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Governmental Affairs

WASHINGTON POST
24 JUN 1976

Panel Says CIA, FBI Covered Up JFK Killing Data

Continued Hill Inquiry Suggested

By George Lardner Jr.
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Senate intelligence committee said yesterday that senior officials of both the CIA and the FBI covered up crucial information in the course of investigating President Kennedy's assassination.

Issuing the final findings of its protracted investigations, the committee said it had been unable to satisfy itself as to why the Warren Commission was kept in the dark, but said that "the possibility exists that senior officials in both agencies made conscious decisions not to disclose potentially important information."

Filled with tantalizing but admittedly inconclusive details, many of them laid out for the first time, the 106-page report emphasized that it had not uncovered evidence "sufficient to justify a conclusion that there was a conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy."

But the committee said the "investigative deficiencies" it turned up were substantial enough to raise grave doubts about the Warren Commission's work and to justify continued congressional investigation.

Sen. Richard S. Schweiker (R-Pa.), who played a key role in the Senate assassination inquiry, said it had turned up "important new leads" that were being kept secret in hopes that the permanent new Senate Intelligence Committee would pursue them effectively.

Other potentially important leads that went unpur-

sued at the time of the assassination, according to the report, included several mysterious flights from Mexico City to Havana.

One of them reportedly involved a Cubana Airlines flight the night Kennedy was killed which was delayed in Mexico City for five hours for an unidentified passenger who finally got aboard "without passing through customs" and then "traveled to Cuba in the cockpit... thus again avoiding identification by the passengers."

Although the CIA received information to this effect on Dec. 1, 1963, the Senate committee said it was unable to find any indication that the CIA had conducted a follow-up investigation to determine the identity of the passenger.

The study dwelt heavily on the CIA's clandestine plotting against Cuban Premier Fidel Castro at the time of the assassination and the determination of U.S. government officials, especially at the FBI, to depict Lee Harvey Oswald as Kennedy's lone killer.

Just four days after the President's murder in Dallas on Nov. 22, 1963, the Senate report disclosed, Deputy Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach sent a memo to the White House declaring:

"The public must be satisfied that Oswald was the assassin; that he did not have confederates who are still at large; and that the evidence was such that he would have been convicted at trial."

Speculation about Oswald's motives, the Katzenbach memo added, "ought to be cut off, and we should have some basis for rebutting thought that this was a Communist conspiracy or (as the Iron Curtain press is saying) a right-wing conspiracy to blame it on the Communists."

By that time, the Senate report showed, the CIA was already making efforts to head off talk of a conspiracy. It attempted, unsuccessfully, on Nov. 23, 1963, to head off the imminent arrest by Mexican police of Sylvia Duran, an employee of the Cuban consulate in Mexico City with whom Oswald had talked on a visit there two months earlier.

Informed by the CIA's Mexico station that the arrest could not be prevented, a top-ranking official in the CIA's Directorate for Plans, Thomas Karamessines, cable back that the arrest "could jeopardize U.S. freedom of action on the whole question of Cuban responsibility."

Questioned by the committee two months ago, Karamessines, the report said, "could not recall preparing the cable or his reasons for issuing such a message. He speculated that the CIA feared the Cubans were responsible, and that Duran might reveal this during an interrogation. He further speculated that if Duran did possess such information, the CIA and the U.S. government would need time to react before it came to the attention of the public."

Repeatedly raising the possibility that the Kennedy assassination might have been a retaliation by Castro or his supporters, the committee said that the CIA had been meeting since early September with a secret Cuban agent code-named AMLASH who was proposing an "inside job" against the Castro regime, including Castro's assassination.

Although the Senate report does not use his real name, AMLASH was a senior Cuban official and Castro intimate named Rolando Cubela whom the CIA recruited in 1961 as an important "asset" inside Cuba, but whom some believe was a double agent. His talk about

getting rid of Castro was communicated to CIA headquarters at Langley, Va., on Sept. 7, 1963.

Late on the evening of that same day, Sept. 7, the Senate report said, Castro held an impromptu, three-hour interview with Associated Press reporter Daniel Harker at an embassy party in Havana. In the interview, the Cuban premier warned against any U.S. efforts to assassinate Cuban leaders and said:

"We are prepared to fight them and answer in kind. United States leaders should think that if they are aiding terrorist plans to eliminate Cuban leaders, they themselves will not be safe."

The warning apparently failed to raise any serious apprehensions in Washington.

On Sept. 12, 1963, several days after publication of the AP dispatch in U.S. newspapers, an interagency Cuban Coordinating Committee met at the State Department and agreed unanimously "there was a strong likelihood that Castro would retaliate in some way against the rash of covert activity in Cuba."

The so-called "brainstorming" session concluded, however, that while kidnappings and attempted assassinations of U.S. citizens in Latin America might be staged, "attacks against U.S. officials" in the United States were "unlikely."

Some CIA officials, such as the chief of counterintelligence on the Special Affairs Staff for Cuban operations, thought AMLASH's "bona fides were subject to question," but the meetings with the Cuban operative continued.

On Oct. 29, 1963, the late Desmond Fitzgerald, who was then in charge of the CIA's Special Affairs Staff, met with Cubela after being introduced to him as a "personal representative" of Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy.

AMLASH, the Senate report recounted, asked for an assassination weapon such as a high-powered rifle with telescopic sights. The matter was apparently left unresolved but by Nov. 19, three days before Kennedy's assassination, Fitzgerald told AMLASH's case officer to inform the Cuban "that the rifle, telescopic sights and explosives would be provided."

AMLASH, who was in Paris at the time, had been planning to return to Cuba, but on Nov. 20, 1963, the report noted, a CIA officer telephoned him and asked him to wait for a meeting on Nov. 22.

"AMLASH asked if the meeting would be interesting, and the CIA officer re-

NEW YORK TIMES
25 JUN 1976

Kennedy and Castro

Possible Cuban Links to the 1963 Killing Seen as Basis for Study

By DAVID BINDER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 24 — On the strength of a report by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, some Senators have called for another investigation of the assassination of President Kennedy. If the call is answered, and it might be one day, the new investigation would be the sixth conducted on a major scale by government officials since John F. Kennedy was murdered in Dallas on Nov. 22, 1963.

What more is to be done in the way of investigation in the 13th year after the murder of the 35th President of the United States?

Trails Have Grown Cold

Trails unexplored at the time grew cold and now are covered with the underbrush of passing years.

J. Edgar Hoover, the director of the F.B.I. at the time of the assassination, is dead. So is Allen W. Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence until the spring of 1961, a man knowledgeable about the Kennedy Administration plots against Cuba's Prime Minister, Fidel Castro.

However, according to Senator Richard S. Schweiker, the Pennsylvania Republican who remains among the most enthusiastic of the assassination students and potential conspiracy theorists, the previous Federal investigations of the murder amounted to "a cover-up."

While Mr. Schweiker has retreated from his assertion of last October that the Warren Commission report would collapse "like a house of cards," he still maintains that there are "promising leads." He takes this view despite the conclusion of yesterday's report, which he helped write, that no new evidence sufficed "to justify a conclusion that there was a conspiracy."

The focus of a new investigation, however, would be rather limited in scope and different in emphasis from the earlier studies, according to staff members of the Senate select committee.

Mr. Schweiker and, with less enthusiasm, some of his Senate colleagues, want to tie up what they believe to be loose ends remaining in three fields.

First, as the committee put

its chairman, Chief Justice Earl Warren, was "seeking to criticize" the FBI.

On two separate occasions, the report added, "Director Hoover asked for all the derogatory material on Warren Commission members and staff contained in the FBI files."

it, "the possibility exists that senior officials [of the F.B.I. and the C.I.A.] made conscious decisions not to disclose potentially important information" relating to the assassination.

The staff specialists say a new inquiry could try to determine "on whose authority" and for what reasons the post-mortem investigations by both agencies were crippled or halted.

Second, questions remain unresolved about the role of a man referred to as Am/Lash, a Cuban official close to Mr. Castro, who was chosen by the C.I.A. to kill the Prime Minister and lead a coup overthrowing the Castro government.

The select committee established that Am/Lash, in reality Rolando Cubelo, was receiving C.I.A. instructions on eliminating Mr. Castro at the very time Lee Harvey Oswald was preparing to shoot at President Kennedy.

Was it possible, the committee staff members ask, that Am/Lash could have been a double agent whose direct knowledge of the C.I.A.'s intentions toward Mr. Castro led to the Kennedy murder?

The third area for further investigation, Mr. Schweiker contends, concerns leads purporting to involve several "mysterious strangers" of Cuban origin, whom the intelligence agencies picked up in the aftermath of the murder and then dropped.

One lead involved reports assembled by the C.I.A. about a Cuban-American who crossed from Texas into Mexico on Nov. 23, 1963, and then boarded a Cuban airliner bound for Havana several days later as the only passenger.

Another involved an unidentified person who arrived in

Mexico City the night of the Kennedy murder and boarded a Cuban airliner that had been delayed five hours to take the man to Havana. The passenger was not subjected to customs controls.

A Senate official who is close to the committee investigation said today, "They feel there is a conspiracy. But they are not ready to point a finger yet at pro-Castro or anti-Castro forces. They also feel there are indications Am/Lash was a double agent."

Along with the recommendation that the new Senate intelligence oversight committee follow up these aspects of the assassination, the select committee has handed over 5,000 pages of documents relating to its own investigation.

Senator Schweiker is scheduled to appear Sunday on the "Face The Nation" television program to plead his cause for pursuit of the leads.

But aides of Senator Daniel K. Inouye, who is chairman of the new intelligence committee, said that the Hawaii Democrat wanted an opportunity to study the latest investigative report before authorizing a new inquiry.

"It is not his first priority," an Inouye aide said.

An aide of Howard H. Baker Jr., a member of the old and new committees, said, "Loose ends should be wrapped up," but added, "He is not overly enthusiastic. I doubt if it has top priority."

Nor is it certain what the United States would have done or would still do if it were suddenly established that the Castro Government indeed plotted and directed the killing of President Kennedy.

At the time, with the 1961 debacle of the C.I.A.-directed Bay of Pigs landing fresh in mind and the 1962 Cuba missile crisis only a year behind them, Kennedy Administration officials were predisposed to avoid still another "Cuban flap," as the select committee report makes clear.

There is no indication whatsoever that the current leaders of the United States desire a "Cuban flap" now, either.

THE WASHINGTON STAR
23 June 1976

Soviets Resume Attack on 3 Newsmen

MOSCOW — A Soviet publication has renewed its attacks on three American reporters in Moscow who it claims are associated with the CIA.

The weekly Literary Gazette yesterday accused George A. Krimsky of The Associated Press, Christopher S. Wren of The New York Times and Alfred Friendly Jr. of Newsweek magazine of seeking military information.

The May 26 issue of the weekly had accused them of working for the CIA. The new article printed what it called "evidence" based, it said, on letters from Soviet citizens.

All three correspondents and their news organizations have rejected the allegations of association with the CIA.

NEW REPUBLIC
5 June 1976

An Eye for an Eye?

The Death of JFK

The Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency engaged in a cover-up of highly relevant information when the Warren Commission was investigating President John Kennedy's assassination in 1963 and 1964. President Lyndon Johnson and Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy became party to the effort which consisted of withholding key facts from the Warren Commission. The cover-up continues even now 12 years later; the FBI still refuses to turn over to congressional investigators some of its most sensitive files on the killing of JFK.

The Warren Commission was never told that Attorney General Kennedy secretly formed—before his brother was killed—a special intergovernmental committee, which included FBI and CIA representatives, to look into the possibility that Cuba's Premier Fidel Castro might organize attempts on the lives of high United States government officials. That this committee existed has been kept secret although information about it reposes in FBI files.

The top-secret committee was created by Robert Kennedy presumably out of concern that Castro might retaliate against CIA attempts on his life, carried out directly by the agency's operatives and with help from the Mafia. That anti-Castro assassination plots were afoot in the early 1960s was unknown at the time (they were disclosed last year by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities) and the Warren Commission was not told of them. Only Allen W. Dulles, who had been CIA director, had knowledge of the anti-Castro plots. In its ignorance the commission couldn't search more intensively into the possible motives of Lee Harvey Oswald in killing the President. The commission had concluded that Oswald was the lone assassin in Dallas, but it acknowledged its inability to come up with the motive.

It does not follow, of course, that the Warren Commission would surely have traced Oswald's motives had it known of the anti-Castro conspiracies and of the establishment of Robert Kennedy's secret group some time before Dallas. There is still no proof that Castro was behind Oswald. But the cover-up made it impossible for the commission to seriously pursue a line of inquiry in this area even though there had been much discussion of the significance of Oswald's links with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee (a pro-Castro group in the United States) and his aborted efforts to go to Cuba two months before he killed JFK.

Robert Kennedy, the CIA and the FBI decided to keep from the Warren Commission the fact that a special group had been set up to protect American leaders from possible Cuban assassination plots. To justify its existence, it would have been necessary to expose the CIA's own conspiracies against Castro. These were among the most closely held secrets of the Kennedy-Johnson period. That the CIA failed to inform the Warren Commission of anti-Castro plots—even though the agency was under presidential orders to provide maximum assistance to the commission—was confirmed in a memo on April 20, 1975 written by CIA inspector general Donald F. Chamberlain to CIA

deputy director E.H. Knoche. It said: "As far as we can tell from all of the materials at our disposition, no one discussed with the Warren Commission any alleged plan to assassinate Castro. There is also no evidence that anyone known to our records made a decision not to tell the Warren Commission anything about this topic or any other matter." Chamberlain added that "we have no evidence in our material indicating Castro's knowledge or the possession of documentation of alleged assassination plots directed against him."

Two days later, on April 22, 1975, Raymond G. Rocca, then deputy chief of the CIA's counterintelligence staff, informed Knoche that "our records show at every point a marked intent to make as much available to the [Warren Commission] as was consistent with the security of the ongoing operations." Rocca also reported that his files do not show whether the Warren Commission was informed of a 1962 report from the CIA's station in Guatemala according to which a statement was made at a Guatemalan Communist party meeting that "we need not preoccupy ourselves over the politics of President Kennedy because we know, according to prognostication, that he will die within the present year."

Although, as Rocca put it, the counterintelligence staff was the CIA's "working-level point of contact with the Warren Commission," plans to assassinate Castro were not "known to us in CIA staff."

In all likelihood, President Johnson, who knew of the anti-Castro plotting, also knew that Robert Kennedy had set up his special committee. But there is no indication that he shared that knowledge with Chief Justice Earl Warren when the commission was organized in November 1963. Robert Kennedy's testimony before the Warren Commission likewise omitted mention of his own fears that assassinations might breed assassinations. But it is part of the public record that Johnson subsequently commented, without elaborating, that President Kennedy might have been killed in retaliation for his administration's anti-Castro policies. At the time, this remark was taken to mean possible retaliation for the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion and subsequent CIA operations against Cuba.

All these facts, secret at the time, may have influenced the Kennedy family in its decision to oppose any reopening of the assassination probe. Again, a new investigation might have led to public disclosures of the CIA plotting and tarnishing the memory of John and Robert Kennedy.

Robert Kennedy's interest in aggressive operations against Cuba was reported in a document written by John McCone, then CIA director, on October 4, 1962, describing a top-level strategy meeting chaired by the attorney general. McCone wrote that "the attorney general reported on discussions with the President on Cuba; dissatisfied with lack of action in the sabotage field, went on to stress that nothing was moving forward, commented that one effort attempted had failed . . ."

Another element of the cover-up was that in at least 50 instances the CIA had, according to an internal FBI memo, ignored materials supplied by the bureau on Oswald's foreign connections. The responsibility for following up such FBI leads was in the hands of an ad hoc group built around the CIA's so-called "D Staff," a clandestine operations center then headed by William

Harvey, a senior agency official. The CIA's counterintelligence office, directed by James Angleton, reported directly to Harvey's "D staff," and it too was involved in investigating certain aspects of the Kennedy assassination. Sources contend that the CIA actually destroyed some of the materials provided by the FBI. Angleton, according to those sources, may have suspected Soviet "plants" in the FBI material. The Warren Commission never knew about any of it.

As has been reported earlier, the FBI destroyed at least one letter Oswald sent to the Dallas police department shortly before the assassination. Oswald demanded that the FBI stop "harassing" his Russian-born wife Marina and threatened to blow up the Dallas police headquarters if the FBI failed to desist. This became known only last year, and the FBI never offered a conclusive explanation for destroying the note. Likewise, the FBI inexplicably failed to place Oswald on its "dangerous list" although it did so with other members of the Fair Play Committee.

A CIA memorandum to the Rockefeller Commission, which last year investigated CIA abuses, said that the agency still feels, as it did in 1964, that the Warren Commission should have given more credence in its final report to the possibility of foreign links in the conspiracy against Kennedy. The memo said that there were promising leads that were not followed up. This statement contradicts the FBI memorandum now in the possession of the Senate Select Committee that the CIA refused to pursue leads obtained by the bureau. However, acute rivalry between the CIA and the FBI already existed at the time—they actually stopped cooperating altogether in 1970—and their estrangement could account for the contradictions.

The cover-up is among the reasons the Senate Select Committee voted on May 13 to recommend a congressional inquiry into the role of the intelligence agencies in the Warren Commission investigation, and into Oswald's motives.

The Senate committee first learned of the cover-up a few months ago. This is the new evidence the panel claims it has obtained about Oswald's motives. Sen. Richard Schweiker of Pennsylvania and Sen. Gary Hart of Colorado, who constitute a special subcommittee on the Kennedy assassination, have written a separate report on the subject. Neither Schweiker nor Hart has publicly revealed thus far the nature of the new evidence—the cover-up. There is said to be great pressure to sanitize this report while the full secret information would be turned over to the Senate's new permanent oversight committee on intelligence or whatever other panel might undertake the recommended investigation of the Kennedy death. The subcommittee report is expected to be issued in mid-June after the FBI and the CIA have inspected it to remove what they may consider "embarrassing" information.

Although senators are far from certain that the proposed inquiry would actually provide a conclusive answer about Oswald's motives—the trail has become cold in the opinion of many senators—the FBI and the CIA could find themselves under charges of obstruction of justice for having withheld significant material

from the Warren Commission.

Among the questions likely to be raised in a new investigation is why Dulles concealed from the Warren Commission, on which he served, the plotting against Castro by the CIA. CIA's own records, released in mid-May, show that the agency had begun to plan Castro's assassination in March 1960, when Dulles was CIA director, and planning had by then begun for the Bay of Pigs. Excerpts from transcripts of the Warren Commission's executive sessions (published in *The New Republic* on Sept. 27, 1975) show that Dulles informed his colleagues that there were certain CIA secrets that he would keep from everybody except the President of the United States. Dulles was addressing the still unclarified question of whether Oswald, as maintained by some assassination buffs, had been an undercover FBI informer.

A similar question could be raised with John McCone who was CIA director during the Warren Commission investigations and who should be called to testify in any new Senate inquiry. McCone was familiar with the anti-Castro plots and probably knew about Robert Kennedy's secret committee.

All the indications are that the existence of this committee was known to very few people: Robert Kennedy himself, probably Dulles and McCone, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, and a few selected associates. Several aides of Robert Kennedy, including a former assistant director of the FBI, said in interviews last week that they had not known of the committee. They said, however, that it was possible that the group, acting in secrecy, worked out of the White House before and after the Kennedy assassination or from the attorney general's office.

The Senate Intelligence Committee learned of the cover-up in the course of its long investigation of the intelligence community. After references were made by witnesses to the Robert Kennedy committee in testimony touching on foreign assassination plots by the CIA, the Church Committee asked the FBI and the CIA for their relevant files. It is understood that the CIA made some material available; the FBI refused to do so for many months. Only recently did the bureau agree to allow Senate committee members to read parts of its secret files, but the senators have to do it at FBI headquarters.

It was in this manner that senators learned of the scope of the cover-up by the intelligence agencies. They've now requested additional materials from the FBI. Some senators are said to believe that further vital information on the Kennedy assassination investigation may turn up in the FBI files.

It remains unclear why, after 12 years, the FBI is still reluctant to let senators see all its files on the assassinations. There are no indications that the bureau has been under any pressure from the White House—President Ford was a member of the Warren Commission—to withhold material from the Senate. In fact, Ford himself may be unaware of the contents of the FBI files. That raises again a fundamental question: is the White House in full control of the intelligence agencies?

Tad Szulc

HUMAN EVENTS
26 June 1976

The Cuban Connection of Nov. 22, 1963

By M. STANTON EVANS

In the fall of 1963, two bizarre assassination plots careened incredibly toward a day of convergence.

One of these, in a general way, we have known about for years. The victim was John F. Kennedy, the assassin—according to official reports—Lee Harvey Oswald. The other we haven't known about until quite recently. Its intended target was Fidel Castro, the assassin-to-be a high-up figure in the Cuban government, in continuous contact with the CIA.

The strands of circumstance that bind these plots together, along with other anomalies, have spurred an outcry for a new investigation of the Kennedy murder. Sen. Richard Schweiker (R.-Pa.) and Representatives Henry Gonzalez (D.-Tex.) and Thomas Downing (D.-Va.), in particular, have urged that the investigation be re-opened. On the Kennedy-Castro evidence alone, that request should be granted by the Congress:

In the light of recent revelations about clandestine activities under Kennedy, we have a startling new perspective not available to the general public when the Warren Commission made its report. We know that through the summer and fall of 1963, the so-called Standing Group of the National Security Council, including Robert Kennedy, Robert McNamara, John McCone, McGeorge Bundy and Theodore Sorensen, reviewed and finally implemented a program of sabotage against the Castro government.

This program was personally approved by President Kennedy on June 19, 1963, "to nourish a spirit of resistance and disaffection" against Castro even as diplomatic talks aimed at accommodation were also going forward. On Oct. 24, 1963, 13 major sabotage operations inside Cuba were approved. These were to be carried out by, or through, the CIA.

Meanwhile, at a lower level of government, even more serious action was afoot. As documented by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, desultory but more or less continuous gestures toward assassinating Castro had been considered by the CIA since the early 1960s. These included such exotic devices as poison cigars and exploding seashells, plus conversations with the Mafia on possible methods of eliminating the Cuban dictator.

In addition, CIA operatives met off and on for a period of months with a high official of the Castro government, known by the code name of AM/LASH. The subject of assassinating Castro kept popping up in these discussions, and while the CIA spokesmen reportedly told AM/LASH they would not support an assas-

sination, they did say they would support a coup, and promised to provide a cache of weapons.

Finally, in the fall of '63, the CIA promised to deliver a ballpoint pen rigged with a poison hypodermic needle, which CIA Director Richard Helms described as a device "for getting rid of Castro, for killing him, murdering him, whatever the case may be." The context was that the device was delivered to keep AM/LASH happy, rather than for actual use, a somewhat fine distinction. It was handed over on Nov. 22, 1963—the day that Kennedy himself was murdered.

What makes all this the more incredible is the fact that Lee Harvey Oswald was a fanatic follower of Fidel Castro. A Marxist and former defector to the USSR, Oswald had joined the Castro-financed Fair Play for Cuba Committee, displayed a picture of Castro on his mantelpiece, and was a subscriber to *The Militant*, the Trotsky Communist publication that specialized in running texts of Castro's speeches. The witnesses who knew him in New Orleans and Dallas testified to his absolute devotion to the Castro cause.

Oswald was in contact with the Communist party in New York and the Trotskyist Socialist Workers party, offering to do free photographic work for them, and he subscribed to the publications of both. What is striking about these otherwise antagonistic Marxist groups is that both were committed to the cause of Castro, and that agents of both were involved in the workings of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee.

During his stay in the USSR, Oswald had married the niece of a colonel in the KGB—the ministry that houses the Soviet secret police and global intelligence services. On his return to the United States and Dallas, Oswald generally steered clear of the anti-Communist White Russian community, choosing in-

stead to associate with a Russian expatriate couple of decidedly left-wing sympathies.

Eight months before the Kennedy murder, Oswald had tried to kill Gen. Edwin A. Walker—a man otherwise totally different in outlook from Kennedy, but widely publicized in the Dallas newspapers as an outspoken opponent of Castro. In the summer of 1963, Oswald had scuffled in the streets against anti-Castro Cuban exiles, and had taken Castro's part in a New Orleans radio debate.

In other words, Oswald had a long, consistent history of Marxist association and sentiment, plus a demonstrated yen for violence, including assassination—both geared to the cause of Fidel Castro. This combination of factors has been conventionally obscured not only by the Warren Commission, but also by the conventional critics of the commission's report, most of whom are eager to downplay any connection between the Kennedy murder and left-wing extremism.

Finally, when he was arrested in Dallas for the murder of Officer J. D. Tippit, Oswald demanded to be represented by John Abt—attorney for the Communist party.

Add the fact that Oswald traveled to Mexico two months before the Kennedy assassination to arrange for passage to Cuba (a request acceded to by Cuban authorities, but denied by the Soviet Union, which was supposed to have been the ultimate object of his journey). All of this against a backdrop of steadily escalating rhetorical violence by Castro and the pro-Castro literature read by Oswald, denouncing Kennedy and the CIA as thieves and ruffians and saboteurs.

Two assassination plots involving Cuba, converging on Nov. 22, 1963. Was there a connection? The American people deserve an answer.

THE SENTINEL STAR
Orlando, Fla.
14 March 1976
'Harassment Of CIA
At Ludicrous Stage'

Editor: The harassment of the CIA by politicians and a few irresponsible journalists has now reached the ludicrous stage. In the wake of the inept handling of the Senate and House investigations and the competition to leak secret documents, we now hear from Robert Horan, the prosecuting attorney of Fairfax County, Va. Mr. Horan, having discovered that CIA headquarters is located in Fairfax County, has (according to the New York Times) announced

his intention to determine whether alleged CIA plots against the life of Fidel Castro have violated some Virginia Law.

We may hear next from a politician in the Bronx that CIA forced New York City into bankruptcy, or, perhaps, a headline happy candidate from Montana can speculate that a CIA covert action triggered last winter's blizzards.

Let us hope that politicians closer to home will refrain from charging that the weeds choking our canals and lakes are in fact CIA listening devices. —JOHN S. TILTON.

VILLAGE VOICE
21 JUNE 1976

Cubans Connected to JFK Murder—but Which Cubans?

BY DICK RUSSELL

The Warren Report, with its simplistic conclusions about Lee Harvey Oswald's "inability to enter into meaningful relationships," is about to become obsolete. Before this month is up, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence will release its own 172-page study of the Kennedy assassination—its last and possibly most damaging chronicle of CIA-FBI wrongdoing, and the first step toward a congressional investigation sometime after the November election. This much is now certain: The motive, one way or the other, goes back to Cuba—either with Fidel Castro, or against him.

In the past few weeks, new information has come out. First a new book called "Betrayal," written by an ex-CIA contract employee named Robert Morrow, who claims the assassination was engineered by a group of right-wing financiers and anti-Castro exiles in retaliation for what they considered Kennedy's sellout at the Bay of Pigs and Cuban Missile Crisis. Then came arguments from the opposite angle—copyrighted articles in the New Republic and Washington Post that made it look as if Castro had better start preparing his defense. From the looks of these, the confusion is only beginning.

If Post writer George Crile's hypotheses are correct, the duplicity surrounding Cuba in the early 1960s was more staggering than ever imagined. Consider "AM LASH," the Cuban the CIA selected to use a poison pen to kill Castro in the fall of 1963. Crile identifies him as Rolando Cubela and makes a strong case for his having been a double agent for Fidel. A more unlikely Castro agent, but one Crile also suspects, was Florida Mob boss Santo Trafficante, Jr. A key figure in the CIA's liaison with the Mob in failed attempts to assassinate Fidel, Trafficante is shown receiving favored treatment from Castro in a Havana jail, working closely with Castro in a lottery racket, and in 1963 announcing to a prominent Miami Cuban that Kennedy was "going to be hit."

The theory goes, if Castro was getting advance inside information on attempts against his life, might he have decided to retaliate? Tad Szulc, in the New Republic, reports that Bobby Kennedy actually

formed a top-secret intergovernmental committee shortly before his brother was killed to look into the possibility that Castro might organize attempts on the lives of high U.S. government officials. One of the Crile stories closes with a quote from Robert Morgan of North Carolina, a senator on the Select Committee: "There is no doubt in my mind that John F. Kennedy was assassinated by Fidel Castro or someone under his influence in retaliation for our efforts to assassinate him."

But the one man in a good position to know Castro's attitude toward the Kennedys believes the Castro motive simply doesn't make sense. He is William Attwood, former U.S. ambassador to Guinea and Kenya, current publisher of Newsday. In the fall of 1963, as a special adviser to America's UN delegation, he undertook secret negotiations to normalize relations with Cuba.

Asked last week what he thought of the Castro's-revenge idea, Attwood scoffed: "Well, I think that's ridiculous. It was quite obvious to me that Castro, at that time, wanted to normalize relations with us. He had no interest whatsoever in breaking this off, he wasn't playing any game. I was on the phone at one point to Havana, setting up a possible meeting down in Veradero to discuss an agenda. In fact, I was supposed to see the president right after Dallas to discuss the kind of questions I'd be asking. Then, if Castro was agreeable, I was to go down very quietly. Not many people were aware of this undertaking."

According to Attwood, by the fall of 1963 U.S. policy toward Cuba was operating on several different tracks. Things had become so confused that, after Attwood received an olive-branch feeler from Cuba's UN delegate and got approval from the Kennedys to pursue it, Secretary of State Dean Rusk wasn't even informed.

"The State Department had its own policy toward Cuba, which was sort of a frozen, do-nothing policy," Attwood recalled. "The CIA, what was left of the gung-ho types, might well still have been plotting something. But I think the Kennedys saw this as a chance to defuse Cuba as a political issue in 1964. They didn't want to be attacked for having loused up the Bay of Pigs. They could say, 'All

right, maybe the Bay of Pigs was a mistake, but now we have an agreement that Castro will not subvert Latin America and also give compensation for our companies that he'd expropriated, in return for which we lift the blockade and unblock the Cuban assets in America.' These were some of the proposals. And things were moving along."

The Kennedy assassination brought a halt to all that. For one thing, Oswald was an apparent Castro sympathizer. For another, says Attwood, "We were entering a political year, and I don't think Johnson really knew what was involved. It sounded too complicated and too risky." Nonetheless, Attwood remembers, Castro did give his okay for negotiations to begin and, according to a French journalist who was with Fidel on the day of Kennedy's death, he was "shocked and dismayed at the news of the assassination."

"I've been to Cuba since and stayed in touch with Cubans here at the UN," Attwood concluded. "so I have every reason to believe they were sincere. I've always felt if there was any Cuban involvement, it would have been on the part of the anti-Castro Cubans, who might have had reason to be fearful that some kind of normalization was in the works and would have wanted to prevent it. That's the only conclusion I can draw from my own experience."

The rumor is that the forthcoming Senate report will confirm Attwood's suspicions, especially concerning the exile groups that conducted anti-Castro operations in 1963 from Lake Pontchartrain, Louisiana and the Florida Keys. That summer, much against the CIA's wishes, the Kennedys had cut off their funding. The Coast Guard had been ordered to watch for any new raids directed at Cuban shores; numerous exiles and Minutemen soldier-of-fortune types were arrested. And bitterness against the Kennedys was rife.

If there was anti-Castro involvement, of course, that means a conspiracy on American soil. It also suggests a good reason for a CIA-FBI cover-up, particularly if

those agencies had ever made prior use of the conspirators. Most of all, in this bizarre realm of turncoats and double-turncoats, it raises the question of just who might have used—and maybe set up—Lee Harvey Oswald.

In an election year, the Senate is reluctant to take such questions any further. Once the assassination report comes out, the new 15-man intelligence oversight committee says it will wait another six months before deciding how to proceed. Even when it does, the senator who knows the most about the case won't be represented. That is Pennsylvania Republican Richard Schweiker, co-chairman of the assassination subcommittee that spent nine months digging into the maze. Because of the Senate's complicated rules of seniority and a late bid for the at-large first-come, first-served seats, he tried but failed to win a place.

"Unfortunately, the Strom Thurmonds and folks like that were the ones who got their hats in the ring months ago," says a Schweiker staff assistant. "But I don't think there was any plot to keep Schweiker off the new committee. He intends to stay actively interested."

Schweiker, who feels his hands were tied by the subcommittee's need for secrecy, plans to keep an investigator in the field and go public with additional information after the initial report is released. Meantime, before the rest of the Senate has a chance to act, the House may take the ball away from them. For months, retiring Virginia Democrat Tom Downing has been battling for a full congressional inquiry into Kennedy's murder. He got as far as an all-day session of the House Rules Committee on March 31, where a vote to wait and see what's in the Senate report tied 7 to 7 and a move for indefinite postponement carried 9 to 6. Since then, Downing has met privately at least once with House leaders Carl Albert and Tip O'Neill. And O'Neill, the overwhelming favorite to replace the retiring Albert as the new Speaker, is reportedly ready to see action on Downing's resolution.

"Our main talking point," says Downing staff assistant Rick Feeney, "is that we have individuals who would be willing to go under oath right away. Not in six months but in two or three weeks."

Downing's ace is 47-year-old Baltimore electronics consultant Robert Morrow, who was once arrested in a CIA counterfeiting scheme and who claims in his semi-fictional autobiography "Betrayal" that he's closer than anyone to cracking the case.

"For more than a decade," Morrow writes in his introduction,

"handcuffed by the secrecy agreement required of everyone directly or indirectly on the payroll of the Central Intelligence Agency, I lived with what I knew. . . . This book is based upon my experiences, on events related to me at the time and subsequently by close associates, and on evidence available in public testimony . . . some dialogue has been improvised and certain events reconstructed."

There is little doubt, according to Washington sources, that Morrow did indeed work Cuban affairs for the CIA during the early 1960s. That, at least, makes him the first ex-CIA employee to speak out publicly on this subject. He says he will tell far more, far less cryptically, to a congressional hearing—and Downing is inclined to believe him.

The problem with "Betrayal" (published by Henry Regnery) is sorting out the improvisations and reconstructions from what Morrow really knew. Where he uses real names, the parties concerned are dead. Where he cannot remember specifics of dates and scenes, he invents them. And his scenario for the assassination itself, as he readily admits, is nothing more than an imaginative hypothesis.

But if only some of Morrow's firsthand knowledge is accurate, he has dropped a bombshell. His initial recruitment by the CIA, he says, grew out of his confidential relationship with a Cuban exile leader named Mario Garcia Kohly. Until the fall of 1963, Morrow claims to have maintained fairly regular contact with former CIA Deputy Director Charles Cabell and case officer "Ed Kendrick," who bears a strong resemblance to E. Howard Hunt's onetime boss of covert operations Tracy Barnes. Cabell and "Kendricks," according to Morrow, were the overseers of his main CIA project during those years—a scheme to manufacture and then flood the Cuban economy with \$50 million in counterfeit pesos.

Here, in chronological order, are Morrow's most startling revelations:

• As an engineering specialist in jamming and coding techniques, Morrow recounts his selection for a top-secret mission during the Bay of Pigs invasion. Given the code name Robert Porter, he says he was flown into Cuba's Camaguey Mountains to try to discover the source of some unusual pulse transmissions that the CIA suspected might be a signal system for ballistic missiles. His alleged pilot was David Ferric, who died mysteriously in 1967 when New Orleans District Attorney Jim Garrison was about to indict him for conspiracy in the Kennedy assassination.

• The CIA, says Morrow, actual-

ly stepped up the Bay of Pigs invasion date without Kennedy's okay. Infuriated, Kennedy then demanded all data gathered about possible ballistic missiles turned over to his brother at the Justice Department. Not only did the CIA conclude that the Soviet Union was operating a control center in the Camaguey Mountains, Morrow continues, it also obtained photos smuggled out by the anti-Castro underground of missile launching sites under construction. But the Kennedys chose to do nothing at that time.

• On a mission to Europe, Morrow says the CIA arranged for him to make a clandestine \$240,000 arms purchase for Mario Kohly's Cuban underground. The deal was consummated through a Dallas man named "Jake," who Morrow says was Jack Ruby, and a CIA front called Ferrudex. That front was hounded out of New Orleans by CIA consultant Clay Shaw, also later accused and ultimately acquitted in Garrison's trial. Morrow says he was taken to the weapons warehouse in Athens by David Ferric.

• During that same trip, Morrow says the CIA had him pick up an envelope in Paris from an American just returned from an extended tour of the Soviet Union. The envelope, he was told, was "the information wanted from Harvey," and had been secreted out of Minsk. A year later, Morrow asserts he was told by Cabell and "Kendricks" that "Harvey" was a CIA agent who had gone to Russia posing as a defector to participate in an internal security operation: make contact with the niece of a KGB colonel and arrange to get her out of Russia as a precondition for her uncle's defection to the West.

• After the Cuban Missile Crisis, Morrow claims he was informed by "Kendricks" of CIA reports that the missiles had not been removed but taken to hidden sites deep in the Cuban interior. Elements of the CIA believed that Kennedy and Khrushchev had reached a quid-pro-quo agreement about missiles in Cuba and Turkey. This, Morrow speculates, was Kennedy's betrayal—and his death warrant.

• By mid-October 1962, the CIA was worried about losing control of one of its anti-Castro groups operating out of New Orleans. Cabell, who was no longer deputy director but still kept vigil over numerous covert activities, reportedly wanted Morrow to find out how closely some of its own contract employees—including Cuban leader Mario Kohly—were connected to a paramilitary training camp established at Lake Pontchartrain by Clay Shaw.

• Morrow says he was informed at that same meeting that on . . .

group—"Jake," or Jack Ruby, was running Chinese cocaine out of Cuba under CIA auspices, in exchange for running guns into Mario Kohly's underground. "Harvey," who had returned from Russia with the KGB colonel's niece when he came to feel he was under suspicion, had been assigned by the CIA to report from the Dallas-New Orleans area on Ruby's activities. "Harvey," or Oswald, had also been hired for similar purposes by the FBI.

• Early in 1963, Morrow writes he was asked by "Kendricks" to obtain several 7.35-caliber Mannlicher-Carcano rifles for delivery to Shaw's group in New Orleans supposedly for an assassination attempt against the leftist leader of the Dominican Republic, Juan Bosch. Three of these rifles were picked up by David Ferrie in a private airplane; Morrow kept four, and today it rests in a gun cabinet in his Baltimore home. The others, Morrow believes, were used against John Kennedy.

• The last straw for the New Orleans conspirators, according to Morrow, was probably the arrest in early October 1963 of Mario Kohly, himself, and two others involved in the CIA's counterfeit peso scheme. The Kennedys, Morrow says, had ordered

the Secret Service to make the arrests and so bust up the CIA's last best hope at undermining Castro's Cuba.

That's about as far as Morrow claims any firsthand information. He goes on to speculate about how Oswald was used, the existence of an Oswald look-alike in the Lake Pontchartrain camp, and the roles of Ruby, Shaw, Ferrie, and others. Even what he says he was told staggers the imagination and, in most instances, there is simply no way to back it up. He points to a vast conspiracy similar to the discredited Garrison case, and an equally vast cover-up by the Kennedys themselves around the Cuban missile situation.

Still, no matter how incredible it seems, the Morrow book cannot be dismissed out of hand. Consider, for example, that the CIA's newly released assassination files mention, for the first time, that Oswald's rifle might have been a 7.35 caliber Mannlicher-Carcano. There is also this declassified document dated December 4, 1963: "Source on (deleted) said he saw (deleted). (Deleted) reported SOVCONGEN told him 30 November that Oswald sent to USSR and married Soviet girl under CIA instructions." By the time those

files were released, Morrow's book had long since gone into galleys.

The counterfeit peso story and Morrow's arrest are also documented in newspaper files and court records. Washington attorney Bernard Fensterwald, Jr., recalls investigating the incident in 1966 and concluding that the arrests were "a frame by the U.S. government," just as Morrow maintains.

Morrow has told Congress that he's now prepared to turn over the bulk of Mario Kohly's private files, once the investigation begins. Kohly, who once had 115 exile groups under his United Organizations to Liberate Cuba, was the CIA's most favored leader during that period. And his files, bequeathed to Morrow upon Kohly's death in 1975 at age 76, could prove a fountain of important new information.

These days it is instructive to recall the quaint conclusion of the Warren Commission's own Gerald Ford: "The strong evidence [is] that Lee Oswald's mind turned to murder whenever he wanted to impress Marina. . . . It's taken 12 years to move from couch to conspiracy—and the new report may be only the beginning." [

THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE

14 June 1976

Girl says CIA sent her to Cuba to poison Castro

NEW YORK [AP]—A teen-aged girl who caught the eye of Fidel Castro was sent to Havana by the Central Intelligence Agency in 1960 to kill the Cuban premier with poison tablets to be slipped into his coffee, the New York News reported Sunday.

The assassination attempt failed, because the girl, fearful the tablets might be discovered as she entered Cuba, secreted them in a jar of cold cream in her handbag and they melted, the News said in a copyright story by Paul Meskil.

The girl, identified as Marie Lorenz, told the newspaper that CIA agents who recruited her for the assassination mission told her "it would change history." She said the agents also told her, "You're the only one who can do it."

THE NEWS SAID an investigator for the Senate Intelligence Committee and the newspaper traced the girl to where she now lives in New York City. Quoting Miss Lorenz, the newspaper gave this account:

Miss Lorenz, a German-American, met Castro aboard the luxury liner Berlin one month after he seized power in Cuba in 1959. Miss Lorenz' father was captain of the Berlin and took her along on a Caribbean cruise. The Berlin docked in Havana, and the Cuban leader boarded the ship and later dined with the captain and his daughter.

Castro took a fancy to Miss Lorenz and later convinced her to return to Havana as his personal interpreter.

CIA operative Frank Fiorini, later known as Frank Sturgis when he was convicted as one of the Watergate burglars, made contact with Miss Lorenz and persuaded her to photograph some of Castro's secret papers. He also later helped her escape from Cuba.

THE CIA TOLD Miss Lorenz that she could perform "a tremendous service" to the United States by assassinating Castro.

"I thought he was joking," Miss Lorenz told the News. "But they kept coming back to it and I realized they were serious."

"They decided on poison," Miss Lorenz told the News. "They said it would be easy to put poison in his food or drink."

Miss Lorenz said she was told she would receive enough money to retire if she were successful.

She said she flew to Havana, but before meeting Castro she slipped the two tablets the CIA had given her into her cold cream.

"THE LOBBY WAS full of reporters and other people trying to see Castro, but he wasn't there," she said. "One of his aides recognized me and took me up to Fidel's suite. He asked me why I left him, and I said it was because I missed my mother and my home."

"Finally, he ordered food and coffee sent up. When it came, he fell asleep on the bed."

"I went into the bathroom and opened the jar of cold cream. I stuck my finger in it, and the whole thing came out like yuk. I couldn't find the capsules. They had melted."

"IT WAS LIKE an omen. I couldn't dump a glob of cold cream in his coffee, so I shut the jar and went back to the bedroom and I watched him sleeping. Finally, I lay down on the bed beside him."

"I thought, 'To hell with it, let history take its course.'"

Miss Lorenz said she flew back to Miami the next morning, where she was met by Fiorini.

The News said Fiorini verified Miss Lorenz' story.

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MEMOIRS OF A CIA PSYCHOLOGIST

With the help of handwriting analysis, a test called the Psychological Assessment System and 30,000 personality files, Jim Keehner spent seven years screening CIA agents and recruits. He's now on the agency's "useless person" list

By Maureen Orth

The young CIA case officers looked intently at their instructor. He was holding up a lemon. "I want you to take this lemon," he said, "and never let it leave you for the next three or four days. Smell it, touch it. Tell me your feelings about it. Get to know your lemon like you've never known another lemon in your life. This is an order."

The instructor was teaching "Personality Theory." He was a CIA psychologist, an expert called upon to train fresh clandestine operators in some of the secret arts of intelligence work. The lemon exercise was supposed to measure and improve their sensitivity, and the trainees were required to turn in written "contact" reports several days later. It was the usual mix. Some had developed meaningful relationships with their fruits. They rhapsodized for three pages about their lemons and had no trouble picking them out from a bowl of dozens. One nonconformist, however, merely drew a big picture of his lemon and labeled it with a question mark. Still, the instructor, Jim Keehner, was pleased. "I was trying to get them in contact with their feelings," he explained. "Feelings had been left out of their previous training, which is all cognitive."

In 1968 the CIA hired Jim Keehner as a specialist in the agency's ongoing effort to increase the psychological skills and awareness of its employees. A CIA case officer's prime duty is to recruit "agents" among foreign citizens around the world, and the agency has a vital interest in any method—no matter how far out—that promises to reveal weaknesses, vulnerabilities and psychic pressure points in possible recruits.

The CIA, in fact, has become one of the world's foremost laboratories for unusual psychological techniques. Keehner's office in the agency's Technical Service Division had a mandate to test anything—from hallucinogenic drugs to computerized handwriting analysis—that would help case officers manipulate their agents or other unsuspecting potential agents. Keehner's mission was to teach other CIA officers how to bring agents under control. Ironically, the negative nature of his work loosened his own self-control and brought him to the point of a complete breakdown. Still bearing the marks of his shattering experience, Keehner hesitantly agreed to provide a portrait of the agency's psychological operations.

Keehner was in the living room of his Georgetown apartment, giving me the CIA's specially designed personality test. According to Keehner, the results of this test would tell him my basic genetic formula: whether I was born an extrovert or an introvert, whether I was moral or amoral, whether I'd be more loyal to a person or a cause, even what sort of torture would be most effective against me.

I tried hard to duplicate the geometric designs on the paper Keehner showed me. I had to construct the designs using pieces of a plastic building block. A clock on the table next to us clicked away, but I was oblivious. "Time!" Keehner called. I managed to complete every design, but it took me too long. I flunked. Keehner seemed overjoyed. "Oh, you're an F," he said. "I knew you were an F. They're sensitive, creative and clumsy." I was taking the test so that Keehner might trust me. We had met for the first time only a few

hours before, and most of the time Keehner was uncomfortable and nervous. "Would a Catholic talk to the Devil?" he asked. "That's what the CIA thinks of talking to the press."

But I scored very high on trustworthiness, and that seemed to ease his concern. He was also unscientifically biased in my favor because I had the same "basic personality formula" as his former fiancée. He began to relax, but only a little.

To Jim Keehner, relaxing means sitting in the window of a "safe house" chain-smoking cigarettes and wondering who is watching from outside. He also checks for the three-agent team (ABC "surveillance patterns") when he's walking down the street, and fears that anything written about him and the CIA will be subject to instant sabotage by his former superiors. His natural wit is almost drowned in a terminal case of paranoia, perhaps because he is aware that he is an official outcast, a name on the

CIA's "useless person" list.

It wasn't always so. A small, thin, 36-year-old Kentuckian, Keehner spent six years traveling the world for the CIA with a packet of suicide pills in his pocket. He never forgot the motto of his office: "Every man has his price." His job was to find the weakest part of a foreign agent's character, his "squeaky board," and then tell the CIA how to step on it. He tested European bankers, Near Eastern journalists, Vietnamese farmers, a Buddhist monk and an African hashish smuggler. He told them he was testing their aptitude, but he was really charting how their minds worked.

"We liked some people with low intelligence who would follow orders," Keehner said. "Then there were some mean ones, the killers. But basically I tested nondescript middle-class people who did it for the money."

Back at CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia, Keehner reported his findings and taught the case officers how to take advantage of them. He also tested the case officers themselves, seeking out their weaknesses so that the agency would know how vulnerable they were to enemy spies.

In addition to his direct testing, Keehner assessed many potential agents indirectly, without the benefit of interviews or tests. He used the information the CIA collects every year on thousands of unsuspecting foreigners. No matter how loyal these people might be to their country, the CIA considers them potential traitors and labels them either "susceptible" or "vulnerable." Today the agency still spends millions to study them, tap their phones and bug their bedrooms in an effort to lure them or force them to become agents. It is not a pretty business, and Keehner had to plot how to bring these targets to the breaking point.

"I was sent to deal with the most negative aspects of the human condition," he said. "It was planned destructiveness. First, you'd check to see if you could destroy a man's marriage. If you could, then that would be enough to put a lot of stress on the individual, to break him down. Then you might start a rumor campaign against him. Harass him constantly. Bump his car in traffic. A lot of it is ridiculous, but it may have a cumulative effect."

The CIA recruited Jim Keehner under deep cover. He was excited when a high-powered Washington outfit called Psychological Assessments Associates wanted to interview him. PAA, with offices in Washington and abroad, is the cover for the agency's psychologists. Its recruiters impressed Keehner by telling him that if he got the job he would travel the world testing the aptitudes of business executives for high-level positions. It was August of 1964.

During the next nine months,

Keehner considered studying for the priesthood while Psychological Assessments checked him out for a top secret security clearance. Then the company contacted him in Kentucky, where he was working in the mental ward of a hospital, and invited him to interview further for what he thought was a glamorous job with a private psychological firm. "They called me in," he remembers, "and said, 'This is the CIA. Do you want to go on or do you want to stop?' It's a funny feeling when they tell you—frightening, yet thrilling and shocking." He barely hesitated before saying yes. Visions of dashing spooks danced in his head.

One thing puzzled Keehner about the CIA's final interviews, however. "They never once asked me about the Vietnam War," he said. Neither did they probe his views of morality, not in seven screening interviews and not when he took the CIA's standard lie-detector test. No one from the agency questioned Keehner about American involvement in Vietnam, then at its peak. The oversight proved to be significant.

Keehner's intensive training in the clandestine ways of the CIA surprised him. "I was intrigued with spies," he said. "But as soon as I got to training I learned that no American who works for the CIA is a spy. Never. A spy is a foreign agent who commits treason and gives information against his government. In the CIA we act as his helpers and get information for our country. Never call an American a spy." The need for secrecy was drilled into him over and over again. He had to sign a contract binding him not to reveal his work to anyone.

After training, Keehner reported to the Washington office of PAA, where he set out to learn the rudiments of the remarkable test he would soon administer round the world. Keehner's boss, John Gittinger (now retired), scored a major breakthrough in measuring personality development about 25 years ago. Gittinger took the standard IQ test—the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale—and converted it to a highly sophisticated tool that can predict behavior based on personality types. The elaborate Psychological Assessment System (PAS) uses a series of letters to categorize individual personality traits: "internalizers" and "externalizers" (I and E), those who see the forest (F, flexibles) and those who see the trees (R, regulated), those who adapt easily (A) and those who don't (U). PAS hypothesizes that everyone is born with a fixed personality formula that is often modified in early childhood and adolescence but never entirely altered.

Because of the test's complexity and its bias toward genetic destiny, it has not been especially popular in the scientific community. However, some psychologists who work extensively with the PAS readily concede that it can be effective for the CIA's purposes. "If I

were getting into the torture business," says Denver clinical psychologist Keith Davis, "I'd think of the PAS I use it in a psychological program aimed at helping patients. But people skilled in subtle manipulation can use it for negative purposes."

"I can be very sneaky myself about predicting behavior and personality formulas," says Dr. Charles Krauskopf of the University of Missouri Psychology Department. "We should be thinking about this the same way we're thinking about nuclear problems and bio-engineering. It's not something that will hide under the carpet."

Keehner thinks the public ought to know about many of the techniques the CIA uses. "One of the tragedies is that most CIA research in the basic sciences is never made available to the American public who paid for it," he says. "My boss, for example, was a non-academic who carried half his work around in his head."

Gittinger finally had a monograph of his Psychological Assessment System published in *The Journal of Clinical Psychology* in April of 1973. Today the system is being used in several American universities and hospitals as an aid in vocational guidance, marriage counseling, correlating personality type with psychosomatic illness and teaching mental patients how to play up their strengths. Keehner believes that most people working with the test have no idea of its use by the CIA. And certainly nobody now using the PAS outside the agency has access to the 30,000 personality formulas the CIA has accumulated over the years.

The CIA even goes so far as to dub the personalities of entire countries with the magic PAS initials. The U.S., for example, is ERA—"a masculine stereotype"—externally oriented, regulated in behavior and adaptable. The country that most resembles the U.S. is none other than the U.S.S.R. "The Russians are EFUs," says Keehner, "like us, but unadaptable. They follow authority blindly." China, on the other hand, is IRU (internalized, regulated, unadaptable), just like former-President Nixon. "I've never met an IRU I've liked," says Keehner.

In fact, nobody in Keehner's office could stand to watch Nixon on television. Out of 15 psychologists in Keehner's office, 14 voted for McGovern, not because they loved McGovern but because they had all indirectly assessed Nixon. Our former leader fared very poorly. Trained to spot lying, the CIA psychologists concluded that Nixon lied in public most of the time.

In addition to testing, Keehner's office often whipped up psychological studies of world leaders. Foreign presidents and their aides had their handwriting scrutinized for signs of psychic imbalance. Keehner worked on the files of many foreign officials, but the assess-

ments on the really big enchiladas were left to his bosses. Keehner happened to see Fidel Castro's assessment, and it noted he had sex with his pants on.

Keehner thought the CIA charter strictly forbade the agency to assess American citizens, so he was surprised when the news broke that the agency had compiled a psychological profile on Daniel Ellsberg because of what Keehner calls a "bureaucratic screw up." "I guess the Plumbers broke into that office to get Ellsberg's psychiatric files for the shrinks," he said. "We could have done it without them. I asked my boss if he would have assessed Ellsberg, and he told me that we probably would have done it if the White House had asked us to."

Keehner's office did assess Commander Lloyd Bucher when the Navy spy ship the *Pueblo* was captured by the North Koreans. "We were very involved in trying to figure out how the North Koreans might affect the crew psychologically," said Keehner. "Bucher should never have been commander of that ship. He was an orphan, you know. He wouldn't intentionally give away anything. But he was not equipped to handle any aspect of the situation he was in."

The CIA assessed Sirhan Sirhan when Robert Kennedy was assassinated, and concluded he was insane. Keehner says he knows of no official assessment of Lee Harvey Oswald, but he says that CIA psychological experts studied Oswald on their own and concluded he was incapable of killing the President by himself. (One of the CIA employees who worked on the Oswald material confirmed both the study and the conclusion.) The agency also analyzed letters from American POWs in North Vietnam to see if their handwriting showed the effects of torture. It did, and some of the prisoners were judged to be hallucinating.

The CIA takes handwriting analysis quite seriously. According to Keehner, the agency's sophisticated methods can work wonders with a simple handwriting sample, to the point of detecting certain diseases before they are subject to medical diagnosis. Every New Year's Day, all the CIA agents in the Soviet Union forward their New Year's cards from Russian friends to CIA headquarters so that the handwriting can be analyzed and filed away.

The agency even spent a half million dollars to build a machine to graph handwriting by computer. It was supposed to cut down analysis time from eight or nine hours to four. But the machine never functioned properly. A staunch believer in handwriting analysis, Keehner says, "If you take the test and we see your writing, there's no way we can be wrong about you."

The CIA denies it, but Keehner says it still uses sexual ruses to entrap

collaborators. In 1969 Keehner went to New York to give the "aptitude test" to an American nurse who had volunteered for unofficial night duty. "We wanted her to sleep with this Russian," he explained. "Either the Russian would fall in love with her and defect, or we'd blackmail him. I had to see if she could sleep with him over a period of time and not get involved emotionally. Boy, was she tough."

Keehner became disgusted with entrapment techniques, however, especially after watching a film of an agent in bed with a "recruitment target." CIA case officers, many of whom Keehner says "got their jollies" from such assignments, made the film with a hidden camera. Keehner was not only repulsed by the practice but also found it quite ineffective. "You don't really recruit agents with sexual blackmail," he says. "That's why I couldn't even take reading the files after a while. I was sickened at seeing people take pleasure in other people's inadequacies. First of all, I thought it was just dumb. For all the money going out, nothing ever came back. We don't recruit that many people. Most of our agents are walk-ins, people who are easy to buy anyway."

Psychologist Ann Herndon, a former CIA colleague who quit to go into private practice, corroborated Keehner's view of the CIA's ineffectiveness in using blackmail as a recruiting technique. "I never once saw anyone recruited in the work I did," she said. "I saw 70 to 80 cases a month. We haven't yet recruited our first Mainland Chinese, and there are at least 100 people working full-time on it."

"It's pretty much of a game," Keehner said. "People took pleasure in the gamesmanship. Everybody was looking for a promotion."

Every morning at 8:30, when Jim Keehner reported for work, he passed the inscription in the marble wall of the CIA's main lobby: "And ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make ye free" (John 7:32). Eventually, the words began to grate on his nerves. He saw it as a symbol of the hypocrisy he felt surrounded by. Also, he became more and more disturbed by the moral implications of his daily work, which was centered around the PAS testing system. Keehner occasionally wondered what would happen if the government decided to test everyone and run their genetic formulas next to their social security numbers on a giant computer. "There are horrible possibilities," he said. "It's social engineering and we don't know yet if people can beat the test."

His disaffection with the agency first began over the issue of the Vietnam War. His office was divided over the war, with the younger psychologists opposing and the older ones endorsing American policy to keep communism from spreading another inch. Keehner also disapproved of the military cast that came over the agency during its Vietnam

operations. "The agency was always swarming with colonels from the Pentagon," he says. "I couldn't stand the waste of money being poured into Vietnam."

"My job was becoming more disgusting to me every day. But I was overwhelmed by the CIA. The first year is confusion. The second is bewilderment. The third it just kind of dawns on you what's happening." Keehner, ever a staunch Catholic, poured out his doubts twice a month in the confessional to no avail. "Masturbation was a mortal sin," he says. "But when I talked about sexual blackmail and manipulating people, the priest said it was a grey area."

It took a while for Keehner to rebel. But he found solace in attending sensitivity training sessions generously financed by the CIA. Touchie-feelie techniques were some of the many methods the agency explored for possible use in psychological assessments: They were still alive after the CIA had abandoned hypnosis, LSD, truth serums and palm-reading. (ESP, says Keehner, is "still up in the air.") Both of Keehner's bosses attended early sensitivity training groups and found them interesting. They approved of his request to train as a sensitivity group leader, under cover of course.

Keehner soon found himself an enthusiastic devotee of group grope. He thought sensitivity sessions not only personally satisfying but also a possible means of reforming the agency. On Mondays he went to Gestalt. On Tuesdays he saw his psychiatrist. On Wednesdays and Fridays he did yoga. On Thursdays he rested. "I was really coming into touch with my feelings for the first time. I started strongly vocalizing my objections to the war at the office. I stopped wearing a tie to work and that was against regulations."

Rebelling was an entirely new concept to Keehner. He had managed to grow up and go through 14 years of Catholic education without once disobeying his parents or his teachers. No doubt those qualities made him an ideal candidate for the CIA, but the agency obviously forgot to assess the effects of contemporary self-help therapy.

In 1971 Keehner was assigned a tour of duty in Southeast Asia. He refused to go. One boss told him to "go over anyway and sabotage it from the field." Keehner still said no. He never got another promotion.

Outside the office, however, Keehner was still cautious. He saw his psychiatrist once a week for an entire year undercover because he felt announcing where he worked would breach CIA security. Instead, Keehner painted such a rosy picture of his job at Psychological Assessments that his psychiatrist asked if PAA had any job openings. "I thought I could just talk about my personal problems and set my work aside," Keehner said. "But the more I got into it, the more I got into it. I was

sinking ship."

A year later, after Keehner developed a severe eye infection, the CIA's powerful Medical Division put him on "medical hold," restricting his duties. He was relieved that he no longer had to go abroad for assessments, though he was still expected to work on files in the office. He asked instead if he could train incoming CIA recruits, and his request was granted.

In his new training position, Keehner enjoyed creative freedom. One day in class it gave him great satisfaction to play the record *Hair* and send the refrain blasting through camp: "Right here in niggertown we've got a dirty little war." Then he had the recruits march around the room to feel the music and to have a little human interaction. The older instructors were amazed. His classes were always monitored after that. Next, he requisitioned 40 lemons from Supply—the first and last such request—and had the recruits get to know their lemons. Keehner was not asked back to CIA training camp.

"Ninety-five percent of the people who took my course gave it an excellent in their evaluations," Keehner says. "I hoped the course would make them face the reality of what they were doing and make them think about the theory that 'every man has his price.' Later some of them said it helped them to get closer to people so they could recruit agents better."

Undaunted, he next came up with the idea of running week-long sensitivity groups for CIA employees as part of their in-agency training. The CIA gave its approval, but only after Keehner had had a little chat with William Colby, who was then director of Clandestine Services. "Don't let the press know we're running these groups," Colby warned. "Time or Newsweek will get a hold of this and make it sound like we're doing something crazy."

Tension is such an occupational hazard at the CIA that the agency is unusually tolerant of activities designed to relieve its employees' anxiety. But it insists that these activities take place "in house" for reasons of security and control. Keehner's new project became an officially authorized outlet for the pent-up emotions of the case officers. Ultimately, Keehner's prolonged exposure to sensitivity training caused him to slip his own psychic moorings. But he was happy with his new work at the onset because he felt he was helping people again.

Everyone who came to Keehner's "Human Interaction Lab" had to take the PAS test first, and also have his handwriting analyzed. Keehner didn't want anyone who seemed unstable to go through such an intense experience. Besides, it wouldn't do to have too many Fs and not enough Rs in a group. "When I had all Fs once I thought I'd go crazy," Keehner says. "Everyone was so sensi-

tive to everyone else's feelings that nobody would talk for days.

"There are some very warm people in the CIA, but they block off their feelings. Most of them are Rs and they compartmentalize their own work in their minds. They can do horrible things all day and then go home and forget about it. It was amazing to see how well they functioned considering the amount of tension their tests displayed."

Group participants ranged in age from 20 to 60. They were mostly middle-level employees. "The big officers wouldn't come because they heard stories of how people broke down and cried," said Keehner. "They'd encourage the younger employees to come, though." Keehner wanted his charges to let it all hang out. They crawled around the floor making animal sounds. They went on "trust walks": one person with his eyes open had to lead another person with his eyes closed through the woods. They stood in the middle of the room and waved in the breeze pretending they were flowers. "I played music," Keehner said, "and told them to go to their favorite place in the room and imagine they were coming up out of the earth. They moved like corn blowing in the wind.

"I remember this one lawyer who had been passed over for promotion. All of a sudden he started to cry and cry. He said he felt isolated from all the other flowers in the room. His one fantasy was that he was a daisy and that he was going to die all alone. A couple of days later he brought me a colorful poster. It said, 'Thank God someone is crazy enough to care for a daisy.'"

While leading groups, Keehner avoided assessments as much as possible. But one day Keehner's boss called him into his office. "He said I wasn't giving the case officers in the field enough support, not getting in and telling them how to manipulate and destroy. I said, 'No, it makes me sick to my stomach.' He said, 'It bothers all of us but we don't articulate it.'"

Meanwhile, Keehner continued to experiment on his own with new kinds of encounter groups. His experience with Primal Scream therapy, however, proved to be a nightmare and precipitated his eventual downfall with the CIA.

Primal Scream requires its participants to stay nude in a swimming pool for six hours. Keehner began feeling uneasy when someone put the "Agnus Dei" on the pool loudspeakers. After all, the music came right from the Mass, and it occurred to Keehner that Mass was probably where he should be at this hour, not naked in a swimming pool with a bunch of people in varying stages of freaking out.

At first he tried to concentrate on helping others, holding back on his own feelings—a mistake. Finally, a leader started pressing on his neck and Keehner started screaming. "Then he started pushing on my genitals," Keehner explained. "Well, boy, I let out a scream. I don't know if it was a Primal Scream or not. That's what they called it."

Within 24 hours of his Primal Scream, Keehner was so anxiety-ridden he had to take three kinds of tranquilizers. He was unable to work. Then he had a case of appendicitis and stayed home for six weeks. When he got back to work he refused to do any more assessments. Keehner went to see John Gittinger. "Why did you ever recruit me?" he asked. Keehner realized he was "out of pattern," a poor boy from Kentucky compared to most of the Ivy League types in the agency. "I don't know," Gittinger replied.

Keehner continued his human interaction labs, but not assessments. One day it was leaked to him he had been put on the "useless person" list. He was furious. Why hadn't he been told in advance? he wanted to know. He planned a confrontation.

Keehner waited until he was at a staff lunch with all the other psychologists, including the head of the entire Technical Services Division. He began

to attack from a lotus position, shoeless in the middle of the floor. "I want to talk about the dirty SOB's who work in this place," he said. "I want to tell each and every one of you what I think of you."

"You could have heard a pin drop," says Ann Herndon. "The tension was so thick. No conflict ever comes out in the open there. Everything is kept under cover. Everyone was horrified. Jim began to make waves. That was the last thing they wanted. Everyone was supposed to be like everyone else."

Keehner officially left the CIA about a month later. "The CIA never fires anyone," he says. "They're afraid of vindictiveness." The agency gave him a \$15,000 contract to continue running his sensitivity groups for a year. He was also promised a second year's contract in writing. Then, early in the summer of '74, Keehner's contract was abruptly canceled, and he no longer had any job with the CIA.

He protested the action in a memo to William Colby, then head of the agency. Three days later he was accused of a security violation, a serious offense at the CIA. The security violation was typing his memo at home. Yet Keehner had typed it at headquarters and could prove it. Nevertheless, he was told to turn in his badge immediately. The fighting was over. Keehner and the CIA were finally through.

Looking back on his nightmare, Keehner says he was just an ordinary small-town boy who arrived at the CIA looking for action and adventure. Instead he found the horrific, the absurd, the monstrous and the trivial. George Orwell kept bumping into Bob and Carol and Ted and Alice. The resulting trauma has been tough to shake.

Finished telling his story, Jim Keehner stood up and went over to the window. "See that guy over there across the street," he whispered. "He could be part of an ABC surveillance pattern. On the other hand, he looks just like my Gestalt leader." ☉

POST, New York
20 May 1976

WASHINGTON POST
18 JUN 1976

New Spokesman Named by CIA

The Central Intelligence Agency has appointed a new spokesman, Andrew Falkiewicz, who will hold the title of assistant to the director. Falkiewicz succeeds Angus Thuermer who is expected to be assigned to the CIA's deputy directorate for operations.

The Arms Plague

With plans going forward to inoculate millions against a deadly strain of flu, it is a pity no comparable means are at hand for immunizing national leaders against a deadlier disorder: the arms plague. Instead, the disorder seems to be more contagious than ever.

The Central Intelligence Agency has identified what seems to be an unusually virulent outbreak in the Soviet Union. The agency reports Moscow may have been spending twice as much on armaments as initially estimated by the West; the CIA now figures that the Russians spent between 50 and 55 billion rubles on defense last year.

That is no justification for a fresh

Pentagon demand for a doubled U. S. defense budget. As Sen. Proxmire (D-Wis.) points out in interpreting the CIA data: "The Russians are spending more rubles than we thought because they are more inefficient and wasteful than we thought."

CIA Director Bush puts it this way: "... the analysis does not indicate that the Soviets have any more weapons or manpower than previously estimated but that the cost of these defense programs is greater than we originally had estimated."

If the Russians are wasting money on military madness, are we obliged to imitate them?

The Washington Star

Wednesday, June 23, 1976

Butterfield's Role Still a Puzzle to Haldeman

By H. R. Haldeman

"I just wanted to wish you and your family a Happy New Year, Bob," said Alexander Butterfield in an unexpected telephone call to our rented home in Arlington. It was Dec. 31, 1974, the eve of the verdict in the Watergate cover-up conspiracy trial.

Butterfield — who revealed the existence of the White House tapes to the Ervin Committee, thus escalating the Watergate storm — had appeared originally as a prosecution witness at

Fourth of a Series

the trial in Judge John J. Sirica's courtroom. Alex later offered to be a character witness for me, a move which the prosecution twice blocked successfully through legal maneuvering.

Watching Butterfield wait on the witness stand, trying to help me, only to be denied the opportunity, reminded me of our long relationship dating back to UCLA and the circumstances under which he came to work in the White House.

ALEX ORIGINALLY approached the White House on his own initiative — not because I recruited him. He was soon to become an Air Force general. I have never understood why he insisted, against my advice, on dropping his commission. Or why he suddenly wanted to be part of the Nixon team.

In view of his subsequent role, these actions seem even more curious today.

Was Butterfield a CIA agent? Maybe. I just don't know.

In retrospect, I'm ambivalent as to whether the agency was out to get

Nixon. I don't dismiss it as an impossibility. I do believe that there are a number of unanswered questions about the break-in at the Watergate.

The agency had the capacity and perhaps, unknown to me, the motivation.

Before that fateful day, June 17, 1972, seven men — Richard Nixon, John Mitchell, John Ehrlichman, John Dean, Jeb Magruder, Charles Colson, and I — functioned together as a very productive team — we were the "White House people."

THE ONLY connection any of us had with Watergate before then was that John Mitchell lived in the apartment complex bearing that name.

But, since the spring of 1973, we were henceforth to become known in history as the "Watergate people." The Nixon administration had begun fading from a constructive government into a defensive, embattled regime, only to capsize in the summer of 1974.

Suddenly, in a federal courthouse, the three senior associates of a resigned president of the United States — together with two 1972 campaign aides, Robert Mardian and Kenneth Parkinson — were on trial. It gave me an eerie feeling, sometimes, to realize during their testimony that I

had recruited three of the confessed Watergate figures who took the witness stand during that trial — Dean, Magruder and Colson. And that, as Mitchell, Ehrlichman and I waited throughout the long proceedings, unseen but strongly felt, was the brooding presence of Richard Nixon.

A number of myths still exist about the overall relations of the "Watergate people," not only with each other but with the president himself.

MITCHELL AND I, for example, had an excellent working and personal relationship, despite the gap in our age, background and interests. We were generally in agreement on most matters, although there were some sharp differences regarding personnel.

Ehrlichman and Mitchell, on the other hand, had limited rapport, a basically different approach to the job, and very little mutual trust, frequently dealing at arm's length regarding the policy and operation of the Justice Department.

John Dean's relationship with Mitchell — the father and son analogy — was not as close as had been publicized. But Dean was, to a degree, a protege of Mitchell, and there was a strong, personal bond between them. Mitchell, for example, was concerned that Dean's White House role would not be large enough and was very reluctant to see him transfer from the Justice Department.

Mitchell and Jeb Magruder had, as far as I know, a good working relationship. Jeb, who was afraid of Mitchell as he was of all senior staff, was determined to be Atty. Gen. Mitchell's boy at the "Committee to Re-elect the President."

CHUCK COLSON and Mitchell — well, there was a strong mutual distrust and dislike there.

With the president, John Mitchell enjoyed a peer relationship, absolutely unique in the Nixon White House. He had full access, was very free to disagree with the president, and argued his points strongly. Nixon used him as a top level agent in dealing with the Cabinet, Kissinger and political matters, trusting him completely.

John Ehrlichman and I had been close personal and family friends for 25 years, going back to our days at UCLA. Originally identified as a "Haldeman man," probably because I recruited him for the White House, John built his own relationship with the president with my encouragement and assistance.

Nixon had a high regard for Ehrlichman's ability and judgment. John's association with the president, however, was often slightly strained and uncomfortable in a mutual way. Analytical and self-assured, Ehrlichman disagreed with the president without fear, frequently, and in a blunt, direct manner.

JOHN HAD SOME definite reservations about Nixon personally. While respecting the president's ability and potential, he expressed concerns about Nixon's lifestyle, specifically in the area of drinking.

Dean and Ehrlichman worked well together. Ehrlichman tutored Dean in the many roles of counsel to the president, and used him as an agent on many matters. On the other hand, Magruder and Ehrlichman had no real relationship.

I forced some degree of cooperative effort between Chuck Colson and Ehrlichman, although there was a mutual distrust and dislike between them. If Ehrlichman had a fault, he was, like Mitchell, weak in his judgment of staff people.

John Dean was the "hot-dog swinger" in the "square" Nixon White House, neither awed by the building or its chief occupant. He was smooth, handled himself well, and was enthusiastically backed by Mitchell, Richard Kleindienst (Mitchell's deputy at the Justice Department and his successor as attorney general in March 1972), Egil Krogh (aide to John Ehrlichman named undersecretary of transportation in December 1972), and Ehrlichman.

DEAN'S relationship with the president, despite suggestions to the contrary, did not exist until Watergate, and only then as a project officer. I recruited him, but never saw his FBI dossier which was not included in his personnel file. But that fact didn't worry me, since I assumed that Dean had been cleared at Justice. My former staff would be amused to know that, regarding Dean, I violated my own cardinal rule laid down for all subordi-

nates — "Don't assume."

If I had seen Dean's FBI dossier it would have barred him from the White House. Allegations about a conflict-of-interest charge, however slight, involving his prior affiliation with a law firm would have been enough to concern me about the smoke, whether or not there was any fire.

Chuck Colson was always a problem. Frankly, I didn't like him, nor did many others. His tough, abrasive manner earned him a bad reputation with all the staff, with perhaps the exception of Dean. He was a protege of Bryce Harlow (an assistant and later counsellor to President Nixon), who introduced him to the White House. I built Colson up, and the president, who de-

veloped a great rapport with him, found Chuck useful.

HIGHLY POLITICAL, Colson loved the game, spicing it with touches of fanaticism. But Colson played to Nixon's darker, less appealing side. He was not a seasoned staff man in the sense of weighing all sides. Chuck took his own view and pushed it all-out. If he had a key fault it was a willingness, even an eagerness, to carry out the president's orders indiscriminately.

Jeb Magruder was an ambitious bootlicker (by his own self-description). While a good project man, he was always self-serving and weak, pragmatic and without any real convictions. He was full of baloney but I found that I could squeeze it

out of him. I had to run Jeb by fear and constant goading. As with many of the junior men on the White House staff, I had to channel and use Magruder's self-interest and keep him on a tight leash.

Magruder had no real relationship with the president at all. Originally tapped as my assistant, he became John Mitchell's man — by his own design.

DURING OUR three-month trial in Washington I had time to reflect on some of the incidents leading up to my resignation as chief of staff. One I particularly recall involved the day late in April 1973 when Henry Kissinger, visibly agitated, stormed into my corner White House office. He had just come from a meeting

with Nixon about the "Haldeman problem" and the options which might still be available regarding it.

Kissinger, never one of the "Watergate people," said that even the thought of resignation on my part was "incomprehensible" to him. He told me that if Nixon accepted my resignation, or permitted me to leave under any circumstances that he, Kissinger, would resign immediately.

"I won't serve in an administration which would permit such a thing to happen," he emphasized.

In several telephone conversations over the years after I left the White House, Henry has expressed the same feeling of support concerning my departure, but he didn't resign over it.

WASHINGTON STAR
23 June 1976

Butterfield's Luck Already Bad, and Now . . .

By Vernon A. Guidry Jr.
Washington Star Staff Writer

Alexander Butterfield, the man who revealed the existence of the secret recording system in the Nixon White House, is again in the news with a suggestion that he might have been a CIA agent.

The renewed suggestion of a CIA link has left Butterfield somewhat puzzled and perhaps a little worse off. While others connected with the Watergate White House have prospered — or have been convicted of crimes — Butterfield has been job hunting.

"It doesn't help when your name is in the news all the time," says Butterfield, whose testimony about the secret White House recordings came under questioning by the Senate Watergate committee.

THE SUGGESTION comes from H.R. Haldeman, former President Richard M. Nixon's White House chief of staff, who also raises the possibility that the CIA, for some motivation unknown, was "out to get" Nixon. Haldeman offers no new evidence for his suggestions, which come in the fourth part of a five-part series of newspaper articles he has syndicated in advance of publication of the memoirs on which he is working.

Butterfield, a former Air Force officer, had joined the Nixon administration in its first days. He served in the White House and as federal aviation administrator from 1973 until last year.

In his newspaper article, Haldeman has this to say about Butterfield and the CIA:

"Alex originally approached the White House on his own initiative — not because I recruited him. He was soon to become an Air Force general. I have never understood why he insisted, against my advice, on dropping his commission. Or why he suddenly wanted to be part of the Nixon team.

"In view of his subsequent role, these actions seem even more curious today.

"Was Butterfield a CIA agent? Maybe. I just don't know.

"In retrospect, I'm ambivalent as to whether the agency was out to get Nixon," Haldeman writes.

BUTTERFIELD has had to contend with the specter of the CIA since last summer, when a former Air Force intelligence officer, Col. L. Fletcher Prouty, said he had been told that Butterfield was the CIA's contact man in the White House, a position that would not entail spying on those for whom he worked.

Butterfield has emphatically denied it. "I'm not anti-CIA. It just so happens that I haven't been (connected with the agency)," he says.

And he has picked up some substantial support in that assertion. After Prouty's comments, the Senate Intelligence Committee looked into the issue. Its chairman, Sen. Frank Church, D-Idaho, later announced the committee had found "no scintilla of evidence that would substantiate such a charge."

Butterfield says he long ago became wary of those who staffed the Nixon White House. He says that when the Watergate prosecutor's operation was going full tilt, he was called in by prosecutors to explain a memorandum he had written that made it appear as if he were launching a political-public relations campaign based on information.

able legality.

Butterfield said he was able to demonstrate that the memorandum had been doctored to give that impression but he was shocked that some one in the White House had made the attempt.

WHEN ASKED why Haldeman might be reviving the CIA business, Butterfield says, "I couldn't begin to guess," although he adds, "he may really think that."

Butterfield takes issue with Haldeman's newspaper article on several points. For one thing, Butterfield had not been selected for promotion to brigadier general, although it probably wasn't a bad bet, since he had been selected for full colonel before his contemporaries, a significant mark of recognition.

For another thing, Butterfield says Haldeman never advised him against dropping his commission. As Butterfield recalls, it he was offered a job as Haldeman's immediate deputy in the White House but only if he retired from the Air Force and signed on as a civilian.

"He actually did not advise me to keep my commission. He said to think

carefully about it and I thought carefully about it," Butterfield says.

By December of 1972, Butterfield says, he wanted to get out of the White House and was nominated by Nixon to head the Federal Aviation Administration, a post which would require him to sever his connection with the military service.

HE ACCEPTED the nomination, he said, because he did not want to appear "money oriented" and because he did not want to wish to embarrass the president. The resignation required by the new post ended Butterfield's retirement and other military benefits which he had earned in his 20 years in the Air Force.

The Ford administration forced Butterfield's resignation. Later, a bill to reinstate his military retirement benefits was defeated in the Senate amid much controversy. Butterfield, 50, still has Civil Service retirement.

For the time being, he is doing what he calls "freelance consulting," but he acknowledges it is a somewhat uncomfortable position for a man who spent his career in highly structured organizations. "I'd like to find a job," he says.

THE WASHINGTON POST Sunday, June 13, 1976

The Colonel's Secret Drug War

By George Crile III

Crile is Washington editor of Harper's magazine.

IN JANUARY, 1975, Sen. Lowell Weicker (R-Conn.) charged that a senior official of the Drug Enforcement Administration had been offered and had examined a consignment of exotic assassination devices. The instruments included exploding telephones, flashlights and cameras, and came complete with triggering mechanisms set to movement, time, pressure, light or sound. Their only conceivable use was for anonymous murder.

Col. Lucien Conein, the official Weicker named, was not in a position to directly deny the senator's assertions. For one thing, Weicker produced a memo from the now defunct B.R. Fox Co. of Alexandria that seemed to implicate Conein in the company's decision to produce the devices for his consideration. Nevertheless, Conein managed to convince reporters that there was nothing more to the incident than the unsolicited mischief of the B.R. Fox Co. He had gone to look at some eavesdropping devices that he was thinking of buying for DEA when, much to his surprise, he was shown strange weapons which he hadn't asked to see and had no intention of buying.

The story made the network news, but with Conein's explanation the matter was dropped, and nothing more has been heard on the subject.

Had it been any other Washington official, this explanation might have sufficed. But Col. Conein is no ordinary bureaucrat. It seems incredible that there was no reaction to the discovery that the man examining the exploding devices was the same Col. Lucien Conein who had been the CIA's notorious Far Eastern operative and the only figure associated with President Nixon's former team to go on to become a senior official of the Ford administration.

A Legendary Career

IT WOULD have been difficult to imagine a more disturbing appointment than that of Lucien Conein to almost any post of responsibility in the government, much less his appointment to a highly sensitive position involving the most delicate covert operations. In earlier days the French used to offer two medical degrees: one requiring many years of school, internship and residency, and the other calling for an intensive 18-month program. The short-course doctors were not permitted to practice in France but they were given full license to operate in the Orient. The latter is the kind of license the CIA gave Lou Conein. It all but read on his Agency contract: "For Use in the Far East Only."

Conein's history is by now laced with legend but the following appears to be a reasonable summary of his exploits before joining the Nixon White House in 1971:

At the age of 17 Conein is said to have fled his hometown in Kansas to join the French Foreign Legion. With the entry of the United States into World War II he transferred to the Office of Strategic Services in France, where he lived and fought with the Corsican Brother-

hood, who were then part of the Resistance. Before he left, Conein says, they made him a member — an honor to bear in mind, for the Brotherhood is an underworld organization deeply involved in the drug trade and considered even more effective and dangerous than its Sicilian counterpart, the Mafia.

After the liberation, Conein parachuted into Vietnam to join an OSS team fighting the Japanese alongside the Vietminh. There he met Ho Chi Minh and Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap. A decade later, in 1954, he was back in Vietnam as one of Gen. Edward Lansdale's special team, charged with setting up a paramilitary organization in the Hanoi area. He helped Ngo Dinh Diem consolidate his power in South Vietnam the next year and in 1963 he was the U.S. embassy's liaison with the cabal of generals who murdered Diem.

Although he has been accused of engineering the assassination, his actual role seems to have been as the Kennedy administration's only direct conduit to the coup's plotters. He had occupied this sensitive position almost by default. He was married to a Vietnamese and he alone among the Americans was intimate with most of the Vietnamese high command. No one else had anything resembling his access to and familiarity with the Vietnamese style of doing business.

Even so, the CIA considered him an unstable commodity and sent him back to Washington. But he soon managed to return as part of an elite 10-man counterinsurgency team under Gen. Lansdale which also included Daniel Ellsberg, then still a war hawk.

It was Conein's past association with Ellsberg and his involvement in Diem's overthrow that brought him to the attention of the White House in 1971. His contact was E. Howard Hunt, an OSS colleague in World War II. Hunt had just begun working with Charles Colson, who was intent both on destroying Ellsberg's reputation and discrediting President Kennedy (and thus Sen. Edward Kennedy, then thought Nixon's most formidable political rival). One of Colson's hopes was to cast responsibility for Diem's assassination onto President Kennedy himself.

Conein's career was then in a tailspin. He had left the CIA in 1968 and had persuaded a group of past associates to back him in a surplus war trading venture in Vietnam. By 1970 he had lost all of his and his investors' money and was back in Washington, drinking heavily and without much hope for the future. It was at this point that he was recruited by Howard Hunt.

Conein didn't offer anything of interest to help the White House undermine Ellsberg's reputation but he quickly ingratiated himself with Colson by providing NBC with an interview on the Saigon coup that tied the Kennedy administration far closer (in knowledge, at least) to that bloody event than before.

With this entre, he was soon asked to give his opinion on how Bud Krogh and his crew of eager young lawyers working with the Plumbers in Room 16 might go about waging the campaign against drugs just launched by the President.

Operation Diamond

IT IS GENERALLY assumed that the roots of Watergate are to be found in the creation of the Plumbers to investigate national security leaks. But it was Nixon's desperate drive against the country's drug epidemic which disclosed to his political operatives what secret resources were available for their use and how to tap them.

To the new President, the country in 1969 seemed to be dissolving irretrievably into disorder. Drugs may only have been a symptom of a deeper ailment, but seen from the White House they were the critical problem from which so many other troubles flowed.

Nixon was so adamant about cutting off the poison that in 1971 he declared drugs the country's number one problem and appointed Egil Krogh as his personal aide to direct a federal war against narcotics directly from

the White House.

By the time Conein appeared, Krogh and his young aides were desperate to come up with results for their demanding chief. They had concluded that conventional approaches to drug enforcement were useless to deal with the realities of the international narcotics trade. The problems were everywhere — not the least being that foreign governments, or at least high foreign officials, were themselves so often part of the trafficking.

Krogh's staff was equally frustrated by the reluctance of the FBI and particularly the CIA to join it. J. Edgar Hoover had known that drugs would be a corrupting influence on his agents and kept out of it. The CIA was every bit as reluctant. From Thailand to Turkey to the Caribbean, those same people smuggling drugs were also useful sources of information on the flow of weapons, revolution and international intrigue. The federal drug effort asked that these traffickers be put out of business; the CIA wanted to maintain flexibility to gather intelligence. Conein, then, was just the man Krogh and his aides were looking for: a man of the world — albeit a very special world — who understood the other side and knew how to fight it.

It is uncertain precisely what part Conein played in the ensuing White House programs; it can only be pointed out that some of them were so sensitive that they required the approval of Henry Kissinger's 40 Committee; others appear to have stretched so far over the boundaries of legality that they were undertaken in total secrecy.

One of these was Operation Diamond, the elaborate clandestine organization that Bernard Barker was organizing in Miami for Howard Hunt. Barker recruited almost 200 former CIA Cuban agents and organized them into specialized units for future operations. They included intelligence and counterintelligence groups and a street-fighting arm, Cubans who had brawled for the Agency at Communist and anti-Communist rallies across Latin America. And there was a particularly sensitive sector known as the Action Teams — an old CIA term for units with paramilitary skills including demolition and assassination.

Barker says that Hunt and G. Gordon Liddy talked about a number of other operations being organized at that time for similar purposes — Ruby, Opal, Crystal, Sapphire. Much later he was told that they were part of a larger, White House-coordinated program called Gemstone. Much of what Liddy would ultimately propose to John Mitchell in his famous \$1 million plan of political subversion was taken from the Diamond plan that Barker drafted. Hunt assured Barker that the action squads would ultimately be turned against Fidel Castro; in the meantime, they would be used in the presidential campaign and then as special soldiers in the international drug war.

Watergate, one might think, should have called a halt to such extralegal plans for narcotics enforcement; instead it seems that the President merely put a bureaucratic face on a guerrilla war. Immediately after the break-in, John Ehrlichman and Krogh arranged for Conein to be transferred out of the White House to a consulting job with the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. Then, a year later, on July 1, 1973, Nixon consolidated all of the previously quarrelling bureaucracies dealing with narcotics into the Drug Enforcement Administration; and in November, attracting little attention in a city obsessed with talk of impeachment, Lucien Conein was appointed head of DEA's newly formed Special Operations Branch: his job, to create worldwide intelligence networks — both inside and outside the United States — to identify and ultimately to put a stop to the work of the major drug traffickers.

"TIL TELL YOU ANYTHING"

MORE THAN ONE CIA official's bewilderment has been borrowed on a term when he learned that Lucien Conein had been given a supervisory position over narcotics. "God save the girl," said Oscar da Silva, who was Co-

nein's boss as Saigon station chief after the Diem assassination. "You've got to start with the premise that Lou Conein is crazy. He worked for me in Vietnam, if work is the word. He was certifiable at that point, I think." But he was useful: "The Agency does not deal with vicars of the church exclusively. We have all kinds of villains and rogues involved as well as heroes. You've got Lou Coneins and a whole lot of other people who serve their purpose. And within reason, if you keep them under control, people like him can do things other people cannot do. And that's how they survive..."

On a slow day, Conein is often found at Tony's or the Class Reunion bar and restaurant, a few blocks from DEA's offices, drinking beer and telling stories with a bunch of old OSS, CIA and DEA friends. Conein talks only occasionally but dominates these gatherings. He sits all but motionless save for his compulsive smoking and quaffing from a beer bottle that looks quite small in his thick paw. He has the look of a graying grizzly bear, but a better image might be that of a gnarled tree that has been struck more than once by lightning and has survived. You're sure there would be scars all over his body, if you were to want to look. Two fingers are missing, lost no doubt in some far-off land; the others seem clawed.

Conein does not mind questions from reporters. On this occasion, he growls menacingly that he has been on to his visitor's inquiries about him. He then gives his stock prefatory remark: "I'll tell you anything you want to hear but it's probably not the truth."

Even with this unusual qualification, whatever the chief of DEA's Special Operations Branch says on the subject of drugs is necessarily of interest, particularly when he starts off with the flat declaration that he would never dream of mounting operations against one of the chief sources of narcotics traffic — the Corsicans. "You can get killed that way," he explains. "I will not talk about the Corsicans, period. I happen to be a member of the Corsican Brotherhood."

"Let me tell you something," he goes on in a voice that makes you strain to listen. "When the Sicilians put out a contract, it's usually limited to the continental United States or maybe Canada or Mexico, but with the Corsicans it's international. They'll go anywhere. There's an old Corsican proverb: 'If you want revenge and you act within 20 years, you're acting in haste.' It wouldn't just be me. They'd take it out on my children and maybe even some grandchildren. This is the code."

Amazingly he adds that he would also be wary of running operations against the CIA's old Cuban agents in Miami, a number of whom have gone into the drug trade. He compares them with the Corsicans, whose effectiveness he attributes to their training and experience with the French intelligence services: "The Cubans have received all the tradecraft from the Agency. If they could get into Cuba to raise hell, they can sure as hell get into the U.S. with drugs."

The problem in trying to move against such adversaries, he explains, is that "we have no cover as far as breaking laws and after this damn Church Committee we'll have even less. You can't do it because 12 or 13 years later maybe you'll have to stand up there with your balls exposed."

Drinking beer with Lou Conein, one is given the impression of a man who knows too much about the ways of the world to bother with trying to stop the unstoppable. Readily he agrees with a suggestion that there is simply too much money to be made in the drug trade for governments to be able to curtail it. A pretty teenage girl in a short red skirt comes by asking for directions and Conein adopts a philosophical tone. He talks of living every day as fully as you can. "I figure I've got 4,000 more breads to chew," he says as he orders another beer, and another lady would anyone want to use drugs anyway when there's still that beer to be drunk?

It is difficult not to be charmed by this legendary rogue and it is hard not to become disturbed by misleading or even downright wrong when he begins by telling you not to believe anything he says. But the alleg-

tions about his activities at DEA are deadly serious.

Recruits From CIA

THE CREATION of Conein's Special Operations Branch stemmed from the Nixon administration's insistence that DEA move away from its "buy and bust" approach, which yielded only small-time traffickers, and create a CIA-styled intelligence capability to identify and then eliminate the major suppliers. There would be a new intelligence service parallel to the traditional Enforcement Division. The man assigned to run the new division, George Belk, was a long-time Federal Bureau of Narcotics veteran whose tough drug enforcement operation in Detroit had caused his office to inherit the Detroit Mafia's old nickname, the "Purple Gang." Belk was enthusiastic to a fault, but he had no experience in intelligence and thus relied heavily on Conein for guidance in creating what he hoped would become an intelligence empire.

The initial problem was that none of the personnel available were trained to organize and run professional intelligence operations. A number of retired or active CIA men had been recruited in 1972 and 1973 — the figure may now run as high as 100. But none of these original recruits were operatives; they were analysts or functionaries. What Belk and Conein wanted were men capable of establishing intelligence nets to cover entire regions of the world and they asked the CIA if it could spare any of its operatives. Conein wanted about 50 but settled for 12.

The Agency was more than happy to provide DEA with some of its men, for it very much wanted to get out of the narcotics work forced on it by the White House. The CIA was then being drastically cut back and when word was spread of the opportunities for advancement with the new drug agency a number of operatives were interested. The first recruits were told they would be sent overseas with the approximate responsibility of a station chief. Of the 12 accepted none had known Conein. They all transferred expecting a quick rise to the top of a new and growing service; all soon bitterly regretted the move.

Their problems began immediately as most DEA officials resented and suspected the 12 new men before they had even arrived. Two years before, the chief of BNDD had been so distressed by his agency's corruption that he had the CIA detail him 19 agents to ferret it out. Their subsequent success alienated them from many at DEA and even managed to cast suspicion over the other CIA veterans who joined the new drug agency.

All kinds of problems flowed from the arrival of Conein's recruits in early 1974. The main difficulty stemmed from the bitter attempts of the enforcement division to sabotage the growth of the new intelligence branch. Enforcement even tried to get the operatives assigned to its division. Conein finally directed his men not to come to the DEA office until the matter was straightened out. He had them go instead to a "safe house" he had acquired for DEA through an old OSS and CIA friend.

A safe house is the CIA's name for a place where agents can go in secret: this one was a two-story apartment in the La Salle building at 1028 Connecticut Ave. NW, half a block from the Mayflower Hotel. Conein told his men that the apartment had formerly been operated by the CIA. Actually — as we shall see later — its identity is more mysterious than that.

It was reportedly in this apartment that Conein and his deputy, Searl (Bud) Frank, examined the B. R. Fox assassination devices. Reporters accepted Conein's assurances that he had not expected to be shown the equipment. But according to two senior DEA officials, Conein knew precisely what B. R. Fox's representatives planned to show him that day. More important, they claim that he had already developed plans to employ them.

"When you get down to it," explained one of the officials, "Conein was organizing an assassination program. He was frustrated by the big-time operators who were

just too insulated to get to . . . He felt we couldn't win, the way things were going."

According to these officials, meetings were held to decide whom to target and what method of assassination to employ. Conein then assigned the task to three of the former CIA operatives detailed to the Connecticut Avenue safe house.

The men he chose were former paramilitary case officers with the Agency's Special Operations Division who had run commando raids into North Vietnam. The DEA officials described them as first-generation Americans, "very young and patriotic and a little naive. They were troubled by the assignment but they trusted Conein because he had been with the CIA. They counted on him not to put them in a compromising situation."

The program was to begin in Mexico. Conein reportedly had his men prepare operational plans to determine the feasibility of killing a number of Mexican traffickers with sophisticated exploding devices. For several months in 1974 the three, working directly under Conein, traveled back and forth to Mexico. After preparing their initial plans he had them identify a number of Mexicans to be recruited to carry out the actual murders.

According to these accounts, at least one Mexican was recruited as an assassination agent. The man had grown up in a border town with a number of major traffickers and had become a DEA informant after being arrested on a drug charge. In exchange for murdering his old friends, the DEA agreed to help him become a legal resident of the United States.

The alleged plan was apparently ready to begin by the beginning of 1975 when Sen. Weicker made his public charge. One of the operatives had already questioned Conein on the legality of his assignment. Now, all three reportedly rebelled and told Conein they would not participate any further.

"Those three have since been dispatched to the four winds, to jobs far from Washington," said one of the DEA officials. "They are bitter about how they were used and very afraid of repercussions."

Conein, in a burst of four-letter words, denied any involvement in such a program. "That is a big — lie. That is built —" He said he knew who the sources were and that they were the ones who should be investigated, but he refused to identify them or to offer any reason why they should not be believed. "Go ahead and print it," he said twice. "I don't care." One reason he offered to rebut the story was that he never had anything to do with any programs in Mexico.

Conein's supervisor, George Belk, now retired, offered a different version of Conein's activities. He said that Conein and several of his agents from the Connecticut Avenue safe house had been working on a program involving Mexico in 1974. But he said he did not know of any plan for DEA to assassinate anyone. "We were trying to determine ways and means by which they [the major drug traffickers] could be immobilized by the Mexican government. . . . The idea was to identify the Mexicans who were known to be operating . . . to collect intelligence to be passed on to the attorney general's office for action by their government." He stressed that there was no extralegal activity taking place.

When asked once again about the reported assassination program, Belk replied: "That may have been somebody's concept but nothing ever came of it. As a matter of fact, nothing ever happened."

Wer Bell and Vesco

APPARENTLY CONEIN'S program did not result in any deaths but its implications become even more provocative when his relationship to the manufacturer of the exploding devices is considered. News accounts describe the B. R. Fox Co. as a short-lived firm run out of an Alexandria home by an electronics engineer and a housewife. There was no explanation as to why Conein had chosen to buy sophisticated wiretapping equipment from such an obscure firm.

The explanation is to be found in the identity of the

actual figure behind the B. R. Fox Co. and its arrangements with Conein — Mitchell Livingston Wer Bell III. Wer Bell is one of the world's most successful inventors and manufacturers of silencers and such exotic lethal weapons as a cigar that fires a single bullet and a swagger stick that doubles as a rocket launcher. But, most important in this context, he is one of Conein's old OSS friends and, according to staff members on the Senate Permanent Investigations Subcommittee, a business partner of Conein's at least as recently as 1974.

In an interview, Wer Bell disarmingly acknowledged a recent business relationship with Conein. Further, he proudly asserted that he had worked with Conein to provide DEA with assassination devices and that the B. R. Fox Co. had even shared the same duplex apartment used by the DEA operatives as a safe house. (This fact is confirmed by the La Salle building's records.)

Conein's apparent use of Wer Bell for DEA operations seems all but incredible when the arms manufacturer's other activities in 1974 are taken into account. That spring, while Conein was readying his assassination program, Wer Bell was negotiating a bizarre arms deal with Robert Vesco, the fugitive swindler in Costa Rica. Wer Bell originally agreed to sell Vesco his entire stock of 2,000 silenced machine guns. But he was unable to get an export license and so the two reached a tentative agreement to build an Ingram submachine gun factory in Costa Rica. (The Ingram is the same weapon featured in the opening scenes of "Three Days of the Condor.")

These dealings were sufficiently menacing to draw the interest of Sen. Henry Jackson's Permanent Investigations Subcommittee. Jackson observed that Wer Bell's Ingrams are not the "normal military defense weapons. This is the kind of weapon . . . used for covert purposes . . . shall we say, mini-revolutions or coups or what have you."

Along with Wer Bell's arms deal, the Jackson subcommittee also investigated Vesco's "penetration" of the federal bureaucracy, and particularly the Drug Enforcement Administration. Here it found that the DEA had all but killed a promising investigation into charges by a government informer that Vesco was trafficking in heroin, and that it had then "lost" most of Vesco's file. Even more suspicious was the discovery that two of the narcotics agency's wiretap specialists had flown from Los Angeles to New Jersey to sweep Vesco's home and office for possible bugs.

The further the committee probed the entangling relations of Vesco, Wer Bell, Conein and the DEA, the

more questions were raised. For one thing, Wer Bell was indicted in 1974, charged with conspiracy to smuggle large quantities of marijuana into the country, in a case yet to come to trial. The staff wanted to know the precise nature of his relationship with Conein.

They had already subpoenaed Conein, Belk and others to testify when suddenly the hearings were cancelled. If the staff members know why, they don't explain; but they also don't conceal their frustration. The decision was not theirs.

A Pandora's Box

THE RECENT congressional investigations into U.S. intelligence activities did not examine narcotics operations, and the President's new guidelines for all other intelligence agencies do not even address themselves to DEA operations. DEA is left more or less alone through its Inspection Division to regulate itself. It is hard to expect too much from this check: the man scheduled to be appointed to the number two spot in Inspection, Bud Frank, is Conein's former deputy. He was on hand that day two years ago to review the exploding devices.

A few months ago, the Justice Department, of which DEA is a branch, conducted an investigation into some of Conein's other operations (see box on opposite page). Two attorneys were assigned the task. After reading the report of their findings, the assistant attorney general concerned instructed them to tone down their conclusions. The attenuated final version was then attached to a general report on the intelligence division and strictly limited to three copies; one each for the attorney general, the assistant attorney general, and for Peter Bensinger, DEA's new administrator.

It is understandable that no administration would wish to take on Col. Conein. It is said that his closet is filled with skeletons from his days with the CIA, and that he has a lethal knowledge of where a great number of other bodies are buried.

But this alone does not explain the silence of the Ford Justice Department. It is unlikely that any investigation of Conein could help but result in a larger exploration of other past and present narcotics efforts and it would inevitably have to enter into the tangled world of Wer Bell and Vesco.

More than likely no one in the Ford administration even knew of Conein's presence at DEA — or knew anything about his activities — until recently. By now it probably knows more than it would prefer — apparently enough to avoid opening this potential Pandora's box in the midst of an election year.

THE WASHINGTON POST Sunday, June 13, 1976

The Informant

Who Jumped Bail

LUCIEN CONEIN'S reported effort to establish an assassination program at the Drug Enforcement Administration was apparently frustrated before it could be tried out. But this program was perhaps only the most direct tactic designed for use in the drug war and the temporary setback did not deter him from pursuing other equally unconventional undertakings. One of the first and largest of these was the anomalous series of secret operations in South Florida code-named Deacon 1.

Deacon 1 was a response to DEA's discovery that the main drug traf-

fickers in Southern Florida — particularly in cocaine — were Cuban exiles. This was a new challenge, for many of these opponents had been professionally trained in exfiltration and infiltration during the CIA's five-year secret war against Cuba in the early 1960s. The DEA found itself helpless against such experienced professionals. What really alarmed the drug agency was the discovery that some of these former CIA men were putting their old counterintelligence training to work against them. "We found that if we were following someone, someone was following us," explained a DEA

official in Miami. "The Cubans were actually counter-surveilling us. They were just beating the pants off us."

The obvious solution to the problem was for DEA to hire its own Cuban exiles; hence Deacon 1, staffed exclusively by former CIA men. Deacon 1 was to be a prototype of the kind of CIA-Far East operation that Conein planned to initiate throughout the world. Three full-time DEA officials — all with CIA backgrounds — were assigned to direct a net of about 20 highly experienced Cubans. From the beginning, the program was kept secret, even from most of the officials in Conein's division. He ran it personally out of his office in Washington, passing orders through a Cuban veteran of the CIA who chummed back and forth to Miami.

The drug world that narcotics officials are called upon to control deals in huge sums of money and is characterized by a total lack of scruples

about corrupting or killing anyone who gets in the way of the traffickers. It is no wonder that government narcotics officials so often turn for assistance to figures as loathsome as the trade itself.

An argument can be made that no other kind of person can safely or effectively operate in such an environment. But just as a man is affected by the company he keeps, so too are drug officials and their programs twisted by the informants they employ. The story of Carlos Hernandez Rumbaut, one of Deacon 1's informants, shows how far just one such alliance can go.

LIKE MOST of the Cubans in Deacon 1, Carlos Hernandez had been at the Bay of Pigs. Apparently he first came to the attention of the old Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) when he was arrested in Mobile in 1969 with 467 pounds of marijuana which he said he was going to sell in Miami. His trial, scheduled for April, 1971, was postponed when the judge determined that his mental state was disturbed.

With this curriculum vitae the BNDD regional office at Miami saw fit the following month to enlist him as a "Class 1 cooperating individual." He provided some useful information; in return, the bureau not only paid him \$150 but attempted to intercede on his behalf with the Alabama authorities. Unmoved, they jailed him pending a new trial. BNDD was thus forced to put Hernandez on an "inactive cooperating individual status."

He was then convicted and sentenced to 15 years. Not even this cooled the Miami office's ardor for Hernandez. He appealed but didn't have enough money to post his \$25,000 bond. Deacon 1's chief agent and Conein's right-hand man on the project solved the problem by arranging for one of Deacon 1's informants, a CIA veteran and a successful Cuban jeweler in Miami, to lend Hernandez \$12,500. He assured the jeweler that DEA was in effect guaranteeing the loan. As soon as Hernandez was released from jail, the Miami office put him back on active

status.

At this point Hernandez had had enough of U.S. justice and fled to Costa Rica, where the government accorded his drug experience a very different recognition. Within weeks he was made an honorary member of the Costa Rican Narcotics Division, then promoted to captain and second in command by order of then President Jose Figueres. Soon after, he became Figueres' bodyguard.

All of this information comes from Hernandez' confidential DEA file, which includes CIA reports on Hernandez' conduct as a Costa Rican narcotics officer. One of these identifies him and a relative of President Figueres as members of a death squad that executed at least one narcotics trafficker in early 1973 and had sworn to kill more (a solution to the drug problem eerily reminiscent of the reported assassination program proposed by Conein for Mexico).

Hernandez' assassination effort as well as his other shady activities prompted U.S. Ambassador Viron P. Vaky to insist in May, 1973, that DEA discontinue its relationship with its informant. But Hernandez was now, for all practical purposes, the Costa Rican narcotics division and the DEA, loath to give up so strategically placed an asset, disregarded the ambassador's directive. In October, 1973, the Alabama courts denied Hernandez' appeal.

HERNANDEZ HAD no intention of returning to the United States to go to jail. Even so, the matter might simply have faded away were it not for the understandable anger of the Deacon 1 informant who had guaranteed half of Hernandez' bail. The jeweler, unwilling to forfeit his \$12,500, demanded that Hernandez make good his loss, and threatened to track him to Costa Rica if he didn't.

Hernandez, meanwhile, was still working with DEA, now in conjunction with its regional office in Mexico City. He told the drug agency that the American government was "treacherous" and he threatened to "eliminate" anyone who attempted to come after him. The embassy in Costa Rica became understandably nervous and asked DEA to resolve

the dispute quietly. A special agent was dispatched to San Jose to soothe Hernandez. In a conciliatory mood, Hernandez at least agreed not to harm any American narcotics official.

The DEA's machinations to protect Hernandez were now forced to widen. DEA's New Orleans regional director was sent to persuade the attorney general of Alabama and the district attorney in Mobile to waive the appeal bond forfeiture. But the director's efforts angered the local prosecutor, Randy Butler, who not only refused to cooperate but made Hernandez an issue in his campaign, and threatened to tell the world if DEA made any further attempt to keep him out of jail.

And so in late 1973 Carlos Hernandez — Bay of Pigs veteran, convicted drug smuggler, DEA informant, Costa Rican narcotics ace, private executioner and presidential bodyguard — was preparing to become an international incident, ready to go off right in the middle of the post-Watergate furor, the moment the jeweler set foot in Costa Rica.

There was no way to appeal to the Costa Rican government for help. There was an election coming up but Hernandez' position in the country's narcotics division was so strong that no one felt he could be dislodged.

Something had to be done quickly. Conein's supervisor, George Belk, decided to pay the jeweler \$12,500 by dramatically increasing his monthly cash payments as an informant over the next year.

It would appear to have been a dangerous risk for Belk to authorize the payments, since they indirectly assisted a fugitive from a drug case. But Belk, when contacted, said there was nothing wrong with this. "Hernandez was a source at the time." But he "didn't work for me, he was working for the Costa Ricans. The guy who was working for us, who had provided the bond money, was the crux of the problem."

Meanwhile, one senior DEA official reports that Hernandez has twice since entered the United States, the proud bearer of an American diplomatic passport.

—GEORGE CRILE III

THE WASHINGTON POST/PARADE
20 June 1976

CIA Popularity

A few years ago, when young Americans were dying in Vietnam, CIA recruiters were banned from many major university campuses. Today they are more than welcome, will probably hire this year some 700 clerical employees and 400 professionals.

The new student interest in joining the Central Intelligence Agency is undoubtedly the result of the narrowing job market. Students now want job and career security. They also regard intelligence work as adventurous.

Such films as "Three Days of the Condor" and "All the President's Men," both starring Robert Redford, have glamorized intelligence with a romance which doesn't necessarily apply to it but seems intriguing to the young.

BALTIMORE SUN
8 June 1976

Cuba denies tie to death of Kennedy

Miami (AP)—Cuba's Prime Minister Fidel Castro categorically denies his government had anything to do with the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

But Mr. Castro has implied that he will reply in kind to further terrorist attacks on Cuban property or diplomats overseas.

In a speech reported over Havana radio yesterday, Mr. Castro also said Cuban combat troops are being "gradually withdrawn" from Angola but that civilian personnel are being sent to the newly independent African nation.

Speaking in the context of terrorism and what he said were attempts to kill him and other Cuban leaders in the early days of the Cuban revolution, Mr. Castro said about the Kennedy murder:

"Some imply that such an action could have been retaliation by the Cuban revolution for the actions carried out against the lives of our leaders at that time. In truth, we reiterate that never has the Cuban revolution utilized terrorism.

"I can categorically affirm that the Cuban revolution never had the most minor participation in the death of the President of the United States, John Kennedy."

NEW YORK TIMES
17 JUN 1976

JUDGE SAID TO BAR C.I.A. FILE DISPOSAL

WASHINGTON, June 15 (UPI)—A Federal judge has ordered the Central Intelligence Agency not to destroy files gathered on thousands of Americans at the direction of Presidents Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard M. Nixon, the American Civil Liberties Union said Tuesday.

A Senate committee staff report said last month that the agency had compiled the information on orders from the two Presidents, who feared extensive foreign influence on domestic unrest in the late 1960s and early '70s.

The A.C.L.U. said that Federal District Judge June Green, in an order dated June 11, had told George Bush, Director of Central Intelligence, to protect the files pending outcome of a civil suit demanding publication of material.

The civil rights group is asking that every American whose name and activities were filed by the agency be so informed and the information be released to them.

Judge Green ordered Mr.

DAILY TELEGRAPH, London
12 June 1976

SATURDAY COLUMN

Last testament of a hero

ROBERT CONQUEST defends Col
Penkovsky, Russian dissident who

faced death to warn the West

amounted, in effect, to an unconvincing attempt to read Col Penkovsky's mind, always a risky procedure. He argued that the colonel "would not," typing dangerously away, have wasted time on non-espionage material. But Penkovsky not only clearly wanted to report everything he, thought, helpful or significant, but was also deeply concerned with writing his testament both personal and ideological. Moreover, much of the material seems, in any case, to have been dictated in London rather than typed in Moscow. This was duly pointed out, and there the matter rested, until a couple of months ago, the U.S. Senate Committee on Intelligence presented its report.

On this, and on this alone, the current critics rely. Readers will be surprised to learn that the report contains no assertion of the unauthenticity of the papers.

It attacks the CIA at some length for wickedly misleading the publisher by passing the material through an intermediary. In the course of all this, the report remarks in passing, in a muddled and illiterate fashion, that the book had been prepared and written by witting CIA assets who drew on actual case materials.

This rather snide way of putting the rather obvious fact that the papers had been edited by someone in the CIA's confidence rather than someone they didn't trust an inch, was instantly greeted—in the *Times* and *Washington Post*—as proving the papers were forged: the *Times* used the word "fabricated," the *Post* went to the length of quoting approvingly a Soviet description: "coarse fraud, a mixture of provocative invention and anti-Soviet slander"—a fair indication of the comparative intensity of anti-CIA mania in the two countries.

The Senate Committee phrase could indeed be taken to imply forgery. But if it had really detected forgery, it would hardly have left it as an ambiguous aside in an assault on the CIA for a much lesser matter, but would have attacked it ferociously in detail, at length with "proofs," in the spirit of the

whole report. If anything, the formulation, quite to the contrary, implies admission at least partial or basic authenticity. It should be added indeed, that an assertion by the Committee does not anyhow quite carry the weight of infallibility implied: for example Gen Goodpaster and others pointed out in the *New York Times* a nasty error about Eisenhower which the committee, nevertheless did not scruple to include in its final report. In fact, it is quite clear that all the alleged points made against the work are without substance.

This does not prove the authenticity of every single sentence in the book, which must await the CIA making the documents available, or at any rate stating its position clearly. That is, if the timid creature has regained enough nerve to stick its head out of the hole into which raving politicians and journalists have driven it with sticks and stones. Meanwhile, it has been a rare experience to see journalists—and American journalists—arguing that the (rather perfunctory) concealment of a source or method of transmission should be thought to invalidate a document. Yet this is quite typical of the manic note to be found in a certain type of journalism, with its insistence that, on matters decided by Fourth Estate caprice, it is the duty of us peasants to accept the verdict.

But those whose business it has been to study with care complex issues which any Pulitzer person believes himself divinely empowered to master in 10 minutes flat, do have a duty to set the record straight, however tedious and time-consuming we may find this. The trouble is, as Gibbon pointed out, that an error consisting of a single line may take several pages to refute. I have here been able to do no more than skim the large pool of evidence and argument which exists in favour of the general authenticity of the *Penkovsky Papers*, and their status as a last message and testament from a brave and intelligent man who knew totalitarianism, and hated what he knew.

ONE of the typical horrors of our time is the instant journalist who suddenly pronounces *ex cathedra* on some problem which requires a good deal of knowledge he has not got. The public, more modest, refrains from producing its own uninstructed opinion out of nothing and accepts what it has been told, or at least tends to.

Misunderstandings or misinterpretations, the product of a slapdash arrogance, may indeed be argued against or exposed. But, over the short run at any rate, the advantage is with the first and noisiest assertion.

The most recent example is the brouhaha about the *Penkovsky Papers*. It will be remembered that in the early 'sixties the Soviet Col Penkovsky, disgusted by the Soviet order and horrified by the danger it presented to the world, approached the West's intelligence services—and provided them with absolutely crucial information in the critical days leading up to the Cuban missile crisis of 1963. Though able to visit London, he did not remain but went back to his dangerous work, out of a sense of duty. He was eventually caught and executed.

Shortly afterwards a book was published in the West under the title the "*Penkovsky Papers*." Though their provenance was lightly disguised, it was clear that they represented those sections of Penkovsky's reports which were not of intelligence significance. They presented a striking picture of Soviet society seen through the eyes of a disillusioned member of the privileged class. They were accepted as genuine by virtually all students except Mr Victor Zorza who, from supposed internal evidence, alleged that they were faked by the CIA. His arguments were two-fold—particular and general.

The particulars were supposed to be cumulative. But since each was without substance, they did not, in fact, accumulate. To take a perfectly typical and fair example: Penkovsky had described Churayev as one of the leaders of the Communist party of the Russian Republic. Zorza pointed out that there was no separate Communist party of the republic. No, but there was a Communist party bureau, of which Churayev was vice-chairman.

A forger, one may feel, might have stuck to pettifoggery, "accuracy" while a Russian's hurried report typically does not. And, incidentally, the fact of the Penkovsky account of Soviet high life being mainly concerned with a few second-rank figures unknown to the Western public tends also to tell against the ideas of a sensationalist fake.

Zorza's general comments

Bush to notify his agency's personnel not to destroy the documents and computer records.

The judge, in effect, countermanded a recommendation in the Rockefeller Commission report on the C.I.A. last year that the files, "which have no foreign intelligence value, should be destroyed by the agency at the conclusion of the current Congressional investigations or as soon thereafter as permitted by law."

WASHINGTON POST
17 JUN 1976

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

A Covert Operation That Failed

House Speaker Carl Albert was made the agent of an undercover attempt by the Nixon administration in late 1971 to destroy the effectiveness of a Greek expatriate whose lobbying against the military dictatorship in Athens infuriated the Nixon high command.

This effort failed only because top officials in the State Department found out about it. They ordered withdrawal of a malicious, unsigned memorandum that had been sent to Albert and issued a private apology to the designated victim, Elias Demetracopoulos. The memorandum on plain white paper was drafted by State and Central Intelligence Agency bureaucrats.

The episode, reminiscent of other covert political operations in the 1971-1972 (Nixon White House), can now be brought to light because Albert has announced his decision not to run for reelection. Those involved refused to discuss the affair earlier because of possible reprisals from the office of the Speaker, the third highest government official.

The failed effort involved, directly or indirectly, White House legal counsel John Dean, U.S. Ambassador Henry Tasca in Athens, an implacable foe of Demetracopoulos, Nixon fund-raiser and confidant Thomas Pappas, a rich Greek-American with intimate ties to the military junta and who was under attack by Demetracopoulos, and lesser figures.

For the Nixon White House, it ended on Dec. 29, 1971, shortly after the mem-

orandum was ordered withdrawn. On that day, a highly unusual, written explanation of the aborted effort, said by White House operatives to have been unsigned, was sent directly to Dean in the White House from the State Department. It reviewed the campaign against Demetracopoulos and stated that, no matter how controversial he was, no case could be made against him. Moreover, it warned that the intended victim was considering a libel suit against the U.S. government for the anonymous memorandum, which could prove extremely embarrassing.

For Demetracopoulos, however, the affair did not end until he had extracted a grudging letter from Albert just seven months later. The Speaker told Demetracopoulos that "a routine inquiry (to the State Department) by a member of my staff" had triggered the memorandum. Albert said his office had sought the background information because Albert had been informed "you might be seeking an appointment at some future date."

In fact, Demetracopoulos first met Albert in the mid-1950s. He had seen him many times between then and December 1971, and had brought high parliamentary leaders of Greece, banished from office during the junta's rule, to the Speaker's office to meet Albert.

Thus, Albert was the victim of a set-up by the administration, which wanted the most prestigious congressional figure possible to make the re-

quest for background information on Demetracopoulos. When he or his staff complied, the memorandum calculated to destroy the effectiveness of Demetracopoulos was quickly sent to Capitol Hill. The clear purpose: to have it widely distributed, under the imprimatur of the Speaker.

Two copies of the memorandum were taken to the House, one for Albert, the other for the House International Relations Committee, which had not asked for it but where it was assumed there would be widespread distribution. A committee staffer, shocked by the anonymous document, gave it only to Rep. Benjamin Rosenthal of New York, chairman of the European subcommittee.

Similarly shocked, Rosenthal asked then Congressional Assistant Secretary of State David Abshire why the State Department would lend itself to anonymous charges against Demetracopoulos that were probably libelous and circulate them on Capitol Hill. Abshire, caught unaware, discussed the matter with then Deputy Under Secretary of State William B. Macomber and they immediately ordered the two copies of the memorandum retrieved.

On Jan. 31, Abshire wrote Demetracopoulos what amounted to an unusual official apology. The man who ran congressional affairs for the State Department wrote that he had not "seen, approved or even heard of the paper prior to its very limited distribution" and that the department could not stand behind "a memorandum containing questionable material."

The last chapter in this plot against the man who had come to be regarded as a dangerous gadfly by Mr. Nixon's advisers was the most revealing: the report to John Dean, recipient of so many undercover reports in those days of the White House plumbers, explaining why this particular plot has failed.

NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, JUNE 14, 1976

W. Harvey, C.I.A. Aide, Dead; Linked to Anti-Castro Plotting

William K. Harvey, reportedly the head of a special Central Intelligence Agency group set up in the 1960's to plan the removal of foreign leaders by means including assassination, died of a heart attack last Wednesday in an Indianapolis hospital.

Mr. Harvey, who was 60 years old, was said to have been in charge of the agency's efforts against Prime Minister Fidel Castro of Cuba. He was among 10 agents whose identities were disclosed by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence after an investigation in 1975 of alleged assassination plots by the United States.

William E. Colby, then Director of Central Intelligence, had argued that disclosure of the names of agents would put them in jeopardy of retaliation by "irrational groups."

Mr. Harvey testified before the Senate committee that he had been told by superiors that the Castro assassination plot had been approved at the highest levels of the government, and that he had discussed the efforts with his immediate superior, Richard Helms, who later became director of the agency.

Mr. Harvey moved to Indianapolis in 1969 after retiring from the agency, where he had worked for 22 years. He worked for the Federal Bureau of Investigation from 1940 to 1947.

At the time of his death, Mr. Harvey was law editor for Bobbs-Merrill Publishing Company.

He was buried Saturday at South Cemetery in Danville, just west of Indianapolis. He is survived by his wife, Clara Grace, a daughter, Sally, and a son, James D. Harvey.

Los Angeles Times

Sat, June 12, 1976

CIA-MISSIONARY CONTACTS CURBED

WASHINGTON (UPI)—The CIA has agreed not to seek intelligence information from U.S. missionaries stationed abroad but may continue to contact such missionaries in the United States, according to CIA Director George Bush.

Bush, in a series of letters and meetings with Sen. Mark O. Hatfield (R-Ore.), also has agreed to expand the definition of missionary to include all Americans abroad who are performing tasks involving preaching, teaching, healing and proselytizing, even if they are not technically controlled by denominational or ecumenical groups "provided their ultimate sponsorship comes from religious organizations."

In return, Hatfield has agreed that he would not proceed with legislation he has introduced which would legislate a total ban on CIA-missionary contact.

The correspondence was made public in the current issue of Sojourners Magazine, an evangelical monthly.

The subject first surfaced last December when Hatfield revealed that the intelligence agency had used American missionaries and had no intention of ending the practice. Hatfield released letters by former CIA Director William Colby and White House counsel Philip Buchen, speaking for President Ford, defending the practice.

The Buchen-Colby responses resulted in a storm of protest across the spectrum of U.S. religious thought, with many denominations urging prohibitive legislation and some saying any missionary personnel who cooperated with the spy agency would be dismissed.

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
Friday, June 4, 1976

Insurance Venture Of CIA Produced Awkward Situations

New Light Shed on Problems.
Including Rebuff to Bid for
Acquisition, SEC Inquiry

By DAVID IGNATIUS

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

The Central Intelligence Agency got into the insurance business in 1962. Since then, the insurance business has got the CIA into some awkward predicaments.

The agency's original idea in setting up a complex of insurance companies was to provide a discreet means of paying retirement, disability and death benefits for double agents and other top-secret operatives who couldn't receive regular CIA benefits in the form of U.S. Treasury checks because of possible exposure.

Lawrence R. Houston, who helped create the insurance operation and who directed it until he retired as the agency's general counsel in 1973, said the CIA on several occasions even had to rebuff investors interested in acquiring what appeared to be a healthy insurance operation. Another time, "company" officials had to fend off a Securities and Exchange Commission insider-trading inquiry that touched peripherally on one concern's purchases of a stock. Further complicating matters, these headaches had to be handled publicly by CIA employees who were merely posing as executives and hadn't any independent authority even to sign checks.

These glimpses inside the CIA's insurance complex, which eventually grew to several companies, emerged from an interview with Mr. Houston. While the existence of the \$30 million CIA insurance complex was disclosed in an April report by the Senate Intelligence Committee, Mr. Houston shed new light on the problems of managing the agency's conglomerate.

Mr. Houston declined, however, to name specific companies in the CIA insurance complex, which he believes is serving a "perfectly legitimate and absolutely necessary purpose." He expressed concern that publication of such specific information could result in exposure and "serious harm" for individuals who have received payments through the project.

Two Existing "Shell" Companies

The CIA decided to get into the insurance business after finding itself scurrying around in 1961 to hastily arrange payments to the families of four American pilots shot down over Cuba in the Bay of Pigs incident. The insurance complex was established the next year with help from friendly industry executives and lawyers, who apprised the CIA of two existing "shell" companies and offered advice on how to "flesh them out," Mr. Houston recalled.

While the CIA tries to write contracts with its covert operatives that specify regular employee contributions for pensions and insurance benefits, many of the payments by the insurance complex have taken a more irregular form, Mr. Houston said. For example, when an "uninsured" operative retired or died, it was often necessary to back-date elaborate phony benefit policies and fund them with lump sums from the CIA.

But it's clear that the role of the insurance complex hasn't been limited to providing insurance. The Senate Intelligence report, while approving the general intent of the project, noted cryptically: "The complex also provided a limited amount of support to clandestine operations—specifically for the acquisition of operational real estate and as a conduit for the funding of selected covert activities."

THE WASHINGTON POST Tuesday, June 22, 1976

Jack Anderson and Les Whitten

The CIA's 'Sex Squad'

In contrast to the haphazard sex on Capitol Hill, the Central Intelligence Agency for years has conducted an elaborate and efficient sex operation.

Few national secrets have been more carefully guarded, but the CIA has provided kings, presidents, potentates and magistrates with female companionship. On a lower level, women have been made available to defectors and CIA agents.

Sometimes, the CIA's guests bring their own partners. More often, the agency selects the women from its vice files. The agency also provides "safe houses" where the liaisons can be consummated in protected privacy.

The CIA's sex shop, according to knowledgeable sources, is run by the Office of Security. This division acts primarily as the CIA's internal police force.

Through field offices scattered around the country, the Office of Security maintains close ties with state and local police. In each field office, a "black book" is kept of the males and females who can be safely recruited to entertain the CIA's visitors.

The black books contain names, telephone numbers and details, gleaned largely from local vice squads. In Washington, for example, CIA agents paid regular visits to the police department's vice squad to photograph documents.

The late Deputy Chief Roy E. Blick, who headed the "sex squad" for years, kept exhaustive records on "perverts" and "miscreants" around the country. He had a close, backroom relationship with the CIA, say our sources.

From 1934 to 1974 the sex operation was supervised by security director Harold Osborn.

Each black book entry, according to sources with access to the files, contains some fascinating vital statistics—physical description, measurements, health status and sexual specialties.

This information is used to find sexual partners for princes and potentates, defectors and agents. The congressional investigations of the CIA, however, skirted the sex operation. The

House intelligence committee stumbled on to the information that the CIA once provided an unidentified Middle East monarch with female companions. We have learned that the king was Jordan's Hussein.

It's the CIA's own foreign agents, coming in from "the cold," who make the most use of the "safe houses." When an undercover operative reports back to the United States, he is whisked to a "safe house" and a "case officer" is assigned to watch over him.

The officer is supposed to keep his charge happy and to provide for his needs. If the need should be sexual, the right contact in the Office of Security is called upon.

The CIA uses sex for an even more seamy purpose. As we reported more than a year ago, the agency has used prostitutes to lure foreign diplomats into love traps where their sexual antics were filmed through one-way mirrors. The film was later used to blackmail the foreigners into becoming informants.

In New York, the CIA maintained adjoining efficiency apartments on the sixth floor of a high-rise in Greenwich Village. On the wall of the blackmail apartment was a large painting of two ships. The painting was actually a one-way mirror.

On the other side of the wall, CIA agents could watch the action through the see-through painting and film intimate moments. A Japanese screen, implanted with microphones, provided sound for the blackmail movies.

In San Francisco, the CIA operated a similar apartment equipped with bugging devices, but no observation mirrors. The New York apartment was used from about 1930 to 1965; the San Francisco apartment from the late 1950s to about 1965.

Footnote: We confronted Osborn with the facts about the sex operation. He denied that any such operation was conducted "during my tenure." A CIA spokesman had no comment. Our calls to the Washington police and the Jordanian embassy had not been returned by press time.

Mr. Houston conceded that the insurance company has been used to channel money for covert operations, as a "sterilized funding" device to make the payments difficult to trace. (Most of the covert funding apparently was carried on the books as investment.) But he denied that this was the real reason the complex was created. "If the complex later got into other agency purposes," he said, "it was because it proved itself a useful instrument." He wouldn't elaborate.

Recruited About 50 Businessmen

To help build a cover for the insurance complex of foreign underwriting concerns, based in such places as Bermuda and the Cayman Islands, and domestic investment concerns, the CIA once recruited about 50 businessmen and retired government and military employees as directors for the companies, Mr. Houston said. They were paid \$50 to \$100 a board meeting, with a maximum of four meetings a year. Aware that they were working for the agency, the directors would sometimes be asked to advise on investment portfolio decisions. But Mr. Houston said he supervised every detail of the operation, including management of the investment portfolios, from CIA headquarters

in Langley, Va.

To make the insurance complex believable, it had to show healthy profits. The complex, according to the Senate report, has retained accumulated net earnings of about \$9 million since 1932, with its profit from stock sales topping \$500,000. In managing the portfolio, Mr. Houston apparently was able to finesse the end of the go-go market. By the early 1970s, he said, "we were mainly out of stocks and into time deposits and Eurobonds."

Mr. Houston said he gathered investment tips from "some witting and some unwitting" consultants and friends and agency contacts. All stock purchases were made through regular brokerage firms and, to avoid potential conflicts of interest, he didn't invest in any companies with which the CIA had contractual relationships.

But profits on the stock dealings and other transactions haven't been used as a slush fund to supplement money appropriated for CIA activities by Congress, the lawyer maintained. Money beyond that needed to support the underwriting costs is returned to the U.S. Treasury through various creative procedures, he said.

complex, the CIA sought to operate the companies as normally as possible. This meant, among other things, "laying off" some of its policies to regular commercial insurance concerns in so-called reinsurance transactions. Mr. Houston, however, would quietly notify the chief executives of these companies that they were actually buying spook insurance. The CIA companies also reinsured policies from the commercial concerns, again to maintain appearance of normality.

Sometimes, however, the profit-making, business-as-usual cover proved to be an embarrassingly successful decoy. On several occasions, investors approached CIA employees who nominally headed companies in the insurance complex and suggested that the units looked like good acquisition possibilities. "We simply never let it come to the point of negotiation," Mr. Houston observed.

THE WASHINGTON STAR
20 June 1976

Jefferson wasn't himself that day

N. Rex Collier (Letters, May 26) took you to task for a misleading headline, "How Presidents Johnson and Nixon Pushed CIA to Spy on Us." That was a fair sample of the diligence of headline writers in trying to breathe new life into tired old tales of CIA skulduggery by dressing them up with sexy new labels — often highly imaginative ones. But now I think we have a better one.

On June 9, you headlined a story, "CIA Goal: Drug, Not Kill, Anderson." For one thing, the headline seems to imply that someone was actually thinking about doing away with Mr. Anderson, although nowhere in the story is this suggested. Second, the headline indicates there was a "goal" to drug Mr. Anderson, whereas the story merely says there "was discussion" about it.

And finally, nowhere in the story is there any allegation of CIA involvement. All we have is reference to two "former" CIA employees who were involved, with no suggestion that either had any present connection with the agency.

No doubt when you're No. 2 you have to try harder, but do you have to try that hard? And now that it is the season for quoting Mr. Jefferson, we might recall what he wrote in a letter to John Norvell in 1807:

"The man who never looks into a newspaper is better informed than he who reads them, inasmuch as he who knows nothing is nearer the truth than he whose mind is filled with falsehood and errors."

John M. Maury

Washington, D.C.

(NOTE — Mr. Maury is former CIA legislative counsel and former assistant secretary of defense.)

HOUSTON POST
8 MAY 1976

Public doubts of CIA challenged by Bush

By TERRY KLEIWER
Post Reporter

CIA Director George Bush Friday challenged presumptions the nation lacks confidence in his agency, and he vowed to continue cooperating with congressional groups looking into CIA operations.

"I'm not sure how much confidence is lacking," he told reporters at a news conference at the Rice-Rittenhouse Hotel. "Some things have been wrong . . . but the abuses of the past are in the past."

Bush added: "I think the American people support the concept of a strong intelligence agency. If they don't, they'd better."

He acknowledged the CIA's image "is not what it should be," but he said putting "a PR (public relations) gloss" on the agency would not be appropriate.

Bush said he hopes negative publicity swirling about the CIA will not mean a lower agency budget this year.

"I hope Congress will support the budget levels suggested by the President . . . I don't see any widespread effort to cut it."

The CIA's new director also said the spy agency can continue to do its job by using new measures aimed at increasing outside oversight of its operations.

"We should disclose and disclose fully to Congress," he added, "but Congress will have to protect (secrets)."

Bush said his track record thus far as director amply shows his intention to cooperate with Congress. He has visited Capitol Hill 19 times in 3 months in official appearances since assuming his office, he said.

Bush is making his first visit to Houston, which he still calls home, since his return from China, where he was the U.S. envoy. He addressed the annual meeting of the YMCA of Greater Houston at a Friday night banquet at the hotel.

Explaining at the outset to reporters that he would not comment on political matters or on sensitive intelligence issues, Bush declined to comment on only a handful of questions.

But he did note U.S. relations with Red China are not likely to change in view of continuing political turmoil there. And he also commented that the CIA, and the federal government generally, did not know Cuba's intentions in Africa before the outbreak of the Angolan war.

"We're still unclear what (Cuba) intends to do," he said. "It's very hard to predict."

Bush would not discuss prospects his own job as CIA director—a Presidential appointment—might hang in the balance in the November election. He said he was not concerned with "job security" in his new position, and he repeated previous statements that he has no political plans.

JOURNAL, Knoxville
11 June 1976

Disguised Charge

It seems a bit incredulous for a land like the Soviet Union, in which the secret police have their fingers in or on nearly everything and everyone, to accuse other nationals within their borders of similar affiliations. The claim by a Soviet periodical that three American newsmen working in Moscow have CIA connections appears to have little substance, if any.

Not only have the three individuals, the news organizations they work for and the U.S. Embassy denied the claim, but the only evidence the Soviets have come forth with are a few letters from Soviet citizens making the allegation. It does develop, however, that the Soviets may have reason to try to embarrass the Americans into leaving the country.

All three of the newsmen speak Russian fluently and have been making contacts with Soviet dissidents. That means they may have a fair understanding of how well the Kremlin is living up to the Helsinki agreement it signed last year—the one guaranteeing a freer exchange of contacts among people.

CONSTITUTION, Atlanta
11 June 1976

Ex-Spy Chief Defends CIA

By PAUL LIEBERMAN

With almost three decades as an official of the Central Intelligence Agency behind him, John M. Maury has developed a favorite saying to defend some of the agency's controversial practices.

"I think the President of the United States ought to have some options between sending a diplomatic note and sending in the Marines," Maury says.

The man who supervised this country's spy activities in both the Soviet Union and the Middle East adds that the "viable options" should include "political manipulation that is supporting a friendly faction; ... propaganda where the source is concealed; and perhaps supporting one military faction against another

Maury worked for the CIA from 1946 to 1974. He was chief of the agency's Soviet Russia Division during many of the peak Cold War years, from 1954 to 1962. He was

chief of the CIA station in Athens from 1962 to 1968.

For the last two years, until he resigned in March, Maury was assistant secretary of defense, first under President Nixon, then President Ford. It was on behalf of the Defense department that Maury was in Atlanta this week, addressing a foreign policy forum for members of the Georgia General Assembly arranged by U.S. Sen. Sam Nunn.

In an interview after the legislative forum Monday, Maury said he thought recent congressional investigations of the CIA's so-called "covert" operations were called for, but argued that the CIA itself had received unfair criticism.

"I think some of the covert operations were a big mistake," the former CIA official said, mentioning as examples the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba and the secret war in Laos. But Maury said many covert operations have not been the CIA's idea.

"All covert operations were directed or approved by

higher authorities," he said. "Virtually every objectionable activity was ordered by the president or by the assistant for national security affairs."

Maury said critics thus have been wrong to describe the CIA as a "rogue elephant."

"In fact, it had been highly responsive," he said.

Maury said elimination of abuses in U.S. intelligence operations should not come through a ban on covert operations. "The answer is not to elect a fool or a scoundrel president," he said.

Maury characterized President Nixon as an example of a "scoundrel," but said he thought most of the leading presidential contenders this year seem "decent" and "considerably better than" four years ago.

The former CIA and Defense department official said the civil war in Angola was a situation in which a covert CIA operation is justified. He said the area was not "vital"

to the national interest of the United States, but that there was a "legitimate national interest" in trying to stem Soviet influence. Maury said we might want to exercise our influence there by "non-tributable means."

Maury said the provision of military or financial aid to an anti-Soviet faction was a legitimate covert activity in that case. He also defended the use in some situations of reporters as agents. "I don't think either of us is compromised if a newspaper man shares information," he said.

Maury said he knew of about a half-dozen cases where newsmen were paid for information. Usually, he said, the newsmen merely did "passive observation" such as evaluating possible targets for recruitment as agents.

"This never gave me any qualms of conscience, because never to my knowledge did we try to influence what went into their own news reports," Maury said.

GREEN BAY PRESS-GAZETTE
25 APRIL 1976

More Openness Possible: CIA Aide

By MARY ELLINGBOE

Press-Gazette Staff Writer

"You cannot operate an intelligence operation in an atmosphere where anything that can be ferreted out is fair game for publication," a special assistant to the deputy CIA director said Saturday.

Maj. Gen. Jack E. Thomas said that "you cannot deal openly with intelligence operations without destroying the basis for it."

However, due to recent attention given the Central Intelligence Agency for alleged involvement in assassination plots, Thomas said that the public can look forward to getting "more" information sooner.

"One of the things we are going to have is a greater openness in the release of substantive information."

"But we have to be extremely careful in protecting our sources and methods," said the former Air Force officer.

Thomas has been a senior CIA staff member since his Air Force retirement in 1969. He had served more than six years as the Asst. Chief of Staff, Intelligence, at Air Force Headquarters.

Nearly all of his military career since 1941 has been in

the intelligence field.

Thomas was the featured speaker Saturday at the state convention of the Reserve Officer's Association, at the Downtowner Motel.

He made his remarks at a press conference prior to the speech.

As chief of the coordination staff of the Director of Central Intelligence, Thomas said he helps establish objectives on the nation's need for information in certain foreign countries.

This involves keeping track of foreign crisis areas such as world grain trends and OPEC investments, both of which would have an impact on U.S. security, he said.

For most of the 29-year history of the CIA, intelligence efforts have been focused on Russia, which is the only country which could physically threaten the U.S., he said.

However, in recent years the CIA has been taking a wider stance in intelligence operations throughout the world.

In his speech, he said he intended to emphasize what is in the future for the CIA.

One of the primary focuses will be the rebuilding of the agency's public image because of damage done by the

NEW YORK TIMES
24 JUN 1976

Senate Unit Backs Knoche Nomination To No. 2 C.I.A. Job

WASHINGTON, June 23 (AP)

—The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities approved today the nomination of E. Henry Knoche to be deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Mr. Knoche, 51 years old, who has served for 23 years in intelligence analysis at the agency, received 12 affirmative votes for confirmation after testifying at the first open hearing of the new committee. The committee was formed May 19 to oversee intelligence agencies. The three other members of the panel were to be polled later.

Mr. Knoche, who will head day-to-day operations of the C.I.A. as first assistant to its director, George Bush, said that he could conceive of no circumstances in which he could recommend that an agency of

the United States engage in a political assassination in peacetime.

He said that he believed strongly that the Government needed the capability of carrying out covert activities "to lessen the prospects of hostilities or other problems abroad."

But he said that covert activity comprised only 2 percent of the C.I.A. budget for the fiscal year 1977. The figure was more than 50 percent in cold war period after World War II, he added.

Mr. Knoche told the committee that he believed guidelines could be worked out for informing its members on covert activity. However, he said, the committee "is going to have to get some understanding with the White House" as to when disclosure should be made of covert actions under consideration.

The agency, he said, is basically "an instrument of foreign policy" and acts on decisions made by "higher authority."

"We are not the judges of when we employ covert action," he said.

munist mood which prevailed in the U.S. during those years.

Another focus will be "demonstrating you can maintain a secret intelligence program in an open society. We're convinced we can and will," he said.

Third will be proving to the public that not all aspects of a successful intelligence operation can be made public, he said.

agency's implication in assassination plots.

He defended the CIA implication in plots against Congolese leader Patrice Lumumba, Cuban Premier Fidel Castro and Chilean President Salvador Allende, saying that the plots are all history now.

Thomas said that the public would be able to better understand why those plots occurred if it could put itself into the powerfully anti-Com-

JOURNAL & COURIER
Lafayette, Ind.
23 May 1976

An attack on credibility

By BERNARD P. LYONS
Editor of the Journal and Courier

George Bush, Central Intelligence Agency director, got a few boos and hisses and a bit of squirms of embarrassment recently when he told the Overseas Press club that he'd like to have journalists continue to feed information to the CIA.

The statement indicated how far removed from reality the CIA and Bush remain after revelation in recent Congressional hearings and elsewhere that the CIA and FBI have used newspaper reporters as informants.

The chagrin that met Bush's remarks at the Overseas Press club was generated by several factors. One, that certain newspaper and other media reporters had compromised their professional positions by serving as informants. Two, that the isolated instances of such informing has created the impression that such spying was widespread. Three, that Bush had the temerity to bring up such an embarrassing topic at a gathering of newspaper people. Four, that Bush still has no concept that there's anything at all wrong with such practice — that, indeed, the "crime" was in being discovered.

For many years, we've been told that Soviet diplomatic representatives in this country, Soviet commercial representatives and newsmen for the Russian agency Tass invariably lead a double life; that they also are members of the secret police, or spies, or both. Most people believed it, and still do. The Russians, in turn, have charged that practically every American assigned to diplomatic, profes-



Lyons

sional or commercial duty in Moscow is a CIA agent. We've scoffed at this.

Now, it turns out, the CIA has indeed had informants in jobs where no one has suspected it. Perhaps we should have, but we didn't. Those of us in the newspaper business felt, particularly, that while American governmental employees abroad have an obligation to pass along information to their superiors — information that might ultimately wind up in CIA or National Security Agency files — we didn't believe for a minute that there were newsmen reporting surreptitiously to the CIA. Such a link is completely inconsistent with the newsman's job of reporting information to the public.

The revelation that some newsmen — however few — have been on the CIA payroll has done untold damage to the position of trust and credibility that a reporter and a newspaper must maintain in order to perform their news-dissemination task effectively. A recent CIA report of an impending climatic change throughout much of the world presents a case in point. The CIA said that meteorological statistics indicate that the world's temperatures will dip slightly over the next several decades. This could cut crop yields in subsistence-level countries enough to produce famine, starvation and consequent political and economic upheaval. The CIA estimate might be a good one ... but the CIA's credibility today is such that few will take it seriously.

The same loss of credibility attends the reporting of newsmen who permit themselves to be compromised as spies and informers — for the CIA, FBI, NSA or whatever.

Rejection of informer roles for reporters isn't a matter of rejecting any larger citizen responsibility in a governmental system that may be threatened by the world around us. Instead, it's a necessary course of action to make sure the democratic system continues to work.

tricks type of spying by the Washington Post.

Have we forgotten how recently the FBI and the CIA have been attacked, censured, and restricted for the very same acts of illegality? Do we now permit others to take over where our government agencies were compelled to stop? In this case the media? May they commit deliberate violations of our First Amendment and use any questionable means to justify the end, no matter how desirable the end may be, as in the Hays case?

Are we brain-washed? If so, there may be some consolation in remembering that any individual or agency, grown too powerful and arrogant, sooner or later digs its own grave. Maidi Pritchard

NEW YORK TIMES
17 June 1976

HIRING OF NEWSMEN BY C.I.A. TO BE TOPIC

Representatives of the National News Council and the Central Intelligence Agency will meet next Thursday in an attempt to clarify the council's position on employment of journalists by the intelligence community, the council's chairman, Stanley H. Fudd, announced yesterday.

Mr. Fudd said two council members, William A. Rusher and R. Peter Strauss, and the associate director, Ned Schnurman, would confer with aides of the C.I.A. director, George Bush, who are authorized to speak for him. The meeting will be held at McLean, Va.

The purpose of the meeting, Mr. Fudd said, is "not to seek the names of individuals who may be, or may have been employed by the C.I.A., but to obtain a clearer exposition of existing relationships and the portent those relationships might hold for a free press in a free society."

The meeting requested by the council, was arranged as a result of correspondence between Mr. Fudd and Mr. Bush, Mr. Schnurman said.

At the council's regular meeting this week, Richard S. Salant, president of CBS News, was elected a member. A change in the group's bylaws has increased the council membership from 15 to 18 and Mr. Salant is the first to be selected. He was described as the first member to represent a national news organization.

WASHINGTON POST
19 MAY 1976

Atonement Voted For CIA Suicide

Associated Press

The Senate passed without debate yesterday a bill providing \$1,250,000 to the family of an Army chemist who committed suicide after being given LSD without his knowledge as part of a CIA drug experiment.

Dr. Frank R. Olson of Ft. Detrick, Md., jumped to his death from a New York hotel room window in 1953, three days after he was slipped the drug at a meeting.

His death was described to his family as an unexplained suicide. Not until 22 years later, with publication of the Rockefeller Commission report on the CIA, did they learn the true circumstances.

THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE
10 June 1976

Should Post 'spy'?

WILMETTE—It is scarcely news when a sometime "Playmate" manages to get advance hype for her book on the Washington sex scene, or when she tells about the rigors of her "work" with the man she doesn't even like.

Nor is it news that an aging man has a relationship with a well-endowed woman young enough to be his daughter, or that her salary is paid by John Q. Public. Call girls on government accounts for the "accommodation of foreign visitors" routinely receive far more for less.

The real news is the silence of the public over the invasion of privacy, the phone tapping [authorized only by the publicity-hungry party], and the dirty-

GLOBE-DEMOCRAT, St. Louis
26 May 1976

CIA is called misunderstood

The Central Intelligence Agency has committed the big mistake of not making itself understood by the American public, William E. Colby, former director of the CIA, said here.

"We need a better way of informing the American people of intelligence operations," Colby told a luncheon gathering of the Illinois Bankers Convention at Stouffer's Riverfront Towers Tuesday.

"WE NEED to share the substantive information, but we also need to keep our secret sources, just like newspaper reporters.

"Then there won't be a surprise when a story is leaked."

Colby, head of the CIA from 1973 until last January, also said the American public has an incorrect image of the CIA.

The old image, he said, is one "of spies in the shadows stealing secret documents. Or stereotype of James Bond . . ."

Colby said intelligence operations have undergone a drastic change since World War II.

"TECHNOLOGY has revolutionized intelligence work . . . electronics, photography, computers . . ."

"We now know how many Russian missiles there are. There's no debate over the gap."

Colby pointed to the armed might of the Soviet Union in supporting his contention that a strong U.S. intelligence operation is needed.

"Concerning the importance of the CIA, you have to look at the past and the future. Fifteen years ago, the Soviet Union was vastly inferior (to the United States). But look at them now.

"AND IN THE FUTURE, several questions arise. Who will take over for Mao or Brezhnev? . . . And who's to say the two countries won't someday unite?"

"We have to know the world of the 1980s and 1990s. Knowledge of this sort enables us to negotiate."

Washington Post
12 June 1976

Leak Probe

Six reporters, including suspended CBS correspondent Daniel Schorr, have rebuffed initial efforts by House ethics committee investigators to question them about who leaked the secret House intelligence report.

Schorr said he was asked to appear next week. He said he replied he would not without a subpoena and, even then, "would not testify with regard to sources."

Schorr has acknowledged that he was responsible for publication of the text of the House intelligence committee's classified final report in *The Village Voice*, a New York weekly newspaper.

The other five reporters said investigators asked to "chat" with them about the case. All five said they refused on grounds that they could not reveal sources. None of the six was subpoenaed.

The five other newsmen are Jim Adams of the Associated Press, Nicholas Horrock and John Crewdson of

REGISTER, Des Moines
7 May 1976

Hear no evil

What is Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) covert action?

It is diplomacy and warfare by other means, clandestine efforts to influence governments or persons to support U.S. objectives, activity ranging from propaganda to paramilitary operations to assassination-plotting.

It is a foreign policy tool too often used by presidents to avoid policy debate. It is the task assigned to the president's "private army" to circumvent the ordinary processes of governmental checks and balances.

It is a function of the CIA which requires the retention of unknown numbers of standby "assets" (agents, journalists, guerrillas) — the so-called worldwide "infrastructure" that made possible thousands of covert actions in the past and will allow for more in the future.

It is intervention in the internal affairs of other governments, just one "plausible denial" step away from violation of international treaties and conventions.

It is something most members of Congress do not want to know about.

The Senate Intelligence Committee seeks to restrict the future use of covert action by increasing congressional oversight. The committee in its final report calls for the establishment of a new intelligence oversight committee (or committees) which would have power to approve and disclose the CIA bud-

et and which would require prior notification by the CIA of covert action.

The committee's proposal for strong oversight now is being attacked and emasculated in the Senate. Many of the critics are members of committees which performed so poorly as CIA watchdogs in the past. These members reject the idea of prior notification, of budgetary authority, of public disclosure of CIA activity — of oversight.

The purpose of the year-and-a-half investigation by the Senate and House Intelligence Committees was to show how the CIA and other intelligence agencies could be reined in, not to prove Congress unequal to the task.

CIA covert action creates a dilemma for our democratic system, for if a policy is right, why should it not be acted out in the open? The Intelligence Committee hopes to eliminate some of the more ominous aspects of the dilemma by proposing a ban against assassination, subversion of democratic governments and support of repressive internal security forces by the CIA. It does not reject any of the other reprehensible covert activity, most particularly paramilitary operations, but evidently hopes strong oversight will discourage or thwart such activity.

If effective oversight cannot be achieved, then there is no place in our system for covert action and all such activity should be banned.

ARMED FORCES JOURNAL
APRIL 1976

Scope of and Reasons Behind U.S./USSR Force Asymmetries

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY should have done the study which follows, but couldn't "because CIA would have objected," according to Lt. General Daniel Graham, recently retired director of DIA.

Graham praised this analysis of the Soviet and U.S. military balance at a recent dinner seminar sponsored by the National Strategy Information Center in cooperation with the Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies of George Wash-

ington University and the Russian Area Studies Program of Georgetown University's graduate school. Graham did not specify what objections CIA would have raised had DIA tried to release such a comparison.

First installment of the report, prepared at the request of Senator John C. Culver (D-IA), by the Library of Congress, compared the U.S./USSR quantitative balance and was printed in the March *AJF*. The Editors.

NEWS, Dallas
28 May 1976

Bush questions oversight consolidation plans

WASHINGTON — Central Intelligence Agency Director George Bush of Dallas Thursday said he is not sure the newly created Senate Intelligence Oversight Committee will result in consolidated gathering agencies.

Bush said "it might be the first step in the right direction," but added that he is concerned that he may have to continue to make numerous appearances before the various committees which have jurisdiction over the intelligence agencies.

"I've been in this job... close to four months, and I have made 24 official appearances on the hill, and each one of these requires a certain amount of prebriefing; each one requires a certain amount of follow up," Bush said at a Bicentennial salute to Texas breakfast.

"That is an enormous amount of

time to spend testifying before congressional committees. That's a fairly large number of appearances when you have the responsibility of running something as important as the intelligence community."

Bush said that he is "not overly optimistic that the creation of the new committee will cut down on the numbers of visits to the hill that the director of central intelligence must make." Bush said that he will work closely with the Senate committee, and that once committee chairman Sen. Daniel K. Inouye, D-Hawaii, has had an opportunity to get his staff organized Bush will speak with the senator about decreasing the number of appearances required of the CIA director.

"I'm not going to defend things in the past that were wrong... but neither am I going to dwell on those things that are wrong. I find it a waste of my time to go back and answer

outrageous charges such as did the Central Intelligence Agency give \$1 million to Tom Dewey in 1948 with a director appointed by Harry Truman and expenditures never in that range of funds for the whole agency," Bush said.

"If I answered every outlandish, outrageous charge printed and then picked up and reprinted, nobody would be minding the store," Bush said, adding that he does not intend to do that.

He said that if "somebody wants to grovel around and spend his time worrying about the excesses of the past, then fine, we'll respond, properly, correctly, through spokesmen. But as director I'm not going to waste my time when you've had a year and a half study by the Senate committee and a year and a half study by the House committee on spending all my time looking over my shoulder."

NEW YORK TIMES
9 JUN 1976

Nixon's Aides Held To Have Weighed Drugging Columnist

WASHINGTON, June 8 (UPI) —The Nixon White House was considering a plan in March 1972, to discredit Jack Anderson, the columnist, by drugging him so he would appear incoherent in a public appearance, a Senate committee reported today.

E. Howard Hunt, subsequently convicted for the Watergate break-in, lunched with a retired Central Intelligence Agency physician at a Washington restaurant a stone's throw from the White House in hopes of obtaining a hallucinogenic drug for the project.

Details of the plan to discredit Mr. Anderson, who aroused the Nixon Administration's ire by publishing secret White House transcripts revealing Mr. Nixon's "tilt" in favor of Pakistan in the war between India and Pakistan involving Bangladesh in 1971, were published by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in a special supplement to its final report.

The drugging project was dropped after it was determined to be impracticable.

The intelligence committee, however, said it "has found no evidence" to support Washington Post report by Bob Woodward, Sept. 21, 1975, that the Nixon White House had attempted to assassinate Mr. Anderson.

"However," the report said a White House effort was made in consultation with a former C.I.A. physician to explore means of drugging Anderson to discredit him by rendering him incoherent before a public appearance.

"This effort apparently never proceeded beyond the planning stage."

NEWS-TRIBUNE, Tacoma
1 June 1976

Russ get even

We received another example recently of the retaliatory lengths to which the Soviet Union will go, when a Soviet publication charged that three American newsmen in Moscow are agents for the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

The Americans, who have denied any CIA connections, are the Moscow-based correspondents for The Associated Press, The New York Times and Newsweek magazine.

The charge puts them on notice that their positions in that country are insecure, and that they had better not risk offending their critics.

One Soviet journalist has hinted that the Moscow charges were made in retaliation for a recent Jack Anderson column which said two Soviet newsmen in Washington are agents for a Soviet spy agency. And it would appear that the journalist might be right.

A spokesman for The Associated Press in New York put the situation into some perspective when he explained the details of the charge against Associated Press Correspondent George A. Krimsky. The publication had accused Krimsky of recruiting a young Soviet citizen to work for the official Russian news agency

Tass, then of receiving unauthorized "special material" from that agency with the employee's help.

The AP termed the charge "a complete fabrication," pointing out it would be "ridiculous to assume that Krimsky or any American correspondent would have the slightest influence on who might or might not work for Tass."

And, indeed, it would.

The spokesman probably put his finger on the real issue when he pointed out that all three correspondents are fluent in Russian, are able to talk directly with Russian people, and have been in contact with political dissidents in Moscow.

"Soviet magazines and newspapers have trumped up charges in the past against foreign correspondents in Moscow who have been able, through their knowledge of languages, to deal directly with the Russian people, particularly dissidents," he said. "They hope in this way to intimidate the correspondents and cut off news sources with the Soviet people."

The Americans have been warned they are treading forbidden ground. The next step could be their expulsion. It will be interesting to see if that occurs.

GENERAL

NEW YORK TIMES, WEDNESDAY, JUNE 16, 1976

WASHINGTON POST
16 JUN 1976**The I.L.O. on Trial**

When the International Labor Organization marked its fiftieth anniversary in 1969, its distinguished contributions to improving the lot of the world's workers and their families were recognized by award of the Nobel Peace Prize. Less than a decade later ideological polarization within the world labor body has become so intense that its survival as a socially effective organization is in doubt.

Whether it still has a useful role to play is being tested in the World Employment Conference, now in session in Geneva. Delegates from 132 rich and poor countries are addressing themselves to easing the insecurity and poverty that degrade life for a billion people, the vast bulk of them in the developing countries. If the final product is a collection of pieties aimed at papering over the substantial differences in approach among the market economies of the West, the Soviet bloc and the third world, the conference will do little to shore up confidence in the I.L.O.'s continued worth. It will do even less if the attempt at consensus collapses and the conference winds up in another round of recriminations.

The questions at issue go far beyond a rerun of the battle over seating the Palestine Liberation Organization, which monopolized the delegates' attention at the start. The disappointing aspect of that episode was not the mechanical majority that made a P.L.O. victory so predictable but the evidence it provided that the third-world countries remain more preoccupied with bloc politics than with concentrating on realistic solutions to problems that bear with special urgency on their millions of unemployed and underemployed people.

The United States has been incontestably right in leading the opposition to efforts at politicizing the I.L.O. The whole point of Washington's threat to pull out of the organization next year is to engender reforms that would return it to its past course of constructive accomplishment. Unfortunately, what is still lacking is any evidence that this country has a positive program of even modest creativity to put before the employment conference—one that would supply proof the United States is in Geneva for some purpose other than to say "no."

It is scarcely enough for the American delegation in Geneva to devote its energies to ridiculous position papers by the I.L.O. staff, which question the "trickle down" benefits to the poorer countries of economic growth based on computerized technology and the spread of multinational corporations. Instead of merely rejecting all third-world proposals for some intermediate technology adapted to the needs of rural populations with neither skills nor schooling, the United States should offer initiatives comparable in imagination to those advanced by Secretary of State Kissinger at the United Nations last year and in Nairobi last month.

The answer to polarization in the I.L.O. or any other international agency does not lie in rigidities on the part of this Government almost as iron-corseted as those that control the spokesmen for the Communist countries, all of whom parade to the conference podium with ritualistic testimonials to their success in guaranteeing full employment by decree.

'I've Matured,' CleaverBy George W. Cornell
Associated Press

NEW YORK—From what he says, he's a changed man.

Eldridge Cleaver, once a Marxist, a justifier of violence, now condemns both. Once a supporter of the Arab world against Israel, he now calls the Arabs flagrant racists, defends Israel and extolls the long Jewish struggle for racial justice.

"I've developed," he says. "I've matured."

In a three-hour taped interview in the Alameda County jail in Oakland, Calif., with two Reform Jewish leaders, and in letters to them, Cleaver said his ideological transformation resulted from experience with communism in Cuba and elsewhere and from living in the Arab world.

"Disillusioning," he called it repeatedly.

The former Black Panther leader, who returned to the United States voluntarily last fall from Algeria after seven years in exile to face charges of attempted murder in a 1968 shootout with police, has now become a Christian, according to the prison chaplain.

Cleaver said Marxist and Arab societies he previously had praised in theory were in actual practice harsh, manipulative and repressive. "I didn't dig it," he said. "There was no possibility of me relating to it."

He said returning to America was difficult because he realized his new outlook "would wreak havoc among my old 'new left' friends and among a formidable array of blacks who are imbued with a knee-jerk, Third World, skin-game ideology," but that his changed views were firm and wrought of "hard experience."

"On many points, the progressive movement in the United States is all wet, misdirected," he said. "The whole idea of settling political problems and arguments by terrorist activities . . . it's something that needs to be very seriously and actively combated."

"I'm 40 years old, I want to contribute to stability and I think I'm ready to do that now."

Cleaver, whose book,

**Says of
Switch**

"Soul on Ice," made him the darling of revolutionaries of the 1960s, first indicated his changed outlook, after his return, in a Boston Herald-American article in which he condemned "communist dictatorships" and "black African dictatorships."

He denounced the United Nations resolution equating Zionism with racism as a "travesty of the truth," saying "Jews have done more than any other people to expose and condemn racism" and that Arab countries are "among the most racist on earth."

In his jail interview with Albert Morspan of New York, vice president of the Union of Hebrew Congregations, and its Los Angeles regional director, Rabbi Erwin Herman, Cleaver said that in Algeria and other Moslem Arab countries, he found racial attitudes "more cruel" than in America, and far behind in ideas of justice.

"It was just amazing that such things exist—like, for instance, slavery," he said. "I saw slaves in Algeria. They have slaves in Mauritania. They have slaves in all those countries."

Earlier in Cuba, he said, "I found a kind of racist government that was frankly hostile . . . I quickly came into all kinds of conflicts with them. The reality was much different than I had projected . . . They began to accuse me of attending secret black power meetings . . . I left Cuba completely disillusioned with Cuban communism."

In regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle East, he said after the Arabs began using "oil as a weapon," he detected a shift in American policy toward Israel. "One could foresee if that trend continued, the American government was capable of sacrificing Israel."

He said he is now firmly committed to Israel's "existence and integrity."



Friday, June 18, 1976

The Washington Star

A New Reign of Terror?

By Henry S. Bradsher
Washington Star Staff Writer

WASHINGTON POST
20 JUN 1976

George F. Will

Irrelevant Communists

In a study written before the murder of two U.S. Embassy officials in Lebanon, a CIA analyst says the impact of international terrorism is likely to be more sharply felt by the United States in the next few years.

There is "good reason to believe that at least a few foreign terrorist groups are planning to step up their attacks on American targets abroad in the near future," the study says. "No matter how tough and well publicized a 'no concessions' policy the U.S. government maintains, it seems likely that Washington will be targeted by terrorist demands somewhat more frequently in the future. . . ."

The study warns that "sooner or later some (terrorist) group is bound to take the plunge" into using weapons of mass destruction.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS are difficult to acquire and handle, but terrorists might seize a nuclear weapons storage facility or a nuclear power plant and threaten radiological pollution to get publicity and back up their demands, the study suggests.

"A more pressing threat, however," it continues, "would seem to lie in the field of chemical, biological and radiological agents." They are relatively easy to acquire, so "the danger that they could turn up in the hands of the sort of ultra-radical or psychopathic fringe group that would have the fewest compunctions about actually using them is very real."

The study was written by David L. Milbank of the CIA's office of political research. A foreword to the document, published in classified form in April and just made public, emphasizes "that the approach adopted and the judgments advanced are those of the author."

Milbank studied 375 bombings, 137 hijackings, 123 kidnappings, 95 armed assaults or ambushes, 48 assassinations and 135 other terrorist incidents from 1968 to 1975, with a slight decline from a peak in 1973.

TERRORISTS have not sparked any revolutions or toppled any governments, Milbank says. But they have contributed to the collapse of regimes in Uruguay and Argentina, compelled some nations to violate their own laws by

Another precinct has been heard from. Comrade Gus Hall, general secretary of the Communist Party-USA, and the party's presidential candidate for the second time (he got 25,343 votes in 1972—0.3 per cent of the vote), has launched his campaign with a stirring defense of detente.

Notice of this event appeared deep in The New York Times, next to a story with an overshadowing headline:

Hair Stylist Tops Field
In Annual Fiddle Contest

I ask you: Is that any way to report on the vanguard of the proletariat, cheek-by-jowl with a fiddle contest? Well, actually, yes. When I called Manhattan information for the number of the CPUSA, the operator, who surely is one of the toiling masses, responded with a question: "Is that 'Communist' with one 'm' or two?" Her question illustrated the futility of both New York's educational system and the CPUSA.

The CPUSA has been relegated to what Communists call "the dustbin of history." But as recently as the early 1950s it received public attention out of all proportion to its importance, just as the John Birch Society did in the early 1960s. Both were examples of the specters a bored society invents for its own titillation.

The CPUSA's last chance to become consequential was in 1948 when many of its agents and sympathizers penetrated the Progressive Party presidential candidacy of Henry Wallace who, poor dear, was the last to know. If Communists had been successful, through him, in denying Truman the presidency, then it might have been possible to take them seriously. But with Communist help Wallace managed to finish fourth, behind Strom Thurmond's Dixiecrat candidacy.

It is not the least of the ironies of the CPUSA's history that it became something of a national obsession for a few years after 1943, after it had conclusively demonstrated its impotence.

American Communists have always been demoralized by the knowledge that they lack courage proportional to desire, and that not even their desire matches their imported rhetoric. Today's Communists know they are like the Viennese Communists whose assault on city hall was halted by a sign that ordered "Keep off the grass."

releasing terrorists out of fear of retribution, strained international relations and forced expensive defense measures.

The study singles out Libya, the Soviet Union and Cuba as the main supporters of international terrorists. "All indications are that (the Soviets) continue" to support Fedayeen groups

opposing Israel, as well as training and indoctrinating a wide range of "third world" revolutionaries, Milbank's study said.

But the study added that the sponsoring nations have found it "difficult to translate assistance into leverage or control. . . ."

The study does not explain the "good reason to

What Madame de Stael said of Germans always has been true of American Communists: They are "vigorously obedient" to every exigency of Soviet foreign policy. Thus The New York Times noted with nice dryness that Hall's remarks about detente "paralleled" recent Soviet press attacks on U.S. critics of detente.

Actually, one can almost admire the energy the CPUSA has invested over the years in rising above self-respect in the name of obedience. The Moscow trials (which prompted Alger Hiss' admiring statement: "Joe Stalin certainly plays for keeps"), Soviet duplicity during the Spanish Civil War, the Soviet alliance with Hitler, the partition of Poland, the attack on Finland—all of these drew CPUSA applause.

Lillian Hellman's anti-Nazi drama "Watch on the Rhine" was attacked by party critics in 1940 and praised by them in 1942. This revolution in esthetic standards was brought about at dawn, June 22, 1941, when Germany attacked Russia.

There are scores of reasons why the CPUSA is today and always has been a Potemkin Village, an empty, cardboard party. But not the least of the reasons is the CPUSA's marvelous ability to evoke laughter, as when a prominent member announced that he had "unmasked the open Trotskyism" of a rival faction.

General Secretary Hall, who presumably will rule Soviet America after the revolution, is an Ohioan, a bureaucrat lacking only a state. He and fellow operatives are gray reminders of what Thomas the Cynic says in Ignazio Silone's "School for Dictators": "No dictator has ever had trouble finding civil servants."

But were it not already as petrified as a dinosaur's skeleton, we would want to embalm the CPUSA, the better to preserve it as a monument to the leftism of irrelevance, and to that wit who coined a slogan appropriate for a CPUSA factional fight involving Jay Lovestone: "Lovestone is a Lovestonite." It runs in the family. When the French Communist Party recently decided to drop references to the "dictatorship of the proletariat," a disillusioned former member declared that the party "is guilty of Right-wing Trotskyist petty bourgeois deviationism of an opportunist, social-Fascist character."

targets will be hit more often. The implication was that the CIA or allied intelligence agencies had information on thinking within some terrorist groups.

IN ADDITION to Americans abroad increasingly being targeted, "the influx of foreign travelers and dignitaries expected in con-

nection with such major U.S.-sponsored events as the current Bicentennial celebrations and the 1980 Winter Olympics will inescapably afford a host of opportunities for dramatic terrorist action," the study says.

Practical considerations have so far deterred foreign-based terrorist groups from operations in the United States. These considerations "will retain

their present force, (but) there is a good chance that a few will succumb to the temptation" to stage incidents here. The study notes that the operations of American domestic terrorists, including their possible cooperation with foreign groups, lies outside the CIA's mandate.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission currently is studying the need for special safeguards at nuclear

energy facilities in this country. One subject under consideration is establishing a federal security force for nuclear power plants, instead of having individual companies and power authorities implement federal regulations as at present, and for the transportation of nuclear materials, now handled by private companies also under government rules.

The unclassified version

of a recent commission report said nuclear power plants are less vulnerable to sabotage than many other industrial targets that would provide spectacular results for saboteurs. But the CIA study says the threat of nuclear pollution from a power plant seized by terrorists "would be inherently credible" and "the publicity would be enormous."

Friday, June 18, 1976

The Washington Star

Reds Call U.S. Rights Unit Illegal

By Henry S. Bradsher
Washington Star Staff Writer

The Soviet Union has charged that the commission recently established by Congress to check on implementation of an East-West human rights agreement is illegal. The State Department rejected the charge.

Congress voted last month to create a joint legislative-executive commission to monitor the way provisions of the Helsinki agreement are carried out by European Communist countries. The Helsinki agreement, signed by President Ford, Soviet Communist party chief Leonid I. Brezhnev and other European and Canadian leaders last Aug. 1, includes pledges to permit freer movement of people and ideas.

Soviet Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin complained Thursday to the assistant secretary of state for European affairs, Arthur A. Hartman, about the commission.

According to a broadcast in Russian from Moscow, Dobrynin contended that the United States is trying "to assume the right, arbitrarily and unilaterally, to interpret" the agreement and judge whether other countries have fulfilled its provisions.

MOSCOW SAID that the U.S. commission "contradicts the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states . . ." It said Dobrynin's representation to Hartman argued that human rights provisions of the agreement should not be stressed more than other aspects of the document, which covered several forms of European

relations.

The broadcast said that the representation pointed out "the absolute illegality of" the American approach. A State Department spokesman said yesterday that "we certainly reject that."

The Ford administration initially was unenthusiastic about the commission, feeling it duplicated State Department monitoring. Opposing it would have left the administration open to political attacks, however, so it has gone along even though some officials privately question its constitutionality.

Now the administration is having to defend it against mounting Communist criticism.

OFFICIALS HERE see the Soviet bloc as being quite sensitive about having foreign attention focused on the way it treats dissidents, limits travel of its citizens and continues to take the attitude in control of publications and the flow of ideas that an intense ideological struggle still exists between East and West.

The commission is to have 15 members and a budget of \$350,000, not yet appropriated. The speaker of the House has appointed six members, with Rep. Dante B. Fascell, D-Fla., to be the commission chairman, and the vice president has named six Senate members. The President is to name one representative each from the State, Defense and Commerce Departments, but has not yet done so.

The commission is supposed to report to Congress. It is expected to provide material, along with State Department material, for the U.S. delegation to a conference scheduled to be held in a year by the 35 Helsinki signatory countries to review workings of the agreement.

WASHINGTON POST
24 JUN 1976

Reactor Case

THE SPANISH REACTOR case shows how difficult it is even for a well-intentioned government to be sure its support of peaceful power plants don't encourage other nations to make their own bombs. Three members of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission have just agreed that it is acceptable to sell Spain its ninth American nuclear reactor. But physicist Victor Gilinsky, in the NRC's first individual dissent in its 89-case history, disagreed. His stated reasons for doing so are instructive and worrisome.

No one accuses Spain, which denies any such intention, of wanting its own bomb. New technology, however, has made it relatively easy for a country, if it chooses to take the momentous political decision, to arrange for the reprocessing of spent reactor fuel into weapons-grade plutonium. By agreement with Madrid, Washington has the right to ensure that such military diversion won't take place if U.S. fuel is used. But if non-U.S. fuel is used, "safeguards" become the responsibility of the International Atomic Energy Agency; but the IAEA's safeguards are in fact less stringent than those the U.S. can impose. In this case, the NRC majority decided that the IAEA's "total safeguards framework" (the accounting and inspection procedures, plus political assurances) would be adequate. Mr. Gilinsky, focusing on the procedures alone, said they're not yet tight enough.

Now, none of the NRC members can be said to be insensitive to the dangers of nuclear proliferation: the opinion and dissent in this case went through 11 drafts. But they have markedly different approaches. The majority, noting that the loophole Mr. Gilinsky wanted to close for the ninth Spanish reactor remains open for the other eight, took the view that diplomatic and political constraints as well as technical ones press on Spain and that the NRC's reactor-licensing authority is necessarily only one of the United States' anti-proliferation tools. Working within the IAEA, to strengthen it, the majority thought, is desirable in itself. Mr. Gilinsky emphasizes the need to close every technical loophole that would be closed. He pointed out that to his suggestion that Spain be asked to limit itself to U.S. fuel for this reactor, the State Department had replied that it might not do so because the request would produce "protracted negotiations." The Department also said that U.S.-Spanish relations with that exception would be harmed.

Members of the NRC majority's seriousness. But we

entirely support the Giliinsky dissent. His anxieties about nuclear proliferation match our own. Nuclear reactors are being exported, by different suppliers, by the usual. No opportunity to curb proliferation can be passed by. Merely to find, by the NRC's standard, that a given export decision is not "inimical to the common defense and security" is inadequate. The implications and precedents of the decision must be given greater weight, if the record of old agreements

and the rush of new technologies is such that not every loophole can be closed, then that is no reason not to try to close those within reach. The licensing authority of the NRC is a limited tool; others must be employed. Spain, for instance, must be pressed to sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. But each available tool must be used to its maximum potential effect. That is what we take to be the urgent meaning of the Giliinsky dissent.

WASHINGTON POST, TUESDAY, JUNE 22, 1976

Peter Ramsbotham

Thoughtful Dissent: A Cornerstone of Democracy

From a commencement address at the University of Maryland by Sir Peter Ramsbotham, the British ambassador to the United States:

Our world today is disturbingly familiar, with loyalty oaths and guerrilla wars, with charges and counter-charges of treason and loyalty, spies and counter-spies. The United States has again, in recent years, faced the question of whether it is a punishable offense for the individual to follow the dictates of his conscience rather than the requirements of his government. The debate is a sharper one here than in my country: The British are an older, more tightly-knit society, whose strength as a nation has been tested from outside more often, century for century, than the United States. The story of your birth as a nation, and of the opening up of your vast continent, has illuminated more dramatically the qualities of determination, inventiveness and vigor inherent in the American character, which accentuate the strength of will of the individual.

Two hundred years ago, the signatories to the Declaration of Independence held certain truths to be self-evident. But behind that statement lay an assumption that every American was capable of perceiving these truths for himself; that each of them bore a certain responsibility, as an individual, for a continuous relationship with his government. What could not be deduced from the statement of principles in the Declaration was that there were specific political consequences that followed. It turned out that different individuals did have different moral apprehensions; and some of these apprehensions were wide enough apart to allow for almost directly opposite interpretations of the obligations of the colonists in the dilemma they faced.

Widely varying opinions about the obligations of the citizen are no less a modern phenomenon; indeed, no democracy is fully alive without such a debate. It is a question of the degree to which dissent is taken and the country's need for unity at the time. The par-

allels between Britain's war with the colonies in the 1770s and the American war in Vietnam in this last decade have been pointed out by modern historians. Both wars raised painful questions of judgment and balance, of courage and loyalty. There is a time when dissent and pacifism are intolerable, when a nation is fighting for its life. To encourage disunity in such circumstances can be treason. But there are other times when it is possible to afford the luxury of debate and disagreement.

What, then, is the criterion by which we should judge the behavior of the dissenter? By the fervor of his convictions? By the firmness of his courage? By the worth of the proposed alternative?

We are reaching out here to the extreme point of perspective, where a people can effectively pass judgment on themselves. But it is well to remind ourselves that the relationship between authority and those dissenting from it may, at a time of crisis, be a decisive factor in the survival of the community.

Philosophers and historians have pondered over these problems for millenia, and there is little I can add. But I would leave one thought in the minds of the young people here today—as an injunction to any would-be dissenters: that dissent (if you feel you must dissent) should be a contribution to, not a subtraction from, the strength of your society. There should be a firm element of thought and courage in the foundations of your action. Democracy rests on debate, not on mindless opposition. In order to preserve the freedoms that we have, there are freedoms which we do not have, which we must deny ourselves; the freedom, for instance, to escape from the interest which society (any society) has in you, as an individual and as a contributor.

If your argument measures up to the most stringent test you can subject it to, in its relationship to the truth and to the needs of your country, then follow it with all the courage at your command.

Eastern Europe

Los Angeles Times

Sun., June 13, 1976

Gulag Survivor Indicts

BY ALEXANDER
SOLZHENITSYN

Western 'Freedoms'

Your notions and mine about many events and facts are based on dissimilar life experience, and therefore may differ considerably. Yet the very angle between beams of sight may help us to perceive a subject in fuller dimensions. I make bold to direct your attention to some aspects of freedom that are not fashionable to talk about, but which will not on that account cease to exist, to have significance.

The concept of freedom cannot be grasped correctly without an appreciation of the vital objectives of our earthly existence. I am an advocate of the view that the aim of life for each of us is not to take boundless pleasure in material goods, but to take our departure from the world as better persons than we arrived at it, better than our inherited instincts would have made us; that is, to travel over the span of life on one path or another of spiritual improvement. (It is only the sum of such progressions that can be called the spiritual progress of humanity.)

If this is so, then external freedom is not a self-sufficient end of people and of societies, but only a means facilitating our undeformed development; only a possibility for us to live a human and not an animal existence; only a condition in which man may better carry out his assignment on earth. And freedom is not the only such condition. No less than outer freedom, man needs unpolluted space for his spirit, room for mental and moral concentration.

Regrettably, contemporary civilized freedom is reluctant to leave us this kind of space. Regrettably, in recent decades our

Exiled Russian writer Alexander Solzhenitsyn is doing research at the Hoover Institution in Stanford for a book on Russia. This article is excerpted from his speech upon receiving the American Friendship Award from the Freedoms Foundation at the Hoover Institution.

very idea of freedom has been diminished and grown shallow in comparison with previous ages; it has been relegated almost exclusively to freedom from outside pressure, to freedom from state coercion. To freedom understood only on the juridical level, and no higher.

Freedom! to litter compulsorily with commercial rubbish the mail boxes, the eyes, ears, and brains of people, the telecasts—so that it is impossible to watch a single one with a sense of coherence. Freedom! to impose information, taking no account of the right of the individual not to accept it, of the right of the individual to peace of mind. Freedom! to spit in the eye and in the soul of the passerby and the passenger with advertising.

Freedom! for editors and film producers to start the younger generation off with seductive miscreations. Freedom! for adolescents of 14-18 years to immerse themselves in idleness and amusements instead of invigorating tasks and spiritual growth. Freedom! for healthy young adults to avoid work and live at the expense of society. Freedom! for strikers, carried to the point of freedom to deprive all the rest of the citizens of a normal life, of work, of transportation, water, and food.

Freedom! for casual, trivial pens to glide irresponsibly over the surfaces of any problem, pushed forward in haste to shape public opinion. Freedom! for the collection of gossip, while the journalist for reasons of self-interest spares compassion for neither his fellow man nor his native land. Freedom! to divulge the defense secrets of one's country for personal political ends.

Freedom! for the businessman in any commercial transaction no matter how many people might be brought to grief, no matter how his homeland might be be-

trayed. Freedom! for politicians indiscriminately to bring about whatever pleases the voter today, but not what farsightedly provides for his safety and well-being.

All these freedoms are often irreproachable juridically, but morally all are faulty. In their example we see that the sum total of all the rights of freedom is still a long way from the freedom of man and of society. It is merely potentiality being realized in different forms. All of this is a subordinate sort of freedom. Not the type of freedom that elevates the human kind, but a precarious freedom which may actually be its undoing.

Genuinely human freedom is inner freedom, given to us by God: freedom to decide upon our own acts, as well as moral responsibility for them. And he who truly understands freedom is not the man who hurries to exploit his legal rights for mercenary advantage, but one who has a

conscience to constrain him even in the face of legal justification.

I think it will not be too much for us to acknowledge that in some renowned countries of the Western world in the 20th century, freedom has been degraded in the name of "development" from its original soaring forms; that in not one country of the world today does there exist that highest form of freedom of spiritualized human beings which consists not in maneuvering between articles of laws, but in voluntary self-restraint and in full consciousness of responsibility, as these freedoms were conceived by our forefathers.

However, I believe profoundly in the soundness, the healthiness of the roots, of the great-spirited, powerful American nation—with the insistent honesty of its youth, and its alert moral sense. With my own eyes I have seen the American country, and precisely because of that I have expressed all this today with steadfast hope.

LONDON TIMES
3 June 1976

Lonely men from the East feel they are neglected

US disappoints Soviet émigrés who cannot adapt to new life

From Peter Strafford
New York, June 2

Frustration is growing among Russian émigrés in the United States about the difficulties of adapting to life here. And the irony is that just as Soviet dissidents turn to the foreign press to air their troubles in Moscow, so they are tending to do the same here.

Last night four émigrés trooped into *The Times* office in New York and explained that they were desperate. They had tried to attract the attention of the New York papers, they said, even going to the length of parading with banners, but they had been ignored.

They complained bitterly that groups which hold huge demonstrations in favour of Soviet Jews and their right to emigrate, take no interest in the émigrés when they finally arrive in the United States. This also applied to politicians who talked a lot about helping Russian Jews to emigrate.

Three of the group were writers and one a former television director. Two of the writers, Mr Edvard Limonov and Mr Valentin Prussakov, wrote an open letter last autumn to Dr Andrei Sakharov, the Soviet physicist, in which they spoke of the difficulties faced by émigrés and accused him of taking too idealistic a view of the West.

Last month the two held their own demonstration, complete with posters, in which they accused *The New York Times* of systematically suppressing information about their difficulties.

The New York Times, they said, willingly printed the ideas of Alexander Solzhenitsyn, whom they described as "a man out of the past". It printed "the naive ideas of Sakharov and Amalrik about your world which they have never seen."

"But it conceals and will not publish our articles in which we write about things which many former Soviet citizens do not like about the Western world, and in which there is a

great deal about its flaws and defects, although they are different from those of Soviet society."

For 10 years, they concluded: "American newspapers have made proclamations about us, the creative intelligentsia, who are not free in Russia. We are now here in the United States. Why are we now denied the right to express our views in the pages of America's so-called free press?"

One of the main groups concerned with helping the émigrés is the American Council for émigrés in the professions. The council's staff concedes that there is a great deal of frustration, particularly among the émigrés with professional qualifications, because of the difficulty of adapting to American life.

More and more émigrés are coming to the United States, the council says, rather than going to Israel. Over the past three years, nearly 2,000 people with a professional background have arrived, and about one third are still without jobs.

It is possible to provide adaptation training, with money from Washington, for doctors and engineers, and even for artists, provided they are prepared to go into commercial art and advertising. But writers and television people are almost incapable of being helped.

Mr Limonov said he had lost the job he had at *Russkoye Slovo*, the Russian-language newspaper in New York, after writing an article in which he described his disappointment with life in the West. Mr Prussakov said he was afraid the same would happen to him because of their demonstration.

Mr Marat Katrov, the former television director, feels luckier in that he at least has a job as a loader hauling containers of drinking water into offices. But he points out bitterly that in Moscow he had his own television programme, and says that he would be prepared to take any job in television if only one was offered to him.

One of the difficulties of course, is that an artist or writer does not have a privileged place in American life, and is expected to rough it like anyone else.

NEW YORK TIMES
2 1 JUN 1976

YUGOSLAVS PRESS FOR CURB ON FOES

Strive to Win Cooperation of Police Abroad After New Acts of Violence

By MALCOLM W. BROWNE
Special to The New York Times

BELGRADE, Yugoslavia, June 18—A bomb explosion at the Yugoslav Embassy in Washington last week has prompted a new diplomatic drive by Yugoslavia to engage the cooperation of foreign police forces against opponents of the Belgrade Government.

Already, Belgrade's initiatives have borne fruit in West Germany, where close to a million Yugoslavs live as migrant workers. The West German Government has informed Yugoslavia that it has formally banned two Yugoslav organizations linked with terrorist activity in West Germany, and has seized quantities of arms from members in a series of nationwide raids.

But discussions between the United States and Yugoslavia

on the subject have been even more acrimonious and tense than ever.

Yugoslavia has charged in several notes that United States authorities, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation and local police forces, tacitly encourage terrorism against Yugoslav diplomats.

An Ominous Shadow
Tanyug, the official Yugoslav press agency, asserted that none of the perpetrators of various incidents involving Yugoslav diplomats in the United States had ever been caught or punished. Tanyug added that "the United States authorities are taking no measures to suppress this criminal activity" and that an "ominous shadow" had been cast over Yugoslav-American relations.

A high Yugoslav Foreign Ministry official was even more emphatic in a conversation.

"This situation is absolutely intolerable," he said. "It is not only your Government that encourages these things, it is your police and even your embassy here in Belgrade."

The American position is that while terrorism in any form is a crime in the United States, the mere existence of political organizations hostile to one or another foreign government is not.

In any case, the use of the

American police against political dissidents from other countries would face overwhelming constitutional and legal obstacles.

This American argument, however, has infuriated key officials in the Yugoslav Government, reportedly at the very top. Among those who have expressed special annoyance on the subject was Franjo Herljevic, Yugoslav Interior Secretary, who is the chief of police, intelligence and other security services.

The main targets of Belgrade's campaign abroad have been members of the Croatian Ustashi movement, a group that favors separation of Croatia from Yugoslavia. The Ustashi are regarded as the ideological successors of Croatian Fascist collaborators with the Nazi occupation of Yugoslavia, who supplied troops to fight against the Allies.

A History of Assassinations
Assassination as a political tool has a long and important history in Yugoslavia and the former nations of which it is made up. The best-known local assassin, Gavrilo Princip, provided the pretext for World War I by killing the Austrian Crown Prince.

The worst incidents in recent years have been the assassination of the Yugoslav Ambassador to Sweden in 1971, and the

assassination last March 7 of the Yugoslav consul general in Frankfurt.

This month, the Uruguayan Ambassador to Paraguay, Carlos Abdala, was slain by a Yugoslav named Jozo Damjanovic, who was reported by the Paraguayan police as having said he had thought he was shooting at the Yugoslav Ambassador. Belgrade regards the case with "utmost gravity."

There have been hundreds of other incidents, especially in West Germany, Australia, Canada, South America and the United States, mainly the nuisance bombing of Yugoslav diplomatic missions or enterprises.

A major difficulty governments face in dealing with Yugoslav opponents of the Government of Marshal Tito is in distinguishing between terrorist groups and others peacefully demanding the restoration of civil rights in authoritarian Yugoslavia.

In one of the harshest comments ever publicly made in this country on Yugoslav-American relations, the Belgrade paper *Borba* said:

"This is the last straw. If the United States really does not want friendly relations with our country to be upset, it must finally put an end to new crimes. It must promise this publicly, and also achieve this."

Western Europe

BALTIMORE SUN
11 June 1976

Zest is gone

United Europe limps along

By PETER J. KUMPA
Sun Staff Correspondent

Brussels—The post-war dream of a united Europe is all but dead.

For reasons as old as language or as new as the recent energy crisis, Europeans have lost their zest, their momentum and—debatably—their will to push on to some sort of federal superstate.

Nationalism guides Europe once again. It is threatened more from regional fragmentation than from federalism. In the United Kingdom, for example, the movement for Scottish independence is deeper than any rush toward integration with the continent.

Federalism still has its advocates. But it is an idea for the future once again. Unity is praised in theory, admired in word but ignored in the tough, daily political and economic decisions of Europe.

The old timetables for achieving union through economic, then monetary, then political means were once endorsed in principle by leading statesmen of all nine countries of the European community. That was in another era. The goals have been scrapped and overtaken by events.

The more modest proposals made at the start of the year by Prime Minister Leo Tindemans of Belgium have also been shelved. They are to be discussed later in the year at more European summits.

An idea or two may be picked from the Tindemans report. For the heart of the proposal on how Europe can keep the federal idea going, little more than talk can be expected.

The mood here in Europe's bureaucratic center is heavy with gloom over the federal future.

"We are adrift on the high seas. The engine has gone dead," said one official. "But," he added quickly with the one promising fact, "we are still together on that ship."

Some co-operation naturally continues. If Europe is not about to plunge into the visionary dreams of two decades ago, neither is it prepared to retreat.

The full customs union is expected to go into effect on

schedule at the end of 1977. The common agricultural policy remains alive despite surpluses and zooming costs. Some progress can be counted in the complex process of harmonization of economies.

The idea of one Europe flickers on because it is easier—politically—for the members to proceed with the rituals of co-operation rather than have none at all.

If a potentially unifiable Europe is adrift, it has come a long way.

The European community now forms a democratic, consumer society with standards up to and sometimes surpassing American ones. Europeans enjoy American levels of wealth and American-style problems of crowded cities and the soiled environment.

The Europeans do co-operate on a number of levels. In some areas of foreign policy, for example the United Nations, foreign ministers are more apt to take similar positions. At any rate, the idea of close consultation is improving.

The community has brought in Britain after two French vetoes. It has included Ireland and Denmark to join France, Italy, West Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg. And it has close ties with other European countries with excellent prospects to enlarge the community in the next few years.

A serious threat by France to break up the community was passed in the mid-1960's though the price for unity was a weaker organizational structure.

In all, the record has been pretty good. It is the future that is disturbing to European federalists.

The progress of European unity up to now has come in relatively easier fields such as tariffs.

The degree of sovereignty surrendered by any state has been small. No vital area of an individual state's authority has been threatened. Europe does not speak with one voice in foreign or defense policy, in monetary co-operation, even in such fields as industrial harmony or common transportation.

With sensitive areas left to negotiate, Europe was hit

both by the energy crisis and the worldwide economic turn-down. It did not take joint action to a significant degree to solve these problems.

Future joint action is hindered by the domination of the Council of Ministers that took command from the community's commission a decade ago. Technically, majority voting on the council is possible. In practice, no decisions are made without a unanimous vote of all nine countries on any proposal. The understanding is clear that if any one of the nine feels strongly enough about an issue, it will not be pressed against that country's will.

This veto power by any member of the community makes progress difficult and uncertain. The best example lies in implementing the agreement to have a directly elected European parliament by 1978.

Up to now, there has been no understanding to update the appointed parliament of 198 members. And it remains a great uncertainty whether the July European summit will come to any agreement.

The French are sticking to the 198-member figure. The British would prefer to at least double the number lest a European parliament come into existence with representation too low for regions such as Scotland. A failure to agree on the size and selection process of a European parliament would be a serious and possibly a fatal blow to federalism.

It is not that the parliament has any great powers. It can dismiss the 13-member commission. It can ask questions.

But federalists count on a revival of the spirit of unity that could come from an institution that is elected directly by the people of the nine states and is not appointed by governments. In time, its powers might be expanded. In time, it may take a broader view of issues, a European view that governments do not wish to risk.

The lack of movement in the Council of Ministers is partially due to the fact that the individual ministers represent governments. And any close examination of the nine

countries shows that to one degree or another, each of the governments has weaknesses.

They may be coalitions as in the Netherlands or Denmark. Or they may have such narrow majorities as to fear taking positions that could endanger them in future elections. It works out so that a strong enough lobby in any country able to shake a piece of one government can block an integrating action of the entire community.

The hope of the federalists is that a European parliament will be able to rise above petty pressures to become a force for integration. France's Gaullists fear just that possibility.

Another hope is the new commission with a new president that is to take office in 1977. If the European summit agrees to the recommendations of Mr. Tindemans, then the president will be named early, perhaps in July, and allowed some leeway in selecting his commissioners.

As it is Britain's turn to name the president, the choice centers on Roy Jenkins, a moderate in the Labor party and now Britain's Home secretary. If Mr. Jenkins accepts the accolade, he may, as a confirmed and enthusiastic European, be expected to breathe more life into the body that proposes solutions for the decisions of the Council of Ministers.

Even if the fragile hopes of the federalists do come true, the outlook for solid progress in integration does not appear bright. The twin pressures of war and poverty are in the past. For many reasons, Europe seems willing to have the United States bear the major concern for security. Europe has neither the stomach nor the will to challenge the American role.

It would take the magnitude of an American pullout—a full one, not a partial withdrawal of troops—or another serious threat of war to turn Europe toward greater unity.

The possibility of one of its members—Italy—taking Communists into its government does not unduly alarm the community. The West Germans may fret over such an outcome, but other states are too preoccupied with internal disputes to show alarm.

Some Europeans scoff at what they consider unnecessary American alarm over the

Italian elections.

Some of this may be due to the continuing European attitude that the U.S. meddles unwisely in affairs on this side of the Atlantic. Through now reduced to modest levels, an anti-American spirit is never too deep in most Europeans. They remain determined to match the Americans in economic power in time.

The smaller European countries in particular—together with community federalists—have not been pleased with the tendency of the U.S., especially in the Nixon-Kissinger years, to deal with the bigger states like West Germany and France on an individual basis.

WASHINGTON POST

24 JUN 1976

Joseph Kraft

The Consequences Of Italy's Elections

ROME—Mamma mia. What a mess the Italians seem to have made of the elections held here Sunday and Monday.

But, in fact, Italy's long-range outlook is not so bad. Short-term difficulties, while acute, can be got over if—as a price for immediate help—the U.S. and its allies insist that the victorious Christian Democratic party abandon the hysterical anti-communism which has come to serve as a screen for corruption and inefficiency.

The truly sad consequence of the election was the unexpected triumph of the Christian Democrats. They arrested a previous slide, winning 38.7 per cent of the vote for parliament this year as against 35.6 per cent of the vote in the regional elections last year, and 38.3 per cent of the 1972 vote for parliament.

The main reason for this gain lies in the promise of change embodied by some attractive younger candidates, notably Umberto Agnelli of the family which owns Fiat. The anti-Communist drive led by the old gang around party president Amintore Fanfani yielded very little. For the Demo-Christians made their gains not on the anti-Communist right, but from the smaller center parties, attracted by the promise of reform.

The old gang, however, still controls the party. Mr. Fanfani strutted into the TV center here in Rome election night, arrogant as a peacock, to proclaim a triumph for "freedom over communism." He seems to have in mind a Demo-Christian regime that does not even talk to the Communists.

But the old-line Christian Democrats have consistently managed Italy's bureaucracy and vast state enterprises in ways which promote clients and thus foster corruption, inefficiency and huge debts. There is no reason to think they will, of their own volition, change now, and make a serious address to Italy's long-term problems.

The long-term problems flow from the post-war economic modernization of the country. Italy produces first-rate products, which sell competitively abroad. Exports make up a substantial part of Italy's domestic product, and they have led a rapid, though not solid,

recovery from last year's inflation.

But the Communist unions have imposed big wage increases on Italian industry. Italian wages have risen 168 per cent since 1970 as against 48 per cent in the U.S., 80 per cent in Germany, 110 per cent in France and 134 per cent in Britain.

In consequence, Italian inflation is surging, investment is almost invisible and the country has a tremendous external debt. Unless the problems of inflation and investment are solved, Italy will fall back in the international competition and sink gradually to the level of an underdeveloped country with South American-style inflation, corruption and (maybe) military coups.

The way to turn the economic corner is by an informal accord with the Communists. They would moderate wage demands in return for a Demo-Christian pledge to clean up the nationalized industries and promote private investment.

The Communists seem willing to go along. Though they failed to cut down the Demo-Christians, they also scored a big victory—34.4 per cent of the parliamentary vote as against 32.4 per cent in the regional elections last June and 27.2 per cent in the 1972 parliamentary elections.

The relatively open line of the Communist leader Enrico Berlinguer has thus been confirmed by victory at the polls. So the problem is to force the Christian Democrats to consult the Communists on an economic program even though they govern without them.

Which is where the United States and the European allies come in. They finance Italy through various arrangements which come up for renewal soon. Unless they are renewed this country will go bust.

So America and its allies have potent means to favor the younger Christian Democrats at the expense of the old gang by making a condition of any further help some consultation with the Communists. It would be especially fitting for the U.S., which played such a role in saving Italy from the bad, old Communists, to now save the country from the bad, old Christian Democrats.

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Near East

Tuesday, June 15, 1976 THE WASHINGTON POST

Many Arabs Are Blaming Washington for War in Lebanon

By Thomas W. Lippman
Washington Post Foreign Service

CAIRO, June 14 — With varying degrees of sincerity and rationality, many Arabs are blaming the United States for the unending bloodshed in Lebanon.

During the past month, government officials, politicians, diplomats, journalists and ordinary citizens in several Arab countries have expressed the belief that the United States is somehow responsible for the Lebanese tragedy. The charge is being heard more often since the overt Syrian military intervention of two weeks ago.

Washington's well-publicized role in relaying information and perhaps guidance to Israel about the Syrian move has given rise to the popular theory that the United States is supporting Syria's ambitions in Lebanon in the hope that the Palestinians will be crushed, which would aid Israel.

"I think it is time for the United States to make an unequivocal declaration if it is not guilty," an Arab diplomat normally sympathetic to Washington said this weekend. "Maybe nobody would believe you, but I think a clear statement would help."

So far, the United States has limited itself to cautious, almost tentative statements of endorsement for efforts to bring about a

cease-fire in Lebanon and stave off a major Syrian-Palestinian clash.

These carefully worded statements have usually been coupled with warnings about the risk that outside intervention in Lebanon may spark a wider Middle East conflict.

There is a tendency among Arabs to blame anyone but themselves for their inability to achieve the unity they all profess to seek. The Americans, the Russians, the former colonial powers, the oil companies and the Zionists are the usual scapegoats, even when there is no credible evidence of their involvement in any given crisis. Thus, it is convenient to find foreign hands at work in the Lebanese war, which is an embarrassment to the entire Arab world.

Events such as the joint U.S.-French naval maneuvers in the Mediterranean contribute to the belief that the great powers are up to their old tricks.

In Lebanon, the decision by Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger to send retired Ambassador L. Dean Brown on a peace mission is seen as further evidence of American machinations, because Brown was the U.S. ambassador to Jordan during the "black September" war in 1970, in which King Hussein crushed Palestinian forces and expelled the guerrillas from Jordan. The Libyans refer to the ambas-

sador as "that murderer, Dean Brown."

The case against the United States was stated in its extreme form last week by Yasser Arafat, head of the Palestine Liberation Organization, who accused Washington of "a sordid plot directed not only against the Lebanese and Palestinian people but against the entire Arab World from the Gulf to the Atlantic."

He said the United States wants to bring the whole region into the "American sphere of influence," a view held by many Palestinians who viewed with suspicion the month of improving relations between Washington and Damascus that preceded the Syrian intervention.

In Marxist-dominated South Yemen, students and workers demonstrated against the Syrian move, calling it a "new link in the chain of American conspiracy to liquidate the Palestinian revolution."

It is not only in the extremist or leftist countries that the United States is being criticized. Here in Egypt, where Washington has been in high favor, editorial writers who usually reflect official thinking have been saying the same things.

"Nobody would believe America's claims that all it did was to keep silent over the entry of the Syrian army into Lebanon," Mustafa Amin wrote in the mass-circulation newspaper

Al Akhbar. "The truth is that the United States persuaded Syria to move and advised the Israeli leaders that the invasion was in their own interest."

Some Foreign Ministry officials have expressed much the same view in private conversations.

The day before Amin's column appeared, the same paper, largest in the Arab world, blamed the Soviet Union for the Syrian advance. "Everybody knows that Syria is striking the Lebanese and the Palestinians with Russian tanks, missiles and Mig aircraft," an editorial said. "Everybody knows as well that the Syrian Baathist regime is the Soviet Union's cat's paw in the area, and Kossygin was in Damascus a few days ago at the time when the Syrian forces entered Lebanon."

President Sadat, in an interview with an Iranian newspaper, said "it has become clear to the Arab countries and to the entire world that I was right when I said 'hands off Lebanon.'"

He has strongly criticized the Syrian move, but has carefully refrained from saying what other outside hands he believes to be meddling in the Lebanese civil war.

Savak spells terror for Iran opposition

By a Sun Staff Correspondent

Tehran, Iran — With ruthless efficiency, the Iranian secret police are hunting down members of an opposition underground movement of Communists and religious extremists who only a year ago seemed able to strike at will through the country.

After several shoot-outs here last month, the police appear confident that they have broken the movement, and sources close to the dissidents acknowledge that they so far have not been able to regroup after suffering heavy losses.

The intensified police campaign has added, however, to the pervasive feeling here of political repression.

Iran's political prisons have become notorious over the past year with widespread charges abroad—and officially denied here—that they now hold from 25,000 to 100,000 prisoners and that tortures rival those of the medieval inquisitions.

Some Iranians, mostly intellectuals and members of the upper middle class, find the police campaign counterproductive, believing that it simply creates more opposition to the

regime. They point to the large colonies of Iranian students abroad who are organized in active opposition to Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.

"This brutal and unnecessary period of police repression we are going through now is turning some of our finest young minds against the country," a professor at Tehran University said.

"Each young Communist or Islamic Marxist the police kill now will mean 10 new recruits and 100 sympathizers in a few years."

Were it not for the intensified police campaign, a promi-

ment lawyer here commented, "these radicals would not have a real issue since the shah has gone further in his economic and social reforms than most European socialists have. . . ."

"But political repression is an issue that gets international attention and that, quite frankly, affects everyone of us who wants to think for himself. The government may call these young men terrorists, but they have more sympathy than is admitted because of this issue."

The ferocity of the current campaign by Savak, the Iranian secret police, puzzles many and alarms some here since the radicals have not threatened the shah's power base in the least or even been able to put together a concrete program able to attract mass support.

"I can see tracking these men down for their terrorist activities, like the murder of the two American colonels," said an industrialist, "but I wonder about the changes in our society and political system this police campaign is bringing.

"Frankly, we are in danger of becoming a police state because of a handful of terrorists, and foreigners say we already are. And I wonder whether terror and counter-terror by police will not simply generate more opposition."

Outlawed Communists and the more numerous Islamic Marxists, members of an alliance of radicals and religious extremists, arrested over the

past year have included not only the expected number of students but workers, farmers, teachers, young business executives and a nephew of the shah.

Total political arrests have been estimated by Western investigators from Amnesty International, the international commission of jurists, and other groups at 300 to 1,000 a month. Dissident sources here said the current police campaign has raised the number to more than 1,000 monthly, most not involved in the underground movement at all.

The underground opposition is not regarded as large. The number of active members was put by Western observers here at several hundred, possibly as many as 1,000; sources close to the dissidents claimed to have about 2,000 to 3,000 active members in their organizations.

Since January, 53 suspected terrorists have been killed in gun battles with the police or executed after trials before military courts. In mid-May, 10 were killed in shoot-outs in three northwest cities in one day. Later 11 others were killed in Tehran. The same week, 16 members of an extremist religious group were arrested in another city on charges of assassinating one of the country's religious leaders.

Since 1972, more than 300 Iranians have been executed for political activities, according to Amnesty International in London.

Large numbers of arrests

have been made since last October, according to sources here, with the result that most of the cells in the underground network have been broken.

"A year ago, the underground had very well trained, armed units that organized several waves of attacks, assassinations and other terrorist actions over the spring and summer," a senior Western diplomat said. "They killed at least six police officials, probably four or five times that in actuality, and three members of the U.S. mission including two Air Force colonels. They struck when and where they wanted.

"It took the police a good nine months to get on to these groups, but they have done so with a vengeance. Now the police have the initiative and the underground is trying to regroup, so far with little success."

Several sources close to the underground opposition acknowledged the effectiveness of the secret police campaign and said that members who had escaped arrest so far had gone into hiding and halted most of their activities. Many are said to have gone abroad, hoping to recruit new members from student groups in the United States, England and France.

But the efforts to gather more support and new recruits are hampered by the lack of a cohesive political philosophy by the various elements in the

underground, which has tried to ally anarchists, Maoists, orthodox Communists and religious extremists opposing Iran's headlong modernization drive.

Some of the underground members see themselves as successors to the moderate leftists who briefly held power here or to the powerful Communist-led Tudeh party that even 10 years ago could still put thousands into the streets in demonstrations that required troops and tanks to end.

But today's radicals find themselves without easy issues to exploit since the shah's "white revolution" will provide all Iranians with health care, free education, social security and worker ownership of industry.

The two issues left—the de facto military alliance with the United States and political freedom here—do not seem to move most Iranians, who instead are consumed with improving their own family's living conditions. The religious extremists denunciations of Western values fall on deaf ears—Western consumer goods are exactly what they want.

The radicals also lost much of their foreign support last year with the rapprochement between Iran and its neighbor Iraq, which had helped finance and train the underground. Iranian officials say the radicals are still receiving help from the Marxist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and from Libya.

Los Angeles Times

Fri., June 18, 1976

Peace: From Guns or NAMRU-3?

The Middle East is often a terrible place, a sun-baked arena of murder, brutality and destruction feeding on religious, political and tribal hatreds.

Today Arabs are killing Arabs in Lebanon, while their leaders scheme for advantage and power. Israelis and Arabs have killed each other in four wars since 1948.

Foreigners, too, fall victim to the indiscriminate violence that claims both VIPs and ordinary folk, young and old.

Just two days ago Francis E. Meloy Jr., the new U.S. ambassador to Lebanon; Robert O. Waring, an aide, and their Lebanese driver were killed in Beirut while on a diplomatic mission.

The United States and the Soviet Union say, often in identical words, that they seek only a "just and lasting peace" in the area. Yet invariably they undertake this quest in sending more guns, tanks and other instruments of destruction to their Middle Eastern clients.

Peace, it seems, will grow only out of the barrel of a gun.

But then there is NAMRU-3—U.S. Naval Medical Research Unit No. 3—a tiny component of American overseas aid at its best.

While violence and confrontation have claimed lives and grabbed headlines, NAMRU-3 has labored quietly and effectively for 30 years to help the people of Egypt conquer diseases and ailments that Americans know only through medical textbooks

or histories of the Middle Ages. It is a battle being waged by only a handful of American civilian and Navy physicians and scientists attached to NAMRU-3.

As detailed by Don A. Schanche, The Times' correspondent in Cairo, NAMRU-3 was established in Cairo in 1946 with an assignment that sought to break an unending cycle of misery and death in one of the oldest nations in the world: "Conduct medical research and development concerning the infectious diseases endemic to your area."

Since then, Schanche reported, NAMRU-3 has virtually eliminated typhus and undulant fever from Egypt and adjacent areas. It has discovered new treatments for cholera and some forms of encephalitis and other diseases. It has engaged in fruitful research in the transmission of diseases by animals and insects, and has set up the best medical library in the Middle East.

Its work has been untouched by the turbulence of the Arab-Israeli conflict that has made the United States a friend at one time and a foe at another in the eyes of Egyptians. Throughout the three decades of its operations, NAMRU-3 has been respected and supported by successive Egyptian governments.

Such gratitude is a supreme compliment that is all too rare for U.S. operations in foreign lands. If only there were more such operations, and the compliments they attract.

Africa

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Wednesday, June 23, 1976

Darkest Africa

To Americans the recent reports of riots and repression in South Africa are uncomfortably familiar, and our natural instinct is to apply American experience to the situation by condemning racism, counselling moderation and urging integrationist reforms. This not only fulfills the moral precept of the equality of men before the law, after all, but has also been highly successful as a practical policy in the United States.

In assessing the prospects of a successful multiracial democracy in South Africa, though, it is well to remember that the United States is an immigrant nation with theory and experience in striking a balance between assimilation and ethnic identity, and that it still has not resolved its own racial problems. In South Africa the situation is far more difficult.

The core of South Africa is the 2.5 million Boers whose ancestors started to settle Africa in 1652. The Boers are among the toughest and proudest tribes on earth. When threatened by British domination in the 1830s, they migrated inland where they conquered the Bantu tribes invading from the north in a series of treks and battles that make the winning of our West seem trifling. Later they took on the British Empire. Insular, fundamentalist Calvinist, and fiercely racist, the Boers will truckle to no one, least of all the hated blacks. Unlike other "colonials," the Boers have no place to go. They even call themselves *Afrikaners*—Africans.

The remaining 1.75 million whites are mostly of British origin. They, too, are typically racist, but because they are English-speaking, they can emigrate if the situation deteriorates. There are also 2.2 million Cape Coloured, the mulatto descendants of early Boer settlers and the aboriginal Hottentots, and 750,000 Asians; both the Coloured and the Asians despise and are despised by the other groups.

The principal antagonists to the Boers are of course the South African blacks, some 18 million Bantu, an intelligent and vigorous people. Their quality is suggested by the warrior reputation of the most famous of them—the Zulu. The Bantu are also racist, against the whites and against the other tribes. There is nothing, to say the least, in the history of black-dominated states in Southern Africa to suggest that a Bantu republic would evolve into any kind of democracy, let alone a multiracial one.

There is no need for an American observer of this depressing scene to abandon his belief in the morality of the integrationist model, or to falter in moral support to those South Africans, white and black, who courageously urge this course. But as a practical policy, modifying segregation cannot be expected to mollify the blacks or improve the security of the whites. The goal of an integrated society is unrealistic considering the disparities in culture, wealth and numbers between black and white.

One policy that might offer a glimmer of hope would be a sharp acceleration of the South African regime's "homelands" policy. Up to now the "Bantustans" have been little more than Indian reservations, but it is possible to conceive that they might evolve into real nations, steadily gaining in independence and territory until the white South Africans are reduced to "Boerstans." Partition is of course seldom a true solution, and in any event adoption of a generous homelands policy remains a slim hope indeed.

We will have to get used to the idea that the U.S. can do very little positively for South Africa. It would seem a most promising area for a policy of strict non-intervention, though domestic and international pressures will urge U.S. involvement. Americans will want to see neither racial equality denied nor

an outpost of Western civilization destroyed.

But what can we do? It may be useful to make occasional unfriendly noises, if only because South Africa is an international pariah. We have already embargoed arms sales, but South Africa can obtain all it needs from other suppliers. Other embargoes and boycotts would have even less effect, even if there were some "solution" a boycott policy might be directed toward. As for American financial investment in South Africa, it is difficult and probably inappropriate for the U.S. government to gauge how much it aids the regime and/or the Bantu.

The Russian-Cuban intervention in Angola demonstrates, it can and will be argued, the dangers of not finding a solution in South Africa. Alas, Angola teaches more depressing lessons. The Portuguese colony was among the most integrated societies in the world, yet it broke down into anarchy and white flight. Even with the whites gone, a racial war broke out among the three major tribal groupings and the Communists easily recruited one of them. No less can be expected in South Africa.

Violence in South Africa will certainly continue and probably intensify in coming years; we have just witnessed the latest skirmish in a 400-year war. The only comfort to Americans is likely to be the thought that if our experience tells little about South Africa, its experience tells little about us. What is happening in Southern Africa is not an ultimate statement about race relations for all of mankind. But neither will UN resolutions, foreign boycotts, or pious declarations resolve the historical and cultural forces involved. What we are seeing is a calamity resulting from immutable fate, a tragedy in the literal sense of the word.

Fri., June 18, 1976

Los Angeles Times

FERVENT REVOLUTIONARIES 'FEEL GOOD—WE WON'

The Cubans in Angola Want to Push On

This is the column that caused the expulsion of Georgie Anne Geyer from Angola.

BY GEORGIE ANNE GEYER

LUANDA, Angola—Beneath the once-gleaming glass tower of the Hotel Presidente, Manuel Abdalla of Santiago de Cuba leaned against a now-seabroiled wall. "Good?" he said. "Of course we feel good. We won."

Abdalla, a construction chief, is typical of the Cubans here. Contrary to reports, they

came voluntarily, they are enthusiastic about what has happened, and they want to go on to help "liberate the rest of Africa."

"I came totally voluntarily," he told me. "I'm a Communist, and nobody can make a Communist do anything he doesn't want to do. Wherever they need us, we'll go."

Talks on the streets of Luanda over a week's time with several dozen Cubans indicated several trends that contradict some of the previous reports.

First, the men were not forced to come, nor

were they criminal elements that Cuban Premier Fidel Castro wanted to get rid of. They are fervent revolutionaries.

Second, although all eagerly want to go home, they are not at all discouraged about being in Africa. After all, they say over and over, they won.

Contrary to some reports, they keep in touch with Cuba, and they send and receive letters from home. But there their contacts pretty much end.

They all say, for instance, that they do not know how many Cubans died. One put it "in the hundreds." They do not know when or if they are going home. Men like Abdalla are typical. He said he came in November and expects to leave in October.

Are the Cubans going to leave? Despite such indications as Castro's note read to Secretary of State Kissinger in Sweden several weeks ago saying they would be withdrawn, there are no indications of it here.

The Cuban men on the streets of Luanda have heard nothing of it and, moreover, many of them are quietly being switched to civilian positions. In the flexible—and highly effective—manner of the Cuban armed forces, men who came as soldiers, like Abdalla, are now listed as civilians. He, for instance, is now working in construction.

With this sort of transferring around, you can make almost anything you want of the numbers game.

But the Cubans also fulfill several other important functions at this point. Observers close to the situation say they are one of the most important supporters of Presidente Agostinho Neto's policy of biracialism against men like Nito Alves and Carlos Arocha, minister of planning and development. These men, they say, take a black racist position.

For these reasons, the Portuguese still here—and there remain still about 50,000—will tell you that they consider the Cuban Marxists their strongest allies. "We all say that when the last Cubans sail away, we will be on that boat, too," a Portuguese translator named Lucinda told me.

The Portuguese also tell you that the Cubans, under a black commander, put down a small insurrection in the black suburb of Prenda about three months ago when some blacks were "going downtown to kill whites." The Cuban forces are about half white and half black.

In effect, while many Socialist countries now have missions here, and while some Angolan officials certainly fear the special power of the Cubans, the Cubans have shown themselves to be both effective and discreet.

With certain exceptions, their behavior has been, as one Portuguese put it, "totally correct." Except for the officers, who have dollars, the average Cuban has no money at all and thus cannot go out and splurge on the local economy.

"I'd like to invite you to a beer," one young Cuban told me, "but I honestly don't have an escudo. All our money goes directly to our families in Cuba."

What's more, they have shown themselves to have an equally discreet but direct effect on the government. The form of Marxism being developed here, the call for volunteers to bring in the sugar harvest, even this week's flamboyant trial of the Western mercenaries—all show the special touch of the Castroites.

In short, it would be extremely naive to think that either the Cuban involvement in Africa or the African Socialist revolution is going to stop in Angola. Indeed, with their own trained people and with the support of the Socialist bloc, Angola is virtually sure to become "the" center of African socialism in the near future.

Only this week, for instance, SWAPO, or the South-West African Peoples Organization, opened its first headquarters here in Luanda and pledged, on this "new border" with South African-occupied South-West Africa, to increase the fight. The same thing is happening with guerrillas now fighting on the Mozambique border against the white Rhodesian government.

So some Cubans may be withdrawn and some may not, but that really doesn't matter. They can easily be brought back when they are needed in Rhodesia or South-West Africa—which they judge will not be for a couple of years—and, meanwhile, they are helping to build Angola.

What really comes out of the Angolan situation is the fact that the West could easily learn some lessons from the Cubans. While this handful of Western mercenaries, who come through here as paid killers and misfits, were on trial here, the Cubans, who could be considered "revolutionary mercenaries," have given a good example of how it should be done.

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
18 JUNE 1976

Amin accuses CIA of trying to kill him

Reuters

LONDON —President Idi Amin of Uganda yesterday blamed the CIA for an alleged attempt to kill him last week, according to a Uganda broadcast monitored in London.

Amin was not hurt when grenades were allegedly thrown at his jeep in Kampapa on June 10, but his driver was killed. Knowledgeable sources have claimed that the whole incident was staged by Amin.

East Asia

Thursday, June 24, 1976
RI

THE WASHINGTON POST

On U.S. in Discord

Aussie Addresses China—and World

By Ross H. Munro
Toronto Globe & Mail

PEKING, June 23 — Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser has told China he has serious doubts about the ability of the United States to counter growing Soviet power, because of disagreement between President Gerald Ford and Congress.

Fraser believed he was speaking strictly privately when he told Chinese Premier Hua Kuo-feng on Sunday evening of his concern, but Australian functionaries mistakenly distributed transcripts of his remarks in the press room set up for the

prime minister's visit.

Fraser linked his concern about the United States to Soviet intervention in Angola, where pro-Western liberation forces were denied aid by the U.S. Congress. The prime minister said he believed the conflict between Congress and the President on foreign policy "materially contributed to Soviet intervention in Angola and the belief that there would not be a reaction from the United States."

"Some years ago, there were six or eight significant leaders in Congress and if a

President had their support, he would be assured of the support of the Congress in certain policies. There is now a risk of the effectiveness of U.S. foreign policy being reduced very severely because of the difference between Congress and the executive."

Fraser then touched on the strategic situation in the Indian Ocean, saying he wanted the United States to counter growing Soviet naval power there. If there is no U.S. Naval presence there, he said, "It would become a Russian sea and I do not believe it is in our interest or in the interests of Southeast Asia."

The Australian prime minister also expressed concern that Vietnam might play the same surrogate role for the Soviet Union in Asia as Cuba has in Africa. "Because of the attitude of the United States, Cuba has

not found it very easy to be successful in an environment that is close to the United States, but with Soviet support found no difficulty in causing very grave problems in Angola. We wonder whether or not Vietnam might follow the same path that Cuba has. We raise that as a question."

Premier Hua was scheduled to respond to Fraser's points at a later session of their talks. The only substantive remarks of the premier carried in the transcript quote him as requesting that the press be told only the topics of conversation and the fact that the two leaders "had a candid and sincere exchange of views."

Fraser also said he wanted to talk at a later session about the role that Australia, Japan, the United States and China can play in the Pacific region.

The Los Angeles Times Tues., June 15, 1976

Clear Signs From China . . .

The Chinese people are being prepared for the passing of Mao Tse-tung. Chinese newspapers have lately carried pictures of the 82-year-old leader that give candid evidence of his increased decrepitude, in marked contrast to the usual practice of portraying Mao as alert, active and vigorous. The purpose of the photos is to signal the Chinese that the inevitable time of transition is approaching. That signal should also be heeded by Washington.

Sino-American relations have for some time been in a state of pause. The absence of movement probably has been dictated by the U.S. political campaign, and the reluctance of Washington in this period to deal with the outstanding issue between the two countries—American recognition of the government on Taiwan as the government of all China.

President Ford, in his last known official message to Peking two months ago, looked forward to a "normalization" of bilateral relations. That word means only one thing to the Chinese: acceptance of Peking's sovereignty over all of China. That eventuality has been implicit in U.S. policy since 1972. The unanswered questions about how to carry out that policy basically involve timing and mode, which specifically mean arrangements that can be made that would not constitute a sacrifice of Taiwan.

The model for future Taiwan policy has been set by Japan, which switched its recognition from the Nationalist government in Taipei to the Communist regime in Peking, while at the same time maintaining a close, growing and accepted economic relationship with Taiwan. The U.S. government would undoubtedly be able to follow the same course, provided there were assurances from China that it would not seek to win control over Taiwan by force.

The way in which the Taiwan dispute could be resolved, then, is not a major problem. But the tim-

ing of a new formal relationship with China presents a problem of perhaps growing urgency, an urgency dictated by Mao's enfeeblement and mortality. That problem is the focus of an important article in the current Foreign Policy magazine by Roger Glenn Brown, a senior CIA analyst.

Brown's central point is that the United States should move quickly to settle the Taiwan question so that it can strengthen its standing in Peking while Mao is still alive. If that is done, Brown argues, the influence of the pragmatists in the Chinese hierarchy who favor improved ties with the West would be augmented in the probably unavoidable conflict over power that will follow Mao's death. Delay, on the other hand, could work to the advantage of the radical and pro-Soviet elements in the Peking leadership who want to resume ideological hostility to the non-Communist world and end the Sino-American connection.

Brown's article is significant on several counts. It is a departure from—even a defiance of—Secretary of State Kissinger's policy of controlling all government-related statements on China, though Brown notes that he is speaking for himself and not the CIA. And it brings into the open a matter of some delicacy in Washington: the U.S. interest in keeping China and Russia on less-than-friendly terms. Whatever can be done to bolster the position of the moderates in China will serve that interest.

No one can foretell what the succession in China will involve, what balance of forces will emerge. But it is plausible that the United States may have some ability at least to influence the course of events, through actions that would support the policies of Peking's moderate leaders while simultaneously serving its own interests. But the time to act in behalf of that goal may be running out, as Mao's long tenure nears its end.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, JUNE 21, 1976

Normalizing Relations With China

By Allen S. Whiting

ANN ARBOR, Mich.—The first Sino-Indian exchange of ambassadors since the 1962 border war proves Peking's willingness to mend diplomatic fences despite domestic political turmoil. On Oct. 22, 1975, an incident on the disputed Himalayan frontier resulted in two Indian dead. However, the subsequent death of Premier Chou En-lai and the toppling of his initial successor, the then Vice Premier, Teng Hsiao-ping, did not prevent New Delhi from improving relations with its northern neighbor.

This should encourage President Ford and Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger to negotiate the complete normalization of relations with China before the death of Chairman Mao Tse-tung further complicates the political scene in Peking.

The failure to establish full diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China is damaging Sino-American détente. Considerable evidence exists that the pace of normalization has fallen far short of what Peking had anticipated.

In 1975, intimations of Chinese irritation became apparent. First voiced in unofficial conversations, they became open on the eve of President Ford's visit last December. The main problem is our relationship with Taiwan. Our diplomatic recognition and defense commitment are incompatible with the understandings reached in the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué at the time of Richard M. Nixon's China visit as President.

These understandings implied that with the end of the Indochina war and a tacit agreement by Peking not to use force against Taiwan, the United States would disengage militarily from the island, dissolve the defense treaty, and

move toward full diplomatic relations with China.

The issue for all concerned with Taiwan's future may be posed in this way: Can the American sense of moral obligation and our allies' sense of United States reliability be sufficiently met by an arrangement whereby we explicitly renounce a commitment to use force against force in exchange for a tacit commitment by Peking not to use force?

Most proposals that meet the needs of United States moral concern and our Asian allies' security concerns fall short of what is acceptable to Peking. Any formal pledge of outside defense assistance is incompatible with Peking's insistence—as expressed in the Shanghai Communiqué—that the "liberation of Taiwan" is China's internal affair.

However, what Peking terms "the Japanese formula" provides a solution to the impasse. This would involve termination of our defense treaty and all formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan while continuing to maintain trade, travel and economic relationships unimpaired.

Were such a precedent to be followed by the United States, our official expression of interest in Taiwan's peaceful evolution would be significantly reinforced by the tangible presence of many American citizens and considerable United States capital on the island.

Any violation by Peking of a tacit understanding not to attack Taiwan would challenge important interests whose influence in and on Congress could not be discounted in advance. In addition, because of Tokyo's concern over sizable Japanese interests there, joint consultation would undoubtedly produce an appropriate response to signs of an imminent effort by China to take the island by force.

To minimize the likelihood of this eventually occurring, however, our

position must be made sufficiently clear and China's tacit acquiescence sufficiently credible to provide the necessary assurance that Taiwan will not be attacked in the aftermath of American military disengagement.

Two underlying imperatives currently render the normalization of Sino-American relations urgent. First, so long as we remain politically and militarily involved with the Chinese Nationalists, good relations with Peking will be vulnerable to political opposition in China on an issue that strikes at the most sensitive nerves of Chinese self-consciousness. Not only will our bilateral relations be affected but also our interaction in other areas such as Korea.

Second, the Peking-Moscow-Washington triangular relationship is significantly involved. After the death of Mr. Mao, the present intense hostility between China and the Soviet Union may well diminish. If we have failed to complete normalization and remain tied to Taiwan's defense, Sino-Soviet rapprochement may come sooner and go further than it otherwise would.

Our competitive position with Moscow would suffer because Peking must certainly come to judge our intervention in its internal affairs as more serious than its grievances with Moscow.

Indeed, if normalization has not occurred before an improvement in Sino-Soviet relations, it may be more difficult for the United States to elicit tacit acceptance of the desired formulations concerning the necessity for peaceful resolution of the Taiwan problem.

Allen S. Whiting, consultant on China affairs to Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger between 1969 and 1973, is professor of political science at the University of Michigan.

Latin America

KANSAS CITY STAR

25 May 1976

Spy Jubilee in Cuba

A great fiesta is planned for June 6 in Cuba honoring the nation's "secret agents and counterspies." The event will commemorate the 15th anniversary of the interior ministry which is in charge of internal security.

It is a peculiar arrogance of strong totalitarian regimes to not only glorify their instruments of terror and oppression but to positively put them on parade. Thus in Nazi Germany the Gestapo wore the most dramatic uniforms and were glamorized at every opportunity. In the Soviet Union the vast bureaucracy of "security" that encompasses the labor and prison camps, the spy agencies and ordinary police, is one big family dedicated to the service and advancement of the state.

In Cuba politics is organized on the

block leader system which lends itself admirably to the type of informant network that can send men and women to the Isle of Pines. If Jose hasn't been showing up at the regular meeting to praise the Maximum Leader and the Cuban people's steady and courageous journey along the path to socialism, then something must be wrong with Jose. In a dictatorship it is considered admirable to inform on your friends and relatives if disloyalty is suspected. It may lead to the firing squad or interrogation in some police basement. But it is for the common good.

The frolic announced by Havana will commemorate Cuban security's victories over the American Central Intelligence Agency which was "foiled in its efforts to assassinate Fidel Castro and overthrow his regime."

Thus the poor CIA, whose mistakes become general knowledge and whose triumphs must remain unknown, is denounced both at home and abroad. The life of a spy is never easy and it must be particularly trying in a democracy where praise and credit are given anonymously but where blame and disgrace can be very public.

Even the most dedicated CIA agent must look at the approaching festivities in Havana where his deadly enemies will be garlanded with blossoms and feel a slight stirring of envy. But that is one of the prices of working for a democracy. What is regarded as a heinous overstepping of bounds here would be seen as clever police work in Havana or Moscow. A country is known by its heroes.

WASHINGTON POST

21 JUN 1976

An Uruguayan Friend Lost by U.S. Policies

By Lewis H. Diuguid

Washington Post Staff Writer

"I am a good example of the results of a policy clearly conducted to lose friends," said an exiled Uruguayan leader who was once considered a friend of the United States in Latin America.

He is now in Washington to denounce U.S. policy in the hemisphere before a congressional committee.

Ex-Sen. Wilson Ferreira Aldunate, who narrowly missed election to the presidency in 1971, accused the State Department of keeping afloat the military regime that shut down democracy in Uruguay three years ago.

Wilson Ferreira, 57, is a strong nationalist who nevertheless is proud to have been named after the American president, Woodrow Wilson. Easily as eloquent a speaker as Fidel Castro but poles apart from him politically, he is now so embittered against U.S. policy that he sees a possible American contribution to the assassination of a fellow exiled ex-senator, Zelmor Michelini, in Argentina last month.

"I don't say that Michelini would have lived but for the U.S. action," Ferreira said in an interview, "but yes it im-

peded his being saved."

By Ferrera's account, when Michelini sought a visa to come here last year—also to question U.S. policy before congressional committees—the State Department flagged the Uruguayan government, which canceled his passport.

Uruguay stranded Michelini in Buenos Aires by informing the U.S. and Argentine governments and the airlines of the cancellation, said Ferreira, who offers extensive evidence that Argentine troops then killed Michelini and three other Uruguayan exiles at the behest of the neighboring government.

A State Department spokesman said that Uruguay, not the United States initiated discussion of press reports that Michelini would come here. The State Department replied that nothing would prevent the visit, the spokesman said, adding that there was no record of Michelini's ever applying for a visa.

In any case, said Ferreira, the Uruguayans would be alive today if the U.S. government had warned Argentine President Gen. Jorge Videla, when they were kidnaped—three days before their death—that the United States would not tolerate any harm being done to them.

Testifying last week before the House subcommittee on international organizations, Ferreira said he despairs of any such humanitarian intervention:

"All we want is to be left alone. Our countrymen are struggling in all possible ways for the defense of the principles, ideals and way of life that our country took from the Constitution of the United States.

"Not one of us could ever understand that the immense weight of the same nation that defined those ideals 200 years ago, and today celebrates them with joy, could continue to be given in support for the enemies of our people."

Ferreira also charged in the interview that Assistant Secretary of State Robert J. McCloskey had misrepresented the status of Uruguayan human rights in a letter intended to convince Congress that violations had diminished.

McCloskey's letter to subcommittee chairman Donald M. Fraser (D-Minn.) quoted the International Commission of Jurists as saying Uruguay is "doing everything possible to reduce the risk of mistreatment of political prisoners."

The commission's secretary general responded, however, that the quote was taken out of context and

that the report in fact documented continuing human-rights violations.

Fraser, agreeing with Ferreira's charge, said, "The U.S. government is trying to mislead Congress on the question of human rights in Uruguay."

McCloskey said that while he signed the letter as the State Department liaison with Congress, it was prepared by other officials and he was not yet prepared to respond.

The U.S. House of Representatives voted last week to cut off military aid to Uruguay because of human-rights violations there.

As for Argentina, Ferreira pointed out that the police had not even bothered to follow up his urgings that they come collect fingerprints of those who carried off the Uruguayans. In a nine-page letter to the Argentine president he concluded:

"When the hour of your own exile comes—as you can be sure it will, General Videla—if you seek refuge in Uruguay, an Uruguay whose destiny will once again be in the hands of its people, we will receive you without warmth and without affection; but we will guarantee you the protection which you denied to those whose death we mourn today."