, Judge Bryan had accepted Mr. Marchetti's testimony that he had obtained certain information only after he left the C.I.A.'s employ. But the Appeals Court ruled that if the C.I.A. had possessed and classified this information while Mr. Marchetti worked for the agency, whether or not he was then in possession of it, he still was barred from disclosing it when he learned of it later on.

The Appeals Court ruling apparently did not reach the question whether the press may publish or broadcast

classified information. Rather, it upheld an injunction against unauthorized disclosure of such information, maintaining that the Government's need for secrecy and the contract Mr. Marchetti had signed overrode his First Amendment rights. In effect, the court held that there was a lifetime restraint on his ability to disclose material that fell under the court's exceptionally broad definition of classified information. If that applies across the board to all the numerous Federal agencies that require such contracts of their employees—or those that may in the future—it will prove to be a major new restraint on the flow of Government information to the public.

Yet it remains a singular fact that the practice of classifying information rests on no statutory authorization whatever—only upon a series of executive orders. Moreover, when the C.I.A. was obliged to prove its case for secrecy before Judge Bryan, its best witnesses were in most instances the CIA itself. It was as when the Government was obliged to prove to



NEW YORK TIMES  
16 March 1975

## Clean Sweep at C. I. A.?

By James Reston

WASHINGTON—The main hope for the survival of an effective Central Intelligence Agency in the United States now lies in a clean sweep of its present leadership and the creation of a powerful new joint committee of the Congress to oversee its future activities.

The first rule of the spy business is that spies are expendable. If they embarrass the government, they are disowned. It is a hard, sometimes unfair, but often necessary rule, and there is no reason why it should be applied only to the spies and not to the men who give them their orders.

The C.I.A. has not failed, but it has been caught fiddling with the liberties of private citizens and has been an embarrassment to the Government. The best way to aggravate the embarrassment now and weaken the C.I.A. even more, is to prolong the current

and many other things which were essential to the struggle, but could not be disclosed to the general public without disclosing them to our adversaries and threatening the sources and even the lives of our agents.

All this is coming out now: the efforts out of Washington to overturn the governments of Diem in Saigon, Allende in Santiago, Castro in Cuba, and even the involvement of the C.I.A. in Watergate and other scandals, including the opening of the mail of members of Congress.

The President says this sort of thing has now been stopped, but the underground war goes on, not only in Portugal, but all over the world. Moscow has been comparatively quiet about the economic disarray in Western Europe, but it has been particularly active within the Communist apparatus in Spain, Italy, Greece, Yugoslavia and the Middle East.

This is not the sort of struggle that can be countered or publicized, but it also cannot be left to the C.I.A. alone or controlled by the weak Congressional committees that have failed to supervise it effectively in the past.

It was the fear of exposing the covert operations of the C.I.A. that led President Ford to appoint a "safe" committee under Vice President Rockefeller to investigate the domestic activities of the agency, but this had so little credibility in the country and the Congress that both the House and the Senate are now launching investigations of the whole U.S. intelligence community on their own.

In the confusion, there have even been cries to abolish the C.I.A., which make racy reading but no sense. The agency needs precise new rules limiting its domestic activities. It needs close supervision by responsible and discreet legislators who know in advance of any covert operation by any intelligence agents of the Government, and it needs new leadership.

On the question of the future direction of the agency, the recent habit of appointing directors from the ranks of the C.I.A. itself probably ought to be reconsidered. Men like Richard Helms, and William Colby, who have spent most of their lives in the service and atmosphere of the C.I.A., may know more about what the C.I.A. should be doing than outsiders, but they are not likely to be the best men at knowing what it should not be doing.

The C.I.A. has served the nation well throughout the cold war years, and this fact has undoubtedly been obscured because its successes can never be publicized while many of its failures are. Thus it will always be the object of suspicion, and should be, but with a new charter, a new director, and careful Congressional supervision, it can undoubtedly regain the confidence of the country and be allowed to get on with its essential work.

Federal District Judge Murray Gurfein, in 1971, that publication of the Pentagon Papers would damage the national security, impressive official witnesses were unable to do that either.

In both cases, an appeals court, hearing no witnesses at all, nevertheless overruled the lower court and opted for Government secrecy and prior restraint. Once again, therefore, the Supreme Court will have to decide whether the First Amendment may be so cavalierly overridden.

NEW YORK TIMES  
20 March 1975

### Submarine Project Affects Big Powers At Sea-Law Meeting

Special to The New York Times

GENEVA, March 19—The secret American attempt to raise a sunken Soviet nuclear submarine will undercut the major powers' demand at the United Nations Law of the Sea Conference for the unfettered right to conduct scientific research in the oceans, a leading spokesman for the developing countries said today.

"The developing countries have been arguing on the basis that espionage is the real reason why the major powers seek complete freedom for scientific research," Christopher W. Pinto of Sri Lanka said. "Now that this is confirmed, they can be more forceful."

Mr. Pinto has been playing a major role at the 137-nation conference, which resumed Monday. He said that the success of the conference, which is attempting to draft a world charter to govern use of the seas and the exploitation of their resources would depend on achieving "a collection of trade-off." The major powers reject such demands of the developing countries as prior notification research activities and participation of their nationals, he added.

The poorer countries suspect, Mr. Pinto explained, that the great powers argue that there must be no hindering of scientific progress "simply to cover espionage activities to be carried out at will."

The disclosure of the Central Intelligence Agency's attempt to sail salvage the Soviet submarine in the mid-Pacific is "bound to complicate the negotiations," he said, "but I do not think it is disastrous."

### WASHINGTON

investigations, retain the present leaders, and publicize all the crimes of the past.

Foreign espionage is an essential but illegal activity, not to be confused with the political espionage and sabotage of the Watergate scandals. It is a form of undercover war, and the Communists are waging it with a vengeance now in Portugal, while the C.I.A. is virtually helpless in its present condition to prevent the subversion of that strategically important country.

President Ford has handled the problem as if it were a common case of government corruption. He has all the evidence he needs to change the leadership of the C.I.A. which has been less than candid, and overhaul the whole sprawling intelligence apparatus of the Government, and he is now in favor of a strong joint committee of Congress to supervise all intelligence activities, but he has not yet acted, and for some mysterious reason William E. Colby, the head of the C.I.A., has not had the grace to resign.

Mr. Ford, when he was in Congress, was a member of the committee that was supposed to oversee the C.I.A., and was startled to discover, when he became President, that the agency had participated in espionage at home and in plots to assassinate political leaders abroad. Now he says he never suspected this sort of thing was going on and would not have approved if he had.

It is easy to say that now. But during the savage conflicts of the early cold war period, it was not so easy. The internal struggles for political control in key strategic countries such as West Germany, Italy, the Middle East, and even in Cuba often depended on providing money for guns, newspaper presses, clandestine radio stations, propaganda periodicals,

WASHINGTON STAR  
20 March 1975

**Q and A**

# Furor Hits CIA Sources, Colby Says

William Colby, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, was interviewed by Washington Star Staff Writer Jeremiah O'Leary.

**Question:** Clark Clifford, who as counsel to President Truman participated in writing the law which established the CIA, said recently that the ground rules need to be updated, to be renovated. Do you concur with that view?

**Colby:** Well, I've made certain recommendations for changing our act already. A year and a half ago when I was confirmed, I suggested that we add the word "foreign" to the word "intelligence" wherever it appears in our act, so it's clear it's foreign intelligence that's the job of this agency and not domestic. I recommended other things to clarify exactly what the CIA ought to be able to do in the United States and what it should not be able to do in the United States.

**Q:** That requires an act of Congress?

**A:** Yes. It hasn't been passed, but there was legislation last year — I supported it — and I'm sure these (congressional investigating) committees will get into a rather fundamental look at some of these questions.

**Q:** Would you ever go out of the business of operating in terms of your own security within the United States, in places like New York where the U.N. is located, or in places like Miami, where there are many Cubans?

**A:** Well, I think, in the first place, that we ought to be able to collect foreign intelligence in America. I think we ought to collect it voluntarily from Americans, and we ought to be able to collect it from foreigners.

**Q:** Interviewing returned travelers?

**A:** That sort of thing, yes. We do a great deal of that, and there are an awful lot of Americans who very kindly help us and support us on this. We do make commitments that we won't expose them as our sources. That's going to be one of the things I'm insisting on — that we not expose them in the course of these investigations. And I think I've received a very sympathetic response from Sen. Church on this. If there's a reasonable basis for our withholding an identity or something, he certainly has given every indication that he will give full consideration to that.

**Q:** Given the scrutiny by the Rockefeller commission, by several

committees of Congress, by the press — can the CIA operate effectively as a clandestine service under these conditions?

**A:** Well, it's having a hard time. We have a number of individual agents abroad who have told us that they really don't want to work for us anymore.

**Q:** Agents?

**A:** Foreigners, working foreigners. We have had a number of Americans who have indicated that they don't want to work with us anymore — not employes, but Americans who have

helped us in various ways. We have a number of foreign intelligence services that have indicated great concern about collaboration with us — whether this will be exposed, and they will be subjected to intense criticism in their country. I think this is a very serious problem for our country. We are in the process of losing some of the information that otherwise we would be getting.

**Q:** You mean that some of these other services and other individuals are no longer confident?

**A:** They're beginning to pull back, or some of them have just stopped working with us. And, of course, more serious and yet not measurable is the number who would have agreed to work with us, but now won't agree to work with us. I have seen a couple of cases where individuals had indicated they thought they would work with us, and then came around here very recently and said, "I know I did agree, but I don't think I will."

**Q:** Have your actual operations overseas been affected by the current furor?

**A:** Oh, yes, I think the current furor has laid a particular problem on us in that people exaggerate CIA. I see that in Mexico there was an accusation this week that we organized the excitement at the university; which, of course, we had nothing to do with. We also have the problem that CIA is used as a shibboleth to shout about in various countries around the world. And I think we have a more serious problem: We have to consider carefully whether we want to help somebody and take a risk of destroying him in the process of helping him. Because if it leaks that we helped him at this stage, we may destroy his political position entirely.

**Q:** What has been the ef-

Philip Agee which give names and a great number of identities?

**A:** Well, I think that's absolutely unconscionable and reprehensible for an officer who served with us; accepted our discipline, agreed with our activities, signed a very warm and friendly letter on his resignation indicating that he valued highly his association with us, and that he would forever maintain the relationship as one of pride and trust, that if he could ever do anything for us he would be happy to. I've got an idea or so as to what he might do. He has named every name he could think of that was anyhow associated with us. There is at least one family who has been put under considerable pressure as a result of this. A girl hounded out of school because her father's name appears in it. We have had to make rather massive changes in our situation in that area to prevent people being subjected to hardships because of this revelation. And the danger is that this kind of thing can go into the whole action of various terrorist movements. Mr. Mitrione, as you know, was murdered in Latin America. There is a school of thought that says that was a patriotic act because he was alleged to be a CIA officer. He was not a CIA officer. And I contend that that kind of a murder is totally unjustifiable. But Mr. Agee has put a number of people under direct threat of exactly that thing happening to them.

**Q:** A couple of years ago, there was a similar furor and public investigation involving the agency and IIT in Chile. What is the truth about the agency's role in Chile?

**A:** Well, the fact is, as I've said many times — I don't want to talk about the details of our activity there — CIA had nothing to do with the coup that overthrew Mr. Allende. It had nothing to do with the military at that time. We had a program of trying to support and assist some of the democratic forces looking to the elections of 1976, which we hoped they would win against Mr. Allende. The fact was, however, his policies were such that he generated so much confusion in the country — not created by CIA — that the military did move against him. If you ask whether that was a CIA success or failure, I would say it was a failure, because the pro-

gram we had in mind did not take place, which was that the democratic forces would succeed eventually through elections in Chile.

Q: Was the agency aware that the Chilean armed forces intended to move when they did?

A: We had certain intelligence coverage of it and we had a series of alerts indicating that it was about to happen. They key to it was whether several different forces would get together to do it, and we had several indications that they would on a certain date and then they didn't. And then they would on another date, and then they didn't. And then that they would in September and they did.

Q: Did the junta ask the United States or the CIA whether the new regime would be recognized?

A: They certainly did not ask the CIA, and I don't know of any other requests.

Q: There have been a number of reports that you gave a verbal addendum to President Ford after submitting your 50-page report involving the word "assassination." Did you make such a report?

A: I think I'll let the President speak for himself on that. He has spoken on it, and I think it's appropriate. Otherwise, I frankly think that this is a subject that I would like to just stay in a total no comment position.

Q: Well, there have been a number of allegations that the agency either had knowledge or discussions involving assassinations, the ones that took place involving Trujillo and Lumumba, and plans or plots involving Castro and Duvalier. What's your response to that?

A: Well, again, I really don't want to comment about that subject. It will be reported fully to the select committees. This is not a subject that I think we would do any good to the United States by talking about.

Q: Can you say flatly that the CIA has never planned the assassination of any foreign leader?

A: Again, I just don't want to comment at all on it.

Q: You've discounted reports of sweeping CIA domestic activity but the issue remains very much alive. What's likely to be the upshot of that?

A: I think that the results of the investigation will

rather clearly show that I'm right, that the program that we undertook to identify foreign links with American dissident movements was not a massive one, in the numbers involved; was not a domestic one, because it was basically foreign; and it wasn't illegal because it was under our charter and our National Security Act. So it was neither massive, illegal nor domestic. It was an intelligence operation.

Q: A great deal of the controversy focuses on files with the names of U.S. citizens. What steps have been taken, if any, to cleanse these files?

A: Well, some time ago — for the last three years — we have been cleansing some of these records. Some of our security files, some of the other things that had material in it that really should not have been in it. We obviously cannot do that now, because the investigations are under way and we cannot be in the position of destroying potential evidence for these investigations. But I have directed that this kind of material still be segregated. And I look forward to the day after the investigations when we have one large bonfire and destroy it all. Because I don't think that we ought to have it and I think that the best disposition is to get rid of it.

Q: Under the Organization Act of 1947, is mail cover in the United States illegal?

A: In my view, we should not do it. And that is why I recommended its termination in 1973 and it was terminated by Dr. Schlesinger.

Q: But that's not quite responsive. Is it illegal under the mandate?

A: Opening mail is, I believe, illegal. Reading the addresses off mail I think would depend on the authority of the organization in question. We're not doing it — but I could imagine that it would be legitimate to look at the addresses of people in contact with known foreign intelligence services or something of that nature.

Q: But is a mail cover a possible subject for criminal prosecution?

A: I do not believe so. And I do not believe that the people who are involved even in the opening will be prosecuted.

of Americans illegal under the mandate?

A: No, it's not. It depends on why. As I told Mrs. Abzug, if we were watching a foreign organization overseas and she ran into contact with it and it was reported, I would probably have her name in the files. And we so did. We had her name for that reason. We have coverage of foreign meetings, things like that abroad. A certain number of Russians, a certain number of Frenchmen, a certain number of something else — and maybe five Americans will go and the names of all will come back and be carded and be recorded. We would not do anything with them. But in any indication of any security problem, we would pass them to the FBI. At that time, as a counter-intelligence program, we were vigorously looking to see whether any foreign countries had support or manipulation of our antiwar and various other dissident movements. We concluded after our investigations that they did not. There wasn't any substantial foreign assistance coming to this. But we did look into it to see whether that was so or not.

Q: Has morale been damaged by the controversies?

A: Well, I think there's a feeling of high public criticism of a few missteps by the CIA, that if you got similar missteps by the Fish and Wildlife Service, nobody would notice it at all. But if it's the CIA, it's big news. The low point in my mind came the other day when there was a story about the D.C. police reporting its activities during the antiwar movement, during the disturbances here.

The lead paragraph is very clear that that was a story about the police. About halfway down the page it mentioned that the CIA had loaned the police five automobiles. And on the following page it mentioned that the CIA had trained about 10 or 12 people. And the two-

column scare headline was "CIA Aid to Police," which was a tiny part of the total story. But that was the headline. The problem about our morale, really is you get some people in CIA who feel that they tried to do their duty, they followed their instructions from the government, they did what was expected at the time, and people now say it was wrong. On the other hand, you have people in CIA who don't want the CIA to do anything wrong, and are quite shaken by the fact that anything improper was done over the past 20 years. So, you have really the two extremes, both of whom feel somewhat shaken by this exposure and the attacks.

Q: Have you encountered any cases in which it was necessary to discharge or seek the retirement of any employes for violating the legislative mandate?

A: No. The ones I think you're thinking of is a group that retired at the end of December. The facts of that case were that Mr. Angleton and I had discussions about various things about his work. I have the highest respect for the contribution he has made to counter-intelligence. I think he is an extremely fine public servant. We did have some differing views about different details of the matter. I determined that it was, I thought, desirable to make some changes, and I offered him another activity but said I thought it was time to put some successive leadership into his responsibility. He had the option of retiring, he took the option. He has agreed to stay around here a few months, he's still here now, helping us on the transition to the new management. The two officers who worked with him — I said I did not think they would succeed him as the chief, and they chose to retire. The fourth officer announced his plan to retire several weeks before the event.

U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, April 7, 1975

*While the Central Intelligence Agency is under the spotlight of critical exposure in the U.S., its counterparts in Communist countries—particularly the Soviet KGB—are still very busy. Known to the CIA, for example, are attempts by the Communist secret services to recruit about 400 Americans as spies in the last four years.*

SATURDAY REVIEW

5 April 1975

# What's Wrong With the CIA?

**Power, arrogance, and the "inside-outside" syndrome are what's wrong, says a former CIA executive who is worried about the challenge to the traditions of representative government.**

by Tom Braden

*Washington, D.C.*

We are gathered, four of us CIA division chiefs and deputies, in the office of our agency's director, an urbane and charming man. He is seated at his desk, puffing nervously on his pipe and asking us questions.

Allen W. Dulles is fretting on this morning in the early Fifties, as, indeed, he has fretted most mornings. You can't be in the middle of building an enormous spy house, running agents into Russia and elsewhere, worrying about Joseph McCarthy, planning to overthrow a government in Guatemala, and helping to elect another in Italy, without fretting.

But on this particular morning, Dulles is due for an appearance before Sen. Richard B. Russell's Armed Services Committee, and the question he is pondering as he puffs on his pipe is whether to tell the senators what is making him fret. He has just spent a lot of money on buying an intelligence network, and the network has turned out to be worthless. In fact, it's a little worse than worthless. All that money, Dulles now suspects, went to the KGB.

Therefore, the questions are somber, and so are the answers. At last, Dulles rises. "Well," he says, "I guess I'll have to fudge the truth a little."

His eyes twinkle at the word *fudge*, then suddenly turn serious. He twists his slightly stooped shoulders into the old tweed topcoat and heads for the door. But he turns back. "I'll tell the truth to Dick [Russell]," he says. "I always do." Then the twinkle returns, and he adds, with a chuckle, "That is, if Dick wants to know."

THE REASON I RECALL the above scene in detail is that lately I have been asking myself what's wrong with the CIA. Two committees of Congress and one from the executive branch are asking the question, too. But they are asking out of a concern for national policy. I am asking for a different reason. I once worked for the CIA. I regard the time I spent there as worthwhile duty. I look back upon the men with whom I worked as able and

honorable. So for me, the question "What's wrong with the CIA?" is both personal and poignant.

Old friends of mine have been caught in evasions or worse. People I worked with have violated the law. Men whose ability I respected have planned operations that ended in embarrassment or disaster. What's wrong with these people? What's wrong with the CIA?

Ask yourself a question often enough, and sometimes the mind will respond with a memory. The memory my mind reported back is that scene in Allen Dulles's office. It seemed, at first blush, a commonplace, inconsequential episode. But the more it fixed itself in my mind, the more it seemed to me that it helped to answer my question about what's wrong with the agency. Let me explain.

The first thing this scene reveals is the sheer power that Dulles and his agency had. Only a man with extraordinary power could make a mistake involving a great many of the taxpayers' dollars and not have to explain it. Allen Dulles had extraordinary power.

Power flowed to him and, through him, to the CIA, partly because his brother was Secretary of State, partly because his reputation as the master spy of World War II hung over him like a mysterious halo, partly because his senior partnership in the prestigious New York law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell impressed the small-town lawyers of Congress.

Moreover, events helped keep power flowing. The country was fighting a shooting war in Korea and a Cold War in Western Europe, and the CIA was sole authority on the plans and potential of the real enemy. To argue against the CIA was to argue against knowledge. Only Joseph McCarthy would run such a risk.

Indeed, McCarthy unwittingly added to the power of the CIA. He attacked the agency and when, in the showdown, Dulles won, his victory vastly increased the respectability of what people then called "the cause" of anti-communism. "Don't join the book burners," Eisenhower had said. That was the bad way to fight communism. The good way was the CIA.

POWER WAS THE FIRST THING that went wrong with the CIA. There was too much of it, and it was too easy to bring

to bear—on the State Department, on other government agencies, on the patriotic businessmen of New York, and on the foundations whose directorships they occupied. The agency's power overwhelmed the Congress, the press, and therefore the people.

I'm not saying that this power didn't help to win the Cold War, and I believe the Cold War was a good war to win. But the power enabled the CIA to continue Cold War operations 10 and 15 years after the Cold War was won. Under Allen Dulles the power was unquestioned, and after he left, the habit of not questioning remained.

I remember the time I walked over to the State Department to get formal approval for some CIA project involving a few hundred thousand dollars and a publication in Europe. The desk man at the State Department balked. Imagine. He balked—and at an operation designed to combat what I knew for certain was a similar Soviet operation. I was astonished. But I didn't argue. I knew what would happen. I would report to the director, who would get his brother on the phone: "Foster, one of your people seems to be a little less than cooperative." That is power.

THE SECOND THING that's wrong with the CIA is arrogance, and the scene I've mentioned above shows that, too. Allen Dulles's private joke about "fudging" was arrogant, and so was the suggestion that "Dick" might not *want* to know. An organization that does not have to answer for mistakes is certain to become arrogant.

It is not a cardinal sin; this fault, and sometimes it squints toward virtue. It might be argued, for example, that only arrogant men would insist on building the U-2 spy plane within a time frame which military experts said could not be met. Yet in the days before satellite surveillance, the U-2 spy plane was the most useful means of keeping the peace. It assured this country's leaders that Russia was not planning an attack. But if arrogance built the plane quickly, it also destroyed it. For surely it was arrogant to keep it flying through Soviet airspace after it was suspected that the Russians were literally zeroing in on overflying U-2s.

I wonder whether the arrogance of the CIA may not have been battlefield-related—a holdover from World War II machismo and derring-do. The leaders of the agency were, almost to a man, veterans of OSS, the CIA's wartime predecessor. Take, for example, the men whose faces I now recall, standing there in the director's office.

One had run a spy-and-operations network into Germany from German-occupied territory. Another had volunteered to parachute into Field Marshall Kesselring's headquarters grounds with terms for his surrender. A third had

*Tom Braden, who knows the CIA firsthand, is a columnist for the Los Angeles Times and co-author of Sub Rosa: The OSS and American Espionage.*

washed and in Norway and, having lost half his men, came up, nevertheless, bleeding and dying.

Some of the CIA men were careerists who had volunteered to carry out unusual orders and to take unusual risks. Moreover, they were impressed, more than most soldiers can be impressed, with the absolute necessity for secrecy and the certain penalty that awaited the breach of it.

But they had another quality that set them apart. For some reason that psychologists could perhaps explain, a man who volunteers to go on an extremely dangerous mission, alone or with one or two helpers, is likely to be not only brave and resourceful but also somewhat vain. Relatively few men volunteered to jump into German or Japanese territory during World War II. Those who did volunteer were conscious that they were, in a word, "different."

Once these men had landed behind the lines, the difference took on outward symbols. They were alone, Americans in a country full of French or Greeks or Italians or Chinese. Often they were treated with great respect. Sometimes, as mere lieutenants, they commanded thousands of men. At a word from them, American or British planes came over to drop supplies to these men. They earned the love and respect that conquered people felt for the great democracy called America. Inevitably, they began to think of themselves individually and collectively as representing the national honor.

Is it not possible that men who have learned to do everything in secrecy, who are accustomed to strange assignments, and who think of themselves as embodying their country, are peculiarly susceptible to imperial Presidencies such as those of Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon? Have they not in fact trained themselves to behave as a power elite?

TO POWER AND TO ARROGANCE add the mystique of the inside-outside syndrome. That scene in the director's office defines the problem. Dulles was leveling with his assistants, and they were leveling with him. An agent or a station chief or an official of the CIA who didn't level—who departed in the slightest degree from a faithful account of what he knew or what he had done—was a danger to operations and to lives. Such a man couldn't last a day in the CIA.

But truth was reserved for the inside. To the outsider, CIA men learned to lie, to lie consciously and deliberately without the slightest twinge of the guilt that most men feel when they tell a deliberate lie.

The inside-outside syndrome is unavoidable in a secret intelligence agency. You bring a group of people together, bind them with an oath, test their loyalty periodically with machines, spy on them to make sure they're not meeting secretly with someone from the Czech Embassy, suspicion that for the rest of the world

with a false cover story, teach them to lie because lying is in the national interest, and they do not behave like other men.

They do not come home from work and answer truthfully the question, "What did you do today, darling?" When they chat with their neighbors, they lie about their jobs. In their compartmentalized, need-to-know jobs, it is perfectly excusable for one CIA man to lie to another if the other doesn't need to know.

Thus it was ritual for Allen Dulles to "fudge," and often he didn't have to. Senator Russell might say, "The chairman has conferred with the director about this question, which touches a very sensitive matter." The question would be withdrawn.

Another technique for dealing with an outsider was the truthful non-response. Consider the following exchange between Sen. Claiborne Pell (Dem., R.I.) and Richard Helms. (The exchange was concerned with spying on Americans, an illegal act under the terms of the law that created the CIA.)

*Senator Pell* (referring to spying on anti-war demonstrations): "But these all occurred within the continental shores of the United States and for that reason you had the justifiable reason to decline [to] move in there because the events were outside your ambit."

*Mr. Helms*: "Absolutely, and I have never been lacking in clarity in my mind since I have been director, that this is simply not acceptable not only to Congress but to the people of the United States."

No doubt that answer was truthful. No doubt Helms did think that domestic spying was not acceptable. But he was doing it, and he didn't say he wasn't.

Finally, of course, there is the direct lie. Here is another excerpt from 1973 testimony by Helms:

*Senator Symington* (Dem., Mo.): "Did you try, in the Central Intelligence Agency, to overthrow the government of Chile?"

*Helms*: "No, Sir."

*Symington*: "Did you have any money passed to the opponents of Allende?"

*Helms*: "No, Sir."

Helms was under oath. Therefore, he must have considered his answer carefully. Obviously, he came to the insider's conclusion: that his duty to protect the inside outweighed his outsider's oath. Or to put it another way, the law of the inside comes first.

ALLEN DULLES once remarked that if necessary, he would lie to anybody about the CIA except the President. "I never had the slightest qualms about lying to an outsider," a CIA veteran remarked recently. "Why does an outsider need to know?"

So much for the lessons of memory. Power, arrogance, and the inside-outside syndrome are what's wrong with the CIA, and to some extent, the faults are

occupational and even necessary tools for the job.

But the events of the Cold War and the coincidence of Allen Dulles's having such enormous discretionary powers enlarged occupational risks until they became faults, and the faults created a monstrosity. Power built a vast bureaucracy and a ridiculous monument in Langley, Va. Arrogance fostered the belief that a few hundred exiles could land on a beach and hold off Castro's army.

The inside-outside syndrome withheld the truth from Adlai Stevenson so that he was forced to make a spectacle of himself on the floor of the United Nations by denying that the United States had anything to do with the invasion of Cuba. The same syndrome has made a sad and worried man of Richard Helms.

It's a shame what happened to the CIA. It could have consisted of a few hundred scholars to analyze intelligence, a few hundred spies in key positions, and a few hundred operators ready to carry out rare tasks of derring-do.

Instead, it became a gargantuan monster, owning property all over the world, running airplanes and newspapers and radio stations and banks and armies and navies, offering temptation to successive Secretaries of State, and giving at least one President a brilliant idea: Since the machinery for deceit existed, why not use it?

Richard Helms should have said no to Richard Nixon. But as a victim of the inside-outside syndrome, Helms could only ask Watergate's most plaintive question: "Who would have thought that it would someday be judged a crime to carry out the orders of the President of the United States?"

A shame—and a peculiarly American shame. For this is the only country in the world which doesn't recognize the fact that some things are better if they are small.

We'll need intelligence in the future. And once in a while, once in a great while, we may need covert action, too. But, at the moment, we have nothing. The revelations of Watergate and the investigations that have followed have done their work. The CIA's power is gone. Its arrogance has turned to fear. The inside-outside syndrome has been broken. Former agents write books naming other agents. Director William Colby goes to the Justice Department with evidence that his predecessor violated the law. The house that Allen Dulles built is divided and torn.

THE END IS NOT IN SIGHT. Various committees now investigating the agency will doubtless find error. They will recommend change, they will reshuffle, they will adjust. But they will leave the monster intact, and even if the monster never makes another mistake, never again overreaches itself—even, indeed, if into some other government agencies, it never does anything at all—it will, by example,

BALTIMORE SUN  
19 March 1975Marquis Childs

## The Wild Rumors About the CIA

go right on creating and perpetuating the myths that always accompanied the presence of the monster.

We know the myths. They circulate throughout the land wherever there are bars and bowling alleys: that the CIA killed John Kennedy; that the CIA crippled George Wallace; that an unexplained airplane crash, a big gold heist, were all the work of the CIA.

These myths are ridiculous, but they will exist as long as the monster exists. The fact that millions believe the myths raises once again the old question which OSS men used to argue after the war: Can a free and open society engage in covert operations?

After nearly 30 years of trial, the evidence ought to be in. The evidence demonstrates, it seems to me, that a free and open society cannot engage in covert operations—not, at any rate, in the kind of large, intricate covert operations of which the CIA has been capable.

I don't argue solely from the box score. But let's look at the box score. It reveals many famous failures. Too easily, they prove the point. Consider what the CIA deems its known successes: Does anybody remember Arbenz in Guatemala? What good was achieved by the overthrow of Arbenz? Would it really have made any difference to this country if we hadn't overthrown Arbenz?

And Allende? How much good did it do the American people to overthrow Allende? How much bad?

Was it essential—even granted the sticky question of succession—to keep those Greek colonels in power for so long?

We used to think that it was a great triumph that the CIA kept the Shah of Iran on his throne against the onslaught of Mossadegh. Are we grateful still?

The uprisings during the last phase of the Cold War, and those dead bodies in the streets of Poland, East Germany, and Hungary: to what avail?

But the box score does not tell the whole story. We paid a high price for that box score. Shame and embarrassment is a high price. Doubt, mistrust, and fear is a high price. The public myths are a high price, and so is the guilty knowledge that we own an establishment devoted to opposing the ideals we profess.

IN OUR MIDST, we have maintained a secret instrument erected in contradiction to James Madison's injunction: "A popular government without the means to popular information is a farce or a tragedy, perhaps both."

As I say, the investigating committees will prop the monster up. I would suggest more radical action. I would shut it down. I would turn the overt intelligence function over to the State Department. Scholars and scientists and people who understand how the railroads run in Sri Lanka don't need to belong to the CIA in order to do their valuable work well.

I would turn the paratroopers over to the army. If, at some time, it becomes

Washington.  
Recipe for how to make things worse than they are: Start with a large order of paranoia, stir in with groundless rumors and wild charges, bake with a strong infusion of CIA flavoring.

In this charged atmosphere all the old suspicions about the assassinations of President John F. Kennedy and his brother, Senator Robert F. Kennedy, are being revived. This can be put down partly to what is little better than cheap publicity-seeking by those who think it is a sure way to garner a headline.

But reports from around the country show that the wildest of the rumors are taken seriously by those, who, given even a little rational thought, should know better: The CIA planned the assassination of the two Kennedy brothers. This has taken hold not only with the crazies but among the young willing to believe anything evil about the "establishment."

The commission that investigated President Kennedy's assassination was headed by the late Chief Justice Earl Warren who accepted the assignment reluctantly after arm-twisting by President Lyndon B. Johnson. Gerald R. Ford, then Republican leader in the House of Representatives, was a member of the commission. After sifting with a capable staff every scrap of evidence, rumor and report, including the charge that a conspiracy was involved, the commission found that Lee Harvey Oswald, the loner, was the killer who had fired on the President as he passed

essential to our survival to mount a secret attack upon a foe, the army is capable of doing it, and, with some changes in command structure in order to bypass bureaucracy, the army could do it as swiftly and secretly as the CIA. Under the command structure of the Department of Defense, congressional oversight would be possible. Then, if the army got caught fielding a secret division in Laos, and if the American people did not want a secret division in Laos, the American people would know where to turn.

I would turn the psychological warriors and propagandists over to the Voice of America. Psychological warriors and propagandists probably never did belong in a secret agency.

And, last, I would choose a very few men to run spies and such covert operations as the passage of money to those in other lands who cannot afford to accept American support openly. But I would limit covert operations to passing money to "friendlies."

I would house these spy masters and

by in the motorcade in Dallas.

As for Robert Kennedy, witnesses saw Sirhan B. Sirhan fire the fatal shot as the young senator passed through the anteroom of a hotel kitchen in Los Angeles. After a lengthy trial, Sirhan was found guilty and sentenced to death. Since his conviction he has waited on death row in San Quentin pending judicial decision on the legality of the death penalty. Naturally, members of his family are eager to exploit the agitation to reopen the case.

There seems at times a competition to see who can swallow the biggest myth, with the Central Intelligence Agency the prime bait. In a suburb of Los Angeles, the Orange County Bar Association heard at a luncheon meeting Philip (Dave) Thomas describe how he had carried out 22 assassinations in the Soviet Union as a CIA agent. One newspaper headline said "CIA Assassin Tells Lawyers of Exploits." The speaker went on to say that to escape the KGB after his latest killing he had seized a Pan American 747, using his American Express Card, to fly him to safety.

Even though the story is wildly improbable, the CIA searched its files. No such name nor anything resembling it came to light.

No matter what is eventually proved to have been wrongdoing by the CIA, the rumor-mongering is contributing to the erosion of the agency's status. Many critical of the covert side — the dirty tricks department of the CIA — believe that its overt operations, intelligence-gathering

and intelligence estimates, are invaluable and its destruction would be a severe loss.

An organization most active in promoting the conspiracy theory of the CIA is the National Caucus of Labor Committees, a militant Marxist organization that links the CIA with the KGB in a giant brainwashing operation. Members believe in a "master plot" they must do everything possible to frustrate. When a story appeared in the Washington Post on the caucus saying the CIA had declined comment, Director William E. Colby said that while he thought it was a domestic matter and the inquiry should have been directed to the FBI, he was replying to say that while the caucus charges were "only twisted fantasies your circulation of them forces CIA to deny them as flatly false."

Once before in a time of trial and tribulation the same witches' brew of fear and suspicion haunted a troubled nation. After President Abraham Lincoln's assassination in 1865 just at the end of the Civil War, the rumor persisted that his Secretary of War, Edwin M. Stanton, had played a part in a plot to murder the President. Nothing was ever proved beyond the fact that the abrasive Stanton had often been at odds with Lincoln over the conduct of the war. Latter-day scholars have dismissed the rumor as unfounded.

Hopefully we will recover from the present plague, which is more virulent than that of a century ago. But sensation-mongering is no service in our time of troubles.

and I would forbid, by law, any of them from ever calling himself "director." They would not work for the CIA. Because I would abolish the name CIA.

As their chief, the President should choose for a term of six years some civilian who has demonstrated staunchness of character and independence of mind. I would make him responsible to a joint committee of Congress, as well as to the President, and I would not permit him to serve more than one term.

THUS, WE MIGHT get rid of power. Without power, arrogance would not be dangerous. Thus, too, we could prevent the inside-outside syndrome, so essential to secrecy, from making a mockery of representative government.

As for the house that Allen Dulles built at Langley, we might leave it standing empty, our only national monument to the value that democracy places upon the recognition and correction of a mistake.



# CIA Latin Chief Is Quitting to Take on Critics

By Jeremiah O'Leary  
Washington Star Staff Writer

The chief of Latin American operations for the CIA is leaving the agency effective May 9 to organize former American intelligence officers in an effort to defend the organization against those who attack it.

He is David A. Phillips, 52, who has been in charge of the Western Hemisphere Division for two years and is a veteran who has been CIA station chief in the Dominican Republic, Brazil and Venezuela. Phillips recently informed CIA Director William E. Colby of his decision to take early retirement and that he intends to organize an association of retired intelligence officers from all American services.

The Washington Star learned that Colby told Phillips he would rather he remain in his present job but accepted Phillips' decision with good wishes when the official made clear his decision was final.

Phillips told the Star he was particularly determined to defend the agency as a private citizen, as he could not do while on the agency payroll, because much of the recent criticism of the CIA has focused on his area of responsibility in Latin America.

THE CIA has been linked with operations against the Marxist regime of the late President Salvador Allende in Chile and allegations of assassination plots against Prime Minister Fidel Castro of Cuba, the late President Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic and the late President Francois Duvalier of Haiti.

The association of retired intelligence officers does not yet exist, but Phillips has sent an open letter under that heading to 250 former CIA officers with whom he is acquainted. The letter says in part:

"As chief of Latin American operations, I have been deeply concerned about the decline of morale at Langley (CIA headquarters) and abroad. Snowballing innu-

endo, egregious stories and charges, and even honest concerns have presented us with the basic dilemma of issuing either a general statement which reassures few but preserves security, or a comprehensive accounting which satisfies some but at the expense of operations and agents.

"Under the circumstances, there is little doubt that a thorough congressional review is the best, if not the only solution even though some leakage of sensitive details on foreign operations seems almost inevitable. A few of our older documents from the Cold War period will make for pretty heady reading today. As for our present activities, I am convinced we have no problem.

"IN THE meantime, our capabilities abroad are being damaged. More and more of our agents and friends — many of them fine people who cooperate on the basis of ideology — are saying thanks but no thanks. Friendly liaison services are beginning to back away from us. The Marchettis and the Agees have the stage and only a few challenge them."

Victor Marchetti and Philip Agee are former CIA agents who have written critical exposes of the agency.

Phillips said he is leaving the CIA because he wants to fill the gap and intends to challenge Marchetti to a series of college campus debates. He also will go on a lecture tour and do some writing to explain why the United States needs an intelligence service.

Phillips said he was concerned that people might think he was still working for the agency when he gets started with the association's efforts. He said, "I wish to make it absolutely clear that the CIA management has not had, and will not have, a hand officially, unofficially or otherwise in this organization and its efforts."

Phillips said he will receive \$15,000 a year as a re-

# Soviet hints CIA helped kill Faisal

Moscow Bureau of The Sun

Moscow—The Soviet Union seriously suggested last night that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency had plotted the assassination of King Faisal of Saudi Arabia because of growing friction between the monarch and Washington over the price of oil and terms of a Middle East settlement.

The government newspaper *Izvestia* stopped short, however, of an open accusation, but it left no doubt that it believes the CIA planned and probably helped carry out Tuesday's assassination.

In a short article headlined "Who Fired?" *Izvestia* cites Arab papers in Beirut, Cairo and Rabat, Morocco, to implicate the United States in the assassination. Tass, the official government news agency, also has carried stories in the last two days suggesting that the Central Intelligence Agency was involved.

Radio Riyadh in Saudi Arabia has said the assassin, a nephew of the King, was mentally deranged and acted alone.

But *Izvestia* and Tass quote the Beirut newspaper *Al Liba* as saying that the United States had concluded that a reduction in oil prices was "impossible to achieve during Faisal's lifetime" and thus decided to assassinate the monarch, who is characterized as increasingly "disappointed with American policies."

The Moroccan newspaper *L'Opinion* is quoted as saying that the basic American decision to remove the King came after the 1973 oil embargo. "There is no need to indicate who did it. . . . The events in

Chile and in Cyprus give sufficient ideas as to who masterminded the crime."

The American intelligence agency is blamed here both for the coup d'etat that overthrew the Chilean administration of President Salvador Allende in 1973 and the ouster last summer of President Makarios from Cyprus.

*Izvestia* pointedly recalls that Henry H. Kissinger, the United States Secretary of State, had warned in January that the U.S. might find it necessary in "extreme circumstances," as *Izvestia* puts it, to intervene militarily in oil-producing countries. Saudi Arabia, the paper indicates, would be a principal target.

"At the end of last year," *Izvestia* wrote last night, "the American magazine *Newsweek* published an ominous cartoon—leaders of oil-producing countries, being shot at from around a corner. Are these threats not becoming a reality?"

Earlier, Tass had suggested that the new King and crown prince in Saudi Arabia were even more pro-American than King Faisal had ever been, leaving the implication that the United States had gained greatly from the assassination.

Tass also suggested that the Arabian-American Oil Company, known as Aramco, may have been involved in the putative plot to assassinate King Faisal because of his recent actions to nationalize the firm.

These charges were in great contrast, however, to the generally mild Soviet comment on the collapse of Mr. Kissinger's efforts to mediate a new Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula.

## U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT 31 MARCH 1975

*In spite of the torrent of unfavorable publicity about the Central Intelligence Agency, recruiting is booming. CIA job applications jumped from a normal 300 weekly to 800 in January and the trend is continuing.*

tired employe compared with his present salary of \$36,000. The association, he said, will be financed by \$10 a year dues to be used for stamps, paper and similar expenses but not for salaries. He expects to provide for his own income through lecture fees.

THE ECONOMIST MARCH 29, 1975

*Glomar Explorer***Went fishing**

Washington, DC

Plenty of people blame the press, the bearer of bad tidings, for the long string of embarrassing disclosures that has put the Central Intelligence Agency in a corner fighting for its bureaucratic life. The manner in which the true mission of that celebrated deep-sea mining ship, the Hughes *Glomar Explorer*, was disclosed last week puts the newspaper editors in a different light. Successive disclosures in the past year showed the CIA in an equivocal relationship to some of the illegalities of the Nixon Administration, meddling in the politics of Chile, indulging in domestic espionage, and under suspicion of complicity in real or attempted foreign political assassinations.

The *Glomar Explorer* is a different case entirely. When a Soviet submarine exploded and sank in the Pacific in 1968, the American under-sea tracking system established where the wreck occurred, while the Soviet system failed to do so. Eventually the Nixon Administration approved the building of a special ship, with a huge covered satellite barge, which arrived on the spot last year and picked up the Soviet submarine from its position on the sea bed, three miles down. The operation was bizarre and financially prodigal, its legality gave rise to lively argument among the government lawyers, it involved deception of the public, and it involved a covert association with a financier, Mr Howard Hughes, whose relations with the Nixon Administration were of arguable propriety in other ways. Still, as a genuine effort to gather foreign military intelligence the operation did fall within the proper function of the CIA.

The press handled it quite differently from the agency's alleged trespasses and indiscretions. After the *Glomar Explorer* sailed in 1973 from the Atlantic port where it was built, one or two reporters picked up hints that its mission might be something other than scraping up mineral nodules from the ocean floor, but the CIA was able to persuade their editors, as a matter of public interest, not to pursue the question. A labour dispute that broke out

over the manning of the ship had some features not easily explicable in a normal commercial vessel; that drew some attention. Last summer the offices of Mr Howard Hughes's holding company in Los Angeles were broken into and quantities of its files removed, including files to do with the *Glomar Explorer* and the company's relations with the CIA. An attempt at what is described as blackmail followed, Mr Hughes refused to pay, and last month a grand jury in Los Angeles began an investigation.

By now the hints and rumours were fairly thick, and indeed the Los Angeles Times published on February 8th a version that had the *Glomar Explorer* searching for a sunken submarine, though in the wrong ocean. A quick intervention by the CIA got the report curtailed and moved to an inside page. Mr William Colby, the director of the CIA, got busy briefing editors, usually telling them more than they knew, explaining that the ship had not finished its job but had to return next summer to collect some more pieces of submarine, and appealing to their public spirit not to spoil the game. The New York Times, the Washington Post, the Washington Star, Time, Newsweek and at least two radio and television networks had heard about it and all agreed to hold their hands, with the reservation that if others published it, they would have to. The dam broke on March 18th.

On that evening the New York Times got word from Mr Jack Anderson, who continues the muck-raking column of the late Drew Pearson, that Mr Anderson was going to use the story not in his column but in his regular radio talk, and it decided that it had to go ahead and publish.

Against publishing the story was the argument that the Russians did not know what those two weird vessels were doing in that spot in the Pacific; Mr Melvin Laird, who was Secretary of Defence at the time the costly project was launched, has said he would guarantee that they did know. Even so, it is possible to argue that knowing something is, for the Soviet government, a different matter from having to take cognisance of it officially. The lessons of the U-2 affair in 1960 have not been forgotten, and hence the Administration was careful not to say a word.

One thing that is clear is that the *Glomar Explorer* will not be returning

to the spot to look for more bits of submarine. A rather valuable ship, equipped to recover objects from the deep sea-bed, looks like coming on the market, unless the circumspect Mr Hughes took the precaution of getting a first option on it. Estimates of the cost of the whole *Glomar Explorer* operation are in the range of \$350m.

Senator Frank Church of Idaho, the liberal chairman of the Senate's select committee on intelligence activities, lost no time in saying that the expense was too much: "No wonder we are broke," he said. Few others are willing to join him publicly in his judgment. There are reports that the lost Russian submarine had a strange profile, which might indicate a secret modernisation, making ships of its type subject to the strategic arms limitation pact, and other reports that one or more of its torpedoes, which may have been nuclear-tipped, were recovered. Where, if not with the CIA, can such reports originate? Yet the CIA is also assiduously circulating the version that the submarine's missiles and its coding apparatus were not, definitely not, among the articles recovered when a part of the wrecked ship fell back into the ocean depths. This is something the agency could be expected to say if it were true, and also if it were not.

Intriguing, in a country that is so widely said to have succumbed to self-doubt, become disillusioned with power, and lost the feel for greatness, is the generosity of the praise that is being heaped on the, in other respects harassed, CIA for the boldness and technical excellence of this exercise in science fiction. What other country would think of such a project, would find the money for it and would carry it out so flawlessly? Where else are the technological resources for such an adventure to be found? Which naval power lost the submarine from view (the Soviet Union), and which power tracked it to its grave in the deep ocean? Good intelligence work as a guarantee of national security and a precondition of effective arms control are celebrated by the New York Times and the Washington Post, with expressions of thankfulness that the CIA has, after all, demonstrated its pre-eminence in the work which it was legitimately called into existence to do.

NEWSWEEK  
24 MARCH 1975**COLBY COMES IN FROM THE COLD**

Congressional investigators looking into the CIA may get more than they expected from their demand that spymaster William Colby turn over the report he delivered to President Ford last Christmas in Vail, Colo., on his agency's domestic operations. Colby has told Sen. Frank Church, head of the Senate probe, that various in-house CIA task forces have from time to time reviewed the agency's internal workings. He volunteered to turn over a list of these studies to the Congressional investigators.

U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT  
24 MARCH 1975

*The Central Intelligence Agency is known to feel that its secrets will be safe with only two of the three groups that are now investigating its activities—the Rockefeller Commission and the Senate probes. CIA officials worry about possible leaks of sensitive material from the House panel.*

APRIL 1975

# GIA

## "KILL SQUADS"

Equipped with the latest in weaponry and gadgetry, these agents kill the enemy on order. They have even "eliminated" U.S. civilians!

By Roy Norton

Mr. G. was certainly not thinking of his own death as he hurried down the corridor to his hotel room in Guatemala. His mind swarmed with the details of smuggling rifles and machine guns to a band of Communist-backed revolutionaries in Mexico. They had money to pay for weapons and wanted delivery at a secret point on Mexico's eastern coast. A fishing boat captain from Grand Isle, La., was to make the delivery.

Mr. G. was thinking of the sizable profits he would make from the deal and barely noticed a thin, well-dressed young man step out of a room down the hallway. The young man coughed, covering his face with a handkerchief.

The two men drew abreast.

"Are you an American?" the young man asked.

Mr. G. turned and his eyes widened with fright. He stared into the barrel of a eight-inch long aluminum tube. *Click!* A strange vapor spurted from the metal device, surrounding Mr. G.'s face.

"What the hell—" he stammered, breathing the sour fumes into his lungs. He crumpled to the floor, his face turning purple. The young man placed the aluminum tube in his pocket and casually walked down the hall and stairway to the lobby.

It took exactly 72 seconds for Mr. G. to die. He died just as the young man walked out into the street. Several minutes later, a hotel maid found the body and screamed her alarm. It was another 20 minutes before an ambulance arrived. That evening, a death certificate was prepared.

Heart attack was the verdict.

The examining doctors knew nothing of a colorless, odorless poison carefully sealed in a thin capsule and shot out of a hermetically sealed aluminum tube. Bizarre poisons are seldom discussed at medical meetings. Few coroners know that such a capsule, fired no more than 24 inches from the victim's face,

will produce almost instant death.

The deadly vapors are breathed into the lungs. Arteries that carry blood to the brain are paralyzed instantly. Within seconds, the victim begins to die. Within minutes, all traces of the poisonous vapor disappear, long before an autopsy can be performed.

The poison was developed in a Russian laboratory in the late 1950s and brought to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency in 1961 when Bogdam Stashinskiy defected to the West. Stashinskiy, a trained assassin for the KGB (*Kommissariat Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti* or Soviet Committee for State Security), knew the vapor was an effective murder weapon. He had eliminated two anti-Soviet exile agents in West Germany before surrendering to U.S. counterespies.

Mr. G. was just one of many victims of the poison since then. A member of the shadowy world of international manipulators, he was a clever soldier of fortune who specialized in gunrunning, dope smuggling, and political intrigue. Like his fellow entrepreneurs, he fed on revolt and revolution, hurrying to the world's hottest trouble spots in order to fatten his bank balance.

The assassin with the deadly aluminum tube was an illegal, or "black" agent in the "Plans" section of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. He is attached to "Staff D," an obscure department known inside the agency as the "Kill Squad." Equipped with the latest in weaponry and gadgetry, these agents kill the enemy on order. Their victims are those persons considered a threat to the national security of the U.S. In the example above, a Communist-inspired revolution south of the border would be a threat to the U.S., hence it was necessary to "eliminate" Mr. G.

Members of the "Kill Squad" are the glamour boys of the CIA's 17,000-man spy organization. They are the true

professionals in the back alley battles of Cold War espionage. Cold-bloodedly, they can murder a double agent in Berlin, liquidate a person who may jeopardize U.S. security, or arrange for an assassination squad to kill the political leader of an unfriendly country.

Naturally, many of these projects are surrounded by the highest secrecy. There are stiff penalties to prevent present, or former, agents of the CIA from discussing their experiences. "I've been out of the 'Company' for two years," remarked an ex-agent. "However, if they knew I was talking, I could be taken into custody without a warrant, held indefinitely, and brought to a secret trial. More than one person has been whisked out to the 'Mansion' for interrogation after they talked in public."

The "Mansion" is the CIA's top secret 65-acre private estate located a few miles from Oxford, Md., along the Choptank River. The Mansion and grounds are protected by high, electrified fences, armed guards and a patrol of vicious German shepherd dogs.

However, despite all this official secrecy, many persons in and out of the agency have become disenchanted with the CIA.

At this very moment in Washington, D.C., a blue ribbon panel, headed by Vice President Rockefeller, is investigating the organization and is preparing a report for President Ford. In light of the fact that much has been exposed concerning the CIA's activities in our own country and the operation to unseat Salvadore Allende in Chile, there are those who feel that the deadly and frightening results of the "Kill Squads" should also be revealed to the public.

Others seek power through office politics. Like any other bureaucratic group, there are cliques inside the CIA struggling for supremacy over the vast spy network. Some informants were recruited, trained, sent into the field, and quickly became disillusioned by the realities of espionage. "It looks good only in the movies," remarked one source.

From interviews developed over a span of many months, considerable data on the CIA was obtained. Despite the secrecy, the agency constantly bubbles with wild stories and fantastic rumors; separating the fact from the fantastic was no easy task. Since this information cannot be verified officially, every effort has been made to insure accuracy within these limitations.

My information includes:

- An aborted assassination plot against Fidel Castro during his visit to New York for an appearance before the United Nations;

- The formation and training of para-military assassination squads, staffed by Cubans;

- "Kill to protect" orders on the U.S. spy plane;

- Persistent rumors concerning the possible murder of several U.S. citizens; and

- Details on the latest weaponry and gadgetry.

Get Castro: Like some ancient

bearded demon, Fidel Castro is a satanic figure to CIA agents. "He is satan incarnate, a living reminder of the agency's failures in Cuba, the Bay of Pigs, and other fiascoes," reported a former agent. "They've tried everything to get Castro. Nothing has worked."

Originally, the agency was lax in determining Castro's political beliefs. A CIA briefing to President Eisenhower's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities in late 1960 reported Castro as being a "political enigma." A still secret report declared that Castro did not become a Communist until after the Bay of Pigs. "Prior to that time, his public statements did not reflect Marxist directions," the report stated.

Nevertheless, there were those in the CIA who did not trust Castro, even in 1960. "If he walks, talks, and acts like a Communist I say he is one," a crusty CIA official declared. Others agreed and, when Castro announced his intentions to visit the United Nations, an assassination plot was formed.

"A visit to the U.S. by a foreign leader is a good opportunity to obtain information," explained a former agent. "The CIA almost always maintains a hospitality suite for the American policemen assigned to guard a visiting dignitary. When the officers go off duty, they drop in for free food and drinks. We debrief them through casual questioning. Surprisingly, we often pick up important intelligence data.

"When Khrushchev visited the U.S., the police reported he was hitting the bottle," he said. "He was also abrupt and he treated his associates in a demeaning manner. This indicated a possible power struggle that ended when the old boy was ousted."

Castro came to New York in 1960 and the CIA opened a hospitality suite at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel. Off duty policemen assigned to guard Castro were offered the finest in food and drink, served and poured by CIA agents.

But the assassination plot was aborted. Why?

One agent said, "there were just too many complications."

Shortly after Castro's visit to New York, the CIA selected several Cuban exiles to staff CIA-financed assassination squads. "The idea was that a four-man team would return to Cuba, set up posts near Castro's headquarters, and kill him in a cross fire from high-powered sniper rifles equipped with bullets that exploded on impact. Another team was assembled to 'hit' Castro when and if he made a public appearance. Still another team was trained to blow up his office, using powerful explosives."

The assassination squads were trained in the Florida Everglades, under the direction of a graduate of a WW II OSS assassination school. Marine officers, assigned to the CIA, assisted in the training. "Several squads were trained, but Castro's intelligence men learned of our intentions," an ex-agent said. "There are rumors of at least two attempts made on Castro's life. Both failed. I don't know if this was our CIA

squads or some ordinary Cuban citizen."

What happened to the remaining assassins? "There is always work for a man schooled in murder," concluded my informant. "At least one of these men was at the Bay of Pigs. Later, he flew some of the old B-26 bombers for the CIA in the Congo rebellion. He got a bellyful in the Congo after being ordered to fly over native villages and indiscriminately fire on civilians. He dropped out of sight after that."

Some critics of the CIA, particularly those with dispute the "lone assassin" verdict in the death of Pres. John Kennedy, believe the CIA is responsible for the murder of several world leaders.

A group of independent, self-financed investigators have been sifting the facts in several assassinations for several years. They are concerned with what are considered similarities in the deaths of Patrice Lumumba, Dag Hammarskjold, Sen. Robert Kennedy, Pres. John Kennedy, Martin Luther King, Jr., and Malcolm X. "There are certain patterns in these murders to warrant further investigation," one investigator declared.

Another investigator was more outspoken. "I am convinced that a clique within the Central Intelligence Agency, or a CIA-linked group, is responsible for several assassinations," he reported. "I just find it too incredible to believe an agency of the U.S. government would cold-bloodedly murder President Kennedy, or assassinate some of the best minds in the modern world simply because the victims did not believe in the Cold War."

However, these independent investigators are not overly optimistic about the results of their investigations. "If we had everything down in black and white, hard evidence, no one would believe it," one man concluded. The facts are few, the theories are numerous.

**The U-2 Murders:** "Intelligence flights over unfriendly countries started as early as 1952 or 1953, using the early U-2 planes under CIA jurisdiction," a former CIA agent revealed. "The U-2 flights have continued to this day, despite the photographs we obtain from our 'spies in the sky.'

"The U-2 planes flown over Russia were highly improved aircraft. Their range was tremendous and their altitude was quite high," he continued. "The CIA was charged with protecting these planes from any publicity and an English civilian was 'eliminated' when he attempted to take pictures of the U-2 at Lakenheath, England.

"I heard of another incident that allegedly occurred at Atsugi Airport, near Tokyo, in the fall of 1959. A Japanese teen-ager slipped onto the base and snapped a few pictures, which he hoped to sell to newspapers or magazines. Word got back to someone and, the next evening, the teen-ager drowned himself. Naturally, I assume he had very little choice and was probably held under the water by an agent," he concluded.

Are the assassinations of civilians

cleared through channels? Must prior approval be obtained?

"Absolutely not! An agent in the 'black' section is trained, and charged, to make his own decisions," the informant said. "An agent may be out of contact with his superiors for long periods of time. If security is compromised, they will remember that dead men tell no tales. Also, a request for permission to kill indicates an agent may have slipped up somewhere along the line. Your superiors in the agency do not like mistakes. You do what you must do to protect the national security and you do it well. An agent might request a professional assassin if he is confronted with a particularly complicated job. Then, the agency would send a pro or two out into the field."

It was essential that the U-2 project be protected by "kill" orders.

Despite his braggart's shouts, Russian Premier Nikita Khrushchev and his predecessors knew the CIA pulled off an important coup in the Cold War.

The following information was obtained from a former U-2 pilot and was verified by other sources. "The U-2 was a beautiful plane," the pilot said. "There were several windows built into the bottom of the craft, designed to photograph enemy installations from high altitudes. This was an important function of the flights over Russia and China.

"However, there was another gadget in the plane and a system of pushing buttons at certain points along the flight," he continued. "These buttons activated a recording device that made a radar imprint on tape of the plane's flight over the Earth. We obtained a flight pattern on the tape. After processing, the radar tape could be locked into an atomic missile. The missile guidance system is set up to follow the exact pattern on the tape, from launching until strikedown. The missile might deviate off course, but it has to come back and seek out the pattern on the tape.

"It is a foolproof system for directing an atomic missile directly on target without missing by an inch," he said. "Once that missile is launched, nothing other than a shoot-down can stop it from hitting directly on target. Scramble systems can foul up a computer-directed missile. The typography of the Earth for several hundred miles need to be changed to stop a radar tape-directed missile. That's an impossibility so the missile is ready to hit directly on target!

"When Francis Gary Powers crashed and Nikita Khrushchev discovered we had missiles homed in right on his head, he almost went nuts," the pilot continued. "He knew there was absolutely nothing he could do. We've been zeroed in for years on every important target in Russia and Red China."

Some intelligence people believe the crash of Powers's U-2 plane was no accident. "The whole thing has just never added up," the pilot concluded. "Things are never what they seem in espionage. A secret weapon is no good unless the enemy knows about it." If Powers did play such a role in a "set-up" crash inside Russia, it would

be the most incredible espionage story in history.

*He Was An Idealist:* Central Intelligence Agency trainees are called JOT's, Junior Officer Trainees, during their extensive training program. Some trainees receive underwater and jungle warfare training at a secret CIA camp in a Southern swamp. Others are given training at a CIA base located near Las Vegas, Nev.

While assassination is seldom discussed openly by the instructors, it is present in CIA classes by implication. A former agent told of an instructor's remarks to the class one afternoon during his training. "A U.S. citizen happened to stumble onto a base where the 'Company' was training Cubans for the Bay of Pigs invasion. He took several photographs of equipment with U.S. markings on the side," the instructor said. "This was before the markings were to be removed for the actual invasion. If the photographs were published, it would have been a very serious breach of security at the Bay of Pigs.

"He arrived in New York and was stopped and interrogated. Offers were made to purchase the pictures and buy him off. He was an idealist and refused to cooperate," the instructor said. "He was crossing a street when a truck veered out of control, struck, and killed him. And fellows, those pictures and negatives just plain disappeared during all the confusion."

Trainees also hear of an old, grizzled desert gold prospector who unknowingly wandered into a restricted military area with top secret installations. "The 'Company' man knew there was a 99 percent chance the old boy would keep his mouth shut," trainees were informed. "But no chance could be taken. The prospector was eliminated and buried in an unmarked grave."

The CIA's assassination squads that operated in Vietnam were known as the Intelligence, Coordination, and Exploitation unit. Trainees were told of ICE terrorists, trained by Special Forces and Green Berets, who had been successful in capturing, or killing, numerous Communist sympathizers. "CIA agents worked very closely with the Green Berets and UDT teams in Vietnam," an informant said.

Almost every ex-agent has a story involving the death of a U.S. citizen who unknowingly jeopardized national security in one way or another. These stories frequently concern someone who stumbled onto a secret military base on U.S. soil. These unsubstantiated tales include stories of people who wandered into a Cuban training camp operated by the CIA in the Florida Everglades. "Those nuts in there are pretty darn trigger-happy," said an agent. "A few got into an argument between themselves ending with a shoot-out that brought the county sheriff into the brawl. It took some real fancy footwork to keep that incident off the front pages."

Mental instability, nervous breakdowns, and mental aberrations with paranoid tendencies are an occupational hazard for the CIA agent. "You

get to be a bit paranoid if you're in this business for any length of time," admitted a former agent. "A number of agents have freaked out, chasing their wives or girl friends with knives or guns. One poor soul took an eight-inch butcher knife and decided to carve up his landlady. A larger than usual number of employees are arrested in Washington, D.C., or the neighboring communities in compromising situations involving morals charges.

"A dubious fringe benefit is a private sanitarium," he said. "Security might be compromised if an agent was treated by an outside psychiatrist. This sounds good, but it can backfire. A young analyst requested to be relieved of his duties; he felt the pressure was too much. The agency did not act. Finally, James Woodbury and his wife, Dorothy, made a suicide pact and leaped off a bridge down at Great Falls, Va. Our suicide rate is much higher than that for the average population."

What frightens this agent, and many others, is a nagging fear that an agent in the field may someday go berserk. "A single man with training in explosives, killing, and every type of dirty warfare could disrupt an entire metropolitan city," he said. "Some day we may wake up and find such an incident on our front pages."

*Weaponry:* Like their fictional counterparts, the management at the CIA has a fascination for sophisticated weaponry. Very few of the bizarre items in their spy arsenal conform to the Geneva Conventions regarding modern armories; many are so secret that few people outside the CIA know about them.

One diabolical device is a candidate for the "ultimate weapon."

"This is an electronic gadget that changes the role of electrical insulators and conductors," I was told. "An insulator becomes a conductor and vice versa. The device can be attached to an automobile, a telephone, or an electrical appliance, and the victim is electrocuted."

At present, the device works only on a single appliance. "The labs hope to come up with a pyramiding system," the informant said. "The device could then be attached to a point in a city's electrical system. The entire city's electrical grid would be transformed from positive-negative to negative-positive. All the humans would be electrocuted, while the building and

physical facilities would be unharmed."

On an even deadlier side, CIA chemists have developed a new nerve gas which contains two chemicals which are not poisonous themselves. However, when the chemicals are mixed with each other, a deadly nerve gas results. "These are common chemicals. They're stored in two separate compartments of a bottle which breaks on impact," my source said. "This makes it easy to carry a nerve gas, without danger."

Poison is a favorite weapon among the CIA's "black" agents. The most useful poisons are those of the curare family, a CIA favorite. Crystalline curare is extremely powerful; only 0.023 grams are required to kill a person. One gadget used by agents is a curare-tipped dart fired from a small blowgun, which resembles a cigarette; a cigarette lighter can also be used as a powerful mechanical dart gun, shooting a poisoned dart across a room.

Other weapons include the traditional silencer-equipped machine guns, pistols, and burp guns. These are usually equipped with custom-made ammunition that explodes on impact. "Whatever the dark side of man can conceive, we have in our arsenal," a former agent said.

"What can we conclude about the CIA and the use of 'Kill Squads'?"

Although a newcomer to international espionage, the Central Intelligence Agency has become one of the world's leading—perhaps the best—intelligence gathering agencies. However, the basic weakness in any spy organization is that a reckless, untruthful, unscrupulous schemer makes the perfect agent. The perfect agent can always be dangerous to a democratic society, unless held in check. We have focused on a single aspect of the CIA; there are many achievements and several failures.

Today when we are so closely examining the CIA after seeing how the Executive Branch of government tried to—and did—use this organization, we must make sure that it can never happen again. It's a small step from obtaining disguises to "eliminating" the opposition. The CIA was formed to preserve the freedom of the people of the U.S.—we must never give it the opportunity to become our master. \*

EDITOR & PUBLISHER  
22 MARCH 1975

## High court petition

The U.S. Supreme Court has been petitioned to overturn an appellate court ruling which sustained the CIA's right to suppress writings of former employees about what they learned while working for the agency. The petition for a high court hearing was made by Victor L. Marchetti and John D. Marks, co-authors of the partly censored book, "CIA and the Cult of Intelligence," joined by publisher Alfred A. Knopf Inc.



WASHINGTON POST  
16 MARCH 1975

## Marchetti Appeals to High Court

By John P. MacKenzie  
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Supreme Court was asked yesterday to decide whether the Central Intelligence Agency has broad power to suppress writings of former employees about what they learned while working for the CIA.

Victor L. Marchetti and John D. Marks, coauthors of the partly censored book, "CIA and the Cult of Intelligence," joined publisher Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. in seeking a high court hearing.

The Fourth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals last month sustained the CIA's right to enforce its secrecy agreement with Marchetti, a former high-ranking agency employee, and relaxed the CIA's burden of proving that deleted passages from the book contained classified information.

The lower court "prostrated itself before the totem of national security," the petition said, "and completely ignored the compelling claims of free speech and free press, which are guaranteed by the Constitution."

In addition to the constitutional attack, the petition challenged the CIA's right to obtain an injunction preventing publication of the disputed passages on grounds that Congress had not authorized such court orders despite the agency's requests.

The authors and publisher had won a significant victory last year when District Judge Albert V. Bryan Jr. in Alexandria rejected the CIA's claim that more than 200 items of information had been classified. Bryan said the agency appeared to classify the information on the spot when it screened the manuscript.

But the court of appeals held that information should be deemed classified if it was "classifiable" and appeared anywhere on a government document bearing a classification stamp. The court said there was a "presumption of regularity in performance by public officials" safeguarding government secrets, so that if an item could have been classified it was in fact classified.

Melvin L. Wulf and Floyd Abrams, attorneys for the authors and publisher, said the appellate court ignored evidence that government classi-

LONDON TIMES  
22 March 1975

## CIA cooperating with British secret service in fighting terrorism and subversion despite some friction

By Louis Heren

An American newspaper report that Britain's Secret Intelligence Service is upset because the Central Intelligence Agency failed to pass on the results of its operations in Britain has been dismissed as fiction by those in a position to know.

The two agencies have always closely cooperated with each other since the SIS helped to organize the CIA in the late forties. Moreover, it was said, the CIA does not operate in Britain.

There is, of course, a CIA station in London, but any information it wanted on British affairs would almost certainly be available from official sources. If it were not available, the British security services could be expected to cooperate.

According to sources there has, however, been some friction between the two agencies. The first is due to antipathy between personalities, which is generally unavoidable when two nations cooperate, although there is said to be less friction between the two intelligence agencies than between, say, the Foreign Office and the State Department.

The second is that the SIS, and indeed other friendly intelligence services, is beginning to feel that the CIA can no longer be trusted with secrets because defectors such as Marchetti and Agee are likely to publish them. There is also some apprehension that they could be revealed during the course of impending congressional investigations into the CIA.

The staff of the CIA station in London includes only analysts, researchers and administrators. That is standard practice as even the defectors have made clear in their revelations.

Mr Cord Meyer, the station chief, originally worked for a One World movement, and afterwards became expert in international organizations and relations, especially labour relations.

He is typical of the CIA's senior men, and probably would not know how to spy if given the opportunity.

The existence of the CIA station here is well known to Mr Wilson as it was to Mr Heath and previous Prime Ministers. The SIS station in Washington is also known to the White House. Again this is standard practice.

Mr Wilson is also personally acquainted with CIA men. For instance, Mr Chet Cooper, who was second in command of the CIA's London station before becoming a special assistant to President Johnson, was in an upstairs room in Chequers the night the Prime Minister tried to reach an agreement with Mr Kosygin, the Soviet Prime Minister, to prolong the bombing pause in Vietnam in the sixties.

Mr Cooper was there, with an open line to the White House, because Mr Wilson knew that he could trust him.

The Labour motion calling on the Government to declare the resident CIA men *persona non grata* therefore served no purpose, except perhaps to distract attention from the visit here next month of Mr Shelepin, the former head of the KGB.

Unbeknown to those who signed the motion, the purpose of those behind the campaign may have been to discredit the new American Ambassador, Mr Elliot Richardson.

The main mutual interests of the CIA and the British intelligence and security services, apart from sharing a variety of information from third countries, is the detection of foreign spies in the upper reaches of governments. Another is the struggle against international terrorism.

The latter obviously requires close cooperation between most friendly intelligence services, especially since the terrorist groups have established links

with the Mafia and other criminal elements.

A third is subversion. Lord Chalfont spoke about this renewed threat in a recent debate in the House of Lords. The Times reported last year that the CIA was investigating subversion in Britain. It was denied, but there is no reason to believe that the report was not generally correct.

The extra CIA men then reported to be in Britain were understood to be experts skilled in the use of advanced surveillance techniques. They had come to Britain to help train members of British security services.

In the Lords debate, Lord Chalfont said: "There were also in society a considerable number of people known in the jargon of intelligence as 'sleepers'. They did not pursue at this moment any extremist or subversive activity but when the time came would be activated and do whatever they had to do to achieve their aims."

The "sleepers" are said to be placed in strategic areas, such as public utilities, the docks and the various communications systems, as well as elsewhere. It is said that in the event of a national emergency they could bring the country to a standstill.

This may sound overly dramatic, but it cannot be dismissed as a figment of the heated imagination of Colonel Stirling and his private army. It is a danger taken quite seriously, but level-headedly, not only in Britain, but in the United States and other Western countries.

There is small reason to get excited about what can only be regarded as another phase of the ideological struggle that has long been evident, but it helps to explain why friendly governments want close cooperation between their intelligence services.

Such cooperation is as essential as Interpol is in the detection of international crime.

NEW YORK DAILY NEWS  
19 MARCH 1975

## CIA Woos Congress

By JOSEPH VOLZ and FRANK VAN RIPER

Washington, March 18 (News Bureau)—The Central Intelligence Agency, apparently trying to win over freshman congressmen, invited the 75 newcomers to breakfast in the well guarded spy shop today. But the get-acquainted affair fell flat when Director William E. Colby refused to answer detailed questions about alleged assassination plots.

Only about 20 freshmen lawmakers showed up for the breakfast at the agency's headquarters in nearby Langley, Va.

Many of the freshman said they had been disappointed at Colby's reticence.

Colby reportedly gave only

one definite response during the hour-long session, that at times saw him managing a slide projector to help deliver his lecture. That was when he was asked if the CIA had had anything to do with the John F. Kennedy assassination. "No," the director replied.

fyng officers do not classify everything that could be classified.

The book has been published with numerous blank spaces marking CIA deletions.

If the court decides to hear the case, oral argument would be in the fall. If the court rejects the petition, the appellate court ruling will stand.



# CIA deserves praise for Project Jennifer

By SMITH HEMPSTONE

WASHINGTON — When Jack Anderson blew the CIA's cover on Operation Jennifer, he compromised not only a possible second attempt to raise the rest of that Russian sub from the floor of the Pacific but other potential similar salvage operations that could have contributed to our national security.

It is impossible to say what might have been retrieved this July from the Golf class boat that sank 750 miles off Hawaii in 1968, if only because it is not clear what precisely was salvaged last summer.

Most of the reports imply that the \$350-million operation recovered the forward third of the diesel-electric submarine containing the remains of some of the Russian crew but neither hydrogen-warhead missiles nor coding machine.

Had a second salvage attempt, now almost certainly precluded by Anderson's radio broadcast and the press reports that followed it, been successful, the results certainly would have been

worth the money.

Had the salvage of the Golf class boat been completed in secrecy, would it have been possible for the CIA ship, *Glomar Explorer* to retrieve the remains of the nuclear-powered November class Russian submarine that is believed to have sunk off Spain in April, 1970? Recovery of that whale-shaped boat's nuclear plant would have been an intelligence coup of the first order.

With the perfect vision of hindsight, the CIA's critics maintain that Project Jennifer was both stupid — since it conceivably could damage relations with the Soviet Union — and wasteful.

But a couple of points have to be made:

The operation was well within the CIA's mandate. It was subjected to intense scrutiny within the government, approved by the "Forty Committee" of the National Security Council chaired by Henry Kissinger

and okayed by Presidents Nixon and Ford. Key congressmen including Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield and Rep. Lucien Nedzi, chairman of the House Select Intelligence Committee, were briefed on Jennifer.

Given the continuing Soviet arms build-up and the uncertainty of the Kremlin's intentions, the CIA would have been derelict in its duty had it not made the effort to gain the intelligence sealed in the sunken sub's crushed hull.

The CIA is wide open to criticism on some matters. But that members of Congress and other people should attack the agency for conducting an imaginative project for which it should be praised shows what a topsy-turvy world this is.

Jack Anderson won the Pulitzer Prize in 1972 for revealing the American "tilt" toward Pakistan during the Indo-Pakistani War. For blowing the cover on an ongoing, important and legitimate CIA operation, he ought to get the Daniel Ellsberg Award for 1975.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR  
2 April 1975

## CIA denies this one

By the Associated Press

Miami  
A former mortgage broker says his office concocted phony mortgages which netted \$3 million or \$4 million on behalf of what he believed was the CIA, the Miami Herald said in recent editions. The CIA said it was not involved in the scheme.

Andres Castro told the Herald a story of interstate shulduggery that ended when his brokerage license was seized and he started running to avoid people who had been defrauded, the newspaper said.

"The CIA made me do it," Mr. Castro told the Herald.

But the Herald quoted a CIA spokesman as saying, "This poor guy's been taken, and it's none of our doing whatsoever. This one ain't on us, dad."

The Herald said at least the federal grand jury was investigating the fraud scheme and Mr. Castro was under investigation by several federal agencies.

The scheme involved doubling mortgages by selling good ones along with forged ones to raise money fast, the newspaper said.

Mr. Castro said he believed he was dealing with the CIA because one of the men involved was Antonio Yglesias, who has a long history of CIA connections dating back to the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, the Herald said.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, THURSDAY, MARCH 20, 1975

## British M.P.'s Link 10 Attaches to C.I.A.

Special to The New York Times

LONDON, March 19—Labor members of Parliament said tonight that 10 officials listed as attachés at the United States Embassy here were linked with the Central Intelligence Agency.

A motion presented to the House of Commons by 34 members, most of them associated with the left wing of the governing party, demanded the immediate expulsion of the officials unless the United States Government could substantiate that they were truly diplomats.

One of the signers: Dennis Skinner, named Cord Meyer Jr. as head of the C.I.A.'s embassy team and said he was shortly to be withdrawn from Britain.

Mr. Meyer is known to be the C.I.A. station chief in Britain, although he is listed in the Foreign Office's London Diplomatic List as "attaché." He is understood to be due for retirement in August.

Others Listed

The motion named the other nine as:

Benjamin J. Price, John W. Coffey, Sidney Bearman, A. Spencer Braham, William McGhee, Joseph C. Thep, Joseph P. Sherman, George Ford II and John A. Reed Jr. Mr. Reed is listed in the Diplomatic List as "Attaché (political-military)" and all the others as "attaché."

Several have been listed in the State Department's biographical records as having been "analysts" and "communications officers."

Two other signers of the motion, Stanley Newens and Thomas Litterick, said they had carried out an investigation that indicated none of the 10 were employees of any United States Government agencies with legitimate interest in foreign affairs.

Mr. Newens has often been linked with left-wing causes and his name frequently appears on rank-and-file motions such as the one presented tonight. Mr. Litterick has been in the Commons only six months.

Although the motion was signed by 34 members, it is unlikely the Government will find time to debate it.

The motion says the C.I.A. has interfered in the internal affairs of many countries and the "subversion and overthrow of governments in Guatemala, Iran, Guyana, Chile and other countries."

It asks the Government to inform the United States that evidence exists to indicate that the 10 accorded diplomatic credentials are associated with C.I.A. work and adds, "Unless this can be disproved forthwith, each must be regarded as persona non grata and withdrawn from Britain immediately."

Prime Minister Wilson was asked in the Commons yesterday whether he would take action against C.I.A. activities in this country. He replied that he was awaiting the outcome of the inquiry into the C.I.A. being held in the United States and would not hesitate to hold an independent inquiry should evidence be found that its agents were operating in Britain under diplomatic cover.

U.S. NEWS &amp; WORLD REPORT, April 7, 1975

# A CRIPPLED CIA— AS U.S. SEEKS CRITICAL ANSWERS

Seldom has this country had greater need of an efficient intelligence service overseas. Yet, experts report: Never has the CIA been in such disarray as it is today.

America's worldwide espionage apparatus is being shaken to its foundations by the crisis currently gripping the Central Intelligence Agency.

A "damage assessment" based on information from top CIA officials and Allied intelligence authorities in Europe shows—

- Foreigners serving as secret agents are frightened that they will be exposed by leaks in Washington—which could be fatal. Result: A number of veteran spies are curtailing their activities or quitting altogether.

- Recruiting of new foreign agents overseas is falling off sharply. Some who volunteered have since changed their minds. They regard the risk as too great.

- Intelligence services in friendly countries are worried about continued collaboration with the CIA. They are fearful that their secrets may be compromised or their governments embarrassed. The London *Times* reports:

"The SIS [Britain's Secret Intelligence Service], and indeed other friendly intelligence services, are beginning to feel that the CIA can no longer be trusted with secrets."

- American companies that in the past extended invaluable assistance to the CIA overseas now are getting cold feet. They fear that their activities in this field—for example, providing "cover" for American agents abroad—may be exposed. That could be disastrous for their foreign enterprises.

**Three probes.** This is only a preliminary inventory of the impact on America's overseas intelligence network of the latest—and most serious—crisis in the 28-year history of the CIA.

The full effect will not be measurable until completion of the three separate investigations that are examining the Agency's operations—one conducted by a "blue ribbon" presidential commission and the other two by Senate and House select committees.

These unprecedented investigations were triggered initially by charges last December that the CIA had engaged in illegal domestic spying on a massive scale—mainly against groups opposing the Vietnam War, and other protest movements.

The scope of the inquiries has been

steadily expanded to encompass new allegations that have surfaced recently.

One claims that Agency officials plotted—but did not carry out—assassinations of three foreign leaders. President Ford is said to have received a verbal report on these incidents from CIA Director William E. Colby.

Another allegation put on the agenda of the three investigating bodies: According to Chief Postal Inspector William J. Cotter, CIA agents for 20 years opened mail to Russia and other Communist countries in violation of postal laws—until he issued an ultimatum in 1973 ordering them to desist.

Even the CIA's latest coup—the salvaging of part of a sunken Soviet missile submarine in the Pacific Ocean—is to be investigated.

The chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Senator Frank Church (Dem.), of Idaho, has questioned the expenditure of a reported 350 million dollars on this project—which included the secret construction of an ocean-mining vessel able to lift a portion of the submarine from 3-mile-deep ocean waters.

**Fear of "witch hunt."** The men who run the CIA now express the fear that what started as a legitimate investigation into alleged wrongdoings may be turning into a witch hunt that could destroy this country's secret intelligence organization. CIA Director Colby put it bluntly:

"The almost hysterical excitement that surrounds any news story mentioning CIA, or referring to any perfectly legitimate activity of CIA, has raised the question whether secret intelligence operations can be conducted by the United States."

Mr. Colby is concerned not only about the damage to America's overseas intelligence setup but also the devastating effect on morale and discipline at the CIA's headquarters in Langley, Va., across the Potomac from Washington. Most of the Agency's 16,000 employees are stationed there.

**Double problem.** A survey indicates that morale is being affected in two ways.

Among one group of CIA officials, there is dismay—and bitterness—caused by the disclosure of the Agency's involvement in improper, and possibly even illegal, activities. The Agency operates on a tightly compartmentalized basis, and this group was largely ignorant of the operations that led to the current crisis.

"These people are asking bitterly how we could have done these things, how

they can explain it to their children," says an official responsible for monitoring staff morale.

They blame officials dealing with covert operations—"the dirty-tricks department"—and counterintelligence for the Agency's troubles.

Another group of CIA staff members are demoralized—and bitter—for a different reason. They feel that the Agency is being "victimized" because of the atmosphere created by Watergate. Their attitude is described by an authoritative source:

"These men believe that they have done their duty during these years, that they have been dedicated citizens. Now they are told that they may need a lawyer."

They complain that they are victims of a "time lag." In the words of one officer with a lifetime career in intelligence: "We are being judged by the ethics and security needs of 1975 for actions that were considered necessary in the cold-war climate of the 1950s and 1960s. Junior officers in the CIA are asking whether they will be called upon in 1990 to explain what they are doing today."

**Work priority.** A major problem for top CIA officials is to keep both of these groups working effectively while investigations unfold and new sensations are splashed in the newspapers.

"You must understand how all of this is affecting the culture pattern of intelligence," declares a ranking officer. "People in this business feel that they are supposed to lead secret lives, hidden away out of the glare of publicity. Imagine how damaging it is to morale when they read stories almost daily in their newspapers about the secret operations of the CIA and when many of them are called to testify before congressional committees."

The CIA's operations at its Langley headquarters are adversely affected in another way by the current furor. Director Colby is compelled to spend more than half of his time defending the CIA before various investigating bodies and dealing with other problems unrelated to his job of gathering and analyzing intelligence.

**A paper problem.** Besides the demands of the official investigations, top CIA officials also are being forced to devote more and more time to handling requests for documents under the new Freedom of Information Act.

Because of the exceedingly sensitive nature of intelligence operations, these requests must be processed by senior officials.

Mr. Colby says that one specific request would require the agency to search through and review 900,000 files. He adds:

"A good-faith attempt to comply with the spirit of the new Freedom of Information Act will have a serious impact on this Agency."

Among CIA officials, there now is a consensus that in spite of the danger of compromising secrets, a thoroughgoing investigation is essential to restore Agency morale and public confidence.

It's felt that there is no other way for the Agency to make its case. A high-ranking officer who is resigning in order to organize a campaign to defend the

WILLIAM F. BUCKLEY Jr.

# CIA Has to Lie Until The Leaks Get Plugged

CIA explains:

"Snowballing innuendo, egregious stories and charges, and even honest concerns have presented us with a basic dilemma of issuing either a general statement which reassures few but preserves security, or a comprehensive accounting which satisfies some but at the expense of operations and agents."

The officer, David Phillips, chief of Latin-American operations, says that under the circumstances "there is little doubt that a thorough congressional review is the best, if not the only solution, even though some leakage of sensitive details on foreign operations seems almost inevitable."

"Wasn't illegal." Mr. Colby, the CIA Director, expresses confidence that the investigations will exonerate the Agency on the main charges leveled against it. In his words:

"I think that the results of the investigation will rather clearly show . . . that the program that we undertook to identify foreign links with American dissident movements was not a massive one in the numbers involved, was not a domestic one because it was basically foreign, and it wasn't illegal because it was under our charter and our National Security Act."

He maintains that all questionable domestic operations were terminated in 1973—after the entire staff of the CIA was invited to submit private reports directly to the Director concerning any improper activity of which they were aware.

Whatever the ultimate outcome of the three-way investigation of the Agency, this fact is now becoming increasingly clear:

America's worldwide intelligence apparatus will be operating under a severe handicap at a time of dangerous crisis in U.S. foreign policy.

Henry L. Stimson, the former secretary of war, is often quoted as having said, in the manner of a character in a P. G. Wodehouse novel, that "gentlemen don't read other gentlemen's mail." That observation which aborted an inchoate Central Intelligence Agency — and left us all feeling very good about the natural aristocratic habits of our secretary of war — may just have had something to do with failing to abort a world war — which left us feeling very bad, particularly those who died fighting that war. It is only true that gentlemen don't read other gentlemen's mail in a world in which gentlemen can be counted on not to launch wars against one another.

It is highly improbable, as Lincoln said in his most famous address, which is intoned but never analyzed, that self-governing republics can last very long in the tumult of history. There are many reasons for this, but one of them is the insistence that knowledge of everything that goes on always leads to an improvement in the general situation. It might be called the Masters and Johnson approach to political democracy. It is in very full flower at the moment, and the investigations of the activity of the Central Intelligence Agency are a case in point.

Miles Copeland, the author who was once with the CIA and still speaks and writes about it more authoritatively and engagingly than anyone I know, has written an essay called, "Is There a CIA in Your Future?" Consider, please, a most remarkable passage in it.

" . . . Almost all the agency people I talked to" — Copeland is referring to a recent visit to Washington (he now lives in London) — "assured me unashamedly, almost proudly, 'Of course we are going to lie to the congressional committees.' They felt that as loyal Americans they cannot do otherwise — except in the unlikely event the members of the committees can be held accountable for their leaks, impossible in the present atmosphere.

"Let me give an example. Let us sup-

pose (I'm not saying he is, but let us suppose) that Algeria's President Boumedienne is cooperating hand in glove with the CIA in its pursuit of the terrorists who have received sanctuary or training in his country, while appeasing the Palestinians and his own extremists by pretending publicly that he hates us. And let us suppose that some member of Sen. Church's committee asks Bill Colby, 'Mr. Colby, is it true that President Boumedienne is secretly cooperating with the CIA?'

"Well, Mr. Colby will at that moment have before him three alternatives. He can say, 'Yes, Senator, that is so' — in which case, past experience tells him, the whole world will be able to read his answer the next day in the New York Times, and either Boumedienne's cooperation or Boumedienne himself will be finished.

"Or he can say, 'Sorry, Senator, but that's top-secret information' — with the same result, since such an answer will be interpreted as a 'yes' by the American press, the American public, the Algerian public and, of course, the members of the committee. Or he can say, 'Who? Did you say Boumedienne? My God, I never heard anything so ridiculous!' A lie. For the good of all of us, including the congressmen who must take the blame for any leak.

"Let us hope that Bill Colby lies. Our mutual friends at the agency assure me that he will — or that if he doesn't, he will be finished, and that some of those who will be first in line calling for his head will be those very congressmen who were supposed to be beneficiaries of his candor."

I cannot imagine a better example of the kind of thing we face. Congress begins by failing to enact legislation that effectively punishes someone who perpetrates a leak. Can't do it, some of them say — First Amendment. But if the First Amendment makes it impossible to insist on secrecy, do you say then. Very well, the world will get on without secrecy? Try it. But first, create a gentlemen's world.

WASHINGTON POST  
1 April 1975

## CIA Monitoring Urged by Four

United Press International

A panel of four professors gave the Rockefeller Commission conflicting testimony yesterday over the best way to prevent the Central Intelligence Agency from invading the privacy of Americans.

A panel of four professors from the Central Intelligence Agency on the privacy of Americans.

All four agreed that some sort of agency should be created to oversee the CIA in an effort to monitor its spy activities. Some said the monitoring effort could be conducted inside the CIA while others argued for an independent board.

The four appeared at the 12th weekly meeting of the commission, which was created by President Ford to investigate charges of illegal domestic spying by the CIA and to recommend possible changes in the agency's charter to more clearly prohibit domestic activity.

Arthur R. Miller, a Harvard law professor, said that the CIA could set up its own board to monitor its activities.

But William W. Van Alstyne, a Duke University law professor, said he did not believe such a board would be

"publicly reassuring."

Edward J. Bloustein, president of Rutgers University, said he also favored an independent agency named by the executive, legislative, and judicial branches.

The fourth witness, Dr. Orville J. Brim Jr., president of the Foundation for Child Development, New York City, and an expert on individual privacy, said he also believed in an independent body.

In addition to the four professors, the commission also heard from a CIA official not named for security reasons.

NEW YORK DAILY NEWS  
17 MARCH 1975

BELLA & THE CIA

Queens: It was most gratifying to read that the Central Intelligence Agency had been keeping tabs on Rep. Bella Abzug. I hope that it is doing the same with every other American who thinks he or she has the right to deal with Communist-bloc nations. Individual rights do not supersede the security of the nation

BILL B.

NATION  
5 APRIL 1975

# BOOKS & THE ARTS

## CIA: Can We Reform It? Can We Afford It At All?

### I. Watching the Watchmen

**INSIDE THE COMPANY: CIA Diary.**  
By Philip Agee. Penguin Books, Ltd.  
640 pp. 95 pence.

**Rep. Michael J. Harrington**

Like corpses sent to the bottom of a river, stories of CIA wrongdoing were bound to come to the surface eventually. But few critics would have predicted that so much incriminating evidence could float to the top in just half a year.

It has been about that long since revelations of CIA activity in Chile first made front-page news, coinciding with numerous articles and books attempting to penetrate the fog surrounding the U.S. intelligence community. Since then, accounts of widespread domestic surveillance have stimulated the public's interest all the more, finally provoking the Congress to take action.

The Central Intelligence Agency, for its part, took the counteroffensive early. When *The CIA: The Cult of Intelligence* was in proof, the agency had portions censored, claiming that the authors, John Marks and Victor Marchetti, were not allowed to use certain information because of the secrecy oaths they signed when they were on the inside. As a result, the book was published with gaps of white space where sensitive information was deleted.

Now another damning book by a former CIA agent has come out, but this one requires no filling-in of the blanks. Unlike the Marks-Marchetti book, it couldn't be censored because the author, Philip Agee, gave the publication rights for the first edition to a British publishing company and does not plan to return to the United States until it is published here—which it will be, because publishers don't sign secrecy oaths.

When it appears in American bookstores, *Inside the Company: CIA Diary*, even though it is long and detailed, will probably be as successful as it has been in the British Commonwealth. In fact, it may be for just this reason that it has succeeded. Public curiosity has been aroused but far from satisfied by the limited accounts available thus far.

To those who have followed the CIA or U.S.-Latin American politics more than casually, much of Agee's information is at least predictable. For the ex-

perts, much was common knowledge. Almost since the beginning of the Republic, the United States has manhandled Latin American nations, and the potential dimensions of CIA activity have been recognized since the agency was created at the start of the cold war in 1947. What shocks us in Agee's book are the specifics. Based on the quality and quantity of the CIA's operations in just three Latin American nations, the worldwide possibilities are staggering.

Written in diary form (though the author admits to having reconstructed his twelve-year association with "the Company"), Agee traces his development from a Midwestern Catholic university through tours with Air Force intelligence at the beginning of his CIA career to specialized covert training, assignments in Ecuador, Uruguay, Washington, D.C. and Mexico, and ultimately, to his estrangement from the agency. The concluding chapters, describing the tribulations of writing the book with CIA harassment, demonstrate the CIA's less-than-official attempts at censorship.

Agee's stories of the life of an agent run from the mundane to the bizarre. Hours are spent opening and reading mail; intricate plans are made to coerce potential informants. And, like every organization man, Agee tells of playing golf with the boss and worrying about promotions.

Of course, each bureaucracy has its stories to tell, but behind the anecdotes in Agee's account lies a bigger story—one of buying and selling state officials (Agee lists four Latin American Presidents) and of governing governments (Agee relates the CIA's manipulation of Ecuador's political parties, press and military which resulted in the 1963 coup).

As Agee tells it, his first years in the service were satisfying, and he worked hard. It wasn't until the U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic and his own awakening to the brutality of CIA-supported governments that he began to question what he was doing. His disenchantment, which stemmed from assignments such as infiltrating the Olympic Games in 1968, led him to general conclusions about U.S. foreign policy.

Even with its focus on personal history, the book illustrates fundamental dilemmas about our foreign relations. What ought the United States to do abroad? What tenets should guide our decisions?

Last December President Ford, in explaining U.S. involvement in the so-called "destabilization" of Salvador Allende's government in Chile, gave an answer that reflects official thinking since

1947. "Our government, like other governments, does take certain actions in the intelligence field to help implement foreign policy and protect national security."

At the bottom of this response is an "anything goes" mentality that fails to draw a distinction between intelligence gathering and covert intervention. Congress shares the blame for the repercussions of this thinking. Neither the House nor the Senate has seriously pondered the implications of lumping benign intelligence activity with aggressive subversion. In fact, oversight committees, by refusing over the years to ask pertinent questions about CIA operations, have not faced the fact that both exist.

Consequently, CIA operations have been guided by only one rule: don't get caught. The result has been intervention such as Agee describes in Ecuador and Uruguay, neither of which poses even the remotest hemispheric threat to our "national security."

Olin Robinson of Bowdoin College has explained the phenomenon simply: "The CIA suffers from a syndrome which might be labeled 'all dressed up and nowhere to go.' It is an organization with extraordinary capabilities employing some of the most talented people in government service (the Watergate personalities notwithstanding). The natural bureaucratic tendency is toward self-perpetuation, and no large organization is likely to change its policies and operations without external pressure to do so."

Since Agee started his book three years ago, the serious threat to the nation's well-being posed by the existence of an intelligence agency that is armed for cold war has increased. It is clearly up to the Congress to put the heat on the CIA so it will not frustrate efforts for détente.

This is the only realistic approach. The ability of the United States to dictate to the rest of the world, including Latin America, has diminished. And it has become increasingly obvious that where we have intervened in the affairs of other nations, we have not necessarily improved the quality of life for their citizens but rather supported repressive regimes such as that of the Chilean junta. With the increasing economic interdependence of nations, international opinion carries more weight and demands that the United States treat its neighbors civilly.

A re-evaluation of the Central Intelligence Agency in the light of these foreign policy considerations should be one of the main tasks of the Congressional select committees that will be investigating intelligence in the coming months. While the CIA may not be obsolete, as Agee suggests, its policies certainly are anachronistic. And there is reason to believe that company men as dedicated as Agee seems to have been will be valuable

*Michael Harrington represents the 6th District in Massachusetts and is a member of the new House Select Committee to investigate intelligence operations. An outspoken critic of the intelligence community, he also serves on the House Foreign Affairs Committee.*

once agency guidelines are squared with legitimate foreign policy concerns. In the meantime, Agee's testimony is a useful and necessary reminder of the genuine horrors of unchecked spying. □

## 2: Who Profits by Worldsnoop?

**THE CIA AND THE CULT OF INTELLIGENCE.** By Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks. Alfred A. Knopf. 393 pp. \$8.95. Paper: Dell Publishing Co. \$1.75.

**THE SECRET TEAM: The CIA and its Allies in Control of the United States and the World.** By L. Fletcher Prouty. Prentice-Hall. 496 pp. \$8.95. Paper: Ballantine Books. \$1.95.

### JAMES HIGGINS

If it is true, as world figures of "the Socialist camp" have recently been suggesting, that the international struggle between their way of life and ours is shifting from military confrontation to ideological competition, where does that leave the CIA? Under scrutiny. Reporters, book writers—some of them with direct or associated CIA experience—a Presidential commission and two select Congressional committees, one from the House, one the Senate, have placed the CIA in the most public position since its creation as a super-secret, financially unaccountable, globally free-wheeling-and-dealing gang of operatives and operators in 1947. That is to say, the Central Intelligence Agency was founded on cold-war premises, assigned to beat the bad guys by hook or crook, advised that the phrase "national security" would be employed on the highest levels to justify any damn thing that went right or wrong—expected, in short, to serve as roving agents of the policy of corporate geographical expansionism which had its origins in the Westward-ho era of the 19th century, initiated almost as soon as the Civil War came to an end.

This has to be clear: that the CIA has functioned, bankrolled by billions of public money to be sure, in behalf of private economic interests—of what used to be called simply big business. It is not made clear, however—not "perfectly clear" perhaps I should say—in much of what has so far been written about the CIA. Exceptions, let me quickly add, can be noted. For example, material published by NACLA (North American Congress on Latin America) and by certain other radical and liberal institutions has been informed by the CIA-big business perspective. I gather, too, that the book by the former CIA officer Philip Agee, already released in England and also scheduled for U.S. publication here by Straight Arrow Books (Rolling Stone), reflects such a point of view. Agee discussed his book, *Inside The Company: CIA Diary*, in an interview with John Gerassi carried by a weekly Boston periodical, *The Real Paper*, in the issue of February 19. "I have learned over the years," Agee said,

"that the CIA and the government as a whole does not represent the interest of the people of the United States. Its main function—and this is clear in our policies in Latin America, in those policies which I helped to carry out for twelve years—is to help, to represent that class of Americans who profit in Latin America . . . the rich."

There seems to be a certain logic, a logic of time and development, governing the process of the production of books about the CIA. Compare, for instance, the political-economy understanding of Agee with that indicated by the authors of two earlier volumes, *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence* by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, and *The Secret Team* by L. Fletcher Prouty. (Both are now available in paperback; Marchetti served as much time in the CIA as Agee, mostly in Washington; Marks was once a State Department intelligence analyst; Prouty, nine years an Air Force colonel, acted as liaison officer in procurement between the Department of Defense and the CIA.) At one point Marchetti-Marks, with what I assume to be agreement, quote the columnist Tom Braden, "former high-ranking CIA covert expert," as saying in January 1973: "Josef Stalin's decision to attempt conquest of Western Europe by manipulation, the use of fronts and the purchase of loyalty turned the Agency (CIA) into a house of dirty tricks. It was necessary. Absolutely necessary, in my view. But it lasted long after the necessity was gone." Prouty takes the retrospective position that U.S. leaders (such as Harry Truman) got off on the wrong foot by automatically "reacting" to Communist strategy and tactics rather than buckling down to the formation of an affirmative, presumably democratic course of action in the post-World War II world.

I have no intention of downgrading the Marchetti-Marks and Prouty books. They are valuable, instructive works, written by "insiders" who know what they're talking about and who finally discovered that they were compelled to take the risks involved in revealing CIA subversion of democratic tenets. Furthermore, both books seem to have played a part in persuading members of Congress, after almost twenty-eight years, to establish special committees charged with responsibility for checking out CIA activities at home as well as abroad. That may be somewhat less significant than, say, the influence Tom Paine's *Common Sense* had upon governmental matters but it is, nonetheless, in these days when nearly almighty power is attributed to the electronic media, quite an accomplishment for print. Which is, also,

the medium of expression of Seymour Hersh of *The New York Times*, Lawrence Stern of *The Washington Post* and Jack Anderson, all of whose reports on the CIA no doubt contributed to the Congressional decisions—urged there by, among others, Rep. Michael Harrington of Massachusetts, Sen. William Proxmire of Wisconsin and Sen. Frank Church of Idaho. Church, by the way, heads the Select Committee of the Senate, where his experience as chairman of the Foreign Relations subcommittee on multinational corporations may come in handy in getting to the fundamental CIA point—that it is in cahoots with big business, which reigns, now more openly than ever, in the executive branch. Indeed, the story of the journalistic exposure of the role of the CIA in world affairs begins much earlier with *The Nation's* special issue devoted to that very subject, written by the veteran journalist, Fred J. Cook, and published June 24, 1961.

At any rate, the Prouty and Marchetti-Marks books and the Philip Agee account are different from books about the CIA written before 1971, when it became evident that the cold war, and its attendant devil theory of communism, were being toned down. The rationale for earlier semi-official documentaries by leaders of the agency—Allen Dulles, who is listed as author of *The Craft of Intelligence*, and Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, writer of *The Real CIA*—no longer applied, politically speaking. This gives their books, already, a flavor of ancient history. And even though the same cannot be said for some other books rooted in that period—*The Invisible Government* by David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, an ambitious and valiant job of investigative reporting; *The Secret War* by Sanche de Gramont; Stewart Steven's *Operation Splinter Factor*; and Miles Copeland's *Without Cloak or Dagger*—the fact remains that these were done by outsiders. Whereas Prouty, Marchetti and Agee were CIA insiders, whose rethinking of their lives, their roles, the nature of the agency's "operations," could not have occurred, in my opinion, until big business switched the foreign policy signals. This switch also accounts for the distinction between the objectives of Marchetti and Prouty on the one hand and Agee on the other.

All three have horror stories to tell. But Prouty and Marchetti, first on the scene with their books critical of the CIA, concentrate mainly on the word I have just placed in quotes: "operations." Both mention Harry Truman's 1963 remark: "I never had any thought when I set up the CIA that it would be injected into peacetime cloak-and-dagger operations." Marchetti gets even more specific, using former CIA Director Richard Helms as source: "Operations" involves overthrowing foreign governments, subverting elections, bribing officials and waging "secret" wars. He goes on to make the point that "the Watergate scandal has also opened up the CIA to increased scrutiny." Undoubtedly it has. Whether or not Watergate was



CIA "operation," who yet knows? But if the word "foreign" is omitted from the Helms-derived description of what the CIA has been up to for more than a quarter of a century, the words come pretty close to fitting as much as we so far have learned about the Watergate affair.

*The Secret Team and The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence*, as I get their message, argue that in practicing cloak-and-dagger operations all over the world, the CIA has ruthlessly expanded its 1947 legal mandate and become a law unto itself. It has converted, in other words, a legitimate commission to collect information into the kind of gangster-style activity to which Helms refers and with which many of us are now familiar, from Iran and Guatemala in the early 1950s to Chile in 1973. Prouty and Marchetti imply that if only the CIA could be re-restricted to the gathering of intelligence, it might still serve a useful purpose. Agee, in his interview with Gerassi, says: "If the American people could learn this [how the overthrow of Salvador Allende in Chile was financed chiefly by a CIA front, the American Institute for Free Labor Development] and all the other frauds perpetrated on them by the CIA . . . I am convinced that the clamor would be so great that Congress would destroy the CIA." If, as I am speculating, the new 1971 tack in U.S. foreign policy toward the Soviet Union and China caused disturbances within the CIA, it is plain that Agee's disillusionment has brought him to political conclusions more drastic than those of Prouty and Marchetti—and of a number of others in the Congress and in public life, who continue to envision a safer and more respectable CIA, one, so to speak, from whose hands the guns will be removed.

But what does big business envision? Well, the violent counterrevolution in Chile several years after competitive coexistence had been announced as the international aim of the United States offers a clue. As does, also, CIA endeavors to suppress and then censor the Marchetti-Marks book—which they and their publishers, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., assisted by the American Civil Liberties Union, are still fighting in the courts. *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence*, the first book the U.S. Government ever attempted to censor by legal action before publication, finally appeared with 168 spaces in the text where only the word "DELETED" is to be found. The context makes evident that certain key

deletions refer to Chile.

On September 4, 1974, a Hersh report in *The New York Times* began: "The director of the Central Intelligence Agency has told Congress that the Nixon Administration authorized more than \$8 million for covert activities by the agency in Chile between 1970 and 1973 to make it impossible for President Salvador Allende Gossens to govern." Could this news have been one of the "DELETED"s from Marchetti's book? I think so. Anyway, by September 16 the news had been confirmed by no less than President Ford, who, in reply to a press conference question, started out by saying, "Let me answer in general." He did so: "Our government, like other governments, does take certain actions in the intelligence field to help implement foreign policy and protect national security." He then went on to say that as he understood it there was no direct U.S. involvement in the "coup itself" (of September 11, 1973) but that, yes, "in a period of time, three or four years ago," an effort was made to help preserve "opposition newspapers and electronic media . . . and opposition political parties" in Chile. "I think," said the President, "this is in the best interest of the people of Chile and certainly in our own interest." Here is where background reading in Marchetti-Marks, Prouty, the Agee interview and, for that matter, most literature on the CIA, comes to the aid of anyone trying to fathom the serious political complications that would cause a chief of state, administering a foreign policy of coexistence, to take on the responsibility of attempting to give warrant to conduct that contradicts such a policy. At some point this contradiction seems to have hit formerly dedicated CIA representatives, who really believed during their company service that "national security" and "our own interest" were synonymous with defense of democracy, on all fronts and by any means necessary, against communism. As soon as their faith was shaken, they proceeded to struggle with the contradiction by writing their own case histories of the CIA.

Their books furnish evidence for the rationality of their decision. But the Ford Administration, faced with the same contradiction, persists in irrationality. No wonder the government went all-out to delete Chile references from the Marchetti-Marks book. No wonder Ford had to step (be pushed?) forward to repeat, as in an echo chamber, national security nonsense to support a

case for CIA interference in Chile, once the deleted matter came to light in reports by Hersh, Stern and others. The point is that Chile, at one and the same time, implied the old national security argument to have been a historical lie—a big lie, to use the words once applied to Nazi deception of the Germans when big business in Germany sought domination of world resources and people—and also threatened to reveal that under cover of competitive coexistence with the giants of the Socialist camp, the CIA and its masters intended to continue playing dirty tricks wherever possible, their aims being necessarily less grand than the Nazis', and their techniques more sophisticated, but both aims and techniques comparable in design to what Hitler's backers had in mind.

This substantially explains why CIA intervention in Chile, together with the more recent disclosures that the CIA was keeping tabs on thousands of U.S. citizens—if deception appears to be failing, better prepare plans for control—have at last convinced members of Congress to investigate the agency and its works. I think it is significant, too, that according to a Gallup poll many people suspect the investigating commission established by President Ford and chaired by Vice President Rockefeller has been rushed into action to absolve and save the CIA. A plausible suspicion, no doubt, considering the conservative character of the commission. The stage has been set, in any event, for a contest between a relatively progressive Congress and a big-business-dominated executive branch on the question of the past, present and future of the CIA.

I am unable to find reasons to expect the result to be its abolition, as I.F. Stone, in typical tangy prose, recommended in the February 20th issue of *The New York Review of Books*. More likely the hearings will develop an issue which should have high priority in the political campaigns of 1976, although that, of course, depends on how plain the issue is made to the people by those in charge of the hearings, those who report them and those still within the ranks of the CIA—or having connections with it—who may follow the courageous trail blazed by such as Prouty, Marchetti, Marks and Agee. □

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WASHINGTON STAR  
20 March 1975

### CIA, FBI Relay Data on Nazis to INS

The Immigration and Naturalization Service is investigating 33 cases of alleged Nazi war criminals in the United States, using information provided by the CIA and FBI, INS Commissioner Leonard F. Chapman Jr. told a House immigration subcommittee yesterday.

Deputy Commissioner James Greene said the CIA and FBI were asked for information in 1973 after the immigration agency received the names of 70 to 80 persons who may have had Nazi connections. The INS found 17 were dead and no proof was found to link several others to major war crimes.



Q and A

# Libertarian Morgan Hits CIA Secrecy

Charles Morgan, Washington director of the American Civil Liberties Union, was interviewed by Washington Star Staff Writer Norman Kempster.

**Question:** It just has been reported that the CIA contracted for an underwater ship with a cover story that it belonged to Howard Hughes. You have been sharply critical of this arrangement. Why?

**Mc. gan:** The problem to me is that the executive contracted out the war-making power to private corporations. The press reports that we're training the army in Saudi Arabia. We've got a ship roaming around loose someplace out there. Well, good heavens, to turn a ship like that over to Howard Hughes! I should add one thing. These views are my own. There are folks in the ACLU that would disagree with me and on much of what I may say the ACLU has no position.

**Q:** You say the ship was turned over to Hughes. Wasn't the Hughes connection just a cover story to conceal CIA involvement?

**A:** How do I know it's not turned over to him? So, (CIA Director William B.) Colby says it isn't. Who can you believe in that agency? Twenty years they've spent learning to lie. They lie by rote. Is there a difference between Hughes and the CIA?

**Q:** Is there? Are you saying they are the same?

**A:** I don't know. We ought to look into it.

**Q:** Do you have any indication other than this recent situation with the ship that there is a connection?

**A:** Well, certainly, certainly. (Former Hughes aide Robert) Maheu testified, according to the Washington Star, in his depositions in his lawsuit against Hughes that in 1960 he was asked by Hughes to form a link between the CIA and Hughes Tool. He then went further and said that he did not do that. Secondly, he said that he'd been working on an intelligence mission in 1960 in Miami and Hughes had tried to summon him back to Los Angeles, or Las Vegas, or someplace and he refused to go. He did identify the agency — the Central Intelligence Agency. He wouldn't go into what he'd been working on but I think the people of this country are entitled to know.

**Q:** But how much control does Howard Hughes have over what this boat does?

**A:** I have no way of knowing. I don't even know if there is a Howard Hughes. All I know is that I've got to

make several assumptions about it. If there is a Howard Hughes, then I have to assume that he is either sane or insane or something else. If I assume him to be sane, then I have to assume him to be the most secure person in the United States. If I assume him to be insane, then we have turned a very highly risky operation over to a man who is an alleged nut. Now I don't want him out there picking up free hydrogen bombs, or walking around with anything else or risking that my country gets into

war. Now if it's not Hughes, and not Hughes' crew, and there is a risk that we may go to war over that ship, then that's even worse.

**Q:** Do you believe the CIA has a right to contract with private corporations to engage in any of the covert activities that the CIA engages in?

**A:** Let me go back just a little bit. In 1967, we were shocked when we found out the CIA was funding the National Student Association. Now I have an equal shock when I find out the CIA is funding Howard Hughes. Now when I look around at the kinds of things that have happened to Hughes that an average citizen couldn't get consideration on for the past several years: an antitrust exemption for the Dunes Hotel, a tax exemption for his medical foundation, non-extradition from the Bahamas, great Justice Department efforts to keep a United States grand jury from indicting him in Nevada. I look at that and I say to myself, "What are we paying that fellow for?" Secondly, if you have covert operations through an American corporation, where's the check on that? Who runs the war? Does Hughes run the operation, or does the CIA? Or do their interests merge? What happens when they go off and get into trouble? Do we go out and defend them? Is it a war contracted for by the CIA secretly, without the taxpayers' knowing where their money went, without any control at all by the executive or anybody else? That's the problem.

**Q:** You ask some interesting questions. Do you know any of the answers?

**A:** I think the questions answer themselves. I think we should investigate and find out about it.

**Q:** Do you have any indication that the Glomar Explorer was engaged in any activities for the CIA other than the Russian submarine caper?

**A:** Well, I would say without any knowledge of any-

thing other than the public documents and public records, we are putting a remarkable amount of American money into overseas ventures. We've got ships roaming loose, small submarines, tiny things built by corporations over here, the Defense Department and every place else. And I don't really know what we're doing in the sea. All I know is that we are doing something there. I assume we are doing it undercover and the reason that we're doing it undercover is because apparently we're doing something wrong. If we're doing something right then we ought to tell everybody about it and tell them what it costs.

**Q:** If we could get back to the Glomar Explorer. Do you know of any other covert operations conducted by that ship?

**A:** I just don't know about that. I read an article in the March 1975 American Legion Magazine. It's a perceptive article. It ends up saying that Hughes' ship is the only ship that's ready to go to mining overseas. If 75 percent or 80 percent of the mineral wealth of the world is overseas and that ship does also mine, then have we financed a ship to mine overseas and violate a U.N. resolution as I understand it about the ownership of the overseas. Are we in such a tremendous hurry in this country to give away every piece of land under the sea and on land to private corporations to make a fortune on it? Is that ship being used as kind of a symbol over the head of countries negotiating now on a law of the seas agreement over in Geneva? I don't know what other uses that ship has, but I'll tell you one thing — if that ship was a one-time, pick-up-a-submarine kind of venture, then it is worse than a Spruce Gander. The same sauce for the Spruce Goose was the sauce that got the Spruce Gander going, and that sauce is money.

**Q:** Why should the CIA be so concerned about under-seas research?

**A:** I don't know what you do with all these nuclear submarines and all these scientific ships and ventures going on. Maybe we're just in collusion with private oil companies and private mining companies doing research for them and finding out where

minerals and oil are.

**Q:** You've spoken informally of underseas explorer Jaques Cousteau in this context. How does he fit into this?

**A:** As I understand, Cousteau in November 1974 showed up in Pensacola, Fla. in his ship, The Calypso. He said he came for research into the red tide. The unfortunate part of that venture is the world's outstanding oceanographer got there at the season when the red tide isn't a problem. You go beyond that and he does say he is doing research on a U2 type of camera to be used in 1978. He's talking about electric sensors through the gulf, studying pollution. I didn't know that Cousteau worked for the government of the United States, but I do now. So, I can't answer the question, I just know the story's there.

**Q:** Does the Hughes contract with the CIA violate any Securities and Exchange Commission regulations?

**A:** I have read some documents filed with the SEC and they don't seem to make full disclosure of this kind of transaction and this kind of operation that is going on, with respect to prospective stockholders in Global Marine, Inc. (The Hughes company that owns the Glomar Explorer.) It may very well be that in other documents they do. The ones that I've been over look to me like they merit an investigation.

**Q:** Is there any way that a prospective stockholder would be damaged by not having full information about the contract with the CIA?

**A:** When you have full disclosure in corporate documents, you can say, "Wait a minute, if that ship's out in the middle of the ocean and it is being watched by satellites and the Russians know it is there, and it's got a risk factor that it may go, I've got a pretty risky investment."

**Q:** You have been stressing the secrecy that surrounded the submarine matter. You tried to interest several newspapers in the story but they withheld it because of national security considerations until columnist Jack Anderson used it. Do you think the press should withhold information like this?

**A:** Of course not. Newspapers are supposed to do their own job. Newspapers are charged with the duty of putting out the truth and the news. They're not national security agents, they're not official bureaus of the state. The press is supposed to be separate from the government. When a person telephones who you know has been paid for 20 years to be a liar and tells you to kill a story, why would you believe him, unless your experience has been such that you believe you're supposed to cover for the United States government.

**Q:** Why do you suppose this story was held out of print?

**A:** The problem is cowardice. The higher one goes in a bureaucracy, the more he is able to rely on "responsibility" to rationalize his fear. Newspaper owners and executives learn as they move up that there is less risk in being held responsible for stories they don't print than for stories they do print. So, when the CIA or some other set of trained liars come to them, they are inclined to suppress legitimate news.

**Q:** Surely a newspaper executive has a responsibility to decide what goes into print.

**A:** Newspaper owners and executives should limit their power to overruling decisions not to publish. They should recognize cowardice as inherent in the bureaucracy and eliminate their power to kill a story. The 1st Amendment means nothing unless there are news people with the spirit and courage to use it. The wall between the government and the press should be absolute. Otherwise, you wind up with house organs for the CIA. If The New York Times had run the Bay of Pigs story in 1961 there wouldn't have been a Bay of Pigs (invasion) and the nation would have been spared that absurdity.

**Q:** Are you saying that newspapers should ignore the national security impli-

cations of what they print?

**A:** I believe that our only national security is to tell the truth. I think for 35 years we have lost the people of the world, constantly and regularly, by not telling the truth to ourselves or abroad. I've noticed over a 2½ year period that when I bring up the fact that somebody lied in Washington, people just shrug their shoulders, like everybody lies. Well, that's okay in a Machiavellian government. That's okay with a prince. But it's not okay in a democracy. We've gone from cover stories to cover-up, and that's mighty easy for a (Watergate conspirator) Jeb Magruder.

**Q:** You say lying is easy for a Magruder. But the CIA presumably should have more reason to lie than the CRP (Nixon campaign committee). Are you saying that the CIA should lay all of its cards on the table?

**A:** I'm saying we should live by the Constitution. That all the pragmatism and pragmatic arguments I hear are so unreal for a democracy. If we live by democracy and live by the Constitution of the United States, the world would be clamoring to come our way. There have been revolutions fought all over the world for the things we profess to believe in. And what happens is that the policy and practice from the highest level comes down to lying.

BALTIMORE NEWS AMERICAN  
16 MARCH 1975

## There Are No Friends In World of Spying

WASHINGTON—(UPI)—Do our friendly allies spy on Americans in the United States?

They often do. And we spy on them in their home countries.

Intelligence gathering knows neither friend nor foe. In many intelligence areas, allies cooperate and exchange information. But on some delicate subjects, particularly advance information on dramatic policy or strategic changes affecting another country and in technology and weapons, it's every spy for himself.

The American intelligence community envies the pristine anonymity enjoyed by their British cousins—MI5 for internal security like our FBI and MI6 for foreign intelligence, as our CIA.

The security chapter in the almost encyclopaedic anatomy of Britain today runs only two generalized pages and is preceded by a quotation from Thomas Carlyle: "He that has a secret should not only hide it but hide that he has it to hide."

MI6 is covered in two sentences:

"It can safely be revealed

that there are two organizations which were once called MI5 and MI6 (MI stands, rather misleadingly, for military intelligence): The first deals with protecting Britain's own secrets against other countries' spies; the second—whose existence is never officially acknowledged—deals with Britain's own spies . . .

"All newspapers are asked to refrain from publishing the names of security chiefs, and they are referred to by cryptic initials, such as M or C, or simply as 'the director general.'"

The book did not mention that editors of publications violating so-called D notices listing subjects forbidden for publication are subject to imprisonment under the Official Secrets Act.

But the identity of the 1973 MI6 chief was revealed Feb. 7 by the West German weekly magazine Der Stern which named him as Sir John Ogilvy Rennie in connection with charges of heroin possession lodged against his son. Only then did London newspapers, which had the story, dare print his name—quoting Der Stern "foreign publications."

WASHINGTON POST

29 March 1975

# U.S. Ambassador to Portugal Protests Article Citing CIA Tie

By Miguel Acoca

Special to The Washington Post

LISBON, March, 28—U.S. Ambassador Frank Carlucci officially protested today a newspaper article alleging that he was a Central Intelligence Agency "strategist and operator" and that the CIA was behind a Spanish-based, right-wing guerrilla organization plotting to topple the leftist Portuguese government.

The ambassador's protest followed an Information Ministry statement yesterday that the controversial ambassador was "persona grata" in Portugal and expressing disapproval of "irresponsible and unfounded speculation" about him.

Accompanied by visiting U.S. Sen. Edward Brooke, whose home state, Massachusetts, has many Portuguese residents, Carlucci called on Prime minister Vasco Goncalves this evening. He remained to make the protest after the senator left.

Dozens of sources said the session between the ambassador and the premier was "frank," which in diplomatic

terminology usually means there was a difference of opinion.

In leaving, the ambassador said, "I have no comment to make on the meeting. If he wants to comment, let him."

Goncalves' aides gave the impression that the meeting had been stormy, but did not elaborate.

Tuesday, just before Goncalves formed a new coalition Cabinet increasing the number of Communist ministers to two and the number of Marxists to four, Carlucci told President Francisco da Costa Gomes of American concern with Portugal's leftward shift.

At that time, according to informed sources, the president rejected Carlucci's warnings of increased political violence, the danger of a leftist takeover and a growing anti-American campaign. Costa Gomes reportedly told Carlucci that there was less anti-Americanism in Portugal than in other countries, and that fewer than five persons have been killed since leftist officers deposed the rightist dictatorship last year.

Carlucci has been in the headlines here since the rightist military uprising against the leftist ruling military collapsed March 11. He was placed in the limelight by Brig. Gen. Otelo de Carvalho, commander of security forces, who stated that because of the coup attempt, he could not guarantee the ambassador's safety.

The ambassador, who spoke on the phone with Gen. Carvalho immediately afterward, has reportedly been trying to meet the outspoken young revolutionary officer ever since. President Costa Gomes, sources said, promised Carlucci an early encounter with Carvalho.

The newspaper story that aroused the ambassador's formal protest of a "personal" campaign appeared Wednesday in a Lisbon afternoon newspaper under a banner headline saying "The CIA acts in Portugal."

Sen. Brooke said in a press conference that during his wide-ranging discussion with Premier Goncalves he had expressed concern that Carlucci

had been called a CIA agent.

"It's been wide circulation of this sort of thing, that has created unfortunate relations between us," added.

The senator asked for understanding of Portugal's revolutionary process, adding that neither the United States nor any other country "should dictate in the internal affairs of a sovereign state such as Portugal."

Brooke said he had "suggested to the prime minister that this is not the time for the U.S. to cut and run from Portugal and for Portugal to cut and run from the U.S."

Meanwhile, the Portuguese Communist Party announced that one of its leaders had made a quick trip to Moscow to discuss political developments here with Soviet Communist Party leaders. The Portuguese party has been sharply criticized by Western European Communists because of tactics that their critics believe soured their electoral prospects by arousing fear of a Communist take-over.

LOS ANGELES TIMES

16 March 1975

ART BUCHWALD

## How the CIA Got Mafia to Hit Fidel

WASHINGTON—Two Robert Kennedy aides revealed the other day that the CIA had plans to assassinate Fidel Castro, and they were going to give the contract to the Mafia to do the job. The question is how did they approach the Mafia about it and what was said.

This is only conjecture, since the files are sealed.

It probably happened during the wedding of Don Corleone's daughter. Hagen, the consigliere, and Sonny Corleone bring the head of the CIA into Don Corleone's library.

The CIA chief kisses Don Corleone's ring.

"Godfather, may I speak to you alone?"

Don Corleone shakes his head. "I trust these men with my life. I cannot insult them by sending them away. What do you want of me?"

The CIA chief licks his lips nervously. "Our honor in Cuba has been violated. This man Fidel Castro spits on us and insults us publicly. We must have justice."

"Why do you come to me?" Don Corleone asks.

"Because we have gone to the Army, the Navy and the Air Force like good citizens, and they just laugh at us. You, Godfather, are the only one we can turn to."

"What do you want me to do?"

The chief glances at Hagen and Sonny and then goes over and whispers in Don Corleone's ear.

The Don looks up gravely. "That I cannot do."

The CIA chief says desperately, "I will pay you anything."

Don Corleone rises from behind his desk and speaks

coldly. "We have known each other many years, but until this day you have never come to me for counsel or help. I am your friend, but have you ever invited me to your home in McLean? Has your wife ever invited my wife for as much as a cup of coffee? Your children refused to play with my children. And once when my son wanted to borrow some camera equipment and a red wig, you turned us down. Let us be frank. You spurned my friendship. You feared to be in my debt."

The CIA chief wipes his forehead with a handkerchief.

"We never invited you because we didn't think you'd come."

The Don holds up his hand. "Don't speak. When you wanted something you went to the government—to the White House, the FBI and the U.S. Post Office. You did not need Don Corleone. Very well, my feelings were wounded, but I am not the sort of person who thrusts his friendship on those who do not value it. Now you come and say, 'Don Corleone, give me justice against Castro.' But you do not ask with respect. And you say, 'I will pay you anything.' And you do this on my daughter's wedding day. I do not want to have anything to do with you."

The CIA chief gets on his knees. "Forgive me, Godfather, I thought we could count on the armed forces for justice. I tried to work through the system. But Castro still lives. Grant me this one favor and you and your wife can come to our home any time you want to. We want your friendship. We really do."


Don Corleone goes over to the CIA chief and puts his hand on his head. "Good, then you shall have your justice. Someday, and that day may never come, I will call upon you to do me a service in return. Until then, consider this favor a gift from my wife who, as you know, is G. Gordon Liddy's Godmother."

The CIA chief is overcome with gratitude.

Don Corleone picks him up gently and says, "Now give me a kiss on the cheek, so I can get back to the wedding."

The CIA chief kisses Don Corleone on the cheek and says, "If you ever want us to read anybody's mail for you, let me know."

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER  
20 MARCH 1975



**GENERAL**

THE ECONOMIST MARCH 29, 1975



## The blows of March

Once again, the Americans have learnt the limits of their power. They also have to face the fact that there is no substitute for the power they have

A confident country learns from its defeats; a rattled and divided one forgets what it was trying to do before it ran into trouble. King Faisal's assassination is the fourth blow to hit American foreign policy this month. The new regime in Saudi Arabia will require an adjustment in American ideas, even if Prince Fahd does now collect the reins of power in his own hands. But it does not change what the United States hopes to do through its recently built connection with the great oil power of the Arab world. All the shocks of the past month have their lessons for Mr Ford, but the lessons are local and specific; it is the temptation to generalised despair about its foreign policy that has to be resisted in the United States.

The abandonment of much of South Vietnam may be a reason to change American policy in that country, if there is still time for a change; or it may be a reason for concluding that no American policy can do much about Indochina any longer; or it may even be reason to say, as some old American opponents of the war are now saying, that it is probably best to keep the present policy going for a time in the hope of salvaging something from the ruins. But Mr Kissinger's empty-handed return from the Middle East, and King Faisal's death, are certainly no ground for changing American policy in that region, although that policy may now have to be pursued through different men and by different means. Nor is the collapse of the democratic hope in Portugal any reason for changing American policy in Europe. These four events make it necessary for Americans to recall what they have been trying to do in the world since 1945, not abandon it. But the United States is a rattled and divided country, with an exhausted Mr Kissinger facing a Congress trying to assert its power over foreign policy, and the defeats of March could yet produce the wrong result.

### So what is American policy?

Because a whole generation has died since 1945, Americans have lost the habit of reminding themselves what their foreign policy has been trying to achieve since then. It has certainly not been confined to the pursuit of exclusively American interests. If it had, the United States would have concentrated on its own defence, and perhaps, though not certainly, on the defence of the centres of industrial power in western Europe and Japan that are linked to the American economy. It would not have given its aid to Greece and Turkey in 1947, or to South Vietnam in the 1950s, and it would not now be spending so much effort on trying to strike a balance between Israel and its Arab neighbours; all these things are peripheral to a strict definition of purely American interests. This is the danger of trying to redefine American policy now in terms of a stern application of Realpolitik. The aims of Realpolitik have to be national aims; the tests by which it is measured, as Bismarck taught the world, can only be those of a nation-state pursuing its own particular ends. No one in western Europe, or in Israel, or any other country that depends on the backing of American power, can want the United States to redefine its policy in those terms.

It is more difficult than that. There has been a large element of ideology in American policy for the past 30 years, because the emergence of Soviet power after 1945 brought the issue of ideology into the centre of world politics. The United States could have ducked that issue, but only by retiring within its own frontiers; and no other nation that shared its ideas about politics, but lacked its power, would have invited it to do that. It can try to contain the dangers of the conflict with Soviet power, as successive presidents since John Kennedy have tried to do. It can even ignore ideology when there is something to be gained by that, as the semi-alliance with China since 1971 has done. But so long as two very different ideas about the organisation of society remain the centre-piece of international politics—and only the Soviet government can decide how long that will remain true—the dispute between them will be the starting-point of American policy.

The only American policy that would not involve a retreat to the America of the 1930s is a policy designed to support those countries where the ideas of liberal and pluralist politics have taken root, or where the conditions exist in which they might take root. That would be a complex enough business in itself, but it is not even as simple as that. The support of such countries requires policies to be drawn up for dealing with other areas which these countries depend upon for economic reasons, or have cause to be concerned about for military reasons. Once the United States has stepped outside its own borders, it finds itself inevitably entangled to some extent with the special interests of its friends. That is why no neat geographical limit can be set upon the area of American policy: there is no major part of the world in which, directly or indirectly, such a policy has no interest at all. There are no entirely watertight political limits, either: the support of a liberal friend sometimes calls for the toleration of a less than liberal friend of that friend. The business of being a power in the world sends a whole series of ripples spreading out from the dropped anchor.

### When the limits narrowed

What the Americans have discovered from the shocks they have experienced in the past few years is not that these things have ceased to be true. It is that their power to carry out the policy that history has landed them with is limited, and when they exceed the limits of what they can do they damage the policy itself. They discovered that when they realised that they could not keep their armed forces big enough to be able to fight a major war in Europe and another in Asia, and a brushfire war somewhere else too, at the same time. The result of that was the reorganisation of defence policy carried out by the Nixon Administration, which set narrower limits on what America's soldiers might be asked to do. This was a matter of military and economic necessity more than anything else: the growth of Soviet armed strength, and the spread of new weapons which the United States itself had helped to distribute to other places around

the world, put a two-and-a-half-war strategy beyond the reach of the American economy. It was one part of the re-examination made inevitable by the changing balance of power in the 1960s.

The other part was the lesson of Vietnam. What the Americans learnt in Vietnam was the danger of over-commitment to an outlying part of their main policy. The Vietnam war could have been avoided if the Americans had realised in time that Ho Chi Minh might be a useful south-east Asian counterweight to China; but they would have had to realise that by the mid-1950s, which is when they first committed themselves against Ho Chi Minh, and at that time the split in the communist world which gave Ho Chi Minh his chance to be a counterweight had not yet taken place. The war might have been shortened if the Americans had understood in time just how good North Vietnam's army was; but by the time they discovered that in the mid-1960s their own troops were already in action, and the fear of an American defeat that would limit American effectiveness elsewhere in the world—as it has—had entered into the calculation. The lesson of Vietnam is not that it was not worth a substantial expenditure of American effort to keep the possibility of a pluralist society alive in southern Vietnam. It is that to keep on increasing the expenditure while the possibility was diminishing did so much damage to America itself.

Mr Kissinger and Mr Nixon had seen that when they drew up the Guam doctrine in 1969, which said that in future countries like South Vietnam would be helped to defend themselves without direct American military intervention. That put the clock back to the Truman doctrine's support of Greece and Turkey in 1947, which was also done without American troops. It marked the end of an interlude of over-confidence in which America thought it could do it all itself.

The danger is that this retrenchment of means could now spill over into a retraction from the attempt to run any kind of coherent international policy. The need for a coherent policy, if you live in one of the many countries that depend upon American consistency, is as great as ever. Without the United States, there is unlikely to be a Middle East settlement in which Israel can be persuaded to withdraw from most of the territory it occupied in 1967, and the Arabs can be persuaded to

accept the existence of this reduced Israel. Without the United States, it is likelier that the left-wing authoritarianism that has been fastened on to Portugal will spread to other European countries. Without the United States, it is doubtful whether there can be even a half-reasonable settlement in Cyprus. Even in South Vietnam the last remaining hope of a political settlement between the two rival governments—a settlement based on some sort of coalition, with an election date fixed for the not too distant future—depends upon some American aid continuing to get through to the Saigon administration. That is not much of a hope, but it would be better than watching the North Vietnamese army pursue the refugees all the way into Saigon. All these things require an Administration in Washington that goes on trying to pick up the threads of policy, and a Congress and public opinion which accept that there is no escape from the need to have a policy.

#### The only doorstep around

For a country in America's position there are bound to be defeats, and there ought to be shifts of position designed to avoid unnecessary defeats; there have to be compromises, and the striking of balances, and the other unpleasing devices of great-power diplomacy. The Americans have not occupied their present position in the world long enough, and perhaps their temper is not yet sufficiently tamed by experience, for this sort of thing to come easily to them. There are many Americans who would like, if it were possible, to withdraw into the simplicities they associate with an earlier period of their country's life—perhaps into the simplicities of an American-centred Realpolitik, perhaps into a detachment which leaves the world to sort out a new balance of power without America. Life was indeed simpler for the Americans in the 1920s and 1930s. But the conditions of that time are unrepeatable, because the powers that left America with so much freedom of action then—above all, British power—no longer exist. The consequences of King Faisal's death, of the failure of Arab-Israeli peacemaking and of the collapse in Vietnam come to America's doorstep because that is the only place that people can see to lay them. They can be turned away, but only if Americans are willing to live in the sort of world that is going to produce.

NEW YORK TIMES  
17 March 1975

## C.I.A. Report Says Worsening World Grain Shortages Could Give U.S. Great

By HENRY WEINSTEIN  
Special to The New York Times

SAN FRANCISCO, March 16—A research report of the Central Intelligence Agency has concluded that world grain shortages, which are likely to increase in the near future, "could give the United States a measure of power it had never had before—possibly an economic and political dominance greater than that of the immediate post-World War II years."

Written in August, 1974, shortly before the World Food Conference in Rome, the report predicts that "in bad years, when the United States could not meet the demand for food of most would-be importers, Washington would acquire virtual life-and-death power over the fate of the multitudes of

### Power

the needy."

The report, made available unofficially to The New York Times, continues: "Without indulging in blackmail in any sense, the United States would gain extraordinary political and economic influence. For not only the poor LDC's [less-developed countries] but also the major powers would be at least partially dependent on food imports from the United States."

In recent weeks, Secretary of State Kissinger has referred to American grain stocks in news conferences in connection with how to deal with Organization of Petroleum Exporting

Countries. Secretary of Agriculture Earl L. Butz has also referred to the way food could be used as a bargaining lever with oil-producing countries.

#### 'Food is a Weapon'

In early November, Dr. Butz said: "Food is a weapon. It is now one of the principal tools in our negotiating kit."

The C.I.A. report, prepared by the agency's office of political research, says that the trends in grain production will give the United States an "enhanced role as a supplier of food" in coming decades that will provide "additional levers of influence, but at the same time will pose difficult choices and possibly new problems for the United States."

"Whatever choice the United

States makes in deciding where its grain should go, it will become a whipping boy among those who consider themselves left out or given only short shrift," says the report, titled "Potential Implications of Trends in World Population, Food Production and Climate."

#### A Disclaimer Added

The report contained a disclaimer at the bottom of its first page that says:

"This study was prepared by the office of political research of the Central Intelligence Agency. It does not, however, represent an official C.I.A. position. The views presented represent the best judgment of the issuing office, which is aware that the complex issues discussed lend themselves to other interpreta-



tion."

In a section on "political and other implications" of food shortages, the report says: "Where climate change causes great shortages of food despite United States exports, the potential risks to the United States would rise. There would be increasingly desperate attempts on the part of the militarily powerful but nonetheless hungry nations to get more grain any way they could. Massive migration backed by force would become a very live issue."

"Nuclear blackmail is not inconceivable," the report says. "More likely, perhaps, would be ill-conceived efforts to undertake drastic cures which might be worse than the disease—e.g., efforts to change the climate by trying to melt the Arctic ice-cap."

Near the end of the 52-page report, it states: "In the poor and powerless areas, population would have to drop to levels that could be supported. Food subsidies and external aid, however generous the donors might be, would be inadequate. Unless or until the climate improved and agricultural techniques change sufficiently, population levels now projected for the LDC's could not be reached. The population 'problem' would have solved itself in the most unpleasant fashion."

The report gives no indication

WASHINGTON POST

17 March 1975

as to whom it was distributed. It is not known whether United States representatives to the World Food Conference had an opportunity to read it.

It also does not indicate why the C.I.A. did a political analysis of food-production and climate trends or whether the agency has taken or plans any action based on the information in the study.

Much of the information in the report, such as that on food needs, supply and demand and on climate, appears to be drawn from academic research by agronomists and climatologists, but the precise sources are generally not identified, nor is the C.I.A.'s relationship to those whose research was used.

The report says that the consensus of leading climatologists is that if a cooling trend in world climate "continues, as feared, it could restrict production in both the U.S.S.R. and China, among other states, and could have an enormous impact, not only on the food-population balance, but also on the world balance of power."

Food supplies have declined in recent years, especially in 1972, the report says, "resulting in rapid rise in food prices everywhere — and a drastic drawdown of existing world stocks of grain."

It notes United States and United Nations forecasts of an

annual growth in world food demand of 2.3 to 2.5 per cent, and says: "It is far more difficult to forecast the growth of food production than the rise in demand for it."

"Unless even optimistic projections about production in the LDC's are too low, many of the food-deficit LDC's are likely to be in for serious trouble within the next five-ten years."

The report asserts that "the greatest potential for increased food production over the longer run lies in the LDC's," but that "the political commitment to agriculture has thus far been lacking."

"In most LDC's, the governing policy has been either to ignore or to soak the peasants in order to promote industry and keep the city-dweller reasonably content. Reversal of this policy would require enormous inputs of capital and skilled personnel, both in notoriously short supply in most LDC's."

Citing the research of Dr. Hubert Lamb, a British climatologist, the report states that the Northern Hemisphere "at least, is growing cooler."

This would mean that of the main grain-growing regions, only the United States and Argentina would escape adverse effects, according to the report. American grain output might be "unaffected or

even slightly enhanced," it says. Canada and the Soviet Union would have shorter growing seasons, monsoon failures in South and Southeast Asia would significantly reduce grain output there, and China would also have monsoon failures.

The report notes that dam and irrigation systems built during the periods of "normal weather" from the 1930's through the 1960's were based on rainfall patterns that would change. Moreover, the report says that "most of the hybrids and all of the 'Green Revolution' [grain] strains were developed to use the warmth and moisture prevailing" in that period, and the expected changes in temperature or rainfall that "could negate most of these advances in yield."

If there is a "marked and persistent cooling trend," the report says, there would not be enough food produced to feed the world's population "unless the affluent nations made a quick and drastic cut in their consumption of grain-fed animals."

"Even then there might not be enough."

The report ends by saying that "the potential implications of a changed climate for the food-population balance and for the world balance of power" would become "far clearer and possibly more manageable if the extent of possible cooling were thoroughly investigated."

## The Problem of Poppies

THE OPIUM POPPY is one of nature's contradictions.

It gives us the substances—mainly codeine and morphine—that can ease the intolerable pain of a cancer victim or suppress a cough as almost no other material can. At the same time, with a slight alteration in process, it can produce heroin, a substance that has caused untold suffering and is blamed by some for a substantial proportion of the urban crime rate.

Now, the governments of the United States and several other countries are faced with this perplexing problem: How can the people of the world maintain the supply of opium necessary to ease suffering and yet prevent the kind of oversupply that floods our cities with deadly heroin?

The situation is becoming serious in the view of American drug manufacturers because for several years there has been a shortfall between demand and supply. The government has eased the shortfall some by putting part of its strategic reserves into circulation; but that is no long run solution. Many of those concerned have attributed the shortage to the fact that Turkey, under great pressure from the United States, went out of the opium producing business in 1972. But in the last three years of its production before the ban, Turkey supplied only 7 per cent of the legal opium used in the United States. India is in fact the country on which the United States has traditionally relied for its opium. The trouble is that its crop in recent years has been unreliable. Drought and other climatic conditions have been part of the problem. The other difficulty is that India and the United States have not been able to come to clear terms as to how much of India's output the United States could expect to receive each year.

All these are elements in the dwindling of the U.S. supply of morphine and codeine. What can be done?

The tendency among many in the drug industry is to point out that Turkey has decided to produce opium again and to argue that Turkish opium gum is the solution—never mind that Turkey, unlike India, has shown itself almost incapable of controlling the destination of its output. This view holds that drug abuse in the United States is not going to be eliminated by banning Turkish opium, that it is a local social problem and that it should not be mixed up with the overall medical needs that are met by legal drugs.

In light of the Turkish experience and "The French Connection," that answer is a bit too easy. There was a serious problem in the past with Turkish opium, and the best informed police in the field say they can see a reduction in serious heroin-related crimes in the period since it was taken off the market. In announcing that it was going back into business as a "matter of national sovereignty," Turkey also announced that it would see to it that its opium was produced in a form that would make the transition to heroin less likely. How successful that effort will be remains to be seen.

There have been several attempts to develop experimentally a strain of opium poppy from which it would be nearly impossible to produce heroin. The experiments were carried on at Beltsville, but little has been heard of them after a promising start. It makes sense for the United States to explore that avenue as a long-term solution to the problem of easing pain, while keeping the pain-killer agent from becoming a social menace.

WASHINGTON STAR  
17 March 1975

## Burma Rebels Offering U.S. Opium Crop at Cut Prices

NEW YORK (AP)—Army rebels in Burma have offered to sell their annual opium crop to the U.S. government for a fraction of its black market value, according to Rep. Lester Wolff.

Wolff, chairman of the House narcotics subcommittee, said he met secretly in Bangkok, Thailand, with rebels from Burma's Shan State during a fact-finding tour in January.

In an interview aired last night on CBS-TV's "60 Minutes," Wolff said

the rebels offered to sell the annual Shan opium crop — 400 tons — for \$20 million. If the opium were to enter illegal channels as heroin, it would have a street value of \$2 billion to \$3 billion, Wolff said.

The New York Democrat said he relayed this offer to government officials in Washington, but the reception has been cool because the Shan rebels use the money they get from the narcotics traffic to carry on their rebellion against Gen. Ne Win, president of Burma.

But Wolff said the rebels are already using drug traffic money to buy arms and ammunition to fight the Burmese government.

Wolff also said he met with Gen. Li, a Nationalist Chinese who controls a massive opium crop in Thailand, and Li indicated he had made enough money and was willing to get out of the drug traffic.

"To indicate his sincerity, he offered two of his children as hostages to the United State government to prove that he would not engage in opium traffic any further," Wolff said.

Wolff was to submit a report on his trip to Congress today.

BALTIMORE SUN  
9 March 1975

### A new kind of crisis

## U.S. seeks sense of direction

By HENRY L. TREWHITT  
Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington—The reason the State Department no longer issues an annual state of the world report, an official there says dryly, "is that we can't bear to write it or read it."

The real reason—that the reports were too time-consuming for the small light they shed—none the less leaves the wry point valid. For across the range of political opinion, specialists agree that the United States, and therefore the other capitalist industrial nations, are in special kind of crisis, in fact a struggle for survival.

They do not agree on all the reasons, where the greatest threat lies, or what ought to be done about it. To Dean Rusk, the former secretary of state, the American crisis is one of confidence and will. To Richard J. Barnet, historian and critic of a generation of policy, the nation is reaping the harvest of arrogance and must change its approach to the world.

For the moment the focus of crisis is on the economy at home and worldwide, blighted so that it touches every American. By most accounts, however, the central problem is even broader, calling for a new national sense of direction.

At the heart of it, as James R. Schlesinger, the Secretary of Defense, views it, is erosion of the power and stabilizing force the United States exercised over post-World War II development.

"Loss of confidence in the underlying structure of the world economy," he said recently, "is associated with the questioning, among other things, of America's role and America's power."

With emphasis on the economy, Henry A. Kissinger, the Secretary of State, calls it "the first truly global crisis" requiring "the first truly global solutions." The world, he says, is poised between "unprecedented chaos and the opportunity for unparalleled creativity."

The considerations behind such dooms-

day language are a mixture of the obvious and the subtle. A wide consensus lists them, with first things first:

- A combination of inflation and recession, magnified by high oil prices, leaving the industrial nations reeling.
- The rise of Soviet power, threatening to overtake that of the United States, with China stirring on the horizon.
- A world-weariness in the United States, with the war in Vietnam and its outcome as part cause, part effect.
- The prospective loss of Cambodia and South Vietnam, Communist advances in Southern Europe, the fragmentation of the North Atlantic alliance from the leftward turn of Portugal and the Greek-Turkish conflict over Cyprus.
- Continuing danger of explosion in the Middle East, with its overlapping politics of oil and Arab-Israeli confrontation.
- A widespread uncertainty everywhere, in the light of all these things, of the strength and direction of the United States.

What Mr. Schlesinger, the Secretary of Defense, perceives clearly in all this is the end of an era. It was the period from World War II to sometime in the recent past, when the United States presided over the security, and in varying degrees the politics, of the industrial West, Japan and much of the poor areas of the globe. Never before, he says, has there been "an era of greater security, of such limited conflict, of economic growth, of trade expansion—and, may I add, of civil liberties more generally widespread than ever before."

Now that role is changing; how much no one is certain. What is certain is that the nation has come to a benchmark as important as its abandonment of isolation with World War II. It is equally certain that the United States would not react again as it did over the past generation to real or perceived crises.

The crises came in Korea, repeatedly over Berlin, in Lebanon, Cuba, the

Congo, the Dominican Republic, but most importantly, in Vietnam. As Vietnam drained the treasury and the national will for conflict, detente with the Soviet Union and China drained the popular perception of the Communist threat that had fueled the will.

In their effort to understand where the nation is now, policy-makers and critics alike tend to look back at how it got there. What happened during the postwar years was infinitely more complex, of course, than merely standing up to the forces of darkness.

Mr. Rusk, who served under President Kennedy and President Johnson, reflects the dominant judgment of policy-makers. His generation, he said, had been led "into a world war that could have been prevented because governments did not take collective security measures to control events before they made war inevitable."

Its answer was the United Nations Charter, which then failed to provide collective security as Soviet-American differences grew. With that, Mr. Rusk says laconically, the U.S. "began to enter into separate measures." Its exercise of power was "prudent," he argues, a judgment echoed by Senator Hubert H. Humphrey (D., Minn.), the former Vice President, on all cases except Vietnam.

There is another view, however, in fact many of them, of the postwar period. To the most severe critics, it was a time of national arrogance, when too often guns took the place of reason in the exercise of exaggerated national interest.

One of these critics is Mr. Barnet, of the Institute of Policy Studies in Washington. Instead of prudence in the use of force, he says, the longer history of the United States has been one of expansionism.

"The high-water mark was in Vietnam," he said, "when some of the assumptions of the postwar period turned out to be unworkable. The Nixon administration was the first since that of Roosevelt to recognize that the Rus-

sian revolution was not transitory. But the United States still fears revolutionary change."

Mr. Barnett stops just short of joining the school of so-called revisionist historians who hold, in varying degrees, that the U.S. mishandled the Soviet Union after World War II and is at least partly responsible for the cold war.

Lloyd C. Gardner, professor of history at Rutgers University, is a revisionist whose views are on the moderate side. But he believes the U.S. should have conceded greater security guarantees to the Soviet Union under Josef V. Stalin.

"What if we hadn't rearmed after World War II?" he asks rhetorically. "Well, Stalin remarked in the Forties that he could see Germany going Communist. By 1948 he was perfectly happy to see it divided. . . . Whether he would have insisted on a Communist Eastern Europe without Western counterpressure is hard to say. After all, Finland is in a strategic position, yet is not communist."

There was no doubt in the minds of policy-makers, however. What resulted was an elaborate security structure, built mostly by John Foster Dulles, President Eisenhower's Secretary of state, for the containment of communism. Even critics give Mr. Dulles high marks for sincerity.

Indeed Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., historian and chronicler of the Kennedy administration, ascribes a "messianic view" to Mr. Dulles; "He saw us as the saviors of the world and the Soviet Union as the diabolical foe."

In that sense, he judged the policies of

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR  
20 March 1975

## Why all those arms?

By Charles W. Yost

Historians in the 21st century writing of our period will probably be at a loss to explain how its two greatest powers, both ostensibly dedicated in their very different ways to freeing mankind from oppression and exploitation, should have over many years wasted an enormous proportion of their resources in fabricating mountains of hardware which was either immensely dangerous or practically useless or both.

I would venture a guess that these historians may ascribe three causes to this curious phenomenon.

The first would be a gross misperception by the two powers of each other's real intentions. No doubt their respective rhetorics at various times contributed to this misperception: Soviet rhetoric of "burying" capitalism, American rhetoric of "rolling back" communism.

However, cooler heads on both sides might well have perceived that after 1950 neither Moscow nor Peking in practice sought military expansion, that in 1956 and 1968 the West refrained from intervening in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Yet, instead of basing its judgments on the real behavior of the other side, each concentrated on arcane calculations of capabilities, which have little relation to the real world.

The second cause of the strategic arms race, which historians may

note, was the unprecedented affluence of the societies which enabled them to engage in it more or less painlessly.

In the United States from 1947 to 1973 prosperity was such that billions could be spent annually for arms without any but the minority below the poverty level realizing they were being deprived. In the Soviet Union both consumer demand and political dissent were so strictly controlled that the diversion to arms of a vast proportion of socialist production rarely entered the public consciousness.

The third cause may in retrospect have been a consequence of the huge growth of the military officer corps in the two countries during World War II and its maintenance at these high levels during the subsequent 25 years.

At the present time the world has obviously entered a new period. Detente between the great powers, while still suffering under serious limitations, makes even more implausible than before that either of them should risk its patrimony and population in a lunatic nuclear strike.

The limitations of affluence have been forcibly brought to the attention of the United States. It has become apparent that every dollar spent for arms is taken from some public or private program important to the general welfare. In the Soviet Union it appears that one of the chief determi-

nants of detente is the effective demand of Soviet consumers for more to consume.

The momentum of the arms race, however, is so strong that it will not be easily checked.

Though overshadowed by other events at the moment, there is now being hammered out in Geneva a detailed formulation of the Vladivostok decisions placing ceilings on strategic arms. If these ceilings are confirmed, a limit will at last have been placed on one major sector of the arms race.

The limit, however, is far too high. Once it is confirmed, we must at once proceed to negotiate its reduction.

Henry Kissinger has speculated this would be "an easier negotiation . . . because it is going to be difficult to prove that, when you already have an enormous capacity to devastate humanity, a few hundred extra missiles make so much difference."

Unfortunately such issues are rarely decided by logic and evidence. We have not for more than a decade needed anywhere near so many missiles as we have had. If a radical change in attitudes occurs — as reason and national interest dictate — it will be because an era is over, the world turned a corner, and men and women everywhere perceive needs far more pressing and legitimate than the endless accumulation of costly, useless, and lethal weapons.

Former President Nixon met the challenge of popular disillusionment with the policy revision that soon was labeled the Nixon Doctrine. In effect, he said, allies and client states would have to carry more of their own security burden. Implicit in the doctrine was the theme: "No more Vietnams."

Now Mr. Kissinger has crafted the further doctrine of interdependence. In part it is a product of necessity, summoning up America's allies to recognize that power, after all, is limited, yet their interests lie with the U.S. But it lacks the ring of containment and the galvanizing effect of a visible and immediate threat.

Or perhaps it needs simply to be put more clearly, as Mr. Humphrey argues. "Now we are in a period of withdrawal," he says, "and we are groping, trying to decide where we are. People want to know what our policy is."

"In the past we sometimes equated power with knowledge. Sometimes our power got in the way of our good judgment. We were a world power with a half-world knowledge."

If Mr. Kissinger has not made his policy clear to Mr. Humphrey, then he obviously still has a difficult task selling it to a weary public. One of the lessons of Vietnam is that not matter what it takes to win public support for foreign policy, no policy can succeed without it.

Mr. Dulles to be a victory for globalists, who thought in terms of a worldwide security structure, over pragmatists who thought more modestly of selected vital interests. Mr. Schlesinger believes the pragmatic course would have left the nation in better shape to meet its current challenges.

The idea that containment was based on an undercurrent of cynicism draws support from surprising places, however. Ray S. Cline, former deputy director of central intelligence, suggests that "of course there was a perceived threat of communism," but that containment was intended more to preserve markets abroad.

"I believe it was thought that the image of the Communist threat was the best way to make people understand the problem," he said.

Whatever the mix of surface and background motives, the drive lasted through a great series of crises, in which the Soviet Union more often blinked and the U.S. prevailed—until Vietnam—in its confrontations with lesser nations. Mr. Schlesinger, the historian, argues that the U.S. in fact reached its peak of interventionism during the 1950's.

In great measure, he said, the extent of intervention then was concealed by the "frequently calm facade of that era" and by the secret use of the CIA as the prime weapon. The last great example, he argues, was the planning for the Bay of Pigs invasion, inherited by President Kennedy.

Most analysts, however, regard Vietnam as the high point of U.S. assertive-

ness. Certainly the war there became the focus of a national agony that left all the post-World War II assumptions of power in question. And beyond any doubt is damned military involvement in any form for millions of Americans.

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## Western Europe

LOS ANGELES TIMES  
26 March 1975

### INTRANSIGENCE COMPOUNDED BY INEPTITUDE

# America's 'Dismal' Policy on Portugal

BY DON COOK

LISBON—One of the sadder aspects of the complex slide of events in Portugal this past year has been the dismal diplomatic performance of the United States, ranging from being immobilized most of the time to being just plain inept.

Immobilization took hold in Washington at the outset last April when one simple obsession about the Portuguese situation gripped Secretary of State Kissinger (and presumably the Central Intelligence Agency)—the emergence of the Communists.

There was certainly nothing wrong with worrying about how the Communists might seize the golden opportunity opening up for them in Lisbon with the overthrow of 50 years of Fascist dictatorship by the Portuguese armed forces.

But the diplomatic problem was how the United States could best move to counter this threat. And here Kissinger, who took personal control of policy decisions and instructions for Lisbon and has remained in control even from his airplane, became so immobilized by the appearance of the Communists that he did nothing for his friends.

Instead of taking the line "what can we do to help" in Lisbon, the attitude adopted in Washington toward the regime was that American support would be doled out only if the regime stiffened its back against the Communists.

This was completely against the recommendations being sent to Washington at the time from the U.S. Embassy in Lisbon.

The embassy assessment was simple. The revolution was clearly popular, and its direction in those early days was in the hands of moderate officers, not one of whom was identified with the Communists.

A revolutionary government had been formed with these moderate military officers and experienced liberal civilians. The pledge to end Portugal's African colonial wars was clearly in the interest of the United States and world conditions generally. The end of fascism had come about in Portugal with far

*Don Cook is a Times correspondent based in Paris.*

less bloodshed and a great deal more relief and stability than anybody could have forecast.

The regime deserved and needed American endorsement and support to cope effectively with the problems ahead, including the country's Communists.

But this assessment, in which the embassy's top political officers unanimously concurred, was reportedly not "tough enough on communism" to suit Kissinger and the State Department. Every one of the political officers who were involved in those original recommendations to Washington last April has

now been transferred far from the Lisbon scene. Such are the rewards of speaking one's mind to the State Department.

To take one simple example of how the embassy in Lisbon sought to play the hand, it recommended that the United States promptly lift the old embargo dating from the early 1960s forbidding the Portuguese to use any American-supplied arms or military equipment in operations in its African territories.

Remarkably enough, the Portuguese did indeed stick to this rule, and while they continued to receive U.S. arms for North Atlantic Treaty Organization defense purposes, they did not use those arms in Africa.

With Mario Soares, a Social Democrat at the Foreign Ministry in Lisbon, busy negotiating independence agreements for the African possessions, and with cease-fire orders in effect in Africa, it would have made common sense for the United States to pat Soares and the Portuguese on the back by announcing with a fanfare that the arms embargo was being lifted. But, according to sources here, Kissinger wouldn't play it that way because the Portuguese government included a Communist, and he urged that they get rid of him first.

Today the arms embargo is still in effect, and any popular diplomatic appreciation which the United States might now gain by lifting it is totally gone.

Kissinger's reaction to the early policy recommendations from Lisbon was little short of humiliating to the officials of the embassy here. He dispatched from Washington a special team of Foreign Service officers to "assess" the quality of the diplomatic reporting that he was getting. This meant that he wasn't getting the kind of advice he wanted.

In the wake of this mission to Lisbon, about three months after the April revolution word began to leak out in Washington that the embassy was not alert enough to the Communist danger and was taking too optimistic and positive a line about working with the new regime.

Meanwhile, the Communists were making inroads steadily in the trade union movements, in control of the press and elsewhere, outside the government itself.

Next to arrive on the scene from Washington was the deputy director of the CIA, Lt. Gen. Vernon A. Walters, who speaks Portuguese (along with nine other languages) and who leaves footprints as big as manhole covers wherever he goes. It really ought to be obvious to most backward politicians in Washington by now that if you want to help another government having difficulties these days you do not send the deputy director of the CIA to take its pulse and examine its health.

Walters passed through Lisbon about the time that Gen. Antonio de Spínola was engaged in his power struggle with the young officers of the Armed Forces Movement last

August. Four weeks later, at the end of September, Spinoza was out.

At this point, the regime leaked the fact of Walters' visit, and the leftist press was jubilant with the implication that the CIA was behind every trouble that erupted for the regime. This continues today, and the ineptitude of Washington has been a big help.

But worse was to come in a fresh public humiliation for the embassy. Kissinger fired Ambassador Stewart Nash Scott in December on the ground that he needed an ambassador who could speak Portuguese and get closer to the regime. Scott was a Nixon political appointee, well above the average in the judgment of a number of people who have comparisons to go by. But he was anxious to try to work more positively with the revolutionary regime instead of continually lectur-

ing Lisbon, on Kissinger's instructions, about its Communist problem.

A year later the Communist problem in Lisbon is infinitely greater than it was when party leader Alvaro Cunhal came back from exile in Moscow and Prague to take charge of the party in the wake of the revolution. A year later the United States has no visible friends or supporters or sympathizers of any influence in the top echelon of the revolutionary military regime. A year later if the regime gets into any kind of trouble it immediately blames it all on the Americans and the CIA.

Perhaps things would have turned out this way anyway. But Kissinger didn't even let the American Embassy give it a good try in the crucial months of 1974.

BAITIMORE SUN

3 April 1975

## Brandt finds U.S. unsure of its role

By GENE OISHP.

Bonn Bureau of The Sun

Bonn—After returning from a visit to the United States, former Chancellor Willy Brandt told a press conference yesterday that he has never seen America so uncertain over its role as a world power.

At the same time, Mr. Brandt said the current period of "painful self-examination" in the U.S. is temporary and

we should not make any "false connections" between the developments in Southeast Asia and the U.S. commitments to Europe.

Mr. Brandt has been in the U.S. several times, but his last visit coincided with the deterioration of the military situation in South Vietnam and Cambodia and the continuing foreign policy differences be-

tween the Ford administration and Congress.

"I have never before experienced a similar degree of internal irritation and uncertainty over the world political role of the United States in any of my previous visits," Mr. Brandt said, adding, "My advice is that while we should not underestimate the possibility of isolationist tendencies in the United States we can assume that [the United States] will continue, under changed conditions, its role as a Western world power."

The former chancellor, who remains national chairman of the ruling Social Democratic party, appeared to be intent on countering a growing concern among Europeans that the U.S. is becoming a less reliable ally.

A recent opinion poll, for example, showed the U.S. slipping in esteem with the West German public, though it remained in first place. Asked whose friendship was most important to West Germany, 49 per cent picked the U.S., as compared to 62 per cent a year ago.

"We would do well," Mr. Brandt, said, "to recognize the material [resources] and moral energy the United States possesses."

He said that a "constructive dialogue" with the U.S. at this time would have a special importance and that Europeans cannot leave their "great ally" in the lurch at this critical phase or to allow themselves to be gripped with mistrust.

LONDON TIMES

8 March 1975

## Americans wary of using troops

From Our Own Correspondent  
Washington, March 7

If West Europe were invaded, only 39 per cent of the American public would favour military involvement, including the use of troops, according to an opinion poll. The main trend in the survey, however, suggests that the public is not turning isolationist and is aware of the need for economic interdependence.

Produced by the Chicago Council of Foreign Relations, the survey attempts a study in depth of American attitudes towards foreign policy. It was conducted in December by the Louis Harris Organization. It included a comparison sample on 328 "leaders", about 77 per cent of whom favoured helping against invasion in Europe.

The public is depicted as overwhelmingly preoccupied with domestic economic issues. Foreign policy questions ranked low on an agenda in which it was thought Government action was necessary.

At the top of foreign policy priorities were cutting foreign aid and the oil situation. The four leading targets for cut-backs in Government expenditure were foreign military and economic aid, defence spending, and Central Intelligence Agency secret operations.

Asked whether it would be best for the future of the country to take an active part in world affairs, 66 per cent said yes and 24 per cent said no—proportions similar to previous responses since the Second World War.

A noted change in attitude is that the sacred cows of the Cold War are no more. Containing communism comes ninth in a list of foreign policy goals. Promoting the development of democracy and capitalism abroad come bottom, 17 and 18 on the list.

"Leaders" wanted to spend less on defence but a majority of the public were in favour of keeping spending at least at its present level. Although there

was a reluctance to use troops in Europe, 71 per cent of the public sample agreed that a communist takeover there would be a threat to the United States.

Asked what to do faced with another oil embargo, only 6 per cent favoured invading the oil producers and 40 per cent favoured sharing oil with Europe and Japan. But asked a different question, on willingness to deal with an oil shortage, 25 per cent favoured military force against the producers and taking the oil "out of the hands of the Arabs". President Ford will be surprised to learn that 59 per cent of the public sample said it would accept petrol rationing.

The public was asked to say how closely it had followed a list of foreign issues. At the bottom of a table was the British election: 6 per cent claimed "very closely", 20 per cent "somewhat closely", and 72 per cent "not very closely".

## East Asia

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

3 April 1975

Joseph C. Harsch

### Measuring the damage of Vietnam

When France fell before Hitler's armies in 1940 General Charles de Gaulle declared that: "France has lost a battle, but France has not lost the war."

That war was eventually won by others, and France shared in the general recovery of the West which followed the great victories of 1945.

The recollection of that story of the fall and recovery of France in World War II can be helpful in setting into accurate perspective what has been happening in Southeast Asia.

The United States has certainly lost a battle in the sudden collapse of the armed forces of South Vietnam in much of the country controlled from Saigon. The collapse of the whole seems to be the more likely, rather than the less likely, end result of the process proceeding now at such startling pace. A transition in Cambodia is also coming swiftly. The long American effort to set up and sustain anti-Communist governments in those countries is obviously near its end.

To minimize the loss would be as foolish as to exaggerate it. There has indeed been a bitter loss to the pride of the United States, some loss to its prestige, some loss of its influence, and another heavy drain on weapons which were given to the South Vietnamese and are now swelling the arsenals of the

Communists. In China in 1950 the advancing Communists called Chiang Kai-shek's soldiers their own "American supply line." The weapons given to Chiang's men to fight Communists became the major source of weapons for those same Communists. That story has been repeated massively at Da Nang.

But none of this reduces or impairs the fact that the U.S. remains today the wealthiest and most powerful of the great powers. The quality of its leadership over the past 15 years is in question, not the power which improved leadership could command. There was failure, yes. Washington consistently misread the quality and persistence of political forces in Asia from 1945 right down to today. It overestimated the range of its own raw power. It underestimated the tenacity and determination of little men walking through the jungles barefooted in black pajamas. But the failure was at the top command level in Washington, not in the human and industrial foundations.

There is no reason to be found either in the reaction of other countries to the present discomfitures in Washington or in common sense and logic for thinking that American influence in the world will be seriously harmed either immediately or in the long run. Moscow has gloated — a little, quietly — but done nothing aggressive. The Chinese have

been a bit cool, but done nothing of significance. The European allies commiserate publicly, and are quietly thankful in private.

Consider that last point — the attitude of friends and allies. To them, the American commitment in Southeast Asia was always a folly and a useless drain on American energies in what they regarded as the wrong place. Not one of them ever thought that Southeast Asia was worth a penny of their own resources or a drop of their own blood. They watched with dismay as it undermined America's capacity and will to play a continuing role in Europe and other places.

West Germany was particularly unhappy about American soldiers and weapons being drained away from the defenses of Western Europe.

In terms of the balance of power the American commitment in Southeast Asia has long been an asset to the Soviet Union and a liability to Japan and Western Europe.

No truly great power ever won all its battles and succeeded in all its policies. Maturity begins with learning the limitations of power. America has lost a battle. Its pride has been humbled. It will be more careful in the future about judging other peoples and other unusual problems. In the future it will probably be more respected and a more influential ally — because it will act with more restraint and more wisdom. It has not lost a war.

NEW YORK TIMES

3 April 1975

## Retreat

By Robert Thompson

LONDON—There are two fashionable myths about the current North Vietnamese offensive in South Vietnam — that the South has more men and more guns than the North, and that the North is more highly motivated than the South.

Not only are the Russian guns far better than the American guns, but because the South is defending known fixed positions, towns and installations, the North Vietnamese Army's artillery cannot miss. The South Vietnamese Army in reply can fire thousands of rounds without being certain of hitting anything.

Moreover, it is estimated that the North has twenty months' supply of ammunition at an intensive combat rate whereas, because of Congress, the South has enough for only a few weeks.

In addition to superior firepower, the North Vietnamese Army, by rapidly deploying six reserve divisions to the two northern regions, also achieved overwhelming numerical superiority at the point of attack.

The superior morale of the North Vietnamese Army stems not from motivation but from the fact that it holds the strategic initiative. Like all Soviet

clients, Hanoi is in a can-win, can't-lose position and, since the Paris Agreement, has not had to spend either manpower or resources on defense, whereas the South has had to string out its forces and its limited ammunition stocks down the whole length of the country and adopt a solely defensive posture.

Insofar as motivation is a factor, it is not the case that the other side got the Prussians while we got the Bavarians but rather that the South Vietnamese were unlucky enough to get the Americans while the North got the Russians!

Blessed also are the excuse-makers for they have destroyed the credibility of the United States. It is, so they say, only a corrupt, repressive regime in Saigon. But in that case why are the poor people of Vietnam fleeing yet again from the Communists? Millions are voting with their feet. What has happened to all those lovely newspaper stories that the refugees fled only from American bombing? Who, as this great tragedy unfolds, will be outraged by the slaughter?

They also say that it would be wrong to pour good money after bad. That line has already cost us the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and the energy crisis. Now, for the sake of \$1 billion or \$2-billion it will cost the United States

\$50 billion to \$100 billion more annually in defense costs if credibility is to be restored.

Incidentally, will many remember all those fascinating newspaper articles on what the \$25 billion a year to be saved from the Vietnam war could be spent on? Where has it gone?

Israel, having been compelled, on the Soviet Union's demand, to accept a cease-fire, has been asked to make further concessions vital to her security in return for an American guarantee. But a guarantee has only one meaning—the willingness to spill blood. It is hardly surprising that Secretary of State Kissinger's attempts at a settlement have failed. Israel realizes that an American President's guarantee is worthless. After all, five of them, from Dwight D. Eisenhower to Gerald R. Ford, pledged support for Vietnam.

With the southern flank of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization crumbling from the Bosphorus to the Azores, both Europe and the moderate rulers of the Middle East are threatened. The madmen and extremists have been let loose and King Faisal has already gone.

Meanwhile, through an illusory détente, the Soviet Union has neutralized the United States for two certain future events: the death of Mao Tse-tung and the death of Marshal Tito. If either China or Yugoslavia can be coerced back into the Moscow fold, the Soviet



Union will further strengthen the security of its base and the can-win, can't-lose strategic initiative both for itself and its allies.

The American retreat before Moscow, like that of Napoleon, is beginning to litter the route of corpses. Henry A. Kissinger has been vainly fighting a rear-guard action with no army, no air force, no navy and no money.

The Administration can no longer

LOS ANGELES TIMES  
2 April 1975

## U.S. Intelligence Failed to Foresee Viet Collapse

BY OSWALD JOHNSTON  
Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON—For nearly two weeks the Ford Administration has been consistently surprised by the sweeping Communist successes in South Vietnam, and the second-guessing already has begun.

But a consensus is beginning to emerge in the intelligence community that the failure was not in neglecting to predict that Hanoi would launch an attack but in ignoring the possibility that Saigon's resistance would collapse as rapidly as it has.

The result has been a near-paralysis in government, so far as Vietnam is concerned, as Administration policymakers try to grasp the scope of the debacle, and why it happened so quickly.

Much now depends on the ability of the fact-finding mission headed by the Army's Chief of Staff, Gen. Frederick C. Weyand, to report back from Saigon with a coherent account of events.

Weyand took with him the Chief of the Central Intelligence Agency's elite in-house intelligence analysts, George C. Carver, and reports from Saigon now indicate that the mission may delay its return until early next week.

In a separate effort to make sense out of chaos, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is sending its own two-man investigating team to Saigon this week. The committee representatives, staffers Richard M. Moose and Charles F. Meissner, last visited Vietnam in May, 1974, when they warned in a report that Hanoi's troops were poised in the most dangerous threat to Saigon of the entire war.

In general, the main component of

conduct a credible American foreign policy. But, do not worry, a new foreign policy line has already been laid down by Congress: If you surrender, the killing will stop. It is a clean message, to the world, of the abject surrender of the United States.

*Sir Robert Thompson, the British expert on guerrilla warfare, was an adviser to President Nixon on the war in Vietnam.*

the intelligence community shared this view right up until the threat became a reality a few weeks ago. The only uncertainty was timing: Would Hanoi strike in 1974, 1975, or 1976?

During the fall of 1973, according to one highly placed intelligence source, a national intelligence estimate representing the formal consensus of the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the State Department's intelligence apparatus and other intelligence components—predicted with virtual unanimity that Hanoi's big push would come in the winter 1974-75.

But analysts recall an informal consensus in the community about the time Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger returned in triumph from Paris with the January, 1973, peace accord that the time of testing would come in about two years.

More recently, it had become the conventional wisdom in the intelligence community to predict that Hanoi's climactic offensive would not come until 1976. The CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency in particular are reported to have pushed this point of view.

Now that the climax is undeniable here, there is quiet recrimination within the community over the failure to keep to the original, apparently correct, prediction.

"There was a strong resistance to calling it a countrywide offensive," one source remarked Tuesday—implying that the resistance, shared by such top Administration officials as Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger, came from a reluctance to admit that the Paris accords had fallen apart.

A more serious failure, analysts now agree, was the lack of any serious, in-depth estimate during the whole Nixon-Kissinger-Ford era of Saigon's ability to survive on its own.

There was widespread doubt among CIA experts during the late 1960s whether a regime could ever be put together in Saigon that could withstand a Communist onslaught without massive American aid, or even American intervention.

Even when the "nation-building" of the Johnson years became supplanted as a slogan by the "Vietnamization" of the Nixon Administration, those doubts were never articulated in a formal intelligence document of the sort that would claim top Administration attention.

During the past week, informed sources said Tuesday, a CIA report has been put together estimating the ability of President Nguyen Van Thieu to survive and of a non-Communist regime to defend Saigon and the Mekong Delta.

But even that report may be too late. During the winter, the focus of intelligence experts was Hanoi—whether a full-fledged "big-unit" offensive would be launched, whether all six of North Vietnam's strategic reserve divisions would be committed.

Ignored was the ability of Thieu's forces to resist any pressure after the fall of Phuoc Long province in January was greeted by only a perfunctory protest note from Washington to the signatories of the Paris accords. As recently as two weeks ago, analysts greeted Thieu's decision to abandon the Central Highlands as "strategically sound"—without anticipating the military and social disintegration that was a direct result of that decision.

NEW YORK TIMES  
21 March 1975

# Military Aid for Vietnam and Cambodia? No.

By Millicent Fenwick

WASHINGTON—As one member of a Congressional delegation of eight, I went to Vietnam and Cambodia on a fact-finding mission. It was a sobering, highly educational, experience.

Cambodia gave the first clear lesson. She is so near the tragic conclusion of her drama that the only remaining question is how to achieve an orderly transfer of power, and the basic reality is China.

China supplies arms to the Khmer Rouge, which now controls 80 per cent of the country. The tottering Government of Marshal Lon Nol cannot last. There must be a structure that will protect the people in the crowded capital, Phnom Penh, and the voluntary agencies caring for them.

But unless this has the backing of China, the killing will continue. The obvious hope is Prince Norodom Sihanouk, and he recently sent a cable to the Senate majority leader, Mike Mansfield, offering friendly relations with the United States and amnesty to all Cambodians except Marshal Lon Nol and his closest advisers. This could be the start of a controlled and stable situation.

Marshal Lon Nol intimated his willingness to resign when we met with him. The United States should certainly not be in a position of deposing or installing chiefs of foreign states, but we should at least propose our good offices on behalf of any plan that gives hope of peace.

Further military aid to the Lon Nol Government would be useless and might, in fact, be misunderstood as continuing support for Lon Nol and a

rebuff to Prince Sihanouk.

Cambodia provided a second lesson. Americans have always given generously to people in trouble. Long before foreign aid was thought of, ordinary citizens were sending help to the victims of war and disaster from Russia to the Yangtze River. Cambodia now shows us that when we give food and medicine to people in need, we should do as much as possible through the voluntary agencies, of which there are such shining examples in Phnom Penh. World Vision, Catholic Relief Services, CARE, and the Lutheran Services are charged with all the responsibility of feeding and caring for these people. The diseases are terrible. Bubonic plague, cholera, pellagra, kwashiorkor and all other illnesses of malnutrition are rampant.

The children are so famished that they must be fed intravenously before their bodies can accept food. I have never seen or imagined such human suffering and the first thought that comes to mind is "stop the killing."

Vietnam is a far more complicated case than Cambodia because the crisis is farther away, but there is an ominous feeling that Cambodia's fate may sooner or later be duplicated. The people to whom we listened were all opposed to a Communist government. Even those in opposition to President Nguyen Van Thieu, though they hoped to see him out of office, wanted no Communist government. They wanted free elections and were confident that a "third force" would win.

It seems most unlikely that either of these could come along with the

victory of the P.R.G. and North Vietnam, but the lesson here is that it must be their choice—not ours. A few days or weeks or years in a country do not give a foreigner the right to believe that any view can be better than that of the people to whom the country belongs.

In the case of both Cambodia and Vietnam, I think we must face the fact that military aid sent from America will not succeed. It will only delay the development of the kind of stable situation—whatever form that takes—that will at least stop the horrible suffering of war. We have no alternative. Those who sent arms to North Vietnam and the Khmer Rouge may well continue to do so for the next thirty years. The citizens of the United States will not. It is not only that we feel we have many problems at home that need attention. It is also a feeling that we should not be in the business of maintaining endless and futile wars.

There will be some who feel that the prestige and status of the United States will suffer in such a denouement. I do not agree. We must have a solid capacity for defense. We must have a clear foreign policy, soundly based on public debate and consensus, about our responsibilities. With these firmly in hand, we should concentrate on a sincere concern for all people, and sensible actions to express that concern. Prestige and status could have no function more secure.

Millicent Fenwick, a Republican, represents New Jersey's Fifth District in the House of Representatives.

NEW YORK TIMES  
1 April 1975

## A SAIGON ANTI-RED SAYS WAR IS OVER

Political Foe of Thieu Puts  
Blame for the Debacle  
on Policy of the U.S.

By MALCOLM W. BROWNE

Special to The New York Times

SAIGON, South Vietnam, March 31—One of South Vietnam's most influential political experts says that he believes that the Communists have won the war.

Ton That Thien, a prominent anti-Communist opponent of President Nguyen Van Thieu, said in an interview that he saw no possibility of negotiating a settlement for a coalition government in Saigon.

"Why should the other side be interested in coalition or negotiations now?" he asked. "They have won."

Mr. Thien held ministerial rank in the government of the late President Ngo Dinh Diem and later served as an adviser to Gen. Duong Van Minh, the general who overthrew Mr. Diem in 1963. Mr. Thien has championed the idea of a third force, free of domination by either the Communists or the Americans.

Kissinger Is Assailed

Asked whether he felt an anti-Communist government in Saigon stood a chance at this point, he replied:

"You cannot throw people into a cataract and then ask what they plan to do to save themselves. Kissinger wanted peace in 1973 and he got it. "Now we are suffering the consequences of what Kissinger did to us in Paris. At this point, the other side has the entire initiative. It's up to the Vietcong to decide what will happen to us.

"This is the result of a policy of détente, of so-called peace with honor. It was incredible that Kissinger could have signed the Paris agreement without getting guarantees from the other side.

"He did it, of course, to help the Nixon campaign. Now Kissinger stands exposed as a phony, of course, but with Vietnam on the brink, it hardly matters to us. It will be the same with Israel, although perhaps the Israelis are stronger and smarter.

"But, the point is, no one believes in America anymore. I certainly do not."

'Threw the Rest Away'

Looking back over the events of the last few weeks, Mr. Thien said:

"Thieu made a mistake at Ean Me Thuot, but that was no reason to throw the rest away. From there, he went on to provoke a panic that couldn't be stopped. It's too late to do anything about it now. Nothing any military man or civilian could do would help much."

Mr. Thien referred to the quick and almost bloodless defeat suffered by Saigon forces at Ban Me Thuot in the Central Highlands three weeks ago, and President Thieu's subsequent decision to abandon the entire region.

The politician contended that Washington had "walked into a Vietcong trap" by installing Mr. Thieu in the presidency, and failing to permit a change in the elections of 1971 and 1973. Washington's support for President Thieu prevented the kind of flexible policy that might have enabled a non-Communist government in Saigon to survive even after the Americans had left, Mr. Thien said.

"Do you know that despite their colonialist role, the French were a lot better to us than the Americans?" he added.

THE WASHINGTON POST Thursday, March 20, 1975

# Cambodia Papers Open Anti-American Attack

By H. D. S. Greenway  
Washington Post Foreign Service

PHNOM PENH, March 19 — "This war was created by the Americans," an article in the daily newspaper Areyathor said this morning.

Today's headline in the Koh Santipheap, another Phnom Penh daily, said "Congressmen, don't misunderstand. Cambodia helps America, not America helps Cambodia." The article went on to say that, if the Americans abandon Cambodia, America will have lost its "honor" and will become a bad name all over the world.

In the last few days the Cambodian-language press has taken on a strident, anti-American tone that has not been seen hitherto, and it represents a growing tension and anxiety in this capital as the debate over emergency aid for Cambodia drags on in the American Congress.

When asked if the articles represented the attitude of government officials, Information Minister Chhang Song said, "You can take it that it does, otherwise I would have closed the papers down."

The press has more freedom here than in Vietnam but "as these stories are just speculation I have the authority and could close them down for three days as a warning," Chhang Song said. "But how can I suppress this? It is the true feeling of the people here."

Chhang Song said that the articles represented a general "psychosis" here caused by

the growing fear of abandonment and the feeling of helplessness among educated Cambodians.

"We used to be rich in rice. Now we have to beg for it. The war is going badly for us and every day we get these gloomy expectations on the aid. People are tense and worried."

The articles are not at all consistent or realistic. One paper speaks of Cambodia being turned over unwillingly to the Communists and another says Cambodians should release themselves from the clutches of the Americans so that they can turn to another superpower—the Soviet Union. But taken together they do represent a growing resentment of Americans.

There are other Cambodians in the city who feel that the Congress would be right to refuse aid to the Lon Nol government, and they think that it would be best to end the war and make an accommodation with the insurgents.

But these people do not have access to the newspapers to put forth their views and their clumsily printed tracts are pushed underneath doors in the dark of the early morning hours.

There is concern here that this anti-American resentment might one day explode into demonstrations against foreigners. Spontaneous demonstrations are not likely, but if a frustrated leader chose to organize one, "I could start a riot in 15 minutes, and it would be March all over again

against your embassy," an official told me recently.

March 11, 1970, was the day when the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong's Provisional Revolutionary Government embassies were sacked here by an organized mob. That action began a train of events which led to Cambodia joining the Indochina war on the American side.

The Cambodian papers have already reported that American embassy officials are burning their papers and sending their effects out of the country. But the local press makes it sound as if the embassy was preparing to close in the near future instead of treating the matter as a contingency plan.

To calm such fears the American embassy reduced the planned evacuation of 15 Catholic Relief Service workers to four.

The Cambodian papers have also announced that the former commander in chief of the armed forces, Gen. Sosthene Fernandez, left for Paris two days ago. The papers said he had gone for a three-month health cure. Knowledgeable sources, however, said that he had wired a friend in Paris to find a permanent apartment for himself and his family.

## Students Call for End to U.S. Aid

PHNOM PENH, March 19 (AP)—A thousand university students held a rally on their

campus Wednesday to urge the U.S. Congress to halt aid to Cambodia and to call on President Lon Nol's government to step down.

Police blocked an anti-Lon Nol student demonstration on Tuesday by sealing off the site for which it was planned. But there was no interference with the meeting today.

A student leader said, "Any more aid will not lead to a peaceful settlement but will only prolong the war." He charged that American aid "went only to the high-ranking officers and officials."

The students said they would back "any government—Communist or not—as long as it brings peace."

NEW YORK TIMES  
18 March 1975

## A Relief Official in Cambodia Denounces U.S. Military Aid

Special to The New York Times

PHNOM PENH, Cambodia, March 17—A high international relief official who has worked with Cambodian refugees for more than a year under the American aid program spoke out yesterday against United States policy here.

"Military aid must be stopped now to end this senseless war," she said.

She is Dr. Gay Alexander, a Scot who is medical director for Catholic Relief Services, the biggest American-funded relief group operating in Cambodia. She asked to have her views recorded in an interview be-

cause "one must do one's best to try to stop this situation." Dr. Alexander was evacuated today along with other relief officials as part of a reduction of relief agency personnel ordered by the United States Embassy.

This was the first time that any official working in a United States Government-financed program here had spoken for publication against American policy.

Catholic Relief Services has the biggest program of all the humanitarian groups here—spending perhaps \$10-million

a year to feed, shelter and provide medical care for hundreds of thousands of refugees.

"They use and manipulate the ordinary people of this country," Dr. Alexander said. "They hold back rice for the highest bidder, while hundreds are dying of malnutrition every day. Economic aid with no U.S. strings attached should continue, but military aid must be stopped now."

A number of relief officials and other foreigners in Phnom Penh, including Americans, have in private expressed opposition to American policy here. No one with the status of Dr. Alexander, however, made such a public declaration here in the five years of warfare.

Some of the heads of other relief organizations here, which also subsist on United States

funds and which include CARE and World Vision, apparently do not share Dr. Alexander's views. They have lobbied privately with Congress for more military aid. They argue privately that without more military aid, economic aid alone would be useless, because if the Lon Nol Government does not get more arms assistance, it will soon collapse and the Cambodian insurgents will take over.

Dr. Alexander said that she had written a personal letter last year to the American Ambassador, John Gunther Dean, telling him of the reports she had heard about government corruption and of her concern over these activities and their destructive effect on the Cambodian people. "I never got an answer or an acknowledgment," she said.

The American Embassy said it had "no comment" on Dr. Alexander's views or on her letter to the Ambassador.

THE ECONOMIST MARCH 15, 1975



## When a policy fails

The only thing the United States can now try to do for Cambodia is to salvage the last fragments of its neutrality when Lon Nol goes

Mr Richard Nixon had a word for it. "Cambodia", he said in 1971, "is the Nixon doctrine in purest form." But the Nixon doctrine did not save Cambodia from its present plight: Phnom Penh under siege, the Lon Nol government visibly losing its grip, half the Cambodians displaced and starving, and the Ford administration and Congress facing, from different sides, the ghastly choice between sending more supplies to prolong the war and letting the Khmer Republic die. It could indeed die while the various committees of Congress wrangle over the different amounts of help they might provide.

The doctrine was, as Mr Nixon stated it, to keep American troops out of Cambodia but to help it to help itself. There was an acknowledged exception, the incursion in 1970 in search of North Vietnamese bases on Cambodian soil close to South Vietnam, and an unacknowledged one, the B-52 bomber raids that had gone on secretly from March, 1969. Neither would have happened if the North Vietnamese had not been there first, and by the ordinary rules the North Vietnamese, not the Americans, were to blame if Cambodian neutrality was injured. For all that, the outcome of the events of 1970 has not been the restoration of Cambodia's neutrality but the extension of the ruinous Indochina war into Cambodia. What went wrong?

On the kindest theory, this American failure results from a simple case of mistaken identity: in giving to Lon Nol's Khmer Republic the support which it withheld from Sihanouk's kingless kingdom, the Nixon administration accidentally picked the wrong Cambodia to help. Unfortunately that won't wash. The war in what is now Vietnam has been going on for just 30 years, and through all that time the only Cambodian political issue of any consequence has been how best to keep Cambodia out of it. Prince Sihanouk chose neutralism, though a neutralism that involved turning a blind eye on the presence of the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong in his eastern territories and on the subsequent attempts of the American bomber squadrons to destroy them there. His prime minister, Lon Nol, decided differently: that the right thing to do was to drive the Vietnamese intruders out. This was something Cambodia alone never remotely possessed the force to do. Still, Lon Nol took advantage of one of Sihanouk's frequent absences in France to remove him from power in 1970; and the Americans went in to try to "clean out" the communist sanctuaries.

### It didn't take hold

But Lon Nol, it turned out, did not command the country. The present civil war is the result. The mistakes of 1970 produced a coalition against Lon Nol that was ill-assorted, but fully strong enough to beat his government. The main components of the coalition are Sihanouk's personal following, the Khmer nationalists and socialists, the various groups of regional insurgents whom Sihanouk himself labelled Khmers Rouges when he used to harry them, and the disciplined cadres trained long ago in Hanoi with their ethnic Vietnamese recruits.

What nobody knows is the kind of Khmer state and the particular ruling group that will emerge when the defeat of the present Phnom Penh government has been completed. Prince Sihanouk sits in Peking.

But who can tell whether he will count for anything when the insurgency is over? Men like his old minister Khieu Samphan, now a Khmer insurgent leader, and Ieng Sary, the head of the Hanoi faction, have plenty of old scores against him and they have more troops than he. Thus there can be no return to the bland comfort and nepotism of the old Sihanouk system. But his political abilities have been astonishing in the past and might even amount to something again. There is a Khmer interest in establishing a Khmer state that is neither an American nor a Vietnamese puppet, if that can still be done.

If something like that, together with an orderly transfer of power and a programme of humanitarian relief, are now the outside limit of what can be hoped for, the public words and visible actions of the Ford administration are not yet aimed at that objective. As President Ford listed the issues at stake last week, one, the humanitarian need, is a real one. The second, "whether the problems of Indochina will be settled by conquest or by negotiation", is a valid question of principle but in Cambodia has probably been answered by events. The third, "the reliability of the United States", seems to assume the existence of an American promise to support the Khmer Republic through thick and thin. Congress, in granting aid, has always specifically ruled out any such commitment and the administration has never admitted having made one. The difficulty is that Mr Kissinger believes the United States, having helped the Khmer Republic come into existence, has at least a moral obligation to provide it with the means to go on fighting so long as its army is prepared to do so. Since Mr Kissinger is at the moment apparently being asked by President Sadat of Egypt to provide an American guarantee that would make it possible for the ceasefire between Egypt and Israel to continue, he does not want to see even a moral obligation abandoned in one part of the world just when a lot could depend on the validity of American commitments in another part.

Still, there may be a better way to end it than the barren scenario superficially in prospect: President Ford standing pat on his principles, Congress refusing the money, and the two branches glaring at each other while Phnom Penh is overrun. The real American interest, an honestly Khmer regime which will not take outside orders and will not willingly serve as a base of attack on South Vietnam and Thailand, is not incompatible with the real Khmer interest. American friendship and aid are not unattractive to a devastated country. Mr Kissinger, who wanted to supply reconstruction aid to North Vietnam two years ago, might think it worth while to aid not one party in Cambodia, but the country as a whole, after a negotiated truce and a transfer of power to a new government that is bound to be a coalition. Congress might well be willing to vote money to help a settlement which it will not vote to keep a hopeless civil war going. The condition is that the new government should offer a reasonable prospect of being one that tries to keep Cambodia out of south-east Asia's other wars. There may just be time for a new approach to work. But, as President Ford said last week with some understatement, "time is running out". Perhaps it has run out already.

BALTIMORE SUN  
30 March 1975

## U.S. WARNS SEOUL ON TAINTED IMAGE

Americans Say South Korea  
Impairs Its Credibility by  
Exaggerating Red Threat

By RICHARD HALLORAN  
Special to The New York Times

SEOUL, South Korea, March 29—Authoritative American military officers here have said that South Korea's credibility has been seriously damaged by exaggerated cries that it faces a serious military threat from North Korea.

In addition, Western diplomatic sources here say that the image of President Park Chung Hee's regime has been tainted both by his repressive political measures and by his invoking of the Communist threat from the North to justify them.

American officials have privately warned the South Korean Government that continued exaggeration of the North Korean threat can endanger the security of South Korea. The United States, South Korea's major ally, may be skeptical that the North Korean hostility is genuine and thus be reluctant to respond in a emergency, they say.

### Warnings Unheeded

So far, however, such warnings seem to have gone unheeded. There was a notable example last week after the discovery of a second tunnel dug by the North Koreans under the demilitarized zone that separates the two sides. The South Korean Defense Minister, Suh Chong Chul, told Korean newsmen:

"In regular warfare, the North Koreans can dispatch division-strength forces in a single hour through it, capture strategic positions behind the forward defense line and completely isolate the advanced defense units." "It should be noted that North Korea, which has completed initial preparations for war, built the tunnels to accomplish war purposes speedily in all-out aggression against the South at the least loss."

"This, I conclude, is an act of war," Mr. Suh said.

American military officers and Western diplomats took a much less alarmist view. They pointedly refrained from publicly endorsing Mr. Suh's position, and privately they firmly disagreed with his assessment.

### First Tunnel Found Last Year

They said that the tunnels, the first of which was allegedly discovered just before President Ford visited South Korea last November, were probably intended for small commando

or guerrilla teams to infiltrate South Korea.

The military sources said that intelligence reports showed an increase in training activity and equipment of North Korean forces similar to the American Special Forces, whose duties include guerrilla warfare, sabotage and espionage.

The tunnels, which were evidently begun about 1971, appear to have been constructed for such teams rather than for conventional soldiers. Just how many tunnels there are is still unknown, although speculation here holds that there are seven to thirteen.

The military sources said that recent probes by North Korean vessels in the sea west of the peninsula and by North Korean jet fighter planes in the airspace in the same area seemed to be part of a continuing testing of South Korean defenses.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR  
19 March 1975

## Thai resistance to U.S. troops disturbs Pentagon

By Guy Halverson  
Staff correspondent of  
The Christian Science Monitor

### Washington

The possibility of a forced U.S. troop pullback from Thailand within the next year is expected to bolster the Pentagon's case for the strategic importance of current U.S. bases in the mid-Pacific and Japan.

There is deepening concern in the Pentagon that a full pullback from Thailand could intensify efforts on Capitol Hill for broader-based U.S. troop withdrawals from the Pacific region.

All told, there are 125,000 U.S. troops in the Far East, along with about 300,000 troops in Europe.

At least two lawmakers, Rep. Ronald V. Dellums (D) of California and Sen. Alan Cranston (D) of California, are calling for overseas troop cuts of roughly 100,000 personnel. Similar legislation did surprisingly well in Congress last year, though not enough for passage.

### Pullback requested

Congress, however, did ask for a pullback of 12,500 overseas troops in what some Pentagon analysts see as an indication of a rising tide of "isolationism" in Congress.

The United States, which currently has 25,000 troops and 350 aircraft in Thailand, had in fact planned to reduce that contingent somewhat during the next year. Premier Kukrit Pramoj has proposed that U.S. troops

be pulled out of Thailand within the next year.

The new seven-party Thai political coalition, concerned by developments in neighboring Cambodia and South Vietnam, also has indicated that Thailand will seek diplomatic relations with China and talks with North Vietnam.

Beyond the troops in Thailand, main U.S. military strength in Asia is in Japan and Okinawa (52,000); South Korea, 42,000; the Philippines 16,000; Taiwan, 5,000; and afloat with the U.S. Seventh Fleet, 27,000.

### Forces pruned back

The United States also has 11,000 troops on Guam, and hefty contingents in Hawaii and Alaska.

Japan, where U.S. forces have been pruned back during past months, and the Philippines, are now seen here as having added strategic importance. Yet, there is some question here about how long the United States will be able to maintain large forces there, given pacifist political feelings in Japan, and that country's increasing links with the third world, particularly oil-producing nations.

Japan, moreover, has had strong reservations about use of its territory as a "staging base" for U.S. military action — such as air strikes — in Asia. Indeed, Thailand was used as a staging base during the direct American involvement in Vietnam and is currently used as a main transportation base for the airlift into Phnom Penh.

### Basic Threat Acknowledged

Western diplomats also said there appeared to be an effort by the North Koreans to assert their rights to be in international waters and airspace in areas south of the line produced by extension of the demilitarized zone beyond the shorelines.

No one here denies that the North Korean Communists pose a basic threat to South Korea, but the military officers and diplomats appeared to be more concerned that North Korea will take advantage of the current political instability in South Korea than about a direct, overt attack across the border.

The military officers expressed particular concern that South Korean troops would be pulled away from their regular duties to maintain order if President Park is unable either to control his critics or to find an accommodation with them.

# Latin America

THE GUARDIAN MANCHESTER  
6 March 1975

## Castro out of the cold

It is about time that there were moves to stop the Straits of Florida from being a hostile moat keeping the United States and Cuba at bay. Dr Kissinger's statement over the weekend about the US being "prepared to move in a new direction" in relations with Cuba is a welcome start. It has been a difficult and gradual decision, taken under pressure, but made easier with the departure of President Nixon. This is reflected in the tortuous way out that the US has chosen. The Organisation of American States will probably be meeting in May. The US has said that if the OAS agrees by a two thirds majority to alter the Charter so that the lifting of the sanctions imposed against Cuba in 1964 can be decided by a simple majority, it will go along with the decision.

The OAS solution can be seen as just a device, for Fidel Castro has always made plain his contempt for the organisation. He regards it as being overdominated by the US. But the device is important for providing Washington with a way out. The sanctions were being whittled away by Latin-American States opening relations with Cuba, and, in broad political terms, were becoming irrelevant. The sanctions were invoked in a spirit of rectitude and as a protest against Cuban interferences in the affairs of other Latin-American countries. But Cuba had no "success" to compare with the US "success" — admitted in April last year by the Director of the CIA, William E. Colby, to a House Committee—in using dollars to help overthrow President Allende of Chile.

The anti-Cuba ban has also become a cold war anachronism. The state of détente between Washington and Moscow may occasionally be wobbly, but a missile crisis like the one of 1962 is now almost impossible. In addition, any movement by the US towards Cuba must open the possibility of Cuba being prised away from the Soviet influence which the US helped build up by making Cuba a pariah. There will be stern bilateral differences to sort out between Washington and Havana: among them American properties nationalised and the question of withdrawal from the base at Guantanamo. There are deals to be done on ideology, for Cuba has had success in brandishing the sanctions and the 1961 Bay of Pigs fiasco among the Third World to the disadvantage of the US. More open relations will permit Cuba more easily to modernise its sugar industry and to restore more normal trading and political links within the area. The US will also have access to a market — and this was one more sign of the growing irrelevance of the ban — which has already been penetrated by the Argentinian and Canadian subsidiaries of American firms.

The device is significant for American relations with the OAS, for the US will be seen to be operating on a more equal basis with other Latin-American States. Often in the past it has been accused of using the OAS as its creature. Dr Kissinger has reached the position where he can both revive a frozen relationship and overhaul attitudes to neglected neighbours.

BALTIMORE SUN  
2 March 1975

## U.S. softens on Cuba Kissinger links better relations, end of embargo

By DEAN MILLS

Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington—Henry A. Kissinger said yesterday that the United States "will consider changes in its bilateral relations" with Havana if the organization of American States lifts its 11-year-old embargo of Cuba.

And the secretary of state, in a speech delivered in Houston, suggested that the U.S. might go along with a move, backed by a majority of OAS members, to end that boycott. Mr. Kissinger said the "guid-

ing principle" of American policy is "to prevent the Cuba issued from dividing us from our hemispheric neighbors."

Noting that more than a decade has passed since the OAS greed to sever diplomatic and commercial relations with Cuba, Mr. Kissinger suggested the embargo may have outlived its usefulness:

"The countries of Latin America have successfully resisted pressure and subversion nations that in the early Sixties felt most threatened by Cuba revolutionary violence no longer feel the menace so acutely.

"This situation has generated a reconsideration of the OAS sanctions and raised questions about the future of our own bilateral relations with Cuba."

At a meeting in Quito last November, 12 OAS members voted in favor of lifting the economic sanctions. That was two votes short of the two-thirds required under the terms of the Rio Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance.

Since that vote, in which the United States abstained, OAS members tentatively have

agreed to amend the Rio treaty so that sanctions could be lifted by a simple majority vote. Those members favoring an end to the Cuba boycott want to apply that change to the Cuban boycott.

Mr. Kissinger said he would consult with Latin American foreign ministers during a trip he plans to the area in April "with the attitude of finding a generally acceptable solution. American officials said yesterday that the United States probably would go along with the idea "if there is considerable sentiment for it" in the Latin capitals.

The officials said the boycott could in theory be lifted almost immediately if there is sufficient support for doing so. But as a practical matter, they said, it would probably take at least several months for the action to work its way through the OAS parliamentary process.

American officials have been saying privately for several months that the United States is interested in moves toward normalization of relations with Cuba. But yesterday's statement by Mr. Kissin-

ger is the most explicit official expression of interest.

"If the OAS sanctions are eventually repealed," he said, "the United States will consider changes in its bilateral relations with Cuba and in its regulations. Our decision will be based on what we consider to be in our own best interests, and will be heavily influenced by the external policies of the Cuban government.

"We see no virtue in perpetual antagonism between the United States and Cuba."

Mr. Kissinger noted that the United States has "taken some symbolic steps to indicate that we are prepared to move in a new direction if Cuba will."

U.S. officials yesterday said those "symbolic steps" included the recent loosening of travel restrictions on Cuban diplomats assigned to the United Nations and the granting of permission to American firms to participate in business deals with Cuba. State Department spokesmen have previously insisted that such actions were isolated exceptions to the embargo against Cuba, rather than signals of possible change.

At the same time, Mr. Kissin-



singer expressed concern about Cuba's "military relationships with countries outside the Hemisphere"—an obvious reference to the military aid given Cuba by the Soviet Union and Communist countries.

And the secretary said that "fundamental change cannot come . . . unless Cuba demonstrates a readiness to assume the mutuality of obligation and regard upon which a new relationship must be founded."

American officials said that would mean Cuban recognition of international standards of law and adherence to a standard of nonintervention in other countries' affairs. The United States has often cited Havana's self-proclaimed role as an exporter of revolution as one reason for maintaining the boycott.

But American diplomats have been saying for the last few months what some Latin officials have been saying for down its policy of encouraging revolution in the rest of Latin America.

And U.S. officials yesterday cited the favorable comments being made by Cuban officials about President Ford and Mr. Kissinger as encouraging signals from Havana.

In the speech yesterday, delivered to a luncheon meeting of several Houston-area civic clubs, Mr. Kissinger also:

• Said the United States is "ready to acknowledge that it is reasonable" for Panama to exercise jurisdiction over the Canal Zone and to participate in the operation of the canal.

THE ECONOMIST MARCH 29, 1975

## Brazil

### One step back

FROM A BRAZIL CORRESPONDENT

Brazil's tentative steps towards liberalisation have been accompanied in the past three or four weeks by a fresh wave of arrests and illegal detentions. More than 20 people are known to have disappeared during this period into the hands of the security forces, and numerous allegations of beatings and electrical torture have seeped through to the press. The victims have included doctors, lawyers and journalists.

One explanation for the reversion to official violence is that elements in the army are determined to keep the liberal tendencies of General Geisel's administration in check. This army pressure is directed as much against the president himself as against the opponents of military government. It could also provoke a test of strength within the army between hard-line and moderate factions.

The president, anxious not to break ranks, wants to crack down on "subversives" but he has promised to try them properly. His civilian justice minister, Mr Armando Falcão, has been told to round up identifiable radical organisations. So far a Communist party printing press has been discovered in a Rio suburb, 23 people have been sentenced for forming a maoist offshoot of the Communists, and no fewer than 120 alleged members of the National Liberation Alliance, a guerrilla group, are standing trial in São Paulo.

Although the question of human rights and the treatment of prisoners is no longer taboo in Brazil, it remains the sticking point in the process of political evolution. The Brazilian Democratic Movement—the opposition in congress—has been persuaded to avoid

a confrontation on the issue. Two weeks ago opposition deputies came as close as they have ever done to an outright clash over political detention, seeking to call Mr Falcão to testify on the documented cases of 19 people who have been missing since last year and are feared dead. The justice minister's earlier written reply was that they had either been released or had left the country. The government party, Arena, insisted that it would defeat any move to grill Mr Falcão in congress, and cautioned against calling a commission of inquiry.

The leaders of the Democratic Movement backed down. They had little choice, knowing that in the face of more extreme pressures General Geisel remains their best ally. They have been given some concessions on other issues: a congressional inquiry into foreign investment in Brazil and a change in the system of fixing the minimum wage. Control of the unions and newspapers has been relaxed. But questions involving what is loosely termed "security" have been ruled out of bounds.

The hopes engendered by last November's election, when General Geisel held back the army and accepted an advance on all fronts by the opposition, have by no means been entirely crushed. But it has not taken long for the new congress to chart out its limits. Even some of the government majority are not convinced of the value of political participation, a cornerstone of General Geisel's reforming strategy. The Arena leader in the lower house, Mr Bonifacio, tried to defuse the human rights debate by stating that liberalisation concerned only the elite. "The people are not interested in that," he declared. "Only we, politicians, journalists, the elite, are preoccupied. The people keep on going to the cinema and to football games."