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
# NEWS, VIEWS and ISSUES

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# Governmental Affairs

WASHINGTON POST  
16 September 1975

## Deadly Toxins Cached by CIA, Church Says

By George Lardner Jr.  
Washington Post Staff Writer

Deadly poisons, including shellfish toxin potent enough to kill thousands of people, have been found in a secret cache maintained by the Central Intelligence Agency, Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho) said yesterday.

He said the CIA kept both the shellfish toxin and a smaller amount of cobra venom "in direct contravention" of presidential orders more than five years ago that such materials be destroyed.

Complaining angrily of news leaks about the poisons, Church confirmed that his Senate intelligence committee would hold public hearings on them next week despite White House objections.

The poisons were reportedly developed for the CIA under the code name Project Naomi during the 1950s. Church said the discovery might be relevant to the committee's assassination inquiry. He said he has no reason to think any of the toxins were ever actually used, but the committee is investigating "one particular mission" that apparently never came to fruition.

In response to a news conference question, Church indicated he was familiar with—but refused to comment on—an allegation that some toxin was sent to Africa to kill Congolese Premier Patrice Lumumba in 1961. According to the allegation, the shipment did not arrive until after Lumumba had been assassinated by other means.

Church would say only that the committee was still investigating the question of projected use of some of the poison and that its findings would be made public "in due course."

The Idaho Democrat added that the retention of the poisons, after President Nixon ordered destruction of such stockpiles in 1969, raised grave questions about internal controls and supervision within the CIA.

Church said CIA Director William E. Colby was apparently unaware of the cache until earlier this year when he asked agency employees to notify him of anything

might be relevant to the outside investigations that were then getting under way.

Church and Committee Vice Chairman John G. Tower (R-Tex.) were quietly told of the stockpile several months ago. The CIA's deputy director of science and technology, Carl Duckett, then conducted an in-house investigation through one of his deputies, Sayra Stevens, and reported the findings to the full Senate committee last week.

Church said the committee is still trying to determine who in the CIA was responsible for blocking destruction of the poisons and who knew about the decision. Former CIA Director Richard Helms, now ambassador to Iran, will be questioned on that score by the committee in executive session today.

"Somewhere within the CIA, a decision was made to disobey the presidential order," Church declared at a breakfast meeting with reporters that preceded his news conference. He said Colby's apparent ignorance of the cache even after becoming CIA director in 1973 suggested an alarming "looseness of command and control within the CIA . . ."

Along with an inventory of other unspecified materials, the lethal poisons were discovered at a CIA laboratory facility and put under heavy guard, Church said. He said news reports that they were found at Ft. Detrick, Md., were incorrect, but he refused to say where they were discovered.

Church said he was singling out the shellfish toxin and the cobra venom because they were the only items in the cache whose retention "unquestionably contravenes" Nixon's executive order.

Nixon announced in November, 1969, that the nation would never engage in germ warfare and ordered the destruction of the U.S. stockpile of bacteriological weapons. A subsequent "clarification" of the order made it clear that the order was to apply to bacteriological toxins. Church

NEW YORK TIMES  
11 September 1975  
**C.I.A. Views on Use  
Of Poison Reported**

By NICHOLAS M. HORROCK  
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 10 — The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has evidence that the Central Intelligence Agency considered "operational use" of the shellfish poison kept in its laboratory, including making suicide pills for agents and "aggressive actions," sources familiar with the events said today.

The poison, these sources said, was kept in a laboratory of the technical services division of the C.I.A., which in 1970 was under the command of Dr. Sidney Gottlieb, the man who conducted LSD experiments for the agency. The Senate investigators are expected to interview Dr. Gottlieb in closed session later this week.

Meanwhile, a prominent pharmacologist, Dr. Murdoch Ritchie of Yale University, has asked the agency and the Senate Committee to prevent the destruction of the shell-fish poison on the ground that it could be extremely valuable for medical research. He said the poison was similar to a one once mentioned in the James Bond books by Ian Fleming.

The poison, called saxitoxin, has properties that make it rare and extremely valuable for research on such nervous system diseases as multiple sclerosis, Dr. Ritchie said.

Agrees that the poisons should have been disposed of.

He also sharply disputed a report in yesterday morning's editions of The Washington Post quoting unnamed sources as stating the poisons were retained on grounds that they might be useful for experimental purposes.

He said the shellfish toxin, for which there is no known antidote, had been kept by the CIA in such quantities "as could kill many thousands of people," far more than what might be needed for any laboratory experimentation.

Church could not say why the CIA had the poisons developed or why it kept them despite the Nixon decree, but he said he assumed they were meant for individual targets.

"I'm not prepared to charge today that the CIA ever intended to conduct mass bacteriological warfare against foreign nations," he said. "I would have to assume that the

Dr. Ritchie said he believed the C.I.A.'s "saxitoxin" was part of a batch prepared by the Army at the Edgewood Arsenal in Maryland in the nineteen-sixties. He said that it was one of the deadliest poisons known to mankind, but added that because of its value for medical research, "it would be criminal to destroy this material."

Dr. Ritchie contended that careful controls could be worked out to keep the poison from misuse. He said saxitoxin, which is distilled from butter clams, is similar to tetrodotoxin, a poison made by the Japanese from puffer fish. The puffer fish poison was mentioned in James Bond novels, he said.

After President Nixon ordered the destruction of chemical and bacteriological weapons in 1969, following the signing of an international treaty limiting biochemical warfare, it became virtually impossible for medical researchers to obtain saxitoxin, Dr. Ritchie said. The commercially manufactured Japanese poison is not as good for research, he said.

Intelligence sources said that there was some documentary evidence to indicate that over the years the intelligence agency "at least considered" using the shell-fish poison. The agency also maintained a supply of cobra venom.

One potential use of the shellfish poison, because it is one of the fastest acting poisons, was to make suicide pills that so United States agents might be able to kill themselves after being caught, sources said. The poison acted so swiftly, these sources said, that the agents' captors would have no time to administer an antidote.

Other intelligence sources, however, said that there were memorandums suggesting aggressive actions" in which the shell-fish poison could be used. They would not elaborate.

There were also indications that the agency had materials for such uses as disabling guard dogs at a foreign embassy without killing them. This would aid the agency in entering and leaving a premise guarded by dogs without the owner's knowing the intrusion had been made.

The Senate Committee, under the chairmanship of Senator Frank Church, Democrat of Idaho, is investigating why these two poisons were not destroyed by the agency following the Presidential order in 1969. According to intelligence sources, though, Dr. Gottlieb headed the division where the materials were retained there was "no implication" violated the order and had them preserved.

Senate investigators are seeking to learn, intelligence sources said, whether Dr. Gottlieb could shed any light on how the Presidential order was handled at the agency.

Mr. Church said that in addition to the cobra and shellfish poisons, the C.I.A. had hoarded large quantities of other dangerous chemicals. These may figure in the hearings next week.

WASHINGTON POST  
17 September 1975

# CIA Tells Of Exotic Weapons Electric Gun, Untraceable Poison Pellets

By George Lardner Jr.  
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Central Intelligence Agency spent some \$3 million on a secret stockpile of deadly poisons and companion weaponry such as a dart gun that could kill its victims without leaving a trace, CIA Director William Colby acknowledged yesterday.

Testifying calmly in lecture-hall tones, Colby told the Senate intelligence committee at its first public session that middle-level CIA officials improperly stored away some of the most deadly toxin in 1970 in defiance of an order by President Nixon that such materials be destroyed.

Top officials of the CIA discovered the forbidden cache in an apparently long-neglected vault earlier this year.

The arsenal included not only deadly shellfish toxin reportedly capable of killing "hundreds of thousands" of people, but also strychnine, cobra venom, cyanide pills and other exotic compounds such as 10 pounds of "BZ," a chemical that attacks the central nervous system.

Several dart guns were also found, including a .45 caliber-sized electric gun capable of silently firing poison pellets that would dissolve in a victim before any autopsy could be performed.

One CIA memo made public by the Senate committee described the gun as "a non-discernible microbioinoculator" that could fire accurately at ranges up to 250 feet. Tiny pellets that could carry a half-milligram of poison and "capable of being used in a noise-free disseminator" such as the dart gun had also been developed, the October, 1967, memo declared.

The same document disclosed a "vulnerability" study of the New York City subway system to determine "the threat of infection to subway passengers" in a covert biological attack.

The memo, addressed to the

chief of the CIA's technical services division, added that the vulnerability study produced information about "methods of delivery which could be used offensively."

At one point during his testimony, Colby said some of the CIA's secret records on the development of the poisons and incapacitating agents—known as Project Naomi—had been destroyed in November, 1972. He also said there was a memorandum of agreement reflecting the destruction of those records between then-CIA Director Richard Helms and the chief of the technical services division, Sidney Gottlieb.

CIA special counsel Mitchell Rogovin said later, however, that Colby "misspoke." Rogovin said there was no such memorandum and that "we have no reason to believe" that any records on Project Naomi were destroyed.

Committee investigators apparently remain skeptical. "We have evidence that there are memos which one would think should exist but which no longer exist," the committee's chief counsel, Fritz Schwarz, told reporters.

Gottlieb, according to Rockefeller Commission sources, was responsible for the destruction of CIA drug-testing records, including the administration of LSD to unwitting subjects. Rogovin suggested that Colby may have had this in mind when he referred to Project Naomi. As for the memo to Helms, Rogovin said it actually came from the chief of the Army Chemical Corps and simply dealt with the Army's development of various toxins for the CIA at Ft. Detrick, Md.

The focal point of the testimony was the nearly 11 grams—approximately half an ounce—of shellfish toxin that was found along with the strychnine and other materials in an 8-by-10 foot storage room at the CIA's "South Laboratory," a building near the State Department.

Emphasizing the potency of the poison, Committee Chairman Frank Church (D-Idaho) said that Carl Duckett, head of the CIA's directorate of science and technology, testified in executive session that if the 11 grams were administered orally, they would be "sufficient to kill at least 14,000 people."

Oral doses, Church stressed, are also "the least efficient way" to administer the toxin. If the "sophisticated equipment" found along with the toxin were used instead, he said, the half ounce would be enough to kill many more people, with estimates "varying upwards into the hundreds of thousands."

When President Nixon re-

nounced biological warfare in the fall of 1969 and followed up on Feb. 14, 1970, with orders to destroy "all existing stocks of toxins" not needed for defensive research, Colby said high-ranking CIA officials knew that the stockpile at Ft. Detrick, including the shellfish toxin, should be destroyed.

"Discussions with Mr. Helms, director of central intelligence, and Mr. Thomas Karamessines, the deputy director for plans in 1970, have established that both were aware of the requirement that such material be disposed of," Colby testified.

"They recall that clear instructions were given that the CIA stockpile should be destroyed by the Army and that, in accordance with presidential directives, the agency should get out of the BW (biological warfare) business," he said.

The former CIA scientist responsible for hiding the shellfish toxin away, Nathan Gordon of Silver Spring, testified however, that he never got the word.

Repeatedly emphasizing the expense and the effort involved in manufacturing the shellfish toxin—experts say it takes tons of shellfish to produce a single gram—Gordon made plain that the prospect of destroying it troubled him greatly. As head of the tiny chemical branch of the CIA's technical services division in 1970 he said he and his two colleagues in that branch decided to keep the poison without even telling Gottlieb, their immediate superior.

Under lengthy questioning by committee members, Gottlieb maintained at times that Nixon's orders did not cover "chemical agents"—a category he claimed the shellfish toxin fell into.

Sen. Walter F. Mondale (D-Minn.) pointed out, however, that this conflicted with a CIA memo on Feb. 16, 1970 that Gordon admitted drafting at Gottlieb's suggestion.

Entitled "Contingency Plan for Stockpile of Biological Warfare Agents," the memo noted that Nixon had just "included all toxin weapons" in calling for the destruction of bacteriological stockpiles. The document then listed 10 biological agents—such as materials designed to bring on tuberculosis—and six "toxins," including 5.1 grams of "paralytic shellfish poison."

Gordon then warned that the CIA stockpile might be destroyed, and said that if the agency's director "wishes to continue this special capability," it could be transferred to a private firm in Baltimore and secretly stored "at a cost no greater than \$75,000 a

year."

The memo was drafted for signing by Karamessines, as head of the CIA's covert operations division, and addressed to CIA Director Helms as a proposed contingency plan. Colby, however, said an investigation indicates that the memo never even got to Karamessines.

Gordon said his immediate boss, Gottlieb, told him to forget the idea and said the program at Ft. Detrick with the special operations division of Army biological experts would have to be ended.

Subsequently, however, Gordon said, the Army project officer at Detrick, Charles Senseny, called him and offered to send him the CIA's five grams of shellfish toxin "for our potential use" some day. Gordon said he and his two colleagues in the CIA chemical branch quietly agreed.

Questioned sharply about the fact that the CIA would wind up with almost 11 grams of the toxin instead of the 5.1 grams it was supposed to have, Gordon said he could only conclude that Detrick's special operations division wanted to save the Army's stockpile from destruction also. He said he was unaware of the double shipment until this year.

Sen. Church said he found Gordon's disclaimers of a conflict between his actions and Nixon's orders "rather astounding." Gordon, however, voiced no regrets and said he still feels that retention of the toxin was "in the interest of the agency's policy" of maintaining behavioral control materials.

CIA Director Colby said the program with the Army formally began in May, 1952, and "was tied to earlier Office of Strategic Services World War II experience, which included the development of two different types of agency suicide pills to be used in the event of capture and a successful operations using BW materials to incapacitate a Nazi leader temporarily."

One of the CIA's earliest requirements, Colby said, was to find "a replacement for the standard cyanide L-pill issued to agents in hazardous situations in World War II. He said this effort ultimately centered on development of a small drill coated with shellfish toxin.

He said, however, that the only use of the expensive poison was in Francis Gary Power's disastrous U-2 flight over the Soviet Union in May, 1960, when he "carried such a device concealed in a silver dollar."

Powers tossed away the silver dollar on being shot down, but kept the poison.

pin. "He obviously did not use it," Colby said.

Instead, the committee was told, Powers' Russian captors found it and tested it on a dog, which died in 10 seconds.

Under questioning by Church, Colby readily agreed, however, that the shellfish toxin and other poisons developed under Project Naomi were designed for offensive uses although he was unaware of any actual applications.

Except for the shellfish toxin and perhaps some other items such as the cobra venom, the CIA's stockpile at Detrick was apparently destroyed. The cache at the CIA's South Laboratory, where the toxin was founded, evidently consisted of a potpourri of items from Detrick plus chemical compounds that CIA scientists had "collected" and stored away in earlier years.

Colby said he was not aware of the secret cache or even of Project Naomi until this year, when he asked agency employees to bring any questionable activities to his attention.

Sen. Mondale said he was especially upset by the fact that there are so few records about the program. He said there was no evidence that the National Security Council ever authorized it and no documentary proof that the stockpile was ordered destroyed in 1970.

"In short, the record's a mess," Mondale told Colby. "Does that bother you?"

"It certainly does," the CIA director said.

## NEW YORK TIMES 18 September 1975 Transit Authority Says No One Knew About C.I.A.'s Test

A spokesman for the Transit Authority said yesterday that as far as could be determined now no one in that agency had any knowledge of a secret Central Intelligence Agency project in which the city's subways were used to test the vulnerability of subway systems to a biological-warfare attack.

A C.I.A. memorandum made public during a hearing of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in Washington on Tuesday said that the test "provided a means of assessing the threat of infection to subway passengers" and demonstrated how to use such an attack "offensively."

According to Congressional sources, C.I.A. officials had said that in the test the subways were flooded with a "harmless simulant" of a disease-carrying gas. No information was disclosed on when or how the test was conducted.

The Transit Authority spokesman said: "As far as we can determine at this time, no one here knew of the test. We cannot comment until we know more about what was supposed to have happened. We are looking into the matter."

NEW YORK TIMES  
18 September 1975

## POISON ARMS BAN IS CITED BY HELMS

He Tells Panel He Gave Oral  
Order to Halt C.I.A. Job,  
but Did Not Follow Up

By NICHOLAS M. HORROCK  
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 17—Richard Helms, the former Director of Central Intelligence, told a Senate committee today that he had issued an oral command to halt the C.I.A.'s biochemical weapons program and to destroy its stockpiles, but that he had never followed up to find out if his order had been carried out. He also testified that he had never issued a written order on the matter.

Mr. Helms, now the Ambassador to Iran, went before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence accompanied by Thomas Karamessines, his former deputy for covert operations. Mr. Helms told the committee that when he learned in February, 1970, of President Nixon's order that all biochemical weapons be destroyed, he and Mr. Karamessines agreed that the C.I.A. "had no choice but to comply." "We agreed to terminate the program," he said.

Mr. Karamessines told the committee that he and Mr. Helms discussed the matter with Dr. Sidney Gottlieb, the director of the Technical Services Division of the C.I.A., which had over-all control of the program. Mr. Karamessines said that it was his "understanding with Gottlieb that all toxins in possession of the agency be returned to Fort Detrick for destruction."

### 2d Day of Hearings

Mr. Helms and Mr. Karamessines appeared as witnesses in the second day of the Senate committee's public inquiry into why the C.I.A. failed to destroy two deadly biochemical poisons, a shellfish toxin and a poison derived from cobra venom, after the Presidential order in 1970.

The committee's counsel, E.A.O. Schwarz 3d, said that the committee would question Dr. Gottlieb about the poisons and other matters in a closed session on Tuesday. He said, however, that Dr. Gottlieb's lawyers had "indicated" that their client might invoke his constitutional right under the Fifth Amendment not to answer questions that might tend to incriminate him.

If Dr. Gottlieb does invoke the amendment, Mr. Schwarz said, the committee may consider whether it will grant him

immunity from prosecution to get the full story on the record. Mr. Helms told the committee that he knew of an 18-year-old, \$3-million C.I.A. joint program with the Army's Biological Warfare Laboratory at Fort Detrick, Md., to develop biochemical weapons.

He said that he had been aware that the program developed biochemicals and such delivery systems as dart guns, but that he had never ordered such weapons used against human beings. "I don't ever recall considering it, let alone authorizing it," he said.

Mr. Karamessines said that he had "no recollection of the actual use of any of the materials," but acknowledged that if they had been used to kill a watchdog in a foreign operation he might not have been informed. He said that he was sure he had never ordered their use against a human being. "As Mr. Helms and others who know me are aware, I would not have continued [at the C.I.A.] if there was a requirement for the killing of a human being," Mr. Karamessines said. He has spent some 30 years in covert operations with the Office of Strategic Services and the C.I.A.

### Three Made Decision

Mr. Helms testified that before President Nixon ordered biochemical warfare weapons destroyed, he asked a National Security Council committee to study the question. Mr. Helms said, however, that he had not told the committee that the C.I.A. possessed such weapons, mainly because it was not cleared to have such information under national security standards.

He also said that he had never doubted that the President's order applied to the C.I.A. Both Mr. Helms and Mr. Karamessines said that they were "surprised" to learn five years later that all the materials had not been destroyed.

Dr. Nathn Gordon, who was in charge of biochemical materials in the Technical Services Division, testified yesterday that he and two other men in his section had decided to retain supplies of the shellfish toxin and the poison made from cobra venom.

Dr. Gordon said that although he knew about the 1970 Presidential order, he did not regard the materials as being covered under it. Moreover, he said, he had received no written directive from the C.I.A. hierarchy to get rid of the materials.

Today, Mr. Helms said that he had not issued a written order on the matter because Mr. Karamessines and Dr. Gottlieb accepted verbal orders as "orders written in blood." He said that he felt Dr. Gottlieb and Mr. Karamessines were two of the most honorable men in the country, and that he never doubted that the order would be carried out.

WASHINGTON POST  
14 September 1975

## Rockefeller Cites Need for Surveillance

NORMAN, Okla., Sept. 13 (AP)—Vice President Rockefeller said today that attempts against the life of President Ford show a need for tougher domestic intelligence operations by the government.

Rockefeller told an airport news conference in Oklahoma City that the FBI and other agencies authorized to gather intelligence in this country need more help.

"What has happened does indicate the importance of having intelligence," he said. "And I think it's an element of the United States is reviewing CIA and the entire intelligence structure."

Rockefeller, who headed the government panel that studied charges of illegal domestic snooping by CIA, said no massive violations were found and the charges are deceiving the public.

"I think that we do see from what happened in the case of the President that it is essential that the FBI and the local law enforcement agencies preserve records of those who have been outspoken or active in efforts to undermine the freedom of this country or destroy democratic society by force or to kill leaders of this society," he said.

Rockefeller said, however, that he felt public officials and political candidates should be prepared to take the risks that go with the job and that the Secret Service is doing all that can be done reasonably to protect them.

Rockefeller's two days of speechmaking, handshaking, fund-raising and frequent news conferences featuring local questioners were paid for by the Republican Party, as was a corresponding trip by President Ford.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 17, 1975

# Though the Subject Is Poison, the C.I.A. Revelations Bring on Nervous Giggles

By LINDA CHARLTON  
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 16—Every now and then the hearing room was swept by nervous giggles today, as when the Central Intelligence Agency's former top chemist said that all he knew about a lethal shellfish toxin was that he had been told "it's good stuff."

The chemist, Dr. Nathan Gordon, provoked another muffled snort during the hearings by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence when he went on to talk about another C.I.A. item, this one guaranteed to produce nothing more lethal than "a real severe case of the tummys."

Dr. Gordon was not trying to be funny. He was trying to explain how it was, in apparent defiance of two Presidential edicts, he had held onto 10.9 grams of the shellfish toxin — enough to kill thousands of persons—in the vault of his laboratory.

Dr. Gordon, a tall, stooping man, with dark-rimmed spectacles and thinning hair

brushed back to curl over the collar of his blue suit, had taken advantage of a Senate rule that allows a subpoenaed witness to bar television or other cameras during his testimony. So the Senate hearing room, the same grand, marble-pillared chamber that once echoed with Senator Sam J. Ervin Jr.'s declamations, was lighted only by four heavy crystal chandeliers.

Dr. Gordon, told the Senate and, yes, he had stored the shellfish toxin, which works by blocking the transmission of nervous-system impulses. But he insisted that he had done so because, first, he did not believe the 1969 and 1970 White House directives applied to the C.I.A. and, second, they applied to bacteriological agents, not chemical ones, anyway.

He said that he thought it important for the agency to maintain "a potential capability in behavioral materials," meaning the shellfish poison and similar laboratory triumphs.

Dr. Gordon's chief, Richard Helms, the former Director of Central Intelligence who

is now Ambassador to Iran, sat in a reserved seat in the front row of the spectator section. He seemed detached and impassive, and he fiddled with the cardboard "reserved" sign as he listened to Dr. Gordon.

During the morning, the present director, William E. Colby, told the committee about some of the ways the C.I.A. had devised to deliver its various poisons, including a formidable dart gun that his lawyer, Mitchell Rogovin, handed to the committee.

## No Pointing

"Don't point that at me," said Senator Frank Church, Democrat of Idaho, the committee chairman, lightly but nervously. Mr. Colby had told the committee that the dart gun fired nearly silently and was accurate at 100 meters. He described, but did not have with him, such other devices as a fountain-pen dart launcher and a bolt that, when placed in a machine, exudes its poison as the ma-

chine warms in use. He had brought the dart gun at the committee's request.

Mr. Golby's account of why the shellfish toxin was not destroyed differed from Gordon's. The director said that the "retired agency officer" in charge—who turned out to be Dr. Gordon—had "made this decision based on the fact that the cost and difficulty of isolating the shellfish toxin were so great that it simply made no sense to destroy it, particularly when there would be no future source of the toxin."

But he also said that the precious poison has been used only once. It was, he said, given to the U-2 spy plane pilot, Francis Gary Powers, for the 1960 flight over the Soviet Union. Mr. Colby said the toxin was in a tiny poison needle concealed in a silver dollar, to provide Mr. Powers with "an option" in case he was shot down. He was shot down, but that was an option he chose not to exercise.

WASHINGTON STAR  
10 September 1975

# FBI Agents Enlarge Probes of Possible CIA Violations

By Orr Kelly  
Washington Star Staff Writer

Agents of the FBI have been assigned by the Justice Department to investigate possible criminal actions involving the operations of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Robert Havel, spokesman for the department, said yesterday that the bureau agents were first called in to probe one aspect of the case several months ago, but he said their work had since been expanded to cover other aspects.

The FBI probe is linked to the work of a committee made up of 13 lawyers from the criminal division and three lawyers from the civil rights division who are studying possible violations of the criminal laws by both the CIA and the FBI.

THE WORK of the committee is being supervised by Kevin I. Maroney, a deputy assistant attorney general who has long worked with the CIA and the FBI. Also involved in the probe are Dep. Atty. Gen. Harold R. Tyler Jr., and Asst. Attys. Gen. Richard Thornburgh and J. Stanley Pottinger.

Assignment of agents from the FBI, which is sometimes seen as a rival to the CIA, to investigate the

intelligence agency is a highly unusual step. Until recently, the CIA even had an agreement with the Justice Department that permitted agency officials to discipline agency employees, without notifying the Justice Department, even in cases involving possible violation of the criminal laws.

Havel refused to say what possible violations of the law were involved in the FBI's part of the investigation.

HOWEVER, information made available over the last eight months in newspaper reports, the report to President Ford by CIA Director William Colby, the Rockefeller Report and congressional investigations has opened up the possibility of violations of the criminal law in the following areas:

- Did Richard Helms, former CIA director and now ambassador to Iran, commit perjury when he told a Senate committee the CIA had not been involved in efforts to overthrow the Chilean government?
- Is anyone criminally responsible for the CIA's involvement in domestic spying?
- Did the CIA or its agents violate the law by opening mail without a warrant?

• Was there any violation of the law by the CIA in its reported involvement in assassination attempts against rulers of other countries?

• Did the CIA operate beyond its legal authority in other areas — and did this involve violation of the criminal laws?

• Did high ranking officials of the government order the CIA to carry out illegal activities — and, in the process, violate the criminal laws themselves?

The most likely areas for prosecution involve the perjury laws and those covering the sanctity of the mails.

On the other hand, Justice Department lawyers say, it is quite possible that the CIA, in its domestic spying efforts, overstepped its authority but not in such a way that any individual can be held responsible for violating the criminal laws.

So far, Havel said, the lawyers involved in the probe have not felt the need for help from professional investigators in their investigation of possible violations of the law by the FBI or its agents. If they should need such help, Havel said, investigators from another agency would be called in.

NEW YORK TIMES  
13 September 1975

## President Bars House Unit From Seeing Secret Data

By NICHOLAS M. HORROCK  
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 12 — President Ford ordered today that the House Select Committee on Intelligence be cut off from all classified documents, and he forbade Administration officials to testify before the committee on classified matters. He also demanded the return of classified material now in the committee's hands.

His actions appeared to place the White House on the most serious collision course with Congress regarding investigations of the intelligence agencies since the sweeping inquiries began earlier this year. At the center of the dispute is the committee's decision yesterday to make public four words from a 1973 intelligence agency summary, over the objection of officials of the intelligence community.

The words were made public along with about 400 others last night, but neither committee members nor Government officials would identify the phrase at issue.

However, authoritative sources said the four words were "and greater communications security," which were part of a list of activities taking place in Egypt the day the 1973 Arab-Israeli war broke out.

The House committee voted 6 to 3 in a closed session yesterday afternoon to disclose the four words in making public a paragraph from a Defense Intelligence Agency secret summary of the activities. The summary was prepared on Oct. 6, 1973.

Mitchell Rogovin, counsel for the Director of Central Intelligence, told the closed session that the intelligence agencies believed the words compromised national security by revealing the "sources and methods" used to gather intelligence.

Today, in a news conference, William E. Colby, the Director of Central Intelligence, said he believed that keeping the four words secret was worth risking a constitutional confrontation between the President and the House.

The confrontation began early today. Rex E. Lee, Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Civil Division, appeared before the committee on behalf of the President and called the publication of the words of "irreparable harm." He relayed Mr. Ford's order.

Representative Otis G. Pike, the committee chairman, responded, "In other words the executive branch is telling the

committee of the House that it may not continue to operate." Mr. Lee said he believed it was up to the committee.

Since the committee investigation covers almost entirely national security matters, Mr. Ford's ban was considered of grave import.

Later, Mr. Pike, Democrat of Suffolk County, told a reporter, "I for one would be very surprised if the committee votes to return the documents that it already has as a result of subpoena, and I'd be even more surprised if the members voted not to continue operation."

Several hours after the morning hearing, the C.I.A. received a subpoena from the committee dated today.

Both Mr. Lee and Mr. Colby stressed that they were concerned as much about the committee's future acts as about what had been done.

When asked why executive-branch cooperation with the committee had been curbed, Mr. Colby said, "We're going to stop it until we can work out an arrangement where we have some assurance that there won't be any revelations without our discussing it together."

A committee source said he felt the committee could proceed with information from sources outside the Government and with leads developed through the classified documents it had already received.

### Court Delays Feared

The committee has always had the option of going to court to enforce its subpoenas, but both committee members and Mr. Ford know that the time spent in court would seriously hamper the future of the investigation, which is scheduled to be completed by Jan. 31.

Until the Administration made an issue of the four-word phrase, no one had paid any attention to it. The words appeared in this context:

"Egypt [deletion] large scale mobilization exercise may be an effort to soothe internal problems as much as to improve military capabilities. Mobilization of some personnel, increased readiness of isolated units, and greater communications security are all assessed as parts of the exercise routine."

Long-time intelligence agents said that "and greater communications security" would alert the Egyptians and Russians to the fact that the United States had penetrated their communications and even penetrated it when efforts were made to have greater security. If a particularly sophisticated technique were being used to protect communications, these words would tell an intelligence analyst that the United States had intruded upon it, the intelligence agents

NEW YORK TIMES  
11 September 1975

## C.I.A. Given White House Data On Ground They Be Kept Secret

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 10 — material from the National Security Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency, which, he said, White House officials said late today that the Ford Administration was delivering materials in response to a committee subpoena, but under the condition that the documents not be made public.

Earlier today, in a special meeting, the House committee voted to subpoena briefing papers given to Presidents Johnson and Nixon on four major international crises during their Presidencies. Included were the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, the 1968 Tet offensive in South Vietnam, the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus and last year's military coup in Portugal.

After a series of negotiations between Mr. Pike and White House officials, the Administration tonight began to deliver material relating to the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. Originally, Mr. Pike said, he had been promised unclassified material.

Instead, he said, the Administration has sent him secret Pike's committee.

meanwhile, Mr. Pike said, he planned to begin hearings tomorrow on American intelligence on the Arab-Israeli war. "These materials will not be read at the hearing, but questions will be based upon them," said Mr. Pike, Democrat of Suffolk.

The House committee has consistently bristled at the effort by the Administration to have matters handled in secret.

The House hearings are expected to examine the question of whether the intelligence estimates made by the various agencies were accurate and enabled the Presidents to properly respond to the crises with which they were faced. These are the second set of public hearings conducted by Mr. Pike's committee.

NEW YORK TIMES  
13 September 1975

## C.I.A. AIDES HELD LIABLE FOR CRIMES

WASHINGTON, Sept. 12 (UPI)

The Justice Department has ruled that whatever immunity they may have enjoyed in the past, Central Intelligence Agency employees will henceforth be subject to Federal prosecution for criminal offenses just as any Federal employe, Senator Charles H. Percy said yesterday.

The Illinois Republican said he had received a letter from the Justice Department signed by Assistant Attorney General Richard L. Thornburg stating:

"The Central Intelligence Agency is now, therefore, unquestionably bound by the same requirements as other executive branch departments and agencies with respect to referral of allegations of Title 18, U. S. [criminal] code, on the part of its officers and employes."

Mr. Percy said that the policy statement, approved by Attorney General Edward H. Levi, put an end to a recently revealed 1954 secret agreement between the C.I.A. and the Justice Department whereby the agency handled investigations into criminal offenses of its own employes and their disposition.

C.I.A. officials in earlier hearings argued that although intelligence operations were not involved in crimes ranging from theft of Government property to embezzlement, the intelligence duties of the offenders might have been compromised in an open trial.

said.

But most suggested that neither Egyptians nor the Soviet Union had any real doubt that United States communications spying was excellent and this phrase would have little consequence.

### Over-All Effect Feared

Administration sources said that the White House had become increasingly concerned with the aggressiveness of the House committee and with the effect this would have on other committees. When the House committee voted yesterday to declassify documents "unilaterally," one well-placed Administration source said, it raised the specter that other Congressional committees might decide to follow suit.

The intelligence agencies and defense units supply a vast amount of classified material to Congress and have over the years been able to "work out" releases of the material that did not quote specific language or compromise security.

"When Mr. Pike took that on," one source said, "he was shaking the whole tree."

Mr. Pike is apparently well aware of this. During the panel's public hearing today, Mr. Pike objected to the past arrangements between the executive branch and Congress.

"That's exactly what's wrong, Mr. Lee," he said. "For decades committees of Congress have not done their jobs and you've been loving it. You could come up here and whisper in one friendly Congressman's ear, and in the mess we're in."

## Four Little Words

In the months since its illegal domestic operations were first disclosed, the CIA and its sister intelligence agencies have stoically endured a steady drubbing from Congress and the press—and for a time last week, it looked like more of the same. The Senate select committee led by Frank Church revealed yet another CIA misdeed: the agency had apparently violated a direct Presidential order and secretly retained a stash of lethal poison. The Church committee's counterpart in the House quickly followed suit, releasing a top-secret report that found U.S. intelligence to have been "starkly wrong" in reading the outbreak of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. This time, however, the CIA counterattacked, accusing the House committee of releasing the kind of documents that could endanger the nation's security.

The controversy over the missing poison dated to a 1970 order by Richard Nixon that all stockpiles of material used in chemical and biological warfare be destroyed. Despite that, a recent CIA inventory turned up a small container of cobra venom and eleven grams of saxitoxin—a nerve poison extracted from butter clams—reportedly capable of killing 20,000 people. No one was quite sure what the CIA had in mind for the poison, though most agreed it was designed for individual killings (or even suicide pills for CIA agents themselves) rather than wholesale targets.

The broader question was who in the CIA had deliberately disobeyed the President. One former agent hunched that Nixon had secretly told the CIA to keep the toxins, but agency director William Colby conceded to Church that a violation of Presidential orders had taken place. The likelihood was that some mid-level official had done it on his own. But whether it was a subordinate or the director himself made little difference, according to Church. He said stricter outside controls were required.

No War? If the Senate committee had scored against the CIA, the agency itself soon scored against the House committee. To prove his claim that U.S. intelligence had failed to predict the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, Rep. Otis Pike of New York released a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) document issued on June 6—hours after the outbreak of hostilities—that concluded: "Mobilization of some personnel, increased readiness of isolated units and greater communications security are all assessed as parts of the exercise routine. . . . There are still no military or political indicators of Egyptian intentions or preparations to resume hostilities with Israel."

Colby charged that publication of four words—"and greater communications security"—might have jeopardized U.S. intelligence "sources and methods," presumably some inside line on Egyptian communication procedures. Pike dismissed that argument as invalid. And he was furious when the White House sent an assistant attorney general to reclaim all classified documents—or exact a standard pledge that the committee would not declassify any material without executive-branch approval. "That's exactly what's wrong," stormed Pike. "For decades other committees of Con-

# Mary McGroary

## Four Little Words And CIA's Failures

Four little words from a classified document, we were told, could endanger national security.

Gerald Ford, who prides himself on his even temper, threw something like a fit over them. He stamped the presidential foot and said the House Select Committee on Intelligence must forthwith return to him all the classified documents he had so generously sent up to them.

The four little words, which were eventually disclosed by the CIA, provided no enlightenment. "And greater communications security" doesn't sound like a phrase to signal the end of western civilization or even complicate the life of an agent in the Balkans.

But against Rep. Otis Pike, D-N.Y., the chairman of the committee, the four words were the only stones the President could throw.

PIKE IS going after the wrong thing in his investigation. He is not beguiled by assassinations, poisonings and other reprehensible covert activities. He is going for the agency's throat. He is examining its very reason for being, its performance in intelligence activities.

He is compiling a litany of failures in spying, which is what CIA defenders say it does best.

Pike has found out that their record has been lamentable: CIA failed to foretell the Arab-Israeli War in 1973, the invasion of Cyprus in 1974, the coup in Portugal, the Arab oil embargo, the Indian nuclear explosion and the Tet offensive in 1968.

The four words that caused the commotion occur in a classified document which is called "A Preliminary Post-Mortem Report on the Intelligence Community's Performance Before the Arab-Israeli War." The agency morosely concludes that agents of both the Defense Intelli-

gress have not done their job, and you've loved it." Not only would the panel retain the contested papers, Pike indicated, but it issued a new subpoena—for Vietnam war documents—returnable this week.

That seemed to prefigure a major court test. But Pike, whose committee franchise expires next January, was reluctant to lose the time in litigation, and the intelligence community seemed fearful of setting a legal precedent for Congressional declassification. The likeliest outcome seemed to be some sort of negotiated settlement in which Congress would continue to probe, but more cautiously, while the White House continued to provide the witnesses and documents.

—SANDRA SALMANS with ANTHONY MARRO in Washington

gence Agency and the CIA were "simply, obviously starkly wrong." On the morning the Egyptians marched, the Watch Committee was still receiving reassurances from agents warning of nothing more serious than "small-scale action."

Last Thursday, in executive session, the committee members and Mitchell Rogovin, CIA Director William E. Colby's counsel, haggled for two hours over release of the spooks' classified failures. Rogovin insisted on the deletion of 13 words, including the fateful four. By vote of 6 to 2, the committee, decided that the American people had a right to know about "and greater communication security," which any alert ham operator could have noted at the time.

IN EVERY case, Rogovin insisted that publication would "endanger sources and methods."

At the committee's defiance administration panicked. An emergency meeting was held in the office of White House counsel Philip M. Buchen. A counterattack was launched. An assistant attorney general, Rex E. Lee, was chosen to go up to Capitol Hill and instruct Otis Pike in his responsibilities.

It was a suicide mission. Pike is not the kind of man who quails at the sight of a representative from the Justice Department or pales at the suggestion that he is violating House rules and the Constitution.

Lee bravely spoke of the "necessary accommodation between the executive and the legislative," reproved Pike for a "serious breach in the use of classified information in an improper manner."

He urged, in those paragraphs Pike allowed him to complete, "a return to the traditional approach" — "the same way that for decades other committees. . . ."

Pike landed on him. "That is what is wrong, Mr. Lee," he said, "For decades other committees of Congress have not done their job and you have loved it."

ADVISING Congress, Pike continued in the same biting tone, has meant that "the executive branch comes up and whispers in one friendly congressman's ear or another friendly congressman's ear, and that is exactly what you want to continue and this is exactly what I think has led us into the mess we are in."

By concentrating on the supposedly defensible aspect of the intelligence community's activities, Pike poses the greatest threat to CIA's continued existence. He may not endanger "sources and methods." He endangers survival. Evil is forgivable on Capitol Hill; incompetence is not.

Even the agency does not defend what Frank Church's Senate committee is looking into. Colby and company don't mind those ex-post-facto examinations of the indefensible, and have cooperated, with an occasional show of reluctance.

But when Pike reveals they're not even doing what they're supposed to do, he's telling CIA's darkest secret. No wonder four words were used as an excuse to try to close down his dangerous prying.

WASHINGTON POST  
12 September 1975

# U.S. Experts 'Starkly Wrong' About '73 Mideast War Data

By George Lardner Jr.  
Washington Post Staff Writer

U.S. intelligence experts were "starkly wrong" about the imminence of the 1973 war in the Middle East that led to the Arab oil boycott, the House intelligence committee disclosed yesterday.

According to portions of a top-secret postmortem subpoenaed from the Central Intelligence Agency, there were plenty of danger signals before hostilities broke out on Oct. 6, 1973, but not a single agency in the government's intelligence community took them seriously enough to produce an official warning.

The former director of one of those agencies, the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, told the committee he felt that the war, and the oil boycott it produced, could have been avoided by diplomatic efforts if the dangers had been recognized.

Instead, even after the war had started, the so-called Watch Committee, which was set up to advise the National Security Council in times of crisis, said it could "find no hard evidence of a major, coordinated Egyptian-Syrian offensive."

The mistaken findings and predictions of the Watch Committee and other agencies were made public only after a closed-door committee debate prompted by CIA protests. Other, more generalized portions of the secret postmortem were released at a morning meeting.

The hearing also brought a sharp attack on Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, whose penchant for secrecy was blamed for repeatedly depriving intelligence experts of vital information during the Nixon administration.

Ray S. Cline, former director of intelligence at the State Department, said the "passion for secrecy" at the Nixon White House was so intense that "senior intelligence officers could not find out how to assist our policymaking process."

He said he grew so discouraged and dismayed that by the time of the Middle East crisis, on the night of Oct. 5, 1973, he decided against bothering Kissinger, who was in New York, with the newfound conclusion that fighting seemed about to break out.

By then, Cline testified, "My staff and I had concluded that hostilities probably were imminent" and drew up a draft memo to that effect. He said he asked that Kissinger be notified "that we had reached this conclusion" but learned later that night that the State Department secretariat and Kissinger's personal staff "did not want to trouble him in New York at that late hour—8 or 9 o'clock in the evening."

A phone call to Kissinger might not have made much difference at that point, Cline said, but at least it would not have been true, as has been written, that when the secretary went to bed that night he "was sure . . . that there wouldn't be a war."

[The State Department last night disputed Cline's testimony, saying that Kissinger "had grown increasingly concerned" in the week preceding the war "that hostilities might break out." A State Department spokesman said Kissinger had requested assessments of the situation "every 48 hours" from the CIA and the State Department's intelligence bureau that Cline headed.

["During that period the intelligence agencies were in agreement that hostilities were not imminent," the spokesman said. "All of their reports . . . predicted that there would not be a war."

[The spokesman said it was "astounding" that if Cline "was in fact concerned about the outbreak of war he did not take effective action" through available channels to "assure that the secretary or other responsible officials were warned."]

Censored segments of the "Preliminary Postmortem Report" on the U.S. intelligence community's performance prior to the 1973 Arab-Israeli War were read into the public record at the hearing by William Parmenter, chief of the CIA's Office of Current Intelligence.

The war broke out on Oct. 6, 1973, when Egyptian forces crossed into Israeli-occupied territory on the East Bank of the Suez Canal. Syrian infantry and armor attacked the Golan Heights the same day.

According to the study on the results of American spywork, however, a thorough search of the reports issued

before Oct. 6 "failed to turn up any official statement from any office or committee responsible for producing finished, analytical intelligence which contributed anything resembling a warning" as such.

The study found that "instead of warnings, the Community's analytical effort in effect produced reassurances . . . that the Arabs would not resort to war, at least not deliberately."

Despite the benefits of hindsight, the report said there was no escaping the fact that "the principal conclusions concerning the imminence of hostilities reached and reiterated by those responsible for intelligence analysis were—quite simply, obviously, and starkly—wrong."

The study emphasized that finding by noting that U.S. experts had been provided with "a plenitude of information which should have suggested, at a minimum, that they take very seriously the threat of war in the near term."

These signs, Cline testified under questioning by Rep. James P. (Jim) Johnson (R-Colo.), included Egyptian troop movements, cancellation of military leaves, imposition of tight security by the Egyptians, and on Oct. 4, 1973, the evacuation of dependents of Soviet advisers from Egypt and Syria.

Emphasizing the Soviet withdrawal, Cline said the Russians were given advance warning of the attack into the Sinai

by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. In addition, Cline said, under the so-called "detente" treaties, the Soviet Union was obligated to consult with the United States on threats to peace.

Rep. Morgan F. Murphy (D-Ill.) said he thought this "a pretty dangerous situation."

"The bottom line is we've really got a one-man show" in foreign policy, Murphy protested. He said he thought some "meddling in Dr. Kissinger's activities" was "long overdue."

Cline said Congress should consider legislation prohibiting the same person from being simultaneously Secretary of State and White House adviser for National Security Affairs. Kissinger holds both posts. Cline maintained that the only job of the President's NSA adviser should be a sort of honest broker between the secretaries of State and Defense, making sure the President is getting all the facts.

By a vote of 6 to 3, the committee decided at an executive session yesterday afternoon to release samples of the erroneous intelligence assessments after Chairman Otis G. Pike (D-N.Y.) complained about the top-secret label the CIA and other agencies wanted to keep on them.

The CIA's Parmenter claimed that disclosure of these mistaken predictions could compromise "intelligence sources and methods," but Pike said he found that incredible.

NEW YORK DAILY NEWS  
16 September 1975

## FOUR LITTLE WORDS

—have provoked a serious clash between the White House and the House Intelligence Committee over the use of top-secret documents furnished to the panel.

President Ford is demanding the return of all the data because Chairman Otis Pike (D-N.Y.) incorporated one short passage blue-penciled by the Central Intelligence Agency in a report devoted to establishing that U.S. intelligence failed to predict the Yom Kippur war.

In defending the panel's action, Pike is on shaky ground. Words which appear innocent enough to laymen's eyes may convey considerable meaning and provide valuable information to the operatives of another country.

As a matter of fact, we can see no purpose in releasing verbatim excerpts from intelligence documents at all.

The reports could easily be paraphrased without losing their essential flavor or, as in the instant case, without altering the conclusion that the CIA misinterpreted the signs of impending conflict in the Middle East in 1973.



LOS ANGELES TIMES  
14 September 1975

# CIA Probe May Help Sen. Church Enter '76 Race

BY ROBERT L. JACKSON  
Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON—When open Senate hearings on the Central Intelligence Agency start Tuesday, the country may get to know a lot more about a boyish-looking liberal Democrat named Frank Church.

Church, who was the nation's youngest senator when Idaho first elected him at age 32 in 1956, has more than enough work these days.

Aside from being chairman of the Senate's long investigation into the CIA and other intelligence-gathering agencies, he is chairman of a foreign relations subcommittee that is probing evidence of international bribery and payment of illegal U.S. campaign contributions by some major defense contractors and oil companies.

Church had begun quietly to organize a drive for the Democratic presidential nomination last January. His subsequent appointment to head the Senate's special committee on intelligence activities forced him to call off those plans—at least temporarily.

Some believe the CIA hearings and their wide television exposure will boost him to national prominence. If that should happen, he may rekindle his presidential campaign when the panel's work concludes by next spring.

The committee's seven-month investigation so far has been conducted in closed hearings. When he finally was ready to go public, Church tried to give the coming hearings a big buildup. The effort failed.

Church coyly told reporters that the first day or two would deal with "a very important subject that has not yet come to light." But word began to leak out from Administration sources that he was referring to the CIA's retention of bacterial poisons, and Church was forced to provide details.

Subsequent hearings will deal with alleged abuses against U.S. citizens by the CIA, the FBI, the Internal Revenue Service and other intelligence agencies. The committee's findings on the CIA's alleged involvement in plots to assassinate foreign leaders will be made public in a report.

Church is not known as a tough-skinned, hard-nosed investigator. On the contrary, during his 18 years in the Senate, he has been regarded by some as a bit soft, somewhat erudite and more eager for compromise than confrontation.

He is cautious and deliberate. When he speaks, he knows how his sentences will end. In briefing reporters after dozens of closed hearings by his CIA committee, Church has been precise in his remarks, yet reluctant to give sensitive details.

His patience has paid off in obtaining CIA records. Although the White House and CIA at first resisted giving Church the top-secret material he wanted, Church spent weeks working out a careful agreement for handling dif-

ferent files.

"We think we have it all," he said, referring to records that deal with the CIA's alleged involvement in foreign assassination plots. In an interview, he acknowledged that there were gaps in the written record but said that this was "not because anything was withheld but because the evidence simply doesn't exist in some cases."

No date has been set for release of the assassination report.

"It's like writing 'War and Peace,'" Church said, referring to the length of the report. "We have reviewed a vast number of documents, including National Security Council files, and have taken 8,000 pages of testimony from over 100 witnesses."

As to why the committee felt it necessary to disclose any CIA involvement in assassination plots, Church said:

"It's an aberration, really, from the traditional American practice in the world and our historic principles. It fell to us to do this job because the Rockefeller commission 'would not treat it.' This was a reference to the Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States, a group headed by Vice President Rockefeller.

Church said the report would address such questions as "how did it happen and who ordered it."

"Some of the conclusions we reach will have general application to the rest of the CIA investigation," he added. "They will deal with the command and control of the CIA."

Church said in July that the panel had found no direct involvement by former Presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy or former Atty. Gen. Robert F. Kennedy in plotting foreign assassinations. Some Republicans on the committee have said there is no direct evidence to clear these officials, either.

Lacking presidential direction, the CIA "may have been behaving like a rogue elephant on a rampage," Church suggested at that time.

It was Church's early interest in foreign affairs and in questionable CIA activities in Chile that resulted in his seeking—and obtaining—the chairmanship of this committee. Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.) appointed him to the job last January.

Following 1972 disclosures of close ties between the government and the International Telephone & Telegraph Corp., Church—as a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee—investigated links between ITT and CIA in Chile. He did so as chairman of the subcommittee on multinational corporations, the same panel that now is investigating international payoffs by large companies.

The subcommittee—acting on evidence obtained by syndicated columnist Jack Anderson—found that ITT had offered the CIA \$1 million to prevent Marxist Salvador Allende from gaining power in Chile. ITT had large holdings in that country.

"CIA turned down the money but proceeded on its own to do the work," Church said. His subcommittee was the first to obtain testimony from a CIA agent about foreign covert operations.

Church believes "a very pervasive sickness" is afflicting the United States. Among the symptoms, he said, is "contempt for the law" by some large corporations and government agencies alike.

"Big corporations are showing contempt for the law with payoffs and bribery abroad and illegal campaign contributions at home as though regard for the law were of no concern in the board rooms," he said.

Federal agencies such as the CIA, FBI and Internal Revenue Service, he said, have violated the constitutional rights of U.S. citizens by illegal wiretaps, burglaries or surveillances.

"These are the very agencies that are charged with upholding and obeying the laws," Church said.

Church's introduction to ethical and political questions came early. His father, the late Frank Forrester Church Sr., a political conservative who owned a sporting goods business in Boise, insisted that his son debate him on major issues of the day.

"My father was deeply interested in politics but he mistrusted all politicians," Church said. "He hated (President Franklin Delano) Roosevelt with a vengeance."

Young Church, a member of the junior high school debating team, made frequent trips to the library to investi-

gate his father's statements.

"I found that the other side was much more persuasive," he said. "I began to like the Democratic Party."

His love for public speaking led him to enter—and win—an American Legion national oratory contest at age 16. Critics say Church has never outgrown a foundness for the sound of his own voice. He loves to declaim—sometimes even when briefing reporters on the CIA committee's business.

One speech he would like to forget, however, was his nationally televised keynote address to the 1960 Democratic National Convention—a flowery, podium-pounding oration that Church acknowledges was dreadful. "I didn't know any better," he smiles.

Church's inner toughness, his friends say, was demonstrated in his little-known bout with cancer while he was a law student, first at Harvard and later at Stanford, in the late 1940s.

What began as a severe pain the lower back was diagnosed as cancer of the stomach and groin. Doctors performed radical surgery but told Church they could not remove all the affected areas. They said the 23-year-old student had only months to live.

But a radiologist at Stanford, in a routine review of Church's file, decided his cancer might be receptive to X-ray therapy. He prescribed a treatment that would be agonizing. Church was told he would be taken "literally to the edge of death" by daily radiation treatments that would turn his skin purple while killing the malignancy.

For several weeks he suffered severe nausea every day after each treatment. A six-footer, he went down to a skeletal 80 pounds.

In this crisis, as in his public career, Church says he could not have made it without his wife, Bethine, his high school sweetheart whom he married in 1947. When they met, Bethine's father, the late Chase A. Clark, was governor of Idaho.

Friends say the politically astute Mrs. Church is one of the senator's most influential advisers.

Church's voting record in the Senate has placed him in the liberal bloc on almost every issue except gun control. There, reflecting home-state interests, he has fought gun legislation on grounds it would serve only "to harass sportsmen and other law-abiding citizens."

Church's opposition to U.S. involvement in Vietnam, which he first expressed in a Senate speech in 1965, resulted largely from his service on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

"When I first came to the Senate I was pretty much a knee-jerk liberal," he said. "It was considered unpatriotic to oppose U.S. foreign policy. We all accepted the slogan,

THE WASHINGTON STAR

12 September 1975

### Commentary

James J. Kilpatrick (WTOP TV and Radio): "A word of encouragement is in order for the House Ethics Committee in the matter of Michael Harrington, a congressman from Massachusetts. There had been some apprehension that the committee would quietly sweep the Harrington affair under the nearest rug. Now it appears that on Sept. 17, after a procedural defect in the complaint against Mr. Harrington has been corrected, the committee will get down to serious deliberation. The facts are not in much dispute. Last year Mr. Harrington wanted to look at some secret testimony in the files of the Armed Services Committee, having to do with CIA activities in Chile. The committee rules permit members to read such transcripts, provided they agree not to divulge the contents in any way whatever. . . . By his own unapologetic assertion, he immediately went out and dishonored the rules. Since then, Mr. Harrington has sought to justify his willful breach of House rules by denouncing the CIA's conduct in Chile. But the issue before the Ethics Committee is not the conduct of the CIA in Santiago, but the conduct of Mr. Harrington in Washington."

'Politics ends at the water's edge.'

"But my education began after I was appointed to the Foreign Relations Committee two years later."

Church said he was shocked to learn that "we were giving \$350 million a year to rich Western European countries. It was the old Uncle Sucker business."

"I began to look more critically at military aid and other aid programs—how we often wound up arming both sides in a conflict and getting blamed by both," he said.

Church recalled the early 1960s, when the United States chiefly assisted the South Vietnamese with American advisers and limited aid.

"I went along with it, believing that we were assisting the Diem government to prevent the Communists from taking over," he said.

But Church said he became "increasingly cynical when we began sending in our own people in large numbers."

In February, 1965, he broke with the Johnson administration in a speech that called for a negotiated settlement in Vietnam.

A furious President Lyndon B. Johnson zeroed in on Church's remark that he (Church) agreed with columnist Walter Lippmann on Vietnam. Johnson told reporters he had advised Church: "The next time you want a dam in Idaho, you go to Walter Lippmann for it."

Church said that Mr. Johnson had never told him this, "but he probably wished that he had said it."

Continuing his opposition to U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia, Church was coauthor with former Sen. John Sherman Cooper (R-Ky.) in 1970 of the landmark legislation that came to be known as the Cooper-Church amendment. It prohibited the use of funds for introducing combat troops into Cambodia and Laos.

The first statutory limit of its type ever imposed by Congress, the Cooper-Church legislation was followed by additional restrictions on the President's war-making powers in 1971 and 1973.

Church's familiarity with foreign affairs has undoubtedly been an asset in his CIA investigation. Aside from investigating U.S. links to the murders of foreign leaders, his committee has sought documents and testimony about CIA covert operations abroad.

Activities abroad, however, are not likely to be disclosed in the public hearings. Church and other committee members have said they do not want to impair the effectiveness of the CIA but only to show where reforms and improvements are needed.

Whether Church decides to seek his party's nomination for President will largely depend on how well the committee does its work and how the public perceives its efforts.

"This investigator," Church says, "could be a minefield."

PUBLISHERS WEEKLY

11 August 1975

A promotion campaign "in exile" has been scheduled for author Philip Agee, whose controversial "Inside the Company: CIA Diary" (\$9.95) was published by Stonehill August 8. Fearing possible government prosecution of Agee, Stonehill substituted a series of interviews, talk shows and other programs by phone from Windsor and Toronto, Canada, instead of the major 20-city tour previously planned for him. Agee is currently being heard in all the planned 20 cities on both radio and TV. Meanwhile, his book sold two printings of 50,000 copies before publication and now has an additional 50,000 on order, for a total of 100,000 in print. "Inside the Company: CIA Diary" is a full selection of the Saturday Review Book Club and the Library of Political and International Affairs Book Club, besides being used by 11 Macmillan book clubs.

# False Data Blamed In '68 Tet Surprise

By George Lardner Jr.  
Washington Post Staff Writer

A former Central Intelligence Agency analyst charged yesterday that the Communists' 1968 Tet offensive in South Vietnam caught U.S. officials by surprise because enemy strength had been "deliberately downgraded" to mislead the American public.

"Although our aim was to fool the American press, the public and the Congress, we in intelligence succeeded best in fooling ourselves," former CIA intelligence expert Samuel A. Adams told the House intelligence committee.

Backing up some of his charges with what he described as notes based on still secret documents, Adams said the distortions were condoned by a number of high-ranking officials, including former U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam Ellsworth Bunker, former White House national security adviser Walt W. Rostow, former CIA Director Richard Helms, and Gens. Creighton W. Abrams, Earle G. Wheeler and William C. Westmoreland.

He said they were among these "who knew there was an attempt going on to fool the press" and thus the American public.

Still battling with the White House over secret government documents relevant to its investigations, the committee went ahead with yesterday's hearing as part of an effort to make the impasse as painful as possible for the Ford administration.

"They're going to be awfully sorry before we're done," predicted a committee source. "Debating an empty chair can be very effective," said another. "That's what we're doing."

Angered by the committee's insistence on the right to declassify secret documents, President Ford last week demanded the return of all classified papers that House investigators have obtained so far and vowed to produce no more government witnesses or records unless the committee changes its position.

Chairmen Otis Pike (D-N.Y.) said yesterday he was confident of winning a court fight on the issue and added that it would have to start "relatively soon" if the committee should choose that course. But he seemed content for the moment to rely on the pressure of public hearings.

The committee's ranking Republican, Rep. Robert McClory

(Ill.), was reluctant to continue yesterday's session in public after Adams started recounting the contents of various "Secret, Eyes Only" cables, but the committee voted 6 to 3 against going into executive session.

"I don't think anything the witness has revealed or is going to reveal is going to jeopardize our operations in Vietnam," Pike said caustically.

Chief analyst on the Vietcong for seven of his 10 years with the CIA, Adams has been highly critical of the agency since he resigned in 1973, especially over his unsuccessful efforts to persuade the U.S. intelligence community to accept more realistic estimates of enemy troop strength.

Unlike other U. S. intelligence fops, Adams said, the astonishment over the massive nature of the Tet offensive "stemmed in large measure from corruption in the intelligence process." U. S. military officials were so unprepared, he said, that in the days following Tet, some 1,200 American aircraft in Vietnam were destroyed or damaged, mostly by shrapnel from artillery shells.

The trouble, Adams said, was that "American intelligence had so denigrated the Vietcong's capabilities that we simply could not have predicted the size of the Tet attack."

As the CIA's only full-time Vietcong analyst in 1966, Adams pointed out, however, that he came across documents indicating that the strength of the Communist forces in Vietnam—then officially estimated at just under 300,000—was actually twice that, or close to 600,000. By mid-1967, he said, the evidence of a much bigger enemy army was so massive that the CIA agreed with him.

Gen. Westmoreland's command, however, began lobbying to keep the estimate below 300,000, Adams charged, because it feared public reaction to higher numbers.

To back up his assertions, Adams cited portions of a "Secret, Eyes Only" cable from Gen. Abrams in Saigon to Gen. Wheeler, then head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on Aug. 20, 1967. Adams said it frowned on higher troop strength estimates as "in sharp contrast to the current overall strength figure of about 299,000 given to the

press here."

Gen. Abrams, the witness said, then suggested dropping two categories of Vietcong from the strength estimate. "We have been projecting an image of success over the recent months," Abrams reportedly declared, adding that if the higher numbers were to become public, "all those who have an incorrect view of the war will be reinforced and the task will be more difficult."

After a conference with CIA officials, Adams said, Westmoreland's public relations staff prepared a "blatantly misleading" draft briefing for the press which was circulated among officials in Washington and Saigon for comment.

Ambassador Bunker voiced his views on the proposed briefing with a "Secret, Eyes Only" cable to White House adviser Rostow, Adams added.

He said the Bunker cable stated that telling the press that certain categories of VC troops had been dropped from the new enemy estimate "seems to me simply to invite trouble. We may end up with stories that enemy strength is greater rather than less."

The press briefings began in Saigon in November and reporters were told that enemy strength had actually declined to 242,000 because of heavy casualties and plummeting morale.

Chairman Pike said he found Adams' testimony "absolutely devastating."

"We rely on our intelligence to provide us with objective data," Pike said. "In this case, it seems to me that political decisions were made after which intelligence was shaped to fit the political decisions."

Adams also told of a 1969 study he did with a colleague that concluded there were 30,000 Vietcong planted in the South Vietnamese government and army. By contrast, Adams said, he knew of only one spy the United States had among the Vietcong before the Tet offensive.

On one occasion, he said, the spy came up with what amounted to the plan for the Tet offensive in Danang.

The information was turned over to the CIA station in Saigon—which did not bother forwarding it to Washington—and to the Marines, who "did pay attention," Adams said. They deployed their forces so well that they decimated the Vietcong who attacked Danang. Among the victims was the secret agent, Adams said.

"We were back down to zero after Tet," Adams said. "The score was 30,000 to zero."

# FALSE TROOP DATA IN VIETNAM CITED

Ex-C.I.A. Man Quotes Secret  
Papers to Show Deliberate  
Underrating of Vietcong

By JOHN M. CREWDSON  
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 18—A former Vietnam specialist for the Central Intelligence Agency today quoted to a House committee from what he said were previously undisclosed military and diplomatic cablegrams supporting his previous assertions of a deliberate effort to undervalue the strength of Communist forces in South Vietnam.

Samuel A. Adams, who served for seven years, as the principal C.I.A. analyst studying the insurgents, told the committee that the surprise of the Vietcong's 1968 Tet offensive had resulted largely from underrating the Communists' strength by as much as one-half.

Mr. Adams resigned from the C.I.A. in 1973, impugning its honesty in connection with underestimates of the size of the insurgency. As a witness for the defense at the Pentagon papers trial in that year, Mr. Adams said there had been "political pressures in the military to display the enemy as weaker than he actually was." He made the same point in last May's issue of Harper's magazine.

As evidence of his assertions, Mr. Adams included in today's testimony parts of two secret cablegrams transmitted from Saigon to Washington in the fall of 1967. He did not display copies of the documents.

The first, he said, was a "secret eyes only" message sent Aug. 20 from the late Gen. Creighton W. Abrams Jr., then the deputy American military commander in Vietnam, to Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

By that time, Mr. Adams told members of the Select Committee in Intelligence of the House of Representatives, there was documentary evidence that Communist strength was nearly 600,000 troops.

General Abrams' message said the newly found higher numbers were "in sharp contrast to the current over-all strength figure of about 299,000 given to the press here," Mr. Adams said.

General Abrams "thereupon suggested dropping two categories of VC from the strength estimated in order to keep it at its old level," Mr. Adams said.

"The main reason for this, he indicated, was 'press reaction,'" Mr. Adams added.

Representative Otis G. Pike, the Long Island Democrat who heads the select intelligence committee, asked Mr. Adams whether a "fair characterization" of his testimony would

The Washington Star Thursday, September 11, 1975

Crosby S. Noyes

## We have tied the hands of intelligence agencies

support the inference that "intelligence was shaped to fit decisions that had already been made." "Yes, Sir," Mr. Adams replied softly.

General Abrams's position was supported, Mr. Abrams said, by Ellsworth Bunker, then the ambassador to South Vietnam.

Mr. Bunker suggested in a cablegram on Oct. 28 to Walt W. Rostow, President Johnson's national security adviser, that no public mention be made of the dropping of the two categories of Vietcong forces from the strength figures.

"Given the overriding need to demonstrate progress in grinding down the enemy," Mr. Adams quoted Ambassador Bunker as having said, "it is essential that we do not drag too many red herrings across the trail."

To make such a disclosure, the Bunker message cautioned, "seems to me simply to invite trouble."

"We may end up with stories that enemy strength is greater rather than less," the ambassador added. "Far better in our view is to deal with the matter orally if it arises [in hopes of] forestalling many confusing and undesirable questions."

Two weeks later, Mr. Adams noted, the military told the press at a briefing in Saigon that Communist strength had actually declined to 242,000, "due to heavy casualties and plummeting morale."

The Tet offensive of 1968 is one of four international crises that the Pike committee has chosen as models for its current inquiry into whether intelligence agencies, and principally the C.I.A., were providing sufficient forewarnings to policy-makers.

The intelligence panel last week subpoenaed a number of secret intelligence documents dealing with official foreknowledge of the Tet offensive, the 1973 Middle East war, and last year's invasion of Cyprus by Turkey—all of which caught the United States off guard to some extent.

After the committee made public over the C.I.A.'s objections a single phrase from an intelligence summary dealing with the Arab build-up in the 1973 war, President Ford ordered that the committee's access to further secret documents be halted. The matter is now at an impasse.

The committee's decision to go ahead with the testimony of Mr. Adams is being interpreted as an effort by Mr. Pike to demonstrate to the White House that his investigation will continue with or without its assistance, and to put pressure on the President to provide documents and witnesses to report critics of the intelligence agencies.

In the frenzy of introspection that always follows an attempt to kill a president, the Secret Service and the intelligence agencies in general are coming in for a good deal of predictable criticism.

It is outrageous, we are told, that a known follower of Charles Manson was allowed to get within a couple feet of Gerald Ford. In the same way, the Warren Commission had some harsh things to say about federal agencies which had no rundown on dangerous characters in the Dallas area in November, 1963.

Well, considering the unmerciful beating that all the federal intelligence agencies have been subjected to of late, what happened was not too surprising.

Domestic surveillance of dangerous characters is equated to "gestapo tactics" by a large part of the population. We have created a climate in this country today in which it is a wonder that the intelligence services continue to function at all.

We must at least be honest with ourselves. No doubt, as Governor Brown says, there are a lot of crazy people in the country. But there are no more than the normal number. And if the danger to presidents and other prominent leaders seems greater than it has been in the past, we all

undoubtedly deserve a share of the blame.

Including, of course, the President himself. Gerald Ford has made haste to assure us that what happened in Sacramento "under no circumstances will prevent me from contacting the American people as I travel from one state and community to another." Ford, of course, is doing no more than his predecessors have done, but with a good deal less reason. The day when a president had to expose himself to potential assassins in order to contact the people is long gone, but the tradition is more powerful than the dictates of common sense.

So presidential mingling will continue, even if it is the most dangerously fatuous way that any president can spend his time. To stop exposing himself to assassins would be to capitulate to the threat of violence. And since that would be bad for the macho image, presidents and other political figures presumably will keep on capitulating to violence the hard way, and the nation will suffer the consequences.

It may be that the Secret Service will be able to figure out more foolproof methods of protecting their man in the future and may even have a certain sanction for the time being for

stepping up the surveillance of the more obvious threats.

But what about potential threats to the security of the nation itself? Why attach such enormous importance to the protection of the person of a president, when the protection of the institutions he represents is considered a form of fascism by so many?

Thanks to Vietnam and Watergate, we live in a time that glorifies the virtues of dissension and rebellion against authority that encourages civil disobedience by groups or individuals and sometimes condones violence in a "good cause."

Thanks also to Vietnam and Watergate, we live in a time in which all of the evils of the government and the society—all of the frustrations and anger of the citizenry—are focused on the political leaders, and especially on the president. To be sure, it is one thing to preach that the system is rotten and should be destroyed, another to try to kill a president. But unfortunately, there is a pervasive tendency among some people to make the two propositions virtually synonymous.

Charles Manson was a product of this climate. Lynette Fromme is a product of this climate. As they say, it's just something you have to live with.

### THE NATIONAL REVIEW

29 August 1975

■ The CIA should have no trouble filling vacancies left by disenchanted employees. A spokesman for the organization says job applications tripled in January and have been increasing since.

Lieutenant General Vernon Walters, deputy director of the CIA, recently told American Security Council

in Washington that the U.S. was in "a tougher power situation than it has been since Valley Forge." For the first time in the nation's history, a foreign country has the "power to destroy or seriously cripple the United States."

... In a similar vein, Peter Deriabin, a KGB officer who defected to this country, says: "What is going on in this country is the destruction of the CIA. This is what the KGB and the GRU [Soviet Military Intelligence] have

lished."

SATURDAY COLUMN

THE recent brouhaha about the CIA long since reached the point where any absurdity could be alleged, and even believed, by some people. Perhaps the view advanced, on a similar occasion, by the official organ of a ruling Communist party might be taken—even by the most purblind of the Left—as carrying some authority.

After noting the spread of rumours that the CIA was responsible for fires, strikes, fights and high level political plots, it concluded: "When the sources and objectives of this kind of 'confidential' information are studied more closely, and when we analyse them more thoroughly, it will not be difficult for us to find that the 'CIA obsession' is being spread and encouraged in our country by [various enemies of the State and in particular the "bureaucratic" (i.e. pro-Soviet) forces]. It is easy enough to identify them and see their intentions. It is perfectly well known from which circles, from which sides they stem," added *Borba* (October 31, 1967) in the name of the Yugoslav Communist leadership.

Cui bono? is, as *Borba* implies, a good question to ask in these circumstances; and the natural answer is also supported by evidence. The KGB "Disinformation" department has been hard at work in all parts of the world: that great purveyor of détente, the Soviet Press, even lifted stories, so planted, that the CIA had organised the assassination of King Faisal.

In America, as President Ford lately pointed out, the campaign against the CIA has begun to reach the stage in which the United States, alone among the Powers, is largely deprived of one of its most essential agencies. As is customary in America, any sort of allegation can be and is thrown about in the Press, leaked by alleged "authoritative" sources, in an atmosphere in which it is impossible for the CIA to work. The original attacks on it, based on evidence which bore some relation to fact, were not very impressive.

But when it was found that the American people still thought it all right to have a secret intelligence service, all sorts of new knaveries were produced: up to and including a vast array of assassination plots, none of which ever produced any assassinations.

Similarly when it was revealed that the CIA had intervened in Chile, going to the terrible lengths of providing funds for opposition newspapers,

# Making room for rumours

By ROBERT CONQUEST

while the Communist embassies were restricting themselves to arming and training para-military bands. There was a great uproar. When it appeared that no one had been much impressed, a whole new set of charges so bad as not to need substantiation were added. This appears, as *Borba* noted, to be normal anti-CIA practice.

In this country, too, we have seen something of an attempt to foment the hysteria complained of by *Borba*. Unsubstantiated, and indeed in many cases simply false, stories have crept into the lower reaches of the Press. There are officers of the American Armed Forces in London in connection with our Joint military defence, and the failure of the alliance to neglect similar liaison on intelligence matters has been represented as a terrible offence.

One officer so engaged was denounced as a prominent "dirty tricks" figure: these "dirty" tricks turned out to have been the American secret sponsorship, in the post-war years when vast Russian funds were being poured into attempts to take over the student organisations and into massive propaganda exercises, of non-totalitarian students and independent intellectual magazines.

Attacks on the CIA on such silly grounds have not had much effect in this country except on professional anti-Americans, often American themselves. It will be remembered that five or ten years ago, it emerged that *Encounter* had been so funded. The then screams of outrage, however, fell largely on deaf ears. Even the *Guardian* remarked that if the CIA had supported such an independent magazine, so much the better for the CIA. Even Marxist contributors rallied strongly to *Encounter's* defence, as having always given the fairest forum. In the end, a tiny group of zealots were shown to be the only ones to have been impressed by the revelations.

The present campaign, one imagines, will similarly founder on the residual sanity of the British. But it still drags on. A recent egregious example was a front page piece in the *Times* (August 21, 1975) asserting that

"it was disclosed yesterday" that the CIA had, in the 1950s given Israel technological support to help her manufacture atomic bombs. That this was vile journalism emerged in the next sentence. It had not been "disclosed" at all, it had been alleged by an odd American journalist writing in *Penthouse*. Moreover, even he had not included the *suggestio falsi* provided in the headlines and opening paragraph, that it was a CIA initiative — on the contrary, alleging merely that the Eisenhower Administration had so decided, and had charged the CIA with the task.

Needless to say the *Penthouse* article according to the *Times*, went on to "disclose" (once more) many alleged CIA assassination plans—none of which, of course, had led to any action. The interesting point, however, is that it revived an old canard about an attempt to assassinate Sukarno in the early '60s, a story long since known to have been based on a KGB "disinformation" forgery carried out through the Czechoslovak secret agencies. Since the Czech expert responsible defected a few years later, the matter is known in considerable detail.

And so it goes. Perhaps I should say at this point that I myself have never worked for or been paid by the CIA or any other intelligence organisation, and that anyone who suggested otherwise would find themselves facing a cracking suit for damages. Why? you may ask, if I regard the CIA as a reputable, desirable and necessary organisation? Because it would be a falsehood told with malicious intent.

I did once think, indeed, just to annoy, of starting a magazine to be called *Culture, Intellect, Art*. Which reminds me that the CIA's rival on the world scene continues to operate on a vast scale in this country as everywhere else, and that one understands that there is considerable speculation at Westminster, in connection with recent proposals (in the interests of "streamlining"), to amalgamate the Orders of the Garter and the Bath, as to the name of the first Knight of the combined orders, and so openly entitled to KGB.

DAILY TELEGRAPH, London  
6 September 1975

## THE CONSPIRATORS

ONE OF THE sure signs of unbalanced judgment is an over-ready belief in some conspiracy theory of history. Some people still probably think that whatever happens in the world is ordained by Jews or Wall Street financiers or Freemasons or the like. But they have recently been outnumbered by those who are convinced that not a sparrow falls but it is the work of the American Central Intelligence Agency—the CIA. It is probably useless to invite such people to read ROBERT CONQUEST's brilliant analysis of their condition on page 10. Such delusions are normally based on inner disturbance which reason and ridicule are alike powerless to cure.

WASHINGTON POST  
18 September 1975

Kenneth Rabin

## Propaganda, American-Style

As one who served briefly in USIA and now teaches public relations, I was prone to linger over James Michener's report on the Stanton Commission (Post, June 21, 1975). The commission's conclusions about American information policy abroad ("Political officers back to State. Voice of America set free . . . A new agency for cultural affairs, autonomous but reporting to the Secretary of State.") are generally sane, striving towards the

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separation of powers seen in the British Information Service, which is embassy based; the British Council, an autonomous cultural agency; and the external service of BBC. But neither Michener's own rationale nor any prior reports of the commission's work got to the core of the problem, the need for a clear governmental commitment to a distinctively American propaganda style in foreign affairs.

Viewed from such a perspective, what's going on with USIA, our overt propaganda agency, is really a mirror on what's been going on recently vis-a-vis USIA's dark twin, the former "U.S. Bureau of Roads."

Both USIA and CIA, it should be remembered, sprang from highly successful American psychological operations in World War II—OWI and OSS, the purveyors of what one scholar called "white" and "black" propaganda, respectively. Both agencies were charged with their current general responsibilities during the Cold War era. And, for reasons that are not entirely unrelated, both strayed far from the mark and are now being tinkered with.

Tinkering, in this case, may not be enough.

We must begin, I suspect, by confronting the bald truth that the idea of propaganda is felt to be somehow un-American; thus, the word is never used in public dialogue about the American government's overt or covert attempts at manipulating public opinion either overseas or at home. Mich-

Oddly enough, there is one country above all in which the most reasonable people may be forced, however reluctantly, to acknowledge the power of conspiracy. That country is not America with its CIA, but Russia with its KGB. Anyone who has read KATKOV's "1917" or TIBOR SZAMUELY's "Russian Tradition" will know of the conspiratorial atmosphere in which in Tsarist Russia the revolutionaries and the secret police alike operated. The heirs of these conspirators now rule Russia, and are still conspiring. No, this is not to say that they ordain all things—on the contrary. But one thing they have most successfully achieved: This is to leave America more or less bereft of an intelligence service of any kind while their own, infinitely more ruthless, proliferates everywhere.

The linguistic mutations underscore the difficulty: America is compelled to propagandize but all propaganda has come to leave a bad taste in our collective mouth. Who will tell America's story? Can we successfully limit the use of "black" propaganda to situations where there might be an absolute threat to world peace?

The Stanton Commission is not the first to avoid these questions.

Congress, itself rather opposed to propaganda, has dealt with both USIA and CIA in consistently unrealistic ways. In the case of CIA, no questions were asked and "black" propaganda multiplied. In the case of USIA, the wrong questions were asked and "white" propaganda was handcuffed.

This occurred because all propaganda—"white" or "black"—is fraught with the risk of embarrassing failures. Since CIA's activities were never questioned on the Hill, its failures and excesses were left to rot in mountains of classified files. Since USIA's activities were constantly questioned by Congress, its failures and excesses were broadcast sufficiently enough to cause the agency to retreat from any serious attempt at innovative and systematic molding of world public opinion.

Hans Morgenthau, writing on the failure of overt American propaganda as a meaningful foreign policy alternative as far back as 1960, summed up USIA's approach as "praise of one's own product and disparagement of the competitor's," a refusal to elevate propaganda strategy—"white" propaganda strategy, at least—to equal position with the diplomatic strategies of war, aid, trade, and such. Our overt propagandists were not involved in key policy decisions; it was a case of world public opinion being damned by either inattention or improper—in the moral sense—attention.

Congressional short-sightedness towards USIA (VOA was treated separately and somewhat less critically, it should be noted), has been paralleled, as Morgenthau implied in 1960, in the executive branch. With one notable exception—Edward R. Murrow—in choice of USIA directors and others—including Dr. Stanton—in choice of public sector advisers, American Presidents have tended to select those who would guide the aspect of overseas propaganda that seems most valid for an open society, with an eye to domestic political debts rather than functional effects. Indeed, most old hands at USIA (the ones who were old hands when I was there in 1967-70, at least) were in the Murrow era was the

ener, for example, makes no mention of propaganda in his discussion of the proposed USIA reforms. How can we make recommendations for something whose name we refuse to utter?

Since the word is used here, a definition should be attempted: Culling from the thoughts of Lippman, Lasswell, Doob, Choukas, and Ellul, let us agree for now that propaganda is the persuasive communication common to a technological or mass society and aimed by one interest in that society at various internal and external audiences to gain either passive or active compliance with the originator's point of view.

"White" propaganda, it follows, can be described as overt in varying degrees. And because it is overt, it is likely that it contains a higher degree of truth, or at least can be perceived for what it is—distinctions that should make it more valued in a contemporary democracy.

The varying degrees of overtness are encompassed by what Leonard Doob called revealed, partially-revealed and delayed-revealed propaganda. The first is the propaganda that is attributed from the start—a USIA film, an institutional advertisement from an oil company. The second is the propaganda that is revealed to some people more completely than others—the standard press release that a journalist corroborates but then rewrites in a standard news story for the general public. The last is another word for the teaser ad that promotes something over time, revealing more information on a step-by-step basis.

The point is, it's *not* propaganda and there's nothing un-American about it.

"Black" propaganda, on the other hand, is fully concealed, totally covert and attributed incorrectly, if at all. A recent example was the disclosure (Post, July 3, 1975) of "Forum World Features Ltd." as a CIA-financed press service whose cover had been compromised. This is the propaganda we were taught to be wary of on the eve of World War II, propaganda designed for use against one's enemy in mortal combat, propaganda which has given the whole craft a tainted image and caused the need for endless euphemisms—information offices, public

NEW YORK TIMES  
12 September 1975

# Destroy the Monster

By Tom Wicker

The disclosure that the Central Intelligence Agency hoarded a supply of deadly poisons in direct contravention of Richard Nixon's order to destroy such poisons in 1969 is only one more bit of evidence that this agency is a Frankenstein's monster that must be destroyed.

There are several ways to explain the stockpiling of shellfish toxin and cobra venom against express Presidential orders. First, the poisons might secretly have been ordered preserved by Mr. Nixon himself. Or the top command of the C.I.A. might have made the decision to retain them, for reasons of its own. Finally, lower-level authorities within the agency might have disobeyed their own immediate superiors and saved the poisons against some real or imagined needs.

It does not mean much that the C.I.A. itself apparently disclosed the retention of the poisons to the investigating committee headed by Senator Frank Church of Idaho. It could be, of course, that the present C.I.A. command has only recently discovered the cached poisons, as is being contended; but given this agency's record of subterfuge, concealment and distortion of the record, it is just as easy to suppose that the disclosure was made only because of recent inquiries into C.I.A. activities, and the possibility that the truth would have been uncovered anyway.

However the matter is viewed, few incidents could more dramatically disclose the dangers of this many-chambered house of deceit, fear, power and secrecy. If Mr. Nixon ordered the poisons secretly preserved against his own stated policy of renouncing bacteriological warfare, then he should not have had a secret agency able and willing to do his bidding. If the agency took it upon itself to contravene Mr. Nixon's declared policy, it could only have done so because of the power and autonomy derived from its ability to operate in secrecy.

If lower-level officials disobeyed their own superiors as well as Mr. Nixon and stockpiled the poisons against national policy, then as Senator Church has said there was an incredible "looseness of command and control within the C.I.A."—a laxity all the more frightening because if the agency's top officials cannot control their underlings, then there is no way to impose outside political control on the agency itself.

That is why the illicit stockpiling of the poisons—whatever use might have been intended for them by whoever was responsible—is one of the more frightening disclosures about this

shadowy agency. It is reminiscent of the report that when James Schlesinger, while briefly the C.I.A. director, ordered a halt to all questionable counterintelligence activities in 1973, agency security officials increased the numbers of his bodyguards. If they feared for his safety *within* the agency, then what might not uncontrolled agents be capable of *outside* the C.I.A.?

Illicit domestic spying, secret and loosely controlled experiments with drugs, connections to the underworld, plots that may or may not have been authorized to kill various foreign leaders, now the hoarded poisons—such abuses are the inevitable consequences of great power, essentially unchecked, cloaked in the mystique of national security, and authorized to operate in secrecy. No amount of Congressional oversight could have prevented the stockpiling of those poisons, or their possible illicit use; and whatever may yet be disclosed about the assassination plots, and who may have authorized them, it is clear that they could have been and perhaps were undertaken on the agency's own initiative.

Such secret power is intolerable in an open, democratic society. Just as

## IN THE NATION

C.I.A. "covert" techniques came to be employed in domestic politics by the White House "plumbers" under Howard Hunt, so might even more dangerous C.I.A. tactics and attitudes, spawned in the dark atmosphere of an anything-goes operation waging secret wars in the name of national security, further contaminate the national life.

Enough is already known of the Church committee's findings—it is plausible to suppose that there is more to be disclosed—to support a recommendation that the C.I.A. as now constituted be abolished. Then, its presumably able and useful sections devoted to the straight collection and analysis of intelligence could be reorganized into a successor agency unburdened and unsullied with "covert" operations and vast secret powers to overturn governments, harass other nations, subvert or kill their leaders, and thwart their legitimate aspirations. Such powers not only have no place in a decent society; but if permitted will almost inevitably be turned against the society that grants them.

To the extent that covert operations of some kind may be legitimate and necessary, surely an overpowering secret agency is not required to carry them out. Depending on the nature of the case, some small, efficient unit within the State Department or the military would be sufficient, and infinitely easier to control.

single high water mark in agency staff morale.

It can be contended, I think, that USIA and the "white" propaganda function in American foreign policy have arrived at their current low state by virtue of self-fulfilling prophecy: all propaganda is bad; decision makers who could not or would not criticize our most devious propaganda scored their oratorical points against the overt material; Presidents came to perceive USIA as just another agency for second- and third-level patronage appointments; USIA staff morale deteriorated; the agency was consulted less and dictated to more; and our overt propaganda operations, so successful in World War II from the government's point of view, and perennially successful in the sense of American advertising and public relations, deteriorated in foreign affairs.

It is doubtful, then, that the Stanton recommendations will have any great effect on propaganda. Some propagandists may get shuffled about, but the need for a choice of an open style of propaganda as a key factor in our foreign policy remains unanswered.

NEW YORK TIMES  
17 September 1975

## Senate Anti-Toxin

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence is trying to find out why the Central Intelligence Agency has been storing shellfish toxin and cobra venom—"enough to kill thousands of people"—along with instruments designed for their delivery, not to mention a silent poison-dart gun that could kill without a trace. It should find out—especially in view of former President Nixon's order for the destruction of this deadly stockpile and this country's announcement to the world that it had in fact been destroyed.

It is bad enough that the United States ever engaged in the manufacture of a weapon of such indiscriminate horror; to have retained it in a secret arsenal against the order of the Commander-in-Chief must be put down as the most reckless kind of insubordination. Senator Frank Church of Idaho, the committee chairman, was mild in ascribing the episode merely to a "looseness of command and control within the C.I.A." It was more like willful sabotage of the nation's proclaimed policy—all the worse for the effect it could have on current Soviet-American negotiations, to renounce all efforts at tampering with the climate as an instrument of war.

Senator Church is right to hold open hearings on the subject, contrary to the wishes of the Administration. Supposedly the decision to leave these deadly poisons on hand—unguarded at that—was made by a middle-level official of the C.I.A.

William E. Colby, the C.I.A.'s present director, concedes the gross violation but finds the records too incomplete to pin down the responsibility. On whatever level the defiance of orders occurred, the public should know where and how its appointed guardians have both failed and endangered it. It is time for the C.I.A. to learn, openly and beyond further question, that it is of value to the country only as long as it subordinates itself to the public will, as expressed by elected government.

PENTHOUSE  
OCTOBER 1975PROJECT  
CHILEHOW THE CIA HELPED  
BUILD THE MOST  
BRUTAL DICTATORSHIP  
THIS SIDE OF  
THE IRON CURTAIN.  
BY TAD SZULC

On September 11, 1973, a bloody military coup—encouraged and abetted by Richard Nixon, Henry Kissinger, the Central Intelligence Agency, and American big business—ousts the constitutional government of Chile. Uncounted thousands of Chileans—including Salvador Allende Gossens, the freely elected president—were killed during the coup, and others are still being quietly murdered by the dictatorial junta in Santiago.

Today, two years later, Senate investigators in Washington are focusing on Chile as a prime example of the CIA's covert operations abroad and on the cover-up attempted by Kissinger and his associates to conceal the full American role in Chilean affairs. Thus we are discovering both the extraordinary extent of the U.S. intervention in that South American country and the stunning brutality resulting from the revolution that President Ford has characterized as being in the "best interest" of Americans and Chileans alike.

Late last year, Kissinger rebuked his ambassador in Santiago for bringing up the question of human rights with the junta during a discussion of U.S. economic aid. "Cut out the political science lectures," Kissinger scrawled across the ambassador's dispatch reporting on the conversation. But it would seem that Kissinger—and the rest of the American government— sorely needs such lectures because he has yet to accept

responsibility for the fact that Chile has become the most brutal and repressive dictatorship this side of the Iron Curtain, a country where it is a felony to think Marxist thoughts, let alone act on them.

What has been happening in Chile exceeds, in fact, the worst features of modern Communist régimes (Cambodia under the former Rouge rule being a backward-society exception) where summary executions and massive disappearances of citizens are no longer in political vogue. Today's Chile is a gruesome result of

ger's and the CIA's clients—Chilean generals and admirals and their rightwing civilian allies—have wrought upon one of the Western Hemisphere's most impressive democracies. We must all accept a degree of responsibility for the suffering of thousands of Chileans tortured by their new masters, for the 7,000 Chileans who remain in political prisons, for the military kangaroo courts that are still operating, and for the fact that, contrary to our pre-revolution expectations, Chile's economy is in absolute shambles.

This state of affairs may explain why Chile's President Augusto Pinochet Ugarte (the army's commander in chief, who led the coup despite his assurances of loyalty to Allende until the very last day) decided early in July to prohibit a visit to Chile by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights. He may have regretted his earlier decision, in mid-1974, to let the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights tour his prison camps and take depositions from the prisoners. Last October this commission, a body of the Organization of American States which is not famous for being outspoken on controversial subjects, produced a devastating report describing tortures and daily violations of the most elementary human rights.

Pinochet's action in barring the U.N. commission annoyed even the State Department, which, ever so gradually, is moving away from its nearly unquestioning support of the junta. Shortly after Chile's decision to keep out U.N. investigators, Deputy Secretary of State Robert S. Ingersoll "dressed down," in the words of a U.S. official, the Chilean Deputy Foreign Minister who was in Washington that week. Such specialists as William D. Rogers, the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, have also been quietly warning the junta that it may wind up as an international pariah if it persists in its attitudes.

The State Department took an especially dim view of Pinochet's behavior because the U.S. had gone along with most of the OAS foreign ministers earlier this year in delaying action on the 177-page report of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission pending a more up-to-date study by the U.N. panel. As matters stand now, the OAS report remains pigeonholed. Still, it should be made compulsory bedtime reading for Henry Kissinger; it might be sobering for him to absorb the nightmarish catalogue of crimes and brutalities in Chile that he helped to set in motion.

Notwithstanding his public denials of an American role in engineering the anti-Allende coup—denials that were later contradicted by sworn statements of CIA Director William E. Colby in secret testimony before congressional committees—there is no question that Kissinger was the principal mover in the campaign against the constitutional Allende government. After all, it was Kissinger who blithely remarked at a meeting of the top-secret White House "Forty Committee," the group presided over by him and responsible for all major covert intelligence operations, "I don't see why we need to stand by and watch a country go Communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people." This was on June 27, 1970, more than two months before the Chileans even went to the polls. That day the first funds were authorized for the CIA to start meddling in Chilean affairs.

\$400,000 to help anti-Allende parties.

For the next three years, no stone was left unturned by Kissinger, first to keep Allende from assuming the presidency, and then to destroy his government. As much as \$8 million, according to Colby, was earmarked (but not entirely spent) for the CIA to "destabilize" the Allende government. The Treasury Department and the Export-Import Bank were mobilized to deny Allende desperately needed credits for the imports of everything from airliners to food. The Nixon administration leaned heavily on international financial institutions to cut off loans to Chile; credit lines from commercial United States banks dried up overnight. Thus the whole might of the United States was applied against an impoverished nation of ten million inhabitants whose only crime was to elect freely and democratically a Socialist (not Communist) president.

The American justification for this assault on Chile was offered by Kissinger in a background press briefing on September 16, 1970. On September 4, Allende had come in first with a 36.1 percent plurality over two other candidates (a conservative former president, Jorge Alessandri, and a leftist Christian Democrat, Radomiro Tomić). Since no candidate had a majority, it became necessary to have a runoff election in Chile's congress. Having failed to achieve Allende's defeat in September, the United States concentrated on forcing Alessandri's victory in the October 24 runoff (the American Embassy in Santiago had insistently predicted that Alessandri would win).

Faced with the runoff, Kissinger, at his most cynical, offered the following rationale for American intervention:

"It would not be at all illogical for the [Chilean] congress to say, 'Sixty-four percent of the people did not want a Communist government. A Communist government tends to be irreversible. Therefore we are going to vote for the No. 2 man.' This is perfectly within their constitutional prerogatives. However, the constitutional habit has developed that Congress votes for the man who gets the highest number of votes. But then, of course, it has never happened before that the man with the highest number of votes happens to represent a nondemocratic party, which tends to make his election pretty irreversible. I have yet to meet somebody who firmly believes that if Allende wins there is likely to be another free election in Chile. . . ."

Let us pause here for a moment. Translated into plain language, this means that the United States was arrogating to itself the right to define for another nation what constitutes democracy and what the constitutional process in Chile should be. This, of course, is a notion the United States would never tolerate if applied to itself or one of its allies. Besides, Kissinger was deliberately misleading his audience by saying that Allende's party was "nondemocratic." Allende belonged to the Socialist Party, a traditional one in Chile. It was allied with the Communist Party under the *Unidad Popular* (Popular Unity) coalition—just as the French Socialists had an electoral pact with French Communists. If one is to take Kissinger literally, then America cannot tolerate any alliance anywhere which includes Communists. This "Kissinger Doctrine," which calls for American intervention wherever we do

elect a government,



the recipe for everything from subversion and invasions to new Vietnams.

But let us go back to Kissinger's scenario. Again, it is important because it clearly set the stage for the intervention and bloodbaths to come. To quote him further:

"Now it is fairly easy for one to predict that, if Allende wins, there is a good chance that he will establish over a period of years some sort of Communist government. In that case you would have . . . in a major Latin American country . . . a Communist government, joining, for example, Argentina, which is already deeply divided, along a long frontier, joining Peru, which has already been heading in directions that have been difficult to deal with, and joining Bolivia, which has also gone in a more leftist, anti-U.S. direction, even without any of these developments."

Kissinger here revealed his ignorance of Latin America—her politics, cultural traditions, ideological alignments, and regional rivalries. He overlooked Chile's traditional tensions with Peru (going back to the Pacific War in the 1870's) as well as with Argentina and Bolivia. He ignored the fact that these four countries have totally different societies, and that it simply did not follow that communism in Chile, even if it came to pass, would necessarily infect all her neighbors. In hindsight, of course, we know that the three years of the Allende régime—which never, by the way, became an outright Communist dictatorship—did not have the slightest impact on Argentina, Peru, and Bolivia. To Kissinger, however, it was necessary to prepare public opinion for what he had in store for Chile.

The history of covert American intervention in Chile can be divided into two parts: the period prior to Allende's inauguration on November 4, 1970, and the period afterwards. In each case, both our money and the clandestine "dirty tricks" resources of the CIA were used without the knowledge or approval of the American Congress.

Congress, or at least some members of it, began learning about all this activity only after the fact. Although a Senate subcommittee ferreted out the facts about the first CIA "contribution" to Chile some time before the coup, congressmen were kept in the dark for some months afterwards about the full extent of the U.S. involvement. In some cases, they were simply lied to by the CIA. On February 7, 1973, for example, then CIA Director Richard M. Helms said, "No, sir," when asked by a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee if the agency tried to "overthrow" the Chilean government. He repeated his "no, sir" reply when asked whether the CIA had "any money passed to the opponents of Allende."

Late in July the CIA's general counsel acknowledged to Congress that "perjury" may have been committed in earlier agency testimony. The finger clearly was pointed at Helms. But Kissinger, too, may have perjury problems for having denied—before a Senate committee—that there was any U.S. involvement in the Chilean coup, a month after it happened.

The web of official lies was first destroyed when Representative Michael Harrington, a Massachusetts Democrat, took it upon himself last year to leak to newsmen the essence of secret testimony by Colby, the new CIA director, acknowledging that millions of dollars had been funneled to Chile. Colby

made Helms and Kissinger look like liars, but he evidently assumed that his testimony would be kept secret from the public. Members of the House Armed Services Committee were not expected to break a secrecy pledge surrounding the testimony. Harrington, who is not a committee member, was allowed to read the Colby testimony after taking a similar pledge. Appalled by what he read, he asked House and Senate leaders to take prompt action. He was ignored. As Harrington tells the story, he deliberately violated the pledge out of a sense of despair that the CIA's misdeeds in Chile would never become known to the American public. The congressional establishment was unforgiving; he was bounced off the House committee investigating intelligence and the House Ethics Committee decided to try to censure him.

The Chilean story begins in 1964—and this fact should remind us that Kissinger does not have a monopoly on American intervention and that the CIA gladly lends itself to political subversion no matter who sits in the White House. Allende had been one of the CIA's favorite targets for quite a few years. In 1964, he was the principal contender for the presidency against Eduardo Frei Montalva, a Christian Democrat who ran on the platform of "Revolution with Liberty." This was intended as a political antidote to Cuba's Fidel Castro and his penchant for trying to foster revolutions in Latin America.

Chile, which was Latin America's most politically sophisticated nation, always had a strong leftist tradition. In 1958, when Jorge Alessandri won his six-year term, the leftist coalition (then known as FRAP) made a good showing. In 1964, Allende, who had spent some time in Cuba as Castro's guest, was perceived in Washington as a formidable opponent against Frei, the Christian Democrat reformer. Rather than support a rightist candidate and what would be a losing cause, the United States cast its lot with Frei. According to subsequent testimony by Director Colby, the CIA spent \$3 million in covert support of Frei's election, financing newspaper and radio publicity as well as seeing to it that millions of escudos were spread around in the right places. (Some students of Chilean politics believe that the total amount spent by the CIA in 1964 was far in excess of the \$3 million.) In the logic of American foreign policy, there was nothing wrong either with overthrowing governments or helping friendly ones to win power. The covert pro-Frei intervention in 1964 was authorized by Lyndon Johnson who, a year later, sent American troops to intervene in the Dominican Republic's civil war.

In mid-1970, it was the Nixon administration's task to insure that the "wrong" man was not elected in Chile. Kissinger's personal entry into the picture took place at the June 27 meeting of the "Forty Committee," when the CIA was authorized to spend the \$400,000 to back Alessandri, largely through the financing of electoral propaganda. One may ask why so little money was being authorized to beat Allende in 1970 whereas nearly ten times as much was expended six years earlier. A possible explanation is that Edward M. Korry, then the American ambassador in Santiago, was unflaggingly assuring the State Department that Alessandri, the rightist, would carry the day. The \$400,000, then, was just a cheap insurance policy.

This was, in effect, what the CIA told the International Telephone and Telegraph Company's director John McCone (himself a former CIA director) when he asked late in June "whether the United States intended to intervene in the election to encourage the support of one of the candidates who stood for the principles that are basic in this country." Richard M. Helms, then CIA director and a specialist in clandestine operations, told McCone that the administration would mount a "minimal effort" to oppose Allende. This was the \$400,000.

ITT, which had over \$100 million invested in Chile (chiefly in the local telephone company), was not satisfied, however, with this "minimal effort." In a gesture of astounding effrontery, ITT offered the CIA \$1 million of its own corporate money to help defeat Allende. The offer was made at a July meeting between ITT's president, Harold S. Geneen, and the CIA's Western Hemisphere division chief, William V. Broe. Helms arranged the get-together between Geneen and Broe on McCone's request. (The CIA's "old-boy network" was obviously highly effective.) Broe, however, turned down ITT's offer to help finance United States foreign policy. It did not seem necessary.

But on September 4, the news of Allende's election hit Washington. The administration and ITT sprang into action. Kissinger already had in hand a secret study of the Chilean situation—a document known as National Security Study Memorandum-97 prepared by his staff in July—and he wasted no time.

On September 15, Nixon presided over a secret meeting in Chile, attended by Kissinger, Helms, and Attorney General John Mitchell. It was conducted outside the "Forty Committee," on which the State Department and the Pentagon are represented. Nixon told Helms to "come up with some ideas," and authorized an initial \$10 million expenditure. The CIA understood this as a "blanket authorization" to get rid of Allende.

On September 16, Kissinger's background briefing made it clear that the United States would not tolerate Allende. On September 18, he presided over a meeting of the "Forty Committee," and decided to let the CIA immediately spend \$350,000 on buying and Allende congressional votes for the October runoff election. It was an idea of such monumental absurdity that the CIA's men in the field in Chile told Washington that it simply would not work and that any attempt to bribe Christian Democratic congressmen, who held the decisive votes, could be easily discovered and cause the United States vast embarrassment. The vote-buying project thus never got off the ground.

On September 29, Helms instructed Broe, his Western Hemisphere chief, to meet with Ned Gerrity, an ITT vice president, to discuss Chile. According to Gerrity's testimony before a Senate subcommittee, "Mr. Broe proposed a plan to accelerate economic chaos in Chile as a means of putting pressure on Christian Democratic congressmen to vote against Dr. Allende, or in any event to weaken Dr. Allende's position in case he was elected." Here, then, we have the extraordinary picture of the CIA conspiring with a powerful multinational corporation to intervene in the domestic affairs of a friendly country. It seems like the worst Marxist demagoguery come true.

Even before Allende was toppled, the Senate subcommittee that was already loo

ing into the CIA-ITT involvement had asked his prescient question: "Did the members of the 'Forty Committee' adequately consider the possibility that, once having launched the U.S. on the road of covert intervention, other, more direct measures might become necessary to insure the desired result: stopping Allende from becoming president of Chile?" The answer, as it turned out, was resounding "Yes." Kissinger was armed with the options in NSSM-97, the National Security Council staff study that gave him the full range of interventionist steps in Chile—and he and the CIA were ready to go. The ploy of buying anti-Allende votes having been declared unworkable, the CIA and its Chilean friends turned to direct action. The congressional runoff election was approaching and something had to be done at once. A confidential communication from ITT's Santiago office to its New York headquarters said on October 16 that "unless there is a move by dissident Chilean military elements by this time next midweek, the consensus . . . is that Salvador Allende will win the October 24 congressional runoff easily." The CIA was sending similar reports to Washington. Allende was evidently aware that a conspiracy by Americans was afoot because he alluded in a speech that week to Chile "swarming" with CIA agents.

What Allende might not have known was that the chosen instrument for the operation against him was a retired army general named Roberto Viaux. Viaux, who had tried an abortive military move during September, was in touch with the CIA through a group of extreme right-wing Chilean civilians determined to prevent Allende's final victory. The CIA knew that Viaux and his friends planned to kidnap Gen. René Schneider, then commander in chief of the Chilean army, and make it appear a plot by Allende's supporters. The hope was that the Chilean military would then be provoked into a coup leading to the cancellation of the runoff election. It was a half-baked idea inasmuch as Schneider was known to be committed to the army's political neutrality—a Chilean military tradition—and the leftists of *Unidad Popular* could have no possible reason to capture the general.

On October 13, the CIA informed Kissinger of the Viaux plot, but it was decided to discourage it. The reason was that the CIA was involved in a parallel conspiracy with Gen. Camilo Valenzuela, a commander of the Santiago garrison, in whom the agency had greater confidence. He, too, wanted to kidnap Schneider.

But the CIA could not stop Viaux. On the morning of October 22, as General Schneider was enroute to his office, his car was blocked by several vehicles. Five civilians brandishing guns tried to drag him out of his limousine and transfer him to another car. But when Schneider reached for his service revolver, the kidnapers panicked and shot him to death. Not surprisingly, Schneider's murder failed to produce the expected results. The Chilean military command closed ranks behind the constitutional process and Allende was elected by the Congress two days later—October 24. If anything, Schneider's death swung a number of votes in favor of Allende.

For reasons that remain unclear, the CIA, on the very day the congress was voting, authorized agents in Chile to give the Valenzuela group three machineguns and tear-

gas grenades for a coup attempt on behalf of Alessandri, Allende's runoff rival. But Alessandri apparently would have no part of it, and the arms were returned unused.

After Allende's inauguration on November 4, 1970, the new American strategy ran along two parallel tracks. One was the economic blockade to "accelerate economic chaos" in Chile, as the CIA's Bill Broe put it to ITT officials, and the other was plain subversion, known in the agency's language as "covert political action."

Kissinger, as was said later, became Nixon's "Chilean Desk Officer" (he had not yet become the secretary of state and acted as the president's special assistant for national security affairs) in coordinating anti-Allende activities. He was overseeing the work of a special Chilean task force composed of representatives of various government agencies and presiding over occasional meetings of the "Forty Committee" which, as time went by, kept increasing the flow of funds of the CIA for anti-Allende subversion. Nixon, of course, wholeheartedly supported the campaign.

But the official posture was sanctimoniously dishonest. Thus on January 4, 1971, when anti-Allende activities were already in full swing, Nixon said that, although he didn't "welcome" Allende's election, "We were very careful to point out that that was the decision of the people of Chile, and . . . we accepted that decision. . . . For the United States to have intervened . . . in a free election and to have turned it around, I think, would have had repercussions all over Latin America that would have been far worse than what has happened in Chile." But of course we were intervening and we had no intention of stopping.

As Colby (a more candid man than Kissinger) testified in secret session before a Senate subcommittee on March 12, 1974, "Our objective was to help create conditions which would make it impossible for Allende or *Unidad Popular* to succeed . . . in 1976." In testimony that is being disclosed here publicly for the first time, Colby said, "We did have an interest in groups opposed to Allende to help insure that [his] government was not successful."

Economically, the American objective was to deprive Allende of the means of running a viable government. As a senior State Department official told a group of visiting university professors, the United States wanted to make sure that the economic collapse of the Allende régime would serve to teach the rest of Latin America that Marxism simply cannot work. The basic formula, then, was a combination of economic and political subversion. At the same time, American army, air force, and navy advisers attached to the Chilean armed forces (they were never expelled during Allende's short tenure) began to work quietly on their military friends in Chile. While the Export-Import Bank, for example, refused to guarantee the sale of Boeing jetliners to the Chilean national airline on the grounds that Chile's international credit rating was insufficient, the Pentagon sold \$5 million of military equipment to Chile—on credit. Shortly before the 1973 coup, the administration indicated plans to sell Chile F-5 jet fighters, also on credit. And, on at least two occasions, arms were secretly flown to Chile from Miami by aircraft controlled by a CIA "proprietary" company.

The political strategy of "destabilizing" Chile

included the cutoff of financial assistance. The ostensible reasons for this cutoff were Chile's poor credit standing and Allende's refusal to pay what United States copper companies regarded as just compensation for the takeover of their properties.

There is ample evidence that CIA-linked Chilean groups organized marches by housewives protesting high prices and shortages (this had worked well in Brazil in 1964) to create social unrest and more political polarization. CIA funds are believed to have been used to launch and maintain a crippling strike by Chilean truck owners in 1972—another "destabilizing" measure. We know from President Ford's own admission that CIA funds were turned over to anti-Allende newspapers that openly called for the Socialist president's removal. And we know that CIA money was given to anti-Allende political parties.

There is no question that Chile's upper classes and a part of the middle class were badly hurt by Allende's moves toward socialism. But nothing happened during Allende's nearly three years in office to warrant Kissinger's predictions that communism was really taking over in Chile. The congress, where Allende had no majority, went on functioning the entire time—and often blocked *Unidad Popular* legislation. The press remained free. There were no political prisoners. Oddly, some of Allende's principal domestic political problems came from the extreme leftist groups outside his coalition that tried to force his hand toward total radicalization. Some of these groups engaged in terrorism against the right, just as rightists practiced terrorism against the *Unidad Popular*.

That Allende, contrary to Kissinger's claims, was not attempting to establish a "Communist dictatorship" was confirmed by, of all people, a senior Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) analyst during a secret hearing before the House Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs on October 31, 1973. Paul F. Wallner, the DIA analyst, said that "as the internal situation deteriorated . . . Allende disregarded Castro's advice to consolidate his gains and eliminate the opposition." And in the congressional elections of March 1973, Allende emerged with greater strength in Congress and well over 40 percent of the popular vote—a marked improvement over his 1970 tally.

A case obviously can be made that Allende grievously damaged the Chilean economy. Inflation was running around 1,000 percent a year, foreign currency reserves were depleted, and shortages mounted. But in truth this was a combination of the Allende régime's economic incompetence, and such uncontrollable external factors as the drop in copper prices, in addition to self-fulfilling prophecies by the United States. Applying economic screws to Chile, Washington *did* succeed in destabilizing the Chilean economy even further than Allende's inept team of economists had managed to do. By mid-1973, therefore, the conditions were ripe for a coup. The rightists and the Americans persuaded most of the military commanders that it was their patriotic duty to oust the Allende régime. An abortive attempt, carried out without coordination with other units, took place in June, and loyalist forces put it down easily.

But on September 11, a full-fledged coup, started by the navy, threw Allende out of office and brought about his death within

ours. He died inside the besieged La Moneda palace, wearing a helmet and clutching a submachine gun, an incongruous bespectacled figure of a middle-class physician whose ascent to the presidency of Chile had shaken faraway Washington to its core. His widow and others claim he was deliberately assassinated (see page 72). The junta says he committed suicide. But what we know for certain is that Allende and his many as 10,000 of his followers were killed in the bloodbath carried out by the victorious junta.

Would the coup have happened without United States involvement? There are some pro-Allende Chileans who believe that, sooner or later, either a coup or a civil war would have taken place because of the polarization of the Chilean society and the mounting inner pressures. But the fact remains that the United States did play a role in creating the conditions that led to the September revolution. And having played such a role, the United States must share the responsibility for the horrors that have swept Chile during the past two years. There can be no doubt that Chilean blood and Chilean suffering are on our hands. Big Brother-like, the military has taken over education in Chilean schools. And no end of imprisonments, tortures, and the denial of the most elementary forms of civil rights is in sight. In fact, Pinochet promised late last June that there would be no elections in Chile so long as he and my successor are alive.

Economically, the Pinochet junta did little to improve Chile's situation, although one of the justifications for the coup was that Allende was leading the country to ruin. According to the London *Economist* (hardly suspect of leftist sympathies), food prices in Chile have gone up "between ten and twenty times" since the junta assumed power. Inflation was raging at 95 percent in the first quarter of 1975, suggesting that the rate for the year will be around 400 percent—less than in Allende's time, but also without his régime's social justification for it.

In human terms, the price paid by the Chileans for the "liberation" from Allende is simply horrifying. Let us examine some of the conclusions of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (whose American representative was former Ambassador Robert F. Woodward):

"While executions by shooting without prior trial in the application of the so-called law of flight [the shooting of escaping prisoners] had ceased, the right to life could not be considered adequately protected in the proceedings of War Councils, which . . . repeatedly were handing down death penalties in circumstances that do not satisfy the requirements of due process."

"The right to personal security had been and was directly and seriously violated by the practice of psychological and physical abuse in the form of cruel and inhuman treatment. . . . The use of electric shock, the threat of harm to close relatives, sexual attacks, covering the person with a hood, blindfolding the person for weeks, etc., are reasonably proven facts."

"Ten months after the events of September, around 5,500 persons remained deprived of their liberty, according to figures supplied by some of the [Chilean cabinet] ministers. Many of these persons had been arrested without any charges, brought against them, and they continued in detention without being brought before the courts.

The situation was even more serious due

to the fact that there were also many persons regarding whom it was not known whether they were free or imprisoned, or even whether they were living or dead."

(The Commission issued its report in October 1974, but, according to reliable diplomatic information, at least 1,500 persons were arrested in December 1974 and January 1975 for no known reasons. Later in 1975, the total political prison population in Chile stood around 7,000—and new arrests were being reported almost daily.)

- "Freedom of expression: . . . None of the mass communication media are free to disseminate thought or inform the public. . . ."

- "Right of assembly: This right was virtually suspended."

- Freedom of opinion: . . . As a result of Decree-Law 77, Marxism is generically considered as a felony. The term 'Marxism' is used as though it were a label for a crime. Consequently, any individual professing Marxist ideology is considered as a criminal, regardless of whether he can be shown to have actually committed acts defined as crimes under criminal law. He can therefore be punished for 'what he is' or 'what he thinks,' regardless of 'what he does.' The commission of the same act in the same circumstances can give rise to different legal consequences depending on the persons who committed the act and their political ideology, without any rule of justice or reasonableness to justify such disparity."

The Inter-American Commission, whose report is accompanied by pages of specific examples of human rights violations ("Prisoner . . . shows deep marks of maltreatment on the wrists, both arms, and the upper and lower back . . . lacerations and scarring on the genitals, which . . . can only be produced by the application of electric shock. . . . May suffer permanent damage to the left testicle and scrotum"), was not the only group to denounce the junta's brutality.

In a report issued late in 1974, the International Commission of Jurists charged that "for every detainee who has been released in recent months, at least two new arrests have been made," adding that the legal system under the junta "continues to contravene basic principles of justice accepted by civilized nations."

In May 1975, the *New York Times* reported that "political detentions in the Santiago area alone were running at about forty a week, and the Court of Appeals was still receiving sworn statements of torture from the victims' relatives."

Also in May, the International Labor Organization said in a special study that at least 110 Chilean labor leaders may have been killed or executed during the first year of the junta's rule. The ILO said the Chilean government had confirmed that ten of them were "executed" and fourteen died while trying to escape. The junta, the ILO report added, failed to prove that the labor leaders had died for reasons other than that they were "trade unionists or that they exercised trade union activities."

This political repression is directed by DINA, the national secret police, and military intelligence services. An undetermined number of DINA and military intelligence officers have been trained in the United States or at home under public safety pro-

grams of the Agency for International Development in the years preceding the 1973 coup. It is impossible to confirm reports that others have been so trained since the coup.

The junta describes all the above charges as part of a Communist campaign waged by the Soviet Union to discredit the new régime. But both the Roman Catholic Church in Chile and, strikingly, the Pentagon's intelligence experts do not see it that way at all.

Santiago's Raul Cardinal Silva Henríquez has repeatedly and publicly denounced the tortures and arrests in Chile—to no avail.

And Paul Wallner, the DIA's Chile specialist, told the House hearing in October 1973 that the situation of political prisoners was "worse in Chile than in Cuba because of sheer numbers and the passage of time."

One could go on and on reciting the known acts of political executions, imprisonments, and tortures in Chile since September 1973. There is, for example, a study prepared by a Chilean exiles' group claiming that by 1974, the junta's rule had produced 22,043 widows and 66,667 fatherless children. Then, there is a list of 247 "assassins, torturers, violators, and criminals of the Chilean military junta," naming officers from generals and admirals down to army and police privates and civilians. One typical allegation reads: "Major P. . . . Scores of workers have been tortured on his orders and then assassinated without trial. . . . Forbade the burial of bodies so that they remained for weeks in open fields to be devoured by animals. . . . The body of Andrés Silva appeared without a head; the body of Daniel Mendez had its arms torn off; that of Rubén Vargas was without ears; that of Segundo Pedrero without one arm; that of Orlando Barriga without hands and nose; that of Rosendo Rebolledo with one leg torn away at its root. . . ." There seems to be no end to these tales of horror.

But all this brings us back to the question of American conscience. What has the United States government said—or done—about the Chilean tragedy, the tragedy we helped to set in motion?

For the record, both the Nixon and the Ford administrations have maintained total public silence about the junta's atrocities. The State Department protest over the U.N. Commission was made privately.

With some 40,000 Chileans abroad, the best the State Department could do nearly two years after the 1973 coup was to convince the Justice Department to allow 400 Chilean families to enter the United States on a case-by-case basis. This, in contrast to the more than 100,000 South Vietnamese refugees we processed almost instantly, was the extent of our humanitarianism.

At a news conference on September 16, 1974, President Ford was asked why the CIA engaged in covert operations against Allende in Chile. His reply summed up our government's attitude: It was done, he said, "in the best interest of the people of Chile, and certainly in our best interest." □

*In our July issue, Penthouse erroneously identified George Constantinides, a retired CIA official, as the new head of Counterintelligence. We are advised that this post is now held by George T. Kalaris, formerly CIA station chief in the Philippines. The CIA never discloses the names of its division chiefs.*

## HUMAN EVENTS

13 September 1975

# Secret War Between KGB and CIA

By ROBERT CONQUEST

*The KGB, the Committee of State Security, is the most important single institution in the Soviet Union. Its dual role is to keep the Communist party in power and to control foreign governments. Mr. Conquest, a British authority on Soviet affairs, compares the KGB with the CIA in the following article.*

Since the war (and up to 1975) over 500 Soviet officials have been expelled from more than 40 countries.

This is a truly extraordinary number, particularly when we consider it does not take into account the sudden departure of Soviet diplomats when their agents have been arrested, which does not rate as "expulsion."

Perhaps more remarkable still, and a reflection on the common sense and political courage of the non-Soviet states, is the fact that over 70 of these expelled turned up later as Soviet representatives in other countries. Eight of these were even expelled for a second time from their new host-countries. And Nikolai Vasilyev even managed to score three expulsions, having been thrown out of France before World War II.

As such figures show, one important advantage of the huge Soviet effort is that it tends to swamp the limited security services of the other nations. In Britain, over 100 diplomats and others were wandering around trying to effect espionage contacts, and it was almost beyond the ability of the British services to shadow each of them all of the time. However, the Russian effort collapsed. Partly this was because of a useful defector, a common cause of Soviet debacles. But there was also the ineptness of most of the participants in these human-wave tactics. Britain expelled over 100 Soviet "diplomats" in 1971 as a result.

Any sensible country would clearly abate the nuisance and insist on cutting down the Soviet representation to a normal level. But though their efforts are a very severe distraction to MI5 in Britain and its equivalents elsewhere, nevertheless these semi-amateur operations are not to be taken too seriously. They usually owe their jobs to family connections in the Soviet New Class; their training in or capacity for espionage is limited; they blunder frequently and involve the USSR in grave diplomatic scandals. Except as a distraction, and to the extent that very occasionally one may make a suitable contact and pass it along to the real professionals, they must still be regarded as a comparatively minor effort when it comes to actual results.

In addition to these clumsy fellows, there is a smaller nucleus of often brilliant professionals. It is believed that no more than a dozen or so a year are graduated from the highly selective KGB training schools. They have shown themselves capable of superb and extremely damaging operations like the lifting of the whole NATO weapon deployment from the American top security base at Orly in 1962-63.

If we compare the KGB with its main opponent, the American Central Intelligence Agency, various differences emerge. It is, of course, an enormous advantage to the KGB, that there is never any question of it coming under public criticism in the USSR.

To illustrate the difference, try to imagine recent events in the United States happening in the Soviet Union. An employe of the Soviet government hands over secret documents to *Pravda*; *Pravda* prints them; and the man in question is tried on a minor charge and acquitted—that would be the Russian equivalent of the Daniel Ellsberg case. A member of the Supreme Soviet—the equivalent of Michael Harrington—discovers and prints confidential information about KGB arrangements in, say, Chile; these are printed in *Pravda* and *Izvestia*; and the result is the KGB boss Yuri Andropov is forced to appear before a committee of the Supreme Soviet, to try to justify such conduct.

It will be seen at once that the CIA operates under constraints which would be regarded as laughable to the point of lunacy in Moscow. To do the other Western powers justice, one should add that even in France or Britain such a public hamstringing of the essential security and intelligence services would be quite unthinkable.

And when one adds that a major allegation against the CIA in Chile was that it had provided funds for opposition newspapers and strike organizations—and not, as the KGB had done through the North Korean Embassy, arms and terrorist training—one wonders what on earth is in the minds of alleged pro-Westerners among its critics.

## Moscow-Funded Student Radicals

It may be remembered that in the early '50s free organizations of students and others and a number of free periodicals were kept going with the aid of American secret funds. Without these, the huge sums pumped from Moscow into such front organizations as the International Union of Students would have received no rebuttal. Yet people now complain even of that!

Unlike the CIA, the KGB also operates—and on a far vaster scale again—inside Soviet territory. While the Americans divide their intelligence activities into two autonomous bodies, the CIA and the FBI, the KGB is a highly coordinated organization with considerable overlap even between the departments working at home and abroad.

For example, a foreign diplomat (as in one case including a French ambassador) may be compromised sexually by agents in Moscow, with a view to be-

coming a tool back home of the KGB external services. Nor would there be any of the curious jurisdictional legalisms by which the CIA is now charged with activity against American citizens while in America. How anyone with a trace of common sense can imagine that it is suitable for surveillance of a suspect, perhaps on the briefest trip home, to cease at the airport and be handed over to a different organization unaccustomed to his habits, is a mystery.

This is one of the many problems the CIA has, but which does not affect the KGB. The latter is, moreover, a body exerting incomparably more political weight in its own right than its American counterpart, with its head, Andropov, ranking as a full member of the ruling Politburo.

Recent allegations against the CIA have been made by "defectors" from it, such as Philip Agee and Victor Marchetti. Much of our knowledge of the KGB also comes from "defectors." But again, we find a difference which is well worth noting.

KGB defectors have to be carefully hidden, given false identities and placed where their late employers cannot find them. A number of those for whom inadequate precautions were taken have been found dead in mysterious, and sometimes not so mysterious, circumstances—poisoned, shot, pushed out of windows.

The new batch of CIA "defectors," on the other hand, live in comfort in countries allied to the United States, write their books and even have them published in New York. The mere thought of a KGB man settling in Hungary, exposing his employers (let alone having his work printed in Moscow), does not begin to make contact with reality at any point.

In the competition with the CIA, the KGB has many other advantages. With hundreds of thousands of Eastern Europeans entering America in the past few decades it is clearly much easier for the Soviet authorities to put in trained "illegals," or to maintain "sleepers."

In the comparatively easygoing political circumstances of the non-Communist countries, there must always be a proportion of people who will simply swallow pro-Soviet views, and be at least potential Soviet agents. Besides, few countries have the huge police forces, "internal passports" and registration agents available to the Soviet security authorities.

Then again, while there is no doubt that large numbers of Soviet bloc subjects would eagerly assist enemies of their government in any way possible, the KGB can prevent or monitor every such contact. Foreigners in the USSR are proportionally few compared with the security forces available to cope with them. From countries like the United States there are hundreds of thousands of visitors to all parts of the world, where

it is not difficult for them to be contacted without supervision. But Soviet visitors abroad are limited both in their numbers and their tested loyalty-quotient. This does not always work, as the USSR seems to be fairly unpopular even with its most loyal subjects. It is estimated that about 2,000 Americans are contacted overseas every year by the KGB with a view to recruitment, while similar attempts on Soviet subjects are rather few.

### High Rate of KGB Agent Defections

Few, but not negligible. And, moreover, the successful contacts of the CIA and other Western services include KGB men themselves. For one of the vulnerabilities of the KGB is the extraordinary high rate of defection to the West. This applies not only to minor figures, but to some of its major operators, including illegal Residents. These men, carefully selected and checked and counter-checked for highest political reliability, nevertheless come over at a rate which time and time again destroys whole KGB networks and gives a vast amount of information to the West.

It should be noted, too, that this is almost wholly one-way traffic. There have, of course, been a few occasions when high Western intelligence officials have defected, as with Kim Philby. But in his case, and the others, it has always been a question of an already indoctrinated Communist agent infiltrating the Western services. In the case of the KGB men, it is of operatives who start off completely loyal to their service and its regime, and are subverted by exposure to truth and to liberty.

The ways in which the CIA is now being hindered and hampered by its own people are quite astonishing. It is already much smaller, and disposes of much less resources, than its giant opponent. It is not only a David fighting a Goliath, but a David additionally handicapped by a heavy ball and chain, and dazed by the occasional half-brick hurled at him by one of his alleged supporters. On the face of it, one would expect a walk-over for Goliath-KGB. The remarkable thing is, even

granted some terrific KGB successes, how well balanced the combatants are.

As for current anti-CIA hysteria in certain countries, it might be worth referring its sillier sponsors to the following analysis, from a source which even they might find authoritative—the official organ of a Communist party:

"Among all the information and stories circulating in the country, especially recently, there are many which insist that many of our problems and difficulties are either inspired, or directly created by the CIA's activity . . . . However, when the sources and objectives of this kind of 'confidential' information are studied more closely, and when we analyze them more thoroughly, it will not be difficult for us to find that the 'CIA obsession' is being spread and encouraged in our country by . . . ."

At this point the Belgrade-official *Borba* (Oct. 31, 1967) goes on to blame a variety of enemies including, especially, pro-Soviet elements.

And so: there really is a worldwide confrontation between the KGB on the one hand and the CIA and the intelligence services of the other non-Communist countries on the other.

The present comparative relaxation in international tension has in no way resulted in any relaxation of pressure by the KGB. Indeed, the larger influx of Soviet citizens and the setting up of new Soviet consulates has given it greater opportunities. The CIA, harassed at home and thinly spread in the field, has conducted largely a defensive operation, even though accompanied by occasional brilliant forays into the Soviet side.

On the whole, and partly as the result of the KGB's blunders, the CIA probably has the slight advantage in spite of everything. The various recent successes of Russian and Communist foreign policy are in the main due to other reasons. The KGB, some of the Soviet leaders seem to feel, is not really pulling its full weight. This may have something to do with the current major attempt to destroy the CIA's effectiveness by concentration on the attacks now being launched against it by naive (or worse) elements in the U.S.A. itself.

LOS ANGELES TIMES  
5 September 1975

### Ford and CIA

I read with misgiving much of what President Ford said before the 57th annual convention of the American Legion (Times, Aug. 20), especially in regard to the CIA.

No doubt any "reckless" congressional actions undermining the CIA's legitimate operations would be "catastrophic," as Ford said, but is that really what Congress is trying to do?


On the contrary, Congress is investigating and is chiefly concerned with illegal activities, which Ford euphemistically referred to as being

"improper." Despite the leaks and the publicity of the investigation, few of the most bitter congressional critics of the CIA would like to see the agency weakened, let alone abolished.

It may appear that the Senate committee headed by Frank Church (D-Ida.) is too aggressive for the Ford Administration to handle. If so, should not part of the blame lie with Ford himself, whose Rockefeller-headed blue ribbon panel might have failed to do its homework adequately?

KEN HEDLER  
Palm Springs

RADIO GUIDE (CHICAGO)  
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Detente, detente, that's all you hear these days. The latest member of the detente club is our southern neighbor, Cuba. Congressmen and Senators are working 'hard' to establish a new relationship with Cuba. However it would appear that not everyone in government wants detente with Cuba.

A shortwave and AM station in Honduras (Central America) has begun a campaign of propaganda broadcasts directed against Cuba. Their theme is both 'anti-communist' and 'anti-Cuban'. What's so special about this Honduras station is that its name is RADIO SWAN and in the 1960's it was owned and operated by our own Central Intelligence Agency.

Radio Swan was originally constructed on Swan Island in the Caribbean by Caymen Island laborers under the direction of the C.I.A. It began operation with a 50,000 watt AM transmitter on 1160KHz, and a 7,500 watt shortwave transmitter on 6,000KHz, in September of 1960.

At the outset of operations, Radio Swan claimed to be owned by the Gibraltar Steamship Company (who had no steamships) located at 437 5th Avenue in New York City. Later in 1960, Gibraltar moved to 18 E. 50th Street, New York City, and shared offices with Radio Press International, a news subsidiary of a local New York Radio station (AM).

Radio Swan blew its cover during the Bay of Pigs invasion. Radio Swan broadcasted instructions and directives to the invading CIA army. Needless to say, after that most people realized that Radio Swan was in reality a CIA propaganda station.

After the Bay of Pigs, things began to get hot for Gibraltar Steamship in New York, so they hot footed off to Miami. Once in Miami, Gibraltar opened offices in the Langford building at 121 SE First Street. At this time they still claimed that Radio Swan was a regular commercial shortwave station, owned and operated by Gibraltar.

Between the 7th and 15th of November, 1961 Radio Swan changed its name to Radio Americas. Still they continued with the anti-Castro and anti-communist broadcasting.

In 1963 Gibraltar Steamship Company vanished as quickly as it appeared. It was replaced by another C.I.A. front called Vanguard Service Corporation. Not being one of the more creative C.I.A. fronts, Vanguard kept the old Gibraltar offices in the Langford Building as well as the old Gibraltar telephone number: Vanguard claimed that it owned Radio Americas and leased the Swan Island facilities from the Gibraltar Steamship Company.

In the late 1960's Radio Americas left the air for unexplained reasons. Vanguard also folded its tent and disappeared into oblivion. In 1971 the United States, after 100 years of occupying Swan Island, returned it to the Honduran Government who claimed the ownership of the island. At this time it was thought that any chance of Radio Swan/Radio Americas reappearing was gone.

However, early this summer, Radio Swan reappeared using 1100KHz AM and 6185KHz shortwave. They are still on the air as of this writing with violent anti-communist programming slanted against Cuba. This 'new' Radio Swan uses the mailing address of P.O. Box 882, San Pedro Sula, Honduras. (Note that Honduras currently owns the island.) In a letter received by noted shortwave listener Ralph Perry, Radio Swan acknowledges their former ownership by the C.I.A. but fails to state their current 'affiliation'. In this letter, Radio Swan states, "As you know, the Communists are trying to take over Latin America. We found it necessary to put Radio Swan back on the air again in defense of Democracy and the free world". One might inquire who is the 'we' to which Radio Swan refers. Could it be that in this year of 'etente, that, the C.I.A. has once again set its sights on Cuba? Certainly Radio Swan does not qualify as a 'bi-centennial' station, or does it? In any case, give a listen for them between 1AM and 6AM Chicago time on 6185KHz (6.185MHz) shortwave. After all it could very well be your tax dollars paying for it.

## 'Only Congress Itself'

By Anthony Lewis

WASHINGTON, Sept. 17—The Senate Intelligence Committee, with its televised hearings on secret C.I.A. poisons, provides the immediate drama in Washington. But the parallel House investigation may have a more profound impact on the larger issues raised by American intelligence activities in recent years. The reason lies in contrasting attitudes toward the crucial question of Executive secrecy.

Senator Frank Church and his committee have followed what an assistant attorney general, with what may have been excessive candor, called the "traditional approach" to getting classified documents. That is to negotiate with Executive officials about what will be provided and promise how it will be handled.

Representative Otis Pike and the House committee are insisting on their right to examine all the relevant evidence on their own terms. They will make no promises on what they will do with subpoenaed documents.

Why is that so important? One experienced person put it as follows:

"On that position hangs the whole question of whether Congress can exercise effective oversight of the intelligence community in future. If a Congressional committee cannot say 'we want X' and get it without negotiating and promising, you open yourself to the charm and the lawyers and the whispering in the ear."

What that observer was describing was the process that has effectively protected Presidents and their intelligence men from serious scrutiny for a generation. Congressional curiosity, when it arose, was headed off by a confidential chat with a friendly member, or a whispered warning of grave consequences to our security.

To know how the charm works one has only to watch Richard Helms, the

### ABROAD AT HOME

former C.I.A. director, testify to the Senate committee so smoothly and smilingly. A C.I.A. employe who violated orders by keeping poison followed "the human impulse to do the greater good," he said; yes, and good was self-defined—which is the essence of danger in secret C.I.A. activity. It was an "aberration," he added; yes, like the Bay of Pigs and Chile and the Phoenix assassination program in Vietnam.

The larger point underlying the various intelligence inquiries is the need for accountability. Intelligence agencies do need privacy, but our system requires that they be ultimately accountable to a detached scrutineer, which is Congress.

Accountability is inconvenient to Presidents and their agents. That is why, as Congressman Pike said, the executive branch urgently wants to continue the old charm-and-whisper

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Meg Greenfield

## CIA: Reality vs. Romance

approach in dealing with Congress. It is why President Ford has seemed so strangely agitated over the House investigation—because it might not be subject to control.

The President chose to draw the issue of power with the committee over a molehill, its release of four words from a classified document. The words, "and greater communications security," supposedly might have told someone that we knew something about communications in Egypt's Army, the subject of the report.

Why, if a private citizen had published those four words, Mr. Ford said, it would be "a serious criminal offense." Do his lawyers really think a judge and jury would convict on those innocuous words? In any event, his analogy is false. If a C.I.A. director were a private citizen, he would be subject to different rules, too. If a horse had stripes, it would look like a zebra. Congress is not a private citizen.

Mr. Ford's remark is actually extremely revealing. It shows the old attitude that "the Government" means only the executive branch; Congress is a second-class branch, which gets information—and thus a share of power—only by the executive's charity. If that is the attitude, nothing has been learned from the Presidential excesses of recent years.

If American intelligence had produced a series of triumphs, there might be something to say for this attitude. In fact, Congress has at length been aroused from its lethargy only by successive intelligence wrongs and disasters. But the reason for independent Congressional oversight is more than pragmatic.

In the deepest sense the safety of liberty in this country rests on respect for the separation of powers — on Congress as a balance to the growth of Presidential power. Anyone who needs to be reminded of that truth should read the late Alexander M. Bicke's remarkable book, "The Morality of Consent," about to be published by the Yale University Press. The secret of our "disorderly" system, he says, is the assurance of freedom given by the continuing contests of power, within government and between government and citizenry.

The great Supreme Court decision on separation of powers was the steel case of 1952, striking down President Truman's seizure of the mills because it went beyond the limits of law. Justice Robert H. Jackson, in his concurring opinion, said the Court rightly refused to extend Presidential power. But in the long run, he warned: "Only Congress itself can prevent power from slipping through its fingers."

I have recently read two very interesting books about the CIA, one friendly and one hostile. The hostile book is Philip Agee's newly published "Inside the Company," the confessional memoir of a lapsed CIA operative. Agee is at pains to expose and, if possible, ruin the agency for which he worked for twelve years. The friendly book is one I in fact reread: "The Craft of Intelligence," by Allen Dulles, which was published with some fanfare back in 1963. It is the exultant, supportive memoir of a man who was director of the CIA for nearly nine years and whose spirit infused a whole generation of intelligence officers. I have no doubt that Dulles's book tells us more — directly and indirectly — about what has gone wrong at the CIA than Agee's book can begin to do.

This instruction may not be apparent to people who are fundamentally opposed to an agency with the CIA's general charter, or to those who believe—conversely—that anything goes. But the guidance is there for those I would call the choke-point set, people like myself who grant the need for some agency activities that are rough and intrusive and yet who are repelled by many of the things that have been revealed. I would list as chief among these the incredible decision to try to arrange for the Mafia to murder Fidel Castro. Murder in the first place, and, in the second, putting the U.S. government in the debt of the mob—how could it have come about?

Agee, who strikes me as one of those fellows who have simply turned in one uncritical enthusiasm for another, doesn't offer nearly so much insight as Dulles does. For in Dulles the potential for disaster is everywhere apparent, and in him we are not seeing some lone, misguided figure, but rather ourselves and our own perspective not so many years ago. And it is all there:

- The overblown and now overtaken sense of the agency's mandate, born of hot war and cold war and of a belief that America knew what was best for everyone else and should seek to achieve it by any means. Activities that Agee can nowadays condemn merely in the recounting, Dulles celebrates as duty.

- A failure—despite *pro forma* expressions of concern—to appreciate the capacity of such an organization to get out of hand, or to take account of the human frailties of officers one knows to be well-intended and patriotic.

- A classically ambivalent American attitude toward espionage—one part discomfort and one part romance. This appears in the former director's need to argue the legitimacy of espionage in the first place; in his impulse to tell how it all works and to boast about things that should probably have gone unacknowledged by a man in his position; in the repeated reference to the "adventure" and "excitement" of the work; in the fact that the book was written at all.

These aspects of Dulles's perception might not have leapt out at me had they not, in different variations, come up in a conversation I'd recently had

with the agency's current director, William Colby. Colby is presiding over one of the great organizational wrecks of our time, a vast secret intelligence agency that has endured a veritable tornado of blown cover, and which is trying to get in line with a sudden demand for public accountability. His yes-we-have-no-bananas defense of the agency—conceding some error by way of stoutly defending the CIA's overall record—has not pleased people on any side of the dispute. Yet he struck me as a man who was relatively cheerful in his gloom because he believes that what has gone wrong can be remedied.

Colby begins with the overblown mandate, insisting that the ethos of the postwar decades produced an extravagant, no-holds-barred sense of mission that he claims has been trimmed back. He lays much of the blame for the abuses on the political winks the agency was getting in the guise of directives. "Go and do it and don't tell me about it," is the way he sums them up, testimony to high-level mixed feelings on this subject, fascination mixed with revulsion, bravura with guilt. For his part Colby argues that discipline, indoctrination and clear directives can produce what he calls a "responsible American intelligence," one that is effective, that includes clandestine services and that functions within constitutional restraints. "I mean one," he says, "that has its mission defined. You have to say fairly clearly what the mission is—and without euphemism."

Because Colby has been involved in some very controversial agency operations, and because he wants to limit the number of persons sharing in any new congressional/executive branch oversight of the agency, much of what he has argued is dismissed by critics of the agency. They see it as just one more attempt to shroud from the public the CIA's overreaching of power.

My own reservations are different. I think the number of congressional and executive-branch overseers is much less important than the willingness of those who are chosen to exercise real responsibility, to crash through the myths and ambiguous feelings—the spy-story stuff—and face up to the hard, explicit and sometimes ugly choices that are required. And I do not think excessive secrecy in these matters represents nearly so great a threat to the public's right to know as it does to the perspective and judgment of those who live in the world of secrets. The first and foremost danger of excessive secrecy is that it corrupts the people who hold the secrets.

Allen Dulles, in his self-assurance, brushes the risk aside, but it is real. We in Washington know that a certain condescension and contempt for normal values are the occupational disease of those who operate too long in the realm of secret information—an if-you-knew-what-I-know approach that can ultimately justify the most misbegotten of decisions. And that plus what Colby himself recognizes as the blurry "edges" between legitimate and

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## Stronger control of CIA

illegitimate action presents a fierce challenge to the maturity and wisdom of everyone along the line. Secrecy and an extraordinary grant of power can be, like LSD, a mind-altering drug.

So while I agree with Colby in theory that these things can be rectified, my gloom is not quite as cheery as his. The mystique and the illusions of a generation of intelligence officers who served us well—and also ill—must be dispelled. An enormously difficult discipline must be imposed. And people in responsible positions must accept responsibility.

For my own part, I admit defeat: the required real-life attributes are plain enough to me, but the principal model that comes to mind is from spy fiction. It is John le Carre's hero, George Smiley, who has it all and has it all just right: a fanatical commitment to the inspection of reality, a corollary distaste for day-dream and drama, a willingness to make moral distinctions and an understanding of what the practical limits are.

(This article is reprinted from Newsweek.)

THE BOSTON PHOENIX  
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## Agee: Tracing the Portugal-CIA Connections

By Sid Blumenthal

Former CIA operative Philip Agee, author of *CIA Diary*, in a joint interview with the *Phoenix* and WBCN, charged that the CIA is currently engaged in clandestine activities in Portugal aimed at creating a "destabilized" situation. "There are visible signs of CIA intervention," Agee said. He stated that he has been to Portugal twice within the year to observe developments, and while there he was able to identify a number of CIA agents working out of the US Embassy in Lisbon, many of them with backgrounds in Latin American intrigue. The CIA chief of station in Portugal, according to Agee, is John S. Morgan, who was in Brazil after the right-wing military coup in 1964. During that period, the CIA passed information on leftists to Brazilian Death Squads, Agee said. Morgan then transferred to Montevideo, Uruguay, from 1970 to 1973, until a right-wing military coup was staged; Agee was involved in CIA actions in Uruguay in the mid-'60s.

James N. Lawler is the deputy CIA chief in Lisbon, Agee says, adding that he and Lawler are members of the same CIA training program and are thus personally acquainted. Agee said that Lawler was active in the

passing of CIA money to Brazilian politicians prior to the *coup* there and that he helped finance anti-Allende candidates in the 1964 election in Chile, a CIA campaign which has been widely exposed in the American press. The *CIA Diary* author says that there are 10 to 15 other CIA agents in Portugal on "temporary duty" and about 10 more agents on permanent assignment. He believes that their work is coordinated by Henry Kissinger and US Ambassador Frank Carlucci (a veteran of US "destabilizations" in Brazil and Chile, according to Agee). Agee also identifies 105 military men out of the 160 Americans in the US mission in Portugal. "It takes a lot of money to stage these violent demonstrations. I think there is a lot of money coming in to Portugal to form a broad front against the way the revolution has been proceeding," he concludes.

Agee thinks too that there may also be a Brazilian connection in Portugal. "It's probable that the Brazilians are active," he stated. Numerous reports in the US press have identified the Brazilian intelligence apparatus as playing an active role in overthrowing the Allende government. Brazil has strong historical and financial ties to Portugal,

had not been exposed, might have taken over the country. A majority of 52-24 per cent rejected that charge.

As of August, 1975, 45 per cent of those queried said they thought the CIA was doing only a fair or a poor job, whereas 36 per cent said the agency did an excellent or pretty good job. So the general image of CIA, according to this poll, is on the down side.

This undoubtedly comes from the exposures by Congress and the Rockefeller Commission. But in spite of that, most Americans still hold to the cold-war belief that spying is necessary. In the Harris survey, 78 per cent said they thought it important that the U.S. have the best intelligence agency in the world, "even if it does make some mistakes."

Most people do not ask for examples of what CIA spy work has accomplished in guarding the national security. They are willing to accept the value of spying on faith, even though they recognize, the Harris Poll found, that intelligence work consists mainly of compiling and analyzing public information.

But public opinion clearly would support much stronger control of the agency by elected officials. It is up to Congress to see that this is accomplished.

as well as sharing a common language. Agee says that the best indication of Brazilian involvement is that the Brazilian ambassador to Portugal is the former head of the Brazilian CIA.

Congressman Michael Harrington, whose leaking of CIA Director William Colby's secret testimony on the "destabilization" of Chile to the *New York Times* led to his eventual removal from the House subcommittee on intelligence, told the *Phoenix* that he believes that the CIA role in Portugal is "problematical." He said he wanted to concentrate on CIA involvement in Latin America where the US has "the strongest proprietary interest." Harrington stated that he feels somewhat "uncomfortable" with the Portugal issue and is unsure about the extent of CIA activities there. Despite his current hesitation, he did send a letter on March 18, a week after the State Department denied before Congress that the US was covertly involved in Portugal, to Congressman

Lee Hamilton, chairman of the investigations subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, asking him to hold hearings on the question. Harrington requested that Hamilton use his subcommittee to probe the "differences between stated US policy and a policy of interference." He said that, in the case of Portugal, Congress could prevent a repetition of the Chilean experience. Harrington has yet to receive a response to this letter. He also asked the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to look into US policy toward Portugal; this request was not granted. Harrington told the *Phoenix* that Congressman Otis Pike, the new chairman of the House subcommittee investigating the CIA, is making "a determined effort to turn away from focusing on foreign covert actions."

Philip Agee says that he has not been asked by any member of Congress or any investigating committee to testify about his CIA career or his knowledge of CIA activity.



NEWS, Greensboro, N.C.  
17 August 1975

## The CIA watch

(An editorial book review)

It is a truism of government that the reports of blue-ribbon presidential commissions are written to be ignored. That has been the ignominious fate most recently of commission reports on civil disorders, campus violence and pornography—all of them tossed on the scrap heap of history by the very presidents who ordered them.

Now yet another presidential commission may be headed for the same brusque treatment. It is the familiar Rockefeller CIA Commission, whose report bears the imposing title, Report to the President by the Commission on CIA Activities within the United States (June, 1975). It will be recalled that when this report made its debut two months ago, an attendant dispute over whether the report would contain a chapter on foreign assassination plots (it didn't) grabbed the headlines and hasn't stopped rolling since. Meanwhile, the 300-page report itself has been left behind to gather moss.

### The revelations

But to neglect this document would be a serious mistake. It is thorough in its research, pointed in its recommendations and—in its own inimitably dull way—fascinating in its detail. The report, to be sure, will never rival a Harold Robbins novel for scandal.

But what could be more intriguing than the day-by-day story of how E. Howard Hunt and Gordon Liddy came to burgle Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office, or how the CIA managed to keep the lid on its mail surveillance operation through a succession of Postmaster Generals? Here, too, are such tidbits as a request by the Treasury Department's Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Unit to use CIA satellite photography to locate moonshine stills in the hills of North Carolina (it was rejected), and anecdotes about the running feud between the CIA and J. Edgar Hoover.

Of course the more substantive revelations of CIA illegality and impropriety are outlined in the report as well: The mail surveillance program; the surveillance of domestic dissident groups during the 1960's; domestic wiretaps and break-ins; misuse of the CIA by the Nixon administration; and such scattered abuses as the LSD experiments and the CIA training of agents for undercover work in the federal Bureau of Narcotics.

But for all the fascination of this catalogue of CIA sins, the commission's report offers more. Woven throughout its pages are several broader themes: A portrait of an intelligence agency with too much power; of presidents with too little discretion, and of an acquiescent Congress tagging along behind like Dopey in Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs. It is too easy simply to blame the CIA for running away with the law. Some in authority weren't watching when it left the stable; others helped open the gate.

To be sure, the CIA comes in for its share of wrist-slappings from the commission—

and deservedly so. But it is repeatedly emphasized in the report that that lower-echelon CIA employes frequently questioned and complained about their orders from higher-ups. At one point—during the reign of the super-secret Operation "CHAOS," the CIA's domestic surveillance unit—then-CIA director Richard Helms was forced to reprimand his subordinates by writing, in a memo, that CHAOS "cannot be stopped simply because some members of the organization do not like this activity."

The main villain in the piece, as it happens, is not Richard Helms, but Richard Nixon. Nixon, and Lyndon Johnson to a lesser extent before him, put extraordinary pressures on Helms to bend the CIA's charter. In most cases Helms reluctantly obeyed. For Helms' part, the report also pointedly suggests that he should have considered resigning rather than do the President's bidding. Helms didn't.

The issue of presidential pressure on the CIA is paramount. No doubt that is why the report's longest chapter is devoted to the CIA's peripheral role in the Ellsberg break-in and the subsequent White House cover-up of Watergate. One episode described in the report is emblematic of the abuses of the Nixon White House. It is when the President, agitated by the publication of the Pentagon Papers in 1971, calls a reluctant Helms into his office to hand over a top-secret file on Vietnam during the Kennedy years, a file presumed to be politically explosive. The President, the report drily notes, took the file and "slipped it into his desk drawer"—a chilling phrase that somehow captures the essence of the Nixon transgressions.

The CIA was largely successful in rebuffing White House pressures during Watergate. It was less so in its presidential charge to snoop into the activities of dissident domestic groups. Here one finds a remarkable story of presidential paranoia and ego-gratification, beginning with the Johnson administration. For both Presidents Johnson and Nixon were determined to show that campus and racial violence was not indigenous, but the work of foreign powers. No matter that the presidents were repeatedly told that no such connection existed; the CIA, FBI and other intelligence units were told to go back and find one anyway.

It was this pressure that ultimately spawned Operation CHAOS within the CIA. It also gave rise to the so-called "Huston Plan", which would have relaxed legal restrictions on all manner of dirty tricks, including break-ins, buggings and more thorough mail surveillance in an effort to stop domestic violence. The report describes one top-level meeting of spy chiefs in 1970 in which President Nixon's liaison man, Charles Huston, tells those assembled that "everything is valid, everything is possible"—that was Huston's paraphrase of Nixon's own words. Had J. Edgar Hoover, for obscure reasons of his own, not adamantly refused to cooperate, the Huston Plan might well have gone forward. It was that close.

The Rockefeller Commission takes a dim view of these and other transgressions. Yet it concludes that there will always be the need for some undercover domestic activity by the CIA. In watching its own employes for security leaks, in contacting friendly domestic intelligence sources, and in countering the activities of foreign spies on U.S. soil—whose own surreptitious activities constitute a serious invasion of Americans' privacy as well.

It would be pleasant to conclude, along with some of the CIA's strongest critics, that the best way to solve the problem would be to prohibit all covert activity by the CIA, domestic and foreign. But one suspects that if that were accomplished, something else would doubtless spring up in the CIA's place—perhaps a new wing of the FBI, or a fancier version of the White House Plumbers. Realistically, it is better to follow the commission's lead in placing further restraints on the CIA we already have and to insure that its operation is fully professional and closely monitored by a strong congressional committee.

For if the Rockefeller Commission performed a lasting service, it is in its portrayal of the CIA not as a headless monster flying off on wild tangents, but a loyal extension of the President himself. If there is blame to be assigned—and most certainly there is—let it be placed not only at the CIA's doorstep, but on the desks of Presidents who used it as a personal toy, and in the halls of Congress where our representatives were either too busy, or more likely too timid, to keep an eye on the cluttered CIA shop.

JOHN ALEXANDER

NEW YORK TIMES  
5 September 1975

### Glomar Explorer Reported Seeking 'Bugs' of Soviet

SAN DIEGO, Sept. 4 (UPI)—The spy ship the Central Intelligence Agency used to recover part of a sunken Russian submarine is reported have a new mission: pulling out underwater "bugs" the Soviets planted on the seabed only 50 miles off the California coast to listen to the United States Navy.

The San Diego Evening Tribune reported yesterday that

the Glomar Explorer would soon begin operations to remove or destroy Russian sensors on the ocean bottom in the vicinity of San Clemente Island.

The Navy, and the Global Marine, Company, ostensible operator of the ship, refused to comment on the report.

The island, about 50 miles south of Los Angeles, is under Navy control. It and the waters around it are frequently used for maneuvers and tests by the Navy and Marine Corps.

DISPATCH, Columbus  
1 Sept. 1975

# KGB Stepping Up Activities Abroad

By L. Edgar Prina  
Copy News Service

WASHINGTON — As the CIA undergoes the severest internal investigation ever into its activities and alleged excesses, the Soviet KGB is stepping up its espionage abroad and its repression at home.

This is not a cause-and-effect situation, U.S. intelligence officials say, but a coincidental and ironic fact.

IT IS detente, the avowed determination by the West and East to seek better relations, that has expanded the KGB's spying and secret police effort.

The KGB, whose initials stand for Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Besopasnosti or Committee for State Security, is believed to be the world's largest foreign intelligence and counterintelligence organization. It is the CIA, FBI and a lot of other things, including a 175,000-man border guard army, all rolled into one.

"It is our opinion that they (KGB) view detente as opening doors that weren't open as recently as five years ago," one U.S. intelligence official said. "There is absolutely no diminution of their effort to penetrate the U.S. government."


THEY HAVE not slowed up their campaign to recruit Americans at any level. As a matter of fact, not a month goes by that we don't see them attempting to recruit Americans.

The KGB completely controls the foreign intelligence organizations of its East European satellites. A measure of the expanded effort it is making in the United States is revealed in the fact that Soviet-bloc official personnel in the United States have increased from 957 as of July 1, 1969, to 1,463 on Feb. 1, 1974.

Western intelligence services estimate that 40 percent of the Soviet-bloc officials overseas have some intelligence work assigned to them.

FBI DIRECTOR Clarence Kelley asked Congress in Spring for funds to hire 157 more agents, mainly for use in counterintelligence.

Most of the KGB recruiting effort is made overseas.



TOP SECRET — The cover of a KGB 460-page document was obtained by Western intelligence agents. "wanted" list is shown here with its translation. A copy of the top-secret

much of it among the large U.S. military population there.

Several times in the last decade or so the Soviets have been spectacularly successful. There was the case of the Army sergeant in France who gave the KGB a complete list of U.S. weapons deployment in Europe, and another in which the Air Force message center chief in Japan turned over several briefcases full of classified information. Both were discovered after many secrets had been revealed.

AMERICAN STUDENTS abroad are another prime target of KGB recruiters.

"They will go all out, not for the one with the beard and hippie characteristics, but for the guy with a relatively short haircut with

this military service behind him," the U.S. official said.

"It is a lot easier to recruit an American overseas, because he figures he is not being watched."

"WHEN THE Russians feel they have a live one, they promise to finish paying his college costs and send him back to the United States to try to join the FBI, CIA, State Department, Pentagon or to get a job in a defense industry."

The KGB looks for "the venal, the corrupt, the guy in debt," the official asserted.

"They long ago discovered that we all have mortgages," he said. "Often the first question they ask is, 'How much is your mortgage?'"

ANOTHER GROUP interests the KGB recruiter

is the third-country citizen who has trained in the United States and found that when he returned home he was either underemployed or jobless.

"The Russians try to get them back to the states, if their record has been clean," the U.S. official said.

"After five years they can become naturalized American citizens and, in an additional three years, they can get a Department of Defense clearance."

ONE OF the big targets of Soviet espionage in the United States is the computer industry. This effort is supported by the Scientific and Technical Directorate, one of the KGB's largest.

Although the U.S. government has fairly strict regulations on the export of tech-

NEWS, Chicago  
9 Sept. 1975

# CIA won't send radar specialists to Sinai passes

The following story is based on an interview of CIA director William E. Colby by Peter Lisagor, Washington Bureau chief of The Chicago Daily

News, and bureau members William J. Eaton and Robert Gruenberg.

WASHINGTON — The Central Intelligence Agency will withhold its electronics specialists from the American detachment in the Sinai mountain passes because of the uproar over the CIA's past conduct.

CIA Director William E. Colby disclosed his agency's reluctance to be drawn into enforcement of the interim Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement during an interview.

"We looked at it and thought about it," Colby said, referring to assignment of CIA personnel as radar experts on the critical mountain roads.

"But in the present atmosphere, we didn't want to be involved. . . . It's not for the CIA to run it — unless Congress wants us to. It's the pure politics of the situation," he explained.

Colby said he would have no objection, however, if former CIA employes were selected for the lookout role to be performed by about 200 Americans in the Sinai.

"They (ex-CIA men) don't leave here with a brand on their forehead," Colby said. "They are free citizens, and we have no control over them."

THE DECISION against CIA participation in the Sinai pact was one example of how the spy agency has been affected by the fallout from a string of disclosures in newspaper reports and congressional hearings.

But Colby said the organization was far from crippled.

"We still do some very venturesome things," Colby said. "The risk factor is up, and the impact of exposure is higher."

The CIA chief estimated that Senate and House committees would finish hearings on intelligence gathering early next

approved in the spring and "then hopefully we'll all get back to work."

UNTIL then, however, Colby stands embattled in his secluded, granite command post, fighting public relations battles and letting his deputies do most of the CIA's daily work.

"We're going to have to climb back out of the trough here," Colby said. "I'm trying to get over the sensationalism of the particular into the excellence of the general — and that's hard."

Yet, seated in his plant-filled office overlooking the green hills of Langley, Va., Colby said the impact of the disclosures on many phases of the CIA's work was less than many people might expect.

"The short-term effect on our intelligence product has been surprisingly not all that (much)," he reported. "We're still getting good information, good reports. Much of this is technical, of course."

"We have lost people — agents — who say, 'I can't work for you anymore' — and this has had a depressing effect. But, we've gotten new ones. . . . the best motivation (for foreign agents) is ideological. . . ."

ON THE brighter side, he reported the agency had 760 job inquiries from college students last July — double the 360 letters received in July, 1974.

Colby says he wants new guidelines for the CIA, better supervision and closer oversight by Congress than the agency had in the past when it opened mail going overseas, considered assassination plots against foreign leaders and spied on antiwar groups in the United States.

"I'm fighting to keep a few secrets," he said, with a faint smile on his tanned face. "We spent billions of dollars — and I mean billions — to collect what a Soviet attaché can get going to a newsstand

nology, the Soviets have capitalized on false "end use" certificates—that is, a French manufacturer, for example, will apply for a machine or component for his own commercial use and later the United States finds that the exported item has landed behind the Iron Curtain.

(As recently as June 5 the Electronic Industries Association announced that it "has urgently called for . . . the easing of U.S. export controls," asserting that many firms contend that U.S. policy has made U.S. exports noncompetitive as compared with those of America's trading partners and others.

(EIA SAID that a "strong effort in the areas of electronic and telecommunications equipment and components" would greatly aid the U.S. balance of payments, create jobs for U.S. workers, improve working relations with foreign countries and serve to strengthen the U.S. electronics manufacturing industry.)

If detente has opened some new doors for the KGB abroad, it has caused an expansion of its secret police work load inside the USSR.

"The Second Chief Directorate of the KGB, which handles counterintelligence and security, is horrified because of the relatively large number of foreign visitors they now have to cope with," a Western intelligence official said.

"THE WHOLE country is rather paranoid on the subject and any foreigner is automatically suspect."

The KGB's fairly new Fifth Directorate, which was created in the late 1960s and operates under the Second Chief Directorate, is charged with control over all dissident groups—the intellectuals, Jews and incipient nationalists.

Not long ago, Western intelligence operatives got a copy of the KGB's 460-page "wanted list" of "agents of foreign intelligence services, defectors, members of anti-Soviet organizations, members of punitive units and other criminals under search warrant."

A TOP SECRET ("sovetskoye sekretno") document, it contains capsulized reports on 1,132 Soviet citizens, including Rudolf Nureyev, the widely acclaimed ballet dancer.

The Russians are not likely to try to kidnap Nureyev and ship him back to the USSR to do his job. . . . are they likely to harm him physically, despite the embarrassment and

tion he has caused Soviet officials. He is too famous for that.

According to Western sources, the KGB has not, to their knowledge, assassinated any defectors or enemies of the state living abroad since one of its agents murdered Stepan Bandera, the legendary Ukrainian emigre leader in Munich in 1959.

BANDERA'S IDEOLOGICAL compatriot, Lev Rebet, was killed by the same KGB operative, also in Munich, in 1957.

In the opinion of Western intelligence experts the KGB has been highly successful in maintaining security in the USSR. But since World War II about 15 of its agents have defected to the West.

The prize catch, however, was Col. Oleg Penkovsky of Soviet military intelligence. As an agent for the United States, he was equipped by the CIA and turned over to that agency 10,000 pages of top secret material on Soviet missiles and missiles and missile-related subjects.

"IT WAS absolutely bona fide top secret information of the highest order," a U.S. official said. "It must have taken the Russians a long time to write up a full damage report on that one."

The Penkovsky information was of vital importance to President Kennedy in standing up to the Soviets during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962.

PENKOVSKY WAS finally caught and shot by Russian authorities.

The beginning of the end came when a KGB agent noticed him speaking to the wife of a British diplomat while she was wheeling a baby carriage in a London park. The KGB immediately put a massive surveillance on him, tapped his phone and put a closed-circuit television camera in his apartment.

BALTIMORE SUN  
18 September 1975

## Making the CIA Safe for Democracy

and buying a copy of Aviation Week."

AS A CIA veteran who has watched other directors get the sack after an embarrassing CIA episode, Colby is aware that he may get the ax after a decent interval.

"Are you viable?" he was asked.

"That's not up to me to answer," he replied, brushing aside the rumors in Washington that Sec. of State Henry A. Kissinger and Vice President Nelson A. Rockefeller believe Colby should be replaced.

In fact, Colby had high praise for Kissinger as a "splendid" official despite some disagreements between the two men.

"I'm expendable any time," Colby said. "If the decision comes that it might be nice to have a new face, there's a point to that."

HE POINTED over his shoulder to the written commission which says that he serves "at the pleasure of the President" and added:

"We've got to demonstrate that intelligence is important to the country. We've got the best intelligence in the world. We need new guidelines, better supervision and better protection of its secrecy.

"If we get all that out of this, it doesn't matter who runs this (agency)."

VIRGINIA PILOT  
11 AUGUST 1975

# Exposure Of CIA Deeds Hit

By PAULA CRAWFORD

Virginian-Pilot Staff Writer

NORFOLK—The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) will cease to be effective if it is constantly in the public eye, an ex-CIA official said Sunday.

Speaking to about 70 people at an informal evening service in Park Place Baptist Church, Walter E. Bass said, "It's impossible for the CIA to serve under constant surveillance of the public eye."

His statements were in response to a question about press coverage of recent CIA activities, including alleged domestic spying and assassinations of foreign political leaders.

No one can any longer pass off as isolated aberrations the wigs and other CIA trinkets furnished to the Nixon operatives who broke into the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist. Consider the shocking revelations of this summer: More than 68,000 pieces of mail opened illegally; the use of Mafiosi in an attempt to slip Fidel Castro a poisoned cigar; administration of LSD and other drugs to unsuspecting persons who in some cases were never told what had happened to them; surveillance of Americans' overseas telephone calls; an \$8-million campaign to overthrow Chile's president; uncounted other plots against foreign politicians and officials; an 18-year program to develop exotic poisons and equally exotic means of delivering them.

This picture of James Bond fantasy run rampant is made more terrifying by the agency's explanation that shellfish toxin, cobra venom and other poisons from the agency's specialized pharmacopoeia were preserved in defiance of a presidential directive. It seems that the CIA's top officials, having spent millions creating the poisons, somehow didn't think about them—or at least didn't follow through quite far enough to see that middle-level bureaucrats carried out instructions—when President Nixon ordered the government out of such enterprises.

Now the Ford administration avidly co-operates in diverting attention from the news that the CIA not only behaved like James Bond in matters where it did not belong but sometimes performed a bit like Maxwell Smart where it did belong. The House Intelligence Committee's revelations of how bad American intelligence estimates were just before the 1973 Middle East war should send a shudder

media-would hamper the agency's ability to serve the country.

A CIA official for 31 years, Bass defined the agency's mission as "keeping the United States from being engaged in a third world war."

He said the CIA accomplished this task by collecting information on nations throughout the world to advise the President on policy decisions.

Also, Bass noted, through the agency's intelligence-gathering activities, it could advise the President how and when to defend the country should the need arise.

Calling himself a strong proponent of the CIA, Bass said the agency is an executive instrument of the President and therefore, is responsible directly to him, and not to the Congress or press.

In a prespeech interview, Bass said that in his opinion, only one U.S. president had ever tried to use the CIA for his own means, but he declined to give a name.

Bass told his audience that he believes that some intelligence activities should be made public, but only after a time when information would be "innocent or not damaging to the United States."

Because of some recent press coverage, Bass said, "The American people as a na-

through most Americans. But Mr. Ford strives to fix public attention on five words the committee apparently should not have released, and creates a sensation by threatening to deny the committee new information if it does not promise to be more careful.

The committee should indeed be more careful, and the Congress must develop orderly mechanisms for releasing classified information when necessary, as this newspaper has already argued. But the facts already coming to light make it clear that the House and Senate committees are investigating an agency that has challenged the fundamental tenets of a free people. Both committees have worked responsibly. Honest disagreement over a few words in a text, which at most confirmed what was already obvious, cannot justify any action by the President that would thwart the work of either committee.

What is evident is that the CIA desperately needs to be brought under control. Long years of absolute license and unquestioned secrecy have worked their bizarre and inevitable way. The presidential "options" for administrative realignment, leaked yesterday by the White House, are mere tinkering compared with what it will take to make the CIA safe for democracy. In a world of international danger, the need for intelligence gathering, and hence for covert operations and strict security, is real. What the President and the Congress must create—and what the Congress must create if the President will not—is the means to put the government Americans elect in direct and detailed charge of that work. The world is full of examples of what happens to countries that seek security against threats from abroad by creating an unpoliced secret police at home.

tion know more about their intelligence agency than does any other people in any other nation of the world."

Bass also called down former or retired CIA employes who reveal information previously sworn to secrecy.

In his opinion, "Only those agency officials currently responsible to the President should decide what information should be made public."

Bass also indicated a belief that too much information could be hazardous. "The Freedom of Information Act passed in this country has allowed foreign spies to get information on America that U.S. spies would have to spend millions of dollars to get in other countries."

Regarding covert domestic spying activities, Bass said it was not unusual for the CIA to have files on Americans who had contact with foreign targets under CIA investigation.

"However, that doesn't mean we are invading the privacy of the individual. He probably just had public contact with a foreign official, and this contact was recorded as fact," Bass said.

Bass said he believes that the majority of the American people "still accept the CIA as an agency that defends the nation."

Bass predicted that continued exposure of CIA activities by the print and electronic

**GENERAL**

LOS ANGELES TIMES

1 September 1975

# The World's Workers May Yet Unite

## Growth of Multinationals Gives New Life to the International Labor Movement

BY WILLIAM B. GOULD

CAMBRIDGE, Eng.—Karl Marx's ringing slogan, "Workers of the world, unite," has pretty much passed into history. All the same, this Labor Day is an appropriate occasion for observance that the concept of international worker solidarity—even without the benefit of Marx's words ringing in our ears—is enjoying something of a revival.

The goal envisions some form of worker unity which does not stop at a nation's frontiers. Over the years, of course, it has had its ups and downs. Indeed, it was widely thought to have been dealt a death blow as long ago as 1914, when Europe's workers responded to World War I on nationalistic rather than class impulses.

What, then, has brought the seemingly moribund idea of international cooperation between trade unions back to life? The answer is the emergence of multinational corporations—most of them based in the United States, Japan and West Germany—as the most powerful actors in the world economy. Confronted with employers whose interests and influence stretch across political borders, unions have been forced into an increased reliance on the international trade secretariats, most of which have their headquarters in Geneva.

Traditionally somewhat sleepy bodies, the secretariats have begun to coordinate efforts for one purpose: to build a united labor front against those corporations which have substantial production units in more than one country.

Unions in the industrially advanced parts of the world—America, Europe and Japan—claim that the multinationals are a threat to job security because of their power to shift new investment to countries in which wages are low and unions weak. Four years ago, for example, Henry Ford said that Britain's industrial relations climate made investment there imprudent—a position that according to British auto unions dramatized the punishment which multinationals could inflict upon nations when they "misbehaved." Moreover, the industrialist's comment strengthened the view that foreign-based multinationals bring with them industrial relations practices which are often ill-suited to the host country and its mores.

Most of these allegations seem to be exaggerated. While some multinationals (especially those based in America) can ignore a host nation's attitudes, the majority settle in and adopt local standards fairly quickly. A more serious problem stems from the tendency of some multinationals to accept the repressive

policies of such host countries as Spain and South Africa.

In fact, even multinational companies are unable in most cases to move facilities to another country because of a labor dispute. There are two reasons for this: They cannot afford to abandon their capital investment and trained work force; and their product—whether a rubber tire, an automobile or a line of frozen food—is often tailored to a single nation's regulations and requirements. While multinationals do pose a real threat to job security, that is because the direction of their corporate expansion is away from the high-wage unionized countries.

What, then, should be the objective of the trade union movement in regard to multinationals and how should they be implemented? The answer has come from Herman Rebhan, general secretary of the Geneva-based International Metalworkers Federation: "We can occupy a plant or sit in, but when it comes right down to it, we can't stop a company from moving. We're concerned with lifting the standards of the workers in developing

*A Stanford law professor specializing in labor and civil-rights law, William B. Gould is currently on a year's leave to study the relationship between multinational corporations and labor throughout the world.*

countries." So far, this is being accomplished by exchanging information between various national unions and federations through the metalworkers and other trade secretariats. More formalized arrangements, such as coordinated bargaining or international collective agreements, remain a distant goal.

This goal is strongly opposed by employers who fear—not without reason—that transnational bargaining would produce an inflationary upsurge because each nation's labor movement would seek the other's contractual benefits, but not its deficiencies. Another management fear is that the international negotiators would become too remote from shop floor militants at a time when even national labor spokesmen are frequently unable to "deliver the goods" at the plant level.

Equally crucial is the attitude of most workers. The unions have yet to find an international issue which can ignite their members' interest. Indeed, most workers still base their wage demands on inter-industry comparisons within their own nation. British auto workers, for example, are far more interested in negotiations in the Midlands than in the fact that the Germans have better holiday benefits. Moreover, wage or economic pa-

riety between national unions is a difficult objective, since benefits for which an American or Japanese union must bargain are often part of another nation's basic system of social welfare. (In France, vacation periods are a matter for legislation, while in America they are negotiated.)

There is another barrier. The West Germans are hardly interested in a contract with General Motors which would expire simultaneously in the United States and Britain—an idea propagated by the late Walter Reuther. In Germany, GM is part of an employers' federation, which also includes steel and electrical companies. Since German unions bargain in a united front with the whole federation, they would not be set up to enter negotiations which touched only auto workers.

Even if all these complex economic issues could be resolved, the AFL-CIO's implacable hostility to communism runs right up against the reality of France and Italy, where Communists dominate the trade union movements.

But while the obstacles to international labor cooperation are manifold, there are openings which could be exploited.

Take the questions of health and safety. These are emotional issues which are receiving increased attention and lend themselves to international discussion. (How would a worker in New Zealand who has lost an arm react if he knows that more exacting safety rules in another country might have saved him?)

Another opening is the European Economic Community, which could provide the basis for concrete labor solidarity. The EEC is already attempting to promote European collective bargaining agreements. Moreover, its European Company Statute, which may become law throughout the Common Market in 1976, would create tax advantages for companies which provide for workers' participation in both the board room and the plant. The statute would even enable such companies to enter into labor contracts applicable throughout the EEC.

The worker participation scheme had its origins in West Germany, but it has already been exported with great success to Sweden and the Netherlands. If its spread throughout the Common Market does, in fact, lead to European labor agreements, it might well mark the most significant step toward international labor unity in this country.

Indeed, Marx's stirring call for proletarian solidarity may yet come to pass in the West. But if it does, it will be in a form which the grim German could not possibly have envisioned during those long afternoons of toil in the British Museum.

DAILY TELEGRAPH, London  
12 August 1975

## HEADS YOU LOSE, TAILS I WIN

RATHER BELATEDLY, perhaps, Reuters news agency has taken a useful initiative in trying to improve conditions for the reporting of news from Moscow and the rest of Russia. Mr GERALD LONG, the managing director, has made public the text of a letter he sent to Mr GROMYKO, Soviet Foreign Minister, complaining about the regular harassment of Moscow correspondents. His letter was dated July 30, which was the day the agreement on European security was signed in Helsinki—one which includes provisions designed to improve the flow of information and conditions for reporters.

However, practically every sentence of the Helsinki document is qualified by a conditional phrase which makes non-observance of its provisions by Russia and the other Communist countries virtually certain. This is what makes the document so farcical. An example of how it will work

was provided without days of its signature. Two American correspondents who applied for multiple entry and exit visas were refused them, on the grounds that the Helsinki document said they would be provided "on the basis of arrangements." The arrangements, said the Russians, were not there.

In answer to a question by Mrs THATCHER in the Commons last week, Mr WILSON made the positively astounding claim that the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 would not have happened "had there been the Helsinki agreement first." He no doubt had in mind the clauses dealing with non-interference in other countries' internal affairs. But Russia has now made plain what was obvious to most people except Mr WILSON in the first place: she will interpret these clauses so as to attack Western support for democracy in countries like Portugal, and to reject any Western efforts, such as Mr LONG's, to introduce any chinks in the Curtain.

WASHINGTON POST  
11 September 1975

## The Diego Garcians

THE DUBIOUS CASE for planting an American base and fleet in the Indian Ocean has been rendered practically indefensible by disclosure of how the site got to be the "uninhabited"—and therefore politically uncomplicated—place which its United States government sponsors repeatedly proclaimed it to be. It got that way, we now are told in a dispatch from Washington Post correspondent David Ottaway, only because virtually all of the 1,200 or 1,400 residents of Diego Garcia and its two neighbor islets were *forcibly* removed to Mauritius 1,000 miles away to make way for the base. One of several dozen former Diego Garcians interviewed by Mr. Ottaway recalls being told by an American who participated in the evacuation: "If you don't leave you won't be fed any longer." Since their removal, the Diego Garcians have lived in poverty and neglect in Mauritius, futilely petitioning the Mauritian, British and American governments for relief or return.

Granted, a lot went wrong in the world in the years, 1966-72, in which this act of mass kidnapping took place. But it takes a very jaded observer not to be repelled by the sordidness of it all. First, there was the complicity of the British lessors and American leasees in solving the politically inconvenient problem of people on Diego Garcia by uprooting them from their homes and traditional ways. One wonders what strategic rationale was concocted inside the bureaucracy to justify the transfer of these few people who had gotten in the way of the cold war juggernaut. Then, there was through the years, on both sides of the Atlantic, a highly effective coverup, facilitated no doubt by the fact that the Diego Garcians in their poverty and their remoteness had scant recourse. Finally, there were the constant affirmations by the Pentagon that the lack of people on Diego Garcia was precisely one of those characteristics that made the island an appropriate place for a "modest" facility in the Indian Ocean.

Only last summer did the Congress vote the funds to

start building an air base and carrier task force facility on the island. It did so only after a two-or-three-year-long debate over whether an American military presence in the Indian Ocean would unnecessarily antagonize the riparian states, provoke the Russians into a more intensive Indian Ocean naval competition, and fuel a naval arms race; or whether such a presence was justified in order to "stabilize" a region rendered increasingly sensitive by the oil tankers that ply its waters and by hints of Soviet interest in it. In the end, it took a full-scale Pentagon campaign to play up the existence of a new Soviet naval facility in the Somali Republic to persuade a reluctant Congress that the United States should build its own base in Diego Garcia. There is little evidence that Congress realized that it was committing itself not simply to the current costs of the base (measured in millions of dollars) but to the future costs of the fleet (billions) that is meant to be permanently deployed there when it is built. Congressional efforts to induce the administration to negotiate limits on naval deployment with the Soviet Union were brushed aside with the retort, by one high State Department official, that the United States did not have to "tug its forlock" and petition Moscow to remove the American Navy from the Indian Ocean.

The strategic case for a base on Diego Garcia was always a close question, one which its sponsors never made particularly well. But it is not a close question at all that the people of Diego Garcia were treated in a shameful way and that they should not be allowed to languish now in the miserable condition to which high strategy unfeelingly consigned them. For the United States government to keep on insisting that it has no responsibility for the people displaced by its lease on Diego Garcia is intolerable. At the very least, Congress should review the issue to ensure fair treatment to the forgotten people of the island.

BALTIMORE SUN  
10 September 1975

## Base lack hurts U.S., reports say

By CHARLES W. CORDRY  
Washington Bureau of The Sun  
Washington—The United States is beginning to suffer a loss of important data on Soviet weapons—particularly a new ballistic missile now undergoing accelerated testing—as a result of the shutdown of a key radar station in Turkey, according to confidential reports.

One of the first confirmations of the expected setback is contained in a summary circulated in the Pentagon, which says lack of Turkish radar data precluded measurement of the distance covered by the new weapon—the SSX-20—in a test September 4.

Turkey closed a number of U.S.-operated facilities at the end of July in retaliation for the House of Representatives' cutoff of military aid. One was the Diyarbakir station, which kept tabs on land-based missiles and satellites.

The Senate has voted to restore aid, stopped earlier because of Turkey's use of American arms in its July, 1974, invasion of Cyprus, and the measure is pending in the House, which refused to take it up before the August congressional recess.

Intelligence reports say the Russians have swung into a high rate of test firing with the SSX-20, a missile of intermediate range that probably will be aimed at targets in Europe and

China. It may be ready for deploying at operational sites early in 1976, authorities say, and data on its performance in final rounds of testing would be especially valuable.

Fitted to carry three independently targeted nuclear warheads, the SSX-20 (SS means surface-to-surface and X means experimental) is a remarkable advance over the approximately 1,000 medium-range missiles it is expected to replace.

It is a two-stage, solid-fueled (that is, fast-firing) rocket derived from a new intercontinental ballistic missile called the SS-16 and is believed to have a range of 2,400 miles. The two old missiles that it is expected to replace are the SS-4, a weapon of 1,100 miles' range that gained notoriety during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, and the SS-5, which has a range of 1,800 miles.

Up to mid-July, the Russians had successfully tested the SSX-20 nine times, at a rate of once a month, from Kapustin Yar, a test site southeast of Stalingrad.

Then in late July, satellite photography showed that equipment had been moved from Kapustin Yar, and in mid-August tests began at an operational intercontinental missile base in the central Soviet Union, Gladkaya. This was presumably done so that the rocket could be fired and monitored over its full range, striking in the Kamchatka Peninsula.

Part of those test flights could be monitored by U.S. facilities in the Aleutian Islands.

THE GUARDIAN MANCHESTER  
2 September 1975

## Gun-running trail starts in US

By DAVID FAIRHALL, DEREK BROWN,  
and SIMON WINCHESTER

Terrorist organisations ranging from the Provisional IRA to the Japanese gunmen who seized the French Embassy in The Hague last year are being equipped by widespread, highly organised theft from US military bases, according to an army report released in Washington yesterday.

In the past four years enough has been stolen to equip "approximately 10 combat battalions with their basic load of small arms and ammunition"—that is nearly 7,000 weapons and 1,200,000 rounds of ammunition. Much of this has evidently found its way to Northern Ireland.

In Belfast last night, observers were astonished by these figures. Only part of such a vast arsenal could have reached Ireland, it was thought. But this did not exclude the possibility that more might be salted away for eventual shipment from the US.

News of the report was received at the University of Massachusetts, where a major Irish conference was in its fourth day, with little surprise by Republicans and those with good IRA contacts. Although no Provisional IRA representatives are attending, great interest is being paid to the activities of

the two representatives of the Irish Republican Socialist Party, Mr Seamus Costello, and Mr Jon White.

One of these two is reliably reported to have made a journey to New York City during his stay, and there is a suspicion — which could not be confirmed — that one of the men seen on the visit was a well-known organiser of illegal arms shipments to Ireland.

The IRSP is said to be dangerously short of material for its projected military campaign in the North of Ireland. It is thought to have sufficient quantities of gelignite to pursue a bombing effort — indeed the current wave of bombings in London is being put down by some observers as the work of the party's military wing, the People's Liberation Army — but it has little in the way of arms and ammunition.

The long circumstantial report was prepared by the US Army's Physical Security Review Board. Previously secret, it was released by a Democratic Congressman, Mr Les Aspin, a frequent critic of the Pentagon.

The most spectacular but least plausible claim in the report is that the Provisional IRA has been trying to recruit US Marines for their skill in handling machine guns and communications equipment.

DAILY TELEGRAPH, London  
10 September 1975

## Dr. COLIN S. GRAY on the aftermath of Helsinki

NOW that Mr Brezhnev's Helsinki Spectacular, otherwise known as the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, is behind us, politics as theatre is usefully displaced by politics as substance. The critical substance currently in contention between the super Powers is the detail of a treaty on strategic arms limitation that is to endure from Oct. 1, 1977, until Dec. 31, 1985 (SALT II). Domestic sceptics in the United States on the claimed benefits of detente have become so influential that the Administration has no choice but to bargain hard over the fine print of treaty language.

The fourth Soviet-American summit, in the annual series initiated in Moscow in May, 1972, was to have occurred in June this year, but no one is willing to predict when, or even whether,

## Detente and the vanishing summit

such a meeting will take place. The reason for the postponement is the inability of the two countries to agree on the details of a SALT II treaty. Henry Kissinger—in company with a novice President—achieved a much-acclaimed "conceptual breakthrough" on SALT in the brief summit meeting in Vladivostok last November. The messy details were deferred for later attention by the SALT delegations in Geneva.

The heart of the Vladivostok accords, as they were called, com-

prised an agreement to establish common aggregate upper ceilings on "strategic offensive delivery systems" (2,400), and launchers of multiple individually targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs: 1,320). The prospective treaty, popularly known as SALT II, would succeed SALT I, which was signed in May 1972, and is due to expire—with respect to its provisions on some offensive strategic forces—in 1977. In jubilant mood, Kissinger informed the world after Vladivostok that the accords would "put a cap on the arms race"

for a period of ten years. Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and manned bombers would be counted against the ceilings.

This was a heady achievement at the summit level of diplomacy. After all, prior to Vladivostok (and certainly prior to Kissinger's visit to Moscow in October 1974) the super-Powers were deadlocked on virtually all SALT II issues. The old Kissinger magic had worked again.

Or had it? By the early spring of 1975 it was beginning to be all too clear that although there had, unquestionably, been a breakthrough on SALT in Vladivostok, virtually every critical item remained to be settled. Since the ceremonial signing of a SALT treaty was intended to comprise the theatrical centrepiece of the long-scheduled 1975 summit in Washington, the technical details of arms control negotiating positions acquired an unusual diplomatic significance.

The annual summit meeting is the ritual keystone of super-Power détente, and—perhaps—SALT has become the ritual keystone of a semblance of substance

to the annual summit. The 1972 summit was dignified by SALT I, in 1973 both sides were still limbering-up for SALT II, while in 1974 the undeniable deadlock on SALT II caused commentators to label the meeting abortive.

Even American politicians far less astute than Gerald Ford are aware that a détente platform is no longer the guarantee of voter appeal that it appeared to be only a few years ago.

Over the past two years the American electorate has observed a war in the Middle East which the principal détente partner did little if anything, to seek to avert. It has paid for the direct and the side effects of what has been called "the great grain robbery." It has absorbed Solzhenitsyn's claims that détente is a fraud. It has witnessed the descent of Portugal into an anarchy widely attributable to the machinations of the far Left. And it has smarted under the humiliation of undisguisable defeat in South-East Asia. Add to this tale of woe the very personal appreciation

NEW YORK TIMES  
13 September 1975

tations of the economic effects of the Soviet-encouraged Arab oil embargo, the total discrediting of the President who made détente almost a personal possession, and the declining credibility of a Secretary of State whose apparent achievements as "Mr Fixit" began seriously to unravel in very short order (Vietnam and Middle Eastern shuttle diplomacy in the spring) and one has scarcely outlined a domestic political context encouraging of bold détente moves. Kissinger's Sinai success must restore a little of the old authority but not to the point where the Senate would acquiesce in unbalanced US concessions in SALT II.

There is a two-way relationship between the SALT negotiating exercise and the general political climate, but the latter is in the driving seat. Much of the technical detail of disagreement over a SALT II treaty bears not so much upon fears of future strategic disadvantage but rather upon a pre-eminent concern not to be seen to have lost in the negotiations. Some small measure of progress on SALT was achieved in the private summitry which occurred backstage in Helsinki, but it has been estimated (by the Russians) that no fewer than three further meetings between Kissinger and Gromyko will be needed this autumn, if a treaty is to be ready for signature late this year.

At present, SALT, and hence the summit with its implications for the health of super Power détente, is in trouble on such central issues as "what to count" (towards the agreed ceiling of 2,400 strategic offensive delivery systems) and "how to count" MIRV launchers. In summary, the state of play is as follows:

(1) The Americans insist on firm "counting rules" for MIRV launchers. Ford dare not submit an unverifiable treaty to the Senate. But, there is no way of distinguishing an ICBM which is "MIRVed" from one which is not by means of satellite reconnaissance. So the United States is insisting that any missile tested "in a MIRV mode" five or six times will be presumed to be a MIRV launcher. Unfortunately, the new Soviet SS-18 ICBM

comes in two versions, one of which—and the only one deployed as yet (it is believed)—bears only a single warhead.

Alternatively, America might be interested in specifying certain missile fields as being reserved only for MIRV launchers. This is neat and unambiguous, but it does not help in verifying whether or not ICBMs deployed elsewhere are "MIRVed."

The Russians claim that launch complexes for MIRVed missiles can be identified by satellite reconnaissance. After toying with this argument for a few months, the United States has now rejected it. The MIRV launcher "signature"—as the jargon has it—is too faint and too easily obscured.

(2) There is disagreement on what should be counted against the ceiling of 2,400. The Russians insist that the new American long-range cruise missiles (essentially, pilotless aircraft launched from submarines, surface ships or aircraft), currently under development, must be included; while the Americans insist that the new Soviet medium-range swing-wing bomber, the Backfire B, must be included.

Verification of the MIRV launcher limit, cruise missiles, and Backfire B comprise the heart of the present impasse, but there is no lack of other items in contention. These include: whether or not the treaty is to specify that American nuclear-capable aircraft in Europe and British and French strategic forces will be the subject of negotiations towards force reductions in a SALT III; whether or not the new Soviet SS-19 ICBM is a "heavy" missile, for which there is a special sub-limit to be carried over from SALT I; and a host of charges to the effect that the Soviets have violated the SALT I agreements.

A robust SALT II treaty—one that is manifestly equitable and which will not contain so many loopholes that very vociferous dissent will ensue in the United States—is not on the horizon at present. It is to be hoped Mr Ford will not accept a poor agreement in order to bolster short-term détente and permit a summit. One Helsinki Spectacular a year is enough—if not one too many.

## Detente Built on Human Rights Instead of Diplomatic Rites

By Alan U. Schwartz

Almost lost amidst the diplomatic backslapping that accompanied the recent Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, in Helsinki, was Leonid I. Brezhnev's stern warning against interference in the internal affairs of his country and its friends.

This collision between pious words and harsh realities is of course commonplace in the world arena, but these days the struggle to adjust principles of détente to principles of freedom seems to have

in some national political circles.

There has been much skirmishing between Congress and the Administration over the extent to which our President's obvious longing for détente should be allowed to muffle the steadily increasing cries of dissidents in many countries who are deprived, often violently, of freedoms we take for granted (to emigrate, to speak, to publish).

And the skirmishing is heating up as more and more legislators see the doc-

uments for what it really is: a basketful of old-fashioned, worn-out diplomatic jargon behind which governments with things to cover up (including ours) have taken refuge for centuries.

The fact is that most countries, including the Soviet Union and the United States, have been interfering steadily in each other's internal affairs (Hungary, Chile, Vietnam, Portugal, for example).

The irony is that when this inter-



ference takes the form of espionage or armed intervention it seems to be accepted, even expected, but when public outcry or economic pressure is directed at redressing particularly invidious instances of governmental repression of dissident views (Soviet treatment of Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn, Andrei D. Sakharov, Andrei Amalrik; South Korean punishment of the poet Kim Chi Ha; Yugoslav imprisonment of Mihajlo Mihajlov; Chilean murder and torture of liberals; South African and Rhodesian persecution of black activists, to name only a few) the resulting diplomatic bellowing can be heard throughout the planet.

These, we are told, are matters of internal affairs, somehow inviolate from scrutiny or complaint because of some supposed principle of international law that, in fact, is no more than a principle of international convenience.

Fortunately, this obfuscation of values, so inimical to real détente, is giving way to an increasing concern for the rights of political dissidents in foreign lands.

Much credit for this effort must be given to organizations dedicated to improving the lot of writers, publishers and others who are being punished for their political and social beliefs.

Through painstaking effort and continuous pressure they are finally beginning to make people within our

WASHINGTON POST  
4 September 1975

## Bonn's Caution on Detente

BONN—Skepticism over detente in the nation that has most to lose if it goes sour explains the confidential study just getting under way at highest levels here to analyze post-Helsinki Soviet policy.

One tentative conclusion: The 25th Communist Party Congress next February in Moscow will surpass everything to date in enshrining detente as the way of the future in hopes of seducing the West.

There is irony in the fact that the Liberal Social Democratic (SPD) government of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt is now displaying private concerns about the course of East-West detente. It was Schmidt's predecessor, Willy Brandt, who single-mindedly pushed Bonn's far-reaching political changes with Moscow and eastern Europe five years ago, culminating in the Helsinki conference on European security.

But Schmidt, a muscular realist whose political problems stem as much from his own left wing as from the Conservative Christian Democratic (CDU) opposition, is no Brandt. Indeed, despite Schmidt's genuine support for reciprocal detente, he is far more wary than Brandt (still very active) as elected head of the SPD) over what he has termed the "psychopolitical" aspects of detente.

Accordingly, under Schmidt there is no illusion but, rather, nervous questioning about the durability and direction of long-range American policy made by a divided Washington government. As one top policymaker here told us: "In the U.S., Europe seems farther and farther away and illusions grow easily."

Government pay attention to the large-scale muzzling of dissidents by certain foreign governments.

A recent amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act require the President to consider the reduction or suspension of security assistance to those countries who evidence a continuous pattern of violating human rights.

And our State Department, long committed to priorities for détente, has responded by establishing human rights departments in each of its geographic sections to monitor governmental activities in these areas. Even more significant, I am told that the State Department's long-maintained hands-off policy on foreign human-rights violations has been modified to permit such interference if the violations can be shown to conflict with a country's treaty obligations.

If vigorously pursued (and perhaps adopted by other countries) this new policy will be most helpful in destroying the myth of national inviolability in matters of human decency.

Despite these positive steps, since the Nixon and Ford Administrations' past records in this area are poor (consistently reflecting attempts to soften expressions of concern for human rights lest they interfere with international trade agreements), these indications of change must be viewed with some skepticism.

Not so with the Congress, however. Certain Senators and Representatives

have expressed a growing concern about the hollowness of foreign policy based on détente through trade and diplomacy at the expense of human freedom.

There is a strong indication that in the near future hearings will be held in both houses to determine the extent of muzzling and repression of dissidents in countries receiving United States foreign assistance.

It is, of course, an essential part of this emerging policy of interference on behalf of human rights that the United States open its own house to public scrutiny. Why not Congressional hearings on the treatment of dissidents in this country? Why were there not foreign observers at the Kent State trial? And why not, indeed (despite all the legal complications) long-overdue adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

In the long run, international competition over concern for human freedom seems a far less painful path to true détente than the ballyhooing, brinkmanship and belligerency that make up most of today's international relations.

*Alan U. Schwartz is a Manhattan lawyer who is frequently involved in matters concerning freedom of communication.*

## Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

The prospect of Moscow really allowing its Communist empire to mellow in the afterglow of Helsinki is mocked by Schmidt's own advisers.

An example given is Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko's grim remark in 1973 to a high West German official who expressed hopes that the indispensable "third basket" in the Helsinki agreement — exchange of ideas, cultures and persons between East and West — would assure major political relaxation.

Whoever thinks the "third basket" will be allowed to change internal conditions in Eastern Europe, Gromyko replied, "is a mastodon."

Along similar lines, Helmut Kohl, leader of the opposition CDU and hence chancellor-designate if his party wins next year's election, told us that if Helsinki damages the West, "it will damage us here in Germany more than anyone else."

Kohl said that the fiery attack on the Soviet Union by exiled Russian author Alexander Solzhenitsyn in Washington last June 30 "was passed around here from hand to hand." On a visit to East Germany two weeks ago, Kohl saw large, illuminated slogans at the Dresden railroad station which symbolized what he called Moscow's "true approach" to detente. They read: "Steel production in England is the lowest since World War II." "Unemployment in Essen (center of West German industry) is the highest since World War II." "All cadets of the people's army have passed their tests and are now lieutenants."

Sharp skepticism both within and without the Schmidt government by no means points to any schism with the Ford administration. Nor should it evoke the spectre of that favorite ome of the Kremlin, German revanchism. To the contrary, with all its in-

dustrial miracles and its fulcrum position in Europe's heartland, West Germany is as inextricably tied to the U.S. as it was in the 1948 Berlin Crisis. That fact is well understood by generals and politicians alike.

Moreover, the skepticism is somewhat mitigated by recent Washington decisions of a more timely nature.

The assignment of two American brigades to the German-manned sector of the central NATO front for the first time ever is viewed as a brilliant political-military move, at least offsetting NATO troop reductions of the Dutch, British and Belgians.

Likewise, the decision of Gen. Alexander Haig, the NATO commander, to conduct fully-integrated military maneuvers this fall also for the first time is seen as a display of allied power calculated to impress Moscow. When West Germany proposed full-scale maneuvers by an Army corps near the Czech border shortly before Soviet troops seized Prague in August 1968, they were vetoed by NATO political headquarters as unduly provocative. Approval of Haig's plan for highly-publicized maneuvers now is perceived as the proper response to widespread detente jitters.

Most important to the Germans is the absence this year of Congress's annual orgy on U.S. troop withdrawals from NATO, but most Schmidt advisers regard this blessing as strictly temporary.

The implications of detente dominate backroom conversation here. There is, however, an even more disturbing problem: Schmidt's running battle with Washington over Germany's and the West's dangerous inflation-recession crisis, a subject requiring full discussion in a subsequent report.

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# Eastern Europe

LOS ANGELES TIMES  
7 September 1975

## SIGNS OF DETENTE

# U.S. Broadcasts to Russ Perk Up

BY MURRAY SEEGER  
Times Staff Writer

MUNICH—With renewed political support in Washington and an internal reorganization, America's two broadcasting stations beamed toward Eastern Europe are entering a new era.

Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe, situated here for more than 20 years, will be combined next month into a single organization attempting to supply the peoples of the Soviet bloc with an open channel of news and information.

Often the center of political debate in Washington, and favorite targets for Communist propaganda attacks, the stations apparently have survived a new wave of budget-cutting without serious damage to their ability to function.

In fact, they appear to be going through a period of rejuvenation. For example:

The wave of increased emigration from Eastern Europe, and especially from the Soviet Union, has brought new, younger talent to the stations. One prominent example is Andrei Sinyaveky, a hero to the modern Russian dissident movement and now a professor at the Sorbonne in Paris. Sinyavsky has started broadcasting high-level literary criticism for Radio Liberty.

The reorganization of the stations has put them under a single operating board and brought them a new boss, Sig Mickelson, an experienced and respected broadcast journalist.

The termination of surreptitious financial support from the Central Intelligence Agency by an act of Congress four years ago probably saved the stations from new attacks in the current reexamination of CIA operations.

And the recent rise of disenchantment over the limits of political detente with the Communist world has given Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe new public support.

"As more people understand the real nature of detente, they appreciate and support what we are trying to do," Mickelson said in an interview.

Internally, there are still bad feelings over the recent staff reductions and fears that the merger of the separate stations will bring more cutbacks.

The staffs of both Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, are filled with emigres from Eastern Europe who have their own feuds and differences of opinions. Combining the largely Russian staff of Radio Liberty with the mixed Radio Free Europe personnel could rekindle old animosities.

"We don't know what is going to happen when those Russians from Liberty meet up with our Bulgarians," one RFE man said.

The natural national jealousies and suspicions of the staff members were aggravated this spring when three former members of the RFE Polish section surfaced in Warsaw and denounced the organization.

Although some employees fired in staff cutbacks have gone home out of disillusionment, others, including some of the Poles, were secret agents infiltrated into Radio Free Europe.

One issue that the station officials are cautious about discussing is the status of their big transmitters in Spain and Portugal.

Since 1951, Radio Free Europe has been sending its signals to Eastern Europe from the small town of Gloria, an hour's drive from Lisbon. The transmitters are considered

old-fashioned and under-powered, but RFE has not been able to afford to rebuild them.

The current political turmoil in Portugal, so far, has had no effect on the installation, which is the main source of employment in Gloria. If the Communists and their sympathizers gain more power in Lisbon, however, they might want to snuff out the transmitters as a favor to Moscow.

Radio Liberty broadcasts from a more modern center on the Costa Brava of northeastern Spain.

Although Spain seems safer from Communist penetration than Portugal, the Madrid government has been taking a tougher stand in its negotiations with the United States over leased American facilities there, including the Radio Liberty transmitters.

Both Radio Free Europe, founded in 1950, and Radio Liberty, three years younger, were created after postwar Communist takeovers of countries in Eastern Europe cut off normal communications between the East and West. Each station had its own operating committee.

Originally, both stations were highly propagandistic and hostile to the Eastern capitals. Although Radio Free Europe raised substantial sums through public solicitations, both stations depended heavily on CIA financing to operate.

After the CIA financing was halted in 1971, the future of the stations remained cloudy until a presidential investigating committee, headed by Dr. Milton S. Eisenhower, recommended that the stations be maintained by direct congressional funding and under a new administrative structure.

The early days of detente with the Soviet Union brought many calls for closing the stations as a gesture to Moscow. But the Eisenhower commission made a contrary finding:

"Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, by providing a flow of free and uncensored information to peoples deprived of it, actually contribute to the climate of detente rather than detract from it."

Findings that helped the stations survive were that both had been operated on sound management bases and that their broadcast content had improved over the years by becoming more objective and trustworthy.

Their research departments gained international reputations for their collections of both official and unofficial materials on life in the Communist world.

In addition, it became clear that both stations performed different functions from the official Washington broadcast outlet, the Voice of America.

While the Voice of America, as a government agency, must support official policy and is concerned with presenting American news and points of view to the world, Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe attempt to be an internal broadcast service for Eastern Europe.

Mickelson pointed out that the law establishing the new Board of International Broadcasting to run the stations insists only that their output be "not inconsistent with the broad foreign policy objectives of the U.S. government."

Congress, for the first time in many years, approved the budget request for the stations this year with little controversy, so that the reorganization plan could proceed on schedule.

The prestige and political standing of the stations was enhanced by the appointment of David Abshire, a former assistant secretary of state for congressional relations, as chairman of the broadcast board, and Mickelson, a former president of CBS News and vice president of Time-Life Broadcasting, as operating chief.

The Voice of America must aim its work at the entire world, while Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe focus sharply on Eastern Europe.

Although the VOA has been accused of pulling its punches in reporting news about the Soviet Union and its

satellites in order to enhance political detente, the other two broadcasting services are less inhibited.

As a result, the VOA Russian-language service has been allowed into Russian wave lengths for three years, while Radio Liberty is heavily jammed, both by noisy electronic interference and by Soviet stations deliberately operating on the same wave lengths.

Radio Liberty is now broadcasting in 19 indigenous languages of the Soviet Union, the only station with such a capacity.

Early this year, it added the three Baltic languages—Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian—to its output, which now ranges from the major Slavic tongues (Russian, Byelorussian and Ukrainian) through five tongues of the Caucasus region, to eight languages of Central Asia.

The station had to reduce its pay roll by 30% to meet its new budget but still has been able since 1971 to add nearly 100 employes, including younger emigres who are able to direct programming toward more current audience interests in the Soviet Union than had their elder predecessors.

In addition to broadcasting Sinyavsky's scholarly output, Radio Liberty is now carrying the satirical songs of Alexander Galich, a recent emigre who was a well known Moscow film maker until his underground balladeering ended his career and forced him to seek permission to leave.

Radio Liberty stations now broadcast a total of 674 hours a week to the Soviet Union, more than three times as much as the major official Western outlets of the Voice of America. British Broadcasting Corp. and West Germany combined.

NEW YORK TIMES  
17 September 1975

## Britannica Yields to Criticism, Alters Soviet Republic Articles

By ISRAEL SHENKER

The Encyclopaedia Britannica, which is crowded with facts, is now trying to cope with an awkward one—the need to revise all 15 of its articles on the 15 republics of the Soviet Union.

After protests from readers complaining of a pro-Soviet slant and a scholarly article in the Slavic Review pointing out "dubious statements or insinuations . . . inconsistencies, infelicities," the Britannica is tacitly conceding that its accounts are misleading.

"We've got them all out for review, and as they come in we are putting in the changes," said Warren E. Preece, who edited the new edition published last year.

In the previous (14th) edition, these articles were written by non-Soviet scholars; in the new edition they are by Soviet citizens. The Soviet authors were provided through Novosti, a Soviet press agency that distributes Government-approved feature articles in the Soviet Union and abroad.

A result, as Prof. Romuald J. Misiunas of Williams College suggests in the current Slavic Review, is "a rehash of the current at the moment, which in many cases enjoys only a tenuous connection with what

we in the West consider objective fact."

Four articles, for example, identify the local Communist party as "the leading political organization," three as "the guiding political organization," and one as "the most important political organization" — although there were other political organizations. The article on the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic has a heading "Political Organizations," and lists three: the Communist party, the Lenin Communist Youth League and the Communist Pioneers (schoolchildren).

None of the articles says that the Communist party is the only one permitted, or that republic officials serve at Moscow's pleasure.

"We are changing that," Mr. Preece said. "We are making it perfectly clear in the articles that are in for correction that some version of the Communist party is running things, that there is a single party."

There is no word in the Britannica pieces concerning difficulties imposed anywhere on those professing religion. "We don't deal with political freedom or religious freedom," Mr. Preece said.

The 14th edition's article on the Estonian Socialist Soviet Republic speaks of rigged elections and of mass deportations

and executions after the Red Army occupied independent Estonia. The new article ignores all this. "Figures about deportations are not genuinely encyclopedic—they're yearbook data," Mr. Preece said.

Reportedly, the new edition speaks of constitutions, proclaiming republics sovereign or independent—with no indication that this contention is false.

"I concede the possibility of prejudice by omission as well as commission," Mr. Preece said.

He has received numerous protests about alleged tendentiousness of the article on the Lithuanian Socialist Soviet Republic, and he countered: "I've got eight people at universities in five different countries, and they all felt that the statements in our article were not all that egregiously false."

In the Slavic Review, the Quarterly publication of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Professor Misiunas describes the new Britannica's articles as "the usual overdone statistical paean to an ever-rising standard of living wrought through the beneficence of Soviet power."

He argues that "unqualified statements about elections to organs of political representation, or about the size and activity of trade unions invariably produce a distorted picture of the true state of affairs."

and executions after the Red Army occupied independent Estonia. The new article ignores all this. "Figures about deportations are not genuinely encyclopedic—they're yearbook data," Mr. Preece said.

Reportedly, the new edition speaks of constitutions, proclaiming republics sovereign or independent—with no indication that this contention is false.

"I concede the possibility of prejudice by omission as well as commission," Mr. Preece said.

He has received numerous protests about alleged tendentiousness of the article on the Lithuanian Socialist Soviet Republic, and he countered: "I've got eight people at universities in five different countries, and they all felt that the statements in our article were not all that egregiously false."

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### Another Opinion Sought

"Things of that sort are going out for another opinion," Mr. Preece said.

Professor Misiunas notes that the Britannica's editors list as their guidelines "objectivity and neutrality" and acknowledgment of "significant and reputable differences of opinion." All 15 articles, he writes, "demonstrate a clear disregard by the editors of the Britannica of their own guidelines."

Charles Van Doren, a Britannica vice president, has described the new Britannica as the first encyclopedia "edited from a world point of view. . . as though we were looking at the earth from the moon."

To help achieve that perspective, a number of scholars from other Communist countries were commissioned to write for the new Britannica. Dr. Mortimer J. Adler, chairman of the board of editors, said there have been no complaints about their articles.

Mr. Preece said that he had been aware that problems might arise if Soviet authors wrote about Soviet conditions and he spoke of "walking a tight rope."

"If you read the articles, what the hell, two-thirds of them are devoted to the topography of the area," he said. "Nobody's complaining about our facts there."

# Western Europe

DAILY TELEGRAPH, London  
27 August 1975

## ON THE LOSING SIDE

NATO'S SOUTHERN FLANK is in the Mediterranean. One does not have to be an expert on strategy to see that the balance of power between the Western Alliance and the Warsaw Pact is changing in favour of the latter, and that unless this trend is reversed the capacity of the Western Alliance to resist the growth in the political influence of the Soviet Union will be eroded, perhaps destroyed. A new study published by the Institute for the Study of Conflict ought to bring the facts home to us (Southern Europe: Nato's Crumbling Flank by DAVID REES). The conclusion is plain enough, even brutal: "The fragmentation of Nato's southern flank is a serious, potentially revolutionary development in the fortunes of the Alliance which has preserved the integrity of the West since 1949. This process, unless checked, could neutralise the Nato presence in the Mediterranean, outflank its critical central European front, and, together with developments in Portugal, threaten the life-line of the Alliance."

Clearly, the political troubles between Greece and

Turkey over Cyprus, together with the troubles in Portugal, have undermined the political cohesion of the West in this area—to put it mildly. In addition there is the growth of Soviet naval power. American naval power has been weakened, and Britain plans to withdraw her naval influence from the Mediterranean by the end of the decade. As Brigadier THOMPSON points out on another page, if these trends continue, in the political and the naval dimensions, then the possibility of the West being compelled to choose between surrender and all-out war, in response to some Soviet initiative or demand, is liable to increase. What is the answer? Clearly the leading Western powers cannot solve the political problems of Turkey and Greece and Portugal. But they might, if they can rediscover the will, deny to the Soviet Union a sea-air power advantage in this area. This will cost money. But it is surely money worth spending. For the Mediterranean matters to us, as we would soon find out if we had to confront the Soviet Union there at a strategic disadvantage. The purpose of statesmanship should be to prevent such situations from arising.

WASHINGTON POST  
11 September 1975

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

## The Other Detente

PARIS—A mood of "detente," unimaginable a year ago, between the U.S. and French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing is producing political dividends despite major underlying tensions, most particularly the sharp contradiction between Paris and Washington over the future of Europe.

"We have a detente now with President Ford," French Foreign Minister Jean Sauvagnargues told us at the Quai d'Orsay. "We both need it even though our interests cannot be identical."

A career diplomat and intimate of the French President, Sauvagnargues has helped end the rancid mood of suspicion and mutual recrimination which poisoned relations between his predecessor, Michel Jobert, and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Early returns from this new civility show visible gains, of which an important part is increasing French cooperation with the military structure of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which France deserted nine years ago, although staying in the alliance.

At NATO's Brussels headquarters, French liaison officers are more closely involved in all aspects of NATO planning, a change that Gen. Alexander Haig, the NATO commander, is carefully cultivating.

One example: with the full backing of Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, Haig now provides France and other NATO allies with superior American intelligence, thus voiding—or trying to void—the dangerous knowledge-and-consultation gap which

split the U.S. from Europe during the 1973 Middle East war.

More tangible evidence of France's new cooperation with NATO were the U.S. maneuvers on the coast of France near Toulon several months ago. "This would not have been permitted in the bad old days," a U.S. diplomat told us.

None of this means Giscard is thinking of rejoining NATO's military organization. His political base is firmly anchored to Prime Minister Jacques Chirac's powerfully revived Gaullist party, which would regard any such change as heretical. Moreover, even pro-American diplomats quietly reinstated in policy positions at the Quai d'Orsay by Giscard after years of Gaullist disfavor now strongly oppose reintegration.

Thus, despite the warming trend, the fundamental conflict between Washington and Paris is far from solution. That conflict is over U.S. policy toward Western Europe and what one official here calls America's "insistence," led by Kissinger, "that Europe's role must be as a satellite revolving around the American sun."

With its own modest "force de frappe" (now being redesigned for MIRV-able warheads at a huge future cost), France's vision of the middle-distant future perceives a more independent Europe which, while under the U.S. strategic umbrella, should constitute a powerful military and economic force by itself, led by France.

French politicians point to vagaries of American politics, saying it is ridiculous to count for more than another 10 years at most on an American pres-

ence in Europe at anything like present levels. That argues for serious moves toward European unity now, requiring American support and sympathy.

But to these politicians, U.S. policy is taking an opposite direction: while talking European unity, the U.S. in fact obstructs it. During the May NATO summit, for example, the French remember one fact above all others: that European unity was never mentioned by the Americans.

The French, accordingly, are caught in a bind. With England and West Germany unable or unwilling to support the French dream of a semi-independent Europe, partly because the existing relationship is so easy and partly for fear of upsetting the U.S.-Soviet balance, the French are immunized.

But the perception here of a larger future European role is not about to disappear. To the contrary, high officials in Paris constantly warn in private that the present European relationship with Washington is inherently unhealthy. More to the point, highly regarded intellectuals such as Michel Tatu, foreign editor of *Le Monde*, are amplifying in print what the politicians are thinking.

"The real problem is the absence of political will," Tatu recently wrote. "... The main obstacle to European unity is Europe's military dependence on the United States."

The implication of those words is staggering, but they reflect a truth as perceived by many powerful politicians, even if the moment of that truth lies some years in the future.

LONDON TIMES  
1 September 1975

# How Britain's economic difficulties help the Soviet grand strategy

Lord Chalfont

This is the last of three articles on Warsaw Pact foreign policy written after discussions with Major General Sejna, a leading official of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, who defected to the West in 1968.

It is not surprising that there have been, after the first two articles in this series, genuine doubts about the *bona fides* of Gen Sejna, as well as deliberate attempts to discredit him and to diminish the value of the information on Soviet foreign policy which he brought with him from Czechoslovakia. They have fallen into a number of fairly predictable categories, and it might be as well, before examining the place which Britain occupies in Russian planning, to comment on some of the views.

The first, and most easily dealt with, is the suggestion put forward by a few self-styled experts that Gen Sejna's facts are wrong—that meetings and other events which he described did not in fact take place. It seems hardly necessary to say it, but I have checked the relevant details with independent sources, who confirm in every case the factual accuracy of what Gen Sejna has said. Then there is the suggestion that his defection was not political, but was motivated by his fear of criminal prosecution.

It is, indeed, true that he was under investigation by the police of the Dubček regime when he defected, and it is right that this should be taken into account when weighing his evidence. It does not, however, seem to me to be a decisive or even a very important factor.

A third area of suspicion is that Gen Sejna is "controlled" by Western intelligence agencies and that his information is part of a coordinated exercise in cold war propaganda. My only useful comment on that is that whenever I met Gen Sejna I met him alone, at times and places of my choosing and that I have taken the elementary precautions familiar to anyone experienced in these matters which are necessary to ensure that I am not being fed with an intelligence officer's brief.

Finally, it has been suggested that there is nothing in Gen Sejna's information which could not have been invented, with hindsight, by any reasonably intelligent defector. Although an experienced interrogator should have no difficulty in distinguishing fabrication of this kind from the truth, the proposition does, in fact, encapsulate a valid and very proper reservation about information obtained from defectors or spies. They have a tendency, well known in the intelligence world, to tell the interrogator what they think he would like to hear.

It is therefore important to emphasize that in writing these three articles I have relied only partly on Gen Sejna's evidence. Numerous other sources have been used, many of which confirm his information. This is especially so in the context of this article.

The basic assumption from which Soviet planners proceed is that Britain is in decline and that by about 1977 the economic and social situation will have deteriorated to a point at which it will be ripe for further exploitation. Indeed, Britain's economic weakness is a crucial element in Russian calculations, a fact which had much to do with the Soviet Union's implacable opposition to British entry into the European Community, which they feared might halt or even reverse the process of economic disintegration. The methods to be used for capitalizing on Britain's enfeebled condition, and the political and social turbulence which may be expected to accompany it, are set out in detail in the British section of the Warsaw Pact's secret long term Strategic Plan, which was largely completed by 1967.

The principal tactical aims are to accelerate the moral and spiritual decline of British society; to erode the capacity of Britain to defend itself against either external or internal attack, by undermining the effectiveness of the armed forces and the police; and to organize what is known in the Communist jargon as a "second power", based on the left wing of the Labour Party, the industrial trade unions and the Communist Party of Great Britain, and designed to usurp the functions of the "first power", namely government and Parliament.

So far as the first of these aims is concerned, the Russians have no need to exert themselves unduly—the business of national demoralization is proceeding very well without outside assistance. More specifically, the Soviet Union has so far failed in its immediate aim of penetrating and subverting the armed forces and the police.

Indeed Mr John Gollan, the general secretary of the British Communist Party, has earned the severe displeasure of his comrades in Moscow for failing to make any substantial advance towards what is regarded by Communist theorists as the essentially prerequisite of the successful overthrow of a capitalist government—the effective control of the armed forces. In this context Portugal is commonly regarded as a classical model. On the other hand as long as successive British governments are prepared themselves to engage in a substantial programme of unilateral disarmament, the Soviet Union might be justified in calculating that Britain's security forces will soon be too emasculated to worry about.

Furthermore, the Strategic Plan provides for the constant encouragement and exploitation of those "progressives" in the trade union movement and the Labour Party who demand massive unilateral reductions in the defence budget.

In the more general context of security, the Warsaw Pact countries have always appreciated the potential value to them of the situation in Northern Ireland. As long ago as 1963 an IRA delegation visited Czechoslovakia, where they were received by a senior officer of the Ministry of Defence. Since then the Strategic Plan has included provision for financial support, a fairly continuous supply of arms and military equipment, and training facilities for Irish terrorists in Czechoslovakia.

It is however in the establishment of a "second power" that the most significant elements of the Strategic Plan for Britain emerge. Apart from some fairly routine James Bondery involving smear campaigns and other intelligence operations against "anti-progressive" politicians (one Warsaw Pact intelligence organization claims that one of its sources of information is a prominent member of the House of Commons), Soviet tactics are mainly directed towards increasing the influence of the "progressive"

movement, namely the extreme left, including the British Communist Party and its hidden sympathizers in the political and industrial wings of the Labour movement. Demands for the establishment of workers' councils and for changes in trade union legislation are encouraged with the object of enhancing the power of the industrial trade unions; and there is a plan for the establishment of an all-European trade union organization on the pattern of the World Federation of Trade Unions—a body which has more to do with the implementation of Soviet foreign policy than with the principles of trade unionism as they are generally understood in the West.

The Communist Party of Great Britain, in spite of its considerable success in penetrating the trade union leadership, is not regarded very highly by Warsaw Pact Communist parties, and some of the training of British cadres (the potential leadership of the "second power") is carried out in Eastern Europe. A small number of Communist Party members (some selected by the British party and some selected through intelligence channels) are given each year a political organization course which, interestingly enough, includes training in sabotage.

The Soviet plan is based on the calculation that by the early 1980s the erosion of Parliamentary government in Britain will have reached an advanced stage, and that the "second power" will be in a position to exploit the conditions of economic crisis, political confusion and social dislocation which the Russians believe will then exist. It would, of course, be foolish to suggest that what is happening, for everyone to see in this country, is the direct result of a carefully formulated and uniformly successful exercise in Soviet foreign policy. It is, however, clearly demonstrable that in many aspects of our political and industrial life, paths are being followed which are largely indistinguishable from those indicated by the Warsaw Pact Strategic Plan. It seems largely academic to speculate whether this is taking place because the efforts of the Soviet planners are succeeding or because there are people in this country who are prepared, out of simple-minded idealism, ignorance or malice, to do their work for them.

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Wednesday, Sept. 10, 1975 THE WASHINGTON POST

# Bonn Resists Pact on U.S. Troop

By Michael Getler

Washington Post Foreign Service

BONN, Sept. 9—American officials here rate the chances as only 50-50 that the West German government will agree to continue its 14-year-old policy of compensating the United States to help offset the cost of stationing American troops and their families in this country.

Since 1961, the United States and West Germany have negotiated six "offset" agreements designed to make up for the balance of payments deficit the United States has traditionally incurred because the 186,000 troops it keeps here spend many of their dollars in this country.

The agreements involve such West German commitments as buying arms and maintaining bank deposits in the United States. During the past 14 years, West Germany has paid about \$10 billion under such offset accords.

The most recent two-year agreement expired June 30.

Since then, German officials have been suggesting that the improved international trade performance of the United States in the last year has eliminated the overall American payments deficit and, thus, the need for any new formal offset agreement specifically regarding troop costs.

A number of senior Pentagon and State Department officials do not disagree very strongly in private with the West German assessment. Both the American and West German governments appear to hope that this potential dispute does not get much public attention or be perceived as an important rift between NATO's two most important military allies.

[Asked at a Washington press conference yesterday about the status of the offset negotiations, U.S. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger told a West German correspondent: "I think it is no secret that your chancellor is not an unqualified admirer of offset agreements." Kissinger said that German-American offset discussions had so far produced no conclusions.]

West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's comment in late June that he did not consider negotiations for a new agreement "a pressing problem at the moment" brought a threat by U.S. Sen. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) to introduce legislation that could force either a new agreement or a reduction of U.S. troops in West Germany.

Nunn and Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.) sponsored a 1973 amendment requiring that the United States reduce its troop strength in Germany in proportion to the part of the cost of maintaining troops in Germany not met by Bonn.

The Jackson-Nunn amendment was applied to the last agreement in which the West Germans agreed to offset the \$2.2 billion deficit in the cost of maintaining the troops in Germany. That amendment has expired, however. Despite Nunn's threat, it is not clear whether Congress still has a high interest in the subject.

Nunn's point is that while the overall U.S. trade balance is now in surplus, the specific

troop cost account is still running a deficit and should be compensated.

The traditional U.S. position on such matters is that no nation should gain a balance of payments advantage because of the stationing of one country's troops on another country's soil for the common defense. For the past 14 years, the West Germans have acknowledged this.

Sources here say that the NATO guidelines for offset agreements dating back to the late 1950s are vague and suggest only that when member nations run into balance of payments problems, offset agreements on military costs should be worked out. Since the United States in the last several years has been running deficits in both its overall trade and its military spending overseas, there was never much question about such payments.

Now, however, with the overall deficit gone, the Germans argue that the military account should not be isolated from the full economic ledger and that a formal military offset should not be required.

The Germans have also become increasingly annoyed with these formal agreements in recent years and particularly with the threats to withdraw American troops, whose presence here the Germans view as being for the good of both the United States and West Germany.

The Germans also argue that formal agreements are not really needed because the West German Defense Ministry will continue to buy weapons in the United States with or without them. The West German federal bank—the Bundesbank—will continue to keep large deposits in American banks, which also can contribute to offsetting military deficits, they say.

U.S. specialists reply, however, that without a formal agreement, the incentive to buy American arms may be reduced and that the interest rate favorable to the U.S. that the Bundesbank agrees to in

## Cost

its U.S. desposits — which makes them useful as an offset device—might also disappear.

Chancellor Schmidt and other West German officials have not said they will not agree to any more offset pacts. U.S. officials here say, however, that the Germans clearly have not been very interested in beginning high-level negotiations. A German Foreign Ministry official acknowledged that negotiations have not begun.

Within the Pentagon and State Department, where the alliance with West Germany is regarded as critical, there is also an understanding that the German defense budget is still high and that the German economy has lost at least some of its momentum.

For Chancellor Schmidt to announce a new offset agreement with the United States within the next several months could hurt him with a German electorate facing higher taxes. On the other hand, observers here say the German populace has generally not objected much to the offset costs.

Schmidt is known to want NATO as a whole to take a new and broader look at the problem of offsetting troop costs.

A senior State Department official, in a recent interview, suggested that the United States may propose a new offset pact to last only one year. The idea is to keep the program alive, defuse the arguments and buy time to try to work out a broader agreement in NATO.

The U.S. offset problem is largely confined to West Germany because of the numbers of U.S. military men and dependents stationed here. Officials here say that in other NATO countries, the costs of smaller U.S. forces is largely compensated by purchases of U.S. goods and other arrangements.

WASHINGTON POST  
14 September 1975

# Volpe Remark Angers Italy

By Sari Gilbert

Special to The Washington Post

ROME, Sept. 13—Angry headlines, a parliamentary question and a demonstration outside the U.S. embassy have been the reactions to an interview with U.S. ambassador John Volpe published here this week in the Italian magazine Epoca.

The theme of the interview was whether the United States had changed its 33-year-long policy of hostility toward the Italian Communists following regional elections last June in which the Communists made sharp gains and became the major party in scores of Ital-

ian cities.

Volpe said in the interview that the participation of the Italian Communists in a national government in Italy, a NATO member, would represent a "basic contradiction" for American foreign policy. His response has been attacked as American interference in Italian domestic politics.

Asked if the U.S. attitude is inconsistent with international detente, the American envoy said that Communist govern-

ments in countries like Italy or Portugal would represent "a substantial modification" of current world stability.

The Italian leftist press has reacted by accusing Volpe of harboring excessively harsh attitudes toward the Communists, of expressing purely personal views, and of being out of touch with current Italian reality.

The Socialist daily L'Avanti suggested that one phrase of the ambassador — "detente

does not mean that we are indifferent to the potential erosion of our alliances"—was a veiled threat. The conservative *La Stampa* of Turin, which said in an editorial that Volpe should not have made his opinions public, raised the question of whether the current envoy was "the most suitable person to represent the United States, a country that has friendly relations with both the U.S.S.R. and China."

The Communist Party pa-

per L'Unita said the views of the ambassador were "absurd and anachronistic." The Communists accused the ambassador of refusing to acknowledge their partys repeated promise that once in power it would not change the country's system of alliances.

This week's attacks on Volpe have come at the end of a summer of speculation over the future course of U.S. policy toward the Italian Communists.

Members of the U.S. embassy staff — although not the ambassador himself — have limited but regular contacts with the Communists (reportedly, an innovation of Volpe) but speculation that a real change might be on the

way began after the June 15 election and persisted despite the widely reported comment of U.S. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger that the "non-democratic forces had become stronger."

Over the summer the Italian press was filled with rumors of forthcoming visits to the United States by Italian Communists, including party leader Enrico Berlinguer, and with reports that Volpe — whom the Italian press has labeled an incorrigible hard liner — was about to be recalled.

One major national liberal weekly went so far as to interpret the long-scheduled transfer to New York in June of the former New York Times

Rome correspondent, Paul Hofmann, as a sign that major American newspapers were persuaded by the June elections to be less anti-Communist.

Speculation about changes in U.S. policy was further fueled when a high-ranking party member, economist Eugenio Peggio, was granted a visa to attend recent International Monetary Fund meeting in Washington, although in the spring another top Communist was denied permission to enter the United States.

The U.S. embassy later issued a statement specifying that Peggio had asked for and received a journalists' visa, the granting of which indicated no change in U.S. policy.

This summer is not the first time that Volpe has come under fire since his arrival here in mid-1973.

A year ago the ambassador was involved in another controversy when an unpredictable left-wing Christian Democratic minister, Carlo Donat Cattin, told the press after a private meeting with Volpe that the American ambassador favored dissolving Parliament and holding new elections at a time when the faltering Christian Democrats ran fewer risks.

Volpe, who spoke Italian with the minister, said subsequently that language problems might have created a misunderstanding. He denied adamantly that he had expressed himself in that fashion.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 14, 1975

## U.S. May Deny Entry to an Italian Communist Invited

By ALVIN SHUSTER

Special to The New York Times

ROME, Sept. 13—The Council on Foreign Relations in New York has scheduled a dinner meeting on Italy next month but its Communist guest of honor will probably not be allowed to enter the United States to attend.

In view of the uncertainty of American policy toward the Italian Communist party, the largest Communist party in Western Europe and the second largest party in Italy, there is increasing doubt over whether a visa will be granted to the invited guest, Sergio Segre, head of the foreign section of the Communist party.

Mr. Segre, a 49-year-old former journalist who has held his present post for five years, is reluctant to apply for a visa without some indication that Washington will say yes. Every indication so far from officials in Washington has been that the answer will be no.

The American position is that to grant a visa to Communist party officials would be regarded in Italy as a change in attitude toward the party and would serve to undermine the Christian Democrats, the dominant group, which is under increasing pressure from the Communists at the polls. Moreover, American officials have often cited the law forbidding the entry of Communists without special waivers from the Attorney General.

### Inconsistency Discerned

Though these are delicate times in Italian politics, with the Communist party coming within two percentage points of the Christian Democrats in regional and local elections last June, diplomats friendly to the United States find its position on visas for Italian Commu-

nists somewhat inconsistent.

"Washington signs agreements on freedom of movement in Helsinki and puts pressure on the Russians to allow travel," one commented, "but then it stops the Communists from here from traveling to your country. Many of us see the problem for Washington and understand the dilemma, but it is sometimes rather curious."

Communist officials are anxious, as they put it, "to open a constructive dialogue" with American officials, who have kept their contacts with the party at low levels. The Communists would like some sign of acceptability.

Approval of Mr. Segre's visa would undoubtedly be read as a sign of change, at least in the Italian press. One reason why he does not want to apply unless assured of approval—he has been in contact with the embassy—is that formal rejection might lead to what a party official termed useless polemics. "A formal no decision would hurt the party as much as a formal yes would help it," a party official explained.

### Envoy Defends Policy

The most recent defense of the American policy came this week in an interview with the United States Ambassador, John A. Volpe, in the news magazine Epoca. He said that détente implied balance and stability and that Communist regimes in Italy or Portugal would represent "a substantive alteration" in that balance.

"Détente does not mean that we are indifferent to the potential erosion of our alliances and to the ties that link us to our closest allies," he added. "Italy's domestic affairs are a matter solely for the Italians to decide. But we and our allies obviously favor those

## to a Meeting Here

forces which wish to remain allied with us in a progressive democratic system which avoids extremism of either left or right. We will give no encouragement to those who advocate radical divergences from this framework."

It was clear that Mr. Volpe believed that visas for Communist officials would represent a form of encouragement.

He added that the United States was opposed to Communists' sharing power or taking power in North Atlantic Treaty countries such as Italy. Moreover, he said, for political, historical, cultural and other reasons linking the United States and Italy, "we could not favor a system of government alien to Western democratic tradition."

State Department officials in Washington, although noting that Mr. Segre had not formally applied for a visa, said that Mr. Volpe's comments had conveyed a "signal" that any application from the Communist official would be rejected.

The extent of the sensitivities here toward American policy were reflected in the reaction to Mr. Volpe's comments. La Stampa, a newspaper owned by Fiat, the giant auto manufacturer, that is usually moderate in tone, said his statements were "open interference in Italian affairs."

### Action Termed Clumsy

"Even those who are against the Communists' inclusion in the Government, today or tomorrow, cannot but reject such clumsy interference," it said.

The Communist organ, L'Unita, denouncing Mr. Volpe for suggesting that the party was a "nondemocratic force,"

said that the party "has always fought democratically." On the question of visas the newspaper said that the United States "is one of the very few countries in the world where the granting of an entry visa depends on the political and ideological position of a citizen."

The dinner to which Mr. Segre was invited is scheduled for Oct. 23, with the focus on Italian foreign policy as seen by the Communist party. The invitation followed a visit to Italy by Zygmunt Nagorski, director of the council.

Mr. Segre has also been invited to participate in a conference Oct. 24 in New York sponsored by the Council and backed by the Italian Institute of International Affairs here. Others invited include Arthur A. Hartman, an Assistant Secretary of State, and David Rockefeller.

### U.S. Aides Notes 'Signal'

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 11—A State Department official said no decision had been made on a visa for Mr. Segre because he had not applied for one. This is normal practice, he added.

However, the official said, Ambassador Volpe's interview with Epoca conveyed "a signal" to Mr. Segre that an application would be denied.

# Near East

WASHINGTON POST  
16 September 1975

## U.S. Pledges Missiles, F-16s To Israelis

By Marilyn Berger  
Washington Post Staff Writer

Israel has been given the prospect of obtaining longer range battlefield missiles as a bonus for having concluded the new agreement with Egypt.

According to a previously undisclosed addition to the memorandum of agreement between Israel and the United States, the United States "agrees to an early

meeting to undertake a joint study of high technology and sophisticated items, including the Pershing ground-to-ground missiles with conventional warheads, with the view to giving a positive response."

The same secret addendum states that the "United States is resolved to continue to maintain Israel's defensive strength through the supply of advanced types of equipment, such as the F-16 aircraft."

The Pershing missile has a range of 460 miles—which would put Arab population centers well within Israeli reach.

The 250 to 400 Pershing missiles the Army has in Europe as part of NATO forces are armed with nuclear warheads of 60 to 400 kilotons, more powerful than the 20-kiloton atomic bomb that destroyed Hiroshima in 1945. (A kiloton is equal in explosive power to 1,000 tons of TNT.)

While the U.S. pledge specifies that only conventional warheads are being considered, columnist Jack Anderson, who made the documents available to The Washington Post, states in his column today that "the implication, according to our sources, is that the Israelis will be able to attach their own nuclear warheads."

The F-16 fighter, which is not expected to come off the production line until 1979, is a fast, highly maneuverable and fairly inexpensive aircraft. Pentagon sources said they had anticipated that Israel eventually would opt for this plane, which is about half the price of the F-15 Israel is planning to purchase.

Israeli Defense Minister

Shimon Peres is expected here Wednesday for talks with U.S. officials on his country's military needs.

These discussions were put off for the period of the so-called reassessment of U.S. Middle East policy, which was announced following the breakdown of negotiations last March. As part of the new agreement it has been understood that the kind of highly sophisticated equipment Israel had been seeking would begin to be made available.

The U.S. assurances to Israel are among the unpublished documents of the agreement that was initiated by Israel and Egypt on Sept. 1. There also are assurances given by the United States to Egypt and by Egypt to Israel through the United States. In addition there are letters from President Ford to Egyptian and Israeli leaders and letters from Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger to the foreign ministers of the two countries.

The memorandum signed by Israel and the United States states that Egypt was informed of the American pledges to Israel and agreed to them.

Kissinger has said these private commitments would be made known to Congress, but only a summary is to be made public.

"We have made an unprecedented effort to put before the Congress any American undertaking, to either of the parties," Kissinger said in a press conference last Tuesday. "We have gone not only through any written undertakings that may exist, but through the entire negotiating record to extract from it any undertaking

of the United States. We have put those before the relevant committees."

Under Secretary of State Joseph Sisco has been meeting with ranking members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to develop the summary of those commitments to be made public.

The full copy of the memorandum of agreement between the United States and Israel, dated Sept. 1, 1975, runs nine typewritten pages, without addenda. Diplomatic sources said the document was signed by Kissinger and Israeli Foreign Minister Yigal Allon on Sept. 1, prior to the ceremony initialing the Sinai disengagement agreement that was held in Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin's office.

On the day of the initialing, Defense Minister Peres conceded that the memorandum "lost a little strength in its wording in order to get strength through support in Congress." There were reports in Israel during the negotiations that there were 24 clauses in the document. The present document has 16, although there may be other addenda that remain undisclosed.

The memorandum stipulates that "the United States will make every effort to be fully responsive, within the limits of its resources and congressional authorization and appropriation, on an ongoing and long-term basis to Israel's military equipment and other defense requirements, to its energy requirements and to its economic needs. It says:

"Israel's long-term military supply needs from the United States shall be the subject of periodic consultations . . . with agreement reached on specific items to be included in a separate U.S.-Israeli memorandum." The United States said it "will view Israel's requests sympathetically, including its request for advanced and sophisticated weapons."

• Under a five-year arrangement for energy supplies, the United States agrees to "promptly make oil available for purchase by Israel" if it is otherwise unavailable. The United States also agrees to "make every effort to help Israel secure the necessary means of transport." Should an embargo limit U.S. supplies as well, the United States agrees to undertake conservation measures in order to make oil available to Israel.

• The United States agrees to help Israel make up for oil

the Sinai Abu Rudeis and Ras Sudar fields, now returned to Egypt. It has been estimated this will cost the United States between \$300 million and \$350 million annually. In addition, the agreement stipulates that the administration will ask Congress "to make available funds" to bring Israel's oil storage capacity up to "one year's need."

The memorandum states that the United States will not expect implementation of the agreement until Egypt fulfills its undertaking to permit Israeli cargoes passage through the Suez Canal.

A series of diplomatic undertakings includes:

• U.S. agreement with Israel that the next accord with Egypt "should be a final peace agreement."

• U.S. agreement with "the Israeli position that under existing political circumstances negotiations with Jordan will be directed toward an overall peace settlement."

• In case of Egyptian violation of the agreement the United States would consult with Israel "as to the significance of the violation and possible remedial action by the U.S. government."

• The United States agrees to "vote against any (U.N.) Security Council resolution which in its judgment affects or alters adversely the agreement."

• The United States agrees to "consult promptly" with Israel "with respect to what support, diplomatic or otherwise, or assistance it can lend to Israel in accordance with its constitutional practices" in case of threats to Israel's security or sovereignty by a world power. This puts in writing what has already existed in fact—that in the event of Soviet intervention in the Middle East, the United States would not stand idly by.

Another part of the memorandum commits the United States to conclude, "if possible within two months after the signature of this document . . . the contingency plan for a military supply operation to Israel in an emergency situation."

During the 1973 war Israel initially claimed that the United States delayed in instituting an airlift of military supplies.

The memorandum also states that the United States "regards the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb [at the gateway to the Red Sea] and the Strait of Gi-



ways" where it "will support Israel's right to free and unimpeded passage." The United States also "recognizes Israel's right to freedom of flights over the Red Sea and such straits and will support diplomatically the exercise of that right."

The United States puts in writing that it does not expect the agreement to be implemented "before approval of the U.S. Congress" of American technicians in the Sinai.

The memorandum states that the United States ob-

tained Egypt's agreement to the American pledges to Israel.

The memorandum states that if the U.N. Emergency Force is withdrawn without prior agreement of both parties and the United States and before the agreement is superseded by another agreement, "it is the U.S. view that the agreement shall remain binding in all its parts."

A related Egyptian assurance to Israel given through the United States, which is not

contained in the memorandum, stipulates that Egypt would "concert actively" with the United States to get the U.N. General Assembly to extend the mandate of the Emergency Force if the Soviet Union should use its veto against it in the Security Council.

Other Egyptian assurances include an expression of intent to reduce hostile propaganda and an agreement not to stand in the way of countries wishing to resume diplomatic relations with Israel.

There have been reports

that Egypt would relax its boycott against firms doing business with Israel, but so far this has been assured in relation to only three companies—Coca-Cola, Ford Motor Co. and Xerox.

There also have been reports of U.S. assurances to Egypt, including an American pledge to help bring about negotiations between Syria and Israel, to consult in the event of Israeli violation of the agreement, and to provide technical assistance for the construction and operation of an electronic early warning system in the Sinai.

Tuesday, Sept. 16, 1975 THE WASHINGTON POST

# Text of U.S.-Israeli Memorandum

Following is the text of the Memorandum of Agreement between the United States and Israel, which, according to diplomatic sources, was signed by Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger and Israeli Foreign Minister Yigal Allon on Sept. 1:

The United States recognizes that the Egypt-Israel Agreement initiated on Sept. 1, 1975 (hereinafter referred to as the Agreement), entailing the withdrawal from vital areas in Sinai, constitutes an act of great significance on Israel's part in the pursuit of final peace. That Agreement has full United States support.

## United States-Israeli Assurances

1. The United States government will make every effort to be fully responsive, within the limits of its resources and congressional authorization and appropriation, on an on-going and long-term basis to Israel's military equipment and other defense requirements, to its energy requirements and to its economic needs. The needs specified in Paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 below shall be deemed eligible for inclusion within the annual total to be requested in FY '76 and later fiscal years.

2. Israel's long term military supply needs from the United States shall be the subject of periodic consultations between representatives of the U.S. and Israeli defense establishments, with agreement reached on specific items to be included in a separate U.S.-Israeli memorandum. To this end, a joint study by military experts will be undertaken within three weeks. In conducting this study, which will include Israel's 1976 needs, the United States

## Secret Addendum On Arms Assistance

Following is the text of the secret addendum to the Memorandum of Agreement between the United States and Israel:

On the question of military and economic assistance to Israel, the following conveyed by the U.S. to Israel augments what the Memorandum of Agreement states.

The United States is resolved to continue to maintain Israel's defensive strength through the supply of advanced types of equipment, such as the F-16 aircraft. The United States government agrees to an early meeting to undertake a joint study of high technology and sophisticated items, including the Pershing ground-to-ground missiles with conventional warheads, with the view to giving a positive response. The U.S. administration will submit annually for approval by the U.S. Congress a request for military and economic assistance in order to help meet Israel's economic and military needs.

will view Israel's requests sympathetically, including its request for advanced and sophisticated weapons.

3. Israel will make its own independent arrangements for oil supply to meet its requirements through normal procedures. In the event Israel is unable to secure its needs in this way, the United States government, upon notification of this fact by the government of Israel, will act as follows for five years, at the end of which period either side can terminate this arrangement on one year's notice.

(a) If the oil Israel needs to meet all its normal requirements for domestic consumption is unavailable for purchase in circumstances where no quantitative restrictions exist on the ability of the United States to procure oil to meet its normal requirements, the United States government will promptly make oil available for purchase by Israel to meet all of the afore-

mentioned normal requirements of Israel. If Israel is unable to secure the necessary means to transport such oil to Israel, the United States government will make every effort to help Israel secure the necessary means of transport.

(b) If the oil Israel needs to meet all of its normal requirements for domestic consumption is unavailable for purchase in circumstances where quantitative restrictions through embargo or otherwise also prevent the United States from procuring oil to meet normal requirements the United States government will promptly make oil available for purchase by Israel in accordance with the International Energy Agency conservation and allocation formula as applied by the United States government, in order to meet Israel's essential requirements. If Israel is unable to secure the necessary means to transport such oil to Israel, the

United States government will make every effort to help Israel secure the necessary means of transport.

Israeli and U.S. experts will meet annually or more frequently at the request of either party, to review Israel's continuing oil requirement.

4. In order to help Israel meet its energy needs, and as part of the overall annual figure in Paragraph 1 above, the United States agrees:

(a) In determining the overall annual figure which will be requested from Congress, the United States government will give special attention to Israel's oil import requirements and, for a period as determined by Article 3 above, will take into account in calculating that figure Israel's additional expenditures for the import of oil to replace that which would have ordinarily come from Abu Rudeis and Ras Sudar (4.5 million tons in 1975).

(b) To ask Congress to make available funds, the amount to be determined by mutual agreement, to the government of Israel necessary for a project for the construction and stocking of the oil reserves to be stored in Israel, bringing storage reserve capacity and reserve stocks now standing at approximately six months, up to one year's need at the time of the completion of the project. The project will be implemented within four years. The construction, operation and financing and other relevant questions of the project will be the subject of early and detailed talks between the two governments.

5. The United States government will not expect Israel to begin to implement the Agreement before Egypt fulfills its undertaking under the January, 1974, Disengagement Agreement to permit passage of all Israeli

cargoes to and from Israeli ports through the Suez Canal.

6. The United States government agrees with Israel that the next agreement with Egypt should be a final peace agreement.

7. In case of an Egyptian violation of any of the provisions of the Agreement, the United States government is prepared to consult with Israel as to the significance of the violation and possible remedial action by the United States government.

8. The United States government will vote against any Security Council resolution which in its judgment affects or alters adversely the Agreement.

9. The United States government will not join in and will seek to prevent efforts by others to bring about consideration of proposals which it and Israel agree are detrimental to the interests of Israel.

10. In view of the long-

standing U. S. commitment to the survival and security of Israel, the United States government will view with particular gravity threats to Israel's security or sovereignty by a world power. In support of this objective, the United States government will in the event of such threat consult promptly with the government of Israel with respect to what support, diplomatic or otherwise, or assistance it can lend to Israel in accordance with its constitutional practices.

11. The United States government and the government of Israel will, at the earliest possible time, and if possible, within two months after the signature of this document, conclude the contingency plan for a military supply operation to Israel in an emergency situation.

12. It is the United States government's position that Egyptian commitments under the Egypt-Israel Agreement, its implementation,

validity and duration are not conditional upon any act or developments between the other Arab states and Israel. The United States government regards the Agreement as standing on its own.

13. The United States government shares the Israeli position that under existing political circumstances negotiations with Jordan will be directed toward an overall peace settlement.

14. In accordance with the principle of freedom of navigation on the high seas and free and unimpeded passage through and over straits connecting international waters, the United States government regards the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb and the Strait of Gibraltar as international waterways. It will support Israel's right to free and unimpeded passage through such straits. Similarly, the United States government recognizes Israel's right to freedom of flights over the Red Sea and

such straits and will support diplomatically the exercise of that right.

15. In the event that the United Nations Emergency Force or any other United Nations organ is withdrawn without the prior agreement of both parties to the Egypt-Israel Agreement and the United States before this Agreement is superseded by another agreement, it is the United States view that the Agreement shall remain binding in all its parts.

16. The United States and Israel agree that signature of the Protocol of the Egypt-Israel Agreement and its full entry into effect shall not take place before approval by the United States Congress of the U.S. role in connection with the surveillance and observation functions described in the Agreement and its Annex. The United States has informed the government of Israel that it has obtained the government of Egypt agreement to the above.

WASHINGTON POST  
17 September 1975

# U.S. Pershings for Israel?

## Some Experts Fear It Could Lead to a Nuclear War

By George C. Wilson  
Washington Post Staff Writer

If the United States gives Israel Pershing missiles it will put practically all of her Arab neighbors under the gun — a situation that caused some Mideast specialists to shudder yesterday as they envisioned consequences ranging from Soviet intervention to nuclear war.

The Pershing has a range of 460 miles — enough to hit Cairo and the Aswan dam in Egypt, to cover all of Jordan, most of Syria and big chunks of Iraq and Saudi Arabia.

The missile is also mobile, and is being improved so it could be fired in a hurry from one place and then wheeled to another site.

Further, Army ordnance officers confirmed yesterday, Pershing is specifically designed for a nuclear warhead.

Therefore, Arab leaders would have to worry about Israel's nuclear technology building warheads for the Pershings even though the secret addendum to the Mideast agreement negotiated by Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger specifies conventional warheads for any

### Israeli Pershings.

The key sentence in that addendum to the U. S. - Israeli agreement states: "The United States government agrees to an early meeting to undertake a joint study of high technology and sophisticated items, including the Pershing ground-to-ground missiles with conventional warheads, with the view to giving a positive response."

Despite the "positive response" description, President Ford stressed at a news conference in the White House Oval Office yesterday that supplying Israel with Pershings and F-16 fighters is "subject to negotiations with Israel."

It is not known when the United States would send the Pershings to Israel if negotiations did wind up with a "positive response" nor which model of the missile Israel would get.

Right now the Army is working on the Pershing 2 — a missile designed to blow up one specific target as distinguished from leveling a wide area.

The Pershing 2 fits into the changes in nuclear strategy Secretary of Defense

James R. Schlesinger has ordered to give the United States the capability of fighting limited war with nuclear weapons. Schlesinger disagrees with those arms control specialists and Gen. Louis H. Wilson, the new commandant of the Marine Corps, who contend that using small nuclear weapons would inevitably escalate to an exchange of big ones — meaning all-out war.

Schlesinger said in his Fiscal 1976 posture statement that the Pershing 2 with a nuclear bomb which could guide itself into the target after the missile had carried it the requisite distance "would greatly increase the accuracy of Pershing, thus permitting the use of small-yield warheads and, hence, reducing unintended collateral damage."

He noted in the same discussion that Pershing is less vulnerable to surprise attack than aircraft on the ground because the missile can be moved from one launch site to another. The Pershing 2 also could be fired in a hurry because it is being engineered for quick reaction. The Pershing 2 is

slated for flight testing in 1977 or 1978, depending on technical progress and funding.

There have been recent warnings that another war in the Mideast could escalate from conventional to nuclear. For example, the American Enterprise Institute, a private research group, issued a report in July stating that "if war is not curbed in the Middle East, it will eventually become nuclear."

Robert J. Pranger, an author of that report and formerly a deputy assistant secretary of defense specializing in Mideast arms problems, was one of those specialists who shuddered yesterday at the idea of Israel getting Pershings.

"We're asking for trouble," he said. Even if Israel rigged an American Pershing with a conventional warhead and fired into an Arab nation just as a warning, he predicted the Soviet Union would respond in some direct military way.

The Soviet responses, Pranger said, could range from supplying Egypt, Syria or Jordan with similar missiles to persuading the U.M.

General Assembly to send a Soviet-led force into Israel—as President Truman sent Americans to Korea.

The Pershing, said Herbert Scoville Jr., an arms control specialist who formerly worked as deputy director of the CIA, "makes no sense as a weapon unless

it carries a nuclear warhead." Therefore, Scoville said, introducing the Pershing in the Mideast "strikes me as very dangerous and perhaps the first slippery step to make the Mideast an area of nuclear confrontation."

Paul C. Warnke, formerly head of the Pentagon's in-

ternational security affairs office, which specializes in arms control problems, said the Pershing arrangement "is the one part of the deal that scares the hell out of me."

He doubted that the United States had to go that far in armament to reassure

Israel, declaring that Pershing is designed to carry nuclear warheads and the Soviet Union might well give its allies in the Mideast similar weapons.

"Then the balloon might go up and we'd have nuclear warfare," Warnke said.

WASHINGTON POST  
14 September 1975

## PLO Sees Itself as Threatened By 'Secret Provisions' of Pact

By Jonathan Randal

Washington Post Foreign Service  
BEIRUT, Sept. 12 —

For the Palestine Liberation Organization it has been a poor month, all too much like the bad old days five years ago when King Hussein smashed the commandoes militarily in Jordan in what they still call "Black September."

Then, at the cost of the Jordanian defeat and of having the Cairo-based "Voice of Palestine" radio station silenced by Gamal Abdel Nasser, the umbrella Palestinian resistance outfit at least could claim it had sabotaged U.S. plans for a partial Sinai disengagement.

But this week, another Egyptian president, Anwar Sadat, took over control of the same radio station to silence the shrill Palestinian criticism of his Sinai disengagement deal with Israel.

To make matters worse for the Palestinians, for once there was no doubt that their propaganda claims were substantially correct: Sadat had agreed, as part of the deal's "secret provisions," to moderate anti-Israeli attacks of the very kind the "Voice of Palestine" specialized in.

Such was the mood of resignation among even the most hardened Palestinians that they freely discussed the possibility that Syrian President Hafez Assad, their projected partner in a proposed joint command, might yet stop criticizing Egypt for the Sinai deal and start negotiations with Israel on the future of the occupied Golan Heights.

The great gains of 1974—recognition of the PLO as the "sole legitimate" representative of all Palestinians first at the Arab summit meeting in Rabat and then at the U.N. General Assembly—have led nowhere.

Part of the fault lies with the Palestinians, although no PLO officials likes to ad-

mit that they have hurt their cause by failing to form a government-in-exile as recommended by such diverse advisers as the Soviets, Algerians, Libyans, Egyptians and even some Lebanese leftists.

But much of the PLO's loss of momentum has been the result of U.S. policy. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger has steadfastly refused to do business with the PLO, apparently for fear of causing the fall of the Israeli government. He even persuaded the Soviet Union that a full-scale Geneva conference, in which the PLO could well have had some form of representation, was a formula for deadlock and disaster.

Also depressing PLO leader Yasser Arafat have been the actions of his old rival, George Habash, leader of the so-called "rejection front," made up of Habash's Marxist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and three other small radical groups backed by Iraq and Libya.

Habash held a news conference this week to try to demonstrate Arafat's errors by charging that in its deal with Israel, Egypt had sold out the Palestinians, Syrians and Jordanians. Even if Arafat were to finally reject any idea of negotiating with the Israelis, Habash would simply say, "I told you so."

Indeed, Arafat could well turn into what one Palestine watcher calls "the toughest terrorist of them all" if he felt threatened. He no doubt recognizes that little is on the horizon to hearten the rank and file.

Palestinian officials are strangely evasive when asked about holding a session of the PLO parliament, formally called the Palestine National Council, which is long overdue and now in theory scheduled for November. Challengers to Arafat could well surface there.

Indeed, about the only optimistic note was struck when a PLO official agreed with a visitor that perhaps some good might come of Syrian negotiations with Israel if only because Assad might serve as a conduit to the United States.

"I think it would be discussed as long as the decision remained ours," a PLO official said warily, stressing that any such channel would constitute an "act of sovereignty." That is a codeword for recognizing the PLO as the official representative of the Palestinians.

That, of course, is the problem since the Israeli government bristles at any such suggestion. Warily, the PLO official discounted suggestions that Israeli Premier Yitzhak Rabin might be encouraged to take greater risks and eventually deal with the PLO if his po-

litical position were more secure.

In one of the many mirror images distorting Israeli-Palestinian efforts at understanding, he said, "Israeli leaders will rethink the problem only when they have had their military backbone broken."

He added, "If Israel wants to make peace, it will have to make peace with those who make war."

In the meantime, yet another Arafat mission to Moscow is expected, although the Kremlin is not expected to be any happier about the divisiveness in Palestinian ranks now than it was during his last visit in April.

As for the United States, the PLO official remarked, "We're told the American policy makers believe we haven't earned the credentials and lack the power to join the club. We'll have to try harder."

What form such tactics will take is hard to predict, although a safe bet is a radical turn away from Arafat's relative moderation.

NEW YORK TIMES

18 September 1975

## ISRAELI RULES OUT ANY NUCLEAR USE OF U. S. MISSILES

Defense Chief Offers to Give  
Guarantee if Advanced  
Pershing Is Provided

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 17—Defense Minister Shimon Peres today asked the United States to supply Israel with battlefield support missiles and said that his Government was ready to guarantee that they would be armed only with conventional warheads.

"Nobody is talking about nuclear warheads," Mr. Peres said,

seeking to rebut reports that Israel wanted the missiles, which have a nuclear capacity, to threaten Arab cities. He said the missiles were needed to deter the Arabs from using their missiles, which also have a nuclear capacity, but are reportedly armed only with conventional warheads.

Speaking to the National Press Club, Mr. Peres said Israel needed the Lance missile, with a range of 60 miles, and the Pershing, with a 450-mile range, to offset the missiles supplied by the Soviet Union to Egypt, Syria and Libya.

New Model Is Due

The Pershings were originally designed as tactical nuclear weapons for use in Europe, but a newer model not yet produced will have the capacity to carry regular explosives.

Mr. Peres arrived in Washington today for talks with Secretary of State Kissinger and Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger on Israel's fu-

ture defense needs, growing out of the Sinai agreement with Egypt.

As part of the accord, the United States lifted the freeze on the supply of new military technology and agreed, in initially unpublished memorandums, to give sympathetic understanding to Israel's request for such advanced weapons as the F-16 fighter, the Lance, the Pershing, laser-directed bombs and new tank models.

Another unpublished memorandum between Israel and the United States, dealing with the Geneva peace conference, was made available to The New York Times today. Some of the details of this document were revealed by The Times last week.

In it, the United States affirmed that it would not recognize or negotiate with the Palestine Liberation Organization until it recognizes Israel's right to exist and accepts Security Council resolutions in that direction.

The United States allowed some flexibility in its position by asserting that, while it would coordinate with Israel on the timing of a Geneva conference, it would only "seek to concert its position" regarding the Palestinians.

The document stated that "It is understood" that all the states that initially participated in Geneva—the United States, the Soviet Union, Israel, Egypt, and Jordan—had a veto on future participants.

This veto was guaranteed to

Israel by the United States in 1973 when the conference was first held, and Mr. Peres said today that Israel had to have a veto or she would not attend if she objected to the memos.

#### Bilateral Talks at Geneva

The United States also pledged to "make every effort" to insure that substantive issues at Geneva were to be discussed on a bilateral basis between Israel and Arabs, thereby avoiding undue pressure on Israel, but the language was again not binding.

Mr. Kissinger, at a news conference in Cincinnati before returning to Washington this afternoon, asked Congress to approve the aid package to Israel, Egypt and other Middle Eastern states, expected to exceed \$3-billion.

He said that, while the Sinai accord would not go into effect until Congress approved the stationing of 200 American civilians in the Sinai passes to staff early warning systems, the accord would go ahead regardless of the vote on the aid package.

But he said the prospects of peace would be adversely affected if Congress did not agree to "the general range" of aid figures. Mr. Peres said at the National Press Club that of the \$2.3-billion requested for Israel, about \$1.8-billion will be for military items.

#### Cost of Aid Defended

The Ford Administration has become sensitive to charges that the Sinai agreement had to be bought with the promises of aid.

Mr. Kissinger, in Cincinnati, said the United States, as a result of the 1973 war, supplied Israel with more than \$2-billion

in equipment, that the resulting oil embargo cost the United States more than \$10-billion, and that inflation cost even more.

"There is no question but that what we're talking about now would be trifling compared with what a war would cost us," Mr. Kissinger said.

He was apparently concerned over the disclosure that the United States had pledged to give favorable consideration to the supply of F-16's and Pershing missiles to Israel.

"All we've agreed to is to study the problem," Mr. Kissinger said. "We have not made a commitment."

He said the F-16 could not be delivered until the end of the decade or the early nineteen eighties. The new Pershing model also could not be delivered for several years.

Mr. Kissinger seemed to indicate that Israel would have no trouble receiving the F-16, but he was more firm in asserting that no commitment had been made on the Pershing.

President Ford sent a letter to Congress today formally clearing the way for the sale of 14 Hawk anti-aircraft missile batteries to Jordan, thereby ending a dispute with Congress.

In the letter, Mr. Ford assured Congress that the missiles would be permanently installed and would lack a mobile capacity. He said they would be based in the Amman-Zerka area and at airbases and radar stations to the east and south of Amman.

Members of Congress had threatened to prohibit the \$260-million sale for fear the missiles would be moved up to

the Israeli border to support an offensive action.

Senator Clifford P. Case, Republican of New Jersey, the leading Senate critic of the sale, said he was satisfied that the Hawks would no longer pose a potential strategic threat to Israel.

Representative Jonathan B. Bingham, Democrat of the Bronx, the leading critic in the House of Representatives, told the International Relations Committee that he would no longer seek to block the sale in view because of Mr. Case's decision not to press the issue in the Senate.

"I must confess that I'm still very unhappy over the deal," Mr. Bingham said.

#### Rabin Doubts Syria Talks

JERUSALEM, Sept. 17 (Reuters)—Premier Yitzhak Rabin said today that he was extremely doubtful about chances of reaching an interim peace agreement with Syria.

Speaking with foreign correspondents, he restated Israel's readiness to talk with Syria or any other Arab state about an over-all settlement.

But he said no decision had been made to enter into talks with the Syrians on an interim agreement on Israeli withdrawals in the Golan heights.

Foreign Minister Yigal Allon made the same point during a Parliament session called by the right-wing Likud opposition, which opposes withdrawals in Golan, occupied in 1967.

The opposition cited statements by Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmy of Egypt as apparent evidence that talks with Syria were contemplated.

NEW YORK TIMES  
18 September 1975

## U.S.-Israel Pact on Geneva

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 17—Following is the text of a previously unpublished memorandum of agreement between the United States and Israel dealing with the Geneva peace conference.

1. The Geneva peace conference will be reconvened at a time coordinated between the United States and Israel.

2. The United States will continue to adhere to its present policy with respect to the Palestine Liberation Organization, whereby it will not recognize or negotiate with the Palestine Liberation Organization so long as the Palestine Liberation Organization does not recognize Israel's right to exist and does not accept Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The United States Government will consult fully and seek to concert its position and strategy at the Geneva peace conference on this issue with the Government of Israel. Similarly, the United States will consult fully and seek to concert its

position and strategy with Israel with regard to the participation of any other additional states. It is understood that the participation at a subsequent phase of the conference of any possible additional state, group or organization will require the agreement of all the initial participants.

3. The United States will make every effort to insure at the conference that all the substantive negotiations will be on a bilateral basis.

4. The United States will oppose and, if necessary, vote against any initiative in the Security Council to alter adversely the terms of reference of the Geneva peace

conference or to change Resolutions 242 and 338 in ways which are incompatible with their original purpose.

5. The United States will seek to insure that the role of the co-sponsors will be consistent with what was agreed in the memorandum of understanding between the United States Government and the Government of Israel of Dec. 20, 1972.

6. The United States and Israel will concert action to assure that the conference will be conducted in a manner consonant with the objectives of this document and with the declared purpose of the conference, namely the advancement of a negotiated peace between Israel and its neighbors.

# Africa

WASHINGTON POST  
9 September 1975

Michael R. Codel

## The Future of U.S. African Policy

The United States continues down a risky path by permitting President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire to dictate our African foreign policy.

The latest act of acquiescence to Mobutu's whims is the impending resignation of Nathaniel Davis after only five months as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. Among the reasons that have been given is Mobutu's refusal to allow Davis into Zaire in July.

This comes quickly after our Ambassador to Tanzania, W. Beverly Carter, was belatedly transformed from hero to goat over his handling of the Zaire-based kidnaping of four American and Dutch students earlier this summer. Carter apparently facilitated payment of a ransom to a group of

*Mr. Codel is a former Associated Press correspondent and Peace Corps volunteer in Africa.*

long-forgotten Zaire rebels and assured the students' release; for this, he received a State Department commendation. Only after Mobutu let it be known that he was piqued over the revelation that those anti-Mobutu rebels still existed, did State do a complete flip-flop, all but destroying Carter's career.

And earlier this year came the expulsion of Deane Hinton, U.S. ambassador to Zaire, because Mobutu decided the latest coup effort against him must have come from the United States. How coincidental that this action came during preparations for the Organization of African Unity summit in Kampala, where Idi Amin was due to hold forth as host. Mobutu does not willingly share center stage with anybody, even fools, and after only the most polite groveling on our part, Mobutu was allowed to make his points with other African leaders at our expense. Now, according to the informed sources cited in *The Post*, the United States is trying to renew the great man's goodwill with a \$60 million aid package: the official and diplomatic version of the corporate bribery needed to conduct business in countries like Zaire.

Who is this man so esteemed by our foreign policy-makers that our African relations must be all but cleared with him in advance and, if he thinks we



President Mobutu

are wrong, must be rectified to his satisfaction afterward? Lest we forget, Zaire used to be known as The Congo, a synonym for chaos, and Mobutu was the man who:

- Was brought to power and was sustained there through the substantial military and financial backing of the United States;
- Consolidated his grip on the country by the public hanging in 1966 of four former cabinet ministers, including ex-Premier Evariste Kimba, following a joke military "trial" on trumped-up conspiracy charges;
- Maintains a policy of keeping resident foreigners, both black and white, as virtual hostages through xenophobic propaganda and anti-foreign campaigns every time a coup starts brewing.
- Has maintained himself in power by buying off or jailing potential opponents. This, at least, satisfies our policy-makers' desire for "stability." Pity that it's little different from Duvalier-style stability.

Who bears the responsibility for permitting this kind of man to have such an influence on our foreign policy decisions? To my mind, the State Department and Congress share equal blame.

At State, it's the increasingly familiar problem of Secretary Kissinger being so personally involved in pursuing our interests in some regions that he has no time to look after them in others. If we have an African policy, it must exist in a void, without knowledgeable leadership from either President or Secretary. Regional or desk officers can't be expected to as-

sume such leadership, and I wouldn't fault their hesitancy after the Carter affair.

In Congress, we see the disproportionate influence of the Black Congressional Caucus which seems to wield considerable strength in a policy vacuum. The caucus is to be commended for keeping Africa at least somewhat in the public eye and for its support of Ambassador Carter (although I wonder to what extent this support would have been rendered if Mr. Carter were not black). Unfortunately, however, the Caucus has too often supported the demagoguery of numerous dictators who suppress their own people. This is no service to Africa nor those descended from Africans.

On the Senate side, there seems to be little more than an overwhelming lack of interest in African affairs. The Foreign Relations subcommittee on Africa should be something more than a stepping stone to the next, more prestigious subcommittee. How can Congress assert its role in foreign policy when such a vital area is treated so cavalierly?

Let there be no doubt of Africa's importance to America. Not only are there cultural ties between Africa and one out of nine Americans, but there will be stronger economic ties as the industrialized world becomes more dependent on African commodities and as Africa expands, quite understandably, its influence in the exploitation and marketing of its raw materials.

The only climate in which our African relations can be carried out successfully is one of mutual respect. If there's no justification for demanding that Africa knuckle under to our demands, then there's none for us to knuckle under to Africa's. It's about time that we stood up to the whims of the Mobutus and the other tenth of 1 per cent of the African population that has the money, the education and the power, and instead, started thinking about the other 99.9 per cent who are effectively blocked from sharing the fruits of political and economic independence.

As long as our African foreign policy continues to be conducted in a leadership vacuum, the decisions will continue to come out of Kinshasa and Kampala, and not out of Washington.

*Joseph Kraft's regular column in this space will resume next month.*

# East Asia

NEW YORK TIMES

14 September 1975

## Washington Looks Anew at Northeast Asia Bases

By RICHARD HALLORAN

TOKYO—Since the fall of South Vietnam four months ago, President Ford and his senior officials have issued regular assurances that the United States intends to stand by its security commitments. Nowhere has that been more true than in Northeast Asia, where a war scare in Korea flared up briefly after the events in Saigon.

Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger went so far as to suggest that the United States would not hesitate to use tactical nuclear weapons in Korea if the Ford Administration considered that necessary.

That period of muscle-flexing, however, seems to have passed. Asia is adjusting to an all-Communist Vietnam and President Kim Il Sung of North Korea, in another of his mercurial changes, has shifted from belligerence to a diplomatic offensive. Washington's rhetoric of reassurance continues, though in a lower key, but running through it is a subtle message to Asian nations on conventional defense: "Look to it yourselves." That, in turn, has revived the issue of reducing or withdrawing the 168,500 United States soldiers, sailors and airmen flung out in a fan from Guam to South Korea to Thailand.

Thus Secretary Schlesinger, in his recent trip to this area, was careful not to overstate the American commitment. He pointedly praised "the self-help efforts being made by the Republic of Korea" and renewed United States offers to assist that nation in becoming self-reliant in defense. Mr. Schlesinger even more pointedly reminded the Japanese that they were not doing enough for their own defense.

### The Troops in Korea

But Mr. Schlesinger indicated that the Administration was not contemplating a withdrawal of United States forces in the immediate future. Instead, he agreed with President Park Chung Hee of South Korea that in about five years, reductions could begin, but added: "I think it is at least arguable that a U. S. presence will need to remain for the indefinite future."

The strong point of the United States military situation in Asia today has shifted from the Southeast to the Northeast complex of South Korea, Japan and Okinawa. That triangle is home for 118,000 United States military people—40,000 in an army infantry division and supporting combat units in South Korea; 51,000 in the Fifth Air Force and a Marine Corps division in Okinawa and 27,000 in the Seventh Fleet based in Japan.

There are also about 4,000 men in Taiwan in logistics and advisory capacities; 16,000 in the 13th Air Force at Clark Air Base and at the Subic Naval Base in the Philippines; 19,500, mostly in the Air Force, in Thailand; 11,000 at the Eighth Air Force's B-52 base and the Naval base on Guam.

The missions of these forces are described by officials as multiple. They can be used for local incidents—the Marines that were dispatched in the Mayaguez incident came from Okinawa. The constant air and sea patrols are said to be

effective in warning against and deterring the Chinese and Russians, and the ground forces are to help deter the North Koreans. There are an estimated 1,700 tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea, the Philippines, and aboard the Seventh Fleet's three aircraft carriers, twenty-two cruisers and destroyers and an unknown number of submarines.

### The Questionable Need

The purely military necessity of these forces is widely debated. The official rationale is that they serve the United States national interest in Asia. Mr. Schlesinger said, for example, that Japanese military strength "is not sufficiently ample to fulfill the mission of the self-defense of the Japanese islands. The pressures to withdraw come from all sides. There are budgetary pressures on all United States forces everywhere. Beyond that, in Korea, United States Congressmen who sense that their voters will not support involvement in another land war in Asia want the troops out right away.

In Japan, the pressures come from within. The Japanese have never been comfortable with United States forces which remind them of the defeat in World War II and the subsequent occupation. Today, the Japanese fear that the presence of United States forces may involve Japan in conflicts not of their own making.

The Japanese Government has so far been unwilling to guarantee that the United States will be allowed to use the bases to support military action in Korea or elsewhere, thus making their usefulness questionable. They are also insecure since any anti-American mob of demonstrators can march in and close them down.

The United States has promised Peking that it will withdraw all forces from Taiwan, which the Chinese consider their sovereign territory. President Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines has indicated that his Government wants the bases at Clark and Subic, but he has vacillated. Thailand, trying to appease North Vietnam, has given the United States until next March 20 to have all forces out.

During the last century, United States power expanded across the Pacific Ocean through Hawaii, Samoa, Guam, the Philippines and into Indochina and Thailand in the south, Taiwan in the center, and Japan and Korea in the north. That power is being contracted today, the withdrawal from the Southeast Asian mainland being almost complete and that from the Philippines and Taiwan seemingly only a matter of time.

That will evidently leave United States forces only in Northeast Asia. But that, too, is being eroded, and a fall-back position is being prepared in the Marianas Islands just north of Guam. There, in June, the people on Saipan, Tinian and other islands of World War II fame, voted to become a United States Commonwealth and to give the United States extensive rights for military bases. Coupled with existing bases on Guam, those islands may be the United States strongpoint in the Western Pacific in the future.

Richard Halloran is bureau chief of The New York Times in Tokyo.

WASHINGTON POST  
18 September 1975

• Two former South Vietnamese intelligence agents who allegedly cooperated with the CIA have been sentenced to death, Saigon's Liberation Daily reported, but it did not say whether the sentences had been carried out.

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NEW YORK TIMES  
9 September 1975

### A CAMBODIAN VIEW OF MAYAGUEZ CASE

Phnom Penh Wasn't Aware

Ship Had Been Seized,

Deputy Premier Says

By PAUL HOFMANN

Cambodian gunboats seized the American container ship Mayaguez last May 12 without the knowledge of the Communist Government in Phnom Penh, according to Ieng Sary, the Cambodian Deputy Premier. He said the authorities in Phnom Penh were not aware of the seizure through American

broadcasts, because the American technology is able to convey information much faster than our armed forces can."

He maintained that "a bloodbath" had been unnecessary, saying that the Phnom Penh Government had ordered the release of the ship and its crew but that American forces attacked while the release was being arranged.

Mr. Ieng Sary, who left the United States yesterday after a week's visit to the United Nations, gave this account here Saturday at a reception arranged at the Union Theological Seminary by a small group of Cambodians living in the United States.

According to a transcript of his remarks made available by Gareth Porter, director of the Indochina Resource Center in Washington, D. C., and George Hildebrand, an associate, Mr. Ieng Sary also explained that the forced evacuation of large numbers of people from Phnom Penh after the Communist takeover of April 17 was dictated by a lack of food.

The Deputy Premier noted that the population of Phnom Penh had swollen in the last stage of the former Government to three million from two million. The new authorities,

he said, carried out an evacuation "without bloodshed in a week" because the countryside offered some possibilities to feed the evacuees.

This version contrasted with reports, soon after the Communist take-over, that the new rulers had begun a peasant revolution, forcing as many as three million or four million people out of Cambodia's cities to the countryside, to till the soil.

#### 'I Handled That Affair'

The Deputy Premier, who spoke in Cambodian, with an English translation provided by a leader of the Cambodian community here, Sok Hom Hing, an economist, gave his versions of the Mayaguez case and of the evacuation of Phnom Penh in reply to questions from the audience at the seminary, Broadway a 120th Street. The reception was attended by more than 100 members of groups that opposed the war in Indochina.

According to the transcript, Mr. Ieng Sary said of the Mayaguez crisis: "I handled that affair with my own hands."

He said the ship was sailing westward within six kilometers of these small Wai Islands when Cambodian forces, "in a spirit

of revolutionary vigilance," captured her. American accounts at the time had said the ship was eight miles — which would be about 13 kilometers off the island when seized.

"The leaders in Phnom Penh didn't know" of the seizure, Mr. Ieng Sary went on, praising the "vigilance" of the Cambodian soldiers, whom he described as "workers." He asserted that the armed forces knew that the Mayaguez was being "operated for information-gathering." The Deputy Premier said that, on learning of the incident, the authorities contacted the forces on the islands and their commander in Sihanoukville on the mainland, ordering him to report to Phnom Penh.

The commander, according to Mr. Ieng Sary, arrived in the capital at 2 P.M. on an unspecified day "and at 5 P.M. we ordered him back under instructions to release the Mayaguez immediately."

The day after her capture off the Wai Islands, the Mayaguez was moved to Tang Island, and the crew was put on fishing boats and eventually taken to Sihanoukville before being released.

While the release of the ves-

sel was being arranged, the Deputy Premier said, the Americans bombed Tang Island — "bombed so hard that they thought everyone who had stayed on the island had been killed." However, according to Mr. Ieng Sary, Cambodian units held out and attacked the United States forces when they landed.

He asserted that orders had been given to release all captured Americans but that the United States forces bombed the island, Sihanoukville the nearby mainland harbor of Ream, causing many casualties.

The Deputy Premier charged that "the C.I.A. will continue to interfere in our problems" and that such activities by the Central Intelligence Agency were the reason why "we must continue to raise our vigilance."

Speaking of conditions in Phnom Penh, Mr. Ieng Sary said that before the capital's capture by the revolutionary forces the "imperialists," meaning the United States, had supplied 30,000 to 40,000 tons of food to the city every month. He asserted that, in the revolution's spirit of self-reliance, the authorities did not want to depend on any help from abroad, and so decided to "disperse" the capital's population.

WASHINGTON POST  
10 September 1975

## Thieu Regime Was Riddled With Vietcong

By Alan Dawson  
United Press International

BANGKOK, Sept. 9 — Only now can it be seen just how much the ranks of the pro-American administrations in South Vietnam were riddled with Vietcong.

Familiar names and faces pop up daily. Some of the most fanatic anti-Communists, it seems, were working all along for the other side.

My personal souvenir of Vietnam is one of those pith helmets worn by combat troops of North Vietnam and the Vietcong.

It is personally autographed by the military police commander who gave it to me. He worked for years inside the South Vietnamese Central Intelligence Agency headquarters while waiting for the Vietcong victory.

A new province chief today is a Vietcong lieutenant colonel who also holds rank in the North Vietnamese army. His former job was chief translator and interpreter for U.S. CIA agents in his home province.

The day that the Vietcong captured his home province, he was with the American adviser there. He was considered by all Americans who knew him to be a dedicated anti-Communist who would probably be executed by any North Vietnamese troops that captured him.

An American still in Vietnam recently did a survey of the 20 Vietnamese who had worked in his architect's office before the Provisional Revolutionary Government took over the nation April 30.

Card-carrying members of the PRG included the chief surveyor—who was in charge of drawing plans for highly classified ammunition storage sites and bases—and an office maid who emptied the trash every day.

The surfacing of these long-time Communist agents makes clear the Communist side had good security and intelligence.

Names of men in the Communist hierarchy, apparently unknown to sophisticated

Sunday, Sept. 14, 1975

THE WASHINGTON POST

## Viet Policy A 'Disaster,' Says Kissinger

By Murrey Marder  
Washington Post Staff Writer

Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger says that he "always considered Indochina a disaster" for American policy.

Since the collapse of that policy last April, with the conquest of South Vietnam and Cambodia by the Communists, Kissinger increasingly has expressed public doubt in retrospect about the wisdom of the original policy. Until now, however, he had not claimed that he "always" considered it disastrous.

This strong public statement by Kissinger to disassociate himself from the U.S. involvement in Indochina was made an hour-long interview with William F. Buckley Jr., taped on Wednesday and broadcast last night on WETA-TV's "Firing Line."

Kissinger was responding to a question from Buckley who said, "It seems to be plain that the disaster of Indochina, against which you struggled, was a disaster nevertheless?"

"Well," replied Kissinger, "I have always considered Indochina a disaster—partly because we did not think through the implications of

agents of the American CIA, pop up almost daily. Observers scour old documents and files trying to find out details about such men as Nguyen Van Linh, Vu Van Kiet—and often find no hint as to their former jobs.

Since May, these men—and other previously unknown persons like them—have appeared on reviewing stands at important celebrations. On official lists, their names appear before those of better-known Vietcong, indicating they are the real powers in the new government.

According to the lists, most are members of the shadowy People's Revolutionary Party—the Communist Party in South Vietnam.

"It was not possible before our victory to speak of these men, because they were in very sensitive jobs," a Foreign Ministry spokesman said.

U.S. intelligence once estimated that about 20,000 Vietcong agents had infiltrated U.S. and South Vietnamese ranks. No one realized, however, just how high the penetration went.

Said a disconsolate officer on the losing side:

"There was no way we could win with penetration into our ranks like that."

NEW YORK TIMES  
1 September 1975

## I.T.T. Subsidiary Eased Out of Thailand

By DAVID A. ANDELMAN  
Special to The New York Times

BANGKOK, Thailand, Aug. 31 — A subsidiary of International Telephone & Telegraph responsible for operating and maintaining the entire American military communications system in Thailand, including top-secret monitoring stations, has been eased out of the country, its operations here terminating today.

The pullout of the subsidiary, the Federal Electric Company, is an important element in the controversy over the waning American role in Thailand and Southeast Asia and the demands by the Thai Government that more and more American installations pass into its hands.

The Federal Electric Company, which has its headquarters in Paramus, N.Y., has operated the entire communications network that links the various American bases in Thailand, the sophisticated radar networks, the satellite ground stations and a secret monitoring station at Ramusun in northeastern Thailand, that has for years intercepted and monitored Communist military and civilian radio traffic in this region.

In fact, Federal Electric has been in Indochina almost from the first days of American involvement in Southeast Asia. It was this company that, unknown to most outsiders, operated the entire military communications network in South Vietnam — one of the most sophisticated ever established in a war zone.

### Withdrawal Deadline Set

The company's troubles in Thailand began more than a year ago when the Thai Government suddenly announced that it wanted Thai companies to take over the functions being performed by F.E.C., clearly in preparation for what the Thais hoped would be a complete turnover of the whole communications network to them by next March 19. That is the

deadline the Government set for the complete withdrawal of the American military from Thailand.

An American official said last week that the chief problem was a technicality over whether the Thai companies would be given the same tax exemption as Federal Electric. The American military demanded that any companies that performed work supported by joint military assistance funds not use a part of that funding to pay taxes to the "host government."

But there reportedly were further discussions as well — particularly over the separating of maintenance of routine facilities, such as telephone communications, from the actual operation of some of the top-secret facilities that the American military did not want any Thai companies involved in.

Finally it was decided that Federal Electric's \$9-million-a-year contract would be terminated today and the company, together with two smaller American concerns — Ampac and Trans-Asia, both of which are "housekeeping" companies — would leave Thailand as the Thai Government demanded. Their operations, however, are being taken over by the United States Department of the Army, at least for the present.

"We still do not know what facilities are to be turned over to the Royal Thai Government, or when," a senior American military official said here last week. "Obviously this complicates everything."

### Uncertainties Persist

In fact, each week there is a new pronouncement on the question of phase-out or termination, a new shading of meaning. On Thursday, the American Ambassador, Charles S. White-

house, met with the Thai Premier, Kukrit Pramoj, to discuss "the general situation."

The Premier has repeatedly in the past demanded removal of the "entire American presence" from Thailand by next March 19 — a process that has already begun with the closing of several American Air Force bases in the last six months.

After Thursday's meeting, Mr. Kukrit told reporters that all American combat troops must be out by March 19. But he added that other American military groups, such as the Joint United States Military Assistance Group and the Military Assistance Command Thailand could remain here as "advisory groups." He told Ambassador Whitehouse he would like the United States to leave sophisticated military installations to the Thai Government after training Thai personnel to operate them.

"All these negotiations are like trying to make a rope of sand," one American official said last week, shaking his head in dismay. "You think you have it all together, then you look down and it's all sifted through your fingers again."

### Comment by I.T.T.

A spokesman for I.T.T., reached by telephone, said that the company "had anticipated the move for some time." He said the closing of operations in Thailand was a "phasing out" that began when the United States withdrew from Vietnam.

what we were doing at the beginning."

Buckley: "Does 'we' mean you included?"

Kissinger: "Well—"

Buckley: "Which was it?"

Kissinger: "—pre (before) my being in office. Those decisions were made in the previous administration—and partly because the magnitude of the task we had set for ourselves was not clear when it was set. And then the American public was not prepared to stick with it. So it failed for a variety of reasons . . ."

Kissinger said, "We let ourselves down by entering too lightly on an enterprise whose magnitude was not understood, by methods which were inappropriate to the scale of the . . . problem, and then were caught by what I would think was a minority, but nevertheless a very determined minority, in a situation in which the effective public support disintegrated."

Neither the secretary nor his interviewer discussed the paradox of attempting to sustain public support for a policy described as fatally flawed "at the beginning."

Although the Ford administration last spring blamed Congress for failure to sustain the anti-Communist government in South Vietnam with adequate aid after the U.S. troop withdrawal, Kissinger said in the Buckley interview:

" . . . I think probably the Congress came to reflect public sentiment so that finally, in the ultimate collapse last spring, there was clearly no public support for any continuation of the American effort. All public opinion polls seemed to show this."

At present in the United States, Kissinger said, there "is an almost metaphysical revulsion" against foreign involvements that involve risks."

Kissinger said, "It is one thing to have a crisis that lasts a day or two—such as the Cambodia incident, or the Mayaguez (ship seizure) incident—but the real test is to sustain a crisis over an extended period of time."

"And there," said Kissinger, "I would think that anything that looks to the public like a massive foreign involvement would require the most meticulous justification before it could be supported. This is our difficulty in the Congress."

Kissinger said this problem for policymakers has come to the surface now in the dispute over sending 200 Americans to man warning stations between Israeli and Egyptian forces in the Sinai desert.

He said there is "a considerable debate starting" over this plan to use 200 "volunteers, ci-

vilians, unarmed" in the existing United Nations peacekeeping force in the Middle East.

Many independent observers regard the American debate over the 200 technicians as mild.

In a hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last Wednesday, the same day that the Kissinger inter-

view was taped, one public opinion analyst said, "The public has remained remarkably quiet on this issue." Pollster Louis Harris said his survey showed 42 per cent of the public in favor of sending the technicians, 28 per cent opposed, and the remainder not sure.



# Latin America

THE SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, London  
31 August 1975

# Cuban oil—the real reason for detente

**THIS YEAR'S** most surprising detente—the resumption of relations of a sort between President Ford's U.S.A. and Fidel Castro's Communist Cuba—owes a good deal more to hard heads than to soft hearts. The motive behind it can be summed up in one word—oil.

There is a strong possibility that there are massive oil fields off the Cuban coast, and this is the real key to the easing of the 13-year-old trade boycott a few days ago.

Castro for his part is behaving with consummate, if cynical, skill. Having let the Russians prospect for oil, now it is on the horizon he is proposing to have the Americans develop the wells.

Recent seismological tests by the Russians in Cuban waters have apparently revealed the likelihood of several large oil structures which form part of the immensely rich Gulf of Mexico oil fields.

But Castro knows only too well that to develop such fields he will need American technological skills and American finance. The Russians are well behind on offshore exploration and production and are not pre-

pared to put the kind of sums that Castro needs the way of the Communist leader.

Hence the recent "let's make up" signals which Castro has made to the Americans (like returning skyjackers who sought asylum in Cuba and \$2 million of ransom money).

This has already led to the partial lifting of the State Department boycott; foreign merchant ships will be allowed to refuel in U.S. ports even if they have already called at Cuban ports; countries which trade with Cuba will now be allowed to receive U.S. food supplies distributed under U.S. Public Law 480.

Direct trade is still ruled out

and Secretary of State Kissinger has maintained that a full-scale resumption of U.S. trade and diplomatic relations with Cuba would be "premature."

But, oil apart, some American businessmen have been told by the Cubans that the Cubans are in the market for \$3,000 million of American equipment.

Given the attractions of major oil fields requiring American expertise and money just 90 miles off the Florida coast, the American Administration is likely to come under growing pressure from American businessmen to lift the trade boycott completely and let the U.S. oil groups take over the exploration from the Russians which is exactly what Castro wants.

One ironic twist to the whole story is that one of the alleged oil structures discovered by the Russians is offshore from the massive U.S. naval base at Guantanamo which the Americans have held on to during all those 13 years since the Castro revolution.

Friday, Sept. 19, 1975

THE WASHINGTON POST

## Kissinger's Statements Heat Canal Zone Talks

By Murrey Marder

Washington Post Staff Writer

Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger tried to answer Alabama Gov. George C. Wallace earlier this week—and touched off a verbal tempest in Panama.

Kissinger counts on exceptional verbal adroitness to help carry him through a maze of complex issues. On Tuesday, however, Kissinger initially misspoke in response to a question on Panama Canal negotiations asked by Wallace at the Southern Governors Conference at Orlando, Fla.

Kissinger quickly tried to amend his reply, but not

quickly enough to avoid repercussions in Panama, where sensitive negotiations were under way.

The latest 10-day round of negotiations recessed Wednesday with Panama declaring the talks produced "very little progress," and chief U.S. negotiator Ellsworth Bunker giving Panamanian officials a clarifying statement about what Kissinger "meant to say."

American sources yesterday dismissed the dispute over the secretary's remarks as "an obvious misunderstanding" and of no consequence to the substance of the negotiations.

But, in Panama, critics of the negotiations have seized on the episode as a new

weapon against the United States.

Wallace's question reflected the strong opposition in Congress to negotiating any new Panama Canal treaty. After the Indochina debacle, Wallace asked, how can the United States "afford to give up control of the Panama Canal?"

In a lengthy reply, Kissinger said at the outset that "the United States must maintain the right, unilaterally, to defend the Panama Canal for an indefinite future, or for a long future. On the other hand, the United States can ease some of the other conditions in the Canal Zone."

Kissinger apparently realized as soon as he said it that

"unilaterally" and "indefinite" are explosive terms in Panama, and doubly so with negotiations going on at that moment. The principles governing new negotiations, which he signed in 1974, are based on changing 1903 treaty language that gives the United States authority to operate and defend the Panama Canal "in perpetuity," and assuring Panamanian participation in defense of the Canal Zone.

Associates emphasized yesterday that Kissinger, in response to Wallace, went on to modify considerably his opening remarks.

Kissinger said one choice for the United States is to risk "a Vietnam-type situation" in which it may be required to use its military force "for an indefinite period" to defend its interests in the canal against opponents in Panama and throughout Latin America.

The preferred course, Kissinger continued, is to seek possible arrangements "in

which our defense interests can be maintained for many decades and our operating interest can also be maintained for several decades and thereby defuse the immediate situation."

What Kissinger first said in reply to Wallace rebounded in Panama.

Foreign Minister Juan Antonio Tack, in the midst of negotiations with Bunker, was reported on Panamanian television to have said that if that was the U.S. position, "then we simply have to think of

stopping the negotiations." Panama's objective, Tack reiterated, is "a gradual phaseout of the U.S. military presence . . . at the end of the century."

Panamanian opponents of the Tack-Bunker negotiations leaped on the Kissinger statements as "a complete violation" of the 1974 accords.

In an attempt to quell the outcry, Bunker, on leaving Panama Wednesday, gave a statement to Tack that was described as the result of "consultation" with Kissinger "in the wake of the recent

statements by the Secretary of State on the negotiations."

The statement, made public by the Panamanian foreign ministry, quoted Bunker as saying:

"It has been learned that some statements made Tuesday in Florida by the secretary were distorted and misinterpreted in some press reports. As we both know, we are working toward a situation in which the defense of the Panama Canal will be a joint operation, in which the Panamanian National Guard

will play an important role . . .

"I am sure that the secretary meant to say that our country could not renounce our right to defend the canal from foreign enemies until we have achieved with Panama effective agreements for the canal's defense. Up to now the course of our negotiations has been in this direction, and nothing has changed in this respect."

Bus and taxi drivers went on strike briefly last night in Panama City to protest Kissinger's remarks.

NEW YORK TIMES  
16 September 1975

## PENTAGON YIELDED TO FORD ON CANAL

Directive Broke Deadlock  
Over U.S. Position at  
Panama Discussions

By DAVID BINDER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 15 — The White House succeeded in breaking a deadlock in the Pentagon on controversial aspects of a new Panama Canal treaty last summer, permitting the Ford Administration to resume stalled negotiations in Panama this month, top-level Washington officials said today. The deadlock, resulting in part from powerful opposition to the State Department's concept of a treaty that would turn over defense of the canal to Panama in less than 50 years, was broken only after the National Security Council had met twice on the issue and President Ford had sent a directive to all the agencies concerned.

The canal talks halted last March when Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, the chief United

States negotiator, returned from Panama after completing agreement in principle on less controversial aspects of a new treaty.

The Administration was then confronted with the problem of agreeing on guidelines for the more controversial issue of the duration of a new treaty.

### Leading Officials Opposed

According to participants in Pentagon debates, leading officials in the Defense Department, including Secretary James R. Schlesinger, expressed sharp antagonism to any agreement that would relinquish defense of the canal to Panama in less than 50 years.

"You have to remember what was going on at that time," a Pentagon official said. "We were being driven out of Southeast Asia. When Saigon fell the attitude tightened considerably at the department. A lot of men said, 'Why give away something you already have?'"

A Cabinet-level participant in the debates recalled: "There were some quite high-ranking officers who said after Saigon that the United States should stand up if tested and be firm. The Mayagüez in Spades."

He added that "some said 'Perpetuity is not long enough' for the United States to defend the canal."

The Panama Canal treaty of

1903 gave the United States authority to operate and defend the canal "in perpetuity." The Ford Administration is committed to a new treaty of limited duration.

### Agitation in Panama Feared

The hard line adopted by Mr. Schlesinger and others was opposed by Secretary of State Kissinger, Deputy Secretary Robert S. Ingersoll, Ambassador Bunker and Assistant Secretary of State William D. Rogers.

They argued that to confront Panama with such demands would not only undermine negotiating effort but also invite increasing agitation by radicals in Panama.

The impasse continued into July, with "a good bit of passion involved" on the Pentagon side, as the Cabinet official described it.

But the State Department had allies in the Defense Department, officials from both recounted. Among them were Deputy Secretary William P. Clement Jr. and Robert F. Ellsworth, the Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs.

As complaints from the Panamanian Government of Gen. Omar Torrijos Herrera mounted about the lengthening pause in negotiations, Mr. Kissinger convened a meeting of the National Security Council in July.

"Defense was not leaned on," Mr. Kissinger recently recalled. "Before that they just didn't have a position."

### Directive From Ford

But it took a second National Security Council meeting Aug. 9 and a directive from President Ford the same day to all the agencies concerned to break the Pentagon deadlock, participants related.

"We were asked to go back and scrub our arguments very hard and to be as forthcoming as we could be," a defense official said. "We found a little more give."

As a result, the Administration was able to work out a compromise on the critical question of treaty duration.

The compromise envisions transfer of canal operations to Panama by the year 2000 but United States defense of the canal for about 40 years.

In addition, an Administration official, said the Pentagon won concurrence for its demand that the new treaty provide for negotiation of a future bases agreement with Panama permitting the United States to continue participating in the defense of the canal.

Agreement on this negotiating position permitted Ambassador Bunker to resume treaty talks with the Panamanian Government on Sept. 8. According to a State Department official, the talks have gone "pretty well."