NEWS, VIEWS and ISSUES

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Governmental Affairs

CHICAGO TRIBUNE
1 September 1975

Harris Survey

Majority says save the CIA

By Louis Harris

BY A 47 to 27 per cent plurality, Americans favor "making the Central Intelligence Agency more accountable to civilian authorities, but not changing the way it is now run," according to the results of the latest Harris Survey.

By 80 to 6 per cent, a large majority of those surveyed rejects the notion of "abolishing the CIA and leaving the U. S. with no foreign intelligence agency."

A 45 to 34 per cent plurality also opposes "abolishing the CIA, but starting a new foreign intelligence agency with proper civilian controls and safeguards."

THE RESULTS of this survey, conducted recently among a cross-section of 1,403 adults nationwide, make it clear that Americans are opposed to the abolition of the CIA, altho they support steps to make the security agency more accountable to the elected officials in government. By 43 to 31 per cent, a plurality would also support a move to "put in a civilian head of the CIA, but not abolishing it."

On a number of specific areas, however, those surveyed are critical of the CIA:

- By 71 to 11 per cent, a majority believes "it was wrong for the CIA to be involved in the assassination attempts of foreign leaders."
- By 54 to 29 per cent, a majority also believes "it was wrong for the CIA to have spied on Americans here at home during the Viet Nam war."
- By 49 to 21 per cent, a plurality agrees with the charge that "the trouble with the CIA is that it got out of control of civilian authorities."
- And by 65 to 18 per cent, a sizable majority believes that "in the future, the CIA must be monitored more closely by Congress and the White House."

But by a convincing majority, 52 to 24 per cent, those surveyed reject the charge that "if it had not been exposed, the CIA might have taken over the country." To the contrary, Americans value maintaining the CIA despite some errors it has committed recently. Also:

- By 78 to 12 per cent, a solid majority believes "it is very important that the U. S. have the best foreign intelligence agency in the world, even if it does make some mistakes."
- By 71 to 13 per cent, a majority also believes that "any successful foreign intelligence agency must be operated in secrecy."
- By 52 to 28 per cent the public is worried that "so many secrets of the CIA have been made public that the future ability of the CIA to operate well has now been threatened."
- By 40 to 27 per cent, a plurality is convinced that "most of the CIA's activities involve serious study of other countries and are not involved with spying or violence."

In the last year the public has given the CIA negative marks in Harris Surveys, but that criticism has not been rising despite more recent disclosures about the agency's alleged wrong-doing. The Harris Survey asked its respondents:

"How would you rate the job the Central Intelligence Agency [CIA] has done as the chief source of foreign intelligence for the U. S. government—excellent, pretty good, only fair, or poor?"

	Positive	Negative	Not sure
	%	%	%
August, 1975	36	45	19
January	34	39	27
September, 1974	31	42	27

As the CIA has become a better known institution in the last year, the number of Americans who give it a positive rating has risen 5 points, altho the agency's negative marks also have risen 3 points. Its ratings tend to parallel those of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other federal law-enforcement agencies.

THE VARIOUS bodies that have been investigating the CIA have not been building enormous reservoirs of public confidence. The cross-section was asked:

"There have been several recent investigations of the CIA. Do you feel the [read list] investigations have been fair and just, too harsh on the CIA, or a whitewash of the CIA?"

	Fair and just	Too harsh	Whitewash	Not sure
	%	%	%	%
Rockefeller commission	33	6	28	33
U.S. Senate Church Committee	28	8	11	53
U.S. House Intelligence Committee	26	6	13	55

The result of the probes of CIA has been to produce public sentiment for a change in the way the foreign intelligence agency does its job. But it is also apparent that the public does not want a change so drastic that it would jeopardize current CIA operations or lead to the agency's abolition.

Instead, the public appears to want the CIA to go about its business, most of which is secret, but with greater accountability to Congress and the White House.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
4 September 1975

CIA-Greek probe

An official investigation has begun in Greece into the possibility that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency might have been involved in the 1967 Army coup in Greece, a common dictatorship it later reportedly gave active support.

TIME Magazine
1 September 1975

The Incontinent Press

As a reporter, I found your article on the effects of press revelations on the efficiency of the Central Intelligence Agency [Aug. 4] disturbing.

The article was particularly meaningful to me because I had just finished collaborating on a story exposing the existence of a CIA base in this area—a story about which, I should add, I felt considerable trepidation.

I wrote the story mainly because my fellow reporters expected it of me and also because I would have gotten into considerable trouble with my editor if I had not. After reading your article, I think I would be happier about myself had the story I did never appeared; and I think there are occasions when we of the media should ask ourselves whether, in our eagerness to write a big story, we are not tampering with something far more important.

Our subservience to the "scoop" mentality has caused us to lose our sense of perspective. We need to get it back.

John W. Floars
The Daily Advance
Elizabeth City, N.C.

NEW YORK TIMES
4 September 1975

Poll Finds Public Favors More C.I.A. Accountability

The American public favors making the Central Intelligence Agency more accountable to civilian authorities, but opposes its abolition by an 80-to-6 per cent majority, the Harris poll reported Tuesday.

The 47-27 per cent vote in favor of greater civilian accountability rejected, however, any further change in the way the agency is run, according to The Associated Press.

"It is clear that the people are opposed to the abolition of the C.I.A.," the Harris survey concluded, "although they support steps to make it more accountable to the elected government of the country.

"By 43-41 per cent, a plurality would also support a move to 'put in a civilian head of the C.I.A., but not abolishing it,' the poll said.

Based on a nationwide poll of 1,403 adults, the Harris organization reported that 74 per cent felt it was wrong for the C.I.A. to become involved in assassination plots against foreign leaders.

U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
1 September 1975

★ ★ ★

President Ford believes that pro-Communist domination of Portugal's military Government would not have come about if the CIA had not been crippled by investigation of its activi-

U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
25 August 1975

THOSE CHARGES AGAINST THE CIA: WHAT THE RECORD SHOWS

It's now possible to piece together much of the story about the Central Intelligence Agency that is being presented to committees of Congress.

These committees are investigating charges that the CIA plotted assassinations of foreign leaders, helped engineer coups to overthrow governments, spied on U.S. citizens in this country, opened and read thousands of private letters and listened in on private telephone calls by Americans.

Months will elapse before the Senate and House committees complete their inquiries—and the final, official findings are published. Much of the testimony has been given behind closed doors. Yet a substantial part of the disclosures has become public.

The following report tells what is now known of the "case" against U.S. intelligence organizations.

CIA ROLE IN ASSASSINATION PLOTS

Did the CIA actually go out and kill—or try to kill—foreign leaders in the name of the U.S. Government? This is the biggest mystery of all.

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Operations, which is investigating assassination charges, has taken all its testimony in secret. But much has emerged from public statements outside the closed hearing room by Committee members and witnesses, and from other public sources.

Most of this information concerns the charge that the CIA organized repeated plots to kill Cuba's Communist Premier, Fidel Castro.

One Committee witness was John Roselli, a former member of the Al Capone gang and long a part of an organized-crime syndicate known as the Mafia. Roselli, according to Committee members, testified that he was recruited by the CIA in 1961 to kill Premier Castro, his younger brother, Raul Castro, and the Cuban revolutionary leader Ché Guevara.

Another witness was Robert Maheu, a former top aide to billionaire Howard Hughes and once a Federal Bureau of Investigation agent, who said he worked several years for the CIA on a retainer of $500 a month, beginning in 1954.

In a news conference following his testimony before the Senate Committee, Mr. Maheu said he was ordered by the CIA to enlist the help of two underworld figures to "eliminate" the Cuban leader. He identified the two underworld figures as Roselli and the late Sam Giancana, who was murdered recently in Chicago before he could be called as a witness. Senator Frank Church (Dem.), of Idaho, chairman of the Committee, said there was no reason to believe the CIA was involved in Giancana's death.

According to Mr. Maheu, the two men were to use their Cuban contacts to smuggle two poison capsules into the Castro household, and, when the word was given, the capsules were to be used to kill. "But," Mr. Maheu said, "the plan was always subject to a 'go' signal which never came."

Of his own knowledge. Premier Castro himself has said that he knew of at least a dozen serious attempts against his life by counterrevolutionary groups under CIA control. Most of the attempts, he told news reporters, occurred in the early 1960s. He added that he had no grounds to assert that the late U.S. President John F. Kennedy and his brother, then U.S. Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, were directly involved in the plots.

Senator Richard Schweiker (Rep.), of Pennsylvania, a member of the Senate Committee, has urged that the investigation of John Kennedy's 1963 assassination be reopened because, in the Senator's view, the plots against Castro provided a political motive for a possible Cuban involvement in the Kennedy shooting, which the investigators did not consider.

Several former Kennedy aides have rejected that possibility. Theodore Sorensen, a onetime Kennedy speechwriter, talked to reporters after testifying at a closed session of the Senate Committee and said: "It's very clear to me that President Kennedy at no time authorized, approved, condoned or even knew of any assassination plot as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy against a leader of any foreign country." Former White House aide Richard Goodwin has quoted President Kennedy as warning in 1961 that involvement in foreign assassinations could bring retaliatory attacks. According to Mr. Goodwin, the President said: "If we get into that kind of thing, we'll all be targets."

Lawrence R. Houston, a former general counsel for the CIA, told reporters that in 1962 he informed the then Attorney General, Robert Kennedy, about an aborted CIA plot with the Mafia to kill Mr. Castro. According to Mr. Houston, Mr. Kennedy gave the impression that he was learning of the plot for the first time but that he "wasn't terribly perturbed about it." Mr. Houston quoted Mr. Kennedy as saying, "If you're going to have anything to do with the Mafia, come to me first."

Senator Church, head of the Senate investigating committee, said he has found no "hard evidence" linking a President to any of the alleged CIA assassination plots.

More accusations. Besides the plots against Fidel Castro, the CIA is also accused of:

- Having had a hand in the assassination of South Vietnam's President Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963, the assassination of Gen. Rafael Trujillo, dictator of the Dominican Republic, in 1961, and the killing of the Prime Minister of the former Congo, Patrice Lumumba, also in 1961.
- Helping to promote the 1973 coup which resulted in the overthrow and death—either by suicide or assassination—of Chile's Marxist President Salvador Allende, and possible involvement in a 1970 plot that resulted in the assassination of Chile's Army chief, Rene Schneider.

Comparatively little has seeped out of the closed Committee hearings about alleged plots in countries other than Cuba.

Senator John Tower (Rep.), of Texas, the Committee vice chairman, declared at one stage of the hearings that the panel had found no evidence of direct CIA involvement in the killing of South Vietnam's President Diem. And former White House aide Sorensen said he told the Committee that President Kennedy gave orders that the U.S. take no part in anti-Diem plots.

CIA officials have acknowledged giving millions of dollars in aid to political parties and groups in Chile, but have denied any part in killings or coups in that country.

The Senate Committee finished its hearings on the assassination phase of its investigations on August 12, with Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger as the final witness.

After testifying, Secretary Kissinger told reporters he knew of no U.S. policy or plots to assassinate any foreign officials or leaders anywhere during the Nixon and Ford Administrations in which he served.

Asked specifically whether the United States bears any responsibility for the deaths of Chilean President Allende or Army chief Schneider, Mr. Kissinger replied: "In my judg-

ment, no. But these are matters the Committee is obviously looking into."

The Nixon tapes again. The Senate Committee on August 12 voted to subpoena some of former President Nixon's tapes and documents about U.S. policy in Chile, but decided not to press immediately for Mr. Nixon's appearance as a witness. Said Senator Church: "It appears at this time Mr. Nixon is not inclined to testify."

Chairman Church says he hopes to have an interim report on the Committee's assassination findings ready to present to the Senate in closed session early in September. He rejected arguments by CIA Director William Colby that information on CIA activities in foreign countries should be kept secret, and the Committee report is expected to be published soon after it reaches the Senate.

That report will be the first official finding ever made public on this subject. Although the presidentially appointed Rockefeller Commission made a detailed report on June 10 about other allegations against the CIA, it refused to publish its assassination findings because, the Commission said, it did not have time to finish that part of its study.

There have been hints that the Senate Committee report may contain some surprises. Senator Howard Baker (Rep.), of Tennessee, a member of the Committee, said on August 8 that "embarrassing, damaging disclosures" would come out.

"Just take a deep breath," he told reporters. "There will be some things you don't like, but we will live through it."

Political rifts inside the Senate Committee of seven Democrats and six Republicans burst into the open on August 12. Senator Barry M. Goldwater (Rep.), of Arizona, issued a statement saying: "It appears that efforts are being made to divorce President Kennedy and his brother, former Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, from the assassination attempts made on Fidel Castro. I'm very much afraid that this may lead to a contest in the Committee between those who want to make sure nobody blames President Kennedy and those who want to tell the truth."

Said Senator Goldwater: "Since World War II, Presidents have directly or indirectly approved all actions taken by the CIA which have been the subject of Select Committee investigation.

"The CIA at all times was acting within the law or had every reason to believe it was acting legally in taking action on behalf of Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon. Any other conclusion is based on wishful thinking or political ax-grinding."

He added: "In the early 1960s, President Kennedy and his brother had every right to perceive that the nation's best interest lay in the removal of Fidel Castro."

Senator Church replied: "I'm just at a loss to know what the Senator means. There is no disposition at all to protect anyone, including the CIA. I think that all this Committee is interested in is telling the truth."

DOMESTIC SPYING—HOW MASSIVE?

On charges that the CIA spied on Americans at home as well as on potential enemies abroad, there is a voluminous public record. The Rockefeller Commission, after its five-month investigation, told of such activities as these:

• **"Operation CHAOS."** In response to presidential requests, the CIA's "Operation CHAOS" between 1967 and 1973 collected information about "dissident" Americans, seeking signs of foreign influence in the war-protest movement. Dossiers were kept on 7,200 Americans.

• **Letter openings.** For more than 20 years, the CIA intercepted mail between the U.S. and Soviet Russia. In one year alone, 2.3 million items of mail were examined.

• **Wiretaps and break-ins.** Without judicial warrants, CIA agents made 32 wiretaps in the U.S. and set up 32 electronic "buggings" and conducted 12 break-ins of homes or offices.

Open hearings by House committees and published statements by CIA Director Colby have added details—and a few new disclosures—to the findings published by the Rockefeller Commission.

Mr. Colby told one House committee that the Intelligence Agency had files on about 75 members of Congress. But he said the files related primarily to the past actions of lawmakers who had been CIA employes or had been given "security clearances" to receive secret information.

Under committee questioning, Mr. Colby revealed that a CIA agent participated in a congressional-election campaign without the candidate's knowledge, and filed reports on campaign activities for "Operation CHAOS." He conceded that was not a proper activity for the CIA and pledged it would not happen again.

In testimony made public by a House subcommittee on postal facilities, Mr. Colby disclosed that the CIA had opened nearly 68,000 letters in surveillance operations in five U.S. cities and had a "watch list" of 300 U.S. citizens. The CIA's initial interest, he said, was in uncovering contacts with Communists abroad. Later, he related, the letters were studied to learn how Russia, China and other Communist countries were opening and censoring letters on the other end, and whether any codes were hidden in the letters.

Mr. Colby conceded that the mail opening was improper, in spite of these "hard intelligence" objectives, and assured the subcommittee it is no longer being done.

It was revealed by the U.S. Postal Service on July 17 that the CIA had retained for three years 25 opened letters and 85 postcards intercepted in 1972 as part of its surveillance of mail between U.S. and Russia.

Postmaster General Benjamin F. Bailar said Director Colby had turned the 110 pieces of mail over to him with the explanation that they were found in a package on a shelf in CIA headquarters during a "routine change in office space." Mr. Colby said he had no idea how the correspondence got there. "Previously," said the Postal Service, "the CIA had claimed that all such intercepted and opened mail had been copied and returned to the mails."

The Justice Department's criminal division promptly seized the mail, announcing that "the FBI and postal inspectors are going over the material for evidence of possible criminal violations."

Taking it to court. A civil suit has been filed by the American Civil Liberties Union in a federal district court in Providence, R.I., accusing 30 present and former CIA, FBI and postal officials of illegally opening mail of American citizens.

In testimony before the House Select Committee on Intelligence on August 6, Mr. Colby revealed that the National Security Agency sometimes "incidentally" eavesdropped on conversations of American citizens in the course of monitoring foreign telephone calls. "On some occasions" calls by American citizens "cannot be separated from the traffic that is being monitored," Mr. Colby asserted, explaining that "it's technically impossible."

The National Security Agency is separate from the CIA, although its operations fall under the general supervision of Mr. Colby, as Director of Intelligence. One of the main jobs of NSA is to monitor communications of other countries and break down their codes.

Lt. Gen. Lew Allen, Jr., Director of the NSA, declined to discuss its operations in an open hearing, and the White House warned the Committee that the matter involves "extremely sensitive information." So the Committee went into closed session to hear General Allen's testimony. According to the Committee chairman, Representative Otis G. Pike (Dem.), of New York, the General said there is no monitoring of American phone calls overseas "at the present time." But, said Mr. Pike, "I do not fully accept that," and he added that "a great many members" of the Committee still have doubts.

In an open part of the Committee hearings, the NSA's general counsel, Roy Banner, said he did not believe the laws on wiretapping prohibit his Agency from eavesdropping on overseas calls placed by American citizens. Representative Les Aspin (Dem.), of Wisconsin, challenged that interpretation of the law and said he would ask the Committee to turn its wiretapping information over to the Justice Department for possible prosecution.

The Rockefeller Commission report had brought out an arrangement between the CIA and the Justice Department under which the CIA itself can decide whether its agents should be prosecuted for law violations.

This subject produced some acrimonious exchanges in hearings before a subcommittee of the House Government Operations Committee.

Representative Bella S. Abzug (Dem.), of New York, head of the subcommittee, asked former CIA general counsel Lawrence R. Houston whether such an agreement could have the effect of granting immunity from prosecution to employes of the CIA. "It could have," Mr. Houston replied. Among the cases involving possible criminal activity report-

ed to the subcommittee by the CIA was that of a Thai operative of the agency who was accused in 1973 of attempting to smuggle narcotics into the U.S. There were also charges of misappropriation of CIA funds and allegations of mishandling of classified documents.

Some disclosures about CIA operations have come from outside the congressional hearings or federal agencies.

Documents made public in a civil suit by the Socialist Workers Party showed that CIA spies practiced for overseas assignments by infiltrating and reporting on the domestic political activities of the party and its youth affiliate, the Young Socialist Alliance.

AND MORE YET TO COME

After months of investigations by the Rockefeller Commission and by Congress, the evidence on this country's massive intelligence operations is voluminous. But the full story is yet to be told. And the final verdict on the legality or propriety of some operations is yet to come. So is a decision on what to do about regulating or restricting intelligence activities in the future.

When the congressional committees broke off their hearings for an August recess, their investigations were far from finished. They will be resumed when Congress returns to work in September.

The Senate Committee, which so far has concentrated on assassination charges, will turn to other allegations against the CIA. It will also look into the intelligence activities of other federal agencies, such as the FBI and the Defense Department. The House Committee will pursue a similar course.

Then will come hearings on legislation expected to propose tighter supervision of intelligence operations—and probably to limit their scope. One proposal would specifically forbid assassination plots. And attempts will probably be made to force at least the figure for the total intelligence budget into the open.

The outlook is that Congress and the White House will be embroiled in controversy over intelligence matters for months to come. [END]

CIA: "BEST IN WORLD"

Director William E. Colby sums up his defense of the CIA in these words: "It may have done some things in the past which were either mistaken or wrong. But the CIA today is the best intelligence service in the world. . . . It is the envy of the foreign nations. . . . I think we need good intelligence. I think we have got it—and I think we should continue."

Charges against the CIA, Mr. Colby maintains, have been exaggerated—especially those charges of "massive" domestic spying. In a report to President Ford, the intelligence chief acknowledged that in the surveillance of "dissident" Americans, which is known as "Operation CHAOS," the CIA sometimes "may have overstepped its bounds." But he insisted "any steps over the line in CIA's 27-year history were few and far between and, if wrong, stemmed from a misconception of the extent of CIA's authority."

Director Colby

"Certainly, at this time," the Director assured the President, "it is my firm belief that all activities of the Agency are within the limits of its authority."

Assassinations. On assassination plots against foreign leaders: Mr. Colby has steadfastly refused to discuss publicly the specific charges that are under investigation by congressional committees. He says "I think there is positive harm to the reputation of the country to go into great detail on these things."

But the intelligence chief emphasizes: "Our policies today are clear. . . . I am opposed to assassinations because I think they're wrong and because I think they frequently bring about absolutely uncontrolled and unforeseeable results."

Over the years, Mr. Colby has related, foreigners have suggested assassinations to him, and employes of the U.S. Government have also discussed the possibility of assassinations with him. But each time, he says, he rejected the idea.

In a June appearance on NBC's "Meet the Press" telecast, Mr. Colby warned that "any attempt to disband" the CIA "would leave our nation vulnerable in a world in which we now sit 30 minutes away from a nuclear missile aimed and cocked at us, in a world in which our economic resources can be throttled by hostile foreign nations."

Director Colby has expressed concern that the effectiveness of U.S. intelligence operations may be damaged by the publicity given CIA operations in the current investigations and the curbs on CIA activities that might be imposed. This is a concern shared by many—in Congress and in the Administration.

Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger has said: "There have been some abuses, but I consider the intelligence function of the CIA is vital for the conduct of foreign policy and I hope that the CIA will not be damaged."

President Ford has given assurance that any recommendations he makes to tighten supervision over U.S. intelligence agencies "in no way will preclude these intelligence agencies from carrying out their legitimate foreign-intelligence responsibilities."

WASHINGTON POST (POTOMAC)
10 August 1975

THE FAST TRACK

The new addition to the President's Council of Economic Advisors, **Paul MacAvoy**, comes from a quiet little street in Ipswich, Massachusetts, where novelist **John Updike** is a neighbor. The street: **Labor-In-Vain** . . . "I'm going to Nome, Alaska, to publish a CIA newsletter," cracks New York Times investigative reporter **Seymour Hersh**, asked about rumors he might leave the Times. Actually, he says he left town a couple of weeks ago to work for several months on a long-promised book on national security for Random House. He says he will then work out of the Times' office in New York while his wife attends medical school there.

THE WASHINGTON STAR
18 August 1975

Ifs, Ands, Buts . . .

Sen Frank Church, D-Idaho, says he would disappove of any CIA involvement in current anti-Communist activity in Portugal, although he feels such covert activity may be proper. "This is a case," he said, "where a covert action bythe CIA could be said to at least conform to our values as a country and to our professed principles." But then he added: "I can't think of anything that would help the Communists more in Portugal than to have us messing in it and get exposed and then let the Communists point to the CIA for having intervened secretly in Portuguese affairs." That could keep most spies cold for awhile.

NEW YORK TIMES
31 August 1975

SIGHTSEERS GAPE AT GLOMAR BARGE

Huge Craft Slowly Sinks and Rises 4 Days Later Off California Island

Special to The New York Times

CATALINA ISLAND, Calif., Aug. 30—Last Sunday a thousand or so vacationers on the beach at Isthmus Cove here were treated to a remarkable sight.

A great covered barge, longer than a football field and resembling an ocean-going dirigible hangar, began sinking about a quarter of a mile offshore. She went down so slowly that hours passed before she finally vanished below the surface.

An ungainly vessel then moved into the cove. She was longer than two football fields, with a great derrick device arising amidships. The vessel positioned herself directly over the spot where the barge had sunk and dropped her anchors. For the next four days the vessel perched motionless over the submerged barge, like some prehistoric sea bird hatching a giant egg.

The barge was the H. M. B.-1, which stands for Hughes Marine Barge, and the ship squatted over her was the Hughes Glomar Explorer.

Sought Submarine

Last year the Glomar reportedly retrieved part of a sunken Soviet nuclear submarine from the bottom of the ocean 700 miles off Hawaii in a covert operation from the Central Intelligence Agency. The submergible barge is a support vessel, reportedly used to attach a giant submarine-grappling claw to the Glomar from below.

Until the secret mission became known in March, the public had been told that the Glomar and her barge were a project financed by the billionaire Howard R. Hughes to mine valuable mineral nodules from the ocean floor.

The vessel's cloak and dagger background made the Glomar and her barge a subject of intense interest among vacationers here.

This interest was heightened by the site of the Glomar activity. Isthmus Cove is one of the two populated areas on this largely undeveloped island, which lies 26 miles off the California coast. The cove is crowded with hundreds of boats.

"It is like having a seat in a drive-in theater," said a visiting accountant.

Permanent residents here say that the latest visit is the barge's fifth trip to Isthmus Cove in he last four years and the Glomar's fourth.

They say the barge first came alone early in 1972, when the Glomar was still under construction at a Pennsylvania shipyard. On the next four visits, the Glomar came here, too. Each time, residents say, the barge went to the same spot and submerged. The Glomar moved in and perched over her for several days and then moved aside as the barge rose out of the sea.

The operation is self-contained, providing its own power with electrical generator aboard the Glomar and a work barge named the Ore Quest. The project requires a small flotilla of auxiliary vessels, including thtree tugs, several security launches, and an achor-pulling vessel called The Happy Hooker.

Whatever the Glomar and the submergible barge are doing, they are not mining mineral nodules. Where the barge submerged the depth is only 159 feet and the ocean floor is flat and sandy.

Throughout the operation most of the Glomar crew—reportedly more than 100 men and technicians—were confined to the ship. The few allowed ashore were close-mouthed and answered vacationers' questions with silence or shrugs.

Lights Up Cove

At night the Glomar was a blaze of lights, illuminating much of the cove.

"Do you want to know what the Glomar is doing?" asked Lillian White, manager of the lone hotel here. "I'll tell you what it's doing. It is frightening the buffalo away from the isthmus. There hasn't been one here since the Glomar arrived."

Catalina is the home of 500 buffalo, whose ancestors were left here many years ago by a movie crew that brought them in for a Western film.

Last Wednesday, the Glomar moved to one side and during the night the barge emerged again from the ocean bottom. On Thursday night the Glomar returned to her berth in Long Beach and the giant barge was towed off northward.

During the day, a lone buffalo appeared in the hills overlooking the cove and then went back over the crest.

"See him?" said Mrs. White. "He's the lookout for the herd."

By afternoon some 50 buffalo came trooping back to [illegible]

BALTIMORE SUN
27 August 1975

CIA not at home

Philadelphia (KNI)—Depending on your feeling about the CIA, this news may either be disturbing or relieving. The news is that there is no one home at the Philadelphia office of the CIA. When you call the local office of the CIA (215-MA 7-1390) a recorded message says: "This is the Central Intelligence Agency. . . and due to other commitments there will not be a representative in this office until Tuesday, September 2."

WASHINGTON STAR
19 August 1975

Glomar Explorer Set For New Secret Trip

LOS ANGELES (AP) — The mystery ship Glomar Explorer, built by Howard Hughes and used in a secret CIA mission to salvage part of a sunken Russian submarine, will perform an undisclosed mission off the California coast.

A spokesman for Global Marine Co., which runs the sophisticated ship, would not disclose what the new mission would be.

Meanwhile, in the first formal public assertion that the federal government owns the ship, the Justice Department announced in Washington it is seeking an injunction to prevent Los Angeles County from levying a $7.5 million tax against the vessel.

The government still has not formally acknowledged the submarine-raising operation conducted by the ship for the CIA.

The injunction is being sought in U.S. District Court in Los Angeles on grounds the ship is the property of the United States and thus not taxable by a state or any of its subdivisions.

The Los Angeles County tax assessor slapped a 25 percent fraud assessment on Hughes' Summa Corp. in June because, he said, it told him in 1974 the ship was registered in Delaware when it was in fact registered in California and taxable there.

On the nature of the upcoming mission, Taylor Hancock, a Global Marine spokesman said:

"We're free to say that it (the Glomar Explorer) will be doing some experimental work by the isthmus," near Catalina Island, about 28 miles off the California coast, said Taylor Hancock.

A CIA spokesman, asked for comment on the latest events affecting the Glomar Explorer, responded: "We haven't said diddly-squat about any of these tales."

HUMAN EVENTS
23 August 1975

Capital [illegible]

★ Sen. Barry Goldwater (R.-Ariz.), a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, charged last week that attempts "to protect the Kennedy name" were splitting the panel. In an obvious reference to Chairman Frank Church (D.-Idaho), Goldwater said that "it appears efforts are being made to divorce" former President John Kennedy, and his brother, Atty. Gen. Robert Kennedy, from assassination attempts on Fidel Castro in the early 1960s. Goldwater said he resented impressions "that the CIA was out of control and conducting private wars against foreign leaders without presidential authority." From the inception of the agency in 1947, Goldwater said, Presidents have "directly or indirectly approved all actions taken by the CIA."

★ How accurate are the accusations of ex-CIA agent-turned-revolutionary Socialist Philip Agee in his book, "Inside the Company: CIA Diary"? Well, Penguin Books, which brought out the edition in England, has publicly apologized in court to Tom Bavin, the general secretary of the International Federation of Plantation, Agricultural and Allied Workers in Geneva, for Agee's suggestion that his organization was under control of the CIA. Penguin has agreed to pay unspecified damages to Bavin, who brought the libel action over the book, and has promised to withdraw the libel from all future editions.

INSIDE THE CIA: INVESTIGATING THE INVESTIGATORS

Lecture by Daniel Schorr

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for the

Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies

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Two years ago I stood on this platform, talking about Watergate, saying, as I recall, that it would not end before President Nixon left the White House. It took another year for the unraveling of Watergate to be completed with resignation. But what I did not anticipate is that a year later I would be back on this platform talking about the Son of Watergate -- the investigation of the CIA and the rest of the intelligence community.

I call it "son of Watergate" because it has the same earmarks -- abuse of power when no one is looking, cover-up when someone starts looking, panic when the looking goes too deep for the cover-up to be maintained.

The CIA situation also has a direct family relationship to Watergate. The strategies and the personnel of Watergate came from the CIA's Bay of Pigs operation. Watergate was covert operations turned inward. Techniques deemed acceptable for bringing down foreign enemies looked less acceptable when used to bring down domestic enemies. More simply, an unlovely flock of chickens has come home to roost.

It was, in fact, Watergate which caused the first thoroughgoing inspection of the CIA chicken coop. Director Richard Helms, who had withheld from the FBI information about CIA's earlier help to its alumnus, Howard Hunt, which Hunt used for the break-in on Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist, had been shipped off to Iran early in 1973.

His successor, James Schlesinger, in May, 1973, called on all employees to come forward and report to the Inspector General, or directly to him, any improprieties they knew of. They knew of hundreds, large and small. Within twelve days they were compiled into a fat book, titled not "Report on Gross Improprieties," but "Flap Potential Report." For the motivation was not so much a zealous rooting out of wrong-doing as a prudent preparation for dealing with situations, like Howard Hunt's wig, that might come unstuck and embarrass the agency. The Flap Potential Report expanded and acquired new titles... "the Skeletons Report" and, finally, with that urbane humor which is the hallmark of the intelligence professional, it became known as "the Family Jewels."

By August, 1973, when the plan had been evolved to dispose of "the Family Jewels," Schlesinger had gone on to greater things at the Pentagon and been succeeded by his executive director, William Colby. The plan was simple -- a series of directives to ban henceforth all those activities that might, if exposed, cause embarrassment because illegal or improper. The mass exposure of Watergate had ended the sense of immunity from exposure. One directive said: No more illegal opening of mail! Another directive said: No more assassination plots! Still another directive said: No more domestic wiretapping.

"Operation Chaos" -- the spying on domestic dissidents -- was to be dismantled and henceforth prohibited. Also, no more experimentation with drugs on unwitting subjects. And some restrictions were imposed on detailing of CIA personnel to the White House and other government agencies.

Bill Colby has expressed pride that the CIA's misdeeds were discovered by the CIA and corrected by the CIA. If there was any sense that individuals, or the agency, might be accountable for past illegality, it was not immediately apparent. Helms, under oath before Congressional committees, dissembled about covert operations abroad and surveillance at home. Helms has since been under investigation by the Justice Department for possible perjury. No report on the discovery and correction of CIA improprieties was made in 1973 to President Nixon -- understandable since he might have used such a report in his desperate battle for self-preservation. But President Ford wasn't told about it either until he asked -- and then not very willingly. The CIA is accustomed to operate on a need to know basis and there was apparently some uncertainty about the need of the President of the U.S. to know such unpleasant things.

By and large, the public CIA rumpus of 1975 was the internal CIA rumpus of 1973. Without going into detail which might jeopardize sources, let me say that the public CIA scandal stemmed partly from a leak of the internal CIA report which -- ironically -- was written in the hope that the whole thing could be worked out quietly and never become public.

The public exposure came mainly in three waves that rolled over the reeling intelligence agency.

First, in September 1974, covert operations, like Chile -- an issue raised by Seymour Hersh in the New York Times. Credit for at least an assist must go to Rep. Michael Harrington of Mass., who, invoking his rights under House rules, read the secret transcript of a briefing by Colby to an Armed Services subcommittee, then protested to enough other Congressional groups so that one could be reasonably sure the story would get out.

It was an issue of $11 million spent first in trying to block and later to weaken Allende in Chile, the first Marxist to come to power in a democratic election. In fairness, one must say that it was a classic Cold War operation that may look questionable from the perspective of a détente period. I have myself seen top secret 1970 memos discussing proposals to bribe members of the Chilean Parliament to vote against Allende -- proposals rejected not as immoral, but as probably ineffectual. But papers on covert action were never meant to be read by weak-kneed constitutionalists. We are, after all, dealing with professionals more accustomed to operating under the rules of the Marquis de Sade than the Marquis of Queensbury.

That controversy produced a sharp reaction against covert political operations. By last December Congress was voting that such operations could only be conducted in the future with the express authority of the President, and timely information to Congress. And, if the CIA is to be believed, such operations -- at low level anyway in a period of Détente -- have now been practically ended. Which, if you look at the current situation in Portugal, may or may not be a good thing.

The covert operation issue had hardly ebbed when the second wave came rolling in -- domestic surveillance. Again,

Sy Hersh, in the New York Times. A banner headline on Sunday, December 22. It spoke of "massive" spying and files kept on left-wing groups and anti-war protestors. This issue had a much greater impact than the issue of Allende in Chile. For this was us — Americans, and not some far away Latinos.

So, President Ford asked what this was all about, and Colby sent him a report in Vail after Christmas that said, yes, some such things had happened, but not massively. And, for the first time, President Ford learned of the 1973 Inspector General's report. But not all of it, because he had only asked about domestic surveillance.

For reasons not fully known, Colby then decided that he'd better level with the President a little more. So, on January 3, he called on Mr. Ford in the White House, and verbally briefed him on some other things that hadn't come out yet, including CIA involvement in assassination conspiracies.

President Ford was shocked. Not so shocked, however — or maybe because he was so shocked — that he agreed with Colby that the skeletons in the CIA's closet should be kept from public gaze. To avoid damaging the reputations of past Presidents and the current conduct of foreign affairs... that, as I understand it, was his reasoning.

He appointed a commission — with Vice-President Rockefeller as last-minute choice as chairman after Retired Judge Friendly of New York had pulled out — whose members were better known for loyalty and discretion than for tearing the joint apart. And he gave that commission the carefully restricted mandate of looking into CIA domestic activities, an area where a damage assessment indicated the worst was already out.

But, in reaction to the domestic spying controversy, Congress moved to launch its own investigations, with much wider mandates. President Ford worried about what an unrestricted investigation would uncover, and he worried aloud to some people, and his worries about what <u>might</u> come out helped to insure that they <u>would</u> come out.

On Feb. 28 of this year the third wave started rolling over the CIA. On that day, on the CBS Evening News, I reported that President Ford was concerned about assassination plots after having been briefed by Colby on the subject.

Awkwardly now, to keep the issue from being left on his doorstep, President Ford asked the Rockefeller commission to get into the subject its mandate had been devised to keep it out of. By stretching "domestic activities" to include foreign assassination conspiracies with significant domestic recruiting, the Rockefeller commission was able to take on the assassination of Gen. Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, and the many unsuccessful attempts, sometimes in concert with the Mafia, to try to get Castro of Cuba.

As the Rockefeller Commission prepared to issue its report in June, President Ford had another change of mind. He decided that the chapter on assassination plots left too many questions unresolved — especially the chain of command to past Presidents — for him to want to issue it under his aegis. So instead of trying to steal the thunder of Congress on assassinations, he passed on the thunder to the Senate Select Committee, encouraging it to get out a report on this subject as soon as possible.

That Senator Church's bi-partisan committee agreed to do.

And so in recent weeks, in the hearing room of the Joint Atomic Committee, reputed to be the securest spot on Capitol Hill, there has been a strange procession of witnesses ranging from John Rosselli of the Mafia to McGeorge Bundy of the Ford Foundation, from Robert Maheu of Las Vegas to Richard Goodwin of New York.

It has been possible to trace the main assassination conspiracies from CIA officials downward and outward -- against Castro from 1959 and well into the Sixties, shortly before and even after the assassination of President Kennedy, raising a question that I'll go into later. Against Trujillo, from which the CIA tried to pull back, but too late. Against Chilean Gen. René Schneider, whose elimination in 1970 appeared necessary to block Allende... a plot that wasn't meant to include assassination, only kidnapping, but was botched. Against Lumumba in the Congo, where the CIA never decided to assassinate him, but supported his opponents who did decide to. What indigenous conspirators could tell the CIA was, jumbling up a couple of advertising slogans, "Pay now and leave the driving to us."

Ambassador Helms has said that as far as he knew the CIA was never responsible for assassinating a foreign leader. And Senator Church called that statement "correct, but not complete." What it omits is what Richard Helms contrived not to know, what the CIA considers itself not responsible for, what it tried to do and failed, and the targets that did not qualify as leaders. I am informed for example, that Iran's former Defense Minister, Bakhtiar, who had a falling out with the Shah, was killed in 1970 in exile, the CIA reportedly having provided some friendly assistance to the Iranian secret police in the form of surveillance to keep track of him. But, alas poor Bakhtiar! He'll be mentioned under covert operations, but won't make it in the Senate's assassination report for reasons that some may consider rank snobbery. Not having been a leader, he didn't qualify for assassination.

The greater difficulty, though, is tracing assassination plots from the CIA upward -- determining what, if any, element there was of Presidential responsibility. The plots spanned four Administrations -- from the late Eisenhower until the early Nixon. Presidents are not in the habit of leaving behind memos saying, "I want Premier So-and-so rubbed out and advise of completed action by close of business Friday."

Helms and others of the CIA say the agency initiated nothing, but acted in response to Presidential "concerns." Aides to Presidents -- ALL of them, from John Eisenhower to Henry Kissinger -- deny that the President ever ordered, or condoned an assassination. There is a contradiction there which may never be fully resolved, for in the end one is left with subjective evaluation of incomplete evidence. When the committee was considering the Kennedys and the Castro plots, Senator Church said that the CIA was like "a rogue elephant off on a rampage of its own." And Senator Goldwater said the CIA acted only on Presidential orders. More recently, the subject has been Nixon and the killing of General Schneider in Chile. And I have not seen Senators Church and Goldwater quite reverse their positions, but Senator Church is going after Nixon tapes trying to pin down just what the ex-President meant in 1970 when he said he wanted everything possible done to stop Allende from coming to power. There Sen. Church seems to see not a rogue elephant, but a rogue President.

It may be that the question of Presidential responsibility

for assassination conspiracies may come down to the judgmental matter of what the King had in mind when he said, "Who will rid me of this turbulent priest?"

* * * *

What we have so far been discussing are activities the agency is no longer conducting, business it is essentially out of since at least 1973. They are, in that sense, and if you pardon the macabre expression, dead issues.

But there are some issues that I think you should be alerted to that are quite live -- live because they require not only judgment about the past, but action in the future.

One of those problems has to do with the consequences of the CIA's tendency to assume that its operations were somehow beyond the law and therefore required no accounting. "Cover," which is a tool of the intelligence trade, blended effortlessly into "cover up." The CIA didn't want to be dragged into the Watergate scandal, so, as the record shows, Helms gave orders that evidence and witnesses who knew about aid to Howard Hunt before Watergate be withheld from the FBI. The CIA didn't want its reputation hurt, and maybe operations blown, so Helms told less than the truth about Chile, and about domestic spying. And, in the Rockefeller report you will find documentary evidence that when the CIA went in for mail opening, there were written internal warnings that the activity was criminal -- not so that it should be stopped, but so that the necessary cover story should be ready in case the operation was blown. The CIA had an enormous preoccupation with what its people called "flap potential."

There was one other "flap potential" the CIA covered up at a time when it might have been relevant. It never told the Warren Commission in 1964 that up until shortly before the assassination of President Kennedy -- and even after -- it had been persistently trying to kill Castro. Nor was it mentioned by commission member Allen Dulles, who had been CIA director when the plots were first hatched. Even without this knowledge, a secret Warren staff report, by William Coleman (who is now Secretary of Transportation) theorized about Castro revenge as a possible motive for Lee Harvey Oswald, who played the role of Castro defender and, according to his wife, hoped to go to Cuba as a hero. But CIA Director John McCone and his deputy, Richard Helms, appearing before the Warren Commission, questioned by a member named Rep. Gerald Ford, said they knew of no reason to suspect a Soviet conspiracy, or a Cuban conspiracy. And they never mentioned the CIA's efforts to kill Castro.

It is important that you understand what I am saying, and especially what I am NOT saying. I am not saying there was any indication that Oswald was put up to it by Castro, or by pro-Castro Cubans, or-- another theory of the Warren staff report -- by anti-Castro Cubans. I am only saying that, considering Oswald's pro-Castro activities, and the CIA's admitted surveillance of Oswald in Mexico City, it knew that efforts to assassinate Castro might have been relevant to a full inquiry, and it failed to give that information to the Warren Commission. The CIA has been accused of a great many things -- including involvement in the Kennedy assassination, of which there is no evidence. Perhaps if the CIA didn't have such penchant for covering up so many things, it wouldn't get accused of so many other things.

There is another current problem, so vexing that it is

hardly discussed. There is a massive new capacity for electronic eavesdropping that makes our anti-wiretap laws obsolete. The CIA and the super-secret National Security Agency can almost literally pick conversations out of the air by monitoring the micro-wave radio channels that today carry most of our long-distance and some of our local calls. The CIA did some eavesdropping at random a few years ago, just testing equipment, until its general counsel warned against it. It can also link its tapes to a computer that will retrieve any call that has mentioned a certain name or a certain subject. It did that, for several months with all calls between the U.S. and a Latin American country as part of a narcotics investigation. But it was stopped in that period when they started worrying about illegal activities.

Is the CIA eavesdropping on Americans today? Well, the Russians monitor U.S. phone calls from their embassy in Washington and their installations in New York and San Francisco, linked to satellites in orbit. And the CIA, keeping track of the Russians, has developed a capacity for eavesdropping on Soviet eavesdropping. It is useful, and on occasions Congressmen have been called and warned that they were being overheard by the Russians. But it involves some eavesdropping on Americans. And it is probably illegal. Beyond the limited use that is being made of this fancy new equipment, lies the capacity for almost unlimited eavesdropping that has far outpaced our legal protections. President Ford, without announcement, has asked Attorney General Levi to worry about it. And I suppose he is worrying about it. I suggest that maybe you should worry about it, too.

Finally, there is one other concern that I believe warrants attention. You'll recall that President Eisenhower, after his retirement, expressed his concern about the growth of a "defense-industrial complex." Well, there also seems to have developed something that could be called an "intelligence-industrial complex."

The cooperation takes many forms, some rather familiar, such as the use of American companies with foreign interests to provide cover for CIA agents and payment of money. But it has apparently gone much further, towards what can only be called the joint pursuit of common objectives. When former CIA Director McCone, on behalf of the ITT, offered the CIA more than a million dollars for an operation in Chile that the ITT wanted to promote, the CIA refused it. But this suggests that the rent-an-agency idea had been broached before and perhaps used before.

The CIA itself is big business. One of its wholly though secretly owned "proprietary" companies has made a lot of money flying charter flights, and another has lost a lot of money on the stock market, the agency apparently being better at political intelligence. If there is anything the CIA is skittish about revealing, it is how much money it gets and what it does with it, and whether it is a money-making proposition. By which I don't mean necessarily counterfeiting; the agency recently denied that it ever counterfeited dollars.

But there are signs, amid all the secrecy, that the CIA is like a conglomerate company, and at home brushing shoulders with other such companies. Are there dangers? Well, we don't really know until we know more about it. But we need to know more about whether, over the years, the agency may have

confused corporate objectives with national objectives.

When the CIA worked with the Mafia, J. Edgar Hoover objected that a Government agency shouldn't open itself to blackmail by organized crime. The disaffected lieutenant of Howard Hughes, Robert Maheu, says that Hughes wanted to run a large covert operation for the CIA so that he could exact concessions from the U.S. Government when needed. Hughes did do one multi-million-dollar operation for the CIA -- the Glomar Explorer that tried to raise a Soviet submarine from the Pacific. Not to mention his publicity people, the Mullen company, who served as a CIA front. And not to mention so-called campaign contributions through Bebe Rebozo to President Nixon. And Hughes did ask favors not only from the CIA, but other government agencies -- when he wanted to buy an airline, or acquire more Las Vegas hotels than the anti-trust laws allowed, or stop atomic testing in Nevada.

We need to know more about the CIA, which employs more economists than the Treasury Department, as a big business and its associations with other big business.

The CIA says it cannot tell all of its secrets and survive. And that may be true. But there are some who say we'll have to know a few more of its secrets if we are to survive. The agency may be a lot better today than it has been in the past. Born in Cold War, its had a tough time adjusting to detente. Operated so long without accountability, it's trying to adjust itself to requirements for accountability. It is paying a heavy price for casual cover-ups of the past by pressure now for almost total disclosure. But, as with Watergate, the chances are that things won't get better until we know the worst.

Note: Not for release before delivery 8:30 PM August 19
There are likely to be changes and additions during delivery, but Mr. Schorr stands behind this text.

HUMAN EVENTS
2 AUGUST 1975

No. 2 CIA Head Says U.S. Threatened by USSR

While Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was touting detente last week and trumpeting the forthcoming European Security Conference summit in Helsinki, Lt. Gen. Vernon Walters, the deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency, painted a far less cheery version of world events to journalists. At a luncheon at the Army-Navy Club hosted by the American Security Council, Walters, in accents similar to Solzhenitsyn's, contended the United States is in a "tougher power situation" than George Washington's Continental Army at Valley Forge, when it was confronted with a superior force of British troops.

WALTERS

"We hope detente will work," he said, "but at the same time we can't help seeing the Soviet Union deploying four new different types of ICBMs, with signs of a fifth on the horizon. They're third-generation missiles, they're not anything they've just cooked up.

"We see them building larger and more powerful submarines; we see them increasing the number of tanks and modernizing the tanks. We see, in other words, in all areas a tremendous military effort being made to modernize and improve the Soviet forces beyond what seems to me to be necessary for either deterrence or defense."

Twenty years ago, said Walters, the CIA was told it was "facing a ruthless and implacable enemy who is determined to destroy us by all means in their power. We must match their dedication with ours and their ruthlessness with ours."

Walters indicated he didn't think things had changed much since that time. "Are we facing that type of enemy, the one you referred to?" he was asked. "Well," said Walters, "I think the factors may have changed, but I don't think the long-term goals have changed very much."

Asked if he had noticed "any change since the so-called period of detente," Walters replied: "I don't think so." Asked if Americans should feel threatened, the deputy CIA director put it bluntly: "I would feel threatened."

THE WASHINGTON POST Sunday, August 31, 1975

Controlling The Passion To Classify

By Arthur M. Cox

Cox, a writer and lecturer on foreign affairs, is a former official of the State Department and the CIA. His next book, "Myths of National Security—The Peril of Secret Government," will be published in September.

"THE WORD 'SECURITY'," Justice Hugo L. Black wrote in the Pentagon Papers case, "is a broad, vague generality whose contours should not be invoked to abrogate the fundamental law embodied in the First Amendment. The guarding of military and diplomatic secrets at the expense of informed representative government provides no real security for our public."

The past four years have amply confirmed the late justice's wisdom. The Watergate coverup and the secret bombing of Cambodia both demonstrated the dangers in permitting the executive branch to define "national security" unilaterally. There is a clear need to oversee and to limit the executive's use of "national security" for concealing operations and controlling the flow of information.

The problem of executive accountability can only be resolved by Congress through meaningful legislation. And yet, despite recent experience, very little is being done. In a sense, indeed, there has been retrogression. Last year government information subcommittees in both houses actually drafted legislation and completed hearings. The bills, providing machinery to ease classification procedures and rules, got nowhere in the face of strong executive opposition. But at least they were drafted. This year no legislation was written, no hearings have been held. The sad result is that it is still possible for a President to hide behind "national security."

The need for congressional action is rendered all the more compelling by the Supreme Court's July, 1974, decision ordering the release of the White House tapes. The unanimous decision was widely hailed, but in the rush of events, inadequate attention was paid to the fact that, for the first time in history, the court also endowed the doctrine of executive privilege with constitutional grounding, most essentially in matters of national security.

The Complex Present

MOST SO-CALLED security information is classified under rules laid down in executive orders issued by various Presidents—Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower and Nixon. The legal authority for these orders has never been made clear, though in each case the Justice Department was apparently relying on implied constitutional powers. In any event, it is these orders which provide the basis for the classification system and for the markings "Top Secret," "Secret" and "Confidential."

There are, however, precedents for congressional oversight. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 provides for coverage of sensitive atomic energy information under a special security classification labeled "Restricted Data" but goes on to state that a joint congressional committee must be kept informed—fully and currently—on all matters relating to development and application of atomic energy. Thus, for more than two decades, Congress has maintained oversight of information involving nuclear weapons, and there has never been a leak of "Restricted Data" on atomic energy from Congress.

Congress also adopted the Freedom of Information Act in 1966, under the prodding of Rep. John Moss (D-Calif.). That law placed the burden of justifying the withholding of most types of information squarely on the executive, but it also permitted the government to withhold any information "specifically required by Executive Order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy." In other words, all so-called national security information was protected from public disclosure.

This situation has been modified somewhat by amendments decisively passed over President Ford's veto in 1974. One amendment provides that a citizen or media representative may ask for release of national security information which, it could be argued, no longer need be classified or which had been improperly classified. If such a request is denied, the amendment provides, the requestor may take the issue to court and the contested documents may be examined *in camera* by the court to determine whether they should justifiably be withheld. These changes may relax the secrecy system somewhat, but it is difficult to imagine that many judges would overrule the executive on a question possibly involving the national security.

The executive branch sees no need for further congressional action. President Nixon's March, 1972, order on "classification and declassification of national security information and material" is working well, according to administration officials. The order, replacing a 1953 Eisenhower order, does make it harder to classify documents. It reduces the number of departments and bureaucrats entitled to classify documents. And it provides for declassification in six to 10 years, except for certain information which may remain classified for up to 30 years.

In spite of these modest improvements, however, the classification bureaucracy remains vast. Rep. William S. Moorhead (D-Pa.), who has studied the problem, has described the classification bureaucracy vividly: "There are 55,000 arms pumping up and down in government offices stamping 'Confidential' on government documents; more than 18,000 government employees are wielding 'Secret' stamps, and a censorship elite of nearly 3,000 bureaucrats has authority to stamp 'Top Secret' on public records."

Through the years the secrecy system has burgeoned. The federal archives reportedly now contain a billion classified documents. There are more than 11,000 corporations, university research centers and "think tanks" which have been cleared by the Defense Department to handle and store secret information. The management and storage of these tons of classified documents costs the taxpayer hundreds of millions of dollars annually. And yet expert witnesses before congressional committees—including Dean Rusk, McGeorge Bundy and members of the Defense Department's Science Advisory Board—say that not more than 10 per cent of the information should ever have been classified in the first place.

But the Ford administration, following its predecessor's lead, has recommended that the classification system be protected by criminal sanctions. S.1, a bill to revise the federal criminal code, sponsored by two conservative senators, John L. McClellan (D-Ark.) and Roman L. Hruska (R-Neb.), with strong administration backing, provides severe criminal penalties for the unlawful communication of "national defense information," a new category. This would include intelligence material, various types of military information and atomic energy "restricted data." For all other national security information, the bill says, a person would be "guilty of an offense if, being or having been in authorized possession or control of classified information . . . he knowingly communicates such information to a person not authorized to receive it."

The security provisions of the bill, now before the Senate Judiciary Committee, are obviously sweeping. If they are enacted, not only government employees but all persons in defense industries, universities and research centers who ever had authorized access to classified information would be subject to criminal penalties. For the first time, the leaking of any classified information, no matter what the degree of sensitivity, would be a crime.

Congress Has Authority

DESPITE administration protestations, it is clear that the system of executive orders controlling secrecy classification needs to be replaced. Too many lies, too much waste and too little freedom of information have resulted from that system. What is needed is congressional oversight plus new guidelines and new machinery to provide realistic accountability. There is no

question that, no matter what the Justice Department may argue, Congress has the constitutional authority to set the boundaries.

Thus, in 1973, former Chief Justice Earl Warren had this to say: "Whatever secrecy is to be permitted concerning governmental records in the highest as well as in the lowest echelons should be fixed by law." Former Justice Arthur Goldberg spoke to the point in 1972 when he told the House government information subcommittee, "I have no doubt that Congress is authorized to enact such legislation."

It will never be possible to achieve absolute accountability because the executive branch is responsible for implementing the laws. If a President and his assistants want to violate laws under the cover of secrecy they can probably do so. But one way to drastically reduce the possibility of such violations would be for Congress to establish a Security Information Commission within the executive branch. The commission would be composed of five distinguished citizens, with appropriate experience, appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. A major role of the commission would be to establish a new classification system based on the principle that information should not be classified without strong grounds for protecting it from our adversaries, and that information should be made available to the public as soon as possible. The commission would have an adequate staff to insure that the guidelines established by Congress were being implemented.

The commission would serve as the President's principal adviser on matters of freedom of information and as an advocate within the executive branch for the premise that essential information must be available to Congress. The commission's chairman should be a member of the National Security Council. The commission's task would be to attempt to balance the needs of essential secrecy and those of the public's right to know. Clearly, the commission would not attempt to substitute itself for the CIA or the State or Defense Departments in dealings with Congress. When, however, the commission saw that one of these agencies was withholding significant information which could safely be made available to Congress, it would be the commission's task to so inform the President.

The President, of course, would have to make the final decision in any clash between the commission and a secret-holding agency. In the past, the chief executive has almost invariably come down on the side of security. Would future Presidents weigh the arguments for freedom of information more carefully? There is reason to believe they would. For the watchdog commission's views would carry some weight within the executive, and the commission's reports to Congress would of necessity indicate whether the executive was adequately taking into account the interests of freedom of information.

The commission would make regular reports to the congressional government information subcommittees on implementation of the law. It would also adjudicate requests for classified information from individual members of Congress.

Further, if Congress is to make sound decisions about appropriations for defense and other national security programs, the national intelligence "estimates" must be made available to the appropriate committees and subcommittees. Such estimates can be effectively "sanitized" to remove all references to intelligence sources and methods, thus reducing any security risk. The commission should be given the responsibility of ensuring that such estimates and other classified information are properly guarded on Capitol Hill.

As for current information, the time limits contained in the Nixon order for the declassification of "Top Secret" and "Secret" information should be accepted. Except for the special exemptions, these provide that "Top Secret" be downgraded to "Secret" after two years and that "Secret" be lowered to "Confidential" after two years. But the Nixon order says that "Confidential" information should be declassified only after six years. This is not justifiable because, the lower the classification, the stronger the case for early declassification. Congress should set the limit for "Confidential" material to one year. This would make the classification time span five years for "Top Secret," three years for "Secret" and one year for "Confidential." Occasionally there will be disputes between Congress and the executive about continuing classification for certain information, but these should be resolved by the security information commission.

A Fine Line

THIS BILL, once passed, could provide the basis for appropriate revision of the espionage legislation as they would apply to classified information. Section 794 of the present act makes it a crime to transmit to foreigners without authority information relating to national defense "with intent or reason to believe that it is to be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of a foreign nation." That intent clause has always been difficult to prove and should be dropped. The language would be improved if it simply provided that the unauthorized transmission of information, classified by law, to a representative of a foreign government would be subject to criminal penalty.

However, leaking classified information to a congressman or to the media is not espionage, nor is publication of such information by a newspaper, book publisher or TV network. Yet a need exists for some kind of sanction against such leaks since there is information which should be held secret to protect genuine considerations of national defense. One of the difficulties about assessing penalties is the fine line between authorized and unauthorized disclosures.

When the President, secretary of state or other high official leaks security information, no questions are raised. Nor are they raised when a President or cabinet member, after retirement, includes "Top Secret" information in his published memoirs. Since high ranking officials use classified information for political or personal advantage, it is difficult to justify severe penalties when lower ranking officials reveal information as a matter of conscience. Penalties could include public reprimand, loss of job and loss of eligibility for future government jobs. The security information commission could be given responsibility for establishing and monitoring the administration of such non-criminal sanctions.

Clearly, there are no panaceas for controlling government secrecy, but if Congress enacted the measures outlined here, a long step would be taken towards establishing essential accountability. In time, public trust in government might be restored, especially if men of outstanding reputation and ability were appointed as members of the security information commission. The commission should influence a new trend in government toward this philosophy: When in doubt, err on the side of freedom of information rather than secrecy.

The Washington Star Thursday, August 7, 1975

'Slither: to slide; glide'

Funk & Wagnalls Dictionary

One good example of the obvious slanting of your news was last May's front-page article entitled, "How Our Subs Slither Along Soviet Coastline." One never sees an article about Russian ships "slithering" along our coast, and certainly there has been ample proof that they are patroling and observing our operations.

By your efforts to picture the CIA, the FBI and all police work in the worst possible light, one wonders just where your allegiance lies. All anti-war groups, demonstrators, peace marchers are made to appear as pleasant, non-violent, well-mannered, docile persons by you. Those of us in this general area who have seen the destruction, harassment and violence of these groups know differently.

As far as the police using spies to infiltrate these groups, good for them! They are representing the taxpayers of this country who don't want it taken over by revolutionists.

Francis Fischer

Lovettsville, Va.

ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH
5 August 1975

CIA's Weak Future

Now that Clark Clifford has joined the pack of liberal knife-wielders who won't stop short of eviseeration of the CIA, we have the final authoritative word on the subject. We can look forward now to a weak intelligence system seen daily through glass walls, as the proposed split-up agency vainly combats the machinations of the Soviets and the stupidity of sanctimonious Americans who won't let us sully our hands with the dirty business necessary to survive.

Joyce Ferrell

Concord Village

OUI
SEPTEMBER 1975

CIA VS

THE AGENCY'S PLOT TO TAKE OVER AMERICA

U.S.A.

IT WAS CALLED OPERATION *PBPRIME*,
THE LEADERS WERE THE TOP FOUR MEN IN THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
AND THE TARGET WAS CONTROL OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT.
IT COULD HAPPEN HERE AND A CONTROVERSIAL
EX-CIA AGENT TELLS EXACTLY HOW. By PHILIP AGEE

continued

The following conversations occurred during a series of secret meetings held in 1975 and 1976 in the office of the director, Central Intelligence Agency at Langley, Virginia. Participants in the meetings included the following CIA personnel: Director of Central Intelligence (D.C.I.), Inspector General (I.G.), Deputy Director of Operations (D.D.O.) and Deputy Director of Management and Services (D.D.M.&S.).

April 1975

D.C.I.: If we're going to do anything about the possibilities I outlined last week, we've got to get started. You've all had five days to think it over and if any of you want to opt out now, I'll understand. We can talk freely here. Stan?

I.G.: I'm for it. We've got to do something and I think your analysis is dead on. Having the agency get into the 1976 elections makes all kinds of sense. Congress and the press are really turning up the heat and the agency has got to counterattack somehow.

D.D.O.: You know, I always thought Truman had that phrase wrong. Our motto should be: "If you can't stand the heat, snuff the flames." (*Laughter*)

D.C.I.: It always has been, Jack, but it won't be anymore if this new Congress gets out of hand. What are your thoughts, Bob?

D.D.M.&S.: You know me. I don't think I've ever once said no in all these years. If we don't get rid of *détente*, they're going to keep on painting us as anachronistic, Cold War hardliners, all that. And with these traitors blabbing all over the place, the opposition will uncover a lot of new dirt to throw at us. Put it all together and you may get a chain saw leveled against the Clandestine Services, counterintelligence—who knows, the whole agency may get abolished in the end. Yeah, I'm for doing it, but we've got to make this tight from the start. If this operation were to blow, our asses and a lot of others would land right in jail, and for a lot longer than any of those Nixon honchos. We've got nothing to bargain with.

D.D.O.: Oh, we do have a few files, Bob. Don't ever underestimate the power of a big fat file folder.

D.C.I.: As I see it, the situation is going to get a lot worse. The domestic-operations investigation and the assassination rumors are nothing compared with what will happen if all of Indochina blows. Since we were in there first, the opposition can say that our failures of the Fifties made the big intervention in '65 necessary. Portugal is going, maybe Greece, maybe even Spain. It's bad, all right. The agency's being forced to retreat just when we ought to be building our assets, developing covert-action capabilities—especially in the Persian Gulf, western Europe. Instead, we have to worry about how to survive! Goddamn it to hell, anyway.

D.D.O.: Thanks to *détente*, people don't take the Soviets seriously anymore, so our role there is out. And we can't depend on Third World terrorism to justify our covert operations, either—too sporadic, not visible enough in a continuous way. Hell, the Third World revolutionaries don't need hijackings and embassy occupations these days and we're not needed to put them down. The Communists never had it so good.

I.G.: You know, it's getting so that people don't even believe our intelligence anymore, much less trust our covert capacity. We tried to warn the press that Thieu was pudding and could go overnight, but they wouldn't listen.

D.C.I.: The important thing here is that we can't let down the people who depend on us—not just our staff officers but our contract agents, proprietary employees and those working under oral commitment. Think of all the intelligence services overseas, the liaison services, that depend on us—Brazil, Thailand, Indonesia, Iran, South Korea, on and on. Hell, think of the governments and the millions we've saved over the years. Are we going to stand by and watch them fall?

D.D.O.: I had this report put together by econ research after our meeting last week. It's an estimate of the world economic slump, with a special look at U.S. problems. They see no chance of real recovery before 1977, maybe not even then. Unemployment's maybe going over ten percent, with 12 percent not out of the question. After Watergate and Vietnam, this depression will be enough to keep the Republicans permanently ruined.

D.D.M.&S.: Oh, I don't know, Jack. Can't somebody like Reagan renounce the Nixon-Ford past and pull the party out of the ashes?

D.D.O.: Would you vote to put Bonzo the Chimp's costar in the White House? The opposition would crucify that fool.

D.C.I.: Jack's right. Our man's got to be a Democrat, one we can compromise and then control. That's the only way to get a backlash going here against the people who sold out Vietnam, who got us in and couldn't win.

I.G.: What about the option of letting events take their course? It looks now like Wallace has a lock on the Democrats and we can lay back and help him along here and there to make sure. Then, when he's elected, we give him the usual inside peek at all the deep, dark secrets, parade out a few James Bond gadgets, and we have him in our pocket.

D.C.I.: I realize you're playing devil's advocate, Stan, and I appreciate it, but the mere possibility of that Neanderthal as my leader, my country's leader, turns my stomach.

D.D.O.: Wallace is a problem, though. We can't let him exploit anticommunism for isolationist purposes.

D.C.I.: We've got to choose our candidate soon, get him compromised and get the psychological campaign going. Get him in the middle and force Wallace and Jerry to the edges.

D.D.M.&S.: Do you have anyone specific in mind?

D.C.I.: No, not yet. Should be a Senator, probably—one of the social-democrat types, liberal anticommunist, good labor record, friendly with the military, strong campaigner, no personal wealth. . . .

D.D.O.: There's always Hubert. (*Laughter*)

D.C.I.: What's important is to find someone we can compromise and fast—say within five–six months. Jack, this will be your project.

D.D.O.: I already have some lines out. The situation's tailor-made for the kind of operation we know how to run, that we've been running all over the world for the past 25 years. Just think, a superclandestine election operation right here at home, in PBPRIME! It'll be just like the Fifties all over again.

May 1975

D.C.I.: Jack and I have been working on organization for the past three weeks and I think we've got it pretty well plotted out on paper. First, we'll set up a central office here inside the Inspector General's office. Stan, as I.G., you'll be responsible for this—keep it small, compartmented, out of the way. One or two offices with some desks, a filing safe and shredder—we don't want to use the normal burn chutes. Keep files to the bare minimum, too. Bob, you'll have two top priorities: Get the Office of Finance to find some money—let's say $30,000,000 for the rest of '75 and $60,000,000 for the election year. Use proprietary income if you can, since it can be covered better. Try the airlines—Air America, Intermountain—or Double-Chek, Vanguard, one of the corporations. Next, get the communications people to set up an independent crypt system that we can use with appropriate field stations for this operation only.

D.D.M.&S.: Will we use the PBPRIME cryptonym?

D.C.I.: Sure, why not? It signifies the entire geographic United States—it's suitably innocuous. Now, as to funds—Jack, you decide which of the foreign intelligence services can be used to channel the money back to us. You'll probably want to look in Latin America and Asia.

D.D.O.: Chile, Malaysia, Brazil, Indonesia, Korea—lots of possibilities.

D.C.I.: Right—go after the liaison services where we have good penetration, cooperative people on top. We'll funnel the cash through our penetration agents in each service and they'll pass it back to our PBPRIME offices here in the States.

I.G.: Will the PBPRIME field setup be a bogus operation or part of the agency structure?

D.C.I.: A little bit of both, Stan—they'll be special I.G. offices which you'll set up in the stations here run by the Domestic Operations Division.

D.D.M.&S.: D.O.D. has space in all the big cities.

D.C.I.: And a lot of the smaller ones. But we'll keep D.O.D. personnel out of this operation—keep the I.G. cover for all our staff structure.

I.G.: We'll need case officers to run these offices and more people to run outside fronts.

D.C.I.: I figure that, with the inside operation, we'll need about 15 people here

in headquarters, plus 30 or 40 to man the new I.G. offices around the country. Jack, you'll select these personnel from your most discreet and trusted people. Get men who've had covert experience in the field—branch chiefs at least, station chiefs if possible—and make sure they're either eligible for retirement or close to it. We'll open special retirement accounts for them in case this thing blows. Now, you're also going to need another 40 to 50 officers working outside, once the campaign gets started. You can recruit these, Jack, from officers who've recently retired, people who've worked in election and political-action operations in Latin America and the Far East.

D.D.O.: I know just the man to handle it—Vern Shannon.

D.C.I.: Brazil?

D.D.O.: Right; he ran the entire anti-Goulart election operation out of Rio in '62—handled a $20,000,000 campaign with about 1000 candidates running: senators, governors, legislators. That campaign led directly to Goulart's getting thrown out by the military two years later. Shannon's a good man. Perfect for recruiting retirees for the outside operation.

D.C.I.: Good, but make sure nobody but the four of us sees the whole picture.

I.G.: What are we talking about in terms of fronts?

D.C.I.: Well, I think the priority need is for an umbrella political-action group, some kind of campaign to revive the Soviet and Communist danger. Something like the Crusade for Freedom—a mass movement. Set up a national office, regional chapters. Get big names to sign on as patrons—not business people or bankers, they'll be kept in the background, but entertainers, athletes, intellectuals, writers, environmentalists, consumer activists. Get as many media people as possible—TV, movie personalities. Then organizational support: scout groups, Legion, Shriners, NAACP, Rotary, A.F.L.-C.I.O. Pump the need for revival of American spirit, patriotism, confidence—make it upbeat, positive. Then balance with strong warnings of the disintegration of our will to resist the creeping loss of freedom from Communist advance. Create tension, polarize—isolate opponents by forcing them into positions they are unprepared for. We've done it before.

I.G.: Sure, but never here. How can we be certain that political tactics that've worked in some backward place like Brazil or Chile will work in the United States? I mean, what with television——

D.C.I.: Why not? What we're dealing with here are fear and pride, two basic human emotions, and they're the same everywhere. People can be just as afraid or proud, whether they're spit-poor Chilean peasants or American industrialists. If you think somebody's out to steal everything you have, you're going to be afraid—damn afraid—no matter how smart you think you are.

D.D.O.: Hell, Stan. Before we got through in Chile, half of the so-called intellectual clique in Santiago was *convinced* Allende had the entire Russian army waiting in his basement.

D.C.I.: Exactly. Which reminds me, Jack, we're going to need the capacity here to put out something like the Plan Z we used against Allende. Set up some private detective agencies to collect intelligence on the opposition that can be mixed with a little pure invention and put out in forged papers.

D.D.O.: I'll get a couple of retired technical-services people to help out.

D.C.I.: Fine. Now I've got to get over to the White House or they'll be calling. God, it's slow going with Jerry. Poor retention, I'm afraid. I'll leave you people to work out the details.

October 1975

D.C.I.: Thank God we got this going when we did. These Congressional investigations are really becoming hysterical—left me no option but to come clean. If I don't, chances are that some junior officer around here who's read the files will try to make a hero of himself. It might get worse, but the way we're moving on PBPRIME, the battle will be over before they're done with maneuvers. You're all doing a great job.

D.D.M.&S.: So's the candidate.

D.C.I.: Yes, Henry Scooperman was the logical choice—popular Senator, ambitious, forceful, solid social-democrat record, no bad habits, great appearance, limited means——

D.D.O.: And no child ever took candy so quickly. Using an Israeli cover agent to make the approach was perfect—QRTEST has legitimate credentials as former chief of the Israeli service and Senator Scooperman has a strong pro-Israel foreign-policy position; gave QRTEST plausible reason to offer support and gave our candidate the opening to rationalize foreign interest in his Presidential campaign. What's wrong with working with a close American ally whose interests are identical with ours? Scooperman needs money for his campaign and accepting Israeli donations is not much different from taking money from an American Zionist businessman. He'll never know the cash comes from us, since not even QRTEST knows for sure—our contacts with him are being handled by his former case officer in Tel Aviv, who now works for McDonnell Douglas.

D.C.I.: So Scooperman's twice removed from us. Sounds good. Pass word to QRTEST to give the Senator a lot of test assignments and make-work—speeches, position papers, personal appearances at a few meaningless banquets. We've got to get him used to taking orders. Stan, how's the personnel picture shaping up?

I.G.: Pretty well. We've got special I.G. offices set up now in New York, Boston, Atlanta, Miami, New Orleans, Houston, Chicago, Denver, Seattle, San Francisco, Los Angeles, as well as D.C.—three case officers, on average, in each office. The cover is that the agency's setting up these new offices to investigate past abuses in its Domestic Operations Division, so it's logical to put them in the D.O.D. stations and to keep them apart from everyone else. Our people will have a free run, no questions asked.

D.C.I.: Bob, any trouble on money? What sources are we using?

D.D.M.&S.: Got it all from the airline proprietaries, Air America mostly. They're putting cash—the first $30,000,000—directly into 40-odd accounts in Zurich, Bern and Geneva.

I.G.: Is Air America still doing all right, what with the Vietnam operation shut down and all? Just curious.

D.D.O.: Oh, the profits will drop off somewhat—nothing this year like the $60,000,000 it cleared in '74. But they've still got contracts in Thailand, Burma, Malaysia, Indonesia. They'll do OK.

D.C.I.: All right, we've got the necessary cash on hand. Now to get it to the individual liaison services. Next week, I'm going to send separate messages—"RYBAT/EYES ONLY"—to the chiefs of station in Bangkok, Santiago, Teheran, Djakarta, Brasilia, Montevideo, Jidda and Kinshasa, advising them that cash is on its way from Switzerland by special courier, earmarked for the domestic-intelligence service in their country.

D.D.O.: The cover being that it's an emergency fund for counterterror operations.

D.C.I.: Right. That's for anybody who asks questions later back here, as well as for the chiefs of station—each'll think it's a onetime thing for his station alone. The messages will specify which penetration agent is to receive the cash in each liaison service. These will be people we know personally, who've trained at the Police Academy or at The Farm.

D.D.O.: Sounds like I'm off on an eight-country inspection tour.

D.C.I.: Starting in about ten days, Jack. I'll stagger the dispersals out of Switzerland so the couriers will be arriving in each country a couple of days before you get there. My message will tell the station chiefs to advise the penetration agents to hold the cash until contacted by an officer from headquarters.

D.D.O.: And if any of the chiefs ask questions, I'll simply say I'm acting on instructions from the director.

D.C.I.: Quote me any way you like, but don't mention any specifics about PBPRIME beyond its involving protection of the agency against its enemies at home.

D.D.M.&S.: And when Jack gets back, I'll deliver the cash into accounts we've opened around the country to finance the new I.G. operations in the D.O.D. stations.

D.C.I.: They're exclusively PBPRIME accounts—no strings to other I.G. operations or to domestic operations?

D.D.M.&S.: None. Only PBPRIME officers working under I.G. cover are authorized to draw.

D.C.I.: What's the outside personnel situation?

D.D.O.: Shannon's doing an incredible job. The cover arrangement is that he's retiring to form an ex-CIA employees' association to defend the agency from its critics. The response has been amazing. Some of the more senior people have called and come straight here, from all over the country. Shannon talks with them about the ex-employees' association, but we're really assessing them for outside jobs in PBPRIME.

D.C.I.: How's the response?

D.D.O.: Very positive. It's natural, I suppose, but the retired officers are as resentful as the rest of us over the agency's image being blackened. Nobody wants his life's work to be called criminal. A lot of them are even suggesting

on their own that the agency get a counterattack going, something like PBPRIME.

D.C.I.: How many recruited so far?

D.D.O.: About 20. We'll build up to a peak of 50 or 60 by spring. Our assessments go out to the new I.G. offices and the inside people there make the direct recruitments. First we'll use the retirees to set up the detective agencies—one at each PBPRIME office—and to help get the patriotic crusade organized.

D.C.I.: The crusade's the key. It'll prepare the terrain for Scooperman's campaign—articulate the issues and the needs that his campaign will come along to fill. Now, we've mentioned the possibility of having some high-level civic group, to give the crusade respectability.

D.D.M.&S.: This is a tough one, but I think it's going to work. There're about 100 companies, from I.T.T. on down, that've given employment cover for our officers overseas at one time or another, plus another 200 that we've worked closely with in other ways and that owe us favors. Now, I don't want to risk making a direct approach to our contacts in any of these companies—that would get too many civilians asking too many questions. Instead, I've been checking on which agency officers served with which companies and could approach top management to suggest participation in such a civic committee. I got five former senior officers through Shannon's retired-employees association and they can make the necessary contacts to put together a committee of about 25 top business people. If we get them all, we'll have at least one representative from each of the main multinational corporate groups—autos, food processing, oil, drugs, mining, banking, and so on. The committee will stay in the background and serve for general guidance and funding. We'll pass cash through it to the patriotic crusade and to the political-action front we're setting up here in D.C.

D.C.I.: The crusade and the action front will be completely separate?

D.D.M.&S.: Right, except that we may have to move certain case officers from the crusade to the front and even to the campaign organization as the situation changes. Basically, the political-action group will serve as an overlap cover between the crusade—a mass-movement nonpartisan thing at first—and Scooperman's campaign.

D.C.I.: Be careful not to cross too many lines on that. Now, on the patriotic crusade, Jack, you're going to organize it by interest sectors according to normal procedure?

D.D.O.: Already have it outlined. We'll have different divisions for labor, youth, women, students, professionals and the media, with each sector headed by one of our civilian friends.

D.C.I.: How soon will the crusade and the political-action group be announced?

D.D.O.: By the first of the year, we hope. We've got to start before the primaries begin in March and we need to recruit a lot of candidates besides Scooperman—Senators, Congressmen, governors. In fact, I think the President's going to be the easiest part. Turning Congress around is what's going to be tough.

D.C.I.: We'll do it, as long as we keep on schedule. Now, I want you all to listen to this statement I've prepared for the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee. I'm trying to make it frank, conciliatory, fully cooperative. . . .

February 1976

D.C.I.: Our timing couldn't have been better. I wouldn't have thought the crusade would spread so fast so quickly, but last week's Washington's Birthday Bicentennial rallies changed my mind.

D.D.M.&S.: And I was afraid something called the Citizens' Coalition for the Second American Revolution might sound too hokey, old-fashioned, but just look—it was announced on New Year's Day to inaugurate the Bicentennial and already there're chapters across the country and we've got national adherence from the Legion, V.F.W., League of Women Voters, A.F.L.-C.I.O. The people are really ready for somebody to tell them they're still right, to give them some hope.

D.C.I.: But don't ignore the [illegible] themes. Start with the positive—[illegible] cal greatness, private initiative, [illegible] power, a tight defense for an open society—but then let's get to the negative: defeat in Vietnam caused by an internal enemy at home—without mentioning any names yet—decline in traditional values, threat of Soviet and Chicom expansionism, our imminent destruction. Then come in with the alternatives: national rejuvenation and restoration, recovery of our position of world leadership, standing up to the Communists, willingness to use our power. These have to be coordinated and developed very carefully. It can't be straight hard-line Birchite stuff. We have to use a populist appeal, a humanist approach—create sorrow and guilt feelings for the people whose freedom we lost in Indochina and who will lose it in Portugal, Thailand and other places if the U. S. doesn't intervene. And keep in mind, the real target all along will be *détente*—talk about the grain deal, the technology giveaways. Blame *détente* for the depression, for loss of U. S. prestige. This will be Scooperman's big issue.

D.D.O.: He's already into it, thanks to our Israeli friend. We've had QRTEST working with him two-three times a week on the different issues—sort of a refresher course. We also decided to give Scooperman only half of the money now—$1000 a month in an escrow account. We're committed to doubling this when he's nominated and then raising it to $10,000 a month. Henry'll think twice before risking all this, especially since we've got tapes of his meetings with QRTEST.

D.C.I.: The agent doesn't know about the tapes does he?

D.D.O.: No, but if we have to, we'll use them. There's nothing QRTEST could do then and he would be officially *persona non grata* in Washington.

D.C.I.: How're we handling Wallace?

D.D.O.: We'll get him on medical records. We've got some pretty damaging stuff forged and ready for surfacing [illegible] his first primary [illegible] material indicating he could go at any minute and that he had a form of meningitis that affected his brain somewhat. This'll dovetail with a rumor campaign about how he's no damned good to his wife and that she might be looking elsewhere for her fun. We have some composite photographs that'll pretty effectively compromise Mrs. Wallace once his aides and financial supporters see them.

D.C.I.: What's next on the agenda for the local crusade chapters?

D.D.O.: No need to worry about the coalition clubs' having an active presence. They'll be sponsoring speaking engagements and petition campaigns for our candidates, historical pageants, folk-art festivals and nostalgia exhibits relating to World Wars One and Two, high school debates and essay competitions relating to the our-national-heritage-under-attack theme. In May, the national coalition will sponsor a student congress in D.C. with delegates from all the major colleges and universities, and next month—on Earth Day—we're holding a pop festival that should attract national attention and get the counterculture types involved. We'll probably break out some of our special Laotian product for that. Finally, our national magazine starts in April, first monthly and later every two weeks. To bury our involvement, the first issue will have a cover story exposing certain agency people as being soft on communism—deadwood we've been looking to ease aside.

D.C.I.: Bob, where does the civic committee come into this?

D.D.M.&S.: Strictly high level—advisory, financial assistance. We organized last month out at Airlie. 28 top multinational people. We call it the Lakefront Conservation and Culture Society. Frankly, some of them suspect the cash comes from our direction, but——

D.C.I.: What about our Arab cover?

D.D.M.&S.: Oh, it worked all right. We have plausible denial. The cash went straight from your safe to Copelen in Europe and he passed it to one of his Egyptian accounts.

I.G.: Copelen's still active for us?

D.D.M.&S.: On an informal level. He does consultant work for a couple of the Middle East countries and some companies operating there. His Egyptian contact spread the cash around to reliable people in Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Iran, businessmen with American interests, and they passed it back to Lakefront through one of our penetration agents in the Kuwait embassy here. The cover was Arab concern over the growing Jewish-bloc influence in Washington. The Lakefronters may have their suspicions, but they see it's all in their best interests.

D.D.O.: We've got eight retired officers working as intermediaries between the Lakefronters and our political-action front—the Center for Democratic Action. One of the officers will work with the center's director—an MIT professor on a one-year leave of absence. He's been an agency talent spotter for 25 years, so we know he's safe. We're still keeping him unwitting, of course—he thinks the center is a high-minded C.F.R.-type operation. Dillion even did the hiring. The Lakefront committee will supply the [illegible] $2,000,000 for '76—and our of-

ficer will point the director the right way on issues and procedures. Target date for having the center fully operational is April 15.

D.C.I.: You're getting good files set up?

D.D.O.: We already have file data on each of the Senators and Congressmen we'll oppose, especially the freshmen elected in '74. They'll be easiest to defeat. The center will function as our assessment branch on incumbents and the I.G. offices in the D.O.D. stations will be surveying the target electoral areas to come up with alternative candidates. Once the electoral plan is set, we'll start financing.

I.G.: I think I'll need another 10 to 15 officers for the PBPRIME field offices if we keep expanding like this. The detective fronts are demanding most of the inside officers' time as it is, gathering intelligence to help on candidate selection. We're also lining up a few choice pimps, junkies, whores, fags, you name it, to help compromise our candidates and give us blackmail and black-operation potential against the opposition. And, just for good measure, the detective fronts are forging certain old police records, so compromising material from some years back can be dredged up on the opposition. Same for hometown newspaper files—we're altering crime-report clips from a few years back, putting the forged versions implicating enemy candidates back in the newspaper morgues so reporters can discover them on anonymous tips later.

D.C.I.: We could even use Deep Throat again for some of these anonymous leads. Just be sure, though, that the finger points away from us if any of these covert operations blow. Start arranging for Soviet-style espionage paraphernalia to be placed where it can be turned up, if necessary, so that the candidates are compromised and nothing traces back to us. Put some microdot messages, secret writing, hollow pencils in the candidates' homes and offices. If problems occur, we want the finger to point straight to the K.G.B. As another precaution, Jack, you might start preparing one of your Russian *émigré* agents for a new role as a K.G.B. defector. If we have to, we can parade him out to tell the whole story of the K.G.B.'s plan to subvert the '76 elections by making the coalition look like a fascist plot against America.

June 1976

D.D.O.: Never saw such a smooth election operation, not even in Latin America. And all this just when, outside, things look the worst for the agency.

D.C.I.: Are you sure we're getting into enough House and Senate races, though? I'm worried that we might've underestimated the enemy.

I.G.: Jack and I have worked on this night and day for the past two months and we've calculated that if we're successful with only half of our targets, we'll have a cooperative Congress. Then the marginal targets might take up some slack if we fall short on the criticals.

D.C.I.: That's the trouble. We've got to be sure. This may be our last chance. I'm still afraid that we could be underestimating the strength of the campaign against the agency. Thought we'd [illegible] would've begun to flag, but it hasn't—despite the Citizens' Coalition. Jack, are you sure that the coalition can't come down harder on the agency's enemies?

D.D.O.: Not yet. We'll be bringing the issues together in the election campaign itself, with some mention of the agency as part of the platform for a strong military force. After the July Fourth celebrations and the conventions, the coalition will be converted into a purely political instrument and we can use it more effectively.

D.C.I.: Damned Soviets aren't responding to the coalition the way we expected, either. Nothing but smiles, toasts, trade missions and preaching on *détente*. They're so quiet they just don't give the coalition a firm, militant target to hit. You're right about the timing, though: We need that crescendo effect building up to November. Don't forget my idea about having the coalition compare agency clandestine operations to the Boston Tea Party—that's a natural.

D.D.O.: I wanted to tell you, too, that we've gotten two more House candidates compromised since last week. Both without a peep.

D.C.I.: What's the total now?

D.D.O.: Ten directly, from House incumbents, with preparations for 30 more. Altogether, we're getting into 70 House campaigns.

D.D.M.&S.: I've just visited most of the PBPRIME offices in the D.O.D. stations and can give you some specifics on that. We've established 50 critical House seats, plus another 20 marginals. Of the criticals, we're planning direct approaches to about half: bribes, women, and so on. We're making each approach different, usually through the candidate's chief aide, so that no pattern will emerge. In the Senate, the line-up is 15 critical targets and five marginals. Of the 15, 12 have incumbents running for re-election and so far we have five of them compromised.

D.C.I.: What're your covers?

D.D.M.&S.: Depends. Corporations—those under Federal regulations—for bribes. Jealous husbands when women are involved. In these cases, we're making the approach political almost from the start and then following up with campaign-finance offers in return for the right speeches, which can be delivered through the coalition.

I.G.: Where the approach isn't direct, we're using blackmail and black operations—damaging material in police files and newspaper records. We've got the detective agencies working on this and Jack has some people doing the same overseas, with foreign police records and newspapers.

D.D.O.: The liaison services are helping out on this—planting black material like a report on a drug or morals arrest that coincides with a trip our target really made to a foreign country. We're planting this material on the ones who accept direct approaches, too, just in case it's needed later. Turns out Senator Scooperman took a trip to the Yucatán with a couple of other fellows when he was 23, so now there's an entry in the Mérida police records—the chief there has been with us since '63—revealing [illegible] Portland, Oregon, was arrested in 1947 on charges of indecently assaulting a 12-year-old native boy and was released after paying a fine of 2500 pesos.

D.C.I.: Just be sure to use that black material privately, except for the most critical cases. Keep me posted.

September 1976

D.C.I.: Well, I think the worst is behind us. We passed the convention test and now all we have to do is keep the general campaign concentrated on two issues: the depression at home and Communist gains abroad. There's no way Jerry can beat us on those issues. I think we're in, but we can't afford overconfidence. Get the word out to everybody that we've got to keep it all real tight until November. Just two more months.

D.D.O.: The situation in the House and Senate races is great—40 out of 50 House criticals through the primaries and 9 out of 12 in the Senate. Every one of them has a damned good chance in November.

D.C.I.: Incredible, isn't it, that not a single one of our blackmail efforts or forgeries was even contested? I mean, not one of those cases was reported to the FBI, or to the police, or even to us.

D.D.O.: That's because we made it so easy for them. We didn't ask anyone to betray his country or his principles. All we did in most cases was suggest that a reassessment of *détente* might help solve other problems. We rarely had to threaten and, in most cases, our financial offers were accepted outright. What made it so smooth was the compartmentalization between the dirty side of the PBPRIME offices and the positive offers to assist from the coalition and the center. They never overlapped.

I.G.: What's interesting now is to see all these other candidates coming over to our position. *Détente* wasn't even a minor issue before the campaign, but thanks to the coalition, one candidate after another has been coming out for reassessment. We didn't have to lift a finger. I think that by November, we'll have Kissinger and the Republicans pretty effectively painted as suckers for the Russians' tricks.

D.C.I.: The coalition's had a lot to do with smothering the Congressional investigations, too. What few critics are left are isolated and ineffectual, identified with the other side. Now to keep them there—pro-Communist, anti-American, like that.

D.D.M.&S.: Next week, the coalition comes out publicly for Scooperman and will operate parallel to the Democratic Party campaign. We're keeping the Center for Democratic Action nonpartisan, concentrating on analysis and files.

D.C.I.: Be careful that the coalition doesn't get absorbed into the Democratic Party structure. We may need it again later, as an independent organization.

November 1976

D.C.I.: So many times over the years I've wondered what would have happened in situations if we hadn't intervened. I wondered if the same result would've occurred without our help.

D.D.M.&S.: There's no doubt with [illegible] modesty, I think we

can say that we've practically turned the country around.

D.D.O.: And Scooperman's landslide is only part of it. What's really significant to me is the reception to the speeches—by Henry and others—regarding *détente*, especially during the last month. This new national mood is what's going to be more important in the long run.

D.C.I.: We may have a momentum going here that will secure another 30 years for the agency and its friends.

I.G.: What about I.G. offices in the D.O.D. stations? Do we close down now that we've finished?

D.C.I.: Not yet. In the first place, we don't want to make any sudden moves right after the election. Better security to go slowly. But even then, we ought to think very carefully about what we dismantle. I mean, we ought to weigh the need for maintaining a capability for tutelage and control in the future.

D.D.M.&S.: The agency can't afford to let the situation in the country deteriorate like it did under Nixon. Certainly the agency should never let itself get exposed and weakened—first letting the White House try to pin Watergate on us, then having to run Butterworth and Deep Throat to counterattack. We made enemies both ways.

D.C.I.: I think we ought to keep the Citizens' Coalition going as a nonpartisan front for rebuilding the Cold War spirit, play up the element of fear of enemies abroad.

D.D.O.: And the Center for Democratic Action can easily continue as our clearing house for domestic political information—assessment of candidates, general analysis. After all, there'll be new elections in two years' time and we can't forget that it was the off-year elections in '74 that nearly did us in.

I.G.: I'll work out a system to keep personnel moving in and out of the detective agencies—it will give the older people a good bridge between the agency and retired service.

D.C.I.: The agencies can be modified for doing credit checks and other commercial business—maybe make up for Air America's profit decline. Bob, we'll need a budget for the next four years—plan where we'll get the money and which of the foreign liaison services will be used as channels. You know, as we multinationalize this operation, we may find ourselves with an international political institution even more effective than the one we have now—setting limits and giving guidance for political parties abroad. With our operations through local intelligence agencies overseas and the activities of the multinational corporations, we could have a world-wide organization none of us dared dream about before this.

D.D.O.: No doubt. PBPRIME must be permanent. I'm already working on new programs for the coalition to coincide with Scooperman's Inauguration.

D.C.I.: Speaking of the Inauguration, I'll be starting the usual briefings for the President-elect next week. I'll use the contact to take over personal direction of Scooperman from QRTEST. This will give us better control, fewer risks. I'm afraid our Israeli friend will have to be terminated. Jack, see that Black September gets enough data on his location and movements so that it can take care of this.

D.D.O.: QRTEST's file will be in Beirut by Monday. We've got good penetration of the Palestinian crowd.

D.C.I.: By the way, this morning I had a call from the Chase Manhattan. The Lakefront Conservation and Culture Society wants me to speak at its monthly luncheon next week. Do you suppose they had doubts after all?

Epilog

During the last week of January 1977, tape recordings containing these and other conversations related to Operation PBPRIME were delivered to the *Toronto Star* by persons unknown. Their authentication and publication stunned the world and provoked another institutional crisis in the United States.

Within four days, President Henry P. Scooperman resigned. Within two months, 25 active and retired officers of the Central Intelligence Agency, including the director and three top deputies, were indicted for violation of campaign-financing laws and other Federal statutes.

During the summer of 1977, Congress formally abolished the CIA, retaining only its research and analysis departments as a new Federal agency, the National Information Center. This agency is to have no overseas operatives, its only mandate being to evaluate information and prepare estimates based on other sources.

Meanwhile, Scooperman's Vice-President, whom Operation PBPRIME had failed to compromise, began to return American foreign policy to the goal of easing international tension. As a result, several important and unexpected concessions were made by the Soviet Union in disarmament negotiations.

In a less noticed activity, sometime during the summer of 1977, at 2 Dzerzhinsky Square, K.G.B. officer Yuri Shakalov, most recently assigned to the Soviet embassy in Washington, was decorated with the Order of the Red Star for outstanding and meritorious service.

In New York City, the Lakefront Conservation and Culture Society was also busy taking care of its own. Members held a series of urgent meetings to determine how to absorb into their companies as many as possible of the former officers of the now-defunct operations—or Clandestine Services—branch of the Central Intelligence Agency. ☒

CHICAGO TRIBUNE
12 AUGUST 1975

Ford 'promotes' CIA

CHICAGO—Any doubts about L. B. J.'s assessment of Ford's I. Q. should be dissipated by the President's latest statements decrying the current lid on CIA activities. His upset stems from his inability to use the CIA to "rescue" Portugal from its pro-Communist, revolutionary government.

Even while the controversy rages in this country over the role of the CIA; even while we are outraged at the gross antidemocratic and un-American activities perpetrated by this fascist organization; even while we are aghast at its opposition to free enterprise, free speech, and self-determination, our President announces his desire to promote further CIA intervention in the internal affairs of another nation.

What does it take to make these politicians realize the changes in understanding that have taken place within their constituencies in recent years?

John A. Tomczyk

TIMES RECORDER, Zanesville, Ohio
14 August 1975

Editorial

Intelligence Vital

CIA DEPUTY DIRECTOR Lt. Gen. Vernon A. Walters defended the work of his agency at a recent press briefing. The briefing, following a press luncheon, sponsored by the American Security Council, represented a departure from the agency's traditional "no comment" stance in the face of public criticism. Given the hysterics that have accompanied the criticism, it is to be hoped that the CIA will continue to set the public record straight.

"The United States is in the toughest power situation we have faced since Valley Forge," Walters explained. "This is the first time since then that a foreign power has had the power to cripple us a nation." The former career Army intelligence officer noted that the Soviet Union is now deploying four new generations of ICBMs and beefing up its total military capability well beyond its logical defensive needs.

"The question then becomes: what do they intend to use these weapons for?" he said. "It's up to the CIA to find out."

A recurring theme of Walters' remarks was that it is not the activities of the U.S. intelligence community that have changed so much as the perception of the threat against the country. Americans feel less threatened than they did [illegible] are less tolerant of the work of the CIA and its sister agencies.

Walters emphasized, however, that those who believe the threat has in fact decreased are deluding themselves. "The tactics may be different," he said, "but the goals have remained the same."

Walters also argued convincingly that the indiscretions of the CIA have been relatively few in relation to the scope of its work. "If you took a city of 50,000 (the total of the CIA's employees during its lifetime) and examined them carefully over 28 years, you would have more transgressions than the CIA has had."

Ideally, the current congressional hearings will result in guidelines that clearly spell out what the CIA can and cannot do. Present guidelines, which date to the agency's formation in 1947, purposely were left vague — a fact that unfortunately has given credence to charges that the agency has exceeded its mandate.

Although Walters is not optimistic that Congress will in fact offer such guidelines, for the good of the country and its vital intelligence operations it is to be hoped that his pessimism will go unrewarded.

SATURDAY REVIEW
6 Sept. 1975

The Condor's Bite

by Karl E. Meyer

I confess to a certain queasiness before seeing *Three Days of the Condor*, the first "big" post-Watergate film, starring Redford, Dunaway, *et al.* The movie was sired by the kind of conglomerate that can turn a condor into a boiled turkey. A Paramount release, it is presented by Dino de Laurentiis, produced by Stanley Schneider, and directed by Sydney Pollack, none of whom are renowned as political controversialists. Besides, how seriously can you take Robert Redford?

The answer, so far as *Condor* goes, is very seriously indeed. There is nothing rubbery about the bird's bite; this is, I found myself thinking, the most provocative film about the corruption of American institutions to reach the commercial screen. It asks us to believe that The Company, a.k.a. the Central Intelligence Agency, can exterminate its own employees, on American soil, and do so with every expectation of getting away with it. The film is also technically brilliant, and its performances have a repertory excellence, but this I found less of a surprise than the disenthralled brutality of its story.

The exterminees, so to speak, are CIA researchers working in a New York brownstone behind a doorplate reading "American Literary Historical Society." One of their number is Joe Turner (Robert Redford), whose job it is to pore over foreign books to see if some obscure potboiler contains a coded message. As the film opens, Redford believes he has indeed found such a code in a third-rate novel that has been mysteriously translated into various exotic languages. He reports his discovery to Company headquarters and, on an otherwise uneventful morning, ducks out the back door to buy lunch for his colleagues.

While Redford is gone, the exterminators arrive—an execution squad led by a contract killer, Joubert (Max von Sydow), who works with surgical nonchalance. Redford, lunch bag in hand, returns to find that his six co-workers are corpses. He dashes to a street telephone and reports the murder to Higgins (Cliff Robertson), the New York station chief; Redford is so rattled he nearly forgets his code name, Condor. Redford is ordered to "come in," and he reluctantly agrees to a rendezvous in a West Side alley on condition that a colleague whose face he knows will also be present. In the alley an attempt is made to kill Redford, and the familiar colleague, an appalled witness, is murdered.

None of this vivid footage will help in the next CIA recruitment campaign, and one can understand why Redford feels he must hide from his own employers. He does so by abducting at gunpoint Kathy (Faye Dunaway), a photographer who lives alone in Brooklyn Heights. Using her apartment as a base, and with Kathy's half-willing assistance, Redford penetrates the labyrinth of The Company and finds why he has been marked for death.

It transpires that a CIA-within-the-CIA has evolved, directed by the agency's fanatic Middle East section chief, who has been confecting his own plans for the subversion of oil-producing states. Unwittingly, Redford had stumbled upon the book code used by this network; to forestall exposure, the section chief had ordered the elimination of Redford's entire unit. Eventually, CIA higher-ups locate this fault in the system, and Max von Sydow is now paid to turn his guns on the insubordinate operative—which von Sydow does, with aplomb, in Redford's presence, and then coolly invites Redford to become a contract killer, too.

But Redford has other plans. Instead of "coming in," he tells the story to *The New York Times*; when the local station chief hears this, he looks at Redford as if he were mad but recovers quickly enough with the curtain line, "But will they print it?" (The bow to *The Times* was not in James Grady's 1974 novel, *Six Days of the Condor*, on which the film was based, but makes a nice lead-in, if pat, to Redford's present venture, which is, of course, the filming of *All the President's Men*, about a certain story that *was* printed.)

I have retold the plot in some detail, even at the risk of spoiling some of the suspense, because the film raises issues of such agonizing importance. Can we believe that the CIA operates "think tanks" in New York under spurious names? Of course. Can we also accept that the CIA, on occasion, will hire gunmen to wipe out its own? Ditto, if with a little more difficulty. But finally, can we believe that CIA agents can be murdered in the streets of New York with only a lying item in the press, planted by presumably compliant police? Too many people would have to be implicated in such a cover-up, too many friends and relatives would begin asking questions; we are not yet a totalitarian country. As film, *Condor* is more a warning than a documentary.

Still, I think it a mistake to be too literal-minded. *Condor* is really about what can be called the *diabolus ex machina*; suggestively, von Sydow's CIA code name is Lucifer. We are within a machine gone berserk—the opening credits are in computer printout type, and some of the most unnerving footage is in the CIA central operations room, reminiscent of Kubrick's similar room in *Dr. Strangelove*, with John Houseman, in a superlative brief appearance, playing a jaundiced Wasp version of Strangelove. The Company is run by men who are less immoral than amoral, believing that the higher needs of national security can sanction any crime, and that the worst crime is to let the outside world know this. And that I find very easy to believe: see the Rockefeller Commission report, *passim*.

Indeed, it is sobering to consider the prophetic paranoia of the movies. *The Manchurian Candidate* (1962) was about a conspiracy to assassinate a President, the chosen weapon being a sniper's bullet. In *State of Siege* (1973), the Costa-Gavras film with Yves Montand in the lead, the CIA was shown training Uruguayan police in torture techniques—and the picture was attacked for being simplistic (which it was) and inaccurate (about which I'm not so sure). Then there was *The Day of the Jackal* (1974), about a conspiracy to kill General de Gaulle, with a professional killer hired for the job. It now develops that the CIA was approached on just such a scheme—a story as yet unconfirmed, and I would like to believe that even The Company is too fastidious to treat with jackals. But I wouldn't go to the stake on that.

In *Condor* all the elements miraculously fuse together: a tight script, superbly paced direction, and acting of credible polish. What can happen, in a spy thriller *cum* politics, when the elements fail to cohere is sadly evident in *The Wilby Conspiracy*, a well-intended film set in apartheid-ridden South Africa. Sidney Poitier plays a black revolutionary so virtuous that we cannot believe in him; Michael Caine, his English accomplice, obviously doesn't, because Caine goes through the motions with his tired reflex mannerisms. In fact—and this was not the intention of director Ralph Nelson—we find ourselves exulting in the villain, a South African security officer played by Nicol Williamson. The screen comes to life when Williamson leers, and it is a pity that his legendary talent, so infrequently seen, is squandered on cinematic kitsch.

Wilby shows that high-mindedness is not enough; *Condor* proves that a principled film can be as compelling as *Jaws*. In fact, the panjandrums who run the Motion Picture Academy can be grateful for *Jaws*, because when it comes time to hand out the Oscars during the Bicentennial year—of all years—the mechanical shark may spare the Academy the embarrassment of honoring a film that suggests we live in a country in which a good guy is surpassingly hard to find. □

Karl E. Meyer, a film buff and former Washington Post *correspondent, was co-author of* The Cuban Invasion, *the first book about the Bay of Pigs.*

LONDON TIMES
21 August 1975

CIA 'gave technological support to Israel to make atomic bomb after 1956 Suez war'

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1957 and 1958 provided the Israelis with the technological support needed to help them manufacture the atomic bomb, it was disclosed yesterday.

According to Tad Szulc, former foreign and diplomatic correspondent of *The New York Times*, the operation was carried out by the CIA's Counterintelligence Staff, then headed by Mr James Angleton, the man dismissed last December when Mr William Colby, the director, and his agency came under fire for alleged illegal domestic activities.

Mr Szulc is now a freelance and has contributed to *Foreign Affairs Quarterly*.

Writing in the September issue of *Penthouse* magazine, he says:

"Although the details of the Israeli nuclear enterprise are still top secret, it is known that in the wake of the 1956 Suez War, the Eisenhower Administration resolved to provide Israel with all possible help in developing an atomic weapon.

"The Israelis had the theoretical knowledge, but they needed technological support at their Dimona nuclear research centre in the Negev Desert."

According to top intelligence sources, Mr Szulc says, "the CIA was charged with the responsibility of providing this support to the Israelis—and Angleton directed the effort.

"Several nuclear scientists were secretly sent to Israel to work with Dimona scientists. The most important of them was a British-born physicist, now an American citizen working for the United States Government in Washington, with special and esoteric ties to the CIA."

The article goes on to say that persons close to Mr Angleton have confirmed this account in recent interviews. Reflecting Mr Angleton's own position, however, they have denied assertions from other sources that the CIA team made fissionable material—plutonium—available to the Israelis from United States stocks.

Mr Szulc asserts that "Angleton's firing was related to the preeminent role he played in the relations between the CIA and Israeli intelligence, something which both Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Colby had resented for a long time. The domestic spying controversy was a convenient excuse for doing away with Angleton and his strongly pro-Israel personal views".

The *Penthouse* article is one of a series on the role of the United States intelligence agencies. It also discloses that the CIA attempted to kill President Sukarno of Indonesia in the late 1950s, and that in 1958 the CIA seriously considered the murder of Mr Chou En-lai, the Chinese Prime Minister, during a visit to Rangoon.

The latter plot was never carried forward, but the attempt at Dr Sukarno's life was aborted and "at least one American pilot, employed by the CIA, was captured by Sukarno's forces during the coup attempt".

Mr Szulc explains: "To kill Sukarno the CIA, according to intelligence sources, planned to fire a shell from a ceremonial 105mm cannon in front of the presidential palace while Sukarno spoke from a balcony. The plan, however, was vetoed on the highest levels in Washington."

Concerning the Chou En-lai assassination plot, Mr Szulc says the setting was to be his visit to Rangoon. "This was at the beginning of the Soviet-Chinese split, and apparently the CIA reasoned that Chou's death would aggravate the developing split."

He continues: "The notion was that Chou was a moderate and thus posed an obstacle to a possible Soviet-Chinese confrontation. Furthermore, intelligence sources said, the CIA planned, by the dissemination of 'disinformation' through intelligence channels, to lead the Chinese to believe that Chou was killed by the Russian KGB (secret police).

Mr Szulc goes on to say: "This murder plot, which was also stopped by Washington, provided for a Burmese CIA agent to place untraceable poison in a rice bowl from which Chou was expected to be eating at a government dinner in his honour".

This particular poison, intelligence sources said, "would have acted within 48 hours and there would be no trace of it if an autopsy were performed. The plan was countermanded at the last moment".

NEW YORK TIMES
21 August 1975

COURT BARS A MOVE TO SEIZE C.I.A. FILES

A motion to compel the Central Intelligence Agency to turn over all its files on Grove Press to a court for safekeeping was rejected yesterday by Judge Kevin Thomas Duffy in Federal District Court in Manhattan.

Lawyers for Grove Press and its president, Barnet Rosset, made the motion last month in their lawsuit seeking more than $10-million in damages from the C.I.A. for alleged wiretapping and other illegal activities against the publishing house.

Grove Press had complained in its motion that the C.I.A. might destroy or alter the disputed documents in its files unless the material was delivered to the Federal District Court, but the general counsel of the C.I.A. submitted a sworn statement pledging that none of the material would be destroyed or altered.

Judge Duffy ruled that Grove Press had not met the requirements for a preliminary injunction and that there was no reason to doubt the Government's counsel's promise that all the documents would be preserved pending the outcome of the suit.

NEWS-FREE PRESS, Chattanooga
22 August 1975

The 'Real Issue'

Are Americans more interested in all the "dirty tricks" of Central Intelligence Agency's past operations or in that agency's ability to observe potential enemies and help to prevent the downfall of the U.S.? If so, they had better make that interest known, for current investigations of the CIA may have a real bearing on our future security.

Lt. Gen. Vernon Walters, the CIA's deputy director, had some strong words of defense for the agency and warnings for the country in his speech this week at the Veterans of Foreign Wars annual convention. Particularly did he seek to pinpoint the "real issue" in the spy operations.

He said what Americans should be concerned about today is not truth or falsehood of allegations about the CIA activities, most of which he discounted as "rummaging through the garbage pails of history." The general said, "The real issue is this. Is the United States as a free and democratic nation going to have eyes to see and ears to hear? Or are we going to stumble into the future, blind and deaf, until the day we have to choose between abject humiliation and nuclear blackmail."

Of course, he and many others fear the latter prospect if, as Gen. Walters says, the CIA is "tied hand and foot and our pockets are turned inside out and contents exposed for every foreigner to look at." The general insists that "we cannot operate with all of our secrets being turned out for public view."

Patriots defending both the CIA and its domestic counterpart, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, agree that the agencies should operate within the legal structure of their charters, particularly where it concerns respect for privacy of American citizens. At the same time, the agencies' friends do not wish to see these secret operations compelled to become so public that they are ineffective.

They join Gen. Walters in his concern about criticism in the 1990s more than they worry about what the CIA doesn't do during the 1970s. The implications of danger to this nation's continued existence are clear in his words:

"What I'm concerned about is if our successors will be asked, 'You mean you failed to do this?' 'You mean you didn't do that?' 'You mean you weren't watching for this?'"

WASHINGTON POST
2 September 1975

Ex-CIA Aide Set to Talk Of Drug File

By Bill Richards
Washington Post Staff Writer

A former senior CIA official who disappeared after ordering the destruction of most of the intelligence agency's files on its illegal drug testing program has resurfaced here and is believed preparing to be called for testimony on CIA drug activities, according to government and other legal sources.

The sources said Dr. Sidney Gottlieb, who headed the CIA's Technical Services Division and was in overall charge of the agency's drug tests at his retirement in 1973, returned here recently and has retained former Senate Watergate Committee counsel Terry Lenzner as his lawyer. Lenzner declined last week to either confirm or deny that he had been retained to represent Gottlieb.

Gottlieb, 57, was responsible for overseeing the destruction of 152 files covering virtually all of the CIA's drug testing, including some on unsuspecting individuals which the Rockefeller Commission on the CIA called "clearly illegal," commission sources said.

In its June report, the commission noted that it was forced to work from limited information because of the destruction of the files. It did not name the person responsible for getting rid of the documents, but a senior commission source said recently that Gottlieb had been the one in charge of the file destruction.

"No one would take responsibility for those files being destroyed and we asked questions right up to the top," said the commission source. "Gottlieb was in charge of their destruction, but we never learned whether he received his orders from someone even higher."

The Rockefeller Commission source said the commission's investigators attempted to reach Gottlieb for questioning but were told by the agency that he was out of the country and was unavailable. Gottlieb was believed to have been in India during the Rockefeller investigation although The Washington Post has learned that his mail was being delivered to an address in the Denver area during that time.

The Justice Department, looking into information compiled by the Rockefeller Commission for possible illegalities, has not yet sought to question Gottlieb, it was learned last week.

The CIA's testing of drugs on persons who were not aware of the tests was one of the few specific actions of the agency, which the commission's 299-page report labeled illegal.

Commission sources said in most cases they were not able to gain specific names of persons who were given drugs, such as LSD, because of the missing files. The sources said they also were unable to learn whether behavior-influencing drugs were administered to anyone outside the U.S. by the CIA.

The one specific example of a drug being administered by the CIA to an unsuspecting person was described by the commission—without any person being named—as occurring in 1953.

In that instance at least three CIA agents, including Gottlieb, were with a group of Army scientists during a gathering in Western Maryland when the scientists were unknowingly given LSD. One of the scientists, Dr. Frank Olson, apparently suffered a mental breakdown after the episode and, according to the CIA, jumped to his death from a New York City hotel window nine days later.

Olson's family never was told that he had been given the drug and learned the details of the incident only after publication of the Rockefeller Commission report. The family has announced its intention to sue the CIA and has received an apology from President Ford, along with a promise that it would be given all the available documents concerning the affair from the CIA.

One of the CIA agents at the Western Maryland meeting where Olson got the LSD has since died and a second, Robert Lashbrook, has retired from the intelligence agency. Lashbrook told The Post that he was not responsible for giving the drug to Olson or the other scientists, but he declined to say who did authorize administering LSD to the unsuspecting scientists. The Rockefeller Commission said all the CIA agents at the meeting were reprimanded by the agency.

Rockefeller Commission sources said Gottlieb, who holds a Ph.D. in chemistry, operated the CIA's secret drug testing program in the years following Olson's death, although the Olson incident apparently caused the agency to bring in psychiatrists on its testing after the scientist's death.

According to the commission's report, all testing of "potentially dangerous substances" on unsuspecting persons was halted in 1963. A senior staff source on the commission said last week that the records ordered destroyed by Gottlieb may have contained evidence of such testing through 1973.

The destruction of the CIA's drug files and Gottlieb's disappearance before the Rockefeller commission investigation compounded the CIA's earlier cloak of secrecy surrounding its drug activities and prevented commission investigators from obtaining many specifics about the drug tests, according to a commission source.

Even within the agency there apparently was a preoccupation with secrecy about drugs. In 1963, the CIA's Inspector General prepared a report on more than 100 pages on the agency's technical services division which handled, among other things, some of the drug testing. An addendum to the overall report—separate and with a higher security classification—was made about the drug program.

In their book this year about the CIA, John Marks and former agency official Victor Marchetti note that a staff officer preparing a compendium of all agency research ties to various universities specifically was told to leave out any mention of research programs involving the use of drugs.

One CIA-funded research project involving drugs was conducted from 1964 through 1967 at the Texas Research Institute of Mental Sciences in Houston. The CIA took pains to disguise its financing of the project by using the Air Force as a cover and results of the tests were given to a private West Coast company that also functioned as a CIA cover, according to Dr. Neil Burch, director of the Texas program.

It is not known whether Gottlieb was connected with the Texas research, but Rockefeller commission sources said he was in charge of much of the CIAs' drug test research during the 1960s.

According to former CIA agent Lashbrook, the agency was particularly concerned in the 1950s and 1960s that LSD and other drugs might be used on American officials aborad. Lashbrook said the CIA also was interested in the possibility of using various drugs on foreign officials.

Before he joined the CIA in 1951, Gottlieb worked for three years as a research associate at the University of Maryland. A university spokesman said last week that the school terminated its official connection with Gottlieb when he joined the intelligence agency. Other former associates of Gottlieb said that as late as 1957 he used the university as a personal cover at a national conference of the American Chemical Society in Miami.

According to once source who was a former CIA agent, Gottlieb also was one of several contacts the agency maintained on an informal basis with the Army's drug research program at Edgewood Arsenal in Maryland. The civilian director of the Army's program has denied that any liaison existed between the CIA and the Army at Edgewood.

Gottlieb also was reported to have worked closely with the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs during the 1960s. After his retirement from the CIA in 1973, Gottlieb worked for a short time as a consultant to the BNDD's successor, the Drug Enforcement Agency, and helped reorganize the DEA's department of science and technology.

John Bartels, who was director of the DEA in 1973, said Gottlieb had agreed to take the consulting job after giving specific warning that he was planning to leave and travel around the world.

Another former top DEA official said that Gottlieb's abrupt departure from the DEA caught officials there by surprise.

"One minute we were all working quite closely together," the official, who asked not to be named, recalled last week. "Gottlieb was in the middle of making some very important decisions when all of a sudden he was gone and we were told there was no way anyone could contact him. It all seemed very sudden and mysterious."

GENERAL

DAILY TELEGRAPH, London
28 July 1975

DAVID FLOYD on Russia's "concessions" at Helsinki

Sterile eggs in "Basket Three"

AFTER many long months of frustrating negotiations Western statesmen are going to Helsinki this week to sign the "Final Act" of the European Security Conference without having extracted any substantial concession from the Russians over "Basket Three." Under this heading it was hoped that some progress would be made towards improving the flow of people, information and ideas across the Iron Curtain.

Now that the final documents to be signed are available it can be seen that, even on paper, the Russians have given very little away. In practice things will remain very much as they were before Helsinki.

In fairness to them it must be said that neither the Soviet leaders nor the men who rule Eastern Europe ever let it be thought that they were going to open up the Communist world to Western influences in the interest of "détente", or European security. The ideological battle between East and West must go on, they said. And they put up a stubborn defence to Western efforts to stimulate the free flow of people and ideas.

It was only when it seemed possible that their stonewalling might prevent the Helsinki "summit" from taking place this month, and that Mr Brezhnev's programme of events for 1975 might be upset, that the Soviet negotiators yielded a little. The tired Western diplomats gave in: anything to get it over and done with.

And yet Basket Three is really the essence of the whole affair. The other "baskets" are mainly statements of general principles governing East-West relations; and their central political purpose, from the Soviet point of view, is to legitimise Russian domination of post-war gains in Eastern Europe. Basket Three was to be the price the Russians had to pay for their political gains.

If Mr Brezhnev was so anxious to have his summit meeting—and the Russians, we are told, "fought like tigers" to have it in July—then, it was argued, he must be ready to make some concessions, to lower a little the barriers between East and West. What concessions has he made?

As far as the flow of information is concerned, the Western negotiators pressed for a greater availability of Western publications in the East. While Communist publications are available in unlimited quantities in the West, the entry of Western newspapers, periodicals and books into Communist countries and their distribution there is subject to the strictest control and censorship. Now at Helsinki the Communist States will undertake to increase "gradually" the number of publications they will import and make them more easily available to their citizens.

There is no question here of a *free* flow of information or even of fiction into the Communist countries, nor any suggestion that the authorities in Russia and Eastern Europe will cease to control very carefully what their people are allowed to read. There is little hope here that the average Soviet citizen, or Polish or Czech citizen, will have anything like free access to news about the outside world or the ideas circulating there.

The other way in which people living in Communist countries could obtain information about the West would be by travelling there and being free to make their own contacts and inquiries. The signatories of the Helsinki documents will undertake to facilitate tourism "on an individual or collective basis."

This will make little difference to practice in the West, where anyone who wishes and has the money can go abroad, and to a Communist country if he chooses. But Communist Governments do not acknowledge the *right* of their citizens to travel abroad at all: they are allowed to only as a favour, and then usually in closely controlled groups.

It is safe to say that those who are most interested in the West and whose minds are most open to Western ideas will have the least chance of travelling. There is no suggestion that Communist Governments will cease to select very carefully who may have the coveted prize of a trip abroad.

Then there is the question of Western access to reliable information about the Communist countries, the principal channel for which is provided by the despatches and reports sent out by the correspondents of news agencies, newspapers and radio and television stations working in Communist capitals. Few people who read the results of their work realise under what difficult conditions they have to operate.

Many restrictions

The correspondent working in Moscow is hedged in on every side by obstacles to his obtaining any information apart from what the authorities wish him to have. He cannot leave Moscow without permission, and half the Soviet Union is in any case permanently out of bounds to him. He is not supposed to approach any Soviet institution or even any Soviet citizen directly, but only through the Press department of the Foreign Ministry, which carefully monitors his messages. He is under constant threat of being expelled if he fails to comply with the strict rules. At the same time, Communist correspondents in the West are free to come and go and write as they please.

Now the Russians have promised to improve the journalist's lot. Applications for visas will be examined "in a favourable spirit and within a suitable and reasonable time scale." Travel facilities will be improved; access to sources of information will be extended; and it is promised that "the legitimate pursuit of their professional activity will neither render journalists liable to expulsion nor otherwise penalise them." But the Soviet authorities will, of course, be the arbiters of what is and is not "legitimate."

As was to be expected, the Soviet concessions on the flow of information are slight indeed. This was not the fault of the Western negotiators, nor perhaps even of the Soviet ones, so much as of the system itself. After all, even in the midst of the recent Apollo-Soyuz space spectacular the Russians found "technical difficulties" to avoid taking TV pictures which would have revealed that Apollo was twice as big as Soyuz. Technical snags can always be found for evading agreements.

But for Mr Brezhnev and the Soviet apparatchiki to have got to Helsinki having given so little away will hardly have the effect of softening up the Soviet system. On the contrary, their self-confidence will be all the greater, both in their treatment of their own people and in their relations with the subject nations of Eastern Europe.

The past decade in the Soviet Union, since the removal of Khruschev, has been one of consolidation and stabilisation. The hopes of "liberalisation" raised by Khruschev's wavering rule have been forgotten, and most of those who pressed for political change in the Soviet system are now silent, in prison camps or psychiatric hospitals, or—the luckier ones—in the West. Jewish emigration has been drastically reduced. The K G B has practically suppressed the dissidents.

That is not to say that all is well with the Soviet system. Discontent is widespread—among religious believers and intellectuals, among the non-Russian population and among the young people, for whom Communism or Marxism has no appeal. Industry, geared to military needs, cannot satisfy consumer demand. Agriculture, hopelessly inefficient, cannot feed the population without periodic purchases of grain from the West.

But these are now the constants of the system, which no Soviet leader seriously hopes to remove The system has other advantages. As Alexander Solzhenitsyn said recently in Washington: "It is a system which has no legislative organs, is without an independent Press and without an independent judiciary, in which the people have no influence on foreign or domestic policy, and where any thought differing from that the State thinks is crushed."

The same can be said with equal justice of the political régimes of all the countries of Eastern Europe, which have been brought into line in the 30 years since Yalta. The latest to try to step out of line, Czechoslovakia, was taught a brutal lesson in 1968, since when an uneasy calm has descended on the whole area. Once again the peoples of Eastern Europe learned the lesson of Munich in 1938, Yalta in 1945, Czechoslovakia in 1948 and Hungary in 1956: that they had little to hope for from the West.

With 27 divisions stationed permanently in Eastern Europe, and another 50 ready to move in at short notice, the Russians are pressing ahead with the process of political, economic and military integration. It is on this situation that the Helsinki summit is to put the seal of Western approval.

The virtuous formulations in the Helsinki documents have no more relation to political reality than did the Yalta agreement which "guaranteed" free elections in Eastern Europe or, for that matter, than has the Soviet constitution which "guarantees" all the democratic freedoms to Soviet citizens. The Western statesmen who go to Finland, some reluctantly, some less so, may believe they are serving the cause of "détente," whatever that is. They are certainly not serving the cause of freedom.

LONDON OBSERVER
3 August 1975

Why the West may live to regret Helsinki

EDWARD CRANKSHAW explains the importance of the summit for the Russians: 'They long to be respectable'

'A NECESSARY summing up of the political outcome of the Second World War' was Mr Brezhnev's modest definition of the main achievement of the Helsinki jamboree. In so far as the assembly of 35 nations recognised the *status quo* in Eastern and Central Europe, established by Russian arms in the interest of Russian power, I suppose it is fair enough to call this a summing up of a political outcome. But necessary?

Certainly far from necessary to us, or to anybody else except the Russians. That it seemed very necessary to Mr Brezhnev we know from the way he has gone on about it for so many years. But one still has to ask why the leader of one of the greatest Powers in the world finds it at all necessary to devote so much time and energy, and to invest so much prestige, in the realisation of a rather childish get-together, which neither increases the security of the Soviet Union (or anybody else), nor adds a millimetre to its real stature.

Russian motivations are always complicated and usually obscure. Historians still argue about the true intentions of Nicholas I towards Turkey on the eve of the Crimean War. Not all the secrets of all the archives yield up a firm answer—and one good reason, it seems to me, is that Nicholas himself did not know what his own intentions were from one week to the next.

We are similarly in the dark about what went on in the mind of his grandson, Nicholas II, when, in 1898, he startled an unbelieving world by demanding a grand disarmament conference, the forerunner of all others. He got his conference—at The Hague. Nothing was done about disarmament, of course, but certain rules for the conduct of war came out of it. Some historians insist that Nicholas was moved by genuine idealism, in the spirit of the old Holy Alliance. Others see in it a rather desperate attempt to stop Austria re-equipping its army with new guns which Russia could not match. Nicholas himself would have been hard put to it to say which was right. I think the contemporary Soviet leadership is also unsure about its immediate objectives.

So historians will doubtless be arguing about Helsinki for many years to come. Was it conceived as a genuine move towards détente, or as a means of strengthening the Russian hold on Eastern Europe, or both? If the first, what can this sort of meeting achieve that is not achieved better by quiet diplomacy? If the second, how can speech-making in Finland strengthen a position which depends on force of arms?

My own view is that much of the drive towards Helsinki came from a need to feel good, which was frequently a complicating factor in pre-revolutionary Russian statesmanship, and is now surfacing again after the Stalin era, during which the idea of goodness did not arise. We are so familiar with the need of the English to convince themselves of the nobility of even their shabbiest actions, that we forget that other nations may be similarly afflicted. It is a characteristic of English politicians that they often do not care what others think of them, provided they can convince themselves that they are acting with motives of the highest rectitude.

Russians, on the contrary, tend to be rather touchingly eager for others to believe them, and the bigger the lie the greater the need. They long to appear respectable. Helsinki has been a sort of apotheosis for a man like Mr Brezhnev, who achieved high office under Stalin and managed to hang on to it by methods very far removed

from the respectable.

Sealed with red tape

Again, Russian statesmen have never liked untidiness. They are great believers in the virtue of formal documents, signed and sealed by all concerned, and neatly done up with red tape—even if the documents mean very little. Russian statesmen have always felt most powerfully, with all the passion of anarchic spirits, the need to go by the book.

How much more must this apply to Russian Communists, proud custodians of the one and only book, men who assure themselves every hour of their waking day that all their actions accord with the grand theoretical design. How does East Europe fit into this design? Certainly they are all-powerful in Eastern and Central Europe: nobody is going to drive them out and they know it. But what is their authority for this indubitable power?

It is all very well for them to tell themselves that they exercise no power other than their strong right arm, upon which all fellow Communists may rely. This has come in useful in the past and doubtless will again. But it cuts very little ice in the larger world, and the appearance of tanks in rebellious city streets does not immediately bring to mind an image of moral rectitude. What Helsinki has done is bring all Europe and North America to something like a declared joint recognition of a situation only tacitly acknowledged so far. And this, I think, is as spiritually uplifting for Mr Brezhnev and his friends as it is depressing for all those Poles, Czechs, Hungarians, etc., who have found comfort in the refusal of the West to agree that current arrangements are in any way sacrosanct.

Mr Brezhnev had something to say about national sovereignty, too. 'It is only the people of each given State, and no one else, that has the sovereign right to resolve its internal affairs and establish internal laws.' This observation, said our Mr Wilson, is an important statement, which he took very seriously. But what does it mean? Mr Wilson seemed to think that it inhibited Russian intervention anywhere, that it meant the end of the Brezhnev doctrine, that had it been spelt out before 1968, Czechoslovakia would not have been invaded.

I wonder. Russia can send troops wherever there are Communists in power and whenever it likes, without in the least technically infringing national sovereignty. All it has to do is to declare that the comrades in Prague, or wherever, have appealed to Moscow for help against counter-revolution. The Warsaw Pact forces may then swarm in to the rescue.

I think that Mr Wilson, and all of us, will find that the sovereign right Mr Brezhnev was thinking about was the sovereign right of the Soviet Union to do what it likes with its own citizens and to reject all outside protests. Mr Brezhnev must be free to go on using the KGB to persecute Jews for applying to leave the country, to torture a Bukovsky slowly to death, to consign a Grigorenko to a lunatic asylum, to stop ordinary Russians from travelling abroad and mixing with foreigners at home.

The Berlin Wall still stands. There is nothing we can do about it, and of course it is better to have a working relationship with a Russia which is at least a more civilised place than it was some years ago than cut ourselves off from it entirely. But there are working arrangements and working arrangements. Russia has not recanted its open declaration of ideological warfare under the banner of co-existence. And ideological warfare to them is not simply a matter of intellectual debate: it means no holds barred in strengthening subversive movements wherever they can be found and controlled in the name of Communism.

This is unfriendly activity, and should be seen and treated as such. In so far as Helsinki helped to dress up a hostile Power in a cloak of respectability, it was not only a betrayal of the victims of oppression, it was self-betrayal, too.

Sunday, August 31, 1975

THE WASHINGTON POST

Kissinger Papers Photographed

MILAN, Aug. 30 (UPI) — An Italian weekly has published telephoto pictures of Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger looking at a handwritten note from President Ford, and secret documents, some of which are readable.

The photographs were taken at the European summit conference in Helsinki last month, it said.

In some of the photographs published Friday the text of the documents is readable, but in others the reproduction is unclear and the magazine supplied an Italian translation of what they reportedly said.

The magazine, Domenica del Corriere, is published by the newspaper Corriere della Sera and has a circulation of 800,000. It said the photographs were taken by Franco Rossi with a 600 mm. telephoto lens from the photographers' gallery overlooking the conference floor July 30, the opening day of the summit.

Mr. Ford is shown passing a note to Kissinger which reads in part: "... Do we have to play East and West in [not legible] confrontation. Why not amplify HOPE which all want get our actions end at that."

The word "hope" was underlined twice as well as capitalized.

Other photographs show Kissinger reading — or a hand said to be his holding — memoranda marked "Top Secret." The magazine says they:

- Predict a "coalition" government in Saigon within a month.
- Describe relations between France and North Vietnam as "strained."
- Report Chinese "advisers" in Cambodia who seem to be commanding Communist forces.
- List Joan Baez and Cora Weiss among "peace activists" who turned out to welcome South Vietnamese Communists to New York.

DAILY TELEGRAPH, London
14 August 1975

What the Soviet Union is getting away with

Detente: the danger to democracy

By GEORGE MEANY

President of the AFL-CIO, the American equivalent of the TUC

THE alternative to *détente*, we are repeatedly told, is holocaust. Either the East and the West bury their differences, or we shall bury each other.

Thus put, *détente* is irresistible. Nothing else seems rational; nothing is worth the destruction of the human race. No ideology, no values, no institutions, however virtuous, can be vindicated by history if there are no people left on the planet.

So, if *détente* offers the only detour, the only accessible turn-off, from the collision course of the super-Powers, it must necessarily be in the interest of all people everywhere, including of course the workers of the democratic countries.

But that's a very big if.

What if this popular conception of *détente* is wrong? What if the term itself has taken on meanings that have nothing to do with the realities of international life? What if *détente* in fact serves as a mask to disguise dangerous trends that ultimately lead to the destruction of democracy, or to the very global conflagration that *détente* was intended to avert, or to both?

What if, in fact, détente is appeasement by another name? What if *détente* does not deter but rather feeds and encourages the forces of war and totalitarianism? Then, it seems to me, the workers in the democratic countries have everything to lose and nothing to gain.

There is no doubt that among many intellectuals in the West the embracing of *détente* has been accompanied by a tendency to downgrade Western institutions, particularly the set of practices we call political democracy. After all, they say, the United States has its Watergate and Vietnam; besides, democracy may be a luxury the affluent countries can afford, but it doesn't feed anybody, etc., etc.

Now, it may be argued that, logically, these two views need not be connected; and I suppose it is true that the pursuit of *détente* does not necessarily have to entail the depreciation of Western political values and institutions. But abstract logic is not the compelling factor behind the quest for *détente*. The compelling factor is a form of wishful thinking, and in reality those promoting the virtues of *détente* feel the need to narrow the gap — no, the vast chasm — that separates the two social systems. Did not your own Clive Jenkins profess to see little difference between your MI6 and the Soviet KGB?

Or, in a similar vein, when the President of the United States, acting on the advice of the Secretary of State, declines to see Alexander Solzhenitsyn on the grounds that doing so might offend the commissars, then clearly the White House itself has been morally subverted by Communist pressure.

Since the President's discourtesy really originates from the American architect of the *détente* policy, it offers a profound insight into the real meaning of *détente* in the eyes of Dr Kissinger. There is no action too abject, too dishonourable, or too disgraceful of our best traditions but that Dr Kissinger will cheerfully carry it out in return for Soviet smiles.

So, on the record so far, *détente* has brought about no favourable changes within the Soviet bloc — certainly no easing of the plight of Soviet dissidents — but it has brought about some unfavourable developments within the West, including, it would seem, the downgrading of anti-Communism as an integral part of the democratic philosophy.

This is a matter of no small importance to the working man of the West. Political democracy recognises that groups and classes of people have conflicting interests, and lays out the means by which conflicts can be expressed and resolved.

Since Communist societies proclaim that they have abolished class conflict, they naturally purport to have no need of these means. But for working people in the Western world political democracy has not been a disposable luxury. It has provided the essential tools by which workers could create unions and acquire the power to advance their social and economic interests. Without the freedoms of speech, assembly, association and other modes of collective expression a union simply cannot function. Then you have a society in which it is presumed that the worker is not the best judge of his own interests, and that those interests must be defined and decided by somebody else in the society, i.e. the State.

Different function

This is, of course, the very system that prevails in the Soviet Union. The destruction of independent workers' organisations — no less thorough than under fascist régimes — is justified in the Communist world by an ideology that claims to have seized control of the State for the workers. The bitter and illuminating irony, of course, lies in the absence of any means by which the workers themselves, can, even indirectly, ratify — or reject — this seizure of power in their name.

This is why the AFL-CIO has refused, and will continue to refuse, to engage in exchange visits with representatives of so-called unions behind the Iron Curtain. They simply are not unions. They are instruments of the State, whose function is the regimentation, not the representation, of workers. To legitimate them as trade unions amounts to a betrayal of the Russian workers.

Governments must relate to one another regardless of the social systems they represent. The dreams of anarchists to the contrary notwithstanding, there can be no power vacuum within a country: somebody has to govern.

The same standards cannot be applied to unions. There are countries where they don't exist, there are parts of my country where unions are weak or non-existent — or where so-called "company unions" exist. We don't invite them into our federation just because they are the only show in town. We think it is vital to maintain the distinction between real unions and phoney unions. Western history in this century is full of examples of the terrible consequences that flow from calling things unions that are not unions.

In sum, then, I am arguing that to the extent that the present policy of *détente* leads to a depreciation of democratic values in the West — and I see considerable evidence of this already — it will be even more harmful for the working man than for anyone else. Remember, the trade union movement's commitment to democracy grows out of the very commonsensical observation that a system that puts numbers above wealth is likely to produce a better deal for the worker than any system that diminishes, frustrates or obliterates majority rule.

What! is this *détente* in whose name the President of the United States snubs one of the greatest writers and freedom fighters of the 20th century?

Détente is not supposed to be a vague understanding, a spontaneous thaw in the cold war. It is encoded in a specific agreement — signed by Nixon and Brezhnev in May, 1972 — which provides for "co-operation" between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. It is not merely a negative restraint, it is positive. It includes an agreement that each side notify the other of any potential local flare-up that might spread and envelop the super-Powers themselves.

What have been the fruits of this *détente*? Eighteen months after

the agreement had been signed the Soviet Union failed to notify the United States of Egyptian-Syrian preparations to launch the Yom Kippur war, of which she had advance knowledge. Moreover, anyone who remembers how the Soviets summoned Henry Kissinger to Moscow to arrange a cease-fire —after having refused to go along with U.S. pleas for U.N. action—knows that the Russians used *détente* to save the Egyptian Third Army Corps from destruction and to deprive Israel of a deserved military victory. To this day, the Soviet role in the Middle East has been destabilising, not peaceful.

And in Vietnam? When even the Vietnamese sought to persuade Hanoi not to go for total military victory but to enter negotiations that would produce a Viet Cong Government, was there any evidence that the Soviets intervened on behalf of moderation?

In Portugal at this moment, is there anyone who will argue that the Russians are restraining Mr Cunhal and his Communist party—whose members marched through the streets with pictures of Stalin!—from seizing power over a people from whom they just received barely 15 per cent. of the vote?

Wherever there is trouble in the world today one looks in vain for a shred of hard evidence that the Soviets are following a course of *détente*.

But that's not quite true. They are following *détente* of a kind —their kind. Their version of *détente* is very simple: they take, take, take and give nothing in return.

Détente means we give the Soviets sophisticated Western technology — especially civilian computer technology. We also finance truck plants, nitrogen fertiliser factories, natural gas production, etc.

You might think that a country that needs such technological assistance must at least be doing something all right agriculturally. Not so. In addition to giving the Soviets our superior technology, we must also sell them food to feed their people.

Western workers are being called upon to bail out the Russian economy—to save it from the catastrophe of totalitarian central planning geared to war production. And make no mistake about it—it's the workers who are footing the bill.

The inflation that cuts into the purchasing power of the American worker is largely the result of skyrocketing food and fuel costs—in both of which Soviet policy played a basic role. The cost to the American housewife of the last big Russian grain deal has been put at over a billion dollars, not to mention the 300 million dollars in subsidies paid out by the American taxpayer.

So far the Soviet economy doesn't seem to produce much that Americans need, but that could change, especially with the help of exported American technology. Already some Soviet cars and tractors are making their way into the U.S. at very competitive prices—remember, the Russians can set whatever prices they like on their exports. In their economic system, pricing policies can be made to serve political goals. Unlike our Western businessmen, the Soviets' prime purpose is not related to private profit.

Our businessmen seem to have an unshakable faith in the power of commerce to achieve practically every imaginable goal—to end war, expand justice, raise living standards. What we have here is a version of the "trickle down" theory applied on an international scale.

But we in the American trade union movement don't buy the "trickle down" theory. We don't buy it at home, and we don't see why we should buy it abroad. It has never worked for us.

We believe that the cause of social and economic justice in the United States must be pursued directly and head-on. That's what the AFL-CIO is in business for. We also believe the cause of peace must be pursued directly, not as a hoped-for fallout from dubious commercial relationships. (We ought not to forget that Germany was Britain's chief trading partner on the eve of both world wars.)

The fact is that a policy of firm resistance to Communist expansion, backed by the military means to make the policy credible, is the best way to keep the peace. When such a policy was followed in Cuba in 1962, it brought no conflagration but a Soviet retreat (and, subsequently, a slight thaw in Soviet-American relations based on a healthy respect for American power). Our stand in Korea stopped Communist expansion there—without bringing on World War III. Scare words like "cold warrior" should not blind us to the fact that it was America's nuclear superiority that prevented World War III, not peaceful Soviet intentions.

In addition, we need to recognise where the real threat to peace originates today. In an earlier time it originated in fascist régimes. Does anyone really believe there is a global expansionist fascist threat in the world today? Where are Franco's armies marching?

Is there a threat from the Western democracies? Are they embarked on a holy war to roll back the Communist gains? Is the United States attempting to liberate Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, East Germany? Do we have political parties in these countries—or in the Soviet Union itself—that serve as instrumentalities of our Government?

No policy for peace—whether it goes by the name of *détente* or something else—can be successful unless it is based on a clear recognition of where the threat to peace comes from. In our era, that threat comes mainly from the Communist world—from its imperialistic drive to dominate world society. Not accidentally, the greatest threat to workers' rights emanates from the same source.

There is a peace to be had by accommodating to this threat—or by remoulding our institutions and values in its image, or in an image more to its liking. But that is not a peace in which the workers of the world can hope to advance their deepest aspirations for a better life.

Whatever our Government may do, whatever our capitalists may do, we will not accommodate to the commissars.

WASHINGTON POST
1 September 1975

Detente Poses a Question of Benefits

U.S. Marketplace an Issue

By Murrey Marder
Washington Post Staff Writer

Ford administration policymakers now recognize that they face an ever-widening arc of debate over the impact of U.S.-Soviet detente on the American marketplace.

The demands of American longshoremen for a larger slice of jobs and money out of the grain trade with the Soviet Union is unlikely to be an isolated phenomenon, administration officials concede. Nor is the crossfire from political rostrums over the cost and consequences of detente, with a presidential campaign just beginning.

In blunt terms that defy the ability of official strategists to reply with simplistic answers, the recurring question is thrust at the administration: "What do we give away and what do we get back?"

In the days when his prestige was at its height, Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger could overwhelm most of his questioners with sophisticated, geopolitical discourse on the benefit of reducing tension with the nation's principal adversary in the nuclear age.

Kissinger's return from the Middle East, with a new Egyptian-Israeli accord, can recoup part of his deflated capacity to impress Congress with his diplomatic skill, his associates believe.

Even Kissinger enthusiasts acknowledge, however, that the controversy about U.S.-Soviet detente policy has spread beyond the ability of Kissinger or any other official to resolve.

The unavoidable problem for the administration, U.S. planners agree, is that if the policy is sustained, it will bring the United States and the Soviet Union increasingly complex relations that involve competing stakes for cross-interests in the American society.

That has been illustrated by the conflicting interests of the dockworkers and Middle Western farmers over the shipment of American grain to Soviet ports. The dockworkers demand more ship-loading work or no sailings. The farmers insist that

the grain sales proceed."

"Confrontation with the Soviet Union was so much simpler to manage," one veteran of the Cold War wryly remarked last week; "whatever the Soviet Union was for, Americans were against. What we get out of detente is the luxury of disagreeing how to handle it."

For the Ford administration this also brings the dilemma of trying to prove a negative to answer those who demand, "What do we get back?"

One frustrated ranking diplomat asked last week: "How do you show on a scorecard the crises that have been avoided, the confrontations that have been averted, the incidents that did not occur?"

Kissinger faced the question at a press conference in Alabama earlier last month: "... In a practical way, what benefit does the average American get from detente?"

Never at a loss for words, even if they are not specific, Kissinger responded: "First of all, a condition of absence from tension and reduced risk of war; secondly, the settlement of a number of outstanding political issues, such as, for example, the issue of Berlin; third, restraint in other areas such as the Middle East; fourth, an easing of the arms race. And in return, we have given up no American interests."

Kissinger has attempted to focus the current debate on the apocalyptic choice between confrontation and detente. "Who," asked one administration official, "wants to advocate the risk of getting blown up?"

The secretary has carried this message to Americans in an unusual number of speeches in cities off the main circuit for major international pronouncements, to solicit support. In Birmingham, Ala. on Aug. 14, Kissinger told an audience of commodity producers:

"Let those who offer us tough rhetoric define what precisely they propose to do. What is their exact alternative? What level of expanded defense expenditure are they willing to sustain over what period of time and for what purpose?"

"Are they not urging a policy of deliberate confrontation?" asked Kissinger. "Can we gain support from any of our major allies for such a radical alternative?"

No politician old enough to remember the Johnson-Goldwater presidential campaign of 1964, where President Johnson devastatingly pinned a nuclear-trigger-happy label on Sen. Barry Goldwater, over Goldwater's angry disavowals, is likely to run on a platform of "deliberate confrontation" with the Soviet Union.

Instead, most critics have centered their attacks on the manner in which the policy of detente is being conducted. This means the mix of rewards and penalties employed by the United States to try to curb the development and use of expanding Soviet military power. The management of detente policy, even many U.S. officials agree in private, is fair game for debate.

The basic charge of the critics is that the U.S. offerings to the Soviet Union of trade, technological exchange, and other benefits customarily extended primarily to nonhostile nations, are too liberal; the American bargaining positions in nuclear arms control and other negotiations with the Soviet Union are "too soft" or solicitous.

This theme is echoed by critics ranging from former California Gov. Ronald Reagan to Alabama Gov. George C. Wallace to AFL-CIO President George Meany to Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.). In Meany's pungent words about the repercussions of U.S. grain sales to Russia: "Foreign policy is too damn important to be left to the Secretary of State."

In the post-Watergate climate of heightened suspicion about secret deals in government, any negotiation affecting major American interests is subject to closer scrutiny. Kissinger is preoccupied with diplomatic secrecy and his negotiating style depends heavily on using ambiguous formulations to achieve diplomatic breakthroughs, with numerous details to be filled in later. Repeatedly, critics charge, this has left loopholes for Soviet exploitation.

Kissinger defenders concede there have been some troublesome ambiguities left over from his negotiations, especially in portions of the 1972 strategic arms limitation accords. Administration officials claim that these ambiguities have been largely resolved. "This was a new field," said one Kissinger associate, "and we are learning."

Additionally, the Kissinger style of bargaining with the Russians deliberately avoids what one official described as the tactic of "squeezing to the last inch every time." Kissinger, the associate said, "believes in carrying over some credit" to the next negotiation, wherever possible.

This has been a constant source of contention between Kissinger and his adversaries in the federal bureaucracy and on Capitol Hill. "The only way to bargain with the Russians," one critic said last week, "is to push them to the wall every time; they expect that, and think you are a patsy if you don't."

Kissinger contends privately that the hazards of "push-them-to-the-wall" stategy with the Russians were illustrated by Soviet rejection last January of the imposed link between American trade benefits and credits and the freer emigration of Soviet Jews. Kissinger reluctantly negotiated that linkage at the insistence of Congress.

That stalemate has blocked expansion of U.S.-Soviet trade (except notably for American grain, which the Soviet Union needs urgently), while Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union has declined sharply.

Resolving this deadlock is major unfinished business on the American-Soviet agenda.

A year ago, in an effort to surmount the growing barriers to U.S. detente strategy, Kissinger himself promoted what was intended as a national debate before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Those 1974 hearings (now scheduled for a repeat performance in a modified framework, starting Sept. 10) were almost obliterated in public consciousness by the Watergate turmoil, the collapse of the Nixon administration, and President Ford's installation in the White House.

The controversy over detente policy subsided so much that the Ford administration was stunned by the double outburst that hit it in July in overlapping disputes.

First, the President's (later-retracted) refusal, with Kissinger's advice, to meet Soviet author Alexander Solzhenitsyn, a bitter critic of any concessions to Soviet communism, engulfed the White House in public criticism. Next, President Ford's decision, planned for months, to attend the 35-nation European Security Conference in Helsinki, where the concept of East-West detente was to be consecrated, brought a second cascade of condemnation.

Mr. Ford recovered his equilibrium on Aug. 1 in Helsinki with what many listeners described as the best-balanced speech at the East-West summit meeting.

Its emphasis was on detente as a testing process, not an accomplishment already achieved. The President's speech carried the admonition that the people of all Europe and North America "are thoroughly tired of having their hopes raised and then shattered by empty words and unfulfilled pledges."

The stiffened language by President Ford contrasted with an effusive pronouncement by President Nixon at the June, 1974, Moscow summit that as a result of the "personal relationship" launched in 1972 with Soviet leader Leonid I. Brezhnev, "We have moved in those two years from confrontation to coexistence to cooperation."

This was extreme hyperbole for two nations that continue to aim at each other nuclear missiles armed with warheads totaling billions of tons of TNT-equivalent power.

The level of U.S.-Soviet cooperation established between 1972 and 1974 was a significant innovation for Moscow and Washington. But policy proceeds down two tracks, a strange combination of adversary and cooperative relationships.

Many U.S. officials, both doves and hawks, were troubled by the Nixonian hyperbole, finding a common discomfort in the illusory public impression it created about the actual state of U.S.-Soviet relations. Once in the detente time-frame they have momentarily reached the stage of open crisis—in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war when the United States ordered a brief global alert of its forces arrayed against the Soviet Union.

The Ford administration, early in its life, decided to step away from the Nixon rhetoric, but not, insiders concede, for any profound strategic reason. Ford speech writers searched for "Grand Rapids language" to fit the President's style. The French word, "detente," was marked for early replacement in the President's public vocabulary.

"We actually had people wracking their brains to think of some other word in English" to signify a reduction of tension, one insider recalled last week.

That search was fruitless; there is no one-word substitute in English.

The alternative was to use Ford language to elaborate in his own style the Ford administration's definition of detente, first in Helsinki, and then to the American Legion convention in Minneapolis on Aug. 19. The timing and the setting of the two addresses, in the wake of mounting domestic political challenge of detente policy, resulted in the stronger

presidential language on detente.

In Minneapolis, to the Legion, the President cautioned that while detente "means movement away from the constant crisis and dangerous confrontation that have characterized relations with the Soviet Union," detente is "not a license to fish in troubled waters."

Soviet interference in Portugal drew a particular admonition in the President's speech, as it did in Kissinger's address in Birmingham five days earlier. Yet, the Soviet Union, for its part, equally has warned the West against outside interference in Portugal's political turmoil, with both sides citing to each other the Helsinki declaration on noninterference in internal affairs.

President Ford also has cautioned that if the SALT negotiations should collapse, he would ask Congress for $2 billion a year more for new nuclear weaponry. This, the Russians recognize, bargaining-chip talk, with a precedent, although nuclear arms bargaining-chips have a history of developing into weapons whether negotiations fail or succeed.

In private, U.S. officials do not claim that the stronger language that the Ford administration is employing represents any underlying shift in detente strategy. On the contrary, they disavow that.

Essentially, said one high official, the administration's detente language is "more skeptical, more realistic, and more conscious of the problems in the relationship, rather than emphasizing what has been accomplished."

The "language of 1972," he said, "is not going to wash in 1975" in the United States," and "the Russians themselves have to be talked to in sterner terms."

One burden that the Ford administration carries in the political controversy over detente, as a result of Nixon administration hyperbole, is a public misconception that the United States threw open its technological secrets to the Soviet Union in the shower of agreements dramatically signed in three summit meetings. That impression was intensified when the recent Apollo-Soyuz joint space mission was shown to be lopsidedly dependent on U.S. technology.

In fact, the 11 U.S.-Soviet agreements on technical cooperation, ranging from joint work on artificial heart research to peaceful atomic energy, housing, health, science, environment protection, transportation and other fields, are still in early stages of development.

After much bargaining over how to proceed, 140 projects in more than 60 technical fields have been planned, but most are in the exploratory phase. A knowledgeable American source said last week that "the record to date is uneven, and the process is slow. But there is enough on the positive side to warrant continued effort."

Monday, Sept. 1, 1975 THE WASHINGTON POST

Soviets Tally Their Gains

By Peter Osnos
Washington Post Foreign Service

MOSCOW, Aug. 31 — If detente is a two-way street, what has the Soviet Union offered in exchange for benefits bestowed by the United States?

The answer does not lend itself to lists. Who gives and who gets in international relations is exquisitely complex, no matter how easily the tally may be drawn by skillful speechwriters attacking or defending the administration's record in the course of the coming election campaign. And the "bottom line" of detente is certain to be calculated as carefully here as in Washington.

For example, the European security accord, signed at last month's summit meeting in Helsinki, has been attacked in the United States as a "sellout" of Eastern Europe in which the West gave Moscow its long-sought recognition of post-World War II boundaries in exchange for some limply worded Soviet affirmations of good intentions on human-rights issues.

On the other hand, it might be argued by some Kremlin critics that Moscow symbolically accepted a permanent U.S. presence on the Soviet borders in Europe and also pledged at the highest political level to conduct a more open society: two tenets that Josef Stalin would certainly have found hard to swallow.

Sen. Henry Jackson (D-Wash.), a presidential aspirant, has said the final act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe represented a "great psychological victory" for the Soviets, presumably at the expense of American interests.

And it is a fact that Moscow is jubilant this autumn over the results of a conference that it first proposed more than two decades ago.

The accord, said Pravda, the Communist Party newspaper, starts "a new stage in the relaxation of tensions and was a major step on the way to consolidating the principles of peaceful coexistence"—the sort of numbing Russian rhetoric that Americans tend to ignore.

But senior Western diplomats here say such ceaseless praise for the Helsinki document, including its rigorously crafted provisions on "non-interference" in the internal affairs of others, would make it "psychologically" much harder for the Krelim to intervene militarily as it did in Czechoslovakia in 1968.

"If restraining the Soviets is one of the important objectives of detente," a longtime Western ambassador said, "then this definitely has to be counted more a plus than a minus."

To cite another example of the difficulties in defining gains: Some Americans claimed that this summer's Apollo-Soyuz space mission gave undue benefit to the Soviets because they came in contact with technology far in advance of their own. But to Moscow the price of working with the United States was to lift the veil of secrecy from its space program, exposing its intricacies and shortcomings.

Did the United States lose by showing what it has? Or did the Soviets lose by revealing what they lack? The measurement depends on the yardstick.

The critics of detente have a natural constituency in the United States because so many Americans still harbor vast reserves of fear and mistrust of the Russians. By their reasoning, anything that is not a clear American advance is automatically a setback.

On the Soviet side, there are undoubtedly Russians who believe that concessions to the West — such as the emigration of 100,000 Jews and thousands of other minorities — weakens Soviet resolve and internal controls, fundamental elements of Kremlin power.

"There is already too little order in Russia," a Soviet diplomat commented quite seriously recently.

Finding common ground for two such completely different societies, formulated on entirely different principles of economic life and personal freedom, is hard enough. But add to that the lingering conviction among many on each side that the long-term goal of the other is conquest, or at least domination, and the task of building two-way confidence becomes enormous.

That is why detente must begin with the simple but ultimately all-important premise that the United States and the Soviet Union want to avoid a war that would lead to mutual annihilation and are willing to set aside differences to avoid a holocaust.

Unless this notion is fully accepted, neither nation will feel really secure.

In the jargon of disarmament specialists, the prevailing doctrine of mutual deterrence is that both superpowers must be equal in terms of nuclear strength and be seen to be equal in the eyes of the world.

What Moscow and Washington are negotiating in SALT II — the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks — is that parity.

If the talks are successful, if suspicions can be controlled and the theories of deterrence are correct, than a SALT agreement will give the world a genuine measure of detente as defined by Webster's — "a relaxation of strained relations or tensions (as between nations)."

The pact, however, will not end competition between Moscow and the West for international influence in, say, the Middle East, Portugal or Latin America. Detente is not peace, as the French writer, Andre Fontaine, recently put it, or else it would be called peace.

How closely Moscow and Washington are prepared to cooperate beyond the nuclear issue depends on how each views the advantages for itself. Where the benefits end, so does a willingness to compromise.

Early in the present stage of Soviet-American relations, Moscow signaled a willingness to let Jews go to Israel in substantial numbers if that would start the flow of American technology and financial credits the Kremlin regards as important for the Soviet Union's development.

At the height of Moscow's interest in 1973, a substantial education tax designed to discourage emigration

was dropped after U.S. complaints, and around 35,000 people left the country.

Then in 1974 Sen. Jackson announced from a White House podium that Moscow was, in effect, prepared to let Congress decide whether Kremlin emigration policies met American standards. Trade was the U.S. leverage.

But that direct challenge to Soviet authority was too much, and the compromise collapsed. Now emigration has dropped to a relative trickle and the Russians are lining up most of their business deals elsewhere.

Russians these days say that their eagerness to buy U.S. products, expertise and grain should have nothing to do with the way their country is run. They cite American trade and aid to countries like South Korea and Spain to show that the United States has long dealt with non-democratic governments.

"We can have detente without trade. But we will not pay for detente with our system," a Communist functionary said bluntly.

Nevertheless, there are Westerners here and liberal-minded Russians who do believe that over an extended period there can be some easing of the restrictions on free expression that make Soviet life so alien to our own—if Kremlin self-assurance continues to grow.

The Soviet state today is authoritarian. But Russia has been that way under czars and commissars alike, and fundamental change seems improbable.

Experts believe, however, that any modification would entail a fine balance between Western pressure in the human-rights area and a combination of political, military, technical and commercial agreements that give Moscow a vested interest in the deepening ties.

That is the pattern of the past three years. They have been good years for the Russians, stable and relatively prosperous. Perhaps as a result, Soviet publicists from Leonid Brezhnev on down declare their conviction in detente at every opportunity.

The process, say the Russians, should be "irreversible," and discontent with detente in the United States plainly worries Moscow. Politburo member Boris Ponomarev told a group of visiting congressmen recently:

"We can conceal neither our surprise nor alarm when a certain circle of political figures . . . keeps stubbornly saying over and over again that it is only the Soviet Union which allegedly stands to gain from the easing of tension."

The Kremlin's concern for preserving its improving position may mean it is susceptible to greater demands from the United States. The imponderable is what Moscow will do if it starts to feel the one-way street running the other way.

DAILY TELEGRAPH, London
20 August 1975

THE HELSINKI MIRAGE

HOW QUICKLY "the spirit of Helsinki" is being tested —and found wanting. President FORD yesterday singled out Portugal as one of "some serious situations" America was watching, "for indications of the Soviet attitude towards détente and co-operation in European security." On cue, *Pravda*, the Russian Communist party newspaper, launched a slashing attack on "interference" in Portugal's domestic affairs by leaders of "the Nato bloc." So for all the fine words in the Helsinki document, there is still no common language between the democracies and expansionary Russian Communism.

East Germany has now completed the installation along 100 miles of its frontier with West Germany of 16,000 explosive booby traps. They are mounted on the eastern (i.e. East German) side of the frontier fence. When set off by tripwires, they unleash a spray of shrapnel over a 30-yard range. So much for "free movement of populations," another of the Helsinki desiderata. Another item from yesterday's news: the Soviet Union has shipped armoured cars, heavy machine guns, heavy mortars and bazookas to Angola. What does *Pravda* have to say? "The imperialist forces and their Peking allies are trying to unleash a civil war in Angola."

Fortunately for the whole of the Western alliance, there is growing evidence of a groundswell in the United States against further pussyfooting around with Russian expansionism. President FORD knows this, and is reflecting it. If there was no progress in the current strategic arms limitation negotiation with Russia, he said, he "would have no choice" but to ask Congress for an additional two to three billion dollars for nuclear arms, on top of the $9·8 billion in the defence budget. America's maritime unions have "blacked" grain shipments to Russia. By doing so, they are talking the language Russia understands, not the false dialogue of Helsinki.

LOS ANGELES TIMES
25 August 1975

Europe: Keeping Our Guard Up

A high-level Kremlin official told a visiting U.S. congressional delegation earlier this month that Moscow was looking forward to "real progress" in the negotiations on mutual reduction of forces in Europe, which resume Sept. 22 after a summer recess.

We hope this signals a change in Russian attitude toward the talks on Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction, as they are called on the Western side. Up to now, Soviet participation in the negotiations has been marked by bald attempts to perpetuate the Warsaw Pact's advantage in tanks and military manpower, while narrowing or eliminating NATO's offsetting edge in sophisticated weaponry.

The MBFR talks had their origin in congressional pressure for substantive reductions in the U.S. troop presence in Europe. This country's NATO allies argued that if there were to be American withdrawals, they should be made only in the context of a parallel reduction in Soviet forces in Central Europe.

U.S. policymakers agreed, and ultimately persuaded the Soviet Union to enter such negotiations. The sincerity of Russian participation up to now, however, is highly suspect.

The Warsaw Pact nations enjoy an edge of well over 100,000 men in military manpower in the area; Communist tanks outnumber those on the NATO side by 15,500 to 6,000. The numerical advantage has, if anything, increased since the MBFR negotiations began.

Since Soviet and other Warsaw Pact forces outnumber those of NATO, the United States and its allies properly felt that the Communist countries should be willing to make proportionately greater reductions in the interest of balance. The Russians argued instead that numerically equal reductions should be made on each side—a formula that, if accepted, would perpetuate the Russian advantage.

Moscow also argued, with greater justice, for inclusion of European-based nuclear forces in the negotiations. The proposal was resisted by the United States and its allies, but in fact concessions in this area could be made without real jeopardy to the military balance in the heart of Europe.

Such concessions should be offered, if they haven't been already, in return for reductions of an acceptable magnitude in Soviet tanks and manpower.

The United States currently has some 7,000 tactical nuclear warheads in Europe; few military experts seriously believe that many are needed. Defense Secretary Schlesinger has been reported willing to accept the withdrawal of at least 1,000 U.S. nuclear warheads from Europe. Others think up to 3,000 could safely be removed, and some experts use even larger figures.

It is essential, however, that this country's NATO allies be reassured that removal of a substantial number of nuclear warheads would not upset the balance of military manpower; we trust that such reassurances are being offered in the discussions that are being held at NATO headquarters this month in preparation for resumption of the MBFR talks.

It may be that the Soviet Union is confident that unilateral reductions will be made in American forces anyway, and thus will be unwilling to make any compromises whatsoever. If that turns out to be so, there will be all the more reason to suspect that the Soviet-inspired European security conference, which proclaimed a new era of peace and cooperation in Europe, was a sham.

Eastern Europe

NEW YORK TIMES
4 September 1975

U.S. Challenged by Soviet On Gains in Human Rights

By CHRISTOPHER WREN
Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, Aug. 3—A prominent Soviet authority on American affairs challenged the United States today to resolve its own social problems rather than to try to put pressure on the Soviet Union on human rights.

Georgi A. Arbatov, director of the Institute for the Study of the United States and Canada, asserted that the Russians "have far surpassed the west and particularly the United States" in honoring the humanitarian provisions of the European security conference document recently signed in Helsinki.

He contended that the Soviet Union was willing to increase contacts with the West, but in an implicit rejoinder to the call for the greater movement of ideas, he insisted that the Helsinki agreement did not obligate Moscow to open its doors to what he called "anti-Soviet subversive propaganda" and "pornography."

The remarks, the sharpest public criticism of the United States in months, were carried in a lengthy article in the Government newspaper, Izvestia. They were believed as reaffirming the Kremlin's resistence to the changes sought by the West on human-rights issues.

Alleged Abuses Cited

Instances of alleged abuses of rights in the United States, cited by Mr. Arbatov, include the manipulation of election funds, wiretapping, the compilin gof dossiers by the Government and "shameful court reprisals against dissidents.' He also referred to what he termed "political assassinations perpetratedby the police and its agents," specifically citing the alleged persecution of the Black Panthers and the crackdown on Indian activists at Wounded Knee, S.D.

"And how could anyone who is trying with a virginal air to present ultimatums on freedom and democracy to other countries remain detached from all this?" Mr. Arbatov asked rhetorically, answering by quoting the maxim, "Physician, heal thyself."

There has been no visible movement by Moscow toward action on the humanitarian provisions of the agreement, reached more than a month ago at Helsinki, which call for improved cultural exchanges and fewer restrictions on travel. The Soviet party chief, Leonid I. Brezhnev, implied to a delegation of visiting members of Congress last month that some points would have to be negotiated further between governments. He also dismissed such issues as Jewish emigration as being minor alongside matters of war and peace.

Mr. Arbaton, who is regarded as an adviser to the Kremlin on matters of American policy, told Izvestia's readers that 'aa deafening campaign" had been launched in the United States to downgrade the accomplishments of the Helsinki conference.

One of its effects, he said, "was to put the President of the United States in a ridiculous position in which he almost had to apologize for going to sign a document that was agreed upon by 35 nations and that has as its goal the strengthening of the foundations of peace and international security."

Concessions Ruled Out

Denying that the Soviet Union and its allies had been the only ones to gain from the accord, he ridiculed the notion that Moscow should pay for Western participation by making "some unilateral concessions in its internal affairs."

"Judging by many public statements, some people in the West would like to turn the agreement reached in Helsinki into a tool of interference in the internal affairs of the socialist countries, undermining the social system existing there," Mr. Arbatov asserted in underscoring Soviet resistance to change imposed from outside. "Only highly naive people can believe that the campaign now underway would force the U.S.S.R. to give up its sovereign rights."

The expert contended that his country had clearly expressed its intention to expand cultural ties and resolve humanitarian matters "on the basis of reciprocity and in strict accordance with the letter and spirit of the document." In so doing, he suggested, Moscow will adhere to the strictest interpretation of the provisions calling for freer exchanges of people and ideas.

In maintaining that the Soviet Union was already ahead, he repeated the familiar contention that more American books, plays and films circulated in the Soviet Union than Soviet works did in the United States. He also alleged that it was more difficult to visit and make contacts in the United States than in the Soviet Union.

Mr. Arbatov also denied Western charges that Moscow was using accommodation with the West as a cover for its support of revolutionary movements abroad. He said that the Soviet Union would never agree to "stop the processes of class and national-Liberation struggle that are the results of the objective laws of historical development." But he insisted that the Communist countries were not exploiting "the policy of détente as an instrument of pushing those processes."

WASHINGTON STAR
24 August 1975

In the Communist World, Business Bribery Can Be Fatal

By John Dornberg
Special to the Washington Star

MUNICH — "It is hard to believe that a Communist executive would take bribes from a representative of capitalist business," a Soviet weekly, *Nedelya*, editorialized indignantly not long ago.

Hard to believe it may be, but to judge from the extensive crackdown on the practice, not only in the Soviet Union but in Romania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria during the past few months, it is widespread.

Indeed, with East-West trade booming and on the threshold of newer and bigger opportunities, it appears that the giving and taking of private favors to clinch deals has become commonplace.

BUT WHATEVER the cavalier attitude toward such practices in their own countries, Western businessmen are discovering with a shock that palm-greasing, for all its long tradition in the Balkans, is no gentleman's peccadillo in the Communist world.

It is considered a grave crime with high-risk penalties.

The case on which *Nedelya* commented, for example, involved Yuri Sosnovsky, the director of a Soviet furniture import-export agency, who was convicted last March of accepting $150,000 in bribes from Walter Haefelin, a Swiss supplier.

Sosnovsky was sentenced to death and, after his conviction was upheld by the Soviet supreme court, was executed by a firing squad last month. Haefelin was given a 10-year term which he is serving in grim Vladimir prison.

DEMANDING OR accepting bribes — be they vast sums of money as in the Sosnovsky-Haefelin case, or just small favors such as bottles of scotch, American cigarettes, banned books and records, or even hard-to-get spare parts for a Western car — can also be a capital crime in Romania.

The director of a government chemicals purchasing agency in Bucharest was sentenced to death and executed last April for "accepting presents" from a Western European manufacturer eager to sell his products in Romania.

Four additional bribery cases are to be tried later this summer and early fall and all are scheduled to be heard by military courts with the power to impose the death penalty.

THE BRIBES RECEIVED are often pittances by Western standards — a watch, a dress for a Romanian trade official's wife, or hi-fi equipment. But they are of inestimable

prestige value by the austere standards of Romanian society and violate the law which prohibits Romanians from possessing more consumer goods than their incomes would enable them to purchase.

To crack down on bribery President Nicolae Ceausescu has established a special department under jurisdiction of the secret police.

Unlike the Soviet Union, however, Romania has expressed no desire to actually incarcerate Western businessmen. Instead, upon formal conviction on such charges as "industrial espionage" or "undermining the economic welfare of the Romanian people," Bucharest usually seeks to extract horrendous fines, bail and damage payments in lieu of imprisonment.

Thus, an Austrian plastics producer recently had to pay $300,000 to obtain the release of two of his sales representatives sentenced to 10 years each in a bribery case.

A WEST GERMAN manufacturer of industrial pumps has just shelled out a record $800,000 to free his salesman who had been convicted of paying a Romanian official $4,000 to clinch a deal.

Fines and damage payments range from $15 to $25 for each day of the sentence, the rate being variable and negotiable, apparently depending on Bucharest's interest in continuing to do business with the manufacturer or supplier involved.

According to one reliable East-West trade source here, more than 100 "purchases" of convicted sales representatives are expected this year.

Although Bulgaria is barely on the threshold of big business with the West, it too has launched a drive against bribery. Earlier this year a number of its senior foreign trade officials were tried, convicted and sentenced to terms of up to 15 years in prison.

THE MOST extensive campaign against bribery and other foreign trade shenanigans has just been mounted by Yugoslavia under whose worker self-management system enterprises are free to deal with Western customers and suppliers directly.

Under-the-table deals are alleged to have amounted to several hundred million dollars in recent years.

THE BIGGEST CASE INVOLVES Yugoslav executives now awaiting trial in Belgrade on a catalog of charges of fraud, embezzlement and bribery in a series of export-import deals.

More than 50 other company and government officials are in pretrial custody and under investigation, among them, allegedly, a deputy minister and a section chief of the ministry of foreign trade.

They are suspected, according to district prosecutor Milan Simicevic, of activities that go "far beyond classical white-collar economic crime, extending into the realm of economic subversion to undermine our entire social and political system."

THOUGH FEW details have been disclosed, the essence of the charges involves the purchase of vast quantities of inferior industrial goods and consumer products abroad and their resale at usurious prices in Yugoslavia.

To finance the deals, the defendants allegedly borrowed heavily from unsuspecting banks and defaulted on the loans. They reportedly deposited profits in numbered Swiss bank accounts, intending to recoup them on trips abroad.

In one case, a scrapped marine diesel engine worth $20,000 was resold in a series of profit-making transactions to its ultimate purchaser for $1.2 million.

One of the key figures in the Yugoslav probe is Slobodan Todorovic, currently in custody in Belgrade's central prison after he was reportedly kidnaped from Austria by Yugoslav secret police agents.

TODOROVIC WAS once a high-ranking Yugoslav executive who was fired from his post with a Belgrade company in 1962. He left the country for Italy, then set up 30 different trading companies for obscure import-export and switch deals with friends and former business associates in Yugoslavia. To finance the purchase of import merchandise, they obtained loans from Yugoslav banks which allegedly wound up in their and Todorovic's pockets.

Todorovic is reported to be just one of scores of "free-lance" Yugoslav purchasing agents abroad. Some 140 are said to operate in Frankfurt, Germany. The majority are in the business of buying inferior goods which they resell, through a network of official middlemen, to companies at home, with everyone involved in the deals allegedly pocketing commissions.

Belgrade's prosecutor the other day described these as "crimes against the people and the state," an ominous hint that he may demand the death penalty, too.

But whatever labels the Communist governments choose to attach to under-the-table East-West deals, they do seem to prove that business is business, regardless of who owns the means of production or reaps the profits.

Western Europe

The Washington Star Thursday, August 21, 1975

Western Help for Lisbon Socialists?

By Henry S. Bradsher
Washington Star Staff Writer

LISBON — The dramatic shift in the Portuguese political situation which has put the Communists on the defensive raises questions about the sudden ability of anti-Communists to organize themselves effectively.

The disciplined Portuguese Communist party (PCP) achieved a strong position in the 16 months since the old Lisbon regime fell because other political elements were disorganized and confused. But in the past month a series of events has eroded Communist power.

They might have been separate events with separate causes. But to many observers here, there seems to be too much coincidence, too clear a pattern in recent developments — especially the widespread attacks on PCP offices — to be simply spontaneous occurrences.

WESTERN countries interested in the fate of Portugal had been lamenting the disarray of anti-Communist forces. Whether they helped organize those forces is not publicly known, but they have helped finance them, according to informed sources.

Western European countries had been lamenting the incoherence of anti-Communist forces in Portugal. It would therefore be logical to assume that they did give them tactical advice.

Much has been made of Soviet influence in Portugal since the April 25, 1974, revolution against the Salazar-Caetano dictatorship. The PCP leader, Alvaro Cunhal, came home from long exile in Eastern Europe a few days later to rouse his underground party.

Responsible Western estimates of secret Soviet financing for the party since then have ranged from $1 million to $3 million a month. Some of the results have been visible in a corps of full-time PCP workers, more extensive propaganda and far more wall posters than other parties manage to put up.

What has not been so well publicized is that Western European Social Democratic parties also have been pouring money into Portugal. They started much later than Moscow, but informed sources now estimate the flow of money from West Germany, Scandinavia and other areas to be greater than Soviet financing.

THIS WESTERN money has gone primarily to support the Socialist party, headed by Mario Soares. It won 38 percent of the votes in last April's constituent assembly elections, and other moderate and centrist parties got 33 percent, while the Communists and their allies got only 18 percent.

Asked about foreign financial support, a Socialist party spokesman said it was too sensitive to discuss. He noted that it is illegal for political parties in Portugal to receive foreign money, but he did not deny that his party was getting it.

But money has not been enough. Neither were votes.

The non-Communists were unable to gain advantage from their popular support. The Communists, exploiting a foothold in the armed forces, had grabbed and held key positions in the national government and local administrations.

THE ANALYSIS at the top levels of the U.S. government as well as in Western Europe was that the anti-Communists lacked the experience, organization or tactical knowledge needed to resist the skillfully organized efforts of the Communists. Leaders such as Soares were considered to be poor organizers, without a background of hard infighting.

The Communists, on the other hand, knew exactly how their minority position could be used tactically to best advantage. But someone needed to advise the Socialists and other anti-Communists.

The first thought that springs to mind in such a situation is that the CIA has been involved.

Senior Americans — not those in the embassy here — have insisted that the CIA has been too crippled with caution by investigations into its covert roles, particularly in Chile, to get involved here.

Somebody needed to tell the anti-Communist elements here how to pull themselves together, the U.S. officials have said, but it was not going to be a U.S. job.

INTERVIEWS in West Germany a month ago turned up strong bipartisan support for help to the anti-Communists here. Some of this support was for action through political party channels — German Socialists to Portuguese Socialists. But some suggested a willingness to engage in more covert operations.

The emergence of the anti-Communist forces began last month, as officials in several foreign capitals were saying that organizational help was needed here.

On July 3 the Catholic church (to which most Portuguese belong) lost its main radio station in Lisbon to the Communists after a lengthy struggle. In a country with 35 percent illiteracy, radio is a major influence. The church became more militant.

On July 7 the Socialist party lost its main newspaper to the Communists, and the armed forces leadership voted to ignore political parties. The Socialists quit the cabinet, where they had been ineffectual in the face of Communist pressure.

SHORTLY thereafter, attacks on Communist offices began in small towns. More than 50 have now been sacked, often with Communists shooting into angry crowds.

Some observers suggest that the attacks developed out of local passions, with one town hearing of an attack elsewhere and deciding to imitate it.

This explanation, and the whole militancy of the anti-Communists now, seem inadequate to other observers, however.

On Tuesday the Soviet party newspaper Pravda angrily denounced the attack on Communists here and implied that if the PCP loses its influence it will be a result of outside influence.

WASHINGTON POST
21 August 1975

NATO Radar Penetrated by Air Rescue

By Michael Getler
Washington Post Foreign Service

BONN, Aug. 20—The dramatic helicopter pickup of three East Germans inside Czechoslovakia last Sunday by a civilian U.S. pilot has touched off considerable behind-the-scenes concern among American and NATO officials.

The pilot, identified as Barry Meeker, 34, apparently managed to elude NATO radar monitoring systems that are constantly focused along West Germany's frontiers with Eastern Europe, probably the most heavily defended in the world.

Although there were conflicting reports about just how many times Meeker made similar flights, he claims to have done it on at least two occasions. This means he crossed and recrossed NATO's most sensitive front lines undetected at least six times.

The episode has touched off an investigation about how Meeker was able to make these flights and completely elude NATO's high-power radar surveillance network and ground border patrols, sources said.

The helicopter Meeker was flying was a small one and undoubtedly he was able to fly low and underneath the electronic eyes of the radar. Darting around mountain areas to elude radar would also make detection difficult.

The affair raises important questions for NATO countries that have invested billions of dollars in a variety of electronic monitoring systems designed to detect all kinds of activity along the frontiers with Eastern Europe.

U.S. officials here say they have no information on Meeker or his whereabouts. The pilot checked out of the Traunstein City Hospital in Bavaria today and left no forwarding address. According to a telephone operator at the hospital Meeker left with "some friends."

It is unofficially reported that Meeker has decided to sell the rights to his personal story to the West German picture magazine Stern and will give no further free interviews.

U.S. officials here say that the episode caught them by surprise but that they were able to determine quickly that Meeker was not an employee of the CIA.

Many questions were raised by his activities. Meeker reportedly was not registered with the U.S. consular office in Munich, near where he reportedly worked for a West German helicopter rescue service. Registration with the consulate is not mandatory but is normal for Americans employed in that area.

Unauthorized crossing of the borders here is illegal but there were no immediate indications that Meeker faces charges.

Officials also indicated they had no information on the whereabouts of the three East Germans—two men and a 14-year-old girl—whom Meeker lifted out of Czechoslovakia in his small craft.

Earlier, news agencies that interviewed Meeker by telephone in the hospital reported:

Meeker said he had received $4,000 for each of his flights to Czechoslovakia, but denied that the payments were fees.

"These were guarantees in case anything would happen to me, that my family would be all right, my family to be; I'm engaged," he said.

"I've noticed negative comments in the press that I'm simply a soldier of fortune . . . selling my services in each one. But what people don't realize is that each one took about two months and during these two months I was not employed, I earned no money at all."

Czechoslovakian authorities today gave a West German official in Prague a protest over the violation of Czech frontiers by Meeker's helicopter.

Meeker underwent surgery for hip and elbow wounds he suffered when Czechoslovak guards opened fire as he was loading his passengers.

Talking of the previous rescue flights, Meeker said he had made them at this time last year, one on Aug. 15 and the other Aug. 17. He said he had brought out four refugees on each of the 1974 flights.

Meeker said that he expected to lose his license to fly in Germany, but he added: "It doesn't matter if I lose my license or not—no one will ever lend me a helicopter again.

He said he doubted that criminal charges will be pressed. "I think some steps will be taken, but more of a hand-slapping nature than of a heads-must-roll nature," he said.

Meeker's lawyer said Meeker had returned to West Germany several weeks ago from Isfahan, Iran, where he was training pilot's of the shah's army.

Meeker said that he was born in Hartford, Conn., and raised in New York City, but that his family now lives in Wakefield, R.I.

His father, William Meeker, said he was "stunned at first" when he heard of his son's exploits. "But after I thought about it I wasn't surprised," he said.

One of the pilot's two younger brothers, Craig, said that before Barry Meeker enlisted in the U.S. Army in 1966 he had been rather apolitical.

Near East

The Washington Star Thursday, August 21, 1975

State Dep't. Shuffle

Envoy to Saudis To Be Replaced

By Jeremiah O'Leary and Roberta Hornig
Washington Star Staff Writers

U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia James E. Akins, who has been accused by his critics of being too soft on Arab oil exporters, says he has been informed officially that he will be relieved of his post Dec. 1.

His replacement is part of a reshuffling of key State Department officials who have differed over energy policy. Saudi officials say they fear Akins' removal signals a new, harder line in U.S. policy.

The 48-year-old career diplomat and Arab specialist said in an interview last night that he has been told he will be replaced after two years in Riyadh and that he does not have a new assignment. Informed sources said Akins will not get a new assignment, which is tantamount to ending a foreign service career.

According to reliable sources, Akins will be replaced by the current ambassador to Canada, William J. Porter, also a veteran Arab specialist. In turn, Porter will be replaced by Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Thomas Enders, these sources said.

THE OFFICIAL version of this reshuffling is that Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger wants to send the 61-year-old Porter to Saudi Arabia because he is the leading Arabist in the State Department. Enders ostensibly is going to Ottawa because his economic expertise would be useful in dealing with the United States' No. 1 trading partner. State Department officials have declined comment on the diplomatic shifts.

But sources close to the situation have asserted that both Akins and Enders are being removed from their crucial positions in formation of U.S. energy policy because of pressure tactics and State Department personality clashes.

Reliable sources have reported that Kissinger has bridled at some of Akins' reports from Saudi Arabia about the key issue of oil price policy. These sources said Kissinger has tended to blame Akins for Saudi Arabia's adherence to decisions by the oil-export cartel to raise oil prices.

AKINS, some sources have alleged, is a victim of the pro-Israeli lobby, which regards him as too soft on the Arabs.

Akins said last night that he has been an advocate of moderation by Saudi Arabia on oil prices and added, "I have told them there is no justification for a price increase." He said no one has worked harder than he to bring peace between Israel and the Arabs.

Enders, chief architect of the U.S. effort to organize oil consuming nations for coordinated action in dealing with the oil producing nations, reportedly has collided on policy matters with Under-secretary of State for Economic Affairs Charles W. Robinson. Officials familiar with the situation say that Kissinger is backing Robinson in the policy dispute.

Enders' assignment to Canada would remove him from the center stage, despite the importance of commerce between the U.S. and Canada.

AKINS, who is in Washington on home leave, said last night that "I didn't know anything about (his impending replacement) until I read it in the papers Tuesday," when syndicated columnist Joseph Kraft reported it. Akins said he immediately asked the State Department for an explanation and was told to return to his post in order to receive Kissinger when the secretary visits Riyadh next week.

The Saudi government also learned of the decision to replace Akins from press reports.

The Saudi Foreign Minister, Prince Saud, said in New York that his government is concerned that assignment of Porter to replace Akins means a change in U.S. policy toward that country. Saudi officials say they think the change means the United States will take a harder line toward Saudi Arabia and other nations in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries now that it appears the danger of a Mideast war is diminishing.

The reaction of the Saudis will be better known on Sept. 24 when the OPEC nations meet in Vienna to discuss the next round of oil price increases. U.S. officials have been hoping that Saudi Arabia, the dominant nation in the oil cartel, would support a moderate increase of 20 cents a barrel against the expected push by Iran and Algeria for an increase of up to $1.50 a barrel.

WHETHER assignment of Porter to Saudi Arabia signals a new U.S. hard line remains to be seen. Porter, who speaks Arabic, has had experience in Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, Morocco, and Algeria. He also possesses the diplomatic skill of acting tough or bland according to his instructions.

Akins, on the other hand, possesses another kind of toughness — he is known for being almost painfully blunt. He once informed State Department officials that he would not support the official administration line on Vietnam in his speeches and gave then-Secretary of State Dean Rusk an unsolicited analysis of what he thought was wrong with U.S. policy in Southeast Asia.

WASHINGTON POST
30 August 1975

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

The Cost of Kissinger's Triumph

Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger's latest tour de force of Mideastern shuttle diplomacy has brought frowns rather than smiles to high officials back in Washington who have this private complaint: we have paid far too much for too little.

The source of their complaint is secret aid assurances made by Dr. Kissinger to Israeli Ambassador Simcha Dinitz in Washington. Although Israel's breathtaking new aid request of $3.3 billion for next year will surely not be met, the Israelis agreed, to a Sinai settlement only after a secret understanding that they will receive more U.S. aid than ever before—probably between $2.5 billion and $3 billion.

Thoughtful policymakers here fret because this lavish expenditure has bought so little. Even Kissinger's defenders concede progress on the Syrian front is unlikely and an overall settlement not even imaginable. Rather, there is fear here that the aid promised Israel could so drastically distort the Mideast's military power balance, that the latest Kissinger triumph will, ironically, reduce the region's stability.

Accordingly, ugly questions are being raised in offical Wahington as the good news rolls in from Jerusalem and Cairo. Did Kissinger promote a Sinai settlement in preference to a general Mideast peace conference in Geneva mainly to refurbish his own

political standing here? Such questions, which an angry Kissinger in private attributes to "sickness" in Washington, are being raised not by fanatical Kissinger-haters but by sober colleagues in the administration.

The answer to Kissinger's motives depends on just how likely was a new shooting war between Israel and the Arabs if there were no Sinai agreement. Although a few officials believe the danger was negligible, Kissinger's warning of imminent war is accepted by some of his critics. But even while granting the necessity for the latest Kissinger shuttle, there is little room for exultation over its cost and consequences.

The cost became apparent about two weeks ago when Israel raised the ante on its aid request to the eye-popping $3.3 billion, including some $2 billion in U.S. military hardware. One key U.S. official told us chances of Israel's getting $3.3 billion are "exactly zero." But Israeli military specialists who visited here last week understand that and still are satisfied with Kissinger's unrevealed promise.

Whatever the exact amount, Israel is sure to emerge from the Kissinger shuttle with immense military superiority in the Mideast. Contrary to the misimpression among the U.S. public and Congress, Israel is much stronger militarily today than it was on the eve of the surprise Egyptian attack in October 1973 and could easily win a two-front war. Any extra hardware increases that advantage.

Consequently, just how much aid Kissinger has promised secretly becomes critical. If it is close to the requested $2 billion in sophisticated hardware, military experts fear it would so unbalance arms in the Mideast that Arab states would be panicked. The result could be, in the short run, Arabs returning to Moscow for arms, in the long run, war—two calamities Kissinger has toiled for years to avoid.

Yet, Kissinger had to guarantee much of the Israeli request to avoid opposition to the Sinai settlement from Shimon Peres, Israel's hawkish minister of defense. In justification, supporters of heavy Israeli aid say Israel is more secure and more apt to be conciliatory with a sophisticated arms supply assured.

Past experience, however, has indicated precisely the opposite: military superiority directly proportionate to Israeli intransigence at the bargaining table. Moreover, considering popular Israeli opposition to the Sinai concessions, there is no hope whatever for serious negotiations on the Syrian front. Nor does anybody here believe the Sinai settlement leads one step closer to a successful Geneva conference.

More likely, the latest Kissinger shuttle may lead to annual repetitions of massive Israeli arms requests. The $3.3 billion is no one-time proposal. Officials here fear Israel might want $3.5 billion to $4 billion a year into the next decade.

That Kissinger will be returning home from this shuttle not in failure but with an initialed agreement carries some side benefits. It may lead the House to reverse itself on Turkish aid. Chances for Congress' approving Hawk missiles to Jordan will be improved. And Henry Kissinger will seem a little more like the diplomatic miracle-maker of yesteryear.

For how long? "About one month," replies one State Department official, who sees congressional probing on grain shipments to Russia, SALT agreements and CIA intervention in Chile quickly pressing in on the Secretary of State.

The reason for such impermanence is that the second interim Sinai agreement, like the battle of Blenheim, may well be interpreted as a "famous victory" purchased at great price with minimal effect.

NEW YORK TIMES
31 August 1975

Mideast Pact Will Not Do Much for Arab Unity

By JAMES M. MARKHAM

ALEXANDRIA—The interim agreement between Egypt and Israel has already become an apple of discord in the Arab camp.

"The inter-Arab cold war is just beginning," warns the pro-Libyan Beirut daily As Safir.

Arab critics of Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat fear that a disengagement agreement in the Sinai will actually be far more than an "interim" accord, that it will effectively detach the principal Arab military power, Egypt, from the confrontation with Israel.

This, in turn, it is argued, will stall movement to a resolution of the thornier outstanding Arab business with Israel: the occupied Syrian Golan Heights, the occupied West Bank of the Jordan River and the proclaimed "rights" of the Palestinians to a home of their own.

The government-guided Egyptian press has been striving in the last few weeks to allay these qualms. It has insisted that Mr. Sadat is concluding only a military, not a political, pact with Israel; that a second disengagement in Sinai is but another step toward an over-all settlement; that Egyptian blood was not shed for purely Egyptian interests.

But Arab militants—for example, Marxists within the Palestinian movement—say that Egypt has sinned not only in Sinai. They charge that Mr. Sadat has totally reoriented Egypt's economic and political posture, rebuffing the Soviet Union and wooing capitalist investors. The deeper these new interests become entrenched, the radicals argue, the less likely it is that Egypt would ever again go to war.

There is perhaps some truth in this analysis, which predicts that Egypt will now begin to focus upon its own long-neglected economic well-being.

"What preoccupies me now is peace," Mr. Sadat told a group of American Congressmen this month, "because without peace we cannot start the major plans of reconstruction we have for our country."

The Arabs' Choices

This preoccupation presents the dissenting Arab states—Syria, Libya, Iraq—and the Palestinians with tough choices. To start with, Syria and Iraq are locked in an almost obsessive feud, with Baghdad trying to out-radical Damascus to demonstrate the purity of its variety of Baathist socialism. Libya's attacks on Egyptian moderation are not at all consonant with the more modulated criticisms of the Syrians, the Iraqis and the middle-of-the-road Palestinians, who want to keep on civil terms with Cairo.

Egypt does have the support of such financial powers as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iran (which, though not an Arab state, is becoming more deeply enmeshed in the region). The conservative Persian Gulf states, through subsidies to Syria, Jordan, Egypt and the Palestinians, also make their influence felt.

It is President Hafez al-Assad of Syria who has consciously built a new, though unsteady, Arab coalition to keep Egypt from backsliding. Last March, when Secretary of State Kissinger was shuttling in these parts, the Syrians announced the formation of a military "joint command" with the Palestine Liberation Organization. In the intervening months, Mr. Assad made overtures to his Jordanian neighbor, King Hussein, whose army had systematically eliminated the Palestinian guerrilla movement in Jordan beginning in "Black September," 1970.

Lobbied by Israeli pressure groups, the United States Congress helped the Syria-Jordanian rapprochement by delaying an Administration request to sell Hawk ground-to-air missiles to King Hussein. By the time Mr. Kissinger shuttled in this time, the King and the Syrian President were announcing another "joint command."

The joint command with the Jordanians (as with the Palestinians) exists more on paper than in fact, but the point is to remind Mr. Sadat that he is facing not just a disgruntled Syria but an Arab front demanding further Israeli withdrawals.

The Egyptian press has astutely welcomed the Syria-Jordanian move. Mr Sadat has found that, in dealing with fellow Arabs as with Israelis a positive attitude pays the most dividends. (After the Israelis scuttled the March shuttle, he opened the Suez Canal.)

The Syrians have also been pressing a campaign to expel Israel from the United Nations. This diplomatic assault gives them some leverage in dealing with the Israelis on the Golan Heights. But it has also led to friction with Egypt, which surfaced at the Kampala meeting of the Organization of African Unity and, last week, at a conference of nonaligned countries in Lima, Peru.

At Kampala, the Egyptians enraged the Palestinians by watering down an expulsion resolution. Mr. Sadat has said the "Kampala stand" will remain Egypt's position. In fact, it seems to be incorporated in the so-called "secret clauses" of the Sinai accord.

The Sinai agreement will press down on the divided Palestine Liberation Organization more than on any other Arab group—with the possible exception of Syria. The Palestinians have been unable to halt the process of piecemeal Egyptian political concessions to the Israelis. Already split into radical "rejectionists" and moderates like Yasir Arafat, the Palestinians have now somehow to come to terms with Mr. Sadat.

The Palestinian moderates seem inclined for the moment to attack the perfidiousness of the Americans, and the Israelis, avoiding a frontal break with the Egyptians. It is an unhappy choice for men like Mr. Arafat: A break with Egypt risks isolating them in the Arab world, but the longer they waffle, the more the radicals can undermine their hold on the organization.

James M. Markham, The New York Times bureau chief in Beirut, has been reporting on the current Middle East peace talks.

WASHINGTON POST
27 August 1975

U.S. Rejects Libya Bid For Planes, Training

United Press International

The State Department has signaled disenchantment with Libya's militancy in Arab-Israeli affairs and turned back 56 Libyan air force personnel who sought training in the United States and blocked the export of eight cargo planes.

Rep. Les Aspin (D-Wis.), who had protested an application by Lockheed Aircraft Corp. to train the Libyans in America, disclosed the State Department decision and settlement, has intensified significantly over the past few months and has been the major consideration in the formulation of our policy toward the Libyan government.

"As a result we have refused to approve the export to Libya of any Military related items, including, as you point out, eight additional C-130 aircraft.

"With regard to the request to bring 56 Libyan air force personnel to the U.S. for training, we have informed Lockheed that we cannot approve the application at this time because of the current state of relations with Libya but that we shall keep this case under active review."

The trainees were to study maintenance of C-130 aircraft.

In a letter to Aspin, Robert J. McCloskey, assistant secretary of state for congressional relations, said in part:

"We share your concern about the Libyan attitude toward our efforts to reach a Middle East peace settlement. Libyan opposition to a settlement, and to moderate Arab leaders who support such a called it a welcome shift in U.S. policy."

Africa

THE NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, AUGUST 11, 1975

U.S. Interest in Southern Africa

By Anthony Harrigan

NASHVILLE—Americans cannot regard with unconcern the worsening situation in sub-Sahara Africa. The United States has a vital stake in maintaining access to the vast mineral wealth of southern Africa and in the security of the Cape sea route around Africa. Around the Cape of Good Hope move the tankers that carry oil to fuel industries and homes in Europe and America.

Unfortunately, the last year has witnessed a steady deterioration of the situation in southern Africa and in the western Indian Ocean area.

Several members of Congress have returned from a visit to Somalia in East Africa and reported on the missile-supply base the Russians have constructed near Berbera on the Gulf of Aden.

To the south the new dictator of Mozambique, the former Portuguese overseas province, has proclaimed his nation a "People's Republic" in the Chinese-Communist style. In Angola, the former Portuguese province on the South Atlantic, all is chaos. Rival guerrilla movements and Marxist factions battle for power in a vast land rich in oil and minerals.

The world has been repeatedly shocked by the brutal actions of Idi Amin, the absurd dictator of Uganda who has been aptly described as a village tyrant.

In Zambia, land was nationalized recently, indicating anew the impossibility of economic cooperation between free-world countries and African socialist regimes.

Despite the appalling results of "independence," the Afro-Asian and Communist majority in the United Nations persists in trying to impose more of the same on Southwest-Africa, the enormous arid territory on the South Atlantic which South Africa has administered intelligently and responsibly since receiving it under a League of Nations mandate.

The United Nations is opposed to true self-determination for the people of Southwest-Africa, which it insists on calling Namibia.

Not all the news is bad, however. South Africa's policy of "détente" with the more responsible African states to the north is making substantial headway. With success in making social and economic adjustments at home and a breakthrough in relations with such African countries as Ivory Coast and Liberia, South Africa is the strong stabilizing force on the African Continent. Meanwhile, Rhodesia continues to maintain orderly, Western-style Government and wide prosperity, while turning back the assaults of revolutionary guerrilla forces.

The United States' role inside Africa is necessarily minimal. What is most important is that the United States employ its influence to sustain responsible, orderly governments and to oppose the expansion of revolutionary regimes. Southern Africa is the mineral treasure house of the Continent. It is very much in the national interest of the United States to maintain access to the gold, uranium, coal, chrome, copper, platinum and other strategic materials in the subcontinent. Access will be denied if Marxist regimes extend their sway.

At the same time the United States has a special strategic interest in the Cape of Good Hope. Despite the reopening of the Suez Canal, the vast bulk of the tanker traffic will continue to use the Cape route. It is essential that this traffic not be interrupted or threatened by the growing Soviet fleet in the Indian Ocean.

In order to protect United States security interests in the Indian Ocean, the United States is planning to develop limited support facilities on the small island of Diego Garcia. These facilities, while necessary now, may be inadequate to meet the needs of the 1980's. A common-sense solution for the United States would be to seek permission from South Africa to establish a missile-handling facility at the Simonstown naval base near the Cape.

Representative Samuel S. Stratton, Democrat of New York, recently said that United States ships in the Indian Ocean must either go to Norfolk, Va., or Subic Bay in the Philippines for missile facilities comparable to those the Russians enjoy in Somalia. And the United States is in danger of losing control over its base at Subic Bay as the Philippine Government seeks to appease Peking.

Viewed over-all, the situation in and around Africa is changing very fast. The United States must make a prompt adjustment to changed political and strategic realities. If the necessary new security arrangements aren't made, Soviet and Chinese Communist imperialism will be fastened on a vast global region.

Anthony Harrigan is executive vice president of the United States Industrial Council, a nationwide association of conservative businessmen. This is a press release offered by the council as a newspaper column.

WASHINGTON STAR
18 August 1975

Kissinger Raps Ousted Tanzania Envoy for 'Personal Publicity'

VAIL, Colo. (UPI) — Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger has heatedly accused W. Beverly Carter, removed from his post as ambassador to Tanzania, of conducting "a personal publicity campaign" and denied the diplomat was being moved out of the State Department.

"I think Ambassador Carter would be better advised to deal with responsible officials in the State Department than to deal in a personal campaign of his own."

"We are trying to maintain a principle that terrorists cannot negotiate with American officials," Kissinger told reporters. "We are doing this to protect thousands of Americans who could become victims all over the world. . . ."

CARTER, A BLACK, apparently incurred Kissinger's anger by violating U.S. policy in dealing with terrorists to obtain the release of four students kidnaped in Tanzania.

Kissinger was asked about reports he ordered Carter to be transfered from the State Department to the U.S. Information Agency.

"Ambassador Carter is not being transfered out of the State Department," Kissinger said. "We have avoided any statements out of the State Department" on the case and said reports have not been fully accurate.

Carter was envoy to Tanzania for three years. Last May, 19 guerrillas from the Popular Revolutionary party in Zaire kidnaped three Stanford University students and a Dutch woman who were working at an animal research station in western Tanzania.

THE TERRORISTS, whose very existence as a revoltionary group the government of Zaire had refused to acknowledge, released one of the hostages so she could deliver to Tanzanian authorities ransom demands. Subsequently Carter arrang-

ed for contact to be established with the terrorists through the embassy, a contact which resulted in the payment of ransom for two of the four students to secure their release.

Carter was summoned back to Washington in the belief that he was going to be assigned to Denmark. Kissinger's deputy undersecretary of state for management informed him he was no longer to be assigned to Tanzania and would not be assigned to Denmark.

The students who were released, other Stanford officals and friends called the White House, members of Congress and reporters to protest Kissinger's treatment of Carter.

KISSINGER SAID the U.S. policy on terrorist attacks must be viewed from the perspective of "not only individual cases but in the case of thousands of Americans" who would be in jeopardy "if the terrorists get the impression the United States will acquiesce to their demands."

Kissinger said the policy often involves "heart-breaking decisions" but "it is our view it saves lives."

Kissinger confirmed that President Ford had written a letter commending Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere for his participation in negotiating the release of the students.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
13 August 1975

Sudan

Land where tied labor persists is on threshold of change

By Richard Critchfield
Special to The Christian Science Monitor

Dilling, Sudan

A local English military governor's report on the suppression of slavery in 1905 still gathers dust on the shelves of the district police station in this remote sub-Saharan town.

And a few of the abuses he wrote about are still going on.

Arab camel caravans that come south from the Sahara to graze on the savanna each spring still kidnap a few orphans or vagrant children and carry them off to serve as herdsmen.

Much more common is the indenturing of six- or seven-year-old Nuba boys to semi-nomadic Arab cattlemen or Baggara Arabs, as they are known in this part of Africa. A tribesman "sells" one of his sons in return for an annual payment of a cow. He returns once a year to collect the cow and see that his son has not been mistreated.

Tens of thousands of such indentured cowherds still exist in the Nuba Mountains, which begin about 250 miles southwest of Khartoum. The youths grow to manhood with only a few rags to wear, subsisting on sorghum gruel and goat's milk twice a day, sleeping in the forest with spears to ward off baboons and hyenas, and knowing little of the world but the savanna where they graze their cattle and the rivers where they water them.

Children detained

In an attempt to combat the kidnapping, Dilling Magistrate Ahmed Ibrahim, himself a Nuba tribesman, recently arrested 31 vagrant children and held them in jail 10 days. "Nobody asked for any one of them," he told me. "These children can be carried off by the camel Arabs without anybody's caring about it, and some of them are."

Because there is no law in the Sudan against indenturing children, there is little the magistrate could do about this either. He said sometimes an Arab master will refuse to pay the annual cow, and the case comes to court. Recently after 10 years as a herdsman, one Nuba youth was refused the 10 cows due him: the Arab offering him his daughter as a bride instead. The cowherd sued and got the cows.

One such indentured cowherd is the Wali, named after his distant tribe. "I must be about 21," the Wali says, "but we don't count our ages. We have only to go with the cows, to graze them, and water them; that's all. If your father doesn't tell you your age and hasn't come to see you for six years, you would hardly know."

A handsome, powerfully built Nuba, the Wali agreed his lot was a hard one. "Perhaps one day I will go north and look for work in the city. I came here with my Arab master long ago. My father brought me here as a small boy, and I never went back to my village. My master would not let me go. Perhaps when I have five or ten cows, I will go home and buy a wife. And cultivate some fields and die there."

Center of slave trade

Bondage in the Nuba Mountains is not new. It became a center of the African slave traffic when Arabs first migrated into the region from the east 700 years ago and black African tribals fled into the mountains for safety and settled there.

The Nuba Mountains lie just at the eastern edge of the African sahel, the 3,000-mile sweep of sub-Sahara savanna stretching from Senegal to Sudan that has been plagued by devastating drought the past six years. The region was closed to all but a few outsiders during the 58 years of British rule in Sudan; and after independence in 1956 successive Khartoum governments maintained the isolation until just recently.

Now Sudanese President Jaafar al-Nimeiry, whose government is penetrating the mountains with primary schools, village dispensaries, and mosques, encourages foreign visitors. Most of the tribesmen no longer go naked since mass conversion to Islam 10 to 15 years ago, but they preserve most of their old customs intact.

Legends in song

Folklore and legends the tribesmen sing to the beat of drums describe the old perpetual warfare, with one of the Nuba's 99 tribes raiding another for cattle and slaves or being raided by the migrant Arab camel caravans and cattlemen. British attempts to abolish slavery led to frequent revolts in the early part of this century by both Arabs and Nubas who resented interference in what they felt was a vital part of their social and economic life.

Indeed, the report by Col. J. R. O'Connell for 1905 on file at the Dilling police station was not unsympathetic. "To expect a brave, warlike, and war-loving people to give up their old habits and surrender what they regard as their right," the British officer wrote to his superiors in Khartoum, "much less to give up their property without a struggle, is manifestly to expect the impossible."

The colonel reported that most Nuba tribesmen refused to surrender people or cattle collected in raids and that local Arabs had staged a protest uprising because they were "short of slaves to tend their herds and feel and resent their loss."

Few changes

Things have not changed that much these past 70 years. The Ngimangs still talk about their 1917 revolt against British rule, which ended with the seizure of their watering places and their tribal chief being hung, as if it were a very recent and glorious event. Cattle thieves are still much admired for their valor, except by the victim.

But change is likely to be the keynote of the next 70 years; especially as a hungry world has discovered the tribals cultivate only 1 million out of 31 million fertile acres, where there is enough rainfall for at least one crop a year. The Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development recently completed a $3 billion to $5 billion investment plan to double Sudan's grain production to 5 million tons by 1985. Change is coming fast, and the Walis are probably the last human remnants of the Nuba Mountains' old way of life.

Richard Critchfield, long a staff member of the Washington Star-News, is on a Ford Foundation grant in Africa studying the lives of ordinary people. Before this, he did the same in Asia, contributing from time to time to this newspaper.

East Asia

WASHINGTON POST
9 August 1975

Fearing Pathet Lao Rule, Meo Tribesmen Flee to Thailand

By Bruce Palling
Special to The Washington Post

PUA, Thailand—Since the collapse of the rightist faction in the Laotian government in May, more than 10,000 Meo tribespeople have slipped into mountainous and isolated northeastern Thailand.

Unwanted by the Thais, they are living in squalor with little food. Because of their long association with U.S. efforts against the Communist forces in Laos, they are regarded suspiciously by the Communist Pathet Lao who now dominate the government in Vientiane and by the Communist government in North Vietnam. Many of the refugees say they are afraid to return to their homes in Laos.

Counting other Meos and Laotians who fled into Thailand earlier in the war, there could be as many as 30,000 refugees from Laos now in Thailand, vastly outnumbering refugees from Cambodia and South Vietnam.

Observers in Laos have expressed suspicions that the anti-Communist Thai armed forces want to use the Meo as a buffer against the Pathet Lao, much as a force of Chinese troops loyal to Chiang Kai-shek was permitted to operate in northern Thailand for years as a buffer against China.

According to reliable sources in Bangkok, U.S. Ambassador Charles Whitehouse also thinks there is merit in this idea. Last month the head of the Thai internal security command, Gen. Saiyud Kerdphol, paid a secret visit to Mai Charim, a remote village 30 miles southeast of here, where about 5,000 refugees have settled, to evaluate the buffer idea.

North Vietnamese officials in Vientiane have recently been saying privately that such a plan would be considered a serious threat. Certainly the Thai Foreign Ministry wishes that all the Meo would go home immediately to avoid provoking the Pathet Lao-dominated government in Laos.

The Meo are best known for their role in the CIA-backed "secret war" in northeastern Laos under the command of Gen. Vang Pao.

Not surprisingly, Vang Pao was one of the first officers to flee Laos in May and he was followed by several planeloads of his former troops.

Thousands of other Meos fled western Laos which had been the area of the country least affected by the war.

About 5,000 Meos are living in a refugee camp in Pua, a tiny town, 400 miles north of Bangkok in Naw Province and less than 20 miles from Laos. About 1,700 of the refugees came from a large irrigation project supported by the U.S. Agency for International Development in neighboring Sayaboury Province in Laos.

The 1,700 tribespeople left the project, with its tractors, experimental fish hatcheries and orchards apparently because they feared new fighting and thought they might be singled out for harsh treatment because of their association with AID.

Recent reports from Laos, however, have not indicated that the Meos who remained have suffered any mistreatment.

At Pua, the Meos are clustered into a school compound where they live in shelters they built themselves. As I walked around the makeshift village, old men in the traditional colorful Meo costume—black trousers decorated with patches of psychedelic woven cloth—would come up to my interpreter and ask: "Where is Vang Pao?"

While it appears that there are only about 50 of Vang Pao's former soldiers in this camp, the villagers still seemed to have faith in his ability to preserve their semi-nomadic way of life with its slash-and-burn agriculture and opium production.

The refugees told no atrocity stories, but said they feared for their safety if they had remained in Laos. They had seen long-established local officials dismissed and replaced by unknown Pathet Lao officers, and there were rumors that the Pathet Lao wanted to arm them to fight Thailand in the future.

Despite statements by Defense Minister Maj. Gen. Pramarn Adireksarn about the high cost to Thailand of supporting Indochinese refugees, no one at Pua was receiving any assistance from the Thai government. Christian World Vision has donated about 22,000 pounds of rice a week.

According to the refugees, more than 30 villagers have died in the past six weeks from hunger and exhaustion. The only ones who have enough money to buy food are those who sell their ceremonial silver necklaces and bracelets at low prices to Thai traders.

By all accounts, conditions are worse at Mai Charim, where at least 80 persons are said to have died of diseases aggravated by malnutrition. Permission to visit the village was denied.

Unconfirmed reports were circulating in Bangkok that the U.S. embassy had been providing assistance to several thousand of Vang Pao's former troops in northeast Thailand. The aid was supposedly only for food and reportedly has stopped.

Thai Foreign Minister Maj. Gen. Chatichai Choonhavan has visited the office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees in Geneva, to request aid for the Indochinese refugees here, and U.N. officials have been to Bangkok to study the situation. The U.N. agency has agreed to solicit donations from member countries for an emergency program to feed and house the refugees.

Senior Foreign Ministry sources in Bangkok say they intend to resettle all the Meos, including 3,000 to 5,000 former Vang Pao troops, around Mai Charim from where it is hoped that they will slowly drift back into Laos.

NEW YORK TIMES
15 August 1975

Meo Tribesmen Face Death in Thailand

The following dispatch was written by Matt Franjola, an Associated Press correspondent who recently visited remote settlements in northern Thailand of Meo mountain tribesmen who fled Laos after the Communist-led Pathet Lao took control of the country.

BAN NAM LAN, Thailand (AP)—Thousands of mountain tribesmen who fled Laos in the last two months are barely subsisting in the jungles near here, weary, sick and in some cases starving.

They walked for up to four weeks over rugged terrain only to find themselves unwelcome in this country and not safe from Pathet Lao raiding parties even here, a day's march into Thailand.

They are Meos, members of an independent primitive tribe of woodsmen and black-clad, silver-bedecked women, who were on the pro-American side of the Laotian war.

Thai and Western experts estimate that 12,000 Meo refugees are living in temporary shelters in this area of northern Thailand, and Thai medical authorities say that 80 per cent of them are suffering from malnutrition, malaria and anemia. Some 18,000 more have sought refuge in northeastern Thailand.

Future Uncertain

Their future is uncertain. Their presence is an irritant to already shaky Thai-Laotian relations. And the door to America is closed to them.

"We were soldiers of Vang Pao and the Americans," said one Meo leader, referring to Gen. Vang Pao, who headed a mercenary army supported by the American Central Intelligence Agency and who has been granted asylum in the United States.

"The Pathet Lao are the enemy," the Meo leader said. "If we go back we have nothing to eat, and they will kill us or send us off to study where we will never return to our families."

The mountain people left when the Communist-led Pathet Lao began to take control of the country in May. Some came from northwestern Laos and crossed a border that to the hill people is only an invitation of the city men far away.

Many Women and Children

But nearly half made their way on foot from around Long Tieng, the former C.I.A. base in central Laos—140 miles as the crow flies but more than a three-week walk through the jungle-covered sierras. Three quarters of them were women and children.

Lao Teng, chief of a Meo refugee settlement at Pua, north of here, said that more than 135 of his people had died of malaria or lack of food during the long march.

In the Ban Nam Lan area, about five miles from the frontier, 5,700 refugees are virtually imprisoned in a jungle area bordered by Laos, a Thai Communist insurgent base and two rivers.

Thai authorities permit only half a dozen a day to leave and walk four hours to the village of Mae Cherim to buy essentials.

Thai authorities here in Nam Province have spent $40,000 on the refugees, Gov. Sawatdi Prapanich said. Provincial refugee sources said that it would cost $1,000 a day to meet the basic minimum needs in rice alone.

"If they have no rice and die, that is their problem," said the Governor. "We did not ask them to come. We have poor Thais who need help."

The Government says that it has run out of funds for the refugees. For the time being those here who can afford it are buying rice brought in by Thai Army helicopter at 20 per cent more than the rate in the provincial capital, but Lao Teng says in Pua that "in two weeks we will run out of money."

Scavenging in Jungle

The Meo wear their wealth in silver jewelry, and Thai merchants are paying only 80 per cent of the regular market price for it, Meo refugees said.

At the Ban Nam Lan site about 2,000 refugees have enough money for two more weeks; the rest already are scavenging in the jungle. They set out daily to hunt for roots, berries and other edible plants. All stands of bamboo in the area have been scoured for edible shoots, and all the palm trees have been cut down for the small heart of palm.

"If it were not for the bamboo shoots, we would have died already," said Muoi Ya, 36 years old. "We need salt. We are weak and sick. Mothers cannot nurse their babies."

Some rice and medical aid has been donated by the Y.M.C.A. and Roman Catholic groups in the north Thailand city of Chiang Mai. But these donations have been small compared with the need.

Of 100 donated sacks of rice, 23 were taken by corrupt Thai officials in the jungle camp, Meo refugees say.

No Thai official comment was available on the report. Thais and Westerners coming from the area in recent weeks have made similar reports.

BALTIMORE SUN
21 August 1975

Refugees in Thailand, Too

Of all the peoples allied with America in Indochina, none paid more dearly than the Meo hill tribesmen of the CIA "secret army" in Laos. Whole villages were decimated, sometimes by fighting and sometimes by exhaustion from incessant moving. Some villages were cut off from their lands so long that children grew up believing rice fell in bags from airplanes.

Today, as tens of thousands of America's former Vietnamese clients await homes in the United States, tens of thousands of primitive Meo hill folk are in remote border areas of Thailand, where they fled as Laos was taken over by the Communists. Newsmen who have visited the Meo report they are exhausted, hungry and sick. Thai officials, who are struggling for better relations with the Pathet Lao, can ill afford much sympathy. "If they have no rice and die, that is their problem," Sawatdi Prapanich, governor of Nam province, told an Associated Press reporter. "We did not ask them to come. We have poor Thais who need help."

Unlike the Vietnamese, the primitive Meo, who farm by moving from hillside to hillside, cutting off the brush and cultivating each slope until it is exhausted, would be little helped by blanket admission to the United States. The office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees is now working with Thai and American authorities to ease their move into the hills of Thailand. U.S. officials say they "expect to make a substantial contribution" of cash to the arrangement.

That seems the least that can be done. Estimates of the number of Meo who crossed from Laos range as high as 40,000. Even if Bangkok agrees to let them stay, provincial and local Thai officials already reportedly are demanding bribes to distribute aid rice. Fellow Meo who were already living in Thailand ironically form the backbone of that country's pro-Communist insurgency, so the temptation for both sides to compete for the refugees' remaining military-age men will be strong. The Meo are among the world's best opium raisers, and their current impoverishment assures that many will turn quickly to that illegal source of support, thereby inviting further trouble with the Thai authorities. The impartial auspices of the U.N. high commissioner may well be helpful in resettling the Meo refugees. But that must not become an excuse for less direct U.S. interest in tribesmen who were America's chief ally in the clandestine adventure in Laos.

BALTIMORE SUN
8 August 1975

Potential use of Manila bases by China intrigues U.S. aides

By CHARLES W. CORDDRY
Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington—China, in a gesture both interesting and puzzling to officials here, has recently tried to sound out Manila on possible Chinese use of naval and air facilities in the Philippines, where the issue of future United States base rights is soon to come to a head.

Intelligence sources who reported Peking's feelers saw in them some evidence that China may want to expand its military operations beyond its own borders with a potential opening in the Philippines. Manila and Peking established diplomatic relations June 9.

More realistically, the intelligence sources suggested that the Chinese—in view of Manila's earlier public campaign over changing the status of U.S. bases—were hedging their bets by expressing an interest in use of facilities before the Soviet Union might make such overtures to Philippines President Ferdinand E. Marcos.

Though Mr. Marcos, during the fall of South Vietnam, publicly questioned the reliability of the United States and the value of the U.S. bases, his attitude seems to have changed markedly, so that there is no visible expectation here of his ending the U.S. presence.

What is expected, officials indicated, is the negotiation of a more equitable administrative arrangement, from Manila's standpoint, under which the bases would be seen as Filipino facilities on which American forces operated by Philippines permission. The United States was granted the "right to retain the use of the bases"—more extensive rights than it later got elsewhere—shortly after Filipino independence was granted in 1946.

The facilities in question are chiefly the big Subic Bay Naval Base, a prime repair and supply area for the U.S. fleet in the western Pacific, and Clark Air Base, a key installation for the U.S. Air Force in that area.

The Pentagon would put these bases very near the top of any global priority list, now especially, in view of the turn to a forward strategy in the Pacific based on air and naval power. The alternatives would be to fall back on Guam, which would be regarded as unsatisfactory, or to Hawaii.

When President Marcos was in Peking in June, arranging the establishment of diplomatic relations after years of opposition to recognizing Communist governments, he was understood to have sought to learn China's attitude toward the American bases in his country.

This was after he had publicly questioned the wisdom of reliance on the United States in light of the Vietnam outcome.

The Chinese leaders apparently avoided Mr. Marcos's inquiries, officials here said, though they had the impression that the Filipino president inferred China wanted a continued American presence in the far Pacific as counterweight to the Soviet Union.

Against this background, it was taken as a puzzling development that a Filipino official lately in Peking was asked by Chou Kwan-hua, the Chinese foreign minister, about the possibility of China's having similar access to air and naval installations.

The Filipino official was reported to have said he would pass along the inquiry to President Marcos, and to have added that he personally thought a "friendly power"—China—should be entitled to privileges similar to those of the United States.

No early change in the status of the U.S. bases is expected, officials said. They thought negotiations, however, would start fairly soon, probably in October.

In his latest expressions, Mr. Marcos has said the United States could continue to use the bases, which the Philippines would control, to maintain "an effective presence over the air- and sea-lanes" of the western Pacific.

WASHINGTON POST
5 September 1975

China Not a Threat, Sen. Byrd Says

United Press International

Assistant Senate Democratic Leader Robert C. Byrd (W.Va.) said yesterday his recent 10-day visit convinced him that China does not harbor any expansionist ambitions nor does it seek to become a world superpower.

Byrd also said China no longer considers the United States a threat to its territorial integrity or existence as a socialist state and that, in turn, the United States should not fear China as a threat in "the foreseeable future . . ."

He called for a gradual movement toward normalizing relations with China, which he said reflected a change in his attitude of some years ago.

Byrd said his personal reappraisal was based on "the shifting necessities underlying our own national security which, I believe, is being increasingly threatened by growing Soviet power and aggressive inclinations."

He described China as "thoroughly distrustful of the intentions, words, and actions of the Soviet Union" and said she foresees a Russian effort to dominate North Vietnam and establish bases south of China's borders, and create dissension in Inner Mongolia and among Chinese minorities.

"In my judgment, the United States need have no fear of Red China as a threat to our own country in the foreseeable future or as long as the Sino-Soviet rupture continues," Byrd said.

Latin America

WASHINGTON STAR
25 August 1975

Let's deal with Cuba

The gradual pace of U.S.-Cuban rapprochement is quickening and it is high time for more bilateral conciliatory gestures by both governments that will help bury the machete.

It is almost as if Fidel Castro and Henry Kissinger have fallen into the rhythm of taking turns at moves that will ease the tensions of 15 years. The anti-hijack treaty was the first real icebreaker. The July decision of the Organization of American States to terminate the mandatory isolation of Cuba removed any need or reason for further stand-offishness between the estranged neighbors.

It is almost silly for Havana and Washington to be taking so much time to put the official stamp on a historic inevitability. Castro has been signaling for months that he would welcome an end to Cuba's pariah status and a normalization of relations with the U.S. Kissinger, although Cuba is far from his highest priority, also has publicly stated that the U.S. is ready to discuss a new relationship any time Cuba wishes.

Washington reacted to the hijack treaty by lifting the 25-mile limit on travel by Cuban diplomats at the United Nations and increasing their range to 250 miles — just enough to permit them to come to Washington. Then Castro gave back $2 million dollars in hijack ransom money to an American airline and the U.S. cooed its gratitude. Now the U.S. has taken a genuinely important step to lift some of the economic sanctions against Cuba.

While it is true that the U.S. decision last week applies only to third-country sanctions and technically is not a bilateral matter with Cuba at all, there can be no question that it was a major step to dismantle the regulations that affect trade with Cuba. There are scores of U.S. firms with subsidiaries abroad that have been unable to sell their products to Cuba under the regulations that are now waived

The practical effect of the latest decision is to permit overseas branches of American firms to sell their manufactured goods in Cuba in free competition with other foreign factories. Collaterally, the U.S. decision will gratify such countries as Canada, Argentina, Mexico, Spain and others where American subsidiaries have until now been ruled out of the Cuban market. The export of American foreign-policy strictures via corporate foreign investment has been a sore point in these friendly countries.

The U.S. also has lifted the regulation that no vessel in the Cuban trade can be refueled in an American port. This will have the salutary effect of increasing the number of vessels in the world merchant fleet that can call at both Cuban and U.S. ports.

When members of Congress were told of the impending State Department announcement of the softening of the ban on third-country trade with Cuba, they applauded the decision. So do we. Now we believe President Ford should lose little time in removing the barriers to direct trade between Cuba and the U.S., and initiating direct talks toward a full restoration of diplomatic and economic relations.

There are stumbling blocks to total rapprochement, to be sure. There is the question of expropriated U.S. property, the status of the Guantanamo Bay naval base, the presence of basing facilities for the Soviet Union and, considering Ford's 1976 election bid, the domestic political peril of being seen as soft on Castro. The anti-Castro Cuban refugee community will make trouble on the issue.

But we believe it is in the self-interest of the United States to restore trade and political relationships with Cuba without delay. The continuation of the cold war with Cuba can no longer be justified on any grounds, now that Castro is out of the business of exporting revolution. He may not be all that lovable a leader in American eyes, but it no longer makes sense to pretend he isn't even there.

WASHINGTON POST
5 September 1975

Sol M. Linowitz

What Future for the Panama Canal?

OAS Secretary General Orfila recently called the Panama Canal "the most explosive issue in Latin America." A lot of other concerned Latin American and U.S. leaders have for some time been warning us about the canal issue and what it may mean to the whole future of the hemisphere.

But most Americans have not been listening—especially Congress.

As though to prove how hard it has not been listening, just before the August recess the House of Representatives passed 246-164 the Snyder Amendment to the State Department appropriation bill, which would have kept the State Department from even negotiating about a new Panama Canal treaty. Only vigorous efforts in the Senate kept that body from adopting the Byrd Amendment to the same effect.

The writer, former U.S. ambassador to the Organization of American States, is chairman of the U.S.-Latin American Commission.

These developments came some weeks after 38 senators and 126 representatives co-sponsored a resolution that sharply opposed the basic objectives of a new treaty.

Obviously there must be some reason otherwise thoughtful members of Congress are lining up as they are with respect to such a potentially dangerous issue. The answer is clear enough: Neither the administration nor those members of the Congress supporting a new treaty have directly responded to the arguments and concerns of those who are opposing the treaty. Rather, they have been content

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to let the opposition build in the apparent expectation that once a treaty is negotiated they will be able to make their case effectively.

But time is running out and opposition is building. Meanwhile, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker and Panamanian Foreign Minister Juan Tack make progress toward a new treaty which may face rejection in the Senate. If that happens, we may find that the Panama Canal has become a tinderbox.

It is long past time to take a hard look at the arguments being advanced against the new treaty and to deal with them forthrightly. Good questions are being asked and they deserve responsive answers.

Will the new treaty mean a surrender of United States sovereignty over the Canal?

The simple answer is that the United States never had sovereignty. The 1903 treaty specifically gave the United States authority which it would have "if it were sovereign." Obviously, these words would not have been necessary if the United States were, in fact, sovereign. A new treaty which recognizes that fact and goes on from there to work out a mutually agreeable arrangement for control of the territory can hardly be called a surrender of United States sovereignty.

Will a new Panama Canal treaty prejudice our national security?

The fact of the matter is that the greatest danger to the security of the United States would be the continuance of the present status of the canal. If there is not a new treaty, we will be running the grave risk that the canal—which is, of course, exceedingly vulnerable under any circumstances—may be damaged or destroyed by irate Panamanians. By the same token we may find ourselves in the positon of having to defend the canal by force against a hostile population and in the face of widespread, if not universal, condemnation. Since the new treaty will specifically include provisions for a continued U.S. defense role with respect to the canal, it is hard to see how a new treaty could be adverse to our natinal security.

Will a new treaty weaken the United States position by exposing the canal to political instability and violence?

If any course is designed to expose the canal to political instability and violence, it would be an anachronistic effort to maintain in effect a treaty negotiated in 1903 which is no longer respected, which is looked upon by Panamanians of all political persuasions as an affront to Panama's national dignity and as a colonial enclave, and which is viewed throughout Latin America as the last vestige of "big stick" diplomacy. Under the new treaty the United States would be able to protect its position while allowing Panama a greater responsibility in the canal's operation.

Will a new treaty adversely affect U.S. commercial interests?

Admittedly, the canal is important to us commercially, but obviously its economic significance has diminished considerably as world commerce patterns and technologies of shipping have changed. Today large vessels cannot use the canal and a major expansion of the present capacity may be necessary —possibly a sea level canal. If the situation remains as it is, it is hardly likely that Panama would accede to the modernization required. In order to accomplish that, there must be assurance of Panamanian cooperation precisely as called for in the proposed treaty.

In the light of these facts, it certainly requires no extended argument to recognize that efforts on our part to adhere to the 1903 treaty would be both damaging to our national interests and in derogation of our hemispheric objectives. By the same token the new treaty would demonstrably offer the prospect of increased security for the canal and the futherance of our common goals for the Americas.

Friday, Sept. 5, 1975 THE WASHINGTON POST

Brazil's Police Raise Concern By Excesses

By Michael Arkus
Reuter

RIO DE JANEIRO—Claudio Elias Barros, 18, left his home one evening recently to collect his brother from school in Rio de Janeiro's plush seaside neighborhood of Copacabana.

A few minutes later he lay dying in the street, shot in the back at point-blank range by a policeman, according to scores of eyewitnesses. The policeman denied the shooting.

In Sao Paulo, Brazil's largest city, Ignacio Medeiros, 22, Joao Diniz, 19, and Francisco Nogueira, 17, all students with impeccable records, left a night club in their car and tried to take a tape recorder from a friend's vehicle, apparently as a prank.

Spotted by a policeman and pursued by a patrol car, they died in a hail of bullets despite their appeals to police not to shoot, according to the prosecutor's report.

Rubem Ferreira, 29, left his house in the Rio suburb of Sao Goncalo with his two small children to buy cold drinks when he was picked up by police.

Two days later he was found on a lonely stretch of road, with second-and third-degree burns over half his body, abandoned as dead by the policeman who had tortured him, according to the prosecutor.

These three cases underline mounting public concern at the countless number of accusations of beatings and torture made against police throughout the country.

According to many law-abiding citizens here, it is not even the greater or lesser frequency of such occurrences but their total arbitrariness that is the prime cause of concern.

This correspondent was a witness to the immediate aftermath of the death of Claudio Barros.

Claudio was a janitor in one of Copacabana's apartment blocks, but lived with his foster mother and 11 foster brothers and sisters in the slum above the suburb.

He survived the floods of 1966, which killed his mother and two sisters, only to be cut down himself shortly before realizing his life's ambition of entering the army.

Claudio was black, his foster family white.

On the day he died, he was trying to separate one of his brothers and several other boys who were fighting.

Osmar Rodriguez, one of the many eyewitnesses told this reporter:

"A police car approached and one of the policemen began clubbing Claudio's brother, Jorge. Claudio told him to stop it. The policeman called him a dirty nigger and grabbed hold of him.

"A second policeman shouted: 'Get him. Shoot him.' The policeman fired and Claudio lay in the road writhing and agonizing for 15 minutes without the police letting anyone get near."

The crowd's anger was immediate, and they stoned the police car. Helmeted Rio police were called in and went to work clubbing and arrested anybody they could lay hands on—including two more of Claudio's brothers.

The policeman who is alleged to have fired and his companion were also arrested. They said Claudio had a knife. But then they also denied shooting, claiming that the shot came from the crowd.

Several witnesses told journalists they saw the policeman take out his revolver, shoot, and then put in a fresh bullet.

Dalva Neves, Claudio's foster mother, was a first refused admittance to the police station, only a block from the scene of the shooting.

Weeping, she was finally allowed in, together with several othe rwitnesses and journalists.

Inside the station, Dalva Neves said, the policeman charged with the shooting laughed in her face when she accused him of murdering her son.

Outside, crowds began roaming the street again, shouting "murderers" and "sons of whores," smashing windows and street signs blocking traffic.

More riot troops were brought in and went about their work clubbing and kicking.

The following day, a police lieutenant said "elements" had been inciting the crowd.

Some of the evidence given by the eyewitnesses will not be accepted, because they are minors. "Apparently you are allowed to be shot dead when you are under age, but not to

"give evidence," one of them said bitterly.

In the Sao Paulo incident, the police initially claimed that the three students were armed and opened fire first, but according to the prosecutor, the police apparently planted revolvers in the boys' car and fired on their own vehicle to give the impression of a gun battle.

The policemen were arrested, but Col. Eramos Dias, state security chief in Sao Paulo, spoke only of an "excess" by his subordinates.

In the case of Rubem Ferreira, the police apparently thought he was a burglar and tried to make him confess with blows, kicks and semi-drowning by means of a hose inserted in the throat, he said.

When all these proved of no avail, they soaked his undershorts in kerosine and set him on fire.

"Abandoned for dead, Ferreira survived to accuse his torturers.

The policemen involved in all three cases are awaiting trial.

But justice tends to be slow, and the cases are only the most spectacular in a long series reported daily in the nation's newspapers.

WASHINGTON POST
29 August 1975

Reports of Deaths Doubted

Chile to Probe Fate of Missing

By Joanne Omang
Washington Post Foreign Service

BUENOS AIRES—Chilean President Augusto Pinochet has joined the many leftist Latin Americans in calling for an investigation into two apparently bogus reports that 119 Chilean leftist have been killed outside Chile in guerrilla infighting of clashes with troops.

Opponents of Pinochet's government have accused it of manufacturing the reports to cover up the true circumstances of the 119 persons' deaths. The 119, they say, died in Chilean prisons.

Pinochet's move reflects an apparent shift in the government line from defense of the original reports to an accusation that they were planted by the left as a pretense to attack the government.

Speaking last week in San Bernardino, a suburb of Santiago, President Pinochet said he would order a check into the sources of the two reports, which were widely reprinted in the government-controlled Chilean press.

International controversy over the fate of the 119 missing persons, he said, was started by "the Marxist-Leninist conspiracy" and was "just another form of attacking us."

The reports of deaths have spurred an unusual amount of debate and public concern for the fate of missing persons within Chile, which has been under a tightly controlled rightist dictatorship since leftist President Salvador Allende was overthrown Sept. 11, 1973.

According to press reports, 4,000 persons jammed Santiago's cathedral for a special mass Aug. 5 at which Auxiliary Bishop Enrique Alvear read a message from the families of 270 missing persons, accusing Chilean authorities of "closing their doors" to the families' pleas for information.

Former President Eduardo Frei, who has rarely spoken out against the government, asked for a government probe of the case and called on the president of the Supreme Court to authorize a judicial investigation.

The controversy broke out last month when the Chilean press reprinted articles from a Buenos Aires magazine called Lea and a Brazilian newspaper named O Dia in which 60 Chilean "extremists" in six countries were listed a having been killed by their comrades in arguments and squabbles over money. Fifty-nine others were reported killed in a battle with Argentine troops.

Sources in the Chilean press corps said copies of the two articles were given to Chilean newspapers by the goverment press office.

All the persons listed as killed had been detained by Chilean security forces at various times beginning in May, 1974, according to documents filed by their families in Chilean courts and with the church-sponsored Committee for Cooperation and Peace in Chile, which aids families of political prisoners.

News Analysis

Chilean newspapers editorially hailed the Lea and O Dia reports as proof that the missing persons were not being held secretly, as the families charged, but had left the country as the government had always maintained. Commentators said the reports showed that members of the outlawed Revolutionary Leftist Movement would "shoot each other like rats" over money and in personal arguments.

"Politicians and foreign reporters who asked so many times regarding the fate of these persons and blamed the government of Chile for their disappearance now have the explanation they rejected," said an editorial published July 25 in Santiago's leading newspaper, El Mercurio.

The original two articles reporting the deaths involved so many discrepancies and questionable circumstances that they were quickly condemned as bogus by attorneys defending political prisoners and by persons in and out of Chile concerned about the fate of the missing persons.

Since the military government took power in Chile more than 41,000 persons have been arrested and questioned for varying lenghts of time. The government says it now holds 653 political prisoners, but other sources put the number at close to 5,000. An estimated 1,500 persons have disappeared.

The Church-sponsored peace committee asked the Supreme Court for a judicial investigation of the case. The request was denied twice—the first time by a vote of 10-3, the second time by a narrower margin of 8-5, according to press reports from Chile. The court did order lower court judges to report every 10 days on the progress of proceedings filed by the families of missing persons.

The Chilean Catholic magazine Mensaje, said: "If they are dead, where are the bodies? Could they all . . . have passed clandestinely across the border under false names in order to be acting now with their true identities? Can all these families be swearing falsely?"

Debate over the reported deaths spread throughout Latin America. Chilean exile groups denied that there had been any faction fights resulting in deaths of any of their members.

In Colombia, a leftist member of Congress asked the U.N. Commission on Human Rights to investigate, as did Amnesty International, a London-based group that assists political prisoners.

The report in O Dia that 59 Chileans were killed in a clash with the Argentine army could not be confirmed since no Argentine news outlet has reported any clash involving 59 deaths. Journalists discovered that O Dia was published in Curitiba, Brazil, for only three issues as an attempt to revive a long-defunct newspaper.

The newspaper Lea, distributed in Buenos Aires, appeared July 15 for only one issue. Its masthead gave a false address and a nonexistent publisher.

WASHINGTON POST
28 August 1975

Panama Warns U.S. On Troops

By Joanne Omang
Washington Post Foreign Service

LIMA, Aug. 27—Foreign Minister Juan A. Tack of Panama warned of possible "actions" in response to the presence of American troops in the Canal Zone today at the fifth ministerial conference of nonaligned nations.

Denouncing the "irritable, provocative and threatening" presence of the 2d Battalion of the 505th Infantry Regiment of the U.S. Army's 82d Division, Tack called it "an act of provocation liable to endanger world peace."

He said he was making the denunciation "because of the later actions that Panama might initiate with the aim of opposing these acts of unjustifiable provocation."

Panama was accepted yesterday into full membership in the nonaligned group, which with 82 member countries and 40 observer nations represents more than half the world's population. Its week-long meeting in this Peruvian capital has centered on the Middle East but that highly divisive question bogged down today in procedural disputes.