

CONFIDENTIAL

NEWS, VIEWS and ISSUES

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5 DECEMBER 1975

NO. 24	PAGE
GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS	1
GENERAL	37
NEAR EAST	42
AFRICA	44
EAST ASIA	47
LATIN AMERICA	49

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CONFIDENTIAL

Governmental Affairs

NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, DECEMBER 5, 1975

Excerpts From C.I.A. Study

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 4—Following are excerpts from a report, "Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973," prepared by the staff of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence:

Numerous allegations have been made about U. S. covert activities in Chile during 1970-73. Several of these are false; others are half-true. In most instances, the response to the allegation must be qualified:

Was the United States directly involved, covertly, in the 1973 coup in Chile? The committee has found no evidence that it was. However, the United States sought in 1970 to foment a military coup in Chile. After 1970 it adopted a policy both overt and covert, of opposition to Allende, and it remained in intelligence contact with the Chilean military, including officers who were participating in coup plotting.

Did the U. S. provide covert support to striking truck owners or other strikers during 1971-73? The 40-man Committee did not approve any such support. However, the U. S. passed money to private sector groups which supported the strikers. And in at least one case, a small amount of C.I.A. money was passed to the strikers by a private sector organization, contrary to C.I.A. ground rules.

Small Amounts of Money

Did the U. S. provide covert support to right-wing terrorist organizations during 1970-73? The C.I.A. gave support in 1970 to one group whose tactics became more violent over time. Through 1971 that group received small sums of American money through third parties for specific purposes. And it is possible that money was passed to these groups on the extreme right from C.I.A.-supported opposition political parties.

The pattern of United States covert action in Chile is striking but not unique. It arose in the context not only of American foreign policy, but also of covert U. S. involvement in other countries within and outside Latin America. The scale of C.I.A. involvement in Chile was unusual but by no means unprecedented.

Preliminary Conclusions

A fundamental question raised by the pattern of U.S.

covert activities persists: Did the threat to vital U.S. national security interests posed by the Presidency of Salvador Allende justify the several major covert attempts to prevent his accession to power? Three American Presidents and their senior advisers evidently thought so.

One rationale for covert intervention in Chilean politics was spelled out by Henry Kissinger in his background briefing to the press on Sept. 16, 1970, the day after Nixon's meeting with Helms. He argued that an Allende victory would be irreversible within Chile, might affect neighboring nations and would pose "massive problems" for the U.S. in Latin America:

"I have yet to meet somebody who firmly believes that if Allende wins, there is likely to be another free election in Chile. . . . Now it is fairly easy for one to predict that if Allende wins, there is a good chance that he will establish over a period of years some sort of Communist Government. In that case, we would have one not on an island off the coast [Cuba] which has not a traditional relationship and impact in Latin America, but in a major Latin-American country you would have a Communist Government, joining for example, Argentina . . . Peru . . . and Bolivia . . . So I don't think we should delude ourselves on an Allende take-over would not present massive problems for us, and for the democratic forces and for pro-U.S. forces in Latin America, and indeed to the whole Western Hemisphere.

In the hands of Congress rests the responsibility for insuring that the executive branch is held to full political accountability for covert activities. The record on Chile is mixed and muted by its incompleteness.

The record leaves unanswered a number of questions. These pertain both to how forthcoming the agency was and how interested and persistent the Congressional committees were. Were members of Congress, for instance, given the opportunity to object to specific projects before the projects were implemented? Did they want to? There is also an issue of jurisdiction. C.I.A. and State Department officials have taken the position that they are authorized to reveal agency operations only to the appropriate oversight committees. The Chilean experience does

suggest that the committee give serious consideration to the possibility that lodging the responsibility for national estimates and conduct of operational activities with the same person—the Director of Central Intelligence—creates an inherent conflict of interest and judgment.

When covert actions in Chile became public knowledge, the costs were obvious. The United States was seen, by its covert actions to have contradicted not only its official declarations but its treaty commitments and principles of long standing. At the same time it was proclaiming a "low profile" in Latin-American relations, the U. S. Government was seeking to foment a coup in Chile.

This report does not attempt to offer a final judgment on the political propriety, the morality, or even the effectiveness of American covert activity in Chile. Did the threat posed by an Allende Presidency justify covert American involvement in Chile? Did it justify the specific and unusual attempt to foment a military coup to deny Allende the Presidency? In 1970, the U. S. sought to foster a military coup in Chile to prevent Allende's accession to power; yet after 1970, the Government—according to the testimony of its officials—did not engage in coup plotting.

Was 1970 a mistake, an aberration? Or was the threat posed to the national security interests of the United States so grave that the Government was remiss in not seeking his downfall directly during 1970-73? What responsibility does the United States bear for the cruelty and political suppression that have become the hallmark of the present regime in Chile?

On these questions committee members may differ. So may American citizens. Yet the committee's mandate is less to judge the past than to recommend for the future. Moving from past cases to future guidelines, what is important to note is that covert action has been perceived as a middle ground between diplomatic representation and the overt use of military force.

In the case of Chile, that middle ground may have been far too broad. Given the costs of covert action, it should be resorted to only to counter severe threats to the national security of the United States. It is far from clear that that was the case in Chile.

NEW YORK TIMES
5 Dec. 1975

PANEL CLEARS C.I.A. OF A DIRECT ROLE IN '73 CHILE COUP

But Senate Committee Staff Finds That U.S. Encouraged the Overthrow of Allende

AID FOR PLOTS TRACED

Document Says Washington Allocated \$13.4 Million to an Influence Campaign

By NICHOLAS M. HORROCK

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 4—The staff of a Senate intelligence committee said today it had found that the United States had encouraged the overthrow of the "democratically elected" Chilean Government of President Salvador Allende Gossens.

It said, however, that no direct involvement by the Central Intelligence Agency or the American Embassy in the 1973 coup had been established.

These statements were made today in a 62-page report issued by the staff of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

The document contained relatively little information not made public previously, either in the committee's report of Nov. 20 on its inquiry into assassination plots against foreign leaders or in accounts published in the press.

Today's report was based upon executive session testimony by C.I.A. officials and other Government officials including Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger. It also reflected information from some secret C.I.A., National Security Council and State Department documents.

Parts of the report, which is titled "Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973," were read into the record of a public hearing. This action came after the Administration kept officials from testifying in public session on the United States actions in Chile.

The United States Government, the committee staff said, ended a 10-year, \$13.4 million effort to deny Dr. Allende power in Chile by "advocating and encouraging the overthrow" of his democratically elected government.

William Miller, the committee's staff director, told the members that the report on

WASHINGTON POST
5 DEC 1975

CIA Role In Chile Outlined

\$13 Million Was Spent on Covert Work

By Laurence Stern
Washington Post Staff Writer

Details of a "massive" campaign of clandestine operations over a 10-year period to block the election and then to overthrow the government of the late Salvador Allende in Chile were revealed yesterday by the Senate intelligence committee.

In a report on what it called an "extensive" and "continuous" program of covert operations conducted during the Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon administrations, the committee report estimated that the United States spent \$13.4 million in Chile between 1963 and 1973.

Of this amount, some \$8 million was allocated to propaganda and support of political parties; \$4.3 million was spent to support and influence the mass media of Chile.

Central Intelligence Agency expenditures to one anti-Allende newspaper, *El Mercurio*, amounted to \$1.5 million from Sept. 9, 1971, to April 11, 1972. The report also said that CIA evaluators had concluded "that *El Mercurio* and other media outlets supported by the Agency had played an important role in setting the stage for the Sept. 11, 1973, military coup."

The owner of *El Mercurio*, wealthy Chilean businessman Augustin Edwards, conferred with top officials of the Nixon administration on the day—Sept. 15, 1970—that President Nixon ordered the CIA to help mount a military coup d'etat as a means of preventing Allende's election.

The report revealed that the International Telephone and Telegraph Corp. and other U.S. multinational firms based in Chile funneled some \$700,000 into that country's presidential popular election in 1970 in behalf of conservative candidate Jorge Alessandri—Allende's principal opponent.

It previously had been disclosed that ITT had offered through one of its directors, former CIA Director John A.

McCone, \$1 million to thwart the Allende election but that the money had been declined by the agency.

The actual contributions of ITT and other American companies, the report disclosed, was given with the CIA's advice on how to "safely channel" the money into the 1970 campaign. ITT contributed about \$350,000 of the total amount, according to the committee.

Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho), chairman of the intelligence panel, estimated that the \$3 million pumped into Chile during the 1964 election would be the equivalent to an expenditure of \$60 million in the United States—allowing for differences in population. That, Church noted, was more than twice the reported amount spent by Lyndon B. Johnson and Barry Goldwater together during the U.S. presidential campaign that year.

In the 1964 Chilean election, the report revealed, more than half of the campaign costs of Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei were financed by the United States without Frei's knowledge. That year, as in the previous four elections in Chile, Allende was a candidate. The CIA spent more than \$2.6 million in Frei's behalf in the 1964 presidential race.

The United States did not only concern itself with presidential elections in Chile but congressional contests as well. In February, 1965, the

303 Committee, which at that time passed on covert operations, approved \$175,000 to support 22 congressional candidates in Chile selected by the U.S. ambassador and the CIA station chief, according to the report.

In describing the CIA-directed propaganda to influence the outcome of the 1970 election, the report cited the case of a *Time* magazine article cover story that was changed as the result of a CIA briefing.

"According to CIA documents," the committee said, "the *Time* correspondent in Chile apparently had accepted Allende's protestations of moderation and constitutionality at face value. Briefings requested by *Time* and provided by the CIA in Washington resulted in a change in the basic thrust of the *Time* story" on Allende's Sept. 4 popular victory.

The pattern of covert financing, according to the report, spread through the entire political and economic sector of Chile, encompassing trade unions, business organizations, right-wing extremist groups and farm organizations.

Funds provided by the CIA, the report said, "financed activities covering a broad

spectrum from propaganda manipulation of the press to large-scale support for Chile's political parties, from public opinion polls to attempts to foment a military coup.

The report asserted that there was no evidence the United States was "directly involved, covertly" in the 1973 coup against Allende. "However the United States sought, in 1970, to foment a military coup in Chile," the committee staff concluded. "After 1970 it adopted a policy of both overt and covert opposition to Allende and it remained in intelligence contact with the Chilean military, including officers who were participating in the coup plotting."

Similarly, the report said that top U.S. national security advisers opposed American funding of the truckers' strike that precipitated the final economic crisis of the Allende administration, setting the stage for the Sept. 11 coup.

The CIA recommended that the truck owners' strike be supported with a \$25,000 grant, but the proposal was never approved. The CIA did rebuke a Chilean cover organization that passed on \$2,800 to the strikers.

The CIA provided \$38,500 for the controversial right-wing paramilitary organization Fatherland and Liberty "in an effort to create tension and a possible pretext for intervention by the Chilean military." The organization was publicly calling for the armed overthrow of Allende's government.

The report, based on access to national security documents, said that the covert activities carried out in Chile were apparently not made available to the CIA intelligence analysts responsible for preparing National Intelligence estimates on Chile.

This meant that those U.S. officials responsible for preparing national estimates on Chile "appear not to have had access to certain information which could have added to, or substantially revised, their assessments and predictions. That flaw was telling," the report said.

The committee heard testimony yesterday from two former ambassadors to Chile, Edward M. Korry and Ralph Dungan, as well as former Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Charles Meyer.

Korry evoked laughter from the audience when he declared that "under Ambassador Dungan and me, Chile made more social progress than any other country in Latin America."

Korry, in a heavily emotional presentation, accused Church and the com-

United States activity in Chile was representative of six major covert operations studied during the committee's investigation. The six operations in turn, were representative of "thousands" by the C.I.A., he said. These were several of the new elements in the committee staff's report.

The International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation put \$350,000 of its own money into the Chilean Presidential election of 1970, the committee staff said, adding that it gave \$250,000 to the campaign of former President Jorge Alessandri and \$100,000 to an anti-Allende party. The report said \$350,000 more had come from other United States businesses, which were unnamed.

The C.I.A. was able to affect the content of a *Time* magazine story in 1970, the report said, through "briefings" requested by *Time* and provided by the C.I.A. in Washington.

The briefings, the report said, "resulted in a change in the basic thrust of the *Time* story on Allende's Sept. 4 victory and in the timing of the story."

The report said that after President Richard M. Nixon ordered a stepped-up effort to stop Dr. Allende in September 1970, the C.I.A. covertly channeled \$11.5 million to *El Mercurio*, the largest daily paper in Chile, to insure anti-Allende

coverage and to keep the paper solvent.

El Mercurio was published, committee spokesmen confirmed, by Augustin Edwards a close friend of Donald M. Kendall, president of Pepsi Cola, Inc.

In the committee's assassination report it was noted that Mr. Kendall had arranged a breakfast meeting between Mr. Edward, Mr. Kissinger and then Attorney General John N. Mitchell.

While the committee staff reported that it could establish no direct operational involvement by the C.I.A. or United States Embassy in the 1973 coup, the members agreed during a press briefing today that the United States policy had "created the atmosphere" in Chile for Dr. Allende's removal.

The report supported news accounts published in *The New York Times* and elsewhere in the fall of 1974 that the United States had covertly poured millions of dollars into Chile, first to keep Dr. Allende from becoming president and later to overthrow his government. The report set the total figure, from 1963 until 1973, at about \$13.4 million and said that between Dr. Allende's inauguration in November 1970 and his ouster, the United States Government spent over \$7 million.

Today's hearing included statements and testimony by Edward M. Korry, who served as United States Ambassador in Santiago during the early Nixon years, and Ralph A. Dungan, the Ambassador between 1964 and 1967.

WASHINGTON POST
2 8 NOV 1975

Contradictions on Chile

Senate Report, Earlier Testimony Disagree

By Laurence Stern

Washington Post Staff Writer

Testifying under oath before the Senate Multinational Corporations Subcommittee, former U.S. Ambassador to Chile Edward Malcolm Korry made a series of seemingly unqualified disclaimers of American intervention in the 1970 Chilean presidential election.

Among his assertions on March 27, 1975, were these:

It was obvious from the historical record that we did not act in any manner that reflected a hard line; that the United States gave no support to any electoral candidate; that the United States did not seek to pressure, subvert, influence a single member of the Chilean congress at any time in the entire four years of my stay.

The revelations of the Senate intelligence committee in its assassination report last week contradict this and other assertions sworn to by Korry 2 years ago.

The committee report quotes, for example, a message Korry sent to President Eduardo Frei, long a favorite of Korry and the American diplomatic establishment.

The message, seeking to encourage Frei to join a secret U.S. plan of political intervention to deny the 1970 Chilean election to Salvador Allende, said: "Frei should know that not a nut or bolt will be allowed to reach Chile under Allende. Once Allende comes to power we shall do all within our power to condemn Chile and the Chileans to utmost deprivation and poverty, a policy designed for a long time to come to accelerate the hard features of a Communist society in Chile."

Statements issued in behalf of President Nixon that the United States played no interventionist role in Chile in 1970 also were strongly challenged by the Senate committee's evidence of a presidentially ordered covert political war against the socialist Allende.

So was the testimony of former Secretary of State William P. Rogers, his successor Henry A. Kissinger, former CIA Director Richard M. Helms, former Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Charles Meyer and other State Department spokesmen.

Meyer commented earlier this week: "I have the feeling I

was part of a James-Bond scenario and didn't know it at the time."

Concerning Korry, the Senate intelligence committee reported that the former ambassador recommended to Washington a plan for "a \$500,000 effort in (the Chilean) congress to persuade certain shifts in voting on 24 October, 1970." That was the date of the Chilean runoff election made necessary because Allende failed to win a majority in the popular election Sept. 4.

The "Forty Committee," the government's top decision-making body for covert operations, authorized \$350,000 to be spent by the Central Intelligence Agency to bribe members of the Chilean congress to oppose Allende and overturn the results of the popular election. The money was never spent, however, because of fears that the CIA's complicity would leak out.

There was another major contradiction. According to the Senate report, Korry received a go-ahead from Washington after a Sept. 14, 1970 National Security Council meeting to implement what was called the "Rube Goldberg" gambit to deny the 1970 election to Allende. This plan called for the diversion of votes in the Chilean congress to the candidacy of Jorge Alessandri, a conservative and aging politician, who would then resign, leaving the incumbent Christian Democrat, Frei, constitutionally free to succeed himself in the presidency. (Chile's constitution bars a president from succeeding himself.)

In his 1973 testimony to the subcommittee investigating efforts by International Telephone and Telegraph Corp. to block the election of Allende in 1970, Korry said that the United States "did not get involved in the so-called Alessandri formula."

But a CIA memo, disclosed in a footnote to the Senate committee report, spelled out Korry's role in the Alessandri formula.

"Ambassador Korry was asked to go directly to President Frei to see if he would be willing to commit himself to this line of action. A contingency of \$250,000 was approved for covert support of projects which Frei or his trusted team deem important. It was further agreed that a propaganda campaign be undertaken by the agency (CIA) to focus on the damage of an Allende takeover."

Korry said yesterday that "I stand by every statement I

have made to the committee and to the press." He added that he will testify publicly at the committee's hearings on Chile next week.

The Senate report gave new significance to an internal ITT document that was first reported by columnist Jack Anderson in March, 1972. It alluded to a Sept. 15, 1970, message from the State Department to Korry in Santiago.

That memo, from ITT field operatives Hal Hendrix and Robert Berrelez, reported to high executives of the firm:

"The big push has begun in Chile to assure a congressional victory for Jorge Alessandri on October 24, as part of what has been dubbed the 'Alessandri Formula' to prevent Chile from becoming a Communist state... Late Tuesday night (Sept. 15), Ambassador Edward Korry finally received a message from the State Department giving him the green light to move in the name of President Nixon. The message gave him maximum authority to do all possible — short of a Dominican Republic-type action — to keep Allende from taking power."

Korry testified in the Senate Multinational Corporations Subcommittee inquiry that "there was no green light or anything approximating it." But he declined to elaborate on his instructions from Washington on the ground that it would be improper for him to discuss the content of an executive communication.

Sept. 15, 1970, was the day, according to the Senate intelligence committee report, that President Nixon ordered Helms to involve the CIA in promoting a military coup d'etat in Chile at a meeting with Kissinger and Attorney General John N. Mitchell.

Other statements by leading administration officials that appear to be contradicted by the evidence of the Senate report were these:

"In his 1972 foreign policy report to Congress, President Nixon, in a reference to Chile, said the United States deals 'realistically with governments as they are — right and left.' His administration, the President said, pursued a policy of 'non-intervention.'"

—During his confirmation hearings as Secretary of State in September, 1973, Kissinger said that "the CIA was heavily involved in 1964 in the election, was in a very minor way involved in the 1970 election and, since then we have absolutely

mittee of conducting a political "pornoflick" rather than an objective inquiry. He was ambassador during the 1970 U.S. intervention.

Dungan, the ambassador from 1964 to 1967, described the intervention "as we now see in hindsight a national disgrace." He added, however, that the excesses occurred under "imprecise congressional mandates, haphazard oversight and money provided by Congress."

The general outlines of the CIA interventions in 1964 and the 1970-1973 period have been reported in the press. What the new committee report provided was precise detail and documentary evidence.

It also demonstrated, through citation of national security documents that were declassified for the committee, that the U.S. policy-making community was split on the 1970 interventions with the State Department taking a dim view of intervention and the Pentagon, White House and the U.S. ambassador to Chile, Korry, supporting it.

In describing the scope of CIA-financed propaganda activity, the report detailed what it called a "spoiling operation" against Allende's leftist coalition in 1970 that included production of hundreds of thousands of posters and leaflets; extensive press and radio campaigning; sign-painting some 2,000 walls with the firing squad slogan "su paredon" (your wall), and conducting a terror campaign showing large photographs of Soviet tanks in Prague.

In one week during the 1964 campaign, the report said, "a CIA-funded propaganda group produced 20 radio spots per day in Santiago and on 44 provincial stations; 12-minute news broadcasts five times daily on three Santiago stations and 24 provincial outlets; thousands of cartoons and much paid press advertising."

WASHINGTON POST
3 0 NOV 1975
Havana Report

HAVANA—The news media in Cuba so far have kept complete silence on U.S. reports of CIA plots against the life of Fidel Castro, Reuter reported. The findings of the Senate intelligence committee on the subject have not been picked up by the Cuban press and there has been no official comment.

stayed away from any coups. Our efforts in Chile were to strengthen the democratic political parties and give them a basis for winning the election in 1976.

Thomas Karamessines, CIA Deputy Director for Plans (covert operations), testified to the Senate intelligence committee that "Kissinger left no doubt in my mind that he was under the heaviest of pressure to get this ac-

complished and he in turn was placing us under the heaviest of pressures to get it accomplished." Karamessines was speaking of the CIA's covert promotion of a coup by the Chilean military in 1970.

—Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 22, 1972, Rogers said: "The United States government did not engage in improper activities in Chile."

—Meyer, testifying before

the Senate Multinational Corporations Subcommittee on March 17, 1973, said: "The policy of the government, Mr. Chairman, was that there would be no intervention in the political affairs of Chile. We were consistent in that we financed no candidates, no political parties before or after Sept. 8 (the date of the popular election).

"As the President stated we deal with govern-

ments as they are... We were religiously and scrupulously adhering to the policy of the government of the United States... of nonintervention."

This week Meyer said ruefully: "I never felt then nor now that I was perjuring or lying. The degree to which I was talking about what I knew — and about what I didn't know — will have to be demonstrated."

THE WASHINGTON POST

Friday, Nov. 28, 1975

Anti-Allende Campaign, U.S. Visit of Chilean May Be Linked

By Laurence Stern

Washington Post Staff Writer

The day President Nixon launched his undeclared war of covert political operations against Chile — Sept. 15, 1970 — there was a series of secret meetings in Washington centering on the presence of a wealthy Santiago publisher, Agustin Edwards.

According to former CIA director Richard M. Helms, it was Edwards' presence in Washington that day which may have "triggered" President Nixon's instructions to involve the CIA in permitting a military coup d'etat intended to prevent the election of Socialist Salvador Allende as president of Chile.

Edwards, a conservative, who bitterly opposed Allende, came to Washington in what one government source described as "a last-minute effort" to recruit U.S. support for a plan to derail Allende's prospects of election by the Chilean Congress, on Oct. 24, 1970.

The El Mercurio publishing chain of which Edwards was publisher and owner had received CIA subsidies since the late 1950s, according to government sources.

Edwards gained President Nixon's ear through the helpful intercession of PepsiCo president Donald Kendall, a mutual friend and longtime political backer as well as law client of Nixon. After Allende's election, Edwards joined the Pepsi-Cola organization as a vice president.

Helms, in his testimony to the Senate intelligence committee, said that prior to the White House meeting at which President Nixon called for CIA intervention, "the editor of El Mercurio had come to Washington, and I had been asked to go and talk to him at one of the hotels here."

Helms was reported to have been perplexed by his instructions to consult with Kendall and Edwards on conditions in Chile. "His feeling seems to be that here he was, the director of the United States Central Intelligence Agency and he was being sent by the White House to interview the head of the Pepsi-Cola Co. and a Santiago publisher," related a well-informed associate of Helms.

In his testimony to the Senate intelligence committee, Helms said he had the impression that President Nixon called the Sept. 15, 1970, White House meeting on Chile "because of Edwards' presence in Washington and what he heard from Kendall about what Edwards was saying about conditions in Chile and what was happening there."

Helms' hand-written notes from that meeting reflected such presidential reactions and instructions as these: "One-in-ten chance, perhaps, but save Chile. Not concerned risks involved."

No involvement of Embassy... \$10,000,000 available... more if necessary... Full-time jobs... best men we have... Game plan... Make the economy scream... 48 hours for plan of action."

On the morning of Sept. 15, a footnote to the Senate intelligence committee report noted, "At the request of Donald Kendall, President of Pepsi-Cola, Henry Kissinger and John Mitchell met for breakfast with Kendall and Edwards. The topic of conversation was the political situation in Chile and the plight of El Mercurio and other anti-Allende forces."

The breakfast meeting was followed by a more formal session at the White House

conducted by the President and attended by Kissinger, Mitchell and Helms. It was then, as the CIA director later testified, that President Nixon "came down very hard that he wanted something done (in Chile) and he didn't much care how and and that he was prepared to make money available..."

The Senate intelligence

committee is now negotiating with Nixon to hear his version of these events.

CIA director William E. Colby testified secretly to a House intelligence subcommittee in June, 1974, that the CIA spent \$8 million in covert efforts to prevent Allende's election and then undermine his government between 1969 and 1973.

NEW YORK TIMES

4 Dec. 1975

U.S. Intelligence Chiefs Deny Falsifying Vietnam Troop Data

WASHINGTON, Dec. 3 (UPI) —The outgoing civilian and military intelligence directors denied today that there was a conspiracy to downgrade Communist troop strength in Vietnam before the 1968 Tet offensive.

William E. Colby, director of Central Intelligence, told the House Intelligence Committee that the C.I.A. insisted at the time that the Vietcong had 500,000 or more men, compared with a military estimate of 292,000.

Lieut. Gen. Daniel O. Graham, who is seeking early retirement as head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, testified that United States military leaders were not surprised by the intensity of the Tet attack, which killed 2,200 Americans and destroyed 58 aircraft.

Both men took issue with statements by Samuel A. Adams, a former C.I.A. agent, who told the committee in September that the agency and the military deliberately falsified Communist strength to make it appear the allies were winning the war.

Mr. Colby, in prepared testimony, said the C.I.A. prepared a special assessment for Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara in May 1967 that concluded "the over-all strength of the Communists' organized force structure in South Viet-

nam is probably in the 500,000 range and may even be higher."

"The 500,000 figure presented by the C.I.A. in this report could be compared with an official military number at that time of 292,000," Mr. Colby said. "I believe that these quotations from official C.I.A. publications show clearly that the C.I.A. did not shrink from pushing the case for higher figures and made no attempt to produce 'politically acceptable' estimates."

Mr. Adams testified that the Vietcong had 600,000 troops at the time, along with 30,000 spies in the South Vietnamese military, and that this fact was concealed from the public by the C.I.A. and the military. Mr. Colby and Mr. Graham said that testimony was erroneous and misleading.

Mr. Graham, who preceded Mr. Colby to the witness table, said it was estimated after the Tet offensive that the Vietcong had a force of only 170,000 men and that not all of them could have taken part.

Mr. Colby, who is continuing as C.I.A. chief until his designated successor, George Bush, goes through the Senate confirmation process, was once in charge of the agency's "Phoenix" program designed to wipe out Vietcong double agents and South Vietnamese collaborators.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 30, 1975

The Unmaking of a President

ANTOFAGASTA, Chile—Americans suffer from a kind of political masochism that relishes depicting United States policy and its agents as a wicked, corrupt force, and relatively recent events in Chile confirm this obsessive malady.

A favorite legend is that Uncle Sam deliberately threw out the benevolent President Salvador Allende Gossens in 1973 while sponsoring a military coup d'état under Gen. Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, now chief of state.

It is sometimes contended that the plot was engineered by C.I.A. agents who are held responsible nowadays for everything from foot-and-mouth disease to famine in Bangladesh. But many argue that the two United States ambassadors to Chile under Allende engineered events producing today's authoritarian regime.

Mr. Allende, whom I knew, is not around to comment. He committed suicide during the putsch. But I have talked with the Presidents who preceded and succeeded him, Eduardo Frei Montalva and General Pinochet. About the only thing they agree on is that the U.S. had nothing to do with Allende's overthrow.

In Santiago Mr. Frei told me he knew both American ambassadors well during the Allende presidency: Edward Korry, who left in late 1971 at the end of Allende's first year, and Nathaniel Davis, his successor.

Mr. Frei didn't pretend to know what the C.I.A. was up to. Nevertheless, he argued it couldn't possibly have stirred up the massive opposition to Allende that followed a 15,000 percent rise in inflation over three years and a 1,000 percent drop in the value of Chile's currency.

He said: "As far as I have been able to find out concerning what happened

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

By C. L. Sulzberger

between 1970 and 1973, I know of no act of intervention in internal politics by either Ambassador Korry or Ambassador Davis."

As for General Pinochet, who planned and led the coup, he assured me here: "I can swear to you as a Christian that I never had any kind of contact with anyone from the C.I.A. or with any ambassador, U.S. or otherwise. I wanted to be free of any obligation to anybody."

"And of course I wanted to protect my intentions by total discretion. Why, afterward, even my family asked what kind of help I received from the United States. I told them: 'Not even good will.' In that I am very much disappointed."

While General Pinochet has an impressive credibility gap, there is every reason to believe this particular assertion. He revealed to me details of his coup never before disclosed.

These show that he prepared his putsch virtually alone over a long period, taking hardly anyone into his confidence. "Anyone," includes the C.I.A. whose principal function in Allende's day seems to have been trying to help moderate democratic forces stay alive. (The agency did oppose Allende at the very start of his presidency and was indirectly involved in the killing of Gen. René Schneider in a mysterious conspiracy just afterward. But it was not involved in the Pinochet coup three years later.)

General Pinochet began worrying about Communism in 1947 when he commanded a small security force at a detention camp. He thought Chile

had reached the end of the road when Allende was elected in 1970. He became known for anti-Communism but the regime mistakenly dismissed another general named Pinochet and left him untouched.

Thereafter he blandly concealed his opinions and was subsequently appointed army commander. He discussed his intentions with only a handful of high army officers, never telling anyone in the air force, navy or constabulary because he felt these had already been dangerously infiltrated by pro-Allende men.

Finally, in June, 1973, he ordered the Army War College to prepare a "game plan" to protect internal security. Each portion was drafted by separate groups so nobody could understand the project's potential significance.

General Pinochet decided to act on Sept. 14, 1973—four days before an independence day parade. This would allow him to bring military units into Santiago for the customary procession, and billet them in concentric rings around the city.

But on Sept. 9, air force Gen. Gustavo Leigh and an admiral representing the navy commander, Adm. José Merino, visited General Pinochet on his daughter's birthday. Leigh, Merino and the national police commander, Gen. César Mendoza, now form the four-man ruling junta that Pinochet dominates. They asked Pinochet to take action and he agreed to move up his D-day to Sept. 11. But he never disclosed details of his operational plan.

Thus he adduces considerable evidence that no foreigner, diplomat or intelligence agent knew anything about his project ahead of time—because hardly any Chilean did. On this point it is logical to believe him.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, THURSDAY, DECEMBER 4, 1975

Public's Esteem for the F.B.I. Is Found Off Sharply

Public esteem for the Federal Bureau of Investigation, always high in earlier days, has declined considerably in the last decade and particularly since 1970, the Gallup organization reported in its latest poll, issued yesterday.

The polling organization said that the "highly favorable" rating given the F.B.I. in 1965 by 84 percent of those interviewed dropped to 37 percent in the poll conducted last month. Even so, the bureau continued to hold the respect of a majority, with generally positive ratings outstripping negative marks by a ratio of about 5 to 1.

The Gallup survey used a 10-point scale on which it

asked 1,515 adults, 18 and older, in more than 300 communities to rate the F.B.I. from plus-5 to minus-5. The two top ratings, plus-5 and plus-4, were counted as "highly favorable." The poll was taken between Oct. 30 and Nov. 3.

The polling organization said the "highly favorable" rating had slipped 13 points, from 34 percent to 21 percent, between 1965 and 1970. There was another drop of 19 points by 1973 and still another decline of 15 points since then, to reach the current low mark. At the same time, 80 percent of those questioned gave the F.B.I. plus-ratings, against 16 percent minus-ratings, with 4 percent stating no opinion.

The Gallup organization said that early disenchantment with the bureau began among younger adults, especially those with a college background, living in the East. But it added that in the latest survey the decline in esteem had become across-the-board, coming after such allegations of misconduct as the harassment of the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. prior to his assassination in 1968. A parallel survey of the pub-

lics regard for the Central Intelligence Agency found that the C.I.A. had scored considerably below the F.B.I. The polling group said that 14 percent of those questioned had given the C.I.A. a "highly favorable" rating, compared with the F.B.I.'s 37 percent. In 1973, the C.I.A. also ranked well behind the bureau but still got "highly favorable" marks from 23 percent of the sample, the Gallup organization said.

WASHINGTON POST
2 DEC 1975

Bruce Retirement

BRUSSELS—David K.E. Bruce, U.S. ambassador to NATO, said he will retire at the end of January—but not because of a dispute with the White House.

In a statement, Bruce, 77, said he had told Secretary of

State Henry Kissinger in September he wished to retire in January. He labeled as "utterly inaccurate" a Newsweek magazine report that he resigned in anger after learning, via leaks, that his job had been offered to outgoing CIA Director William E. Colby.

THE NEW YORK REVIEW
13 November 1975

Someone to Watch Over You

The Abuses of the
Intelligence Agencies
by The Center for National
Security Studies, edited by
Jerry J. Berman
and Morton H. Halperin.
Center for National Security Studies
(122 Maryland Ave., NE,
Washington, DC 20002), \$2.25

Garry Wills

This is a dizzying computation of all the snoopings, publicly known so far, performed by our public servants upon their putative masters. With admirable restraint the report attempts to collect and document every instance of illegal activity undertaken by our various intelligence agencies. It gives the defense offered by the agencies, the authority under which each agency operated, and the statutes apparently infringed. It is a very useful and complete handbook on official crime. We can surmise that the tally is not complete, since it arose from spot investigations, odd suits, and accidental confession. But already the count is almost self-defeating. The hundreds under surveillance, the thousands photographed, the hundreds of thousands filed. The "watch lists" in readiness for emergency detention. The blacks. The kids. Hit lists. Enemies. The "enemy within" is us. The deadpan recital of it all tends to dissolve in the mind. Everett Dirksen claimed, "A million here, a million there—in time that adds up to real money." It doesn't, of course. That kind of addition turns—magically, at some unthinkable number—into subtraction. We know fairly well what we are getting for \$1.98. But not for forty billion. Much the same thing happens by the thousandth wiretapping or break-in recorded here.

We must summon up a gratitude to E. Howard Hunt. One or two of his comic break-ins, complete with celebratory self-photographing sessions—or one intimidating "interview" with red wig and voice-modulator—reminds us what all these figures really mean. The break-in at the Democratic National Committee was small potatoes set beside the hundreds of FBI "black bag" jobs; but its very \$1.98 size smuggled it in toward the imagination past TV commercials and situation comedies. Watergate was the sit-com of scandals, "Haldeman and Son," your friendly garbage collectors tripping over each other's feet.

Those who found the Nixon tenure in office peculiarly sinister fail to notice its redeeming feature: Nixon distrusted everyone, even J. Edgar Hoover. Even Richard Helms. Anyone outside his sight. He had to rely on private flunkies for everything—to control demonstrations around the White

House (call over John Dean from the Justice Department), to conduct the war on drugs (use the scrubbed ferocity of Egil Krogh), to keep track of Teddy (put Tony Ulasewicz on the trail of boiler-room girls), to draw up a master plan for spying on everyone—including the spies (have young Tom Huston teach J. Edgar his tricks).

Poor Huston, how he wronged the Director: he thought him remiss in the patriotic breaking of laws. He had to admit, before the Church committee, that Hoover had been doing the very things he proposed; but Huston thought Hoover was above all that—and Hoover had to slap down the kid for being such a simpleton.

Nixon had the apparatus of a police state at his disposal, but he was *too* devious to use it. Right-wingers constantly make the mistake of thinking that liberals live up to their own pretensions. The pretensions give them license to sink down toward their enemies' level. If you want real and systematic perfidy, you do not get it with Nixon, who sabotaged himself with a saving gracelessness. You get it with Truman, with his tests for security risks and front organizations. Or with Kennedy, and his harassing of socialist groups. Or with Lyndon Johnson, who warred on Black Panthers. (Eisenhower stepped up CIA activity abroad—a subject dealt with glancingly in this report, and one I hope to return to in a later piece. But Eisenhower had little, if any, interest in nonmilitary—i.e., ideological—spying, a taste that made sophisticates of "intelligence" consider him soft.)

It was during Truman's time that the Attorney General's List was published, a proscription list unparalleled in our history, the basis of all later black-listings. It made a man's job fair game if he had given money to, or accepted membership in, or attended a meeting of, any one of hundreds of organizations branded for discrimination but not charged with any crime. A new public category had been created, the noncriminal non-American.

It was during Kennedy's regime that the FBI launched its "COINTELPRO" action against the Socialist Workers of America—sending letters to employers, planting "disinformation" to scuttle a registered and above-board political party. There is something touching about the FBI's own memos on this operation. On the one hand, the party was flagrant in its un-Americanism: it "has, over the past several years, been openly espousing its line on a local and national basis through"—are you ready for the revelation of its dastardly tactics?—"running candidates for public office." The FBI, thwarted by this openness, had to arrange a Disruption Program (its own term) to "alert the public." Alert it to what? To the

socialist "line"? Yet the party's very offense was the public dissemination of this line. And *how* did the FBI alert the public? By openly professing its own line? No, by secret slander, anonymous notes, and forged provocations.*

That is what sinks in through the reading of this dreary catalogue, this list of spy work extended over decades, descending to the pettiest tricks—the sheer lawlessness of the activity used against legal dissemination of "un-American" ideas. The customary defense of the intelligence agencies is that they may have been carried away by their eagerness to capture criminals. The constable's excess is an enduring problem when dealing with a wily crook. But what we see documented here, on page after page, is the conscious and deliberate and extensive breaking of laws by a whole series of public agencies (the CIA, the FBI, the IRS, military teams, the NSA) against people who have broken no laws, whose proscribed activities are not even preliminary to the breaking of laws, whose real offense is not criminal activity but disloyal *thinking*. Under liberal regimes, for decade after decade, we have had a thought-control approach to internal surveillance. This was known; it was supported by the public; it was endowed by the Congress—and even now there is little compunction about what occurred. The reaction of a majority of Americans to this report, shocking as it is, will be: So what?

What makes this reaction possible?

Not merely the press of a cold war or the quirks of a single senator. We have to grant J. Edgar one thing—he called things un-American, and Americans agreed with him, for years, emphatically. The rejection of Nixon (and of Watergate) has nothing to do with the more serious and dangerous spying on Americans by other Americans that has been accepted as "the American way" for decades, and maybe for centuries. Maybe it is the American way.

In 1921, Gilbert Chesterton applied for entry to America as a visiting lecturer. He was stunned by the questions he had to answer. Was he an anarchist? A polygamist? Did he advocate the overthrow of America by force? He was applying in the aftermath of the Palmer raids, but the procedures of admission had been settled for years; and they amused a man who had traveled widely without

*Thanks to pretrial discovery, there is a particularly full account of the FBI activities against the Socialist Workers Party and the Young Socialists Alliance. All these documents will soon be published in a paperback by the Pathfinder Press (410 West St., NYC 10014; \$1.95). It is no wonder that intelligence agencies try to stay out of court.

ever undergoing such an inquisition: "I have stood on the other side of Jordan, in the land ruled by a rude Arab chief, where the police looked so like brigands that one wondered what the brigands looked like. But they did not ask me whether I had come to subvert the power of the Shereef, and they did not exhibit the faintest curiosity about my personal views on the ethical basis of civil authority." Only America, the land of the free, asked him what he *thought* about the kind of freedom it was peddling—and asked him not as a settler or possible immigrant, but merely as a visitor. He especially loved the idea that subverters of the nation would be docile in declaring, ahead of time, their intention to subvert.

There is a naïve assumption, among Americans, that everybody knows what his or her ideas on government are, and that they will declare this mental baggage whenever challenged. We make such challenges not only to visitors or prospective citizens, but to people already certified as American—are they American *enough*? Hence, loyalty oaths, security checks, Americanism committees of the Legion, un-American activities committees of the Congress, and Freedom Trains to teach Americans how to be *more* American.

America is not merely a country, but an Idea. An Ism. So we do not settle our Americanism by immigration, by citizenship, by obedience to the law. We have to prove our Americanism by recitals of a catechism about our inmost thoughts. Chesterton, being as generous as he could to this odd trait, noted a certain danger of tyranny in it but supposed that we raised an ideological test because we had not gathered ourselves together as a nation by the more gradual methods of Europe, with a racial or geographical or historical unity inbuilt by our circumstances: "America is the only nation in the world that is founded on a creed. That creed is set forth with dogmatic and even theological lucidity in the Declaration of Independence, perhaps the only piece of practical politics that is also theoretical politics and also great literature." Chesterton restated Lincoln's claim that this country was conceived immaculately in freedom by its "dedication to the proposition that all men are created equal."

It is very dangerous to derive citizenship from a proposition. That means that every citizen must *subscribe* to the proposition. And that means we must know the citizen's mode of thought in order to grant him a charter of participation in the national life. Unless we know the inner workings of his mind, we have no clear assurance of his citizenship. Living within our borders is not sufficient. Attending our

schools is not sufficient. Even submitting to our electoral process is not sufficient.

Those surprised by McCarthyite excesses of the cold war had no excuse for their surprise. The readiness to clap Nisei into detention camps was not questioned by liberals during World War II. Liberal organs of thought cried out against German-speaking citizens in World War I (and threw Karl Muck into jail without legal process). Even those who attacked the House Un-American Activities Committee attacked it as un-American—by that very process saying there was an American way of thinking and acting that had been violated. Liberals did not protest the harassment, the provocation, the infiltration, by illegal means of the Ku Klux Klan or various fascist organizations. Indeed, the FBI has lived many years of its red hunt by blunting criticism with the question: Do you want to be disarmed against the fascists or the Klan?

Since Americanism is something to be striven for daily, and to be demonstrated on demand, there is a presumption that any citizen is not American until he or she *proves* it. That is why politicians are introduced as "great Americans," or *real* Americans, or *true* Americans. There are no un-English activities committees or un-French committees. Why un-American? Because the full protection of our laws is not given automatically. You must *earn* it by demonstrating a patriotic mentality.

The record of this report is a long series of incursions on the legal rights of Americans, of men and women who were ideological suspects and therefore second-class citizens, open prey to anyone with a purer ideological claim. For instance: In 1968, the Ku Klux Klan was going to hold a meeting in the conference facilities of an Alabama motel. The FBI, as part of its general harassment of the Klan, went to the national headquarters of the motel chain and asked that the Klan be denied this site. The bureau also used the IRS, a dummy organization of its own, and forged materials to discredit the Klan. What has any of this to do with law enforcement? Nothing at all. It was conscious war against ideas—war not conducted openly by politicians and publicists, but secretly by our national police force. It was an ideological purge, in which any means were sanctified by the holiness of the cause. People were slandered, set against each other, intimidated—all with our tax dollars and without our knowledge. Laws were broken; but by the law enforcers. A second-class citizenship, outside the law, was established for Klan members.

What was done to the Klan was done even more zealously against communists, leftists, black activist groups,

and civil rights leaders. Provocateurs were sent into organizations, to prod them into breaking laws. A 1968 memo on the New Left set the bureau's goal: "to expose, disrupt and otherwise neutralize the activities of this group." The activities of the group—not its illegal activities. The FBI long ago gave up the narrow aim of investigating crimes. It now polices the mental health of America, trying to destroy any group it does not approve of.

The FBI may have established the pattern for our modern ideological policing; but this report shows how readily all other enforcement agencies followed that lead. Military intelligence units moved into the area of citizen harassment very actively in the wake of 1967's riots. The army center at Fort Holabird opened files on at least 80,000 nonmilitary citizens of the US, and spread its lists by computer to many other bases. The files were FBI-inclusive, with material on sex lives and other private habits for use in ideological blackmail. Military agents were sent to infiltrate groups that might take part in any demonstration. The center at Fort Holabird set up a code for 770 organizations, and by 1969 it was receiving 1,200 reports a month, to build up a surveillance record on domestic activities that would outreach even the FBI's. This information was ordered destroyed in 1970, but a Senate investigating committee found solid evidence that it still exists in various forms, thanks to the computer system that spread the information.

Local police forces, when they do not cooperate with the FBI, compete with it. The FBI's war on the Black Panthers used local arrests on various charges (like defective lights on cars) to harass the Panthers and dry up their bail fund. At times the harassment became entrapment—but who cares, since they *were* Panthers. The IRS has long been trained to get people on tax counts, when they are really wanted for something else. This practice goes back to Al Capone. We declared him a second-class citizen and *then* found some law to put him away with. It was Robert Kennedy's approach to Jimmy Hoffa.

The National Security Agency has added its own expensive talents to the American snooping effort. It automatically plucks out of cables and radio-grams information keyed to proper names or certain words. The CIA uses citizen fronts as cover for its foreign activities; it claims to have infiltrated student organizations to train agents for work with overseas leftists. It prefers to manipulate even friendly types (like writers for *Encounter*) to maintain control over the channels of

NEW YORK TIMES
1 DEC 1975

Tigers Or Jellyfish?

"The time has come to bring [the] investigations of this matter to an end. One year of Watergate is enough."

—Richard Nixon, Jan. 30, 1974

"It is time . . . to end the self-flagellation that has done so much harm to this nation's capacity to conduct foreign policy."

—Henry Kissinger, Nov. 24, 1975

By Anthony Lewis

BOSTON, Nov. 30—Suppose that during the Senate Watergate investigation President Nixon had directed Government officials not to appear as witnesses in public session. Would the Senate committee meekly have dropped its plans to question H. R. Haldeman and the others in open hearings? Would the press have let this pass without a murmur?

Of course not. Senators and editors would have been outraged. But move to 1975—from Watergate to the C.I.A., from Richard Nixon to Henry Kissinger and Gerald Ford—and outrage is in short supply.

The Senate intelligence committee has public hearings this week on American covert activities in Chile. But Secretary of State Kissinger has refused to appear, saying it would be "wholly inappropriate" to discuss in public "any real or purported covert operation." And President Ford instructed C.I.A. officials not to appear.

The U.S. role in upsetting the constitutional government of Chile is as important as Watergate on any reasonable scale of values. Yet there have been no loud noises from Capitol Hill about the Ford Administration's pe-

ABROAD AT HOME

remptory refusal to take part in what could be highly instructive hearings on the subject. And the affair has had scarcely any notice in the press.

Will Senator Frank Church and his committee really stand still for a new, unilateral privilege allowing executive witnesses to decide when their appearance is "appropriate?" Is the committee going to forget about evidence sought from Kissinger long ago but not supplied? One such item is a desk calendar that might show whether C.I.A. officials were truthful when they said

ideological exchange. The reaction of people like Arthur Schlesinger Jr. to the *Encounter* revelations shows how we have come to expect ideological self-policing. The CIA was working on the right side, wasn't it? The inappropriateness of having a secret police covertly run the magazine and radio stations did not strike people, so long as the operations were well run, were on our side.

Indeed, the CIA was long welcomed by liberals as a kind of good FBI, an FBI of our very own. The good guys were doing the manipulating in this case. But of course that is what most of the nation has all along thought of the FBI itself. It was the good guys, and it was out to get the bad guys. Who cared how that was done? Since they were bad guys, you could not handle them with kid gloves. Agencies that deal with them have to destroy the law in order to save it. Un-Americans don't deserve the protection of the law anyway. And who was un-American? We all are, until we prove different—take our loyalty oaths, submit to security checks. Stand up and be counted. If you are not willing to be snooped on, manipulated, observed, then you must have something to hide—foundation in itself for a prior assumption of un-Americanhood. The only good American, the only one who deserves to be free, is the one who puts his freedom at the disposal of our secret police system. Alas, that makes most of us pretty good Americans.

It happened—all the long tale of deceit, laid out in patterns in this straightforward account—because we let it happen; in some measure, wanted it to happen. We had an American proposition we must be dedicated to. If the Klan did not accept the abstract proposition of human equality, its thoughts could be persecuted, entirely aside from the enforcement of laws. And so we advance the 1984 equations: freedom can only be guarded by destroying privacy; only secrecy can protect the open society; and the law must be denied those Americans who are sneaky enough to obey the law while thinking things we do not like. Right, Comrade?

NEW YORK TIMES
28 NOV 1975

Anti-C.I.A. Plan Rejected

SAN DIEGO, Nov. 27 (UPI)—The Academic Senate at the University of California's San Diego campus has rejected a resolution that would have prohibited members from doing research for the Central Intelligence Agency. Fewer than half of the organization's eligible members, all tenured faculty members, took part in the mail ballot. The vote was 232 against the motion and 152 in favor.

Kissinger never called a halt to the coup attempts begun in Chile in September, 1970.

The Senate committee's seriousness will also be tested by Richard Nixon's attempts, to set terms for his appearance. He says he must be questioned in California, by just two committee members, and he reserves the right to invoke "executive privilege." Two courts have already given short shrift to the notion that he retains any such privilege. He is subject to subpoena like anyone else. Is the Church committee afraid to issue one?

There are questions for the House of Representatives, too. Its intelligence committee has subpoenaed vital evidence on covert actions from Secretary Kissinger, and moved to hold him in contempt for failing to produce it. But there is talk that the House leadership plans to kill the contempt citation. Is that true?

And why is the House committee's chairman, Otis Pike, not moving to extend the artificial January deadline for its work? There have been delays beyond the committee's control, and the deadline is now quite unrealistic. If it were lifted, Secretary Kissinger and others would have to take the House inquiry's requests for information more seriously.

The press also has some questions to answer. It rises in a chorus of outrage when a judge prohibits stories that might prejudice the defendant in a criminal trial. But it yawns when the Secretary of State and the President try to keep the public from learning facts crucial to an understanding of the way America operates in the world.

Time magazine, which did hard investigating in Watergate, dismissed the Senate committee's assassination report in a page, devoting its cover to shopping. Most of the press let the subject drop after a first flurry of stories. A week later the Washington Post began pursuing some intriguing clues in the report, such as the indication that Nixon was roused to covert warfare on Chile by his friend Donald Kendall of Pepsi-Cola.

A Congressional investigator of covert activities remarked sadly the other day: "We get all kinds of pressure not to do things—and almost none to go on with our job." Why are Congress and the press so much more pliant now than they were in Watergate?

One reason is a natural respect for secrecy in the nation's intelligence services, though in fact plots to murder foreign leaders or overthrow their governments are not "intelligence." But there is also a personal reason. Henry Kissinger is a genius at softening up legislators and journalists—at co-opting them. One person on Capitol Hill said:

"Every time we get close to a nerve, we find that it leads to Kissinger. And then, soon, we get the pressure to protect him."

NEW YORK TIMES
2 Dec. 1975**ROSENBERG FILES
TO BE RELEASED**Justice Agency and the C.I.A.
Waive \$35,000 in Fees

WASHINGTON, Dec. 1 (UPI)—The Justice Department and the Central Intelligence Agency have waived nearly \$35,000 in search fees for release of the files on the convicted atom spies, Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, officials said today.

The Justice Department said it was waiving \$20,458 in search fees because of the "public interest and historic significance" of the espionage case. The C.I.A., meanwhile, disclosed that it waived last week its \$14,153.30 fee on 953 pages of Rosenberg documents.

The Rosenbergs' sons, Robert and Michael, won a Federal court order releasing the files under the Freedom of Information Act. But they have been unable to pay the large fees for searching through the files and copying them.

Both the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the C.I.A. had said anyone seeking copies of the documents would have to pay a copying charge of 10 cents a page. But Deputy Attorney General Harold R. Tyler Jr. said he had ordered the search fee waived after receiving several requests.

Mr. Tyler said, "The Rosenberg case is close to being unique in terms of both current public interest and historical significance."

"I am convinced that my action is in the public interest in this particular case inasmuch as release of these records will benefit the general public far more than it will any individual requester."

"In taking this action," he said, "I wish to affirm my belief that public examination of these records will demonstrate beyond reasonable doubt the integrity of the investigative, prosecutorial and judicial processes as they were carried out in the Rosenberg case."

The Rosenbergs were electrocuted in 1953 after being convicted of passing atomic secrets to the Russians. Their sons, who use the name Meeropol, which is the name of their adoptive parents, had not requested the waiver but had threatened court action to get the charge removed.

The waiver requests were made by Prof. Allen Weinstein, a professor of history at Smith College, and by reporters for The Washington Star and The Washington Post.

Mr. Tyler ordered the F.B.I. to make the papers available as soon as possible to all who wish to see them. The entire bureau file consists of about 29,000 pages.

The F.B.I. had already waived a charge for the time that executives spent reviewing the documents to remove information that would encroach on the privacy of innocent persons and other matter exempted by the Freedom of Information Act.

Mr. Tyler said this charge would have totaled \$215,000.

NEW YORK TIMES
5 DEC 1975**ROSENBERG FILES
OF C.I.A. RELEASED**Growth of Soviet Atomic
Research and Reports on
Klaus Fuchs Described

By PETER KIHSS

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 4—An initial batch of 894 pages of Central Intelligence Agency files have been released on the 25-year-old case that sent Julius and Ethel Rosenberg to their deaths for plotting atomic spying in behalf of the Soviet Union.

A look at the documents, released under the Freedom of Information Act suit brought by the Rosenbergs' two sons hoping to clear their parents' names, supplied some footnotes to history today at a Rosslyn, Va., C.I.A. office.

They included the following: Two pages of a study of Soviet military intelligence, contending that the Soviet's atomic quest started relatively unplanned as a result of pre-World War II Comintern recruitment of scientists for foreign Communist fronts. By 1943, the study said, Soviet officers were receiving detailed information on atomic research by their allies—England, Canada and the United States.

A 1960 report from a source in East Germany on Dr. Klaus Fuchs, termed in the other study the first atomic spy for the Soviet military, asserting that he carried out "extensive calculations for a breeder reactor with a relatively high burn-out of about 60 percent" while in prison in Britain.

A C.I.A. report to the Federal Bureau of Investigation dated May 19, 1950, citing a Nazi security booklet as having listed Dr. Fuchs before the 1941 German invasion of the Soviet Union as an "extremely dangerous security risk" who might be used by the Russians.

Start of Investigations

Dr. Fuchs had worked at the Los Alamos, N.M., atomic bomb project, as a German refugee with the British scientific mission. His volunteered spy confession led to his arrest in England Feb. 2, 1950, and a 14-year prison term, and set off American investigations that led to the Rosenberg case.

Harry Gold, a Philadelphia chemist, was arrested as the agent to whom Dr. Fuchs gave information. This led to the arrest of David Greenglass, a

wartime Army machinist at Los Alamos, for giving data to Mr. Gold. Mr. Greenglass identified Julius Rosenberg, his brother-in-law, and Ethel Rosenberg, his sister, as other contacts.

The newly released documents showed that the C.I.A. tried to trace Anatoli A. Yakovlev, against whom the Rosenberg indictment is still outstanding as Mr. Gold's spy superior. The agency reported Mr. Yakovlev, who left the United States after serving as Soviet vice consul in New York from 1941 to 1946, had become vice consul in Paris.

A June 29, 1962, C.I.A. report, long after the 1953 electrocutions of the Rosenbergs, said that the Soviet official's true name was Yatskov, that he served in France from 1946 to 1948 as a scientific and technical intelligence officer, and that he then returned to the Soviet Union, where he got into some unexplained troubles "because of relatives" and then wound up in an intelligence "illegals directorate."

Fuchs Called 'Bitter'

An April 5, 1960, C.I.A. document said that Dr. Fuchs had recently been appointed Deputy director of the Central Physics Institute for Nuclear Physics in Dresden, East Germany.

He was termed "still a brilliant scientist...dedicated politically to communism...now married to a devout Communist seven years his senior."

"Fuchs is now very bitter as a result of his years in British prison and has completely withdrawn himself from social contacts in Dresden," the report said.

The winding trails of the investigations were indicated by a Feb. 21, 1950, C.I.A. memorandum to the F.B.I., reporting that an informant whose name is blanked out had told of an incident of Dr. Fuchs's last trip to the United States which he "now considers important."

"Fuchs had borrowed a hat from an acquaintance," the memorandum related. "When Fuchs forgot it, the acquaintance refused to pick up the hat at a certain restaurant and insisted that it be brought over by [the blanked-out name]."

Newly released F.B.I. documents here include an interview with Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer, director of the Los Alamos atomic bomb project, calling Dr. Fuchs's wartime "scientific contributions commendable."

A March 9, 1964, C.I.A. memorandum reported that in "usually reliable" informant had reported that "all the Soviet state security personnel involved in the Fuchs case in England received awards."

The material was obtained by the Rosenberg sons, Michael and Robert Meeropol, who won the release yesterday of 29,000 pages of F.B.I. data on the case.

NEW YORK TIMES
23 Nov. 1975**CAMPUSES ASSAIL
C.I.A. RECRUITING**Efforts to Enlist Minorities
Protested at U.C.L.A.

By EVERETT R. HOLLES

Special to The New York Times

SAN DIEGO, Nov. 22—The Central Intelligence Agency's renewed efforts to recruit blacks and other minority students at large universities has led to protest rallies and picket lines on three campuses of the University of California.

Faculty members joined student demonstrators this week in San Diego, Los Angeles and Berkeley, demanding not only expulsion of on-campus agency recruiters but also "full disclosure and immediate cancellation of all other associations" with the agency.

The intensified recruiting of minority students for foreign intelligence work, ordered by William E. Colby, the outgoing Director of Central Intelligence, because of "a need for C.I.A.'s staff to reflect the diversity of American society," centered on the three campuses, where the agency has encountered sharp hostility in the past.

The agency has not changed its recruiting techniques, a spokesman said in Washington.

"We have about a dozen regional recruiting offices, as before, across the country," he said. "We place ads in college newspapers, we work through college placement agencies, and we have a fair number of walk-ins. The same as it has been since the inception of the agency."

The spokesman said that applications were "way up."

The most forceful anti-C.I.A. action came on the San Diego campus Tuesday when the faculty Senate, with support from the Black Studies Third College and the Center for Chicano Studies, mailed out ballots to its 700 members for a referendum on severing all ties with the agency, including any funded activities as well as recruiting.

University officials denied the existence of any agency-financed projects on the campuses.

A straw vote taken at an earlier faculty meeting showed four out of six of those attending opposed to what speakers denounced as "this shocking invasion of the campus by an agency of proven involvement in political assassination and other insidious actions."

At Berkeley, 300 students and faculty attended two rallies in Sproul Plaza, organized by a coalition of student organizations that passed resolutions condemning the presence of the agency recruiters on campus and demanding repudiation of all connections with agency programs.

A picket line was set up around the campus placement office where minority students were being interviewed for

Thurs., Nov. 27, 1975 *Los Angeles Times*

Students in Saxon Melee Face Ouster

UC San Diego Orders Probe of CIA Recruiting Fracas

From Times Wire Services

SAN DIEGO—Students who roughed up University of California President David Saxon during a visit to UC San Diego Tuesday face possible probation and perhaps dismissal, university officials said Wednesday.

Saxon, who was jostled and spat upon during a demonstration protesting his refusal to ban Central Intelligence Agency recruiting on campus, said he was "both saddened and shocked" by the incident.

"I abhor the recently revealed reprehensible activities carried out by members of that agency (CIA) in the name of national security," Saxon said in a statement issued Wednesday.

"But I abhor even more the violence done to reasoned discussion on the San Diego campus in the name of righteousness."

"I refuse to acknowledge that even the most proper ends are served by such improper means, especially so at

the university, where intellectual freedom is of central importance."

Saxon said he was "ashamed" of the "attack on the integrity of our community" and "especially ashamed that it was necessary for me to leave in a police car."

William McElroy, UCSD chancellor, said he had ordered his vice chancellor to investigate the incident and recommend probation or possible dismissal for the students involved.

Saxon was surrounded by jeering students Tuesday as he walked from a meeting he had agreed to on the gymnasium steps to answer questions of students and staff.

A campus security officer said there was no indication of trouble beforehand but that tension mounted as Saxon answered questions about possible CIA recruitment on the campus.

As Saxon walked away toward a classroom to address an Academic Senate meeting, his way was blocked at times by students with locked arms.

One student spat at him and one tore at his coat. Campus police formed a wedge and forced a way through the crowd for him. One officer said Saxon appeared shaken but maintained his composure.

The demonstrators, chanting anti-CIA slogans and waving signs, forced their way into the room where the Academic Senate was meeting, forcing the session to end abruptly.

Saxon, followed by students, was guided through a side door by plainclothes campus police who took him away in a police car.

During the confrontation on the gymnasium steps, Saxon did not say whether the CIA had recruited at UCSD. He did say he would not set himself up as "a moral God to others" and would not "interfere with the right of citizens to choose for themselves what is moral or proper." In reference to the CIA, he said the agency was "a perfectly legal organization."

agency positions.

Speakers at the Berkeley rallies included State Assemblyman Kenneth Meade, several professors and leaders of the Associated Students Council, the Education Liberation Front, the Spartacus Youth League and the Peace and Freedom Party.

Office Is Picketed

Two rallies were held on the Los Angeles campus where 100 students picketed the Federal Volunteers' Service Office set up at the U.C.L.A. Graduate School of Management for agency job interviews.

Winston Doby of the vice chancellor's office defended the agency recruiting before one of the meetings.

"We have to recognize the C.I.A. is a legitimate agency governed by the same employment rules as any other government agency," he said.

The campus protests erupted following the disclosure that administrative representatives from the San Diego, Berkeley and Los Angeles campuses had attended a conference on Oct. 23 and 24 at the C.I.A.'s headquarters in Langley, Va., in response to an Aug. 23 letter from Mr. Colby to the University of California's president, Dr. David Saxon.

Mr. Colby asked specifically for representation from the three campuses because of their heavy minority enrollments, explaining that although "the general volume and quality of applicants for C.I.A. employment has never been higher," the agency was having difficulty in attracting young people from the minorities.

Members of the Faculty Senate acknowledged that, whatever the outcome of their mail referendum, it would have no binding force on the university administration.

Los Angeles Times

Sun., Nov. 30, 1975

Faculty at UC San Diego Rejects Move Against CIA

From a Times Staff Writer

SAN DIEGO—Faculty members have rejected a resolution calling for a halt to all Central Intelligence Agency activities at UC San Diego and a full disclosure of all CIA operations at University of California campuses, a UC San Diego spokesman announced Saturday.

The action came four days after UC San Diego students protesting the CIA's presence on campus jeered and spat on UC President David Saxon during an outdoor discussion of the CIA's role there.

After the confrontation, a meeting between Saxon and the university's Academic Senate was disrupted by students who forced their way into the conference room, causing Saxon to be escorted off campus in a police car.

The defeated resolution was put to the faculty for a mail vote after faculty critics of the CIA assailed the agency's campus minority recruitment program. They charged the CIA with being "at the center of the corruption of this society."

The controversy was fueled by disclosures that outgoing CIA Director William E. Colby invited administrators from UC San Diego, UC Berkeley and UCLA to Washington to discuss the agency's recruiting needs.

Faculty and student critics of the CIA's campus involvement have sought the banning of all activities by the agency at UC schools.

San Diego's Academic Senate had asked Saxon to form a statewide committee to look into and make public the CIA's UC functions, and Saxon's ill-fated appearance before the body Tuesday was to discuss that request.

Saxon has emphasized the agency is "a perfectly legal organization" but added he would not "interfere with the rights of citizens to choose for themselves what is proper."

UC San Diego Chancellor William McElroy was not available for comment on the ballot results released Saturday but is on record as defending the CIA's campus presence.

Los Angeles Times Sun., Nov. 30, 1975

An Attack on the University

A university is a sanctuary of the intellect. The suppression of ideas by force, even those ideas we think are fraught with death, is alien to the spirit and purpose of a university, where intellectual discourse must be free from coercion.

The point would be clear enough to students of the University of California at San Diego had the police invaded the campus to stop their discussion of the Central Intelligence Agency and ban their demonstration against the agency.

But the attack on the integrity of the university originated within the community itself and came from a minority of students who shoved their way into a classroom and forced an adjournment of an Academic Senate meeting with University President David Saxon. Ten campus policemen had to form a protective guard for Saxon to get him safely through the crowd of protesting students and he had to leave the campus in a police car.

The issue was the volatile one of possible CIA recruitment on the campus, and Saxon, before meeting with the Academic Senate, stopped to answer questions from the students on the steps of the

school's gymnasium. His position that the CIA was a legal organization with a legal right to recruit on campus brought a chorus of obscenities from the protesters. One student spat at him and another tore at his coat.

Saxon, who demonstrated his own commitment to academic freedom by quitting the university rather than sign a loyalty oath in the McCarthy era, told the students he would not set himself up as a "moral God to others" and would not "interfere with the right of citizens to choose for themselves what is moral or proper."

Saxon later said, "I abhor the recently revealed reprehensible activities" of the CIA, but he added in reference to the protesting students, "I refuse to acknowledge that even the most proper ends are served by such improper means, especially so at the university where intellectual freedom is of central importance."

That should be the first lesson taught at any university, and it should be reinforced by the example of those who have long left the universities and hold positions of power in this society.

Christian Science Monitor

25 November 1975

CIA on campus

Given the recent unsettling revelations of abuse of power by the FBI and CIA, it is understandable that some students and faculty members at several University of California branches are protesting Central Intelligence Agency recruiting on campus. While protesters certainly have a right to voice their opinion, we think they miss an essential point.

For too many years the FBI and CIA tended to be staffed largely by persons of similar background. There was too little room for dissent or any questioning of the activities that eventually got these departments into so much trouble. While there has been a recent trend to upgrade the status of women and include more minorities in government, the intelligence agencies lagged behind and thus missed out on a valuable segment of society.

A comparison can be made to military-officer training programs on campus. Now that antiwar sentiment has died down and many schools have divested themselves of research contracts which brought with them a degree of financial dependence on the federal government, it is interesting to note that ROTC programs are enjoying renewed interest—particularly among women and minorities.

Like the military services, intelligence agencies should, as outgoing CIA director William Colby recently said, "reflect the diversity of American society." Too, there is no reason why departments of government should not have the same access to potential employees as private corporations. Having CIA representatives on campus could afford an opportunity for skeptics to probe the extent to which the agency is getting its house in order, as well as provide direct and valuable criticism to the CIA.

The rebuilding of confidence in government could well be aided by such things as CIA recruiting on the nation's campuses.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 25, 1975

C.I.A. Seeks Money to Repair Leaks

By LINDA CHARLTON

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 24—The Central Intelligence Agency, a harried homeowner of late, is worried about leaks—and about cracks. In its foundation, worn linoleum in the cafeteria and deteriorating curbing in the parking lot.

These sorry details were disclosed in an application for \$6.3 million worth of building repairs filed by the agency with the House Public Works Committee Nov. 3. They document the condition of the \$48 million headquarters, completed in 1962, that is situated on 201 wooded, fenced, guarded and secluded acres in McLean, Va., eight miles from downtown Washington.

An agency spokesman, asked if it would be possible to have photographs taken of some of the items needing repair, laughed and said that the building was, indeed, "falling down," but that security was not. No press photographers have ever been allowed in, he said, and none will be now.

The application said that the headquarters had en-

dured more than a normal burden of wear and tear. "This facility has been in use continuously 24 hours a day, 365 days a year for more than a decade," it said.

Other Items Listed

The largest single item—\$2,350,000—is for installation of an automatic fire sprinkler system to meet revised Federal fire safety standards. An additional \$495,000 is sought to install electrostatic precipitators on the chimney stacks, to comply with environmental protection regulations.

The parking lots need new lighting, and, in spots, new roadways or curbs; elevators require overload alarms, and the dining and kitchen areas need \$75,000 worth of new linoleum and "refurbishment," the C.I.A. said.

With such little extras as \$8,500 for a sewer connection, \$363,000 for new heating lines and \$907,000 for new heating and cooling systems, it all adds up to \$6.3 million.

The site of the headquarters is no secret. On several of the surrounding highways, there are signposts reading

"C.I.A.," and suburban buses stop at its gates. But the buildings—there is a huge central building plus several much smaller ones—cannot be seen. The agency bought up adjacent acreage when it was learned that there were plans to build apartment buildings that would offer tenants an unauthorized view of the C.I.A.

The alteration application, which requires committee approval, does give some bare facts and figures. It cost the Government \$36.3 million to acquire the land and existing buildings; it costs \$3.8 million annually for operation, maintenance and repair, and the agency estimated that the "renovated facility" would have a "useful life" of 40 years.

There is, the application said, about one million square feet of "occupiable" space. What it does not state is the number of parking spaces for employees, or even for visitors. The C.I.A. does not disclose how many people work for the agency, but it is unofficially estimated that there are 12,000 employees at the headquarters.

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

Monday, December 1, 1975

9,000 Soviet spies haven't come in from the cold

In the shadowy worldwide struggle between intelligence and counterintelligence agencies, the Soviet Union's KGB is expanding steadily (it now numbers an estimated 300,000, sources say) even while the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency faces a continuing barrage of investigations and headlines.

Here is an inside look at the KGB through the eyes of veteran U.S. intelligence sources.

By Benjamin Welles

Special to The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

Almost a year ago the KGB, the huge Soviet espionage conglomerate, received a totally unexpected bonus in its seesaw battle with the CIA, its American rival.

CIA Director William E. Colby fired James J. Angleton, the veteran counterespionage chief, and three senior deputies in a power struggle marked by press leaks of suspicious accuracy from the CIA's highest levels. Mr. Angleton was a veteran of 31 years who had helped detect such top KGB spies as Harold "Kim" Philby and George Blake.

According to Mr. Colby's associates, Mr. Angleton was too independent and too intent on expanding his authority. Moreover, it is said he had developed intimate cooperation with Israeli intelligence, one of the world's best, and both Mr. Colby and Henry A. Kissinger had decided to wrest this plum back for themselves.

The abrupt dismissal of Mr. Angleton and his three top aides — Raymond Rocca, Newton Miler and William Hood — represented the loss of more than 100 years' combined experience in possibly the

most secret aspect of U.S. Government operations: counterespionage. Without it there can be no true security.

For the last year the CIA and its sister intelligence agencies have been reeling between internal squabbles, press exposes, and vice-presidential and congressional investigations.

What has the KGB been doing in the meantime? "Expanding steadily," say those in a position to know. Moreover, it has been maintaining a highly professional silence. There was, for instance, no gloating over the CIA's discomfiture: The controlled Soviet press merely reprinted brief news extracts.

KGB remains powerful

A huge, rich, and powerful bureaucracy, the KGB numbers 300,000 including border police and internal security detachments. Created in the 1920s, even before the Red Army, it is the U.S.S.R.'s "senior" service and, despite various name changes, has remained all-powerful. Its chief, Yuri Andropov, holds Politburo (Cabinet) rank. Its colleague service, the GRU, the arm of military intelligence, is smaller, defers to the KGB, and in fact is headed by an ex-KGB officer, Piotr Ivanovitch Ivashutin.

Between the KGB and the CIA there is a fundamental difference, specialists note. The CIA is licensed by the 1947 law creating it essentially to conduct espionage, counterespionage, and political subversion overseas — not against Americans at home. From recent congressional exposures, however, it would appear that the law has been violated by successive CIA directors. One of them, Richard Helms, told Congress recently they "made their legal peace" with such violations.

The KGB, by contrast, is empowered both to police 200 million Soviets at home and also to carry out abroad espionage, counterespionage, disinformation and "wet affairs" (Soviet jargon for

personal violence. It runs two types of spies: "legals" and "illegals."

The "legals" have official cover inside embassies, trade, or airline offices, or even as Soviet newsmen. The "illegals" are the "moles" who burrow deep and stay hidden deep in various private guises for years until activated. The better trained are virtually undetectable unless betrayed by defectors, and their numbers are unknown. The "legals," however, are easier to follow.

Numbers rising in U.S.

NATO intelligence in 1959 had detected 3,500 KGB legals outside the Soviet Union and today has its eyes on, perhaps, 9,000. In the U.S. alone, the United Nations, Washington, and in Soviet offices across the country, there were some 300 known legals in 1959; today there are at least 900.

"Presumably with this constant rise in numbers they must be getting more results," said a Western source.

Ever since 1959, specialists say, the KGB has been cooperating closely with services it has trained to high proficiency, such as the ones in Cuba, Hungary, Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. Each service relentlessly seeks recruits among its own ethnic refugees in the U.S.

The Western intelligence community, using meticulous record-keeping such as time-tested passport controls, can often track KGB officers from post to post despite false names — or even false beards. Their operating methods are closely studied.

The KGB has a simplistic slogan: "Any American can be bought," said an experienced observer. The annual visit of more than 130,000 American tourists to the U.S.S.R. makes recruiting easier, although the KGB's main interest lies in American officials such as code clerks or diplomats with access to government information. College-age Americans ideologically hostile to their own administration also are sought as long-term penetration agents into key government divisions such as the FBI or CIA.

By rough rule of thumb, Western intelligence officials estimate that 40 percent of Soviet citizens abroad are on KGB assignment. Why so many?

Essentially, they say, because espionage is relatively cheap and highly cost-effective. Its economic and military benefits to the U.S.S.R. are incalculable — and often overlooked.

By stealing U.S. military and industrial secrets the U.S.S.R. can save billions of rubles, manpower, and time, and thus concentrate its limited resources on keeping military parity — if not superiority — with the U.S. Without effective and continuing espionage Moscow would fall dangerously behind the richer and more industrially advanced U.S.

BALTIMORE SUN
21 Nov. 1975

Christ versus Castro

Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington—Thomas Parrott, a CIA officer, gave his sarcasm full rein in testifying before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities about Gen. Edward Lansdale, a non-CIA man brought in by President Kennedy to oversee the agency's major covert action program.

"I'll give you one example of Lansdale's perspicacity," Mr. Parrott said in testimony. "This plan consisted of spreading the word that the Second Coming of Christ was imminent and that Christ was against Castro [who] was anti-Christ."

"And you would spread this word around Cuba, and then on whatever date it was, that there would be a manifestation of this thing. And at that time—this is absolutely true—and at that time just over the horizon there would be an American submarine which would surface off of Cuba and send up some starshells. And this would be the manifestation of the Second Coming and Castro would be overthrown. . . . Well, some wag called this operation . . . Elimination by Illumination."

"Detente" may be a convenient cosmetic to the political leaders in Washington and Moscow, say the experts; to the intelligence professionals it means nothing. Their work goes on, irrespective of political climates. Soviet dignitaries who meet U.S. industrialists, bankers, politicians, union leaders, or artists are either KGB graduates or on KGB assignment.

One typical example is Aleksandr Shelepin who has successively headed the Young Communists (Komsomol), the KGB and, latterly, the so-called Soviet trade union movement. In this latest role, his mission was to penetrate and destroy the ICFTU, the noncommunist international trade union movement.

Ostensibly Mr. Shelepin was retired "in disgrace" after a recent visit to Britain where his sinister fame led to noisy protests. But he is reported active again in the KGB "illegals" directorate.

The only effective answer to steady KGB expansion is counterespionage, say U.S. intelligence veterans: recruiting agents already in the enemy service — admittedly difficult, though not impossible — or luring defectors for their information.

During the "cold war" 1950s and '60s, defections were frequent and helped the CIA catch such KGB spies as Philby and Blake in Britain, and others in NATO and West Germany.

It was in 1960 that the CIA's Mr. Angleton and his staff ascertained on the basis of defectors' reports that Philby, the British embassy's liaison man in Washington, was a top KGB agent. But successive British governments were loath to believe it, and not until 1963 did Philby's bluff end in his flight to Moscow. Today, 25 years after his exposure, Philby is still "in," working for the KGB-controlled press service Novosti on U.S. and British developments. His nemesis Mr. Angleton, on the other hand is "out."

Starting in the mid-1960s, however — along with the U.S. escalation in Vietnam — defections such as the ones that unmasked Philby began falling off, and with them authoritative insight into the KGB.

Moreover the U.S. intelligence community began squabbling within itself. In 1969 the late J. Edgar Hoover abruptly canceled all FBI liaison with the CIA on counterespionage because President Johnson had refused to defend him publicly against senatorial charges that the FBI was tapping the phones of U.S. senators. Mr. Hoover's pique ended telephone taps on some 2,000 or more Soviet "bloc" personnel across the U.S.

"Maybe it was Vietnam, or the student riots, or the race thing or exposure journalism or Congress — you name it," said an experienced informant, "but since 1970 or so we've had few valuable defectors."

"The climate of defection has been ruined. Why should a KGB officer come over to us now? They're running ahead — in intelligence work, anyway."

WASHINGTON STAR
23 NOV 1975

Moscow Hits CIA Death Planning

MOSCOW — Radio Moscow said yesterday that CIA plans to assassinate foreign leaders as revealed in a Senate report were "contrary to elementary norms of humanity, international law and morals."

The reaction to the report from Radio Moscow and other Soviet news media came on the same day that the official press crowd over the U.S. withdrawal of its U.N. resolution urging amnesty for the world's political prisoners.

Tass, the Soviet news agency, said the revelations of the CIA plots have resulted in "a wave of indignation from the public in the United States" and added that the assassination plots had "the approval of the White House."

WASHINGTON POST
2 DEC 1975

Richard Harris Smith

Allen Dulles and the Politics of Assassination

Three years after his resignation as Director of Central Intelligence, Allen Dulles was asked by a friend if he would have been willing to "take the heat" during the U-2 and Bay of Pigs affairs—to state publicly, and falsely, that he alone had been ultimately responsible for any errors of secret service committed in those times of crisis.

"I've always felt," he replied, "that I should assume full responsibility for anything the Agency has done. I should shield and protect the President in any way I can."

Were he alive today, Dulles might well stand before the Church Committee and solemnly swear that he had never discussed CIA assassination plots.

Mr. Smith, who served as a junior intelligence analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency in 1967-1968, is the author of a book on the World War II Office of Strategic Services. He is currently at work on a biography of Allen Dulles.

with Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy. Given his personal ethic as a public servant in seven presidential administrations, it is entirely conceivable that he would protect the reputations of those chief executives, even if it were personally embarrassing, or to the detriment of his beloved intelligence service.

But it is inconceivable that Dulles would have hidden such sensitive state secrets from the President. "I am under his orders," Dulles would often say. "He is my boss."

No plots for political murder could have gone forward in CIA without a "gentleman's agreement" between the CIA chief and his "boss." Nor was Dulles one to shy away from raising the question with the man on high if, under extreme circumstances, he felt the practice of assassination might serve the national interest.

He had struggled with this issue even before he took charge of CIA.

As chief of the OSS office in Switzerland during World War II, Dulles was approached by dissident Germans of the Third Reich who proposed to cut short the life of Adolf Hitler. With Washington's knowledge and approval, he gave an encouraging wink to their efforts. The plot ended, of course, in failure.

Reflecting, after the war, on that experience, he told an audience of the New York Bar Association that, in a totalitarian state, assassination might be the only means available to overthrow a modern tyrant. Those words were spoken in 1947—weeks before the

Central Intelligence Agency came into existence. Six years later, Dulles became its director.

Early in his regime, a visiting West German general suggested to an assembled group of CIA executives that the Agency "liquidate" East Germany's Communist strongman Walter Ulbricht. An immediate objection was heard from Richard Helms, the future CIA director, then one of Dulles' top aides. Political murder, said Helms, was simply not a viable practice for an intelligence service. But Dulles cut him short. "Don't take my people too seriously," he told the general. "We're prepared to consider anything."

Others at the table tried to suppress a grin. They knew Dulles would never give serious thought to having Ulbricht killed; but he was always eager to establish the reputation of his Agency (particularly among conspirators of the Old World) for sinister expediency and derring-do.

In reality, assassination was then considered "counter-productive" by most practitioners of secret service. When CIA overthrew the left-wing Arbenz regime of Guatemala in 1954, extreme care was taken to insure that President Arbenz and his top advisers should escape unharmed, lest they acquire political immortality through martyrdom.

The question was raised anew in 1957, after the Suez debacle, when Egypt's Nasser was Washington's bete noir of the day. After a dinner party at the home of Walter Lippmann, as the men were segregated for brandy and cigars, conversation turned to the "Nasser problem."

"Allen," said one of America's leading foreign correspondents with tongue-in-cheek, "can't you find an assassin?" Dulles' face assumed a deadly serious expression. Leaning back in a large leather chair, he struck a match, lit his pipe, took a few puffs, then replied, "Well, first you would need a fanatic, a man who'd be willing to kill himself if he were caught. And he couldn't be an outsider. He'd have to be an Arab." Dulles stopped and shook his head in apparent consternation. "It would be very difficult to find just the right man."

Most of the listeners were astounded. The usually discreet Mr. Dulles, having delivered a reasoned response to a

morbid jest, had shown his serious consideration of political murder.

It wasn't long before Fidel Castro outshone Nasser as leading political villain in Washington's eyes. At President Eisenhower's direction, CIA worked out a plan, on the Guatemala model, for Castro's overthrow. The object of the operation, as it followed a complex and confusing course of development in the year preceding the Bay of Pigs disaster, was to provoke a general insurrection throughout the island.

Dr. Richard Bissell, then chief of CIA's Clandestine Services and Dulles' technical alter-ego, presented to the director a scholarly dissertation on how this political upheaval was to be accomplished. In Bissell's academic scenario, the revolt would receive an enormous boost from Castro's demise. The Cuban dictator seemed more the dynamic "evil genius" of his regime than Guatemala's Arbenz had ever been; his removal from the scene thus presented a certain grisly logic. With the Cuban Army bereft of its commander and thoroughly demoralized, the insurgents would, in theory, have an open field.

There was much about the final Cuban plan, particularly the military details of a half-baked invasion strategy, that Dulles never fully grasped. But he did take a personal interest in Bissell's blueprint for revolution. Castro's assassination was integral to that blueprint. Dulles understood that. And when he finally gave his nod to political murder, it could be only because he had himself received a green light—tacit or explicit—from Dwight Eisenhower and John Kennedy.

Dulles might "consider anything" if he felt it would preserve and protect the imperial power of the United States. But he was too politically astute, too dedicated to American representative government, to allow his Agency to become a "rogue elephant," hatching plots abroad without the sanction of the nation's highest elected official.

Allen Dulles liked to remind his aides that he and they served at the pleasure of the President. If his CIA committed acts seen in hindsight, as morally reprehensible the final responsibility must be sought in the Oval Office.

LATIN AMERICA

31 October 1975

Colombia: The government has decided not to renew the contract of the United States-owned Summer Institute of Linguistics, frequently accused of acting as an information network for the CIA. Its work will be taken over gradually by Colombian scientists. Peru's attitude towards the institute's activities is still under discussion.

NEW YORK TIMES
2 7 NOV 1975

Piffiab to the Rescue

By William Safire

WASHINGTON—For the fun of publicly examining the spy system we have called in from the cold, a blown-cover charge must be paid: America's much-needed intelligence community is rattled and depressed, and finds it difficult to function.

In White House offices, the word "Piffiab" is heard in connection with rebuilding the morale as well as the control structure of our intelligence system. It is an extruded acronym of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board: PFIAB.

For years, this has been the most blue-ribbon of all the boards and commissions that abound in Washington. Its monthly sessions are regularly attended by a dozen of the nation's most respected citizens, including inventor Edward Land, scientist Edward Teller, publisher Gordon Gray, lawyer Leo Cherne, writer Clare Booth Luce and ex-everything George Shultz.

Unfortunately, Piffiab in the past six years has been dominated by Henry Kissinger through Nelson Rockefeller, a member before becoming Vice President; its staff and budget are small, its oversight capability, thereby limited.

The idea now is to change all that by bringing in a few more prestigious people and giving the board much more to do. A few weeks ago, President Ford intended to expand the board to fifteen members, including:

¶Lane Kirkland, secretary-treasurer of the A.F.L.-C.I.O., the number two man in organized labor and well-versed in C.I.A. affairs after his service on the C.I.A. investigative panel.

¶John Connally, who had served on Piffiab twice before, resigning when he was indicted; in fairness, acquittal ought to be followed by reinstatement.

¶Edward Bennett Williams, whose representation of unpopular clients and ownership of the embattled injury-ridden Washington Redskins uniquely qualified him for C.I.A. involvement; like Kirkland, Williams is a Democrat—in fact, treasurer of the party.

¶William J. Casey, retiring president of the Export-Import Bank, ex-S.E.C. head who was one of the organizers of allied intelligence in World War II.

White House aides went over this list with Henry Kissinger, who will not be criticized in this space on a national holiday. The Secretary of State had no objection to Williams, in whose box he sits to cheer the Redskins on, or to Connally, whose use of power he had come to respect in years past, but Kirkland and Casey were anathema.

Mr. Kirkland's sin was in his fierce denunciation of appeasement in the name of détente, and his warm approval of some of Senator Scoop Jackson's speeches; worst of all—in State's

eyes—when Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn came to Washington, the Soviet writer was the house guest of Lane Kirkland and his wife, Elena, who is also unashamedly pro-Israel.

Secretary Kissinger gave no special reason for opposing Mr. Casey, but House aides assumed that he remembered the work of the Murphy Commission: On that panel, Bill Casey was one who insisted that the National Security Adviser not also wear the hat of a Cabinet officer.

President Ford yielded to Kissinger on Kirkland, but not on Casey, who had also been slated for Piffiab's chairmanship to replace George W. Anderson, the former Chief of Naval Operations. The President decided to appoint Casey as a member but to keep Admiral Anderson on as chairman; after the firing of James Schlesinger, it suddenly seemed a good idea to keep aboard a man suspicious of Soviet SALT intentions.

These appointments are scheduled to be made "between Peking and Vail," in the travel-marked White House calendar, and will dovetail with some far-reaching structural recommendations about the scope of Director of Central Intelligence's job and the degree of intelligence oversight to be exercised within the executive branch.

An Office of Management and Budget task force is now working on options about the nature of the assignment George Bush has been nominated for. This is known as the "Option Three routine": Option One will be to leave everything the way it is, with the Director of Intelligence trying to play the dual role of C.I.A. chief and overall intelligence-community defender (which is now impossible); Option Two will be to appoint a White House intelligence czar (which would frighten everyone and raise an uproar); and Option Three (which is the one usually chosen), to ask Congress to separate the job of director from the job of administrator of C.I.A.

That's not all. Plans call for Piffiab's staff to be beefed up so as to handle an important new source of information: copies of all reports by the Inspectors General of the various intelligence agencies. Every spook knows how significant that would be: The Inspector General's report of May 21, 1973, was the basis for almost all the information brought out by all the subsequent committees and commissions.

With such changes, and despite the separate pressures of church and State, America's intelligence system can come out of its bunker. We will better be able to know what our opponents are doing and how strong we need to be. On this weekend, the prospect of having our intelligence community again doing its job—and only its job—is no small matter to be thankful for.

THE ECONOMIST NOVEMBER 29, 1975

CIA

Cloak, dagger, poisoned cigars

Washington, DC

Which tactics are appropriate for a western democracy to use in implementing its foreign policy? Although proud of constitutionalism and orderly processes at home, is it entitled to fight fire with fire overseas? If the KGB, the Soviet "committee on state security", employs methods of subterfuge, deception, covert intervention and even assassination to achieve its goals, does that mean that the western intelligence services must respond in kind?

Difficult though they may seem to be today, those questions had self-evident answers for a generation of Americans who felt that the United States had a responsibility to go to the ramparts in the cold war and hold back the communists at every turn. Towards that end, and towards an ordering of the world that would comply with what were conceived to be vital American interests, almost anything could be justified.

So it was that high government officials, whispering and conniving and talking in codes with the abandon of children at play, plotted to take the lives of Mr Fidel Castro, and Patrice Lumumba who led the Congo for a short time after its independence from Belgium.

Those plots and the paraphernalia for them—poison pens, tainted cigars, exploding seashells, contaminated diving suits and other playthings—were detailed last week in an interim report of the Senate select committee on intelligence. Although no official of the Central Intelligence Agency could ever have been found actually holding a symbolic smoking gun, according to the report the CIA men in effect loaded the weapons and encouraged others to do the dirty work. A foreign leader did not have to be a communist or a pro-communist to get such attention from the CIA; he could have displeased Washington in some other way, or even have been a former friend.

The committee said that the agency had also become involved in other plots, albeit ones originated overseas, against Rafael Trujillo, the dictator in the Dominican Republic, Ngo Dinh Diem, the president of South Vietnam, and General Rene Schneider, the chief of staff of the Chilean army who refused to block the accession of Salvador Allende to his country's presidency and therefore became a candidate for kidnapping by American-supported right-wing elements.

Plotting was a bipartisan pastime, and the names of Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon all emerge sullied from the committee's investigation. It is clear that assassination, and other forms of intervention that stopped just short of it, were deliberate aspects of national policy. What is less clear is how direct and efficient the chain-of-command really was—whether presidents actually ordered deathly deeds or were spared the un-

pleasantness of doing so by intentional vagueness and what the committee called "circumlocution" in government communications. Precise blame is thus difficult to assign.

The Senate committee, led by Mr. Frank Church of Idaho, released its much-delayed report with a good deal of fanfare and emotion. As television cameras whirred away, Mr. Walter Mondale, a Democrat from Minnesota, said that the investigation documented that "Americans are no good at killing and lying and covering up—and I'm glad that that's the case." The White House made an unsuccessful last-minute attempt to prevent publication of the re-

port, and Democrats in the Senate, during a secret session, blocked any vote on its release, lest the tally be too close and thereby stir doubts about the propriety of public disclosure of such delicate information. But most members of the committee remained defiant. "There may be temporary injury" from its publication, conceded Mr. Richard Schweiker, "but I believe the countries of the world will recognize that our willingness to examine our past and seek a better future openly, without finching, is an indication of the greatness of our country."

Indeed, the importance of the unusual

document—peppered with codenames and embarrassing euphemisms—lay less in its substance, much of which was already widely known, than in the phenomenon of its publication. The process is, in the view of Mr. Henry Kissinger, the secretary of state, a simple matter of "self-flagellation"; but as far as the Senate committee is concerned, it is a matter of high patriotism, a demonstration of the resilience of the system of checks-and-balances in the American system of government. "The story is sad", the committee concluded, "but this country has the strength to hear the story and to learn from it".

NEW YORK TIMES

26 NOV 1975

Plots Report Draws Attention to Helms

By JOHN M. CREWDSON

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 25—The Senate Select Intelligence Committee's report on assassination plots inspired by the Central Intelligence Agency against foreign leaders has served to refocus attention on the record compiled by Richard M. Helms, now the American Ambassador to Iran, during much of his 26-year career with the agency.

The principal finding concerning Mr. Helms in the committee's long report, released last week, was that he had failed, while a Deputy Director of the C.I.A., to inform agency and White House superiors of efforts to kill Prime Minister Fidel Castro of Cuba, something the Senate panel termed a "grave error in judgment."

Ron Nessen, the Presidential press secretary, said following the report's release that President Ford had seen nothing in its findings that would cause him to reconsider Mr. Helms's continued service as Ambassador. A State Department spokesman said today that he had seen no indication of any such reconsideration either.

Mr. Helms served for seven years as Director of Central Intelligence, the agency's top post, before being named Ambassador in 1972.

The Rockefeller Commission, set up by President Ford earlier this year to inquire into the C.I.A.'s domestic activities, criticized Mr. Helms in its report last June for "poor judgment" in destroying tape recordings and documents that might have related to the Watergate scandals.

The commission said the destruction was ordered after Mr. Helms had received a request from Senator Mike Mansfield of Montana, the majority leader, to retain in agency files all materials of possible relevance to the Watergate case.

Some of the C.I.A.'s activities, including domestic surveillance and the assassination plots, are under study by Justice Department prosecutors, who are also, according to department officials, examining for possible perjury some of Mr. Helms's testimony during his February 1973 confirmation hearings for

the Ambassadorial post he now holds.

Mr. Helms told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during those hearings that the C.I.A. had never attempted to overthrow the Chilean Government of President Salvador Allende Gossens or passed money to political opponents of the Marxist leader.

Testimony About Hunt

Mr. Helms also told the committee that E. Howard Hunt Jr., one of the convicted Watergate conspirators, had not maintained a relationship with the C.I.A. after Mr. Hunt's retirement as a C.I.A. officer in 1970.

Mr. Helms also said, in answer to a question, that he could not recall whether during his tenure as director, the C.I.A. had been asked to become involved in an interagency effort to share intelligence relating to the anti-Vietnam war movement in the United States.

"I don't recall whether we were asked," Mr. Helms testified, "but we were not involved, because it seemed to me that this was a clear violation of what our charter was." The National Security Act of 1947, which established the C.I.A., prohibits any domestic police or surveillance functions by the agency.

Justice Department lawyers are understood to be comparing those statements by Mr. Helms with subsequent evidence that Mr. Hunt received unwitting assistance from the C.I.A. in the 1971 burglary of the California office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist, that the C.I.A. spent upwards of \$10 million in an effort to overthrow the Allende Government, and that the C.I.A., under Mr. Helms, was involved in the surveillance of domestic dissidents and in formulating the Nixon Administration's abortive Huston-plan for broadened domestic surveillance.

One well-placed Justice Department source, asked about its investigation of the evidence published in the Senate panel's assassination report, indicated that no determination on the illegality of such plots had yet been made, and that in Mr. Helms's particular case there was "no law against lying"

to one's superiors in Government.

The source predicted, however, that Mr. Helms would eventually "have to answer" for some aspects of his conduct.

The Justice Department is understood to be reluctant to proceed with any prosecutions stemming from the alleged C.I.A. activities until lawyers there obtain copies of the testimony and evidence collected by the Senate intelligence committee, something that, committee sources have suggested, may not be forthcoming.

One committee aide said today, however, that the panel did intend to turn over to the department for investigation some of the conflicts in the testimony produced by its inquiry.

A spokesman at the American Embassy in Tehran said last week that Mr. Helms would have "no comment" on the findings made in the assassination report, which included the following:

That Mr. Helms, following the unsuccessful Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in April 1961, ordered the reactivation of an effort, involving American underworld figures, to kill Mr. Castro that had been initiated in conjunction with the invasion. Mr. Helms, the panel said, did not tell John McCone, then the Director of Central Intelligence, that the assassination effort had been renewed. Mr. Helms was then Deputy Director for plans.

That Mr. Helms never stepped forward to correct the record when he learned in 1962 that Robert F. Kennedy, then the Attorney General, had been misled into believing that the plots against Mr. Castro's life had ended after the Bay of Pigs invasion, and that when Mr. McCone was informed by Mr. Helms the following year of the Bay of Pigs assassination plot, he was not told of the subsequent effort in 1962.

That Mr. Helms authorized a C.I.A. subordinate to ap-

proach a prospective Cuban assassin in 1963 and represent himself as Mr. Kennedy's personal representative, although the Attorney General's approval "to speak his name" in such a fashion had not been sought.

The Senate report also said that Mr. Helms had failed to inform the Warren Commission, which investigated the murder of President Kennedy, of the plots on Mr. Castro's life because the "precise question" had not been asked.

After Mr. Helms became the C.I.A. chief in 1966, the report said, he told Dean Rusk, then the Secretary of State, that a Cuban C.I.A. operative who had expressed a desire to kill Mr. Castro, and to whom the agency had offered an assassination device, had not been part of an assassination plot.

Finally, when President Johnson asked in 1967 for a complete report on the C.I.A.'s involvement in attempts on Mr. Castro's life, Mr. Helms briefed the President orally on an internal agency report on the matter but did not mention at least one such plot that had taken place during Mr. Johnson's Presidency.

Although Mr. Helms's testimony during his confirmation hearings in 1973 were the only statements thus far reported to be under examination by the Justice Department for a potential perjury charge, public records show that the Ambassador has apparently been less than candid with congress on other occasions.

In May 1973, for example, Mr. Helms, recalled from Tehran to answer questions about the C.I.A.'s involvement in the burglary of Dr. Ellsberg's psychiatrist, told a House armed services subcommittee that the C.I.A. had no authority or capability to place under surveillance newsmen to whom sensitive national security information had been leaked.

The C.I.A. later acknowledged, however, that it had placed five reporters who had been the beneficiaries of such leaks under surveillance in 1971 and 1972.

WASHINGTON POST
2, 2 NOV 1975

CIA No 'Rogue Elephant'

By Laurence Stern
Washington Post Staff Writer

The U.S. espionage establishment was carrying out its basic institutional role—though one little understood by most Americans—in the assassination case studies described by the Senate intelligence committee report.

Although in its epilogue the committee described the assassination plots as "aberrations," the mass of evidence in the 347-page report suggests that each of the episodes took place within a firm context of national policy going all the way to the Oval Office.

In one way or another, the five assassination targets were regarded as personages inimical to U.S. national security interests. At the same time, the various administrations in the White House did not want to be saddled with the open responsibility for the downfall of the individual leaders or their governments.

But the testimony of witnesses who were central

News Analysis

participants in the events covered by the assassination report tends to push the trail of responsibility to the door of the White House.

Richard Bissell, the Central Intelligence Agency deputy director for plans (head of the dirty tricks division) and a principal Castro assassination plotter, told the committee the schemes were authorized by "highest authority"—by which he meant the President.

As Sen. Howard H. Baker (R-Tenn.) pointed out in a supplementary report, Bissell testified that it would not have been "consonant with the operations of the CIA" to conduct operations of such extreme sensitivity without the President's knowledge and permission.

The recurrent theme in the testimony of the upper-level CIA functionaries was that they were acting within a framework of authority within which all their programs and schemes had an ultimate presidential sanction.

The CIA has been described as a "king's army" at the disposal of the President when he has to resort to secret action to carry out his foreign policies. And the Senate committee, in its unprecedented detailed portrait

Carl T. Rowan

U.S. likely to continue fomenting coups abroad

One of these days the Church and Pike committees will drop their last bombshells about U.S. plots to assassinate foreign leaders and overthrow foreign governments. Once the cries of shame and outrage have faded, the American people are going to have to come to grips with a simple question:

Do we want to control the ideology, determine the leadership, of foreign governments, or do we not?

I know what the public pretense is. We've endorsed a U.N. charter and a hundred other documents pledging not to interfere in the internal affairs of other nations.

But everyone has always known such declarations were merely hypocritical gestures toward the kind of world that ideally ought to exist.

Since World War II it has been accepted as routine that the Soviet Union would spend billions of rubles, employ thousands of agents, to ensure the existence of regimes friendly to Russia in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, East Germany, etc., and would intervene with troops where money and espionage failed.

It has been accepted as part of international competition that the Soviets would finance newspapers in Latin America and Africa, the Chinese would arm rebels in East Africa, the Indians would subvert any

regime in Bangladesh that seemed even a remote threat to India.

The U.S. contribution to this atmosphere in which there is no such thing as an "independent" small or weak nation, and in which even the strongest are constantly in danger of subversion, has been:

- The use of billions of dollars to finance "friendly" labor unions, political parties, newspapers and magazines all over the world.

- The supplying of money, arms, damaging information and even manpower with which to destroy any person, party or political force that a handful of Americans deemed to be a "threat" to the U.S. or its power position in the world.

President Ford said in his press conference last Wednesday that he has ordered the CIA not to plan or participate in the assassination of any foreign leader. But Ford insisted that under certain circumstances the United States must "undertake covert operations."

What the President really was saying is that despite all the idealistic charters and joint communiques we have signed, we will go on interfering in the internal affairs of other countries.

Perhaps all the great powers ought to cut out the phony baloney. Israel, the

Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, Canada, West Germany (to name a few) will be interested in who our next presidential candidates are. All of them will drop a few subtle speeches, even sneak around a few dollars, to influence the outcome.

My guess is that the American public will go along with Ford in approving "covert foreign operations."

The dilemma then is: how does anyone guarantee that a covert operation to deny an Allende the presidency in Chile will not lead directly or indirectly to Allende's murder?

We pumped millions of dollars and vast quantities of arms into Chile to bolster right-wing forces opposing the Marxist president Salvador Allende. Our agents encouraged and financed the coup in which Allende was killed. Do we say we engaged in "covert operations," which Ford will continue to sanction, but that he had nothing to do with the murder of Allende?

Only shameful sophistry permits the drawing of any such line.

The likelihood is that Americans will go on meddling and scheming abroad. And that conniving and subverting will continue to mean death for a lot of foreign leaders. And occasionally some of our leaders.

of the upper levels of the American espionage system, describes an agency that is anything but the "rogue elephant" that the committee chairman, Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho) once suggested it was.

Former CIA Director, Richard M. Helms, recalling his departure from the White House on Sept. 15, 1970, with President Nixon's orders to prevent the election in Chile of Salvador Allende, a Socialist, later testified: "If I ever carried a marshal's baton in my knapsack out of the Oval Office, it was that day."

Despite titillating accounts of exploding seashells, contaminated diving suits and exotic poisons that fill the pages of the report, the underlying truth is that the CIA has functioned as a strongly hierarchical bureaucracy that owes its final allegiance on operational matters to the

White House.

William Harvey, the CIA agent put in charge of recruiting underworld figures for the Castro poison schemes, repeatedly followed this line of testimony:

"I was completely convinced during this entire period that this operation had the full authority of the White House, either from the President or from someone authorized and known to be authorized to speak for the President."

The CIA's involvement in covert political warfare got its start in the idiosyncratic relationship between the Dulles brothers during the Eisenhower administration.

John Foster Dulles, the Secretary of State, according to intelligence veterans of that era, did not trust the State Department bureaucracy on matters of high sensitivity and

would call his brother, Allen, the CIA director, who would deploy the clandestine services of the CIA to the task.

The tradition of CIA covert operations with its clubby, swashbuckling, secretive panache, took firm root in the Dulles' days. During the 1950's, the clandestine programs of the CIA were rated within the government as a success, primarily in battling Communist mass organizations in Europe.

The agency survived the humiliating fiasco of the Bay of Pigs in 1961 to entangle itself in a continuing series of misadventures during the 1960's—some of them chronicled in the assassination report.

It had once been a boast of Allen W. Dulles that Americans never heard of the CIA's successes—only its

WASHINGTON STAR
22 NOV 1975

The assassination business

The interim report of Senator Church's select committee on intelligence, "Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders," probably will do us harm abroad, as President Ford has said. It will be "exploited...to do maximum damage to the reputation and foreign policy of the United States."

A number of senators must agree with Mr. Ford, yet they chose not to suppress this sordid report. Why?

Perhaps some of them feel that it would be inappropriate for the United States to doctor or embroider its official record. Americans have no "official" history, in the totalitarian sense. You can't imagine a report so injurious issuing from the Kremlin or the Winter Palace, but the contrast is not altogether unfavorable to American custom.

Even when a free society tries hard to hide discreditable truths about the past, the effort often fails. Someone tells. So maybe it is better to have the full story, carefully told and evaluated, than to have the bits and pieces of old skeletons falling out of the closet one by one.

These, however, are mainly tactical considerations. What we need to digest are the long-term lessons, which are often dull.

Nothing is duller, for instance, than perspective. Assassination as an instrument of policy did not originate in the U. S. nor with the CIA. The exceptional thing about the plots against Lumumba, Allende, Castro and Trujillo — none of which panned out — is that they were aimed at foreign leaders in "peacetime." We view it as unsporting perhaps, but not morally repugnant in quite the same way, that this country successfully plotted to intercept and shoot down a plane carrying the Japanese general, Yamamoto, who had commanded the attack on Pearl Harbor. That was in "wartime." In our age, the distinction is not always easy to make. In the years covered by the report, many of the accustomed differences between war and peace had collapsed.

What we have here, accordingly, is a manifestation of that doctrine called "globalism" — a doctrine having at its base the notion that vital American interests were imperiled by a crumbling colonial order in the Congo, or a Caribbean dictatorship, or the alignment of an offshore island with the communist bloc. American interest in the world was a seamless whole.

Globalism involved, further, an illusion that with the right plans and tricks we would seize history by the throat and exert control over distant events, however petty.

The Senate report must be seen not only as a comment on the perils and follies of globalism, but as a scalding self-indictment by Congress, which makes the laws and handles the money.

One can't expect Congress to rise above the prevailing standard of judgment and ethics at large, and Congress in the Fifties and Sixties was as much under the spell of globalism as the rest of us. What we can expect is that Congress rise to the prevailing level of judgment and morality, which probably would have condemned the assassination of foreign heads of state. Certainly Congress ought to exceed its constituency in vigilance. One can expect Congress to know more and do more, when it's timely, about the secret projects of creature agencies than Congress knew or did in this period about the CIA. Executive secrecy was involved; but Congress has ways of penetrating that veil when it wishes. And in the present case, exposure came too long after the fact.

In a recent *Columbia Journalism Review* article, reprinted in *The Star* last Sunday, former Sen. J. William Fulbright had some wise observations about the present national mood of revelation and self-flagellation. Of these, perhaps the wisest was that as we open the old closets full of dusty skeletons we tend to dwell on the sensational facts and give "short shrift to the policy questions."

The policy questions raised by the Church committee report may be too obvious to need dwelling on. Some are questions of proper administrative procedure — for instance the unchecked capacity of a President to overbear the cautions of the professionals, as Mr. Nixon did in his design against Allende. Others are broader: Can a democracy be much good at cloak and dagger stuff? Do these operations, even when they succeed, sufficiently affect events or American interests to justify the risks and opprobrium? Can Congress give the CIA the discretion it needs and also protect the country and the country's good name against its blunders and abuses? These questions may be dull, but they beat poisoned cigars in ultimate importance.

THE PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER

25 November 1975

Government: That CIA Again

It seems that the security-tight offices of the CIA are full of leaks. There are water leaks, steam leaks, chimney leaks and even foundation leaks. The problem was leaked out in a five-year, \$6.3 million plan the CIA filed with the House Public Works Committee for renovating its 10-year-old headquarters in Langley, Va.

You can now add another abuse to the list of charges against the CIA — abuse of the English language.

The assassination report by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence said the CIA had a cardinal rule of never calling it murder. It mentioned such things as "stand-by assassination capability," "incapacitating," "terminating," "removing from the scene" and "altering the health" of the victims. There was even a consultant group called the "Health Alteration Committee."

failures. However now that so much of the agency's clandestine history has been laid bare in congressional and executive investigations, the claim does not stand the test of public scrutiny.

Sunday, Nov. 23, 1975

THE WASHINGTON POST

Warren Commission Lawyer Asks Reopening of Probe

George Lardner Jr.
Washington Post Staff Writer

The most outspoken defender of the Warren Commission's inquiry into President Kennedy's assassination said yesterday that it should be reopened.

David W. Belin, who served as a staff lawyer on the Warren Commission and more recently as executive director of the Rockefeller Commission, called on Congress to order a thorough new investigation in light of widespread skepticism about the Warren Commission's work and the withholding of evidence from it by government officials and agencies.

The Central Intelligence Agency, the FBI and the late Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy himself, Belin protested in a public statement, all failed to disclose to the Warren Commission evidence concerning plots to assassinate Cuban Premier Fidel Castro.

Belin, a Des Moines attorney, also pointed out that the FBI has recently admitted its failure to disclose evidence of threats made to the FBI by Lee Harvey Oswald several days before the Nov. 22, 1963, assassination of the President in Dallas.

Speaking out on the 12th anniversary of the murder, Belin maintained that a new inquiry would reach the same central conclusion that Oswald "killed both President Kennedy and (Dallas Police) Officer (J.D.) Tippit," but he said a fresh investigation might also shed additional light "on what motivated Oswald."

Belin voiced doubt that a reopening of the investigation so many years after the assassination "would disclose the existence of any foreign conspiracy," but he did not rule out that possibility.

Although the Warren Commission found no credible evidence of any foreign conspiracy, he pointed out, "the Warren Commission did not have any information concerning CIA assassination plans directed against Fidel Castro and possible ramifications of such plans."

In the past, Belin has resisted suggestions that the investigation be reopened, on the grounds that some witnesses have died and the recollections of others are not likely to be as accurate now as they were in 1964. Despite that, he said he felt a fresh, objective and independent inquiry would "greatly contribute toward a rebirth of confidence and trust in government."

Belin remained silent about the relevance of CIA assassination scheming

turned up by the Rockefeller Commission earlier this year because of the secrecy imposed by the administration, but the Senate intelligence committee last week released an even broader study of CIA murder attempts and conspiracies.

The Senate report showed that the CIA and to a lesser extent the FBI and Attorney General Kennedy were all aware of some of the efforts to kill Castro when the Warren Commission asked for any information bearing on whether the ostensibly pro-Castro Oswald might have been part of a conspiracy.

Belin also called for release by the CIA—as well as by the National Archives—of all information it has on Oswald and on the Kennedy assassination. Included in the archives documents are the autopsy photographs and X-rays of President Kennedy,

which the Warren Commission decided to suppress because, Belin said, of "the personal family desires of the Kennedy family." He called this "perhaps the worst mistake made by the commission."

Belin said he felt reopening the Warren inquiry would serve to refute "the most extreme and vocal assassination critics," who, he charged, have deliberately misrepresented the overall record of evidence that the commission had before it.

Finally, Belin asked in his statement for a review by the National News Council or some similar forum of the news media's continuing coverage of President Kennedy's assassination.

In any case, he maintained that a reopening of the Warren investigation itself would show how the public can at times "be misled by sen-

sationalism, demagoguery and deliberate misrepresentation of the overall record," especially when there is insufficient public knowledge of the record.

The disclosures of the Senate intelligence committee in the past week would also appear to give the Warren Commission critics something to complain about. FBI Deputy Associate Director James B. Adams acknowledged at a Senate hearing Wednesday that the FBI submitted secret reports on seven Warren Commission critics to the Johnson White House in 1966 at the request of then-White House aide Marvin Watson.

Included in the FBI packet, Adams acknowledged, was traffic record information and photographs of at least one of the critics in the course of "sexual activity."

BALTIMORE SUN
25 Nov. 1975

The Death of JFK

For years "conspiracy theorists" have been charging that the Warren Commission (1) incompetently failed to follow all leads in the John F. Kennedy assassination case, or (2) deliberately conspired to keep the truth hidden. Last spring Senator Church responded to a new wave of sensational charges with a promise that his committee studying the intelligence community would take a new look at the assassination investigation. Vice President Rockefeller said his commission conducting a similar study would take a similar look. Both commission and committee had their hands full with other matters and as a consequence could deal with the assassination only in passing. But it is interesting to note that today the executive director of the Rockefeller Commission, David Belin, and two members of the Church Committee, Senators Schweiker and Hart, have called for reopening the investigation into the murder of John F. Kennedy.

These calls proceed from different perspectives and with different anticipation. Mr. Belin, who was also assistant counsel of the Warren Commission, believes the new investigation would prove the commission came to the right conclusion. He believes a new study would restore public faith in government institutions and

demonstrate to the public how easily it can be misled by clever sensation-mongers. Senators Schweiker and Hart believe the study will prove the Warren Commission did a poor job and came to the wrong conclusion.

We believe that the preponderance of the evidence suggests that Lee Harvey Oswald was the assassin and that he probably acted alone, or at least without the assistance of any organized group or government. But it is troubling to learn from Church Committee that both the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency lied to the Warren Commission during its investigation—and that one member of the Commission, former C.I.A. Director Allen Dulles, was aware of that and allowed his fellow members to be deceived. This makes it possible to believe there was a conspiracy after the assassination. Until this is explained, the conspiratorial-minded will always believe the most bizarre theories.

For a more important reason, Congress should take a new and detailed look into the Kennedy assassination. If the F.B.I. and C.I.A. could get away with lies to a special commission once, they could again. Congress needs to find out how this happened and what can be done to keep it from happening again.

THE WASHINGTON POST Saturday, Nov. 22, 1975

CIA Schemes, Gadgets Would Amaze Even Ian Fleming

By Robert G. Kaiser

Washington Post Staff Writer

The late Ian Fleming, who invented James Bond, the archetypal spy of our age, liked to imply that Bond was more than just an invention—that his “license to kill,” his exotic partners in espionage and his remarkable gadgets were more than figments of Fleming’s imagination.

That hint of verisimilitude helped explain the success of Fleming’s James Bond novels. Now the Senate intelligence committee has demonstrated that Fleming’s hints could have been stronger. It was all true.

Well, nearly all true.

Bond usually got his man. The Central Intelligence Agency agents, exposed by the Senate committee—spies with code names like QJ-WIN, WI-ROGUE—never got their man.

WI-ROGUE (an acronymical pseudonym) was “an essentially stateless soldier of fortune . . . a forger and former bank robber,” according to an internal CIA report. He was “a man with an unsavory reputation who would try anything once, at least,” according to the CIA’s station officer in the Congo.

The CIA dispatched WI-ROGU to the Congo “after providing him with plastic surgery and a toupee so that Europeans traveling in the Congo would not recognize him,” according to the Senate committee. The Agency’s Africa Division had recommended him for the mission:

“He is indeed aware of the precepts of right and wrong, but if he is given an assignment which may be morally wrong in the eyes of the world, but necessary because his case officer ordered him to carry it out, then it is right, and he will dutifully undertake appropriate action for its execution without pangs of conscience . . .” So reports the Senate Committee, quoting the Africa Division.

WI-ROGUE was in the Congo at the same time as QJ-WIN. QJ-WIN “was a foreign citizen with a criminal background recruited in Europe,” the Senate panel learned, “not . . . a man of many scruples,” in the words of another CIA operative.

These men were “assets” of the Leopoldville “station” of the CIA, though neither knew of the other’s status. Then one day they met. A CIA agent in the Congo reported on the encounter in a cable to Washington:

“QJ-WIN, who resides same hotel as WI-ROGUE, reported WI-ROGUE smelled as though he in intel (intelligence) business. Station denied

any info on WI-ROGUE . . . QJ-WIN reported WI-ROGUE had offered him \$300 per month to participate in intel net and be member ‘execution squad.’ When QJ-WIN said he not interested, WI-ROGUE added there would be bonuses for special jobs. Under QJ-WIN questioning, WI-ROGUE later said he working for (America) service (i.e., CIA) . . .”

The CIA’s department of gadgets, the Senate committee discovered, is called the Technical Services Division, or TSD. In 1960 TSD considered a number of schemes “to undermine (Fidel) Castro’s charismatic appeal (in Cuba) by sabotaging his speeches.” For example:

“ . . . A scheme to spray Castro’s broadcasting studio with a chemical which produced effects similar to LSD, but the scheme was rejected because the chemical was unreliable . . .”

TSD impregnated a box of cigars with a chemical which produced temporary disorientation, hoping to induce Castro to smoke one of the cigars before delivering a speech, but that one also apparently did not get off the ground.

The most ambitious scheme of 1960 was a plan “to destroy Castro’s image as ‘The Beard’ by dusting his shoes with thallium salts, a strong depilatory that would cause his beard to fall out. The depilatory was to be administered during a trip outside Cuba, when it was anticipated Castro would leave his shoes outside the door of his hotel room to be shined. TSD procured the chemical and tested it on animals . . .”

But that idea was dropped, apparently because “Castro canceled his trip.”

(The committee retold these stories from a report prepared by the CIA’s inspector general.)

Some of TSD’s inventions failed to work. The division produced some capsules of lethal poison for potential assassins who hoped to drop one of the pills into something Castro was drinking. But “the first batch of pills prepared by TSD . . . would not

dissolve in water.”

Another of TSD’s inventions could never be used because of the unwitting generosity of James Donovan, a New York lawyer who negotiated the release of Cuban exiles captured during the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion.

Someone in the CIA had the idea that Donovan could make a gift of a diving suit to Castro, known to enjoy deep-sea diving. According to the committee report:

“The Technical Services Division bought a diving suit, dusted the inside with a fungus that would produce a chronic skin disease (Madura foot), and contaminated the breathing apparatus with a tubercule bacillus.”

But Donovan, who had been negotiating personally with Castro, subverted this plan by giving the Cuban leader—on his own initiative, without consulting Washington—a different new diving suit, untainted by Madura foot or tuberculosis. After that, it seemed inappropriate to present Castro with a second diving suit.

The Senate committee learned that the CIA has had a committee to pass on the use of biological and chemical substances. In one CIA document it was referred to as the “Health Alteration Committee.”

In 1960 the CIA’s Near East Division asked the Health Alteration Committee to endorse a “special operation” to “incapacitate” an Iraqi colonel who was thought to be “promoting Soviet-bloc political interests in Iraq.” The committee said a “disabling operation” could be undertaken.

According to the Senate committee report, “The approved operation was to mail a monogrammed handkerchief containing an incapacitating agent to the colonel from an Asian country . . .”

The CIA informed the Senate committee that the colonel in question “suffered a terminal illness before a firing squad in Baghdad (an event we had nothing to do with) not very long after our handkerchief proposal was considered.”

Sunday, Nov. 23, 1975

THE WASHINGTON POST

JFK and the CIA:

By Robert Sam Anson

Dallas Revisited

This is an excerpt from "They've Killed the President!" published last week by Bantam Books, Inc., ©1975 by Robert Sam Anson. Anson, national political correspondent for New Times magazine and a public television producer in New York, is a former Time correspondent and author of "McGovern: A Biography."

POOR HOWARD HUNT. After Watergate people were ready to blame him for just about everything, and considering his background — spy, burglar, devotee of plots and assassinations — it wasn't really surprising.

The cruelest charge, of course, was that he and his friend Frank Sturgis (who Hunt said wasn't all that good a friend, since they had only met in 1972, although Sturgis put the beginning of their acquaintance in 1961) had been two of the "tramps" arrested by the Dallas police behind the grassy knoll shortly after the assassination.

The accusation received considerable publicity, especially after comedian Dick Gregory repeated it on national television. David Belin and the Rockefeller CIA commission went to great pains to prove there was nothing to it. Belin really didn't mind the effort; indeed he was delighted, since the accusation was so patently preposterous. Photo experts were called in, measurements taken, witnesses interviewed, and in the end the Rockefeller commission was able to report what virtually everyone knew from the beginning: whoever the "tramps" were, they were not Howard Hunt and Frank Sturgis. The height was all wrong. So was the age. As a matter of fact, except to Gregory and a few others, they didn't look like Hunt and Sturgis at all.

Such, however, typifies the investigation of whether the Central Intelligence Agency was involved in the murder of President Kennedy. There was, there has never been, any investigation at all.

The CIA was an inevitable suspect. Kennedy and the agency had long been at loggerheads. The CIA's failure to correctly estimate the resistance of Castro's forces at the Bay of Pigs was only one of a number of incidents. Almost on the eve of the missile crisis the agency, without the President's authority, pulled off one of its patented anti-Castro capers which had at first amused Kennedy. Kennedy did not find this one funny; nor did the Russians.

What the men from Langley did was sabotage a shipment of Cuban sugar bound for the Soviet Union. The opportunity presented itself in late August, 1962, when a British freighter filled with sugar bound for Russia sailed into San Juan harbor for repairs. The CIA managed to contaminate 14,000 of some 80,000 sacks of sugar by injecting them with an allegedly harmless substance that would give the sugar a foul taste. The purpose was to undermine the Russians' confidence in Cuba's chief export crop. When Kennedy found out what had happened he warned the Russians, prevented the ship from sailing, and excoriated the agency for creating a "dreadful precedent for chemical sabotage." The Russians, who were busily installing missiles in Cuba, strongly protested the incident in a series of diplomatic notes.

After the missile crisis and the growing rapprochement with Castro and the Soviet Union, the agency defied Kennedy's orders to turn off exile raids on the Cuban homeland — just as it had prepared to defy him at the Bay of Pigs. Before the invasion the agency prepared a plan for the operation to go forward *even if* Kennedy got cold feet at the last moment and tried to stop it.

The President's orders had also been disobeyed in Vietnam, where, three weeks before his own death, Ngo Dinh Diem had been overthrown and murdered, apparently with the active complicity of the CIA.

The disobedience, at whatever level, enraged the President. At the time of his death he was planning a full-scale review of the agency's activities. He did not like

being embarrassed, and the agency embarrassed him not only in Cuba and in Vietnam but in the Soviet Union, where in 1963 the Russians arrested a Yale history professor and charged him with committing espionage against the Soviet Union. Kennedy, after receiving assurances from the agency that the professor was "clean," had personally appealed to Khrushchev to release him, and Khrushchev, as a gesture of his esteem for Kennedy, had agreed. But when the professor returned and met with Kennedy in the Oval Office, he reportedly admitted that he had indeed been spying for the agency. Kennedy was livid.

The President had already sacked CIA director Allen Dulles and his deputy, Richard Bissell, and installed his own brother to honcho the agency's covert operations, but apparently more shake-ups were required. His desire to splinter the CIA into a thousand pieces and scatter it to the winds did not escape the attention of the agency.

THE AGENCY had grievances against the President as well. Hunt was not the only CIA man to believe that Kennedy had betrayed the agency and its people at the Bay of Pigs. The bitterness was increased by what Hunt termed Kennedy's "heaping guilt on the CIA." Even John McCone, whom Kennedy had appointed to succeed Dulles and who was supposedly his ally, deeply disagreed with the President's moves to normalize relations with Cuba.

The agency was also fearful of a whole range of Kennedy initiatives that grew out of his American University speech in the summer of 1963, from arms control to the banning of atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons to accommodation with the Communists in Laos to the reevaluation of the entire American commitment to Southeast Asia. Shortly before his death Kennedy had approved the first withdrawal from South Vietnam of American advisers. A thousand advisers were to be called home by the end of the year — a token number perhaps, but a clear sign of where Kennedy was heading. On his return from Texas he had said he would conduct a full-scale policy review of U.S. relations with South

Vietnam. One of the first moves was meeting with Ambassador to Saigon Henry Cabot Lodge. He and Kennedy were to have lunched at the President's Virginia estate on Nov. 24. CIA liked none of it.

Indeed John Kennedy was one of the agency's opponents, potentially its most dangerous adversary. The CIA had a motive. It had the means. It had the experience. It had the disposition. The agency could have killed him, and far better than anyone else covered its crime. But did it? If Lee Harvey Oswald was the assassin (or a member of an assassination conspiracy), and if he was still an intelligence agent (as he certainly seemed to have been during his sojourn in the Soviet Union) on Nov. 22, 1963, and if, finally, he was acting with the agency's approbation when he killed Kennedy, then, of course, the answer is self-evident. But there are a number of hurdles to cross before reaching that conclusion.

It is by no means certain, in the first place, that Oswald was an assassin. Much of the evidence, along with his casual behavior immediately after the shots were fired, points to the contrary. However cool and calculating killers are supposed to be, it is difficult to imagine someone who has just shot the President of the United States pausing to drink a Coke, then strolling outside in no evident hurry, getting on a bus, getting off,

hailing a cab, offering it up to a little old lady, and finally, as the police and FBI closed in, making good his escape, which turns out to be to a local movie theater.

Oswald's excuse for "fleeing" the scene of the crime was that he thought that, because of the assassination, work would be suspended for the rest of the day. The assumption was not illogical. Work, as it happens, was suspended for the rest of the day, and besides Oswald 11 other workers left the Book Depository after the assassination. There may have been a conspiracy, but it wasn't that big.

Some critics have found Oswald's going to the movie theater suspicious, a sign perhaps that Oswald was an intelligence agent. George O'Toole, a former CIA man who suggests that the FBI may have been involved in Kennedy's killing (a not surprising contention, considering the bureau's and the agency's mutual detestation), points out that movie theaters are a favored rendezvous for agents.

Oswald's apparently having been an agent does not necessarily mean he was a CIA man. Army intelligence, in particular, has nearly as large a budget as the agency, and more than three times as many agents. Far better than the CIA, Army intelligence was in a position to know the arrangements of the President's trip to Dallas, as well as the security precautions the Secret Service was taking to ensure his safety. Chronically short-handed, the Secret Service worked with Army intelligence as a matter of routine.

ALMOST SURELY Oswald was an intelligence agent of some sort. While in Dallas, New Orleans and Mexico City he was in close, even intimate contact with other intelligence agents or contract employees of the CIA. On Nov. 22, however, he could just as well have been operating *without* the agency's sanction, or, though this seems less likely, without its prior knowledge. There are numerous instances when the CIA has lost control of its own people, and, one presumes (though the agency has yet to admit it), when one of its agents has been turned against it.

Another possibility is that Oswald was "taken over" by an extremist faction within the agency, or a group close enough to it to be aware of Oswald's background.

Again, there are a number of cases when this has happened, when individual agents have acted not only contrary to the orders of the President but those of the leadership of CIA. One longtime observer of the agency, journalist Frank McCulloch, says:

"That sort of thing is inevitable, given the sort of people the CIA recruits. CIA looks for guys who are bright, tough, naturally competitive. Ideology does not mean nearly as much as the instinct to win. If you take one of these guys... and give him a job, well, he's going to do it, whatever it takes. Maybe there are things the agency doesn't want him to do — tells him he can't do. But he does them anyway. How will the agency ever find out? It's just part of winning. These guys are trained to win."

Cuba produced that feeling in many agents, of whom Howard Hunt is merely the best known. The cause of the exiles came in time to be the cause of the Americans who worked with them.

THE COMING to power of Fidel Castro was a disaster not only for U.S. foreign policy but for organized crime. The mob was anxious to see Castro removed from the scene at the earliest possible moment. So was the CIA.

During the agency's planning of the Bay of Pigs invasion one of the sources it turned to for intelligence information on the disposition of Castro's forces was the mob, which at the time still maintained a considerable apparatus on the island.

Before and after the invasion the mob was also trying to secure Castro's assassination, sometimes with the agency's help, sometimes without it. Frank Sturgis, who as a casino operator in Havana had lines to both the CIA and the mob, was twice approached shortly after

the Cuban revolution by organized crime figures wishing to enlist him as an assassin. Sturgis declined, but reported the conversations to CIA friends in Havana.

The CIA itself had been talking of eliminating Castro since the closing days of the Eisenhower administration, and Sturgis' report may have freshened interest in the project. A mob hit rather than an assassination by the agency itself would provide the CIA with what was known in the trade as "plausible deniability" if, as ultimately turned out, the attempt went askew.

By early 1961 the agency and organized crime were deep into discussions on how best to eliminate their common foe. Reports vary on how the initial contacts were made. What the stories agree on is that after protracted discussion John Roselli, the suavely vicious Mafia *capo* of Las Vegas, agreed to recruit a team of hit men for the CIA.

All of this was unknown to all but one of the men of the Warren Commission in 1964. The exception was Allen Dulles, and he was hardly talking. The mob, after all, worked for him.

Even now the full truth about the CIA and the mob is far from clear. What the few brief glimpses down the corridor have provided is chilling enough: the two most secret and powerful organizations in America working hand and glove in a relationship so intimate that for all practical purposes there has ceased to be a distinction between what is done in the name of intelligence and what is done in the name of crime. Everything, even murder, comes together under a single heading: "the national interest."

THE MELDING together of American intelligence and organized crime is the key to understanding John Kennedy's murder. Without that understanding the conspiracy is like the jumbled pieces of a puzzle, each of them odd-shaped, impossible to connect. But lay in that keystone and suddenly what has all seemed so bizarre for so many years makes terrifying sense.

One way or another all the major figures connected to the assassination are also linked to the agency and the mob.

There is Oswald, the apparent agent, in constant contact with other CIA men, many of whom have their own ties to the mob. He lists as the address for his fictitious pro-Castro organization a building whose tenants include both mob and intelligence figures. After the assassination a large quantity of Oswald's literature turns up in the office of one of those tenants, Guy Banister, a private investigator employed by New Orleans crime boss Carlos Marcello and a man who in the past worked on CIA operations. One of his close friends in New Orleans is David Ferrie, an identified agent who also works for the mob. Another reported associate is Clay Shaw, like Ferrie an identified agent.

After the assassination Oswald is shot to death by Jack Ruby, a man with numerous connections to Cosa Nostra figures, who is also involved with Cuba and Cuban exiles. When a story arises that Oswald has met with a prominent exile figure to plan the assassination, the man who conveniently appears to debunk it turns out to be a reported guarunner for an agency-backed organization. Later, an Oswald look-alike is found to be one of the leaders of an exile organization reportedly backed by both the agency and the mob.

Finally, when the pressures for a new investigation of the assassination are boiling over, the man who announces he has solved the case is a district attorney who by his own admission has numerous contacts with Cosa Nostra figures. During the trial he dismisses all references to the Cosa Nostra and fixes blame on an odd-lot assortment of conspirators. The trial ends in farce and the prospects for a new investigation are obliterated. In the process the CIA gains sympathy.

Just how many coincidences can be piled atop one

another before one has to wonder? One especially wonders when the groups involved are neither Boy Scouts nor, as Jim Garrison once put it, "retired circus clowns." They are two secret violent societies whose fates are inextricably intertwined. Many things bring them together. One of them is Cuba. Another is hatred of

John Kennedy.

Few people know of their alliance, and only one is in a position to do anything about it. He has sworn that he will. Before he can, he is murdered in Dallas on Nov. 22, 1963.

Coincidence.

Friday, November 21, 1975

The Washington Star

Castro Survived a Wave of Plots

By Jeremiah O'Leary
Washington Star Staff Writer

At the very moment President John F. Kennedy was shot on Nov. 22, 1963, two CIA officers were handing a specially made poison pen to a Cuban official to be used in assassinating Fidel Castro.

That meeting with a highly placed but anti-Castro Cuban official known by the CIA cryptonym of AM/LASH was one of at least eight plots launched by the CIA from 1960 through 1965 to kill the Cuban leader, according to the interim report of the Senate Select Intelligence Committee.

Testimony made public yesterday by the committee disclosed that the late Desmond Fitzgerald, head of CIA covert operations against Cuba, and an unidentified CIA case officer met AM/LASH in a foreign city to give him a ball-point pen rigged with a hypodermic needle so fine that the victim would not notice its insertion. At the meeting, probably in Mexico City, Fitzgerald recommended that the Cuban agent use a deadly commercial poison called Blackleaf-40. The two CIA men also assured AM/LASH that the CIA would give him everything he needed, including a high-powered rifle, a telescopic sight, a silencer and all the money he wanted to kill Castro from a distance.

ONLY WHEN Fitzgerald and the other CIA officer left the Cuban agent did they learn that President Kennedy had been assassinated by a pro-Castro ex-Marine named Lee Harvey Oswald at the very moment the poison device was being handed over for use against

Castro. The committee obtained the information about this bizarre meeting from a CIA inspector general's report and interviews conducted in 1967.

The CIA plots to kill Castro spanned the Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson administrations and involved CIA attempts to use both Mafia figures and anti-Castro Cubans. The means for assassinating Castro in-

cluded firearms, deadly poisons and explosives and the liquidation of the Marxist leader was discussed openly in the highest councils of the government, including the White House.

The first serious plots against Castro were brewed in the CIA as early as August 1960. The committee report said Richard Bissell, deputy director of plans, authorized the two attempts to murder Castro and other Cuban leaders in the period before the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion. Bissell was deputy director from January 1, 1959, until he was fired by the Kennedys in February 1962 because of the failure of the Cuban exile invasion run by the CIA.

The committee said Richard Helms, who succeeded Bissell as deputy director and is now ambassador to Iran, authorized a second attempt on Castro's life through the underworld figures in the year after the Bay of Pigs disaster. The committee developed evidence that CIA Director Allen Dulles knew and approved of the first plots against Castro in 1960. The committee said there is a note in Dulles' handwriting joining with Bissell in approving a memorandum by J.C. King, then head of the CIA's Western Hemisphere division. King recommended "thorough consideration be given to the elimination of Fidel Castro."

BISSELL AND Col. Sheffield Edwards, director of the CIA Security Office, testified that they were certain both Dulles and his deputy, Gen. Charles Cabell, knew about and authorized the first phase of the plot involving the underworld figures.

The first concrete evidence of the initial underworld operation, the committee said, is Edwards' statement that Bissell asked him to locate someone who could assassinate Castro. Edwards said he called on ex-FBI agent Robert A. Maheu, later an aide to multimillionaire Howard Hughes, to handle the job. Maheu and one of Edwards' men agreed to approach Las Vegas gambling figure John Rosselli

and offer \$150,000 for Castro's assassination.

Rosselli went to Miami to recruit Cubans to carry out the contract and in the process brought in two other criminals, Sam Giancana and Santos Trafficante. The two Mafia men recruited the Cubans while the CIA undertook to furnish poison pills for them to use in killing Castro. But Maheu and Giancana engaged in a keystone comedy caper by hiring a detective who got caught installing an illegal "bug" in a Las Vegas room because of Giancana's complicated love life. The FBI also picked up word that Giancana was involved in a "contract" on Castro's life. The CIA had to step in with great difficulty to persuade J. Edgar Hoover and the Department of Justice to spare their Mafiosi aides from prosecution and presumably from telling everything they knew.

THE POISON PILLS furnished by the CIA finally were smuggled into Cuba just before the Bay of Pigs invasion but the would-be Cuban assassins did not accomplish their mission and returned the pills.

Late in 1961, another CIA official, William K. Harvey, who was in charge of a program called Executive Action for disabling foreign leaders or assassinating them as a last resort, took over the anti-Castro effort from Edwards at Bissell's request.

Harvey's program, with the code name of ZR/RIFLE, was then tailored to resume dealing with the syndicate figures for another attempt against Castro. Meanwhile, Helms succeeded Bissell as deputy director of plans in February 1962 and ordered Harvey to get in touch with Rosselli but to avoid Maheu and Giancana. The poison pills were brought out again and Rosselli testified that this time the Cubans would go after not only Fidel but Raul Castro and Che Guevara as well.

Harvey obtained arms, boats and radios for the Cubans but they never left

Florida. The connection was broken off but nobody ever told the Cuban assassins that the \$150,000 offer had been withdrawn.

EARLY IN 1963, Fitzgerald replaced Harvey and headed what was called Task Force W. Fitzgerald's efforts were turned to exploring strange plans such as the exploding seashell and the contaminated diving suit for the Cuban leader. But his principal activity was contact with AM/LASH, who could not make up his mind whether to kill Castro or defect. The CIA finally terminated relations with AM/LASH in 1965.

The committee was far from precise about how much of these assassination plots was known by or authorized at higher levels of the government. John McCone, who succeeded Dulles in November 1961, said he knew nothing of the assassination plans. Helms testified he didn't know whether McCone knew or not but said McCone had never told him not to assassinate Castro. Bissell recalled that he and Edwards briefed Dulles and Gen. Cabell but that "circumlocutious" language was used.

Edwards, according to testimony, deliberately avoided using any "bad words" such as assassinate or kill.

THE COMMITTEE was inconclusive also about what was known by President Kennedy, his brother, Atty. Gen. Robert Kennedy, and later by President Lyndon B. Johnson. The Kennedys, after the Bay of Pigs, never ceased in their determination that Castro's regime had to be overthrown as a menace to the U.S. and the Western Hemisphere. President Kennedy ordered creation of Operation MONGOOSE in April, 1962, and placed it under control of Robert Kennedy and Gen. Maxwell Taylor. In turn, the chief of operations was Gen. Edward

NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, DECEMBER 5, 1975

Power and Corruption

By Tom Wicker

Lansdale, who had a reputation for dealing with situations like that in Cuba.

The committee developed testimony that Lansdale labored ceaselessly on plans for disrupting the Cuban regime and that he was prodded hard by the Kennedys to produce more sabotage and infiltration. Lansdale dealt with the attorney general and the White House Special Group in the months prior to the missile crisis of 1962 and he was in contact with Harvey and Helms at CIA on carrying out the many objectives of MONGOOSE.

Most of the testimony agrees that the word "assassination" was not used in dialogue involving the Kennedys, Lansdale or the White House group. But at a Special Group meeting on Aug. 10, 1962, someone raised the question of "liquidation of leaders" in Cuba. The testimony differs on who raised "liquidation". Harvey testified that Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara brought it up, saying, "Shouldn't we consider the elimination or assassination of Castro?"

McNAMARA SAID he does not recall that. McCone and the late Edward R. Murrow of USIA raised vehement objections at the August meeting and the matter was dropped. Nevertheless, Helms continued to consider that he had continuing authority to press on with the plots and Lansdale told Harvey to develop a plan for "liquidation" of Cuban leaders.

The missile crisis, the death of Kennedy and the accession of Johnson to the White House appear to have ended the assassination plots against Castro. Helms said he banned assassination five years after he became director of the CIA in 1966.

NEW YORK TIMES
3 Dec. 1975

Seymour Hersh Is Winner Of John Zenger Award

The University of Arizona's 1975 John Peter Zenger Award has been won by Seymour M. Hersh of The New York Times for his articles on domestic surveillance by the Central Intelligence Agency and other investigative reporting.

Mr. Hersh, a 38-year-old University of Chicago graduate, won a 1970 Pulitzer Prize for his exclusive reporting of the My Lai massacre in Viet-

No wonder the latest Gallup Poll shows a sharp decline in public esteem for the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency—from 84 percent "highly favorable" to the F.B.I. in 1965, for example, to only 37 percent today. And only 14 percent of a sample of 1,515 adults were any longer, "highly favorable" to the C.I.A.

These figures clearly reflect the long, dismal series of disclosures that both agencies have abused their powers, been misused by their political masters, threatened in various ways the constitutional rights of American citizens they were supposedly protecting, and participated in such reprehensible schemes as murder plots against foreign leaders and character assassination plots against Americans.

The latest of these unlovely disclosures is that the F.B.I. has been supplying secret dossiers, conducting illicit bugs and taps, and carrying on other forms of political surveillance for every President at least back to Franklin Roosevelt.

That merely confirms what most critics of the security agencies have believed all along—that they were not so much evading or thwarting political control as succumbing to it. So far from operating against the wishes of Presidents and their advisers—in all Administrations of both parties in the last forty years—they were mostly doing either what they were told, or what they correctly perceived that their superiors wanted them to do.

Several things need to be said about this—the first of which is that, as apologists for Richard Nixon have insisted, a certain double standard of accountability has been at work. Whatever Mr. Nixon's misdeeds, it is now undeniable that he was by no means the first President to order wiretaps, punitive tax investigations, political surveillances of his "enemies," and the like. His critics should be careful, also, about too glibly suggesting that Mr. Nixon was a worse offender than his predecessors. There is no great difference in wiretapping the Democratic National Committee and the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party.

In one sense, it might even be to Mr. Nixon's credit that he used his private "plumbers" in 1972 rather than perverting the F.B.I. as Lyndon Johnson appears to have done in 1964. Nor does it seem likely that Mr. Nixon knew more of what was being done in his service than Mr. Johnson did, or President Kennedy before that.

Presidents can hardly be impeached in retrospect, and that Mr. Nixon was

not doing much that other Presidents had not done—save his deliberate participation in the post-Watergate cover-up—is not a reason to regard his forced resignation as unfair or unwarranted. Times changed, and placed Mr. Nixon in a different public atmosphere, in the midst of which more became known about the seamier side of his Administration than had been known about any before.

That truth will not spare those of us who condemned Mr. Nixon from the charge of his partisans that we were looking the other way when earlier Presidents were trampling over the Bill of Rights. Nor should it. But a more important point is implicit in that charge although it is not usually conceded by those who make it.

It is that to a great extent such abuses of power as we are learning about are inherent in the existence of this kind of power. That is not to apologize for efforts to drive Martin Luther King to suicide, or to poison Patrice Lumumba, or to wiretap reporters to learn the sources of leaks, as unfortunate aberrations or unavoidable evils—regrettable, but just a part

IN THE NATION

of necessary intelligence and security work.

Most of the repellent events recently disclosed had nothing to do with real, rational intelligence or security concerns. Instead, they represented self-serving political acts, the obsessive pursuits of men corrupted by power, the capricious exercises of that power, by those who had it, simply because they did have it.

Thus, whatever real problems of Communist subversion from within and without may have threatened the United States since the 1930's, they could hardly have been greater threats to constitutional rights and individual liberty than those that came to be posed by the great security agencies, with their power to operate both in secrecy and in the name of national security, their unlimited budgets, their freedom from supervision—above all, their subservience to political masters who were enabled by the mere existence of such agencies to flout the Constitution and the law for their own political purposes or obsessions.

No one in Congress or the executive branch has even begun to face—let alone answer—the consequent philosophical and institutional questions: Can secret police agencies ever be made compatible with political and intellectual liberty? By what methods of control and accountability can they be made so? Control by whom, accountability to whom?

nam.

The Zenger award, which consists of \$500 and a citation, is to be presented Jan. 17 at the annual convention of the Arizona Newspapers Association near Phoenix.

Christian Science Monitor
24 November 1975

Erwin D. Canham

The new cover-up?

Under pressure of public indignation, the special prosecutors appointed by former President Nixon, the Ervin committee of the Senate, and the House Judiciary Committee pressed their inquiries of Watergate and its related crimes right up to the highest sources in the Republican administration.

When will public indignation force similar investigations, right to the top, of the abuses in domestic politics by the FBI and with the apparent knowledge if not instigation of Democratic Presidents Kennedy and Johnson? Congressional probes so far have only gone part of the way.

The harassment of the Reverend Martin Luther King Jr. took place largely during the Kennedy administration, while Robert Kennedy was Attorney General. How much did he and his presidential brother know about it? How much did they authorize? And at the Democratic Convention in Atlantic City in 1964, wiretapping by the FBI of Mr. King and others seems to have been directly demanded by President Johnson. What are the facts?

Political use of the FBI is even more appalling than the clumsy burglarizing of the Watergate offices of the Democratic National Committee. Beyond that event, of course, were many other developments culminating in the effort to cover up and lie about it.

What kind of cover-up has there been of the espionage abuses in the last two Democratic presidencies? And what were those abuses? What was Lyndon Johnson's relationship to the FBI? What role have congressional leaders themselves played? Is the Church committee really getting to the bottom of these matters, or is it seeking to protect Democratic leaders?

It will be healthy to bring these matters to light, no matter how painful. Disclosure can lead to clean-up. Attention must be focused, as Attorney General Edward Levi is evidently focusing it, on ways of preventing FBI abuses in the future.

One way will be to see that no future FBI director attains the political and personal untouchability of J. Edgar Hoover. Whatever may have been Mr. Hoover's services to his country, and many of them will not be denied, the build-up of dictatorial authority should never happen again.

It is now clear that the CIA internationally and the FBI domestically were doing for years things which are contrary to basic American principles. They were the tactics of the enemy. In the end such tactics are self-defeating. Now, to the nation's shame, they are coming to light. Are we sure they will not be repeated?

Steps are being taken to draft new rules within the Justice Department and in Congress to render effective at last legislative oversight of how vast sums of taxpayer money are being expended for ways going far beyond intelligence-gathering to murder and sabotage. If there is any category which should be labeled un-American activities, it is in this realm of lawless, bloody deeds.

There is a madness in power. There is delusion in self-justification and self-righteousness. It is easy to believe that deeds in a righteous cause are all themselves right. But the end does not justify the means, and usually disgraceful means do not even attain the desired end.

The United States has partially awakened

THE BALTIMORE SUN
30 November 1975

James J. Kilpatrick

Occasionally Our Leaders Must Think the Unthinkable

Washington.

Now that the dust has settled from the great CIA report, perhaps a couple of sober questions may be asked. Was this particular report in the national interest? Is tyrannicide ever morally justified?

I would answer the first question, no, and the second question, uncertainly, yes; but on these issues there is abundant room for reasonable-minded men to disagree. The questions defy easy answers.

Consider, first, the report itself. It is described by the Senate Intelligence Committee, with emphasis, as an interim report. The implication is that other findings on other attempted assassinations are yet to come. The committee's conclusions, tentative as they are, are something less than final. What compelling necessity, we may inquire, demanded release of such an interim report? I know of none.

Even as an interim report, the committee's conclusions are remarkably inconclusive. Descriptive words recur: Uncertain, incomplete, insufficient, doubtful, speculative, unclear, conflicting. The committee studied our government's role as to five men: Lumumba in the Congo, Castro in Cuba, Diem in Vietnam, Schneider in Chile, and Trujillo in the Dominican Republic.

The findings boil down to this: In two of the cases (Lumumba and Castro), assassination proposals went beyond mere discussion and reached a stage of specific planning. In the other three cases, there was talk only. In none of the five cases did CIA agents make an actual attempt. There is a "reasonable inference" that President Eisenhower authorized an assassination effort as to Lumumba, but the inference is offset by evidence to the contrary. Other presidents are cleared.

That is the sum total of 8,000 pages of testimony, thousands of hours of work by staff members, and 347 pages of an interim report. What a mountain of labor, one is minded to observe, to produce so small a churchmouse. For these uncertain, incomplete, and inconclusive conclusions, what price must be paid?

The committee report provides a rich meal for America's detractors to feed on. By reason of this publication, the CIA's vital task will be made more difficult; the intelligence services of friendly

nations will think twice about cooperating in the future. A mass of highly sensitive material has now been compiled in written form; it will be a miracle if this material is not leaked or stolen. It is a strange exercise in national masochism, thus to flagellate ourselves before the World.

The committee, of course, feels otherwise. "The committee believes the truth about the assassination allegations should be told because democracy depends upon a well-informed electorate. We reject any contention that the facts disclosed in this report should be kept secret because they are embarrassing to the United States." No one can quarrel with the committee's abstract defense of the people's right to know. But do the people have a right to know everything? Do the people have a right to know the intimate, sordid details spelled out in this interim report? For my own part, I deny it.

The plot against Lumumba evolved from an apprehension, soundly based at the time, that the Soviet Union, through Lumumba, was about to take over the Congo. Look at a map of Africa; contemplate the consequences. The plot against Castro evolved from the actual physical presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba—the first such Communist penetration in the Western Hemisphere.

The civilized mind recoils from any thought of murder in cold blood. In the two cases, this was what the CIA was plotting. The specific schemes—deadly, bizarre and ludicrous—both repel and fascinate the reader. Each of us may form his own judgment on presidential involvement. "It is my personal view," says Senator Howard Baker (R., Tenn.), "that on balance the likelihood that presidents knew of the assassination plots is greater than the likelihood that they did not." This is a chilling business to brood on.

But is there no case—no case whatever—in which tyrannicide could be justified? If it had been possible to arrange the murder of Hitler in, say, 1938, and thus to have averted the fearful consequences of his madness, would this have been a moral act? My own feeling is that, in the dangerous world we live in, our leaders must occasionally think unthinkable thoughts; and in the overriding necessity, must not flinch from doing the unthinkable deed.

from the era of disgraceful deeds but it has not yet fully clarified the record and agreed upon remedial measures.

New rules on paper will not do it. Possibly the greatest lesson to emphasize is that presidents of the United States and those on whom they rely should be persons of integrity and character, capable of looking into themselves and saying of some proposal: "That just isn't done."

Los Angeles Times Fri., Nov. 21, 1975

SHUNNED BY PBS

KCET to Air CIA Critique

BY DICK ADLER
Times Staff Writer

Knocking the usually lugubrious and occasionally painful fund-raising antics of a public television station has become almost a national pastime. Most print critics can't resist wishing out loud for a few well-made commercials, and both Cher and Johnny Carson have taken very funny shots recently.

But in case you wonder where those membership dollars so lumpishly cajoled from your wallet go, take a look at a fascinating documentary called "The Rise and Fall of the CIA" on KCET this Sunday evening at 7:10. For \$850, the amount raised between an Alistair Cooke blurb and yet another smiling demand from Jean Marsh, Channel 28 has purchased exclusive local rights to an important program turned down by the networks, the PBS and most independent commercial stations.

"The Rise and Fall of the CIA" was originally made in three 30-minute segments by World in Action, the excellent documentary unit of England's commercial Granada Television, and aired there last June to considerable acclaim and ratings. The programs were screened by PBS in Washington this past summer, in hopes they would be purchased for use on the entire public network. But the PBS screening committee objected to certain aspects of the programs, found them "fairly superficial and shallow" and claimed that they "said some questionable things about the CIA" (according to a PBS spokesman), so they were turned down. Other prospective buyers also balked; only WNEW-TV, Metromedia's New York outlet, the Dallas public station and KCET have so far decided to let their viewers see the programs.

PBS, of course, is entitled to make its own programming decisions. What is somewhat disturbing in this instance is that, according to reliable sources, at least two representatives from Corp. for Public Broadcasting—the governmental agency which is designed strictly to administer funds for PBS—were present at the screening in Washington, and that these CPB representatives played a role in the rejection.

Joe Dine, a CPB press official in Washington, admits that a senior CPB programming executive and his assistant were present at a screening of "The Rise and Fall of the CIA," but doesn't see any impropriety. "I couldn't say categorically that the CPB's opinion didn't have anything to do with the rejection by PBS, but it wasn't an official decision on the part of CPB not to use the programs. We don't make programming decisions," he says. Others question even the overt presence of a government agency such as CPB at the screening of a series of programs critical of another government agency.

Aired First in England

KCET's program chief, Charles Allen, says that he first heard of the Granada programs when they were aired in England in June, and that when PBS turned them down he moved to buy the package for Channel 28. The fact that CPB may or may not have been part of the original rejection doesn't bother him. "In a sense, a turn-down by CPB might be considered the highest form of praise," Allen says. "It was CPB who told producer Lewis Freedman that a series of one-minute programs on the Bicentennial wouldn't work."

The three Granada programs, smoothly welded into one 75-minute unit, certainly leave themselves open to a certain amount of criticism, but charges of superficiality and shallowness wouldn't immediately seem to be among them. The research, by producers Mike Beckman, Allan Segal and their staff, appears to be prodigious. It is true that they rely for on-camera information largely on the words of disaffected former CIA employes, notably ex-deputy director Tom Braden. But the producers say that current CIA officials turned down their requests for interviews.

And even allowing for an extra portion of axe-grinding by these disgruntled former CIA types, "The Rise and Fall of the CIA" presents such a wealth of documented information in such a cool and lucid manner that the overall indictment is impressive. Visual imagery is as important here as on-camera interviews: a party of retired OSS and CIA veterans, looking mostly like the sort of people you see at the ball game; newsreel film of the Cuban invasion force in Miami which helped blow the project's cover and led to the Bay-of-Pigs fiasco; paid Vietnamese CIA agents bringing in the heads of Viet Cong prisoners bounty.


Braden—a Credible Image

If there is a star in the program, it is Braden—he is the central thread which weaves the rest of the material (from such former CIA links as E. Howard Hunt and army liaison Col. Fletcher Prouty) into a generally believable scenario. Braden has the jaded, cynically wise and droopy-eyed manner of a spoiled spy, most effective when he is talking about things like "the Battle for Picasso's Mind" (the CIA's attempts to recruit intellectuals to its cause, including the secret subsidy of Britain's Encounter magazine) and the way one phone call from CIA chief Allen Dulles to his brother John Foster Dulles helped to win over a recalcitrant State Department official.

Unless you're an ex-agent yourself or have some other special interest in the CIA, there will be a lot of new and perhaps startling information for you in the program. How the CIA overthrew the Moussadegh government in Iran, for example; or how much the "secret war" in Laos cost U.S. taxpayers (\$2 billion); or how the CIA tipped off the U.S. Army that My Lai was a supposed Viet Cong stronghold.

What ordinary viewers can do with such information is another question, but at least it will be there for possible future use. For that, no thanks to PBS—and many thanks to KCET for giving us the chance to decide for ourselves what we should know.

THE DETROIT FREE PRESS
23 November 1975



THE QUESTION
A Senate panel reported that the CIA instigated a s s a s s i n a t i o n plots against two foreign leaders, and became involved in plotting that led to the death of three others. Do you think a tighter reign should be kept on CIA activities?

HOW YOU VOTED

NO. 76.6 percent. COMMENTS: "How can they remain an

effective secret service if we make all of their activities public?" . . . "We're already exposing ourselves too much to our enemies" . . . "Who would hold the reign, the Russians?" . . . "I believe in functional autonomy for the CIA" . . . "The whole wave of concern to expose the CIA is merely a communist plot to weaken the U.S. security."

YES, 23.4 percent. COMMENTS: "Someone should be held accountable for all of these CIA atrocities" . . . "The CIA's activities should be 100 percent under control of a six-man Senate committee, maybe then the CIA will remain within its legal and moral boundaries" . . . "What kind of nation are we when we attempt to assassinate any world leader whose particular philosophy differs from that of the United States" . . . "It's a sorry state of affairs when the CIA has to stoop to murder" . . . "The CIA should not act like the mafia."

BALTIMORE SUN
29 Nov. 1975

FBI, CIA Criticized

Sir: The Orwellian and dreadful disclosures that have been revealed by the U.S. Senate (i.e., Senate Intelligence Committee) investigation of the FBI and CIA's clandestine and invidious surveillance of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and thousands of other citizens are chilling and stultifying. Thoughtful and rational citizens must be grateful to Senator Frank Church and his colleagues for their courage, persistence and sedulous efforts in ferreting out the facts in this matter.

The revelations graphically dictate the need for stronger and more effective control and monitoring of the manifold activities of the FBI and CIA by the Congress. Moreover, steps should be immediately taken by the President and Congress in order to assure all citizens that their human and constitutional rights will not be violated by their government.

The petulant and reprehensible actions of J. Edgar Hoover germane to Dr. King and other citizens convey a frightening perspective to the Actonian admonition: "Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely." The escutcheon of our nation has been tarnished by the illegal and inhumane actions of the FBI and CIA.

The Bicentennial, given the grim and dispiriting Watergate debacle and the current CIA and FBI revelations, provides a basis for a stronger resolve to effect a recrudescence of decency, civility and respect for the rule of law in a free society.

Samuel L. Banks.

Baltimore.

COLUMBIA JOURNALISM REVIEW
NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 1975

FULBRIGHT ON THE PRESS

A famous dissenter
calls for a halt to media 'inquisitions'
and challenges some versions
of his own legend

by J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT

Heresy though it may be, I do not subscribe unquestioningly to the Biblical aphorism that "the truth shall make you free." A number of crucial distinctions are swept aside by an indiscriminate commitment to the truth — the distinction, for instance, between factual and philosophical truth, or between truth in the sense of disclosure and truth in the sense of insight. There are also certain useful fictions — or "myths" — which we invest with a kind of metaphorical truth. One of these is the fiction that "the king can do no wrong." He can, of course, and he does, and everybody knows it. But in the course of political history it became apparent that it was useful to the cohesion and morale of society to attribute certain civic virtues to the chief of state, even when he patently lacked them. A certain dexterity is required to sustain the fiction, but it rests on a kind of social contract — an implicit agreement among Congress, the press, and the people that some matters are better left undiscussed, not out of a desire to suppress information, but in recognition, as the French writer Jean Giraudoux put it, that "there are truths which can kill a nation." What he meant, it seems, was that there are gradations of truth in a society, and that there are some truths which are more significant than others but which are also destructible. The self-confidence and cohesion of a society may be a fact, but it can be diluted or destroyed by other facts such as the corruption or criminality of the society's leaders. Something like that may have been what Voltaire had in mind when he wrote, "There are truths which are not for all men, nor for all times." Or as Mark Twain put it, even more cogently, "Truth is the most

valuable thing we have. Let us economize it."

In the last decade — the Vietnam and Watergate decade — we have lost our ability to "economize" the truth. That Puritan self-righteousness which is never far below the surface of American life has broken through the frail barriers of civility and restraint, and the press has been in the vanguard of the new aggressiveness. This is not to suggest in any way that the press ought to pull its punches, much less be required to do so, on matters of political substance. I myself have not been particularly backward about criticizing presidents and their policies, and I am hardly likely at this late date to commend such inhibitions to others. I do nonetheless deplore the shifting of the criticism, from policies to personalities, from matters of tangible consequence to the nation as a whole to matters of personal morality of uncertain relevance to the national interest.

By and large, we used to make these distinctions, while also perpetuating the useful myth that "the king can do no wrong." One method frequently employed when things went wrong was simply to blame someone else — in a ceremonial way. When I began publicly to criticize the Johnson Administration, first over the Dominican intervention in 1965, then over the escalating Vietnam war, I was at some pains to attribute the errors of judgment involved to the "president's advisers" and not to the president himself — although I admit today that I was not wholly free of doubts about the judgment of the top man.

Our focus was different in those days from that of more recent investigations, especially Watergate, but also the current inquiries concerning the CIA and the multinational corporations. It was sometimes evident in hearings before the Foreign Relations Committee on Vietnam and other matters that facts were being withheld or misrepresented, but our primary concern was with the events and policies involved rather than with the individual officials who chose — or more often were sent — to misrepresent the administration's position. Our concern was with correcting mistakes rather than exposing, embarrassing, or punishing those who made them.

In contrast, a new inquisitorial style has evolved, which is primarily the legacy of Watergate, although perhaps it began with the Vietnam war. That protracted conflict gave rise to well-justified opposition based on what seemed to me — and still does — a rational appreciation of the national interest. But it also set loose an emotional mistrust — even hostility — to government in general. Somehow the policy mistakes of certain leaders became distorted in the minds of many Americans, especially young ones, as if they had been acts of premeditated malevolence rather than failures of judgment. The leaders who took us into Vietnam and kept us there bear primary responsibility for the loss of confidence in government which their policies provoked. I am as certain today as I ever was that opposition to the Vietnam war — including my own and that of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee — was justified and necessary. Nonetheless, I feel bound to recognize that those of us who criticized the war as mistaken in terms of the national interest may unwittingly have contributed to that surge of vindictive emotionalism which now seems to have taken on a virulent life of its own.

The emotionalism has not survived without cause, to be sure. The Watergate scandals provoked a justified wave of public indignation, and a wholly necessary drive to prevent such abuses in the future. Moral indignation, however — even *justified* moral indignation — creates certain problems of its own, notably

the tendency of indignation, unrestrained, to become self-righteous and vindictive. Whatever the cause and antecedents, whatever too the current provocation, the fact remains that the anti-Watergate movement generated a kind of inquisition psychology both on the part of the press and in the Congress.

If once the press was excessively orthodox and unquestioning of government policy, it has now become almost sweepingly iconoclastic. If once the press showed excessive deference to government and its leaders, it has now become excessively mistrustful and even hostile. The problem is not so much the specific justification of specific investigations and exposures — any or all may have merit — but whether it is desirable at this stage of our affairs — after Vietnam and Watergate — to sustain the barrage of scandalous revelations. Their ostensible purpose is to bring reforms, but thus far they have brought little but cynicism and disillusion. Everything revealed about the CIA or dubious campaign practices may be wholly or largely true, but I have come to feel of late that these are not the kind of truths we most need now; these are truths which must injure if not kill the nation.

Consider the example of the CIA. It has been obvious for years that Congress was neglecting its responsibility in failing to exercise meaningful legislative oversight of the nation's intelligence activities. A few of us tried on several occasions to persuade the Senate to establish effective oversight procedures, but we were never able to muster more than a handful of votes. Now, encouraged by an enthusiastic press, the Senate — or at least its special investigating committee — has swung from apathy to crusading zeal, offering up one instance after another of improper CIA activities with the apparent intent of eliciting all possible public shock and outrage. It seems to me unnecessary at this late date to dredge up every last gruesome detail of the CIA's designs against the late President Allende of Chile. Perhaps it would be worth doing — to shake people up — if Watergate were not so recently behind us. But the American people are all too shaken up by that epic scandal, and their need and desire now are for restored stability and confidence. The Senate knows very well what is needed with respect to the CIA — an effective oversight committee to monitor the agency's activities in a careful, responsible way on a continuing basis. No further revelations are required to bring this about: all that is needed is an act of Congress to create the new unit. Prodding by the press to this end would be constructive, but the new investigative journalism seems preoccupied instead with the tracking down and punishment of wrongdoers, with giving them their just deserts.

My own view is that no one should get everything he deserves — the world would become a charnel house. Looking back on the Vietnam war, it never occurred to me that President Johnson was guilty of anything worse than bad judgment. He misled the Congress on certain matters, and he misled me personally with respect to the Gulf of Tonkin episode in 1964. I resented that, and I am glad the deceit was exposed. But I never wished to carry the matter beyond exposure, and that only for purposes of hastening the end of the war. President Johnson and his advisers were tragically mistaken about the Vietnam war, but by no standard of equity or accuracy did they qualify as "war criminals." Indeed, had Mr. Johnson ended the war by 1968, I would readily have supported him as my party's candidate for reelection.

Watergate, one hopes, has been consigned to the history books, but the fame and success won by the reporters who

uncovered the scandals of the Nixon administration seem to have inspired legions of envious colleagues to seek their own fame and fortune by dredging up new scandals for the delectation of an increasingly cynical and disillusioned public. The media have thus acquired an unwholesome fascination with the singer to the neglect of the song. The result is not only an excess of emphasis on personalities but short shrift for significant policy questions. It is far from obvious, for example, that Watergate will prove to have been as significant for the national interest as President Nixon's extraordinary innovations in foreign policy. The Nixon détente policy was by no means neglected, but it certainly took second place in the news to Watergate.

Similarly — to take a more recent topic of interest to Congress and the press — it strikes me as a matter of less than cosmic consequence that certain companies have paid what in some cases may be commissions, and in others more accurately bribes, to foreign officials to advance their business interests. Such laws as may have been violated were not our own but those of foreign countries, and thus far the countries involved have exhibited far less indignation over these payments than over their exposure by a United States Senate subcommittee. I should not have to add, I trust, that I do not advocate corporate bribery either abroad or at home; nor would I object to legislation prohibiting the practice. At the same time the subject does not strike me as deserving of a harvest of publicity. It disrupts our relations with the countries concerned, and what is worse, it smacks of that same moral prissiness and meddlesome impulse which helped impel us into Vietnam. Furthermore, "commission" payments are not unknown in government business in the United States, and hypocrisy is not an attractive trait. Even in our business dealings with Italy or Saudi Arabia, there is relevance in the lesson of Vietnam: whatever the failings of others, we are simply not authorized — or qualified — to serve as the self-appointed keepers of the conscience of all mankind.

A recent instance of misplaced journalistic priority, which came within my own domain, was the media's neglect of the extensive hearings on East-West détente held by the Foreign Relations Committee during the summer and fall of 1974. The issues involved — the nuclear arms race and the SALT talks, economic and political relations between the United States and the Soviet Union and China — were central to our foreign policy and even to our national survival. At the same time that the media were ignoring the détente hearings, they gave generous coverage to the nomination of a former Nixon aide as ambassador to Spain, a matter of transient interest and limited consequence.

To cite another example: the press and television gave something like saturation coverage in 1974 to Congressman Wilbur Mills's personal misfortunes; by contrast I do not recall reading anything in the press about the highly informative hearings on the Middle East, and another set on international terrorism, held in the spring of that year by Congressman Lee Hamilton's House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia. The crucial ingredient, it seems, is scandal — corporate, political, or personal. Where it is present, there is news, although the event may otherwise be inconsequential. Where it is lacking, the event may or not be news, depending in part, to be sure, on its intrinsic importance, but hardly less on competing events, the degree of controversy involved, and whether it involves something "new" — new, that is, in the way of disclosure as distinguished from insight or perspective.

The national press would do well to reconsider its priorities. It has excelled in exposing wrongdoers, in alerting the public to the high crimes and peccadilloes of persons in high places. But it has fallen short — far short — in its higher responsibility of public education. With an exception or two, such as the National Public Radio, the media convey only fragments of those public proceedings which are designed to inform the general public. A superstar can always command the attention of the press, even with a banality. An obscure professor can scarcely hope to, even with a striking idea, a new insight, or a lucid simplification of a complex issue. A bombastic accusation, a groundless, irresponsible prediction, or, best of all, a "leak," will usually gain a congressman or senator his heart's content of publicity; a reasoned discourse, more often than not, is destined for entombment in the *Congressional Record*. A member of the Foreign Relations Committee staff suggested that the committee had made a mistake in holding the 1974 détente hearings in public; if they had been held in closed session and the transcripts then leaked, the press would have covered them generously.

We really must try to stop conducting our affairs like a morality play. In a democracy we ought to try to think of our public servants not as objects of adulation or of revilement, but as *servants* in the literal sense, to be lauded or censured, retained or dispensed with, according to the competence with which they do the job for which they were hired. Bitter disillusionment with our leaders is the other side of the coin of worshipping them. If we did not expect our leaders to be demigods, we would not be nearly as shocked by their failures and transgressions.

The press has always played up to our national tendency to view public figures as either saints or sinners, but the practice has been intensified since Watergate. President Ford was hailed as a prince of virtue and probity when he came to office. Then he pardoned President Nixon and was instantly cast into the void, while the media resounded with heartrending cries of betrayal and disillusion. Many theories, often conspiratorial, were put forth in explanation of the Nixon pardon — all except the most likely: that the president acted impulsively and somewhat prematurely out of simple human feeling.

Secretary Kissinger, for his part, has been alternately hailed as a miracle worker and excoriated as a Machiavellian schemer, if not indeed a Watergate coconspirator. I myself was criticized by some of the Kissinger-hating commentators for "selling out" by cooperating with the secretary on East-West détente and the Middle East. Until that time it had never occurred to me that opposition itself constituted a principle, and one which required me to alter my own long-held views on Soviet-American relations and the need for a compromise peace in the Middle East.

My point is not that the character of our statesmen is irrelevant but that their personal qualities are relevant only as they pertain to policy, to their accomplishments or lack of them in their capacity as public servants. Lincoln, it is said, responded to charges of alcoholism against the victorious General Grant by offering to send him a case of his favorite whiskey. Something of that spirit would be refreshing and constructive in our attitude toward our own contemporary leaders. None of them, I strongly suspect — including Dr. Kissinger, President Ford, and former President Nixon — is either a saint or a devil, but a human like the rest of us, whose proper moral slot is to be found somewhere in that vast space between hellfire and the gates of heaven.

A free society can remain free only as long as its citizens

exercise restraint in the practice of their freedom. This principle applies with special force to the press, because of its power and because of its necessary immunity from virtually every form of restraint except self-restraint. The media have become a fourth branch of government in every respect except for their immunity from checks and balances. This is as it should be — there are no conceivable restraints to be placed on the press which would not be worse than its excesses. But because the press cannot and should not be restrained from outside, it bears a special responsibility for restraining itself, and for helping to restore civility in our public affairs.

For a start, journalists might try to be less thinned-skinned. Every criticism of the press is not a fascist assault upon the First Amendment. One recalls, for example, that when former Vice-President Agnew criticized members of Congress and others, the press quite properly reported his remarks, taking the matter more or less in their stride. But when he criticized the media, the columnists and editorialists went into transports of outraged excitement, bleeding like hemophiliacs from the vice-president's pinpricks.

More recently, since Watergate, the press has celebrated its prowess with a festival of self-congratulation, and politicians have joined with paeans of praise. The politicians' tributes should be taken with a grain of salt in any case — they have seen the media's power and few are disposed to trifle with it. The real need of the press is self-examination, and a degree of open-mindedness to the criticisms which are leveled against it. Journalists bear an exceedingly important responsibility for keeping office holders honest; they have an equally important responsibility for keeping themselves honest, and fair.

I make these general criticisms of the press with some embarrassment, because during my thirty-two years in public life I was treated for the most part with understanding and generosity by the press, most particularly by the major newspapers in my home state of Arkansas. Such complaints as I have — and I have a few — are essentially aspects of the more general problems cited above.

To my considerable personal discomfort I have found myself from time to time under journalistic examination to determine — it would seem — whether I was a saint or an agent of the devil. Knowing full well that I was not the former, and daring to hope that I was not one of Satan's minions either, I have sometimes experienced a curious sense of detachment when reading about myself, as if the subject were really someone else. In truth, I have never thought of myself as anything but a politician — until my recent retirement — trying to advance the national interest, as best I understood it, while also doing my best to service my constituency, readily if not happily compromising between the two when that seemed necessary.

The Arkansas press — including the two statewide newspapers, the *Gazette* and the *Democrat* — came closer than others to accepting me on those terms, reporting my often heretical views on foreign policy with reasonable objectivity while also noting my efforts on behalf of agriculture, education, and industry in Arkansas — efforts in which I took and still take considerable personal pride. Even in my last, losing primary campaign in 1974 I was pleased and proud to have the support of the *Gazette* and the *Democrat*.

The sophisticated national press — though usually generous and sometimes flattering to me personally — has

nonetheless had a tendency to pose certain rather tedious — and in my opinion largely meaningless — “paradoxes” about my personality and my role. Is Fulbright truly a humanitarian idealist, or a racist under the skin? An “international peace prophet,” as one friendly writer recently put it, or “plain old Bill,” regaling Arkansas rubes with talk about the price of cotton and chickens? How too, they have asked, anguishing on my behalf, can an “urbane” internationalist like Fulbright survive in a southern “hillbilly” state like Arkansas? But most of all my friends in the national press have pointed — more in sorrow than in anger — to the “paradox” of my “humanitarianism on a global scale” as against my early opposition to civil-rights legislation and, more recently, my dissent from aspects of our Middle East policy and my differences with the Israeli lobby in Congress.

All these questions have been posed as a “moral” dilemma, in much the same way that our presidents have been viewed as either saints or sinners. What I perceive in this approach is not a genuine moral dilemma, or even an authentic paradox of personality, but another manifestation of that Puritan dogmatism which pervades our national life, including — to a far greater degree than is recognized — our liberal intellectual community. In the case of the eastern liberal press, the dogmatism is reinforced by arrogance — the arrogance of people who regard themselves as duly appointed arbiters not only of the nation's style and taste but also of its morality. The “paradox” posed about me by a number of writers has never greatly impressed or interested me because it is not really my paradox but theirs. “How,” they are asking, “can a man who shares so many of my opinions and prejudices fail so woefully to share them all?”

In fact there are a few rather simple explanations to the so-called “paradoxes” in my career. While believing in the necessity of international cooperation and of the United Nations idea, I have also believed that education and economic opportunity were the best avenue to racial justice in the United States. I did not vote for civil-rights legislation prior to the late sixties for two very simple reasons: first, because I doubted its efficacy; second, because my constituents would not have tolerated it. I felt able to challenge some of their strong feelings on such matters as the Vietnam war; I did not feel free to go against them on the emotionally charged issue of race. And as far as the “paradox” of world peace as against the price of cotton is concerned, I see no conundrum at all — I have always been interested in both.

Coming finally to the “paradox” of my “urbane” internationalism as against my “provincial” Arkansas constituency, I take this as no more than a conceit of the eastern “establishment.” It has not been my observation that the representation in Congress of New York, Massachusetts, or California has been notably more responsible, intellectual, sophisticated, or humane than that of Arkansas. I have always felt attuned, responsive, and at one with my home state, and although the voters of Arkansas decided after thirty years that they wanted a change, I have little doubt that I survived a lot longer in politics in Arkansas than I ever would have in New York or Massachusetts.

Rather than for my moral qualities I should prefer to be evaluated for my specific positions on specific issues, for my contributions or lack of them as a public servant. That is what counts in a democracy, or in a mature society. It matters little to the nation or to posterity whether a president or senator met some individual's or group's or newspaper's particular standard of political “purity.” For my own part I do not regard myself as a fitting or even interesting subject for priestly exorcism. If my career is judged worthy of review by journalists or historians, I very much hope that it

will be for what I contributed or failed to contribute to my country and my state. The purity or lack of it in my motives is an issue strictly between me and my Maker.

I cannot stress too strongly that my criticism of the press in this regard is not especially personal. Looking back over my long career — to my many speeches on foreign policy, to the hearings, legislation, and other activities of the Foreign Relations Committee during my chairmanship — I am bound to conclude that I have been treated by the press with overall fairness and generosity. It is the general practice of moralizing to which I object, rather than the moralizing which has been directed toward me, most of which has been generous, some of which indeed has been flattering.

I have been more distressed personally by what has often seemed to me an arbitrary and prejudiced standard of "newsworthiness" in the national press, particularly as applied to the Middle East. I have noted repeatedly, for example, the quantitative disparity between the press coverage of Palestinian guerilla attacks within Israel and of Israeli attacks upon South Lebanon, although the loss of civilian life in the latter has almost certainly been greater. I even made a statement on the subject in the Senate in August 1974, but the statement itself was ignored, consigned to entombment in the *Congressional Record*.

Another instance of dubious "newsworthiness" arose following my final major speech as a senator, a discussion of the Middle East at Westminster College in Missouri. *The New York Times* reported the main theme — which was the danger of a world crisis arising out of the Arab-Israeli conflict — with reasonable accuracy, although the headline — FULBRIGHT, AT FULTON, GLOOMY ON WORLD — suggested that the gloom lay not so much upon the world as on the speaker. *The Washington Post* — not for the first time involving a statement critical of Israel — did not report the speech at all, although it was otherwise widely reported around the country. Some months later, by contrast, the *Post* found prominent place, including a picture, for an article recalling adverse comments I had made on black voting in the Arkansas Democratic primary back in 1944.

Still another instance of dubious "newsworthiness" in my experience occurred in April 1971 upon the occasion of a lecture I delivered at Yale University, again concerning the Middle East. On that occasion too I was critical of Israeli policy. *The New York Times* and other newspapers provided fair and accurate coverage. *The Washington Post* did not report the speech at all, but on the following day carried an article on the Israeli reaction to my speech, headlined ISRAELI PRESS LASHES OUT AT FULBRIGHT. Later still one of the *Post's* columnists devoted a whole column of vituperation to my unreported speech. Recently, the *Post* may have had a change of heart as they did publish on the op-ed page of July 7, 1975 a statement of my views concerning the appropriate settlement of the conflict in the Middle East.

The ultimate test of the press's fairness is its coverage of opinions of which the writers and editorialists do not approve. In my own experience as a critic not of Israel itself, but of the Israeli lobby and of what has seemed to me the excessive responsiveness of the United States government to demands made upon it by the government of Israel, the press has frequently failed to meet the test of fairness and objectivity, tending both to an arbitrary standard of newsworthiness and to a shifting of attention from the event to its author, from statement to motive, from song to singer. I have in recent years been called "cranky,"

"crochety," and "obsessive" about Israel and the Middle East — by contrast, it is sometimes lamented, with my "courageous" or "inspiring" leadership on Vietnam. All this signals to me is that the writer does not sympathize with my views and has devised an excuse to avoid reporting them. To my knowledge the reporters who have made these personal charges have neither general psychiatric qualifications nor specific familiarity with my state of mind. If indeed I have been "crochety" about the Middle East, it is not Israel which has brought me to that state but journalists who have thwarted my efforts to communicate views which could, I readily concede, be judged mistaken under dispassionate examination, but which I myself have long believed and still believe to be rational, at least arguable, and pertinent to the national interest.

I have always had a good deal of admiration for Washington's overshadowed evening newspaper. The *Star* suffers from the ignominy of having achieved few if any Watergate scoops, but over the years it has demonstrated certain less flamboyant virtues, such as confining its opinions to its editorial page. The *Star* has rarely been friendly to me or my positions on foreign policy in its editorials; at the same time it has usually given fair and objective treatment to my statements and to the proceedings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The *Star* even published a favorable review of my 1972 book, *The Crippled Giant*, although the paper's editorial writers could hardly have approved its main thrust, while the *Post* sought out as its reviewer an obscure controversialist from Pine Bluff, Arkansas, who had little to say about my book but a great deal to say about my signing of the "Southern Manifesto" in 1956 and my many personal shortcomings as he perceived them.

In addition to *The Washington Star* and the press in general in my home state of Arkansas, I have always felt a special regard for the smaller, regional newspapers around the country. The steady decline in their numbers and variety is a substantial loss to the country. Few of them have scored any great scoops of investigative journalism, but many of them combine a genuine regard for objectivity in the news with a good deal of common sense and sound judgment in their editorials. Their principal failing in my opinion has been an excess of deference to the large, national newspapers.

The special strength of the writers for the smaller newspapers is journalistic "distance" — a virtue much celebrated but rarely practiced by their more famous Washington-based colleagues. The latter tend to express "distance" through vituperation, but more commonly cultivate all possible intimacy with the high officials whose activities they report. The officials in turn usually find it advantageous to respond, with the result that some of the elite of the Washington press corps have effectively made the transition from observers to participants in the making of public policy. Free as their writers are from such temptations and aspirations, the smaller newspapers seem to me, by and large, to come closer to fulfilling their journalistic obligations to report the news accurately and interpret it with personal detachment. They often seem better able, as the historian Bernard A. Weisberger expressed it, "to see men and events in whole and human perspective — that is, always fallible, and not always the masters of their own destiny. Or, in short, historically."

I commend to the press, in conclusion, a renewed

awareness of its great power and commensurate responsibility — a responsibility which is all the greater for the fact that there is no one to restrain the press except the press itself, nor should there be. After a long era of divisiveness and acrimony in our national life, we are in need of a reaffirmation of the social contract among people, government, and the media. The essence of that contract is a measure of voluntary restraint, an implicit agreement among the major groups and interests in our society that none will apply their powers to the fullest. For all the ingeniousness of our system of checks and balances, our ultimate protection against tyranny is the fact that we are a people who have not wished to tyrannize one another. "The

republican form of government," wrote Herbert Spencer in 1891, "is the highest form of government: but because of this it requires the highest type of human nature — a type nowhere at present existing." We have shown in times of adversity in the past that we are capable of this "highest type of human nature." We would do well, if we can, to call it into existence once again. It has never been needed more. 12

J. William Fulbright is the former United States senator from Arkansas. He was chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from 1959 to 1974 and is now of counsel to the law firm of Hogan and Hartson in Washington.

WASHINGTON STAR
24 NOV 1975

Charles Bartlett

Today's morality and yesterday's

The Senate Select Committee has issued an assassination report which should never have been published about activities that should never have been contemplated. "These deeds must not be thought after these ways," whispered Lady Macbeth, "so it will make us mad." Sen. Frank Church, D-Idaho, and his committee colleagues, confronted by the dark deeds of three administrations, chose the risks of stirring indignation against the nation over the risk to themselves of affronting the public's right to know.

Their report documents the "arrogance of power" phase of American foreign policy but it has already been discredited by the outcome in Indochina, the brilliant perceptions of William Fulbright and a pronounced shift in the political mood. The report holds the initiatives of an era in which the struggle was the main thing up to the judgments of an era of which political morality is everything.

The committee did its job thoroughly, exploring each

CIA fling at Macbethian diplomacy with such zeal as to leave the nation no resort to the refuge of "plausible denial." Since these marginal, illegal plottings gained justification from the great care that was taken to enable U.S. officials to show clean hands, this absolute disclosure has the result of making all these operations seem doubly ridiculous.

The senators maintain the nation is obliged to suffer the embarrassment of their clean-breasting in order to secure a moral base for the future. Their theory is that exposure to the humiliation of a public "mea culpa" will make policy-makers more cautious and covert operators more aware that their machinations must ultimately face the test of open scrutiny.

But was it really necessary to muddy the past to insure conformity with the guidelines of the new morality? The intelligence precept of cold war days in which "acceptable norms of human behavior do not

apply" had been fully repudiated by President Ford and CIA Director Colby. Congress can affect the future by enacting edicts against the Macbeth option and by obliging CIA directors to forswear it on confirmation.

Toying with the theory that the CIA was an animal on the loose, the senators suggest that full disclosure was crucial to restore discipline within the government. Their report tries to soften its impact upon the records of dead Presidents by impugning the CIA's chain of command in those days of derring-do. Putting the personalities ahead of the institution was an easy choice for the senators.

However, it does not make an honest historical record. Protecting the chief executive was a crucial aspect of these operations. The lesson of the U-2 debacle was that Presidents must never be involved in any way. But while the lines of authority had to be obscured, the agency's need for policy guidance from the top was implicit in the

misdeeds

flash nature of these ventures. The plotters were after all career government officials, hardly types who go off on their own to slay heads of state.

"Do it but don't tell me," is a machination which has become second nature to politicians. They learn it in coping with campaign finance laws. But just as the Watergate burglary was triggered by the Nixon aides who prodded Jeb Magruder, the assassination plots were launched by proddings from the Oval Office. Those were days in which it was fashionable for the ablest officials to respond with alacrity to their readings of the President's wishes.

The damage of this act of penance may outweigh its fruits. But the senators are solemn in avowing that this country "must not adopt the tactics of the enemy." They can be assured at least that the enemy will not adopt their method of conscience-cleansing.

We Need the CIA

It is no secret that the Central Intelligence Agency strayed beyond its sphere of influence when it got into the domestic security business; but that does not alter the fact that the United States needs the CIA.

For example, it has been suspected for years that the Russians have been pouring more into military spending than they said they were. Just how much or to what extent was not known. For the Soviets, understandably, don't go around bragging about it.

Something of substance, however, has come to be known; and the CIA is responsible for bringing it to light.

The agency has estimated that since


1971 the Russians have been spending more each year on military preparedness than has the United States; further, the CIA says that a reduction in such Soviet spending is unlikely.

The importance of this information lies in the fact that the United States now knows that it cannot, or at least should not, drastically reduce its military spending in the face of continued Russian emphasis on that front.

We do not, of course, know how or where the CIA got its information; but we would like to bet that none of us would be aware of what the Russians are doing if it were not for the CIA.

TRIBUNE-DEMOCRAT
Johnstown, Pa.
14 Nov. 1975

GENESIS
December 1975



By Jesse James Leaf

Now, for the first time, exclusively in Genesis, an ex-CIA intelligence officer exposes the perpetrators and the victims of the bloodiest and most frightening conflict yet—the war within America's Central Intelligence Agency.

The dirty little dramas played out every day in the secrecy-shrouded offices of the CIA are a time bomb, ticking steadily and inevitably toward destruction—threatening to blow the Agency apart even sooner than the catalog of dirty tricks surfacing daily in your newspaper.

The author of this brutally frank, explosive report is an insider—who, after six years with the Agency, remains in daily furtive contact with colleagues who remain behind to carry on the internecine combat. Jesse James Leaf, now managing editor of this magazine, tells here the entire shattering and shameful story.

Right at this moment, while Congress and the media probe the rarefied heights of CIA dirty tricks—assassinations, buggings, illegalities of every description—another more dangerous war is being fought within the halls of Agency head-

quarters itself. This is a civil war which has already torn the Agency apart, resulted in two bloody purges and has reduced the efficiency of this once-respected organization to practically nil. It is a sorry spectacle of pettiness, bureaucratic bumbling, hypocrisy and indifference which has caused untold misery to loyal employees and irreparable damage to our national intelligence effort.

The decline of the CIA didn't come about overnight, and it hasn't ended yet. The Agency is an organization without a heart. It has virtually ceased functioning under attacks from its critics and conservative direction from within. It is torn by ideological suspicion, held back by unimaginative and frightened leadership.


“... Colby will be the next sacrificial lamb . . . A new generation of old boys is on the way up . . .”

The trouble stretches back to the 1960's, “a time of agonizing reappraisal” to quote a current non-cola commercial. Our national priorities were under question and under fire—Viet Nam, cities under the torch, the moral strength of our nation enduring daily testing.

First Kennedy, then Johnson and Nixon sought to defuse the explosive unrest igniting the youth in this country. The word came down to hire the dissatisfied, to get the dissidents into the establishment—let them see how it feels to be on the front line. The hope was that the ponderous machinery of government would bureaucratize them.

The Central Intelligence Agency was no exception. During the 40's and 50's, CIA recruiters had an easy time looking for the best and the brightest. The formula was simple enough—love of God, love of country. They scored in the best places, and the product was comfortably uniform. CIA's rate of defectors, dropouts and the disgruntled was far below comparable Government agencies. It was a tight, happy little ship.

But came the halcyon days of the 60's



and changes were taking place—social changes the CIA establishment misunderstood. In an orgy of self-confidence, it absorbed hundreds of bright, young professionals, funneling as many as 400 a year through its Career Training Program—the Agency's six-month intensive course where the craft of intelligence shares equal billing with building the mystique of CIA *esprit de corps*.

What really happened during this period was the setting of a time bomb—the Agency was sowing the seeds of its own destruction. They had marched blindly into new territory without taking the trouble to plot the land. They had supposed that the world outside the well-guarded gates of Agency headquarters in McLean, Virginia, like the cloistered world inside, had not really changed. Trapped with an ideology that stood still, they paid no attention to the waves of dissent that had already washed through the Washington Civil Service Corps. At the State department, junior officers had successfully organized and were effecting changes in the old-line, pin-striped ranks. HEW, Labor and HUD were all suffering and growing under the impatience of their younger professionals. Member departments of the President's Cabinet were being carried, kicking and screaming, into the 1970's.

Not so the CIA. The incoming recruits found an organization that was beginning to ossify. The gung-ho warriors who made up the OSS during World War II and the cold warriors who followed in the 50's had become bureaucratized. The Agency, which had prided itself on its cocked hat professionalism and free-wheeling organization had become a refuge for fattening civil servants with expanding waistlines. Small men with narrow vision—empire builders, petty political infighters and gossip mongers—ruled the CIA. The games that had to be played shifted from the world stage to the smaller halls of Agency headquarters. Like old, mangy lions, they coveted their lairs—secure, workless jobs, fat pay checks, gilt-edged fringe benefits. The CIA was full of white-shirted, crew-cut, big-assed old-timers petrified that they were losing control of events, that time was overtaking them. The new Agency professional represented a new order they didn't understand and were therefore suspicious of. So they sat on them.

And discontent grew.

In the Directorate of Operations (then called Plans), many of the younger case officers had trouble justifying to themselves some of the stupid and illegal

operations in which they were forced to participate. The decline in the Agency's clandestine operations abroad meant that large numbers of the younger officers had to mark time, sometimes for years, in dead-end clerical jobs or make-work assignments.

In the Directorate of Intelligence, incoming personnel were thrown into a mire of conflicting egos, ironbound cliques and petty prejudices. Trained to be political and economic analysts, and chosen for their intelligence, ambition and initiative, they quickly became aware that the way to the top lay in keeping your mouth shut and your nose clean. And they soon learned of an invisible "shit list" which predetermines the future of every employee at the CIA. The "list" is totally subjective and irrefutable. Work, ability, dedication have no effect on its judgements. An ever popular topic of discussion over lunch or drinks is the "list." How far will Ed go? Well, he's a New Yorker, and pushy—no more than a 13 (GS-13, lower level supervisory). Dick—a playboy, too wild. He's going nowhere. Noel—dull-witted, a square. He's going places.

Not that being a clod is a prerequisite for promotion at CIA, but it helps. It means that Neil poses no threat, he does what he's told, won't step on anybody's toes. A non-entity. Perfect CIA supervisory material.

The ethical bankruptcy of the CIA also took its toll, working against itself and alienating precisely the kind of intensely moral, self-righteous people it tried to recruit. Well-documented are the Agency operations in southeast Asia and other questionable activities performed in the name of saving the world from Communism. But I'm talking about the dirty little dramas played out every day in the offices of the CIA.

During one of our bull sessions, a member of the group, a Mormon, told us that during a routine discussion with a personnel officer, a number of photographs fell out of his 201 (personnel) file. They showed him in various stages of undress, and from all angles—apparently taken during his entrance physical three years before. He tried to obtain an explanation for this invasion of privacy and to have the photographs removed from his file. Unsuccessful, he was left with no alternative but to resign from an organization he felt had so little decency.

I must admit that the incident was amusing to some of us—but not to the women who were part of our coterie.

The role of women in the CIA is a little-known, but particularly unsavory chapter in its history. The Agency has bowed to social pressures and stepped up its hiring of female professionals. The recruiters carefully screen out outright liars and potential troublemakers. The end product, the CIA professional woman, is almost universally ugly, silly, incompetent and, as it turns out, easy bed bait.

Think about it. These were the serious girls in school. Wallflowers at dances. Studious. Unattractive. Socially and psychologically immature, they would have languished in big city singles bars, or as political science teachers at some small university, or spent their lives as

housewives.

But the Agency gives them new life. Surrounded by their male counterparts in a flamboyantly one-sided male-female ratio, they become the office sex object in an essentially closed and chauvinistic society. Sex, or its promise, becomes the way to hold their jobs and then the way up. The aging, middle class suburban husband types who make up the supervisory levels at CIA go ape.

Of the professional women I knew most were having affairs with other Agency men, not surprising given the closed nature of the company. But of these, most were cavorting with their superiors, and I can name several women who owe their jobs directly to sleeping with their bosses or their bosses' friends. I know of several divorces directly resulting from these liaisons. We lost respect for the people involved and the Agency lost competent people who were passed over or transferred in favor of bedmates.

Left in the backwash are the truly bright women who have something more to offer the government than a willing vagina. Almost without exception, they have had it made abundantly clear that their future with the Agency holds limited promise. Those in the forefront of change have either quit or remain locked in lower level jobs. With no outlet at work, and little opportunity to develop normal outside interests, they are a pool of disenchanting and bitter people at emotional war with the Agency.

Let me stress that these relationships are carried on with the full knowledge of the higher-ups. It fits into the peculiar sense of CIA morality that such activity is condoned so long as the men involved are part of the club—the "old boys" who run the CIA. Similar activity by any other member of the staff is greeted with the self-righteous indignation reserved for the morally hypocritical.

This is the atmosphere those hundreds of impatient, idealistic professionals who led and followed me into the CIA found. With jobs lacking challenge, advancement a matter of putting in your time and wearing a clean shirt, and chaffing under the confines of an extremely conservative and stagnating bureaucracy, the younger professionals grew restive. Their growing discontent, coupled with the highest dropout rate in the Agency's history (70 percent of my incoming class resigned within three years), found notice at the top. Annoyed at this unseemly display of insolence, the brass decided to squeeze the growing mutiny—but without actually endangering the ideological or administrative structure they found so personally rewarding. This is the typical Agency reaction, the "catalyst" reaction—to engineer an *appearance* of doing something without actually doing anything. It is a device Agency insiders soon learn to expect and they consequently become programmed into chronic inaction.

It was decided to call an Agency-wide meeting of younger professionals to discuss the state of CIA, entertain discussion and criticism and offer possible solutions. I think you can pinpoint the beginning of the end for the Central Intelligence Agency to that meeting held at the Agency's futuristic auditorium in

1970.

The meeting was doomed from the first. It was set up by invitation only, the invitations dispensed, of course, by the brass. Needless to say, the people who should have been there weren't. Those who did turn out, the bootlickers and chosen fair-haired boys (and girls), were window dressing for the brass. They sat through self-serving public relations speeches, and listened to each other ask meaningless questions.

Absolutely nothing of substance was raised or solved at the meeting. The Director was satisfied that he responded to demands for change and had shrewdly disarmed the budding revolutionaries. The lackies who attended had the chance to show their faces to Richard Helms and his beaming honchos.

Under the naive belief that the meeting marked a turning point in CIA employee relations, a band of young professionals organized the Junior Officers Study Group, a self-styled employee action committee patterned after similar organizations in other Washington agencies—but with one major difference. Where other groups, such as the one at State, were seriously trying to effect change from below, and played to generally responsive ears, the Agency group served to draw out the troublemakers for easy disposal. Of the 20 members who formed the hard core, most have left the Agency, some to better jobs in Defense, State or private industry. A handful have had curiously explosive records of promotion within the CIA.

The history of the JOSG is a depressing chronicle of what happens when Young Turks, even castrated Young Turks, buck the established CIA authority.

Flushed with good intentions, they began a modest program of gentlemanly reform. "We started with a low profile," says one member of the group. "We felt that if we made constructive recommendations to office chiefs, they would pay attention to us. Rather than attack the system because we were fed up with it, we took a more conservative tack than comparable employee action groups, say at State."

What the group was unprepared for was the Agency's paranoid distrust of criticism and change.

JOSG's first substantive action was in the area of Equal Opportunity Employment. In 1970, the CIA, contrary to established procedure in other Government agencies, had no full-time Equal Opportunity Employment Officer. The group tried to obtain statistics on how many minorities were employed at CIA, but were refused the data. Representatives of the group appealed to Col. Red White, then Executive Director of the CIA. Despite the innocuous nature of the request, White exploded. Unable to abide this insolence, White ordered the group to end the investigation and disband immediately.

Group members were shocked by the negative intensity of the reaction. They dropped their name and went underground, meeting secretly and informally. Through a contact at the Office of Personnel, they were able to secure the

statistics, which they published as a report and distributed to every office and division chief in the Agency.

The response was predictable. At the middle level, they were greeted with stony silence. The most liberal of their supervisors offered lukewarm (but clandestine) encouragement. When copies of the memo reached the upper levels, the catalyst response was applied. Richard Helms, then Director of Central Intelligence, a figurehead who serves as public image of the Agency, but who rarely dirties his hands in the day-to-day operations of the little people, was publicly impressed (or, more likely, was told to be impressed). With great flourish, he ordered a fulltime EOE Officer to be established at CIA. To this day, there has been no substantive change in the racial makeup of the Agency.

This apparent early victory buoyed the group, and it began to attract hangers-on and draw out the discontented. The Agency Suggestions Committee was receiving an increasing number of radical solutions to the ills which afflicted the CIA—hiring and firing procedures, organizational weaknesses, poor productivity, unresponsive personnel procedures. As is their custom, the Committee had a difficult time deflecting the spate of suggestions it received. One of the more radical suggestions—which happened to be my brainchild—was a total reorganization of the Office of Current Intelligence. It called for the elimination of several supervisors—one of whom was my boss. The Suggestions Committee replied that it couldn't act on my suggestion without my first plotting out the work flow of the 300 analysts in the OCI, that is, supply productivity reports on each supervisor, map input of raw data and outflow of finished intelligence reports, and apply salary figures to output. In addition, my suggestion, which was supposed to have been confidential, found its way to my supervisor's in box. This made for a strained confrontation and assured my place on his shit list—bronzed for posterity. Today, he is Director of OCI.

Still under the critical eye of suspicious superiors, the Group continued to press for modest reform—establishment of a day care center, changing the dress code, improving the company magazine.

The meetings and memos continued fitfully for two years until William Colby (now Director of Central Intelligence) replaced White. Where White was blatantly hostile, Colby was a snake. He openly encouraged the JOSG, even invited members to working lunches in the Executive Dining Room. Privately, he quashed them at every turn.

Meanwhile, employee discontent was reaching alarming proportions. Security leaks, which were virtually unknown in the past, became a roaring deluge. Jack Anderson was receiving more classified documents than he could count. Reporters and columnists knew more about what went on in the Agency than insiders themselves. Viet Nam and Watergate were beginning to take their toll as well.

In addition, the Agency was visibly falling down on the job. Operations overseas were being blown or subverted by foreign intelligence services, negat-

ing whole operations. At home, mistakes, oversights and mistaken judgments were affecting policy action decisions. Clearly something was wrong. The old confidence was failing.

To his credit, Nixon correctly assessed the problem, putting the blame on the "old boys," the stodgy holdovers from earlier days. Now carrying the weight of middle age and stagnant ideology on their shoulders, the career Agency upper level had slowed to a snail's pace and worse. They were holding the Agency back, keeping their fat thumbs on the younger members. When innovation and dynamism were desperately needed, they plodded their old rutted roads—and the Agency was suffering.

Realizing this, Nixon brought in a professional hatchetman—James Schlesinger. His job was to move in quickly, institute a purge, and move out again. This would leave the Agency lean and tough, yet protect Colby (who was next in line for the Directorship) and the rest of the upper echelon.

The excuse for cleaning the Agency's house was the Government-wide Reduction in Force (RIF) Program which had earlier helped Nixon justify slicing budget requests from pariah agencies like HEW and HUD. The word came down that 10 percent of the Agency's 17,000 employees were getting the ax.

But Schlesinger, an overrated administrator with the perception of an ox, never bothered to study the agency he was supposed to reform. He never understood the protective mechanism so expertly constructed over the years. He was supposed to remove the deadwood, but what Schlesinger didn't realize was that dead wood floats to the top. By working through Colby, he put the chicken coop in the hands of the fox. He tried to get the blood flowing again with the clots who blocked it in the first place. The purge lists were drawn up by the middle level, precisely the decaying undergrowth that should have been hauled off years before.

It was like a mandate from heaven. The old boys saw the chance to secure their empires, settle old scores and eliminate those smart-assed young guys with their long hair and wise suggestions. Rather than deadwood, the 1973 RIF (followed by a second purge in 1974) removed the live wires, the Agency's most valuable assets—the unconventional, the most innovative, the questioning, the impatient. One employee who survived the bloodletting says that "Everybody with 'spark' was cut. It's no fun to ride the elevators anymore." (Riding the elevators is a popular Agency pastime—a place to catch up on the latest news and gossip.)

Perhaps the saddest cases were those older employees who, in some distant past, crossed the wrong person. CIA employees work for years under the cloud of past grudges—petty people who wait for an opportunity to strike at old enemies for slights, mistakes or prejudices sometimes a decade old. One colleague, an Agency employee for 22 years, was marked by his Division Chief and forced into early retirement during the RIF. Early retirement is a particularly effective weapon because it

denies the RIFee the generous benefits available to other employees. Before he left, he waged a three month battle to save his job. He circulated the depressing history of Agency indifference to younger officers, writing at one point: "This is what you can expect after serving your country with loyalty and dedication for a quarter of a century."

The 1973 and 1974 RIFs had a traumatic effect on the CIA. They sent shock waves through the organization that are being felt today. Those who were left heard the warning loud and clear: Don't make waves, don't criticize, don't stand out.

It has been downhill ever since. The depleted agency has been shaken by reassignments, reorganizations and revelations in the media about Watergate and other dirty tricks. There is a complete breakdown in morale. A new ideological split has developed—this time a cleavage along political lines. Liberal employees are shocked and disheartened by revelations implicating the CIA in the use of experimental drugs, murders and other unsavory business. The conservatives are keeping quiet and

out of sight. The result is a CIA whose effectiveness as an intelligence gathering and interpreting agency is next to useless.

Concerned over their Senate testimonies, the higher-ups have removed themselves from the daily operations of the Agency. Directives have come down to analysts instructing them to be especially alert to substantive problems suggested by incoming intelligence because nobody upstairs is minding the store.

Without direction, and with yet another RIF threatening this year (this time directed mainly at the Directorate of Operations), agency people are playing it close to the vest. There is a lack of professional pride and concern in the product—the finished intelligence reporting which is the bread and butter of the Agency. Whole branches are undermanned and nobody seems to give a damn. There is a "who cares" attitude prevalent today that would have been unthinkable five years ago. Employees now think of their Agency work as just a job they hold at a time when they're lucky to have a job.

Nobody is really worried that the CIA

will be abolished—organizations have an institutional momentum that can't easily be stopped. And it is expert in covering its tracks. People are protected, jobs diffused, blame defocused. Colby will be the next sacrificial lamb. More and more "grey" types are being promoted to higher positions—faceless men who won't rock the boat, who have families to worry about, whose main concern is their pension security. A new generation of old boys is on the way up.

Incoming professionals are cut from the same mold. No more chances taken with ideologues. No more boy geniuses, no more sparring with the ambitious. No more creativity, it's too risky. "This new crop of youngsters," reports an old Agency hand, "looks like they all came out of the late, late show."

The result is a scared, rump CIA whose intelligence product has declined and whose overseas operations are impotent. It is an organization of people keeping quiet, unwilling to take a chance, afraid to take a stand.

And that's no way to run an intelligence organization.

NEW YORK TIMES
1 DEC 1975

Restoring Faith

The interest in and the skepticism about the conclusions reached by the Warren Commission investigating President Kennedy's assassination are greater now than at any time since the report was first released. Even David W. Belin, a former commission lawyer and a staunch defender of its work, now urges that the inquiry be reopened.

The most powerful arguments for doing so come not from any of the veteran assassination buffs, but emerge from the secret recesses of the F.B.I. and the C.I.A. themselves.

- Although the C.I.A. was actively working on ways to achieve the death of Fidel Castro—including arming a would-be assassin on the day of President Kennedy's murder—Allen Dulles, then director of C.I.A., failed to inform his fellow commission members of that program, nor did any employee of the agency come forward with such information.

- Having failed to inform the commission of the anti-Castro plotting, the agency also failed to provide the potentially significant information that it involved members of the Mafia.

- The F.B.I. failed to inform the commission that it had received a threatening letter from Lee Harvey Oswald, the President's assassin, less than a month before the President's death; and it went on to destroy the letter.

- The failure of the F.B.I. and the C.I.A. to disclose these items of information increases the importance of such still unanswered questions as the extent and nature of Lee Harvey Oswald's relationship with the F.B.I.; the explanation of the ease with which he was able to travel in the Soviet Union; the reason for the smoothness of his re-entry into American life after recanting his defec-

tion to the Soviets, etc., etc., etc.

Mr. Belin, while continuing to believe that the Warren Commission's conclusions are correct, notes that many Americans think otherwise. He suggests that a new investigation by itself will restore governmental credibility. That is hardly likely. Few Americans were prepared a decade ago to believe in official cover-ups and murder plotting; yet even then they grew increasingly skeptical of the Warren Commission's findings. Having learned to their horror all those hitherto-unthinkable revelations, their damaged faith is unlikely to be entirely repaired by one more investigation.

Nevertheless, some highly desirable goals are within reach and it is essential that they be pursued. Much skepticism about government in general flows from the belief that secret agencies of government are unaccountable and out of control and that there is an automatic reflex in Washington to sweep embarrassments under the rug. This belief was bolstered just a few days ago by the Administration's frantic efforts to smother the assassination report.

Such skepticism can only be eroded over time; but the flaws in the Warren Commission investigation offer an excellent opportunity to begin dealing with such issues and to dispose of some questions about the Kennedy assassination as well. The American system of self-government can hardly be deemed to be working effectively so long as major questions relating to cover-ups in the investigation of a Presidential murder remain unanswered.

A Congressional investigation laying out all the now-sequestered evidence and seeking to establish the extent of the cover-ups, the reasons why they were undertaken and the identities of those responsible for them might help in the restoration of the Government's reputation for integrity and responsibility.

GENERALDAILY TELEGRAPH, London
13 November 1975**MOSCOW'S FEAR OF SAKHAROV**

WILL ANY LEADING Western politician in office speak up about Russia's refusal, reported from Moscow yesterday, to allow Dr ANDREI SAKHAROV to go to Oslo to collect his Nobel Peace Prize? Will Mr WILSON? Will President FORD? Will President GISCARD D'ESTAING? Alas, it is to be very much doubted. Yet all three, along with many other heads of Government, signed the Helsinki declaration, which among other things sought to promote the free movement of individuals and ideas. All have since praised it, adding solemnly that, of course, the test will be in its application. Mr WILSON even went so far as to express the opinion that, if the Helsinki agreement had been in existence at the time, the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Russia could not have taken place. Dr SAKHAROV is the leading campaigner for civil rights in Russia. His eminence as a scientist is such that Russia dare not

suppress him or do away with him, as would happen to lesser mortals. Yet they dare not let him accept his Nobel prize because it would spotlight their weakest point, the lack of law and freedom for their citizens.

The record of Western leaders on such matters is not a good one. President FORD originally refused to accept a visit to the White House by ALEXANDER SOLZHENITSYN when he was in America, because Dr KISSINGER had advised him it would be bad for "détente." When he belatedly changed his mind, SOLZHENITSYN was no longer interested. Shortly before his visit to Moscow last month, President GISCARD D'ESTAING received a letter from Dr SAKHAROV urging him to intercede with Mr BREZHNEV to secure an amnesty for political prisoners in Russia. It was not even acknowledged. Why are the leaders of the West so mealy-mouthed and timorous? It must be a source of amazement in Moscow.

Sunday, November 23, 1975

The Washington Star

Why do we cut our tongues out on human rights in other countries?

By Arthur Miller

Detente at present is a body without a soul, but its promise is enormous if we will seize it.

The fact is that the Helsinki accords bind both sides to respect elementary human rights. Why are we so powerless to speak to this issue? Is it that we fear the other side will start making noises about the race situation in Boston? The tortures in our client-state, Chile? The re-arrest under fake charges of the South Korean poet, Kim Chi Ha?

The answer to the dilemma is, not to sweep our own sins under the same rug as the Soviets' — or for that matter, the sins of South Africa — but to rise to the challenge that detente implicitly raises; to open our own actions to the same measure and standard that we and the Soviets have signed and agreed to. The truth of the matter is that with all our failings, we are still the freest country in the world, and if it should turn out that foreign criticism forces us to take a new and resolute look at our own injustices, why must we fear such a competition?

The truth is that such criticism is going on anyway, but from the other side, not from ours, at least not openly, not as part of our relationships with repressive regimes. And I repeat, this super politeness, at least in part, stems from a clouded conscience. But the Congress has the power to begin clearing that conscience by requiring certain minimal standards of respect for civil rights at least in those countries whose dependence on our support is nearly total. And if you say that we cannot be held responsible for what another government does, I can only answer that we are already responsible when that government cannot exist excepting with our support.

This is not a question of coming out with high-class speeches supporting academic or intellectual freedom. We are supporting repression. We can stop doing it. And in the process we can turn to our new trading partners and say, "We meant what we signed to in the Helsinki accords; we are actively working to eradicate injustice and unfreedom within our country and in those countries dependent on us — what are you

doing to carry out the obligations in regard to human rights that you signed to?" This is not interference in another country's internal affairs; it is an attempt to implement a signed agreement.

This article is excerpted from a statement American playwright Arthur Miller gave last week at a hearing of the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations.

The question inevitably arises as to whether we should refuse, for example, to sell wheat until the human rights provisions of the Helsinki accords are lived up to. I believe it would be unwise and unproductive to equate so many bushels with so much liberty. Besides, enlarging commerce not only benefits both sides materially, it is also a manifest of good will and good faith and as such can serve as a base upon which to build a new forthrightness in our relationships with the Soviet world. To again think in either/or terms at all times and in every instance can only lead back to impotence, and on the Soviet side must lend justification to those who can see only a threat to Soviet power in any deepening relationship with the United States.

Detente may indeed be a gesture empty of human content, but so is a letter of intent that precedes a binding contract. As with such a letter, everything depends on the next steps, and we apparently have no intention of taking such steps. It is the business of the Senate and Congress to decide whether such steps should be taken to implement the Helsinki agreement.

For example, a specific number of writers in Czechoslovakia (a country where large numbers of Soviet troops are stationed) is denied the right to publish their works in the Czech or Slovak languages. Certain of them have had their unpublished manuscripts seized from their homes. Many, if not most, of these writers are former members of the Communist party and have never advocated a return

to capitalism, nor do they now. Their chief sin is to have advocated an indigenous, independent Czech culture responsible to their own people rather than the demands of Soviet authorities. The blacklist against these writers is so broad that the regime has found it impossible to staff a literary magazine or newspaper.

It should be added that even in other Socialist countries the Czech situation is an embarrassment. In Hungary, for example, I could walk with Hungarian writers and meet with them in restaurants without a secret policeman dogging my footsteps. Not so in Prague, where a plainclothesman will take a table a few feet away, openly and brazenly warning all concerned that the regime is observing them. Czechoslovakia lives under a permanent state of McCarthyism from which there is no appeal.

The situation of the Czech writers and intellectuals is not unique in a world where repression, jailing, and the outright murder of writers by their governments is ordinary news. But there is one respect in which they are special; they have nowhere to appeal for relief. As citizens of a Socialist country, it is futile to look to other Socialist states for support, and their case is ambiguous in the eyes of the European Left whose anti-capitalist stance mutes its indignation against repression in the East.

I am not telling you that the Czech writers look to us for help. It is far worse than that. I believe they have long since assumed that we have decided to collaborate with the Soviet Union as a trading partner and that it is unrealistic for them to expect us to rock the boat. And this is why their situation is so meaningful; it has all the earmarks of the long future in which small nations especially must settle for a modicum of prosperity in exchange for which their souls will be excised, quietly, remorselessly, all for a good cause, the cause of peace between the giants.

I do not believe we have to cut out our tongues in order to reassure any other country of our peaceful intentions, or that we must adopt the impotence of moral eunuchs so that the volume of trade may grow. The Senate and the Congress, it seems to me, have the obligation to decide whether Czech repression is in contravention of the Helsinki accords. If it is, then the State Department should be instructed to ask the Soviet government what it intends to do about the matter as a signatory to the agreement. If, for example, the

Christian Science Monitor

28 NOV 1975

Charles W. Yost

Should U.S. tie aid to human rights?

Washington

One of the numerous subjects of controversy between the executive and legislative branches of our government is whether the United States should extend assistance to nations persistently violating human rights.

Last year's Foreign Assistance Act included a "sense of Congress" amendment that called on the President, "except in extraordinary circumstances," to reduce or deny security assistance to "any government which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights."

Since many of our regular military aid recipients, such as South Korea, the Philippines, Brazil, and Indonesia, have been accused of violating human rights, this poses a serious dilemma for the President and Secretary of State. Liberals in the Congress think the administration is evading application of the amendment. They threaten to put forward legislation reserving to Congress itself a voice in determining which countries are in violation and should be denied assistance.

This controversy arises from a confrontation between two contradictory currents in American foreign policy. The first is an evangelistic concern, going far back in our history, for liberty versus oppression, democracy versus authoritarianism, free enterprise versus communism — a belief that what is good for America must be good for the rest of the world.

The second current, arising in part from the same source but bent by the cold war, is the presumed need to assist any country, whatever the character of its government, which seems threatened by communism and whose "loss to the free world" we believe might tilt the balance of power.

The administration conceives of the latter imperative as being overriding, whereas the Congress — reflecting the post-Vietnam public mood of skepticism about military aid in general — sees much less need to be inhibited by strategic considerations.

The difference is aggravated by considerable fuzziness about just what "human rights" comprise.

Most people would agree that genocide, large-scale domestic slaughter such as was practiced in Burundi and Uganda not too long ago, constitutes a gross and outrageous violation of human rights.

There is also widespread revulsion against systematic torture as it was practiced by the colonels' government in Greece.

More difficulty arises, however, when we

existence of this blacklist is denied, the Senate can discover evidence that it indeed exists. If the Soviet government still refuses to attempt to correct the situation — indeed, if no concrete result comes of the whole effort — something vital will nevertheless have been gained.

The United States will have at least begun to establish before its own citizens and the world that its power exists not only to make the world safe for American business, but to hasten the evolution of humanity toward a decent respect for the human person. And if such approach can

only lead to counter-charges against ourselves, so be it. The failures of American society are known everywhere now; we can only gain by learning how others really see us. Perhaps our rightful pride in our freedom does need to be measured against our injustices, and so openly as to be an element in the diplomatic process. We have nothing to hide for those with eyes to see. And if we have to take it once we dish it out, perhaps this new necessity will help us, if only for our pride before the world, to revive that will, that insistence and faith in our capacity to make a society that is just to all.

NEW YORK TIMES

5 Dec. 1975

SOVIET SUSPECTED OF ARMS VIOLATION

U.S. Intelligence Officials Raise Questions About a New Radar Station

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON Dec. 4—American intelligence officials have reported to the Ford Administration that the Soviet Union recently constructed a large-scale radar station on the Kamchatka Peninsula, raising new questions about possible violations of the 1972 treaty limiting strategic arms.

According to well-placed Administration officials, the Russians have built very modern "phased-array radars" in the Kamchatka area of the north-eastern Soviet Union for use in testing systems of defensive weapons known as antiballistic missiles.

This suspected violation of the strategic arms agreements is similar to the other alleged violations in that it points up the fuzziness of some aspects of the 1972 agreements.

'Current' Ranges Questioned

Article Four of the 1972 treaty allowed two operational sites, in Moscow and at Grand Forks, N.D.—the latter site has subsequently been mothballed—and provided that in addition ABM radars could be employed "for development or testing within current or additionally agreed test ranges."

Because this raised questions as to where each side had its "current" test ranges, the United States delegation to the negotiations told the Russians on April 26, 1972, that it understood that the Soviet Union had only one ABM test range, near Sarysagan in Kazakhstan, Central Asia.

High-level discussions are

attempt to equate human rights with the democratic political rights to which Americans are accustomed — free elections, free speech, free emigration, etc.

Not only communist countries but almost all "third-world" countries seriously limit the exercise of such rights.

Is it appropriate for the U.S. to insist that other peoples adopt its form of government and its political liberties, even if their traditions and experience have not equipped them to do so effectively or meaningfully?

Leaders of third-world countries contend, moreover, that economic rights and freedoms — sufficient food, health care, and employment — are far more important to their peoples than political rights.

They sometimes claim that the U.S. is in violation of "basic human rights" by its economic neglect of the substantial proportion of its population still living below the poverty level. Others point out that Americans are quite ready to denounce restrictions on emigration as a violation of human rights, but have for 50 years been severely restricting immigration, which equally denies freedom of movement.

This whole subject of human rights has many gray areas. There is therefore serious doubt whether the U.S. should apply its political and economic standards to others, or wage ideological crusades of the sort it has condemned when carried on by communist states.

On the other hand, the U.S. is certainly under no obligation to provide aid, particularly military aid, to governments whose behavior it strongly disapproves, which engage, in the language of the Foreign Assistance Act, "in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights." A widely, if not universally, recognized human right is the right not to be imprisoned, certainly not to be tortured, for the expression of dissident political views.

There would seem to be only two or three cases where strategic considerations are still so overriding that the U.S. should feel obliged to continue military aid to governments which display a consistent pattern of violation of human rights of this gross and internationally recognized character. In other cases the U.S. could in good conscience terminate its aid.

The author of this article writes from a background of 40 years as a United States diplomat.

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now under way within the Administration on whether the Kamchatka radar violate the 1972 treaty on defensive missiles, and what to do about it.

The sophisticated "phased-array radars" scan by electronic means. The smaller, dish-shaped radars scan mechanically, and are less suited to protect against incoming missiles.

Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr., the retired Chief of Naval Operations, who was told about the Kamchatka site, told the House Select Committee on Intelligence this week that it was a "clear and precise" violation. Some Administration officials are not so sure.

As with other alleged Soviet violations of the 1972 ABM treaty and the accompanying limited accord on offensive weapons, it is almost impossible to prove that the Russians did not technically comply with the agreements.

Despite several charges of Soviet violations, the Administration has consistently concluded that, at worst, the Soviet Union was not living up to the spirit of the agreement. President Ford has stated there were "no violations."

A Storm in Washington

Nevertheless, the Soviet actions have created something of a political storm in Washington, of which Kamchatka issue is only the latest flurry.

Political conservatives such as Admiral Zumwalt, a possible candidate for the Senate in Virginia, or Senator Henry M. Jackson, an announced candidate for the Democratic Presidential nomination, are arguing that the actions demonstrate that the Russians cannot be trusted and that the Administration was naive.

Moreover, the direct role of Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger in negotiating the 1972 accords and current efforts to conclude a treaty on offensive weapons is a factor. Charges about the Russians have been turned into arguments that Mr. Kissinger was deliberately closing his eyes to violations, deceiving the President, Congress and the public—something he vehemently denies.

The issue has been clouded by its complexity. Very few people can understand the technical aspects. The Administration, moreover, to protect its confidential diplomacy, has refused to disclose the allegations publicly. Thus, information is provided, for the most part, in a contentious way by critics such as Admiral Zumwalt, or in highly selective and incomplete briefings by Administration officials.

"We interpret the reference in Article Four," the American delegation to the negotiations said in April, 1972, "to 'additionally agreed test ranges'

to mean that ABM components will not be located at any other test ranges without prior agreement between the governments that there will be such additional ABM test ranges." United States ABM ranges are at White Sands, N.M., and at Kwajalein Atoll in the Pacific.

No Soviet Yes or No

The Russians, however, did not confirm or deny the American statement, merely replying on May 5, 1972, that "national means permitted identifying current test ranges."

Presumably, the new radar in Kamchatka would be useful to monitor Soviet long-range offensive missiles that are fired regularly either from Kazakhstan or Siberia, land in Kamchatka or go over it and end up in the Pacific Ocean.

The Saryagan range has been used in the past to monitor Soviet intermediate-range missiles fired from a test site east of Volgograd, officials said.

What trouble American officials is whether there is proof that the Russians have built a new ABM test range in Kamchatka or whether they have merely modernized an old one. There have always been old-fashioned dish-shaped radars in Kamchatka; the Russians could say that it always was an ABM test range and thus permissible.

It has also been charged that

the Russians have replaced their light missile, the SS-11, with a much larger weapon, the SS-19, after both sides had agreed not to convert light-missile launchers into heavy ones.

Two years ago the Russians began digging underground works identical to their missile silos, in possible violation of the treaty's prohibition against new missile silos. But the Soviet Union said the 150 to 200 new silos were for command-control centers, and American intelligence accepted that explanation. The Russians have also been accused of covering up work on submarine construction and on mobile missile launchers, contravening the accord.

In turn, the United States has been charged by the Russians with covering up some Minuteman missile sites while new concrete was being poured. The accords called on each side not to impede the ability of the other to check on compliance.

Admiral Zumwalt also charged this week that the Russians had begun interfering in other ways with American satellites flying over the Soviet Union, but Administration officials denied that American capabilities had been impaired.

Thursday, Dec. 4, 1975

THE WASHINGTON POST

Schlesinger Backs A Wary Detente

By Murrey Marder

Washington Post Staff Writer

Former Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger said yesterday that the United States must pursue detente "without illusion" that the Soviet Union is prepared to live peacefully with the West.

"To the contrary," Schlesinger told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Soviet leaders "have indicated that detente is itself a reflection of their growing military power, which in their interpretation has forced concessions from the West."

A detente policy is desirable to try to reduce political tension, but "strictly on the basis of mutuality," he said. Schlesinger warned that "concessions granted in order to elicit future goodwill will fail in that objective."

This was Schlesinger's first public testimony since he was fired by President Ford on Nov. 2. The reasons given for his dismissal included Schlesinger's differences with Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger about the conduct of

detente policy.

Schlesinger spoke in philosophical vein yesterday without personal recrimination, although his differences with Kissinger on approach to the Soviet Union were evident. Schlesinger repeated the same points yesterday afternoon in an address to the Pacem in Terris conference at the Sheraton-Park Hotel, where he was paired against Pentagon critic Rep. Les Aspin (D-Wis.).

Before the Senate committee, Schlesinger said he saw no evidence that Kissinger withheld from President Ford information about alleged Soviet violations of 1972 nuclear arms accords.

Retired Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt told a House committee on Tuesday that there were "gross violations" by the Soviet Union, and that President Ford was "badly briefed" by Kissinger about them.

Schlesinger, in response to questions by Sen. Clifford P.

Case (R-N.J.) said, "I would be inclined, until I see evidence, to disagree." He said information about the allegations was known to only a few officials, but "the President was aware of the alleged violations."

He said the Soviet Union "clearly stretched" interpretations of the agreement, exploited "ambiguities," and one action "could be interpreted as a violation." Schlesinger said that was "the use of radar in an ABM (anti-ballistic missile) mode."

Soviet deployment of the heavy SS-19 missile was "not a violation of the treaty," Schlesinger said, but "may have been a violation of the spirit of the treaty."

John Trattner, a State Department spokesman speaking for Kissinger said yesterday: "We have no evidence that there have been any violations of the SALT I agreement."

Schlesinger reiterated to the Senate committee his con-

tion that the United States is endangered by the Soviet Union's swiftly growing military power. He again said that the Soviet Union by the 1980s can overtake present U.S. advantages in numbers of nuclear warheads and missile accuracy.

"Given the current configuration of world power, he said, "it is our historic destiny to be the guardian of freedom."

Several members of the generally pro-detente Foreign Relations Committee disputed Schlesinger's "historic destiny" theme. The sparsely attended hearing, however, was never acrimonious, and speakers on both sides often were barely audible.

Schlesinger said he agrees with the need "to control the wholly needless expansion of the strategic nuclear forces on both sides, which continue to grow without in any way augmenting security." His prime concern, he said, is "the dwindling of American conventional power" which "forces us in the direction of greater reliance on the threat of nuclear response."

At the Pacem in Terris conference, Schlesinger echoed his theme that if the United States is strong enough to resist Soviet "exploitation" of detente, in time the two nations may move toward "a live-and-let-live policy." This,

Schlesinger said, would be "true detente."

Aspin countered that the so-called "spending gap," through which the Soviet Union is allegedly out-distancing the United States in military expansion, "is in its own way as phoney as the

missile gap of the early 1960s."

In addition, as a result of tension between the Soviet Union and China, Aspin said, 23 of the 31 divisions added by the Soviet Union in the last seven years "have gone to the Chinese border."

Aspin maintained, "The question is not 'How much are the Russians spending?'" but, "How much is enough for the defense of this country and its vital interests?"

WASHINGTON STAR
2 5 NOV 1975

The war of Moynihan's tongue

It was inevitable that Ambassador Pat Moynihan's blunt diplomatic style would become controversial at the United Nations. This war of Moynihan's tongue, as one might call it, has been brewing for weeks. Its intensification — now that the British ambassador to that body has compared Mr. Moynihan to Wyatt Earp and King Lear — gives us yet another opportunity to express our enthusiasm and support for the ambassador.

We are aware that deft circumlocution is a more customary norm in diplomatic language. Nations having vital business to transact do not, for good reason, clobber one another every day with ripe words from Roget.

But what is going on at the General Assembly these days is not diplomacy. Unlike the Security Council and some of the UN's specialized agencies, the General Assembly has no vital business to transact. Its agenda is crowded with symbolic issues. It is not deliberative; most of the voting is done in predictable blocs. Its voting system, in which nonentities like Byelorussia have equal weight with the U. S., is the ultimate parody of the majority principle. *Faute de mieux*, the General Assembly has turned more and more to theater. Its idea of a high old good time is to bring before the assembled nations a posturing blowhard like Yassir Arafat or Idi Amin, and to hang upon his words as if he were a Winston Churchill or a George Washington — or even a Solomon. Indeed, that shrewd political realist Nikita Khrushchev caught the drift of things at the UN years ago when, failing to register sufficiently with words, he commenced banging the table with a shoe.

The professional diplomatic community in this city and elsewhere, having a certain vested interest in quiet diplomacy, has not yet reconciled itself to General Assembly theater. It is reluctant to part with the pleasure of meek submission to rabid speeches and resolutions that contravene every political and social value the Charter is supposed to represent.

This may explain why Mr. Moynihan, whose working principle is to tell the truth even when

it hurts, has become the target of an intrigue to banish him to the decent obscurity of Harvard. The selection of the United Kingdom's UN Ambassador, Mr. Ivor Richard, as its spearcarrier is a bit odd, of course. Mr. Richard is described to us as a Labor Party politician of no special consequence, but it is remarkable that his superiors in London unleashed him. It must be disconcerting to Mr. Moynihan, as it is to us, to see good friends running for cover during the shootout.

But we think it would be a great misfortune if Mr. Moynihan lost heart and quit, as he came near doing last Friday. The only grievance against him is that he is saying what has needed saying for years, and saying it with the bite and passion to make himself heard even in the din of Turtle Bay.

Indeed, his recent sayings do an undeserved service to the General Assembly — a service probably recognized as such by a number of delegates who are in no position to make their silent approval clear.

It is the counsel of despair to think that the General Assembly is beyond redemption. Enjoying as it does a certain importance in the world, the General Assembly should not be allowed to sink into absurdity and irrelevance. It is, if you want to put a label on it, neo-colonialism at its most condescending to take the view that since the views of some UN majorities are fatuous, they should be heard in timid silence.

Ambassador Moynihan takes the view that what is said and done at the General Assembly does matter — that if its words and acts go unanswered they may give a color of respect to causes and principles which this country fundamentally opposes.

We take the same view, and we are glad that Mr. Moynihan is there to speak for the silent millions. He should not conclude that because our friends in London are momentarily shell-shocked by the sound of eggshells popping it is time to give up and go home. And we are glad that President Ford has emphasized that view to Mr. Moynihan this week.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, DECEMBER 1, 1975

Schlesinger and Kissinger

By Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn

ZURICH—I shall never forget, when President Kennedy was assassinated, the pain we felt for America and the bewilderment and disillusionment experienced by the many former soldiers in World War II and former inmates in Soviet camps and prisons.

It was all the worse because of the inability or the lack of desire by the American judicial authorities to uncover the assassins and to clear up the crime.

We had the feeling that powerful, open-handed and generous America, so boundlessly partial to freedom, had been smeared in the face with dirt, and the feeling persisted. Something more than respect was shaken— it was our faith.

Despite the dissimilarity of events, I had a very comparable feeling at the time of the abrupt dismissal of Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger, a man of steadfast, perceptive and brilliant mind. Once again, the feeling was that America had been insulted.

I realize that President Ford acted in full conformity with the Constitution. But woe betide a system in which it is sufficient and expedient to govern guided only by one's personal or party's election interests.

There is something higher than jurisdiction, and that is decency. There is something beyond juridical right, and that is good sense. There should at least be decency toward one's allies. After all, the Secretary of Defense is not merely a member of the American Government. He is in fact also responsible for the defense of the entire free world.

It would have been a friendly act first to have received consent from the allies. As for good sense, this involves the way things are handled. A leap-frog succession of officials in such a post can only impair the defense of the country. (It was noted who was pleased by the dismissal).

There are rumors that the dismissal was linked to another name. It is an irony of history that the two names almost rhyme.

When I was in the United States last summer, I avoided direct questions from the press on assessing the character of Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger. But his present triumph and the blinding misinformation being spread to this day about his activities compel me to speak out bluntly.

Defending his policy of unending concessions, Mr. Kissinger repeats the one and same argument almost like an incantation: "Let our critics point out the alternative to nuclear war!" More than anything, it is this phrase that exposes the nature of Mr. Kissinger; in particular, it exposes that he is least of all a diplomat.

"Alter" in Latin means "other (of two)." An alternative is a choice between two possibilities. This is a scientific concept, but even scientific situations often allow a much broader choice. But diplomacy is not a sci-

ence. It is an art, one of the arts concerning the nature of man. To construct diplomacy on an "alternative" is to put it on the lowest and crudest level.

An art does not recognize alternatives within itself; it would fall apart if it developed only on the basis of two possibilities. No, in every instance art has a thousand choices. Every art has a spectrum, a keyboard of possibilities. From ancient times to the present, the art of diplomacy has consisted of playing on this keyboard.

How many great diplomats of the past have won negotiations even with empty hands or backed by inadequate power, in circumstances of military weakness, conceding nothing and paying nothing, defeating the opponent only by intellectual and psychological means. That is diplomacy.

Mr. Kissinger endlessly deafens us with the threat "... but otherwise, nuclear war." He obscures the fact that this same nuclear war hangs equally over the head of his opponents (at least as of today, until new successes by Mr. Kissinger).

And in these equal circumstances, under the same threat, his opponents are always winning and he is always yielding. Let him learn something from his opponents—how is it that they operate so successfully in the nuclear age? The answer would be: They study the psychology of Mr. Kissinger.

What an absurdity: The United States was the first to introduce nuclear weapons to the world. Should it because of this have become weaker, and should it because of this surrender its positions in the world?

I dispute not only that Mr. Kissinger has the life experience necessary to understand the psychology of Communist leaders, and as a result sits at the negotiating table as if blindfolded. I also dispute that he is on the high diplomatic intellectual level ascribed to him.

It is not diplomacy to negotiate with a preponderance of power behind one's back, with an abundance of material means in one's pocket, to submit to all participants in the negotiations, to pay them all off and thereby to create unbalanced and temporary grounds for transition to further concessions.

The celebrated Vietnam agreement, the worst diplomatic defeat for the West in 30 years, hypocritically and very conveniently for the aggressor prepared the way for the quiet surrender of three countries in Indochina.

Is it possible that the prominent diplomat could not see what a house of cards he was building? (The Soviet

press, in its rage against Andrei D. Sakharov, damned his Nobel Peace Prize as "the ultimate in political pornography." The press aimed in the wrong direction and was three years too late. This abuse would have been more suitable for the Nobel Prize shared by the aggressor and the capitulator in the Paris agreement.)

A similar alarming feeling of shakiness is aroused by the Middle East agreements of Mr. Kissinger (as far as I know, many Israeli leaders do not regard them any higher), although there has not been the kind of open capitulation to which Vietnam was doomed by the same pen.

Mr. Kissinger does not concede that any concessions whatsoever are being made. Thus, it appears: "The Western countries have not set a goal of ideological détente" (that is, they have not even tried to eradicate the coldest aspect of the cold wars, so what is their goal?). Or as he said on Aug. 15, 1975: "It is not we who were on the defensive in Helsinki." Three months have passed and we ask: If it was not you, who was it?

The very process of surrender of world positions has the character of an avalanche. At every successive stage it becomes more difficult to hold out and one must yield more and more. This is evident in the new conditions across entire continents, in the unprecedented encroachments by the Soviet Union in southwestern Africa and in votes in the United Nations.

Mr. Kissinger always has an emergency exit available to him. He can transfer to a university to lecture to credulous youngsters about the art of diplomacy. But the Government of the United States (just as those youngsters) will have no emergency exit.

There is another favorite argument by Mr. Kissinger: In the nuclear age, we shall not forget that peace, too, "is a moral imperative." Yes, that is true and not only in the nuclear age (indeed, this nuclear age is an obsession for Mr. Kissinger) but only if one correctly understands peace as the opposite of violence and does not consider Cambodian genocide and Vietnamese prison camps as the attainment of peace.

But a peace that tolerates any ferocious forms of violence and any massive doses of it against millions of people—just so long as this does not affect us for several years yet—such a peace, alas, has no moral loftiness even in the nuclear age.

Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn, the dissident Soviet writer now in exile, won the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1970. This article was translated from the Russian by Raymond H. Anderson.

Near East

NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 28, 1975

U.S. and Lebanon: Echoes of 1958

By JAMES M. MARKHAM
Special to The New York Times

BEIRUT, Lebanon, Nov. 26—As would-be mediators from the Vatican, France and the United Nations come and go, the American role in the Lebanese crisis has been obscured.

Moreover, that role remains a subject of speculation and controversy because of the overt support for the Prime Minister, a Moslem, and of questions about the supplying of guns to Christians.

In 1958, shortly after United States marines landed on Beirut's beaches in the midst of a civil war, they established liaison with a highly disciplined Christian party called the Phalangists Libanaises, which was thought to be the bedrock of anti-Communism in Lebanon. The Americans reportedly furnished the Phalangists with weapons and a radio transmitter.

An identity of interests was created—at least in the Arab mind—that the Americans are still living with. Times have changed, though, and today the hardly disguised official policy of the United States Government is sympathetic toward the Prime Minister, Rashid Karami, who is a centrist, and chilly toward President Suleiman Franjeh, a Christian allied with the Phalangists.

Signal from Kissinger

The policy was signaled on Nov. 6 in a letter from Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger—conspicuously addressed to Mr. Karami, not to Mr. Franjeh, and made public by the embassy—that said: "I want you to know that my Government very much hopes to see an end to the fighting in Lebanon and fully supports your Government in its efforts to bring this about."

Then, in an apparent bow to Moslem demands for modification of the requirement of Moslem-Christian balance, Mr. Kissinger wished Mr. Karami "well in your effort to encourage all concerned to show the moderation and spirit of compromise that would seem to be necessary if there is to be an end to the violence and the commencement of a process of political accommodation leading to a new basis of stability with security for all your countrymen."

Mr. Karami has been the champion of gradual change in Lebanon's political system, which has the effect of giving a predominant role to the Christian community though it is now a minority. American officials do not hide their belief that it is partly the intransigence of some Christian leaders, including the President, that is blocking reform.

Infrequent Contacts
The letter is said to have outraged Mr. Franjeh, who has been irritated at the American Government since last year, when narcotics detectives, leading specially trained dogs, inspected the luggage of his entourage when he arrived in New York to address the United Nations General Assembly.

Americans Still Try to Live Down Old Phalangist Link
American Ambassador, G. McMurtrie Godley, see each other infrequently. However, Mr. Godley is on good terms with Mr. Karami and is a friend of Raymond Edde, a Christian centrist who would like to succeed Mr. Franjeh next year.

A lively conversationalist, Mr. Godley, in what appeared to be a series of calculated indiscretions, aired his feelings on the remains of the cocktail and dinner circuit. Beirut is a

small town; such signals are not missed.

Though the Americans seem to be backing Mr. Karami, their policy remains the subject of some mystery as well as controversy because it is not clear whether they are arming the Phalangists or some favored faction in the Christian camp. American officials insist that their hands are clean—that the days of 1958 are over. The United States interest in Lebanon, they maintain, is that it should remain stable since instability endangers the much larger enterprise of Mr. Kissinger's painstaking Middle Eastern diplomacy. If Syria and Israel were to come to blows in Lebanon, the Sinai agreement between the Israelis and Egyptians and other accords still in embryo would be shattered.

This assessment is widely accepted by European diplomats and others essentially sympathetic to American policy in the Middle East.

Third World's Assessment
Another view, sometimes voiced by third world diplomats, is that the Americans need the Phalangists to keep the Palestinian guerrilla movement preoccupied and on the defensive, so it is less likely to upset Mr. Kissinger's diplomacy.

Partisans of the second school of thought recall a quickly forgotten incident last July, when Representative Lea Aspin, Democrat of Wisconsin, pointed an accusing finger at a Lebanese representative of Colt Industries named Sarkis G. Soghanalian, who had received embassy and State Department approval for the sale of \$250,000 worth of handguns and ammunition to unspecified clients here.

Mr. Soghanalian, who is known to have contacts on the Lebanese right, denied that he had intended to sell the weapons to the Phalangists, the Palestinians or any of the growing private armies. Nonetheless, a State Department official assured a reporter that the 2,000 Colt pistols were destined for "responsible elements—that is, Christian elements."

That was before the factional conflict exploded into a conflagration that has taken at least 4,000 lives and assumed international dimensions. It was also before the Sinai disengagement accord and before a marked evolution in official American thinking on the Palestinian question, which culminated two weeks ago in the testimony of Harold H. Saunders, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, who said: "The issue is not whether Palestinian interests should be expressed in a final settlement, but how. There will be no peace until an answer is found."

'Hard-Liners Have Lost Out'
This attitude, which has unsettled the Israelis, has not been lost on the Palestine Liberation Organization nor on other Arabs who closely follow American decisions.

"I think the hard-liners have lost out," an Arab diplomat who knows the United States said of Lebanon. "I think the Americans have decided to back the mainstream rather than to try to profit from the divisions in Lebanon for short-term gains."

"I wouldn't call it a constructive attitude," he continued, "but at least it's not divisive."

A well-placed Palestinian guerrilla echoed the theme: "We are even hearing that the Americans are not selling guns to the Phalangists," he said. "If it is a fact that the Americans are not arming the conservatives or sanctioning indirect sales, the United States may begin to shake off the image that has stuck since 1958. But a number of skeptics remain to be convinced that it is not sanctioning gun sales here still."

Christian Science Monitor
4 December 1975

Israel grows wary U.S. may desert it

Accommodation with
PLO urged by some

By Francis Ofner
Special correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

142

Jerusalem

There is a crisis in relations between Israel and the United States.

Israelis are more apprehensive than ever about being deserted by the U.S. on the issue of the Palestinians.

They were alarmed when the U.S. last weekend let go through the Security Council an agreement that they bitterly opposed because it included an invitation to the

Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to a special council debate on the Middle East scheduled for Jan. 12.

They were not assuaged by the U.S. — in a note to the Soviet Union Tuesday — proposing a preparatory meeting, from which the PLO would be excluded, to discuss reconvening the Middle East peace conference at Geneva (as distinct from the Security Council). In any case, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko lost no time in rejecting the U.S. proposal later Tuesday.

Things may well be brought to a head long before Jan. 12. Egypt has taken the initiative at the UN to have the PLO represented in the immediate Security Council debate which the

Lebanese are seeking after Tuesday's Israeli air raids on Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon said in Israel to be guerrilla centers.

For Israelis, the key and agonizing question now is: What price will the U.S. extract from Israel for a U.S. veto of any future Security Council resolution deemed inimical to Israel, particularly on the PLO issue?

Israeli Foreign Ministry sources here assume that Israel could expect an American veto for a resolution that would:

1. Expressly recognize the PLO before the PLO has recognized Israel and undertaken to live in peace with it, or

2. Impose on Israel by force a solution to the Israeli-Arab dispute.

Indeed, that much emerges from a cable that President Ford sent to Israeli Premier Yitzhak Rabin on Dec. 2.

But the Israeli diplomats who maintain daily contacts with the State Department and the White House still expect to be asked by Washington to pay a price for a veto.

Because of this, something has started to

move on the Israeli side on the Palestine issue. Mr. Rabin, as well as his Minister of Defense, Shimon Peres, are still against any recognition of the PLO — even if it were first to recognize Israel.

But contrary opinions now are being heard in growing volume. In the Cabinet itself, several ministers favor a change of position. They include Justice Minister Chaim Zadok, Housing Minister Avraham Ofer, and Health Minister Victor Shemtov. Foreign Minister Yigal Allon is somewhere between Mr. Rabin and this ministerial group.

At the weekly Cabinet meeting last Sunday, it was decided to discuss the question of "new foreign policy initiatives" at one of the next meetings. Unofficially it was confirmed that by "initiatives" was meant Israel's approach to the PLO.

David Anable reports from the United Nations:

Israel is under extreme pressure here. And now, ironically, Israel's air raids on Palestinian refugee camps Tuesday have precipitated

the very issue against which—the raids are thought partly to have been in protest — participation of the PLO in a Security Council debate.

That had been expected Jan. 12 at the earliest, but Egypt moved Wednesday to have the PLO represented at the immediate Security Council meeting requested by Lebanon to discuss the raids.

The Arab aim is to drive a wedge between Israel and the United States, not least over acceptance of a role for the PLO.

This week the Israelis were under fire here in yet another General Assembly debate on the Middle East as well as in nearly all the Assembly's seven committees.

"You can move from committee to committee today," said Israeli Ambassador Chaim Herzog to his General Assembly audience, "and you will discover that this obsession with Israel, which has been imposed upon you, has become a mania which has by now perverted this organization into . . . a body which is rapidly losing any vestige of credibility in the eyes of decent people."

Monday, November 24, 1975

The Washington Star

Garry Wills

Why U.S. should fight 'new racist crusade'

Is there racism in Israel? Unquestionably. It is a nation made up of human beings, and one of the most persistent of the human vices is racial antagonism. There is a prejudice against Arabs within Israel's original borders, and a denial of civil rights to those within the occupied territories.

But Israel's record of racial prejudice is positively angelic next to America's. Our treatment of Indians, blacks, the Nisei, Puerto Ricans, Chicanos has been despicable in the past and has risen, in recent years, to a level merely bad. But remember that, with only one exception (the Nisei), our prejudice was loosed on people who were not allied to enemies in war time.

Israelis have been fighting Arabs, off and on, for 30 years, and there is a long history of cultural antagonism before that. This had to affect the treatment of Arabs within the Israeli nation. But this treatment has been so careful that one of the charges often made is that Israelis patronize the Arabs by demanding less of them!

If the General Assembly were to vote that Americans are racist, the charge would have a great deal of truth to it. But it would be hypocritical and irrelevant. It would not be mounted by people with records much better. It would not help us

or anyone wipe out the remaining stains of racism in our country.

Then why the equivalent assault on Israel? Because the assault is not equivalent. The General Assembly was not attacking Israel for the incidental traces of racism in its practice. It was attacking the very basis of the State of Israel's existence. It was saying that Israelis had no right to the ingathering of their persecuted brothers within the sanctuary of Israel.

The monstrous reversals in this General Assembly vote are hard to exaggerate. Israel was founded as an asylum for the principal victims of racism in this century. It took its origin, in large part, as a remedy to racism at its worst. Yet for trying to escape the racism of centuries of European practice, it is now called racist.

And those great defenders of racial equality, who voted for the General Assembly resolution, are themselves renewing the very racism that led to Israel's foundation. They are proscribing a whole country — not its faults or correctable practices, but its very reason for being.

In doing this, they proscribe as well a whole people, each member of the Jewish faith no matter where he or she lives. The connection of any Jew to Israel's hopes will be used to

call the individual Jew a racist, and to deny his or her civil rights in other countries.

The response of Congress was entirely in order. The President spoke too soon when he said we should not even consider pulling out of the U.N. That is exactly what we must consider, very cautiously but very thoroughly. Moreover, the President should order Rogers Morton to stop playing games with Commerce Department information on the Arab boycott. We should make sure that our aid and trade with other countries in no way lends de facto assistance to the racists' campaign against the State of Israel.

Anti-Semitism has been in the world a very long time; yet the shocked response to Hitler's obscenities offered us hope that we would see its demise in our lifetime. There has been motion toward the realization of that hope — e.g., in the way Christian churches have expunged the remains of prejudice against the Jews from their theology and liturgies.

That is why it comes as such a blow to see the force and reach of the new anti-Semitism expressed in that vote of the General Assembly. Whatever obstacles we can place in the path of this new racist crusade, we are obliged to place there, while seeking peace for all mankind.

Africa

Los Angeles Times Sun., Nov. 23, 1975

Is U.S. Being Drawn Into

BY GERALD J. BENDER

Angolan Conflict?

The American withdrawal from Southeast Asia unleashed a spate of national soul-searching. Americans began to ask themselves and their government uncomfortable but long overdue questions concerning the origin of U.S. involvement, the dynamics of escalation, the covert war-making powers of the executive branch, and the perception of U.S. interests abroad, and assured themselves that no such venture would happen again.

Yet something similar is happening again. Once again the United States

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is involved in a foreign civil war, this time in the newly independent African nation Angola.

While publicly the State Department either denies or refuses to comment on allegations of American involvement in Angola, the CIA has been quietly intervening. The pattern is familiar, but there is one major difference: The Administration and the CIA have not been able to hide their activities from the American people.

Earlier this month while Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger was strongly condemning the "extra-continental" interference in Angola, William Colby, the lame duck director of the CIA, and Joseph Sisco, undersecretary of state, told a closed session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the CIA has been covertly supplying two of the contending Angolan parties with rifles, machine guns, vehicles, ammunition and logistical support.

What are the origins of the Angolan war, which has prevented the emergence of a unified nation and claimed between 20,000 and 30,000 lives in 1975? What are U.S. interests in the area? How did the United States become involved and why?

Ethnic, racial, class, regional, and ideological differences divide the three Angolan nationalist movements—the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the Nationalist Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), and the Nationalist Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). In addition, an intense distrust and personal animosity exist among the movements' leaders.

Each of the movements draws most of its supporters from one of three major ethno-linguistic regions. The FNLA is located among the approximately 700,000 Kikongo speaking peoples of the northwest; the MPLA has traditionally received support from the 1.3 million Kimbundu speakers in the north-central part of the country around the capital Luanda; and UNITA is firmly based among the more than 2 million Ovimbundu in central Angola.

Angolan nationalists were never able to form a common front during the 14 years of armed struggle against Portuguese colonialism. The principal rivals have been the MPLA and FNLA, whose relative strengths vacillated throughout the colonial war as well as during the past year. At the time of the Portuguese coup in April, 1974, the FNLA was almost universally acknowledged to have the largest and best equipped army.

The FNLA has received most of its arms and training from Angola's northern neighbor, Zaire, whose President Mobutu apparently feels that the best means of securing his 1,300 mile border with Angola would be to have his brother-in-law, FNLA President Holden Roberto, at the helm of government. Since 1973, the FNLA has also received considerable arms, money, and military training from the Chinese who, fearing the MPLA's growing dependence upon Russian assistance, have thus extended the Sino-Soviet rivalry to Angola.

The MPLA turned to its foreign supporters for help in avoiding an FNLA onslaught. Russia, which had been the principal supplier of arms and money during the long colonial struggle, enthusiastically responded along with Yugoslavia, Cuba, and a number of African countries.

By late spring of this year, the frequent minor clashes between the two nationalist movements grew into an all-out war. By the end of September the MPLA controlled 12 of the country's 16 district capitals.

The third movement, UNITA, which has received the least amount of external aid and is consequently the weakest militarily, tried to stay out of the fight between the other two movements. But neutrality was possible only for so long; UNITA had to choose to fight with one group or the other to avoid being crushed by them.

Ideologically, UNITA is closer to the MPLA, but now has thrown its lot in with the FNLA. One important

reason for UNITA's decision is that the party could obtain weapons from the FNLA's patrons (e.g. Zaire, China, the CIA, France and South Africa) while the Russians and other MPLA suppliers had little interest in arming a potential rival. Angola is at war and UNITA, above all, wants arms.

For the past two months, the combined forces of the FNLA and UNITA—with considerable help from Portuguese, South African, Rhodesian and French mercenaries (many of whom admittedly fought in Biafra)—have dislodged the MPLA from most of the territory it held in the central and southern regions of the country. According to one State Department analyst, "These white troops have made the difference and turned the war around."

The introduction of white mercenaries into the conflict seriously escalated the war. In only three weeks they moved 600 miles with tanks and armored cars from Angola's southern border. They are now close to Luanda, the MPLA stronghold, and threaten to provide Holden Roberto with the necessary firepower to carry out his vow to "flatten the capital." To stave off this threat, Cuba and Mozambique reportedly have sent between 2,000 and 3,000 troops to help the MPLA defend the capital.

The alliance between the FNLA and UNITA is tenuous and destined to collapse if they ever defeat the MPLA. UNITA was initially founded in the mid-1960s by dissident members of the FNLA, led by UNITA President Jonas Savimbi, who once served as FNLA President Holden Roberto's foreign minister. Savimbi charged at the time of his break with Roberto that the movement was dominated by one man (Roberto) and "flagrant tribalism." He has repeated similar charges during the decade which has followed, including only a few months ago.

In fact, after almost 20 years, Holden Roberto has been unable to delegate meaningful authority or to attract significant non-Bakongo cadres. Moreover, at the outset of the colonial war in 1961, the principal victims of Bakongo attacks were thousands of Ovimbundu coffee plantation workers. When the FNLA assumed almost total control of northern Angola in the fall of 1974, one of their first acts was to expell 60,000 Ovimbundu working on the coffee estates. Today the tension between the two groups is manifest in Huambo—the capital of the FNLA-UNITA newly

proclaimed Popular and Democratic Republic of Angola—where UNITA and FNLA soldiers have frequently been exchanging gunfire. Unless Angola is partitioned, it is highly probable that the FNLA and UNITA will meet as enemies, not allies, on a future battlefield.

U.S. covert support for the FNLA and UNITA has been largely indirect and disbursed mainly through neighboring Zaire. Zaire has supplied arms and equipment from its own forces which the United States has been replenishing. In fact, Zaire turned over so much materiel to the FNLA over the past 12 months that President Mobutu was forced to tell Holden Roberto in late May or early June that he could spare no more. Furthermore, the Chinese warned Roberto about the same time that they could promise no further military aid beyond 1975. The Zairian and Chinese warnings to Roberto, which coincided with some of the MPLA's most impressive victories, apparently worried Kissinger, since it appears that U.S. covert aid to the FNLA increased substantially this past summer.

In addition to using Zaire as a conduit for covert aid, the State Department is trying to persuade Congress to agree to a more than five-fold increase in overt military assistance to Zaire (from \$3.5 million to \$19 million), and a three-fold increase in economic aid (from \$20 to \$60 million).

The drop in the price of copper and the increase in the price of oil are two important factors, along with the heavy burden of the intervention in Angola, that resulted in a major economic crisis which caused Zaire to default on over \$8 million in loans during the past two months. U.S. firms have about \$750 million invested in Zaire, which could be jeopardized if this crisis continues. Kissinger sees Mobutu as one of Washington's strongest allies in opposing Russian interests in Africa, and therefore he would like to help him out of his difficult economic circumstances. If the war continues, the United States probably will have to assume an ever-increasing role as the supplier of military equipment.

U.S. involvement in this civil war appears aimed at preventing the MPLA from exercising power in Angola, in the belief that the party's advocacy of socialism and its heavy dependence on the Soviet Union for arms and financial support imply that it is a danger to U.S. "interests."

But what are American interests in the area: Economic? Strategic? Diplomatic?

The total value of fixed U.S. investment in Angola is very small—under \$70 million, the overwhelming majority of which comes from one company, Gulf Oil Corp. Ironically, and significantly, Gulf does not appear to share Kissinger's or Colby's fear of the MPLA. Saydi Mingas, the MPLA finance minister in the transitional government, recently remarked in Washington that relations

between his party and Gulf were "very good." The company does not perceive the MPLA to constitute a greater threat to its operations than the FNLA or UNITA. The oil company is concerned about U.S. intervention—a concern which has been quietly communicated to the State Department.

Does the United States have strategic interests in Angola? In a 1970 National Security Council study (NSSM 39), Kissinger argued that the United States had no strategic interests there. Colby made it clear in his recent testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the United States still perceives no strategic interests at stake in Angola.

Is the United States then interested in scoring diplomatic victories through its Angolan involvement? Sen. Richard C. Clark (D-Iowa), chairman of the Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Africa, argues that rather than bolstering American diplomatic efforts in Africa, we are alienating a number of African leaders. Moreover, Kissinger has little support for his policy within his own African bureau. After a thorough review of the Angolan situation within the State Department this past June, the bureau almost unanimously recommended that the United States stay out of the conflict.

If no solid case can be made to support American intervention to protect economic, strategic or diplomatic interests in Angola, why has the United States become involved in the Angolan tragedy? "To stop Soviet domination," Administration officials argue in an accent which has a decidedly cold war, rather than detente, ring to it.

Unquestionably an MPLA-dominated Angola would be more sympathetic to the Soviet Union than to the United States. After all, the Russians gave them the means to resist Portuguese colonialism which had been tacitly supported by the United States. Moreover, some leaders consider themselves marxists, which places them closer to Soviet, not American, perceptions of the world. But does this really spell Soviet domination? Does this really justify putting millions of dollars worth of American weapons into the hands of other An-

golans and white mercenaries?

Similar concerns were recently expressed about Soviet aid and marxist rhetoric in Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique, but neither country has shown signs of Russian domination. In fact, FRELIMO already has demonstrated its independence from the Soviet Union on at least two important issues in recent months. And Idi Amin's recent rupture with Moscow should have put to rest the myth that Russian arms are tantamount to Russian domination. It is a dangerous trap to measure the politics of African leaders by the source of their arms. Pride is a more reliable guide.

No American official has suggested that Chinese arms to the FNLA or the flattery bestowed upon China by Holden Roberto indicates that he or his party are Maoists. Nor has it been suggested that South African arms to UNITA bind them to a support of apartheid. Neither can it be argued that CIA support of both groups guarantees they will be friends of the United States in the future. Both UNITA's Savimbi and FNLA's Roberto have strongly attacked the United States in the past and they will undoubtedly do it again in the future.

Rather than emulating the familiar course of intervention and escalation in Vietnam, the United States should take a second look at Angola. If detente still has any meaning, the United States should be exhausting all diplomatic means to reach an accord with the Soviet Union to reduce the level of violence, rather than jointly raising it.

As long as the major powers in conjunction with dozens of secondary powers pursue policies of unilateral intervention instead of multilateral reconciliation, any hope for peace in Angola remains dim. Until the Russians, Chinese and Americans can agree to end this war by proxy, the carnage in Angola will continue. The cessation of international intervention is no guarantee that Angolans will reconcile their differences, but it would at least afford them the opportunity to try to resolve these differences at the conference table and not on the battlefield.

WASHINGTON POST
2 6 NOV 1975

A Russian 'Vietnam'?

THE MOST IMPORTANT political event of the year in the Third World is the Kremlin's burgeoning intervention in the Angolan civil war. Nothing faintly like it has been seen since the period 10 years ago when the United States started sinking deeply into the quagmire of Vietnam. Now as then, a great power is committing military supplies and manpower to help a favored client in a local struggle for power. Now as then, the other great power is coming more or less reluctantly to the support of the other side. It is, frankly, inconceivable, that the Russians will end up putting half a million men ashore in Angola. But already they seem to have furnished some hundreds of "advisers," plus tens of millions of dollars in military

supplies, plus a few thousand Cuban proxies to take a role in or at least near the actual battle. From a random and intermittent guerrilla conflict, the struggle in Angola has become—thanks mostly to Moscow—the most savage war currently going on in the world.

What is behind this rampant Soviet adventurism? Why has the Kremlin gone halfway to the South Pole to all but openly commit its prestige to the fortunes of a rather routine African politician, the Popular Movement's Agostinho Neto, who may or may not remain a loyal client when—or if—he establishes real power? Angola does offer certain conventional great-power lures: a good Atlantic port opening on the sea lanes around the Cape, oil and minerals in apparently plentiful quantities, the opportunity to stick a thumb in China's eye. One wonders, though, if the real point of Soviet policy is not something else. Moscow perhaps sees a post-Vietnam international setting in which its own power is waxing and American power, or American resolve, is on the wane. Angola may be a test case to establish how much Soviet intervention the international traffic will now bear.

Since Angola is important in itself, and since the Soviet performance does suggest an experiment in power-flexing, it makes a difference how the United States responds. We would not want this country to stand idly by

while the Russians play out their imperialistic game. That would be an invitation to further power plays. But we doubt the need and correctness of getting back into covert competition with Moscow, as the United States—so far with uncertain results—is in fact doing in Angola. The United States would do better to come before the international community with clean hands, produce the evidence of Soviet intervention, and use the means of diplomacy and public pressure to call on the Russians to go home. Surely some members of the Third World understand their own self-interest in discouraging great-power military interventions. Secretary of State Kissinger was entirely correct to warn the other day that Soviet intervention in Angola is inconsistent with professions of detente.

Alternately, the President could consider leveling with the American people. He could, for instance, send up a message to Congress saying that it matters, for the following good strategic, economic and political reasons, which group of Angolans runs Angola, and that the United States should consider supporting a modest open program to give a little help to its friends. Why not? If the case for support cannot survive disclosure and debate, then let that be the end of it. Meanwhile, the important thing to do is to keep the eyes of the world sharply focused on exactly what the Russians are up to in Angola.

Friday, November 21, 1975

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

Angola: rising East-West test

By Joseph C. Harsch

Suddenly — the great powers are focused on Angola.

A year ago it was just another Portuguese colony.

Today, it is the cockpit of nations.

Russian trucks, tanks, guns, planes, "advisers" and pilots are reported seen in Luanda, capital of the Soviet supported MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola).

American planes are reported landing cargoes of guns at Kinshasa in neighboring Zaire. From there they are reported going to the northern forces of the combined National Front/Unita groups which control both the northern and southern parts of Angola. British pilots are reported flying men and weapons to the southern National Front/Unita forces.

Western correspondents are getting as fast as possible to Huambo (formerly Nova Lisboa) which has been designated as the capital and command center for the National Front/Unita forces. They report white troops speaking with a South African accent, Americans training local troops, and military equipment of American and West European manufacture.

News reports suggest that the military supplies going to the northern anti-Soviet forces are following the same supply line from Belgium to Kinshasa which was used during the civil war in the former Belgian Congo. Supplies to the Soviet-supported MPLA are supposed to have come by sea. Supplies to the southern anti-Soviet front presumably come from and through South Africa or through Zambia.

Cuban troops are said to have arrived in Luanda. The Chinese are giving sympathetic support to the anti-Soviet side. This aligns the Chinese with both Americans and South Africans.

For an explanation, pull out your map of Africa and note that Soviet naval forces based at Luanda, or any other of the several good harbors of Angola, would be on the flank of the oil supply line which carries Persian Gulf oil to Europe. The great tankers must go around the Cape. The Suez Canal is not deep enough. West Europe's industrial fabric would come to a halt in a few weeks if anything ever cut off that flow of oil.

Soviet naval forces have a protected harbor on the Somali coast at Berbera. They also enjoy harbor facilities at Conakry in Guinea. So far, they have no naval facilities on either side of the southern part of Africa. A base at Luanda would be of only marginal value to their North Atlantic submarine patrols, but would make it possible for their surface forces to circle the African continent. This would help them in both the South Pacific and the Indian Ocean.

If the local communists in Portugal and Spain could drive the Americans from the Iberian peninsula, the naval balance of power in both North and South Atlantic would be altered to Moscow's advantage.

For the above reason the Western countries have obviously undertaken a substantial military supply operation to aid the anti-Soviet factions in Angola. It would appear from reports that both sides waited only for the official Portuguese withdrawal from Angola on

Nov. 11 to begin rival supply operations. Both seem to have reached full flood by this past week. There is still the decisive military campaign ahead.

The Soviet-backed MPLA forces are at the moment on the defensive. Their main base is Luanda, but it is almost on the firing line.

Everything north of Luanda itself is in National Front/Unita hands. The northern anti-Soviet forces claim to hold even the power station which supplies electricity to Luanda itself.

On the southern front the anti-Soviet forces have had a spectacular advance up the sea coast. They have taken nearly 700 miles of coastline and now are within 200 miles of Luanda. They think there is nothing of military importance between their present front at Porto Amboim and the outskirts of Luanda.

The military prospect would seem to be for the southern forces to push on up to the Luanda area and attempt to join their northern allies for the encirclement of Luanda.

Diplomatic observers point out that the Angola affair is a reversal of what had long been the usual pattern in such matters. Previously, American supplies moved openly to anti-communist forces while Moscow supplied its clients indirectly or clandestinely.

In this case Soviet supplies have come ashore at Luanda openly. Aid to the anti-Soviet forces is unofficial, indirect, and more or less clandestine. Newsweek Magazine's correspondent Andrew Jaffe asked a British pilot who had flown him to Huambo from Lusaka who had hired him. He got the facetious reply, "You can say we work for MI6½." (MI6 is British military intelligence.)

The Soviets had the legalistic advantage that their clients were in control of Luanda which had been the Portuguese capital of the whole of Angola. Their movement has been recognized by most countries which tend to vote with Moscow as being the legitimate new government of Angola. Hence they can claim to be backing the legitimists while anti-Soviet forces are backing the rival faction which as yet does not control the old capital.

East Asia

WASHINGTON POST
23 NOV 1975

Jack Anderson

The Threat in Korea

Despite a slight cooling of tensions in Korea, the north's recklessly ambitious Kim Il Sung could rekindle the Korean War at any time.

But General Richard Stilwell, the U.S. commander in Korea, has concluded from computer studies that he has the military power to stop an invasion in its tracks. It would take a blizzard of bombs from Guam-based B-52s, however, to do the job.

These are the findings of Rep. John Murphy, D-N.Y., who has just spent a week in Korea questioning the top commanders and browsing through secret papers. He headed a congressional delegation of Korean War veterans, who returned to their old battleground to assess the danger of a new war.

In a "Personal and Confidential" report to House Speaker Carl Albert, the blunt-spoken Murphy warns tersely: "The problem in the near future is that Kim Il Sung is essentially irrational and could spark a deliberate attack with a resultant massive military response from South Korea."

The U.S. intelligence directorate in the Pacific has a similar opinion of Kim but expresses it in more bureaucratic language. "Kim is a zealous nationalist and a dedicated Communist wholly capable of executing faulty judgements based on misconception," the directorate has stated. "He also suffers from tunnel vision where the Korean peninsula is concerned, and he is not interested in global detente, which can only hinder his goal of reunification by force of arms."

According to Murphy, both China and Russia have a restraining hold upon the impetuous Kim. "It is generally known that since the 'shocks of Spring'—the fall of Saigon and Phnom Penh—Kim has attempted to exploit what he perceived as a weakening U.S. stance in Asia.

"He went to Peking to ask for help, but his adventure was not encouraged there..." Murphy asserts. "Kim is looked upon as unstable by his former ally, the

Republic of China. I do not believe that China is interested in a new war on the Korean Peninsula...

"With a longstanding invitation to visit Moscow, he has (also) attempted to visit Soviet leaders, ostensibly to persuade them to support a move south, whereupon the longstanding invitation was withdrawn."

Nevertheless, Murphy warns that Kim's ties to the two Communist superpowers are sufficiently secure that "in the event Kim unilaterally invades the Republic of Korea, China or Russia would not let North Korea be extinguished."

In Murphy's view, Kim is caught in an economic vise and "his time is running out." Murphy cites the apprehensions of U.S. officials, therefore, that "Kim may think this winter is 'now or never,' and he may go for broke trying to reach Seoul."

Using computers to calculate the moves available to Kim, the U.S. command believes a push down the traditional central invasion routes could be stopped in five days. Therefore, Kim's best bet, the computers indicate, would be to drive down the shorter, northwestern route.

But the computers show that the combined Korean-American forces, with the artillery firepower, tactical air support and B-52 bombing strikes available to them, could stop the North Koreans "in their tracks." Declares Murphy: "The command assumes North Korea could only last from 30 to 60 days without massive aid from their Russian and Chinese allies."

In case of a North Korean attack, Stilwell is prepared for "an immediate, violent and successful response," and he has "supreme confidence" in the South Korean Army which is "well trained and fit."

But Murphy is gravely alarmed over the substandard equipment, which the South Koreans are stuck with. The supplies that the U.S. left behind after the Korean War, he reports, were mostly World War II

vintage and are now "woefully obsolete."

Yet 80 per cent of the military expenditures since 1950, he alleges, "has been used to maintain the old equipment originally left by the U.S. forces."

The result is that "large units" of the South Korean Army "are still equipped with the old M-1 rifles—or no rifles at all—while the North Korean Army is equipped with fully automatic AK-47 rifles."

And half of the South Korean Air Force consists of F86-F sabrejets.

Although the North Koreans have superior equipment, he notes that both Russia and China are withholding their advanced arms from an indignant Kim.

Reports Murphy: "Kim Il Sung, according to our intelligence, has 'complained bitterly' over this practice and has been refused access to the much more advanced MIG-23, the so-called Fox-Bat, which the Russians provided the Arab nations during the 1973 Yom Kippur War."

"China has followed the same pattern as Russia and has provided the North Koreans with a lower level of military technology than it currently possesses."

Murphy calls for the U.S. to bring the South Korean Army "to parity with the North Korean Armed Forces in terms of sophisticated weapons and weapons systems."

Quoting from actual speeches, he also warns that Kim "promises to violate the truce and start a new war if the United States pulls out of Korea." The U.S. presence north of the Han River, Murphy therefore contends, "is the psychological and military obstacle that prevents North Korea from attempting an invasion of the south."

He urges: "The Congress should make no mistake that the relatively symbolic forces of the United States in South Korea are maintaining peace and security not only on the peninsula, but ultimately in the Western Pacific."

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THE WASHINGTON POST Thursday, Nov. 27, 1975

Indonesian Funding of Costly Space Project Stirs Criticism

By Martin Woollacott

Manchester Guardian

JAKARTA—When the U.S. space agency shoots "Palapa" into orbit in July, Indonesia will share with the United States, Canada and the Soviet Union the distinction of actually possessing one of those icons of modern technology, a communications satellite.

One of the poorest nations in Asia is joining one of the most expensive clubs in the world—

another example of the Indonesian government's fatal fondness, its critics say, for illusory and gimmicky shortcuts to "modernity" and economic growth.

Thus "Palapa," which will crown a communications improving program costing \$1.5 billion has become a focus of controversy as well as pride.

That \$1.5 billion would buy an awful lot of the little dams, roads, bridges, health centers, schools and small factories desperately needed by the impoverished peasant mass of Java, 80 million people living at the highest agricultural density in the world. The same is true of the many smaller but only slightly better-off communities on the outer

islands from Sumatra to the Moluccas.

"Instead," said an Indonesian journalist, "they are going to get President Suharto live on television, plus the facility, which none of them will ever use, of being able to telephone someone at the other end of the archipelago." The exaggeration is pardonable as a means of

dramatizing the difficult choices the Indonesian government inevitably faces.

The archipelago communications program was conceived in the afterglow of the oil boom, when Indonesia thought it was going to have so much money the only problem would be how to spend it.

That Euphoria has vanished now, but the program is not one of those projects the government plans to scale down or postpone, for it is of central political and psychological importance to the army generals, assisted by technocrats, who have run Indonesia since the fall of Sukarno.

The very name assigned to the satellite is indicative; it refers to one of the most famous events in Javan history. Gajak Madah, prime minister of the Empire of Majapahit, swore an oath, it is recorded, that he would not eat white coconut meat (palapa) until the unity of the realm was restored.

That was in the 14th century, but ramshackle medieval empires — Majapahit itself lasted less than 100 years — are Indonesia's only real historical claim to have

existed as a nation, rather than as a collection of separate societies unified only by the experience of Dutch rule.

Thus "palapa" means unification, which Indonesia's rulers, despite the everyday rhetoric of speeches and propaganda, see as a task only half completed at best.

In this they have good reason. In Java itself, three separate sub-societies, each with its own language and history — Javan, Sundan, and Maduran — share the crowded island territory. Outside Java, on the 3,000 islands of the archipelago, another 11 major sub-societies, and hundreds of smaller ones, exist.

"Palapa" will carry about 3,000 simultaneous phone conversations and one color TV channel. The rest of the capacity appears to have been earmarked for military use and the Ministry of Education, with some "spare."

All this, however, will cost "only" \$150 million. The other \$1.35 billion is being spent on the upgrading of conventional telecommunications — the extension of the existing microwave system and of the telephone net in urban areas.

From the government's

point of view, the program will do four important things."

First, it will provide swift military communications for an army still fearful of revolt, riot and rebellion.

Second, it will make nationwide television broadcasting possible, leading, it is hoped, to the cultural and ideological unification of the country.

Third, it will permit nationwide education television, seen as a quick way to better education in a country where 40 per cent of the 6-to-14 age group still receive no schooling.

Finally, it will greatly improve existing telephone links between main centers while at the same time bringing into the system — through the satellite — small and distant but politically or economically important communities.

But the program faces a number of problems:

—Existing phone lines are already badly overloaded (it costs \$1,500 in bribes to get a phone installed) and clearly could not easily accommodate the new traffic.

—There is little TV programming and what there is is poor.

—And there now is no educational TV, although a crash program is under way to train 1,000 producers, directors, and writers abroad. Educational TV has not really worked anywhere else in the underdeveloped world, skeptics point out, asking why it should work now in Indonesia.

The government has great hopes that the program will be of immediate political use in the 1977 elections and has a vision of villagers all over Indonesia gathered around the communal TV set to listen to pre-election chats from President Suharto or to absorb the gospel of Sukarno's "five principles" night after night.

"It's not so laughable," said a diplomat. "The new programs will go on about development and modernization — and, right in front of you, in the shape of the very TV itself, will be proof of that development." The government, an heir of the magical and mystical tradition of Java, is putting its faith this time in a piece of Western scientific magic.

The program can be defended on rational grounds, but in the end it is an act of faith.

WASHINGTON POST
24 NOV 1975

The U.S.-Vietnam Relationship

AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD Vietnam has come full circle. From regarding that Asian land as a place where our very national destiny would be shaped, Washington has withdrawn to the view that we must first of all care for the welfare of the few American citizens who happen still to be there. This is a prudent policy; one wishes it had been adopted, say, a decade earlier. It also is showing some signs of success.

For months after the Communist triumph in April, the Vietnamese insisted they would not deal with the United States in any way until Washington acknowledged its aid commitment in the Paris accords of January, 1973. That commitment, however, was hedged on the "(anticipation) that this agreement will usher in an era of reconciliation." One government that signed it, Mr. Thieu's, no longer exists. Washington has, correctly, pronounced the agreement "dead"—dead as a basis for policy and dead in terms of public support for it. By releasing nine Americans (mostly missionaries) out of the 50-odd who stayed on after April, and by accepting 1,600 Vietnamese refugees back from Guam, Vietnam demonstrates in deed if not word that it thinks the Paris accords are dead, too.

The Ford administration, which had taken a rigid bargaining position, at once relaxed a bit and authorized some token private relief shipments by the American Friends Service Committee. Secretary of State Kissinger explained that there was "no obstacle to the principle of normalization" and that the United States was ready to reciprocate Vietnam's "gestures." Vietnam at once made its own response, inviting the House Select Com-

mittee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia to meet its representatives in Paris. This committee, set up last September under the chairmanship of Rep. G. V. Montgomery (D-Miss.), has a membership spanning the familiar spectrum of American opinion on Vietnam. It seems to have successfully conveyed to the Vietnamese, however, that on the particular issue of the 820 Americans officially listed as missing in action in Indochina, it speaks with a single voice. Mr. Montgomery is going to Paris with Mr. Kissinger's blessing—an all too rare example of congressional-executive collaboration on an important foreign policy matter.

Whatever their previous views, most Americans, we surmise, have lost their zest for engaging any of the issues still posed by Vietnam. Neither revenge nor guilt nor strategic purpose stirs more than small eddies. This makes it impossible for the Vietnamese to play on American divisions and passions, as they once did, for ends of their own. It makes it feasible, however, for a careful policy of normalization to be worked out with adequate public support. We think Vietnam would be foolish to expect a nickel's worth of American aid. But the Vietnamese still have political reasons of their own—offsetting the pressures they feel from China and Russia—to cultivate a relationship with the United States. In brief, they need us more than we need them. This is the reason one can hope the Vietnamese are coming to realize that they cannot treat the few Americans left in their country as hostages, and that all Americans share an interest in receiving what satisfaction is possible with respect to the MIAs.

Latin America

WASHINGTON POST
27 NOV 1975

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

Senate Testimony Accuses Castro

By Jack Anderson
and Les Whitten

Despite the balmy Caribbean breezes blowing between Cuba and the United States, secret Senate testimony warns that Fidel Castro is still trying to spread his revolution to U.S. territory.

The veteran investigator Alfonso Tarabochia, testifying behind closed doors of the Senate Internal Security subcommittee, charged that the Cuban leader is collaborating with the Soviet KGB to undermine democracy in Puerto Rico.

"More than 200 Puerto Rican activists have visited Cuba," Tarabochia reported. "Many were trained in terrorism.... This number does not include the 60 or 70 Puerto Ricans who traveled to Cuba with the Venceremos Brigade."

This brigade has been portrayed as fresh-faced young Americans, eager merely to help Cubans chop sugar cane. But Tarabochia testified that the Venceremos Brigade "is controlled by the KGB through the Cuban

Intelligence Directorate." The DGI, as the directorate is better known, reported directly to Castro.

Selected members of the brigade, according to Tarabochia, are hip deep in Puerto Rican revolution. His tale of intrigue and subversion, incidentally, has been confirmed to us by U.S. intelligence sources.

"Detente and the lifting of the blockade of Cuba" may be the tune Castro is whistling, said Tarabochia, but below "the surface... there are no indications that the Cubans have renounced their policy of subversion."

Castro's main front for Puerto Rican revolution, said Tarabochia, is the Puerto Rican Socialist Party. One of its leaders was caught with a cache of bombs sunk in a "five-foot-deep hold covered by a concrete slab located under a cabinet" in Puerto Rico. Exotic acids and detonation devices were found with the bombs.

In the United States, the revolutionaries have enlisted Puerto Ricans in New York City, Chicago, Philadelphia, Albuquerque, Boston,

Bridgeport and several other cities. Although Castro's siren song of peace began early this year, one key Puerto Rican revolutionary front was founded as late as March.

Tarabochia, using elaborate charts, traced the Puerto Rican and Cuban activists to such citadels of terrorist training as North Korea.

He found a trail of 16 bombings traceable to Puerto Rican revolutionaries in Newark, New York and Chicago. The bombers, using timers ranging from cheap Timexes to 17-jewel watches, hit police stations, an Exxon building, Union Carbide and a bank.

Directing the terror campaign for Castro and the KGB, according to the secret testimony, is Manuel Pineiro Lozada, former "dirty tricks" chief of the Cuban intelligence service.

To legitimize the campaign for revolution, Pineiro Lozada has tried to bring in liberal leaders and has even lured some American Indian activists. So far, however, Tarabochia reports that the Puerto Rican people are firm in their desire to remain with the United States.

WASHINGTON STAR
3 DEC 1975

William F. Buckley Jr.

Look who's talking about evils in Chile

What is going on in the matter of Chile? If one reads the cosmopolitan press and views the televised media, one would think Chile the ganglion of all social and political evils of our generation. Now there is a great deal going on in Chile that is unpleasant, and there are some things going on in Chile that are outrageous. But the fixed stare in the direction of Chile, given the circumstances of its recent history, can only be compared with the outrage that swept the manipulable world when Franco executed five murderers a couple of months ago.

The perspective is provided by scanning the sponsors of a resolution carried through the United Nations General Assembly, excori-

ating Chile for its denial of human rights. These sponsors included Algeria, Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia and Poland. There isn't an Algerian, Bulgarian, Cuban, Czechoslovak or Pole who would not consider as idyllic, in comparison with his own, the life of a typical Chilean.

We voted for that resolution, but with a gesture of reluctance that becomes a great power singling out for alarm a williwaw while ignoring the typhoons in the big and sassy parts of the world, most conspicuously the Communist states. Ambassador Moynihan, in his electric motion calling for world-wide amnesty for political prisoners, delivered a brilliant speech singling out the important distinctions. He quoted

Stephen Spender, who went to Spain during the civil war to act out his conscience in protest against Franco — only to discover, as George Orwell did, and eventually, Arthur Koestler, that the other side was at least equally guilty of atrocities.

"It came to me," Moynihan quoted Spender at the U.N., "that unless I cared about every murdered child indiscriminately, I didn't really care about children being murdered at all." Thus Moynihan, quite properly, deplores the suppression of peaceable political dissent everywhere — and asks his colleagues to meditate on one or two anomalies that don't receive much attention at the U.N.

He pointed out that 23 of

the co-sponsors of the usual anti-South African resolution of the assembly have political prisoners of their own, and of course the figure for Chile is comparable. He went on to say that there are, in South Africa — which shares the general obloquy along with Chile — about 100 political prisoners, so far as we know. And how do we know? Because there is a vigorous opposition press in South Africa. He quoted from the *Monthly Bulletin* of the Impeccable International Press Institute, whose African director recently wrote, "The unpalatable fact is — and this is something that sticks in the throat of every self-respecting African who will face it — that there is more press freedom in South Africa than in the rest of Africa put together."

The press is not that free

in Chile, but it is freer than in most of the countries that have criticized Chile, Moynihan progressed. How do we know what is going on inside these countries? Much has been made of Gen. Pinochet's refusal to permit a U.N. "working" committee investigating human rights into Chile. "This is true," Moynihan said. "But it is only part of the truth. The whole truth would include the fact that Amnesty International and the International Red Cross were permitted to visit Chile. Moreover, if the visit of the working group had gone through, it would have been the first time in history that any government had permitted such a visit."

And then Moynihan quoted a letter of Prof. Milton Friedman published in the *Wall Street Journal*: "On the atmosphere in Chile, it is perhaps not irrelevant that at two universities, the Catholic University and the University of Chile, I gave talks on 'The Fragility of Freedom,' in which I explicitly characterized the existing regime as unfree, talked about the difficulty of maintaining a free society, the role of free markets and free enterprise in doing so, and the urgency of establishing those preconditions for freedom. There was no advance or ex post facto censorship, the audiences were large and enthusias-

tic, and I received no subsequent criticism."

"More and more," Moynihan said, "the United Nations seems only to know of violations of human rights in countries where it is still possible to protest such violations." Causing one to ponder the question, yet again: what is it that accounts for the extraordinary success of the organized left in training the attention of the world on the Chiles of the world — while ignoring the Cubas.

NEW YORK TIMES
26 NOV 1975

The Worst of Both Worlds

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

By C. L. Sulzberger

SANTIAGO, Chile — From 1970 to 1973 Chile's Allende Government experimented with a socialist medley and ended up with chaos, bankruptcy, falling production and anarchy. Since 1973 the Pinochet Government has held the country in leaden dictatorship's vise.

Salvador Allende Gossens, a likable politician with a record of humanitarian ideas, was like a tubby fox, a good talker, popular with the ladies. But he simply wasn't up to the job of controlling left-wing extremists in his coalition. Revolutionists called MIR took matters into their hands, seizing farms, factories and destroying all semblances of order.

Augusto Pinochet Ugarte is of another cut. Hefty, with slate-blue eyes and brutal mouth, he practices karate at 60. Possessed of a hooded countenance, he would have made a fine poker player. He seized power by force and keeps it by force.

His Government is headed by a junta of armed forces commanders whom he dominates. But the army has been outside politics for two generations (although by no means always) and is unaccustomed to civilian administration, consensus and public relations. So it coldly makes war—the one thing it knows. The enemy is the people.

This is not fascism with one monolithic party and fake elections. There are no parties. It is plain old-fashioned dictatorship helped along by five secret police forces (the most infamous of which is called Dina) and no inhibitions about locking up, torturing or even occasionally killing those suspected of opposing it.

General Pinochet told me the situation when he took over two years ago could be summed up as: "Chaos, misery, destruction." Today it is ter-

ror, unhappiness, despair. He assured me there were no convicted political prisoners in jail, only 516 "detainees waiting to be tried under the state of seige." Diplomats estimate over 4,000 are locked up and moderate opposition leaders claim the figure is even higher.

The President says perhaps 2,000 people died in the 1973 fighting but that only 100 have been killed in guerrilla and anti-guerrilla shootouts since. The opposition believes between 10,000 and 15,000 have been slain or simply "disappeared."

General Pinochet admits there is a police toughness but denies the Government "accepts the principle of torture." Neutral observers say "sadistic and refined torture" exists. The Christian Democrats acknowledge reports abroad on torture are exaggerated but it is "frequent" despite protests by some army officers.

The official line is that the press and education are unrestrained. That is nonsense. Education is a tragedy. Unsuitable military rectors have been appointed to all universities. Leading intellectuals were fired, others fled.

Economically Chile was left a shambles by Mr. Allende—and remains a shambles. Unhappily, the price of the main export, copper, fell by two-thirds while the cost of oil imports soared. Up to 23 percent of the workers are unemployed. Hunger is common.

It is often said the monetarist theories of Prof. Milton Friedman and his Chilean acolytes are the mode. However, President Pinochet told me: "The Friedman philosophy cannot be applied effectively here although many of his suggestions to us were interest-

ing." The right-wing financial establishment, the conservative Catholic lay organization.

By contrast the Catholic Church hierarchy, which opposes Opus Dei, contains a large majority against General Pinochet. Cardinal Raul Silva Enriquez, the primate, takes a firm anti-Government position. Pinochet claims he and Cardinal Silva are "good personal friends" but the Cardinal "is surrounded by hostile people."

The President assured me the historical personage who most influenced him was Diego Portales, an early Chilean statesman. Strangely enough, Portales destroyed militarism, jailed independence war heroes, and institutionalized open opposition.

Having abruptly experienced two contrasting governmental systems, Chileans have become politically polarized. Destroyed on the surface, Communism's infrastructure remains intact underground. Even the Christian Democrats don't demand quick elections because they see no current alternative to the detested military.

What should the United States attitude be? One cannot recommend economic sanctions, which would heighten the suffering of a hungry people. But a strong Washington position against dictatorship and torture will be of long-term help in encouraging eventual democracy.

There is a story that Cardinal Silva warned Mr. Allende he couldn't survive unless he cut his ties with the extreme left and that he has warned General Pinochet he can't survive unless he cuts his ties with the extreme right. Allende, a clever leader, wasn't strong enough to control his zealots. Pinochet, a strong leader, isn't clever enough to control his zealots. Meanwhile schizophrenic Chile has been eviscerated.