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CONFIDENTIAL

Governmental Affairs

THE NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 21, 1975

SENATE PANEL, REPORTING ON C.I.A., ASSERTS U.S. AIDES WERE INVOLVED IN PLOTS TO KILL FOREIGN LEADERS

No Evidence That U.S. Actions Resulted in Deaths Is Found

By NICHOLAS M. HORROCK
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 20—A bipartisan, select committee of the Senate reported today that officials of the United States Government instigated assassination plots against two foreign leaders and became embroiled in plotting that led to the deaths of three others.

Fidel Castro of Cuba and Patrice Lumumba of the Congo; now Zaire, were the leaders who were targets of plots said to have been initiated by officials in Washington. The three others were Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam, Rafael Leonidas Trujillo of the Dominican Republic and Gen. René Schneider of Chile.

Of the five, all except Prime Minister Castro were assassinated, but the committee—the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations—found no evidence that any foreign leader was killed as a result of assassination plots initiated by officials of the United States.

It was the first time that a formal Government investigation established that assassination had become part of United States foreign policy. Several Congressional sources said it was the only instance, except after a military defeat, in which a modern nation had formally acknowledged such behavior.

New Details Disclosed

The plots that were cited in the document were sketched in reports attributed to intelligence and other Government sources in The New York Times and other publications over the last seven months, but there was a vast amount of new detail. The committee disclosed that a wide range of Federal officials involved themselves in plots such as hiring Mafia members and making secret arms deliveries to Chilean military officers.

The committee's 347-page report, made public today over the strong opposition of President Ford and after four hours of closed debate on the Senate floor in which the Senate refused to vote and thus permitted the committee to decide on its release, made these other points:

It was unable to establish that any former United States President had directly ordered the killing of a foreign leader. But it said that "whether or not the President in fact knew about the assassination plots, and even if their subordinates failed in their duty of full disclosure, it still follows that the President should have known about the plots."

It said the plans to kill Mr. Lumumba and Prime Minister Castro were initiated and furthered by the Central Intelligence Agency.

It found that American officials "encouraged or were privy to" coups d'état that resulted in the deaths of General Trujillo, President Diem and General Schneider, chief of Chile's general staff.

It found that in the plot to kill Mr. Lumumba "there was a reasonable inference" that President Eisenhower might have authorized the operation. This conclusion was based in part on testimony by a former official who recalled that President Eisenhower had appeared to order the death at a National Security Council meeting in 1960. The report established that Allen Dulles, former C.I.A. director, had ordered Mr. Lumumba killed.

It disclosed for the first time that on the day President Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas, Nov. 22, 1963, the C.I.A. was equipping a dissident official in the Castro Government with a ball point pen containing a hypodermic needle to poison the Cuban leader. It revealed further that this coincided with a meeting of a special envoy of President Kennedy with Mr. Castro in an effort to improve relations between Cuba and the United States.

It disclosed that ranking Government officials discussed, and may have authorized, the establishment within the C.I.A. of a "generalized assassination capability," adding that during these discussions "the concept of assassination was not affirmatively disavowed."

It sharply condemned the hiring of criminals to carry out

plots and disclosed that the C.I.A. had used Mafia figures in the Castro plot and had employed two European soldiers of fortune with criminal records in the plot against Mr. Lumumba.

"The spectacle of the Government consorting with criminal elements destroys respect for government and law and undermines the viability of democratic institutions," it concluded.

Sharpest Criticism

The committee saved its harshest language for the concept that the United States should ever have utilized assassination as a tool. It said:

"We condemn the use of assassination as a tool of foreign policy. Aside from pragmatic arguments against the use of assassination supplied to the committee by witnesses with extensive experience in covert operations, we find that assassination violates moral precepts fundamental to our way of life."

Not satisfied that future administrations would eschew the use of assassinations, as President Ford has done, the committee said it would submit a bill to make it unlawful for anyone "subject to the jurisdiction of the United States" to conspire, attempt to, or kill a foreign leader. The proposed legislation will specifically cover government officials acting under orders, the committee said.

Late yesterday President Ford made a final effort to halt publication by 12 personal letters to Senate leaders. He told them he opposed the release of information of alleged assassinations plots for the same reasons he cited in letters to committee members 15 days ago.

"Public release of these official materials and information will do grievous damage to our country," the President said in his earlier letter. "It would be exploited by foreign nations and groups hostile to the United States in a manner designed to do maximum damage to the reputation and foreign policy of the United States."

The Senate apparently spurned this argument and refused to order the alteration or suppression of the committee's report. In doing so, it also rejected a last-minute appeal by William E. Colby, the Director of Central Intelligence, who asked that the names of some 12 individuals, some of them Agency officials, be stricken

from possible acts of violence.

The 12 names were scattered among dozens of others throughout the report's 347 pages, and it appeared impossible for the casual reader to distinguish the names characterized by Mr. Colby as especially sensitive from any of the others.

A Potential Assassin

The report — more than 120,000 words of text, distilled from 60 days of hearings, the testimony of some 75 witnesses and 8,000 pages of transcript — was pungent in its detail and its depiction of the men involved in the plots and their moods.

In the Lumumba plot, for instance, one of the potential assassins, code-named WI/ROGUE, is described by a C.I.A. official this way:

"He is indeed aware of the precepts of right and wrong, but if he is given an assignment which may be morally wrong in the eyes of the world, but necessary because his case officer ordered him to carry it out, then it is right, and he will dutifully undertake appropriate action for its execution without pangs of conscience."

Almost no fantasy of spy movies was a tactical impossibility in these dark covert battles, the report confirms. The planning against Mr. Castro, for instance, contemplated poisoned cigars, poison sea shells and poison pills.

Individual officials of government in three Administrations came under criticism or question in the report.

Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger and his deputy in the White House in 1970, Gen. Alexander M. Haig Jr., were contradicted by C.I.A. officials on parts of their testimony on Chile.

In one instance, Mr. Kissinger had said that the Nixon Administration's policy of encouraging military coups d'état in Chile ended in the fall of 1970. Testimony by Thomas Karamessines, the C.I.A. official in charge of the Chile plotting, contradicted this. He told the committee that "as far as he knew" this effort to foment an uprising never ended.

The committee stated that although the Nixon Administration never ordered the C.I.A. to kill General Schneider, President Nixon had ordered a full-scale, unsuccessful effort to prevent Salvador Allende Gossens of Chile, a Marxist, from

ever taking office as President.

Richard Helms, then the C.I.A. director, told the committee that "this was a pretty all-inclusive order. . . . If I ever carried a marshal's baton in my knapsack out of the Oval Office, it was this day."

The committee did not interview former President Nixon prior to this report, but it has said that it expects to.

More confusion about men and motives was found in the committee's investigation of the Castro plotting. It criticized the late Robert F. Kennedy, then the Attorney General, for not condemning assassination as a technique and the use of underworld elements by Government agencies when he learned some details of these matters in May, 1962.

But it also said that there was not evidence that either he or his brother, President Kennedy, had ever ordered an assassination attempt.

It criticized Mr. Helms, Richard Bissell, director of covert actions in the early 1960's, and several middle-level C.I.A. officials for either misleading their superiors or not being fully candid with them.

Helms Held Not Candid

At one point, the committee called the withholding of information from Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy "inexcusable." At another point it found "unpersuasive" Mr. Helms's explanations of why he had not been candid with then C.I.A. director John McCone.

Among those that the C.I.A. officials failed to inform about their plots against Prime Minister Castro, the report said, were the members of the Warren Commission, which was investigating President Kennedy's death. The committee said that even Mr. Dulles, who was a member of the commission and knew about early Castro plots, did not inform his fellow commission members.

The commission did not spare the policy makers from criticism. It disclosed that early in 1961, McGeorge Bundy, then President Kennedy's assistant for national security affairs, learned about development of the capability to assassinate.

"Bundy raised no objection," the report said, quoting Mr. Bissell's sworn testimony. In a footnote the committee said:

"Bundy, as the national security adviser to the President, had an obligation to tell the President of such a grave matter, even though it was only a discussion of a capability to assassinate. His failure to do so was a serious error."

Strong Rejection

The report was strong and unrelenting in stating the reasons, both practical and moral, that it rejected assassination as a technique.

"The witnesses who testified before the committee uniformly condemned assassination," the report said. "They denounced it as immoral, described it as impractical, and reminded us that an open society, more than any other, is particularly vulnerable to the risk that its own leaders may be assassinated. As President Kennedy re-

'Synecdoche' Looms Large in the Report

By RICHARD D. LYONS.

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 20—

A potential fad word, synecdoche, emerged today from the Senate intelligence committee's report on alleged assassination plots.

The word is the name for a rhetorical shortcut in which a complicated situation is referred to as briefly as possible, sometimes leading to misunderstandings about exactly what is meant.

As an example, on Page 265 of its report, the committee cites the phrase "disposing of Castro," which may mean either killing the Cuban leader or dislodging his regime. The point is that the phrase can mean different things to different people.

Meeting Described

Synecdoche also may be used in the reverse, with a longer phrase taking the place of one that is shorter. One example cited was "doing something about Castro," which could be taken to mean killing him.

As the committee report indicated, the use of synecdoche — it is pronounced "sin-NECK-doe-key" — complicated the unraveling of who said what to whom because of the ambiguities inherent in the rhetorical technique.

As an ominous example

portedly said, "We can't get into that kind of thing, or we would all be trageted."

The committee provided the most new information in its description of the plot to kill Mr. Lumumba. It related how deeply concerned the United States was at his emergence in the last days of the Belgian Congo. He was, the Eisenhower Administration felt, a threat of almost the same magnitude as Mr. Castro because his leadership could mean losing valuable Central African resources to Communist influences. At one point, moreover, the report quotes an official who believed that Mr. Lumumba was insane.

In August, 1960, Mr. Dulles ordered the killing of Mr. Lumumba. It was pursued later, although Mr. Lumumba was out of power, because the agency was convinced that his charismatic political qualities could spark the Congolese to support the Soviet Union.

A great deal of the plotting involved how the United States would get Mr. Lumumba a way from the protection of United Nations forces and kill him. Two main methods of killing him were devised; one involved giving him a biological toxin selected from poisons stockpiled by the C.I.A. at the Army post at Fort Detrick, Md.

A substance was actually flown to Africa, but never administered, according to the report. In another plan, the C.I.A. contemplated killing Mr. Lu-

of synecdoche, the report refers to a meeting in 1960 of a subcommittee of the National Security Council at which a reference was made to taking "direct positive action" against Fidel Castro, his brother Raul, and Che Guevara, another of his aides.

"The reference to 'direct positive action' is ambiguous and subject to different interpretations, including a suggestion that assassination be explored," the report states on Page 116.

Officials of the Central Intelligence Agency were themselves aware that such ambiguities were causing problems. In 1967 the agency's Inspector General, Lyman Kirkpatrick, said in an internal report dealing with assassination:

"The point is that of frequent resort to synecdoche—the mention of a part when the whole is to be understood, or vice versa. Thus, we encounter repeated references to phrases such as 'disposing of Castro,' which may be read in the narrow, literal sense of assassinating him, when it is intended that it be read in the broader figurative sense of dislodging the Castro regime.

"Reversing the coin, we find people speaking vaguely of 'doing something about Castro' when it is clear that what they have specifically in mind is killing him. In

a situation wherein those speaking may not have actually meant what they seemed to say or may not be surprised if their oral shorthand is interpreted differently than was intended." In the report, all the "nots" are italicized.

McCone Memo

The Senate committee's report noted that "differing perceptions between superiors and their subordinates were graphically illustrated in the Castro context." It said that John McCone, the former C.I.A. director, wrote in a memorandum of April 14, 1967:

"Through the years the Cuban problem was discussed in terms such as 'dispose of Castro,' 'remove Castro,' 'knock off Castro,' etc., and this meant the overthrow of the Communist Government in Cuba and the replacing of it with a democratic regime. Terms such as the above appear in many working papers, memoranda for the record, etc., and, as stated, all refer to a change in the Cuban Government."

But the report went on to state that another former director, Richard Helms, "who had considerable experience as a covert operator, gave precisely the opposite meaning to the same words, interpreting them as conveying authority for assassination."

NEW YORK TIMES

20 Nov. 1975

AGENT HELD ASSURED IN PLOTS ON CASTRO

WASHINGTON, Nov. 19 (Reuters)—A Cuban agent for the Central Intelligence Agency who was a key figure in C.I.A. plots to kill Prime Minister Fidel Castro of Cuba was assured the operations had the backing of very high United States Government officials, Congressional sources said today.

The sources said that investigators for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence had

mumba with a high-powered rifle.

The Congolese leader died early in 1961 at the hands of enemies in Katanga Province, and the report cited evidence that the C.I.A. had not had a role in his death.

According to staff members who worked on the preparation of the report, "dozens of areas are still under scrutiny or may provide leads for further investigation. For instance, one said, there was a report that a woman friend of the late Sam Giancana, the Mafia leader who was involved in the plot against Mr. Castro, was also an acquaintance of President Kennedy's.

discovered this in the course of inquiries they had been pursuing for several months.

According to the sources, the investigators had found that the agent, a Cuban Army colonel and senior adviser to Mr. Castro, was given the assurance after he demanded verification of C.I.A. assertions that the murder plots had been authorized at top Government levels.

This assurance was conveyed to the colonel by a man who said that he was representing Robert F. Kennedy, then Attorney General, at a secret meeting in Paris on Oct. 29, 1963, the sources said.

The sources would not identify the colonel, but said that he was now in a Cuban jail.

A spokesman for the Senate committee refused to confirm or deny the account given by the sources.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 21, 1975

TEXTS ON ALLEGED U.S. ASSASSINATION PLOTS

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 20—Following are the texts of four sections of the report on alleged United States involvement in assassination plots against foreign leaders. It was released today by the Senate Intelligence Committee.

Summary of Findings and Conclusions

1. The Questions Presented

The Committee sought to answer four broad questions:

Assassination plots.—Did United States officials instigate, attempt, aid and abet, or acquiesce in plots to assassinate foreign leaders?

Involvement in other killings.—Did United States officials assist foreign dissidents in a way which significantly contributed to the killing of foreign leaders?

Authorization.—Where there was involvement by United States officials in assassination plots or other killings, were such activities authorized and if so, at what levels of our Government?

Communication and control.—Even if not authorized in fact, were the assassination activities perceived by those involved to be within the scope of their lawful authority? If they were so perceived, was there inadequate control exercised by higher authorities over the agencies to prevent such misinterpretation?

2. Summary of Findings and Conclusions on the Plots

The Committee investigated alleged United States involvement in assassination plots in five foreign countries:

Country	Individual involved?
CUBA	FIDEL CASTRO.
CONGO (ZAIRE)	PATRICE LUMUMBA.
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	RAFAEL TRUJILLO.
CHILE	GENERAL RENE SCHNEIDER.
SOUTH VIETNAM	NGO DINH DIEM.

¹ In addition to the plots discussed in the body of this report, the Committee received some evidence of CIA involvement in plans to assassinate President Sukarno of Indonesia and "Papa Doc" Duvalier of Haiti. Former Deputy Director for Plans Richard Bissell testified that the assassination of Sukarno had been "contemplated" by the CIA, but that planning had proceeded no farther than identifying an "asset" whom it was believed might be recruited to kill Sukarno. Arms were supplied to dissident groups in Indonesia, but according to Bissell, those arms were not intended for assassination. (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 85)

Walter Elder, Executive Assistant to CIA Director John McCone, testified that the Director authorized the CIA to furnish arms to dissidents planning the overthrow of Haiti's dictator, Duvalier. Elder told the Committee that while the assassination of Duvalier was not contemplated by the CIA, the arms were furnished "to help [the dissidents] take what measures were deemed necessary to replace the government," and it was realized that Duvalier might be killed in the course of the overthrow. (Elder, 8/13/75, p. 79)

² Assassination plots against the Cuban leadership sometimes contemplated action against Raul Castro and Che Guevara. In South Vietnam Diem's brother Ngo Dinh Nhu was killed at the same time as Diem.

The evidence concerning each alleged assassination can be summarized as follows:

Patrice Lumumba (Congo/Zaire).—In the Fall of 1960, two CIA officials were asked by superiors to assassinate Lumumba. Poisons were sent to the Congo and some exploratory steps were taken toward gaining access to Lumumba. Subsequently, in early 1961, Lumumba was killed by Congolese rivals. It does not appear from the evidence that the United States was in any way involved in the killing.

Fidel Castro (Cuba).—United States Government personnel plotted to kill Castro from 1960 to 1965. American underworld figures and Cubans hostile to Castro were used in these plots, and were provided encouragement and material support by the United States.

Rafael Trujillo (Dominican Republic).—Trujillo was shot by Dominican dissidents on May 31, 1961. From early in 1960 and continuing to the time of the assassination, the United States Government generally supported these dissidents. Some Government personnel were aware that the dissidents intended to kill Trujillo. Three pistols and three carbines were furnished by American officials, although a request for machine guns was later refused. There is conflicting evidence concerning whether the weapons were knowingly supplied for use in the assassination and whether any of them were present at the scene.

Ngô Đình Diem (South Vietnam).—Diem and his brother, Nhu, were killed on November 2, 1963, in the course of a South Vietnamese General's coup. Although the United States Government supported the coup, there is no evidence that American officials favored the assassination. Indeed, it appears that the assassination of Diem was not part of the General's pre-coup planning but was instead a spontaneous act which occurred during the coup and was carried out without United States involvement or support.

General Rene Schneider (Chile).—On October 25, 1970, General Schneider died of gunshot wounds inflicted three days earlier while resisting a kidnap attempt. Schneider, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and a constitutionalist opposed to military coups, was considered an obstacle in efforts to prevent Salvador Allende from assuming the office of President of Chile. The United States Government supported, and sought to instigate a military coup to block Allende. U.S. officials supplied financial aid, machine guns and other equipment to various military figures who opposed Allende. Although the CIA continued to support coup plotters up to Schneider's shooting, the record indicates that the CIA had withdrawn active support of the group which carried out the actual kidnap

attempt on October 22, which resulted in Schneider's death. Further, it does not appear that any of the equipment supplied by the CIA to coup plotters in Chile was used in the kidnaping. There is no evidence of a plan to kill Schneider or that United States officials specifically anticipated that Schneider would be shot during the abduction.

Assassination capability (Executive action).—In addition to these five cases, the Committee has received evidence that ranking Government officials discussed, and may have authorized, the establishment within the CIA of a generalized assassination capability. During these discussions, the concept of assassination was not affirmatively disavowed.

Similarities and differences among the plots.—The assassination plots all involved Third World countries, most of which were relatively small and none of which possessed great political or military strength. Apart from that similarity, there were significant differences among the plots:

(1) Whether United States officials initiated the plot, or were responding to requests of local dissidents for aid.

(2) Whether the plot was specifically intended to kill a foreign leader, or whether the leader's death was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of an attempt to overthrow the government.

The Castro and Lumumba cases are examples of plots conceived by United States officials to kill foreign leaders.

In the Trujillo case, although the United States Government certainly opposed his regime, it did not initiate the plot. Rather, United States officials responded to requests for aid from local dissidents whose aim clearly was to assassinate Trujillo. By aiding them, this country was implicated in the assassination, regardless of whether the weapons actually supplied were meant to kill Trujillo or were only intended as symbols of support for the dissidents.

The Schneider case differs from the Castro and Trujillo cases. The United States Government, with full knowledge that Chilean dissidents considered General Schneider an obstacle to their plans, sought a coup and provided support to the dissidents. However, even though the support included weapons, it appears that the intention of both the dissidents and the United States officials was to abduct General Schneider, not to kill him. Similarly, in the Diem case, some United States officials wanted Diem removed and supported a coup to accomplish his removal, but there is no evidence that any of those officials sought the death of Diem himself.

3. Summary of Findings and Conclusions on the Issues of Authority and Control

To put the inquiry into assassination allegations in context, two points must be made clear. First, there is no doubt

that the United States Government opposed the various leaders in question. Officials at the highest levels objected to the Castro and Trujillo regimes, believed the accession of Allende to power in Chile would be harmful to American interests and thought of Lumumba as a dangerous force in the heart of Africa. Second, the evidence on assassinations has to be viewed in the context of other, more massive activities against the regimes in question. For example, the plots against Fidel Castro personally cannot be understood without considering the fully authorized comprehensive assaults upon his regime, such as the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961 and Operation MONGOOSE in 1962.

Once methods of coercion and violence are chosen, the probability of loss of life is always present. There is, however, a significant difference between a coldblooded, targeted, intentional killing of an individual foreign leader and other forms of intervening in the affairs of foreign nations. Therefore, the Committee has endeavored to explore as fully as possible the questions of how and why the plots happened, whether they were authorized, and if so, at what level.

The picture that emerges from the evidence is not a clear one. This may be due to the system of deniability and the consequent state of the evidence which, even after our long investigation, remains conflicting and inconclusive. Or it may be that there were in fact serious shortcomings in the system of authorization so that an activity such as assassination could have been undertaken by an agency of the United States Government without express authority.

The Committee finds that the system of executive command and control was so ambiguous that it is difficult to be certain at what levels assassination activity was known and authorized. This situation creates the disturbing prospect that Government officials might have undertaken the assassination plots without it having been uncontroversially clear that there was explicit authorization from the Presidents. It is also possible that there might have been a successful "plausible denial"

in which Presidential authorization was issued but is now obscured. Whether or not the respective Presidents knew of or authorized the plots, as chief executive officer of the United States, each must bear the ultimate responsibility for the activities of his subordinates.

The Committee makes four other major findings.¹ The first relates to the Committee's inability to make a finding that the assassination plots were authorized by the Presidents or other persons above the governmental agency or agencies involved. The second explains why certain officials may have perceived that, according to their judgment and experience, assassination was an acceptable course of action. The third criticizes agency officials for failing on several occasions to disclose their plans and activities to superior authorities or for failing to do so with sufficient detail and clarity. The fourth criticizes Administration officials for not ruling out assassination, particularly after certain Administration officials had become aware of prior assassination plans and the establishment of a general assassination capability.

¹The Committee's findings are elaborated in Section IV, *infra*.

There is admittedly a tension among the findings. This tension reflects a basic conflict in the evidence. While there are some conflicts over facts, it may be more important that there appeared to have been two differing perceptions of the same facts. This distinction may be the result of the differing backgrounds of those persons experienced in covert operations as distinguished from those who were not. Words of urgency which may have meant killing to the former, may have meant nothing of the sort to the latter.

While we are critical of certain individual actions, the Committee is also mindful of the inherent problems in a system which relies on secrecy, compartmentation, circumlocution, and the avoidance of clear responsibility. This system creates the risk of confusion and rashness in the very areas where clarity and sober judgment are most necessary. Hence, before reviewing the evidence relating to the cases, we briefly deal with the general subject of covert action.

plans to assassinate Castro using poison cigars, exploding seashells, and a contaminated diving suit did not advance beyond the laboratory phase. The plot involving underworld figures reached the stage of producing poison pills, establishing the contacts necessary to send them into Cuba, procuring potential assassins within Cuba, and apparently delivering the pills to the island itself. One 1960 episode involved a Cuban who initially had no intention of engaging in assassination, but who finally agreed, at the suggestion of the CIA, to attempt to assassinate Raul Castro if the opportunity arose. In the AM/LASH operation, which extended from 1963 through 1965, the CIA gave active support and encouragement to a Cuban whose intent to assassinate Castro was known, and provided him with the means of carrying out an assassination.

2. No Foreign Leaders Were Killed as a Result of Assassination Plots Initiated by Officials of the United States

The poisons intended for use against Patrice Lumumba were never administered to him, and there is no evidence that the United States was in any way involved in Lumumba's death at the hands of his Congolese enemies. The efforts to assassinate Castro failed.

3. American Officials Encouraged or Were Privy to Coup Plots Which Resulted in the Deaths of Trujillo, Diem, and Schneider

American officials clearly desired the overthrow of Trujillo, offered both encouragement and guns to local dissidents who sought his overthrow and whose plans included assassination. American officials also supplied those dissidents with pistols and rifles.

American officials offered encouragement to the Vietnamese generals who plotted Diem's overthrow, and a CIA official in Vietnam gave the generals money after the coup had begun. However, Diem's assassination was neither desired nor suggested by officials of the United States.

The record reveals that United States officials offered encouragement to the Chilean dissidents who plotted the kidnapping of General Rene Schneider, but American officials did not desire or encourage Schneider's death. Certain high officials did know, however, that the dissidents planned to kidnap General Schneider.

As Director Colby testified before the Committee, the death of a foreign leader is a risk foreseeable in any coup attempt. In the cases we have considered, the risk of death was in fact known in varying degrees. It was widely known that the dissidents in the Dominican Republic intended to assassinate Trujillo. The contemplation of coup leaders at one time to assassinate Nhu, President Diem's brother, was communicated to the upper levels of the United States Government. While the CIA and perhaps the White House knew that the coup leaders in Chile planned to kidnap General Schneider, it was not anticipated that he would be killed, although the possibility of his death should have been recognized as a foreseeable risk of his kidnapping.

4. The Plots Occurred in a Cold War Atmosphere Perceived to Be of Crisis Proportions

The Committee fully appreciates the importance of evaluating the assassination plots in the historical context within which they occurred. In the preface to this report, we described the percep-

IV. Findings and Conclusions

In evaluating the evidence and arriving at findings and conclusions the Committee has been guided by the following standards. We believe these standards to be appropriate to the constitutional duty of a Congressional committee.

1. The Committee is not a court. Its primary role is not to determine individual guilt or innocence, but rather to draw upon the experiences of the past to better propose guidance for the future.

2. It is necessary to be cautious in reaching conclusions because of the amount of time that has passed since the events reviewed in this report, the inability of three Presidents and many other key figures to speak for themselves, the conflicting and ambiguous nature of much of the evidence, and the problems in assessing the weight to be given to particular documents and testimony.

3. The Committee has tried to be fair to the persons involved in the events under examination, while at the same time responding to a need to understand the facts in sufficient detail

to lay a basis for informed recommendations.

With these standards in mind, the Committee has arrived at the following findings and conclusions.

A. Findings Concerning the Plots Themselves

1. Officials of the United States Government Initiated Plots to Assassinate Fidel Castro and Patrice Lumumba

The Committee finds that officials of the United States Government initiated and participated in plots to assassinate Patrice Lumumba and Fidel Castro.

The plot to kill Lumumba was conceived in the latter half of 1960 by officials of the United States Government, and quickly advanced to the point of sending poisons to the Congo to be used for the assassination.

The effort to assassinate Castro began in 1960 and continued until 1965. The

tion generally shared within the United States during the depths of the Cold War, that our country faced a monolithic enemy in Communism. That attitude helps explain the assassination plots which we have reviewed, although it does not justify them. Those involved nevertheless appeared to believe they were advancing the best interests of their country.

5. American Officials Had Exaggerated Notions About Their Ability to Control the Actions of Coup Leaders

Running throughout the cases considered in this report was the expectation of American officials that they could control the actions of dissident groups which they were supporting in foreign countries. Events demonstrated that the United States had no such power. This point is graphically demonstrated by cables exchanged shortly before the coup in Vietnam. Ambassador Lodge cabled Washington on October 30, 1963, that he was unable to halt a coup; a cable from William Bundy in response stated that "we cannot accept conclusion that we have no power to delay or discourage a coup." The coup took place three days later.

Shortly after the experience of the Bay of Pigs; CIA Headquarters requested operatives in the Dominican Republic to tell the dissidents to "turn off" the assassination attempt, because the United States was not prepared to "cope with the aftermath." The dissidents replied that the assassination was their affair and that it could not be turned off to suit the convenience of the United States Government.

6. CIA Official Made Use of Known Underworld Figures in Assassination Efforts

Officials of the CIA made use of persons associated with the criminal underworld in attempting to achieve the assassination of Fidel Castro. These underworld figures were relied upon because it was believed that they had expertise and contacts that were not available to law-abiding citizens.

Foreign citizens with criminal backgrounds were also used by the CIA in two other cases that we have reviewed. In the development of the Executive Action capability, one foreign national with a criminal background was used to "spot" other members of the European underworld who might be used by the CIA for a variety of purposes, including assassination, if the need should arise. In the Lumumba case, two men with criminal backgrounds were used as field operatives by CIA officers in a volatile political situation in the Congo.

B. Conclusions Concerning the Plots Themselves

1. The United States Should Not Engage in Assassination

We condemn the use of assassination as a tool of foreign policy. Aside from pragmatic arguments against the use of assassination supplied to the Committee by witnesses with extensive experience in covert operations, we find that assassination violates moral precepts fundamental to our way of life.

In addition to moral considerations, there were several practical reasons advanced for not assassinating foreign leaders. These reasons are discussed in the section of this report recommend-

ing a statute making assassination a crime.

(a) Distinction Between Targeted Assassinations Instigated by the United States and Support for Dissidents Seeking to Overthrow Local Governments

Two of the five principal cases investigated by the Committee involved plots to kill foreign leaders (Lumumba and Castro) that were instigated by American officials. Three of the cases (Trujillo, Diem, and Schneider) involved killings in the course of coup attempts by local dissidents. These latter cases differed in the degree to which assassination was contemplated by the leaders of the coups and in the degree the coups were motivated by United States officials.

The Committee concludes that targeted assassinations instigated by the United States must be prohibited.

Coups involve varying degrees of risk of assassination. The possibility of assassination in coup attempts is one of the issues to be considered in determining the propriety of United States involvement in coups, particularly in those where the assassination of a foreign leader is a likely prospect.

This country was created by violent revolt against a regime believed to be tyrannous, and our founding fathers (the local dissidents of that era) received aid from foreign countries. Given that history, we should not today rule out support for dissident groups seeking to overthrow tyrants. But passing beyond that principle, there remain serious

questions: for example, whether the national interest of the United States is genuinely involved; whether any such support should be overt rather than covert; what tactics should be used; and how such actions should be authorized and controlled by the coordinate branches of government. The Committee believes that its recommendations on the question of covert actions in support of coups must await the Committee's final report which will be issued after a full review of covert action in general.

(b) The Setting in Which the Assassination Plots Occurred Explains, But Does Not Justify Them

The Cold War setting in which the assassination plots took place does not change our view that assassination is unacceptable in our society. In addition to the moral and practical problems discussed elsewhere, we find three principal defects in any contention that the tenor of the period justified the assassination plots:

First, the assassination plots were not necessitated by imminent danger to the United States. Among the cases studied, Castro alone posed a physical threat to the United States, but then only during the period of the Cuban missile crisis, and assassination was not advanced by policymakers as a possible course of action during the crisis.

Second, we reject absolutely any notion that the United States should justify its actions by the standards of totalitarians. Our standards must be higher, and this difference is what the struggle is all about. Of course, we must defend our democracy. But in defending it, we must resist undermining the very virtues we are defending.

Third, such activities almost inevitably become known. The damage to American foreign policy, to the good name and reputation of the United States abroad, and to the American people's

and support of our government and its foreign policy is incalculable. This last point—the undermining of the American public's confidence in its government—is the most damaging consequence of all.

Two documents which have been supplied to the Committee graphically demonstrate attitudes which can lead to tactics that erode and could ultimately destroy the very ideals we must defend.

The first document was written in 1954 by a special committee formed to advise the President on covert activities. The United States may, it said, have to adopt tactics "more ruthless than (those) employed by the enemy" in order to meet the threat from hostile nations. The report concluded that "long standing American concepts of American fair play must be reconsidered."¹

¹ The full text of the passage is as follows: " * * * another important requirement is an aggressive covert psychological, political, and paramilitary organization far more effective, more unique, and, if necessary, more ruthless than that employed by the enemy. No one should be permitted to stand in the way of the prompt, efficient, and secure accomplishment of this mission.

"The second consideration, it is now clear that we are facing an implacable enemy whose avowed objective is world domination by whatever means at whatever cost. There are no rules in such a game. Hitherto acceptable norms of human conduct do not apply. If the U.S. is to survive, long standing American concepts of American fair play must be reconsidered."

Although those proposals did not involve assassinations, the attitudes underlying them were, as Director Colby testified, indicative of the setting within which the assassination plots were conceived. (Colby, 6/4/75, p. 117).

We do not think that traditional American notions of fair play need be abandoned when dealing with our adversaries. It may well be ourselves that we injure most if we adopt tactics "more ruthless than the enemy."

A second document which represents an attitude which we find improper was sent to the Congo in the fall of 1960 when the assassination of Patrice Lumumba was being considered. The chief of CIA's Africa Division recommended a particular agent — WI/ROGUE—because:

He is indeed aware of the precepts of right and wrong, but if he is given an assignment which may be morally wrong in the eyes of the world, but necessary because his case officer ordered him to carry it out, then it is right, and he will dutifully undertake appropriate action for its execution without pangs of conscience. In a word, he can rationalize all actions.

The Committee finds this rationalization is not in keeping with the ideals of our nation.

2. The United States Should Not Make Use of Underworld Figures for Their Criminal Talents

We conclude that agencies of the United States must not use underworld figures for their criminal talents² in carrying out Agency operations. In addition to the corrosive effect upon our government,³ the use of underworld figures involves the following dangers:

a. The use of underworld figures for "dirty business" gives them the power to blackmail the government and to avoid prosecution, for past or future crimes. For example, the figures involved in the Castro assassination operation used their involvement with the CIA to avoid prosecution. The CIA also contemplated attempting to quash criminal charges brought in a foreign tribunal against QJ/WIN.

² Pending our investigation of the use of informants by the FBI and other agencies, we reserve judgment on the use of known criminals as informants. We are concerned here only with the use of persons known to

be actively engaged in criminal pursuits for their expertise in carrying out criminal acts.

The corrosive effect of dealing with underworld figures is graphically demonstrated by the fact that Attorney General Robert Kennedy, who had devoted much of his professional life to fighting organized crime, did not issue an order against cooperating with such persons when he learned in May 1961 that the CIA had made use of Sam Giancana in a sensitive operation in Cuba.

In May, 1962, the Attorney General learned that the operation—which was described to him as terminated—had involved assassination. According to a CIA witness, the Attorney General was angered by the report and told those briefing him that he must be consulted before underworld figures were used again. He did not, however, direct that underworld figures must never again be used.

b. The use of persons experienced in criminal techniques and prone to criminal behavior increases the likelihood that criminal acts will occur.

Sometimes agents in the field are necessarily given broad discretion. But the risk of improper activities is increased when persons of criminal background are used, particularly when they are selected precisely to take advantage of their criminal skills or contacts.

c. There is the danger that the United States Government will become an unwitting accomplice to criminal acts and that criminal figures will take advantage of their association with the government to advance their own projects and interests.

d. There is a fundamental impropriety in selecting persons because they are skilled at performing deeds which the laws of our society forbid.

The use of underworld figures by the United States Government for their criminal skills raises moral problems comparable to those recognized by Justice Brandeis in a different context five decades ago:

Our government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a law-breaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; to declare that in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means—to declare that the Government may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of the private criminal—would bring terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this Court should resolutely set its face. [Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 439 465 (1927)]

e. The spectacle of the Government consorting with criminal elements destroys respect for government and law and undermines the viability of democratic institutions.

C. Findings and Conclusions Relating to Authorization and Control

In the introduction to this report, we set forth in summary form our major conclusions concerning whether the assassination plots were authorized. The ensuing discussion elaborates and explains those conclusions.

The Committee analyzed the question of authorization for the assassination activities from two perspectives. First, the Committee examined whether officials in policymaking positions authorized or were aware of the assassination activities. Second, the Committee inquired whether the officials responsible for the operational details of the plots perceived that assassination had the approval of their superiors, or at least was the type of activity that their superiors would not disapprove.

No doubt, the CIA's general efforts against the regimes discussed in this report were authorized at the highest levels of the government. However the

record is unclear and serious doubt remains concerning whether assassination was authorized by the respective Presidents. Even if the plots were not expressly authorized, it does not follow that the Agency personnel believed they were acting improperly.

1. The Apparent Lack of Accountability in the Command and Control System Was Such That the Assassination Plots Could Have Been Undertaken Without Express

Authorization

As emphasized throughout this report, we are unable to draw firm conclusions concerning who authorized the assassination plots. Even after our long investigation it is unclear whether the conflicting and inconclusive state of the evidence is due to the system of plausible denial or there were, in fact, serious shortcomings in the system of authorization which made it possible for assassination efforts to have been undertaken by agencies of the United States Government without express authority from officials above those agencies.¹

As noted above, there are also certain inherent limitations in the extensive record compiled by the Committee. Many years have passed, several of the key figures are dead, and while we have been assured by the present Administration that all the relevant evidence has been produced, it is always possible that other more conclusive material exists, but has not been found.

Based on the record of our investigation, the Committee finds that the system of Executive command and control was so inherently ambiguous that it is difficult to be certain at what level assassination activity was known and authorized. This creates the disturbing prospect that assassination activity might have been undertaken by officials of the United States Government without its having been incontrovertibly clear that there was explicit authorization from the President of the United States. At the same time, this ambiguity and imprecision leaves open the possibility that there was a successful "plausible denial" and that a Presidential authorization was issued but is now obscured.

Whether or not assassination was authorized by a President of the United States, the President as the chief executive officer of the United States Government must take ultimate responsibility for major activities during his Administration. Just as these Presidents must be held accountable, however, their subordinates throughout the Government had a concomitant duty to fully disclose their plans and activities.

As part of their responsibility, these Presidents had a duty to determine the nature of major activities and to prevent undesired activities from taking place. This duty was particularly compelling when the Presidents had reason to believe that major undesired activities had previously occurred or were being advocated and might occur again. Whether or not the Presidents in fact knew about the assassination plots, and even if their subordinates failed in their duty of full disclosure, it still follows that the Presidents should have known about the plots. This sets a demanding standard, but one the Committee supports. The future of democracy rests upon such accountability.

2. Findings Relating to the Level at Which the Plots Were Authorized

(a) Diem

We find that neither the President nor any other official in the United States Government authorized the as-

assination of Diem and his brother Nhu. Both the the DCI and top State Department officials did know, however, that the death of Nhu, at least at one point, had been contemplated by the coup leaders. But when the possibility that the coup leaders were considering assassination was brought to the attention of the DCI, he directed that the United States would have no part in such activity, and there is some evidence that this information was relayed to the coup leaders.

(b) Schneider

We find that neither the President nor any other official in the United States Government authorized the assassination of General Rene Schneider. The CIA, and perhaps the White House did know that coup leaders contemplated a kidnapping, which, as it turned out, resulted in Schneider's death.

(c) Trujillo

The Presidents and other senior officials, in the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations sought the overthrow of Trujillo and approved or condoned actions to obtain that end.

The DCI and the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs knew that the Dominican dissidents viewed the removal of Trujillo as critical to any plans to overthrow his regime and that they intended to assassinate Trujillo if given the opportunity. It is uncertain precisely when officials at higher levels of government with responsibility for formulating policy learned that the dissidents equated assassination with overthrow. Clearly by early May 1961 senior American officials, including President Kennedy, knew that the dissidents intended to assassinate Trujillo. The White House and State Department, as well as the CIA, knew that the United States had provided the dissidents with rifles and pistols and that the dissidents had requested machine guns which they intended to use in connection with an assassination effort. Thereafter, on May 16, 1961 President Kennedy approved National Security Council recommendations that the United States not initiate the overthrow of Trujillo until it was known what government would succeed the dictator. That recommendation was consistent with earlier attempts initiated by the CIA to discourage the planned assassination and thereby avoid potential problems from a power vacuum which might arise. After deciding to discourage the planned assassination, the DCI directed that the machine guns not be passed to the Dominican dissidents. That policy was reconfirmed by the State Department, the Special Group, and, in a cable of May 29, 1961, by President Kennedy himself.

The day before the assassination, President Kennedy cabled the State Department representative in the Dominican Republic that the United States "as [a] matter of general policy cannot condone assassination." However, the cable also stated that if the dissidents planning the imminent assassination of Trujillo succeeded, and thereby established a provisional government, the United States would recognize and support them.

The President's cable has been construed in several ways. One reading stresses the President's opposition to assassination "as a matter of general policy." Another stresses those portions of the cable which discuss pragmatic matters, including the risk that the United States involvement might be exposed, and suggests that the last minute telegram was designed to avoid

a charge that the United States shared responsibility for the assassination. A third construction would be that both of the prior readings are correct and that they are not mutually exclusive. However the cable is construed, its ambiguity illustrates the difficulty of seeking objectives which can only be accomplished by force—indeed, perhaps only by the assassination of a leader—and yet not wishing to take specific actions which seem abhorrent.

(d) Lumumba

The chain of events revealed by the documents and testimony is strong enough to permit a reasonable inference that the plot to assassinate Lumumba was authorized by President Eisenhower. Nevertheless, there is enough countervailing testimony by Eisenhower Administration officials and enough ambiguity and lack of clarity in the records of high-level policy meetings to preclude the Committee from making a finding that the President intended an assassination effort against Lumumba.

It is clear that the Director of Central Intelligence, Allen Dulles, authorized an assassination plot. There is, however, no evidence of United States involvement in bringing about the death of Lumumba at the hands of Congolese authorities.

Strong expressions of hostility toward Lumumba from the President and his National Security Assistant, followed immediately by CIA steps in furtherance of an assassination operation against Lumumba, are part of a sequence of events that, at the least, make it appear that Dulles believed assassination was a permissible means of complying with pressure from the President to remove Lumumba from the political scene.

Robert Johnson's testimony that he understood the President to have ordered Lumumba's assassination at an NSC meeting does, as he said, offer a "clue" about Presidential authorization. His testimony, however, should be read in light of the fact that NSC records during this period do not make clear whether or not the President ordered Lumumba's assassination and the fact that others attending those meetings testified that they did not recall hearing such a Presidential order.

Richard Bissell assumed that Presidential authorization for assassinating Lumumba had been communicated to him by Dulles, but Bissell had no specific recollection concerning when that communication occurred. The impression shared by the Congo Station Officer and the DDP's Special Assistant Joseph Scheider that the President authorized an assassination effort against Lumumba was derived solely from conversations Scheider had with Bissell and Bronson Tweedy. However, the impression thus held by Scheider and the Station Officer does not, in itself, establish Presidential authorization because neither Scheider nor the Station Officer had first-hand knowledge of Allen Dulles' statements about Presidential authorization, and because Scheider may have misconstrued Bissell's reference to "highest authority."

(e) Castro

There was insufficient evidence from which the Committee could conclude that Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, or Johnson, their close advisors, or the Special Group authorized the assassination of Castro.

The assassination plots against Castro were clearly authorized at least through the level of DDP. We also find that DCI Allen Dulles approved "thorough consideration" of the "elimination" of Castro. Further, it is also likely that

Dulles knew about and authorized the actual plots that occurred during his tenure. Bissell and Edwards testified that they had briefed Dulles (and Cabell) on the plot involving underworld figures "circumlocutiously," but that they were certain that he had understood that the plot involved assassination. Their testimony is buttressed by the fact that Dulles knew about the plot to assassinate Lumumba which was being planned at the same time, and which also involved Bissell. We can find no evidence that McCone was aware of the plots which occurred during his tenure. His DDP, Richard Helms, testified that he never discussed the subject with McCone and was never expressly authorized by anyone to assassinate Castro.

The only suggestion of express Presidential authorization for the plots against Castro was Richard Bissell's opinion that Dulles would have informed Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy by circumlocution only after the assassination had been planned and was underway. The assumptions underlying this opinion are too attenuated for the Committee to adopt it as a finding. First, this assumes that Dulles himself knew of the plot, a matter which is not entirely certain. Second, it assumes that Dulles went privately to the two Presidents—a course of action which Helms, who had far more covert action experience than Bissell, testified was precisely what the doctrine of plausible denial forbade CIA officials from doing. Third, it necessarily assumes that the Presidents would understand from a "circumlocutious" description that assassination was being discussed.

In view of the strained chain of assumptions and the contrary testimony of all the Presidential advisors, the men closest to both Eisenhower and Kennedy, the Committee makes no finding implicating Presidents who are not able to speak for themselves.

Helms and McCone testified that the Presidents under which they served never asked them to consider assassination.

There was no evidence whatsoever that President Johnson knew about or authorized any assassination activity during his Presidency.

3. CIA Officials Involved in the Assassination Operations Perceived Assassination to Have Been a Permissible Course of Action

The CIA officials involved in the targeted assassination attempts testified that they had believed that their activities had been fully authorized.¹

¹The lower level operatives, such as the AM/LASH case officers, are not discussed in this section, since they had clear orders from their immediate superiors within the CIA.

In the case of the Lumumba assassination operation, Richard Bissell testified that he had no direct recollection of authorization, but after having reviewed the cables and Special Group minutes, testified that authority must have flowed from Dulles through him to the subordinate levels in the Agency.

In the case of the assassination effort against Castro, Bissell and Sheffield Edwards testified they believed the operation involving underworld figures had been authorized by Dulles when they briefed him shortly after the plot had been initiated. William Harvey testified he believed that the plots were completely authorized at every appropriate level within and beyond the Agency, although he had "no personal knowledge whatever of the individuals' identities, times, exact words, or chan-

nels through which such authority may have passed." Harvey stated that he had been told by Richard Bissell that the effort against Castro had been authorized "from the highest level," and that Harvey had discussed the plots with Richard Helms, his immediate superior. Helms testified that although he had never discussed assassination with his superiors, he believed:

"... that in these actions we were taking against Cuba and against Fidel Castro's government in Cuba, that they were what we had been asked to do. ... In other words we had been asked to get rid of Castro and ... there were no limitations put on the means, and we felt we were acting well within the guidelines that we understood to be in play at this particular time.

The evidence points to a disturbing situation. Agency officials testified that they believed the effort to assassinate Castro to have been within the parameters of permissible action. But Administration officials responsible for formulating policy, including McCone, testified that they were not aware of the effort and did not authorize it. The explanation may lie in the fact that orders concerning overthrowing the Castro regime were stated in broad terms that were subject to differing interpretations by those responsible for carrying out those orders.

The various Presidents and their senior advisors strongly opposed the regimes of Castro and Trujillo, the accession to power of Allende, and the potential influence of Patrice Lumumba. Orders concerning action against those foreign leaders were given in vigorous language. For example, President Nixon's orders to prevent Allende from assuming power left Helms feeling that "if I ever carried a marshal's baton in my knapsack out of the Oval Office, it was that day." Similarly, General Lansdale described the Mongoose effort against Cuba as "a combat situation," and Attorney General Kennedy emphasized that "a solution to the Cuba problem today carries top priority." Helms testified that the pressure to "get rid of Castro and the Castro regime" was intense, and Bissell testified that he had been ordered to "get off your ass about Cuba."

It is possible that there was a failure of communication between policymakers and the agency personnel who were experienced in secret, and often violent, action. Although policymakers testified that assassination was not intended by such words as "get rid of Castro." Some of their subordinates in the Agency testified that they perceived that assassination was desired and that they should proceed without troubling their superiors.

The 1967 Inspector General's Report on assassinations appropriately observed:

The point is that of frequent resort to synecdoche—the mention of a part when the whole is to be understood, or vice versa. Thus, we encounter repeated references to phrases such as "disposing of Castro," which may be read in the narrow, literal sense of assassinating him, when it is intended that it be read in the broader, figurative sense of dislodging the Castro regime. Reversing the coin, we find people speaking vaguely of "doing something about Castro" when it is clear that what they have specifically in mind is killing him. In a situation wherein those speaking may not have actually meant what they seemed to say or may not have said what they actually meant, they should not be surprised if their oral shorthand is interpreted differently than was intended.

Differing perceptions between superiors and their subordinates were graphically illustrated in the Castro context.¹ McCone, in a memorandum dated April 14, 1967, reflected as follows:

Through the years the Cuban problem was discussed in terms such as "dispose of Castro," "remove Castro," "knock off

Castro," etc., and this meant the overthrow of the Communist government in Cuba and the replacing of it with a democratic regime. Terms such as the above appear in many working papers, memoranda for the record, etc., and, as stated, all refer to change in the Cuban government.²

Senator MATHIAS. Let me draw an example from history. When Thomas Becket was proving to be an annoyance, as Castro, the King said, "who will rid me of this troublesome priest?" He didn't say, "go out and murder him". He said, "who will rid me of this man," and let it go at that.

Mr. HELMS. That is a warming reference to the problem.

Senator MATHIAS. You feel that spans the generations and the centuries?

Mr. HELMS. I think it does, sir.

Senator MATHIAS. And that is typical of the kind of thing which might be said, which might be taken by the Director or by anybody else as presidential authorization to go forward?

Mr. HELMS. That is right. But in answer to that, I realize that one sort of grows up in tradition of the time and I think that any of us would have found it very difficult to discuss assassinations with a President of the U.S. I just think we all had the feeling that we were hired out to keep those things out of the oval office.

It should be noted, however, that this memorandum was prepared several years after the assassination plots when a newspaper article alleged CIA involvement in attempts on Castro's life.

Helms, who had considerable experience as a covert operator, gave precisely the opposite meaning to the same words, interpreting them, as conveying authority for assassination.

Helms repeatedly testified that he felt that explicit authorization was unnecessary for the assassination of Castro in the early 1960's, but he said he did not construe the intense pressure from President Nixon in 1970 as providing authority to assassinate anyone. As Helms testified, the difference was not that the pressure to prevent Allende from assuming office was any less than the pressure to remove the Castro regime, but rather that "I had already made up my mind that we weren't going to have any of that business when I was Director."

Certain CIA contemporaries of Helms who were subjected to similar pressures in the Castro case rejected the thesis that implicit authority to assassinate Castro derived from the strong language of the policymakers. Bissell testified that he had believed that "formal and explicit approval" would be required for assassination, and Helms' assistant George McManus, testified that "it never occurred to me" that the vigorous words of the Attorney General could be taken as authorizing assassination. The differing perceptions may have resulted from their different backgrounds and training. Neither Bissell (an academician whose Agency career for the six years before he became DDP had been in the field of technology) nor McManus (who had concentrated on intelligence and staff work) were experienced in covert operations.³

³ Of course, this analysis cannot be carried too far. In the Lumumba case, for example, Johnson and Dillon, who were Administration officials with no covert operation experience, construed remarks as urging or permitting assassination, while other persons who were not in the Agency did not so interpret them.

The perception of certain Agency officials that assassination was within the range of permissible activity was reinforced by the continuing approval of violent covert actions against Cuba that were sanctioned at the Presidential level, and by the failure of the successive administrations to make clear that assassination was not permissible. This point is one of the subjects considered in the next section.

4. The Failure in Communication Between Agency Officials in Charge of the Assassination Operation and Their Superiors in the Agency and in the Administration Was Due to:

(A) The Failure of Subordinates to Disclose Their Plans and Operations to Their Superiors; and (B) the Failure of Superiors in the Climate of Violence and Aggressive Covert Actions Sanctioned by the Administrations to Rule Out Assassination as a Tool of Foreign Policy; to Make Clear to Their Subordinates That Assassination Was Impermissible; or to Inquire Further After Receiving Indications That It Was Being Considered

While we cannot find that officials responsible for making policy decisions knew about or authorized the assassination attempts (with the possible exception of the Lumumba case), agency operatives at least through the level of DDP nevertheless perceived assassination to have been permissible. This failure in communication was inexcusable in light of the gravity of assassination. The Committee finds that the failure of Agency officials to inform their superiors was reprehensible, and that the reasons that they offered for having neglected to inform their superiors are unacceptable. The Committee further finds that Administration officials failed to be sufficiently precise in their directions to the Agency, and that their attitude toward the possibility of assassination was ambiguous in the context of the violence of other activities that they did authorize.

(a) Agency Officials Failed on Several Occasions to Reveal the Plots to Their Superiors, or to Do so With Sufficient Detail and Clarity

Several of the cases considered in this report raise questions concerning whether officials of the CIA sufficiently informed their superiors in the Agency or officials outside the Agency about their activities.

(i) Castro

The failure of Agency officials to inform their superiors of the assassination efforts against Castro is particularly troubling.

On the basis of the testimony and documentary evidence before the Committee, it is not entirely certain that Dulles was ever made aware of the true nature of the underworld operation. The plot continued into McCone's term, apparently without McCone's or the Administration's knowledge or approval.

On some occasions when Richard Bissell had the opportunity to inform his superiors about the assassination effort against Castro, he either failed to inform them, failed to do so clearly, or misled them.

Bissell testified that he and Edwards told Dulles and Cabell about the assassination operation using underworld figures, but that they did so "circumlocutiously", and then only after contact had been made with the underworld and a price had been offered for Castro's death.

Perhaps Bissell should have checked back with Dulles at an earlier stage after having received approval to give "thorough consideration" to Castro's "elimination" from Dulles in December 1959.

Bissell further testified that he never

raised the issue of assassination with non-CIA officials of either the Eisenhower or Kennedy Administration. His reason was that since he was under Dulles in the chain of command, he would normally have had no duty to discuss the matter with these Presidents or other Administration officials, and that he assumed that Dulles would have "circumlocutiously" spoken with Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy about the operation. These reasons are insufficient. It was inexcusable to withhold such information from those responsible for formulating policy on the unverified assumption that they might have been "circumlocutiously" informed by Dulles.¹

¹ Even assuming that Bissell correctly perceived that Dulles understood the nature of the operation, it was also inexcusable for Bissell not to have briefed Dulles in plain language. Further, even if one accepts Bissell's assumption that Dulles told the Presidents, they would have been told too late because Bissell "guessed" they would have been told that the operation "had been planned and was being attempted."

The failure either to inform those officials or to make certain that they had been informed by Dulles was particularly reprehensible in light of the fact that there were many occasions on which Bissell should have informed them, and his failure to do so was misleading. In the first weeks of the Kennedy Administration, Bissell met with Bundy and discussed the development of an assassination capability within CIA—Executive Action. But Bissell did not mention that an actual assassination attempt was underway. Bissell appeared before the Taylor-Kennedy Board of Inquiry which was formed to report to the President on the Bay of Pigs and the Cuban situation, but he testified that he did not inform the Board of the assassination operation.² As chief of the CIA directorate concerned with clandestine operations and the Bay of Pigs, Bissell frequently met with officials in the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations to discuss Cuban operations, and his advice was frequently sought. He did not tell them that the CIA had undertaken an effort to assassinate Castro, and did not ask if they favored proceeding with the effort. He was present at the meeting with Dulles and President Kennedy at which the new President was briefed on covert action in Cuba, but neither Dulles nor Bissell mentioned the assassination operation that was underway. Dulles himself may not have always been candid. On December 11, 1959, he approved the CIA's giving "through consideration to the elimination of Fidel Castro," but told the Special Group in a meeting the following month that "we do not have in mind the quick elimination of Castro, but rather actions designed to enable responsible opposition leaders to get a foothold."

² Dulles was also a member of the Board.

The failures to make forthright disclosures to policy-makers continued during the time that Richard Helms was DDP. Helms' failure to inform McCone about the underworld operation (when it was reactivated under Harvey and poison pills were sent to Cuba) was a grave error in judgment, and Helms' excuses are unpersuasive. In May 1962 the Attorney General was told that the CIA's involvement in an assassination plot had terminated with the Bay of Pigs. Not only did Edwards, who had briefed the Attorney General, know that the operation had not been terminated, but Helms did not inform the Attorney General that the operation was still active when he learned that the Attor-

ney General had been misled. Helms did not inform McCone of the plot until August 1963, and did so then in a manner which indicated that the plot had been terminated before McCone became Director. Helms' denial that AM/LASH had been involved in an assassination effort in response to Secretary of State Rusk's inquiries was, as Helms conceded, not factual.

When Helms briefed President Johnson on the Castro plots, he apparently described the activities that had occurred during prior administrations but did not describe the AM/LASH operation which had continued until 1965. Helms also failed to inform the Warren Commission of the plots because the precise question was not asked.¹

¹ John McCone was Director of the CIA and at least knew about the pre-Bay of Pigs plot during the Warren Commission's inquiry. McCone failed to disclose the plot to the Commission. Allen Dulles was on the Warren Commission. He did not inform the other members about the plots that had occurred during his term as DCI.

Helms told the Committee that he had never raised the assassination operation with McCone or other Kennedy Administration officials because of the sensitivity of the matter, because he had assumed that the project had been previously authorized, and because the aggressive character of the Kennedy Administration's program against the Castro regime led him to believe that assassination was permissible, even though he did not receive an express instruction to that effect. He added that he had never been convinced that the operation would succeed, and that he would have told McCone about it if he had ever believed that it would "go anywhere."

Helms' reasons for not having told his superiors about the assassination effort are unacceptable; indeed, many of them were reasons why he should have specifically raised the matter with higher authority. As Helms himself testified, assassination was of a high order of sensitivity. Administration policymakers, supported by intelligence estimates furnished by the Agency, had emphasized on several occasions that successors to Castro might be worse than Castro himself. In addition, the Special Group (Augmented) required that plans for covert actions against Cuba be submitted in detail for its approval. Although the Administration was exerting intense pressure on the CIA to do something about Castro and the Castro regime, it was a serious error to have undertaken so drastic an operation without making certain that there was full and unequivocal permission to proceed.

William Harvey, the officer in charge of the CIA's attempt using underworld figures to assassinate Castro, testified that he never discussed the plot with McCone or officials of the Kennedy Administration because he believed that it had been fully authorized by the previous Director, because he was uncertain whether it had a chance of succeeding, and because he believed that it was not his duty to inform higher authorities.

Nonetheless, the Committee believes there were occasions on which it was incumbent on Harvey to have disclosed the assassination operation. As head of Task Force W, the branch of the CIA responsible for covert operations in Cuba, Harvey reported directly to General Lansdale and the Special Group (Augmented). The Special Group (Augmented) had made it known that covert operations in Cuba should be first approved by it, both by explicit instruction and by its practice that particular opera-

tions be submitted in "nouseating detail." Yet Harvey did not inform either General Lansdale or the Special Group (Augmented) of the assassination operation, either when he was explicitly requested to report to McCone, General Taylor, and the Special Group on his activities in Miami in April 1962, or when the subject of assassination was raised in the August 1962 meeting and McCone voiced his disapproval. Harvey testified that a matter as sensitive as assassination would never be raised in a gathering as large as the Special Group (Augmented).

The Committee finds the reasons advanced for not having informed those responsible for formulating policy about the assassination operation inadequate, misleading and inconsistent. Some officials viewed assassination as too important and sensitive to discuss with superiors, while others considered it not sufficiently important. Harvey testified that it was premature to tell McCone about the underworld operation in April 1962, because it was not sufficiently advanced; but too late to tell him about it in August 1962, since by that time Harvey had decided to terminate it. On other occasions, officials thought disclosure was someone else's responsibility; Bissell said he thought it was up to Dulles, and Harvey believed it was up to Helms.

The Committee concludes that the failure to clearly inform policymakers of the assassination effort against Castro was grossly improper. The Committee believes that it should be incumbent on the DDP to report such a sensitive operation to his superior, the DCI, no matter how grave his doubts might be about the possible outcome of the operation. It follows that the DCI has the same duty to accurately inform his superiors.

(ii) Trujillo

In the Trujillo case there were several instances in which it appears that policymakers were not given sufficient information, or were not informed in a timely fashion.

At a meeting on December 29, 1960, Bissell presented a plan to the Special Group for supporting Dominican exile groups and local dissidents, and stated that the plan would not bring down the regime without "some decisive stroke against Trujillo himself." At a meeting on January 12, 1961, the Special Group authorized the passage of "limited supplies of small arms and other materials" to Dominican dissidents under certain conditions.

At this time, the fact that the dissidents had been contemplating the assassination of Trujillo had been known in the State Department at least through the level of the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, and by senior officials of the CIA, including the DCI. Yet the internal State Department memorandum which was furnished to Undersecretary Livingston Merchant, and which was said to have been the basis for the Special Group's agreeing to the limited supply of small arms and other material (i.e., explosive devices), did not mention assassination. Instead, it spoke of "sabotage potential" and stated that there "would be no thought of toppling the [government] by any such minor measure [as the supplying of small arms and explosives]."

At a meeting of the Special Group on February 14, 1961, representatives of the CIA briefed the new members of the Group on outstanding CIA projects. The Dominican Republic was one of the briefing topics. The minutes of that meeting indicate that Mr. Bandy

requested a memorandum for "higher authority" on the subject of what plans could be made for a successor government to Trujillo. Bissell had no clear recollection as to the details of the February 14 briefing and was unable to recall whether or not the method of overthrow to be attempted by the dissidents was discussed. It is not known, therefore, whether the new members of the Special Group learned, at that time, of Bissell's assessment that overthrow of the regime required a decisive stroke against Trujillo himself. Robert McNamara recalled no mention at that meeting of any dissident plans to assassinate Trujillo.

On February 15 and 17, 1961, memoranda were prepared for the President by Secretary of State Rusk and by Richard Bissell respectively. Although both the Department of State and the CIA then had information concerning the dissidents' intent to assassinate Trujillo if possible, neither memorandum referred to such a contingency. Rusk disclaimed any knowledge of the dissidents' intent to assassinate Trujillo until shortly before the event occurred, but Bissell admitted personal awareness of the assassination plans.

Bissell's February 17 memorandum indicated that dissident leaders had informed the CIA of "their plan of action which they felt could be implemented if they were provided with arms for 300 men, explosives, and remote control detonation devices." Various witnesses testified that supplying arms for 300 men would: standing alone, indicate a "non-targeted" use for the arms. One possible method of assassinating Trujillo which had long been discussed by the dissidents and which was the favored approach at the time of Bissell's memorandum envisioned assassination by means of a bomb detonated by remote control. But the memorandum made no reference to the use to which the explosive devices might be put. (There is no record of any query from recipients of the briefing paper as to the nature of the dissidents' "plan of action" or the uses for which the arms and explosives were intended.)

The passage of the carbines was approved by CIA Headquarters on March 31, 1961. Although the State Department's representative in the Dominican Republic concurred in the decision to pass the carbines, he was requested by the CIA not to communicate this information to State Department officials in Washington, and he complied with that request. Accordingly, neither the State Department nor the White House was aware of the passage for several weeks. Similarly, there was no contemporaneous disclosure outside the CIA, other than to the State Department representative in the Dominican Republic, that machine guns had been sent to the Dominican Republic via the diplomatic pouch.

A memorandum prepared by Adolph Berle, the State Department official from whom the CIA sought permission to pass the machine guns, states that "on cross-examination it developed that the real plan was to assassinate Trujillo and they wanted guns for that purpose." (Berle, Memorandum of Conversation, 5/3/61) Berle's memorandum states that he informed the CIA officials that "we did not wish to have anything to do with any assassination plots anywhere, any time." The CIA official reportedly said he felt the same way, even though on the previous day he had been one of the signers of a draft CIA cable which would have permitted passage of the machine guns to the dissidents for " . . . their additional protection on their proposed endeavor." (Draft

HQs to Station Cable, 5/2/61).

Although the report of a new anti-Trujillo plot was discussed at a meeting of the Special Group on May 4, 1961, there is no indication that Berle, who was the Chairman of the Inter-Agency Task Force having responsibility for contingency planning for Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti, disclosed to higher authority the assassination information which he discovered by "cross-examination." The National Security Council met the next day and noted the President's view that the United States should not initiate the overthrow of Trujillo before it was known what government would succeed him. That National Security Council Record of Action was approved by the President on May 16, 1961. There is no record indicating whether Berle communicated to the President, or to members of the National Security Council, his knowledge as to the lethal intent of the dissidents who would be carrying out the overthrow of Trujillo.

(iii) Schneider

The issue here is not whether the objectives of the CIA were contrary to those of the Administration. It is clear that President Nixon desired to prevent Allende from assuming office, even if that required fomenting and supporting a coup in Chile. Nor did White House officials suggest that tactics employed (including as a first step kidnapping General Schneider) would have been unacceptable as a matter of principle. Rather, the issue posed is whether White House officials were consulted, and thus given an opportunity to weigh such matters as risk and likelihood of success, and to apply policy-making judgments to particular tactics. The record indicates that up to October 15 they were; after October 15 there is some doubt.

The documentary record with respect to the disputed post-October 15 period gives rise to conflicting inferences. On the one hand, Karamessines' calendar shows at least one White House contact in the critical period prior to the kidnapping of General Schneider on October 22. However, the absence of any substantive memoranda in CIA files—when contrasted with several such memoranda describing contacts with the White House between September 15 and October 15—may suggest a lack of significant communication on the part of the CIA as well as a lack of careful supervision on the part of the White House.

The standards applied within the CIA itself suggest a view that action which the Committee believes called for top-level policy discussion and decision was thought of as permissible, without any further consultation, on the basis of the initial instruction to prevent Allende from assuming power. Machine guns were sent to Chile and delivered to military figures there on the authority of middle level CIA officers without consultation even with the CIA officer in charge of the program. We find no suggestion of bad faith in the action of the middle level officers, but their failure to consult necessarily establishes that there was no advance permission from outside the CIA for the passage of machine guns. And it also suggests an unduly lax attitude within the CIA toward consultation with superiors. Further, this case demonstrates the problems inherent in giving an agency a "blank check" to engage in covert operations without specifying which actions are permissible and which are not, and without adequately supervising and monitoring these activities.

(b) Administration Officials Failed to Rule Out Assassination as a Tool of Foreign Policy, to Make Clear to Their Subordinates That Assassination Was Impermissible or to Inquire Further After Receiving Indications That Assassination Was Being Considered

While we do not find that high Administration officials expressly approved of the assassination attempts, we have noted that certain agency officials nevertheless perceived assassination to have been authorized. Although those officials were remiss in not seeking express authorization for their activities, their superiors were also at fault for giving vague instructions and for not explicitly ruling out assassination. No written order prohibiting assassination was issued until 1972, and that order was an internal CIA directive issued by Director Helms.

(i) Trujillo

Immediately following the assassination of Trujillo, there were a number of high-level meetings about the Dominican Republic attended by the policymakers of the Kennedy Administration. All relevant facts concerning CIA and State Department support of the Dominican dissidents were fully known. No directive was issued by the President or the Special Group criticizing any aspect of United States involvement in the Dominican affair. Similarly, there is no record of any action having been taken prohibiting future support or encouragement of groups or individuals known to be planning the assassination of a foreign leader. The meetings and discussions following the Trujillo assassination represent another missed opportunity to establish an administration policy against assassination and may partially account for the CIA's assessment of the Dominican operation as a success a few years later. They may also have encouraged Agency personnel, involved in both the Trujillo and the Castro plots, in their belief that the Administration would not be unhappy if the Agency were able to make Castro disappear. No such claim, however, was made in testimony by any Agency official.

(ii) Schneider

As explained above, there is no evidence that assassination was ever proposed as a method of carrying out the Presidential order to prevent Allende from assuming office. The Committee believes, however, that the granting of *carte blanche* authority to the CIA by the Executive in this case may have contributed to the tragic and unintended death of General Schneider. This was also partially due to assigning an impractical task to be accomplished within an unreasonably short time. Apart from the question of whether any intervention in Chile was justified under the circumstances of this case, the Committee believes that the Executive in any event should have defined the limits of permissible action.

(iii) Lumumba

We are unable to make a finding that President Eisenhower intentionally authorized an assassination effort against Lumumba due to the lack of absolute certainty in the evidence. However, it appears that the strong language used in discussions at the Special Group and NSC, as reflected in minutes of relevant meetings, led Dulles to believe that assassination was desired. The minutes contain language concerning the need to "dispose of" Lumumba, an "extremely

strong feeling about the necessity for straightforward action," and a refusal to rule out any activity that might contribute to "getting rid of" Lumumba.

(iv) Castro

The efforts to assassinate Fidel Castro took place in an atmosphere of extreme pressure by Eisenhower and Kennedy Administration officials to discredit and overthrow the Castro regime. Shortly after Castro's ascendancy to power, Allen Dulles directed that "thorough consideration" be given to the "elimination" of Castro. Richard Helms recalled that:

I remember vividly [that the pressure] was very intense. And therefore, when you go into the record, you find a lot of nutty schemes there and those nutty schemes were borne of the intensity of the pressure. And we were quite frustrated.

Bissell recalled that:

During that entire period, the Administration was extremely sensitive about the defeat that had been inflicted, as they felt, on the U.S. at the Bay of Pigs, and were pursuing every possible means of getting rid of Castro.

Another CIA official stated that sometime in the Fall of 1961 Bissell was:

* * * chewed out in the Cabinet Room in the White House by both the President and the Attorney General for, as he put it, sitting on his ass and not doing anything about getting rid of Castro and the Castro Regime.

General Lansdale informed the agencies cooperating in Operation MONGOOSE that "you're in a combat situation where we have been given full command." Secretary of Defense McNamara confirmed that "we were hysterical about Castro at the time of the Bay of Pigs and thereafter."

Many of the plans that were discussed and often approved contemplated violent action against Cuba. The operation which resulted in the Bay of Pigs was a major paramilitary onslaught that had the approval of the highest government officials, including the two Presidents. Thereafter, Attorney General Kennedy vehemently exhorted the Special Group (Augmented) that "a solution to the Cuban problem today carried top priority * * * no time, money, effort—or manpower is to be spared." Subsequently, Operation MONGOOSE involved propaganda and sabotage operations aimed toward spurring a revolt of the Cuban people against Castro. Measures which were considered by the top policymakers included incapacitating sugar workers during harvest season by the use of chemicals; blowing up bridges and production plants; sabotaging merchandise in third countries—even those allied with the United States—prior to its delivery to Cuba; and arming insurgents on the island. Programs undertaken at the urging of the Administration included intensive efforts to recruit and arm dissidents within Cuba, and raids on plants, mines, and harbors. Consideration and approval of these measures may understandably have led the CIA to conclude that violent actions were an acceptable means of accomplishing important objectives.

The Attorney General himself took a personal interest in the recruitment and development of assets within Cuba, on occasion recommending Cubans to the CIA as possible recruits and meeting in Washington and Florida with Cuban exiles active in the covert war against the Castro Government.

Discussions at the Special Group and NSC meetings might well have contributed to the perception of some CIA officials that assassination was a permissible tool in the effort to overthrow the Castro Regime. At a Special Group meeting in November 1960, Undersecretary Merchant inquired whether any planning had been undertaken for "direct positive action" against Che Guevara.

ra, Raul Castro, and Fidel Castro. Cabell replied that such a capability did not exist, but he might well have left the meeting with the impression that assassination was not out of bounds. Lansdale's plan, which was submitted to the Special Group in January 1962, aimed at inducing "open revolt and overthrow of the Communist regime." Included in its final phase an "attack on the cadre of the regime, including key leaders." The proposal stated that "this should be a 'Special Target' operation * * * Gangster elements might provide the best recruitment potential against police * * *". Although Lansdale's proposal was shelved, the type of aggressive action contemplated was not formally ruled out. Minutes from several Special Group meetings contain language such as "possible removal of Castro from the Cuban scene."

On several occasions, the subject of assassination was discussed in the presence of senior Administration officials. Those officials never consented to actual assassination efforts, but they failed to indicate that assassination was impermissible as a matter of principle.

In early 1961, McGeorge Bundy was informed of a CIA project described as the development of a capability to assassinate. Bundy raised no objection and, according to Bissell, may have been more affirmative. Bissell stated that he did not construe Bundy's remarks as authorization for the underworld plot against Castro that was then underway. But the fact that he believed that the development of an assassination capability had, as he subsequently told Harvey, been approved by the White House, may well have contributed to the general perception that assassination was not prohibited.²

¹ The Inspector General's Report states that Harvey's notes (which no longer exist) quoted Bissell as saying to Harvey "The White House has twice urged me to create such a capability."

² Bundy, as the National Security Advisor to the President, had an obligation to tell the President of such a grave matter, even though it was only a discussion of a capability to assassinate. His failure to do so was a serious error.

Documents received by the Committee indicate that in May 1961, Attorney General Kennedy and the Director of the FBI received information that the CIA was engaged in clandestine efforts against Castro which included the use of Sam Giancana and other underworld figures. The various documents referred to "dirty business," "clandestine efforts," and "plans" which were still "working" and might eventually "pay off." The Committee is unable to determine whether Hoover and the Attorney General ever inquired into the nature of the CIA operation, although there is no evidence that they did so inquire. The Committee believes that they should have inquired, and that their failure to do so was a dereliction of their duties.

Documents indicate that in May 1962, Attorney General Kennedy was told that the CIA had sought to assassinate Castro prior to the Bay of Pigs. According to the CIA officials who were present at the briefing, the Attorney General indicated his displeasure about lack of consultation rather than about the impropriety of the attempt itself. There is no evidence that the Attorney General told the CIA that it must not engage in assassination plots in the future.

At a meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) in August 1962, well after the assassination efforts were underway, Robert McNamara is said to have

raised the question of whether the assassination of Cuban leaders should be explored, and General Lansdale issued an action memorandum assigning the CIA the task of preparing contingency plans for the assassination of Cuban leaders. While McCone testified that he had immediately made it clear that assassination was not to be discussed or condoned, Harvey's testimony and documents which he wrote after the event indicate that Harvey may have been confused over whether McCone had objected to the use of assassination, or whether he was only concerned that the subject not be put in writing. In any event, McCone went no further. He issued no general order banning consideration of assassination within the Agency.

One of the programs forwarded to General Lansdale by the Defense Department in the MONGOOSE program was entitled "Operation Bounty" and envisioned dropping leaflets in Cuba offering rewards for the assassination of Government leaders. Although the plan was vetoed by Lansdale, it indicates that persons in agencies other than the CIA perceived that assassination might be permissible.

While the ambivalence of Administration officials does not excuse the misleading conduct by Agency officials or justify their failure to seek explicit permission, this attitude displayed an insufficient concern about assassination which may have contributed to the perception that assassination was an acceptable tactic in accomplishing the Government's general objectives.

Moreover, with the exception of the tight guidelines issued by the Special Group (Augmented) concerning Operation MONGOOSE, precise limitations were never imposed on the CIA requiring prior permission for the details of other proposed covert operations against Cuba.

No general policy banning assassination was promulgated until Helms' intra-agency order in 1972. Considering the number of times the subject of assassination had arisen, Administration officials were remiss in not explicitly forbidding such activity.

The committee notes that many of the occasions on which CIA officials should have informed their superiors of the assassination efforts but failed to do so, or did so in a misleading manner, were also occasions on which Administration officials paradoxically may have reinforced the perception that assassination was permissible.

For example, when Bissell spoke with Bundy about an Executive Action capability, Bissell failed to indicate that an actual assassination operation was underway, but Bundy failed to rule out assassination as a tactic.

In May 1962, the Attorney General was misleadingly told about the effort to assassinate Castro prior to the Bay of Pigs, but not about the operation that was then going on. The Attorney General, however, did not state that assassination was improper.

When a senior administration official raised the question of whether assassination should be explored at a Special Group meeting, the assassination operation should have been revealed. A firm written order against engaging in assassination should also have been issued by McCone if, as he testified, he had exhibited strong aversion to assassination.

5. Practices Current at the Time in Which the Assassination Plots Occurred Were Revealed by the Record to Create the Risk of Confusion, Rashness and Irresponsibility in the Very Areas Where Clarity and Sober Judgment Were Most Necessary

Various witnesses described elements of the system within which the assassination plots were conceived. The Committee is disturbed by the custom that permitted the most sensitive matters to be presented to the highest levels of Government with the least clarity. We view the following points as particularly dangerous:

(1) The expansion of the doctrine of "plausible denial" beyond its intended purpose of hiding the involvement of the United States from other countries into an effort to shield higher officials from knowledge, and hence responsibility, for certain operations.

(2) The use of circumlocution or euphemism to describe serious matters—such as assassination—when precise meanings ought to be made clear.

(3) The theory that general approval of broad covert action programs is sufficient to justify specific actions such as assassination or the passage of weapons.

(4) The theory that authority granted, or assumed to be granted, by one DCI or one Administration could be presumed to continue without the necessity for reaffirming the authority with successor officials.

(5) The creation of covert capabilities without careful review and authorization by policymakers, and the further risk that such capabilities, once created, might be used without specific authorization.

(a) The Danger Inherent in Overextending the Doctrine of "Plausible Denial"

The original concept of "plausible denial" envisioned implementing covert actions in a manner calculated to conceal American involvement if the actions were exposed. The doctrine was at times a delusion and at times a snare. It was naive for policymakers to assume that sponsorship of actions as big as the Bay of Pigs invasion could be concealed. The Committee's investigation of assassination and the public disclosures which preceded the inquiry demonstrate that when the United States resorted to cloak-and-dagger tactics, its hand was ultimately exposed. We were particularly disturbed to find little evidence that the risks and consequences of disclosure were considered.

We find that the likelihood of reckless action is substantially increased when policymakers believe that their decisions will never be revealed. Whatever can be said in defense of the original purpose of plausible denial—a purpose which intends to conceal United States involvement from the outside world—the extension of the doctrine to the internal decision-making process of the Government is absurd. Any theory which, as a matter of doctrine, places elected officials on the periphery of the decision-making process is an invitation to error, an abdication of responsibility, and a perversion of democratic government. The doctrine is the antithesis of accountability.

(b) The danger of Using "Circumlocution" and "Euphemism"

According to Richard Bissell, the extension of "plausible denial" to internal decision-making required the use

of circumlocution and euphemism in speaking with Presidents and other senior officials.

Explaining this concept only heightens its absurdity. On the one hand, it assumes that senior officials should be shielded from the truth to enable them to deny knowledge if the truth comes out. On the other hand, the concept assumes that senior officials must be told enough, by way of double talk, to grasp the subject. As a consequence, the theory fails to accomplish its objective and only increases the risk of misunderstanding. Subordinate officials should describe their proposals in clear, precise, and brutally frank language: superiors are entitled to, and should demand, no less.

Euphemism may actually have been preferred—not because of “plausible denial”—but because the persons involved could not bring themselves to state in plain language what they intended to do. In some instances, moreover, subordinates may have assumed, rightly or wrongly, that the listening superiors did not want the issue squarely placed before them. “Assassinate,” “murder” and “kill” are words many people do not want to speak or hear. They describe acts which should not even be proposed, let alone plotted. Failing to call dirty business by its rightful name may have increased the risk of dirty business being done.

(c) The Danger of Generalized Instructions

Permitting specific acts to be taken on the basis of general approvals of broad strategies (e.g., keep Allende from assuming office, get rid of the Castro regime) blurs responsibility and accountability. Worse still, it increases the danger that subordinates may take steps which would have been disapproved if the policymakers had been informed. A further danger is that policymakers might intentionally use loose general

instructions to evade responsibility for embarrassing activities.

In either event, we find that the gap between the general policy objectives and the specific actions undertaken to achieve them was far too wide.

It is important that policymakers review the manner in which their directives are implemented, particularly when the activities are sensitive, secret, and immune from public scrutiny.

(d) The Danger of “Floating Authorization”

One justification advanced by Richard Helms and William Harvey for not informing John McCone about the use of underworld figures to attempt to assassinate Fidel Castro was their assertion that the project had already been approved by McCone's predecessor, Allan Dulles, and that further authorization was unnecessary, at least until the operation had reached a more advanced stage.

We find that the idea that authority might continue or “float” from one administration or director to the next and that there is no duty to reaffirm authority inhibits responsible decision-making. Circumstances may change or judgments differ. New officials should be given the opportunity to review significant programs.

(e) The Problems Connected With Creating New Covert Capabilities

The development of a new capability raises numerous problems. Having a capability to engage in certain covert activity increases the probability that the activity will occur, since the capability represents a tool available for use. There is the further danger that authorization for the mere creation of a capability may be misunderstood as permitting its use without requiring further authorization.

Finally, an assassination capability should never have been created.

Recommendations

The Committee's long investigation of assassination has brought a number of important issues into sharp focus. Above all stands the question of whether assassination is an acceptable tool of American foreign policy. Recommendations on other issues must await the completion of our continuing investigation and the final report, but the Committee needs no more information to be convinced that a flat ban against assassination should be written into law.

We condemn assassination and reject it as an instrument of American policy. Surprisingly, however, there is presently no statute making it a crime to assassinate a foreign official outside the United States. Hence, for the reasons set forth below, the Committee recommends the prompt enactment of a statute making it a Federal crime to commit or attempt an assassination, or to conspire to do so.

A. General Agreement That the United States Must Not Engage in Assassination

Our view that assassination has no place in America's arsenal is shared by the Administration.

President Ford, in the same statement in which he asked this Committee to deal with the assassination issue, stated:

I am opposed to political assassination. This administration has not and will not use such means as instruments of national policy. (Presidential Press Conference, 6/9/75, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. II, No. 24, p. 611.)

The witnesses who testified before the Committee uniformly condemned assassination. They denounced it as immoral, described it as impractical, and reminded us that an open society, more than any other, is particularly vulnerable to the risk that its own leaders may be assassinated. As President Kennedy reportedly said: “We can't get into that kind of thing, or we would all be targets.” (Goodwin, 7/18/75, p. 4)

The current Director of Central Intelligence and his two predecessors testified emphatically that assassination should be banned. William Colby said:

With respect to assassination, my position is clear, I just think it is wrong. And I have said so and made it very clear to my subordinates. * * * 5/21/75, p. 89.)

Richard Helms, who had been involved in an assassination plot before he became DCI, said he had concluded assassination should be ruled out for both moral and practical reasons:

As a result of my experiences through the years, when I became Director I had made up my mind that this option * * * of killing foreign leaders, was something that I did not want to happen on my watch. My reasons for this were these:

There are not only moral reasons but there are also some other rather practical reasons: It is almost impossible in a democracy to keep anything like that secret * * * Somebody would go to a Congressman, his Senator, he might go to a newspaper man, whatever the case may be, but it just is not a

practical alternative, it seems to me, in our society.

Then there is another consideration * * * if you are going to try by this kind of means to remove a foreign leader, then who is going to take his place running that country, and are you essentially better off as a matter of practice when it is over than you were before? And I can give you I think a very solid example of this which happened in Vietnam when President Diem was eliminated from the scene. We then had a revolving door of prime ministers after that for quite some period of time, during which the Vietnamese Government at a time in its history when it should have been strong was nothing but a caretaker government.

In other words, that whole exercise turned out to be the disadvantage of the United States: * * * there is no sense in my sitting here with all the experience I have had and not sharing with the Committee my feelings this day. It isn't because I have lost my cool, or because I have lost my guts, it simply is because I don't think it is a viable option in the United States of America these days.

Chairman Church. Doesn't it also follow, Mr. Helms—I agree with what you have said fully—but doesn't it also follow on the practical side, apart from the moral side, that since these secrets are bound to come out, when they do, they do very grave political damage to the United States in the world at large? I don't know to what extent the Russians involved themselves in political assassinations, but under their system they at least have a better prospect of keeping it concealed. Since we do like a free society and since these secrets are going to come out in due course, the revelation will then do serious injury to the good name and reputation of the United States.

Would you agree with that?

Mr. Helms. Yes, I would.

Chairman Church. And finally, if we were to reserve to ourselves the prerogative to assassinate foreign leaders, we may invite reciprocal action from foreign governments who assume that if it's our prerogative to do so, it is their prerogative as well, and that is another danger that we at least invite with this kind of action, wouldn't you agree?

Mr. Helms: Yes, sir. (Helms, 6/13/75, pp. 76-78)

John McCone said he was opposed to assassinations because:

I didn't think it was proper from the standpoint of the U.S. Government and the Central Intelligence Agency. (McCone, 6/6/75, p. 15)

B. CIA Directives Banning Assassination

Helms in 1972 and Colby in 1973 issued internal CIA orders banning assassination. Helms' order said:

It has recently again been alleged in the press that CIA engages in assassination. As you are well aware, this is not the case, and Agency policy has long been clear on this issue. To underline it, however, I direct that no such activity or operation be undertaken, assisted or suggested by any of our personnel * * * (Memo, Helms to Deputy Directors, 3/6/72)

In one of a series of orders arising out of the CIA's own review of prior “questionable activity,” Colby stated:

CIA will not engage in assassination nor induce, assist or suggest to others that assassination be employed. (Memo, Colby to Deputy Directors, 8/29/73)

C. The Need for a Statute

Commendable and welcome as they are, these CIA directives are not sufficient. Administrations change, CIA directors change, and someday in the future what was tried in the past may once again become a temptation. Assassination plots did happen. It would be irresponsible not to do all that can be done to prevent their happening again. A law is needed. Laws express our nation's values; they deter those who might be tempted to ignore those values and stiffen the will of those who want

to resist the temptation.

The Committee recommends a statute which would make it a criminal offense for persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States (1) to conspire, within or outside the United States, to assassinate a foreign official; (2) to attempt to assassinate a foreign official, or (3) to assassinate a foreign official.

Present law makes it a crime to kill, or to conspire to kill, a foreign official or foreign official guest while such a person is in the United States. (18 U.S.C. 1116-1117). However, there is no law which makes it a crime to assassinate, to conspire to assassinate, or to attempt to assassinate a foreign official while such official is outside the United States. The Committee's proposed statute is designed to close this gap in the law.

Subsection (a) of the proposed statute would punish conspiracies within the United States; subsection (b) would punish conspiracies outside the United States. Subsection (b) is necessary to eliminate the loophole which would otherwise permit persons to simply leave the United States and conspire abroad. Subsections (c) and (d), respectively, would make it an offense to attempt to kill a foreign official outside the United States.

Subsections (a), (b), (c), and (d) would apply expressly to any "officer or employee of the United States" to make clear that the statute punishes conduct by United States Government personnel, as well as conduct by private citizens. In addition, subsection (a), which covers conspiracies within the United States, would apply to "any other person," regardless of citizenship. Non-citizens who conspired within the United States to assassinate a foreign official would clearly come within the jurisdiction of the law. Subsections (b), (c), and (d), which deal with conduct abroad, would apply to United States citizens, and to officers or employees of the United States, regardless of their citizenship. Criminal liability for acts committed abroad by persons who are not American citizens or who are not officers or employees of the United States is beyond the jurisdiction of the United States.

"Foreign official" is defined in subsection (e) (2) to make clear that an offense may be committed even though the "official" belongs to an insurgent force, an unrecognized government, or a political party. The Committee's investigation—as well as the reality of international politics—has shown that officials in such organizations are potential targets for assassination. Killing, attempting to kill, or conspiring to kill would be punishable under the statute only if it were politically motivated. Political motivation would encompass acts against foreign officials because of their political views, actions, or state-

ments.

²For example, Lumumba was not an official of the Congolese government at the time of the plots against his life, and Trujillo, even though the dictator of the Dominican Republic, held no official governmental position in the latter period of his regime.

The definition of "foreign official" in section (e) (2) also provides that such person must be an official of a foreign government or movement "with which the United States is not at war pursuant to a declaration of war or against which the United States Armed Forces have not been introduced into hostilities or situations pursuant to the provisions of the War Powers Resolution." This definition makes it clear that, absent a declaration of war or the introduction of United States Armed Forces pursuant to the War Powers Resolution, the killing of foreign officials on account of their political views would be a criminal offense.

During the Committee's hearings, some witnesses, while strongly condemning assassination, asked whether assassination should absolutely be ruled out in a time of truly unusual national emergency. Adolf Hitler was cited as an example. Of course, the cases which the Committee investigated were not of that character. Indeed, in the Cuban missile crisis—the only situation of true national danger considered in this report—assassination was not even considered and, if used, might well have aggravated the crisis.

In a grave emergency, the President has a limited power to act, not in violation of the law, but in accord with his own responsibilities under the Constitution to defend the Nation. As the Supreme Court has stated, the Constitution "is not a suicide pact." (*Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez*, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963).)

During an unprecedented emergency, Abraham Lincoln claimed unprecedented power based on the need to preserve the nation:

"... my oath to preserve the Constitution to the best of my ability, imposed upon me the duty of preserving, by every indispensable means, that government—that nation—of which that Constitution was the organic law. Was it possible to lose the nation, and yet preserve the Constitution? By general law, life and limb must be protected; yet often a limb must be amputated to save a life; but a life is never wisely given to save a limb. I felt that measures, otherwise unconstitutional, might become lawful, by becoming indispensable to the preservation of the Constitution, through the preservation of the nation." (*The Complete Works of Abraham Lincoln*, Vol. X, pp. 65-66.) (Nicolay and Hay, Eds. 1894.)

Whatever the extent of the President's own constitutional powers, it is a fundamental principal of our constitutional system that those powers are checked and limited by Congress, including the impeachment power. As a necessary corollary, any action taken by a President pursuant to his limited inherent powers and in apparent conflict with the law must be disclosed to Congress. Only then can Congress judge whether

the action truly represented, in Lincoln's phrase, an "indispensable necessity" to the life of the Nation.

As Lincoln explained in submitting his extraordinary actions to Congress for ratification:

In full view of his great responsibility he has, so far, done what he has deemed his duty. You will now, according to your own judgment perform yours. (Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session, July 4, 1861.)

Epilogue

The Committee does not believe that the acts which it has examined represent the real American character. They do not reflect the ideals which have given the people of the country and of the world hope for a better, fuller, fairer life. We regard the assassination plots as aberrations.

The United States must not adopt the tactics of the enemy. Means are as important as ends. Crisis makes it tempting to ignore the wise restraints that make men free. But each time we do so, each time the means we use are wrong, our inner strength, the strength which makes us free is lessened.

Despite our distaste for what we have seen, we have great faith in this country. The story is sad, but this country has the strength to hear the story and to learn from it. We must remain a people who confront our mistakes and resolve not to repeat them. If we do not, we will decline; but, if we do, our future will be worthy of the best of our past.

Panel Members Listed

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 29—The Senate select committee whose report on Central Intelligence Agency activities was made public today was composed of the following 11 members:

Frank Church, Democrat of Idaho, chairman.

John G. Tower, Republican of Texas, vice chairman.

Philip A. Hart, Democrat of Michigan.
Walter F. Mondale, Democrat of Minnesota.

Walter D. Huddleston, Democrat of Kentucky.

Robert Morgan, Democrat of North Carolina.

Gary Hart, Democrat of Colorado.
Howard H. Baker Jr., Republican of Tennessee.

Barry Goldwater, Republican of Arizona.

Charles McC. Mathias Jr., Republican of Maryland.

Richard Schweiker, Republican of Pennsylvania.

Kissinger-C.I.A. Conflict In Chile Hearings Cited

By SEYMOUR M. HERSK

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence reported yesterday that during its hearings there had been conflicts in testimony between Henry A. Kissinger and the Central Intelligence Agency about the extent of White House authorization for the agency's role in a Chilean kidnapping plot in October 1970.

Mr. Kissinger, who was then president Nixon's national security adviser, told the committee in secret testimony last August that he and his deputy, Gen. Alexander M. Haig, had turned down a specific C.I.A. proposal to organize a military coup d'etat aimed at preventing Salvador Allende from becoming President of Chile.

Agency officials testified, however, that their subsequent involvement in the kidnapping and assassination of a high-level Chilean general loyal to Mr. Allende came, as the Senate report put it, "with the knowledge and approval of the White House."

The Senate report concluded that while the United States' policy was to seek a military coup, there was no evidence that any American official specifically planned an assassination or expected that a kidnapping attempt would lead to a shooting.

Two Attempts Failed

The Senate testimony revealed that Richard M. Helms, who was then Director of Central Intelligence, and other agency officials continued to aid anti-Allende military factions even after it became clear that no military coup would be possible without the removal of Gen. Rene Schneider, the army's commander in chief, who was an Allende supporter.

The C.I.A. encouraged two unsuccessful kidnapping attempts in mid-October on the general, supplying at least \$70,000 to two Chilean officers and three machine guns and other weapons, the testimony showed. On the third attempt, General Schneider was assassinated after he allegedly opened fire on his abductors.

The slaying took place on Oct. 22, 1970, two days before Mr. Allende's victory in the Sept. 4 election was to be ratified by the Congress. Mr. Allende, a Marxist who was founder of the Socialist Party in Chile, defeated less leftist candidates who had been covertly aided by the C.I.A.

On the previous Sept. 15, the Senate report said, President Nixon had summoned Mr. Helms to a White House meeting with Mr. Kissinger and John N. Mitchell, then the Attorney General, and ordered the C.I.A. to spend \$10 million, and "more if necessary," to provoke a military coup in an effort to "save Chile."

Details of Mr. Nixon's role

in the plotting were initially described last July by The New York Times, but the Senate assassinati report included the first direct testimony on the operation as well as the first account of the dispute between Mr. Kissinger and the C.I.A. over who authorized what.

During his Senate testimony, Mr. Kissinger acknowledged that he was aware that the primary thrust of the White House meeting "was to urge Helms to do whatever he could to prevent Allende from being seated." Mr. Kissinger further testified, "It is clear that President Nixon wanted him [Helms] to encourage the Chilean military to cooperate or to take the initiative in preventing Allende from taking office."

The Senate report describes how the C.I.A. was authorized to report on its efforts to President Nixon through Mr. Kissinger, bypassing the Ambassador in Chile, the Department of State, the Pentagon and the 40 Committee. At the time, the 40 Committee which oversees clandestine intelligence efforts, was considered one of the most secret units in the Government.

This led to what the Senate report called a two-track approach, with the 40 Committee authorizing funds for anti-Allende propaganda activity and the White House seeking contacts with Chilean military men who would lead a coup.

By the end of September, the Senate report concluded, both tracks had the same goal: the overthrow of the Allende Government.

The Senate report notes that the White House insisted that economic pressure also be brought against the Allende Government. The report includes the following warning that Ambassador Edward M. Korry, sent to a Chilean political moderate in an effort encourage him to become involved in the anti-Allende planning:

Not a nut or bolt will be allowed to reach Chile under Allende. Once Allende comes to power we shall do all within our power to condemn Chile and the Chileans to utmost deprivation and poverty, a policy designed for a long time to come to accelerate the hard features of a Communist society in Chile."

Thomas Karamessines, then the C.I.A. deputy director in charge of covert operations, was placed in direct charge of a special Chilean task force. He told the Senate committee of having been under pressure from Mr. Kissinger to accomplish an overthrow. Mr. Kissinger, "left no doubt in my mind," Mr. Karamessines testified, "that he was under the heaviest of pressure to get this accomplished, and he in turn was placing us under the heaviest

White House Not Linked To Plots Against Castro

By JOHN M. CREWDSON

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 20—The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence reported today that it had not found any evidence of White House authorization for repeated attempts by the Central Intelligence Agency to inspire a bizarre variety of plots against the life of Prime Minister Fidel Castro of Cuba.

In the report issued by the committee today, nearly a third of which was devoted to the agency's persistent but unsuccessful efforts to arrange for the deaths of Mr. Castro and his two principal associates, the panel said that it had uncovered "at least" eight separate plots conceived by C.I.A. officials in the Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson Administrations.

The death plots some of which never progressed from the planning stage, were aimed variously at the Cuban leader, his brother Raul and Ernesto Che Guevara, the late Cuban Finance Minister, the committee said, and spanned the period from 1960 to 1965.

There was no clear indication,

of pressures to get it accomplished."

Mr. Kissinger, in his testimony, said he knew of no specific plan that involved the abduction of General Schneider.

He testified that on Oct. 15, 1970, he met in the White House with Mr. Karamessines to discuss a coup attempt to be led by a retired Chilean general, Roberto Viaux Marambio. His chances were not rated very high and it was decided at the meeting to forestall any further action by Mr. Viaux.

The basic dispute cited by the Senate emerged from that meeting. Mr. Kissinger, whose testimony was supported by General Haig, said that he had turned "off the coup plans." Mr. Karamessines told the Senate Committee that he had left the meeting after Mr. Kissinger said that "the agency should continue keeping the pressure on every Allende weak spot in sight."

Mr. Karamessines further testified that there never was a White House order ending the anti-Allende effort.

"I am sure that the seeds that were laid in that effort in 1970 had their impact in 1973," he told the committee, alluding to the coup that ousted Mr. Allende in September 1973 and led to his death.

The Senate report noted that it had been unable to question former President Nixon in this point and had been unable to gain access to the daily calendars of Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Nixon to confirm that some of the subsequent meetings on a military solution in Chile alleged to have taken place by C.I.A. officials had actually been held.

according to the report, that any of the plots, which involved as prospective assassins American underworld figures, Cuban exiles and a C.I.A. agent within the Castro Government, had been approved in advance, or even made known to, Government officials outside the C.I.A.

In addition, the committee said that there was no indisputable evidence that Allen W. Dulles, the Director of Central Intelligence when the first plot was conceived, had been made aware of it in detail by his subordinates, and no evidence at all that John A. McCone, his successor, was told of the plotting that took place within the agency in his tenure.

The Senate report conceded that to provide the United States with a "plausible denial" in the event the anti-Castro plots were discovered, Presidential authorization might have been subsequently "obscured." It also declared that, whatever the extent of their knowledge, Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson should bear the "ultimate responsibility for the actions of their subordinates."

The report termed "particularly reprehensible" the apparent failure of Richard Bissell, the C.I.A.'s chief of clandestine operations when he initially attempted were made on Mr. Castro's life, to make certain that Mr. Dulles and Presidents Kennedy and Johnson knew what was afoot.

And the committee described as "a grave error in judgment" the failure of Richard Helms, Mr. Bissell's successor and now the American Ambassador to Iran, to inform Mr. McCone in early 1962 that plotting against Mr. Castro's life was continuing.

The initial planning for a Cuban assassination, the report said, involved an attempt to arrange for a fatal accident involving not Mr. Castro, but his brother Raul. The plan was aborted by Tracy Barnes, then Mr. Bissell's deputy and now deceased, shortly after he had approved it, and the accident never took place.

That effort was followed by the preparation by C.I.A. scientists of a box of cigars, of the brand favored by the Cuban Prime minister, that had been impregnated with a poison. But the Senate committee found no evidence that the cigars had ever been delivered.

The attempt to arrange the accident, the report said, was little more than a response by the C.I.A. to an opportunity that one of its Cuban agents was to have for close access to Raul Castro, and the poisoned cigars seemed almost an afterthought.

But the plotting within the C.I.A. against Mr. Castro's life

NEW YORK TIMES
20 Nov. 1975

COLBY ASKS PANEL TO DROP 12 NAMES FROM PLOT REPORT

By JOHN M. CREWDSON

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 19—William E. Colby, the Director of Central Intelligence, appealed today to a Senate committee not to make public the names of 12 individuals, some of them agency officials, who were allegedly involved in C.I.A. plots against the lives of foreign heads of state.

In a rare news conference at the Central Intelligence Agency's suburban Virginia headquarters, Mr. Colby said that he feared that the individuals, if named in a committee report expected to be released tomorrow, might be subject to retaliation from "unstable and extremist groups."

He said that while he opposed "in principle" publication of the report on C.I.A. assassination plots, which must be approved by the full Senate in order to be released, his immediate concern was to protect "the safety and livelihoods of the individuals involved" in those matters and also "the future of American intelligence."

An All-Out Effort

Mr. Colby's unusual appeal, which seemed to have been addressed as much to the full Senate as to the 11 members of the Select Committee on Intelligence, which has voted unanimously to approve the report's release, marked an all-out effort by the Ford Administration to block disclosure of the document on the Senate floor.

The Senate is scheduled to begin a closed debate at 9 A.M. tomorrow on whether to approve or forbid the release of the assassination report, a document of nearly 400 pages that is based on a five-month investigation by the select committee.

Senator Frank Church, the committee's chairman, said that his panel had considered carefully the C.I.A.'s arguments for deleting the names of individuals included in its report and had done so where it believed that was warranted.

"In the end," said Mr.

involved in such assassination attempts.

According to the report, when Mr. Helms later briefed President Johnson on the early Castro plots, he did not describe for him the Am-Lash operation, the only one that had continued into his presidency.

began in earnest some eight months before the 1961 invasion of Cuba by an anti-Castro exile force trained by the agency.

The report said that beginning in August 1960, three months before the election of President Kennedy, the C.I.A., working through Robert A. Maheu, a former F.B.I. agent who later served as a top aide to Howard R. Hughes, the billionaire industrialist, asked John Roselli, a reputed organized-crime figure, to locate one or more Cubans willing to make an attempt on Mr. Castro's life.

Mr. Roselli eventually brought two other top underworld figures into the operation—Sam Giancana, now dead but for years the head of an important Chicago crime syndicate, and Santos Trafficante, a Cuban exile who has been associated with criminal elements in Tampa, Fla.

Mr. Bissell told the Senate committee that he knew that underworld figures had been enlisted on behalf of the C.I.A. to arrange for the murder, which was to have coincided with the Bay of Pigs invasion the following April, and which was to have involved the slipping of pills containing toxin into Mr. Castro's food by a waiter in a Havana restaurant.

Mr. Bissell told the panel that he and another agency official, Col. Sheffield Edwards, had briefed Mr. Dulles "circumlocutiously" about an "intelligence operation" then under way against the Castro Government, and that they believe he understood that it revolved around assassination, although the word was never spoken.

Mr. Bissell also said that he assumed that Mr. Dulles had informed General Eisenhower and Mr. Kennedy, on the basis of that indirect briefing.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation became aware in May, 1962, more than a year after the Cuban invasion—and the assassination attempt—that failed, that Mr. Giancana had told associates of his involvement in a scheme to kill Mr. Castro.

The F.B.I., according to documents obtained by the committee, also discovered that Mr. Maheu and Mr. Giancana had been involved in tapping a telephone in a Las Vegas, Nev. hotel room, and learned upon investigating that the C.I.A. apparently as a favor to Mr. Giancana, had paid for the installation.

Robert F. Kennedy, the late President's brother who was Attorney General at the time inquired about the details of the relationship and was told by Colonel Edwards in May 1972, that Mr. Giancana and others had been involved in an assassination plot against Mr. Castro that ended after the abortive invasion.

But the Senate report said that a second effort, also involving poison pills designed for Mr. Castro's food was at that moment under way within the C.I.A., that Colonel Edwards, who knew about it, did not tell Mr. Kennedy and that Mr. Helms, who had taken over from Mr. Bissell, did not come

forward when he learned that the Attorney General had been misled.

Mr. Helms's reasons for not having told Mr. Kennedy, Mr. McCone or any other superior about the continuing assassination efforts, according to his testimony, concerned his assumption that the efforts had previously been authorized by higher-ups. Also, he said that he assumed that the Kennedy Administration's internal expressions of antipathy toward the Castro Government amounted to tacit approval.

In any event, according to the Senate report, the plot involving the underworld and the poison pills was subsequently abandoned by the C.I.A. after several of the Cuban operatives assigned to administer the poison to Mr. Castro got "cold feet."

Other schemes were hatched at C.I.A. headquarters in 1963, including one that suggested placing an exploding seashell in the water near Mr. Castro's favorite bathing spot in the Caribbean, and another, equally bizarre, designed to supply Mr. Castro with a skin-diving suit that had been contaminated in advance by bacteria.

Neither of those schemes, the report said, appears to have been taken beyond the C.I.A. laboratory, but later in 1963 a C.I.A. agent inside the Cuban Government, known by the agency cryptonym Am-Lash, was offered a pen containing a poison needle after he expressed a willingness to take Mr. Castro's life.

The agent, the report said, rejected the device as too amateurish. The Senate panel noted that the offer was made to him on Nov. 22, 1963, at almost the precise moment time Mr. Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas.

It was ironic, the report said, that almost at the same moment a special envoy from Mr. Kennedy was meeting with Mr. Castro "to explore the possibility of improved relations."

Warren Not Told

The Warren Commission, which investigated the circumstances in the Kennedy assassination, was never made aware of the C.I.A.'s attempts on Mr. Castro's life as an adjunct to its inquiry, according to former commission lawyers.

Mr. McCone, who was subsequently told about the plotting against Mr. Castro before the Bay of Pigs invasion, never told the Warren Commission, of which he was a member, of what he knew, and Mr. Helms did not volunteer his knowledge the Senate report said, "because the precise question was not asked" of him.

The C.I.A. continued to encourage Am-Lash, the report said, by providing him with a cache of weapons in Cuba and later by putting him in touch with a group of anti-Castro exiles in this country who could also supply arms.

These efforts continued into 1965, the Senators found, and said that Mr. Helms, who knew about some of them, denied to Secretary of State Dean Rusk that Am-Lash had ever been

Church, an Idaho Democrat, "the committee decided which names must be included," and he added, "We intend to proceed with the report."

According to Mr. Colby, the C.I.A. provided the Church committee with about 30 names of agency employees and American and foreign collaborators in connection with its inquiry into the assassination plots, because it believed those names were "important to an understanding of the matter" by the committee.

But, he said, the committee had agreed to the agency's request to remove the names from the final version of its report in only "18 or 20" of the cases.

It was not a question, Mr. Colby added, of whether the assassination attempts were "good or bad," and he said that Mr. Ford's expressed disapproval of such activities "is shared by many of us."

"The real question," he continued, "is whether we will impose an extra legal retaliation upon people who, at one time, did what the general consensus of people and the command structure around them thought was appropriate at the time."

At a news conference called after Mr. Colby's, Senator Church defended his intention to seek the release of the document with a reference to a decision by a United States district judge here earlier this week not to order the deletion of one such name.

The judge, Gerhard A. Gesell, ruled that while the identification of a man described only as a retired C.I.A. official might endanger his life, he was compelled to deny the former official's request for anonymity because the "public interest" in the report's contents "greatly outweighs the right to privacy of an individual."

The Senate committee agreed yesterday, however, to excise the name of the retired official, who is understood to be Dr. Sidney Gottlieb, the former head of the agency's technical services division, whose name was reported prominently earlier this year after he was questioned in closed session by the committee about other matters.

Mr. Colby, without naming Dr. Gottlieb, acknowledged today that some of the 12 names remaining in the Senate report, and possibly some of those deleted at the agency's request, had been mentioned in news accounts of the Senate committee's investigation.

But, he said, there is "a vast difference in my mind between their appearance in press stories and their official confirmation in a committee report." He also expressed concern that such confirmation might bring the individuals harm from unnamed groups, "either domestic or foreign, who might feel called upon to take some such action against these people."

The C.I.A. director said that if neither the select committee nor the Senate acceded to his wishes to preserve their anonymity, the C.I.A. would provide the named individuals with what "limited protection

21 Nov. 1975

Story an Unhappy One For Voice of America

By LINDA CHARLTON

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 20— It wasn't the kind of story that anyone at the Voice of America was very happy about:

"It's a mean story, not at all consistent with what we think of ourselves," said the chief of the news division. But at 6:30 P.M. They were ready to start broadcasting it around the world. MI In Enish, the radio script begins this way: "In Washington, a Senate investigation reveals that the United States Central Intelligence Agency was involved in several plots to kill foreign leaders."

By midnight, it would be broadcast several times in English and in Khmer, Thai, Spanish, Hindi, Arabic, Urdu, Ukrainian and, at what will be dawn in Moscow, Russian.

As the 24-hour broadcast cycle turns, the story—modified by time change and expanded with reaction, background and analysis—will be broadcast in all the 35 languages in which the Voice—the broadcast arm of the United States Information Agency—is fluent.

Differences in Content

There would be modifications for different regions. To be included in broadcasts to Southeast Asia was a more detailed look at the assassination of Ngo Dinh diem, the South Vietnamese President.

For Africa, the plots to kill the first Prime Minister of the Congo, now Zaire, Patrice Lumumba were detailed, along with the fact that Mr. Lumumba was in fact, "apparently murdered by his rivals," not by the C.I.A.

For the Latin-American service, the plots against Fidel Castro of Cuba, Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic and Gen. Rene Schmed of Chile were given prominence.

"If you're caught not telling it straight," said Bernard H. Kamenske, chief of the news division, "you lose any sense of trust with your listener."

He acknowledged that this is not a universal view in government circles, that there are those who think the United States should not be paying good money to advertise its own faults. But he insisted, "There is no alternative to it. What we attempt to provide is reality. And any diplomat who thinks that they're hurt by reality, they're mistaken."

Sometimes those ome

voices have prevailed. Last spring, under the direction of the State Department, information about the United States evacuation from Saigon was restricted to "official statements" from the Administration or Congress.

Mr. Kamenske and his superior, Alan Heil, chief of news and current affairs, at first yielded to the pressure to go along with the limitation, then they broke with it in a memorandum to the Voice staff. "It is important to remember that we strive to know the truth and tell it," the memo said.

Mr. Kamenske, a big, bespectacled man of 48, said that the C.I.A. story did cause many at the broadcast service a sense of "personal embarrassment" because "we are an American abroad."

Kenneth R. Giddens, the Alabama businessman who heads the agency, was personally regretful: "I think it's a very tragic thing that we're confronted with this situation, which I doubt does this nation any good. Everybody knows we live in a jungle world, and activities take place by almost all nations when their interests are threatened. But most of them have laws, such as official secrets laws, so that some of the more distasteful things they've done aren't spread on the record."

He added, "I wish we were smart enough and our system permitted some way legally—legally—so we could clean dirty linen in private."

Playing It Straight

Public laundering being the way things are done, however, Mr. Giddens said he had not even discussed the C.I.A. report with the news staff, and assumed, "The men down there in charge are going to play this thing straight." He was asked if there had been any pressure to handle the story gingerly, or to downplay it: "Not on this," he said, in a studio with a smile.

Down the hall, at 3:30 P.M., Anatol Petrov was broadcasting to the Soviet Union about the Senate committee's decision to disregard the President and publish a "report about participation of C.I.A. in plots to kill foreign state leaders."

A few hours later, in time for early-rising Muscovites to listen with their morning tea, the Russian service would be saying something very much like, "In Washington, a Senate investigation reveals..."

19 Nov. 1975

INTELLIGENCE COST PUT AT \$4 BILLION

By LESLIE H. GELB

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 18—The developing debate over the national intelligence community has forced disclosure for the first time of total appropriations for the "national intelligence program." This year's figure, knowledgeable officials said, is \$4 billion—hidden away in the \$90 billion Pentagon spending bill approved by the Senate today.

These officials said that it was covered by such specific budget titles as "other procurement, Air Force," "contingencies, defense," and "procurement, defense agencies."

Last September Representative Robert N. Giaino, Democrat of Connecticut, made the first move toward forcing disclosure of the real size and nature of these items. Senator Alan Cranston, Democrat of California, pressed the issue again in a Senate floor speech last Friday.

The knowledgeable officials who today disclosed the overall intelligence total for the first time said they had done so in the hope of forcing closer Congressional scrutiny of vaguely worded multimillion dollar budget titles and to bring about an open debate on the secret intelligence budget.

\$2 Billion in Tactical Plan

The \$4 billion figure, covering the "national intelligence program" and known only to a few dozen legislators, does not include \$2 billion additional for what is preferred to as tactical intelligence spending by the Army, Navy and Air Force.

Details of the \$4 billion appropriation, for what is called the national intelligence program, are known only to a few dozen legislators. The appropriation does not include \$2 billion for what is referred to as tactical intelligence spending by the Army, Navy and Air Force.

It has long been known that the national intelligence program—estimated in the past as running as high as \$8 billion—has been mixed in with the Pentagon budget without identification, but the specific hiding places in that budget have never been disclosed authoritatively.

While the House of Representatives trimmed the program budget this year by about \$250 million, it could not be ascertained whether the program ever reached \$8 billion or whether it has been reduced substantially in recent years.

The program, according to officials in Congress and the Administration, includes \$750 million for the Central Intelligence Agency tucked inside a \$2.1 billion budget item identified only as "other procurement, Air Force."

Other agencies included in this program and the funds designated are as follows:

we can give in this country."

Mr. Colby said that he had expressed his concern in letters to Senator Church and other members of Congress, and that President Ford had written to Mr. Church last month with a request to keep the assassination report secret on the ground that its publication would "result in serious harm to the national interest."

The Senate panel voted unanimously to reject Mr. Ford's request, and Mr. Church said at the time that his committee had undertaken to investigate the charges of C.I.A. involvement in assassination plot at the "urgings" of the President himself.

The Senate committee's inquiry was founded on information gathered by a Presidential commission on C.I.A. activities set up by Mr. Ford last January. As far as is known, no foreign leaders were killed in C.I.A.-inspired plots, which were directed primarily against Prime Minister Fidel Castro of Cuba.

A White House official said today that summaries of Mr. Ford's arguments against the release of the report had been delivered to key Senators.

WASHINGTON STAR

2 0 NOV 1975

Speculation on CIA agent is deplored

The Washington Star, as well as other media, recently speculated as to the identity of the former Central Intelligence Agency officer who sought to have the Senate Select Committee delete his name from the committee's assassination report. The President, Judge Gerhard A. Gesell and I all found that there is a real possibility of physical harm to this man or to his family if his name were revealed. Indeed, the Senate Select Committee finally agreed to delete his name from the report.

I have great difficulty in understanding what legitimate purpose was served by the published speculation concerning the identity, right or wrong, of an individual whose physical safety is thus endangered.

W. E. Colby,

Director
Central Intelligence Agency

Christian Science Monitor
3 November 1975

Kissinger: contempt of Congress?

By Clayton Jones
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger stands on the threshold of being held in contempt of Congress for withholding State Department information.

The House Intelligence Committee is due to consider a contempt citation Tuesday (Nov. 4).

But the clash between the White House and Capitol Hill may be averted, as with so many recent battles over access to secret documents, in a rush to clean up U.S. spy activities quickly.

Because chairman Otis G. Pike (D) of New York is unsure of House backing for a contempt measure, he may accept a compromise with Dr. Kissinger, committee sources say. "I'm not sure Congress wants to face up to its responsibilities," Mr. Pike said.

Dr. Kissinger yielded a bit on Oct. 31 when he went before the House panel that has subpoenaed a State Department document critical of the Secretary's handling of the 1973 Cyprus crisis.

Weighing the threats of contempt, Dr. Kissinger said he would hand over the document, which is a lower-echelon memorandum, on the Cyprus issue, but the memo would be "amalgamated" with others and would not contain the names of working-level, foreign-service officials who authored them.

To allow Congress access to every State Department official and memo could destroy the anonymity of officers' recommendations and even lead to a resurgence of McCarthy-

ism, Dr. Kissinger said.

He referred to Sen. Joseph R. McCarthy who in the early 1950s blamed foreign-service officers for policy setbacks in China, sometimes destroying their careers.

"What I am concerned about is that junior officers not slant their reports in a direction that is fashionable . . . and be able to write their memoranda without worrying how they would look in five or ten years," Dr. Kissinger testified.

But Rep. Les Aspin (D) of Wisconsin believes that "whistle blowers" in the State Department should be able to tell their stories to Congress without fear of persecution. And minority chairman Robert McClory of Illinois said Congress should not be barred from hearing testimony from employees who are willing to provide information to Congress. Author of the Cyprus memo, foreign officer Thomas Boyatt, is one who wants to disclose all but is being held back by Dr. Kissinger.

The House unit has dug step-by-step into major spy operations with a call for specifics from each intelligence agency on its risks, costs, and forecasting abilities.

I have become unhappy and alarmed as this investigation continues about the cynical, hypocritical, and evil acts we turn up," said Representative Pike. "In one case, the State Department said the CIA opposed a covert operation and it went ahead anyway."

Dr. Kissinger revealed that during his six years in the White House under Presidents Nixon and Ford all covert plans were personally approved by the President, and most likely that was the case for previous presidents.

His disclosure ties a closer link between past questionable CIA activities and presidential responsibility.

But the Secretary refused to shed light on the "40 committee" composed of four high government officials — the President, Vice-President, secretaries of Defense and State Department. The Pike panel probe of this group uncovered 40 covert operations approved between 1972 and 1974 without one meeting of the committee.

The National Security Agency, a semi-autonomous communications and cryptological agency under the Pentagon's umbrella, budgeted for about \$1.2 billion.

The National Reconnaissance Office, another semi-autonomous unit under the Air Force that runs the satellite photography program, set to spend under \$2 billion.

The Defense Intelligence Agency, which pulls together intelligence for the armed services and the Secretary of Defense, scheduled to spend about \$100 million.

Since 1974, most Congressmen have been voting billions for intelligence each year, knowing only that they were approving military hardware described no more precisely than "electronic control equipment," "communications equipment" or "erection of structures and acquisition of land."

Now, however, some Congressional and Administration officials are so convinced that the intelligence budget — at least, in one over-all total — should be subject to a debate on national priorities, that they are providing this information to the press.

Others, including Representative Giamo and Senator Cranston are using various legislative techniques to get these intelligence expenditures into the open without technically violating Congressional rules on secrecy.

Vote Needed for Disclosure

The general rule is that classified information can be made public only by vote of either the Senate or the House of Representatives. Certain committees, however, have officially disclosed classified material by a majority vote of their own members. Individual legislators who take this responsibility on themselves face censure.

The Administration has opposed any budget disclosures on the ground that other nations, then, would be more able to counteract American programs.

Those pressing for disclosure know that the sentiment is decidedly against them. In September, the House Appropriations Committee voted 30 to 19 not even to receive intelligence budget figures from its own subcommittee, and the whole House voted 267 to 147 not to make the budget public.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 21, 1975

House Panel Firm on Kissinger Citation

WASHINGTON, Nov. 20 (AP) — The House Select Committee on Intelligence voted today to move ahead with at least one contempt citation against Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger despite President Ford's protest that the action "involves grave matters affecting our conduct of foreign policy."

Otis G. Pike, the New York Democrat who is committee chairman, said the committee would not press two other contempt citations if Mr. Ford's advisers delivered promised documents.

The three citations voted by the committee last week must be approved by the full House of Representatives before they can be turned over to a United States attorney for prosecution.

The President sent a letter to each committee member protesting against all three citations. He said he personally invoked executive privilege to prevent Mr. Kissinger's turning over State Department requests for covert intelligence operations abroad.

"Thus, in declining to comply with the subpoena, Secretary of State Kissinger was acting on my instructions as President of the United States," Mr. Ford said.

Mr. Ford said the National Security Council staff has been making "a substantial effort" and will continue to work to provide the committee with the documents it seeks.

"This issue involves grave matters affecting our conduct

of foreign policy and raises questions which go to the ability of our republic to govern itself effectively," he said.

The White House released the letter, dated yesterday, as presidential aides were turning over documents subpoenaed by the panel before it voted to cite Mr. Kissinger for contempt of Congress.

But a committee draft report said new material handed over to the panel was not enough to quash the contempt citation.

C.I.A.'s Work Unimpeded By Inquiries and Reports, Officials of Agency Assert

By SEYMOUR M. HERSH
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 9—Officials of the Central Intelligence Agency, despite repeated public avowals of diminished prestige and operational ability because of the various inquiries into intelligence operations, are convinced that the agency will suffer no serious loss of authority and no erosion of its ability to produce professional intelligence estimates and reports.

Key agency officials do not expect either the Senate or House Select Committee on Intelligence to recommend a ban on clandestine intelligence activities. Instead, they believe the committees will seek to impose more stringent controls on such operations, a compromise they feel will be welcomed by the agency.

In a series of recent interviews, a number of agency officials also expressed surprise at what they said was the inability of the Senate committee, headed by Senator Frank Church, Democrat of Idaho, to generate public support for its inquiry.

"Frank Church was the first TV show to close this fall," one senior agency aide said.

Mr. Church and his senior aides took sharp exception to these views. They said that much of the committee's most important work was proceeding now in executive hearings and would, if consistent with national security requirements, be made public after the investigation ends next February.

All the agency officials interviewed agreed that the public criticism and official investigations following the published reports last December of widespread domestic spying by the agency had failed to hamper seriously its main function—the collection of worthwhile intelligence.

At one point last February, William E. Colby, the recently ousted Director of Central Intelligence, testified that what he called "exaggerated" charges of improper conduct had "placed American intelligence in danger."

"We've been looking for apparent, observable effects," one intelligence official said last week. "There are none."

He added, however, that agency officials were concerned about "the intangibles, that you don't know what you're missing—the defector who doesn't defect, someone who doesn't

tell you a wonderful story."

"But it's hard to say that we've lost much because of that," the official said.

Sources cited the following areas in which there has been some impairment of operations:

¶Some American companies that provided cover jobs for agents in the United States have curtailed their cooperation.

¶A small number of the large American corporations that permitted the C.I.A. to use foreign offices and branches for cover jobs have become less enthusiastic about permitting the agency to have direct access to employees overseas. The companies have requested that the agency conduct all its business with employees through a designated contact man.

¶Some of the agency's personnel still on clandestine assignments overseas have suffered from lowered morale and a confusion about what is permissible in the field. Everyone now has to check back home with his field officer, and this is taking away operational initiative in spot developments, one source said. Some agency officials said, however, that they did not think it was a bad idea to have men in the field checking in with superiors in such cases.

¶There has been some reluctance by various officials and operatives in foreign intelligence services to cooperate. "Some of our old-line contacts don't want to show up in our hearings or in our press," one source said. "But it just means that it's a little bit more difficult to undertake an operation with friendly operatives." He added that such operations were still feasible.

¶There have been scattered instances of less cooperation at high-level government-to-government interchanges of information. One high-level Ford Administration official said that some British intelligence officials "no longer tell us where they got information so we can evaluate the source, but only pass on the information. The Boston Globe reported last month that American officials were treating top-secret British information as being "on loan" to avoid the possibility of its being subpoenaed by Congress or the courts as "property" of the C.I.A.

But all the sources agreed that intelligence information, including the most sensitive material available, was still flowing in.

"Things are tougher, that's true," one official said. "But I haven't seen any evidence that things are compromised in terms of being able to function."

One high-level intelligence of-

ficial said that the United States and other intelligence services occasionally held back things from each other, but that that was nothing new.

One senior Ford Administration official, asked for his assessment of potential damage to intelligence operations, complained about the continued disclosure to Congress of internal documents relating to agency plots to assassinate foreign leaders and other clandestine operations. The official said he was concerned that future Presidents and intelligence chiefs might be restricted because of the fear that successors would make certain data public.

Aside from that, however, the official said he knew of no instance in which the agency's ability to produce intelligence had been adversely affected by the Congressional hearings.

One high-level agency source did say that one European politician had recently turned down covert financing of a political campaign. The official refused to supply further information, and it was impossible to gauge how widespread such refusals of secret aid were.

A Frequent Question

One agency official conceded that a factor in the dispute over how much, if any, damage had been done to C.I.A. operations in the last 10 months was that Congress had repeatedly asked the same question in recent hearings.

Last Wednesday, William Nelson, the C.I.A.'s director of operations, was asked for his views on the matter by Representative David C. Treen, Republican of Louisiana, during House hearings.

Mr. Nelson said that some American citizens and agents abroad had refused to cooperate for fear of being exposed. He said that "there has been a good deal of apprehension" in foreign intelligence services about continuing their relationships with the C.I.A.

"I don't want to overexaggerate this, however," Mr. Nelson added. "The agency is still functioning abroad, and I think functioning rather effectively."

A number of agency officials said that a major concern did develop over the publication earlier this year of "Inside the Company," a book by Philip Agee, a former agency operative, describing clandestine agency activity in Latin America and naming C.I.A. covert agents and their undercover contacts.

The book led to serious problems for some operatives, intelligence officials said. They added, however, that no similar information had leaked from the Congressional intelligence committees.

If a central complaint did emerge during the interviews, which were initiated before the ouster of Mr. Colby last weekend, it was repeated concern about a loss of moral within the agency because of the widespread public criticism of its domestic spying and some of its clandestine overseas activity.

Some officials, though, dis-

counted the significance of morale inside any bureaucracy. One high-level Administration official said that morale had been bad inside the State Department for 25 years, "but they still do their job."

But those officials who were bothered by a loss of morale said that President Ford's summary dismissal of Mr. Colby, who had been Director of Central Intelligence since 1973, had created a unifying surge of sympathy for Mr. Colby in the agency.

One Colby associate said that the director initially planned to leave the post last Wednesday—he later agreed to stay through the end of the year—after signing 70 supergrade promotions that had been authorized and to award the promotions at a ceremony.

More than 500 senior C.I.A. officials gathered Wednesday for the ceremony in the auditorium on the agency's grounds near Washington.

"Colby walks in," one eyewitness recalled, "and all of a sudden everyone jumps up and applause begins. It lasted five minutes, with Colby trying to shut it off. Now everyone [inside the agency] is saying that Colby died for our sins."

Colby Praised

Mr. Colby has been widely praised for his consistent efforts to cooperate with the various investigating committees that were set up this year, although his approach is known to have angered many associates and friends of Richard Helms, who was director of the C.I.A. when it was engaged in domestic spying.

One mild demurral to the general praise for Mr. Colby's candor came from Representative Otis G. Pike, Democrat of Suffolk, who is chairman of the House intelligence committee. Mr. Pike told Mr. Colby during a hearing: "It has been my own experience that if you are asked the right question, you will give an honest answer. You do not make it easy for us to ask the right question."

When the House and Senate committees began summoning agency witnesses, one Colby admirer said: "You had the making of a potentially disastrous situation. And yet by playing it straight, and by trying to get the material out, the agency has finally come into the 20th century. They now know that acts of wrongdoing must be turned over to the Department of Justice."

A number of agency men praised Mitchell Rogovin, a Washington lawyer hired by Mr. Colby to aid the agency in its presentations before Congress.

Sources said that Mr. Rogovin constantly and successfully urged Mr. Colby and others to turn over voluntarily evidence of wrongdoing as a means of keeping the Congressional investigations on the defensive.

"Part of the problem of being in our culture," one middle-level agency official said in explaining why many in the agency were reluctant to make any information public, "is that compartmentalization is one of

the fundamental disciplines—the idea is to limit the damage in case the K.G.B. [the Soviet secret intelligence service] penetrates the agency. This becomes part of the ritual, and some of the things we thought would be abhorrent to the American public [upon disclosure] “are things the people have to put up with day after day.”

Raw Files Provided

One official said in an interview two weeks ago that Justice Department officials were being provided with direct access to the agency's raw files. At least one Justice Department inquiry, into allegations that Mr. Helms committed perjury while testifying before Congress, is known to still be under review.

Other agency officials also expressed the view that the relatively few new issues raised thus far by the Congressional committees were based entirely on documents and evidence supplied by the agency.

Nothing has been unearthed by the committee that hasn't been discovered by the agency and stopped,” one source said.

Senator Church said today in a televised interview that his committee's report would contain “some new information about the agency's assassination plot.”

The official added that the basic working document utilized by the blue-ribbon commission set up by President Ford and headed by Vice President Rockefeller for its investigation and report in June was the internal C.I.A. dossier on domestic abuses assembled in May 1973 at the request of James R. Schlesinger, then the C.I.A. director, who was dismissed last week as Secretary of Defense.

Some agency officials speculated that the Schlesinger report did not include all the agency's domestic wrongdoing, but they doubted that the intelligence committees would be able to develop significant new material.

Time operatives, the Schlesinger report has been denounced as the “vomit report,” a reference to the fact that agency employees volunteered much of the information about the domestic violations to Mr. Schlesinger's office. There are still some men in the agency, a highly reliable source said, who pride themselves on “having stronger stomachs.”

There is no evidence that Mr. Colby or any other official has authorized further inquiries into domestic wrongdoing, although the existence of such attitudes is reported to be wide throughout the agency.

Two middle-level C.I.A. officials who are now serving in key managerial positions in the agency expressed disappointment in the public proceedings of the Church committee.

“A lot of basic questions about intelligence and its need haven't been aired, and that's too bad,” one said. The other complained that the Church committee had not begun to examine publicly the “fundamental” issue of covert operations.

A more senior intelligence official wondered whether what he felt was the failure of the Congressional investigations to deal with the more substantial issues would not provoke yet another inquiry into intelligence in some future Congress.

“The Senate had the staff,” one agency source said, “but it got too bogged down in the assassinations.”

He said that thus far the Church committee had yet to fix firmly a schedule for public hearings on the agency's covert activities in Chile, where at least \$3 million was spent to prevent the election of Salvador Allende Gossens in 1970 and, failing that, to attempt to make it more difficult for Mr. Allende's regime to govern.

Mr. Allende was overthrown by a military junta in September 1973 and was either killed or committed suicide.

A number of agency men believe that the House intelligence committee has publicly examined more basic questions dealing with the capability of the C.I.A. to make accurate intelligence assessments.

One former agency official said: “The House goes after the arteries, while the Senate goes after the capillaries.”

The Senate committee was known to be engaged in an intense dispute over Senator Church's desire to stage extensive public hearings on the C.I.A.'s role in Chile.

Opposition on Panel

Sources close to the committee said that opposition from Republicans and some Democrats on the nine-member panel had prevented Mr. Church from going forward this week with full-scale public hearings. As of last Friday, the sources said, the Senators had been unable to agree how long the hearings, if public, should last and which witnesses should be summoned.

Defenders of the Senate committee, including Mr. Church, concede that the public hearings have failed to arouse strong public interest, but they insist that the committee should not be judged until it completes its work.

A number of sources said that the assassination report, scheduled to be released in two weeks, reaches no definite conclusions about who authorized what in Cuba, Chile, the

Congo and the Dominican Republic. The report, however, is said to contain the most detailed information ever assembled outside the C.I.A. on how covert operations are initiated and carried out.

Mr. Church is known to be sensitive to the charges that he sought to obtain personal publicity by publicly investigating such seemingly dramatic but less significant issues as the failure of some low-level agency official to destroy lethal toxin stocks after a direct Presidential order to do so in late 1969.

The Senator said in a recent telephone interview that such accusations were “groundless” and added: “The assassination matter would have been unprecedented box office. It would have been the most sensational hearings held in this century. I was against bringing this out because I thought it would have caused damage” to the nation.

‘Headline-Grabbing’ Denied

“It's just unconscionable to turn around and say that the committee is headline-grabbing,” Mr. Church added.

Similarly, William G. Miller, staff director of the Church committee inquiry, said in a telephone interview that 30 investigators and attorneys had been working since early this year on what he said was one of the central issues in the investigation: Are you going to have covert operations and under what conditions and what controls?

Thus far, Mr. Miller said, the staff dealing with that issue has been meeting privately and may be forced to conclude its work with relatively little information made public.

Mr. Miller conceded that “the things that have been made public are not as important in the long run, but it takes a lot of maturity and strength to realize that the way you get to the gut issues is to handle them in executive session.”

He added that the Senators on the committee had to make decisions and attempt to balance “what the public should know against national security.”

“In every major area of inquiry,” he said, “the more information there is, the greater the sense of having to weigh

carefully the issue of secrecy versus national security.”

He described the committee's major goal as ensuring that the nation got a new legislative charter for regulating the activities of its needed intelligence agencies.

“We're trying to put intelligence within the constitutional framework,” he said. “That's the major work of the committee, and it won't be seen, until February.”

Differing Views Voiced

Other Senate staffers, including some senior members of Mr. Church's committee, expressed differing views.

“The committee has not been willing to hang tough and fight the Administration” on access to documentation, one committee said. “It's frittered away the psychological and moral leverage you journalists gave them [early this year]—when everyone was afraid of a cover-up.”

Another committee source complained that Senator Church and Mr. Miller “have the notion that if you go quietly, in the end you'll come up with some worthwhile remedies” for the intelligence community.

“People will say you're terribly reasonable, but that's only because you haven't found out anything,” the source said.

Whenever there was a real crunch in the area of domestic abuses, the source said, the committee was “manhandled” by the agency, it never subpoenaed or threatened to subpoena documents, and it “didn't go beyond what was reported by journalists.”

Another Senate aide with experience in high-level national security matters described the widely circulated newspaper photographs of Senator Church holding a C.I.A. dart gun during a public hearing as “the essence of the Church approach.”

“There was a way to do the job but it wouldn't have gotten headlines,” the aide said. “The C.I.A. is going to come out of this better off because everyone will think things have been dug up and investigated.”

“It was the best chance Congress ever had.”

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER

29 October 1975

CIA Threat?

To the Editor:

It's really incredible! Our civilized world is slowly crumbling before the assault of revolutionaries in all parts of the globe and here at home, Sen. Church is investigating the CIA!

Does anyone really believe that the enemy and threat to our lives is the FBI or CIA? I believe we would be in real trouble without

them.

Congress seems incapable of doing anything to solve the many real problems facing us — inflation, a future energy shortage. They only investigate — investigate and gain all that prime TV coverage.

That seems to be more important to Sen. Church than getting down to work. Someone should hand him a fiddle — We have a new Nero!

NORMA FAYNE
Wilmington, Del.

Washington Post

9 NOV 1975

Jack Anderson

Demoralization and Deterioration

There is another side to the CIA story that hasn't been told. It's a story of demoralization and deterioration inside the clandestine agency. It's the reason William Colby was finally fired as the CIA chief.

We believe that excessive secrecy produced an unwholesome environment, which was changing the CIA into an ugly, frightening creature. "For too long," we recently wrote, "the CIA has operated in a subterranean world of half light, a world of grotesque shapes and shadows."

This was turning the CIA, we suggested, into an unfamiliar, un-American agency, which plotted murders, committed burglaries, conducted buggings, blackmailed diplomats, tailed newsmen and spied on loyal Americans.

Our CIA contacts have given us another picture, which we feel obligated to publish. We felt sunlight was the best antidote for the rot that was infecting the CIA. They claim there has been too much sunlight which, as one CIA source put it, "has left us naked before our enemies."

Here are some of the repercussions, which we have been able to confirm:

—Top CIA informants and contract employees are switching their allegiances to foreign intelligence services, which they consider more trustworthy.

—The Soviet defectors, whom the CIA has been able to coax over to the American side, no longer trust the agency. This could shut off invaluable future sources of information.

—The spectacle of the CIA confessing its sins to Sen. Frank Church, D-Idaho, has left sophisticated allied intelligence officials incredulous. One of them commented: "You don't have a country, you have a church—no pun intended."

—This has reduced the CIA's credibility with allied intelligence agencies. "Oh, they have to deal with us," one source acknowledged, "but the extent of the cooperation is less because of their lessened confidence in us."

—The Middle Eastern intelligence services simply can't understand how the CIA could be induced to turn over to Rep. Otis

Pike, D-N.Y., the most secret material on the Cyprus crisis and related Middle East problems.

—In Portugal, where a Communist coup is still a threat, the CIA normally would have given clandestine support to moderate leaders at least commensurate with what the Soviets are doing. Instead, it has been left largely to Britain, France, Italy and West Germany to save Portugal.

—In Italy, Communists have taken over at least 17 major jurisdictions during recent elections. In times past, the CIA would have worked with Italian security men to prevent the victories, just as the Soviets poured money into the campaigns to elect the Communists.

—In Spain, the Soviets are more active than at any time since the Spanish civil war. They are strengthening the Communist remnants throughout the country. In contrast, the CIA has been outmaneuvered, their morale broken.

—In Lebanon, the Soviet-supported Palestine Liberation Organization is gaining power. Once the CIA operated one of its strongest networks in Lebanon. Now its efforts are feeble.

—In Israel, the long ties between the CIA and the crack Israeli intelligence service have been badly strained.

—In France, the veteran No. 2 man in the intelligence services, a staunch friend of the CIA, has been replaced by a political appointee. Our sources blame this upon the decline of the CIA.

—In Australia, the devotedly pro-American intelligence chief has been ousted under similar, dismal circumstances.

—Even in Canada, the old relationship between the CIA and the intelligence arm of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police has become corroded.

"All of them (are beginning to) mistrust us," explained a CIA contact. "They looked to us for leadership. Because they are out on the firing line, they must know that our word is trustworthy. But who will trust us with their country's secrets now?"

"You don't write up contracts in this

Inside the CIA

business. The dealings of one agent with another becomes a sort of unofficial contract with the U.S. government."

CIA agents look upon themselves as patriots. Even in time of peace, they put their lives on the line for their country. Declared one CIA man with long experience: "No one in this business would work with all that self-sacrifice if he didn't think he was part of the secret arm of our government. Every CIA agent feels that he is an instrumentality of the President, no matter which President is in power."

Most of the veterans blame William Colby, the embattled CIA chief, for failing to stand up for them. He began to appear to them as a cold, calculating man who preferred exposure to loyalty, the sine qua non of all covert activity.

His predecessor, Richard Helms, was a dapper backroom operator, wise in the ways of the Georgetown sophisticates. If the CIA encountered any obstacles, he would explain the CIA's position in the musty, rich reading rooms of the Cosmos Club, Metropolitan Club and other haunts where the establishment figures hang out.

But Colby didn't operate in this clubby way. Instead, he submitted a 50-page summary to President Ford. As one CIA insider sees it, this "led the President to make an uninformed statement about how he was not going to 'tolerate' this kind of activity, which seemed to confirm everything the rumors were saying."

"This left a vacuum in the public understanding, and the legislative branch rushed in to fill it. The intelligence committees were set up with no resistance from Colby or anyone else. Colby was rushed up to Capitol Hill and shoved over documents he should never have given to anyone. We estimate that at some time during this period, he has spent no more than five per cent of his time running the CIA."

Meanwhile, the CIA began hemorrhaging. Top agents and technicians began rushing to retire. The demoralization spread until the word reached the President. He reacted by firing Colby.

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THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

Thursday, November 6, 1975

Congress eyes postal-inspection policy

By the Associated Press

Washington
Congress is beginning to scrutinize the activities of the Postal Service's inspection agency as a result of revelations that mail was opened illegally by the FBI and CIA.

A House Post Office subcommittee called chief postal inspector C. Neil Benson to answer questions Nov. 5 on what he plans to do to secure the mail in the future.

Mr. Benson testified he "could not conceive" of any repetition of illegal CIA and FBI mail-opening programs.

"If I were contacted by the CIA or any other law-enforcement agency about opening mail, I would decline to do so," Inspector Benson told the subcommittee.

"It would not matter what the circumstances were, even if it was a national security matter, I don't have the authority under the law to open mail," he said.

Mr. Benson became head of the Postal Inspection Service in August after it was disclosed that the CIA and FBI opened mail illegally. The Justice Department reportedly is considering prosecution of individuals involved in the operations.

Mr. Benson promised to turn over to the department for prosecution any new cases of illegal mail openings.

"The Postal Service has the responsibility to do everything within its power to assure that the sanctity of the seal on first-class mail remains inviolate," he told the subcommittee.

Christian Science Monitor
11 Nov. 1975

Congress and CIA

As a non-American citizen, I would like to express my appreciation to Roscoe Drummond for his fine commentary "The CIA isn't all bad." At long last someone is saying that members of the Congress should find another way to become popular. There are still other more important problems to be studied. I think it is about time that the new game of turning classified CIA information over to the public be put to an end. It is causing prejudice not only to the United States, but even more to the nations of the free world. Be childish, fine but please not too much.

La Tour-de-Peilz, Switzerland Daniel Jaunitz

NEW YORK TIMES

14 Nov. 1975

A Report Links C.I.A. to Murder in U.S.

By JOHN M. CREWDSON

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 13 — The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence is investigating the possibility that the Central Intelligence Agency was responsible for a hit-and-run murder in New Orleans in the late 1950's or early 1960's.

A spokesman for the C.I.A. emphatically denied that a premeditated murder had ever been ordered or carried out by C.I.A. officials within the United States.

Senator Frank Church, who heads the select panel, confirmed through a spokesman that his staff was "at work on this matter," but said that the results of the investigation would not be included in the committee's forthcoming report on C.I.A. assassination plots directed at foreign heads of state.

"We don't know as yet what weight to give to it," Senator Church, an Idaho Democrat, said of the information obtained by the committee. "We have not made a full assessment of the evidence."

Neither the name of the alleged victim nor any circumstances that might have provoked such an action by the C.I.A. in New Orleans or elsewhere could be learned.

Report First of Kind

The report under investigation, while thus far uncorroborated, is the first known to have come to the attention of investigators suggesting that the C.I.A. had ever considered the use of assassination in this country.

Senator Church provided no details of the evidence obtained by the committee's staff, but the principal exhibit is understood to be a written statement from a former missionary that a C.I.A. official once acknowledged to him having participated in such an assassination.

The former missionary, the Rev. Alden J. Stevenson, now a chaplain at the University of San Francisco, was unable in a recent interview to recall the name of the C.I.A. man who, he said, solicited his opinion about the ethics of a killing carried out under orders from agency higher-ups.

But Father Stevenson, a member of the Jesuit order, provided a detailed description of the man, including his involvement in intelligence-gathering flights over the Chinese mainland from a base at Hsinchu, Taiwan, where the conversation with the official took place.

Father Stevenson, whose mission was in Hsinchu, near the Taiwanese base, and others who had known the C.I.A. official, subsequently recalled that he had been referred to as "Mr. Mac" and had an aluminum leg.

Intelligence sources said that that description fitted a C.I.A. official they identified as Robert McNamara, who had served with the agency in

Washington and Las Vegas, Nev., as well as at Hsinchu.

'Supply Officer'

The C.I.A. spokesman dismissed reports of agency involvement in a domestic assassination as "just poppycock," but he did confirm that the agency had employed a one-legged man named Robert McNamara, now dead, in this country and abroad.

The spokesman said that Mr. McNamara's only domestic assignment, however, had been to a C.I.A. facility near Las Vegas, where he died on Sept. 3, 1962.

Records compiled by Clark County, Nev., which includes Las Vegas, show that a Robert Joseph McNamara was pronounced dead on that date of a heart attack.

The C.I.A. spokesman described Mr. McNamara as a "supply officer," and another source confirmed that the agency did maintain a weapons supply depot near Las Vegas at the time.

According to an obituary printed in the Sept. 5, 1962, issue of The Las Vegas Sun, Mr. McNamara, who was then 40 years old, died at an unnamed local hotel where he and his family had been guests for the last week.

The obituary said that the McNamaras had stopped in Las Vegas on the way to Taiwan, where Mr. McNamara, who was described as a World War II amputee, was to take an assignment as a civilian employee of the Air Force.

W Efforts to locate Mr. McNamara's wife, who sources said is still living, were not immediately successful.

Despite the C.I.A. spokesman's characterization of him as a "supply officer," others familiar with him or his reputation described him as an "operations type" who had taken part in the Normandy invasion, and who, under military cover, had headed intelligence overflight operations conducted by the C.I.A. from Taiwan.

The C.I.A. spokesman at first refused to address the question of whether Mr. McNamara had ever been ordered by his superiors in the agency to carry out a murder in New Orleans, saying only that there was "no record of him being assigned anywhere except the Las Vegas area" within the United States.

A 'Flat' Denial

The spokesman telephoned a few minutes later, however, to say that the C.I.A. would "flatly deny that Mr. McNamara was ever instructed to kill anyone or did carry out such an assignment."

He declined, however, to extend his denial to encompass the possibility that Mr. McNamara might have undertaken such an operation without the approval of higher authorities.

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has compiled a report of 400 pages based on the evidence it has gathered in secret hearings concerning

attempts by the C.I.A. on the lives of some foreign leaders, principally Fidel Castro, the Cuban Prime Minister.

Sources familiar with the report, which the Church committee plans to release next week if the full Senate approves, have said that although it deals "chiefly" with assassination plots directed at foreign heads of state, it will also illustrate, in the words of one source, "how the agency deals with people who try to blackmail it."

Letter Spurred Inquiry

These sources said that the report contained evidence, provided to the Senate committee by the Rockefeller commission, which investigated some aspects of the C.I.A.'s activities, that an individual had been killed by the C.I.A. under such circumstances, but outside the United States.

Although the Senate report is understood to contain indications that more than one low-level intelligence operative met with a similar fate, none of the information thus far provided to the Church committee by the C.I.A. has concerned an officially sanctioned murder in New Orleans or elsewhere inside this country.

Father Stevenson, the former missionary whose letter to a member of Congress outlining his conversation with Mr. McNamara provided the impetus for the Senate committee's investigation, said in the recent interview that, as best he could recall, the discussion took place between 1959 and 1961.

The priest said that he had become acquainted with Mr. McNamara, a Roman Catholic, through his attendance at services the priest held at a chapel near the Hsinchu base, and that after a time the C.I.A. man invited him to dine with himself and his wife at their house in the C.I.A. compound at Yang Min Shan, in the hills north of Taipei.

Father Stevenson said that he had considered the invitation unusual, because the C.I.A. contingent working at Hsinchu was a tightly knit group that kept its own company, and that he accepted because he felt that the C.I.A. man had "something on his mind."

The man's wife, who, sources said, was also a C.I.A. employee, remained in Taipei after the meal, the priest said, and it was during the 50-mile drive back to Hsinchu later that evening that the conversation about the assassination took

place.

Father Stevenson emphasized that his discussion with the C.I.A. man did not constitute a formal confession, but rather was a conversation of conscience in which the man, at first, "just threw out this hypothetical case."

The problem he posed, the priest recalled, concerned the appropriate moral and ethical response to an order from higher authority "to eliminate a person as a danger to national security."

A Further Opinion

The man told him, Father Stevenson said, that he had previously discussed the same question with another priest, but wanted a further opinion. As the man provided more details about the "hypothetical" murder, the priest said, he became suspicious and asked him whether he had been "involved in something like this."

The man, he recalled, replied that he had been, and explained that he was troubled by the fact that he had relied on the judgment of his superiors in carrying out the killing, having known nothing about the victim or the C.I.A.'s reasons for wanting him dead.

Father Stevenson said that the C.I.A. man had told him he had simply received instructions one day to travel to a planning site without disclosing his whereabouts to anyone, including his wife. Once there, the man said, he was told that he was to take part in an assassination in the New Orleans area with assistance from another C.I.A. employee.

A check of the New Orleans city directory showed that a Robert McNamara rented an apartment near the Tulane University campus in 1960, but no indication could be found that he and the C.I.A. official were one and the same.

The owner of the building in which the apartment had been taken said that he had no records of tenants going back to 1960, and that the manager of the building in that period had since died.

Father Stevenson said that he remembered the C.I.A. man telling him that, as planning for the operation continued, his wife became progressively disturbed by his unexplained disappearance and, finally, insisted to the man's superior that she be told where he had gone and why.

The priest said that the man told him that, much to the displeasure of the C.I.A., he was flown home to reassure his wife of his safety before resuming the planning for the assassination.

LOS ANGELES TIMES
7 NOVEMBER 1975

—David Phillips (former chief of the CIA's Latin American Department) is president of the newly formed Assn. of Retired Intelligence Officers. He announced in Washington that he would invite fired CIA Director William Egan Colby and fired Defense Secretary James Rodney Schlesinger (for his tenure as CIA director in 1971-73) to join the group. An invitation also was extended to Lt. Gen. Daniel Graham, who quit as director of the Defense Intelligence Agency in the wake of the ousting of his former bosses.

Los Angeles Times Sun., Nov. 16, 1975

CIA: How Did It Ever Come to This?

BY ROBERT J. DONOVAN

WASHINGTON—When the Church committee report on the CIA's involvement in assassination plans is released soon, it will be, among other things, a monument to the miscarriage of a famous law creating the CIA 28 years ago.

The question will be raised again: How did the CIA go wrong? How did it turn out to be radically different from what those who voted to establish it believed it was going to be? The answers to those questions will help shape whatever restrictions are to be placed on the CIA for the future.

The main cause of the miscarriage was the cold war and the feeling it engendered that the end of achieving security against the supposed Soviet

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threat justified the means. Contributing factors were quirks in the law itself.

The law is the National Security Act of 1947, the principal purpose of which was not to create the CIA but to achieve the so-called unification of the armed services. The CIA was incidental to the larger goal of coordinating military policy and foreign policy.

Even so, members of the 80th Congress who voted for the act went out of their way to try to nail down the limits of the CIA's authority, and some of those old tigers would have been astounded at the things the CIA has done at home and abroad since the legislation cleared Congress and was signed by President Truman July 26, 1947.

Incredible as later events were to be, however, a rereading of the 1947 hearings almost suggests that the legislators of a generation ago instinctively feared that the CIA might get into just such things as domestic wiretapping, outfitting E. Howard Hunt Jr. with equipment for breaking into the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist, preparing psychological profiles on Ellsberg, or subsidizing business, labor, church and student groups through a maze of foundations.

Congress tried to legislate limits simply because it was nervous about creating for the first time in American history a huge peacetime intelligence establishment. The role of such an agency in a democracy posed questions, and today it is striking how often worried references to the Gestapo crept into the hearings on the bill.

Rep. Clarence J. Brown (R-Ohio) said that while he wanted the country to have the finest intelligence service, he did not wish the President—any President—"to have a Gestapo of his own." He inquired at a hearing

whether the proposed CIA "might possibly affect the rights and privileges of the people of the United States."

"No, sir," replied Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, director of Central Intelligence under a previous interim intelligence establishment. "I do not think there is anything in the bill, since it is all foreign intelligence, that can possibly affect any of the privileges of the people of the United States."

Rep. Henderson Lanham (D-Ga.) asked another witness, Vannevar Bush, whether there was danger that the CIA would "become a Gestapo or anything of that sort?"

"I think there is no danger of that," replied Dr. Bush as chairman of the Joint Research and Development Board. "The bill provides clearly that (the CIA) is not concerned with intelligence on internal affairs, and I think that is a safeguard against its becoming an empire. We already have, of course, the FBI in this country concerned with internal matters."

Officials of the Truman Administration recognized the concern in Congress that a new-fangled operation with dangerous implications for a democracy might be in the making, and they tried to lay this fear to rest.

James V. Forrestal, then secretary of the Navy, assured a House committee: "The purposes of the Central Intelligence (Agency) are limited definitely to purposes outside of this country, except the collation of information gathered by other government agencies."

"Collation" was a clue to understanding what was being asked of Congress. The CIA was to be an organization for centrally gathering and coordinating information. The CIA was to collect, evaluate, estimate. There was only a passing hint—and that from Allen Dulles, later a director of Central Intelligence—that the CIA would conduct operations intended not to report on events that had happened, but to do things—such as pour money into Chile in a covert operation—to cause them to happen.

In a little-noticed line in a memorandum, Dulles suggested that the CIA should have "exclusive jurisdiction to carry out secret intelligence operations." No such authority was written into the law. And anyhow, Dulles never mentioned secret political operations. Congress did understand that the CIA would engage in some activities in the United States, such as overt collection of intelligence, seeking information from American businessmen, scientists, and

others who had been abroad, and in general supplementing the CIA's basic foreign intelligence mission. But the domestic activities that have been revealed in the headlines in the last year or so were completely out

of character with the functions considered by Congress in 1947.

Neither did the bill explicitly authorize the CIA to engage in covert political or paramilitary operations abroad.

Again, however, it was only a matter of time before CIA operations supported Chinese Nationalist troops who had fled to Burma. Then it assisted in the campaign against the Huk guerillas in the Philippines. It organized a coup to overthrow Premier Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran and a leftist regime in Guatemala. It trained a brigade of Cuban exiles that later invaded the Bay of Pigs. It maintained an army in Laos. It worked with generals who conducted a coup against, and later assassinated, President Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam. And all this is just part of the list of covert political and paramilitary operations designed to influence events abroad.

To see how this miscarriage came about, it is necessary to go back to the beginning. Before World War II the United States had no centralized intelligence. The Army and Navy had their separate operations. During the war President Roosevelt established the Office of Strategic Services as an overall intelligence operation. After the war Truman disbanded it in preparation for creating a permanent peacetime intelligence establishment.

After receiving conflicting advice on the nature of such an agency, Truman compromised on a makeshift organization called the Central Intelligence Group, forerunner of the CIA. In his directive creating the CIG he specified its functions and duties.

Then on Feb. 26, 1947, Truman submitted the National Security Act to Congress as a permanent arrangement for unifying the armed forces and coordinating military policy and foreign policy. Under the draft legislation that he recommended, the CIA would be established to replace the makeshift CIG. The CIA would be under the proposed new National Security Council, also included in the act.

In his letter of transmittal, Truman dwelt on military unification and did not even mention the CIA, let alone "dirty tricks," as the covert overseas operations came to be called. There is no evidence that he was at that time thinking of any such activities.

Truman's draft was bare of any de-

tails on the duties of the proposed CIA and simply provided for the transfer to it of the functions, personnel, property and records of the CIG. When the House took up the question, however, it decided to spell out in the new law the functions to be assigned to the CIA so that a President could not alter them without first obtaining approval of Congress. The House accomplished this simply by picking up the language of Truman's 1946 directive establishing the CIG and, without essential change, applying it to the CIA.

Most of the terms thus adopted were unexceptional.

Two other descriptions of functions transferred from the old CIG directive, however, were to have quite exceptional implications. One of these was to "perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting national security" as might be directed by higher authority. The other was to take responsibility for "protecting intelligence sources and methods" from unauthorized disclosure.

These abstract, open-ended provisions became part of the National Security Act of 1947 and eventually came to be taken in the government as justification for activities that would have astonished the 80th Congress that had inserted the clauses.

The clause authorizing the CIA to perform other duties and functions related to intelligence was the loophole through which the CIA engaged in political and paramilitary operations abroad. The authority to assume responsibility for protecting intelligence sources and methods became the loophole for all sorts of domestic activities, including wire-tapping, undertaken in the name of counterintelligence.

These abuses did not come about automatically. With cold war tensions growing dramatically worse, the Soviet Union shook Washington to its foundations in February, 1948, by seizing complete control of Czechoslovakia through a coup by the Czech Community Party. Washing-

ton was frantic that the Communists also would gain control of Italy in forthcoming elections.

From Germany, where events were building toward the Berlin airlift, the American commander, Gen. Lucius D. Clay, cabled the Pentagon in March to record his feelings that war "may come with dramatic suddenness." Ten days later the CIA handed Truman the somewhat unnerving estimate that war was not probable within 60 days. By the end of March, Soviet forces blockaded all land and water approaches to Berlin.

Washington was permeated with the feeling that something more had to be done to influence a dangerous situation abroad, and one of the things that was done, on June 18, 1948, was the promulgation of a top secret document known as NSC 10-2.

While the full text of NSC 10-2 is still top secret, the NSC has disclosed that the document discussed the covert activities of other countries, obviously including the Soviet Union, and agreed to the necessity of a response to these activities by the United States. In other words, NSC 10-2 bade goodby to the old concept of the CIA as solely a gatherer and analyst of intelligence and ushered in a new era of covert operations.

Acting under NSC 10-2 and through the loophole of other CIA functions and duties, Truman established within the agency the Office of Policy Coordination. While within the CIA, it was under the joint authority of the State and Defense Departments as well. According to David Wise, a leading authority on the subject, it was authorized to conduct special operations, provided they were secret and small enough so that the United States could deny them, plausibly.

Whether Truman had any conception of the Pandora's box he was opening is doubtful.

Head of the Office of Policy Coordination was Frank G. Wisner. He was a former OSS agent and a star member of the "old boy" element in the OSS who during the war had

thrived on derring-do and melodramatic feats behind the enemy lines. Moving into CIA, the old boys, by all reports, were gung-ho for carrying on in the old OSS tradition and thus added impetus to the new movement that was now beginning in the agency.

The movement lasted for years, as international crisis piled upon international crisis.

In 1950, according to Wise, Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, then director of Central Intelligence, freed Wisner's office from joint control by State and Defense, leaving it entirely a CIA operation. In 1951, during the Korean war, there was established in the agency a directorate of plans, later called directorate of operations, which engages in secret operations.

In the Eisenhower Administration a special group called the "54-12 Group" was formed among top CIA, Defense, State and even White House officials to make the vital decisions about covert operations. In the Johnson Administration it became known as the 303 Committee after a room number in the Executive Offices Building. The Nixon Administration renamed it the "40 Committee," evidently after the serial number of an NSC document.

So, contrary to the spirit of the National Security Act, the CIA has been for many years in the business of cloak-and-dagger operations, tales of which have been filling the headlines for months. The assassination report will be another and no doubt unlovely chapter.

Once again, the CIA will be caught in the spotlight of public opinion. Pressure for curbing the agency's excesses has been growing as one seamy revelation followed another: The Church committee report is bound to heighten the pressure. Wholesale congressional reform of the CIA is surely on the way. An obvious first step will be to reemphasize the original design by sharply curbing the CIA's covert operations abroad and ending its unacceptable activities at home.

LONDON TIMES
28 Oct. 1975

Valuation of Soviet defence 'nonsense'

From Our Own Correspondent
Washington, Oct 27

The Pentagon's use of dollar estimates of Soviet defence spending has been decried by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) which compiles the estimates.

The CIA position was made public by Senator William Proxmire, who released classified testimony given to a congressional joint economic subcommittee last June by Mr William Colby, the CIA director, and Lieutenant-General Daniel Graham, a dissident within the Pentagon's own defence intelligence agency.

The argument has immediate relevance. The annual "battle of the budget" is raging and Dr Schlesinger, the Defence Secretary, has not hesitated to

complain that proposed cuts in the Pentagon budget will dramatically weaken the United States because the Soviet Union is supposedly "outspending" the Americans on some military items by as much as 50 per cent.

For the present fiscal year the Pentagon's estimate is that the Soviet Union is spending \$117,000m (about £58,000m) on defence, while the Congress is paring the United States budget towards \$90,000m.

The estimate is based on what the CIA thinks it would cost the United States, with American salaries and prices, to man and equip Soviet forces at the estimated levels. The idea has always seemed preposterous for direct comparison; but, as Senator Proxmire

agreed, it was valuable in plotting the trends in Soviet spending.

However, to use the estimates to make "insinuations of a widening gap" was nonsense, he said, and the testimony showed that the CIA, if in politest terms, basically agreed.

General Graham, admitting his was a lonely voice within the Pentagon, said the guesswork was "the quintessence of mirror imaging, which is one of the biggest bear traps on the road to objective intelligence estimates".

Mr Colby said another generation of Russian missiles was expected for 1978-79, and he discussed Soviet concentration on developing far-flung naval power in all the world's oceans.

WASHINGTON POST

21 NOV 1975

The Assassination Report

THE SENATE INTELLIGENCE committee's assassination report, signed by all of its active members, is first of all a remarkable demonstration of confidence in a free society's capacity to confront its own iniquities, to take them to heart, and to adjust national policy as a result. We accept the committee's judgment that the assassination plots studied here were "aberrations" and not true reflections of the national character. To believe otherwise is to assault the basic process of consensus and correction by which a democratic society must proceed. Moreover, American participation in the plots was unquestionably the work of officials who thought not only that they were acting under proper authority but that they were acting in the nation's best interests. In the revulsion against acts planned in earlier, more charged times, it needs to be emphasized how much the enveloping political context has changed: the very fact of this report is evidence enough of that. It should be noted, too, that President Ford, and the three most recent directors of the Central Intelligence Agency, have all stated that they oppose political assassination as an instrument of American policy.

The report's special distinction is to avoid unjustified conclusions and to accept the difficulty of pinning down deliberations, motivations and events of an essentially elusive character. By general knowledge and leaks, we knew before that the United States had probably tried to kill Lumumba and Castro (dissidents on their own killed Lumumba, the report says; Castro still lives) and that Washington had given some encouragement to the dissidents who killed Trujillo and Diem and who kidnapped General Schneider in Chile in 1970 (without meaning to kill him, though he was killed). The report offers a great deal more information about these cases, though it accepts that final knowledge is deterred by the

secrecy in which these plots were considered, by the passage of time, by the insufficient documentation, by the tendency for "circumlocutions" to be used in place of clear language, and by the doctrine of "plausible denial" which at once masked presidential participation in plot deliberations and tempted subordinates to keep their chiefs less than fully informed. Given the difficulty other investigators will have in matching, let alone topping, this committee's information, we should not expect to learn much more.

The Church committee's recommendation that it be made a crime to assassinate a foreign official sounds like a good idea in principle. Such a law would be a useful supplement to the Executive branch's own professions of self-denial. But the real deterrents against such wrong and intolerable acts probably lie elsewhere. There must be maintained a general political atmosphere which simply does not support acts of war and crime as a substitute for legitimate methods of conducting foreign policy. Then, there must be devised particular procedures to ensure that assassination plots do not slip through the inherently ambiguous executive command-and-control system which prevailed when these plots were laid—a system which makes it impossible to know even now whether any President actually authorized any plot.

The Church Committee promised to make such proposals in the context of its overall judgments on covert operations in its final report next February. In the meantime it was important for a committee of Congress to deal, as best it could, with the speculation and anxiety that had arisen as a result of piecemeal reports. The result is a document so rich in detail and so provocative in terms of the need for reform that we intend to return to it in subsequent editorials.

Christian Science Monitor
13 Nov. 1975

How Colby would revise CIA rules

By Robert P. Hey
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

Congress is expected here to provide the Central Intelligence Agency with the broad reforms sought by Director William E. Colby to ensure that the agency operates both effectively and within the framework of the U.S. Constitution.

Congressional sources — both inside and outside committees now investigating the CIA — make clear that Congress itself seeks changes similar to Mr. Colby's, which he voiced for the first time at a Wednesday, Nov. 12 breakfast with reporters:

- Establish guidelines, through changes in existing law, of what the CIA "can do and what [it] can't do." Current law, says Mr. Colby, is so vague it lets the CIA do almost anything the National Security Council directs it to do.

A year ago Congress took the first step toward limiting the CIA's wide-ranging powers. It required all activities not involving intelligence gathering to be specifically ap-

proved by the President, who then had to inform relevant congressional committees.

- Specifically, Mr. Colby seeks resolution of a conflict between a law which prohibits the CIA from undertaking domestic intelligence gathering, and one which requires the CIA's Director to protect CIA intelligence and methods. This conflict, he says, "has raised some problems." Congressional sources agree.

Director Colby specifically hopes Congress will settle the question of "the proper limit of the counterintelligence function" of the CIA — is it to operate both at home and abroad? Or only overseas?

- Better supervision of CIA activities, both by Congress and the executive branch. In recent months many members of Congress have conceded that in the past they did not want to be informed of CIA activities. Similar allegations have been made that high officials of past presidential administrations took the same position. Supervision, in Mr. Colby's understated phrase, was "not very evident."

Republicans and Democrats in Congress say the Congress will keep closer supervision of the CIA now. Many in Congress want to establish a joint Senate-House committee. Others wish separate Senate and House groups to monitor closely the CIA and other intelligence gathering agencies, including the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

"Good external supervision by a proper committee of the Congress," says Mr. Colby, "will create better internal supervision [within the executive branch] and will ensure that the CIA" operates as the government — and the nation — wishes it to.

- Make it illegal for persons in government charged with keeping secrets to disclose them to unauthorized persons, such as reporters. There now is no law providing punishment for domestic leaks and other disclosures of secrets, he said.

Such a provision is contained in a wide-ranging legal bill now before the Senate, generally referred to as S-1; Mr. Colby strongly supports this provision. He says the CIA has been harmed by disclosures of secrets — both from Congress and the executive branch — during the current investigations of the agency.

"What's really happening" with the current question of some past CIA actions, says Mr. Colby, "is we are bringing intelligence into our constitutional structure." He offers the same perspective several members of Congress do — that in the early 1950s the cold war atmosphere dominated the views Congress and the nation took of intelligence gathering — and that they consequently did not want to know about it.

Since Watergate, Mr. Colby points out, Americans and Congress "insist that our intelligence operations be conducted within the Constitution."

THE NEW YORKER
4 Nov. 1975

LETTER FROM WASHINGTON

OCTOBER 25

THE Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has been at work for almost ten months, and its staff of more than one hundred has accumulated files and records that are said to be greater in bulk than those of any Senate investigating committee in the past. On the subject of assassination alone, the pages of testimony are estimated to approach in number those recorded during the Watergate hearings. The corresponding House committee, which has a staff of thirty, seems likely to set records of its own. Large staffs and bulging files do not, of course, testify to the justification for an investigation or to its usefulness; if they did, the late and unlamented House Committee on Internal Security—formerly the Committee on Un-American Activities—could legitimately have boasted of a large contribution to the general enlightenment. In terms of education, though, which Woodrow Wilson held to be the most important function of congressional investigations, the committees chaired by Senator Frank Church, of Idaho, and Representative Otis Pike, of New York, seem to have performed most admirably. Not only the public but leaders of the intelligence community itself, including the President and the past and present heads of the clandestine and semi-clandestine agencies now under scrutiny, have been learning far more of what has been done, particularly in the field of covert operations, than they ever knew before—probably more than some of them care to know, and certainly more than they wanted outsiders to know. Although what has been made public thus far can be only a minute fraction of what is being withheld, it has been damaging and compromising enough to bring from the leaders and defenders of the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation anguished assertions to the effect that national security has been imperilled and that it may be years before our intelligence agents can function as “effectively” as they are said to have done in the past.

The fact that these agencies and others—among them, notably, the Internal Revenue Service—are now widely known to have acted in defiance of the law, the Constitution, and Presidential directives seems certain to have some restraining effect, at least temporarily. But it appears quite unlikely that the agencies can be curbed by any kind of legislation or regulation while the current mood of Congress and the public remains what it is. At present, it seems, opinion here and across the country is against imposed restraint, and even against further ex-

posure. On October 1st, the House voted decisively, 267 to 147, against requiring the C.I.A. to disclose, without itemization, its annual expenditures—a figure that would have to be known in order to begin to appraise the value, or “cost effectiveness,” of the services rendered. Whenever there is a majority of that size in the House, it is safe to assume that the legislators are not defying public opinion but reflecting it, and this seems amply confirmed by the mail the congressional investigators are receiving, which is running very heavily against airing any further secrets before the world. Since the Watergate inquiries produced relatively little such opposition—except in the earliest days, when many Americans simply could not believe the deprivations of the Nixon Administration—some people have suspected that the intelligence community has organized and coordinated a letter-writing campaign. But this does not seem to be the case. The Nixon people were, after all, particularly skillful at running such campaigns; the intelligence people, resourceful as they are in so many estimable and deplorable ways, have never shown such aptitude. The tendency here is to believe that the outpouring of opposition is, on the whole, genuine and spontaneous. People seem to feel that the clandestine agencies are—*de facto*, if not *de jure*—engaged in a series of wars against foreign, and perhaps some domestic, enemies and are thus entitled to operate under the rules of warfare, in which ends always justify means.

Defenders of the decision not to make public what the C.I.A. gets and spends did not, of course, maintain that the American people had no right to such information. The rationale, as it was put by Robert Sikes, a Florida Democrat who has served in the House since 1941, was that disclosing the C.I.A.'s budget would in time lead to “full disclosure of anything and everything we've tried to keep secret from our enemies.” Sikes and some of his colleagues may see this as a good and sufficient reason for concealment, but it is doubtful whether the leaders of the intelligence community are as worried about what our “enemies”—presumably the Soviet Union and some of its satellites—may find out (apart from the workings of some of our electronic equipment) as they are worried about the changes in American opinion that would be almost certain to develop if anything like a detailed accounting for specific undertakings became public knowledge. Existing public complacency might dissolve, as it did after the early Watergate revelations, if—as would certainly happen if full C.I.A. appropriations were disclosed—a de-

mand for itemization were made and met. Among the best-informed people here, the general impression is that the C.I.A. gets and spends about three billion dollars a year, and that another four billion or so goes to other agencies engaged in the same line of work. The total is probably a bit more, since some intelligence activity is undertaken and funded by agencies as seemingly remote as the Commerce and Agriculture Departments; indeed, the Senate and House investigating committees may be paying agents who have infiltrated their own staffs. Still, the total is quite certainly less than ten per cent of all defense appropriations, and most people would probably not regard that as an excessive share of the costs of maintaining national security. But a breakdown would put matters in a very different light. How much, it might be asked, was spent on misestimating the strength of the Vietcong before the Tet offensive of 1968? How much money could we save, or use to meet pressing social needs, if we stopped bribing foreign politicians and subsidizing pro-American newspapers and political parties? What was the cost per taxpayer of “destabilizing” the Allende regime in Chile? Assuming that C.I.A. officials are telling the truth when they say that the mail of private citizens is no longer being read, what was the cost of the twenty-year program in which almost three million items of correspondence were examined by C.I.A. operatives? What was set aside this year for paying off informers in Portugal, and how does that figure compare with, say, what the Washington police are paid? To be sure, not much reliance could be placed on any figures the agency people gave out, for their bookkeeping methods, to the extent that there are any, are deliberately misleading, and lying is an acknowledged and—when the agency's secrets are in danger of being revealed—dutiful aspect of an agent's conduct. (An American intelligence veteran was asked recently by Saul Pett, of the Associated Press, if the C.I.A. had, as some foreign agencies are reputed to have, a section detailed to kill defectors from the ranks. The man said he knew of n. e. Would he admit it if he did know of one? Pett asked. “No,” the man said.) But with any sort of reasonable figures, the public might gain a clearer and more alarming comprehension of what services the intelligence community is rendering and of how, in terms of cost and value, they compare with services performed by other agencies.

The President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, and the Attorney General have pleaded, on the whole successfully, with House and Senate investigators to hold down on public rev-

elations. If their pleas should be ignored or—not very likely—overridden by the courts, the ensuing revelations might produce a national outrage exceeding the one that followed the Watergate revelations. For what Watergate amounted to, really, was a series of aberrations—of felonious acts by individual public servants, of flagrant abuses of the public trust, of specific violations of specific laws. The Watergate culprits conducted no secret experiments that cost human lives. They are not known to have made feasibility studies of assassination or to have actually attempted murder. Their miscalculations were mostly of the sort that led to their own undoing, rather than to needless deaths on the battlefields of Vietnam. Their misdeeds were not of an institutionalized nature, and could in no way be defended as having any relation to national survival. (A few such claims were made for certain wiretappings and in the dispute over publication of the Pentagon Papers, but their spurious nature was speedily exposed.) The intelligence agencies, though, were not acting in defiance of established mandates. Their misdeeds, such as they were, were clearly institutionalized. This was not quite the intent of the statute that established the C.I.A. The National Security Act of 1947, which was the brainchild of President Truman and Clark Clifford, set up a mechanism to gather and coordinate the kind of information—military capacities, movements, and intentions—that might help avert the possibility of another Pearl Harbor. This would naturally involve espionage, but not intervention in the internal affairs of other countries, and certainly not spying on private American citizens and organizations. Yet the establishing law contained a provision that the C.I.A. could “perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence . . . as the National Security Council may from time to time direct.” This language was urged upon the President and Congress by Allen Dulles, who would become the C.I.A.’s director six years later, and by other veterans of the predecessor agency, the Office of Strategic Services, who in the recent war had developed a taste for and considerable skill at clandestine activities other than mere intelligence gathering. Their goal had been victory in war, not the preservation of peace, and in the late forties they saw this country engaged in a global conflict that would almost certainly develop into armed hostilities.

The investigations to date have raised several questions about the intelligence community’s effectiveness and, more important, its integrity in performing its primary function. Apparently to satisfy President Johnson’s

hunger for favorable military news, C.I.A. operatives in Vietnam deliberately falsified reports of Vietcong strength late in 1967. Failures in communicating intelligence estimates caught officials here by surprise at the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War of 1973 and the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974. Disclosures of such shortcomings led Representative Pike to say that “if an attack were to be launched on America in the very near future, it is my belief that America would not know that the attack was about to be launched.” Pike and others have hazarded the guess that such disastrous ignorance might flow not from the fact that we have been getting too little intelligence, or that what we get is often inaccurate, but, rather, from the fact that “we’re drowning . . . in intelligence which we are not absorbing.” Or, as it was put in a recent speech by Senator Walter Mondale, of Minnesota, perhaps the most aggressive member of the Church committee, “The great bulk of our intelligence budget is spent on collection, a much smaller amount . . . on information processing, and a relatively infinitesimal, and inadequate, amount . . . on the crucial task of analyzing the information so we know what it means.”

Most people here feel that, despite a series of almost unforgivable errors in forecasting, the intelligence community can continue to serve useful—indeed, invaluable—ends, and that simple abolition of any of the agencies would be a poor way of dealing with their many offenses against civil liberties and democratic procedures. Without the C.I.A. and the National Security Agency and their various mechanisms, particularly the electronic ones, the prospects for arms limitation and eventual steps toward disarmament, not very bright now, would be nonexistent, as would be the outlook for continued détente. (Obviously, such prospects as there are, particularly in our dealings with the Soviet Union, depend as much on Moscow’s sophisticated intelligence operations as on our own.) Even in our relations with governments that can be classified as friendly or neutral, it is necessary to have about them the kind of information that only the intelligence community can provide, for friends can easily become enemies, as neutrals can become partisans. If we are to engage in such activities as, say, trying to keep the peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors by maintaining some kind of balance of military strength between them, we cannot leave to them alone the task of estimating their needs or defining a proper balance. In large part, this can be done by methods long accepted as proper and conventional—observation by ambassadors and their qualified military, economic, and political aides; careful, critical reading of official and unofficial journals and re-

ports; and research of an essentially academic nature. By far the most productive means—electronic surveillance, or espionage—is also now considered as essential as it is conventional. But there are, of course, circumstances in which these methods, however efficiently applied, do not provide all the information a government feels it needs. The technology that makes electronic spying possible also provides means for rendering it inoperable. There is still no sure way, for example, of determining by technical means whether the Soviet Union is stockpiling nerve gas, and it becomes necessary to infiltrate trained agents or employ foreign informers.

The failures of the intelligence community in its field of primary responsibility—the amassing and appraisal of information deemed vital to national security—are probably beyond legislative remedy. It may be that fewer agents and a recruiting system that would screen out adventurers like E. Howard Hunt and James McCord would produce a body of information at once more assimilable and more reliable, but the mistakes, according to the Senate and House investigators, are made mainly at the stage of final analysis and appraisal, which are, presumably, the work of the highest and best-qualified officials, so that without knowledge of who these people are and what is budgeted for their work there is little reason to believe that legislative action could bring about much qualitative improvement. Nor is there widespread hope that Congress alone can do a great deal about curbing those clandestine operations that have little or nothing to do with the gathering of intelligence. A comprehensive series of proposals to reform the C.I.A. was set forth early in October by Senator Mondale. It calls for getting the C.I.A. out of all covert activities and putting these under the control of a “politically responsible official of the executive branch, such as the Secretary of State.” But most of them are already under the Secretary’s control in his function as the leading member of the National Security Council, and some would maintain that Henry Kissinger, who once authorized a bit of wiretapping of his own, and who has had nothing critical to say about the agency’s interventions in Chile, has yet to demonstrate that he is a more “responsible” official than William E. Colby or Colby’s predecessor, Richard Helms, Kissinger’s choice for Ambassador to Iran. Mondale’s plan would make funds for clandestine activities “come out of State and Defense Department budgets, in order to insure that intelligence operations are truly essential to defense and diplomacy.” Some of what Senator Church described as the “rogue elephant” proclivities of the C.I.A. might be curbed if a few of the cooler heads in State and

Defense had to decide on the relevance to national security of the agency's activities, but neither Kissinger nor any of his predecessors has been known to be critical of specific C.I.A. undertakings, and James Schlesinger was himself a Director of the Central Intelligence Agency before assuming his present office, in which he has been one of the staunchest defenders of the agency as it has recently been functioning. (The F.B.I. is, after all, technically a part of the Department of Justice and shares its budget, but Attorneys General have been conspicuously unable to control the bureau or its agents.) Another Mondale proposal is to "make American ambassadors fully responsible for all intelligence operations going on in those countries where they serve." But this rule was invoked—not by statute but by Presidential directive—during the Kennedy Administration and proved unworkable. The policy, as it was then described, made an ambassador captain of the "country team," and it might have had some effect if the captain could have always been sure of who his C.I.A. subordinates were, and if all ambassadors were able and dedicated career diplomats rather than wealthy men or women being rewarded for their political services, mainly financial. Another safeguard proposed by Mondale, among others, is to "spell out clearly rules for the intelligence community by passing stiff laws that

will attach tough criminal penalties to violations of their charter or of other laws of the United States." But C.I.A. members who are American citizens are already subject to the same penalties as others who violate laws, and the difficulty, as a score of witnesses has already shown, is in inducing them to identify their fellow-perpetrators in acts that are in contravention either of the law or of agency regulations—particularly the latter, which are mostly in the minds of the leaders rather than in a written code.

Publicity and new legislation may lead to some restraint, but the general feeling here is that the real answer lies in new formulations of foreign policy and national security. If the President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense are persuaded that a left-wing regime in Chile or Guatemala threatens the vital interests of the United States, they will conceive it part of their duty to do what they can to replace that regime. And even if they think otherwise and instruct the C.I.A. to have no part in the engineering of a coup, C.I.A. agents may take the directive as simply a formal instrument of "plausible deniability"—the term used for orders that are intended not as absolute injunctions but as documents appearing to absolve the policymaking officials of personal responsibility and liability. In such cases, the agents may feel empowered to carry out what they assume is the order

of their superiors, denied for the record but in fact an expression of their will. There is probably nowhere in this city a document ordering the carrying out of Operation Phoenix, in Vietnam, but carried out it was, perhaps solely on the authority of William Colby, perhaps on oral instructions from the National Security Council or the 40 Committee.

Historically, the pursuit of "national interest" is understood to be the pursuit of objectives essential to national survival and sovereignty. These need not be construed so narrowly as to include only the threat of armed attack on the national territory. The survival of Western Europe has always seemed essential to our survival not only as a national entity but as a democratic society not under constant siege. To most Americans, the extinction of Israel would threaten not only democracy but the kind of culture that democracy needs in order to survive. But none of this could be threatened by a Marxist Chile or a Marxist South Vietnam; we are not endangered by the continued existence of Fidel Castro. If our high elective and appointed officials saw things in this light, "intelligence" would have a far more limited meaning, and our clandestine agencies would be run by men who accepted more limited aims and more morally acceptable means.

—RICHARD H. ROVERE

Washington Post

5 NOV 1975

Walter Pincus

Intelligence Priorities

"The growth stocks in the intelligence business," a member of the House Intelligence Committee said recently, "are economics, terrorism and narcotics." What he meant was that the U.S. intelligence community was changing its priority targets with the Vietnam war over and detente with China and the Soviet Union upon us.

As the danger to national security, seen by policymakers, shifts to events such as the Arab oil boycott, the Soviet grain deal

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or the creation of financial stress through international banking transfers, the intelligence agencies also shift the focus of their operations. The Central Intelligence Agency in the past year hired several outstanding economists. The Defense Intelligence Agency went up to Congress for a budget increase justified initially by "new demands," the first of which was "keeping alert to military threats and political and economic extortion as a result of the availability and control of natural resources."

Today intelligence agencies are being investigated for past illegal and unsavory operations that grew from an expanded view of their past targets. It thus is right that both Congress and the administration explore the dangers inherent in the current shift of intelligence targets.

Take the question of international oil. To keep abreast of all important aspects of this important natural resource, an intelligence agency would have to know not only the intimate details of government planning in Iran and Saudi Arabia, for example. It would also have to know all about the companies that explore, drill, pump and carry the oil. Many of these companies are owned in whole or in part by Americans or U.S.-based corporations. Many key employees, even of foreign corporations in the oil fields, are Americans.

If the U.S. intelligence agencies undertake their new target operations with the efficiency applied in the past, they inevitably will be gathering information on Americans, infiltrating American or multi-national corporations and intercepting cables and phone calls involving American businessmen. Such operations in the past, in pursuit of dif-

ferent information from different people, led to many of today's most difficult problems for CIA, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the National Security Agency.

Congress and the Ford administration will not be able to avoid meeting in coming months the question of American civil rights versus foreign intelligence needs. It will come up in the most precise terms when statutory language is proposed and debated for NSA, the agency which electronically intercepts international telephone and cable traffic. At present, NSA operates under authority of an executive order signed in 1955 by President Eisenhower. Unlike CIA and the FBI, no law as yet defines the extent of its overseas activities. U.S. law prohibits similar intercepts within the United States, even for national security reasons unless they have prior approval of the Attorney General. It would be almost impossible to establish such a realistic prior approval system for NSA's intercepts if they continue at their past rate.

NSA in 1973 stopped its interception of cables and calls involving Americans whose names were supplied it by CIA, the FBI and Secret Service. There was a recognition then that perhaps laws or at least Fourth Amendment rights were being violated. NSA, however, continued its own collection of material on targets it selected. If the target today is foreign oil, Americans are still being intercepted.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, NOVEMBER 17, 1975

John Ehrlichman's Novel

ESSAY

By William Safire

WASHINGTON—In the coming week, we are to be treated to a 500-page book published by the Senate intelligence subcommittee on the subject of C.I.A. assassination plots. Its conclusion: No "hard" evidence has been produced to directly connect any United States President to a murder.

In coming months, however, we have a different treat in store: a novel, avowedly a work of fiction, by John Ehrlichman, the former chief domestic aide to President Nixon who has been twice convicted of Watergate-related misdeeds. Its plot is based on the opposite conclusion.

The hero-villain of "The Company," which will be published by Simon and Shuster, is a Director of Central Intelligence. In the early sixties, when he was Deputy Chief, a fictional President gave him an order to arrange for the murder of a man connected with the invasion of a Caribbean island, which he carried out. In the novel, the report of this episode is the most terrible secret carried in the C.I.A. files.

After the President dies in office, his successor—wanting a C.I.A. director whom he could easily control—puts our hero-villain at the helm of "The Company." The secret report of the assassination is protected. But in the late sixties, a new President comes on the scene whom the C.I.A. director fears.

To protect himself and the agency's terrible secrets, the C.I.A. chief culti-

vates a national security adviser with a German accent who winds up at the right hand of the new President, and who is able to keep the hero-villain in place. But the secretive new President never trusts the C.I.A., and conducts some dirty-trick national security surveillance with a special White House unit.

I won't give away the whole plot—that's the function of reviewers when the novel comes out—but suffice it to say that the C.I.A. chief finds out about the amateur White House spies, and uses this information to blackmail the President into destroying the assassination report and selecting a "safe" C.I.A. successor, as our hero goes off to become an ambassador.

Ehrlichman's book is a *roman à clef*—literally, a novel with a key, skirting libel by disguising characters and events—a literary form used by Aldous Huxley in "Point Counterpoint" and Simone de Beauvoir in "The Mandarins." The 385-page manuscript is now being pored over; and bid for; by book clubs and paperback houses.

The novel is surprisingly well written. I have been assured and reassured that it is the product of John Ehrlichman in his New Mexico retreat, with-

out ghosts or rewriters, and the story stands up as a gripping and powerful yarn. The romantic subplot is not much, but the scenes inside the White House and C.I.A. are redolent with verisimilitude.

And the characters—all so familiar to us, political figures whose names have become household cursewords—hidden only by fiction's figleaf. The author spares nobody: not the C.I.A. Director, not the flatterable and fawning national security adviser, not the political hatchetman, and least of all the President.

Ehrlichman's "President Richard Monckton" reflects only the dark side of the leader he followed all his life. In presenting a self-deluding, hate-filled moralizer as President, the author settles his score with the man he feels led him into crimes, abandoned his defense and denied his pardon.

That portrait, so one-sided, is false, though the dialogue rings so frighteningly true; those who despise our recent President will have a field day, which alone will account for much of the book's certain best-sellerdom.

But the most intriguing aspects of this novel are the questions raised. Was there—in real life—anything like a report of a Presidential murder order destroyed by a subsequent President? Was a national security adviser's secretary on the C.I.A. payroll before and after he entered the White House?

Did a hatchetman bring an ex-C.I.A. spy into the Oval Office to meet the President, and did he then go on to be the head of the dirty-tricks unit? Was a picture made of that meeting? Did the C.I.A. isolate and circumvent a Deputy Director placed in its midst by the President?

And more—did the C.I.A. stake out an expected burglary site and photograph White House operatives at work? And was this evidence, or any other, used by the C.I.A. Director to blackmail the President?

Or is this a stack of thin-sliced baloney, the figment of a self-protective imagination, the work of a man willing to cast doubt on anybody just to absolve himself and raise the money to pay his legal defense?

I don't profess to know. No hard evidence is offered; there are some bits of truth in this strange fiction, and some falsehood in the hints at truth, but who can say how much?

Certainly not John Ehrlichman. To anyone who poses these questions, he replies: "I don't know what you're talking about. I wrote a novel."

THE NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 14, 1975

Chile and the C.I.A.: Foiled Testimony

To the Editor:

The Times of Nov. 10 reports that the Senate select committee investigating the C.I.A. has not been able to schedule a public hearing on Chile. Here are some relevant facts.

On Oct. 2, pursuant to my requests via the committee staff, the chairman, Senator Church, invited me to testify. (I was U. S. Ambassador to Chile from 1967 to 1971.) I accepted by immediate return letter. On Oct. 20, the committee informed me by letter that I should present myself for a public hearing at 10 A.M., Nov. 4; it suggested in two and a half single-spaced pages the topics which I might discuss in an opening 15-minute statement.

On Oct. 28, by registered letter, I sent to Senator Church a lengthy statement for the public record; I explained that my oral opening statement (already drafted) would be based on this written submission, which I requested be promptly distributed to the committee for careful, unpublicized consideration by the Senators prior to my appearance.

On Oct. 30, I verified, by telephone, receipt of my letter; I asked the committee why only one public day on Chile *in toto* and only two witnesses, myself and a former C.I.A. official, had been scheduled by Senator Church. On Oct. 31, the committee telephoned to say there would be no public hearing

Nov. 4; any public hearing was now in question, I was told. I protested.

On Nov. 3, a high State Department official called on behalf of the President to remind me of Mr. Ford's determined opposition to public hearings on this topic. That same day, William Colby wrote to reinforce this view and "to convey to you my judgment that the subject matter remains classified." I told the State Department caller that I had insisted the committee hold public hearings and I would continue to. On Nov. 4, I wrote the committee to reiterate this position and to ask why my predecessor for almost three years (1965-67) and my successor for two years (1971-73) had been called to testify in secret executive session while I, the witness to the specific 1970-71 events under investigation, could not testify to the committee, either in public or in private, before Senator Church handed to the Senate the committee's report on assassination. (A junior committee staff representative had questioned me informally at my home last summer.)

Instead of timely and mature consideration of the facts and the issues, the public is again being manipulated. It should ask Senator Church why he, no less than the Administration, won't permit public hearings now.

EDWARD M. KERRY
Briarcliff Manor, N. Y., Nov. 10, 1975

WASHINGTON POST
17 NOV 1975

Justice Dept. Probes Helms Testimony

By Laurence Stern
Washington Post Staff Writer

Events have put a crust of irony on the appeal that Richard M. Helms made to the American Society of Newspaper Editors in 1971.

"The nation must, to a degree, take it on faith that we, too, are honorable men devoted to her service," Helms said in what was his first public speech although he had been CIA director since 1965.

Prosecutors in the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice are now sifting through other words uttered by Helms. They are conducting what was described by officials as an active investigation of the former director's sworn testimony in more than half a dozen appearances before congressional committees and federal grand juries.

The object of that investigation, according to official sources, is to determine whether Helms' testimony constituted perjury and obstruction of justice.

It is a ticklish inquiry, fitting as it does into a larger investigation of whether officials of the CIA and other intelligence agencies are criminally liable for the excesses that have been made public in the round of congressional and executive inquiries over the past year.

One Justice Department official put it. "This is all extremely awkward. We are in the position of investigating agencies and people with whom we have regularly worked through the years."

In the case of Helms, the testimony being reviewed by prosecutors centers on his efforts to defend the agency from implication in the overthrow of the Chilean government of Marxist President Salvador Allende in 1973 and from involvement in the expanded domestic surveillance programs of the Nixon and Johnson administrations.

A Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff report recommended in September, 1974, that a perjury investigation be initiated against Helms as a result of discrepancies between his sworn statements and the testimony of CIA Director William E. Colby. The subject was the agency's covert intervention in Chile. But the report was shelved.

It cited an exchange between the former CIA director and one of his leading senatorial defenders, Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.), during an executive hearing Feb. 7, 1973, on Helms'

nominations as ambassador to Iran.

Symington: Did you have any money passed to opponents of Allende?

Helms: No sir.

Symington: So that the stories that you were involved in that are wrong entirely?

Helms: "Yes sir..."

The following year Colby testified that the CIA had expended some \$13 million in covert funding against Allende in the 1964 and 1970 presidential elections. Helms afterward acknowledged that he probably had erred in his testimony to the Foreign Relations Committee.

In May, 1973, Helms told the House Armed Services subcommittee on intelligence that the CIA does not conduct surveillance against American citizens in the pursuit of security leaks. "We don't have any arm of the agency to investigate in U.S.," he testified. "...This is within the aegis of the police or the FBI or somebody of this kind."

Colby later disclosed to Congress that the CIA did conduct surveillance against a group of private citizens, including four journalists.

In another exchange before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the former director, in response to a question by Sen. Clifford P. Case (R-N.J.) said he could not recall that the White House asked the CIA to join in

a government-wide information pool directed at the antiwar movement.

"What would you do in a case like that? Suppose you were?" Case persisted.

"I would simply go to explain to the President this didn't seem to be advisable," replied Helms.

"That would end it?" Case asked.

"Well I think so, normally," answered Helms.

Soon afterwards the papers of former White House aide Tom Charles Huston became public, with praise for the "most helpful" attitude of Helms in the White House program targeted at antiwar groups.

Helms later said he "simply did not remember" the Huston proposal.

The Justice Department is known to be looking into the destruction of records on drug testing by the CIA during the final months of Helms' tenure as director.

Sidney Gottlieb, former director of the agency's Technical Services Division, told a closed session of the Senate intelligence committee that he acted at the order of

Helms. However, Helms told the Rockefeller commission that he could not recall giving such an order.

Also at the nomination hearing in 1974 Helms was

asked by another senatorial friend, J. W. Fulbright of Arkansas, about any relationships between the CIA and Watergate. "Is there anything I should have asked you?" Fulbright asked, knowing Helms' propensity for lawyerly responses. Helms could not think of anything. He asserted that there was no link between the agency and the Watergate arrests.

Helms knew at the time that the false identification papers found on the Watergate burglars had been provided by the CIA to E. Howard Hunt and G. Gordon Liddy.

Helms also had given orders that the information not be supplied to the CIA official in charge of liaison with the FBI, according to testimony presented to the House Armed Services intelligence subcommittee.

The case of Helms, as one official pointed out, is a unique one from the standpoint of perjury prosecution. "Do you convict a man," he asked, "when one of his chief responsibilities is to lie, when necessary, to protect secrets?"

That may well be one of the central issues now being pondered in the Criminal Division in the case of Richard Helms.

ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH
10 October 1975

CIA Objectivity

Your Sept. 25 attack on the CIA compounds and reshapes the paper's never-ending distortions of that agency.

From personal experience, as a CIA-USAF intelligence officer during the late 1960s, I can testify to the differences of opinion within the CIA and the intelligence community concerning Viet Cong and North Vietnamese strength. Quite simply, there were considerable differences of opinion between CIA estimates on the enemy's numbers and those generated by the U.S. military command. Invariably, the CIA presented objective and properly pessimistic analyses of the war while the U.S. military continued to delude itself and our policymakers with inaccurate data by which "light could be seen at the end of Gen. Westmoreland's tunnel."

Your editorial ignores the highly professional, very accurate analyses produced by CIA officers regarding the Vietnam War, the fallacy of anti-ballistic missiles and the counter-productive effects of bombing various parts of Southeast Asia.

In fact, the CIA has been far more objective, more rational than any other U.S. intelligence body. The CIA was and is the single most effective balance

THE LONDON TIMES
3 November 1975

Mr Whitlam links rival with money from CIA

Port Augusta, Australia, Nov 2.—Mr Gough Whitlam, the Australian Prime Minister, today linked Mr Douglas Anthony, the Country Party leader, with United States Central Intelligence Agency money. He told a rally in this South Australia town: "I had no associations with CIA money in Australia as Mr Anthony has."

"They (the Opposition) are getting more and more desperate... these men who are subsidized by the CIA..."

Mr Anthony later issued a statement denying the accusation and said Mr Whitlam must be losing his grip to resort to "such fabrications". Mr Anthony added: "I am able to give the Australian

against the Pentagon's self-serving analyses concerning the war and its bloated defense budget.

people a categorical denial of Mr Whitlam's charge that my party has been supported by the CIA and overseas ship-builders.

"I wonder if he can give a denial that he gets funds from communist-controlled unions." Political sources said the CIA had been accused in the past of overseas links with parties opposing left-wing governments.

Opposition party leaders at federal and state level met in Melbourne today at the call of Mr Malcolm Fraser, the Liberal Party leader, to discuss a statement by Mr Whitlam that his Labour Government could continue to rule without budget funds.

The Opposition parties have mobilized their slim majority in the Upper House to block money Bills in the hope of forcing the Government to the polls before its term expires in June, 1977.

Mr Whitlam said in a television interview on Friday night that the Government could use unspecified "legal means" to meet its financial obligations.—Reuter.

GENERALNEW YORK TIMES
16 Nov. 1975**Hope for Cheap Power
From Atom Is Fading**By DAVID BURNHAM
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 15—The long-held dream that nuclear power would give the United States and the world an endless stream of low-cost electric power has faded, according to a growing number of economists, technical experts and utility officials.

In the years immediately after World War II, people envisaged that the miracle of the atom would produce automobiles gliding through smogless cities. As recently as 1969, a leading nuclear scientist was predicting that the cheap energy of nuclear power might very well set man free. Just two years ago, President Nixon held out nuclear power as one of the key weapons in the American battle for energy independence by 1980.

But now, that nuclear dream is clouded by problems, some great and some small, such as the soaring increase in the cost of building reactors to an expected \$1,135 per kilowatt in 1985, from \$300 per kilowatt in 1972; a growing concern about the problems and costs of protecting reactors and their waste products from sabotage; the rising price of uranium, and a possible requirement of new and expensive safety devices for the nation's reactors as a result of a fire last spring in a reactor at Brown's Ferry, Alabama.

Though national defense considerations and environmental restrictions may still make the atom more attractive than fossil fuels such as coal and oil, many experts have become convinced that substantial subsidies will be required if the United States is even to come close to the Ford Administration's stated goal of building 620 reactors in the next 25 years.

Providing such a subsidy, in fact, is a prime objective of the Administration's proposed \$100-billion Energy Independence Authority and several other possible aid plans under consideration.

"I agree there was a dream, and five years ago, when we were generating power at \$100 a kilowatt, the dream seemed justified," said Dr. Ivan M. Weinberg, an independent con-

sultant who is one of the nation's most distinguished nuclear scientists, in an interview.

"Right now," Dr. Weinberg said, "it looks like the dream has ended, but I caution you all the returns aren't in. At this moment, though, it is probable that nuclear energy is going to be a great deal more expensive than enthusiasts such as myself first thought."

In an article in The New York Times in 1969, Dr. Weinberg said that "recent technical developments suggest that H. G. Wells's vision of a 'world, set free' by very cheap energy must be taken seriously."

Dr. Carl Walske, president of the Atomic Industrial Forum, a pronuclear lobbying group, acknowledged that there had been widespread stories that "electricity would be as free as water" but did not agree that there had been a widespread public dream of endless cheap power.

Unrealistic Claims

But Dr. Walske said he did believe that overly optimistic expectations about the potential of nuclear power were created during the 1950's by the unrealistic claims of the various competing reactor manufacturers that their product "was better and cheaper than that of the others."

"This industry right now has incredibly serious problems," said Irvin C. Bupp, a professor at Harvard University's Graduate School of Business, the co-author of a recent study analyzing the relative costs of generating power by nuclear and coal-fired plants.

"Publicly available information on the costs of nuclear power versus other alternatives tends to strongly overstate the case for nuclear power and underestimate the case for the alternatives," a report to the Energy Research and Development Administration concluded recently.

"We noted a distinct tendency in the nuclear energy literature to underestimate nuclear power costs, more often than not by simply omitting some costs, or neglecting the potential effects on costs of practical or operational experience such as significantly lower capacity factors than theoretical projections would suggest," said the report, by Richard J. Barber Associates, a Washington consulting firm.

"All things considered, it appears that purely on economical grounds and ignoring shortage

problems resulting from state regulation of electricity rates, the future of the United States nuclear reactor industry is less bright than most recent Government forecasts indicate," an article in the forthcoming issue of the Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science concludes.

The article was written by Paul L. Jaskow, an associate professor of economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Martin L. Baughman, associate director of energy modeling at the University of Texas at Austin.

"Right now, if you can build your plant near a railroad that provides a cheap supply of coal, coal looks much better than nuclear," said William Kriegsmann, a former member of the Atomic Energy Commission who is now with the consulting firm of Arthur D. Little.

The use of nuclear power to generate electricity in New England, for example, may still be economic because of the remoteness of the Northeastern states from coal and oil. But when the generator is to be built near the mouth of a coal mine, the equation is said to go against nuclear reactors.

The apparent fading of the dream of cheap power, the difficulties faced by some utilities in raising capital and the slowdown in the traditional growth pattern of the use of electricity in the United States have prompted a number of utilities to postpone or cancel plans to build new reactors.

Even officials with many years of experience in nuclear matters appear to have lost some of their enthusiasm. John D. Selby, the new president of the Michigan Consumer Power Corporation, who was formerly the deputy general manager for nuclear fuel and reactors at General Electric, said in an interview:

"I don't feel that consumer power should commit [build] another nuclear plant at this time. Nuclear power is a viable form of power. But I feel coal is equally viable."

The Ford Administration is still committed to nuclear power as a key part of its drive to make the United States independent of foreign sources of energy, particularly the oil produced by the Arab nations in the Middle East.

"The figures I have show that nuclear reactors today are more than competitive," said Merrill J. Whitman, an energy systems expert in the Energy Research and Development Administration.

"The problem," he added, "is the tremendous front-end costs, raising the money to build the reactors."

Nuclear proponents have long argued that the advantage of nuclear power over fossil-fired plants is, that, although it costs

more to build a reactor, the cost of producing electricity over the life of the system is lower because uranium is cheaper than coal or oil.

This basic thesis is now being challenged on several fronts.

One challenge was stated in a paper on the economics of nuclear power written by Professor Bupp of the Harvard Business School and Jean-Claude Derian, Marie-Paul Donsimoni and Robert Treitel of the Center for Policy Alternatives at M.I.T.

Their statistical study of reactors and coal-fired plants found that while the cost of constructing both kinds of generators is increasing, the cost of nuclear reactors is increasing faster than the cost of coal plants.

Construction costs for coal plants, Professor Bupp and his colleagues said, increased at an average of \$13 per kilowatt per year between 1969 and 1975, while the cost of nuclear plants increased at \$31 per kilowatt per year.

They noted that the more rapidly rising capital costs of nuclear plants would mean increasing production costs for amortization of the investment.

The industry likes to blame the Federal Government for the high nuclear construction costs, contending that complex licensing and safety requirements have resulted in lengthening the construction time for a reactor to 10 years. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission blames the industry.

Whoever is responsible, the long construction period means the utilities have to absorb the high cost of borrowing the huge amounts of required capital for long periods before the reactors begin earning their keep.

A second challenge has emerged in the sharply increasing price of uranium, which several weeks ago prompted the Westinghouse Electric Corporation to tell 20 utility customers that it would no longer provide uranium after 1978.

Uranium costs have quadrupled from their mid-1973 level of about \$7 a pound, and many observers believe the cost may reach \$50 a pound for deliveries in the 1980's.

Yet another serious unresolved problem confronting the nuclear industry is what to do with spent fuel—in effect the nuclear ashes—created as the reactors heat the water to produce the steam that turns the turbines and generates electricity.

For many years, the Government and industry had proposed chemically treating this spent fuel in a complex process that considerably reduces the bulk of the waste while at the

same time extracting plutonium. The plutonium then would be used to fuel the reactor.

Complex Process

The process of extracting the plutonium on a large-scale commercial basis, however, now appears more complex than was foreseen. One of the problems is that small amounts of plutonium could be turned into home-made nuclear bombs by a small group of terrorists. This potential has prompted the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to delay approving "plutonium recycle" until it determines how many guards and fences and other expensive

safeguards will be required.

The delay in licensing has prompted the owners of a major reprocessing plant now nearing completion in Barnwell, S.C., to ask the Energy Research and Development Administration to buy them out. This request—in effect for another subsidy for the nuclear industry—is under active consideration by the agency.

The delay has also prompted the Edison Institute, the New York-based trade association of the nation's privately owned utilities, to undertake a study dealing in part with the actual benefits that would result from reprocessing and re-using plutonium.

One of the chairmen for the Edison Institute study is Bernard H. Cherry, manager of fuels for the General Utilities Corporation of New Jersey.

In Favor of Nuclear

While confirming a report by National Public Radio that a preliminary draft of the study had concluded that plutonium recycle was "marginally economic," Mr. Cherry said that concerning his company's operations in New Jersey he still felt that nuclear power had more advantages than coal.

"The decision is tougher than a few years ago, but it still seems to flop over to nuclear if you examine all the costs for

the entire life of a plant," he said.

Mr. Cherry said one reason he was "still inclined toward nuclear" was the excellent operating experience his company had had with its reactors. The Three Mile Island facility, for example, near Harrisburg, Pa., generated 79.4 percent of the electricity it was designed to produce during the first six months of 1975, he said.

This was far superior to the over-all record of the 53 reactors now operating in the United States, which on the average produced only 58.3 percent of their designed capacity during the first half of 1975.

Washington Post
11 NOV 1975

Anthony Sampson

U.S. Oil Companies: Accomplices of OPEC?

How seriously should we take the current frenzy of hostility to the big oil companies?

On the face of it, at least to a European student of oil politics, the situation is baffling. On the one hand Congress appears to be on the warpath more ferociously than at any time since the late nineteenth century. The Senate has come near to voting to break up the big com-

Mr. Sampson, a British journalist, is author of "The Seven Sisters," a study of the oil industry.

panies, with 45 senators committed to it. All likely Democratic candidates are opposed to Big Oil except (surprise!) Lloyd Bentsen of Texas. The popular distrust of the companies seems to be even greater than at the time of the embargo two years ago.

On the other hand, any practical plan to limit the powers of the giant companies seems a long way off. The proposals for setting up a federal oil corporation—whether from Senator Stevenson or President Ford—seem unlikely to bear fruit, or to achieve great popular support. The present distrust of bureaucracy, and of regulatory agencies does not encourage the setting up of a further state body, and anyone looking at the government's own oil policies over the past few years must admit that they have been scarcely more creditable than the companies' own performance.

The argument that breaking up the companies within the United States will in itself bring down prices is not very convincing. Nor is it clear that it is in the long-term interests of the United States to bring down the price, unless consumption can be cut down by some other controls. Many politicians, while publicly campaigning for a rollback, have really come to terms with the high price, in which case the important

question is whether the companies should be allowed to retain the extra profits for investment in other energy sources. But this question too has become bogged down in the general skepticism about Federal bodies.

Is the current mood then simply an extreme manifestation of the familiar ambivalence in attitudes to big oil? Ever since Rockefeller oil has generated a popular fury at the power of the corporations over men's lives, followed by an eventual resignation to the lack of any practical alternative. Much of that hatred was directed not so much against the price of oil, as to the whole concept of giant corporations, summed up in that terrifying dictum of Rockefeller: "The day of combination is here to stay. Individualism has gone, never to return." With Exxon now the biggest corporation in the world, as its grandfather Standard Oil was in the last century, the concern for individualism still remains a potent political force.

But there is also, I believe, a very powerful rational argument, as opposed to the emotional reaction, against the power of the giant oil corporations, and particularly against the "Seven Sisters" who still dominate the world oil market, as they have for the past fifty years. The argument does not concern their internal position within the United States, so much as their global role, and particularly their relationship with OPEC. And the political distrust of the Seven Sisters is more than a revival of the familiar hatred of the trusts and combinations: it is also a rational reaction to the extension of corporate power to the world scale.

The most serious case against the companies, I believe, rests on their inability or reluctance to do anything to disrupt the OPEC cartel, and their willingness to serve as the instruments of allocation and pro-rationing by the OPEC countries to maintain their high price. It is one thing for the United States (like Britain) to decide that the present high price may be advisable. It is quite another thing to accept that the price will

continue to be fixed by thirteen countries. And it is very difficult indeed to accept that the thirteen countries should use the seven sisters—five of them American-based—as the agents of their cartel, without any apparent attempts to disrupt it.

It is odd to look back on the development, or non-development, of American ideas about OPEC since the oil crisis first broke two years ago. First there were confident predictions, by William Simon at the Treasury and the prophets of free enterprise, that the market mechanism would show itself as the shortage disappeared. Then there were hopeful stories of the sheikdoms having to cut their prices. Then there were thinly veiled threats from State and Pentagon about landings and sanctions. And then, a month ago, OPEC pushed up their price again.

In such mystery-stories, as Sherlock Holmes would advise, it is important to look at the negative clues: the dogs that did not bark. When the OPEC price went up again, there was one group that was very noticeably silent in the general hubbub of protest—the oil companies. They said nothing, because they could not risk offending the countries which had in effect become their closest partners in their concessions. Sheikh Yamani in fact had achieved what he had set out to do, seven years ago, to forge an "indissoluble marriage" between the companies and the countries.

It is this marriage which now constitutes the most awkward problem and obstacle in the way of a convincing American oil policy. There are at last signs that Dr. Kissinger, as well as his advisors, are coming to realize that the big companies are serving to underpin OPEC, as Senator Church warned in the report of his multinationals subcommittee last January. The attempts to break up OPEC have totally failed, and the boasts of Thomas Enders have been counterproductive, serving to unify OPEC against an outside threat. But if OPEC cannot be broken, at least some of its props can be

removed, and an effective oil foreign policy is now directly linked to an effective policy to limit the power of the companies, either through anti-trust or (more effectively) through legislation to separate them from their concessions.

It would be absurd to oversimplify the problem. If the Aramco partners (who constitute four of the five American sisters) were to be broken up tomorrow, there would not be an immediate glut of Saudi oil. If the Iranian consortium, which includes all seven of the sisters, were disbanded, the Shah would still have the means to regulate his oil supplies, and for a time at least might avoid a clash with the Saudis. But the underlying smooth working of OPEC, as the Shah has plainly admitted to me, depends on the machinery of the Sisters, who for decades have been

accustomed to neatly balancing the world's oil production to prevent glut and overpopulation. By weakening this machinery, the West would certainly make OPEC more vulnerable.

And in terms of United States politics, the association between OPEC and the Sisters is likely to become increasingly intolerable. For the oil companies have been given all their privileges of tax-avoidance and diplomatic support on the assumption that they were acting on behalf of the American consumer, or the national security. Now that they cannot be observed to be defending either, on the global stage, their behavior must be constantly suspect; and a government which has promised and failed to split open the OPEC cartel will be compelled to look more closely at the supports behind it.

Thus the current revolt against Big Oil is not simply a helpless protest against giant companies and profits, which will fizzle out at the end of the Presidential election. It represents a very legitimate objection to a global alliance against the consumer. To break up the Seven Sisters, or to force them to pull out of their concessions, will be at least as difficult as the breaking-up of the Rockefeller monopoly sixty years ago, and like that break-up it would leave many problems unsolved. But there are some indications that the popular feeling today is as strong as the populist mood of the 1890s; as then, the world has very suddenly changed, and government has not caught up with big business. There may be a good deal of froth and hypocrisy on the surface but there are very solid grounds for concern at the bottom.

NEW YORK TIMES

19 Nov. 1975

U.S. Blocks Rights Data On Nations Getting Arms

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 18 — The Ford Administration has refused to comply with a mandate of Congress that it specify which nations receiving American military assistance engage in repeated "gross violations" of human rights.

So many nations around the world engage in such violations, the State Department said in an unpublicized report to Congress, that there was "no adequate objective way" to distinguish which countries were more reprehensible than others. Thus, no nations were cited.

Last year's Foreign Assistance Act included a "Sense of Congress" amendment that called on the President, "except in extraordinary circumstances" to reduce significantly, or terminate, security assistance to "any government which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights."

The amendment further stated that whenever military assistance was proposed for any government in "gross violation," the President "shall advise the Congress of the extraordinary circumstance necessitating the assistance."

Apparently recognizing that the policies of such regular military aid recipients as South Korea, the Philippines, Indonesia and Brazil had been sharply criticized as repressive, the State Department had originally planned to meet the requirements of the amendment by submitting a country-by-country analysis of how would-be aid recipients handled hu-

man-rights problems, and why security requirements dictated continued aid.

State Department officials said today that a digest of one to two pages had been drafted for Congress at the time earlier this month that Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger began his defense of the \$4.7 billion request. But according to several aides, Mr. Kissinger rejected the country-by-country draft on the ground that since all but a relative handful of countries committed human-rights violations it served no useful purpose to specify for criticism American allies and friends.

One aide said that Mr. Kissinger, in ordering a more general report, had argued that there was a kind of international "original sin" in which the United States should not try to pass judgment on others.

Revised Report Sent

Last weekend, the revised report was sent to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House International Relations Committee. It produced some critical comments from liberals most concerned with the human-rights issues.

"I found the report to be primarily a defense of the State Department's apparent intention not to comply with the law," said Representative Donald W. Fraser, Democrat of Minnesota, who is chairman of the international organizations subcommittee.

Senator Alan Cranston, Democrat of California, said the report "amounts to a cover-up of information that American taxpayers and legislators are entitled to."

Mr. Cranston said that he and Mr. Fraser planned to introduce amendments that would toughen the human-rights provisions to give Congress a voice in declaring which countries were in "gross violation" of human rights and make it mandatory for the President to reduce or end aid to such countries unless he justified the continuance.

The State Department report was made available to The New York Times today by a member of Congress.

Many in Violation

Its main conclusions were that when the State Department asked its embassies to report on the human-rights situation in each country, it was found that "many states appear to be in violation of various rights and freedoms."

"Some countries, of course, present more serious evidence than others," it said.

"Repressive laws and actions, arbitrary arrest and prolonged detention, torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, unfair trials or other flagrant denials of the rights of life, liberty and the security of the person are not extraordinary events in the world community," the report said.

"These are all too common, occurring within both those countries receiving United States security assistance and those that do not," it continued.

"Human-rights abuses follow no pattern" the report said.

"They are not limited to types of political regimes or political philosophies. Abuses take place in both the Western and Eastern Hemispheres. They are carried out by and against persons of virtually all races and major religions of the world.

Distinctions Difficult

"In view of the widespread nature of human-rights violations in the world, we have found no adequately objective way to make distinctions of degree between nations. This fact leads us, therefore, to the conclusion that neither the United States security interest

nor the human-rights cause would be properly served by the public obloquy and impaired relations with security-assistance recipient countries that would follow the making of inherently subjective United States Government determinations that "gross" violations do or do not exist or that a 'consistent' pattern of such violations does or does not exist in such countries."

It concluded by asserting that "quiet but forceful diplomacy" continued to be the best way to improve security and human-rights matters.

Administration officials insisted today that the refusal to cite particular countries for human-rights violations in the report did not mean the Administration was not interested in human rights.

Behind-the-Scenes Steps

They mentioned that the United States had taken steps behind the scenes to press Chile for compliance on the question and that because of Chile's activities in restraint of human rights, Chile was not listed as a country for which military aid was being sought.

When Mr. Kissinger appeared in defense of the \$4.7 billion aid request, of which \$3.3 billion is for the Middle East, he was not asked in either of the two appearances before House committees anything about human rights.

But Carlyle E. Maw, the Under Secretary for Security Assistance, was asked, and he said that it was difficult and perhaps wrong for any country to accuse another of "gross violations" of human rights, and none of the would-be aid recipients had been so declared by President Ford.

The Administration has asked security assistance for 35 nations. Of these, Senator Cranston had previously cited the following as illustrative as

committing human-rights violations: Zaire, Brazil, Paraguay, Peru, Taiwan, Indonesia, South Korea, the Philippines and Morocco.

Washington Post
6 NOV 1975

Another Bad Nuclear Deal

THE DECISION BY France to sell South Korea a pilot plant to reprocess spent nuclear fuel illustrates nothing so much as the inadequacy of existing international controls to prevent the spread of nuclear bombs. The French can and do claim that the plant will be subject not just to International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards but to additional tighter safeguards of their own. South Koreans can and do claim that they are accepting all these controls, have taken the no-bomb pledge of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, and merely wish to get on with a legitimate peaceable "Project Independence" energy program of their own. In short, nobody is violating anything. Look, ma, no bombs.

Yet the deal is deeply troubling, for all that the French, who export nuclear equipment in part to pay for their own costly weapons program, complain that American protests against it derive from mean commercial rivalry. It raises the specter of national nuclear power industries, which are spreading everywhere, leading to national nuclear weapons programs in the coming years. Following the irresponsible example of a West German deal with Brazil earlier this year, the French are passing beyond the sale of reactors to the sale of reprocessing equipment and technology. Korea has no conceivable economic justification, now or in the foreseeable future, for a reprocessing capability: not even the United States,

the largest nuclear-power producer, has seen the need for it yet. But a country with that capability, regardless of its original innocent intent, could find itself coming under internal pressure to abrogate the non-proliferation treaty, or to cheat, in order to produce weapons-grade nuclear material. Korea, frightened of being politically abandoned by Washington, is just such a country—a consideration we commend, by the way, to those Americans who would remove American troops forthwith.

The answer is plain: the political and legal restraints on the export of reprocessing facilities must be tightened. Countries so minded, could, like India, build their own reprocessing plants but such independent efforts could better be discouraged if the suppliers of nuclear materials agreed to be less profligate in dispensing their wares. The United States has on the table a proposal to establish regional nuclear reprocessing centers. It is being discussed by seven suppliers, including Russia, in London this week. The rationale for this and similar extra cooperative measures on the part of the suppliers is that the IAEA is an agency dominated by the nuclear have-nots, who for reasons of pride and policy tend to resist truly foolproof controls. There is no more serious diplomatic project before the United States than to take every feasible step to bar the further proliferation of nuclear arms.

NEW YORK TIMES
2 Nov. 1975

EUROPEANS REBUT U.S. NUCLEAR PLAN

Bonn, Paris Seem Cool to
Idea of Regional Centers
For Plutonium Storage.

By CLYDE H. FARNSWORTH
Special to The New York Times

PARIS, Nov. 1—The United States has run into hostility from its West European allies in negotiations for better safeguard in the export of nuclear technology.

Seven supplier countries — Britain, Canada, France, West Germany, Japan, the Soviet Union and the United States—began talks last spring to try to tighten controls to prevent the diversion of nuclear material into weapons.

The secret conversations, the urgency of which was understood by Moscow's participation, were the result of the surprise detonation of a nuclear device in India last year.

The explosive material was the plutonium obtained as a waste product in a reactor supplied by Canada. The reactor

was intended for peaceful purposes.

The seven are reconvening next week in London. In the meantime, both France and West Germany have concluded sales that the United States thinks have increased the danger of a spread of nuclear weapons.

Fuel Centers Proposed

In addition to proposals to strengthen defenses of nuclear installations against sabotage and tighten procedures governing transport of nuclear materials, the London negotiators are expected to discuss an American proposal for regional nuclear fuel centers.

These are intended to become the points for collecting and storing the plutonium that is taken out of spent fuel rods when the fuel is reprocessed.

Such centers would reduce the risk of plutonium transfers into explosive devices, according to the Americans.

The International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna already carries out an inspection program, but some form of parallel supervision is deemed essential by the United States.

The problems are underscored in a study by the Vienna agency, predicting the installation of 356 nuclear generating stations in the third world by 1990.

Neither France nor West Ger-

many sees much hope in getting the regional centers operating soon. Questions of where they would be situated, who would own them and control them remain unanswered.

Restraint Is Opposed

The two countries also reject suggestions from the United States that they should restrain their nuclear technology exports while new procedures are being worked out.

French sources say that France is hostile to any actions that would tend to freeze the circulation of knowledge or the sale of technology.

Despite American objections, West Germany went ahead earlier this year with the sale of what amounts to a full-scale nuclear industry to Brazil. The United States feared this might stimulate efforts by Argentina and would lead to atomic weapons competition in Latin America.

More recently the United States has been critical of an impending French sale of nuclear technology to South Korea. The French have rebutted the criticism.

But what has particularly annoyed the French authorities was an editorial in The New York Times on Wednesday, accusing France of taking mankind "a long step toward worldwide spread of nuclear weapons — and ultimate disas-

ter" by selling the nuclear material to South Korea.

French officials defended the transaction on the ground that only a pilot plant for training personnel was involved, that South Korea had agreed to inspection by the Vienna agency and, in any event, had already bought nuclear installations from the Westinghouse Electric Corporation in the United States.

One of France's largest multinational companies, Pechiney-Saint Gobain, won the South Korean contract.

Some of the conflict apparently represents battles between the multinationals for bigger shares of the growing international market in nuclear goods.

The New York Times Book Review/October 26, 1975

Thinking about the thinkable

Can America Win The Next War?

By Drew Middleton.

271 pp. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. \$8.95.

By CHALMERS JOHNSON

Despite the attacks that will be leveled against it, there is nothing really controversial about this book. All Drew Middleton does is to lay out in clear, concise prose what any reader of the studies of London's International Institute of Strategic Studies or the Defense Department's reports to Congress knows well: The Soviet leadership "expects further wars and . . . is making a gargantuan effort to prepare for them." Middleton documents the results—in depth, weapon by weapon—and, more important, looks at both the United States and the Soviet Union in terms of their political and social preparedness what the Soviets refer to as the total "correlation of forces."

Middleton reaches several conclusions. In a class A (his term) war between the United States and the Soviet Union that remained non-nuclear because of the inability of the United States to foresee where a first use of tactical nuclear weapons might lead the United States would lose. (Everyone, except perhaps the Chinese, would lose in a total nuclear war.) In a class B war (Soviet-American confrontation over a politically important third area, such as Israel, Yugoslavia or Cuba) or a class C war (a local conflict in which the United States intervenes to influence the outcome, one most likely to involve the control of resources in the future) the United States should be able to win, "but only, and it is a major condition, if the American people accept the reasons and support the war."

There are many reasons for this situation. Détente is one. It is useless to blame Secretary Kissinger for the policy of détente since the only genuine political alternative to it in America in recent years has been default, not defense. Nonetheless, "Russian sponsorship of a period of détente

Chalmers Johnson teaches political science at the University of California, Berkeley. His latest book is "Autopsy on People's War."

in Europe and the NATO area generally aroused hopes that far outran the little that the Soviets had actually done." In addition, Soviet leaders have transformed the Russian Navy from one intended primarily to defend the U.S.S.R. against American submarines to one capable of cutting United States supply lines on the high seas. American allies have declined in strength, which means that in a future war the United States will not enjoy its customary year or so to mobilize militarily and mentally and must go with what it has. Finally, the development of hand-held anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles threatens to restore infantry, not America's strong suit, to a place on the battlefield comparable to what it held before it was neutralized by the tank and the bomber. On this last score, at least the 1973 Yom Kippur war sounded the alarm.

Middleton is blunt but not simple-minded or alarmist about these matters. He asks, for example, whether the American volunteer army is "too black" or whether it is capable of coping with its drug and disciplinary problems. Middleton quotes an admiral aboard the cruiser Little Rock, "Lenin said that an army reflects the society. Well, God help us if he was right, and our forces reflect our society." However, after probing these issues, branch by branch, Middleton concludes that the problems have been exaggerated. I would agree. When I visited Fort Bragg in the early 1970's, I quizzed my escort officer about conditions in the Army, and he referred to the 82nd Airborne as the "jumping junkies." But, later that same evening, he mentioned that after I had gotten out of the car, the sergeant who was driving us had turned around and said, "Sir, you ought not to knock the Army in front of outsiders, particularly someone from Berkeley." It was the best news I'd heard all day: the sergeants still believe in the Army.

Russia maintains and is enlarging its ground and air forces in Europe and along the Chinese border in excess of any conceivable need to defend

the Soviet Union. It manufactures tanks and warships at rates several times greater than the United States and has been constantly developing its strategic nuclear force since the signing of the SALT I agreement. Why? One of Middleton's German colleagues answers as follows: "Once genuine parity at all levels—or perhaps a combination of overall parity with local superiority in potential crisis areas—is achieved and once substantial numbers of Soviet attack aircraft carriers and naval task forces for intervention (or the threat of intervention) have been deployed, the Soviet leaders will consider the time ripe to teach the Americans a lesson." Those who doubt this, or who think that trade, technology and credits are making the Soviet Union dependent on the West, ought to take Middleton's book along on the airplane to read on their next trip to Moscow. ■

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

Thursday, November 13, 1975

Nuclear arms study says a war 'is likely'

By Stewart Dill McBride
Staff writer of
The Christian Science Monitor

Boston

By 1999 the world will have seen nuclear war or submitted to an authoritarian international government to avert an atomic holocaust. Most nations will risk nuclear doomsday before surrendering their sovereignty.

Those are some of the grim conclusions of a panel of nuclear arms experts from Harvard and MIT, just published in the November issue of Harvard Magazine. The panelists, all members of the Harvard-MIT Arms Control Seminar agreed:

- Nuclear war, in some form, will erupt before the turn of the century — probably not between world superpowers like the U.S. and U.S.S.R., but rather between smaller nations which are likely to acquire nuclear weapons during the next 25 years, such as Israel and its Arab neighbors, India and Pakistan, and some of the African nations.

- By 1999, some 1,000 large nuclear reactors around the world will be generating enough radioactive waste to build a nuclear bomb every week — or 50,000 nuclear bombs by the end of the century.

- The proliferation of nuclear weaponry will require a new form of world government to control their manufacture and use. Nations are not likely to sacrifice the sovereignty or democratic institutions at stake.

- A "small" nuclear war would claim the

lives of tens of thousands to one million persons while a major war, for instance, between the United States and Soviet Union, would destroy the citizenry of both countries.

Said Harvard Prof. Thomas Schelling, an arms strategist who helped found the Arms Control Seminar (which once included Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger): "Although, by temperament, I may be an optimist, a reasoned evaluation of where we may be in 25 years suggests that we will not be able to regulate nuclear weapons around the world in 1999 any better than we can control the 'Saturday night special,' heroin, or pornography today.

"And it is very frightening to realize that by 1999 a device with the power to blow up a community the size of Cambridge, for example, could probably be carried on the back of any strong person."

Given the level of worldwide terrorism today, he said, the principal problems of nuclear proliferation may not be coping with international conflict, but rather coping with the "worldwide equivalent of banditry, hijacking, and bank robbing.

"Where people are now putting conventional bombs in bank vaults and airport lockers, by 1999 they will be able to sequester nuclear bombs. I imagine that getting hold of a bomb will not be difficult."

Compared with the handful of nuclear weapons available in the U.S. in 1945, there now are tens of thousands of nuclear weapons in the world; many are capable of destroying an area 100 times larger than those bombed in World War II at Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

"The reasons we don't concentrate on solution to the nuclear-armament problem is that we have such strong forces anxious to protect our freedoms in the defense and military areas that we cannot get up any steam to initiate true arms control. The budget of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is less than 1/10,000 of what the Defense Department spends," said visiting Harvard physics Prof. Richard Garwin, a former member of the President's Science Advisory Committee.

Professor Schelling said he believes that the United States is in a "bad moral position" because of its vast arms production and sales, thus making it increasingly difficult to exercise leadership in the realm of nonproliferation among smaller nations.

"We spend billions on weapons and suggest

that smaller powers should participate in making the world safe for countries like us. They may be quite unwilling to listen when we tell them they are as much at risk as we are," said Professor Schelling. He recommends that the U.S. diminish its "obsession with the Soviet-American confrontation" and take a more worldwide approach to peace through the control of nuclear weapons.

Prof. George B. Kistiakowsky, an esteemed Harvard chemist who designed the implosion mechanism for the first atomic bomb, maintains that the public has been lulled into a "sensation of false safety" by a "succession of 'breakthroughs toward peace.' In reality, the arms race goes merrily on, is even accelerating.

"We now see one country after another following in our steps: France, China, now India, and perhaps Israel. The Shah of Iran has said he will 'have' to have nuclear weapons by and by. South Africa has pointed out that it, too, will 'need' a supply. There are no cases in history of absolutely insane arms races ending peacefully by simply laying down arms. Arms races usually end up in war," noted Dr. Kistiakowsky.

In order to prevent large-scale nuclear disaster, MIT political science Prof. George Rathjons says, "It would take an enormous surrender of sovereignty to bring nuclear proliferation under control . . . a radical change in our whole life-style, meaning the surrender of most democratic values. Nuclear war is more conceivable."

Paul Doty, biochemistry professor at Harvard and the fifth panel member, said the world's principal hope lies in the measure of reason and restraint exercised by the United States and Soviet Union. "Perhaps only by exhibiting some restraint can the two superpowers transmit the message that the alleged advantage of excessive nuclear build-up is not as tempting as before and that one's international machismo does not need to be measured by ownership of an excessively large number of nuclear weapons."

Mr. Doty said that despite criticism heaped on the United Nations for its handling of various crises, "the UN has repeatedly demonstrated its usefulness in dealing with international disputes. Banal as it may sound, a commitment, particularly of the superpowers, to strengthen this institution is one of our best hopes for the future."

Tuesday, November 4, 1975

The Washington Star

Crosby S. Noyes

Congress is being misled on Soviet

Behind the unprecedented cuts in this year's defense budget is one of the most outrageous efforts to mislead the Congress and the American people about the Soviet-American power balance that has ever been mounted. It amounts to a deliberate misrepresentation of all the available evidence.

Among the leaders of this effort is Sen. William Proxmire, D-Wis., chairman of a

subcommittee of the Joint Economic Committee which has conducted extensive investigations into the Soviet-American balance. Largely as a result of the subcommittee's recommendations, the Senate is now expected to restore only about \$106 million of a defense appropriations request that was reduced by the House to the tune of \$7.6 billion. Defense Secretary James Schlesinger has denounced the House cuts as

"savage and arbitrary."

Proxmire is a dedicated opponent of the defense establishment and all its works. His own summary of the hearings which his subcommittee conducted last summer is that, "Insinuations of a widening gap between Soviet and United States military power, to the advantage of the Soviet Union, are nonsense, unsupported by the facts."

Proxmire bases this

buildup

assertion on the ground that several witnesses before his committee, including CIA Director William E. Colby and Lt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham, director of the Defense Intelligence Organization, conceded the difficulty of comparing the Soviet and American defense establishments in terms of dollar equivalents. Other factors,

including the completely different economic systems of the two countries, they pointed out, must be taken into account.

What Proxmire does not say — and what is the crucial point of the hearings that he conducted — is that the distortions involved in cost analysis comparisons minimize the actual gap between the Soviet and American defense efforts. The existence of a widening gap between the military establishments was no insinuation. It was stated by both witnesses as a categorical fact. And the attempt to dismiss the evidence as worthless because of the admitted distortions is a palpable

WASHINGTON POST
20 NOV 1975

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

Communist Air Gains for 1980s Cited

By Jack Anderson
and Les Whitten

A classified Pentagon intelligence study predicts the Soviets, the Chinese and their respective Communist allies will have almost 15,000 combat planes to hurl against the U.S. Navy by 1985.

The unsettling document, stamped "secret," deals only with Soviet airpower available for an attack on the U.S. Navy. It expresses "normal uncertainty" about its 10-year forecast.

But its figures show distinct Communist air gains during the 1980s. By 1985, the Communist world is expected to have 14,605 fighters, bombers and reconnaissance planes within range of U.S. naval ships and facilities.

The document warns that the Soviets will have 7,810

fraud.

What Colby told the Senate Defense Appropriations subcommittee was exactly what Schlesinger had told them: By the best estimate of the American intelligence community, the Soviet Union is outspending the United States by as much as 50 percent in dollar terms in its military budget.

Earlier, Colby told the Proxmire subcommittee that the Russians have outspent us every year since 1971, that the cost of their programs in intercontinental attack capability exceeded ours in 1974 by 60 percent, in investment by 20 percent, in strategic de-

fense by nearly 800 percent, in ground forces by 100 percent and in research and development by about 20 percent.

But, again, the witnesses emphasized that it was not so much a question of the cost as of what the Russians got for what they paid. And on this point, Gen. Graham was particularly critical of CIA cost estimates for Soviet defense, showing small yearly increases in the budget over the last decade.

"During that time frame, 1960 to 1971," Gen. Graham testified, "the Soviets had gone from a handful of ICBM launchers to over 1,500 for five different sys-

tems; produced over 50 missile-launching submarines, created a highly sophisticated military space program, produced a new bomber, introduced five new fighters, deployed several thousand SAM (surface to air missile) launchers, deployed a large force opposite China, activated about 20 more divisions and so on. This is only a partial list of the reasons I found the results of the costing methodology simply not credible. It could not be done with a very small average increase in the budget."

You can't help wondering how soon the evidence which senators glibly dismiss as "nonsense" will return to haunt them.

combat planes able to attack Navy forces. The other Warsaw Pact nations will have 2,230, China 3,725, North Korea 490, and North Vietnam 350.

Soviet strike forces will include new MIG variations such as the "Fishbed," "Flogger," "Fencer" and "Foxbat." About 575 Soviet jets will be long-range, strategic bombers, the study projects.

By contrast, the Navy is unlikely to have more than 2,500 tactical war planes. The Air Force may have 10,000 planes, but most would not be available for combat against a Soviet attack on the Navy. There is no estimate of the 1985 strength of U.S. allies.

The study is the work of the hush-hush Defense Intelligence Projections and Planning team and is titled "1985 Air Threat to Navy

Forces." It is based on the assumption that the Navy will continue to ring Europe and Asia with surface and undersea craft, and thus will be vulnerable to attacks on patrol craft.

The Communist air fleets also will have advanced technical features to plague the United States in case of conflict.

"By 1985, (U.S.) naval strike forces will encounter a numerically superior enemy fighter force equipped with beyond-visual-range air-to-air missiles," warns the Pentagon intelligence document.

"Future Soviet surface-to-air defense weapons will be highly mobile, equipped with multimode sensors and designed to degrade the Navy's defense suppression capability" the report concludes.

Footnote: The Navy has been shaken by Pentagon and congressional efforts to impose the new F-18 fighter as the Navy's plane of the 1980s. Navy experts complain in classified memos that the F-18 runs a moderate to high risk of being an unreliable performer.

Red Herring—After we named Soviet U.N. Ambassador Yakov Malik as a Soviet spymaster, our journalistic ethics were lambasted by Iona Andronov, a writer for the Soviets' worldwide "New Times" magazine.

Now we have learned that Andronov's journalistic ethics are on shaky foundations. Senior U.S. intelligence sources identify him as a dedicated KGB agent who poses as a newsman.

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NEW YORK TIMES, TUESDAY, OCTOBER 28, 1975

Experts Fear Turkey Will Permit Wider Opium

By STEVE V. ROBERTS
Special to The New York Times

Poppy Cultivation

AFYON, Turkey—Turks did a good job of controlling the production of opium poppies during the growing season that ended in September, according to American and United Nations experts.

The experts are still waiting to see whether any Turkish opium shows up on the world's illicit drug markets, but they do not think that it will. Opium gum is the raw material for heroin.

The experts are worried, however, that domestic political pressures will force Turkish officials to expand the area devoted to poppy cultivation and thus endanger the effectiveness of the control mechanism.

Licenses for next year's crop are now being issued, and the Government is permitting many farmers to double their poppy acreage. But even this increase has not satisfied the farmers of Afyon, the center of Turkey's poppy-growing region about 150 miles southwest of Ankara, the capital.

Poppy production became an important issue in the recent Turkish general elections, particularly after the United States Congress approved a measure requiring President Ford to consult with Ankara on controlling the crop. Many Turks are offended by what they consider American intervention in their affairs and blame Washington for the strict limits placed on poppy farmers.

'This Is Our Land'

"This is our land," a city official in Afyon asserted. "Why should another country decide

what we should cultivate?" Poppies have been grown here for centuries, and the name Afyon mean opium in Turkish. Experts say that this region was a major source of supply for the American heroin market, and in 1971 Washington persuaded Turkey to ban cultivation in exchange for \$35-million to compensate farmers and develop new sources of income for them.

Turkey was ruled at the time by a caretaker government under military supervision, and Americans here acknowledge that no democratic government could have imposed the ban successfully. After the elections of 1973, the ban was removed and farmers were allowed to start planting again last fall.

Production was limited to seven provinces and most farmers were permitted to plant only about half an acre. Enforcement personnel applied the rules stringently and arrested about 4,000 farmers for overplanting, according to Munir Ak, director of the Government's soil products office here.

The Government bought the entire crop of 6,000 tons this fall and paid an unusually high price to discourage illicit competitors. The United Nations has guaranteed the price, and has also provided equipment and training for enforcement agencies.

Traditionally, farmers lanced the poppy pod and extracted thick gum that could be converted into morphine base and sold to smugglers. This year

lancing was prohibited, and the Government bought only whole pods. These will be sold to pharmaceutical companies in Europe, which are able to extract morphine from the dried capsules.

The decision to double individual farmers' acreages, which Premier Suleyman Demirel announced at the peak of the election campaign, is considered troublesome but not dangerous by the experts. Their main fear is that the Government will permit cultivation outside the seven provinces now designated, a relatively small area in southwestern Anatolia.

It would be much harder to control production farther east, where the terrain is more rugged and the people are less respectful of civil authority.

In addition, the experts are concerned that the smugglers may have merely decided to sit out the first year and study the enforcement system. Next year, they warn, if Turkey is no longer so zealous and world opinion is no longer so interested, the drug traffickers could reappear.

Complaints From Farmers

The political pressures in favor of increased production were evident recently when a group of farmers gathered at a cafe in Iscehisar, a village about 12 miles from Afyon. The area is so poor that many houses are still made of mud bricks, and the animals sleep inside to provide warmth in winter.

During the ban, the farmers'

complained, some of them received American aid, but the wheat and barley that they planted could not replace the poppy as a source of income. They did not have their own poppyseed oil and became sick from substitutes. They had no stalks to feed their cattle or burn for fuel, and no opium gum to pacify teething babies, they said.

"The women were so worried about the babies they didn't pay any attention to us," one farmer said.

Now the farmers have their own oil again and some cash in their pockets, but they are still not happy. The plots they are permitted to plant are too small and the rules are too strict, they said, and many of them were arrested for what they said were innocent mistakes. "I'm always going to court," said Hamza Aydin, the mukhtar, or village headman.

Their complaints are echoed by the oil processors of Afyon, who say the current crop is only about one-fifth the size of the crops grown before the ban. Accordingly, seeds are scarce and poppyseed oil prices have skyrocketed.

"The United States is still the driver and we're passengers on the bus," said one young farmer in Iscehisar. "He takes us wherever he likes."

Another farmer summed up the mood when he said, "Everybody should plant poppies anywhere that he likes." It is that attitude that causes law enforcement agents to worry about the future.

Los Angeles Times
Oct. 28, 1975

Mexican Heroin

BY RONALD J. OSTROW
Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON—Heroin produced in Mexico, long the dominant source for addicts in the Southwestern United States, is flowing increasingly into the big cities of the Northeast. Drug Enforcement Administration figures showed Monday.

The DEA analysis, prepared at the request of Sen. Charles H. Percy (R-Ill.), confirmed the near severing of the so-called French connection—Turkish-grown opium processed into heroin in illicit laboratories in the Marseilles area of France.

For the first six months of 1975, according to the report, 90% of 305 heroin samples confiscated in 13 major U.S. cities were Mexican-processed. This is compared to 76% in a similar survey last year, 63% in 1973 and 40% in 1972.

Under pressure from the Nixon administration, Turkey banned the growing of the opium poppy in 1971. But the decision, politically unpopular in Turkey, was reversed, and Turkey harvested an estimated 150-ton crop last June.

Percy indicated that he

cent inroads by Mexican-grown heroin, dubbed "Mexican brown" because of its color, as a threat equal to that of the old French connection.

In letters to Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger and Atty. Gen. Edward H. Levi, Percy urged that "immediate diplomatic steps" be taken with Mexican officials to stop the flow of Mexican heroin into the United States.

"In many ways, the current situation is more difficult to control than in the days of the now dormant French connection," Percy said in the letters he released Monday.

"Instead of heroin being smuggled over thousands of miles from distant continents and secreted by sophisticated international couriers, it now can be walked across a 1,945-mile, largely unguarded border. It is then only hours away from major population centers in this country."

Percy said the increasing flow of Mexican heroin toward the major cities of the Northeast and the drying up of the European supply were "the most startling aspects" of the DEA study.

greatest penetration eastward of the Mexican-processed heroin was on an irregular line running from Detroit to the Florida panhandle.

But the 1975 analysis found that 100% of samples confiscated in Boston had originated in Mexico, as did 83% in New York and Philadelphia. In last year's survey, Mexican heroin accounted for 50% of the Boston and Philadelphia samples and 21% of the New York sample.

In Los Angeles, all the samples seized in the first half of this year came from Mexico, compared to 97% last year.

Percy said the opium poppy is grown in Mexico along the western slopes of the Sierra Madre. It is processed mostly in mobile laboratories around Culiacan.

Percy asked that Kissinger intercede directly with Mexican President Luis Echeverria Alvarez and that Levi devise cooperative enforcement strategy with Mexican Atty. Gen. Pedro-Ojeda.

He noted that Mexico's federal judicial police and army have regularly set fire to illegal poppy fields and that the destruction of the fields by chemical sprays is being negotiated.

Eastern Europe

Los Angeles Times

Fri., Oct. 24, 1975

Sakharov and the Prospects for Detente

BY ERNEST CONINE

When Chairman Mao lectures the United States against the perils of detente with the Soviet Union, the American people are entitled to take his advice with the proverbial grain of salt. China has its own cold war going with the Russians and wants all the support it can get.

We would be wise to pay attention, however, when warnings against "bogus detente" come from highly respected voices inside Russia itself. The best case in point is Andrei D. Sakharov, the bomb-builder turned civil libertarian who recently won the Nobel Peace Prize.

Moscow's response to the honor accorded Sakharov was to condemn him as an "antipatriot" and an opponent of peaceful coexistence. Actually, his words and actions during the last two decades suggest that his troubles with the Kremlin stem from the fact that he is all too fervent a believer in genuine detente.

Sakharov, one of the most eminent physicists in the Soviet Union, was a ranking participant in development of the Russian hydrogen bomb. In the late 1950s, while still active in weapons work, he became increasingly troubled at the apocalyptic forces he had helped to unleash, and privately urged Nikita S. Khrushchev to stop nuclear testing.

The scientist first came to prominent notice in the West in 1968, when he arranged for foreign publication of his Manifesto, calling for joint solution of world problems by the Soviet Union and the United States and urging a gradual convergence of the capitalist and Communist systems.

The convergence idea isn't considered especially radical in the West. It lies, in fact, at the root of Western theories about the value of expanded trade with the Soviet bloc as a liberalizing influence on Communist societies. But the Soviet regime condemned his "rotten" convergence theory and removed him from his work.

Rather than grovel for a return to official favor, Sakharov increasingly lent his energies and prestige to the campaign to induce the Kremlin to allow in practice the rights which in theory are guaranteed by the Soviet constitution and Moscow's signing of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

He has publicly and repeatedly condemned the regime for confining dissident writers to insane asylums, for persecuting Tatars and other restive Soviet minorities and for refusing to allow free emigration of Jews or other Soviet citizens who might want to leave.

HUMAN EVENTS, Washington

1 November 1975

★ The United States quietly expelled a top-ranking Soviet "diplomat," Grigory Rapota, for espionage earlier this year. Columnists Rowland Evans and Robert Novak report that "some well-informed members of Congress are livid that the Rapota case was not publicized by the Ford Administration." Apparently, Secretary of State Kissinger did not want to antagonize the Soviets by making an issue of the diplomat-spy.

What appears to gail the Kremlin most of all is the insistence by Sakharov and some other dissidents that true peaceful coexistence is impossible as long as the Soviet government runs a closed, repressive society.

The point was made strongly in an article by Andrei Amalrik, a dissenter who recently spent five years in prison and exile, which appeared in the New York Times this week.

"Whether or not the American leaders recognize it," he wrote, "a fundamental change in the foreign policy of the U.S.S.R. is impossible without a change in its internal situation. It is difficult to imagine a state combining constant suppression and violence internally with peaceful behavior and accommodation externally. . . ."

"Therefore," Amalrik concluded, "any relaxation in the internal policies of the U.S.S.R. should be desirable to the Americans not only out of humanitarian considerations. It is also vitally important to them for reasons of their own security."

Sakharov, who has sounded similar warnings against Western naivete about detente, admits that he is no longer a Marxist. But to

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label him an "antipatriot" and a foe of detente, as the Soviet propaganda apparatus has done, is grotesque.

In the words of the Nobel committee, "Andrei Sakharov is a firm believer in the brotherhood of man, in genuine coexistence as the only way to save mankind."

This writer met Sakharov in Moscow last year, and found him to be a kind, gentle man who loves Russia and cannot be imagined conspiring to overthrow the Soviet or any other government by force.

Unlike Amalrik or Alexander Solzhenitsyn, he is a true liberal in the Western sense. As the French newspaper *Le Monde* put it, "He does not oppose detente but wants some of it to rub off on the Soviet Union itself. . . . He has long advocated that the socialist and capitalist systems should draw together; he continues to plead for cooperation between the two, especially as he sees it an indispensable tool for moderating Soviet society."

Sakharov may or may not be right in his contention that true detente and the liberalization of Soviet society are inseparable, that the first is impossible without the second. But the issue of whether the Soviet interest in de-

tente is real or bogus is of crucial importance to Americans.

Whether this country is spending too much or too little on its military forces depends upon the answer. So does the question of how far we can safely go in making concessions on arms control, and to what extent advanced U.S. industrial technology can prudently be sold to the Russians.

Americans like to think that the old East-West confrontation really is giving way to cooperation, that the Russians are coming more and more to share our own live-and-let-live approach to detente. Unfortunately, the continuing Soviet strategic arms buildup is not reassuring; neither is the recent Soviet role in Portugal and the Middle East.

It is worth remembering that for internal consumption Soviet propagandists do not talk much about detente; they prefer the term "peaceful coexistence." And now, as in the past, the Kremlin constantly reminds Soviet citizens that peaceful coexistence of states does not mean coexistence of ideas; neither does it mean abandonment of the global struggle for advantage.

As Politburo member Mikhail Suslov said in a recent speech, detente opens "an increasing number of possibilities for revolution all over the world."

Maybe they don't mean it. Maybe, as it is frequently argued, Soviet leaders make such statements, or allow them to be made, in order to keep Kremlin hard-liners quiescent and to keep their own ideological credentials in order.

But it is not reassuring that Sakharov, whose association with the men at the peak of the Soviet power structure has been far more intimate than Henry Kissinger's, is convinced otherwise. If he is right, it could turn out that a Russia which isn't safe for its own dissidents isn't safe for the rest of us either.

★ Evans and Novak also noted that the "Rapota case highlights a phenomenon which has grown to alarming proportions: Soviet KGB agents, operating as legitimate diplomats, having the run of the Senate and House dining rooms, committee hearings and congressional offices under circumstances tailor-made for spying."

THE NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, OCTOBER 31, 1975

U.S. Interests and Priorities in Relations With the Soviet

By Marshall D. Shulman

The luminous courage of the Soviet historian and dissident Andrei Amalrik has earned our respect many times over. But his advice regarding our policies toward the Soviet Union requires thoughtful examination, particularly because it comes at a time when some fateful decisions are being made in Washington about our military policies and their effect upon the prospect for a treaty on the limitation of strategic arms.

Mr. Amalrik argues that our priority concern in our relations with the Soviet Union should be not to reduce the danger of war by stabilizing the military competition, but to bring about transformations in the Soviet system in the direction of democratization and the observance of human rights. His argument is based upon the assumption that peace will be preserved by the balance of nuclear power.

It is understandable that Mr. Amalrik, who has felt the full force of the arbitrary power of the Soviet police apparatus, should regard this as the No. 1 problem. It is also understandable that Mr. Amalrik, from his distant and isolated position, may not perceive the dangerous tendencies on both sides now driving the nuclear military competition toward greater instability.

With less justification, not many Americans manifest any serious concern that the prospects for a treaty on strategic arms are being swamped by the heedless drive toward the development of new military technologies that will make any future agreed controls over the military competition even more difficult than they already are.

The risks of nuclear war are not being moderated by rational restraint on the part of either the United States or the Soviet Union. They are steadily increasing as a result of new and less-stable military technologies, and of the widening proliferation of nuclear weapons. Moreover, the \$11 billion worth of conventional weapons sold abroad last year by the United States increases the prospects of local conflicts and the risk of involvement of the great powers in these conflicts.

In recent weeks, the discussions in Washington have been dominated by negative feelings about détente, which have gone beyond a healthy deflation of the Nixon Administration's puffed-up rhetoric and now are swinging toward an indiscriminate and shortsighted hardening of our positions. As a consequence, we may look back upon this time with regret that we did not see our own interests clearly enough.

The naysayers, still boxing with the illusions and rhetoric of 1972, warn against détente as a Soviet deception that works against our interests. Meanwhile, on the Russians' side, their opposite numbers have been making similar complaints—that the Soviet leadership has suffered a diplomatic setback in the Middle East, that it has

ing opportunities to exploit the economic and political troubles of the West, that it has not been pushing the Communist parties of Portugal and Italy to power with sufficient vigor, while détente threatens to undermine the position of the Communist parties in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

This debate promises to build up in the coming four months, while the party prepares its foreign and domestic policy lines for the 25th Congress, scheduled for February.

The present Soviet leadership has been defending its present course against those who would favor a more aggressive foreign policy, but it is hard-pressed to show more than dubious benefits from the Helsinki show—the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe—from the continued advances in American military technology, and from the shortfall of economic relations below the high expectations of a few years ago.

Especially in the economic field, the leadership is confronted with serious structural problems in agriculture, productivity and advanced technology.

This has in turn fed the debate in Washington over whether the net effect of these problems would make Soviet policy more pliant in the face of a harder United States line in the strategic-arms-limitation talks and other matters, or whether the result will be an undermining of the advocates of a low-tension policy.

What are the real interests of the United States at this juncture, and what should be our priorities in our relations with the Soviet Union? Here are four propositions, advanced in the hope of stimulating an enlightened debate on these central questions.

1. The central problem of United States foreign policy is not détente, but the threatening disintegration of international relations into widespread violence and anarchy.

The risks and instabilities involved in many of these urgent problems would be infinitely greater if the United States and the Soviet Union were locked into a high-tension relationship instead of the imperfectly moderated competition called détente.

Therefore, it is more in the United States interest to have the Soviet Union on a détente course, with all its ambiguities and dangers, than to have it follow an alternative policy of more active and militant exploitation of the world's troubled areas.

2. In our relations with the Soviet Union, the most serious and immediate danger is the possibility of nuclear war. Therefore, the first priority in our relations with the Soviet Union in the immediate period—whatever the nature of the Soviet regime—must be to reverse the present drift toward more unstable and less controllable military technologies, toward larger and more widely spread military arsenals.

Our real security interests require a stabilization of the military competition at moderate levels, instead of forcing the pace of new military technologies in the vain pursuit of superiority, which now threatens to block present and future strategic-arms-limitation negotiations and to reduce our security.

3. The best instrument we have for encouraging more substantial restraint by the Soviet Union in its foreign policy would be a modest and controlled expansion of economic relations between the two countries, subject to cancellation if Soviet behavior were recklessly provocative or if there were signs of a new military build-up.

There are many tough questions here concerning grain, credits, technology transfer, which involve a balancing of risks and gains, but they should be decided on the basis of national deliberation and national policy—not by private traders, unions or companies.

4. Beyond these immediate priorities, we clearly have a long-term interest in an evolution of the Soviet system toward a foreign policy of restraint and responsibility, and domestic constraints on police repressiveness and arbitrary disregard for elementary human rights.

There are forces for change in these directions within the Soviet Union. They are more likely to be effective during a prolonged period of reduced international tension than under the mobilized response to high tension. Moreover, although the spotlight of world public attention can help to inhibit egregious police excesses, grandstand ultimatums from abroad for concessions tend to stiffen backlash resistance to restraints on the police apparatus.

If we make the transformation of the Soviet system our immediate first priority and use whatever leverage we have for this purpose, we are not only unlikely to achieve more than the limited steps that are feasible for the Soviet system as it is now constituted, but we will strengthen the military, the ideologues, the police, the nationalists, and the other forces who seek to perpetuate the remnants of Stalinism in foreign and domestic policy.

The main business of the present limited détente is to reduce the danger of nuclear war by working toward a sane management of the nuclear instruments of destruction. Unless this is successful, there will be no opportunity to work for the strengthening of democracy in the world.

Marshall D. Shulman is Adlai E. Stevenson Professor of International Relations and former director of the Russian Institute at Columbia University.

Western Europe

NEW YORK TIMES
9 Nov. 1975

COMMUNIST GAINS IN ITALY UPSET U.S.

Kissinger Advises Dominant Party to 'Revitalize' and Bar Reds From Government

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 8—Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger and other top Administration officials are expressing growing concern over the Communist political gains in Italy and have been sending repeated signals to the dominant Christian Democratic Party to revitalize itself and keep the Communists from joining the national Government.

The issue has troubled Washington for more than a year, and the anxiety has grown in recent months because of the Communists' strength in last June's local elections and signs of further gains in the next parliamentary elections in 1977.

Mr. Kissinger's constant advice to Italian visitors has been

Washington Post

1 2 NOV 1975

NATO Military Analysts Give Italian Army Grade 4 Rating

By David Willey
London Observer

ROME—If Soviet tanks were suddenly to rumble through Yugoslavia and appear on Italy's eastern frontier, what sort of Army would they find facing them? An inadequately equipped and trained conscript force with low morale, according to NATO military analysts.

The Italian army is regarded as grade four in terms of combat readiness and efficiency in NATO terms. President Giovanni Leone even found it necessary to give a pep talk to the army, of which he is nominal commander-in-chief, during recent maneuvers near the Yugoslav frontier.

A radical program of reform has just been announced which will involve cutting the army's strength by about a third, re-equipping it with new weapons, reorganizing the antiquated

described by one official as "revitalize, revitalize" and do everything possible to prevent the Communists from entering a governing coalition. Such a Communist role, even though the Italian Communists are regarded as moderate, would be viewed by Washington as a disaster for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the officials said.

Given the volatile state of Italian politics and the lack of public interest in this country about Italy's situation, the Administration has generally refrained from commenting publicly on Italian developments.

Warning to Committee

But Mr. Kissinger made an unusually pointed public statement about the Administration's concern in testifying before a House committee on Thursday.

Asked by a member of the House International Relations Committee whether Italy "could be lost to NATO" as the result of Communist political gains, Mr. Kissinger replied:

"We are disturbed by the dramatic gains by the Communist Party in June. Basically the United States cannot determine the domestic structure of Italy by its own initiative; basically the future of Italy is not an American foreign poli-

cy problem.

"But having said that, the United States hopes very much the Christian Democratic Party, which has been the governing party, revitalizes itself so that it can gain the necessary public support and a coalition can be put together by the democratic parties to prevent the entry into the government of the Communist Party of Italy.

"Since the impact on NATO of having one of the major countries with a major Communist Party participation would be very serious, we're giving Italy as much advice and as much encouragement as we can."

When Mr. Kissinger spoke, Ambassador John A. Volpe was in Washington for consultations with President Ford and the State Department on the political situation in Italy, and Mr. Kissinger had just finished on Tuesday stressing the need for revitalization to Giulio Andreotti, the Italian Budget Minister, who was here with a parliamentary delegation.

Younger Leaders Advised

The Administration believes that the Christian Democrats, who replaced Amintore Fanfani as their party leader in July after the Communists came within three percentage points of the Christian Democrats in the local elections, must bring younger people into prom-

inence and achieve a more dynamic image. Otherwise, the Administration believes, Italy runs the risk of having the Communists make such a strong showing in coming elections as to make their entry into the Government inevitable.

The American concern was reminiscent of the years immediately after World War II, when the Truman Administration feared that the Communists would win the elections in 1948. To prevent that, the United States poured millions of dollars into Italy, much of it through clandestine channels, to help the Christian Democrats win the crucial parliamentary vote.

Several nongovernmental experts believe that the Italian Communist Party should be brought into a coalition as it is independent of Moscow and Peking and run on democratic principles at home, where it controls several local administrations. But Mr. Kissinger and his aides believe that such a development would be a disaster for the West.

They have asserted that a Communist-influenced government would inevitably weaken Italy's ties to NATO further damaging the alliance's southern flank, already in tenuous because of the unpredictable situation in Portugal, Spain, Greece and Turkey.

that the Italian military tradition is based upon a backward and passive society. A different style of leadership is required and the concept of command as the incarnation of an omnipotent authority is disappearing, he said.

Capt. Accame said he wanted to see collective decision-making. He went on to quote General Charles de Gaulle, "The true school of command is general culture," and Mao Tse-tung, "An army without culture is an ignorant army and an ignorant army cannot win."

Another sign of the times was the presence for the first time of conscripts in uniform (wearing red scarves over their faces to escape identification) at a left-wing rally during the summer about events in Portugal. The Italian armed forces are becoming politically conscious and for motivation they are being offered only obsolete patriotic platitudes.

The fault lies with the officer class whose top leaders have been involved in obscure Fascist-inspired plots, and

chain of command, and streamlining supplies and services.

A new, more human, military code of discipline is to be introduced, and it is hoped that these changes will ultimately produce a defense force that will make Italy more than just a logistics base for American and other NATO forces.

There have been rumblings of discontent recently at all levels of the Italian armed forces. The conscripts, who make up the bulk of the 220,000-strong army, have obtained some satisfaction already. They are to be allowed to wear civilian clothes off duty, work a five-day week and will shortly have to serve only 12 instead of 15 months.

Some non-commissioned officers took to the streets in Rome last June to explain their grievances to the public. About 2,000 air force sergeants

demonstrated for better pay and conditions. The air force runs both civil and military air traffic control in Italy and if they had gone on strike as they threatened, it would have caused chaos in air traffic control all over Europe. The government has promised to look into their complaints.

The most serious case of disaffection was the resignation of a senior naval officer, Captain Falco Accame, commander of the destroyer Indomito, who gave up a distinguished 32-year career in the navy just when he was on the point of promotion to admiral. The pretext for his resignation was the refusal of higher authority to allocate sufficient married quarters to his non-commissioned officers while his vessel was undergoing a six-month refit.

The real reason was more philosophical. In an interview after his resignation, he said

who have refused to recognize the realities of a country in which one-third of the electorate now votes Communist.

The general public is almost totally ignorant about what is

going on in the upper echelons of the country's armed forces. No Italian daily newspaper boasts a regular defense correspondent.

The basic problem in

reorganizing Italy's defenses is, of course, financial. The defense budget is kept at about 6 per cent of the gross national product. In 1974, it was about \$2 billion and 60 per cent of this went for pay.

BALTIMORE SUN
28 Oct. 1975

Spain's underground parties cautiously prepare to surface

By FREDERIC B. HILL
Sun Staff Correspondent

Madrid—Political parties have been banned in Spain for 36 years under the Franco regime, whose fascist National Movement was the only legal organization. Meetings of 20 people or more were illegal. Would-be "politicians" lost their passports, were fined or jailed.

But, despite these severe limits on political activity, a wide range of skeletal, secret and not-so-secret political parties are ready and waiting to emerge into the open under Gen. Francisco Franco's designated successor, Prince Juan Carlos.

Most "party" leaders, ranging from reformed fascists to Communists, are willing to give Prince Juan Carlos a short grace period after the expected death or resignation of the generalissimo.

But most, particularly the center-left, the Socialists and the Communists, feel strongly that the prince must open up the rigid system soon to full democratic participation or face widespread unrest—not only from extremists.

"This government has no more credibility in the eyes of society, and people want a pluralistic democratic system," says Raul Morodo, a politically active lawyer and Socialist. "The model for change is not known, but it should come soon."

Antonio Garcia-Lopez, leader of the center-right Social Democratic Union, says "it can't happen overnight. But we have to change the Constitution and have elections..."

Most "illegal" political activists agree on the need for basic reforms, including free unions, universal suffrage, an end to the harsh anti-terrorism law, redistribution of wealth and decentralization of government to account for Spain's sharp regional differences.

Chances of a substantial opening-up in time seem good. Just how far and whether it will be far enough is another question—one that may well be an-

swered by what Spain's generally apolitical but conservative Army will accept.

Without being specific, Prince Juan Carlos indicated several times in the last few months that he favors a more democratic form of government, with four or five parties along Western European lines. He would bar Communists and extremists.

The real power struggle he faces will be between right-wing forces which want to move only slightly, and in effect, keep Francoism without Generalissimo Franco, and the embryonic parties, which feel this would be fatal.

In the last two or three years as the "post-Franco period" appeared to be on the horizon, the right wing won the battles over establishment rebels and more underground parties which argued for change before Generalissimo Franco left the scene. But, many feel, the right may have lost the war by digging themselves into what came to be called "the bunker."

"This country has been dominated by the right wing for so long and the future lies with the left just because of that," a former supporter of the regime said recently.

The Franco regime's moves to allow "associations" collapsed when Generalissimo Franco and his inner circle realized they were becoming political parties. He tacked on the proviso that only those who swore allegiance to the National Movement would be allowed to form associations. Only two groups, both rightist, were formed.

The extent of this last-ditch retrenchment, reinforced by the recent left-wing terrorism, is reflected in the make-up of the best-placed conservative "party," which is now preparing itself for action.

To beat the system, many leading "establishment" figures formed an independent study group called Fedisa. Though many are wealthy men whose self-interests mix with their political ideals, they are trying to co-opt the center of the new

prepare to surface

political spectrum by backing many liberal changes. Their main difference from other parties is their opposition to legalizing the Communist party.

Fedisa sports a number of big-league ex-Francoists: Manuel Fraga Iribarne, Spain's ambassador to Britain and widely considered likely to be Prince Juan Carlos's first prime minister; Jose Maria de Arelliza, a former ambassador to the U.S.; and Pio Cabanillas and Marcelino Oreja, the minister and deputy minister of information who resigned last year in disgust at the regime's resistance to change.

A party with more legitimate claim to the center—but still to the right of it—is the Social Democratic Union headed by Mr. Garcia-Lopez, a 45-year-old businessman and economist.

Mr. Garcia-Lopez and his aides feel the Communist party should be allowed to operate openly because its banning would increase its already strong underground network. He calls for "popular socialism without Marxism" along West German lines.

Another party close to the center-right position is the Christian Democratic group headed by a former education minister, Joaquin Ruiz Jimenez. He heads the Catholic Church's Peace and Justice Commission.

With no real party in the center, several socialist parties are organized left of center. The strongest, and most willing to work with the more conservative parties, is the Spanish Socialist party (PSOE).

Headed by a dynamic Seville lawyer, Felipe Gonzalez, the party has no more than 7,000 members. But its potential strength, many observers agree, is probably the greatest once political activity is permitted. Mr. Gonzalez has said that only a complete break with the Franco system would be acceptable.

The PSOE recently joined

with the Social Democratic Union, the Christian Democrats and 13 other parties to form a non-Communist coalition with the law-abiding name, Platform of Democratic Convergence.

Despite an equally harmless earlier name, 14 members of the group were arrested last year by Madrid police for holding an illegal meeting.

Spain's Communist party (PCE) dominates the rest of the left. It is well-organized, particularly in the unofficial "workers' commissions," which often make the real union decisions at factories in Spain.

While it is reported to have 20,000 to 25,000 members, its activists tend to be professional people. The leader is Santiago Carrillo, a 59-year-old lawyer who lives in exile in Paris.

Mr. Carrillo, who insists the PCE is willing to abide by democratic rules, launched another coalition in Paris last summer, the Junta Democratica, in an effort to unite the anti-Franco "opposition."

But while its only major programmatic differences from the Platform of Democratic Convergence were rejection of Prince Juan Carlos and demands for a referendum on a monarchy or republic, the junta raised the suspicions of the others. Only small socialist groups have joined it.

The public appeal of all these parties if elections were to be held is impossible to judge due to Spain's 37 years without free choice. The country is probably considerably more conservative than it was in 1931, when only 60 of some 400 representatives in the then new republic were from right-wing parties.

But right now, while political activists are busy organizing, skirting the law but not flouting it, caution is still a byword. "We are meeting," one political activist dared to say before hanging up what he fears is a tapped telephone.

Near East

Saturday, Nov. 1, 1975 THE WASHINGTON POST

U.S. Disowns Envoy's Attack On Sadat Talk

By Murrey Marder

Washington Post Staff Writer

The State Department disassociated itself yesterday from U.S. Ambassador to Israel Malcolm Toon's statements that Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's criticism of Zionists during his American visit has embarrassed President Ford.

Toon also was reported to have said that a Syrian intervention in Lebanon would require both the United States and Israel to consider what to do about it.

Syria called in the U.S. ambassador to Damascus, Robert W. Murphy, on

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21 Nov. 1975

Thursday to protest what it called hostile remarks by Toon.

Selected portions of Toon's remarks made Wednesday at a Rotary Club meeting in Haifa were distributed by the State Department yesterday with an extraordinarily ambiguous official disclaimer.

Spokesman Robert Funseth said Toon "obviously was not instructed to make these remarks" and "where his remarks departed from official policy they obviously do not represent the views of the

U.S. government."

The spokesman refused, however, in response to reporters' repeated questions, to say which of Toon's remarks were being disowned by State. Presumably the references to Sadat, who is now being given red-carpet treatment on his visit to the United States, caused the greatest official discomfort. The State Department's version of what Toon said omitted reference to the possibility of Syrian intervention in Lebanon, but quoted Toon as describing Syria's position on negotiations with Israel as "totally uncompromising."

Sadat's comments about Zionists and Jews in a National Press Club speech here on Monday were denounced in Israel as blatantly anti-Semitic. Ambassador Toon in answer to a question said in Haifa Wednesday that he could not understand "why President

Sadat . . . has chosen to embarrass the President of the United States and my country in this way."

State Department spokesman Funseth reiterated yesterday that "we are not going to comment directly on the remarks of President Sadat."

Ten Democratic House members issued a statement yesterday deploring what they called "the virulently anti-Semitic remarks" made by Sadat.

They said they are also "profoundly disappointed by the silence of President Ford in the aftermath of the Sadat remarks on Zionism," although they noted the President "has spoken out against the U.N. resolution." That resolution, equating Zionism with racism, has been denounced almost unanimously in Congress.

Sadat is scheduled to address a joint session of Congress on Wednesday.

HIGH ISRAELI TOLL IN A NEW WAR SEEN

Colby Says Military Power Is Growing but He Places Death Estimate at 8,000

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 20—William E. Colby, the Director of Central Intelligence, has surprised Israel's supporters on Capitol Hill by asserting that Israel's military superiority over the Arabs was increasing but that in another Middle East war Israel would probably suffer 8,000 dead, more than three times the 2,500 fatalities in the October 1973 war.

His analysis, made at a closed-door session of the House International Relations Committee on Nov. 12, was

disclosed by Congressional sources today, as pro-Israeli members of Congress sought to refute Mr. Colby's estimate that Israel was increasing its forces in relation to the Arabs. They charged that Mr. Colby had counted only Egypt and Syria as Israel's foes in any future war, whereas Libya, Saudi Arabia, and other Arab states would help Egypt and Syria.

Some Infer Defeat

Moreover, the estimate of 8,000 killed in another three-week war startled many members of Congress who were at the hearing. They insisted today that such a loss would amount to a "defeat" for Israel, given its small population.

Mr. Colby's assertion that Israel was increasing its superiority over the Arabs was mentioned by Senator J. Bennett Johnston Jr., Democrat of Louisiana, to Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger during a hearing of a Senate appropriations subcommittee.

Mr. Kissinger, who was defending the Administration's \$4.7 billion security assistance

request, of which \$2.3 billion was for Israel, said he had not read Mr. Colby's testimony.

Senator M. Johnston said that the C.I.A. and the defense intelligence agency had concluded that Israel had sufficient forces to last it through 1980, but Mr. Kissinger pointed out that the intelligence agencies had miscalculated in 1973 when they believed Israel would win easily.

Inter-Agency Study

Mr. Kissinger also said that the request for \$1.5 billion in military assistance for Israel was based on an interagency study, which included Pentagon and C.I.A. representatives.

After the hearing today, Mr. Kissinger told reporters that he was summoning home Malcolm Toon, the Ambassador to Israel, and envoys to Arab countries to discuss the next phase in Middle East diplomacy.

Mr. Kissinger has pressed for a new round of Syrian-Israeli talks, but now seems to be leaning toward asking the Russians to support an informal meeting of interested states to

prepare for a Geneva, including participation of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

During a break in the hearing, Mr. Kissinger said that President Ford had asked him to retain the chairmanship of two key White House interagency committees even though he has given up his White House post of national security adviser to Mr. Ford. The committees are the verification panel, which deals with proposals for the talks on strategic arms limitation, and the Washington Special Action Group that is convened at times of international crises.

He Headed 6 Committees

As national security adviser for the last seven years, Mr. Kissinger headed six committees. That gave him, in a sense, power over every aspect of political-military affairs in Washington.

He is turning his national security chief's role to Lieut. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, his former deputy, who will head four of its committees: the 40 Committee, which oversees covert activities; the Defense Program Review Committee; the Senior Review Group; and the Intelligence Committee.

BALTIMORE SUN
20 Nov. 1975

Israel said to fear widening arms gap

By CHARLES W. CORDDRY
Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington—Israeli officials, concerned about the fate of their large arms aid request, are reported to be telling members of Congress that Arab military power will increase in relation to Israel's over the next five years even if they get all the weapons they are seeking here.

These officials believe the Ford administration somewhat weakens its own case for Israeli aid by underestimating the extent to which present ratios of Arab to Israeli forces can be expected to widen by 1980. This is true, the Israelis say, of aircraft, tanks, artillery, surface-to-air missiles and ground combat divisions.

An underlying irony is that the United States will be shipping some of the weapons to Arab states that would contribute to the widening power ratios foreseen by the Israelis. But Israeli officials believe, the main infusion of weapons into Arab lands in the next two years or so will be from the Soviet Union and Western Europe.

The administration has asked Congress to authorize \$1.5 billion in military aid to Israel in this fiscal year—half in grants, half on credit—and that annual rate is expected to continue for several years.

In Jerusalem, however, the U.S. Congress is perceived as being generally in an aid-cutting mood and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin is sufficiently concerned that he has just sent one of his country's most articulate spokesmen, Maj. Gen. Aharon Yariv, here to defend the military aid case to congressmen.

General Yariv, now retired from the military and serving in the Israeli parliament, was military attache here in the late 1950's and was Israel's intelligence chief during the six-day war in June, 1967. He conducted military negotiations with the Egyptians after the 1973 war.

In their aid requests, the Israelis are emphasizing the latest jet fighters, U.S. F-15's, to offset the Arabs' Soviet MiG-23's; 200 more tanks over four years' time; large quantities of artillery in which they were found wanting in 1973, and the

NEW YORK TIMES
13 Nov. 1975

The U.N. And Zionism

By Anthony Lewis

BOSTON, Nov. 12—The United Nations General Assembly deserves every bit of the outrage aroused by its resolution terming Zionism "a form of racism." Fear and anger are appropriate reactions.

Plain old anti-Semitism in the world is one reason for passage of the resolution, and it is necessary to face up to that grizzly fact. Averting one's eyes from the incitement of hatred against Jews—pretending that it is a passing phenomenon in some other place—was tried in the 1930's.

Nor is it possible to take much comfort from the fact that the General Assembly has long since lost its right to be treated seriously as a maker of moral statements to the world. Whatever its foolishness, the resolution will almost certainly be used as the basis for new discriminations against Jews (who will be called "Zionists") in the Soviet Union and elsewhere.

But it is not enough for Americans to be angry at the United Nations. It is certainly not enough to nod in agreement at preachments by such well-known exemplars of moral sensitivity as Gerald Ford and Jacob Javits. For the unhappy truth is that this country has a share of responsibility for the disaster.

A generation ago the United States was in a position to talk of moral standards in world affairs. There was, for example, a strong idealistic ele-

ABROAD AT HOME

The United States must avoid the temptation to be self-righteous.

ment in America's support for the creation of Israel and in our effective leadership of the U.N. to that end. In those days there was an extraordinary respect around the world, for American idealism.

That hold on the world's imagination—that unique form of leadership—has been lost by our own actions. Successive Governments of the United States put aside ethical considerations as amateur stuff and went in for the cynical use of power. If we make short-term interest our guide, with

power as the only limit, how can we object to the Arabs or anyone else doing the same thing?

A superpower that drops 500,000 tons of bombs on Cambodia is in rather a doubtful position to lecture others on morality. So is a Secretary of State who asserts the right to upset the constitutional government of a friendly country by covert means.

The funny thing about all the hard-nosed "realism" practiced by Henry Kissinger and others is that it evidently does not gain votes for our side when we want to make a stand on principle. The torturers whom Mr. Kissinger and the C.I.A. helped to power in Chile, and are helping to keep in power now, did not vote with us in the General Assembly. Chile abstained.

A particularly grotesque example of the results of "realism" in this regard is provided by Burundi. When the Burundi Government engaged in mass tribal slaughter of a truly genocidal character, the United States Government declined to take any disapproving action—apparently because of American economic interests there. But even in tiny Burundi such a policy earned no return favors in the U.N. Burundi voted for the resolution.

A word has to be said, too, about Israel's responsibility. While it is true that declared opposition to "Zionism" often cloaks anti-Semitism, it is also true that Israel's policy made it easier for the Arabs to push through an extremist resolution.

Israel has persistently refused to make a real commitment to return the Arab territories won in the 1967 war. Her policy instead has been to rely on American support and huge amounts of American arms, playing for time on the ultimate territorial issues—time that I think is making life progressively harder for Israel, not easier.

There is every reason for Israel to have survival as its first national thought—and second, and third. But it does not follow that the correct policy is to take a diplomatic line so hard that moderate Arabs are given no encouragement and extremism thrives.

As for the United States, the temptation it must avoid now is to luxuriate in self-righteousness. To respond in kind to the opportunists and tyrants who pushed this resolution through—to boycott the U.N. or punish it financially—would be unhelpful. That is the Soviet way: When the game goes wrong, pick up your marbles. The United States should show that it is bigger than that, and more patient in the cause of freedom.

If we believe in freedom, then we should be prepared to go on arguing the case for it, with other free countries, in what remains for all its distortions the most complete international forum. Some day, too, an American Government will understand again that cynical manipulation does not work for this country in foreign policy—that our strength lies in our ideals.

East Asia

Sunday, November 9, 1975

The Washington Star

Will America remain committed to the past in Southeast Asia?

By Jeffrey Race

The political gyrations now occurring in Southeast Asia signify not the end of the Vietnam War but the impending final settlement resulting from the liquidation of more than a century of Western military intervention on the Southeast Asian mainland. Will the United States cooperate in the changes now taking place? Continuing present attitudes of hurt pride and passive opposition to the inevitable is certainly conceivable, perhaps likely, but it will have costs, and we should be clear what they are.

Jeffrey Race, a fellow of the Institute of Current World Affairs, has spent much of the past decade in Southeast Asia and has written a number of studies on political and economic development in the region.

The history of the last thousand years in peninsular Southeast Asia has been one of marches and countermarches among the contending empires and petty principalities. Only Vietnam was an important power throughout, and at this point, long-range processes of consolidation have left but two — Vietnam and Thailand — facing each other in the struggle for regional dominance.

Massive, and related, changes have taken place in both countries, on which the U.S. has tripped and stumbled. These changes are the same ones which began to rock the West three centuries ago, which crushed or decisively altered the most powerful European kingdoms of the day, and out of which America's own revolution grew. Our traditions dictated that we should honor, not resist, these same changes in Asia; only American pride permitted our leaders to think that they could resist what humbled the potentates of earlier eras. But resist we did — and do.

What are these changes? Simply demands for broader political participation, resulting by well-understood processes from increasing urbanization, literacy, communications and wealth. Shortsighted French attempts to surpass such demands succeeded only in bringing the Communists to dominance in Vietnamese politics, and French leaders were humbled in 1954 like the Bourbons in 1789. Americans rushed in with their own attempt to halt the course of history. They succeeded in radicalizing the opposition in South Vietnam, and also in Laos and Cambodia, and they too have been predictably humbled for their failure to understand and adjust to the flow of events.

Ironically decades back American patriots engraved an epitaph for the British soldiers killed at Lexington and Concord. Near the bridge by which was fired "the

shot heard round the world," this monument now reads: "They came three thousand miles to keep the past upon its throne." In the last two centuries, have Americans learned only to treble the distance they will go on the same fool's errand?

If our experience in Vietnam suggests a melancholy answer to that question, the state of our relations with Thailand is even more disquieting. During the past two years the Thai have overthrown the American-supported military dictatorship, promulgated a new constitution, and permitted new groups to participate in politics.

Has this trend toward democracy, almost unique in Asia, been welcomed by the U.S., as a vindication of the ideals for which we fought the Vietnam War? Sadly, the reverse is true. U.S. leaders have yet to offer a single word of encouragement for the progressive trends in Thailand. This is of course perceived in Bangkok exactly as it has been intended, as a signal of official American displeasure. Behind-the-scenes American dealings with the Thai military over the Vietnamese planes flown to Thailand and over the Marine landings during the Mayaguez rescue have been two other ominous signals of Washington's preferences for dealing with the generals.

It is urgent for the U.S. and the world, that America find some other way of relating to history than being bludgeoned into submitting to it at great cost in human life. For Southeast Asia, this would mean accepting the finality of what has happened in Vietnam and improving relations with that country, as de Gaulle did with Algeria; and it would mean recognizing and encouraging democratic trends in Thailand, not obstructing them.

There is not much time to act on this perception. Thai leaders are under pressure from their domestic constituency as a result both of events in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, and of the suspicion engendered by decades of American support to Thai dictators.

The Vietnamese are similarly at a crossroads. A pragmatic and methodical people, they have evaluated the options open to them and have extended the hand of friendship to both Thailand and the United States. What will be our response? Once the bureaucratic coalitions in diverse capitals mobilize around some particular policies, a mutually reinforcing chain of events will ensue. The system will acquire a rigidity much like it had in the late 1960s — and which it took so much human sacrifice to turn around.

Washington's decisions will largely determine the degree of strain henceforth obtaining on the peninsula. If Washington sympathetically accepts what has happened, strain will be reduced, and America can participate as a helpful partner in

shaping the political lineup emerging from the liquidation of Western intervention on the peninsula. Russia, China, Japan, the members of ASEAN, and certainly Vietnam, would welcome this outcome. But if Washington continues to be cold and hostile toward Vietnam, aggravating suspicions that it will go on using local clients to frustrate inevitable political change, then a higher degree of strain will ensue. Thai leaders will have to exaggerate their distance from the U.S. and the West, opportunities for constructive cooperation will slip away, and America's role will sooner or later be reduced even more drastically.

American leaders will have difficulty accepting this fact if present emotional attitudes continue. Emotionalism is apparent, for example, in the statement sometimes heard at high levels in the U.S. government regarding the Thai: "Well, if they don't want us, we'll just get out." Such a statement could have profound consequences in the present situation where each actor is homing on the perceptions of others.

A second statement frequently heard about U.S. relations with Thailand and Vietnam is: "They need us more than we need them; let them come to us." Saying

this no doubt helps our sense of power and feeling of self-importance. The question remains whether this is the proper way to conduct the affairs of a great nation. I suggest that it is not, because it overlooks the most fundamental fact of international relations, which is that the powerful only remain so by forming relationships with the less powerful.

Another issue is leadership. We frequently hear in Washington these days, "There's no point in pursuing improved relations (with Thailand or Vietnam) because X will never accept it," where X may be Thai or Vietnamese leaders, the speaker's own boss, the Congress, or the man in Muncie. The statement is usually offered as an irrefutable justification for doing nothing. Doing nothing is of course a policy, but doing nothing about our relations with Thailand and Vietnam is going to have serious consequences for our interests.

The meshing of complex processes, against apathy and opposition, is the function of leadership. Constituencies can be created, positions can be prepared. The point is that strong leadership will produce one outcome in Southeast Asia; our present stance of aggressive followership will produce another.

NEW YORK TIMES
19 NOV 1975

Signal to Hanoi

In tones so muted that they may scarcely be heard, the Ford Administration is nevertheless softening its rigid hostility toward the new Communist regimes of Southeast Asia.

At least one large voluntary organization, the American Friends Service Committee, learned last weekend that it would be permitted to resume small-scale shipments of relief supplies for war-shattered communities of North and South Vietnam. In lifting its ban on such aid, the State Department was merely correcting an unfortunate aspect of the postwar Vietnam policy.

At the same time, Secretary of State Kissinger let it be known through a group of Congressmen about to confer with North Vietnamese representatives in Paris that the United States was ready to respond to goodwill gestures from Hanoi, working toward a "normalization" of relations. He emphasized, however, that the Administration was not yet considering any economic aid proposals to North Vietnam; Hanoi officials have regularly insisted that reconstruction aid, as envisaged in the 1973 Paris agreements, would have to be an integral element in any resumption of working relations.

This is the commendable beginning of a new flexibility toward the Communist regimes in Indochina, but there is still a long way to go. The United States veto

of North and South Vietnam's separate admission to the United Nations last August blocked any early political dialogue. Administration officials argue, however, that their position was based primarily on the Communist powers' refusal to permit simultaneous membership for North and South Korea; when Vietnam becomes unified and applies for single membership, the United States' objections of principle would not necessarily hold.

A flat trade embargo remains in effect against both Vietnams and Cambodia; earlier this month President Ford gave Congressional leaders clear signals of his opposition to pending legislation to lift this embargo. The volume of trade expectable between the United States and Indochina would not be large, but Asia-based American business interests and chambers of commerce are agitating for reopening of commercial relations, lest the boycott turn into a long-range problem such as has clouded United States relations with China and Cuba.

The Communist regimes of Vietnam and Cambodia remain engaged in their delicate balancing act between the rival attractions of China and the Soviet Union. After years of warfare, it is paradoxical that the United States is the one superpower to which these new regimes could now relate without inherent tensions. The sooner this country's policymakers overcome a lingering bitterness over defeat in Vietnam, the brighter will be the prospects for a constructive new American role in Southeast Asia's political and economic development.

Los Angeles Times Sun., Oct. 19, 1975.

Should U.S. Have Military Ties With China?

BY MICHAEL PILLSBURY

Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger will be discussing a broad range of ways in which U.S.-China relations can be improved when he visits Peking this week. But American military ties with the Chinese are not likely to be on the agenda. Indeed, the subject has scarcely been broached in this country.

In fact, the whole idea may seem academic, given a background of hostility and the fact that warming between Washington and Peking is only a few years old. In the kaleido-

Michael Pillsbury, former assistant political affairs officer at the U.N. Secretariat, is a staff member of the Rand Corp., specializing in Sino-Soviet military affairs. His article is excerpted from Foreign Policy.

scope of changing interests, however, today's theoretical idea may become tomorrow's practical alternative for policy-makers.

Before Americans talk seriously of adding China to the nations included in U.S. military programs, of course, they will want to examine carefully the probable effects on both China and its chief rival, the Soviet Union.

Since 1971, at least two schools of thought have emerged in Moscow about the implications, for the Soviet Union, of the new U.S. policy toward China. One is relatively sanguine; the other, quite apprehensive.

Some Russians apparently do not object to the recent improvements in U.S.-Chinese relations, in part because it seems impossible to them that Peking and Washington will ever achieve any substantial degree of political rapprochement, let alone any anti-Soviet cooperation.

The second Soviet school, however, seems deeply troubled by the general trend evident since 1971. Soviet authors have explicitly warned the U.S. government that becoming too friendly with Peking may well endanger U.S.-Soviet detente.

Can anyone in Moscow seriously believe that Maoist China and Republican America could actively collude to oppose the Soviet Union? These questions can be better understood if first approached through Soviet eyes.

In 1973, the Soviet Union began asserting that China had proposed a military relationship to the United States. One unofficial Soviet broadcast went further, by stating that the United States had actually set up a tank factory and a helicopter assembly plant in China.

For no publicly apparent reason, the Soviet media soon began to accuse the Chinese leadership of actively seeking and receiving support from the CIA.

It is important to appreciate how memories of U.S. aid to Yugoslavia could affect Soviet perceptions today. It was over 25 years ago in mid-1949 that Washington went to Tito's aid when he was threatened by Soviet invasion. President Truman and Dean Acheson quickly arranged development loans, an export license for a steel finishing mill, and diplomatic support for Belgrade's bid for a Security Council seat in the United Nations. Despite the prevailing atmosphere of militant anti-communism, Truman released \$16 million of Mutual Defense Assistance funds to Yugoslavia.

Observers may protest that Soviet analysts surely would not overlook the obvious differences between U.S. aid for Yugoslavia in 1949 and U.S.-Chinese collusion against the Soviet Union in the 1970s. Yugoslavia's expulsion from Cominform had occurred just four days after the beginning of the Berlin airlift—not in a period of U.S.-Soviet detente. More importantly, Yugoslavia is a small, nonindustrial power without the capacity or ambition to challenge the Soviet Union.

The People's Republic of China, on the other hand, is large, potentially threatening to the Soviet Union, already possesses dozens of nuclear missiles and jet bombers, and may intend to expand its challenge to Soviet influence on a worldwide scale.

Thus, to Americans, for Ford and Kissinger to replicate the Yugoslav policy of Truman and Acheson with respect to China may seem impossible. But a Soviet specialist on China told me that one aspect of the Yugoslav/China analogy that does fit is wartime contingency planning. After all, a striking degree of military (and presumably intelligence) cooperation did develop between Belgrade and Washington in the early 1950s. This sort of U.S.-Chinese joint military planning seems quite plausible to some Soviet observers.

If the United States ever wanted to enter into a military relationship with China, there is still the other side of the question: Would China be willing? Is it possible that Peking's leaders might seek Western military equipment, defense technology, and intelligence?

China has been warning its population for nearly six years of the danger of a Soviet surprise attack, so one obvious motive would be to provide a quick fix for the relatively inferior Chinese army, navy, and air force in an effort to deter a Soviet invasion.

There are two ways a U.S.-Chinese military relationship could aid the Chinese in deterring the Soviets.

First, by upgrading their war-fighting capabilities with U.S. jet transports, armored personnel carriers, tanks and jet fighters, Peking would raise the cost of a Soviet invasion of China. It seems unlikely, however, that China could afford the kind of massive arms purchases that would be required to establish even a degree of either strategic or conventional military parity with the Soviet Union.

Expenditure of hundreds of millions of dollars of scarce foreign exchange for U.S. military equipment would not be as advantageous to Peking as a second psychological type of deterrence which is much cheaper. Whether or not the United States actually grants any Chinese military requests in peacetime, Peking could significantly affect Soviet calculations about the degree of U.S. or Western support China might receive in the event of a Soviet attack.

As long as U.S.-Chinese relations remain cool and distant, Moscow may assume that Peking would neither ask for nor receive military support from any outside source even after a devastating Soviet conventional attack or a disarming nuclear first strike. If, either through public statements or "disinformation" passed through clandestine channels, the Chinese were able to convince Moscow that U.S. military and intelligence support has been promised to China in the event of a surprise Soviet attack, this would undoubtedly have a profound effect on the debate within the Soviet leadership. Soviet military planners would face a new and dangerous uncertainty: the possibility of wartime Western aid to China.

Three advantages would accrue to the United States in any U.S.-Chinese military relationship.

—The military payoff would serve as a concrete reward for the pragmatic Chinese policy of establishing working diplomatic relations with the United States, a policy which may fall under attack within China after Mao Tse-tung dies. More specifically, a U.S. military assistance and sales program in Peking would begin to involve the influential Chinese defense establishment in a new diplomatic relationship with the United States by giving the Chinese military a stake—defense technology—in preserving good relations with America.

—U.S. arms and technology transfers to China may aid in deterring a Soviet attack or further Soviet military pressure on China, forestalling a future Sino-Soviet war which could jeopardize world peace. Certain im-

improvements discussed below in Chinese strategic forces could reduce the risk of Sino-Soviet nuclear war and insure a more stable nuclear balance without significantly increasing the Chinese strategic threat to us.

—Increased Chinese military capabilities, especially if deployed near the Sino-Soviet border, could induce even greater Soviet deployments to military districts on the Chinese border than presently exist, tying down a greater percentage of Soviet ground, naval, and air forces.

These general advantages of U.S. military sales to China could be maximized while minimizing negative consequences by giving export licenses to U.S. private corporations *only for sales of defensive or passive military systems to China*. Two relevant examples would be a military reconnaissance system and a phased array or Over-the-Horizon (OTH) radar system. These systems might provide strategic and tactical warning to Peking in the event of a Soviet surprise attack.

Moreover, if China genuinely believes its own propaganda statements about the urgent necessity of preparing for a Soviet surprise attack, then Peking may be interested in acquiring a "hot line" capability to receive U.S. tactical warning of Soviet missile or air attacks.

A U.S. strategic relationship with China, limited to this type of passive, defensive military technology, might bring some of the general advantages listed, at minimal damage to U.S.-Soviet relations.

Possible initiatives that would encourage development of a U.S.-Chinese military relationship include an exchange of military academy delegations, defense attaches, and even defense ministers; U.S.-Chinese intelligence exchanges about the Soviet Union through covert channels; limited military assistance to the Chinese; and allied military sales.

Perhaps fearing that the United States may have begun to either consider these ideas or even discuss them in secret with the Chinese, Soviet diplomats in the United States have *already* begun to make the case against any U.S.-supported increase in China's defense capabilities, saying that it would:

—Poison the atmosphere of U.S.-Soviet detente and strengthen the hand of those Soviet leaders who believe the United States cannot be

trusted;

—Stimulate Soviet military leaders to call for a preemptive attack on China before Western arms arrive;

—Eventually (after Mao dies) fall under control of anti-American Chinese leaders and be used against U.S. allies and U.S. national security interests in Asia;

—Embolden the Chinese leadership to take more provocative military risks in any future crisis, thus increasing the probability of Chinese involvement in armed conflicts.

Should we assume that Moscow flatly opposes *any* improvement in U.S.-Chinese relations? Probably not. Supplying China with 100 B-52 heavy bombers would obviously elicit a different Soviet reaction than the sale of a small number of helicopters, radar components, or high resolution satellite cameras. Also, since Moscow denies it would ever think of attacking China, or NATO, the Soviets could hardly object to joint military contingency planning that would raise the costs to the Soviets of invading China or NATO.

Nevertheless, Moscow has apparently made its position perfectly clear. An item in the American monthly *Air Progress* asserts that Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev recently told Prime Minister Harold Wilson that, as a precondition for a British-Soviet trade deal, London must refuse to sell the new Harrier jet fighter to Peking. The British agreed.

Whether Moscow will ever feel similarly obliged to interfere in U.S.-Chinese relations remains to be seen. Before this happens, our immediate need is for serious analysis of the future direction of the China policy begun by Nixon and Kissinger. In the end, publicly voiced Soviet fears may suggest new U.S. options that will increase stability in the turbulent Sino-Soviet conflict—the only relationship in the world in which two nuclear powers have shed each other's blood along a common border in a bitter ideological confrontation that shows few signs of amelioration.

Clearly, all these possibilities are directly related, from the U.S. point of view, to the state of U.S.-Soviet detente. If detente seems to be deteriorating, then the temptation to experiment with some of these initiatives would increase. A President more hostile to the Soviet Union and detente than Ford might be particu-

larly attracted to the idea, risky as it is, of forging a close U.S.-Chinese bond in the Pacific, perhaps embracing Japan, as a new form of anti-Soviet containment.

But we need not go to such extremes in considering future modes of U.S.-Chinese military relations. Less drastic alternatives are more attractive. We should modify the specious policy of "evenhandedness" which now governs exports of advanced defense technology.

The same restrictions should not apply to both the Soviet Union and China. China is not nearly as large a security threat to us as the Soviet Union is. To maintain a rough parity in the global triangle of power, we need a policy which explicitly recognizes that Peking has a legitimate interest in improving its deterrence against the threat of Soviet attack. Despite Soviet denials of hostile intent we view with much concern the increase of Soviet armed strength near the Chinese border from 15 divisions in 1968 to nearly 50 in 1975.

Any U.S. initiatives or responses to Chinese requests, moreover, must be based on an appreciation of the danger to the West of an unstable Sino-Soviet nuclear balance. We should reject the current blind public policy of blanket prohibition of defense technology transfer and intelligence sharing with Peking and instead require only that two conditions be met for any item or information Peking seeks:

1. It must enhance those Chinese defense capabilities which we believe will help deter Soviet military pressure on China without increasing offense capabilities which threaten U.S. allies in Asia;

2. It must not unduly alarm Moscow about U.S. intentions and thereby jeopardize U.S.-Soviet detente.

Many requests might meet these conditions, including technology which has both civil and military applications. For example, the same kinds of advanced underwater listening equipment China needs for offshore oil exploration will also enhance Peking's antisubmarine sonar detection capability. This would be useful against the Soviet submarine fleet in the Pacific which has long threatened the naval forces and merchant shipping of China, Japan, and the United States.

Latin America

WASHINGTON POST
16 NOV 1975

Jack Anderson

Purging the Christian Democrats

Chile's military dictatorship, having outlawed the communists and socialists, has now set out to destroy the moderate Christian Democratic Party.

The junta is secretly scheming to develop a political system without politicians or parties. Among the generals, this is called the "Paraguayan Solution," because it was successfully imposed on Paraguay by dictator Alfredo Stroessner.

We have discussed our evidence in detail with both Chile's Minister of Justice Miguel Schweitzer and Ambassador to Washington Manuel Trucco. Both vehemently denied that their government has any intention of eliminating the Christian Democratic Party and, thereby, extinguishing democracy forever in Chile.

Yet we have received convincing evidence to the contrary. It has come from classified intelligence reports, discussions with American authorities and confidential documents smuggled to us from some of the most respected Christian Democratic leaders in Chile.

As early as last July, we saw intelligence reports from Santiago, which claimed the junta was turning against the Christian Democrats. "The U.S. embassy predicts," we reported, "that the military government shortly will outlaw all political parties in Chile."

Chilean sources, whose reliability cannot be questioned, also told us that the junta had decided to move against the Christian Democrats. The decision had been reached, according to these sources, at a secret cabinet meeting.

Not long afterward, agents of the dreaded DINA, the Chilean Intelligence Directorate, began to move against Christian Democrats on a global scale. There is reason to believe, for example, that DINA has hired thugs to track down and assassinate prominent exiles.

Bernardo Leighton, one of the founders of Chile's Christian Democratic Party, was brutally gunned down, along with his wife, on the streets of Rome last month. He barely survived.

Italian police have called it a political crime but have failed to nail the culprits. Diplomatic sources consider it more than an idle coincidence, however, that French police reportedly corralled a trio of DINA agents at Orly Airport in Paris three days after the attempted murder of the Leightons.

The three DINA men were following a female Chilean exile. They were interrogated and then put aboard a plane for Santiago. Chile's Paris embassy originally declined comment but has now denied the entire incident.

DINA agents in Europe receive instructions, according to high-level sources, from Madrid, which is the center of DINA activity in Europe. A contingent of Chilean intelligence agents operate out of the Spanish capital under the direction of Col. Pedro Ewing, a central figure in the coup which overthrew the late President Salvador Allende.

Ostensibly, they handle security matters for Chile's European embassies. But their undercover mission, say our sources, is to keep watch on Chilean exiles.

Here in the United States, two prominent Christian Democratic exiles have been marked for murder. Gabriel Valdes, a former foreign minister, and Rodomiro Tomic, who ran against Allende for the presidency in 1970, were warned of the assassination danger by reliable sources.

Not the least of these was the U.S. embassy in Santiago. The FBI considered the threats so credible that special details were ordered to protect Valdes and Tomic.

As added evidence of the campaign to wipe out the Christian Democrats, a string of ominous events has occurred in Chile. Here are a few of the stories that have been smuggled to us:

— A former Christian Democrat Congressman, Pedro Araya Ortiz, was arrested in September and tortured at the infamous Tres Alamos military prison. He was subjected to repeated electric shocks and cigarette burns. From the scars on his body, doctors later confirmed he had been hideously tortured.

— DINA conducted a raid on the home of Jaime Castillo Valasco on August 22. He was a former Minister of Justice under Christian Democratic President Eduardo Frei. More recently, Castillo has been defending political prisoners of the military regime. The Chilean embassy didn't deny the raid had taken place but claimed Castillo was violently anti-junta and the uncle of a leftist revolutionary.

— "Prior censorship" has been imposed on Radio Balmaceda, a station owned by the Christian Democratic Party. Spokesmen for the junta claimed that the

Christian Democrats still speak out against the regime.

— Last August, 50 professors and students were arrested at the eastern branch of the University of Chile de Santiago. Many were members of the Christian Democratic Party. Chilean officials claim some of those arrested were revolutionaries in disguise. Those who were not, the officials say, were released immediately.

— Six professors of political science were arbitrarily dismissed at Catholic University of Chile for organizing a seminar on the future of democracy in the world. One of the participants was supposed to be former President Eduardo Frei, who had been a professor at the same university for 15 years. He was denied the opportunity to speak at the seminar.

— At Northern University in Copiapo, three officials and 17 professors were arrested last March. They were released in July and rearrested as they left the prison.

— Labor leaders at some of Chile's largest copper mines, including Potrerillos, El Salvador, Liantas and Barquitos, have been arrested. Many were members of the Christian Democratic Party. According to documents smuggled to us, many were beaten and tortured. The Chilean embassy argued that most of those apprehended were really revolutionaries who were plotting to destroy property.

— Last August 18, over 1900 officials and employees of the Agricultural Service of the Chilean government were abruptly dismissed. They included lawyers, technicians and administrative personnel. Other mass purges are under way, according to our sources, in ENDESA, the national electric company. Most of those dismissed were Christian Democrats. Chilean officials denied any deliberate attempt to punish the Christian Democrats. They were merely merging agencies and slashing budgets, said the officials.

Footnote: Technically, political parties still exist in Chile, albeit in a legal limbo. The junta simply has declared them "in recess" and has forbidden them from making official statements on political matters. Top Christian Democratic leaders selected our column as the outlet for telling their story to the world. They contacted us secretly as individuals, however, not as representatives of any party.

NEW YORK TIMES, SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 8, 1975

On Not Being Locked Into Outdated Assumptions in Panama

PANAMA CITY, Panama — Just as generals customarily prepare their strategy to fight outdated wars, statesmen all too often found their policies on outdated assumptions. Thus, the military postulates of Adm. Alfred Mahan are dead and so are the political theorems of Teddy Roosevelt.

One aspect developed from the former was insistence on keeping a uniquely American presence in Panama's Canal Zone and a base at Guantanamo, Cuba, to ensure that no potentially hostile extracontinental powers could threaten either the United States or its transoceanic link across this country's isthmus.

An aspect developed from the latter was belief that the United States had to seek Latin-American outlets for its capital surplus and that the political apostasy of any country in this hemisphere would cause the United States to lose face and undermine its influence elsewhere.

Both strategy and policy have had to undergo drastic revision as a result of the nuclear-missile age and the gradual fading of the canal's vital importance. Huge aircraft carriers and huger oil tankers that can't pass its confines have become a normal feature of the maritime scene.

As the canal's crucial value began to diminish (although it is still of much naval and commercial importance) deterrence became an increasing factor in politics as well as in defensive planning. It was deterrence, both nuclear and geopolitical, that ended all thought of gunboat diplomacy in Cuba.

Likewise it will ultimately be the real umbrella that shelters the Panama Canal or, under the new treaty being negotiated, its possible larger, sea-level successor which Washington would have the right to develop.

But the old idea that we can hold to a 1903 treaty that gave us the sole

right to operate and defend the existing canal and administer an extraterritorial zone bordering it has started to fade. It will disappear as immutably as British claims over Cyprus, French claims over Algeria and Portuguese

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

By C. L. Sulzberger

claims over Mozambique. They were also once hallowed by international law, now outmoded in a changing world.

This quintessential reality is not yet understood by many Americans. They have been reared on the idea that Panama is lucky to have Uncle Sam as a tenant and that if we abandon our claim to perpetual rights here we risk losing the canal to Russia, crippling our economy and hemispheric safety.

In fact the canal is really protected by missile-armed submarines with their strategic deterrent. About all locally based forces (U.S. or Panamanian) can do is prevent sabotage.

Although world commerce still makes great use of this seaway, that use has declined during the past two years and its necessity is on the wane. Ellsworth Bunker, U.S. Ambassador at Large, says:

"The canal's value — while of continuing importance — is probably not as great relatively speaking as in earlier years." He also stresses, "the canal's growing vulnerability to hostile attack, which points to the fact that we should not rely too heavily on it."

It took some time before the Pentagon accepted this. However, Gen.

George Brown, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has publicly associated himself with Mr. Bunker's position. The departure of Defense Secretary Schlesinger, generally accounted hawkish on this issue, may hearten those seeking sweeping revision.

Once the U.S. zone has been liquidated, an American training force for counterinsurgency and jungle warfare might continue here or be shifted to the United States. This is not a paramount matter: When our 1976 Presidential elections have been held, there should be no major obstacle to a new canal deal once its prospect is no longer a political football.

The big question is whether Panamanians, who are being prodded both by anti-American groups and by opponents of Gen. Omar Torrijos Herrera, the Government's strongman, will patiently await our electoral results. This year for the first time national holiday paraders bore signs attacking "Yankee imperialism."

Washington reckons that General Torrijos, awarded the title of "Maximum Leader of the Revolution," is strong enough to sit things out and intends to do so. Demetrio Lakas, President of the republic, assured me his Government would keep the situation tranquil another year. "We are peaceful people and we don't hate anyone," he said. "Those who talk about another Vietnam here are nuts."

But the problem remains — even if there is delay in facing it. No sensible United States policy in this hemisphere or the nonaligned Third World can evolve until we modernize our outdated Panamanian position.

NEW YORK TIMES, THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 20, 1975

Anti-Americanism in Mexico Deep-Seated but

By EDWARD COWAN

Special to The New York Times

MEXICO CITY, Nov. 13—

"Every Mexican has two attitudes toward the United States. One is by heritage, one by his own experience."

The speaker, a Mexican marketing executive who works for a Mexican company, was attempting to explain why there is anti-Americanism in Mexico and why it is shared to a degree even by Mexicans like himself who are basically well disposed toward the United States.

Among the thousands of expatriate Americans who live in this capital, an apparent increase of anti-Americanism

in Mexico has been discussed as a result of booing and jeering of United States athletes at the Pan American Games here last month. Most Americans here seemed little concerned.

No Anti-Yankee Signs

The passionate outpourings of the crowd came as a surprise because anti-Americanism is not a blatant, daily feature of life in Mexico. It is hard to find a single "Yankee no!" sign in Mexico City, although in some European capitals they are familiar sights.

But resentment of the United States exists, if largely in a latent form. Educated Mexicans say that it is woven into the fabric of Mexican history.

The marketing executive for instance, said that he has diffi-

culty defending the United States when his teen-age son asks about the war of 1846-47, which Americans call the Mexican War. It led to the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, under which Mexico, having been beaten on the battlefield, ceded for \$15 million an area now consisting of New Mexico, Arizona, Utah, Nevada, California and parts of Wyoming and Colorado.

President Cites History

President Luis Echeverria Alvarez cited this history in confirming that the jeering of United States athletes was only partly sports partisanship and partly political.

"I do admit there may be a background of a historical nature," the President said in an hour-long interview at Los Pinos, the official residence.

Not Open

"During an unfair war we lost half of our territory to the United States."

Mr. Echeverria was asked about the view of United States diplomats here that his speeches have aroused antagonisms toward the United States.

"Or rather," he shot back, "my speeches have emerged from a general feeling from which I take my thoughts."

He continued: "We belong to the third world. We are defending our economy. We are struggling to survive. We would like to be friends, not servants. We have to be nationalistic or we shall perish."

The President stressed, however, that Mexico's desire

to put economic and cultural distance between itself and the United States would not cause unpleasantness for the millions of American tourists who visit Mexico every year and whose dollars play an important role in covering the deficit in Mexico's trade.

"No American can complain of an unfriendly attitude or of discourtesy," he said.

Indeed, resident and visiting Americans have no such complaints. Yet the resident Americans, especially those who speak Spanish and know Mexicans, affirm that anti-Americanism exists and may be getting stronger, although it causes no trouble for them personally.

President Is Blamed

These Americans tend to agree with the United States diplomats that presidential rhetoric is encouraging Mexicans to blame the United States for Mexico's problems.

Last Sunday, for instance, *Excelsior*, an independent newspaper, put at the top of its front page a report that President Echeverria had said that it was difficult to live next to the biggest military, commercial and nuclear power in the world.

As in other countries, dislike of the United States is voiced most frequently by students and intellectuals.

A high school teacher in her 20's said in English that "the United States says society

should be like this," meaning in the American style.

"But Mexico and South America can't be like this because of their culture," she stressed. "They're trying to de-culturalize us."

Would Exclude U.S.

The teacher, noting that the United States had won the most team points in the Pan American Games, said that perhaps it should be excluded because of its size and the advantages of its prosperity.

In a conciliatory spirit, the teacher added: "It's not the Americans individually. It's a system that comes to dominate another culture."

At the Mexican-American Institute of Cultural Relations, where Mexicans study English and other foreign languages and foreigners study Spanish, a 25-year-old student named Alejo said that the United States was "bad for Mexico" because "the U.S. is the big house for the money."

Another student, Salvador, 19, said that he wanted to live north of the border because "I can live more comfortably there." The son of a businessman with two iron foundries and a scrap-metal concern, Salvador expressed admiration for American workmanship and quality control. Mexico had a lower standard of living partly, said Salvador, "because here people are lazier than in the States."

Salvador said that he hoped

to work in the United States, as do tens of thousands of Mexicans who are there now, legally and illegally. But another student said: "A lot of Mexicans don't like Americans. They go over there to work and they get treated crummy."

The students said they studied English to improve their job opportunities and incomes and to use it as a lingua franca in other countries.

Roberto, 20, said that Mexicans disliked the United States because of intervention in Vietnam and Chile.

Manuel Alonso, a public relations consultant to President Echeverria, said in English: "The image of the United States in Latin America is deteriorating. They don't pay the same attention to their neighbors as to far away problems in the Middle East." He said that Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger had repeatedly postponed a trip to Latin America.

Panama Problem Cited

"This creates a bad sense on the people," Mr. Alonso said. "The Panama problem has not been solved, and that is coming to the attention of everybody."

"Being anti-Yankee is a sport in itself in Mexico," said a European journalist.

A European banker recalled that when he worked for a United States bank here, its senior Mexican employees once amused themselves at a dinner

party with mimicry of their employers' speech and manners.

A secretary at an international bank said of Mexican sentiments toward the United States: "There is a good feeling because they are very advanced and we learn from them."

As for the boeing at the games, she dismissed it as coming from "the lower classes."

A taxi driver assured an American: "We have good relations. We don't care about the religion. We don't care about the politics."

A Family History

The marketing executive illustrated his theory about every Mexican having two attitudes, one by heritage and one by experience, with the history of his own family. His grandfather had been in Vera Cruz in April, 1914, when sailors and marines landed, because President Woodrow Wilson wanted to block the delivery of German arms to President Victoriano Huerta. Wilson regarded the Huerta administration unconstitutional and likely to provoke war with the United States.

In the brief fighting, more than 300 Mexicans were killed, according to Howard F. Cline, an American historian.

This intervention was part of the history of his family, the marketing executive said, and hence influenced his attitudes as he was growing up.

THE ECONOMIST NOVEMBER 8, 1975

Argentina

Charity for one

FROM OUR BUENOS AIRES CORRESPONDENT

"Is it worth risking the peace of the republic for the trifling sum of 31.5m pesos (about £180,000)?" asked a government senator four months ago. He went on to draw a parallel with the Watergate affair, arguing that it was a tragedy that the United States should lose a president over a minor peccadillo. Events last week showed that the latest political storm to blow up around Argentina's president, Mrs Isabel Perón, could indeed develop along Watergate lines.

The scandal first came to light when the Buenos Aires newspaper, *La Prensa*, revealed that Mrs Perón had disbursed a legacy left by her late husband, Juan Perón, from the account of a charity called the Crusade for Justicialist Solidarity. The charity is largely financed from the proceeds of state gambling. Mrs Perón withdrew her cheque and her apologists explained that the president had got her cheque books mixed up. But it now appears that Mrs Perón has made out at least 22 cheques on the charity, none of them for particularly charitable purposes. A peronist labour leader claimed in the newspaper *La Opinión* that it was not a case of confusion but of ethics. "It's as if I drew on union funds to pay my domestic light bill," he said.

The opposition, which has from the start had more information on Mrs Perón's unusual financial arrangements than peronist parliamentarians themselves, has called for a congressional investigation into the charity. It would also like to investigate the social welfare ministry, which used to be run by Mrs Perón's former private secretary, Mr José López Rega. There is still much resentment over the fact that Mrs Perón foiled any attempt to prosecute Mr López Rega, after he resigned.

Peronist deputies voted unanimously to set up an investigating committee to look into the ministry and the charity. But when Mrs Perón was told about it, she was not amused. So the bewildered deputies dithered last week over whether to backtrack by declaring the committee unconstitutional or simply block the probe by refusing to appoint their allotted four members to the committee of six. The reaction of opposition members was immediate. They said that if the committee was not set up, they would begin impeachment proceedings.

Other examples of government corruption are coming to light through the courts. One case of alleged graft resulted in the imprisonment of three people, and foiled the resignation of the minister of tourism and sport, Mr

Pedro Eladio Vazquez, who is now Mrs Perón's closest friend and adviser. The scandals have come at a bad time for Mrs Perón. November may well be the decisive month for the government: the armed forces, their reorganisation completed, are expected to decide this month whether to stage their long-debated coup or hold off until after Argentina's summer. Mrs Perón began the month by being stricken with a painful gall bladder complaint and was admitted to a private clinic. Not a psychological illness, perhaps, but it comes at a psychological moment.