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Governmental Affairs

THE WASHINGTON POST Wednesday, June 11, 1975

Rockefeller Panel Findings on CIA Domestic Activities

The White House last night released the report given to President Ford by the Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States which Mr. Ford established Jan. 4 by executive order and which was headed by Vice President Rockefeller. Following is the "Summary of Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations" contained in Chapter 3 of the report.

A. SUMMARY OF CHARGES AND FINDINGS

The initial public charges were that the CIA's domestic activities had involved:

1. Large-scale spying on American citizens in the United States by the CIA, whose responsibility is foreign intelligence.

2. Keeping dossiers on large numbers of American citizens.

3. Aiming these activities at Americans who have expressed their disagreement with various government policies.

These initial charges were subsequently supplemented by others including allegations that the CIA:

• Had intercepted and opened personal mail in the United States for 20 years;

• Had infiltrated domestic dissident groups and otherwise intervened in domestic politics;

• Had engaged in illegal wiretaps and break-ins; and,

• Had improperly assisted other government agencies.

In addition, assertions have been made ostensibly linking the CIA to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

It became clear from the public reaction to these charges that the secrecy in which the agency necessarily operates, combined with the allegations of wrongdoing, had contributed to widespread public misunderstanding of the agency's actual practices.

A detailed analysis of the facts has convinced the commission that the great majority of the CIA's domestic activities comply with its statutory authority.

Nevertheless, over the 28 years of its history, the CIA has engaged in some activities that should be criticized and not permitted to happen again—both in light of the limits imposed on the agency by law and as a matter of public policy.

Some of these activities were initiated or ordered by Presidents, either directly or indirectly.

Some of them fall within the doubtful area between responsibilities delegated to the CIA by Congress and the National Security Council on the one hand and activities specifically prohibited to the agency on the other.

Some of them were plainly unlawful and constituted improper invasions upon the rights of Americans.

The agency's own undertakings for the most part in 1973

and 1974, have gone far to terminate the activities upon which this investigation has focused. The recommendations of the commission are designed to clarify areas of doubt concerning the agency's authority, to strengthen the agency's structure, and to guard against recurrences of these improprieties.

B. THE CIA'S Role AND AUTHORITY Findings

The Central Intelligence Agency was established by the National Security Act of 1947 as the nation's first comprehensive peacetime foreign intelligence service. The objective was to provide the President with coordinated intelligence, which the country lacked prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor.

The Director of Central Intelligence reports directly to the President. The CIA receives its policy direction and guidance from the National Security Council, composed of the President, the Vice President and the secretaries of State and Defense.

The statute directs the CIA to correlate, evaluate, and disseminate intelligence obtained from United States intelligence agencies, and to perform such other functions related to intelligence as the National Security Council directs. Recognizing that the CIA would be dealing with sensitive, secret materials, Congress made the Director of Central Intelligence responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.

At the same time, Congress sought to assure the American public that it was not establishing a secret police which would threaten the civil liberties of Americans. It specifically forbade the CIA from exercising "police, subpoena, or law-enforcement powers or internal security functions." The CIA was not to replace the Federal Bureau of Investigation in conducting domestic activities to investigate crime or internal subversion.

Although Congress contemplated that the focus of the CIA would be on foreign intelligence, it understood that some of its activities would be conducted within the United States. The CIA necessarily maintains its headquarters here, procures logistical support, recruits and trains employees, tests equipment, and conducts other domestic activities in support of its foreign intelligence mission. It makes necessary investigations in the United States to maintain the security of its facilities and personnel.

Additionally, it has been understood from the beginning that the CIA is permitted to collect foreign intelligence—that is, information concerning foreign capabilities, intentions, and activities—from American citizens within this country by overt means.

Determining the legal propriety of the application of the law to the

particular facts involved. This task involves consideration of more than the National Security Act and the directives of the National Security Council; constitutional and other statutory provisions also circumscribe the domestic activities of the CIA. Among the applicable constitutional provisions are the First Amendment, protecting freedom of speech, of the press, and of peaceable assembly; and the Fourth Amendment, prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures. Among the statutory provisions are those which limit such activities as electronic eavesdropping and interception of the mails.

The precise scope of many of these statutory and constitutional provisions is not easily stated. The National Security Act in particular was drafted in broad terms in order to provide flexibility for the CIA to adapt to changing intelligence needs. Such critical phrases as "internal security functions" are left undefined. The meaning of the director's responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure has also been a subject of uncertainty.

The word "foreign" appears nowhere in the statutory grant of authority, though it has always been understood that the CIA's mission is limited to matters related to foreign intelligence. This apparent statutory ambiguity, although not posing problems in practice, has troubled members of the public who read the statute without having the benefit of the legislative history and the instructions to the CIA from the National Security Council.

Conclusions

The evidence within the scope of this inquiry does not indicate that fundamental rewriting of the National Security Act is either necessary or appropriate.

The evidence does demonstrate the need for some statutory and administrative clarification of the role and function of the agency.

Ambiguities have been partially responsible for some, though not all, of the agency's deviations within the United States from its assigned mission. In some cases reasonable persons will differ as to the lawfulness of the activity; in others, the absence of clear guidelines as to its authority deprived the agency of a means of resisting pressures to engage in activities which now appear to us improper.

Greater public awareness of the limits of the CIA's domestic authority would do much to reassure the American people.

The requisite clarification can best be accomplished (a) through a specific amendment clarifying the National Security Act provision which delineates the permissible scope of CIA activities, as set forth in recommendation 1, and (b) through issuance of an executive order further limiting domestic activities of the CIA, as set

forth in recommendation 2.

Recommendation (1)

Section 403 of the National Security Act of 1947 should be amended in the form set forth in Appendix VI to this report. These amendments, in summary, would:

a. Make explicit that the CIA's activities must be related to foreign intelligence.

b. Clarify the responsibility of the CIA to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. (The agency would be responsible for protecting against unauthorized disclosures within the CIA, and it would be responsible for providing guidance and technical assistance to other agency and department heads in protecting against unauthorized disclosures within their own agencies and departments.)

c. Confirm publicly the CIA's existing authority to collect foreign intelligence from willing sources within the United States and, except as specified by the President in a published executive order, prohibit the CIA from collection efforts within the United States directed at securing foreign intelligence from unknowing American citizens.

Recommendation (2)

The President should by executive order prohibit the CIA from the collection of information about the domestic activities of United States citizens, (whether by overt or covert means), the evaluation, correlation, and dissemination of analyses or reports about such activities, and the storage of such information, with exceptions for the following categories of persons or activities:

a. Persons presently or formerly affiliated, or being considered for affiliation, with the CIA, directly or indirectly, or others who require clearance by the CIA to receive classified information;

b. Persons or activities that pose a clear threat to CIA facilities or personnel, provided that proper coordination with the FBI is accomplished;

c. Persons suspected of espionage or other illegal activities relating to foreign intelligence, provided that proper coordination with the FBI is accomplished.

d. Information which is received incidental to appropriate CIA activities may be transmitted to an agency with appropriate jurisdiction, including law enforcement agencies.

Collection of information from normal library sources such as newspapers, books, magazines and other such documents is not to be affected by this order.

Information currently being maintained which is inconsistent with the order should be destroyed at the conclusion of the current congressional investigations or as soon thereafter as permitted by law.

The CIA should periodically screen its files and eliminate all material inconsistent with the order.

The order should be issued after consultation with the National Security Council, the Attorney General, and the Director of Central Intelligence. Any modification of the order would be permitted only through published amendments.

C. SUPERVISION AND CONTROL OF THE CIA

1. External Controls

Findings

The CIA is subject to supervision and control by various executive agen-

cies and by the Congress.

Congress has established special procedures for review of the CIA and its secret budget within four small subcommittees. Historically, these subcommittees have been composed of members of Congress with many other demands on their time. The CIA has not as a general rule received detailed scrutiny by the Congress.

The principal bodies within the executive branch performing a supervisory or control function are the National Security Council, which gives the CIA its policy direction and control; the Office of Management and Budget, which reviews the CIA's budget in much the same fashion as it reviews budgets of other government agencies; and the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, which is composed of distinguished citizens, serving part-time in a general advisory function for the President on the quality of the gathering and interpretation of intelligence.

None of these agencies has the specific responsibility of overseeing the CIA to determine whether its activities are proper.

The Department of Justice also exercises an oversight role, through its power to initiate prosecutions for criminal misconduct. For a period of over 20 years, however, an agreement existed between the Department of Justice and the CIA providing that the agency was to investigate allegations of crimes by CIA employees or agents which involved government money or property or might involve operational security. If, following the investigation, the agency determined that there was no reasonable basis to believe a crime had been committed, or that operational security aspects precluded prosecution, the case was not referred to the Department of Justice.

The commission has found nothing to indicate that the CIA abused the function given it by the agreement. The agreement, however, involved the agency directly in forbidden law-enforcement activities, and represented an abdication by the Department of Justice of its statutory responsibilities.

Conclusions

Some improvement in the congressional oversight system would be helpful. The problem of providing adequate oversight and control while maintaining essential security is not easily resolved. Several knowledgeable witnesses pointed to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy as an appropriate model for congressional oversight of the agency. That committee has had an excellent record of providing effective oversight while avoiding breaches of security in a highly sensitive area.

One of the underlying causes of the problems confronting the CIA arises out of the pervading atmosphere of secrecy in which its activities have been conducted in the past. One aspect of this has been the secrecy of the budget.

A new body is needed to provide oversight of the agency within the executive branch. Because of the need to preserve security, the CIA is not subject to the usual constraints of audit, judicial review, publicity or open congressional budget review and oversight. Consequently, its operations require additional external control. The authority assigned the job of supervising the CIA must be given sufficient power and significance to assure the public of effective supervision.

The situation whereby the agency determined whether its own employees would be prosecuted must not be per-

mitted to recur.

Recommendation (3)

The President should recommend to Congress the establishment of a Joint Committee on Intelligence to assume the oversight role currently played by the Armed Services Committees.

Recommendation (4)

Congress should give careful consideration to the question whether the budget of the CIA should not, at least to some extent, be made public, particularly in view of the provisions of Article I, Section 9, Clause 7 of the Constitution.

Recommendation (5)

a. The functions of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board should be expanded to include oversight of the CIA. This expanded oversight board should be composed of distinguished citizens with varying backgrounds and experience. It should be headed by a full-time chairman and should have a full-time staff appropriate to its role. Its functions related to the CIA should include:

1. Assessing compliance by the CIA with its statutory authority.

2. Assessing the quality of foreign intelligence collection.

3. Assessing the quality of foreign intelligence estimates.

4. Assessing the quality of the organization of the CIA.

5. Assessing the quality of the management of the CIA.

6. Making recommendations with respect to the above subjects to the President and the Director of Central Intelligence, and, where appropriate, the Attorney General.

b. The board should have access to all information in the CIA. It should be authorized to audit and investigate CIA expenditures and activities on its own initiative.

c. The inspector general of the CIA should be authorized to report directly to the board, after having notified the Director of Central Intelligence, in cases he deems appropriate.

Recommendation (6)

The Department of Justice and the CIA should establish written guidelines for the handling of reports of criminal violations by employees of the agency or relating to its affairs. These guidelines should require that the criminal investigation and the decision whether to prosecute be made by the Department of Justice, after consideration of agency views regarding the impact of prosecution on the national security. The agency should be permitted to conduct such investigations as it requires to determine whether its operations have been jeopardized. The agency should scrupulously avoid exercise of the prosecutorial function.

2. Internal Controls

Findings

The director's duties in administering the intelligence community, handling relations with other components of the government, and passing on broad questions of policy leave him little time for day-to-day supervision of the agency. Past studies have noted the need for the director to delegate greater responsibility for the administration of the agency to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence.

In recent years, the position of deputy director has been occupied by a high-ranking military officer, with responsibilities for maintaining liaison with the Department of Defense, fostering the agency's relationship with the military services, and providing top

CIA management with necessary experience and skill in understanding particular intelligence requirements of the military. Generally speaking, the deputy directors of central intelligence have not been heavily engaged in administration of the agency.

Each of the four directorates within the CIA—operations, intelligence, administration, and science and technology—is headed by a deputy director who reports to the Director and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. These four deputies, together with certain other top agency officials such as the comptroller, form the Agency Management Committee, which makes many of the administrative and management decisions affecting more than one directorate.

Outside the chain of command, the primary internal mechanism for keeping the agency within bounds is the inspector general. The size of this office was recently sharply reduced, and its previous practice of making regular reviews of various agency departments was terminated. At the present time, the activities of the office are almost entirely concerned with coordinating agency responses to the various investigating bodies, and with various types of employee grievances.

The office of general counsel has on occasion played an important role in preventing or terminating agency activities in violation of law, but many of the questionable or unlawful activities discussed in this report were not brought to the attention of this office. A certain parochialism may have resulted from the fact that attorneys in the office have little or no legal experience outside the agency. It is important that the agency receive the best possible legal advice on the often difficult and unusual situations which confront it.

Conclusions

In the final analysis, the proper functioning of the agency must depend in large part on the character of the Director of Central Intelligence.

The best assurance against misuse of the agency lies in the appointment to that position of persons with the judgment, courage, and independence to resist improper pressure and importuning, whether from the White House, within the agency or elsewhere.

Compartmentation within the agency, although certainly appropriate for security reasons, has sometimes been carried to extremes which prevent proper supervision and control.

The agency must rely on the discipline and integrity of the men and women it employs. Many of the activities we have found to be improper or unlawful were in fact questioned by lower-level employees. Bringing such situations to the attention of upper levels of management is one of the purposes of a system in internal control.

Recommendation (7)

a. Persons appointed to the position of Director of Central Intelligence should be individuals of stature, independence, and integrity. In making this appointment, consideration should be given to individuals from outside the career service of the CIA, although promotion from within should not be barred. Experience in intelligence service is not necessarily a prerequisite for the position; management and administrative skills are at least as important as the technical expertise which can always be found in an able deputy.

b. Although the director serves at the pleasure of the President, no director should serve in that position more than 10 years.

Recommendation (8)

a. The Office of Deputy Director of Central Intelligence should be reconstituted to provide for two such deputies, in addition to the four heads of the agency's directorates. One deputy would act as the administrative officer, freeing the director from day-to-day management duties. The other deputy should be a military officer, serving the functions of fostering relations with the military and providing the agency with technical expertise on military intelligence requirements.

b. The advice and consent of the Senate should be required for the appointment of each Deputy Director of Central Intelligence.

Recommendation (9)

a. The inspector general should be upgraded to a status equivalent to that of the deputy directors in charge of the four directorates within the CIA.

b. The Office of Inspector General should be staffed by outstanding, experienced officers from both inside and outside the CIA, with ability to understand the various branches of the agency.

c. The inspector general's duties with respect to domestic CIA activities should include periodic reviews of all offices within the United States. He should examine each office for compliance with CIA authority and regulations as well as for the effectiveness of their programs in implementing policy objectives.

d. The inspector general should investigate all these reports from employees concerning possible violations of the CIA statute.

e. The inspector general should be given complete access to all information in the CIA relevant to his reviews.

f. An effective inspector general's office will require a larger staff, more frequent reviews, and highly qualified personnel.

g. Inspector general reports should be provided to the National Security Council and the recommended executive oversight body. The inspector general should have the authority, when he deems it appropriate, after notifying the Director of Central Intelligence to consult with the executive oversight body on any CIA activity (see Recommendation 5).

Recommendation (10)

a. The director should review the composition and operation of the Office of General Counsel and the degree to which this office is consulted to determine whether the agency is receiving adequate legal assistance and representation in view of current requirements.

b. Consideration should be given to measures which would strengthen the office's professional capabilities and resources, including, among other things, (1) occasionally departing from the existing practice of hiring lawyers from within the agency to bring in seasoned lawyers from private practice as well as to hire law school graduates without prior CIA experience; (2) occasionally assigning agency lawyers to serve a tour of duty elsewhere in the government to expand their experience; (3) encouraging lawyers to participate in outside professional activities.

Recommendation (11)

To a degree consistent with the need for security, the CIA should be encouraged to provide for increased representation in the directorates and to bring persons

with outside experience into the agency at all levels.

Recommendation (12)

a. The agency should issue detailed guidelines for its employees further specifying those activities within the United States which are permitted and those which are prohibited by statute, executive orders, and NSC and DCI directives.

b. These guidelines should also set forth the standards which govern CIA activities and the general types of activities which are permitted and prohibited. They should, among other things, specify that:

- Clandestine collection of intelligence directed against United States citizens which is prohibited except as specifically permitted by law or published executive order.

- Unlawful methods or activities are prohibited.

- Prior approval of the DCI shall be required for any activities which may raise questions of compliance with the law or with agency regulations.

c. The guidelines should also provide that employees with information on possibly improper activities are to bring it promptly to the attention of the Director of Central Intelligence or the inspector general.

D. SIGNIFICANT AREAS OF INVESTIGATION

Introduction

Domestic activities of the CIA raising substantial questions of compliance with the law have been closely examined by the commission to determine the context in which they were performed, the pressure of the times, the relationship of the activity to the agency's foreign intelligence assignment and to other CIA activities, the procedures used to authorize and conduct the activity, and the extent and effect of the activity.

In describing and assessing each such activity, it has been necessary to consider both that activity's relationship to the legitimate national security needs of the nation and the threat such activities might pose to individual rights of Americans and to a society founded on the need for government, as well as private citizens, to obey the law.

1. The CIA's Mail Intercepts

Findings

At the time the CIA came into being, one of the highest national intelligence priorities was to gain an understanding of the Soviet Union and its worldwide activities affecting our national security.

In this context, the CIA began in 1952 a program of surveying mail between the United States and the Soviet Union as it passed through a New York postal facility. In 1953 it began opening some of this mail. The program was expanded over the following two decades and ultimately involved the opening of many letters and the analysis of envelopes, or "covers," of a great many more letters.

The New York mail intercept was designed to attempt to identify persons within the United States who were cooperating with the Soviet Union and its intelligence forces to harm the United States. It was also intended to determine technical communications procedures and mail censorship techniques used by the Soviets.

The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency approved commencement of the New York mail intercept in 1952. During the ensuing years, so far as the record shows, Postmasters

General Summerfield, Day, and Blount were informed of the program in varying degrees, as was Attorney General Mitchell. Since 1958, the FBI was aware of this program and received 57,000 items from it.

A 1962 CIA memorandum indicates the agency was aware that the mail openings would be viewed as violating federal criminal laws prohibiting obstruction or delay of the mails.

In the last years before the termination of this program, out of 4,350,000 items of mail sent to and from the Soviet Union, the New York intercept examined the outside of 2,300,000 of these items, photographed 33,000 envelopes, and opened 8,700.

The mail intercept was terminated in 1973 when the chief postal inspector refused to allow its continuation without an up-to-date high-level approval.

The CIA also ran much smaller mail intercepts for brief periods in San Francisco between 1969 and 1971 and in the territory of Hawaii during 1954 and 1955. For a short period in 1957, mail in transit between foreign countries was intercepted in New Orleans.

Conclusions

While in operation, the CIA's domestic mail opening programs were unlawful. United States statutes specifically forbid opening the mail.

The mail openings also raise constitutional questions under the Fourth Amendment guarantees against unreasonable search, and the scope of the New York project poses possible difficulties with the First Amendment rights of speech and press.

Mail cover operations (examining and copying of envelopes only) are legal when carried out in compliance with postal regulations on a limited and selective basis involving matters of national security. The New York mail intercept did not meet these criteria.

The nature and degree of assistance given by the CIA to the FBI in the New York mail project indicate that the CIA's primary purpose eventually became participation with the FBI in internal security functions. Accordingly, the CIA's participation was prohibited under the National Security Act.

Recommendation (13)

a. The President should instruct the Director of Central Intelligence that the CIA is not to engage again in domestic mail openings except with express statutory authority in time of war. (See also Recommendation 23).

b. The President should instruct the Director of Central Intelligence that mail cover examinations are to be in compliance with postal regulations; they are to be undertaken only in furtherance of the CIA's legitimate activities and then only on a limited and selected basis clearly involving matters of national security.

2. Intelligence Community Coordination Findings

As a result of growing domestic disorder, the Department of Justice, starting in 1967 at the direction of Attorney General Ramsey Clark, coordinated a series of secret units and interagency groups in an effort to collate and evaluate intelligence relating to these events. These efforts continued until 1973.

The interagency committees were designed for analytic and not operational purposes. They were created as a result of White House pressure which began in 1967, because the FBI performed only limited evaluation and

analysis of the information it collected on these events. The stated purpose of CIA's participation was to supply relevant foreign intelligence and to furnish advice on evaluation techniques.

The CIA was reluctant to become unduly involved in these committees, which had problems of domestic unrest as their principal focus. It repeatedly refused to assign full-time personnel to any of them.

The most active of the committees was the Intelligence Evaluation Staff, which met from January, 1971, to May, 1973. A CIA liaison officer attended over 100 weekly meetings of the staff, some of which concerned drafts of reports which had no foreign aspects. With the exception of one instance, there is no evidence that he acted in any capacity other than as an adviser on foreign intelligence, and, to some degree, as an editor.

On one occasion the CIA liaison officer appears to have caused a CIA agent to gather domestic information which was reported to the Intelligence Evaluation Staff.

The commission found no evidence of other activities by the CIA that were conducted on behalf of the Department of Justice groups except for the supplying of appropriate foreign intelligence and advice on evaluation techniques.

Conclusions

The statutory prohibition on internal security functions does not preclude the CIA from providing foreign intelligence or advice on evaluation techniques to interdepartmental intelligence evaluation organizations having some domestic aspects. The statute was intended to promote coordination, not compartmentation of intelligence between governmental departments.

The attendance of the CIA liaison officer at over 100 meetings of the Intelligence Evaluation Staff, some of them concerned wholly with domestic matters, nevertheless created at least the appearance of impropriety. The Director of Central Intelligence was well advised to approach such participation reluctantly.

The liaison officer acted improperly in the one instance which he directed an agent to gather domestic information within the United States which was reported to the Intelligence Evaluation Staff.

Much of the problem stemmed from the absence in government of any organization capable of adequately analyzing intelligence collected by the FBI on matters outside the purview of CIA.

Recommendation

a. A capability should be developed within the FBI, or elsewhere in the Department of Justice, to evaluate, analyze, and coordinate intelligence and counterintelligence collected by the FBI concerning espionage, terrorism, and other related matters of internal security.

b. The CIA should restrict its participation in any joint intelligence committees to foreign intelligence matters.

c. The FBI should be encouraged to continue to look to the CIA for such foreign intelligence and counterintelligence as is relevant to FBI needs.

Special Operations Group—"Operation CHAOS"

Findings

The late 1960s and early 1970s were marked by widespread violence, and civil disorders. Demonstrations, marches and protest assemblies were frequent in a number of cities. Many universities and college campuses be-

came places of disruption and unrest. Government facilities were picketed and sometimes invaded. Threats of bombing and bombing incidents occurred frequently. In Washington and other major cities, special security measures had to be instituted to control the access to public buildings.

Responding to presidential requests made in the face of growing domestic disorder, the Director of Central Intelligence in August, 1967, established a Special Operations Group within the CIA to collect, coordinate, evaluate and report on the extent of foreign influence on domestic dissidence.

The group's activities, which later came to be known as Operation CHAOS, led the CIA to collect information on dissident Americans from CIA field stations overseas and from the FBI.

Although the stated purpose of the operation was to determine whether there were any foreign contacts with American dissident groups, it resulted in the accumulation of considerable material on domestic dissidents and their activities.

During six years, the operation compiled some 13,000 different files, including files on 7,200 American citizens. The documents in these files and related materials included the names of more than 30,000 persons and organizations, which were entered into a computerized index.

This information was kept closely guarded within the CIA. Using this information, personnel of the group prepared 3,500 memoranda for internal use; 3,000 memoranda for dissemination to the FBI; and 37 memoranda for distribution to White House and other top level officials in the government.

The staff assigned to the operation was steadily enlarged in response to repeated presidential requests for additional information, ultimately reaching a maximum of 52 in 1971. Because of excessive isolation, the operation was substantially insulated from meaningful review within the agency, including review by the Counterintelligence Staff—of which the operation was technically a part.

Commencing in late 1969, Operation CHAOS used a number of agents to collect intelligence abroad on any foreign connections with American dissident groups. In order to have sufficient "cover" for these agents, the operation recruited persons from domestic dissident groups or recruited others and instructed them to associate with such groups in this country.

Most of the operation's recruits were not directed to collect information domestically on American dissidents. On a number of occasions, however, such information was reported by the recruits while they were developing dissident credentials in the United States, and the information was retained in the files of the operation. On three occasions, an agent of the operation was specifically directed to collect domestic intelligence.

No evidence was found that any Operation CHAOS agent used or was directed by the agency to use electronic surveillance, wiretaps or break-ins in the United States against any dissident individual or group.

Activity of the operation decreased substantially by mid-1972. The operation was formally terminated in March 1974.

Conclusions

Some domestic activities of Operation CHAOS unlawfully exceeded the CIA's statutory authority, even though

the declared mission of gathering intelligence abroad as to foreign influence on domestic dissident activities was proper.

Most significantly, the operation became a repository for large quantities of information on the domestic activities of American citizens. This information was derived principally from FBI reports or from overt sources and not from clandestine collection by the CIA, and much of it was not directly related to the question of the existence of foreign connections.

It was probably necessary for the CIA to accumulate an information base on domestic dissident activities in order to assess fairly whether the activities had foreign connections. The FBI would collect information but would not evaluate it. But the accumulation of domestic data in the operation exceeded what was reasonably required to make such an assessment and was thus improper.

The use of agents of the operation on three occasions to gather information within the United States on strictly domestic matters was beyond the CIA's authority. In addition the intelligence disseminations and those portions of a major study prepared by the agency which dealt with purely domestic matters were improper.

The isolation of Operation CHAOS within the CIA and its independence from supervision by the regular chain of command within the clandestine service made it possible for the activities of the operation to stray over the bounds of the agency's authority without the knowledge of senior officials. The absence of any regular review of these activities prevented timely correction of such missteps as did occur.

Recommendation (15)

a. Presidents should refrain from directing the CIA to perform what are essentially internal security tasks.

b. The CIA should resist any efforts, whatever their origin, to involve it again in such improper activities.

c. The agency should guard against allowing any component (like the Special Operations Group) to become so self-contained and isolated from top leadership that regular supervision and review are lost.

d. The files of the CHAOS project which have no foreign intelligence value should be destroyed by the agency at the conclusion of the current congressional investigations, or as soon thereafter as permitted by law.

4. Protection of the Agency Against

Threats of Violence—

Office of Security

Findings

The CIA was not immune from the threats of violence and disruption during the period of domestic unrest between 1967 and 1972. The Office of Security was charged throughout this period with the responsibility of ensuring the continued functioning of the CIA.

The office therefore, from 1967 to 1970, had its field officers collect information from published materials, law enforcement authorities, other agencies and college officials before recruiters were sent to some campuses. Monitoring and communications support was provided to recruiters when trouble was expected.

The office was also responsible, with the approval of the Director of Central Intelligence, for a program from February, 1967, to December, 1968, which at first monitored, but later infiltrated, dissident organizations in the Washington, D.C. area to determine if the groups planned any activities against

CIA or other government installations.

At no time were more than 12 persons performing these tasks, and they performed them on a part-time basis. The project was terminated when the Washington Metropolitan Police Department developed its own intelligence capability.

In December, 1967, the office began a continuing study of dissident activity in the United States, using information from published and other voluntary knowledgeable sources. The office produced weekly situation information reports analyzing dissident activities and providing calendars of future events. Calendars were given to the Secret Service, but the CIA made no other disseminations outside the agency. About 500 to 800 files were maintained on dissenting organizations and individuals. Thousands of names in the files were indexed. Report publication was ended in late 1972, and the entire project was ended in 1973.

Conclusions

The program under which the Office of Security rendered assistance to agency recruiters on college campuses was justified as an exercise of the agency's responsibility to protect its own personnel and operations. Such support activities were not undertaken for the purpose of protecting the facilities or operations of other governmental agencies, or to maintain public order or enforce laws.

The agency should not infiltrate a dissident group for security purposes unless there is a clear danger to agency installations, operations or personnel, and investigative coverage of the threat by the FBI and local law enforcement authorities is inadequate. The agency's infiltration of dissident groups in the Washington area went far beyond steps necessary to protect the agency's own facilities, personnel and operations, and therefore exceeded the CIA's statutory authority.

In addition, the agency undertook to protect other government departments and agencies — a police function prohibited to it by statute.

Intelligence activity directed toward learning from what sources a domestic dissident group receives its financial support within the United States, and how much income it has, is no part of the authorized security operations of the agency. Neither is it in function of the agency to compile records on who attends peaceful meetings of such dissident groups, or what each speaker has to say (unless it relates to disruptive or violent activity which may be directed against the agency).

The agency's actions in contributing funds, photographing people, activities and cars, and following people home were unreasonable under the circumstances and therefore exceeded the CIA's authority.

With certain exceptions, the program under which the Office of Security (without infiltration) gathered, organized and analyzed information about dissident groups for purposes of security was within the CIA's authority.

The accumulation of reference files on dissident organizations and their leaders was appropriate both to evaluate the risks posed to the agency and to develop an understanding of dissident groups and their differences for security clearance purposes. But the accumulation of information on domestic activities went beyond what was required by the agency's legitimate security needs and therefore exceeded the CIA's authority.

Recommendation (16)

The CIA should not infiltrate dissident groups or other organizations of Americans in the absence of a written determination by the Director of Central Intelligence that such action is necessary to meet a clear danger to agency facilities, operations, or personnel and that adequate coverage by law enforcement agencies is unavailable.

Recommendation (17)

All files on individuals accumulated by the Office of Security in the program relating to dissidents should be identified, and, except where necessary for a legitimate foreign intelligence activity, be destroyed at the conclusion of the current congressional investigations, or as soon thereafter as permitted by law.

5 Other Investigations by the Office of Security

A. SECURITY CLEARANCE INVESTIGATIONS OF PROSPECTIVE EMPLOYEES AND OPERATIVES

Findings and Conclusions

The Office of Security routinely conducts standard security investigations of persons seeking affiliation with the agency. In doing so, the office is performing the necessary function of screening persons to whom it will make available classified information. Such investigations are necessary, and no improprieties were found in connection with them.

B. INVESTIGATIONS OF POSSIBLE BREACHES OF SECURITY

1. Persons Investigated

Findings

The Office of Security has been called upon on a number of occasions to investigate specific allegations that intelligence sources and methods were threatened by unauthorized disclosures. The commission's inquiry concentrated on those investigations which used investigative means intruding on the privacy of the subjects, including physical and electronic surveillance, unauthorized entry, mail covers and intercepts, and reviews of individual federal tax returns.

The large majority of these investigations were directed at persons affiliated with the agency — such as employees, former employees, and defectors and other foreign nationals used by the agency as intelligence sources.

A few investigations involving intrusions on personal privacy were directed at subjects with no relationship to the agency. The commission has found no evidence that any such investigations were directed against any congressman, judge, or other public official. Five were directed against newsmen, in an effort to determine their sources of leaked classified information, and nine were directed against other United States citizens.

The CIA's investigations of newsmen to determine their sources of classified information stemmed from pressures from the White House and were partly a result of the FBI's unwillingness to undertake such investigations. The FBI refused to proceed without an advance opinion that the Justice Department would prosecute if a case were developed.

Conclusions

Investigations of allegations against agency employees and operatives are a reasonable exercise of the director's statutory duty to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure if the investigations are fully conducted. Such investigations also assist the director in the exercise of his unreviewable authority

to terminate the employment of any agency employee. They are proper unless their principal purpose becomes law enforcement or the maintenance of internal security.

The director's responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods is not so broad as to permit investigations of persons having no relationship whatever with the agency. The CIA has no authority to investigate news men simply because they have published leaked classified information. Investigations by the CIA should be limited to persons presently or formerly affiliated with the agency, directly or indirectly.

Recommendation (18)

a. The Director of Central Intelligence should issue clear guidelines setting forth the situations in which the CIA is justified in conducting its own investigation of individuals presently or formerly affiliated with it.

b. The guidelines should permit the CIA to conduct investigations of such persons only when the Director of Central Intelligence first determines that the investigation is necessary to protect intelligence sources and methods the disclosure of which might endanger the national security.

c. Such investigations must be coordinated with the FBI whenever substantial evidence suggesting espionage or violation of a federal criminal statute is discovered.

Recommendation (19)

a. In cases involving serious or continuing security violations, as determined by the security committee of the United States Intelligence Board, the committee should be authorized to recommend in writing to the Director of Central Intelligence (with a copy to the National Security Council) that the case be referred to the FBI for further investigation, under procedures to be developed by the Attorney General.

b. These procedures should include a requirement that the FBI accept such referrals without regard to whether a favorable prosecutive opinion is issued by the Justice Department. The CIA should not engage in such further investigations.

Recommendation (20)

The CIA and other components and agencies of the intelligence community should conduct periodic reviews of all classified material originating within those departments or agencies, with a view to declassifying as much of that material as possible. The purpose of such review would be to assure the public that it has access to all information that should properly be disclosed.

Recommendation (21)

The commission endorses legislation, drafted with appropriate safeguards of the constitutional rights of all affected individuals, which would make it a criminal offense for employees or former employees of the CIA wilfully to divulge to any unauthorized person classified information pertaining to foreign intelligence or the collection thereof obtained during the course of their employment.

2. Investigative Techniques

Findings

Even an investigation within the CIA's authority must be conducted by lawful means. Some of the past investigations by the Office of Security within the United States were conducted by means which were invalid at the time. Others might have been lawful when conducted, but would be

impermissible today.

Some investigations involved physical surveillance of the individuals concerned, possibly in conjunction with other methods of investigation. The last instance of physical surveillance by the agency within the United States occurred in 1973.

The investigation disclosed the domestic use of 32 wiretaps, the last in 1965; 32 instances of bugging, the last in 1968; and 12 break-ins, the last in 1971. None of these activities were conducted under a judicial warrant, and only one with the written approval of the Attorney General.

Information from the income tax records of 16 persons was obtained from the Internal Revenue Service by the CIA in order to help determine whether the taxpayer was a security risk with possible connections to foreign groups. The CIA did not employ the existing statutory and regulatory procedures for obtaining such records from the IRS.

In 91 instances, mail covers (the photographing of the front and back of an envelope) were employed, and in 12 instances letters were intercepted and opened.

The state of the CIA records on these activities is such that it is often difficult to determine why the investigation occurred in the first place, who authorized the special coverage, and what the results were. Although there was testimony that these activities were frequently known to the Director of Central Intelligence and sometimes to the Attorney General, the files often are insufficient to confirm such information.

Conclusions

The use of physical surveillance is not unlawful unless it reaches the point of harassment. The unauthorized entries described were illegal when conducted and would be illegal if conducted today. Likewise, the review of individuals' federal tax returns and the interception and opening of mail violated specific statutes and regulations prohibiting such conduct.

Since the constitutional and statutory constraints applicable to the use of electronic eavesdropping (bugs and wiretaps) have been evolving over the years, the commission deems it impractical to apply those changing standards on a case-by-case basis. The commission does believe that while some of the instances of electronic eavesdropping were proper when conducted, many were not. To be lawful today, such activities would require at least the written approval of the Attorney General on the basis of a finding that the national security is involved and that the case has significant foreign connections.

Recommendation (22)

The CIA should not undertake physical surveillance (defined as systematic observation) of agency employees, contractors or related personnel within the United States without first obtaining written approval of the Director of Central Intelligence.

Recommendation (23)

In the United States and its possessions, the CIA should not intercept wire or oral communications or otherwise engage in activities that would require a warrant if conducted by a law enforcement agency. Responsibility for such activities belongs with the FBI.

Recommendation (24)

The CIA should strictly adhere to established legal procedures govern-

ing access to federal income tax information.

Recommendation (25)

CIA investigation records should show that each investigation was duly authorized, and by whom, and should clearly set forth the factual basis for undertaking the investigation and the results of the investigation.

C. HANDLING OF DEFECTORS

Findings

The Office of Security is charged with providing security for persons who have defected to the United States. Generally a defector can be processed and placed into society in a few months, but one defector was involuntarily confined at a CIA installation for three years. He was held in solitary confinement under spartan living conditions. The CIA maintained the long confinement because of doubts about the bona fides of the defector. This confinement was approved by the Director of Central Intelligence and the FBI, Attorney General, United States Intelligence Board and selected members of Congress were aware to some extent of the confinement. In one other case a defector was physically abused; the Director of Central Intelligence discharged the employee involved.

Conclusions

Such treatment of individuals by an agency of the United States is unlawful. The Director of Central Intelligence and the inspector general must be alert to prevent repetitions.

6. Involvement of the CIA in Improper Activities for the White House

Findings

During 1971, at the request of various members of the White House staff, the CIA provided alias documents and disguise material, a tape recorder, camera, film and film processing to E. Howard Hunt. It also prepared a psychological profile of Dr. Daniel Ellsberg.

Some of this equipment was later used without the knowledge of the CIA in connection with various improper activities, including the entry into the office of Dr. Lewis Fielding, Ellsberg's psychiatrist.

Some members of the CIA's medical staff who participated in the preparation of the Ellsberg profile knew that one of its purposes was to support a public attack on Ellsberg. Except for this fact, the investigation has disclosed no evidence that the CIA knew or had reason to know that the assistance it gave would be used for improper purposes.

President Nixon and his staff also insisted in this period that the CIA turn over to the President highly classified files relating to the Lebanon landings, the Bay of Pigs, the Cuban missile crisis, and the Vietnam war. The request was made on the ground that these files were needed by the President in the performance of his duties, but the record shows the purpose, undisclosed to the CIA, was to serve the President's personal political ends.

The commission has also investigated the response of the CIA to the investigations following the Watergate arrests. Beginning in June 1972, the CIA received various requests for information and assistance in connection with these investigations. In a number of instances, its responses were either incomplete or delayed and some materials that may or may not have contained relevant information were destroyed. The commission feels that this conduct reflects poor judgment on the part of the CIA but it has found no

evidence that the CIA participated in the Watergate break-in or in the post-Watergate cover-up by the White House.

Conclusions

Providing the assistance requested by the White House, including the alias and disguise materials, the cameras and the psychological profile on Ellsberg, was not related to the performance by the agency of its authorized intelligence functions and was therefore improper.

No evidence has been disclosed, however, except as noted in connection with the Ellsberg profile, that the CIA knew or had reason to know that its assistance would be used in connection with improper activities. Nor has any evidence been disclosed indicating that the CIA participated in the planning or carrying out of either the Fielding or Watergate break-ins. The CIA apparently was unaware of the break-ins until they were reported in the media.

The record does show, however, that individuals in the agency failed to comply with the normal control procedures in providing assistance to E. Howard Hunt. It also shows that the agency's failure to cooperate fully with ongoing investigations following Watergate was inconsistent with its obligations.

Finally, the commission concludes that the requests for assistance by the White House reflect a pattern for actual and attempted misuse of the CIA by the Nixon administration.

Recommendation (26)

a. A single and exclusive high-level channel should be established for transmission of all White House staff requests to the CIA. This channel should run between an officer of the National Security Council staff, designated by the President and the office of the director or his deputy.

b. All agency officers and employees should be instructed that any direction or request reaching them directly and out of regularly established channels should be immediately reported to the Director of Central Intelligence.

7. Domestic Activities of the Directorate of Operations

Findings and Conclusions

In support of its responsibility for the collection of foreign intelligence and conduct of overt operations overseas, the CIA's Directorate of Operations engages in a variety of activities within the United States.

A. OVERT COLLECTION OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES

One division of the Directorate of Operations collects foreign intelligence within the United States from residents, business firms, and other organizations willing to assist the agency. This activity is conducted openly by officers who identify themselves as CIA employees. Such sources of information are not compensated.

In connection with these collection activities, the CIA maintains approximately 50,000 active files which include details of the CIA's relationships with these voluntary sources and the results of a Federal Agency name check.

The division's collection efforts have been almost exclusively confined to foreign economic, political, military, and operational topics.

Commencing in 1969, personnel engaged in the collection of information on activities of the division resulted in

the collection of limited information with respect to American dissidents and dissident groups. Although the focus was on foreign contacts of these groups, background information on domestic dissidents was also collected. Between 1969 and 1974, when this activity was formally terminated, 490 reports were made to Operation CHAOS.

In 1972 and 1973, the division obtained and transmitted to other parts of the CIA information about telephone calls between the Western Hemisphere (including the United States) and two other countries. The information was limited to names, telephone numbers, and locations of callers and recipients. It did not include the content of the conversations.

This division also occasionally receives reports concerning criminal activity within the United States. Pursuant to written regulations, the source or a report of the information received is referred to the appropriate law enforcement agency.

The CIA's efforts to collect foreign intelligence from residents of the United States willing to assist the CIA are a valid and necessary element of its responsibility. Not only do these persons provide a large reservoir of foreign intelligence; they are by far the most accessible source of such information.

The division's files on American citizens and firms representing actual or potential sources of information constitute a necessary part of its legitimate intelligence activities. They do not appear to be vehicles for the collection or communication of derogatory, embarrassing, or sensitive information about American citizens.

The division's efforts, with few exceptions, have been confined to legitimate topics.

The collection of information with respect to American dissident groups exceeded legitimate foreign intelligence collection and was beyond the proper scope of CIA activity. This impropriety was recognized in some of the division's own memoranda.

The commission was unable to discover any specific purpose for the collection of telephone toll call information or any use of that information by the agency. In the absence of a valid purpose, such collection is improper.

B. PROVISION AND CONTROL OF COVER FOR CIA PERSONNEL

CIA personnel engaged in clandestine foreign intelligence activities cannot travel, live, or perform their duties openly as agency employees. Accordingly, virtually all CIA personnel serving abroad and many in the United States assume a "cover" as employees of another government agency or of a commercial enterprise. CIA involvement in certain activities, such as research and development projects, are also sometimes conducted under cover.

CIA's cover arrangements are essential to the CIA's performance of its foreign intelligence mission. The investigation has disclosed no instances in which domestic aspects of the CIA's cover arrangements involved any violations of law.

By definition, however, cover necessitates an element of deception which must be practiced within the United States as well as within foreign countries. This creates a risk of conflict with constitutional guarantees and other legal requirements. The agency

recognizes this risk. It has installed controls under which cover arrangements are closely supervised to attempt to ensure compliance with applicable laws.

C. OPERATING PROPRIETARY COMPANIES

The CIA uses proprietary companies to provide cover and perform administrative tasks without attribution to the agency. Most of the large operating proprietaries—primarily airlines—have been liquidated, and the remainder engage in activities offering little or no competition to private enterprise.

The only remaining large proprietary activity is a complex of financial companies with assets of approximately \$20 million, that enables the agency to administer certain sensitive trusts, annuities, pensions, insurance arrangements, and other benefits and payments provided to officers or contract employees without attribution to CIA. The remaining small operating proprietaries, generally having fewer than 10 employees each, make nonattributable purchases of equipment and supplies.

Except as discussed in connection with the Office of Security, the commission has found no evidence that any proprietaries have been used for operations against American citizens or investigation of their activities. All of them appear to be subject to close supervision and multiple financial controls within the agency.

D. DEVELOPMENT OF CONTACTS WITH FOREIGN NATIONALS

In connection with the CIA's foreign intelligence responsibilities, it seeks to develop contacts with foreign nationals within the United States. American citizens voluntarily assist in developing these contacts. As far as the commission can find, these activities have not involved coercive methods.

These activities appear to be directed entirely to the production of foreign intelligence and to be within the authority of the CIA. We found no evidence that any of these activities have been directed against American citizens.

E. ASSISTANCE IN NARCOTICS CONTROL

The Directorate of the Operations provides foreign intelligence support to the government's efforts to control the flow of narcotics and other dangerous drugs into this country. The CIA coordinates clandestine intelligence collection overseas and provides other government agencies with foreign intelligence on drug traffic.

From the beginning of such efforts in 1969, the CIA Director and other officials have instructed employees to make no attempt to gather information on Americans allegedly trafficking in drugs. If such information is obtained incidentally, it is transmitted to law enforcement agencies.

Concerns that the CIA's narcotics-related intelligence activities may involve the agency in law enforcement or other actions directed against American citizens thus appear unwarranted.

Beginning in the fall of 1973, the directorate monitored conversations between the United States and Latin America in an effort to identify narcotics traffickers. Three months after the program began, the general counsel of the CIA was consulted. He indicated that the program was illegal, and it was immediately terminated.

nated.

This monitoring, although a source of valuable information for enforcement officials, was a violation of a statute of the United States. Continuation of the operation for over three months without the knowledge of the Office of the General Counsel demonstrates the need for improved internal consultation. (See Recommendation 10.)

3. Domestic Activities of the Directorate of Science and Technology Findings and Conclusions

The CIA's Directorate of Science and Technology performs a variety of research and development and operational support functions for the agency's foreign intelligence mission. Many of these activities are performed in the United States and involve cooperation with private companies. A few of these activities were improper or questionable.

As part of a program to test the influence of drugs on humans, research included the administration of LSD to persons who were unaware that they were being tested. This was clearly illegal. One person died in 1953, apparently as a result. In 1963, following the inspector general's discovery of these events, new stringent criteria were issued prohibiting drug testing by the CIA on unknowing persons. All drug testing programs were ended in 1967.

In the process of testing monitoring equipment for use overseas, the CIA has overheard conversations between Americans. The names of the speakers were not identified; the contents of the conversations were not disseminated. All recordings were destroyed when testing was concluded. Such testing should not be directed against unsuspecting persons in the United States. Most of the testing undertaken by the agency could easily have been performed using only agency personnel and with the full knowledge of those whose conversations were being recorded. This is the present agency practice.

Other activities of this directorate include the manufacture of alias credentials for use by CIA employees and agents. Alias credentials are necessary to facilitate CIA clandestine operations, but the strictest controls and accountability must be maintained over the use of such documents. Recent guidelines established by the Deputy Director for Operations to control the use of alias documentation appear adequate to prevent abuse in the future.

As part of another program, photographs taken by CIA aerial photography equipment are provided to civilian agencies of the government. Such photographs are used to assess natural disasters, conduct route surveys and forest inventories, and detect crop blight. Permitting civilian use of aerial photography systems is proper. The economy of operating but one aerial photography program dictates the use of these photographs for appropriate civilian purposes.

Recommendation (27)

In accordance with its present guidelines, the CIA should not again engage in the testing of drugs on unsuspecting persons.

Recommendation (28)

Testing of equipment for monitoring conversations should not involve unsuspecting persons living within the United States.

Recommendation (29)

A civilian agency committee should

be re-established to oversee the civilian uses of aerial intelligence photography in order to avoid any concerns over the improper domestic use of a CIA-developed system.

9. CIA Relationships With Other Federal, State, and Local Agencies
CIA operations touch the interest of many other agencies. The CIA, like other agencies of the government, frequently has occasion to give or receive assistance from other agencies. This investigation has concentrated on those relationships which raise substantial questions under the CIA's legislative mandate.

Findings and Conclusions A. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

The FBI counterintelligence operations often have positive intelligence ramifications. Likewise, legitimate domestic CIA activities occasionally cross the path of FBI investigations. Daily liaison is therefore necessary between the two agencies.

Much routine information is passed back and forth. Occasionally joint operations are conducted. The relationship between the agencies has, however, not been uniformly satisfactory over the years. Formal liaison was cut off from February, 1970, to November, 1972, but relationships have improved in recent years.

The relationship between the CIA and the FBI needs to be clarified and outlined in detail in order to ensure that the needs of national security are met without creating conflicts or gaps of jurisdiction.

Recommendation (30)

The Director of Central Intelligence and the Director of the FBI should prepare and submit for approval by the National Security Council a detailed agreement setting forth the jurisdiction of each agency and providing for effective liaison with respect to all matters of mutual concern. This agreement should be consistent with the provisions of law and with other applicable recommendations of this report.

B. NARCOTICS LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES

Beginning in late 1970, the CIA assisted the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs to uncover possible corruption within that organization. The CIA used one of its proprietary companies to recruit agents for BNDD and gave them short instructional courses. Over 2½ years, the CIA recruited 19 agents for the BNDD. The project was terminated in 1973.

The director was correct in his written directive terminating the project. The CIA's participation in law enforcement activities in the course of these activities was forbidden by its statute. The director and the inspector general should be alert to prevent involvement of the agency in similar enterprises in the future.

C. THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

For more than 20 years, the CIA, through a proprietary, conducted a training school for foreign police and security officers in the United States under the auspices of the Agency for International Development of the Department of State. The proprietary also sold small amounts of licensed firearms and police equipment to the foreign officers and their departments. The CIA's activities in providing educational programs for foreign police were not improper under the agency's statute. Although the school was conducted within the United States through a CIA proprietary, it had no

other significant domestic impact.

Engaging in the firearms business was a questionable activity for a government intelligence agency. It should not be repeated.

D. FURNISHING REQUESTS FROM OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES

In the spring of 1970, at the request of the White House, the CIA contributed \$33,655.68 for payment of stationery and other costs for replies to persons who wrote the President after the invasion of Cambodia.

This use of CIA funds for a purpose unrelated to intelligence is improper. Steps should be taken to ensure against any repetition of such an incident.

E. STATE AND LOCAL POLICE

The CIA handles a variety of routine security matters through liaison with local police departments. In addition, it offered training courses from 1966 to 1972 to United States police officers on a variety of law enforcement techniques, and has frequently supplied equipment to state and local police.

In general, the coordination and cooperation between state and local law enforcement agencies and the CIA has been exemplary, based upon a desire to facilitate their respective legitimate aims and goals.

Most of the assistance rendered to state and local law enforcement agencies by the CIA has been no more than an effort to share with law enforcement authorities the benefits of new methods, techniques, and equipment developed or used by the agency.

On a few occasions, however, the agency has improperly become involved in actual police operations. Thus, despite a general rule against providing manpower to local police forces, the CIA has lent men, along with radio equipped vehicles, to the Washington Metropolitan Police Department to help monitor antiwar demonstrations. It helped the same department surveil a police informer. It also provided an interpreter to the Fairfax County (Virginia) Police Department to aid in a criminal investigation.

In compliance with the spirit of a recent act of Congress, the CIA terminated all but routine assistance to state and local law enforcement agencies in 1973. Such assistance is now being provided state and local agencies by the FBI. There is no impropriety in the CIA's furnishing the FBI with information on new technical developments which may be useful to local law enforcement.

For several years the CIA has given gratuities to local police officers who had been helpful to the agency. Any such practice should be terminated.

The CIA has also received assistance from local police forces. Aside from routine matters, officers from such forces have occasionally assisted the Office of Security in the conduct of investigations. The CIA has occasionally obtained police badges and other identification for use as cover for its agents.

Except for one occasion when some local police assisted the CIA in an unauthorized entry, the assistance received by the CIA from state and local law enforcement authorities was proper. The use of police identification as a means of providing cover, while not strictly speaking a violation of the agency's statutory authority as long as no police function is performed, is a practice subject to misunderstanding and should be avoided.

WASHINGTON POST
12 June 1975

Espionage and an Open

Society

The following is excerpted from the CIA report of the Rockefeller Commission.

During the period of the commission's inquiry, there have been public allegations that a democracy does not need an intelligence apparatus. The commission does not share this view. Intelligence is information gathered for policymakers in government which illuminates the range of choices available to them and enables them to exercise judgment. Good intelligence will not necessarily lead to wise policy choices. But without sound intelligence, national policy decisions and actions cannot effectively respond to actual conditions and reflect the best national interest or adequately protect our national security.

Intelligence gathering involves collecting information about other countries' military capabilities, subversive activities, economic conditions, political developments, scientific and technological progress, and social activities and conditions. The raw information must be evaluated to determine its reliability and relevance, and must then be analyzed. The final products—called "finished intelligence"—are distributed to the President and the political, military and other governmental leaders according to their needs.

Intelligence gathering has changed rapidly and radically since the advent of the CIA in 1947. The increased complexity of international political, economic, and military arrangements, the increased destructiveness of the weapons of modern warfare and the advent of electronic methods of surveillance have altered and enlarged the needs for sophisticated intelligence. Intelligence agencies have had to rely more and more on scientific and technological developments to help meet these needs.

Despite the increasing complexity and significance of intelligence in national policymaking, it is also important to understand its limits. Not all information is reliable, even when the most highly refined intelligence methods are used to collect it. Nor can any intelligence system ensure that its current estimates of another country's intentions or future capacities are accurate or will not be outrun by unforeseen events. There are limits to accurate forecasting, and the use of deception by our adversaries or the penetration of our intelligence services increases the possibility that intelligence predictions may prove to be wrong. Nevertheless, informed decision-making is impossible without an intelligence system adequately protected from penetration.

Therefore, a vital part of any intelligence service is an effective counterintelligence program, directed toward protecting our own intelligence system and ascertaining the activities of foreign intelligence services, such as espionage, sabotage and subversion, and toward minimizing or counteracting the effectiveness of these activities.

This commission is devoted to analyzing the interest of protecting the privacy and security rights of American citizens.

But we cannot ignore the invasion of the privacy and security rights of Americans by foreign countries or their agents. This is the other side of the coin—and it merits attention here in the interest of perspective.

Witnesses with responsibilities for counterintelligence have told the commission that the United States remains the principal intelligence target of the Communist bloc.

The Communists invest large sums of money, personnel and sophisticated technology in collecting information—within the United States—on our military capabilities, our weapons systems, our defense structure and our social divisions. The Communists seek to penetrate our intelligence services, to compromise our law enforcement agencies and to recruit as their agents United States citizens holding sensitive government and industry jobs. In addition, it is a common practice in Communist bloc countries to inspect and open mail coming from or going to the United States.

In an open society such as ours, the intelligence opportunities for our adversaries are immeasurably greater than they are for us in their closed societies. Our society must remain an open one, with our traditional freedoms unimpaired. But when the intelligence activities of other countries are flourishing in the free environment, we afford them, it is all the more essential that the foreign intelligence activities of the CIA and our other intelligence agencies, as well as the domestic counterintelligence activities of the FBI, be given the support necessary to protect our national security and to shield the privacy and rights of American citizens from foreign intrusion.

The commission has received estimates, that Communist bloc intelligence forces currently number well over 500,000 worldwide.

The number of Communist government officials in the United States has tripled since 1960, and is still increasing. Nearly 2,000 of them are now in this country—and a significant percentage of them have been identified as members of intelligence or security agencies. Conservative estimates for the number of unidentified intelligence officers among the remaining officials raise the level to over 40 per cent.

In addition to sending increasing numbers of their citizens to this country openly, many of whom have been trained in espionage, Communist bloc countries also place considerable emphasis on the training, provision of false identification and dispatching of "illegal" agents—that is, operatives for whom an alias identity has been systematically developed which enables them to live in the United States as American citizens or resident aliens without our knowledge of their true origins.

While making large-scale use of human intelligence sources, the Communist countries also appear to have developed electronic collection of intelligence to an extraordinary degree of technology and sophistication for use in the United States and elsewhere throughout the world, and we believe that these countries can monitor and record thousands of private telephone conversations. Americans have a right to be uneasy if not seriously disturbed at the real possibility

Indices and Files
on American Citizens
Findings

Biographical information is a major resource of an intelligence agency. The CIA maintains a number of files and indices that include biographical information on Americans.

As a part of its normal process of indexing names and information of foreign intelligence interest, the Directorate of Operations has indexed some 7,000,000 names of all nationalities. An estimated 115,000 of these are believed to be American citizens.

Where a person is believed to be of possibly continuing intelligence interest, files to collect information as received are opened. An estimated 57,000 out of a total of 750,000 such files concern American citizens. For the most part, the names of Americans appear in indices and files as actual or potential sources of information or assistance to the CIA. In addition to these files, files on some 7,200 American citizens, relating primarily to their domestic activities, were, as already stated, compiled within the Directorate of Operations as part of Operation CHAOS.

The Directorate of Administration maintains a number of files on persons who have been associated with the CIA. These files are maintained for security, personnel, training, medical and payroll purposes. Very few are maintained on persons unaware that they have a relationship with the CIA. However, the Office of Security maintained files on American citizens associated with dissident groups who were never affiliated with the agency because they were considered a threat to the physical security of agency facilities and employees. These files were also maintained, in part, for use in future security clearance determinations. Dissemination of security files is restricted to persons with an operational need for them.

The Office of Legislative Counsel maintains files concerning its relationships with congressmen.

Conclusions

Although maintenance of most of the indices, files, and records of the agency has been necessary and proper, the standards applied by the agency at some points during its history have permitted the accumulation and indexing of materials not needed for legitimate intelligence or security purposes. Included in this category are many of the files related to Operation CHAOS and the activities of the Office of Security concerning dissident groups.

Constant vigilance by the agency is essential to prevent the collection of information on United States citizens which is not needed for proper intelligence activities. The executive order recommended by the commission (Recommendation 2) will ensure purging of nonessential or improper materials from agency files.

II. Allegations Concerning the Assassination of President Kennedy

Numerous allegations have been made that the CIA participated in the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. The commission staff investigated these allegations. On the basis of the staff's investigation, the commission concludes that there is no credible evidence of CIA involvement.

NEW YORK TIMES
11 June 1975

Triumph and Defeat: The C.I.A. Record

By JOHN M. CREWDSON
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 10—The Central Intelligence Agency, that bewildering mixture of espionage and sabotage, is for the most part held firmly below the surface of public consciousness by the national security statutes, which prevent the slightest disclosure of its size, shape or intentions.

Periodically, however, one of the mooring lines frays and breaks and sends a part of the agency bobbing into full view, generally to the embarrassment of the C.I.A. and the rest of the Government as well.

The most recent such unintended revelations are the news accounts of the C.I.A.'s involvement in undercover surveillance activities at home and assassination plots abroad, accounts that led to the just-completed inquiry of the Rockefeller Commission, whose final report was issued today.

Kennedy Words Recalled

The sting that the C.I.A. will doubtless feel from the commission's findings, however, is by no means unique in its 28-year history. President Kennedy underscored that point on Nov. 28, 1961, when he told an audience of C.I.A. employees with a touch of sympathy in his voice, "Your successes are unheralded—your failures trumpeted."

There have been many of both since 1947, when the C.I.A. was established by the National Security Act as the nation's clearinghouse for information obtained from around the world, by overt and covert means. The information was needed by the highly specialized agencies of the Federal Government.

Mr. Kennedy's remarks, however, had a special poignancy, for they came seven months after the failure, loudly trumpeted, of the most ambitious operation then conceived by the intelligence agency—the invasion of Cuba by a ragtag band of exiled anti-Castro Cubans who were set ashore at dawn on April 15, 1961, on the beaches of the Bay of Pigs.

In May of the previous year, an American high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft called the U-2 was brought down over Sverdlovsk in the Soviet heartland.

Admission Put Off

But although the plane, which had been photographing Russian military installations, was flown by a civilian pilot under contract to the C.I.A., the agency managed to avoid a public admission of its operational role in the affair until more

than three years later.

In the years before the Bay of Pigs debacle, the C.I.A., its various divisions and sections hidden away in an unprepossessing collection of Government buildings, was able to maintain an almost invisible presence in Washington, free from both scandal and honor.

Little was written about the agency, either with or without its blessing. Its top officials were known to and courted by a select group of Washington reporters, but the tidbits the agency handed out, which usually illuminated developments in the Communist world, were rarely attributed publicly to their true source.

In the early cold-war years, it was believed that the nation needed a single system that could collect and evaluate peacetime intelligence from a variety of sources and deal, at the same time, with the increasingly aggressive Communist intelligence services—if necessary, on their own terms.

The C.I.A.'s task, it was generally conceded, was one that needed doing, and its well-bred and Ivy-educated officials were left almost without supervision to do it in their own way.

A New Headquarters

In 1961, the year of the Cuban invasion, the C.I.A. moved lock, stock and cloak into what was—for a semicret agency—unusually visible, futuristic glass-and-concrete headquarters in Langley, Va., across the Potomac River from the Capital.

Perhaps as an outgrowth of those two events—one reinforcing the agency's public identity and the other calling its judgment into question—the comfortable, if claustrophobic, niche that the C.I.A. had carved out for itself became a topic of growing interest and inquiry.

Since its inception in 1947, the agency had been accused almost daily of propping up foreign political parties, interfering with foreign elections and inspiring bribery, bombings, kidnappings and murders in countries around the globe.

In many instances, the charges were merely the unfounded suspicions of the C.I.A.'s adversaries; in others, they were subsequently proved true. In any case, they were invariably dismissed as unworthy of a response.

But as the hostility between the West and East that had marked the nineteen-fifties began to fade, so did the public's acceptance of the C.I.A. and its appointed mission of guarding against the Communist per-

By the mid-nineteen sixties, the first hazy outlines had begun to emerge of the C.I.A.'s interconnections with some of the institutions in this country and the major political and social abroad. Then came the disclosures that the C.I.A., or at least its emissaries and its unaccounted-for dollars, had in the two intervening decades seemingly permeated every facet of American life—business, finance, journalism, academia, local government, unions and even the arts.

Of subversion abroad, these disclosures were substantiated.

Unlike most of the charges, the C.I.A., it was learned, had arranged with Michigan State University to provide "deep cover" support for agency operatives in Vietnam during the previous decade.

Through a maze of private foundations of varying degrees of legitimacy, it had helped to fund the activities of the National Student Association, the American Newspaper Guild, the respected literary magazine Encounter and scores of other enterprises, respectable and dubious alike.

Accounts emerged of the C.I.A.'s agreements with American multinational corporations that had sometimes allowed agency operatives to pose as their employees and more often involved the exchange of economic and even political intelligence between agency officials and widely traveled business executives.

What was not known at the time, but was discovered later, was that some three dozen American journalists stationed abroad were employed by the C.I.A. as undercover informants, and that the agency was training the members of a dozen local police forces in this country in the handling of explosives and detection of wiretaps.

Allegations Confirmed

Meanwhile, some of the allegations of C.I.A. interference in the affairs of other nations were being supported or confirmed.

In 1965, for example, the

State Department finally conceded the truth of a five-year-old charge by Lee Kuan Yew, the Prime Minister of Singapore, that a C.I.A. agent had offered him a \$3.3-million bribe to cover up an unsuccessful agency operation in that country.

Some of the less well-publicized disclosures, such as the expenditure, previously denied, by the C.I.A. of several hundred million dollars to support the anti-Communist propagandizing of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, were overshadowed by the revelation that the agency had waged a covert, multimillion-dollar effort to destroy the effectiveness of Chile's Marxist President, Salvador Allende Gossens.

The C.I.A.'s involvement in the Vietnam war resulted in Operation Phoenix, inspired by the C.I.A. and put into effect by the South Vietnamese Army. It resulted in the deaths of more than 20,000 "suspected" members of the "Vietcong infrastructure" and allegedly in the torture of others.

Antiwar Demonstrations

It was a domestic adjunct to the Vietnam war, the public demonstrations of opposition that periodically arose in most of the nation's major cities—that was largely responsible for the scrutiny that the C.I.A. has undergone by the Rockefeller Commission and that will be continued by two Congressional committees.

The C.I.A., the commission reported today, inserted its operatives and informants into domestic antiwar groups and maintained an "excessive" number of dossiers—more than 7,000—on persons whom it believed were associated with political dissidents, foreign powers or both.

The Rockefeller Commission also investigated, but did not publicly report on, what may prove to be the greatest embarrassment in the C.I.A.'s history—the now apparently substantiated reports that the agency attempted to murder Premier Fidel Castro of Cuba and possibly other foreign leaders.

A Senate investigating committee, headed by Senator Frank Church, Democrat of Idaho, is inquiring into that topic

NEW YORK TIMES
12 June 1975

Report of C.I.A. Panel Goes on Sale in Capital

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 11—Copies of the report of the Rockefeller commission on Central Intelligence Agency activities in the United States made public yesterday, went on sale here today at the Government Printing Office bookstore. The printing office said copies would soon be available in Federal bookstores in 17 other major

cities.

The 299-page, single-spaced report, which sells for \$2.85, can be obtained by sending a check payable to the Superintendent of Documents, c/o Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20420.

The printing office said that 26,383 copies of the report had been printed, 15,000 of them for public consumption, 10,000 for the C.I.A. commission itself, and the remainder for libraries throughout the country.

that their personal and business activities which they discuss freely over the telephone could be recorded and analyzed by agents of foreign powers.

This raises the real specter that selected American users of telephones are potentially subject to blackmail that can seriously affect their actions, or even lead in some cases to recruitment as espionage agents.

WALL STREET JOURNAL, THURSDAY, JUNE 12, 1975

REVIEW & OUTLOOK

Intelligence and the CIA

A public audit of the CIA was desirable and overdue; few people believe any longer that the work of any government agency is so sensitive that its general performance should be exempt from public scrutiny.

But those findings of the Rockefeller Commission that have been made public are only interesting and useful; they are not shocking and appalling. Considering the web-spinning propensities of espionage, CIA professionals have displayed considerable reluctance to stray outside their legal turf and when they have done so it has usually been because of White House pressures. Pre-audit speculations suggesting a gumshoe agency gone wild are now revealed to have been mainly molehills.

That knowledge will be useful in clarifying the CIA's role and, most importantly, emphasizing the need for the CIA and FBI to coordinate their responsibilities. Nothing about the Rockefeller report suggests, however, that the CIA's specific operations should be put in a fish-bowl where its effectiveness in gathering intelligence would be hampered. As Arms Control chief Fred C. Ikle says in a speech quoted elsewhere on this page today, effective intelligence gathering will become ever more vital, not less so, in the years just ahead.

It can be argued with considerable power that those CIA misdeeds uncovered in the Rockefeller report stemmed primarily from too little intelligence, not too much. The CIA's CHAOS operations, which involved it in illegal domestic spying, derived from fears by both Presidents Johnson and Nixon that U.S. anti-war dissidents were being aided and encouraged by foreign powers.

At a time when campus buildings were being bombed and burned, central cities were aflame and national leaders were being threatened with physical violence, should it be any surprise that an American President would want intelligence information? It should not, and the fears of both Presidents that they were not getting sufficient intelligence no doubt explains why the CIA was given an assignment that would normally and legally be the exclusive job of the FBI. As the Rockefeller report shows, CIA Director Helms nonetheless warned President Nixon in 1969 that such work was outside the agency's charter.

But the circumstances surrounding the formation of CHAOS demonstrate the importance of good intelligence. As it happened the CIA could find no evidence of foreign incitement of U.S. domestic disorders. Good intelligence tells a President what is not true, as well as what is true. In the civil disorders of the

1960s and early 1970s, the fact that an intelligence agency could reassure national leaders that there was no foreign intervention probably acted as a protection to American civil liberties, rather than a threat.

There are, of course, even more serious possibilities for presidential miscalculations in a nuclear age, as Mr. Ikle suggests. Given the potential effects of such miscalculations it is absolutely vital that the President not be placed in a position where he is making decisions based on fears, rumors or hunches.

Other doubtful activities of the CIA no doubt can be, and, in fact, have been, tightened up through procedural processes. But surely it

will come as no surprise to Americans, or to the Russian KGB, that the CIA for some years routinely scanned mail between the U.S. and Communist countries. Or that it conducted wiretaps and other forms of surveillance on its own employees as part of its internal security procedures.

We still don't know of course, what role the CIA played in alleged assassination plots overseas. While this issue may be far more serious, it's idle to discuss such matters on the slender knowledge presently available.

It is not idle, however, to say that the CIA's intelligence services are vital and, to be effective, many of the procedures will have to remain secret. The Rockefeller Commission report suggests that as long as Americans trust their Presidents they probably can trust the CIA. And Presidents get public scrutiny almost daily.

Notable and Quotable

Fred C. Ikle, director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, in a speech to the Pittsburgh World Affairs Council Tuesday night:

One aspect of the flow of information from the government to the public greatly worries me. This is that we have yet to learn how and where to draw the line in fighting the evils of secrecy. If we fail to draw this line properly, if we cannot maintain the privacy of certain intelligence activities, our arms control efforts will become paralyzed. If we cannot find a way to protect our legitimate intelligence operations, we will jeopardize future SALT and other arms control agreements.

Today's arms control agreements acknowledge a situation of partial trust. We have enough trust to make a contract with our adversaries, but not enough to rely on the contract without monitoring compliance. Our ability to negotiate significant agreements depends on our ability to verify those agreements are being kept.

Arms control, if we want to be serious about it, is a deadly serious business. It concerns matters of life and death for the nation. It ties us to a potential adversary with immense power, the sternest internal controls, and a pervasive system of secrecy. To have meaningful and reliable arms control, we have to know what the other side is doing. And we cannot find out simply by asking. We must have reliable intelligence operations, and we need operations that can be kept secret. Yes, secret; because unrestrained publicity would provide a road map for deception or counter-measures, thus rendering arms control verification well nigh impossible.

It is simply a fact of life that the effectiveness of certain procedures to monitor arms control depends on their being unknown to those who are being monitored. We cannot inform the party whose conduct we wish to verify of each and every step we take to check its compliance. This is particularly true of procedure to judge the

reliability of arms control agreements.

At this time, our intelligence services are under severe public scrutiny. Unquestionably, a democratic nation is wise to monitor carefully every facet of its government operations, particularly those that cannot be conducted in full public view. And it goes without saying that all our government agencies—including the intelligence services—must operate within the law.

But the current rash of publicity and leaks is something that goes way beyond our tradition of openness and the public's right to know. Of course, we all can delight in a good spy story. And the temptation must be strong today to publish titillating accounts of delicate intelligence operations and to be the first in going public. I believe, however, the American public will not long feel entertained by indiscretions that disable our national intelligence capability.

This capability, built up over many years, has permitted our government to assess the military effort of our potential adversaries so that we could meet threats realistically. And it has made it possible for us to move forward with arms control agreements on which we could rely. Now this capability might be wrecked by irresponsible public disclosure. Whether our adversary receives such information from a paid spy, or reads it in a self-serving book or a well-meaning newspaper—the end result is the same.

Our lawmakers, I am sure, will have the widest public support in drawing a discriminating line between legitimate secrecy and irresponsible concealment, between mischievous disclosure and the openness democratic societies must have. I am sure the American people will support—indeed demand—adherence to a code of ethics, or where needed a code of law, that protects both the nation's standards of decency and its safety.

NEW YORK TIMES
12 June 1975

C.I.A. Report May Mean A Major Reorganization

By CLIFTON DANIEL
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 11—Already censured by the Rockefeller commission for some "plainly unlawful" acts, the Central Intelligence Agency now faces a major reorganization—if the commission's recommendations are fully implemented.

President Ford has apparently not decided which recommendations he will adopt and how he will implement them, but he made it known today that he favors prompt action on them.

Ron Nessen, the President's press secretary, said that Mr. Ford was sending a memorandum to the secretaries of State, Defense and the Treasury and the Director of Central Intelligence asking for comment on the recommendations. The President wants replies "as soon as possible," Mr. Nessen said, "in a matter of weeks at least."

With the replies in hand, Mr. Ford will decide which recommendations he can apply administratively and which would require Congressional action.

"The President considers the subject matter important," Mr. Nessen said, "and I would look for quick action."

Officials examining the Rockefeller commission recommendations today found them more drastic than they appeared at first glance yesterday, wrapped as they were in the lawyerly language of the commission's report.

Among other things, the next Director of Central Intelligence very probably will not be a career intelligence officer, as the present director, William E. Colby, is and one former director, Richard Helms, was.

Recommendation number seven of the Rockefeller commission said that, in the selection of C.I.A. directors, "consideration should be given to individuals outside the career service of the C.I.A., although promotion from within should not be barred."

Colby's Future

There was no general expectation here that Mr. Colby would be dismissed. He bears no direct personal responsibility for the improper domestic activities of the C.I.A. that led to the Rockefeller commission's inquiry. On the contrary, since becoming director in 1973, Mr. Colby has been terminating various of those activities.

Presumably, he will remain in office at least until the pending Congressional investigations of the intelligence community are concluded. Then, according to a man familiar with the Rockefeller commission's intentions, a new director will be sought.

"After all this," he said, "when we start out again, we had better start with a new man."

Friends of Mr. Colby, who

is widely regarded as a cool professional and a good soldier, think he should take retirement in stride.

Of the seven directors the C.I.A. has had in its 28 years, only he and Mr. Helms have been intelligence professionals, unless Allen W. Dulles, who was director for eight years and spent 14 of his 41½ working years in intelligence, is also counted as a career man.

Choosing an outsider as a director, and limiting his term to 10 years, would be one of several measures recommended by the Rockefeller commission to reform the C.I.A. and bring it under stricter control.

30 Recommendations

Among the 30 recommendations of the Rockefeller commission were the following:

• Congress should establish a joint committee on intelligence to assume oversight of the C.I.A., now exercised by the Armed Services committees.

• Congress should consider making the C.I.A. budget public, at least to some extent, to comply with the Constitution, which requires that public expenditures be published.

• The functions of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, a body of distinguished citizens with no powers, should be expanded to include oversight of the C.I.A., and it should have a full-time chairman and staff.

With those changes in the oversight structure, the C.I.A. should become more accountable to outside agencies, and less a power unto itself, officials said.

However, the Rockefeller commission also proposed major changes in the internal structure of the intelligence agency. In addition to favoring and independent director with a 10-year maximum term, the commission recommended the following:

• Instead of one deputy director, who is always a high-ranking military officer, the agency should have two. One would act as administrative officer, the other would be a military officer.

• The inspector general of the C.I.A., now Dr. Donald Frank Chamberlain, should be upgraded in status and given a larger staff and greater responsibilities. His duties would include the investigation of reports from employees that the agency was violating the law.

The Rockefeller commission's report disclosed that recently, when the C.I.A. was coming under attack for improper practices, the professional staff of the inspector general's office had been cut from 14 to five.

• The office of the agency's general counsel should be strengthened by occasionally bringing in outside lawyers, occasionally assigning agency lawyers to work elsewhere in

BALTIMORE SUN
12 June 1975

Intelligence men give mixed reviews

By HENRY L. TREWHITT
Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington — The reaction of the intelligence community yesterday to the Rockefeller commission report ranged from dismay to a judgment that its findings had been fair to the Central Intelligence Agency.

From the CIA itself, the official reaction was silence. CIA employees said privately the agency could not comment publicly while investigations by two congressional committees are still under way.

Still privately, other agency sources spoke of reduced morale, dwindling contacts with foreign intelligence services, and growing distrust on the part of agents abroad. They attributed these trends to the impact of the Rockefeller commission report and fears that the agency no longer can keep its secrets.

However, a group of retired or resigned intelligence officers said the report on CIA domestic operations was "fair and objective."

The report concluded that a series of CIA domestic activities in the past—all discontinued—had been "plainly unlawful" and recommended a series of reforms.

The bleakest reaction came from a career intelligence specialist. In his judgment, journalists had overreacted to the specifics of wrongdoing with the result that CIA morale has

plummeted and the agency's foreign contacts have been damaged.

"It will take a long time to turn it around," he said.

But high officials of the agency were said to have found the commission's findings to be fair, under the circumstances. This was the public reaction of the recently organized Association of Retired Intelligence Officers. The group was formed specifically to counter what it regards as misconceptions about the agency.

David Phillips, former chief of CIA Latin American operations, now spokesman for the association, said the report "disposes of some allegations and considerable speculation concerning CIA and its activities."

"Many of the organization's unique problems are highlighted," Mr. Phillips said, "and CIA mistakes, including errors of judgment and excesses, are aired. Much of this is put into the perspective of earlier years when times and needs may well have been different in many critical respects."

He warned, however, that investigators should tread carefully in their approach to the agency's overseas operations. Exposure of contacts and methods, he said, could cripple or destroy essential activities abroad.

the Government, and encouraging C.I.A. lawyers to participate in outside professional activities.

This last set of recommendations suggested that the commission thought that C.I.A. lawyers were out of contact with their own profession.

The commission's report disclosed that for 27 years the agency had only one general counsel, Lawrence Houston. He retired last June 29.

The reorganization proposed by the Rockefeller commission was not the most drastic proposal considered, C. Douglas Dillon, vice chairman of the commission, disclosed today.

Mr. Dillon, a former Secretary of the Treasury, said in a telephone conversation from New York that the commission had talked about cutting the agency in two, separating its intelligence-gathering and analyzing functions from its operational arm.

"The commission just didn't think that would be wise," he said.

NEW YORK TIMES
12 June 1975

C.I.A. Inquiry Hailed; Recommendations Called Weak

By SEYMOUR M. HERSH
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 11—The official who provided much of the basic information for the initial account in The New York Times of domestic spying last December praised the Rockefeller commission today for compiling what he termed an "exhaustive" report on the Central Intelligence Agency's illegal activities.

But the source, who spoke only under the continued guarantee of anonymity, criticized the commission's recommendations as being too weak and not providing for explicit statutory prohibition—with appropriate punishment—for future wrongdoing.

The official, who has had direct access to highly classified intelligence information, estimated that 90 per cent or more of the allegations he knew about had been described in the commission's report. "I was kind of shocked by the details," he said. "I didn't think the commission would turn out that much detail."

Spying on Congressmen
One conspicuous omission, he said, dealt with the C.I.A.'s domestic spying on members of Congress. The x Rockefeller commission report made no mention of such files, although William E. Colby, Director of Central Intelligence, told a House subcommittee last March 5 that files on at least four present and former members of Congress were maintained by the C.I.A.'s special domestic counterintelligence unit.

One such file showed that the agency had maintained a dossier on Representative Bella S. Abzug, Democrat of Manhattan, since 1953—17 years before she was elected to Congress—and had illegally opened some of her mail.

Mr. Colby further testified that "a number" of the domestic counterintelligence files had been destroyed, an assertion that also was omitted from the Rockefeller commission's report.

Other sources with some independent knowledge of the domestic spying activities subsequently noted in telephone interviews that the commission's report did not mention the destruction in late 1974 of between 150 and 200 C.I.A. domestic files on black dissidents, nearly all of which included photographs of some kind.

No Cover-up Seen

Sources close to the Rockefeller commission conceded that such information had not been included in the final report, but emphasized—as one put it—that there was no evidence that this was an attempt to hide anything. "A lot of files on blacks were not destroyed," one source said.

"It would be a mistake," another source said, "to put

a racist twist on this or to say that the ones [files] that were destroyed were the hot ones."

"We found everything that was humanly possible on that operation," he added.

In effect agreeing with that statement, The Times's basic intelligence source predicted that the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, whose chairman is Senator Frank Church, Democrat of Idaho, would be unable to significantly advance the commission's findings—at least in the area of illegal domestic activities.

"They're nice enough people," he said of the staff members of the Senate committee, "but not substantial enough to handle this."

Intensive Interviewing

any further information about domestic spying, the source said, would have to result from intensive personal interviewing of C.I.A. domestic operatives who may not have officially reported all of their activities.

The Times's source attacked the 30 recommendations by the Rockefeller commission as being totally inadequate.

"There are too many recommendations that say that the C.I.A., the President and the director [for the C.I.A.] 'should not do things without imposing criminal sanctions,'" he said.

"We need criminal sanctions to hold the bureaucracy in line," the source continued. "Times have a way of chang-

ing, and world views change. Without criminal sanctions, it's possible that conditions could arise which would involve activities like those now being criticized. Don't forget, justifications change with the times."

End to Further Inquiries

The source concluded the interview with what amounted to a plea for an end to further inquiries. "It's time to return to normal for the C.I.A.," he said. "This has been upsetting even more so for the analytical types than the covert types [in the agency]."

He added that many C.I.A. analysts, those who research data and prepare intelligence estimates, "were deeply disappointed to find out that their agency, which they have respect for, was involved in this kind of a thing."

The Rockefeller commission report also did not deal with the allegations, as published by The New York Times last Dec. 29, of a former C.I.A. domestic operative who said he had conducted break-ins, wiretap operations and other illegal activities while investigating antiwar groups in New York City in the late nineteen-sixties and early nineteen-seventies.

In Congressional testimony last February, Mr. Colby said the agency had been unable to identify the former C.I.A. man, who was not identified

by name in The Times's account, and added: "I fear that the journalist has been the victim of what we in the intelligence trade call a fabricator."

No Evidence Found

Sources close to the Rockefeller commission said that, despite repeated checks, they had been unable to find any documentary evidence of such undercover C.I.A. activities in New York City. The former C.I.A. agent identified himself as having worked for the agency's domestic operations divisions there.

In a telephone interview this morning, the former C.I.A. operative—who depicted New York City as "a big training ground" for undercover agents—expressed skepticism that a full account of all the C.I.A.'s domestic activities would ever be compiled.

"It's so easy to cover up," he said. "You're never going to find out what really happened; all the details and all the people involved will never come out."

"They'll clean up their shop a little, but in 10 or 20 years it'll start again," he added. "It's all so cyclical."

The former C.I.A. man has refused thus far to agree to discuss his activities with members of the Rockefeller commission or the Senate committee headed by Mr. Church.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
12 June 1975

CIA and individual integrity

Beyond all the necessary laws and guidelines, the Rockefeller commission zeroes in on the bottom-line need for integrity in CIA employees and the contribution such integrity has already made to reform. "Many of the activities we have found to be improper or unlawful were in fact questioned by lower-level employees," says the commission. It rightly urges that such voices be heard on up the line.

These recommendations come at a time when Congress is considering valuable legislation to protect federal employees from department harassment or retaliation when they speak out in public. Such speaking out often follows a failure to be listened to within an agency.

CIA employees also ought to be protected in this regard, while observing their special responsibilities in preserving legitimate secrecy. There has been some questioning of the Rockefeller recommendation that it be made a criminal offense for employees or former employees to disclose "classified" information.

Here a criterion in the proposed legislation could be useful. It protects employees in disclosing information to which citizens are entitled under the Freedom of Information Act. This act has provisions for determining the legitimacy of "classified" labels. Surely employees of the public, no less than members of the public itself, should have all the rights specified in the Freedom of Information Act.

WASHINGTON POST

11 June 1975

Helms: CIA's Johnny-on-the-Spot

By Lawrence Meyer

Washington Post Staff Writer

By his own account, Richard M. Helms was present at the Central Intelligence Agency "from the day its doors opened in 1947."

By the account of the Rockefeller commission's inquiry into CIA domestic activities, Helms was also something of a Johnny-on-the-spot when the CIA was involving itself in a variety of activities that the commission describes as either improper or simply illegal.

Helms and CIA Director Allen W. Dulles on May 17, 1954, met with Postmaster General Arthur Summerfield to discuss continuation of a program under which the CIA was opening mail coming from and going to the Soviet Union.

"According to Helms' contemporaneous memorandum of the meeting," the Rockefeller commission report said, "Dulles described the importance of the mail program and asked that it be allowed to continue. No mention appears to have been made of covert mail opening."

Helms, then 41, was chief of operations in the Plans Directorate of CIA, moving up the bureaucratic ladder until he was appointed Director of Central Intelligence, a position he held from 1969 until 1973.

The commission report does not trace Helms' rise to the top. He simply appears periodically.

He is criticized by the commission at one point for "poor judgment" for destroying tapes and documents within days of receiving a request from Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield in January, 1973, not to destroy any material that might have some relevance to the Watergate investigation.

But Helms is not criticized often in the report, although it finds fault with a variety of CIA activities.

After describing how Helms and then CIA Executive Director William E. Colby held up transmittal of evidence from the CIA to the Watergate prosecutors until January, 1973, the report asserts: "The agency is subject to serious criticism for this conduct."

Similarly, the commission asserts that the CIA's domestic mail-opening programs "were unlawful." That program continued through the Eisenhower administration after being

instituted in 1952 and was not terminated until 1973.

In 1961, Dulles and Helms, then the Deputy director for plans, met with the new Postmaster General, J. Edward Day, to inform him that mail was being opened.

Ten years later, Helms, by then CIA Director, met separately with Postmaster General Winton M. Blount and Attorney General John N. Mitchell "to discuss the mail project," according to the report. Neither objected to it, the report said.

When the commission report turns to Operation Chaos—a special operations group established by the CIA to collect and evaluate information on foreign contacts with American dissidents—Helms' role is central.

Despite Helms' acknowledgment in a Sept. 6, 1969, memo of "statutory and de facto proscriptions on agency domestic involvements" in connection with the super-secret Operation Chaos, Helms at other times indicated that he was aware the CIA had gone beyond the limit.

Helms sent a report prepared by the CIA, entitled "Restless Youth," to special presidential assistant for national security affairs Walt W. Rostow on Sept. 4, 1968, analyzing student revolutionary movements.

"You will," Helms wrote in a cover memo to Rostow, "of course, be aware of the peculiar sensitivity which attaches to the fact that the CIA has prepared a report on student activities both here and abroad."

Five months later, Helms sent another copy of "Restless Youth" to Henry A. Kissinger, then President Nixon's assistant for national security affairs.

"This is an area not within the charter of this agency, so I need not emphasize how extremely sensitive this makes the paper," Helms wrote Kissinger. "Should anyone learn of its existence it would prove most embarrassing for all concerned."

The State Department said in a statement last night that the section of "Restless Youth" dealing with radical students in America is only 12 pages out of a total of 264 and that "there is no indication in this section that it is derived from surveillance or any sensitive sources or methods."

Kissinger has denied knowledge of domestic intelligence gathering activities

by the CIA.

Helms' memo, the statement said, did not indicate that the information in the report resulted from "unusual or illegal investigative activities" and it was "assumed" that Director Helms' cautionary note was directed at emphasizing that it was not within the Agency's charter to do analyses on American student activities, rather than any implication that the analysis itself was based on illegal or improper investigative activities.

Helms rejected one attempt by the CIA to use its agents to collect information on domestic dissidents, known as "Project One," according to the report. But a second program, called "Project Two," involved "agents' observations of domestic activities," according to the report, and these observations were turned over to Chaos.

As a result, the report said, "a limited quantity of intelligence on domestic dissident activities" was collected and disseminated.

"Director Helms testified that he was not aware of this collection and dissemination," the report said.

Chaos used three agents to gather information on domestic radical activities during the period from 1969 through 1971, according to the report. Helms testified that he was not aware of the domestic use of these agents, the report said.

Even within the CIA, however, Chaos was a controver-

sial operation. In December, 1972, in response to internal criticism of the program, Helms stated in a memo, "Chaos is a legitimate counter intelligence function of the agency and cannot be stopped simply because some members of the organization do not like this activity."

In dealing with the Watergate affair, the commission report broadly summarized previously known information and concluded that it found no evidence that the CIA either participated in or knew in advance of the Watergate break-in or the break-in at the offices of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist.

"The commission considers the agency's delay of nearly a year in instituting such an investigation, (of a possible CIA tie to the Watergate break-in) the agency's failure promptly to disclose relevant information in its possession, and the agency's destruction of some materials which may have contained relevant information to reflect poor judgment and to be subject to criticism."

Although this criticism is directed at the CIA by the commission, the narrative of the report shows that all of the actions or failures criticized were in Helms' control.

NEW YORK TIMES
5 June 1975

C.I.A. ROLE CHARGED IN LEBANON'S STRIFE

Special to The New York Times

BEIRUT, Lebanon, June 4—Palestinian guerrilla leaders and their Lebanese leftist supporters have accused the United States Central Intelligence Agency of providing arms, munitions and directives to the right-wing Phalangist party, made up of Christians.

More than 300 people have been killed in fighting between the Phalangist militia and Palestinian guerrillas since April 13.

There was heavy fire early today in the Chia neighborhood. Sporadic sniper fire continued through the day, causing tension in the capital.

Many Palestinian guerrillas and Lebanese leftists believe that the Phalangist militia has received guns and munitions through a Lebanese military air base and the small port of Juneye, north of Beirut.

Kemal Jumblatt, a Socialist leader who is close to the Soviet Embassy here, said at a news conference:

"From our intelligence, it appears that the Phalangists are in rapport with the Israelis and have received directives, arms and ammunition through the C.I.A."

WASHINGTON STAR
11 June 1975

CIA Panel Treads Fine Line Between Revelation and Sympathy

By James R. Dickenson
Washington Star Staff Writer

For all the furor over the timing of the release of the Rockefeller commission report on the CIA's domestic surveillance activities and the decision not to publish its findings on allegations of agency involvement in overseas political assassination plots, the report presents nothing in the way of substantial new revelations.

In the post-Watergate era, this immediately triggers suspicions of a cover-up, suspicions that were first evoked by the conservative, establishment nature of the panel, some of whose members had had previous ties with the intelligence community.

There is a political rule of thumb, however, that the most difficult problems are referred to a sympathetic commission. Even if President Ford issued no guidelines or helpful hints, the report appears to walk the fine line that he obviously wanted: To conduct an investigation that at least appears satisfactory but not one that would impair the CIA.

ALONG WITH its findings of wrongdoings, the report contains judicious recommendations for improved congressional oversight and administrative reforms that would prevent such wrongdoing in the future.

Even though all the commission's major findings confirm reports already in the press, the sys-

Analysis

tematic snooping, opening of mail and compiling of

dossiers on American citizens, most of whom were engaged in anti-war or civil rights activities, is still staggering as outlined in the report.

It describes a 21-year program of surveillance in which at least an estimated 130,000 pieces of mail to and from the Soviet Union were opened and a seven-year program of spying on Americans in which files were opened on 13,000 people and organizations and index records kept on another 300,000.

The name of this program, begun in 1967 at the insistence of President Lyndon B. Johnson, tells something about the Cold War mentality: "Operation CHAOS," was its name, which calls to mind the sinister "KAOS" agents in the television comedy series, "Get Smart!"

THE REPORT also tells of 32 illegal domestic wiretaps, 32 electronic buggings, and 12 burglaries by the CIA. By comparison, CIA Director William Colby told a Senate committee last January that there had been files opened on 10,000 American citizens and only five break-ins and 21 telephone taps.

One barrier to any possible cover-up is that President Ford is turning over the 80-page chapter on assassination plots and the material on which it is based to the special Senate committee that is also investigating the CIA. Under the chairmanship of Frank Church of Idaho, a liberal Democrat and foe of the Vietnam war, the panel is not likely to whitewash the agency.

Church yesterday
BALTIMORE SUN
12 June 1975

characterized the commission report as "limited in scope" and said the recommendations did not go far enough.

"What is needed is specific prohibitions in the law with penalties attached to violations of the law," he said in an interview on public television.

FORD'S DECISION to give the assassination material to the committee inspired some cynical speculation that the Kennedy and Johnson administrations were involved in the assassination plots and that Ford would probably be just as happy to let the Democratic-controlled Senate committee reveal this.

It also dismayed some conservatives such as Sen. James Allen, D-Ala., who grumbled that with the Congress's record for leaks Ford might "just as well have put it on national television."

His refusal to publicize the potentially embarrassing assassination allegations pleased other conservatives, however, many of whom in his party are restive under the Ford-Rockefeller leadership and are looking for an excuse to support someone like former California Gov. Ronald Reagan.

SUCH TACTICS would be terribly risky in the post-Watergate era, however, particularly with such a potentially explosive subject. Some observers, moreover, doubt that Ford is capable of planning and executing such a maneuver. At any rate, there is also a strong suspicion that some of the plots had their inception in the Eisenhower administration.

"When did Ford ever plan anything that complicated that worked out?" asks one conservative critic. Another, a Southerner, thought the change of signals on releasing the chapter on assassinations over the weekend showed that the administration still has a knack for fowling up, which the popular Mayaguez rescue operation had obscured.

"It's a mistake not to release the bad stuff yourself," says one veteran Republican pol. "In this day and age people can think of too many reasons why you didn't."

One reason some people are thinking of is that the commission's investigation, which it didn't have time to complete, would suffer by comparison to the one Church's committee is expected to undertake.

SOME SOURCES at the White House were critical of Rockefeller because of the commission's failure to advise the President until two or three weeks ago that it was limiting its investigation of the alleged assassination plots to their domestic implications.

The commission members defended their work, however, and attributed the absence of new revelations to an aggressive press. "I think we made as careful a study as we could," said C. Douglas Dillon, the New York investment banker who served in both the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations. "We couldn't find anything that amounted to anything that the press had not already found out."

CIA could have read of LSD tests

Washington (AP)—While the Central Intelligence Agency secretly tested Lysergic Acid Diethylamide—LSD—in the 1950's, dozens of the nation's doctors were busily performing similar research and publishing the results in public journals.

Anyone could have walked into a medical library and read them.

But the espionage agency search to do something that

was ethically forbidden of doctors: To find out what would happen if the mind-altering drug were given to an unsuspecting subject.


The Rockefeller commission report on the agency released Tuesday briefly described the LSD tests, noting that one person committed suicide several days after having an adverse reaction to a dose of LSD administered without his knowledge. "There is little doubt what

the CIA was doing with LSD was both unethical and unnecessary," Solomon Snyder, professor of psychiatry at Johns Hopkins University and a veteran LSD researcher, said yesterday.

Dr. Snyder and other psychiatrists who were involved in research with the psychedelic drug in the 1950's said yesterday that the scientific literature of the period was full of reports of research with humans taking the drug.

FORTUNE
June 1975

Uncloaking the



No intelligence agency can do its job effectively unless it can keep its operations secret. That's why the investigative hysteria in Washington is so dangerous for U.S. security.

by Charles J. V. Murphy

In the hangman's atmosphere that currently envelops the immediate prospects of the Central Intelligence Agency, an important point has been strangely overlooked. Why was this agency, so rich in intellectual talent, once full of élan, now gravely wounded, created in the first place?

The all-but-forgotten answer is that the CIA was brought into existence by Congress in 1947, at President Truman's request, for the straightforward purpose of preventing another such shocking lapse of vigilance as the one that made possible the disaster at Pearl Harbor, six years earlier.

An inquiry by a joint committee of Congress that lasted through seven re-crimination-laden months, from November, 1945, to May, 1946, elicited the embarrassing revelation that all the essential intelligence exposing Japan's preparations for war, even the departure of the Japanese fleet, had come into American hands before the attack. The failure to perceive what was in the making was found, in hindsight, to have resulted from the fact that no agency in the government had ever been charged with pulling such intelligence together.

The fateful political and military clues, in jigsaw pieces, had all been collected by the State, War, and Navy departments, each in its own parochial interest, in the form of radio intercepts, diplomatic dispatches, and routine mili-

tary intelligence reports. But no one office or person had the authority, or duty, to make a grand assessment for the President, one sharp enough to command a summary alert.

A question of Soviet intentions

What makes the existing situation strange is that the primary task laid upon the CIA eighteen years ago—to be the watchman of national security—has never been more urgent than it is today. For example, the Soviet Union has in advanced development, even partly in deployment, the most powerful array of strategic nuclear weapons that the military technologies have so far produced. Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, a professional strategic-weapons analyst not given to exaggeration, describes the array as "quite awesome." It includes four third-generation land-based ICBM prototypes, plus a fifth that has lately appeared on the test range; a bigger and faster missile-armed submarine; and a supersonic bomber having an intercontinental capability. Four of the five ICBM's and the 4,500-mile-submarine-launched missile have all been MIRVed—fitted, that is, with from four to eight independently targetable warheads.

If the deployments of these weapons should proceed to the some 2,400 ICBM launchers sanctioned by the SALT agreements of 1972 and 1974, and if the U.S. stands on the weapons it now has in place, the Russians can be expected to end up, four or five years hence, with a superiority in nuclear throw-weight five

times, perhaps even six times, greater than the U.S. will have in its order of battle—10 to 12 million pounds for the U.S.S.R. to only two million for the U.S.

Weights and numbers in these magnitudes far surpass anything needed for a defensive strategy of deterrence. How does the U.S.S.R. intend to use this power, once it materializes? This is a question for which the President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, and the Congress must look to the CIA to provide an answer. No other institution is equipped to give one.

But the tilt of the military balance is only one of the uncertainties, and not necessarily the most dangerous one, that beset American prospects. During the past several years, the CIA, by reason of the tightening interdependence of nations, has been drawn deeply into economic analysis and estimating. Efforts by producing nations to cartelize trade in basic commodities, the political realignments in groping evolution around the Persian Gulf, the strategic role to be assigned to the oceans of petrodollars in the contest for national or bloc advantage—all bulk increasingly large in the CIA's purview.

This has happened because the economic events abroad have come to bear so crucially on national decisions affecting foreign policy, and because the minuscule intelligence mechanisms available in State, Treasury, Commerce, and Agriculture could not begin to handle the job. In the view of William E. Colby, the Director of the CIA, "It is becoming as important to our national security to watch the machinations of foreign cartels as to follow Soviet or Chinese missile development."

The three spotlights

Yet, at an hour when the government's need for objective, sophisticated, timely, and many-faceted intelligence could scarcely be more acute, the CIA is in danger of being scattered to the four winds. Three full-bore investigations into the agency's philosophy and operations are in progress in Washington. When they have finished their probing, every consequential activity since its founding, even the most sensitive, will have been brought into the open by one panel or the other.

A presidential commission, seven private citizens under the chairmanship of Vice President Rockefeller, is to render a report this month, after an inquiry that began early in January and summoned just about every senior CIA officer, active and retired, into its chambers for questioning. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, under the

chairmanship of Democrat Frank Church of Idaho, has started out on a protracted, no-holds-barred inquiry into every controversial aspect and incident of the agency's career.

The temperament and background of the sixty-five-member staff assembled by Senator Church clearly signal that the Senate's share of the show is likely to be on the boards for months. Nor will that be the end of the ordeal. A companion House Select Committee under Representative Lucien N. Nedzi, Democrat from Michigan, no less dovish and isolationist than Church, is to parallel an untrammelled exploration of the CIA's operations with a horizon-filling look into all the federal intelligence activities, including those of the FBI.

Before the curtain is rung down on all this, the CIA will be the only national intelligence service on earth stripped of its secrets. For anyone who recalls the mood in Washington when the agency was being put together some three decades ago, such an outcome is almost past believing. From the start, President Truman, Congress, and the executive departments most directly involved in foreign policy—State and Defense—were all agreed that its work should never suffer much public exposure.

The agency's authority and functions were deliberately left vague in the enabling legislation, and the specific tasks laid upon it by the National Security Council were kept under tight classification. Congressional knowledge and sanction of its operations were limited to several oversight panels consisting of, all together, a dozen or so senior members of the Armed Services and Appropriations committees in both Houses.

Until lately, the overseeing was respectful and trusting, but it did go on all along. The late Richard Russell of Georgia, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the most influential man in Congress in national security matters, long refused to have William Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, on his panel, because he considered Fulbright a blabbermouth.

Now that protection, that immunity, has been demolished. And the strangest thing of all is that the blowing of the agency's cover was largely brought on by a dubious piece of journalism—the long report in the New York Times of December 22 that the agency during the Nixon years, "directly violating its charter, conducted a massive illegal domestic intelligence operation" against individuals and groups who disagreed with the Administration's policies in Vietnam and other matters. Six months of investigation have pretty well established that these charges were greatly exaggerated.

After the ordeal

Director Colby, to be sure, helped to whip up the storm with his too-ready admission that his predecessors had countenanced certain "illegal" activities. He failed to make it sufficiently clear at the outset just what the mistakes were, and that what had been done was in any case done on presidential authority.

Whether misdemeanors or something worse, providing a measure of support for the Watergate break-in and in the Daniel Ellsberg affair was certainly improper and unwise. (In each case, a top official of the CIA authorized the support, but reluctantly.) The deplorable outcome, in any case, was to generate a suspiciousness in Congress and an uproar in the liberal press that have forced the CIA further into the open than is good for a secret state mechanism. It now has no choice but to stand in the dock while its role and mission are examined.

"The big problem," Representative Nedzi says, "is determining the role of secret institutions in a free, democratic society." But that is only one problem beside other problems. We should also be asking ourselves whether the U.S. can remain "a free, democratic society" without the kind of secret organization that the CIA has to be in order to do its job effectively.

There seems to be no reason to doubt that the ordeal of investigations and hearings and reorganizations will leave the CIA weakened and its operations curtailed. The agency's main business is collecting and analyzing what in the trade is called "high-level positive foreign intelligence"—information concerning the actions and intentions of other states that bear, for ill or otherwise, on the American situation. That function, including available clandestine techniques for enriching the harvest, especially of a political and military nature, is not likely to be taken from the agency, although the sharing of the product between the executive and legislative branches is certain to be broadened, not without risk, perhaps foolishly.

But the functions that have kept the CIA in hot water at home while it has prosecuted the Cold War abroad—clandestine activities ranging from classical espionage and counterintelligence operations to political actions aimed at thwarting hostile developments in other countries—are plainly marked for peremptory amputation.

The leakiest vessels in town

In fact, the CIA, for all practical purposes, is already out of the covert political action business under a prohibition imposed in the last hours of the Ninety-third Congress by a little-noticed amendment tacked on to the foreign-aid bill by

a little-known California Democrat, Representative Leo Ryan. The new law forbids the President to use funds appropriated to the CIA for any operation abroad (except for collecting information) without justifying the intended use in a detailed report to Congress—including specifically, the seventeen-member Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the thirty-four-member House Foreign Affairs Committee. These two bodies are esteemed by the Washington press corps as the leakiest vessels in town.

No President in his right mind would enter into such a transaction. Disclosure would almost certainly doom any secret enterprise, and bring embarrassment to whatever foreign movement the U.S. government wished to help.

The CIA has been unique among national intelligence organizations in that it is subject to legislative oversight and lays out its operations before members of Congress when it asks for funds. In Britain, MI6, the agency's counterpart on the clandestine side, is lodged discreetly and impenetrably inside the Foreign Office and serves the Prime Minister directly. Parliament through the generations has tolerated the separateness on the practical grounds that certain necessary state business is most usefully pursued in secrecy. Yet, in spite of the potential weakness in the CIA's armor, friendly intelligence services have for a quarter of a century worked trustingly with its officers, and indeed vied with one another for a special relationship, admiring as many did the CIA's unmatched technical resources and the high quality of its people.

A business dependent on trust

Now that relationship has been shaken—not because of a loss of confidence in the agency itself, but rather because in the eyes of foreign intelligence establishments the CIA is no longer permitted to keep its secrets from Congress and the press. A recently retired senior CIA intelligence officer, who had intimate contact with all the major non-Communist services and still remains in touch with them, finds that many of his old friends are reluctant to work with the agency. "These people are worried and scared," he said. "Our business is tremendously dependent on trust. If they have something sensitive, they're loath to share it with us, lest it come out that they had been involved."

Colby himself, shaken by the recolling of the CIA's foreign collaborators, issued a warning at a congressional hearing that "the almost hysterical excitement" about the CIA could jeopardize its effectiveness. The wonderment and consternation produced in friendly for-

eign capitals by the compulsive undressing of the CIA was vividly expressed by a diplomat experienced in this work when he exclaimed, aghast, "You Americans don't have a country over there. You have a huge church."

The Administration might have been expected to try to block the Ryan amendment, but instead let it slip through Congress without serious challenge on the floor. The reasoning behind the inaction was blatantly political. Given the mood of Congress, the loss of American zest for foreign involvements, and the uncloaking of the agency's role in Chile and other countries, the decision at the White House was that an arm's-length stance would most become the President until the Rockefeller Commission issued its verdict.

In President Ford's defense, it should be said that he does not have enough fingers to plug all the leaks in the dike. The CIA has an excess of troubles these days. It is a victim of, among other things, the pervasive mistrust of government secrecy. Watergate, along with all its other bad consequences, tipped the balance in the contentious issue of the government's right to secrets. Some people apparently believe that the government has no right to any secrets, a view that, if it prevails, will be fatal to the function of intelligence.

One result of the heightened suspicion of secrecy was the amending of the Freedom of Information Act. Under the amendments passed in the final weeks of the Ninety-third Congress, any federal body, even the CIA, must respond to any request for a classified document. If the response is negative, the government can be compelled to justify its grounds for refusal in court.

In original intent, the law was meant to prod the government into letting scholars and journalists look into classified files no longer deserving of a security lock. But the language of the law, if allowed to stand, could open the files of the CIA to the public. Several test cases are now before the courts.

Fenced in by the Forty Committee

The CIA has also been a casualty of detente. Henry Kissinger's objective throughout the six and a half years that he has been guiding U.S. foreign policy has been to convince the Russians, and the Chinese too, that the Cold War was finished as far as the U.S. was concerned. Curtailing the CIA's covert interventions has been one way of getting the message to Moscow and Peking.

Kissinger was able to bring about this curtailment in his capacity as the President's deputy in the transactions of the National Security Council, to which the CIA is generally responsible, and, most

directly, in his chairmanship of the Forty Committee. This committee takes its curious name from the number on a top-secret NSC memo stipulating its responsibilities, one of which is to set the metes and bounds of the CIA's covert activities.

How far the CIA's political activities abroad have shrunk can be judged from its inaction in Portugal, in a kind of situation where in the past its talents would have been resolutely brought into play. After the military takeover in April, 1974, it gradually became apparent that the Communists dominated the Armed Forces Movement. The only practical way for Portugal's NATO partners to prevent a Communist takeover was to foster, discreetly, a coalition of the Conservative moderates and the Socialists under the Socialist leader Mario Soares.

But Secretary Kissinger was loath to commit the CIA to such a campaign, lest its role be exposed and the outcry in Congress and the press against CIA meddling in the politics of other countries be redoubled. When Europeans finally mustered the resolve to fill the vacuum and set about rallying support around Soares, it was too late.

An inspiration at State

Until the advent of the Kennedy Administration, the clandestine side of the CIA was the ascendant side, under an official with the bland title Deputy Director for Plans. His Directorate of Plans managed some 7,000 people, or about two-fifths of the CIA's total force of about 17,000 (now somewhat fewer as a result of firings, early retirements, and attrition), and consumed about half of the agency's budget of some \$600 million a year. The resources at his disposal included several highly professional air services, of which Air America has been the most publicized; various paramilitary organizations now in skeletal status; a superb worldwide communications system; and some hundreds of officers attached to or working out from some fourscore stations abroad, mostly in U.S. embassies and consulates.

When the CIA was set up in 1947, it was ill equipped for the war of wits that covert political action demands. Its only going resources at the start were the straightforward intelligence-collecting and counterintelligence functions that it had been able to salvage from the demobilized Office of Strategic Services.

The mechanism for countering the Communist political subversion then epidemic in Europe was the inspiration of the policy-planning staff of the State Department. Basically, the intent was to provide the U.S. government with a covert instrument for funneling funds into non-Communist political organizations. Such funds went mostly for the support

of newspapers and journals and the organization of public meetings and demonstrations, all toward the end of making sure that Europe's still feeble parliamentary processes were not paralyzed by the threatening specter of Communism.

The late Frank C. Wisner, a lawyer and a resourceful veteran of OSS service in the Balkans, assembled the basic machinery of the CIA's political-action services behind a facade called the Office of Policy Coordination. His headquarters was in a group of prefab structures belonging to the new agency, situated along the reflecting pool that stretches in front of the Lincoln Memorial. The CIA provided him with funds, but he looked to the State Department and the Pentagon for guidance and targets. He did the work they wanted done but could not or would not do themselves.

The struggle for votes

This was the period, 1947-50, that witnessed the Soviet subjection of Rumania and Czechoslovakia and the struggle to save Italy, Greece, even France and West Germany, from going Communist. Wisner's organization, spiritedly supported by the CIA's expanding intelligence and counterintelligence services, played a telling, perhaps even decisive role in the defeat of the Communists in the Italian elections of 1948 and in the Greek elections of the early 1950's.

Considering the stakes, the expenditures were modest, only a few million dollars in each operation. And the experience was valuable in the education of the small, elite body of political-action tacticians whom Wisner recruited—a good many lawyers, with a sprinkling of economists, historians, bankers, and journalists.

In 1950, General Walter Bedell Smith, Eisenhower's wartime Chief of Staff, was made director of the agency. He soon decided to bring Wisner's operations under his direct control, alongside covert intelligence. He put Wisner in charge of both functions, which gave rise to the Directorate of Plans, but Wisner continued, as before, to take guidance from the White House in all covert political action.

After Smith came Allen Dulles, who took over in 1953, in the early months of the Eisenhower Administration. Intuitive and bold, Dulles had penetrated the German Foreign Office during World War II while in charge of OSS operations in Europe. While still Smith's deputy at the CIA, he had broadened the political-action services to meet the Communist covert war in new sectors: the European labor movements and student and youth organizations.

The CIA has a bad image these days, partly because so much of the commentary about the agency has been hostile or

uninformed, and to some minds anything it does seems at least faintly sinister. But there certainly was nothing sinister about the CIA's political actions. There has been a cloak of secrecy sometimes, to be sure, but never a dagger. When the full story comes out, it will be clear that the much-rumored plot to kill Fidel Castro back in the early 1960's was not hatched by the CIA.

To a large extent, the "dirty tricks" in political action have consisted of efforts to counter Soviet activities by recruiting intellectuals, mostly from the universities, training them in paramilitary tactics, and dispatching them abroad to duel with KGB "agents of influence" and their dupes at various international congresses and conferences. The CIA presence was there by invitation of the host countries. The shared purpose was to keep the KGB and the local Communist apparatus from turning these meetings into anti-American, anti-NATO demonstrations, and fomenting disorder in friendly societies.

Gloria Steinem, now a leader in the women's liberation movement and editor of *Ms.* magazine, worked with the CIA in helping to organize some of the volunteers who attended the World Youth Festivals in Vienna in 1959 and Helsinki in 1962. The CIA people, she later explained, "wanted to do what we wanted to do—present a healthy, diverse view of the United States."

The CIA has involved itself in some dangerous and violent operations, of course. It has proved itself to be pretty good, for example, at conducting small-scale warfare. In the ruin of the American intervention in Vietnam, and with the CIA's world role and mission in danger of irrational truncation, it is important to recall the effectiveness of the agency's paramilitary operations in Indochina. The successes proved to be only temporary, as matters turned out, but the disasters that overwhelmed them were not of the CIA's making.

The CIA's small-war intervention in Laos, beginning in the early 1960's, was a highly effective enterprise. It consisted mostly of supplying Meo tribesmen with rifles, some artillery, air resupply, pay (a few dollars a month), and communications, together with training and administrative support that never engaged more than a few hundred CIA people at any one time.

After ten years of marching and countermarching, the battle lines were about where they were when the agency first set about organizing the Meo tribesmen. Only after South Vietnam and Cambodia fell were the Communists able to prevail in Laos. The so-called secret war there, not really secret at all, took the lives of eight CIA men, and cost

about \$1 million a week in the last years.

A better way in Vietnam

CIA guerilla-warfare specialists also operated effectively in Vietnam in the early 1960's. In those years the director of the CIA was John McCone, a businessman as admired at the agency for his acumen as Dulles had been for his verve and style. Looking back, McCone regrets that the U.S. did not stick to doing things the CIA's way in Vietnam.

"In 1961-62," he recalls, "we had a sound plan—an experienced military assistance group in Saigon and the beginnings of a covert U.S.-directed operation calculated to teach the Vietnamese how to arm for and fight a guerrilla war. The aim was to keep the Diem government afloat without committing sizable U.S. ground forces. Sure, that part of it was covert, but no more so than the Communist force already in the field.

"I remain convinced that if the CIA had been left to develop that strategy, with the Pentagon's help, the Vietcong would have been held at bay, and Hanoi's Soviet and Chinese suppliers would never have let the action escalate on anything like the scale that the increasing direct American military intervention brought on. The war might still be going on, on a small scale, in the countryside, but the United States would have escaped a massive failure."

Win one, lose one in Chile

On the political-action side, McCone points with pride at the CIA's handling of Marxist Salvador Allende's first serious challenge in Chile, in 1964. "As early as 1962," he says, "President Kennedy had decided in the National Security Council that the agency should see to it that Castro's agitators did not take Chile into the Communist camp under Allende's banner. In 1964 that decision was confirmed by President Johnson.

"A sounding indicated that Allende might well slip in. Our effort was centered on promoting in public discussion the proposition that it was in the common interest of the Christian Democrats and the other non-Communist parties to come together against a Communist party heavily financed by Cuba and the Soviet bloc. That was all the political action amounted to. Nothing more. A handful of intelligence officers experienced in political organization, frugal expenditure, and a good case."

That time the CIA succeeded. Six years later, however, when Allende made his next bid, the attention of the White House was occupied elsewhere. The CIA's covert political function was on the way out. Suddenly, in early September, 1970, the State Department awakened to the fact that Allende had

emerged in first place in the presidential election, with 36 percent of the popular vote to just under 35 percent for the Conservative candidate and not quite 29 percent for the Christian Democrat. Inasmuch as no candidate had a majority, the choice was thrown into the legislature. With barely seven weeks left before the legislature was to vote, the National Security Council ordered the CIA to head off Allende, if it could, by whipping up sentiment in friendly journals for an anti-Communist coalition. But the bugle sounded too late.

McCone defends covert action such as the CIA took in Chile as a valid means of defending national interests. "Where situations favor covert action, the President must consider such action, and the Congress must tolerate it, provided it is in direct support of a declared national policy. Covert action is a rational alternative to an overt response, as in Vietnam, that can turn costly, unavailing, and humiliating. Covert action is a useful, even indispensable means of self-defense. As the agency has employed this method in many situations, it was the only way of making the voice of reason heard in foreign places."

Today the CIA's capacity for covert action is in shards, at least temporarily. And the responsibility does not lie with Congress alone. When James Schlesinger, now Secretary of Defense, moved into the CIA directorship in January, 1973, he had an unmistakable commission to dismantle the Directorate of Plans, among other things.

Schlesinger succeeded Richard Helms, a wartime OSS officer who had risen in that "band of brothers" under Dulles and Wisner to become Deputy Director for Plans in 1962 and director of the agency in 1966. President Nixon's men pushed Helms aside because of his refusal to let the agency be used as a shield for the Watergate break-in. His abrupt departure, to be Ambassador to Iran, was taken inside the agency as a signal that the old guard of professionals was in for a change.

A hand-carried letter

The grapevine was right, as it should be in any intelligence service worth its salt. A force reduction on the order of 7 percent was executed at once, producing the dismissal, resignation, or early retirement of about 1,000 people. The cuts fell most deeply on the Directorate of Plans, where the senior layer was all but peeled off.

Among the most prominent casualties were officers who had come out of the OSS, and had spent their careers in Plans, alongside Helms. Two senior officers were given a hand-carried letter in the morning, notifying them that their

services would no longer be required after the close of that day's business.

The counterintelligence service—the best by far in the non-Communist world and the binding element for many of the others—was cut in half. Three senior officers quit in disgust after their chief, James Angleton, was let go. All in all, the share of the agency budget going into clandestine services was severely compressed. To Schlesinger, the departure of the “old boys” was no occasion for weeping; to him, they were “relics of the Cold War.”

The Directorate of Plans was renamed the Directorate for Operations. To take charge of it Schlesinger promoted William Colby, a Princeton man who, like Helms and Wisner, came into the agency from the OSS and had passed his whole career on the clandestine side. For five years (1962-67) he was chief of the Far East Division, and for three years (1968-71) he ran with skill and resolution the controversial Phoenix plan aimed at uprooting the Communists from villages in South Vietnam.

The man who came in from the cold

The ascent of a veteran black-side man to be head of what was left of the old Directorate of Plans—and later to be head of the shrunken CIA—was not as odd as it looked. Colby had come in from the cold. He had perceived that détente had altered the role of the CIA. He had also come to realize that, given the mood of Congress, the indifference of the press to the strategic value of intelligence, and the American people's mounting aversion to foreign involvements, the clandestine side had become so vulnerable as to make it all but ineffective.

Colby, then, is resigned to the prospect that the CIA will change into something different from the CIA he worked in for so many years. “Just tell us in the intelligence business what the nation wants and does not want,” he said at a congressional hearing, “and we will do our best to satisfy it.”

He is too knowledgeable and serious a man, however, to be willing to see the capability for clandestine political action struck down entirely. The President, he says, must be left with a mechanism that in certain situations will allow him “a choice between a diplomatic protest and sending in the Marines.” But even that remnant is in jeopardy, unless the President is prepared to fight Congress for it.

If the black side should be extirpated, or transferred elsewhere, the agency wouldn't be without work. Two crucial functions are not in dispute: the collection of intelligence information and the analysis of what is collected. Within the collecting process, the CIA conducts three different programs: electronic surveillance (listening in on electronic

emissions of all sorts); photographic reconnaissance utilizing satellites and the high-flying U-2 and SR-71 aircraft; and the collection of intelligence, both covert and overt, by people.

Looking into a closed society

McCone always held that the analytical process, leading to the drafting of the National Estimates from the grist brought to the mill at Langley, Virginia, was the agency's most important (and least appreciated) function. Spying by means of high technology has had the effect of legitimizing the clandestine side of the collection process, and has given the analysts more hard intelligence to work with than ever came from human spies alone. In combination with over-the-horizon radar and electronic techniques for monitoring alien communications, the spying satellites supply the only reliable and comprehensive means for looking down into a closed society and listening in on some of the business being transacted there.

Cameras and film have improved to the point where by some accounts something on the ground only a foot or so in length can be identified in a picture taken 100 miles above. The interpretive techniques have also gained in sureness. The photo interpreters are able to determine within narrow tolerances the physical dimensions and technical characteristics of the new Soviet weaponry as it comes into view—submarines and warships being assembled on the ways, prototype tactical aircraft being taxied on the tarmac, rocket engines firing up in the test beds, radar dishes under construction.

The CIA does not do all this demanding work alone. It flies the satellites in partnership with the Air Force, which provides and launches them. The cameras and film, together with the interpretation of the pictures, are the responsibility of the CIA. The Defense Department's National Security Agency has done a first-class job in monitoring the telemetry broadcast by Soviet missiles on test flights, and the drill sequences of Soviet technicians on the missile ranges.

From the data accumulated by these and other means, the CIA and its collaborators are able, in the case of a Soviet rocket, for example, to come up with a fair estimate of its performance. They can determine the rate of acceleration, burning interval, exhaust temperature, instant of cutoff, speed, trajectory, the behavior in trajectory, even the payload, and the accuracy at impact. It's a masterly exercise.

Colby believes that with high-technology surveillance so far advanced, “we could drop all the covert political operations and the country would stand.” He offers an example of how precise the

surveillance is these days: “We can say that on a certain date the Russians had exactly 1,618 ICBM's deployed. We are almost absolutely sure of the number.”

But knowing what is in place is only part of the knowledge that the CIA is expected to supply. The pictures projected on the magnifiers at the National Photographic Interpretation Center in southeast Washington can't tell the photo interpreters how many weapons of that type are to be deployed and where or the characteristics of the follow-on weapon no doubt already in preparation under concealing roofs. All that is hidden inside Russian heads, and is ascertainable only by the clandestine method now in disrepute—the gleanings of an agent, the secrets spilled by a defector.

Cameras over Cuba

The CIA's functioning in the Cuban missile crisis in the autumn of 1962 during McCone's stewardship, illustrates both the value of high-in-the-sky surveillance and the value of down-on-the-ground covert intelligence. McCone, an engineer by training, found the new technology of intelligence fascinating. “Technology,” in his words, “gives intelligence a new cutting edge.” But he also put a high value on clandestine intelligence, and was willing to spend money on the chance of getting it.

In the summer and early fall of 1962 the CIA collected from agents in Cuba some 1,300 reports of Russian missiles being moved about the island. State Department Sovietologists, however, told Kennedy that it would not accord with the Soviet mentality to put offensive nuclear weapons into another country.

McCone was persuaded that Khrushchev would try to do something to offset the American success with its ICBM's and his conviction crystallized as a result of the information being fed to MIE and CIA contacts by Colonel Oleg Penkovsky, a member of the Soviet State Scientific Committee. Penkovsky was attached to the Soviet equivalent of the American Joint Chiefs of Staff; he knew when weapons were scheduled for deployment, and was able to pass along word that for some reason only a small number of the only Soviet ICBM in advanced development, the huge SS-6, were to be released to the ready forces.

In the meantime, a heavy ship movement out of the Black Sea was being tracked into Cuba. It was much too large to be explained away as economic aid. The Soviet embassy in Washington had acknowledged that the U.S.S.R. was giving some anti-aircraft missiles to Castro for defensive purposes, but McCone asked himself why the Russians wanted SAM's in Cuba unless they had something to hide.

McCone persevered, and in October succeeded in inducing President Ken-

ready to authorize U-2 photographic flights over Cuba. The photographs taken the first three days revealed the construction of numerous missile sites. Each site showed a singular "trapezoidal" form in the positioning of the rocket launchers. From documents Penkovsky had given them, the CIA men at once recognized the arrangement as standard for the SS-4's and SS-5's with the Red Army in Europe. The SS-4 had a range of about 1,200 miles, and the SS-5 about 2,500. From Cuba, they could reach most of the cities in the U.S.

By then, the photo interpreters had been able to fix the total number of Soviet ICBM's in the operational forces at about seventy, only a fraction of what the U.S. Strategic Air Force had in place. There was no doubt then that the balance lay with the U.S. McCone said so, and Kennedy had this knowledge when he decided to move to a showdown.

A danger of blindness

With the new capabilities in high-technology surveillance, and the increased reliance on them, the CIA has passed into its third age. The Dulles-Wicham period was the first. It emphasized clandestine political action, but it also brought along all the pioneering technical apparatus. The McCone-Helms period, 1961-73, was the second age. Technology came to command the major assets, but the black side was given strong support. The Schlesinger-Colby succession introduced the third age, bringing on a withering away of the clandestine side, and an almost complete dependence on technology, together with analysis drawing mostly on open printed matter and diplomatic reporting.

Is the nation thereby made more vulnerable? For policing the hazy SALT covenants, in the face of the Soviet re-

fusal to allow on-the-ground inspection, the U.S., and the whole non-Communist world for that matter, must look primarily to photographic satellites. A camera, though, can record only what is in plain view. It is possible to fool or blind or render deaf the systems now in place. The Russians could make it much more difficult for us to comprehend their rocket telemetry, and there is some suspicion that they have undertaken to do so. Their submarine pens have been roofed over. There are even disturbing indications that they are edging past the prescriptions placed upon antiballistic systems by raising the power of the radars in place and testing what could be experimental ABM warheads from antiaircraft launchers.

The meaning of all this is not clear. But the pattern is worrisome. It supplies the best of reasons for keeping reckless hands in Congress off the CIA. EN

How Our Man in Tehran Brought Down a Demagogue

It may be instructive for Americans to be reminded, after the grand-scale squandering of lives, prestige, and wealth in Indochina, that another U.S. government, only a generation back, was capable of exercising power and influence deftly and unobtrusively in a potentially damaging international situation, and achieving success at a very moderate cost. The CIA exercised power that way in Iran in 1953. The performance was a gem in the art of clandestine political action.

The CIA task in Iran, laid upon it by President Eisenhower in the National Security Council, was to unhorse a rabble-rousing politician, Mohammed Mossedegh, memorable otherwise for an uncontrollable impulse to public weeping, who had maneuvered his way into the premiership two years earlier. Mossedegh had expelled the British, seized the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co.'s refinery at Abadan and nationalized its properties. A British boycott failed to bring Mossedegh around. He plotted with the Communist party of Iran, the Tudeh, to overthrow Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and hook up with the Soviet Union. To the Kremlin it was an attractive, if nettlesome, prospect, promising access to oil supplies and to the waters of the Persian Gulf.

To head off the danger that Iran would become a Soviet ally, if not satellite, Allen Dulles of the CIA dispatched to Tehran his Middle East operations chief, thirty-seven-year-old Kermit Roosevelt, grandson of T.R. He entered upon his mission under a cover that stayed on. Roosevelt's plan, which the Shah approved and in which the British were to be invisible partners,

called for the Iranian Army to seize Tehran, arrest the usurper and install a new Premier.

In mid-August, through bad luck, the enterprise failed. A attempt to arrest Mossedegh misfired. The Shah fled to Rome and shrieking mobs roamed through the capital. In Washington, Eisenhower's counselors urged the abandonment of a loathsome gamble; but Allen Dulles insisted that Roosevelt be given his head.

From a private house, never showing himself, working through half a dozen junior CIA officers and a small number of Iranian intelligence officers, Roosevelt succeeded within a week in steeling the Palace Guard in Tehran for action, and whipping up sentiment against Mossedegh in the press, among the merchants, and in the bazaars. Once the army moved, Mossedegh's strength melted away. The Shah returned to his palace, triumphant. Roosevelt left Tehran as inconspicuous as he had arrived. The enterprise cost the U.S. little more than his modest salary (about \$12,000 a year) and his travel expenses, plus an advance to the Shah's bodyguard of "a few tens of thousands" of dollars for back pay, a debt that the Shah quickly repaid.

The Iran operation supplied the CIA Directorate of Plans with a useful model. "The lesson was," as one official recently put it, "that a clandestine outfit need not take open command of a coup, or revolution. The intelligent way to control events is to recruit the right people, drill them carefully, and maneuver them into the right spots."

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL,
Friday, May 30, 1975

CIA DEFENDERS rally to protect the spy agency from its critics.

Rockefeller's special investigating commission, in its early-June report, will defend the CIA's oft-attacked covert operations. Director Colby goes public with a series of speeches asserting the need for covert activity. Ford associates ridicule a proposal to require that secret operations have the President's written approval plus advance briefing of 50 legislators. Officials warn of congressional leaks as well as diplomatic storms if a presidentially approved opera-

tion should blow up.

Administration leaders hope to persuade Congress, after its current inquiries, to set up a permanent joint committee on intelligence. It would monitor CIA activities but limit the danger of leaks. Officials complain that CIA men now shy away from taking strong positions for fear of leaks.

Ford's teammates, along with conservatives Goldwater and Tower, praise Sen. Church's CIA probe for a "responsible" approach so far.

WASHINGTON STAR
9 June 1975

Camp Facade Cloaks CIA Training School

By Jeremiah O'Leary
Washington Star Staff Writer

WILLIAMSBURG — Three miles west of Virginia's colonial capital on Route 143 toward Richmond, the only entrance to Camp Peary resembles the main gate of any U.S. military reservation with its guard shack, an armed M.P. and a chain-link fence topped with barbed wire.

The sign at the threshold reads: "Armed Forces Experimental Training Activity, Department of Defense, Camp Peary." There is nothing to indicate a super-secret function, but Camp Peary is a great deal more than it seems to be. Since 1951, this 10,000-acre tract of woodland and marsh on the banks of the York River has been the principal training center for the CIA.

The 50,000 residents of York and James City counties and the 10,000 inhabitants of Williamsburg have only the dimmest notion of what goes on inside Camp Peary. The eight retired generals and admirals who live at nearby Queen's Lake are close enough to hear gunfire and to see planes landing and taking off at the mile-long runway at Camp Peary but they do not ask questions.

Williamsburg's weekly, the *Virginia Gazette*, exposed Camp Peary as the CIA's training base three years ago using second-hand accounts but no reporter from that paper or any other is known to have set foot in the camp until I did recently. That is because the listed public relations officer is also Camp Peary's security officer.

MUCH OF WHAT has been written about the CIA's activities at Camp Peary emerged only in the past several years and nearly all of it consists of disclosures from a handful of former CIA officers who are disillusioned with the agency or actively antagonistic toward it. The writings and statements of men like Philip Agee, Joe Maggio, Victor Marchetti, John L. Marks and Patrick J. McGarvey revealed much about what the CIA was doing at Camp Peary, but these sources disagreed among themselves on some specifics of the activities at the CIA's West Point.

Marchetti and McGarvey both, however, linked Camp Peary with CIA assassination plans, including Operation Phoenix in South Vietnam. Marchetti said a number of contract employees trained at Peary for the counter-terror program that he said accounted for 40,000 dead Viet Cong infiltrators.

McGarvey, of Upper Marlboro, Md., said one of Camp Peary's missions was training in "neutralization of an infrastructure," to which he added, "Essentially, that's, saying you're killing people."

CAMP PEARY was well enough known when it came into being in 1942 as a training camp for World War II Navy Sea Bees.

Three times the size of Williams-

burg, Camp Peary encompassed a large portion of Bruton District in York County, including Magruder Village, Carter's Creek, Bigler Mill Pond and yet today the place does not appear on maps of the historic region.

There also are two 17th Century structures at Camp Peary that are erroneously remembered in Williamsburg as the Porto Bello Mansion. Boarded up and numbered as all military base buildings are, the two buildings were actually the customs houses for the colonial governors when Williamsburg was a port for shipping on the York and James rivers.

Nearly 70,000 sailors trained at Camp Peary until the state of Virginia acquired the site for a game preserve and reforestation project in 1948. When the camp became the CIA's covert training center during the Korean conflict, it effectively vanished from the public view.

The very isolation of Camp Peary, which is closed to the public and does not encourage visitors, has transformed the place into a dream world for conservationists and nature-lovers. Herds of deer are so tame that they wander fearlessly on the lawns and show up for daily handouts from the kitchens of CIA wives.

In one late afternoon visit, I saw beaver, muskrats, ground-hogs, foxes, wild turkeys and every variety of bird common or rare to these latitudes.

CAMP PEARY today has a small permanent cadre of less than 20 instructors and their families, the MP contingent, some maintenance personnel including a fire department, and a fluctuating student population in several courses of varying length that probably does not exceed 150. In all, the population of Camp Peary is placed at about 300.

There is a training course for newly hired officers entering training (presently the training class has about 35 JOT's: average age, the late twenties.) There is also a Basic Operations Course; an Advanced Operations Course and periodically there are senior seminars for veteran officers and mid-career courses somewhat like the periodic re-training courses known as "in-service" to the FBI at Quantico, Va.

If assassination ever was a part of CIA training, agency officers say every employee including those at Peary have now been required to submit a signed statement to Colby stating whether they have ever known of or been involved in any discussion or plan for an assassination.

AT PEARY today, the men and women are trained in the use of small arms, including 9 mm pistols and Swedish submachine guns, but it is denied that assassination has any

part in the curriculum. It is acknowledged that there are escape and evasion tests, with trainees trying to evade "capture"; some close-combat work in simulated villages and in border-crossing — in which trainees get a workout trying to penetrate a frontier system like that along the Iron Curtain.

For parachute training or heavy weapons work, the CIA's people go to places like Ft. Benning and Ft. Bragg.

"This is a place like Benning or Parris Island," said one experienced source. "We teach self-defense, unarmed combat and the like. Flat and heel of the hand, not fists or karate. There's a lot of work in the gym and we have good rifle and pistol ranges."

THE EMPHASIS, they say at Peary, is now on self-protection because of the growing incidence of terrorism around the world with Americans as targets. There is a course at Peary on the protection of CIA officers' homes and a sophisticated anti-kidnaping course that involves curious means of crashing into and evading other autos simulating terrorist roadblocks. This course was so interesting to King Hussein that he arranged for one just like it in Jordan.

There are no more foreign national training at Peary. The last non-U.S. personnel to train there were members of the bodyguard of the late King Faisal of Saudi Arabia. The Saudi students were at Peary when the King was slain and promptly went home to Riyadh.

But Camp Peary is no longer exclusively for use of the CIA, either. There are now a small number of State Department officers on student status and soon there is expected to be a quantum expansion. It is reliably reported that the Defense Intelligence Agency, which once trained personnel at Ft. Holabird in Baltimore and now uses Ft. Huachuca, Ariz., will soon shift its training operations to Camp Peary.

MOST OF THE students live in modern brick barracks, a BOQ (Bachelor Officers Quarters) for the men and WOQ for the women trainees. There is a small but well-appointed club, stamped from the mold of officers' clubs all over the United States, complete with swimming pool. The permanent staff has modest ranch-style houses for which they pay \$135 a month. There are some older homes here that existed before Peary became a naval training base and some of the childless couples and married M.P.s live in these.

Only bare concrete floors, now beginning to sprout saplings in the cracks, remain of the World War II wooden barracks used the Sea Bees and many of these areas are nearly

hidden by the underbrush.

At least two of the old farm houses, especially remodeled inside and with scenic views of the river and lakes, are set aside for VIP visitors. Colby is a periodic visitor when he wants to get away from his weekly grind and his publicly listed Bethesda home telephone. Former CIA Director James R. Schlesinger, now secretary of defense and nominal landlord of Camp Peary, is a dedicated bird-watcher and often comes to the reservation to pursue his hobby.

It is reported but unverified that certain key members of Congress also are permitted to use Camp Peary as a vacation spot because of

its unparalleled fishing and hunting and absolute isolation. It is also reported that Peary is used by the CIA as a "safe house" for defectors or others.

The CIA continues to send its trainees into outside communities on training missions. Right now, the exercises in tailing, surveillance, secret meetings and message drops are being conducted in and around Richmond department stores with instructors watching and marking the trainees as they work against veterans sent down from Washington to test their skill at the requirements of espionage on the streets.

IN THE PAST, the Gazette editori-

ally took umbrage at Camp Peary on the presumption that it was a training ground for assassination and surveillance. The paper called on the Virginia senators and Rep. Thomas N. Downing, D-Va, in whose district the camp is located, to investigate and put a stop to it all.

Downing said he has had a blanket invitation from CIA headquarters since 1972 to make an inch-by-inch examination of Camp Peary whenever he wishes. He said he had been assured by the CIA that there never was any training at Camp Peary in assassination or with mini-nukes and added, "I think that's probably true."

WASHINGTON POST

12 June 1975

'The Need for Intelligence'

WE DIRECT YOUR ATTENTION to a relatively brief and unobtrusive passage in the Rockefeller commission report which is reprinted elsewhere on this page today. Entitled Chapter 2, "The Need for Intelligence," it addresses a consideration that is easy to overlook in the rush to judge the CIA's misdeeds. The CIA's past excesses and misdeeds are critically important. But so is this country's need for an effective intelligence system. This need is not rooted in outdated and excessive apprehensions, but in an appreciation of contemporary reality: the world is complex and fast-changing, and some nations in it are hostile to our own. The proper purpose of the extraordinary purgative exercise now being directed at the CIA—of which the Rockefeller commission report is a part—is to ensure that, without assailing citizens' rights, policy makers will continue to have the information and analysis they need to make decisions. This is basic.

Now, while a much greater proportion of this information could be made public and thereby shared and tested in timely fashion, it nonetheless remains necessary in our view that much of the collection and analysis of it must be done on a discreet, that is to say, secret, basis. We shape, and execute domestic policy in the open, or we should, on the presumption that all of us have the nation's best interests at heart. But in the formulation of national security policy it would be foolish to ignore that some of those who would observe the policy-making process have interests in conflict with our own. That is the rationale for some secrecy in this area. For a newspaper to accept this rationale even while it does its daily darndest to unlock official secrets is merely a necessary fact of life in a society trying at once to be faithful to its highest domestic values, and to survive in an often-hostile international environment. Citizens must, we believe, accept both requirements as legitimate and honorable.

It must be understood that nations—and, especially, but not exclusively, those which are our adversaries—commonly try to penetrate or confound each other's intelligence systems. This makes it essential to protect one's own system by erecting defenses that come under the name of counter-intelligence. The Rockefeller commission report shows the danger here: some activities undertaken in the name or form of counter-intelligence led the CIA outside its charter and outside the law. It is wrong, however, to label any effort to establish guidelines for counter-intelligence procedures—procedures which unavoidably take place on domestic soil—as a step which legitimizes domestic "spying." Hard discussion is needed on the report's proposals that the CIA be permitted to collect information on employees and, in coordination with the FBI, on persons posing a "clear threat" to its facilities or personnel and on "persons suspected of espionage or other illegal activities relating to foreign intelligence." This discussion must proceed from a double awareness of past pitfalls and continuing counter-intelligence needs.

The commission notes, for instance, that some Communist countries "can" monitor Americans' private phone conversations by the thousand; this makes some Americans "potentially subject" to blackmail. That a foreign power "can" tap an American's phone does not excuse the CIA from actually having done so. It is one of this country's proudest boasts that, at its best, it holds itself to standards that it expects no other country to meet. But it would be frivolous to proceed from there to conclude that the large intelligence effort which, say, Russia has mounted in this country can safely be ignored. In the drive to ensure that the CIA is cleansed of its excesses and improprieties, its legitimate functions must not be impaired.

THE GUARDIAN MANCHESTER

3 May 1975

No Intelligence cash for Federalists

Sir,—In the Guardian (May 2) you quoted Mr Body, MP for Holland-with-Boston, as saying that "the Federal Trust has received a great deal of money from the CIA."

This statement is completely untrue. The Federal Trust has never received any money from the CIA in any shape or form. Such an allegation to the effect

that it has received CIA money might cause great damage to the Federal Trust and adversely affect its sources of donation and income—Yours, etc.

(Sir) John Foster,
Chairman of Trustees,
Federal Trust for Education
and Research,
12a Maddox Street,
London W1.

NATIONAL REVIEW

6 JUNE 1975

■ Signs of the times: A lecture agent has advised David Phillips, the CIA man who has resigned from the Agency to undertake its defense, that whereas he can expect to make from \$5,000 to \$10,000 a year on lectures defending the Agency, he could make between \$50,000 and 100,000 a year attacking it.

'Operation Chaos'...

Instead of the whitewash that many critics had predicted, the Rockefeller Commission's report on the domestic activities of the Central Intelligence Agency is a trenchant, actual and plain-spoken document. It presents an appalling picture of illegal and improper actions conducted against American citizens in a wide range of activities and over a long period of time.

The National Security Act of 1947 establishing the C.I.A. explicitly forbade the agency from exercising any "police, subpoena, or law-enforcement powers or internal security functions." Although the word "foreign" is nowhere used in the statute, it was clearly understood that the C.I.A. was to engage only in collecting foreign intelligence.

Yet when domestic turmoil began to develop in the mid-sixties in campus demonstrations, rebellions in the black slums and the widespread protest movement against the Vietnam war, the C.I.A. under Richard Helms responded to the pressure from President Johnson to investigate domestic dissidents in the hope of finding embarrassing links to Communist countries.

No such links were ever found, but the White House pressure to pursue this will-o-the-wisp greatly intensified during the first four years of the Nixon Administration. It would be laughable if it were not sinister that the C.I.A.'s code name for this wholly illegal investigative project was "Operation Chaos."

It is horrifying to learn that the C.I.A. had undercover contacts monitor the meetings of groups such as the Southern Christian Leadership Conference and the Washington Urban League. It maintained files on nearly a thousand organizations. By August, 1973, when C.I.A. Director Colby virtually halted this project, "the paper trail left by Operation Chaos included somewhere in the area of 13,000 files on subjects and individuals," the report discloses. Linked to this was a computer system containing an index of over 300,000 names and organizations, almost all of them of United States citizens and organizations unconnected with espionage.

Mr. Helms and the high officials of the Johnson and Nixon Administrations with whom he dealt were well aware that they were breaking the law. Thus, in submitting to Henry Kissinger a report on "Restless Youth," Mr. Helms wrote in a covering memorandum early in 1969 that a section on American students was "extremely sensitive" because the whole area was outside the agency's charter.

For twenty years beginning in 1953, the C.I.A. surveyed mail between this country and the Soviet Union, opening several thousand letters each year. This, too, was in clear violation of the law and was finally halted at the insistence of the Chief Postal Inspector.

Like the Federal Bureau of Investigation under the late J. Edgar Hoover, the C.I.A. in selected instances engaged in wiretapping and burglary—sometimes on its own and sometimes in collaboration with the F.B.I.

What emerges from this report's account of Operation Chaos and of mail interception, wiretapping and other misconduct is the picture of an embryonic police state. The press disclosures that forced this Presidential directed inquiry by the Rockefeller Commission and the further investigations to come by the Senate and House committee have served to alert the nation to a development profoundly dangerous to constitutional democracy.

... C.I.A. Reform ...

The revelations in the Rockefeller report demonstrate the unwisdom of freeing the Central Intelligence Agency from all the normal legal and institutional procedures that serve to review and restrain the exercise of power, by ordinary government agencies. The law establishing the C.I.A. placed total reliance upon the good judgment

of the President and the C.I.A. director.

Even at the outset, in the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations and under the canny leadership of Allen Dulles, this reliance proved insufficient to prevent some illegal activities such as the extensive mail interception program. Under later Presidents this control system totally failed.

The recommendations of the Rockefeller Commission, sound as far as they go, largely add up to imposing the restraints that help control other bureaucracies. It urges that Congress seriously consider making the C.I.A.'s budget "at least to some extent" a matter of public knowledge, instead of concealing it—as is now done—in fictitious items listed in various departmental budgets. Quite apart from all the obvious dangers such loose practice presents, it does not even seem to meet the explicit requirements of the Constitution.

The agency has not only been largely immune from the inquiries of the General Accounting Office, Congress's investigatory arm, but also has felt free to mislead the Office of Management and Budget, the President's agent for fiscal control. Amending the law and executive orders to make it clear that the C.I.A. can no longer escape normal budgetary control, would do much, all by itself, to uncover and perhaps prevent the expenditure of large sums of money on illegal operations.

The C.I.A. has traditionally had an understanding with the Attorney General that the agency would investigate any criminal charges against its own employees and not refer them to the Justice Department. The commission is right to urge that this "gentleman's agreement" be abrogated and that the Justice Department reassume its proper prosecutorial role.

The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and the Congressional supervisory committees have all failed in their trust. Had they been vigilant and aggressive the shocking misdeeds now being exposed could never have occurred or would soon have been curbed. The commission wisely recommends that the powers of the advisory board be strengthened and that Congress at long last establish a joint committee on intelligence, but not too much reliance can be placed on either of these reforms.

In this dangerous world, the United States must have a well-run agency to gather information about foreign nations, especially those that may have hostile designs. The excesses and aberrations of the C.I.A. do not erase that necessity, nor do they cancel out the useful work the agency has performed at times in assessing various critical international situations.

The challenge to President Ford and to Congress is to devise institutions and procedures strong enough and supple enough to enable the C.I.A. to perform its essential overseas tasks without simultaneously swirling out of control and becoming a covert menace to the very freedoms it is supposed to be protecting.

... Assassination Blot

The best way to avoid suspicions of a cover-up is not to cover up. President Ford's explanations for withholding those portions of the Rockefeller Commission's report concerning allegations of political assassinations only compound the injury already inflicted by massive leaks and innuendo on this sordid issue.

It is no excuse to say, as the President did, that the subject is "extremely sensitive." Indeed it is, which is why a full and authoritative statement is the only way to prevent half-truths and gossip from acquiring a life and credibility of their own. For the President simply to refer darkly to unspecified incidents of the past fifteen or twenty years is in itself a veiled indictment susceptible to misuse for partisan political purposes.

The President personally broadened the Rockefeller

WASHINGTON POST
11 June 1975

Controversial Acts Laid to System, Rather Than Individuals

'Reforms' Might Legitimize Spying in U.S.

By William Greider

Washington Post Staff Writer

The Rockefeller commission's report on the Central Intelligence Agency's domestic misdeeds sidesteps some crucial questions about who's to blame and will probably provoke new debate over how to control the secret agency.

The investigation compiled and analyzed a mountain of previously secret data, made public yesterday, on the domestic activities which got the CIA in trouble last winter when they were first revealed. The commission concludes that many of these—spying on political dissidents, mail openings, keeping secret files on American citizens—went beyond the proper limits of the CIA's charter, if not beyond the law itself.

But the findings get fuzzy when it comes to resolving the conflicting testimony of high officials over who authorized these enterprises. The blame falls more on the system, less on individuals, some of whom are still in government. In short, the report did not answer the question: who is lying?

Second, while the commission recommends that a wide variety of CIA practices, from burglary to mail opening, should be permanently forbidden, its recommendations for "reforms" may also be read as legitimizing some of the CIA's controversial surveillance activities inside the United States.

The eight-member commission, chaired by the Vice President, was born six months ago amid widespread skepticism because its membership was dominated by cold warriors long associated with the "intelligence community." Now that the commission's report is public, questions seem likely to continue.

The commission proposed amendments to the National Security Act of 1947 to

eliminate "ambiguities" about what the CIA can and

News Analysis

cannot do, but the clarifications in some cases might actually strengthen the agency's ability to participate in domestic security cases.

The proposed amendments, for instance, would say explicitly what many people assumed was already in the law—that the CIA activities must concentrate on "foreign intelligence" only. Yet they would also grant the agency explicit authority "for providing guidance and technical assistance to other agency and department heads in protecting against unauthorized disclosures within their own agencies and departments."

Language such as "guidance and technical assistance" is subject to stretching when a bureaucracy seeks to expand its role. Would "technical assistance" cover the red wig and spy camera which the CIA provided to the White House "plumbers"? Could the CIA assign undercover agents for "guidance" to another federal agency that is chasing domestic suspects?

Likewise, the commission called on President Ford to issue an executive order defining more narrowly what domestic surveillance activities the CIA can properly undertake on American citizens. It is at least arguable that the proposed limits might authorize some of the very spying on domestic political dissidents which provoked the current controversy.

The executive order, for instance, would permit surveillance on anyone associated with the CIA, past or present, for security purposes. That means the agency could bird-dog author and ex-agency official Victor Marchetti, which it did in 1971.

Commission's assignment to include the reports of United States involvement through CIA in the ugly business of plotting the murder of foreign rulers. Whatever facts the commission's inquiry established should now be made public, along with whatever additional material emerges from the independent investigations now being made by two Congressional committees.

In the absence of such disclosure, Mr. Ford's statement that "I am totally opposed to political assassination" is more fatuous than reassuring.

Directors of CIA Since 1947

Since its formation in 1947, the Central Intelligence Agency has been headed by:

- Rear Adm. Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, 1947 to 1950.
- Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, 1950 to 1953.
- Allen W. Dulles, 1953 to 1961.
- John A. McCone, 1961 to 1966.
- Richard M. Helms, 1966 to 1973.
- James R. Schlesinger, 1973 (two months).
- William E. Colby, 1973 to present.

The agency would be permitted to collect information, secretly or otherwise, on any "person or activities" that pose a clear threat to CIA facilities — "Provided that proper coordination with the FBI is accomplished." Who would determine if an individual or organization is a threat? The director of central intelligence.

That is the same rationale that the CIA used to justify placing at least 12 infiltrators in Washington area anti-war groups—Women's Strike for Peace, the Washington Peace Center, Congress on Racial Equality and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, among others. Those particular activities went too far, the commission concluded, but the basic rationale was accepted.

"The CIA should not infiltrate dissident groups or other organizations of Americans," the commission said, "in the absence of a written determination by the director of central intelligence that such action is necessary to meet a clear danger to agency facilities, operations or personnel and that adequate coverage by law enforcement agencies is unavailable."

If you turn that proposal inside out, it says the CIA can infiltrate those political groups if its director says it's okay and the FBI isn't doing the job—which is approximately the situation which government officials claimed in 1967 when that surveillance was begun.

The proposed executive order would also allow the CIA to investigate anyone

other illegal activities relating to foreign intelligence," provided again that it coordinates its operation with the FBI.

In the past, while the limits were vague and ill-defined, the general assumption was that the FBI had sole jurisdiction for investigating espionage cases. This new language could be interpreted as actually expanding the CIA's right to probe these matters [while still barring it from law-enforcement functions]. Further, the commission endorsed the CIA's efforts to get new legislation imposing criminal penalties on any of its employees, past or present, who divulge classified information.

Specific questions of what exactly happened inside the government which led to the string of improper activities are also only partially answered by the commission's final report.

The commission concluded, as former CIA Director Richard M. Helms has insisted, that the intelligence agency was under considerable pressure from two Presidents—Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard M. Nixon—to pursue investigations of domestic peace groups and their possible links with foreign governments.

Beyond that general framework, the report begged more specific questions about which White House officials told which CIA officials what to do. Helms, according to the report, alternately resisted pressures to get into domestic spying and then launched spying projects. Helms kept these activities super-secret, even from top officials of the CIA. Yet he testified

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
12 June 1975

Opening 'invisible government'

Writing in "The Invisible Government" 11 years ago, authors David Wise and Thomas Ross noted that the intelligence community had achieved "a quasi-independent status and power of its own" and that "the public, the President, and the Congress must support steps to control the intelligence establishment, to place checks on its power, and to make it truly accountable."

With the release of the Rockefeller commission's findings on the Central Intelligence Agency, that message is even more relevant today.

It is pointless to argue whether the CIA's indiscretions and illegalities were "massive." The fact remains that the agency spied upon thousands of Americans for many years, infiltrated domestic groups, monitored phone calls and private mail in the United States, and tested drugs on unknown human guinea pigs—all in violation of its 1947 charter.

Much of the blame must be placed on former presidents who misused the CIA, sometimes for purely political purposes, and congressional oversight committees more interested in maintaining "deniability" than getting at the facts. The cold-war thinking that led to these circumstances within the U.S. intelligence community is perhaps understandable, but it in no way justifies the degree to which laws were broken and power abused.

The Rockefeller commission did a good job in reviewing and interpreting CIA files, but much more needs to be done. Congressman James V. Stanton, who will head the new House investigative subcommittee, correctly described the report as "a starting mark." It remains for the two congressional committees to delve further into the CIA's past performance.

More important than probing the agency's history, however, and absolutely essential to reestablishing its credibility, will be the steps taken to prevent future illegality and abuse.

did not know whether it had been a "slip" and a mistake by department officials or "a tacit agreement."

The spokesman, Robert Havell, also said it was his "understanding" that a whole series of attorneys general during the 20-year life of the agreement had not been told of it.

SEVERAL previous attorneys general, including Herbert Brownell Jr., who held the post at the time the agreement began, said in interviews earlier in the day that they had no recollection of any such agreement.

The spokesman said, too, that as far as the Justice Department knew, no CIA employee had been prosecuted during the entire 20 years—apparently because of the agreement.

The Rockefeller commission stated that in 1954, the CIA "pointed out" to the Justice Department that "in many cases involving CIA, prosecution would require public disclosure of sensitive agency operations and procedures."

The commission report recommends that the CIA charter be changed to emphasize its proper role in matters of foreign security, that executive and joint congressional branch oversight committees be established, that the agency's budget be made at least partially public, and that the CIA cease from maintaining files on Americans. Any CIA director, the report rightly states, must be a person with "judgment, courage, and independence to resist improper pressures."

And the Rockefeller commission gets to the heart of what has caused the recent furor when it introduces a passage on investigative techniques and their misuse with this essential declaration: "Even an investigation within the CIA's authority must be conducted by lawful means." Aiding accountability in this regard would be the commission's recommendation that the CIA record who has authorized each investigation, why, and with what results.

As we have stated before, it is time for a thorough study of the CIA with a view to an overall restatement of its mandate and functions, including, for example, whether the subversion of foreign governments is ever an acceptable CIA activity.

In today's world, there remains a very real need for the sometimes unpleasant work of an intelligence gathering and analysis agency of government. But what has been lacking and is now so greatly needed is principled leadership and responsible monitoring. Some activities may have to remain covert, but the CIA must relinquish some of its independence in favor of accountability.

As CIA director William Colby himself has said, the intelligence profession in the United States "must be . . . conducted on American principles and . . . must be more open and responsive to our public than the intelligence activities of other nations."

said. "But subsequently, the director of the CIA sent a letter to either the attorney general or the deputy attorney general saying, 'This is how it will work and we will do it this way—the investigations—unless we hear to the contrary.'"

"AND SO FAR as we can determine," he went on, "the letter went unanswered. So that procedure went on till January of this year."

He added: "So far as we know, no one was prosecuted during that time."

The CIA was created by the National Security Act of 1947. The act's statement of the CIA's powers and duties includes the following proviso after the list of powers: "Provided, that the agency shall have no police, subpoena, law enforcement powers, or internal security functions."

Presumably, this is the language that led to the Rockefeller commission's conclusion that the secret agreement had "involved directly in forbidden law enforcement activities."

that he was unaware that this collection aimed at "foreign collection data" had strayed substantially into the forbidden area of domestic politics.

Did Helms really know what was happening or did his subordinates run wild? The commission blamed the "missteps" on the structure, not the individuals involved.

WASHINGTON POST
12 June 1975

Correction

In a list of Central Intelligence Agency directors published in yesterday's Washington Post, the name of William F. Raborn Jr., who headed the agency from 1963 to 1966, was inadvertently omitted.

WASHINGTON STAR
11 June 1975

Did Justice Yield CIA Too Much?

By Leslie Oelsner
New York Times News Service

The Rockefeller commission says the Justice Department "abdicated its statutory duties" for more than 20 years through a secret agreement in which it gave the CIA the power to decide whether or not to prosecute criminal charges involving agency employees.

The commission charged in the report made public yesterday that the agreement "involved the agency directly in forbidden law enforcement activities" in violation of the law that created the CIA and limited its powers.

But the commission said it had found "no evidence" that the CIA "abused" the prosecutorial decision turned over to it by the Justice Department.

THE AGREEMENT was ended in January, when the department "directed that cases with a potential for criminal prosecution be referred to it for consideration," the report said.

But the commission called for new guidelines, in writing, requiring that both the criminal investigation and the decision of whether or not to prosecute be made by the Justice Department.

A Justice Department spokesman, in confirming last night that there was such an agreement, said

The Justice Department "responded," the commission said, that the agency should itself investigate "allegations affecting its operations" and "not refer the case to the Department of Justice."

HAVELL, the Justice spokesman, gave a somewhat different account.

"We found out about the agreement," he said, "in December of 1974," when CIA Director William E. Colby "mentioned the agreement when he was over here conferring with people" in the wake of the exposures about the CIA in the New York Times.

"The best we can determine," he said, "was the CIA director or the general counsel (of the CIA) in 1954 met with the deputy attorney general (William P. Rogers) and they discussed how to deal with that section of Title 18" that requires the agency head to report crimes committed by their employees to the attorney general.

"The report was read at the meeting," he

WASHINGTON POST
1 JUNE 1975

Overseeing Spies Without Blowing Cover

By Harry Rositzke

FOR THE FIRST TIME in 30 years the Congress is addressing itself to the question of what role it can or should play in the secret intelligence operations of the Executive Branch. Up to now its oversight committees have either been passive recipients of CIA secrets and FBI progress reports or avid investigators of publicized covert action operations.

The problem is not the past but the future. It should not be too much of a challenge for the Special Committees now at work to come up with satisfactory post-mortems regarding the charges against the CIA. What will be difficult for the Senate and House Intelligence Committees to handle is the basic long-term issue:

How far can a permanent committee of the Congress play a constructive future role in guiding, controlling or second-guessing the White House in running its secret business? What can Congress do beyond controlling the size and organization of the intelligence community through its appropriations power? What price will the nation pay for congressional intervention into America's secret intelligence activities at home or abroad?

The answers to these questions are likely to be different for each category of secret operations with which the Congress may wish to concern itself. These cover a broad range—in the case of CIA alone from covert action (paramilitary, propaganda and political) to espionage and counter-espionage. Each type of operation varies in the degree of secrecy with which it is carried out and therefore the degree to which it can or should evade oversight. At one end of the spectrum are such "noisy" paramilitary actions as the Bay of Pigs or the "secret army" operation in Laos. At the other end are quiet intelligence operations—an American agent within a Moscow ministry or a KGB officer working for the CIA in a Soviet embassy in Asia. In cases like these the slightest hint, inside or outside the committee rooms of Congress, can destroy the operation.

Another pertinent element affecting the question of congressional access is the fact that these three main types of operations—action, intelligence and counterintelligence—are generated within the Executive in sharply different ways.

Covert political action operations like the anti-Allende program in Chile are the most accessible to congressional scrutiny. Action projects assigned to the CIA are generated at the White House level and require a formal policy decision at the National Security Council level (the Forty Com-

mittee). Such decisions are on the bureaucratic record. That record may be hidden, but history has shown that it is almost impossible for the American government to carry out a large-scale secret action without that action being exposed by Congress or the press.

The Executive is unlikely to disregard this fact of life even if tempted to intervene secretly in the Persian Gulf or in the shaky southern tier of NATO.

A precise curb on the President's freedom in using his "third arm" to achieve foreign policy aims has recently been added by Congress in an amendment to the Foreign Aid Act. He must now inform Congress of any on-going non-intelligence operation

abroad which he considers to be in the national interest.

Granted that this or any future president is unlikely to disregard this requirement for large-scale actions, ordinary political action on a small scale is bound to remain within his discretion.

Congress and the public tend to equate political action with coups, counter-coups and secret funding of election campaigns, but the day-to-day core of secret political action, both for the CIA and the KGB, is the maintenance of confidential contacts with high-level government officials, politicians, and labor leaders around the globe.

These persons may be straightforward intelligence agents supplying information, yet the simple fact that they are committing espionage for the U.S. gives them a bias, in favor of the American interest as they pursue their normal political or government careers. But the principal so-called "agents of influence" are men who do not spy for the CIA, but who for personal or career reasons, and often without the payment of money, will act to further American foreign policy aims in their country. They may be bankers, industrialists, media executives or senior military officers as well as politicians and labor leaders of the right or the left. The only requirement is that they be in a position to exert personal influence of one kind or another in their own societies.

It is this ground-level of political action that cannot, and should not, be open to name-by-name scrutiny by a congressional committee. It makes no sense for an oversight committee to second-guess the State Department or the CIA on who should or should not be on the list of secret political contacts, for it has nothing to contribute in the way of expertise or political judgment. Here, at the agent level, the Congress cannot oversee the Executive's conduct any more than it can stipulate the open contacts maintained by our Embassy political officers or military attaches.

A Blank Wall

WHEN CONGRESS moves its oversight function from political action operations to secret intelligence work abroad, it faces similar, if not greater, limitations. And here it must deal with the programs of three federal agencies: the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency.

The requirements for foreign intelligence, both open and secret, are generated within the intelligence community as a whole. The main priorities are set by the White House and the Departments of State and Defense directly or through the analysts within the various intelligence staffs throughout the government. These information objectives come out of the strategic and tactical concerns of the diplomatic and military policy-makers and reflect their needs. The only function of intelligence is to serve those needs.

Congress is not only incapable of "overseeing" the secret intelligence operations of the CIA or the DIA designed to satisfy these requirements, but it can be argued that secret foreign intelligence operations are none of Congress' business. This is an axiom in the European democracies. What Congress can do is to determine how much money is to be spent on foreign intelligence collection—and not much more.

This does not mean that Congress cannot be informed about foreign intelligence collection. It can be briefed, on the priority intelligence targets, on the kinds of information being sought by what means, and on the year's performance vis-a-vis those targets by the CIA, DIA and NSA. Yet these briefings will naturally reflect the Executive's estimates of its own performance—and the Congress is bound to accept this self-evaluation, for it will have no basis for questioning these judgments.

Nor can Congress ride herd on individual intelligence operations, however politically sensitive. It is up to the Executive to decide whether the recruitment of a high-level agent in Moscow will affect detente adversely, or whether the penetration of a friendly Foreign Office is justified by the information to be gathered weighed against possible embarrassment if the operation comes to light.

Only in such large-scale technical intelligence operations as the U-2 and the Glomar Explorer affairs can Congress justifiably demand some degree of prior consent. It is conceivable that a standing committee might send a handful of investigators into the halls of the CIA to ferret out

less expensive intelligence operations to which they or their bosses might take exception, but the loss in security would hardly be repaid by any improvements in the quality of intelligence collection.

The same blank wall faces Congress in overseeing the collection of communications intelligence by the National Security Agency. The electronic monitoring of foreign civilian and military traffic and the cryptographic analysis of foreign coded messages are the sensitive sectors of any nation's intelligence effort. As an ultra-secret element of the Washington intelligence community, NSA cannot be examined or monitored from the outside — by Congress or by other elements of the Executive.

Congress can impose arbitrary limits on the NSA budget, the number of its overseas monitoring stations or the size of its Fort Meade headquarters, but it cannot judge NSA's efficiency or usefulness. It can, of course, get an evaluation of the NSA "product" by querying the "consumers," but that again will be an Executive judgment it cannot examine critically.

Maximum Security

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE operations abroad are even more impenetrable to oversight or control. They are, to start with, almost completely self-generated, for they normally arise out of the actions of other intelligence services—a KGB officer cultivates the society of an American Embassy clerk, or a local citizen walks into the Embassy to announce that he is a Soviet agent and wants to work for the Americans. In short, a CIA station reacts to events. Only in the rarer cases of shaping a recruitment attempt directed at a presumably susceptible Soviet or East European intelligence officer does a station take the initiative.

There is no policy level in Washington at which a congressional committee can grapple with these operations. Nor can the maximum security required to conduct them against a vigilant hostile service be compromised without degrading or destroying them. Once the need to know is extended to Congress and counterintelligence files are scanned for the names of targets and agents, the counter effort becomes a farce.

The same restrictions apply to the counterintelligence work of the FBI against foreign intelligence operations within the U.S.

Domestic counterintelligence work against American citizens is, fortunately, much more easily controlled by the Congress. The political intelligence targets of the FBI are generated by instructions from FBI headquarters to its field offices. Whether or not any FBI counterintelligence program exceeds the proper limits of the policies

laid down by the Department of Justice, or the Attorney General is exceeding his legal authority, can be determined by an examination of those instructions.

Congress as a whole also has the authority to define what organizations in American society are a threat to the nation's internal security. It can restrict, or blot out, any list of "subversive" organizations. It can bar the surveillance of any American not engaged in suspect criminal activity. It can restrict within exceedingly precise limits the right of any federal agency to tap a telephone or examine a bank account.

A Frail Instrument

CONGRESS MAY AND hopefully will take whatever legislative actions it can, but tightening the laws will not remove public concern about "domestic spying." The people and the press are on jealous guard against our overzealous guardians, be they in the FBI or the CIA, in the police or the Pentagon. The search for illegal surveillance, wire-tapping, room-bugging, break-ins and improper files has lately become almost daily preoccupation of the press and the President and the Congress have responded with vigor to the public's demand for the facts—but again these are facts of the past.

What can a standing oversight committee do to prevent future misdeeds? The question is not one of the law or agency directives, but of the conduct of persons or units in the federal government who wilfully or ignorantly violate the law or exceed the limits of their bureaucratic charters. Can a committee reach into the more secret recesses of the White House or the federal security bureaucracy to detect in advance and forestall illegal actions against American citizens?

Congress is a frail instrument to rely upon for this demanding task. The operations of the White House plumbers, the Pentagon's wholesale compilation of dossiers of American civilians, the FBI's extensive program of investigation and harassment of American dissidents, the CIA's participation in several incidents of domestic surveillance—all eluded the attention of Congress while they were going on. An oversight committee can review over all expenditures, scan policy instructions and put searching questions to senior officials. It cannot detect inflections of policy or law by errant federal officials in Los Angeles, New York, or Washington.

A New Overseer

THERE IS A practical solution, one which is coming into vogue in other sectors of our society. It is to approach the problem from the bottom

up rather than from the top down.

A counterintelligence ombudsman in Washington could well serve as the overseer of our guardians. He should be a man of character and experience, a well-known figure with an established reputation—someone like Prof. Samuel Dash of Watergate fame. He would require only a small staff of investigators and a well-publicized address and telephone number.

The ombudsman, or his staff, would be available to any federal employee in the White House or in any intelligence or investigative agency who has reason to suppose that he, his boss or his agency are carrying out actions that are improper or illegal.

This system would permit a lowly clerk or a presidential appointee, discreetly and without threat of retribution, to blow the whistle on what offends his sense of legality. He can make his complaint in the full confidence that he will be taken seriously and his charges investigated.

The ombudsman offers the same opportunity to any American citizen whose rights are violated by a federal intelligence agency. The improper targets of domestic investigation or harassment have a right to be heard, and at no cost to them. Crank complaints are inevitable, but a bright investigator can winnow these out without wasting time.

An ombudsman of this sort could work under the authority of the Senate Judiciary Committee or of a Joint Committee on Intelligence—if one were to be set up.

Why an ombudsman—and not a congressional committee?

Both the man in a classified job and the put-upon citizen are much more likely to trust a known individual than an anonymous committee of part-time members. Leaks to the press generally are not addressed to the management of a newspaper, but to a known journalist of proven discretion. The complainants will also know their charges will not be caught up in the maelstrom of politics and publicity-prone legislators, for an apolitical ombudsman—and only such a person—can act without regard for what party occupies the White House or runs the committee. The current politicking regarding "domestic spying" is too conspicuous to be missed by anyone.

Obviously, the problem does not lend itself easily to foolproof solutions, there frequently being a basic contradiction between the nation's need to act secretly and the public's need to know. But if internal security matters are to be kept out of politics and yet properly policed, a neutral ombudsman may well be the best mechanism. It is an experiment worth trying, and Congress can make the experiment at little expense or risk.

NEWSWEEK (INTERNATIONAL EDITION)

2 JUNE 1975

INTERVIEW: David Atlee Phillips

'There Is No Other Way'

For 25 years, David Atlee Phillips served as a CIA agent in more than half a dozen Latin American nations. When he resigned three weeks ago to form a group called the Association of Retired Intelligence Officers, Phillips, 52, was chief of the CIA's Latin American operations, a post he occupied at the time the Allende government was overthrown in Chile. Last week, Phillips discussed the CIA's past roles and present troubles with NEWSWEEK's Andrew Nagorski. Below, their conversation:

NAGORSKI: Your new organization is rather unique. What is its purpose?

PHILLIPS: Right now the CIA is at the center of a great controversy. There's no question that we have a public-relations problem of some magnitude. That can't be handled from within. The institution is not geared for it. And so I decided to try and do it from outside.

Q. Given the past record of CIA covert financing, how can anybody be sure that your organization isn't a CIA front?

A. No one can be absolutely sure except for William Colby [the director of the CIA] and me and my wife. But given the intense scrutiny that we're under now in Congress, it's inconceivable for anyone to think that Mr. Colby and I would try to fool Congress.

Q. The CIA spent millions of dollars to "destabilize" Chile. Doesn't that make the U.S. at least indirectly responsible for the coup and the murder of Allende?

A. Any involvement, you must say truthfully, has some effect. But the CIA was not behind the strikes that led to the coup that toppled Allende and was not in contact with the coup plotters.

Q. What, then, was the CIA role in Chile?

A. It was in a way the same sort of thing that happened in Western Europe after the war. We were preserving certain democratic sectors. It was keeping some people who looked like they were about to go down in the very bad situation that was going on in Chile in a position to be able to stay in business until the elections. I don't want to go beyond that.

Q. But isn't that a brush-off?

A. Not at all. I'm simply saying that when I went to work for the U.S. Government as an intelligence officer I signed a secrecy agreement that I must honor.

Q. Did the CIA have prior knowledge of the coup?

A. Yes, it did.

Q. And did it do anything to notify Allende?

A. On many occasions over a period of months we heard that there was going to be a coup or there wasn't going to be one. So the question never arose as to whether we were going to advise him.

Q. On what ground can the blatant interference in domestic affairs that the CIA seemed to be involved in in Chile be justified by a country that claims to represent democracy?

A. I was an intelligence operator and a professional and I was not involved in policymaking. So I'm not the man to ask those questions.

Q. But after 25 years in the agency you

presently alive and living in Havana.

Q. Was there any link between the assassination attempts on Castro and the assassination of Kennedy?

A. To my knowledge, no, and I'm convinced that I'm right. The reason is that when Lee Harvey Oswald went to Mexico during that famous trip, my job was to know what was going on in and around the Cuban Embassy, and I am convinced that he was rebuffed by the Cubans and went back to Dallas alone. He also approached the Soviets and I think they both thought he was a rather strange man and sent him on his way.

Q. What do you see as the effect of the current investigations of the CIA?



Photos by Robert R. McElroy—Newsweek

Phillips: 'The CIA right now is the most open intelligence agency in the world'

really have no feelings one way or another?

A. Yes, I do. But I just retired so anything that I might come up with right now would not really be objective. I will only tell you this: I am absolutely convinced that at this time major covert actions are not necessary or justified in Latin America. That's the reason why, during my tenure of the last two years, the few things that were going on were quickly terminated.

Q. How many times did the CIA attempt to assassinate Castro?

A. Oh, no! As I said before, I have a secrecy agreement.

Q. But will you agree that the CIA has been involved in assassination attempts on foreign leaders?

A. In 25 years, many of them spent working with Cuban matters, I have never known of anyone within the agency planning or discussing assassination of a foreign leader—never. But there's no question that there's something there that I didn't know about. The one thing I do know for sure is that Fidel Castro is

A. I see them as positive. I have no philosophical problems at all with the idea that we should be so thoroughly investigated. In this country now, given the way things are after Watergate, there is nothing less that will do.

Q. Is there a danger of the CIA becoming too open an institution?

A. Yes, but there is no other way. The CIA right now is the most open intelligence agency in the world.

Q. Some people suggest that the U.S. would be better off without a CIA.

A. That's just beyond my comprehension. I've found in 25 years that the world is still a pretty difficult place and there are certain jobs to be done. In the area that I know about, in Latin America, it's also true that we have the duty to know what other people are doing. Over the last five years more than 80 Soviets have been expelled from ten Latin American countries. We have the responsibility of knowing what they're up to. Incidentally, in that last five years not one CIA officer has been expelled from Latin America, despite all the headlines.

LONDON TIMES
5 June 1975

Newspaper lawyers and journalists attempt to persuade senators to redraft stringent new legislation governing official secrets

American press bargains to preserve its freedom

From Fred Emery
Washington, June 4

News organizations in the United States are trying to have deleted a part of a proposed law that is tantamount to an official secrets act.

Lawyers for several large newspapers as well as members of a reporters' committee are having a meeting today with staff members of at least three liberal senators.

The newspaper representatives find unacceptable sections of the Act relating to espionage and the theft of Government secrets.

The leading senator involved in the talks is Senator Birch Bayh, one of the co-sponsors of the new criminal code drafted under Senator John McClellan, chairman of the judiciary subcommittee on criminal laws.

It is now being said that Mr Bayh sponsored the code only on the understanding that he could have his amendments accepted later.

Civil libertarians who object to other provisions of the proposed code such as a return to capital punishment, had been counting on the "First Amendment Mafia" as press defenders are called, to sabotage the Bill.

Reports of the press "doing a deal" to achieve new laws that it can live with, are causing rapid rethinking. What the House of Representatives might do with its companion Bill is another matter.

The whole issue is an explosive one. Any attempt to restrict the public's right to know can, in the end, be counted on to raise a howl.

The howl is, of course, not universal. The recent refusal by the Supreme Court to allow Mr Victor Marchetti to break his contract with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and publish all the facts he wants to, has not been taken up as a crusade.

A more fascinating constitutional point is that Mr John Marks, his co-author of the book *The Cult of Intelligence*, has been similarly gagged. The Supreme Court justices' thinking on the matter has not been revealed, but it is apparent that Mr Marks, who had no contract with the CIA, saw his First Amendment freedoms "tainted" by association with Mr Marchetti.

But what is being opposed in the proposed new law affects everyday news. If its

provisions were to be taken literally, it is doubtful whether those who reported the CIA's recovery of the Soviet submarine or the alleged CIA planning of assassinations of foreign leaders could have escaped prosecution.

It might have been risky, too, to report explanations of the Pentagon Budget, unless officially authorized.

Congressional sources pleaded that they were not trying to "get" at the press, only those who leaked information. The receipt of a leaked secret by a newspaperman was not being made an offence. This eliminated the notion of "stolen" goods, which is, in any case, strenuously argued here as the United States Government possesses no copyright.

However, a newspaperman's subsequent communication of a leaked secret—showing it to his editor, for example—even without its being published, would have become a crime.

There were to have been two offences: of "disclosing" and "misleading" what for the first time is being redefined as "national defence information". The law would have

applied to all who had ever been "in authorized possession" and the unauthorized would have been guilty if they refused promptly to return the information (if in the form of a document) to those empowered to reclaim it.

The definition of "national defence information" alarmed the reporters' committee. It included "military capability of the United States or of an associate nation . . . military planning . . . weapons development . . . intelligence operations, activities, plans, estimates, analyses . . . and intelligence with regard to a foreign power".

Another offence proposed in the Bill was simply that of "disclosing classified information". In essence, it would have punished the leaker, not the recipient, who is expressly exempted.

Most people, even those working for the press, agree that espionage laws should have bite. But Senator McClellan's drafters, trying to ensure that there will not be a re-play by budding Daniel Ellsbergs, evidently went too far.

ROLLING STONE
19 JUNE 1975

CAPITOL CHATTER

We may have given up our embassy in Cambodia but we haven't relinquished our propaganda options. Early last month a new radio station, calling itself the Voice of the Future Nation and claiming to represent the Khmer Rouge (Cambodian Communists), suddenly began broadcasting in Cambodian from a clandestine site. It was not, however, on the frequency which the Khmer Rouge revolutionaries used for their broadcasts in the past.

One of its first news reports: that several of the "traitors" of the Lon Nol regime, including former Premier Long Boret and General Lon Non, younger brother of the former president, had been beheaded. Sounded reasonable enough but *Le Monde* correspondent Patrice de Beer saw both Lon Non and Long Boret laughing and chatting with soldiers at the Ministry of Information in Phnom Penh after their alleged execution.

Someone was apparently in a hurry to get the word out that the former Phnom Penh government leaders had been executed, even if it wasn't true. Longtime observers of Amer-

ican involvement in Indochina believe this is the latest in a long line of "black" (covert) radio stations operated by the CIA in Indochina. Historically, these "black" broadcasts have been used to make revolutionaries seem more extreme than they actually were, by going well to the left of the actual content of Communist broadcasts.

Meanwhile, ex-CIA agent Victor Marchetti, (coauthor of *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence*) is warning that the upcoming CIA investigation by Congress is going to force the agency to turn its employees into public relations agents. Marchetti warned that the agency will mount a massive publicity campaign, including tested measures of "disinformation" to confuse and discredit CIA opponents.

"It's now or never for us and the CIA," Marchetti cautioned. "If Congress does not conduct a thorough investigation and place some very tight controls on the CIA, we aren't ever going to get another chance."

One of the CIA's newest lines

LONDON TIMES
27 May 1975

Allegations of CIA money for Europe cause denied

By a Staff Reporter

Mr David Steel, Liberal MP, Roxburgh, Selkirk and Peebles, and vice-president of Britain in Europe, has dismissed allegations that pro-European youth organizations had received financial backing from the American Central Intelligence Agency as "a sign of the sheer desperation in the anti-Market campaign".

Referring to allegations by Mr Richard Body, Conservative MP for Holland with Boston, Mr Steel said at a youth press conference in London yesterday that Mr Body had "latched on to 20-year-old allegations about CIA finance of European youth campaigns" and tried to relate them to the present referendum campaign. Mr Steel added: "The Britain in Europe organization was founded only a few months ago. We shall be publishing our finances in full, as we are obliged to under the Referendum Act, and it will be seen that not one penny of our income has derived from CIA sources."

of business is selling tickets for rock concerts. Employees at the CIA's Langley, Virginia, headquarters can take advantage of one of Washington's unique fringe benefits by buying their tickets at a top-secret Ticketron outlet administered by the CIA's Employee Activity Association. Ticketron is

Mr Body has been picking up very ancient political fag ends which therefore taste very nasty. Most of the people on the platform this morning were toddlers at the time these reports refer to, so even every one of the far-fetched assertions were true they are totally irrelevant to our "Yes" campaign.

Similar allegations about CIA finance for pro-EEC youth movements were made in the current issue of *Time Out*.

The Britain in Europe campaign claims that most organized youth wish to stay in Europe, and there were eight representatives of youth movements on the press conference platform. They included Mr Tony Kerpel, national chairman of the Young Conservatives; Mr David Cockroft, organizing secretary of the Young European Left; Mr Simon Hebditch, the international vice-chairman of the Young Liberals; and Mr Colin Maltby, chairman of the Federation of Conservative Students.

about the whole matter—an internal memo gives instructions that there is to be "no publicity" about the CIA outlet or a similar one administered by the National Security Agency's Civilian Welfare Fund at the NSA's Fort George Meade, Maryland, of-

NEW YORK TIMES
11 June 1975

The Report: Ending a 'Massive' Hang-Up

By CLETON DANIEL

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 10—For nearly six months this town has been hung up on one word relating to the domestic activities of the Central Intelligence Agency. The word is "massive."

If the Rockefeller commission, which investigated the C.I.A.'s domestic operations, did nothing else in its report, which was released today, it should have disposed of that hang-up.

Nowhere in its report did the commission use the term massive, either in confirmation or denial, although that word was the one used in the original newspaper report of illegal domestic activities, which led directly to the establishment of the commission.

That first report, written by Seymour M. Hersh, appeared in The New York Times. William E. Colby, Director of Central Intelligence, responded directly to it in his appearance before the Senate Appropriations subcommittee on intelligence the following January 15.

"I flatly deny," he said, "the charge in The New York Times of Dec. 22, 1974, that the Central Intelligence Agency, directly violating its charter, conducted massive illegal domestic operations."

Vice President Rockefeller, chairman of the Presidential commission, and his vice chairman, Douglas C. Dillon, both followed the Colby line in subsequent comments on their investigation of the C.I.A. They said they could not accept the word massive.

No Prosecutions Recalled

During that time, the report said, there was an agreement between the Justice Department and the C.I.A. "providing that the agency was to investigate crimes by C.I.A. employees or agents which involved Government money or property or might involve operational security." It was left to the C.I.A. to decide whether any of its employees should be prosecuted for such offenses.

One man who has known the C.I.A. for most of its 28 years could not recall today

a single prosecution against a C.I.A. agent—a remarkable record for an organization with 15,000 or more employees.

Yet, the report by the Rockefeller Commission contained many examples of clearly illegal actions by the agency. In one case, a foreign defector was "held in solitary confinement under Spartan living conditions" for three years. That would be a clear violation of the rights of habeas corpus and due process, which apply to aliens as well as citizens in the United States.

As for murder—that is, assassination plots against foreign leaders, with which the agency has been charged—the Rockefeller commission said nothing. It undertook an inquiry because of the public furor, "but time did not permit a full investigation," its report said, and its evidence was simply turned over to President Ford, who intends in turn to give it to the Department of Justice and to congressional committees.

The President had raised the issue initially. On Thursday, Jan. 16, he gave a lunch at the White House for group that had entertained him previously, as Vice President, at lunch in New York; the group included the publisher of The New York Times, Arthur Ochs Sulzberger, and the newspaper's principal editors.

On that occasion in January, so far as one can recall, the President for the first time used the word "assassinations" in a discussion with newsmen on the activities of the C.I.A.

The President's manner was grave, his tone was hushed. Exactly what he said, although it was of the gravest import, was never reported. That part of the conversation was off the record, and after an unsuccessful effort to have it put on the record, The New York Times respected the President's confidence.

But the substance of his remarks began to leak out, and in six weeks they were being heard on the CBS Television Evening News and elsewhere.

Various sources reported that the President had made these points:

"The C.I.A. as an institution was needed to protect the security interests of the United

States and should not be destroyed.

"For that reason, he had picked a commission to investigate charges against the C.I.A. that could be relied upon to understand and respect the agency's national defense role.

"The charges against the C.I.A. were that it had illegally engaged in activities against Americans inside the United States, in violation of its charter from Congress. The Rockefeller commission was therefore limited to investigating the agency's domestic activities.

If the commission should wander into the foreign field, it would stumble upon all kinds of activities, including assassinations—and it was then and only then that the trigger word was used.

There was no discussion, no elaboration.

"There was nothing to be gained by opening the Pandora's box of assassinations. It would only lead to futile recriminations.

Well-meaning people in the past had ordered activities that seemed right and proper at the time, but might seem wrong and improper in the light of new circumstances. The new generation should not pass judgment on the old.

Those were the themes of President Ford's concern in January, after he had read the charges against the C.I.A. and had a briefing on them from William E. Colby, Director of Central Intelligence, a briefing that included some information on assassinations.

Expression of Confidence

Those were the same themes sounded last night at the President's news conference in the White House Rose Garden. There he announced his intention to release the Rockefeller commission's report on the C.I.A.'s domestic activities and to send the commission's information on assassinations to the Justice Department and to the Congressional committees investigating the intelligence community.

Mr. Ford said, "It remains my deepest conviction that the C.I.A. and other units of the intelligence community are vital to the survival of this country."

Expressing his confidence in the Rockefeller commission members, he responded to a question about whether Vice President Rockefeller had embarrassed him in conducting the investigation by saying, "The Vice President and I understood each other perfectly."

Again and again he emphasized, by using the word "domestic", that the commission was supposed to investigate only the activities of the C.I.A. inside the United States.

He even absolved the commission of the charges against the agency by saying that he himself had "suggested that the commission undertake an investigation of any domestic involvement in political assassinations."

President Ford did not explain, nor was he asked to explain, the nuance involved in the use of the term "domestic" involvement. Presumably, he was thinking of the recruitment of mafia gunmen or other hirelings in this country to commit assassinations abroad.

The President was particularly emphatic in his disinclination to pass judgment on the acts of his predecessors.

"I think historians will make those judgments better than anybody in 1975, including myself," Mr. Ford said. For that reason he cautioned the House and Senate committees that would receive the assassination evidence "to use the utmost prudence in how they handle the material."

In particular, President Ford was at pains to disavow any intention of discrediting the possible candidacy of Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Democrat of Massachusetts, for the Presidency by casting reflections on his brother, the late President Kennedy, whose role in alleged plots against Cuban Premier Fidel Castro has been publicly discussed lately.

In brief, for six months President Ford has not changed his tune. He has been nothing if not consistent.

As consistent and loyal as he may have been, however, the case against the C.I.A. is now out of his hands and Mr. Rockefeller's; it may be in harsher hands than theirs.

WASHINGTON POST (PARADE)

1 JUNE 1975

**LECTURING
SPY**

Philip Agee, the former CIA member whose book, "Inside the Company—a CIA Diary," has proved so troublesome to the agency, has been lecturing in England on his CIA experiences.

Agee's book, published abroad but not in this country, reveals names and places, mostly in Latin

America where he worked for the intelligence service. His literary revelations in the form of a diary have caused the CIA a good deal of anguish and anger. CIA chief William Colby is determined to prevent Agee's book from being published in the U.S. it is available, however, in Canada and England, and except to those of the intelligence community, it is mostly dull.

Last April Agee lectured at the London School of Economics, as the advertisement below announces.

ANNOUNCEMENTS

CIA: PHILIP AGEE
Author of INSIDE THE COMPANY
—a CIA diary.
Will speak at the old theatre
London School of Economics,
Houghton St., Aldwych, W.C.2
FRIDAY, April 18, 7-30 p.m.

NEWSWEEK
9 JUNE 1975

[Deleted]

Because U.S. statutes designed to prevent the disclosure of state secrets are deemed too vague, such sensitive Federal agencies as the departments of State and Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency have long written their own rules. They require employees to sign agreements that they will not divulge classified information they may learn about in the course of their work.

For many years there was no protest to this arrangement. But then three years ago, a onetime CIA administrator named Victor Marchetti challenged both the system and the specific agreement he himself had signed as a condition of his employment. Marchetti is the co-author of a book titled "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence." He contended that the agreement he signed violated the First Amendment by abridging his rights to speak or publish. Last week the Supreme Court indicated that the government's power to enforce Marchetti's agreement may be constitutionally valid.

In fourteen years with the CIA, Marchetti rose to become executive assistant to the deputy director—and was privy to a great deal of classified information. When he decided to publish his book in the spring of 1972, the CIA cited the secrecy agreement and won a Federal-court injunction requiring Marchetti to submit his manuscript for censorship. The CIA deleted 339 passages, then agreed to trim the total to 163. But Marchetti, collaborator John D. Marks and publisher Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., went back to court and won the right to restore all but 26 of the excisions.

On appeal, Judge Clement F. Haynsworth of the Fourth Circuit restored the deletions to the 163 desired by the CIA. He found that Marchetti had "effectively relinquished" his First Amendment rights "by his execution of the secrecy agreement and his entry into the confidential relationship." At that point last summer, Marchetti's book was published—with blank spaces where the deleted material would have appeared. But Marchetti wants to write more and his lawyers next appealed to the Supreme Court. They argued that Marchetti's case marks "the first case in the nation's history" in which an author "is perpetually required . . . to submit his books and articles . . . for censorship."

Test: But the High Court decided to let the Haynsworth decision stand, possibly because the Marchetti case is now scheduled to be heard again in the district court to determine if the newly amended Freedom of Information Act forces relaxation of the classification rules. Marchetti may not be the only potential litigant. A book by former CIA agent Philip Agee has already appeared in England, where the agency cannot reach him legally. If it is published in the U.S., yet another test of the government's right to forbid disclosure of classified material may be on the docket.

—JERROLD K. FOOTLICK with DIANE CAMPER in Washington

CHICAGO TRIBUNE
11 JUNE 1975

Jerald terHorst

A plot worthy of the CIA

WASHINGTON—The unsuccessful plot to oust Rep. Lucien Nedzi (D., Mich.) as chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence has little to do with the charge that he is a CIA patsy but very much to do with a power play by a few Democrats with political and ideological motives.

One certain result is that the House panel, already months behind schedule because of backstage bickering, now stands to lose whatever credibility still remains for its inquiry.

Convinced over the weekend that they would lose badly, the insurgents compromised. Nedzi will name a subcommittee to deal with the CIA aspects of the probe.

The cover story for the power grab is that Nedzi, in his regular capacity as head of the Armed Services subcommittee on intelligence, learned about CIA involvement in assassination plans and domestic surveillance more than a year ago and did not immediately "go public" with his knowledge or call for a full-scale congressional inquiry.

BY SITTING on that information, say his Democratic accusers, he has a "conflict of interests" in his special capacity now as chairman of the Select Committee that the House set up in January to look into unauthorized projects of the CIA, FBI, IRS, and other intelligence-gathering agencies.

What's really at stake, however, is something else. It is indicative of the fact that if it hadn't been for this excuse, the oust-Nedzi band would have found another reason to further "their own interests on the panel."

Rep. Robert Giaino (D., Conn.), a ringleader of the cabal, is in line to be chairman if Nedzi leaves via resignation or House vote. Rated one of the most effective, if unpredictably anti-establishment New England lawmakers, Giaino has more seniority than Nedzi. He was disappointed when Speaker Carl Albert did not hand him the gavel.

THE WASHINGTON POST
10 JUNE 1975

By Jack Anderson
and Les Whitten

Church for President — Supporters of Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho) are frustrated over his refusal to enter his name in the presidential sweepstakes. He has forbidden them from seeking the Democratic presidential nomination in his behalf as long as he is running the Senate investigation of the CIA and FBI.

Church has told them firmly that he doesn't want to mix pres-

idential politics in any way with the investigation. Yet he continues to stir enthusiasm for his candidacy in the attitudes he expresses toward government.

The other three pushing for ouster of Nedzi were Representatives James V. Stanton (Ohio) and two ultra-liberals and long-time critics of the Michigan Democrat—Michael Harrington (Mass.) and Ronald Dellums (Cal.).

What has gotten Nedzi into trouble, apparently, is his refusal to allow the committee's inquiry to turn into a spectacular vendetta against the nation's intelligence-gathering agencies.

What makes the CIA patsy charge against Nedzi so transparent is that it is not a new revelation by any means. As far back as last December, CIA Director William Colby had testified publicly before the Senate Armed Services Committee that Nedzi was among the regular group of CIA overseers to whom information on past activities had been provided. That was all on the record at the time that Albert designated Nedzi as chairman, and the House voted its approval in January. By raising it now, the dump-Nedzi group clearly shows its ulterior motives.

INDEED, WHEN the dump-Nedzi group moved into the open last week, Nedzi already had placed on the agenda, two weeks from now, a full airing of alleged CIA involvement in assassination plots. Nedzi was prepared to tell the panel what he had been told and also to let them quiz Colby directly.

His position is that as a CIA overseer it was his duty to make sure that improper activities no longer were going on, and to consider safeguards against any recurrence—not merely to conduct splashy hearings "into long past history."

What's at stake now, however, goes beyond Nedzi's personal integrity or that of his accusers. The integrity of the committee's eventual findings has now been irreparably damaged.

Universal Press Syndicate

identical politics in any way with the investigation. Yet he continues to stir enthusiasm for his candidacy in the attitudes he expresses toward government.

In condemning CIA assassination plots, for example, he declared strongly: "The notion that we must mimic the Communists and abandon our principles (is) . . . an abomination."

Then he added emphatically: "Ours is not a wicked country, and we cannot abide a wicked government."

TIME

16 JUNE 1975

CIA

Leaving Murky Murders to the Senate

Finally holding the 350-page document aloft for reporters to see, Vice President Nelson Rockefeller last week prepared to deliver to the White House his commission's report on the alleged improprieties and machinations of the CIA. "We've done a good job, I think," said Rockefeller. "There's been no stone unturned, there's no punches pulled." Then the Vice President gave a brief synopsis of the report on the agency, which his eight-man panel had been preparing for the past five months: "There are things that have been done that are in contradiction to the statutes, but in comparison to the total [CIA] effort, they are not major."

That tantalizing glimpse of the eagerly awaited report's contents was all that was vouchsafed the public. Accepting the volume four days later, President Gerald Ford took the report home for what he called a "long weekend's reading." Later, White House sources indicated that Ford would probably make the report public this week.

Domestic Spying. Initially, Rockefeller and his panel were commissioned by Ford to look into allegations about domestic spying—made principally by New York Times Reporter Seymour Hersh—that the CIA had conducted a massive domestic intelligence operation in the U.S. during the late '60s and early '70s against antiwar activists and dissidents. If so, this was seemingly a violation of the agency's charter that banned "internal security functions."

But as Rockefeller's investigation went on, other stories appeared in the press linking the CIA to assassination plots against Cuba's Fidel Castro, the Dominican Republic's Rafael Trujillo (killed May 30, 1961) and Viet Nam's Ngo Dinh Diem (shot to death Nov. 2, 1963). In March Ford directed Rockefeller to investigate such charges.

The Rockefeller Commission also looked into the recurring speculation that Castro had tried to gain revenge for the CIA's attempts on his life by using Lee Harvey Oswald to kill John F. Kennedy. Like the Warren Commission, the Rockefeller group concluded that there was no credible indication of any such conspiracy behind Kennedy's death and Oswald acted alone.

The document delivered last week by Rockefeller contained nothing about any assassinations of foreign leaders. In explanation, Rockefeller said that his commission did not have enough time to look into the allegations thoroughly. Said the Vice President: "We didn't feel we could come to a conclusion on par-

tial information."

As explained by Presidential Counsel Philip Buchen, the White House liaison with the commission, the members found that the study of the assassinations "was almost a bottomless subject. If they were to go into the whole thing, it would have taken more time and resources than they had." The group could have asked for an extension and a larger staff, but the members clearly had no stomach for digging deeper into those affairs of the CIA. On Monday afternoon, four days before the report was delivered, the commission voted unanimously not to include any material on the foreign assassinations. However, the White House has agreed to hand over the commission's tentative research on the subject to the Senate's special eleven-man committee, chaired by Senator Frank Church, that is vigorously probing all U.S. intelligence activities.

Misused Powers. As for the CIA's domestic transgressions, the commission reportedly absolved the agency of much blame, noting that Presidents Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon drove the CIA to overstep its bounds. Johnson had an obsessive belief that foreign money and influence must have been behind the students' revolt and the antiwar movement. Nixon also prodded the CIA to misuse its powers and spy on dissenters. The commission called for tighter controls on White House access to the agency and tighter congressional oversight of its operations.

Just how poorly Congress has been performing its task of monitoring the CIA came to light last week in an incident involving Democratic Congressman Lucien Nedzi, the chairman of one House committee that supposedly watches over the CIA. The New York Times reported that Nedzi had been briefed more than a year ago by the agency about its involvement in assassination plans and domestic espionage and he had done nothing whatsoever about the matter. Particularly, Nedzi did not mention it when he was made chairman of the special committee created by the House in February to investigate charges that the CIA had violated its statutes—a seeming conflict of interest.

When Nedzi did not deny that he had known about the CIA's shadowy activities all along, five of his six Democratic colleagues on the investigating committee hotly called for his resignation as chairman. If Nedzi does not go quietly this week, his fellow Democrats on the committee made it plain that if

necessary, they would force a House vote to get him out.

With Nedzi's committee incapacitated and the Rockefeller Commission's report handed in, the job of pursuing the investigation of the CIA was left in the hands of the Senate committee. Under Church, a liberal Democrat from Idaho who may run for his party's presidential nomination in 1976, the committee has been zealously holding private hearings since May 15. After the Rockefeller Commission handed in its report, Church accused it of ducking the assassination issue. As to the Vice President's claim that the CIA was not guilty of "major" sins, Church angrily declared: "I don't regard murder plots as a 'minor' matter."

Church has hard evidence for his harsh statement. During his three appearances before the Senate committee—more than ten hours at the witness table—CIA Director William Colby said, according to intelligence sources, that the agency had worked with Chicago gangsters on plans to kill Castro. In one case, the hit man was to have been a Cuban army major who was close to the Cuban leader. The allotted fee for the job: \$150,000. (For another example, see box.)

An Abomination. To find out more about the assassination plots, particularly who authorized them, Church will devote the rest of this month to closed-door hearings on the subject. Not only does Church plan to recall Colby and other CIA officials, past and present, but he will call the Mafia's John Roselli, who reportedly was signed up by the CIA to direct some of the schemes to assassinate Castro. Church also plans to question Robert Maheu, the onetime FBI agent and aide to Howard Hughes, who is said to have recruited Roselli for the CIA.

"Ours is not a wicked country, and we cannot abide a wicked government," says Church. He prefers to talk not of "assassinations" but of "murder—a simpler, clearer term." Says he: "The U.S. cannot involve itself in any way in murder. The notion that we must mimic the Communists and abandon our principles [is] an abomination."

When it draws up its final report on the CIA, Church's Senate committee will face the same dilemma in proposing solutions that Nelson Rockefeller outlined when his commission began its study in January: "We must have an intelligence capability, which is essential to our security as a nation, without offending our liberties as a people."

Spanish-speaking toughs on the Windy City's West Side. Some of the hoodlums were sent to Miami and Central America for training in commando tactics.

Exactly what the Mafia rangers accomplished against Cuba is still unclear. Some intelligence officials doubt that a single guerrilla from Chicago ever set foot on the island. For his part, Cain later was to boast how he had led hit-and-run raids on Cuban power stations.

U.S. sources say that the CIA spent on the operation,

The Momo and Cain Connection

The story of the CIA's efforts to enlist Mafia aid in assassinating Cuba's Fidel Castro continues to unfold. In 1960, during the waning months of Dwight Eisenhower's presidency, TIME has learned that the agency went to Momo Salvatore ("Sam") Giancana, a high-ranking Mafia don who ruled Chicago's gangland with a bloody hand. The

mission: kill Castro. For help, Giancana turned to one of the most nimble and conniving figures in the Mafia: Richard Cain, who had been the Mafia's agent in the enemy camp: a detective on Chicago's police force.

Among his other accomplishments, Cain spoke Spanish fluently. With the consent of the CIA, intelligence sources

NEW YORK TIMES
12 June 1975Washington Post
10 June 1975

while Giancana laid out \$90,000 of the Mob's own funds for Cain's expenses. When some Mafia officials objected to the payments, Giancana contended that the funds should be considered as "ice" (protection money).

What did Giancana get for his investment? In October 1960, the CIA did him a favor that was beyond the purview of the agency. Giancana was fuming because his girl friend, Singer Phyllis McGuire, was interested in Comedian Dan Rowan. The CIA arranged for burglars to break into Rowan's hotel room in Las Vegas and search for evidence that might cool the romance.

But in 1964, for all the ice he had carefully laid away, Giancana seemed to get no special treatment from the U.S. Government. Haled before a federal grand jury looking into the Mafia's affairs in Chicago, Giancana refused to talk and served twelve months in jail for contempt of court. Released in 1966, the don moved to Mexico for a while but is now back in Chicago.

Cain had been forced to quit the Chicago police in 1960 after he was caught spying on Mayor Daley's commissioner of investigations. Incredibly, he was hired in 1962 by Cook County Sheriff Richard Ogilvie (who was to become Illinois' Governor six years later). Resuming his role as a spy for the Mob, Cain was fired by Ogilvie for his shenanigans in 1964. Finally, in 1968, Cain was jailed for his part in a Mafia operation. Released in 1971, he became the still absent Giancana's man in Chicago.

There, on Dec. 20, 1973, two men wearing ski masks and carrying walkie-talkies surprised him in Rose's Sandwich Shop, a sleazy restaurant that had color stills from *The Godfather* on one wall. One man held a 12-gauge shotgun under Cain's chin and blew the head off the man whose quarry had once been Fidel Castro.

NEW YORK TIMES
30 May 1975

How to Run the C.I.A.

To the Editor:

Some sense and much nonsense appear in the press concerning the Central Intelligence Agency. The secrecy which intelligence requires breeds fear and suspicion. If there have indeed been abuses, they must be corrected at the source. We need not expect to find 007's under our beds, nor should we see the C.I.A. as an American K.G.B., with all that such a comparison implies.

So long as we have dangerous adversaries, we must provide ourselves with a vast defense establishment. Intelligence is its vital adjunct, without which this nation and its allies must deploy military and diplomatic resources in ignorance of the enemy's means and intentions.

What is needed is a C.I.A. which no one has ever heard of except as a bureau of experts—no scandals, no publicity, no risks—a silent, elite civil service as dedicated as the professional military branches. This is surely what the agency has sought to achieve. It is the duty of the Administration, the National Security Council, the Congress and Mr. Colby to preserve, supervise and use the sophisticated

DOCTOR DISPUTES
KENNEDY REPORTSays Panel Misstated Views
on President's Slaying

PITTSBURGH, June 11 (AP)—Dr. Cyril Wecht, saying that his views of President Kennedy's murder were distorted by the Rockefeller commission, wants the commission to release a transcript of his statements.

"If that transcript shows in any way I have withdrawn or revised my thoughts of the Warren Report, I'll eat the transcript on steps of the White House," said Dr. Wecht, a forensic pathologist who is the coroner of Allegheny County.

The Central Intelligence Agency report sought to put to rest all of the theories surrounding the circumstances of President Kennedy's death, including claims that more than one gunman was involved and that Mr. Kennedy has been struck by bullets from two directions. The report said it had found no such evidence.

Dr. Wecht denies the statement by the report that he "testified that the available evidence all points to the President being struck by two bullets coming from the rear, and that no support can be found for theories which postulate gunmen to the front or right front of the presidential car."

Dr. Wecht said that was a "flagrant" misrepresentation of what he told a commission attorney, Robert Olsen, in a five-hour interview on May 7.

He said he still maintained that at least two gunmen were involved in the plot and that Lee Harvey Oswald alone could not have inflicted all the wounds sustained by Mr. Kennedy and former Gov. John B. Connally of Texas.

"Believe me, I hammered this point and made it perfectly clear," Dr. Wecht said. "It is utterly reprehensible and despicable but also a great compliment that they would consider my testimony that much of a threat."

He said he had first become suspicious of the Rockefeller commission's objectivity when David Belin was appointed executive director. Mr. Belin had been chief legal counsel for the Warren Commission.

resources of the agency with supreme wisdom, skill and restraint if it is to serve the needs for which it was created.

LAWRENCE H. MCGILL
New York, May 21, 1975.Ford's Statement
About CIA Report

President Ford held a press conference yesterday in the Rose Garden at the White House and disclosed he will make public today the major portion of the Rockefeller commission report on domestic activities of the Central Intelligence Agency. Following is his prepared statement on the status of the report.

On Friday the "Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States" presented its report to me. I read the report this weekend, and have decided it should be made available to the public. It will be released tomorrow.

I thank the Vice President and the other members of the commission and their staff. It will be obvious to all those who read the report that the commission has done an extensive job of looking into the allegations that the CIA exceeded its authority by conducting domestic operations in violation of its statute. My reading of the report leads me to the conclusion that the panel has been fair, frank and balanced.

I will ask the Attorney General to study all materials gathered by the commission on any matter to determine whether any action should be undertaken against any individuals.

I am asking each of the federal agencies and departments affected by the report to study its recommendations and to report back to me with their comments on the report.

In addition to investigating the original allegations of improper domestic activities by the CIA, the commission, at my request, subsequently looked into allegations concerning possible domestic involvement in assassination attempts. The commission has reported that it did not complete every aspect of that investi-

gation. The materials that have developed concerning these allegations have been turned over to me in classified form.

Because the investigation of assassination allegations is incomplete and because the allegations involve extremely sensitive matters, I have decided that it is not in the national interest to make public materials relating to these allegations at this time. However, under procedure that will serve the national interest, I will make available to the Senate and House select committee these materials together with other related materials in the executive branch.

I know that the members of the Congress will exercise utmost prudence in handling such information.

As I have stated previously, I am opposed to political assassinations. The administration has not and will not use such means as instruments of national policy. However, in fairness, none of us should jump to conclusions as to events that may have occurred in the past.

After I have further studied the recommendations of the commission, I will order or submit to Congress the necessary measures to insure that the intelligence community functions in a way designed to protect the constitutional rights of all Americans.

It remains my deep personal conviction that the CIA and other units of the intelligence community are vital to the survival of the country. As we take the steps necessary to insure proper functioning of the intelligence community, we must also be certain that the United States maintains the intelligence capabilities necessary for the full protection of our national interests.

NEW YORK TIMES
11 June 1975

A Comparison of News Account and Panel's Findings

By JAMES M. NAUGHTON
Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, June 10—The Rockefeller commission report on domestic activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, issued today by the White House, stated that the agency illegally assembled a "veritable mountain" of files on American citizens and groups "apparently unconnected with espionage."

The commission's 299-page report affirmed in virtually every respect an account in The New York Times last Dec. 22 of a "massive, illegal domestic intelligence operation against the antiwar movement and other dissident groups in the United States."

The report stated that "Operation CHAOS" the agency—title of a secret program conducted between 1967 and late 1973—and some other C.I.A. activities "were plainly illegal and constituted improper invasions of the right of Americans." The commission said it was convinced, however, that "the great majority of the C.I.A.'s domestic activities comply with its statutory authority."

According to the report, "The paper trail left by Operation CHAOS" alone contained about 13,000 files on subjects and individuals and produced a computerized index of the names of more than 300,000 United States citizens and organizations.

The commission called for "the drawing of reasonable lines" between the conflicting goals of individual rights and collective national security. Its report was, with few exceptions, worded in carefully muted terms that encouraged the continuation of a vigorous pursuit of intelligence within clear legal limits.

But the bulk of the report's scattered conclusions was a confirmation of the allegations contained in the Dec. 22, 1974, news account in The Times by Seymour M. Hersh. The commission was established by President Ford on Jan. 4 to inquire into those and subsequent published charges against the agency.

What follows is a comparison of the central elements of the Dec. 22 news account and excerpts from the various sections of the commission's findings that bear on the original allegations:

FILES ON CITIZENS
NEWS ACCOUNT: "An extensive investigation . . . has established that intelligence files on at least 10,000 American citizens were maintained by a special unit of the C.I.A."

COMMISSION: "The paper trail left by Operation CHAOS included somewhere in the area of 13,000 files on subjects and individuals (including approximately 7,200 personality or '201' files); over 11,000 memoranda, reports and letters from the F.B.I.; and almost 3,500 memoranda for internal use by the agency."

tion . . . On top of this veritable mountain of material was a computer system containing an index of over 300,000 names and organizations which, with few exceptions, were of United States citizens and organizations apparently unconnected with espionage."

"Approximately 500 to 800 files were created on dissenting organizations and on individuals [in a separate effort by the C.I.A. Office of Security]. The chief of the special branch 'guessed' that somewhere between 12,000 and 16,000 names were indexed to these files."

ILLEGAL METHODS
NEWS ACCOUNT: "Sources said a check of the C.I.A.'s domestic files . . . produced evidence of dozens of other illegal activities by members of the C.I.A. inside the United States, beginning in the nineteen-fifties, including break-ins, wiretapping and the surreptitious inspection of mail."

COMMISSION: "The commission's inquiry concentrated on these investigations [of news leaks by the Office of Security] which used investigative means intruding on the privacy of the subjects, including physical and electronic surveillance, unauthorized entry, mail covers and intercepts, and reviews of individuals of individual Federal tax returns."

"Five [of these investigations] were directed against newsmen, in an effort to determine their sources of leaked classified information, and nine were directed against other United States citizens."

"Even an investigation within the C.I.A.'s authority must be conducted by lawful means. . . . The investigation disclosed the domestic use of 32 wiretaps, the last in 1965; 32 instances of bugging, the last in 1968; and 12 break-ins, the last in 1971. None of these activities was conducted under a judicial warrant, and only one with the written approval of the Attorney General."

"For a period of approximately six months, commencing in the fall of 1973, the directorate [of operations] monitored telephone conversations between the United States and Latin America in an effort to identify foreign drug traffickers . . . the monitoring of telephone calls, while a source of valuable information for enforcement officials, was a violation of a statute of the United States."

"An intercept project in New York City was the most extensive of [four] C.I.A. mail operations, and lasted for 20 years. [It] had expanded by 1959 to include the opening of over 13,000 letters a year . . . in the last full year of its operation, the New York mail intercept handled approximately 4,350,000 items of mail and examined the outside of over 2,300,000 of those items. Photographs were taken of the exteriors of approximately 33,000 items. Some 8,700 items were opened and the contents analyzed."

"While in operation, the C.I.A.'s domestic mail opening programs were unlawful."

SHADOWING CITIZENS
NEWS ACCOUNT: "The C.I.A. authorized agents to follow participants in antiwar and other demonstrations."

COMMISSION: "In some instances, the agency identified leaders or speakers at a meeting [of dissidents] by photographing their automobiles and checking registration records. In other cases, it followed them home in order to identify them through the city directory. Photographs were also taken at several major demonstrations in the Washington area and at protest activities in the vicinity of the White House."

INFILTRATING DISSIDENTS
NEWS ACCOUNT: "The C.I.A. also set up a network of informants who were ordered to penetrate antiwar groups."

COMMISSION: "[A project of the Office of Security] was initially aimed at monitoring public demonstrations which might develop into picketing of agency buildings. Almost from the outset, however, it became a project for placing 'assets' in suitable organizations in order to obtain information concerning intended demonstrations directed at C.I.A. properties. ('Asset' is a term used by the C.I.A. to refer to agents or informants other than employees.)"

"By late June, 1967, the agency sought to obtain whatever information it could regarding the sources and amounts of income of each of the infiltrated organizations. One infiltrator was sent to dissident rallies in New York, Philadelphia and Baltimore. One was called upon to maintain a continuous check on the movements and activities of certain prominent dissident leaders whenever they arrived in Washington, D. C. Infiltrators were charged from time to time with obtaining specific information on individuals, groups or planned demonstrations."

MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
NEWS ACCOUNT: "At least one avowedly antiwar member of Congress was among those placed under surveillance by the C.I.A., the sources said. Other members of Congress were said to be included in the C.I.A.'s dossiers on dissident Americans."

COMMISSION: "The commission discovered no evidence suggesting that any of these investigations [involving physical and electronic surveillance] were directed at any Congressman, judge or other public official."

"The [C.I.A.] Office of Legislative Counsel maintains Congressional files for use in its legislative liaison duties . . . generally, these files contain the following types of documents: Correspondence between the member and the C.I.A., excerpts from the Congressional Record dealing with the member, constituent employment or personnel requests forwarded to the agency by the member, short biographies and political descriptions of the member and copies of all foreign cables containing the name of the member."

"Although the commission report is silent on dissident files kept on members of Congress, William E. Colby, the Director of Central Intelligence, has testified that the names of four present for former members of Congress, including "at least a couple" antiwar members, were in C.I.A. files."

FILES DESTROYED
NEWS ACCOUNT: "Some sources also reported that there was widespread paper shredding at the agency shortly after [James M. Schlesinger, the director of Central Intelligence in 1973] began to crack down on the C.I.A.'s operations."

COMMISSION: "As part of a program to test the influence of drugs on humans, research included the administration of LSD to persons who were unaware that they were being tested. This was clearly illegal. One person died in 1953, apparently as a result."

"Unfortunately, only limited records of the testing conducted in these drug programs are now available. All the records concerning the program were ordered destroyed in 1973, including a total of 152 separate files."

"Collection of [Data on telephone calls between Americans and others abroad] was terminated in May, 1973, and the C.I.A. claims that all information obtained by the agency has been destroyed."

SECRET UNIT
NEWS ACCOUNT: "Most of the domestic surveillance and the collection of domestic intelligence was conducted by the sources said, by one of the most clandestine units in the United States intelligence community, the Special Operations Branch of Counterintelligence."

COMMISSION: "The C.I.A., upon the instruction of the Director of Central Intelligence, established within the counterintelligence staff a special operations group in August, 1967, to collect, coordinate, evaluate and report on foreign contacts with American dissidents. [The group's activities [later] came to be known as Operation CHAOS.]

BALTIMORE SUN
12 June 1975

Ernest B. Furgurson

Censorship and Candor

Washington.

To a newspaperman, there might seem only one side to the issue of the censored chapter in the Rockefeller commission's CIA report: the alleged assassination plots involved were official matters financed by the taxpayers, and therefore they are the people's business.

That is the rationale for disclosure, not only of a cabinet member's financial holdings but also of the most sensitive intradepartmental conversations. And if the information is not forthcoming voluntarily or through official investigators, then it is the newsman's duty to siphon it out.

But there is another side, that of the government professionals who must analyze and recommend policy, and plan for eventualities that may never take place. Their point of view clearly is self-serving, but there is a reasonable case to be made that it also serves the public. That position is spelled out by John Sylvester, Jr., a 44-year-old career diplomat, in the current issue of the Foreign Service Journal.

"Will candor survive the sinking ship of state?" he asks. He seems to doubt it.

Sylvester maintains that "candor within the government is at least as important for our country as government candor with the people. Good decisions in government depend on accurate and frank official reporting and straightforward use of expertise."

Daniel Ellsberg's leaking of the Pentagon papers, among many other recent examples, excited civilian insistence that the government be more forthcoming with the public. But the response within government is to be still more inhibited, Sylvester says.

He compares this accurately to the days of the political hunt for scapegoats after the fall of China a quarter century ago. Foreign service officers learned then, he recalls, "that their reporting might soon end up in the public record, and thus advisably should be politically propitious and discreet." The multitude of leaks lately has brought back that attitude, carried to further extremes.

Sylvester says this is "widespread and deleterious to the working of responsible government." It causes "blander, more cautious official reporting . . . increasingly, supposedly analytical classified reports are written more like press releases."

The most sensitive memoranda are distributed less widely, he continues, and often are dispensed with in favor of telephone calls. As a result, subordinates too frequently are inadequately or erroneously informed, and able to offer less useful aid to their seniors.

The diplomat suggests that before senior officials can be confident that secrets will remain so, "at least one case of unauthorized disclosure of confidential information will have to result in public penalties rather than fame and fortune."

On reading that, the public might be grateful for his concession that "the dividing line between what should or should not be secret is at best fuzzy, and one's view will inevitably depend

on whether one's seat is in or out of authority."

Sitting outside, yet commiserating slightly with him, we will add that the occasional disclosure of classified information would not seem such a disaster if the public were more sophisticated about it.

For one thing, the existence of contingency plans to do seemingly outrageous things does not mean that those missions are seriously contemplated. There are plans for every contingency that can be imagined at the Pentagon, the State Department or the CIA, just in case, and the thinkers there would not be earning their pay if they did not devise them. The press, of course, is repeatedly guilty of making contingency plans seem the equivalent of accomplished facts.

But as for the gap in the CIA report, the way for the government to avoid public furor about assassination plots—contingency or otherwise—is not by *ex post facto* censorship. It is by prior and total abstinence.

NEW YORK DAILY NEWS
11 JUNE 1975

PUTTING THINGS IN FOCUS

The supposedly mountainous "domestic surveillance" program which some media folk and politicians ascribed to the Central Intelligence Agency turns out to have been overblown considerably in the telling.

That is the conclusion drawn by the presidential commission which delved into the allegations. And it has facts and figures to back its assessment.

The CIA does not emerge with a clean bill of health. The probers headed by Vice President Nelson Rockefeller found that the cloak-and-dagger boys did indulge in some illegal or dubious capers.

But their transgressions—such as bugging, wire-tapping, and opening letters—hardly were on a massive scale.

A number of the illicit or questionable activities operation was deemed so great that, during one field survey in November, 1972, even the staff of the C.I.A.'s Inspector General was precluded from reviewing CHAOS files or discussing its specific operations.

"There is no indication that the C.I.A.'s general counsel was ever consulted about the propriety of Operation CHAOS activities."

"Some domestic activities, of Operation CHAOS unlawfully exceeded the C.I.A.'s statutory authority."



Sen. Church

occurred many years ago and have long since been discontinued.

Nonetheless, Rockefeller & Co. did recommend some reforms—in the shape of new legislation, executive orders or administrative improvements—to better define the agency's area of operations and see that it sticks to it.

But it also emphasized—as President Gerald R. Ford did in his Monday night press conference—that the CIA remains a vital organ in the nation's defense, and that it must have sufficient scope and freedom from prying eyes to permit it to carry out its function effectively. Let's never lose sight of that overriding necessity. As for the—

'MURDER PLOT' CHARGES

that have been flung at the CIA, the Rockefeller commission looked into them, but its investigation was incomplete and inconclusive. At Mr. Ford's direction, the material it gathered will be given to the Justice Department and two Congressional committees, including the Senate group headed by Frank Church (D-Idaho).

Exactly where that trail will lead, or what will develop, no one can safely predict at this time.

In the circumstances, most Americans would be well advised to heed another bit of advice Mr. Ford gave: Don't leap to conclusions, or make hasty judgments on the basis of rumors, leaks and speculation.

WASHINGTON POST
10 June 1975

Joseph Kraft

Our Intelligence Apparatus

A fatal flaw shadowed the Rockefeller commission on the Central Intelligence Agency from its first days. Not that a fix was in to whitewash the agency and smear past Democratic Presidents, as some seem to believe.

On the contrary, President Ford paid too much attention to persons in the press and television determined to blacken the intelligence community. As a result, he gave the wrong mandate to the wrong commission, and he is stuck with a report which only proves the need for more serious inquiry.

The starting point was a story in The New York Times which asserted that the CIA had undertaken massive domestic surveillance in violation of congressional proscriptions against such activity inside the United States. Without apparently realizing it, President Ford accepted that diagnosis as the heart of whatever might be wrong in the intelligence community.

He established a commission dominated by persons with broad political and foreign policy experience. To these practical men, he gave the narrow mandate of looking into activities by the CIA "within the United States which rise to violations of the charter." As staff director he visited upon the commission David Belin, a lawyer highly sensitive to moral questions who had served Mr. Ford on the commission investigating the assassination of President Kennedy.

Within a week the Rockefeller commission received from the CIA the so-called inspector general's report — an account of various CIA transactions prepared in response to questions from a former director, James Schlesinger. There were deceptions in the inspector general's report, and the commission speedily determined that the deceptions dealt with the matter of assassinations.

BALTIMORE SUN
4 June 1975

Freedom of Information

Attorney General Levi complained recently that the new Freedom of Information Act amendments had created terrible administrative burdens on the Department of Justice, particularly the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The amendments took effect three months ago, and immediately the number of requests to inspect files jumped some 40-fold. There have been increased requests at other agencies, too. The Internal Revenue Service, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Food and Drug Administration, to name those feeling the greatest pressure. In many cases the agencies cannot do the job properly without more help and more money.

In which case, the money should be forthcoming from the Congress. This newspaper strongly supported the enlargement of the Freedom of Information Act. It would also support whatever increased costs are necessary to make the law work. So would Congress, we are sure. However, the time to determine just how great a burden the new law creates is not now but after the law has been in effect for longer than three months. Some of the burden may be due to increased demands for information, but some

At first the commission was disposed to exclude that issue from consideration on the grounds that it had nothing to do with domestic surveillance. But President Ford himself, in an apparent effort to put the assassination question out of bounds, mentioned it to a group of visiting editors. In response to the resulting howl, Mr. Ford then included the assassination item on the commission's agenda. The commission delegated Mr. Belin to look into the issue of whether the assassinations had anything to do with domestic actions by the CIA.

Mr. Belin plunged into the assassination question with zest and largely on his own. Because they had domestic implications, he went deep into charges

that the Kennedy administration had plotted to assassinate Fidel Castro of Cuba and Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic. Because they had no domestic associations, he went much less deeply into charges regarding assassinations of President Diem of South Vietnam and President Lumumba of the Congo.

Meanwhile the commission bowled along. Vice President Rockefeller, not fully cognizant of Mr. Belin's work, indicated the report would show no great violations of the charter by the CIA. He and his staff indicated that the full report would be turned over to the President and then made public as a matter of course.

But the White House legal staff was aware of Mr. Belin's work. It was clearly not definitive and to them it looked to raise more questions than it answered about a highly emotional subject. So they raised the issue with the commission, and eventually worked out the compromise whereby only the report on domestic surveillance becomes public at this time.

What all this proves is that domestic surveillance is not the heart of what is wrong with the intelligence community. On the contrary, domestic surveillance and the assassinations both come from a larger, parent problem.

The basic fact is that the intelligence community was born and given increase during the period of intense cold war. The struggle against international communism looked to many people like a do-or-die affair. Within that context it seemed legitimate to read the mail of American citizens suspected of helping the enemy, and to take extreme measures against heads of foreign governments thought to be helping the enemy, and to take extreme measures against heads of foreign governments.

Now, however, the struggle against communism has given way to detente. Far from playing dirty tricks on the reds, the chief intelligence function is to monitor compliance with various agreements in arms control and other areas. The North-South struggle has replaced the East-West struggle in intensity, and a major intelligence requirement is for better information on political and economic events in the underdeveloped world.

The intelligence community has not adjusted well to these changes. Hence the continued cold-war zealotry of so many intelligence operatives; hence the failure of the correct CIA estimates on Vietnam to get through at the top; hence the constant fight between the analysts and the dirty-trick artists, and between the military and civilian specialists. The task ahead is to accomplish the adjustment. The best that can be said for the Rockefeller report is that it points in that direction.

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may be due to plain old bureaucratic desire for secrecy. The reason Congress enacted the new amendments was that the FBI and other agencies found ways to thwart the spirit of the original Freedom of Information Act while staying within the letter of the law. Congress is required to review the administration of the new act next March. Then it can decide how much new help the government needs, if any, and whether changes in the law are needed.

The real problem in public access to government information is not that a burden has been imposed on some officials, but that some officials are still keeping the public in the dark about the public's business. Conscientious bureaucrats who want to publicize information covered by the Freedom of Information Act are often prevented from doing so by superiors. These so-called "whistle blowers" are in the tradition of Ernest Fitzgerald, who made public cost overruns on the C5A, and was fired, and Dr. Jacqueline Verrett, who publicized suppressed studies linking cyclamates to cancer, and was punished by the Food and Drug Administration. Legislation pending before the Senate would make it less likely that conscientious efforts to publicize public information would lead to penalties. It deserves to be enacted.

East Asia

THE NEW YORK TIMES, THURSDAY, JUNE 12, 1975

South Vietnam Reds Pressed for Negotiated End

By FLORA LEWIS

Special to The New York Times

PARIS, June 11—As the North Vietnamese forces pressed ever closer to Saigon, the South Vietnamese Communists' Provisional Revolutionary Government asked France to arrange negotiations with ever more urgency, according to authoritative French sources.

Information on the politics of the approaching end of the war and some of its aftermath has now become available here.

According to the French, the Vietnamese Communists became certain that they were winning the war after the fall of Ban Me Thuot on March 10. However, still uneasy about the timetable and the cost in lives, they were expecting to be unable to move into Saigon before late summer and possibly only after a ferocious battle.

There were, the sources here are convinced, three possibilities from the Communist point of view. The first was to get President Nguyen Van Thieu replaced by a senior Saigon personality who would negotiate a coalition with the Provisional Revolutionary Government, possibly the former Defense Minister, Gen. Tran Van Don.

After the fall of Hue, that was discarded as unnecessary. Then the second possibility was considered, to insist on replacing Mr. Thieu with a personality of the "third force" who had been in contact with the Provisional Revolutionary Government, such as Gen. Duong Van Minh, and negotiating a government with him.

The third possibility was straight military victory, and the second idea was also discarded as this third possibility seemed more and more easily within Hanoi's early reach.

Fear of Being Eclipsed

The Provisional Revolutionary Government preferred negotiations for fear of being eclipsed and left powerless by the North Vietnamese if the war ended with the entry of Hanoi's troops in the southern capital and without any agreement, according to evidence here.

That is what did happen. The new information is that the Provisional Revolutionary Government now has virtually nothing to say in the South. Saigon is being run by a North Vietnamese military committee whose head, though a southerner by birth, wears the North Vietnamese Army uniform and is a part of Hanoi's team.

On only two ceremonial occasions has the known Provisional Revolutionary Government leadership appeared in Saigon since the take-over, and then it disappeared from view. The ministers who figure on the Provisional Revolutionary Government's cabinet list have not taken over the Saigon Government departments, which function with unknown or invisible North Vietnamese Communist heads.

But Le Duan, the head of the party, has been shuttling between Hanoi and Saigon in a small Ilyushin jet.

According to the information, all officials with whom the French Ambassador, Jean-Marie Merillon, who has since left, dealt after the take-over were northerners who did not give their names.

It was Mr. Merillon, the senior French diplomat in Vietnam, who argued with Mr. Thieu that he should leave, the sources said. He told the South Vietnamese President that it was the only way to save a vast number of lives in Saigon and probably Mr. Thieu's own life.

Even after the unexpectedly rapid advance of North Vietnamese troops had made the fall of Saigon a foregone conclusion, Mr. Thieu insisted on fighting to the bitter end. French diplomatic reports say he argued that he could establish an enclave in Saigon and the Mekong Delta and negotiate later, from a better position.

The United States Ambassador, Graham A. Martin, was so preoccupied with organizing the American evacuation in the last few days of Mr. Thieu's Government that he did not take part in such exchanges, the information indicates. The French reports said Mr. Martin delayed arranging evacuation for eight to ten days beyond Washington's wishes and then barely had time to work it out.

Generals Advise Departure

However, the French believe that the Central Intelligence Agency mission in Saigon, which rejected Mr. Martin's persistent optimism even as the situation was crumbling, did help persuade Mr. Thieu to leave.

On the night before Mr. Thieu finally agreed to go, his generals, headed by the chief of the general staff, Cau Van Vien, told him it was the only way to save Saigon. More than one Vietnamese described Mr. Thieu to diplomats in those days as

being "like Hitler in his bunker, talking about imaginary divisions."

He turned power over to his vice president, Tran Van Huong, who lasted a week and then handed over to General Minh. By that time, there was no longer any question of negotiations, which might have been possible some weeks earlier.

On the day Ambassador Martin left Saigon, by helicopter from the American Embassy compound, he went to pay a formal farewell call on Ambassador Merillon, whose embassy was around the block.

The American Ambassador presented the French Ambassador with a pagoda statue as a farewell present, and took his leave.

A little after 4 that afternoon, Ambassador Martin boarded his helicopter. But the lift continued until 3 o'clock the next morning.

Witnesses in the French compound next door could watch as the Americans rose floor by floor through their Embassy to reach the helicopter platform, and the Vietnamese throng pushed after them, kept a floor behind by the Marines.

Hanoi's Tanks Enter

Shortly after the last helicopter took off, guards shooting to keep more refugees from trying to clamber aboard or ride its skids, an American turned up with his suitcase. It was too late. He was sheltered in the French Embassy for a while, and eventually sent home.

By that time, the first North Vietnamese tanks were moving down Hai Ba Trung Street, past the side entrance of the French Embassy, on their way to the Presidential Palace. The lead tank was firing its cannon to clear the way.

Otherwise, there was no fighting as they entered Saigon.

Gen. Minh was awaiting them in the palace. He was taken off in a jeep to the radio sta-

tion. Then, according to reports, he disappeared. Actually, it is now known, he and his entourage were returned to the palace for 48 hours, the men put in one room and the women in another. Then he was sent home.

A few days later, communications with the outside world were cut.

Apart from the French Embassy, where there are still 153 people with a tenuous radio link abroad, the only Western diplomats left in Saigon are a Belgian and a Swiss, without staffs or communications.

The Polish and Hungarian delegations to the International Control Commission remained, but the report said they were confined to their quarters except when they too were admitted to the two victory ceremonials, and their telephones have been cut. A Soviet mission that had been accredited to the Provisional Revolutionary Government in Loc Ninh before the final offensive, was evacuated to Hanoi.

No Soviet or Chinese diplomats have been permitted to come to Saigon.

The conclusion of informed sources here is that Hanoi is now in no hurry to decide how to deal with Saigon politically, and that there may be a long delay in setting up a new South Vietnamese Government, if ever that is done.

The view in Paris is that Hanoi has now decided to maintain direct control, a step that the sources said was "bound to come sooner or later" but that they think came much sooner than Hanoi planned or than might have been the case.

Ambassador Martin's arguments for refusing to urge President Thieu to leave earlier when the French, at least, thought a negotiated end was still possible, were that Mr. Thieu's departure would provoke wild panic and chaotic collapse in Saigon.

So far as the French know, his instructions from Washington were vague during this period and such decisions were left to his discretion.

THE GUARDIAN MANCHESTER

26 May 1975

MARTIN WOOLLACOTT

Communist victors find a divided church

The Roman Catholic Church in South Vietnam, long in the forefront of the fight against communism, is now attempting the radical readjustment necessary if it is to survive.

But it is split between left and right-wings, who are already quarrelling over two issues, or rather personalities. As soon as communications are restored, Rome will be faced with difficult problems here.

The left-wing Catholic groups called for the immediate resignation of Mgr Henri Lemaitre, a Belgian priest who is the apostolic delegate to South Vietnam, and of Mgr Nguyen Van Thuan, Deputy Archbishop of Saigon, a nephew of Diem, and a staunch anti-Communist. These various groups have combined to send a letter to the Pope asking for the removal of these two men if they don't voluntarily resign.

One letter to the apostolic delegate, couched in Communist-style language, bluntly accused him of having "dragged the Church into a policy of collusion with the American imperialists and their valet Thieu," and of having "furtively tried to impose an anti-Communist bishop on Saigon." By this it meant the appointment earlier this month of Mgr Thuan, who has the right of succession should the present Archbishop of Saigon, Mgr Nguyen Van Binh, resign or die. It ended by demanding that Mgr Lemaitre resign and leave Vietnam "immediately on receipt of this letter."

One of the leading figures of the Catholic Left is Father Huynh Cong Minh, who has a parish on the outskirts of Saigon, and who, it now appears, ran a clandestine group called the Movement of Catholics for the People. Father Minh, a serious, bearded, young man, who never wears clerical robes except when saying mass and signals his priesthood only by a small gold cross pinned to his white shirt, says his group is "a movement of conscientisation, not a pressure group." The movement emerged from underground existence on the day before the fall of Saigon and has since held meetings and produced two magazines which welcome the liberation and speak of the need for Catholics to help in building socialism in Vietnam.

Father Minh is not a Communist, or if he is, he is a very good actor. He says: "I shall always be a Catholic. I shall always be tied to the Church and to Rome. But our Catholic life here in Vietnam must change. We have been a small, privileged, and favoured

minority. Now we must help in the work of building socialism.

"Our starting point is our Christian ideals and the starting point of the Communists is different but we can co-exist and work together. They expect religions to wither away so they see no reason for combatting us unless we combat them."

Father Minh claims that North Vietnam's attitude to its own Catholics changed markedly when they saw priests and Catholic laity taking an active part in the defence of the North against bombing and when they found, after reluctantly recruiting Catholics into the army, that they made excellent soldiers and did not lack patriotism.

But, Father Minh says, these first few weeks could be of vital importance for the future of Catholicism in Vietnam. The liberation of Saigon and South Vietnam "as immediately welcomed by many bishops and priests, including some with strong anti-Communist records. The Archbishop of Saigon issued a pastoral letter, as did the Archbishop of Hue, and the Bishop of Dalat. Others, like the Bishop of Kontum, the last French Bishop in Indo-China, have apparently remained silent.

But generally the initial response was such as to give the Communists no cause for suspicion. One well known anti-Communist priest organised an immediate festival for his entire parish, including non-Catholics and the NLF soldiers camped nearby, killing three beef cattle and two pigs. He explained to an amused congregation that since the young men of the parish no longer had to pay bribes to evade military service he expected their families to hand over a similar amount to pay for the feast.

The NLF soldiers joined in the laughter, but the new authorities could be forgiven for dismissing the Catholic welcome as superficial. The whole history of Catholicism in Vietnam is inextricably intermingled first with French colonialism, and then with anti-Communist nationalism. The Diem lobby in the United States was virtually started by a Catholic social democrat, Joseph Buttinger, who later became a historian of Vietnam. Diem was, of course, backed by Cardinal Spellman. During the French war in Indo-China the Catholic areas were the backbone of resistance to the Viet-minh and that continued to be the case in South Vietnam.

The officer corps of the old Vietnamese National Army was heavily Catholic, and Catholics continued to be represented out

of all proportion to their actual numbers—about 9 per cent of the total population of South Vietnam—both in the army and in the bureaucracy after Diem.

Catholics have not only been prominent in support of the southern regimes, including that of Thieu, who was a Catholic convert, but they have also been prominent in new anti-Communist initiatives. One such was the Nhan Xa (Revolutionary Social Humanist Party), a descendant of Diem's party, the Can Lao. Mgr Thuan was associated with both, particularly the latter, formed in 1966 to create a real alternative to the Communists.

In the same line of succession of anti-Communist Catholic opposition groups was Father Tran Huu Thanh's Anti-Corruption Movement which emerged late last year and forced a few reforms on the Thieu Government. Father Thanh is still here, at the Redemptorist Church in Northern Saigon.

Father Thanh says: "I am still an anti-Communist. But under the new circumstances the Church must pursue a policy of careful cooperation. Then I think it will be viable." He considers it foolish to "try to appease" the authorities by demonstrating against Lemaitre and Thuan. "Let matters take their course. The apostolic delegate in Hanoi after 1954 left after one year, a decent interval. Rome does not need to be told its business by a bunch of young priests."

Father Minh, on the other hand, argues that "this is a very delicate moment for the Church in South Vietnam. The new Government does not want to get into a quarrel with the Church. But if Catholics persist in opposition then naturally something will happen. Lemaitre and Thuan must go."

Whether they do or not, the Church in Vietnam obviously faces a difficult period. Father Minh is right in saying that

the majority of bishops and other senior priests are anti-Communist right-wingers.

For instance, of Saigon's 400 priests, perhaps 100 are known as "rightists" but they include all 11 deans and most other Church dignitaries.

Southern Catholics may benefit from a certain détente that has developed recently between Hanoi and the Vatican. Southern priests who have given confession to Catholic soldiers from the North are amazed at how "old fashioned" they are.

Some of the restrictions on the Church in North Vietnam, which virtually locked it away from world Catholic developments for 20 years, are now apparently being lifted. Southern Catholics, the majority of Vietnam's Catholics, may therefore now benefit from Hanoi's experience with the smaller community in the North and its understanding of new developments in Catholic thought, particularly in the third world churches. "I am not a pessimist," Father Minh says. "The Church has survived in the North. We Catholics of the Left now have a chance to try to educate the Catholic community as a whole to work with the Communists, even to build socialism with them."

One is reminded of the Catholic chaplain in Lampedusa's *The Leopard*, reassuring his master that the Church would always stand with the nobility. And if Mother Church had to abandon the nobility, The Leopard snapped, would she not do so instantly, and would she not be wholly justified in doing so?

Nevertheless, there are clearly difficult times ahead for the Church in Vietnam—difficult times that it will no doubt survive but in a much different form.

LONDON OBSERVER
25 May 1975



Can Thais keep on juggling?

from MARK FRANKLAND in Bangkok

THE American defeat in Indo-China has forced the ruling class of Thailand to look at reality, and it is scared by what it sees.

Until recently, this country was seemingly one of the happiest and most promising of America's clients in Asia. Today, the most popular guessing game in Bangkok is how long it will be before it goes Communist.

Even allowing for the exaggeration in any prediction made at this moment of uncertainty in Asian history, the queasy feeling here is of great concern to South-east Asia. Thailand is the key to the rest of the region.

This is partly a matter of geography, for it lies between Burma and Malaysia and the now Communist States of Indo-China. But it is even more a question of example, for if Thailand, with its great natural resources, with the most revered monarchy in Asia (and possibly the world) and a Buddhist religion in which almost all Thais take part, cannot resist the Communists, what hope is there for countries with few or none of these advantages?

The Thais have every reason to be confused: consider the news they were having to digest this weekend. Vietnam's Army may not be at the door, but its diplomats are already in Bangkok, dragon-like with indignation that Thailand let America use it as a rear area throughout the Indo-China war.

A Hanoi delegation is ostensibly here to discuss the establishment of diplomatic relations, but its immediate purpose is to frighten the Thais into closing down the American military bases.

There was also disconcerting news from the rest of Indo-China. In Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge had just occupied the temple of Phra Viharn, which sits on the Thai border and is believed by many Thais to belong to Thailand. The Laotians, whom Thais used to regard as laughable poor relations, were showing great aplomb in easing out USAID, the American foreign aid organisation that once ran Laos like a second Government.

Any Thai who wanted to know what his Government was going to do about the Americans in Thailand could only scratch his head. The Mayaguez affair and the violent speeches made during the demonstrations against

the US Embassy here seemed to make it impossible for the Government to wriggle out of its already public commitment to close the American bases by next March.

Yet the Government was plainly worried about the effects of a pullout. The Americans spend a lot of money and employ a lot of Thais. Senior Army officers own much of the land around the bases and do very well out of the bars and brothels that have been built there.

There was more evidence, too, of the radicalisation of Thai domestic politics that began with the overthrow of the military oligarchy in 1973. Strikers armed with steel pipes, the favourite weapon of Japanese student revolutionaries, had closed down the Dusit Thani, an extravagant new Bangkok hotel that might have been designed by Busby Berkeley for one of his Hollywood spectacles, and where guests spend more in a day than a Thai coolie earns in a month.

A member of the Government said it was the fault of outside agitators. The head of the hotel workers' union replied it was a simple matter of workers fighting unjust capitalists.

The confusion of ordinary Thais may be judged by some disarming remarks the other day by the university professor who was an unwilling caretaker. Prime Minister from the time of the generals' overthrow to the installation of the present elected Government this year. Life as Premier had been so difficult, he said, that he sometimes used to hide away in a sumptuous lavatory in Government House that had been built for the State visit of Queen Elizabeth.

What there could well be in Thailand is a very formidable Communist revolt in which the emergence of a Communist Indo-China would be a factor—as an example and source of supplies and training—but far from the most important one.

Both foreign diplomats and Thais believe that the conditions for such an insurgency already exist. There is great inequality, even by Asian standards, which foreign aid and investments have helped to increase and which the politicians, albeit now democratically elected, seem unwilling or unable to do much about.

Coherent Marxist thinking

is catching on among the student and workers' organisations which were set up after the overthrow of the generals. The peasant farmers on the great fertile plains, that are the envy of the rest of South-East Asia, are falling into the hands of money-lenders, the only easy source of credit, and so are no more master of their land, even when they still have legal title to it.

Power and wealth are concentrated in Bangkok, where the woes of the provinces are too often ignored. And if the Government does promise redress, corruption in the Civil Service, the Army and the police is so great that men of influence can usually deflect any decision that affects their interests.

The beginning of an insurgency have of course been present for a decade in the border areas where non-Thai minorities live: mountain tribes in the North, Vietnamese and Laotians in the North-East and Malays in the South. In spite of American counter-insurgency advice and equipment, and Thai Army operations (sometimes because of them) the revolt has grown steadily, if unspectacularly.

It is still manageable, but it does offer a base to Thai Communists with their eyes on the Thai heartlands.

Not all this is apparent to the people in power in Bangkok, at least not to the point of taking actions that diminish their position and privileges. But the shaming of the Americans in Indo-China has started to open Thai eyes to the Americans' failure to help Thailand, too, on to a better course of development.

The Thais are looking into all the agreements they have with the Americans and find only one, signed with the then US Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, that offers concrete support, and that is in the event of a foreign invasion of Thailand—the least probable of the dangers facing the country.

Thus the Thais are busy trying to soothe the Vietnamese, while building their main new bridge to Peking.

But the chief danger is within: a political and social system that may break under pressures of its own making. Unless the Government can do something about that, both Thailand and much of South-East Asia is in trouble.

NEW YORK TIMES
12 June 1975

Regime in Cambodia Charges 3 Nations Kept Her Backward

BANGKOK, Thailand, June 11 (Reuters)—Cambodia's new Government today blamed France, Japan and the United States for the country's economic backwardness.

In a commentary monitored here, the Phnom Penh radio declared: "The old and new aggressors have caused the weakness of our country. If there had been no foreign attacks, Cambodia would have become a powerful country."

It accused France, which governed Cambodia as a protectorate for 90 years until 1953, of having prevented development of weaving and handicrafts industries.

The old and new colonialists, the radio said, "wanted to keep our country in a colonial situation. They stole our raw materials to ship them to their own countries."

The radio accused the "Japanese fascists, then the United States, of wanting to stop Cambodia from developing and of bringing their own goods to Cambodia to compete with local products."

It accused the ousted government of Marshal Lon Nol, which seized power in a coup on March, 1970, against Prince Norodom Sihanouk, of having sold Cambodia out to the Americans.

Since the Communist takeover last April 17, the chief aim had been "to make Cambodia a country with modern, powerful agriculture," the commentary said, adding:

"After that we will be able to transform our farming country into a country that is also industrial."

LONDON TIMES
June 1978

South Korea fears United Nations force will be disbanded and US may renege on commitment

From Peter Hazelhurst

Tokyo, June 1

In spite of strong warnings that the United States will intervene if North Korea launches an attack against the South, the regime in Seoul harbours private fears that the United Nations peace-keeping force might soon be dissolved and Congress might back away from its military commitments in the future.

These fears were outlined to *The Times* today by one of President Park Chung Hee's confidantes, Mr Park Joon Hyu, chairman of the policy planning committee of the ruling Democratic Republican Party.

He also claimed that Washington has deliberately kept the South Korean Air Force under strength in the past because American leaders were convinced that Seoul might launch a strike against the North and endanger the policy of détente with China and the Soviet Union.

Expressing South Korea's most immediate fear, Mr Park said in Tokyo that his Government believes that events in Indo-China might encourage many non-aligned nations to support North Korea during the forthcoming session of the United Nations General Assembly.

"We fear that resolutions supporting North Korea and calling for the withdrawal of the United Nations forces in the South will be passed by a majority for the first time during the next session of the United Nations General Assembly."

"In the past our resolution calling on the Security Council to make alternative arrangements to substitute the United Nations Command was passed, but it looks as though two conflicting resolutions will go through this time. It is going to present the General Assembly with an embarrassing situation."

"However, the communist resolution in the Assembly will not have any legal or political meaning because the Security Council is responsible for the United Nations forces in Korea. But it will mean that the North will win a majority in the General Assembly for the first time in history and it will give them propaganda value," Mr Park said.

He said that in spite of firm security pacts with China and the Soviet Union, North Korea had been invited to join the block of non-aligned nations. Mr Park admitted that the Foreign Ministry were "toying with the idea" of requesting

the "non-aligned nations" to admit South Korea as a member. "This would demonstrate how absurd North Korea's claim is," he added.

Describing the United Nations General Assembly as the "absurdity of modern times", Mr Park said that the South would claim, in future, that the body does not have the power to come to decisions on the Korean issue.

"Issues in the General Assembly are no longer decided on merit. They are decided on the basis of whether a country is allied with the United States, and we fear many Third World nations will vote against us simply because they oppose the United States Middle East policy," he said.

"We are not going to let our fate be decided by the United Nations General Assembly in future and we will maintain that the Security Council is responsible for peace-keeping arrangements on the Korean peninsula."

"But, quite frankly, we are more or less resigned that the UN Command will be dissolved within the next few years. This does not mean that the United States forces will go, but the withdrawal of the United Nations forces will demoralize our people," Mr Park said.

(At present the United Nations forces in Korea consist of 38,000 American troops and a small symbolic force of troops representing other members of the command, including a contingent of approximately 20 British officers and men.)

Mr Park said the regime is convinced that if the North launches an attack it will not come in the form of a conventional military offensive across the demilitarized zone (DMZ). "What we are afraid of is that they will infiltrate guerrillas into the South by sea, air and through tunnels under the DMZ in an attempt to foment an uprising against President Park's government."

"Our troops can counter an attack across the DMZ. Our morale is high and we are confident we can beat the North in conventional war, if we continue to receive military equipment. However, we know they have 80,000 specially trained guerrillas who could be sent into civilian areas in the rear."

Mr Park, who is visiting Japan to discuss security arrangements in East Asia, said warnings that the United States would intervene if the North attacks the South "appears to have given the communists something to think about."

"But we are still pessimistic about just how long the consensus in the United States will last. The promises are better than nothing and we have no other choice but to remain silent. But we are uneasy."

"The ruling party in Washington does not have a working majority, the Democrats are divided and our security pact is not as strong as the one which binds Nato. To be quite honest we are scared to make moves to amend the pact because we have fears that detrimental clauses might be written in to make matters worse."

Harking back to the traumatic shock of the collapse of Indo-China, Mr Park said: "For us it's an awful situation. Vietnam was given enough promises but they still lost. Everyone in the United States is saying that American troops must not be involved in another war in Asia. And why should they?"

"We have told them that we will fight by ourselves if they give us enough arms. But they won't. They say you have enough. Frankly I think it's a stupid policy. If they modernize our army and give us time to train our soldiers with new equipment we can fight. If they wait it will be another repetition of Vietnam."

Echoing the resentment of the armed forces, Mr Park said that the Americans deliberately refused to build up South Korea's air force in recent years to correct the imbalance in air power on the peninsula. (The North is reported to be equipped with more than 600 fighter-bombers as compared with 210 obsolete American jet fighters in the South.)

In an indication that the two allies have clashed sharply over the issue, Mr Park said Washington had refused to modernize the air force in the past on the ground that American air power was available.

"But the truth is that the Americans refused to give us the equipment because they feared that the South might attack the North and endanger their policy of détente with China and the Soviet Union in recent years. That's nonsense."

"First it was the Administration and now we have fears that Congress might stand in the way. The level of supply was so low two years ago that we were forced to look elsewhere for arms and spend our much-needed foreign exchange on equipment. The Americans did not like it at the time but I think they realize now we were correct," Mr Park said.

WASHINGTON POST

12 June 1975

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

Korea: Park's Inflexibility

SEOUL—President Park Chung Hee, vowing to fight for the last inch of land even if U.S. forces leave Korea, told us South Korea could and would develop its own nuclear weapons if the U.S. nuclear umbrella is withdrawn.

In one of his rare interviews, the Korean strong man also declared he would not relax tough internal security measures while the military threat from North Korea lasts. Recognizing that restoration of full civil liberties would help him in the U.S. Congress, he insisted such relaxation could make Korea another Vietnam and therefore gave no hope for major change.

Thus, Gen. Park is set apart from other East Asian leaders traumatized by the Indochina debacle and looking for accommodation with the rising Communist tide. Facing the gun barrels of the North Korean garrison state, Park relies heavily on his U.S. alliance. But he will not appease American critics by actions he says would weaken security and is prepared to go it alone if necessary.

Park gave responsive, often blunt answers for nearly two hours in his office at the Blue House—his first meeting with a foreign reporter in eight months. Small to the point of frailty, the 57-year-old professional soldier in his 15th year of rule seemed in excellent health and supremely confident the course he follows is correct.

While declaring his own faith in official U.S. reaffirmations of support for South Korea, Park told us, "There were and still are quite a number of Koreans doubting the commitment of the United States" since the fall of Vietnam. What if those doubts are well founded? "Even without assistance, our people are determined to fight to the last man and not to concede an inch of our territory."

He next confirmed for the first time that South Korea, if abandoned by the U.S., would go nuclear. "We have the capability," the president said, but are not developing it and are honoring the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. Then he bluntly added: "If the U.S. nuclear umbrella were to be removed, we have to start developing

our nuclear capability to save ourselves."

The nuclear umbrella and airpower comprise the major U.S. deterrent to a Communist attack, but Park also argued the U.S. 2d infantry division here plays "an essential role in deterring attack." If American ground troops were removed, "the enemy will be inclined to make a miscalculation" and "American word would carry far less credibility." Chuckling, Park said the U.S. soldiers play the role of full-back in soccer football as a last line of defense. In other words, the 2d division would not be in the heart of ground combat.

As for his May 13 decree banning internal dissent, the president said that otherwise "we might become another Vietnam." Is there hope for relaxation? "It depends on the actions of the North Koreans. If the threat from the North Koreans is reduced, we should be able to relax security measures. If it is heightened, we would have to take tighter restrictions. There is no other way."

Park seemed to fully appreciate the difficulty his crackdown causes him in Washington, calling it "one of my biggest headaches." Many Americans would say "very nice" (Park, speaking in Korean, used the English words "very nice") if students were allowed

to demonstrate. But, he added, that would undermine security and make the nation vulnerable to Communist attack.

Park cited three examples of democracies curtailing civil liberties under extraordinary conditions: Canada's crackdown on Quebec separatists, Gen. de Gaulle's authoritarian measures during the Algerian crisis and U.S. internment (in "concentration camps," said Park) of Nisei Japanese during World War II. Granting that human rights are abridged in South Korea, said the president, Americans should note there is "no trace of human rights" in North Korea.

Other Park pronouncements:

- Provocation: If instead of a frontal attack North Korea makes a provocation by attacking South Korea's five small western coastal islands, retaliation against North Korean rear areas "would play into the hands of the

Communists." Instead, the islands, nestled along the North Korean coast, should be made "invulnerable" to attack.

- Airpower: Combined U.S. and South Korean airpower is in "precarious balance" with North Korea's. But since "there is no guarantee that Americans will remain in Korea forever," South Korea needs more of its own planes.

- Four-power pact: The plan by opposition leaders here for the U.S., Soviet Union, China and Japan to guarantee Korean peace is "highly unrealistic." Great power guarantees did not work in Indochina and would "not be backed by any strength" in Korea.

Park Chung Hee is clearly not inclined toward new arrangements in handling his menacing northern neighbor. His insistence on harsh internal security measures, his appeal for continued U.S. military presence here and his determination to survive—even to the point of going nuclear—if the Americans leave are all linked to an iron resolve that Korea shall not become a domino. That resolve, rare in nervous East Asia after Vietnam, may more than compensate for the aggravation caused U.S. officials by Park's inflexibility.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

30 MAY 1975

U.S. still most powerful despite Vietnam, Heath says

Salt Lake City

Former British Prime Minister Edward Heath said recently that despite its defeat in Vietnam the United States was still the most powerful and influential nation in the world.

Speaking at the commencement exercises of Westminster College here, Mr. Heath said, "Don't be deluded by the charge that Southeast Asia is the failing of America. What is failing is not America, but an illusion: That the postwar strategy of the containment of communism has . . . universal application."