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Governmental Affairs

THE NATIONAL OBSERVER
26 JULY 1975

'We Didn't Choose the Boy Scouts as a Career'

These CIA Alumni Now Try to Improve The Agency's Image

By Daniel St. Albin Greene
FROM WASHINGTON, D.C.

DECEPTION was integral to their way of life. They went to work about the same time as most other Government employes in this "one-industry town," but their neighbors didn't know where they went or what they did when they got there. When asked, they'd usually say vaguely that they worked someplace in the Federal bureaucracy, where anonymity thrives. Sometimes two friends would discover that they were in the same trade and had been lying needlessly to each other for years.

But for David Atlee Phillips, Samuel Halpern, Hayden Estey, and Eric Biddle, Jr., the daily intrigue is over. For many years they were in the business of espionage as officers of the Central Intelligence Agency—and they don't mind saying they're proud of it.

Such an admission is unusual enough in the midst of rampaging controversy that now engulfs the CIA and threatens to downgrade the Government's attitude toward peacetime espionage in general. But in addition these and other onetime intelligence agents have mounted the first public-relations campaign in history to "explain" what the murky world of American spying is all about.

'What It Is Not'

"We didn't choose the Boy Scouts as a career," says Dave Phillips, who resigned as chief of the CIA's Latin American operations three months ago. "But it is also true that these things come in cycles. Many of the things we are getting our lumps for these days are things that U.S. Presidents thought were pretty remarkable."

This irony is at the heart of the message that Phillips and his previously secretive colleagues want to get across to the American public. In a letter to former CIA employes announcing the formation of the Association of Retired Intelligence Officers (ARIO), Phillips said he had resigned from the agency "to help clear up some of the erroneous impressions and sensationalism surrounding us, by explaining what CIA is and, more important probably, what it is not."

More specifically, ARIO members can be expected to use all the propaganda skills they developed in foreign intrigue to counteract damaging disclosures by the press, the Rockefeller Commission, Sen. Frank Church's Senate Intelligence Committee, and expose books by former agents Victor Marchetti *(The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence,* written with John D. Marks) and Philip Agee [see accompanying story].

The intelligence men who, as John LeCarre readers put it, have come "in from the cold" don't deny that they've been involved in a lot of secret doings they still can't talk about. But those interviewed by The Observer maintained that during their careers they knew nothing about CIA people spying on Americans in their own land, tampering with the public mail, spiking drinks with LSD, or any of the other misdeeds revealed by the Rockefeller Commission.

Cables to Chile

What about the most persistent and potentially damning charge of all: that the CIA plotted to have some foreign political leaders assassinated, including Cuban Premier Fidel Castro and former Chilean President Salvador Allende?

Phillips, who was a spy in Cuba both before and after the Castro revolution and who was directing Latin American operations when Allende was killed in 1973, denies the allegations. He says that a few months before the bloody overthrow of Allende, CIA headquarters sent cables ordering agents in Chile to "cut off contacts with people who are planning coups" against the Marxist president.

But Sam Halpern, who retired last December after 32 years in the intelligence business, adds a provocative qualifier: "Nobody in his right mind would think that the CIA would go off on its own to knock off a political leader in another country." Not even if the order came from the White House? "We might try to argue 'em out of it; but if the order was, 'Yeah, we heard you, but go ahead and do it anyway,' we'd go do it."

Congressional Control

Whether ARIO members are driven by personal dedication, are erecting a propaganda front for their old agency, or have some other motive can't be established. Phillips acknowledges it will take time for ARIO to earn credibility in an increasingly skeptical society. But whatever their motivations, four erstwhile CIA men talked freely last week about their careers in that mysterious institution.

"We are doing something now," observed Phillips, "that we would not have dreamed of doing a year ago." Why now? "There's no question that some sort of congressional control is going to be implicit in whatever the ultimate solution is," he said. "And when congressional control is involved, it means the people are the final arbiters of what's going to happen. So we are now in a position that de-

mands, for the first time in our history, that a secret intelligence organization must be publicly talked about."

In 1946 President Truman established the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) to carry on some of the functions of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the nation's wartime intelligence organization. Though skeptical that the new outfit would be dominated by unregenerated militarists from the OSS, Hayden Estey and a few other disgruntled staffers left World Report magazine (now U.S. News and World Report) to work for the CIG. The National Security Act of 1947 created the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency, replacing the CIG.

Attracted Young Graduates

Estey's early skepticism proved groundless. "The morale and dedication was so high in the early days," he recalls, "that most people worked seven days a week." That spirit sustained him for the next 23 years, until he retired in 1970.

"Many young college graduates," adds Phillips, "chose the CIA because it was known as a place where there was intellectual stimulation, ferment of ideas, and room for dissent."

His own gravitation to the world of espionage, however, was far more circuitous. After high school, the handsome young Texan followed his older brother, an aspiring novelist, to New York City to pursue an acting career. His brother, James Atlee Phillips, went on to become a prolific writer of spy novels (James' son, Shawn, is a folk-rock balladeer). But after the war, part of which he spent in a German prisoner-of-war camp, David Phillips gradually decided that he would never be a very good actor; so he, too, turned his attention to writing.

A producer bought an option on a comedic play Phillips wrote about a POW camp. It was never staged, but the monthly income from the option enabled Phillips to go to Chile to write and attend college. When the owner of a struggling English language weekly died, he took it over by assuming its debts. Then, to increase the paper's chances of survival, he bought a local printing plant—and that's how Dave Phillips became a spy.

Served as a 'Dangle'

"The day I bought the printing plant," he reminisces, "a CIA man called to ask if I would collaborate with them. That was the beginning of the Cold War, and the combination of a 'clearable' American and a printing press was irresistible."

For $50 a month, Phillips secretly printed propaganda and served as a "dangle." Word was spread that the young publisher was really the chief of American intelligence in Chile. "I was dangled to attract people who

would try to cultivate me, which is just what the local Soviet KGB man did."

Dangling led to full-time employment as a contract spy in Guatemala, then Cuba, where he posed as an American businessman. He was in Cuba when Castro came out of the mountains. He kept the same kind of cover as a spy in Lebanon, which he left the night before the Marines landed in 1958.

"I had become a specialist in propaganda and political action," Phillips explains. "During the Cold War, my missions were to do things to make people overseas think better of the United States than they did of the Soviet Union. Part of my job was to see that certain messages got to certain people, to cultivate the kind of friends that a government needs in any country."

Virtuous Compartments

Sometimes spying, by any name, can be a risky business. While Phillips was in Cuba in the late 1950s, another American agent masquerading as a businessman was arrested and executed.

After a decade of spying under contract, Phillips was given civil-service status as a $16,000-a-year intelligence officer stationed at CIA headquarters in Langley, Va., where he worked on the ill-fated Bay of Pigs project. That was followed by stints in several Latin American countries.

Phillips disclaims knowledge of the nefarious deeds attributed to the CIA during the years he was rising in the hierarchy: "You mustn't be surprised to find out that some people don't know things in an intelligence organization where secrecy and compartmentation are considered virtues. It used to be that everyone within the system depended on the assumption that orders came from the top and that the right people who needed to know were doing things they should do. Now we have found out that over this long period of time, some of those people were doing things that were wrong. Obviously, these things might not have happened if more people had known about them. But it is equally obvious that without secrecy we wouldn't have had the best intelligence service in the world."

Phillips was not a typical CIA man. Most intelligence officers are engaged in the overt aspects of the business, such as research, analysis, and evaluation of intelligence. Even those involved in covert operations generally function as "agent handlers," recruiting foreign spies and directing their clandestine activities. Phillips estimates that no more than 5 per cent of those actively engaged in spying—as he was before becoming a staff intelligence officer—are Americans.

'A Bum Idea'

More representative, perhaps, is Sam Halpern, whose long and varied intelligence career never included spying in the traditional sense of the word.

At 53, Halpern is a trim, genial man who wears thick glasses and keeps his steel-gray hair cropped military style. He's also a man who speaks his mind, bluntly and without hesitation.

On political assassination: "I don't see any difference, in terms of national policy, between a Bay of Pigs operation, in which a lot of people get killed on both sides, and the killing of one guy. The only difference is, in the one case you don't know who's going to die, and in the other case you do know who's going to die. But from our point of view, assassination is a bum idea."

'It Has Never Helped'

On the CIA's problems: "I'm not trying to condone everything we've done. But don't blame the agency. Blame the President—or the system of Government that makes the President supreme in foreign matters." Halpern says he's still proud of the agency, "despite the things I've found out that we shouldn't have done. . . . I've got no regrets."

Eric Biddle, Jr., has, though. Since he left the agency in 1960, after more than eight years of service, his CIA background has been an occupational onus.

"I still believe it was the most important work I ever did," says Biddle. "I'm proud of it. But I regret having done it because I don't think this country is sure that it wants a strategic intelligence service. In every other major country in the world, to have been in the intelligence service means that you were a select and highly thought-of person. But here—it has never helped and it has frequently hurt me."

Biddle talks about some of the reasons he decided to leave the agency: "One was the great discipline you live under in that business—the great demands it makes on your private life. You have to assume, the whole time you're in, that your entire life may be observed, one way or another. Then when you get back here [in Washington, from overseas], you've got the problem of not being able to tell anybody where you work. You have to develop your own cover. So the people in the business become extremely inhibited, and tend to draw within themselves and into a small circle of their own people. I'm a pretty outgoing person; I just didn't want to spend my life that way."

Will the CIA ever be able to redeem itself? Eric Biddle is pessimistic: "The only way to ensure the integrity of the intelligence system is to have Presidents of integrity. And that's beyond the control of the intelligence people."

THE PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
22 JULY 1975

What secrets are legitimate?

We accept the principle that even in an open society like ours the government is entitled on occasion to keep some matters under wraps. In the conduct of diplomacy, in particular, not everything can be done in a goldfish bowl. Moreover, we also go along with the principle that when you make an agreement, you ought to keep it.

Simple enough. Or is it? Consider the case of Rep. Michael Harrington. Somewhat over a year ago, the Massachussetts Democrat was given access to classified material bearing on operations of the Central Intelligence Agency in Chile, on condition that he agree — as he did — not to reveal what he learned.

What he learned, from secret testimony of CIA Director William E. Colby, was not only that the U.S. had violated treaty commitments in the CIA's secret activities to "destabilize" the former Chilean government of Salvadore Allende, but that top U.S. Government officials had apparently lied under oath about those activities. He also learned that the chairman of the House subcommittee in charge of CIA oversight, Rep. Louis Nedzi of Michigan, had known of at least some of the things but had kept his knowledge to himself.

After having tried unsuccessfully to persuade House and Senate committees on foreign affairs to hold hearings on the matter, Mr. Harrington last summer revealed what he learned. He has been in trouble ever since. The House Armed Services Committee chastised him last month for breaking the rules, and now, at his request, the House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct is looking into the matter.

"What is the responsibility of a member who discovers in classified records a clear indication that his government has broken the law?" Rep. Harrington asks in a letter to House Speaker Carl Albert.

We think Rep. Harrington made the right decision. As we say, the government has a right to keep legitimate secrets, but the operating word there is "legitimate." Government officials have no legitimate right to break laws and abuse power and lie about what they've done and then put a "top secret" classification on it all.

The House ethics panel should proceed with its inquiry into Rep. Harrington's behavior, but Congress itself oughtto be far more concerned about the behavior that prompted it.

WASHINGTON POST
18 July 1975

The Lagos Workers' Union urged the Nigeria government to close down a radio monitoring station operated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, a facility of the CIA.

NEWSWEEK
21 JULY 1975

The Casualty

To his family, Frank R. Olson was a warm, playful, easygoing man. To his colleagues at the Army's top-secret germ-warfare lab at Fort Detrick, Md., he was a top-flight research biochemist. But suddenly in the fall of 1953, while he was working on a special project for the Central Intelligence Agency, Olson, then 43, seemed inexplicably to be going mad—and two days after Thanksgiving he killed himself by jumping from a tenth-story window in New York City. His death was officially attributed to a "work-related accident" so that his widow, Alice, and their three children could collect death benefits. But for the next 22 years the family was plagued by persistent and troubling questions about what psychic horror could possibly have driven him to take his own life.

Last week, the Olson family gathered in the garden of their Frederick, Md., home to announce that they had discovered the tragic answer at last. Their clue had been a passing page or two in the Rockefeller commission report on domestic CIA activities which was released last month—a terse no-names recounting of one agency project in which unwitting human subjects were given doses of the hallucinogen LSD. One of the CIA's guinea pigs, the commission reported, had developed "serious side effects" and had committed suicide. The dates and details meshed with Olson's death—and finally his onetime supervisor at Fort Detrick, Vincent Ruwet, admitted to the family what he had withheld from them for more than twenty years. "Suddenly," the family said, "we learn that Alice Olson's being left in early adulthood to raise a family alone, we children left to grow up without a father—we learn that these deprivations were not necessary at all . . . [This discovery] marks a shift in our lives from thinking that our father's death was a suicide to knowing it was a CIA atrocity."

Olson had been part of the Special Operations Division at Fort Detrick—an elite corps of 50 bacteriologists and biochemists working under tight security with some of the deadliest microorganisms known to man. Within SOD was another, smaller group under special contract to the CIA to study, among other things, potential offensive and defensive uses of LSD in war and for intelligence gathering. Periodically, the CIA contract group retreated into the nearby Catoctin Mountains to discuss their progress in privacy—and it was after dinner during one three-day retreat that Olson and three other high-level scientists were told by their CIA hosts that LSD had been slipped into their Cointreau and Triple Sec cordials.

What happened in Olson's mind that night may never be known; most of the records of the LSD project were destroyed in 1973. But when he returned home, Alice Olson remembers, "he was an entirely different person. I didn't know what had happened. I just knew that something was terribly wrong. The entire weekend he was very melancholy and talked about a mistake he had made. He said he was going to leave his job." Monday-morning reassurances from coworkers helped forestall his decision to quit, and he came home in better spirits that evening. But on Tuesday morning, Ruwet, who himself had been one of the subjects and experienced aftereffects of the drug for several weeks, decided that Olson needed psychiatric attention, and Olson went home to tell his wife he would be going to New York for it. An SOD employee sped him to the Washington airport, and Alice Olson never saw her husband again.

Psychosis: Ruwet and a man named Robert Lashbrook accompanied Olson to New York and arranged for him to see Dr. Harold A. Abramson, a former psychiatric consultant for the Army with a top security clearance whose early research into LSD was beginning to attract considerable professional interest. After several long sessions, including one that ran for most of a day, Abramson diagnosed Olson's problem as delusions and severe psychosis. On Thanksgiving Day, Olson returned to Washington but decided at the last minute not to go home, fearing he might become irrational in front of his children. Instead, he went back to New York, where Abramson prepared to have him admitted to a Maryland sanitarium on Saturday.

Friday evening, Olson called his wife from the room at the Statler Hotel in midtown Manhattan where he and Lashbrook were staying. "We talked of his coming home and entering the hospital," she remembers. "It was in no way a farewell call." But only a few hours later, according to the police report, Lashbrook was startled awake by the sound of shattering glass—and Olson, who had thrown himself through the closed window, lay lifeless on the Seventh Avenue pavement.

The death benefits helped pay the bills, but did not answer the inevitable questions of neighbors and friends. "I used to say my father died of a nervous breakdown," said Olson's married daughter, Lisa Hayward, 29. "Then I heard my brother Nils say he died of a concussion so I said that too. That was difficult to deal with." Just as hard was dealing with their own nagging uncertainty. On learning the truth, Mrs. Olson said, "I felt tremendous relief and very deep sorrow. The grief was overwhelming, almost like the night he died. And I had a feeling of futility—such a waste of his life, such a waste of my life."

Hope: The Olson children decided to file a multimillion-dollar suit against the agency. "Since 1953, we have struggled to understand my father's death as an inexplicable 'suicide'," Lisa said. "Now, 22 years later, we learn that his death was the result of CIA negligence and illegality on a scale difficult to contemplate." Eric Olson, who was 9 years old when his father died and is now a research psychologist at Yale, emphasized that the suit was less for money than "full disclosure" of the facts surrounding the suicide—but his larger, unspoken hope was that the suit might finally relieve his family of a long-festering wound. "We cannot expect that everyone in this nation will be as critical of the CIA as we have become," he said. "No other family has been violated in quite the same way."

—JAMES R. GAINES with JANE WHITMORE in Washington

BALTIMORE SUN
17 July 1975

Drug agency hired CIA agent linked to researcher's LSD death

Washington Bureau of the Sun

Washington—Sidney Gottlieb, the Central Intelligence Agency operative allegedly present when LSD was given to an Army researcher who later killed himself, was later hired by the Drug Enforcement Administration, a DEA spokesman confirmed yesterday.

Mr. Gottlieb, described by an official of the Senate Intelligence Committee as a longtime CIA agent, was hired as a consultant by John R. Bartels, Jr., former director of drug agency who was fired by the Attorney General, Edward H. Levi, in the course of the current probe into corruption at the drug fighting agency.

Reportedly, Mr. Gottlieb was hired in late 1973 as a consultant at DEA, assisting in organizing the agency's office of science and technology. He worked for the agency for about five months, his duties involving drug research and the development of hardware, according to a spokesman.

Mr. Gottlieb, who retired and went to Colorado, was reported to be on a round-the-world trip at present, and unavailable for comment.

The name of the former CIA agent emerged in the course of the revelations stemming from the Rockefeller commission's report that Frank Olson, an Army researcher, had been given LSD by intelligence operatives at a time when the agency was experimenting with various drugs. Mr. Olson, unaware at the time that his liqueur contained the drug, committed suicide 10 days later. The Olson family is now suing the CIA.

NEW YORK TIMES
20 July 1975

Luck and the C.I.A.

Later this month, Joseph Okpaku's Third Press will publish a book, a year in preparation, by investigators Michael Canfield and Alan J. Weberman.

Called "Coup d'Etat in America, the C.I.A. and the Assassination of John F. Kennedy," the title alone has the ring of money, and Mr. Okpaku cheerfully admits that the fortuitous disclosures about the Central Intelligence Agency in recent months lend credence and saleability to the investigative work.

The 300-page book, with 70 pages of which are in the form of an appendix of documents, purports to show that Lee Harvey Oswald was a "deep-cover" C.I.A. agent who acted for the agency in killing the President in November, 1963.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, SATURDAY, JULY 12, 1975

C.I.A. in the Early Nineteen-Fifties Was Among Pioneers in Research on LSD's Effects

By BOYCE RENSBERGER

The Central Intelligence Agency was one of the pioneers in studying the drug LSD, having begun its research eight years before Dr. Timothy Leary swallowed his first dose of the powerful mind-altering substance.

The C.I.A., a review of the history of LSD research indicates, began its experiments with the drug at about the same time the Army and Navy began their studies of what was then, in the early nineteen-fifties, a mysterious drug with extraordinary powers to modify perception, thought, emotion and behavior.

LSD's potential utility as a chemical warafre agent was obvious from its earliest days in the laboratory in the late nineteen-forties.

Standard reference works on chemical warfare agents list LSD as one of a handful of "psychochemicals" under study by the chemical warfare research laboratories once housed at Fort Detrick ond at Edgewood Arsenal, both in Maryland. Chemical warfare research at these centers has since been phased out.

Plunged to His Death

When Dr. Frank R. Olson, the bacteriologist employed at Fort Detrick who was given LSD by C.I.A. experimenters, plunged from a New York hotel window to his death 22 years ago, the drug had only been made available to researchers in the United States a few months earlier by the Sandoz Research Laboratories of Switzerland.

Various government agencies had been working with the drug for several years, hoving obtained it privately. A few civilian researchers had also begun work earlier, including Dr. Howard A. Abramson, the psychiatrist to whom the C.I.A. took Dr. Olson when he began experiencing bad reactions to the drug.

LSD, or lysergic acid diethylamide, was first synthesized in 1938 by Dr. Albert Hofmann, a Sandoz chemist in Basel. The chemical's effects on the mind were not discovered until 1943 when Dr. Hofmann accidentally inhaled some LSD powder and experienced "a peculiar sensation" in which "fantastic pictures of extraordinary plasticity and intensive color seemed to surge toward me."

In 1947 the first systematic study of the effects of the curious compound confirmed Dr. Hofmann's earlier conclusions and spurred other researchers to investigate. Dr. Abramson began his experiments with LSD in 1951.

Because of the drug's wide-ranging effects, it was studied as a possible treatment for mental illness and as a way of producing artificial and temporary psychoses for research.

According to Dr. Sidney Cohen of the University of California at Los Angeles, another pioneer in LSD research, the drug disrupts the brain's normal ability to sort and code incoming information, thereby permitting an overflow sensation and a loss of one's "sense of self." Visual and tactile hallucinations are common.

In the early days, Dr. Cohen said, LSD was of interest to military and intelligence agencies because it was thought it might be a way of "breaking down a person's defenses" during interrogation. There was interest in the drug's usefulness as such an agent and in finding an antidote to protect American military and intelligence personnel.

The drug would also have obvious value as a way of temporarily incapacitating individuals. Because extremely small doses of the drug are effective, LSD is almost impossible to detect in body tissues. The drug was also studied by chemical warfare scientists for use in a gas or aerosol form to knock out enemy armies.

Accounts of Dr. Olson's death have indicated that he apparently committed suicide more than a week after receiving LSD. All trace of the drug is ordinarily broken down by the human body and excreted within 24 hours. For this reason, Dr. Cohen and other authorities said the suicide could hardly have been a direct result of the drug.

Rather, Dr. Cohen suggested, the drug probably stirred up such a storm in Dr. Olson's mind that some long repressed memory or other information became conscious and had a depressing effect on Dr. Olson's mood. Dr. Olson's wife has said that after taking LSD he seemed "very melancholy" and talked of quitting his job because of some mistake he had made.

Dr. Cohen suggested that although the immediate effects of LSD had long subsided, the depression they spawned deepened and Dr. Olson became suicidal.

Dr. Cohen said such reactions, although uncommon, have occurred in other circumstances, particularly when the recipient of the LSD was not under close psychiatric supervision.

Dr. Jndd Marmor, president of the American Psychiatric Association, issued a statement yesterday saying that giving LSD to a person without his full informed consent is unethical, even if done in the purported interest of "national security."

"Once yon open that door," Dr. Marmor said, "you open the door to the potentlal for the ruthless modification of people's minds on the grounds of national security. I think that . . . would be a very dangerous thing from the standpoint of a democratic society."

From 1953 to 1966 the National Institute of Mental Healh granted $7.5-million to fund 84 research projects studying LSD. Some scientists examined the drug's chemical properties, some studied its effects in animals and a few gave it to human beings.

The C.I.A.'s research on LSD is said to have continued from 1953 to 1963.

From the early nineteen-sixties on, it was increasingly apparent that quantities of LSD were being diverted from legitimate research by such persons as Dr. Leary, who upon expulsion from the Harvard foculty, went on to become a drug cult hero.

In 1966, faced with a growing barrage of publicity about drug abuse, Sandoz stopped production of LSD and the pace of research on the drug declined. It has now virtually ceased, even though some scientists such as Dr. Cohen believe LSD may still have a role to play in psychotherapy.

Despite Sandoz's move, illicit sources of the drug, which is only moderately difficult to make under clandestine circumstances, continues to supply a reduced number of recreational users of LSD.

WASHINGTON POST
24 July 1975

Intelligence Role of Military Attaches Lauded

Associated Press

The director of the Defense Intelligence Agency says U.S. military attaches around the world are "the most cost-effective intelligence collection operation we have in the government today."

The director, Lt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham, also said he expects to have a military attache in Peking by the end of next year. "I don't think the Chinese will mind at all" having him there, Graham said.

Military attaches are among the most visible members of the U.S. intelligence community and their mission is rarely a secret. The Defense Intelligence Agency is the Pentagon's intelligence branch and specializes in military information.

Graham and Maj. Gen. Willis D. Crittenberger Jr., deputy DIA director, testified June 11 before the Defense Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee. A heavily censored transcript of their remarks was released Tuesday.

Crittenberger said there are 88 U.S. military attaches and they have to be high-ranking in order to get intelligence:

"For an attache to be able to gain access to a foreign military regime, he can't be a second lieutenant. He has got to be a flag officer, or a colonel, to talk equally to the foreign people with whom he must deal to bring back the intelligence we need."

Crittenberger said the British have four admirals and generals in Washington and the French have three or four generals while the United States has only one officer that high in their countries, so "we are under strength compared to the others."

"The Russians are the most rank-happy people in the world," Graham said. "The only way I could get a man over there to talk to those generals and marshals and get anything out of them was to get a general officer in there, so we did."

The two DIA generals were testifying to support the agency's request for a $111 million budget for the 15 months beginning July 1. That sum includes $25 million for the attache program. The DIA budget for the 12 months that ended June 30 totaled $80 million, including $18 million for the attache program.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, JULY 18, 1975

Ex-C.I.A. Aide Says Scientist Who Died Knew About LSD Tests

By JOSEPH B. TREASTER

A former employe of the Central Intelligence Agency said yesterday he believed that a scientist who plunged to his death from a Manhattan hotel window 22 years ago had knowingly participated in a C.I.A. experiment with LSD shortly before.

The statement by Robert V. Lashbrook in a telephone interview appeared to contradict a report by the Rockefeller commission that the drug had been given to the scientist, Frank R. Olson, without his knowledge.

In describing the LSD incident, the Rockefeller paned did not identify the scientist who died, but a colleague later told his widow and children that the scientist was Mr. Olson. The family has announced its intentions to sue the C.I.A. for what it calls Mr. Olson's "wrongful death."

Neither the family nor the police and officials of the medical examiner's office who investigated the death were aware of Mr. Olson's exposure to the potent mind-altering drug until the Rockefeller commission's report was published last month.

In the interview from his home in Ojai, Calif., Mr. Lashbrook, who has a Ph.D. in chemistry and worked for the C.I.A. for 12 years as a researcher, recalled attending a "technical meeting" in November, 1953, with three other C.I.A. employes, Mr. Olson and five other employes of the Special Operations Division at Fort Detrick, Md., where the drug reportedly was given to four or five persons.

Mr. Lashbrook said he had not been present when "everyone agreed" to take part in a test with LSD, but he said someone he felt was reliable had told him of the arrangement.

"It was my understanding that actually everyone there had agreed in advance that such a test would be conducted, that they were willing to be one of the subjects. The only thing was that the time was not specified," Mr. Lashbrook said.

Mr. Lashbrook said that he had been asked whether he would be willing to be a subject in the LSD tests during the meeting and that he had reluctantly agreed. He said he had been a "guinea pig" several times in LSD experiments and added, "Frankly, I didn't like it."

In a section apparently referring to Mr. Olson, the Rockefeller report said: "Prior to receiving the LSD, the subject had participated in discussions where the testing of such substances on unsuspecting subjects was agreed to in principle.

"However," the report continued, "this individual was not aware that he had been given LSD until about 20 minutes after it had been administered. He developed serious side effects and was sent to New York with a C.I.A. escort for psychiatric treatment. Several days later he jumped from a 10th floor window of his room and died as a result."

Experiment Not Noted

According to New York city police reports, Mr. Lashbrook was one of two men who accompanied Mr. Olson to New York and was sharing room 1018A at the Statler Hotel with Mr. Olson when Mr. Olson went out the window.

Mr. Lashbrook, who said that he was a "friend" and a "consultant chemist" employed by the "War Department," identified Mr. Olson's body at the Medical Examiner's Office and gave the police most of the information in their report. He did not mention the LSD experiment or his C.I.A. affiliation.

Mr. Lashbrook said in the interview that lasted for more than an hour that the police "wouldn't have known about" LSD and that the "question never came up" in what he said was a brief talk with an official at the Medical Examiner's Office. The C.I.A. did some of the pioneer research with LSD; the drug did not receive wide publicity until well into the nineteen-sixties.

"Any direct relationship between [the drug and Mr. Olson's death] would be a little difficult to justify," Mr. Lashbrook said, because the body would have eliminated any elements of LSD within 24 hours and the death occurred more than a week after the experiment.

"Possibly LSD had brought up something in his past that was bothering him," Mr. Lashbrook added. "Certainly at the time the LSD would appear to have been not directly related and it would have raised a lot of questions that I or no one else was prepared to answer."

When Mr. Lashbrook was asked why he did not mention the LSD to Mr. Olson's widow, he replied, "How would you explain it. The name itself would not have meant anything to her.

"At that time," he said, "everyone was very, very upset. No one expected anything like that. Everyone was quite beside themselves as to what to do."

BALTIMORE SUN
22 July 1975

Ford apologizes to Maryland family of man killed in CIA's test of LSD

Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington—President Ford apologized yesterday on behalf of the government to the family of Dr. Frank R. Olson, the Frederick biochemist who died in November, 1953, after being given a dose of LSD without his knowledge by Central Intelligence Agency operatives.

Mr. Ford expressed the sympathy of the American people personally in a 17-minute meeting with Mr. Olson's widow, Alice, and their three children, Lisa Olson Hayward, Nils W. and Eric W. Olson.

The family asked the President to provide them with "all the facts" about Dr. Olson's death. Mr. Ford told them that he would instruct the White House counsel's office "to make information available to them at the earliest possible time."

Mr. Ford promised further that he has asked Edward H. Levi, the Attorney General, to meet with their legal representatives about the claims they are to make against the CIA.

Ronald H. Nessen, the presidential press secretary, said the family was invited in for a talk because Mr. Ford "feels very strongly about this." The White House photographer, David Hume Kennerly, recorded the meeting with the Maryland family.

Dr. Olson was a research scientist at Fort Detrick, near his Frederick home, in 1953. He has been identified as the individual referred to in the Rockefeller commission report on CIA activities as an Army civilian administered LSD without his knowledge or consent.

According to the commission, the employee "had participated in discussions where the testing of such substances on unsuspecting subjects was agreed to in principle." It added, "however, this individual was not made aware that he had been given LSD until about 20 minutes after it had been administered.

He developed serious side effects and was sent to New York with a CIA escort for psychiatric treatment. Several days later, he jumped out a window and died as a result.

In a formal White House news release, the following statement was issued on behalf of the family yesterday after the presidential meeting:

"We deeply appreciate President Ford's expression of sympathy and apology to our family. His concern and his invitation to meet with him are of great value to us.

"Frank Olson's death was a tragic loss to his family, his friends and his scientific colleagues. As previously unknown circumstances of his death have been revealed, the American people have been deeply moved. We are heartened by this response and encouraged that this experience has provided an impetus in our country for reflection on fundamental issues important to us all as a free people.

"We are grateful that President Ford has given us his support for our effort to be fully informed about Frank Olson's death and to obtain a just resolution of this matter. We hope that this will be part of a continuing effort to insure that the CIA is accountable for its actions and that people in all parts of the world are safe from abuses of power by American intelligence agencies."

Asked if Mr. Ford agreed with the last sentence of the statement, Mr. Nessen said Mr. Ford wants "all government agencies to abide by the law."

U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
28 JULY 1975

Washington Whispers

A witness who testified in the CIA probe complains that his interrogators were young lawyers who showed little knowledge of and less interest in the broader aspects of the investigation. His comment: "They were interested only in the specifics of 'who did what to whom' and became visibly bored with the 'whys' of U.S. policy."

NEW YORK TIMES
11 July 1975

High-Level Backing Cited In C.I.A. Drug-Unit Spying

By NICHOLAS M. HORROCK
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 10—John N. Mitchell, the former Attorney General, and Richard Helms, former Director of Central Intelligence, authorized a secret program to infiltrate the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs with agents, a program that the Rockefeller Commission later found illegal, authoritative sources reported today.

This report came as William E. Colby, the current Director of Central Intelligence, denied as "outrageous nonsense" a report indicating that a high-level member of the Nixon White House staff had given information to the C.I.A.

Also today, the House Rules Committee moved to abolish the strife-torn House Select Committee on Intelligence and replace it with a larger panel that would retain the same authority. [Page 34.]

According to the sources familiar with the Bureau of Narcotics, the infiltration program was instituted at the request of John Ingersoll, then director of the narcotics bureau, and partly paid for out of "unvouchered" funds available to the Attorney General.

Three Attorneys General—Mr. Mitchell, Richard G. Kleindienst and Elliot L. Richaardson—knew about the program, but never questioned its legality, these sources said.

James R. Schlesinger, former head of the C.I.A., may not have been briefed on the operation during his short tenure at the agency, the sources said. Mr. Colby halted the operation in 1973, when the Drug Enforcement Administration absorbed the narcotics bureau in a major reorganization.

The agents allegedly used in the narcotic bureau were recruited and trained by the C.I.A. As the program moved forward in 1970 and 1971, there was concern as to wether the 13 men who had infiltrated the B.N.D.D. might still be reporting to the C.I.A., sources said. Two of the men, for instance, went overseas as part of their function for the narcotics bureau.

The program is under renewed scrutiny by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and is also being investigated by the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, whose chairman is Senator Henry M. Jackson, Democrat of Washington.

The program has come under sharp criticism on two grounds. The Rockefeller commission found that it violated the C.I.A.'s 1947 charter, which prohibits the agency from exercising police powers within the United States. And army officials believe that in its primary goal of stamping out corruption among Federal narcotics agents, the program abrogated the agent's rights to due process of law and privacy.

John R. Bartels Jr., who recently resigned as head of the Drug Enforcement Administration, told the Jackson subcommittee today he did not continue the program under D.E.A. because "the philosophy of using this type of covert program seemed to me to be potentially damaging to the morale of agents in the field and also at variance with my philosophy of according the same type of constitutional protections to agents as one accords to defendants in drug-related cases."

The idea for the undercover men was conceived by Mr. Ingersoll in 1970 as a result of his growing concern about how to identify and halt internal corruption in the narcotics bureau. He received approval for the program from Mr. Mitchell and—on the basis of it being a request from the Attorney General—Mr. Helms pledged agency cooperation. No consideration was given to the question of whether the program was legal, two sources familiar with it said.

"It could not be said that the C.I.A. was in any way reluctant to cooperate," one source said.

According to sources, the following occurred:

Two C.I.A. agents, posing as private businessmen, began recruiting candidates for a secret operation in law enforcement.

Candidates were not told they would be working undercover within B.N.D.D. at first. The men were trained in two-week courses in the "trade craft" of code names and other aspects of covert operations. They were also given a rigorous background check.

At the end of this period they were asked if they wanted to work for the narcotics bureau. Thirteen of the 19 candidates eventually went to work there. The secret operatives applied, were examined and trained as Federal narcotics agents with the knowledge of only two men, Mr. Ingersoll and Patrick Fuller, then Chief of Internal Inspection. Mr. Ingersoll is abroad and Mr. Fuller declined to comment.

The operatives were spread out over the various B.N.D.D. regions, and eventually two of them went abroad. In one case, officials of the bureau heard a "rumor" that agents in a field office were drinking heavily and using Government cars to drive around with their girl friends.

One of the operatives was "routinely" transferred into the suspect office and assigned to cultivate the erring agents.

It was his job to find out if there was sufficient truth to the rumor to begin an internal inspection case. The agent reported only to Mr. Fuller, using a code name and other protections. There is some question over the effect the undercover report of corruption might have on the victim.

"There's a phrase in the trade," said one source. "It's called, 'dropping a dime on a guy.' That means you can ruin a man with a telephone call." He said that unsubstantiated allegations by these secret operatives resulted in men's chances for promotion being halted. Another source, however, said the material was not used against an agent unless it could be substantiated in a case for dismissal or other Civil Service action.

The 13 men are all still with the narcotics bureau, according to several sources, and have been transferred to routine jobs. The Drug Enforcement Administration also has some 60 former C.I.A. employes working in its structure.

What has concerned several intelligence sources is the reason the C.I.A. would cooperate in such a program and whether, in fact, some of these operatives were placed to give C.I.A. secret internal power in the narcotics agency.

Yesterday a source close to the staff of the House Select Committee on Intelligence told The New York Times that the staff director, A. Searle Field, had seen a document that indicated that a high level member of the Nixon White House staff was reporting to the C.I.A. Several members of the committee told reporters that Mr. Field had issued an internal advisory to the committee members suggesting the C.I.A. documents showed the agency had a pattern of infiltrating the executive branch.

Today a source close to the House Commitee's investigation said the documents that Mr. Field saw were apparently produced by the Office of the C.I.A.'s Inspector General, but had not been provided to the Senate Committee.

This source said Mr. Field saw the documents as part of a list of possible improprieties that the C.I.A. might have to answer to. This, the source suggested, would make it appear that the C.I.A. had men in the White House without the knowledge of the President.

Mr. Colby, however, reacted to these reports with an angry charge that they were "outrageous nonsense" and there was "no truth to" the proposition the C.I.A. had secretly infiltrated the White House. Ron Nessen, the White House press secretary, said there "may be a handful" of C.I.A. employes working at the White House but it "shows up on the payroll . . . they're here quite openly."

Authoritative sources familiar with the Rockefeller commission activities said the commission never saw any evidence that the C.I.A. had made improper infiltration into any other United States Government agency except the narcotics bureau.

Senator Frank Church, Democrat of Idaho, who is chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, has ordered his staff to make an investigation into the infiltration charges. He declined, however, to confirm or deny whether his committee had received any C.I.A. documents that implied it was spying on the White House.

NEW YORK TIMES
15 July 1975

Common Cause Aide Quits After Getting C.I.A. Counsel Post

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 14 — Common Cause, the public interest lobbying group, announced today the resignation of Mitchell Rogovin as general counsel and as chairman of its litigation committee.

Mr. Rogovin, a partner in the Washington law firm of Arnold & Porter, recently agreed to serve as special counsel to the Central Intelligence Agency during the House and Senate intelligence inquiries.

In a statement reversing his earlier position, David Cohen, president of Common Cause, said that he and Mr. Rogovin had recently agreed that "the potential exists for conflicting positions between Common Cause and the C.I.A. with regard to the Congressional investigations." Common Cause has been advocating public disclosure of the C.I.A.'s budget.

"Under these circumstances," Mr. Cohen said, "both Mitchell Rogovin and Common Cause believe that in a given situation the appearances of a conflict of interest might exist because of Mr. Rogovin's dual roles, regardless of what the actual circumstances are."

TIME, JULY 21, 1975

A 'Spy' in the White House?

Bombarded by criticism and hounded by investigations, the CIA is beginning to take on some of the characteristics of the State Department during the McCarthy era in the early 1950s: morale is falling, effectiveness is diminishing, recruiting is becoming tougher, and good men are wary of committing their thoughts to paper in memos and recommendations that might come back to haunt them some day. Last week the pressure on the besieged CIA continued with a welter of new accusations.

The most sensational charge was that the CIA had secretly planted its agents not only in the Treasury, Commerce and many other departments but also in Richard Nixon's White House. What was more, the alleged top agent was no file clerk or chauffeur but Alexander Butterfield, the former presidential deputy assistant who did as much as anyone to break open the Watergate scandal. It was Butterfield who supervised Nixon's notorious taping system. When an aide to the Senate Watergate committee casually asked Butterfield in July 1973 if conversations had been taped in the White House, Butterfield forthrightly said yes, and Nixon's fate was sealed.

The report that Butterfield had been a CIA man was persuasively denied by many sources, but it started a wave of speculation about how high and wide the agency had spread its covert operations. More basically, it produced a rare glimpse into the mysterious workings of the CIA and its use of "contact" people in Government agencies.

The story began last week when Congressmen Robert Kasten and Ronald Dellums, members of the House committee investigating the CIA, reported that the agency had planted its own operatives in the White House and many other arms of Government. Both men said that the committee's staff director, A. Searle Field, had reviewed CIA documents reporting such plants. The next day the agency's alleged man in the White House was named by L. Fletcher Prouty, 57, who retired as an Air Force colonel in 1963.

For nine years, while still in the Air Force, Prouty was a contact for the CIA in the Pentagon. As such, he had acted as a liaison between the two establishments. Last week he said he had learned in 1971 that the CIA's contact in the White House was Butterfield. At the time, Prouty was looking for access to the White House to get help for a project involving U.S. prisoners of war in Viet Nam. His CIA connections referred him to Howard Hunt, the convicted Watergate burglar and a longtime CIA agent. "If you're a Rotarian," explains Prouty, "you go to a member of the Rotary Club." The old school tie worked. Prouty said that Hunt, who was working for a CIA front company, told him, "My contact is Butterfield. There'll be no problem with it. Give me a week or so." Soon after, said Prouty, the White House began to help.

Still, Prouty did not go so far as to call Butterfield a CIA "spy" in the White House. Indeed, from what Prouty said, Butterfield was performing only the traditional role of contact in Washington—acting as a go-between. The CIA, like most federal departments, relies heavily on contact men in other agencies to look out for its interests.

Prouty cited his own experience as a contact man. At the beginning of 1960, the CIA wanted to fly two Cubans into Cuba in the hope that they might assassinate Fidel Castro. As a contact in the Pentagon, Prouty was approached by the CIA to see that the plan worked smoothly. Said he: "I set it all up, made sure some [U.S.] fighter plane didn't shoot us down."

Vicious Nonsense. It was long rumored in Washington that Butterfield had been the "CIA man" in the White House and that the relationship was known to Nixon. As a contact, Butterfield would have routinely handled requests from the CIA. That certainly did not make him an "agent." CIA Director William Colby angrily maintained that the claim that the agency had infiltrated the White House was "outrageous, vicious nonsense." Without clearing Butterfield unequivocally, the White House declared that as far as it knew, no presidential aide had ever acted as "a secret CIA agent."

The CIA may not have "infiltrated" the White House, as charged, but the bothersome question remained of just when a contact man becomes so loyal to the agency that in effect he turns into its agent. As time goes on, the congressional committees investigating the CIA will want to know more about the agency's invisible web of influence that stretches throughout Washington. The CIA's ordeal has a long, long way to go.

BALTIMORE SUN
23 July 1975

New House intelligence panel to open hearings on CIA finances next month

By MURIEL DOBBIN
Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington — The long-dormant House intelligence-activities investigation will be launched next month with a public probe of how the Central Intelligence Agency uses its money, Representative Otis G. Pike (D., N.Y.) announced yesterday.

Mr. Pike, the new chairman of the reconstituted House intelligence committee, held a two-hour organizational meeting to outline his panel's strategy, which will involve co-operation with the Senate intelligence panel and an effort not to retread ground already plowed in the course of the congressional inquiry into the espionage community.

According to Mr. Pike, as a result of a conference with Senator Frank Church (D., Idaho), chairman of the Senate intelligence committee, it had been decided that the House counterpart should explore the fiscal aspects of the CIA and leave the field of political assassination to the Church group, now about to make a public report on that sector.

The CIA budget, estimated at around $4 billion, has long been a closely held secret, and William E. Colby, director of the agency, has shown no enthusiasm for any change in that arrangement. It is generally accepted that the trail of the money could lead to intelligence agents and their operations, a sensitive area fiercely protected by the agency.

An example of that protectiveness was offered before the House individual rights subcommittee yesterday, when Lawrence R. Huston, former CIA general counsel, defended the agency's decision not to prosecute nine of its employees because of the danger of exposing secret operations.

Representative Bella S. Abzug (D., N.Y.), chairwoman of the subcommittee, released a letter in which the CIA admitted it had discovered 39 cases of alleged lawbreaking by agency employees but had referred only 21 of them for prosecution.

Those decisions were made by the agency during the period of an agreement between the CIA and the Justice Department whereby such intelligence-related prosecutions were contingent of their endangering sensitive projects.

The Rockefeller commission report took the position that such an arrangement involved the CIA in forbidden domestic law-enforcement activity and also meant the Justice Department was abdicating its responsibility.

Mrs. Abzug asked Mr. Huston whether he would have decided against criminal prosecution in cases "all the way up to murder" under this agreement. The witness said that he would have but added that none of the cases had involved murder.

After his appearance before the committee, Mr. Huston told newsmen he had told Robert F. Kennedy, Attorney General at the time, how the CIA plotted with the Mafia to kill the Cuban premier, Fidel Castro.

According to Mr. Huston, Mr. Kennedy "wasn't terribly perturbed" but commented, "If you're going to have anything to do with the Mafia, come to me first." During that 1962 meeting, said Mr. Huston, there was no suggestion that those involved in Castro plots should be prosecuted.

The revived House intelligence probe will call for testimony by witnesses from Congress, the General Accounting Office and the Office of Management and Budget, according to Mr. Pike. The new chairman said the committee would seek to pinpoint responsibility for the CIA's fiscal decisions, especially in cases of "wrong or improper" moves.

An atmosphere of at least temporary harmony prevailed at the House intelligence committee, a panel bedeviled by dissension since its inception six months ago. The House last week voted to abolish the first intelligence committee and set up a new one with a different chairman and three more members.

NEW YORK TIMES
16 July 1975

Spies in White House

Allegations About C.I.A. Point Up Accepted Role of Capital 'Tattling'

By JAMES M. NAUGHTON
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 15—The Central Intelligence Agency has denied vigorously that it ever planted any spies in the executive mansion, and the White House insists there certainly are none there now. But true or not, the allegations of C.I.A. penetration of the President's home and office serve to illustrate a curious fact of life in bureaucratic Washington: the Government routinely "spies" on itself because knowledge is power. "The brutal truth," said a government veteran now serving in the White House," is that knowing something first can give you tremendous leverage."

News Analysis

A cabinet member armed with foreknowledge of a President's view on a current policy issue can frame a position that will have minimum impact. And a bureaucrat able to advise a senior official on White House attitudes can enhance the bureaucrat's career prospects.

Mr. Prouty was quoted yesterday by The Springfield (Mass.) Daily News as saying that perhaps he had been given "the wrong name to cover up the real informer." The search for the facts was further complicated today when Mr. Prouty denied making such a statement.

The chairmen of Senate and House committees looking into C.I.A. activities have said they have no evidence now that the agency penetrated the White House in the sense that agents were working there on clandestine assignments. The matter remains under investigation, however.

So does an allegation, reportedly supported by a 1973 report of the C.I.A. Inspector General, that agents of the C.I.A. infiltrated the now-defunct Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs with the approval of Bureau and Justice Department executives but without the knowledge of Federal narcotics agents.

The C.I.A., like the State and Defense Departments and other agencies, routinely assigns individuals to work in the White House and various departments in roles related to their intelligence gathering function. What remained at issue was whether these and other individuals might be performing intelligence agency duties without the knowledge of their superiors in the White House and Cabinet departments.

One government official, while neither confirming nor denying these suggestions, said that the image of C.I.A. personnel working in Mata Hari style in the White House might stem from confusion about agency problems. The official, insisting on anonymity, said that he had acted as an agency "contact officer" while working in the White House. But he said that amounted to no more than providing informal guidance to gence agency who asked from time to time about policy attitudes.

Accordingly, say those who have been both bureaucrats and White House officials, intramural spying — "tattling" or "coordination" are words they would prefer—has become a government commonplace and will likely remain so.

Presidents trying to gain control of entrenched bureaucracies seed agencies with loyal allies who will report back on the extent to which White House policy directives are being honored.

Conversely, agencies asked to assign personnel to work in the White House respond enthusiastically, secure in the knowledge that a buraucrat's loyalty will often run more to the old agency than to the new President.

Both practices can go amok, with embarrassing or worse consequences. Documents showing the attempt by the Nixon White House to make the Internal Revenue Service "politically responsive" were disclosed during the Watergate investigations and formed part of the grounds for seeking the impeachment of Mr. Nixon for abuse of power.

Similarly, testimony last year before the Senate Armed Services Committee showed how Charles E. Radford, a young Navy yeoman assigned as a National Security Council clerk, kept the Pentagon advised of what kenry A. Kissinger, now Secretary of State, had in his White House briefcase and waste basket.

No one has yet established the facts of the alleged C.I.A. infiltration of the White House. L. Fletcher Prouty, a retired Air Force colonel who once was a liaison officer with the intelligence agency, charged last week that Alexander P. Butterfield had been a C.I.A. "contact officer" in the Nixon White House. The agency, the White House and Mr. Butterfield all denied it.

Whether anyone in the White House acted as an "informer" in the classic Mata Hari sense apparently was at issue. One government official, insisting on anonymity, said today that he had performed as a C.I.A. "contact officer" while working in the White House. The official said that amounted, however, to no more than providing informal guidance to acquaintances in the intelligence agency who asked from time to time about policy attitudes in the executive mansion.

Other officials described such practices as neither surprising nor alarming and said they were an unavoidable consequence of bureaucratic one-upmanship.

To a bureaucrat, said one, it can be "critical information" to determine how much room for maneuvering exists in a given policy debate. Thus, the aide said, it is common for a White House official with ties to a government agency to be asked, "Where do we stand on this before I send such-and-such paper to the White House?"

According to another wellplace official, "the more highly structured [is] the advancement system of an agency, the stronger is the tie" binding a temporary White House aide to that agency. Thus military officials, whose career advancement will depend on judgments of superiors in the Pentagon, are said to be more prone to pressure fori nside information.

Similarly, the official said, advocates of particular government programs are likely to feed strategic information to an agency promoting that program within the Administration, "People who are bright enough to get transferredf rom an agency to the White House are generally zealots about one thing or another," he said.

The routine acceptance of intragovernment tattling may be illustrated by two matters involving Secretary of State Kissinger. Although frowned upono fficially, the spying on Mr. Kissinger by yeoman Radford was hushed up initially and no formal action was taken against the yeoman or his superiors at the Pentagon.

When a reporter for the tabloid National Enquirer took away the garbage at curbside of Mr. Kissinger's home last week, the State Department issued a formal denunciation, saying that the Secretary was "revolted" by the act and that Mrs. Kissinger was suffering "grave anguish."

LONDON TIMES
10 July 1975

Oil firm admits getting money from CIA

From Frank Vogl
US Economics Correspondent
Washington, July 9

The Ashland Oil Company, the fiftieth largest company in the United States, disclosed in a 400-page report to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) that it received $98,968 (about £44,400) from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the five years to March, 1973.

This disclosure adds a new twist to what has already become a sensational series of revelations about the secret uses of huge funds by giant multinational companies.

Many large United States companies have been charged by federal Government prosecutors with making illegal domestic political campaign contributions, and SEC investigations have shown that many of these companies gave large bribes to foreign politicians and government officials.

The latest SEC investigation has produced evidence that some foreign activities of United States companies have directly involved the CIA.

It would appear that the money received by Ashland from the CIA was a reimbursement of salaries that Ashland had paid to CIA agents abroad, who had posed as Ashland executives.

Senator Frank Church, as chairman of the Senate committee on multinational companies, has been investigating the illegal uses of company funds for political payments and, as chairman of a special Senate committee, he has been investigating the activities of the CIA.

With this latest disclosure, the work of his two committees appears to be converging and he is likely to exploit this to the full. Thus many more admissions by companies of links with the CIA and foreign political payments are likely to be disclosed at public hearings staged by the senator.

Ashland executives are bound to be called before one of the senator's committees, especially because the new report fails to give details of the exact nature of the company's involvement with the CIA, and also fails to detail to whom exactly Ashland made illegal foreign payments.

The report does note that Ashland possibly made pay-offs to foreign officials and politicians totalling about $275,000 (£125,000) in recent years, with about $190,000 of this amount being spent in Gabon. Most of the report deals with the previously disclosed domestic political payments by the company of $800,000. Most of these payments were illegal.

One of the hitherto undisclosed domestic political contributions by Ashland was $5,000 to the campaign of Mr Hugh Carey for the governorship of New York last year. This payment appears to be legal.

But it could have repercussions, particularly on the reputation of Mr Carey. He is already facing considerable difficulties and embarrassment over payments from oil companies, notably those run by his brother.

WASHINGTON POST
22 July 1975

Charles B. Seib

The Prouty-Butterfield Flap

The Alexander Butterfield-CIA story, which flared and then fizzled out in one brief week, provided a good —but not reassuring—case history of enterprise journalism as it is practiced on television today. There was a shoot-from-the-hip quality to it and a disturbing disregard for a man's reputation and for the public's need to make sense out of the strange doings in Washington.

The story had its beginning in an effort by two congressmen to defend their turf—namely the House investigation of the CIA. Reacting to a move to kill or restrict the investigation, they committed a little leak. They told reporters that they had learned of a CIA practice of "infiltrating" the executive agencies to the extent of placing an agent high on the Nixon White House staff.

The result was predictable. CIA Director William Colby called the story "vicious nonsense." Ron Nessen, the President's press secretary, said a mountain was being made of a molehill. And reporters set out on the trail of the alleged part-time spook on the old Nixon team.

Mr. Seib is an associate editor of The Post, serving as an internal ombudsman. From time to time he also writes a column of press criticism.

The next day, July 11, shortly after 7 a.m., the two top network morning shows—the CBS Morning News and the NBC Today Show—came up with a name—the same name. They produced former Air Force Col. Fletcher Prouty, live on CBS and taped on NBC. Prouty said the high Nixon official with CIA ties was none other than Alexander Butterfield, who in 1973 started Richard Nixon's slide toward disgrace by disclosing the White House taping system.

Butterfield was a CIA "contact officer" in the White House, Prouty said. His source: E. Howard Hunt, a long-time CIA man who later was sent to prison for his connection with the Watergate burglary.

Just what is Butterfield supposed to have done for the CIA? That didn't come clear. On the CBS show, Prouty said Butterfield's function was "to open doors for CIA operations." On the NBC show he assented to a description of Butterfield as a "man with CIA connections." Imprecise descriptions to be sure, and far from identifying Butterfield as a CIA spy. But in the context, the implication was clear; Butterfield was the CIA's man right on the edge of the Oval Office.

Neither network provided a response from Butterfield or verification from any other source. NBC did couple a flat denial from Mrs. Butterfield with the Prouty charge. CBS put Prouty on the air without any denial, direct or indirect, but a half hour later reported that Mrs. Butterfield said the charge was "ridiculous." Both networks say they tried hard to locate Butterfield before the broadcasts, but without success.

The story hung there for 2½ days. Prouty elaborated on his charge, and it was widely carried in the print press, usually coupled with a CIA denial and with emphasis on Prouty's statement that he was not calling Butterfield a "spy."

Then Butterfield, who had not been reached by reporters, astutely accepted an invitation to appear on the popular CBS show, "60 Minutes," that Sunday evening. There, before a prime time audience of around 20 million viewers, he indignantly denied Prouty's story.

"Not a shred of truth," he said under questioning by Mike Wallace. At another point in the interview: "I have never been their designated contact man. That is absolutely false." Later: "I had no contact whatsoever with the CIA." And later: "I never did deal with the CIA in any way."

(Wallace says that Butterfield was not paid to appear on "60 Minutes," but his and his wife's fares—his from the West Coast and hers from Washington—and their hotel bills were paid by CBS.)

Since then, Hunt has denied he told Prouty that Butterfield was a CIA contact, and Sen. Church, who heads the Senate CIA investigation, has said no shred of evidence has been found to support the charge. Nevertheless, the Butterfields feel that his job search

The News Business

(he was eased out of his post as head of the Federal Aviation Agency last March) has been seriously hampered. And it is a fact of life that undoubtedly there will be some who will say, years from now, when his name comes up: "Oh, yes. He's the guy who scuttled Nixon for the CIA."

Prouty claims that he did not defame Butterfield—that he, after all, only called him a "contact officer." It is true that nowhere in the network transcripts is there the charge that Butterfield was a spy or an infiltrator. But consider this exchange between CBS reporter Daniel Schorr and Prouty:

> SCHORR: Colonel Prouty, I guess you have no way of knowing whether President Nixon knew Alexander Butterfield, who worked in his office, was a CIA man?
>
> PROUTY: I think that's one of the big problems. I would doubt Nixon or anyone else really knew it.

A strong implication that Butterfield was more than a contact man came again later in the CBS broadcast when Schorr and Bruce Morton of CBS were recapping the Prouty charge. Morton stated the question: "Did the CIA infiltrate the White House and other government agencies?" A tape of Colby's "vicious nonsense" denial was run, and then Morton said: "But earlier on this broadcast, a retired Air Force officer who handled liaison with the CIA told Daniel Schorr that a high-ranking White House aide during the Nixon administration was a CIA man. And then he and Schorr went into the Prouty material.

On the NBC broadcast, reporter Ford Rowan developed Prouty's assertion that during Butterfield's military career he was processed for assignment to CIA, which led to this exchange:

> ROWAN: Is there any doubt in your mind that Alexander Butterfield was a man with CIA connections, who went to the White House staff and his CIA connections persisted at the time he was on the White House?
>
> PROUTY: No, I've never had any doubts about that.

At the end of the segment, Rowan did note that Prouty said he did not think that "Butterfield or any CIA man assigned to the White House" was asked to spy on the President.

Now, if Prouty was merely saying that Butterfield was a contact man, the man the CIA dealt with when it had something to take up with the White House (Butterfield's denial rejects even that role), why the rush by CBS and NBC to get the story before the public first thing Friday morning? And why the presentation of the Prouty revelation, if it can be called that, as a big development in the story about high-level CIA "infiltration" of the federal establishment?

In retrospect, it is clear that all concerned—Prouty and CBS and NBC—were careless in their handling of a man's reputation and of an important and complex story. Not only does it appear that unjustifiable harm was done to Butterfield, but a great disservice was done to the public in that the Butterfield story drew attention away from a very serious question: Just what has been the nature and extent of the CIA's involvement in the operations of other government agencies? That question is going to be hard enough to answer. Such distractions as the Butterfield caper don't make the job any easier.

Schorr and Rowan were asked for their afterthoughts on the Prouty broadcasts. Schorr defends the use of Prouty without supporting evidence on the ground that in an earlier situation Prouty's information stood up. Rowan defends his broadcast on the ground that he had received some support for Prouty's story from several other sources.

Conceding those points, one must still ask why they didn't take the time to check on Prouty's story more fully or at least wait for Butterfield's response.

Schorr said that although CBS learned the evening before the broadcast that NBC also had Prouty, competitive pressure was not a factor in the decision to go ahead. In fact, he said, that decision was made before he found out that Prouty had talked to Rowan. He noted, however, that Thursday was a dull news day and that the Morning News people were happy to get a good lead story for Friday morning.

Rowan conceded that competition

LOS ANGELES TIMES
18 July 1975

Why the Big Flap Over CIA Contact Men?

The Agency Must Communicate, and Floating Bottles Aren't the Answer

BY ERNEST CONINE

The American people, at least many of those prominent in politics and journalism, are showing signs of becoming paranoiac. Exhibit A is the remarkable uproar set off by the unremarkable disclosure that there are people in the White House and various federal agencies and departments who maintain "contact" with the Central Intelligence Agency.

Alexander P. Butterfield, best known as the former White House aide who disclosed the existence of the Nixon tapes to the Senate Watergate committee, has flatly denied that he was ever a "contact officer" for the CIA.

The retired Air Force officer who made the allegation about Butterfield now allows that he may have been misinformed. And, contrary to initial insinuations, responsible congressional investigators say there is no evidence that the CIA has spied on the White House or other agencies by "infiltrating" personnel without the knowledge of the agency involved.

Butterfield, who left the government some time ago, glumly expects that the notoriety now attached to his name will complicate his efforts to establish a suitable niche in the private sector.

But while the damage so irresponsibly done to his reputation is disturbing in itself, the sensation over the existence of CIA "contact men" is even more so for what it says about the current atmosphere in Washington and the country.

The CIA was created to serve the President of the United States by providing intelligence on the activities, capabilities and intentions of other nations. How is the agency supposed to get the information to the White House? By floating it across the Potomac in a bottle?

It is self-evident that a degree of cooperation and coordination is essential between the CIA and other departments that have intelligence responsibilities—Defense, Treasury, State and the FBI, to name a few. How are they supposed to communicate? Through Western Union?

People with common sense will conclude that the logical thing is for the CIA and agencies of government with which it has business to maintain liaison officers for such contacts.

Ernest Conine is a member of The Times' Editorial Board.

Yet confirmation that CIA liaison men have indeed been detailed to the White House and other departments is treated as a sensational and incriminating disclosure.

A European diplomat, expressing his wonderment at the expose-a-day atmosphere that now prevails in America, told the New York Times, "You don't have a country over there. You have a huge church."

Given the American character, the remark would have been appropriate at almost any time in the last 200 years. But it is especially appropriate at a time when we are developing a national talent for seeing evil even where none exists. The talent is nowhere more evident than in the controversy surrounding the CIA.

The CIA deserves its lumps for doing things that, to put it mildly, it shouldn't have done.

It had no business penetrating U.S. radical groups to establish their connection, if any, with foreign powers; that is the FBI's responsibility. It had no business investigating leaks to newsmen in this country, or opening people's mail or listening to their telephone conversations.

Certainly the CIA had no business getting involved, if it did, in assassination attempts against foreign leaders whose actions were injurious to this country's interests but hardly perilous to our fundamental national security. As Sen. Frank Church (D-Ida.) put it, "If we are going to lay claim to being a civilized country, we must make certain in the future that no agency of our government can be licensed to murder"—with or without presidential approval.

The American people have a right to expect Congress to conduct a thorough investigation into CIA deeds and misdeeds. If some people must be fired from the CIA in disgrace, if some must go to jail, if the agency itself must be shaken up to keep it from becoming a rogue elephant, so be it.

It is equally obvious, however, that the nation needs a first-class intelligence-gathering capability; that the goal must be to reform the CIA, not destroy it, to see that the agency stops doing the wrong things but does a better job of the right things.

Unfortunately, the CIA's critics show an appalling inability to distinguish between the agency's excesses and normal, acceptable intelligence-gathering techniques.

In the bizarre atmosphere that now prevails, it is considered sinful that the CIA has asked scientists to fill their government in on what transpires at international conferences attended by Soviet scientists. Never mind that Soviet participants at such conferences are always under KGB discipline.

Disclosure that Ashland Oil Co. and some other firms allowed themselves to be used as financial conduits for CIA operations, and knowingly provided cover for agents masquerading as corporate representatives abroad, is received as a shameful example of corporate behavior.

How, pray tell, is the CIA supposed to run its intelligence-gathering operations? Are CIA agents in other countries supposed to wear signs on their backs? Are they and their contacts supposed to come to the embassy for their paychecks?

Finally, in the flap over CIA "contact men," critics seem to be suggesting that any man or woman who ever worked for or with the CIA is some kind of monster who must forever be shunned by decent folk and denied employment elsewhere.

Such indiscriminate character assassination is McCarthyism of the worst kind. It is also nonsense of a sort that will make it harder than ever for the CIA to recruit good people for its legitimate functions, and to avoid losing the good people it has.

Sensation-seeking members of Congress and their compliant allies in the media will have a lot to answer for if they end up destroying the CIA instead of reforming it, thereby setting the stage for massive intelligence failures of the sort that could lead to serious mistakes in judgment. And when either of the two great nuclear powers makes mistakes, the world becomes a very dangerous place.

The admonition against throwing out the baby with the bath water is the hoariest of cliches. But it's worth keeping in mind.

was a factor in his pressing to get the story on the air. He said he didn't know that CBS had Prouty, but he thought ABC might have him. "In a situation like this," he said, "my thought is to get it on the air and see how it flies."

This one appears to have crashed.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
21 July 1975

Butterfield exonerated

The trouble with trying to ferret out wrongdoing in high places is that overaggressiveness, a tendency to focus on personalities, or failure to follow up news tips adequately can lead to the harming of someone's reputation.

Such appears to have been the case with Alexander P. Butterfield, retired Air Force officer, former head of the Federal Aviation Administration, and best known for his revelation of the White House taping system that led directly to the downfall of the Nixon administration.

The allegation by L. Fletcher Prouty, formerly the Central Intelligence Agency's liaison in the Air Force, that Mr. Butterfield was the CIA's "contact man" in the White House turns out to have been based on a passing comment in 1971 by E. Howard Hunt.

Notwithstanding Mr. Prouty's subsequent backing down on the Butterfield allegation and the finding by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that "all the evidence is directly contrary to that charge," an indelible — if erroneous — mark has been left on an otherwise good record.

There is still much for investigators in the Senate and elsewhere to do regarding U.S. intelligence agencies that have overstepped their bounds in recent years. The extent to which the CIA played a role in the operations of other governmental departments, for example, needs to be thoroughly studied so that future abuses can be avoided.

But the Butterfield case points up that investigators, and particularly the media, have a special obligation to make sure that public reports are indeed based on fact, and that individual rights are protected in the reporting.

NEW YORK TIMES
24 July 1975

'70 Nixon Order to C.I.A. To Balk Allende Reported

President's Authorization Termed Cause of Agency's Role in Military Plots to Thwart Marxist's Election

By NICHOLAS M. HORROCK
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 23. — President Richard M. Nixon authorized the Central Intelligence Agency to make a last-ditch, all-out effort in September, 1970, to keep Salvador Allende Gossens from becoming President of Chile, authoritative Government sources said today.

As a result of the assignment, the sources said, the C.I.A. became involved in the planning of two military coups d'état—planning that included proposals to kidnap Gen. René Schneider, Chief of Staff of the Chilean Army.

Theoretically, the kidnapping of General Schneider would have given the Chilean military a justification for declaring martial law and assuming the powers of government.

The sources said that the C.I.A. tried later to stop the carrying out of one plan, but that it went forward nevertheless and General Schneider was killed by Chilean military plotters in the kidnap attempt.

In the other plot, the agency was said to have supplied insurgents with three machine guns and with tear-gas grenades. When it was discerned that the plot could not get broad political support it was halted and the guns were later returned to the C.I.A. unused, the sources said.

Henry A. Kissinger, then President Nixon's assistant for national security affairs, was briefed about the first plot on Oct. 13, 1970, by Thomas J. Karamessines, then chief of covert operations for the intelligence agency, the sources said. Mr. Karamessines reportedly told Mr. Kissinger the plot had little chance of success and it was at that point the two agreed it should be halted.

Mr. Kissinger has told President Ford of this plot, Administration sources said, but has said he did not know that the C.I.A. was negotiationg with yet another group. Intelligence sources said, howeever, that agency officials felt Mr. Nixon's orders to block Mr. Allende, which were strongly worded, constituted a blanket authorization for their activities.

Reports in The New York Times last fall indicated that the C.I.A. was involved in efforts to stop Mr. Allende from assuming the Presidency. But in these accounts and in subsequent Congressional hearings the efforts appeared to be limited to the secret financing of opposition parties and labor unions. The latest disclosures are the first confirmation that President Nixon and the C.I.A. contemplated military coups or the violent take-over of the Chilean Government.

The new information, with copies of Congressional testimony in 1973 by Richard M. Helms, then Director of Central Intelligence, have been forwarded to the Department of Justice for study on whether the contradictions may constitute perjury, the sources confirmed.

Mr. Helms testified on Chile before a Senate committee as early as May, 1973, and later in connection with his confirmation as United States Ambassador to Iran. He also testified at a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on Chile earlier this year. There are contradictions in his testimony over the depth and extent of C.I.A. activities against Dr. Allende.

Kissinger's Testimony Sought

Meanwhile, Senator Frank Church, chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence announced today that the committee would call Mr. Kissinger to testify on the "line of authority implementing the Nixon policy toward Chile." The Idahoe Democrat said that Mr. Kissinger could offer insight into the extent of the "knowledge and control" exercised by the policy-makers.

The announcement brought a sharp reactin from Roderick Hills, a counsel to President Ford. He said the request for Mr. Kissinger's testimony was "abrupt" and was not handled with the same courtesy he knew the committee had extended to other witnesses.

The committee, Mr. Hills said, had made no attempt to find out what Mr. Kissinger could really add on the question. He said, however, that his reaction should not "in any way" indicate that Mr. Kissinger would attempt to avoid testifying.

Government sources and sources within the intelligence community gave this report on the fast-paced events of the fall of 1970:

On Sept. 15, 1970, 11 days after Mr. Allende a Markist, had won teh presidential elections by a plurality, President Nixon called a secret meeting at the White House. It was attended by Mr. Kissinger, Mr. Helms and John Mitchell, then Attorney General.

The meeting was unusual because it was out of the normal channels of transmitting instructions to the C.I.A. Under the law and in practice C.I.A. covert operations are passed on by the 40 Committee, a top level White House security group, and transmitted through the national Security Council. It is unclear whether the matter ever reached the agenda of the committee.

Mr. Nixon was, one source said, "extremelytanxious" abou Mr. Allende's rise to power in Chile. Another source said the former President was "frantic." He told Mr. Helms in 'strong language" that the C.I.A. was not doing enough in the situation and it had better "come up with some ideas." He said that money was no object and authorized an initial expenditure of $10-million to unseat tehe Chilean Marxist.

C.I.A.'s Efforts Redoubled

Notes on the meeting, however, do not indicate that Mr. Nixon ever specifically ordered the C.I.A. to arrange a coup d'état in Chile. But the "tone" of the meeting, one source said, was "do everything you can."

The agency redoubled its efforts. Mr. Karamessines, deputy director of plans at C.I.A. and thus the chief covert operator, went to Chile himself, one source said.

On Oct. 13, 1970, Mr. Karamessines briefed Mr. Kissinger on the C.I.A.'s progress. He told Mr. Kissinger that Brig. Gen. Roberto Viaux, who had recently retired from the Chilean Army, was plotting to kidnap General Schneider as the prelude to a military take-over. Mr. Karamessines said, however, that it was the opinion of the C.I.A. that General Viaux's project could not succeed. Mr. Kissinger told the C.I.A. to "keep the pressure up" and keep the C.I.A.'s "assets" in Chile up to par, but agreed that this plan should not go forward.

He told the agency to try to halt General Viaux's plot. These sources said that C.I.A. cable traffic, copies of which are in the hands of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, indicate that the C.I.A. did make an effort to halt the plan.

Nevertheless, General Viaux's plot went forward. On October 22, 48 hours before the Chilean Congress was scheduled to vote on Mr. Allende's election—the fact that he had not won a majority threw the decision into Congress — an attempt was made to kidnap General Schneider. When it appeared the general was going to resist, these sources said, he was killed by three .45 caliber bullets, according to Chilean press accounts.

However, between the Oct. 13 meeting and the killing of General Schneider on Oct. 22, these sources said, the C.I.A. was negotiating with a completely separate group of plotters. A group of military officers under Gen. Camilo Valenzuela, then commander of the Santiago army garrison, was also planning to kidnap General Schneider to pave the way for a military take-over.

The C.I.A. these sources said, at first had greater confidence in General Valenzuela's plot. Accordingly, officials at the agency headquarters at Langley, Va., authorized the C.I.A. station in Santiago to give the insurgents three machine guns and tear gas grenades for use in a kidnapping attempt. The authorization was issued on Sunday, Oct. 24.

But within hours the C.I.A. had ascertained that the Valenzuela coup not get sufficient political support to succeed and that Jorge Alessandri Rodriguez of the right-wing National party, the runer-up in the election, would not accept the presidency. Nevertheless, apparently on the order of C.I.A. officials in Santiago, the guns and tear gas were reportedly given to the conspirators. They were later returned to the agency unused.

After Mr. Allende had been confirmed and had assumed office, the agency secretly sent money to the families of men arrested in General Viaux's abortive plot, the sources said. The money, one source said, was paid to "keep the families quiet about the contacts with C.I.A."

Nixon Reported Told

According to the sources, Mr. Kissinger told President Ford after Mr. Nixon had resigned, of the stepped-up effort to unseat Mr. Allende and about the Viaux plot. But Mr. Kissinger has maintained, in private conversations, that he never knew about the second plot, the sources said.

Mr. Kissinger has said, in these private conversations, that had the C.I.A. proposed a military coup in Chile the agency would presumably have come back to him and outlined the plot, and the President and the 40 Committee would either have authorized or prohibited it. The 40 Committee is a special group under the National Security Council that passes on all covert operations.

One source said that the 40 Committee had approved all covert activities in Chile except the involvement in the Viaux and Valenzuela affairs. But another source said that "from the beginning it appeared the matter was being handled on its own special track."

Another source said that C.I.A. officials had felt that the President's strongly worded assignment on Sept. 15, 1970, was a "blanket authorization" to become involved in planning for a military take-over.

Since the military coup in September, 1973, in which President Allende was killed, there has been a growing national inquiry into the role of Mr. Kissinger and the C.I.A. in efforts to undermine the Chilean Government. When Mr. Helms testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during hearings in 1973 on his nomination as ambassador, he gave very scanty testimony on

the Chilean matter.

Earlier this year, in private testimony later made public, Mr. Helms told the Senators he had "made a mistake in his earlier testimony" in that he had not revealed that President Nixon wanted President Allende's Government overthrown.

In other testimony this year, Mr. Helms said there had been a "probe" to see if there were any forces in Chile to oppose Dr. Allende's advent as President.

"It was very quickly established there were not," he added, "and therefore no further effort was made along those lines to the best of my knowledge, at least I know of none."

Mr. Helms returned to Teheran, where he is Ambassador. He could not be reached by The New York Times today.

NEW YORK TIMES
23 July 1975

Hunt Sons Charge C.I.A. Used Agents To Embezzle Funds

DALLAS, July 22 (UPI)—Two sons of H. L. Hunt, the late billionaire contending they were discriminated against because of their conservative views, charged today that the Central Intelligence Agency infiltrated the family oil empire and used secret agents to help embezzle more than $50-million from them.

The brothers, Nelson Bunker Hunt and W. Herbert Hunt, said new Federal charges that they had tried to cover up a family wiretapping scheme were a further result of an attempt by the C.I.A. to discredit the Hunt oil empire. They said they held the C.I.A. responsible for earlier Federal charges that they had spied on aides of their father.

They said their refusal to allow the C.I.A. to use their overseas Hunt Oil Company affiliate for espionge had led to the Federal charges against them.

"After turning down the C.I.A., a massive embezzlement scheme involving loses of over $50-million from the Hunt Oil Company were uncovered," the brothers said in a news release. "An investigation disclosed that some of the Hunt employes involved in the scheme were secret Government agents."

A Federal grand jury yesterday charged the Hunt brothers, Percy Foreman of Houston, a criminal lawyer, three other attorneys and a retired Texas industrialist with obstruction of justice for allegedly trying to thwart the wiretap investigation.

The indictment charged that the seven men had conspired to pay witnesses to go to prison to hush testimony about the wiretapping. The Hunt brothers allegedly spied on aides of their father to obtain information on his business dealings.

LOS ANGELES TIMES
10 July 1975

Mission Impossible?

BY J. F. terHORST

WASHINGTON—Mike Ackerman is a spy who came in from the glare. Now, having quit the CIA, he is doggedly seeking the glare—not to rat on his fellow spies, but to persuade the country, the press and members of Congress that undressing the CIA is as treasonous as giving our missile secrets to the Russians.

This will be a tougher mission than any in Ackerman's 11-year career as a professional espionage agent carrying out clandestine operations in 20 countries in North and South America, Europe and Africa. For, while he is extremely critical of the CIA, he doesn't want it destroyed or rendered impotent by the glare of publicity on past or present activities. And that's a hard product to sell to people who believe in an open society, resent prying, fear "secret police" and are properly shocked by official reports of CIA domestic surveillance, testing drugs on innocent persons, assassination plottings and dealings with the Mafia.

I told him as much when he dropped by my office the other day. We had been fellow panelists on the Mike Douglas television show the previous evening and, frankly, Ackerman hadn't gotten in many good licks for the agency. No way, I told him, to make a hero out of the CIA. The public climate is hostile.

Ackerman is for real. He quit the CIA in Miami three weeks ago, cashing in a bright future with the agency for the refund of his pension and $4,000 in leave pay. He blew his own cover by walking into the office of the Miami Herald and telling his story to a reporter.

His story checks out. He really is off the agency payroll and on his own. He is not being paid under the table to peddle CIA propaganda. As a bachelor of 34, he can afford unemployment better than most.

He quit for several reasons. Disgust with some of the goings-on he has been reading about, like assassination planning and cozying up to gangsters—stuff concocted by the "cowboys," he says, the old generation of clandestine operatives who thought they were still working for the OSS and Wild Bill Donovan. And Ackerman is angry with senators and congressmen and journalists who don't want to settle for controlling CIA but are more interested in the political and personal benefits to be reaped from stripping CIA naked before the world.

But mainly he resigned because he no longer could do his job—a ticklish and risky job of persuading knowledgeable foreigners to gather secrets from their own governments and turn them over to the United States. That, and sometimes covertly helping non-Communist groups and officials to stay in power—something he thinks the CIA should be doing right now in Portugal.

"The CIA is paralyzed," Ackerman says. "Its credibility overseas is nil. Its enemies rejoice. Its friends are chagrined. Its professional officers are demoralized." He quit because his own intelligence sources were frightened that they, too, would be exposed and their lives endangered. "I quit because I no longer could guarantee them the security they have to have."

He is deeply religious. His late father was an immigrant Russian Jew, and his mother still keeps a kosher home near Miami. That heritage, and a trip to Russia as a student, have made him intensely conscious of Soviet oppression. His CIA experiences, moreover, have made him keenly aware of the threat posed by the Soviet KGB in this country, Latin America, Europe and the Arab lands—and the need for an effective CIA to monitor those activities and counter them.

Ackerman swears that his CIA unit operated under a strict ban against any assassination or political murder. But if it's true that others did such plotting, he thinks Congress should pass a law to make it a crime. He wants a law forbidding CIA personnel from divulging secrets, saying that is as traitorous as when somebody in the military slips weapon secrets to a foreign power. He thinks Congress should set up a special committee for permanent oversight of the CIA, with strict accountability required. And he thinks a lawmaker who tells secrets out of the hearing room should be cashiered from Congress.

Fat chance of that. And only a slim chance that Mike will succeed in saving the CIA from overexposure. A lecture agent has told him he might be able to meet expenses with that kind of pitch to audiences—but that he could make up to a hundred grand this year as a blabbermouth.

PUBLISHERS WEEKLY
14 JULY 1975

NOVEL TO ORDER

The CIA's recovery of that sunken Russian submarine has stirred at least one publisher to commission a book. The publisher is British, the author is American and the form will be fiction.

Noel Gerson, who recently became a client of Scott Meredith, has started work on the novel, "Neptune," for Heinemann. Pan, on the strength of a large advance, has tied up reprint rights. John Farquharson Ltd., Meredith's London associate, helped put the deal together. U.S. and other publication rights are in the hands of the New York agency.

The Gerson output numbers 138 titles, one of which became the well-known Ava Gardner picture "The Naked Maja" and four of which, during the last five years, have been Reader's Digest Condensed Book Selections.

WASHINGTON STAR
23 July 1975

Jesuit Priest: 'I Got $5 Million Covert From the CIA'

By Norman Kempster
Washington Star Staff Writer

Following a White House meeting with President John F. Kennedy in 1963, a Belgian Jesuit priest was given $5 million in under-the-table CIA money to support anti-Communist labor unions throughout Latin America and back the presidential campaign of Eduardo Frei in Chile.

The incident was related by an American Jesuit friend of Belgian Rev. Roger Vekemans as an example of the CIA's relations with missionaries and other overseas representatives of religious groups.

The Rev. James Vizzard said he was having lunch with Vekemans at a restaurant near Dupont Circle when a White House automobile picked up the Belgian for a meeting with Kennedy, Atty. Gen. Robert F. Kennedy, CIA Director John McCone and Peace Corps Director R. Sargent Shriver.

AFTER VEKEMANS' session at the White House, Vizzard related, "Roger came back with a big grin on his face and he said, 'I got $10 million — $5 million overt from AID (Agency for International Development) and $5 million covert from the CIA.'"

Vizzard said he has no reason to believe that the CIA ever asked Vekemans to do anything that he would not have done anyway in attempting to carry out orders from his superiors in Rome to support social development in Latin America. It was just a case of the CIA helping to finance a program that fit in with the agency's objectives.

Almost from its inception in 1947, the CIA has used religious groups both as a source of information and as a conduit for funds. CIA spokesmen declined to discuss the CIA-church connection in any detail but other sources said the relationship was prevalent in the 1950s and 1960s at least. Some sources said it may be used less frequently today.

SOURCES SAID the CIA dealt with religious groups in Latin America, Africa, Asia and elsewhere.

A spokesman for the Senate select intelligence committee said the panel's staff is investigating complaints that the CIA has had improper dealings with missionaries.

The spokesman said some of the accusations resulted from CIA activities in Bolivia. He said the charges included "tapped phones, dossiers and improper use of priests."

"The committee is interested in whatever it can get on this matter," the spokesman said.

Dr. Eugene Stockwell, assistant general secretary of the National Council of Churches for overseas missions, said he has personal knowledge of two cases in which missionaries provided intelligence information to the CIA. But he said they occurred 14 years ago.

HOWEVER, Stockwell said his organization is warning missionaries that the CIA may try to contact them. He said it is important that overseas churchmen not be gullible enough to inadvertently provide information to intelligence agencies.

"I personally would hope that missionaries would not provide information of this kind," he said in a telephone interview.

David A. Phillips, once the chief of the CIA's Latin Americans operations, remarked, "CIA people go to church, too."

"Over the past 25 years in Latin America, CIA people have been in contact to mutual advantage with some of the many fine churchmen who work in the area," said Phillips, who has been attempting to respond to criticism of the agency since he retired from active service earlier this year.

"THIS DOES NOT surprise or shock me," he added. "On the contrary, any information gathering organization would be derelict if it did not take advantage of the in-depth expertise of American clerics working in the area."

But Phillips insisted that overseas contacts with missionary groups have declined in recent years.

"There are a lot of things that used to happen in Latin America in the 1960s that don't happen in the 1970s," Phillips said in a telephone interview.

Other sources indicated that any reduction in CIA contacts with church groups is probably due to a new suspicion of the agency on the part of missionaries rather than any CIA scruples about using religious figures.

ACCORDING to the Rockefeller Commission report, the CIA routinely contacts American citizens returning from abroad to determine if they can provide useful information. The commission said the agency attempts to contact all Americans except for students and Peace Corps volunteers.

A CIA official confirmed that there is no prohibition on contacting missionaries, either those who are taking brief home leave or those who are returning to the United States to stay. He refused to discuss specifics but he left little doubt that missionaries are routinely asked for information.

The official emphasized that in contacting returning Americans, CIA representatives always identify themselves fully and stress that the interview is voluntary.

NEVERTHELESS, some returning missionaries have expressed shock at having been questioned by the CIA.

The CIA official said he knows of no instance in which churchmen were asked for information while they were working in foreign countries.

But former State Department intelligence officer John Marks said such contacts have been made.

Marks, a CIA critic who is director of the CIA project at the Center for National Security Studies, related the case of a Protestant missionary who said that until he left Bolivia two years ago he routinely passed on to the U.S. Embassy, and thus presumably to the CIA station, the names of Bolivians he thought were Communists.

Marks said another American at the same mission was asked to take over the reporting duties but refused to do so.

VIZZARD, who serves as a lobbyist for the United Farm Workers Union, was interviewed in the living room of a house near Chevy Chase Circle which he shares with eight other Jesuit priests. He said he has frequently heard reports of CIA contacts with missionaries.

"If you get eight or ten priests together, you hear stories," he said. "Some of them are probably true, some are probably false."

Vizzard said he has first hand knowledge of CIA funding of one church-related organization in addition to what Vekemans revealed about his CIA connection.

In the 1950s, Vizzard said, he was working in the Washington office of the National Catholic Rural Life Conference which was sponsoring a series of land-reform congresses in several Latin American nations. He remembers the organ-

ization received a $25,000 check from a prominant Philadelphia businessman to help finance one of the meetings.

VIZZARD SAID he remarked to the organization's director, Msgr. Luigi Ligutti, that the contribution was most generous.

"Ligutti replied, 'Oh, it's not his money, it's the CIA's money,'" Vizzard said. He added that he understands that the CIA helped to finance the other congresses as well.

Vekemans, the Belgian, was secretary of some of the conferences, Vizzard said.

But Vekemans' primary effort was the Center for Economic and Social Development of Latin America located in Santiago, Chile.

Vizzard said the primary purpose of the center was to support anti-Communist labor organizatins. But Vizzard said Vekemans also worked hard for the election of Frei as president of Chile in 1964.

FREI DEFEATED Marxist Salvadore Allende that year. CIA Director William E. Colby has told a congressional committee that the CIA pumped $3 million into Frei's campaign. It was not clear whether the portion of the $5 million in CIA money which Vekemans spent on Frei's behalf was included in the $3 million total.

Allende ran for president again in 1970 and was elected. Colby told the same committee that the CIA spent $8 million in opposing Allende's election and in attempting to undermine his government. Allende died in a coup that overthrew his government in 1973.

Vizzard emphasized that support of Frei, a Christian Democrat, was a happy marriage between the CIA and the Catholic church. Both supported Frei for their own reasons.

"THERE REALLY was a belief at that time that the answer to social problems was a movement like the Christian Democratic party," Vizzard remarked.

Marks said he has learned that the CIA had the Catholic bishop of a diocese outside of Saigon on its payroll at least as late a 1971. He said the CIA treated the bishop with such care that a CIA case officer flew in from Saigon for special secret meetings with him.

According to Phillip Agee, a former CIA officer who has since turned against the agency, the CIA's dealings with churches were not always of the "mutual benefit" variety described by the agency's friends.

In his book, "Inside the Company," Agee relates that in Ecuador in the early 1960s, CIA-backed squads of right-wing terrorists bombed churches because they believed the Communists would be blamed for the attacks. In most cases, Agee wrote, the blame did go to the left.

BALTIMORE NEWS AMERICAN
16 JULY 1975

CARL T. ROWAN

End The CIA?

You come home from a month abroad and plunge into this seemingly endless string of revelations about the excesses and abuses by the Central Intelligence Agency. And you are filled with revulsion by reports that the CIA secretly administered LSD to five of its scientists, causing the death of one of them — and then let his family believe for 22 years that he simply had committed suicide.

You are outraged that for 20 years the CIA carried on an illegal program of intercepting and reading the mail of American citizens, or that some of the CIA's vast secret pool of money was funneled to Ashland Oil, Inc., and probably to other companies, and wound up in illegal funds which were used to determine who got elected to the presidency and other powerful political offices in this country.

But most of all, you are left with a sense of growing national tragedy. For what we may be witnessing is a tawdry drama in which an agency that is still vital to national security self-destructs.

The proven and documented abuses and transgressions of the CIA are now so numerous, and in many cases so revolting, there is virtually nothing the CIA can be accused of that millions of Americans (and foreigners) will not believe. Thus the question arises as to whether the CIA as it exists can ever again effectively serve this nation. But how does one abolish an agency so as to kill its poisonous growths, and start anew with an organization that deals only with those intelligence activities essential to survival in what is still a very dirty dangerous international atmosphere?

Nothing constructive seems possible until we get all the investigations over, until all the abuses have been aired, until the American people have a clear understanding of what it is that we must forbid, and build strong safeguards against, in the future.

There is a foolish tendency in many circles these days to argue that the nation is being harmed by congressmen, who leak information about CIA excesses, or by newspapers carrying stories of CIA abuses.

Let us first face the truth that our security — and the CIA's — has been jeopardized, not by blabbering congressmen, not by an "unpatriotic" press, but by

- Presidents, grown overpowerful yet craving even more power, who ignored both the Bill of Rights and laws passed by Congress and turned the CIA into a monster which in ways was more a threat to the American people than to any foreign foe.
- CIA leaders who, in awe of presidents or presidential aides, committed the agency and its resources to operations they knew were illegal and beyond the CIA's mandate.
- Congressmen entrusted with oversight of this powerful intelligence agency who were utterly timid, shamefully derelict.

So now America's front pages are full of stories suggesting that not only did the CIA plot to overthrow or kill foreign leaders, but that it even "infiltrated" the White House and spied on presidents.

Somehow we must do two things: (1) restore a sane perspective about the role of the CIA and other intelligence agencies in our national life, and (2) establish safeguards that involve watching not just the intelligence community, but the president and his chief aides who are most able to turn the CIA, the FBI and other agencies onto evil courses.

The same perspective must include an understanding by all of us that in a world where dangerous adversaries are constantly spying, subverting, scheming, stirring up trouble, playing dirty tricks, we can never be mere Boy Scouts and Sunday school teachers. Survival depends on our having people who can play a rough game, too.

That bit of sanity also includes a realization that, whatever its excesses, the CIA has not been ruling presidents, our chief executives have been exploiting the CIA. Of course there have been CIA people on the White House staffs. And Defense Department men. And FBI men. And USIA men (one of my worst arguments with Lyndon Johnson came when I insisted that if he wanted USIA employe Voichi Okamoto to be his personal photographer, the USIA could not legally pick up the tab). Presidents tend to build empires by pirating staffs of other agencies, and no staff is easier to raid than the CIA, which has limited public accountability.

This kind of absurdity will end when the nation declares that the president's staff shall be only what the president gets Congress to approve, and that it may not be swelled to ridiculous proportions by bringing in ten times more people from agencies whose heads don't have the guts to say no.

We need an effective CIA that Americans can trust. But we'll never have one until we rein in our presidents and hold responsible our congressional overseers to the extent that we can believe in them, too.

THE WASHINGTON STAR
23 JULY 1975

Commentary

Joseph McCaffrey (WMAL-7 News): "Perhaps we really need the CIA to open up its books so that we can find out what we have been paying for over these many years. So far all we have heard makes us feel that we really haven't been getting our money's worth. . . . Columnist Jimmy Breslin might be a good choice as the next director. After all, he wrote the book about not being able to shoot straight. We have spent billions on the CIA, even building it a nice expensive playpen over in Langley. Please, CIA, tell us something that will make us feel we got at least 10 cents on our tax dollar. Please."

PENTHOUSE
August 1975

HOW THE U.S. PLANS AND COMMITS SUBVERSION AND ASSASSINATION ABROAD

MURDER BY PROXY

BY TAD SZULC

Political assassination is so repulsive to Americans that for years we have considered only madmen or Soviet and Nazi agents capable of it. But today the CIA—and therefore the United States government—stands accused of plots to murder foreign leaders. And the agency may be greatly affected by the outcome of current investigations of such charges.

In all fairness to the CIA, there is no proof thus far that CIA agents have themselves committed assassinations abroad. Former CIA Director Richard M. Helms made this point earlier this year when he said flatly: "I do not know of any foreign leader that was ever assassinated by the CIA." But Helms's statement, angrily shouted at Washington newsmen questioning him, was no more than an artful technical denial. (Helms lost his cool, used this occasion to shout at CBS's Daniel Schorr "son of a bitch" and "killer," and to apply one of the juiciest sexual epithets to Schorr.)

Though it is probably true that no *American* CIA official ever actually murdered a foreign leader, there is plentiful material to suggest that foreign nationals employed by the CIA have attempted to assassinate, and sometimes succeeded in assassinating, key figures overseas on orders from Washington. The name of the game seems to be murder by proxy.

What is know at this juncture about CIA assassination plots?

• For one thing, they were the subject of the so-called "oral" report CIA Director William E. Colby presented to President Ford shortly after the scandal broke out last December over allegations that the agency had been involved in domestic spying. The content of this report is not publicly known, but key sources in the Rockefeller Commission and the Senate select committee investigating the CIA informed *Penthouse* that political assassination was one of the important areas of their secret inquiries. This may explain why Helms, wholly out of character, lost his composure before newsmen minutes after testifying before the Rockefeller Commission in April.

Senator Frank Church, the chairman of the Senate Select Investigating Committee on Intelligence, concluded after hearing testimony by Helms and other past and present agency officials that the CIA's formal denials of involvement in assassination plots "were correct but not complete." Church, however, spoke early in May, before his committee began full-fledged hearings.

• Godfather-like, the CIA drew the Mafia into a plot to kill Cuba's premier Fidel Castro by literally letting out a contract on him. According to documents held by the FBI, the agency had contacted Sam Giancana, described as a Chicago rackets *capo*, and John Roselli, a man with Mafia connections, to carry out the assassination. Roselli, presumably, was going to be the hit man, either staging a sharpshooter execution of the Cuban premier or trying to murder him with poison capsules provided by the CIA. The agency, it appears, had hoped that the murder would be pinned on the Mafia, which had lost its gambling operations on the island with Castro's advent.

That the CIA had considered killing Castro on a number of other occasions—estimates among informed Washington sources run from six to thirteen actual attempts or plots—is now virtually a matter of public record. There are also indications, not fully corroborated, that two exiled Cubans working for the CIA were sent into Cuba during the early 1960s to kill Defense Minister Raul Castro, the premier's brother. Intelligence sources said that the two Cubans subsequently were members of E. Howard Hunt's Watergate "plumbers" teams.

• It is also believed that the CIA, possibly in concert with the U.S. army's Special Forces, was involved in orchestrating the 1961 assassination of the Dominican Republic's dictator, Rafael Leonidas Trujillo. The assassination was carried out by a group of Dominicans on a lonely road outside the city of Santo Domingo, but it is virtually certain that the CIA was fully informed of the operation and may even have supplied "technical assistance" (rifles) to the Dominicans, according to an intelligence source. Interestingly, the first word of Trujillo's assassination came in a White House announcement while President Kennedy was visiting Paris, which suggests astoundingly rapid reports from the U.S. representatives on the spot.

Penthouse investigations also brought out the following new material concerning abortive CIA assassination plots abroad:

• In the late 1950s, senior CIA officials in Asia proposed the assassination of Indonesia's President Sukarno as part of a broader plot to overthrow his left-leaning government. At least one American pilot, employed by the CIA, was captured by Sukarno's forces during the coup attempt. To kill Sukarno, the CIA, according to intelligence sources, planned to fire a shell from a ceremonial 105-mm cannon in front of the presidential palace while Sukarno spoke from a balcony. This plan, however, was vetoed on the highest levels in Washington.

• In 1958, a plot was concocted to kill China's Premier Chou En-lai during a visit to Rangoon, Burma. This was at the beginning of the Soviet-Chinese split, and apparently the CIA reasoned that Chou's death would aggravate the developing split. The notion was that Chou was a moderate and thus posed an obstacle to a possible Soviet-Chinese confrontation. Furthermore, intelligence sources said, the CIA planned, by the dissemination of "disinformation" through intelligence channels, to lead the Chinese to believe that Chou was killed by the Russian KGB.

This murder plot, which was also stopped by Washington, provided for a Burmese CIA agent to place untraceable poison in a rice bowl from which Chou was expected to be eating at a government dinner in his honor. This particular kind of poison, intelligence sources said, would have acted within forty-eight hours and there would be no trace of it if an autopsy were performed. The plan was countermanded at the last moment.

Obviously, assassinations abroad are not ... CIA opera-

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tion. Generally speaking, the CIA collects intelligence by all possible means, technological as well as human, as well as engaging in "covert actions" that range from overthrows of foreign régimes to the control and subornation of foreign leaders in and out of governments and every form of "black" propaganda.

Over the years, the CIA has been involved in such paramilitary activities as the 1954 overthrow of the Arbenz régime in Guatemala, the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, the creation of the "secret army" in Laos in the early 1960s, the intervention in the Congo in 1964 (with the use of Cuban pilot veterans of the Bay of Pigs), Operation Phoenix in Vietnam (the flushing out and assassination of over 20,000 Vietnamese suspected of Communist ties or sympathies), and the organizing of Cambodian and Thai mercenaries in Indochina.

But the CIA has also engaged in unsuspected operations ranging from the 1957 and 1958 secret supply of technical assistance to Israel for the development of nuclear weapons, to the 1974 effort to raise a sunken Soviet submarine from the floor of the Pacific.

- A recent example is the apparent decision by the Ford administration to have the CIA leave "stay-behinds" in Vietnam after the fall of Saigon to maintain the flow of intelligence and to try to destroy American-made war materiel captured by the North Vietnamese. It is unclear if the "stay-behind" agents are all Vietnamese; there may be a few Americans among them.
- The nuclear operation in Israel remains to this day one of the government's most sensitive secrets. It is generally known that Israel possesses a military nuclear capability. But the degree of United States secret cooperation provided through the CIA has not been known.

According to senior intelligence sources, the operation was carried out by the CIA's Counterintelligence Staff, then headed by James Angleton, the man Colby fired last December at the time the agency was accused of illegal domestic activities.

(Actually, Angleton's firing was related to the preeminent role he played in the relations between the CIA and Israeli intelligence, something which both Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Colby had resented for a long time. The domestic spying controversy was a convenient excuse for doing away with Angleton and his strongly pro-Israeli personal views.)

Although the details of the Israeli nuclear enterprise are still top secret, it is known that in the wake of the 1956 Suez war, the Eisenhower administration resolved to provide Israel with all possible help in developing an atomic weapon. The Israelis had the theoretical knowledge, but they needed technological support at their Dimona nuclear research center in the Negev Desert.

According to top intelligence sources, the CIA was charged with the responsibility of providing this support to the Israelis—and Angleton directed the effort. Several nuclear scientists were secretly sent to Israel to work with Dimona scientists. The most important of them, according to intelligence sources, was a British-born physicist, now an American citizen working for the U.S. government in Washington, with special and esoteric ties to the CIA.

Persons close to Angleton have confirmed this account in recent interviews. Reflecting Angleton's own position, however, they have denied assertions from other sources that the CIA team made fissionable material—plutonium—available to the Israelis from United States stocks.

The controversy over the CIA and the rest of the United States "intelligence community," the array of other secret agencies practicing the arts of intelligence, turns principally around covert operations abroad which, in the eyes of many Americans, constitute a violation of the sovereignty of other nations. A parallel controversy is over allegations, partially confirmed by the agency, that the CIA has violated its statutory charter by engaging in secret domestic political activities. Under the law, the CIA is confined to activities overseas.

These activities form a long catalogue of deeds and misdeeds around the world. In addition to the paramilitary activities listed above, the agency has helped to "destabilize" or oust twenty or more foreign governments since it was founded in 1947. It has been behind any number of changes of régimes in Syria in the late 1940s and 1950s (Syria was, for a while, a favorite CIA-playground); the overthrow of the Mossadegh régime in Iraq in 1953 (the operation was run from a special headquarters in Geneva); a covert political intervention in Guyana in 1962 that helped to defeat the Marxist leadership; attempts to subvert the government of Singapore in 1965; the anti-Sukarno coup in Indonesia in 1965; the "destabilization" of the government of Chile's President Salvador Allende in September 1973; and the ouster of the government of the Malagasy Republic in 1975.

The CIA was also involved in the 1964 military revolution in Brazil (it helped to finance political opposition to President João Goulart), and is known to have played dangerous political games in Algeria in 1958 and in several Latin American countries in the 1950s and 1960s. The agency has not only supported the repressive former Greek military junta, but also such liberal anti-Communist governments as those of Eduardo Frei in Chile and Juan Bosch in the Dominican Republic.

On another level, the CIA infiltrated the National Students Association in the U.S. and secretly financed anti-Communist liberal intellectuals in western Europe through the Congress for Cultural Freedom and a series of first-rate publications such as *Encounter* in Britain and *Der Monat* in West Germany. Intellectually, the Congress and the related magazines are among the few things of which the agency has the right to be proud. As part of its covert propaganda effort, it has also subsidized book publishers in New York and in a dozen foreign capitals, where quite a few newspaper editors and writers are on the agency's payroll. The CIA has likewise been supporting—and using—trade unions in Europe, Asia, and Latin America, and occasionally using American labor unions.

It is essential, however, to emphasize that in every known important situation, the CIA has acted on the orders of America's top leaders, including the six presidents who have been in office since the CIA was created in 1947. Its first boss was Harry S Truman; its present boss is Gerald Ford, actively assisted in the intelligence area by Secretary of State Kissinger. Holding as well the parallel post of Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Kissinger controls the National Security Council apparatus, including the White House-based "Forty Committee" whose responsibility is the direction of top secret foreign intelligence operations. It was the Forty Committee, for example, which authorized the CIA to invest large sums of money—as much as $8 million—and to offer other forms of assistance to the plotters who overthrew Chile's President Allende in September 1973. It can also be assumed that the "54/12 Committee" (the equivalent of the Forty Committee under President Eisenhower) had authorized the nuclear support given Israel by the CIA.

The crucial point, therefore, is that simply to investigate the servant—the CIA—is to overlook the role that has been played and is being played by the master, which is the White House. CIA veterans say that while the agency enjoyed a reasonable degree of autonomy in some matters during the reign of its late director Allen W. Dulles (the man who sold Eisenhower and then John Kennedy on the Bay of Pigs adventure), it has been kept on a rather short leash by the White House in subsequent years. During the Nixon era, for instance, Helms had virtually no personal access to the president. As is the case with Colby at the present time, Helms had to work through Kissinger.

So if Congress desires to build safeguards around the CIA, it must revise the legislation that grants the National Security Council (i.e., the White House) and the CIA a virtual *carte blanche* to undertake just about anything in the world that may occur to them.

The key legislative paragraph is Section 102 (d) of the 1947 National Security Act that directs the CIA, among other specific intelligence tasks, "to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct." The phrasing of the Act—". . . such other functions and duties . . . as the National Security Council may from time to time direct . . ."—thus gives the White House and the CIA a license to subvert and even kill if it is thought to be in the "national interest." Under this provision, there is obviously no accountability to Congress by the president, the NSC, or the CIA for whatever "functions and duties" the intelligence operatives may choose to undertake.

Moreover, this uncontrolled freedom to act carries with it the extraordinary danger of the United States being unwittingly involved in what a senior intelligence official has described as "war by intelligence accident," to say nothing of the ill will and enmity this country is acquiring abroad through its cavalier secret subversive activities ranging from Cuba to Indochina and from Italy to the Malagasy Republic.

The agency's exemption from outside control was further reinforced in the 1949 Central Intelligence Agency Act providing that the CIA need not disclose the "functions, names, official titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel employed by the Agency." Similarly, the CIA director has the power to spend money "without regard to the provisions of law and regulations relating to the expenditure of government funds." This money would be "accounted for solely on the certificate of the Director." Inasmuch as the CIA's budget appropriations are concealed throughout the Federal budget, no outsider really knows how much the CIA

receives annually or how much it spends—or on what. Congressional appropriations and CIA oversight committees have been traditionally uninterested in the details of the agency's operations. But an informed guess is that the CIA budget runs to about $6 billion annually and that the agency employs some 8,000 persons in the United States and around the world, exclusive of foreign informants.

In one of the best studies of the intelligence community, David Wise, a Washington writer, concluded that the license given the CIA under the National Security Act and top secret National Security Council Intelligence Directives (known as NSCIDs or "Nonskids") form, in effect, the agency's "secret charter" for covert foreign operations. Wise also reported that this "secret charter" was spelled out in 1968 at a private session of the Council on Foreign Relations in New York by Richard M. Bissell, formerly the CIA's deputy director for clandestine operations. Bissell's explanation deserves to be quoted here:

"Covert operations should . . . be divided into two classifications: (1) *intelligence collection*, primarily espionage, or the obtaining of the intelligence by covert means; and (2) *covert action*, attempting to influence the internal affairs of other nations—sometimes called 'intervention'—by covert means.

"The scope of covert action could include: (1) political advice or counsel; (2) subsidies to an individual; (3) financial support and 'technical assistance' to political parties; (4) support of private organizations including labor unions, business firms, cooperatives, etc.; (5) covert propaganda; (6) 'private' training of individuals and exchange of persons; (7) economic operations; and (8) paramilitary [or] political action operations designed to overthrow or to support a régime (like the Bay of Pigs and the programs in Laos). These operations can be classified in various ways; by the degree and type of secrecy required by their legality, and, perhaps, by their benign or hostile character."

Bissell thus laid out, as had never been done before, what the CIA considered—and, evidently, still considers—its license to subvert foreign nations. It should be noted that Bissell's blueprint for covert actions has nothing directly to do with the great intelligence confrontations with the Soviet KGB or even activities in Communist countries, an area in which the CIA has had relatively little success despite occasional and undocumented claims of secret triumphs. On the contrary, covert actions as described by Bissell are aimed at *friendly or neutral nations* where the CIA—and the White House—desires to affect domestic political processes by everything from bribery to paramilitary actions.

Despite criticism directed at the administration and the CIA over the 1973 Chilean intervention, the agency makes no bones about the fact that covert operations in foreign countries, of the type described by Bissell, not only remain "necessary" but are continuing. This, of course, reflects the views held by Kissinger and Colby that the United States has the *right* to intervene in the affairs of other countries to further *real or imagined* objectives of American foreign policy—just as we have done in the past, often with catastrophic and objectionable results. Cuba, Indochina, and Chile have clearly taught the administration nothing in terms of how the world, where we have no abundance of friends, regards this sort of imperial policy. The agency's philosophy and mentality on the subject were expressed as follows by Colby at a Washington conference on covert actions in September 1974:

"There have been, and are still, certain situations in the world in which some discreet support can assist America's friends against her adversaries in their contest for control of a foreign nation's political direction. While these instances are few today compared to the 1950s, I believe it only prudent for our nation to be able to act in such situations, and thereby forestall greater difficulties for us in the future. . . . CIA's involvement in covert action is very small indeed compared to those earlier periods. I do not say that we do not now conduct such activities; I merely state that they are undertaken only as directed by the National Security Council. . . . I can envisage situations in which the United States might well need to conduct covert action in the face of some new threat that developed in the world. . . . I thus would think it mistaken to deprive our nation of the possibility of some moderate covert action response to a foreign problem and leave us with nothing between a diplomatic protest and sending the marines."

It can be argued, as even some of the agency's critics do, that the CIA should retain a covert action capability in the unpredictable world in which we live. But the problem is that what Colby has called "moderate covert action" can so easily escalate into something wholly immoderate. His pleas, then, must be taken with the most extreme caution. If nothing else, the Forty Committee and the CIA should apprise appropriate congressional committees beforehand. We should not be pushed into a war, or even someone else's civil war, by "intelligence accident."

Moreover, the CIA and the Pentagon have not been able in the last thirteen years to work out a clear definition of their respective responsibility for paramilitary actions requested by the White House. One of the by-products of the Bay of Pigs disaster, *Penthouse* has learned, was a decision by President Kennedy to divide this responsibility between the agency and the Defense Department. A top secret National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM-57), issued on June 28, 1962, and signed by Kennedy, directed that large-scale paramilitary operations would be run by the Pentagon with CIA support while small-scale paramilitary operations would be controlled by the agency with support from the Defense Department.

A memorandum of understanding, attempting to spell out this division of responsibility, was subsequently signed by John McCone, then CIA director, and Roswell L. Gilpatric, then under secretary of defense, but the jurisdictional fights never stopped. So the CIA chose to regard its "secret army" in Laos as a "small operation." For years, the Laos war in the strategic Plaine des Jarres was directed by successive American ambassadors and CIA station chiefs in Vientiane with the assistance of military attachés and the availability of supportive B-52 and tactical air strikes by Seventh Air Force aircraft. The CIA operation in Laos also had the support of "White Star" teams of the U.S. Army's Special Forces (Green Berets). The CIA's argument that *it* should run the Laotian war was based on the premise that it was a "secret" war and that, therefore, the American hand should not be shown—although it was common knowledge for years that the United States was behind the "clandestine" army. CIA aircraft and helicopters, belonging to Air America, Inc., a wholly owned agency airline, flew supply and support missions for the secret army in Laos.

The Laos case is instructive. If the CIA regarded Laos as a "small" situation, how is one to interpret Colby's statement about "moderate" support? Again, the danger is that we may be victimized by White House and CIA semantics.

Another vital aspect of the CIA's secret worldwide operations is its networks of "covers," often supplied by other branches of the United States government as well as by private corporations. Through a maze of crisscrossing contracts and reimbursement arrangements, particularly through the Agency for International Development, the CIA's resources include business firms, advertising and public-relations companies, communications companies, banks, airlines, engineering firms, labor and university teams, American free-lance or "stringer" journalists working abroad in seemingly innocent pursuits, police-training specialists, and experts in virtually every field. A bit of the secrecy curtain hanging over CIA operations and financing can be lifted by a judicious reading of the AID's list of "Current Technical Service Contracts." In it are buried quite a few CIA appropriations, with the agency refunding AID for its hidden expenditures. This is, for example, what can be gleaned from the contracts' list of AID as of June 30, 1974:

Air America, the CIA airline, had an $84,876,020 contract for "air transport and flying services for USAID" in Laos and a $5,831,000 contract for "flying and related services for USAID" in Vietnam. Continental Air Services, Inc., a CIA contractor, had a $24,288,000 AID contract for "flying and related services" in Laos. Bird and Sons, another CIA contractor, had a $450,000 AID contract in Laos for "flying and related services at Watty Airport" (Bird later flew the airlift to Cambodia for the U.S. air force). Evergreen Helicopters, Inc., part of the Air America combine, had a $360,612 contract for "flying services" in Ethiopia. Royal Air Lao had a $250,000 contract from AID for "flying and related services at Watty Airport" in Laos. The *known* CIA air operations contracts outstanding last year thus added up to $116 million.

When it comes to the direct flow of cash, the CIA has a variety of discreet channels, too. Over the years, a number of reputable American foundations were used to deliver funds to the agency's domestic and foreign clients. In other cases money went through the CIA's proprietary companies at home and abroad, or through agency "front" outfits. During the Vietnam war, a reputable international currency dealer with offices in New York, Washington, Zurich, Hong Kong, and a dozen other cities "laundered" CIA funds, with dollars often being exchanged for piastres on the Saigon black market. Early this year, several American bankers were asked by personal friends in the CIA to handle the delivery of special funds in Spain and Portugal. Some refused, but others reportedly agreed to cooperate in the spirit of "national interest."

National interest, to be sure, is invariably invoked by CIA officials publicly and pri-

vately to justify covert foreign operations. Colby stated it publicly as he posed the unreal alternatives of diplomatic protest and sending in marines when a foreign situation seems to be turning sour from Washington's viewpoint. In most cases, the U.S. has many other political weapons, including economic and diplomatic sanctions, to which it can turn without engaging in either subversion or the dispatch of marines.

Curiously, it never seems to occur to CIA people that *real* United States national interest is not necessarily served by secret interventions and that, more often than not, these violations of the sovereignty of other countries tend to boomerang on us. Nor does it seem to occur to them that in today's world the destruction of the Allende régime in Chile was not worth, in the long run, universal suspicion of American motives. Kissinger may find that the erosion of American prestige in the world is more attributable to the CIA's subversive ventures than to the fact that we were unable or unwilling to save the Thieu régime from collapse last spring.

The CIA, in fact, now finds itself in the curious predicament of being accused of every mischief in the world—whether it is guilty of it or not. However, the CIA *is* active in Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Greece—because of Kissinger's fear of a Mediterranean "domino" syndrome developing from the leftist strength in Portugal—but details of these operations are scarce and well concealed.

"We are obviously keeping a low profile out there what with all the investigations going on at home," a senior CIA official said in a recent private conversation. "But this is a shame. We could do great things in Portugal if we were only given the full freedom to operate. As it is, we can do little more than keep our ear to the ground and quietly, very quietly, encourage our friends."

The CIA's mentality about covert operations was highlighted in the same conversation when it was suggested to this official that under the conditions prevailing in Chile in 1973, particularly the military's hostility toward Allende, a coup might have occurred with no CIA involvement and thus no embarrassment to the U.S.

"Ah, but no," he said. "We had to be absolutely sure that *all* the military commanders were against Allende—and there were some unconvinced generals. So we had to convince them. Besides, it was important for our friends in Chile to know that they had outside support—and not only moral support."

The CIA, in fact, always likes to be as sure as possible of the success of its operations—regardless of their wisdom or morality—and it tends to be quite meticulous about it. A case in point is the method used in planning political assassinations.

It is a complicated and cumbersome procedure in which the first step is a proposal by the CIA's Deputy Director for Operations (DDO)—the Clandestine Services—that the United States interest would be served by the murder of a foreign leader. This is a political decision. The next stage is the review of the proposal by DDO's "Staff D" (formerly known as "Staff C") from the viewpoint of the efficacy of the plan in terms of the target, operational problems, and the personnel involved. This is a purely technical study inasmuch as "Staff D" basically evaluates proposed operations of all kinds. If "Staff D" signs off on the proposal, the Counterintelligence Staff in DDO takes over to determine if the potential victim may not be a secret CIA source and whether perfect security can be achieved. In other words, the Counterintelligence Staff must make sure that there would be no attribution of the killing to the CIA or the United States and that "absolute denial" is possible.

If Counterintelligence clears the project, the Technical Services Division (TSD) then studies and recommends the mode of assassination—the "lethality"—from a professional standpoint. TSD determines if the CIA can produce the means of assassination alone or whether it has to go to other American or foreign sources. The study includes an examination of the personal habits of the designated victim so that the plan can be worked out in the most minute detail.

The final step is approval by the Forty Committee at the White House. This, again, is a political decision. If the murder is to be committed by a foreign national, the authorization may be given by the committee itself. (The committee is made up of five men and has been headed since 1969 by Kissinger.) But if the chosen killer is an American citizen, the ultimate decision must be made by the president. (It is unclear if this would apply to Mafia hirelings.)

We don't know on how many occasions the president might have authorized an assassination by an American citizen, who would usually be a CIA agent, nor how many murders were actually committed by others on CIA orders under the procedure described above. All the files pertaining to successful assassinations are destroyed immediately after an operation so that no record will exist. (It is not clear if this procedure is also followed for files concerning abandoned assassination projects.)

All the CIA operations abroad are currently under the overall control of Director Colby and his deputy, Lt. Gen. Vernon A. Walters. Immediately below them in the hierarchy is William Nelson, Deputy Director for Operations ("Clandestine Services"). Nelson runs Counterintelligence as well as all the overseas regional "commands" and foreign "stations."

Most of the information on CIA assassination plans concerns plots against Fidel Castro and there seems to be no doubt that the agency planned his murder on many occasions. Reports on Trujillo's death are contradictory. According to some sources, the CIA, using the American Consulate General as a cover, was responsible for the delivery of M-1 rifles to the Dominican Republic for the killing. This allegation, however, has yet to be corroborated. Other sources say that a Special Forces unit from Panama handled the arms. In any event, there is a long tradition of cooperation between the CIA and Special Forces around the world in a variety of covert situations. Intelligence teams secretly infiltrating Laos and Cambodia in the late 1960s often included CIA and Special Forces personnel in addition to electronic specialists from the NSA.

There are also uncorroborated charges of the CIA's involvement in the death of the Congo's Patrice Lumumba and of plans to kill Haiti's late dictator, François Duvalier. But it is a fact that CIA agents were around when Bolivian army rangers murdered Ernesto "Che" Guevara in 1967. And the rangers were trained by the Green Berets.

In the end, however, the truth—aside from the Castro plots—may never be known unless witnesses before the investigating committees come forward with evidence about assassinations of foreign leaders.

Another area of mystery is the possibility of murders of lesser-known figures who the CIA, for a variety of reasons, might have wished to see eliminated. Such operations would not likely come to public attention.

In the secret intelligence wars ranging over the last twenty-five years, CIA agents have obviously killed some of their Communist opponents—and surely CIA men, too, have been killed. In situations involving double agents and defectors, countless other operatives must also have died. But, needless to say, there are no records of this shadowy area of intelligence pursuits.

The CIA—like other United States intelligence agencies—does not confine itself entirely to political subversion. In fact, most of the work is unspectacular, often tedious, espionage conducted through electronic and human means. This is the province of the CIA's Deputy Director for Intelligence (DDI), the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the NSA.

Some of this collection of intelligence as it is known in the trade, is clearly vital to the formulation of United States foreign policy. No president or secretary of state can plan policy without access to the greatest possible volume of foreign intelligence—whether it has to do with the development of Soviet nuclear missiles and MIRV's, or secret alliances between, say, the Soviet Union and Egypt. A great deal of this intelligence can be secured by technological means—electronic eavesdropping on foreign military and diplomatic communications and satellite photography of Soviet and Chinese nuclear testing and firing sites—but CIA veterans insist that in the final analysis no substitute has yet been invented for the human spy, the invisible deep-cover agent who can steal or buy secrets of other states.

So important is this flow of information considered that thousands of intelligence experts at CIA, DIA, and NSA headquarters in and around Washington work around the clock examining, evaluating, and collating the mass of raw intelligence streaming in day and night from abroad. Among the experts there are military specialists, political and economic analysts (many of them with an impressive array of academic degrees), and people knowledgeable in virtually every area of human endeavor. There are men and women who have an encyclopedic knowledge of Communist political structures, and there are others who probably know more than any other Americans about such areas as West Africa or Mongolia. There are specialists on geography and geology as well as on weather in Indochina and railways in Eastern Europe.

Distilled from this immense volume of information are the highly classified reports—CIA's daily bulletins—submitted every morning to the president and the secretary of state to keep them abreast of breaking developments. Other and less sensitive roundups go out daily to several hundred key policy officials. There is also a weekly compilation of the most interesting intelligence developments along with speculation on their meaning. Frequently the intelligence community produces National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) on specific subjects such as Indochina or the Middle East, containing projections of future events. After Henry Kissinger's abortive Middle

East peace mission last March, for example, the community produced an NIE weighing the likelihood of a new Arab-Israeli war. They concluded that there was little chance of a war before the fall of 1975. And in the spring of 1975, when Vietnam was crumbling, an NIE declared that the North Vietnamese would negotiate with Saigon for a new régime and that the South Vietnamese could defend the capital.

The CIA, the NSA, and the air force's National Reconnaissance Office share the responsibility for monitoring Soviet nuclear deployments and advances. This is the only way the United States has to assure itself that the other side is not cheating on the agreements on the limitation of strategic forces (SALT). The Russians, of course, monitor our nuclear activities for the same reason.

But how good is the quality of American intelligence? Although this question cannot be fully answered, enough is known of the performance of the CIA and its sister agencies to make some judgments. On the whole, most experts agree, the performance deserves relatively good marks, particularly in the case of the CIA. But the problem is that Kissinger and his top advisers do not always go along with the agency's conclusions—and the final result is disastrous.

In 1969, for example, the CIA warned the White House that the Vietnam war would never be won through massive B-52 bombings. The agency built an impressive case for the resilience of the North Vietnamese society and made the point that no matter how intensive the bombings the Chinese could always keep Hanoi supplied. The White House, as we know, disregarded this analysis and spent many years bombing North Vietnam to no avail. In another instance, the CIA warned against the 1970 helicopter raid to rescue American POWs from a North Vietnamese camp, arguing that the prisoners were not at that location. The CIA turned out to be right. The agency, disagreeing with the majority of the intelligence community, also warned the administration that the South Vietnamese could not withstand a Communist offensive.

But there were also occasions when the CIA, acting in a self-serving way, sought to please the White House at the expense of accurate information. In the most famous case of this type, senior CIA officials rejected figures provided by agency analysts on the North Vietnamese and Vietcong strength. The analysts went for high figures, which were accurate, but their bosses pared them down to fit Kissinger's preconceptions about the military situation.

In general, the quality of political intelligence is also reasonably high, according to foreign policy experts outside the intelligence community, but, again, the problem is that Kissinger often tends to disregard the CIA's conclusions in favor of his own perceptions of the state of the world. This is probably the greatest single weakness of the intelligence community in the political sense: Kissinger is the *producer* of intelligence in his capacity as the chief of the NSC machine, which includes intelligence, and its major *consumer* in his role as secretary of state. As an embittered CIA official remarked recently, "Kissinger just talks to himself."

And, finally, what overall assessment can we make of foreign intelligence as practiced by the CIA and the other agencies?

A realistic answer is that the United Stat national interest is ill served by the kind cold war covert operations spelled out Richard Bissell's "secret charter." If t United States is to maintain a leading po tion in the world as a moral force for t good—backed when necessary by our mi tary might—it must dispense with subtle unsubtle forms of subversion. The percen ages in this game now tend to run again us, and the disgrace acquired from t CIA's foreign adventures outweighs the political advantages.

The argument that the Russians and t Chinese are engaging in subversion is n longer convincing. In fact, their form of sub version has also brought them limited bene fits. Allende's election in Chile or the Po tuguese military revolution in 1974 were no produced by Communist subversion but b complex forces of history with which th United States must learn to cope in mor sophisticated ways. The practice of polit cal assassination adds little to the lustre o the American image.

But, just as realistically, one must recog nize that we live in a predatory world and w must, therefore, maintain and improve ou intelligence collection capability—even b covert means if needed. Without adequat intelligence, we cannot understand the world and, therefore, we cannot formulate rational foreign policies.

So what we need is a CIA that concerns itself with the gathering and interpretation o intelligence. The United States should no have to rely on subversion and murder in the execution of its foreign policy. O+—a

(This is the fourth article in a monthly series on America's intelligence community.)

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
24 July 1975

CIA reform suggested by Clifford

By Richard L. Strout
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

Former Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford, who had a hand in putting together the Central Intelligence Agency's covert operations under Presidents Truman and Kennedy, offers five urgent recommendations for CIA reform.

He told a group of reporters at breakfast here that the present situation demands:

1. A new law controlling the intelligence operation that modernizes the present statute written almost 30 years ago.

2. Elimination of the catch-all phrase in the current law under which he asserts abuses have occurred and specifically the rejection of all domestic CIA activities, and referral of them, if necessary, to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

3. A new intelligence adviser should be established in the White House, channeling all information and speaking for the President, and taking over the intelligence duties now exercised by Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger in the National Security Council. (A man can't handle the State Department and NSC at the same time, Mr. Clifford argues.)

4. Separate covert operations (surreptitious and extra-legal activities) from the CIA and put them into a separate agency reporting to the intelligence head at the White House.

5. Create a joint committee of Congress, possibly three men from either house, to give genuine legislative oversight to CIA and intelligence activities. "This is most important of all," says Mr. Clifford.

Mr. Clifford, as special adviser of President Truman, helped organize unification of the armed services to create better intelligence after the Pearl Harbor surprise attack. This resulted in the National Security Act of 1947. For 175 years, the United States had no intelligence operations, save in war, he recalled.

Surreptitious work abroad began, he disclosed, in a hush-hush agency known as "10-slant-2" which used funds to counter Communist activities in the Italian election in 1948; the result was favorable, he said, but very close. Under Gen. Bedell Smith the agency expanded, using unvouched funds.

In the spring of 1961, Mr. Clifford said, he received a telephone call from President Kennedy and found him looking more serious than he had ever seen him before, declaring "I've made a terrible mistake." It was the Bay of Pigs fiasco. President Kennedy said a second such mistake would destroy his administration and attributed it to faulty intelligence.

Mr. Clifford was delegated to reform U.S. intelligence. Later he was interim Secretary of Defense under President Johnson, but differed over Vietnam.

On the CIA, Mr. Clifford said: The agency has gone almost 30 years without supervision. Some congressmen supposed to watch it specifically announced they did not want to know details.

At no time did he ever hear Presidents Truman, Kennedy, or Johnson say that they knew, let alone countenanced, assassination of foreign leaders.

The CIA report by the Rockefeller Commission is "quite good" if "a little bland," but he differs with it in believing a new law is needed.

NEW YORK TIMES
20 July 1975

An Unclear Law

For Congress, Overseeing the C.I.A. Is No Easier Now

By LESLIE H. GELB

WASHINGTON—Despite revelations that the Central Intelligence Agency has inspired coups and assassination plots, Congress still has not come to grips with the problem of overseeing the agency's covert operations abroad. Legislators still find themselves caught between a belief in the protective value of covert operations and a conviction that this kind of protection could endanger democratic processes at home.

Congressional procedures for supervising cloak-and-dagger affairs continue to be a patchwork that permits legislators to know what is going on but does not permit them to do much about it. Congressmen who are privy to intelligence secrets are not sure whether their primary duty is to maintain secrecy or to inform the public of wrongdoing. The 1974 law that was intended to strengthen oversight of covert operations is shot through with loopholes, and liberal legislators who talk of more oversight are, in fact, content to allow the Congressmen who tacitly approved previous operations to remain the watchdogs.

The C.I.A. continues to conduct covert operations abroad with the knowledge and approval of six Congressional subcommittees. These operations (several old ones and two new ones) include some political activity and efforts to combat drug rings and terrorist organizations. But none, officials here said, could be construed as efforts to undermine or overthrow existing governments.

C.I.A. Director William E. Colby has told the subcommittees that, compared with previous years, the number of operations has been substantially reduced and that the Soviet Union largely has curtailed its operations as well. Sources paraphrased Mr. Colby as saying that, in the present world, the United States is not seriously threatened by Communist undercover activities and that both sides see little advantage in such ventures for now.

During the debate on the foreign aid bill last fall, several amendments were put forward to ban all covert operations. These were defeated by very wide margins. Congress then went on to adopt its only law governing these activities. It stipulates that no funds can be expended "by or on behalf of the Central Intelligence Agency for operations in foreign countries, other than activities intended solely for obtaining necessary intelligence, unless and until the President finds that each such operation is important to the national security of the United States and reports, in a timely fashion, a description and scope of such operation to the appropriate committees of the Congress."

The law did not give Congress any new powers. It merely made Presidential responsibility and reporting requirements explicit. It also mandated that the information be passed to the Senate Foreign Relations and House International Relations Committees. Until this enactment, only the House and Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committees were privy to the data on covert operations.

Among the loopholes in the law is that it only applies to covert operations carried out "by or on behalf of" the C.I.A. This could mean that operations conducted by one of the military services, such as the secret bombing of Cambodia, the mission of the Pueblo spy ship or American submarines following Soviet submarines into Russian territorial waters, are not within the law's purview. A second loophole is the phrase "in a timely fashion." This means that the Administration can inform Congress of operations after the fact. This is precisely what Mr. Colby has done since the law was enacted.

It is perfectly within the rules of the game for Mr. Colby to tell a House subcommittee in open testimony that "we are in compliance," but legislators are not supposed to make these same disclosures. Congressmen would not say for the record that the new law on covert operations is being observed by the Administration because to say that would be to admit that the United States is conducting such operations—and that's classified.

Members of one subcommittee dealing with these matters do not discuss what they are being told with members of other intelligence subcommittees, because each is not sure that the other is privy to exactly the same information.

A legislator who believes that a particular covert operation is unacceptable would find it almost impossible to take his objections outside of his committee without violating the internal regulations of the House and Senate. It is possible for a legislator to call for an executive or closed session of the Senate or House to discuss classified material, but even this is complicated in the case of covert activities.

Any Representative who requests secret data from the House Armed Services Committee, to take one case, must sign a pledge not to discuss the data with anyone other than a member of the committee. Several weeks ago, that committee voted to deny Representative Michael Harrington, Democrat of Massachusetts, further access to secret documents because he admittedly violated his pledge by telling newsmen that the C.I.A. poured millions of dollars into Chile for the purpose of "destabilizing" the left-wing government of President Allende. Ironically, the Harrington disclosures and the resulting controversy about Chile were the direct cause of Congressional approval of the new law on covert operations.

Liberals Not Aggressive

Liberals have been none too anxious to take a direct hand in overseeing covert activities. The makeup of the six subcommittees is decidedly conservative: in the Senate, Democrats like John C. Stennis of Mississippi and John L. McClellan of Arkansas, and Republicans like Barry Goldwater of Arizona and Roman Hruska of Nebraska serve on them. Liberal legislators have not shown a great willingness to fight for places on these subcommittees.

When the Senate Foreign Relations Committee became privy to C.I.A. secrets for the first time, the members allowed all of arrangements on handling the data to be made by the chairman, Senator John J. Sparkman, Democrat of Alabama and Mr. Colby. No one else was present. The committee, meeting in executive session, then agreed to a procedure whereby Mr. Colby would give the covert operations information only to Mr. Sparkman and Senator Clifford P. Case, Republican of New Jersey. One committee member said, "I don't like the setup, but I don't want to be saddled with the information either."

Members of Congress are quick to praise Mr. Colby for providing whatever information was requested. But some members believe that being informed is not the main issue. Even the proposed Joint House-Senate Intelligence Committee, although a step in the right direction, will not solve the problem, they believe, unless the law and Congressional attitudes are changed.

They want the law tightened to include all forms of covert operations and to insure Congress the right of prior approval. They also hope for a change in attitude so that if an operation is proposed that raises basic questions about Congressional responsibility and American interests, Congress can consider the questions in a deliberate manner.

Leslie H. Gelb is a New York Times Washington correspondent specializing in diplomatic affairs.

The New York Times Book Review/July 13, 1975

For My Eyes Only

The Last Word

By RICHARD R. LINGEMAN

Most fledgling writers who perform their stint in the service are sustained by the hope that some day they'll get a book, or at least a short story, out of the experience. So you can imagine the unhappiness of all of us who did time in the various military intelligence branches when the Supreme Court recently refused to review a lower-court ruling upholding the C.I.A.'s right to censor "The C.I.A. and the Cult of Intelligence."

As you may recall, co-author Victor Marchetti, who served in the C.I.A., was required under an agreement he signed with the Agency to submit his book to censorship prior to publication. Marchetti and his publisher fought this stipulation, but a lower court upheld the contract. As a result, hundreds of deletions in the MS. were demanded by the C.I.A. When the book was published it contained blank spaces where the deleted material would have appeared.

Now I spent much of my Army service doing counter-intelligence work and naturally intended to write about it some time. Once I even got as far as writing a novel but gave it up because my well-inculcated secretiveness was still too strong. The counter-intelligence part of my life remained under lock and key in a mental strongbox—writer's capital I would draw on in due time.

Then came the Marchetti case, which in effect affirmed the secrecy pledges that are taken by graduates of all branches of intelligence, not just the C.I.A. When I was demobbed, I certainly signed such an agreement, pledging me to keep my lip zipped in perpetuity about every scrap of classified information that had passed under my eyes. When a man is being discharged from the Army he'll sign anything, but I had no idea I was giving away a possibly valuable hunk of literary property.

Of course I could try publishing in England as did former C.I.A. man Philip Agee, whose book "Inside the Company" first appeared there and is now out. But I might as well be frank: I really don't have enough material to make a book. Your ordinary counter-intelligence investigator stationed in a backwater city in Japan, as I was, just doesn't pick up much of the really heavy stuff.

Speaking of C.I.A. agents reminds me of a running case our office had which was filed under some such rubric as "Suspected C.I.A. Operatives" and classified Secret. Perhaps the C.I.A. had a similar file on us, but our file contained a single name, that of a local American Catholic priest. Nobody could come up with much more on the man, if they even tried; perhaps he didn't exist. Still, in hindsight, it seems a pity that I didn't look him up. Not that he would have told me what he was really doing, but I might have caught him in the act of baking microfilm in the Communion wafers or something. On second thought he seems more in Graham Greene's line.

We did have some interesting confidential informants on our payroll. My beat was ultranationalist groups, which is how I got my introduction to Korematsu (his real name) the most unforgettable fanatic I ever met. Korematsu was an old-fashioned Japanese patriot who believed in such things as political assassination and capped off by ritual suicide, or *seppuku*. He had a missing little finger because he had once cut it off and sent it to a creditor who was hounding him; this was an old samurai ploy for shaming an adversary. Korematsu was always in need of money, which is why he consented to all those clandestine conversations we had in parked cars. (Once a policeman sidled up and asked what we were doing; my interpreter told him we were moon-viewing, another popular Japanese pastime, though one not ordinarily engaged in on a foggy night).

In exchange for the 15,000 yen a month we paid him—a good wage at the time—Korematsu would harangue us about the good old days under the Tokugawa Shogunate. In addition to keeping track of the state of Korematsu's assassination threshold, we had the satisfaction of insuring the survival of the Fukuoka Chapter of the Greater Japan Production Party (name not invented), as his tiny band of super-patriots was called. It was money well spent since, without a solvent Korematsu, we never would have had a case in our files entitled Greater Japan Production Party. Politics is cheap in the Orient.

Then there was our one and only (I'm embarrassed to say) bona-fide spy case. This caper, at its zenith, had our entire office all over town. One was out shagging tenuous leads such as a mysterious man identifiable only by a facial scar and a ring with Chinese characters on it. Many's the night I spent in a bar he allegedly frequented trying to stare unobtrusively at ring fingers. All these clues had been fed to us by a hot-shot investigator from Tokyo headquarters (who wore, I swear, a trench coat and probably carried a picture of John Wayne in his wallet). Unfortunately, the whole story was a concoction of a 16-year-old boy's fertile imagination. He had stowed away aboard a parked Air Force plane and, when caught, claimed to be a spy, offering to spill all he knew in exchange for leniency. Investigators believed his story because he had drawn for them the plans of American war planes—obtained, it later turned out, from faithful reading of a well-known aviation magazine.

Now, alas, I can't tell those stories, all of which were—and no doubt still are—classified up to Secret at least. Nor how we routinely forged restaurant bills to balance our confidential-funds book (that was to pay Korematsu's salary), or what a headquarters major down on an inspection trip did after we plied him with drink and got him in a compromising situation with a female artiste who gave private recitals before all-male audiences. So my advice to young writers is, stay out of the intelligence game (stay out of the infantry too) or at least bring your literary agent along when you sign that paper.

WASHINGTON POST
17 July 1975

Col. Sheffield Edwards, Was Army, CIA Officer

Col. Sheffield Edwards, 73, a retired Army officer and Central Intelligence Agency official, died Tuesday at Leesburg Hospital in Virginia after a long illness.

Born in San Francisco, he graduated from the Military Academy at West Point in 1923.

During World War II, Col. Edwards was chief of staff of the 8th Air Support Command and the 9th Fighter Command and executive of the combined air section of the I British Corps.

In the latter half of the war, he was assigned to G-3, headquarters, 12th Army Group. He received the Legion of Merit and Bronze Star for his war service.

Col. Edwards was assigned in 1946 to the Central Intelligence Group, a predecessor of the CIA, as assistant executive

He was appointed director of security of the CIA in 1947, holding that position until retiring in 1963.

At his retirement, then CIA Director John McCone awarded him the Distinguished Intelligence Medal for "outstanding achievement in the field of intelligence relating to the national security."

He credited Col. Edwards with being the principal architect in the development of CIA security programs.

[illegible]

president of Sheffield Edwards Security and Management Consultants in Washington until 1970, when he retired to his home in Leesburg.

He is survived by his wife, Sarita Barber Edwards, of Leesburg; a daughter, Mrs. Kennedy Schmertz, of Washington; a son, Sheffield Edwards Jr., of Miami, Fla., and four grandchildren.

The family suggests that expressions of sympathy be in the form of contributions to [illegible] Fund.

BALTIMORE SUN
20 July 1975

Congress and the CIA: The spies that get away

By MURIEL DOBBIN

Washington.

The belated congressional investigation of the intelligence community is reminiscent of a conscience-stricken watchdog barking after a departed burglar.

The failure of the congressional oversight committees to rein in the power of the Central Intelligence Agency was a major factor in the development of that agency into what Senator Frank Church, the Idaho Democrat heading the Senate intelligence committee investigation, last week compared to "an out-of-control rogue elephant."

The Rockefeller commission's report on the domestic and foreign misdeeds of the CIA pinpointed the inadequacy of the four standing congressional subcommittees responsible for keeping tabs on the intelligence agency.

The congressional response so far has been a scramble to probe the dark side of intelligence-gathering and prove the competence of Capitol Hill by pointing the finger of shock at the sinners of the CIA.

The Senate intelligence committee has succeeded in operating for six months with commendably tight security and no leaks, and is about to issue its first public report on CIA involvement in political assassinations.

The House Select Committee on Intelligence has succeeded in nothing for six months, and was abolished last week and replaced by a new and larger committee that certainly can do no worse than its predecessor, but which is unlikely to do much more than tread in the footsteps of its Senate counterpart.

A less dramatic but more constructive approach is that advocated by legislators such as Senator Howard H. Baker (R., Tenn.) and Senator Lowell P. Weicker (R., Conn.). They contend that preventive legislation is needed, rather than an unending stream of disclosures about the past three decades when the CIA might have been running amok, but Congress was doing nothing to stop it.

Not even the most rampant liberals on Capitol Hill seriously propose the abolition of the CIA, although there have been urgings that the agency be restricted to the coordination and evaluation of intelligence data and abandon its involvement in covert operations.

Yet there are mixed feelings about the proposal, made by the Rockefeller commission and in a Baker-Weicker bill, that a joint congressional intelligence committee be set up as CIA watchdog, supplemented by an expanded presidential foreign intelligence advisory board.

Representatives and senators appear to be divided between those who fear that leaks from such a committee would do lasting damage to the intelligence community and those at the other end of the spectrum who suggest that such a panel is needed is to "let the sun shine in" on the world of espionage.

The idea of sunshine in spy country understandably makes the CIA shudder. William E. Colby, the agency's director, has testified on Capitol Hill 39 times in the current session and delivered 30 speeches to such assorted groups as State Department seminars, a girls' school, a women's club and the Associated Press annual meeting, in the course of an unprecedented effort by the CIA to present its side of the story.

According to CIA spokesmen, serious damage already has been done to the agency's operating efficiency abroad as friendly foreign governments become increasingly nervous about the proliferating publicity in the United States.

"We are now at the stage where people who once gave us top-secret stuff worry about giving us secret stuff, those who once gave us secret data are hesitant about things marked confidential and the rest won't go beyond a handshake," an agency official said.

To compound the problem, there appears to be no end in sight to the congressional investigation of the CIA, the FBI and related intelligence agencies; yet the establishment of committees or the enactment of legislation to remedy the errors of the past is equally remote.

At present, four standing subcommittees, two in the Senate and two in the House, have responsibility for overseeing the nation's intelligence operations.

The Rockefeller commission employed considerable tact when it suggested that "some improvement in the congressional oversight system would be helpful" and noted that the CIA "had not, as a general rule, received detailed scrutiny by Congress."

There is some dispute over whether that lack of oversight stemmed from the feeling of some congressmen and senators that an intelligence agency is entitled to some secrets or whether the CIA was judiciously selective in briefing the congressional committees.

Senator Church, whose committee has spent the past several weeks exploring the specific area of CIA involvement in political assassination plots, says Congress was not kept apprised of the extent of the agency's foreign operations.

Mr. Church, of course, is faced with issuing a report on a subject politically far more delicate than the revelations of the Watergate scandal, since the ultimate authority over the CIA is the president's and since the presidents linked to alleged assassination plots all are dead.

The Senate committee's report on what Mr. Church refers to as "political murders" is likely to satisfy nobody. The chairman already has predicted it is unlikely that the mantle of responsibility for such schemes can be draped around anybody's shoulders. The absence of a whipping boy inevitably will evoke cries of coverup.

Yet perhaps the most difficult aspect of the investigation of intelligence operations is the fact that such projects necessarily are compartmentalized so that no one has unnecessary knowledge; consequently responsibility is widespread.

Though CIA directors are supposed to be entirely forthcoming with Congress, the intelligence community's concept of candor is unlike the average person's. As one senator put it, "You're always getting back to this business of 'need to know'—they told us as much as they thought we needed to know."

Moreover, the CIA takes the firm position that deception in the cause of protecting its agents is no vice.

The general attitude of Congress regarding its oversight of the intelligence community seems to boil down to an inclination to wait and see how the investigations come out before making any moves to legislate or reorganize the present structure.

Senate hearings on the intelligence probe, originally scheduled for this month, are unlikely to be held before late September, according to some estimates, and those will focus on the bureaucratic background of the espionage agencies and their domestic misdeeds. It seems most unlikely that there will ever be open hearings on political assassinations.

The House intelligence probe, a mishmash of delays and acrimonious disagreement, is already six months behind that of the Senate, so its results safely may be assumed to be even more distant in time. Two dubious leaks about an allegedly successful political assassination and a leaked memorandum about so-called "infiltration" of the government by the CIA are the current claim to fame of the House inquiry. Neither has been supported by evidence.

The new House committee, which emerged after nine hours of wrangling on the House floor, is stripped of what were viewed as its most divisive aspects, namely, the chairman, Representative Lucien N. Nedzi, a Michigan Democrat, and Representative Michael J. Harrington, a Massachusetts Democrat. The two held widely differing viewpoints on the usefulness of the CIA and the need for keeping intelligence secrets.

The current House committee is larger, with 13 members instead of 10, a ploy to reduce factionalism, according to Representative Richard Bolling (D., Mo.) its sponsor.

One cynical congressional observer suggested that the enlargement of the intelligence committee was based on the theory that if something didn't work, the thing to do was to make it bigger.

The outlook for the intelligence investigation is somber, in that it is more likely to be colored by politics and publicity seekers than by sober assessment of the unquestionably real problems and how to solve them. The situation is not likely to be improved by the fact that such solutions will probably be proposed in the midst of the political hullabaloo called a presidential election year.

NEW YORK DAILY NEWS
18 JULY 1975

In From the Cold

CIA Chief Looks Back

By JAMES WIEGHART

Washington, July 17 — For a guy who has been serving as the nation's number one punching bag for the last seven months, CIA Director William E. Colby looks to be in pretty good shape.

Colby, 55, is a career spy who rose to the top of the country's premier spy agency two years ago, just in time to catch the flak for some CIA dirty tricks that went beyond the bounds of the agency's charter.

CAPITOL STUFF

In the last seven months, Colby has spent much of his time testifying behind closed doors before the Rockefeller Commission and the Select Senate Committee on Intelligence about these alleged dirty tricks—illegal domestic spying, participation in assassination plots against foreign leaders (on at least one occasion, in league with the Mafia), administering LSD and other drugs to unsuspecting subjects and the like.

Virtually all of the wrongdoing goes back years, to the cold war era when the nation supposedly was locked in a death struggle with international communism and good red-blooded American spies were expected to deal roughly with the other side.

Unfortunately for Colby, the CIA misdeeds he is being asked to account for by the Senate committee and others are being scrutinized in the benign era of detente, with a new, post-Vietnam, post-Watergate standard of morality as a measuring stick.

So, when he is not being interrogated by senators behind closed doors, Colby spends a good deal of his time answering questions posed by reporters on TV panels, at press conferences or, like today, sitting in a bright yellow chair by a coffee table in his airy office overlooking the Potomoc River at the agency's sprawling headquarters in suburban Langley, Va.

William Colby
Cold War remembered

A thin, wiry man about 5 foot 7, weighing about 160 pounds, with icy blue eyes and transparent plastic rim glasses, Colby looks and talks more like a lawyer — which he is — than a spy.

He won't answer direct questions about specific allegations of CIA wrong-doing except to concede that there was some. He rejects the adjective "massive" which has been used to describe the extnte of illegal domestic spying by the CIA, but agrees that point is debatable.

"Look, we did some things that we should not have," he said with the wave of a hand. "That was wrong. We have furnished the information to the proper authorities and we are not doing those things anymore."

Three Main Reasons

How did it happen? "Well, there are three main reasons," he said. "One is the old cold war tradition — 'Go do it and don't tell me about it.' So there wasn't much external supervision. The better the external supervision, the better internal supervision.

"Second, it was an era of intense challenge ... There was a great sense of urgency ... The feeling that we were a nation under attack ... we were under attack. This stimulated the desire to do that extra bit ... We looked for justification for actions that seemed necessary.

"And third, this is a great bit organization. In any big organization, mistakes are made, however well intentioned. Don't forget, we're looking over a period covering 25 years."

Colby doesn't resent the investigations, both official and by the press, agreeing that "this is all part of our system." But the sensational disclosures have taken a toll.

Sees Tighter Supervision

"Alot of people and foreign intelligence agencies who have worked with us are pulling back, fearful of exposure," Colby said. "A number of persons we have tried to get as agents have turned us down.

"It is not so much that we are under investigation, or even that we are under attack that creates the problem. It is the possibility of leakage—the exposure —that hurts."

Colby believes that the investigations will lead to tighter supervision, by the Congress and by the executive branch. Thiswill not pose manor problems for the CIAas long as it can continue to safeguard its secrets. He is not at all apprehensive that the avalanche of publicity on agency misdeeds will lwad to a public demand for the abolition of the CIA.

"I'm not worried about that," he said. "There is a great deal of support for intelligence in this country — an awareness that for our own safety we need to know what is going on around the world. There may be differences in opinion bout how we should bo about it, but there is general agreement that we need to have a strong intelligence service."

CHICAGO TRIBUNE
12 JULY 1975

CIA's 'necessary evils'

BANGOR, Me.—Let's tell it like it is. Neither the attackers nor the defenders of the CIA have faced up to the real issue: It is that unless and until there is enforceable international law, every nation must have the right to conduct "illegal" espionage if it would survive.

Ours is now a world in which any nation, in the name of defense, peace, freedom, or some trumped up charges, can commit aggression; bomb hospitals and innocent women and children; commit piracy on the high seas; and even destroy itself in the process. Under these conditions, every nation is forced to maintain a system of defense and adequate methods of procuring intelligence —that is, spying. Certainly, there are rules of espionage. But where do you draw the line in a field that respects no law?

Enforced and effective international law would arrest an Adolf Hitler rather than go to war against an entire nation. War between any of the 50 United States is now unthinkable because we have effective, enforceable, democratic, peaceful, legal, and satisfying methods of solving our problems and settling our disputes.

Our future choice is very clear. Either we take a step in the direction of enforceable international law, or we risk the total destruction of mankind thru the nightmare of holocaust. The next step toward enforceable international law could be achieved thru the development of regional governments—such as a United States of each continent or the creation of an Atlantic Union. Or, the next move might be toward a stronger United Nations or some form of world government.

Our present course is aimed in a destructive direction. It leaves us totally unprepared to meet the threatening problems that invite the annihilation of mankind: pollution, overpopulation, and war. No matter what course we take, one truth is now self-evident: If we are not willing to modify our sovereignty for the benefit of a safer and more peaceful world, then at least we should remain submissively silent in understanding acceptance of the CIA and its necessary evils.

Al Bernstein

WASHINGTON POST
17 July 1975

CIA Monitored Socialists 23 Years

By Stephen Green and Lawrence Meyer
Washington Post Staff Writers

The Central Intelligence Agency monitored the domestic activities of the Socialist Workers Party for 23 years in apparent violation of the CIA charter, according to documents released by the party yesterday.

The documents indicate the intelligence agency continued domestic surveillance in Washington for nearly two years after the Rockefeller Commission said such activities were supposed to have been stopped by the agency.

The documents show the CIA received reports in 1969 and 1970 on what four agents learned here about the Young Socialists Alliance, the youth organization of the Socialist Workers Party.

Identified only as R-4, R-5, R-6 and R-7, the agents conducted surveillance of Young Socialists Alliance activities on D.C. college campuses, according to the documents.

The Socialist Workers Party obtained the documents from the CIA as the result of a court suit in New York, seeking them under the Freedom of Information Act.

According to the Rockefeller Commission report on the CIA, the agency's Office of Security infiltrated and monitored at least 17 Washington area antiwar and black activist groups in 1967 and 1968. These activities by the CIA, the commission concluded, were illegal because they did not come under the agency's legal mandate to conduct intelligence activities outside the United States and to protect itself.

In December, 1968, the commission report said, the CIA relinquished its surveillance of Washington groups to the D.C. police department, which until 1972 relayed its findings to the intelligence agency.

Assistant D.C. Police Chief Theodore R. Zanders said yesterday that he "can't come up with anything" to show that agents R-4, R-5, R-6 and R-7 worked for the D.C. police.

The only CIA domestic surveillance in Washington after 1968 that was mentioned by the Rockefeller Commission report was the 1971 assignment of an agent to infiltrate the May Day antiwar protest organization.

President Ford created the Rockefeller Commission to investigate the functioning of the CIA after press disclosures that the agency had engaged in massive, illegal domestic spying. A Senate committee is now conducting its own investigation of these allegations.

The new revelation about CIA domestic surveillance is the second time in recent days in which information about CIA activities not contained in the Rockefeller Commission report was made public.

It was revealed last week that the agency in 1953 gave doses of LSD to a small group of scientists without their knowledge. The commission had reported that only one scientist was given the drug. He since has been identified as biochemist Frank Olson, who two weeks after taking the drug in 1953 plunged to his death from the 10th floor of a New York City hotel room.

A CIA spokesman yesterday said he was not familiar with anybody working for the CIA given a code designation of "R." He added that "I cannot say one way or another" whether R-4, R-5, R-6 and R-7 were working for the CIA.

David Belen, who served as executive director of the Rockefeller Commission, said the four agents could have worked for the CIA's Operation CHAOS, which monitored dissident groups around the country from 1967 to 1973. The agent assigned to infiltrate the May Day organization reported to CHAOS, according to the commission report.

According to the documents, the CIA's Office of Security received reports on the observations of agents R-4, R-5, R-6 and R-7 concerning four meetings held in D.C. between Aug. 10, 1969, and Dec. 6, 1969.

Three of these sessions were sponsored by the Young Socialists Alliance. The other was sponsored by the antiwar Student Mobilization Committee and featured a speaker from the Young Socialists Alliance.

In addition, the CIA Office of Security received pamphlets and other literature gathered by the agents at the meetings.

According to the documents, an unidentified "CIA employee" from an unidentified "CIA unit" sent a memo on Dec. 11, 1969, to the agency's "Deputy Director of Security" discussing surveillance of the Young Socialists Alliance.

Attached to the memo were "pamphlets and flyers" gathered a week earlier from a "Socialist Educational Conference sponsored by the Young Socialist Alliance here in Washington."

The memo stated: "The YSA, as you know, is the youth vanguard of the Trotskyite Socialist Workers Party as well as the controlling force behind the "mass movement" amalgam known as the Student Mobe (Student Mobilization Committee). Target Analysis Branch will be treating this topic in some depth in this week's Situation Information Report."

The memo said that since "the splintering of SDS last summer at Chicago" where the 1968 Democratic convention was held, "the YSA (mostly via Student Mobe) is coming on strong and currently represents the best guess for leadership in the radical youth movement for the early 1970s."

The memo adds that "we will most definitely keep abreast of evolving developments in this Trotskyite old left/new left complex."

According to the documents, on Aug. 10, 1969, agent "R-7 checked a meeting held by the Student Mobilization Committee at 2030 hours at the Reiss Science Building at Georgetown University." In his report, R-7 stated that "about 50-60 people were present, 95 per cent of which were Cubans. The main speaker was Dan Rosenshine, national committee member of the Young Socialist Alliance and guest of the Cuban government at the celebration of the 10th anniversary of the Cuban revolution."

Agent R-7 reported that Rosenshine's speech "was very short but he showed film slides on Cuba." R-7 added that "no new literature was available at this meeting."

On Dec. 6, 1969, according to the documents, agents R-4, R-6 and R-7 attended YSA meetings at George Washington University.

R-4, the documents state, "made a cursory check" and reported that a "meeting headlined as the Socialist Educational Conference" was "attended by approximately 100 people, about three colored and the remainder college hippy type."

A separate YSA meeting at the college on the same date was attended by R-6 and R-7 who found "75-100 people were in attendance—about six colored, the remainder white college students mixed with hippy and regular type."

Agents R-5 and R-6 both attended a Sept. 16 meeting at George Washington sponsored by YSA. They reported, according to the documents that a "total of 11 people were in attendance. From that standpoint, the meeting was a failure."

According to the Rockefeller Commission, agents used by the CIA for surveillance of domestic activites in D.C. were volunteer unemployed housewives and manual laborers who were paid less than $100 a month.

The documents show that as early as 1951, the CIA kept material relating to the Socialist Workers Party, which espouses the philosophy of the late Leon Trotsky, who preached worldwide social revolution. The party has run candidates in presidential elections and in local D.C. elections.

The documents show that an [illegible] about the SWP was written Aug. 6, 1951,

4 Agents on Socialist Case Are Acknowledged by CIA

By Stephen Green
Washington Post Staff Writer

A CIA spokesman said yesterday it "can be assumed" that agents designated R-4, R-5, R-6 and R-7 were working for the intelligence agency when they gathered information about th Young Socialists Alliance here in 1969 and 1970.

The spokesman also said that some information about the Alliance and its parent Socialist Workers Party was obtained casually by CIA employees in the course of doing other business.

Other material about the party may have been sent to the CIA by persons not connected with the agency and then was put into CIA files, the spokesman added.

Documents showing that the intelligence agency obtained information about the Socialist Workers Party as early as 1951 were released Wednesday by the party.

The party obtained the documents from the CIA as the result of a court order in a suit seeking to stop the CIA, FBI and other government agencies from spying on it. The civil suit was brought in New York City by the Political Rights Defense Fund.

In addition to showing the CIA kept literature about the party, the documents also show the agency got information about party meetings here in 1969 and 1970 from four agents identified only as R-4, R-5, R-6 and R-7.

The Young Socialists Alliance is the youth organization of the Socialist Workers Party which espouses the world revolution philosophy of the late Leon Trotsky.

The Rockefeller Commission report on the CIA said the agency violated its charter by spying on domestic organizations. It specifically cited Operation CHAOS, a CIA operation to spy on antiwar and black activist groups around the country between 1967 and 1973.

It also said that in 1967 and 1968 the CIA's Office of Security infiltrated and spied on activist organizations in Washington but in December of 1968 that operation was turned over to D.C. Police.

President Ford created the Rockefeller Commission to investigate the CIA after press reports that the agency engaged in massive, illegal domestic spying.

The only mention by the commission of CIA domestic spying in Washington after 1968 was an occassion in 1971 when a CHAOS agent was assigned to infiltrate the May Day antiwar organization.

The CIA spokesman said yesterday that the agents identified only as R-4, R-5, R-6 and R-7 may have worked for the CHAOS project. He said it also was possible that the four agents spying on the Young Socialists Alliance here may have been "overzealous."

On Wednesday, the CIA spokesman said R-4, R-5, R-6 and R-7 may or may not have been CIA agents. Yesterday, he said: "It can be assumed" they were working for the CIA." Their reports were filed with the CIA Office of Security, according to the documents.

The documents include copies of memorandums dated 1959 and 1961, respectively, from New York and Boston "field" offices. The 1959 memo deals with YSA literature obtained from Columbia University. The 1961 memo discusses literature obtained at a YSA demonstration near Harvard University.

The CIA spokesman said the memos were written from the agency's New York and Boston offices to CIA headquarters.

According to the spokesman, the material was gathered in a "passive way." He said the CIA had not then "targeted" the YSA for surveillance. "It was overt, not covert," thw spokesman said.

He explained that "some of our fellows probably were passing through Harvard Yard on other business and picked it (the literature) up and sent it to us."

According to the spokesman, the CIA maintained a file on the Socialists Workers Party as early as 1951 because the organization was listed as "subversive" by the Justice Department and that in doing background checks on potential CIA employees, the agency would want to check the possibility of any link between potential employees and the party.

The documents also show the CIA kept in its files a copy of the 1968 New York state elections ballot containing the names of Socialist Workers Party candidates.

The CIA spokesman said that persons not employed by the agency often sent it unsolicited material. "There is a nut fringe that sends us stuff. What do we do with it? We pop it in the files," he said.

from "one CIA employee" to another "CIA employee." It traces the history of the party and notes that it had been cited as "subversive" by the Justice Department.

A 1953 CIA files memorandum cites a New York Times report that the party's 1952 presidential candidate polled 10,306 votes in seven states.

A March 11, 1959, memorandum notes that the agency obtained Young Socialists Alliance literature that had been "posted" on the campus of Columbia University in New York City.

A March, 1961, memo refers to YSA literature distributed in Harvard Square in Cambridge, Mass.

The CIA documents also included a copy of the 1968 New York State elections ballot containing the names of Socialist Labor Party candidates.

The documents acknowledge that the CIA also has other material on file about the SWP. The agency refused to make public much of this information, however, on the grounds that it was not required to do so by the Freedom of Information Act. The SWP is continuing court action in an effort to get the material.

The documents include a copy of a 1950 newspaper article about the party but give no indication when it was acquired by the CIA.

NEW YORK TIMES
23 July 1975

30 ACCUED IN SUIT OF OPENING MAILS

PROVIDENCE, R.I., July 22(AP) — Thirty present and former officials of the Central Intelligence Agency and other Government agencies were accused in a class action suit today of illegally opening the mail of Americans.

The suit, filed by the American Civil Liberties Union in Federal District Court here, alleges that officials of the C.I.A., the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Post Office opened the first-class mail of the plaintiff, Rodney Driver, and other Amerian Americans.

Mr. Driver, a University of Rhode Island mathematics professor, said three letters he had sent to mathematicians in the Soviet Union were opened and copied. He said the letters contained personal and mathematical information.

At a news conference, Mr. Driver said he believed the C.I.A. opened his mail because he obtained copies of the letters from the agency when he requested them under the Freedom of Information Act.

The Rockefeller commission, which investigated C.I.A. activities, reported in June that the agency opened mail to or sent by American citizens. The mail project began in New York in 1952, the commission said, involving mail to and from the Soviet Union.

The program ended in 1973 and the commission reported that during the last full year of the program the intelligence agency handled 4,350,000 items, examined the outside of 2.3 million, photographed the outside of 33,000 and opened 8,700.

The suit asks the court to order compensatory damages of $20,000 for each letter opened and read by the C.I.A. and $10,000 for each perso whose mail it opened.

Among those named in the suit are: Richard Helms and James R. Schlesinger, former directors of Central Intelligence; L. Patrick Gray 3d, former acting F.B.I. director; former Attorney General John N. Mitchell and Lawrence F. O'Brien and Winton M. Blount, former Postmasters General.

Also named were William E. Colby, the director of Central Intelligence, and Clarence [illegible], whom the A.C.L.U. said had been named in the suit because they were the officials now responsible for maintaining the information obtained from the alleged illegal actions.

Spokesmen for the A.C.L.U. said they were unaware of the number of persons covered by the class action suit but estimated the number of Americans whose mail was opened to be in the tens of thousands.

PARADE • JULY 13, 1975

Women of the CIA

by Connecticut Walker

LANGLEY, VA.

Most people think of espionage as a man's world. But just as history has its Mata Hari and fiction its Modesty Blaise, so the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency has a handful of high-ranking women professionals.

Take Jenonne Walker, a veteran intelligence analyst and executive assistant to Director William E. Colby. Or take Pat Taylor, a member of the agency's Office of Current Intelligence. Or Helene Boatner, a top economist who helps supervise the CIA's secret budget. Or the chief of the Soviet Internal Affairs branch, one of Washington's most respected Kremlinologists—a woman who has come up through the ranks of the CIA.

For the first time, the CIA has permitted all these women to be interviewed. Some, like the Kremlinologist and a number of clandestine operators, asked that their names not be used in print because of the political sensitivity of their jobs.

Others, however, are not worried about PARADE blowing their "cover." They work in the open—gathering, evaluating, and analyzing information, or administering the CIA's global operations from the agency's sprawling headquarters in Langley, Va.

A spokeswoman's voice

As Helene Boatner puts it, "There are a lot of people in the CIA who cannot speak up, so it behooves those of us who can to inform and educate the American people about what we do."

Not that the agency was at first eager to open its door even a crack to PARADE. In keeping with the time-honored tradition of maintaining low and often invisible profiles, agency officials turned down an initial request for interviews with women. But then Director Colby intervened. He suggested to his colleagues that the agency, with all its mounting controversial publicity, needed to increase its press accessibility and public accountability.

While waiting to interview women at the CIA, PARADE asked two former high-ranking male agency officials what it took for a woman to break into intelligence work—and to get ahead.

To James Angleton, recently retired after 21 years as chief of counterintelligence, the ideal female candidate is one who "has lived abroad, possesses special attributes, especially political awareness, an area of expertise, and a fluency with foreign languages. A serious, ambitious and competitive woman who wishes to reach the top," Angleton avers, "can find fulfillment in a CIA career."

Says Ray Cline, former deputy director of the CIA: "If you look at women in responsible positions at the agency, you notice that they achieved their jobs through ability, of course, but also through flexibility in accepting challenging assignments. Most of them are single."

No wonder. The agency has not made it easy for married women to join its ranks. Spouses are not allowed to work in the same offices. A wife may not take her husband abroad as a dependent. She must take periodic lie-detector tests to make sure she has not disclosed classified information to friends or relatives—or to her husband if he does not work for the agency. Until this year, the CIA's Career Trainee Program, which is geared toward turning out clandestine operators, admitted no married women at all.

Fits to a T

Angleton's and Cline's descriptions of the ideal woman for the CIA fits Jenonne Walker. After 12 years at a variety of posts in the intelligence division, this 40-year-old native of Oklahoma is now Colby's No. 1 aide. To reach her office a PARADE reporter, tagged with a badge marked "visitor," was ushered up to the seventh floor of CIA headquarters in a private, locked elevator. Miss Walker's office is next door to Colby's and offers a commanding view of the lush green Virginia countryside.

She is an attractive woman with a frank but friendly manner.

"The director has a group of special assistants — 11 National Intelligence Officers who know what's going on in different areas of the world," she explains. "I act as a clearing house for other agency staff and as an information funnel for Colby. I took this job about two years ago when he became director. He told me I was to 'educate him on the substance.' By that he meant I had the responsibility of introducing him to the intelligence side of the agency." (Before becoming head of CIA, Colby spent most of his career in the "black," or covert, side of the business.)

"It's my job to know the major foreign intelligence questions that analysts around town are disagreeing about," continues Miss Walker. "I sometimes get the analysts together so Colby can hear all sides of an issue. I also staff-out orders for him. I also check on the progress of things he wants done and I suggest other projects he might begin.

"This is not an organization where orders are really necessary. It's more a matter of monitoring and suggesting activities. It's a very personal operation. Colby's is a small, personal office."

The job of special assistant to the director is a rotating assignment. Miss Walker will be transferred later this summer. "I hanker after my own cabbage patch," she says. "I'll miss the constant access to the director, but I look forward to getting back to writing my own reports."

When Jenonne Walker rejoins the ranks of the analysts, one of her most distinguished colleagues will be the woman who serves as branch chief for Soviet Internal Affairs. She is constantly asked by policymakers to assess the political and physical health of Soviet Communist Party boss Leonid Brezhnev and to guide speculation about who his successor might be. She consented to talk to PARADE on condition that her name not be printed.

Feminine gumshoe

"In the Soviet field, length of experience counts," she says. "There are not many people in this town who have outlasted me. I've focused on the USSR since 1958. My work involves compiling all available information, regardless of its source, then examining the gaps and trying to guess what's in them. It's something like reading a mystery novel: as you turn each page you discover another piece of information, but you never get the whole story."

At 54, this capable knowledgeable lady earns $32,800 a year—near the top of the civil service scale. But she admits: "There were long dry periods when I thought I wasn't going anywhere. Looking back, however, I would take a job here again without question."

Another CIA professional who says she has no regrets is Helene Boatner, the first woman economist in the agency's budget office. She helps prepare the agency's requests for money from Congress and monitors the CIA's immense expenditures. A math major from the University of Texas, she was hired in 1963, then got a master's degree in economics. She has worked in the agency's Office of Economic Research, the now-defunct Office of National Estimates and attended the National War College. Her present job pays close to $35,000 a year.

"If you're interested in intelligence analysis or foreign affairs," says Miss Boatner, "I feel the agency is a better

place to work than the State Department."

Why?

"Because the agency has no policy ax to grind. It's independent of bureaucratic interests. While it's not easy even here to suggest that American policy in any given area is wrong or misguided, it's more possible here than in any other place in the government."

Blonde, 39-year-old Pat Taylor, an analyst for the Office of Current Intelligence, was asked when she meets people away from her job if she is reluctant to admit she works for the CIA.

"No," she responds. "When friends learn I work here, I sometimes encounter curiosity but not hostility. The agency encourages its analysts to publish their writings outside, to attend meetings, and to take graduate courses. Sometimes I'll enter a conference wearing my name tag which clearly identifies me as a CIA employee, and I'll get a couple of blinks—but nothing else."

There is one group of CIA women who never wear name tags. These are the spies and counterspies—the women in the clandestine services.

Traditionally women have been relegated to a minor role on the fringes of spy activity. A woman attached to a foreign "station," or outpost, might have accompanied a male colleague to a restaurant, making it appear as if a husband and wife were dining out. Then she might be left at the table alone while her companion, "a case officer" in charge of "running" an agent, slipped into the men's room to pick up a message left in a "dead drop" by one of his local contacts.

However, a few women have themselves worked as "case officers" abroad. One, with seven years' experience in the field, said, "Year by year there are more women case officers in the business, but they're still outnumbered by men. Covert operators must be inconspicuous. In such areas as the Moslem world, cultural mores prevent women from mingling freely and unobtrusively in public. In Western Europe, however, women now supervise agents and sometimes recruit them. They also provide operational support — counter-surveillance, keeping a lookout during a meeting between a case officer and an agent, renting safe houses (where a rendezvous can take place) and acting as couriers. It's not glamorous work, but it's vitally important."

Clandestine interview

A retired female member of the counterintelligence staff, who agreed to be interviewed by telephone but would not be identified, concurs: "Without women, the counterintelligence office would be a lost branch. Women often served to supply all the digging—the leads, the targets."

But not, the agency insists, their bodies. The CIA claims to be above using its women to seduce or entrap potential foreign agents. A former London station chief once explained to his deputy, "Why, we couldn't ask American women to do things which would involve exploiting their sex!" Instead, say the old pros, if a clandestine operator wants to ensnare a foreign intelligence officer through the use of female charms, he hires prostitutes or relies on willing local agents. According to one former top-level agency official, foreign women have seduced "an astonishing number" of Russian spies on behalf of the CIA.

Help from drug agents

The CIA has also used U.S. narcotics men from time to time to maintain "love dens" in New York City and San Francisco, where prostitutes in the pay of the agency have lured foreign intelligence officers and then later tried to blackmail them into divulging secret information.

Despite the successful careers of some, the women of the CIA still have a long way to go. Four times as many men as women apply to the agency for jobs, and only 5 per cent of the agency's female staff earn $22,000 or above as compared to 49 per cent of the men.

But high-ranking women are not the rarity they were 10 years ago. The agency has generated a campaign to recruit more women as well as more blacks and members of other minorities.

"I think my being a woman was a factor in my being selected for this job," says Director Colby's executive assistant Jenonne Walker—adding with a smile, "but Colby isn't likely to admit it."

SUNDAY TIMES, London
13 July 1975

Secret memo on Castro plot

By Henry Brandon, Washington

THE SUGGESTION that Cuba's Fidel Castro should be assassinated was brought up at cabinet level in the United States in August 1962, according to a hitherto secret memo written five years later by John McCone, then director of the CIA. But Mr McCone himself took immediate exception to such a discussion. The subject, he said, was completely out of bounds as far as the American government was concerned and the idea should not be discussed, nor should it appear in any paper, as the US government could not consider such actions on moral or ethical grounds.

The Church Senate committee investigating the CIA and other intelligence agencies is now resigned to not being able to discover if any order for Dr Castro's assassination was ever given.

Both McGeorge Bundy, who was President Kennedy's special assistant for national security, and Robert McNamara, his Secretary of Defence, made it clear before the committee in secret testimony on Friday that, as Mr Bundy later put it, "no one in the White House or at Cabinet level gave any approval of any kind to any CIA effort to assassinate anyone."

According to the McCone memo, the cabinet level group—including Mr McNamara, Dean Rusk, McGeorge Bundy, Edward Murrow and Mr McCone—had been discussing the so-called Operation Mongoose, which included a wide range of anti-Castro counter-insurgency measures. After the meeting Mr McCone re-emphasised his position to Mr McNamara who heartily agreed.

Mr McCone says that "at no time did the suggestion receive serious consideration by the special group nor by any individual responsible for policy."

Senator Church has now revealed that the only testimony that could possibly conflict with Mr Bundy's and Mr McNamara's was based on opinion, conjecture or speculation, and that the committee had no hard evidence linking plots with President Kennedy or Robert Kennedy.

There are growing signs that the Church committee, frustrated with the assassination investigation, would like to move on to the FBI, which so far has been far more reluctant to open its books to the committee than CIA.

Mr Kermit Roosevelt, who was the CIA's chief operative in the Middle East and received public credit for having engineered the overthrow of Premier Mossadegh of Iran, has told me that following the Franco-British-Israeli Suez operation, discussion between the State Department, the Foreign Office and the intelligence services on both sides led to a written compact to prepare for action to overthrow President Nasser if it became "demonstrably feasible." But, he stressed, no plans, whether it was the CIA's overthrow of Mossadegh or of Arbens, once president of Guatemala, or the compact against Nasser "seriously contemplated" assassination as a method of operation.

The Washington Merry-Go-Round THE WASHINGTON POST Thursday, July 24, 1975

Colby Explains CIA Mail Monitoring

By Jack Anderson and Les Whitten

In testimony stamped "secret" on each page, Central Intelligence Agency Director William E. Colby has described how the CIA used to monitor the mails.

Not only did he reveal details that were left out of the Rockefeller commission report, but he admitted for the first time that the CIA had violated the law.

"It is my understanding," he said, "that it is illegal to open the mail, first-class mail—that the only justification might be during war under certain special legal authority."

Here are the highlights of his secret testimony before a House subcommittee chaired by Rep. Charles H. Wilson (D-Calif.).

• Colby disclosed that the CIA is able to read mail without opening it. A secret chemical, whose name we cannot reveal for security reasons, enables agents to decipher writing inside sealed envelopes. Colby swore, however, that the CIA has used this magic, see-through chemical only overseas. It was unnecessary to use it in the United States, apparently, as long as the postal authorities cooperated with the CIA.

• The Rockefeller report mentioned that the CIA had opened mail in Honolulu, New Orleans, New York City and San Francisco. But Colby testified that the CIA also had opened mail in Miami from April 24-28, 1961. Apparently this had something to do with the CIA's Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba on April 17, 1961.

The CIA opened the mail of certain "CIA employees and foreign nationals who were the subject of inquiries." Their mail also was checked to find out who was corresponding with them. "These mail openings and covers allowed us to stay ahead of the Communist state of the art in chemical censorship and permitted us to devise systems to safely communicate with our (contacts) in communist areas," Colby explained.

• The CIA concentrated on monitoring the mail from the Soviet Union and mainland China. But mail also was examined from North Vietnam, Cuba and other Communist countries. Most of these countries apparently use the Soviet postal system to route their mail abroad.

• The largest mail-opening operation was in New York City in what Colby called "the East Coast project."

• The CIA gave a New York postal clerk a "Christmas bonus totaling $3,000 for five years," said Colby, for "transporting the mailbags to the area where CIA officers handled the mail." Paying off the clerk, Colby deadpanned, "was an improper act by the agency." He refused to identify the clerk. However, we can identify him as Peter F. McAuley. He told our associate, Jack Cloherty: "It was my job to help them—the Postal Service assigned me."

Colby was asked whether past Presidents knew that the CIA had been tampering with the mails. "I don't think we can say any President individually knew," he said.

Had any Attorney General been advised of the illegal operation? "Only (John) Mitchell, is our impression," Colby replied.

The appearance of the CIA director on Capitol Hill was ike an episode from a James Bond movie. Before Colby entered the hearing room, a team of electronic experts swept the premises with sophisticated detection equipment to make sure there were no hidden mikes.

Then Colby took the witness stand. In the next room, an agent sat in front of a briefcase throughout the testimony. The briefcase contained mysterious gadgets that monitored the airwaves above and around the hearing room. This was a precaution to make sure the room wasn't being bugged by a long-range eavesdropper.

After Colby left the hearing, a CIA agent accompanied the clerk who typed the proceedings. The agent confiscated all the carbons and the typewriter ribbon. He deposited them in a sack labeled "top secret trash."

With his bag of "trash," the agent departed under escort for CIA headquarters in McLean, Va.

White House Whispers—President Ford confided to friends that he hopes Israel and Egypt sign another interim peace agreement by the end of the month . . . The President also told friends he will continue to veto legislation that he thinks is inflationary.

U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
21 JULY 1975

Washington Whispers

Sources familiar with secret material on CIA assassination plots describe it as a "hot potato" for the investigating committee headed by Senator Frank Church. Testimony centering on roles of John and Robert Kennedy is explosive, said one source, who added: "It's an embarrassing situation for Senator Church, who had hoped to give the Kennedys a clean bill."

* * *

Those unconfirmed reports linking the Kennedys to an assassination plot against Fidel Castro have raised their prestige to a new high among anti-Castro Cuban refugees in the United States. Until the reports surfaced, most Cuban refugees had been convinced that the Kennedys abandoned support for the anti-Castro movement after the Bay of Pigs debacle and the 1962 missile crisis.

THE TIMES (LONDON)
7 JULY 1975

Vital role of the CIA

From Field Marshal Sir Gerald Templer

Sir, There is one aspect of the current spate of adverse publicity about the CIA and the attacks upon it which has been overlooked. In Western Europe we owe a profound debt to the Americans, firstly for the Marshall Plan which not only put us on our feet after the war but was the supreme act of generosity by any major power in history, and secondly for providing a nuclear shield which so far has enabled us to live in freedom. The efficacy of this nuclear shield directly depends on the accuracy of the intelligence provided by the CIA.

Recent developments must certainly have done serious damage to the agency's morale. But the damage goes much deeper than that. As a result of recent publicity and publications (one of which, under stand, has gone so far as to give the names of CIA officers and collaborators all over the world) the reputation of the agency is severely battered. And no one working in a hostile climate (especially behind the Iron Curtain) is, in present circumstances, likely to wish to work for the agency for fear that he might find his name, or anyway that of one or more of his responsible officers, betrayed to the public. As for collaborators whose identities have still been preserved, their anxieties are not hard to imagine.

No one would seriously argue that certain of the CIA practices revealed by the investigations are not pretty dubious, notably the fact that the agency tried out hallucinatory drugs on unsuspecting victims. No one would also seriously argue that some individuals who collaborate with the CIA only act from dishonourable motives. Intelligence services, however, whether we like it or not, are essential to national survival and to world peace, and many who work for them in some clandestine and often dangerous capacity do so for reputable and high-minded reasons.

The CIA is an organization which, despite some warts, has played and must continue to play a vital role in the struggle for freedom and stability in the modern world. Let us, therefore, spare a thought for the problems confronting those now trying to repair the damage caused by the recent publicity and try to help them in any way we can.

Yours faithfully,
GERALD TEMPLER,
12 Wilton Street, SW1.

NEUE ZEIT
East Berlin, 18 June 1975

CIA ASSASSINATION PRACTICES TO REMAIN HIDDEN

/Report: "CIA Assassination Practices to Remain Hidden, according to the U.S. Vice President"/

CIA assassination practices abroad remain secret, nor are they being investigated. That much became clear from a U.S. TV interview with U.S. Vice President Nelson Rockefeller. As the chairman of the investigating committee formed after disclosures of and protests against illegal CIA activities, he stated the assassination or planned elimination of foreign politicians had not been a subject of the investigation. Furthermore, a number of persons who could have given information about possible CIA assassination plans had died meanwhile.

NEWSWEEK reported in its most recent edition that the use of poisened cigars belonged to the various assassination attempts against Cuban Premier Fidel Castro. Medical intelligence experts had already in 1960 prepared a whole box of them. But that plot could not be implemented.

In order to undermine the regime of the Indonesian President Sukarno at the time, the CIA had produced, in the '60's, a fake pornographic movie. In it, according to NEWSWEEK, a "double," who even had had to undergo a facial operation, had played Sukarno's role. The plan to smuggle the movie into Indonesia, however, had been dropped.

The CHICAGO TRIBUNE revealed on the weekend that the CIA, again in the '60's, had wanted to "eliminate" the then French President de Gaulle because of his "very critical attitude" toward U.S. aggression in Indochina and toward NATO.

Criminal CIA interference with Italy's domestic life is being denounced by the weekly GIORNI VIE NUOVE. It says there that U.S. intelligence had suported the development and funding of various extremist organizations such as the "Mussolini Action Brigades" or the Maoist "Red Brigades" and the "Armed Proletarian Basic Organizations." Terrorist gangs also had been promoted that excelled in assaults, robberies, traffic in people, and arms and narcotics trade. With the help of such elements, according to the paper, unrest was to be stirred up and distrust and fear were to be implanted, in order to have chaotic conditions give rise to a reactionary coup.

USA-Vizepräsident: CIA-Mordpraktiken bleiben geheim

Untersuchungskommission beschäftigte sich nicht mit Plänen gegen Politiker

Die Mordpraktiken des USA-Geheimdienstes CIA im Ausland bleiben geheim und werden auch nicht untersucht. Dies geht aus einem amerikanischen Fernsehinterview mit USA-Vizepräsident Nelson Rockefeller hervor. Als Vorsitzender der Untersuchungskommission, die nach Enthüllungen und Protesten gegen gesetzwidrige Praktiken der CIA gebildet worden war, erklärte er, die Ermordung oder geplante Beseitigung ausländischer Politiker sei nicht Gegenstand der Untersuchungen gewesen. Eine Reihe von Personen, die Aufschluß über mögliche Mordpläne der CIA hätten geben können, sei zudem inzwischen verstorben.

Die USA-Wochenzeitschrift „Newsweek" berichtet in ihrer jüngsten Ausgabe, daß zu den verschiedenen Mordvorhaben gegen den kubanischen Ministerpräsidenten Fidel Castro auch die Verwendung vergifteter Zigarren gehörte. Die medizinischen Geheimdienstexperten hätten 1960 bereits eine ganze Kiste davon präpariert. Jedoch habe sich dieses Komplott nicht verwirklichen lassen.

Um das Regime des seinerzeitigen indonesischen Präsidenten Sukarno zu unterminieren, habe die CIA in den sechziger Jahren einen gefälschten pornographischen Film angefertigt. Laut „Newsweek" spielte darin ein „Doppelgänger", der noch einer Gesichtsoperation unterzogen worden war, die Rolle Sukarnos. Der Plan, den Film nach Indonesien einzuschmuggeln, sei jedoch fallengelassen worden.

Die „Chicago Tribune" hatte am Wochenende enthüllt, daß die CIA ebenfalls in den sechziger Jahren auch den damaligen französischen Staatspräsidenten de Gaulle wegen seiner „sehr kritischen Einstellung" zur USA-Aggression in Indochina und zur NATO „ausschalten" wollte.

Die verbrecherische Einmischung der CIA in das innenpolitische Leben Italiens prangert die Wochenzeitung „Giorni Vie Nuove" an. Der USA-Geheimdienst habe die Entstehung und Finanzierung unterschiedlicher extremistischer Organisationen wie der „Mussolini-Aktionsbrigaden" oder der maoistischen „Roten Brigaden" und der „Bewaffneten proletarischen Grundorganisationen" unterstützt. Gefördert wurden auch Terrorbanden, die sich durch Anschläge, Plünderungen, Menschenhandel, Waffen- und Rauschgifthandel hervortaten. Mit Hilfe derartiger Elemente sollten nach dem Bericht der Zeitung Unruhe gestiftet, Mißtrauen und Angst gesät werden, um durch chaotische Zustände einen reaktionären Putsch zu ermöglichen.

BERLINER ZEITUNG
East Berlin, 20 June 1975

CIA AND PRC AGITATION IN INDIA REPORTED

/Report by ADN correspondent from New Delhi/

Five rightist parties on Wednesday formed a new government in the western state of Gujarat in the Indian Union. The Congress Party, ruling that union state thus far, had lost many votes in Gujarat in both phases of the election on 8 and 11 June. Developments in Gujarat are seen by the Indian public as partial success by reaction which, with the help of gifts, false propaganda and the deployment of tough guys, started a country-wide campaign against the policy of the central government led by the Congress Party and the person of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.

An analysis of the elections in the West Indian Union state, the progressive press of the country emphasizes, ought to be an occasion for the Congress Party and the central government to draw serious conclusions regarding their future policy. The massive sympathy demonstrations these days for Indira Gandhi made clear, it is stated, that the offensive by reaction was leading to a further polarization of forces within the country.

It was revealed at a press conference in New Delhi that a large group of Chinese agents has infiltrated the Indian border state of Mizaram, meant to direct the rebellious organizations operating there, which have gone into decline, and supply them with further weapons. Here, like in Nagaland, Sikkim and Kashmir, China seeks to incite national minorities against the central government, to enlist them in a secessionist struggle.

The Indian press agency IPA yesterday reported CIA activities against India and Sri Lanka. According to the press agency, the CIA has set up a new operations base in the South Indian union state of Tamil Nadu after the machinations in Sri Lanka had been exposed. Much involved in this was said to be the second secretary of the U.S. Embassy in New Delhi, Thomas Hawbaker, who was meeting regularly with leading members of the rightist United National Party (UNP) of Sri Lanka in Tamil Nadu.

CIA und Peking wühlen in Indien

Neu Delhi. ADN-Korr./BZ

Fünf Rechtsparteien haben Mittwoch in dem westindischen Unionsstaat Gujarat eine neue Regierung gebildet. Die Kongreßpartei, die bisher in diesem Unionsstaat regierte, hatte bei den beiden Wahletappen in Gujarat am 8. und 11. Juni eine erhebliche Zahl Mandate verloren. Die Entwicklung in Gujarat wird in der indischen Öffentlichkeit als ein Teilerfolg für die Reaktion gewertet, die eine landesweite Kampagne mit Hilfe von Geschenken, Lügenpropaganda und Schlägerkolonnen gegen die Politik der von der Kongreßpartei geführten Zentralregierung und gegen die Person der Ministerpräsidentin Indira Gandhi eingeleitet hat.

Eine Analyse der Wahlen in dem westindischen Unionsstaat, betont die fortschrittliche Presse des Landes, sollte für die Kongreßpartei und die Zentralregierung Anlaß sein, ernste Lehren für ihre weitere Politik zu ziehen. Die massiven Sympathiekundgebungen dieser Tage für Indira Gandhi machen deutlich, daß die Offensive der Reaktion zu einer weiteren Polarisierung der Kräfte im Lande führt.

• Rechtsparteien bildeten Regierung im indischen Unionsstaat Gujarat

Auf einer Pressekonferenz in Neu Delhi wurde enthüllt, daß eine größere Gruppe chinesischer Agenten in den indischen Grenzstaat Mizoram eingeschleust worden ist und die dort operierenden vom Zerfall erfaßten aufständischen Organisationen anleiten und mit weiteren Waffen versorgen soll. China versucht hier wie auch in Nagaland, Sikkim und Kaschmir, nationale Minderheiten gegen die Zentralregierung aufzuwiegeln und sie für einen Separatistenkampf zu gewinnen.

Über Aktivitäten des USA-Geheimdienstes CIA gegen Indien und Sri Lanka berichtete gestern die indische Presseagentur IPA. Nach Angaben der Agentur hat die CIA eine neue Operationsbasis in dem südindischen Unionsstaat Tamil Nadu errichtet, nachdem die Machenschaften in Sri Lanka aufgedeckt wurden. Besondere Aktivitäten entwickelt dabei der zweite Sekretär der USA-Botschaft in Neu Delhi, Thomas Hawbaker, der sich regelmäßig mit führenden Mitgliedern der rechten United National Party (UNP) von Sri Lanka in Tamil Nadu trifft.

GENERAL

THE NEW YORK TIMES, THURSDAY, JULY 17, 1975

Games Nations Play

By Ronald Hilton

STANFORD, Calif.—The basic problem of United States foreign policy is our relationship with the Soviet Union. The outcome of the joint space mission should not divert attenion from this point. One would assume that the subject would be covered with the utmost care by the press and in our universities. Such, unfortunately, is not the case. There is evidence that all the news is not being told, and that those responsible range from businessmen eager to conclude deals with Moscow to individuals or groups who have in détente a pretext to close their eyes or to promote a cause.

There is something quaint about the chairman of Pepsico, Inc., Donald M. Kendall, one of the Kremlin's favorite Americans, presenting a Soviet delegation to President Ford, on whom it bestowed a scarf with the inscription "Pepsi-Cola Peace."

The Stanford Research Institute sponsored a Moscow meeting of United States businessmen eager for the fruits of détente; the same issues of the Soviet press that carried Leonid I. Brezhnev's welcoming remarks featured cartoons of bloated capitalists, as if to tell the Soviet public not to take his remarks at their surface value.

Détente is a means to an end. For the Soviet Union, it lessens the danger from the West while Moscow deals with Peking. President Ford fell into a trap by meeting Mr. Brezhnev in Vladivostok, appearing thus to reject Peking's claims to disputed border areas and providing a prelude for Mr. Brezhnev's speech in Ulan Bator, Mongolia, in which he coldly rejected China's claims.

Western leaders have likewise fallen into a trap by agreeing to a summit meeting to conclude a European security pact that would guarantee the present European borders. Claims that concessions have been obtained on human-rights issues, thus opening up the closed Soviet society, are supported only by insignificant and meaningless details.

It is difficult to understand how the State Department can reassure the Baltic people in this country that recognition of the present borders does not imply recognition of the Soviet absorption of the Baltic states. A European security pact will give a great stimulus to the Soviet push for an Asian security pact, which would isolate China if it refused to accept the present Asian borders.

The Russians believe time is on their side, that the laws of history will bring about the collapse of capitalism. The only difference between the hard- and soft-liners in the Kremlin is that the former wish to hasten the process, while the latter are willing to wait for the fruit to fall from the tree. They will shake the tree by encouraging industrial strikes throughout the capitalist world. All are agreed that history is irreversible, that the Communists will come to power through some kind of popular front, win control in some way, and then declare that the process is irreversible.

The Russians believe that terrestrial space is on their side. Our universities are foolish to belittle geopolitics. Our political scientists are often dismally ignorant of the geographical dimension of their subject. We should pay more attention to Soviet grand strategy and the influence on Soviet thinking of men like the geographer Halford Mackinder: "Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland: Who rules the Heartland commands the World Island: Who rules the World-Island commands the World." Moscow's control of European heartland is of immense importance.

Moscow believes that it has a historical mission and that the new world system will have Moscow as its focus. One of its policies is to undermine capitalism through the third world.

Moscow skillfully humiliated the United States in Southeast Asia just in time for May Day, and it is playing its game of chess throughout Asia, Africa and Latin America. The Soviet grand strategy clearly calls for weakening the West throughout the third-world countries on which the West depends for the critical raw materials without which it would collapse.

Moscow seeks victory, not peace. It conducts a harsh campaign against rapprochement between South Africa and black Africa. Nothing less than the total humiliation of the West in Africa is sought—a repetition of Indochina, with the difference that the West depends on Africa for critical raw materials. The interpretation of Russian history as a constant push for warm waters may be combined with Moscow's geopolitical push for supremacy in the third world.

The Russians believe that they are virtuous and that the United States is corrupt and decadent, that bourgeois democracy contains the seeds of its own destruction.

While United States foreign policy is primarily an extension of domestic politics, the Kremlin can devote its full attention to its international grand strategy. Our Administration fights the battle with one hand tied behind its back.

At present the soft-liners are in control in the Kremlin, which fears that if it promotes too much unrest in the troubled West, it might trigger aggressive neo-Nazism. The mass celebrations of the 30th anniversary of the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany were an enormous charade, full of dishonest history, intended to convince the West Germans that the Soviets could lick them single-handed. As for President Ford's "Pepsi-Cola Peace" scarf, like Virgil I can only comment *"timeo Danaos et dona ferentes"* ("I fear the Greeks, even when bringing gifts").

Ronald Hilton, who is on the Stanford University faculty and is executive director of the California Institute of International Studies, is editor of the quarterly "World Affairs Report."

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
23 July 1975

Appeasement in Helsinki?

Commentary by Howard K. Smith on ABC News

It sounds like Scrooge on the eve of Christmas to doubt the worth of the United States-Russian space juncture, there is no danger in the spectacular itself. But it does add to a kind of euphoria in which the President can go to Helsinki . . . to sign, along with Brezhnev, an agreement he ought not sign.

The trouble with the agreement is, as usual, we give more than we get. The aim was free movement of people and ideas across the curtain. Our side agrees to complete freedom, the Russians will still strictly ration which people and literature their side will let in and out.

Attempts to get them to equalize and reduce arms on both sides have gone nearly nowhere. They insist on their 3 to 1 superiority in tanks in Europe, 2 to 1 lead in planes, and 3 to 2 advantage in armed men east of the Berlin Wall.

They do agree to give us previous notice of military maneuvers near the curtain, but not of troop movements which are more important. Anyhow, that's no concession. Our aides offered to give them total notice on troops.

What they get is our blessing for their permanent conquest of East Europe, and of their one-sided principle of bargaining. What theirs is theirs, what's ours is up for grabs.

It's a bad agreement. It is old-fashioned appeasement. Our President's signature should not go on it.

The Washington Merry-Go-Round THE WASHINGTON POST Wednesday, July 23, 1975

Opium Policy— Apathy to Threats

By Jack Anderson and Les Whitten

The State Department's response to opium trafficking abroad has ranged from leaden apathy to blunt threats. A pro-U.S. dictator, for example, was menaced with an immediate $35 million aid cutoff if he didn't extradite a drug kingpin.

The astounded dictator, Paraguay's Gen. Alfredo Stoessner, stammered that cutting the aid would be like "an atomic explosion" on his impoverished land. But the State Department man on the scene, Assistant Secretary Nelson Gross, persisted and bullied him into submission.

The dope king, Auguste Ricord, was snatched from his luxurious life in a Paraguayan hoosegow, although Paraguayan courts had previously held the extradition was illegal. He was put on a plane to a grim U.S. prison, and as a result, Stroessner kept his $35 million.

The conventional diplomats in Foggy Bottom were so stunned at the audacious and probably unlawful threat that one official report inaccurately stated Gross had "threatened the head of state with nuclear extinction."

But the State Department is rarely so zealous, according to a suppressed staff study by a blue ribbon commission. Some ambassadors refused to believe that Asian heroin ever even made its way to the United States.

The commission, whose members include Vice President Rockefeller and Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.) was set up to produce in-depth papers on U.S. foreign policy.

While most of the papers have been released, the one on the State Department's handling of narcotics abroad has been withheld both because it is late and it is "questionable in its conclusions," a commission spokesman said.

But another factor may be its unstinting criticism of the way the department has dealt with the drug problem. The study concluded that "the State Department is not likely to respond creatively and rapidly to (any) new foreign policy initiatives."

The snafu on drugs is important because once again the nation is being flooded with heroin. Turkish opium fields are blossoming and "skag" from the mountainous regions of Laos, Thailand and Burma is being loaded on mules for eventual shipment to America.

The report indicates the State Department has no machinery even for dealing with its own "country team" members abroad, and fights constantly with the Drug Enforcement Agency, the White House, the National Security Council and the CIA over anti-drug tactics.

When President Nixon's White House team picked 60 major drug trafficking nations in 1971 for U.S. pressure, the State Department went at the job with all the zeal of octagenerians at a pillow fight.

The White House quickly "became disenchanted with the slowness and unimaginativeness of the State Department's response," according to the report.

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger "typically concentrates on a small number of policy issues. Narcotics control was not on his agenda." Narcotics, the report observed acidly, "is not the Cuban missile crisis."

To justify its do-nothing attitude, the State Department began grumbling about the narcotics agents attached to embassies abroad. The striped pants boys feared the agents would offend allies with talk about " 'those damn Turks' or 'those damn French,' poisoning our youth with heroin."

State also complained about the CIA, which issued reports lambasting corrupt narcotics police in Thailand, drug-trafficking officials in South America and bumbling "narcs" in Mexico.

NEW YORK TIMES
19 July 1975

The Poppy Whose Sap Is Anti-Life

By Charles B. Rangel

WASHINGTON — The deadly red opium poppies of Turkey are again in full bloom—legally.

When the Turkish Government announced its unilateral decision to lift the ban on opium-poppy cultivation, in violation of executive agreements, it gave repeated assurances that it would act to prevent illegal diversion of opium gum, the raw material for heroin. But now the poppies are being harvested without any evidence that adequate controls have been imposed.

Pious promises are not sufficient to block the flow of Turkey's drugs into the United States.

There have been some arrests of Turkish farmers for planting more than their quota of poppies, but the "cautious optimism" of many Turkish and American officials over successful policing of the crop is still unwarranted. As one spokesman for the Drug Enforcement Administration realistically noted, "Their record on controlling the farmers has not been good in the past."

Since the planting of the new crop last fall, United States Federal and state law-enforcement agencies report that heroin stockpiled during the ban is being released for sale. The dealers anticipate additional supplies from the 1975 crop.

The Drug Enforcement Administration has admitted that it cannot effectively stem the flood of drugs into our country. The truth of that confession is already evident on the streets of New York. Higher quality heroin from the stockpiles is now available in greater quantity. In fact, the Drug Enforcement Administration has told me that the latest Turkish crop will hit New York's streets in late August and early September.

While the 1975 crop is estimated to be 50 per cent larger than earlier crops, the Administration has adopted a "don't step on anyone's toes" attitude. Our representatives at the State Department and at the United Nations are content to dance in diplomatic circles and ignore Turkey's failure to act. Apparently they have also forgotten that the United States paid Turkish farmers over $35 million not to grow opium poppies. Initial White House opposition to the lifting of the ban has melted into politely expressed concern over possible diversion without insistence on workable controls.

In addition, the United States is giving another $3 million in technical aid to Turkey to help enforce the new regulations.

Secretary of State Kissinger traveled to Turkey in May to discuss the Cyprus situation. President Ford is now pushing Congress to resume arms sales to Turkey.

Despite the vote of the House International Affairs Committee to lift the arms embargo, many members of Congress feel that no satisfactory agreement can be reached on either Cyprus or military aid without strong Turkish action to prevent drug traffic.

Turkey asks America to trust her good faith. In light of how little we have learned about how Turkey intends to insure that her crop is used only for pharmaceutical purposes, that is a naive request while heroin addiction continues at a tragic rate.

While newsmen have been given access to the poppy fields as part of a Turkish public-relations offensive, experts from the Drug Enforcement Administration and the United Nations have been denied full opportunity to supervise the policing effort.

The Ford Administration cannot sit silently while a bumper crop of poppies is harvested and the incidence of heroin abuse in New York City rises to the epidemic levels of the late nineteen-sixties. The President should promptly convene the National Security Council to devise a strategy for combating the smuggling of narcotics into the United States.

When President Ford speaks of maintaining American strength in world affairs, he should keep in mind the lives of hundreds of thousands of our own youth, not simply the seizure of a merchant ship.

Charles B. Rangel, Democrat, represents New York's 19th District in Congress, and is chairman of the Congressional Black Caucus.

WASHINGTON POST
21 July 1975

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

What the Soviets Really Said

Confidential diplomatic cables reveal that U.S senators seeking neutralization of the Indian Ocean met icy indifference from high Soviet officials in Moscow, not the warm desire to negotiate naval limits being described on Capitol Hill.

The cables, in fact, contradict claims by Sen. John Culver of Iowa that the senatorial delegation's visit found the Soviets receptive to Indian Ocean discussions. The U.S. embassy reported home a cool, evasive response from key officials, who argued their fleet has the right to sail anywhere. Culver himself is described in the cables as disappointed.

The solitary basis for claim of Soviet pliability is private reassurances of one Russian whose official mission is to massage visiting U.S. legislators. Indeed, both Culver and Sen. Gary Hart of Colorado are quoted in the cables as saying they realize this official's soft talk did not represent Soviet policy but is an attempt to stop the proposed U.S. naval base on Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean (statements denied to us by both senators).

The increasingly bitter fight by Culver-led liberals against Diego Garcia can be the only explanation for his failure to disclose fully the official Soviet attitude. With efforts to pooh-pooh the Soviet Indian Ocean base in Somalia demolished by aerial photography and personal inspections, the liberals now demand delay on Diego Garcia while seeking negotiations with the Russians. The Ford administration position—that the Kremlin has no intention of neutralizing the Indian Ocean, so that waiting for negotiations would only increase the Soviet headstart there—is buttressed by what the Soviets really told the senators.

Negotiating an arms-free Indian Ocean was brought up by Culver at the senators' July 1 meeting in Moscow with supreme Soviet members. Culver, a freshman Democrat, presented foreign policy proposals—including reciprocal reduction of naval movements in the Indian Ocean.

In responding, the Soviet deputies ducked the Indian Ocean question. When Culver persisted, a reply came from Boris Ponomarev, candidate member of the Politburo. "Indirectly responding to Culver," the embassy cabled, "he said that the U.S. justified a great armament build-up simply because the Soviet Union sails into the Indian Ocean. 'Fleets can sail anywhere,' said Ponomarev."

Sen. Hart, like Culver a freshman Democrat, responded, according to the cable, that "it is not helpful to say that fleets are built to cruise in all waters." That generated softer language from two less influential Russians—Georgy Arbatov and Nikolay Inozemstev, directors of think-tanks on international relations. While offering the possibility of negotiations, they suggested 29 nations bordering the Indian Ocean would have to be represented. Arbatov further fogged matters by saying his government "had made a specific proposal on the Mediterranean and it might be useful to begin with that"—a proposal removing the U.S. 6th Fleet.

The embassy's cable described Soviet deputies retreating "behind a thicket of generalities." A later cable asserted the "Soviets sidestepped question of their willingness to negotiate bilaterally" on naval limits in the Indian Ocean, adding: "Culver was disappointed by evasiveness of reply and expected it to come up during talk with (party leader Leonid) Brezhnev, but it did not."

That evening, Culver dined with Vasily Kuznetsov, first deputy foreign minister. With its officials not present, the embassy cabled back: "According to Culver, Kuznetsov also was evasive about (Indian Ocean) bilateral negotiations."

But on July 3, Arbatov introduced a new complication. Unable to find Culver, he approached Hart, "saying that he feared Soviet side had not made its policy on Indian Ocean clear." To clarify, he said the Russians "of course" were interested in discussing naval limitations.

It is this slim reed that Culver and Co. cling to in demanding that Diego Garcia be delayed pending negotiations. The immensely congenial Arbatov is sometimes regarded as a "disinformation" agent — purveying purposely misleading facts. Moreover, the embassy cabled: "In discussions with (State) Department escort officer, both Hart and Culver . . . said they realize Arbatov's . . . statement did not represent Soviet policy but only effort to lobby against Diego Garcia."

Hart and Culver both denied this to us. However, Hart added he understood Arbatov was "not speaking formally for the Soviet government." Culver went off the record in assessing Arbatov's role. Generally, Culver described pertinent portions of the cables we read him as "essentially accurately reported." That means, inescapably, Culver was not giving Senate colleagues the full story.

Should senators committed against a U.S. government national security policy deal with that policy at the Kremlin as quasi-negotiators? Granting them every pure intent, these partisan American politicians totally lacking in diplomatic experience are prey to doubletalk, "disinformation" and Soviet counterparts fully programmed by the Kremlin.

NEW YORK TIMES
22 July 1975

Solzhenitsyn Says Ford Joins In Eastern Europe's 'Betrayal'

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 21 — Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn accused President Ford today of participating in "the betrayal of Eastern Europe" planning to attend the 35-nation European summit meeting next week. As a result the exiled Soviet novelist said, he could see no point in meeting with the President.

In a statement read over the telephone, Mr. Solzhenitsyn continued his campaign aimed at alerting the American people to the dangers he perceives in the policy of Soviet-American détente.

The impetus for Mr. Solzhenitsyn's call was the flurry of statements and press reports about President Ford's efforts to reverse his original decision not to receive Mr. Solzhenitsyn at the White House when the author first arrived in Washington for a speech on June 30. After first snubbing him, the White House said it was holding open an invitation to Mr. Solzhenitsyn.

Mr. Solzhenitsyn said that one of the original reasons given by Ron Nessen, the White House spokesman, when Mr. Ford did not see the author was that the President preferred "substantive" meetings to "symbolic" ones.

This provoked Mr. Solzhenitsyn's response, indicating his displeasure with a document that is scheduled to be signed in Helsinki, Finland, to mark the end of the European security conference, and with Mr. Ford's participation in the summit meeting.

In the telephone conversation from the home of Aleksandra Tolstoy, the one living daughter of Leo Tolstoy, in Rockland County, N.Y., Mr. Solzhenitsyn chatted in Russian about his statement, and then an English translation of it was read over the phone by an official of the Tolstoy Foundation. It said:

"Since I left Washington for the second time there have been many reports in the press concerning the White House change of intention and now the desire to see me.

"Among the somewhat contradictory explanations as to why this meeting did not take place earlier, it was stated that President Ford would prefer only meetings that were 'substantive' rather than 'symbolic.' I entirely share this point of view.

"Nobody needs symbolic meetings. The president will shortly be going to Europe to sign (incidentally together with the leaders of Western European states) The betrayal of Eastern Europe, to acknowledge officially its slavery forever.

"Had I the hope of dissuading him from signing this treaty I myself would seek such a meeting. However, there is no such hope. If the President considers the 30-year raging of worldwide totalitarianism as an example of an 'era of peace' what will the basis be for a conversation?"

Mr. Solzhenitsyn was concerned that the signing of the European document would lend permanence to the post-war division of Europe into Communist and non-Communist nations.

Critics of the conference have said that document's mention of the "inviolability of frontiers" has doomed the people of Eastern Europe to Communist rule, but supporters have said it merely reflects the reality of postwar Europe.

The White House, which had no immediate comment on Mr. Solzhenitsyn's statement, announced today that Mr. Ford would visit Poland, Rumania

and Yugoslavia in connection with the Helsinki trip.

Mr. Solzhenitsyn said in the conversation, undertaken at his initiative, that the White House was wrong in saying that he had held out for a written invitation to see Mr. Ford. What was important, he said, was the substance of the conversation.

The Author's Version

He said he had not asked to see Mr. Ford.

What had happened, he said, was that before his June 30 speech at an A.F.L.-C.I.O. banquet in his honor in Washington, George Meany, the organization's president, had invited Mr. Ford to the dinner, but the President had declined in order to dine with is daughter Susan.

Mr. Solzhenitsyn said the effort by conservative Senators to arrange the meeting with Mr. Ford was taken at their initiative, not his.

The President had refused to receive him at first on the advice of Secretary of State Kissinger and others who feared the 'symbolic" effect it might have on détente. This led to criticism and a change in the White House position.

NEW YORK TIMES
23 July 1975

White House Says Europe Pact Does Not Settle Eastern Borders

By JAMES M. NAUGHTON
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 22—The White House maintained today that European security agreement to be signed next week week by President Ford and 34 other heads of state "in no way legally settles borders in Eastern Europe."

Ron Nessen, the White House press secretary, cautioned against whe he termed "simple kinds of generalizations" about the agreement which was produced after two years of negotiations at the European security conference.

His remarks were in response to an allegation yesterday by Aleksander I. Solzhenitsyn that Mr. Ford was taking part in a "betrayal of Eastern Europe" by preparing to sign the document. Mr. Nessen was also reacing to news accounts describing the agreement as a ratification, in effect, of Europe's postwar boundaries.

he press secretary noted that the East-West agreement was not a treaty and was legally binding on the participating nations, whose leaders will sign it at Helsinki, Finland, next. He said it would not be submitted to the Senate for ratification, though Mr. Ford will consult with Senate leaders about it.

Jackson Accuses Ford

Later Senator Henry M. Jackson, Democrat of Washington, Issued a statement charging that the President was helping foster "the illusion that substantive progress toward greater security in Europe has been made." He agreed that the Helsinki document "in no way ligitimizes Soviet domination" of Eastern Europe but said Mr. Ford's signature would be invoked by the Russians as "a retreat by the West."

In a telephoned statement to The New York Times, Mr. Solzhenitsyn, the Nobel laureate who was exiled from the Soviet Union, termed the agreement a treaty and said it would affirm the "slavery forever" of Eastern European nations dominated by the Soviet Union. Because of Mr. Ford's participation in the Helsinki meeting he added, he will refuse the President's belated invitation to visit the White House.

The Soviet Union proposed the 35-nation conference in 1954 as a way of formulating an agreement on the inviolability of postwar European frontiers. The final draft, which stipulates that borders should not be changed by force, provides that they can be altered "by peaceful means and agreement."

Mr. Nessen said that at the insistence of the United States and other Western nations the word "recognize" was omitted from the agreement. He said that accounts suggesting that the document would affirm existing borders were "somewhat oversimplified and overgeneralized."

Referring to Mr. Ford's initial refusal to receive Mr. Solzhenitsyn and the subsequent invitation, Mr. Nessen said that Mr. Ford regretted that there had been "some problems" in arranging a White House meeting. He reiterated Mr. Ford's "open invitation."

NEW YORK TIMES
13 July 1975

Soviet Assails Schlesinger On Nuclear Arms Remark

By CHRISTOPHER S. WREN
Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, July 12—The Soviet Union today denounced Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger, accusing him of playing a "dangerous game" by making "belligerent statements" about American policy on the use of nuclear weapons.

An article in the Communist party newspaper Pravda charged that Mr. Schlesinger, rather than working to helpp lessen the Pentagon toward a "strategy of possible use by the United States of nuclear weapons in any critical situation."

The article, which was phrased in generally terse language, coincided with a new round of press attacks on Mr. Schlesinger for his recent statement envisioning conditions in which American nuclear weapons might be employed.

Although it did not threaten any specific response by Moscow, the Pravda article was signed "Observer", which traditionally has meant that it was prepared under Kremlin-level supervision.

Although Mr. Schlesinger, in his position as Pentagon chief, has figured as a scapegoat for the Soviet press, he has been particularly criticized here for several recent statements. These included his report to Congress in May that the United States might be forced to respond to any conventional Soviet-led invasion of Western Europe by using tactical nuclear weapons on the battlefield.

More recently, Mr. Schlesinger declined to rule out the possibility that the United States might resort to first use of nuclear weapons if drawn into a conventional war. Both statements were cited today by Pravda, which tended to gloss over the nuances of the Defense Secretary's remarks and all but implied that he was in favor of a pre-emptive strike against the Soviet Union.

Mr. Schlesinger also upset the Kremlin by his earlier assertion that the Soviet Union had constructed a missile facility in Somalia. The contention was supported by members of Congress who subsequently visited the African country.

Russians Stress Detente

Whatever the reason, the Kremlin has seemed to be most upset that Mr. Schlesinger has been referring to Soviet aggressive designs at a time when Moscow has been working to promote a policy of accommodation with the West.

The criticism comes at a time when the Soviet Union has appeared frustrated by a lack of movement on a new strategic arms accord with the United States as outlined by President Ford and the Soviet leader Leonid I. Brezhnev at their brief summit meeting near Vladivostok last November.

The arms agreement is reportedly hung up on the means of verifying the numbers of weapons permitted under the tenative agreement—2,400 delivery systems on each side, of which 1,320 may carry nuclear warheads.

In the current issue of the weekly magazine Ogonyok, Mr. Schlesinger was accused, along with former Defense Secretary Melvin Laird and other unspecified "influential circles," of trying to hamper the conclusion of a new Soviet-American arms accord.

Danverous Speculations

Ogonyok said that their tactics were calculated to win for the United States "unilateral advantages" on arms reductions. The weekly singled out Mr. Schlesinger for what it contended were "dangerous speculations and pseudo-theoretical pronouncements that concede the possibility of a limit ed nuclear war and revive the exceedingly dangerous theory of the first nuclear blow."

Yesterday, Mr. Schlesinger was accused in the newspaper Sovetskaya Rossiya, a Communist party organ wielding less authority than Pravda, of seeking to undermine European.

WASHINGTON STAR
7 July 1975

Are the Russians Cheating On Weapons Agreements?

By Henry S. Bradsher
Washington Star Staff Writer

In the summer of 1972, Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird was a staunch defender of the strategic arms limitation agreements which President Nixon and the Soviet Communist party's general secretary, Leonid I. Brezhnev, had signed May 26 in the Kremlin.

Laird testified several times before Congress for approval of the agreements. They meant, he said, that work on anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defensive systems was being halted and the Soviets were "stopping the momentum on their offensive systems."

He agreed, in answer to questions from a skeptical Sen. Henry M. Jackson, D-Wash., that "a large increase" in the Soviet ability to hurl nuclear warheads — called "throw weight" by arms control experts — would be contrary to what the United States thought it was achieving by the agreements.

Now Laird is publicly charging that the Soviet Union has violated the agreements.

HE HAS WRITTEN in the July Reader's Digest that "the Russians have conducted radar tests (for ABM use) specifically forbidden by the treaty." They also "have cheated on . . . the clear American understanding that neither side would appreciably increase the size of its intercontinental ballistic missiles," Laird wrote.

Informed observers suggest that the former defense secretary is bitter. He argued in good faith for agreements which he now feels were full of holes that the Ford administration is unwilling to admit, at possible risk to American security.

Laird did not answer four requests for interviews on this.

Laird's article represented only the latest and possibly most authoritative of a number of questions which have been raised about the way the 1972 SALT I agreements are working.

As the followup SALT II treaty is being negotiated, a low-level debate exists on festering doubts whether the Soviets can be trusted to carry out arms control agreements. The negotiations going on in Geneva are hung up on a number of points, especially the verification of the tentative agreement made in Vladivostok last Nov. 23 on limiting multiple-warhead missiles.

THOSE WHO express doubts about implementation of the 1972 agreement are critical to debates within the administration now, and possibly will be later in Congress if a SALT II treaty ever reaches the ratification stage. These doubts center particularly on whether to accept some terms which cannot be verified by the United States.

While internally divided on these doubts, the administration is pushing ahead for a SALT II agreement.

President Ford was asked June 25 about Laird's article. He replied that he had investigated allegations of Soviet violations.

"I have found that they have not violated the SALT agreement," Ford said. "They have not used any loopholes . . ."

In a similar reply last Dec. 2, Ford added that "there are, however, some ambiguities" in the agreements. Other officials make frequent use of the word "ambiguities" in discussing the 1972 agreements.

In denying that the Soviet Union has violated the agreements, administration spokesmen seem to a number of arms control specialists to be relying upon lawyers' definitions rather than the original intent of SALT I as understood here. Where the agreements were imprecise or ambiguous, the Soviets have gone ahead with their armaments programs.

THE BROADER question which arises is whether that original understanding in Washington went beyond the realities of the agreements.

A senior official involved in the subject comments that "SALT I was oversold here. Some of the things that were said then probably should not have been said."

Another official familiar with the record says that "the Soviet refusal to be pinned down on a number of specific points, combined with the American resort to making unilateral assertions of how we would interpret the agreements, has led to misunderstandings on what was decided."

These assertions inevitably have to be read as reflections on Henry A. Kissinger. As Nixon's national security adviser, he was responsible for the results of SALT I negotiations Today, as secretary of state as well as Ford's security man, he and his tight little circle of advisers are directing SALT II negotiations.

IN EXPLAINING SALT I to congressional leaders on June 15, 1972, Kissinger said the modernization of weapons was permitted but there were "a number of safeguards" against the Soviets' increasing their nuclear capability.

"First, there is the safeguard that no missile larger than the heaviest light missile that now exists can be substituted," he said. "Secondly, there is the provision that the (missile launching) silo configuration cannot be changed in a significant way . . . This meant that it could not be increased by more than 10 to 15 percent.

"We believe that these two statements, taken in conjunction, give us an adequate safeguard against a substantial substitution of heavy missiles for light missiles," Kissinger declared.

Laird told the Senate Armed Services Committee on July 24, 1972, that the 10 or 15 percent increase in silo size to accommodate a larger and more powerful missile applied to only one dimension, diameter or length. "I would consider that a violation of the agreement" if both dimensions were increased, he said.

THE SOVIET UNION has, however, argued now in the SALT II negotiations that increases in both dimensions are permitted. The combination gives a 52 percent increase in silo volume, compared with a 32 percent increase if only one dimension is raised by 15 percent.

A senior official notes ruefully that in 1972 "we thought we had them pinned down on silo size. But, anyway, we found out later that silo size is not as significant as we had hoped it would be."

The reason is that the Soviets have found it possible to stuff larger missiles into silos than was originally designed. Instead of allowing space around the missiles for launch blast, they pop the missiles out of their protected holes and then ignite their rockets by a "cold launch" technique like the one used by submerged missile submarines.

The heaviest light missile which the Soviets had in 1972 was the SS11, an ICBM 69 cubic meters in volume with a throw weight just over 2,000 pounds. This was the limit which Kissinger said could not be increased by substitution.

Now the Soviet Union has begun replacing its 1,000 or so SS11s with SS19 ICBMs. Each is about 100 cubic meters in volume with a throw weight of some 6,000 or more pounds of nuclear explosives and controls for six separately targetable warheads.

SECRETARY of Defense James R. Schlesinger said June 20 that "there are now some 50 SS19s that we consider operational." These are the missiles that Laird was alarmed about.

Senior officials involved in SALT I say they tried long and hard to pin the Soviets down on just what was meant by the treaty prohibition against upgrading light into heavy missiles. The Americans wanted arithmetic definitions, but the Soviets would accept only vague words.

So the U.S. delegation fell back on a unilateral statement that "the United States would consider any ICBM having a volume significantly greater than that of the largest light ICBM now operational on either side to be a heavy ICBM. The U.S. proceeds on the premise that the Soviet side will give due account to this consideration."

Schlesinger said last Tuesday that "it is plain that the deployment by the Soviets of the SS19 is inconsistent with the American unilateral statement . . . I think that it does raise the question as to the inherent worth of unilateral statements."

OTHERS HAVE raised the larger question of whether the Ford administration should react publicly to a violation of the American intent in entering into SALT I. But senior officials working with Kissinger are inclined to accept the situation.

"After all," one of them explained, "the Soviets knew in 1972 that they had the SS19 program coming along, and we couldn't very well expect them to accept a definition which would have stopped it."

This justification is rejected privately now by some members of Congress and might become a public issue before long. Jackson in particular is smouldering over the situation.

After Ford's June 25 press conference rejection of Laird's charges, Jackson said CIA Director William E. Colby and Schlesinger had testified in secret before his arms control sub-

committee "in a manner that is difficult to reconcile with the President's statement." But Kissinger had refused to testify, Jackson indicated.

"I intend to report to Congress on this matter" after Kissinger testifies, Jackson added. Kissinger still has not rescheduled an appearance originally promised for May 15.

LAIRD'S CHARGE of ABM radar tests in violation of SALT I involves either an ambiguity or an outright violation, depending upon technical readings on the tests.

The treaty to halt ABM systems prohibits testing of various components "in an ABM mode" — a phrase not defined by common agreement but only the subject of a unilateral U.S. statement. Among things the Americans sought to ban was a radar that makes "measurements on a cooperative target vehicle . . during the re-entry (into the earth's atmosphere) portion of its trajectory or makes measurements in conjunction with the test of an ABM interception missile . . ."

For a year and a half, the Soviet Union focused radar on re-entry targets. Finally, the United States raised the point last spring in the Standing Consultative Committee which is responsible for working out problems over implementation of SALT I. The Soviets immediately stopped, although claiming that their tests had been legal through a loophole permitting "safety or instrumentation" tests.

THE ABM BAN was intended to insure that neither superpower tried to protect its missiles or cities from the other's attacks, thus seeking a degree of security behind which it might launch attacks with impunity. But the Soviet radar tests, together with evidence of testing high-acceleration missiles of an ABM type, raise questions of whether the Soviets are continuing to try to develop missile defenses which could "destabilize" the arms race.

Only by testing radar against incoming targets can the Soviets acquire enough data to develop computer programs and missile designs for an effective ABM system. Thus, even if the Soviets have now stopped their tests, they might have achieved a valuable advantage in development.

In 1972, the United States had a fully developed ABM technology; the Soviets did not. Both were supposed to stop then, but new doubts now exist on Soviet intentions, while the United States is planning to put its only permitted ABM installation on reduced status shortly after its completion this autumn.

The effect of these developments since SALT I was signed and then defended by Kissinger has been muted so far.

AS ONE PERSON involved in arms control at the top level observes, "The idea of peace and disarmament is appealing to everyone, and if the administration insists that that's what it's achieving, it's hard to get people aroused enough to want to do anything that looks like stirring up trouble."

The thrust of Laird's case is that the administration might not have achieved peace and disarmament but is unwilling to admit its failure.

The alternative to saying the Soviets have not violated the SALT I agreements is to make a public issue over it. That would raise the questions of whether the agreements were oversold on the basis of the unilateral declarations and Kissinger accepted ambiguities which violated the results he was hoping to achieve.

WASHINGTON STAR
8 July 1975

Military vs. the Diplomats: Can We Trust the Soviets?

By Henry S. Bradsher
Washington Star Staff Writer

A controversy is brewing within the Ford administration over signing any new arms control agreement with the Soviet Union that requires trusting Moscow.

A treaty now being negotiated is moving toward some terms on which Soviet compliance cannot be verified by present U.S. intelligence methods. Resistance to this movement is developing here.

It focuses on a quiet dispute between Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger's State Department, which believes some unverifiable elements are acceptable in the broader interests of getting a new treaty, and Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger's Pentagon, which has strong misgivings.

IN HIS ROLE as President Ford's national security adviser, Kissinger appears to many observers to have the upper hand in such disputes. Resolution of this dispute depends on a presidential decision.

But the ultimate power to block any new treaty produced by the current Strategic Armaments Limitations Talks (SALT) lies in Congress. Doubts exist there, too, although their depth and strength remain hidden so far.

The controversy goes beyond suspicions that the Soviet Union might not be fully living up to the 1972 treaty which came out of SALT I that began in 1969. American expectations of what was being obtained from that treaty have been disappointed in at least one basic area, the increase in Soviet capability to hurl nuclear warheads.

Beyond those suspicions are official doubts about the continuing ability of American intelligence to keep track of Soviet strategic weapons developments.

THE EFFECT of the SALT I treaty was to force the Soviet Union into following the American experience of shifting from emphasis on quantities of strategic weapons into a higher quality of weaponry.

With their number of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) pegged at 1,613 by the 1972 treaty, compared with 1,054 for the United States, the Russians were in effect encouraged to emulate the U.S. practice of putting multiple warheads on missiles.

But, whereas it was possible for American satellite reconnaissance photos to show the number of Soviet ICBM launching silos and missile submarines, and thus to check on quantitative treaty limitations, no way has been found to determine whether a missile has been equipped with multiple warheads.

Intelligence which kept up with quantitative changes is therefore unable to keep up with qualitative changes.

THE SALT II negotiations now under way seek to put a limit of 1,320 multiwarhead missiles on each superpower.

This was tentatively agreed to Nov. 23 in Vladivostok by Ford and Secretary-General Leonid I. Brezhnev of the Soviet Communist party, subject to the writing of a formal treaty. Their agreement put a ceiling of 2,400 on strategic weapons delivery systems for each side, including bombers as well as missiles.

The original intention of Kissinger, who directs arms control negotiations, was to judge the Kremlin's compliance with the 1,320 limit by counting within it all Soviet missiles known to be capable of carrying multiple warheads.

Soviet negotiators flatly rejected this approach. They insisted that some of their huge new SS18 missiles would carry only one warhead although others would have more — seven, according to U.S. monitoring of SS18 tests.

UNDER THE 1972 agreement, the Soviet Union can deploy up to 308 SS18 missiles. This number had earlier been believed to be 313, but corrected intelligence lowered it.

Rather than allow the SALT II negotiations to break down over the number of SS18s with multiple warheads, Kissinger has changed his stand. He is now prepared to allow the Soviet Union to have about 100 of them designated as containing only single warheads, thus being outside the 1,320 limit but still within the 2,400 ceiling.

Some senior Pentagon officials are not prepared to allow this. Neither are some members of Congress, most notably Sen. Henry M. Jackson, D-Wash., who has been the member most outspokenly skeptical of inadequately guaranteed arms agreements with the Soviet Union.

There are reports of intensive administration pressure on intelligence technologists to try to find some way of determining whether a missile sitting in a Soviet silo has multiple warheads, thereby giving the United States an independent verification of compliance with the 1,320 limit.

BUT NO METHOD is yet within sight. The Pentagon reaction is that the United States cannot, therefore,

safely enter into a SALT II treaty trusting the Soviet word on deployment of multiple warheads.

At the moment, intelligence experts are feeling pretty good about their capabilities. The report by Sen. Dewey F. Bartlett, R-Okla., that there are indeed Soviet missiles stored in Berbera, Somalia, as the Pentagon had reported, seems to confirm the capability of high-altitude reconnaissance.

But that is now relatively old-fashioned reconnaissance of the missile silo counting type. As the nature of the arms control problem changes this type is fading in importance.

The United States has agreed to one essentially unverifiable arms limitation. That was the 1972 international ban on biological warfare. Officials accepted this risk because they felt the nuclear deterrent was an ultimate safeguard against the violation.

NOW, some officials do not want to endanger or weaken that ultimate safeguard by getting into another unverifiable agreement on the heart of the Soviet-American arms race.

If the Soviet and American negotiators are unable to agree on the multiple warhead problem or other outstanding issues left by the Vladivostok agreement, the arms race will continue pretty much as before.

In fact, some officials point out, the arms race has gone on just about the way it probably would have if there were no SALT I treaty or Vladivostok agreement.

Then-President Richard M. Nixon claimed on June 29, 1972, that SALT I "put a brake on new weapons." But the Soviet Union now has a greater ability to deliver nuclear warheads on American targets than U.S. intelligence analysts had predicted before SALT I that Moscow would have at this time if no arms limitation treaty was signed. And officials say the Vladivostok agreement seems more likely to rechannel the continuing Soviet arms buildup than to halt it.

THE IMPLIED U.S. threat to the Russians has always been that if they did not agree to arms control then American economic and technological might would be used to out-gun them.

But, along with a reluctance to have unverifiable treaties, Congress is also showing a growing reluctance to fund an endless arms race.

The recent congressional debate on future defense programs failed to deny the Pentagon anything it wanted. Nonetheless, the administration is both apprehensive over being able to keep up with the Russians and unwilling to pour into weaponry the kind of massive hunk of gross national product which the Kremlin spends on arms.

So far, Kissinger has seemed to a number of close observers of arms control matters to have had the predominant influence on President Ford with arguments on the overall importance of detente with the Soviet Union.

But these observers also note Ford's long congressional support of the Pentagon. A recent article by a close Ford friend, former Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird, contending that the Soviet Union has violated SALT I, suggested that Ford was coming under pressure to quit listening to Kissinger on arms control matters and return to his own belief in military arguments.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
24 July 1975

Christian Democrats 'adopt' Solzhenitsyn

West Germans split on security-parley results

By David Mutch
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Bonn

Political leaders in West Germany are divided right down the middle on the nature and usefulness of the European security-conference results.

The ruling coalition of Social Democrats and Free Democrats (SDP and FDP) find them acceptable. But the opposition Christian Democrats (CDU) and their sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU), reject them out of hand.

The conference agreements, to be signed at a 35-nation summit meeting in Helsinki at the end of this month, have been sought by the Soviet Union since the mid-'60s as a confirmation of post-World War II European borders. In large part the agreements are related to the "German question" (the division of Germany).

It is hard for sea-surrounded Americans to visualize the German situation.

But suppose the United States were occupied east of the Mississippi by a foreign power, the Capitol were moved to President Ford's hometown in Michigan, and Washington, D.C., were made "neutral" ground; that visits by divided families were highly restricted, and any "East" Americans who tried to flee to the "West" would be shot on the spot by police recruited from the "East" by Communist leaders.

It is that kind of situation in Germany that has caused the Christian Democrats to adopt exiled Soviet author Alexander Solzhenitsyn as one of their own.

"Look more carefully at his arguments," says the party's foreign-policy adviser Rupert Dirnecker, "and you will see that he really wants to balance detente in favor of people to help free the 150 million East Europeans and the Russian people."

The Christian Democrats see Eastern Communist leaders as having restricted freedoms in their lands since detente began in order to protect their power base.

"What has happened," claims Mr. Dirnecker, a Soviet-affairs expert, "is that Henry Kissinger's superpower detente has moved so fast that it has neglected the enslaved people, and hence it is cynical and has lost its values and must be slowed down."

At a special meeting of the Parliament called during the summer recess to debate the issue this Friday, the CDU/CSU will make it clear they will not be bound nor committed by the security conference agreement.

Should they come to power in 1976 — a distinct possibility — they will have "a free hand to operate without regard to these agreements," said a leading foreign-policy expert in an interview.

Gerhard Schroeder, former Christian Democrat foreign minister and head of Parliament's foreign-affairs committee, has long wanted to link the security conference with East-West arms reductions.

And he says it will be foolish to sign such agreements "with the Soviets now making the kind of breakthrough they are in the Western alliance in Portugal."

The documents to be signed at Helsinki are not legally binding treaties and do not require approval by the West German Parliament. They constitute "declarations of intent."

The complex agreements are a kind of East-West political-detente platform, full of contradictions and paradoxes, argue those who oppose them in Germany. For example, the agreements state all European frontiers are inviolable; but yet they contain a clause put in at German insistence that frontiers can be changed peacefully by agreement under international law.

Mr. Dirnecker said: "The Russians already are using these agreements as propaganda, claiming it is a final peace treaty that creates new European international law."

Under the agreements the U.S.S.R. pledges to allow more freedom of information and cross-border contacts between people.

But opponents here say there is no guarantee this will happen.

WASHINGTON STAR
10 July 1975

Is Russia cheating on SALT?

A formal determination by the American government that the Russians have been cheating on the agreements made in 1972 on the limitation of strategic nuclear arms would have the most momentous and unpleasant implications. It could scuttle the movement toward an East-West detente that has been the cornerstone of the Nixon-Kissinger-Ford foreign policy. It would virtually rule out a second stage of the SALT agreement, now in the process of negotiation. It would unquestionably mean an urgent American acceleration of the nuclear arms race.

It would also invite the inference that those who negotiated the 1972 agreements — including notably Secretary of State Henry Kissinger — were negligent in closing the loopholes and nailing down the admitted ambiguities in SALT I. It would mean, in short, that the administration leaders had been taken into camp by the Russians at a significant risk to American security — a possibility which the administration leaders are understandably reluctant to admit. At a press conference on June 25, President Ford firmly denied that the Russians were guilty of any violations of the SALT agreement or had taken advantage of existing loopholes.

Nevertheless, the charges from other American disarmament experts are serious. Former Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird, who once stoutly defended the agreements, now charges publicly that the Soviet Union is in open violation of some of their most crucial restrictions. In the current Readers' Digest, he has written that "the Russians have conducted radar tests (for the development of an anti-ballistic missile system) specifically forbidden by the treaty." Furthermore, according to Laird, "they have cheated on . . . the clear American understanding that neither side would appreciably increase the size of its intercontinental ballistic missiles."

Much of the difficulty, it seems, hinges on the reference to a "clear *American* understanding." When the American SALT negotiators have been unsuccessful in pinning down their Russian counterparts to precise definitions, they have resorted to the practice of making unilateral declarations of their own understanding of what the treaty means. The Russians have not been required to subscribe to these American interpretations, and in a number of cases have simply ignored them.

Thus, the Americans believed that, by placing limits on the dimensions of silos for intercontinental ballistic missiles, the size of any missiles that the Russians might install in them could not be appreciably greater than the old ones. The Russians, however, under *their* reading of the agreement, are in the process of replacing their old SS9 ICBMs with new SS19s, having three times the nuclear payload and multiple warheads. The same problem also applies to the ban on ABM development. For some time the Russians have been testing radars and high-acceleration missiles in what American experts define as an "ABM mode" — the definition again being an exclusively American one. The American concern is that, in conducting these tests, the Russians are continuing their efforts to develop a defensive technology designed to protect their cities and ICBM sites against nuclear attack — something which SALT I was specifically supposed to prevent. The Russians reply that they are doing nothing of the sort — that they are merely taking advantage of a provision which permits "safety or instrumentation tests."

In our own view, it is not really a question of whether or not the Russians are "cheating" on a formal agreement that they have made with the United States. The important point is that they are doing things under the agreement that the United States did not expect them to do. SALT I, as it is working out, is not limiting the development of the Soviet nuclear arsenal as our negotiators thought it would. That means, in turn, that the initial agreement was not as good, from the American point of view, as the negotiators thought it was and presented it to be to the American public. If anything is evident from this experience, it is that, treaty or no treaty, the Russians will do everything they can to achieve and hold an advantage over the United States in strategic nuclear weapons Finally, in our view, it means that absolutely nothing can be taken for granted, or defined unilaterally, in this or any future agreement on strategic weapons that may be negotiated. If our hopes for detente and disarmament are to be disappointed, far better now than when it is too late.

WASHINGTON POST
20 July 1975

Barry M. Blechman

Establishing a Base On Diego Garcia

In a move typical of legislative decision-making, the Congress almost (but not quite) voted last year to build American naval and air facilities on the island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. An amendment to the appropriation specified that the $29 million authorized for the project was not to be spent until the President certified that the base was essential to the U.S. national interest. The President's assurance was transmitted earlier this year. Now, the Congress must reaffirm its previous decision. Unfortunately, the past month's shell game concerning the Soviet base at Berbera, in the Somali Republic, has diverted attention from the more important factors that should dominate the decision.

Mr. Blechman is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution.

On June 10, Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger presented the Senate Armed Services Committee with high altitude reconnaissance photos purporting to show military construction at Berbera. These facilities were said to include an airfield, barracks, petroleum storage tanks, a communications site, and, most significant, a large building designed to assemble, store and service surface-to-surface and air-to-surface missiles.

Much to the surprise of most observers, the Somalis point-blank denied the charge. The facilities were their own, they said, and the sophisticated missile asembly building . . . well, that was actually a meat-packing plant. Indeed, the Somalis made their denial plausible by inviting the media and members of the Congress to come and see for themselves.

The Somalis' motive in this rather bizarre incident is not apparent. But in any case, their bluff—if that is what it was—was called. Several groups of Americans, including members of the House Armed Services Committee and Sen. Dewey F. Bartlett, visited Berbera over the July 4 weekend and found the installation virtually as it was described by Mr. Schlesinger.

But the point is that the decision on Diego Garcia should not hinge on this charade. By permitting it to do so, the Congress has fallen into the Pentagon's well-laid trap. The question of how U.S. interests are threatened by a Soviet Indian Ocean base unmatched by one of our own has been left unanswered; the instinct is to react to any Soviet initiative. Thus, Mr. Schlesinger's decision to release the reconnaissance photos was well-timed; it diverted attention from the more important questions. What advantages would the United States gain by developing its own base in the Indian Ocean? And what costs are implied by such a step.

The proposal for Diego Garcia is relatively modest. There would be a runway capable of handling giant C-5A transports and KC-135 tankers. The harbor would be dredged to accommodate aircraft carriers. And fuel storage sufficient to supply a carrier taskforce operating in the region for up to 30 days would be constructed. These facilities would make it easier (and cheaper) to operate U.S. naval forces in the Indian Ocean during peacetime. According to the administration, peacetime naval deployments—which have been increasing in frequency since 1971—are important to maintain U.S. influence in the region.

Moreover, in the event of a crisis, the United States could deploy naval forces to the Indian Ocean more quickly and without depending on long and relatively vulnerable supply lines running back to Subic Bay in the Philippines—the closest existing U.S. base. This is important to give the President freedom of action in the event of various "contingencies." The latter coy term refers mainly to the eventuality of a new Arab oil embargo, which, if effective enough, the United States might wish to end through the use of military force.

These are significant military advantages. But in reaching its decision on Diego Garcia, the Congress must weigh these gains against the political and budgetary costs of the base. And the latter are not insignificant either.

A U.S. base at Diego Garcia would constitute another step toward increased competition with the Soviet Union in the Indian Ocean, a region relatively remote from both superpowers. The fact that the U.S.S.R. already has taken a comparable step does not compel us to follow suit. Rivalry in the Indian Ocean diverts limited U.S. military resources from more pressing needs, such as the Mediterranean. It means a real, if slight, increase in the risk that the United States would get drawn into some future conflict in the region. It means the continued approbation of most of the nations of the region, including such erstwhile allies as Australia, which would much prefer if both the United States and the Soviet Union would stay out of their backyards. And finally, it means another step toward the establishment of a requirement in U.S. military planning for the maintenance of a permanent U.S. fleet in the region; a move that, in the absence of cuts in U.S. naval deployments elsewhere, could imply incremental defense expenditures on the order of $5 to $8 billion for ship and aircraft procurement and $800 million per year in operating cost.

The obvious, if remote, solution to the incipient superpower competition in the Indian Ocean is a formal treaty in which both the United States and the Soviet Union agree to limit their naval deployments there. Such an agreement was briefly discussed in 1971. Prospects may improve in the future. In the meantime, the Indian Ocean should not be conceded to the Soviet Navy; but the periodic deployment of warships from the U.S. Seventh Fleet, which operates in the Western Pacific, should be sufficient to remind local nations of U.S. interests in the region and of its global military capabilities.

More permanent steps, however, such as the proposed base on Diego Garcia, are another matter. Judgments on them must rest on independent assessments of U.S. national security interests, not on precedents set by the Soviet Union. And in my view, the case for a U.S. base in the Indian Ocean is not convincing. For the present, at least, the costs would seem to outweigh the gains.

Eastern Europe

THE GUARDIAN MANCHESTER
15 July 1975

Simon Winchester on Solzhenitsyn's tempestuous US tour: Washington, Monday

Cool wind from Siberia

PRESIDENT FORD is now said to be thinking of changing his mind and inviting Alexander Solzhenitsyn over for tea and biscuits at the White House. Last week he politely declined to meet the talkative exile on the advice of those around him who felt the Russian's rhetoric too vehemently anti-Communist for these heady days of détente: his refusal has caused a howl of protest here and so, once the Apollo-Soyuz crews have accomplished their mightily symbolic hand-shaking up in space, the Nobel Prize winner may well be asked to step inside the Executive Mansion for an equally symbolic hand-shake here on earth.

The symbolism will, of course, be very different — and that is what worries Mr Ford's advisers. During his entire stay in this country and in Canada Mr Solzhenitsyn has been preaching at great length the evils of Soviet-American friendship. He has been castigating the Americans for failing to support the Tsars for recognising the Communist Government, in Moscow in 1933, for opening the doors to the policies of mutual co-existence, and for leap-frogging to the political and economic realities of present day East-West relations.

The author believes that all international relations should be forged on the basis of an intense personal morality — his own — and firmly believes communism to be foully evil and that even the remotest evidence of warmth expressed towards it and its protaganists is morally wrong and invariably fatal.

That kind of talk has gone down extremely well with this society's more Neanderthal brothers and sisters and overnight, it seems fair to say, this man who, via the Book of the Month Club which has ensured that millions of unread copies of The Gulag lie on coffee tables from Scarsdale to Sausalito) and the kind of media blitz so popular in this country, has become the darling of the redneck population.

George Meany, President of the AFL-CIO, and a cantankerous power broker who despises communists with all the old-style fervour, says he finds in Solzhenitsyn "the single figure who has raised highest the flame of liberty." And so it was to 2,400 of Mr Meany's colleagues in the trade union movement that the shaggy author spoke, nonstop, for an hour and a half here two weeks ago.

"There is evil now in the Soviet Union . . . tremenodus waves of hatred flow from there," he declared, to the thunderous applause of 4,800 gnarled hands and the stiffening with pleasure of 2,400 sagging beer bellies. "The situation is not dire . . . it is catastrophic," his interpreter chanted, while Solzhenitsyn's arms waved like a semaphor engine. The audience cheered loudly: they had not savoured such words for many a year and never once from a man of such truly international status.

But the feelings of Mr Meany and his friends are not by any means universal. Within a few days one of this country's wiser columnists, Joseph Kraft, was writing that Solzhenitsyn, as evidenced by his speech, "harks from a culture backwards by US standards," and went on to suggest that because Solzhenitsyn's views have so little to do with the practical American reality, the worship of his presence here seems to be slightly ominous . . . I sense a nostalgia for the simple certitudes of the Cold War."

Last Saturday the Washington Post was crammed with letters criticising Mr Kraft for daring to speak ill of their beloved author and President Ford for ducking the meeting. Most said they felt "ashamed to be an American" or words to that effect, and expressed hurt disbelief that some observers had actually had the temerity to query the hysterical author's "mental stability." Reading Saturday's paper, it was easy to think John Foster Dulles was still in office down at Soggy Bottom, and that the Cold War was at its chilliest.

The visit of the writer has probably served to remind us more about residual American attitudes than it has told us new about him — his views, after all, have been fairly well chronicled in his books. But if President Ford does now agree to have Solzhenitsyn in the White House, it may persuade the cynics among us to take an even more extreme view of this republic's standards of reality and integrity.

For any such invitation could only come for domestic political reasons — an acceptance by the campaigners for Mr Ford that since rednecks vote, so they should be postured towards.

BALTIMORE SUN
17 July 1975

In Defense of Solzhenitsyn's View of the World

Sir: Joseph Kraft in his column July 3 has misrepresented both what the exiled Russian writer, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, said in his recent speech in Washington and the audience reaction to his remarks.

Mr. Kraft said that the audience laughed uneasily at references Solzhenitsyn made to "an alliance between our (the Soviet) Communist leaders and your capitalists," and to his commendation of American labor for holding aloof from Russia.

The truth is that the audience of some 2500 AFL-CIO officials and their guests applauded long and vigorously when Solzhenitsyn praised American labor for not having been deceived, as were so many intellectuals, into mistaking slavery in the Soviet Union for freedom. Solzhenitsyn emphasized that from the very beginning the Communist regime had oppressed and slaughtered the workers in Russia.

He reminded his audience that the Russian Revolution had not been led by workers, but by emigre intellectuals. The one genuine worker in the Communist party leadership at the beginning of the revolution, Alexander Shapnikov, was soon liquidated because he insisted on defending the interests of the workers.

The audience applauded just as long and vigorously when Solzhenitsyn spoke of the "strange, surprising alliance" between the American capitalists and the Soviet Communists, saying: "This is something which is almost incomprehensible to the human mind. That fantastic greed for profit, gain, which goes beyond all reason, all limitations, all conscience, only to make money."

This observer saw no gap between Solzhenitsyn and his audience on these points. Mr. Kraft says "the gap became even more pronounced when Mr. Solzhenitsyn turned to international affairs." I know Mr. Kraft was in the audience, because I saw him, but his mind must have been elsewhere. The audience interrupted Solzhenitsyn frequently with applause and gave him a long and enthusiastic standing ovation at the end of his 90-minute speech.

Solzhenitsyn's message was a grim one. He described the last 30 years as a period of constant retreat by Western democracies before the totalitarian onslaught. He charged that the West had surrendered more to the communist totalitarians in this period than was ever surrendered by the vanquished in any war in history. He described the present mood in the West as a craving for peace at any price.

He said that in half of today's Europe the people had less will to defend themselves than did the people of Vietnam. He noted that voices are even now being heard suggesting that we abandon Korea and other Asian countries in the hope that we will be allowed to go on driving cars and playing golf and tennis.

Solzhenitsyn said the situation in the world is not dangerous, it is catastrophic. Like Winston Churchill in the 1930's he is trying to alert people to the danger facing them. Churchill, for all his eloquence, failed. Then, as now, it was popular to think that the danger was not real, and many, like Kraft, weren't listening.

Reed J. Irvine
Chairman of the board
Accuracy In Media, Inc.
Washington.

LONDON TIMES
17 July 1975

Solzhenitsyn: Poison darts from among the pygmies

Bernard Levin

I knew—indeed I went about saying—that not long after the expulsion of Alexander Solzhenitsyn from the Soviet Union the campaign against him in the West would begin. I don't mean the communist campaign: that had naturally been running since he first emerged as the greatest of all opponents of Soviet tyranny. Nor was I thinking of the *New Statesman*, which was denouncing Solzhenitsyn as an "extremist" while he was still in the Soviet Union and in danger of his life, or Sartre, who actually had the impudence to complain that Solzhenitsyn had refused to meet him, as if the man who had spent 40 years in slobbering adulation of the Soviet Union, interspersed with occasional criticisms, had a right to expect anything but contempt from communism's most heroic opponent.

No, the campaign I foresaw is the one now being mounted among the exponents of American radical-chic and their modish equivalents in this country. For these people, Solzhenitsyn poses a problem. He insists on basing his rejection of communism and all its works on a pair of moral propositions: first, that a system which is based on the total extirpation of human freedom and the systematic destruction of all spiritual values is *evil*, and second, that to treat with friendship such a system and those who rule it not only betrays those who suffer under it but inevitably makes the system's ultimate victory more likely, and thus betrays the cause of freedom itself as well.

The towering moral grandeur of men like Alexander Solzhenitsyn and Andrei Sakharov, Semyon Gluzman and Vladimir Bukovsky, Valentin Moroz and Pyotr Grigorenko, is something that makes our pygmy world uncomfortable; quite apart from the need to discredit such figures because they tell the truth about the Soviet Union, it is necessary to discredit them because they force us to face the fact that certain things are right and others wrong.

And so, as I say, I knew that the campaign against Solzhenitsyn would begin; and so it has. Indeed, it has been going for some time now. But for sheer squalor, moral dishonesty and fashionable intellectual corruption I do not believe it would be possible to match an article in Tuesday's *Guardian*, by their smart, silly man in Washington, Mr Simon Winchester. Taken at any level, the article was a disgrace to a great newspaper, not least because it was presented as a news-feature rather than as the grinding of an ideological axe, and took even farther than is nowadays generally the case *The Guardian's* abandonment of any attempt to distinguish between news and views.

Mr Winchester reported first that President Ford, who had earlier avoided inviting Mr Solzhenitsyn to the White House, was now apparently thinking of doing so after all, and Mr Winchester made clear in his second sentence where *he* stood on the matter, with a fine sneer at "the talkative exile". No doubt, as I have suggested, there are people who would prefer Mr Solzhenitsyn to keep quiet, if only because of the uncomfortable truths he states when he speaks; no doubt there were people in the thirties who wished Einstein and Thomas Mann and the rest of that crowd would stop moaning on about Nazi Germany, but I cannot help feeling that in those days *The Guardian* would have been on the side of the talkative exiles rather than their enemies.

But that was only the beginning. *The Guardian's* correspondent, after saying that what was worrying the President's advisers was the fact that the talkative exile "has been preaching at great length the evils of Soviet-American friendship" (perhaps, in the judicious opinion of people like Mr Winchester, it is just permissible to preach *very briefly* the evils of Soviet-American friendship), really got down to work. Solzhenitsyn, he declared, "believes that all international relations should be forged on the basis of an intense personal morality—his own—and firmly believes communism to be foully evil . . .".

Just pause for a moment and contemplate the particularly repulsive *suggestio falsi* between those dashes. Mr Solzhenitsyn preaches a fierce and unfashionable Christian faith; since, even among *Guardian* readers, there must still be some who would not regard a belief in Christianity as in itself proof of moral turpitude, Solzhenitsyn must be denied his religion and portrayed as an arrogant fanatic who believes only in himself.

"That kind of talk", Mr Winchester goes on, "has gone down extremely well with this society's more Neanderthal brothers and sisters." Mr Solzhenitsyn having been disposed of as a kind of madman, anyone with the temerity to feel sympathetic towards him must be smeared as a kind of fascist, for "overnight, it seems fair to say, this man who, via the Book of the Month Club (which has ensured that millions of unread copies of *The Gulag* [Archipelago] lie on coffee tables from Scarsdale to Sausalito) and the kind of media blitz so popular in this country, has become the darling of the redneck population".

As a preface to muck like that, "it seems fair to say" is not bad, eh? But note the way in which the further smears are built up. Naturally, nobody would have read the talkative exile's disgraceful attack on Soviet concentration-camps—well, not disgraceful, actually, let's say deplorable, or better still inopportune, yes, that's it, *inopportune*—if it had not been for the Book of the Month Club distributing it, and as a matter of fact the club's members haven't read it anyway; they just leave it lying unread on coffee-tables (the technique is as old as dishonesty, and consists of anyone who is too much of a moral coward to face a mighty book's implications claiming that it is unreadable); in any case they probably can't read, since they are "the redneck population", of which sub-human species the talkative exile naturally becomes the suspect "darling".

Now if the talkative exile is a madman, and those who admire him paid-up members of the Ku Klux Klan to a man and a woman, what words would be bad enough to describe those who invite him to address them, and applaud him vigorously when he does so? My imagination—like, I am sure, yours—boggles, but fortunately Mr Winchester is at hand with the fruits of his own Mr Solzhenitsyn was invited to address a conference of the AFL-CIO (the American trade union organization), of whom the President, George Meany, cannot, by definition, be anything but a scoundrel, else why would he offer a platform to the mad fanatic who is the darling of the fascist hordes? But Mr Meany is not just a generalized scoundrel: he is "a cantakerous power broker who despises communists with all the old-style fervour". You will, I take it, agree with the implication of Mr Winchester that a man who goes so far as to despise the adherents of a creed responsible over the years for the extermination of tens of millions of men, women and children, and responsible right now for the enslavement of hundreds of millions, is obviously unfit for serious consideration. But even if you have doubts on that point, they will surely be put at rest when you learn that Mr Meany described the talkative exile as "the single figure who has raised highest the flame of liberty".

Mr Meany having thus been disposed of, at any rate to Mr Winchester's satisfaction, it was the turn of the 2,400 American trade unionists who listened to "the shaggy author", or, as he became a few paragraphs later, "the hairy polemicist". (Not only talkative, but unkempt, too, by God—no wonder Mr Winchester ends up by suggesting, with a sneer at those who "expressed hurt disbelief that some observers had actually had the temerity to query the hysterical author's mental stability", that Solzhenitsyn is certifiable as well.) Mr Solzhenitsyn spoke "non-stop for an hour and a half" (garrulous as well, you see, banging on for something like a quarter the length of a normal speech by Castro). And the things he said in his interminable address!

"There is evil in the Soviet Union", he declared, thus suggesting, *ipso facto*, that he must be bughouse; "waves of hatred flow from there", he added, putting the matter beyond doubt; "The situation is not dire . . . it is catastrophic" he raved. No, to be precise, *he* didn't *rave*: "his interpreter chanted, while Solzhenitsyn's arms waved like a semaphor engine". You see, if a man associates with a mad fanatic, even in the role of interpreter, he's bound to go off his rocker sooner or later and start chanting, while Solzhenitsyn clearly needs to be put in a strait-jacket, which would at any rate stop him waving his arms like a semaphor engine, whatever that might be. No wonder he was enthusiastically applauded by the 2,400 rednecks of the American trades union movement, *all* of whom, according to Mr Winchester's unambiguous statement, had "sagging beer-bellies". (Well, I suppose you'd have to be a drunk to listen to the hysterical, shaggy, crazy Solzhenitsyn for an hour and a half, particularly under the aegis of the cantankerous, communist-despising power-broker Meany.)

After all of which (and a good deal more besides) it is not really surprising to learn Mr Winchester's view that "if President Ford does now agree to have Solzhenitsyn in the White House, it may persuade the cynics among us to take an even more extreme view of this republic's standards of reality and

integrity".

Now, from the evidence of this article, Mr Winchester may be supposed able to recognize either reality or integrity is not immediately clear; but to suggest that America's integrity will be damaged if President Ford *invites* Solzhenitsyn rather than if he continues to refuse to betrays a mental confusion so great as to make me wonder whether it is not Mr Winchester who has gone hairy, shaggy, hysterical, rednecked, Neanderthal, unread, beer-bellied, cantankerous and crazy, rather than Solzhenitsyn and those who admire him.

And Mr Winchester's article, let me remind you, appeared not in a manifesto from the Corin and Vanessa Redgrave Bring-Back-Beria Front and Fun-Revolutionary Bombers for Peace and Brotherhood, but in *The Guardian*! That, after all, is why I have felt obliged to take it seriously; *corruptio optimi pessima*. If *The Guardian* is capable of publishing a man who, faced with a human being of such gigantic moral and intellectual stature as Alexander Solzhenitsyn, responds only by a gush of terrified and rancid vilification, a putrid schambling together of every sneer and smear and innuendo that would warm the corrupt heart of the mighty and evil tyranny against which Solzhenitsyn battles, then the best are decayed indeed. Such men in their granite refusal of compromise and flexibility, are not easy for any society to contain and live with. But Alexander Solzhenitsyn, by his very existence, confers moral worth upon the world he lives in; by his words, he inspires millions inside and outside the iron empire that, afraid to kill him and even more afraid to let him survive, threw him out; by his courage he demonstrates that there is no weight in the universe great enough to crush into nothingness the human longing for freedom; by his faith he moves mountains, and shames a faithless world. And it is him, and those who read or hear his witness, and who invite him to speak, or applaud him when he does so, and who protest when the niceties of diplomacy prevent the President of the United States, *ex officio* leader of the free world, from offering him symbolic hospitality—it is these whom I, at any rate, today salute, even as a great, free newspaper defiles itself by traducing them.

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Friday, July 18, 1975

REVIEW & OUTLOOK

The Meaning of Solzhenitsyn

Alexander Solzhenitsyn, the Russian writer whose career has been the outstanding moral phenomenon of the Soviet Union, recently gave two major addresses in this country. The response has been a phenomenon in its own right. Mr. Solzhenitsyn is deeply admired by many thoughtful people for his prolonged and steadfast defiance of the Soviet government, a defiance which led to his exile abroad early last year. Yet among many others his presence in the United States appears to be causing acute discomfort, and he is experiencing their open hostility.

Reports of Mr. Solzhenitsyn's talks contain an undertone of irritation with his "preachiness." Columnists accuse him of reviving "Cold War" rhetoric. President Ford, in the most unworthy decision of his tenure, gave heed to certain advisers who warned that a White House invitation for Mr. Solzhenitsyn might offend the Kremlin.

Much of this irritation is caused by Mr. Solzhenitsyn's message, portions of which appear elsewhere on this page. The Russian exile has delivered a grim warning that communism continues to advance steadily, as it has for the past six decades, and that the West is showing itself too cowardly and morally uncertain to defend its civilized values. This is not what people want to hear. One can virtually see the psychological defenses going up, seizing on his occasional overdrawn argument and unfocused criticism of the West to dismiss the powerful underlying message.

Yet this warning alone, it strikes us, is not the only or even the chief reason Solzhenitsyn is so discomfiting. More or less by accident, he has come to play a role in his country's moral history without parallel in this century. By living up to this role, he has acquired a stature that makes most modern men look like pygmies. Politics aside, his very presence carries a discomfiting moral message.

Solzhenitsyn may share many human frailties. He may even, as some who read Russian tell us, be a less gifted writer than fellow Nobel laureate Mikhail Sholokhov, an unreconstructed Stalinist who in the '60s advocated summary execution for dissident intellectuals. But he devoted his career to a task of immense importance for the Russian people, telling the truth about the unimaginable repressions and moral distortions of Soviet rule.

Solzhenitsyn won overnight fame in Russia in 1962 with publication of his short, autobiographical novel describing one day's life in a prison camp. This short period of official favor, the result of Khrushchev's de-Stalinization campaign, quickly yielded to increasingly severe official hostility, as Solzhenitsyn went deeper into the prison camp experience and allowed his manuscripts to appear abroad. He persisted in this work when his freedom and even his life seemed in jeopardy.

This firmness, a firmness common to many less-famous dissidents and thousands of anonymous prison camp inmates, has provided Russia with something we in the West had thought disappeared under communism, an uncompromised standard of morality. Like sunlight clearing a fog, the return of these "saints" from the camps after 1956 made clear to many Russians that Stalinism, even Marxism, could only flourish in an atmosphere of hypocrisy, official deceit and personal dishonesty. Yet in the midst of this, there still was something indomitable in the human soul.

Inevitably, Solzhenitsyn faced the question, why was the West so indifferent to the horrors of Communist rule? In his New York speech, he attempted an answer, that communism "has infected the whole world with the belief in the relativity of good and evil." The notorious double standard of Western liberals derives from a philosophical double standard; they actually seem to admit the Communist claim that "all morality depends on class ideology," that socialist justice can do away with bourgeois notions of fairness and still deserve the name of justice. Against this, Solzhenitsyn defends the old idea that a moral standard is indivisible, a murder is still a murder, even if committed by Communist guards in a state-run prison camp.

"It is almost a joke now in the Western World, in the 20th Century, to use words like 'good' and 'evil,'" Solzhenitsyn observes. Yet he makes a mistake in attributing this relativism solely to Marxism; during his sojourn in the West he will no doubt learn that much of it is homegrown. Western liberals have been taught that man is merely a mass of protoplasm, his behavior merely the result of his environment, and that thus he cannot be judged by any universal standard of good and evil.

But here is Alexander Solzhenitsyn, fresh from the environment of the Gulag Archipelago, testifying by his presence that man is more than that, and calling with his voice for a moral law. Those who are uncomfortable in his presence are not so merely because he challenges their view of the Soviet Union, but more profoundly because he challenges their view of man himself.